[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (4.3.6)

1 files changed, 57 insertions, 56 deletions

diff --git a/src/charon/sa/keymat.c b/src/charon/sa/keymat.c
index 46fb79587..e49626354 100644
--- a/src/charon/sa/keymat.c
+++ b/src/charon/sa/keymat.c
@@ -24,52 +24,52 @@ typedef struct private_keymat_t private_keymat_t;
  * Private data of an keymat_t object.
  */
 struct private_keymat_t {
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * Public keymat_t interface.
 	 */
 	keymat_t public;
-	
+
 	/**
- 	 * IKE_SA Role, initiator or responder
- 	 */
- 	bool initiator;
-	
+	 * IKE_SA Role, initiator or responder
+	 */
+	bool initiator;
+
 	/**
 	 * inbound signer (verify)
 	 */
 	signer_t *signer_in;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * outbound signer (sign)
 	 */
 	signer_t *signer_out;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * inbound crypter (decrypt)
 	 */
 	crypter_t *crypter_in;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * outbound crypter (encrypt)
 	 */
 	crypter_t *crypter_out;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * General purpose PRF
 	 */
 	prf_t *prf;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * Negotiated PRF algorithm
 	 */
 	pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * Key to derive key material from for CHILD_SAs, rekeying
 	 */
 	chunk_t skd;
-	
+
 	/**
 	 * Key to build outging authentication data (SKp)
 	 */
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ keylen_entry_t keylen_enc[] = {
 keylen_entry_t keylen_int[] = {
 	{AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, 			128},
 	{AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96,			160},
+	{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_96,		256},
 	{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128,	256},
 	{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192,	384},
 	{AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256,	512},
@@ -158,15 +159,15 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 	prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
 	u_int16_t alg, key_size;
 	prf_t *rekey_prf = NULL;
-	
+
 	spi_i = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
 	spi_r = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t));
-	
+
 	if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
 	{
 		return FALSE;
 	}
-	
+
 	/* Create SAs general purpose PRF first, we may use it here */
 	if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION, &alg, NULL))
 	{
@@ -206,8 +207,8 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 	*((u_int64_t*)spi_i.ptr) = id->get_initiator_spi(id);
 	*((u_int64_t*)spi_r.ptr) = id->get_responder_spi(id);
 	prf_plus_seed = chunk_cat("ccc", full_nonce, spi_i, spi_r);
-	
-	/* KEYMAT = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr) 
+
+	/* KEYMAT = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr)
 	 *
 	 * if we are rekeying, SKEYSEED is built on another way
 	 */
@@ -221,7 +222,7 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 	}
 	else
 	{
-		/* SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), [g^ir (new)] | Ni | Nr) 
+		/* SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), [g^ir (new)] | Ni | Nr)
 		 * use OLD SAs PRF functions for both prf_plus and prf */
 		rekey_prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, rekey_function);
 		if (!rekey_prf)
@@ -240,20 +241,20 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 		prf_plus = prf_plus_create(rekey_prf, prf_plus_seed);
 	}
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYSEED %B", &skeyseed);
-	
+
 	chunk_clear(&skeyseed);
 	chunk_clear(&secret);
 	chunk_free(&full_nonce);
 	chunk_free(&fixed_nonce);
 	chunk_clear(&prf_plus_seed);
-	
+
 	/* KEYMAT = SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr */
-	
+
 	/* SK_d is used for generating CHILD_SA key mat => store for later use */
 	key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &this->skd);
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_d secret %B", &this->skd);
-	
+
 	/* SK_ai/SK_ar used for integrity protection => signer_in/signer_out */
 	if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, &alg, NULL))
 	{
@@ -275,17 +276,17 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 		return FALSE;
 	}
 	key_size = signer_i->get_key_size(signer_i);
-	
+
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ai secret %B", &key);
 	signer_i->set_key(signer_i, key);
 	chunk_clear(&key);
-	
+
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ar secret %B", &key);
 	signer_r->set_key(signer_r, key);
 	chunk_clear(&key);
-	
+
 	if (this->initiator)
 	{
 		this->signer_in = signer_r;
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 		this->signer_in = signer_i;
 		this->signer_out = signer_r;
 	}
-	
+
 	/* SK_ei/SK_er used for encryption => crypter_in/crypter_out */
 	if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &alg, &key_size))
 	{
@@ -318,17 +319,17 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 		return FALSE;
 	}
 	key_size = crypter_i->get_key_size(crypter_i);
-	
+
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", &key);
 	crypter_i->set_key(crypter_i, key);
 	chunk_clear(&key);
-	
+
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", &key);
 	crypter_r->set_key(crypter_r, key);
 	chunk_clear(&key);
-	
+
 	if (this->initiator)
 	{
 		this->crypter_in = crypter_r;
@@ -339,8 +340,8 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 		this->crypter_in = crypter_i;
 		this->crypter_out = crypter_r;
 	}
-	
-	/* SK_pi/SK_pr used for authentication => stored for later */	
+
+	/* SK_pi/SK_pr used for authentication => stored for later */
 	key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf);
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key);
 	DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pi secret %B", &key);
@@ -362,11 +363,11 @@ static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
 	{
 		this->skp_build = key;
 	}
-	
+
 	/* all done, prf_plus not needed anymore */
 	prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
 	DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf);
-	
+
 	return TRUE;
 }
 
