VyOS readthedocs (mirror of https://github.com/vyos/vyos-documentation.git) https://git.amelek.net/vyos/vyos-documentation.git/atom?h=agents-md-bot-workflow 2026-07-28T09:16:46+00:00 2026-07-28T09:16:46+00:00 Yuriy Andamasov yuriy@vyos.io 2026-07-28T09:16:46+00:00 urn:sha1:95e9ad86def9b1f33d65a422e1235011e0fb1225 * security: remediate CodeQL code-scanning alerts (picker XSS sinks, test sanitization, vendored DataTables exclusion) Remediates all 11 open CodeQL alerts on the default branch: - version-picker.js (js/xss-through-dom, alerts 1-3): percent-encode every DOM-derived path component (select.value, parsed location segments) at URL construction time via encodePath()/langUrlFor(), and tighten the parseLocation slug charset to [A-Za-z0-9._-]. No-op on legitimate sphinx slugs — URLs stay byte-identical (asserted by tests). - workers/apex/test/manifest.test.ts (js/incomplete-multi-character- sanitization, alert 6): strip HTML comments from the root.html fixture repeatedly to a fixpoint instead of a single pass. - docs/_static/js/datatables.js (alerts 4,5,7-11): excluded from CodeQL analysis via .github/codeql/codeql-config.yml (new codeql-cfg-path input to the fleet reusable workflow). The file is vendored stock DataTables 1.11.5; the flagged helpers are display/sort normalization, not sanitization boundaries. Excluding keeps the vendored copy byte-identical to upstream instead of hand-patching it. Adds 9 picker tests (hostile-input encoding + slug-charset accept/reject); workers suite 103/103 green. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io) * security: normalize pre-existing percent escapes in encodePath Adversarial-review finding (Codex, medium): location.pathname returns well-formed escapes verbatim, so blind encodeURIComponent double-encoded them (%2E -> %252E), broke the HEAD probe on escaped deep links, and dumped the user at the version root. Each segment is now decoded first (malformed escapes keep the raw segment — no throw), then re-encoded to canonical single encoding. Decoding cannot resurrect dot-segments: the URL parser resolves '.'/'..' and their percent-encoded forms during navigation, so pathname never presents them (verified against the WHATWG parser in Node). workers suite 106/106 (+2 regression tests, mutation-verified). 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io) * security: normalize percent escapes per run, not per segment Round-2 adversarial finding (Codex, medium): whole-segment decode meant one malformed escape (a%20b%zz) threw for the segment and double-encoded the valid escapes beside it. encodeSegment now decodes+re-encodes each well-formed %HH run independently; literal spans (including a bare '%') always pass through encodeURIComponent, so taint neutralization holds unconditionally; a run decoding to invalid UTF-8 stays verbatim (already pure %HH text). workers suite 108/108 (+2 discriminating regression tests). 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io) 2026-07-14T17:24:14+00:00 Yuriy Andamasov yuriy@vyos.io 2026-07-14T17:24:14+00:00 urn:sha1:fc86a64665824b4efb7b4b4d7fba6e9ffa2b406d 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)