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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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This was merged before it was really ready - verify_trusted_cert needs
to check each certificate against vendor_dbx, "dbx", and "MokListX", or
else it can enable a blacklisted certificate accidentally.
This reverts commit 8721bbe6fb1bfdfbc8bd16e05673929e4cbbdedc.
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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scan-build doesn't like it when we assign return values but don't use
them.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Allow shim to perform verification against a list of trusted
certificates by simply concatenating the DER files.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mbrown@fensystems.co.uk>
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There is currently no way for a caller of handle_image() to free the
memory allocated to hold the relocated executable. Fix by adding the
allocated memory address and number of pages as returned parameters
from handle_image().
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mbrown@fensystems.co.uk>
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Treat entry_point as a returned parameter from handle_image(), rather
than using a global variable.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mbrown@fensystems.co.uk>
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relocate_coff() currently modifies the PE header within the raw data.
This appears to be unnecessary, and causes a verification failure if a
second attempt is made to verify the same data buffer.
Signed-off-by: Michael Brown <mbrown@fensystems.co.uk>
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Remove the setup_console(1) calls from shim and instead make lib/console.c
make that call when necessary. This avoids shim forcing the EFI console to
switch to text-mode if nothing is printed.
This commit also modifies MokManager to work the same way for consistency,
even though MokManager will always print something.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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This is a preparation commit for removing the setup_console(1) calls from
MokManager and shim so that we don't force the EFI console to switch to
text-mode.
This commit replaces all direct calls to Print / PrintAt with calls to
the new helpers (no functional changes) so that we can delay calling
setup_console(1) till the first Print call in a follow-up patch.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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When the firmware is using EFI_LOAD_OPTION to specify options for the secondary
loader, the shim will properly detect that and return in set_second_stage. Later
howerer in handle_image EFI_LOADED_IMAGE is being overwritten with load_option
irrespective of the fact that load_option was never set. This effectively
prevents the EFI_LOAD_OPTION from reaching the secondary loader.
Only overwrite EFI_LOADED_IMAGE's LoadOptions when load_option is not NULL
solves the problem.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <lengyelt@ainfosec.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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This makes it so shim's idea of Mok variables all resides in one table
of data, and we don't need a bunch of nearly identical ad-hoc functions
to handle each of them.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Make ImageAddress() directly check for overflow in its math.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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We don't really care if setting MokIgnoreDB fails; don't save the return.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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clang-analyzer thinks that because we're not checking for NULL from
ImageAddress() it can be NULL, but doesn't realize we've already checked
that value once before.
Check it again, it can't hurt.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Clang believes "SumOfBytesHashed" is never used, because the thing that
uses that computed value is #if 0'd currently.
Just swizzle the #if's so that line is also not compiled.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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I'm pretty done with typing uefi_call_wrapper() and counting arguments
every time. Instead, just make the compiler error if we don't have
ms_abi. Also, make it so nothing can use uefi_call_wrapper() directly.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Also consistently name our status variable "efi_status" unless there's a
good reason not to, such as already having another one of those.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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"FixupData" in the edk2 tree is a log of the relocations that happened,
which is allocated by the "client" calling relocate, and written into
while it does relocations. Since we never allocate that log anywhere,
FixupData is always NULL, and so covscan says:
318 case EFI_IMAGE_REL_BASED_HIGH:
319 Fixup16 = (UINT16 *) Fixup;
320 *Fixup16 = (UINT16) (*Fixup16 + ((UINT16) ((UINT32) Adjust >> 16)));
null: At condition FixupData != NULL, the value of FixupData must be
NULL. dead_error_condition: The condition FixupData != NULL cannot
be true.
321 if (FixupData != NULL) {
CID 182859 (#1 of 4): Logically dead code (DEADCODE)dead_error_begin:
Execution cannot reach this statement: *((UINT16 *)FixupData) =
*F....
322 *(UINT16 *) FixupData = *Fixup16;
323 FixupData = FixupData + sizeof (UINT16);
324 }
325 break;
And it's right; all four occurrances are deadcode that never do anything
but confuse the reader.
Kill it with fire.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Covscan says:
455 if (IsFound) {
456 tpm_measure_variable(dbname, guid, CertSize, Cert->SignatureData);
457 return DATA_FOUND;
CID 182850 (#1 of 1): Structurally dead code (UNREACHABLE)unreachable: This code cannot be reached: drain_openssl_errors();.
458 drain_openssl_errors();
459 } else {
460 LogError(L"AuthenticodeVerify(): %d\n", IsFound);
461 }
And, well... woops.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Covscan noticed:
746static EFI_STATUS generate_hash (char *data, unsigned int datasize_in,
747 PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT *context,
748 UINT8 *sha256hash, UINT8 *sha1hash)
749
750{
...
