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| author | Adam Ierymenko <adam.ierymenko@gmail.com> | 2013-12-31 11:03:45 -0800 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Adam Ierymenko <adam.ierymenko@gmail.com> | 2013-12-31 11:03:45 -0800 |
| commit | 10df5dcf707e76d4f66daef8dfb4a51df27abce1 (patch) | |
| tree | e52a72a59461b0125f91261a4029e39c0a0b23dd /node/PacketDecoder.cpp | |
| parent | 8055635e85beba3f0cf028cf3efe50dbf99b0cc3 (diff) | |
| download | infinitytier-10df5dcf707e76d4f66daef8dfb4a51df27abce1.tar.gz infinitytier-10df5dcf707e76d4f66daef8dfb4a51df27abce1.zip | |
Fix several things:
(1) The changes to path learning in the two previous releases were poorly thought out,
and this version should remedy that by introducing PROBE. This is basically a kind of
ECHO request and is used to authenticate endpoints that are not learned via a valid
request/response pair. Thus we will still passively learn endpoints, but securely.
(2) Turns out there was a security oversight in _doHELLO() that could have permitted...
well... I'm not sure it was exploitable to do anything particularly interesting since
a bad identity would be discarded anyway, but fix it just the same.
Diffstat (limited to 'node/PacketDecoder.cpp')
| -rw-r--r-- | node/PacketDecoder.cpp | 76 |
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/node/PacketDecoder.cpp b/node/PacketDecoder.cpp index ca9f18a3..be4650f9 100644 --- a/node/PacketDecoder.cpp +++ b/node/PacketDecoder.cpp @@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r) return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST(_r,peer); case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH: return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(_r,peer); + case Packet::VERB_PROBE: + return _doPROBE(_r,peer); default: // This might be something from a new or old version of the protocol. // Technically it passed MAC so the packet is still valid, but we @@ -195,16 +197,25 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r) if (peer->identity() != id) { unsigned char key[ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]; if (_r->identity.agree(id,key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH)) { - TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); - Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR); - outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO); - outp.append(packetId()); - outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION); - outp.armor(key,true); - _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1); + if (dearmor(key)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop + TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR); + outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO); + outp.append(packetId()); + outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION); + outp.armor(key,true); + _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1); + } else { + LOG("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + } + } else { + TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): key agreement failed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); } return true; - } // else continue and send OK since we already know thee... + } else if (!dearmor(peer->key())) { + TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + return true; + } // else continue and respond } else { // If we don't have a peer record on file, check the identity cache (if // we have one) to see if we have a cached identity. Then check that for @@ -213,20 +224,30 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r) if ((alreadyHaveCachedId)&&(id != alreadyHaveCachedId)) { unsigned char key[ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH]; if (_r->identity.agree(id,key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH)) { - TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); - Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR); - outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO); - outp.append(packetId()); - outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION); - outp.armor(key,true); - _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1); + if (dearmor(key)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop + TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR); + outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO); + outp.append(packetId()); + outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION); + outp.armor(key,true); + _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1); + } else { + LOG("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + } + } else { + TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): key agreement failed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); } return true; } // else continue since identity is already known and matches - // Learn a new peer if it's new. This also adds it to the identity - // cache if that's enabled. - peer = _r->topology->addPeer(SharedPtr<Peer>(new Peer(_r->identity,id))); + // If this is a new peer, learn it + SharedPtr<Peer> newPeer(new Peer(_r->identity,id)); + if (!dearmor(newPeer->key())) { + LOG("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + return true; + } + peer = _r->topology->addPeer(newPeer); } peer->onReceive(_r,_localPort,_remoteAddress,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_HELLO,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,Utils::now()); @@ -908,4 +929,23 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const return true; } +bool PacketDecoder::_doPROBE(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const SharedPtr<Peer> &peer) +{ + try { + uint64_t ts = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_PROBE_IDX_TIMESTAMP); + //uint64_t msSinceLastSend = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_PROBE_IDX_MS_SINCE_LAST_SEND); + Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_OK); + outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_PROBE); + outp.append(ts); + outp.append(peer->lastDirectSend()); // FIXME: need to refactor to also track relayed sends + outp.armor(peer->key(),true); + _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1); + } catch (std::exception &exc) { + TRACE("dropped PROBE from %s(%s): unexpected exception: %s",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),exc.what()); + } catch ( ... ) { + TRACE("dropped PROBE from %s(%s): unexpected exception: (unknown)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str()); + } + return true; +} + } // namespace ZeroTier |
