container: T4353: fix Jinja2 linting errors

1 files changed, 27 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/data/templates/container/registries.conf.j2 b/data/templates/container/registries.conf.j2
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4057bb452
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/templates/container/registries.conf.j2
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+### Autogenerated by /usr/libexec/vyos/conf_mode/containers.py ###
+
+# For more information on this configuration file, see containers-registries.conf(5).
+#
+# NOTE: RISK OF USING UNQUALIFIED IMAGE NAMES
+# We recommend always using fully qualified image names including the registry
+# server (full dns name), namespace, image name, and tag
+# (e.g., registry.redhat.io/ubi8/ubi:latest). Pulling by digest (i.e.,
+# quay.io/repository/name@digest) further eliminates the ambiguity of tags.
+# When using short names, there is always an inherent risk that the image being
+# pulled could be spoofed. For example, a user wants to pull an image named
+# `foobar` from a registry and expects it to come from myregistry.com. If
+# myregistry.com is not first in the search list, an attacker could place a
+# different `foobar` image at a registry earlier in the search list. The user
+# would accidentally pull and run the attacker's image and code rather than the
+# intended content. We recommend only adding registries which are completely
+# trusted (i.e., registries which don't allow unknown or anonymous users to
+# create accounts with arbitrary names). This will prevent an image from being
+# spoofed, squatted or otherwise made insecure.  If it is necessary to use one
+# of these registries, it should be added at the end of the list.
+#
+# An array of host[:port] registries to try when pulling an unqualified image, in order.
+# unqualified-search-registries = ["example.com"]
+
+{% if registry is vyos_defined %}
+unqualified-search-registries = {{ registry }}
+{% endif %}