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diff --git a/rfc/rfc2284.txt b/rfc/rfc2284.txt new file mode 100644 index 00000000..99405629 --- /dev/null +++ b/rfc/rfc2284.txt @@ -0,0 +1,843 @@ + + + + + + +Network Working Group L. Blunk +Request for Comments: 2284 J. Vollbrecht +Category: Standards Track Merit Network, Inc. + March 1998 + + + + + PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) + + +Status of this Memo + + This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the + Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for + improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet + Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state + and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. + +Copyright Notice + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. + +Abstract + + The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [1] provides a standard method for + transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links. + + PPP also defines an extensible Link Control Protocol, which allows + negotiation of an Authentication Protocol for authenticating its peer + before allowing Network Layer protocols to transmit over the link. + + This document defines the PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol. + +Table of Contents + + 1. Introduction .......................................... 2 + 1.1 Specification of Requirements ................... 2 + 1.2 Terminology ..................................... 2 + 2. PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) .......... 3 + 2.1 Configuration Option Format ..................... 4 + 2.2 Packet Format ................................... 6 + 2.2.1 Request and Response ............................ 6 + 2.2.2 Success and Failure ............................. 7 + 3. Initial EAP Request/Response Types .................... 8 + 3.1 Identity ........................................ 9 + 3.2 Notification .................................... 10 + 3.3 Nak ............................................. 10 + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 1] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + 3.4 MD5-Challenge ................................... 11 + 3.5 One-Time Password (OTP) ......................... 11 + 3.6 Generic Token Card .............................. 12 + REFERENCES ................................................... 13 + ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................. 14 + CHAIR'S ADDRESS .............................................. 14 + AUTHORS' ADDRESSES ........................................... 14 + Full Copyright Statement ..................................... 15 + +1. Introduction + + In order to establish communications over a point-to-point link, each + end of the PPP link must first send LCP packets to configure the data + link during Link Establishment phase. After the link has been + established, PPP provides for an optional Authentication phase before + proceeding to the Network-Layer Protocol phase. + + By default, authentication is not mandatory. If authentication of + the link is desired, an implementation MUST specify the + Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option during Link + Establishment phase. + + These authentication protocols are intended for use primarily by + hosts and routers that connect to a PPP network server via switched + circuits or dial-up lines, but might be applied to dedicated links as + well. The server can use the identification of the connecting host + or router in the selection of options for network layer negotiations. + + This document defines the PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol + (EAP). The Link Establishment and Authentication phases, and the + Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option, are defined in The + Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) [1]. + +1.1. Specification of Requirements + + In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements + of the specification. These words are often capitalized. The key + words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", + "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document + are to be interpreted as described in RFC 2119 [6]. + +1.2. Terminology + + This document frequently uses the following terms: + + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 2] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + authenticator + The end of the link requiring the authentication. The + authenticator specifies the authentication protocol to be + used in the Configure-Request during Link Establishment + phase. + + peer + The other end of the point-to-point link; the end which is + being authenticated by the authenticator. + + silently discard + This means the implementation discards the packet without + further processing. The implementation SHOULD provide the + capability of logging the error, including the contents of + the silently discarded packet, and SHOULD record the event + in a statistics counter. + + displayable message + This is interpreted to be a human readable string of + characters, and MUST NOT affect operation of the protocol. + The message encoding MUST follow the UTF-8 transformation + format [5]. + +2. PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) + + The PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) is a general + protocol for PPP authentication which supports multiple + authentication mechanisms. EAP does not select a specific + authentication mechanism at Link Control Phase, but rather postpones + this until the Authentication Phase. This allows the authenticator + to request more information before determining the specific + authentication mechanism. This also permits the use of a "back-end" + server which actually implements the various mechanisms while the PPP + authenticator merely passes through the authentication exchange. + + 1. After the Link Establishment phase is complete, the authenticator + sends one or more Requests to authenticate the peer. The Request + has a type field to indicate what is being requested. Examples of + Request types include Identity, MD5-challenge, One-Time + Passwords, Generic Token Card, etc. The MD5-challenge type + corresponds closely to the CHAP authentication protocol. + Typically, the authenticator will send an initial Identity Request + followed by one or more Requests for authentication information. + However, an initial Identity Request is not required, and MAY be + bypassed in cases where the identity is presumed (leased lines, + dedicated dial-ups, etc.). + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 3] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + 2. The peer sends a Response packet in reply to each Request. As + with the Request packet, the Response packet contains a type field + which corresponds to the type field of the Request. + + 3. The authenticator ends the authentication phase with a Success or + Failure packet. + +Advantages + + The EAP protocol can support multiple authentication mechanisms + without having to pre-negotiate a particular one during LCP Phase. + + Certain devices (e.g. a NAS) do not necessarily have to understand + each request type and may be able to simply act as a passthrough + agent for a "back-end" server on a host. The device only need look + for the success/failure code to terminate the authentication phase. + +Disadvantages + + EAP does require the addition of a new authentication type to LCP and + thus PPP implementations will need to be modified to use it. It also + strays from the previous PPP authentication model of negotiating a + specific authentication mechanism during LCP. + +2.1. Configuration Option Format + + A summary of the Authentication-Protocol Configuration Option format + to negotiate the EAP Authentication Protocol is shown below. The + fields are transmitted from left to right. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Type | Length | Authentication-Protocol | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + + Type + + 3 + + Length + + 4 + + Authentication-Protocol + + C227 (Hex) for PPP Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 4] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + +2.2. Packet Format + + Exactly one PPP EAP packet is encapsulated in the Information field + of a PPP Data Link Layer frame where the protocol field indicates + type hex C227 (PPP EAP). A summary of the EAP packet format is shown + below. The fields are transmitted from left to right. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Code | Identifier | Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Data ... + +-+-+-+-+ + + + Code + + The Code field is one octet and identifies the type of EAP packet. + EAP Codes are assigned as follows: + + 1 Request + 2 Response + 3 Success + 4 Failure + + Identifier + + The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching + responses with requests. + + Length + + The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the + EAP packet including the Code, Identifier, Length and Data + fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should + be treated as Data Link Layer padding and should be ignored on + reception. + + Data + + The Data field is zero or more octets. The format of the Data + field is determined by the Code field. + + + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 5] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + +2.2.1. Request and Response + + Description + + The Request packet is sent by the authenticator to the peer. Each + Request has a type field which serves to indicate what is being + requested. The authenticator MUST transmit an EAP packet with the + Code field set to 1 (Request). Additional Request packets MUST be + sent until a valid Response packet is received, or an optional + retry counter expires. Retransmitted Requests MUST be sent with + the same Identifier value in order to distinguish them from new + Requests. The contents of the data field is dependent on the + Request type. The peer MUST send a Response packet in reply to a + Request packet. Responses MUST only be sent in reply to a + received Request and never retransmitted on a timer. The + Identifier field of the Response MUST match that of the Request. + + Implementation Note: Because the authentication process will + often involve user input, some care must be taken when deciding + upon retransmission strategies and authentication timeouts. It + is suggested a retransmission timer of 6 seconds with a maximum + of 10 retransmissions be used as default. One may wish to make + these timeouts longer in certain cases (e.g. where Token Cards + are involved). Additionally, the peer must be prepared to + silently discard received retransmissions while waiting for + user input. + + A summary of the Request and Response packet format is shown below. + The fields are transmitted from left to right. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Code | Identifier | Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Type | Type-Data ... + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+- + + + Code + + 1 for Request; + + 2 for Response. + + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 6] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + Identifier + + The Identifier field is one octet. The Identifier field MUST be + the same if a Request packet is retransmitted due to a timeout + while waiting for a Response. Any new (non-retransmission) + Requests MUST modify the Identifier field. If a peer recieves a + duplicate Request for which it has already sent a Response, it + MUST resend it's Response. If a peer receives a duplicate Request + before it has sent a Response to the initial Request (i.e. it's + waiting for user input), it MUST silently discard the duplicate + Request. + + Length + + The Length field is two octets and indicates the length of the EAP + packet including the Code, Identifier, Length, Type, and Type-Data + fields. Octets outside the range of the Length field should be + treated as Data Link Layer padding and should be ignored on + reception. + + Type + + The Type field is one octet. This field indicates the Type of + Request or Response. Only one Type MUST be specified per EAP + Request or Response. Normally, the Type field of the Response + will be the same as the Type of the Request. However, there is + also a Nak Response Type for indicating that a Request type is + unacceptable to the peer. When sending a Nak in response to a + Request, the peer MAY indicate an alternative desired + authentication Type which it supports. An initial specification of + Types follows in a later section of this document. + + Type-Data + + The Type-Data field varies with the Type of Request and the + associated Response. + +2.2.2. Success and Failure + + Description + + The Success packet is sent by the authenticator to the peer to + acknowledge successful authentication. The authenticator MUST + transmit an EAP packet with the Code field set to 3 (Success). + + If the authenticator cannot authenticate the peer (unacceptable + Responses to one or more Requests) then the implementation MUST + transmit an EAP packet with the Code field set to 4 (Failure). An + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 7] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + authenticator MAY wish to issue multiple Requests before sending a + Failure response in order to allow for human typing mistakes. + + Implementation Note: Because the Success and Failure packets + are not acknowledged, they may be potentially lost. A peer + MUST allow for this circumstance. The peer can use a Network + Protocol packet as an alternative indication of Success. + Likewise, the receipt of a LCP Terminate-Request can be taken + as a Failure. + + A summary of the Success and Failure packet format is shown below. + The fields are transmitted from left to right. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Code | Identifier | Length | + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + + + Code + + 3 for Success; + + 4 for Failure. + + Identifier + + The Identifier field is one octet and aids in matching replies to + Responses. The Identifier field MUST match the Indentifier field + of the Response packet that it is sent in response to. + + Length + + 4 + +3. Initial EAP Request/Response Types + + This section defines the initial set of EAP Types used in + Request/Response exchanges. More Types may be defined in follow-on + documents. The Type field is one octet and identifies the structure + of an EAP Request or Response packet. The first 3 Types are + considered special case Types. The remaining Types define + authentication exchanges. The Nak Type is valid only for Response + packets, it MUST NOT be sent in a Request. The Nak Type MUST only be + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 8] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + sent in repsonse to a Request which uses an authentication Type code. + All EAP implementatins MUST support Types 1-4. These Types, as well + as types 5 and 6, are defined in this document. Follow-on RFCs will + define additional EAP Types. + + 1 Identity + 2 Notification + 3 Nak (Response only) + 4 MD5-Challenge + 5 One-Time Password (OTP) (RFC 1938) + 6 Generic Token Card + +3.1. Identity + + Description + + The Identity Type is used to query the identity of the peer. + Generally, the authenticator will issue this as the initial + Request. An optional displayable message MAY be included to + prompt the peer in the case where there expectation of interaction + with a user. A Response MUST be sent to this Request with a Type + of 1 (Identity). + + Implementation Note: The peer MAY obtain the Identity via user + input. It is suggested that the authenticator retry the + Indentity Request in the case of an invalid Identity or + authentication failure to allow for potential typos on the part + of the user. It is suggested that the Identity Request be + retried a minimum of 3 times before terminating the + authentication phase with a Failure reply. The Notification + Request MAY be used to indicate an invalid authentication + attempt prior to transmitting a new Identity Request + (optionally, the failure MAY be indicated within the message of + the new Identity Request itself). + + Type + + 1 + + Type-Data + + This field MAY contain a displayable message in the Request. The + Response uses this field to return the Identity. If the Identity + is unknown, this field should be zero bytes in length. The field + MUST NOT be null terminated. The length of this field is derived + from the Length field of the Request/Response packet and hence a + null is not required. + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 9] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + +3.2. Notification + + Description + + The Notification Type is optionally used to convey a displayable + message from the authenticator to the peer. The peer SHOULD + display this message to the user or log it if it cannot be + displayed. It is intended to provide an acknowledged notification + of some imperative nature. Examples include a password with an + expiration time that is about to expire, an OTP sequence integer + which is nearing 0, an authentication failure warning, etc. In + most circumstances, notification should not be required. + + Type + + 2 + + Type-Data + + The Type-Data field in the Request contains a displayable message + greater than zero octets in length. The length of the message is + determined by Length field of the Request packet. The message + MUST not be null terminated. A Response MUST be sent in reply to + the Request with a Type field of 2 (Notification). The Type-Data + field of the Response is zero octets in length. The Response + should be sent immediately (independent of how the message is + displayed or logged). + +3.3. Nak + + Description + + The Nak Type is valid only in Response messages. It is sent in + reply to a Request where the desired authentication Type is + unacceptable. Authentication Types are numbered 4 and above. + The Response contains the authentication Type desired by the peer. + + Type + + 3 + + Type-Data + + This field MUST contain a single octet indicating the desired + authentication type. + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 10] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + +3.4. MD5-Challenge + + Description + + The MD5-Challenge Type is analagous to the PPP CHAP protocol [3] + (with MD5 as the specified algorithm). The PPP Challenge + Handshake Authentication Protocol RFC [3] should be referred to + for further implementation specifics. The Request contains a + "challenge" message to the peer. A Repsonse MUST be sent in reply + to the Request. The Response MAY be either of Type 4 (MD5- + Challenge) or Type 3 (Nak). The Nak reply indicates the peer's + desired authentication mechanism Type. All EAP implementations + MUST support the MD5-Challenge mechanism. + + Type + + 4 + + Type-Data + + The contents of the Type-Data field is summarized below. For + reference on the use of this fields see the PPP Challenge + Handshake Authentication Protocol [3]. + + 0 1 2 3 + 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Value-Size | Value ... + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + | Name ... + +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ + +3.5. One-Time Password (OTP) + + Description + + The One-Time Password system is defined in "A One-Time Password + System" [4]. The Request contains a displayable message + containing an OTP challenge. A