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| author | Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org> | 2007-01-28 21:05:59 +0000 |
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| committer | Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org> | 2007-01-28 21:05:59 +0000 |
| commit | 61aaf3c61a16fb7257ea58f381f3579cea84d9c1 (patch) | |
| tree | fad134cd44ed91f9e14e2890cd0a1497fb25d233 /doc/src | |
| parent | 808cf8b3174aa7ad0833ea69cb55753d21318c9c (diff) | |
| download | vyos-strongswan-61aaf3c61a16fb7257ea58f381f3579cea84d9c1.tar.gz vyos-strongswan-61aaf3c61a16fb7257ea58f381f3579cea84d9c1.zip | |
[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (2.8.1.dfsg.orig)
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diff --git a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.html b/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.html deleted file mode 100644 index 87a13365a..000000000 --- a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2456 +0,0 @@ -<html><head><title>Opportunistic Encryption using The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</title> -<STYLE type='text/css'> - .title { color: #990000; font-size: 22px; line-height: 22px; font-weight: bold; text-align: right; - font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - .filename { color: #666666; font-size: 18px; line-height: 28px; font-weight: bold; text-align: right; - font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - p.copyright { color: #000000; font-size: 10px; - font-family: verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - p { margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; } - li { margin-left: 3em; } - ol { margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; } - ul.text { margin-left: 2em; margin-right: 2em; } - pre { margin-left: 3em; color: #333333 } - ul.toc { color: #000000; line-height: 16px; - font-family: verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - H3 { color: #333333; font-size: 16px; line-height: 16px; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - H4 { color: #000000; font-size: 14px; font-family: helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - TD.header { color: #ffffff; font-size: 10px; font-family: arial, helvetica, san-serif; valign: top } - TD.author-text { color: #000000; font-size: 10px; - font-family: verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - TD.author { color: #000000; font-weight: bold; margin-left: 4em; font-size: 10px; font-family: verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - A:link { color: #990000; font-weight: bold; - font-family: MS Sans Serif, verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - A:visited { color: #333333; font-weight: bold; - font-family: MS Sans Serif, verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - A:name { color: #333333; font-weight: bold; - font-family: MS Sans Serif, verdana, charcoal, helvetica, arial, sans-serif } - .link2 { color:#ffffff; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none; - font-family: monaco, charcoal, geneva, MS Sans Serif, helvetica, monotype, verdana, sans-serif; - font-size: 9px } - .RFC { color:#666666; font-weight: bold; text-decoration: none; - font-family: monaco, charcoal, geneva, MS Sans Serif, helvetica, monotype, verdana, sans-serif; - font-size: 9px } - .hotText { color:#ffffff; font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; - font-family: charcoal, monaco, geneva, MS Sans Serif, helvetica, monotype, verdana, sans-serif; - font-size: 9px } -</style> -</head> -<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000" alink="#000000" vlink="#666666" link="#990000"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<table width="66%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tr><td><table width="100%" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="1"> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">Independent submission</td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">M. Richardson</td></tr> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">Internet-Draft</td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">SSW</td></tr> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">Expires: November 19, 2003</td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">D. Redelmeier</td></tr> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header"> </td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">Mimosa</td></tr> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header"> </td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">May 21, 2003</td></tr> -</table></td></tr></table> -<div align="right"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#990000" size="+3"><b><br><span class="title">Opportunistic Encryption using The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</span></b></font></div> -<div align="right"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#666666" size="+2"><b><span class="filename">draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-11.txt</span></b></font></div> -<font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> - -<h3>Status of this Memo</h3> -<p> -This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.</p> -<p> -Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering -Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. -Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as -Internet-Drafts.</p> -<p> -Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months -and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. -It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite -them other than as "work in progress."</p> -<p> -The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at -<a href='http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt'>http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt</a>.</p> -<p> -The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at -<a href='http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html'>http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a>.</p> -<p> -This Internet-Draft will expire on November 19, 2003.</p> - -<h3>Copyright Notice</h3> -<p> -Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.</p> - -<h3>Abstract</h3> - -<p> -This document describes opportunistic encryption (OE) using the Internet Key -Exchange (IKE) and IPsec. -Each system administrator adds new -resource records to his or her Domain Name System (DNS) to support -opportunistic encryption. The objective is to allow encryption for secure communication without -any pre-arrangement specific to the pair of systems involved. - -</p> -<p> -DNS is used to distribute the public keys of each -system involved. This is resistant to passive attacks. The use of DNS -Security (DNSSEC) secures this system against active attackers as well. - -</p> -<p> -As a result, the administrative overhead is reduced -from the square of the number of systems to a linear dependence, and it becomes -possible to make secure communication the default even -when the partner is not known in advance. - -</p> -<p> -This document is offered up as an Informational RFC. - -</p><a name="toc"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Table of Contents</h3> -<ul compact class="toc"> -<b><a href="#anchor1">1.</a> -Introduction<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor6">2.</a> -Overview<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor13">3.</a> -Specification<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor31">4.</a> -Impacts on IKE<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor38">5.</a> -DNS issues<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor42">6.</a> -Network address translation interaction<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor46">7.</a> -Host implementations<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor47">8.</a> -Multi-homing<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor48">9.</a> -Failure modes<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor52">10.</a> -Unresolved issues<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor54">11.</a> -Examples<br></b> -<b><a href="#securityconsiderations">12.</a> -Security considerations<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor79">13.</a> -IANA Considerations<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor80">14.</a> -Acknowledgments<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.references1">§</a> -Normative references<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.authors">§</a> -Authors' Addresses<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.copyright">§</a> -Full Copyright Statement<br></b> -</ul> -<br clear="all"> - -<a name="anchor1"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.1"></a><h3>1. Introduction</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.1.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor2">1.1</a> Motivation</h4> - -<p> -The objective of opportunistic encryption is to allow encryption without -any pre-arrangement specific to the pair of systems involved. Each -system administrator adds -public key information to DNS records to support opportunistic -encryption and then enables this feature in the nodes' IPsec stack. -Once this is done, any two such nodes can communicate securely. - -</p> -<p> -This document describes opportunistic encryption as designed and -mostly implemented by the Linux FreeS/WAN project. -For project information, see http://www.freeswan.org. - -</p> -<p> -The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and Internet Engineering -Steering Group (IESG) have taken a strong stand that the Internet -should use powerful encryption to provide security and -privacy <a href="#RFC1984">[4]</a>. -The Linux FreeS/WAN project attempts to provide a practical means to implement this policy. - -</p> -<p> -The project uses the IPsec, ISAKMP/IKE, DNS and DNSSEC -protocols because they are -standardized, widely available and can often be deployed very easily -without changing hardware or software or retraining users. - -</p> -<p> -The extensions to support opportunistic encryption are simple. No -changes to any on-the-wire formats are needed. The only changes are to -the policy decision making system. This means that opportunistic -encryption can be implemented with very minimal changes to an existing -IPsec implementation. - -</p> -<p> -Opportunistic encryption creates a "fax effect". The proliferation -of the fax machine was possible because it did not require that everyone -buy one overnight. Instead, as each person installed one, the value -of having one increased - as there were more people that could receive faxes. -Once opportunistic encryption is installed it -automatically recognizes -other boxes using opportunistic encryption, without any further configuration -by the network -administrator. So, as opportunistic encryption software is installed on more -boxes, its value -as a tool increases. - -</p> -<p> -This document describes the infrastructure to permit deployment of -Opportunistic Encryption. - -</p> -<p> -The term S/WAN is a trademark of RSA Data Systems, and is used with permission -by this project. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.1.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor3">1.2</a> Types of network traffic</h4> - -<p> - To aid in understanding the relationship between security processing and IPsec - we divide network traffic into four categories: - -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>* Deny:</dt> -<dd> networks to which traffic is always forbidden. -</dd> -<dt>* Permit:</dt> -<dd> networks to which traffic in the clear is permitted. -</dd> -<dt>* Opportunistic tunnel:</dt> -<dd> networks to which traffic is encrypted if possible, but otherwise is in the clear - or fails depending on the default policy in place. - -</dd> -<dt>* Configured tunnel:</dt> -<dd> networks to which traffic must be encrypted, and traffic in the clear is never permitted. -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -</p> -<p> -Traditional firewall devices handle the first two categories. No authentication is required. -The permit policy is currently the default on the Internet. - -</p> -<p> -This document describes the third category - opportunistic tunnel, which is -proposed as the new default for the Internet. - -</p> -<p> - Category four, encrypt traffic or drop it, requires authentication of the - end points. As the number of end points is typically bounded and is typically - under a single authority, arranging for distribution of - authentication material, while difficult, does not require any new - technology. The mechanism described here provides an additional way to - distribute the authentication materials, that of a public key method that does not - require deployment of an X.509 based infrastructure. - -</p> -<p> -Current Virtual Private Networks can often be replaced by an "OE paranoid" -policy as described herein. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.1.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor4">1.3</a> Peer authentication in opportunistic encryption</h4> - -<p> - Opportunistic encryption creates tunnels between nodes that - are essentially strangers. This is done without any prior bilateral - arrangement. - There is, therefore, the difficult question of how one knows to whom one is - talking. - -</p> -<p> - One possible answer is that since no useful - authentication can be done, none should be tried. This mode of operation is - named "anonymous encryption". An active man-in-the-middle attack can be - used to thwart the privacy of this type of communication. - Without peer authentication, there is no way to prevent this kind of attack. - -</p> -<p> -Although a useful mode, anonymous encryption is not the goal of this -project. Simpler methods are available that can achieve anonymous -encryption only, but authentication of the peer is a desireable goal. -The latter is achieved through key distribution in DNS, leveraging upon -the authentication of the DNS in DNSSEC. - -</p> -<p> - Peers are, therefore, authenticated with DNSSEC when available. Local policy -determines how much trust to extend when DNSSEC is not available. - -</p> -<p> - However, an essential premise of building private connections with - strangers is that datagrams received through opportunistic tunnels - are no more special than datagrams that arrive in the clear. - Unlike in a VPN, these datagrams should not be given any special - exceptions when it comes to auditing, further authentication or - firewalling. - -</p> -<p> - When initiating outbound opportunistic encryption, local - configuration determines what happens if tunnel setup fails. It may be that - the packet goes out in the clear, or it may be dropped. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.1.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor5">1.4</a> Use of RFC2119 terms</h4> - -<p> - The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, - SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this - document, are to be interpreted as described in <a href="#RFC2119">[5]</a> -</p> -<a name="anchor6"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.2"></a><h3>2. Overview</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.2.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor7">2.1</a> Reference diagram</h4> -<br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="networkdiagram"></a> - -<p>The following network diagram is used in the rest of - this document as the canonical diagram: -</p></font><pre> - [Q] [R] - . . AS2 - [A]----+----[SG-A].......+....+.......[SG-B]-------[B] - | ...... - AS1 | ..PI.. - | ...... - [D]----+----[SG-D].......+....+.......[C] AS3 - - - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> - -<p> -</p><table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Reference Network Diagram </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - -<p> - In this diagram, there are four end-nodes: A, B, C and D. - There are three gateways, SG-A, SG-B, SG-D. A, D, SG-A and SG-D are part - of the same administrative authority, AS1. SG-A and SG-D are on two different exit - paths from organization 1. SG-B/B is an independent organization, AS2. - Nodes Q and R are nodes on the Internet. PI is the Public - Internet ("The Wild"). - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor8">2.2</a> Terminology</h4> - -<p> - The following terminology is used in this document: - -</p> -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>Security gateway:</dt> -<dd> a system that performs IPsec tunnel - mode encapsulation/decapsulation. [SG-x] in the diagram. -</dd> -<dt>Alice:</dt> -<dd> node [A] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.1.0.65. -</dd> -<dt>Bob:</dt> -<dd> node [B] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.2.0.66. -</dd> -<dt>Carol:</dt> -<dd> node [C] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.1.1.67. -</dd> -<dt>Dave:</dt> -<dd> node [D] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.3.0.68. -</dd> -<dt>SG-A:</dt> -<dd> Alice's security gateway. Internally it is 192.1.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.4. -</dd> -<dt>SG-B:</dt> -<dd> Bob's security gateway. Internally it is 192.2.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.5. -</dd> -<dt>SG-D:</dt> -<dd> Dave's security gateway. Also Alice's backup security gateway. Internally it is 192.3.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.6. -</dd> -<dt>-</dt> -<dd> A single dash represents clear-text datagrams. -</dd> -<dt>=</dt> -<dd> An equals sign represents phase 2 (IPsec) cipher-text - datagrams. -</dd> -<dt>~</dt> -<dd> A single tilde represents clear-text phase 1 datagrams. -</dd> -<dt>#</dt> -<dd> A hash sign represents phase 1 (IKE) cipher-text - datagrams. -</dd> -<dt>.</dt> -<dd> A period represents an untrusted network of unknown - type. -</dd> -<dt>Configured tunnel:</dt> -<dd> a tunnel that - is directly and deliberately hand configured on participating gateways. - Configured tunnels are typically given a higher level of - trust than opportunistic tunnels. -</dd> -<dt>Road warrior tunnel:</dt> -<dd> a configured tunnel connecting one - node with a fixed IP address and one node with a variable IP address. - A road warrior (RW) connection must be initiated by the - variable node, since the fixed node cannot know the - current address for the road warrior. -</dd> -<dt>Anonymous encryption:</dt> -<dd> - the process of encrypting a session without any knowledge of who the - other parties are. No authentication of identities is done. -</dd> -<dt>Opportunistic encryption:</dt> -<dd> - the process of encrypting a session with authenticated knowledge of - who the other parties are. -</dd> -<dt>Lifetime:</dt> -<dd> - the period in seconds (bytes or datagrams) for which a security - association will remain alive before needing to be re-keyed. -</dd> -<dt>Lifespan:</dt> -<dd> - the effective time for which a security association remains useful. A - security association with a lifespan shorter than its lifetime would - be removed when no longer needed. A security association with a - lifespan longer than its lifetime would need to be re-keyed one or - more times. -</dd> -<dt>Phase 1 SA:</dt> -<dd> an ISAKMP/IKE security association sometimes - referred to as a keying channel. -</dd> -<dt>Phase 2 SA:</dt> -<dd> an IPsec security association. -</dd> -<dt>Tunnel:</dt> -<dd> another term for a set of phase 2 SA (one in each direction). -</dd> -<dt>NAT:</dt> -<dd> Network Address Translation - (see <a href="#RFC2663">[20]</a>). -</dd> -<dt>NAPT:</dt> -<dd> Network Address and Port Translation - (see <a href="#RFC2663">[20]</a>). -</dd> -<dt>AS:</dt> -<dd> an autonomous system (AS) is a group of systems (a network) that - are under the administrative control of a single organization. -</dd> -<dt>Default-free zone:</dt> -<dd> - a set of routers that maintain a complete set of routes to - all currently reachable destinations. Having such a list, these routers - never make use of a default route. A datagram with a destination address - not matching any route will be dropped by such a router. - -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor9">2.3</a> Model of operation</h4> - -<p> -The opportunistic encryption security gateway (OE gateway) is a regular -gateway node as described in <a href="#RFC0791">[2]</a> section 2.4 and -<a href="#RFC1009">[3]</a> with the additional capabilities described here and -in <a href="#RFC2401">[7]</a>. -The algorithm described here provides a way to determine, for each datagram, -whether or not to encrypt and tunnel the datagram. Two important things -that must be determined are whether or not to encrypt and tunnel and, if -so, the destination address or name of the tunnel end point which should be used. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.3.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor10">2.3.1</a> Tunnel authorization</h4> - -<p> -The OE gateway determines whether or not to create a tunnel based on -the destination address of each packet. Upon receiving a packet with a destination -address not recently seen, the OE gateway performs a lookup in DNS for an -authorization resource record (see <a href="#TXT">Use of TXT delegation record</a>). The record is located using -the IP address to perform a search in the in-addr.arpa (IPv4) or ip6.arpa -(IPv6) maps. If an authorization record is found, the OE gateway -interprets this as a request for a tunnel to be formed. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.3.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor11">2.3.2</a> Tunnel end-point discovery</h4> - -<p> -The authorization resource record also provides the address or name of the tunnel -end point which should be used. - -</p> -<p> -The record may also provide the public RSA key of the tunnel end point -itself. This is provided for efficiency only. If the public RSA key is not -present, the OE gateway performs a second lookup to find a KEY -resource record for the end point address or name. - -</p> -<p> -Origin and integrity protection of the resource records is provided by -DNSSEC (<a href="#RFC2535">[16]</a>). <a href="#nodnssec">Restriction on unauthenticated TXT delegation records</a> -documents an optional restriction on the tunnel end point if DNSSEC signatures -are not available for the relevant records. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.3.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor12">2.3.3</a> Caching of authorization results</h4> - -<p> -The OE gateway maintains a cache, in the forwarding plane, of -source/destination pairs for which opportunistic encryption has been -attempted. This cache maintains a record of whether or not OE was -successful so that subsequent datagrams can be forwarded properly -without additional delay. - -</p> -<p> -Successful negotiation of OE instantiates a new security association. -Failure to negotiate OE results in creation of a -forwarding policy entry either to drop or transmit in the clear future -datagrams. This negative cache is necessary to avoid the possibly lengthy process of repeatedly looking -up the same information. - -</p> -<p> -The cache is timed out periodically, as described in <a href="#teardown">Renewal and teardown</a>. -This removes entries that are no longer -being used and permits the discovery of changes in authorization policy. - -</p> -<a name="anchor13"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.3"></a><h3>3. Specification</h3> - -<p> -The OE gateway is modeled to have a forwarding plane and a control -plane. A control channel, such as PF_KEY, connects the two planes. -(See <a href="#RFC2367">[6]</a>.) -The forwarding plane performs per datagram operations. The control plane -contains a keying -daemon, such as ISAKMP/IKE, and performs all authorization, peer authentication and -key derivation functions. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor14">3.1</a> Datagram state machine</h4> - -<p> -Let the OE gateway maintain a collection of objects -- a superset of the -security policy database (SPD) specified in <a href="#RFC2401">[7]</a>. For -each combination of source and destination address, an SPD -object exists in one of five following states. -Prior to forwarding each datagram, the -responder uses the source and destination addresses to pick an entry from the SPD. -The SPD then determines if and how the packet is forwarded. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.1.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor15">3.1.1</a> Non-existent policy</h4> - -<p> -If the responder does not find an entry, then this policy applies. -The responder creates an entry with an initial state of "hold policy" and requests -keying material from the keying daemon. The responder does not forward the datagram, -rather it attaches the datagram to the SPD entry as the "first" datagram and retains it -for eventual transmission in a new state. - - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.1.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor16">3.1.2</a> Hold policy</h4> - -<p> -The responder requests keying material. If the interface to the keying -system is lossy (PF_KEY, for instance, can be), the implementation -SHOULD include a mechanism to retransmit the -keying request at a rate limited to less than 1 request per second. -The responder does not forward the datagram. It attaches the -datagram to the SPD entry as the "last" datagram where it is retained -for eventual transmission. If there is -a datagram already so stored, then that already stored datagram is discarded. - -</p> -<p> -Because the "first" datagram is probably a TCP SYN packet, the -responder retains the "first" datagram in an attempt to avoid waiting for a -TCP retransmit. The responder retains the "last" -datagram in deference to streaming protocols that find it useful to know -how much data has been lost. These are recommendations to -decrease latency. There are no operational requirements for this. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.1.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor17">3.1.3</a> Pass-through policy</h4> - -<p> -The responder forwards the datagram using the normal forwarding table. -The responder enters this state only by command from the keying daemon, -and upon entering this state, also forwards the "first" and "last" datagrams. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.1.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor18">3.1.4</a> Deny policy</h4> - -<p> -The responder discards the datagram. The responder enters this state only by -command -from the keying daemon, and upon entering this state, discards the "first" -and "last" datagrams. -Local administration decides if further datagrams cause ICMP messages -to be generated (i.e. ICMP Destination Unreachable, Communication -Administratively Prohibited. type=3, code=13). - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.1.5"></a><h4><a name="anchor19">3.1.5</a> Encrypt policy</h4> - -<p> -The responder encrypts the datagram using the indicated security association database -(SAD) entry. The responder enters this state only by command from the keying daemon, and upon entering -this state, releases and forwards the "first" and "last" datagrams using the -new encrypt policy. - -</p> -<p> -If the associated SAD entry expires because of byte, packet or time limits, then -the entry returns to the Hold policy, and an expire message is sent to the keying daemon. - -</p> -<p> -All states may be created directly by the keying daemon while acting as a -responder. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2"></a><h4><a name="initclasses">3.2</a> Keying state machine - initiator</h4> - -<p> -Let the keying daemon maintain a collection of objects. Let them be -called "connections" or "conn"s. There are two categories of -connection objects: classes and instances. A class represents an -abstract policy - what could be. An instance represents an actual connection - -what is implemented at the time. - -</p> -<p> -Let there be two further subtypes of connections: keying channels (Phase -1 SAs) and data channels (Phase 2 SAs). Each data channel object may have -a corresponding SPD and SAD entry maintained by the datagram state machine. - -</p> -<p> -For the purposes of opportunistic encryption, there MUST, at least, be -connection classes known as "deny", "always-clear-text", "OE-permissive", and -"OE-paranoid". -The latter two connection classes define a set of source and/or destination -addresses for which opportunistic encryption will be attempted. The administrator MAY set policy -options in a number of additional places. An implementation MAY create additional connection classes to further refine -these policies. - -</p> -<p> -The simplest system may need only the "OE-permissive" connection, and would -list its own (single) IP address as the source address of this policy and -the wild-card address 0.0.0.0/0 as the destination IPv4 address. That is, the -simplest policy is to try opportunistic encryption with all destinations. - -</p> -<p> -The distinction between permissive and paranoid OE use will become clear -in the state transition differences. In general a permissive OE will, on -failure, install a pass-through policy, while a paranoid OE will, on failure, -install a drop policy. - -</p> -<p> -In this description of the keying machine's state transitions, the states -associated with the keying system itself are omitted because they are best documented in the keying system -(<a href="#RFC2407">[8]</a>, -<a href="#RFC2408">[9]</a> and <a href="#RFC2409">[10]</a> for ISAKMP/IKE), -and the details are keying system specific. Opportunistic encryption is not -dependent upon any specific keying protocol, but this document does provide -requirements for those using ISAKMP/IKE to assure that implementations inter-operate. - -</p> -<p> -The state transitions that may be involved in communicating with the -forwarding plane are omitted. PF_KEY and similar protocols have their own -set of states required for message sends and completion notifications. - -</p> -<p> -Finally, the retransmits and recursive lookups that are normal for DNS are -not included in this description of the state machine. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor20">3.2.1</a> Nonexistent connection</h4> - -<p> -There is no connection instance for a given source/destination address pair. -Upon receipt of a request for keying material for this -source/destination pair, the initiator searches through the connection classes to -determine the most appropriate policy. Upon determining an appropriate -connection class, an instance object is created of that type. -Both of the OE types result in a potential OE connection. - -</p> -<p>Failure to find an appropriate connection class results in an -administrator defined default. - -</p> -<p> -In each case, when the initiator finds an appropriate class for the new flow, -an instance connection is made of the class which matched. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor21">3.2.2</a> Clear-text connection</h4> - -<p> -The non-existent connection makes a transition to this state when an -always-clear-text class is instantiated, or when an OE-permissive -connection fails. During the transition, the initiator creates a pass-through -policy object in the forwarding plane for the appropriate flow. - -</p> -<p> -Timing out is the only way to leave this state -(see <a href="#expiring">Expiring connection</a>). - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor22">3.2.3</a> Deny connection</h4> - -<p> -The empty connection makes a transition to this state when a -deny class is instantiated, or when an OE-paranoid connection fails. -During the transition, the initiator creates a deny policy object in the forwarding plane -for the appropriate flow. - -</p> -<p> -Timing out is the only way to leave this state -(see <a href="#expiring">Expiring connection</a>). - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor23">3.2.4</a> Potential OE connection</h4> - -<p> -The empty connection makes a transition to this state when one of either OE class is instantiated. -During the transition to this state, the initiator creates a hold policy object in the -forwarding plane for the appropriate flow. - -</p> -<p> -In addition, when making a transition into this state, DNS lookup is done in -the reverse-map for a TXT delegation resource record (see <a href="#TXT">Use of TXT delegation record</a>). -The lookup key is the destination address of the flow. - -</p> -<p> -There are three ways to exit this state: - -<ol class="text"> -<li>DNS lookup finds a TXT delegation resource record. -</li> -<li>DNS lookup does not find a TXT delegation resource record. -</li> -<li>DNS lookup times out. -</li> -</ol><p> -</p> -<p> -Based upon the results of the DNS lookup, the potential OE connection makes a -transition to the pending OE connection state. The conditions for a -successful DNS look are: - -<ol class="text"> -<li>DNS finds an appropriate resource record -</li> -<li>It is properly formatted according to <a href="#TXT">Use of TXT delegation record</a> -</li> -<li> if DNSSEC is enabled, then the signature has been vouched for. -</li> -</ol><p> - -Note that if the initiator does not find the public key -present in the TXT delegation record, then the public key must -be looked up as a sub-state. Only successful completion of all the -DNS lookups is considered a success. - -</p> -<p> -If DNS lookup does not find a resource record or DNS times out, then the -initiator considers the receiver not OE capable. If this is an OE-paranoid instance, -then the potential OE connection makes a transition to the deny connection state. -If this is an OE-permissive instance, then the potential OE connection makes a transition to the -clear-text connection state. - -</p> -<p> -If the initiator finds a resource record but it is not properly formatted, or -if DNSSEC is -enabled and reports a failure to authenticate, then the potential OE -connection should make a -transition to the deny connection state. This action SHOULD be logged. If the -administrator wishes to override this transition between states, then an -always-clear class can be installed for this flow. An implementation MAY make -this situation a new class. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.4.1"></a><h4><a name="nodnssec">3.2.4.1</a> Restriction on unauthenticated TXT delegation records</h4> - -<p> -An implementation SHOULD also provide an additional administrative control -on delegation records and DNSSEC. This control would apply to delegation -records (the TXT records in the reverse-map) that are not protected by -DNSSEC. -Records of this type are only permitted to delegate to their own address as -a gateway. When this option is enabled, an active attack on DNS will be -unable to redirect packets to other than the original destination. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.5"></a><h4><a name="anchor24">3.2.5</a> Pending OE connection</h4> - -<p> -The potential OE connection makes a transition to this state when -the initiator determines that all the information required from the DNS lookup is present. -Upon entering this state, the initiator attempts to initiate keying to the gateway -provided. - -</p> -<p> -Exit from this state occurs either with a successfully created IPsec SA, or -with a failure of some kind. Successful SA creation results in a transition -to the key connection state. - -</p> -<p> -Three failures have caused significant problems. They are clearly not the -only possible failures from keying. - -</p> -<p> -Note that if there are multiple gateways available in the TXT delegation -records, then a failure can only be declared after all have been -tried. Further, creation of a phase 1 SA does not constitute success. A set -of phase 2 SAs (a tunnel) is considered success. - -</p> -<p> -The first failure occurs when an ICMP port unreachable is consistently received -without any other communication, or when there is silence from the remote -end. This usually means that either the gateway is not alive, or the -keying daemon is not functional. For an OE-permissive connection, the initiator makes a transition -to the clear-text connection but with a low lifespan. For an OE-pessimistic connection, -the initiator makes a transition to the deny connection again with a low lifespan. The lifespan in both -cases is kept low because the remote gateway may -be in the process of rebooting or be otherwise temporarily unavailable. - -</p> -<p> -The length of time to wait for the remote keying daemon to wake up is -a matter of some debate. If there is a routing failure, 5 minutes is usually long enough for the network to -re-converge. Many systems can reboot in that amount of -time as well. However, 5 minutes is far too long for most users to wait to -hear that they can not connect using OE. Implementations SHOULD make this a -tunable parameter. - -</p> -<p> -The second failure occurs after a phase 1 SA has been created, but there is -either no response to the phase 2 proposal, or the initiator receives a -negative notify (the notify must be -authenticated). The remote gateway is not prepared to do OE at this time. -As before, the initiator makes a transition to the clear-text or the deny -connection based upon connection class, but this -time with a normal lifespan. - -</p> -<p> -The third failure occurs when there is signature failure while authenticating -the remote gateway. This can occur when there has been a -key roll-over, but DNS has not caught up. In this case again, the initiator makes a -transition to the clear-text or the deny connection based -upon the connection class. However, the lifespan depends upon the remaining -time to live in the DNS. (Note that DNSSEC signed resource records have a different -expiry time than non-signed records.) - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.6"></a><h4><a name="keyed">3.2.6</a> Keyed connection</h4> - -<p> -The pending OE connection makes a transition to this state when -session keying material (the phase 2 SAs) is derived. The initiator creates an encrypt -policy in the forwarding plane for this flow. - -</p> -<p> -There are three ways to exit this state. The first is by receipt of an -authenticated delete message (via the keying channel) from the peer. This is -normal teardown and results in a transition to the expired connection state. - -</p> -<p> -The second exit is by expiry of the forwarding plane keying material. This -starts a re-key operation with a transition back to pending OE -connection. In general, the soft expiry occurs with sufficient time left -to continue to use the keys. A re-key can fail, which may -result in the connection failing to clear-text or deny as -appropriate. In the event of a failure, the forwarding plane -policy does not change until the phase 2 SA (IPsec SA) reaches its -hard expiry. - -</p> -<p> -The third exit is in response to a negotiation from a remote -gateway. If the forwarding plane signals the control plane that it has received an -unknown SPI from the remote gateway, or an ICMP is received from the remote gateway -indicating an unknown SPI, the initiator should consider that -the remote gateway has rebooted or restarted. Since these -indications are easily forged, the implementation must -exercise care. The initiator should make a cautious -(rate-limited) attempt to re-key the connection. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.7"></a><h4><a name="expiring">3.2.7</a> Expiring connection</h4> - -<p> -The initiator will periodically place each of the deny, clear-text, and keyed -connections into this -sub-state. See <a href="#teardown">Renewal and teardown</a> for more details of how often this -occurs. -The initiator queries the forwarding plane for last use time of the -appropriate -policy. If the last use time is relatively recent, then the connection -returns to the -previous deny, clear-text or keyed connection state. If not, then the -connection enters -the expired connection state. - -</p> -<p> -The DNS query and answer that lead to the expiring connection state are also -examined. The DNS query may become stale. (A negative, i.e. no such record, answer -is valid for the period of time given by the MINIMUM field in an attached SOA -record. See <a href="#RFC1034">[12]</a> section 4.3.4.) -If the DNS query is stale, then a new query is made. If the results change, then the connection -makes a transition to a new state as described in potential OE connection state. - -</p> -<p> -Note that when considering how stale a connection is, both outgoing SPD and -incoming SAD must be queried as some flows may be unidirectional for some time. - -</p> -<p> -Also note that the policy at the forwarding plane is not updated unless there -is a conclusion that there should be a change. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2.8"></a><h4><a name="anchor25">3.2.8</a> Expired connection</h4> - -<p> -Entry to this state occurs when no datagrams have been forwarded recently via the -appropriate SPD and SAD objects. The objects in the forwarding plane are -removed (logging any final byte and packet counts if appropriate) and the -connection instance in the keying plane is deleted. - -</p> -<p> -The initiator sends an ISAKMP/IKE delete to clean up the phase 2 SAs as described in -<a href="#teardown">Renewal and teardown</a>. - -</p> -<p> -Whether or not to delete the phase 1 SAs -at this time is left as a local implementation issue. Implementations -that do delete the phase 1 SAs MUST send authenticated delete messages to -indicate that they are doing so. There is an advantage to keeping -the phase 1 SAs until they expire - they may prove useful again in the -near future. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor26">3.3</a> Keying state machine - responder</h4> - -<p> -The responder has a set of objects identical to those of the initiator. - -</p> -<p> -The responder receives an invitation to create a keying channel from an initiator. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.3.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor27">3.3.1</a> Unauthenticated OE peer</h4> - -<p> -Upon entering this state, the responder starts a DNS lookup for a KEY record for the -initiator. -The responder looks in the reverse-map for a KEY record for the initiator if the -initiator has offered an ID_IPV4_ADDR, and in the forward map if the -initiator has offered an ID_FQDN type. (See <a href="#RFC2407">[8]</a> section -4.6.2.1.) - -</p> -<p> -The responder exits this state upon successful receipt of a KEY from DNS, and use of the key -to verify the signature of the initiator. - -</p> -<p> -Successful authentication of the peer results in a transition to the -authenticated OE Peer state. - -</p> -<p> -Note that the unauthenticated OE peer state generally occurs in the middle of the key negotiation -protocol. It is really a form of pseudo-state. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.3.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor28">3.3.2</a> Authenticated OE Peer</h4> - -<p> -The peer will eventually propose one or more phase 2 SAs. The responder uses the source and -destination address in the proposal to -finish instantiating the connection state -using the connection class table. -The responder MUST search for an identical connection object at this point. - -</p> -<p> -If an identical connection is found, then the responder deletes the old instance, -and the new object makes a transition to the pending OE connection state. This means -that new ISAKMP connections with a given peer will always use the latest -instance, which is the correct one if the peer has rebooted in the interim. - -</p> -<p> -If an identical connection is not found, then the responder makes the transition according to the -rules given for the initiator. - -</p> -<p> -Note that if the initiator is in OE-paranoid mode and the responder is in -either always-clear-text or deny, then no communication is possible according -to policy. An implementation is permitted to create new types of policies -such as "accept OE but do not initiate it". This is a local matter. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.4"></a><h4><a name="teardown">3.4</a> Renewal and teardown</h4> - -<a name="rfc.section.3.4.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor29">3.4.1</a> Aging</h4> - -<p> -A potentially unlimited number of tunnels may exist. In practice, only a few -tunnels are used during a period of time. Unused tunnels MUST, therefore, be -torn down. Detecting when tunnels are no longer in use is the subject of this section. - -</p> -<p> -There are two methods for removing tunnels: explicit deletion or expiry. - -</p> -<p> -Explicit deletion requires an IKE delete message. As the deletes -MUST be authenticated, both ends of the tunnel must maintain the -key channel (phase 1 ISAKMP SA). An implementation which refuses to either maintain or -recreate the keying channel SA will be unable to use this method. - -</p> -<p> -The tunnel expiry method, simply allows the IKE daemon to -expire normally without attempting to re-key it. - -</p> -<p> -Regardless of which method is used to remove tunnels, the implementation requires -a method to determine if the tunnel is still in use. The specifics are a -local matter, but the FreeS/WAN project uses the following criteria. These -criteria are currently implemented in the key management daemon, but could -also be implemented at the SPD layer using an idle timer. - -</p> -<p> -Set a short initial (soft) lifespan of 1 minute since many net flows last -only a few seconds. - -</p> -<p> -At the end of the lifespan, check to see if the tunnel was used by -traffic in either direction during the last 30 seconds. If so, assign a -longer tentative lifespan of 20 minutes after which, look again. If the -tunnel is not in use, then close the tunnel. - -</p> -<p> -The expiring state in the key management -system (see <a href="#expiring">Expiring connection</a>) implements these timeouts. -The timer above may be in the forwarding plane, -but then it must be re-settable. - -</p> -<p> -The tentative lifespan is independent of re-keying; it is just the time when -the tunnel's future is next considered. -(The term lifespan is used here rather than lifetime for this reason.) -Unlike re-keying, this tunnel use check is not costly and should happen -reasonably frequently. - -</p> -<p> -A multi-step back-off algorithm is not considered worth the effort here. - -</p> -<p> -If the security gateway and the client host are the -same and not a Bump-in-the-Stack or Bump-in-the-Wire implementation, tunnel -teardown decisions MAY pay attention to TCP connection status as reported -by the local TCP layer. A still-open TCP connection is almost a guarantee that more traffic is -expected. Closing of the only TCP connection through a tunnel is a -strong hint that no more traffic is expected. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.4.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor30">3.4.2</a> Teardown and cleanup</h4> - -<p> -Teardown should always be coordinated between the two ends of the tunnel by -interpreting and sending delete notifications. There is a -detailed sub-state in the expired connection state of the key manager that -relates to retransmits of the delete notifications, but this is considered to -be a keying system detail. - -</p> -<p> -On receiving a delete for the outbound SAs of a tunnel (or some subset of -them), tear down the inbound ones also and notify the remote end with a -delete. If the local system receives a delete for a tunnel which is no longer in -existence, then two delete messages have crossed paths. Ignore the delete. -The operation has already been completed. Do not generate any messages in this -situation. - -</p> -<p> -Tunnels are to be considered as bidirectional entities, even though the -low-level protocols don't treat them this way. - -</p> -<p> -When the deletion is initiated locally, rather than as a -response to a received delete, send a delete for (all) the -inbound SAs of a tunnel. If the local system does not receive a responding delete -for the outbound SAs, try re-sending the original -delete. Three tries spaced 10 seconds apart seems a reasonable -level of effort. A failure of the other end to respond after 3 attempts, -indicates that the possibility of further communication is unlikely. Remove the outgoing SAs. -(The remote system may be a mobile node that is no longer present or powered on.) - -</p> -<p> -After re-keying, transmission should switch to using the new -outgoing SAs (ISAKMP or IPsec) immediately, and the old leftover -outgoing SAs should be cleared out promptly (delete should be sent -for the outgoing SAs) rather than waiting for them to expire. This -reduces clutter and minimizes confusion for the operator doing diagnostics. - -</p> -<a name="anchor31"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.4"></a><h3>4. Impacts on IKE</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.4.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor32">4.1</a> ISAKMP/IKE protocol</h4> - -<p> - The IKE wire protocol needs no modifications. The major changes are - implementation issues relating to how the proposals are interpreted, and from - whom they may come. - -</p> -<p> - As opportunistic encryption is designed to be useful between peers without - prior operator configuration, an IKE daemon must be prepared to negotiate - phase 1 SAs with any node. This may require a large amount of resources to - maintain cookie state, as well as large amounts of entropy for nonces, - cookies and so on. - -</p> -<p> - The major changes to support opportunistic encryption are at the IKE daemon - level. These changes relate to handling of key acquisition requests, lookup - of public keys and TXT records, and interactions with firewalls and other - security facilities that may be co-resident on the same gateway. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor33">4.2</a> Gateway discovery process</h4> - -<p> - In a typical configured tunnel, the address of SG-B is provided - via configuration. Furthermore, the mapping of an SPD entry to a gateway is - typically a 1:1 mapping. When the 0.0.0.0/0 SPD entry technique is used, then - the mapping to a gateway is determined by the reverse DNS records. - -</p> -<p> - The need to do a DNS lookup and wait for a reply will typically introduce a - new state and a new event source (DNS replies) to IKE. Although a -synchronous DNS request can be implemented for proof of concept, experience -is that it can cause very high latencies when a queue of queries must -all timeout in series. - -</p> -<p> - Use of an asynchronous DNS lookup will also permit overlap of DNS lookups with - some of the protocol steps. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor34">4.3</a> Self identification</h4> - -<p> - SG-A will have to establish its identity. Use an - IPv4 ID in phase 1. - -</p> -<p> There are many situations where the administrator of SG-A may not be - able to control the reverse DNS records for SG-A's public IP address. - Typical situations include dialup connections and most residential-type broadband Internet access - (ADSL, cable-modem) connections. In these situations, a fully qualified domain - name that is under the control of SG-A's administrator may be used - when acting as an initiator only. - The FQDN ID should be used in phase 1. See <a href="#fqdn">Use of FQDN IDs</a> - for more details and restrictions. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor35">4.4</a> Public key retrieval process</h4> - -<p> - Upon receipt of a phase 1 SA proposal with either an IPv4 (IPv6) ID or - an FQDN ID, an IKE daemon needs to examine local caches and - configuration files to determine if this is part of a configured tunnel. - If no configured tunnels are found, then the implementation should attempt to retrieve - a KEY record from the reverse DNS in the case of an IPv4/IPv6 ID, or - from the forward DNS in the case of FQDN ID. - -</p> -<p> - It is reasonable that if other non-local sources of policy are used - (COPS, LDAP), they be consulted concurrently but some - clear ordering of policy be provided. Note that due to variances in - latency, implementations must wait for positive or negative replies from all sources - of policy before making any decisions. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.5"></a><h4><a name="anchor36">4.5</a> Interactions with DNSSEC</h4> - -<p> - The implementation described (1.98) neither uses DNSSEC directly to - explicitly verify the authenticity of zone information, nor uses the NXT - records to provide authentication of the absence of a TXT or KEY - record. Rather, this implementation uses a trusted path to a DNSSEC - capable caching resolver. - -</p> -<p> - To distinguish between an authenticated and an unauthenticated DNS - resource record, a stub resolver capable of returning DNSSEC - information MUST be used. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.6"></a><h4><a name="anchor37">4.6</a> Required proposal types</h4> - -<a name="rfc.section.4.6.1"></a><h4><a name="phase1id">4.6.1</a> Phase 1 parameters</h4> - -<p> - Main mode MUST be used. - -</p> -<p> - The initiator MUST offer at least one proposal using some combination - of: 3DES, HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1, DH group 2 or 5. Group 5 SHOULD be - proposed first. - <a href="#RFC3526">[11]</a> -</p> -<p> - The initiator MAY offer additional proposals, but the cipher MUST not - be weaker than 3DES. The initiator SHOULD limit the number of proposals - such that the IKE datagrams do not need to be fragmented. - -</p> -<p> - The responder MUST accept one of the proposals. If any configuration - of the responder is required then the responder is not acting in an - opportunistic way. - -</p> -<p> - SG-A SHOULD use an ID_IPV4_ADDR (ID_IPV6_ADDR for IPv6) of the external - interface of SG-A for phase 1. (There is an exception, see <a href="#fqdn">Use of FQDN IDs</a>.) The authentication method MUST be RSA public key signatures. - The RSA key for SG-A SHOULD be placed into a DNS KEY record in - the reverse space of SG-A (i.e. using in-addr.arpa). - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.6.2"></a><h4><a name="phase2id">4.6.2</a> Phase 2 parameters</h4> - -<p> - SG-A MUST propose a tunnel between Alice and Bob, using 3DES-CBC - mode, MD5 or SHA1 authentication. Perfect Forward Secrecy MUST be specified. - -</p> -<p> - Tunnel mode MUST be used. - -</p> -<p> - Identities MUST be ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET with the mask being /32. - -</p> -<p> - Authorization for SG-A to act on Alice's behalf is determined by - looking for a TXT record in the reverse-map at Alice's address. - -</p> -<p> - Compression SHOULD NOT be mandatory. It may be offered as an option. - -</p> -<a name="anchor38"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.5"></a><h3>5. DNS issues</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.5.1"></a><h4><a name="KEY">5.1</a> Use of KEY record</h4> - -<p> - In order to establish their own identities, SG-A and SG-B SHOULD publish - their public keys in their reverse DNS via - DNSSEC's KEY record. - See section 3 of <a href="#RFC2535">RFC 2535</a>[16]. - -</p> -<p> -<p>For example: -</p></font><pre> -KEY 0x4200 4 1 AQNJjkKlIk9...nYyUkKK8 -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> - -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>0x4200:</dt> -<dd> The flag bits, indicating that this key is prohibited - for confidentiality use (it authenticates the peer only, a separate - Diffie-Hellman exchange is used for - confidentiality), and that this key is associated with the non-zone entity - whose name is the RR owner name. No other flags are set. -</dd> -<dt>4:</dt> -<dd>This indicates that this key is for use by IPsec. -</dd> -<dt>1:</dt> -<dd>An RSA key is present. -</dd> -<dt>AQNJjkKlIk9...nYyUkKK8:</dt> -<dd>The public key of the host as described in <a href="#RFC3110">[17]</a>. -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -</p> -<p>Use of several KEY records allows for key rollover. The SIG Payload in - IKE phase 1 SHOULD be accepted if the public key given by any KEY RR - validates it. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.5.2"></a><h4><a name="TXT">5.2</a> Use of TXT delegation record</h4> - -<p> -Alice publishes a TXT record to provide authorization for SG-A to act on -Alice's behalf. - -Bob publishes a TXT record to provide authorization for SG-B to act on Bob's -behalf. - -These records are located in the reverse DNS (in-addr.arpa) for their -respective IP addresses. The reverse DNS SHOULD be secured by DNSSEC, when -it is deployed. DNSSEC is required to defend against active attacks. - -</p> -<p> - If Alice's address is P.Q.R.S, then she can authorize another node to - act on her behalf by publishing records at: - </p> -</font><pre> -S.R.Q.P.in-addr.arpa - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<p> - The contents of the resource record are expected to be a string that - uses the following syntax, as suggested in <a href="#RFC1464">[15]</a>. - (Note that the reply to query may include other TXT resource - records used by other applications.) - - <br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="txtformat"></a> -</p> -</font><pre> -X-IPsec-Server(P)=A.B.C.D KEY - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Format of reverse delegation record </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - -</p> -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>P:</dt> -<dd> Specifies a precedence for this record. This is - similar to MX record preferences. Lower numbers have stronger - preference. - -</dd> -<dt>A.B.C.D:</dt> -<dd> Specifies the IP address of the Security Gateway - for this client machine. - -</dd> -<dt>KEY:</dt> -<dd> Is the encoded RSA Public key of the Security - Gateway. The key is provided here to avoid a second DNS lookup. If this - field is absent, then a KEY resource record should be looked up in the - reverse-map of A.B.C.D. The key is transmitted in base64 format. - -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -<p> - The pieces of the record are separated by any whitespace - (space, tab, newline, carriage return). An ASCII space SHOULD - be used. - -</p> -<p> - In the case where Alice is located at a public address behind a - security gateway that has no fixed address (or no control over its - reverse-map), then Alice may delegate to a public key by domain name. - - <br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="txtfqdnformat"></a> -</p> -</font><pre> -X-IPsec-Server(P)=@FQDN KEY - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Format of reverse delegation record (FQDN version) </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - -</p> -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>P:</dt> -<dd> Is as above. - -</dd> -<dt>FQDN:</dt> -<dd> Specifies the FQDN that the Security Gateway - will identify itself with. - -</dd> -<dt>KEY:</dt> -<dd> Is the encoded RSA Public key of the Security - Gateway. -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -<p> - If there is more than one such TXT record with strongest (lowest - numbered) precedence, one Security Gateway is picked arbitrarily from - those specified in the strongest-preference records. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.5.2.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor39">5.2.1</a> Long TXT records</h4> - -<p> - When packed into transport format, TXT records which are longer than 255 - characters are divided into smaller <character-strings>. - (See <a href="#RFC1035">[13]</a> section 3.3 and 3.3.14.) These MUST - be reassembled into a single string for processing. - Whitespace characters in the base64 encoding are to be ignored. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.5.2.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor40">5.2.2</a> Choice of TXT record</h4> - -<p> - It has been suggested to use the KEY, OPT, CERT, or KX records - instead of a TXT record. None is satisfactory. - -</p> -<p> The KEY RR has a protocol field which could be used to indicate a new protocol, -and an algorithm field which could be used to - indicate different contents in the key data. However, the KEY record - is clearly not intended for storing what are really authorizations, - it is just for identities. Other uses have been discouraged. - -</p> -<p> OPT resource records, as defined in <a href="#RFC2671">[14]</a> are not - intended to be used for storage of information. They are not to be loaded, - cached or forwarded. They are, therefore, inappropriate for use here. - -</p> -<p> - CERT records <a href="#RFC2538">[18]</a> can encode almost any set of - information. A custom type code could be used permitting any suitable - encoding to be stored, not just X.509. According to - the RFC, the certificate RRs are to be signed internally which may add undesirable -and unnecessary bulk. Larger DNS records may require TCP instead of UDP transfers. - -</p> -<p> - At the time of protocol design, the CERT RR was not widely deployed and - could not be counted upon. Use of CERT records will be investigated, - and may be proposed in a future revision of this document. - -</p> -<p> - KX records are ideally suited for use instead of TXT records, but had not been deployed at - the time of implementation. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.5.3"></a><h4><a name="fqdn">5.3</a> Use of FQDN IDs</h4> - -<p> - Unfortunately, not every administrator has control over the contents - of the reverse-map. Where the initiator (SG-A) has no suitable reverse-map, the - authorization record present in the reverse-map of Alice may refer to a - FQDN instead of an IP address. - -</p> -<p> - In this case, the client's TXT record gives the fully qualified domain - name (FQDN) in place of its security gateway's IP address. - The initiator should use the ID_FQDN ID-payload in phase 1. - A forward lookup for a KEY record on the FQDN must yield the - initiator's public key. - -</p> -<p> - This method can also be used when the external address of SG-A is - dynamic. - -</p> -<p> - If SG-A is acting on behalf of Alice, then Alice must still delegate - authority for SG-A to do so in her reverse-map. When Alice and SG-A - are one and the same (i.e. Alice is acting as an end-node) then there - is no need for this when initiating only. -</p> -<p>However, Alice must still delegate to herself if she wishes others to - initiate OE to her. See <a href="#txtfqdnformat">Format of reverse delegation record (FQDN version)</a>. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.5.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor41">5.4</a> Key roll-over</h4> - -<p> -Good cryptographic hygiene says that one should replace public/private key pairs -periodically. Some administrators may wish to do this as often as daily. Typical DNS -propagation delays are determined by the SOA Resource Record MINIMUM -parameter, which controls how long DNS replies may be cached. For reasonable -operation of DNS servers, administrators usually want this value to be at least several -hours, sometimes as a long as a day. This presents a problem - a new key MUST -not be used prior to it propagating through DNS. - -</p> -<p> -This problem is dealt with by having the Security Gateway generate a new -public/private key pair at least MINIMUM seconds in advance of using it. It -then adds this key to the DNS (both as a second KEY record and in additional TXT -delegation records) at key generation time. Note: only one key is allowed in -each TXT record. - -</p> -<p> -When authenticating, all gateways MUST have available all public keys -that are found in DNS for this entity. This permits the authenticating end -to check both the key for "today" and the key for "tomorrow". Note that it is -the end which is creating the signature (possesses the private key) that -determines which key is to be used. - -</p> -<a name="anchor42"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.6"></a><h3>6. Network address translation interaction</h3> - -<p> - There are no fundamentally new issues for implementing opportunistic encryption - in the presence of network address translation. Rather there are - only the regular IPsec issues with NAT traversal. - -</p> -<p> - There are several situations to consider for NAT. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.6.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor43">6.1</a> Co-located NAT/NAPT</h4> - -<p> - If SG-A is also performing network address translation on - behalf of Alice, then the packet should be translated prior to - being subjected to opportunistic encryption. This is in contrast to - typically configured tunnels which often exist to bridge islands of - private network address space. SG-A will use the translated source - address for phase 2, and so SG-B will look up that address to - confirm SG-A's authorization. - -</p> -<p> In the case of NAT (1:1), the address space into which the - translation is done MUST be globally unique, and control over the - reverse-map is assumed. - Placing of TXT records is possible. - -</p> -<p> In the case of NAPT (m:1), the address will be SG-A. The ability to get - KEY and TXT records in place will again depend upon whether or not - there is administrative control over the reverse-map. This is - identical to situations involving a single host acting on behalf of - itself. - - FQDN style can be used to get around a lack of a reverse-map for - initiators only. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.6.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor44">6.2</a> SG-A behind NAT/NAPT</h4> - -<p> - If there is a NAT or NAPT between SG-A and SG-B, then normal IPsec - NAT traversal rules apply. In addition to the transport problem - which may be solved by other mechanisms, there - is the issue of what phase 1 and phase 2 IDs to use. While FQDN could - be used during phase 1 for SG-A, there is no appropriate ID for phase 2 - that permits SG-B to determine that SG-A is in fact authorized to speak for Alice. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.6.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor45">6.3</a> Bob is behind a NAT/NAPT</h4> - -<p> - If Bob is behind a NAT (perhaps SG-B), then there is, in fact, no way for - Alice to address a packet to Bob. Not only is opportunistic encryption - impossible, but it is also impossible for Alice to initiate any - communication to Bob. It may be possible for Bob to initiate in such - a situation. This creates an asymmetry, but this is common for - NAPT. - -</p> -<a name="anchor46"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.7"></a><h3>7. Host implementations</h3> - -<p> - When Alice and SG-A are components of the same system, they are - considered to be a host implementation. The packet sequence scenario remains unchanged. - -</p> -<p> - Components marked Alice are the upper layers (TCP, UDP, the - application), and SG-A is the IP layer. - -</p> -<p> - Note that tunnel mode is still required. - -</p> -<p> - As Alice and SG-A are acting on behalf of themselves, no TXT based delegation - record is necessary for Alice to initiate. She can rely on FQDN in a - forward map. This is particularly attractive to mobile nodes such as - notebook computers at conferences. - To respond, Alice/SG-A will still need an entry in Alice's reverse-map. - -</p> -<a name="anchor47"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.8"></a><h3>8. Multi-homing</h3> - -<p> -If there are multiple paths between Alice and Bob (as illustrated in -the diagram with SG-D), then additional DNS records are required to establish -authorization. - -</p> -<p> -In <a href="#networkdiagram">Reference Network Diagram</a>, Alice has two ways to -exit her network: SG-A and SG-D. Previously SG-D has been ignored. Postulate -that there are routers between Alice and her set of security gateways -(denoted by the + signs and the marking of an autonomous system number for -Alice's network). Datagrams may, therefore, travel to either SG-A or SG-D en -route to Bob. - -</p> -<p> -As long as all network connections are in good order, it does not matter how -datagrams exit Alice's network. When they reach either security gateway, the -security gateway will find the TXT delegation record in Bob's reverse-map, -and establish an SA with SG-B. - -</p> -<p> -SG-B has no problem establishing that either of SG-A or SG-D may speak for -Alice, because Alice has published two equally weighted TXT delegation records: - <br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="txtmultiexample"></a> -</p> -</font><pre> -X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.5 AQMM...3s1Q== -X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.6 AAJN...j8r9== - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Multiple gateway delegation example for Alice </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - -</p> -<p> -Alice's routers can now do any kind of load sharing needed. Both SG-A and SG-D send datagrams addressed to Bob through -their tunnel to SG-B. - -</p> -<p> -Alice's use of non-equal weight delegation records to show preference of one gateway over another, has relevance only when SG-B -is initiating to Alice. - -</p> -<p> -If the precedences are the same, then SG-B has a more difficult time. It -must decide which of the two tunnels to use. SG-B has no information about -which link is less loaded, nor which security gateway has more cryptographic -resources available. SG-B, in fact, has no knowledge of whether both gateways -are even reachable. - -</p> -<p> -The Public Internet's default-free zone may well know a good route to Alice, -but the datagrams that SG-B creates must be addressed to either SG-A or SG-D; -they can not be addressed to Alice directly. - -</p> -<p> -SG-B may make a number of choices: - -<ol class="text"> -<li>It can ignore the problem and round robin among the tunnels. This - causes losses during times when one or the other security gateway is - unreachable. If this worries Alice, she can change the weights in her - TXT delegation records. -</li> -<li>It can send to the gateway from which it most recently received datagrams. - This assumes that routing and reachability are symmetrical. -</li> -<li>It can listen to BGP information from the Internet to decide which - system is currently up. This is clearly much more complicated, but if SG-B is already participating - in the BGP peering system to announce Bob, the results data may already - be available to it. -</li> -<li>It can refuse to negotiate the second tunnel. (It is unclear whether or -not this is even an option.) -</li> -<li>It can silently replace the outgoing portion of the first tunnel with the -second one while still retaining the incoming portions of both. SG-B can, -thus, accept datagrams from either SG-A or SG-D, but -send only to the gateway that most recently re-keyed with it. -</li> -</ol><p> -</p> -<p> -Local policy determines which choice SG-B makes. Note that even if SG-B has perfect -knowledge about the reachability of SG-A and SG-D, Alice may not be reachable -from either of these security gateways because of internal reachability -issues. - -</p> -<p> -FreeS/WAN implements option 5. Implementing a different option is -being considered. The multi-homing aspects of OE are not well developed and may -be the subject of a future document. - -</p> -<a name="anchor48"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.9"></a><h3>9. Failure modes</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.9.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor49">9.1</a> DNS failures</h4> - -<p> - If a DNS server fails to respond, local policy decides - whether or not to permit communication in the clear as embodied in - the connection classes in <a href="#initclasses">Keying state machine - initiator</a>. - It is easy to mount a denial of service attack on the DNS server - responsible for a particular network's reverse-map. - Such an attack may cause all communication with that network to go in - the clear if the policy is permissive, or fail completely - if the policy is paranoid. Please note that this is an active attack. - -</p> -<p> - There are still many networks - that do not have properly configured reverse-maps. Further, if the policy is not to communicate, - the above denial of service attack isolates the target network. Therefore, the decision of whether -or not to permit communication in the clear MUST be a matter of local policy. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.9.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor50">9.2</a> DNS configured, IKE failures</h4> - -<p> - DNS records claim that opportunistic encryption should - occur, but the target gateway either does not respond on port 500, or - refuses the proposal. This may be because of a crash or reboot, a - faulty configuration, or a firewall filtering port 500. - -</p> -<p> - The receipt of ICMP port, host or network unreachable - messages indicates a potential problem, but MUST NOT cause communication - to fail - immediately. ICMP messages are easily forged by attackers. If such a - forgery caused immediate failure, then an active attacker could easily - prevent any - encryption from ever occurring, possibly preventing all communication. - -</p> -<p> - In these situations a clear log should be produced - and local policy should dictate if communication is then - permitted in the clear. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.9.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor51">9.3</a> System reboots</h4> - -<p> -Tunnels sometimes go down because the remote end crashes, -disconnects, or has a network link break. In general there is no -notification of this. Even in the event of a crash and successful reboot, -other SGs don't hear about it unless the rebooted SG has specific -reason to talk to them immediately. Over-quick response to temporary -network outages is undesirable. Note that a tunnel can be torn -down and then re-established without any effect visible to the user -except a pause in traffic. On the other hand, if one end reboots, -the other end can't get datagrams to it at all (except via -IKE) until the situation is noticed. So a bias toward quick -response is appropriate even at the cost of occasional -false alarms. - -</p> -<p> -A mechanism for recovery after reboot is a topic of current research and is not specified in this -document. - -</p> -<p> -A deliberate shutdown should include an attempt, using deletes, to notify all other SGs -currently connected by phase 1 SAs that communication is -about to fail. Again, a remote SG will assume this is a teardown. Attempts by the -remote SGs to negotiate new tunnels as replacements should be ignored. When possible, -SGs should attempt to preserve information about currently-connected SGs in non-volatile storage, so -that after a crash, an Initial-Contact can be sent to previous partners to -indicate loss of all previously established connections. - -</p> -<a name="anchor52"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.10"></a><h3>10. Unresolved issues</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.10.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor53">10.1</a> Control of reverse DNS</h4> - -<p> - The method of obtaining information by reverse DNS lookup causes - problems for people who cannot control their reverse DNS - bindings. This is an unresolved problem in this version, and is out - of scope. - -</p> -<a name="anchor54"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.11"></a><h3>11. Examples</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.11.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor55">11.1</a> Clear-text usage (permit policy)</h4> - -<p> -Two example scenarios follow. In the first example GW-A -(Gateway A) and GW-B (Gateway B) have always-clear-text policies, and in the second example they have an OE -policy. - -</p><br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="regulartiming"></a> -</font><pre> - Alice SG-A DNS SG-B Bob - (1) - ------(2)--------------> - <-----(3)--------------- - (4)----(5)-----> - ----------(6)------> - ------(7)-----> - <------(8)------ - <----------(9)------ - <----(10)----- - (11)-----------> - ----------(12)-----> - --------------> - <--------------- - <------------------- - <------------- - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Timing of regular transaction </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - -<p> -Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Perhaps she wants to retrieve a -web page from Bob's web server. In the absence of opportunistic -encryptors, the following events occur: - -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>(1)</dt> -<dd>Human or application 'clicks' with a name. -</dd> -<dt>(2)</dt> -<dd>Application looks up name in DNS to get IP address. -</dd> -<dt>(3)</dt> -<dd>Resolver returns A record to application. -</dd> -<dt>(4)</dt> -<dd>Application starts a TCP session or UDP session and OS sends datagram. -</dd> -<dt>(5)</dt> -<dd>Datagram is seen at first gateway from Alice (SG-A). (SG-A -makes a transition through Empty connection to always-clear connection and -instantiates a pass-through policy at the forwarding plane.) -</dd> -<dt>(6)</dt> -<dd>Datagram is seen at last gateway before Bob (SG-B). -</dd> -<dt>(7)</dt> -<dd>First datagram from Alice is seen by Bob. -</dd> -<dt>(8)</dt> -<dd>First return datagram is sent by Bob. -</dd> -<dt>(9)</dt> -<dd>Datagram is seen at Bob's gateway. (SG-B makes a transition through -Empty connection to always-clear connection and instantiates a pass-through -policy at the forwarding plane.) -</dd> -<dt>(10)</dt> -<dd>Datagram is seen at Alice's gateway. -</dd> -<dt>(11)</dt> -<dd>OS hands datagram to application. Alice sends another datagram. -</dd> -<dt>(12)</dt> -<dd>A second datagram traverses the Internet. -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor56">11.2</a> Opportunistic encryption</h4> - -<p> -In the presence of properly configured opportunistic encryptors, the -event list is extended. - -<br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="opportunistictiming"></a> -</p> -</font><pre> - Alice SG-A DNS SG-B Bob - (1) - ------(2)--------------> - <-----(3)--------------- - (4)----(5)----->+ - ----(5B)-> - <---(5C)-- - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(5D)~~~> - <~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E1)~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E2)~~> - <~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E3)~~~ - #############(5E4)##> - <############(5E5)### - <----(5F1)-- - -----(5F2)-> - #############(5G1)##> - <----(5H1)-- - -----(5H2)-> - <############(5G2)### - #############(5G3)##> - ============(6)====> - ------(7)-----> - <------(8)------ - <==========(9)====== - <-----(10)---- - (11)-----------> - ==========(12)=====> - --------------> - <--------------- - <=================== - <------------- - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Timing of opportunistic encryption transaction </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>(1)</dt> -<dd>Human or application clicks with a name. -</dd> -<dt>(2)</dt> -<dd>Application initiates DNS mapping. -</dd> -<dt>(3)</dt> -<dd>Resolver returns A record to application. -</dd> -<dt>(4)</dt> -<dd>Application starts a TCP session or UDP. -</dd> -<dt>(5)</dt> -<dd>SG-A (host or SG) sees datagram to target, and buffers it. -</dd> -<dt>(5B)</dt> -<dd>SG-A asks DNS for TXT record. -</dd> -<dt>(5C)</dt> -<dd>DNS returns TXT record(s). -</dd> -<dt>(5D)</dt> -<dd>Initial IKE Main Mode Packet goes out. -</dd> -<dt>(5E)</dt> -<dd>IKE ISAKMP phase 1 succeeds. -</dd> -<dt>(5F)</dt> -<dd>SG-B asks DNS for TXT record to prove SG-A is an agent for Alice. -</dd> -<dt>(5G)</dt> -<dd>IKE phase 2 negotiation. -</dd> -<dt>(5H)</dt> -<dd>DNS lookup by responder (SG-B). -</dd> -<dt>(6)</dt> -<dd>Buffered datagram is sent by SG-A. -</dd> -<dt>(7)</dt> -<dd>Datagram is received by SG-B, decrypted, and sent to Bob. -</dd> -<dt>(8)</dt> -<dd>Bob replies, and datagram is seen by SG-B. -</dd> -<dt>(9)</dt> -<dd>SG-B already has tunnel up with SG-A, and uses it. -</dd> -<dt>(10)</dt> -<dd>SG-A decrypts datagram and gives it to Alice. -</dd> -<dt>(11)</dt> -<dd>Alice receives datagram. Sends new packet to Bob. -</dd> -<dt>(12)</dt> -<dd>SG-A gets second datagram, sees that tunnel is up, and uses it. -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -</p> -<p> - For the purposes of this section, we will describe only the changes that - occur between <a href="#regulartiming">Timing of regular transaction</a> and - <a href="#opportunistictiming">Timing of opportunistic encryption transaction</a>. This corresponds to time points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 on the list above. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor57">11.2.1</a> (5) IPsec datagram interception</h4> - -<p> - At point (5), SG-A intercepts the datagram because this source/destination pair lacks a policy -(the non-existent policy state). SG-A creates a hold policy, and buffers the datagram. SG-A requests keys from the keying daemon. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor58">11.2.2</a> (5B) DNS lookup for TXT record</h4> - -<p> - SG-A's IKE daemon, having looked up the source/destination pair in the connection - class list, creates a new Potential OE connection instance. SG-A starts DNS - queries. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor59">11.2.3</a> (5C) DNS returns TXT record(s)</h4> - -<p> - DNS returns properly formed TXT delegation records, and SG-A's IKE daemon - causes this instance to make a transition from Potential OE connection to Pending OE - connection. - -</p> -<p> - Using the example above, the returned record might contain: - - <br><hr size="1" shade="0"> -<a name="txtexample"></a> -</p> -</font><pre> -X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.5 AQMM...3s1Q== - </pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" align="center"><tr><td align="center"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" size="1"><b> Example of reverse delegation record for Bob </b></font><br></td></tr></table><hr size="1" shade="0"> - - with SG-B's IP address and public key listed. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor60">11.2.4</a> (5D) Initial IKE main mode packet goes out</h4> - -<p>Upon entering Pending OE connection, SG-A sends the initial ISAKMP - message with proposals. See <a href="#phase1id">Phase 1 parameters</a>. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.5"></a><h4><a name="anchor61">11.2.5</a> (5E1) Message 2 of phase 1 exchange</h4> - -<p> - SG-B receives the message. A new connection instance is created in the - unauthenticated OE peer state. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.6"></a><h4><a name="anchor62">11.2.6</a> (5E2) Message 3 of phase 1 exchange</h4> - -<p> - SG-A sends a Diffie-Hellman exponent. This is an internal state of the - keying daemon. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.7"></a><h4><a name="anchor63">11.2.7</a> (5E3) Message 4 of phase 1 exchange</h4> - -<p> - SG-B responds with a Diffie-Hellman exponent. This is an internal state of the - keying protocol. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.8"></a><h4><a name="anchor64">11.2.8</a> (5E4) Message 5 of phase 1 exchange</h4> - -<p> - SG-A uses the phase 1 SA to send its identity under encryption. - The choice of identity is discussed in <a href="#phase1id">Phase 1 parameters</a>. - This is an internal state of the keying protocol. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.9"></a><h4><a name="anchor65">11.2.9</a> (5F1) Responder lookup of initiator key</h4> - -<p> - SG-B asks DNS for the public key of the initiator. - DNS looks for a KEY record by IP address in the reverse-map. - That is, a KEY resource record is queried for 4.1.1.192.in-addr.arpa - (recall that SG-A's external address is 192.1.1.4). - SG-B uses the resulting public key to authenticate the initiator. See <a href="#KEY">Use of KEY record</a> for further details. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.10"></a><h4><a name="anchor66">11.2.10</a> (5F2) DNS replies with public key of initiator</h4> - -<p> -Upon successfully authenticating the peer, the connection instance makes a -transition to authenticated OE peer on SG-B. - -</p> -<p> -The format of the TXT record returned is described in -<a href="#TXT">Use of TXT delegation record</a>. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.11"></a><h4><a name="anchor67">11.2.11</a> (5E5) Responder replies with ID and authentication</h4> - -<p> - SG-B sends its ID along with authentication material. This is an internal - state for the keying protocol. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.12"></a><h4><a name="anchor68">11.2.12</a> (5G) IKE phase 2</h4> - -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.12.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor69">11.2.12.1</a> (5G1) Initiator proposes tunnel</h4> - -<p> - Having established mutually agreeable authentications (via KEY) and - authorizations (via TXT), SG-A proposes to create an IPsec tunnel for - datagrams transiting from Alice to Bob. This tunnel is established only for - the Alice/Bob combination, not for any subnets that may be behind SG-A and SG-B. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.12.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor70">11.2.12.2</a> (5H1) Responder determines initiator's authority</h4> - -<p> - While the identity of SG-A has been established, its authority to - speak for Alice has not yet been confirmed. SG-B does a reverse - lookup on Alice's address for a TXT record. - -</p> -<p>Upon receiving this specific proposal, SG-B's connection instance - makes a transition into the potential OE connection state. SG-B may already have an - instance, and the check is made as described above. -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.12.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor71">11.2.12.3</a> (5H2) DNS replies with TXT record(s)</h4> - -<p> - The returned key and IP address should match that of SG-A. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.12.4"></a><h4><a name="anchor72">11.2.12.4</a> (5G2) Responder agrees to proposal</h4> - -<p> - Should additional communication occur between, for instance, Dave and Bob using - SG-A and SG-B, a new tunnel (phase 2 SA) would be established. The phase 1 SA - may be reusable. - -</p> -<p>SG-A, having successfully keyed the tunnel, now makes a transition from - Pending OE connection to Keyed OE connection. - -</p> -<p>The responder MUST setup the inbound IPsec SAs before sending its reply. -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.12.5"></a><h4><a name="anchor73">11.2.12.5</a> (5G3) Final acknowledgment from initiator</h4> - -<p> - The initiator agrees with the responder's choice and sets up the tunnel. - The initiator sets up the inbound and outbound IPsec SAs. - -</p> -<p> - The proper authorization returned with keys prompts SG-B to make a transition - to the keyed OE connection state. - -</p> -<p>Upon receipt of this message, the responder may now setup the outbound - IPsec SAs. -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.13"></a><h4><a name="anchor74">11.2.13</a> (6) IPsec succeeds, and sets up tunnel for communication between Alice and Bob</h4> - -<p> - SG-A sends the datagram saved at step (5) through the newly created - tunnel to SG-B, where it gets decrypted and forwarded. - Bob receives it at (7) and replies at (8). - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.11.2.14"></a><h4><a name="anchor75">11.2.14</a> (9) SG-B already has tunnel up with G1 and uses it</h4> - -<p> - At (9), SG-B has already established an SPD entry mapping Bob->Alice via a - tunnel, so this tunnel is simply applied. The datagram is encrypted to SG-A, - decrypted by SG-A and passed to Alice at (10). - -</p> -<a name="securityconsiderations"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.12"></a><h3>12. Security considerations</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.12.