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| author | Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> | 2017-09-27 14:17:20 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Peter Jones <pmjones@gmail.com> | 2018-03-12 16:21:43 -0400 |
| commit | a32651360552559ee6a8978b5bcdc6e7dcc72b8c (patch) | |
| tree | 0bab10d2247fef9931f69f3b88e487643c608ac7 /lib/variables.c | |
| parent | bfeaae2386fc113aaa4733d0ae3b4ad577fe3a9a (diff) | |
| download | efi-boot-shim-a32651360552559ee6a8978b5bcdc6e7dcc72b8c.tar.gz efi-boot-shim-a32651360552559ee6a8978b5bcdc6e7dcc72b8c.zip | |
MokManager: handle mok parameter allocations better.
Covscan daftly claims:
288. var_compare_op: Comparing MokSB to null implies that MokSB might be null.
2330 if (MokSB) {
2331 menu_strings[i] = L"Change Secure Boot state";
2332 menu_item[i] = MOK_CHANGE_SB;
2333 i++;
2334 }
2335
...
2358 choice = console_select(perform_mok_mgmt, menu_strings, 0);
2359 if (choice < 0)
2360 goto out;
...
2362 switch (menu_item[choice]) {
...
2395 case MOK_CHANGE_SB:
CID 182841 (#1 of 1): Dereference after null check
(FORWARD_NULL)293. var_deref_model: Passing null pointer MokSB to
mok_sb_prompt, which dereferences it. [show details]
2396 efi_status = mok_sb_prompt(MokSB, MokSBSize);
Which is, of course, entirely false, beause for menu_item[choice] to be
MOK_CHANGE_SB, MokSB must be !NULL. And then:
252. Condition efi_status == 0, taking true branch.
2397 if (efi_status == EFI_SUCCESS)
2398 MokSB = NULL;
This guarantees it won't be in the list the next time through the loop.
This adds tests for NULLness before mok_sb_prompt(), just to make it
more clear to covscan what's going on.
Also do the same thing for all of:
MOK_CHANGE_SB
MOK_SET_PW
MOK_CHANGE_DB
MOK_ENROLL_MOKX
MOK_DELETE_MOKX
I also Lindent-ed everything I had to touch.
Three other minor errors are also fixed:
1) the loop in enter_mok_menu() leaked the menu allocations each time
through the loop
2) mok_sb_prompt(), mok_pw_prompt(), and mok_db_prompt() all call
FreePool() on their respective variables (MokSB, etc), and
check_mok_request() also calls FreePool() on these. This sounds
horrible, but it turns out it's not an issue, because they only free
them in their EFI_SUCCESS paths, and enter_mok_menu() resets the
system if any of the mok_XX_prompt() calls actually returned
EFI_SUCCESS, so we never get back to check_mok_request() for it to do
its FreePool() calls.
3) the loop in enter_mok_menu() winds up introducing a double free in
the call to free_menu(), but we also can't hit this bug, because all
the exit paths from the loop are "goto out" (or return error) rather
than actually exiting on the loop conditional.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib/variables.c')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
