[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (4.3.2)

122 files changed, 37886 insertions, 46595 deletions

diff --git a/src/pluto/Makefile.am b/src/pluto/Makefile.am
index f788bc3d1..01237305b 100644
--- a/src/pluto/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/pluto/Makefile.am
@@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ ipsec_PROGRAMS = pluto _pluto_adns
 pluto_SOURCES = \
 ac.c ac.h \
 alg_info.c alg_info.h \
-asn1.c asn1.h \
 ca.c ca.h \
 certs.c certs.h \
 connections.c connections.h \
@@ -19,11 +18,8 @@ db_ops.c db_ops.h \
 defs.c defs.h \
 demux.c demux.h \
 dnskey.c dnskey.h \
-dsa.c dsa.h \
-elgamal.c elgamal.h \
 fetch.c fetch.h \
 foodgroups.c foodgroups.h \
-gcryptfix.c gcryptfix.h \
 id.c id.h \
 ike_alg.c ike_alg.h \
 ipsec_doi.c ipsec_doi.h \
@@ -36,23 +32,16 @@ kernel_pfkey.c kernel_pfkey.h \
 keys.c keys.h \
 lex.c lex.h \
 log.c log.h \
-md2.c md2.h \
-md5.c md5.h \
 modecfg.c modecfg.h \
-mp_defs.c mp_defs.h \
 nat_traversal.c nat_traversal.h \
 ocsp.c ocsp.h \
 packet.c packet.h \
 pem.c pem.h \
-pgp.c pgp.h \
-pkcs1.c pkcs1.h \
+pgpcert.c pgpcert.h \
 pkcs7.c pkcs7.h \
 plutomain.c \
-primegen.c smallprime.c \
 rcv_whack.c rcv_whack.h \
-rnd.c rnd.h \
 server.c server.h \
-sha1.c sha1.h \
 smartcard.c smartcard.h \
 spdb.c spdb.h \
 state.c state.h \
@@ -61,22 +50,17 @@ vendor.c vendor.h \
 virtual.c virtual.h \
 xauth.c xauth.h \
 x509.c x509.h \
-alg/ike_alg_aes.c alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c alg/ike_alg_twofish.c \
-alg/ike_alg_serpent.c alg/ike_alg_sha2.c alg/ike_alginit.c \
 rsaref/pkcs11t.h rsaref/pkcs11.h rsaref/unix.h rsaref/pkcs11f.h
 
 _pluto_adns_SOURCES = adns.c adns.h
 
-LIBSTRONGSWANDIR=$(top_srcdir)/src/libstrongswan
+LIBSTRONGSWANDIR=$(top_builddir)/src/libstrongswan
 LIBFREESWANDIR=$(top_builddir)/src/libfreeswan
-LIBCRYPTODIR=$(top_builddir)/src/libcrypto
-
 
 INCLUDES = \
 -I${linuxdir} \
--I$(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)\
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/libstrongswan \
 -I$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan \
--I$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto \
 -I$(top_srcdir)/src/whack
 
 AM_CFLAGS = \
@@ -84,24 +68,23 @@ AM_CFLAGS = \
 -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" \
 -DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" \
 -DSHARED_SECRETS_FILE=\"${confdir}/ipsec.secrets\" \
+-DIPSEC_PLUGINDIR=\"${plugindir}\" \
+-DPLUGINS=\""${pluto_plugins}\"" \
+-DSTRONGSWAN_CONF=\"${strongswan_conf}\" \
 -DKERNEL26_SUPPORT -DKERNEL26_HAS_KAME_DUPLICATES \
 -DPLUTO -DKLIPS -DDEBUG
 
 pluto_LDADD = \
-oid.o \
+$(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/libstrongswan.la \
 $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a \
-$(LIBCRYPTODIR)/libcrypto.a \
--lgmp -lresolv -lpthread -ldl
+-lresolv -lpthread $(DLLIB)
 
 _pluto_adns_LDADD = \
 $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a \
--lresolv -ldl
+-lresolv $(DLLIB)
 
 dist_man_MANS = pluto.8 ipsec.secrets.5
 
-oid.o :	$(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/asn1/oid.c $(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/asn1/oid.h
-		$(COMPILE) -c -o $@ $<
-
 # This compile option activates the sending of a strongSwan VID
 if USE_VENDORID
   AM_CFLAGS += -DVENDORID
@@ -122,23 +105,16 @@ if USE_NAT_TRANSPORT
   AM_CFLAGS += -DI_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
 endif
 
-# This compile option activates dynamic URL fetching using libcurl
-if USE_CURL
-  pluto_LDADD += -lcurl
-  AM_CFLAGS += -DLIBCURL
-endif
-
-# This compile option activates dynamic LDAP CRL fetching
-if USE_LDAP
-  pluto_LDADD += -lldap -llber
-  AM_CFLAGS += -DLIBLDAP
-endif
-
 # This compile option activates smartcard support
 if USE_SMARTCARD
   AM_CFLAGS += -DSMARTCARD
 endif
 
+# This compile option activates the integrity test of libstrongswan
+if USE_INTEGRITY_TEST
+  AM_CFLAGS += -DINTEGRITY_TEST
+endif
+
 if USE_CAPABILITIES
   pluto_LDADD += -lcap
 endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/Makefile.in b/src/pluto/Makefile.in
index 457f93d9f..01bda8540 100644
--- a/src/pluto/Makefile.in
+++ b/src/pluto/Makefile.in
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.10.1 from Makefile.am.
+# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.10.2 from Makefile.am.
 # @configure_input@
 
 # Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
@@ -50,21 +50,16 @@ ipsec_PROGRAMS = pluto$(EXEEXT) _pluto_adns$(EXEEXT)
 # This compile option activates NAT traversal with IPSec transport mode
 @USE_NAT_TRANSPORT_TRUE@am__append_4 = -DI_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
 
-# This compile option activates dynamic URL fetching using libcurl
-@USE_CURL_TRUE@am__append_5 = -lcurl
-@USE_CURL_TRUE@am__append_6 = -DLIBCURL
-
-# This compile option activates dynamic LDAP CRL fetching
-@USE_LDAP_TRUE@am__append_7 = -lldap -llber
-@USE_LDAP_TRUE@am__append_8 = -DLIBLDAP
-
 # This compile option activates smartcard support
-@USE_SMARTCARD_TRUE@am__append_9 = -DSMARTCARD
-@USE_CAPABILITIES_TRUE@am__append_10 = -lcap
-@USE_THREADS_TRUE@am__append_11 = -DTHREADS
+@USE_SMARTCARD_TRUE@am__append_5 = -DSMARTCARD
+
+# This compile option activates the integrity test of libstrongswan
+@USE_INTEGRITY_TEST_TRUE@am__append_6 = -DINTEGRITY_TEST
+@USE_CAPABILITIES_TRUE@am__append_7 = -lcap
+@USE_THREADS_TRUE@am__append_8 = -DTHREADS
 subdir = src/pluto
 DIST_COMMON = $(dist_man_MANS) $(srcdir)/Makefile.am \
-	$(srcdir)/Makefile.in TODO
+	$(srcdir)/Makefile.in
 ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4
 am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/configure.in
 am__configure_deps = $(am__aclocal_m4_deps) $(CONFIGURE_DEPENDENCIES) \
@@ -77,34 +72,28 @@ ipsecPROGRAMS_INSTALL = $(INSTALL_PROGRAM)
 PROGRAMS = $(ipsec_PROGRAMS)
 am__pluto_adns_OBJECTS = adns.$(OBJEXT)
 _pluto_adns_OBJECTS = $(am__pluto_adns_OBJECTS)
-_pluto_adns_DEPENDENCIES = $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a
-am_pluto_OBJECTS = ac.$(OBJEXT) alg_info.$(OBJEXT) asn1.$(OBJEXT) \
-	ca.$(OBJEXT) certs.$(OBJEXT) connections.$(OBJEXT) \
-	constants.$(OBJEXT) cookie.$(OBJEXT) crl.$(OBJEXT) \
-	crypto.$(OBJEXT) db_ops.$(OBJEXT) defs.$(OBJEXT) \
-	demux.$(OBJEXT) dnskey.$(OBJEXT) dsa.$(OBJEXT) \
-	elgamal.$(OBJEXT) fetch.$(OBJEXT) foodgroups.$(OBJEXT) \
-	gcryptfix.$(OBJEXT) id.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg.$(OBJEXT) \
-	ipsec_doi.$(OBJEXT) kernel.$(OBJEXT) kernel_alg.$(OBJEXT) \
-	kernel_netlink.$(OBJEXT) kernel_noklips.$(OBJEXT) \
-	kernel_pfkey.$(OBJEXT) keys.$(OBJEXT) lex.$(OBJEXT) \
-	log.$(OBJEXT) md2.$(OBJEXT) md5.$(OBJEXT) modecfg.$(OBJEXT) \
-	mp_defs.$(OBJEXT) nat_traversal.$(OBJEXT) ocsp.$(OBJEXT) \
-	packet.$(OBJEXT) pem.$(OBJEXT) pgp.$(OBJEXT) pkcs1.$(OBJEXT) \
-	pkcs7.$(OBJEXT) plutomain.$(OBJEXT) primegen.$(OBJEXT) \
-	smallprime.$(OBJEXT) rcv_whack.$(OBJEXT) rnd.$(OBJEXT) \
-	server.$(OBJEXT) sha1.$(OBJEXT) smartcard.$(OBJEXT) \
-	spdb.$(OBJEXT) state.$(OBJEXT) timer.$(OBJEXT) \
-	vendor.$(OBJEXT) virtual.$(OBJEXT) xauth.$(OBJEXT) \
-	x509.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg_aes.$(OBJEXT) \
-	ike_alg_blowfish.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg_twofish.$(OBJEXT) \
-	ike_alg_serpent.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg_sha2.$(OBJEXT) \
-	ike_alginit.$(OBJEXT)
-pluto_OBJECTS = $(am_pluto_OBJECTS)
 am__DEPENDENCIES_1 =
-pluto_DEPENDENCIES = oid.o $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a \
-	$(LIBCRYPTODIR)/libcrypto.a $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) \
-	$(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1)
+_pluto_adns_DEPENDENCIES = $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a \
+	$(am__DEPENDENCIES_1)
+am_pluto_OBJECTS = ac.$(OBJEXT) alg_info.$(OBJEXT) ca.$(OBJEXT) \
+	certs.$(OBJEXT) connections.$(OBJEXT) constants.$(OBJEXT) \
+	cookie.$(OBJEXT) crl.$(OBJEXT) crypto.$(OBJEXT) \
+	db_ops.$(OBJEXT) defs.$(OBJEXT) demux.$(OBJEXT) \
+	dnskey.$(OBJEXT) fetch.$(OBJEXT) foodgroups.$(OBJEXT) \
+	id.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg.$(OBJEXT) ipsec_doi.$(OBJEXT) \
+	kernel.$(OBJEXT) kernel_alg.$(OBJEXT) kernel_netlink.$(OBJEXT) \
+	kernel_noklips.$(OBJEXT) kernel_pfkey.$(OBJEXT) keys.$(OBJEXT) \
+	lex.$(OBJEXT) log.$(OBJEXT) modecfg.$(OBJEXT) \
+	nat_traversal.$(OBJEXT) ocsp.$(OBJEXT) packet.$(OBJEXT) \
+	pem.$(OBJEXT) pgpcert.$(OBJEXT) pkcs7.$(OBJEXT) \
+	plutomain.$(OBJEXT) rcv_whack.$(OBJEXT) server.$(OBJEXT) \
+	smartcard.$(OBJEXT) spdb.$(OBJEXT) state.$(OBJEXT) \
+	timer.$(OBJEXT) vendor.$(OBJEXT) virtual.$(OBJEXT) \
+	xauth.$(OBJEXT) x509.$(OBJEXT)
+pluto_OBJECTS = $(am_pluto_OBJECTS)
+pluto_DEPENDENCIES = $(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/libstrongswan.la \
+	$(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) \
+	$(am__DEPENDENCIES_1)
 DEFAULT_INCLUDES = -I.@am__isrc@
 depcomp = $(SHELL) $(top_srcdir)/depcomp
 am__depfiles_maybe = depfiles
@@ -141,6 +130,7 @@ CPPFLAGS = @CPPFLAGS@
 CYGPATH_W = @CYGPATH_W@
 DEFS = @DEFS@
 DEPDIR = @DEPDIR@
+DLLIB = @DLLIB@
 DSYMUTIL = @DSYMUTIL@
 DUMPBIN = @DUMPBIN@
 ECHO_C = @ECHO_C@
@@ -163,6 +153,9 @@ LDFLAGS = @LDFLAGS@
 LEX = @LEX@
 LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@
 LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT = @LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT@
+LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS = @LIBGCRYPT_CFLAGS@
+LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG = @LIBGCRYPT_CONFIG@
+LIBGCRYPT_LIBS = @LIBGCRYPT_LIBS@
 LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@
 LIBS = @LIBS@
 LIBTOOL = @LIBTOOL@
@@ -174,6 +167,7 @@ MAKEINFO = @MAKEINFO@
 MKDIR_P = @MKDIR_P@
 NM = @NM@
 NMEDIT = @NMEDIT@
+OBJDUMP = @OBJDUMP@
 OBJEXT = @OBJEXT@
 OTOOL = @OTOOL@
 OTOOL64 = @OTOOL64@
@@ -187,6 +181,8 @@ PATH_SEPARATOR = @PATH_SEPARATOR@
 PERL = @PERL@
 PKG_CONFIG = @PKG_CONFIG@
 RANLIB = @RANLIB@
+RUBY = @RUBY@
+RUBYINCLUDE = @RUBYINCLUDE@
 SED = @SED@
 SET_MAKE = @SET_MAKE@
 SHELL = @SHELL@
@@ -247,6 +243,7 @@ oldincludedir = @oldincludedir@
 pdfdir = @pdfdir@
 piddir = @piddir@
 plugindir = @plugindir@
+pluto_plugins = @pluto_plugins@
 prefix = @prefix@
 program_transform_name = @program_transform_name@
 psdir = @psdir@
@@ -258,6 +255,7 @@ srcdir = @srcdir@
 strongswan_conf = @strongswan_conf@
 sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@
 target_alias = @target_alias@
+top_build_prefix = @top_build_prefix@
 top_builddir = @top_builddir@
 top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
 xml_CFLAGS = @xml_CFLAGS@
@@ -265,7 +263,6 @@ xml_LIBS = @xml_LIBS@
 pluto_SOURCES = \
 ac.c ac.h \
 alg_info.c alg_info.h \
-asn1.c asn1.h \
 ca.c ca.h \
 certs.c certs.h \
 connections.c connections.h \
@@ -277,11 +274,8 @@ db_ops.c db_ops.h \
 defs.c defs.h \
 demux.c demux.h \
 dnskey.c dnskey.h \
-dsa.c dsa.h \
-elgamal.c elgamal.h \
 fetch.c fetch.h \
 foodgroups.c foodgroups.h \
-gcryptfix.c gcryptfix.h \
 id.c id.h \
 ike_alg.c ike_alg.h \
 ipsec_doi.c ipsec_doi.h \
@@ -294,23 +288,16 @@ kernel_pfkey.c kernel_pfkey.h \
 keys.c keys.h \
 lex.c lex.h \
 log.c log.h \
-md2.c md2.h \
-md5.c md5.h \
 modecfg.c modecfg.h \
-mp_defs.c mp_defs.h \
 nat_traversal.c nat_traversal.h \
 ocsp.c ocsp.h \
 packet.c packet.h \
 pem.c pem.h \
-pgp.c pgp.h \
-pkcs1.c pkcs1.h \
+pgpcert.c pgpcert.h \
 pkcs7.c pkcs7.h \
 plutomain.c \
-primegen.c smallprime.c \
 rcv_whack.c rcv_whack.h \
-rnd.c rnd.h \
 server.c server.h \
-sha1.c sha1.h \
 smartcard.c smartcard.h \
 spdb.c spdb.h \
 state.c state.h \
@@ -319,34 +306,33 @@ vendor.c vendor.h \
 virtual.c virtual.h \
 xauth.c xauth.h \
 x509.c x509.h \
-alg/ike_alg_aes.c alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c alg/ike_alg_twofish.c \
-alg/ike_alg_serpent.c alg/ike_alg_sha2.c alg/ike_alginit.c \
 rsaref/pkcs11t.h rsaref/pkcs11.h rsaref/unix.h rsaref/pkcs11f.h
 
 _pluto_adns_SOURCES = adns.c adns.h
-LIBSTRONGSWANDIR = $(top_srcdir)/src/libstrongswan
+LIBSTRONGSWANDIR = $(top_builddir)/src/libstrongswan
 LIBFREESWANDIR = $(top_builddir)/src/libfreeswan
-LIBCRYPTODIR = $(top_builddir)/src/libcrypto
 INCLUDES = \
 -I${linuxdir} \
--I$(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)\
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/libstrongswan \
 -I$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan \
--I$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto \
 -I$(top_srcdir)/src/whack
 
 AM_CFLAGS = -DIPSEC_DIR=\"${ipsecdir}\" -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" \
 	-DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" \
 	-DSHARED_SECRETS_FILE=\"${confdir}/ipsec.secrets\" \
-	-DKERNEL26_SUPPORT -DKERNEL26_HAS_KAME_DUPLICATES -DPLUTO \
-	-DKLIPS -DDEBUG $(am__append_1) $(am__append_2) \
-	$(am__append_3) $(am__append_4) $(am__append_6) \
-	$(am__append_8) $(am__append_9) $(am__append_11)
-pluto_LDADD = oid.o $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a \
-	$(LIBCRYPTODIR)/libcrypto.a -lgmp -lresolv -lpthread -ldl \
-	$(am__append_5) $(am__append_7) $(am__append_10)
+	-DIPSEC_PLUGINDIR=\"${plugindir}\" \
+	-DPLUGINS=\""${pluto_plugins}\"" \
+	-DSTRONGSWAN_CONF=\"${strongswan_conf}\" -DKERNEL26_SUPPORT \
+	-DKERNEL26_HAS_KAME_DUPLICATES -DPLUTO -DKLIPS -DDEBUG \
+	$(am__append_1) $(am__append_2) $(am__append_3) \
+	$(am__append_4) $(am__append_5) $(am__append_6) \
+	$(am__append_8)
+pluto_LDADD = $(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/libstrongswan.la \
+	$(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a -lresolv -lpthread $(DLLIB) \
+	$(am__append_7)
 _pluto_adns_LDADD = \
 $(LIBFREESWANDIR)/libfreeswan.a \
--lresolv -ldl
+-lresolv $(DLLIB)
 
 dist_man_MANS = pluto.8 ipsec.secrets.5
 all: all-am
@@ -357,8 +343,8 @@ $(srcdir)/Makefile.in:  $(srcdir)/Makefile.am  $(am__configure_deps)
 	@for dep in $?; do \
 	  case '$(am__configure_deps)' in \
 	    *$$dep*) \
-	      cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh \
-		&& exit 0; \
+	      ( cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh ) \
+	        && { if test -f $@; then exit 0; else break; fi; }; \
 	      exit 1;; \
 	  esac; \
 	done; \
@@ -426,7 +412,6 @@ distclean-compile:
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ac.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/adns.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/alg_info.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/asn1.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ca.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/certs.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/connections.Po@am__quote@
@@ -438,19 +423,10 @@ distclean-compile:
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/defs.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/demux.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/dnskey.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/dsa.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/elgamal.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/fetch.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/foodgroups.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/gcryptfix.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/id.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alg.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ipsec_doi.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/kernel.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/kernel_alg.Po@am__quote@
@@ -460,24 +436,16 @@ distclean-compile:
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/keys.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/lex.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/log.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/md2.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/md5.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/modecfg.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/mp_defs.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/nat_traversal.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/ocsp.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/packet.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pem.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pgp.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pkcs1.Po@am__quote@
+@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pgpcert.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/pkcs7.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/plutomain.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/primegen.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rcv_whack.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/rnd.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/server.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/sha1.Po@am__quote@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/smallprime.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/smartcard.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/spdb.Po@am__quote@
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__include@ @am__quote@./$(DEPDIR)/state.Po@am__quote@
@@ -508,90 +476,6 @@ distclean-compile:
 @AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
 @am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(LTCOMPILE) -c -o $@ $<
 
-ike_alg_aes.o: alg/ike_alg_aes.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_aes.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_aes.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_aes.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_aes.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_aes.c' object='ike_alg_aes.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
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-
-ike_alg_aes.obj: alg/ike_alg_aes.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_aes.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_aes.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_aes.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_aes.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_aes.c'; fi`
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_aes.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_aes.c' object='ike_alg_aes.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_aes.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_aes.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_aes.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_aes.c'; fi`
-
-ike_alg_blowfish.o: alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_blowfish.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_blowfish.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c' object='ike_alg_blowfish.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
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-
-ike_alg_blowfish.obj: alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_blowfish.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_blowfish.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c'; fi`
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_blowfish.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c' object='ike_alg_blowfish.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_blowfish.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c'; fi`
-
-ike_alg_twofish.o: alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_twofish.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_twofish.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_twofish.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_twofish.c' object='ike_alg_twofish.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_twofish.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_twofish.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
-
-ike_alg_twofish.obj: alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_twofish.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_twofish.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_twofish.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_twofish.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c'; fi`
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_twofish.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_twofish.c' object='ike_alg_twofish.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_twofish.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_twofish.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_twofish.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c'; fi`
-
-ike_alg_serpent.o: alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_serpent.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_serpent.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_serpent.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_serpent.c' object='ike_alg_serpent.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_serpent.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_serpent.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
-
-ike_alg_serpent.obj: alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_serpent.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_serpent.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_serpent.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_serpent.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c'; fi`
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_serpent.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_serpent.c' object='ike_alg_serpent.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_serpent.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_serpent.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_serpent.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c'; fi`
-
-ike_alg_sha2.o: alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_sha2.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_sha2.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_sha2.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_sha2.c' object='ike_alg_sha2.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_sha2.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alg_sha2.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
-
-ike_alg_sha2.obj: alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alg_sha2.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Tpo -c -o ike_alg_sha2.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_sha2.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_sha2.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c'; fi`
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alg_sha2.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alg_sha2.c' object='ike_alg_sha2.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alg_sha2.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alg_sha2.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alg_sha2.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c'; fi`
-
-ike_alginit.o: alg/ike_alginit.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alginit.o -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Tpo -c -o ike_alginit.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alginit.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alginit.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alginit.c' object='ike_alginit.o' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alginit.o `test -f 'alg/ike_alginit.c' || echo '$(srcdir)/'`alg/ike_alginit.c
-
-ike_alginit.obj: alg/ike_alginit.c
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -MT ike_alginit.obj -MD -MP -MF $(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Tpo -c -o ike_alginit.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alginit.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alginit.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alginit.c'; fi`
-@am__fastdepCC_TRUE@	mv -f $(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Tpo $(DEPDIR)/ike_alginit.Po
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	source='alg/ike_alginit.c' object='ike_alginit.obj' libtool=no @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@AMDEP_TRUE@@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	DEPDIR=$(DEPDIR) $(CCDEPMODE) $(depcomp) @AMDEPBACKSLASH@
-@am__fastdepCC_FALSE@	$(CC) $(DEFS) $(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) -c -o ike_alginit.obj `if test -f 'alg/ike_alginit.c'; then $(CYGPATH_W) 'alg/ike_alginit.c'; else $(CYGPATH_W) '$(srcdir)/alg/ike_alginit.c'; fi`
-
 mostlyclean-libtool:
 	-rm -f *.lo
 
@@ -608,8 +492,8 @@ install-man5: $(man5_MANS) $(man_MANS)
 	  esac; \
 	done; \
 	for i in $$list; do \
-	  if test -f $(srcdir)/$$i; then file=$(srcdir)/$$i; \
-	  else file=$$i; fi; \
+	  if test -f $$i; then file=$$i; \
+	  else file=$(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
 	  ext=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/^.*\\.//'`; \
 	  case "$$ext" in \
 	    5*) ;; \
@@ -653,8 +537,8 @@ install-man8: $(man8_MANS) $(man_MANS)
 	  esac; \
 	done; \
 	for i in $$list; do \
-	  if test -f $(srcdir)/$$i; then file=$(srcdir)/$$i; \
-	  else file=$$i; fi; \
+	  if test -f $$i; then file=$$i; \
+	  else file=$(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
 	  ext=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/^.*\\.//'`; \
 	  case "$$ext" in \
 	    8*) ;; \
@@ -693,7 +577,7 @@ ID: $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)
 	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
 	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
 	  done | \
-	  $(AWK) '{ files[$$0] = 1; nonemtpy = 1; } \
+	  $(AWK) '{ files[$$0] = 1; nonempty = 1; } \
 	      END { if (nonempty) { for (i in files) print i; }; }'`; \
 	mkid -fID $$unique
 tags: TAGS
@@ -871,9 +755,6 @@ uninstall-man: uninstall-man5 uninstall-man8
 	uninstall-ipsecPROGRAMS uninstall-man uninstall-man5 \
 	uninstall-man8
 
-
-oid.o :	$(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/asn1/oid.c $(LIBSTRONGSWANDIR)/asn1/oid.h
-		$(COMPILE) -c -o $@ $<
 # Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
 # Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
 .NOEXPORT:
diff --git a/src/pluto/TODO b/src/pluto/TODO
deleted file mode 100644
index 1c22b2f5c..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/TODO
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-Pluto TODO list
-===============
-RCSID $Id: TODO 3269 2007-10-08 20:03:02Z andreas $
-
-- should all log entries that are for errors say ERROR?
-
-- Add a "plug-in" facility so that others can add features without
-  changing the mainline code.  This is how X509/LDAP/biometric stuff
-  might be added.
-
-- (internal change only) routines for outputting payloads should plug
-  "np" into the previous payload so that a payload generating routine
-  need not know what the next payload will be.  This may be more bother
-  than it is worth.
-
-- notifications, in and out
-  + delete
-  + first contact
-  + last contact? (not part of drafts, but would be nice)
-
-- Make DNS usage for asynchronous (non-blocking)
-  + looking up KEY and TXT records during negotiation
-  + perhaps not for whack command arguments and ipsec.secrets since the
-    library code uses gethostbyname
-
-- check that ipsec auto and whack to agree on what is worth reporting
-
-- Should Pluto (rather than ipsec manual) install %passthrough conns?
-  That way Pluto would know of them.
-
-- For responding to Road Warriors, how can we decide if the RW has
-  gone away?  The rekeying event is perhaps too imprecise.  Even if
-  rekeying event is good enough, how do we know if the route should be
-  torn down?  Perhaps limiting a Phase 1 ID to one IP address would
-  help (limiting a client subnet to one peer already helps).  Perhaps
-  (in some rate-limited way) we can take an ICMP host unreachable
-  as a hint to do some authenticated and reliable probe.
-
-- it is annoying that Pluto and auto have different models for public keys.
-  + auto specifies one per connection
-  + Pluto allows one to be specified per id
-  Two connections with the same id are going to use the same key:
-  the one of the last conn to be added!
-
-  I think auto ought to be fixed.  It is hard for Pluto to warn when
-  there is a conflict since the deletion of a connection doesn't
-  prompt auto to tell pluto to delete the public key.
-
-- different connections with the same host IP addresses are randomly
-  interchangeable until the ID payload is received.  At least for the
-  Responder case (and eventually for the opportunistic Initiator).
-  Worse, all Road Warriors must be considered to have the
-  indistinguishable IP addresses.  This affects ISAKMP SA negotiation.
-  Currently, there is little flexibility in this negotiation, so the
-  problem is limited to the specification of acceptable authentication
-  method(s).  Correct, but more work than seems worthwhile, would be
-  to select the conn based on what is proposed.
-
-  Warning about such confusion at connection definition time isn't great
-  because there is no confusion when explicitly initiated (a particular
-  conn is specified).  Warning for a Road Warrior conn is possible
-  since it cannot be initiated (and has been implemented).
-
-- characterize and ameliorate DOS attacks.  Lots of rate limiting.
-
-- look at John Denker's wish list: http://www.quintillion.com/moat/wish.list
-
-- use of random numbers needs to be audited.
-
-- unknown (not just unimplemented) transforms cause a negotiation to
-  fail.  Only the transform should be rejected.
-
-- we need better policy control.  Our present flags need to be
-  modulated (forbid, allow, offer, require)
-
-- HS will specify how --copyright and --version should behave
-
-- HS will initiate project-wide terminology replacing ISAKMP SA, IPSEC
-  SA, Protection Suite, Phase 1, Main Mode, Phase 2, Quick Mode, ...
-  Simplicity and clarity will be a goal.
-
-- interface discovery ought to match what is specified in ipsec.conf.
-  This probably means grokking /proc/net/ipsec_tncfg.  Documented in
-  ipsec_tncfg(5).  This won't do for Hugh's debugging setup.
-
-
-Protocol Issues
-===============
-
-Notification and delete payloads seem to be "escape hatches" for the
-protocols.  As such, anything implemented using them seems to be
-kludged without being well designed or well situated or well
-constrained in the protocols.  Often the precise meaning (if any) or
-usage is under specified.  An implementation is allowed to ignore
-them, so they cannot really matter (but they too often do).  Their
-specification ought to be scrutinized by a protocol guru.
-
-Any extra payload in last main mode message is not protected (not
-authenticated by hash).
-
-Should notification payloads be interpreted before or after the normal
-payloads (i.e. understood in the context of, executed in the context of).
-
-What is the precise result of an INITIAL_CONNECTION?  What is a
-"system" (eg. does Phase 1 Identity count)?  What is "earlier" or
-"before" (simultaneous negotiation is possible, with time being only a
-partial order)?  Could it be used for FINAL_CONTACT (needed too)?
-
-Blasting out a pile of UDP messages, especially to a particular
-destination, is likely to provoke message loss.  The exchanges are
-just that, so they individually are self-throttling.  But what about
-multiple exchanges simultaneously?  What about notifications (example:
-when shutting down, a flurry of delete notifications are likely).
-Should the RFCs be designed to protect against this problem?
-
-draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-03.txt rekeying is way too complicated.
-Our solution looks sound and simple (we have the Responder install the
-incoming IPSEC SA before sending its first reply).  In "2.2.1.4
-Responder Pre-Set-up Security Hole", the draft claims that setting up
-the IPSEC SA early leaves the Responder open to replay attacks.  I
-think that this is wrong: the Message Id, since it must not be reused,
-serves to prove that this isn't a replay.
-
-The details for notification messages suggested by
-draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-02.txt are over-complicated, just to make
-them machine-comprehensible.  I think this is over-engineering,
-justified only if another level of negotiation is contemplated (ugh!).
-Plain text is probably sufficient for informing humans (I admit that
-there is a problem with I18N).
diff --git a/src/pluto/ac.c b/src/pluto/ac.c
index 6745ff484..3b5df9738 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ac.c
+++ b/src/pluto/ac.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ac.c 4632 2008-11-11 18:37:19Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -25,10 +23,11 @@
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
+#include <utils.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
 #include <asn1/oid.h>
+
 #include "ac.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "crl.h"
@@ -38,971 +37,947 @@
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 
-/* chained list of X.509 attribute certificates */
-
+/**
+ * Chained list of X.509 attribute certificates
+ */
 static x509acert_t *x509acerts   = NULL;
 
-/* chained list of ietfAttributes */
-
+/**
+ * Chained list of ietfAttributes
+ */
 static ietfAttrList_t *ietfAttributes = NULL;
 
-/* ASN.1 definition of ietfAttrSyntax */
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of ietfAttrSyntax
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t ietfAttrSyntaxObjects[] =
 {
-  { 0, "ietfAttrSyntax",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "policyAuthority",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
-  { 1,   "values",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /*  3 */
-  { 2,     "octets",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 2,     "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  5 */
-  { 2,     "oid",			ASN1_OID,	      ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
-  { 2,     "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
-  { 2,     "string",			ASN1_UTF8STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
-  { 2,     "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
-  { 1,   "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,	      ASN1_END  }  /* 10 */
+	{ 0, "ietfAttrSyntax",                ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "policyAuthority",             ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT |
+																ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",                     ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
+	{ 1,   "values",                      ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /*  3 */
+	{ 2,     "octets",                    ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_OPT |
+																ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+	{ 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  5 */
+	{ 2,     "oid",                       ASN1_OID,             ASN1_OPT |
+																ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
+	{ 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
+	{ 2,     "string",                    ASN1_UTF8STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
+																ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+	{ 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+	{ 1,   "end loop",                    ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 10 */
+	{ 0, "exit",                          ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_EXIT }
 };
 
-#define IETF_ATTR_OCTETS	 4
-#define IETF_ATTR_OID		 6
-#define IETF_ATTR_STRING	 8
-#define IETF_ATTR_ROOF		11
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of roleSyntax */
+#define IETF_ATTR_OCTETS         4
+#define IETF_ATTR_OID            6
+#define IETF_ATTR_STRING         8
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of roleSyntax
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t roleSyntaxObjects[] =
 {
-  { 0, "roleSyntax",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "roleAuthority",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
-  { 1,   "roleName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OBJ  }  /*  3 */
+	{ 0, "roleSyntax",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_NONE }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "roleAuthority",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	ASN1_OPT |
+												ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 1 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END  }, /* 2 */
+	{ 1,   "roleName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,	ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 3 */
+	{ 0, "exit",			ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_EXIT }
 };
 
-#define ROLE_ROOF		4
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of an X509 attribute certificate */
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of an X509 attribute certificate
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t acObjects[] =
 {
-  { 0, "AttributeCertificate",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "AttributeCertificateInfo",    ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,	   "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,	      ASN1_DEF |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,	   "holder",                    ASN1_SEQUENCE,	      ASN1_NONE }, /*  3 */
-  { 3,	     "baseCertificateID",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT  }, /*  4 */
-  { 4,	       "issuer",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,	      ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
-  { 4,	       "serial",		ASN1_INTEGER,	      ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
-  { 4,         "issuerUID",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
-                                                              ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
-  { 4,         "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  8 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
-  { 3,	     "entityName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
-  { 3,	     "objectDigestInfo",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 12 */
-  { 4,	       "digestedObjectType",	ASN1_ENUMERATED,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 13*/
-  { 4,	       "otherObjectTypeID",	ASN1_OID,    	      ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
-  { 4,         "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 15*/
-  { 4,         "digestAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 16 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 17 */
-  { 2,	   "v2Form",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 18 */
-  { 3,	     "issuerName",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OPT |
-                                                              ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 19 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
-  { 3,	     "baseCertificateID",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 21 */
-  { 4,	       "issuerSerial",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 22 */
-  { 5,	         "issuer",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,	      ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 23 */
-  { 5,	  	 "serial",		ASN1_INTEGER,	      ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
-  { 5,           "issuerUID",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
-                                                              ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
-  { 5,           "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 27 */
-  { 3,       "objectDigestInfo",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 28 */
-  { 4,	       "digestInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 29 */
-  { 5,  	 "digestedObjectType",	ASN1_ENUMERATED,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 30 */
-  { 5,	  	 "otherObjectTypeID",	ASN1_OID,    	      ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /* 31 */
-  { 5,           "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 32 */
-  { 5,           "digestAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 33 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 34 */
-  { 2,	   "signature",                 ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 35 */
-  { 2,	   "serialNumber",              ASN1_INTEGER,         ASN1_BODY }, /* 36 */
-  { 2,	   "attrCertValidityPeriod",    ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 37 */
-  { 3,	     "notBeforeTime",           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 38 */
-  { 3,	     "notAfterTime",            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 39 */
-  { 2,	   "attributes",                ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 40 */
-  { 3,       "attribute",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 41 */
-  { 4,         "type",			ASN1_OID,             ASN1_BODY }, /* 42 */
-  { 4,         "values",		ASN1_SET, 	      ASN1_LOOP }, /* 43 */
-  { 5,           "value",		ASN1_EOC, 	      ASN1_RAW  }, /* 44 */
-  { 4, 	       "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,	      ASN1_END  }, /* 45 */
-  { 2,     "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 46 */
-  { 2,     "extensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 47 */
-  { 3,       "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 48 */
-  { 4,         "extnID",		ASN1_OID,             ASN1_BODY }, /* 49 */
-  { 4,         "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,         ASN1_DEF |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /* 50 */
-  { 4,         "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_BODY }, /* 51 */
-  { 2,     "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 52 */
-  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 53 */
-  { 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }  /* 54 */
+	{ 0, "AttributeCertificate",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "AttributeCertificateInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+	{ 2,	   "version",					ASN1_INTEGER,		  ASN1_DEF |
+																  ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+	{ 2,	   "holder",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_NONE }, /*  3 */
+	{ 3,	     "baseCertificateID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	  ASN1_OPT  }, /*  4 */
+	{ 4,	       "issuer",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
+	{ 4,	       "serial",				ASN1_INTEGER,		  ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
+	{ 4,         "issuerUID",				ASN1_BIT_STRING,	  ASN1_OPT |
+																  ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
+	{ 4,         "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /*  8 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+	{ 3,	   "entityName",				ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,	  ASN1_OPT |
+																  ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
+	{ 3,	     "objectDigestInfo",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,	  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 12 */
+	{ 4,	       "digestedObjectType",	ASN1_ENUMERATED,	  ASN1_BODY }, /* 13 */
+	{ 4,	       "otherObjectTypeID",		ASN1_OID,			  ASN1_OPT |
+																  ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+	{ 4,         "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 15 */
+	{ 4,         "digestAlgorithm",			ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_RAW  }, /* 16 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 17 */
+	{ 2,	   "v2Form",					ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	  ASN1_NONE }, /* 18 */
+	{ 3,	     "issuerName",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_OPT |
+																  ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 19 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
+	{ 3,	     "baseCertificateID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 21 */
+	{ 4,	       "issuerSerial",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_NONE }, /* 22 */
+	{ 5,	         "issuer",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 23 */
+	{ 5,	  	 "serial",					ASN1_INTEGER,		  ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
+	{ 5,           "issuerUID",				ASN1_BIT_STRING,	  ASN1_OPT |
+																  ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
+	{ 5,           "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 27 */
+	{ 3,       "objectDigestInfo",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,	  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 28 */
+	{ 4,	       "digestInfo",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 29 */
+	{ 5,  	 "digestedObjectType",			ASN1_ENUMERATED,	  ASN1_BODY }, /* 30 */
+	{ 5,	  	 "otherObjectTypeID",		ASN1_OID,			  ASN1_OPT |
+																  ASN1_BODY }, /* 31 */
+	{ 5,           "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 32 */
+	{ 5,           "digestAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_RAW  }, /* 33 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 34 */
+	{ 2,	   "signature",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_RAW  }, /* 35 */
+	{ 2,	   "serialNumber",				ASN1_INTEGER,		  ASN1_BODY }, /* 36 */
+	{ 2,	   "attrCertValidityPeriod",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_NONE }, /* 37 */
+	{ 3,	     "notBeforeTime",			ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 38 */
+	{ 3,	     "notAfterTime",			ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 39 */
+	{ 2,	   "attributes",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_LOOP }, /* 40 */
+	{ 3,       "attribute",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_NONE }, /* 41 */
+	{ 4,         "type",					ASN1_OID,			  ASN1_BODY }, /* 42 */
+	{ 4,         "values",					ASN1_SET, 			  ASN1_LOOP }, /* 43 */
+	{ 5,           "value",					ASN1_EOC, 			  ASN1_RAW  }, /* 44 */
+	{ 4, 	       "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 45 */
+	{ 2,     "end loop",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 46 */
+	{ 2,     "extensions",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_LOOP }, /* 47 */
+	{ 3,       "extension",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,		  ASN1_NONE }, /* 48 */
+	{ 4,         "extnID",					ASN1_OID,			  ASN1_BODY }, /* 49 */
+	{ 4,         "critical",				ASN1_BOOLEAN,		  ASN1_DEF |
+																  ASN1_BODY }, /* 50 */
+	{ 4,         "extnValue",				ASN1_OCTET_STRING,	  ASN1_BODY }, /* 51 */
+	{ 2,     "end loop",					ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_END  }, /* 52 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",			ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_RAW  }, /* 53 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureValue",				ASN1_BIT_STRING,	  ASN1_BODY }, /* 54 */
+	{ 0, "exit",							ASN1_EOC,			  ASN1_EXIT }
 };
 
-#define AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE		 0
-#define AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_INFO		 1
-#define AC_OBJ_VERSION			 2
-#define AC_OBJ_HOLDER_ISSUER		 5
-#define AC_OBJ_HOLDER_SERIAL		 6
-#define AC_OBJ_ENTITY_NAME		10
-#define AC_OBJ_ISSUER_NAME		19
-#define AC_OBJ_ISSUER			23
-#define AC_OBJ_SIG_ALG			35
-#define AC_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER		36
-#define AC_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE		38
-#define AC_OBJ_NOT_AFTER		39
-#define AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE		42
-#define AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE		44
-#define AC_OBJ_EXTN_ID			49
-#define AC_OBJ_CRITICAL			50
-#define AC_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE		51
-#define AC_OBJ_ALGORITHM		53
-#define AC_OBJ_SIGNATURE		54
-#define AC_OBJ_ROOF			55
+#define AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE               0
+#define AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_INFO          1
+#define AC_OBJ_VERSION                   2
+#define AC_OBJ_HOLDER_ISSUER             5
+#define AC_OBJ_HOLDER_SERIAL             6
+#define AC_OBJ_ENTITY_NAME              10
+#define AC_OBJ_ISSUER_NAME              19
+#define AC_OBJ_ISSUER                   23
+#define AC_OBJ_SIG_ALG                  35
+#define AC_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER            36
+#define AC_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE               38
+#define AC_OBJ_NOT_AFTER                39
+#define AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE           42
+#define AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE          44
+#define AC_OBJ_EXTN_ID                  49
+#define AC_OBJ_CRITICAL                 50
+#define AC_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE               51
+#define AC_OBJ_ALGORITHM                53
+#define AC_OBJ_SIGNATURE                54
 
 const x509acert_t empty_ac = {
-      NULL     , /* *next */
-            0  , /* installed */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /* certificate */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*   certificateInfo */
-            1  , /*     version */
-		 /*     holder */
-		 /*       baseCertificateID */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*         holderIssuer */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*         holderSerial */
-		 /*       entityName */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*         generalNames */
-		 /*     v2Form */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*       issuerName */
-                 /*     signature */
-    OID_UNKNOWN, /*       sigAlg */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*     serialNumber */
-                 /*     attrCertValidityPeriod */
-            0  , /*       notBefore */
-            0  , /*       notAfter */
-		 /*     attributes */
-      NULL     , /*       charging */
-      NULL     , /*       groups */
-		 /*     extensions */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*       authKeyID */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*       authKeySerialNumber */
-      FALSE    , /*       noRevAvail */
-		 /*   signatureAlgorithm */
-    OID_UNKNOWN, /*     algorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /*   signature */
+	  NULL     , /* *next */
+			0  , /* installed */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /* certificate */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*   certificateInfo */
+			1  , /*     version */
+				 /*     holder */
+				 /*       baseCertificateID */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*         holderIssuer */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*         holderSerial */
+				 /*       entityName */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*         generalNames */
+				 /*     v2Form */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*       issuerName */
+				 /*     signature */
+	OID_UNKNOWN, /*       sigAlg */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*     serialNumber */
+				 /*     attrCertValidityPeriod */
+			0  , /*       notBefore */
+			0  , /*       notAfter */
+				 /*     attributes */
+	  NULL     , /*       charging */
+	  NULL     , /*       groups */
+				 /*     extensions */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*       authKeyID */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*       authKeySerialNumber */
+	  FALSE    , /*       noRevAvail */
+				 /*   signatureAlgorithm */
+	OID_UNKNOWN, /*     algorithm */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /*   signature */
 };
 
 
-/*  compare two ietfAttributes, returns zero if a equals b
+/**
+ *  compare two ietfAttributes, returns zero if a equals b
  *  negative/positive if a is earlier/later in the alphabet than b
  */
-static int
-cmp_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t *a,ietfAttr_t *b)
+static int cmp_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t *a,ietfAttr_t *b)
 {
-    int cmp_len, len, cmp_value;
+	int cmp_len, len, cmp_value;
 
-    /* cannot compare OID with STRING or OCTETS attributes */
-    if (a->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID && b->kind != IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID)
-	return 1;
-	
-    cmp_len = a->value.len - b->value.len;
-    len = (cmp_len < 0)? a->value.len : b->value.len;
-    cmp_value = memcmp(a->value.ptr, b->value.ptr, len);
+	/* cannot compare OID with STRING or OCTETS attributes */
+	if (a->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID && b->kind != IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID)
+		return 1;
+		
+	cmp_len = a->value.len - b->value.len;
+	len = (cmp_len < 0)? a->value.len : b->value.len;
+	cmp_value = memcmp(a->value.ptr, b->value.ptr, len);
 
-    return (cmp_value == 0)? cmp_len : cmp_value;
+	return (cmp_value == 0)? cmp_len : cmp_value;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  add an ietfAttribute to the chained list
  */
-static ietfAttr_t*
-add_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t *attr)
+static ietfAttr_t* add_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t *attr)
 {
-    ietfAttrList_t **listp = &ietfAttributes;
-    ietfAttrList_t *list = *listp;
-    int cmp = -1;
-
-    while (list != NULL)
-    {
-	cmp = cmp_ietfAttr(attr, list->attr);
-	if (cmp <= 0)
-	    break;
-	listp = &list->next;
-	list = *listp;
-    }
-
-    if (cmp == 0)
-    {
-	/* attribute already exists, increase count */
-	pfree(attr);
-	list->attr->count++;
-	return list->attr;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
-
-	/* new attribute, unshare value */
-	attr->value.ptr = clone_bytes(attr->value.ptr, attr->value.len
-	    , "attr value");
-	attr->count = 1;
-	time(&attr->installed);
-
-	el->attr = attr;
-	el->next = list;
-	*listp = el;
-
-	return attr;
-    }
+	ietfAttrList_t **listp = &ietfAttributes;
+	ietfAttrList_t *list = *listp;
+	int cmp = -1;
+
+	while (list != NULL)
+	{
+		cmp = cmp_ietfAttr(attr, list->attr);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+		listp = &list->next;
+		list = *listp;
+	}
+
+	if (cmp == 0)
+	{
+		/* attribute already exists, increase count */
+		free(attr);
+		list->attr->count++;
+		return list->attr;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		ietfAttrList_t *el = malloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t);
+
+		/* new attribute, unshare value */
+		attr->value = chunk_clone(attr->value);
+		attr->count = 1;
+		time(&attr->installed);
+
+		el->attr = attr;
+		el->next = list;
+		*listp = el;
+
+		return attr;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * decodes a comma separated list of group attributes
  */
-void
-decode_groups(char *groups, ietfAttrList_t **listp)
+void decode_groups(char *groups, ietfAttrList_t **listp)
 {
-    if (groups == NULL)
-	return;
+	if (groups == NULL)
+		return;
 
-    while (strlen(groups) > 0)
-    {
-	char *end;
-	char *next = strchr(groups, ',');
+	while (strlen(groups) > 0)
+	{
+		char *end;
+		char *next = strchr(groups, ',');
 
-	if (next == NULL)
-	   end = next = groups + strlen(groups);
-	else
-	   end = next++;
+		if (next == NULL)
+		   end = next = groups + strlen(groups);
+		else
+		   end = next++;
 
-	/* eat preceeding whitespace */
-	while (groups < end && *groups == ' ')
-	    groups++;
+		/* eat preceeding whitespace */
+		while (groups < end && *groups == ' ')
+			groups++;
 
-	/* eat trailing whitespace */
-	while (end > groups && *(end-1) == ' ')
-	    end--;
+		/* eat trailing whitespace */
+		while (end > groups && *(end-1) == ' ')
+			end--;
 
-	if (groups < end)
-	{
-	    ietfAttr_t *attr   = alloc_thing(ietfAttr_t, "ietfAttr");
-	    ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
+		if (groups < end)
+		{
+			ietfAttr_t *attr   = malloc_thing(ietfAttr_t);
+			ietfAttrList_t *el = malloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t);
 
-	    attr->kind  = IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING;
-	    attr->value.ptr = groups;
-	    attr->value.len = end - groups;
-	    attr->count = 0;
+			attr->kind  = IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING;
+			attr->value.ptr = groups;
+			attr->value.len = end - groups;
+			attr->count = 0;
 
-	    el->attr = add_ietfAttr(attr);
-	    el->next = *listp;
-	    *listp = el;
-	}
+			el->attr = add_ietfAttr(attr);
+			el->next = *listp;
+			*listp = el;
+		}
 
-	groups = next;
-    }
+		groups = next;
+	}
 }
 
-static bool
-same_attribute(const ietfAttr_t *a, const ietfAttr_t *b)
+static bool same_attribute(const ietfAttr_t *a, const ietfAttr_t *b)
 {
-    return (a->kind == b->kind && a->value.len == b->value.len
-	   && memcmp(a->value.ptr, b->value.ptr, b->value.len) == 0);
+	return (a->kind == b->kind && a->value.len == b->value.len
+		   && memeq(a->value.ptr, b->value.ptr, b->value.len));
 }
 
-bool
-group_membership(const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list
-	       , const char *conn
-	       , const ietfAttrList_t *conn_list)
+bool group_membership(const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list
+			   , const char *conn
+			   , const ietfAttrList_t *conn_list)
 {
-    if (conn_list == NULL)
-	return TRUE;
-
-    while (peer_list != NULL)
-    {
-	const ietfAttr_t *peer_attr = peer_list->attr;
-	const ietfAttrList_t *list = conn_list;
+	if (conn_list == NULL)
+		return TRUE;
 
-	while (list != NULL)
+	while (peer_list != NULL)
 	{
-	    ietfAttr_t *conn_attr = list->attr;
+		const ietfAttr_t *peer_attr = peer_list->attr;
+		const ietfAttrList_t *list = conn_list;
 
-	    if (same_attribute(conn_attr, peer_attr))
-	    {
+		while (list != NULL)
+		{
+			ietfAttr_t *conn_attr = list->attr;
+
+			if (same_attribute(conn_attr, peer_attr))
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("%s: peer matches group '%.*s'"
+						, conn
+						, (int)peer_attr->value.len, peer_attr->value.ptr)
+				)
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			list = list->next;
+		}
+		peer_list = peer_list->next;
+	}
 		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("%s: peer matches group '%.*s'"
-			, conn
-			, (int)peer_attr->value.len, peer_attr->value.ptr)
+			DBG_log("%s: peer doesn't match any group", conn)
 		)
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    list = list->next;
-	}
-	peer_list = peer_list->next;
-    }
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("%s: peer doesn't match any group", conn)
-	)
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-
-void
-unshare_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t **listp)
+void unshare_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t **listp)
 {
-    ietfAttrList_t *list = *listp;
-
-    while (list != NULL)
-    {
-	ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
-
-	el->attr = list->attr;
-	el->attr->count++;
-	el->next = NULL;
-	*listp = el;
-	listp = &el->next;
-	list = list->next;
-    }
+	ietfAttrList_t *list = *listp;
+
+	while (list != NULL)
+	{
+		ietfAttrList_t *el = malloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t);
+
+		el->attr = list->attr;
+		el->attr->count++;
+		el->next = NULL;
+		*listp = el;
+		listp = &el->next;
+		list = list->next;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- * parses ietfAttrSyntax
+/**
+ * Parses ietfAttrSyntax
  */
-static ietfAttrList_t*
-parse_ietfAttrSyntax(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static ietfAttrList_t* parse_ietfAttrSyntax(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    ietfAttrList_t *list = NULL;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
 
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	ietfAttrList_t *list = NULL;
 
-    while (objectID < IETF_ATTR_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(ietfAttrSyntaxObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return NULL;
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(ietfAttrSyntaxObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 
-	switch (objectID)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	case IETF_ATTR_OCTETS:
-	case IETF_ATTR_OID:
-	case IETF_ATTR_STRING:
-	    {
-		ietfAttr_t *attr   = alloc_thing(ietfAttr_t, "ietfAttr");
-		ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
-
-		attr->kind  = (objectID - IETF_ATTR_OCTETS) / 2;
-		attr->value = object;
-		attr->count = 0;
-
-		el->attr = add_ietfAttr(attr);
-		el->next = list;
-		list = el;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+		case IETF_ATTR_OCTETS:
+		case IETF_ATTR_OID:
+		case IETF_ATTR_STRING:
+			{
+				ietfAttr_t *attr   = malloc_thing(ietfAttr_t);
+				ietfAttrList_t *el = malloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t);
+
+				attr->kind  = (objectID - IETF_ATTR_OCTETS) / 2;
+				attr->value = object;
+				attr->count = 0;
+
+				el->attr = add_ietfAttr(attr);
+				el->next = list;
+				list = el;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return list;
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return list;
 }
-/*
- * parses roleSyntax
+
+/**
+ * Parses roleSyntax
  */
-static void
-parse_roleSyntax(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static void parse_roleSyntax(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
 
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(roleSyntaxObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 
-    while (objectID < ROLE_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(roleSyntaxObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	default:
-	    break;
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+			default:
+				break;
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
+	parser->destroy(parser);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Parses an X.509 attribute certificate
  */
-bool
-parse_ac(chunk_t blob, x509acert_t *ac)
+bool parse_ac(chunk_t blob, x509acert_t *ac)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    bool critical;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    int type = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, 0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	int type = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+	bool critical;
 
-    while (objectID < AC_OBJ_ROOF) {
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(acObjects, blob);
 
-	if (!extract_object(acObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		u_int level = parser->get_level(parser)+1;
 
-	/* those objects which will parsed further need the next higher level */
-	level++;
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+		case AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE:
+			ac->certificate = object;
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_INFO:
+			ac->certificateInfo = object;
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_VERSION:
+			ac->version = (object.len) ? (1 + (u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  v%d", ac->version);
+			)
+			if (ac->version != 2)
+			{
+				plog("v%d attribute certificates are not supported"
+					, ac->version);
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_HOLDER_ISSUER:
+			ac->holderIssuer = get_directoryName(object, level, FALSE);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_HOLDER_SERIAL:
+			ac->holderSerial = object;
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_ENTITY_NAME:
+			ac->entityName = get_directoryName(object, level, TRUE);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_ISSUER_NAME:
+			ac->issuerName = get_directoryName(object, level, FALSE);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
+			ac->sigAlg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+			ac->serialNumber = object;
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE:
+			ac->notBefore = asn1_to_time(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_NOT_AFTER:
+			ac->notAfter = asn1_to_time(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE:
+			type = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
+			{
+				switch (type) {
+				case OID_AUTHENTICATION_INFO:
+					DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+						DBG_log("  need to parse authenticationInfo")
+					)
+					break;
+				case OID_ACCESS_IDENTITY:
+					DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+						DBG_log("  need to parse accessIdentity")
+					)
+					break;
+				case OID_CHARGING_IDENTITY:
+					ac->charging = parse_ietfAttrSyntax(object, level);
+					break;
+				case OID_GROUP:
+					ac->groups = parse_ietfAttrSyntax(object, level);
+					break;
+				case OID_ROLE:
+					parse_roleSyntax(object, level);
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
+			extn_oid = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_CRITICAL:
+			critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+			)
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
+			{
+				switch (extn_oid) {
+				case OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS:
+					DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+						DBG_log("  need to parse crlDistributionPoints")
+					)
+					break;
+				case OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID:
+					parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
+						, &ac->authKeyID, &ac->authKeySerialNumber);
+					break;
+				case OID_TARGET_INFORMATION:
+					DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+						DBG_log("  need to parse targetInformation")
+					)
+					break;
+				case OID_NO_REV_AVAIL:
+					ac->noRevAvail = TRUE;
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
+			ac->algorithm = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case AC_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
+			ac->signature = object;
+			break;
 
-	switch (objectID)
-	{
-	case AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE:
-	    ac->certificate = object;
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_INFO:
-	    ac->certificateInfo = object;
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_VERSION:
-	    ac->version = (object.len) ? (1 + (u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  v%d", ac->version);
-	    )
-	    if (ac->version != 2)
-	    {
-		plog("v%d attribute certificates are not supported"
-		    , ac->version);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_HOLDER_ISSUER:
-	    ac->holderIssuer = get_directoryName(object, level, FALSE);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_HOLDER_SERIAL:
-	    ac->holderSerial = object;
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_ENTITY_NAME:
-	    ac->entityName = get_directoryName(object, level, TRUE);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_ISSUER_NAME:
-	    ac->issuerName = get_directoryName(object, level, FALSE);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
-	    ac->sigAlg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER:
-	    ac->serialNumber = object;
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE:
-	    ac->notBefore = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_NOT_AFTER:
-	    ac->notAfter = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE:
-	    type = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
-	    {
-		switch (type) {
-		case OID_AUTHENTICATION_INFO:
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("  need to parse authenticationInfo")
-		    )
-		    break;
-		case OID_ACCESS_IDENTITY:
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("  need to parse accessIdentity")
-		    )
-		    break;
-		case OID_CHARGING_IDENTITY:
-		    ac->charging = parse_ietfAttrSyntax(object, level);
-		    break;
-		case OID_GROUP:
-		    ac->groups = parse_ietfAttrSyntax(object, level);
-		    break;
-		case OID_ROLE:
-		    parse_roleSyntax(object, level);
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
-	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_CRITICAL:
-	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
-	    {
-		switch (extn_oid) {
-		case OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS:
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("  need to parse crlDistributionPoints")
-		    )
-		    break;
-		case OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID:
-		    parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
-			, &ac->authKeyID, &ac->authKeySerialNumber);
-		    break;
-		case OID_TARGET_INFORMATION:
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("  need to parse targetInformation")
-		    )
-		    break;
-		case OID_NO_REV_AVAIL:
-		    ac->noRevAvail = TRUE;
-		    break;
 		default:
-		    break;
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
-	    ac->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case AC_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
-	    ac->signature = object;
-	    break;
-
-	default:
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    time(&ac->installed);
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+	time(&ac->installed);
+
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
 }
 
-/*
- *  release an ietfAttribute, free it if count reaches zero
+/**
+ *  Release an ietfAttribute, free it if count reaches zero
  */
-static void
-release_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t* attr)
+static void release_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t* attr)
 {
-    if (--attr->count == 0)
-    {
-	ietfAttrList_t **plist = &ietfAttributes;
-	ietfAttrList_t *list = *plist;
-
-	while (list->attr != attr)
+	if (--attr->count == 0)
 	{
-	    plist = &list->next;
-	    list = *plist;
+		ietfAttrList_t **plist = &ietfAttributes;
+		ietfAttrList_t *list = *plist;
+
+		while (list->attr != attr)
+		{
+			plist = &list->next;
+			list = *plist;
+		}
+		*plist = list->next;
+		
+		free(attr->value.ptr);
+		free(attr);
+		free(list);
 	}
-        *plist = list->next;
-	
-	pfree(attr->value.ptr);
-	pfree(attr);
-	pfree(list);
-    }
 }
 
-/*
- *  free an ietfAttrList
+/**
+ *  Free an ietfAttrList
  */
-void
-free_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t* list)
+void free_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t* list)
 {
-    while (list != NULL)
-    {
-	ietfAttrList_t *el = list;
-
-	release_ietfAttr(el->attr);
-	list = list->next;
-	pfree(el);
-    }
+	while (list != NULL)
+	{
+		ietfAttrList_t *el = list;
+
+		release_ietfAttr(el->attr);
+		list = list->next;
+		free(el);
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- *  free a X.509 attribute certificate
+/**
+ *  Free a X.509 attribute certificate
  */
-void
-free_acert(x509acert_t *ac)
+void free_acert(x509acert_t *ac)
 {
-    if (ac != NULL)
-    {
-	free_ietfAttrList(ac->charging);
-	free_ietfAttrList(ac->groups);
-	pfreeany(ac->certificate.ptr);
-	pfree(ac);
-    }
+	if (ac != NULL)
+	{
+		free_ietfAttrList(ac->charging);
+		free_ietfAttrList(ac->groups);
+		free(ac->certificate.ptr);
+		free(ac);
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- *  free first X.509 attribute certificate in the chained list
+/**
+ *  Free first X.509 attribute certificate in the chained list
  */
-static void
-free_first_acert(void)
+static void free_first_acert(void)
 {
-    x509acert_t *first = x509acerts;
-    x509acerts = first->next;
-    free_acert(first);
+	x509acert_t *first = x509acerts;
+	x509acerts = first->next;
+	free_acert(first);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Free all attribute certificates in the chained list
  */
-void
-free_acerts(void)
-{
-    while (x509acerts != NULL)
-	free_first_acert();
+void free_acerts(void)
+{ 
+	while (x509acerts != NULL)
+		free_first_acert();
 }
 
-/*
- *  get a X.509 attribute certificate for a given holder
+/**
+ *  Get a X.509 attribute certificate for a given holder
  */
-x509acert_t*
-get_x509acert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial)
+x509acert_t* get_x509acert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial)
 {
-    x509acert_t *ac = x509acerts;
-    x509acert_t *prev_ac = NULL;
+	x509acert_t *ac = x509acerts;
+	x509acert_t *prev_ac = NULL;
 
-    while (ac != NULL)
-    {
-	if (same_dn(issuer, ac->holderIssuer)
-	&&  same_serial(serial, ac->holderSerial))
+	while (ac != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (ac!= x509acerts)
-	    {
-		/* bring the certificate up front */
-		prev_ac->next = ac->next;
-		ac->next = x509acerts;
-		x509acerts = ac;
-	    }
-	    return ac;
+		if (same_dn(issuer, ac->holderIssuer)
+		&&  same_serial(serial, ac->holderSerial))
+		{
+			if (ac!= x509acerts)
+			{
+				/* bring the certificate up front */
+				prev_ac->next = ac->next;
+				ac->next = x509acerts;
+				x509acerts = ac;
+			}
+			return ac;
+		}
+		prev_ac = ac;
+		ac = ac->next;
 	}
-	prev_ac = ac;
-	ac = ac->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
- *  add a X.509 attribute certificate to the chained list
+/**
+ *  Add a X.509 attribute certificate to the chained list
  */
-static void
-add_acert(x509acert_t *ac)
+static void add_acert(x509acert_t *ac)
 {
-    x509acert_t *old_ac = get_x509acert(ac->holderIssuer, ac->holderSerial);
+	x509acert_t *old_ac = get_x509acert(ac->holderIssuer, ac->holderSerial);
 
-    if (old_ac != NULL)
-    {
-	if (ac->notBefore >old_ac->notBefore)
-	{
-	    /* delete the old attribute cert */
-	    free_first_acert();
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("attribute cert is newer - existing cert deleted")
-	    )
-	}
-	else
+	if (old_ac != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("attribute cert is not newer - existing cert kept");
-	    )
-	    free_acert(ac);
-	    return;
+		if (ac->notBefore >old_ac->notBefore)
+		{
+			/* delete the old attribute cert */
+			free_first_acert();
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("attribute cert is newer - existing cert deleted")
+			)
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("attribute cert is not newer - existing cert kept");
+			)
+			free_acert(ac);
+			return;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    plog("attribute cert added");
+	plog("attribute cert added");
 
-    /* insert new attribute cert at the root of the chain */
-    ac->next = x509acerts;
-    x509acerts = ac;
+	/* insert new attribute cert at the root of the chain */
+	ac->next = x509acerts;
+	x509acerts = ac;
 }
 
-/* verify the validity of an attribute certificate by
+/**
+ * Verify the validity of an attribute certificate by
  * checking the notBefore and notAfter dates
  */
-static err_t
-check_ac_validity(const x509acert_t *ac)
+static err_t check_ac_validity(const x509acert_t *ac)
 {
-    time_t current_time;
-
-    time(&current_time);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  not before  : %s", timetoa(&ac->notBefore, TRUE));
-	DBG_log("  current time: %s", timetoa(&current_time, TRUE));
-	DBG_log("  not after   : %s", timetoa(&ac->notAfter, TRUE));
-    )
-
-    if (current_time < ac->notBefore)
-	return "attribute certificate is not valid yet";
-    if (current_time > ac->notAfter)
-	return "attribute certificate has expired";
-    else
-	return NULL;
+	time_t current_time;
+
+	time(&current_time);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  not before  : %T", &ac->notBefore, TRUE);
+		DBG_log("  current time: %T", &current_time, TRUE);
+		DBG_log("  not after   : %T", &ac->notAfter, TRUE);
+	)
+
+	if (current_time < ac->notBefore)
+		return "attribute certificate is not valid yet";
+	if (current_time > ac->notAfter)
+		return "attribute certificate has expired";
+	else
+		return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * verifies a X.509 attribute certificate
  */
-bool
-verify_x509acert(x509acert_t *ac, bool strict)
+bool verify_x509acert(x509acert_t *ac, bool strict)
 {
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    x509cert_t *aacert;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    time_t valid_until = ac->notAfter;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->entityName);
-	DBG_log("holder: '%s'",buf);
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->issuerName);
-	DBG_log("issuer: '%s'",buf);
-    )
-    
-    ugh = check_ac_validity(ac);
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	plog("%s", ugh);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("attribute certificate is valid")
-    )
-
-    lock_authcert_list("verify_x509acert");
-    aacert = get_authcert(ac->issuerName, ac->authKeySerialNumber
-	, ac->authKeyID, AUTH_AA);
-    unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509acert");
-
-    if (aacert == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("issuer aacert not found");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("issuer aacert found")
-    )
-
-    if (!check_signature(ac->certificateInfo, ac->signature
-			 , ac->algorithm, ac->algorithm, aacert))
-    {
-	plog("attribute certificate signature is invalid");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("attribute certificate signature is valid");
-    )
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	x509cert_t *aacert;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	time_t valid_until = ac->notAfter;
 
-    return verify_x509cert(aacert, strict, &valid_until);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->entityName);
+		DBG_log("holder: '%s'",buf);
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->issuerName);
+		DBG_log("issuer: '%s'",buf);
+	)
+	
+	ugh = check_ac_validity(ac);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		plog("%s", ugh);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("attribute certificate is valid")
+	)
+
+	lock_authcert_list("verify_x509acert");
+	aacert = get_authcert(ac->issuerName, ac->authKeySerialNumber
+		, ac->authKeyID, AUTH_AA);
+	unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509acert");
+
+	if (aacert == NULL)
+	{
+		plog("issuer aacert not found");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("issuer aacert found")
+	)
+
+	if (!x509_check_signature(ac->certificateInfo, ac->signature, ac->algorithm,
+							  aacert))
+	{
+		plog("attribute certificate signature is invalid");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("attribute certificate signature is valid");
+	)
+
+	return verify_x509cert(aacert, strict, &valid_until);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Loads X.509 attribute certificates
  */
-void
-load_acerts(void)
+void load_acerts(void)
 {
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-    /* change directory to specified path */
-    u_char *save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
-
-    if (!chdir(A_CERT_PATH))
-    {
-	struct dirent **filelist;
-	int n;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	plog("Changing to directory '%s'",A_CERT_PATH);
-	n = scandir(A_CERT_PATH, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
+	/* change directory to specified path */
+	u_char *save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
 
-	if (n > 0)
+	if (!chdir(A_CERT_PATH))
 	{
-	    while (n--)
-	    {
-		chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
-		bool pgp = FALSE;
+		struct dirent **filelist;
+		int n;
+
+		plog("Changing to directory '%s'",A_CERT_PATH);
+		n = scandir(A_CERT_PATH, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
 
-		if (load_coded_file(filelist[n]->d_name, NULL, "acert", &blob, &pgp))
+		if (n > 0)
 		{
-		    x509acert_t *ac = alloc_thing(x509acert_t, "x509acert");
-		    
-		    *ac = empty_ac;
-
-		    if (parse_ac(blob, ac)
-		    && verify_x509acert(ac, FALSE))
-			add_acert(ac);
-		    else
-			free_acert(ac);
+			while (n--)
+			{
+				chunk_t blob = chunk_empty;
+				bool pgp = FALSE;
+
+				if (load_coded_file(filelist[n]->d_name, NULL, "acert", &blob, &pgp))
+				{
+					x509acert_t *ac = malloc_thing(x509acert_t);
+					
+					*ac = empty_ac;
+
+					if (parse_ac(blob, ac)
+					&& verify_x509acert(ac, FALSE))
+						add_acert(ac);
+					else
+						free_acert(ac);
+				}
+				free(filelist[n]);
+			}
+			free(filelist);
 		}
-		free(filelist[n]);
-	    }
-	    free(filelist);
 	}
-    }
-    /* restore directory path */
-    ignore_result(chdir(save_dir));
+	/* restore directory path */
+	ignore_result(chdir(save_dir));
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * lists group attributes separated by commas on a single line
  */
-void
-format_groups(const ietfAttrList_t *list, char *buf, int len)
+void format_groups(const ietfAttrList_t *list, char *buf, int len)
 {
-    bool first_group = TRUE;
-
-    while (list != NULL && len > 0)
-    {
-	ietfAttr_t *attr = list->attr;
+	bool first_group = TRUE;
 
-	if (attr->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS
-	||  attr->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING)
+	while (list != NULL && len > 0)
 	{
-	    int written = snprintf(buf, len, "%s%.*s"
-			    , (first_group)? "" : ", "
-			    , (int)attr->value.len, attr->value.ptr);
-
-	    first_group = FALSE;
-	    
-	    /* return value of snprintf() up to glibc 2.0.6 */
-	    if (written < 0)
-		break;
-
-	    buf += written;
-	    len -= written;
+		ietfAttr_t *attr = list->attr;
+
+		if (attr->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS
+		||  attr->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING)
+		{
+			int written = snprintf(buf, len, "%s%.*s"
+							, (first_group)? "" : ", "
+							, (int)attr->value.len, attr->value.ptr);
+
+			first_group = FALSE;
+			
+			/* return value of snprintf() up to glibc 2.0.6 */
+			if (written < 0)
+				break;
+
+			buf += written;
+			len -= written;
+		}
+		list = list->next;
 	}
-	list = list->next;
-    }
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  list all X.509 attribute certificates in the chained list
  */
-void
-list_acerts(bool utc)
+void list_acerts(bool utc)
 {
-    x509acert_t *ac = x509acerts;
-    time_t now;
-
-    /* determine the current time */
-    time(&now);
+	x509acert_t *ac = x509acerts;
+	time_t now;
 
-    if (ac != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 Attribute Certificates:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
+	/* determine the current time */
+	time(&now);
 
-    while (ac != NULL)
-    {
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s",timetoa(&ac->installed, utc));
-	if (ac->entityName.ptr != NULL)
+	if (ac != NULL)
 	{
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->entityName);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       holder:   '%s'", buf);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 Attribute Certificates:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
 	}
-	if (ac->holderIssuer.ptr != NULL)
-	{
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->holderIssuer);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       hissuer:  '%s'", buf);
-	}
-	if (ac->holderSerial.ptr != NULL)
-	{
-	    datatot(ac->holderSerial.ptr, ac->holderSerial.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       hserial:   %s", buf);
-	}
-	if (ac->groups != NULL)
-	{
-	    format_groups(ac->groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       groups:    %s", buf);
-	}
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->issuerName);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
-	datatot(ac->serialNumber.ptr, ac->serialNumber.len, ':'
-	    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:    %s", buf);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       validity:  not before %s %s",
-		timetoa(&ac->notBefore, utc),
-		(ac->notBefore < now)?"ok":"fatal (not valid yet)");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  not after  %s %s",
-		timetoa(&ac->notAfter, utc),
-		check_expiry(ac->notAfter, ACERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
-	if (ac->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	{
-	    datatot(ac->authKeyID.ptr, ac->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
-	}
-	if (ac->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+
+	while (ac != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(ac->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, ac->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
-	}
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T", &ac->installed, utc);
+		if (ac->entityName.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->entityName);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       holder:   '%s'", buf);
+		}
+		if (ac->holderIssuer.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->holderIssuer);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       hissuer:  '%s'", buf);
+		}
+		if (ac->holderSerial.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(ac->holderSerial.ptr, ac->holderSerial.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       hserial:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		if (ac->groups != NULL)
+		{
+			format_groups(ac->groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       groups:    %s", buf);
+		}
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->issuerName);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+		datatot(ac->serialNumber.ptr, ac->serialNumber.len, ':'
+			, buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:    %s", buf);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       validity:  not before %T %s",
+				&ac->notBefore, utc,
+				(ac->notBefore < now)?"ok":"fatal (not valid yet)");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  not after  %T %s",
+				&ac->notAfter, utc,
+				check_expiry(ac->notAfter, ACERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+		if (ac->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(ac->authKeyID.ptr, ac->authKeyID.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		if (ac->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(ac->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, ac->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+		}
 
-	ac = ac->next;
-    }
+		ac = ac->next;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  list all group attributes in alphabetical order
  */
-void
-list_groups(bool utc)
+void list_groups(bool utc)
 {
-    ietfAttrList_t *list = ietfAttributes;
-    
-    if (list != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Group Attributes:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
-
-    while (list != NULL)
-    {
-	ietfAttr_t *attr = list->attr;
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, count: %d", timetoa(&attr->installed, utc),
-		attr->count);
+	ietfAttrList_t *list = ietfAttributes;
 	
-	switch (attr->kind)
+	if (list != NULL)
 	{
-	case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS:
-	case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING:
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %.*s", (int)attr->value.len, attr->value.ptr);
-	    break;
-	case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID:
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       OID");
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
-        }
-
-	list = list->next;
-    }
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Group Attributes:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	}
+
+	while (list != NULL)
+	{
+		ietfAttr_t *attr = list->attr;
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, count: %d", &attr->installed, utc, attr->count);
+		
+		switch (attr->kind)
+		{
+		case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS:
+		case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING:
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %.*s", (int)attr->value.len, attr->value.ptr);
+			break;
+		case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID:
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       OID");
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		list = list->next;
+	}
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/ac.h b/src/pluto/ac.h
index d60ad25af..bee016143 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ac.h
+++ b/src/pluto/ac.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /* Support of X.509 attribute certificates
  * Copyright (C) 2002 Ueli Galizzi, Ariane Seiler
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Martin Berner, Lukas Suter
- 
+
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ac.h 3253 2007-10-06 21:39:00Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _AC_H
@@ -22,9 +20,9 @@
 /* definition of ietfAttribute kinds */
 
 typedef enum {
-    IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS =	0,
-    IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID =	1,
-    IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING =	2
+	IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS =     0,
+	IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID =        1,
+	IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING =     2
 } ietfAttribute_t;
 
 /* access structure for an ietfAttribute */
@@ -32,17 +30,17 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef struct ietfAttr ietfAttr_t;
 
 struct ietfAttr {
-  time_t	   installed;
-  int		   count;
+  time_t           installed;
+  int              count;
   ietfAttribute_t  kind;
-  chunk_t	   value;
+  chunk_t          value;
 };
 
 typedef struct ietfAttrList ietfAttrList_t;
 
 struct ietfAttrList {
   ietfAttrList_t   *next;
-  ietfAttr_t	   *attr;
+  ietfAttr_t       *attr;
 };
 
 
@@ -52,31 +50,31 @@ typedef struct x509acert x509acert_t;
 
 struct x509acert {
   x509acert_t    *next;
-  time_t	 installed;
-  chunk_t	 certificate;
-  chunk_t	   certificateInfo;
-  u_int		     version;
-		/*   holder */
-		/*     baseCertificateID */
-  chunk_t		 holderIssuer;
-  chunk_t		 holderSerial;
-  chunk_t		 entityName;
-                /*   v2Form */
-  chunk_t	       issuerName;
-                /*   signature */
+  time_t         installed;
+  chunk_t        certificate;
+  chunk_t          certificateInfo;
+  u_int              version;
+				/*   holder */
+				/*     baseCertificateID */
+  chunk_t                holderIssuer;
+  chunk_t                holderSerial;
+  chunk_t                entityName;
+				/*   v2Form */
+  chunk_t              issuerName;
+				/*   signature */
   int                  sigAlg;
-  chunk_t	     serialNumber;
-                /*   attrCertValidityPeriod */
+  chunk_t            serialNumber;
+				/*   attrCertValidityPeriod */
   time_t               notBefore;
   time_t               notAfter;
-		/*   attributes */
+				/*   attributes */
   ietfAttrList_t       *charging;
   ietfAttrList_t       *groups;
-		/*   extensions */
+				/*   extensions */
   chunk_t              authKeyID;
   chunk_t              authKeySerialNumber;
-  bool		       noRevAvail;
-		/* signatureAlgorithm */
+  bool                 noRevAvail;
+				/* signatureAlgorithm */
   int                algorithm;
   chunk_t          signature;
 };
@@ -88,7 +86,7 @@ extern void unshare_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t **listp);
 extern void free_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t *list);
 extern void decode_groups(char *groups, ietfAttrList_t **listp);
 extern bool group_membership(const ietfAttrList_t *my_list
-    , const char *conn, const ietfAttrList_t *conn_list);
+	, const char *conn, const ietfAttrList_t *conn_list);
 extern bool parse_ac(chunk_t blob, x509acert_t *ac);
 extern bool verify_x509acert(x509acert_t *ac, bool strict);
 extern x509acert_t* get_x509acert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial);
diff --git a/src/pluto/adns.c b/src/pluto/adns.c
index a721d8837..95e22b96f 100644
--- a/src/pluto/adns.c
+++ b/src/pluto/adns.c
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: adns.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-#ifndef USE_LWRES	/* whole file! */
+#ifndef USE_LWRES       /* whole file! */
 
 /* This program executes as multiple processes.  The Master process
  * receives queries (struct adns_query messages) from Pluto and distributes
@@ -58,7 +56,7 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/nameser.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <netdb.h>	/* ??? for h_errno */
+#include <netdb.h>      /* ??? for h_errno */
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
@@ -70,11 +68,11 @@
 #endif
 
 #include "constants.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
 
 /* shared by all processes */
 
-static const char *name;	/* program name, for messages */
+static const char *name;        /* program name, for messages */
 
 static bool debug = FALSE;
 
@@ -88,43 +86,43 @@ static bool debug = FALSE;
 static enum helper_exit_status
 read_pipe(int fd, unsigned char *stuff, size_t minlen, size_t maxlen)
 {
-    size_t n = 0;
-    size_t goal = minlen;
+	size_t n = 0;
+	size_t goal = minlen;
 
-    do {
-	ssize_t m = read(fd, stuff + n, goal - n);
+	do {
+		ssize_t m = read(fd, stuff + n, goal - n);
 
-	if (m == -1)
-	{
-	    if (errno != EINTR)
-	    {
-		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input error on pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
-		return HES_IO_ERROR_IN;
-	    }
-	}
-	else if (m == 0)
-	{
-	    return HES_OK;	/* treat empty message as EOF */
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    n += m;
-	    if (n >= sizeof(size_t))
-	    {
-		goal = *(size_t *)(void *)stuff;
-		if (goal < minlen || maxlen < goal)
+		if (m == -1)
 		{
-		    if (debug)
-			fprintf(stderr, "%lu : [%lu, %lu]\n"
-			    , (unsigned long)goal
-			    , (unsigned long)minlen, (unsigned long)maxlen);
-		    return HES_BAD_LEN;
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+			{
+				syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input error on pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+				return HES_IO_ERROR_IN;
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	}
-    } while (n < goal);
+		else if (m == 0)
+		{
+			return HES_OK;      /* treat empty message as EOF */
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			n += m;
+			if (n >= sizeof(size_t))
+			{
+				goal = *(size_t *)(void *)stuff;
+				if (goal < minlen || maxlen < goal)
+				{
+					if (debug)
+						fprintf(stderr, "%lu : [%lu, %lu]\n"
+							, (unsigned long)goal
+							, (unsigned long)minlen, (unsigned long)maxlen);
+					return HES_BAD_LEN;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	} while (n < goal);
 
-    return HES_CONTINUE;
+	return HES_CONTINUE;
 }
 
 /* Write a variable-length record to a pipe.
@@ -135,27 +133,27 @@ read_pipe(int fd, unsigned char *stuff, size_t minlen, size_t maxlen)
 static enum helper_exit_status
 write_pipe(int fd, const unsigned char *stuff)
 {
-    size_t len = *(const size_t *)(const void *)stuff;
-    size_t n = 0;
+	size_t len = *(const size_t *)(const void *)stuff;
+	size_t n = 0;
 
-    do {
-	ssize_t m = write(fd, stuff + n, len - n);
+	do {
+		ssize_t m = write(fd, stuff + n, len - n);
 
-	if (m == -1)
-	{
-	    /* error, but ignore and retry if EINTR */
-	    if (errno != EINTR)
-	    {
-		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Output error from master: %s", strerror(errno));
-		return HES_IO_ERROR_OUT;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    n += m;
-	}
-    } while (n != len);
-    return HES_CONTINUE;
+		if (m == -1)
+		{
+			/* error, but ignore and retry if EINTR */
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+			{
+				syslog(LOG_ERR, "Output error from master: %s", strerror(errno));
+				return HES_IO_ERROR_OUT;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			n += m;
+		}
+	} while (n != len);
+	return HES_CONTINUE;
 }
 
 /**************** worker process ****************/
@@ -171,14 +169,14 @@ write_pipe(int fd, const unsigned char *stuff)
  */
 
 #if (__RES) <= 19960801
-# define OLD_RESOLVER	1
+# define OLD_RESOLVER   1
 #endif
 
 #ifdef OLD_RESOLVER
 
 # define res_ninit(statp) res_init()
 # define res_nquery(statp, dname, class, type, answer, anslen) \
-    res_query(dname, class, type, answer, anslen)
+	res_query(dname, class, type, answer, anslen)
 # define res_nclose(statp) res_close()
 
 static struct __res_state *statp = &_res;
@@ -193,75 +191,75 @@ static res_state statp = &my_res_state;
 static int
 worker(int qfd, int afd)
 {
-    {
-	int r = res_ninit(statp);
-
-	if (r != 0)
 	{
-	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot initialize resolver");
-	    return HES_RES_INIT;
-	}
+		int r = res_ninit(statp);
+
+		if (r != 0)
+		{
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot initialize resolver");
+			return HES_RES_INIT;
+		}
 #ifndef OLD_RESOLVER
-	statp->options |= RES_ROTATE;
+		statp->options |= RES_ROTATE;
 #endif
-	statp->options |= RES_DEBUG;
-    }
+		statp->options |= RES_DEBUG;
+	}
 
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	struct adns_query q;
-	struct adns_answer a;
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		struct adns_query q;
+		struct adns_answer a;
 
-	enum helper_exit_status r = read_pipe(qfd, (unsigned char *)&q
-	    , sizeof(q), sizeof(q));
+		enum helper_exit_status r = read_pipe(qfd, (unsigned char *)&q
+			, sizeof(q), sizeof(q));
 
-	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
-	    return r;	/* some kind of exit */
+		if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+			return r;   /* some kind of exit */
 
-	if (q.qmagic != ADNS_Q_MAGIC)
-	{
-	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in input from master: bad magic");
-	    return HES_BAD_MAGIC;
-	}
+		if (q.qmagic != ADNS_Q_MAGIC)
+		{
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in input from master: bad magic");
+			return HES_BAD_MAGIC;
+		}
 
-	a.amagic = ADNS_A_MAGIC;
-	a.serial = q.serial;
+		a.amagic = ADNS_A_MAGIC;
+		a.serial = q.serial;
 
-	a.result = res_nquery(statp, q.name_buf, C_IN, q.type, a.ans, sizeof(a.ans));
-	a.h_errno_val = h_errno;
+		a.result = res_nquery(statp, q.name_buf, C_IN, q.type, a.ans, sizeof(a.ans));
+		a.h_errno_val = h_errno;
 
-	a.len = offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans) + (a.result < 0? 0 : a.result);
+		a.len = offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans) + (a.result < 0? 0 : a.result);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	if (((q.debugging & IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER) && q.type == T_KEY)
-	|| ((q.debugging & IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER) && q.type == T_TXT))
-	    sleep(30);	/* delay the answer */
+		if (((q.debugging & IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER) && q.type == T_KEY)
+		|| ((q.debugging & IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER) && q.type == T_TXT))
+			sleep(30);  /* delay the answer */
 #endif
 
-	/* write answer, possibly a bit at a time */
-	r = write_pipe(afd, (const unsigned char *)&a);
+		/* write answer, possibly a bit at a time */
+		r = write_pipe(afd, (const unsigned char *)&a);
 
-	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
-	    return r;	/* some kind of exit */
-    }
+		if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+			return r;   /* some kind of exit */
+	}
 }
 
 /**************** master process ****************/
 
 bool eof_from_pluto = FALSE;
-#define PLUTO_QFD	0	/* queries come on stdin */
-#define PLUTO_AFD	1	/* answers go out on stdout */
+#define PLUTO_QFD       0       /* queries come on stdin */
+#define PLUTO_AFD       1       /* answers go out on stdout */
 
 #ifndef MAX_WORKERS
-# define MAX_WORKERS 10	/* number of in-flight queries */
+# define MAX_WORKERS 10 /* number of in-flight queries */
 #endif
 
 struct worker_info {
-    int qfd;	/* query pipe's file descriptor */
-    int afd;	/* answer pipe's file descriptor */
-    pid_t pid;
-    bool busy;
-    void *continuation;	/* of outstanding request */
+	int qfd;    /* query pipe's file descriptor */
+	int afd;    /* answer pipe's file descriptor */
+	pid_t pid;
+	bool busy;
+	void *continuation; /* of outstanding request */
 };
 
 static struct worker_info wi[MAX_WORKERS];
@@ -270,300 +268,300 @@ static struct worker_info *wi_roof = wi;
 /* request FIFO */
 
 struct query_list {
-    struct query_list *next;
-    struct adns_query aq;
+	struct query_list *next;
+	struct adns_query aq;
 };
 
 static struct query_list *oldest_query = NULL;
-static struct query_list *newest_query;	/* undefined when oldest == NULL */
+static struct query_list *newest_query; /* undefined when oldest == NULL */
 static struct query_list *free_queries = NULL;
 
 static bool
 spawn_worker(void)
 {
-    int qfds[2];
-    int afds[2];
-    pid_t p;
-
-    if (pipe(qfds) != 0 || pipe(afds) != 0)
-    {
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "pipe(2) failed: %s", strerror(errno));
-	exit(HES_PIPE);
-    }
-
-    wi_roof->qfd = qfds[1];	/* write end of query pipe */
-    wi_roof->afd = afds[0];	/* read end of answer pipe */
-
-    p = fork();
-    if (p == -1)
-    {
-	/* fork failed: ignore if at least one worker exists */
-	if (wi_roof == wi)
+	int qfds[2];
+	int afds[2];
+	pid_t p;
+
+	if (pipe(qfds) != 0 || pipe(afds) != 0)
+	{
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "pipe(2) failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+		exit(HES_PIPE);
+	}
+
+	wi_roof->qfd = qfds[1];     /* write end of query pipe */
+	wi_roof->afd = afds[0];     /* read end of answer pipe */
+
+	p = fork();
+	if (p == -1)
+	{
+		/* fork failed: ignore if at least one worker exists */
+		if (wi_roof == wi)
+		{
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, "fork(2) error creating first worker: %s", strerror(errno));
+			exit(HES_FORK);
+		}
+		close(qfds[0]);
+		close(qfds[1]);
+		close(afds[0]);
+		close(afds[1]);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else if (p == 0)
 	{
-	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "fork(2) error creating first worker: %s", strerror(errno));
-	    exit(HES_FORK);
+		/* child */
+		struct worker_info *w;
+
+		close(PLUTO_QFD);
+		close(PLUTO_AFD);
+		/* close all master pipes, including ours */
+		for (w = wi; w <= wi_roof; w++)
+		{
+			close(w->qfd);
+			close(w->afd);
+		}
+		exit(worker(qfds[0], afds[1]));
 	}
-	close(qfds[0]);
-	close(qfds[1]);
-	close(afds[0]);
-	close(afds[1]);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else if (p == 0)
-    {
-	/* child */
-	struct worker_info *w;
-
-	close(PLUTO_QFD);
-	close(PLUTO_AFD);
-	/* close all master pipes, including ours */
-	for (w = wi; w <= wi_roof; w++)
+	else
 	{
-	    close(w->qfd);
-	    close(w->afd);
+		/* parent */
+		struct worker_info *w = wi_roof++;
+
+		w->pid = p;
+		w->busy = FALSE;
+		close(qfds[0]);
+		close(afds[1]);
+		return TRUE;
 	}
-	exit(worker(qfds[0], afds[1]));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* parent */
-	struct worker_info *w = wi_roof++;
-
-	w->pid = p;
-	w->busy = FALSE;
-	close(qfds[0]);
-	close(afds[1]);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
 }
 
 static void
 send_eof(struct worker_info *w)
 {
-    pid_t p;
-    int status;
+	pid_t p;
+	int status;
 
-    close(w->qfd);
-    w->qfd = NULL_FD;
+	close(w->qfd);
+	w->qfd = NULL_FD;
 
-    close(w->afd);
-    w->afd = NULL_FD;
+	close(w->afd);
+	w->afd = NULL_FD;
 
-    /* reap child */
-    p = waitpid(w->pid, &status, 0);
-    /* ignore result -- what could we do with it? */
+	/* reap child */
+	p = waitpid(w->pid, &status, 0);
+	/* ignore result -- what could we do with it? */
 }
 
 static void
 forward_query(struct worker_info *w)
 {
-    struct query_list *q = oldest_query;
-
-    if (q == NULL)
-    {
-	if (eof_from_pluto)
-	    send_eof(w);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	enum helper_exit_status r
-	    = write_pipe(w->qfd, (const unsigned char *) &q->aq);
-
-	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
-	    exit(r);
-
-	w->busy = TRUE;
-
-	oldest_query = q->next;
-	q->next = free_queries;
-	free_queries = q;
-    }
+	struct query_list *q = oldest_query;
+
+	if (q == NULL)
+	{
+		if (eof_from_pluto)
+			send_eof(w);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		enum helper_exit_status r
+			= write_pipe(w->qfd, (const unsigned char *) &q->aq);
+
+		if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+			exit(r);
+
+		w->busy = TRUE;
+
+		oldest_query = q->next;
+		q->next = free_queries;
+		free_queries = q;
+	}
 }
 
 static void
 query(void)
 {
-    struct query_list *q = free_queries;
-    enum helper_exit_status r;
+	struct query_list *q = free_queries;
+	enum helper_exit_status r;
 
-    /* find an unused queue entry */
-    if (q == NULL)
-    {
-	q = malloc(sizeof(*q));
+	/* find an unused queue entry */
 	if (q == NULL)
 	{
-	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc(3) failed");
-	    exit(HES_MALLOC);
+		q = malloc(sizeof(*q));
+		if (q == NULL)
+		{
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc(3) failed");
+			exit(HES_MALLOC);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	free_queries = q->next;
-    }
-
-    r = read_pipe(PLUTO_QFD, (unsigned char *)&q->aq
-	, sizeof(q->aq), sizeof(q->aq));
-
-    if (r == HES_OK)
-    {
-	/* EOF: we're done, except for unanswered queries */
-	struct worker_info *w;
-
-	eof_from_pluto = TRUE;
-	q->next = free_queries;
-	free_queries = q;
-
-	/* Send bye-bye to unbusy processes.
-	 * Note that if there are queued queries, there won't be
-	 * any non-busy workers.
-	 */
-	for (w = wi; w != wi_roof; w++)
-	    if (!w->busy)
-		send_eof(w);
-    }
-    else if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
-    {
-	exit(r);
-    }
-    else if (q->aq.qmagic != ADNS_Q_MAGIC)
-    {
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in query from Pluto: bad magic");
-	exit(HES_BAD_MAGIC);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct worker_info *w;
-
-	/* got a query */
-
-	/* add it to FIFO */
-	q->next = NULL;
-	if (oldest_query == NULL)
-	    oldest_query = q;
 	else
-	    newest_query->next = q;
-	newest_query = q;
+	{
+		free_queries = q->next;
+	}
+
+	r = read_pipe(PLUTO_QFD, (unsigned char *)&q->aq
+		, sizeof(q->aq), sizeof(q->aq));
 
-	/* See if any worker available */
-	for (w = wi; ; w++)
+	if (r == HES_OK)
 	{
-	    if (w == wi_roof)
-	    {
-		/* no free worker */
-		if (w == wi + MAX_WORKERS)
-		    break;	/* no more to be created */
-		/* make a new one */
-		if (!spawn_worker())
-		    break;	/* cannot create one at this time */
-	    }
-	    if (!w->busy)
-	    {
-		/* assign first to free worker */
-		forward_query(w);
-		break;
-	    }
+		/* EOF: we're done, except for unanswered queries */
+		struct worker_info *w;
+
+		eof_from_pluto = TRUE;
+		q->next = free_queries;
+		free_queries = q;
+
+		/* Send bye-bye to unbusy processes.
+		 * Note that if there are queued queries, there won't be
+		 * any non-busy workers.
+		 */
+		for (w = wi; w != wi_roof; w++)
+			if (!w->busy)
+				send_eof(w);
+	}
+	else if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+	{
+		exit(r);
+	}
+	else if (q->aq.qmagic != ADNS_Q_MAGIC)
+	{
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in query from Pluto: bad magic");
+		exit(HES_BAD_MAGIC);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		struct worker_info *w;
+
+		/* got a query */
+
+		/* add it to FIFO */
+		q->next = NULL;
+		if (oldest_query == NULL)
+			oldest_query = q;
+		else
+			newest_query->next = q;
+		newest_query = q;
+
+		/* See if any worker available */
+		for (w = wi; ; w++)
+		{
+			if (w == wi_roof)
+			{
+				/* no free worker */
+				if (w == wi + MAX_WORKERS)
+					break;      /* no more to be created */
+				/* make a new one */
+				if (!spawn_worker())
+					break;      /* cannot create one at this time */
+			}
+			if (!w->busy)
+			{
+				/* assign first to free worker */
+				forward_query(w);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return;
+	return;
 }
 
 static void
 answer(struct worker_info *w)
 {
-    struct adns_answer a;
-    enum helper_exit_status r = read_pipe(w->afd, (unsigned char *)&a
-	, offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans), sizeof(a));
-
-    if (r == HES_OK)
-    {
-	/* unexpected EOF */
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "unexpected EOF from worker");
-	exit(HES_IO_ERROR_IN);
-    }
-    else if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
-    {
-	exit(r);
-    }
-    else if (a.amagic != ADNS_A_MAGIC)
-    {
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input from worker error: bad magic");
-	exit(HES_BAD_MAGIC);
-    }
-    else if (a.continuation != w->continuation)
-    {
-	/* answer doesn't match query */
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input from worker error: continuation mismatch");
-	exit(HES_SYNC);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* pass the answer on to Pluto */
-	enum helper_exit_status r
-	    = write_pipe(PLUTO_AFD, (const unsigned char *) &a);
-
-	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
-	    exit(r);
-	w->busy = FALSE;
-	forward_query(w);
-    }
+	struct adns_answer a;
+	enum helper_exit_status r = read_pipe(w->afd, (unsigned char *)&a
+		, offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans), sizeof(a));
+
+	if (r == HES_OK)
+	{
+		/* unexpected EOF */
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "unexpected EOF from worker");
+		exit(HES_IO_ERROR_IN);
+	}
+	else if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+	{
+		exit(r);
+	}
+	else if (a.amagic != ADNS_A_MAGIC)
+	{
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input from worker error: bad magic");
+		exit(HES_BAD_MAGIC);
+	}
+	else if (a.continuation != w->continuation)
+	{
+		/* answer doesn't match query */
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input from worker error: continuation mismatch");
+		exit(HES_SYNC);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* pass the answer on to Pluto */
+		enum helper_exit_status r
+			= write_pipe(PLUTO_AFD, (const unsigned char *) &a);
+
+		if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+			exit(r);
+		w->busy = FALSE;
+		forward_query(w);
+	}
 }
 
