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author | Christian Poessinger <christian@poessinger.com> | 2022-07-01 11:20:45 +0200 |
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committer | GitHub <noreply@github.com> | 2022-07-01 11:20:45 +0200 |
commit | 196aaf47a71b5069b4e6542736ec76221ee2e4e1 (patch) | |
tree | 6fc02f6b86c9a34be41e39e98fdd58b20dfaf4fe /python/vyos/pki.py | |
parent | 52289a9f63c4ea341e9117c847cd333eb22654eb (diff) | |
parent | efd956f912b84c8df8902d56e16f22cbd90efdd0 (diff) | |
download | vyos-1x-196aaf47a71b5069b4e6542736ec76221ee2e4e1.tar.gz vyos-1x-196aaf47a71b5069b4e6542736ec76221ee2e4e1.zip |
Merge pull request #1380 from sarthurdev/ovpn-multi-ca
openvpn: T4485: Accept multiple tls ca-certificate values
Diffstat (limited to 'python/vyos/pki.py')
-rw-r--r-- | python/vyos/pki.py | 61 |
1 files changed, 61 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/python/vyos/pki.py b/python/vyos/pki.py index fd91fc9bf..cd15e3878 100644 --- a/python/vyos/pki.py +++ b/python/vyos/pki.py @@ -332,6 +332,54 @@ def verify_certificate(cert, ca_cert): except InvalidSignature: return False +def verify_crl(crl, ca_cert): + # Verify CRL was signed by specified CA + if ca_cert.subject != crl.issuer: + return False + + ca_public_key = ca_cert.public_key() + try: + if isinstance(ca_public_key, rsa.RSAPublicKeyWithSerialization): + ca_public_key.verify( + crl.signature, + crl.tbs_certlist_bytes, + padding=padding.PKCS1v15(), + algorithm=crl.signature_hash_algorithm) + elif isinstance(ca_public_key, dsa.DSAPublicKeyWithSerialization): + ca_public_key.verify( + crl.signature, + crl.tbs_certlist_bytes, + algorithm=crl.signature_hash_algorithm) + elif isinstance(ca_public_key, ec.EllipticCurvePublicKeyWithSerialization): + ca_public_key.verify( + crl.signature, + crl.tbs_certlist_bytes, + signature_algorithm=ec.ECDSA(crl.signature_hash_algorithm)) + else: + return False # We cannot verify it + return True + except InvalidSignature: + return False + +def verify_ca_chain(sorted_names, pki_node): + if len(sorted_names) == 1: # Single cert, no chain + return True + + for name in sorted_names: + cert = load_certificate(pki_node[name]['certificate']) + verified = False + for ca_name in sorted_names: + if name == ca_name: + continue + ca_cert = load_certificate(pki_node[ca_name]['certificate']) + if verify_certificate(cert, ca_cert): + verified = True + break + if not verified and name != sorted_names[-1]: + # Only permit top-most certificate to fail verify (e.g. signed by public CA not explicitly in chain) + return False + return True + # Certificate chain def find_parent(cert, ca_certs): @@ -357,3 +405,16 @@ def find_chain(cert, ca_certs): chain.append(parent) return chain + +def sort_ca_chain(ca_names, pki_node): + def ca_cmp(ca_name1, ca_name2, pki_node): + cert1 = load_certificate(pki_node[ca_name1]['certificate']) + cert2 = load_certificate(pki_node[ca_name2]['certificate']) + + if verify_certificate(cert1, cert2): # cert1 is child of cert2 + return -1 + return 1 + + from functools import cmp_to_key + return sorted(ca_names, key=cmp_to_key(lambda cert1, cert2: ca_cmp(cert1, cert2, pki_node))) + |