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| author | rockfish-vyos <321823801+rockfish-vyos@users.noreply.github.com> | 2026-08-31 17:57:40 +0000 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | rockfish-vyos <321823801+rockfish-vyos@users.noreply.github.com> | 2026-08-31 17:57:40 +0000 |
| commit | 712c1520f8ebfecf3bc35d9aca21d73d7188f0c2 (patch) | |
| tree | 4967e21929c5646bbb6e5c3ded99b1bc0f06f83c /python | |
| parent | b9fd27b511d22554f294e87e9349456b3418bb2b (diff) | |
| download | vyos-1x-712c1520f8ebfecf3bc35d9aca21d73d7188f0c2.tar.gz vyos-1x-712c1520f8ebfecf3bc35d9aca21d73d7188f0c2.zip | |
ipsec: T9254: do not emit ESN transforms in IKE proposals
get_esp_ike_cipher() renders both IKE_SA proposals and CHILD_SA
proposals. It unconditionally appended the -esn / -noesn variants,
which are only meaningful for ESP: ESN is Transform Type 5 per
RFC 7296 section 3.3.2 and is defined for CHILD_SAs only.
Emitting ESN in an IKE_SA proposal breaks interoperability with
implementations that reject the malformed payload without replying
at all. Observed against a Cisco FTD: the IKE_SA_INIT is silently
discarded, no NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN and no INVALID_KE_PAYLOAD, so the
tunnel never comes up and nothing on the initiator side explains it.
Add an explicit esn parameter defaulting to True so ESP behaviour is
unchanged, and pass esn=False at the four IKE call sites: peer.j2,
profile.j2, remote_access.j2 and l2tp.j2. The five esp_proposals call
sites keep ESN.
ike_group could have served as the discriminator, since IKE call sites
do not pass it, but that coupling is incidental: the argument only
exists to resolve PFS.
Smoke test assertions on the proposals lines are updated accordingly;
the esp_proposals assertions are left untouched.
Diffstat (limited to 'python')
| -rwxr-xr-x | python/vyos/template.py | 21 |
1 files changed, 16 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/python/vyos/template.py b/python/vyos/template.py index dbbc4df84..1233710f2 100755 --- a/python/vyos/template.py +++ b/python/vyos/template.py @@ -483,7 +483,16 @@ def get_first_ike_dh_group(ike_group): return 'dh-group2' # Fallback on dh-group2 @register_filter('get_esp_ike_cipher') -def get_esp_ike_cipher(group_config, ike_group=None): +def get_esp_ike_cipher(group_config, ike_group=None, esn=True): + """Render strongSwan proposal strings. + + esn=True : ESP/CHILD_SA proposals, where ESN transforms are meaningful + esn=False : IKE_SA proposals. ESN is a CHILD_SA transform (RFC 7296 + section 3.3.2, Transform Type 5) and has no meaning in an + IKE_SA proposal. Emitting it there breaks interoperability + with implementations that reject the malformed payload + without replying at all (observed with Cisco FTD, T9254). + """ pfs_lut = { 'dh-group1' : 'modp768', 'dh-group2' : 'modp1024', @@ -530,10 +539,12 @@ def get_esp_ike_cipher(group_config, ike_group=None): group = get_first_ike_dh_group(ike_group) tmp += '-' + pfs_lut[group] - # For 'optional' and 'disabled' we need two values as - # proposal without '-esn'/'-noesn' is incompatible with - # proposals with any of them. - if 'esn' in proposal: + # ESP/CHILD_SA only. For 'optional' and 'disabled' we need two + # values as a proposal without '-esn'/'-noesn' is incompatible + # with proposals carrying any of them. This pairing is meaningless + # for an IKE_SA, which has no ESN transform at all - see the esn + # parameter above. + if esn and 'esn' in proposal: if proposal['esn'] == 'required': tmp += '-esn' elif proposal['esn'] == 'optional': |
