Revert lots of Cryptlib updates.

OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys
I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker.

Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed
but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test
data to match the bug.

So that's pretty broken.

For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in
the wild to work.

This reverts commit 513cbe2aea689bf968f171f894f3d4cdb43524d5.
This reverts commit e9cc33d6f2b7f35c6f5e349fd83fb9ae0bc66226.
This reverts commit 80d49f758ead0180bfe6161931838e0578248303.
This reverts commit 9bc647e2b23bcfd69a0077c0717fbc454c919a57.
This reverts commit ae75df6232ad30f3e8736e9449692d58a7439260.
This reverts commit e883479f35644d17db7efed710657c8543cfcb68.
This reverts commit 97469449fda5ba933a64280917e776487301a127.
This reverts commit e39692647f78e13d757ddbfdd36f440d5f526050.
This reverts commit 0f3dfc01e2d5e7df882c963dd8dc4a0dfbfc96ad.
This reverts commit 4da6ac819510c7cc4ba21d7a735d69b45daa5873.
This reverts commit d064bd7eef201f26cb926450a76260b5187ac689.
This reverts commit 9bc86cfd6f9387f0da9d5c0102b6aa5627e91c91.
This reverts commit ab9a05a10f16b33f7ee1e9da360c7801eebdb9d2.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 790 deletions

diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 78260664..00000000
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/rsa/rsa_ossl.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,790 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/bn_int.h"
-#include "rsa_locl.h"
-
-#ifndef RSA_NULL
-
-static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
-static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
-                           BN_CTX *ctx);
-static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa);
-static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa);
-static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = {
-    "OpenSSL PKCS#1 RSA (from Eric Young)",
-    rsa_ossl_public_encrypt,
-    rsa_ossl_public_decrypt,     /* signature verification */
-    rsa_ossl_private_encrypt,    /* signing */
-    rsa_ossl_private_decrypt,
-    rsa_ossl_mod_exp,
-    BN_mod_exp_mont,            /* XXX probably we should not use Montgomery
-                                 * if e == 3 */
-    rsa_ossl_init,
-    rsa_ossl_finish,
-    RSA_FLAG_FIPS_METHOD,       /* flags */
-    NULL,
-    0,                          /* rsa_sign */
-    0,                          /* rsa_verify */
-    NULL                        /* rsa_keygen */
-};
-
-const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
-{
-    return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
-}
-
-static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP(buf, num, from, flen, NULL, 0);
-        break;
-    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (i <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
-        goto err;
-
-    /*
-     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-     * modulus
-     */
-    j = BN_num_bytes(ret);
-    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, &(to[num - j]));
-    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
-        to[k] = 0;
-
-    r = num;
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    BN_BLINDING *ret;
-
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rsa->lock);
-
-    if (rsa->blinding == NULL) {
-        rsa->blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-    }
-
-    ret = rsa->blinding;
-    if (ret == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_BLINDING_is_current_thread(ret)) {
-        /* rsa->blinding is ours! */
-
-        *local = 1;
-    } else {
-        /* resort to rsa->mt_blinding instead */
-
-        /*
-         * instructs rsa_blinding_convert(), rsa_blinding_invert() that the
-         * BN_BLINDING is shared, meaning that accesses require locks, and
-         * that the blinding factor must be stored outside the BN_BLINDING
-         */
-        *local = 0;
-
-        if (rsa->mt_blinding == NULL) {
-            rsa->mt_blinding = RSA_setup_blinding(rsa, ctx);
-        }
-        ret = rsa->mt_blinding;
-    }
-
- err:
-    CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rsa->lock);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
-                                BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    if (unblind == NULL)
-        /*
-         * Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
-         */
-        return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
-    else {
-        /*
-         * Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
-         */
-        int ret;
-
-        BN_BLINDING_lock(b);
-        ret = BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-        BN_BLINDING_unlock(b);
-
-        return ret;
-    }
-}
-
-static int rsa_blinding_invert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
-                               BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    /*
-     * For local blinding, unblind is set to NULL, and BN_BLINDING_invert_ex
-     * will use the unblinding factor stored in BN_BLINDING. If BN_BLINDING
-     * is shared between threads, unblind must be non-null:
-     * BN_BLINDING_invert_ex will then use the local unblinding factor, and
-     * will only read the modulus from BN_BLINDING. In both cases it's safe
-     * to access the blinding without a lock.
-     */
-    return BN_BLINDING_invert_ex(f, unblind, b, ctx);
-}
-
-/* signing */
-static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret, *res;
-    int i, j, k, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-    int local_blinding = 0;
-    /*
-     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
-     */
-    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
-    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_X931(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        i = RSA_padding_add_none(buf, num, from, flen);
-        break;
-    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (i <= 0)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_bin2bn(buf, num, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        /* usually the padding functions would catch this */
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
-        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
-        if (blinding == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (blinding != NULL) {
-        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
-        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
-        if (d == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
-                BN_free(d);
-                goto err;
-            }
-
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
-            BN_free(d);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
-        BN_free(d);
-    }
-
-    if (blinding)
-        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) {
-        BN_sub(f, rsa->n, ret);
-        if (BN_cmp(ret, f) > 0)
-            res = f;
-        else
-            res = ret;
-    } else
-        res = ret;
-
-    /*
-     * put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
-     * modulus
-     */
-    j = BN_num_bytes(res);
-    i = BN_bn2bin(res, &(to[num - j]));
-    for (k = 0; k < (num - i); k++)
-        to[k] = 0;
-
-    r = num;
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                   unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int j, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-    int local_blinding = 0;
-    /*
-     * Used only if the blinding structure is shared. A non-NULL unblind
-     * instructs rsa_blinding_convert() and rsa_blinding_invert() to store
-     * the unblinding factor outside the blinding structure.
-     */
-    BIGNUM *unblind = NULL;
-    BN_BLINDING *blinding = NULL;
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
-     * top '0' bytes
-     */
-    if (flen > num) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* make data into a big number */
-    if (BN_bin2bn(from, (int)flen, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (!(rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING)) {
-        blinding = rsa_get_blinding(rsa, &local_blinding, ctx);
-        if (blinding == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
-            goto err;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if (blinding != NULL) {
-        if (!local_blinding && ((unblind = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        if (!rsa_blinding_convert(blinding, f, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    }
-
-    /* do the decrypt */
-    if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
-        ((rsa->p != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->q != NULL) &&
-         (rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->rsa_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa, ctx))
-            goto err;
-    } else {
-        BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
-        if (d == NULL) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx)) {
-                BN_free(d);
-                goto err;
-            }
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
-            BN_free(d);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
-        BN_free(d);
-    }
-
-    if (blinding)
-        if (!rsa_blinding_invert(blinding, ret, unblind, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    p = buf;
-    j = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);      /* j is only used with no-padding mode */
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(to, num, buf, j, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP(to, num, buf, j, num, NULL, 0);
-        break;
-    case RSA_SSLV23_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(to, num, buf, j, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, j, num);
-        break;
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (r < 0)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-/* signature verification */
-static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-                                  unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
-{
-    BIGNUM *f, *ret;
-    int i, num = 0, r = -1;
