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author | Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org> | 2010-05-25 19:01:36 +0000 |
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committer | Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org> | 2010-05-25 19:01:36 +0000 |
commit | 1ac70afcc1f7d6d2738a34308810719b0976d29f (patch) | |
tree | 805f6ce2a15d1a717781d7cbceac8408a74b6b0c /src/libcharon/sa/keymat.c | |
parent | ed7d79f96177044949744da10f4431c1d6242241 (diff) | |
download | vyos-strongswan-1ac70afcc1f7d6d2738a34308810719b0976d29f.tar.gz vyos-strongswan-1ac70afcc1f7d6d2738a34308810719b0976d29f.zip |
[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (4.4.0)
Diffstat (limited to 'src/libcharon/sa/keymat.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/libcharon/sa/keymat.c | 617 |
1 files changed, 617 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/keymat.c b/src/libcharon/sa/keymat.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000..837cbe428 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/libcharon/sa/keymat.c @@ -0,0 +1,617 @@ +/* + * Copyright (C) 2008 Martin Willi + * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it + * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the + * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your + * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but + * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY + * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License + * for more details. + */ + +#include "keymat.h" + +#include <daemon.h> +#include <crypto/prf_plus.h> + +typedef struct private_keymat_t private_keymat_t; + +/** + * Private data of an keymat_t object. + */ +struct private_keymat_t { + + /** + * Public keymat_t interface. + */ + keymat_t public; + + /** + * IKE_SA Role, initiator or responder + */ + bool initiator; + + /** + * inbound signer (verify) + */ + signer_t *signer_in; + + /** + * outbound signer (sign) + */ + signer_t *signer_out; + + /** + * inbound crypter (decrypt) + */ + crypter_t *crypter_in; + + /** + * outbound crypter (encrypt) + */ + crypter_t *crypter_out; + + /** + * General purpose PRF + */ + prf_t *prf; + + /** + * Negotiated PRF algorithm + */ + pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg; + + /** + * Key to derive key material from for CHILD_SAs, rekeying + */ + chunk_t skd; + + /** + * Key to build outging authentication data (SKp) + */ + chunk_t skp_build; + + /** + * Key to verify incoming authentication data (SKp) + */ + chunk_t skp_verify; +}; + +typedef struct keylen_entry_t keylen_entry_t; + +/** + * Implicit key length for an algorithm + */ +struct keylen_entry_t { + /** IKEv2 algorithm identifier */ + int algo; + /** key length in bits */ + int len; +}; + +#define END_OF_LIST -1 + +/** + * Keylen for encryption algos + */ +keylen_entry_t keylen_enc[] = { + {ENCR_DES, 64}, + {ENCR_3DES, 192}, + {END_OF_LIST, 0} +}; + +/** + * Keylen for integrity algos + */ +keylen_entry_t keylen_int[] = { + {AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96, 128}, + {AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96, 160}, + {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_96, 256}, + {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128, 256}, + {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192, 384}, + {AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256, 512}, + {AUTH_AES_XCBC_96, 128}, + {END_OF_LIST, 0} +}; + +/** + * Lookup key length of an algorithm + */ +static int lookup_keylen(keylen_entry_t *list, int algo) +{ + while (list->algo != END_OF_LIST) + { + if (algo == list->algo) + { + return list->len; + } + list++; + } + return 0; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.create_dh + */ +static diffie_hellman_t* create_dh(private_keymat_t *this, + diffie_hellman_group_t group) +{ + return lib->crypto->create_dh(lib->crypto, group);; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.derive_keys + */ +static bool derive_ike_keys(private_keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal, + diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, + chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id, + pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function, + chunk_t rekey_skd) +{ + chunk_t skeyseed, key, secret, full_nonce, fixed_nonce, prf_plus_seed; + chunk_t spi_i, spi_r; + crypter_t *crypter_i, *crypter_r; + signer_t *signer_i, *signer_r; + prf_plus_t *prf_plus; + u_int16_t alg, key_size; + prf_t *rekey_prf = NULL; + + spi_i = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t)); + spi_r = chunk_alloca(sizeof(u_int64_t)); + + if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS) + { + return FALSE; + } + + /* Create SAs general purpose PRF first, we may use it here */ + if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION, &alg, NULL)) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected", + transform_type_names, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION); + return FALSE; + } + this->prf_alg = alg; + this->prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, alg); + if (this->prf == NULL) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!", + transform_type_names, PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION, + pseudo_random_function_names, alg); + return FALSE; + } + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "shared Diffie Hellman secret %B", &secret); + /* full nonce is used as seed for PRF+ ... */ + full_nonce = chunk_cat("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r); + /* but the PRF may need a fixed key which only uses the first bytes of + * the nonces. */ + switch (alg) + { + case PRF_AES128_XCBC: + /* while rfc4434 defines variable keys for AES-XCBC, rfc3664 does + * not and therefore fixed key semantics apply to XCBC for key + * derivation. */ + key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf)/2; + nonce_i.len = min(nonce_i.len, key_size); + nonce_r.len = min(nonce_r.len, key_size); + break; + default: + /* all other algorithms use variable key length, full nonce */ + break; + } + fixed_nonce = chunk_cat("cc", nonce_i, nonce_r); + *((u_int64_t*)spi_i.ptr) = id->get_initiator_spi(id); + *((u_int64_t*)spi_r.ptr) = id->get_responder_spi(id); + prf_plus_seed = chunk_cat("ccc", full_nonce, spi_i, spi_r); + + /* KEYMAT = prf+ (SKEYSEED, Ni | Nr | SPIi | SPIr) + * + * if we are rekeying, SKEYSEED is built on another way + */ + if (rekey_function == PRF_UNDEFINED) /* not rekeying */ + { + /* SKEYSEED = prf(Ni | Nr, g^ir) */ + this->prf->set_key(this->prf, fixed_nonce); + this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, secret, &skeyseed); + this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skeyseed); + prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, prf_plus_seed); + } + else + { + /* SKEYSEED = prf(SK_d (old), [g^ir (new)] | Ni | Nr) + * use OLD SAs PRF functions for both prf_plus and prf */ + rekey_prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, rekey_function); + if (!rekey_prf) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "PRF of old SA %N not supported!", + pseudo_random_function_names, rekey_function); + chunk_free(&full_nonce); + chunk_free(&fixed_nonce); + chunk_clear(&prf_plus_seed); + return FALSE; + } + secret = chunk_cat("mc", secret, full_nonce); + rekey_prf->set_key(rekey_prf, rekey_skd); + rekey_prf->allocate_bytes(rekey_prf, secret, &skeyseed); + rekey_prf->set_key(rekey_prf, skeyseed); + prf_plus = prf_plus_create(rekey_prf, prf_plus_seed); + } + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "SKEYSEED %B", &skeyseed); + + chunk_clear(&skeyseed); + chunk_clear(&secret); + chunk_free(&full_nonce); + chunk_free(&fixed_nonce); + chunk_clear(&prf_plus_seed); + + /* KEYMAT = SK_d | SK_ai | SK_ar | SK_ei | SK_er | SK_pi | SK_pr */ + + /* SK_d is used for generating CHILD_SA key mat => store for later use */ + key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf); + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &this->skd); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_d secret %B", &this->skd); + + /* SK_ai/SK_ar used for integrity protection => signer_in/signer_out */ + if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, &alg, NULL)) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected", + transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM); + prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus); + DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf); + return FALSE; + } + signer_i = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, alg); + signer_r = lib->crypto->create_signer(lib->crypto, alg); + if (signer_i == NULL || signer_r == NULL) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N not supported!", + transform_type_names, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, + integrity_algorithm_names ,alg); + prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus); + DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf); + return FALSE; + } + key_size = signer_i->get_key_size(signer_i); + + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ai secret %B", &key); + signer_i->set_key(signer_i, key); + chunk_clear(&key); + + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ar secret %B", &key); + signer_r->set_key(signer_r, key); + chunk_clear(&key); + + if (this->initiator) + { + this->signer_in = signer_r; + this->signer_out = signer_i; + } + else + { + this->signer_in = signer_i; + this->signer_out = signer_r; + } + + /* SK_ei/SK_er used for encryption => crypter_in/crypter_out */ + if (!proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, &alg, &key_size)) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "no %N selected", + transform_type_names, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM); + prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus); + DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf); + return FALSE; + } + crypter_i = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size / 8); + crypter_r = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size / 8); + if (crypter_i == NULL || crypter_r == NULL) + { + DBG1(DBG_IKE, "%N %N (key size %d) not supported!", + transform_type_names, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, + encryption_algorithm_names, alg, key_size); + prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus); + DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf); + return FALSE; + } + key_size = crypter_i->get_key_size(crypter_i); + + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_ei secret %B", &key); + crypter_i->set_key(crypter_i, key); + chunk_clear(&key); + + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_er secret %B", &key); + crypter_r->set_key(crypter_r, key); + chunk_clear(&key); + + if (this->initiator) + { + this->crypter_in = crypter_r; + this->crypter_out = crypter_i; + } + else + { + this->crypter_in = crypter_i; + this->crypter_out = crypter_r; + } + + /* SK_pi/SK_pr used for authentication => stored for later */ + key_size = this->prf->get_key_size(this->prf); + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pi secret %B", &key); + if (this->initiator) + { + this->skp_build = key; + } + else + { + this->skp_verify = key; + } + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, key_size, &key); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "Sk_pr secret %B", &key); + if (this->initiator) + { + this->skp_verify = key; + } + else + { + this->skp_build = key; + } + + /* all done, prf_plus not needed anymore */ + prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus); + DESTROY_IF(rekey_prf); + + return TRUE; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.derive_child_keys + */ +static bool derive_child_keys(private_keymat_t *this, + proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, + chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, + chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, + chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r) +{ + u_int16_t enc_alg, int_alg, enc_size = 0, int_size = 0; + chunk_t seed, secret = chunk_empty; + prf_plus_t *prf_plus; + + if (dh) + { + if (dh->get_shared_secret(dh, &secret) != SUCCESS) + { + return FALSE; + } + DBG4(DBG_CHD, "DH secret %B", &secret); + } + seed = chunk_cata("mcc", secret, nonce_i, nonce_r); + DBG4(DBG_CHD, "seed %B", &seed); + + if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, + &enc_alg, &enc_size)) + { + DBG2(DBG_CHD, " using %N for encryption", + encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg); + + if (!enc_size) + { + enc_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_enc, enc_alg); + } + if (enc_alg != ENCR_NULL && !enc_size) + { + DBG1(DBG_CHD, "no keylength defined for %N", + encryption_algorithm_names, enc_alg); + return FALSE; + } + /* to bytes */ + enc_size /= 8; + + /* CCM/GCM/CTR/GMAC needs additional bytes */ + switch (enc_alg) + { + case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV8: + case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV12: + case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV16: + case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_ICV8: + case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_ICV12: + case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CCM_ICV16: + enc_size += 3; + break; + case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV8: + case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV12: + case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV16: + case ENCR_AES_CTR: + case ENCR_NULL_AUTH_AES_GMAC: + enc_size += 4; + break; + default: + break; + } + } + + if (proposal->get_algorithm(proposal, INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM, + &int_alg, &int_size)) + { + DBG2(DBG_CHD, " using %N for integrity", + integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg); + + if (!int_size) + { + int_size = lookup_keylen(keylen_int, int_alg); + } + if (!int_size) + { + DBG1(DBG_CHD, "no keylength defined for %N", + integrity_algorithm_names, int_alg); + return FALSE; + } + /* to bytes */ + int_size /= 8; + } + + this->prf->set_key(this->prf, this->skd); + prf_plus = prf_plus_create(this->prf, seed); + + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_i); + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_i); + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, enc_size, encr_r); + prf_plus->allocate_bytes(prf_plus, int_size, integ_r); + + prf_plus->destroy(prf_plus); + + if (enc_size) + { + DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption initiator key %B", encr_i); + DBG4(DBG_CHD, "encryption responder key %B", encr_r); + } + if (int_size) + { + DBG4(DBG_CHD, "integrity initiator key %B", integ_i); + DBG4(DBG_CHD, "integrity responder key %B", integ_r); + } + return TRUE; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.get_skd + */ +static pseudo_random_function_t get_skd(private_keymat_t *this, chunk_t *skd) +{ + *skd = this->skd; + return this->prf_alg; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.get_signer + */ +static signer_t* get_signer(private_keymat_t *this, bool in) +{ + return in ? this->signer_in : this->signer_out; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.get_crypter + */ +static crypter_t* get_crypter(private_keymat_t *this, bool in) +{ + return in ? this->crypter_in : this->crypter_out; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.get_auth_octets + */ +static chunk_t get_auth_octets(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify, + chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, + identification_t *id) +{ + chunk_t chunk, idx, octets; + chunk_t skp; + + skp = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build; + + chunk = chunk_alloca(4); + memset(chunk.ptr, 0, chunk.len); + chunk.ptr[0] = id->get_type(id); + idx = chunk_cata("cc", chunk, id->get_encoding(id)); + + DBG3(DBG_IKE, "IDx' %B", &idx); + DBG3(DBG_IKE, "SK_p %B", &skp); + this->prf->set_key(this->prf, skp); + this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, idx, &chunk); + + octets = chunk_cat("ccm", ike_sa_init, nonce, chunk); + DBG3(DBG_IKE, "octets = message + nonce + prf(Sk_px, IDx') %B", &octets); + return octets; +} + +/** + * Key pad for the AUTH method SHARED_KEY_MESSAGE_INTEGRITY_CODE. + */ +#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD "Key Pad for IKEv2" +#define IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH 17 + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.get_psk_sig + */ +static chunk_t get_psk_sig(private_keymat_t *this, bool verify, + chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, + identification_t *id) +{ + chunk_t key_pad, key, sig, octets; + + if (!secret.len) + { /* EAP uses SK_p if no MSK has been established */ + secret = verify ? this->skp_verify : this->skp_build; + } + octets = get_auth_octets(this, verify, ike_sa_init, nonce, id); + /* AUTH = prf(prf(Shared Secret,"Key Pad for IKEv2"), <msg octets>) */ + key_pad = chunk_create(IKEV2_KEY_PAD, IKEV2_KEY_PAD_LENGTH); + this->prf->set_key(this->prf, secret); + this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, key_pad, &key); + this->prf->set_key(this->prf, key); + this->prf->allocate_bytes(this->prf, octets, &sig); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "secret %B", &secret); + DBG4(DBG_IKE, "prf(secret, keypad) %B", &key); + DBG3(DBG_IKE, "AUTH = prf(prf(secret, keypad), octets) %B", &sig); + chunk_free(&octets); + chunk_free(&key); + + return sig; +} + +/** + * Implementation of keymat_t.destroy. + */ +static void destroy(private_keymat_t *this) +{ + DESTROY_IF(this->signer_in); + DESTROY_IF(this->signer_out); + DESTROY_IF(this->crypter_in); + DESTROY_IF(this->crypter_out); + DESTROY_IF(this->prf); + chunk_clear(&this->skd); + chunk_clear(&this->skp_verify); + chunk_clear(&this->skp_build); + free(this); +} + +/** + * See header + */ +keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator) +{ + private_keymat_t *this = malloc_thing(private_keymat_t); + + this->public.create_dh = (diffie_hellman_t*(*)(keymat_t*, diffie_hellman_group_t group))create_dh; + this->public.derive_ike_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id, pseudo_random_function_t,chunk_t))derive_ike_keys; + this->public.derive_child_keys = (bool(*)(keymat_t*, proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i, chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r))derive_child_keys; + this->public.get_skd = (pseudo_random_function_t(*)(keymat_t*, chunk_t *skd))get_skd; + this->public.get_signer = (signer_t*(*)(keymat_t*, bool in))get_signer; + this->public.get_crypter = (crypter_t*(*)(keymat_t*, bool in))get_crypter; + this->public.get_auth_octets = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t *, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id))get_auth_octets; + this->public.get_psk_sig = (chunk_t(*)(keymat_t*, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init, chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id))get_psk_sig; + this->public.destroy = (void(*)(keymat_t*))destroy; + + this->initiator = initiator; + + this->signer_in = NULL; + this->signer_out = NULL; + this->crypter_in = NULL; + this->crypter_out = NULL; + this->prf = NULL; + this->prf_alg = PRF_UNDEFINED; + this->skd = chunk_empty; + this->skp_verify = chunk_empty; + this->skp_build = chunk_empty; + + return &this->public; +} + |