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor76">12.1</a> Configured vs opportunistic tunnels</h4> - -<p> - Configured tunnels are those which are setup using bilateral mechanisms: exchanging -public keys (raw RSA, DSA, PKIX), pre-shared secrets, or by referencing keys that -are in known places (distinguished name from LDAP, DNS). These keys are then used to -configure a specific tunnel. - -</p> -<p> -A pre-configured tunnel may be on all the time, or may be keyed only when needed. -The end points of the tunnel are not necessarily static: many mobile -applications (road warrior) are considered to be configured tunnels. - -</p> -<p> -The primary characteristic is that configured tunnels are assigned specific -security properties. They may be trusted in different ways relating to exceptions to -firewall rules, exceptions to NAT processing, and to bandwidth or other quality of service restrictions. - -</p> -<p> -Opportunistic tunnels are not inherently trusted in any strong way. They are -created without prior arrangement. As the two parties are strangers, there -MUST be no confusion of datagrams that arrive from opportunistic peers and -those that arrive from configured tunnels. A security gateway MUST take care -that an opportunistic peer can not impersonate a configured peer. - -</p> -<p> -Ingress filtering MUST be used to make sure that only datagrams authorized by -negotiation (and the concomitant authentication and authorization) are -accepted from a tunnel. This is to prevent one peer from impersonating another. - -</p> -<p> -An implementation suggestion is to treat opportunistic tunnel -datagrams as if they arrive on a logical interface distinct from other -configured tunnels. As the number of opportunistic tunnels that may be -created automatically on a system is potentially very high, careful attention -to scaling should be taken into account. - -</p> -<p> -As with any IKE negotiation, opportunistic encryption cannot be secure -without authentication. Opportunistic encryption relies on DNS for its -authentication information and, therefore, cannot be fully secure without -a secure DNS. Without secure DNS, opportunistic encryption can protect against passive -eavesdropping but not against active man-in-the-middle attacks. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.12.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor77">12.2</a> Firewalls versus Opportunistic Tunnels</h4> - -<p> - Typical usage of per datagram access control lists is to implement various -kinds of security gateways. These are typically called "firewalls". - -</p> -<p> - Typical usage of a virtual private network (VPN) within a firewall is to -bypass all or part of the access controls between two networks. Additional -trust (as outlined in the previous section) is given to datagrams that arrive -in the VPN. - -</p> -<p> - Datagrams that arrive via opportunistically configured tunnels MUST not be -trusted. Any security policy that would apply to a datagram arriving in the -clear SHOULD also be applied to datagrams arriving opportunistically. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.12.3"></a><h4><a name="anchor78">12.3</a> Denial of service</h4> - -<p> - There are several different forms of denial of service that an implementor - should concern themselves with. Most of these problems are shared with - security gateways that have large numbers of mobile peers (road warriors). - -</p> -<p> - The design of ISAKMP/IKE, and its use of cookies, defend against many kinds - of denial of service. Opportunism changes the assumption that if the phase 1 (ISAKMP) - SA is authenticated, that it was worthwhile creating. Because the gateway will communicate with any machine, it is - possible to form phase 1 SAs with any machine on the Internet. - -</p> -<a name="anchor79"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.13"></a><h3>13. IANA Considerations</h3> - -<p> - There are no known numbers which IANA will need to manage. - -</p> -<a name="anchor80"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.14"></a><h3>14. Acknowledgments</h3> - -<p> - Substantive portions of this document are based upon previous work by - Henry Spencer. - -</p> -<p> - Thanks to Tero Kivinen, Sandy Harris, Wes Hardarker, Robert Moskowitz, - Jakob Schlyter, Bill Sommerfeld, John Gilmore and John Denker for their - comments and constructive criticism. - -</p> -<p> - Sandra Hoffman and Bill Dickie did the detailed proof reading and editing. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.references1"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Normative references</h3> -<table width="99%" border="0"> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="OEspec">[1]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:hugh@mimosa.com">Redelmeier, D.</a> and <a href="mailto:henry@spsystems.net">H. Spencer</a>, "Opportunistic Encryption", paper http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-1.91/doc/opportunism.spec, May 2001.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC0791">[2]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Information Processing Techniques Office and University of Southern California (USC)/Information Sciences Institute, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc791.txt">Internet Protocol</a>", STD 5, RFC 791, September 1981.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1009">[3]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:">Braden, R.</a> and <a href="mailto:">J. Postel</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1009.txt">Requirements for Internet gateways</a>", RFC 1009, June 1987.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1984">[4]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">IAB, IESG, <a href="mailto:brian@dxcoms.cern.ch">Carpenter, B.</a> and <a href="mailto:fred@cisco.com">F. Baker</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1984.txt">IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet</a>", RFC 1984, August 1996.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2119">[5]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:-">Bradner, S.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2119.txt">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a>", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2367">[6]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:danmcd@eng.sun.com">McDonald, D.</a>, <a href="mailto:cmetz@inner.net">Metz, C.</a> and <a href="mailto:phan@itd.nrl.navy.mil">B. Phan</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2367.txt">PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2</a>", RFC 2367, July 1998.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2401">[7]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:kent@bbn.com">Kent, S.</a> and <a href="mailto:rja@corp.home.net">R. Atkinson</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2401.txt">Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol</a>", RFC 2401, November 1998.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2407">[8]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:ddp@network-alchemy.com">Piper, D.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2407.txt">The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP</a>", RFC 2407, November 1998.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2408">[9]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:wdm@tycho.ncsc.mil">Maughan, D.</a>, <a href="mailto:mss@tycho.ncsc.mil">Schneider, M.</a> and <a href="er@raba.com">M. Schertler</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2408.txt">Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)</a>", RFC 2408, November 1998.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2409">[10]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dharkins@cisco.com">Harkins, D.</a> and <a href="mailto:carrel@ipsec.org">D. Carrel</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2409.txt">The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</a>", RFC 2409, November 1998.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC3526">[11]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:kivinen@ssh.fi">Kivinen, T.</a> and <a href="mailto:mrskojo@cc.helsinki.fi">M. Kojo</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3526.txt">More MODP Diffie-Hellman groups for IKE</a>", RFC 3526, March 2003.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1034">[12]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">Mockapetris, P., "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1034.txt">Domain names - concepts and facilities</a>", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1035">[13]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:">Mockapetris, P.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1035.txt">Domain names - implementation and specification</a>", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2671">[14]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:vixie@isc.org">Vixie, P.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2671.txt">Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS0)</a>", RFC 2671, August 1999.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1464">[15]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:rosenbaum@lkg.dec.com">Rosenbaum, R.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1464.txt">Using the Domain Name System To Store Arbitrary String Attributes</a>", RFC 1464, May 1993.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2535">[16]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dee3@us.ibm.com">Eastlake, D.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2535.txt">Domain Name System Security Extensions</a>", RFC 2535, March 1999.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC3110">[17]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">Eastlake, D., "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3110.txt">RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</a>", RFC 3110, May 2001.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2538">[18]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dee3@us.ibm.com">Eastlake, D.</a> and <a href="mailto:ogud@tislabs.com">O. Gudmundsson</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2538.txt">Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS)</a>", RFC 2538, March 1999.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2748">[19]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:David.Durham@intel.com">Durham, D.</a>, <a href="mailto:jboyle@Level3.net">Boyle, J.</a>, <a href="mailto:ronc@cisco.com">Cohen, R.</a>, <a href="mailto:herzog@iphighway.com">Herzog, S.</a>, <a href="mailto:rajan@research.att.com">Rajan, R.</a> and <a href="mailto:asastry@cisco.com">A. Sastry</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2748.txt">The COPS (Common Open Policy Service) Protocol</a>", RFC 2748, January 2000.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2663">[20]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:srisuresh@lucent.com">Srisuresh, P.</a> and <a href="mailto:holdrege@lucent.com">M. Holdrege</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2663.txt">IP Network Address Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations</a>", RFC 2663, August 1999.</td></tr> -</table> - -<a name="rfc.authors"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Authors' Addresses</h3> -<table width="99%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Michael C. Richardson</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Sandelman Software Works</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">470 Dawson Avenue</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">CA</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author" align="right">EMail: </td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca">mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="author" align="right">URI: </td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/">http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/</a></td></tr> -<tr cellpadding="3"><td> </td><td> </td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">D. Hugh Redelmeier</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Mimosa</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Toronto, ON</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">CA</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author" align="right">EMail: </td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:hugh@mimosa.com">hugh@mimosa.com</a></td></tr> -</table> -<a name="rfc.copyright"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Full Copyright Statement</h3> -<p class='copyright'> -Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.</p> -<p class='copyright'> -This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to -others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it -or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and -distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, -provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are -included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this -document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing -the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other -Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of -developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for -copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be -followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than -English.</p> -<p class='copyright'> -The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be -revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.</p> -<p class='copyright'> -This document and the information contained herein is provided on an -"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING -TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING -BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION -HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.</p> -<h3>Acknowledgement</h3> -<p class='copyright'> -Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the -Internet Society.</p> -</font></body></html> diff --git a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml b/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml deleted file mode 100644 index d587df693..000000000 --- a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2519 +0,0 @@ -<?xml version="1.0"?> -<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd"> -<?rfc toc="yes"?> -<?rfc tocdepth='2' ?> - -<rfc ipr="full2026" docName="draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-12.txt"> - -<front> - <area>Security</area> - <workgroup>Independent submission</workgroup> - <title abbrev="opportunistic"> - Opportunistic Encryption using The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) - </title> - - <author initials="M." surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael C. Richardson"> - <organization abbrev="SSW">Sandelman Software Works</organization> - <address> - <postal> - <street>470 Dawson Avenue</street> - <city>Ottawa</city> - <region>ON</region> - <code>K1Z 5V7</code> - <country>CA</country> - </postal> - <email>mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</email> - <uri>http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/</uri> - </address> - </author> - - <author initials="D.H." surname="Redelmeier" - fullname="D. Hugh Redelmeier"> - <organization abbrev="Mimosa">Mimosa</organization> - <address> - <postal> - <city>Toronto</city> - <region>ON</region> - <country>CA</country> - </postal> - <email>hugh@mimosa.com</email> - </address> - </author> - - <date month="June" year="2003"></date> - -<abstract> - <t> -This document describes opportunistic encryption (OE) using the Internet Key -Exchange (IKE) and IPsec. -Each system administrator adds new -resource records to his or her Domain Name System (DNS) to support -opportunistic encryption. The objective is to allow encryption for secure communication without -any pre-arrangement specific to the pair of systems involved. - </t> - <t> -DNS is used to distribute the public keys of each -system involved. This is resistant to passive attacks. The use of DNS -Security (DNSSEC) secures this system against active attackers as well. - </t> - <t> -As a result, the administrative overhead is reduced -from the square of the number of systems to a linear dependence, and it becomes -possible to make secure communication the default even -when the partner is not known in advance. - </t> - <t> -This document is offered up as an Informational RFC. - </t> -</abstract> - -</front> - -<middle> - -<section title="Introduction"> - -<section title="Motivation"> - -<t> -The objective of opportunistic encryption is to allow encryption without -any pre-arrangement specific to the pair of systems involved. Each -system administrator adds -public key information to DNS records to support opportunistic -encryption and then enables this feature in the nodes' IPsec stack. -Once this is done, any two such nodes can communicate securely. -</t> - -<t> -This document describes opportunistic encryption as designed and -implemented by the Linux FreeS/WAN project in revisions up and including 2.00. -Note that 2.01 and beyond implements RFC3445, in a backward compatible way. -For project information, see http://www.freeswan.org. -</t> - - <t> -The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and Internet Engineering -Steering Group (IESG) have taken a strong stand that the Internet -should use powerful encryption to provide security and -privacy <xref target="RFC1984" />. -The Linux FreeS/WAN project attempts to provide a practical means to implement this policy. - </t> - - <t> -The project uses the IPsec, ISAKMP/IKE, DNS and DNSSEC -protocols because they are -standardized, widely available and can often be deployed very easily -without changing hardware or software or retraining users. - </t> - - <t> -The extensions to support opportunistic encryption are simple. No -changes to any on-the-wire formats are needed. The only changes are to -the policy decision making system. This means that opportunistic -encryption can be implemented with very minimal changes to an existing -IPsec implementation. - </t> - - <t> -Opportunistic encryption creates a "fax effect". The proliferation -of the fax machine was possible because it did not require that everyone -buy one overnight. Instead, as each person installed one, the value -of having one increased - as there were more people that could receive faxes. -Once opportunistic encryption is installed it -automatically recognizes -other boxes using opportunistic encryption, without any further configuration -by the network -administrator. So, as opportunistic encryption software is installed on more -boxes, its value -as a tool increases. -</t> - - <t> -This document describes the infrastructure to permit deployment of -Opportunistic Encryption. -</t> - - <t> -The term S/WAN is a trademark of RSA Data Systems, and is used with permission -by this project. - </t> - -</section> - -<section title="Types of network traffic"> - <t> - To aid in understanding the relationship between security processing and IPsec - we divide network traffic into four categories: - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="* Deny:"> networks to which traffic is always forbidden.</t> - <t hangText="* Permit:"> networks to which traffic in the clear is permitted.</t> - <t hangText="* Opportunistic tunnel:"> networks to which traffic is encrypted if possible, but otherwise is in the clear - or fails depending on the default policy in place. - </t> - <t hangText="* Configured tunnel:"> networks to which traffic -must be encrypted, and traffic in the clear is never permitted. -A Virtual Private Network (VPN) is a form of configured tunnel. -</t> - </list> - </t> - -<t> -Traditional firewall devices handle the first two categories. -No authentication is required. -The permit policy is currently the default on the Internet. -</t> - -<t> -This document describes the third category - opportunistic tunnel, which is -proposed as the new default for the Internet. -</t> - -<t> - Category four, encrypt traffic or drop it, requires authentication of the - end points. As the number of end points is typically bounded and is typically - under a single authority, arranging for distribution of - authentication material, while difficult, does not require any new - technology. The mechanism described here provides an additional way to - distribute the authentication materials, that of a public key method that does not - require deployment of an X.509 based infrastructure. -</t> -<t> -Current Virtual Private Networks can often be replaced by an "OE paranoid" -policy as described herein. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Peer authentication in opportunistic encryption"> - - <t> - Opportunistic encryption creates tunnels between nodes that - are essentially strangers. This is done without any prior bilateral - arrangement. - There is, therefore, the difficult question of how one knows to whom one is - talking. - </t> - - <t> - One possible answer is that since no useful - authentication can be done, none should be tried. This mode of operation is - named "anonymous encryption". An active man-in-the-middle attack can be - used to thwart the privacy of this type of communication. - Without peer authentication, there is no way to prevent this kind of attack. - </t> - - <t> -Although a useful mode, anonymous encryption is not the goal of this -project. Simpler methods are available that can achieve anonymous -encryption only, but authentication of the peer is a desireable goal. -The latter is achieved through key distribution in DNS, leveraging upon -the authentication of the DNS in DNSSEC. -</t> - - <t> - Peers are, therefore, authenticated with DNSSEC when available. Local policy -determines how much trust to extend when DNSSEC is not available. - </t> - - <t> - However, an essential premise of building private connections with - strangers is that datagrams received through opportunistic tunnels - are no more special than datagrams that arrive in the clear. - Unlike in a VPN, these datagrams should not be given any special - exceptions when it comes to auditing, further authentication or - firewalling. - </t> - - <t> - When initiating outbound opportunistic encryption, local - configuration determines what happens if tunnel setup fails. It may be that - the packet goes out in the clear, or it may be dropped. - </t> - - </section> - -<section title="Use of RFC2119 terms"> -<t> - The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, - SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this - document, are to be interpreted as described in <xref target="RFC2119" /> -</t> -</section> - -</section> - -<section title="Overview"> - - <section title="Reference diagram"> - - <figure anchor="networkdiagram" title="Reference Network Diagram"> - <preamble>The following network diagram is used in the rest of - this document as the canonical diagram:</preamble> - <artwork> - [Q] [R] - . . AS2 - [A]----+----[SG-A].......+....+.......[SG-B]-------[B] - | ...... - AS1 | ..PI.. - | ...... - [D]----+----[SG-D].......+....+.......[C] AS3 - - - </artwork> - <postamble></postamble> - - </figure> - - <t> - In this diagram, there are four end-nodes: A, B, C and D. - There are three security gateways, SG-A, SG-B, SG-D. A, D, SG-A and - SG-D are part - of the same administrative authority, AS1. SG-A and SG-D are on two - different exit - paths from organization 1. SG-B/B is an independent organization, AS2. - Nodes Q and R are nodes on the Internet. PI is the Public - Internet ("The Wild"). - </t> - - </section> - - <section title="Terminology"> - - <t> - The following terminology is used in this document: - </t> - - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="Security gateway (or simply gateway):"> a system that performs IPsec tunnel - mode encapsulation/decapsulation. [SG-x] in the diagram.</t> - <t hangText="Alice:"> node [A] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.1.0.65.</t> - <t hangText="Bob:"> node [B] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.2.0.66.</t> - <t hangText="Carol:"> node [C] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.1.1.67.</t> - <t hangText="Dave:"> node [D] in the diagram. When an IP address is needed, this is 192.3.0.68.</t> - <t hangText="SG-A:"> Alice's security gateway. Internally it is 192.1.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.4.</t> - <t hangText="SG-B:"> Bob's security gateway. Internally it is 192.2.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.5.</t> - <t hangText="SG-D:"> Dave's security gateway. Also Alice's backup security gateway. Internally it is 192.3.0.1, externally it is 192.1.1.6.</t> - <t hangText="."> A period represents an untrusted network of unknown - type.</t> - <t hangText="Configured tunnel:"> a tunnel that - is directly and deliberately hand configured on participating gateways. - Configured tunnels are typically given a higher level of - trust than opportunistic tunnels.</t> - - <t hangText="Road warrior tunnel:"> a configured tunnel connecting one - node with a fixed IP address and one node with a variable IP address. - A road warrior (RW) connection must be initiated by the - variable node, since the fixed node cannot know the - current address for the road warrior. </t> - - <t hangText="Anonymous encryption:"> - the process of encrypting a session without any knowledge of who the - other parties are. No authentication of identities is done.</t> - - <t hangText="Opportunistic encryption:"> - the process of encrypting a session with authenticated knowledge of - who the other party is.</t> - - <t hangText="Lifetime:"> - the period in seconds (bytes or datagrams) for which a security - association will remain alive before needing to be re-keyed.</t> - - <t hangText="Lifespan:"> - the effective time for which a security association remains useful. A - security association with a lifespan shorter than its lifetime would - be removed when no longer needed. A security association with a - lifespan longer than its lifetime would need to be re-keyed one or - more times.</t> - - <t hangText="Phase 1 SA:"> an ISAKMP/IKE security association sometimes - referred to as a keying channel.</t> - - <t hangText="Phase 2 SA:"> an IPsec security association.</t> - - <t hangText="Tunnel:"> another term for a set of phase 2 SA (one in each direction).</t> - - <t hangText="NAT:"> Network Address Translation - (see <xref target="RFC2663" />).</t> - - <t hangText="NAPT:"> Network Address and Port Translation - (see <xref target="RFC2663" />).</t> - - <t hangText="AS:"> an autonomous system </t> - - <t hangText="FQDN:"> Fully-Qualified Domain Name </t> - - <t hangText="Default-free zone:"> - a set of routers that maintain a complete set of routes to - all currently reachable destinations. Having such a list, these routers - never make use of a default route. A datagram with a destination address - not matching any route will be dropped by such a router. - </t> - - </list> - </section> - -<section title="Model of operation"> - -<t> -The opportunistic encryption security gateway (OE gateway) is a regular -gateway node as described in <xref target="RFC0791" /> section 2.4 and -<xref target="RFC1009" /> with the additional capabilities described here and -in <xref target="RFC2401" />. -The algorithm described here provides a way to determine, for each datagram, -whether or not to encrypt and tunnel the datagram. Two important things -that must be determined are whether or not to encrypt and tunnel and, if -so, the destination address or name of the tunnel end point which should be used. -</t> - -<section title="Tunnel authorization"> -<t> -The OE gateway determines whether or not to create a tunnel based on -the destination address of each packet. Upon receiving a packet with a destination -address not recently seen, the OE gateway performs a lookup in DNS for an -authorization resource record (see <xref target="TXT"/>). The record is located using -the IP address to perform a search in the in-addr.arpa (IPv4) or ip6.arpa -(IPv6) maps. If an authorization record is found, the OE gateway -interprets this as a request for a tunnel to be formed. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Tunnel end-point discovery"> - -<t> -The authorization resource record also provides the address or name of the tunnel -end point which should be used. -</t> -<t> -The record may also provide the public RSA key of the tunnel end point -itself. This is provided for efficiency only. If the public RSA key is not -present, the OE gateway performs a second lookup to find a KEY -resource record for the end point address or name. -</t> -<t> -Origin and integrity protection of the resource records is provided by -DNSSEC (<xref target="RFC2535"/>). <xref target="nodnssec"/> -documents an optional restriction on the tunnel end point if DNSSEC signatures -are not available for the relevant records. -</t> - -</section> - -<section title="Caching of authorization results"> -<t> -The OE gateway maintains a cache, in the forwarding plane, of -source/destination pairs for which opportunistic encryption has been -attempted. This cache maintains a record of whether or not OE was -successful so that subsequent datagrams can be forwarded properly -without additional delay. -</t> - -<t> -Successful negotiation of OE instantiates a new security association. -Failure to negotiate OE results in creation of a -forwarding policy entry either to drop or transmit in the clear future -datagrams. This negative cache is necessary to avoid the possibly lengthy process of repeatedly looking -up the same information. -</t> - -<t> -The cache is timed out periodically, as described in <xref target="teardown" />. -This removes entries that are no longer -being used and permits the discovery of changes in authorization policy. -</t> -</section> - -</section> <!-- "Model of operation" --> - -</section> <!