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<title>efi-boot-shim.git, branch 15.7</title>
<subtitle> (mirror of https://github.com/vyos/efi-boot-shim.git)
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amelek.net/vyos/efi-boot-shim.git/atom?h=15.7</id>
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<updated>2022-11-16T21:35:47+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Update version to 15.7</title>
<updated>2022-11-16T21:35:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-16T18:28:18+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:11491619f4336fef41c3519877ba242161763580</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Bump grub's sbat requirement to grub,3</title>
<updated>2022-11-16T21:35:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-16T18:25:11+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:dd8be98cf0fceddd9f156d2917565b18d38c4830</id>
<content type='text'>
Due to the issues addressed in the 2022-11-15 batch of grub CVEs[0], we
need to bump the sbat version from grub.  This patch changes it from 2
to 3.

[0] https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2022-11/msg00059.html

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Update shim's .sbat to sbat,3</title>
<updated>2022-11-16T21:35:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-15T21:36:09+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ea0d0a5be4323d4e403f97610a581bf34f044f4e</id>
<content type='text'>
Though we don't need to bump SBAT_LEVEL for this, we've decided to
change the level to 3 here in case
53509eaf2253e23bfb552e9386fd0877abe592b4 turns out to be worse than we
think it is, so we can fix that easily later.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>More coverity modeling</title>
<updated>2022-11-16T21:35:47+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-15T21:23:10+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:616c566b3a47762c6cea71eb26db083e3eb66624</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds a few more UEFI functions to our coverity model, so we see a
few less false positives during scanning.  It also fixes an error in our
model for OpenSSL's OBJ_dup().

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>CryptoPkg/BaseCryptLib: fix NULL dereference</title>
<updated>2022-11-15T18:07:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jian J Wang</name>
<email>jian.j.wang@intel.com</email>
</author>
<published>2019-04-25T15:42:16+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:53509eaf2253e23bfb552e9386fd0877abe592b4</id>
<content type='text'>
AuthenticodeVerify() calls OpenSSLs d2i_PKCS7() API to parse asn encoded
signed authenticode pkcs#7 data. when this successfully returns, a type
check is done by calling PKCS7_type_is_signed() and then
Pkcs7-&gt;d.sign-&gt;contents-&gt;type is used. It is possible to construct an asn1
blob that successfully decodes and have d2i_PKCS7() return a valid pointer
and have PKCS7_type_is_signed() also return success  but have Pkcs7-&gt;d.sign
be a NULL pointer.

Looking at how PKCS7_verify() [inside of OpenSSL] implements checking for
pkcs7 structs it does the following:
- call PKCS7_type_is_signed()
- call PKCS7_get_detached()
Looking into how PKCS7_get_detatched() is implemented, it checks to see if
p7-&gt;d.sign is NULL or if p7-&gt;d.sign-&gt;contents-&gt;d.ptr is NULL.

As such, the fix is to do the same as OpenSSL after calling d2i_PKCS7().
- Add call to PKS7_get_detached() to existing error handling

Cc: Chao Zhang &lt;chao.b.zhang@intel.com&gt;
Cc: Jiewen Yao &lt;jiewen.yao@intel.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Jian J Wang &lt;jian.j.wang@intel.com&gt;
Cherry-picked-from: https://github.com/tianocore/edk2/commit/26442d11e620a9e81c019a24a4ff38441c64ba10
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>mok: remove MokListTrusted from PCR 7</title>
<updated>2022-11-14T19:32:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Arthur Gautier</name>
<email>arthur.gautier@arista.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-21T20:20:45+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aa1b289a1a16774afc3143b8948d97261f0872d0</id>
<content type='text'>
MokListTrusted was added by mistake to PCR 7 in 4e513405. The value of
MokListTrusted does not alter the behavior of secure boot so, as per
https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf#page=36
(section 3.3.4 PCR usage) so it should not be factored in the value of
PCR 7.

See:
  https://github.com/rhboot/shim/pull/423
  https://github.com/rhboot/shim/commit/4e513405b4f1641710115780d19dcec130c5208f

Fixes https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/484
Fixes https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/492

Signed-off-by: Arthur Gautier &lt;arthur.gautier@arista.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>make-archive: Build reproducible tarball</title>
<updated>2022-11-14T19:26:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Julian Andres Klode</name>
<email>julian.klode@canonical.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-14T11:16:29+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:5169769e0f84dd227592cb73da97dacd61ae40b9</id>
<content type='text'>
Remove timestamps, user names, etc. from the tarball so that
it can be built reproducibly by multiple people, on different
machines.

The outer bzip2 layer might still be different, no reproducible
bzip2 known.

Signed-off-by: Julian Andres Klode &lt;julian.klode@canonical.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>pe: Fix image section entry-point validation</title>
<updated>2022-11-14T19:13:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ilya Okomin</name>
<email>ilya.okomin@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-07T20:52:08+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:17f02339ed1be9e90738603fe3c95ae7dc300061</id>
<content type='text'>
Seen mokmanager image load failure '2 sections contain entry point'
for shim built on Oracle Linux 9 aarch64. found_entry_point counter in
handle_image() uses SizeOfRawData to calculate section boundary.
PE spec defines VirtualSize for the total size of the section when loaded
into memory. SizeOfRawData is the size of the section (for object files)
or the size of the initialized data on disk.

Fix this issue by updating section in-memory size limit to VirtualSize.

Resolves: #517
Signed-off-by: Ilya Okomin &lt;ilya.okomin@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add -malign-double to IA32 compiler flags</title>
<updated>2022-11-14T19:04:12+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Nicholas Bishop</name>
<email>nicholasbishop@google.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-10-06T20:08:56+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:0cf43ac6d78c6f47f8b91210639ac1aa63665f0b</id>
<content type='text'>
This changes the alignment of UINT64 data to 8 bytes on IA32, which
matches EDK2's understanding of alignment. In particular this change
affects the offset where shim writes `EFI_LOADED_IMAGE.ImageSize`.

Fixes https://github.com/rhboot/shim/issues/515

Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bishop &lt;nicholasbishop@google.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>load_cert_file: Use EFI RT memory function</title>
<updated>2022-11-08T17:46:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-11-02T16:45:23+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:ea4911c2f3ce8f8f703a1476febac86bb16b00fd</id>
<content type='text'>
Use the EFI RT memory function CopyMem instead of memcpy in load_cert_file.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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