764
CID 182849 (#1 of 1): Unsigned compared against 0
(NO_EFFECT)unsigned_compare: This less-than-zero comparison of an
unsigned value is never true. datasize_in < 0U.
765 if (datasize_in < 0) {
766 perror(L"Invalid data size\n");
767 return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
768 }
And I guess that's a fair point, but some of the callers take the size
as a signed integer. So we should be handling that on all the input
cases instead of getting that far.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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This commit fixes 2 issues with the TPM support code:
1) Remove "REQUIRE_TPM ?=" line from the Makefile, further down the Makefile
checks if REQUIRE_TPM is undefined, but the above line sets it to an empty
string, which is not the same as undefined. Without this handle_image fails
after the tpm_log_pe() call even if REQUIRE_TPM=1 once was not set when
building the shim
2) When secure-boot is disabled then shim_verify() would exit with the
status of tpm_log_pe(), which on systems with a TPM is an error. Combined
with the recent change to always install the shim protocols, this causes
grub to refuse to boot any kernel since the verify() call now always fails.
This commit fixes this by explicitly setting status = EFI_SUCCESS when
secure-boot is disabled.
Signed-off-by: Hans de Goede <hdegoede@redhat.com>
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I don't know when or why we ever see this, but it's easy enough to
avoid.
Resolves github issue #95
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Currently the shim_lock protocol is only installed when SecureBoot is enabled.
However, having Verify just measure into the TPM without SecureBoot is a useful
feature.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <lengyelt@ainfosec.com>
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Currently TPM related errors are being silently discarded.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <lengyelt@ainfosec.com>
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Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <lengyelt@ainfosec.com>
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Currently the only measurement the shim logs in the TPM is that of the EFI
application it directly loads. However, there are no measurements being taken
of application that are being verified through the shim_lock protocol. In this
patch we extend PCR4 for any binary for which Verify is being called through
the shim_lock protocol.
Signed-off-by: Tamas K Lengyel <lengyelt@ainfosec.com>
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Make sure if we chainload things, a chainloaded bootloader will be able to use
the latest systab replacements and protocols. They need to match for things
to validate correctly.
Signed-off-by: Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <mathieu.trudel-lapierre@canonical.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys
I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker.
Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed
but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test
data to match the bug.
So that's pretty broken.
For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in
the wild to work.
This reverts commit 513cbe2aea689bf968f171f894f3d4cdb43524d5.
This reverts commit e9cc33d6f2b7f35c6f5e349fd83fb9ae0bc66226.
This reverts commit 80d49f758ead0180bfe6161931838e0578248303.
This reverts commit 9bc647e2b23bcfd69a0077c0717fbc454c919a57.
This reverts commit ae75df6232ad30f3e8736e9449692d58a7439260.
This reverts commit e883479f35644d17db7efed710657c8543cfcb68.
This reverts commit 97469449fda5ba933a64280917e776487301a127.
This reverts commit e39692647f78e13d757ddbfdd36f440d5f526050.
This reverts commit 0f3dfc01e2d5e7df882c963dd8dc4a0dfbfc96ad.
This reverts commit 4da6ac819510c7cc4ba21d7a735d69b45daa5873.
This reverts commit d064bd7eef201f26cb926450a76260b5187ac689.
This reverts commit 9bc86cfd6f9387f0da9d5c0102b6aa5627e91c91.
This reverts commit ab9a05a10f16b33f7ee1e9da360c7801eebdb9d2.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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This makes shim not create its own keyring and sign MokManager and
fallback by default.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Even if errors occurred, always try to measure all of our Mok entries.
This way we won't fail on e.g. MokList not being set.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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We're currently measuring the raw second stage loader into PCR 9, but
we're closer to spec if we measure the semi-parsed PE into PCR 4. The
hash that's logged is the same as the hash used for the Authenticode
validation, so refactor shim.c a little to separate out the hash
generation.
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It's desirable to be able to use PCR 7 for all TPM policy on Secure Boot
systems, but right now Shim doesn't record any information about its
configuration or the signature used to launch the second stage loader. Add
support for that.
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Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
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EFI_NOT_FOUND will be returned when creating MokListRT if vendor cert is
empty. This is harmless, meaningless and skippable.
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
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start is a UCS-2 character pointer and loader_len is a number of bytes.
Adjust loader_len to count characters before adding to the start pointer.
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Signed-off-by: Gary Lin <glin@suse.com>
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The commit 03b9f800 introduces an issue in case the gap between
SumOfBytesHashed and context->SecDir->VirtualAddress exists.
This would be a typo because a formal PE image always meet
SumOfBytesHashed + hashsize == context->SecDir->VirtualAddress either
the gap exists or not.
Signed-off-by: Lans Zhang <jia.zhang@windriver.com>
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Sometimes we get our own path in LoadOptions for no clear reason. Don't
execute it, just ignore it.
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
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