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+Network Working Group                                         P. Congdon
+Request for Comments: 3580                       Hewlett Packard Company
+Category: Informational                                         B. Aboba
+                                                               Microsoft
+                                                                A. Smith
+                                                        Trapeze Networks
+                                                                 G. Zorn
+                                                           Cisco Systems
+                                                                J. Roese
+                                                               Enterasys
+                                                          September 2003
+
+
+    IEEE 802.1X Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)
+                            Usage Guidelines
+
+Status of this Memo
+
+   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
+   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
+   memo is unlimited.
+
+Copyright Notice
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.
+
+Abstract
+
+   This document provides suggestions on Remote Authentication Dial In
+   User Service (RADIUS) usage by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators.  The
+   material in this document is also included within a non-normative
+   Appendix within the IEEE 802.1X specification, and is being presented
+   as an IETF RFC for informational purposes.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 1]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+Table of Contents
+
+   1.  Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
+       1.1.  Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3
+       1.2.  Requirements Language. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  4
+   2.  RADIUS Accounting Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
+       2.1.  Acct-Terminate-Cause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5
+       2.2.  Acct-Multi-Session-Id. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6
+       2.3.  Acct-Link-Count. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
+   3.  RADIUS Authentication. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  7
+       3.1.  User-Name. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
+       3.2.  User-Password, CHAP-Password, CHAP-Challenge . . . . . .  8
+       3.3.  NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
+       3.4.  NAS-Port . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
+       3.5.  Service-Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  8
+       3.6.  Framed-Protocol. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
+       3.7.  Framed-IP-Address, Framed-IP-Netmask . . . . . . . . . .  9
+       3.8.  Framed-Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
+       3.9.  Filter-ID. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
+       3.10. Framed-MTU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  9
+       3.11. Framed-Compression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+       3.12. Displayable Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+       3.13. Callback-Number, Callback-ID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
+       3.14. Framed-Route, Framed-IPv6-Route. . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+       3.15. State, Class, Proxy-State. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+       3.16. Vendor-Specific. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+       3.17. Session-Timeout. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
+       3.18. Idle-Timeout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+       3.19. Termination-Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+       3.20. Called-Station-Id. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+       3.21. Calling-Station-Id . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+       3.22. NAS-Identifier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+       3.23. NAS-Port-Type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
+       3.24. Port-Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+       3.25. Password-Retry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+       3.26. Connect-Info . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+       3.27. EAP-Message. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+       3.28. Message-Authenticator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+       3.29. NAS-Port-Id. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
+       3.30. Framed-Pool, Framed-IPv6-Pool. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+       3.31. Tunnel Attributes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
+   4.  RC4 EAPOL-Key Descriptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
+   5.  Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+       5.1.  Packet Modification or Forgery . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
+       5.2.  Dictionary Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+       5.3.  Known Plaintext Attacks. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
+       5.4.  Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+       5.5.  Outcome Mismatches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 2]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+       5.6.  802.11 Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
+       5.7.  Key Management Issues. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
+   6.  IANA Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+   7.  References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+       7.1.  Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
+       7.2.  Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
+   8.  Table of Attributes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
+   9.  Intellectual Property Statement  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+   10. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
+   11. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
+   12. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
+
+1.  Introduction
+
+   IEEE 802.1X enables authenticated access to IEEE 802 media, including
+   Ethernet, Token Ring, and 802.11 wireless LANs.  Although Remote
+   Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS) support is optional
+   within IEEE 802.1X, it is expected that many IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticators will function as RADIUS clients.
+
+   IEEE 802.1X [IEEE8021X] provides "network port authentication" for
+   IEEE 802 [IEEE802] media, including Ethernet [IEEE8023], Token Ring
+   and 802.11 [IEEE80211] wireless LANS.
+
+   IEEE 802.1X does not require use of a backend Authentication Server,
+   and thus can be deployed with stand-alone bridges or Access Points,
+   as well as in centrally managed scenarios.
+
+   In situations where it is desirable to centrally manage
+   authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) for IEEE 802
+   networks, deployment of a backend authentication and accounting
+   server is desirable.  In such situations, it is expected that IEEE
+   802.1X Authenticators will function as AAA clients.
+
+   This document provides suggestions on RADIUS usage by IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticators.  Support for any AAA protocol is optional for IEEE
+   802.1X Authenticators, and therefore this specification has been
+   incorporated into a non-normative Appendix within the IEEE 802.1X
+   specification.
+
+1.1.  Terminology
+
+   This document uses the following terms:
+
+   Access Point (AP)
+         A Station that provides access to the distribution services via
+         the wireless medium for associated Stations.
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 3]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   Association
+         The service used to establish Access Point/Station mapping and
+         enable Station invocation of the distribution system services.
+
+   Authenticator
+         An Authenticator is an entity that requires authentication from
+         the Supplicant.  The Authenticator may be connected to the
+         Supplicant at the other end of a point-to-point LAN segment or
+         802.11 wireless link.
+
+   Authentication Server
+         An Authentication Server is an entity that provides an
+         Authentication Service to an Authenticator.  This service
+         verifies, from the credentials provided by the Supplicant, the
+         claim of identity made by the Supplicant.
+
+   Port Access Entity (PAE)
+         The protocol entity associated with a physical or virtual
+         (802.11) Port.  A given PAE may support the protocol
+         functionality associated with the Authenticator, Supplicant or
+         both.
+
+   Station (STA)
+         Any device that contains an IEEE 802.11 conformant medium
+         access control (MAC) and physical layer (PHY) interface to the
+         wireless medium (WM).
+
+   Supplicant
+         A Supplicant is an entity that is being authenticated by an
+         Authenticator.  The Supplicant may be connected to the
+         Authenticator at one end of a point-to-point LAN segment or
+         802.11 wireless link.
+
+1.2.  Requirements Language
+
+   In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
+   of the specification.  These words are often capitalized.  The key
+   words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD",
+   "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED",  "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document
+   are to be interpreted as described in [RFC2119].
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 4]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+2.  RADIUS Accounting Attributes
+
+   With a few exceptions, the RADIUS accounting attributes defined in
+   [RFC2866], [RFC2867], and [RFC2869] have the same meaning within IEEE
+   802.1X sessions as they do in dialup sessions and therefore no
+   additional commentary is needed.
+
+   Attributes requiring more discussion include:
+
+      Acct-Terminate-Cause
+      Acct-Multi-Session-Id
+      Acct-Link-Count
+
+2.1.  Acct-Terminate-Cause
+
+   This attribute indicates how the session was terminated, as described
+   in [RFC2866].  [IEEE8021X] defines the following termination cause
+   values, which are shown with their RADIUS equivalents in the table on
+   the next page.