-- "Overview" --> - -<section title="Protocol Specification"> - -<t> -The OE gateway is modeled to have a forwarding plane and a control -plane. A control channel, such as PF_KEY, connects the two planes. -(See <xref target="RFC2367" />.) -The forwarding plane performs per datagram operations. The control plane -contains a keying daemon, such as ISAKMP/IKE, and performs all -authorization, peer authentication and key derivation functions. -</t> - -<section title="Forwarding plane state machine"> - -<t> -Let the OE gateway maintain a collection of objects -- a superset of the -security policy database (SPD) specified in <xref target="RFC2401" />. For -each combination of source and destination address, an SPD -object exists in one of five following states. -Prior to forwarding each datagram, the responder uses the source and -destination addresses to pick an entry from the SPD. -The SPD then determines if and how the packet is forwarded. -</t> - -<!-- from file forwardingstate.txt --> -<artwork><![CDATA[ - .--------------. - | non-existant | - | policy | - `--------------' - | - | PF_ACQUIRE - | - |<---------. - V | new packet - .--------------. | (maybe resend PF_ACQUIRE) - | hold policy |--' - | |--. - `--------------' \ pass - | | \ msg .---------. - | | \ V | forward - | | .-------------. | packet - create | | | pass policy |--' - IPsec | | `-------------' - SA | | - | \ - | \ - V \ deny - .---------. \ msg - | encrypt | \ - | policy | \ ,---------. - `---------' \ | | discard - \ V | packet - .-------------. | - | deny policy |--' - '-------------' -]]></artwork> - - -<section title="Non-existent policy"> -<t> -If the gateway does not find an entry, then this policy applies. -The gateway creates an entry with an initial state of "hold policy" and requests -keying material from the keying daemon. The gateway does not forward the datagram, -rather it SHOULD attach the datagram to the SPD entry as the "first" datagram and retain it -for eventual transmission in a new state. - -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Hold policy"> -<t> -The gateway requests keying material. If the interface to the keying -system is lossy (PF_KEY, for instance, can be), the implementation -SHOULD include a mechanism to retransmit the -keying request at a rate limited to less than 1 request per second. -The gateway does not forward the datagram. The gateway SHOULD attach the -datagram to the SPD entry as the "last" datagram where it is retained -for eventual transmission. -If there is a datagram already so stored, then that already stored datagram is discarded. -</t> -<t> -The rational behind saving the the "first" and "last" datagrams are as follows: -The "first" datagram is probably a TCP SYN packet. Once there is keying -established, the gateway will release this datagram, avoiding the need to -for the end-point to retransmit the datagram. In the case where the connection -was not a TCP connection, buyt was instead a streaming protocol or a DNS request, -the "last" datagram that was retained is likely the most recent data. The difference -between "first" and "last" may also help the end-points determine -which data awas dropped while negotiation took place. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Pass-through policy"> -<t> -The gateway forwards the datagram using the normal forwarding table. -The gateway enters this state only by command from the keying daemon, -and upon entering this state, also forwards the "first" and "last" datagrams. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Deny policy"> -<t> -The gateway discards the datagram. The gateway enters this state only by -command -from the keying daemon, and upon entering this state, discards the "first" -and "last" datagrams. -An implementation MAY provide the administator with a control to determine -if further datagrams cause ICMP messages -to be generated (i.e. ICMP Destination Unreachable, Communication -Administratively Prohibited. type=3, code=13). -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Encrypt policy"> -<t> -The gateway encrypts the datagram using the indicated security association database -(SAD) entry. The gateway enters this state only by command from the keying daemon, and upon entering -this state, releases and forwards the "first" and "last" datagrams using the -new encrypt policy. -</t> -<t> -If the associated SAD entry expires because of byte, packet or time limits, then -the entry returns to the Hold policy, and an expire message is sent to the keying daemon. -</t> -</section> - -<t> -All states may be created directly by the keying daemon while acting as a -gateway. -</t> - -</section> <!-- "Datagram state machine" --> - - -<section anchor="initclasses" title="Keying Daemon -- initiator"> -<t> -Let the keying daemon maintain a collection of objects. Let them be -called "connections" or "conn"s. There are two categories of -connection objects: classes and instances. A class represents an -abstract policy - what could be. An instance represents an actual connection - -what is implemented at the time. -</t> - -<t> -Let there be two further subtypes of connections: keying channels (Phase -1 SAs) and data channels (Phase 2 SAs). Each data channel object may have -a corresponding SPD and SAD entry maintained by the datagram state machine. -</t> - -<t> -For the purposes of opportunistic encryption, there MUST, at least, be -connection classes known as "deny", "always-clear-text", "OE-permissive", and -"OE-paranoid". -The latter two connection classes define a set of source and/or destination -addresses for which opportunistic encryption will be attempted. -The administrator MAY set policy options in a number of additional places. -An implementation MAY create additional connection classes to further refine -these policies. -</t> - -<t> -The simplest system may need only the "OE-permissive" connection, and would -list its own (single) IP address as the source address of this policy and -the wild-card address 0.0.0.0/0 as the destination IPv4 address. That is, the -simplest policy is to try opportunistic encryption with all destinations. -</t> - -<t> -The distinction between permissive and paranoid OE use will become clear -in the state transition differences. In general a permissive OE will, on -failure, install a pass-through policy, while a paranoid OE will, on failure, -install a drop policy. -</t> - -<t> -In this description of the keying machine's state transitions, the states -associated with the keying system itself are omitted because they are best documented in the keying system -(<xref target="RFC2407" />, -<xref target="RFC2408" /> and <xref target="RFC2409" /> for ISAKMP/IKE), -and the details are keying system specific. Opportunistic encryption is not -dependent upon any specific keying protocol, but this document does provide -requirements for those using ISAKMP/IKE to assure that implementations inter-operate. -</t> -<t> -The state transitions that may be involved in communicating with the -forwarding plane are omitted. PF_KEY and similar protocols have their own -set of states required for message sends and completion notifications. -</t> -<t> -Finally, the retransmits and recursive lookups that are normal for DNS are -not included in this description of the state machine. -</t> - -<!-- from file initiatorstate.txt --> -<artwork><![CDATA[ - - | - | PF_ACQUIRE - | - V - .---------------. - | non-existant | - | connection | - `---------------' - | | | - send , | \ -expired pass / | \ send -conn. msg / | \ deny - ^ / | \ msg - | V | do \ -.---------------. | DNS \ .---------------. -| clear-text | | lookup `->| deny |---> expired -| connection | | for | connection | connection -`---------------' | destination `---------------' - ^ ^ | ^ - | | no record | | - | | OE-permissive V | no record - | | .---------------. | OE-paranoid - | `------------| potential OE |---------' - | | connection | ^ - | `---------------' | - | | | - | | got TXT record | DNSSEC failure - | | reply | - | V | wrong - | .---------------. | failure - | | authenticate |---------' - | | & parse TXT RR| ^ - | repeated `---------------' | - | ICMP | | - | failures | initiate IKE to | - | (short-timeout) | responder | - | V | - | phase-2 .---------------. | failure - | failure | pending |---------' - | (normal | OE | ^ - | timeout) | |invalid | phase-2 failure (short-timeout) - | | |<--.SPI | ICMP failures (normal timeout) - | | | | | - | | +=======+ |---' | - | | | IKE | | ^ | - `--------------| | states|---------------' - | +=======+ | | - `---------------' | - | IPsec SA | invalid SPI - | established | - V | rekey time - .--------------. | - | keyed |<---|-------------------------------. - | connection |----' | - `--------------' | - | timer | - | | - V | - .--------------. connection still active | - clear-text----->| expired |------------------------------------' - deny----->| connection | - `--------------' - | dead connected - deleted - V -]]></artwork> - - -<section title="Nonexistent connection"> -<t> -There is no connection instance for a given source/destination address pair. -Upon receipt of a request for keying material for this -source/destination pair, the initiator searches through the connection classes to -determine the most appropriate policy. Upon determining an appropriate -connection class, an instance object is created of that type. -Both of the OE types result in a potential OE connection. -</t> -<t>Failure to find an appropriate connection class results in an -administrator defined default. -</t> -<t> -In each case, when the initiator finds an appropriate class for the new flow, -an instance connection is made of the class which matched. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Clear-text connection"> -<t> -The non-existent connection makes a transition to this state when an -always-clear-text class is instantiated, or when an OE-permissive -connection fails. During the transition, the initiator creates a pass-through -policy object in the forwarding plane for the appropriate flow. -</t> -<t> -Timing out is the only way to leave this state -(see <xref target="expiring" />). -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Deny connection"> -<t> -The empty connection makes a transition to this state when a -deny class is instantiated, or when an OE-paranoid connection fails. -During the transition, the initiator creates a deny policy object in the forwarding plane -for the appropriate flow. -</t> -<t> -Timing out is the only way to leave this state -(see <xref target="expiring" />). -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Potential OE connection"> -<t> -The empty connection makes a transition to this state when one of either OE class is instantiated. -During the transition to this state, the initiator creates a hold policy object in the -forwarding plane for the appropriate flow. -</t> -<t> -In addition, when making a transition into this state, DNS lookup is done in -the reverse-map for a TXT delegation resource record (see <xref target="TXT" />). -The lookup key is the destination address of the flow. -</t> -<t> -There are three ways to exit this state: -<list style="numbers"> -<t>DNS lookup finds a TXT delegation resource record.</t> -<t>DNS lookup does not find a TXT delegation resource record.</t> -<t>DNS lookup times out.</t> -</list> -</t> - -<t> -Based upon the results of the DNS lookup, the potential OE connection makes a -transition to the pending OE connection state. The conditions for a -successful DNS look are: -<list style="numbers"> -<t>DNS finds an appropriate resource record</t> -<t>It is properly formatted according to <xref target="TXT" /></t> -<t> if DNSSEC is enabled, then the signature has been vouched for.</t> -</list> - -Note that if the initiator does not find the public key -present in the TXT delegation record, then the public key must -be looked up as a sub-state. Only successful completion of all the -DNS lookups is considered a success. -</t> -<t> -If DNS lookup does not find a resource record or DNS times out, then the -initiator considers the receiver not OE capable. If this is an OE-paranoid instance, -then the potential OE connection makes a transition to the deny connection state. -If this is an OE-permissive instance, then the potential OE connection makes a transition to the -clear-text connection state. -</t> -<t> -If the initiator finds a resource record but it is not properly formatted, or -if DNSSEC is -enabled and reports a failure to authenticate, then the potential OE -connection makes a -transition to the deny connection state. This action SHOULD be logged. If the -administrator wishes to override this transition between states, then an -always-clear class can be installed for this flow. An implementation MAY make -this situation a new class. -</t> - -<section anchor="nodnssec" title="Restriction on unauthenticated TXT delegation records"> -<t> -An implementation SHOULD also provide an additional administrative control -on delegation records and DNSSEC. This control would apply to delegation -records (the TXT records in the reverse-map) that are not protected by -DNSSEC. -Records of this type are only permitted to delegate to their own address as -a gateway. When this option is enabled, an active attack on DNS will be -unable to redirect packets to other than the original destination. -<!-- This was asked for by Bill Sommerfeld --> -</t> -</section> -</section> - -<section title="Pending OE connection"> -<t> -The potential OE connection makes a transition to this state when -the initiator determines that all the information required from the DNS lookup is present. -Upon entering this state, the initiator attempts to initiate keying to the gateway -provided. -</t> -<t> -Exit from this state occurs either with a successfully created IPsec SA, or -with a failure of some kind. Successful SA creation results in a transition -to the key connection state. -</t> -<t> -Three failures have caused significant problems. They are clearly not the -only possible failures from keying. -</t> -<t> -Note that if there are multiple gateways available in the TXT delegation -records, then a failure can only be declared after all have been -tried. Further, creation of a phase 1 SA does not constitute success. A set -of phase 2 SAs (a tunnel) is considered success. -</t> -<t> -The first failure occurs when an ICMP port unreachable is consistently received -without any other communication, or when there is silence from the remote -end. This usually means that either the gateway is not alive, or the -keying daemon is not functional. For an OE-permissive connection, the initiator makes a transition -to the clear-text connection but with a low lifespan. For an OE-pessimistic connection, -the initiator makes a transition to the deny connection again with a low lifespan. The -lifespan in both -cases is kept low because the remote gateway may -be in the process of rebooting or be otherwise temporarily unavailable. -</t> -<t> -The length of time to wait for the remote keying daemon to wake up is -a matter of some debate. If there is a routing failure, 5 minutes is usually long -enough for the network to -re-converge. Many systems can reboot in that amount of -time as well. However, 5 minutes is far too long for most users to wait to -hear that they can not connect using OE. Implementations SHOULD make this a -tunable parameter. -</t> -<t> -The second failure occurs after a phase 1 SA has been created, but there is -either no response to the phase 2 proposal, or the initiator receives a -negative notify (the notify must be -authenticated). The remote gateway is not prepared to do OE at this time. -As before, the initiator makes a transition to the clear-text or the deny -connection based upon connection class, but this -time with a normal lifespan. -</t> -<t> -The third failure occurs when there is signature failure while authenticating -the remote gateway. This can occur when there has been a -key roll-over, but DNS has not caught up. In this case again, the initiator makes a -transition to the clear-text or the deny connection based -upon the connection class. However, the lifespan depends upon the remaining -time to live in the DNS. (Note that DNSSEC signed resource records have a different -expiry time than non-signed records.) -<!-- dig @gateway would also work here --> -</t> - -</section> - -<section anchor="keyed" title="Keyed connection"> -<t> -The pending OE connection makes a transition to this state when -session keying material (the phase 2 SAs) is derived. The initiator creates an encrypt -policy in the forwarding plane for this flow. -</t> -<t> -There are three ways to exit this state. The first is by receipt of an -authenticated delete message (via the keying channel) from the peer. This is -normal teardown and results in a transition to the expired connection state. -</t> -<t> -The second exit is by expiry of the forwarding plane keying material. This -starts a re-key operation with a transition back to pending OE -connection. In general, the soft expiry occurs with sufficient time left -to continue to use the keys. A re-key can fail, which may -result in the connection failing to clear-text or deny as -appropriate. In the event of a failure, the forwarding plane -policy does not change until the phase 2 SA (IPsec SA) reaches its -hard expiry. -</t> -<t> -The third exit is in response to a negotiation from a remote -gateway. If the forwarding plane signals the control plane that it has received an -unknown SPI from the remote gateway, or an ICMP is received from the remote gateway -indicating an unknown SPI, the initiator should consider that -the remote gateway has rebooted or restarted. Since these -indications are easily forged, the implementation must -exercise care. The initiator should make a cautious -(rate-limited) attempt to re-key the connection. -</t> -</section> - -<section anchor="expiring" title="Expiring connection"> -<t> -The initiator will periodically place each of the deny, clear-text, and keyed -connections into this -sub-state. See <xref target="teardown" /> for more details of how often this -occurs. -The initiator queries the forwarding plane for last use time of the -appropriate -policy. If the last use time is relatively recent, then the connection -returns to the -previous deny, clear-text or keyed connection state. If not, then the -connection enters -the expired connection state. -</t> -<t> -The DNS query and answer that lead to the expiring connection state are also -examined. The DNS query may become stale. (A negative, i.e. no such record, answer -is valid for the period of time given by the MINIMUM field in an attached SOA -record. See <xref target="RFC1034" /> section 4.3.4.) -If the DNS query is stale, then a new query is made. If the results change, then the connection -makes a transition to a new state as described in potential OE connection state. -</t> -<t> -Note that when considering how stale a connection is, both outgoing SPD and -incoming SAD must be queried as some flows may be unidirectional for some time. -</t> -<t> -Also note that the policy at the forwarding plane is not updated unless there -is a conclusion that there should be a change. -</t> - -</section> -<section title="Expired connection"> -<t> -Entry to this state occurs when no datagrams have been forwarded recently via the -appropriate SPD and SAD objects. The objects in the forwarding plane are -removed (logging any final byte and packet counts if appropriate) and the -connection instance in the keying plane is deleted. -</t> -<t> -The initiator sends an ISAKMP/IKE delete to clean up the phase 2 SAs as described in -<xref target="teardown" />. -</t> -<t> -Whether or not to delete the phase 1 SAs -at this time is left as a local implementation issue. Implementations -that do delete the phase 1 SAs MUST send authenticated delete messages to -indicate that they are doing so. There is an advantage to keeping -the phase 1 SAs until they expire - they may prove useful again in the -near future. -</t> -</section> - -</section> <!-- "Keying state machine - initiator" --> - -<section title="Keying Daemon - responder"> -<t> -The responder has a set of objects identical to those of the initiator. -</t> -<t> -The responder receives an invitation to create a keying channel from an initiator. -</t> - -<!-- from file responderstate.txt --> -<artwork><![CDATA[ - | - | IKE main mode - | phase 1 - V - .-----------------. - | unauthenticated | - | OE peer | - `-----------------' - | - | lookup KEY RR in in-addr.arpa - | (if ID_IPV4_ADDR) - | lookup KEY RR in forward - | (if ID_FQDN) - V - .-----------------. RR not found - | received DNS |---------------> log failure - | reply | - `----+--------+---' - phase 2 | \ misformatted - proposal | `------------------> log failure - V - .----------------. - | authenticated | identical initiator - | OE peer |--------------------> initiator - `----------------' connection found state machine - | - | look for TXT record for initiator - | - V - .---------------. - | authorized |---------------------> log failure - | OE peer | - `---------------' - | - | - V - potential OE - connection in - initiator state - machine - - -$Id: draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:24 as Exp $ -]]></artwork> - - -<section title="Unauthenticated OE peer"> -<t> -Upon entering this state, the responder starts a DNS lookup for a KEY record for the -initiator. -The responder looks in the reverse-map for a KEY record for the initiator if the -initiator has offered an ID_IPV4_ADDR, and in the forward map if the -initiator has offered an ID_FQDN type. (See <xref target="RFC2407" /> section -4.6.2.1.) -</t> -<t> -The responder exits this state upon successful receipt of a KEY from DNS, and use of the key -to verify the signature of the initiator. -</t> - -<!-- -<t> -The public key that is retrieved should be stored in stable storage for an -administratively defined period of time, (typically several months if -possible). If a key has previously been stored on disk, then the returned key -should be compared to what has been received, and the key considered valid -only if they match. -</t> ---> - -<t> -Successful authentication of the peer results in a transition to the -authenticated OE Peer state. -</t> -<t> -Note that the unauthenticated OE peer state generally occurs in the middle of the key negotiation -protocol. It is really a form of pseudo-state. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Authenticated OE Peer"> -<t> -The peer will eventually propose one or more phase 2 SAs. The responder uses the source and -destination address in the proposal to -finish instantiating the connection state -using the connection class table. -The responder MUST search for an identical connection object at this point. -</t> -<t> -If an identical connection is found, then the responder deletes the old instance, -and the new object makes a transition to the pending OE connection state. This means -that new ISAKMP connections with a given peer will always use the latest -instance, which is the correct one if the peer has rebooted in the interim. -</t> -<t> -If an identical connection is not found, then the responder makes the transition according to the -rules given for the initiator. -</t> -<t> -Note that if the initiator is in OE-paranoid mode and the responder is in -either always-clear-text or deny, then no communication is possible according -to policy. An implementation is permitted to create new types of policies -such as "accept OE but do not initiate it". This is a local matter. - </t> -</section> - -</section> <!-- "Keying state machine - responder" --> - -<section anchor="teardown" title="Renewal and teardown"> - <section title="Aging"> -<t> -A potentially unlimited number of tunnels may exist. In practice, only a few -tunnels are used during a period of time. Unused tunnels MUST, therefore, be -torn down. Detecting when tunnels are no longer in use is the subject of this section. -</t> - -<t> -There are two methods for removing tunnels: explicit deletion or expiry. -</t> - -<t> -Explicit deletion requires an IKE delete message. As the deletes -MUST be authenticated, both ends of the tunnel must maintain the -key channel (phase 1 ISAKMP SA). An implementation which refuses to either maintain or -recreate the keying channel SA will be unable to use this method. -</t> - -<t> -The tunnel expiry method simply allows the IKE daemon to -expire normally without attempting to re-key it. -</t> - -<t> -Regardless of which method is used to remove tunnels, the implementation MUST -a method to determine if the tunnel is still in use. The specifics are a -local matter, but the FreeS/WAN project uses the following criteria. These -criteria are currently implemented in the key management daemon, but could -also be implemented at the SPD layer using an idle timer. -</t> - -<t> -Set a short initial (soft) lifespan of 1 minute since many net flows last -only a few seconds. -</t> - -<t> -At the end of the lifespan, check to see if the tunnel was used by -traffic in either direction during the last 30 seconds. If so, assign a -longer tentative lifespan of 20 minutes after which, look again. If the -tunnel is not in use, then close the tunnel. -</t> - -<t> -The expiring state in the key management -system (see <xref target="expiring" />) implements these timeouts. -The timer above may be in the forwarding plane, -but then it must be re-settable. -</t> - -<t> -The tentative lifespan is independent of re-keying; it is just the time when -the tunnel's future is next considered. -(The term lifespan is used here rather than lifetime for this reason.) -Unlike re-keying, this tunnel use check is not costly and should happen -reasonably frequently. -</t> - -<t> -A multi-step back-off algorithm is not considered worth the effort here. -</t> - -<t> -If the security gateway and the client host are the -same and not a Bump-in-the-Stack or Bump-in-the-Wire implementation, tunnel -teardown decisions MAY pay attention to TCP connection status as reported -by the local TCP layer. A still-open TCP connection is almost a guarantee that more traffic is -expected. Closing of the only TCP connection through a tunnel is a -strong hint that no more traffic is expected. -</t> - -</section> <!-- "Aging" --> - -<section title="Teardown and cleanup"> - -<t> -Teardown should always be coordinated between the two ends of the tunnel by -interpreting and sending delete notifications. There is a -detailed sub-state in the expired connection state of the key manager that -relates to retransmits of the delete notifications, but this is considered to -be a keying system detail. -</t> - -<t> -On receiving a delete for the outbound SAs of a tunnel (or some subset of -them), tear down the inbound ones also and notify the remote end with a -delete. If the local system receives a delete for a tunnel which is no longer in -existence, then two delete messages have crossed paths. Ignore the delete. -The operation has already been completed. Do not generate any messages in this -situation. -</t> -<t> -Tunnels are to be considered as bidirectional entities, even though the -low-level protocols don't treat them this way. -</t> - -<t> -When the deletion is initiated locally, rather than as a -response to a received delete, send a delete for (all) the -inbound SAs of a tunnel. If the local system does not receive a responding delete -for the outbound SAs, try re-sending the original -delete. Three tries spaced 10 seconds apart seems a reasonable -level of effort. A failure of the other end to respond after 3 attempts, -indicates that the possibility of further communication is unlikely. Remove the outgoing SAs. -(The remote system may be a mobile node that is no longer present or powered on.) -</t> - -<t> -After re-keying, transmission should switch to using the new -outgoing SAs (ISAKMP or IPsec) immediately, and the old leftover -outgoing SAs should be cleared out promptly (delete should be sent -for the outgoing SAs) rather than waiting for them to expire. This -reduces clutter and minimizes confusion for the operator doing diagnostics. -</t> - -</section> - -</section> - -</section> <!-- "Specification" --> - -<section title="Impacts on IKE"> - - <section title="ISAKMP/IKE protocol"> - <t> - The IKE wire protocol needs no modifications. The major changes are - implementation issues relating to how the proposals are interpreted, and from - whom they may come. - </t> - <t> - As opportunistic encryption is designed to be useful between peers without - prior operator configuration, an IKE daemon must be prepared to negotiate - phase 1 SAs with any node. This may require a large amount of resources to - maintain cookie state, as well as large amounts of entropy for nonces, - cookies and so on. - </t> - <t> - The major changes to support opportunistic encryption are at the IKE daemon - level. These changes relate to handling of key acquisition requests, lookup - of public keys and TXT records, and interactions with firewalls and other - security facilities that may be co-resident on the same gateway. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="Gateway discovery process"> - <t> - In a typical configured tunnel, the address of SG-B is provided - via configuration. Furthermore, the mapping of an SPD entry to a gateway is - typically a 1:1 mapping. When the 0.0.0.0/0 SPD entry technique is used, then - the mapping to a gateway is determined by the reverse DNS records. - </t> - <t> - The need to do a DNS lookup and wait for a reply will typically introduce a - new state and a new event source (DNS replies) to IKE. Although a -synchronous DNS request can be implemented for proof of concept, experience -is that it can cause very high latencies when a queue of queries must -all timeout in series. - </t> - <t> - Use of an asynchronous DNS lookup will also permit overlap of DNS lookups with - some of the protocol steps. