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.. _rpki:
####
RPKI
####
.. pull-quote::
There are two types of Network Admins who deal with BGP, those who have
created an international incident and/or outage, and those who are lying
-- `tweet by EvilMog`_, 2020-02-21
:abbr:`RPKI (Resource Public Key Infrastructure)` is a framework :abbr:`PKI
(Public Key Infrastructure)` designed to secure the Internet routing
infrastructure. It associates BGP route announcements with the correct
originating :abbr:`ASN (Autonomus System Number)` which BGP routers can then
use to check each route against the corresponding :abbr:`ROA (Route Origin
Authorisation)` for validity. RPKI is described in :rfc:`6480`.
A BGP-speaking router like VyOS can retrieve ROA information from RPKI
"Relying Party software" (often just called an "RPKI server" or "RPKI
validator") by using :abbr:`RTR (RPKI to Router)` protocol. There are several
open source implementations to choose from, such as NLNetLabs' Routinator_
(written in Rust), Cloudflare's GoRTR_ and OctoRPKI_ (written in Go), and
RIPE NCC's RPKI Validator_ (written in Java). The RTR protocol is described
in :rfc:`8210`.
.. tip::
If you are new to these routing security technologies then there is an
`excellent guide to RPKI`_ by NLnet Labs which will get you up to speed
very quickly. Their documentation explains everything from what RPKI is to
deploying it in production (albeit with a focus on using NLnet Labs'
tools). It also has some `help and operational guidance`_ including
"What can I do about my route having an Invalid state?"
First you will need to deploy an RPKI validator for your routers to use. The
RIPE NCC helpfully provide `some instructions`_ to get you started with
several different options. Once your server is running you can start
validating announcements.
Imported prefixes during the validation may have values:
valid
The prefix and ASN that originated it match a signed ROA. These are
probably trustworthy route announcements.
invalid
The prefix or prefix length and ASN that originated it doesn't
match any existing ROA. This could be the result of a prefix hijack, or
merely a misconfiguration, but should probably be treated as
untrustworthy route announcements.
notfound
No ROA exists which covers that prefix. Unfortunately this is the case
for about 80% of the IPv4 prefixes which were announced to the :abbr:`DFZ
(default-free zone)` at the start of 2020 (see more detail in
NLnet Labs' `RPKI analytics`_).
.. note::
If you are responsible for the global addresses assigned to your
network, please make sure that your prefixes have ROAs associated with them
to avoid being `notfound` by RPKI. For most ASNs this will involve
publishing ROAs via your :abbr:`RIR (Regional Internet Registry)` (RIPE
NCC, APNIC, ARIN, LACNIC or AFRINIC), and is something you are encouraged
to do whenever you plan to announce addresses into the DFZ.
Particularly large networks may wish to run their own RPKI certificate
authority and publication server instead of publishing ROAs via their RIR.
This is a subject far beyond the scope of VyOS' documentation. Consider
reading about Krill_ if this is a rabbit hole you need or especially want
to dive down.
We can build route-maps for import based on these states. Here is a simple
RPKI configuration, where `routinator` is the RPKI-validating "cache"
server with ip `192.0.2.1`:
.. code-block:: none
set protocols rpki cache routinator address '192.0.2.1'
set protocols rpki cache routinator port '3323'
Here is an example route-map to apply to routes learned at import. In this
filter we reject prefixes with the state `invalid`, and set a higher
`local-preference` if the prefix is RPKI `valid` rather than merely
`notfound`.
.. code-block:: none
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 10 action 'permit'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 10 match rpki 'valid'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 10 set local-preference '300'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 20 action 'permit'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 20 match rpki 'notfound'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 20 set local-preference '125'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 30 action 'deny'
set policy route-map ROUTES-IN rule 30 match rpki 'invalid'
Once your routers are configured to reject RPKI-invalid prefixes, you can
test whether the configuration is working correctly using the `RIPE Labs RPKI
Test`_ experimental tool.
.. _tweet by EvilMog: https://twitter.com/Evil_Mog/status/1230924170508169216
.. _Routinator: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/rpki/routinator/
.. _GoRTR: https://github.com/cloudflare/gortr
.. _OctoRPKI: https://github.com/cloudflare/cfrpki#octorpki
.. _Validator: https://www.ripe.net/manage-ips-and-asns/resource-management/certification/tools-and-resources
.. _some instructions: https://labs.ripe.net/Members/tashi_phuntsho_3/how-to-install-an-rpki-validator
.. _Krill: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/rpki/krill/
.. _RPKI analytics: https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/projects/rpki/rpki-analytics/
.. _RIPE Labs RPKI Test: https://sg-pub.ripe.net/jasper/rpki-web-test/
.. _excellent guide to RPKI: https://rpki.readthedocs.io/
.. _help and operational guidance: https://rpki.readthedocs.io/en/latest/about/help.html
|