+
+   IEEE 802.1X                       RADIUS
+   dot1xAuthSessionTerminateCause    Acct-Terminate-Cause
+   Value                             Value
+   -------------                     --------------------
+   SupplicantLogoff(1)               User Request (1)
+   portFailure(2)                    Lost Carrier (2)
+   SupplicantRestart(3)              Supplicant Restart (19)
+   reauthFailed(4)                   Reauthentication Failure (20)
+   authControlForceUnauth(5)         Admin Reset (6)
+   portReInit(6)                     Port Reinitialized (21)
+   portAdminDisabled(7)              Port Administratively Disabled (22)
+   notTerminatedYet(999)             N/A
+
+   When using this attribute, the User Request (1) termination cause
+   corresponds to the situation in which the session terminated due to
+   an EAPOL-Logoff received from the Supplicant.  When a session is
+   moved due to roaming, the EAPOL state machines will treat this as a
+   Supplicant Logoff.
+
+   A Lost Carrier (2) termination cause indicates session termination
+   due to loss of physical connectivity for reasons other than roaming
+   between Access Points.  For example, if the Supplicant disconnects a
+   point-to-point LAN connection, or moves out of range of an Access
+   Point, this termination cause is used.  Lost Carrier (2) therefore
+   equates to a Port Disabled condition in the EAPOL state machines.
+
+   A Supplicant Restart (19) termination cause indicates
+   re-initialization of the Supplicant state machines.
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 5]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   A Reauthentication Failure (20) termination cause indicates that a
+   previously authenticated Supplicant has failed to re-authenticate
+   successfully following expiry of the re-authentication timer or
+   explicit re-authentication request by management action.
+
+   Within [IEEE80211], periodic re-authentication may be useful in
+   preventing reuse of an initialization vector with a given key.  Since
+   successful re-authentication does not result in termination of the
+   session, accounting packets are not sent as a result of
+   re-authentication unless the status of the session changes.  For
+   example:
+
+   a. The session is terminated due to re-authentication failure.  In
+      this case the Reauthentication Failure (20) termination cause is
+      used.
+
+   b. The authorizations are changed as a result of a successful
+      re-authentication.  In this case, the Service Unavailable (15)
+      termination cause is used.  For accounting purposes, the portion
+      of the session after the authorization change is treated as a
+      separate session.
+
+   Where IEEE 802.1X authentication occurs prior to association,
+   accounting packets are not sent until an association occurs.
+
+   An Admin Reset (6) termination cause indicates that the Port has been
+   administratively forced into the unauthorized state.
+
+   A Port Reinitialized (21) termination cause indicates that the Port's
+   MAC has been reinitialized.
+
+   A Port Administratively Disabled (22) termination cause indicates
+   that the Port has been administratively disabled.
+
+2.2.  Acct-Multi-Session-Id
+
+   The purpose of this attribute is to make it possible to link together
+   multiple related sessions.  While [IEEE8021X] does not act on
+   aggregated ports, it is possible for a Supplicant roaming between
+   Access Points to cause multiple RADIUS accounting packets to be sent
+   by different Access Points.
+
+   Where supported by the Access Points, the Acct-Multi-Session-Id
+   attribute can be used to link together the multiple related sessions
+   of a roaming Supplicant.  In such a situation, if the session context
+   is transferred between Access Points, accounting packets MAY be sent
+   without a corresponding authentication and authorization exchange,
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 6]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   provided that Association has occurred.  However, in such a situation
+   it is assumed that the Acct-Multi-Session-Id is transferred between
+   the Access Points as part of the Inter-Access Point Protocol (IAPP).
+
+   If the Acct-Multi-Session-Id were not unique between Access Points,
+   then it is possible that the chosen Acct-Multi-Session-Id will
+   overlap with an existing value allocated on that Access Point, and
+   the Accounting Server would therefore be unable to distinguish a
+   roaming session from a multi-link session.
+
+   As a result, the Acct-Multi-Session-Id attribute is unique among all
+   the bridges or Access Points, Supplicants and sessions.  In order to
+   provide this uniqueness, it is suggested that the Acct-Multi-
+   Session-Id be of the form:
+
+   Original AP MAC Address | Supplicant MAC Address | NTP Timestamp
+
+   Here "|" represents concatenation, the original AP MAC Address is the
+   MAC address of the bridge or Access Point at which the session
+   started, and the 64-bit NTP timestamp indicates the beginning of the
+   original session.  In order to provide for consistency of the Acct-
+   Multi-Session-Id between roaming sessions, the Acct-Multi-Session-Id
+   may be moved between Access Points as part of IAPP or another handoff
+   scheme.
+
+   The use of an Acct-Multi-Session-Id of this form guarantees
+   uniqueness among all Access Points, Supplicants and sessions.  Since
+   the NTP timestamp does not wrap on reboot, there is no possibility
+   that a rebooted Access Point could choose an Acct-Multi-Session-Id
+   that could be confused with that of a previous session.
+
+   Since the Acct-Multi-Session-Id is of type String as defined in
+   [RFC2866], for use with IEEE 802.1X, it is encoded as an ASCII string
+   of Hex digits.  Example:  "00-10-A4-23-19-C0-00-12-B2-
+   14-23-DE-AF-23-83-C0-76-B8-44-E8"
+
+2.3.  Acct-Link-Count
+
+   The Acct-Link-Count attribute may be used to account for the number
+   of ports that have been aggregated.
+
+3.  RADIUS Authentication
+
+   This section describes how attributes defined in [RFC2865],
+   [RFC2867], [RFC2868], [RFC2869], [RFC3162] and [RFC3579] are used in
+   IEEE 802.1X authentication.
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 7]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+3.1.  User-Name
+
+   In IEEE 802.1X, the Supplicant typically provides its identity via an
+   EAP-Response/Identity message.  Where available, the Supplicant
+   identity is included in the User-Name attribute, and included in the
+   RADIUS Access-Request and Access-Reply messages as specified in
+   [RFC2865] and [RFC3579].
+
+   Alternatively, as discussed in [RFC3579] Section 2.1., the User-Name
+   attribute may contain the Calling-Station-ID value, which is set to
+   the Supplicant MAC address.
+
+3.2.  User-Password, CHAP-Password, CHAP-Challenge
+
+   Since IEEE 802.1X does not support PAP or CHAP authentication, the
+   User-Password, CHAP-Password or CHAP-Challenge attributes are not
+   used by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators acting as RADIUS clients.
+
+3.3.  NAS-IP-Address, NAS-IPv6-Address
+
+   For use with IEEE 802.1X, the NAS-IP-Address contains the IPv4
+   address of the bridge or Access Point acting as an Authenticator, and
+   the NAS-IPv6-Address contains the IPv6 address.  If the IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticator has more than one interface, it may be desirable to use
+   a loopback address for this purpose so that the Authenticator will
+   still be reachable even if one of the interfaces were to fail.
+
+3.4.  NAS-Port
+
+   For use with IEEE 802.1X the NAS-Port will contain the port number of
+   the bridge, if this is available.  While an Access Point does not
+   have physical ports, a unique "association ID" is assigned to every
+   mobile Station upon a successful association exchange.  As a result,
+   for an Access Point, if the association exchange has been completed
+   prior to authentication, the NAS-Port attribute will contain the
+   association ID, which is a 16-bit unsigned integer.  Where IEEE
+   802.1X authentication occurs prior to association, a unique NAS-Port
+   value may not be available.