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="Self identification"> - <t> - SG-A will have to establish its identity. Use an - IPv4 ID in phase 1. - </t> - <t> There are many situations where the administrator of SG-A may not be - able to control the reverse DNS records for SG-A's public IP address. - Typical situations include dialup connections and most residential-type broadband Internet access - (ADSL, cable-modem) connections. In these situations, a fully qualified domain - name that is under the control of SG-A's administrator may be used - when acting as an initiator only. - The FQDN ID should be used in phase 1. See <xref target="fqdn" /> - for more details and restrictions. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="Public key retrieval process"> - <t> - Upon receipt of a phase 1 SA proposal with either an IPv4 (IPv6) ID or - an FQDN ID, an IKE daemon needs to examine local caches and - configuration files to determine if this is part of a configured tunnel. - If no configured tunnels are found, then the implementation should attempt to retrieve - a KEY record from the reverse DNS in the case of an IPv4/IPv6 ID, or - from the forward DNS in the case of FQDN ID. - </t> - <t> - It is reasonable that if other non-local sources of policy are used - (COPS, LDAP), they be consulted concurrently but some - clear ordering of policy be provided. Note that due to variances in - latency, implementations must wait for positive or negative replies from all sources - of policy before making any decisions. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="Interactions with DNSSEC"> - <t> - The implementation described (1.98) neither uses DNSSEC directly to - explicitly verify the authenticity of zone information, nor uses the NXT - records to provide authentication of the absence of a TXT or KEY - record. Rather, this implementation uses a trusted path to a DNSSEC - capable caching resolver. - </t> - <t> - To distinguish between an authenticated and an unauthenticated DNS - resource record, a stub resolver capable of returning DNSSEC - information MUST be used. - </t> - - </section> - -<!-- - <section title="Interactions with COPS"> - <t> - At this time there is no experience with implementations that interact - with COPS Policy Decision Points (PDP) <xref target="RFC2748" />. It is - suggested that it may be - appropriate for many of - the policy and discovery mechanisms outlined here to be done by a PDP. - In this context, the IKE daemon present in the Policy Enforcement Point - (PEP) may not need any modifications. - </t> - </section> ---> - - <section title="Required proposal types"> - - <section anchor="phase1id" title="Phase 1 parameters"> - <t> - Main mode MUST be used. - </t> - <t> - The initiator MUST offer at least one proposal using some combination - of: 3DES, HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-SHA1, DH group 2 or 5. Group 5 SHOULD be - proposed first. - <xref target="RFC3526" /> - </t> - <t> - The initiator MAY offer additional proposals, but the cipher MUST not - be weaker than 3DES. The initiator SHOULD limit the number of proposals - such that the IKE datagrams do not need to be fragmented. - </t> - <t> - The responder MUST accept one of the proposals. If any configuration - of the responder is required then the responder is not acting in an - opportunistic way. - </t> - <t> - The initiator SHOULD use an ID_IPV4_ADDR (ID_IPV6_ADDR for IPv6) of the external - interface of the initiator for phase 1. (There is an exception, see <xref - target="fqdn" />.) The authentication method MUST be RSA public key signatures. - The RSA key for the initiator SHOULD be placed into a DNS KEY record in - the reverse space of the initiator (i.e. using in-addr.arpa or - ip6.arpa). - </t> - </section> - - <section anchor="phase2id" title="Phase 2 parameters"> - <t> - The initiator MUST propose a tunnel between the ultimate - sender ("Alice" or "A") and ultimate recipient ("Bob" or "B") - using 3DES-CBC - mode, MD5 or SHA1 authentication. Perfect Forward Secrecy MUST be specified. - </t> - <t> - Tunnel mode MUST be used. - </t> - <t> - Identities MUST be ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET with the mask being /32. - </t> - <t> - Authorization for the initiator to act on Alice's behalf is determined by - looking for a TXT record in the reverse-map at Alice's IP address. - </t> - <t> - Compression SHOULD NOT be mandatory. It MAY be offered as an option. - </t> - </section> - </section> - -</section> - -<section title="DNS issues"> - <section anchor="KEY" title="Use of KEY record"> - <t> - In order to establish their own identities, security gateways SHOULD publish - their public keys in their reverse DNS via - DNSSEC's KEY record. - See section 3 of <xref target="RFC2535">RFC 2535</xref>. - </t> - <t> - <preamble>For example:</preamble> - <artwork><![CDATA[ -KEY 0x4200 4 1 AQNJjkKlIk9...nYyUkKK8 -]]></artwork> - - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="0x4200:"> The flag bits, indicating that this key is prohibited - for confidentiality use (it authenticates the peer only, a separate - Diffie-Hellman exchange is used for - confidentiality), and that this key is associated with the non-zone entity - whose name is the RR owner name. No other flags are set.</t> - <t hangText="4:">This indicates that this key is for use by IPsec.</t> - <t hangText="1:">An RSA key is present.</t> - <t hangText="AQNJjkKlIk9...nYyUkKK8:">The public key of the host as described in <xref target="RFC3110" />.</t> - </list> - </t> - <t>Use of several KEY records allows for key rollover. The SIG Payload in - IKE phase 1 SHOULD be accepted if the public key given by any KEY RR - validates it. - </t> - </section> - - <section anchor="TXT" title="Use of TXT delegation record"> - <t> -If, for example, machine Alice wishes SG-A to act on her behalf, then -she publishes a TXT record to provide authorization for SG-A to act on -Alice's behalf. Similarly for Bob and SG-B. -</t> - -<t> -These records are located in the reverse DNS (in-addr.arpa or ip6.arpa) for their -respective IP addresses. The reverse DNS SHOULD be secured by DNSSEC. -DNSSEC is required to defend against active attacks. - </t> - <t> - If Alice's address is P.Q.R.S, then she can authorize another node to - act on her behalf by publishing records at: - <artwork><![CDATA[ -S.R.Q.P.in-addr.arpa - ]]></artwork> - </t> - - <t> - The contents of the resource record are expected to be a string that - uses the following syntax, as suggested in <xref target="RFC1464">RFC1464</xref>. - (Note that the reply to query may include other TXT resource - records used by other applications.) - - <figure anchor="txtformat" title="Format of reverse delegation record"> - <artwork><![CDATA[ -X-IPsec-Server(P)=A.B.C.D KEY - ]]></artwork> - </figure> - </t> - - where the record is formed by the following fields: - - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="P:"> Specifies a precedence for this record. This is - similar to MX record preferences. Lower numbers have stronger - preference. - </t> - - <t hangText="A.B.C.D:"> Specifies the IP address of the Security Gateway - for this client machine. - </t> - - <t hangText="KEY:"> Is the encoded RSA Public key of the Security - Gateway. The key is provided here to avoid a second DNS lookup. If this - field is absent, then a KEY resource record should be looked up in the - reverse-map of A.B.C.D. The key is transmitted in base64 format. - </t> - </list> - - <t> - The fields of the record MUST be separated by whitespace. This - MAY be: space, tab, newline, or carriage return. A space is preferred. - </t> - - <t> - In the case where Alice is located at a public address behind a - security gateway that has no fixed address (or no control over its - reverse-map), then Alice may delegate to a public key by domain name. - - <figure anchor="txtfqdnformat" - title="Format of reverse delegation record (FQDN version)"> - <artwork><![CDATA[ -X-IPsec-Server(P)=@FQDN KEY - ]]></artwork> - </figure> - </t> - - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="P:"> Is as above. - </t> - - <t hangText="FQDN:"> Specifies the FQDN that the Security Gateway - will identify itself with. - </t> - - <t hangText="KEY:"> Is the encoded RSA Public key of the Security - Gateway. </t> - </list> - - <t> - If there is more than one such TXT record with strongest (lowest - numbered) precedence, one Security Gateway is picked arbitrarily from - those specified in the strongest-preference records. - </t> - - <section title="Long TXT records"> - <t> - When packed into transport format, TXT records which are longer than 255 - characters are divided into smaller <character-strings>. - (See <xref target="RFC1035" /> section 3.3 and 3.3.14.) These MUST - be reassembled into a single string for processing. - Whitespace characters in the base64 encoding are to be ignored. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="Choice of TXT record"> - <t> - It has been suggested to use the KEY, OPT, CERT, or KX records - instead of a TXT record. None is satisfactory. - </t> - <t> The KEY RR has a protocol field which could be used to indicate a new protocol, -and an algorithm field which could be used to - indicate different contents in the key data. However, the KEY record - is clearly not intended for storing what are really authorizations, - it is just for identities. Other uses have been discouraged. - </t> - <t> OPT resource records, as defined in <xref target="RFC2671" /> are not - intended to be used for storage of information. They are not to be loaded, - cached or forwarded. They are, therefore, inappropriate for use here. - </t> - <t> - CERT records <xref target="RFC2538" /> can encode almost any set of - information. A custom type code could be used permitting any suitable - encoding to be stored, not just X.509. According to - the RFC, the certificate RRs are to be signed internally which may add undesirable -and unnecessary bulk. Larger DNS records may require TCP instead of UDP transfers. - </t> - <t> - At the time of protocol design, the CERT RR was not widely deployed and - could not be counted upon. Use of CERT records will be investigated, - and may be proposed in a future revision of this document. - </t> - <t> - KX records are ideally suited for use instead of TXT records, but had not been deployed at - the time of implementation. -<!-- Jakob Schlyter <j@crt.se> confirmed --> - </t> - </section> - </section> - - <section anchor="fqdn" title="Use of FQDN IDs"> - <t> - Unfortunately, not every administrator has control over the contents - of the reverse-map. Where the initiator (SG-A) has no suitable reverse-map, the - authorization record present in the reverse-map of Alice may refer to a - FQDN instead of an IP address. - </t> - <t> - In this case, the client's TXT record gives the fully qualified domain - name (FQDN) in place of its security gateway's IP address. - The initiator should use the ID_FQDN ID-payload in phase 1. - A forward lookup for a KEY record on the FQDN must yield the - initiator's public key. - </t> - <t> - This method can also be used when the external address of SG-A is - dynamic. - </t> - <t> - If SG-A is acting on behalf of Alice, then Alice must still delegate - authority for SG-A to do so in her reverse-map. When Alice and SG-A - are one and the same (i.e. Alice is acting as an end-node) then there - is no need for this when initiating only. </t> - <t>However, Alice must still delegate to herself if she wishes others to - initiate OE to her. See <xref target="txtfqdnformat" />. - </t> - < - </section> - -<section title="Key roll-over"> -<t> -Good cryptographic hygiene says that one should replace public/private key pairs -periodically. Some administrators may wish to do this as often as daily. Typical DNS -propagation delays are determined by the SOA Resource Record MINIMUM -parameter, which controls how long DNS replies may be cached. For reasonable -operation of DNS servers, administrators usually want this value to be at least several -hours, sometimes as a long as a day. This presents a problem - a new key MUST -not be used prior to it propagating through DNS. -</t> -<t> -This problem is dealt with by having the Security Gateway generate a new -public/private key pair at least MINIMUM seconds in advance of using it. It -then adds this key to the DNS (both as a second KEY record and in additional TXT -delegation records) at key generation time. Note: only one key is allowed in -each TXT record. -</t> -<t> -When authenticating, all gateways MUST have available all public keys -that are found in DNS for this entity. This permits the authenticating end -to check both the key for "today" and the key for "tomorrow". Note that it is -the end which is creating the signature (possesses the private key) that -determines which key is to be used. -</t> - - </section> -</section> - - -<section title="Network address translation interaction"> - <t> - There are no fundamentally new issues for implementing opportunistic encryption - in the presence of network address translation. Rather there are - only the regular IPsec issues with NAT traversal. - </t> - <t> - There are several situations to consider for NAT. - </t> - <section title="Co-located NAT/NAPT"> - <t> - If a security gateway is also performing network address translation on - behalf of an end-system, then the packet should be translated prior to - being subjected to opportunistic encryption. This is in contrast to - typically configured tunnels which often exist to bridge islands of - private network address space. The security gateway will use the translated source - address for phase 2, and so the responding security gateway will look up that address to - confirm SG-A's authorization. - </t> - <t> In the case of NAT (1:1), the address space into which the - translation is done MUST be globally unique, and control over the - reverse-map is assumed. - Placing of TXT records is possible. - </t> - <t> In the case of NAPT (m:1), the address will be the security - gateway itself. The ability to get - KEY and TXT records in place will again depend upon whether or not - there is administrative control over the reverse-map. This is - identical to situations involving a single host acting on behalf of - itself. - - FQDN style can be used to get around a lack of a reverse-map for - initiators only. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="Security Gateway behind NAT/NAPT"> - <t> - If there is a NAT or NAPT between the security gateways, then normal IPsec - NAT traversal problems occur. In addition to the transport problem - which may be solved by other mechanisms, there is the issue of - what phase 1 and phase 2 IDs to use. While FQDN could - be used during phase 1 for the security gateway, there is no appropriate ID for phase 2. - Due to the NAT, the end systems live in different IP address spaces. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="End System is behind a NAT/NAPT"> - <t> - If the end system is behind a NAT (perhaps SG-B), then there is, in fact, no way for - another end system to address a packet to this end system. - Not only is opportunistic encryption - impossible, but it is also impossible for any communication to - be initiate to the end system. It may be possible for this end - system to initiate in such communication. This creates an asymmetry, but this is common for - NAPT. - </t> - </section> -</section> - -<section title="Host implementations"> -<t> - When Alice and SG-A are components of the same system, they are - considered to be a host implementation. The packet sequence scenario remains unchanged. -</t> -<t> - Components marked Alice are the upper layers (TCP, UDP, the - application), and SG-A is the IP layer. -</t> -<t> - Note that tunnel mode is still required. -</t> -<t> - As Alice and SG-A are acting on behalf of themselves, no TXT based delegation - record is necessary for Alice to initiate. She can rely on FQDN in a - forward map. This is particularly attractive to mobile nodes such as - notebook computers at conferences. - To respond, Alice/SG-A will still need an entry in Alice's reverse-map. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Multi-homing"> -<t> -If there are multiple paths between Alice and Bob (as illustrated in -the diagram with SG-D), then additional DNS records are required to establish -authorization. -</t> -<t> -In <xref target="networkdiagram" />, Alice has two ways to -exit her network: SG-A and SG-D. Previously SG-D has been ignored. Postulate -that there are routers between Alice and her set of security gateways -(denoted by the + signs and the marking of an autonomous system number for -Alice's network). Datagrams may, therefore, travel to either SG-A or SG-D en -route to Bob. -</t> -<t> -As long as all network connections are in good order, it does not matter how -datagrams exit Alice's network. When they reach either security gateway, the -security gateway will find the TXT delegation record in Bob's reverse-map, -and establish an SA with SG-B. -</t> -<t> -SG-B has no problem establishing that either of SG-A or SG-D may speak for -Alice, because Alice has published two equally weighted TXT delegation records: - <figure anchor="txtmultiexample" - title="Multiple gateway delegation example for Alice"> - <artwork><![CDATA[ -X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.5 AQMM...3s1Q== -X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.6 AAJN...j8r9== - ]]></artwork> - </figure> -</t> -<t> -Alice's routers can now do any kind of load sharing needed. Both SG-A and SG-D send datagrams addressed to Bob through -their tunnel to SG-B. -</t> -<t> -Alice's use of non-equal weight delegation records to show preference of one gateway over another, has relevance only when SG-B -is initiating to Alice. -</t> -<t> -If the precedences are the same, then SG-B has a more difficult time. It -must decide which of the two tunnels to use. SG-B has no information about -which link is less loaded, nor which security gateway has more cryptographic -resources available. SG-B, in fact, has no knowledge of whether both gateways -are even reachable. -</t> -<t> -The Public Internet's default-free zone may well know a good route to Alice, -but the datagrams that SG-B creates must be addressed to either SG-A or SG-D; -they can not be addressed to Alice directly. -</t> -<t> -SG-B may make a number of choices: -<list style="numbers"> -<t>It can ignore the problem and round robin among the tunnels. This - causes losses during times when one or the other security gateway is - unreachable. If this worries Alice, she can change the weights in her - TXT delegation records.</t> - -<t>It can send to the gateway from which it most recently received datagrams. - This assumes that routing and reachability are symmetrical.</t> - -<t>It can listen to BGP information from the Internet to decide which - system is currently up. This is clearly much more complicated, but if SG-B is already participating - in the BGP peering system to announce Bob, the results data may already - be available to it. </t> - -<t>It can refuse to negotiate the second tunnel. (It is unclear whether or -not this is even an option.)</t> - -<t>It can silently replace the outgoing portion of the first tunnel with the -second one while still retaining the incoming portions of both. SG-B can, -thus, accept datagrams from either SG-A or SG-D, but -send only to the gateway that most recently re-keyed with it.</t> -</list> -</t> - -<t> -Local policy determines which choice SG-B makes. Note that even if SG-B has perfect -knowledge about the reachability of SG-A and SG-D, Alice may not be reachable -from either of these security gateways because of internal reachability -issues. -</t> - -<t> -FreeS/WAN implements option 5. Implementing a different option is -being considered. The multi-homing aspects of OE are not well developed and may -be the subject of a future document. -</t> - -</section> - -<section title="Failure modes"> - <section title="DNS failures"> - <t> - If a DNS server fails to respond, local policy decides - whether or not to permit communication in the clear as embodied in - the connection classes in <xref target="initclasses" />. - It is easy to mount a denial of service attack on the DNS server - responsible for a particular network's reverse-map. - Such an attack may cause all communication with that network to go in - the clear if the policy is permissive, or fail completely - if the policy is paranoid. Please note that this is an active attack. - </t> - <t> - There are still many networks - that do not have properly configured reverse-maps. Further, if the policy is not to communicate, - the above denial of service attack isolates the target network. Therefore, the decision of whether -or not to permit communication in the clear MUST be a matter of local policy. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="DNS configured, IKE failures"> - <t> - DNS records claim that opportunistic encryption should - occur, but the target gateway either does not respond on port 500, or - refuses the proposal. This may be because of a crash or reboot, a - faulty configuration, or a firewall filtering port 500. - </t> - <t> - The receipt of ICMP port, host or network unreachable - messages indicates a potential problem, but MUST NOT cause communication - to fail - immediately. ICMP messages are easily forged by attackers. If such a - forgery caused immediate failure, then an active attacker could easily - prevent any - encryption from ever occurring, possibly preventing all communication. - </t> - <t> - In these situations a clear log should be produced - and local policy should dictate if communication is then - permitted in the clear. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="System reboots"> -<t> -Tunnels sometimes go down because the remote end crashes, -disconnects, or has a network link break. In general there is no -notification of this. Even in the event of a crash and successful reboot, -other SGs don't hear about it unless the rebooted SG has specific -reason to talk to them immediately. Over-quick response to temporary -network outages is undesirable. Note that a tunnel can be torn -down and then re-established without any effect visible to the user -except a pause in traffic. On the other hand, if one end reboots, -the other end can't get datagrams to it at all (except via -IKE) until the situation is noticed. So a bias toward quick -response is appropriate even at the cost of occasional -false alarms. -</t> - -<t> -A mechanism for recovery after reboot is a topic of current research and is not specified in this -document. -</t> - -<t> -A deliberate shutdown should include an attempt, using deletes, to notify all other SGs -currently connected by phase 1 SAs that communication is -about to fail. Again, a remote SG will assume this is a teardown. Attempts by the -remote SGs to negotiate new tunnels as replacements should be ignored. When possible, -SGs should attempt to preserve information about currently-connected SGs in non-volatile storage, so -that after a crash, an Initial-Contact can be sent to previous partners to -indicate loss of all previously established connections. -</t> - - </section> -</section> - -<!-- -<section title="Performance experiences"> - - Claudia> Is it useful to point out (or to clarify for our own discussion) any of the - Claudia> following: - - Claudia> * how much time this is likely to take on typical current hardware? - Claudia> * what steps are likely to be time consuming - Claudia> * how any added time could affect a typical transaction, such as hitting - Claudia> a web site - Claudia> * any ways to minimize such time delays - - <section title="Introduced latency"> - </section> - - <section title="Cryptographic performance"> - </section> - - <section title="Phase 1 SA performance"> - </section> - -</section> ---> - -<section title="Unresolved issues"> - <section title="Control of reverse DNS"> - <t> - The method of obtaining information by reverse DNS lookup causes - problems for people who cannot control their reverse DNS - bindings. This is an unresolved problem in this version, and is out - of scope. - </t> - </section> -</section> - -<section title="Examples"> - -<section title="Clear-text usage (permit policy)"> - -<t> -Two example scenarios follow. In the first example GW-A -(Gateway A) and GW-B (Gateway B) have always-clear-text policies, and in the second example they have an OE -policy. The clear-text policy serves as a reference for what occurs in -TCP/IP in the absence of Opportunistic Encryption. - -<t> -Alice wants to communicate with Bob. Perhaps she wants to retrieve a -web page from Bob's web server. In the absence of opportunistic -encryptors, the following events occur: -</t> - - <figure anchor="regulartiming" title="Timing of regular transaction"> - <artwork><![CDATA[ - Alice SG-A DNS SG-B Bob - Human or application - 'clicks' with a name. - (1) - - ------(2)--------------> - Application looks up - name in DNS to get - IP address. - - <-----(3)--------------- - Resolver returns "A" RR - to application with IP - address. - - (4) - Application starts a TCP session - or UDP session and OS sends - first datagram - - ----(5)-----> - Datagram is seen at first gateway - from Alice (SG-A). - - ----------(6)------> - Datagram traverses - network. - - ------(7)-----> - Datagram arrives - at Bob, is provided - to TCP. - - <------(8)------ - A reply is sent. - - <----------(9)------ - Datagram traverses - network. - <----(10)----- - Alice receives - answer. - - (11)-----------> - A second exchange - occurs. - ----------(12)-----> - --------------> - <--------------- - <------------------- - <------------- - ]]></artwork> -</figure> - -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Opportunistic encryption"> - -<t> -In the presence of properly configured opportunistic encryptors, the -event list is extended. Only changes are annotated. -</t> - -<t>The following symbols are used in the time-sequence diagram</t> - -<t> -<list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="-"> A single dash represents clear-text datagrams.</t> - <t hangText="="> An equals sign represents phase 2 (IPsec) cipher-text - datagrams.</t> - <t hangText="~"> A single tilde represents clear-text phase 1 datagrams.</t> - <t hangText="#"> A hash sign represents phase 1 (IKE) cipher-text - datagrams.</t> -</list> -</t> - -<t> -<figure anchor="opportunistictiming" title="Timing of opportunistic encryption transaction"> - <artwork><![CDATA[ - Alice SG-A DNS SG-B Bob - (1) - ------(2)--------------> - <-----(3)--------------- - (4)----(5)----->+ - SG-A sees datagram - to new target and - saves it as "first" - - ----(5B)-> - SG-A asks DNS - for TXT RR. - - <---(5C)-- - DNS returns TXT RR. - - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(5D)~~~> - initial IKE main mode - packet is sent. - - <~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E1)~~~ - ~~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E2)~~> - <~~~~~~~~~~~~(5E3)~~~ - IKE phase 1 - privacy. - - #############(5E4)##> - SG-A sends ID to SG-B - <----(5F1)-- - SG-B asks DNS - for SG-A's public - KEY - -----(5F2)-> - DNS provides KEY RR. - SG-B authenticates SG-A - - <############(5E5)### - IKE phase 1 - complete - - #############(5G1)##> - IKE phase 2 - Alice<->Bob - tunnel is proposed. - - <----(5H1)-- - SG-B asks DNS for - Alice's TXT record. - -----(5H2)-> - DNS replies with TXT - record. SG-B checks - SG-A's authorization. - - <############(5G2)### - SG-B accepts proposal. - - #############(5G3)##> - SG-A confirms. - - ============(6)====> - SG-A sends "first" - packet in new IPsec - SA. - ------(7)-----> - packet is decrypted - and forward to Bob. - <------(8)------ - <==========(9)====== - return packet also - encrypted. - <-----(10)---- - - (11)-----------> - a second packet - is sent by Alice - ==========(12)=====> - existing tunnel is used - --------------> - <--------------- - <=================== - <------------- - ]]></artwork> -</figure> - -</t> - - <t> - For the purposes of this section, we will describe only the changes that - occur between <xref target="regulartiming" /> and - <xref target="opportunistictiming" />. This corresponds to time points 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 on the list above. - </t> - -<list style="symbols"> - <t> - At point (5), SG-A intercepts the datagram because this source/destination pair lacks a policy -(the non-existent policy state). SG-A creates a hold policy, and buffers the datagram. SG-A requests keys from the keying daemon. - </t> - - <t> - SG-A's IKE daemon, having looked up the source/destination pair in the connection - class list, creates a new Potential OE connection instance. SG-A starts DNS - queries. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5C) DNS returns TXT record(s)"> - - <t> - DNS returns properly formed TXT delegation records, and SG-A's IKE daemon - causes this instance to make a transition from Potential OE connection to Pending OE - connection. - </t> - - <t> - Using the example above, the returned record might contain: - - <figure anchor="txtexample" - title="Example of reverse delegation record for Bob"> - <artwork><![CDATA[ -X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.1.1.5 AQMM...3s1Q== - ]]></artwork> - </figure> - with SG-B's IP address and public key listed. - </t> - - </section> - - <section title="(5D) Initial IKE main mode packet goes out"> - <t>Upon entering Pending OE connection, SG-A sends the initial ISAKMP - message with proposals. See <xref target="phase1id" />. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5E1) Message 2 of phase 1 exchange"> - <t> - SG-B receives the message. A new connection instance is created in the - unauthenticated OE peer state. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5E2) Message 3 of phase 1 exchange"> - <t> - SG-A sends a Diffie-Hellman exponent. This is an internal state of the - keying daemon. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5E3) Message 4 of phase 1 exchange"> - <t> - SG-B responds with a Diffie-Hellman exponent. This is an internal state of the - keying protocol. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5E4) Message 5 of phase 1 exchange"> - <t> - SG-A uses the phase 1 SA to send its identity under encryption. - The choice of identity is discussed in <xref target="phase1id" />. - This is an internal state of the keying protocol. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5F1) Responder lookup of initiator key"> - <t> - SG-B asks DNS for the public key of the initiator. - DNS looks for a KEY record by IP address in the reverse-map. - That is, a KEY resource record is queried for 4.1.1.192.in-addr.arpa - (recall that SG-A's external address is 192.1.1.4). - SG-B uses the resulting public key to authenticate the initiator. See <xref - target="KEY" /> for further details. - </t> - </section> - -<section title="(5F2) DNS replies with public key of initiator"> -<t> -Upon successfully authenticating the peer, the connection instance makes a -transition to authenticated OE peer on SG-B. -</t> -<t> -The format of the TXT record returned is described in -<xref target="TXT" />. -</t> -</section> - - <section title="(5E5) Responder replies with ID and authentication"> - <t> - SG-B sends its ID along with authentication material. This is an internal - state for the keying protocol. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5G) IKE phase 2"> - <section title="(5G1) Initiator proposes tunnel"> - <t> - Having established mutually agreeable authentications (via KEY) and - authorizations (via TXT), SG-A proposes to create an IPsec tunnel for - datagrams transiting from Alice to Bob. This tunnel is established only for - the Alice/Bob combination, not for any subnets that may be behind SG-A and SG-B. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5H1) Responder determines initiator's authority"> - <t> - While the identity of SG-A has been established, its authority to - speak for Alice has not yet been confirmed. SG-B does a reverse - lookup on Alice's address for a TXT record. - </t> - <t>Upon receiving this specific proposal, SG-B's connection instance - makes a transition into the potential OE connection state. SG-B may already have an - instance, and the check is made as described above.</t> - </section> - - <section title="(5H2) DNS replies with TXT record(s)"> - <t> - The returned key and IP address should match that of SG-A. - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(5G2) Responder agrees to proposal"> - <t> - Should additional communication occur between, for instance, Dave and Bob using - SG-A and SG-B, a new tunnel (phase 2 SA) would be established. The phase 1 SA - may be reusable. - </t> - <t>SG-A, having successfully keyed the tunnel, now makes a transition from - Pending OE connection to Keyed OE connection. - </t> - <t>The responder MUST setup the inbound IPsec SAs before sending its reply.</t> - </section> - - <section title="(5G3) Final acknowledgment from initiator"> - <t> - The initiator agrees with the responder's choice and sets up the tunnel. - The initiator sets up the inbound and outbound IPsec SAs. - </t> - <t> - The proper authorization returned with keys prompts SG-B to make a transition - to the keyed OE connection state. - </t> - <t>Upon receipt of this message, the responder may now setup the outbound - IPsec SAs.</t> - </section> - </section> - - <section title="(6) IPsec succeeds, and sets up tunnel for communication between Alice and Bob"> - <t> - SG-A sends the datagram saved at step (5) through the newly created - tunnel to SG-B, where it gets decrypted and forwarded. - Bob receives it at (7) and replies at (8). - </t> - </section> - - <section title="(9) SG-B already has tunnel up with G1 and uses it"> - <t> - At (9), SG-B has already established an SPD entry mapping Bob->Alice via a - tunnel, so this tunnel is simply applied. The datagram is encrypted to SG-A, - decrypted by SG-A and passed to Alice at (10). - </t> - - </section> -</section> <!-- OE example --> - -</section> <!-- Examples --> - -<section anchor="securityconsiderations" title="Security considerations"> - - <section title="Configured vs opportunistic tunnels"> -<t> - Configured tunnels are those which are setup using bilateral mechanisms: exchanging -public keys (raw RSA, DSA, PKIX), pre-shared secrets, or by referencing keys that -are in known places (distinguished name from LDAP, DNS). These keys are then used to -configure a specific tunnel. -</t> -<t> -A pre-configured tunnel may be on all the time, or may be keyed only when needed. -The end points of the tunnel are not necessarily static: many mobile -applications (road warrior) are considered to be configured tunnels. -</t> -<t> -The primary characteristic is that configured tunnels are assigned specific -security properties. They may be trusted in different ways relating to exceptions to -firewall rules, exceptions to NAT processing, and to bandwidth or other quality of service restrictions. -</t> -<t> -Opportunistic tunnels are not inherently trusted in any strong way. They are -created without prior arrangement. As the two parties are strangers, there -MUST be no confusion of datagrams that arrive from opportunistic peers and -those that arrive from configured tunnels. A security gateway MUST take care -that an opportunistic peer can not impersonate a configured peer. -</t> -<t> -Ingress filtering MUST be used to make sure that only datagrams authorized by -negotiation (and the concomitant authentication and authorization) are -accepted from a tunnel. This is to prevent one peer from impersonating another. -</t> -<t> -An implementation suggestion is to treat opportunistic tunnel -datagrams as if they arrive on a logical interface distinct from other -configured tunnels. As the number of opportunistic tunnels that may be -created automatically on a system is potentially very high, careful attention -to scaling should be taken into account. -</t> -<t> -As with any IKE negotiation, opportunistic encryption cannot be secure -without authentication. Opportunistic encryption relies on DNS for its -authentication information and, therefore, cannot be fully secure without -a secure DNS. Without secure DNS, opportunistic encryption can protect against passive -eavesdropping but not against active man-in-the-middle attacks. -</t> - </section> - - <section title="Firewalls versus Opportunistic Tunnels"> -<t> - Typical usage of per datagram access control lists is to implement various -kinds of security gateways. These are typically called "firewalls". -</t> -<t> - Typical usage of a virtual private network (VPN) within a firewall is to -bypass all or part of the access controls between two networks. Additional -trust (as outlined in the previous section) is given to datagrams that arrive -in the VPN. -</t> -<t> - Datagrams that arrive via opportunistically configured tunnels MUST not be -trusted. Any security policy that would apply to a datagram arriving in the -clear SHOULD also be applied to datagrams arriving opportunistically. -</t> - </section> - - <section title="Denial of service"> -<t> - There are several different forms of denial of service that an implementor - should concern themselves with. Most of these problems are shared with - security gateways that have large numbers of mobile peers (road warriors). -</t> -<t> - The design of ISAKMP/IKE, and its use of cookies, defend against many kinds - of denial of service. Opportunism changes the assumption that if the phase 1 (ISAKMP) - SA is authenticated, that it was worthwhile creating. Because the gateway will communicate with any machine, it is - possible to form phase 1 SAs with any machine on the Internet. -</t> - -</section> -</section> - -<section title="IANA Considerations"> -<t> - There are no known numbers which IANA will need to manage. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Acknowledgments"> -<t> - Substantive portions of this document are based upon previous work by - Henry Spencer. -</t> -<t> - Thanks to Tero Kivinen, Sandy Harris, Wes Hardarker, Robert Moskowitz, - Jakob Schlyter, Bill Sommerfeld, John Gilmore and John Denker for their - comments and constructive criticism. -</t> -<t> - Sandra Hoffman and Bill Dickie did the detailed proof reading and editing. -</t> -</section> - -</middle> - -<back> -<references title="Normative references"> -<?rfc include="reference.OEspec" ?> -<!-- renumber according to reference order --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.0791" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1009" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1984" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119" ?> -<!-- IPsec --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2367" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2401" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2407" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2408" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2409" ?> -<!-- MODPGROUPS --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3526" ?> -<!-- DNSSEC --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1034" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1035" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2671" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1464" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2535" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3110" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2538" ?> -<!-- COPS --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2748" ?> -<!-- NAT --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2663" ?> -</references> -<!-- <references title="Non-normative references"> --> -<!-- ESPUDP --> -<!-- <?rfc include="reference.ESPUDP" ?> --> -<!-- </references> --> -</back> -</rfc> -<!-- - $Id: draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:24 as Exp $ - - $Log: draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic.xml,v $ - Revision 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:24 as - added files from freeswan-2.04-x509-1.5.3 - - Revision 1.33 2003/06/30 03:19:59 mcr - timing-diagram with inline explanation. - - Revision 1.32 2003/06/30 01:57:44 mcr - initial edits per-Bob Braden. - - Revision 1.31 2003/05/26 19:31:23 mcr - updates to drafts - IPSEC RR - SC versions, and RFC3526 - reference in OE draft. - - Revision 1.30 2003/05/21 15:42:34 mcr - updates due to publication of RFC 3526. - - Revision 1.29 2003/01/17 16:22:55 mcr - rev 11 of OE draft. - - Revision 1.28 2002/07/25 19:27:31 mcr - added DHR's minor edits. - - Revision 1.27 2002/07/21 16:26:26 mcr - slides from presentation at OLS - draft-10 of OE draft. - - Revision 1.26 2002/07/16 03:46:53 mcr - second edits from Sandra. - - Revision 1.25 2002/07/16 03:36:14 mcr - removed HS from authors list - updated reference inclusion to use <?rfc-include directive. - Revision 1.24 2002/07/11 02:08:21 mcr - updated XML file from Sandra - - Revision 1.23 2002/06/06 17:18:53 mcr - spellcheck. - - Revision 1.22 2002/06/06 17:14:19 mcr - results of hand-editing session from May 28th. - This is FINAL OE draft. - - Revision 1.21 2002/06/06 02:25:44 mcr - results of hand-editing session from May 28th. - This is FINAL OE draft. - - Revision 1.20 2002/05/24 03:28:37 mcr - changes as requested by RFC editor. - - Revision 1.19 2002/04/09 16:01:05 mcr - comments from PHB. - - Revision 1.18 2002/04/08 02:14:34 mcr - RGBs changes to rev6. - - Revision 1.17 2002/03/12 21:23:55 mcr - adjusted definition of default-free zone. - moved text on key rollover from format description to new - section. - - Revision 1.16 2002/02/22 01:23:21 mcr - revisions from MCR (2002/2/18) and net. - - Revision 1.15 2002/02/21 20:44:12 mcr - extensive from DHR. - - Revision 1.14 2002/02/10 16:20:39 mcr - -05 draft. Many revisions to do "OE system in world of OE systems" - view of the universe. - - Revision 1.13 2001/12/20 04:35:22 mcr - fixed reference to rfc1984. - - Revision 1.12 2001/12/20 03:35:19 mcr - comments from Henry, Tero, and Sandy. - - Revision 1.11 2001/12/19 07:26:22 mcr - added comment about KX records. - - Revision 1.10 2001/11/09 04:28:10 mcr - fixed some typos with XML, and one s/SG-B/SG-D/. - - Revision 1.9 2001/11/09 04:07:13 mcr - expanded section 10: multihoming, with an example. - - Revision 1.8 2001/11/09 02:16:51 mcr - added lifetime/lifespan definitions. - moved example from 5B to 5C. - added reference to phase 1 IDs to 5D. - cleared up text in aging section. - added text about delegation of DNSSEC activity to a DNS server. - spelt out DH group names. - added text about ignoring TXT records unless DNSSEC is deployed (somerfeld) - added example of TXT delegation using FQDN. - clarified some text in NAT interaction section. - clarified absense of TXT record need for host implementation - - Revision 1.7 2001/11/08 23:09:37 mcr - changed revision of draft to 03. - - Revision 1.6 2001/11/08 19:37:14 mcr - fixed some formatting of Aging section. - - Revision 1.5 2001/11/08 19:19:30 mcr - fixed address for DHR, updated address for MCR, - added reference to original HS/DHR OE specification paper. - - Revision 1.4 2001/11/08 19:08:24 mcr - section 10, "Renewal and Teardown" added moved between 4/5, and - slightly rewritten. - - Revision 1.3 2001/11/08 18:56:34 mcr - sections 4.2, 5.6, 5.7.1 and 6.2 edited as per HS. - section 10, "Renewal and Teardown" added. - section 11, "Failure modes" completed. - - Revision 1.2 2001/11/05 20:31:31 mcr - added section from OE spec on aging and teardown. - - Revision 1.1 2001/11/05 04:27:58 mcr - OE draft added to documentation. - - Revision 1.12 2001/10/10 01:12:31 mcr - removed impact on DNS servers section. - removed nested comments. - adjusted data of issue - - Revision 1.11 2001/09/17 02:55:50 mcr - outline is now stable. - - Revision 1.5 2001/08/19 02:53:32 mcr - version 00d formatted. - - Revision 1.10 2001/08/19 02:34:04 mcr - version 00d formatted. - - Revision 1.9 2001/08/19 02:21:54 mcr - version 00d - - Revision 1.8 2001/07/20 19:07:06 mcr - commented out section 1.1 - - Revision 1.7 2001/07/20 14:14:22 mcr - HS and HD comments. - - Revision 1.6 2001/07/19 00:56:50 mcr - version 00b. - - Revision 1.5 2001/07/12 23:57:07 mcr - OE ID, 00. - - -!> diff --git a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.html b/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.html deleted file mode 100644 index 08473104f..000000000 --- a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,659 +0,0 @@ -<html><head><title>A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS.</title> -<STYLE type='text/css'> - .title { color: #990000; 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font-weight: normal; text-decoration: none; - font-family: charcoal, monaco, geneva, MS Sans Serif, helvetica, monotype, verdana, sans-serif; - font-size: 9px } -</style> -</head> -<body bgcolor="#ffffff" text="#000000" alink="#000000" vlink="#666666" link="#990000"> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<table width="66%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"><tr><td><table width="100%" border="0" cellpadding="2" cellspacing="1"> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">IPSECKEY WG</td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">M. Richardson</td></tr> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">Internet-Draft</td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">SSW</td></tr> -<tr valign="top"><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">Expires: March 4, 2004</td><td width="33%" bgcolor="#666666" class="header">September 4, 2003</td></tr> -</table></td></tr></table> -<div align="right"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#990000" size="+3"><b><br><span class="title">A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS.</span></b></font></div> -<div align="right"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#666666" size="+2"><b><span class="filename">draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-07.txt</span></b></font></div> -<font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> - -<h3>Status of this Memo</h3> -<p> -This document is an Internet-Draft and is in full conformance with all provisions of Section 10 of RFC2026.</p> -<p> -Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering -Task Force (IETF), its areas, and its working groups. -Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as -Internet-Drafts.</p> -<p> -Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months -and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. -It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite -them other than as "work in progress."</p> -<p> -The list of current Internet-Drafts can be accessed at -<a href='http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt'>http://www.ietf.org/ietf/1id-abstracts.txt</a>.</p> -<p> -The list of Internet-Draft Shadow Directories can be accessed at -<a href='http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html'>http://www.ietf.org/shadow.html</a>.</p> -<p> -This Internet-Draft will expire on March 4, 2004.</p> - -<h3>Copyright Notice</h3> -<p> -Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.</p> - -<h3>Abstract</h3> - -<p> -This document describes a new resource record for DNS. This record may be -used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems. - -</p> -<p> -This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY Resource -Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445. - -</p><a name="toc"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Table of Contents</h3> -<ul compact class="toc"> -<b><a href="#anchor1">1.</a> -Introduction<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor2">1.1</a> -Overview<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor3">1.2</a> -Usage Criteria<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor4">2.</a> -Storage formats<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor5">2.1</a> -IPSECKEY RDATA format<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor6">2.2</a> -RDATA format - precedence<br></b> -<b><a href="#algotype">2.3</a> -RDATA format - algorithm type<br></b> -<b><a href="#gatewaytype">2.4</a> -RDATA format - gateway type<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor7">2.5</a> -RDATA format - gateway<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor8">2.6</a> -RDATA format - public keys<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor9">3.</a> -Presentation formats<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor10">3.1</a> -Representation of IPSECKEY RRs<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor11">3.2</a> -Examples<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor12">4.</a> -Security Considerations<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor13">4.1</a> -Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor14">5.</a> -IANA Considerations<br></b> -<b><a href="#anchor15">6.</a> -Acknowledgments<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.references1">§</a> -Normative references<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.references2">§</a> -Non-normative references<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.authors">§</a> -Author's Address<br></b> -<b><a href="#rfc.copyright">§</a> -Full Copyright Statement<br></b> -</ul> -<br clear="all"> - -<a name="anchor1"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.1"></a><h3>1. Introduction</h3> - -<p> - The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.1.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor2">1.1</a> Overview</h4> - -<p> - The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key that is - to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use with the - IPsec protocol suite. This can be the public key of a host, - network, or application (in the case of per-port keying). - -</p> -<p> - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL - NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and - "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in - RFC2119 <a href="#RFC2119">[8]</a>. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.1.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor3">1.2</a> Usage Criteria</h4> - -<p> - An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be used in combination with DNSSEC -unless some other means of authenticating the IPSECKEY resource record -is available. - -</p> -<p> - It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource - records at the same name. This will be due to the presence - of multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys. - - -</p> -<p> - This resource record is class independent. - -</p> -<a name="anchor4"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.2"></a><h3>2. Storage formats</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.2.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor5">2.1</a> IPSECKEY RDATA format</h4> - -<p> - The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a public key, - algorithm type, and an optional gateway address. - -</p></font><pre> - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | precedence | gateway type | algorithm | gateway | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+ + - ~ gateway ~ - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | / - / public key / - / / - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> - -<a name="rfc.section.2.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor6">2.2</a> RDATA format - precedence</h4> - -<p> -This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in -the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section -3.3.9 of RFC1035 <a href="#RFC1035">[2]</a>. - -</p> -<p> -Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with lower precedence are -to be attempted first. Where there is a tie in precedence, the order -should be non-deterministic. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.3"></a><h4><a name="algotype">2.3</a> RDATA format - algorithm type</h4> - -<p> -The algorithm type field identifies the public key's cryptographic -algorithm and determines the format of the public key field. - -</p> -<p> -A value of 0 indicates that no key is present. - -</p> -<p> -The following values are defined: - -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>1</dt> -<dd>A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 <a href="#RFC2536">[11]</a> -</dd> -<dt>2</dt> -<dd>A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 <a href="#RFC3110">[12]</a> -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.4"></a><h4><a name="gatewaytype">2.4</a> RDATA format - gateway type</h4> - -<p> -The gateway type field indicates the format of the information that -is stored in the gateway field. - -</p> -<p> -The following values are defined: - -<blockquote class="text"><dl> -<dt>0</dt> -<dd>No gateway is present -</dd> -<dt>1</dt> -<dd>A 4-byte IPv4 address is present -</dd> -<dt>2</dt> -<dd>A 16-byte IPv6 address is present -</dd> -<dt>3</dt> -<dd>A wire-encoded domain name is present. The wire-encoded -format is self-describing, so the length is implicit. The domain name -MUST NOT be compressed. -</dd> -</dl></blockquote><p> -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.5"></a><h4><a name="anchor7">2.5</a> RDATA format - gateway</h4> - -<p> -The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be -created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record. - -</p> -<p> -There are three formats: - -</p> -<p> -A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field. The data -portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of -<a href="#RFC1035">RFC1035</a>[2]. This is a 32-bit number in network byte order. - -</p> -<p>A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field. -The data portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 2.2 of -<a href="#RFC1886">RFC1886</a>[7]. This is a 128-bit number in network byte order. - -</p> -<p> -The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name, as described -in section 3.3 of RFC1035 <a href="#RFC1035">[2]</a>. Compression MUST NOT be used. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.2.6"></a><h4><a name="anchor8">2.6</a> RDATA format - public keys</h4> - -<p> -Both of the public key types defined in this document (RSA and DSA) -inherit their public key formats from the corresponding KEY RR formats. -Specifically, the public key field contains the algorithm-specific -portion of the KEY RR RDATA, which is all of the KEY RR DATA after the -first four octets. This is the same portion of the KEY RR that must be -specified by documents that define a DNSSEC algorithm. -Those documents also specify a message digest to be used for generation -of SIG RRs; that specification is not relevant for IPSECKEY RR. - -</p> -<p> -Future algorithms, if they are to be used by both DNSSEC (in the KEY -RR) and IPSECKEY, are likely to use the same public key encodings in -both records. Unless otherwise specified, the IPSECKEY public key -field will contain the algorithm-specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA -for the corresponding algorithm. The algorithm must still be -designated for use by IPSECKEY, and an IPSECKEY algorithm type number -(which might be different than the DNSSEC algorithm number) must be -assigned to it. - -</p> -<p>The DSA key format is defined in RFC2536 <a href="#RFC2536">[11]</a> -</p> -<p>The RSA key format is defined in RFC3110 <a href="#RFC3110">[12]</a>, -with the following changes: -</p> -<p> -The earlier definition of RSA/MD5 in RFC2065 limited the exponent and -modulus to 2552 bits in length. RFC3110 extended that limit to 4096 -bits for RSA/SHA1 keys. The IPSECKEY RR imposes no length limit on -RSA public keys, other than the 65535 octet limit imposed by the -two-octet length encoding. This length extension is applicable only -to IPSECKEY and not to KEY RRs. - -</p> -<a name="anchor9"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.3"></a><h3>3. Presentation formats</h3> - -<a name="rfc.section.3.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor10">3.1</a> Representation of IPSECKEY RRs</h4> - -<p> - IPSECKEY RRs may appear in a zone data master file. - The precedence, gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED. - The base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL; if not present, - then the public key field of the resource record MUST be construed - as being zero octets in length. - -</p> -<p> - The algorithm field is an unsigned integer. No mnemonics are defined. - -</p> -<p> - If no gateway is to be indicated, then the gateway type field MUST - be zero, and the gateway field MUST be "." - -</p> -<p> - The Public Key field is represented as a Base64 encoding of the - Public Key. Whitespace is allowed within the Base64 text. For a - definition of Base64 encoding, see -<a href="#RFC1521">RFC1521</a>[3] Section 5.2. - -</p> -<p> - The general presentation for the record as as follows: -</p> -</font><pre> -IN IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm - gateway base64-encoded-public-key ) -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.3.2"></a><h4><a name="anchor11">3.2</a> Examples</h4> - -<p> -An example of a node 192.0.2.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its -own behalf. -</p> -</font><pre> -38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2 - 192.0.2.38 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<p> -An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has published its key only. -</p> -</font><pre> -38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 0 2 - . - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<p> -An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has delegated authority to the node -192.0.2.3. -</p> -</font><pre> -38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2 - 192.0.2.3 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<p> -An example of a node, 192.0.1.38 that has delegated authority to the node -with the identity "mygateway.example.com". -</p> -</font><pre> -38.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 3 2 - mygateway.example.com. - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<p> -An example of a node, 2001:0DB8:0200:1:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has -delegated authority to the node 2001:0DB8:c000:0200:2::1 -</p> -</font><pre> -$ORIGIN 1.0.0.0.0.0.2.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.int. -0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 2 2 - 2001:0DB8:0:8002::2000:1 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -</pre><font face="verdana, helvetica, arial, sans-serif" size="2"> -<p> - -</p> -<a name="anchor12"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.4"></a><h3>4. Security Considerations</h3> - -<p> - This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material - for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) - <a href="#RFC2407">[9]</a>. - -</p> -<p> -The IPSECKEY resource record contains information that SHOULD be -communicated to the end client in an integral fashion - i.e. free from -modification. The form of this channel is up to the consumer of the -data - there must be a trust relationship between the end consumer of this -resource record and the server. This relationship may be end-to-end -DNSSEC validation, a TSIG or SIG(0) channel to another secure source, -a secure local channel on the host, or some combination of the above. - -</p> -<p> -The keying material provided by the IPSECKEY resource record is not -sensitive to passive attacks. The keying material may be freely -disclosed to any party without any impact on the security properties -of the resulting IPsec session: IPsec and IKE provide for defense -against both active and passive attacks. - -</p> -<p> - Any user of this resource record MUST carefully document their trust - model, and why the trust model of DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is - the secure channel used. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.section.4.1"></a><h4><a name="anchor13">4.1</a> Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records</h4> - -<p> -This section deals with active attacks against the DNS. These attacks -require that DNS requests and responses be intercepted and changed. -DNSSEC is designed to defend against attacks of this kind. - -</p> -<p> -The first kind of active attack is when the attacker replaces the -keying material with either a key under its control or with garbage. - -</p> -<p> -If the attacker is not able to mount a subsequent -man-in-the-middle attack on the IKE negotiation after replacing the -public key, then this will result in a denial of service, as the -authenticator used by IKE would fail. - -</p> -<p> -If the attacker is able to both to mount active attacks against DNS -and is also in a position to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on IKE and -IPsec negotiations, then the attacker will be in a position to compromise -the resulting IPsec channel. Note that an attacker must be able to -perform active DNS attacks on both sides of the IKE negotiation in -order for this to succeed. - -</p> -<p> -The second kind of active attack is one in which the attacker replaces -the the gateway address to point to a node under the attacker's -control. The attacker can then either replace the public key or remove -it, thus providing an IPSECKEY record of its own to match the -gateway address. - -</p> -<p> -This later form creates a simple man-in-the-middle since the attacker -can then create a second tunnel to the real destination. Note that, as before, -this requires that the attacker also mount an active attack against -the responder. - -</p> -<p> -Note that the man-in-the-middle can not just forward cleartext -packets to the original destination. While the destination may be -willing to speak in the clear, replying to the original sender, -the sender will have already created a policy expecting ciphertext. -Thus, the attacker will need to intercept traffic from both sides. In some -cases, the attacker may be able to accomplish the full intercept by use -of Network Addresss/Port Translation (NAT/NAPT) technology. - -</p> -<p> -Note that the danger here only applies to cases where the gateway -field of the IPSECKEY RR indicates a different entity than the owner -name of the IPSECKEY RR. In cases where the end-to-end integrity of -the IPSECKEY RR is suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use -of the IPSECKEY RR to cases where the RR owner name matches the -content of the gateway field. - -</p> -<a name="anchor14"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.5"></a><h3>5. IANA Considerations</h3> - -<p> -This document updates the IANA Registry for DNS Resource Record Types -by assigning type X to the IPSECKEY record. - -</p> -<p> -This document creates an IANA registry for the algorithm type field. - -</p> -<p> -Values 0, 1 and 2 are defined in <a href="#algotype">RDATA format - algorithm type</a>. Algorithm numbers -3 through 255 can be assigned by IETF Consensus (<a href="#RFC2434">see RFC2434</a>[6]). - -</p> -<p> -This document creates an IANA registry for the gateway type field. - -</p> -<p> -Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 are defined in <a href="#gatewaytype">RDATA format - gateway type</a>. -Algorithm numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned by -Standards Action (<a href="#RFC2434">see RFC2434</a>[6]). - -</p> -<a name="anchor15"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<a name="rfc.section.6"></a><h3>6. Acknowledgments</h3> - -<p> -My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, Rob Austein, -and Olafur Gurmundsson who reviewed this document carefully. -Additional thanks to Olafur Gurmundsson for a reference implementation. - -</p> -<a name="rfc.references1"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Normative references</h3> -<table width="99%" border="0"> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1034">[1]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">Mockapetris, P., "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1034.txt">Domain names - concepts and facilities</a>", STD 13, RFC 1034, November 1987.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1035">[2]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:">Mockapetris, P.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1035.txt">Domain names - implementation and specification</a>", STD 13, RFC 1035, November 1987.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1521">[3]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:nsb@bellcore.com">Borenstein, N.</a> and <a href="mailto:">N. Freed</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1521.txt">MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) Part One: Mechanisms for Specifying and Describing the Format of Internet Message Bodies</a>", RFC 1521, September 1993.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2026">[4]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:sob@harvard.edu">Bradner, S.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2026.txt">The Internet Standards Process -- Revision 3</a>", BCP 9, RFC 2026, October 1996.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2065">[5]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dee@cybercash.com">Eastlake, D.</a> and <a href="mailto:charlie_kaufman@iris.com">C. Kaufman</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2065.txt">Domain Name System Security Extensions</a>", RFC 2065, January 1997.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2434">[6]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:narten@raleigh.ibm.com">Narten, T.</a> and <a href="mailto:Harald@Alvestrand.no">H. Alvestrand</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2434.txt">Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs</a>", BCP 26, RFC 2434, October 1998.</td></tr> -</table> - -<a name="rfc.references2"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Non-normative references</h3> -<table width="99%" border="0"> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC1886">[7]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:set@thumper.bellcore.com">Thomson, S.</a> and <a href="mailto:Christian.Huitema@MIRSA.INRIA.FR">C. Huitema</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1886.txt">DNS Extensions to support IP version 6</a>", RFC 1886, December 1995.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2119">[8]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:-">Bradner, S.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2119.txt">Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels</a>", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2407">[9]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:ddp@network-alchemy.com">Piper, D.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2407.txt">The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP</a>", RFC 2407, November 1998.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2535">[10]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dee3@us.ibm.com">Eastlake, D.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2535.txt">Domain Name System Security Extensions</a>", RFC 2535, March 1999.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC2536">[11]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:dee3@us.ibm.com">Eastlake, D.</a>, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2536.txt">DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</a>", RFC 2536, March 1999.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC3110">[12]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">Eastlake, D., "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3110.txt">RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</a>", RFC 3110, May 2001.</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text" valign="top"><b><a name="RFC3445">[13]</a></b></td> -<td class="author-text">Massey, D. and S. Rose, "<a href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc3445.txt">Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record (RR)</a>", RFC 3445, December 2002.</td></tr> -</table> - -<a name="rfc.authors"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Author's Address</h3> -<table width="99%" border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="0"> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Michael C. Richardson</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Sandelman Software Works</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">470 Dawson Avenue</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">Ottawa, ON K1Z 5V7</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author-text"> </td> -<td class="author-text">CA</td></tr> -<tr><td class="author" align="right">EMail: </td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="mailto:mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca">mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</a></td></tr> -<tr><td class="author" align="right">URI: </td> -<td class="author-text"><a href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/">http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/</a></td></tr> -</table> -<a name="rfc.copyright"><br><hr size="1" shade="0"></a> -<table border="0" cellpadding="0" cellspacing="2" width="30" height="15" align="right"><tr><td bgcolor="#990000" align="center" width="30" height="15"><a href="#toc" CLASS="link2"><font face="monaco, MS Sans Serif" color="#ffffff" size="1"><b> TOC </b></font></a><br></td></tr></table> -<h3>Full Copyright Statement</h3> -<p class='copyright'> -Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.</p> -<p class='copyright'> -This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to -others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it -or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published and -distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any kind, -provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are -included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this -document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing -the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other -Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of -developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for -copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be -followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than -English.</p> -<p class='copyright'> -The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be -revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.</p> -<p class='copyright'> -This document and the information contained herein is provided on an -"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING -TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING -BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION -HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF -MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.</p> -<h3>Acknowledgement</h3> -<p class='copyright'> -Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the -Internet Society.</p> -</font></body></html> diff --git a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.xml b/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.xml deleted file mode 100644 index e51b32615..000000000 --- a/doc/src/draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.xml +++ /dev/null @@ -1,560 +0,0 @@ -<?xml version="1.0"?> -<!DOCTYPE rfc SYSTEM "rfc2629.dtd"> -<?rfc toc="yes"?> - -<rfc ipr="full2026" docName="draft-ietf-ipseckey-rr-07.txt"> - -<front> - <area>Security</area> - <workgroup>IPSECKEY WG</workgroup> - <title abbrev="ipsecrr"> - A method for storing IPsec keying material in DNS. - </title> - - <author initials="M." surname="Richardson" fullname="Michael C. Richardson"> - <organization abbrev="SSW">Sandelman Software Works</organization> - <address> - <postal> - <street>470 Dawson Avenue</street> - <city>Ottawa</city> - <region>ON</region> - <code>K1Z 5V7</code> - <country>CA</country> - </postal> - <email>mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</email> - <uri>http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/</uri> - </address> - </author> - - <date month="September" year="2003" /> - -<abstract> - <t> -This document describes a new resource record for DNS. This record may be -used to store public keys for use in IPsec systems. -</t> - -<t> -This record replaces the functionality of the sub-type #1 of the KEY Resource -Record, which has been obsoleted by RFC3445. -</t> -</abstract> - -</front> - -<middle> - -<section title="Introduction"> -<t> - The type number for the IPSECKEY RR is TBD. -</t> - -<section title="Overview"> -<t> - The IPSECKEY resource record (RR) is used to publish a public key that is - to be associated with a Domain Name System (DNS) name for use with the - IPsec protocol suite. This can be the public key of a host, - network, or application (in the case of per-port keying). -</t> - -<t> - The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL - NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and - "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in - RFC2119 <xref target="RFC2119" />. -</t> -</section> - -<section title="Usage Criteria"> -<t> - An IPSECKEY resource record SHOULD be used in combination with DNSSEC -unless some other means of authenticating the IPSECKEY resource record -is available. -</t> - -<t> - It is expected that there will often be multiple IPSECKEY resource - records at the same name. This will be due to the presence - of multiple gateways and the need to rollover keys. - -</t> - -<t> - This resource record is class independent. -</t> -</section> -</section> - -<section title="Storage formats"> - -<section title="IPSECKEY RDATA format"> - -<t> - The RDATA for an IPSECKEY RR consists of a precedence value, a public key, - algorithm type, and an optional gateway address. -</t> - -<artwork><![CDATA[ - 0 1 2 3 - 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | precedence | gateway type | algorithm | gateway | - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-------------+ + - ~ gateway ~ - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ - | / - / public key / - / / - +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-| -]]></artwork> -</section> - -<section title="RDATA format - precedence"> -<t> -This is an 8-bit precedence for this record. This is interpreted in -the same way as the PREFERENCE field described in section -3.3.9 of RFC1035 <xref target="RFC1035" />. -</t> -<t> -Gateways listed in IPSECKEY records with lower precedence are -to be attempted first. Where there is a tie in precedence, the order -should be non-deterministic. -</t> -</section> - -<section anchor="algotype" title="RDATA format - algorithm type"> -<t> -The algorithm type field identifies the public key's cryptographic -algorithm and determines the format of the public key field. -</t> - -<t> -A value of 0 indicates that no key is present. -</t> - -<t> -The following values are defined: - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="1">A DSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC2536 <xref target="RFC2536" /></t> - <t hangText="2">A RSA key is present, in the format defined in RFC3110 <xref target="RFC3110" /></t> - </list> -</t> - -</section> - -<section anchor="gatewaytype" title="RDATA format - gateway type"> -<t> -The gateway type field indicates the format of the information that -is stored in the gateway field. -</t> - -<t> -The following values are defined: - <list style="hanging"> - <t hangText="0">No gateway is present</t> - <t hangText="1">A 4-byte IPv4 address is present</t> - <t hangText="2">A 16-byte IPv6 address is present</t> - <t hangText="3">A wire-encoded domain name is present. The wire-encoded -format is self-describing, so the length is implicit. The domain name -MUST NOT be compressed.</t> - </list> -</t> - -</section> - -<section title="RDATA format - gateway"> -<t> -The gateway field indicates a gateway to which an IPsec tunnel may be -created in order to reach the entity named by this resource record. -</t> -<t> -There are three formats: -</t> - -<t> -A 32-bit IPv4 address is present in the gateway field. The data -portion is an IPv4 address as described in section 3.4.1 of -<xref target="RFC1035">RFC1035</xref>. This is a 32-bit number in network byte order. -</t> - -<t>A 128-bit IPv6 address is present in the gateway field. -The data portion is an IPv6 address as described in section 2.2 of -<xref target="RFC1886">RFC1886</xref>. This is a 128-bit number in network byte order. -</t> - -<t> -The gateway field is a normal wire-encoded domain name, as described -in section 3.3 of RFC1035 <xref target="RFC1035" />. Compression MUST NOT be used. -</t> - -</section> - -<section title="RDATA format - public keys"> -<t> -Both of the public key types defined in this document (RSA and DSA) -inherit their public key formats from the corresponding KEY RR formats. -Specifically, the public key field contains the algorithm-specific -portion of the KEY RR RDATA, which is all of the KEY RR DATA after the -first four octets. This is the same portion of the KEY RR that must be -specified by documents that define a DNSSEC algorithm. -Those documents also specify a message digest to be used for generation -of SIG RRs; that specification is not relevant for IPSECKEY RR. -</t> - -<t> -Future algorithms, if they are to be used by both DNSSEC (in the KEY -RR) and IPSECKEY, are likely to use the same public key encodings in -both records. Unless otherwise specified, the IPSECKEY public key -field will contain the algorithm-specific portion of the KEY RR RDATA -for the corresponding algorithm. The algorithm must still be -designated for use by IPSECKEY, and an IPSECKEY algorithm type number -(which might be different than the DNSSEC algorithm number) must be -assigned to it. -</t> - -<t>The DSA key format is defined in RFC2536 <xref target="RFC2536" /></t>. - -<t>The RSA key format is defined in RFC3110 <xref target="RFC3110" />, -with the following changes:</t> - -<t> -The earlier definition of RSA/MD5 in RFC2065 limited the exponent and -modulus to 2552 bits in length. RFC3110 extended that limit to 4096 -bits for RSA/SHA1 keys. The IPSECKEY RR imposes no length limit on -RSA public keys, other than the 65535 octet limit imposed by the -two-octet length encoding. This length extension is applicable only -to IPSECKEY and not to KEY RRs. -</t> - -</section> - -</section> - - - -<section title="Presentation formats"> - -<section title="Representation of IPSECKEY RRs"> -<t> - IPSECKEY RRs may appear in a zone data master file. - The precedence, gateway type and algorithm and gateway fields are REQUIRED. - The base64 encoded public key block is OPTIONAL; if not present, - then the public key field of the resource record MUST be construed - as being zero octets in length. -</t> -<t> - The algorithm field is an unsigned integer. No mnemonics are defined. -</t> -<t> - If no gateway is to be indicated, then the gateway type field MUST - be zero, and the gateway field MUST be "." -</t> - -<t> - The Public Key field is represented as a Base64 encoding of the - Public Key. Whitespace is allowed within the Base64 text. For a - definition of Base64 encoding, see -<xref target="RFC1521">RFC1521</xref> Section 5.2. -</t> - - -<t> - The general presentation for the record as as follows: -<artwork><![CDATA[ -IN IPSECKEY ( precedence gateway-type algorithm - gateway base64-encoded-public-key ) -]]></artwork> -</t> -</section> - - -<section title="Examples"> -<t> -An example of a node 192.0.2.38 that will accept IPsec tunnels on its -own behalf. -<artwork><![CDATA[ -38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2 - 192.0.2.38 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -]]></artwork> -</t> - -<t> -An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has published its key only. -<artwork><![CDATA[ -38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 0 2 - . - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -]]></artwork> -</t> - -<t> -An example of a node, 192.0.2.38 that has delegated authority to the node -192.0.2.3. -<artwork><![CDATA[ -38.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 1 2 - 192.0.2.3 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -]]></artwork> -</t> - -<t> -An example of a node, 192.0.1.38 that has delegated authority to the node -with the identity "mygateway.example.com". -<artwork><![CDATA[ -38.1.0.192.in-addr.arpa. 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 3 2 - mygateway.example.com. - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -]]></artwork> -</t> - -<t> -An example of a node, 2001:0DB8:0200:1:210:f3ff:fe03:4d0 that has -delegated authority to the node 2001:0DB8:c000:0200:2::1 -<artwork><![CDATA[ -$ORIGIN 1.0.0.0.0.0.2.8.B.D.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.int. -0.d.4.0.3.0.e.f.f.f.3.f.0.1.2.0 7200 IN IPSECKEY ( 10 2 2 - 2001:0DB8:0:8002::2000:1 - AQNRU3mG7TVTO2BkR47usntb102uFJtugbo6BSGvgqt4AQ== ) -]]></artwork> -</t> - -</section> -</section> - -<section title="Security Considerations"> -<t> - This entire memo pertains to the provision of public keying material - for use by key management protocols such as ISAKMP/IKE (RFC2407) - <xref target="RFC2407" />. -</t> - -<t> -The IPSECKEY resource record contains information that SHOULD be -communicated to the end client in an integral fashion - i.e. free from -modification. The form of this channel is up to the consumer of the -data - there must be a trust relationship between the end consumer of this -resource record and the server. This relationship may be end-to-end -DNSSEC validation, a TSIG or SIG(0) channel to another secure source, -a secure local channel on the host, or some combination of the above. -</t> - -<t> -The keying material provided by the IPSECKEY resource record is not -sensitive to passive attacks. The keying material may be freely -disclosed to any party without any impact on the security properties -of the resulting IPsec session: IPsec and IKE provide for defense -against both active and passive attacks. -</t> - -<t> - Any user of this resource record MUST carefully document their trust - model, and why the trust model of DNSSEC is appropriate, if that is - the secure channel used. -</t> - -<section title="Active attacks against unsecured IPSECKEY resource records"> -<t> -This section deals with active attacks against the DNS. These attacks -require that DNS requests and responses be intercepted and changed. -DNSSEC is designed to defend against attacks of this kind. -</t> - -<t> -The first kind of active attack is when the attacker replaces the -keying material with either a key under its control or with garbage. -</t> - -<t> -If the attacker is not able to mount a subsequent -man-in-the-middle attack on the IKE negotiation after replacing the -public key, then this will result in a denial of service, as the -authenticator used by IKE would fail. -</t> - -<t> -If the attacker is able to both to mount active attacks against DNS -and is also in a position to perform a man-in-the-middle attack on IKE and -IPsec negotiations, then the attacker will be in a position to compromise -the resulting IPsec channel. Note that an attacker must be able to -perform active DNS attacks on both sides of the IKE negotiation in -order for this to succeed. -</t> - -<t> -The second kind of active attack is one in which the attacker replaces -the the gateway address to point to a node under the attacker's -control. The attacker can then either replace the public key or remove -it, thus providing an IPSECKEY record of its own to match the -gateway address. -</t> - -<t> -This later form creates a simple man-in-the-middle since the attacker -can then create a second tunnel to the real destination. Note that, as before, -this requires that the attacker also mount an active attack against -the responder. -</t> - -<t> -Note that the man-in-the-middle can not just forward cleartext -packets to the original destination. While the destination may be -willing to speak in the clear, replying to the original sender, -the sender will have already created a policy expecting ciphertext. -Thus, the attacker will need to intercept traffic from both sides. In some -cases, the attacker may be able to accomplish the full intercept by use -of Network Addresss/Port Translation (NAT/NAPT) technology. -</t> - -<t> -Note that the danger here only applies to cases where the gateway -field of the IPSECKEY RR indicates a different entity than the owner -name of the IPSECKEY RR. In cases where the end-to-end integrity of -the IPSECKEY RR is suspect, the end client MUST restrict its use -of the IPSECKEY RR to cases where the RR owner name matches the -content of the gateway field. -</t> -</section> - -</section> - -<section title="IANA Considerations"> -<t> -This document updates the IANA Registry for DNS Resource Record Types -by assigning type X to the IPSECKEY record. -</t> - -<t> -This document creates an IANA registry for the algorithm type field. -</t> -<t> -Values 0, 1 and 2 are defined in <xref target="algotype" />. Algorithm numbers -3 through 255 can be assigned by IETF Consensus (<xref target="RFC2434">see RFC2434</xref>). -</t> - -<t> -This document creates an IANA registry for the gateway type field. -</t> -<t> -Values 0, 1, 2 and 3 are defined in <xref target="gatewaytype" />. -Algorithm numbers 4 through 255 can be assigned by -Standards Action (<xref target="RFC2434">see RFC2434</xref>). -</t> - - - -</section> - -<section title="Acknowledgments"> -<t> -My thanks to Paul Hoffman, Sam Weiler, Jean-Jacques Puig, Rob Austein, -and Olafur Gurmundsson who reviewed this document carefully. -Additional thanks to Olafur Gurmundsson for a reference implementation. -</t> -</section> - -</middle> - -<back> -<references title="Normative references"> -<!-- DNSSEC --> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1034" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1035" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1521" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2026" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2065" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2434" ?> -</references> - -<references title="Non-normative references"> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.1886" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2119" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2407" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2535" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.2536" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3110" ?> -<?rfc include="reference.RFC.3445" ?> -</references> -</back> -</rfc> -<!-- - $Id: draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.xml,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:24 as Exp $ - - $Log: draft-richardson-ipsec-rr.xml,v $ - Revision 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:24 as - added files from freeswan-2.04-x509-1.5.3 - - Revision 1.23 2003/09/04 23:26:09 mcr - more nits. - - Revision 1.22 2003/08/16 15:55:35 mcr - fixed version to -06. - - Revision 1.21 2003/08/16 15:52:32 mcr - Sam's comments on IANA considerations. - - Revision 1.20 2003/07/27 22:57:54 mcr - updated document with new text about a seperate registry - for the algorithm type. - - Revision 1.19 2003/06/30 01:51:50 mcr - minor typo fixes. - - Revision 1.18 2003/06/16 17:45:00 mcr - adjusted date on rev-04. - - Revision 1.17 2003/06/16 17:41:30 mcr - revision -04 - - Revision 1.16 2003/06/16 17:39:20 mcr - adjusted typos, and adjusted IANA considerations. - - Revision 1.15 2003/05/26 19:31:23 mcr - updates to drafts - IPSEC RR - SC versions, and RFC3526 - reference in OE draft. - - Revision 1.14 2003/05/23 13:57:40 mcr - updated draft ##. - - Revision 1.13 2003/05/23 13:54:45 mcr - updated month on draft. - - Revision 1.12 2003/05/21 15:42:49 mcr - new SC section with comments from Rob Austein. - - Revision 1.11 2003/05/20 20:52:22 mcr - new security considerations section. - - Revision 1.10 2003/05/20 19:07:47 mcr - rewrote Security Considerations. - - Revision 1.9 2003/05/20 18:17:09 mcr - nits from Rob Austein. - - Revision 1.8 2003/04/29 00:44:59 mcr - updates according to WG consensus: restored three-way - gateway field type. - - Revision 1.7 2003/03/30 17:00:29 mcr - updates according to community feedback. - - Revision 1.6 2003/03/19 02:20:24 mcr - updated draft based upon comments from working group - - Revision 1.5 2003/02/23 22:39:22 mcr - updates to IPSECKEY draft. - - Revision 1.4 2003/02/21 04:39:04 mcr - updated drafts, and added crosscompile.html - - Revision 1.3 2003/01/17 16:26:34 mcr - updated IPSEC KEY draft with restrictions. - - Revision 1.2 2002/08/26 18:20:54 mcr - updated documents - - Revision 1.1 2002/08/10 20:05:33 mcr - document proposing IPSECKEY Resource Record - - -!> |