Imported Upstream version 5.0.1

1 files changed, 166 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev1/keymat_v1.h b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev1/keymat_v1.h
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev1/keymat_v1.h
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+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Tobias Brunner
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup keymat_v1 keymat_v1
+ * @{ @ingroup ikev1
+ */
+
+#ifndef KEYMAT_V1_H_
+#define KEYMAT_V1_H_
+
+#include <sa/keymat.h>
+#include <sa/authenticator.h>
+
+typedef struct keymat_v1_t keymat_v1_t;
+
+/**
+ * Derivation and management of sensitive keying material, IKEv1 variant.
+ */
+struct keymat_v1_t {
+
+	/**
+	 * Implements keymat_t.
+	 */
+	keymat_t keymat;
+
+	/**
+	 * Derive keys for the IKE_SA.
+	 *
+	 * These keys are not handed out, but are used by the associated signers,
+	 * crypters and authentication functions.
+	 *
+	 * @param proposal		selected algorithms
+	 * @param dh			diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh()
+	 * @param dh_other		public DH value from other peer
+	 * @param nonce_i		initiators nonce value
+	 * @param nonce_r		responders nonce value
+	 * @param id			IKE_SA identifier
+	 * @param auth			authentication method
+	 * @param shared_key	PSK in case of AUTH_CLASS_PSK, NULL otherwise
+	 * @return				TRUE on success
+	 */
+	bool (*derive_ike_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
+							diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t dh_other,
+							chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
+							auth_method_t auth, shared_key_t *shared_key);
+
+	/**
+	 * Derive keys for the CHILD_SA.
+	 *
+	 * @param proposal		selected algorithms
+	 * @param dh			diffie hellman key, NULL if none used
+	 * @param spi_i			SPI chosen by initiatior
+	 * @param spi_r			SPI chosen by responder
+	 * @param nonce_i		quick mode initiator nonce
+	 * @param nonce_r		quick mode responder nonce
+	 * @param encr_i		allocated initiators encryption key
+	 * @param integ_i		allocated initiators integrity key
+	 * @param encr_r		allocated responders encryption key
+	 * @param integ_r		allocated responders integrity key
+	 */
+	bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
+						diffie_hellman_t *dh, u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r,
+						chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
+						chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
+						chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
+
+	/**
+	 * Create the negotiated hasher.
+	 *
+	 * @param proposal		selected algorithms
+	 * @return				TRUE, if creation was successful
+	 */
+	bool (*create_hasher)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal);
+
+	/**
+	 * Get the negotiated hasher.
+	 *
+	 * @return				allocated hasher or NULL
+	 */
+	hasher_t *(*get_hasher)(keymat_v1_t *this);
+
+	/**
+	 * Get HASH data for authentication.
+	 *
+	 * @param initiatior	TRUE to create HASH_I, FALSE for HASH_R
+	 * @param dh			public DH value of peer to create HASH for
+	 * @param dh_other		others public DH value
+	 * @param ike_sa_id		IKE_SA identifier
+	 * @param sa_i			encoded SA payload of initiator
+	 * @param id			encoded IDii payload for HASH_I (IDir for HASH_R)
+	 * @param hash			chunk receiving allocated HASH data
+	 * @return				TRUE if hash allocated successfully
+	 */
+	bool (*get_hash)(keymat_v1_t *this, bool initiator,
+						chunk_t dh, chunk_t dh_other, ike_sa_id_t *ike_sa_id,
+						chunk_t sa_i, chunk_t id, chunk_t *hash);
+
+	/**
+	 * Get HASH data for integrity/authentication in Phase 2 exchanges.
+	 *
+	 * @param message		message to generate the HASH data for
+	 * @param hash			chunk receiving allocated hash data
+	 * @return				TRUE if hash allocated successfully
+	 */
+	bool (*get_hash_phase2)(keymat_v1_t *this, message_t *message, chunk_t *hash);
+
+	/**
+	 * Returns the IV for a message with the given message ID.
+	 *
+	 * The return chunk contains internal data and is valid until the next
+	 * get_iv/udpate_iv/confirm_iv call.
+	 *
+	 * @param mid			message ID
+	 * @param iv			chunk receiving IV, internal data
+	 * @return				TRUE if IV allocated successfully
+	 */
+	bool (*get_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t *iv);
+
+	/**
+	 * Updates the IV for the next message with the given message ID.
+	 *
+	 * A call of confirm_iv() is required in order to actually make the IV
+	 * available.  This is needed for the inbound case where we store the last
+	 * block of the encrypted message but want to update the IV only after
+	 * verification of the decrypted message.
+	 *
+	 * @param mid			message ID
+	 * @param last_block	last block of encrypted message (gets cloned)
+	 * @return				TRUE if IV updated successfully
+	 */
+	bool (*update_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t last_block);
+
+	/**
+	 * Confirms the updated IV for the given message ID.
+	 *
+	 * To actually make the new IV available via get_iv this method has to
+	 * be called after update_iv.
+	 *
+	 * @param mid			message ID
+	 * @return				TRUE if IV confirmed successfully
+	 */
+	bool (*confirm_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid);
+};
+
+/**
+ * Create a keymat instance.
+ *
+ * @param initiator			TRUE if we are the initiator
+ * @return					keymat instance
+ */
+keymat_v1_t *keymat_v1_create(bool initiator);
+
+#endif /** KEYMAT_V1_H_ @}*/