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Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c')
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c215
1 files changed, 127 insertions, 88 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 01056356..49c71b91 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -1,29 +1,77 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ * must display the following acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ * being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
*
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include "internal/x509_int.h"
int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
int i;
- const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+ X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
- ai = &a->cert_info;
- bi = &b->cert_info;
- i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
+ ai = a->cert_info;
+ bi = b->cert_info;
+ i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
if (i)
return (i);
return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
@@ -33,97 +81,94 @@ int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
{
unsigned long ret = 0;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
unsigned char md[16];
char *f;
- if (ctx == NULL)
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
goto err;
- f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
- if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+ if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(f);
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
- (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
- (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
+ (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+ (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
goto err;
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
return (ret);
}
#endif
int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
}
int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
}
int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
- return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
+ return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
}
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
{
return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
}
+#endif
-X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
{
- return (a->cert_info.issuer);
+ return (a->cert_info->issuer);
}
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
+ return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
+ return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
}
#endif
-X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
{
- return (a->cert_info.subject);
+ return (a->cert_info->subject);
}
ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
{
- return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
-}
-
-const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
-{
- return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+ return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
}
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
+ return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
{
- return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
+ return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
}
#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
/*
* Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
* Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
@@ -143,16 +188,16 @@ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
if (rv)
return rv;
/* Check for match against stored encoding too */
- if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
- if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
- return -1;
- if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
- return 1;
- return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
- a->cert_info.enc.len);
+ if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
+ rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+ if (rv)
+ return rv;
+ return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+ a->cert_info->enc.len);
}
return rv;
}
+#endif
int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
{
@@ -206,23 +251,21 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
unsigned long ret = 0;
unsigned char md[16];
- if (md_ctx == NULL)
- return ret;
-
/* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
- && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
- && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+ if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+ && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+ && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
) & 0xffffffffL;
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
return (ret);
}
@@ -233,13 +276,15 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
int i;
+ X509_CINF cinf;
X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
if (!sk)
return NULL;
- x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
- x.cert_info.issuer = name;
+ x.cert_info = &cinf;
+ cinf.serialNumber = serial;
+ cinf.issuer = name;
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
@@ -262,26 +307,26 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
return (NULL);
}
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
{
- if (x == NULL)
- return NULL;
- return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
+ if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+ return (NULL);
+ return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
}
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
{
- if (x == NULL)
+ if (!x)
return NULL;
- return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
+ return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
}
-int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
+int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
{
- const EVP_PKEY *xk;
+ EVP_PKEY *xk;
int ret;
- xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
if (xk)
ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
@@ -300,6 +345,8 @@ int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
case -2:
X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
}
+ if (xk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
if (ret > 0)
return 1;
return 0;
@@ -317,8 +364,8 @@ static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
{
const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
int curve_nid;
- if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
- grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+ if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
if (!grp)
return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
@@ -348,12 +395,11 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
unsigned long flags)
{
int rv, i, sign_nid;
- EVP_PKEY *pk;
- unsigned long tflags = flags;
-
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ unsigned long tflags;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
-
+ tflags = flags;
/* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
if (x == NULL) {
x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
@@ -361,17 +407,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
} else
i = 0;
- pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
-
- /*
- * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
- * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
- * Suite-B errors if applicable. This is indicated via a NULL chain
- * pointer. All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
- */
- if (chain == NULL)
- return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
-
if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
/* Correct error depth */
@@ -379,6 +414,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
goto end;
}
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
/* Check EE key only */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
@@ -393,7 +429,8 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
goto end;
}
- pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
if (rv != X509_V_OK)
goto end;
@@ -402,6 +439,8 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
/* Final check: root CA signature */
rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
end:
+ if (pk)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
/* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
@@ -409,7 +448,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
i--;
/*
* If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
- * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
+ * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
*/
if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
@@ -424,7 +463,7 @@ int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
int sign_nid;
if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
return X509_V_OK;
- sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
+ sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
}
@@ -453,7 +492,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
- X509_up_ref(x);
+ CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
}
return ret;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2025-08-30 09:22:03 +0000