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-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn.h2
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_div.c4
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c2
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_print.c35
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c23
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_word.c22
6 files changed, 59 insertions, 29 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn.h b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn.h
index 86264ae6..633d1b1f 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn.h
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn.h
@@ -842,6 +842,8 @@ int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
if (*(ftl--)) break; \
(a)->top = tmp_top; \
} \
+ if ((a)->top == 0) \
+ (a)->neg = 0; \
bn_pollute(a); \
}
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_div.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
index 72e6ce3f..bc37671c 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_div.c
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
({ asm volatile ( \
"divl %4" \
: "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \
- : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "g"(d0) \
+ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \
: "cc"); \
q; \
})
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ int BN_div(BIGNUM *dv, BIGNUM *rem, const BIGNUM *m, const BIGNUM *d,
({ asm volatile ( \
"divq %4" \
: "=a"(q), "=d"(rem) \
- : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "g"(d0) \
+ : "a"(n1), "d"(n0), "r"(d0) \
: "cc"); \
q; \
})
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
index 80105fff..10b78f51 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
@@ -569,7 +569,7 @@ void BN_clear(BIGNUM *a)
{
bn_check_top(a);
if (a->d != NULL)
- memset(a->d, 0, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(a->d, a->dmax * sizeof(a->d[0]));
a->top = 0;
a->neg = 0;
}
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_print.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
index bfa31efc..f121fb6e 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_print.c
@@ -72,12 +72,9 @@ char *BN_bn2hex(const BIGNUM *a)
char *buf;
char *p;
- if (a->neg && BN_is_zero(a)) {
- /* "-0" == 3 bytes including NULL terminator */
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(3);
- } else {
- buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
- }
+ if (BN_is_zero(a))
+ return OPENSSL_strdup("0");
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(a->top * BN_BYTES * 2 + 2);
if (buf == NULL) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2HEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -111,6 +108,7 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
char *p;
BIGNUM *t = NULL;
BN_ULONG *bn_data = NULL, *lp;
+ int bn_data_num;
/*-
* get an upper bound for the length of the decimal integer
@@ -120,9 +118,9 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
*/
i = BN_num_bits(a) * 3;
num = (i / 10 + i / 1000 + 1) + 1;
- bn_data =
- (BN_ULONG *)OPENSSL_malloc((num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1) * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
- buf = (char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
+ bn_data_num = num / BN_DEC_NUM + 1;
+ bn_data = OPENSSL_malloc(bn_data_num * sizeof(BN_ULONG));
+ buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num + 3);
if ((buf == NULL) || (bn_data == NULL)) {
BNerr(BN_F_BN_BN2DEC, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
@@ -140,9 +138,12 @@ char *BN_bn2dec(const BIGNUM *a)
if (BN_is_negative(t))
*p++ = '-';
- i = 0;
while (!BN_is_zero(t)) {
+ if (lp - bn_data >= bn_data_num)
+ goto err;
*lp = BN_div_word(t, BN_DEC_CONV);
+ if (*lp == (BN_ULONG)-1)
+ goto err;
lp++;
}
lp--;
@@ -240,10 +241,12 @@ int BN_hex2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
}
ret->top = h;
bn_correct_top(ret);
- ret->neg = neg;
*bn = ret;
bn_check_top(ret);
+ /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+ if (ret->top != 0)
+ ret->neg = neg;
return (num);
err:
if (*bn == NULL)
@@ -295,7 +298,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
if (j == BN_DEC_NUM)
j = 0;
l = 0;
- while (*a) {
+ while (--i >= 0) {
l *= 10;
l += *a - '0';
a++;
@@ -306,11 +309,13 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
j = 0;
}
}
- ret->neg = neg;
bn_correct_top(ret);
*bn = ret;
bn_check_top(ret);
+ /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+ if (ret->top != 0)
+ ret->neg = neg;
return (num);
err:
if (*bn == NULL)
@@ -321,6 +326,7 @@ int BN_dec2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
{
const char *p = a;
+
if (*p == '-')
p++;
@@ -331,7 +337,8 @@ int BN_asc2bn(BIGNUM **bn, const char *a)
if (!BN_dec2bn(bn, p))
return 0;
}
- if (*a == '-')
+ /* Don't set the negative flag if it's zero. */
+ if (*a == '-' && (*bn)->top != 0)
(*bn)->neg = 1;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
index f9fb2e9e..60d3f226 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_rand.c
@@ -121,15 +121,14 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
int ret = 0, bit, bytes, mask;
time_t tim;
- if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0)) {
- BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
- return 0;
- }
-
if (bits == 0) {
+ if (top != -1 || bottom != 0)
+ goto toosmall;
BN_zero(rnd);
return 1;
}
+ if (bits < 0 || (bits == 1 && top > 0))
+ goto toosmall;
bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
bit = (bits - 1) % 8;
@@ -145,13 +144,9 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
time(&tim);
RAND_add(&tim, sizeof(tim), 0.0);
- if (pseudorand) {
- if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, bytes) == -1)
- goto err;
- } else {
- if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
- goto err;
- }
+ /* We ignore the value of pseudorand and always call RAND_bytes */
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, bytes) <= 0)
+ goto err;
#if 1
if (pseudorand == 2) {
@@ -199,6 +194,10 @@ static int bnrand(int pseudorand, BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
}
bn_check_top(rnd);
return (ret);
+
+toosmall:
+ BNerr(BN_F_BNRAND, BN_R_BITS_TOO_SMALL);
+ return 0;
}
int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom)
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_word.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
index b031a60b..9b5f9cb9 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/bn/bn_word.c
@@ -72,10 +72,32 @@ BN_ULONG BN_mod_word(const BIGNUM *a, BN_ULONG w)
if (w == 0)
return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+#ifndef BN_LLONG
+ /*
+ * If |w| is too long and we don't have BN_ULLONG then we need to fall
+ * back to using BN_div_word
+ */
+ if (w > ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4)) {
+ BIGNUM *tmp = BN_dup(a);
+ if (tmp == NULL)
+ return (BN_ULONG)-1;
+
+ ret = BN_div_word(tmp, w);
+ BN_free(tmp);
+
+ return ret;
+ }
+#endif
+
bn_check_top(a);
w &= BN_MASK2;
for (i = a->top - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
#ifndef BN_LLONG
+ /*
+ * We can assume here that | w <= ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and so
+ * | ret < ((BN_ULONG)1 << BN_BITS4) | and therefore the shifts here are
+ * safe and will not overflow
+ */
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | ((a->d[i] >> BN_BITS4) & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
ret = ((ret << BN_BITS4) | (a->d[i] & BN_MASK2l)) % w;
#else
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-12-17 22:06:22 +0000