 /* assumption: input limited; accept blocking on output */
 static int
 master(void)
 {
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	fd_set readfds;
-	int maxfd = PLUTO_QFD;		/* approximate lower bound */
-	int ndes = 0;
-	struct worker_info *w;
-
-	FD_ZERO(&readfds);
-	if (!eof_from_pluto)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    FD_SET(PLUTO_QFD, &readfds);
-	    ndes++;
-	}
-	for (w = wi; w != wi_roof; w++)
-	{
-	    if (w->busy)
-	    {
-		FD_SET(w->afd, &readfds);
-		ndes++;
-		if (maxfd < w->afd)
-		    maxfd = w->afd;
-	    }
-	}
+		fd_set readfds;
+		int maxfd = PLUTO_QFD;          /* approximate lower bound */
+		int ndes = 0;
+		struct worker_info *w;
+
+		FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+		if (!eof_from_pluto)
+		{
+			FD_SET(PLUTO_QFD, &readfds);
+			ndes++;
+		}
+		for (w = wi; w != wi_roof; w++)
+		{
+			if (w->busy)
+			{
+				FD_SET(w->afd, &readfds);
+				ndes++;
+				if (maxfd < w->afd)
+					maxfd = w->afd;
+			}
+		}
 
-	if (ndes == 0)
-	    return HES_OK;	/* done! */
+		if (ndes == 0)
+			return HES_OK;      /* done! */
 
-	do {
-	    ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
-	} while (ndes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-	if (ndes == -1)
-	{
-	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "select(2) error: %s", strerror(errno));
-	    exit(HES_IO_ERROR_SELECT);
-	}
-	else if (ndes > 0)
-	{
-	    if (FD_ISSET(PLUTO_QFD, &readfds))
-	    {
-		query();
-		ndes--;
-	    }
-	    for (w = wi; ndes > 0 && w != wi_roof; w++)
-	    {
-		if (w->busy && FD_ISSET(w->afd, &readfds))
+		do {
+			ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+		} while (ndes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+		if (ndes == -1)
+		{
+			syslog(LOG_ERR, "select(2) error: %s", strerror(errno));
+			exit(HES_IO_ERROR_SELECT);
+		}
+		else if (ndes > 0)
 		{
-		    answer(w);
-		    ndes--;
+			if (FD_ISSET(PLUTO_QFD, &readfds))
+			{
+				query();
+				ndes--;
+			}
+			for (w = wi; ndes > 0 && w != wi_roof; w++)
+			{
+				if (w->busy && FD_ISSET(w->afd, &readfds))
+				{
+					answer(w);
+					ndes--;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Not to be invoked by strangers -- user hostile.
@@ -574,42 +572,42 @@ master(void)
 static void
 adns_usage(const char *fmt, const char *arg)
 {
-    const char **sp = ipsec_copyright_notice();
+	const char **sp = ipsec_copyright_notice();
 
-    fprintf(stderr, "INTERNAL TO PLUTO: DO NOT EXECUTE\n");
+	fprintf(stderr, "INTERNAL TO PLUTO: DO NOT EXECUTE\n");
 
-    fprintf(stderr, fmt, arg);
-    fprintf(stderr, "\n%s\n", ipsec_version_string());
+	fprintf(stderr, fmt, arg);
+	fprintf(stderr, "\nstrongSwan "VERSION"\n");
 
-    for (; *sp != NULL; sp++)
-	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", *sp);
+	for (; *sp != NULL; sp++)
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", *sp);
 
-    syslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, arg);
-    exit(HES_INVOCATION);
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, arg);
+	exit(HES_INVOCATION);
 }
 
 int
 main(int argc UNUSED, char **argv)
 {
-    int i = 1;
+	int i = 1;
 
-    name = argv[0];
+	name = argv[0];
 
-    while (i < argc)
-    {
-	if (streq(argv[i], "-d"))
+	while (i < argc)
 	{
-	    i++;
-	    debug = TRUE;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    adns_usage("unexpected argument \"%s\"", argv[i]);
-	    /*NOTREACHED*/
+		if (streq(argv[i], "-d"))
+		{
+			i++;
+			debug = TRUE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			adns_usage("unexpected argument \"%s\"", argv[i]);
+			/*NOTREACHED*/
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    return master();
+	return master();
 }
 
 #endif /* !USE_LWRES */
diff --git a/src/pluto/adns.h b/src/pluto/adns.h
index f2d0b28bd..f564be232 100644
--- a/src/pluto/adns.h
+++ b/src/pluto/adns.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: adns.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-#ifndef USE_LWRES	/* whole file! */
+#ifndef USE_LWRES       /* whole file! */
 
 /* The interface in RHL6.x and BIND distribution 8.2.2 are different,
  * so we build some of our own :-(
@@ -38,38 +36,38 @@
  */
 
 struct adns_query {
-    size_t len;
-    unsigned int qmagic;
-    unsigned long serial;
-    lset_t debugging;	/* only used #ifdef DEBUG, but don't want layout to change */
-    u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
-    int type;	/* T_KEY or T_TXT */
+	size_t len;
+	unsigned int qmagic;
+	unsigned long serial;
+	lset_t debugging;   /* only used #ifdef DEBUG, but don't want layout to change */
+	u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
+	int type;   /* T_KEY or T_TXT */
 };
 
 struct adns_answer {
-    size_t len;
-    unsigned int amagic;
-    unsigned long serial;
-    struct adns_continuation *continuation;
-    int result;
-    int h_errno_val;
-    u_char ans[NS_PACKETSZ * 10];   /* very probably bigger than necessary */
+	size_t len;
+	unsigned int amagic;
+	unsigned long serial;
+	struct adns_continuation *continuation;
+	int result;
+	int h_errno_val;
+	u_char ans[NS_PACKETSZ * 10];   /* very probably bigger than necessary */
 };
 
 enum helper_exit_status {
-    HES_CONTINUE = -1,	/* not an exit */
-    HES_OK = 0,	/* all's well that ends well (perhaps EOF) */
-    HES_INVOCATION,	/* improper invocation */
-    HES_IO_ERROR_SELECT,	/* IO error in select() */
-    HES_MALLOC,	/* malloc failed */
-    HES_IO_ERROR_IN,	/* error reading pipe */
-    HES_IO_ERROR_OUT,	/* error reading pipe */
-    HES_PIPE,	/* pipe(2) failed */
-    HES_SYNC,	/* answer from worker doesn't match query */
-    HES_FORK,	/* fork(2) failed */
-    HES_RES_INIT,	/* resolver initialization failed */
-    HES_BAD_LEN,	/* implausible .len field */
-    HES_BAD_MAGIC,	/* .magic field wrong */
+	HES_CONTINUE = -1,  /* not an exit */
+	HES_OK = 0, /* all's well that ends well (perhaps EOF) */
+	HES_INVOCATION,     /* improper invocation */
+	HES_IO_ERROR_SELECT,        /* IO error in select() */
+	HES_MALLOC, /* malloc failed */
+	HES_IO_ERROR_IN,    /* error reading pipe */
+	HES_IO_ERROR_OUT,   /* error reading pipe */
+	HES_PIPE,   /* pipe(2) failed */
+	HES_SYNC,   /* answer from worker doesn't match query */
+	HES_FORK,   /* fork(2) failed */
+	HES_RES_INIT,       /* resolver initialization failed */
+	HES_BAD_LEN,        /* implausible .len field */
+	HES_BAD_MAGIC,      /* .magic field wrong */
 };
 
 #endif /* !USE_LWRES */
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_aes.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_aes.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c635af723..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_aes.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "libaes/aes_cbc.h"
-#include "alg_info.h"
-#include "ike_alg.h"
-
-#define  AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(128/BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define  AES_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
-#define  AES_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
-#define  AES_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
-
-static void
-do_aes(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
-{
-    aes_context aes_ctx;
-    char iv_bak[AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    char *new_iv = NULL;	/* logic will avoid copy to NULL */
-
-    aes_set_key(&aes_ctx, key, key_size, 0);
-
-    /*	
-     *	my AES cbc does not touch passed IV (optimization for
-     *	ESP handling), so I must "emulate" des-like IV
-     *	crunching
-     */
-    if (!enc)
-	memcpy(new_iv=iv_bak, (char*) buf + buf_len - AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE
-		, AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-    SS_AES_cbc_encrypt(&aes_ctx, buf, buf, buf_len, iv, enc);
-
-    if (enc)
-	new_iv = (char*) buf + buf_len-AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-    memcpy(iv, new_iv, AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-}
-
-struct encrypt_desc algo_aes =
-{
-	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
-	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_AES_CBC,
-	algo_next: 	NULL, 
-	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(aes_context),
-	enc_blocksize: 	AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	keyminlen: 	AES_KEY_MIN_LEN,
-	keydeflen: 	AES_KEY_DEF_LEN,
-	keymaxlen: 	AES_KEY_MAX_LEN,
-	do_crypt: 	do_aes,
-};
-
-int ike_alg_aes_init(void);
-
-int
-ike_alg_aes_init(void)
-{
-	int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&algo_aes);
-	return ret;
-}
-/*
-IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_aes_init
-*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 2bbef051b..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "libblowfish/blowfish.h"
-#include "alg_info.h"
-#include "ike_alg.h"
-
-#define  BLOWFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	8  	/* block size */
-#define  BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
-#define  BLOWFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN	448
-
-
-static void
-do_blowfish(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
-{
-    BF_KEY bf_ctx;
-
-    BF_set_key(&bf_ctx, key_size , key);
-    BF_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, buf_len, &bf_ctx, iv, enc);
-}
-
-struct encrypt_desc algo_blowfish =
-{
-	algo_type: IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
-	algo_id:   OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC,
-	algo_next: NULL, 
-	enc_ctxsize: sizeof(BF_KEY),
-	enc_blocksize: BLOWFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	keyminlen: BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
-	keydeflen: BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
-	keymaxlen: BLOWFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
-	do_crypt: do_blowfish,
-};
-
-int ike_alg_blowfish_init(void);
-
-int
-ike_alg_blowfish_init(void)
-{
-    int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&algo_blowfish);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-/*
-IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_blowfish_init
-*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
deleted file mode 100644
index fb01caa41..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "libserpent/serpent_cbc.h"
-#include "alg_info.h"
-#include "ike_alg.h"
-
-#define  SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(128/BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define  SERPENT_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
-#define  SERPENT_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
-#define  SERPENT_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
-
-static void
-do_serpent(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_size, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
-{
-    serpent_context serpent_ctx;
-    char iv_bak[SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    char *new_iv = NULL;	/* logic will avoid copy to NULL */
-
-
-    serpent_set_key(&serpent_ctx, key, key_size);
-    /*	
-     *	my SERPENT cbc does not touch passed IV (optimization for
-     *	ESP handling), so I must "emulate" des-like IV
-     *	crunching
-     */
-    if (!enc)
-	    memcpy(new_iv=iv_bak, 
-			    (char*) buf + buf_size-SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-			    SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-    serpent_cbc_encrypt(&serpent_ctx, buf, buf, buf_size, iv, enc);
-
-    if (enc)
-	    new_iv = (char*) buf + buf_size-SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-    memcpy(iv, new_iv, SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-}
-
-struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_serpent =
-{
-	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
-	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC,
-	algo_next: 	NULL,
-	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(struct serpent_context),
-	enc_blocksize: 	SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-        keyminlen: 	SERPENT_KEY_MIN_LEN,
-        keydeflen: 	SERPENT_KEY_DEF_LEN,
-        keymaxlen: 	SERPENT_KEY_MAX_LEN,
-        do_crypt: 	do_serpent,
-};
-
-int ike_alg_serpent_init(void);
-
-int
-ike_alg_serpent_init(void)
-{
-    int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&encrypt_desc_serpent);
-
-    return ret;
-}
-/*
-IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_serpent_init
-*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b7c8438c..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,634 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "libsha2/sha2.h"
-#include "alg_info.h"
-#include "ike_alg.h"
-
-static void
-sha256_hash_final(u_char *hash, sha256_context *ctx)
-{
-    sha256_final(ctx);
-    memcpy(hash, ctx->sha_out, SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE);
-}
-
-static void
-sha384_hash_final(u_char *hash, sha512_context *ctx)
-{
-    sha512_final(ctx);
-    memcpy(hash, ctx->sha_out, SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE);
-}
-
-static void
-sha512_hash_final(u_char *hash, sha512_context *ctx)
-{
-    sha512_final(ctx);
-    memcpy(hash, ctx->sha_out, SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE);
-}
-
-/* SHA-256 hash test vectors
- * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
- * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
- */
-
-static const u_char sha256_short2_msg[] = {
-    0x19
-};
-
-static const u_char sha256_short2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x68, 0xaa, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xdf, 0xf9, 0x6e,
-    0x33, 0x55, 0xe6, 0xc7, 0xee, 0x37, 0x3e, 0x3d,
-    0x6a, 0x4e, 0x17, 0xf7, 0x5f, 0x95, 0x18, 0xd8,
-    0x43, 0x70, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0xc3, 0xe3, 0xd4
-};
-
-static const u_char sha256_short4_msg[] = {
-    0xe3, 0xd7, 0x25, 0x70, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x7c,
-    0xe3, 0x88, 0x7a, 0xb2, 0xcd, 0x68, 0x46, 0x52
-};
-
-static const u_char sha256_short4_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x17, 0x5e, 0xe6, 0x9b, 0x02, 0xba, 0x9b, 0x58,
-    0xe2, 0xb0, 0xa5, 0xfd, 0x13, 0x81, 0x9c, 0xea,
-    0x57, 0x3f, 0x39, 0x40, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x82, 0x51,
-    0x28, 0xcf, 0x42, 0x09, 0xbe, 0xab, 0xb4, 0xe8
-};
-
-static const u_char sha256_long2_msg[] = {
-    0x83, 0x26, 0x75, 0x4e, 0x22, 0x77, 0x37, 0x2f,
-    0x4f, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0x20, 0x52, 0x7a, 0xfe, 0xf0,
-    0x4d, 0x8a, 0x05, 0x69, 0x71, 0xb1, 0x1a, 0xd5,
-    0x71, 0x23, 0xa7, 0xc1, 0x37, 0x76, 0x00, 0x00,
-    0xd7, 0xbe, 0xf6, 0xf3, 0xc1, 0xf7, 0xa9, 0x08,
-    0x3a, 0xa3, 0x9d, 0x81, 0x0d, 0xb3, 0x10, 0x77,
-    0x7d, 0xab, 0x8b, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x02, 0xb8, 0x4a,
-    0x26, 0xc7, 0x73, 0x32, 0x5f, 0x8b, 0x23, 0x74,
-    0xde, 0x7a, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x58, 0xcb, 0x5c, 0x5c,
-    0xf3, 0x5b, 0xce, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0x94, 0x6e, 0x5b,
-    0xd6, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x3a, 0x8b, 0xeb, 0x3f,
-    0x9d, 0x65, 0x92, 0xec, 0xed, 0xaa, 0x66, 0xca,
-    0x82, 0xa2, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x51, 0xbc, 0xf9, 0x33,
-    0x62, 0x30, 0xe5, 0xd7, 0x84, 0xe4, 0xc0, 0xa4,
-    0x3f, 0x8d, 0x79, 0xa3, 0x0a, 0x16, 0x5c, 0xba,
-    0xbe, 0x45, 0x2b, 0x77, 0x4b, 0x9c, 0x71, 0x09,
-    0xa9, 0x7d, 0x13, 0x8f, 0x12, 0x92, 0x28, 0x96,
-    0x6f, 0x6c, 0x0a, 0xdc, 0x10, 0x6a, 0xad, 0x5a,
-    0x9f, 0xdd, 0x30, 0x82, 0x57, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xc6,
-    0x71, 0xaf, 0x67, 0x59, 0xdf, 0x28, 0xeb, 0x39,
-    0x3d, 0x54, 0xd6
-};
-
-static const u_char sha256_long2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x97, 0xdb, 0xca, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x6d, 0x62, 0xc8,
-    0xa4, 0x22, 0xc9, 0x41, 0xdd, 0x7e, 0x83, 0x5b,
-    0x8a, 0xd3, 0x36, 0x17, 0x63, 0xf7, 0xe9, 0xb2,
-    0xd9, 0x5f, 0x4f, 0x0d, 0xa6, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0xbc
-};
-
-static const hash_testvector_t sha256_hash_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha256_short2_msg), sha256_short2_msg, sha256_short2_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha256_short4_msg), sha256_short4_msg, sha256_short4_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha256_long2_msg),  sha256_long2_msg,  sha256_long2_msg_digest  },
-    { 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-/* SHA-384 hash test vectors
- * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
- * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
- */
-
-static const u_char sha384_short2_msg[] = {
-    0xb9
-};
-
-static const u_char sha384_short2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xbc, 0x80, 0x89, 0xa1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xc0, 0xb1,
-    0x41, 0x95, 0xf4, 0xec, 0xc7, 0x40, 0x94, 0xfe,
-    0xc6, 0x4f, 0x01, 0xf9, 0x09, 0x29, 0x28, 0x2c,
-    0x2f, 0xb3, 0x92, 0x88, 0x15, 0x78, 0x20, 0x8a,
-    0xd4, 0x66, 0x82, 0x8b, 0x1c, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x3d,
-    0x27, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0xab, 0x69, 0x38
-};
-
-static const u_char sha384_short4_msg[] = {
-     0xa4, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x77, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x37, 0x5f,
-     0xf1, 0x0a, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x59, 0x17, 0x39
-};
-
-static const u_char sha384_short4_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xc9, 0xa6, 0x84, 0x43, 0xa0, 0x05, 0x81, 0x22,
-    0x56, 0xb8, 0xec, 0x76, 0xb0, 0x05, 0x16, 0xf0,
-    0xdb, 0xb7, 0x4f, 0xab, 0x26, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x91,
-    0x3f, 0x19, 0x4b, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x0e, 0x91, 0xea,
-    0x99, 0x67, 0x56, 0x6b, 0x58, 0x10, 0x9c, 0xbc,
-    0x67, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0x08, 0xe4, 0xc8, 0x23, 0xf7
-};
-
-static const u_char sha384_long2_msg[] = {
-    0x39, 0x96, 0x69, 0xe2, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x9c, 0x6d,
-    0xbc, 0xbb, 0x69, 0x12, 0xec, 0x10, 0xff, 0xcf,
-    0x74, 0x79, 0x03, 0x49, 0xb7, 0xdc, 0x8f, 0xbe,
-    0x4a, 0x8e, 0x7b, 0x3b, 0x56, 0x21, 0xdb, 0x0f,
-    0x3e, 0x7d, 0xc8, 0x7f, 0x82, 0x32, 0x64, 0xbb,
-    0xe4, 0x0d, 0x18, 0x11, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x20, 0x61,
-    0xe1, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0x23, 0xfa, 0xc1,
-    0x72, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x3f, 0x50, 0x42,
-    0xe6, 0xbf, 0x58, 0xcb, 0xa8, 0xa2, 0x74, 0x6e,
-    0x1f, 0x64, 0xf9, 0xb9, 0xea, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x71,
-    0x15, 0x07, 0x05, 0x3c, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x33, 0x9d,
-    0x52, 0x86, 0x5f, 0x25, 0xcc, 0x22, 0xb5, 0xe8,
-    0x77, 0x84, 0xa1, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0x61, 0xd6, 0x6c,
-    0xb6, 0xe8, 0x95, 0x73, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x2c, 0xe6,
-    0x56, 0x5c, 0xbd, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xca, 0x40, 0x38,
-    0x32, 0xcf, 0xcb, 0x0e, 0x8b, 0x72, 0x11, 0xe8,
-    0x3a, 0xf3, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xac, 0x17, 0x92, 0x9f,
-    0xf1, 0xc0, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x1c, 0xc0, 0x27, 0xaa,
-    0xed, 0xef, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xad, 0x7c, 0x2b, 0x7c,
-    0x5a, 0x80, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x04, 0xd9, 0x6d, 0x2a,
-    0x77, 0x35, 0x7b, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0xae, 0xed,
-    0x17, 0x15, 0x1c, 0xb9, 0xbc, 0x51, 0x25, 0xa4,
-    0x22, 0xe9, 0x41, 0xde, 0x0c, 0xa0, 0xfc, 0x50,
-    0x11, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0xcf, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xd0, 0x96,
-    0x76, 0x71, 0x1c, 0xf3, 0xdb, 0x0a, 0x34, 0x40,
-    0x72, 0x0e ,0x16, 0x15, 0xc1, 0xf2, 0x2f, 0xbc,
-    0x3c, 0x72, 0x1d, 0xe5, 0x21, 0xe1, 0xb9, 0x9b,
-    0xa1, 0xbd, 0x55, 0x77, 0x40, 0x86, 0x42, 0x14,
-    0x7e, 0xd0, 0x96
-};
-
-static const u_char sha384_long2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x4f, 0x44, 0x0d, 0xb1, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xd2, 0x89,
-    0x9f, 0xa3, 0x35, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x15, 0xaa, 0x02,
-    0x5e, 0xe1, 0x77, 0xa7, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x4a, 0xaf,
-    0x38, 0xe4, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x4d, 0xe6, 0x60, 0xf5,
-    0xde, 0x8f, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0xb2, 0xfb, 0xd2, 0xa3,
-    0xcb, 0xff, 0xd2, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x12, 0x88, 0xc0
-};
-
-static const hash_testvector_t sha384_hash_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha384_short2_msg), sha384_short2_msg, sha384_short2_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha384_short4_msg), sha384_short4_msg, sha384_short4_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha384_long2_msg),  sha384_long2_msg,  sha384_long2_msg_digest  },
-    { 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-/* SHA-512 hash test vectors
- * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
- * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
- */
-
-static const u_char sha512_short2_msg[] = {
-    0xd0
-};
-
-static const u_char sha512_short2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x99, 0x92, 0x20, 0x29, 0x38, 0xe8, 0x82, 0xe7,
-    0x3e, 0x20, 0xf6, 0xb6, 0x9e, 0x68, 0xa0, 0xa7,
-    0x14, 0x90, 0x90, 0x42, 0x3d, 0x93, 0xc8, 0x1b,
-    0xab, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x67, 0x8d, 0x4a, 0xce, 0xee,
-    0xe5, 0x0e, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0xaf, 0xad, 0xa4, 0xc8,
-    0x5a, 0x54, 0xea, 0x83, 0x06, 0x82, 0x6c, 0x4a,
-    0xd6, 0xe7, 0x4c, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x63, 0x1b, 0xfa,
-    0x8a, 0x54, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0xb3, 0xfb, 0xba, 0x15
-};
-
-static const u_char sha512_short4_msg[] = {
-    0x8d, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0x0e, 0x38, 0x89, 0x19, 0x14,
-    0x91, 0x81, 0x6e, 0x9d, 0x98, 0xbf, 0xf0, 0xa0
-};
-
-static const u_char sha512_short4_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xcb, 0x0b, 0x67, 0xa4, 0xb8, 0x71, 0x2c, 0xd7,
-    0x3c, 0x9a, 0xab, 0xc0, 0xb1, 0x99, 0xe9, 0x26,
-    0x9b, 0x20, 0x84, 0x4a, 0xfb, 0x75, 0xac, 0xbd,
-    0xd1, 0xc1, 0x53, 0xc9, 0x82, 0x89, 0x24, 0xc3,
-    0xdd, 0xed, 0xaa, 0xfe, 0x66, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xdd,
-    0x0b, 0xc6, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x67, 0x73, 0x98,
-    0x82, 0x13, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x16, 0xf5, 0x17, 0xad,
-    0x0d, 0xe4, 0xb2, 0xf0, 0xc9, 0x5c, 0x90, 0xf8
-};
-
-static const u_char sha512_long2_msg[] = {
-    0xa5, 0x5f, 0x20, 0xc4, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xd1, 0x32,
-    0x80, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x82, 0x4e, 0x31,
-    0xa2, 0x30, 0x54, 0x32, 0xaa, 0x3d, 0x06, 0xd3,
-    0xe2, 0x82, 0xa8, 0xd8, 0x4e, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xde,
-    0x69, 0x74, 0xbf, 0x49, 0x54, 0x69, 0xfc, 0x7f,
-    0x33, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x8c, 0x26, 0xc4,
-    0x93, 0x60, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x7a, 0xf5, 0x65, 0x23,
-    0xac, 0xf6, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x03, 0xe5, 0x6f, 0xf2,
-    0xf8, 0x68, 0x00, 0x2b, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0x31, 0xed,
-    0xc4, 0x4d, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x22, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0xb3,
-    0xb2, 0x43, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0x7d, 0x92, 0x49,
-    0x36, 0x69, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xf8, 0x8d, 0x95,
-    0x19, 0xe4, 0xeb, 0x50, 0xa6, 0x44, 0xf8, 0xe4,
-    0xf9, 0x5e, 0xb0, 0xea, 0x95, 0xbc, 0x44, 0x65,
-    0xc8, 0x82, 0x1a, 0xac, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x15, 0xab,
-    0x49, 0x81, 0x16, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x2f,
-    0x96, 0x90, 0x87, 0xa1, 0x45, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0xcc,
-    0x9c, 0x67, 0xc2, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x32, 0x99, 0x41,
-    0x9c, 0xc4, 0x12, 0x8b, 0xe9, 0xa0, 0x77, 0xb3,
-    0xac, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x06, 0x4e, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x28,
-    0x35, 0x13, 0xdc, 0x06, 0xe7, 0x51, 0x5d, 0x0d,
-    0x73, 0x13, 0x2e, 0x9a, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xd3, 0xb1,
-    0xf8, 0xb2, 0x46, 0xf1, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x3f, 0xc7,
-    0x29, 0x41, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0x20, 0x98, 0xe8,
-    0xbf, 0x16, 0xf2, 0x68, 0xd6, 0x4f, 0x0b, 0x0f,
-    0x47, 0x07, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xa1, 0xa1, 0x79, 0x1b,
-    0xa2, 0xf3, 0xc0, 0xc7, 0x58, 0xe5, 0xf5, 0x51,
-    0x86, 0x3a, 0x96, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xad, 0x47, 0xd7,
-    0xfb, 0x40, 0xd2
-};
-
-static const u_char sha512_long2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xc6, 0x65, 0xbe, 0xfb, 0x36, 0xda, 0x18, 0x9d,
-    0x78, 0x82, 0x2d, 0x10, 0x52, 0x8c, 0xbf, 0x3b,
-    0x12, 0xb3, 0xee, 0xf7, 0x26, 0x03, 0x99, 0x09,
-    0xc1, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0x27, 0x0d, 0x48, 0x71, 0x93,
-    0x77, 0x96, 0x6b, 0x95, 0x7a, 0x87, 0x8e, 0x72,
-    0x05, 0x84, 0x77, 0x9a, 0x62, 0x82, 0x5c, 0x18,
-    0xda, 0x26, 0x41, 0x5e, 0x49, 0xa7, 0x17, 0x6a,
-    0x89, 0x4e, 0x75, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x14, 0x51, 0xf5
-};
-
-static const hash_testvector_t sha512_hash_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha512_short2_msg), sha512_short2_msg, sha512_short2_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha512_short4_msg), sha512_short4_msg, sha512_short4_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha512_long2_msg),  sha512_long2_msg,  sha512_long2_msg_digest  },
-    { 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-/* SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hmac test vectors
- * from RFC 4231 "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224,
- * HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512"
- * December 2005, M. Nystrom, RSA Security
- */
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac1_key[] = {
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac1_msg[] = {
-    0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac1_256[] = {
-    0xb0, 0x34, 0x4c, 0x61, 0xd8, 0xdb, 0x38, 0x53,
-    0x5c, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0xce, 0xaf, 0x0b, 0xf1, 0x2b,
-    0x88, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x83, 0x3d, 0xa7,
-    0x26, 0xe9, 0x37, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x32, 0xcf, 0xf7
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac1_384[] = {
-    0xaf, 0xd0, 0x39, 0x44, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x95, 0x62,
-    0x6b, 0x08, 0x25, 0xf4, 0xab ,0x46, 0x90, 0x7f,
-    0x15, 0xf9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x10, 0x1e, 0xc6,
-    0x82, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x9c,
-    0xfa, 0xea, 0x9e, 0xa9, 0x07, 0x6e, 0xde, 0x7f,
-    0x4a, 0xf1, 0x52, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0xfa, 0x9c, 0xb6
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac1_512[] = {
-    0x87, 0xaa, 0x7c, 0xde, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x61, 0x9d,
-    0x4f, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x6c, 0xb0,
-    0x23, 0x79, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0xce, 0x4e, 0xc2, 0x78,
-    0x7a, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x7c, 0xde,
-    0xda, 0xa8, 0x33, 0xb7, 0xd6, 0xb8, 0xa7, 0x02,
-    0x03, 0x8b, 0x27, 0x4e, 0xae, 0xa3, 0xf4, 0xe4,
-    0xbe, 0x9d, 0x91, 0x4e, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xf1, 0x70,
-    0x2e, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x3a, 0x12, 0x68, 0x54
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac2_key[] = {
-    0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac2_msg[] = {
-    0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20,
-    0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20,
-    0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68,
-    0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac2_256[] = {
-    0x5b, 0xdc, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xbf, 0x60, 0x75, 0x4e,
-    0x6a, 0x04, 0x24, 0x26, 0x08, 0x95, 0x75, 0xc7,
-    0x5a, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x27, 0x39, 0x83,
-    0x9d, 0xec, 0x58, 0xb9, 0x64, 0xec, 0x38, 0x43
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac2_384[] = {
-    0xaf, 0x45, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x76, 0x48, 0x40, 0x31,
-    0x61, 0x7f, 0x78, 0xd2, 0xb5, 0x8a, 0x6b, 0x1b,
-    0x9c, 0x7e, 0xf4, 0x64, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x1b, 0x47,
-    0xe4, 0x2e, 0xc3, 0x73, 0x63, 0x22, 0x44, 0x5e,
-    0x8e, 0x22, 0x40, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x69, 0xe2, 0xc7,
-    0x8b, 0x32, 0x39, 0xec, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x49
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac2_512[] = {
-    0x16, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0x19, 0xe2,
-    0xe3, 0x95, 0xfb, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x56, 0xe0, 0xa3,
-    0x87, 0xbd, 0x64, 0x22, 0x2e, 0x83, 0x1f, 0xd6,
-    0x10, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0xea, 0x25, 0x05, 0x54,
-    0x97, 0x58, 0xbf, 0x75, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x99, 0x4a,
-    0x6d, 0x03, 0x4f, 0x65, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe6, 0xfd,
-    0xca, 0xea, 0xb1, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x4a, 0x6b, 0x4b,
-    0x63, 0x6e, 0x07, 0x0a, 0x38, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0x37
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac3_key[] = {
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac3_msg[] = {
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac3_256[] = {
-    0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46,
-    0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7,
-    0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0x22,
-    0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac3_384[] = {
-    0x88, 0x06, 0x26, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x8a,
-    0x0a, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xe0, 0x14, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x6f,
-    0x0a, 0xa6, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xeb,
-    0xe8, 0x3e, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x59, 0x66, 0x14, 0x4b,
-    0x2a, 0x5a, 0xb3, 0x9d, 0xc1, 0x38, 0x14, 0xb9,
-    0x4e, 0x3a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x27
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac3_512[] = {
-    0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84,
-    0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9,
-    0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36,
-    0x55, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39,
-    0xbf, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x82, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x22, 0xc8,
-    0x06, 0xb4, 0x85, 0xa4, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x07,
-    0xb9, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x37, 0xbe, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x26,
-    0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x32, 0x92, 0xfb
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac4_key[] = {
-    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
-    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
-    0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18,
-    0x19
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac4_msg[] = {
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd 
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac4_256[] = {
-    0x82, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x38, 0x9a, 0x44, 0x3c, 0x0e,
-    0xa4, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x98, 0x99, 0xf2, 0x08, 0x3a,
-    0x85, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0x78, 0xf8, 0x07,
-    0x7a, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0xf4, 0x67, 0x29, 0x66, 0x5b
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac4_384[] = {
-    0x3e, 0x8a, 0x69, 0xb7, 0x78, 0x3c, 0x25, 0x85,
-    0x19, 0x33, 0xab, 0x62, 0x90, 0xaf, 0x6c, 0xa7,
-    0x7a, 0x99, 0x81, 0x48, 0x08, 0x50, 0x00, 0x9c,
-    0xc5, 0x57, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0x1f, 0x57, 0x3b, 0x4e,
-    0x68, 0x01, 0xdd, 0x23, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x79,
-    0xcc, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x86, 0xc6, 0x74, 0xcf, 0xfb
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac4_512[] = {
-    0xb0, 0xba, 0x46, 0x56, 0x37, 0x45, 0x8c, 0x69,
-    0x90, 0xe5, 0xa8, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1d, 0x4a, 0xf7,
-    0xe5, 0x76, 0xd9, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x4b, 0x87, 0x2d,
-    0xe7, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x50, 0x36, 0x1e, 0xe3, 0xdb,
-    0xa9, 0x1c, 0xa5, 0xc1, 0x1a, 0xa2, 0x5e, 0xb4,
-    0xd6, 0x79, 0x27, 0x5c, 0xc5, 0x78, 0x80, 0x63,
-    0xa5, 0xf1, 0x97, 0x41, 0x12, 0x0c, 0x4f, 0x2d,
-    0xe2, 0xad, 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x10, 0xa2, 0x98, 0xdd
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac6_key[] = {
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac6_msg[] = {
-    0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x55, 0x73, 0x69,
-    0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65,
-    0x72, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x42,
-    0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x69, 0x7a,
-    0x65, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x2d, 0x20,
-    0x48, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79,
-    0x20, 0x46, 0x69, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac6_256[] = {
-    0x60, 0xe4, 0x31, 0x59, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0x7f,
-    0x0d, 0x8a, 0x26, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x7f,
-    0x8e, 0x0b, 0xc6, 0x21, 0x37, 0x28, 0xc5, 0x14,
-    0x05, 0x46, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x54
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac6_384[] = {
-    0x4e, 0xce, 0x08, 0x44, 0x85, 0x81, 0x3e, 0x90,
-    0x88, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0x3a, 0x04, 0x1b, 0xc5, 0xb4,
-    0x4f, 0x9e, 0xf1, 0x01, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x58, 0x8f,
-    0x3c, 0xd1, 0x1f, 0x05, 0x03, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0xc6,
-    0x0c, 0x2e, 0xf6, 0xab, 0x40, 0x30, 0xfe, 0x82,
-    0x96, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x63, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x52
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac6_512[] = {
-    0x80, 0xb2, 0x42, 0x63, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xeb,
-    0xb7, 0x14, 0x93, 0xc1, 0xdd, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0xb4,
-    0x9b, 0x46, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0xee, 0xc1,
-    0x12, 0x1b, 0x01, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x52,
-    0x6b, 0x56, 0xd0, 0x37, 0xe0, 0x5f, 0x25, 0x98,
-    0xbd, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x21, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0x1e, 0x52,
-    0x95, 0xe6, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xf6, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0xec,
-    0x8b, 0x91, 0x5a, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x65, 0x98
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac7_msg[] = {
-    0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
-    0x61, 0x20, 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x75,
-    0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x61, 0x20, 0x6c,
-    0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
-    0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b,
-    0x2d, 0x73, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65,
-    0x79, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x20,
-    0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74,
-    0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63,
-    0x6b, 0x2d, 0x73, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x20, 0x64,
-    0x61, 0x74, 0x61, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65,
-    0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x65,
-    0x64, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x62, 0x65,
-    0x20, 0x68, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20,
-    0x62, 0x65, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62,
-    0x65, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x75, 0x73, 0x65,
-    0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
-    0x20, 0x48, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x43, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c,
-    0x67, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6d, 0x2e
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac7_256[] = {
-    0x9b, 0x09, 0xff, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xcb,
-    0x27, 0x63, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x44,
-    0xbf, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x64, 0x4f, 0x07, 0x13, 0x93,
-    0x8a, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x35, 0xe2
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac7_384[] = {
-    0x66, 0x17, 0x17, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x02, 0x0d,
-    0x35, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x2c,
-    0x60, 0x24, 0x20, 0xfe, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0x9a,
-    0xdc, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x82, 0x46, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xc5,
-    0xa6, 0x78, 0xcc, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x17, 0x6d,
-    0x38, 0x60, 0xe6, 0x11, 0x0c, 0x46, 0x52, 0x3e
-};
-
-static const u_char sha2_hmac7_512[] = {
-    0xe3, 0x7b, 0x6a, 0x77, 0x5d, 0xc8, 0x7d, 0xba,
-    0xa4, 0xdf, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xfd,
-    0xde, 0xbd, 0x71, 0xf8, 0x86, 0x72, 0x89, 0x86,
-    0x5d, 0xf5, 0xa3, 0x2d, 0x20, 0xcd, 0xc9, 0x44,
-    0xb6, 0x02, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x3c, 0x49, 0x82, 0xb1,
-    0x0d, 0x5e, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xde, 0x15,
-    0x13, 0x46, 0x76, 0xfb, 0x6d, 0xe0, 0x44, 0x60,
-    0x65, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x40, 0xfa, 0x8c, 0x6a, 0x58
-};
-
-static const hmac_testvector_t sha256_hmac_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac1_key), sha2_hmac1_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac1_msg), sha2_hmac1_msg, sha2_hmac1_256 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac2_key), sha2_hmac2_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac2_msg), sha2_hmac2_msg, sha2_hmac2_256 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac3_key), sha2_hmac3_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac3_msg), sha2_hmac3_msg, sha2_hmac3_256 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac4_key), sha2_hmac4_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac4_msg), sha2_hmac4_msg, sha2_hmac4_256 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac6_msg), sha2_hmac6_msg, sha2_hmac6_256 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac7_msg), sha2_hmac7_msg, sha2_hmac7_256 },
-    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-static const hmac_testvector_t sha384_hmac_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac1_key), sha2_hmac1_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac1_msg), sha2_hmac1_msg, sha2_hmac1_384 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac2_key), sha2_hmac2_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac2_msg), sha2_hmac2_msg, sha2_hmac2_384 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac3_key), sha2_hmac3_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac3_msg), sha2_hmac3_msg, sha2_hmac3_384 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac4_key), sha2_hmac4_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac4_msg), sha2_hmac4_msg, sha2_hmac4_384 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac6_msg), sha2_hmac6_msg, sha2_hmac6_384 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac7_msg), sha2_hmac7_msg, sha2_hmac7_384 },
-    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-static const hmac_testvector_t sha512_hmac_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac1_key), sha2_hmac1_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac1_msg), sha2_hmac1_msg, sha2_hmac1_512 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac2_key), sha2_hmac2_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac2_msg), sha2_hmac2_msg, sha2_hmac2_512 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac3_key), sha2_hmac3_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac3_msg), sha2_hmac3_msg, sha2_hmac3_512 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac4_key), sha2_hmac4_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac4_msg), sha2_hmac4_msg, sha2_hmac4_512 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac6_msg), sha2_hmac6_msg, sha2_hmac6_512 },
-    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac7_msg), sha2_hmac7_msg, sha2_hmac7_512 },
-    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_256 = {
-	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
-	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_256,
-	algo_next: NULL,
-	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(sha256_context),
-	hash_block_size:  SHA2_256_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	hash_digest_size: SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	hash_testvectors: sha256_hash_testvectors,
-	hmac_testvectors: sha256_hmac_testvectors,
-	hash_init: (void (*)(void *))sha256_init,
-	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_char *, size_t ))sha256_write,
-	hash_final:(void (*)(u_char *, void *))sha256_hash_final
-};
-
-struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_384 = {
-	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
-	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_384,
-	algo_next: NULL,
-	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(sha512_context),
-	hash_block_size:  SHA2_384_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	hash_digest_size: SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	hash_testvectors: sha384_hash_testvectors,
-	hmac_testvectors: sha384_hmac_testvectors,
-	hash_init: (void (*)(void *))sha384_init,
-	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_char *, size_t ))sha512_write,
-	hash_final:(void (*)(u_char *, void *))sha384_hash_final
-};
-
-struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_512 = {
-	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
-	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_512,
-	algo_next: NULL,
-	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(sha512_context),
-	hash_block_size:  SHA2_512_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	hash_digest_size: SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	hash_testvectors: sha512_hash_testvectors,
-	hmac_testvectors: sha512_hmac_testvectors,
-	hash_init: (void (*)(void *))sha512_init,
-	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_char *, size_t ))sha512_write,
-	hash_final:(void (*)(u_char *, void *))sha512_hash_final
-};
-
-int ike_alg_sha2_init(void);
-
-int
-ike_alg_sha2_init(void)
-{
-    int ret
-;
-    ret = ike_alg_register_hash(&hash_desc_sha2_256);
-    if (ret)
-	goto out;
-    ret = ike_alg_register_hash(&hash_desc_sha2_384);
-    if (ret)
-	goto out;
-    ret = ike_alg_register_hash(&hash_desc_sha2_512);
-
-out:
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
-IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_sha2_init
-*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 1788bc394..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "libtwofish/twofish_cbc.h"
-#include "alg_info.h"
-#include "ike_alg.h"
-
-#define  TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(128/BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define  TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
-#define  TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
-#define  TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
-
-static void
-do_twofish(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_size, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
-{
-    twofish_context twofish_ctx;
-    char iv_bak[TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    char *new_iv = NULL;	/* logic will avoid copy to NULL */
-
-    twofish_set_key(&twofish_ctx, key, key_size);
-    /*	
-     *	my TWOFISH cbc does not touch passed IV (optimization for
-     *	ESP handling), so I must "emulate" des-like IV
-     *	crunching
-     */
-    if (!enc)
-	    memcpy(new_iv=iv_bak, 
-			    (char*) buf + buf_size-TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-			    TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-    twofish_cbc_encrypt(&twofish_ctx, buf, buf, buf_size, iv, enc);
-
-    if (enc)
-	    new_iv = (char*) buf + buf_size-TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-    memcpy(iv, new_iv, TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-}
-
-struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_twofish = 
-{
-	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
-	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC,
-	algo_next: 	NULL,
-	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(twofish_context),
-        enc_blocksize: 	TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-        keydeflen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
-        keyminlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN,
-	keymaxlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
-	do_crypt: 	do_twofish,
-};
-
-struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_twofish_ssh =
-{
-	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
-	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH,
-	algo_next: 	NULL,
-	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(twofish_context),
-        enc_blocksize: 	TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-        keydeflen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
-        keyminlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN,
-	keymaxlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
-	do_crypt: 	do_twofish,
-};
-
-int ike_alg_twofish_init(void);
-
-int
-ike_alg_twofish_init(void)
-{
-    int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&encrypt_desc_twofish);
-
-    if (ike_alg_register_enc(&encrypt_desc_twofish_ssh) < 0)
-	plog("ike_alg_twofish_init(): Experimental OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH activation failed");
-
-    return ret;
-}
-/*
-IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_twofish_init
-*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alginit.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alginit.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 8784bf31b..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alginit.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-extern int ike_alg_init(void); 		int ike_alg_init(void) {
-{ extern int ike_alg_aes_init (void); ike_alg_aes_init();}
-{ extern int ike_alg_blowfish_init (void); ike_alg_blowfish_init();}
-{ extern int ike_alg_serpent_init (void); ike_alg_serpent_init();}
-{ extern int ike_alg_sha2_init (void); ike_alg_sha2_init();}
-{ extern int ike_alg_twofish_init (void); ike_alg_twofish_init();}
-return 0;}
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg_info.c b/src/pluto/alg_info.c
index cd02d2358..a85a18905 100644
--- a/src/pluto/alg_info.c
+++ b/src/pluto/alg_info.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /*
  * Algorithm info parsing and creation functions
- * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * Copyright (C) JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- * 
- * RCSID $Id: alg_info.c 3846 2008-04-18 17:01:45Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -27,390 +26,187 @@
 
 #include <ctype.h>
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 #include <pfkeyv2.h>
 
+#include <utils.h>
+#include <utils/lexparser.h>
+#include <crypto/diffie_hellman.h>
+#include <crypto/transform.h>
+#include <crypto/proposal/proposal_keywords.h>
+
+
 #include "alg_info.h"
 #include "constants.h"
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "whack.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include "kernel_alg.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
-#else
-/*
- *	macros/functions for compilation without pluto (eg: spi for manual conns)
- */
-#include <assert.h>
-#define passert(x) assert(x)
-extern int debug;	/* eg: spi.c */
-#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (debug) { action ; } }
-#define DBG_log(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
-#define RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-#define loglog(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, ##args);
-#define alloc_thing(thing, name) alloc_bytes(sizeof (thing), name)
-void * alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name) {
-	void *p=malloc(size);
-        if (p == NULL)
-		fprintf(stderr, "unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s",
-			(unsigned long) size, name);
-	memset(p, '\0', size);
-	return p;
-}
-#define pfreeany(ptr) free(ptr)
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
 
 /*
  * sadb/ESP aa attrib converters
  */
-int
-alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(int auth)
-{
-    int sadb_aalg = 0;
-
-    switch(auth) {
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
-	    sadb_aalg = auth + 1;
-	    break;
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD:
-	    sadb_aalg = auth;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    /* loose ... */
-	    sadb_aalg = auth;
-    }
-    return sadb_aalg;
-}
-
-int /* __attribute__ ((unused)) */
-alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(int sadb_aalg)
-{
-    int auth = 0;
-
-    switch(sadb_aalg) {
-	case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
-	case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
-	    auth = sadb_aalg - 1;
-	    break;
-	/* since they are the same ...  :)  */
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512:
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD:
-	    auth = sadb_aalg;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    /* loose ... */
-	    auth = sadb_aalg;
-    }
-    return auth;
-}
-
-/*
- * Search enum_name array with in prefixed uppercase
- */
-static int
-enum_search_prefix (enum_names *ed, const char *prefix, const char *str, int strlen)
-{
-    char buf[64];
-    char *ptr;
-    int ret;
-    int len = sizeof(buf) - 1;	/* reserve space for final \0 */
-
-    for (ptr = buf; *prefix; *ptr++ = *prefix++, len--);
-    while (strlen-- && len-- && *str) *ptr++ = toupper(*str++);
-    *ptr = 0;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("enum_search_prefix () calling enum_search(%p, \"%s\")"
-	    , ed, buf)
-    )
-    ret = enum_search(ed, buf);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Search enum_name array with in prefixed and postfixed uppercase
- */
-static int
-enum_search_ppfix (enum_names *ed, const char *prefix, const char *postfix, const char *str, int strlen)
-{
-    char buf[64];
-    char *ptr;
-    int ret;
-    int len = sizeof(buf) - 1;	/* reserve space for final \0 */
-
-    for (ptr = buf; *prefix; *ptr++ = *prefix++, len--);
-    while (strlen-- && len-- && *str) *ptr++ = toupper(*str++);
-    while (len-- && *postfix) *ptr++ = *postfix++;
-    *ptr = 0;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("enum_search_ppfixi () calling enum_search(%p, \"%s\")"
-	    , ed, buf)
-    )
-    ret = enum_search(ed, buf);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Search esp_transformid_names for a match, eg:
- * 	"3des" <=> "ESP_3DES"
- */
-#define ESP_MAGIC_ID 0x00ffff01
-
-static int
-ealg_getbyname_esp(const char *const str, int len)
+int alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(int auth)
 {
-    if (!str || !*str)
-	return -1;
-
-    /* leave special case for eg:  "id248" string */
-    if (strcmp("id", str) == 0)
-	return ESP_MAGIC_ID;
-
-    return enum_search_prefix(&esp_transformid_names, "ESP_", str, len);
+	int sadb_aalg = 0;
+
+	switch(auth) {
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+			sadb_aalg = auth + 1;
+			break;
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD:
+			sadb_aalg = auth;
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* loose ... */
+			sadb_aalg = auth;
+	}
+	return sadb_aalg;
 }
 
-/*
- * Search auth_alg_names for a match, eg:
- * 	"md5" <=> "AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5"
- */
-static int
-aalg_getbyname_esp(const char *const str, int len)
+int alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(int sadb_aalg)
 {
-    int ret;
-    unsigned num;
-
-    if (!str || !*str)
-	return -1;
-
-    /* interpret 'SHA' as 'SHA1' */
-    if (strncasecmp("SHA", str, len) == 0)
-	return AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1;
-
-    /* interpret 'AESXCBC' as 'AES_XCBC_MAC' */
-    if (strncasecmp("AESXCBC", str, len) == 0)
-	return AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
-
-    ret = enum_search_prefix(&auth_alg_names,"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_", str ,len);
-    if (ret >= 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    ret = enum_search_prefix(&auth_alg_names,"AUTH_ALGORITHM_", str, len);
-    if (ret >= 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    sscanf(str, "id%d%n", &ret, &num);
-    return (ret >= 0 && num != strlen(str))? -1 : ret;
+	int auth = 0;
+
+	switch(sadb_aalg) {
+		case SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC:
+		case SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC:
+			auth = sadb_aalg - 1;
+			break;
+		/* since they are the same ...  :)  */
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512:
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD:
+			auth = sadb_aalg;
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* loose ... */
+			auth = sadb_aalg;
+	}
+	return auth;
 }
 
-static int
-modp_getbyname_esp(const char *const str, int len)
+void alg_info_free(struct alg_info *alg_info)
 {
-    int ret;
-
-    if (!str || !*str)
-	return -1;
-    
-    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_group_names,"OAKLEY_GROUP_", str, len);
-    if (ret >= 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    ret = enum_search_ppfix(&oakley_group_names, "OAKLEY_GROUP_", " (extension)", str, len);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-void 
-alg_info_free(struct alg_info *alg_info)
-{
-    pfreeany(alg_info);
+	free(alg_info);
 }
 
 /*
  * Raw add routine: only checks for no duplicates
  */
-static void
-__alg_info_esp_add (struct alg_info_esp *alg_info, int ealg_id, unsigned ek_bits, int aalg_id, unsigned ak_bits)
+static void __alg_info_esp_add(struct alg_info_esp *alg_info, int ealg_id,
+							   unsigned ek_bits, int aalg_id, unsigned ak_bits)
 {
-    struct esp_info *esp_info=alg_info->esp;
-    unsigned cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt, i;
+	struct esp_info *esp_info = alg_info->esp;
+	unsigned cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt, i;
 
-    /* check for overflows */
-    passert(cnt < elemsof(alg_info->esp));
+	/* check for overflows */
+	passert(cnt < countof(alg_info->esp));
 
-    /* dont add duplicates */
-    for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
-    {
-	if (esp_info[i].esp_ealg_id == ealg_id
-	&& (!ek_bits || esp_info[i].esp_ealg_keylen == ek_bits)
-	&& esp_info[i].esp_aalg_id == aalg_id
-	&& (!ak_bits || esp_info[i].esp_aalg_keylen == ak_bits))
-	    return;
-    }
+	/* dont add duplicates */
+	for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
+	{
+		if (esp_info[i].esp_ealg_id == ealg_id
+		&& (!ek_bits || esp_info[i].esp_ealg_keylen == ek_bits)
+		&& esp_info[i].esp_aalg_id == aalg_id
+		&& (!ak_bits || esp_info[i].esp_aalg_keylen == ak_bits))
+		{
+			return;
+		}
+	}
 
-    esp_info[cnt].esp_ealg_id = ealg_id;
-    esp_info[cnt].esp_ealg_keylen = ek_bits;
-    esp_info[cnt].esp_aalg_id = aalg_id;
-    esp_info[cnt].esp_aalg_keylen = ak_bits;
+	esp_info[cnt].esp_ealg_id = ealg_id;
+	esp_info[cnt].esp_ealg_keylen = ek_bits;
+	esp_info[cnt].esp_aalg_id = aalg_id;
+	esp_info[cnt].esp_aalg_keylen = ak_bits;
 
-    /* sadb values */
-    esp_info[cnt].encryptalg = ealg_id;
-    esp_info[cnt].authalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(aalg_id);
-    alg_info->alg_info_cnt++;
+	/* sadb values */
+	esp_info[cnt].encryptalg = ealg_id;
+	esp_info[cnt].authalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(aalg_id);
+	alg_info->alg_info_cnt++;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("__alg_info_esp_add() ealg=%d aalg=%d cnt=%d"
-	    , ealg_id, aalg_id, alg_info->alg_info_cnt)
-    )
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("esp alg added: %s_%d/%s, cnt=%d",
+				enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, ealg_id), ek_bits,
+				enum_show(&auth_alg_names, aalg_id),
+				alg_info->alg_info_cnt)
+	)
 }
 
 /*
  * Add ESP alg info _with_ logic (policy):
  */
-static void
-alg_info_esp_add (struct alg_info *alg_info, int ealg_id, int ek_bits, int aalg_id, int ak_bits)
+static void alg_info_esp_add(struct alg_info *alg_info, int ealg_id,
+							 int ek_bits, int aalg_id, int ak_bits)
 {
-    /* Policy: default to 3DES */
-    if (ealg_id == 0)
-	ealg_id = ESP_3DES;
-
-    if (ealg_id > 0)
-    {
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-	if (aalg_id > 0)
-#else
-	/* Allow no auth for manual conns (from spi.c) */
-	if (aalg_id >= 0)
-#endif
-	    __alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
-				ealg_id, ek_bits,
-				aalg_id, ak_bits);
-	else
+	/* Policy: default to 3DES */
+	if (ealg_id == 0)
 	{
-	    /* Policy: default to MD5 and SHA1 */
-	    __alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
-				ealg_id, ek_bits,
-				AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, ak_bits);
-	    __alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
-				ealg_id, ek_bits,
-				AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1, ak_bits);
+		ealg_id = ESP_3DES;
+	}
+	if (ealg_id > 0)
+	{
+		if (aalg_id > 0)
+		{
+			__alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
+								ealg_id, ek_bits,
+								aalg_id, ak_bits);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* Policy: default to MD5 and SHA1 */
+			__alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
+								ealg_id, ek_bits,
+								AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, ak_bits);
+			__alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
+								ealg_id, ek_bits,
+								AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1, ak_bits);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-}
-
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-/**************************************
- *
- *	IKE alg
- *
- *************************************/
-/*
- * Search oakley_enc_names for a match, eg:
- * 	"3des_cbc" <=> "OAKLEY_3DES_CBC"
- */
-static int
-ealg_getbyname_ike(const char *const str, int len)
-{
-    int ret;
-
-    if (!str || !*str)
-	return -1;
-
-    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_enc_names,"OAKLEY_", str, len);
-    if (ret >= 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    ret = enum_search_ppfix(&oakley_enc_names, "OAKLEY_", "_CBC", str, len);
-    return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Search  oakley_hash_names for a match, eg:
- * 	"md5" <=> "OAKLEY_MD5"
- */
-static int
-aalg_getbyname_ike(const char *const str, int len)
-{
-    int ret;
-    unsigned num;
-
-    if (!str || !*str)
-	return -1;
-
-    /* interpret 'SHA1' as 'SHA' */
-    if (strncasecmp("SHA1", str, len) == 0)
-	return enum_search(&oakley_hash_names, "OAKLEY_SHA");
-
-    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_hash_names,"OAKLEY_", str, len);
-    if (ret >= 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    sscanf(str, "id%d%n", &ret, &num);
-    return (ret >=0 && num != strlen(str))? -1 : ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Search oakley_group_names for a match, eg:
- * 	"modp1024" <=> "OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024"
- */
-static int
-modp_getbyname_ike(const char *const str, int len)
-{
-    int ret;
-
-    if (!str || !*str)
-	return -1;
-
-    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_group_names,"OAKLEY_GROUP_", str, len);
-    if (ret >= 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    ret = enum_search_ppfix(&oakley_group_names, "OAKLEY_GROUP_", " (extension)", str, len);
-    return ret;
 }
 
-static void
-__alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info_ike *alg_info, int ealg_id, unsigned ek_bits, int aalg_id, unsigned ak_bits, int modp_id)
+static void __alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info_ike *alg_info, int ealg_id,
+								unsigned ek_bits, int aalg_id, unsigned ak_bits,
+								int modp_id)
 {
-    struct ike_info *ike_info = alg_info->ike;
-    unsigned cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
-    unsigned i;
+	struct ike_info *ike_info = alg_info->ike;
+	unsigned cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
+	unsigned i;
 
-    /* check for overflows */
-    passert(cnt < elemsof(alg_info->ike));
+	/* check for overflows */
+	passert(cnt < countof(alg_info->ike));
 
-    /* dont add duplicates */
-   for (i = 0;i < cnt; i++)
+	/* dont add duplicates */
+   for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
    {
-	if (ike_info[i].ike_ealg == ealg_id
-	&& (!ek_bits || ike_info[i].ike_eklen == ek_bits)
-	&&  ike_info[i].ike_halg == aalg_id
-	&& (!ak_bits || ike_info[i].ike_hklen == ak_bits)
-	&&  ike_info[i].ike_modp==modp_id)
-	    return;
-    }
+		if (ike_info[i].ike_ealg == ealg_id
+		&& (!ek_bits || ike_info[i].ike_eklen == ek_bits)
+		&&  ike_info[i].ike_halg == aalg_id
+		&& (!ak_bits || ike_info[i].ike_hklen == ak_bits)
+		&&  ike_info[i].ike_modp==modp_id)
+			return;
+	}
 
-    ike_info[cnt].ike_ealg = ealg_id;
-    ike_info[cnt].ike_eklen = ek_bits;
-    ike_info[cnt].ike_halg = aalg_id;
-    ike_info[cnt].ike_hklen = ak_bits;
-    ike_info[cnt].ike_modp = modp_id;
-    alg_info->alg_info_cnt++;
+	ike_info[cnt].ike_ealg = ealg_id;
+	ike_info[cnt].ike_eklen = ek_bits;
+	ike_info[cnt].ike_halg = aalg_id;
+	ike_info[cnt].ike_hklen = ak_bits;
+	ike_info[cnt].ike_modp = modp_id;
+	alg_info->alg_info_cnt++;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("__alg_info_ike_add() ealg=%d aalg=%d modp_id=%d, cnt=%d"
-		, ealg_id, aalg_id, modp_id
-		, alg_info->alg_info_cnt)
-    )
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("ikg alg added: %s_%d/%s/%s, cnt=%d",
+				enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, ealg_id), ek_bits,
+				enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, aalg_id),
+				enum_show(&oakley_group_names, modp_id),
+				alg_info->alg_info_cnt)
+	)
 }
 
 /*
@@ -419,792 +215,449 @@ __alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info_ike *alg_info, int ealg_id, unsigned ek_bits
  */
 
 static int default_ike_groups[] = { 
-    OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536,
-    OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024
+	MODP_1536_BIT,
+	MODP_1024_BIT
 };
 
-/*	
- *	Add IKE alg info _with_ logic (policy):
+/*      
+ *      Add IKE alg info _with_ logic (policy):
  */
-static void
-alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info *alg_info, int ealg_id, int ek_bits, int aalg_id, int ak_bits, int modp_id)
+static void alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info *alg_info, int ealg_id,
+							  int ek_bits, int aalg_id, int ak_bits, int modp_id)
 {
-    int i = 0;
-    int n_groups = elemsof(default_ike_groups);
-
-    /* if specified modp_id avoid loop over default_ike_groups */
-    if (modp_id)
-    {
-	n_groups=0;
-	goto in_loop;
-    }
-	
-    for (; n_groups--; i++)
-    {
-	modp_id = default_ike_groups[i];
-in_loop:
-	/* Policy: default to 3DES */
-	if (ealg_id == 0)
-	    ealg_id = OAKLEY_3DES_CBC;
+	int i = 0;
+	int n_groups = countof(default_ike_groups);
 
-	if (ealg_id > 0)
+	/* if specified modp_id avoid loop over default_ike_groups */
+	if (modp_id)
 	{
-	    if (aalg_id > 0)
-		__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
-				   ealg_id, ek_bits,
-				   aalg_id, ak_bits,
-				   modp_id);
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* Policy: default to MD5 and SHA */
-		__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
-				   ealg_id, ek_bits,
-				   OAKLEY_MD5, ak_bits,
-				   modp_id);
-		__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
-				   ealg_id, ek_bits,
-				   OAKLEY_SHA, ak_bits,
-				   modp_id);
-	    }
+		n_groups=0;
+		goto in_loop;
+	}
+		
+	for (; n_groups--; i++)
+	{
+		modp_id = default_ike_groups[i];
+in_loop:
+		/* Policy: default to 3DES */
+		if (ealg_id == 0)
+		{
+			ealg_id = OAKLEY_3DES_CBC;
+		}
+		if (ealg_id > 0)
+		{
+			if (aalg_id > 0)
+			{
+				__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
+								   ealg_id, ek_bits,
+								   aalg_id, ak_bits,
+								   modp_id);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* Policy: default to MD5 and SHA */
+				__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
+								   ealg_id, ek_bits,
+								   OAKLEY_MD5, ak_bits,
+								   modp_id);
+				__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
+								   ealg_id, ek_bits,
+								   OAKLEY_SHA, ak_bits,
+								   modp_id);
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-}
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
-
-/*	
- *	Creates a new alg_info by parsing passed string		
- */
-enum parser_state_esp {
-    ST_INI,
-    ST_EA,		/* encrypt algo   */
-    ST_EA_END,
-    ST_EK,		/* enc. key length */
-    ST_EK_END,
-    ST_AA,		/* auth algo */
-    ST_AA_END,
-    ST_AK,		/* auth. key length */
-    ST_AK_END,
-    ST_MODP,	/* modp spec */
-    ST_FLAG_STRICT,
-    ST_END,
-    ST_EOF,
-    ST_ERR
-};
-
-static const char *parser_state_esp_names[] = {
-    "ST_INI",
-    "ST_EA",
-    "ST_EA_END",
-    "ST_EK",
-    "ST_EK_END",
-    "ST_AA",
-    "ST_AA_END",
-    "ST_AK",
-    "ST_AK_END",
-    "ST_MOPD",
-    "ST_FLAG_STRICT",
-    "ST_END",
-    "ST_EOF",
-    "ST_ERR"
-};
-
-static const char*
-parser_state_name_esp(enum parser_state_esp state)
-{
-    return parser_state_esp_names[state];
-}
-
-/* XXX:jjo to implement different parser for ESP and IKE */
-struct parser_context {
-    unsigned state, old_state;
-    unsigned protoid;
-    char ealg_buf[16];
-    char aalg_buf[16];
-    char modp_buf[16];
-    int (*ealg_getbyname)(const char *const str, int len);
-    int (*aalg_getbyname)(const char *const str, int len);
-    int (*modp_getbyname)(const char *const str, int len);
-    char *ealg_str;
-    char *aalg_str;
-    char *modp_str;
-    int eklen;
-    int aklen;
-    int ch;
-    const char *err;
-};
-
-static inline void 
-parser_set_state(struct parser_context *p_ctx, enum parser_state_esp state)
-{
-    if (state != p_ctx->state)
-    {
-	p_ctx->old_state = p_ctx->state;
-	p_ctx->state = state;
-    }
 }
 
-static int 
-parser_machine(struct parser_context *p_ctx)
+static status_t alg_info_add(chunk_t alg, unsigned protoid,
+							 int *ealg, size_t *ealg_keysize,
+							 int *aalg, size_t *aalg_keysize, int *dh_group)
 {
-    int ch = p_ctx->ch;
-
-    /* special 'absolute' cases */
-    p_ctx->err = "No error.";
+	const proposal_token_t *token = proposal_get_token(alg.ptr, alg.len);
 
-    /* chars that end algo strings */
-    switch (ch){
-    case 0:	/* end-of-string */
-    case '!':	/* flag as strict algo list */
-    case ',':	/* algo string separator */
-	switch (p_ctx->state) {
-	case ST_EA:
-	case ST_EK:
-	case ST_AA:
-	case ST_AK:
-	case ST_MODP:
-	case ST_FLAG_STRICT:
-	    {
-		enum parser_state_esp next_state = 0;
-
-		switch (ch) {
-		case 0:
-		    next_state = ST_EOF;
-		    break;
-		case ',':
-		    next_state = ST_END;
-		    break;
-		case '!':
-		    next_state = ST_FLAG_STRICT;
-		    break;
-	        }
-	        /* ch? parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_END) : parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EOF) ; */
-	        parser_set_state(p_ctx, next_state);
-	        goto out;
-	    }
-	default:
-	    p_ctx->err = "String ended with invalid char";
-	    goto err;
-	}
-    }
-re_eval:
-    switch (p_ctx->state) {
-    case ST_INI:
-	if (isspace(ch))
-	    break;
-	if (isalnum(ch))
-	{
-	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str++) = ch;
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EA);
-	    break;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "No alphanum. char initially found";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_EA:
-	if (isalpha(ch) || ch == '_')
-	{
-	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str++) = ch;
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (isdigit(ch))
-	{
-	    /* bravely switch to enc keylen */
-	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str) = 0;
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EK);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	if (ch == '-')
-	{
-	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str) = 0;
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EA_END);
-	    break;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "No valid char found after enc alg string";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_EA_END:
-	if (isdigit(ch))
-	{
-	    /* bravely switch to enc keylen */
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EK);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	if (isalpha(ch))
-	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AA);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "No alphanum char found after enc alg separator";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_EK:
-	if (ch == '-')
-	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EK_END);
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (isdigit(ch))
-	{
-	    p_ctx->eklen = p_ctx->eklen*10 + ch - '0';
-	    break;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non digit or valid separator found while reading enc keylen";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_EK_END:
-	if (isalpha(ch))
-	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AA);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non alpha char found after enc keylen end separator";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_AA:
-	if (ch == '-')
-	{
-	    *(p_ctx->aalg_str++) = 0;
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AA_END);
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (isalnum(ch) || ch == '_')
-	{
-	    *(p_ctx->aalg_str++) = ch;
-	    break;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non alphanum or valid separator found in auth string";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_AA_END:
-	if (isdigit(ch))
-	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AK);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	/* Only allow modpXXXX string if we have a modp_getbyname method */
-	if ((p_ctx->modp_getbyname) && isalpha(ch))
-	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_MODP);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non initial digit found for auth keylen";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_AK:
-	if (ch=='-')
-	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AK_END);
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (isdigit(ch))
+	if (token == NULL)
 	{
-	    p_ctx->aklen = p_ctx->aklen*10 + ch - '0';
-	    break;
+		return FAILED;
 	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non digit found for auth keylen";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_AK_END:
-	/* Only allow modpXXXX string if we have a modp_getbyname method */
-	if ((p_ctx->modp_getbyname) && isalpha(ch))
+	switch (token->type)
 	{
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_MODP);
-	    goto re_eval;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non alpha char found after auth keylen";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_MODP:
-	if (isalnum(ch))
-	{
-	    *(p_ctx->modp_str++) = ch;
-	    break;
-	}
-	p_ctx->err = "Non alphanum char found after in modp string";
-	goto err;
-    case ST_FLAG_STRICT:
-	if (ch == 0)
-	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_END);
-	p_ctx->err = "Flags character(s) must be at end of whole string";
-	goto err;
-
-    /* XXX */
-    case ST_END:
-    case ST_EOF:
-    case ST_ERR:
-	break;
-    /* XXX */
-    }
-out:
-    return p_ctx->state;
-err:
-    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_ERR);
-    return ST_ERR;
+		case ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM:
+			if (*ealg != 0)
+			{
+				return FAILED;
+			}
+			*ealg = (protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP) ?
+					 oakley_from_encryption_algorithm(token->algorithm) :
+					 esp_from_encryption_algorithm(token->algorithm);
+			if (*ealg == 0)
+			{
+				return FAILED;
+			}
+			*ealg_keysize = token->keysize;
+			break;
+		case INTEGRITY_ALGORITHM:
+			if (*aalg != 0)
+			{
+				return FAILED;
+			}
+			*aalg = (protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP) ?
+					 oakley_from_integrity_algorithm(token->algorithm) :
+					 esp_from_integrity_algorithm(token->algorithm);
+			if (*aalg == 0)
+			{
+				return FAILED;
+			}
+			*aalg_keysize = token->keysize;
+			break;
+		case DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP:
+			if (protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
+			{
+				if (*dh_group != 0)
+				{
+					return FAILED;
+				}
+				*dh_group = token->algorithm;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			return FAILED;
+	}
+	return SUCCESS;
 }
 
-/*
- * Must be called for each "new" char, with new
- * character in ctx.ch
- */
-static void
-parser_init(struct parser_context *p_ctx, unsigned protoid)
-{
-    memset(p_ctx, 0, sizeof (*p_ctx));
-    p_ctx->protoid = protoid; /* XXX: jjo */
-    p_ctx->protoid = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
-    p_ctx->ealg_str = p_ctx->ealg_buf;
-    p_ctx->aalg_str = p_ctx->aalg_buf;
-    p_ctx->modp_str = p_ctx->modp_buf;
-    p_ctx->state = ST_INI;
-
-    switch (protoid) {
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-	p_ctx->ealg_getbyname = ealg_getbyname_ike;
-	p_ctx->aalg_getbyname = aalg_getbyname_ike;
-	p_ctx->modp_getbyname = modp_getbyname_ike;
-	break;
-#endif
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-	p_ctx->ealg_getbyname = ealg_getbyname_esp;
-	p_ctx->aalg_getbyname = aalg_getbyname_esp;
-	break;
-    }
-}
 
-static int
-parser_alg_info_add(struct parser_context *p_ctx, struct alg_info *alg_info)
+static status_t alg_info_parse_str(struct alg_info *alg_info, char *alg_str)
 {
-    int ealg_id = 0;
-    int aalg_id = 0;
-    int modp_id = 0;
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-    const struct oakley_group_desc *gd;
-#endif
+	char *strict, *single;
+	status_t status = SUCCESS;
 
-    if (*p_ctx->ealg_buf)
-    {
-	ealg_id = p_ctx->ealg_getbyname(p_ctx->ealg_buf, strlen(p_ctx->ealg_buf));
-	if (ealg_id == ESP_MAGIC_ID)
-	{
-	    ealg_id = p_ctx->eklen;
-	    p_ctx->eklen = 0;
-	}
-	if (ealg_id < 0)
+	strict = alg_str + strlen(alg_str) - 1;
+	if (*strict == '!')
 	{
-	    p_ctx->err = "enc_alg not found";
-	    return -1;
+		alg_info->alg_info_flags |= ALG_INFO_F_STRICT;
+		*strict = '\0';
 	}
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("parser_alg_info_add() ealg_getbyname(\"%s\")=%d"
-		, p_ctx->ealg_buf
-		, ealg_id)
-	)
-    }
-    if (*p_ctx->aalg_buf)
-    {
-	aalg_id = p_ctx->aalg_getbyname(p_ctx->aalg_buf, strlen(p_ctx->aalg_buf));
-	if (aalg_id < 0)
+	while ((single = strsep(&alg_str, ",")))
 	{
-	    p_ctx->err = "hash_alg not found";
-	    return -1;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("parser_alg_info_add() aalg_getbyname(\"%s\")=%d"
-		, p_ctx->aalg_buf
-		, aalg_id)
-	)
-    }
-    if (p_ctx->modp_getbyname && *p_ctx->modp_buf)
-    {
-	modp_id = p_ctx->modp_getbyname(p_ctx->modp_buf, strlen(p_ctx->modp_buf));
-	if (modp_id < 0)
-	{
-	    p_ctx->err = "modp group not found";
-	    return -1;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("parser_alg_info_add() modp_getbyname(\"%s\")=%d"
-		, p_ctx->modp_buf
-		, modp_id)
-	)
-    }
-    switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-	alg_info_esp_add(alg_info,
-			 ealg_id, p_ctx->eklen,
-			 aalg_id, p_ctx->aklen);
-	break;
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-	if (modp_id && !(gd = lookup_group(modp_id)))
-	{
-	    p_ctx->err = "found modp group id, but not supported";
-	    return -1;
-	}
-	alg_info_ike_add(alg_info,
-			 ealg_id, p_ctx->eklen,
-			 aalg_id, p_ctx->aklen,
-			 modp_id);
-	break;
-#endif
-    default:
-	return -1;
-    }
-    return 0;
-}
+		chunk_t string = { (u_char *)single, strlen(single) };
+		int ealg = 0;
+		int aalg = 0;
+		int dh_group = 0;
+		size_t ealg_keysize = 0;
+		size_t aalg_keysize = 0;
 
-static int
-alg_info_parse_str (struct alg_info *alg_info, const char *alg_str, const char **err_p)
-{
-    struct parser_context ctx;
-    int ret;
-    const char *ptr;
-    static char err_buf[256];
-
-    *err_buf = 0;
-    parser_init(&ctx, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
-    if (err_p)
-	*err_p = NULL;
+		eat_whitespace(&string);
 
-    /* use default if nul esp string */
-    if (!*alg_str)
-    {
-	switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-	case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-	    alg_info_ike_add(alg_info, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-	    return 0;
-#endif
-	case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-	    alg_info_esp_add(alg_info, 0, 0, 0, 0);
-	    return 0;
-	default:
-	    /* IMPOSSIBLE */
-	    passert(alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
-	}
-    }
+		if (string.len > 0) 
+		{
+			chunk_t alg;
+
+			/* get all token, separated by '-' */
+			while (extract_token(&alg, '-', &string))
+			{
+				status |= alg_info_add(alg, alg_info->alg_info_protoid,
+									   &ealg, &ealg_keysize,
+									   &aalg, &aalg_keysize, &dh_group);
+			}
+			if (string.len)
+			{
+				status |= alg_info_add(string, alg_info->alg_info_protoid,
+									   &ealg, &ealg_keysize,
+									   &aalg, &aalg_keysize, &dh_group);
+			}
+		}
+		if (status == SUCCESS)
 
-    for (ret = 0, ptr = alg_str; ret < ST_EOF;)
-    {
-	ctx.ch = *ptr++;
-	ret = parser_machine(&ctx);
-		
-	switch (ret) {
-	case ST_FLAG_STRICT:
-	    alg_info->alg_info_flags |= ALG_INFO_F_STRICT;
-	    break;
-	case ST_END:
-	case ST_EOF:
-	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-		DBG_log("alg_info_parse_str() ealg_buf=%s aalg_buf=%s"
-			"eklen=%d  aklen=%d",
-			ctx.ealg_buf, ctx.aalg_buf,
-			ctx.eklen, ctx.aklen)
-	    )
-	    if (parser_alg_info_add(&ctx, alg_info) < 0)
-	    {
-		snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf),
-		    "%s, enc_alg=\"%s\", auth_alg=\"%s\", modp=\"%s\"",
-		    ctx.err,
-		    ctx.ealg_buf,
-		    ctx.aalg_buf,
-		    ctx.modp_buf);
-		goto err;
-	    }
-	    /* zero out for next run (ST_END) */
-	    parser_init(&ctx, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
-	    break;
-	case ST_ERR:
-	    snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf),
-		"%s, just after \"%.*s\" (old_state=%s)",
-		ctx.err,
-		(int)(ptr-alg_str-1), alg_str ,
-		parser_state_name_esp(ctx.old_state));
-	    goto err;
-	default:
-	    if (!ctx.ch)
-		break;
+		{
+			switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid)
+			{
+				case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+					alg_info_esp_add(alg_info, ealg, ealg_keysize,
+								 			   aalg, aalg_keysize);
+					break;
+				case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+					alg_info_ike_add(alg_info, ealg, ealg_keysize,
+											   aalg, aalg_keysize,
+											   dh_group);
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return 0;
-err:
-    if (err_p)
-	*err_p=err_buf;
-    return -1;
+	return status;
 }
 
-struct alg_info_esp *
-alg_info_esp_create_from_str (const char *alg_str, const char **err_p)
+struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp_create_from_str(char *alg_str)
 {
-    struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp;
-    char esp_buf[256];
-    static char err_buf[256];
-    char *pfs_name;
-    int ret = 0;
-    /*
-     * alg_info storage should be sized dynamically
-     * but this may require 2passes to know
-     * transform count in advance.
-     */
-    alg_info_esp = alloc_thing (struct alg_info_esp, "alg_info_esp");
-    if (!alg_info_esp)
-	goto out;
-
-    pfs_name=index (alg_str, ';');
-    if (pfs_name)
-    {
-	memcpy(esp_buf, alg_str, pfs_name-alg_str);
-	esp_buf[pfs_name-alg_str] = 0;
-	alg_str = esp_buf;
-	pfs_name++;
-
-	/* if pfs strings AND first char is not '0' */
-	if (*pfs_name && pfs_name[0] != '0')
+	struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp;
+	char esp_buf[BUF_LEN];
+	char *pfs_name;
+	status_t status = SUCCESS;
+	/*
+	 * alg_info storage should be sized dynamically
+	 * but this may require 2passes to know
+	 * transform count in advance.
+	 */
+	alg_info_esp = malloc_thing (struct alg_info_esp);
+	zero(alg_info_esp);
+
+	pfs_name=index (alg_str, ';');
+	if (pfs_name)
 	{
-	    ret = modp_getbyname_esp(pfs_name, strlen(pfs_name));
-	    if (ret < 0)
-	    {
-		/* Bomb if pfsgroup not found */
-		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-		    DBG_log("alg_info_esp_create_from_str(): pfsgroup \"%s\" not found"
-			, pfs_name)
-		)
-		if (*err_p)
-		{
-		    snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf),
-			"pfsgroup \"%s\" not found",
-			pfs_name);
+		memcpy(esp_buf, alg_str, pfs_name-alg_str);
+		esp_buf[pfs_name-alg_str] = 0;
+		alg_str = esp_buf;
+		pfs_name++;
 
-		    *err_p = err_buf;
+		/* if pfs strings AND first char is not '0' */
+		if (*pfs_name && pfs_name[0] != '0')
+		{
+			const proposal_token_t *token;
+
+			token = proposal_get_token(pfs_name, strlen(pfs_name));
+			if (token == NULL || token->type != DIFFIE_HELLMAN_GROUP)
+			{
+				/* Bomb if pfsgroup not found */
+				DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+					DBG_log("alg_info_esp_create_from_str(): pfsgroup \"%s\" not found"
+						, pfs_name)
+				)
+				status = FAILED;
+				goto out;
+			}
+			alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup = token->algorithm;
 		}
-		goto out;
-	    }
-	    alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup = ret;
 	}
-    }
-    else
-	alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup = 0;
-		
-    alg_info_esp->alg_info_protoid = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
-    ret = alg_info_parse_str((struct alg_info *)alg_info_esp, alg_str, err_p) ;
+	else
+	{
+		alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup = 0;
+	}
+	alg_info_esp->alg_info_protoid = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
+	status = alg_info_parse_str((struct alg_info *)alg_info_esp, alg_str);
+
 out:
-    if (ret < 0)
-    {
-	pfreeany(alg_info_esp);
-	alg_info_esp = NULL;
-    }
-    return alg_info_esp;
+	if (status != SUCCESS)
+	{
+		free(alg_info_esp);
+		alg_info_esp = NULL;
+	}
+	return alg_info_esp;
 }
 
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-struct alg_info_ike *
-alg_info_ike_create_from_str (const char *alg_str, const char **err_p)
+struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike_create_from_str(char *alg_str)
 {
-    struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike;
-    /*
-     * alg_info storage should be sized dynamically
-     * but this may require 2passes to know
-     * transform count in advance.
-     */
-    alg_info_ike = alloc_thing (struct alg_info_ike, "alg_info_ike");
-    alg_info_ike->alg_info_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
-
-    if (alg_info_parse_str((struct alg_info *)alg_info_ike,
-			   alg_str, err_p) < 0)
-    {
-	pfreeany(alg_info_ike);
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    return alg_info_ike;
+	struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike;
+	/*
+	 * alg_info storage should be sized dynamically
+	 * but this may require 2passes to know
+	 * transform count in advance.
+	 */
+	alg_info_ike = malloc_thing (struct alg_info_ike);
+	zero(alg_info_ike);
+	alg_info_ike->alg_info_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
+
+	if (alg_info_parse_str((struct alg_info *)alg_info_ike, alg_str) != SUCCESS)
+	{
+		free(alg_info_ike);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	return alg_info_ike;
 }
-#endif
 
 /*
- * 	alg_info struct can be shared by
- * 	several connections instances,
- * 	handle free() with ref_cnts
+ *      alg_info struct can be shared by
+ *      several connections instances,
+ *      handle free() with ref_cnts
  */
 void 
 alg_info_addref(struct alg_info *alg_info)
 {
-    if (alg_info != NULL)
-    {
-	alg_info->ref_cnt++;
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("alg_info_addref() alg_info->ref_cnt=%d"
-		, alg_info->ref_cnt)
-	)
-    }
+	if (alg_info != NULL)
+	{
+		alg_info->ref_cnt++;
+	}
 }
 
 void
 alg_info_delref(struct alg_info **alg_info_p)
 {
-    struct alg_info *alg_info = *alg_info_p;
+	struct alg_info *alg_info = *alg_info_p;
 
-    if (alg_info != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(alg_info->ref_cnt != 0);
-	alg_info->ref_cnt--;
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("alg_info_delref() alg_info->ref_cnt=%d"
-		, alg_info->ref_cnt)
-	)
-	if (alg_info->ref_cnt == 0)
+	if (alg_info != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-		DBG_log("alg_info_delref() freeing alg_info")
-	    )
-	    alg_info_free(alg_info);
+		passert(alg_info->ref_cnt != 0);
+		alg_info->ref_cnt--;
+		if (alg_info->ref_cnt == 0)
+		{
+			alg_info_free(alg_info);
+		}
+		*alg_info_p = NULL;
 	}
-	*alg_info_p = NULL;
-    }
 }
 
 /* snprint already parsed transform list (alg_info) */
 int
 alg_info_snprint(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info *alg_info)
 {
-    char *ptr = buf;
-    int np = 0;
-    struct esp_info *esp_info;
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-    struct ike_info *ike_info;
-#endif
-    int cnt;
-	
-    switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-	{
-	    struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp = (struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info;
+	char *ptr = buf;
+	int np = 0;
+	struct esp_info *esp_info;
+	struct ike_info *ike_info;
+	int cnt;
+		
+	switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
+	case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+		{
+			struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp = (struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info;
+
+			ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info_esp, esp_info, cnt)
+			{
+				np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%s",
+						enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, esp_info->esp_ealg_id));
+				ptr += np;
+				buflen -= np;
+				if (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+				{
+					np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "_%u", esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen);
+					ptr += np;
+					buflen -= np;
+				}
+				np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "/%s, ",
+						enum_show(&auth_alg_names, esp_info->esp_aalg_id));
+				ptr += np;
+				buflen -= np;
+				if (buflen < 0)
+					goto out;
+			}
+			if (alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
+			{
+				np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "; pfsgroup=%s; ",
+						enum_show(&oakley_group_names, alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup));
+				ptr += np;
+				buflen -= np;
+				if (buflen < 0)
+					goto out;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
 
-	    ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info_esp, esp_info, cnt)
-	    {
-		np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d, "
-			, esp_info->esp_ealg_id
-			, (int)esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen
-			, esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
-		ptr += np;
-		buflen -= np;
-		if (buflen < 0)
-		    goto out;
-	    }
-	    if (alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
-	    {
-		np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "; pfsgroup=%d; "
-			, alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup);
+	case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+		ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info, ike_info, cnt)
+		{
+			np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%s",
+					enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, ike_info->ike_ealg));
+			ptr += np;
+			buflen -= np;
+			if (ike_info->ike_eklen)
+			{
+				np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "_%u", ike_info->ike_eklen);
+				ptr += np;
+				buflen -= np;
+			}
+			np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "/%s/%s, ",
+					enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, ike_info->ike_halg),
+					enum_show(&oakley_group_names, ike_info->ike_modp));
+			ptr += np;
+			buflen -= np;
+			if (buflen < 0)
+				goto out;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		np = snprintf(buf, buflen, "INVALID protoid=%d\n"
+				, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
 		ptr += np;
 		buflen -= np;
-		if (buflen < 0)
-		    goto out;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	}
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-	ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info, ike_info, cnt)
-	{
-	    np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d-%d, "
-		    , ike_info->ike_ealg
-		    , (int)ike_info->ike_eklen
-		    , ike_info->ike_halg
-		    , ike_info->ike_modp);
-	    ptr += np;
-	    buflen -= np;
-	    if (buflen < 0)
 		goto out;
-	}
-	break;
-#endif
-    default:
-	np = snprintf(buf, buflen, "INVALID protoid=%d\n"
-		, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
-	ptr += np;
-	buflen -= np;
-	goto out;
    }
 
    np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%s"
-	    , alg_info->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT?
-	    "strict":"");
+			, alg_info->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT?
+			"strict":"");
    ptr += np;
    buflen -= np;
 out:
-    if (buflen < 0)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "buffer space exhausted in alg_info_snprint_ike(), buflen=%d"
-	    , buflen);
-    }
-	
-    return ptr - buf;
+	if (buflen < 0)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "buffer space exhausted in alg_info_snprint_ike(), buflen=%d"
+			, buflen);
+	}
+		
+	return ptr - buf;
 }
 
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-int
-alg_info_snprint_esp(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info)
+int alg_info_snprint_esp(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info)
 {
-    char *ptr = buf;
+	char *ptr = buf;
 
-    int cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
-    struct esp_info *esp_info = alg_info->esp;
+	int cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
+	struct esp_info *esp_info = alg_info->esp;
 
-    while (cnt--)
-    {
-	if (kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(esp_info->esp_ealg_id, 0, NULL)
-	&&  kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(esp_info->esp_aalg_id, NULL))
+	while (cnt--)
 	{
-	    u_int eklen = (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
-		    ? esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen
-		    : kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(esp_info->esp_ealg_id)
-			    * BITS_PER_BYTE;
-
-	    u_int aklen = esp_info->esp_aalg_keylen
-		    ? esp_info->esp_aalg_keylen
-		    : kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(esp_info->esp_aalg_id)
-			    * BITS_PER_BYTE;
-
-	    int ret = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d_%03d, ",
-			   esp_info->esp_ealg_id, eklen,
-			   esp_info->esp_aalg_id, aklen);
-	    ptr += ret;
-	    buflen -= ret;
-	    if (buflen < 0)
-	 	break;
+		if (kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(esp_info->esp_ealg_id, 0, NULL)
+		&&  kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(esp_info->esp_aalg_id, NULL))
+		{
+			u_int eklen = (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+					? esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen
+					: kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(esp_info->esp_ealg_id)
+							* BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+			u_int aklen = esp_info->esp_aalg_keylen
+					? esp_info->esp_aalg_keylen
+					: kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(esp_info->esp_aalg_id)
+							* BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+			int ret = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d_%03d, ",
+						   esp_info->esp_ealg_id, eklen,
+						   esp_info->esp_aalg_id, aklen);
+			ptr += ret;
+			buflen -= ret;
+			if (buflen < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		esp_info++;
 	}
-	esp_info++;
-    }
-    return ptr - buf;
+	return ptr - buf;
 }
 
-int
-alg_info_snprint_ike(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info)
+int alg_info_snprint_ike(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info)
 {
-    char *ptr = buf;
-
-    int cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
-    struct ike_info *ike_info = alg_info->ike;
+	char *ptr = buf;
 
-    while (cnt--)
-    {
-	struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc = ike_alg_get_encrypter(ike_info->ike_ealg);
-	struct hash_desc *hash_desc = ike_alg_get_hasher(ike_info->ike_halg);
+	int cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
+	struct ike_info *ike_info = alg_info->ike;
 
-	if (enc_desc != NULL &&  hash_desc != NULL
-	&& lookup_group(ike_info->ike_modp))
+	while (cnt--)
 	{
+		struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc = ike_alg_get_crypter(ike_info->ike_ealg);
+		struct hash_desc *hash_desc = ike_alg_get_hasher(ike_info->ike_halg);
+		struct dh_desc *dh_desc = ike_alg_get_dh_group(ike_info->ike_modp);
 
-	    u_int eklen = (ike_info->ike_eklen)
-			? ike_info->ike_eklen
-			: enc_desc->keydeflen;
-
-	    u_int aklen = (ike_info->ike_hklen)
-			? ike_info->ike_hklen
-			: hash_desc->hash_digest_size * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+		if (enc_desc &&  hash_desc && dh_desc)
+		{
 
-	    int ret = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d_%03d-%d, ",
-			   ike_info->ike_ealg, eklen,
-			   ike_info->ike_halg, aklen,
-			   ike_info->ike_modp);
-	    ptr += ret;
-	    buflen -= ret;
-	    if (buflen < 0)
-		break;
+			u_int eklen = (ike_info->ike_eklen)
+						? ike_info->ike_eklen
+						: enc_desc->keydeflen;
+
+			u_int aklen = (ike_info->ike_hklen)
+						? ike_info->ike_hklen
+						: hash_desc->hash_digest_size * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+			int ret = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d_%03d-%d, ",
+						   ike_info->ike_ealg, eklen,
+						   ike_info->ike_halg, aklen,
+						   ike_info->ike_modp);
+			ptr += ret;
+			buflen -= ret;
+			if (buflen < 0)
+				break;
+		}
+		ike_info++;
 	}
-	ike_info++;
-    }
-    return ptr - buf;
+	return ptr - buf;
 }
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg_info.h b/src/pluto/alg_info.h
index cacc2a354..fcf7efca0 100644
--- a/src/pluto/alg_info.h
+++ b/src/pluto/alg_info.h
@@ -10,76 +10,71 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: alg_info.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef ALG_INFO_H
 #define ALG_INFO_H
 
 struct esp_info {
-	u_int8_t transid;	/* ESP transform */
-	u_int16_t auth;		/* AUTH */
-	size_t enckeylen;	/* keylength for ESP transform */
-	size_t authkeylen;	/* keylength for AUTH */
-	u_int8_t encryptalg;	/* normally  encryptalg=transid */
-	u_int8_t authalg;	/* normally  authalg=auth+1 */
+		u_int8_t transid;       /* ESP transform */
+		u_int16_t auth;         /* AUTH */
+		size_t enckeylen;       /* keylength for ESP transform */
+		size_t authkeylen;      /* keylength for AUTH */
+		u_int8_t encryptalg;    /* normally  encryptalg=transid */
+		u_int8_t authalg;       /* normally  authalg=auth+1 */
 };
 
 struct ike_info {
-	u_int16_t ike_ealg;	/* high 16 bit nums for reserved */
-	u_int8_t ike_halg;
-	size_t ike_eklen;
-	size_t ike_hklen;
-	u_int16_t ike_modp;
+		u_int16_t ike_ealg;     /* high 16 bit nums for reserved */
+		u_int8_t ike_halg;
+		size_t ike_eklen;
+		size_t ike_hklen;
+		u_int16_t ike_modp;
 };
 
 #define ALG_INFO_COMMON \
-	int alg_info_cnt;		\
-	int ref_cnt;			\
-	unsigned alg_info_flags;	\
-	unsigned alg_info_protoid
+		int alg_info_cnt;               \
+		int ref_cnt;                    \
+		unsigned alg_info_flags;        \
+		unsigned alg_info_protoid
 
 struct alg_info {
-	ALG_INFO_COMMON;
+		ALG_INFO_COMMON;
 };
 
 struct alg_info_esp {
-	ALG_INFO_COMMON;
-	struct esp_info esp[64];
-	int esp_pfsgroup;
+		ALG_INFO_COMMON;
+		struct esp_info esp[64];
+		int esp_pfsgroup;
 };
 
 struct alg_info_ike {
-	ALG_INFO_COMMON;
-	struct ike_info ike[64];
+		ALG_INFO_COMMON;
+		struct ike_info ike[64];
 };
 #define esp_ealg_id transid
 #define esp_aalg_id auth
-#define esp_ealg_keylen enckeylen	/* bits */
-#define esp_aalg_keylen authkeylen	/* bits */
+#define esp_ealg_keylen enckeylen       /* bits */
+#define esp_aalg_keylen authkeylen      /* bits */
 