Repsonse MUST be sent in reply to + the Request. The Response MUST be of Type 5 (OTP) or Type 3 + (Nak). The Nak reply indicates the peer's desired authentication + mechanism Type. + + Type + + 5 + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 11] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + Type-Data + + The Type-Data field contains the OTP "challenge" as a displayable + message in the Request. In the Response, this field is used for + the 6 words from the OTP dictionary [4]. The messages MUST not be + null terminated. The length of the field is derived from the + Length field of the Request/Reply packet. + +3.6. Generic Token Card + + Description + + The Generic Token Card Type is defined for use with various Token + Card implementations which require user input. The Request + contains an ASCII text message and the Reply contains the Token + Card information necessary for authentication. Typically, this + would be information read by a user from the Token card device and + entered as ASCII text. + + Type + + 6 + + Type-Data + + The Type-Data field in the Request contains a displayable message + greater than zero octets in length. The length of the message is + determined by Length field of the Request packet. The message + MUST not be null terminated. A Response MUST be sent in reply to + the Request with a Type field of 6 (Generic Token Card). The + Response contains data from the Token Card required for + authentication. The length is of the data is determined by the + Length field of the Response packet. + +Security Considerations + + Security issues are the primary topic of this RFC. + + The interaction of the authentication protocols within PPP are highly + implementation dependent. + + For example, upon failure of authentication, some implementations do + not terminate the link. Instead, the implementation limits the kind + of traffic in the Network-Layer Protocols to a filtered subset, which + in turn allows the user opportunity to update secrets or send mail to + the network administrator indicating a problem. + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 12] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + + There is no provision for retries of failed authentication. However, + the LCP state machine can renegotiate the authentication protocol at + any time, thus allowing a new attempt. It is recommended that any + counters used for authentication failure not be reset until after + successful authentication, or subsequent termination of the failed + link. + + There is no requirement that authentication be full duplex or that + the same protocol be used in both directions. It is perfectly + acceptable for different protocols to be used in each direction. + This will, of course, depend on the specific protocols negotiated. + + In practice, within or associated with each PPP server, it is not + anticipated that a particular named user would be authenticated by + multiple methods. This would make the user vulnerable to attacks + which negotiate the least secure method from among a set (such as PAP + rather than EAP). Instead, for each named user there should be an + indication of exactly one method used to authenticate that user name. + If a user needs to make use of different authentication methods under + different circumstances, then distinct identities SHOULD be employed, + each of which identifies exactly one authentication method. + +References + + [1] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51, + RFC 1661, July 1994. + + [2] Reynolds, J. and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, + RFC 1700, October 1994. + + [3] Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol + (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996. + + [4] Haller, N. and C. Metz, "A One-Time Password System", RFC 1938, + May 1996. + + [5] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of Unicode and ISO + 10646", RFC 2044, October 1996. + + [6] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement + Levels", RFC 2119, March 1997. + + + + + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 13] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + +Acknowledgments + + This protocol derives much of its inspiration from Dave Carrel's AHA + draft as well as the PPP CHAP protocol [3]. Bill Simpson provided + much of the boilerplate used throughout this document. Al Rubens + (Merit) also provided valuable feedback. + +Chair's Address + + The working group can be contacted via the current chair: + + Karl F. Fox + Ascend Communications, Inc. + 655 Metro Place South, Suite 370 + Dublin, Ohio 43017 + + EMail: karl@ascend.com + Phone: +1 614 760 4041 + Fax: +1 614 760 4050 + +Authors' Addresses + + Larry J. Blunk + Merit Network, Inc. + 4251 Plymouth Rd., Suite C + Ann Arbor, MI 48105 + + EMail: ljb@merit.edu + Phone: 734-763-6056 + FAX: 734-647-3185 + + + John R. Vollbrecht + Merit Network, Inc. + 4251 Plymouth Rd., Suite C + Ann Arbor, MI 48105 + + EMail: jrv@merit.edu + Phone: +1-313-763-1206 + FAX: +1-734-647-3185 + + + + + + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 14] + +RFC 2284 EAP March 1998 + + +Full Copyright Statement + + Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. + + This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to + others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it + or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published + and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any + kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are + included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this + document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing + the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other + Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of + developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for + copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be + followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than + English. + + The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be + revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. + + This document and the information contained herein is provided on an + "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING + TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING + BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION + HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF + MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +Blunk & Vollbrecht Standards Track [Page 15] + |