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Companion to vyos-documentation#2127 (rolling). That PR switched the
Context7 1.5/1.4 variants to branch-backed and moved context7-refresh
to a push trigger, but a push-triggered workflow only fires from the
copy present on the pushed branch. Land the same two workflow changes
on sagitta so pushes here self-refresh the branch variant:
- context7-refresh.yml: workflow_run chain → push trigger on
rolling/circinus/sagitta; refresh payload uses branch:"sagitta".
- Delete update-version-tags.yml (obsolete — no more git-tag
indirection; branch variant tracks HEAD natively).
No context7.json on this branch — Context7 reads config only from the
default branch (rolling). Workflow-only change.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
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(#2108) (#2110)
On a fresh (no-consent) load the consent banner could render completely
unstyled and expand to full page height. Cookiebot delivers its dialog CSS as
a constructed stylesheet on document.adoptedStyleSheets; ReadTheDocs'
readthedocs-addons.js reassigns that whole-array property with a destructive
replace, and when that lands after Cookiebot's network-gated adoption it drops
Cookiebot's sheet, leaving #CybotCookiebotDialog at position:static expanded to
~6700px. It is a race, so it is intermittent and clears once consent is given
(the dialog then never renders).
- layout.html: a small adoptedStyleSheets shim, installed before any page
script, that preserves Cookiebot's sheet so another library cannot drop it.
- custom.css: a leak-safe safety net that keeps the dialog contained even if
its adopted sheet is ever absent. It uses only properties Cookiebot itself
sets, so it has verifiably no effect on the normal, styled banner.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit dce7bb521e3947af59fe18895b609ec353e0450e)
Co-authored-by: Yuriy Andamasov <yuriy@vyos.io>
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Signed-off-by: MilaNad <l.nadolina@vyos.io>
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(#2096)
This reverts commit b4cffbf38e970b2683d07e063cac455371da681e.
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* docs: Update OpenFabric page to VyOS 1.5 standards
* Update openfabric.md
* Update openfabric.md
* Update openfabric.md
(cherry picked from commit 754295dcb7c048e8142b36eb90b9a0b18cad506d)
# Conflicts:
# docs/configuration/protocols/openfabric.md
Co-authored-by: LiudmylaNad <l.nadolina@vyos.io>
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centrally) (#2085)
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high-availability: T7059: Add persistence-timeout option in virtual-server (backport #2053)
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T8960: ai-validation — consolidate cross-repo auth onto vyos-bot App (backport #2077)
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Swap the cross-repo-checkout token from the dedicated vyos-docs-reviewer
App (VYOS_APP_ID/_PRIVATE_KEY) to the shared vyos-bot App via the fleet
get-token composite, scoped contents:read. Skip-check now gates on
APP_CLIENT_ID + APP_PRIVATE_KEY + ANTHROPIC_API_KEY (org-level vyos-bot
creds); reword the stale token comment. PR-comment posting still uses
the default GITHUB_TOKEN. Byte-identical to the paired reference copy in
VyOS-Networks/vyos-docs-opus-reviewer (scripts/ai-validation.yml).
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 459109f13adf026d012c4e803f4a86a8f84e6ce3)
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(cherry picked from commit dc04c30291806195311e585450b490d0c672c356)
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ci(ai-validation): allow Pass 2 review on external-contributor PRs (backport #2063)
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The upstream `anthropics/claude-code-action` performs a write-permission
check on `github.actor` before our skip logic runs. On `pull_request_target`
the actor is the PR author; external contributors resolve to `read` and the
action exits 1 with `Actor does not have write permissions to the repository`.
Net effect: AI validation has been failing on every external-contributor PR
(LiudmylaNad, teslazonda, scottlaird in the last 4 weeks) while succeeding
on maintainer PRs. Failure reproduced on run 26541079685 (PR #2061).