+
+3.5.  Service-Type
+
+   For use with IEEE 802.1X, the Framed (2), Authenticate Only (8), and
+   Call Check (10) values are most commonly used.
+
+   A Service-Type of Framed indicates that appropriate 802 framing
+   should be used for the connection.  A Service-Type of Authenticate
+   Only (8) indicates that no authorization information needs to be
+   returned in the Access-Accept.  As described in [RFC2865], a
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 8]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   Service-Type of Call Check is included in an Access-Request packet to
+   request that the RADIUS server accept or reject the connection
+   attempt, typically based on the Called-Station-ID (set to the bridge
+   or Access Point MAC address) or Calling-Station-ID attributes (set to
+   the Supplicant MAC address).  As noted in [RFC2865], it is
+   recommended that in this case, the User-Name attribute be given the
+   value of Calling-Station-Id.
+
+3.6.  Framed-Protocol
+
+   Since there is no value for IEEE 802 media, the Framed-Protocol
+   attribute is not used by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators.
+
+3.7.  Framed-IP-Address, Framed-IP-Netmask
+
+   IEEE 802.1X does not provide a mechanism for IP address assignment.
+   Therefore the Framed-IP-Address and Framed-IP-Netmask attributes can
+   only be used by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators that support IP address
+   assignment mechanisms.  Typically this capability is supported by
+   layer 3 devices.
+
+3.8.  Framed-Routing
+
+   The Framed-Routing attribute indicates the routing method for the
+   Supplicant.  It is therefore only relevant for IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticators that act as layer 3 devices, and cannot be used by a
+   bridge or Access Point.
+
+3.9.  Filter-ID
+
+   This attribute indicates the name of the filter list to be applied to
+   the Supplicant's session.  For use with an IEEE 802.1X Authenticator,
+   it may be used to indicate either layer 2 or layer 3 filters.  Layer
+   3 filters are typically only supported on IEEE 802.1X Authenticators
+   that act as layer 3 devices.
+
+3.10.  Framed-MTU
+
+   This attribute indicates the maximum size of an IP packet that may be
+   transmitted over the wire between the Supplicant and the
+   Authenticator.  IEEE 802.1X Authenticators set this to the value
+   corresponding to the relevant 802 medium, and include it in the
+   RADIUS Access-Request.  The RADIUS server may send an EAP packet as
+   large as Framed-MTU minus four (4) octets, taking into account the
+   additional overhead for the IEEE 802.1X Version (1), Type (1) and
+   Body Length (2) fields.  For EAP over IEEE 802 media, the Framed-MTU
+   values (which do not include LLC/SNAP overhead) and maximum frame
+   length values (not including the preamble) are as follows:
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                      [Page 9]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+                                        Maximum Frame
+   Media             Framed-MTU            Length
+   =========        ===============     ==============
+   Ethernet              1500              1522
+   802.3                 1500              1522
+   802.4                 8174              8193
+   802.5 (4 Mbps)        4528              4550
+   802.5 (16 Mbps)      18173             18200
+   802.5 (100 Mb/s)     18173             18200
+   802.6                 9191              9240
+   802.9a                1500              1518
+   802.11                2304              2346
+   802.12 (Ethernet)     1500              1518
+   802.12 (Token Ring)   4502              4528
+   FDDI                  4479              4500
+
+   NOTE - the Framed-MTU size for IEEE 802.11 media may change as a
+   result of ongoing work being undertaken in the IEEE 802.11 Working
+   Group.  Since some 802.11 stations cannot handle an MTU larger than
+   1500 octets, it is recommended that RADIUS servers encountering a
+   NAS-Port-Type value of 802.11 send EAP packets no larger than 1496
+   octets.
+
+3.11.  Framed-Compression
+
+   [IEEE8021X] does not include compression support.  Therefore this
+   attribute is not understood by [IEEE8021X] Authenticators.
+
+3.12.  Displayable Messages
+
+   The Reply-Message attribute, defined in section 5.18 of [RFC2865],
+   indicates text which may be displayed to the user.  This is similar
+   in concept to the EAP Notification Type, defined in [RFC2284].  As
+   noted in [RFC3579], Section 2.6.5, when sending a displayable message
+   to an [IEEE8021X] Authenticator, displayable messages are best sent
+   within EAP-Message/EAP-Request/Notification attribute(s), and not
+   within Reply-Message attribute(s).
+
+3.13.  Callback-Number, Callback-ID
+
+   These attributes are not understood by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 10]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+3.14.  Framed-Route, Framed-IPv6-Route
+
+   The Framed-Route and Framed-IPv6-Route attributes provide routes that
+   are to be configured for the Supplicant.  These attributes are
+   therefore only relevant for IEEE 802.1X Authenticators that act as
+   layer 3 devices, and cannot be understood by a bridge or Access
+   Point.
+
+3.15.  State, Class, Proxy-State
+
+   These attributes are used for the same purposes as described in
+   [RFC2865].
+
+3.16.  Vendor-Specific
+
+   Vendor-specific attributes are used for the same purposes as
+   described in [RFC2865].  The MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key
+   attributes, described in section 2.4 of [RFC2548], MAY be used to
+   encrypt and authenticate the RC4 EAPOL-Key descriptor [IEEE8021X,
+   Section 7.6].  Examples of the derivation of the MS-MPPE-Send-Key and
+   MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attributes from the master key negotiated by an EAP
+   method are given in [RFC2716].  Details of the EAPOL-Key descriptor
+   are provided in Section 4.
+
+3.17.  Session-Timeout
+
+   When sent along in an Access-Accept without a Termination-Action
+   attribute or with a Termination-Action attribute set to Default, the
+   Session-Timeout attribute specifies the maximum number of seconds of
+   service provided prior to session termination.
+
+   When sent in an Access-Accept along with a Termination-Action value
+   of RADIUS-Request, the Session-Timeout attribute specifies the
+   maximum number of seconds of service provided prior to re-
+   authentication.  In this case, the Session-Timeout attribute is used
+   to load the reAuthPeriod constant within the Reauthentication Timer
+   state machine of 802.1X.  When sent with a Termination-Action value
+   of RADIUS-Request, a Session-Timeout value of zero indicates the
+   desire to perform another authentication (possibly of a different
+   type) immediately after the first authentication has successfully
+   completed.
+
+   When sent in an Access-Challenge, this attribute represents the
+   maximum number of seconds that an IEEE 802.1X Authenticator should
+   wait for an EAP-Response before retransmitting.  In this case, the
+   Session-Timeout attribute is used to load the suppTimeout constant
+   within the backend state machine of IEEE 802.1X.
