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<title>efi-boot-shim.git/include, branch 15.6</title>
<subtitle> (mirror of https://github.com/vyos/efi-boot-shim.git)
</subtitle>
<id>https://git.amelek.net/vyos/efi-boot-shim.git/atom?h=15.6</id>
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<updated>2022-05-24T20:28:35+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>Update SBAT generation requirements for 05/24/22</title>
<updated>2022-05-24T20:28:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Setje-Eilers</name>
<email>jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-10T21:09:26+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:9a09faf390eea083c3bef1b07c7e043ebe0cc1f6</id>
<content type='text'>
bump shim SBAT generation requirement to 2 for CVE-2022-28737
bump GRUB2 SBAT generation requirement to 2 for CVE-2021-3695

Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers &lt;jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Give the Coverity scanner some more GCC blinders...</title>
<updated>2022-05-23T20:49:53+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-19T19:55:40+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:aa61fdf490d16aaa23de0cbe5e9f16d3bc72e582</id>
<content type='text'>
Coverity complains:

  CID 373676 (#3 of 3): Unrecoverable parse warning (PARSE_ERROR)
  1. arguments_provided_for_attribute: attribute "__malloc__" does not take arguments

This is, of course, just plain wrong.  Even so, I'm tired of looking at
it, so this patch wraps the #define we use for that attribute in a check
to see if it's being built by Coverity.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sbat policy: make our policy change actions symbolic</title>
<updated>2022-05-18T20:37:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T19:14:12+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a50d3645467fcfef970a00154d6d49494355afc9</id>
<content type='text'>
There are a couple of places where the code we've got right now just
uses integers to decode one of our MoK variables.  That's bad.

This patch replaces those with symbolic names.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>peimage.h: make our signature macros force the type</title>
<updated>2022-05-18T20:37:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T18:54:06+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f28833f7cbb3f536081b19c8a2cc6f709e772128</id>
<content type='text'>
scan-build invoked clang in a way that complains about our
SIGNATURE_XX() macro's sizes being used to assign to things that are
that size in post-process-pe.c.

This patch makes them cast the results to the appropriately sized type.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>sbat.h: minor reformatting for legibility</title>
<updated>2022-05-18T20:37:23+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-05-18T18:39:39+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:610a1ac7614d2ad97b81b250dc37643df610d4f5</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>SBAT revocation management</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T23:01:46+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Jan Setje-Eilers</name>
<email>jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-04-22T20:13:20+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:f81a7cc34e0b1a4f2d3104f44df80f93497eaa9e</id>
<content type='text'>
Support for updating SBAT revocations to latest or previous revocations.

Allow SBAT revocations to be reset to empty metadata only when UEFI
Secure Boot is disabled.

Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers &lt;Jan.SetjeEilers@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add MokPolicy variable and MOK_POLICY_REQUIRE_NX</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T23:01:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-03-31T20:19:53+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:df96f48f28fa94b62d06f39a3b014133dd38def5</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds a new MoK variable, MokPolicy (&amp;MokPolicyRT) that's intended
as a bitmask of machine owner policy choices, and the bit
MOK_POLICY_REQUIRE_NX.  This bit specifies whether it is permissible to
load binaries which do not support NX mitigations, and it currently
defaults to allowing such binaries to be loaded.

The broader intention here is to migrate all of the MoK policy variables
that are really just on/off flags to this variable.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>PE Loader: support and require NX</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T23:01:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-02T23:29:50+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:226fee25ffcbd29988399ba080c7706eb1d52251</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds support in our PE loader for NX support utilizing the
EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE protocol.  Specifically, it changes the loader such
that:

- binaries without the EFI_IMAGE_DLLCHARACTERISTICS_NX_COMPAT flag set
  in the Optional Header are rejected as EFI_UNSUPPORTED
- binaries with non-discardable sections that have both the
  EFI_SCN_MEM_WRITE and EFI_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE flags set are rejected as
  EFI_UNSUPPORTED
- if the EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE protocol is installed, then:
  - sections without the EFI_SCN_MEM_READ flag set will be marked with
    EFI_MEMORY_RP
  - sections without the EFI_SCN_MEM_WRITE flag set will be marked with
    EFI_MEMORY_RO
  - sections without the EFI_SCN_MEM_EXECUTE flag set will be marked
    with EFI_MEMORY_XP

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Add some missing PE image flag definitions</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T23:01:03+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Peter Jones</name>
<email>pjones@redhat.com</email>
</author>
<published>2021-12-02T22:43:29+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:465663e5f6b350abdb18f0ab51ec8924e739bc78</id>
<content type='text'>
This patch adds some missing definitions for PE header flags.  We don't
use all of them, but it's less confusing with the list matching the
spec, except where the spec is obviously wrong.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones &lt;pjones@redhat.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Load additional certs from a signed binary</title>
<updated>2022-05-17T22:30:52+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Snowberg</name>
<email>eric.snowberg@oracle.com</email>
</author>
<published>2022-02-01T20:49:51+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:35d7378d29b9ad6f664df20efc4121e210859e65</id>
<content type='text'>
Heavily inspired by Matthew Garrett's patch "Allow additional certificates
to be loaded from a signed binary".

Add support for loading a binary, verifying its signature, and then
scanning it for embedded certificates. This is intended to make it
possible to decouple shim builds from vendor signatures. In order to
add new signatures to shim, an EFI Signature List should be generated
and then added to the .db section of a well-formed EFI binary. This
binary should then be signed with a key that shim already trusts (either
a built-in key, one present in the platform firmware or
one present in MOK) and placed in the same directory as shim with a
filename starting "shim_certificate" (eg, "shim_certificate_oracle").

Shim will read multiple files and incorporate the signatures from all of
them. Note that each section *must* be an EFI Signature List, not a raw
certificate.

Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg &lt;eric.snowberg@oracle.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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