-/*	alg_info_flags bits */
-#define ALG_INFO_F_STRICT	0x01
+/*      alg_info_flags bits */
+#define ALG_INFO_F_STRICT       0x01
 
 extern int alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(int auth);
 extern int alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(int sadb_aalg);
 extern void alg_info_free(struct alg_info *alg_info);
 extern void alg_info_addref(struct alg_info *alg_info);
 extern void alg_info_delref(struct alg_info **alg_info);
-extern struct alg_info_esp* alg_info_esp_create_from_str(const char *alg_str
-    , const char **err_p);
-extern struct alg_info_ike* alg_info_ike_create_from_str(const char *alg_str
-    , const char **err_p);
+extern struct alg_info_esp* alg_info_esp_create_from_str(char *alg_str);
+extern struct alg_info_ike* alg_info_ike_create_from_str(char *alg_str);
 extern int alg_info_parse(const char *str);
-extern int alg_info_snprint(char *buf, int buflen
-    , struct alg_info *alg_info);
+extern int alg_info_snprint(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info *alg_info);
 extern int alg_info_snprint_esp(char *buf, int buflen
-    , struct alg_info_esp *alg_info);
+	, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info);
 extern int alg_info_snprint_ike(char *buf, int buflen
-    , struct alg_info_ike *alg_info);
+	, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info);
 #define ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(ai, ai_esp, i) \
-	for (i=(ai)->alg_info_cnt,ai_esp=(ai)->esp; i--; ai_esp++) 
+		for (i=(ai)->alg_info_cnt,ai_esp=(ai)->esp; i--; ai_esp++) 
 #define ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(ai, ai_ike, i) \
-	for (i=(ai)->alg_info_cnt,ai_ike=(ai)->ike; i--; ai_ike++) 
+		for (i=(ai)->alg_info_cnt,ai_ike=(ai)->ike; i--; ai_ike++) 
 #endif /* ALG_INFO_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/asn1.c b/src/pluto/asn1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 529f597fb..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/asn1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,787 +0,0 @@
-/* Simple ASN.1 parser
- * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: asn1.c 5041 2009-03-27 08:58:48Z andreas $
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include <asn1/oid.h>
-#include "log.h"
-
-/* some common prefabricated ASN.1 constants */
-
-static u_char ASN1_INTEGER_0_str[] = { 0x02, 0x00 };
-static u_char ASN1_INTEGER_1_str[] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
-static u_char ASN1_INTEGER_2_str[] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 };
-
-const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_0 = strchunk(ASN1_INTEGER_0_str);
-const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_1 = strchunk(ASN1_INTEGER_1_str);
-const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_2 = strchunk(ASN1_INTEGER_2_str);
-
-/* some popular algorithmIdentifiers */
-
-static u_char ASN1_md5_id_str[] = {
-    0x30, 0x0C,
-          0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05,
-	  0x05, 0x00
-};
-
-static u_char ASN1_sha1_id_str[] = {
-    0x30, 0x09,
-	  0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E,0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
-	  0x05, 0x00
-};
-
-static u_char ASN1_md5WithRSA_id_str[] = {
-    0x30, 0x0D,
-	  0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04,
-	  0x05, 0x00
-};
-
-static u_char ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id_str[] = {
-    0x30, 0x0D,
-	  0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05,
-	  0x05, 0x00
-};
-
-static u_char ASN1_rsaEncryption_id_str[] = {
-    0x30, 0x0D,
-	  0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
-	  0x05, 0x00
-};
-
-const chunk_t ASN1_md5_id = strchunk(ASN1_md5_id_str);
-const chunk_t ASN1_sha1_id = strchunk(ASN1_sha1_id_str);
-const chunk_t ASN1_rsaEncryption_id = strchunk(ASN1_rsaEncryption_id_str);
-const chunk_t ASN1_md5WithRSA_id = strchunk(ASN1_md5WithRSA_id_str);
-const chunk_t ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id = strchunk(ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id_str);
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of an algorithmIdentifier */
-
-static const asn1Object_t algorithmIdentifierObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "algorithmIdentifier",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,	ASN1_NONE }, /* 0 */
-  { 1,   "algorithm",		ASN1_OID,	ASN1_BODY }, /* 1 */
-  { 1,   "parameters",		ASN1_EOC,	ASN1_OPT |
-						ASN1_RAW  }, /* 2 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,	ASN1_END  }  /* 3 */
-};
-
-#define ALGORITHM_ID_ALG		1
-#define ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMETERS		2
-#define ALGORITHM_ID_ROOF		4
-
-/*
- * return the ASN.1 encoded algorithm identifier
- */
-chunk_t
-asn1_algorithmIdentifier(int oid)
-{
-    switch (oid)
-    {
-    case OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
-	return ASN1_rsaEncryption_id;
-    case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
-	return ASN1_md5WithRSA_id;
-    case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
-	return ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id;
-    case OID_MD5:
-	return ASN1_md5_id;
-   case OID_SHA1:
-	return ASN1_sha1_id;
-   default:
-	return empty_chunk;
-    }
-}
-
-/*  If the oid is listed in the oid_names table then the corresponding
- *  position in the oid_names table is returned otherwise -1 is returned
- */
-int
-known_oid(chunk_t object)
-{
-    int oid = 0;
-
-    while (object.len)
-    {
-	if (oid_names[oid].octet == *object.ptr)
-	{
-	    if (--object.len == 0 || oid_names[oid].down == 0)
-	    {
-		return oid;          /* found terminal symbol */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		object.ptr++; oid++; /* advance to next hex octet */
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    if (oid_names[oid].next)
-		oid = oid_names[oid].next;
-	    else
-		return OID_UNKNOWN;
-	}
-    }
-    return -1;
-}
-
-/*
- *  Decodes the length in bytes of an ASN.1 object
- */
-u_int
-asn1_length(chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    u_char n;
-    size_t len;
-
-    /* advance from tag field on to length field */
-    blob->ptr++;
-    blob->len--;
-
-    /* read first octet of length field */
-    n = *blob->ptr++;
-    blob->len--;
-
-    if ((n & 0x80) == 0) /* single length octet */
-	return n;
-
-    /* composite length, determine number of length octets */
-    n &= 0x7f;
-
-    if (n > blob->len)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("number of length octets is larger than ASN.1 object")
-	)
-	return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
-    }
-
-    if (n > sizeof(len))
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("number of length octets is larger than limit of %d octets"
-		, (int)sizeof(len))
-	)
-	return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
-    }
-
-    len = 0;
-    
-    while (n-- > 0)
-    {
-	len = 256*len + *blob->ptr++;
-	blob->len--;
-    }
-    return len;
-}
-
-/*
- * codes ASN.1 lengths up to a size of 16'777'215 bytes
- */
-void
-code_asn1_length(size_t length, chunk_t *code)
-{
-    if (length < 128)
-    {
-	code->ptr[0] = length;
-	code->len = 1;
-    }
-    else if (length < 256)
-    {
-	code->ptr[0] = 0x81;
-	code->ptr[1] = (u_char) length;
-	code->len = 2;
-    }
-    else if (length < 65536)
-    {
-	code->ptr[0] = 0x82;
-	code->ptr[1] = length >> 8;
-	code->ptr[2] = length & 0x00ff;
-	code->len = 3;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	code->ptr[0] = 0x83;
-	code->ptr[1] = length >> 16;
-	code->ptr[2] = (length >> 8) & 0x00ff;
-	code->ptr[3] = length & 0x0000ff;
-	code->len = 4;
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * build an empty asn.1 object with tag and length fields already filled in
- */
-u_char*
-build_asn1_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, size_t datalen)
-{
-    u_char length_buf[4];
-    chunk_t length = { length_buf, 0 };
-    u_char *pos;
-
-    /* code the asn.1 length field */
-    code_asn1_length(datalen, &length);
-
-    /* allocate memory for the asn.1 TLV object */
-    object->len = 1 + length.len + datalen;
-    object->ptr = alloc_bytes(object->len, "asn1 object");
-
-    /* set position pointer at the start of the object */
-    pos = object->ptr;
-
-    /* copy the asn.1 tag field and advance the pointer */
-   *pos++ = type;
-   
-   /* copy the asn.1 length field and advance the pointer */
-   chunkcpy(pos, length);
-
-   return pos;
-}
-
-/*
- * build a simple ASN.1 object
- */
-chunk_t
-asn1_simple_object(asn1_t tag, chunk_t content)
-{
-    chunk_t object;
-
-    u_char *pos = build_asn1_object(&object, tag, content.len);
-    chunkcpy(pos, content);
-
-    return object;
-}
-
-/* Build an ASN.1 object from a variable number of individual chunks.
- * Depending on the mode, chunks either are moved ('m') or copied ('c').
- */
-chunk_t
-asn1_wrap(asn1_t type, const char *mode, ...)
-{
-    chunk_t construct;
-    va_list chunks;
-    u_char *pos;
-    int i;
-    int count = strlen(mode);
-	
-    /* sum up lengths of individual chunks */ 
-    va_start(chunks, mode);
-    construct.len = 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-    {
-        chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
-	construct.len += ch.len;
-    }
-    va_end(chunks);
-
-    /* allocate needed memory for construct */
-    pos = build_asn1_object(&construct, type, construct.len);
-
-    /* copy or move the chunks */
-    va_start(chunks, mode);
-    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-    {
-	chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
-
-	switch (*mode++)
-	{
-	case 'm':
-	    mv_chunk(&pos, ch);
-	    break;
-	case 'c':
-	default:
-	    chunkcpy(pos, ch);
-	}
-    }
-    va_end(chunks);
-
-    return construct;
-}
-
-/*
- * convert a MP integer into a DER coded ASN.1 object
- */
-chunk_t
-asn1_integer_from_mpz(const mpz_t value)
-{
-    size_t bits = mpz_sizeinbase(value, 2);  /* size in bits */
-    size_t size = 1 + bits / BITS_PER_BYTE;  /* size in bytes */
-    chunk_t n = mpz_to_n(value, size);
-
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_INTEGER, "m", n);
-}
-
-/*
- *  determines if a character string is of type ASN.1 printableString
- */
-bool
-is_printablestring(chunk_t str)
-{
-    const char printablestring_charset[] =
-	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789 '()+,-./:=?";
-    u_int i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < str.len; i++)
-    {
-	if (strchr(printablestring_charset, str.ptr[i]) == NULL)
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-#define TIME_MAX	0x7fffffff
-
-/*
- *  Converts ASN.1 UTCTIME or GENERALIZEDTIME into calender time
- */
-time_t
-asn1totime(const chunk_t *utctime, asn1_t type)
-{
-    struct tm t;
-    time_t tc, tz_offset;
-    u_char *eot = NULL;
-
-    if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, 'Z', utctime->len)) != NULL)
-    {
-	tz_offset = 0; /* Zulu time with a zero time zone offset */
-    }
-    else if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, '+', utctime->len)) != NULL)
-    {
-	int tz_hour, tz_min;
-
-	sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min);
-	tz_offset = 3600*tz_hour + 60*tz_min;  /* positive time zone offset */
-    }
-    else if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, '-', utctime->len)) != NULL)
-    {
-	int tz_hour, tz_min;
-
-	sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min);
-	tz_offset = -3600*tz_hour - 60*tz_min;  /* negative time zone offset */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return 0; /* error in time format */
-    }
-
-    /* parse ASN.1 time string */
-    {
-	const char* format = (type == ASN1_UTCTIME)? "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d":
-						     "%4d%2d%2d%2d%2d";
-
-	sscanf(utctime->ptr, format, &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon, &t.tm_mday,
-				     &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min);
-    }
-
-    /* is there a seconds field? */
-    if ((eot - utctime->ptr) == ((type == ASN1_UTCTIME)?12:14))
-    {
-	sscanf(eot-2, "%2d", &t.tm_sec);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	t.tm_sec = 0;
-    }
-
-    /* representation of year */
-    if (t.tm_year >= 1900)
-    {
-	t.tm_year -= 1900;
-    }
-    else if (t.tm_year >= 100)
-    {
-	return 0;
-    }
-    else if (t.tm_year < 50)
-    {
-	t.tm_year += 100;
-    }
-
-    /* representation of month 0..11*/
-    t.tm_mon--;
-
-    /* set daylight saving time to off */
-    t.tm_isdst = 0;
-
-    /* convert to time_t */
-    tc = mktime(&t);
-
-    /* if no conversion overflow occurred, compensate timezone */
-    return (tc == -1) ? TIME_MAX : (tc - timezone - tz_offset);
-}
-
-/*
- *  convert a date into ASN.1 UTCTIME or GENERALIZEDTIME format
- */
-chunk_t
-timetoasn1(const time_t *time, asn1_t type)
-{
-    int offset;
-    const char *format;
-    char buf[TIMETOA_BUF];
-    chunk_t formatted_time;
-    struct tm *t = gmtime(time);
-
-    if (type == ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
-    {
-	format = "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ";
-	offset = 1900;
-    }
-    else /* ASN1_UTCTIME */
-    {
-	format = "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ";
-	offset = (t->tm_year < 100)? 0 : -100;
-    }
-    sprintf(buf, format, t->tm_year + offset, t->tm_mon + 1, t->tm_mday
-	  	       , t->tm_hour, t->tm_min, t->tm_sec);
-    formatted_time.ptr = buf;
-    formatted_time.len = strlen(buf);
-    return asn1_simple_object(type, formatted_time);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Initializes the internal context of the ASN.1 parser
- */
-void
-asn1_init(asn1_ctx_t *ctx, chunk_t blob, u_int level0,
-	bool implicit, u_int cond)
-{
-    ctx->blobs[0] = blob;
-    ctx->level0   = level0;
-    ctx->implicit = implicit;
-    ctx->cond     = cond;
-    memset(ctx->loopAddr, '\0', sizeof(ctx->loopAddr));
-}
-
-/*
- * print the value of an ASN.1 simple object
- */
-static void
-debug_asn1_simple_object(chunk_t object, asn1_t type, u_int cond)
-{
-    int oid;
-
-    switch (type)
-    {
-    case ASN1_OID:
-	oid = known_oid(object);
-	if (oid != OID_UNKNOWN)
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  '%s'",oid_names[oid].name);
-	    )
-	    return;
-	}
-	break;
-    case ASN1_UTF8STRING:
-    case ASN1_IA5STRING:
-    case ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
-    case ASN1_T61STRING:
-    case ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)object.len, object.ptr);
-	)
-	return;
-    case ASN1_UTCTIME:
-    case ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    time_t time = asn1totime(&object, type);
-	    DBG_log("  '%s'", timetoa(&time, TRUE));
-	)
-	return;
-    default:
-	 break;
-    }
-    DBG(cond,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("", object);
-    )
-}
-
-/*
- * Parses and extracts the next ASN.1 object
- */
-bool
-extract_object(asn1Object_t const *objects,
-	u_int *objectID, chunk_t *object, u_int *level, asn1_ctx_t *ctx)
-{
-    asn1Object_t obj = objects[*objectID];
-    chunk_t *blob;
-    chunk_t *blob1;
-    u_char *start_ptr;
-
-    *object = empty_chunk;
-
-    if (obj.flags & ASN1_END)  /* end of loop or option found */
-    {
-	if (ctx->loopAddr[obj.level] && ctx->blobs[obj.level+1].len > 0)
-	{
-	    *objectID = ctx->loopAddr[obj.level]; /* another iteration */
-	    obj = objects[*objectID];
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    ctx->loopAddr[obj.level] = 0;         /* exit loop or option*/
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-    }
-
-    *level = ctx->level0 + obj.level;
-    blob = ctx->blobs + obj.level;
-    blob1 = blob + 1;
-    start_ptr = blob->ptr;
-
-   /* handle ASN.1 defaults values */
-
-    if ((obj.flags & ASN1_DEF)
-    && (blob->len == 0 || *start_ptr != obj.type) )
-    {
-	/* field is missing */
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:", *level, obj.name);
-	)
-	if (obj.type & ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
-	{
-	    (*objectID)++ ;  /* skip context-specific tag */
-	}
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    /* handle ASN.1 options */
-
-    if ((obj.flags & ASN1_OPT)
-    && (blob->len == 0 || *start_ptr != obj.type))
-    {
-        /* advance to end of missing option field */
-	do
-	    (*objectID)++;
-	while (!((objects[*objectID].flags & ASN1_END)
-	      && (objects[*objectID].level == obj.level)));
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    /* an ASN.1 object must possess at least a tag and length field */
-
-    if (blob->len < 2)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  ASN.1 object smaller than 2 octets",
-		    *level, obj.name);
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    blob1->len = asn1_length(blob);
-
-    if (blob1->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH || blob->len < blob1->len)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  length of ASN.1 object invalid or too large",
-		    *level, obj.name);
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    blob1->ptr = blob->ptr;
-    blob->ptr += blob1->len;
-    blob->len -= blob1->len;
-
-    /* return raw ASN.1 object without prior type checking */
-
-    if (obj.flags & ASN1_RAW)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:", *level, obj.name);
-        )
-	object->ptr = start_ptr;
-	object->len = (size_t)(blob->ptr - start_ptr);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    if (*start_ptr != obj.type && !(ctx->implicit && *objectID == 0))
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s: ASN1 tag 0x%02x expected, but is 0x%02x",
-		*level, obj.name, obj.type, *start_ptr);
-	    DBG_dump("", start_ptr, (u_int)(blob->ptr - start_ptr));
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L%d - %s:", ctx->level0+obj.level, obj.name);
-    )
-
-    /* In case of "SEQUENCE OF" or "SET OF" start a loop */
-
-    if (obj.flags & ASN1_LOOP)
-    {
-	if (blob1->len > 0)
-	{
-	    /* at least one item, start the loop */
-	    ctx->loopAddr[obj.level] = *objectID + 1;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* no items, advance directly to end of loop */
-	    do
-		(*objectID)++;
-	    while (!((objects[*objectID].flags & ASN1_END)
-		  && (objects[*objectID].level == obj.level)));
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-    }
-
-    if (obj.flags & ASN1_OBJ)
-    {
-	object->ptr = start_ptr;
-	object->len = (size_t)(blob->ptr - start_ptr);
-	DBG(ctx->cond,
-	    DBG_dump_chunk("", *object);
-	)
-    }
-    else if (obj.flags & ASN1_BODY)
-    {
-	*object = *blob1;
-	debug_asn1_simple_object(*object, obj.type, ctx->cond);
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * parse an ASN.1 simple type
- */
-bool
-parse_asn1_simple_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, u_int level
-, const char* name)
-{
-    size_t len;
-
-    /* an ASN.1 object must possess at least a tag and length field */
-    if (object->len < 2)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  ASN.1 object smaller than 2 octets",
-		    level, name);
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (*object->ptr != type)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s: ASN1 tag 0x%02x expected, but is 0x%02x",
-		level, name, type, *object->ptr);
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    len = asn1_length(object);
-
-    if (len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH || object->len < len)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  length of ASN.1 object invalid or too large",
-		    level, name);
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L%d - %s:", level, name);
-    )
-    debug_asn1_simple_object(*object, type, DBG_RAW);
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * extracts an algorithmIdentifier
- */
-int
-parse_algorithmIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0, chunk_t *parameters)
-{
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < ALGORITHM_ID_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(algorithmIdentifierObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return alg;
-
-	switch (objectID)
-	{
-	case ALGORITHM_ID_ALG:
-	    alg = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMETERS:
-	    if (parameters != NULL)
-		*parameters = object;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
-	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return alg;
- }
-
-/*
- *  tests if a blob contains a valid ASN.1 set or sequence
- */
-bool
-is_asn1(chunk_t blob)
-{
-    u_int len;
-    u_char tag = *blob.ptr;
-
-    if (tag != ASN1_SEQUENCE && tag != ASN1_SET)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("  file content is not binary ASN.1");
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    len = asn1_length(&blob);
- 
-    /* exact match */
-    if (len == blob.len)
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    /* some websites append a surplus newline character to the blob */
-    if (len + 1 == blob.len && *(blob.ptr + len) == '\n')
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  file size does not match ASN.1 coded length");
-    )
-    return FALSE;
-}
diff --git a/src/pluto/asn1.h b/src/pluto/asn1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 730245e4a..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/asn1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,141 +0,0 @@
-/* Simple ASN.1 parser
- * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: asn1.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#ifndef _ASN1_H
-#define _ASN1_H
-
-#include <stdarg.h>
-#include <gmp.h>
-
-#include "defs.h"
-
-/* Defines some primitive ASN1 types */
-
-typedef enum {
-    ASN1_EOC =			0x00,
-    ASN1_BOOLEAN =		0x01,
-    ASN1_INTEGER =		0x02,
-    ASN1_BIT_STRING =		0x03,
-    ASN1_OCTET_STRING = 	0x04,
-    ASN1_NULL = 		0x05,
-    ASN1_OID =			0x06,
-    ASN1_ENUMERATED =		0x0A,
-    ASN1_UTF8STRING =		0x0C,
-    ASN1_NUMERICSTRING =	0x12,
-    ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING =	0x13,
-    ASN1_T61STRING =		0x14,
-    ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING =	0x15,
-    ASN1_IA5STRING =		0x16,
-    ASN1_UTCTIME =		0x17,
-    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME =	0x18,
-    ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING =	0x19,
-    ASN1_VISIBLESTRING = 	0x1A,
-    ASN1_GENERALSTRING =	0x1B,
-    ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING =	0x1C,
-    ASN1_BMPSTRING =		0x1E,
-
-    ASN1_CONSTRUCTED =		0x20,
-
-    ASN1_SEQUENCE =		0x30,
-
-    ASN1_SET =			0x31,
-
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0 =		0x80,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_1 =		0x81,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2 =		0x82,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_3 =		0x83,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_4 =		0x84,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_5 =		0x85,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6 =		0x86,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_7 =		0x87,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_8 =		0x88,
-
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0 =		0xA0,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1 =		0xA1,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2 =		0xA2,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3 =		0xA3,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4 =		0xA4,
-    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_5 =		0xA5
-} asn1_t;
-
-/* Definition of ASN1 flags */
-
-#define ASN1_NONE	0x00
-#define ASN1_DEF	0x01
-#define ASN1_OPT	0x02
-#define ASN1_LOOP	0x04
-#define ASN1_END	0x08
-#define ASN1_OBJ	0x10
-#define ASN1_BODY	0x20
-#define ASN1_RAW	0x40
-
-#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH	0xffffffff
-
-/* definition of an ASN.1 object */
-
-typedef struct {
-    u_int   level;
-    const u_char  *name;
-    asn1_t  type;
-    u_char  flags;
-} asn1Object_t;
-
-#define ASN1_MAX_LEVEL	10
-
-typedef struct {
-    bool  implicit;
-    u_int cond;
-    u_int level0;
-    u_int loopAddr[ASN1_MAX_LEVEL+1];
-    chunk_t  blobs[ASN1_MAX_LEVEL+2];
-} asn1_ctx_t;
-
-/* some common prefabricated ASN.1 constants */
-
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_0;
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_1;
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_2;
-
-/* some popular algorithmIdentifiers */
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_md5_id;
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_sha1_id;
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_rsaEncryption_id;
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_md5WithRSA_id;
-extern const chunk_t ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id;
-
-extern chunk_t asn1_algorithmIdentifier(int oid);
-extern int known_oid(chunk_t object);
-extern u_int asn1_length(chunk_t *blob);
-extern void code_asn1_length(size_t length, chunk_t *code);
-extern u_char* build_asn1_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, size_t datalen);
-extern chunk_t asn1_integer_from_mpz(const mpz_t value);
-extern chunk_t asn1_simple_object(asn1_t tag, chunk_t content);
-extern chunk_t asn1_wrap(asn1_t type, const char *mode, ...);
-extern bool is_printablestring(chunk_t str);
-extern time_t asn1totime(const chunk_t *utctime, asn1_t type);
-extern chunk_t timetoasn1(const time_t *time, asn1_t type);
-extern void asn1_init(asn1_ctx_t *ctx, chunk_t blob
-    , u_int level0, bool implicit, u_int cond);
-extern bool extract_object(asn1Object_t const *objects
-    , u_int *objectID, chunk_t *object, u_int *level, asn1_ctx_t *ctx);
-extern bool parse_asn1_simple_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, u_int level
-    , const char* name);
-extern int parse_algorithmIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0
-    , chunk_t *parameters);
-extern bool is_asn1(chunk_t blob);
-
-#endif /* _ASN1_H */
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/ca.c b/src/pluto/ca.c
index 816db53a8..4fdb8cfe7 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ca.c
+++ b/src/pluto/ca.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ca.c 4709 2008-11-27 10:20:25Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -23,7 +21,6 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -40,17 +37,17 @@
 static x509cert_t *x509authcerts = NULL;
 
 const ca_info_t empty_ca_info = {
-      NULL	  ,  /* next */
-      NULL	  ,  /* name */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME,
-    { NULL, 0 }	  ,  /* authName */
-    { NULL, 0 }	  ,  /* authKeyID */
-    { NULL, 0 }	  ,  /* authKey SerialNumber */
-      NULL	  ,  /* ldaphost */
-      NULL	  ,  /* ldapbase */
-      NULL	  ,  /* ocspori */
-      NULL	  ,  /* crluri */
-      FALSE	     /* strictcrlpolicy */
+	  NULL        ,  /* next */
+	  NULL        ,  /* name */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME,
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,  /* authName */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,  /* authKeyID */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,  /* authKey SerialNumber */
+	  NULL        ,  /* ldaphost */
+	  NULL        ,  /* ldapbase */
+	  NULL        ,  /* ocspori */
+	  NULL        ,  /* crluri */
+	  FALSE          /* strictcrlpolicy */
 };
 
 /* chained list of X.509 certification authority information records */
@@ -63,52 +60,52 @@ static ca_info_t *ca_infos = NULL;
 bool
 trusted_ca(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *pathlen)
 {
-    bool match = FALSE;
-
-    /* no CA b specified -> any CA a is accepted */
-    if (b.ptr == NULL)
-    {
-	*pathlen = (a.ptr == NULL)? 0 : MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    /* no CA a specified -> trust cannot be established */
-    if (a.ptr == NULL)
-    {
-	*pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	bool match = FALSE;
+
+	/* no CA b specified -> any CA a is accepted */
+	if (b.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		*pathlen = (a.ptr == NULL)? 0 : MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+
+	/* no CA a specified -> trust cannot be established */
+	if (a.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		*pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    *pathlen = 0;
+	*pathlen = 0;
 
-    /* CA a equals CA b -> we have a match */
-    if (same_dn(a, b))
-	return TRUE;
+	/* CA a equals CA b -> we have a match */
+	if (same_dn(a, b))
+		return TRUE;
 
-    /* CA a might be a subordinate CA of b */
-    lock_authcert_list("trusted_ca");
+	/* CA a might be a subordinate CA of b */
+	lock_authcert_list("trusted_ca");
 
-    while ((*pathlen)++ < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN)
-    {
-	x509cert_t *cacert = get_authcert(a, empty_chunk, empty_chunk, AUTH_CA);
+	while ((*pathlen)++ < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN)
+	{
+		x509cert_t *cacert = get_authcert(a, chunk_empty, chunk_empty, AUTH_CA);
 
-	/* cacert not found or self-signed root cacert-> exit */
-	if (cacert == NULL || same_dn(cacert->issuer, a))
-	    break;
+		/* cacert not found or self-signed root cacert-> exit */
+		if (cacert == NULL || same_dn(cacert->issuer, a))
+			break;
 
-	/* does the issuer of CA a match CA b? */
-	match = same_dn(cacert->issuer, b);
+		/* does the issuer of CA a match CA b? */
+		match = same_dn(cacert->issuer, b);
 
-	/* we have a match and exit the loop */
-	if (match)
-	    break;
+		/* we have a match and exit the loop */
+		if (match)
+			break;
 
-	/* go one level up in the CA chain */
-	a = cacert->issuer;
-    }
-    
-    unlock_authcert_list("trusted_ca");
-    return match;
+		/* go one level up in the CA chain */
+		a = cacert->issuer;
+	}
+	
+	unlock_authcert_list("trusted_ca");
+	return match;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -117,36 +114,36 @@ trusted_ca(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *pathlen)
 bool
 match_requested_ca(generalName_t *requested_ca, chunk_t our_ca, int *our_pathlen)
 {
-    /* if no ca is requested than any ca will match */
-    if (requested_ca == NULL)
-    {
-	*our_pathlen = 0;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    *our_pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1;
+	/* if no ca is requested than any ca will match */
+	if (requested_ca == NULL)
+	{
+		*our_pathlen = 0;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-    while (requested_ca != NULL)
-    {
-	int pathlen;
+	*our_pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1;
 
-	if (trusted_ca(our_ca, requested_ca->name, &pathlen)
-	&& pathlen < *our_pathlen)
+	while (requested_ca != NULL)
 	{
-	    *our_pathlen = pathlen;
+		int pathlen;
+
+		if (trusted_ca(our_ca, requested_ca->name, &pathlen)
+		&& pathlen < *our_pathlen)
+		{
+			*our_pathlen = pathlen;
+		}
+		requested_ca = requested_ca->next;
 	}
-	requested_ca = requested_ca->next;
-    }
 
-    if (*our_pathlen > MAX_CA_PATH_LEN)
-    {
-	*our_pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (*our_pathlen > MAX_CA_PATH_LEN)
+	{
+		*our_pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -155,9 +152,9 @@ match_requested_ca(generalName_t *requested_ca, chunk_t our_ca, int *our_pathlen
 static void
 free_first_authcert(void)
 {
-    x509cert_t *first = x509authcerts;
-    x509authcerts = first->next;
-    free_x509cert(first);
+	x509cert_t *first = x509authcerts;
+	x509authcerts = first->next;
+	free_x509cert(first);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -166,12 +163,12 @@ free_first_authcert(void)
 void
 free_authcerts(void)
 {
-    lock_authcert_list("free_authcerts");
+	lock_authcert_list("free_authcerts");
 
-    while (x509authcerts != NULL)
-        free_first_authcert();
+	while (x509authcerts != NULL)
+		free_first_authcert();
 
-    unlock_authcert_list("free_authcerts");
+	unlock_authcert_list("free_authcerts");
 }
 
 /*
@@ -180,29 +177,29 @@ free_authcerts(void)
 x509cert_t*
 get_authcert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid, u_char auth_flags)
 {
-    x509cert_t *cert = x509authcerts;
-    x509cert_t *prev_cert = NULL;
-
-    while (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	if (cert->authority_flags & auth_flags
-	&& ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->subjectKeyID)
-	    : (same_dn(subject, cert->subject)
-	       && same_serial(serial, cert->serialNumber))))
+	x509cert_t *cert = x509authcerts;
+	x509cert_t *prev_cert = NULL;
+
+	while (cert != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (cert != x509authcerts)
-	    {
-		/* bring the certificate up front */
-		prev_cert->next = cert->next;
-		cert->next = x509authcerts;
-		x509authcerts = cert;
-	    }
-	    return cert;
+		if (cert->authority_flags & auth_flags
+		&& ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->subjectKeyID)
+			: (same_dn(subject, cert->subject)
+			   && same_serial(serial, cert->serialNumber))))
+		{
+			if (cert != x509authcerts)
+			{
+				/* bring the certificate up front */
+				prev_cert->next = cert->next;
+				cert->next = x509authcerts;
+				x509authcerts = cert;
+			}
+			return cert;
+		}
+		prev_cert = cert;
+		cert = cert->next;
 	}
-	prev_cert = cert;
-	cert = cert->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -211,49 +208,49 @@ get_authcert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid, u_char auth_flags)
 x509cert_t*
 add_authcert(x509cert_t *cert, u_char auth_flags)
 {
-    x509cert_t *old_cert;
+	x509cert_t *old_cert;
 
-    /* set authority flags */
-    cert->authority_flags |= auth_flags;
+	/* set authority flags */
+	cert->authority_flags |= auth_flags;
 
-    lock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
+	lock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
 
-    old_cert = get_authcert(cert->subject, cert->serialNumber
-	, cert->subjectKeyID, auth_flags);
+	old_cert = get_authcert(cert->subject, cert->serialNumber
+		, cert->subjectKeyID, auth_flags);
 
-    if (old_cert != NULL)
-    {
-	if (same_x509cert(cert, old_cert))
-	{
-	    /* cert is already present, just add additional authority flags */
-	    old_cert->authority_flags |= cert->authority_flags;
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
-		DBG_log("  authcert is already present and identical")
-	    )
-	    unlock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
-
-	    free_x509cert(cert);
-	    return old_cert;
-	}
-	else
+	if (old_cert != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* cert is already present but will be replaced by new cert */
-	    free_first_authcert();
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
-		DBG_log("  existing authcert deleted")
-	    )
+		if (same_x509cert(cert, old_cert))
+		{
+			/* cert is already present, just add additional authority flags */
+			old_cert->authority_flags |= cert->authority_flags;
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+				DBG_log("  authcert is already present and identical")
+			)
+			unlock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
+
+			free_x509cert(cert);
+			return old_cert;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* cert is already present but will be replaced by new cert */
+			free_first_authcert();
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+				DBG_log("  existing authcert deleted")
+			)
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* add new authcert to chained list */
-    cert->next = x509authcerts;
-    x509authcerts = cert;
-    share_x509cert(cert);  /* set count to one */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  authcert inserted")
-    )
-    unlock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
-    return cert;
+
+	/* add new authcert to chained list */
+	cert->next = x509authcerts;
+	x509authcerts = cert;
+	share_x509cert(cert);  /* set count to one */
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  authcert inserted")
+	)
+	unlock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
+	return cert;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -262,41 +259,41 @@ add_authcert(x509cert_t *cert, u_char auth_flags)
 void
 load_authcerts(const char *type, const char *path, u_char auth_flags)
 {
-    struct dirent **filelist;
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    u_char *save_dir;
-    int n;
-
-    /* change directory to specified path */
-    save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
-
-    if (chdir(path))
-    {
-	plog("Could not change to directory '%s'", path);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("Changing to directory '%s'", path);
-	n = scandir(path, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
-
-	if (n < 0)
-	    plog("  scandir() error");
-	else
-	{
-	    while (n--)
-	    {
-		cert_t cert;
+	struct dirent **filelist;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	u_char *save_dir;
+	int n;
 
-		if (load_cert(filelist[n]->d_name, type, &cert))
-		    add_authcert(cert.u.x509, auth_flags);
+	/* change directory to specified path */
+	save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
 
-		free(filelist[n]);
-	    }
-	    free(filelist);
+	if (chdir(path))
+	{
+		plog("Could not change to directory '%s'", path);
 	}
-    }
-    /* restore directory path */
-    ignore_result(chdir(save_dir));
+	else
+	{
+		plog("Changing to directory '%s'", path);
+		n = scandir(path, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
+
+		if (n < 0)
+			plog("  scandir() error");
+		else
+		{
+			while (n--)
+			{
+				cert_t cert;
+
+				if (load_cert(filelist[n]->d_name, type, &cert))
+					add_authcert(cert.u.x509, auth_flags);
+
+				free(filelist[n]);
+			}
+			free(filelist);
+		}
+	}
+	/* restore directory path */
+	ignore_result(chdir(save_dir));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -305,9 +302,9 @@ load_authcerts(const char *type, const char *path, u_char auth_flags)
 void
 list_authcerts(const char *caption, u_char auth_flags, bool utc)
 {
-    lock_authcert_list("list_authcerts");
-    list_x509cert_chain(caption, x509authcerts, auth_flags, utc);
-    unlock_authcert_list("list_authcerts");
+	lock_authcert_list("list_authcerts");
+	list_x509cert_chain(caption, x509authcerts, auth_flags, utc);
+	unlock_authcert_list("list_authcerts");
 }
 
 /*
@@ -315,19 +312,19 @@ list_authcerts(const char *caption, u_char auth_flags, bool utc)
  */
 static const x509cert_t*
 get_alt_cacert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
-    , const x509cert_t *cert)
+	, const x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    while (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->subjectKeyID)
-	    : (same_dn(subject, cert->subject)
-	       && same_serial(serial, cert->serialNumber)))
+	while (cert != NULL)
 	{
-	    return cert;
+		if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->subjectKeyID)
+			: (same_dn(subject, cert->subject)
+			   && same_serial(serial, cert->serialNumber)))
+		{
+			return cert;
+		}
+		cert = cert->next;
 	}
-	cert = cert->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* establish trust into a candidate authcert by going up the trust chain.
@@ -336,85 +333,85 @@ get_alt_cacert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
 bool
 trust_authcert_candidate(const x509cert_t *cert, const x509cert_t *alt_chain)
 {
-    int pathlen;
-
-    lock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
-
-    for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
-    {
-	const x509cert_t *authcert = NULL;
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
-	    DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
-	    DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
-	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
-	    }
-	)
+	int pathlen;
 
-	/* search in alternative chain first */
-	authcert = get_alt_cacert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-	    , cert->authKeyID, alt_chain);
+	lock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
 
-	if (authcert != NULL)
+	for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("issuer cacert found in alternative chain")
-	    )
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* search in trusted chain */
-	    authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-		, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+		const x509cert_t *authcert = NULL;
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	    if (authcert != NULL)
-	    {
 		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+			DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+			DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
+			if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
+			}
 		)
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		plog("issuer cacert not found");
-		unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	}
 
-	if (!check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature
-			   , cert->algorithm, cert->algorithm, authcert))
-	{
-	    plog("certificate signature is invalid");
-	    unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
-	)
+		/* search in alternative chain first */
+		authcert = get_alt_cacert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+			, cert->authKeyID, alt_chain);
+
+		if (authcert != NULL)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("issuer cacert found in alternative chain")
+			)
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* search in trusted chain */
+			authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+				, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+			if (authcert != NULL)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+				)
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				plog("issuer cacert not found");
+				unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!x509_check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature,
+								  cert->algorithm, authcert))
+		{
+			plog("certificate signature is invalid");
+			unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
+		)
 
-	/* check if cert is a self-signed root ca */
-	if (pathlen > 0 && same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
-	    )
-	    unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
-	    return TRUE;
+		/* check if cert is a self-signed root ca */
+		if (pathlen > 0 && same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
+			)
+			unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+			return TRUE;
+		}
+
+		/* go up one step in the trust chain */
+		cert = authcert;
 	}
-
-	/* go up one step in the trust chain */
-	cert = authcert;
-    }
-    plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
-    unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
-    return FALSE;
+	plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
+	unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -423,19 +420,19 @@ trust_authcert_candidate(const x509cert_t *cert, const x509cert_t *alt_chain)
 ca_info_t*
 get_ca_info(chunk_t authname, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid)
 {
-    ca_info_t *ca= ca_infos;
+	ca_info_t *ca= ca_infos;
 
-    while (ca!= NULL)
-    {
-	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, ca->authKeyID)
-	    : (same_dn(authname, ca->authName)
-	       && same_serial(serial, ca->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	while (ca!= NULL)
 	{
-	    return ca;
+		if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, ca->authKeyID)
+			: (same_dn(authname, ca->authName)
+			   && same_serial(serial, ca->authKeySerialNumber)))
+		{
+			return ca;
+		}
+		ca = ca->next;
 	}
-	ca = ca->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 
@@ -445,21 +442,18 @@ get_ca_info(chunk_t authname, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid)
 static void
 free_ca_info(ca_info_t* ca_info)
 {
-    if (ca_info == NULL)
-	return;
-
-    pfreeany(ca_info->name);
-    pfreeany(ca_info->ldaphost);
-    pfreeany(ca_info->ldapbase);
-    pfreeany(ca_info->ocspuri);
-
-    freeanychunk(ca_info->authName);
-    freeanychunk(ca_info->authKeyID);
-    freeanychunk(ca_info->authKeySerialNumber);
-
-    free_generalNames(ca_info->crluri, TRUE);
-
-    pfree(ca_info);
+	if (ca_info == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	free(ca_info->name);
+	free(ca_info->ldaphost);
+	free(ca_info->ldapbase);
+	free(ca_info->ocspuri);
+	free(ca_info->authName.ptr);
+	free(ca_info->authKeyID.ptr);
+	free(ca_info->authKeySerialNumber.ptr);
+	free_generalNames(ca_info->crluri, TRUE);
+	free(ca_info);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -468,13 +462,13 @@ free_ca_info(ca_info_t* ca_info)
 void
 free_ca_infos(void)
 {
-    while (ca_infos != NULL)
-    {
-	ca_info_t *ca = ca_infos;
+	while (ca_infos != NULL)
+	{
+		ca_info_t *ca = ca_infos;
 
-	ca_infos = ca_infos->next;
-	free_ca_info(ca);
-    }
+		ca_infos = ca_infos->next;
+		free_ca_info(ca);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -483,28 +477,28 @@ free_ca_infos(void)
 bool
 find_ca_info_by_name(const char *name, bool delete)
 {
-    ca_info_t **ca_p = &ca_infos;
-    ca_info_t *ca = *ca_p;
+	ca_info_t **ca_p = &ca_infos;
+	ca_info_t *ca = *ca_p;
 
-    while (ca != NULL)
-    {
-	/* is there already an entry? */
-	if (streq(name, ca->name))
+	while (ca != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (delete)
-	    {
-		lock_ca_info_list("find_ca_info_by_name");
-		*ca_p = ca->next;
-		free_ca_info(ca);
-		plog("deleting ca description \"%s\"", name);
-		unlock_ca_info_list("find_ca_info_by_name");
-	    }
-	    return TRUE;
+		/* is there already an entry? */
+		if (streq(name, ca->name))
+		{
+			if (delete)
+			{
+				lock_ca_info_list("find_ca_info_by_name");
+				*ca_p = ca->next;
+				free_ca_info(ca);
+				plog("deleting ca description \"%s\"", name);
+				unlock_ca_info_list("find_ca_info_by_name");
+			}
+			return TRUE;
+		}
+		ca_p = &ca->next;
+		ca = *ca_p;
 	}
-	ca_p = &ca->next;
-	ca = *ca_p;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 
@@ -514,136 +508,133 @@ find_ca_info_by_name(const char *name, bool delete)
 void
 add_ca_info(const whack_message_t *msg)
 {
-    smartcard_t *sc = NULL;
-    cert_t cert;
-    bool valid_cert = FALSE;
-    bool cached_cert = FALSE;
-
-    if (find_ca_info_by_name(msg->name, FALSE))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "attempt to redefine ca record \"%s\"", msg->name);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (scx_on_smartcard(msg->cacert))
-    {
-	/* load CA cert from smartcard */
-	valid_cert = scx_load_cert(msg->cacert, &sc, &cert, &cached_cert);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* load CA cert from file */
-	valid_cert = load_ca_cert(msg->cacert, &cert);
-    }
-
-    if (valid_cert)
-    {
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	x509cert_t *cacert = cert.u.x509;
-	ca_info_t *ca = NULL;
-
-	/* does the authname already exist? */
-	ca = get_ca_info(cacert->subject, cacert->serialNumber
-		, cacert->subjectKeyID);
-	
-	if (ca != NULL)
-	{
-	    /* ca_info is already present */
-	    loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "  duplicate ca information in record \"%s\" found,"
-			       "ignoring \"%s\"", ca->name, msg->name);
-	    free_x509cert(cacert);
-	    return;
-	}
+	smartcard_t *sc = NULL;
+	cert_t cert;
+	bool valid_cert = FALSE;
+	bool cached_cert = FALSE;
 
-	plog("added ca description \"%s\"", msg->name);
-
-	/* create and initialize new ca_info record */
-	ca = alloc_thing(ca_info_t, "ca info");
-	*ca = empty_ca_info;
-
-	/* name */
-	ca->name = clone_str(msg->name, "ca name");
-	    
-	/* authName */
-	clonetochunk(ca->authName, cacert->subject.ptr
-	    , cacert->subject.len, "authName");
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ca->authName);
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("authname: '%s'", buf)
-	)
-
-	/* authSerialNumber */
-	clonetochunk(ca->authKeySerialNumber, cacert->serialNumber.ptr
-	    , cacert->serialNumber.len, "authKeySerialNumber");
-
-	/* authKeyID */
-	if (cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	if (find_ca_info_by_name(msg->name, FALSE))
 	{
-	    clonetochunk(ca->authKeyID, cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr
-		, cacert->subjectKeyID.len, "authKeyID");
-	    datatot(cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr, cacert->subjectKeyID.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
-		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf)
-	    )
+		loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "attempt to redefine ca record \"%s\"", msg->name);
+		return;
 	}
 
-	/* ldaphost */
-	ca->ldaphost = clone_str(msg->ldaphost, "ldaphost");
-
-	/* ldapbase */
-	ca->ldapbase = clone_str(msg->ldapbase, "ldapbase");
-
-	/* ocspuri */
-	if (msg->ocspuri != NULL)
+	if (scx_on_smartcard(msg->cacert))
 	{
-	    if (strncasecmp(msg->ocspuri, "http", 4) == 0)
-		ca->ocspuri = clone_str(msg->ocspuri, "ocspuri");
-	    else
-		plog("  ignoring ocspuri with unkown protocol");
+		/* load CA cert from smartcard */
+		valid_cert = scx_load_cert(msg->cacert, &sc, &cert, &cached_cert);
 	}
-
-	/* crluri2*/
-	if (msg->crluri2 != NULL)
+	else
 	{
-	    generalName_t gn =
-		{ NULL, GN_URI, {msg->crluri2, strlen(msg->crluri2)} };
-
-	    add_distribution_points(&gn, &ca->crluri);
+		/* load CA cert from file */
+		valid_cert = load_ca_cert(msg->cacert, &cert);
 	}
 
-	/* crluri */
-	if (msg->crluri != NULL)
+	if (valid_cert)
 	{
-	    generalName_t gn =
-		{ NULL, GN_URI, {msg->crluri, strlen(msg->crluri)} };
-
-	    add_distribution_points(&gn, &ca->crluri);
-	}
-
-	/* strictrlpolicy */
-	ca->strictcrlpolicy = msg->whack_strict;
-
-	/* insert ca_info record into the chained list */
-	lock_ca_info_list("add_ca_info");
-
-	ca->next = ca_infos;
-	ca_infos = ca;
-	ca->installed = time(NULL);
-	
-	unlock_ca_info_list("add_ca_info");
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		x509cert_t *cacert = cert.u.x509;
+		ca_info_t *ca = NULL;
+
+		/* does the authname already exist? */
+		ca = get_ca_info(cacert->subject, cacert->serialNumber
+				, cacert->subjectKeyID);
+		
+		if (ca != NULL)
+		{
+			/* ca_info is already present */
+			loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "  duplicate ca information in record \"%s\" found,"
+							   "ignoring \"%s\"", ca->name, msg->name);
+			free_x509cert(cacert);
+			return;
+		}
+
+		plog("added ca description \"%s\"", msg->name);
+
+		/* create and initialize new ca_info record */
+		ca = malloc_thing(ca_info_t);
+		*ca = empty_ca_info;
+
+		/* name */
+		ca->name = clone_str(msg->name);
+			
+		/* authName */
+		ca->authName = chunk_clone(cacert->subject);
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ca->authName);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("authname: '%s'", buf)
+		)
 
-	/* add cacert to list of authcerts */
-	if (!cached_cert && sc != NULL)
-	{
-	    if (sc->last_cert.type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
-		sc->last_cert.u.x509->count--;
-	    sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_authcert(cacert, AUTH_CA);
-	    share_cert(sc->last_cert);
+		/* authSerialNumber */
+		ca->authKeySerialNumber = chunk_clone(cacert->serialNumber);
+
+		/* authKeyID */
+		if (cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			ca->authKeyID = chunk_clone(cacert->subjectKeyID);
+			datatot(cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr, cacert->subjectKeyID.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+				DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf)
+			)
+		}
+
+		/* ldaphost */
+		ca->ldaphost = clone_str(msg->ldaphost);
+
+		/* ldapbase */
+		ca->ldapbase = clone_str(msg->ldapbase);
+
+		/* ocspuri */
+		if (msg->ocspuri != NULL)
+		{
+			if (strncasecmp(msg->ocspuri, "http", 4) == 0)
+				ca->ocspuri = clone_str(msg->ocspuri);
+			else
+				plog("  ignoring ocspuri with unkown protocol");
+		}
+
+		/* crluri2*/
+		if (msg->crluri2 != NULL)
+		{
+			generalName_t gn =
+				{ NULL, GN_URI, {msg->crluri2, strlen(msg->crluri2)} };
+
+			add_distribution_points(&gn, &ca->crluri);
+		}
+
+		/* crluri */
+		if (msg->crluri != NULL)
+		{
+			generalName_t gn =
+				{ NULL, GN_URI, {msg->crluri, strlen(msg->crluri)} };
+
+			add_distribution_points(&gn, &ca->crluri);
+		}
+
+		/* strictrlpolicy */
+		ca->strictcrlpolicy = msg->whack_strict;
+
+		/* insert ca_info record into the chained list */
+		lock_ca_info_list("add_ca_info");
+
+		ca->next = ca_infos;
+		ca_infos = ca;
+		ca->installed = time(NULL);
+		
+		unlock_ca_info_list("add_ca_info");
+
+		/* add cacert to list of authcerts */
+		if (!cached_cert && sc != NULL)
+		{
+			if (sc->last_cert.type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+				sc->last_cert.u.x509->count--;
+			sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_authcert(cacert, AUTH_CA);
+			share_cert(sc->last_cert);
+		}
+		if (sc != NULL)
+			time(&sc->last_load);
 	}
-	if (sc != NULL)
-	    time(&sc->last_load);
-    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -652,51 +643,51 @@ add_ca_info(const whack_message_t *msg)
 void
 list_ca_infos(bool utc)
 {
-    ca_info_t *ca = ca_infos;
-    
-    if (ca != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 CA Information Records:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
-
-    while (ca != NULL)
-    {
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	/* strictpolicy per CA not supported yet
-	 *
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, \"%s\", strictcrlpolicy: %s"
-		, timetoa(&ca->installed, utc), ca->name
-		, ca->strictcrlpolicy? "yes":"no");
-	*/
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, \"%s\"", timetoa(&ca->installed, utc), ca->name);
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ca->authName);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authname: '%s'", buf);
-	if (ca->ldaphost != NULL)
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ldaphost: '%s'", ca->ldaphost);
-	if (ca->ldapbase != NULL)
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ldapbase: '%s'", ca->ldapbase);
-	if (ca->ocspuri != NULL)
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ocspuri:  '%s'", ca->ocspuri);
-
-	list_distribution_points(ca->crluri);
-
-	if (ca->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	ca_info_t *ca = ca_infos;
+	
+	if (ca != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(ca->authKeyID.ptr, ca->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 CA Information Records:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
 	}
-	if (ca->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+
+	while (ca != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(ca->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, ca->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+		/* strictpolicy per CA not supported yet
+		 *
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, \"%s\", strictcrlpolicy: %s"
+				, &ca->installed, utc, ca->name
+				, ca->strictcrlpolicy? "yes":"no");
+		*/
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, \"%s\"", &ca->installed, utc, ca->name);
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ca->authName);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authname: '%s'", buf);
+		if (ca->ldaphost != NULL)
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ldaphost: '%s'", ca->ldaphost);
+		if (ca->ldapbase != NULL)
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ldapbase: '%s'", ca->ldapbase);
+		if (ca->ocspuri != NULL)
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ocspuri:  '%s'", ca->ocspuri);
+
+		list_distribution_points(ca->crluri);
+
+		if (ca->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(ca->authKeyID.ptr, ca->authKeyID.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		if (ca->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(ca->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, ca->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		ca = ca->next;
 	}
-	ca = ca->next;
-    }
 }
 
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/ca.h b/src/pluto/ca.h
index 13f874284..44d079b4c 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ca.h
+++ b/src/pluto/ca.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ca.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _CA_H
@@ -20,45 +18,45 @@
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 
-#define MAX_CA_PATH_LEN		7
+#define MAX_CA_PATH_LEN         7
 
 /* authority flags */
 
-#define AUTH_NONE	0x00	/* no authorities */
-#define AUTH_CA		0x01	/* certification authority */
-#define AUTH_AA		0x02	/* authorization authority */
-#define AUTH_OCSP	0x04	/* ocsp signing authority */
+#define AUTH_NONE       0x00    /* no authorities */
+#define AUTH_CA         0x01    /* certification authority */
+#define AUTH_AA         0x02    /* authorization authority */
+#define AUTH_OCSP       0x04    /* ocsp signing authority */
 
 /* CA info structures */
 
 typedef struct ca_info ca_info_t;
 
 struct ca_info {
-    ca_info_t       *next;
-    char	    *name;
-    time_t	    installed;
-    chunk_t	    authName;
-    chunk_t	    authKeyID;
-    chunk_t	    authKeySerialNumber;
-    char	    *ldaphost;
-    char	    *ldapbase;
-    char	    *ocspuri;
-    generalName_t   *crluri;
-    bool	    strictcrlpolicy;
+	ca_info_t       *next;
+	char            *name;
+	time_t          installed;
+	chunk_t         authName;
+	chunk_t         authKeyID;
+	chunk_t         authKeySerialNumber;
+	char            *ldaphost;
+	char            *ldapbase;
+	char            *ocspuri;
+	generalName_t   *crluri;
+	bool            strictcrlpolicy;
 };
 
 extern bool trusted_ca(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *pathlen);
 extern bool match_requested_ca(generalName_t *requested_ca
-    , chunk_t our_ca, int *our_pathlen);
+	, chunk_t our_ca, int *our_pathlen);
 extern x509cert_t* get_authcert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
-    , u_char auth_flags);
+	, u_char auth_flags);
 extern void load_authcerts(const char *type, const char *path
-    , u_char auth_flags);
+	, u_char auth_flags);
 extern x509cert_t* add_authcert(x509cert_t *cert, u_char auth_flags);
 extern void free_authcerts(void);
 extern void list_authcerts(const char *caption, u_char auth_flags, bool utc);
 extern bool trust_authcert_candidate(const x509cert_t *cert
-    , const x509cert_t *alt_chain);
+	, const x509cert_t *alt_chain);
 extern ca_info_t* get_ca_info(chunk_t name, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid);
 extern bool find_ca_info_by_name(const char *name, bool delete);
 extern void add_ca_info(const whack_message_t *msg);
diff --git a/src/pluto/certs.c b/src/pluto/certs.c
index 43976a913..ca3019b9b 100644
--- a/src/pluto/certs.c
+++ b/src/pluto/certs.c
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /* Certificate support for IKE authentication
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * HSR - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: certs.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -19,241 +19,251 @@
 #include <string.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "library.h"
+#include "asn1/asn1.h"
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
 #include "id.h"
-#include "x509.h"
-#include "pgp.h"
 #include "pem.h"
 #include "certs.h"
-#include "pkcs1.h"
 
-/*
+/**
  * used for initializatin of certs
  */
-const cert_t empty_cert = {CERT_NONE, {NULL}};
+const cert_t cert_empty = {CERT_NONE, {NULL}};
 
-/*
+/**
  * extracts the certificate to be sent to the peer
  */
-chunk_t
-get_mycert(cert_t cert)
+chunk_t cert_get_encoding(cert_t cert)
 {
-    switch (cert.type)
-    {
-    case CERT_PGP:
-	return cert.u.pgp->certificate;
-    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
-	return cert.u.x509->certificate;
-    default:
-	return empty_chunk;
-    }
+	switch (cert.type)
+	{
+	case CERT_PGP:
+		return cert.u.pgp->certificate;
+	case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+		return cert.u.x509->certificate;
+	default:
+		return chunk_empty;
+	}
+}
+
+public_key_t* cert_get_public_key(const cert_t cert)
+{
+	switch (cert.type)
+	{
+		case CERT_PGP:
+			return cert.u.pgp->public_key;
+			break;
+		case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+			return cert.u.x509->public_key;
+			break;
+		default:
+			return NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 /* load a coded key or certificate file with autodetection
  * of binary DER or base64 PEM ASN.1 formats and armored PGP format
  */
-bool
-load_coded_file(const char *filename, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char *type
-, chunk_t *blob, bool *pgp)
+bool load_coded_file(char *filename, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char *type,
+					 chunk_t *blob, bool *pgp)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	FILE *fd = fopen(filename, "r");
 
-    FILE *fd = fopen(filename, "r");
+	if (fd)
+	{
+		int bytes;
+		fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END );
+		blob->len = ftell(fd);
+		rewind(fd);
+		blob->ptr = malloc(blob->len);
+		bytes = fread(blob->ptr, 1, blob->len, fd);
+		fclose(fd);
+		plog("  loaded %s file '%s' (%d bytes)", type, filename, bytes);
 
-    if (fd)
-    {
-	int bytes;
-	fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END );
-	blob->len = ftell(fd);
-	rewind(fd);
-	blob->ptr = alloc_bytes(blob->len, type);
-	bytes = fread(blob->ptr, 1, blob->len, fd);
-	fclose(fd);
-	plog("  loaded %s file '%s' (%d bytes)", type, filename, bytes);
+		*pgp = FALSE;
 
-	*pgp = FALSE;
+		/* try DER format */
+		if (is_asn1(*blob))
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  file coded in DER format");
+			)
+			return TRUE;
+		}
 
-	/* try DER format */
-	if (is_asn1(*blob))
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  file coded in DER format");
-	    )
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
+		/* try PEM format */
+		ugh = pemtobin(blob, pass, filename, pgp);
 
-	/* try PEM format */
-	ugh = pemtobin(blob, pass, filename, pgp);
+		if (ugh == NULL)
+		{
+			if (*pgp)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+					DBG_log("  file coded in armored PGP format");
+				)
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			if (is_asn1(*blob))
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+					DBG_log("  file coded in PEM format");
+				)
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			ugh = "file coded in unknown format, discarded";
+		}
 
-	if (ugh == NULL)
+		/* a conversion error has occured */
+		plog("  %s", ugh);
+		free(blob->ptr);
+		*blob = chunk_empty;
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    if (*pgp)
-	    {
-                DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-                    DBG_log("  file coded in armored PGP format");
-                )
-                return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    if (is_asn1(*blob))
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		    DBG_log("  file coded in PEM format");
-		)
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    ugh = "file coded in unknown format, discarded";
+		plog("  could not open %s file '%s'", type, filename);
 	}
-
-	/* a conversion error has occured */
-	plog("  %s", ugh);
-	pfree(blob->ptr);
-	*blob = empty_chunk;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("  could not open %s file '%s'", type, filename);
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-/*
- *  Loads a PKCS#1 or PGP private RSA key file
+/**
+ *  Loads a PKCS#1 or PGP privatekey file
  */
-err_t
-load_rsa_private_key(const char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass
-, RSA_private_key_t *key)
+private_key_t* load_private_key(char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass,
+								key_type_t type)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    bool pgp = FALSE;
-    chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+	private_key_t *key = NULL;
+	chunk_t blob = chunk_empty;
+	bool pgp = FALSE;
 
-    const char *path = concatenate_paths(PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, filename);
+	char *path = concatenate_paths(PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, filename);
 
-    if (load_coded_file(path, pass, "private key", &blob, &pgp))
-    {
-	if (pgp)
+	if (load_coded_file(path, pass, "private key", &blob, &pgp))
 	{
-	    if (!parse_pgp(blob, NULL, key))
-		ugh = "syntax error in PGP private key file";
+		if (pgp)
+		{
+ 			parse_pgp(blob, NULL, &key);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, type,
+								 	 BUILD_BLOB_ASN1_DER, blob, BUILD_END);
+		}
+		if (key == NULL)
+		{
+			plog("  syntax error in %s private key file", pgp ? "PGP":"PKCS#");
+		}			
+		free(blob.ptr);
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    if (!pkcs1_parse_private_key(blob, key))
-		ugh = "syntax error in PKCS#1 private key file";
+		plog("  error loading private key file");
 	}
-	pfree(blob.ptr);
-    }
-    else
-	ugh = "error loading RSA private key file";
-
-    return ugh;
+	return key;
 }
-/*
+
+/**
  *  Loads a X.509 or OpenPGP certificate
  */
-bool
-load_cert(const char *filename, const char *label, cert_t *cert)
+bool load_cert(char *filename, const char *label, cert_t *cert)
 {
-    bool pgp = FALSE;
-    chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+	bool pgp = FALSE;
+	chunk_t blob = chunk_empty;
 
-    /* initialize cert struct */
-    cert->type = CERT_NONE;
-    cert->u.x509 = NULL;
+	/* initialize cert struct */
+	cert->type = CERT_NONE;
+	cert->u.x509 = NULL;
 
-    if (load_coded_file(filename, NULL, label, &blob, &pgp))
-    {
-	if (pgp)
-	{
-	    pgpcert_t *pgpcert = alloc_thing(pgpcert_t, "pgpcert");
-	    *pgpcert = empty_pgpcert;
-	    if (parse_pgp(blob, pgpcert, NULL))
-	    {
-		cert->type = CERT_PGP;
-		cert->u.pgp = pgpcert;
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		plog("  error in OpenPGP certificate");
-		free_pgpcert(pgpcert);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
+	if (load_coded_file(filename, NULL, label, &blob, &pgp))
 	{
-	    x509cert_t *x509cert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t, "x509cert");
-	    *x509cert = empty_x509cert;
-	    if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, x509cert))
-	    {
-		cert->type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
-		cert->u.x509 = x509cert;
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		plog("  error in X.509 certificate");
-		free_x509cert(x509cert);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
+		if (pgp)
+		{
+			pgpcert_t *pgpcert = malloc_thing(pgpcert_t);
+			*pgpcert = pgpcert_empty;
+			if (parse_pgp(blob, pgpcert, NULL))
+			{
+				cert->type = CERT_PGP;
+				cert->u.pgp = pgpcert;
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				plog("  error in OpenPGP certificate");
+				free_pgpcert(pgpcert);
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			x509cert_t *x509cert = malloc_thing(x509cert_t);
+			*x509cert = empty_x509cert;
+			if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, x509cert))
+			{
+				cert->type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
+				cert->u.x509 = x509cert;
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				plog("  error in X.509 certificate");
+				free_x509cert(x509cert);
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Loads a host certificate
  */
-bool
-load_host_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert)
+bool load_host_cert(char *filename, cert_t *cert)
 {
-    const char *path = concatenate_paths(HOST_CERT_PATH, filename);
+	char *path = concatenate_paths(HOST_CERT_PATH, filename);
 
-    return load_cert(path, "host cert", cert);
+	return load_cert(path, "host cert", cert);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Loads a CA certificate
  */
-bool
-load_ca_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert)
+bool load_ca_cert(char *filename, cert_t *cert)
 {
-    const char *path = concatenate_paths(CA_CERT_PATH, filename);
+	char *path = concatenate_paths(CA_CERT_PATH, filename);
 
-    return load_cert(path, "CA cert", cert);
+	return load_cert(path, "CA cert", cert);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * establish equality of two certificates
  */
-bool
-same_cert(const cert_t *a, const cert_t *b)
+bool same_cert(const cert_t *a, const cert_t *b)
 {
-    return a->type == b->type && a->u.x509 == b->u.x509;
+	return a->type == b->type && a->u.x509 == b->u.x509;
 }
 
-/*  for each link pointing to the certif icate
- "  increase the count by one
+/**
+ * for each link pointing to the certificate increase the count by one
  */
-void
-share_cert(cert_t cert)
+void share_cert(cert_t cert)
 {
-    switch (cert.type)
-    {
-    case CERT_PGP:
-	share_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
-	break;
-    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
-	share_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
-	break;
-    default:
-        break;
-    }
+	switch (cert.type)
+	{
+	case CERT_PGP:
+		share_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
+		break;
+	case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+		share_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 /*  release of a certificate decreases the count by one
@@ -263,16 +273,16 @@ void
 release_cert(cert_t cert)
 {
    switch (cert.type)
-    {
-    case CERT_PGP:
-	release_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
-	break;
-    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
-	release_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
-	break;
-    default:
-        break;
-    }
+	{
+	case CERT_PGP:
+		release_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
+		break;
+	case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+		release_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -281,7 +291,7 @@ release_cert(cert_t cert)
 void
 list_certs(bool utc)
 {
-    list_x509_end_certs(utc);
-    list_pgp_end_certs(utc);
+	list_x509_end_certs(utc);
+	list_pgp_end_certs(utc);
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/certs.h b/src/pluto/certs.h
index b71c53e15..0810c52fa 100644
--- a/src/pluto/certs.h
+++ b/src/pluto/certs.h
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /* Certificate support for IKE authentication
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * HSR - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,66 +12,65 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: certs.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _CERTS_H
 #define _CERTS_H
 
-#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
+
 #include "x509.h"
-#include "pgp.h"
+#include "pgpcert.h"
 
 /* path definitions for private keys, end certs,
  * cacerts, attribute certs and crls
  */
 #define PRIVATE_KEY_PATH  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/private"
 #define HOST_CERT_PATH    IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/certs"
-#define CA_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/cacerts"
-#define A_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/acerts"
-#define AA_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/aacerts"
-#define OCSP_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/ocspcerts"
-#define CRL_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/crls"
-#define REQ_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/reqs"
+#define CA_CERT_PATH      IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/cacerts"
+#define A_CERT_PATH       IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/acerts"
+#define AA_CERT_PATH      IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/aacerts"
+#define OCSP_CERT_PATH    IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/ocspcerts"
+#define CRL_PATH          IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/crls"
+#define REQ_PATH          IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/reqs"
 
 /* advance warning of imminent expiry of
  * cacerts, public keys, and crls
  */
-#define CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL	30 /* days */
-#define OCSP_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL	30 /* days */
-#define PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL		 7 /* days */
-#define CRL_WARNING_INTERVAL		 7 /* days */
-#define ACERT_WARNING_INTERVAL		 1 /* day */
+#define CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL        30 /* days */
+#define OCSP_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL      30 /* days */
+#define PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL          7 /* days */
+#define CRL_WARNING_INTERVAL             7 /* days */
+#define ACERT_WARNING_INTERVAL           1 /* day */
 
 /* certificate access structure
  * currently X.509 and OpenPGP certificates are supported
  */
 typedef struct {
-    u_char type;
-    union {
-	x509cert_t *x509;
-	pgpcert_t  *pgp;
-    } u;
+	u_char type;
+	union {
+		x509cert_t *x509;
+		pgpcert_t  *pgp;
+	} u;
 } cert_t;
 
 /* used for initialization */
-extern const cert_t empty_cert;
+extern const cert_t cert_empty;
 
 /*  do not send certificate requests
  *  flag set in plutomain.c and used in ipsec_doi.c
  */
 extern bool no_cr_send;
 
-extern err_t load_rsa_private_key(const char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass
-    , RSA_private_key_t *key);
-extern chunk_t get_mycert(cert_t cert);
-extern bool load_coded_file(const char *filename, prompt_pass_t *pass
-    , const char *type, chunk_t *blob, bool *pgp);
-extern bool load_cert(const char *filename, const char *label
-    , cert_t *cert);
-extern bool load_host_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert);
-extern bool load_ca_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert);
+extern public_key_t* cert_get_public_key(const cert_t cert);
+extern chunk_t cert_get_encoding(cert_t cert);
+extern private_key_t* load_private_key(char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass,
+									   key_type_t type);
+extern bool load_coded_file(char *filename, prompt_pass_t *pass,
+							const char *type, chunk_t *blob, bool *pgp);
+extern bool load_cert(char *filename, const char *label, cert_t *cert);
+extern bool load_host_cert(char *filename, cert_t *cert);
+extern bool load_ca_cert(char *filename, cert_t *cert);
 extern bool same_cert(const cert_t *a, const cert_t *b);
 extern void share_cert(cert_t cert);
 extern void release_cert(cert_t cert);
diff --git a/src/pluto/connections.c b/src/pluto/connections.c
index cd118cb34..4deb722f7 100644
--- a/src/pluto/connections.c
+++ b/src/pluto/connections.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: connections.c 4924 2009-03-10 21:13:18Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <string.h>
@@ -25,20 +23,21 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>       /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 #include "kameipsec.h"
 
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "id.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "ca.h"
 #include "crl.h"
-#include "pgp.h"
+#include "pgpcert.h"
 #include "certs.h"
 #include "ac.h"
 #include "smartcard.h"
@@ -48,13 +47,13 @@
 #include "demux.h"
 #include "state.h"
 #include "timer.h"
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
 #include "server.h"
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "keys.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
-#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"     /* needs keys.h and adns.h */
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "alg_info.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
@@ -62,7 +61,7 @@
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 #include "virtual.h"
 
-static void flush_pending_by_connection(struct connection *c);	/* forward */
+static void flush_pending_by_connection(struct connection *c);  /* forward */
 
 static struct connection *connections = NULL;
 
@@ -77,14 +76,14 @@ static struct connection *connections = NULL;
  */
 
 struct host_pair {
-    struct {
-	ip_address addr;
-	u_int16_t port;	/* host order */
-    } me, him;
-    bool initial_connection_sent;
-    struct connection *connections;	/* connections with this pair */
-    struct pending *pending;	/* awaiting Keying Channel */
-    struct host_pair *next;
+	struct {
+		ip_address addr;
+		u_int16_t port; /* host order */
+	} me, him;
+	bool initial_connection_sent;
+	struct connection *connections;     /* connections with this pair */
+	struct pending *pending;    /* awaiting Keying Channel */
+	struct host_pair *next;
 };
 
 static struct host_pair *host_pairs = NULL;
@@ -96,45 +95,45 @@ bool
 same_peer_ids(const struct connection *c, const struct connection *d
 , const struct id *his_id)
 {
-    return same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
-	&& same_id(his_id == NULL? &c->spd.that.id : his_id, &d->spd.that.id);
+	return same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+		&& same_id(his_id == NULL? &c->spd.that.id : his_id, &d->spd.that.id);
 }
 
 static struct host_pair *
 find_host_pair(const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
 , const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport)
 {
-    struct host_pair *p, *prev;
-
-    /* default hisaddr to an appropriate any */
-    if (hisaddr == NULL)
-	hisaddr = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(myaddr))->any;
-	
-    if (nat_traversal_enabled)
-    {
-	/**
-	 * port is not relevant in host_pair. with nat_traversal we
-	 * always use pluto_port (500)
-	 */
-	myport = pluto_port;
-	hisport = pluto_port;
-    }
-
-    for (prev = NULL, p = host_pairs; p != NULL; prev = p, p = p->next)
-    {
-	if (sameaddr(&p->me.addr, myaddr) && p->me.port == myport
-	&&  sameaddr(&p->him.addr, hisaddr) && p->him.port == hisport)
+	struct host_pair *p, *prev;
+
+	/* default hisaddr to an appropriate any */
+	if (hisaddr == NULL)
+		hisaddr = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(myaddr))->any;
+		
+	if (nat_traversal_enabled)
 	{
-	    if (prev != NULL)
-	    {
-		prev->next = p->next;	/* remove p from list */
-		p->next = host_pairs;	/* and stick it on front */
-		host_pairs = p;
-	    }
-	    break;
+		/**
+		 * port is not relevant in host_pair. with nat_traversal we
+		 * always use pluto_port (500)
+		 */
+		myport = pluto_port;
+		hisport = pluto_port;
 	}
-    }
-    return p;
+
+	for (prev = NULL, p = host_pairs; p != NULL; prev = p, p = p->next)
+	{
+		if (sameaddr(&p->me.addr, myaddr) && p->me.port == myport
+		&&  sameaddr(&p->him.addr, hisaddr) && p->him.port == hisport)
+		{
+			if (prev != NULL)
+			{
+				prev->next = p->next;   /* remove p from list */
+				p->next = host_pairs;   /* and stick it on front */
+				host_pairs = p;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return p;
 }
 
 /* find head of list of connections with this pair of hosts */
@@ -142,63 +141,63 @@ static struct connection *
 find_host_pair_connections(const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
 , const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport)
 {
-    struct host_pair *hp = find_host_pair(myaddr, myport, hisaddr, hisport);
-
-    if (nat_traversal_enabled && hp && hisaddr)
-    {
-	struct connection *c;
+	struct host_pair *hp = find_host_pair(myaddr, myport, hisaddr, hisport);
 
-	for (c = hp->connections; c != NULL; c = c->hp_next)
+	if (nat_traversal_enabled && hp && hisaddr)
 	{
-	    if (c->spd.this.host_port == myport && c->spd.that.host_port == hisport)
-		return c;
+		struct connection *c;
+
+		for (c = hp->connections; c != NULL; c = c->hp_next)
+		{
+			if (c->spd.this.host_port == myport && c->spd.that.host_port == hisport)
+				return c;
+		}
+		return NULL;
 	}
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    return hp == NULL? NULL : hp->connections;
+	return hp == NULL? NULL : hp->connections;
 }
 
 static void
 connect_to_host_pair(struct connection *c)
 {
-    if (oriented(*c))
-    {
-	struct host_pair *hp;
+	if (oriented(*c))
+	{
+		struct host_pair *hp;
 
-	ip_address his_addr = (c->spd.that.allow_any)
-			      ? *aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr))->any
-			      : c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		ip_address his_addr = (c->spd.that.allow_any)
+							  ? *aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr))->any
+							  : c->spd.that.host_addr;
 
-	hp = find_host_pair(&c->spd.this.host_addr, c->spd.this.host_port
-	    , &his_addr, c->spd.that.host_port);
+		hp = find_host_pair(&c->spd.this.host_addr, c->spd.this.host_port
+			, &his_addr, c->spd.that.host_port);
 
-	if (hp == NULL)
+		if (hp == NULL)
+		{
+			/* no suitable host_pair -- build one */
+			hp = malloc_thing(struct host_pair);
+			hp->me.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr;
+			hp->him.addr = his_addr;
+			hp->me.port = nat_traversal_enabled ? pluto_port : c->spd.this.host_port;
+			hp->him.port = nat_traversal_enabled ? pluto_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
+			hp->initial_connection_sent = FALSE;
+			hp->connections = NULL;
+			hp->pending = NULL;
+			hp->next = host_pairs;
+			host_pairs = hp;
+		}
+		c->host_pair = hp;
+		c->hp_next = hp->connections;
+		hp->connections = c;
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    /* no suitable host_pair -- build one */
-	    hp = alloc_thing(struct host_pair, "host_pair");
-	    hp->me.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr;
-	    hp->him.addr = his_addr;
-	    hp->me.port = nat_traversal_enabled ? pluto_port : c->spd.this.host_port;
-	    hp->him.port = nat_traversal_enabled ? pluto_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
-	    hp->initial_connection_sent = FALSE;
-	    hp->connections = NULL;
-	    hp->pending = NULL;
-	    hp->next = host_pairs;
-	    host_pairs = hp;
+		/* since this connection isn't oriented, we place it
+		 * in the unoriented_connections list instead.
+		 */
+		c->host_pair = NULL;
+		c->hp_next = unoriented_connections;
+		unoriented_connections = c;
 	}
-	c->host_pair = hp;
-	c->hp_next = hp->connections;
-	hp->connections = c;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* since this connection isn't oriented, we place it
-	 * in the unoriented_connections list instead.
-	 */
-	c->host_pair = NULL;
-	c->hp_next = unoriented_connections;
-	unoriented_connections = c;
-    }
 }
 
 /* find a connection by name.
@@ -209,317 +208,317 @@ connect_to_host_pair(struct connection *c)
 struct connection *
 con_by_name(const char *nm, bool strict)
 {
-    struct connection *p, *prev;
+	struct connection *p, *prev;
 
-    for (prev = NULL, p = connections; ; prev = p, p = p->ac_next)
-    {
-	if (p == NULL)
+	for (prev = NULL, p = connections; ; prev = p, p = p->ac_next)
 	{
-	    if (strict)
-		whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
-		    , "no connection named \"%s\"", nm);
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (streq(p->name, nm)
-	&& (!strict || p->kind != CK_INSTANCE))
-	{
-	    if (prev != NULL)
-	    {
-		prev->ac_next = p->ac_next;	/* remove p from list */
-		p->ac_next = connections;	/* and stick it on front */
-		connections = p;
-	    }
-	    break;
+		if (p == NULL)
+		{
+			if (strict)
+				whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+					, "no connection named \"%s\"", nm);
+			break;
+		}
+		if (streq(p->name, nm)
+		&& (!strict || p->kind != CK_INSTANCE))
+		{
+			if (prev != NULL)
+			{
+				prev->ac_next = p->ac_next;     /* remove p from list */
+				p->ac_next = connections;       /* and stick it on front */
+				connections = p;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return p;
+	return p;
 }
 
 void
 release_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
 {
-    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-    {
-	/* This does everything we need.
-	 * Note that we will be called recursively by delete_connection,
-	 * but kind will be CK_GOING_AWAY.
-	 */
-	delete_connection(c, relations);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	flush_pending_by_connection(c);
-	delete_states_by_connection(c, relations);
-	unroute_connection(c);
-    }
+	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+	{
+		/* This does everything we need.
+		 * Note that we will be called recursively by delete_connection,
+		 * but kind will be CK_GOING_AWAY.
+		 */
+		delete_connection(c, relations);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		flush_pending_by_connection(c);
+		delete_states_by_connection(c, relations);
+		unroute_connection(c);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Delete a connection */
 
 #define list_rm(etype, enext, e, ehead) { \
-	etype **ep; \
-	for (ep = &(ehead); *ep != (e); ep = &(*ep)->enext) \
-	    passert(*ep != NULL);    /* we must not come up empty-handed */ \
-	*ep = (e)->enext; \
-    }
+		etype **ep; \
+		for (ep = &(ehead); *ep != (e); ep = &(*ep)->enext) \
+			passert(*ep != NULL);    /* we must not come up empty-handed */ \
+		*ep = (e)->enext; \
+	}
 
 
 void
 delete_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
 {
-    struct connection *old_cur_connection
-	= cur_connection == c? NULL : cur_connection;
+	struct connection *old_cur_connection
+		= cur_connection == c? NULL : cur_connection;
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
+	lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
 #endif
 
-    set_cur_connection(c);
-
-    /* Must be careful to avoid circularity:
-     * we mark c as going away so it won't get deleted recursively.
-     */
-    passert(c->kind != CK_GOING_AWAY);
-    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-    {
-	plog("deleting connection \"%s\" instance with peer %s {isakmp=#%lu/ipsec=#%lu}"
-	     , c->name
-	     , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
-	     , c->newest_isakmp_sa, c->newest_ipsec_sa);
-	c->kind = CK_GOING_AWAY;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("deleting connection");
-    }
-    release_connection(c, relations);	/* won't delete c */
-
-    if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
-	delete_group(c);
-
-    /* free up any logging resources */
-    perpeer_logfree(c);
-
-    /* find and delete c from connections list */
-    list_rm(struct connection, ac_next, c, connections);
-    cur_connection = old_cur_connection;
-
-    /* find and delete c from the host pair list */
-    if (c->host_pair == NULL)
-    {
-	if (c->ikev1)
-	    list_rm(struct connection, hp_next, c, unoriented_connections);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct host_pair *hp = c->host_pair;
-
-	list_rm(struct connection, hp_next, c, hp->connections);
-	c->host_pair = NULL;	/* redundant, but safe */
-
-	/* if there are no more connections with this host_pair
-	 * and we haven't even made an initial contact, let's delete
-	 * this guy in case we were created by an attempted DOS attack.
+	set_cur_connection(c);
+
+	/* Must be careful to avoid circularity:
+	 * we mark c as going away so it won't get deleted recursively.
 	 */
-	if (hp->connections == NULL
-	&& !hp->initial_connection_sent)
+	passert(c->kind != CK_GOING_AWAY);
+	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+	{
+		plog("deleting connection \"%s\" instance with peer %s {isakmp=#%lu/ipsec=#%lu}"
+			 , c->name
+			 , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+			 , c->newest_isakmp_sa, c->newest_ipsec_sa);
+		c->kind = CK_GOING_AWAY;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		plog("deleting connection");
+	}
+	release_connection(c, relations);   /* won't delete c */
+
+	if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
+		delete_group(c);
+
+	/* free up any logging resources */
+	perpeer_logfree(c);
+
+	/* find and delete c from connections list */
+	list_rm(struct connection, ac_next, c, connections);
+	cur_connection = old_cur_connection;
+
+	/* find and delete c from the host pair list */
+	if (c->host_pair == NULL)
 	{
-	    passert(hp->pending == NULL);	/* ??? must deal with this! */
-	    list_rm(struct host_pair, next, hp, host_pairs);
-	    pfree(hp);
+		if (c->ikev1)
+			list_rm(struct connection, hp_next, c, unoriented_connections);
 	}
-    }
+	else
+	{
+		struct host_pair *hp = c->host_pair;
 
-    if (c->kind != CK_GOING_AWAY)
-	pfreeany(c->spd.that.virt);
+		list_rm(struct connection, hp_next, c, hp->connections);
+		c->host_pair = NULL;    /* redundant, but safe */
 
+		/* if there are no more connections with this host_pair
+		 * and we haven't even made an initial contact, let's delete
+		 * this guy in case we were created by an attempted DOS attack.
+		 */
+		if (hp->connections == NULL
+		&& !hp->initial_connection_sent)
+		{
+			passert(hp->pending == NULL);       /* ??? must deal with this! */
+			list_rm(struct host_pair, next, hp, host_pairs);
+			free(hp);
+		}
+	}
+	if (c->kind != CK_GOING_AWAY)
+	{
+		free(c->spd.that.virt);
+	}
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
+	cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
 #endif
-    pfreeany(c->name);
-    free_id_content(&c->spd.this.id);
-    pfreeany(c->spd.this.updown);
-    freeanychunk(c->spd.this.ca);
-    free_ietfAttrList(c->spd.this.groups);
-    free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
-    pfreeany(c->spd.that.updown);
-    freeanychunk(c->spd.that.ca);
-    free_ietfAttrList(c->spd.that.groups);
-    free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE);
-    gw_delref(&c->gw_info);
-
-    lock_certs_and_keys("delete_connection");
-    release_cert(c->spd.this.cert);
-    scx_release(c->spd.this.sc);
-    release_cert(c->spd.that.cert);
-    scx_release(c->spd.that.sc);
-    unlock_certs_and_keys("delete_connection");
-
-    alg_info_delref((struct alg_info **)&c->alg_info_esp);
-    alg_info_delref((struct alg_info **)&c->alg_info_ike);
-
-    pfree(c);
+	free(c->name);
+	free_id_content(&c->spd.this.id);
+	free(c->spd.this.updown);
+	free(c->spd.this.ca.ptr);
+	free_ietfAttrList(c->spd.this.groups);
+	free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+	free(c->spd.that.updown);
+	free(c->spd.that.ca.ptr);
+	free_ietfAttrList(c->spd.that.groups);
+	free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE);
+	gw_delref(&c->gw_info);
+
+	lock_certs_and_keys("delete_connection");
+	release_cert(c->spd.this.cert);
+	scx_release(c->spd.this.sc);
+	release_cert(c->spd.that.cert);
+	scx_release(c->spd.that.sc);
+	unlock_certs_and_keys("delete_connection");
+
+	alg_info_delref((struct alg_info **)&c->alg_info_esp);
+	alg_info_delref((struct alg_info **)&c->alg_info_ike);
+
+	free(c);
 }
 
 /* Delete connections with the specified name */
 void
 delete_connections_by_name(const char *name, bool strict)
 {
-    struct connection *c = con_by_name(name, strict);
+	struct connection *c = con_by_name(name, strict);
 
-    for (; c != NULL; c = con_by_name(name, FALSE))
-	delete_connection(c, FALSE);
+	for (; c != NULL; c = con_by_name(name, FALSE))
+		delete_connection(c, FALSE);
 }
 
 void
 delete_every_connection(void)
 {
-    while (connections != NULL)
-	delete_connection(connections, TRUE);
+	while (connections != NULL)
+		delete_connection(connections, TRUE);
 }
 
 void
 release_dead_interfaces(void)
 {
-    struct host_pair *hp;
-
-    for (hp = host_pairs; hp != NULL; hp = hp->next)
-    {
-	struct connection **pp
-	    , *p;
+	struct host_pair *hp;
 
-	for (pp = &hp->connections; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	for (hp = host_pairs; hp != NULL; hp = hp->next)
 	{
-	    if (p->interface->change == IFN_DELETE)
-	    {
-		/* this connection's interface is going away */
-		enum connection_kind k = p->kind;
-
-		release_connection(p, TRUE);
-
-		if (k <= CK_PERMANENT)
-		{
-		    /* The connection should have survived release:
-		     * move it to the unoriented_connections list.
-		     */
-		    passert(p == *pp);
-
-		    p->interface = NULL;
+		struct connection **pp
+			, *p;
 
-		    *pp = p->hp_next;	/* advance *pp */
-		    p->host_pair = NULL;
-		    p->hp_next = unoriented_connections;
-		    unoriented_connections = p;
-		}
-		else
+		for (pp = &hp->connections; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
 		{
-		    /* The connection should have vanished,
-		     * but the previous connection remains.
-		     */
-		    passert(p != *pp);
+			if (p->interface->change == IFN_DELETE)
+			{
+				/* this connection's interface is going away */
+				enum connection_kind k = p->kind;
+
+				release_connection(p, TRUE);
+
+				if (k <= CK_PERMANENT)
+				{
+					/* The connection should have survived release:
+					 * move it to the unoriented_connections list.
+					 */
+					passert(p == *pp);
+
+					p->interface = NULL;
+
+					*pp = p->hp_next;   /* advance *pp */
+					p->host_pair = NULL;
+					p->hp_next = unoriented_connections;
+					unoriented_connections = p;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* The connection should have vanished,
+					 * but the previous connection remains.
+					 */
+					passert(p != *pp);
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				pp = &p->hp_next;       /* advance pp */
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		pp = &p->hp_next;	/* advance pp */
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* adjust orientations of connections to reflect newly added interfaces */
 void
 check_orientations(void)
 {
-    /* try to orient all the unoriented connections */
-    {
-	struct connection *c = unoriented_connections;
+	/* try to orient all the unoriented connections */
+	{
+		struct connection *c = unoriented_connections;
 
-	unoriented_connections = NULL;
+		unoriented_connections = NULL;
 
-	while (c != NULL)
-	{
-	    struct connection *nxt = c->hp_next;
+		while (c != NULL)
+		{
+			struct connection *nxt = c->hp_next;
 
-	    (void)orient(c);
-	    connect_to_host_pair(c);
-	    c = nxt;
+			(void)orient(c);
+			connect_to_host_pair(c);
+			c = nxt;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* Check that no oriented connection has become double-oriented.
-     * In other words, the far side must not match one of our new interfaces.
-     */
-    {
-	struct iface *i;
-
-	for (i = interfaces; i != NULL; i = i->next)
+	/* Check that no oriented connection has become double-oriented.
+	 * In other words, the far side must not match one of our new interfaces.
+	 */
 	{
-	    if (i->change == IFN_ADD)
-	    {
-		struct host_pair *hp;
+		struct iface *i;
 
-		for (hp = host_pairs; hp != NULL; hp = hp->next)
+		for (i = interfaces; i != NULL; i = i->next)
 		{
-		    if (sameaddr(&hp->him.addr, &i->addr)
-		    && (!no_klips || hp->him.port == pluto_port))
-		    {
-			/* bad news: the whole chain of connections
-			 * hanging off this host pair has both sides
-			 * matching an interface.
-			 * We'll get rid of them, using orient and
-			 * connect_to_host_pair.  But we'll be lazy
-			 * and not ditch the host_pair itself (the
-			 * cost of leaving it is slight and cannot
-			 * be induced by a foe).
-			 */
-			struct connection *c = hp->connections;
-
-			hp->connections = NULL;
-			while (c != NULL)
+			if (i->change == IFN_ADD)
 			{
-			    struct connection *nxt = c->hp_next;
-
-			    c->interface = NULL;
-			    (void)orient(c);
-			    connect_to_host_pair(c);
-			    c = nxt;
+				struct host_pair *hp;
+
+				for (hp = host_pairs; hp != NULL; hp = hp->next)
+				{
+					if (sameaddr(&hp->him.addr, &i->addr)
+					&& (!no_klips || hp->him.port == pluto_port))
+					{
+						/* bad news: the whole chain of connections
+						 * hanging off this host pair has both sides
+						 * matching an interface.
+						 * We'll get rid of them, using orient and
+						 * connect_to_host_pair.  But we'll be lazy
+						 * and not ditch the host_pair itself (the
+						 * cost of leaving it is slight and cannot
+						 * be induced by a foe).
+						 */
+						struct connection *c = hp->connections;
+
+						hp->connections = NULL;
+						while (c != NULL)
+						{
+							struct connection *nxt = c->hp_next;
+
+							c->interface = NULL;
+							(void)orient(c);
+							connect_to_host_pair(c);
+							c = nxt;
+						}
+					}
+				}
 			}
-		    }
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 static err_t
 default_end(struct end *e, ip_address *dflt_nexthop)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    const struct af_info *afi = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&e->host_addr));
-
-    if (afi == NULL)
-	return "unknown address family in default_end";
-
-    /* default ID to IP (but only if not NO_IP -- WildCard) */
-    if (e->id.kind == ID_NONE && !isanyaddr(&e->host_addr))
-    {
-	e->id.kind = afi->id_addr;
-	e->id.ip_addr = e->host_addr;
-	e->has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* default nexthop to other side */
-    if (isanyaddr(&e->host_nexthop))
-	e->host_nexthop = *dflt_nexthop;
-
-    /* default client to subnet containing only self
-     * XXX This may mean that the client's address family doesn't match
-     * tunnel_addr_family.
-     */
-    if (!e->has_client)
-	ugh = addrtosubnet(&e->host_addr, &e->client);
-
-    return ugh;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	const struct af_info *afi = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&e->host_addr));
+
+	if (afi == NULL)
+		return "unknown address family in default_end";
+
+	/* default ID to IP (but only if not NO_IP -- WildCard) */
+	if (e->id.kind == ID_ANY && !isanyaddr(&e->host_addr))
+	{
+		e->id.kind = afi->id_addr;
+		e->id.ip_addr = e->host_addr;
+		e->has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* default nexthop to other side */
+	if (isanyaddr(&e->host_nexthop))
+		e->host_nexthop = *dflt_nexthop;
+
+	/* default client to subnet containing only self
+	 * XXX This may mean that the client's address family doesn't match
+	 * tunnel_addr_family.
+	 */
+	if (!e->has_client)
+		ugh = addrtosubnet(&e->host_addr, &e->client);
+
+	return ugh;
 }
 
 /* Format the topology of a connection end, leaving out defaults.
@@ -535,710 +534,702 @@ format_end(char *buf
 , bool is_left
 , lset_t policy)
 {
-    char client[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-    const char *client_sep = "";
-    char protoport[sizeof(":255/65535")];
-    const char *host = NULL;
-    char host_space[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-    char host_port[sizeof(":65535")];
-    char host_id[BUF_LEN + 2];
-    char hop[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-    const char *hop_sep = "";
-    const char *open_brackets  = "";
-    const char *close_brackets = "";
-
-    if (isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
-    {
-	switch (policy & (POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO))
+	char client[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	const char *client_sep = "";
+	char protoport[sizeof(":255/65535")];
+	const char *host = NULL;
+	char host_space[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	char host_port[sizeof(":65535")];
+	char host_id[BUF_LEN + 2];
+	char hop[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	const char *hop_sep = "";
+	const char *open_brackets  = "";
+	const char *close_brackets = "";
+
+	if (isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
 	{
-	case POLICY_GROUP:
-	    host = "%group";
-	    break;
-	case POLICY_OPPO:
-	    host = "%opportunistic";
-	    break;
-	case POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO:
-	    host = "%opportunisticgroup";
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    host = "%any";
-	    break;
+		switch (policy & (POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO))
+		{
+		case POLICY_GROUP:
+			host = "%group";
+			break;
+		case POLICY_OPPO:
+			host = "%opportunistic";
+			break;
+		case POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO:
+			host = "%opportunisticgroup";
+			break;
+		default:
+			host = "%any";
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    client[0] = '\0';
-
-    if (is_virtual_end(this) && isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
-    {
-	host = "%virtual";
-    }
-
-    /* [client===] */
-    if (this->has_client)
-    {
-	ip_address client_net, client_mask;
-
-	networkof(&this->client, &client_net);
-	maskof(&this->client, &client_mask);
-	client_sep = "===";
-
- 	/* {client_subnet_wildcard} */
- 	if (this->has_client_wildcard)
- 	{
- 	    open_brackets  = "{";
- 	    close_brackets = "}";
- 	}
-
-	if (isanyaddr(&client_net) && isanyaddr(&client_mask)
-	&& (policy & (POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO)))
-	    client_sep = "";	/* boring case */
-	else if (subnetisnone(&this->client))
-	    strcpy(client, "?");
+
+	client[0] = '\0';
+
+	if (is_virtual_end(this) && isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
+	{
+		host = "%virtual";
+	}
+
+	/* [client===] */
+	if (this->has_client)
+	{
+		ip_address client_net, client_mask;
+
+		networkof(&this->client, &client_net);
+		maskof(&this->client, &client_mask);
+		client_sep = "===";
+
+		/* {client_subnet_wildcard} */
+		if (this->has_client_wildcard)
+		{
+			open_brackets  = "{";
+			close_brackets = "}";
+		}
+
+		if (isanyaddr(&client_net) && isanyaddr(&client_mask)
+		&& (policy & (POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO)))
+			client_sep = "";    /* boring case */
+		else if (subnetisnone(&this->client))
+			strcpy(client, "?");
+		else
+			subnettot(&this->client, 0, client, sizeof(client));
+	}
+	else if (this->modecfg && isanyaddr(&this->host_srcip))
+	{
+		/* we are mode config client */
+		client_sep = "===";
+		strcpy(client, "%modecfg");
+	}
+
+	/* host */
+	if (host == NULL)
+	{
+		addrtot(&this->host_addr, 0, host_space, sizeof(host_space));
+		host = host_space;
+	}
+
+	host_port[0] = '\0';
+	if (this->host_port != IKE_UDP_PORT)
+		snprintf(host_port, sizeof(host_port), ":%u"
+			, this->host_port);
+
+	/* payload portocol and port */
+	protoport[0] = '\0';
+	if (this->has_port_wildcard)
+		snprintf(protoport, sizeof(protoport), ":%u/%%any", this->protocol);
+	else if (this->port || this->protocol)
+		snprintf(protoport, sizeof(protoport), ":%u/%u", this->protocol
+			, this->port);
+
+	/* id, if different from host */
+	host_id[0] = '\0';
+	if (this->id.kind == ID_MYID)
+	{
+		strcpy(host_id, "[%myid]");
+	}
+	else if (!(this->id.kind == ID_ANY
+	|| (id_is_ipaddr(&this->id) && sameaddr(&this->id.ip_addr, &this->host_addr))))
+	{
+		int len = idtoa(&this->id, host_id+1, sizeof(host_id)-2);
+
+		host_id[0] = '[';
+		strcpy(&host_id[len < 0? (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(host_id)-2 : 1 + len], "]");
+	}
+
+	/* [---hop] */
+	hop[0] = '\0';
+	hop_sep = "";
+	if (that != NULL && !sameaddr(&this->host_nexthop, &that->host_addr))
+	{
+		addrtot(&this->host_nexthop, 0, hop, sizeof(hop));
+		hop_sep = "---";
+	}
+
+	if (is_left)
+		snprintf(buf, buf_len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"
+			, open_brackets, client, close_brackets, client_sep
+			, this->allow_any? "%":""
+			, host, host_port, host_id, protoport
+			, hop_sep, hop);
 	else
-	    subnettot(&this->client, 0, client, sizeof(client));
-    }
-    else if (this->modecfg && isanyaddr(&this->host_srcip))
-    {
-	/* we are mode config client */
-	client_sep = "===";
-	strcpy(client, "%modecfg");
-    }
-
-    /* host */
-    if (host == NULL)
-    {
-	addrtot(&this->host_addr, 0, host_space, sizeof(host_space));
-	host = host_space;
-    }
-
-    host_port[0] = '\0';
-    if (this->host_port != IKE_UDP_PORT)
-	snprintf(host_port, sizeof(host_port), ":%u"
-	    , this->host_port);
-
-    /* payload portocol and port */
-    protoport[0] = '\0';
-    if (this->has_port_wildcard)
-	snprintf(protoport, sizeof(protoport), ":%u/%%any", this->protocol);
-    else if (this->port || this->protocol)
-	snprintf(protoport, sizeof(protoport), ":%u/%u", this->protocol
-	    , this->port);
-
-    /* id, if different from host */
-    host_id[0] = '\0';
-    if (this->id.kind == ID_MYID)
-    {
-	strcpy(host_id, "[%myid]");
-    }
-    else if (!(this->id.kind == ID_NONE
-    || (id_is_ipaddr(&this->id) && sameaddr(&this->id.ip_addr, &this->host_addr))))
-    {
-	int len = idtoa(&this->id, host_id+1, sizeof(host_id)-2);
-
-	host_id[0] = '[';
-	strcpy(&host_id[len < 0? (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(host_id)-2 : 1 + len], "]");
-    }
-
-    /* [---hop] */
-    hop[0] = '\0';
-    hop_sep = "";
-    if (that != NULL && !sameaddr(&this->host_nexthop, &that->host_addr))
-    {
-	addrtot(&this->host_nexthop, 0, hop, sizeof(hop));
-	hop_sep = "---";
-    }
-
-    if (is_left)
-	snprintf(buf, buf_len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"
-	    , open_brackets, client, close_brackets, client_sep
-	    , this->allow_any? "%":""
-	    , host, host_port, host_id, protoport
-	    , hop_sep, hop);
-    else
-	snprintf(buf, buf_len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"
-	    , hop, hop_sep
-	    , this->allow_any? "%":""
-	    , host, host_port, host_id, protoport, client_sep
-	    , open_brackets, client, close_brackets);
-    return strlen(buf);
+		snprintf(buf, buf_len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"
+			, hop, hop_sep
+			, this->allow_any? "%":""
+			, host, host_port, host_id, protoport, client_sep
+			, open_brackets, client, close_brackets);
+	return strlen(buf);
 }
 