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 11]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+3.18.  Idle-Timeout
+
+   The Idle-Timeout attribute is described in [RFC2865].  For IEEE 802
+   media other than 802.11 the media are always on.  As a result the
+   Idle-Timeout attribute is typically only used with wireless media
+   such as IEEE 802.11.  It is possible for a wireless device to wander
+   out of range of all Access Points.  In this case, the Idle-Timeout
+   attribute indicates the maximum time that a wireless device may
+   remain idle.
+
+3.19.  Termination-Action
+
+   This attribute indicates what action should be taken when the service
+   is completed.  The value RADIUS-Request (1) indicates that re-
+   authentication should occur on expiration of the Session-Time.  The
+   value Default (0) indicates that the session should terminate.
+
+3.20.  Called-Station-Id
+
+   For IEEE 802.1X Authenticators, this attribute is used to store the
+   bridge or Access Point MAC address in ASCII format (upper case only),
+   with octet values separated by a "-".  Example: "00-10-A4-23-19-C0".
+   In IEEE 802.11, where the SSID is known, it SHOULD be appended to the
+   Access Point MAC address, separated from the MAC address with a ":".
+   Example "00-10-A4-23-19-C0:AP1".
+
+3.21.  Calling-Station-Id
+
+   For IEEE 802.1X Authenticators, this attribute is used to store the
+   Supplicant MAC address in ASCII format (upper case only), with octet
+   values separated by a "-".  Example: "00-10-A4-23-19-C0".
+
+3.22.  NAS-Identifier
+
+   This attribute contains a string identifying the IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticator originating the Access-Request.
+
+3.23.  NAS-Port-Type
+
+   For use with IEEE 802.1X, NAS-Port-Type values of Ethernet (15)
+   Wireless - IEEE 802.11 (19), Token Ring (20) and FDDI (21) may be
+   used.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 12]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+3.24.  Port-Limit
+
+   This attribute has no meaning when sent to an [IEEE8021X]
+   Authenticator.
+
+3.25.  Password-Retry
+
+   In IEEE 802.1X, the Authenticator always transitions to the HELD
+   state after an authentication failure.  Thus this attribute does not
+   make sense for IEEE 802.1X.
+
+3.26.  Connect-Info
+
+   This attribute is sent by a bridge or Access Point to indicate the
+   nature of the Supplicant's connection.  When sent in the Access-
+   Request it is recommended that this attribute contain information on
+   the speed of the Supplicant's connection.  For 802.11, the following
+   format is recommended: "CONNECT 11Mbps 802.11b".  If sent in the
+   Accounting STOP, this attribute may be used to summarize statistics
+   relating to session quality.  For example, in IEEE 802.11, the
+   Connect-Info attribute may contain information on the number of link
+   layer retransmissions.  The exact format of this attribute is
+   implementation specific.
+
+3.27.  EAP-Message
+
+   Since IEEE 802.1X provides for encapsulation of EAP as described in
+   [RFC2284] and [IEEE8021X], the EAP-Message attribute defined in
+   [RFC3579] is used to encapsulate EAP packets for transmission from
+   the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator to the Authentication Server. [RFC3579]
+   Section 2.2. describes how the Authentication Server handles invalid
+   EAP packets passed to it by the Authenticator.
+
+3.28.  Message-Authenticator
+
+   As noted in [RFC3579] Section 3.1., the Message-Authenticator
+   attribute MUST be used to protect packets within a RADIUS/EAP
+   conversation.
+
+3.29.  NAS-Port-Id
+
+   This attribute is used to identify the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator port
+   which authenticates the Supplicant.  The NAS-Port-Id differs from the
+   NAS-Port in that it is a string of variable length whereas the NAS-
+   Port is a 4 octet value.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 13]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+3.30.  Framed-Pool, Framed-IPv6-Pool
+
+   IEEE 802.1X does not provide a mechanism for IP address assignment.
+   Therefore the Framed-Pool and Framed-IPv6-Pool attributes can only be
+   used by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators that support IP address assignment
+   mechanisms.  Typically this capability is supported by layer 3
+   devices.
+
+3.31.  Tunnel Attributes
+
+   Reference [RFC2868] defines RADIUS tunnel attributes used for
+   authentication and authorization, and [RFC2867] defines tunnel
+   attributes used for accounting.  Where the IEEE 802.1X Authenticator
+   supports tunneling, a compulsory tunnel may be set up for the
+   Supplicant as a result of the authentication.
+
+   In particular, it may be desirable to allow a port to be placed into
+   a particular Virtual LAN (VLAN), defined in [IEEE8021Q], based on the
+   result of the authentication.  This can be used, for example, to
+   allow a wireless host to remain on the same VLAN as it moves within a
+   campus network.
+
+   The RADIUS server typically indicates the desired VLAN by including
+   tunnel attributes within the Access-Accept.  However, the IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticator may also provide a hint as to the VLAN to be assigned
+   to the Supplicant by including Tunnel attributes within the Access-
+   Request.
+
+   For use in VLAN assignment, the following tunnel attributes are used:
+
+   Tunnel-Type=VLAN (13)
+   Tunnel-Medium-Type=802
+   Tunnel-Private-Group-ID=VLANID
+
+   Note that the VLANID is 12-bits, taking a value between 1 and 4094,
+   inclusive.  Since the Tunnel-Private-Group-ID is of type String as
+   defined in [RFC2868], for use with IEEE 802.1X, the VLANID integer
+   value is encoded as a string.
+
+   When Tunnel attributes are sent, it is necessary to fill in the Tag
+   field.  As noted in [RFC2868], section 3.1:
+
+      The Tag field is one octet in length and is intended to provide a
+      means of grouping attributes in the same packet which refer to the
+      same tunnel.  Valid values for this field are 0x01 through 0x1F,
+      inclusive.  If the Tag field is unused, it MUST be zero (0x00).
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 14]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   For use with Tunnel-Client-Endpoint, Tunnel-Server-Endpoint, Tunnel-
+   Private-Group-ID, Tunnel-Assignment-ID, Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID or
+   Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID attributes (but not Tunnel-Type, Tunnel-
+   Medium-Type, Tunnel-Password, or Tunnel-Preference), a tag field of
+   greater than 0x1F is interpreted as the first octet of the following
+   field.
+
+   Unless alternative tunnel types are provided, (e.g. for IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticators that may support tunneling but not VLANs), it is only
+   necessary for tunnel attributes to specify a single tunnel.  As a
+   result, where it is only desired to specify the VLANID, the tag field
+   SHOULD be set to zero (0x00) in all tunnel attributes.  Where
+   alternative tunnel types are to be provided, tag values between 0x01
+   and 0x1F SHOULD be chosen.
+
+4.  RC4 EAPOL-Key Frame
+
+   The RC4 EAPOL-Key frame is created and transmitted by the
+   Authenticator in order to provide media specific key information.
