vyos-documentation.git/.github/workflows, branch current

ci: T8943: sweep HIGH-producer pins to renamed branches (rollout 1c) (#2071)

2026-05-30T13:05:48+00:00

Rewrites uses: pins to the three HIGH-fanout producers (vyos/.github, vyos/vyos-cla-signatures, VyOS-Networks/vyos-reusable-workflows) from their old default branch to the new production compat branch staged in Task 1. No functional change; pin-ref rewrite only. Tracking: T8943

chore: T8937: retire Mergify-replaceable GHA caller workflows

2026-05-30T07:44:58+00:00

Replaces 5 caller workflows now superseded by central Mergify rules. See https://vyos.dev/T8937 for the design + spec + plan. Advances: T8937 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

ci(ai-validation): allow Pass 2 review on external-contributor PRs

2026-05-29T09:15:36+00:00

The upstream `anthropics/claude-code-action` performs a write-permission check on `github.actor` before our skip logic runs. On `pull_request_target` the actor is the PR author; external contributors resolve to `read` and the action exits 1 with `Actor does not have write permissions to the repository`. Net effect: AI validation has been failing on every external-contributor PR (LiudmylaNad, teslazonda, scottlaird in the last 4 weeks) while succeeding on maintainer PRs. Failure reproduced on run 26541079685 (PR #2061). Fix: set `allowed_non_write_users: '*'` on the Pass 2 step. The action bypasses the actor check when this input is set and `github_token` is provided (already the case). The action also auto-scrubs Anthropic / cloud / GHA secrets from subprocess envs when this input is set. Safe in THIS workflow because the existing defense-in-depth bounds what Pass 2 can do with untrusted PR content: - `allowedTools` restricted to inline-comment + read-only surfaces - `github_token` is the PR-scoped default (not the broader VYOS_APP_ID) - prompt marks PR content as untrusted via `` - workspace-wipe removes `CLAUDE.md` / `.claude/` before Pass 2 - prepare bundles MD via `git show HEAD:` (blob, not `cp`) Full rationale inlined as a comment block above the new input. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

ci: remove PR mirror workflow

2026-05-28T23:10:58+00:00

The mirror caller has been disabled and the target mirror repo at VyOS-Networks/vyos-documentation has been removed. Drop the workflow file so the repo state reflects "this repo does not mirror" without relying on a dangling disabled workflow.

ci(ai-validation): skip prepare on Mergify-authored PRs

2026-05-14T06:27:19+00:00

Lifts the existing Mergify-author short-circuit (today inside validate's `secrets-check` step) to a job-level `if:` on `prepare`, so the whole pipeline skips for backport/queue PRs. Why now: every Mergify backport whose merge ref shares no shallow ancestor with the (advanced) base branch fails the prepare step at git diff "$BASE...HEAD" --name-only ... fatal: FETCH_HEAD...HEAD: no merge base (because base is `git fetch --no-tags --depth=1` and the merge ref is `fetch-depth: 2`). Proximate symptom: run 25842928620 on PR #2042 (sagitta backport of #2023). AI Validation isn't a required check so the queue isn't blocked, but every Mergify backport is left with a red "prepare" check that adds noise to PR review. The validate-level skip in commit 0e8a2956 was correct for the "claude-code-action rejects bot-initiated runs" failure mode but fires too late — prepare has already run and crashed before validate's `if: needs.prepare.outputs.has_md_changes == 'true'` even evaluates. Implementation: single job-level `if:` on prepare. validate's `needs: [prepare]` cascades the skip naturally (skipped needs make the dependent's expression-based `if:` evaluate against empty outputs). The in-step author check in validate stays as defense-in-depth. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

Merge pull request #2023 from vyos/yuriy/doc-linter-cleanup-followups

2026-05-14T05:06:07+00:00

ci(doc-linter): fix 12 accumulated bugs flagged across PR #2014/#2019/#2020 reviews

