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authorDaniel Watkins <oddbloke@ubuntu.com>2021-03-19 10:06:42 -0400
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>2021-03-19 10:06:42 -0400
commitb794d426b9ab43ea9d6371477466070d86e10668 (patch)
tree11e19cd3e8db36dee151da4933e5429b18660268 /cloudinit/cloud.py
parentc6726c2bbe82b738bd0a7fb308496a497c797d5f (diff)
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write passwords only to serial console, lock down cloud-init-output.log (#847)
Prior to this commit, when a user specified configuration which would generate random passwords for users, cloud-init would cause those passwords to be written to the serial console by emitting them on stderr. In the default configuration, any stdout or stderr emitted by cloud-init is also written to `/var/log/cloud-init-output.log`. This file is world-readable, meaning that those randomly-generated passwords were available to be read by any user with access to the system. This presents an obvious security issue. This commit responds to this issue in two ways: * We address the direct issue by moving from writing the passwords to sys.stderr to writing them directly to /dev/console (via util.multi_log); this means that the passwords will never end up in cloud-init-output.log * To avoid future issues like this, we also modify the logging code so that any files created in a log sink subprocess will only be owner/group readable and, if it exists, will be owned by the adm group. This results in `/var/log/cloud-init-output.log` no longer being world-readable, meaning that if there are other parts of the codebase that are emitting sensitive data intended for the serial console, that data is no longer available to all users of the system. LP: #1918303
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