-    unsigned char *p;
-    unsigned char *buf = NULL;
-    BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(rsa->n, rsa->e) <= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-        return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* for large moduli, enforce exponent limit */
-    if (BN_num_bits(rsa->n) > OPENSSL_RSA_SMALL_MODULUS_BITS) {
-        if (BN_num_bits(rsa->e) > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_PUBEXP_BITS) {
-            RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE);
-            return -1;
-        }
-    }
-
-    if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-    f = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
-    buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
-    if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * This check was for equality but PGP does evil things and chops off the
-     * top '0' bytes
-     */
-    if (flen > num) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (BN_bin2bn(from, flen, f) == NULL)
-        goto err;
-
-    if (BN_ucmp(f, rsa->n) >= 0) {
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT,
-               RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS);
-        goto err;
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(ret, f, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                               rsa->_method_mod_n))
-        goto err;
-
-    if ((padding == RSA_X931_PADDING) && ((bn_get_words(ret)[0] & 0xf) != 12))
-        if (!BN_sub(ret, rsa->n, ret))
-            goto err;
-
-    p = buf;
-    i = BN_bn2bin(ret, p);
-
-    switch (padding) {
-    case RSA_PKCS1_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(to, num, buf, i, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_X931_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_X931(to, num, buf, i, num);
-        break;
-    case RSA_NO_PADDING:
-        r = RSA_padding_check_none(to, num, buf, i, num);
-        break;
-    default:
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
-        goto err;
-    }
-    if (r < 0)
-        RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
-
- err:
-    if (ctx != NULL)
-        BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    BN_CTX_free(ctx);
-    OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
-    return (r);
-}
-
-static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
-{
-    BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    BN_CTX_start(ctx);
-
-    r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-    vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
-
-    {
-        BIGNUM *p = BN_new(), *q = BN_new();
-
-        /*
-         * Make sure BN_mod_inverse in Montgomery initialization uses the
-         * BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag
-         */
-        if (p == NULL || q == NULL) {
-            BN_free(p);
-            BN_free(q);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        BN_with_flags(p, rsa->p, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-        BN_with_flags(q, rsa->q, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-        if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE) {
-            if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-                (&rsa->_method_mod_p, rsa->lock, p, ctx)
-                || !BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&rsa->_method_mod_q,
-                                           rsa->lock, q, ctx)) {
-                BN_free(p);
-                BN_free(q);
-                goto err;
-            }
-        }
-        /*
-         * We MUST free p and q before any further use of rsa->p and rsa->q
-         */
-        BN_free(p);
-        BN_free(q);
-    }
-
-    if (rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC)
-        if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked
-            (&rsa->_method_mod_n, rsa->lock, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-
-    /* compute I mod q */
-    {
-        BIGNUM *c = BN_new();
-        if (c == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        BN_with_flags(c, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->q, ctx)) {
-            BN_free(c);
-            goto err;
-        }
-
-        {
-            BIGNUM *dmq1 = BN_new();
-            if (dmq1 == NULL) {
-                BN_free(c);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            BN_with_flags(dmq1, rsa->dmq1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-            /* compute r1^dmq1 mod q */
-            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m1, r1, dmq1, rsa->q, ctx,
-                rsa->_method_mod_q)) {
-                BN_free(c);
-                BN_free(dmq1);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            /* We MUST free dmq1 before any further use of rsa->dmq1 */
-            BN_free(dmq1);
-        }
-
-        /* compute I mod p */
-        if (!BN_mod(r1, c, rsa->p, ctx)) {
-            BN_free(c);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        /* We MUST free c before any further use of I */
-        BN_free(c);
-    }
-
-    {
-        BIGNUM *dmp1 = BN_new();
-        if (dmp1 == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        BN_with_flags(dmp1, rsa->dmp1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-        /* compute r1^dmp1 mod p */
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, r1, dmp1, rsa->p, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_p)) {
-            BN_free(dmp1);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        /* We MUST free dmp1 before any further use of rsa->dmp1 */
-        BN_free(dmp1);
-    }
-
-    if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
-        goto err;
-    /*
-     * This will help stop the size of r0 increasing, which does affect the
-     * multiply if it optimised for a power of 2 size
-     */
-    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
-            goto err;
-
-    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->iqmp, ctx))
-        goto err;
-
-    {
-        BIGNUM *pr1 = BN_new();
-        if (pr1 == NULL)
-            goto err;
-        BN_with_flags(pr1, r1, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-        if (!BN_mod(r0, pr1, rsa->p, ctx)) {
-            BN_free(pr1);
-            goto err;
-        }
-        /* We MUST free pr1 before any further use of r1 */
-        BN_free(pr1);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * If p < q it is occasionally possible for the correction of adding 'p'
-     * if r0 is negative above to leave the result still negative. This can
-     * break the private key operations: the following second correction
-     * should *always* correct this rare occurrence. This will *never* happen
-     * with OpenSSL generated keys because they ensure p > q [steve]
-     */
-    if (BN_is_negative(r0))
-        if (!BN_add(r0, r0, rsa->p))
-            goto err;
-    if (!BN_mul(r1, r0, rsa->q, ctx))
-        goto err;
-    if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
-        goto err;
-
-    if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
-        if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                   rsa->_method_mod_n))
-            goto err;
-        /*
-         * If 'I' was greater than (or equal to) rsa->n, the operation will
-         * be equivalent to using 'I mod n'. However, the result of the
-         * verify will *always* be less than 'n' so we don't check for
-         * absolute equality, just congruency.
-         */
-        if (!BN_sub(vrfy, vrfy, I))
-            goto err;
-        if (!BN_mod(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n, ctx))
-            goto err;
-        if (BN_is_negative(vrfy))
-            if (!BN_add(vrfy, vrfy, rsa->n))
-                goto err;
-        if (!BN_is_zero(vrfy)) {
-            /*
-             * 'I' and 'vrfy' aren't congruent mod n. Don't leak
-             * miscalculated CRT output, just do a raw (slower) mod_exp and
-             * return that instead.
-             */
-
-            BIGNUM *d = BN_new();
-            if (d == NULL)
-                goto err;
-            BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
-
-            if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(r0, I, d, rsa->n, ctx,
-                                       rsa->_method_mod_n)) {
-                BN_free(d);
-                goto err;
-            }
-            /* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
-            BN_free(d);
-        }
-    }
-    ret = 1;
- err:
-    BN_CTX_end(ctx);
-    return (ret);
-}
-
-static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa)
-{
-    rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
-    return (1);
-}
-
-static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
-{
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
-    BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
-    return (1);
-}
-
-#endif