http-api-client: T8955: enable TLS verification by default

ApiClientConfig.verify_tls defaulted to False and ApiClient unconditionally
silenced urllib3's InsecureRequestWarning, so TLS peer verification was off by
default. The sole consumer, src/op_mode/config_sync.py, builds the client
without passing verify_tls and therefore connected to a *remote* secondary VyOS
node over HTTPS without verifying the certificate -- a MITM exposure on the
channel that carries the API key and the full configuration.

- ApiClientConfig.verify_tls now defaults to True and accepts bool | str;
  a string is forwarded to requests as a CA bundle path (verify=<path>).
- InsecureRequestWarning is suppressed only when verification is explicitly
  disabled (verify_tls is False), not when a CA path or True is set.
- config_sync reads an optional verify_tls from the secondary runtime settings,
  defaulting to False to preserve current behaviour for self-signed secondaries.
  The insecurity is now explicit at the call site instead of hidden in the
  library default. Exposing a CA certificate (PKI reference) and peer
  fingerprint pinning under service config-sync secondary is follow-up T9396.

🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

2 files changed, 20 insertions, 4 deletions

diff --git a/python/vyos/http_api_client.py b/python/vyos/http_api_client.py
index ae16cfa54..f0783e3fc 100644
--- a/python/vyos/http_api_client.py
+++ b/python/vyos/http_api_client.py
@@ -51,7 +51,11 @@ class ApiClientConfig:
     key: str
     port: int = 443
     timeout: Optional[int] = None
-    verify_tls: bool = False
+    # TLS peer verification, forwarded verbatim to requests' ``verify``:
+    #   True       - verify against the system CA store (secure default)
+    #   False      - disable verification (insecure; opt-in only)
+    #   "<path>"   - verify against a custom CA bundle file/dir
+    verify_tls: bool | str = True
 
 
 class ApiClient:
@@ -60,7 +64,8 @@ class ApiClient:
     Design goals:
     - minimal surface area (thin wrapper around requests)
     - consistent error handling + typed exceptions
-    - safe defaults for VyOS typical self-signed HTTPS usage (verify_tls=False)
+    - secure defaults (verify_tls=True); deployments using self-signed
+      certificates opt into verify_tls=False or supply a CA bundle path
     """
 
     _DEFAULT_HEADERS = {
@@ -77,7 +82,9 @@ class ApiClient:
         self._session = requests.Session()
         self._session.headers.update(self._DEFAULT_HEADERS)
 
-        if not config.verify_tls:
+        # Only silence the insecure-request warning when verification has been
+        # explicitly disabled. A CA bundle path or True must keep warnings on.
+        if config.verify_tls is False:
             urllib3.disable_warnings(urllib3.exceptions.InsecureRequestWarning)
 
     @property
diff --git a/src/op_mode/config_sync.py b/src/op_mode/config_sync.py
index 8d473cc70..828cd8623 100644
--- a/src/op_mode/config_sync.py
+++ b/src/op_mode/config_sync.py
@@ -73,13 +73,22 @@ def _load_config_sync_settings() -> dict:
     key = secondary.get('key')
     port = int(secondary.get('port', 443))
     timeout = int(secondary.get('timeout')) if secondary.get('timeout') else None
+    # config-sync talks to a remote secondary over HTTPS. TLS verification is
+    # off by default because secondary nodes typically present a self-signed
+    # certificate; an operator can opt in (True, or a CA bundle path) once the
+    # runtime config exposes it.
+    # TODO(T9396): expose ca-certificate / peer-fingerprint under
+    # service config-sync secondary
+    verify_tls = secondary.get('verify_tls', False)
 
     if not address or not key:
         raise opmode.UnconfiguredObject(
             'Config-sync is not fully configured: missing secondary address/key'
         )
 
-    return dict(host=address, key=key, port=port, timeout=timeout)
+    return dict(
+        host=address, key=key, port=port, timeout=timeout, verify_tls=verify_tls
+    )
 
 
 class ConfigSyncDiffManager: