[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (4.3.6)

1 files changed, 180 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pgp/pgp_utils.c b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pgp/pgp_utils.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1658f3232
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/libstrongswan/plugins/pgp/pgp_utils.c
@@ -0,0 +1,180 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Martin Willi
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ */
+
+#include "pgp_utils.h"
+
+#include <debug.h>
+
+ENUM_BEGIN(pgp_pubkey_alg_names, PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY,
+	"RSA",
+	"RSA_ENC_ONLY",
+	"RSA_SIGN_ONLY"
+);
+ENUM_NEXT(pgp_pubkey_alg_names, PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY, PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_DIFFIE_HELLMAN, PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY,
+	"ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY",
+	"DSA",
+	"ECC",
+	"ECDSA",
+	"ELGAMAL",
+	"DIFFIE_HELLMAN"
+);
+ENUM_END(pgp_pubkey_alg_names, PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_DIFFIE_HELLMAN);
+
+ENUM(pgp_sym_alg_names, PGP_SYM_ALG_PLAIN, PGP_SYM_ALG_TWOFISH,
+	"PLAINTEXT",
+	"IDEA",
+	"3DES",
+	"CAST5",
+	"BLOWFISH",
+	"SAFER",
+	"DES",
+	"AES_128",
+	"AES_192",
+	"AES_256",
+	"TWOFISH"
+);
+
+ENUM_BEGIN(pgp_packet_tag_names, PGP_PKT_RESERVED, PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY,
+	"Reserved",
+	"Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet",
+	"Signature Packet",
+	"Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet",
+	"One-Pass Signature Packet",
+	"Secret Key Packet",
+	"Public Key Packet",
+	"Secret Subkey Packet",
+	"Compressed Data Packet",
+	"Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet",
+	"Marker Packet",
+	"Literal Data Packet",
+	"Trust Packet",
+	"User ID Packet",
+	"Public Subkey Packet"
+);
+ENUM_NEXT(pgp_packet_tag_names, PGP_PKT_USER_ATTRIBUTE, PGP_PKT_MOD_DETECT_CODE, PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY,
+	"User Attribute Packet",
+	"Sym. Encrypted and Integrity Protected Data Packet",
+	"Modification Detection Code Packet"
+);
+ENUM_END(pgp_packet_tag_names, PGP_PKT_MOD_DETECT_CODE);
+
+/**
+ * Read a PGP scalar of bytes length, advance blob
+ */
+bool pgp_read_scalar(chunk_t *blob, size_t bytes, u_int32_t *scalar)
+{
+	u_int32_t res = 0;
+
+	if (bytes > blob->len)
+	{
+		DBG1("PGP data too short to read %d byte scalar", bytes);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	while (bytes-- > 0)
+	{
+		res = 256 * res + blob->ptr[0];
+		*blob = chunk_skip(*blob, 1);
+	}
+	*scalar = res;
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read a PGP MPI, advance blob
+ */
+bool pgp_read_mpi(chunk_t *blob, chunk_t *mpi)
+{
+	u_int32_t bits, bytes;
+
+	if (!pgp_read_scalar(blob, 2, &bits))
+	{
+		DBG1("PGP data too short to read MPI length");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	bytes = (bits + 7) / 8;
+	if (bytes > blob->len)
+	{
+		DBG1("PGP data too short to read %d byte MPI", bytes);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	*mpi = chunk_create(blob->ptr, bytes);
+	*blob = chunk_skip(*blob, bytes);
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read length of an PGP old packet length encoding
+ */
+static bool pgp_old_packet_length(chunk_t *blob, u_int32_t *length)
+{
+	/* bits 0 and 1 define the packet length type */
+	u_char type;
+
+	if (!blob->len)
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	type = 0x03 & blob->ptr[0];
+	*blob = chunk_skip(*blob, 1);
+
+	if (type > 2)
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return pgp_read_scalar(blob, type == 0 ? 1 : type * 2, length);
+}
+
+/**
+ * See header.
+ */
+bool pgp_read_packet(chunk_t *blob, chunk_t *data, pgp_packet_tag_t *tag)
+{
+	u_int32_t len;
+	u_char t;
+
+	if (!blob->len)
+	{
+		DBG1("missing input");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	t = blob->ptr[0];
+
+	/* bit 7 must be set */
+	if (!(t & 0x80))
+	{
+		DBG1("invalid packet tag");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	/* bit 6 set defines new packet format */
+	if (t & 0x40)
+	{
+		DBG1("new PGP packet format not supported");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	t = (t & 0x3C) >> 2;
+	if (!pgp_old_packet_length(blob, &len) || len > blob->len)
+	{
+		DBG1("invalid packet length");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	*data = chunk_create(blob->ptr, len);
+	*blob = chunk_skip(*blob, len);
+	*tag = t;
+	DBG2("L1 - PGP %N (%u bytes)", pgp_packet_tag_names, t, len);
+	DBG3("%B", data);
+	return TRUE;
+}
+