Age | Commit message (Collapse) | Author |
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Introduce a new MOK variable called MokListTrustedRT. It allows an end-user
to decide if they want to trust MOKList keys within the soon to be booted
Linux kernel. This variable does not change any functionality within shim
itself. When Linux boots, if MokListTrustedRT is set and
EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE is not set, keys in MokListRT are loaded into the
.machine keyring instead of the .platform keyring.
Signed-off-by: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
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v2 - updated for conflicts and to include documentation (pjones)
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Provide a mechanism for a physically present end user to disable the use
of db when doing signature verification. This is handled by the OS passing
down a variable that contains a UINT32 and a SHA256 hash. If this variable
is present, MokManager prompts the user to choose whether to enable or
disable the use of db for verification purposes (depending on the value of
the UINT32). They are then asked to type the passphrase that matches the
hash. This then saves a boot services variable which is checked by shim,
and if set will cause shim to not use db for verification purposes. If
db is to be ignored, shim will export a runtime variable called
'MokIgnoreDB' for the OS to query at runtime.
Signed-off-by: Josh Boyer <jwboyer@fedoraproject.org>
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Brief overview of the function and format of the various variables used
by Shim and MokManager.
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