 /* format topology of a connection.
  * Two symmetric ends separated by ...
  */
-#define CONNECTION_BUF	(2 * (END_BUF - 1) + 4)
+#define CONNECTION_BUF  (2 * (END_BUF - 1) + 4)
 
 static size_t
 format_connection(char *buf, size_t buf_len
-		  , const struct connection *c
-		  , struct spd_route *sr)
+				  , const struct connection *c
+				  , struct spd_route *sr)
 {
-    size_t w = format_end(buf, buf_len, &sr->this, &sr->that, TRUE, LEMPTY);
+	size_t w = format_end(buf, buf_len, &sr->this, &sr->that, TRUE, LEMPTY);
 
-    w += snprintf(buf + w, buf_len - w, "...");
-    return w + format_end(buf + w, buf_len - w, &sr->that, &sr->this, FALSE, c->policy);
+	w += snprintf(buf + w, buf_len - w, "...");
+	return w + format_end(buf + w, buf_len - w, &sr->that, &sr->this, FALSE, c->policy);
 }
 
 static void
 unshare_connection_strings(struct connection *c)
 {
-    c->name = clone_str(c->name, "connection name");
-
-    unshare_id_content(&c->spd.this.id);
-    c->spd.this.updown = clone_str(c->spd.this.updown, "updown");
-    scx_share(c->spd.this.sc);
-    share_cert(c->spd.this.cert);
-    if (c->spd.this.ca.ptr != NULL)
-	clonetochunk(c->spd.this.ca, c->spd.this.ca.ptr, c->spd.this.ca.len, "ca string");
-
-    unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
-    c->spd.that.updown = clone_str(c->spd.that.updown, "updown");
-    scx_share(c->spd.that.sc);
-    share_cert(c->spd.that.cert);
-    if (c->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
-	clonetochunk(c->spd.that.ca, c->spd.that.ca.ptr, c->spd.that.ca.len, "ca string");
-
-    /* increment references to algo's */
-    alg_info_addref((struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
-    alg_info_addref((struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
+	c->name = clone_str(c->name);
+
+	unshare_id_content(&c->spd.this.id);
+	c->spd.this.updown = clone_str(c->spd.this.updown);
+	scx_share(c->spd.this.sc);
+	share_cert(c->spd.this.cert);
+	c->spd.this.ca = chunk_clone(c->spd.this.ca);
+
+	unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+	c->spd.that.updown = clone_str(c->spd.that.updown);
+	scx_share(c->spd.that.sc);
+	share_cert(c->spd.that.cert);
+	c->spd.that.ca = chunk_clone(c->spd.that.ca);
+
+	/* increment references to algo's */
+	alg_info_addref((struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
+	alg_info_addref((struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
 }
 
-static void
-load_end_certificate(const char *filename, struct end *dst)
+static void load_end_certificate(char *filename, struct end *dst)
 {
-    time_t valid_until;
-    cert_t cert;
-    bool valid_cert = FALSE;
-    bool cached_cert = FALSE;
+	time_t valid_until;
+	cert_t cert;
+	bool valid_cert = FALSE;
+	bool cached_cert = FALSE;
 
-    /* initialize end certificate */
-    dst->cert.type = CERT_NONE;
-    dst->cert.u.x509 = NULL;
+	/* initialize end certificate */
+	dst->cert.type = CERT_NONE;
+	dst->cert.u.x509 = NULL;
 
-    /* initialize smartcard info record */
-    dst->sc = NULL;
+	/* initialize smartcard info record */
+	dst->sc = NULL;
 
-    if (filename != NULL)
-    {
-	if (scx_on_smartcard(filename))
+	if (filename != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* load cert from smartcard */
-	    valid_cert = scx_load_cert(filename, &dst->sc, &cert, &cached_cert);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* load cert from file */
-	    valid_cert = load_host_cert(filename, &cert);
+		if (scx_on_smartcard(filename))
+		{
+			/* load cert from smartcard */
+			valid_cert = scx_load_cert(filename, &dst->sc, &cert, &cached_cert);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* load cert from file */
+			valid_cert = load_host_cert(filename, &cert);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (valid_cert)
-    {
-	err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-	switch (cert.type)
+	if (valid_cert)
 	{
-	case CERT_PGP:
-	    select_pgpcert_id(cert.u.pgp, &dst->id);
-
-	    if (cached_cert)
-		dst->cert = cert;
-	    else
-	    {
-		valid_until = cert.u.pgp->until;
-		add_pgp_public_key(cert.u.pgp, cert.u.pgp->until, DAL_LOCAL);
-		dst->cert.type = cert.type;
-		dst->cert.u.pgp = add_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
-	    select_x509cert_id(cert.u.x509, &dst->id);
-
-	    if (cached_cert)
-		dst->cert = cert;
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* check validity of cert */
-		valid_until = cert.u.x509->notAfter;
-		ugh = check_validity(cert.u.x509, &valid_until);
-		if (ugh != NULL)
+		err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+		switch (cert.type)
 		{
-		    plog("  %s", ugh);
-		    free_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
-		    break;
-		}
+		case CERT_PGP:
+			select_pgpcert_id(cert.u.pgp, &dst->id);
 
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("certificate is valid")
-		)
-		add_x509_public_key(cert.u.x509, valid_until, DAL_LOCAL);
-		dst->cert.type = cert.type;
-		dst->cert.u.x509 = add_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
-	    }
-	    /* if no CA is defined, use issuer as default */
-	    if (dst->ca.ptr == NULL)
-		dst->ca = dst->cert.u.x509->issuer;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
-	}
+			if (cached_cert)
+				dst->cert = cert;
+			else
+			{
+				valid_until = cert.u.pgp->until;
+				add_pgp_public_key(cert.u.pgp, cert.u.pgp->until, DAL_LOCAL);
+				dst->cert.type = cert.type;
+				dst->cert.u.pgp = add_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
+			}
+			break;
+		case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+			select_x509cert_id(cert.u.x509, &dst->id);
 
-	/* cache the certificate that was last retrieved from the smartcard */
-	if (dst->sc != NULL)
-	{
-	    if (!same_cert(&dst->sc->last_cert, &dst->cert))
-	    {
-		lock_certs_and_keys("load_end_certificates");
-		release_cert(dst->sc->last_cert);
-		dst->sc->last_cert = dst->cert;
-		share_cert(dst->cert);
-		unlock_certs_and_keys("load_end_certificates");
-	    }
-	    time(&dst->sc->last_load);
+			if (cached_cert)
+				dst->cert = cert;
+			else
+			{
+				/* check validity of cert */
+				valid_until = cert.u.x509->notAfter;
+				ugh = check_validity(cert.u.x509, &valid_until);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					plog("  %s", ugh);
+					free_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+					break;
+				}
+
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("certificate is valid")
+				)
+				add_x509_public_key(cert.u.x509, valid_until, DAL_LOCAL);
+				dst->cert.type = cert.type;
+				dst->cert.u.x509 = add_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+			}
+			/* if no CA is defined, use issuer as default */
+			if (dst->ca.ptr == NULL)
+				dst->ca = dst->cert.u.x509->issuer;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* cache the certificate that was last retrieved from the smartcard */
+		if (dst->sc != NULL)
+		{
+			if (!same_cert(&dst->sc->last_cert, &dst->cert))
+			{
+				lock_certs_and_keys("load_end_certificates");
+				release_cert(dst->sc->last_cert);
+				dst->sc->last_cert = dst->cert;
+				share_cert(dst->cert);
+				unlock_certs_and_keys("load_end_certificates");
+			}
+			time(&dst->sc->last_load);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 static bool
 extract_end(struct end *dst, const whack_end_t *src, const char *which)
 {
-    bool same_ca = FALSE;
-
-    /* decode id, if any */
-    if (src->id == NULL)
-    {
-	dst->id.kind = ID_NONE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE);
+	bool same_ca = FALSE;
 
-	if (ugh != NULL)
+	/* decode id, if any */
+	if (src->id == NULL)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_BADID, "bad %s --id: %s (ignored)", which, ugh);
-	    dst->id = empty_id;	/* ignore bad one */
+		dst->id.kind = ID_ANY;
 	}
-    }
+	else
+	{
+		err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE);
 
-    dst->ca = empty_chunk;
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_BADID, "bad %s --id: %s (ignored)", which, ugh);
+			dst->id = empty_id; /* ignore bad one */
+		}
+	}
+
+	dst->ca = chunk_empty;
 
-    /* decode CA distinguished name, if any */
-    if (src->ca != NULL)
-    {
-	if streq(src->ca, "%same")
-	    same_ca = TRUE;
-	else if (!streq(src->ca, "%any"))
+	/* decode CA distinguished name, if any */
+	if (src->ca != NULL)
 	{
-	    err_t ugh;
-
-	    dst->ca.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
-	    ugh = atodn(src->ca, &dst->ca);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		plog("bad CA string '%s': %s (ignored)", src->ca, ugh);
-		dst->ca = empty_chunk;
-	    }
+		if streq(src->ca, "%same")
+			same_ca = TRUE;
+		else if (!streq(src->ca, "%any"))
+		{
+			err_t ugh;
+
+			dst->ca.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+			ugh = atodn(src->ca, &dst->ca);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				plog("bad CA string '%s': %s (ignored)", src->ca, ugh);
+				dst->ca = chunk_empty;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* load local end certificate and extract ID, if any */
-    load_end_certificate(src->cert, dst);
-
-    /* does id has wildcards? */
-    dst->has_id_wildcards = id_count_wildcards(&dst->id) > 0;
-
-    /* decode group attributes, if any */
-    decode_groups(src->groups, &dst->groups);
-
-    /* the rest is simple copying of corresponding fields */
-    dst->host_addr = src->host_addr;
-    dst->host_nexthop = src->host_nexthop;
-    dst->host_srcip = src->host_srcip;
-    dst->has_natip = src->has_natip;
-    dst->client = src->client;
-    dst->protocol = src->protocol;
-    dst->port = src->port;
-    dst->has_port_wildcard = src->has_port_wildcard;
-    dst->key_from_DNS_on_demand = src->key_from_DNS_on_demand;
-    dst->has_client = src->has_client;
-    dst->has_client_wildcard = src->has_client_wildcard;
-    dst->modecfg = src->modecfg;
-    dst->hostaccess = src->hostaccess;
-    dst->allow_any = src->allow_any;
-    dst->sendcert = src->sendcert;
-    dst->updown = src->updown;
-    dst->host_port = src->host_port;
-
-    /* if host sourceip is defined but no client is present
-     * behind the host then set client to sourceip/32
-     */
-    if (addrbytesptr(&dst->host_srcip, NULL)
-    && !isanyaddr(&dst->host_srcip)
-    && !dst->has_natip
-    && !dst->has_client)
-    {
-	err_t ugh = addrtosubnet(&dst->host_srcip, &dst->client);
 
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	    plog("could not assign host sourceip to client subnet");
-	else
-	    dst->has_client = TRUE;
-    }
-    return same_ca;
+	/* load local end certificate and extract ID, if any */
+	load_end_certificate(src->cert, dst);
+
+	/* does id has wildcards? */
+	dst->has_id_wildcards = id_count_wildcards(&dst->id) > 0;
+
+	/* decode group attributes, if any */
+	decode_groups(src->groups, &dst->groups);
+
+	/* the rest is simple copying of corresponding fields */
+	dst->host_addr = src->host_addr;
+	dst->host_nexthop = src->host_nexthop;
+	dst->host_srcip = src->host_srcip;
+	dst->has_natip = src->has_natip;
+	dst->client = src->client;
+	dst->protocol = src->protocol;
+	dst->port = src->port;
+	dst->has_port_wildcard = src->has_port_wildcard;
+	dst->key_from_DNS_on_demand = src->key_from_DNS_on_demand;
+	dst->has_client = src->has_client;
+	dst->has_client_wildcard = src->has_client_wildcard;
+	dst->modecfg = src->modecfg;
+	dst->hostaccess = src->hostaccess;
+	dst->allow_any = src->allow_any;
+	dst->sendcert = src->sendcert;
+	dst->updown = src->updown;
+	dst->host_port = src->host_port;
+
+	/* if host sourceip is defined but no client is present
+	 * behind the host then set client to sourceip/32
+	 */
+	if (addrbytesptr(&dst->host_srcip, NULL)
+	&& !isanyaddr(&dst->host_srcip)
+	&& !dst->has_natip
+	&& !dst->has_client)
+	{
+		err_t ugh = addrtosubnet(&dst->host_srcip, &dst->client);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+			plog("could not assign host sourceip to client subnet");
+		else
+			dst->has_client = TRUE;
+	}
+	return same_ca;
 }
 
 static bool
 check_connection_end(const whack_end_t *this, const whack_end_t *that
 , const whack_message_t *wm)
 {
-    if (wm->addr_family != addrtypeof(&this->host_addr)
-    || wm->addr_family != addrtypeof(&this->host_nexthop)
-    || (this->has_client? wm->tunnel_addr_family : wm->addr_family)
-      != subnettypeof(&this->client)
-    || subnettypeof(&this->client) != subnettypeof(&that->client))
-    {
-	/* this should have been diagnosed by whack, so we need not be clear
-	 * !!! overloaded use of RC_CLASH
-	 */
-	loglog(RC_CLASH, "address family inconsistency in connection");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (wm->addr_family != addrtypeof(&this->host_addr)
+	|| wm->addr_family != addrtypeof(&this->host_nexthop)
+	|| (this->has_client? wm->tunnel_addr_family : wm->addr_family)
+	  != subnettypeof(&this->client)
+	|| subnettypeof(&this->client) != subnettypeof(&that->client))
+	{
+		/* this should have been diagnosed by whack, so we need not be clear
+		 * !!! overloaded use of RC_CLASH
+		 */
+		loglog(RC_CLASH, "address family inconsistency in connection");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (isanyaddr(&that->host_addr))
-    {
-	/* other side is wildcard: we must check if other conditions met */
-	if (isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
+	if (isanyaddr(&that->host_addr))
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_ORIENT, "connection must specify host IP address for our side");
-	    return FALSE;
+		/* other side is wildcard: we must check if other conditions met */
+		if (isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_ORIENT, "connection must specify host IP address for our side");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (this->virt && (!isanyaddr(&this->host_addr) || this->has_client))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_CLASH,
-	    "virtual IP must only be used with %%any and without client");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (this->virt && (!isanyaddr(&this->host_addr) || this->has_client))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_CLASH,
+			"virtual IP must only be used with %%any and without client");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    return TRUE;	/* happy */
+	return TRUE;        /* happy */
 }
 
 struct connection *
 find_connection_by_reqid(uint32_t reqid)
 {
-    struct connection *c;
+	struct connection *c;
 
-    reqid &= ~3;
-    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
-    {
-	if (c->spd.reqid == reqid)
-	    return c;
-    }
+	reqid &= ~3;
+	for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
+	{
+		if (c->spd.reqid == reqid)
+			return c;
+	}
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static uint32_t
 gen_reqid(void)
 {
-    uint32_t start;
-    static uint32_t reqid = IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX & ~3;
-
-    start = reqid;
-    do {
-	reqid += 4;
-	if (reqid == 0)
-	    reqid = (IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX & ~3) + 4;
-	if (!find_connection_by_reqid(reqid))
-	    return reqid;
-    } while (reqid != start);
-
-    exit_log("unable to allocate reqid");
-    return 0; /* never reached ... */
+	uint32_t start;
+	static uint32_t reqid = IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX & ~3;
+
+	start = reqid;
+	do {
+		reqid += 4;
+		if (reqid == 0)
+			reqid = (IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX & ~3) + 4;
+		if (!find_connection_by_reqid(reqid))
+			return reqid;
+	} while (reqid != start);
+
+	exit_log("unable to allocate reqid");
+	return 0; /* never reached ... */
 }
 
 void
 add_connection(const whack_message_t *wm)
 {
-    if (con_by_name(wm->name, FALSE) != NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "attempt to redefine connection \"%s\"", wm->name);
-    }
-    else if (wm->right.protocol != wm->left.protocol)
-    {
-	/* this should haven been diagnosed by whack
-	 * !!! overloaded use of RC_CLASH
-	 */
-	loglog(RC_CLASH, "the protocol must be the same for leftport and rightport");
-    }
-    else if (check_connection_end(&wm->right, &wm->left, wm)
-    && check_connection_end(&wm->left, &wm->right, wm))
-    {
-	bool same_rightca, same_leftca;
-	struct connection *c = alloc_thing(struct connection, "struct connection");
-
-	c->name   = wm->name;
-	c->ikev1  = wm->ikev1;
-	c->policy = wm->policy;
-
-	if ((c->policy & POLICY_COMPRESS) && !can_do_IPcomp)
-	    loglog(RC_COMMENT
-		, "ignoring --compress in \"%s\" because KLIPS is not configured to do IPCOMP"
-		, c->name);
-
-	if (wm->esp)
+	if (con_by_name(wm->name, FALSE) != NULL)
 	{
-	    const char *ugh;
-
-	     DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("from whack: got --esp=%s", wm->esp ? wm->esp: "NULL")
-	    )
-	    c->alg_info_esp= alg_info_esp_create_from_str(wm->esp? wm->esp : "", &ugh);
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT|DBG_CONTROL,
-		static char buf[256]="<NULL>";
-
-		if (c->alg_info_esp)
-		    alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)
-			    ,(struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
-		DBG_log("esp string values: %s", buf);
-	    )
-	    if (c->alg_info_esp)
-	    {
-		if (c->alg_info_esp->alg_info_cnt==0)
-		     loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "got 0 transforms for esp=\"%s\"", wm->esp);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		       , "esp string error: %s", ugh? ugh : "Unknown");
-	    }
+		loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "attempt to redefine connection \"%s\"", wm->name);
 	}
-	
-	if (wm->ike)
+	else if (wm->right.protocol != wm->left.protocol)
 	{
-	    const char *ugh;
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("from whack: got --ike=%s", wm->ike ? wm->ike: "NULL")
-	    )
-	    c->alg_info_ike= alg_info_ike_create_from_str(wm->ike? wm->ike : "", &ugh);
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT|DBG_CONTROL,
-		static char buf[256]="<NULL>";
-
-		if (c->alg_info_ike)
-		    alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)
-			    , (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
-		DBG_log("ike string values: %s", buf);
-	    )
-	    if (c->alg_info_ike)
-	    {
-		if (c->alg_info_ike->alg_info_cnt==0)
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "got 0 transforms for ike=\"%s\"", wm->ike);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		       , "ike string error: %s", ugh? ugh : "Unknown");
-	    }
+		/* this should haven been diagnosed by whack
+		 * !!! overloaded use of RC_CLASH
+		 */
+		loglog(RC_CLASH, "the protocol must be the same for leftport and rightport");
 	}
-	
-	c->sa_ike_life_seconds = wm->sa_ike_life_seconds;
-	c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds = wm->sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
-	c->sa_rekey_margin = wm->sa_rekey_margin;
-	c->sa_rekey_fuzz = wm->sa_rekey_fuzz;
-	c->sa_keying_tries = wm->sa_keying_tries;
+	else if (check_connection_end(&wm->right, &wm->left, wm)
+	&& check_connection_end(&wm->left, &wm->right, wm))
+	{
+		bool same_rightca, same_leftca;
+		struct connection *c = malloc_thing(struct connection);
 
-	/* RFC 3706 DPD */
-	c->dpd_delay = wm->dpd_delay;
-	c->dpd_timeout = wm->dpd_timeout;
-	c->dpd_action = wm->dpd_action;
+		zero(c);
+		c->name   = wm->name;
+		c->ikev1  = wm->ikev1;
+		c->policy = wm->policy;
 
-	c->addr_family = wm->addr_family;
-	c->tunnel_addr_family = wm->tunnel_addr_family;
+		if ((c->policy & POLICY_COMPRESS) && !can_do_IPcomp)
+			loglog(RC_COMMENT
+				, "ignoring --compress in \"%s\" because KLIPS is not configured to do IPCOMP"
+				, c->name);
 
-	c->requested_ca = NULL;
+		if (wm->esp)
+		{
+			 DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("from whack: got --esp=%s", wm->esp ? wm->esp: "NULL")
+			)
+			c->alg_info_esp= alg_info_esp_create_from_str(wm->esp? wm->esp : "");
+
+			DBG(DBG_CRYPT|DBG_CONTROL,
+				static char buf[BUF_LEN]="<NULL>";
+
+				if (c->alg_info_esp)
+					alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)
+							,(struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
+				DBG_log("esp proposal: %s", buf);
+			)
+			if (c->alg_info_esp)
+			{
+				if (c->alg_info_esp->alg_info_cnt==0)
+					 loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "got 0 transforms for esp=\"%s\"", wm->esp);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "esp string error");
+			}
+		}
+		
+		if (wm->ike)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("from whack: got --ike=%s", wm->ike ? wm->ike: "NULL")
+			)
+			c->alg_info_ike= alg_info_ike_create_from_str(wm->ike? wm->ike : "");
+
+			DBG(DBG_CRYPT|DBG_CONTROL,
+				static char buf[BUF_LEN]="<NULL>";
+
+				if (c->alg_info_ike)
+					alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)
+							, (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
+				DBG_log("ike proposal: %s", buf);
+			)
+			if (c->alg_info_ike)
+			{
+				if (c->alg_info_ike->alg_info_cnt==0)
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "got 0 transforms for ike=\"%s\"", wm->ike);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ike string error:");
+			}
+		}
+		
+		c->sa_ike_life_seconds = wm->sa_ike_life_seconds;
+		c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds = wm->sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
+		c->sa_rekey_margin = wm->sa_rekey_margin;
+		c->sa_rekey_fuzz = wm->sa_rekey_fuzz;
+		c->sa_keying_tries = wm->sa_keying_tries;
 
-	same_leftca  = extract_end(&c->spd.this, &wm->left, "left");
-	same_rightca = extract_end(&c->spd.that, &wm->right, "right");
+		/* RFC 3706 DPD */
+		c->dpd_delay = wm->dpd_delay;
+		c->dpd_timeout = wm->dpd_timeout;
+		c->dpd_action = wm->dpd_action;
 
-	if (same_rightca)
-	    c->spd.that.ca = c->spd.this.ca;
-	else if (same_leftca)
-	    c->spd.this.ca = c->spd.that.ca;
+		c->addr_family = wm->addr_family;
+		c->tunnel_addr_family = wm->tunnel_addr_family;
 
-	default_end(&c->spd.this, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
-	default_end(&c->spd.that, &c->spd.this.host_addr);
+		c->requested_ca = NULL;
 
-	/* force any wildcard host IP address, any wildcard subnet
-	 * or any wildcard ID to that end
-	 */
-	if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_addr) || c->spd.this.has_client_wildcard
-	|| c->spd.this.has_port_wildcard || c->spd.this.has_id_wildcards
-	|| c->spd.this.allow_any)
-	{
-	    struct end t = c->spd.this;
+		same_leftca  = extract_end(&c->spd.this, &wm->left, "left");
+		same_rightca = extract_end(&c->spd.that, &wm->right, "right");
 
-	    c->spd.this = c->spd.that;
-	    c->spd.that = t;
-	}
+		if (same_rightca)
+			c->spd.that.ca = c->spd.this.ca;
+		else if (same_leftca)
+			c->spd.this.ca = c->spd.that.ca;
 
-	c->spd.next = NULL;
-	c->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+		default_end(&c->spd.this, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+		default_end(&c->spd.that, &c->spd.this.host_addr);
 
-	/* set internal fields */
-	c->instance_serial = 0;
-	c->ac_next = connections;
-	connections = c;
-	c->interface = NULL;
-	c->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED;
-	c->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
-	c->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
-	c->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
-
-	if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
-	{
-	    c->kind = CK_GROUP;
-	    add_group(c);
-	}
-	else if ((isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr) && !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
-	|| c->spd.that.has_client_wildcard || c->spd.that.has_port_wildcard
-	|| c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards || c->spd.that.allow_any)
-	{
-	    /* Opportunistic or Road Warrior or wildcard client subnet
-	     * or wildcard ID */
-	    c->kind = CK_TEMPLATE;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    c->kind = CK_PERMANENT;
-	}
-	set_policy_prio(c);	/* must be after kind is set */
+		/* force any wildcard host IP address, any wildcard subnet
+		 * or any wildcard ID to that end
+		 */
+		if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_addr) || c->spd.this.has_client_wildcard
+		|| c->spd.this.has_port_wildcard || c->spd.this.has_id_wildcards
+		|| c->spd.this.allow_any)
+		{
+			struct end t = c->spd.this;
+
+			c->spd.this = c->spd.that;
+			c->spd.that = t;
+		}
+
+		c->spd.next = NULL;
+		c->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+
+		/* set internal fields */
+		c->instance_serial = 0;
+		c->ac_next = connections;
+		connections = c;
+		c->interface = NULL;
+		c->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED;
+		c->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+		c->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+		c->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+		if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+		{
+			c->kind = CK_GROUP;
+			add_group(c);
+		}
+		else if ((isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr) && !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+		|| c->spd.that.has_client_wildcard || c->spd.that.has_port_wildcard
+		|| c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards || c->spd.that.allow_any)
+		{
+			/* Opportunistic or Road Warrior or wildcard client subnet
+			 * or wildcard ID */
+			c->kind = CK_TEMPLATE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			c->kind = CK_PERMANENT;
+		}
+		set_policy_prio(c);     /* must be after kind is set */
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	c->extra_debugging = wm->debugging;
+		c->extra_debugging = wm->debugging;
 #endif
 
-	c->gw_info = NULL;
+		c->gw_info = NULL;
 
-	passert(!(wm->left.virt && wm->right.virt));
-	if (wm->left.virt || wm->right.virt)
-	{
-	    passert(isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
-	    c->spd.that.virt = create_virtual(c,
-		wm->left.virt ? wm->left.virt : wm->right.virt);
-	    if (c->spd.that.virt)
-		c->spd.that.has_client = TRUE;
-	}
+		passert(!(wm->left.virt && wm->right.virt));
+		if (wm->left.virt || wm->right.virt)
+		{
+			passert(isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
+			c->spd.that.virt = create_virtual(c,
+				wm->left.virt ? wm->left.virt : wm->right.virt);
+			if (c->spd.that.virt)
+				c->spd.that.has_client = TRUE;
+		}
 
-	unshare_connection_strings(c);
-	(void)orient(c);
+		unshare_connection_strings(c);
+		(void)orient(c);
 
-	if (c->ikev1)
-	    connect_to_host_pair(c);
+		if (c->ikev1)
+			connect_to_host_pair(c);
 
-	/* log all about this connection */
-	plog("added connection description \"%s\"", c->name);
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
-
-	    (void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), c, &c->spd);
-
-	    DBG_log("%s", topo);
-
-	    /* Make sure that address families can be correctly inferred
-	     * from printed ends.
-	     */
-	    passert(c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.this.host_addr)
-		&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop)
-		&& (c->spd.this.has_client? c->tunnel_addr_family : c->addr_family)
-		  == subnettypeof(&c->spd.this.client)
-
-		&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
-		&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_nexthop)
-		&& (c->spd.that.has_client? c->tunnel_addr_family : c->addr_family)
-		  == subnettypeof(&c->spd.that.client));
-
-	    DBG_log("ike_life: %lus; ipsec_life: %lus; rekey_margin: %lus;"
-		" rekey_fuzz: %lu%%; keyingtries: %lu; policy: %s"
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ike_life_seconds
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_margin
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_fuzz
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_keying_tries
-		, prettypolicy(c->policy));
-	);
-    }
+		/* log all about this connection */
+		plog("added connection description \"%s\"", c->name);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
+
+			(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), c, &c->spd);
+
+			DBG_log("%s", topo);
+
+			/* Make sure that address families can be correctly inferred
+			 * from printed ends.
+			 */
+			passert(c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.this.host_addr)
+				&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop)
+				&& (c->spd.this.has_client? c->tunnel_addr_family : c->addr_family)
+				  == subnettypeof(&c->spd.this.client)
+
+				&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+				&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_nexthop)
+				&& (c->spd.that.has_client? c->tunnel_addr_family : c->addr_family)
+				  == subnettypeof(&c->spd.that.client));
+
+			DBG_log("ike_life: %lus; ipsec_life: %lus; rekey_margin: %lus;"
+				" rekey_fuzz: %lu%%; keyingtries: %lu; policy: %s"
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_ike_life_seconds
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_margin
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_fuzz
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_keying_tries
+				, prettypolicy(c->policy));
+		);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Derive a template connection from a group connection and target.
  * Similar to instantiate().  Happens at whack --listen.
  * Returns name of new connection.  May be NULL.
- * Caller is responsible for pfreeing.
+ * Caller is responsible for freeing.
  */
 char *
 add_group_instance(struct connection *group, const ip_subnet *target)
 {
-    char namebuf[100]
-	, targetbuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-    struct connection *t;
-    char *name = NULL;
-
-    passert(group->kind == CK_GROUP);
-    passert(oriented(*group));
-
-    /* manufacture a unique name for this template */
-    subnettot(target, 0, targetbuf, sizeof(targetbuf));
-    snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s#%s", group->name, targetbuf);
-
-    if (con_by_name(namebuf, FALSE) != NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "group name + target yields duplicate name \"%s\""
-	    , namebuf);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	t = clone_thing(*group, "group instance");
-	t->name = namebuf;
-	unshare_connection_strings(t);
-	name = clone_str(t->name, "group instance name");
-	t->spd.that.client = *target;
-	t->policy &= ~(POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_GROUTED);
-	t->kind = isanyaddr(&t->spd.that.host_addr) && !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(t->policy)
-	    ? CK_TEMPLATE : CK_INSTANCE;
+	char namebuf[100]
+		, targetbuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	struct connection *t;
+	char *name = NULL;
 
-	/* reset log file info */
-	t->log_file_name = NULL;
-	t->log_file = NULL;
-	t->log_file_err = FALSE;
+	passert(group->kind == CK_GROUP);
+	passert(oriented(*group));
 
-	t->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+	/* manufacture a unique name for this template */
+	subnettot(target, 0, targetbuf, sizeof(targetbuf));
+	snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s#%s", group->name, targetbuf);
 
-	if (t->spd.that.virt)
+	if (con_by_name(namebuf, FALSE) != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG_log("virtual_ip not supported in group instance");
-	    t->spd.that.virt = NULL;	
+		loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "group name + target yields duplicate name \"%s\""
+			, namebuf);
 	}
+	else
+	{
+		t = clone_thing(*group);
+		t->name = namebuf;
+		unshare_connection_strings(t);
+		name = clone_str(t->name);
+		t->spd.that.client = *target;
+		t->policy &= ~(POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_GROUTED);
+		t->kind = isanyaddr(&t->spd.that.host_addr) && !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(t->policy)
+			? CK_TEMPLATE : CK_INSTANCE;
+
+		/* reset log file info */
+		t->log_file_name = NULL;
+		t->log_file = NULL;
+		t->log_file_err = FALSE;
+
+		t->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+
+		if (t->spd.that.virt)
+		{
+			DBG_log("virtual_ip not supported in group instance");
+			t->spd.that.virt = NULL;    
+		}
 
-	/* add to connections list */
-	t->ac_next = connections;
-	connections = t;
+		/* add to connections list */
+		t->ac_next = connections;
+		connections = t;
 
-	/* same host_pair as parent: stick after parent on list */
-	group->hp_next = t;
+		/* same host_pair as parent: stick after parent on list */
+		group->hp_next = t;
 
-	/* route if group is routed */
-	if (group->policy & POLICY_GROUTED)
-	{
-	    if (!trap_connection(t))
-		whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+		/* route if group is routed */
+		if (group->policy & POLICY_GROUTED)
+		{
+			if (!trap_connection(t))
+				whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return name;
+	return name;
 }
 
 /* an old target has disappeared for a group: delete instance */
@@ -1246,17 +1237,17 @@ void
 remove_group_instance(const struct connection *group USED_BY_DEBUG
 , const char *name)
 {
-    passert(group->kind == CK_GROUP);
-    passert(oriented(*group));
+	passert(group->kind == CK_GROUP);
+	passert(oriented(*group));
 
-    delete_connections_by_name(name, FALSE);
+	delete_connections_by_name(name, FALSE);
 }
 
 /* Common part of instantiating a Road Warrior or Opportunistic connection.
  * his_id can be used to carry over an ID discovered in Phase 1.
  * It must not disagree with the one in c, but if that is unspecified,
  * the new connection will use his_id.
- * If his_id is NULL, and c.that.id is uninstantiated (ID_NONE), the
+ * If his_id is NULL, and c.that.id is uninstantiated (ID_ANY), the
  * new connection will continue to have an uninstantiated that.id.
  * Note: instantiation does not affect port numbers.
  *
@@ -1267,90 +1258,90 @@ instantiate(struct connection *c, const ip_address *him
 , u_int16_t his_port
 , const struct id *his_id)
 {
-    struct connection *d;
-    int wildcards;
-
-    passert(c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE);
-    passert(c->spd.next == NULL);
-
-    c->instance_serial++;
-    d = clone_thing(*c, "temporary connection");
-    d->spd.that.allow_any = FALSE;
-
-    if (his_id != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(match_id(his_id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards));
-	d->spd.that.id = *his_id;
-	d->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
-    }
-    unshare_connection_strings(d);
-    unshare_ietfAttrList(&d->spd.this.groups);
-    unshare_ietfAttrList(&d->spd.that.groups);
-    d->kind = CK_INSTANCE;
-
-    passert(oriented(*d));
-    d->spd.that.host_addr = *him;
-    setportof(htons(c->spd.that.port), &d->spd.that.host_addr);
-
-    if (his_port) d->spd.that.host_port = his_port;
-
-    default_end(&d->spd.that, &d->spd.this.host_addr);
-
-    /* We cannot guess what our next_hop should be, but if it was
-     * explicitly specified as 0.0.0.0, we set it to be him.
-     * (whack will not allow nexthop to be elided in RW case.)
-     */
-    default_end(&d->spd.this, &d->spd.that.host_addr);
-    d->spd.next = NULL;
-    d->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
-
-    /* set internal fields */
-    d->ac_next = connections;
-    connections = d;
-    d->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED;
-    d->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
-    d->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
-    d->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
-
-    /* reset log file info */
-    d->log_file_name = NULL;
-    d->log_file = NULL;
-    d->log_file_err = FALSE;
-
-    connect_to_host_pair(d);
-
-    return d;
-    if (sameaddr(&d->spd.that.host_addr, &d->spd.this.host_nexthop))
-    {
-	d->spd.this.host_nexthop = *him;
-    }
+	struct connection *d;
+	int wildcards;
+
+	passert(c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE);
+	passert(c->spd.next == NULL);
+
+	c->instance_serial++;
+	d = clone_thing(*c);
+	d->spd.that.allow_any = FALSE;
+
+	if (his_id != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(match_id(his_id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards));
+		d->spd.that.id = *his_id;
+		d->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
+	}
+	unshare_connection_strings(d);
+	unshare_ietfAttrList(&d->spd.this.groups);
+	unshare_ietfAttrList(&d->spd.that.groups);
+	d->kind = CK_INSTANCE;
+
+	passert(oriented(*d));
+	d->spd.that.host_addr = *him;
+	setportof(htons(c->spd.that.port), &d->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+	if (his_port) d->spd.that.host_port = his_port;
+
+	default_end(&d->spd.that, &d->spd.this.host_addr);
+
+	/* We cannot guess what our next_hop should be, but if it was
+	 * explicitly specified as 0.0.0.0, we set it to be him.
+	 * (whack will not allow nexthop to be elided in RW case.)
+	 */
+	default_end(&d->spd.this, &d->spd.that.host_addr);
+	d->spd.next = NULL;
+	d->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+
+	/* set internal fields */
+	d->ac_next = connections;
+	connections = d;
+	d->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED;
+	d->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+	d->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+	d->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+	/* reset log file info */
+	d->log_file_name = NULL;
+	d->log_file = NULL;
+	d->log_file_err = FALSE;
+
+	connect_to_host_pair(d);
+
+	return d;
+	if (sameaddr(&d->spd.that.host_addr, &d->spd.this.host_nexthop))
+	{
+		d->spd.this.host_nexthop = *him;
+	}
 }
 
 struct connection *
 rw_instantiate(struct connection *c, const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port
 , const ip_subnet *his_net, const struct id *his_id)
 {
-    struct connection *d = instantiate(c, him, his_port, his_id);
-
-    if (d && his_net && is_virtual_connection(c))
-    {
-	d->spd.that.client = *his_net;
-	d->spd.that.virt = NULL;
-	if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(him, his_net))
-	    d->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
-    {
-	/* This must be before we know the client addresses.
-	 * Fill in one that is impossible.  This prevents anyone else from
-	 * trying to use this connection to get to a particular client
-	 */
-	d->spd.that.client = *aftoinfo(subnettypeof(&d->spd.that.client))->none;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL
-	, DBG_log("instantiated \"%s\" for %s" , d->name, ip_str(him)));
-    return d;
+	struct connection *d = instantiate(c, him, his_port, his_id);
+
+	if (d && his_net && is_virtual_connection(c))
+	{
+		d->spd.that.client = *his_net;
+		d->spd.that.virt = NULL;
+		if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(him, his_net))
+			d->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+	}
+
+	if (d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+	{
+		/* This must be before we know the client addresses.
+		 * Fill in one that is impossible.  This prevents anyone else from
+		 * trying to use this connection to get to a particular client
+		 */
+		d->spd.that.client = *aftoinfo(subnettypeof(&d->spd.that.client))->none;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+		, DBG_log("instantiated \"%s\" for %s" , d->name, ip_str(him)));
+	return d;
 }
 
 struct connection *
@@ -1361,77 +1352,77 @@ oppo_instantiate(struct connection *c
 , const ip_address *our_client USED_BY_DEBUG
 , const ip_address *peer_client)
 {
-    struct connection *d = instantiate(c, him, 0, his_id);
+	struct connection *d = instantiate(c, him, 0, his_id);
 
-    passert(d->spd.next == NULL);
+	passert(d->spd.next == NULL);
+
+	/* fill in our client side */
+	if (d->spd.this.has_client)
+	{
+		/* there was a client in the abstract connection
+		 * so we demand that the required client is within that subnet.
+		 */
+		passert(addrinsubnet(our_client, &d->spd.this.client));
+		happy(addrtosubnet(our_client, &d->spd.this.client));
+		/* opportunistic connections do not use port selectors */
+		setportof(0, &d->spd.this.client.addr);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* there was no client in the abstract connection
+		 * so we demand that the required client be the host
+		 */
+		passert(sameaddr(our_client, &d->spd.this.host_addr));
+	}
 
-    /* fill in our client side */
-    if (d->spd.this.has_client)
-    {
-	/* there was a client in the abstract connection
-	 * so we demand that the required client is within that subnet.
+	/* fill in peer's client side.
+	 * If the client is the peer, excise the client from the connection.
 	 */
-	passert(addrinsubnet(our_client, &d->spd.this.client));
-	happy(addrtosubnet(our_client, &d->spd.this.client));
+	passert((d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+		&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &d->spd.that.client));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(peer_client, &d->spd.that.client));
 	/* opportunistic connections do not use port selectors */
-	setportof(0, &d->spd.this.client.addr);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* there was no client in the abstract connection
-	 * so we demand that the required client be the host
+	setportof(0, &d->spd.that.client.addr);
+
+	if (sameaddr(peer_client, &d->spd.that.host_addr))
+		d->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+
+	passert(d->gw_info == NULL);
+	gw_addref(gw);
+	d->gw_info = gw;
+
+	/* Adjust routing if something is eclipsing c.
+	 * It must be a %hold for us (hard to passert this).
+	 * If there was another instance eclipsing, we'd be using it.
+	 */
+	if (c->spd.routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+		d->spd.routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+
+	/* Remember if the template is routed:
+	 * if so, this instance applies for initiation
+	 * even if it is created for responding.
 	 */
-	passert(sameaddr(our_client, &d->spd.this.host_addr));
-    }
-
-    /* fill in peer's client side.
-     * If the client is the peer, excise the client from the connection.
-     */
-    passert((d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
-	&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &d->spd.that.client));
-    happy(addrtosubnet(peer_client, &d->spd.that.client));
-    /* opportunistic connections do not use port selectors */
-    setportof(0, &d->spd.that.client.addr);
-
-    if (sameaddr(peer_client, &d->spd.that.host_addr))
-	d->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
-
-    passert(d->gw_info == NULL);
-    gw_addref(gw);
-    d->gw_info = gw;
-
-    /* Adjust routing if something is eclipsing c.
-     * It must be a %hold for us (hard to passert this).
-     * If there was another instance eclipsing, we'd be using it.
-     */
-    if (c->spd.routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
-	d->spd.routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
-
-    /* Remember if the template is routed:
-     * if so, this instance applies for initiation
-     * even if it is created for responding.
-     */
-    if (routed(c->spd.routing))
-	d->instance_initiation_ok = TRUE;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
-
-	(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), d, &d->spd);
-	DBG_log("instantiated \"%s\": %s", d->name, topo);
-    );
-    return d;
+	if (routed(c->spd.routing))
+		d->instance_initiation_ok = TRUE;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
+
+		(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), d, &d->spd);
+		DBG_log("instantiated \"%s\": %s", d->name, topo);
+	);
+	return d;
 }
 
 /* priority formatting */
 void
 fmt_policy_prio(policy_prio_t pp, char buf[POLICY_PRIO_BUF])
 {
-    if (pp == BOTTOM_PRIO)
-	snprintf(buf, POLICY_PRIO_BUF, "0");
-    else
-	snprintf(buf, POLICY_PRIO_BUF, "%lu,%lu"
-	    , pp>>16, (pp & ~(~(policy_prio_t)0 << 16)) >> 8);
+	if (pp == BOTTOM_PRIO)
+		snprintf(buf, POLICY_PRIO_BUF, "0");
+	else
+		snprintf(buf, POLICY_PRIO_BUF, "%lu,%lu"
+			, pp>>16, (pp & ~(~(policy_prio_t)0 << 16)) >> 8);
 }
 
 /* Format any information needed to identify an instance of a connection.
@@ -1442,65 +1433,65 @@ fmt_policy_prio(policy_prio_t pp, char buf[POLICY_PRIO_BUF])
 static size_t
 fmt_client(const ip_subnet *client, const ip_address *gw, const char *prefix, char buf[ADDRTOT_BUF])
 {
-    if (subnetisaddr(client, gw))
-    {
-	buf[0] = '\0';	/* compact denotation for "self" */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	char *ap;
-
-	strcpy(buf, prefix);
-	ap = buf + strlen(prefix);
-	if (subnetisnone(client))
-	    strcpy(ap, "?");	/* unknown */
+	if (subnetisaddr(client, gw))
+	{
+		buf[0] = '\0';  /* compact denotation for "self" */
+	}
 	else
-	    subnettot(client, 0, ap, SUBNETTOT_BUF);
-    }
-    return strlen(buf);
+	{
+		char *ap;
+
+		strcpy(buf, prefix);
+		ap = buf + strlen(prefix);
+		if (subnetisnone(client))
+			strcpy(ap, "?");    /* unknown */
+		else
+			subnettot(client, 0, ap, SUBNETTOT_BUF);
+	}
+	return strlen(buf);
 }
 
 void
 fmt_conn_instance(const struct connection *c, char buf[CONN_INST_BUF])
 {
-    char *p = buf;
+	char *p = buf;
 
-    *p = '\0';
+	*p = '\0';
 
-    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-    {
-	if (c->instance_serial != 0)
+	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
 	{
-	    snprintf(p, CONN_INST_BUF, "[%lu]", c->instance_serial);
-	    p += strlen(p);
-	}
+		if (c->instance_serial != 0)
+		{
+			snprintf(p, CONN_INST_BUF, "[%lu]", c->instance_serial);
+			p += strlen(p);
+		}
 
-	if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
-	{
-	    size_t w = fmt_client(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr, " ", p);
+		if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+		{
+			size_t w = fmt_client(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr, " ", p);
 
-	    p += w;
+			p += w;
 
-	    strcpy(p, w == 0? " ..." : "=== ...");
-	    p += strlen(p);
+			strcpy(p, w == 0? " ..." : "=== ...");
+			p += strlen(p);
 
-	    addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 0, p, ADDRTOT_BUF);
-	    p += strlen(p);
+			addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 0, p, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+			p += strlen(p);
 
-	    (void) fmt_client(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr, "===", p);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    *p++ = ' ';
-	    addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 0, p, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+			(void) fmt_client(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr, "===", p);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			*p++ = ' ';
+			addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 0, p, ADDRTOT_BUF);
 #
-	    if (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port)
-	    {
-		p += strlen(p);
-		sprintf(p, ":%d", c->spd.that.host_port);
-	    }
+			if (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port)
+			{
+				p += strlen(p);
+				sprintf(p, ":%d", c->spd.that.host_port);
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Find an existing connection for a trapped outbound packet.
@@ -1520,124 +1511,124 @@ fmt_conn_instance(const struct connection *c, char buf[CONN_INST_BUF])
  */
 struct connection *
 find_connection_for_clients(struct spd_route **srp,
-			    const ip_address *our_client,
-			    const ip_address *peer_client,
-			    int transport_proto)
+							const ip_address *our_client,
+							const ip_address *peer_client,
+							int transport_proto)
 {
-    struct connection *c = connections, *best = NULL;
-    policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
-    struct spd_route *sr;
-    struct spd_route *best_sr = NULL;
-    int our_port  = ntohs(portof(our_client));
-    int peer_port = ntohs(portof(peer_client));
-
-    passert(!isanyaddr(our_client) && !isanyaddr(peer_client));
+	struct connection *c = connections, *best = NULL;
+	policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+	struct spd_route *best_sr = NULL;
+	int our_port  = ntohs(portof(our_client));
+	int peer_port = ntohs(portof(peer_client));
+
+	passert(!isanyaddr(our_client) && !isanyaddr(peer_client));
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL))
-    {
-	char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF], pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL))
+	{
+		char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF], pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-	addrtot(our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
-	addrtot(peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
-	DBG_log("find_connection: "
-		"looking for policy for connection: %s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
-		, ocb, transport_proto, our_port, pcb, transport_proto, peer_port);
-    }
+		addrtot(our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+		addrtot(peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+		DBG_log("find_connection: "
+				"looking for policy for connection: %s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
+				, ocb, transport_proto, our_port, pcb, transport_proto, peer_port);
+	}
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
-    {
-	if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
-	    continue;
-
-	for (sr = &c->spd; best!=c && sr; sr = sr->next)
+	for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
 	{
-	    if ((routed(sr->routing) || c->instance_initiation_ok)
-	    && addrinsubnet(our_client, &sr->this.client)
-	    && addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client)
-	    && addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client)
-	    && (!sr->this.protocol || transport_proto == sr->this.protocol)
-	    && (!sr->this.port || our_port == sr->this.port)
-	    && (!sr->that.port || peer_port == sr->that.port))
-	    {
-		char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
-		char cib2[CONN_INST_BUF];
+		if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
+			continue;
+
+		for (sr = &c->spd; best!=c && sr; sr = sr->next)
+		{
+			if ((routed(sr->routing) || c->instance_initiation_ok)
+			&& addrinsubnet(our_client, &sr->this.client)
+			&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client)
+			&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client)
+			&& (!sr->this.protocol || transport_proto == sr->this.protocol)
+			&& (!sr->this.port || our_port == sr->this.port)
+			&& (!sr->that.port || peer_port == sr->that.port))
+			{
+				char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+				char cib2[CONN_INST_BUF];
 
-		policy_prio_t prio = 8 * (c->prio + (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE))
-				   + 2 * (sr->this.port == our_port)
-				   + 2 * (sr->that.port == peer_port)
-				   +     (sr->this.protocol == transport_proto);
+				policy_prio_t prio = 8 * (c->prio + (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE))
+								   + 2 * (sr->this.port == our_port)
+								   + 2 * (sr->that.port == peer_port)
+								   +     (sr->this.protocol == transport_proto);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-		if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-		{
-		    char c_ocb[SUBNETTOT_BUF], c_pcb[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-		    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, c_ocb, sizeof(c_ocb));
-		    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, c_pcb, sizeof(c_pcb));
-		    DBG_log("find_connection: conn \"%s\"%s has compatible peers: %s->%s [pri: %ld]"
-			    , c->name
-			    , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)
-			    , c_ocb, c_pcb, prio);
-		}
+				if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+				{
+					char c_ocb[SUBNETTOT_BUF], c_pcb[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+					subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, c_ocb, sizeof(c_ocb));
+					subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, c_pcb, sizeof(c_pcb));
+					DBG_log("find_connection: conn \"%s\"%s has compatible peers: %s->%s [pri: %ld]"
+							, c->name
+							, (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)
+							, c_ocb, c_pcb, prio);
+				}
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-		if (best == NULL)
-		{
-		    best = c;
-		    best_sr = sr;
-		    best_prio = prio;
-		}
-
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-		    DBG_log("find_connection: "
-			    "comparing best \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} (child %s) to \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} (child %s)"
-			    , best->name
-			    , (fmt_conn_instance(best, cib), cib)
-			    , best_prio
-			    , best
-			    , (best->policy_next ? best->policy_next->name : "none")
-			    , c->name
-			    , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib2), cib2)
-			    , prio
-			    , c
-			    , (c->policy_next ? c->policy_next->name : "none")));
-
-		if (prio > best_prio)
-		{
-		    best = c;
-		    best_sr = sr;
-		    best_prio = prio;
+				if (best == NULL)
+				{
+					best = c;
+					best_sr = sr;
+					best_prio = prio;
+				}
+
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+					DBG_log("find_connection: "
+							"comparing best \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} (child %s) to \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} (child %s)"
+							, best->name
+							, (fmt_conn_instance(best, cib), cib)
+							, best_prio
+							, best
+							, (best->policy_next ? best->policy_next->name : "none")
+							, c->name
+							, (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib2), cib2)
+							, prio
+							, c
+							, (c->policy_next ? c->policy_next->name : "none")));
+
+				if (prio > best_prio)
+				{
+					best = c;
+					best_sr = sr;
+					best_prio = prio;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (best!= NULL && NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy))
-	best = NULL;
+	if (best!= NULL && NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy))
+		best = NULL;
 
-    if (srp != NULL && best != NULL)
-	*srp = best_sr;
+	if (srp != NULL && best != NULL)
+		*srp = best_sr;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL))
-    {
-	if (best)
+	if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL))
 	{
-	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
-	    DBG_log("find_connection: concluding with \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} kind=%s"
-		    , best->name
-		    , (fmt_conn_instance(best, cib), cib)
-		    , best_prio
-		    , best
-		    , enum_name(&connection_kind_names, best->kind));
-	} else {
-	    DBG_log("find_connection: concluding with empty");
+		if (best)
+		{
+			char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+			DBG_log("find_connection: concluding with \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} kind=%s"
+					, best->name
+					, (fmt_conn_instance(best, cib), cib)
+					, best_prio
+					, best
+					, enum_name(&connection_kind_names, best->kind));
+		} else {
+			DBG_log("find_connection: concluding with empty");
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-    return best;
+	return best;
 }
 
 /* Find and instantiate a connection for an outgoing Opportunistic connection.
@@ -1664,203 +1655,203 @@ find_connection_for_clients(struct spd_route **srp,
  */
 struct connection *
 build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(struct gw_info *gw
-					,const ip_address *our_client
-					,const ip_address *peer_client)
+										,const ip_address *our_client
+										,const ip_address *peer_client)
 {
-    struct iface *p;
-    struct connection *best = NULL;
-    struct spd_route *sr, *bestsr;
-    char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF], pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-
-    addrtot(our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
-    addrtot(peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
-
-    passert(!isanyaddr(our_client) && !isanyaddr(peer_client));
-
-    /* We don't know his ID yet, so gw id must be an ipaddr */
-    passert(gw->key != NULL);
-    passert(id_is_ipaddr(&gw->gw_id));
-
-    /* for each of our addresses... */
-    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	/* go through those connections with our address and NO_IP as hosts
-	 * We cannot know what port the peer would use, so we assume
-	 * that it is pluto_port (makes debugging easier).
-	 */
-	struct connection *c = find_host_pair_connections(&p->addr
-	    , pluto_port, (ip_address *)NULL, pluto_port);
+	struct iface *p;
+	struct connection *best = NULL;
+	struct spd_route *sr, *bestsr;
+	char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF], pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-	for (; c != NULL; c = c->hp_next)
+	addrtot(our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+	addrtot(peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+
+	passert(!isanyaddr(our_client) && !isanyaddr(peer_client));
+
+	/* We don't know his ID yet, so gw id must be an ipaddr */
+	passert(gw->key != NULL);
+	passert(id_is_ipaddr(&gw->gw_id));
+
+	/* for each of our addresses... */
+	for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_OPPO,
-		DBG_log("checking %s", c->name));
-	    if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
-	    {
-		continue;
-	    }
-
-	    for (sr = &c->spd; best!=c && sr; sr = sr->next)
-	    {
-		if (routed(sr->routing)
-		&& addrinsubnet(our_client, &sr->this.client)
-		&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client))
+		/* go through those connections with our address and NO_IP as hosts
+		 * We cannot know what port the peer would use, so we assume
+		 * that it is pluto_port (makes debugging easier).
+		 */
+		struct connection *c = find_host_pair_connections(&p->addr
+			, pluto_port, (ip_address *)NULL, pluto_port);
+
+		for (; c != NULL; c = c->hp_next)
 		{
-		    if (best == NULL)
-		    {
-			best = c;
-			break;
-		    }
-
-		    DBG(DBG_OPPO,
-			DBG_log("comparing best %s to %s"
-				, best->name, c->name));
-
-		    for (bestsr = &best->spd; best!=c && bestsr; bestsr=bestsr->next)
-		    {
-			if (!subnetinsubnet(&bestsr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
-			|| (samesubnet(&bestsr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
-			     && !subnetinsubnet(&bestsr->that.client
-						, &sr->that.client)))
+			DBG(DBG_OPPO,
+				DBG_log("checking %s", c->name));
+			if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
 			{
-			    best = c;
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			for (sr = &c->spd; best!=c && sr; sr = sr->next)
+			{
+				if (routed(sr->routing)
+				&& addrinsubnet(our_client, &sr->this.client)
+				&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client))
+				{
+					if (best == NULL)
+					{
+						best = c;
+						break;
+					}
+
+					DBG(DBG_OPPO,
+						DBG_log("comparing best %s to %s"
+								, best->name, c->name));
+
+					for (bestsr = &best->spd; best!=c && bestsr; bestsr=bestsr->next)
+					{
+						if (!subnetinsubnet(&bestsr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
+						|| (samesubnet(&bestsr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
+							 && !subnetinsubnet(&bestsr->that.client
+												, &sr->that.client)))
+						{
+							best = c;
+						}
+					}
+				}
 			}
-		    }
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (best == NULL
-    || NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy)
-    || (best->policy & POLICY_OPPO) == LEMPTY
-    || best->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
-	return NULL;
-    else
-	return oppo_instantiate(best, &gw->gw_id.ip_addr, NULL, gw
-			      , our_client, peer_client);
+	if (best == NULL
+	|| NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy)
+	|| (best->policy & POLICY_OPPO) == LEMPTY
+	|| best->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
+		return NULL;
+	else
+		return oppo_instantiate(best, &gw->gw_id.ip_addr, NULL, gw
+							  , our_client, peer_client);
 }
 
 bool
 orient(struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct spd_route *sr;
-
-    if (!oriented(*c))
-    {
-	struct iface *p;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
 
-	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+	if (!oriented(*c))
 	{
-	    /* Note: this loop does not stop when it finds a match:
-	     * it continues checking to catch any ambiguity.
-	     */
-	    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	    {
-		if (p->ike_float)
-		    continue;
-
-		for (;;)
+		struct iface *p;
+
+		for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
 		{
-		    /* check if this interface matches this end */
-		    if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &p->addr)
-		    && (!no_klips || sr->this.host_port == pluto_port))
-		    {
-			if (oriented(*c))
+			/* Note: this loop does not stop when it finds a match:
+			 * it continues checking to catch any ambiguity.
+			 */
+			for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 			{
-			    if (c->interface == p)
-				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-				       , "both sides of \"%s\" are our interface %s!"
-				       , c->name, p->rname);
-			    else
-				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "two interfaces match \"%s\" (%s, %s)"
-				       , c->name, c->interface->rname, p->rname);
-			    c->interface = NULL;	/* withdraw orientation */
-			    return FALSE;
+				if (p->ike_float)
+					continue;
+
+				for (;;)
+				{
+					/* check if this interface matches this end */
+					if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &p->addr)
+					&& (!no_klips || sr->this.host_port == pluto_port))
+					{
+						if (oriented(*c))
+						{
+							if (c->interface == p)
+								loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+									   , "both sides of \"%s\" are our interface %s!"
+									   , c->name, p->rname);
+							else
+								loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "two interfaces match \"%s\" (%s, %s)"
+									   , c->name, c->interface->rname, p->rname);
+							c->interface = NULL;        /* withdraw orientation */
+							return FALSE;
+						}
+						c->interface = p;
+					}
+
+					/* done with this interface if it doesn't match that end */
+					if (!(sameaddr(&sr->that.host_addr, &p->addr)
+					&& (!no_klips || sr->that.host_port == pluto_port)))
+						break;
+
+					/* swap ends and try again.
+					 * It is a little tricky to see that this loop will stop.
+					 * Only continue if the far side matches.
+					 * If both sides match, there is an error-out.
+					 */
+					{
+						struct end t = sr->this;
+
+						sr->this = sr->that;
+						sr->that = t;
+					}
+				}
 			}
-			c->interface = p;
-		    }
-
-		    /* done with this interface if it doesn't match that end */
-		    if (!(sameaddr(&sr->that.host_addr, &p->addr)
-		    && (!no_klips || sr->that.host_port == pluto_port)))
-			break;
-
-		    /* swap ends and try again.
-		     * It is a little tricky to see that this loop will stop.
-		     * Only continue if the far side matches.
-		     * If both sides match, there is an error-out.
-		     */
-		    {
-			struct end t = sr->this;
-
-			sr->this = sr->that;
-			sr->that = t;
-		    }
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    return oriented(*c);
+	return oriented(*c);
 }
 
 void
 initiate_connection(const char *name, int whackfd)
 {
-    struct connection *c = con_by_name(name, TRUE);
+	struct connection *c = con_by_name(name, TRUE);
 
-    if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
-    {
-	set_cur_connection(c);
-	if (!oriented(*c))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_ORIENT, "we have no ipsecN interface for either end of this connection");
-	}
-	else if (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_INITSHUNT
-		, "cannot initiate an authby=never connection");
-	}
-	else if (c->kind != CK_PERMANENT && !c->spd.that.allow_any)
-	{
-	    if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr))
-		loglog(RC_NOPEERIP, "cannot initiate connection without knowing peer IP address");
-	    else
-		loglog(RC_WILDCARD, "cannot initiate connection with ID wildcards");
-	}
-	else
+	if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
 	{
-	    /* do we have to prompt for a PIN code? */
-	    if (c->spd.this.sc != NULL && !c->spd.this.sc->valid && whackfd != NULL_FD)
-	    {
-		scx_get_pin(c->spd.this.sc, whackfd);
-	    }
-	    if (c->spd.this.sc != NULL && !c->spd.this.sc->valid)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_NOVALIDPIN, "cannot initiate connection without valid PIN");
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-
-		if (c->spd.that.allow_any)
+		set_cur_connection(c);
+		if (!oriented(*c))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_ORIENT, "we have no ipsecN interface for either end of this connection");
+		}
+		else if (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_INITSHUNT
+				, "cannot initiate an authby=never connection");
+		}
+		else if (c->kind != CK_PERMANENT && !c->spd.that.allow_any)
 		{
-		    c = instantiate(c, &c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port
-				  , &c->spd.that.id);
+			if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr))
+				loglog(RC_NOPEERIP, "cannot initiate connection without knowing peer IP address");
+			else
+				loglog(RC_WILDCARD, "cannot initiate connection with ID wildcards");
 		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* do we have to prompt for a PIN code? */
+			if (c->spd.this.sc != NULL && !c->spd.this.sc->valid && whackfd != NULL_FD)
+			{
+				scx_get_pin(c->spd.this.sc, whackfd);
+			}
+			if (c->spd.this.sc != NULL && !c->spd.this.sc->valid)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_NOVALIDPIN, "cannot initiate connection without valid PIN");
+			}
+			else
+			{
 
-		/* We will only request an IPsec SA if policy isn't empty
-		 * (ignoring Main Mode items).
-		 * This is a fudge, but not yet important.
-		 * If we are to proceed asynchronously, whackfd will be NULL_FD.
-		 */
-		c->policy |= POLICY_UP;
-		ipsecdoi_initiate(whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
-		whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* protect from close */
-	    }
+				if (c->spd.that.allow_any)
+				{
+					c = instantiate(c, &c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port
+								  , &c->spd.that.id);
+				}
+
+				/* We will only request an IPsec SA if policy isn't empty
+				 * (ignoring Main Mode items).
+				 * This is a fudge, but not yet important.
+				 * If we are to proceed asynchronously, whackfd will be NULL_FD.
+				 */
+				c->policy |= POLICY_UP;
+				ipsecdoi_initiate(whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
+				whackfd = NULL_FD;      /* protect from close */
+			}
+		}
+		reset_cur_connection();
 	}
-	reset_cur_connection();
-    }
-    close_any(whackfd);
+	close_any(whackfd);
 }
 
 /* (Possibly) Opportunistic Initiation:
@@ -1874,10 +1865,10 @@ initiate_connection(const char *name, int whackfd)
  * Most of the code will be restarted if an ADNS request is made
  * to discover the gateway.  The only difference between the first
  * and second entry is whether gateways_from_dns is NULL or not.
- *	initiate_opportunistic: initial entrypoint
- *	continue_oppo: where we pickup when ADNS result arrives
- *	initiate_opportunistic_body: main body shared by above routines
- *	cannot_oppo: a helper function to log a diagnostic
+ *      initiate_opportunistic: initial entrypoint
+ *      continue_oppo: where we pickup when ADNS result arrives
+ *      initiate_opportunistic_body: main body shared by above routines
+ *      cannot_oppo: a helper function to log a diagnostic
  * This structure repeats a lot of code when the ADNS result arrives.
  * This seems like a waste, but anything learned the first time through
  * may no longer be true!
@@ -1887,174 +1878,174 @@ initiate_connection(const char *name, int whackfd)
  */
 
 enum find_oppo_step {
-    fos_start,
-    fos_myid_ip_txt,
-    fos_myid_hostname_txt,
-    fos_myid_ip_key,
-    fos_myid_hostname_key,
-    fos_our_client,
-    fos_our_txt,
+	fos_start,
+	fos_myid_ip_txt,
+	fos_myid_hostname_txt,
+	fos_myid_ip_key,
+	fos_myid_hostname_key,
+	fos_our_client,
+	fos_our_txt,
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    fos_our_key,
+	fos_our_key,
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-    fos_his_client,
-    fos_done
+	fos_his_client,
+	fos_done
 };
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
 static const char *const oppo_step_name[] = {
-    "fos_start",
-    "fos_myid_ip_txt",
-    "fos_myid_hostname_txt",
-    "fos_myid_ip_key",
-    "fos_myid_hostname_key",
-    "fos_our_client",
-    "fos_our_txt",
+	"fos_start",
+	"fos_myid_ip_txt",
+	"fos_myid_hostname_txt",
+	"fos_myid_ip_key",
+	"fos_myid_hostname_key",
+	"fos_our_client",
+	"fos_our_txt",
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    "fos_our_key",
+	"fos_our_key",
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-    "fos_his_client",
-    "fos_done"
+	"fos_his_client",
+	"fos_done"
 };
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
 struct find_oppo_bundle {
-    enum find_oppo_step step;
-    err_t want;
-    bool failure_ok;            /* if true, continue_oppo should not die on DNS failure */
-    ip_address our_client;	/* not pointer! */
-    ip_address peer_client;
-    int transport_proto;
-    bool held;
-    policy_prio_t policy_prio;
-    ipsec_spi_t failure_shunt;	/* in host order!  0 for delete. */
-    int whackfd;
+	enum find_oppo_step step;
+	err_t want;
+	bool failure_ok;            /* if true, continue_oppo should not die on DNS failure */
+	ip_address our_client;      /* not pointer! */
+	ip_address peer_client;
+	int transport_proto;
+	bool held;
+	policy_prio_t policy_prio;
+	ipsec_spi_t failure_shunt;  /* in host order!  0 for delete. */
+	int whackfd;
 };
 
 struct find_oppo_continuation {
-    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
-    struct find_oppo_bundle b;
+	struct adns_continuation ac;        /* common prefix */
+	struct find_oppo_bundle b;
 };
 
 static void
 cannot_oppo(struct connection *c
-	    , struct find_oppo_bundle *b
-	    , err_t ugh)
+			, struct find_oppo_bundle *b
+			, err_t ugh)
 {
-    char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-    char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
-    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+	addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+	addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
 
-    DBG(DBG_DNS | DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("Can't Opportunistically initiate for %s to %s: %s"
-	, ocb, pcb, ugh));
+	DBG(DBG_DNS | DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("Can't Opportunistically initiate for %s to %s: %s"
+		, ocb, pcb, ugh));
 
-    whack_log(RC_OPPOFAILURE
-	, "Can't Opportunistically initiate for %s to %s: %s"
-	, ocb, pcb, ugh);
+	whack_log(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+		, "Can't Opportunistically initiate for %s to %s: %s"
+		, ocb, pcb, ugh);
 
-    if (c != NULL && c->policy_next != NULL)
-    {
-	/* there is some policy that comes afterwards */
-	struct spd_route *shunt_spd;
-	struct connection *nc = c->policy_next;
-	struct state *st;
+	if (c != NULL && c->policy_next != NULL)
+	{
+		/* there is some policy that comes afterwards */
+		struct spd_route *shunt_spd;
+		struct connection *nc = c->policy_next;
+		struct state *st;
 
-	passert(c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE);
-	passert(c->policy_next->kind == CK_PERMANENT);
+		passert(c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE);
+		passert(c->policy_next->kind == CK_PERMANENT);
 
-	DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("OE failed for %s to %s, but %s overrides shunt"
-			      , ocb, pcb, c->policy_next->name));
+		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("OE failed for %s to %s, but %s overrides shunt"
+							  , ocb, pcb, c->policy_next->name));
 
-	/*
-	 * okay, here we need add to the "next" policy, which is ought
-	 * to be an instance.
-	 * We will add another entry to the spd_route list for the specific
-	 * situation that we have.
-	 */
+		/*
+		 * okay, here we need add to the "next" policy, which is ought
+		 * to be an instance.
+		 * We will add another entry to the spd_route list for the specific
+		 * situation that we have.
+		 */
 
-	shunt_spd = clone_thing(nc->spd, "shunt eroute policy");
+		shunt_spd = clone_thing(nc->spd);
 
-	shunt_spd->next = nc->spd.next;
-	nc->spd.next = shunt_spd;
+		shunt_spd->next = nc->spd.next;
+		nc->spd.next = shunt_spd;
 
-	happy(addrtosubnet(&b->peer_client, &shunt_spd->that.client));
+		happy(addrtosubnet(&b->peer_client, &shunt_spd->that.client));
 
-	if (sameaddr(&b->peer_client, &shunt_spd->that.host_addr))
-	    shunt_spd->that.has_client = FALSE;
+		if (sameaddr(&b->peer_client, &shunt_spd->that.host_addr))
+			shunt_spd->that.has_client = FALSE;
 
-	/*
-	 * override the tunnel destination with the one from the secondaried
-	 * policy
-	 */
-	shunt_spd->that.host_addr = nc->spd.that.host_addr;
+		/*
+		 * override the tunnel destination with the one from the secondaried
+		 * policy
+		 */
+		shunt_spd->that.host_addr = nc->spd.that.host_addr;
 
-	/* now, lookup the state, and poke it up.
-	 */
+		/* now, lookup the state, and poke it up.
+		 */
 
-	st = state_with_serialno(nc->newest_ipsec_sa);
+		st = state_with_serialno(nc->newest_ipsec_sa);
 
-	/* XXX what to do if the IPSEC SA has died? */
-	passert(st != NULL);
+		/* XXX what to do if the IPSEC SA has died? */
+		passert(st != NULL);
 
-	/* link the new connection instance to the state's list of
-	 * connections
-	 */
+		/* link the new connection instance to the state's list of
+		 * connections
+		 */
 
-	DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("installing state: %ld for %s to %s"
-			      , nc->newest_ipsec_sa
-			      , ocb, pcb));
+		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("installing state: %ld for %s to %s"
+							  , nc->newest_ipsec_sa
+							  , ocb, pcb));
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	if (DBGP(DBG_OPPO | DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-	{
-	    char state_buf[LOG_WIDTH];
-	    char state_buf2[LOG_WIDTH];
-	    time_t n = now();
-
-	    fmt_state(FALSE, st, n
-		      , state_buf, sizeof(state_buf)
-		      , state_buf2, sizeof(state_buf2));
-	    DBG_log("cannot_oppo, failure SA1: %s", state_buf);
-	    DBG_log("cannot_oppo, failure SA2: %s", state_buf2);
-	}
+		if (DBGP(DBG_OPPO | DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+		{
+			char state_buf[LOG_WIDTH];
+			char state_buf2[LOG_WIDTH];
+			time_t n = now();
+
+			fmt_state(FALSE, st, n
+					  , state_buf, sizeof(state_buf)
+					  , state_buf2, sizeof(state_buf2));
+			DBG_log("cannot_oppo, failure SA1: %s", state_buf);
+			DBG_log("cannot_oppo, failure SA2: %s", state_buf2);
+		}
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-	if (!route_and_eroute(c, shunt_spd, st))
-	{
-	    whack_log(RC_OPPOFAILURE
-		      , "failed to instantiate shunt policy %s for %s to %s"
-		      , c->name
-		      , ocb, pcb);
+		if (!route_and_eroute(c, shunt_spd, st))
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+					  , "failed to instantiate shunt policy %s for %s to %s"
+					  , c->name
+					  , ocb, pcb);
+		}
+		return;
 	}
-	return;
-    }
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    if (b->held)
-    {
-	/* Replace HOLD with b->failure_shunt.
-	 * If no b->failure_shunt specified, use SPI_PASS -- THIS MAY CHANGE.
-	 */
-	if (b->failure_shunt == 0)
+	if (b->held)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("no explicit failure shunt for %s to %s; installing %%pass"
-				  , ocb, pcb));
-	}
+		/* Replace HOLD with b->failure_shunt.
+		 * If no b->failure_shunt specified, use SPI_PASS -- THIS MAY CHANGE.
+		 */
+		if (b->failure_shunt == 0)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("no explicit failure shunt for %s to %s; installing %%pass"
+								  , ocb, pcb));
+		}
 
-	(void) replace_bare_shunt(&b->our_client, &b->peer_client
-	    , b->policy_prio
-	    , b->failure_shunt
-	    , b->failure_shunt != 0
-	    , b->transport_proto
-	    , ugh);
-    }
+		(void) replace_bare_shunt(&b->our_client, &b->peer_client
+			, b->policy_prio
+			, b->failure_shunt
+			, b->failure_shunt != 0
+			, b->transport_proto
+			, ugh);
+	}
 #endif
 }
 
 static void initiate_opportunistic_body(struct find_oppo_bundle *b
-    , struct adns_continuation *ac, err_t ac_ugh);	/* forward */
+	, struct adns_continuation *ac, err_t ac_ugh);      /* forward */
 
 void
 initiate_opportunistic(const ip_address *our_client
@@ -2063,93 +2054,93 @@ initiate_opportunistic(const ip_address *our_client
 , bool held
 , int whackfd)
 {
-    struct find_oppo_bundle b;
-
-    b.want = (whackfd == NULL_FD ? "whack" : "acquire");
-    b.failure_ok = FALSE;
-    b.our_client = *our_client;
-    b.peer_client = *peer_client;
-    b.transport_proto = transport_proto;
-    b.held = held;
-    b.policy_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
-    b.failure_shunt = 0;
-    b.whackfd = whackfd;
-    b.step = fos_start;
-    initiate_opportunistic_body(&b, NULL, NULL);
+	struct find_oppo_bundle b;
+
+	b.want = (whackfd == NULL_FD ? "whack" : "acquire");
+	b.failure_ok = FALSE;
+	b.our_client = *our_client;
+	b.peer_client = *peer_client;
+	b.transport_proto = transport_proto;
+	b.held = held;
+	b.policy_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+	b.failure_shunt = 0;
+	b.whackfd = whackfd;
+	b.step = fos_start;
+	initiate_opportunistic_body(&b, NULL, NULL);
 }
 
 static void
 continue_oppo(struct adns_continuation *acr, err_t ugh)
 {
-    struct find_oppo_continuation *cr = (void *)acr;	/* inherit, damn you! */
-    struct connection *c;
-    bool was_held = cr->b.held;
-    int whackfd = cr->b.whackfd;
+	struct find_oppo_continuation *cr = (void *)acr;    /* inherit, damn you! */
+	struct connection *c;
+	bool was_held = cr->b.held;
+	int whackfd = cr->b.whackfd;
 
-    /* note: cr->id has no resources; cr->sgw_id is id_none:
-     * neither need freeing.
-     */
-    whack_log_fd = whackfd;
+	/* note: cr->id has no resources; cr->sgw_id is ID_ANY:
+	 * neither need freeing.
+	 */
+	whack_log_fd = whackfd;
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    /* Discover and record whether %hold has gone away.
-     * This could have happened while we were awaiting DNS.
-     * We must check BEFORE any call to cannot_oppo.
-     */
-    if (was_held)
-	cr->b.held = has_bare_hold(&cr->b.our_client, &cr->b.peer_client
-	    , cr->b.transport_proto);
+	/* Discover and record whether %hold has gone away.
+	 * This could have happened while we were awaiting DNS.
+	 * We must check BEFORE any call to cannot_oppo.
+	 */
+	if (was_held)
+		cr->b.held = has_bare_hold(&cr->b.our_client, &cr->b.peer_client
+			, cr->b.transport_proto);
 #endif
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    /* if we're going to ignore the error, at least note it in debugging log */
-    if (cr->b.failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS,
-	    {
+	/* if we're going to ignore the error, at least note it in debugging log */
+	if (cr->b.failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS,
+			{
+				char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+				char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+				addrtot(&cr->b.our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+				addrtot(&cr->b.peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+				DBG_log("continuing from failed DNS lookup for %s, %s to %s: %s"
+					, cr->b.want, ocb, pcb, ugh);
+			});
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (!cr->b.failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		c = find_connection_for_clients(NULL, &cr->b.our_client, &cr->b.peer_client
+			, cr->b.transport_proto);
+		cannot_oppo(c, &cr->b
+					, builddiag("%s: %s", cr->b.want, ugh));
+	}
+	else if (was_held && !cr->b.held)
+	{
+		/* was_held indicates we were started due to a %trap firing
+		 * (as opposed to a "whack --oppohere --oppothere").
+		 * Since the %hold has gone, we can assume that somebody else
+		 * has beaten us to the punch.  We can go home.  But lets log it.
+		 */
 		char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 		char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
 		addrtot(&cr->b.our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
 		addrtot(&cr->b.peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
-		DBG_log("continuing from failed DNS lookup for %s, %s to %s: %s"
-		    , cr->b.want, ocb, pcb, ugh);
-	    });
-    }
-#endif
 
-    if (!cr->b.failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	c = find_connection_for_clients(NULL, &cr->b.our_client, &cr->b.peer_client
-	    , cr->b.transport_proto);
-	cannot_oppo(c, &cr->b
-		    , builddiag("%s: %s", cr->b.want, ugh));
-    }
-    else if (was_held && !cr->b.held)
-    {
-	/* was_held indicates we were started due to a %trap firing
-	 * (as opposed to a "whack --oppohere --oppothere").
-	 * Since the %hold has gone, we can assume that somebody else
-	 * has beaten us to the punch.  We can go home.  But lets log it.
-	 */
-	char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+		loglog(RC_COMMENT
+			, "%%hold otherwise handled during DNS lookup for Opportunistic Initiation for %s to %s"
+			, ocb, pcb);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		initiate_opportunistic_body(&cr->b, &cr->ac, ugh);
+		whackfd = NULL_FD;      /* was handed off */
+	}
 
-	addrtot(&cr->b.our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
-	addrtot(&cr->b.peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
-
-	loglog(RC_COMMENT
-	    , "%%hold otherwise handled during DNS lookup for Opportunistic Initiation for %s to %s"
-	    , ocb, pcb);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	initiate_opportunistic_body(&cr->b, &cr->ac, ugh);
-	whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* was handed off */
-    }
-
-    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
-    close_any(whackfd);
+	whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+	close_any(whackfd);
 }
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
@@ -2158,110 +2149,112 @@ check_key_recs(enum myid_state try_state
 , const struct connection *c
 , struct adns_continuation *ac)
 {
-    /* Check if KEY lookup yielded good results.
-     * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
-     * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
-     * Note: if c is different this time, there is
-     * a chance that we did the wrong query.
-     * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
-     */
-    enum myid_state old_myid_state = myid_state;
-    const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    myid_state = try_state;
-
-    if (old_myid_state != myid_state
-    && old_myid_state == MYID_SPECIFIED)
-    {
-	ugh = "%myid was specified while we were guessing";
-    }
-    else if ((our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c)) == NULL)
-    {
-	ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
-    }
-    else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
-    {
-	ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
-	 * for checking the other side.
+	/* Check if KEY lookup yielded good results.
+	 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+	 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+	 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+	 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+	 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
 	 */
-	pubkey_list_t *kr;
+	enum myid_state old_myid_state = myid_state;
+	private_key_t *private;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	ugh = "no KEY RR found for us";
-	for (kr = ac->keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+	myid_state = try_state;
+
+	if (old_myid_state != myid_state && old_myid_state == MYID_SPECIFIED)
 	{
-	    ugh = "all our KEY RRs have the wrong public key";
-	    if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
-	    && same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &kr->key->u.rsa))
-	    {
-		ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-		break;
-	    }
+		ugh = "%myid was specified while we were guessing";
+	}
+	else if ((private = get_private_key(c)) == NULL)
+	{
+		ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
 	}
-    }
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-	myid_state = old_myid_state;
-    return ugh;
+	else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+	{
+		ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+		 * for checking the other side.
+		 */
+		pubkey_list_t *kr;
+
+		ugh = "no KEY RR found for us";
+		for (kr = ac->keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+		{
+			ugh = "all our KEY RRs have the wrong public key";
+			if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
+			&& private->belongs_to(private, &kr->key->public_key))
+			{
+				ugh = NULL;     /* good! */
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+		myid_state = old_myid_state;
+	return ugh;
 }
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
-static err_t
-check_txt_recs(enum myid_state try_state
-, const struct connection *c
-, struct adns_continuation *ac)
+static err_t check_txt_recs(enum myid_state try_state,
+							const struct connection *c,
+							struct adns_continuation *ac)
 {
-    /* Check if TXT lookup yielded good results.
-     * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
-     * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
-     * Note: if c is different this time, there is
-     * a chance that we did the wrong query.
-     * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
-     */
-    enum myid_state old_myid_state = myid_state;
-    const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    myid_state = try_state;
-
-    if (old_myid_state != myid_state
-    && old_myid_state == MYID_SPECIFIED)
-    {
-	ugh = "%myid was specified while we were guessing";
-    }
-    else if ((our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c)) == NULL)
-    {
-	ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
-    }
-    else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
-    {
-	ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
-	 * for checking the other side.
+	/* Check if TXT lookup yielded good results.
+	 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+	 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+	 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+	 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+	 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
 	 */
-	struct gw_info *gwp;
+	enum myid_state old_myid_state = myid_state;
+	private_key_t *private;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	myid_state = try_state;
 
-	ugh = "no TXT RR found for us";
-	for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+	if (old_myid_state != myid_state
+	&& old_myid_state == MYID_SPECIFIED)
 	{
-	    ugh = "all our TXT RRs have the wrong public key";
-	    if (gwp->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
-	    && same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
-	    {
-		ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-		break;
-	    }
+		ugh = "%myid was specified while we were guessing";
+	}
+	else if ((private = get_private_key(c)) == NULL)
+	{
+		ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
 	}
-    }
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-	myid_state = old_myid_state;
-    return ugh;
+	else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+	{
+		ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+		 * for checking the other side.
+		 */
+		struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+		ugh = "no TXT RR found for us";
+		for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+		{
+			public_key_t *pub_key = gwp->key->public_key;
+
+			ugh = "all our TXT RRs have the wrong public key";
+			if (pub_key->get_type(pub_key) == KEY_RSA &&
+			    private->belongs_to(private, pub_key))
+			{
+				ugh = NULL;     /* good! */
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		myid_state = old_myid_state;
+	}
+	return ugh;
 }
 
 
@@ -2271,776 +2264,775 @@ initiate_opportunistic_body(struct find_oppo_bundle *b
 , struct adns_continuation *ac
 , err_t ac_ugh)
 {
-    struct connection *c;
-    struct spd_route *sr;
+	struct connection *c;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
 
-    /* What connection shall we use?
-     * First try for one that explicitly handles the clients.
-     */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    char ours[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	    char his[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	    int ourport;
-	    int hisport;
-
-	    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
-	    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
-	    ourport = ntohs(portof(&b->our_client));
-	    hisport = ntohs(portof(&b->peer_client));
-	    DBG_log("initiate on demand from %s:%d to %s:%d proto=%d state: %s because: %s"
-		, ours, ourport, his, hisport, b->transport_proto
-		, oppo_step_name[b->step], b->want);
-	});
-    if (isanyaddr(&b->our_client) || isanyaddr(&b->peer_client))
-    {
-	cannot_oppo(NULL, b, "impossible IP address");
-    }
-    else if ((c = find_connection_for_clients(&sr
-					      , &b->our_client
-					      , &b->peer_client
-					      , b->transport_proto)) == NULL)
-    {
-	/* No connection explicitly handles the clients and there
-	 * are no Opportunistic connections -- whine and give up.
-	 * The failure policy cannot be gotten from a connection; we pick %pass.
-	 */
-	cannot_oppo(NULL, b, "no routed Opportunistic template covers this pair");
-    }
-    else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
-    {
-	/* We've found a connection that can serve.
-	 * Do we have to initiate it?
-	 * Not if there is currently an IPSEC SA.
-	 * But if there is an IPSEC SA, then KLIPS would not
-	 * have generated the acquire.  So we assume that there isn't one.
-	 * This may be redundant if a non-opportunistic
-	 * negotiation is already being attempted.
+	/* What connection shall we use?
+	 * First try for one that explicitly handles the clients.
 	 */
-
-	/* If we are to proceed asynchronously, b->whackfd will be NULL_FD. */
-
-	if(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			char ours[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			char his[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			int ourport;
+			int hisport;
+
+			addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+			addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+			ourport = ntohs(portof(&b->our_client));
+			hisport = ntohs(portof(&b->peer_client));
+			DBG_log("initiate on demand from %s:%d to %s:%d proto=%d state: %s because: %s"
+				, ours, ourport, his, hisport, b->transport_proto
+				, oppo_step_name[b->step], b->want);
+		});
+	if (isanyaddr(&b->our_client) || isanyaddr(&b->peer_client))
 	{
-	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
-	    /* there is already an instance being negotiated, no nothing */
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("found existing instance \"%s\"%s, rekeying it"
-				     , c->name
-				     , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)));
-	    /* XXX-mcr - return; */
+		cannot_oppo(NULL, b, "impossible IP address");
 	}
-
-	/* otherwise, there is some kind of static conn that can handle
-	 * this connection, so we initiate it */
-
-#ifdef KLIPS
-	if (b->held)
+	else if ((c = find_connection_for_clients(&sr
+											  , &b->our_client
+											  , &b->peer_client
+											  , b->transport_proto)) == NULL)
 	{
-	    /* what should we do on failure? */
-	    (void) assign_hold(c, sr, b->transport_proto, &b->our_client, &b->peer_client);
+		/* No connection explicitly handles the clients and there
+		 * are no Opportunistic connections -- whine and give up.
+		 * The failure policy cannot be gotten from a connection; we pick %pass.
+		 */
+		cannot_oppo(NULL, b, "no routed Opportunistic template covers this pair");
 	}
-#endif
-	ipsecdoi_initiate(b->whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
-	b->whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* protect from close */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* We are handling an opportunistic situation.
-	 * This involves several DNS lookup steps that require suspension.
-	 * Note: many facts might change while we're suspended.
-	 * Here be dragons.
-	 *
-	 * The first chunk of code handles the result of the previous
-	 * DNS query (if any).  It also selects the kind of the next step.
-	 * The second chunk initiates the next DNS query (if any).
-	 */
-	enum find_oppo_step next_step = fos_myid_ip_txt;
-	err_t ugh = ac_ugh;
-	char mycredentialstr[BUF_LEN];
-	char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("creating new instance from \"%s\"%s"
-				 , c->name
-				 , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)));
-				 
-
-	idtoa(&sr->this.id, mycredentialstr, sizeof(mycredentialstr));
-
-	passert(c->policy & POLICY_OPPO);   /* can't initiate Road Warrior connections */
-
-	/* handle any DNS answer; select next step */
-
-	switch (b->step)
+	else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
 	{
-	case fos_start:
-	    /* just starting out: select first query step */
-	    next_step = fos_myid_ip_txt;
-	    break;
-
-	case fos_myid_ip_txt:	/* TXT for our default IP address as %myid */
-	    ugh = check_txt_recs(MYID_IP, c, ac);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
-		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our IP (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
-				      , myid_str[MYID_IP]
-				      , ugh));
-		if (!logged_myid_ip_txt_warning)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "can not use our IP (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]
-			   , ugh);
-		    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning = TRUE;
-		}
-
-		next_step = fos_myid_hostname_txt;
-		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
-		if (!logged_myid_ip_txt_warning)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "using our IP (%s:TXT) as identity!"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]);
-		    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning = TRUE;
-		}
+		/* We've found a connection that can serve.
+		 * Do we have to initiate it?
+		 * Not if there is currently an IPSEC SA.
+		 * But if there is an IPSEC SA, then KLIPS would not
+		 * have generated the acquire.  So we assume that there isn't one.
+		 * This may be redundant if a non-opportunistic
+		 * negotiation is already being attempted.
+		 */
 
-		next_step = fos_our_client;
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	case fos_myid_hostname_txt:	/* TXT for our hostname as %myid */
-	    ugh = check_txt_recs(MYID_HOSTNAME, c, ac);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* cannot use our hostname as OE identitiy for initiation */
-		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
-				      , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-				      , ugh));
-		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "can not use our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-			   , ugh);
-		    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = TRUE;
-		}
-#ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		next_step = fos_myid_ip_key;
-		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
-#endif
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* we can use our hostname as OE identity for initiation */
-		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "using our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity!"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
-		    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = TRUE;
-		}
-		next_step = fos_our_client;
-	    }
-	    break;
+		/* If we are to proceed asynchronously, b->whackfd will be NULL_FD. */
 
-#ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	case fos_myid_ip_key:	/* KEY for our default IP address as %myid */
-	    ugh = check_key_recs(MYID_IP, c, ac);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
-		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our IP (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
-				      , myid_str[MYID_IP]
-				      , ugh));
-		if (!logged_myid_ip_key_warning)
+		if(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "can not use our IP (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]
-			   , ugh);
-		    logged_myid_ip_key_warning = TRUE;
+			char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+			/* there is already an instance being negotiated, no nothing */
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("found existing instance \"%s\"%s, rekeying it"
+									 , c->name
+									 , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)));
+			/* XXX-mcr - return; */
 		}
 
-		next_step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
-		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
-		if (!logged_myid_ip_key_warning)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "using our IP (%s:KEY) as identity!"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]);
-		    logged_myid_ip_key_warning = TRUE;
-		}
-		next_step = fos_our_client;
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	case fos_myid_hostname_key:	/* KEY for our hostname as %myid */
-	    ugh = check_key_recs(MYID_HOSTNAME, c, ac);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
-		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
-				      , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-				      , ugh));
-		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "can not use our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-			   , ugh);
-		    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = TRUE;
-		}
+		/* otherwise, there is some kind of static conn that can handle
+		 * this connection, so we initiate it */
 
-		next_step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
-		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
-		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning)
+#ifdef KLIPS
+		if (b->held)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			   , "using our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity!"
-			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
-		    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = TRUE;
+			/* what should we do on failure? */
+			(void) assign_hold(c, sr, b->transport_proto, &b->our_client, &b->peer_client);
 		}
-		next_step = fos_our_client;
-	    }
-	    break;
 #endif
-
-	case fos_our_client:	/* TXT for our client */
-	    {
-		/* Our client is not us: we must check the TXT records.
-		 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
-		 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
-		 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+		ipsecdoi_initiate(b->whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
+		b->whackfd = NULL_FD;   /* protect from close */
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* We are handling an opportunistic situation.
+		 * This involves several DNS lookup steps that require suspension.
+		 * Note: many facts might change while we're suspended.
+		 * Here be dragons.
+		 *
+		 * The first chunk of code handles the result of the previous
+		 * DNS query (if any).  It also selects the kind of the next step.
+		 * The second chunk initiates the next DNS query (if any).
 		 */
-		const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+		enum find_oppo_step next_step = fos_myid_ip_txt;
+		err_t ugh = ac_ugh;
+		char mycredentialstr[BUF_LEN];
+		char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
 
-		next_step = fos_his_client;	/* normal situation */
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("creating new instance from \"%s\"%s"
+								 , c->name
+								 , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)));
+								
 
-		passert(sr != NULL);
+		idtoa(&sr->this.id, mycredentialstr, sizeof(mycredentialstr));
 
-		if (our_RSA_pri == NULL)
-		{
-		    ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
-		}
-		else if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &b->our_client))
-		{
-		    /* this wasn't true when we started -- bail */
-		    ugh = "our IP address changed underfoot";
-		}
-		else if (!same_id(&ac->sgw_id, &sr->this.id))
-		{
-		    /* this wasn't true when we started -- bail */
-		    ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
-		}
-		else
+		passert(c->policy & POLICY_OPPO);   /* can't initiate Road Warrior connections */
+
+		/* handle any DNS answer; select next step */
+
+		switch (b->step)
 		{
-		    /* Similar to code in quick_inI1_outR1_tail
-		     * for checking the other side.
-		     */
-		    struct gw_info *gwp;
-
-		    ugh = "no TXT RR for our client delegates us";
-		    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
-		    {
-			passert(same_id(&gwp->gw_id, &sr->this.id));
-
-			ugh = "TXT RR for our client has wrong key";
-			/* If there is a key from the TXT record,
-			 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
-			 * If there was no key, we have a tentative win:
-			 * we need to check our KEY record to be sure.
-			 */
-			if (!gwp->gw_key_present)
+		case fos_start:
+			/* just starting out: select first query step */
+			next_step = fos_myid_ip_txt;
+			break;
+
+		case fos_myid_ip_txt:   /* TXT for our default IP address as %myid */
+			ugh = check_txt_recs(MYID_IP, c, ac);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
 			{
-			    /* Success, but the TXT had no key
-			     * so we must check our our own KEY records.
-			     */
-			    next_step = fos_our_txt;
-			    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-			    break;
+				/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
+				DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our IP (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+									  , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+									  , ugh));
+				if (!logged_myid_ip_txt_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "can not use our IP (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+						   , ugh);
+					logged_myid_ip_txt_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+
+				next_step = fos_myid_hostname_txt;
+				ugh = NULL;     /* failure can be recovered from */
 			}
-			if (same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+			else
 			{
-			    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-			    break;
+				/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
+				if (!logged_myid_ip_txt_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "using our IP (%s:TXT) as identity!"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_IP]);
+					logged_myid_ip_txt_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+
+				next_step = fos_our_client;
 			}
-		    }
-		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	case fos_our_txt:	/* TXT for us */
-	    {
-		/* Check if TXT lookup yielded good results.
-		 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
-		 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
-		 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
-		 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
-		 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
-		 */
-		const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
-
-		next_step = fos_his_client;	/* unless we decide to look for KEY RR */
+			break;
 
-		if (our_RSA_pri == NULL)
-		{
-		    ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
-		}
-		else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
-		{
-		    ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    /* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
-		     * for checking the other side.
-		     */
-		    struct gw_info *gwp;
-
-		    ugh = "no TXT RR for us";
-		    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
-		    {
-			passert(same_id(&gwp->gw_id, &sr->this.id));
-
-			ugh = "TXT RR for us has wrong key";
-			if (gwp->gw_key_present
-			&& same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+		case fos_myid_hostname_txt:     /* TXT for our hostname as %myid */
+			ugh = check_txt_recs(MYID_HOSTNAME, c, ac);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
 			{
-			    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-				DBG_log("initiate on demand found TXT with right public key at: %s"
-					, mycredentialstr));
-			    ugh = NULL;
-			    break;
-			}
-		    }
+				/* cannot use our hostname as OE identitiy for initiation */
+				DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+									  , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+									  , ugh));
+				if (!logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "can not use our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+						   , ugh);
+					logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = TRUE;
+				}
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		    if (ugh != NULL)
-		    {
-			/* if no TXT with right key, try KEY */
-			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			    DBG_log("will try for KEY RR since initiate on demand found %s: %s"
-				    , ugh, mycredentialstr));
-			next_step = fos_our_key;
-			ugh = NULL;
-		    }
+				next_step = fos_myid_ip_key;
+				ugh = NULL;     /* failure can be recovered from */
 #endif
-		}
-	    }
-	    break;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* we can use our hostname as OE identity for initiation */
+				if (!logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "using our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity!"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
+					logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+				next_step = fos_our_client;
+			}
+			break;
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	case fos_our_key:	/* KEY for us */
-	    {
-		/* Check if KEY lookup yielded good results.
-		 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
-		 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
-		 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
-		 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
-		 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
-		 */
-		const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+		case fos_myid_ip_key:   /* KEY for our default IP address as %myid */
+			ugh = check_key_recs(MYID_IP, c, ac);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
+				DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our IP (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+									  , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+									  , ugh));
+				if (!logged_myid_ip_key_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "can not use our IP (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+						   , ugh);
+					logged_myid_ip_key_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+
+				next_step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
+				ugh = NULL;     /* failure can be recovered from */
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
+				if (!logged_myid_ip_key_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "using our IP (%s:KEY) as identity!"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_IP]);
+					logged_myid_ip_key_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+				next_step = fos_our_client;
+			}
+			break;
 
-		next_step = fos_his_client;	/* always */
+		case fos_myid_hostname_key:     /* KEY for our hostname as %myid */
+			ugh = check_key_recs(MYID_HOSTNAME, c, ac);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
+				DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+									  , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+									  , ugh));
+				if (!logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "can not use our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+						   , ugh);
+					logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+
+				next_step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
+				ugh = NULL;     /* failure can be recovered from */
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
+				if (!logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						   , "using our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity!"
+						   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
+					logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = TRUE;
+				}
+				next_step = fos_our_client;
+			}
+			break;
+#endif
 
-		if (our_RSA_pri == NULL)
-		{
-		    ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
-		}
-		else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
-		{
-		    ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    /* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
-		     * for checking the other side.
-		     */
-		    pubkey_list_t *kr;
-
-		    ugh = "no KEY RR found for us (and no good TXT RR)";
-		    for (kr = ac->keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
-		    {
-			ugh = "all our KEY RRs have the wrong public key (and no good TXT RR)";
-			if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
-			&& same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &kr->key->u.rsa))
+		case fos_our_client:    /* TXT for our client */
 			{
-			    /* do this only once a day */
-			    if (!logged_txt_warning)
-			    {
-				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-				       , "found KEY RR but not TXT RR for %s. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html."
-				       , mycredentialstr);
-				logged_txt_warning = TRUE;
-			    }
-			    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-			    break;
+				/* Our client is not us: we must check the TXT records.
+				 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+				 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+				 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+				 */
+				private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
+
+				next_step = fos_his_client;     /* normal situation */
+
+				passert(sr != NULL);
+
+				if (private == NULL)
+				{
+					ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+				}
+				else if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &b->our_client))
+				{
+					/* this wasn't true when we started -- bail */
+					ugh = "our IP address changed underfoot";
+				}
+				else if (!same_id(&ac->sgw_id, &sr->this.id))
+				{
+					/* this wasn't true when we started -- bail */
+					ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* Similar to code in quick_inI1_outR1_tail
+					 * for checking the other side.
+					 */
+					struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+					ugh = "no TXT RR for our client delegates us";
+					for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+					{
+						passert(same_id(&gwp->gw_id, &sr->this.id));
+
+						ugh = "TXT RR for our client has wrong key";
+						/* If there is a key from the TXT record,
+						 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
+						 * If there was no key, we have a tentative win:
+						 * we need to check our KEY record to be sure.
+						 */
+						if (!gwp->gw_key_present)
+						{
+							/* Success, but the TXT had no key
+							 * so we must check our our own KEY records.
+							 */
+							next_step = fos_our_txt;
+							ugh = NULL; /* good! */
+							break;
+						}
+						if (private->belongs_to(private, gwp->key->public_key))
+						{
+							ugh = NULL; /* good! */
+							break;
+						}
+					}
+				}
 			}
-		    }
-		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+			break;
 
-	case fos_his_client:	/* TXT for his client */
-	    {
-		/* We've finished last DNS queries: TXT for his client.
-		 * Using the information, try to instantiate a connection
-		 * and start negotiating.
-		 * We now know the peer.  The chosing of "c" ignored this,
-		 * so we will disregard its current value.
-		 * !!! We need to randomize the entry in gw that we choose.
-		 */
-		next_step = fos_done;	/* no more queries */
+		case fos_our_txt:       /* TXT for us */
+			{
+				/* Check if TXT lookup yielded good results.
+				 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+				 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+				 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+				 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+				 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+				 */
+				private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
+
+				next_step = fos_his_client;     /* unless we decide to look for KEY RR */
+
+				if (private == NULL)
+				{
+					ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+				}
+				else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+				{
+					ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+					 * for checking the other side.
+					 */
+					struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+					ugh = "no TXT RR for us";
+					for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+					{
+						passert(same_id(&gwp->gw_id, &sr->this.id));
+
+						ugh = "TXT RR for us has wrong key";
+						if (gwp->gw_key_present &&
+							private->belongs_to(private, gwp->key->public_key))
+						{
+							DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+								DBG_log("initiate on demand found TXT with right public key at: %s"
+										, mycredentialstr));
+							ugh = NULL;
+							break;
+						}
+					}
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+					if (ugh != NULL)
+					{
+						/* if no TXT with right key, try KEY */
+						DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+							DBG_log("will try for KEY RR since initiate on demand found %s: %s"
+									, ugh, mycredentialstr));
+						next_step = fos_our_key;
+						ugh = NULL;
+					}
+#endif
+				}
+			}
+			break;
 
-		c = build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(ac->gateways_from_dns
-							    , &b->our_client
-							    , &b->peer_client);
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		case fos_our_key:       /* KEY for us */
+			{
+				/* Check if KEY lookup yielded good results.
+				 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+				 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+				 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+				 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+				 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+				 */
+				private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
+
+				next_step = fos_his_client;     /* always */
+
+				if (private == NULL)
+				{
+					ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+				}
+				else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+				{
+					ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+					 * for checking the other side.
+					 */
+					pubkey_list_t *kr;
+
+					ugh = "no KEY RR found for us (and no good TXT RR)";
+					for (kr = ac->keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+					{
+						ugh = "all our KEY RRs have the wrong public key (and no good TXT RR)";
+						if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
+						&& private->belongs_to(private, kr->key->public_key))
+						{
+							/* do this only once a day */
+							if (!logged_txt_warning)
+							{
+								loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+									   , "found KEY RR but not TXT RR for %s. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html."
+									   , mycredentialstr);
+								logged_txt_warning = TRUE;
+							}
+							ugh = NULL; /* good! */
+							break;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
-		if (c == NULL)
-		{
-		    /* We cannot seem to instantiate a suitable connection:
-		     * complain clearly.
-		     */
-		    char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
-			, pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
-			, pb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-
-		    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
-		    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
-		    passert(id_is_ipaddr(&ac->gateways_from_dns->gw_id));
-		    addrtot(&ac->gateways_from_dns->gw_id.ip_addr, 0, pb, sizeof(pb));
-		    loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE
-			, "no suitable connection for opportunism"
-			  " between %s and %s with %s as peer"
-			, ocb, pcb, pb);
+		case fos_his_client:    /* TXT for his client */
+			{
+				/* We've finished last DNS queries: TXT for his client.
+				 * Using the information, try to instantiate a connection
+				 * and start negotiating.
+				 * We now know the peer.  The chosing of "c" ignored this,
+				 * so we will disregard its current value.
+				 * !!! We need to randomize the entry in gw that we choose.
+				 */
+				next_step = fos_done;   /* no more queries */
+
+				c = build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(ac->gateways_from_dns
+															, &b->our_client
+															, &b->peer_client);
+
+				if (c == NULL)
+				{
+					/* We cannot seem to instantiate a suitable connection:
+					 * complain clearly.
+					 */
+					char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
+						, pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
+						, pb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+					addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+					addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+					passert(id_is_ipaddr(&ac->gateways_from_dns->gw_id));
+					addrtot(&ac->gateways_from_dns->gw_id.ip_addr, 0, pb, sizeof(pb));
+					loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+						, "no suitable connection for opportunism"
+						  " between %s and %s with %s as peer"
+						, ocb, pcb, pb);
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
-		    if (b->held)
-		    {
-			/* Replace HOLD with PASS.
-			 * The type of replacement *ought* to be
-			 * specified by policy.
-			 */
-			(void) replace_bare_shunt(&b->our_client, &b->peer_client
-			    , BOTTOM_PRIO
-			    , SPI_PASS	/* fail into PASS */
-			    , TRUE, b->transport_proto
-			    , "no suitable connection");
-		    }
+					if (b->held)
+					{
+						/* Replace HOLD with PASS.
+						 * The type of replacement *ought* to be
+						 * specified by policy.
+						 */
+						(void) replace_bare_shunt(&b->our_client, &b->peer_client
+							, BOTTOM_PRIO
+							, SPI_PASS  /* fail into PASS */
+							, TRUE, b->transport_proto
+							, "no suitable connection");
+					}
 #endif
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    /* If we are to proceed asynchronously, b->whackfd will be NULL_FD. */
-		    passert(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE);
-		    passert(c->gw_info != NULL);
-		    passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy));
-		    passert(LHAS(LELEM(RT_UNROUTED) | LELEM(RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE), c->spd.routing));
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* If we are to proceed asynchronously, b->whackfd will be NULL_FD. */
+					passert(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE);
+					passert(c->gw_info != NULL);
+					passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy));
+					passert(LHAS(LELEM(RT_UNROUTED) | LELEM(RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE), c->spd.routing));
 #ifdef KLIPS
-		    if (b->held)
-		    {
-			/* what should we do on failure? */
-			(void) assign_hold(c, &c->spd
-					   , b->transport_proto
-					   , &b->our_client, &b->peer_client);
-		    }
+					if (b->held)
+					{
+						/* what should we do on failure? */
+						(void) assign_hold(c, &c->spd
+										   , b->transport_proto
+										   , &b->our_client, &b->peer_client);
+					}
 #endif
-		    c->gw_info->key->last_tried_time = now();
-		    ipsecdoi_initiate(b->whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
-		    b->whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* protect from close */
-		}
-	    }
-	    break;
+					c->gw_info->key->last_tried_time = now();
+					ipsecdoi_initiate(b->whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
+					b->whackfd = NULL_FD;       /* protect from close */
+				}
+			}
+			break;
 
-	default:
-	    bad_case(b->step);
-	}
+		default:
+			bad_case(b->step);
+		}
 
-	/* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    char ours[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	    char his[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+		/* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			char ours[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			char his[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-	    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
-	    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
-	    DBG_log("initiate on demand from %s to %s new state: %s with ugh: %s"
-		    , ours, his, oppo_step_name[b->step], ugh ? ugh : "ok");
-	});
+			addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+			addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+			DBG_log("initiate on demand from %s to %s new state: %s with ugh: %s"
+					, ours, his, oppo_step_name[b->step], ugh ? ugh : "ok");
+		});
 
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    b->policy_prio = c->prio;
-	    b->failure_shunt = shunt_policy_spi(c, FALSE);
-	    cannot_oppo(c, b, ugh);
-	}
-	else if (next_step == fos_done)
-	{
-	    /* nothing to do */
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* set up the next query */
-	    struct find_oppo_continuation *cr = alloc_thing(struct find_oppo_continuation
-		, "opportunistic continuation");
-	    struct id id;
-
-	    b->policy_prio = c->prio;
-	    b->failure_shunt = shunt_policy_spi(c, FALSE);
-	    cr->b = *b;	/* copy; start hand off of whackfd */
-	    cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;
-	    cr->b.step = next_step;
-
-	    for (sr = &c->spd
-	    ; sr!=NULL && !sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &b->our_client)
-	    ; sr = sr->next)
-		;
-
-	    if (sr == NULL)
-		sr = &c->spd;
-
-	    /* If a %hold shunt has replaced the eroute for this template,
-	     * record this fact.
-	     */
-	    if (b->held
-	    && sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE && eclipsable(sr))
-	    {
-		sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED;
-		eclipse_count++;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Switch to issue next query.
-	     * A case may turn out to be unnecessary.  If so, it falls
-	     * through to the next case.
-	     * Figuring out what %myid can stand for must be done before
-	     * our client credentials are looked up: we must know what
-	     * the client credentials may use to identify us.
-	     * On the other hand, our own credentials should be looked
-	     * up after our clients in case our credentials are not
-	     * needed at all.
-	     * XXX this is a wasted effort if we don't have credentials
-	     * BUT they are not needed.
-	     */
-	    switch (next_step)
-	    {
-	    case fos_myid_ip_txt:
-		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
-		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		if (ugh != NULL)
 		{
-		    cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
-		    cr->b.want = b->want = "TXT record for IP address as %myid";
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_IP]
-			, &myids[MYID_IP]
-			, T_TXT
-			, continue_oppo
-			, &cr->ac);
-		    break;
+			b->policy_prio = c->prio;
+			b->failure_shunt = shunt_policy_spi(c, FALSE);
+			cannot_oppo(c, b, ugh);
 		}
-		cr->b.step = fos_myid_hostname_txt;
-		/* fall through */
-
-	    case fos_myid_hostname_txt:
-		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
-		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		else if (next_step == fos_done)
+		{
+			/* nothing to do */
+		}
+		else
 		{
+			/* set up the next query */
+			struct find_oppo_continuation *cr = malloc_thing(struct find_oppo_continuation);
+			struct id id;
+
+			b->policy_prio = c->prio;
+			b->failure_shunt = shunt_policy_spi(c, FALSE);
+			cr->b = *b; /* copy; start hand off of whackfd */
+			cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;
+			cr->b.step = next_step;
+
+			for (sr = &c->spd
+			; sr!=NULL && !sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &b->our_client)
+			; sr = sr->next)
+				;
+
+			if (sr == NULL)
+				sr = &c->spd;
+
+			/* If a %hold shunt has replaced the eroute for this template,
+			 * record this fact.
+			 */
+			if (b->held
+			&& sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE && eclipsable(sr))
+			{
+				sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED;
+				eclipse_count++;
+			}
+
+			/* Switch to issue next query.
+			 * A case may turn out to be unnecessary.  If so, it falls
+			 * through to the next case.
+			 * Figuring out what %myid can stand for must be done before
+			 * our client credentials are looked up: we must know what
+			 * the client credentials may use to identify us.
+			 * On the other hand, our own credentials should be looked
+			 * up after our clients in case our credentials are not
+			 * needed at all.
+			 * XXX this is a wasted effort if we don't have credentials
+			 * BUT they are not needed.
+			 */
+			switch (next_step)
+			{
+			case fos_myid_ip_txt:
+				if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+				&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+				{
+					cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
+					cr->b.want = b->want = "TXT record for IP address as %myid";
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_IP]
+						, &myids[MYID_IP]
+						, T_TXT
+						, continue_oppo
+						, &cr->ac);
+					break;
+				}
+				cr->b.step = fos_myid_hostname_txt;
+				/* fall through */
+
+			case fos_myid_hostname_txt:
+				if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+				&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+				{
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		    cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
+					cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
 #else
-		    cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;
+					cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;
 #endif
-		    cr->b.want = b->want = "TXT record for hostname as %myid";
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-			, &myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-			, T_TXT
-			, continue_oppo
-			, &cr->ac);
-		    break;
-		}
+					cr->b.want = b->want = "TXT record for hostname as %myid";
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+						, &myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+						, T_TXT
+						, continue_oppo
+						, &cr->ac);
+					break;
+				}
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		cr->b.step = fos_myid_ip_key;
-		/* fall through */
-
-	    case fos_myid_ip_key:
-		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
-		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
-		{
-		    cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
-		    cr->b.want = b->want = "KEY record for IP address as %myid (no good TXT)";
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_IP]
-			, (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway meaningless */
-			, T_KEY
-			, continue_oppo
-			, &cr->ac);
-		    break;
-		}
-		cr->b.step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
-		/* fall through */
-
-	    case fos_myid_hostname_key:
-		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
-		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
-		{
-		    cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;           /* last attempt! */
-		    cr->b.want = b->want = "KEY record for hostname as %myid (no good TXT)";
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
-			, (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway meaningless */
-			, T_KEY
-			, continue_oppo
-			, &cr->ac);
-		    break;
-		}
+				cr->b.step = fos_myid_ip_key;
+				/* fall through */
+
+			case fos_myid_ip_key:
+				if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+				&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+				{
+					cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
+					cr->b.want = b->want = "KEY record for IP address as %myid (no good TXT)";
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_IP]
+						, (const struct id *) NULL      /* security gateway meaningless */
+						, T_KEY
+						, continue_oppo
+						, &cr->ac);
+					break;
+				}
+				cr->b.step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
+				/* fall through */
+
+			case fos_myid_hostname_key:
+				if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+				&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+				{
+					cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;           /* last attempt! */
+					cr->b.want = b->want = "KEY record for hostname as %myid (no good TXT)";
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+						, (const struct id *) NULL      /* security gateway meaningless */
+						, T_KEY
+						, continue_oppo
+						, &cr->ac);
+					break;
+				}
 #endif
-		cr->b.step = fos_our_client;
-		/* fall through */
-
-	    case fos_our_client:	/* TXT for our client */
-		if (!sameaddr(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b->our_client))
-		{
-		    /* Check that at least one TXT(reverse(b->our_client)) is workable.
-		     * Note: {unshare|free}_id_content not needed for id: ephemeral.
-		     */
-		    cr->b.want = b->want = "our client's TXT record";
-		    iptoid(&b->our_client, &id);
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&id
-			, &c->spd.this.id	/* we are the security gateway */
-			, T_TXT
-			, continue_oppo
-			, &cr->ac);
-		    break;
-		}
-		cr->b.step = fos_our_txt;
-		/* fall through */
-
-	    case fos_our_txt:	/* TXT for us */
-		cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE;
-		cr->b.want = b->want = "our TXT record";
-		ugh = start_adns_query(&sr->this.id
-		    , &sr->this.id	       /* we are the security gateway XXX - maybe ignore? mcr */
-		    , T_TXT
-		    , continue_oppo
-		    , &cr->ac);
-		break;
+				cr->b.step = fos_our_client;
+				/* fall through */
+
+			case fos_our_client:        /* TXT for our client */
+				if (!sameaddr(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b->our_client))
+				{
+					/* Check that at least one TXT(reverse(b->our_client)) is workable.
+					 * Note: {unshare|free}_id_content not needed for id: ephemeral.
+					 */
+					cr->b.want = b->want = "our client's TXT record";
+					iptoid(&b->our_client, &id);
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+						, &c->spd.this.id       /* we are the security gateway */
+						, T_TXT
+						, continue_oppo
+						, &cr->ac);
+					break;
+				}
+				cr->b.step = fos_our_txt;
+				/* fall through */
+
+			case fos_our_txt:   /* TXT for us */
+				cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE;
+				cr->b.want = b->want = "our TXT record";
+				ugh = start_adns_query(&sr->this.id
+					, &sr->this.id             /* we are the security gateway XXX - maybe ignore? mcr */
+					, T_TXT
+					, continue_oppo
+					, &cr->ac);
+				break;
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	    case fos_our_key:	/* KEY for us */
-		cr->b.want = b->want = "our KEY record";
-		cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
-		ugh = start_adns_query(&sr->this.id
-		    , (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway meaningless */
-		    , T_KEY
-		    , continue_oppo
-		    , &cr->ac);
-		break;
+			case fos_our_key:   /* KEY for us */
+				cr->b.want = b->want = "our KEY record";
+				cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+				ugh = start_adns_query(&sr->this.id
+					, (const struct id *) NULL  /* security gateway meaningless */
+					, T_KEY
+					, continue_oppo
+					, &cr->ac);
+				break;
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
-	    case fos_his_client:	/* TXT for his client */
-		/* note: {unshare|free}_id_content not needed for id: ephemeral */
-		cr->b.want = b->want = "target's TXT record";
-		cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
-		iptoid(&b->peer_client, &id);
-		ugh = start_adns_query(&id
-		    , (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway unconstrained */
-		    , T_TXT
-		    , continue_oppo
-		    , &cr->ac);
-		break;
-
-	    default:
-		bad_case(next_step);
-	    }
+			case fos_his_client:        /* TXT for his client */
+				/* note: {unshare|free}_id_content not needed for id: ephemeral */
+				cr->b.want = b->want = "target's TXT record";
+				cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+				iptoid(&b->peer_client, &id);
+				ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+					, (const struct id *) NULL  /* security gateway unconstrained */
+					, T_TXT
+					, continue_oppo
+					, &cr->ac);
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				bad_case(next_step);
+			}
 
-	    if (ugh == NULL)
-		b->whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* complete hand-off */
-	    else
-		cannot_oppo(c, b, ugh);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+				b->whackfd = NULL_FD;   /* complete hand-off */
+			else
+				cannot_oppo(c, b, ugh);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    close_any(b->whackfd);
+	close_any(b->whackfd);
 }
 
 void
 terminate_connection(const char *nm)
 {
-    /* Loop because more than one may match (master and instances)
-     * But at least one is required (enforced by con_by_name).
-     */
-    struct connection *c = con_by_name(nm, TRUE);
-
-    if (c == NULL || !c->ikev1)
-	return;
+	/* Loop because more than one may match (master and instances)
+	 * But at least one is required (enforced by con_by_name).
+	 */
+	struct connection *c = con_by_name(nm, TRUE);
 
-    do
-    {
-	struct connection *n = c->ac_next;  /* grab this before c might disappear */
+	if (c == NULL || !c->ikev1)
+		return;
 
-	if (streq(c->name, nm)
-	&& c->kind >= CK_PERMANENT
-	&& !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+	do
 	{
-	    set_cur_connection(c);
-	    plog("terminating SAs using this connection");
-	    c->policy &= ~POLICY_UP;
-	    flush_pending_by_connection(c);
-	    delete_states_by_connection(c, FALSE);
-	    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-		delete_connection(c, FALSE);
-	    reset_cur_connection();
-	}
-	c = n;
-    } while (c != NULL);
+		struct connection *n = c->ac_next;  /* grab this before c might disappear */
+
+		if (streq(c->name, nm)
+		&& c->kind >= CK_PERMANENT
+		&& !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+		{
+			set_cur_connection(c);
+			plog("terminating SAs using this connection");
+			c->policy &= ~POLICY_UP;
+			flush_pending_by_connection(c);
+			delete_states_by_connection(c, FALSE);
+			if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+				delete_connection(c, FALSE);
+			reset_cur_connection();
+		}
+		c = n;
+	} while (c != NULL);
 }
 
 /* an ISAKMP SA has been established.
  * Note the serial number, and release any connections with
  * the same peer ID but different peer IP address.
  */
-bool uniqueIDs = FALSE;	/* --uniqueids? */
+bool uniqueIDs = FALSE; /* --uniqueids? */
 
 void
 ISAKMP_SA_established(struct connection *c, so_serial_t serial)
 {
-    c->newest_isakmp_sa = serial;
-
-    /* the connection is now oriented so that we are able to determine
-     * whether we are a mode config server with a virtual IP to send.
-     */
-    if (!isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_srcip) && !c->spd.that.has_natip)
-	c->spd.that.modecfg = TRUE;
-	
-    if (uniqueIDs)
-    {
-	/* for all connections: if the same Phase 1 IDs are used
-	 * for a different IP address, unorient that connection.
-	 */
-	struct connection *d;
+	c->newest_isakmp_sa = serial;
 
-	for (d = connections; d != NULL; )
+	/* the connection is now oriented so that we are able to determine
+	 * whether we are a mode config server with a virtual IP to send.
+	 */
+	if (!isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_srcip) && !c->spd.that.has_natip)
+		c->spd.that.modecfg = TRUE;
+		
+	if (uniqueIDs)
 	{
-	    struct connection *next = d->ac_next;	/* might move underneath us */
-
-	    if (d->kind >= CK_PERMANENT
-	    && same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
-	    && same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id)
-	    && !sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &d->spd.that.host_addr))
-	    {
-		release_connection(d, FALSE);
-	    }
-	    d = next;
+		/* for all connections: if the same Phase 1 IDs are used
+		 * for a different IP address, unorient that connection.
+		 */
+		struct connection *d;
+
+		for (d = connections; d != NULL; )
+		{
+			struct connection *next = d->ac_next;       /* might move underneath us */
+
+			if (d->kind >= CK_PERMANENT
+			&& same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+			&& same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id)
+			&& !sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &d->spd.that.host_addr))
+			{
+				release_connection(d, FALSE);
+			}
+			d = next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Find the connection to connection c's peer's client with the
@@ -3056,108 +3048,108 @@ ISAKMP_SA_established(struct connection *c, so_serial_t serial)
  */
 struct connection *
 route_owner(struct connection *c
-	    , struct spd_route **srp
-	    , struct connection **erop
-	    , struct spd_route **esrp)
+			, struct spd_route **srp
+			, struct connection **erop
+			, struct spd_route **esrp)
 {
-    struct connection *d
-	, *best_ro = c
-	, *best_ero = c;
-    struct spd_route *srd, *src;
-    struct spd_route *best_sr, *best_esr;
-    enum routing_t best_routing, best_erouting;
-
-    passert(oriented(*c));
-    best_sr  = NULL;
-    best_esr = NULL;
-    best_routing = c->spd.routing;
-    best_erouting = best_routing;
-
-    for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->ac_next)
-    {
-	for (srd = &d->spd; srd; srd = srd->next)
+	struct connection *d
+		, *best_ro = c
+		, *best_ero = c;
+	struct spd_route *srd, *src;
+	struct spd_route *best_sr, *best_esr;
+	enum routing_t best_routing, best_erouting;
+
+	passert(oriented(*c));
+	best_sr  = NULL;
+	best_esr = NULL;
+	best_routing = c->spd.routing;
+	best_erouting = best_routing;
+
+	for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->ac_next)
 	{
-	    if (srd->routing == RT_UNROUTED)
-		continue;
-
-	    for (src = &c->spd; src; src=src->next)
-	    {
-		if (!samesubnet(&src->that.client, &srd->that.client))
-		    continue;
-		if (src->that.protocol != srd->that.protocol)
-		    continue;
-		if (src->that.port != srd->that.port)
-		    continue;
-		passert(oriented(*d));
-		if (srd->routing > best_routing)
+		for (srd = &d->spd; srd; srd = srd->next)
 		{
-		    best_ro = d;
-		    best_sr = srd;
-		    best_routing = srd->routing;
-		}
+			if (srd->routing == RT_UNROUTED)
+				continue;
 
-		if (!samesubnet(&src->this.client, &srd->this.client))
-		    continue;
-		if (src->this.protocol != srd->this.protocol)
-		    continue;
-		if (src->this.port != srd->this.port)
-		    continue;
-		if (srd->routing > best_erouting)
-		{
-		    best_ero = d;
-		    best_esr = srd;
-		    best_erouting = srd->routing;
+			for (src = &c->spd; src; src=src->next)
+			{
+				if (!samesubnet(&src->that.client, &srd->that.client))
+					continue;
+				if (src->that.protocol != srd->that.protocol)
+					continue;
+				if (src->that.port != srd->that.port)
+					continue;
+				passert(oriented(*d));
+				if (srd->routing > best_routing)
+				{
+					best_ro = d;
+					best_sr = srd;
+					best_routing = srd->routing;
+				}
+
+				if (!samesubnet(&src->this.client, &srd->this.client))
+					continue;
+				if (src->this.protocol != srd->this.protocol)
+					continue;
+				if (src->this.port != srd->this.port)
+					continue;
+				if (srd->routing > best_erouting)
+				{
+					best_ero = d;
+					best_esr = srd;
+					best_erouting = srd->routing;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+			err_t m = builddiag("route owner of \"%s\"%s %s:"
+				, c->name
+				, (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)
+				, enum_name(&routing_story, c->spd.routing));
+
+			if (!routed(best_ro->spd.routing))
+				m = builddiag("%s NULL", m);
+			else if (best_ro == c)
+				m = builddiag("%s self", m);
+			else
+				m = builddiag("%s \"%s\"%s %s", m
+					, best_ro->name
+					, (fmt_conn_instance(best_ro, cib), cib)
+					, enum_name(&routing_story, best_ro->spd.routing));
+
+			if (erop != NULL)
+			{
+				m = builddiag("%s; eroute owner:", m);
+				if (!erouted(best_ero->spd.routing))
+					m = builddiag("%s NULL", m);
+				else if (best_ero == c)
+					m = builddiag("%s self", m);
+				else
+					m = builddiag("%s \"%s\"%s %s", m
+						, best_ero->name
+						, (fmt_conn_instance(best_ero, cib), cib)
+						, enum_name(&routing_story, best_ero->spd.routing));
+			}
+
+			DBG_log("%s", m);
+		});
+
+	if (erop != NULL)
+		*erop = erouted(best_erouting)? best_ero : NULL;
+
+	if (srp != NULL )
 	{
-	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
-	    err_t m = builddiag("route owner of \"%s\"%s %s:"
-		, c->name
-		, (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)
-		, enum_name(&routing_story, c->spd.routing));
-
-	    if (!routed(best_ro->spd.routing))
-		m = builddiag("%s NULL", m);
-	    else if (best_ro == c)
-		m = builddiag("%s self", m);
-	    else
-		m = builddiag("%s \"%s\"%s %s", m
-		    , best_ro->name
-		    , (fmt_conn_instance(best_ro, cib), cib)
-		    , enum_name(&routing_story, best_ro->spd.routing));
-
-	    if (erop != NULL)
-	    {
-		m = builddiag("%s; eroute owner:", m);
-		if (!erouted(best_ero->spd.routing))
-		    m = builddiag("%s NULL", m);
-		else if (best_ero == c)
-		    m = builddiag("%s self", m);
-		else
-		    m = builddiag("%s \"%s\"%s %s", m
-			, best_ero->name
-			, (fmt_conn_instance(best_ero, cib), cib)
-			, enum_name(&routing_story, best_ero->spd.routing));
-	    }
-
-	    DBG_log("%s", m);
-	});
-
-    if (erop != NULL)
-	*erop = erouted(best_erouting)? best_ero : NULL;
-
-    if (srp != NULL )
-    {
-	*srp = best_sr;
-	if (esrp != NULL )
-	    *esrp = best_esr;
-    }
-
-    return routed(best_routing)? best_ro : NULL;
+		*srp = best_sr;
+		if (esrp != NULL )
+			*esrp = best_esr;
+	}
+
+	return routed(best_routing)? best_ro : NULL;
 }
 
 /* Find a connection that owns the shunt eroute between subnets.
@@ -3167,20 +3159,20 @@ route_owner(struct connection *c
 struct connection *
 shunt_owner(const ip_subnet *ours, const ip_subnet *his)
 {
-    struct connection *c;
-    struct spd_route *sr;
+	struct connection *c;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
 
-    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
-    {
-	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+	for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
 	{
-	    if (shunt_erouted(sr->routing)
-	    && samesubnet(ours, &sr->this.client)
-	    && samesubnet(his, &sr->that.client))
-		return c;
+		for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+		{
+			if (shunt_erouted(sr->routing)
+			&& samesubnet(ours, &sr->this.client)
+			&& samesubnet(his, &sr->that.client))
+				return c;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* Find some connection with this pair of hosts.
@@ -3191,25 +3183,25 @@ struct connection *
 find_host_connection(const ip_address *me, u_int16_t my_port
 , const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port, lset_t policy)
 {
-    struct connection *c = find_host_pair_connections(me, my_port, him, his_port);
-
-    if (policy != LEMPTY)
-    {
-	lset_t auth_requested  = policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+	struct connection *c = find_host_pair_connections(me, my_port, him, his_port);
 
-	/* if we have requirements for the policy,
-	 * choose the first matching connection.
-	 */
-	while (c != NULL)
+	if (policy != LEMPTY)
 	{
-	    if (c->policy & auth_requested)
-	    {
-		break;
-	    }
-	    c = c->hp_next;
+		lset_t auth_requested  = policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+
+		/* if we have requirements for the policy,
+		 * choose the first matching connection.
+		 */
+		while (c != NULL)
+		{
+			if (c->policy & auth_requested)
+			{
+				break;
+			}
+			c = c->hp_next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return c;
+	return c;
 }
 
 /* given an up-until-now satisfactory connection, find the best connection
@@ -3266,187 +3258,197 @@ find_host_connection(const ip_address *me, u_int16_t my_port
  *
  * In the Initiator case, the particular connection might have been
  * specified by whatever provoked Pluto to initiate.  For example:
- *	whack --initiate connection-name
+ *      whack --initiate connection-name
  * The advantages of switching connections when we're the Initiator seem
  * less important than the disadvantages, so after FreeS/WAN 1.9, we
  * don't do this.
  */
-#define PRIO_NO_MATCH_FOUND	2048
+#define PRIO_NO_MATCH_FOUND     2048
 
 struct connection *
 refine_host_connection(const struct state *st, const struct id *peer_id
 , chunk_t peer_ca)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    struct connection *d;
-    struct connection *best_found = NULL;
-    u_int16_t auth = st->st_oakley.auth;
-    lset_t auth_policy = POLICY_PSK;
-    const chunk_t *psk = NULL;
-    bool wcpip;	/* wildcard Peer IP? */
-    int best_prio = PRIO_NO_MATCH_FOUND;
-    int wildcards, our_pathlen, peer_pathlen;
-
-    if (same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer_id)
-    && trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &peer_pathlen)
-    && peer_pathlen == 0
-    && match_requested_ca(c->requested_ca, c->spd.this.ca, &our_pathlen)
-    && our_pathlen == 0)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("current connection is a full match"
-		    " -- no need to look further");
-	)
-	return c;
-    }
-
-    switch (auth)
-    {
-    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
-	auth_policy = POLICY_PSK;
-	psk = get_preshared_secret(c);
-	/* It should be virtually impossible to fail to find PSK:
-	 * we just used it to decode the current message!
-	 */
-	if (psk == NULL)
-	    return NULL;	/* cannot determine PSK! */
-	break;
-    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-	auth_policy = POLICY_XAUTH_PSK;
-	psk = get_preshared_secret(c);
-	if (psk == NULL)
-	    return NULL;	/* cannot determine PSK! */
-	break;
-    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
-	auth_policy = POLICY_RSASIG;
-	break;
-    case XAUTHInitRSA:
-    case XAUTHRespRSA:
-	auth_policy = POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG;
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(auth);
-    }
-
-    /* The current connection won't do: search for one that will.
-     * First search for one with the same pair of hosts.
-     * If that fails, search for a suitable Road Warrior or Opportunistic
-     * connection (i.e. wildcard peer IP).
-     * We need to match:
-     * - peer_id (slightly complicated by instantiation)
-     * - if PSK auth, the key must not change (we used it to decode message)
-     * - policy-as-used must be acceptable to new connection
-     */
-    d = c->host_pair->connections;
-    for (wcpip = FALSE; ; wcpip = TRUE)
-    {
-	for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct connection *d;
+	struct connection *best_found = NULL;
+	u_int16_t auth = st->st_oakley.auth;
+	lset_t auth_policy = POLICY_PSK;
+	const chunk_t *psk = NULL;
+	bool wcpip; /* wildcard Peer IP? */
+	int best_prio = PRIO_NO_MATCH_FOUND;
+	int wildcards, our_pathlen, peer_pathlen;
+
+	if (same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer_id)
+	&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &peer_pathlen)
+	&& peer_pathlen == 0
+	&& match_requested_ca(c->requested_ca, c->spd.this.ca, &our_pathlen)
+	&& our_pathlen == 0)
 	{
-	    const char *match_name[] = {"no", "ok"};
-
-	    bool matching_id = match_id(peer_id
-					, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards);
-	    bool matching_auth = (d->policy & auth_policy) != LEMPTY;
-
-	    bool matching_trust = trusted_ca(peer_ca
-					, d->spd.that.ca, &peer_pathlen);
-	    bool matching_request = match_requested_ca(c->requested_ca
-					, d->spd.this.ca, &our_pathlen);
-	    bool match = matching_id && matching_auth && matching_trust;
-
-	    int prio = (MAX_WILDCARDS + 1) * !matching_request + wildcards;
-
-	    prio = (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1) * prio + peer_pathlen;
-	    prio = (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1) * prio + our_pathlen;
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-		DBG_log("%s: %s match (id: %s, auth: %s, trust: %s, request: %s, prio: %4d)"
-		    , d->name
-		    , match ? "full":" no"
-		    , match_name[matching_id]
-		    , match_name[matching_auth]
-		    , match_name[matching_trust]
-		    , match_name[matching_request]
-		    , match ? prio:PRIO_NO_MATCH_FOUND)
-	    )
-
-	    /* do we have a match? */
-	    if (!match)
-		continue;
-
-	    /* ignore group connections */
-	    if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
-		continue;
-
-	    if (c->spd.that.host_port != d->spd.that.host_port
-	    && d->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-	    {
-		continue;
-	    }
-
-	    switch (auth)
-	    {
-	    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
-	    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-	    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-		/* secret must match the one we already used */
-		{
-		    const chunk_t *dpsk = get_preshared_secret(d);
-
-		    if (dpsk == NULL)
-			continue;	/* no secret */
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("current connection is a full match"
+					" -- no need to look further");
+		)
+		return c;
+	}
 
-		    if (psk != dpsk)
-			if (psk->len != dpsk->len
-			|| memcmp(psk->ptr, dpsk->ptr, psk->len) != 0)
-			    continue;	/* different secret */
+	switch (auth)
+	{
+	case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+		auth_policy = POLICY_PSK;
+		psk = get_preshared_secret(c);
+		/* It should be virtually impossible to fail to find PSK:
+		 * we just used it to decode the current message!
+		 */
+		if (psk == NULL)
+		{
+			return NULL;        /* cannot determine PSK! */
 		}
 		break;
-
-	    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
-	    case XAUTHInitRSA:
-	    case XAUTHRespRSA:
-		/*
-		 * We must at least be able to find our private key
-		.*/
- 		if (d->spd.this.sc == NULL		/* no smartcard */
-		&& get_RSA_private_key(d) == NULL)	/* no private key */
-		    continue;
+	case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+	case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+		auth_policy = POLICY_XAUTH_PSK;
+		psk = get_preshared_secret(c);
+		if (psk == NULL)
+		{
+			return NULL;        /* cannot determine PSK! */
+		}
 		break;
-
-	    default:
+	case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+	case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+	case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+	case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+		auth_policy = POLICY_PUBKEY;
+		break;
+	case XAUTHInitRSA:
+	case XAUTHRespRSA:
+		auth_policy = POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG;
+		break;
+	default:
 		bad_case(auth);
-	    }
-
-	    /* d has passed all the tests.
-	     * We'll go with it if the Peer ID was an exact match.
-	     */
-	    if (prio == 0)
-	    {
-		return d;
-	    }
-
-	    /* We'll remember it as best_found in case an exact
-	     * match doesn't come along.
-	     */
-	    if (prio < best_prio)
-	    {
-		best_found = d;
-		best_prio = prio;
-	    }
 	}
-	if (wcpip)
-	    return best_found;	/* been around twice already */
 
-	/* Starting second time around.
-	 * We're willing to settle for a connection that needs Peer IP
-	 * instantiated: Road Warrior or Opportunistic.
-	 * Look on list of connections for host pair with wildcard Peer IP
+	/* The current connection won't do: search for one that will.
+	 * First search for one with the same pair of hosts.
+	 * If that fails, search for a suitable Road Warrior or Opportunistic
+	 * connection (i.e. wildcard peer IP).
+	 * We need to match:
+	 * - peer_id (slightly complicated by instantiation)
+	 * - if PSK auth, the key must not change (we used it to decode message)
+	 * - policy-as-used must be acceptable to new connection
 	 */
-	d = find_host_pair_connections(&c->spd.this.host_addr, c->spd.this.host_port
-	    , (ip_address *)NULL, c->spd.that.host_port);
-    }
+	d = c->host_pair->connections;
+	for (wcpip = FALSE; ; wcpip = TRUE)
+	{
+		for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+		{
+			const char *match_name[] = {"no", "ok"};
+
+			bool matching_id = match_id(peer_id
+										, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards);
+			bool matching_auth = (d->policy & auth_policy) != LEMPTY;
+
+			bool matching_trust = trusted_ca(peer_ca
+										, d->spd.that.ca, &peer_pathlen);
+			bool matching_request = match_requested_ca(c->requested_ca
+										, d->spd.this.ca, &our_pathlen);
+			bool match = matching_id && matching_auth && matching_trust;
+
+			int prio = (MAX_WILDCARDS + 1) * !matching_request + wildcards;
+
+			prio = (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1) * prio + peer_pathlen;
+			prio = (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1) * prio + our_pathlen;
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+				DBG_log("%s: %s match (id: %s, auth: %s, trust: %s, request: %s, prio: %4d)"
+					, d->name
+					, match ? "full":" no"
+					, match_name[matching_id]
+					, match_name[matching_auth]
+					, match_name[matching_trust]
+					, match_name[matching_request]
+					, match ? prio:PRIO_NO_MATCH_FOUND)
+			)
+
+			/* do we have a match? */
+			if (!match)
+				continue;
+
+			/* ignore group connections */
+			if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+				continue;
+
+			if (c->spd.that.host_port != d->spd.that.host_port
+			&& d->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+			{
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			switch (auth)
+			{
+			case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+			case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+			case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+				/* secret must match the one we already used */
+				{
+					const chunk_t *dpsk = get_preshared_secret(d);
+
+					if (dpsk == NULL)
+						continue;       /* no secret */
+
+					if (psk != dpsk)
+						if (psk->len != dpsk->len
+						|| memcmp(psk->ptr, dpsk->ptr, psk->len) != 0)
+							continue;   /* different secret */
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+			case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+			case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+			case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+			case XAUTHInitRSA:
+			case XAUTHRespRSA:
+				/*
+				 * We must at least be able to find our private key
+				.*/
+				if (d->spd.this.sc == NULL              /* no smartcard */
+				&& get_private_key(d) == NULL)      /* no private key */
+					continue;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				bad_case(auth);
+			}
+
+			/* d has passed all the tests.
+			 * We'll go with it if the Peer ID was an exact match.
+			 */
+			if (prio == 0)
+			{
+				return d;
+			}
+
+			/* We'll remember it as best_found in case an exact
+			 * match doesn't come along.
+			 */
+			if (prio < best_prio)
+			{
+				best_found = d;
+				best_prio = prio;
+			}
+		}
+		if (wcpip)
+			return best_found;  /* been around twice already */
+
+		/* Starting second time around.
+		 * We're willing to settle for a connection that needs Peer IP
+		 * instantiated: Road Warrior or Opportunistic.
+		 * Look on list of connections for host pair with wildcard Peer IP
+		 */
+		d = find_host_pair_connections(&c->spd.this.host_addr, c->spd.this.host_port
+			, (ip_address *)NULL, c->spd.that.host_port);
+	}
 }
 
 /**
@@ -3456,35 +3458,35 @@ refine_host_connection(const struct state *st, const struct id *peer_id
 static bool
 is_virtual_net_used(const ip_subnet *peer_net, const struct id *peer_id)
 {
-    struct connection *d;
+	struct connection *d;
 
-    for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->ac_next)
-    {
-	switch (d->kind)
+	for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->ac_next)
 	{
-	case CK_PERMANENT:
-	case CK_INSTANCE:
-	    if ((subnetinsubnet(peer_net,&d->spd.that.client) ||
-		 subnetinsubnet(&d->spd.that.client,peer_net))
-	    && !same_id(&d->spd.that.id, peer_id))
-	    {
-		char buf[BUF_LEN];
-		char client[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-		subnettot(peer_net, 0, client, sizeof(client));
-		idtoa(&d->spd.that.id, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		plog("Virtual IP %s is already used by '%s'", client, buf);
-		idtoa(peer_id, buf, sizeof(buf));
-		plog("Your ID is '%s'", buf);
-		return TRUE; /* already used by another one */
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case CK_GOING_AWAY:
-	default:
-	break;
+		switch (d->kind)
+		{
+		case CK_PERMANENT:
+		case CK_INSTANCE:
+			if ((subnetinsubnet(peer_net,&d->spd.that.client) ||
+				 subnetinsubnet(&d->spd.that.client,peer_net))
+			&& !same_id(&d->spd.that.id, peer_id))
+			{
+				char buf[BUF_LEN];
+				char client[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+				subnettot(peer_net, 0, client, sizeof(client));
+				idtoa(&d->spd.that.id, buf, sizeof(buf));
+				plog("Virtual IP %s is already used by '%s'", client, buf);
+				idtoa(peer_id, buf, sizeof(buf));
+				plog("Your ID is '%s'", buf);
+				return TRUE; /* already used by another one */
+			}
+			break;
+		case CK_GOING_AWAY:
+		default:
+		break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return FALSE; /* you can safely use it */
+	return FALSE; /* you can safely use it */
 }
 
 /* find_client_connection: given a connection suitable for ISAKMP
@@ -3512,9 +3514,9 @@ is_virtual_net_used(const ip_subnet *peer_net, const struct id *peer_id)
  * instantiation.  They are the IDs that have been authenticated.
  */
 
-#define PATH_WEIGHT	1
-#define WILD_WEIGHT	(MAX_CA_PATH_LEN+1)
-#define PRIO_WEIGHT	(MAX_WILDCARDS+1)*WILD_WEIGHT
+#define PATH_WEIGHT     1
+#define WILD_WEIGHT     (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN+1)
+#define PRIO_WEIGHT     (MAX_WILDCARDS+1)*WILD_WEIGHT
 
 /* fc_try: a helper function for find_client_connection */
 static struct connection *
@@ -3530,121 +3532,121 @@ fc_try(const struct connection *c
 , chunk_t peer_ca
 , const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list)
 {
-    struct connection *d;
-    struct connection *best = NULL;
-    policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
-    int wildcards, pathlen;
-
-    const bool peer_net_is_host = subnetisaddr(peer_net, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
-
-    for (d = hp->connections; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
-    {
-	struct spd_route *sr;
+	struct connection *d;
+	struct connection *best = NULL;
+	policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+	int wildcards, pathlen;
 
-	if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
-	    continue;
-
-	if (!(same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
-	&& match_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards)
-	&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, d->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)
-	&& group_membership(peer_list, d->name, d->spd.that.groups)))
-	    continue;
-
-    	/* compare protocol and ports */
-	if (d->spd.this.protocol != our_protocol
-	||  d->spd.this.port != our_port
-	||  d->spd.that.protocol != peer_protocol
-	|| (d->spd.that.port != peer_port && !d->spd.that.has_port_wildcard))
-	    continue;
-
-	/* non-Opportunistic case:
-	 * our_client must match.
-	 *
-	 * So must peer_client, but the testing is complicated
-	 * by the fact that the peer might be a wildcard
-	 * and if so, the default value of that.client
-	 * won't match the default peer_net.  The appropriate test:
-	 *
-	 * If d has a peer client, it must match peer_net.
-	 * If d has no peer client, peer_net must just have peer itself.
-	 */
+	const bool peer_net_is_host = subnetisaddr(peer_net, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
 
-	for (sr = &d->spd; best != d && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	for (d = hp->connections; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
 	{
-	    policy_prio_t prio;
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-	    {
-		char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-		char s3[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d3[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		struct spd_route *sr;
 
-		subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
-		subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
-		subnettot(&sr->this.client,  0, s3, sizeof(s3));
-		subnettot(&sr->that.client,  0, d3, sizeof(d3));
-		DBG_log("  fc_try trying "
-			"%s:%s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d vs %s:%s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
-			, c->name, s1, c->spd.this.protocol, c->spd.this.port
-				 , d1, c->spd.that.protocol, c->spd.that.port
-			, d->name, s3, sr->this.protocol, sr->this.port
-				 , d3, sr->that.protocol, sr->that.port);
-	    }
-#endif /* DEBUG */
+		if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+			continue;
 
-	    if (!samesubnet(&sr->this.client, our_net))
-		continue;
+		if (!(same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+		&& match_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards)
+		&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, d->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)
+		&& group_membership(peer_list, d->name, d->spd.that.groups)))
+			continue;
 
-	    if (sr->that.has_client)
-	    {
-		if (sr->that.has_client_wildcard)
-		{
-		    if (!subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &sr->that.client))
+		/* compare protocol and ports */
+		if (d->spd.this.protocol != our_protocol
+		||  d->spd.this.port != our_port
+		||  d->spd.that.protocol != peer_protocol
+		|| (d->spd.that.port != peer_port && !d->spd.that.has_port_wildcard))
 			continue;
-		}
-		else
+
+		/* non-Opportunistic case:
+		 * our_client must match.
+		 *
+		 * So must peer_client, but the testing is complicated
+		 * by the fact that the peer might be a wildcard
+		 * and if so, the default value of that.client
+		 * won't match the default peer_net.  The appropriate test:
+		 *
+		 * If d has a peer client, it must match peer_net.
+		 * If d has no peer client, peer_net must just have peer itself.
+		 */
+
+		for (sr = &d->spd; best != d && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
 		{
-		    if (!samesubnet(&sr->that.client, peer_net) && !is_virtual_connection(d))
-			continue;
-		    if (is_virtual_connection(d)
-		    && (!is_virtual_net_allowed(d, peer_net, &c->spd.that.host_addr)
-		        || is_virtual_net_used(peer_net, peer_id?peer_id:&c->spd.that.id)))
-			    continue;
+			policy_prio_t prio;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+			if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+			{
+				char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+				char s3[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d3[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+				subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
+				subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
+				subnettot(&sr->this.client,  0, s3, sizeof(s3));
+				subnettot(&sr->that.client,  0, d3, sizeof(d3));
+				DBG_log("  fc_try trying "
+						"%s:%s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d vs %s:%s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
+						, c->name, s1, c->spd.this.protocol, c->spd.this.port
+								 , d1, c->spd.that.protocol, c->spd.that.port
+						, d->name, s3, sr->this.protocol, sr->this.port
+								 , d3, sr->that.protocol, sr->that.port);
+			}
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+			if (!samesubnet(&sr->this.client, our_net))
+				continue;
+
+			if (sr->that.has_client)
+			{
+				if (sr->that.has_client_wildcard)
+				{
+					if (!subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &sr->that.client))
+						continue;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					if (!samesubnet(&sr->that.client, peer_net) && !is_virtual_connection(d))
+						continue;
+					if (is_virtual_connection(d)
+					&& (!is_virtual_net_allowed(d, peer_net, &c->spd.that.host_addr)
+						|| is_virtual_net_used(peer_net, peer_id?peer_id:&c->spd.that.id)))
+							continue;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				if (!peer_net_is_host)
+					continue;
+			}
+
+			/* We've run the gauntlet -- success:
+			 * We've got an exact match of subnets.
+			 * The connection is feasible, but we continue looking for the best.
+			 * The highest priority wins, implementing eroute-like rule.
+			 * - a routed connection is preferrred
+			 * - given that, the smallest number of ID wildcards are preferred
+			 * - given that, the shortest CA pathlength is preferred
+			 */
+			prio = PRIO_WEIGHT * routed(sr->routing)
+				 + WILD_WEIGHT * (MAX_WILDCARDS - wildcards)
+				 + PATH_WEIGHT * (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN - pathlen)
+				 + 1;
+			if (prio > best_prio)
+			{
+				best = d;
+				best_prio = prio;
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		if (!peer_net_is_host)
-		    continue;
-	    }
-
-	    /* We've run the gauntlet -- success:
-	     * We've got an exact match of subnets.
-	     * The connection is feasible, but we continue looking for the best.
-	     * The highest priority wins, implementing eroute-like rule.
-	     * - a routed connection is preferrred
-	     * - given that, the smallest number of ID wildcards are preferred
-	     * - given that, the shortest CA pathlength is preferred
-	     */
-	    prio = PRIO_WEIGHT * routed(sr->routing)
-		 + WILD_WEIGHT * (MAX_WILDCARDS - wildcards)
-		 + PATH_WEIGHT * (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN - pathlen)
-		 + 1;
-	    if (prio > best_prio)
-	    {
-		best = d;
-		best_prio = prio;
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (best != NULL && NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy))
-	best = NULL;
+	if (best != NULL && NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy))
+		best = NULL;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("  fc_try concluding with %s [%ld]"
-		, (best ? best->name : "none"), best_prio)
-    )
-    return best;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("  fc_try concluding with %s [%ld]"
+				, (best ? best->name : "none"), best_prio)
+	)
+	return best;
 }
 
 static struct connection *
@@ -3659,92 +3661,92 @@ fc_try_oppo(const struct connection *c
 , chunk_t peer_ca
 , const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list)
 {
-    struct connection *d;
-    struct connection *best = NULL;
-    policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
-    int wildcards, pathlen;
+	struct connection *d;
+	struct connection *best = NULL;
+	policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+	int wildcards, pathlen;
 
-    for (d = hp->connections; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
-    {
-	struct spd_route *sr;
-	policy_prio_t prio;
-
-	if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
-	    continue;
-
-	if (!(same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
-	&& match_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards)
-	&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, d->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)
-	&& group_membership(peer_list, d->name, d->spd.that.groups)))
-	    continue;
-
-	/* compare protocol and ports */
-	if (d->spd.this.protocol != our_protocol
-	||  d->spd.this.port != our_port
-	||  d->spd.that.protocol != peer_protocol
-	|| (d->spd.that.port != peer_port && !d->spd.that.has_port_wildcard))
-	    continue;
-
-	/* Opportunistic case:
-	 * our_net must be inside d->spd.this.client
-	 * and peer_net must be inside d->spd.that.client
-	 * Note: this host_pair chain also has shunt
-	 * eroute conns (clear, drop), but they won't
-	 * be marked as opportunistic.
-	 */
-	for (sr = &d->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	for (d = hp->connections; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
 	{
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-	    {
-		char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-		char s3[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d3[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		struct spd_route *sr;
+		policy_prio_t prio;
 
-		subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
-		subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
-		subnettot(&sr->this.client,  0, s3, sizeof(s3));
-		subnettot(&sr->that.client,  0, d3, sizeof(d3));
-		DBG_log("  fc_try_oppo trying %s:%s -> %s vs %s:%s -> %s"
-			, c->name, s1, d1, d->name, s3, d3);
-	    }
+		if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+			continue;
+
+		if (!(same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+		&& match_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards)
+		&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, d->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)
+		&& group_membership(peer_list, d->name, d->spd.that.groups)))
+			continue;
+
+		/* compare protocol and ports */
+		if (d->spd.this.protocol != our_protocol
+		||  d->spd.this.port != our_port
+		||  d->spd.that.protocol != peer_protocol
+		|| (d->spd.that.port != peer_port && !d->spd.that.has_port_wildcard))
+			continue;
+
+		/* Opportunistic case:
+		 * our_net must be inside d->spd.this.client
+		 * and peer_net must be inside d->spd.that.client
+		 * Note: this host_pair chain also has shunt
+		 * eroute conns (clear, drop), but they won't
+		 * be marked as opportunistic.
+		 */
+		for (sr = &d->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+		{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+			if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+			{
+				char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+				char s3[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d3[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+				subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
+				subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
+				subnettot(&sr->this.client,  0, s3, sizeof(s3));
+				subnettot(&sr->that.client,  0, d3, sizeof(d3));
+				DBG_log("  fc_try_oppo trying %s:%s -> %s vs %s:%s -> %s"
+						, c->name, s1, d1, d->name, s3, d3);
+			}
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-	    if (!subnetinsubnet(our_net, &sr->this.client)
-	    || !subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &sr->that.client))
-		continue;
-
-	    /* The connection is feasible, but we continue looking for the best.
-	     * The highest priority wins, implementing eroute-like rule.
-	     * - our smallest client subnet is preferred (longest mask)
-	     * - given that, his smallest client subnet is preferred
-	     * - given that, a routed connection is preferrred
-	     * - given that, the smallest number of ID wildcards are preferred
-	     * - given that, the shortest CA pathlength is preferred
-	     */
-	    prio = PRIO_WEIGHT * (d->prio + routed(sr->routing))
-	    	 + WILD_WEIGHT * (MAX_WILDCARDS - wildcards)
-		 + PATH_WEIGHT * (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN - pathlen);
-	    if (prio > best_prio)
-	    {
-		best = d;
-		best_prio = prio;
-	    }
+			if (!subnetinsubnet(our_net, &sr->this.client)
+			|| !subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &sr->that.client))
+				continue;
+
+			/* The connection is feasible, but we continue looking for the best.
+			 * The highest priority wins, implementing eroute-like rule.
+			 * - our smallest client subnet is preferred (longest mask)
+			 * - given that, his smallest client subnet is preferred
+			 * - given that, a routed connection is preferrred
+			 * - given that, the smallest number of ID wildcards are preferred
+			 * - given that, the shortest CA pathlength is preferred
+			 */
+			prio = PRIO_WEIGHT * (d->prio + routed(sr->routing))
+				 + WILD_WEIGHT * (MAX_WILDCARDS - wildcards)
+				 + PATH_WEIGHT * (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN - pathlen);
+			if (prio > best_prio)
+			{
+				best = d;
+				best_prio = prio;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* if the best wasn't opportunistic, we fail: it must be a shunt */
+	if (best != NULL
+	&& (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy)
+		|| (best->policy & POLICY_OPPO) == LEMPTY))
+	{
+		best = NULL;
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* if the best wasn't opportunistic, we fail: it must be a shunt */
-    if (best != NULL
-    && (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy)
-	|| (best->policy & POLICY_OPPO) == LEMPTY))
-    {
-	best = NULL;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("  fc_try_oppo concluding with %s [%ld]"
-		, (best ? best->name : "none"), best_prio)
-    )
-    return best;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("  fc_try_oppo concluding with %s [%ld]"
+				, (best ? best->name : "none"), best_prio)
+	)
+	return best;
 
 }
 
@@ -3754,28 +3756,28 @@ fc_try_oppo(const struct connection *c
 chunk_t
 get_peer_ca_and_groups(struct connection *c, const ietfAttrList_t **peer_list)
 {
-    struct state *p1st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
-
-    *peer_list = NULL;
+	struct state *p1st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
 
-    if (p1st != NULL
-    &&  p1st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL
-    &&  p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	x509acert_t *ac = get_x509acert(p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer
-				      , p1st->st_peer_pubkey->serial);;
+	*peer_list = NULL;
 
-	if (ac != NULL && verify_x509acert(ac, strict_crl_policy))
-	    *peer_list = ac->groups;
-	else
+	if (p1st != NULL
+	&&  p1st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL
+	&&  p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer.ptr != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("no valid attribute cert found")
-	    )
+		x509acert_t *ac = get_x509acert(p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer
+									  , p1st->st_peer_pubkey->serial);;
+
+		if (ac != NULL && verify_x509acert(ac, strict_crl_policy))
+			*peer_list = ac->groups;
+		else
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("no valid attribute cert found")
+			)
+		}
+		return p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer;
 	}
-	return p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer;
-    }
-    return empty_chunk;
+	return chunk_empty;
 }
 
 struct connection *
@@ -3784,325 +3786,325 @@ find_client_connection(struct connection *c
 , const u_int8_t our_protocol, const u_int16_t our_port
 , const u_int8_t peer_protocol, const u_int16_t peer_port)
 {
-    struct connection *d;
-    struct spd_route *sr;
+	struct connection *d;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
 
-    const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL;
-    chunk_t peer_ca = get_peer_ca_and_groups(c, &peer_list);
+	const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL;
+	chunk_t peer_ca = get_peer_ca_and_groups(c, &peer_list);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-    {
-	char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-	subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
-	subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
-
-	DBG_log("find_client_connection starting with %s"
-	    , (c ? c->name : "(none)"));
-	DBG_log("  looking for %s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
-	    , s1, our_protocol, our_port
-	    , d1, peer_protocol, peer_port);
-    }
-#endif /* DEBUG */
+	if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+	{
+		char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
 
-    /* give priority to current connection
-     * but even greater priority to a routed concrete connection
-     */
-    {
-	struct connection *unrouted = NULL;
-	int srnum = -1;
+		subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
+		subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
+
+		DBG_log("find_client_connection starting with %s"
+			, (c ? c->name : "(none)"));
+		DBG_log("  looking for %s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
+			, s1, our_protocol, our_port
+			, d1, peer_protocol, peer_port);
+	}
+#endif /* DEBUG */
 
-	for (sr = &c->spd; unrouted == NULL && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	/* give priority to current connection
+	 * but even greater priority to a routed concrete connection
+	 */
 	{
-	    srnum++;
+		struct connection *unrouted = NULL;
+		int srnum = -1;
+
+		for (sr = &c->spd; unrouted == NULL && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+		{
+			srnum++;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-	    {
-		char s2[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d2[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-		subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, s2, sizeof(s2));
-		subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, d2, sizeof(d2));
-		DBG_log("  concrete checking against sr#%d %s -> %s"
-			, srnum, s2, d2);
-	    }
+			if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+			{
+				char s2[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d2[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+				subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, s2, sizeof(s2));
+				subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, d2, sizeof(d2));
+				DBG_log("  concrete checking against sr#%d %s -> %s"
+						, srnum, s2, d2);
+			}
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-	    if (samesubnet(&sr->this.client, our_net)
-	    && samesubnet(&sr->that.client, peer_net)
-	    && sr->this.protocol == our_protocol
-	    && sr->this.port == our_port
-	    && sr->that.protocol == peer_protocol
-	    && sr->that.port == peer_port
-	    && group_membership(peer_list, c->name, sr->that.groups))
-	    {
-		passert(oriented(*c));
-		if (routed(sr->routing))
-		    return c;
-
-		unrouted = c;
-	    }
-	}
+			if (samesubnet(&sr->this.client, our_net)
+			&& samesubnet(&sr->that.client, peer_net)
+			&& sr->this.protocol == our_protocol
+			&& sr->this.port == our_port
+			&& sr->that.protocol == peer_protocol
+			&& sr->that.port == peer_port
+			&& group_membership(peer_list, c->name, sr->that.groups))
+			{
+				passert(oriented(*c));
+				if (routed(sr->routing))
+					return c;
 
-	/* exact match? */
-	d = fc_try(c, c->host_pair, NULL, our_net, peer_net
-	    , our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
-	    , peer_ca, peer_list);
+				unrouted = c;
+			}
+		}
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	    DBG_log("  fc_try %s gives %s"
-		    , c->name
-		    , (d ? d->name : "none"))
-	)
+		/* exact match? */
+		d = fc_try(c, c->host_pair, NULL, our_net, peer_net
+			, our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
+			, peer_ca, peer_list);
 
-	if (d == NULL)
-	    d = unrouted;
-    }
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+			DBG_log("  fc_try %s gives %s"
+					, c->name
+					, (d ? d->name : "none"))
+		)
 
-    if (d == NULL)
-    {
-	/* look for an abstract connection to match */
-	struct spd_route *sr;
-	struct host_pair *hp = NULL;
+		if (d == NULL)
+			d = unrouted;
+	}
 
-	for (sr = &c->spd; hp==NULL && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	if (d == NULL)
 	{
-	    hp = find_host_pair(&sr->this.host_addr
-				, sr->this.host_port
-				, NULL
-				, sr->that.host_port);
+		/* look for an abstract connection to match */
+		struct spd_route *sr;
+		struct host_pair *hp = NULL;
+
+		for (sr = &c->spd; hp==NULL && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+		{
+			hp = find_host_pair(&sr->this.host_addr
+								, sr->this.host_port
+								, NULL
+								, sr->that.host_port);
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
-	    {
-		char s2[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d2[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+			{
+				char s2[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d2[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
 
-		subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, s2, sizeof(s2));
-		subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, d2, sizeof(d2));
+				subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, s2, sizeof(s2));
+				subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, d2, sizeof(d2));
 
-		DBG_log("  checking hostpair %s -> %s is %s"
-			, s2, d2
-			, (hp ? "found" : "not found"));
-	    }
+				DBG_log("  checking hostpair %s -> %s is %s"
+						, s2, d2
+						, (hp ? "found" : "not found"));
+			}
 #endif /* DEBUG */
-	}
+		}
 
-	if (hp != NULL)
-	{
-	    /* RW match with actual peer_id or abstract peer_id? */
-	    d = fc_try(c, hp, NULL, our_net, peer_net
-		, our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
-		, peer_ca, peer_list);
-
-	    if (d == NULL
-	    && subnetishost(our_net)
-	    && subnetishost(peer_net))
-	    {
-		/* Opportunistic match?
-		 * Always use abstract peer_id.
-		 * Note that later instantiation will result in the same peer_id.
-		 */
-		d = fc_try_oppo(c, hp, our_net, peer_net
-		    , our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
-		    , peer_ca, peer_list);
-	    }
+		if (hp != NULL)
+		{
+			/* RW match with actual peer_id or abstract peer_id? */
+			d = fc_try(c, hp, NULL, our_net, peer_net
+				, our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
+				, peer_ca, peer_list);
+
+			if (d == NULL
+			&& subnetishost(our_net)
+			&& subnetishost(peer_net))
+			{
+				/* Opportunistic match?
+				 * Always use abstract peer_id.
+				 * Note that later instantiation will result in the same peer_id.
+				 */
+				d = fc_try_oppo(c, hp, our_net, peer_net
+					, our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
+					, peer_ca, peer_list);
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("  concluding with d = %s"
-		, (d ? d->name : "none"))
-    )
-    return d;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("  concluding with d = %s"
+				, (d ? d->name : "none"))
+	)
+	return d;
 }
 
 int
 connection_compare(const struct connection *ca
 , const struct connection *cb)
 {
-    int ret;
-
-    /* DBG_log("comparing %s to %s", ca->name, cb->name);  */
-
-    ret = strcasecmp(ca->name, cb->name);
-    if (ret != 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    ret = ca->kind - cb->kind;	/* note: enum connection_kind behaves like int */
-    if (ret != 0)
-	return ret;
-
-    /* same name, and same type */
-    switch (ca->kind)
-    {
-    case CK_INSTANCE:
-	return ca->instance_serial < cb->instance_serial ? -1
-	    : ca->instance_serial > cb->instance_serial ? 1
-	    : 0;
-
-    default:
-	return ca->prio < cb->prio ? -1
-	    : ca->prio > cb->prio ? 1
-	    : 0;
-    }
+	int ret;
+
+	/* DBG_log("comparing %s to %s", ca->name, cb->name);  */
+
+	ret = strcasecmp(ca->name, cb->name);
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	ret = ca->kind - cb->kind;  /* note: enum connection_kind behaves like int */
+	if (ret != 0)
+		return ret;
+
+	/* same name, and same type */
+	switch (ca->kind)
+	{
+	case CK_INSTANCE:
+		return ca->instance_serial < cb->instance_serial ? -1
+			: ca->instance_serial > cb->instance_serial ? 1
+			: 0;
+
+	default:
+		return ca->prio < cb->prio ? -1
+			: ca->prio > cb->prio ? 1
+			: 0;
+	}
 }
 
 static int
 connection_compare_qsort(const void *a, const void *b)
 {
-    return connection_compare(*(const struct connection *const *)a
-			    , *(const struct connection *const *)b);
+	return connection_compare(*(const struct connection *const *)a
+							, *(const struct connection *const *)b);
 }
 
 void
 show_connections_status(bool all, const char *name)
 {
-    struct connection *c;
-    int count, i;
-    struct connection **array;
-
-    /* make an array of connections, and sort it */
-    count = 0;
-    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
-    {
-	if (c->ikev1 && (name == NULL || streq(c->name, name)))
-	    count++;
-    }
-    array = alloc_bytes(sizeof(struct connection *)*count, "connection array");
-
-    count=0;
-    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
-    {
-	if (c->ikev1 && (name == NULL || streq(c->name, name)))
-	    array[count++]=c;
-    }
-
-    /* sort it! */
-    qsort(array, count, sizeof(struct connection *), connection_compare_qsort);
-
-    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-    {
-	const char *ifn;
-	char instance[1 + 10 + 1];
-	char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
-
-	c = array[i];
-
-	ifn = oriented(*c)? c->interface->rname : "";
-
-	instance[0] = '\0';
-	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && c->instance_serial != 0)
-	    snprintf(instance, sizeof(instance), "[%lu]", c->instance_serial);
-
-	/* show topology */
+	struct connection *c;
+	int count, i;
+	struct connection **array;
+
+	/* make an array of connections, and sort it */
+	count = 0;
+	for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
 	{
-	    char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
-	    struct spd_route *sr = &c->spd;
-	    int num=0;
-
-	    while (sr != NULL)
-	    {
-		(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), c, sr);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "\"%s\"%s: %s; %s; eroute owner: #%lu"
-			  , c->name, instance, topo
-			  , enum_name(&routing_story, sr->routing)
-			  , sr->eroute_owner);
-		sr = sr->next;
-		num++;
-	    }
+		if (c->ikev1 && (name == NULL || streq(c->name, name)))
+			count++;
 	}
+	array = malloc(sizeof(struct connection *)*count);
 
-	if (all)
+	count=0;
+	for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
 	{
-	    /* show CAs if defined */
-	    if (c->spd.this.ca.ptr != NULL || c->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		char this_ca[BUF_LEN], that_ca[BUF_LEN];
-
-		dntoa_or_null(this_ca, BUF_LEN, c->spd.this.ca, "%any");
-		dntoa_or_null(that_ca, BUF_LEN, c->spd.that.ca, "%any");
-
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		    , "\"%s\"%s:   CAs: '%s'...'%s'"
-		    , c->name
-		    , instance
-		    , this_ca
-		    , that_ca);
-	    }
-
-	    /* show group attributes if defined */
-	    if (c->spd.that.groups != NULL)
-	    {
-		char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	
-		format_groups(c->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		    , "\"%s\"%s:   groups: %s"
-		    , c->name
-		    , instance
-		    , buf);
-	    }
-
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   ike_life: %lus; ipsec_life: %lus;"
-		" rekey_margin: %lus; rekey_fuzz: %lu%%; keyingtries: %lu"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ike_life_seconds
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_margin
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_fuzz
-		, (unsigned long) c->sa_keying_tries);
-
-	    /* show DPD parameters if defined */
-	
-	    if (c->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		    , "\"%s\"%s:   dpd_action: %s;"
-		    " dpd_delay: %lus; dpd_timeout: %lus;"
-		    , c->name
-		    , instance
-		    , enum_show(&dpd_action_names, c->dpd_action)
-		    , (unsigned long) c->dpd_delay
-		    , (unsigned long) c->dpd_timeout);
-
-	    if (c->policy_next)
-	    {
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		    , "\"%s\"%s:   policy_next: %s"
-		    , c->name, instance, c->policy_next->name);
-	    }
-
-	    /* Note: we display key_from_DNS_on_demand as if policy [lr]KOD */
-	    fmt_policy_prio(c->prio, prio);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   policy: %s%s%s; prio: %s; interface: %s; "
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, prettypolicy(c->policy)
-		, c->spd.this.key_from_DNS_on_demand? "+lKOD" : ""
-		, c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand? "+rKOD" : ""
-		, prio
-		, ifn);
+		if (c->ikev1 && (name == NULL || streq(c->name, name)))
+			array[count++]=c;
 	}
 
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-	    , "\"%s\"%s:   newest ISAKMP SA: #%ld; newest IPsec SA: #%ld; "
-	    , c->name
-	    , instance
-	    , c->newest_isakmp_sa
-	    , c->newest_ipsec_sa);
-	    
-	if (all)
+	/* sort it! */
+	qsort(array, count, sizeof(struct connection *), connection_compare_qsort);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
 	{
-	    ike_alg_show_connection(c, instance);
-	    kernel_alg_show_connection(c, instance);
+		const char *ifn;
+		char instance[1 + 10 + 1];
+		char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
+
+		c = array[i];
+
+		ifn = oriented(*c)? c->interface->rname : "";
+
+		instance[0] = '\0';
+		if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && c->instance_serial != 0)
+			snprintf(instance, sizeof(instance), "[%lu]", c->instance_serial);
+
+		/* show topology */
+		{
+			char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
+			struct spd_route *sr = &c->spd;
+			int num=0;
+
+			while (sr != NULL)
+			{
+				(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), c, sr);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "\"%s\"%s: %s; %s; eroute owner: #%lu"
+						  , c->name, instance, topo
+						  , enum_name(&routing_story, sr->routing)
+						  , sr->eroute_owner);
+				sr = sr->next;
+				num++;
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (all)
+		{
+			/* show CAs if defined */
+			if (c->spd.this.ca.ptr != NULL || c->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				char this_ca[BUF_LEN], that_ca[BUF_LEN];
+
+				dntoa_or_null(this_ca, BUF_LEN, c->spd.this.ca, "%any");
+				dntoa_or_null(that_ca, BUF_LEN, c->spd.that.ca, "%any");
+
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+					, "\"%s\"%s:   CAs: '%s'...'%s'"
+					, c->name
+					, instance
+					, this_ca
+					, that_ca);
+			}
+
+			/* show group attributes if defined */
+			if (c->spd.that.groups != NULL)
+			{
+				char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		
+				format_groups(c->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+					, "\"%s\"%s:   groups: %s"
+					, c->name
+					, instance
+					, buf);
+			}
+
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+				, "\"%s\"%s:   ike_life: %lus; ipsec_life: %lus;"
+				" rekey_margin: %lus; rekey_fuzz: %lu%%; keyingtries: %lu"
+				, c->name
+				, instance
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_ike_life_seconds
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_margin
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_fuzz
+				, (unsigned long) c->sa_keying_tries);
+
+			/* show DPD parameters if defined */
+		
+			if (c->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+					, "\"%s\"%s:   dpd_action: %N;"
+					" dpd_delay: %lus; dpd_timeout: %lus;"
+					, c->name
+					, instance
+					, dpd_action_names, c->dpd_action
+					, (unsigned long) c->dpd_delay
+					, (unsigned long) c->dpd_timeout);
+
+			if (c->policy_next)
+			{
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+					, "\"%s\"%s:   policy_next: %s"
+					, c->name, instance, c->policy_next->name);
+			}
+
+			/* Note: we display key_from_DNS_on_demand as if policy [lr]KOD */
+			fmt_policy_prio(c->prio, prio);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+				, "\"%s\"%s:   policy: %s%s%s; prio: %s; interface: %s; "
+				, c->name
+				, instance
+				, prettypolicy(c->policy)
+				, c->spd.this.key_from_DNS_on_demand? "+lKOD" : ""
+				, c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand? "+rKOD" : ""
+				, prio
+				, ifn);
+		}
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+			, "\"%s\"%s:   newest ISAKMP SA: #%ld; newest IPsec SA: #%ld; "
+			, c->name
+			, instance
+			, c->newest_isakmp_sa
+			, c->newest_ipsec_sa);
+			
+		if (all)
+		{
+			ike_alg_show_connection(c, instance);
+			kernel_alg_show_connection(c, instance);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    if (count > 0)
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+	if (count > 0)
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);    /* spacer */
 
-    pfree(array);
+	free(array);
 }
 
 /* struct pending, the structure representing Quick Mode
@@ -4111,14 +4113,14 @@ show_connections_status(bool all, const char *name)
  */
 
 struct pending {
-    int whack_sock;
-    struct state *isakmp_sa;
-    struct connection *connection;
-    lset_t policy;
-    unsigned long try;
-    so_serial_t replacing;
-
-    struct pending *next;
+	int whack_sock;
+	struct state *isakmp_sa;
+	struct connection *connection;
+	lset_t policy;
+	unsigned long try;
+	so_serial_t replacing;
+
+	struct pending *next;
 };
 
 /* queue a Quick Mode negotiation pending completion of a suitable Main Mode */
@@ -4130,36 +4132,36 @@ add_pending(int whack_sock
 , unsigned long try
 , so_serial_t replacing)
 {
-    bool already_queued = FALSE;
-    struct pending *p = c->host_pair->pending;
+	bool already_queued = FALSE;
+	struct pending *p = c->host_pair->pending;
 
-    while (p != NULL)
-    {
-	if (streq(c->name, p->connection->name))
+	while (p != NULL)
 	{
-	    already_queued = TRUE;
-	    break;
+		if (streq(c->name, p->connection->name))
+		{
+			already_queued = TRUE;
+			break;
+		}
+		p = p->next;
 	}
-	p = p->next;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("Queuing pending Quick Mode with %s \"%s\"%s"
-		, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
-		, c->name
-		, already_queued? " already done" : "")
-    )
-    if (already_queued)
-	return;
-
-    p = alloc_thing(struct pending, "struct pending");
-    p->whack_sock = whack_sock;
-    p->isakmp_sa = isakmp_sa;
-    p->connection = c;
-    p->policy = policy;
-    p->try = try;
-    p->replacing = replacing;
-    p->next = c->host_pair->pending;
-    c->host_pair->pending = p;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("Queuing pending Quick Mode with %s \"%s\"%s"
+				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+				, c->name
+				, already_queued? " already done" : "")
+	)
+	if (already_queued)
+		return;
+
+	p = malloc_thing(struct pending);
+	p->whack_sock = whack_sock;
+	p->isakmp_sa = isakmp_sa;
+	p->connection = c;
+	p->policy = policy;
+	p->try = try;
+	p->replacing = replacing;
+	p->next = c->host_pair->pending;
+	c->host_pair->pending = p;
 }
 
 /* Release all the whacks awaiting the completion of this state.
@@ -4169,157 +4171,157 @@ add_pending(int whack_sock
 void
 release_pending_whacks(struct state *st, err_t story)
 {
-    struct pending *p;
-    struct stat stst;
+	struct pending *p;
+	struct stat stst;
 
-    if (st->st_whack_sock == NULL_FD || fstat(st->st_whack_sock, &stst) != 0)
-	zero(&stst);	/* resulting st_dev/st_ino ought to be distinct */
+	if (st->st_whack_sock == NULL_FD || fstat(st->st_whack_sock, &stst) != 0)
+		zero(&stst);    /* resulting st_dev/st_ino ought to be distinct */
 
-    release_whack(st);
+	release_whack(st);
 
-    for (p = st->st_connection->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	if (p->isakmp_sa == st && p->whack_sock != NULL_FD)
+	for (p = st->st_connection->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 	{
-	    struct stat pst;
+		if (p->isakmp_sa == st && p->whack_sock != NULL_FD)
+		{
+			struct stat pst;
 
-	    if (fstat(p->whack_sock, &pst) == 0
-	    && (stst.st_dev != pst.st_dev || stst.st_ino != pst.st_ino))
-	    {
-		passert(whack_log_fd == NULL_FD);
-		whack_log_fd = p->whack_sock;
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		    , "%s for ISAKMP SA, but releasing whack for pending IPSEC SA"
-		    , story);
-		whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
-	    }
-	    close(p->whack_sock);
-	    p->whack_sock = NULL_FD;
+			if (fstat(p->whack_sock, &pst) == 0
+			&& (stst.st_dev != pst.st_dev || stst.st_ino != pst.st_ino))
+			{
+				passert(whack_log_fd == NULL_FD);
+				whack_log_fd = p->whack_sock;
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+					, "%s for ISAKMP SA, but releasing whack for pending IPSEC SA"
+					, story);
+				whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+			}
+			close(p->whack_sock);
+			p->whack_sock = NULL_FD;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 static void
 delete_pending(struct pending **pp)
 {
-    struct pending *p = *pp;
+	struct pending *p = *pp;
 
-    *pp = p->next;
-    if (p->connection != NULL)
-	connection_discard(p->connection);
-    close_any(p->whack_sock);
-    pfree(p);
+	*pp = p->next;
+	if (p->connection != NULL)
+		connection_discard(p->connection);
+	close_any(p->whack_sock);
+	free(p);
 }
 
 void
 unpend(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct pending **pp
-	, *p;
+	struct pending **pp
+		, *p;
 
-    for (pp = &st->st_connection->host_pair->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
-    {
-	if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("unqueuing pending Quick Mode with %s \"%s\""
-		, ip_str(&p->connection->spd.that.host_addr)
-		, p->connection->name));
-	    (void) quick_outI1(p->whack_sock, st, p->connection, p->policy
-		, p->try, p->replacing);
-	    p->whack_sock = NULL_FD;	/* ownership transferred */
-	    p->connection = NULL;	/* ownership transferred */
-	    delete_pending(pp);
-	}
-	else
+	for (pp = &st->st_connection->host_pair->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
 	{
-	    pp = &p->next;
+		if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("unqueuing pending Quick Mode with %s \"%s\""
+				, ip_str(&p->connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+				, p->connection->name));
+			(void) quick_outI1(p->whack_sock, st, p->connection, p->policy
+				, p->try, p->replacing);
+			p->whack_sock = NULL_FD;    /* ownership transferred */
+			p->connection = NULL;       /* ownership transferred */
+			delete_pending(pp);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			pp = &p->next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* a Main Mode negotiation has been replaced; update any pending */
 void
 update_pending(struct state *os, struct state *ns)
 {
-    struct pending *p;
+	struct pending *p;
 
-    for (p = os->st_connection->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	if (p->isakmp_sa == os)
-	    p->isakmp_sa = ns;
-	if (p->connection->spd.this.host_port != ns->st_connection->spd.this.host_port)
+	for (p = os->st_connection->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 	{
-	    p->connection->spd.this.host_port = ns->st_connection->spd.this.host_port;
-	    p->connection->spd.that.host_port = ns->st_connection->spd.that.host_port;
+		if (p->isakmp_sa == os)
+			p->isakmp_sa = ns;
+		if (p->connection->spd.this.host_port != ns->st_connection->spd.this.host_port)
+		{
+			p->connection->spd.this.host_port = ns->st_connection->spd.this.host_port;
+			p->connection->spd.that.host_port = ns->st_connection->spd.that.host_port;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* a Main Mode negotiation has failed; discard any pending */
 void
 flush_pending_by_state(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct host_pair *hp = st->st_connection->host_pair;
-
-    if (hp != NULL)
-    {
-	struct pending **pp
-	    , *p;
+	struct host_pair *hp = st->st_connection->host_pair;
 
-	for (pp = &hp->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	if (hp != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
-		delete_pending(pp);
-	    else
-		pp = &p->next;
+		struct pending **pp
+			, *p;
+
+		for (pp = &hp->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+		{
+			if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+				delete_pending(pp);
+			else
+				pp = &p->next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* a connection has been deleted; discard any related pending */
 static void
 flush_pending_by_connection(struct connection *c)
 {
-    if (c->host_pair != NULL)
-    {
-	struct pending **pp
-	    , *p;
-
-	for (pp = &c->host_pair->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	if (c->host_pair != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (p->connection == c)
-	    {
-		p->connection = NULL;	/* prevent delete_pending from releasing */
-		delete_pending(pp);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		pp = &p->next;
-	    }
+		struct pending **pp
+			, *p;
+
+		for (pp = &c->host_pair->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+		{
+			if (p->connection == c)
+			{
+				p->connection = NULL;   /* prevent delete_pending from releasing */
+				delete_pending(pp);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				pp = &p->next;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 void
 show_pending_phase2(const struct host_pair *hp, const struct state *st)
 {
-    const struct pending *p;
+	const struct pending *p;
 
-    for (p = hp->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+	for (p = hp->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 	{
-	    /* connection-name state-number [replacing state-number] */
-	    char cip[CONN_INST_BUF];
-
-	    fmt_conn_instance(p->connection, cip);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%lu: pending Phase 2 for \"%s\"%s replacing #%lu"
-		, p->isakmp_sa->st_serialno
-		, p->connection->name
-		, cip
-		, p->replacing);
+		if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+		{
+			/* connection-name state-number [replacing state-number] */
+			char cip[CONN_INST_BUF];
+
+			fmt_conn_instance(p->connection, cip);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%lu: pending Phase 2 for \"%s\"%s replacing #%lu"
+				, p->isakmp_sa->st_serialno
+				, p->connection->name
+				, cip
+				, p->replacing);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Delete a connection if it is an instance and it is no longer in use.
@@ -4329,18 +4331,18 @@ show_pending_phase2(const struct host_pair *hp, const struct state *st)
 void
 connection_discard(struct connection *c)
 {
-    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-    {
-	/* see if it is being used by a pending */
-	struct pending *p;
+	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+	{
+		/* see if it is being used by a pending */
+		struct pending *p;
 
-	for (p = c->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	    if (p->connection == c)
-		return;	/* in use, so we're done */
+		for (p = c->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+			if (p->connection == c)
+				return; /* in use, so we're done */
 
-	if (!states_use_connection(c))
-	    delete_connection(c, FALSE);
-    }
+		if (!states_use_connection(c))
+			delete_connection(c, FALSE);
+	}
 }
 
 
@@ -4354,32 +4356,32 @@ long eclipse_count = 0;
 struct connection *
 eclipsed(struct connection *c, struct spd_route **esrp)
 {
-    struct connection *ue;
-    struct spd_route *sr1 = &c->spd;
+	struct connection *ue;
+	struct spd_route *sr1 = &c->spd;
 
-    ue = NULL;
+	ue = NULL;
 
-    while (sr1 != NULL && ue != NULL)
-    {
-	for (ue = connections; ue != NULL; ue = ue->ac_next)
+	while (sr1 != NULL && ue != NULL)
 	{
-	    struct spd_route *srue = &ue->spd;
-
-	    while (srue != NULL
-	    && srue->routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED
-	    && !(samesubnet(&sr1->this.client, &srue->this.client)
-		 && samesubnet(&sr1->that.client, &srue->that.client)))
-	    {
-		srue = srue->next;
-	    }
-	    if (srue != NULL && srue->routing==RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
-	    {
-		*esrp = srue;
-		break;
-	    }
+		for (ue = connections; ue != NULL; ue = ue->ac_next)
+		{
+			struct spd_route *srue = &ue->spd;
+
+			while (srue != NULL
+			&& srue->routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED
+			&& !(samesubnet(&sr1->this.client, &srue->this.client)
+				 && samesubnet(&sr1->that.client, &srue->that.client)))
+			{
+				srue = srue->next;
+			}
+			if (srue != NULL && srue->routing==RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+			{
+				*esrp = srue;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return ue;
+	return ue;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/connections.h b/src/pluto/connections.h
index b11565296..16cbbfd72 100644
--- a/src/pluto/connections.h
+++ b/src/pluto/connections.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: connections.h 4024 2008-05-29 07:49:47Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _CONNECTIONS_H
@@ -118,135 +116,135 @@
  * - display format: n,m
  */
 typedef unsigned long policy_prio_t;
-#define BOTTOM_PRIO   ((policy_prio_t)0)	/* smaller than any real prio */
+#define BOTTOM_PRIO   ((policy_prio_t)0)        /* smaller than any real prio */
 #define set_policy_prio(c) { (c)->prio = \
-	((policy_prio_t)(c)->spd.this.client.maskbits << 16) \
-	| ((policy_prio_t)(c)->spd.that.client.maskbits << 8) \
-	| (policy_prio_t)1; }
-#define POLICY_PRIO_BUF	(3+1+3+1)
+		((policy_prio_t)(c)->spd.this.client.maskbits << 16) \
+		| ((policy_prio_t)(c)->spd.that.client.maskbits << 8) \
+		| (policy_prio_t)1; }
+#define POLICY_PRIO_BUF (3+1+3+1)
 extern void fmt_policy_prio(policy_prio_t pp, char buf[POLICY_PRIO_BUF]);
 
 struct virtual_t;
 
 struct end {
-    struct id id;
-    ip_address
-	host_addr,
-	host_nexthop,
-	host_srcip;
-    ip_subnet client;
-
-    bool key_from_DNS_on_demand;
-    bool has_client;
-    bool has_client_wildcard;
-    bool has_port_wildcard;
-    bool has_id_wildcards;
-    bool has_natip;
-    char *updown;
-    u_int16_t host_port;	/* host order */
-    u_int16_t port;		/* host order */
-    u_int8_t protocol;
-    cert_t cert;		/* end certificate */
-    chunk_t ca;			/* CA distinguished name */
-    struct ietfAttrList *groups;/* access control groups */
-    smartcard_t *sc;		/* smartcard reader and key info */
-    struct virtual_t *virt;
-    bool modecfg;		/* this end: request local address from server */
-				/* that end: give local addresses to clients */
-    bool hostaccess;		/* allow access to host via iptables INPUT/OUTPUT */
-				/* rules if client behind host is a subnet */
-    bool allow_any;		/* IP address is subject to change */
-    certpolicy_t sendcert;	/* whether or not to send the certificate */
+	struct id id;
+	ip_address
+		host_addr,
+		host_nexthop,
+		host_srcip;
+	ip_subnet client;
+
+	bool key_from_DNS_on_demand;
+	bool has_client;
+	bool has_client_wildcard;
+	bool has_port_wildcard;
+	bool has_id_wildcards;
+	bool has_natip;
+	char *updown;
+	u_int16_t host_port;        /* host order */
+	u_int16_t port;             /* host order */
+	u_int8_t protocol;
+	cert_t cert;                /* end certificate */
+	chunk_t ca;                 /* CA distinguished name */
+	struct ietfAttrList *groups;/* access control groups */
+	smartcard_t *sc;            /* smartcard reader and key info */
+	struct virtual_t *virt;
+	bool modecfg;               /* this end: request local address from server */
+								/* that end: give local addresses to clients */
+	bool hostaccess;            /* allow access to host via iptables INPUT/OUTPUT */
+								/* rules if client behind host is a subnet */
+	bool allow_any;             /* IP address is subject to change */
+	certpolicy_t sendcert;      /* whether or not to send the certificate */
 };
 
 struct spd_route {
-    struct spd_route *next;
-    struct end this;
-    struct end that;
-    so_serial_t eroute_owner;
-    enum routing_t routing;	/* level of routing in place */
-    uint32_t reqid;
+	struct spd_route *next;
+	struct end this;
+	struct end that;
+	so_serial_t eroute_owner;
+	enum routing_t routing;     /* level of routing in place */
+	uint32_t reqid;
 };
 
 struct connection {
-    char *name;
-    bool ikev1;
+	char *name;
+	bool ikev1;
 
-    lset_t policy;
-    time_t sa_ike_life_seconds;
-    time_t sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
-    time_t sa_rekey_margin;
-    unsigned long sa_rekey_fuzz;
-    unsigned long sa_keying_tries;
+	lset_t policy;
+	time_t sa_ike_life_seconds;
+	time_t sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
+	time_t sa_rekey_margin;
+	unsigned long sa_rekey_fuzz;
+	unsigned long sa_keying_tries;
 
-    /* RFC 3706 DPD */
-    time_t dpd_delay;
-    time_t dpd_timeout;
-    dpd_action_t dpd_action;
+	/* RFC 3706 DPD */
+	time_t dpd_delay;
+	time_t dpd_timeout;
+	dpd_action_t dpd_action;
 
-    char              *log_file_name;       /* name of log file */
-    FILE              *log_file;            /* possibly open FILE */
-    TAILQ_ENTRY(connection) log_link;     /* linked list of open conns */
-    bool               log_file_err;        /* only bitch once */
+	char              *log_file_name;       /* name of log file */
+	FILE              *log_file;            /* possibly open FILE */
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(connection) log_link;     /* linked list of open conns */
+	bool               log_file_err;        /* only bitch once */
 
-    struct spd_route spd;
+	struct spd_route spd;
 
-    /* internal fields: */
+	/* internal fields: */
 
-    unsigned long instance_serial;
-    policy_prio_t prio;
-    bool instance_initiation_ok;	/* this is an instance of a policy that mandates initiate */
-    enum connection_kind kind;
-    const struct iface *interface;	/* filled in iff oriented */
+	unsigned long instance_serial;
+	policy_prio_t prio;
+	bool instance_initiation_ok;        /* this is an instance of a policy that mandates initiate */
+	enum connection_kind kind;
+	const struct iface *interface;      /* filled in iff oriented */
 
-    so_serial_t	/* state object serial number */
-	newest_isakmp_sa,
-	newest_ipsec_sa;
+	so_serial_t /* state object serial number */
+		newest_isakmp_sa,
+		newest_ipsec_sa;
 
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    lset_t extra_debugging;
+	lset_t extra_debugging;
 #endif
 
-    /* note: if the client is the gateway, the following must be equal */
-    sa_family_t addr_family;		/* between gateways */
-    sa_family_t tunnel_addr_family;	/* between clients */
+	/* note: if the client is the gateway, the following must be equal */
+	sa_family_t addr_family;            /* between gateways */
+	sa_family_t tunnel_addr_family;     /* between clients */
 
-    struct connection *policy_next;	/* if multiple policies,
-					   next one to apply */
+	struct connection *policy_next;     /* if multiple policies,
+										   next one to apply */
 
-    struct gw_info *gw_info;
-    struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp;
-    struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike;
+	struct gw_info *gw_info;
+	struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp;
+	struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike;
 
-    struct host_pair *host_pair;
-    struct connection *hp_next;		/* host pair list link */
+	struct host_pair *host_pair;
+	struct connection *hp_next;         /* host pair list link */
 
-    struct connection *ac_next;		/* all connections list link */
+	struct connection *ac_next;         /* all connections list link */
 
-    generalName_t *requested_ca;	/* collected certificate requests */
-    bool got_certrequest;
+	generalName_t *requested_ca;        /* collected certificate requests */
+	bool got_certrequest;
 };
 
 #define oriented(c) ((c).interface != NULL)
 extern bool orient(struct connection *c);
 
 extern bool same_peer_ids(const struct connection *c
-    , const struct connection *d, const struct id *his_id);
+	, const struct connection *d, const struct id *his_id);
 
 /* Format the topology of a connection end, leaving out defaults.
  * Largest left end looks like: client === host : port [ host_id ] --- hop
  * Note: if that==NULL, skip nexthop
  */
-#define END_BUF	(SUBNETTOT_BUF + ADDRTOT_BUF + IDTOA_BUF + ADDRTOT_BUF + 10)
+#define END_BUF (SUBNETTOT_BUF + ADDRTOT_BUF + IDTOA_BUF + ADDRTOT_BUF + 10)
 extern size_t format_end(char *buf, size_t buf_len
-    , const struct end *this, const struct end *that
-    , bool is_left, lset_t policy);
+	, const struct end *this, const struct end *that
+	, bool is_left, lset_t policy);
 
 extern void add_connection(const whack_message_t *wm);
 extern void initiate_connection(const char *name, int whackfd);
 extern void initiate_opportunistic(const ip_address *our_client
-    , const ip_address *peer_client, int transport_proto, bool held, int whackfd);
+	, const ip_address *peer_client, int transport_proto, bool held, int whackfd);
 extern void terminate_connection(const char *nm);
 extern void release_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations);
 extern void delete_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations);
@@ -257,87 +255,87 @@ extern void remove_group_instance(const struct connection *group, const char *na
 extern void release_dead_interfaces(void);
 extern void check_orientations(void);
 extern struct connection *route_owner(struct connection *c
-				      , struct spd_route **srp
-				      , struct connection **erop
-				      , struct spd_route **esrp);
+									  , struct spd_route **srp
+									  , struct connection **erop
+									  , struct spd_route **esrp);
 extern struct connection *shunt_owner(const ip_subnet *ours
-    , const ip_subnet *his);
+	, const ip_subnet *his);
 
-extern bool uniqueIDs;	/* --uniqueids? */
+extern bool uniqueIDs;  /* --uniqueids? */
 extern void ISAKMP_SA_established(struct connection *c, so_serial_t serial);
 
 #define his_id_was_instantiated(c) ((c)->kind == CK_INSTANCE \
-    && (id_is_ipaddr(&(c)->spd.that.id)? \
-    sameaddr(&(c)->spd.that.id.ip_addr, &(c)->spd.that.host_addr) : TRUE))
+	&& (id_is_ipaddr(&(c)->spd.that.id)? \
+	sameaddr(&(c)->spd.that.id.ip_addr, &(c)->spd.that.host_addr) : TRUE))
 
-struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in state.h) */
+struct state;   /* forward declaration of tag (defined in state.h) */
 extern struct connection
-    *con_by_name(const char *nm, bool strict),
-    *find_host_connection(const ip_address *me, u_int16_t my_port
-	, const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port, lset_t policy),
-    *refine_host_connection(const struct state *st, const struct id *id
-	, chunk_t peer_ca),
-    *find_client_connection(struct connection *c
-	, const ip_subnet *our_net
-	, const ip_subnet *peer_net
-	, const u_int8_t our_protocol
-	, const u_int16_t out_port
-	, const u_int8_t peer_protocol
-	, const u_int16_t peer_port),
-    *find_connection_by_reqid(uint32_t reqid);
+	*con_by_name(const char *nm, bool strict),
+	*find_host_connection(const ip_address *me, u_int16_t my_port
+		, const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port, lset_t policy),
+	*refine_host_connection(const struct state *st, const struct id *id
+		, chunk_t peer_ca),
+	*find_client_connection(struct connection *c
+		, const ip_subnet *our_net
+		, const ip_subnet *peer_net
+		, const u_int8_t our_protocol
+		, const u_int16_t out_port
+		, const u_int8_t peer_protocol
+		, const u_int16_t peer_port),
+	*find_connection_by_reqid(uint32_t reqid);
 
 extern struct connection *
 find_connection_for_clients(struct spd_route **srp
-			    , const ip_address *our_client
-			    , const ip_address *peer_client
-			    , int transport_proto);
+							, const ip_address *our_client
+							, const ip_address *peer_client
+							, int transport_proto);
 
 extern chunk_t get_peer_ca_and_groups(struct connection *c
-    , const ietfAttrList_t **peer_list);
-    
+	, const ietfAttrList_t **peer_list);
+	
 /* instantiating routines
  * Note: connection_discard() is in state.h because all its work
  * is looking through state objects.
  */
-struct gw_info;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in dnskey.h) */
-struct alg_info;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in alg_info.h) */
+struct gw_info; /* forward declaration of tag (defined in dnskey.h) */
+struct alg_info;        /* forward declaration of tag (defined in alg_info.h) */
 extern struct connection *rw_instantiate(struct connection *c
-					 , const ip_address *him
-					 , u_int16_t his_port
-					 , const ip_subnet *his_net
-					 , const struct id *his_id);
+										 , const ip_address *him
+										 , u_int16_t his_port
+										 , const ip_subnet *his_net
+										 , const struct id *his_id);
 
 extern struct connection *oppo_instantiate(struct connection *c
-					   , const ip_address *him
-					   , const struct id *his_id
-					   , struct gw_info *gw
-					   , const ip_address *our_client
-					   , const ip_address *peer_client);
+										   , const ip_address *him
+										   , const struct id *his_id
+										   , struct gw_info *gw
+										   , const ip_address *our_client
+										   , const ip_address *peer_client);
 
 extern struct connection
   *build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(struct gw_info *gw
-					   , const ip_address *our_client
-					   , const ip_address *peer_client);
+										   , const ip_address *our_client
+										   , const ip_address *peer_client);
 
 /* worst case: "[" serial "] " myclient "=== ..." peer "===" hisclient '\0' */
 #define CONN_INST_BUF \
-    (2 + 10 + 1 + SUBNETTOT_BUF + 7 + ADDRTOT_BUF + 3 + SUBNETTOT_BUF + 1)
+	(2 + 10 + 1 + SUBNETTOT_BUF + 7 + ADDRTOT_BUF + 3 + SUBNETTOT_BUF + 1)
 
 extern void fmt_conn_instance(const struct connection *c
-    , char buf[CONN_INST_BUF]);
+	, char buf[CONN_INST_BUF]);
 
 /* operations on "pending", the structure representing Quick Mode
  * negotiations delayed until a Keying Channel has been negotiated.
  */
 
-struct pending;	/* forward declaration (opaque outside connections.c) */
+struct pending; /* forward declaration (opaque outside connections.c) */
 
 extern void add_pending(int whack_sock
-    , struct state *isakmp_sa
-    , struct connection *c
-    , lset_t policy
-    , unsigned long try
-    , so_serial_t replacing);
+	, struct state *isakmp_sa
+	, struct connection *c
+	, lset_t policy
+	, unsigned long try
+	, so_serial_t replacing);
 
 extern void release_pending_whacks(struct state *st, err_t story);
 extern void unpend(struct state *st);
@@ -360,9 +358,9 @@ extern struct connection *eclipsed(struct connection *c, struct spd_route **);
 
 extern void show_connections_status(bool all, const char *name);
 extern int  connection_compare(const struct connection *ca
-    , const struct connection *cb);
+	, const struct connection *cb);
 extern void update_host_pair(const char *why, struct connection *c
-    , const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
-    , const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport);
+	, const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
+	, const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport);
 
 #endif /* _CONNECTIONS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/constants.c b/src/pluto/constants.c
index 50a75c0aa..adcd77131 100644
--- a/src/pluto/constants.c
+++ b/src/pluto/constants.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* tables of names for values defined in constants.h
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002 D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: constants.c 4612 2008-11-11 06:37:37Z andreas $
  */
 
 /*
@@ -25,7 +24,6 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -36,42 +34,36 @@
 
 const char compile_time_interop_options[] = ""
 #ifdef THREADS
-	" THREADS"
-#endif
-#ifdef LIBCURL
-	" LIBCURL"
-#endif
-#ifdef LIBLDAP
-	" LIBLDAP"
+		" THREADS"
 #endif
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-	" SMARTCARD"
+		" SMARTCARD"
 #endif
 #ifdef VENDORID
-	" VENDORID"
+		" VENDORID"
 #endif
 #ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
-	" CISCO_QUIRKS"
+		" CISCO_QUIRKS"
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	" KEYRR"
+		" KEYRR"
 #endif
-    ;
+	;
 
 /* version */
 
 static const char *const version_name[] = {
-	"ISAKMP Version 1.0",
+		"ISAKMP Version 1.0",
 };
 
 enum_names version_names =
-    { ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION<<ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION,
-	ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION<<ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION,
-	version_name, NULL };
+	{ ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION<<ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION,
+		ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION<<ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION,
+		version_name, NULL };
 
 /* RFC 2459 CRL reason codes */
 
-static const char *const crl_reason_name[] = {
+ENUM(crl_reason_names, REASON_UNSPECIFIED, REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL,
 	"unspecified",
 	"key compromise",
 	"ca compromise",
@@ -81,26 +73,20 @@ static const char *const crl_reason_name[] = {
 	"certificate hold",
 	"reason #7",
 	"remove from crl"
-    };
-
-enum_names crl_reason_names =
-    { REASON_UNSPECIFIED, REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL, crl_reason_name, NULL};
+);
 
 /* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
 
-static const char *const dpd_action_name[] = {
+ENUM(dpd_action_names, DPD_ACTION_NONE, DPD_ACTION_RESTART,
 	"none",
 	"clear",
 	"hold",
 	"restart"
-    };
-
-enum_names dpd_action_names =
-    { DPD_ACTION_NONE, DPD_ACTION_RESTART, dpd_action_name, NULL};
-        
+);	
+	
 /* Timer events */
 
-static const char *const timer_event_name[] = {
+ENUM(timer_event_names, EVENT_NULL, EVENT_LOG_DAILY,
 	"EVENT_NULL",
 	"EVENT_REINIT_SECRET",
 	"EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN",
@@ -113,16 +99,13 @@ static const char *const timer_event_name[] = {
 	"EVENT_DPD",
 	"EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT",
 	"EVENT_LOG_DAILY"
-    };
-
-enum_names timer_event_names =
-    { EVENT_NULL, EVENT_LOG_DAILY, timer_event_name, NULL };
+);
 
 /* Domain of Interpretation */
 
 static const char *const doi_name[] = {
-	"ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP",
-	"ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC",
+		"ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP",
+		"ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC",
 };
 
 enum_names doi_names = { ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP, ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC, doi_name, NULL };
@@ -155,7 +138,7 @@ const char *const debug_bit_names[] = {
 	"impair-bust-mr2",
 
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 #endif
 
 /* State of exchanges */
@@ -197,78 +180,78 @@ static const char *const state_name[] = {
 	"STATE_MODE_CFG_R4",
 
 	"STATE_IKE_ROOF"
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names state_names =
-    { STATE_MAIN_R0, STATE_IKE_ROOF-1, state_name, NULL };
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R0, STATE_IKE_ROOF-1, state_name, NULL };
 
 /* story for state */
 
 const char *const state_story[] = {
-	"expecting MI1",			 /* STATE_MAIN_R0 */
-	"sent MI1, expecting MR1",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I1 */
-	"sent MR1, expecting MI2",		 /* STATE_MAIN_R1 */
-	"sent MI2, expecting MR2",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I2 */
-	"sent MR2, expecting MI3",		 /* STATE_MAIN_R2 */
-	"sent MI3, expecting MR3",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I3 */
-	"sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established",	 /* STATE_MAIN_R3 */
-	"ISAKMP SA established",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I4 */
-
-	"expecting QI1",			 /* STATE_QUICK_R0 */
-	"sent QI1, expecting QR1",		 /* STATE_QUICK_I1 */
-	"sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2",	/* STATE_QUICK_R1 */
-	"sent QI2, IPsec SA established",	 /* STATE_QUICK_I2 */
-	"IPsec SA established",			 /* STATE_QUICK_R2 */
-
-	"got Informational Message in clear",	 /* STATE_INFO */
-	"got encrypted Informational Message",	 /* STATE_INFO_PROTECTED */
-
-	"expecting XAUTH request",		 /* STATE_XAUTH_I0 */
-	"sent XAUTH request, expecting reply",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_R1 */
-	"sent XAUTH reply, expecting status",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_I1 */
-	"sent XAUTH status, expecting ack",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_R2 */
-	"sent XAUTH ack, established",		 /* STATE_XAUTH_I2 */
-	"received XAUTH ack, established",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_R3 */
-
-	"expecting ModeCfg request",		 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 */
+	"expecting MI1",                         /* STATE_MAIN_R0 */
+	"sent MI1, expecting MR1",               /* STATE_MAIN_I1 */
+	"sent MR1, expecting MI2",               /* STATE_MAIN_R1 */
+	"sent MI2, expecting MR2",               /* STATE_MAIN_I2 */
+	"sent MR2, expecting MI3",               /* STATE_MAIN_R2 */
+	"sent MI3, expecting MR3",               /* STATE_MAIN_I3 */
+	"sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established",       /* STATE_MAIN_R3 */
+	"ISAKMP SA established",                 /* STATE_MAIN_I4 */
+
+	"expecting QI1",                         /* STATE_QUICK_R0 */
+	"sent QI1, expecting QR1",               /* STATE_QUICK_I1 */
+	"sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2",  /* STATE_QUICK_R1 */
+	"sent QI2, IPsec SA established",        /* STATE_QUICK_I2 */
+	"IPsec SA established",                  /* STATE_QUICK_R2 */
+
+	"got Informational Message in clear",    /* STATE_INFO */
+	"got encrypted Informational Message",   /* STATE_INFO_PROTECTED */
+
+	"expecting XAUTH request",               /* STATE_XAUTH_I0 */
+	"sent XAUTH request, expecting reply",   /* STATE_XAUTH_R1 */
+	"sent XAUTH reply, expecting status",    /* STATE_XAUTH_I1 */
+	"sent XAUTH status, expecting ack",      /* STATE_XAUTH_R2 */
+	"sent XAUTH ack, established",           /* STATE_XAUTH_I2 */
+	"received XAUTH ack, established",       /* STATE_XAUTH_R3 */
+
+	"expecting ModeCfg request",             /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 */
 	"sent ModeCfg request, expecting reply", /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I1 */
-	"sent ModeCfg reply, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R1 */
-	"received ModeCfg reply, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I2 */
+	"sent ModeCfg reply, established",       /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R1 */
+	"received ModeCfg reply, established",   /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I2 */
 
-	"expecting ModeCfg set",		 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I0 */
-	"sent ModeCfg set, expecting ack",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R3 */
-	"sent ModeCfg ack, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I3 */
-	"received ModeCfg ack, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R4 */
-    };
+	"expecting ModeCfg set",                 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I0 */
+	"sent ModeCfg set, expecting ack",       /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R3 */
+	"sent ModeCfg ack, established",         /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I3 */
+	"received ModeCfg ack, established",     /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R4 */
+};
 
 /* kind of struct connection */
 
 static const char *const connection_kind_name[] = {
-    "CK_GROUP",		/* policy group: instantiates to template */
-    "CK_TEMPLATE",	/* abstract connection, with wildcard */
-    "CK_PERMANENT",	/* normal connection */
-    "CK_INSTANCE",	/* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
-    "CK_GOING_AWAY"	/* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
+	"CK_GROUP",         /* policy group: instantiates to template */
+	"CK_TEMPLATE",      /* abstract connection, with wildcard */
+	"CK_PERMANENT",     /* normal connection */
+	"CK_INSTANCE",      /* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
+	"CK_GOING_AWAY"     /* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
 };
 
 enum_names connection_kind_names =
-    { CK_GROUP, CK_GOING_AWAY, connection_kind_name, NULL };
+	{ CK_GROUP, CK_GOING_AWAY, connection_kind_name, NULL };
 
 /* routing status names */
 
 static const char *const routing_story_strings[] = {
-    "unrouted",	/* RT_UNROUTED: unrouted */
-    "unrouted HOLD",	/* RT_UNROUTED_HOLD: unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
-    "eroute eclipsed",	/* RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED: RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
-    "prospective erouted",	/* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE: routed, and prospective shunt installed */
-    "erouted HOLD",	/* RT_ROUTED_HOLD: routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
-    "fail erouted",	/* RT_ROUTED_FAILURE: routed, and failure-context shunt eroute installed */
-    "erouted",	/* RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL: routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
-    "keyed, unrouted",  /* RT_UNROUTED_KEYED: was routed+keyed, but it got turned into an outer policy */
-    };
+	"unrouted", /* RT_UNROUTED: unrouted */
+	"unrouted HOLD",    /* RT_UNROUTED_HOLD: unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
+	"eroute eclipsed",  /* RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED: RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
+	"prospective erouted",      /* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE: routed, and prospective shunt installed */
+	"erouted HOLD",     /* RT_ROUTED_HOLD: routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
+	"fail erouted",     /* RT_ROUTED_FAILURE: routed, and failure-context shunt eroute installed */
+	"erouted",  /* RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL: routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
+	"keyed, unrouted",  /* RT_UNROUTED_KEYED: was routed+keyed, but it got turned into an outer policy */
+};
 
 enum_names routing_story =
-    { RT_UNROUTED, RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL, routing_story_strings, NULL};
+	{ RT_UNROUTED, RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL, routing_story_strings, NULL};
 
 /* Payload types (RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.1) */
 
@@ -296,16 +279,18 @@ const char *const payload_name[] = {
 	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-D",
 	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-OA",
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
-const char *const payload_name_nat_d[] = { "ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-D",
-	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-OA", NULL };
+const char *const payload_name_nat_d[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-D",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-OA", NULL
+};
 
 static enum_names payload_names_nat_d =
 	{ ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS, ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS, payload_name_nat_d, NULL };
-	
+		
 enum_names payload_names =
-    { ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC, payload_name, &payload_names_nat_d };
+	{ ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC, payload_name, &payload_names_nat_d };
 
 /* Exchange types (note: two discontinuous ranges) */
 
@@ -317,26 +302,26 @@ static const char *const exchange_name[] = {
 	"ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR",
 	"ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO",
 	"ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const exchange_name2[] = {
 	"ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK",
 	"ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP",
 	"ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO",
-    };
+};
 
 static enum_names exchange_desc2 =
-    { ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK, ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO, exchange_name2, NULL };
+	{ ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK, ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO, exchange_name2, NULL };
 
 enum_names exchange_names =
-    { ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE, ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG, exchange_name, &exchange_desc2 };
+	{ ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE, ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG, exchange_name, &exchange_desc2 };
 
 /* Flag BITS */
 const char *const flag_bit_names[] = {
 	"ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION",
 	"ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT",
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 /* Situation BITS definition for IPsec DOI */
 
@@ -345,7 +330,7 @@ const char *const sit_bit_names[] = {
 	"SIT_SECRECY",
 	"SIT_INTEGRITY",
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 /* Protocol IDs (RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.4.1) */
 
@@ -354,78 +339,74 @@ static const char *const protocol_name[] = {
 	"PROTO_IPSEC_AH",
 	"PROTO_IPSEC_ESP",
 	"PROTO_IPCOMP",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names protocol_names =
-    { PROTO_ISAKMP, PROTO_IPCOMP, protocol_name, NULL };
+	{ PROTO_ISAKMP, PROTO_IPCOMP, protocol_name, NULL };
 
 /* IPsec ISAKMP transform values */
 
 static const char *const isakmp_transform_name[] = {
 	"KEY_IKE",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names isakmp_transformid_names =
-    { KEY_IKE, KEY_IKE, isakmp_transform_name, NULL };
+	{ KEY_IKE, KEY_IKE, isakmp_transform_name, NULL };
 
 /* IPsec AH transform values */
 
 static const char *const ah_transform_name[] = {
-	"AH_MD5",
-	"AH_SHA",
-	"AH_DES",
-	"AH_SHA2_256",
-	"AH_SHA2_384",
-	"AH_SHA2_512",
-	"AH_RIPEMD",
-	"AH_AES_XCBC_MAC",
-	"AH_RSA"
-    };
+	"HMAC_MD5",
+	"HMAC_SHA1",
+	"DES_MAC",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_256",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_384",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_512",
+	"HMAC_RIPEMD",
+	"AES_XCBC_96",
+	"SIG_RSA"
+};
 
 enum_names ah_transformid_names =
-    { AH_MD5, AH_RSA, ah_transform_name, NULL };
+	{ AH_MD5, AH_RSA, ah_transform_name, NULL };
 
 /* IPsec ESP transform values */
 
 static const char *const esp_transform_name[] = {
-	"ESP_DES_IV64",
-	"ESP_DES",
-	"ESP_3DES",
-	"ESP_RC5",
-	"ESP_IDEA",
-	"ESP_CAST",
-	"ESP_BLOWFISH",
-	"ESP_3IDEA",
-	"ESP_DES_IV32",
-	"ESP_RC4",
-	"ESP_NULL",
-	"ESP_AES",
-	"ESP_AES-CTR",
-	"ESP_AES-CCM_8",
-	"ESP_AES-CCM_12",
-	"ESP_AES-CCM_16",
-	"ESP_UNASSIGNED_17",
-	"ESP_AES_GCM_8",
-	"ESP_AES_GCM_12",
-	"ESP_AES_GCM_16",
-	"ESP_SEED_CBC",
-	"ESP_CAMELLIA"
-    };
+	"DES_IV64",
+	"DES_CBC",
+	"3DES_CBC",
+	"RC5_CBC",
+	"IDEA_CBC",
+	"CAST_CBC",
+	"BLOWFISH_CBC",
+	"3IDEA",
+	"DES_IV32",
+	"RC4",
+	"NULL",
+	"AES_CBC",
+	"AES_CTR",
+	"AES_CCM_8",
+	"AES_CCM_12",
+	"AES_CCM_16",
+	"UNASSIGNED_17",
+	"AES_GCM_8",
+	"AES_GCM_12",
+	"AES_GCM_16",
+	"SEED_CBC",
+	"CAMELLIA_CBC"
+};
 
-/*
- * ipsec drafts suggest "high" ESP ids values for testing,
- * assign generic ESP_ID<num> if not officially defined
- */
 static const char *const esp_transform_name_high[] = {
-	"ESP_SERPENT",
-	"ESP_TWOFISH"
-    };
+	"SERPENT_CBC",
+	"TWOFISH_CBC"
+};
 
 enum_names esp_transformid_names_high =
-    { ESP_SERPENT, ESP_TWOFISH, esp_transform_name_high, NULL };
+	{ ESP_SERPENT, ESP_TWOFISH, esp_transform_name_high, NULL };
 
 enum_names esp_transformid_names =
-    { ESP_DES_IV64, ESP_CAMELLIA, esp_transform_name, &esp_transformid_names_high };
+	{ ESP_DES_IV64, ESP_CAMELLIA, esp_transform_name, &esp_transformid_names_high };
 
 /* IPCOMP transform values */
 
@@ -434,10 +415,10 @@ static const char *const ipcomp_transform_name[] = {
 	"IPCOMP_DEFLAT",
 	"IPCOMP_LZS",
 	"IPCOMP_LZJH",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names ipcomp_transformid_names =
-    { IPCOMP_OUI, IPCOMP_LZJH, ipcomp_transform_name, NULL };
+	{ IPCOMP_OUI, IPCOMP_LZJH, ipcomp_transform_name, NULL };
 
 /* Identification type values */
 
@@ -453,10 +434,10 @@ static const char *const ident_name[] = {
 	"ID_DER_ASN1_DN",
 	"ID_DER_ASN1_GN",
 	"ID_KEY_ID",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names ident_names =
-    { ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_KEY_ID, ident_name, NULL };
+	{ ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_KEY_ID, ident_name, NULL };
 
 /* Certificate type values */
 
@@ -472,21 +453,18 @@ static const char *const cert_type_name[] = {
 	"CERT_ARL",
 	"CERT_SPKI",
 	"CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names cert_type_names =
-    { CERT_NONE, CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE, cert_type_name, NULL };
+	{ CERT_NONE, CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE, cert_type_name, NULL };
 
 /* Certificate policy names */
 
-static const char *const cert_policy_name[] = {
+ENUM(cert_policy_names, CERT_ALWAYS_SEND, CERT_NEVER_SEND,
 	"ALWAYS_SEND",
 	"SEND_IF_ASKED",
 	"NEVER_SEND",
-    };
-
-enum_names cert_policy_names =
-    { CERT_ALWAYS_SEND, CERT_NEVER_SEND, cert_policy_name, NULL };
+);
 
 /* Goal BITs for establishing an SA
  * Note: we drop the POLICY_ prefix so that logs are more concise.
@@ -494,7 +472,7 @@ enum_names cert_policy_names =
 
 const char *const sa_policy_bit_names[] = {
 	"PSK",
-	"RSASIG",
+	"PUBKEY",
 	"ENCRYPT",
 	"AUTHENTICATE",
 	"COMPRESS",
@@ -517,24 +495,23 @@ const char *const sa_policy_bit_names[] = {
 	"DONTREAUTH",
 	"BEET",
 	"MOBIKE",
-	"ECDSA",
 	"PROXY",
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 const char *const policy_shunt_names[4] = {
 	"TRAP",
 	"PASS",
 	"DROP",
 	"REJECT",
-    };
+};
 
 const char *const policy_fail_names[4] = {
 	"NONE",
 	"PASS",
 	"DROP",
 	"REJECT",
-    };
+};
 
 /* Oakley transform attributes
  * oakley_attr_bit_names does double duty: it is used for enum names
@@ -560,7 +537,7 @@ const char *const oakley_attr_bit_names[] = {
 	"OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER",
 	"OAKLEY_BLOCK_SIZE",
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const oakley_var_attr_name[] = {
 	"OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME (variable length)",
@@ -574,36 +551,36 @@ static const char *const oakley_var_attr_name[] = {
 	NULL,
 	NULL,
 	"OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER (variable length)",
-    };
+};
 
 static enum_names oakley_attr_desc_tv = {
-    OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
-    OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV, oakley_attr_bit_names, NULL };
+	OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+	OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV, oakley_attr_bit_names, NULL };
 
 enum_names oakley_attr_names = {
-    OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME, OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER,
-    oakley_var_attr_name, &oakley_attr_desc_tv };
+	OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME, OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER,
+	oakley_var_attr_name, &oakley_attr_desc_tv };
 
 /* for each Oakley attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
 enum_names *oakley_attr_val_descs[] = {
-	NULL,			/* (none) */
-	&oakley_enc_names,	/* OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM */
-	&oakley_hash_names,	/* OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM */
-	&oakley_auth_names,	/* OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD */
-	&oakley_group_names,	/* OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION */
+	NULL,                   /* (none) */
+	&oakley_enc_names,      /* OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM */
+	&oakley_hash_names,     /* OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM */
+	&oakley_auth_names,     /* OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD */
+	&oakley_group_names,    /* OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION */
 	&oakley_group_type_names,/* OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B */
-	&oakley_lifetime_names,	/* OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION */
-	&oakley_prf_names,	/* OAKLEY_PRF */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE */
-	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER */
-    };
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B */
+	&oakley_lifetime_names, /* OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION */
+	&oakley_prf_names,      /* OAKLEY_PRF */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE */
+	NULL,                   /* OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER */
+};
 
 /* IPsec DOI attributes (RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.5) */
 
@@ -617,7 +594,7 @@ static const char *const ipsec_attr_name[] = {
 	"KEY_ROUNDS",
 	"COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE",
 	"COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const ipsec_var_attr_name[] = {
 	"SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length)",
@@ -628,40 +605,40 @@ static const char *const ipsec_var_attr_name[] = {
 	NULL,
 	NULL,
 	"COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG (variable length)",
-    };
+};
 
 static enum_names ipsec_attr_desc_tv = {
-    SA_LIFE_TYPE + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
-    COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
-    ipsec_attr_name, NULL };
+	SA_LIFE_TYPE + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+	COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+	ipsec_attr_name, NULL };
 
 enum_names ipsec_attr_names = {
-    SA_LIFE_DURATION, COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG,
-    ipsec_var_attr_name, &ipsec_attr_desc_tv };
+	SA_LIFE_DURATION, COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG,
+	ipsec_var_attr_name, &ipsec_attr_desc_tv };
 
 /* for each IPsec attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
 enum_names *ipsec_attr_val_descs[] = {
-	NULL,			/* (none) */
-	&sa_lifetime_names,	/* SA_LIFE_TYPE */
-	NULL,			/* SA_LIFE_DURATION */
-	&oakley_group_names,	/* GROUP_DESCRIPTION */
-	&enc_mode_names,		/* ENCAPSULATION_MODE */
-	&auth_alg_names,		/* AUTH_ALGORITHM */
-	NULL,			/* KEY_LENGTH */
-	NULL,			/* KEY_ROUNDS */
-	NULL,			/* COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE */
-	NULL,			/* COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG */
-    };
+	NULL,                   /* (none) */
+	&sa_lifetime_names,     /* SA_LIFE_TYPE */
+	NULL,                   /* SA_LIFE_DURATION */
+	&oakley_group_names,    /* GROUP_DESCRIPTION */
+	&enc_mode_names,                /* ENCAPSULATION_MODE */
+	&auth_alg_names,                /* AUTH_ALGORITHM */
+	NULL,                   /* KEY_LENGTH */
+	NULL,                   /* KEY_ROUNDS */
+	NULL,                   /* COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE */
+	NULL,                   /* COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG */
+};
 
 /* SA Lifetime Type attribute */
 
 static const char *const sa_lifetime_name[] = {
 	"SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS",
 	"SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names sa_lifetime_names =
-    { SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS, SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES, sa_lifetime_name, NULL };
+	{ SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS, SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES, sa_lifetime_name, NULL };
 
 /* Encapsulation Mode attribute */
 
@@ -670,55 +647,55 @@ static const char *const enc_mode_name[] = {
 	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT",
 	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL",
 	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const enc_udp_mode_name[] = {
-	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL",
-	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT",
-    };
+		"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL",
+		"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT",
+	};
 
 static enum_names enc_udp_mode_names =
-    { ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS, ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS, enc_udp_mode_name, NULL };
+	{ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS, ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS, enc_udp_mode_name, NULL };
 
 enum_names enc_mode_names =
-    { ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL, ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC, enc_mode_name, &enc_udp_mode_names };
+	{ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL, ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC, enc_mode_name, &enc_udp_mode_names };
 
 /* Auth Algorithm attribute */
 
 static const char *const auth_alg_name[] = {
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_XCBC_MAC",
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_SIG_RSA"
-    };
+	"HMAC_MD5",
+	"HMAC_SHA1",
+	"DES_MAC",
+	"KPDK",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_256",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_384",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_512",
+	"HMAC_RIPEMD",
+	"AES_XCBC_96",
+	"SIG_RSA"
+};
 
 static const char *const extended_auth_alg_name[] = {
-	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL"
-    };
+	"NULL"
+	};
 
 enum_names extended_auth_alg_names =
-    { AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL, extended_auth_alg_name, NULL };
+	{ AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL, extended_auth_alg_name, NULL };
 
 enum_names auth_alg_names =
-    { AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_SIG_RSA, auth_alg_name
-	, &extended_auth_alg_names };
+	{ AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_SIG_RSA, auth_alg_name
+		, &extended_auth_alg_names };
 
 /* From draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth */
 static const char *const xauth_type_name[] = {
-  "Generic",
-  "RADIUS-CHAP",
-  "OTP",
-  "S/KEY",
+	"Generic",
+	"RADIUS-CHAP",
+	"OTP",
+	"S/KEY",
 };
 
 enum_names xauth_type_names =
-    { XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC, XAUTH_TYPE_SKEY, xauth_type_name, NULL};
+	{ XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC, XAUTH_TYPE_SKEY, xauth_type_name, NULL};
 
 /* From draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth */
 static const char *const xauth_attr_tv_name[] = {
@@ -730,11 +707,11 @@ static const char *const xauth_attr_tv_name[] = {
 	NULL,
 	NULL,
 	"XAUTH_STATUS",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names xauth_attr_tv_names = {
-    XAUTH_TYPE   + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
-    XAUTH_STATUS + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV, xauth_attr_tv_name, NULL };
+	XAUTH_TYPE   + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+	XAUTH_STATUS + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV, xauth_attr_tv_name, NULL };
 
 static const char *const unity_attr_name[] = {
 	"UNITY_BANNER",
@@ -751,8 +728,15 @@ static const char *const unity_attr_name[] = {
 };
 
 enum_names unity_attr_names =
-    { UNITY_BANNER , UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME, unity_attr_name , &xauth_attr_tv_names };
+	{ UNITY_BANNER , UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME, unity_attr_name , &xauth_attr_tv_names };
 
+static const char *const microsoft_attr_name[] = {
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_SERVER",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_SERVER",
+};
+
+enum_names microsoft_attr_names =
+	{ INTERNAL_IP4_SERVER, INTERNAL_IP6_SERVER, microsoft_attr_name , &unity_attr_names };
 
 static const char *const xauth_attr_name[] = {
 	"XAUTH_USER_NAME",
@@ -764,10 +748,10 @@ static const char *const xauth_attr_name[] = {
 	"XAUTH_STATUS (wrong TLV syntax, should be TV)",
 	"XAUTH_NEXT_PIN",
 	"XAUTH_ANSWER",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names xauth_attr_names =
-    { XAUTH_USER_NAME , XAUTH_ANSWER, xauth_attr_name , &unity_attr_names };
+	{ XAUTH_USER_NAME , XAUTH_ANSWER, xauth_attr_name , &microsoft_attr_names };
 
 static const char *const modecfg_attr_name[] = {
 	"INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS",
@@ -785,97 +769,104 @@ static const char *const modecfg_attr_name[] = {
 	"INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET",
 	"SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES",
 	"INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names modecfg_attr_names =
-    { INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS, INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET, modecfg_attr_name , &xauth_attr_names };
+	{ INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS, INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET, modecfg_attr_name , &xauth_attr_names };
 
 /* Oakley Lifetime Type attribute */
 
 static const char *const oakley_lifetime_name[] = {
 	"OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS",
 	"OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names oakley_lifetime_names =
-    { OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS, OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES, oakley_lifetime_name, NULL };
+	{ OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS, OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES, oakley_lifetime_name, NULL };
 
 /* Oakley PRF attribute (none defined) */
 
 enum_names oakley_prf_names =
-    { 1, 0, NULL, NULL };
+	{ 1, 0, NULL, NULL };
 
 /* Oakley Encryption Algorithm attribute */
 
 static const char *const oakley_enc_name[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_DES_CBC",
-	"OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC",
-	"OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC",
-	"OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC",
-	"OAKLEY_3DES_CBC",
-	"OAKLEY_CAST_CBC",
-	"OAKLEY_AES_CBC",
-    };
+	"DES_CBC",
+	"IDEA_CBC",
+	"BLOWFISH_CBC",
+	"RC5_R16_B64_CBC",
+	"3DES_CBC",
+	"CAST_CBC",
+	"AES_CBC",
+	"CAMELLIA_CBC"
+};
 
 #ifdef NO_EXTRA_IKE
 enum_names oakley_enc_names =
-    { OAKLEY_DES_CBC, OAKLEY_AES_CBC, oakley_enc_name, NULL };
+	{ OAKLEY_DES_CBC, OAKLEY_CAMELLIA_CBC, oakley_enc_name, NULL };
 #else
 static const char *const oakley_enc_name_draft_aes_cbc_02[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_MARS_CBC"	/*	65001	*/,
-	"OAKLEY_RC6_CBC"     	/*	65002	*/,
-	"OAKLEY_ID_65003"	/*	65003	*/,
-	"OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC"	/*	65004	*/,
-	"OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC"	/*	65005	*/,
+	"MARS_CBC"       /*      65001   */,
+	"RC6_CBC"        /*      65002   */,
+	"ID_65003"       /*      65003   */,
+	"SERPENT_CBC"    /*      65004   */,
+	"TWOFISH_CBC"    /*      65005   */,
 };
+
 static const char *const oakley_enc_name_ssh[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH",
+	"TWOFISH_CBC_SSH",
 };
+
 enum_names oakley_enc_names_ssh =
-    { OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, oakley_enc_name_ssh
-	, NULL };
+	{ OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, oakley_enc_name_ssh
+		, NULL };
 
 enum_names oakley_enc_names_draft_aes_cbc_02 =
-    { OAKLEY_MARS_CBC, OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC, oakley_enc_name_draft_aes_cbc_02
-	, &oakley_enc_names_ssh };
+	{ OAKLEY_MARS_CBC, OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC, oakley_enc_name_draft_aes_cbc_02
+		, &oakley_enc_names_ssh };
 
 enum_names oakley_enc_names =
-    { OAKLEY_DES_CBC, OAKLEY_AES_CBC, oakley_enc_name
-	, &oakley_enc_names_draft_aes_cbc_02 };
+	{ OAKLEY_DES_CBC, OAKLEY_CAMELLIA_CBC, oakley_enc_name
+		, &oakley_enc_names_draft_aes_cbc_02 };
 #endif
 
 /* Oakley Hash Algorithm attribute */
 
 static const char *const oakley_hash_name[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_MD5",
-	"OAKLEY_SHA",
-	"OAKLEY_TIGER",
-	"OAKLEY_SHA2_256",
-	"OAKLEY_SHA2_384",
-	"OAKLEY_SHA2_512",
-    };
+	"HMAC_MD5",
+	"HMAC_SHA1",
+	"HMAC_TIGER",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_256",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_384",
+	"HMAC_SHA2_512",
+};
 
 enum_names oakley_hash_names =
-    { OAKLEY_MD5, OAKLEY_SHA2_512, oakley_hash_name, NULL };
+	{ OAKLEY_MD5, OAKLEY_SHA2_512, oakley_hash_name, NULL };
 
 /* Oakley Authentication Method attribute */
 
 static const char *const oakley_auth_name1[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY",
-	"OAKLEY_DSS_SIG",
-	"OAKLEY_RSA_SIG",
-	"OAKLEY_RSA_ENC",
-	"OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV",
-	"OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC",
-	"OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV",
-    };
+	"pre-shared key",
+	"DSS signature",
+	"RSA signature",
+	"RSA encryption",
+	"RSA encryption revised",
+	"ElGamal encryption",
+	"ELGamal encryption revised",
+	"ECDSA signature",
+	"ECDSA-256 signature",
+	"ECDSA-384 signature",
+	"ECDSA-521-signature",   
+};
 
 static const char *const oakley_auth_name2[] = {
 	"HybridInitRSA",
 	"HybridRespRSA",
 	"HybridInitDSS",
 	"HybridRespDSS",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const oakley_auth_name3[] = {
 	"XAUTHInitPreShared",
@@ -888,44 +879,64 @@ static const char *const oakley_auth_name3[] = {
 	"XAUTHRespRSAEncryption",
 	"XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption",
 	"XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption",
-    };
+};
 
 static enum_names oakley_auth_names1 =
-    { OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY, OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV
-	, oakley_auth_name1, NULL };
+	{ OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY, OAKLEY_ECDSA_521
+		, oakley_auth_name1, NULL };
 
 static enum_names oakley_auth_names2 =
-    { HybridInitRSA, HybridRespDSS
-	, oakley_auth_name2, &oakley_auth_names1 };
+	{ HybridInitRSA, HybridRespDSS
+		, oakley_auth_name2, &oakley_auth_names1 };
 
 enum_names oakley_auth_names =
-    { XAUTHInitPreShared, XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption
-	, oakley_auth_name3, &oakley_auth_names2 };
+	{ XAUTHInitPreShared, XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption
+		, oakley_auth_name3, &oakley_auth_names2 };
 
 /* Oakley Group Description attribute */
 
 static const char *const oakley_group_name[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP768",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GP155",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GP185",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536",
-    };
+	"MODP_768",
+	"MODP_1024",
+	"GP_155",
+	"GP_185",
+	"MODP_1536",
+};
 
 static const char *const oakley_group_name_rfc3526[] = {
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144",
-	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192"
+	"MODP_2048",
+	"MODP_3072",
+	"MODP_4096",
+	"MODP_6144",
+	"MODP_8192"
+};
+
+static const char *const oakley_group_name_rfc4753[] = {
+	"ECP_256",
+	"ECP_384",
+	"ECP_521"
+};
+
+static const char *const oakley_group_name_rfc5114[] = {
+	"ECP_192",
+	"ECP_224"
 };
+
+enum_names oakley_group_names_rfc5114 =
+	{ ECP_192_BIT, ECP_224_BIT,
+			oakley_group_name_rfc5114, NULL };
+
+enum_names oakley_group_names_rfc4753 =
+	{ ECP_256_BIT, ECP_521_BIT,
+			oakley_group_name_rfc4753, &oakley_group_names_rfc5114 };
+
 enum_names oakley_group_names_rfc3526 =
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192,
-	    oakley_group_name_rfc3526, NULL };
+	{ MODP_2048_BIT, MODP_8192_BIT,
+			oakley_group_name_rfc3526, &oakley_group_names_rfc4753 };
 
 enum_names oakley_group_names =
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP768, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536, 
-	    oakley_group_name, &oakley_group_names_rfc3526 };
+	{ MODP_768_BIT, MODP_1536_BIT, 
+			oakley_group_name, &oakley_group_names_rfc3526 };
 
 /* Oakley Group Type attribute */
 
@@ -933,10 +944,10 @@ static const char *const oakley_group_type_name[] = {
 	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP",
 	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_ECP",
 	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N",
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names oakley_group_type_names =
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP, OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N, oakley_group_type_name, NULL };
+	{ OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP, OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N, oakley_group_type_name, NULL };
 
 /* Notify messages -- error types */
 
@@ -971,38 +982,38 @@ static const char *const notification_name[] = {
 	"CERTIFICATE_UNAVAILABLE",
 	"UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE",
 	"UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const notification_status_name[] = {
 	"CONNECTED",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const ipsec_notification_name[] = {
 	"IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME",
 	"IPSEC_REPLAY_STATUS",
 	"IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const notification_dpd_name[] = {
-        "R_U_THERE",
-        "R_U_THERE_ACK",
+	"R_U_THERE",
+	"R_U_THERE_ACK",
 };
 
 enum_names notification_dpd_names =
-    { R_U_THERE, R_U_THERE_ACK,
-        notification_dpd_name, NULL };
+	{ R_U_THERE, R_U_THERE_ACK,
+		notification_dpd_name, NULL };
 
 enum_names ipsec_notification_names =
-    { IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME, IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT,
-	ipsec_notification_name, &notification_dpd_names };
+	{ IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME, IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT,
+		ipsec_notification_name, &notification_dpd_names };
 
 enum_names notification_status_names =
-    { CONNECTED, CONNECTED,
-	notification_status_name, &ipsec_notification_names };
+	{ CONNECTED, CONNECTED,
+		notification_status_name, &ipsec_notification_names };
 
 enum_names notification_names =
-    { INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE, UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS,
-	notification_name, &notification_status_names };
+	{ INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE, UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS,
+		notification_name, &notification_status_names };
 
 /* MODECFG
  * From draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg
@@ -1014,20 +1025,20 @@ const char *const attr_msg_type_name[] = {
 	"ISAKMP_CFG_SET",
 	"ISAKMP_CFG_ACK",
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names attr_msg_type_names =
-    { 0 , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, attr_msg_type_name , NULL };
+	{ 0 , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, attr_msg_type_name , NULL };
 
 /* socket address family info */
 
 static const char *const af_inet_name[] = {
 	"AF_INET",
-    };
+};
 
 static const char *const af_inet6_name[] = {
 	"AF_INET6",
-    };
+};
 
 static enum_names af_names6 = { AF_INET6, AF_INET6, af_inet6_name, NULL };
 
@@ -1045,7 +1056,7 @@ const struct af_info af_inet4_info = {
 	32,
 	ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE,
 	&ipv4_any, &ipv4_wildcard, &ipv4_all,
-    };
+};
 
 const struct af_info af_inet6_info = {
 	AF_INET6,
@@ -1055,29 +1066,28 @@ const struct af_info af_inet6_info = {
 	128,
 	ID_IPV6_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET, ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE,
 	&ipv6_any, &ipv6_wildcard, &ipv6_all,
-    };
+};
 
 const struct af_info *
 aftoinfo(int af)
 {
-    switch (af)
-    {
-	case AF_INET:
-	    return &af_inet4_info;
-	case AF_INET6:
-	    return &af_inet6_info;
-	default:
-	    return NULL;
-    }
+	switch (af)
+	{
+		case AF_INET:
+			return &af_inet4_info;
+		case AF_INET6:
+			return &af_inet6_info;
+		default:
+			return NULL;
+	}
 }
 
-bool
-subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn)
+bool subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn)
 {
-    ip_address base;
+	ip_address base;
 
-    networkof(sn, &base);
-    return isanyaddr(&base) && subnetishost(sn);
+	networkof(sn, &base);
+	return isanyaddr(&base) && subnetishost(sn);
 }
 
 /* BIND enumerated types */
@@ -1085,62 +1095,62 @@ subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn)
 #include <arpa/nameser.h>
 
 static const char *const rr_type_name[] = {
-	"T_A",	/* 1 host address */
-	"T_NS",	/* 2 authoritative server */
-	"T_MD",	/* 3 mail destination */
-	"T_MF",	/* 4 mail forwarder */
-	"T_CNAME",	/* 5 canonical name */
-	"T_SOA",	/* 6 start of authority zone */
-	"T_MB",	/* 7 mailbox domain name */
-	"T_MG",	/* 8 mail group member */
-	"T_MR",	/* 9 mail rename name */
-	"T_NULL",	/* 10 null resource record */
-	"T_WKS",	/* 11 well known service */
-	"T_PTR",	/* 12 domain name pointer */
-	"T_HINFO",	/* 13 host information */
-	"T_MINFO",	/* 14 mailbox information */
-	"T_MX",	/* 15 mail routing information */
-	"T_TXT",	/* 16 text strings */
-	"T_RP",	/* 17 responsible person */
-	"T_AFSDB",	/* 18 AFS cell database */
-	"T_X25",	/* 19 X_25 calling address */
-	"T_ISDN",	/* 20 ISDN calling address */
-	"T_RT",	/* 21 router */
-	"T_NSAP",	/* 22 NSAP address */
-	"T_NSAP_PTR",	/* 23 reverse NSAP lookup (deprecated) */
-	"T_SIG",	/* 24 security signature */
-	"T_KEY",	/* 25 security key */
-	"T_PX",	/* 26 X.400 mail mapping */
-	"T_GPOS",	/* 27 geographical position (withdrawn) */
-	"T_AAAA",	/* 28 IP6 Address */
-	"T_LOC",	/* 29 Location Information */
-	"T_NXT",	/* 30 Next Valid Name in Zone */
-	"T_EID",	/* 31 Endpoint identifier */
-	"T_NIMLOC",	/* 32 Nimrod locator */
-	"T_SRV",	/* 33 Server selection */
-	"T_ATMA",	/* 34 ATM Address */
-	"T_NAPTR",	/* 35 Naming Authority PoinTeR */
+	"T_A",  /* 1 host address */
+	"T_NS", /* 2 authoritative server */
+	"T_MD", /* 3 mail destination */
+	"T_MF", /* 4 mail forwarder */
+	"T_CNAME",      /* 5 canonical name */
+	"T_SOA",        /* 6 start of authority zone */
+	"T_MB", /* 7 mailbox domain name */
+	"T_MG", /* 8 mail group member */
+	"T_MR", /* 9 mail rename name */
+	"T_NULL",       /* 10 null resource record */
+	"T_WKS",        /* 11 well known service */
+	"T_PTR",        /* 12 domain name pointer */
+	"T_HINFO",      /* 13 host information */
+	"T_MINFO",      /* 14 mailbox information */
+	"T_MX", /* 15 mail routing information */
+	"T_TXT",        /* 16 text strings */
+	"T_RP", /* 17 responsible person */
+	"T_AFSDB",      /* 18 AFS cell database */
+	"T_X25",        /* 19 X_25 calling address */
+	"T_ISDN",       /* 20 ISDN calling address */
+	"T_RT", /* 21 router */
+	"T_NSAP",       /* 22 NSAP address */
+	"T_NSAP_PTR",   /* 23 reverse NSAP lookup (deprecated) */
+	"T_SIG",        /* 24 security signature */
+	"T_KEY",        /* 25 security key */
+	"T_PX", /* 26 X.400 mail mapping */
+	"T_GPOS",       /* 27 geographical position (withdrawn) */
+	"T_AAAA",       /* 28 IP6 Address */
+	"T_LOC",        /* 29 Location Information */
+	"T_NXT",        /* 30 Next Valid Name in Zone */
+	"T_EID",        /* 31 Endpoint identifier */
+	"T_NIMLOC",     /* 32 Nimrod locator */
+	"T_SRV",        /* 33 Server selection */
+	"T_ATMA",       /* 34 ATM Address */
+	"T_NAPTR",      /* 35 Naming Authority PoinTeR */
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names rr_type_names = { T_A, T_NAPTR, rr_type_name, NULL };
 
 /* Query type values which do not appear in resource records */
 static const char *const rr_qtype_name[] = {
-	"T_IXFR",	/* 251 incremental zone transfer */
-	"T_AXFR",	/* 252 transfer zone of authority */
-	"T_MAILB",	/* 253 transfer mailbox records */
-	"T_MAILA",	/* 254 transfer mail agent records */
-	"T_ANY",	/* 255 wildcard match */
+	"T_IXFR",       /* 251 incremental zone transfer */
+	"T_AXFR",       /* 252 transfer zone of authority */
+	"T_MAILB",      /* 253 transfer mailbox records */
+	"T_MAILA",      /* 254 transfer mail agent records */
+	"T_ANY",        /* 255 wildcard match */
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names rr_qtype_names = { T_IXFR, T_ANY, rr_qtype_name, &rr_type_names };
 
 static const char *const rr_class_name[] = {
-	"C_IN",	/* 1 the arpa internet */
+	"C_IN", /* 1 the arpa internet */
 	NULL
-    };
+};
 
 enum_names rr_class_names = { C_IN, C_IN, rr_class_name, NULL };
 
@@ -1149,34 +1159,33 @@ enum_names rr_class_names = { C_IN, C_IN, rr_class_name, NULL };
  *
  */
 const char *const natt_type_bitnames[] = {
-  "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00/01",    /* 0 */
-  "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02/03",
-  "RFC 3947",
-  "3",                                   /* 3 */
-  "4",   "5",   "6",   "7",
-  "8",   "9",   "10",  "11",
-  "12",  "13",  "14",  "15",
-  "16",  "17",  "18",  "19", 
-  "20",  "21",  "22",  "23",
-  "24",  "25",  "26",  "27",
-  "28",  "29",
-  "nat is behind me",
-  "nat is behind peer"
+	"draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00/01",    /* 0 */
+	"draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02/03",
+	"RFC 3947",
+	"3",                                   /* 3 */
+	"4",   "5",   "6",   "7",
+	"8",   "9",   "10",  "11",
+	"12",  "13",  "14",  "15",
+	"16",  "17",  "18",  "19", 
+	"20",  "21",  "22",  "23",
+	"24",  "25",  "26",  "27",
+	"28",  "29",
+	"nat is behind me",
+	"nat is behind peer"
 };
 
 /* look up enum names in an enum_names */
 
-const char *
-enum_name(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val)
+const char* enum_name(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val)
 {
-    enum_names	*p;
-
-    for (p = ed; p != NULL; p = p->en_next_range)
-    {
-	if (p->en_first <= val && val <= p->en_last)
-	    return p->en_names[val - p->en_first];
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	enum_names  *p;
+
+	for (p = ed; p != NULL; p = p->en_next_range)
+	{
+		if (p->en_first <= val && val <= p->en_last)
+			return p->en_names[val - p->en_first];
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* find or construct a string to describe an enum value
@@ -1185,16 +1194,16 @@ enum_name(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val)
 const char *
 enum_show(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val)
 {
-    const char *p = enum_name(ed, val);
+	const char *p = enum_name(ed, val);
 
-    if (p == NULL)
-    {
-	static char buf[12];	/* only one!  I hope that it is big enough */
+	if (p == NULL)
+	{
+		static char buf[12];    /* only one!  I hope that it is big enough */
 
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu??", val);
-	p = buf;
-    }
-    return p;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu??", val);
+		p = buf;
+	}
+	return p;
 }
 
 
@@ -1203,123 +1212,126 @@ static char bitnamesbuf[200];   /* only one!  I hope that it is big enough! */
 int 
 enum_search(enum_names *ed, const char *str) 
 {
-    enum_names	*p;
-    const char *ptr;
-    unsigned en;
+	enum_names  *p;
+	const char *ptr;
+	unsigned en;
 
-    for (p = ed; p != NULL; p = p->en_next_range)
-	for (en = p->en_first; en <= p->en_last ;en++)
+	for (p = ed; p != NULL; p = p->en_next_range)
 	{
-	    ptr = p->en_names[en - p->en_first];
-	    if (ptr == 0) continue;
-	    /* if (strncmp(ptr, str, strlen(ptr))==0) */
-	    if (strcmp(ptr, str) == 0)
-		    return en;
+		for (en = p->en_first; en <= p->en_last ;en++)
+		{
+			ptr = p->en_names[en - p->en_first];
+			if (ptr == 0)
+			{
+				continue;
+			}
+			if (streq(ptr, str))
+			{
+				return en;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    return -1;
+	return -1;
 }
 
 /* construct a string to name the bits on in a set
  * Result may be in STATIC buffer!
  * Note: prettypolicy depends on internal details.
  */
-const char *
-bitnamesof(const char *const table[], lset_t val)
+const char* bitnamesof(const char *const table[], lset_t val)
 {
-    char *p = bitnamesbuf;
-    lset_t bit;
-    const char *const *tp;
+	char *p = bitnamesbuf;
+	lset_t bit;
+	const char *const *tp;
 
-    if (val == 0)
-	return "none";
+	if (val == 0)
+		return "none";
 
-    for (tp = table, bit = 01; val != 0; bit <<= 1)
-    {
-	if (val & bit)
+	for (tp = table, bit = 01; val != 0; bit <<= 1)
 	{
-	    const char *n = *tp;
-	    size_t nl;
-
-	    if (n == NULL || *n == '\0')
-	    {
-		/* no name for this bit, so use hex */
-		static char flagbuf[sizeof("0x80000000")];
-
-		snprintf(flagbuf, sizeof(flagbuf), "0x%llx", bit);
-		n = flagbuf;
-	    }
-
-	    nl = strlen(n);
-
-	    if (p != bitnamesbuf && p < bitnamesbuf+sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - 1)
-		*p++ = '+';
-
-	    if (bitnamesbuf+sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - p > (ptrdiff_t)nl)
-	    {
-		strcpy(p, n);
-		p += nl;
-	    }
-	    val -= bit;
+		if (val & bit)
+		{
+			const char *n = *tp;
+			size_t nl;
+
+			if (n == NULL || *n == '\0')
+			{
+				/* no name for this bit, so use hex */
+				static char flagbuf[sizeof("0x80000000")];
+
+				snprintf(flagbuf, sizeof(flagbuf), "0x%llx", bit);
+				n = flagbuf;
+			}
+
+			nl = strlen(n);
+
+			if (p != bitnamesbuf && p < bitnamesbuf+sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - 1)
+				*p++ = '+';
+
+			if (bitnamesbuf+sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - p > (ptrdiff_t)nl)
+			{
+				strcpy(p, n);
+				p += nl;
+			}
+			val -= bit;
+		}
+		if (*tp != NULL)
+			tp++;   /* move on, but not past end */
 	}
-	if (*tp != NULL)
-	    tp++;   /* move on, but not past end */
-    }
-    *p = '\0';
-    return bitnamesbuf;
+	*p = '\0';
+	return bitnamesbuf;
 }
 
 /* print a policy: like bitnamesof, but it also does the non-bitfields.
  * Suppress the shunt and fail fields if 0.
  */
-const char *
-prettypolicy(lset_t policy)
+const char* prettypolicy(lset_t policy)
 {
-    const char *bn = bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names
-	, policy & ~(POLICY_SHUNT_MASK | POLICY_FAIL_MASK));
-    size_t len;
-    lset_t shunt = (policy & POLICY_SHUNT_MASK) >> POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT;
-    lset_t fail = (policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) >> POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT;
-
-    if (bn != bitnamesbuf)
-	bitnamesbuf[0] = '\0';
-    len = strlen(bitnamesbuf);
-    if (shunt != 0)
-    {
-	snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+%s"
-	    , policy_shunt_names[shunt]);
-	len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
-    }
-    if (fail != 0)
-    {
-	snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+failure%s"
-	    , policy_fail_names[fail]);
-	len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
-    }
-    if (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(policy))
-    {
-	snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+NEVER_NEGOTIATE");
-	len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
-    }
-    return bitnamesbuf;
+	const char *bn = bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names
+		, policy & ~(POLICY_SHUNT_MASK | POLICY_FAIL_MASK));
+	size_t len;
+	lset_t shunt = (policy & POLICY_SHUNT_MASK) >> POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT;
+	lset_t fail = (policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) >> POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT;
+
+	if (bn != bitnamesbuf)
+		bitnamesbuf[0] = '\0';
+	len = strlen(bitnamesbuf);
+	if (shunt != 0)
+	{
+		snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+%s"
+			, policy_shunt_names[shunt]);
+		len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
+	}
+	if (fail != 0)
+	{
+		snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+failure%s"
+			, policy_fail_names[fail]);
+		len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
+	}
+	if (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(policy))
+	{
+		snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+NEVER_NEGOTIATE");
+		len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
+	}
+	return bitnamesbuf;
 }
 
 /* test a set by seeing if all bits have names */
 
-bool
-testset(const char *const table[], lset_t val)
+bool testset(const char *const table[], lset_t val)
 {
-    lset_t bit;
-    const char *const *tp;
-
-    for (tp = table, bit = 01; val != 0; bit <<= 1, tp++)
-    {
-	const char *n = *tp;
-
-	if (n == NULL || ((val & bit) && *n == '\0'))
-	    return FALSE;
-	val &= ~bit;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	lset_t bit;
+	const char *const *tp;
+
+	for (tp = table, bit = 01; val != 0; bit <<= 1, tp++)
+	{
+		const char *n = *tp;
+
+		if (n == NULL || ((val & bit) && *n == '\0'))
+			return FALSE;
+		val &= ~bit;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 
@@ -1328,40 +1340,43 @@ const char sparse_end[] = "end of sparse names";
 /* look up enum names in a sparse_names */
 const char *sparse_name(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val)
 {
-    const struct sparse_name *p;
+	const struct sparse_name *p;
 
-    for (p = sd; p->name != sparse_end; p++)
-	if (p->val == val)
-	    return p->name;
-    return NULL;
+	for (p = sd; p->name != sparse_end; p++)
+		if (p->val == val)
+			return p->name;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* find or construct a string to describe an sparse value
  * Result may be in STATIC buffer!
  */
-const char *
-sparse_val_show(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val)
+const char* sparse_val_show(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val)
 {
-    const char *p = sparse_name(sd, val);
+	const char *p = sparse_name(sd, val);
 
-    if (p == NULL)
-    {
-	static char buf[12];	/* only one!  I hope that it is big enough */
+	if (p == NULL)
+	{
+		static char buf[12];    /* only one!  I hope that it is big enough */
 
-	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu??", val);
-	p = buf;
-    }
-    return p;
+		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu??", val);
+		p = buf;
+	}
+	return p;
 }
 
 void init_constants(void)
 {
-    happy(anyaddr(AF_INET, &ipv4_any));
-    happy(anyaddr(AF_INET6, &ipv6_any));
+	happy(anyaddr(AF_INET, &ipv4_any));
+	happy(anyaddr(AF_INET6, &ipv6_any));
 
-    happy(addrtosubnet(&ipv4_any, &ipv4_wildcard));
-    happy(addrtosubnet(&ipv6_any, &ipv6_wildcard));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(&ipv4_any, &ipv4_wildcard));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(&ipv6_any, &ipv6_wildcard));
 
-    happy(initsubnet(&ipv4_any, 0, '0', &ipv4_all));
-    happy(initsubnet(&ipv6_any, 0, '0', &ipv6_all));
+	happy(initsubnet(&ipv4_any, 0, '0', &ipv4_all));
+	happy(initsubnet(&ipv6_any, 0, '0', &ipv6_all));
 }
+
+u_char secret_of_the_day[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/constants.h b/src/pluto/constants.h
index 409dd1d61..5fe936e08 100644
--- a/src/pluto/constants.h
+++ b/src/pluto/constants.h
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-
 /* manifest constants
  * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
@@ -12,13 +11,15 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: constants.h 4612 2008-11-11 06:37:37Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _CONSTANTS_H
 #define _CONSTANTS_H
 
+#include <utils.h>
+#include <utils/identification.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+
 extern const char compile_time_interop_options[];
 
 extern void init_constants(void);
@@ -28,8 +29,6 @@ extern void init_constants(void);
  * Any changes here should be reflected there.
  */
 
-#define elemsof(array) (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array)))	/* number of elements in an array */
-
 /* Many routines return only success or failure, but wish to describe
  * the failure in a message.  We use the convention that they return
  * a NULL on success and a pointer to constant string on failure.
@@ -39,19 +38,10 @@ extern void init_constants(void);
  * <freeswan.h> defines err_t for this return type.
  */
 
-typedef int bool;
-#define FALSE	0
-#define TRUE	1
-
-#define NULL_FD	(-1)	/* NULL file descriptor */
+#define NULL_FD (-1)    /* NULL file descriptor */
 #define dup_any(fd) ((fd) == NULL_FD? NULL_FD : dup(fd))
 #define close_any(fd) { if ((fd) != NULL_FD) { close(fd); (fd) = NULL_FD; } }
 
-#define BITS_PER_BYTE	8
-
-#define streq(a, b) (strcmp((a), (b)) == 0)	/* clearer shorthand */
-#define strcaseeq(a, b) (strcasecmp((a), (b)) == 0)	/* clearer shorthand */
-
 /* set type with room for at least 64 elements for ALG opts (was 32 in stock FS) */
 
 typedef unsigned long long lset_t;
@@ -71,8 +61,8 @@ typedef unsigned long long lset_t;
 # define DEFAULT_CTLBASE IPSEC_PIDDIR "/pluto"
 #endif
 
-#define CTL_SUFFIX ".ctl"	/* for UNIX domain socket pathname */
-#define LOCK_SUFFIX ".pid"	/* for pluto's lock */
+#define CTL_SUFFIX ".ctl"       /* for UNIX domain socket pathname */
+#define LOCK_SUFFIX ".pid"      /* for pluto's lock */
 #define INFO_SUFFIX ".info"     /* for UNIX domain socket for apps */
 
 /* Routines to check and display values.
@@ -86,10 +76,10 @@ typedef unsigned long long lset_t;
  */
 
 struct enum_names {
-    unsigned long en_first;  /* first value in range */
-    unsigned long en_last;   /* last value in range (inclusive) */
-    const char *const *en_names;
-    const struct enum_names *en_next_range;	/* descriptor of next range */
+	unsigned long en_first;  /* first value in range */
+	unsigned long en_last;   /* last value in range (inclusive) */
+	const char *const *en_names;
+	const struct enum_names *en_next_range;     /* descriptor of next range */
 };
 
 typedef const struct enum_names enum_names;
@@ -108,8 +98,8 @@ extern const char *bitnamesof(const char *const table[], lset_t val);
  * Often appropriate for enums defined by others.
  */
 struct sparse_name {
-    unsigned long val;
-    const char *const name;
+	unsigned long val;
+	const char *const name;
 };
 typedef const struct sparse_name sparse_names[];
 
@@ -119,264 +109,172 @@ extern const char sparse_end[];
 
 #define FULL_INET_ADDRESS_SIZE    6
 
-/* Group parameters from draft-ietf-ike-01.txt section 6 */
-
-#define MODP_GENERATOR "2"
-
-#define MODP768_MODULUS \
-    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 " \
-    "29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD " \
-    "EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 " \
-    "E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-
-#define MODP1024_MODULUS \
-    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 " \
-    "29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD " \
-    "EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 " \
-    "E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED " \
-    "EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 " \
-    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-
-#define MODP1536_MODULUS \
-    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 " \
-    "29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD " \
-    "EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 " \
-    "E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED " \
-    "EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D " \
-    "C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F " \
-    "83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D " \
-    "670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF "
-
-/* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-modp-groups-03.txt */
-#define MODP2048_MODULUS \
-	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
-	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
-	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
-	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
-	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
-	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
-	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
-	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
-	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
-	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
-	"15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-
-#define MODP3072_MODULUS \
-	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
-	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
-	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
-	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
-	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
-	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
-	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
-	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
-	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
-	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
-	"15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64" \
-	"ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D B3970F85 A6E1E4C7" \
-	"ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 1AD2EE6B" \
-	"F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
-	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31" \
-	"43DB5BFC E0FD108E 4B82D120 A93AD2CA FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-
-#define MODP4096_MODULUS \
-	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
-	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
-	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
-	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
-	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
-	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
-	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
-	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
-	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
-	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
-	"15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64" \
-	"ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D B3970F85 A6E1E4C7" \
-	"ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 1AD2EE6B" \
-	"F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
-	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31" \
-	"43DB5BFC E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7" \
-	"88719A10 BDBA5B26 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA" \
-	"2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6" \
-	"287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 233BA186 515BE7ED" \
-	"1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 D5B05AA9" \
-	"93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34063199" \
-	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-
-/* copy&pasted from rfc3526: */
-#define MODP6144_MODULUS \
-	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08" \
-	"8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B" \
-	"302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9" \
-	"A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6" \
-	"49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8" \
-	"FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
-	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C" \
-	"180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718" \
-	"3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D" \
-	"04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D" \
-	"B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226" \
-	"1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
-	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC" \
-	"E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26" \
-	"99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB" \
-	"04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2" \
-	"233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127" \
-	"D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492" \
-	"36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406" \
-	"AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918" \
-	"DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151" \
-	"2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03" \
-	"F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F" \
-	"BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA" \
-	"CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B" \
-	"B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632" \
-	"387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E" \
-	"6DCC4024 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-
-/* copy&pasted from rfc3526: */
-#define MODP8192_MODULUS \
-	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
-	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
-	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
-	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
-	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
-	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
-	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
-	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
-	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
-	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
-	"15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64" \
-	"ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D B3970F85 A6E1E4C7" \
-	"ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 1AD2EE6B" \
-	"F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
-	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31" \
-	"43DB5BFC E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7" \
-	"88719A10 BDBA5B26 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA" \
-	"2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6" \
-	"287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 233BA186 515BE7ED" \
-	"1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 D5B05AA9" \
-	"93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492" \
-	"36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD" \
-	"F8FF9406 AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831" \
-	"179727B0 865A8918 DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B" \
-	"DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF" \
-	"5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 F482D7CE 6E74FEF6" \
-	"D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F BEC7E8F3" \
-	"23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA" \
-	"CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328" \
-	"06A1D58B B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C" \
-	"DA56C9EC 2EF29632 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE" \
-	"12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E 6DBE1159 74A3926F 12FEE5E4" \
-	"38777CB6 A932DF8C D8BEC4D0 73B931BA 3BC832B6 8D9DD300" \
-	"741FA7BF 8AFC47ED 2576F693 6BA42466 3AAB639C 5AE4F568" \
-	"3423B474 2BF1C978 238F16CB E39D652D E3FDB8BE FC848AD9" \
-	"22222E04 A4037C07 13EB57A8 1A23F0C7 3473FC64 6CEA306B" \
-	"4BCBC886 2F8385DD FA9D4B7F A2C087E8 79683303 ED5BDD3A" \
-	"062B3CF5 B3A278A6 6D2A13F8 3F44F82D DF310EE0 74AB6A36" \
-	"4597E899 A0255DC1 64F31CC5 0846851D F9AB4819 5DED7EA1" \
-	"B1D510BD 7EE74D73 FAF36BC3 1ECFA268 359046F4 EB879F92" \
-	"4009438B 481C6CD7 889A002E D5EE382B C9190DA6 FC026E47" \
-	"9558E447 5677E9AA 9E3050E2 765694DF C81F56E8 80B96E71" \
-	"60C980DD 98EDD3DF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
-#define LOCALSECRETSIZE		(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-
 /* limits on nonce sizes.  See RFC2409 "The internet key exchange (IKE)" 5 */
-#define MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE	8	/* bytes */
-#define DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE	16	/* bytes */
-#define MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE	256	/* bytes */
+#define MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE      8       /* bytes */
+#define DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE      16      /* bytes */
+#define MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE      256     /* bytes */
 
 #define COOKIE_SIZE 8
 #define MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE 16
 
-#define MD2_DIGEST_SIZE		(128 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE		(128 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE	(160 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE	(256 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE	(384 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE	(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-
-#define MD5_BLOCK_SIZE		(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE		(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA2_256_BLOCK_SIZE	(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA2_384_BLOCK_SIZE	(1024 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define SHA2_512_BLOCK_SIZE	(1024 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-
-#define DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(64 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-
-#define DSS_QBITS	160	/* bits in DSS's "q" (FIPS 186-1) */
+#define DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE      (64 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
 
 /* Maximum is required for SHA2_512 */
-#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN		SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE
-#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE	SHA2_512_BLOCK_SIZE
+#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN          HASH_SIZE_SHA512
 
 /* RFC 2404 "HMAC-SHA-1-96" section 3 */
-#define HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN    SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN		HASH_SIZE_SHA1
 
 /* RFC 2403 "HMAC-MD5-96" section 3 */
-#define HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN    MD5_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN   		HASH_SIZE_MD5
 
-#define IKE_UDP_PORT	500
+#define IKE_UDP_PORT    500
+
+/* IPsec AH transform values
+ * RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.3
+ * and in http://www.iana.org/assignments/isakmp-registry
+ */
+enum ipsec_authentication_algo {
+  AH_NONE         = 0,
+  AH_MD5          = 2,
+  AH_SHA          = 3,
+  AH_DES          = 4,
+  AH_SHA2_256     = 5,
+  AH_SHA2_384     = 6,
+  AH_SHA2_512     = 7,
+  AH_RIPEMD       = 8,
+  AH_AES_XCBC_MAC = 9,
+  AH_RSA          = 10
+};
+
+extern enum_names ah_transformid_names;
+
+/* IPsec ESP transform values
+ * RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.4
+ * and from http://www.iana.org/assignments/isakmp-registry
+ */
+
+enum ipsec_cipher_algo {
+  ESP_NONE          = 0,
+  ESP_DES_IV64      = 1,
+  ESP_DES           = 2,
+  ESP_3DES          = 3,
+  ESP_RC5           = 4,
+  ESP_IDEA          = 5,
+  ESP_CAST          = 6,
+  ESP_BLOWFISH      = 7,
+  ESP_3IDEA         = 8,
+  ESP_DES_IV32      = 9,
+  ESP_RC4           = 10,
+  ESP_NULL          = 11,
+  ESP_AES           = 12,
+  ESP_AES_CTR       = 13,
+  ESP_AES_CCM_8     = 14,
+  ESP_AES_CCM_12    = 15,
+  ESP_AES_CCM_16    = 16,
+  ESP_UNASSIGNED_17 = 17,
+  ESP_AES_GCM_8     = 18,
+  ESP_AES_GCM_12    = 19,
+  ESP_AES_GCM_16    = 20,
+  ESP_SEED_CBC      = 21,
+  ESP_CAMELLIA      = 22,
+  ESP_SERPENT       = 252,
+  ESP_TWOFISH       = 253
+};
+
+extern enum_names esp_transformid_names;
+
+/* IPCOMP transform values
+ * RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.5
+ */
+
+enum ipsec_comp_algo {
+  IPSCOMP_NONE   = 0,
+  IPCOMP_OUI     = 1,
+  IPCOMP_DEFLATE = 2,
+  IPCOMP_LZS     = 3,
+  IPCOMP_LZJH    = 4
+};
+
+extern enum_names ipcomp_transformid_names;
+
+/* Certificate type values
+ * RFC 2408 ISAKMP, chapter 3.9
+ */
+enum ipsec_cert_type {
+  CERT_NONE=                0,
+  CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509=  1,
+  CERT_PGP=                 2,
+  CERT_DNS_SIGNED_KEY=      3,
+  CERT_X509_SIGNATURE=      4,
+  CERT_X509_KEY_EXCHANGE=   5,
+  CERT_KERBEROS_TOKENS=     6,
+  CERT_CRL=                 7,
+  CERT_ARL=                 8,
+  CERT_SPKI=                9,
+  CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE=      10,
+  CERT_RAW_RSA_KEY=         11
+};
 
 /* RFC 2560 OCSP - certificate status */
 
 typedef enum {
-    CERT_GOOD = 	0,
-    CERT_REVOKED = 	1,
-    CERT_UNKNOWN = 	2,
-    CERT_UNDEFINED =	3
+	CERT_GOOD =         0,
+	CERT_REVOKED =      1,
+	CERT_UNKNOWN =      2,
+	CERT_UNDEFINED =    3
 } cert_status_t;
 
 /* RFC 2459 CRL reason codes */
 
-extern enum_names crl_reason_names;
+extern enum_name_t *crl_reason_names;
 
 typedef enum {
-    REASON_UNSPECIFIED =		0,
-    REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE = 		1,
-    REASON_CA_COMPROMISE = 		2,
-    REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED =	3,
-    REASON_SUPERSEDED =			4,
-    REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATON =	5,
-    REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD =		6,
-    REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL =		8
+	REASON_UNSPECIFIED =                0,
+	REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE =             1,
+	REASON_CA_COMPROMISE =              2,
+	REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED =        3,
+	REASON_SUPERSEDED =                 4,
+	REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATON =      5,
+	REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD =           6,
+	REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL =            8
 } crl_reason_t;
 
 /* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
 
-extern enum_names dpd_action_names;
+extern enum_name_t *dpd_action_names;
 
 typedef enum {
-    DPD_ACTION_NONE =    0,
-    DPD_ACTION_CLEAR =   1,
-    DPD_ACTION_HOLD  =   2,
-    DPD_ACTION_RESTART = 3,
-    DPD_ACTION_UNKNOWN = 4
+	DPD_ACTION_NONE =    0,
+	DPD_ACTION_CLEAR =   1,
+	DPD_ACTION_HOLD  =   2,
+	DPD_ACTION_RESTART = 3,
+	DPD_ACTION_UNKNOWN = 4
 } dpd_action_t;
 
 /* Timer events */
 
-extern enum_names timer_event_names;
+extern enum_name_t *timer_event_names;
 
 enum event_type {
-    EVENT_NULL,	/* non-event */
-    EVENT_REINIT_SECRET,	/* Refresh cookie secret */
+	EVENT_NULL, /* non-event */
+	EVENT_REINIT_SECRET,        /* Refresh cookie secret */
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN,		/* scan shunt eroutes known to kernel */
+	EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN,           /* scan shunt eroutes known to kernel */
 #endif
-    EVENT_SO_DISCARD,		/* discard unfinished state object */
-    EVENT_RETRANSMIT,		/* Retransmit packet */
-    EVENT_SA_REPLACE,		/* SA replacement event */
-    EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED,	/* SA replacement event */
-    EVENT_SA_EXPIRE,		/* SA expiration event */
-    EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE,	/* NAT Traversal Keepalive */
-    EVENT_DPD,			/* dead peer detection */
-    EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT,		/* dead peer detection timeout */
-    EVENT_LOG_DAILY     	/* reset certain log events/stats */
+	EVENT_SO_DISCARD,           /* discard unfinished state object */
+	EVENT_RETRANSMIT,           /* Retransmit packet */
+	EVENT_SA_REPLACE,           /* SA replacement event */
+	EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED,   /* SA replacement event */
+	EVENT_SA_EXPIRE,            /* SA expiration event */
+	EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE,      /* NAT Traversal Keepalive */
+	EVENT_DPD,                  /* dead peer detection */
+	EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT,          /* dead peer detection timeout */
+	EVENT_LOG_DAILY             /* reset certain log events/stats */
 };
 
-#define EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY		3600 /* 1 hour */
-#define EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0		10   /* 10 seconds */
+#define EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY               3600 /* 1 hour */
+#define EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0                10   /* 10 seconds */
 
 /* Misc. stuff */
 
@@ -429,29 +327,29 @@ extern enum_names doi_names;
 extern const char *const debug_bit_names[];
 #endif
 
-#define DBG_RAW		LELEM(0)	/* raw packet I/O */
-#define DBG_CRYPT	LELEM(1)	/* encryption/decryption of messages */
-#define DBG_PARSING	LELEM(2)	/* show decoding of messages */
-#define DBG_EMITTING	LELEM(3)	/* show encoding of messages */
-#define DBG_CONTROL	LELEM(4)	/* control flow within Pluto */
-#define DBG_LIFECYCLE	LELEM(5)	/* SA lifecycle */
-#define DBG_KLIPS	LELEM(6)	/* messages to KLIPS */
-#define DBG_DNS		LELEM(7)	/* DNS activity */
-#define DBG_NATT	LELEM(8)	/* NAT-T */
-#define DBG_OPPO	LELEM(9)	/* opportunism */
-#define DBG_CONTROLMORE LELEM(10)	/* more detailed debugging */
+#define DBG_RAW         LELEM(0)        /* raw packet I/O */
+#define DBG_CRYPT       LELEM(1)        /* encryption/decryption of messages */
+#define DBG_PARSING     LELEM(2)        /* show decoding of messages */
+#define DBG_EMITTING    LELEM(3)        /* show encoding of messages */
+#define DBG_CONTROL     LELEM(4)        /* control flow within Pluto */
+#define DBG_LIFECYCLE   LELEM(5)        /* SA lifecycle */
+#define DBG_KLIPS       LELEM(6)        /* messages to KLIPS */
+#define DBG_DNS         LELEM(7)        /* DNS activity */
+#define DBG_NATT        LELEM(8)        /* NAT-T */
+#define DBG_OPPO        LELEM(9)        /* opportunism */
+#define DBG_CONTROLMORE LELEM(10)       /* more detailed debugging */
 
-#define DBG_PRIVATE	LELEM(11)	/* private information: DANGER! */
+#define DBG_PRIVATE     LELEM(11)       /* private information: DANGER! */
 
-#define IMPAIR0	12	/* first bit for IMPAIR_* */
+#define IMPAIR0 12      /* first bit for IMPAIR_* */
 
-#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER	LELEM(IMPAIR0+0)	/* sleep before answering */
-#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER	LELEM(IMPAIR0+1)	/* sleep before answering */
-#define IMPAIR_BUST_MI2	LELEM(IMPAIR0+2)	/* make MI2 really large */
-#define IMPAIR_BUST_MR2	LELEM(IMPAIR0+3)	/* make MI2 really large */
+#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER    LELEM(IMPAIR0+0)        /* sleep before answering */
+#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER    LELEM(IMPAIR0+1)        /* sleep before answering */
+#define IMPAIR_BUST_MI2 LELEM(IMPAIR0+2)        /* make MI2 really large */
+#define IMPAIR_BUST_MR2 LELEM(IMPAIR0+3)        /* make MI2 really large */
 
-#define DBG_NONE	0	/* no options on, including impairments */
-#define DBG_ALL		LRANGES(DBG_RAW, DBG_CONTROLMORE)  /* all logging options on EXCEPT DBG_PRIVATE */
+#define DBG_NONE        0       /* no options on, including impairments */
+#define DBG_ALL         LRANGES(DBG_RAW, DBG_CONTROLMORE)  /* all logging options on EXCEPT DBG_PRIVATE */
 
 /* State of exchanges
  *
@@ -484,86 +382,86 @@ extern enum_names state_names;
 extern const char *const state_story[];
 
 enum state_kind {
-    STATE_UNDEFINED,	/* 0 -- most likely accident */
+	STATE_UNDEFINED,    /* 0 -- most likely accident */
 
-    /*  Opportunism states: see "Opportunistic Encryption" 2.2 */
+	/*  Opportunism states: see "Opportunistic Encryption" 2.2 */
 
-    OPPO_ACQUIRE,	/* got an ACQUIRE message for this pair */
-    OPPO_GW_DISCOVERED,	/* got TXT specifying gateway */
+	OPPO_ACQUIRE,       /* got an ACQUIRE message for this pair */
+	OPPO_GW_DISCOVERED, /* got TXT specifying gateway */
 
-    /* IKE states */
+	/* IKE states */
 
-    STATE_MAIN_R0,
-    STATE_MAIN_I1,
-    STATE_MAIN_R1,
-    STATE_MAIN_I2,
-    STATE_MAIN_R2,
-    STATE_MAIN_I3,
-    STATE_MAIN_R3,
-    STATE_MAIN_I4,
+	STATE_MAIN_R0,
+	STATE_MAIN_I1,
+	STATE_MAIN_R1,
+	STATE_MAIN_I2,
+	STATE_MAIN_R2,
+	STATE_MAIN_I3,
+	STATE_MAIN_R3,
+	STATE_MAIN_I4,
 
-    STATE_QUICK_R0,
-    STATE_QUICK_I1,
-    STATE_QUICK_R1,
-    STATE_QUICK_I2,
-    STATE_QUICK_R2,
+	STATE_QUICK_R0,
+	STATE_QUICK_I1,
+	STATE_QUICK_R1,
+	STATE_QUICK_I2,
+	STATE_QUICK_R2,
 
-    STATE_INFO,
-    STATE_INFO_PROTECTED,
+	STATE_INFO,
+	STATE_INFO_PROTECTED,
 
-    /* XAUTH states */
+	/* XAUTH states */
 
-    STATE_XAUTH_I0,              /* initiator state (client) */
-    STATE_XAUTH_R1,              /* responder state (server) */
-    STATE_XAUTH_I1,
-    STATE_XAUTH_R2,
-    STATE_XAUTH_I2,
-    STATE_XAUTH_R3,
+	STATE_XAUTH_I0,              /* initiator state (client) */
+	STATE_XAUTH_R1,              /* responder state (server) */
+	STATE_XAUTH_I1,
+	STATE_XAUTH_R2,
+	STATE_XAUTH_I2,
+	STATE_XAUTH_R3,
 
-    /* Mode Config pull states */
+	/* Mode Config pull states */
 
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_R0,           /* responder state (server) */
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_I1,           /* initiator state (client) */
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_R1,
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_I2,
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_R0,           /* responder state (server) */
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_I1,           /* initiator state (client) */
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_R1,
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_I2,
 
-    /* Mode Config push states */
+	/* Mode Config push states */
 
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_I0,           /* initiator state (client) */
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_R3,           /* responder state (server) */
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_I3,
-    STATE_MODE_CFG_R4,
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_I0,           /* initiator state (client) */
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_R3,           /* responder state (server) */
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_I3,
+	STATE_MODE_CFG_R4,
 
-    STATE_IKE_ROOF
+	STATE_IKE_ROOF
 };
 
-#define STATE_IKE_FLOOR	STATE_MAIN_R0
+#define STATE_IKE_FLOOR STATE_MAIN_R0
 
-#define PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES	 (LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I2) \
-    | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4))
+#define PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES  (LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I2) \
+	| LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4))
 #define ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES ( \
-      LELEM(STATE_MAIN_R3)     | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4)     \
-    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R1)    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R2) | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
-    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I1)    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I2)    \
-    | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I2) \
-    | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
+	  LELEM(STATE_MAIN_R3)     | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4)     \
+	| LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R1)    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R2) | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
+	| LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I1)    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I2)    \
+	| LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I2) \
+	| LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
 
 #define IS_PHASE1(s) ((STATE_MAIN_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MAIN_I4) \
-		   || (STATE_XAUTH_I0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
-		   || (STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
+				   || (STATE_XAUTH_I0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
+				   || (STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
 
 #define IS_QUICK(s) (STATE_QUICK_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_QUICK_R2)
 #define IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(s) (STATE_MAIN_I2 <= (s))
 
 #define IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) (        \
-		   (s) == STATE_MAIN_R3      \
-		|| (s) == STATE_MAIN_I4      \
-		|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_I2     \
-		|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_R3     \
-		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R1  \
-		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I2  \
-		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I3  \
-		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R4)
+				   (s) == STATE_MAIN_R3      \
+				|| (s) == STATE_MAIN_I4      \
+				|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_I2     \
+				|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_R3     \
+				|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R1  \
+				|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I2  \
+				|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I3  \
+				|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R4)
 
 #define IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ((s) == STATE_QUICK_I2 || (s) == STATE_QUICK_R2)
 #define IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ((s) == STATE_QUICK_R1)
@@ -575,11 +473,11 @@ enum state_kind {
 extern enum_names connection_kind_names;
 
 enum connection_kind {
-    CK_GROUP,		/* policy group: instantiates to template */
-    CK_TEMPLATE,	/* abstract connection, with wildcard */
-    CK_PERMANENT,	/* normal connection */
-    CK_INSTANCE,	/* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
-    CK_GOING_AWAY	/* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
+	CK_GROUP,           /* policy group: instantiates to template */
+	CK_TEMPLATE,        /* abstract connection, with wildcard */
+	CK_PERMANENT,       /* normal connection */
+	CK_INSTANCE,        /* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
+	CK_GOING_AWAY       /* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
 };
 
 
@@ -593,14 +491,14 @@ extern enum_names routing_story;
 
 /* note that this is assumed to be ordered! */
 enum routing_t {
-    RT_UNROUTED,	/* unrouted */
-    RT_UNROUTED_HOLD,	/* unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
-    RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED,	/* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
-    RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE,	/* routed, and prospective shunt installed */
-    RT_ROUTED_HOLD,	/* routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
-    RT_ROUTED_FAILURE,	/* routed, and failure-context shunt installed */
-    RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL,	/* routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
-    RT_UNROUTED_KEYED   /* keyed, but not routed, on purpose */
+	RT_UNROUTED,        /* unrouted */
+	RT_UNROUTED_HOLD,   /* unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
+	RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED, /* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
+	RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE,      /* routed, and prospective shunt installed */
+	RT_ROUTED_HOLD,     /* routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
+	RT_ROUTED_FAILURE,  /* routed, and failure-context shunt installed */
+	RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL,   /* routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
+	RT_UNROUTED_KEYED   /* keyed, but not routed, on purpose */
 };
 
 #define routed(rs) ((rs) > RT_UNROUTED_HOLD)
@@ -618,25 +516,25 @@ enum routing_t {
 extern enum_names payload_names;
 extern const char *const payload_name[];
 
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE       0	/* No other payload following */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SA         1	/* Security Association */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_P          2	/* Proposal */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_T          3	/* Transform */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_KE         4	/* Key Exchange */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ID         5	/* Identification */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT       6	/* Certificate */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CR         7	/* Certificate Request */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH       8	/* Hash */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG        9	/* Signature */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE      10	/* Nonce */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_N          11	/* Notification */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_D          12	/* Delete */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_VID        13	/* Vendor ID */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE       0        /* No other payload following */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SA         1        /* Security Association */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_P          2        /* Proposal */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_T          3        /* Transform */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_KE         4        /* Key Exchange */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ID         5        /* Identification */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT       6        /* Certificate */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CR         7        /* Certificate Request */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH       8        /* Hash */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG        9        /* Signature */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE      10       /* Nonce */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_N          11       /* Notification */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_D          12       /* Delete */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_VID        13       /* Vendor ID */
 #define ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR       14       /* Mode config Attribute */
 
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC   20	/* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (rfc) */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC  21	/* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (rfc) */
-#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF       22	/* roof on payload types */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC   20       /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (rfc) */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC  21       /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (rfc) */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF       22       /* roof on payload types */
 
 #define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS   130   /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (drafts) */
 #define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS  131   /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (drafts) */
@@ -687,18 +585,24 @@ extern enum_names modecfg_attr_names;
 
 extern enum_names xauth_attr_names;
 
-/* ISAKMP mode config attributes specific to the Unity vendor Id */
-#define   UNITY_BANNER		    28672
-#define   UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD	    28673
-#define   UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN	    28674
-#define   UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME	    28675
-#define   UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE	    28676
-#define   UNITY_NATT_PORT	    28677
-#define   UNITY_LOCAL_LAN	    28678
-#define   UNITY_PFS		    28679
-#define   UNITY_FW_TYPE		    28680
-#define   UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS	    28681
-#define   UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME	    28682
+/* ISAKMP mode config attributes specific to Microsoft */
+#define INTERNAL_IP4_SERVER         23456
+#define INTERNAL_IP6_SERVER         23457
+
+extern enum_names microsoft_attr_names;
+
+/* ISAKMP mode config attributes specific to the Unity vendor ID */
+#define   UNITY_BANNER              28672
+#define   UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD         28673
+#define   UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN          28674
+#define   UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME       28675
+#define   UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE       28676
+#define   UNITY_NATT_PORT           28677
+#define   UNITY_LOCAL_LAN           28678
+#define   UNITY_PFS                 28679
+#define   UNITY_FW_TYPE             28680
+#define   UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS      28681
+#define   UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME       28682
 
 #define   UNITY_BASE                UNITY_BANNER
 
@@ -711,8 +615,8 @@ extern enum_names unity_attr_names;
 #define XAUTH_TYPE_SKEY    3
 
 /* Values for XAUTH_STATUS */
-#define	XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL       0
-#define	XAUTH_STATUS_OK         1
+#define XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL       0
+#define XAUTH_STATUS_OK         1
 
 extern enum_names xauth_type_names;
 
@@ -732,19 +636,19 @@ extern enum_names exchange_names;
 
 #define ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE       0
 #define ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE       1
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT     2	/* ID Protection */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AO         3	/* Authentication Only */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR       4	/* Aggressive */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO       5	/* Informational */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG   6	/* Mode Config */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT     2        /* ID Protection */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AO         3        /* Authentication Only */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR       4        /* Aggressive */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO       5        /* Informational */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG   6        /* Mode Config */
 
 /* Extra exchange types, defined by Oakley
  * RFC2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", near end of Appendix A
  */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK      32	/* Oakley Quick Mode */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP       33	/* Oakley New Group Mode */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK      32       /* Oakley Quick Mode */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP       33       /* Oakley New Group Mode */
 /* added in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt, near end of Appendix A */
-#define ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO   34	/* Oakley Acknowledged Informational */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO   34       /* Oakley Acknowledged Informational */
 
 /* Flag bits */
 
@@ -774,20 +678,14 @@ extern enum_names protocol_names;
 
 /* warning: trans_show uses enum_show, so same static buffer is used */
 #define trans_show(p, t) \
-    ((p)==PROTO_IPSEC_AH ? enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, (t)) \
-    : (p)==PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ? enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, (t)) \
-    : (p)==PROTO_IPCOMP ? enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, (t)) \
-    : "??")
-
-/* many transform values are moved to freeswan/ipsec_policy.h */
-
-extern enum_names isakmp_transformid_names;
+	((p)==PROTO_IPSEC_AH ? enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, (t)) \
+	: (p)==PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ? enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, (t)) \
+	: (p)==PROTO_IPCOMP ? enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, (t)) \
+	: "??")
 
 #define KEY_IKE               1
 
-extern enum_names ah_transformid_names;
-extern enum_names esp_transformid_names;
-extern enum_names ipcomp_transformid_names;
+extern enum_names isakmp_transformid_names;
 
 /* the following are from RFC 2393/draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 3.3 */
 typedef u_int16_t cpi_t;
@@ -801,15 +699,16 @@ typedef u_int16_t cpi_t;
 
 extern enum_names ident_names;
 extern enum_names cert_type_names;
-extern enum_names cert_policy_names;
+
+extern enum_name_t *cert_policy_names;
 
 typedef enum certpolicy {
-  CERT_ALWAYS_SEND   = 0,	/* the default */
-  CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED = 1,
-  CERT_NEVER_SEND    = 2,
+	CERT_ALWAYS_SEND   = 0,
+	CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED = 1, 
+	CERT_NEVER_SEND    = 2,
 
-  CERT_YES_SEND      = 3,	/* synonym for CERT_ALWAYS_SEND */
-  CERT_NO_SEND       = 4	/* synonym for CERT_NEVER_SEND  */
+ 	CERT_YES_SEND      = 3,       /* synonym for CERT_ALWAYS_SEND */
+	CERT_NO_SEND       = 4        /* synonym for CERT_NEVER_SEND  */
 } certpolicy_t;
 
 /* Policies for establishing an SA
@@ -825,36 +724,36 @@ extern const char *prettypolicy(lset_t policy);
 
 /* ISAKMP auth techniques (none means never negotiate) */
 #define POLICY_PSK           LELEM(0)
-#define POLICY_RSASIG        LELEM(1)
+#define POLICY_PUBKEY        LELEM(1)
 
-#define POLICY_ISAKMP_SHIFT	0	/* log2(POLICY_PSK) */
-#define POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK	(POLICY_PSK | POLICY_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
-#define POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK	POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK	/* all so far */
+#define POLICY_ISAKMP_SHIFT     0       /* log2(POLICY_PSK) */
+#define POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK     (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_PUBKEY | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
+#define POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK      POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK     /* all so far */
 
 /* Quick Mode (IPSEC) attributes */
-#define POLICY_ENCRYPT       LELEM(2)	/* must be first of IPSEC policies */
-#define POLICY_AUTHENTICATE  LELEM(3)	/* must be second */
-#define POLICY_COMPRESS      LELEM(4)	/* must be third */
+#define POLICY_ENCRYPT       LELEM(2)   /* must be first of IPSEC policies */
+#define POLICY_AUTHENTICATE  LELEM(3)   /* must be second */
+#define POLICY_COMPRESS      LELEM(4)   /* must be third */
 #define POLICY_TUNNEL        LELEM(5)
 #define POLICY_PFS           LELEM(6)
-#define POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK  LELEM(7)	/* supress tunnel egress address checking */
+#define POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK  LELEM(7)    /* supress tunnel egress address checking */
 
-#define POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT	2	/* log2(POLICY_ENCRYPT) */
-#define POLICY_IPSEC_MASK	LRANGES(POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK)
+#define POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT      2       /* log2(POLICY_ENCRYPT) */
+#define POLICY_IPSEC_MASK       LRANGES(POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK)
 
 /* shunt attributes: what to do when routed without tunnel (2 bits) */
-#define POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT	8	/* log2(POLICY_SHUNT_PASS) */
-#define POLICY_SHUNT_MASK	(03ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT      8       /* log2(POLICY_SHUNT_PASS) */
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_MASK       (03ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
 
-#define POLICY_SHUNT_TRAP	(0ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT) /* default: negotiate */
-#define POLICY_SHUNT_PASS	(1ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
-#define POLICY_SHUNT_DROP	(2ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
-#define POLICY_SHUNT_REJECT	(3ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_TRAP       (0ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT) /* default: negotiate */
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_PASS       (1ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_DROP       (2ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_REJECT     (3ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
 
 /* fail attributes: what to do with failed negotiation (2 bits) */
 
-#define POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT	10	/* log2(POLICY_FAIL_PASS) */
-#define POLICY_FAIL_MASK	(03ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT       10      /* log2(POLICY_FAIL_PASS) */
+#define POLICY_FAIL_MASK        (03ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
 
 #define POLICY_FAIL_NONE     (0ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT) /* default */
 #define POLICY_FAIL_PASS     (1ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
@@ -864,21 +763,20 @@ extern const char *prettypolicy(lset_t policy);
 /* connection policy
  * Other policies could vary per state object.  These live in connection.
  */
-#define POLICY_DONT_REKEY	LELEM(12)	/* don't rekey state either Phase */
-#define POLICY_OPPO		LELEM(13)	/* is this opportunistic? */
-#define POLICY_GROUP		LELEM(14)	/* is this a group template? */
-#define POLICY_GROUTED		LELEM(15)	/* do we want this group routed? */
-#define POLICY_UP		LELEM(16)	/* do we want this up? */
-#define POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH	LELEM(17)	/* is modecfg pushed by server? */
-#define POLICY_XAUTH_PSK	LELEM(18)	/* do we support XAUTH????PreShared? */
-#define POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG	LELEM(19)	/* do we support XAUTH????RSA? */
-#define POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER	LELEM(20)	/* are we an XAUTH server? */
-#define POLICY_DONT_REAUTH	LELEM(21)	/* don't reauthenticate on rekeying, IKEv2 only */
-#define POLICY_BEET		LELEM(22)	/* bound end2end tunnel, IKEv2 */
-#define POLICY_MOBIKE		LELEM(23)	/* enable MOBIKE for IKEv2  */
-#define POLICY_FORCE_ENCAP	LELEM(24)	/* force UDP encapsulation (IKEv2)  */
-#define POLICY_ECDSASIG		LELEM(25)	/* ECDSA signature (IKEv2) */
-#define POLICY_PROXY		LELEM(26)	/* proxy transport mode (MIPv6) */
+#define POLICY_DONT_REKEY       LELEM(12)       /* don't rekey state either Phase */
+#define POLICY_OPPO             LELEM(13)       /* is this opportunistic? */
+#define POLICY_GROUP            LELEM(14)       /* is this a group template? */
+#define POLICY_GROUTED          LELEM(15)       /* do we want this group routed? */
+#define POLICY_UP               LELEM(16)       /* do we want this up? */
+#define POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH     LELEM(17)       /* is modecfg pushed by server? */
+#define POLICY_XAUTH_PSK        LELEM(18)       /* do we support XAUTH????PreShared? */
+#define POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG     LELEM(19)       /* do we support XAUTH????RSA? */
+#define POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER     LELEM(20)       /* are we an XAUTH server? */
+#define POLICY_DONT_REAUTH      LELEM(21)       /* don't reauthenticate on rekeying, IKEv2 only */
+#define POLICY_BEET             LELEM(22)       /* bound end2end tunnel, IKEv2 */
+#define POLICY_MOBIKE           LELEM(23)       /* enable MOBIKE for IKEv2  */
+#define POLICY_FORCE_ENCAP      LELEM(24)       /* force UDP encapsulation (IKEv2)  */
+#define POLICY_PROXY            LELEM(25)       /* proxy transport mode (MIPv6) */
 
 /* Any IPsec policy?  If not, a connection description
  * is only for ISAKMP SA, not IPSEC SA.  (A pun, I admit.)
@@ -903,17 +801,17 @@ extern const char *const oakley_attr_bit_names[];
 #define OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD   3
 #define OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION       4
 #define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE              5
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME             6	/* B/V */
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE     7	/* B/V */
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO     8	/* B/V */
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A           9	/* B/V */
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B          10	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME             6        /* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE     7        /* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO     8        /* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A           9        /* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B          10        /* B/V */
 #define OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE              11
-#define OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION          12	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION          12        /* B/V */
 #define OAKLEY_PRF                    13
 #define OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH             14
 #define OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE             15
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER            16	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER            16        /* B/V */
 #define OAKLEY_BLOCK_SIZE             17
 
 /* for each Oakley attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
@@ -926,14 +824,14 @@ extern enum_names *oakley_attr_val_descs[];
 extern enum_names ipsec_attr_names;
 
 #define SA_LIFE_TYPE             1
-#define SA_LIFE_DURATION         2	/* B/V */
+#define SA_LIFE_DURATION         2      /* B/V */
 #define GROUP_DESCRIPTION        3
 #define ENCAPSULATION_MODE       4
 #define AUTH_ALGORITHM           5
 #define KEY_LENGTH               6
 #define KEY_ROUNDS               7
 #define COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE       8
-#define COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG     9	/* B/V */
+#define COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG     9      /* B/V */
 
 /* for each IPsec attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
 extern enum_names *ipsec_attr_val_descs[];
@@ -961,9 +859,9 @@ extern enum_names sa_lifetime_names;
 #define PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT     3600 /* one hour    (pluto(8)) */
 #define SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM          86400 /* one day */
 
-#define SA_REPLACEMENT_MARGIN_DEFAULT	    540 /* (IPSEC & IKE) nine minutes */
-#define SA_REPLACEMENT_FUZZ_DEFAULT	    100 /* (IPSEC & IKE) 100% of MARGIN */
-#define SA_REPLACEMENT_RETRIES_DEFAULT	      3 /* (IPSEC & IKE) */
+#define SA_REPLACEMENT_MARGIN_DEFAULT       540 /* (IPSEC & IKE) nine minutes */
+#define SA_REPLACEMENT_FUZZ_DEFAULT         100 /* (IPSEC & IKE) 100% of MARGIN */
+#define SA_REPLACEMENT_RETRIES_DEFAULT        3 /* (IPSEC & IKE) */
 
 #define SA_LIFE_DURATION_K_DEFAULT  0xFFFFFFFFlu
 
@@ -971,7 +869,7 @@ extern enum_names sa_lifetime_names;
 
 extern enum_names enc_mode_names;
 
-#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED 0	/* not legal -- used internally */
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED 0        /* not legal -- used internally */
 #define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL      1
 #define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT   2
 
@@ -985,18 +883,18 @@ extern enum_names enc_mode_names;
 
 extern enum_names auth_alg_names, extended_auth_alg_names;
 
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE		0  /* our private designation */
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5		1
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1	2
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC		3
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK		4
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256	5
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384	6
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512	7
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD	8
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_XCBC_MAC	9
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_SIG_RSA		10
-#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL		251
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE             0  /* our private designation */
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5         1
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1        2
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC          3
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK             4
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256    5
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384    6
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512    7
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD      8
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_XCBC_MAC     9
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_SIG_RSA          10
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL             251
 
 /* Oakley Lifetime Type attribute
  * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
@@ -1030,23 +928,24 @@ extern enum_names oakley_prf_names;
 
 extern enum_names oakley_enc_names;
 
-#define OAKLEY_DES_CBC			1
-#define OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC			2
-#define OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC		3
-#define OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC		4
-#define OAKLEY_3DES_CBC			5
-#define OAKLEY_CAST_CBC			6
-#define OAKLEY_AES_CBC			7
+#define OAKLEY_DES_CBC                  1
+#define OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC                 2
+#define OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC             3
+#define OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC          4
+#define OAKLEY_3DES_CBC                 5
+#define OAKLEY_CAST_CBC                 6
+#define OAKLEY_AES_CBC                  7
+#define OAKLEY_CAMELLIA_CBC             8
 
-#define OAKLEY_MARS_CBC			65001
-#define OAKLEY_RC6_CBC			65002
-#define OAKLEY_ID_65003			65003
-#define OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC		65004
-#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC		65005
+#define OAKLEY_MARS_CBC                 65001
+#define OAKLEY_RC6_CBC                  65002
+#define OAKLEY_ID_65003                 65003
+#define OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC              65004
+#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC              65005
 
-#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH		65289
+#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH          65289
 
-#define OAKLEY_ENCRYPT_MAX      	65535	/* pretty useless :) */
+#define OAKLEY_ENCRYPT_MAX              65535   /* pretty useless :) */
 
 /* Oakley Hash Algorithm attribute
  * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
@@ -1079,42 +978,35 @@ extern enum_names oakley_auth_names;
 #define OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV         5
 #define OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC         6
 #define OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV     7
+#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_SIG           8
+#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_256           9
+#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_384          10
+#define OAKLEY_ECDSA_521          11
 
-#define OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF           8	/* roof on auth values THAT WE SUPPORT */
+#define OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF          12    /* roof on auth values THAT WE SUPPORT */
 
-#define HybridInitRSA			64221
-#define HybridRespRSA			64222
-#define HybridInitDSS			64223
-#define HybridRespDSS			64224
+#define HybridInitRSA                   64221
+#define HybridRespRSA                   64222
+#define HybridInitDSS                   64223
+#define HybridRespDSS                   64224
 
-#define XAUTHInitPreShared		65001
-#define XAUTHRespPreShared		65002
-#define XAUTHInitDSS			65003
+#define XAUTHInitPreShared              65001
+#define XAUTHRespPreShared              65002
+#define XAUTHInitDSS                    65003
 #define XAUTHRespDSS                    65004
-#define XAUTHInitRSA			65005
-#define XAUTHRespRSA			65006
-#define XAUTHInitRSAEncryption		65007
-#define XAUTHRespRSAEncryption		65008
-#define XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption	65009
-#define XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption	65010
+#define XAUTHInitRSA                    65005
+#define XAUTHRespRSA                    65006
+#define XAUTHInitRSAEncryption          65007
+#define XAUTHRespRSAEncryption          65008
+#define XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption   65009
+#define XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption   65010
 
 /* Oakley Group Description attribute
  * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
  */
 extern enum_names oakley_group_names;
 
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP768       1
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024      2
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GP155         3
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GP185         4
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536      5
-
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048      14
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072      15
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096      16
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144      17
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192      18
-/*	you must also touch: constants.c, crypto.c */
+/*      you must also touch: constants.c, crypto.c */
 
 /* Oakley Group Type attribute
  * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
@@ -1134,54 +1026,54 @@ extern enum_names notification_names;
 extern enum_names ipsec_notification_names;
 
 typedef enum {
-    NOTHING_WRONG =             0,  /* unofficial! */
-
-    INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE =       1,
-    DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED =          2,
-    SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED =    3,
-    INVALID_COOKIE =             4,
-    INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION =      5,
-    INVALID_MINOR_VERSION =      6,
-    INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE =      7,
-    INVALID_FLAGS =              8,
-    INVALID_MESSAGE_ID =         9,
-    INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID =       10,
-    INVALID_SPI =               11,
-    INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID =      12,
-    ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED =  13,
-    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN =        14,
-    BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX =       15,
-    PAYLOAD_MALFORMED =         16,
-    INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION =   17,
-    INVALID_ID_INFORMATION =    18,
-    INVALID_CERT_ENCODING =     19,
-    INVALID_CERTIFICATE =       20,
-    CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED =     21,
-    INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY =    22,
-    INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION =  23,
-    AUTHENTICATION_FAILED =     24,
-    INVALID_SIGNATURE =         25,
-    ADDRESS_NOTIFICATION =      26,
-    NOTIFY_SA_LIFETIME =        27,
-    CERTIFICATE_UNAVAILABLE =   28,
-    UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE = 29,
-    UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS =   30,
-
-    /* ISAKMP status type */
-    CONNECTED =              16384,
-
-    /* IPSEC DOI additions; status types (RFC2407 IPSEC DOI 4.6.3)
-     * These must be sent under the protection of an ISAKMP SA.
-     */
-    IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME = 24576,
-    IPSEC_REPLAY_STATUS =      24577,
-    IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT =    24578,
-
-    /* RFC 3706 DPD */
-    R_U_THERE =                36136,
-    R_U_THERE_ACK =            36137
-
-    } notification_t;
+	NOTHING_WRONG =             0,  /* unofficial! */
+
+	INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE =       1,
+	DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED =          2,
+	SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED =    3,
+	INVALID_COOKIE =             4,
+	INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION =      5,
+	INVALID_MINOR_VERSION =      6,
+	INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE =      7,
+	INVALID_FLAGS =              8,
+	INVALID_MESSAGE_ID =         9,
+	INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID =       10,
+	INVALID_SPI =               11,
+	INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID =      12,
+	ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED =  13,
+	NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN =        14,
+	BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX =       15,
+	PAYLOAD_MALFORMED =         16,
+	INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION =   17,
+	INVALID_ID_INFORMATION =    18,
+	INVALID_CERT_ENCODING =     19,
+	INVALID_CERTIFICATE =       20,
+	CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED =     21,
+	INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY =    22,
+	INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION =  23,
+	AUTHENTICATION_FAILED =     24,
+	INVALID_SIGNATURE =         25,
+	ADDRESS_NOTIFICATION =      26,
+	NOTIFY_SA_LIFETIME =        27,
+	CERTIFICATE_UNAVAILABLE =   28,
+	UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE = 29,
+	UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS =   30,
+
+	/* ISAKMP status type */
+	CONNECTED =              16384,
+
+	/* IPSEC DOI additions; status types (RFC2407 IPSEC DOI 4.6.3)
+	 * These must be sent under the protection of an ISAKMP SA.
+	 */
+	IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME = 24576,
+	IPSEC_REPLAY_STATUS =      24577,
+	IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT =    24578,
+
+	/* RFC 3706 DPD */
+	R_U_THERE =                36136,
+	R_U_THERE_ACK =            36137
+
+	} notification_t;
 
 
 /* Public key algorithm number
@@ -1192,8 +1084,8 @@ typedef enum {
 
 enum pubkey_alg
 {
-    PUBKEY_ALG_RSA = 1,
-    PUBKEY_ALG_DSA = 3,
+	PUBKEY_ALG_RSA = 1,
+	PUBKEY_ALG_DSA = 3,
 };
 
 /* Limits on size of RSA moduli.
@@ -1203,37 +1095,37 @@ enum pubkey_alg
  * real security.  For now, we require 512 bits.
  */
 
-#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC	12
+#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC      12
 
-#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS	(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH	"RSA modulus too small for security: less than 512 bits"
+#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS  (512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH      "RSA modulus too small for security: less than 512 bits"
 
-#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS	(8192 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH	"RSA modulus too large: more than 8192 bits"
+#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS  (8192 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH      "RSA modulus too large: more than 8192 bits"
 
 /* Note: RFC 2537 encoding adds a few bytes.  If you use a small
  * modulus like 3, the overhead is only 2 bytes
  */
-#define RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES	(RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 2)
+#define RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES  (RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 2)
 
 /* socket address family info */
 
 struct af_info
 {
-    int af;
-    const char *name;
-    size_t ia_sz;
-    size_t sa_sz;
-    int mask_cnt;
-    u_int8_t id_addr, id_subnet, id_range;
-    const ip_address *any;
-    const ip_subnet *none;	/* 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent */
-    const ip_subnet *all;	/* 0.0.0.0/0 or IPv6 equivalent */
+	int af;
+	const char *name;
+	size_t ia_sz;
+	size_t sa_sz;
+	int mask_cnt;
+	u_int8_t id_addr, id_subnet, id_range;
+	const ip_address *any;
+	const ip_subnet *none;      /* 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent */
+	const ip_subnet *all;       /* 0.0.0.0/0 or IPv6 equivalent */
 };
 
 extern const struct af_info
-    af_inet4_info,
-    af_inet6_info;
+	af_inet4_info,
+	af_inet6_info;
 
 extern const struct af_info *aftoinfo(int af);
 
@@ -1245,18 +1137,18 @@ extern bool subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn);
 /* BIND enumerated types */
 
 extern enum_names
-    rr_qtype_names,
-    rr_type_names,
-    rr_class_names;
+	rr_qtype_names,
+	rr_type_names,
+	rr_class_names;
 
 /* How authenticated is info that might have come from DNS?
  * In order of increasing confidence.
  */
 enum dns_auth_level {
-    DAL_UNSIGNED,	/* AD in response, but no signature: no authentication */
-    DAL_NOTSEC,	/* no AD in response: authentication impossible */
-    DAL_SIGNED,	/* AD and signature in response: authentic */
-    DAL_LOCAL	/* locally provided (pretty good) */
+	DAL_UNSIGNED,       /* AD in response, but no signature: no authentication */
+	DAL_NOTSEC, /* no AD in response: authentication impossible */
+	DAL_SIGNED, /* AD and signature in response: authentic */
+	DAL_LOCAL   /* locally provided (pretty good) */
 };
 
 /*
@@ -1272,4 +1164,7 @@ enum dns_auth_level {
 /* natt traversal types */
 extern const char *const natt_type_bitnames[];
 
+/* secret value for responder cookies */
+extern u_char secret_of_the_day[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
+
 #endif /* _CONSTANTS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/cookie.c b/src/pluto/cookie.c
index 00197321c..00c863f18 100644
--- a/src/pluto/cookie.c
+++ b/src/pluto/cookie.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* cookie generation/verification routines.
  * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: cookie.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -23,45 +22,52 @@
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
 #include "cookie.h"
 
-const u_char zero_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE];	/* guaranteed 0 */
+const u_char zero_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE];  /* guaranteed 0 */
 
 /* Generate a cookie.
  * First argument is true if we're to create an Initiator cookie.
  * Length SHOULD be a multiple of sizeof(u_int32_t).
  */
-void
-get_cookie(bool initiator, u_int8_t *cookie, int length, const ip_address *addr)
+void get_cookie(bool initiator, u_int8_t *cookie, int length, ip_address *addr)
 {
-    u_char buffer[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-    SHA1_CTX ctx;
+	hasher_t *hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_SHA1);
+	u_char buffer[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
+
+	do {
+		if (initiator)
+		{
+			rng_t *rng;
+
+			rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_STRONG);
+			rng->get_bytes(rng, length, cookie);
+			rng->destroy(rng);
+		}
+		else  /* Responder cookie */
+		{
+			chunk_t addr_chunk, secret_chunk, counter_chunk;
+			size_t addr_len;
+			static u_int32_t counter = 0;
+			unsigned char addr_buf[
+				sizeof(union {struct in_addr A; struct in6_addr B;})];
 
-    do {
-	if (initiator)
-	{
-	    get_rnd_bytes(cookie, length);
-	}
-	else  /* Responder cookie */
-	{
-	    /* This looks as good as any way */
-	    size_t addr_length;
-	    static u_int32_t counter = 0;
-	    unsigned char addr_buff[
-		sizeof(union {struct in_addr A; struct in6_addr B;})];
+			addr_len = addrbytesof(addr, addr_buf, sizeof(addr_buf));
+			addr_chunk = chunk_create(addr_buf, addr_len);
+			secret_chunk = chunk_create(secret_of_the_day, HASH_SIZE_SHA1);
+			counter++;
+			counter_chunk = chunk_create((void *) &counter, sizeof(counter));
+			hasher->get_hash(hasher, addr_chunk, NULL);
+			hasher->get_hash(hasher, secret_chunk, NULL);
+			hasher->get_hash(hasher, counter_chunk, buffer);
+			memcpy(cookie, buffer, length);
+		}
+	} while (is_zero_cookie(cookie));   /* probably never loops */
 
-	    addr_length = addrbytesof(addr, addr_buff, sizeof(addr_buff));
-	    SHA1Init(&ctx);
-	    SHA1Update(&ctx, addr_buff, addr_length);
-	    SHA1Update(&ctx, secret_of_the_day, sizeof(secret_of_the_day));
-	    counter++;
-	    SHA1Update(&ctx, (const void *) &counter, sizeof(counter));
-	    SHA1Final(buffer, &ctx);
-	    memcpy(cookie, buffer, length);
-	}
-    } while (is_zero_cookie(cookie));	/* probably never loops */
+	hasher->destroy(hasher);
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/cookie.h b/src/pluto/cookie.h
index b52bb2299..809d66491 100644
--- a/src/pluto/cookie.h
+++ b/src/pluto/cookie.h
@@ -10,15 +10,13 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: cookie.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
-extern const u_char zero_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE];	/* guaranteed 0 */
+extern const u_char zero_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE];   /* guaranteed 0 */
 
-extern void get_cookie(bool initiator, u_int8_t *cookie, int length
-    , const ip_address *addr);
+extern void get_cookie(bool initiator, u_int8_t *cookie, int length,
+					   ip_address *addr);
 
 #define is_zero_cookie(cookie) all_zero((cookie), COOKIE_SIZE)
diff --git a/src/pluto/crl.c b/src/pluto/crl.c
index c891d19e6..c800f2acc 100644
--- a/src/pluto/crl.c
+++ b/src/pluto/crl.c
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /* Support of X.509 certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
- * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * HSR Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: crl.c 4632 2008-11-11 18:37:19Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -23,13 +23,15 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
+#include <asn1/oid.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include <asn1/oid.h>
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "crl.h"
 #include "ca.h"
@@ -37,482 +39,482 @@
 #include "keys.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
+
 
 /* chained lists of X.509 crls */
 
 static x509crl_t  *x509crls      = NULL;
 
-/* ASN.1 definition of an X.509 certificate list */
-
+/**
+  * ASN.1 definition of an X.509 certificate revocation list
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t crlObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "certificateList",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "tbsCertList",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,     "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  3 */
-  { 2,     "signature",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  4 */
-  { 2,     "issuer",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
-  { 2,     "thisUpdate",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  6 */
-  { 2,     "nextUpdate",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  7 */
-  { 2,     "revokedCertificates",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_LOOP }, /*  8 */
-  { 3,       "certList",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  9 */
-  { 4,         "userCertificate",	ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
-  { 4,         "revocationDate",	ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 11 */
-  { 4,         "crlEntryExtensions",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_LOOP }, /* 12 */
-  { 5,           "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
-  { 6,             "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
-  { 6,             "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
-  { 6,             "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
-  { 4,         "end opt or loop",	ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 17 */
-  { 2,     "end opt or loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
-  { 2,     "optional extensions",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 19 */
-  { 3,       "crlExtensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 20 */
-  { 4,         "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 21 */
-  { 5,           "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 22 */
-  { 5,           "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 23 */
-  { 5,           "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
-  { 3,       "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 25 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
-  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 27 */
-  { 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_BODY }  /* 28 */
- };
-
-#define CRL_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_LIST		 0
+	{ 0, "certificateList",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "tbsCertList",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+	{ 2,     "version",					ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_OPT |
+														   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  3 */
+	{ 2,     "signature",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  4 */	
+	{ 2,     "issuer",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
+	{ 2,     "thisUpdate",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  6 */
+	{ 2,     "nextUpdate",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  7 */
+	{ 2,     "revokedCertificates",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
+														   ASN1_LOOP }, /*  8 */
+	{ 3,       "certList",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  9 */
+	{ 4,         "userCertificate",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
+	{ 4,         "revocationDate",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 11 */
+	{ 4,         "crlEntryExtensions",  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
+							   							   ASN1_LOOP }, /* 12 */
+	{ 5,           "extension",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,	   ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
+	{ 6,             "extnID",			ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+	{ 6,             "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
+														   ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
+	{ 6,             "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
+	{ 4,         "end opt or loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 17 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt or loop",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
+	{ 2,     "optional extensions",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 19 */
+	{ 3,       "crlExtensions",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 20 */
+	{ 4,         "extension",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 21 */
+	{ 5,           "extnID",			ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 22 */
+	{ 5,           "critical",			ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
+														   ASN1_BODY }, /* 23 */
+	{ 5,           "extnValue",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
+	{ 3,       "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 25 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 27 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureValue",			ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_BODY }, /* 28 */
+	{ 0, "exit",						ASN1_EOC,		   ASN1_EXIT }
+};
+
+#define CRL_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_LIST         0
 #define CRL_OBJ_TBS_CERT_LIST			 1
-#define CRL_OBJ_VERSION				 2
-#define CRL_OBJ_SIG_ALG				 4
-#define CRL_OBJ_ISSUER				 5
-#define CRL_OBJ_THIS_UPDATE			 6
-#define CRL_OBJ_NEXT_UPDATE			 7
+#define CRL_OBJ_VERSION					 2
+#define CRL_OBJ_SIG_ALG					 4
+#define CRL_OBJ_ISSUER					 5
+#define CRL_OBJ_THIS_UPDATE				 6
+#define CRL_OBJ_NEXT_UPDATE				 7
 #define CRL_OBJ_USER_CERTIFICATE		10
 #define CRL_OBJ_REVOCATION_DATE			11
 #define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_ID		14
 #define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_CRITICAL		15
-#define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_VALUE		16
-#define CRL_OBJ_EXTN_ID				22
-#define CRL_OBJ_CRITICAL			23
-#define CRL_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE			24
-#define CRL_OBJ_ALGORITHM			27
-#define CRL_OBJ_SIGNATURE			28
-#define CRL_OBJ_ROOF				29
-
+#define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_VALUE	16
+#define CRL_OBJ_EXTN_ID					22
+#define CRL_OBJ_CRITICAL				23
+#define CRL_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE				24
+#define CRL_OBJ_ALGORITHM				27
+#define CRL_OBJ_SIGNATURE				28
 
 const x509crl_t empty_x509crl = {
-      NULL        , /* *next */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME, /* installed */
-      NULL        , /* distributionPoints */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /* certificateList */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*   tbsCertList */
-            1     , /*     version */
-    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*     sigAlg */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     issuer */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME, /*     thisUpdate */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME, /*     nextUpdate */
-      NULL        , /*     revokedCertificates */
-                    /*     crlExtensions */
-                    /*       extension */
-                    /*         extnID */
-                    /*         critical */
-                    /*         extnValue */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeyID */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeySerialNumber */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           crlNumber */
-    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*   algorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }     /*   signature */
+	  NULL        , /* *next */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME, /* installed */
+	  NULL        , /* distributionPoints */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /* certificateList */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*   tbsCertList */
+			1     , /*     version */
+	OID_UNKNOWN   , /*     sigAlg */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*     issuer */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME, /*     thisUpdate */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME, /*     nextUpdate */
+	  NULL        , /*     revokedCertificates */
+					/*     crlExtensions */
+					/*       extension */
+					/*         extnID */
+					/*         critical */
+					/*         extnValue */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeyID */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeySerialNumber */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           crlNumber */
+	OID_UNKNOWN   , /*   algorithm */
+	{ NULL, 0 }     /*   signature */
 };
 
-/*
- *  get the X.509 CRL with a given issuer
+/**
+ *  Get the X.509 CRL with a given issuer
  */
-static x509crl_t*
-get_x509crl(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid)
+static x509crl_t* get_x509crl(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid)
 {
-    x509crl_t *crl = x509crls;
-    x509crl_t *prev_crl = NULL;
-
-    while (crl != NULL)
-    {
-	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL && crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	? same_keyid(keyid, crl->authKeyID)
-	: (same_dn(crl->issuer, issuer) && same_serial(serial, crl->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	x509crl_t *crl = x509crls;
+	x509crl_t *prev_crl = NULL;
+
+	while (crl != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (crl != x509crls)
-	    {
-		/* bring the CRL up front */
-		prev_crl->next = crl->next;
-		crl->next = x509crls;
-		x509crls = crl;
-	    }
-	    return crl;
+		if ((keyid.ptr != NULL && crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		? same_keyid(keyid, crl->authKeyID)
+		: (same_dn(crl->issuer, issuer) && same_serial(serial, crl->authKeySerialNumber)))
+		{
+			if (crl != x509crls)
+			{
+				/* bring the CRL up front */
+				prev_crl->next = crl->next;
+				crl->next = x509crls;
+				x509crls = crl;
+			}
+			return crl;
+		}
+		prev_crl = crl;
+		crl = crl->next;
 	}
-	prev_crl = crl;
-	crl = crl->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
- *  free the dynamic memory used to store revoked certificates
+/**
+ *  Free the dynamic memory used to store revoked certificates
  */
-static void
-free_revoked_certs(revokedCert_t* revokedCerts)
+static void free_revoked_certs(revokedCert_t* revokedCerts)
 {
-    while (revokedCerts != NULL)
-    {
-	revokedCert_t * revokedCert = revokedCerts;
-	revokedCerts = revokedCert->next;
-	pfree(revokedCert);
-    }
+	while (revokedCerts != NULL)
+	{
+		revokedCert_t * revokedCert = revokedCerts;
+		revokedCerts = revokedCert->next;
+		free(revokedCert);
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- *  free the dynamic memory used to store CRLs
+/**
+ *  Free the dynamic memory used to store CRLs
  */
-void
-free_crl(x509crl_t *crl)
+void free_crl(x509crl_t *crl)
 {
-    free_revoked_certs(crl->revokedCertificates);
-    free_generalNames(crl->distributionPoints, TRUE);
-    pfree(crl->certificateList.ptr);
-    pfree(crl);
+	free_revoked_certs(crl->revokedCertificates);
+	free_generalNames(crl->distributionPoints, TRUE);
+	free(crl->certificateList.ptr);
+	free(crl);
 }
 
-static void
-free_first_crl(void)
+static void free_first_crl(void)
 {
-    x509crl_t *crl = x509crls;
+	x509crl_t *crl = x509crls;
 
-    x509crls = crl->next;
-    free_crl(crl);
+	x509crls = crl->next;
+	free_crl(crl);
 }
 
-void
-free_crls(void)
+void free_crls(void)
 {
-    lock_crl_list("free_crls");
+	lock_crl_list("free_crls");
 
-    while (x509crls != NULL)
-	free_first_crl();
+	while (x509crls != NULL)
+		free_first_crl();
 
-    unlock_crl_list("free_crls");
+	unlock_crl_list("free_crls");
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Insert X.509 CRL into chained list
  */
-bool
-insert_crl(chunk_t blob, chunk_t crl_uri, bool cache_crl)
+bool insert_crl(chunk_t blob, chunk_t crl_uri, bool cache_crl)
 {
-    x509crl_t *crl = alloc_thing(x509crl_t, "x509crl");
-
-    *crl = empty_x509crl;
-
-    if (parse_x509crl(blob, 0, crl))
-    {
-	x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
-	x509crl_t *oldcrl;
-	bool valid_sig;
-	generalName_t *gn;
-
-	/* add distribution point */
-	gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
-	gn->kind = GN_URI;
-	gn->name = crl_uri;
-	gn->next = crl->distributionPoints;
-	crl->distributionPoints = gn;
-
-	lock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
-	/* get the issuer cacert */
-	issuer_cert = get_authcert(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber,
-	    crl->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
-	if (issuer_cert == NULL)
-	{
-	    plog("crl issuer cacert not found");
-	    free_crl(crl);
-	    unlock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("crl issuer cacert found")
-	)
-
-	/* check the issuer's signature of the crl */
-	valid_sig = check_signature(crl->tbsCertList, crl->signature
-			, crl->algorithm, crl->algorithm, issuer_cert);
-	unlock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+	x509crl_t *crl = malloc_thing(x509crl_t);
 
-	if (!valid_sig)
-	{
-	    free_crl(crl);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("crl signature is valid")
-	)
-
-	lock_crl_list("insert_crl");
-	oldcrl = get_x509crl(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber
-	    , crl->authKeyID);
+	*crl = empty_x509crl;
 
-	if (oldcrl != NULL)
+	if (parse_x509crl(blob, 0, crl))
 	{
-	    if (crl->thisUpdate > oldcrl->thisUpdate)
-	    {
-		/* keep any known CRL distribution points */
-		add_distribution_points(oldcrl->distributionPoints
-		    , &crl->distributionPoints);
-
-		/* now delete the old CRL */
-		free_first_crl();
+		x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
+		x509crl_t *oldcrl;
+		bool valid_sig;
+		generalName_t *gn;
+
+		/* add distribution point */
+		gn = malloc_thing(generalName_t);
+		gn->kind = GN_URI;
+		gn->name = crl_uri;
+		gn->next = crl->distributionPoints;
+		crl->distributionPoints = gn;
+
+		lock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+		/* get the issuer cacert */
+		issuer_cert = get_authcert(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber,
+			crl->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+		if (issuer_cert == NULL)
+		{
+			plog("crl issuer cacert not found");
+			free_crl(crl);
+			unlock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("thisUpdate is newer - existing crl deleted")
+			DBG_log("crl issuer cacert found")
 		)
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		unlock_crl_list("insert_crls");
+
+		/* check the issuer's signature of the crl */
+		valid_sig = x509_check_signature(crl->tbsCertList, crl->signature,
+										 crl->algorithm, issuer_cert);
+		unlock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+
+		if (!valid_sig)
+		{
+			free_crl(crl);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("thisUpdate is not newer - existing crl not replaced");
+			DBG_log("crl signature is valid")
 		)
-		free_crl(crl);
-		return oldcrl->nextUpdate - time(NULL) > 2*crl_check_interval;
-	    }
-	}
 
-	/* insert new CRL */
-	crl->next = x509crls;
-	x509crls = crl;
+		lock_crl_list("insert_crl");
+		oldcrl = get_x509crl(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+			, crl->authKeyID);
 
-	unlock_crl_list("insert_crl");
+		if (oldcrl != NULL)
+		{
+			if (crl->thisUpdate > oldcrl->thisUpdate)
+			{
+				/* keep any known CRL distribution points */
+				add_distribution_points(oldcrl->distributionPoints
+					, &crl->distributionPoints);
+
+				/* now delete the old CRL */
+				free_first_crl();
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("thisUpdate is newer - existing crl deleted")
+				)
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				unlock_crl_list("insert_crls");
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("thisUpdate is not newer - existing crl not replaced");
+				)
+				free_crl(crl);
+				return oldcrl->nextUpdate - time(NULL) > 2*crl_check_interval;
+			}
+		}
 
-	/* If crl caching is enabled then the crl is saved locally.
-         * Only http or ldap URIs are cached but not local file URIs.
-         * The issuer's subjectKeyID is used as a unique filename
-         */
-	if (cache_crl && strncasecmp(crl_uri.ptr, "file", 4) != 0)
+		/* insert new CRL */
+		crl->next = x509crls;
+		x509crls = crl;
+
+		unlock_crl_list("insert_crl");
+
+		/* If crl caching is enabled then the crl is saved locally.
+		 * Only http or ldap URIs are cached but not local file URIs.
+		 * The issuer's subjectKeyID is used as a unique filename
+		 */
+		if (cache_crl && strncasecmp(crl_uri.ptr, "file", 4) != 0)
+		{
+			char path[BUF_LEN], buf[BUF_LEN];
+			char digest_buf[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
+			chunk_t subjectKeyID = chunk_from_buf(digest_buf);
+			bool has_keyID;
+			
+			if (issuer_cert->subjectKeyID.ptr == NULL)
+			{
+				has_keyID = compute_subjectKeyID(issuer_cert, subjectKeyID);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				subjectKeyID = issuer_cert->subjectKeyID;
+				has_keyID = TRUE;
+			}
+			if (has_keyID)
+			{
+				datatot(subjectKeyID.ptr, subjectKeyID.len, 16, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				snprintf(path, BUF_LEN, "%s/%s.crl", CRL_PATH, buf);
+				chunk_write(crl->certificateList, path, "crl",  0022, TRUE);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* is the fetched crl valid? */
+		return crl->nextUpdate - time(NULL) > 2*crl_check_interval;
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    char path[BUF_LEN];
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	    char digest_buf[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	    chunk_t subjectKeyID = { digest_buf, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE };
-
-	    if (issuer_cert->subjectKeyID.ptr == NULL)
-		compute_subjectKeyID(issuer_cert, subjectKeyID);
-	    else
-		subjectKeyID = issuer_cert->subjectKeyID;
-
-	    datatot(subjectKeyID.ptr, subjectKeyID.len, 16, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    snprintf(path, BUF_LEN, "%s/%s.crl", CRL_PATH, buf);
-	    write_chunk(path, "crl", crl->certificateList, 0022, TRUE);
+		plog("  error in X.509 crl");
+		free_crl(crl);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-
-	/* is the fetched crl valid? */
-	return crl->nextUpdate - time(NULL) > 2*crl_check_interval;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("  error in X.509 crl");
-	free_crl(crl);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Loads CRLs
  */
-void
-load_crls(void)
+void load_crls(void)
 {
-    struct dirent **filelist;
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    u_char *save_dir;
-    int n;
-
-    /* change directory to specified path */
-    save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
-    if (chdir(CRL_PATH))
-    {
-	plog("Could not change to directory '%s'", CRL_PATH);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("Changing to directory '%s'", CRL_PATH);
-	n = scandir(CRL_PATH, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
-
-	if (n < 0)
-	    plog("  scandir() error");
+	struct dirent **filelist;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	u_char *save_dir;
+	int n;
+
+	/* change directory to specified path */
+	save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
+	if (chdir(CRL_PATH))
+	{
+		plog("Could not change to directory '%s'", CRL_PATH);
+	}
 	else
 	{
-	    while (n--)
-	    {
-		bool pgp = FALSE;
-		chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
-		char *filename = filelist[n]->d_name;
+		plog("Changing to directory '%s'", CRL_PATH);
+		n = scandir(CRL_PATH, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
 
-		if (load_coded_file(filename, NULL, "crl", &blob, &pgp))
+		if (n < 0)
+			plog("  scandir() error");
+		else
 		{
-		    chunk_t crl_uri;
-
-		    crl_uri.len = 7 + sizeof(CRL_PATH) + strlen(filename);
-		    crl_uri.ptr = alloc_bytes(crl_uri.len + 1, "crl uri");
-
-		    /* build CRL file URI */
-		    snprintf(crl_uri.ptr, crl_uri.len + 1, "file://%s/%s"
-		        , CRL_PATH, filename);
-
-		    insert_crl(blob, crl_uri, FALSE);
+			while (n--)
+			{
+				bool pgp = FALSE;
+				chunk_t blob = chunk_empty;
+				char *filename = filelist[n]->d_name;
+
+				if (load_coded_file(filename, NULL, "crl", &blob, &pgp))
+				{
+					chunk_t crl_uri;
+
+					crl_uri.len = 7 + sizeof(CRL_PATH) + strlen(filename);
+					crl_uri.ptr = malloc(crl_uri.len + 1);
+
+					/* build CRL file URI */
+					snprintf(crl_uri.ptr, crl_uri.len + 1, "file://%s/%s"
+						, CRL_PATH, filename);
+
+					insert_crl(blob, crl_uri, FALSE);
+				}
+				free(filelist[n]);
+			}
+			free(filelist);
 		}
-		free(filelist[n]);
-	    }
-	    free(filelist);
 	}
-    }
-    /* restore directory path */
-    ignore_result(chdir(save_dir));
+	/* restore directory path */
+	ignore_result(chdir(save_dir));
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Parses a CRL revocation reason code
  */
-static crl_reason_t
-parse_crl_reasonCode(chunk_t object)
+static crl_reason_t parse_crl_reasonCode(chunk_t object)
 {
-    crl_reason_t reason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
-
-    if (*object.ptr == ASN1_ENUMERATED
-    &&  asn1_length(&object) == 1)
-    {
-	reason = *object.ptr;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  '%s'", enum_name(&crl_reason_names, reason))
-    )
-    return reason;
+	crl_reason_t reason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	if (*object.ptr == ASN1_ENUMERATED
+	&&  asn1_length(&object) == 1)
+	{
+		reason = *object.ptr;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  '%N'", crl_reason_names, reason)
+	)
+	return reason;
 }
 
 /*
  *  Parses an X.509 CRL
  */
-bool
-parse_x509crl(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509crl_t *crl)
+bool parse_x509crl(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509crl_t *crl)
 {
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    bool critical;
-    chunk_t extnID;
-    chunk_t userCertificate = empty_chunk;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < CRL_OBJ_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(crlObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
-
-	/* those objects which will parsed further need the next higher level */
-	level++;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	case CRL_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_LIST:
-	    crl->certificateList = object;
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_TBS_CERT_LIST:
-	    crl->tbsCertList = object;
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_VERSION:
-	    crl->version = (object.len) ? (1+(u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  v%d", crl->version);
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
-	    crl->sigAlg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_ISSUER:
-	    crl->issuer = object;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_THIS_UPDATE:
-	    crl->thisUpdate = parse_time(object, level);
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_NEXT_UPDATE:
-	    crl->nextUpdate = parse_time(object, level);
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_USER_CERTIFICATE:
-	    userCertificate = object;
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_REVOCATION_DATE:
-	    {
-		/* put all the serial numbers and the revocation date in a chained list
-		   with revocedCertificates pointing to the first revoked certificate */
-
-		revokedCert_t *revokedCert = alloc_thing(revokedCert_t, "revokedCert");
-		revokedCert->userCertificate = userCertificate;
-		revokedCert->revocationDate = parse_time(object, level);
-		revokedCert->revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
-		revokedCert->next = crl->revokedCertificates;
-		crl->revokedCertificates = revokedCert;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_ID:
-	case CRL_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
-	    extnID = object;
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_CRITICAL:
-	case CRL_OBJ_CRITICAL:
-	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_VALUE:
-	case CRL_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
-	    {
-		u_int extn_oid = known_oid(extnID);
-
-		if (extn_oid == OID_CRL_REASON_CODE)
-		{
-		    crl->revokedCertificates->revocationReason =
-			parse_crl_reasonCode(object);
-		}
-		else if (extn_oid == OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID)
-		{
-		    parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
-			, &crl->authKeyID, &crl->authKeySerialNumber);
-		}
-		else if (extn_oid == OID_CRL_NUMBER)
-		{
-		    if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&object, ASN1_INTEGER, level, "crlNumber"))
-			return FALSE;
-		    crl->crlNumber = object;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t extnID;
+	chunk_t userCertificate = chunk_empty;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+	bool critical;
+
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(crlObjects, blob);
+
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		u_int level = parser->get_level(parser)+1;
+
+		switch (objectID) {
+		case CRL_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_LIST:
+			crl->certificateList = object;
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_TBS_CERT_LIST:
+			crl->tbsCertList = object;
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_VERSION:
+			crl->version = (object.len) ? (1+(u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  v%d", crl->version);
+			)
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
+			crl->sigAlg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_ISSUER:
+			crl->issuer = object;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+				DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+			)
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_THIS_UPDATE:
+			crl->thisUpdate = asn1_parse_time(object, level);
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_NEXT_UPDATE:
+			crl->nextUpdate = asn1_parse_time(object, level);
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_USER_CERTIFICATE:
+			userCertificate = object;
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_REVOCATION_DATE:
+			{
+				/* put all the serial numbers and the revocation date in a chained list
+				   with revocedCertificates pointing to the first revoked certificate */
+
+				revokedCert_t *revokedCert = malloc_thing(revokedCert_t);
+				revokedCert->userCertificate = userCertificate;
+				revokedCert->revocationDate = asn1_parse_time(object, level);
+				revokedCert->revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+				revokedCert->next = crl->revokedCertificates;
+				crl->revokedCertificates = revokedCert;
+			}
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_ID:
+		case CRL_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
+			extnID = object;
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_CRITICAL:
+		case CRL_OBJ_CRITICAL:
+			critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+			)
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_VALUE:
+		case CRL_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
+			{
+				u_int extn_oid = asn1_known_oid(extnID);
+
+				if (extn_oid == OID_CRL_REASON_CODE)
+				{
+					crl->revokedCertificates->revocationReason =
+						parse_crl_reasonCode(object);
+				}
+				else if (extn_oid == OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID)
+				{
+					parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
+						, &crl->authKeyID, &crl->authKeySerialNumber);
+				}
+				else if (extn_oid == OID_CRL_NUMBER)
+				{
+					if (!asn1_parse_simple_object(&object, ASN1_INTEGER,
+												  level, "crlNumber"))
+					{
+						goto end;
+					}
+					crl->crlNumber = object;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
+			crl->algorithm = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case CRL_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
+			crl->signature = object;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
-	    crl->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case CRL_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
-	    crl->signature = object;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    time(&crl->installed);
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+	time(&crl->installed);
+
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
 }
 
 /*  Checks if the current certificate is revoked. It goes through the
@@ -523,28 +525,28 @@ static cert_status_t
 check_revocation(const x509crl_t *crl, chunk_t serial
 , time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t * revocationReason)
 {
-    revokedCert_t *revokedCert = crl->revokedCertificates;
-
-    *revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-    *revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
-    
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("serial number:", serial)
-    )
-
-    while(revokedCert != NULL)
-    {
-	/* compare serial numbers */
-	if (revokedCert->userCertificate.len == serial.len &&
-	    memcmp(revokedCert->userCertificate.ptr, serial.ptr, serial.len) == 0)
+	revokedCert_t *revokedCert = crl->revokedCertificates;
+
+	*revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	*revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+	
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_dump_chunk("serial number:", serial)
+	)
+
+	while(revokedCert != NULL)
 	{
-	    *revocationDate = revokedCert->revocationDate;
-	    *revocationReason = revokedCert->revocationReason;
-	    return CERT_REVOKED;
+		/* compare serial numbers */
+		if (revokedCert->userCertificate.len == serial.len &&
+			memeq(revokedCert->userCertificate.ptr, serial.ptr, serial.len))
+		{
+			*revocationDate = revokedCert->revocationDate;
+			*revocationReason = revokedCert->revocationReason;
+			return CERT_REVOKED;
+		}
+		revokedCert = revokedCert->next;
 	}
-	revokedCert = revokedCert->next;
-    }
-    return CERT_GOOD;
+	return CERT_GOOD;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -553,37 +555,37 @@ check_revocation(const x509crl_t *crl, chunk_t serial
 void
 check_crls(void)
 {
-    x509crl_t *crl;
+	x509crl_t *crl;
 
-    lock_crl_list("check_crls");
-    crl = x509crls;
-
-    while (crl != NULL)
-    {
-	time_t time_left = crl->nextUpdate - time(NULL);
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	lock_crl_list("check_crls");
+	crl = x509crls;
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, crl->issuer);
-	    DBG_log("issuer: '%s'",buf);
-	    if (crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(crl->authKeyID.ptr, crl->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
-	    }
-	    DBG_log("%ld seconds left", time_left)
-	)
-	if (time_left < 2*crl_check_interval)
+	while (crl != NULL)
 	{
-	    fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(crl->issuer
-		, crl->authKeySerialNumber
-		, crl->authKeyID, crl->distributionPoints);
-	    add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+		time_t time_left = crl->nextUpdate - time(NULL);
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, crl->issuer);
+			DBG_log("issuer: '%s'",buf);
+			if (crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(crl->authKeyID.ptr, crl->authKeyID.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+			}
+			DBG_log("%ld seconds left", time_left)
+		)
+		if (time_left < 2*crl_check_interval)
+		{
+			fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(crl->issuer
+				, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+				, crl->authKeyID, crl->distributionPoints);
+			add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+		}
+		crl = crl->next;
 	}
-	crl = crl->next;
-    }
-    unlock_crl_list("check_crls");
+	unlock_crl_list("check_crls");
 }
 
 /*
@@ -593,118 +595,117 @@ cert_status_t
 verify_by_crl(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until, time_t *revocationDate
 , crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
 {
-    x509crl_t *crl;
-
-    ca_info_t *ca = get_ca_info(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-			      , cert->authKeyID);
+	x509crl_t *crl;
 
-    generalName_t *crluri = (ca == NULL)? NULL : ca->crluri;
+	ca_info_t *ca = get_ca_info(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+							  , cert->authKeyID);
 
-    *revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-    *revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+	generalName_t *crluri = (ca == NULL)? NULL : ca->crluri;
 
-    lock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
-    crl = get_x509crl(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber, cert->authKeyID);
+	*revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	*revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-    if (crl == NULL)
-    {
-	unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
-	plog("crl not found");
+	lock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+	crl = get_x509crl(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber, cert->authKeyID);
 
-	if (cert->crlDistributionPoints != NULL)
+	if (crl == NULL)
 	{
-	    fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(cert->issuer
-		, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-		, cert->authKeyID, cert->crlDistributionPoints);
-	    add_crl_fetch_request(req);
-	}
+		unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+		plog("crl not found");
 
-	if (crluri != NULL)
-	{
-	    fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(cert->issuer
-		, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-		, cert->authKeyID, crluri);
-	    add_crl_fetch_request(req);
-	}
+		if (cert->crlDistributionPoints != NULL)
+		{
+			fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(cert->issuer
+				, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+				, cert->authKeyID, cert->crlDistributionPoints);
+			add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+		}
 
-	if (cert->crlDistributionPoints != 0 || crluri != NULL)
-	{
-	    wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_crl");
-	    return CERT_UNKNOWN;
+		if (crluri != NULL)
+		{
+			fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(cert->issuer
+				, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+				, cert->authKeyID, crluri);
+			add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+		}
+
+		if (cert->crlDistributionPoints != 0 || crluri != NULL)
+		{
+			wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_crl");
+			return CERT_UNKNOWN;
+		}
+		else
+			return CERT_UNDEFINED;
 	}
 	else
-	    return CERT_UNDEFINED;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
-	bool valid;
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("crl found")
-	)
-
-	add_distribution_points(cert->crlDistributionPoints
-		, &crl->distributionPoints);
-
-	add_distribution_points(crluri
-		, &crl->distributionPoints);
-
-	lock_authcert_list("verify_by_crl");
-
-	issuer_cert = get_authcert(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber
-		, crl->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
-	valid = check_signature(crl->tbsCertList, crl->signature
-		, crl->algorithm, crl->algorithm, issuer_cert);
-	
-	unlock_authcert_list("verify_by_crl");
-
-	if (valid)
 	{
-	    cert_status_t status;
+		x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
+		bool valid;
 
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("crl signature is valid")
-	    )
-	   /* return the expiration date */
-	    *until = crl->nextUpdate;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("crl found")
+		)
 
-	    /* has the certificate been revoked? */
-	    status = check_revocation(crl, cert->serialNumber, revocationDate
-	    			, revocationReason);
+		add_distribution_points(cert->crlDistributionPoints
+				, &crl->distributionPoints);
 
-	    if (*until < time(NULL))
-	    {
-		fetch_req_t *req;
+		add_distribution_points(crluri
+				, &crl->distributionPoints);
 
-		plog("crl update is overdue since %s"
-		    , timetoa(until, TRUE));
+		lock_authcert_list("verify_by_crl");
 
-		/* try to fetch a crl update */
-		req = build_crl_fetch_request(crl->issuer
-				, crl->authKeySerialNumber
-				, crl->authKeyID, crl->distributionPoints);
-		unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+		issuer_cert = get_authcert(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+				, crl->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+		valid = x509_check_signature(crl->tbsCertList, crl->signature,
+									 crl->algorithm, issuer_cert);
+		
+		unlock_authcert_list("verify_by_crl");
 
-		add_crl_fetch_request(req);
-		wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_crl");
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("crl is valid")
-		)
-	    }
-	    return status;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
-	    plog("crl signature is invalid");
-	    return CERT_UNKNOWN;
+		if (valid)
+		{
+			cert_status_t status;
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("crl signature is valid")
+			)
+		   /* return the expiration date */
+			*until = crl->nextUpdate;
+
+			/* has the certificate been revoked? */
+			status = check_revocation(crl, cert->serialNumber, revocationDate
+								, revocationReason);
+
+			if (*until < time(NULL))
+			{
+				fetch_req_t *req;
+
+				plog("crl update is overdue since %T", until, TRUE);
+
+				/* try to fetch a crl update */
+				req = build_crl_fetch_request(crl->issuer
+								, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+								, crl->authKeyID, crl->distributionPoints);
+				unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+
+				add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+				wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_crl");
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("crl is valid")
+				)
+			}
+			return status;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+			plog("crl signature is invalid");
+			return CERT_UNKNOWN;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -713,63 +714,63 @@ verify_by_crl(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until, time_t *revocationDate
 void
 list_crls(bool utc, bool strict)
 {
-    x509crl_t *crl;
+	x509crl_t *crl;
 
-    lock_crl_list("list_crls");
-    crl = x509crls;
+	lock_crl_list("list_crls");
+	crl = x509crls;
 
-    if (crl != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 CRLs:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
-
-    while (crl != NULL)
-    {
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	u_int revoked = 0;
-	revokedCert_t *revokedCert = crl->revokedCertificates;
-
-	/* count number of revoked certificates in CRL */
-	while (revokedCert != NULL)
-	{
-	    revoked++;
-	    revokedCert = revokedCert->next;
-        }
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, revoked certs: %d",
-		timetoa(&crl->installed, utc), revoked);
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, crl->issuer);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
-	if (crl->crlNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	if (crl != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(crl->crlNumber.ptr, crl->crlNumber.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       crlnumber: %s", buf);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 CRLs:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
 	}
-	list_distribution_points(crl->distributionPoints);
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       updates:   this %s",
-		timetoa(&crl->thisUpdate, utc));
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  next %s %s",
-		timetoa(&crl->nextUpdate, utc),
-		check_expiry(crl->nextUpdate, CRL_WARNING_INTERVAL, strict));
-	if (crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	{
-	    datatot(crl->authKeyID.ptr, crl->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
-	}
-	if (crl->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+
+	while (crl != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(crl->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, crl->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
-	}
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		u_int revoked = 0;
+		revokedCert_t *revokedCert = crl->revokedCertificates;
+
+		/* count number of revoked certificates in CRL */
+		while (revokedCert != NULL)
+		{
+			revoked++;
+			revokedCert = revokedCert->next;
+		}
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, revoked certs: %d",
+				&crl->installed, utc, revoked);
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, crl->issuer);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+		if (crl->crlNumber.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(crl->crlNumber.ptr, crl->crlNumber.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       crlnumber: %s", buf);
+		}
+		list_distribution_points(crl->distributionPoints);
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       updates:   this %T",
+				&crl->thisUpdate, utc);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  next %T %s",
+				&crl->nextUpdate, utc,
+				check_expiry(crl->nextUpdate, CRL_WARNING_INTERVAL, strict));
+		if (crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(crl->authKeyID.ptr, crl->authKeyID.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		if (crl->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(crl->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, crl->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+		}
 
-	crl = crl->next;
-    }
-    unlock_crl_list("list_crls");
+		crl = crl->next;
+	}
+	unlock_crl_list("list_crls");
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/crl.h b/src/pluto/crl.h
index b5051dcac..7c110ad5a 100644
--- a/src/pluto/crl.h
+++ b/src/pluto/crl.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: crl.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include "constants.h"
@@ -22,9 +20,9 @@ typedef struct revokedCert revokedCert_t;
 
 struct revokedCert{
   revokedCert_t *next;
-  chunk_t	userCertificate;
-  time_t	revocationDate;
-  crl_reason_t	revocationReason;
+  chunk_t       userCertificate;
+  time_t        revocationDate;
+  crl_reason_t  revocationReason;
 };
 
 /* storage structure for an X.509 CRL */
@@ -33,28 +31,28 @@ typedef struct x509crl x509crl_t;
 
 struct x509crl {
   x509crl_t     *next;
-  time_t	 installed;
+  time_t         installed;
   generalName_t *distributionPoints;
   chunk_t        certificateList;
   chunk_t          tbsCertList;
   u_int              version;
-  	         /*  signature */
+				 /*  signature */
   int                  sigAlg;
   chunk_t            issuer;
   time_t             thisUpdate;
   time_t             nextUpdate;
   revokedCert_t      *revokedCertificates;
-                /*   v2 extensions */
-                /*   crlExtensions */
-                /*     extension */
-                /*       extnID */
-                /*       critical */
-                /*       extnValue */
-  chunk_t		 authKeyID;
-  chunk_t		 authKeySerialNumber;
-  chunk_t		 crlNumber;
+				/*   v2 extensions */
+				/*   crlExtensions */
+				/*     extension */
+				/*       extnID */
+				/*       critical */
+				/*       extnValue */
+  chunk_t                authKeyID;
+  chunk_t                authKeySerialNumber;
+  chunk_t                crlNumber;
 
-                /* signatureAlgorithm */
+				/* signatureAlgorithm */
   int                algorithm;
   chunk_t          signature;
 };
@@ -82,7 +80,7 @@ extern void load_crls(void);
 extern void check_crls(void);
 extern bool insert_crl(chunk_t blob, chunk_t crl_uri, bool cache_crl);
 extern cert_status_t verify_by_crl(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until
-    , time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t *revocationReason);
+	, time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t *revocationReason);
 extern void list_crls(bool utc, bool strict);
 extern void free_crls(void);
 extern void free_crl(x509crl_t *crl);
diff --git a/src/pluto/crypto.c b/src/pluto/crypto.c
index 207192e14..1adccc74e 100644
--- a/src/pluto/crypto.c
+++ b/src/pluto/crypto.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* crypto interfaces
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier
- * Copyright (C) 2007 Andreas Steffen
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001 D. Hugh Redelmeier
+ * Copyright (C) 2007-2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,617 +11,582 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: crypto.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H   /* stupid trick to force prototype decl in <des.h> */
-#include <libdes/des.h>
-
-#include <errno.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "state.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
-#include "alg_info.h"
-#include "ike_alg.h"
-
-
-/* moduli and generator. */
-
-static MP_INT
-    modp1024_modulus,
-    modp1536_modulus,
-    modp2048_modulus,
-    modp3072_modulus,
-    modp4096_modulus,
-    modp6144_modulus,
-    modp8192_modulus;
-
-MP_INT groupgenerator;	/* MODP group generator (2) */
-
-static void do_3des(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc);
-
-static struct encrypt_desc crypto_encryptor_3des =
-{ 	
-	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
-	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_3DES_CBC, 
-	algo_next: 	NULL,
-	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(des_key_schedule) * 3,
-	enc_blocksize: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, 
-	keydeflen: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
-	keyminlen: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
-	keymaxlen: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
-	do_crypt: 	do_3des,
-};
-
-/* MD5 hash test vectors
- * from RFC 1321 "MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"
- * April 1992, R. Rivest, RSA Data Security
- */
-
-static const u_char md5_test0_msg[] = {
-
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test0_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xd4, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x00, 0xb2, 0x04,
-    0xe9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xec, 0xf8, 0x42, 0x7e
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test1_msg[] = {
-    0x61
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test1_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x0c, 0xc1, 0x75, 0xb9, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xa8,
-    0x31, 0xc3, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test2_msg[] = {
-    0x61, 0x62, 0x63
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0xb0,
-    0xd6, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x7d, 0x28, 0xe1, 0x7f, 0x72
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test3_msg[] = {
-    0x6d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x20,
-    0x64, 0x69, 0x67, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test3_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xf9, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x7d, 0x7c, 0xb7, 0x93, 0x8d,
-    0x52, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0x31, 0xaa, 0xf1, 0x61, 0xd0
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test4_msg[] = {
-    0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68,
-    0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70,
-    0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78,
-    0x79, 0x7a
-};
 
-static const u_char md5_test4_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xc3, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0xd7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xe4, 0x00,
-    0x7d, 0xfb, 0x49, 0x6c, 0xca, 0x67, 0xe1, 0x3b
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_test5_msg[] = {
-    0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48,
-    0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50,
-    0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58,
-    0x59, 0x5a, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66,
-    0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e,
-    0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76,
-    0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33,
-    0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39
-};
+static struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_3des =
+{       
+	algo_type:       IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:         OAKLEY_3DES_CBC, 
+	algo_next:       NULL,
 
-static const u_char md5_test5_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xd1, 0x74, 0xab, 0x98, 0xd2, 0x77, 0xd9, 0xf5,
-    0xa5, 0x61, 0x1c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x41, 0x9d, 0x9f
+	enc_blocksize:	 DES_BLOCK_SIZE, 
+	keydeflen:		 DES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+	keyminlen:		 DES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+	keymaxlen:		 DES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
 };
 
-static const u_char md5_test6_msg[] = {
-    0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
-    0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36,
-    0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34,
-    0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32,
-    0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30,
-    0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
-    0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36,
-    0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34,
-    0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32,
-    0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30
-};
+#define  AES_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  AES_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
+#define  AES_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
 
-static const u_char md5_test6_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x57, 0xed, 0xf4, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0x55,
-    0xac, 0x49, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x21, 0x07, 0xb6, 0x7a
-};
-
-static const hash_testvector_t md5_hash_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(md5_test0_msg), md5_test0_msg, md5_test0_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(md5_test1_msg), md5_test1_msg, md5_test1_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(md5_test2_msg), md5_test2_msg, md5_test2_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(md5_test3_msg), md5_test3_msg, md5_test3_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(md5_test4_msg), md5_test4_msg, md5_test4_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(md5_test5_msg), md5_test5_msg, md5_test5_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(md5_test6_msg), md5_test6_msg, md5_test6_msg_digest },
-    { 0, NULL, NULL }
-};
-
-/* MD5 hmac test vectors
- * from RFC 2202 "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1"
- * September 1997, P. Cheng, IBM & R. Glenn, NIST
- */
-
-static const u_char md5_hmac1_key[] = {
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_hmac1_msg[] = {
-    0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_hmac1[] = {
-    0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
-    0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_hmac2_key[] = {
-    0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_hmac2_msg[] = {
-    0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20,
-    0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20,
-    0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68,
-    0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f
-};
+static struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_aes =
+{
+	algo_type: 	     IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	     OAKLEY_AES_CBC,
+	algo_next: 	     NULL, 
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac2[] = {
-    0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
-    0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38
+	enc_blocksize: 	 AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keyminlen: 		 AES_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keydeflen: 		 AES_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen: 		 AES_KEY_MAX_LEN,
 };
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac3_key[] = {
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
-};
+#define  BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  BLOWFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN	448
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac3_msg[] = {
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
-    0xdd, 0xdd
-};
+static struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_blowfish =
+{
+	algo_type:       IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:         OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+	algo_next:       NULL, 
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac3[] = {
-    0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
-    0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6
+	enc_blocksize:	 BLOWFISH_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keyminlen:		 BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keydeflen:		 BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keymaxlen:		 BLOWFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
 };
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac4_key[] = {
-    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
-    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
-    0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18,
-    0x19
-};
+#define  SERPENT_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  SERPENT_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
+#define  SERPENT_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac4_msg[] = {
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
-    0xcd, 0xcd 
-};
-
-static const u_char md5_hmac4[] = {
-    0x69, 0x7e, 0xaf, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x3a, 0xea,
-    0x3a, 0x75, 0x16, 0x47, 0x46, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x79
-};
+static struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_serpent =
+{
+	algo_type: 	    IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	    OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC,
+	algo_next: 	    NULL,
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac6_key[] = {
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+	enc_blocksize:   SERPENT_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keyminlen:		 SERPENT_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keydeflen:		 SERPENT_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen:		 SERPENT_KEY_MAX_LEN,
 };
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac6_msg[] = {
-    0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x55, 0x73, 0x69,
-    0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65,
-    0x72, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x42,
-    0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x69, 0x7a,
-    0x65, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x2d, 0x20,
-    0x48, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79,
-    0x20, 0x46, 0x69, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74
-};
+#define  TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
+#define  TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac6[] = {
-    0x6b, 0x1a, 0xb7, 0xfe, 0x4b, 0xd7, 0xbf, 0x8f,
-    0x0b, 0x62, 0xe6, 0xce, 0x61, 0xb9, 0xd0, 0xcd
-};
+static struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_twofish = 
+{
+	algo_type: 	     IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	     OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC,
+	algo_next: 	     NULL,
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac7_msg[] = {
-    0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x55, 0x73, 0x69,
-    0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65,
-    0x72, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x42,
-    0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x69, 0x7a,
-    0x65, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
-    0x64, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72,
-    0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x4f, 0x6e,
-    0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d,
-    0x53, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x20, 0x44, 0x61, 0x74,
-    0x61
+	enc_blocksize:	 TWOFISH_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keydeflen:		 TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keyminlen:		 TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen:		 TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
 };
 
-static const u_char md5_hmac7[] = {
-    0x6f, 0x63, 0x0f, 0xad, 0x67, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0xee,
-    0x1f, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0x62, 0xdb, 0x3a, 0xa5, 0x3e
-};
+static struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_twofish_ssh =
+{
+	algo_type: 	     IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	     OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH,
+	algo_next: 	     NULL,
 
-static const hmac_testvector_t md5_hmac_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac1_key), md5_hmac1_key, sizeof(md5_hmac1_msg), md5_hmac1_msg, md5_hmac1 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac2_key), md5_hmac2_key, sizeof(md5_hmac2_msg), md5_hmac2_msg, md5_hmac2 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac3_key), md5_hmac3_key, sizeof(md5_hmac3_msg), md5_hmac3_msg, md5_hmac3 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac4_key), md5_hmac4_key, sizeof(md5_hmac4_msg), md5_hmac4_msg, md5_hmac4 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key), md5_hmac6_key, sizeof(md5_hmac6_msg), md5_hmac6_msg, md5_hmac6 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key), md5_hmac6_key, sizeof(md5_hmac7_msg), md5_hmac7_msg, md5_hmac7 },
-    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	enc_blocksize:	 TWOFISH_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keydeflen:		 TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keyminlen:		 TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen:		 TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
 };
 
-static struct hash_desc crypto_hasher_md5 =
-{ 	
+static struct hash_desc hash_desc_md5 =
+{       
 	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
 	algo_id:   OAKLEY_MD5,
 	algo_next: NULL, 
-	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(MD5_CTX),
-	hash_block_size:  MD5_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	hash_digest_size: MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	hash_testvectors: md5_hash_testvectors,
-	hmac_testvectors: md5_hmac_testvectors,
-	hash_init: (void (*)(void *)) MD5Init,
-	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)) MD5Update,
-	hash_final: (void (*)(u_char *, void *)) MD5Final
+	hash_digest_size: HASH_SIZE_MD5,
 };
 
-/* SHA-1 test vectors
- * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
- * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
- */
-
-static const u_char sha1_short2_msg[] = {
-    0x5e
+static struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha1 =
+{       
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA,
+	algo_next: NULL, 
+	hash_digest_size: HASH_SIZE_SHA1,
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_short2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x5e, 0x6f, 0x80, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0x97, 0x98, 0xca,
-    0xfc, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0xb9, 0x6c, 0xc5, 0x7b, 0xa4,
-    0xc4, 0xdb, 0x59, 0xc2
+static struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_256 = {
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_256,
+	algo_next: NULL,
+	hash_digest_size: HASH_SIZE_SHA256,
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_short4_msg[] = {
-    0x9a, 0x7d, 0xfd, 0xf1, 0xec, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x6e,
-    0xd6, 0x46, 0xaa, 0x55, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x71, 0x46
+static struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_384 = {
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_384,
+	algo_next: NULL,
+	hash_digest_size: HASH_SIZE_SHA384,
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_short4_msg_digest[] = {
-    0x82, 0xab, 0xff, 0x66, 0x05, 0xdb, 0xe1, 0xc1,
-    0x7d, 0xef, 0x12, 0xa3, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xa8,
-    0x2b, 0x54, 0x4a, 0x35
+static struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_512 = {
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_512,
+	algo_next: NULL,
+	hash_digest_size: HASH_SIZE_SHA512,
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_long2_msg[] = {
-    0xf7, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x14, 0x1b, 0xcd, 0x17, 0x0a,
-    0xe8, 0x9b, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x15, 0xa1, 0xd5, 0x9f,
-    0x3f, 0xd8, 0x4d, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x92, 0x51, 0xbd,
-    0xac, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x61, 0xd0, 0x5e, 0xd1, 0x15,
-    0xa0, 0x6a, 0x7c, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0xea,
-    0xd2, 0x44, 0x21, 0xde, 0xd9, 0xc3, 0x25, 0x92,
-    0xbd, 0x57, 0xed, 0xea, 0xe3, 0x9c, 0x39, 0xfa,
-    0x1f, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x6a, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xcf, 0x1f,
-    0x7b, 0xee, 0xad, 0x17, 0x13, 0xe2, 0xe0, 0x95,
-    0x98, 0x97, 0x34, 0x7f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x0b, 0x04,
-    0x00, 0xc2, 0x09, 0x81, 0x5d, 0x6b, 0x10, 0xa6,
-    0x83, 0x83, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x56, 0x2a, 0x56, 0xca,
-    0xb1, 0xa2, 0x8e, 0x81, 0xb6, 0x57, 0x66, 0x54,
-    0x63, 0x1c, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xb8, 0x6e, 0x3b,
-    0x33, 0xa1, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x53, 0x07, 0xc0, 0x0a,
-    0xff, 0x14, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xed, 0x73, 0x50, 0x60,
-    0x6a, 0x0f, 0x85, 0xe6, 0xa9, 0x1d, 0x39, 0x6f,
-    0x5b, 0x5c, 0xbe, 0x57, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x38, 0x80,
-    0x7c, 0x7d, 0x52, 0x3d, 0x6d, 0x79, 0x2f, 0x6e,
-    0xbc, 0x24, 0xa4, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0x27,
-    0xcd, 0xbb, 0xfb
+const struct dh_desc unset_group = {
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_NONE, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    0
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_long2_msg_digest[] = {
-    0xcb, 0x00, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x97, 0xd2, 0x60,
-    0x99, 0x1b, 0xa6, 0xa4, 0x60, 0xe7, 0x6e, 0x20,
-    0x2b, 0xad, 0x27, 0xb3
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_1024 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_1024_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    1024 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const hash_testvector_t sha1_hash_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha1_short2_msg), sha1_short2_msg, sha1_short2_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha1_short4_msg), sha1_short4_msg, sha1_short4_msg_digest },
-    { sizeof(sha1_long2_msg),  sha1_long2_msg,  sha1_long2_msg_digest  },
-    { 0, NULL, NULL }
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_1536 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_1536_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    1536 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-/* SHA-1 hmac test vectors
- * from RFC 2202 "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1"
- * September 1997, P. Cheng, IBM & R. Glenn, NIST
- */
-
-static const u_char sha1_hmac1_key[] = {
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
-    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_2048 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_2048_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    2048 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac1[] = {
-    0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, 0x72, 0x64,
-    0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x8c, 0x8e,
-    0xf1, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x00
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_3072 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_3072_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    3072 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac2[] = {
-    0xef, 0xfc, 0xdf, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0xeb, 0x2f, 0xa2,
-    0xd2, 0x74, 0x16, 0xd5, 0xf1, 0x84, 0xdf, 0x9c,
-    0x25, 0x9a, 0x7c, 0x79
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_4096 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_4096_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    4096 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac3_key[] = {
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
-    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_6144 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_6144_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    6144 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac3[] = {
-    0x12, 0x5d, 0x73, 0x42, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x11, 0xcd,
-    0x91, 0xa3, 0x9a, 0xf4, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x7b, 0x4f,
-    0x63, 0xf1, 0x75, 0xd3
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_modp_8192 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    MODP_8192_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    8192 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac4[] = {
-    0x4c, 0x90, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x02, 0x62, 0x50, 0xc6,
-    0xbc, 0x84, 0x14, 0xf9, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xc8, 0x6c,
-    0x2d, 0x72, 0x35, 0xda
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_ecp_256 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    ECP_256_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    2*256 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac6[] = {
-    0xaa, 0x4a, 0xe5, 0xe1, 0x52, 0x72, 0xd0, 0x0e,
-    0x95, 0x70, 0x56, 0x37, 0xce, 0x8a, 0x3b, 0x55,
-    0xed, 0x40, 0x21, 0x12
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_ecp_384 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    ECP_384_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    2*384 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const u_char sha1_hmac7[] = {
-    0xe8, 0xe9, 0x9d, 0x0f, 0x45, 0x23, 0x7d, 0x78,
-    0x6d, 0x6b, 0xba, 0xa7, 0x96, 0x5c, 0x78, 0x08,
-    0xbb, 0xff, 0x1a, 0x91
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_ecp_521 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    ECP_521_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    2*528 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static const hmac_testvector_t sha1_hmac_testvectors[] = {
-    { sizeof(sha1_hmac1_key), sha1_hmac1_key, sizeof(md5_hmac1_msg), md5_hmac1_msg, sha1_hmac1 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac2_key),  md5_hmac2_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac2_msg), md5_hmac2_msg, sha1_hmac2 },
-    { sizeof(sha1_hmac3_key), sha1_hmac3_key, sizeof(md5_hmac3_msg), md5_hmac3_msg, sha1_hmac3 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac4_key),  md5_hmac4_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac4_msg), md5_hmac4_msg, sha1_hmac4 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key),  md5_hmac6_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac6_msg), md5_hmac6_msg, sha1_hmac6 },
-    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key),  md5_hmac6_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac7_msg), md5_hmac7_msg, sha1_hmac7 },
-    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_ecp_192 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    ECP_192_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    2*192 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-static struct hash_desc crypto_hasher_sha1 =
-{ 	
-	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
-	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA,
-	algo_next: NULL, 
-	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
-	hash_block_size:  SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
-	hash_digest_size: SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	hash_testvectors: sha1_hash_testvectors,
-	hmac_testvectors: sha1_hmac_testvectors,
-	hash_init: (void (*)(void *)) SHA1Init,
-	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)) SHA1Update,
-	hash_final: (void (*)(u_char *, void *)) SHA1Final
+static struct dh_desc dh_desc_ecp_224 = {       
+	algo_type:  IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP,
+	algo_id:    ECP_224_BIT, 
+	algo_next:  NULL,
+	ke_size:    2*224 / BITS_PER_BYTE
 };
 
-void
-init_crypto(void)
+void init_crypto(void)
 {
-    if (mpz_init_set_str(&groupgenerator, MODP_GENERATOR, 10) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp1024_modulus, MODP1024_MODULUS, 16) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp1536_modulus, MODP1536_MODULUS, 16) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp2048_modulus, MODP2048_MODULUS, 16) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp3072_modulus, MODP3072_MODULUS, 16) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp4096_modulus, MODP4096_MODULUS, 16) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp6144_modulus, MODP6144_MODULUS, 16) != 0
-    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp8192_modulus, MODP8192_MODULUS, 16) != 0)
-	exit_log("mpz_init_set_str() failed in init_crypto()");
-
-    ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *) &crypto_encryptor_3des);
-    ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *) &crypto_hasher_sha1);
-    ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *) &crypto_hasher_md5);
-    ike_alg_init();
-    ike_alg_test();
+	enumerator_t *enumerator;
+	encryption_algorithm_t encryption_alg;
+	hash_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+	diffie_hellman_group_t dh_group;
+	bool no_md5  = TRUE;
+	bool no_sha1 = TRUE;
+
+	enumerator = lib->crypto->create_hasher_enumerator(lib->crypto);
+	while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &hash_alg))
+	{
+		const struct hash_desc *desc;
+
+		switch (hash_alg)
+		{
+			case HASH_SHA1:
+				desc = &hash_desc_sha1;
+				no_sha1 = FALSE;
+				break;
+			case HASH_SHA256:
+				desc = &hash_desc_sha2_256;
+				break;
+			case HASH_SHA384:
+				desc = &hash_desc_sha2_384;
+				break;
+			case HASH_SHA512:
+				desc = &hash_desc_sha2_512;
+				break;
+			case HASH_MD5:
+				desc = &hash_desc_md5;
+				no_md5 = FALSE;
+				break;
+			default:
+				continue;
+		}
+		ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)desc);
+	}
+	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
+
+	if (no_sha1)
+	{
+		exit_log("pluto cannot run without a SHA-1 hasher");
+	}
+	if (no_md5)
+	{
+		exit_log("pluto cannot run without an MD5 hasher");
+	}
+		
+	enumerator = lib->crypto->create_crypter_enumerator(lib->crypto);
+	while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &encryption_alg))
+	{
+		const struct encrypt_desc *desc;
+ 
+		switch (encryption_alg)
+		{
+			case ENCR_3DES:
+				desc = &encrypt_desc_3des;
+				break;
+			case ENCR_BLOWFISH:
+				desc = &encrypt_desc_blowfish;
+				break;
+			case ENCR_AES_CBC:
+				desc = &encrypt_desc_aes;
+				break;
+			case ENCR_TWOFISH_CBC:
+				desc = &encrypt_desc_twofish;
+				ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)&encrypt_desc_twofish_ssh);
+				break;
+			case ENCR_SERPENT_CBC:
+				desc = &encrypt_desc_serpent;
+				break;
+			default:
+				continue;			
+		}
+		ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)desc);
+	}
+	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
+
+	enumerator = lib->crypto->create_dh_enumerator(lib->crypto);
+	while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &dh_group))
+	{
+		const struct dh_desc *desc;
+
+		switch (dh_group)
+		{
+			case MODP_1024_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_1024;
+				break;
+			case MODP_1536_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_1536;
+				break;
+			case MODP_2048_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_2048;
+				break;
+			case MODP_3072_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_3072;
+				break;
+			case MODP_4096_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_4096;
+				break;
+			case MODP_6144_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_6144;
+				break;
+			case MODP_8192_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_modp_8192;
+				break;
+			case ECP_256_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_ecp_256;
+				break;
+			case ECP_384_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_ecp_384;
+				break;
+			case ECP_521_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_ecp_521;
+				break;
+			case ECP_192_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_ecp_192;
+				break;
+			case ECP_224_BIT:
+				desc = &dh_desc_ecp_224;
+				break;
+			default:
+				continue;
+		}
+		ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)desc);
+	}
+	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
 }
 
-/* Oakley group description
- *
- * See RFC2409 "The Internet key exchange (IKE)" 6.
- */
-
-const struct oakley_group_desc unset_group = {0, NULL, 0};	/* magic signifier */
-
-const struct oakley_group_desc oakley_group[OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE] = {
-#   define BYTES(bits) (((bits) + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE)
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024, &modp1024_modulus, BYTES(1024) },
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536, &modp1536_modulus, BYTES(1536) },
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048, &modp2048_modulus, BYTES(2048) },
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072, &modp3072_modulus, BYTES(3072) },
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096, &modp4096_modulus, BYTES(4096) },
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144, &modp6144_modulus, BYTES(6144) },
-    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192, &modp8192_modulus, BYTES(8192) },
-#   undef BYTES
-};
-
-const struct oakley_group_desc *
-lookup_group(u_int16_t group)
+void free_crypto(void)
 {
-    int i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i != elemsof(oakley_group); i++)
-	if (group == oakley_group[i].group)
-	    return &oakley_group[i];
-    return NULL;
+	/* currently nothing to do */
 }
 
-/* Encryption Routines
- *
- * Each uses and updates the state object's st_new_iv.
- * This must already be initialized.
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv1 encryption algorithm name to crypter name
  */
+encryption_algorithm_t oakley_to_encryption_algorithm(int alg)
+{
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_DES_CBC:
+			return ENCR_DES;
+		case OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC:
+			return ENCR_IDEA; 
+		case OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC:
+			return ENCR_BLOWFISH;
+		case OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC:
+			return ENCR_RC5;
+		case OAKLEY_3DES_CBC:
+			return ENCR_3DES;
+		case OAKLEY_CAST_CBC:
+			return ENCR_CAST;
+		case OAKLEY_AES_CBC:
+			return ENCR_AES_CBC;
+		case OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC:
+			return ENCR_SERPENT_CBC;
+		case OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC:
+		case OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH:
+			return ENCR_TWOFISH_CBC;
+		default:
+			return ENCR_UNDEFINED;
+	}
+}
 
-/* encrypt or decrypt part of an IKE message using DES
- * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv1 hash algorithm name to hasher name
  */
-static void __attribute__ ((unused))
-do_des(bool enc, void *buf, size_t buf_len, struct state *st)
+hash_algorithm_t oakley_to_hash_algorithm(int alg)
 {
-    des_key_schedule ks;
-
-    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)st->st_enc_key.ptr, ks);
-
-    passert(st->st_new_iv_len >= DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-    st->st_new_iv_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;	/* truncate */
-
-    des_ncbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf, (des_cblock *)buf, buf_len,
-	ks,
-	(des_cblock *)st->st_new_iv, enc);
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_MD5:
+			return HASH_MD5;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA:
+			return HASH_SHA1;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA2_256:
+			return HASH_SHA256;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA2_384:
+			return HASH_SHA384;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA2_512:
+			return HASH_SHA512;
+		default:
+			return HASH_UNKNOWN;
+	}
 }
 
-/* encrypt or decrypt part of an IKE message using 3DES
- * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv1 hash algorithm name to IKEv2 prf name
  */
-static void
-do_3des(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
+pseudo_random_function_t oakley_to_prf(int alg)
 {
-    des_key_schedule ks[3];
-
-    passert (!key_size || (key_size==(DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3)))
-    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)key + 0, ks[0]);
-    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)key + 1, ks[1]);
-    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)key + 2, ks[2]);
-
-    des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf, (des_cblock *)buf, buf_len,
-	ks[0], ks[1], ks[2],
-	(des_cblock *)iv, enc);
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_MD5:
+			return PRF_HMAC_MD5;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA:
+			return PRF_HMAC_SHA1;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA2_256:
+			return PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA2_384:
+			return PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384;
+		case OAKLEY_SHA2_512:
+			return PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512;
+		default:
+			return PRF_UNDEFINED;
+	}
 }
 
-/* hash and prf routines */
-void
-crypto_cbc_encrypt(const struct encrypt_desc *e, bool enc, u_int8_t *buf, size_t size, struct state *st)
+/**
+ * Maps IKEv1 authentication method to IKEv2 signature scheme
+ */
+signature_scheme_t oakley_to_signature_scheme(int method)
 {
-    passert(st->st_new_iv_len >= e->enc_blocksize);
-    st->st_new_iv_len = e->enc_blocksize;	/* truncate */
-
-    e->do_crypt(buf, size, st->st_enc_key.ptr, st->st_enc_key.len, st->st_new_iv, enc);
-    /*
-    e->set_key(&ctx, st->st_enc_key.ptr, st->st_enc_key.len);
-    e->cbc_crypt(&ctx, buf, size, st->st_new_iv, enc);
-    */
+	switch (method)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+		case XAUTHInitRSA:
+		case XAUTHRespRSA:
+			return SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_NULL;
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+			return SIGN_ECDSA_WITH_NULL;
+		default:
+			return SIGN_UNKNOWN;
+	}
 }
 
-/* HMAC package
- * rfc2104.txt specifies how HMAC works.
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv2 encryption to IKEv1 encryption algorithm
  */
-
-void
-hmac_init(struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
-    const struct hash_desc *h,
-    const u_char *key, size_t key_len)
+int oakley_from_encryption_algorithm(encryption_algorithm_t alg)
 {
-    int k;
-
-    ctx->h = h;
-    ctx->hmac_digest_size = h->hash_digest_size;
-
-    /* Prepare the two pads for the HMAC */
-
-    memset(ctx->buf1, '\0', h->hash_block_size);
-
-    if (key_len <= h->hash_block_size)
-    {
-	memcpy(ctx->buf1, key, key_len);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	h->hash_init(&ctx->hash_ctx);
-	h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, key, key_len);
-	h->hash_final(ctx->buf1, &ctx->hash_ctx);
-    }
-
-    memcpy(ctx->buf2, ctx->buf1, h->hash_block_size);
-
-    for (k = 0; k < h->hash_block_size; k++)
-    {
-	ctx->buf1[k] ^= HMAC_IPAD;
-	ctx->buf2[k] ^= HMAC_OPAD;
-    }
-
-    hmac_reinit(ctx);
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case ENCR_DES:
+			return OAKLEY_DES_CBC;
+		case ENCR_3DES:
+			return OAKLEY_3DES_CBC;
+		case ENCR_RC5:
+			return OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC;
+		case ENCR_IDEA:
+			return OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC;
+		case ENCR_CAST:
+			return OAKLEY_CAST_CBC;
+		case ENCR_BLOWFISH:
+			return OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC;
+		case ENCR_AES_CBC:
+			return OAKLEY_AES_CBC;
+		case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CBC:
+			return OAKLEY_CAMELLIA_CBC;
+		case ENCR_SERPENT_CBC:
+			return OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC;
+    	case ENCR_TWOFISH_CBC:
+			return OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+	}
 }
 
-void
-hmac_reinit(struct hmac_ctx *ctx)
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv2 integrity to IKEv1 hash algorithm
+ */
+int oakley_from_integrity_algorithm(integrity_algorithm_t alg)
 {
-    ctx->h->hash_init(&ctx->hash_ctx);
-    ctx->h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, ctx->buf1, ctx->h->hash_block_size);
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96:
+			return OAKLEY_MD5;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+			return OAKLEY_SHA;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128:
+			return OAKLEY_SHA2_256;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192:
+			return OAKLEY_SHA2_384;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256:
+			return OAKLEY_SHA2_512;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+	}
 }
 
-void
-hmac_update(struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
-    const u_char *data, size_t data_len)
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv2 encryption to IKEv1 ESP encryption algorithm
+ */
+int esp_from_encryption_algorithm(encryption_algorithm_t alg)
 {
-    ctx->h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, data, data_len);
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case ENCR_DES:
+			return ESP_DES;
+		case ENCR_3DES:
+			return ESP_3DES;
+		case ENCR_RC5:
+			return ESP_RC5;
+		case ENCR_IDEA:
+			return ESP_IDEA;
+		case ENCR_CAST:
+			return ESP_CAST;
+		case ENCR_BLOWFISH:
+			return ESP_BLOWFISH;
+		case ENCR_NULL:
+			return ESP_NULL;
+		case ENCR_AES_CBC:
+			return ESP_AES;
+		case ENCR_AES_CTR:
+			return ESP_AES_CTR;
+		case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV8:
+			return ESP_AES_CCM_8;
+		case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV12:
+			return ESP_AES_CCM_12;
+		case ENCR_AES_CCM_ICV16:
+			return ESP_AES_CCM_16;
+		case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV8:
+			return ESP_AES_GCM_8;
+		case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV12:
+			return ESP_AES_GCM_12;
+		case ENCR_AES_GCM_ICV16:
+			return ESP_AES_GCM_16;
+		case ENCR_CAMELLIA_CBC:
+			return ESP_CAMELLIA;
+		case ENCR_SERPENT_CBC:
+			return ESP_SERPENT;
+    	case ENCR_TWOFISH_CBC:
+			return ESP_TWOFISH;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+	}
 }
 
-void
-hmac_final(u_char *output, struct hmac_ctx *ctx)
+/**
+ * Converts IKEv2 integrity to IKEv1 ESP authentication algorithm
+ */
+int esp_from_integrity_algorithm(integrity_algorithm_t alg)
 {
-    const struct hash_desc *h = ctx->h;
-
-    h->hash_final(output, &ctx->hash_ctx);
-
-    h->hash_init(&ctx->hash_ctx);
-    h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, ctx->buf2, h->hash_block_size);
-    h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, output, h->hash_digest_size);
-    h->hash_final(output, &ctx->hash_ctx);
+	switch (alg)
+	{
+		case AUTH_HMAC_MD5_96:
+			return AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA1_96:
+			return AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1;
+		case AUTH_AES_XCBC_96:
+			return AUTH_ALGORITHM_AES_XCBC_MAC;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_256_128:
+			return AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_384_192:
+			return AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384;
+		case AUTH_HMAC_SHA2_512_256:
+			return AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512;
+		default:
+			return 0;
+	}
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/crypto.h b/src/pluto/crypto.h
index e773d86df..06c4e1d1a 100644
--- a/src/pluto/crypto.h
+++ b/src/pluto/crypto.h
@@ -10,31 +10,20 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: crypto.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU MP library */
+#include <crypto/crypters/crypter.h>
+#include <crypto/signers/signer.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+#include <crypto/prfs/prf.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
 
-#include "libsha2/sha2.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
 
 extern void init_crypto(void);
+extern void free_crypto(void);
 
-/* Oakley group descriptions */
-
-extern MP_INT groupgenerator;	/* MODP group generator (2) */
-
-struct oakley_group_desc {
-    u_int16_t group;
-    MP_INT *modulus;
-    size_t bytes;
-};
-
-extern const struct oakley_group_desc unset_group;	/* magic signifier */
-extern const struct oakley_group_desc *lookup_group(u_int16_t group);
-#define OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE 7
-extern const struct oakley_group_desc oakley_group[OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE];
+extern const struct dh_desc unset_group;      /* magic signifier */
 
 /* unification of cryptographic encoding/decoding algorithms
  * The IV is taken from and returned to st->st_new_iv.
@@ -46,63 +35,23 @@ extern const struct oakley_group_desc oakley_group[OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE];
 #define MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN0  (3 * DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE)
 #define MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN  (256/BITS_PER_BYTE)
 
-struct state;	/* forward declaration, dammit */
+struct state;   /* forward declaration, dammit */
 
-void crypto_cbc_encrypt(const struct encrypt_desc *e, bool enc, u_int8_t *buf, size_t size, struct state *st);
-
-#define update_iv(st)	memcpy((st)->st_iv, (st)->st_new_iv \
-    , (st)->st_iv_len = (st)->st_new_iv_len)
+#define update_iv(st)   memcpy((st)->st_iv, (st)->st_new_iv \
+	, (st)->st_iv_len = (st)->st_new_iv_len)
 
 #define set_ph1_iv(st, iv) \
-    passert((st)->st_ph1_iv_len <= sizeof((st)->st_ph1_iv)); \
-    memcpy((st)->st_ph1_iv, (iv), (st)->st_ph1_iv_len);
+	passert((st)->st_ph1_iv_len <= sizeof((st)->st_ph1_iv)); \
+	memcpy((st)->st_ph1_iv, (iv), (st)->st_ph1_iv_len);
 
 /* unification of cryptographic hashing mechanisms */
 
-#ifndef NO_HASH_CTX
-union hash_ctx {
-	MD5_CTX ctx_md5;
-	SHA1_CTX ctx_sha1;
-	sha256_context ctx_sha256;
-	sha512_context ctx_sha512;
-    };
-
-/* HMAC package
- * Note that hmac_ctx can be (and is) copied since there are
- * no persistent pointers into it.
- */
-
-struct hmac_ctx {
-    const struct hash_desc *h;	/* underlying hash function */
-    size_t hmac_digest_size;	/* copy of h->hash_digest_size */
-    union hash_ctx hash_ctx;	/* ctx for hash function */
-    u_char buf1[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    u_char buf2[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    };
-
-extern void hmac_init(
-    struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
-    const struct hash_desc *h,
-    const u_char *key,
-    size_t key_len);
-
-#define hmac_init_chunk(ctx, h, ch) hmac_init((ctx), (h), (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
-
-extern void hmac_reinit(struct hmac_ctx *ctx);	/* saves recreating pads */
-
-extern void hmac_update(
-    struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
-    const u_char *data,
-    size_t data_len);
-
-#define hmac_update_chunk(ctx, ch) hmac_update((ctx), (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
-
-extern void hmac_final(u_char *output, struct hmac_ctx *ctx);
+extern encryption_algorithm_t oakley_to_encryption_algorithm(int alg);
+extern hash_algorithm_t oakley_to_hash_algorithm(int alg);
+extern pseudo_random_function_t oakley_to_prf(int alg);
+extern signature_scheme_t oakley_to_signature_scheme(int method);
+extern int oakley_from_encryption_algorithm(encryption_algorithm_t alg);
+extern int oakley_from_integrity_algorithm(integrity_algorithm_t alg);
+extern int esp_from_encryption_algorithm(encryption_algorithm_t alg);
+extern int esp_from_integrity_algorithm(integrity_algorithm_t alg);
 
-#define hmac_final_chunk(ch, name, ctx) { \
-	pfreeany((ch).ptr); \
-	(ch).len = (ctx)->hmac_digest_size; \
-	(ch).ptr = alloc_bytes((ch).len, name); \
-	hmac_final((ch).ptr, (ctx)); \
-    }
-#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/db_ops.c b/src/pluto/db_ops.c
index 993baf53e..4ba4fa324 100644
--- a/src/pluto/db_ops.c
+++ b/src/pluto/db_ops.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: db_ops.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 /* 
@@ -31,22 +29,22 @@
  *               also update attrs_cur (by offset)
  *
  * db_context structure:
- * 	+---------------------+
- *	|  prop               |
- *	|    .protoid         |
- *	|    .trans           | --+
- *	|    .trans_cnt       |   |
- *	+---------------------+ <-+
- *	|  trans0             | ----> { trans#1 | ... | trans#i | ...   }
- *	+---------------------+                       ^
- *	|  trans_cur          | ----------------------' current transf.
- *	+---------------------+
- *	|  attrs0             | ----> { attr#1 | ... | attr#j | ...  }
- *	+---------------------+                      ^
- *	|  attrs_cur          | ---------------------' current attr.
- *	+---------------------+
- *	| max_trans,max_attrs |  max_trans/attrs: number of elem. of each vector
- *	+---------------------+
+ *      +---------------------+
+ *      |  prop               |
+ *      |    .protoid         |
+ *      |    .trans           | --+
+ *      |    .trans_cnt       |   |
+ *      +---------------------+ <-+
+ *      |  trans0             | ----> { trans#1 | ... | trans#i | ...   }
+ *      +---------------------+                       ^
+ *      |  trans_cur          | ----------------------' current transf.
+ *      +---------------------+
+ *      |  attrs0             | ----> { attr#1 | ... | attr#j | ...  }
+ *      +---------------------+                      ^
+ *      |  attrs_cur          | ---------------------' current attr.
+ *      +---------------------+
+ *      | max_trans,max_attrs |  max_trans/attrs: number of elem. of each vector
+ *      +---------------------+
  *
  * See testing examples at end for interface usage.
  */
@@ -69,50 +67,31 @@
 