+   For example, within 802.11 the RC4 EAPOL-Key frame can be used to
+   distribute multicast/broadcast ("default") keys, or unicast ("key
+   mapping") keys.  The "default" key is the same for all Stations
+   within a broadcast domain.
+
+   The RC4 EAPOL-Key frame is not acknowledged and therefore the
+   Authenticator does not know whether the Supplicant has received it.
+   If it is lost, then the Supplicant and Authenticator will not have
+   the same keying material, and communication will fail.  If this
+   occurs, the problem is typically addressed by re-running the
+   authentication.
+
+   The RC4 EAPOL-Key frame is sent from the Authenticator to the
+   Supplicant in order to provision the "default" key, and subsequently
+   in order to refresh the "default" key.  It may also be used to
+   refresh the key-mapping key.  Rekey is typically only required with
+   weak ciphersuites such as WEP, defined in [IEEE80211].
+
+   Where keys are required, an EAP method that derives keys is typically
+   selected.  Therefore the initial "key mapping" keys can be derived
+   from EAP keying material, without requiring the Authenticator to send
+   an RC4 EAPOL-Key frame to the Supplicant.  An example of how EAP
+   keying material can be derived and used is presented in [RFC2716].
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 15]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   While the RC4 EAPOL-Key frame is defined in [IEEE8021X], a more
+   complete description is provided on the next page.
+
+    0                   1                   2                   3
+    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |    Version    |  Packet Type  |  Packet Body Length           |
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |     Type      |          Key  Length          |Replay Counter...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Replay Counter...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Replay Counter    |   Key IV...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key IV...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key IV...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key IV...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key IV...         |F| Key Index   |
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key Signature...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key Signature...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key Signature...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key Signature...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+   |                             Key...
+   +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+
+   Version
+      The Version field is one octet.  For IEEE 802.1X, it contains the
+      value 0x01.
+
+   Packet Type
+      The Packet Type field is one octet, and determines the type of
+      packet being transmitted.  For an EAPOL-Key Descriptor, the Packet
+      Type field contains 0x03.
+
+   Packet Body Length
+      The Packet Body Length is two octets, and contains the length of
+      the EAPOL-Key descriptor in octets, not including the Version,
+      Packet Type and Packet Body Length fields.
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 16]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   Type
+      The Type field is a single octet.  The Key descriptor is defined
+      differently for each Type; this specification documents only the
+      RC4 Key Descriptor (Type = 0x01).
+
+   Key Length
+      The Key Length field is two octets.  If Packet Body Length = 44 +
+      Key Length, then the Key Field contains the key in encrypted form,
+      of length Key Length.  This is 5 octets (40 bits) for WEP, and 13
+      octets (104 bits) for WEP-128.  If Packet Body Length = 44, then
+      the Key field is absent, and Key Length represents the number of
+      least significant octets from the MS-MPPE-Send-Key attribute
+      [RFC2548] to be used as the keying material.  Note that the MS-
+      MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attributes are defined from the
+      point of view of the Authenticator.  From the Supplicant point of
+      reference, the terms are reversed.  Thus the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key on
+      the Supplicant corresponds to the MS-MPPE-Send-Key on the
+      Authenticator, and the MS-MPPE-Send-Key on the Supplicant
+      corresponds to the MS-MPPE-Recv-Key on the Authenticator.
+
+   Replay Counter
+      The Replay Counter field is 8 octets.  It does not repeat within
+      the life of the keying material used to encrypt the Key field and
+      compute the Key Signature field.  A 64-bit NTP timestamp MAY be
+      used as the Replay Counter.
+
+   Key IV
+      The Key IV field is 16 octets and includes a 128-bit
+      cryptographically random number.
+
+   F
+      The Key flag (F) is a single bit, describing the type of key that
+      is included in the Key field.  Values are:
+
+      0 = for broadcast (default key)
+      1 = for unicast (key mapping key)
+
+   Key Index
+      The Key Index is 7 bits.
+
+   Key Signature
+      The Key Signature field is 16 octets.  It contains an HMAC-MD5
+      message integrity check computed over the EAPOL-Key descriptor,
+      starting from the Version field, with the Key field filled in if
+      present, but with the Key Signature field set to zero.  For the
+      computation, the 32 octet (256 bit) MS-MPPE-Send-Key [RFC2548] is
+      used as the HMAC-MD5 key.
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 17]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   Key
+      If Packet Body Length = 44 + Key Length, then the Key Field
+      contains the key in encrypted form, of length Key Length.  If
+      Packet Body Length = 44, then the Key field is absent, and the
+      least significant Key Length octets from the MS-MPPE-Send-Key
+      attribute is used as the keying material.  Where the Key field is
+      encrypted using RC4, the RC4 encryption key used to encrypt this
+      field is formed by concatenating the 16 octet (128 bit) Key-IV
+      field with the 32 octet MS-MPPE-Recv-Key attribute.  This yields a
+      48 octet RC4 key (384 bits).
+
+5.  Security Considerations
+
+   Since this document describes the use of RADIUS for purposes of
+   authentication, authorization, and accounting in IEEE 802.1X-enabled
+   networks, it is vulnerable to all of the threats that are present in
+   other RADIUS applications.  For a discussion of these threats, see
+   [RFC2607], [RFC2865], [RFC3162], [RFC3579], and [RFC3576].
+
+   Vulnerabilities include:
+
+      Packet modification or forgery
+      Dictionary attacks
+      Known plaintext attacks
+      Replay
+      Outcome mismatches
+      802.11 integration
+      Key management issues
+
+5.1.  Packet Modification or Forgery
+
+   RADIUS, defined in [RFC2865], does not require all Access-Requests to
+   be authenticated or integrity protected.  However, IEEE 802.1X is
+   based on EAP.  As described in [3579], Section 3.1.:
+
+      The Message-Authenticator attribute MUST be used to protect all
+      Access-Request, Access-Challenge, Access-Accept, and Access-Reject
+      packets containing an EAP-Message attribute.
+
+   As a result, when used with IEEE 802.1X, all RADIUS packets MUST be
+   authenticated and integrity protected.  In addition, as described in
+   [3579], Section 4.2.:
+
+      To address the security vulnerabilities of RADIUS/EAP,
+      implementations of this specification SHOULD support IPsec
+      [RFC2401] along with IKE [RFC2409] for key management.  IPsec ESP
+      [RFC2406] with non-null transform SHOULD be supported, and IPsec
+      ESP with a non-null encryption transform and authentication
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 18]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+      support SHOULD be used to provide per-packet confidentiality,
+      authentication, integrity and replay protection.  IKE SHOULD be
+      used for key management.
+
+5.2.  Dictionary Attacks
+
+   As discussed in [RFC3579] Section 4.3.3., the RADIUS shared secret is
+   vulnerable to offline dictionary attack, based on capture of the
+   Response Authenticator or Message-Authenticator attribute.  In order
+   to decrease the level of vulnerability, [RFC2865], Section 3
+   recommends:
+
+      The secret (password shared between the client and the RADIUS
+      server) SHOULD be at least as large and unguessable as a well-
+      chosen password.  It is preferred that the secret be at least 16
+      octets.
