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authorAdam Ierymenko <adam.ierymenko@gmail.com>2013-12-31 11:03:45 -0800
committerAdam Ierymenko <adam.ierymenko@gmail.com>2013-12-31 11:03:45 -0800
commit10df5dcf707e76d4f66daef8dfb4a51df27abce1 (patch)
treee52a72a59461b0125f91261a4029e39c0a0b23dd /node/PacketDecoder.cpp
parent8055635e85beba3f0cf028cf3efe50dbf99b0cc3 (diff)
downloadinfinitytier-10df5dcf707e76d4f66daef8dfb4a51df27abce1.tar.gz
infinitytier-10df5dcf707e76d4f66daef8dfb4a51df27abce1.zip
Fix several things:
(1) The changes to path learning in the two previous releases were poorly thought out, and this version should remedy that by introducing PROBE. This is basically a kind of ECHO request and is used to authenticate endpoints that are not learned via a valid request/response pair. Thus we will still passively learn endpoints, but securely. (2) Turns out there was a security oversight in _doHELLO() that could have permitted... well... I'm not sure it was exploitable to do anything particularly interesting since a bad identity would be discarded anyway, but fix it just the same.
Diffstat (limited to 'node/PacketDecoder.cpp')
-rw-r--r--node/PacketDecoder.cpp76
1 files changed, 58 insertions, 18 deletions
diff --git a/node/PacketDecoder.cpp b/node/PacketDecoder.cpp
index ca9f18a3..be4650f9 100644
--- a/node/PacketDecoder.cpp
+++ b/node/PacketDecoder.cpp
@@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ bool PacketDecoder::tryDecode(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REQUEST(_r,peer);
case Packet::VERB_NETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH:
return _doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(_r,peer);
+ case Packet::VERB_PROBE:
+ return _doPROBE(_r,peer);
default:
// This might be something from a new or old version of the protocol.
// Technically it passed MAC so the packet is still valid, but we
@@ -195,16 +197,25 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
if (peer->identity() != id) {
unsigned char key[ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
if (_r->identity.agree(id,key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH)) {
- TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
- Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
- outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
- outp.append(packetId());
- outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
- outp.armor(key,true);
- _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
+ if (dearmor(key)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop
+ TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
+ outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
+ outp.append(packetId());
+ outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
+ outp.armor(key,true);
+ _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
+ } else {
+ LOG("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ }
+ } else {
+ TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): key agreement failed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
}
return true;
- } // else continue and send OK since we already know thee...
+ } else if (!dearmor(peer->key())) {
+ TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ return true;
+ } // else continue and respond
} else {
// If we don't have a peer record on file, check the identity cache (if
// we have one) to see if we have a cached identity. Then check that for
@@ -213,20 +224,30 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doHELLO(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r)
if ((alreadyHaveCachedId)&&(id != alreadyHaveCachedId)) {
unsigned char key[ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH];
if (_r->identity.agree(id,key,ZT_PEER_SECRET_KEY_LENGTH)) {
- TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
- Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
- outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
- outp.append(packetId());
- outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
- outp.armor(key,true);
- _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
+ if (dearmor(key)) { // ensure packet is authentic, otherwise drop
+ TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): address already claimed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_ERROR);
+ outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_HELLO);
+ outp.append(packetId());
+ outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::ERROR_IDENTITY_COLLISION);
+ outp.armor(key,true);
+ _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
+ } else {
+ LOG("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ }
+ } else {
+ TRACE("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): key agreement failed",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
}
return true;
} // else continue since identity is already known and matches
- // Learn a new peer if it's new. This also adds it to the identity
- // cache if that's enabled.
- peer = _r->topology->addPeer(SharedPtr<Peer>(new Peer(_r->identity,id)));
+ // If this is a new peer, learn it
+ SharedPtr<Peer> newPeer(new Peer(_r->identity,id));
+ if (!dearmor(newPeer->key())) {
+ LOG("rejected HELLO from %s(%s): packet failed authentication",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ return true;
+ }
+ peer = _r->topology->addPeer(newPeer);
}
peer->onReceive(_r,_localPort,_remoteAddress,hops(),packetId(),Packet::VERB_HELLO,0,Packet::VERB_NOP,Utils::now());
@@ -908,4 +929,23 @@ bool PacketDecoder::_doNETWORK_CONFIG_REFRESH(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const
return true;
}
+bool PacketDecoder::_doPROBE(const RuntimeEnvironment *_r,const SharedPtr<Peer> &peer)
+{
+ try {
+ uint64_t ts = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_PROBE_IDX_TIMESTAMP);
+ //uint64_t msSinceLastSend = at<uint64_t>(ZT_PROTO_VERB_PROBE_IDX_MS_SINCE_LAST_SEND);
+ Packet outp(source(),_r->identity.address(),Packet::VERB_OK);
+ outp.append((unsigned char)Packet::VERB_PROBE);
+ outp.append(ts);
+ outp.append(peer->lastDirectSend()); // FIXME: need to refactor to also track relayed sends
+ outp.armor(peer->key(),true);
+ _r->demarc->send(_localPort,_remoteAddress,outp.data(),outp.size(),-1);
+ } catch (std::exception &exc) {
+ TRACE("dropped PROBE from %s(%s): unexpected exception: %s",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str(),exc.what());
+ } catch ( ... ) {
+ TRACE("dropped PROBE from %s(%s): unexpected exception: (unknown)",source().toString().c_str(),_remoteAddress.toString().c_str());
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
} // namespace ZeroTier