Fix: set `allowed_non_write_users: '*'` on the Pass 2 step. The action
bypasses the actor check when this input is set and `github_token` is
provided (already the case). The action also auto-scrubs Anthropic / cloud
/ GHA secrets from subprocess envs when this input is set.
Safe in THIS workflow because the existing defense-in-depth bounds what
Pass 2 can do with untrusted PR content:
- `allowedTools` restricted to inline-comment + read-only surfaces
- `github_token` is the PR-scoped default (not the broader VYOS_APP_ID)
- prompt marks PR content as untrusted via `<UNTRUSTED-PR-CONTENT>`
- workspace-wipe removes `CLAUDE.md` / `.claude/` before Pass 2
- prepare bundles MD via `git show HEAD:<path>` (blob, not `cp`)
Full rationale inlined as a comment block above the new input.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 1fa39bd7ac64898f7a21922bc0f195d115d3cdeb)
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ci(doc-linter): fix 12 accumulated bugs flagged across PR #2014/#2019/#2020 reviews (backport #2023)
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ci(ai-validation): skip prepare on Mergify-authored PRs (backport #2043)
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Lifts the existing Mergify-author short-circuit (today inside validate's
`secrets-check` step) to a job-level `if:` on `prepare`, so the whole
pipeline skips for backport/queue PRs.
Why now: every Mergify backport whose merge ref shares no shallow
ancestor with the (advanced) base branch fails the prepare step at
git diff "$BASE...HEAD" --name-only ...
fatal: FETCH_HEAD...HEAD: no merge base
(because base is `git fetch --no-tags --depth=1` and the merge ref is
`fetch-depth: 2`). Proximate symptom: run 25842928620 on PR #2042
(sagitta backport of #2023). AI Validation isn't a required check so
the queue isn't blocked, but every Mergify backport is left with a red
"prepare" check that adds noise to PR review.
The validate-level skip in commit 0e8a2956 was correct for the
"claude-code-action rejects bot-initiated runs" failure mode but
fires too late — prepare has already run and crashed before validate's
`if: needs.prepare.outputs.has_md_changes == 'true'` even evaluates.
Implementation: single job-level `if:` on prepare. validate's
`needs: [prepare]` cascades the skip naturally (skipped needs make
the dependent's expression-based `if:` evaluate against empty outputs).
The in-step author check in validate stays as defense-in-depth.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 7d94d6116be1a4776b7317cb5190a83dd065e571)
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docs: fix sagitta interface include text cleanup
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Addresses Copilot review on PR #2023:
1. .. code-block:: tracking was triggered by a plain substring check, which
matched mid-line occurrences too. In MD prose like ``.. code-block::``
(docs/documentation.md:222) this set in_rst_codeblock=True spuriously and
could suppress line-length checks downstream. Replace with a leading-whitespace-
anchored regex and gate on file_ext in ('.rst', '.txt') or an open {eval-rst}
MyST fence so the directive opener is only recognized where it can actually
occur.
2. print('start') in main() was leftover debug noise — remove it.
(cherry picked from commit e87278ef35660a6257b55f4585274a52d3124583)
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removal with word-boundary prefix
Agent-Logs-Url: https://github.com/vyos/vyos-documentation/sessions/cdefcaf2-e89e-4090-b39a-15b385b774df
Co-authored-by: andamasov <12631358+andamasov@users.noreply.github.com>
(cherry picked from commit be8090a3a09adb950557c2887c9a27c017ffd31d)
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Each `uses:` line was pinned to a mutable version tag (`@v6`,
`@v0.8.4`, …). Tags can be rewritten to point to malicious code —
CVE-2025-30066 (reviewdog/action-setup) and the tj-actions/changed-files
incident in 2025 are the canonical real-world examples. GitHub's
hardening guide for Actions recommends pinning to full-length commit
SHAs and keeping the tag as a trailing comment for human readability.