+
+   In addition, the risk of an offline dictionary attack can be further
+   mitigated by employing IPsec ESP with a non-null transform in order
+   to encrypt the RADIUS conversation, as described in [RFC3579],
+   Section 4.2.
+
+5.3.  Known Plaintext Attacks
+
+   Since IEEE 802.1X is based on EAP, which does not support PAP, the
+   RADIUS User-Password attribute is not used to carry hidden user
+   passwords.  The hiding mechanism utilizes MD5, defined in [RFC1321],
+   in order to generate a key stream based on the RADIUS shared secret
+   and the Request Authenticator.  Where PAP is in use, it is possible
+   to collect key streams corresponding to a given Request Authenticator
+   value, by capturing RADIUS conversations corresponding to a PAP
+   authentication attempt using a known password.  Since the User-
+   Password is known, the key stream corresponding to a given Request
+   Authenticator can be determined and stored.
+
+   The vulnerability is described in detail in [RFC3579], Section 4.3.4.
+   Even though IEEE 802.1X Authenticators do not support PAP
+   authentication, a security vulnerability can still exist where the
+   same RADIUS shared secret is used for hiding User-Password as well as
+   other attributes.  This can occur, for example, if the same RADIUS
+   proxy handles authentication requests for both IEEE 802.1X (which may
+   hide the Tunnel-Password, MS-MPPE-Send-Key and MS-MPPE-Recv-Key
+   attributes) and GPRS (which may hide the User-Password attribute).
+
+   The threat can be mitigated by protecting RADIUS with IPsec ESP with
+   a non-null transform, as described in [RFC3579], Section 4.2.  In
+   addition, the same RADIUS shared secret MUST NOT be used for both
+   IEEE 802.1X authentication and PAP authentication.
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 19]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+5.4.  Replay
+
+   As noted in [RFC3579] Section 4.3.5., the RADIUS protocol provides
+   only limited support for replay protection.  Replay protection for
+   RADIUS authentication and accounting can be provided by enabling
+   IPsec replay protection with RADIUS, as described in [RFC3579],
+   Section 4.2.
+
+   As with the Request Authenticator, for use with IEEE 802.1X
+   Authenticators, the Acct-Session-Id SHOULD be globally and temporally
+   unique.
+
+5.5.  Outcome Mismatches
+
+   [RFC3579] Section 2.6.3. discusses the issues that arise when the EAP
+   packet encapsulated in an EAP-Message attribute does not agree with
+   the RADIUS Packet Type.  For example, an EAP Success packet might be
+   encapsulated within an Access-Reject; an EAP Failure might be sent
+   within an Access-Accept; or an EAP Success or Failure might be sent
+   within an Access-Challenge.
+
+   As described in [RFC3579] Section 2.6.3., these conflicting messages
+   are likely to cause confusion.  To ensure that access decisions made
+   by IEEE 802.1X Authenticators conform to the wishes of the RADIUS
+   server, it is necessary for the Authenticator to make the decision
+   solely based on the authentication result (Access-Accept/Reject) and
+   not based on the contents of EAP-Message attributes, if present.
+
+5.6.  802.11 Integration
+
+   [IEEE8021X] was developed for use on wired IEEE 802 networks such as
+   Ethernet, and therefore does not describe how to securely adapt IEEE
+   802.1X for use with 802.11.  This is left to an enhanced security
+   specification under development within IEEE 802.11.
+
+   For example, [IEEE8021X] does not specify whether authentication
+   occurs prior to, or after association, nor how the derived keys are
+   used within various ciphersuites.  It also does not specify
+   ciphersuites addressing the vulnerabilities discovered in WEP,
+   described in [Berkeley], [Arbaugh], [Fluhrer], and [Stubbl].
+   [IEEE8021X] only defines an authentication framework, leaving the
+   definition of the authentication methods to other documents, such as
+   [RFC2716].
+
+   Since [IEEE8021X] does not address 802.11 integration issues,
+   implementors are strongly advised to consult additional IEEE 802.11
+   security specifications for guidance on how to adapt IEEE 802.1X for
+   use with 802.11.  For example, it is likely that the IEEE 802.11
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 20]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   enhanced security specification will define its own IEEE 802.11 key
+   hierarchy as well as new EAPOL-Key descriptors.
+
+5.7.  Key Management Issues
+
+   The EAPOL-Key descriptor described in Section 4. is likely to be
+   deprecated in the future, when the IEEE 802.11 enhanced security
+   group completes its work.  Known security issues include:
+
+   [1]  Default key-only support.  IEEE 802.1X enables the derivation of
+        per-Station unicast keys, known in [IEEE80211] as "key mapping
+        keys."  Keys used to encrypt multicast/broadcast traffic are
+        known as "default keys".  However, in some 802.11
+        implementations, the unicast keys, derived as part of the EAP
+        authentication process, are used solely in order to encrypt,
+        authenticate and integrity protect the EAPOL-Key descriptor, as
+        described in Section 4.  These implementations only support use
+        of default keys (ordinarily only used with multicast/broadcast
+        traffic) to secure all traffic, unicast or multicast/broadcast,
+        resulting in inherent security weaknesses.
+
+        Where per-Station key-mapping keys (e.g. unicast keys) are
+        unsupported, any Station possessing the default key can decrypt
+        traffic from other Stations or impersonate them.  When used
+        along with a weak cipher (e.g. WEP), implementations supporting
+        only default keys provide more material for attacks such as
+        those described in [Fluhrer] and [Stubbl].  If in addition, the
+        default key is not refreshed periodically, IEEE 802.1X dynamic
+        key derivation provides little or no security benefit.  For an
+        understanding of the issues with WEP, see [Berkeley], [Arbaugh],
+        [Fluhrer], and [Stubbl].
+
+   [2]  Reuse of keying material.  The EAPOL-Key descriptor specified in
+        section 4 uses the same keying material (MS-MPPE-Recv-Key) both
+        to encrypt the Key field within the EAPOL-Key descriptor, and to
+        encrypt data passed between the Station and Access Point.
+        Multi-purpose keying material is frowned upon, since multiple
+        uses can leak information helpful to an attacker.
+
+   [3]  Weak algorithms.  The algorithm used to encrypt the Key field
+        within the EAPOL-Key descriptor is similar to the algorithm used
+        in WEP, and as a result, shares some of the same weaknesses.  As
+        with WEP, the RC4 stream cipher is used to encrypt the key.  As
+        input to the RC4 engine, the IV and key are concatenated rather
+        than being combined within a mixing function.  As with WEP, the
+        IV is not a counter, and therefore there is little protection
+        against reuse.