ci(ai-validation): skip validation on Mergify-authored PRs

2026-05-13T22:16:59+00:00

The upstream anthropics/claude-code-action rejects bot-initiated workflow runs with: Workflow initiated by non-human actor: mergify (type: Bot). Add bot to allowed_bots list or use '*' to allow all bots. This leaves a failing required check on every Mergify backport PR (#2025 today is the proximate symptom — circinus backport of #2016 is blocked from auto-merging by this). Per org policy, Mergify-authored PRs skip the bot-review flow entirely: the underlying change was already reviewed on the source PR. Re-running validation on the backport would also post duplicate findings. Fix: extend the existing `secrets-check` step (kept the id for backwards compat with the cascade of `if: steps.secrets-check.outputs.skip != 'true'` gates) to also short-circuit when `github.event.pull_request.user.login` equals `mergify[bot]`. Add a `skip_reason` output so the notify-on-PR step can distinguish bot-skip (silent) from missing-secrets (post a notice comment). Implementation notes: - PR author is bound through env: PR_AUTHOR (same pattern as secret bindings) so the template-expansion happens before bash sees the value as an already-quoted env variable. - Uses `printf '...%s\n' "$PR_AUTHOR"` for the notice line so the shell — not the YAML template engine — interpolates the author into the workflow log output. - Renamed step name to "Decide whether to skip validation" to reflect the broader scope; step id stays `secrets-check`. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

ci(lint-doc): pin all GitHub Actions to commit SHAs

2026-05-13T21:50:16+00:00

Each `uses:` line was pinned to a mutable version tag (`@v6`, `@v0.8.4`, …). Tags can be rewritten to point to malicious code — CVE-2025-30066 (reviewdog/action-setup) and the tj-actions/changed-files incident in 2025 are the canonical real-world examples. GitHub's hardening guide for Actions recommends pinning to full-length commit SHAs and keeping the tag as a trailing comment for human readability. Resolved each action's tag to its commit SHA via `gh api /repos//git/refs/tags/` and verified the SHA is a commit (not an annotated-tag object) via `gh api /repos//git/commits/`: - actions/checkout v6 -> de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd - bullfrogsec/bullfrog v0.8.4 -> 1831f79cce8ad602eef14d2163873f27081ebfb3 - trilom/file-changes-action v1.2.4 -> a6ca26c14274c33b15e6499323aac178af06ad4b - actions/setup-python v6 -> a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405 This change covers `lint-doc.yml` only. A fleet-wide sweep across every workflow in `.github/workflows/` is a separate effort — worth doing because the drift / supply-chain risk is the same in every one. Tracked as a follow-up to this PR's review. Tracked as item 11 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR #2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

ci(doc-linter): lint added + renamed files, not only modified

2026-05-13T21:49:50+00:00

Previous workflow: env: FILES_MODIFIED: ${{ steps.file_changes.outputs.files_modified }} run: python scripts/doc-linter.py "$FILES_MODIFIED" `trilom/file-changes-action`'s `files_modified` output is modifications-only. A PR adding a new `.md`/`.rst` doc page passed `files_added`, never `files_modified`, so a brand-new page with long lines or real public IPs slipped past the linter entirely. Workflow: also pass `files_added` and `files_renamed` as separate positional args. Each output is a JSON array (action v1.2.4) and is passed via env to avoid shell-quoting issues. Linter: `main()` now accepts one OR multiple positional argv entries, each a JSON array of paths. Arrays are merged and deduplicated before linting. Single-arg invocations remain backward-compatible. Switched from `ast.literal_eval` to `json.loads` — the action's outputs are JSON, and `json.loads` is the right tool (and dodges literal_eval-via-`eval`-substring linter warnings). Test coverage: - Two JSON arrays merge -> single linter run on union. - Empty-string argv entry skipped (no `files_renamed` in many PRs). - Malformed JSON -> falls back to walking DOCS_ROOT. - No argv -> walks DOCS_ROOT. - Single-arg invocation -> backward-compat preserved. Tracked as item 7 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR #2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)

ci(ai-validation): stop retargeting origin to fork URL

2026-05-12T06:20:17+00:00

The previous CR-driven fix (7a7a8002) re-pointed origin to the PR's HEAD fork on the assumption that claude-code-action calls `git fetch origin `. That assumption is wrong for fork PRs: the action detects a fork PR and fetches `pull//head` instead, and those refs only exist on the base repo. Retargeting origin to the fork therefore breaks the fork-PR fetch path with: PR # is from a fork, fetching via refs/pull//head... fatal: couldn't find remote ref pull//head Observed on run 25689321499 (PR #1891 from natali-rs1985/vyos-documentation). Leave origin pointed at vyos/vyos-documentation (the base repo) — that's where actions/checkout left it after the merge-ref checkout, and where `pull//head` resolves. Replace the step with an explanatory comment. 🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)