Resolved each action's tag to its commit SHA via `gh api
/repos/<repo>/git/refs/tags/<tag>` and verified the SHA is a commit
(not an annotated-tag object) via `gh api
/repos/<repo>/git/commits/<sha>`:
- actions/checkout v6 -> de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd
- bullfrogsec/bullfrog v0.8.4 -> 1831f79cce8ad602eef14d2163873f27081ebfb3
- trilom/file-changes-action v1.2.4 -> a6ca26c14274c33b15e6499323aac178af06ad4b
- actions/setup-python v6 -> a309ff8b426b58ec0e2a45f0f869d46889d02405
This change covers `lint-doc.yml` only. A fleet-wide sweep across
every workflow in `.github/workflows/` is a separate effort —
worth doing because the drift / supply-chain risk is the same in
every one. Tracked as a follow-up to this PR's review.
Tracked as item 11 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR #2014
/ #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit e99182b911dbe9d3a3f02e000426f7075cadc608)
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Previous workflow:
env:
FILES_MODIFIED: ${{ steps.file_changes.outputs.files_modified }}
run: python scripts/doc-linter.py "$FILES_MODIFIED"
`trilom/file-changes-action`'s `files_modified` output is
modifications-only. A PR adding a new `.md`/`.rst` doc page passed
`files_added`, never `files_modified`, so a brand-new page with long
lines or real public IPs slipped past the linter entirely.
Workflow: also pass `files_added` and `files_renamed` as separate
positional args. Each output is a JSON array (action v1.2.4) and is
passed via env to avoid shell-quoting issues.
Linter: `main()` now accepts one OR multiple positional argv entries,
each a JSON array of paths. Arrays are merged and deduplicated before
linting. Single-arg invocations remain backward-compatible. Switched
from `ast.literal_eval` to `json.loads` — the action's outputs are
JSON, and `json.loads` is the right tool (and dodges
literal_eval-via-`eval`-substring linter warnings).
Test coverage:
- Two JSON arrays merge -> single linter run on union.
- Empty-string argv entry skipped (no `files_renamed` in many PRs).
- Malformed JSON -> falls back to walking DOCS_ROOT.
- No argv -> walks DOCS_ROOT.
- Single-arg invocation -> backward-compat preserved.
Tracked as item 7 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR #2014 /
#2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 1ef5684729646ca3a24aff83ab8edd0aa57914c7)
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`is_docs_path()` returned True for any path under `docs/`, including
the archived RST shadows under `docs/_rst_legacy/` and the build
output under `docs/_build/`. Sphinx excludes both from the build
(per `docs/conf.py`'s exclude_patterns) and AGENTS marks
`_rst_legacy` as reference-only. The linter shouldn't process either.
Add a `DOCS_EXCLUDED_SUBDIRS = ('_build', '_rst_legacy')` constant.
After confirming a path is under `docs/`, walk each excluded subtree
and reject the path if it's contained.
Also unify the auto-discover walk fallback to call `is_docs_path()`
for the filter — previously it had its own hand-rolled `"_build"
not in path` check that didn't handle `_rst_legacy` at all and would
have walked the entire legacy archive. Prune `dirs[:]` in-place at
each walk level so we don't descend into the excluded subtrees in
the first place — optimization on top of correctness. Reverted the
`_dirs` -> `dirs` rename here because we now mutate it.
Test coverage: 10 hand-coded `is_docs_path()` cases — all pass:
- `docs/configuration/foo.md` -> True
- `docs/_rst_legacy/foo.rst` -> False (was True)
- `docs/_rst_legacy/subdir/rst-foo.rst` -> False (was True)
- `docs/_build/html/index.html` -> False (was True)
- `docs/_include/foo.txt` -> True (live snippets stay in scope)
- `docs` -> True
- `AGENTS.md`, `README.md`, `.github/copilot-instructions.md`,
`scripts/doc-linter.py` -> False (already correct)
Tracked as item 4 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR #2014
/ #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 379ed4757b62a7c1df965a59bc4f1fd0cef2d3e8)
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The line-length skip was
test_line_length = not (in_md_fence or in_rst_codeblock)
`in_md_fence` was True for every MyST/Markdown fence regardless of
content type. That includes admonition directives like `:::{note}`,
`:::{warning}`, `:::{tip}` whose content is normal prose, not
preformatted code. Long lines in admonitions were silently skipped,
contradicting the documented 80-char rule which exempts code blocks
only.
