[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (4.4.0)

1 files changed, 163 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/keymat.h b/src/libcharon/sa/keymat.h
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+++ b/src/libcharon/sa/keymat.h
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+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 Martin Willi
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * @defgroup keymat keymat
+ * @{ @ingroup sa
+ */
+
+#ifndef KEYMAT_H_
+#define KEYMAT_H_
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <utils/identification.h>
+#include <crypto/prfs/prf.h>
+#include <crypto/crypters/crypter.h>
+#include <crypto/signers/signer.h>
+#include <config/proposal.h>
+#include <sa/ike_sa_id.h>
+
+typedef struct keymat_t keymat_t;
+
+/**
+ * Derivation an management of sensitive keying material.
+ */
+struct keymat_t {
+
+	/**
+	 * Create a diffie hellman object for key agreement.
+	 *
+	 * The diffie hellman is either for IKE negotiation/rekeying or
+	 * CHILD_SA rekeying (using PFS). The resulting DH object must be passed
+	 * to derive_keys or to derive_child_keys and destroyed after use
+	 *
+	 * @param group			diffie hellman group
+	 * @return				DH object, NULL if group not supported
+	 */
+	diffie_hellman_t* (*create_dh)(keymat_t *this, diffie_hellman_group_t group);
+
+	/**
+	 * Derive keys for the IKE_SA.
+	 *
+	 * These keys are not handed out, but are used by the associated signers,
+	 * crypters and authentication functions.
+	 *
+	 * @param proposal	selected algorithms
+	 * @param dh		diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh()
+	 * @param nonce_i	initiators nonce value
+	 * @param nonce_r	responders nonce value
+	 * @param id		IKE_SA identifier
+	 * @param rekey_prf	PRF of old SA if rekeying, PRF_UNDEFINED otherwise
+	 * @param rekey_sdk	SKd of old SA if rekeying
+	 * @return			TRUE on success
+	 */
+	bool (*derive_ike_keys)(keymat_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
+							diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t nonce_i,
+							chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
+							pseudo_random_function_t rekey_function,
+							chunk_t rekey_skd);
+	/**
+	 * Derive keys for a CHILD_SA.
+	 *
+	 * The keys for the CHILD_SA are allocated in the integ and encr chunks.
+	 * An implementation might hand out encrypted keys only, which are
+	 * decrypted in the kernel before use.
+	 * If no PFS is used for the CHILD_SA, dh can be NULL.
+	 *
+	 * @param proposal	selected algorithms
+	 * @param dh		diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh(), or NULL
+	 * @param nonce_i	initiators nonce value
+	 * @param nonce_r	responders nonce value
+	 * @param encr_i	chunk to write initiators encryption key to
+	 * @param integ_i	chunk to write initiators integrity key to
+	 * @param encr_r	chunk to write responders encryption key to
+	 * @param integ_r	chunk to write responders integrity key to
+	 * @return			TRUE on success
+	 */
+	bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_t *this,
+							  proposal_t *proposal, diffie_hellman_t *dh,
+							  chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
+							  chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
+							  chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
+	/**
+	 * Get SKd to pass to derive_ikey_keys() during rekeying.
+	 *
+	 * @param skd		chunk to write SKd to (internal data)
+	 * @return			PRF function to derive keymat
+	 */
+	pseudo_random_function_t (*get_skd)(keymat_t *this, chunk_t *skd);
+
+	/**
+	 * Get a signer to sign/verify IKE messages.
+	 *
+	 * @param in		TRUE for inbound (verify), FALSE for outbound (sign)
+	 * @return			signer
+	 */
+	signer_t* (*get_signer)(keymat_t *this, bool in);
+
+	/*
+	 * Get a crypter to en-/decrypt IKE messages.
+	 *
+	 * @param in		TRUE for inbound (decrypt), FALSE for outbound (encrypt)
+	 * @return			crypter
+	 */
+	crypter_t* (*get_crypter)(keymat_t *this, bool in);
+
+	/**
+	 * Generate octets to use for authentication procedure (RFC4306 2.15).
+	 *
+	 * This method creates the plain octets and is usually signed by a private
+	 * key. PSK and EAP authentication include a secret into the data, use
+	 * the get_psk_sig() method instead.
+	 *
+	 * @param verify		TRUE to create for verfification, FALSE to sign
+	 * @param ike_sa_init	encoded ike_sa_init message
+	 * @param nonce			nonce value
+	 * @param id			identity
+	 * @return				authentication octets
+	 */
+	chunk_t (*get_auth_octets)(keymat_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
+							   chunk_t nonce, identification_t *id);
+	/**
+	 * Build the shared secret signature used for PSK and EAP authentication.
+	 *
+	 * This method wraps the get_auth_octets() method and additionally
+	 * includes the secret into the signature. If no secret is given, SK_p is
+	 * used as secret (used for EAP methods without MSK).
+	 *
+	 * @param verify		TRUE to create for verfification, FALSE to sign
+	 * @param ike_sa_init	encoded ike_sa_init message
+	 * @param nonce			nonce value
+	 * @param secret		optional secret to include into signature
+	 * @param id			identity
+	 * @return				signature octets
+	 */
+	chunk_t (*get_psk_sig)(keymat_t *this, bool verify, chunk_t ike_sa_init,
+						   chunk_t nonce, chunk_t secret, identification_t *id);
+	/**
+	 * Destroy a keymat_t.
+	 */
+	void (*destroy)(keymat_t *this);
+};
+
+/**
+ * Create a keymat instance.
+ *
+ * @param initiator		TRUE if we are the initiator
+ * @return				keymat instance
+ */
+keymat_t *keymat_create(bool initiator);
+
+#endif /** KEYMAT_H_ @}*/