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 21]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   As a result of these vulnerabilities, implementors intending to use
+   the EAPOL-Key descriptor described in this document are urged to
+   consult the 802.11 enhanced security specification for a more secure
+   alternative.  It is also advisable to consult the evolving literature
+   on WEP vulnerabilities, in order to better understand the risks, as
+   well as to obtain guidance on setting an appropriate re-keying
+   interval.
+
+6.  IANA Considerations
+
+   This specification does not create any RADIUS attributes nor any new
+   number spaces for IANA administration.  However, it does require
+   assignment of new values to existing RADIUS attributes.  These
+   include:
+
+   Attribute              Values Required
+   =========              ===============
+   NAS-Port-Type          Token-Ring (20), FDDI (21)
+   Tunnel-Type            VLAN (13)
+   Acct-Terminate-Cause   Supplicant Restart (19)
+                          Reauthentication Failure (20)
+                          Port Reinitialized (21)
+                          Port Administratively Disabled (22)
+
+7.  References
+
+7.1.  Normative References
+
+   [RFC1321]      Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", RFC
+                  1321, April 1992.
+
+   [RFC2119]      Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
+                  Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.
+
+   [RFC2284]      Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible
+                  Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.
+
+   [RFC2865]      Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A. and W. Simpson,
+                  "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
+                  RFC 2865, June 2000.
+
+   [RFC2866]      Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", RFC 2866, June 2000.
+
+   [RFC2867]      Zorn, G., Aboba, B. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS Accounting
+                  Modifications for Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2867,
+                  June 2000.
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 22]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   [RFC2868]      Zorn, G., Leifer, D., Rubens, A., Shriver, J.,
+                  Holdrege, M. and I. Goyret, "RADIUS Attributes for
+                  Tunnel Protocol Support", RFC 2868, June 2000.
+
+   [RFC2869]      Rigney, C., Willats, W. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS
+                  Extensions", RFC 2869, June 2000.
+
+   [RFC3162]      Aboba, B., Zorn, G. and D. Mitton, "RADIUS and IPv6",
+                  RFC 3162, August 2001.
+
+   [RFC3280]      Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet
+                  X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and
+                  Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", RFC 3280,
+                  April 2002.
+
+   [RFC3576]      Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D. and B.
+                  Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
+                  Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", RFC
+                  3576, July 2003.
+
+   [RFC3579]      Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote
+                  Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For
+                  Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", RFC 3579,
+                  September 2003.
+
+   [IEEE8021X]    IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
+                  Networks:  Port based Network Access Control, IEEE Std
+                  802.1X-2001, June 2001.
+
+7.2.  Informative References
+
+   [RFC2104]      Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
+                  Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", RFC 2104,
+                  February 1997.
+
+   [RFC2434]      Narten, T. and H. Alvestrand, "Guidelines for Writing
+                  an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", BCP 26, RFC
+                  2434, October 1998.
+
+   [RFC2548]      Zorn, G., "Microsoft Vendor-specific RADIUS
+                  Attributes", RFC 2548, March 1999.
+
+   [RFC2607]      Aboba, B. and J. Vollbrecht, "Proxy Chaining and
+                  Policy Implementation in Roaming", RFC 2607, June
+                  1999.
+
+   [RFC2716]      Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication
+                  Protocol", RFC 2716, October 1999.
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 23]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   [MD5Attack]    Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent
+                  Attack."  CryptoBytes Vol.2 No.2, Summer 1996.
+
+   [IEEE802]      IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
+                  Networks:  Overview and Architecture, ANSI/IEEE Std
+                  802, 1990.
+
+   [IEEE8021Q]    IEEE Standards for Local and Metropolitan Area
+                  Networks:  Draft Standard for Virtual Bridged Local
+                  Area Networks, P802.1Q, January 1998.
+
+   [IEEE8023]     ISO/IEC 8802-3 Information technology -
+                  Telecommunications and information exchange between
+                  systems - Local and metropolitan area networks -
+                  Common specifications - Part 3:  Carrier Sense
+                  Multiple Access with Collision Detection (CSMA/CD)
+                  Access Method and Physical Layer Specifications, (also
+                  ANSI/IEEE Std 802.3- 1996), 1996.
+
+   [IEEE80211]    Information technology - Telecommunications and
+                  information exchange between systems - Local and
+                  metropolitan area networks - Specific Requirements
+                  Part 11:  Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and
+                  Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications, IEEE Std.
+                  802.11-1999, 1999.
+
+   [Berkeley]     Borisov, N., Goldberg, I. and D. Wagner, "Intercepting
+                  Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 802.11", ACM
+                  SIGMOBILE, Seventh Annual International Conference on
+                  Mobile Computing and Networking, July 2001, Rome,
+                  Italy.
+
+   [Arbaugh]      Arbaugh, W., Shankar, N. and J.Y.C. Wan, "Your 802.11
+                  Wireless Network has No Clothes", Department of
+                  Computer Science, University of Maryland, College
+                  Park, March 2001.
+
+   [Fluhrer]      Fluhrer, S., Mantin, I. and A. Shamir, "Weaknesses in
+                  the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4", Eighth Annual
+                  Workshop on Selected Areas in Cryptography, Toronto,
+                  Canada, August 2001.
+
+   [Stubbl]       Stubblefield, A., Ioannidis, J. and A. Rubin, "Using
+                  the Fluhrer, Mantin and Shamir Attack to Break WEP",
+                  2002 NDSS Conference.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 24]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+8.  Table of Attributes
+
+   The following table provides a guide to which attributes MAY be sent
+   and received as part of IEEE 802.1X authentication.  L3 denotes
+   attributes that require layer 3 capabilities, and thus may not be
+   supported by all Authenticators.  For each attribute, the reference
+   provides the definitive information on usage.