Track an `is_code` property on each fence-stack entry. A fence is
code-bearing when:
- info string is empty (plain ``` per CommonMark), OR
- info string doesn't start with `{` (bare language tag like
`python`, `bash`, `yaml`), OR
- info string is `{<directive>}` and `<directive>` is in the
CODE_BEARING_DIRECTIVES set (`code-block`, `code`, `sourcecode`,
`cfgcmd`, `opcmd`, `cmdinclude`, `cmdincludemd`, `literalinclude`,
`parsed-literal`, `raw`, `command-output`, `eval-rst`).
Anything else is prose-bearing (`{note}`, `{warning}`, `{tip}`,
`{deprecated}`, `{seealso}`, …) and its content gets line-length
checked.
`in_md_code_fence` checks the topmost stack entry — the innermost
fence wins, so a `{note}` containing an inner `{code-block}` lints
the outer prose lines and skips the inner code-block body. The
classic `is_suppression_marker()` call still uses `in_md_fence`
because suppression markers are about "any fence depth" not
"code-bearing depth".
`{eval-rst}` is kept in CODE_BEARING_DIRECTIVES to preserve current
behavior — its body is RST and any line-length on nested
`.. code-block::` is handled by the separate RST tracker. Tightening
eval-rst is a separate change if wanted.
Test coverage:
- `_fence_is_code` classifier: 16 cases (code-like vs prose-like)
all pass.
- Integration: long line in `{note}` flagged ✓; long line in
```python``` not flagged ✓; long line in `{cfgcmd}` not flagged ✓;
nested `{note}` > ```text``` — inner skipped ✓; nested `{note}` >
prose — flagged ✓.
Sweep over current `docs/` tree: 28 new warnings surface across the
existing pages (long prose inside admonition directives that the
previous logic had been silently hiding). CI on PR scope is changed
files only, so the new findings appear only when contributors touch
those pages — they won't break this PR or future infra PRs.
Tracked as item 5 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR #2014
/ #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit cd5759f26a1c18abc3c137234cf1ab503e2b26b7)
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The dedent check inside `handle_file_action()` was
if in_rst_codeblock:
if len(line) > rst_codeblock_indent and not line[rst_codeblock_indent].isspace():
in_rst_codeblock = False
This worked only when the next line was at least
`rst_codeblock_indent + 1` chars long — the indexing
`line[rst_codeblock_indent]` requires that. A short dedented
line (e.g., a single character at column 0 under a directive
indented at column 4) failed the length guard and `in_rst_codeblock`
stayed True. The block remained open longer than it should,
suppressing line-length checks on subsequent prose until either
EOF or the next `.. code-block::` reset the state.
Replace with a leading-whitespace-count check: on any non-blank
line, exit the block when leading-ws is <= the directive's
column. Blank lines don't reset the block context.
Test: a 3-line file with `.. code-block:: text` directive at col
0, one body line, a single `a` at col 0, then a 113-char line
at col 0. With the old logic the long line is still treated as
inside the code block and not flagged. With the new logic the
single-`a` dedent exits the block and the long line is flagged
as expected.
Tracked as items 6 and 12 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog
from PR #2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 6628b2901933f67568ba68617ee27c6f843c6dcf)
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The leading-compression group in `IPV6GROUPS` was
r'(?:\s' + IPV6SEG + r':){1,7}:'
The `\s` required whitespace before each hextet in the repeated
group. In practice this meant compressed forms with leading
hextets — `2001:db8::`, `64:ff9b::`, `fe80::1` — only matched
when preceded by whitespace inside the line. The linter calls
`lint_ipv6(line.strip())`, so at start-of-stripped-line there's
no whitespace, and the address fell through to no match.