@@ -382,7 +383,7 @@ static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
 	u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0;
 	chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty;
 	prf_plus_t *prf_plus;
-	
+
 	if (dh)
 	{
 		if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS)
@@ -393,13 +394,13 @@ static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
 	}
 	seed = chunk_cata("mcc", secret, nonce_i, nonce_r);
 	DBG4(DBG_CHD, "seed %B", &seed);
-	
+
 	if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM,
 								&enc_alg, &enc_size))
 	{
-		DBG2(DBG_CHD, "  using %N for encryption", 
+		DBG2(DBG_CHD, "  using %N for encryption",
 			 encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg);
-		
+
 		if (!enc_size)
 		{
 			enc_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_enc, enc_alg);
@@ -412,7 +413,7 @@ static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
 		}
 		/* to bytes */
 		enc_size /= 8;
-		
+
 		/* CCM/GCM/CTR needs additional bytes */
 		switch (enc_alg)
 		{
@@ -434,13 +435,13 @@ static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
 				break;
 		}
 	}
-	
+
 	if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM,
 								&int_alg, &int_size))
 	{
 		DBG2(DBG_CHD, "  using %N for integrity",
 			 integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg);
-		
+
 		if (!int_size)
 		{
 			int_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_int, int_alg);
@@ -454,17 +455,17 @@ static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this,
 		/* to bytes */
 		int_size /= 8;
 	}
-	
+
 	this->prf->set_key(this->prf, this->skd);
 	prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, seed);
-	
+
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i);
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i);
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r);
 	prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r);
-	
+
 	prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus);
-	
+
 	if (enc_size)
 	{
 		DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption initiator key %B", encr_i);
@@ -512,19 +513,19 @@ static chunk_t get_auth_octets(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
 {
 	chunk_t chunk, idx, octets;
 	chunk_t skp;
-	
+
 	skp = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build;
-	
+
 	chunk = chunk_alloca(4);
 	memset(chunk.ptr, 0, chunk.len);
 	chunk.ptr[0] = id->get_type(id);
 	idx = chunk_cata("cc", chunk, id->get_encoding(id));
-	
+
 	DBG3(DBG_IKE, "IDx' %B", &idx);
 	DBG3(DBG_IKE, "SK_p %B", &skp);
 	this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skp);
 	this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, idx, &chunk);
-	
+
 	octets = chunk_cat("ccm", ike_sa_init, nonce, chunk);
 	DBG3(DBG_IKE, "octets = message + nonce + prf(Sk_px, IDx') %B", &octets);
 	return octets;
@@ -539,12 +540,12 @@ static chunk_t get_auth_octets(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
 /**
  * Implementation of keymat_t.get_psk_sig
  */
-static chunk_t get_psk_sig(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify, 
+static chunk_t get_psk_sig(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
 						   chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret,
 						   identification_t *id)
 {
 	chunk_t key_pad, key, sig, octets;
-	
+
 	if (!secret.len)
 	{	/* EAP uses SK_p if no MSK has been established */
 		secret = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build;
@@ -561,7 +562,7 @@ static chunk_t get_psk_sig(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify,
 	DBG3(DBG_IKE, "AUTH = prf(prf(secret, keypad), octets) %B", &sig);
 	chunk_free(&octets);
 	chunk_free(&key);
-	
+
 	return sig;
 }
 
@@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ static void destroy(private_keymat_t *this)
 keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator)
 {
 	private_keymat_t *this = malloc_thing(private_keymat_t);
-	
+
 	this->public.create_dh = (diffie_hellman_t*(*)(keymat_t*, diffie_hellman_group_t group))create_dh;
 	this->public.derive_ike_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id, pseudo_random_function_t,chunk_t))derive_ike_keys;
 	this->public.derive_child_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r))derive_child_keys;
@@ -597,9 +598,9 @@ keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator)
 	this->public.get_auth_octets = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t *, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id))get_auth_octets;
 	this->public.get_psk_sig = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t*, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id))get_psk_sig;
 	this->public.destroy = (void(*)(keymat_t*))destroy;
-	
+
 	this->initiator = initiator;
-	
+
 	this->signer_in = NULL;
 	this->signer_out = NULL;
 	this->crypter_in = NULL;
@@ -609,7 +610,7 @@ keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator)
 	this->skd = chunk_empty;
 	this->skp_verify = chunk_empty;
 	this->skp_build = chunk_empty;
-	
+
 	return &this->public;
 }