+
+   802.1X        #   Attribute
+     X           1   User-Name [RFC2865]
+                 2   User-Password [RFC2865]
+                 3   CHAP-Password [RFC2865]
+     X           4   NAS-IP-Address [RFC2865]
+     X           5   NAS-Port [RFC2865]
+     X           6   Service-Type [RFC2865]
+                 7   Framed-Protocol [RFC2865]
+     L3          8   Framed-IP-Address [RFC2865]
+     L3          9   Framed-IP-Netmask [RFC2865]
+     L3         10   Framed-Routing [RFC2865]
+     X          11   Filter-Id [RFC2865]
+     X          12   Framed-MTU [RFC2865]
+                13   Framed-Compression [RFC2865]
+     L3         14   Login-IP-Host [RFC2865]
+     L3         15   Login-Service [RFC2865]
+     L3         16   Login-TCP-Port [RFC2865]
+                18   Reply-Message [RFC2865]
+                19   Callback-Number [RFC2865]
+                20   Callback-Id [RFC2865]
+     L3         22   Framed-Route [RFC2865]
+     L3         23   Framed-IPX-Network [RFC2865]
+     X          24   State [RFC2865]
+     X          25   Class [RFC2865]
+     X          26   Vendor-Specific [RFC2865]
+     X          27   Session-Timeout [RFC2865]
+     X          28   Idle-Timeout [RFC2865]
+     X          29   Termination-Action [RFC2865]
+     X          30   Called-Station-Id [RFC2865]
+     X          31   Calling-Station-Id [RFC2865]
+     X          32   NAS-Identifier [RFC2865]
+     X          33   Proxy-State [RFC2865]
+                34   Login-LAT-Service [RFC2865]
+                35   Login-LAT-Node [RFC2865]
+                36   Login-LAT-Group [RFC2865]
+   802.1X        #   Attribute
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 25]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   802.1X        #   Attribute
+     L3         37   Framed-AppleTalk-Link [RFC2865]
+     L3         38   Framed-AppleTalk-Network [RFC2865]
+     L3         39   Framed-AppleTalk-Zone [RFC2865]
+     X          40   Acct-Status-Type [RFC2866]
+     X          41   Acct-Delay-Time [RFC2866]
+     X          42   Acct-Input-Octets [RFC2866]
+     X          43   Acct-Output-Octets [RFC2866]
+     X          44   Acct-Session-Id [RFC2866]
+     X          45   Acct-Authentic [RFC2866]
+     X          46   Acct-Session-Time [RFC2866]
+     X          47   Acct-Input-Packets [RFC2866]
+     X          48   Acct-Output-Packets [RFC2866]
+     X          49   Acct-Terminate-Cause [RFC2866]
+     X          50   Acct-Multi-Session-Id [RFC2866]
+     X          51   Acct-Link-Count [RFC2866]
+     X          52   Acct-Input-Gigawords [RFC2869]
+     X          53   Acct-Output-Gigawords [RFC2869]
+     X          55   Event-Timestamp [RFC2869]
+                60   CHAP-Challenge [RFC2865]
+     X          61   NAS-Port-Type [RFC2865]
+                62   Port-Limit [RFC2865]
+                63   Login-LAT-Port [RFC2865]
+     X          64   Tunnel-Type [RFC2868]
+     X          65   Tunnel-Medium-Type [RFC2868]
+     L3         66   Tunnel-Client-Endpoint [RFC2868]
+     L3         67   Tunnel-Server-Endpoint [RFC2868]
+     L3         68   Acct-Tunnel-Connection [RFC2867]
+     L3         69   Tunnel-Password [RFC2868]
+                70   ARAP-Password [RFC2869]
+                71   ARAP-Features [RFC2869]
+                72   ARAP-Zone-Access [RFC2869]
+                73   ARAP-Security [RFC2869]
+                74   ARAP-Security-Data [RFC2869]
+                75   Password-Retry [RFC2869]
+                76   Prompt [RFC2869]
+     X          77   Connect-Info [RFC2869]
+     X          78   Configuration-Token [RFC2869]
+     X          79   EAP-Message [RFC3579]
+     X          80   Message-Authenticator [RFC3579]
+     X          81   Tunnel-Private-Group-ID [RFC2868]
+     L3         82   Tunnel-Assignment-ID [RFC2868]
+     X          83   Tunnel-Preference [RFC2868]
+                84   ARAP-Challenge-Response [RFC2869]
+   802.1X        #   Attribute
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 26]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+   802.1X        #   Attribute
+     X          85   Acct-Interim-Interval [RFC2869]
+     X          86   Acct-Tunnel-Packets-Lost [RFC2867]
+     X          87   NAS-Port-Id [RFC2869]
+     L3         88   Framed-Pool [RFC2869]
+     L3         90   Tunnel-Client-Auth-ID [RFC2868]
+     L3         91   Tunnel-Server-Auth-ID [RFC2868]
+     X          95   NAS-IPv6-Address [RFC3162]
+                96   Framed-Interface-Id [RFC3162]
+     L3         97   Framed-IPv6-Prefix [RFC3162]
+     L3         98   Login-IPv6-Host [RFC3162]
+     L3         99   Framed-IPv6-Route [RFC3162]
+     L3        100   Framed-IPv6-Pool [RFC3162]
+     X         101   Error-Cause [RFC3576]
+   802.1X        #   Attribute
+
+   Key
+   ===
+   X         = May be used with IEEE 802.1X authentication
+   L3        = Implemented only by Authenticators with Layer 3
+               capabilities
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 27]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+9.  Intellectual Property Statement
+
+   The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
+   intellectual property or other rights that might be claimed to
+   pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
+   this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
+   might or might not be available; neither does it represent that it
+   has made any effort to identify any such rights.  Information on the
+   IETF's procedures with respect to rights in standards-track and
+   standards- related documentation can be found in BCP-11.  Copies of
+   claims of rights made available for publication and any assurances of
+   licenses to be made available, or the result of an attempt made to
+   obtain a general license or permission for the use of such
+   proprietary rights by implementors or users of this specification can
+   be obtained from the IETF Secretariat.
+
+   The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
+   copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
+   rights which may cover technology that may be required to practice
+   this standard.  Please address the information to the IETF Executive
+   Director.
+
+10.  Acknowledgments
+
+   The authors would like to acknowledge Bob O'Hara of Airespace, David
+   Halasz of Cisco, Tim Moore, Sachin Seth and Ashwin Palekar of
+   Microsoft, Andrea Li, Albert Young and Dave Bagby of 3Com for
+   contributions to this document.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 28]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+11.  Authors' Addresses
+
+   Paul Congdon
+   Hewlett Packard Company
+   HP ProCurve Networking
+   8000 Foothills Blvd, M/S 5662
+   Roseville, CA  95747
+
+   Phone: +1 916 785 5753
+   Fax:   +1 916 785 8478
+   EMail: paul_congdon@hp.com
+
+   Bernard Aboba
+   Microsoft Corporation
+   One Microsoft Way
+   Redmond, WA 98052
+
+   Phone: +1 425 706 6605
+   Fax:   +1 425 936 7329
+   EMail: bernarda@microsoft.com
+
+   Andrew Smith
+   Trapeze Networks
+   5753 W. Las Positas Blvd.
+   Pleasanton, CA 94588-4084
+
+   Fax: +1 415 345 1827
+   EMail: ah_smith@acm.org
+
+   John Roese
+   Enterasys
+
+   Phone: +1 603 337 1506
+   EMail: jjr@enterasys.com
+
+   Glen Zorn
+   Cisco Systems, Inc.
+   500 108th Avenue N.E., Suite 500
+   Bellevue, WA 98004
+
+   Phone: +1 425 438 8218
+   Fax:   +1 425 438 1848
+   EMail: gwz@cisco.com
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 29]
+
+RFC 3580                   IEEE 802.1X RADIUS             September 2003
+
+
+12.  Full Copyright Statement
+
+   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003).  All Rights Reserved.
+
+   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
+   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
+   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
+   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
+   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
+   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
+   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
+   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
+   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
+   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
+   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
+   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
+   English.
+
+   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
+   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
+
+   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
+   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
+   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
+   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
+   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+Acknowledgement
+
+   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
+   Internet Society.
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+Congdon, et al.              Informational                     [Page 30]
+