Real-world impact: a documentation page mentioning
`2001:4860:4860::8888` (Google DNS) or `64:ff9b::1` (NAT64
well-known prefix) at the start of a line silently passed the
IPv6 documentation-address check.
None of the other groups in `IPV6GROUPS` use a `\s` prefix.
This one was inconsistent. Drop the `\s` so the branch matches
compressed forms directly, like its peers.
Verified with 6 hand-coded cases (RFC 3849 doc range, Google
DNS, NAT64 prefix, mid-line and start-of-line positions). All
pass.
Tracked as item 3 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from PR
#2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit cc1b4d7c28272786e39a11b37a3ca22b80b12eec)
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`lint_ipv4()` and `lint_ipv6()` used `re.search`, which returns
only the first match. A line like
Set DNS forwarder 192.0.2.1 then fall back to 8.8.8.8
flagged nothing because `192.0.2.1` (RFC 5737 documentation
range) is allowed and the search stopped there. The real
public IP `8.8.8.8` slipped through despite being exactly
the case the linter was meant to catch.
Switch both functions to `re.finditer` and walk every match:
return on the first disallowed address; only return None when
all matches on the line are allowed (private / multicast /
non-global).
Also fix the casing of "private space" in both error
messages — was "private Space" with a stray capital.
Verified with 7 hand-coded cases (allowed + public mixes,
boundary cases, IPv6 RFC 3849 / Google DNS). All pass.
Tracked as items 1, 2, and 10 of the rolling-side cleanup
backlog from PR #2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 85c0c1ea222d2c70662de5a03ecaf04b6498006e)
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`lint_AS()` and its `NUMBER` regex were a placeholder for a
future AS-number documentation-range check (RFC 5398).
`lint_AS()` was never called from anywhere — it'd merely
`pass` on `re.search` hit. Pure dead code that made it look
like AS-number linting existed when it didn't.
Delete:
- the `NUMBER` regex constant
- the `lint_AS()` function
If/when AS-number linting is actually desired, implement it
properly: hook into the lint loop in `handle_file_action()`,
return the standard `(message, line, severity)` tuple on
violations, and define the allowed AS ranges from
`/^AGENTS.md/` (currently 64496–64511 and 65536–65551).
Tracked as item 8 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog from
PR #2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit 61ecb4e103c6a6225b3d71586f7f65e41c3e3510)
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`lint_mac()` was called and its return value immediately overwritten
with `None`:
err_mac = lint_mac(cnt, line.strip())
# disable mac detection for the moment, too many false positives
err_mac = None
The comment is correct — MAC linting produced too many false
positives — but the cleanup never landed. The dead call ran on every
line for every linted file, and the function/MAC-regex/MAC-error-text
all sat in the source as a misleading hint that MAC linting was a
live feature.
Delete:
- the `MAC` regex constant
- the `lint_mac()` function
- the `err_mac = lint_mac(...)`, `err_mac = None`, and the `err_mac`
entry in the tuple iterated by the error-collection loop in
`handle_file_action()`
Tracked as item 9 of the rolling-side cleanup backlog flagged across
the PR #2014 / #2019 / #2020 reviews. When MAC linting is genuinely
wanted again, recover the regex/function from git history and wire it
in cleanly.
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
(cherry picked from commit ac9f61e5ae366774e51975b0faddd7ba07996762)
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docs: drop unused {include} of _include/common-references.txt from 11 sagitta MD pages + rewrap long lines
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(CodeRabbit review)
preferrably → preferably (openvpn.md:81)
used from → used for (ipoe-server.md:301)
'It and can be' → 'It can be'; wan't → want (vrf/index.md:76)
🤖 Generated by [robots](https://vyos.io)
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