 #include <assert.h>
 
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-#else
-#define passert(x) assert(x)
-extern int debug;	/* eg: spi.c */
-#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (debug) { action ; } }
-#define DBG_log(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
-#define alloc_thing(thing, name) alloc_bytes(sizeof (thing), name)
-void * alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name) {
-	void *p=malloc(size);
-        if (p == NULL)
-		fprintf(stderr, "unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s",
-			(unsigned long) size, name);
-	memset(p, '\0', size);
-	return p;
-}
-#define pfreeany(ptr) free(ptr)
-
-#endif
-
 #ifdef NOT_YET
 /*
- * 	Allocator cache:
- * 	Because of the single-threaded nature of pluto/spdb.c, 
- * 	alloc()/free() is exercised many times with very small
- * 	lifetime objects.
- * 	Just caching last object (currently it will select the
- * 	largest) will avoid this allocation mas^Wperturbations
+ *      Allocator cache:
+ *      Because of the single-threaded nature of pluto/spdb.c, 
+ *      alloc()/free() is exercised many times with very small
+ *      lifetime objects.
+ *      Just caching last object (currently it will select the
+ *      largest) will avoid this allocation mas^Wperturbations
  *
  */
 struct db_ops_alloc_cache {
-	void *ptr;
-	int size;
+		void *ptr;
+		int size;
 };
 #endif
 
 #ifndef NO_DB_OPS_STATS
-/* 	
- * 	stats: do account for allocations 	
- * 	displayed in db_ops_show_status() 
+/*      
+ *      stats: do account for allocations       
+ *      displayed in db_ops_show_status() 
  */
 struct db_ops_stats {
-	int st_curr_cnt;	/* current number of allocations */
-	int st_total_cnt;	/* total allocations so far */
-	size_t st_maxsz;	/* max. size requested */
+		int st_curr_cnt;        /* current number of allocations */
+		int st_total_cnt;       /* total allocations so far */
+		size_t st_maxsz;        /* max. size requested */
 };
 #define DB_OPS_ZERO { 0, 0, 0};
 #define DB_OPS_STATS_DESC   "{curr_cnt, total_cnt, maxsz}"
@@ -121,239 +100,233 @@ struct db_ops_stats {
 static struct db_ops_stats db_context_st = DB_OPS_ZERO;
 static struct db_ops_stats db_trans_st = DB_OPS_ZERO;
 static struct db_ops_stats db_attrs_st = DB_OPS_ZERO;
-static __inline__ void * alloc_bytes_st (size_t size, const char *str, struct db_ops_stats *st) 
+static __inline__ void *malloc_bytes_st(size_t size, struct db_ops_stats *st) 
 {
-	void *ptr = alloc_bytes(size, str);
-	if (ptr)  {
-		st->st_curr_cnt++;
-		st->st_total_cnt++;
-		if (size > st->st_maxsz) st->st_maxsz=size;
-	}	
-	return ptr;
+		void *ptr = malloc(size);
+		if (ptr)
+		{
+				st->st_curr_cnt++;
+				st->st_total_cnt++;
+				if (size > st->st_maxsz) st->st_maxsz=size;
+		}       
+		return ptr;
 }
-#define ALLOC_BYTES_ST(z,s,st) alloc_bytes_st(z, s, &st);
-#define PFREE_ST(p,st)         do { st.st_curr_cnt--; pfree(p);  } while (0);
+#define ALLOC_BYTES_ST(z,st) malloc_bytes_st(z, &st);
+#define PFREE_ST(p,st)         do { st.st_curr_cnt--; free(p);  } while (0);
 
 #else
 
-#define ALLOC_BYTES_ST(z,s,n) alloc_bytes(z, s);
-#define PFREE_ST(p,n)         pfree(p);
+#define ALLOC_BYTES_ST(z,n) malloc(z);
+#define PFREE_ST(p,n)         free(p);
 
 #endif /* NO_DB_OPS_STATS */
-/*	Initialize db object
- *	max_trans and max_attrs can be 0, will be dynamically expanded
- *	as a result of "add" operations
+/*      Initialize db object
+ *      max_trans and max_attrs can be 0, will be dynamically expanded
+ *      as a result of "add" operations
  */
 int
 db_prop_init(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs) 
 {
-	int ret=-1;
+		ctx->trans0 = NULL;
+		ctx->attrs0 = NULL;
 
-	ctx->trans0 = NULL;
-	ctx->attrs0 = NULL;
+		if (max_trans > 0) { /* quite silly if not */
+				ctx->trans0 = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof(struct db_trans) * max_trans, 
+								db_trans_st);
+				memset(ctx->trans0, '\0', sizeof(struct db_trans) * max_trans);
+		}
 
-	if (max_trans > 0) { /* quite silly if not */
-		ctx->trans0 = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_trans) * max_trans, 
-			"db_context->trans", db_trans_st);
-		if (!ctx->trans0) goto out;
-	}
+		if (max_attrs > 0) { /* quite silly if not */
+				ctx->attrs0 = ALLOC_BYTES_ST (sizeof(struct db_attr) * max_attrs,
+								db_attrs_st);
+				memset(ctx->attrs0, '\0', sizeof(struct db_attr) * max_attrs);
+		}
 
-	if (max_attrs > 0) { /* quite silly if not */
-		ctx->attrs0 = ALLOC_BYTES_ST (sizeof (struct db_attr) * max_attrs,
-				"db_context->attrs", db_attrs_st);
-		if (!ctx->attrs0) goto out;
-	}
-	ret = 0;
-out:
-	if (ret < 0 && ctx->trans0) {
-		PFREE_ST(ctx->trans0, db_trans_st);
-		ctx->trans0 = NULL;
-	}
-	ctx->max_trans = max_trans;
-	ctx->max_attrs = max_attrs;
-	ctx->trans_cur = ctx->trans0;
-	ctx->attrs_cur = ctx->attrs0;
-	ctx->prop.protoid = protoid;
-	ctx->prop.trans = ctx->trans0;
-	ctx->prop.trans_cnt = 0;
-	return ret;
+		ctx->max_trans = max_trans;
+		ctx->max_attrs = max_attrs;
+		ctx->trans_cur = ctx->trans0;
+		ctx->attrs_cur = ctx->attrs0;
+		ctx->prop.protoid = protoid;
+		ctx->prop.trans = ctx->trans0;
+		ctx->prop.trans_cnt = 0;
+		return 0;
 }
 
-/*	Expand storage for transforms by number delta_trans */
+/*      Expand storage for transforms by number delta_trans */
 static int
 db_trans_expand(struct db_context *ctx, int delta_trans)
 {
-	int ret = -1;
-	struct db_trans *new_trans, *old_trans;
-	int max_trans = ctx->max_trans + delta_trans;
-	int offset;
+		int ret = -1;
+		struct db_trans *new_trans, *old_trans;
+		int max_trans = ctx->max_trans + delta_trans;
+		int offset;
 
-	old_trans = ctx->trans0;
-	new_trans = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_trans) * max_trans, 
-			"db_context->trans (expand)", db_trans_st);
-	if (!new_trans)
-		goto out;
-	memcpy(new_trans, old_trans, ctx->max_trans * sizeof(struct db_trans));
-	
-	/* update trans0 (obviously) */
-	ctx->trans0 = ctx->prop.trans = new_trans;
-	/* update trans_cur (by offset) */
-	offset = (char *)(new_trans) - (char *)(old_trans);
+		old_trans = ctx->trans0;
+		new_trans = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_trans) * max_trans, 
+						db_trans_st);
+		if (!new_trans)
+				goto out;
+		memcpy(new_trans, old_trans, ctx->max_trans * sizeof(struct db_trans));
+		
+		/* update trans0 (obviously) */
+		ctx->trans0 = ctx->prop.trans = new_trans;
+		/* update trans_cur (by offset) */
+		offset = (char *)(new_trans) - (char *)(old_trans);
 
-	{
-	  char *cctx = (char *)(ctx->trans_cur);
-	  
-	  cctx += offset;
-	  ctx->trans_cur = (struct db_trans *)cctx;
-	}
-	/* update elem count */
-	ctx->max_trans = max_trans;
-	PFREE_ST(old_trans, db_trans_st);
-	ret = 0;
+		{
+		  char *cctx = (char *)(ctx->trans_cur);
+		
+		  cctx += offset;
+		  ctx->trans_cur = (struct db_trans *)cctx;
+		}
+		/* update elem count */
+		ctx->max_trans = max_trans;
+		PFREE_ST(old_trans, db_trans_st);
+		ret = 0;
 out:
-	return ret;
+		return ret;
 }
-/*	
- *	Expand storage for attributes by delta_attrs number AND
- *	rewrite trans->attr pointers
+/*      
+ *      Expand storage for attributes by delta_attrs number AND
+ *      rewrite trans->attr pointers
  */
 static int
 db_attrs_expand(struct db_context *ctx, int delta_attrs)
 {
-	int ret = -1;
-	struct db_attr *new_attrs, *old_attrs;
-	struct db_trans *t;
-	int ti;
-	int max_attrs = ctx->max_attrs + delta_attrs;
-	int offset;
+		int ret = -1;
+		struct db_attr *new_attrs, *old_attrs;
+		struct db_trans *t;
+		int ti;
+		int max_attrs = ctx->max_attrs + delta_attrs;
+		int offset;
+
+		old_attrs = ctx->attrs0;
+		new_attrs = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_attr) * max_attrs, 
+						db_attrs_st);
+		if (!new_attrs)
+				goto out;
 
-	old_attrs = ctx->attrs0;
-	new_attrs = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_attr) * max_attrs, 
-			"db_context->attrs (expand)", db_attrs_st);
-	if (!new_attrs)
-		goto out;
+		memcpy(new_attrs, old_attrs, ctx->max_attrs * sizeof(struct db_attr));
+		
+		/* update attrs0 and attrs_cur (obviously) */
+		offset = (char *)(new_attrs) - (char *)(old_attrs);
+		
+		{
+		  char *actx = (char *)(ctx->attrs0);
+		
+		  actx += offset;
+		  ctx->attrs0 = (struct db_attr *)actx;
+		
+		  actx = (char *)ctx->attrs_cur;
+		  actx += offset;
+		  ctx->attrs_cur = (struct db_attr *)actx;
+		}
 
-	memcpy(new_attrs, old_attrs, ctx->max_attrs * sizeof(struct db_attr));
-	
-	/* update attrs0 and attrs_cur (obviously) */
-	offset = (char *)(new_attrs) - (char *)(old_attrs);
-	
-	{
-	  char *actx = (char *)(ctx->attrs0);
-	  
-	  actx += offset;
-	  ctx->attrs0 = (struct db_attr *)actx;
-	  
-	  actx = (char *)ctx->attrs_cur;
-	  actx += offset;
-	  ctx->attrs_cur = (struct db_attr *)actx;
-	}
+		/* for each transform, rewrite attrs pointer by offsetting it */
+		for (t=ctx->prop.trans, ti=0; ti < ctx->prop.trans_cnt; t++, ti++) {
+				char *actx = (char *)(t->attrs);
 
-	/* for each transform, rewrite attrs pointer by offsetting it */
-	for (t=ctx->prop.trans, ti=0; ti < ctx->prop.trans_cnt; t++, ti++) {
-		char *actx = (char *)(t->attrs);
- 
-		actx += offset;
-		t->attrs = (struct db_attr *)actx;
-	}
-	/* update elem count */
-	ctx->max_attrs = max_attrs;
-	PFREE_ST(old_attrs, db_attrs_st);
-	ret = 0;
+				actx += offset;
+				t->attrs = (struct db_attr *)actx;
+		}
+		/* update elem count */
+		ctx->max_attrs = max_attrs;
+		PFREE_ST(old_attrs, db_attrs_st);
+		ret = 0;
 out:
-	return ret;
+		return ret;
 }
-/*	Allocate a new db object */
+/*      Allocate a new db object */
 struct db_context * 
 db_prop_new(u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs) 
 {
-	struct db_context *ctx;
-	ctx = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_context), "db_context", db_context_st);
-	if (!ctx) goto out;
-	
-	if (db_prop_init(ctx, protoid, max_trans, max_attrs) < 0) {
-		PFREE_ST(ctx, db_context_st);
-		ctx=NULL;
-	}
+		struct db_context *ctx;
+		ctx = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_context), db_context_st);
+		if (!ctx) goto out;
+		
+		if (db_prop_init(ctx, protoid, max_trans, max_attrs) < 0) {
+				PFREE_ST(ctx, db_context_st);
+				ctx=NULL;
+		}
 out:
-	return ctx;
+		return ctx;
 }
-/*	Free a db object */
+/*      Free a db object */
 void
 db_destroy(struct db_context *ctx)
 {
-	if (ctx->trans0) PFREE_ST(ctx->trans0, db_trans_st);
-	if (ctx->attrs0) PFREE_ST(ctx->attrs0, db_attrs_st);
-	PFREE_ST(ctx, db_context_st);
+		if (ctx->trans0) PFREE_ST(ctx->trans0, db_trans_st);
+		if (ctx->attrs0) PFREE_ST(ctx->attrs0, db_attrs_st);
+		PFREE_ST(ctx, db_context_st);
 }
-/*	Start a new transform, expand trans0 is needed */
+/*      Start a new transform, expand trans0 is needed */
 int
 db_trans_add(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t transid)
 {
-	/*	skip incrementing current trans pointer the 1st time*/
-	if (ctx->trans_cur && ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt)
-		ctx->trans_cur++;
-	/*	
-	 *	Strategy: if more space is needed, expand by 
-	 *	          <current_size>/2 + 1
-	 *
-	 *	This happens to produce a "reasonable" sequence
-	 *	after few allocations, eg.:
-	 *	0,1,2,4,8,13,20,31,47
-	 */
-	if ((ctx->trans_cur - ctx->trans0) >= ctx->max_trans) {
-		/* XXX:jjo if fails should shout and flag it */
-		if (db_trans_expand(ctx, ctx->max_trans/2 + 1)<0)
-			return -1;
-	}
-	ctx->trans_cur->transid = transid;
-	ctx->trans_cur->attrs=ctx->attrs_cur;
-	ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt = 0;
-	ctx->prop.trans_cnt++;
-	return 0;
+		/*      skip incrementing current trans pointer the 1st time*/
+		if (ctx->trans_cur && ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt)
+				ctx->trans_cur++;
+		/*      
+		 *      Strategy: if more space is needed, expand by 
+		 *                <current_size>/2 + 1
+		 *
+		 *      This happens to produce a "reasonable" sequence
+		 *      after few allocations, eg.:
+		 *      0,1,2,4,8,13,20,31,47
+		 */
+		if ((ctx->trans_cur - ctx->trans0) >= ctx->max_trans) {
+				/* XXX:jjo if fails should shout and flag it */
+				if (db_trans_expand(ctx, ctx->max_trans/2 + 1)<0)
+						return -1;
+		}
+		ctx->trans_cur->transid = transid;
+		ctx->trans_cur->attrs=ctx->attrs_cur;
+		ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt = 0;
+		ctx->prop.trans_cnt++;
+		return 0;
 }
-/*	Add attr copy to current transform, expanding attrs0 if needed */
+/*      Add attr copy to current transform, expanding attrs0 if needed */
 int
 db_attr_add(struct db_context *ctx, const struct db_attr *a) 
 {
-	/*	
-	 *	Strategy: if more space is needed, expand by 
-	 *	          <current_size>/2 + 1
-	 */
-	if ((ctx->attrs_cur - ctx->attrs0) >= ctx->max_attrs) {
-		/* XXX:jjo if fails should shout and flag it */
-		if (db_attrs_expand(ctx, ctx->max_attrs/2 + 1) < 0)
-			return -1;
-	}
-	*ctx->attrs_cur++=*a;
-	ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt++;
-	return 0;
+		/*      
+		 *      Strategy: if more space is needed, expand by 
+		 *                <current_size>/2 + 1
+		 */
+		if ((ctx->attrs_cur - ctx->attrs0) >= ctx->max_attrs) {
+				/* XXX:jjo if fails should shout and flag it */
+				if (db_attrs_expand(ctx, ctx->max_attrs/2 + 1) < 0)
+						return -1;
+		}
+		*ctx->attrs_cur++=*a;
+		ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt++;
+		return 0;
 }
-/*	Add attr copy (by value) to current transform, 
- *	expanding attrs0 if needed, just calls db_attr_add().
+/*      Add attr copy (by value) to current transform, 
+ *      expanding attrs0 if needed, just calls db_attr_add().
  */
 int
 db_attr_add_values(struct db_context *ctx,  u_int16_t type, u_int16_t val)
 {
-	struct db_attr attr;
-	attr.type = type;
-	attr.val = val;
-	return db_attr_add (ctx, &attr);
+		struct db_attr attr;
+		attr.type = type;
+		attr.val = val;
+		return db_attr_add (ctx, &attr);
 }
 #ifndef NO_DB_OPS_STATS
 int
 db_ops_show_status(void)
 {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "stats " __FILE__ ": " 
-			DB_OPS_STATS_DESC " :"
-			DB_OPS_STATS_STR("context")
-			DB_OPS_STATS_STR("trans")
-			DB_OPS_STATS_STR("attrs"),
-			DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_context_st),
-			DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_trans_st),
-			DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_attrs_st)
-			);
-	return 0;
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "stats " __FILE__ ": " 
+						DB_OPS_STATS_DESC " :"
+						DB_OPS_STATS_STR("context")
+						DB_OPS_STATS_STR("trans")
+						DB_OPS_STATS_STR("attrs"),
+						DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_context_st),
+						DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_trans_st),
+						DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_attrs_st)
+						);
+		return 0;
 }
 #endif /* NO_DB_OPS_STATS */
 /* 
@@ -362,51 +335,51 @@ db_ops_show_status(void)
 #ifdef TEST
 static void db_prop_print(struct db_prop *p)
 {
-	struct db_trans *t;
-	struct db_attr *a;
-	int ti, ai;
-	enum_names *n, *n_at, *n_av;
-	printf("protoid=\"%s\"\n", enum_name(&protocol_names, p->protoid));
-	for (ti=0, t=p->trans; ti< p->trans_cnt; ti++, t++) {
-		switch( t->transid) {
-			case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-				n=&isakmp_transformid_names;break;
-			case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-				n=&esp_transformid_names;break;
-			default:
-				continue;
-		}
-		printf("  transid=\"%s\"\n", 
-			enum_name(n, t->transid));
-		for (ai=0, a=t->attrs; ai < t->attr_cnt; ai++, a++) {
-			int i;
-			switch( t->transid) {
-				case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-					n_at=&oakley_attr_names;
-					i=a->type|ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
-					n_av=oakley_attr_val_descs[(i)&ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
-					break;
-				case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-					n_at=&ipsec_attr_names;
-					i=a->type|ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
-					n_av=ipsec_attr_val_descs[(i)&ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
-					break;
-				default:
-					continue;
-			}
-			printf("    type=\"%s\" value=\"%s\"\n", 
-				enum_name(n_at, i),
-				enum_name(n_av, a->val));
+		struct db_trans *t;
+		struct db_attr *a;
+		int ti, ai;
+		enum_names *n, *n_at, *n_av;
+		printf("protoid=\"%s\"\n", enum_name(&protocol_names, p->protoid));
+		for (ti=0, t=p->trans; ti< p->trans_cnt; ti++, t++) {
+				switch( t->transid) {
+						case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+								n=&isakmp_transformid_names;break;
+						case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+								n=&esp_transformid_names;break;
+						default:
+								continue;
+				}
+				printf("  transid=\"%s\"\n", 
+						enum_name(n, t->transid));
+				for (ai=0, a=t->attrs; ai < t->attr_cnt; ai++, a++) {
+						int i;
+						switch( t->transid) {
+								case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+										n_at=&oakley_attr_names;
+										i=a->type|ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+										n_av=oakley_attr_val_descs[(i)&ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+										break;
+								case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+										n_at=&ipsec_attr_names;
+										i=a->type|ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+										n_av=ipsec_attr_val_descs[(i)&ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+										break;
+								default:
+										continue;
+						}
+						printf("    type=\"%s\" value=\"%s\"\n", 
+								enum_name(n_at, i),
+								enum_name(n_av, a->val));
+				}
 		}
-	}
 
 }
 static void db_print(struct db_context *ctx) 
 {
-	printf("trans_cur diff=%d, attrs_cur diff=%d\n", 
-			ctx->trans_cur - ctx->trans0,
-			ctx->attrs_cur - ctx->attrs0);
-	db_prop_print(&ctx->prop);
+		printf("trans_cur diff=%d, attrs_cur diff=%d\n", 
+						ctx->trans_cur - ctx->trans0,
+						ctx->attrs_cur - ctx->attrs0);
+		db_prop_print(&ctx->prop);
 }
 
 void
@@ -415,25 +388,25 @@ void abort(void);
 void
 passert_fail(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
 {
-    fprintf(stderr, "ASSERTION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
-    abort();	/* exiting correctly doesn't always work */
+	fprintf(stderr, "ASSERTION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
+	abort();    /* exiting correctly doesn't always work */
 }
 int main(void) {
-	struct db_context *ctx=db_prop_new(PROTO_ISAKMP, 0, 0);
-	db_trans_add(ctx, KEY_IKE);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_3DES_CBC);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_MD5);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_RSA_SIG);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024);
-	db_trans_add(ctx, KEY_IKE);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_AES_CBC);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_MD5);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536);
-	db_trans_add(ctx, ESP_3DES);
-	db_attr_add_values(ctx, AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1);
-	db_print(ctx);
-	db_destroy(ctx);
-	return 0;
+		struct db_context *ctx=db_prop_new(PROTO_ISAKMP, 0, 0);
+		db_trans_add(ctx, KEY_IKE);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_3DES_CBC);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_MD5);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_RSA_SIG);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024);
+		db_trans_add(ctx, KEY_IKE);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_AES_CBC);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_MD5);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536);
+		db_trans_add(ctx, ESP_3DES);
+		db_attr_add_values(ctx, AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1);
+		db_print(ctx);
+		db_destroy(ctx);
+		return 0;
 }
 #endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/db_ops.h b/src/pluto/db_ops.h
index 4004e710a..464c245dd 100644
--- a/src/pluto/db_ops.h
+++ b/src/pluto/db_ops.h
@@ -10,47 +10,45 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: db_ops.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _DB_OPS_H
 #define _DB_OPS_H
 
 /*
- * 	Main db object, (quite proposal "oriented")
+ *      Main db object, (quite proposal "oriented")
  */
 #ifndef NO_DB_CONTEXT
 struct db_context {
-	struct db_prop prop;		/* proposal buffer (not pointer) */
-	struct db_trans *trans0;	/* transf. list, dynamically sized */
-	struct db_trans *trans_cur;	/* current transform ptr */
-	struct db_attr *attrs0;		/* attr. list, dynamically sized */
-	struct db_attr *attrs_cur;	/* current attribute ptr */
-	int max_trans;			/* size of trans list */
-	int max_attrs;			/* size of attrs list */
+		struct db_prop prop;            /* proposal buffer (not pointer) */
+		struct db_trans *trans0;        /* transf. list, dynamically sized */
+		struct db_trans *trans_cur;     /* current transform ptr */
+		struct db_attr *attrs0;         /* attr. list, dynamically sized */
+		struct db_attr *attrs_cur;      /* current attribute ptr */
+		int max_trans;                  /* size of trans list */
+		int max_attrs;                  /* size of attrs list */
 };
 /*
- * 	Allocate a new db object
+ *      Allocate a new db object
  */
 struct db_context * db_prop_new(u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs);
-/*	Initialize object for proposal building  */
+/*      Initialize object for proposal building  */
 int db_prop_init(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs);
-/*	Free all resourses for this db */
+/*      Free all resourses for this db */
 void db_destroy(struct db_context *ctx);
 
-/*	Start a new transform */
+/*      Start a new transform */
 int db_trans_add(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t transid);
-/*	Add a new attribute by copying db_attr content */
+/*      Add a new attribute by copying db_attr content */
 int db_attr_add(struct db_context *db_ctx, const struct db_attr *attr);
-/*	Add a new attribute by value */
+/*      Add a new attribute by value */
 int db_attr_add_values(struct db_context *ctx,  u_int16_t type, u_int16_t val);
 
-/*	Get proposal from db object */
+/*      Get proposal from db object */
 static __inline__ struct db_prop *db_prop_get(struct db_context *ctx) {
-	return &ctx->prop;
+		return &ctx->prop;
 }
-/*	Show stats (allocation, etc) */
+/*      Show stats (allocation, etc) */
 #endif /* NO_DB_CONTEXT */
 int db_ops_show_status(void);
 #endif /* _DB_OPS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/defs.c b/src/pluto/defs.c
index f2c1eab48..f83318e12 100644
--- a/src/pluto/defs.c
+++ b/src/pluto/defs.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: defs.c 4632 2008-11-11 18:37:19Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -27,296 +25,62 @@
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
-
-const chunk_t empty_chunk = { NULL, 0 };
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 
 bool
 all_zero(const unsigned char *m, size_t len)
 {
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i != len; i++)
-	if (m[i] != '\0')
-	    return FALSE;
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/* memory allocation
- *
- * LEAK_DETECTIVE puts a wrapper around each allocation and maintains
- * a list of live ones.  If a dead one is freed, an assertion MIGHT fail.
- * If the live list is currupted, that will often be detected.
- * In the end, report_leaks() is called, and the names of remaining
- * live allocations are printed.  At the moment, it is hoped, not that
- * the list is empty, but that there will be no surprises.
- *
- * Accepted Leaks:
- * - "struct iface" and "device name" (for "discovered" net interfaces)
- * - "struct event in event_schedule()" (events not associated with states)
- * - "Pluto lock name" (one only, needed until end -- why bother?)
- */
-
-#ifdef LEAK_DETECTIVE
-
-/* this magic number is 3671129837 decimal (623837458 complemented) */
-#define LEAK_MAGIC 0xDAD0FEEDul
-
-union mhdr {
-    struct {
-	const char *name;
-	union mhdr *older, *newer;
-	unsigned long magic;
-    } i;    /* info */
-    unsigned long junk;	/* force maximal alignment */
-};
-
-static union mhdr *allocs = NULL;
-
-void *alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name)
-{
-    union mhdr *p = malloc(sizeof(union mhdr) + size);
-
-    if (p == NULL)
-	exit_log("unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s"
-	    , (unsigned long) size, name);
-    p->i.name = name;
-    p->i.older = allocs;
-    if (allocs != NULL)
-	allocs->i.newer = p;
-    allocs = p;
-    p->i.newer = NULL;
-    p->i.magic = LEAK_MAGIC;
-
-    memset(p+1, '\0', size);
-    return p+1;
-}
-
-void *
-clone_bytes(const void *orig, size_t size, const char *name)
-{
-    void *p = alloc_bytes(size, name);
-
-    memcpy(p, orig, size);
-    return p;
-}
-
-void
-pfree(void *ptr)
-{
-    union mhdr *p;
-
-    passert(ptr != NULL);
-    p = ((union mhdr *)ptr) - 1;
-    passert(p->i.magic == LEAK_MAGIC);
-    if (p->i.older != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(p->i.older->i.newer == p);
-	p->i.older->i.newer = p->i.newer;
-    }
-    if (p->i.newer == NULL)
-    {
-	passert(p == allocs);
-	allocs = p->i.older;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	passert(p->i.newer->i.older == p);
-	p->i.newer->i.older = p->i.older;
-    }
-    p->i.magic = ~LEAK_MAGIC;
-    free(p);
-}
-
-void
-report_leaks(void)
-{
-    union mhdr
-	*p = allocs,
-	*pprev = NULL;
-    unsigned long n = 0;
-
-    while (p != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(p->i.magic == LEAK_MAGIC);
-	passert(pprev == p->i.newer);
-	pprev = p;
-	p = p->i.older;
-	n++;
-	if (p == NULL || pprev->i.name != p->i.name)
-	{
-	    if (n != 1)
-		plog("leak: %lu * %s", n, pprev->i.name);
-	    else
-		plog("leak: %s", pprev->i.name);
-	    n = 0;
-	}
-    }
-}
-
-#else /* !LEAK_DETECTIVE */
-
-void *alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name)
-{
-    void *p = malloc(size);
-
-    if (p == NULL)
-	exit_log("unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s"
-	    , (unsigned long) size, name);
-    memset(p, '\0', size);
-    return p;
-}
-
-void *clone_bytes(const void *orig, size_t size, const char *name)
-{
-    void *p = malloc(size);
+	size_t i;
 
-    if (p == NULL)
-	exit_log("unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s"
-	    , (unsigned long) size, name);
-    memcpy(p, orig, size);
-    return p;
+	for (i = 0; i != len; i++)
+		if (m[i] != '\0')
+			return FALSE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
-#endif /* !LEAK_DETECTIVE */
 
 /*  Note that there may be as many as six IDs that are temporary at
  *  one time before unsharing the two ends of a connection. So we need
  *  at least six temporary buffers for DER_ASN1_DN IDs.
  *  We rotate them. Be careful!
  */
-#define	MAX_BUF		10
+#define MAX_BUF         10
 
 char*
 temporary_cyclic_buffer(void)
 {
-    static char buf[MAX_BUF][BUF_LEN];	/* MAX_BUF internal buffers */
-    static int counter = 0;			/* cyclic counter */
+	static char buf[MAX_BUF][BUF_LEN];  /* MAX_BUF internal buffers */
+	static int counter = 0;                     /* cyclic counter */
 
-    if (++counter == MAX_BUF) counter = 0;	/* next internal buffer */
-    return buf[counter];			/* assign temporary buffer */
+	if (++counter == MAX_BUF) counter = 0;      /* next internal buffer */
+	return buf[counter];                        /* assign temporary buffer */
 }
 
 /* concatenates two sub paths into a string with a maximum size of BUF_LEN
  * use for temporary storage only
  */
-const char*
-concatenate_paths(const char *a, const char *b)
+char* concatenate_paths(char *a, char *b)
 {
-    char *c;
+	char *c;
 
-    if (*b == '/' || *b == '.')
-	return b;
+	if (*b == '/' || *b == '.')
+		return b;
 
-    c = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
-    snprintf(c, BUF_LEN, "%s/%s", a, b);
-    return c;
+	c = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+	snprintf(c, BUF_LEN, "%s/%s", a, b);
+	return c;
 }
 
-/*  compare two chunks, returns zero if a equals b
- *  negative/positive if a is earlier/later in the alphabet than b
- */
-int
-cmp_chunk(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
-{
-    int cmp_len, len, cmp_value;
-    
-    cmp_len = a.len - b.len;
-    len = (cmp_len < 0)? a.len : b.len;
-    cmp_value = memcmp(a.ptr, b.ptr, len);
-
-    return (cmp_value == 0)? cmp_len : cmp_value;
-};
-
 /* moves a chunk to a memory position, chunk is freed afterwards
  * position pointer is advanced after the insertion point
  */
 void
 mv_chunk(u_char **pos, chunk_t content)
 {
-    if (content.len > 0)
-    {
-	chunkcpy(*pos, content);
-	freeanychunk(content);
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * write the binary contents of a chunk_t to a file
- */
-bool
-write_chunk(const char *filename, const char *label, chunk_t ch
-, mode_t mask, bool force)
-{
-    mode_t oldmask;
-    FILE *fd;
-    size_t written;
-
-    if (!force)
-    {
-	fd = fopen(filename, "r");
-	if (fd)
-	{
-	    fclose(fd);
-	    plog("  %s file '%s' already exists", label, filename);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* set umask */
-    oldmask = umask(mask);
-
-    fd = fopen(filename, "w");
-
-    if (fd)
-    {
-	written = fwrite(ch.ptr, sizeof(u_char), ch.len, fd);
-	fclose(fd);
-	if (written != ch.len)
+	if (content.len > 0)
 	{
-	    plog("  writing to %s file '%s' failed", label, filename);
-	    umask(oldmask);
-	    return FALSE;
+		chunkcpy(*pos, content);
+		free(content.ptr);
 	}
-	plog("  written %s file '%s' (%d bytes)", label, filename, (int)ch.len);
-	umask(oldmask);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("  could not open %s file '%s' for writing", label, filename);
-	umask(oldmask);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-}
-
-/* Names of the months */
-
-static const char* months[] = {
-    "Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
-    "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"
-};
-
-
-/*
- *  Display a date either in local or UTC time
- */
-char*
-timetoa(const time_t *time, bool utc)
-{
-    static char buf[TIMETOA_BUF];
-
-    if (*time == UNDEFINED_TIME)
-	sprintf(buf, "--- -- --:--:--%s----", (utc)?" UTC ":" ");
-    else
-    {
-	struct tm *t = (utc)? gmtime(time) : localtime(time);
-
-	sprintf(buf, "%s %02d %02d:%02d:%02d%s%04d",
-	    months[t->tm_mon], t->tm_mday, t->tm_hour, t->tm_min, t->tm_sec,
-	    (utc)?" UTC ":" ", t->tm_year + 1900
-	);
-    }
-    return buf;
 }
 
 /*  checks if the expiration date has been reached and
@@ -327,44 +91,44 @@ timetoa(const time_t *time, bool utc)
 const char*
 check_expiry(time_t expiration_date, int warning_interval, bool strict)
 {
-    time_t now;
-    int time_left;
-
-    if (expiration_date == UNDEFINED_TIME)
-      return "ok (expires never)";
+	time_t now;
+	int time_left;
 
-    /* determine the current time */
-    time(&now);
+	if (expiration_date == UNDEFINED_TIME)
+	  return "ok (expires never)";
 
-    time_left = (expiration_date - now);
-    if (time_left < 0)
-	return strict? "fatal (expired)" : "warning (expired)";
+	/* determine the current time */
+	time(&now);
 
-    if (time_left > 86400*warning_interval)
-	return "ok";
-    {
-	static char buf[35]; /* temporary storage */
-	const char* unit = "second";
+	time_left = (expiration_date - now);
+	if (time_left < 0)
+		return strict? "fatal (expired)" : "warning (expired)";
 
-	if (time_left > 172800)
-	{
-	    time_left /= 86400;
-	    unit = "day";
-	}
-	else if (time_left > 7200)
-	{
-	    time_left /= 3600;
-	    unit = "hour";
-	}
-	else if (time_left > 120)
+	if (time_left > 86400*warning_interval)
+		return "ok";
 	{
-	    time_left /= 60;
-	    unit = "minute";
+		static char buf[35]; /* temporary storage */
+		const char* unit = "second";
+
+		if (time_left > 172800)
+		{
+			time_left /= 86400;
+			unit = "day";
+		}
+		else if (time_left > 7200)
+		{
+			time_left /= 3600;
+			unit = "hour";
+		}
+		else if (time_left > 120)
+		{
+			time_left /= 60;
+			unit = "minute";
+		}
+		snprintf(buf, 35, "warning (expires in %d %s%s)", time_left,
+				 unit, (time_left == 1)?"":"s");
+		return buf;
 	}
-	snprintf(buf, 35, "warning (expires in %d %s%s)", time_left,
-		 unit, (time_left == 1)?"":"s");
-	return buf;
-    }
 }
 
 
@@ -374,8 +138,8 @@ check_expiry(time_t expiration_date, int warning_interval, bool strict)
 int
 file_select(const struct dirent *entry)
 {
-    return strcmp(entry->d_name, "." ) &&
-	   strcmp(entry->d_name, "..");
+	return strcmp(entry->d_name, "." ) &&
+		   strcmp(entry->d_name, "..");
 }
 
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/defs.h b/src/pluto/defs.h
index 574ce4a1a..8491f4ae8 100644
--- a/src/pluto/defs.h
+++ b/src/pluto/defs.h
@@ -11,128 +11,77 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: defs.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _DEFS_H
 #define _DEFS_H
 
+#include <string.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
+#include <chunk.h>
+
 #ifdef KLIPS
-# define USED_BY_KLIPS	/* ignore */
+# define USED_BY_KLIPS  /* ignore */
 #else
-# define USED_BY_KLIPS	UNUSED
+# define USED_BY_KLIPS  UNUSED
 #endif
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-# define USED_BY_DEBUG	/* ignore */
+# define USED_BY_DEBUG  /* ignore */
 #else
-# define USED_BY_DEBUG	UNUSED
+# define USED_BY_DEBUG  UNUSED
 #endif
 
-/* Length of temporary buffers */
-
-#define BUF_LEN	      512
-
 /* type of serial number of a state object
  * Needed in connections.h and state.h; here to simplify dependencies.
  */
 typedef unsigned long so_serial_t;
-#define SOS_NOBODY	0	/* null serial number */
-#define SOS_FIRST	1	/* first normal serial number */
+#define SOS_NOBODY      0       /* null serial number */
+#define SOS_FIRST       1       /* first normal serial number */
 
 /* memory allocation */
 
-extern void *alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name);
-#define alloc_thing(thing, name) (alloc_bytes(sizeof(thing), (name)))
+#define clone_thing(orig) clalloc((void *)&(orig), sizeof(orig))
 
-extern void *clone_bytes(const void *orig, size_t size, const char *name);
-#define clone_thing(orig, name) clone_bytes((const void *)&(orig), sizeof(orig), (name))
-#define clone_str(str, name) \
-    ((str) == NULL? NULL : clone_bytes((str), strlen((str))+1, (name)))
+#define clone_str(str) \
+	((str) == NULL? NULL : strdup(str))
+
+#define replace(p, q) \
+	{ free(p); (p) = (q); }
 
-#ifdef LEAK_DETECTIVE
-  extern void pfree(void *ptr);
-  extern void report_leaks(void);
-#else
-# define pfree(ptr) free(ptr)	/* ordinary stdc free */
-#endif
-#define pfreeany(p) { if ((p) != NULL) pfree(p); }
-#define replace(p, q) { pfreeany(p); (p) = (q); }
-
-
-/* chunk is a simple pointer-and-size abstraction */
-
-struct chunk {
-    u_char *ptr;
-    size_t len;
-    };
-typedef struct chunk chunk_t;
-
-#define setchunk(ch, addr, size) { (ch).ptr = (addr); (ch).len = (size); }
-#define strchunk(str) { str, sizeof(str) }
-/* NOTE: freeanychunk, unlike pfreeany, NULLs .ptr */
-#define freeanychunk(ch) { pfreeany((ch).ptr); (ch).ptr = NULL; }
-#define clonetochunk(ch, addr, size, name) \
-    { (ch).ptr = clone_bytes((addr), (ch).len = (size), name); }
-#define clonereplacechunk(ch, addr, size, name) \
-    { pfreeany((ch).ptr); clonetochunk(ch, addr, size, name); }
 #define chunkcpy(dst, chunk) \
-    { memcpy(dst, chunk.ptr, chunk.len); dst += chunk.len;}
-#define same_chunk(a, b) \
-    ( (a).len == (b).len && memcmp((a).ptr, (b).ptr, (b).len) == 0 )
+	{ memcpy(dst, chunk.ptr, chunk.len); dst += chunk.len;}
 
 extern char* temporary_cyclic_buffer(void);
-extern const char* concatenate_paths(const char *a, const char *b);
-
-extern const chunk_t empty_chunk;
-
-/* compare two chunks */
-extern int cmp_chunk(chunk_t a, chunk_t b);
+extern char* concatenate_paths(char *a, char *b);
 
 /* move a chunk to a memory position and free it after insertion */
 extern void mv_chunk(u_char **pos, chunk_t content);
 
-/* write the binary contents of a chunk_t to a file */
-extern bool write_chunk(const char *filename, const char *label, chunk_t ch
-    ,mode_t mask, bool force);
-
-/* display a date either in local or UTC time */
-extern char* timetoa(const time_t *time, bool utc);
-
 /* warns a predefined interval before expiry */
 extern const char* check_expiry(time_t expiration_date,
-    int warning_interval, bool strict);
+	int warning_interval, bool strict);
 
-#define MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS	5
-#define PROMPT_PASS_LEN		64
+#define MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS  5
+#define PROMPT_PASS_LEN         64
 
 /* struct used to prompt for a secret passphrase
  * from a console with file descriptor fd
  */
 typedef struct {
-    char secret[PROMPT_PASS_LEN+1];
-    bool prompt;
-    int fd;
+	char secret[PROMPT_PASS_LEN+1];
+	bool prompt;
+	int fd;
 } prompt_pass_t;
 
-/* no time defined in time_t */
-#define UNDEFINED_TIME	0
-
-/* size of timetoa string buffer */
-#define TIMETOA_BUF	30
-
 /* filter eliminating the directory entries '.' and '..' */
 typedef struct dirent dirent_t;
 extern int file_select(const dirent_t *entry);
 
 /* cleanly exit Pluto */
-
 extern void exit_pluto(int /*status*/) NEVER_RETURNS;
 
-
 /* zero all bytes */
 #define zero(x) memset((x), '\0', sizeof(*(x)))
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/demux.c b/src/pluto/demux.c
index 04728a4a8..3cfc909af 100644
--- a/src/pluto/demux.c
+++ b/src/pluto/demux.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: demux.c 3686 2008-03-28 11:48:14Z martin $
  */
 
 /* Ordering Constraints on Payloads
@@ -110,8 +108,8 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>	/* only used for belt-and-suspenders select call */
-#include <sys/poll.h>	/* only used for forensic poll call */
+#include <sys/time.h>   /* only used for belt-and-suspenders select call */
+#include <sys/poll.h>   /* only used for forensic poll call */
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
@@ -119,9 +117,9 @@
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
-#  include <asm/types.h>	/* for __u8, __u32 */
+#  include <asm/types.h>        /* for __u8, __u32 */
 #  include <linux/errqueue.h>
-#  include <sys/uio.h>	/* struct iovec */
+#  include <sys/uio.h>  /* struct iovec */
 #endif
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
@@ -132,15 +130,13 @@
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "state.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "crypto.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "demux.h"      /* needs packet.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
 #include "timer.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* requires connections.h */
+#include "whack.h"      /* requires connections.h */
 #include "server.h"
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 #include "vendor.h"
@@ -173,14 +169,14 @@ u_int8_t reply_buffer[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
  */
 
 struct state_microcode {
-    enum state_kind state, next_state;
-    lset_t flags;
-    lset_t req_payloads;	/* required payloads (allows just one) */
-    lset_t opt_payloads;	/* optional payloads (any mumber) */
-    /* if not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, process_packet will emit HDR with this as np */
-    u_int8_t first_out_payload;
-    enum event_type timeout_event;
-    state_transition_fn *processor;
+	enum state_kind state, next_state;
+	lset_t flags;
+	lset_t req_payloads;        /* required payloads (allows just one) */
+	lset_t opt_payloads;        /* optional payloads (any mumber) */
+	/* if not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, process_packet will emit HDR with this as np */
+	u_int8_t first_out_payload;
+	enum event_type timeout_event;
+	state_transition_fn *processor;
 };
 
 /* State Microcode Flags, in several groups */
@@ -190,19 +186,21 @@ struct state_microcode {
  * Note: SMF_ALL_AUTH matches 0 for those circumstances when no auth
  * has been set.
  */
-#define SMF_ALL_AUTH	LRANGE(0, OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF-1)
-#define SMF_PSK_AUTH	LELEM(OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY)
-#define SMF_DS_AUTH	(LELEM(OAKLEY_DSS_SIG) | LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_SIG))
-#define SMF_PKE_AUTH	(LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_ENC) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC))
-#define SMF_RPKE_AUTH	(LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV))
+#define SMF_ALL_AUTH    LRANGE(0, OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF-1)
+#define SMF_PSK_AUTH    LELEM(OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY)
+#define SMF_DS_AUTH     (LELEM(OAKLEY_DSS_SIG)   | LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_SIG)   | \
+						 LELEM(OAKLEY_ECDSA_SIG) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ECDSA_256) | \
+						 LELEM(OAKLEY_ECDSA_384) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ECDSA_521))
+#define SMF_PKE_AUTH    (LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_ENC) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC))
+#define SMF_RPKE_AUTH   (LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV))
 
 /* misc flags */
 
-#define SMF_INITIATOR	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 0)
-#define SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 1)
-#define SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 2)
-#define SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 3)
-#define SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 4)
+#define SMF_INITIATOR   LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 0)
+#define SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT       LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 1)
+#define SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED     LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 2)
+#define SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED    LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 3)
+#define SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE     LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 4)
 
 #define SMF_ENCRYPTED (SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED)
 
@@ -210,14 +208,14 @@ struct state_microcode {
 #define SMF_REPLY   LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 5)
 
 /* this state completes P1, so any pending P2 negotiations should start */
-#define SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 6)
+#define SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2  LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 6)
 
 /* end of flags */
 
 
-static state_transition_fn	/* forward declaration */
-    unexpected,
-    informational;
+static state_transition_fn      /* forward declaration */
+	unexpected,
+	informational;
 
 /* state_microcode_table is a table of all state_microcode tuples.
  * It must be in order of state (the first element).
@@ -228,288 +226,288 @@ static state_transition_fn	/* forward declaration */
  */
 
 static const struct state_microcode
-    *ike_microcode_index[STATE_IKE_ROOF - STATE_IKE_FLOOR];
+	*ike_microcode_index[STATE_IKE_ROOF - STATE_IKE_FLOOR];
 
 static const struct state_microcode state_microcode_table[] = {
 #define PT(n) ISAKMP_NEXT_##n
 #define P(n) LELEM(PT(n))
 
-    /***** Phase 1 Main Mode *****/
-
-    /* No state for main_outI1: --> HDR, SA */
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_R0: I1 --> R1
-     * HDR, SA --> HDR, SA
-     */
-    { STATE_MAIN_R0, STATE_MAIN_R1
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(SA), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inI1_outR1},
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_I1: R1 --> I2
-     * HDR, SA --> auth dependent
-     * SMF_PSK_AUTH, SMF_DS_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, Ni
-     * SMF_PKE_AUTH:
-     *	--> HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
-     * SMF_RPKE_AUTH:
-     *	--> HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
-     * Note: since we don't know auth at start, we cannot differentiate
-     * microcode entries based on it.
-     */
-    { STATE_MAIN_I1, STATE_MAIN_I2
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(SA), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE) /* don't know yet */
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inR1_outI2 },
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_R1: I2 --> R2
-     * SMF_PSK_AUTH, SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Ni --> HDR, KE, Nr
-     * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
-     *	    --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
-     * SMF_RPKE_AUTH:
-     *	    HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
-     *	    --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
-     */
-    { STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_MAIN_R2
-    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(KE) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(NATD_RFC), PT(KE)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inI2_outR2 },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(HASH), PT(KE)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(NONCE) | P(KE) | P(ID), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(HASH) | P(CERT), PT(NONCE)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
-
-    /* for states from here on, output message must be encrypted */
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_I2: R2 --> I3
-     * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I
-     * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I
-     * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
-     *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
-     * SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
-     *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
-     */
-    { STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_MAIN_I3
-    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(KE) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(NATD_RFC), PT(ID)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inR2_outI3 },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(NONCE) | P(KE) | P(ID), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
-
-    /* for states from here on, input message must be encrypted */
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_R2: I3 --> R3
-     * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I --> HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R
-     * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --> HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
-     * SMF_PKE_AUTH, SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_I --> HDR*, HASH_R
-     */
-    { STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_MAIN_R3
-    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-      | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ID) | P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inI3_outR3 },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_MAIN_R3
-    , SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-      | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ID) | P(SIG), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(CERT), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inI3_outR3 },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-      | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_I3: R3 --> done
-     * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R --> done
-     * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R --> done
-     * SMF_PKE_AUTH, SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_R --> done
-     * May initiate quick mode by calling quick_outI1
-     */
-    { STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_MAIN_I4
-    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
-      | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ID) | P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inR3 },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_MAIN_I4
-    , SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
-      | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ID) | P(SIG), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(CERT), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inR3 },
-
-    { STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
-      | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_R3: can only get here due to packet loss */
-    { STATE_MAIN_R3, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY
-    , PT(NONE), EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-    /* STATE_MAIN_I4: can only get here due to packet loss */
-    { STATE_MAIN_I4, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY
-    , PT(NONE), EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-
-    /***** Phase 2 Quick Mode *****/
-
-    /* No state for quick_outI1:
-     * --> HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
-     */
-
-    /* STATE_QUICK_R0:
-     * HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
-     * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
-     * Installs inbound IPsec SAs.
-     * Because it may suspend for asynchronous DNS, first_out_payload
-     * is set to NONE to suppress early emission of HDR*.
-     * ??? it is legal to have multiple SAs, but we don't support it yet.
-     */
-    { STATE_QUICK_R0, STATE_QUICK_R1
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(HASH) | P(SA) | P(NONCE), /* P(SA) | */ P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NATOA_RFC), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, quick_inI1_outR1 },
-
-    /* STATE_QUICK_I1:
-     * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
-     * HDR*, HASH(3)
-     * Installs inbound and outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
-     * ??? it is legal to have multiple SAs, but we don't support it yet.
-     */
-    { STATE_QUICK_I1, STATE_QUICK_I2
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(HASH) | P(SA) | P(NONCE), /* P(SA) | */ P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NATOA_RFC), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, quick_inR1_outI2 },
-
-    /* STATE_QUICK_R1: HDR*, HASH(3) --> done
-     * Installs outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
-     */
-    { STATE_QUICK_R1, STATE_QUICK_R2
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , P(HASH), LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, quick_inI2 },
-
-    /* STATE_QUICK_I2: can only happen due to lost packet */
-    { STATE_QUICK_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-    /* STATE_QUICK_R2: can only happen due to lost packet */
-    { STATE_QUICK_R2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-
-    /***** informational messages *****/
-
-    /* STATE_INFO: */
-    { STATE_INFO, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, informational },
-
-    /* STATE_INFO_PROTECTED: */
-    { STATE_INFO_PROTECTED, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , P(HASH), LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, informational },
-
-    /* XAUTH state transitions */
-    { STATE_XAUTH_I0, STATE_XAUTH_I1
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, xauth_inI0 },
-
-    { STATE_XAUTH_R1, STATE_XAUTH_R2
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, xauth_inR1 },
-
-    { STATE_XAUTH_I1, STATE_XAUTH_I2
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, xauth_inI1 },
-
-    { STATE_XAUTH_R2, STATE_XAUTH_R3
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, xauth_inR2 },
-
-    { STATE_XAUTH_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-    { STATE_XAUTH_R3, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-    /* ModeCfg pull mode state transitions */
-
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R0, STATE_MODE_CFG_R1
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inR0 },
-
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I1, STATE_MODE_CFG_I2
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inI1 },
-
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
-
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+	/***** Phase 1 Main Mode *****/
+
+	/* No state for main_outI1: --> HDR, SA */
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_R0: I1 --> R1
+	 * HDR, SA --> HDR, SA
+	 */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R0, STATE_MAIN_R1
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(SA), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inI1_outR1},
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_I1: R1 --> I2
+	 * HDR, SA --> auth dependent
+	 * SMF_PSK_AUTH, SMF_DS_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, Ni
+	 * SMF_PKE_AUTH:
+	 *  --> HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
+	 * SMF_RPKE_AUTH:
+	 *  --> HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+	 * Note: since we don't know auth at start, we cannot differentiate
+	 * microcode entries based on it.
+	 */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I1, STATE_MAIN_I2
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(SA), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE) /* don't know yet */
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inR1_outI2 },
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_R1: I2 --> R2
+	 * SMF_PSK_AUTH, SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Ni --> HDR, KE, Nr
+	 * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
+	 *      --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+	 * SMF_RPKE_AUTH:
+	 *      HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+	 *      --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+	 */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_MAIN_R2
+	, SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(KE) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(NATD_RFC), PT(KE)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inI2_outR2 },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(HASH), PT(KE)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(NONCE) | P(KE) | P(ID), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(HASH) | P(CERT), PT(NONCE)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+	/* for states from here on, output message must be encrypted */
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_I2: R2 --> I3
+	 * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I
+	 * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I
+	 * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+	 *      --> HDR*, HASH_I
+	 * SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+	 *      --> HDR*, HASH_I
+	 */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_MAIN_I3
+	, SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(KE) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(NATD_RFC), PT(ID)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inR2_outI3 },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(NONCE) | P(KE) | P(ID), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+	/* for states from here on, input message must be encrypted */
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_R2: I3 --> R3
+	 * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I --> HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R
+	 * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --> HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
+	 * SMF_PKE_AUTH, SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_I --> HDR*, HASH_R
+	 */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_MAIN_R3
+	, SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	  | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ID) | P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inI3_outR3 },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_MAIN_R3
+	, SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	  | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ID) | P(SIG), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(CERT), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inI3_outR3 },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	  | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_I3: R3 --> done
+	 * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R --> done
+	 * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R --> done
+	 * SMF_PKE_AUTH, SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_R --> done
+	 * May initiate quick mode by calling quick_outI1
+	 */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_MAIN_I4
+	, SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
+	  | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ID) | P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inR3 },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_MAIN_I4
+	, SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
+	  | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ID) | P(SIG), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(CERT), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inR3 },
+
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
+	  | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_R3: can only get here due to packet loss */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_R3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY
+	, PT(NONE), EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+	/* STATE_MAIN_I4: can only get here due to packet loss */
+	{ STATE_MAIN_I4, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY
+	, PT(NONE), EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+
+	/***** Phase 2 Quick Mode *****/
+
+	/* No state for quick_outI1:
+	 * --> HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
+	 */
+
+	/* STATE_QUICK_R0:
+	 * HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
+	 * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
+	 * Installs inbound IPsec SAs.
+	 * Because it may suspend for asynchronous DNS, first_out_payload
+	 * is set to NONE to suppress early emission of HDR*.
+	 * ??? it is legal to have multiple SAs, but we don't support it yet.
+	 */
+	{ STATE_QUICK_R0, STATE_QUICK_R1
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(HASH) | P(SA) | P(NONCE), /* P(SA) | */ P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NATOA_RFC), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, quick_inI1_outR1 },
+
+	/* STATE_QUICK_I1:
+	 * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
+	 * HDR*, HASH(3)
+	 * Installs inbound and outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
+	 * ??? it is legal to have multiple SAs, but we don't support it yet.
+	 */
+	{ STATE_QUICK_I1, STATE_QUICK_I2
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(HASH) | P(SA) | P(NONCE), /* P(SA) | */ P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NATOA_RFC), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, quick_inR1_outI2 },
+
+	/* STATE_QUICK_R1: HDR*, HASH(3) --> done
+	 * Installs outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
+	 */
+	{ STATE_QUICK_R1, STATE_QUICK_R2
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, P(HASH), LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, quick_inI2 },
+
+	/* STATE_QUICK_I2: can only happen due to lost packet */
+	{ STATE_QUICK_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+	/* STATE_QUICK_R2: can only happen due to lost packet */
+	{ STATE_QUICK_R2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+
+	/***** informational messages *****/
+
+	/* STATE_INFO: */
+	{ STATE_INFO, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, informational },
+
+	/* STATE_INFO_PROTECTED: */
+	{ STATE_INFO_PROTECTED, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, P(HASH), LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, informational },
+
+	/* XAUTH state transitions */
+	{ STATE_XAUTH_I0, STATE_XAUTH_I1
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, xauth_inI0 },
+
+	{ STATE_XAUTH_R1, STATE_XAUTH_R2
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_RETRANSMIT, xauth_inR1 },
+
+	{ STATE_XAUTH_I1, STATE_XAUTH_I2
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, xauth_inI1 },
+
+	{ STATE_XAUTH_R2, STATE_XAUTH_R3
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, xauth_inR2 },
+
+	{ STATE_XAUTH_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+	{ STATE_XAUTH_R3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+	/* ModeCfg pull mode state transitions */
+
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_R0, STATE_MODE_CFG_R1
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inR0 },
+
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_I1, STATE_MODE_CFG_I2
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inI1 },
+
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
 
    /* ModeCfg push mode state transitions */
 
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I0, STATE_MODE_CFG_I3
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inI0 },
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_I0, STATE_MODE_CFG_I3
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inI0 },
 
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R3, STATE_MODE_CFG_R4
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
-    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
-    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inR3 },
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_R3, STATE_MODE_CFG_R4
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+	, P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+	, EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inR3 },
 
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I3, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_I3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
 
-    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R4, STATE_UNDEFINED
-    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
-    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
-    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+	{ STATE_MODE_CFG_R4, STATE_UNDEFINED
+	, SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+	, LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+	, EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
 
 #undef P
 #undef PT
@@ -518,23 +516,23 @@ static const struct state_microcode state_microcode_table[] = {
 void
 init_demux(void)
 {
-    /* fill ike_microcode_index:
-     * make ike_microcode_index[s] point to first entry in
-     * state_microcode_table for state s (backward scan makes this easier).
-     * Check that table is in order -- catch coding errors.
-     * For what it's worth, this routine is idempotent.
-     */
-    const struct state_microcode *t;
-
-    for (t = &state_microcode_table[elemsof(state_microcode_table) - 1];;)
-    {
-	passert(STATE_IKE_FLOOR <= t->state && t->state < STATE_IKE_ROOF);
-	ike_microcode_index[t->state - STATE_IKE_FLOOR] = t;
-	if (t == state_microcode_table)
-	    break;
-	t--;
-	passert(t[0].state <= t[1].state);
-    }
+	/* fill ike_microcode_index:
+	 * make ike_microcode_index[s] point to first entry in
+	 * state_microcode_table for state s (backward scan makes this easier).
+	 * Check that table is in order -- catch coding errors.
+	 * For what it's worth, this routine is idempotent.
+	 */
+	const struct state_microcode *t;
+
+	for (t = &state_microcode_table[countof(state_microcode_table) - 1];;)
+	{
+		passert(STATE_IKE_FLOOR <= t->state && t->state < STATE_IKE_ROOF);
+		ike_microcode_index[t->state - STATE_IKE_FLOOR] = t;
+		if (t == state_microcode_table)
+			break;
+		t--;
+		passert(t[0].state <= t[1].state);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Process any message on the MSG_ERRQUEUE
@@ -586,357 +584,357 @@ init_demux(void)
 static bool
 check_msg_errqueue(const struct iface *ifp, short interest)
 {
-    struct pollfd pfd;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
 
-    pfd.fd = ifp->fd;
-    pfd.events = interest | POLLPRI | POLLOUT;
+	pfd.fd = ifp->fd;
+	pfd.events = interest | POLLPRI | POLLOUT;
 
-    while (pfd.revents = 0
-    , poll(&pfd, 1, -1) > 0 && (pfd.revents & POLLERR))
-    {
-	u_int8_t buffer[3000];	/* hope that this is big enough */
-	union
+	while (pfd.revents = 0
+	, poll(&pfd, 1, -1) > 0 && (pfd.revents & POLLERR))
 	{
-	    struct sockaddr sa;
-	    struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
-	    struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
-	} from;
+		u_int8_t buffer[3000];  /* hope that this is big enough */
+		union
+		{
+			struct sockaddr sa;
+			struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+			struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
+		} from;
 
-	int from_len = sizeof(from);
+		int from_len = sizeof(from);
 
-	int packet_len;
+		int packet_len;
 
-	struct msghdr emh;
-	struct iovec eiov;
-	union {
-	    /* force alignment (not documented as necessary) */
-	    struct cmsghdr ecms;
+		struct msghdr emh;
+		struct iovec eiov;
+		union {
+			/* force alignment (not documented as necessary) */
+			struct cmsghdr ecms;
 
-	    /* how much space is enough? */
-	    unsigned char space[256];
-	} ecms_buf;
+			/* how much space is enough? */
+			unsigned char space[256];
+		} ecms_buf;
 
-	struct cmsghdr *cm;
-	char fromstr[sizeof(" for message to  port 65536") + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
-	struct state *sender = NULL;
+		struct cmsghdr *cm;
+		char fromstr[sizeof(" for message to  port 65536") + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+		struct state *sender = NULL;
 
-	zero(&from.sa);
-	from_len = sizeof(from);
+		zero(&from.sa);
+		from_len = sizeof(from);
 
-	emh.msg_name = &from.sa;	/* ??? filled in? */
-	emh.msg_namelen = sizeof(from);
-	emh.msg_iov = &eiov;
-	emh.msg_iovlen = 1;
-	emh.msg_control = &ecms_buf;
-	emh.msg_controllen = sizeof(ecms_buf);
-	emh.msg_flags = 0;
+		emh.msg_name = &from.sa;        /* ??? filled in? */
+		emh.msg_namelen = sizeof(from);
+		emh.msg_iov = &eiov;
+		emh.msg_iovlen = 1;
+		emh.msg_control = &ecms_buf;
+		emh.msg_controllen = sizeof(ecms_buf);
+		emh.msg_flags = 0;
 
-	eiov.iov_base = buffer;	/* see readv(2) */
-	eiov.iov_len = sizeof(buffer);
+		eiov.iov_base = buffer; /* see readv(2) */
+		eiov.iov_len = sizeof(buffer);
 
-	packet_len = recvmsg(ifp->fd, &emh, MSG_ERRQUEUE);
+		packet_len = recvmsg(ifp->fd, &emh, MSG_ERRQUEUE);
 
-	if (packet_len == -1)
-	{
-	    log_errno((e, "recvmsg(,, MSG_ERRQUEUE) on %s failed in comm_handle"
-		, ifp->rname));
-	    break;
-	}
-	else if (packet_len == sizeof(buffer))
-	{
-	    plog("MSG_ERRQUEUE message longer than %lu bytes; truncated"
-		, (unsigned long) sizeof(buffer));
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    sender = find_sender((size_t) packet_len, buffer);
-	}
-
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "rejected packet:\n", buffer, packet_len);
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "control:\n", emh.msg_control, emh.msg_controllen);
-	/* ??? Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> and misc documentation
-	 * suggests that name will have the original destination
-	 * of the packet.  We seem to see msg_namelen == 0.
-	 * Andi says that this is a kernel bug and has fixed it.
-	 * Perhaps in 2.2.18/2.4.0.
-	 */
-	passert(emh.msg_name == &from.sa);
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "name:\n", emh.msg_name
-	    , emh.msg_namelen);
-
-	fromstr[0] = '\0';	/* usual case :-( */
-	switch (from.sa.sa_family)
-	{
-	char as[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
-
-	case AF_INET:
-	    if (emh.msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
-		snprintf(fromstr, sizeof(fromstr)
-		, " for message to %s port %u"
-		    , inet_ntop(from.sa.sa_family
-		    , &from.sa_in4.sin_addr, as, sizeof(as))
-		    , ntohs(from.sa_in4.sin_port));
-	    break;
-	case AF_INET6:
-	    if (emh.msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
-		snprintf(fromstr, sizeof(fromstr)
-		    , " for message to %s port %u"
-		    , inet_ntop(from.sa.sa_family
-		    , &from.sa_in6.sin6_addr, as, sizeof(as))
-		    , ntohs(from.sa_in6.sin6_port));
-	    break;
-	}
-
-	for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&emh)
-	; cm != NULL
-	; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&emh,cm))
-	{
-	    if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_IP
-	    && cm->cmsg_type == IP_RECVERR)
-	    {
-		/* ip(7) and recvmsg(2) specify:
-		 * ee_origin is SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP for ICMP
-		 *  or SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL for locally generated errors.
-		 * ee_type and ee_code are from the ICMP header.
-		 * ee_info is the discovered MTU for EMSGSIZE errors
-		 * ee_data is not used.
-		 *
-		 * ??? recvmsg(2) says "SOCK_EE_OFFENDER" but
-		 * means "SO_EE_OFFENDER".  The OFFENDER is really
-		 * the router that complained.  As such, the port
-		 * is meaningless.
-		 */
+		if (packet_len == -1)
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "recvmsg(,, MSG_ERRQUEUE) on %s failed in comm_handle"
+				, ifp->rname));
+			break;
+		}
+		else if (packet_len == sizeof(buffer))
+		{
+			plog("MSG_ERRQUEUE message longer than %lu bytes; truncated"
+				, (unsigned long) sizeof(buffer));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			sender = find_sender((size_t) packet_len, buffer);
+		}
 
-		/* ??? cmsg(3) claims that CMSG_DATA returns
-		 * void *, but RFC 2292 and /usr/include/bits/socket.h
-		 * say unsigned char *.  The manual is being fixed.
+		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "rejected packet:\n", buffer, packet_len);
+		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "control:\n", emh.msg_control, emh.msg_controllen);
+		/* ??? Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> and misc documentation
+		 * suggests that name will have the original destination
+		 * of the packet.  We seem to see msg_namelen == 0.
+		 * Andi says that this is a kernel bug and has fixed it.
+		 * Perhaps in 2.2.18/2.4.0.
 		 */
-		struct sock_extended_err *ee = (void *)CMSG_DATA(cm);
-		const char *offstr = "unspecified";
-		char offstrspace[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
-		char orname[50];
+		passert(emh.msg_name == &from.sa);
+		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "name:\n", emh.msg_name
+			, emh.msg_namelen);
 
-		if (cm->cmsg_len > CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sock_extended_err)))
+		fromstr[0] = '\0';      /* usual case :-( */
+		switch (from.sa.sa_family)
 		{
-		    const struct sockaddr *offender = SO_EE_OFFENDER(ee);
-
-		    switch (offender->sa_family)
-		    {
-		    case AF_INET:
-			offstr = inet_ntop(offender->sa_family
-			    , &((const struct sockaddr_in *)offender)->sin_addr
-			    , offstrspace, sizeof(offstrspace));
-			break;
-		    case AF_INET6:
-			offstr = inet_ntop(offender->sa_family
-			    , &((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)offender)->sin6_addr
-			    , offstrspace, sizeof(offstrspace));
+		char as[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+
+		case AF_INET:
+			if (emh.msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+				snprintf(fromstr, sizeof(fromstr)
+				, " for message to %s port %u"
+					, inet_ntop(from.sa.sa_family
+					, &from.sa_in4.sin_addr, as, sizeof(as))
+					, ntohs(from.sa_in4.sin_port));
 			break;
-		    default:
-			offstr = "unknown";
+		case AF_INET6:
+			if (emh.msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+				snprintf(fromstr, sizeof(fromstr)
+					, " for message to %s port %u"
+					, inet_ntop(from.sa.sa_family
+					, &from.sa_in6.sin6_addr, as, sizeof(as))
+					, ntohs(from.sa_in6.sin6_port));
 			break;
-		    }
 		}
 
-		switch (ee->ee_origin)
+		for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&emh)
+		; cm != NULL
+		; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&emh,cm))
 		{
-		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_NONE:
-		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "none");
-		    break;
-		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL:
-		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "local");
-		    break;
-		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP:
-		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname)
-			, "ICMP type %d code %d (not authenticated)"
-			, ee->ee_type, ee->ee_code
-			);
-		    break;
-		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP6:
-		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname)
-			, "ICMP6 type %d code %d (not authenticated)"
-			, ee->ee_type, ee->ee_code
-			);
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "invalid origin %lu"
-			, (unsigned long) ee->ee_origin);
-		    break;
-		}
-
-		{
-		    struct state *old_state = cur_state;
-
-		    cur_state = sender;
-
-		    /* note dirty trick to suppress ~ at start of format
-		     * if we know what state to blame.
-		     */
-		    if ((packet_len == 1) && (buffer[0] = 0xff)
+			if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_IP
+			&& cm->cmsg_type == IP_RECVERR)
+			{
+				/* ip(7) and recvmsg(2) specify:
+				 * ee_origin is SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP for ICMP
+				 *  or SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL for locally generated errors.
+				 * ee_type and ee_code are from the ICMP header.
+				 * ee_info is the discovered MTU for EMSGSIZE errors
+				 * ee_data is not used.
+				 *
+				 * ??? recvmsg(2) says "SOCK_EE_OFFENDER" but
+				 * means "SO_EE_OFFENDER".  The OFFENDER is really
+				 * the router that complained.  As such, the port
+				 * is meaningless.
+				 */
+
+				/* ??? cmsg(3) claims that CMSG_DATA returns
+				 * void *, but RFC 2292 and /usr/include/bits/socket.h
+				 * say unsigned char *.  The manual is being fixed.
+				 */
+				struct sock_extended_err *ee = (void *)CMSG_DATA(cm);
+				const char *offstr = "unspecified";
+				char offstrspace[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+				char orname[50];
+
+				if (cm->cmsg_len > CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sock_extended_err)))
+				{
+					const struct sockaddr *offender = SO_EE_OFFENDER(ee);
+
+					switch (offender->sa_family)
+					{
+					case AF_INET:
+						offstr = inet_ntop(offender->sa_family
+							, &((const struct sockaddr_in *)offender)->sin_addr
+							, offstrspace, sizeof(offstrspace));
+						break;
+					case AF_INET6:
+						offstr = inet_ntop(offender->sa_family
+							, &((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)offender)->sin6_addr
+							, offstrspace, sizeof(offstrspace));
+						break;
+					default:
+						offstr = "unknown";
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+
+				switch (ee->ee_origin)
+				{
+				case SO_EE_ORIGIN_NONE:
+					snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "none");
+					break;
+				case SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL:
+					snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "local");
+					break;
+				case SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP:
+					snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname)
+						, "ICMP type %d code %d (not authenticated)"
+						, ee->ee_type, ee->ee_code
+						);
+					break;
+				case SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP6:
+					snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname)
+						, "ICMP6 type %d code %d (not authenticated)"
+						, ee->ee_type, ee->ee_code
+						);
+					break;
+				default:
+					snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "invalid origin %lu"
+						, (unsigned long) ee->ee_origin);
+					break;
+				}
+
+				{
+					struct state *old_state = cur_state;
+
+					cur_state = sender;
+
+					/* note dirty trick to suppress ~ at start of format
+					 * if we know what state to blame.
+					 */
+					if ((packet_len == 1) && (buffer[0] = 0xff)
 #ifdef DEBUG
-			&& ((cur_debugging & DBG_NATT) == 0)
+						&& ((cur_debugging & DBG_NATT) == 0)
 #endif
-			) {
-			    /* don't log NAT-T keepalive related errors unless NATT debug is
-			     * enabled
-			     */
-		    }
-		    else
-		    plog((sender != NULL) + "~"
-			"ERROR: asynchronous network error report on %s"
-			"%s"
-			", complainant %s"
-			": %s"
-			" [errno %lu, origin %s"
-			/* ", pad %d, info %ld" */
-			/* ", data %ld" */
-			"]"
-			, ifp->rname
-			, fromstr
-			, offstr
-			, strerror(ee->ee_errno)
-			, (unsigned long) ee->ee_errno
-			, orname
-			/* , ee->ee_pad, (unsigned long)ee->ee_info */
-			/* , (unsigned long)ee->ee_data */
-			);
-		    cur_state = old_state;
+						) {
+							/* don't log NAT-T keepalive related errors unless NATT debug is
+							 * enabled
+							 */
+					}
+					else
+					plog((sender != NULL) + "~"
+						"ERROR: asynchronous network error report on %s"
+						"%s"
+						", complainant %s"
+						": %s"
+						" [errno %lu, origin %s"
+						/* ", pad %d, info %ld" */
+						/* ", data %ld" */
+						"]"
+						, ifp->rname
+						, fromstr
+						, offstr
+						, strerror(ee->ee_errno)
+						, (unsigned long) ee->ee_errno
+						, orname
+						/* , ee->ee_pad, (unsigned long)ee->ee_info */
+						/* , (unsigned long)ee->ee_data */
+						);
+					cur_state = old_state;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* .cmsg_len is a kernel_size_t(!), but the value
+				 * certainly ought to fit in an unsigned long.
+				 */
+				plog("unknown cmsg: level %d, type %d, len %lu"
+					, cm->cmsg_level, cm->cmsg_type
+					, (unsigned long) cm->cmsg_len);
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* .cmsg_len is a kernel_size_t(!), but the value
-		 * certainly ought to fit in an unsigned long.
-		 */
-		plog("unknown cmsg: level %d, type %d, len %lu"
-		    , cm->cmsg_level, cm->cmsg_type
-		    , (unsigned long) cm->cmsg_len);
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    return (pfd.revents & interest) != 0;
+	return (pfd.revents & interest) != 0;
 }
 #endif /* defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) */
 
 bool
 send_packet(struct state *st, const char *where)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    int port_buf;
-    bool err;
-    u_int8_t ike_pkt[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
-    u_int8_t *ptr;
-    unsigned long len;
-
-    if (c->interface->ike_float && st->st_tpacket.len != 1)
-    {
-	if ((unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len > (MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE-sizeof(u_int32_t)))
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	int port_buf;
+	bool err;
+	u_int8_t ike_pkt[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
+	u_int8_t *ptr;
+	unsigned long len;
+
+	if (c->interface->ike_float && st->st_tpacket.len != 1)
 	{
-	    DBG_log("send_packet(): really too big");
-	    return FALSE;
+		if ((unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len > (MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE-sizeof(u_int32_t)))
+		{
+			DBG_log("send_packet(): really too big");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		ptr = ike_pkt;
+		/** Add Non-ESP marker **/
+		memset(ike_pkt, 0, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+		memcpy(ike_pkt + sizeof(u_int32_t), st->st_tpacket.ptr,
+			(unsigned long)st->st_tpacket.len);
+		len = (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len + sizeof(u_int32_t);
 	}
-	ptr = ike_pkt;
-	/** Add Non-ESP marker **/
-	memset(ike_pkt, 0, sizeof(u_int32_t));
-	memcpy(ike_pkt + sizeof(u_int32_t), st->st_tpacket.ptr,
-	    (unsigned long)st->st_tpacket.len);
-	len = (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len + sizeof(u_int32_t);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ptr = st->st_tpacket.ptr;
-	len = (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	else
 	{
-	    DBG_log("sending %lu bytes for %s through %s to %s:%u:"
-		, (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len
-		, where
-		, c->interface->rname
- 		, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
-		, (unsigned)c->spd.that.host_port);
-	    DBG_dump_chunk(NULL, st->st_tpacket);
-	});
-
-    /* XXX: Not very clean.  We manipulate the port of the ip_address to
-     * have a port in the sockaddr*, but we retain the original port
-     * and restore it afterwards.
-     */
-
-    port_buf = portof(&c->spd.that.host_addr);
-    setportof(htons(c->spd.that.host_port), &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+		ptr = st->st_tpacket.ptr;
+		len = (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_RAW,
+		{
+			DBG_log("sending %lu bytes for %s through %s to %s:%u:"
+				, (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len
+				, where
+				, c->interface->rname
+				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+				, (unsigned)c->spd.that.host_port);
+			DBG_dump_chunk(NULL, st->st_tpacket);
+		});
+
+	/* XXX: Not very clean.  We manipulate the port of the ip_address to
+	 * have a port in the sockaddr*, but we retain the original port
+	 * and restore it afterwards.
+	 */
+
+	port_buf = portof(&c->spd.that.host_addr);
+	setportof(htons(c->spd.that.host_port), &c->spd.that.host_addr);
 
 #if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
-    (void) check_msg_errqueue(c->interface, POLLOUT);
+	(void) check_msg_errqueue(c->interface, POLLOUT);
 #endif /* defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) */
 
-    err = sendto(c->interface->fd
-    	, ptr, len, 0
-    	, sockaddrof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
-    	, sockaddrlenof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)) != (ssize_t)len;
-
-    /* restore port */
-    setportof(port_buf, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
-
-    if (err)
-    {
-       /* do not log NAT-T Keep Alive packets */
-        if (streq(where, "NAT-T Keep Alive"))
- 	    return FALSE;
-	log_errno((e, "sendto on %s to %s:%u failed in %s"
-	    , c->interface->rname
-	    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
-	    , (unsigned)c->spd.that.host_port
-	    , where));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	err = sendto(c->interface->fd
+		, ptr, len, 0
+		, sockaddrof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+		, sockaddrlenof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)) != (ssize_t)len;
+
+	/* restore port */
+	setportof(port_buf, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+	if (err)
+	{
+	   /* do not log NAT-T Keep Alive packets */
+		if (streq(where, "NAT-T Keep Alive"))
+			return FALSE;
+		log_errno((e, "sendto on %s to %s:%u failed in %s"
+			, c->interface->rname
+			, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+			, (unsigned)c->spd.that.host_port
+			, where));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 static stf_status
 unexpected(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected message received in state %s"
-	, enum_name(&state_names, md->st->st_state));
-    return STF_IGNORE;
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected message received in state %s"
+		, enum_name(&state_names, md->st->st_state));
+	return STF_IGNORE;
 }
 
 static stf_status
 informational(struct msg_digest *md UNUSED)
 {
-    struct payload_digest *const n_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N];
-
-    /* If the Notification Payload is not null... */
-    if (n_pld != NULL)
-    {
-        pb_stream *const n_pbs = &n_pld->pbs;
-        struct isakmp_notification *const n = &n_pld->payload.notification;
-        int disp_len;
-        char disp_buf[200];
-
-        /* Switch on Notification Type (enum) */
-        switch (n->isan_type)
-        {
-        case R_U_THERE:
-            return dpd_inI_outR(md->st, n, n_pbs);
-
-        case R_U_THERE_ACK:
-            return dpd_inR(md->st, n, n_pbs);
-        default:
-            if (pbs_left(n_pbs) >= sizeof(disp_buf)-1)
-                disp_len = sizeof(disp_buf)-1;
-            else
-                disp_len = pbs_left(n_pbs);
-            memcpy(disp_buf, n_pbs->cur, disp_len);
-            disp_buf[disp_len] = '\0';
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    return STF_IGNORE;
+	struct payload_digest *const n_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N];
+
+	/* If the Notification Payload is not null... */
+	if (n_pld != NULL)
+	{
+		pb_stream *const n_pbs = &n_pld->pbs;
+		struct isakmp_notification *const n = &n_pld->payload.notification;
+		int disp_len;
+		char disp_buf[200];
+
+		/* Switch on Notification Type (enum) */
+		switch (n->isan_type)
+		{
+		case R_U_THERE:
+			return dpd_inI_outR(md->st, n, n_pbs);
+
+		case R_U_THERE_ACK:
+			return dpd_inR(md->st, n, n_pbs);
+		default:
+			if (pbs_left(n_pbs) >= sizeof(disp_buf)-1)
+				disp_len = sizeof(disp_buf)-1;
+			else
+				disp_len = pbs_left(n_pbs);
+			memcpy(disp_buf, n_pbs->cur, disp_len);
+			disp_buf[disp_len] = '\0';
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	return STF_IGNORE;
 }
 
 /* message digest allocation and deallocation */
@@ -947,54 +945,57 @@ static struct msg_digest *md_pool = NULL;
 void
 free_md_pool(void)
 {
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	struct msg_digest *md = md_pool;
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		struct msg_digest *md = md_pool;
 
-	if (md == NULL)
-	    break;
-	md_pool = md->next;
-	pfree(md);
-    }
+		if (md == NULL)
+			break;
+		md_pool = md->next;
+		free(md);
+	}
 }
 
 static struct msg_digest *
-alloc_md(void)
+malloc_md(void)
 {
-    struct msg_digest *md = md_pool;
-
-    /* convenient initializer:
-     * - all pointers NULL
-     * - .note = NOTHING_WRONG
-     * - .encrypted = FALSE
-     */
-    static const struct msg_digest blank_md;
-
-    if (md == NULL)
-	md = alloc_thing(struct msg_digest, "msg_digest");
-    else
-	md_pool = md->next;
-
-    *md = blank_md;
-    md->digest_roof = md->digest;
-
-    /* note: although there may be multiple msg_digests at once
-     * (due to suspended state transitions), there is a single
-     * global reply_buffer.  It will need to be saved and restored.
-     */
-    init_pbs(&md->reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
-
-    return md;
+	struct msg_digest *md = md_pool;
+
+	/* convenient initializer:
+	 * - all pointers NULL
+	 * - .note = NOTHING_WRONG
+	 * - .encrypted = FALSE
+	 */
+	static const struct msg_digest blank_md;
+
+	if (md == NULL)
+	{
+		md = malloc_thing(struct msg_digest);
+		zero(md);
+	}
+	else
+		md_pool = md->next;
+
+	*md = blank_md;
+	md->digest_roof = md->digest;
+
+	/* note: although there may be multiple msg_digests at once
+	 * (due to suspended state transitions), there is a single
+	 * global reply_buffer.  It will need to be saved and restored.
+	 */
+	init_pbs(&md->reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
+
+	return md;
 }
 
 void
 release_md(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    freeanychunk(md->raw_packet);
-    pfreeany(md->packet_pbs.start);
-    md->packet_pbs.start = NULL;
-    md->next = md_pool;
-    md_pool = md;
+	chunk_free(&md->raw_packet);
+	free(md->packet_pbs.start);
+	md->packet_pbs.start = NULL;
+	md->next = md_pool;
+	md_pool = md;
 }
 
 /* wrapper for read_packet and process_packet
@@ -1013,35 +1014,35 @@ release_md(struct msg_digest *md)
 void
 comm_handle(const struct iface *ifp)
 {
-    static struct msg_digest *md;
+	static struct msg_digest *md;
 
 #if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
-    /* Even though select(2) says that there is a message,
-     * it might only be a MSG_ERRQUEUE message.  At least
-     * sometimes that leads to a hanging recvfrom.  To avoid
-     * what appears to be a kernel bug, check_msg_errqueue
-     * uses poll(2) and tells us if there is anything for us
-     * to read.
-     *
-     * This is early enough that teardown isn't required:
-     * just return on failure.
-     */
-    if (!check_msg_errqueue(ifp, POLLIN))
-	return;	/* no normal message to read */
+	/* Even though select(2) says that there is a message,
+	 * it might only be a MSG_ERRQUEUE message.  At least
+	 * sometimes that leads to a hanging recvfrom.  To avoid
+	 * what appears to be a kernel bug, check_msg_errqueue
+	 * uses poll(2) and tells us if there is anything for us
+	 * to read.
+	 *
+	 * This is early enough that teardown isn't required:
+	 * just return on failure.
+	 */
+	if (!check_msg_errqueue(ifp, POLLIN))
+		return; /* no normal message to read */
 #endif /* defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) */
 
-    md = alloc_md();
-    md->iface = ifp;
+	md = malloc_md();
+	md->iface = ifp;
 
-    if (read_packet(md))
-	process_packet(&md);
+	if (read_packet(md))
+		process_packet(&md);
 
-    if (md != NULL)
-	release_md(md);
+	if (md != NULL)
+		release_md(md);
 
-    cur_state = NULL;
-    reset_cur_connection();
-    cur_from = NULL;
+	cur_state = NULL;
+	reset_cur_connection();
+	cur_from = NULL;
 }
 
 /* read the message.
@@ -1052,177 +1053,177 @@ comm_handle(const struct iface *ifp)
 static bool
 read_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    const struct iface *ifp = md->iface;
-    int packet_len;
-    u_int8_t *buffer;
-    u_int8_t *buffer_nat;
-    union
-    {
-	struct sockaddr sa;
-	struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
-	struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
-    } from;
-    int from_len = sizeof(from);
-    err_t from_ugh = NULL;
-    static const char undisclosed[] = "unknown source";
-
-    happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&ifp->addr), &md->sender));
-    zero(&from.sa);
-    ioctl(ifp->fd, FIONREAD, &packet_len);
-    buffer = alloc_bytes(packet_len, "buffer read packet");
-    packet_len = recvfrom(ifp->fd, buffer, packet_len, 0
-	, &from.sa, &from_len);
-
-    /* First: digest the from address.
-     * We presume that nothing here disturbs errno.
-     */
-    if (packet_len == -1
-    && from_len == sizeof(from)
-    && all_zero((const void *)&from.sa, sizeof(from)))
-    {
-	/* "from" is untouched -- not set by recvfrom */
-	from_ugh = undisclosed;
-    }
-    else if (from_len
-    < (int) (offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_family) + sizeof(from.sa.sa_family)))
-    {
-	from_ugh = "truncated";
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	const struct af_info *afi = aftoinfo(from.sa.sa_family);
-
-	if (afi == NULL)
+	const struct iface *ifp = md->iface;
+	int packet_len;
+	u_int8_t *buffer;
+	u_int8_t *buffer_nat;
+	union
 	{
-	    from_ugh = "unexpected Address Family";
+		struct sockaddr sa;
+		struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+		struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
+	} from;
+	int from_len = sizeof(from);
+	err_t from_ugh = NULL;
+	static const char undisclosed[] = "unknown source";
+
+	happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&ifp->addr), &md->sender));
+	zero(&from.sa);
+	ioctl(ifp->fd, FIONREAD, &packet_len);
+	buffer = malloc(packet_len);
+	packet_len = recvfrom(ifp->fd, buffer, packet_len, 0
+		, &from.sa, &from_len);
+
+	/* First: digest the from address.
+	 * We presume that nothing here disturbs errno.
+	 */
+	if (packet_len == -1
+	&& from_len == sizeof(from)
+	&& all_zero((const void *)&from.sa, sizeof(from)))
+	{
+		/* "from" is untouched -- not set by recvfrom */
+		from_ugh = undisclosed;
 	}
-	else if (from_len != (int)afi->sa_sz)
+	else if (from_len
+	< (int) (offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_family) + sizeof(from.sa.sa_family)))
 	{
-	    from_ugh = "wrong length";
+		from_ugh = "truncated";
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    switch (from.sa.sa_family)
-	    {
-	    case AF_INET:
-		from_ugh = initaddr((void *) &from.sa_in4.sin_addr
-		    , sizeof(from.sa_in4.sin_addr), AF_INET, &md->sender);
-		md->sender_port = ntohs(from.sa_in4.sin_port);
-		break;
-	    case AF_INET6:
-		from_ugh = initaddr((void *) &from.sa_in6.sin6_addr
-		    , sizeof(from.sa_in6.sin6_addr), AF_INET6, &md->sender);
-		md->sender_port = ntohs(from.sa_in6.sin6_port);
-		break;
-	    }
+		const struct af_info *afi = aftoinfo(from.sa.sa_family);
+
+		if (afi == NULL)
+		{
+			from_ugh = "unexpected Address Family";
+		}
+		else if (from_len != (int)afi->sa_sz)
+		{
+			from_ugh = "wrong length";
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			switch (from.sa.sa_family)
+			{
+			case AF_INET:
+				from_ugh = initaddr((void *) &from.sa_in4.sin_addr
+					, sizeof(from.sa_in4.sin_addr), AF_INET, &md->sender);
+				md->sender_port = ntohs(from.sa_in4.sin_port);
+				break;
+			case AF_INET6:
+				from_ugh = initaddr((void *) &from.sa_in6.sin6_addr
+					, sizeof(from.sa_in6.sin6_addr), AF_INET6, &md->sender);
+				md->sender_port = ntohs(from.sa_in6.sin6_port);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* now we report any actual I/O error */
-    if (packet_len == -1)
-    {
-	if (from_ugh == undisclosed
-	&& errno == ECONNREFUSED)
+	/* now we report any actual I/O error */
+	if (packet_len == -1)
 	{
-	    /* Tone down scary message for vague event:
-	     * We get "connection refused" in response to some
-	     * datagram we sent, but we cannot tell which one.
-	     */
-	    plog("some IKE message we sent has been rejected with ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details)");
+		if (from_ugh == undisclosed
+		&& errno == ECONNREFUSED)
+		{
+			/* Tone down scary message for vague event:
+			 * We get "connection refused" in response to some
+			 * datagram we sent, but we cannot tell which one.
+			 */
+			plog("some IKE message we sent has been rejected with ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details)");
+		}
+		else if (from_ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "recvfrom on %s failed; Pluto cannot decode source sockaddr in rejection: %s"
+				, ifp->rname, from_ugh));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "recvfrom on %s from %s:%u failed"
+				, ifp->rname
+				, ip_str(&md->sender), (unsigned)md->sender_port));
+		}
+
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 	else if (from_ugh != NULL)
 	{
-	    log_errno((e, "recvfrom on %s failed; Pluto cannot decode source sockaddr in rejection: %s"
-		, ifp->rname, from_ugh));
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    log_errno((e, "recvfrom on %s from %s:%u failed"
-		, ifp->rname
-		, ip_str(&md->sender), (unsigned)md->sender_port));
+		plog("recvfrom on %s returned misformed source sockaddr: %s"
+			, ifp->rname, from_ugh);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
+	cur_from = &md->sender;
+	cur_from_port = md->sender_port;
 
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else if (from_ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	plog("recvfrom on %s returned misformed source sockaddr: %s"
-	    , ifp->rname, from_ugh);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    cur_from = &md->sender;
-    cur_from_port = md->sender_port;
-
-    if (ifp->ike_float == TRUE)
-    {
-	u_int32_t non_esp;
-
-	if (packet_len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
-	{
-	    plog("recvfrom %s:%u too small packet (%d)"
-		, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port, packet_len);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	memcpy(&non_esp, buffer, sizeof(u_int32_t));
-	if (non_esp != 0)
+	if (ifp->ike_float == TRUE)
 	{
-	    plog("recvfrom %s:%u has no Non-ESP marker"
-		, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port);
-	    return FALSE;
+		u_int32_t non_esp;
+
+		if (packet_len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
+		{
+			plog("recvfrom %s:%u too small packet (%d)"
+				, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port, packet_len);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		memcpy(&non_esp, buffer, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+		if (non_esp != 0)
+		{
+			plog("recvfrom %s:%u has no Non-ESP marker"
+				, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		packet_len -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
+		buffer_nat = malloc(packet_len);
+		memcpy(buffer_nat, buffer + sizeof(u_int32_t), packet_len);
+		free(buffer);
+		buffer = buffer_nat;
 	}
-	packet_len -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
-	buffer_nat = alloc_bytes(packet_len, "buffer read packet");
-	memcpy(buffer_nat, buffer + sizeof(u_int32_t), packet_len);
-	pfree(buffer);
-	buffer = buffer_nat;
-    }
-
-    /* Clone actual message contents
-     * and set up md->packet_pbs to describe it.
-     */
-    init_pbs(&md->packet_pbs, buffer, packet_len, "packet");
-
-    DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
-	    DBG_log("*received %d bytes from %s:%u on %s"
-		, (int) pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)
-		, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port
-		, ifp->rname);
-	});
 
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump("", md->packet_pbs.start, pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)));
+	/* Clone actual message contents
+	 * and set up md->packet_pbs to describe it.
+	 */
+	init_pbs(&md->packet_pbs, buffer, packet_len, "packet");
 
-	if ((pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)==1) && (md->packet_pbs.start[0]==0xff))
-	{
-	    /**
-	     * NAT-T Keep-alive packets should be discarded by kernel ESPinUDP
-	     * layer. But bogus keep-alive packets (sent with a non-esp marker)
-	     * can reach this point. Complain and discard them.
-	     */
-	    DBG(DBG_NATT,
-		DBG_log("NAT-T keep-alive (bogus ?) should not reach this point. "
-			"Ignored. Sender: %s:%u", ip_str(cur_from),
-			(unsigned) cur_from_port);
-	    )
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
+	DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+			DBG_log("*received %d bytes from %s:%u on %s"
+				, (int) pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)
+				, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port
+				, ifp->rname);
+		});
+
+	DBG(DBG_RAW,
+		DBG_dump("", md->packet_pbs.start, pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)));
 
-#define IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET	17
-#define IKEV2_VERSION		0x20
+		if ((pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)==1) && (md->packet_pbs.start[0]==0xff))
+		{
+			/**
+			 * NAT-T Keep-alive packets should be discarded by kernel ESPinUDP
+			 * layer. But bogus keep-alive packets (sent with a non-esp marker)
+			 * can reach this point. Complain and discard them.
+			 */
+			DBG(DBG_NATT,
+				DBG_log("NAT-T keep-alive (bogus ?) should not reach this point. "
+						"Ignored. Sender: %s:%u", ip_str(cur_from),
+						(unsigned) cur_from_port);
+			)
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-    /* ignore IKEv2 packets - they will be handled by charon */
-    if (pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs) > IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET
-    &&  md->packet_pbs.start[IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET] == IKEV2_VERSION)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	    DBG_log("  ignoring IKEv2 packet")
-	)
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+#define IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET    17
+#define IKEV2_VERSION           0x20
+
+	/* ignore IKEv2 packets - they will be handled by charon */
+	if (pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs) > IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET
+	&&  md->packet_pbs.start[IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET] == IKEV2_VERSION)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+			DBG_log("  ignoring IKEv2 packet")
+		)
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* process an input packet, possibly generating a reply.
@@ -1233,860 +1234,881 @@ read_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
 static void
 process_packet(struct msg_digest **mdp)
 {
-    struct msg_digest *md = *mdp;
-    const struct state_microcode *smc;
-    bool new_iv_set = FALSE;
-    bool restore_iv = FALSE;
-    u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    u_int new_iv_len = 0;
+	struct msg_digest *md = *mdp;
+	const struct state_microcode *smc;
+	bool new_iv_set = FALSE;
+	bool restore_iv = FALSE;
+	u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	u_int new_iv_len = 0;
 
-    struct state *st = NULL;
-    enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED;	/* state we started in */
+	struct state *st = NULL;
+	enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED;       /* state we started in */
 
 #define SEND_NOTIFICATION(t) { \
-    if (st) send_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
-    else send_notification_from_md(md, t); }
+	if (st) send_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
+	else send_notification_from_md(md, t); }
 
-    if (!in_struct(&md->hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->packet_pbs, &md->message_pbs))
-    {
-	/* Identify specific failures:
-	 * - bad ISAKMP major/minor version numbers
-	 */
-	if (md->packet_pbs.roof - md->packet_pbs.cur >= (ptrdiff_t)isakmp_hdr_desc.size)
+	if (!in_struct(&md->hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->packet_pbs, &md->message_pbs))
 	{
-	    struct isakmp_hdr *hdr = (struct isakmp_hdr *)md->packet_pbs.cur;
-	    if ((hdr->isa_version >> ISA_MAJ_SHIFT) != ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION)
-	    {
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION);
-		return;
-	    }
-	    else if ((hdr->isa_version & ISA_MIN_MASK) != ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION)
-	    {
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MINOR_VERSION);
+		/* Identify specific failures:
+		 * - bad ISAKMP major/minor version numbers
+		 */
+		if (md->packet_pbs.roof - md->packet_pbs.cur >= (ptrdiff_t)isakmp_hdr_desc.size)
+		{
+			struct isakmp_hdr *hdr = (struct isakmp_hdr *)md->packet_pbs.cur;
+			if ((hdr->isa_version >> ISA_MAJ_SHIFT) != ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION)
+			{
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION);
+				return;
+			}
+			else if ((hdr->isa_version & ISA_MIN_MASK) != ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION)
+			{
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MINOR_VERSION);
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
 		return;
-	    }
 	}
-	SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (md->packet_pbs.roof != md->message_pbs.roof)
-    {
-	plog("size (%u) differs from size specified in ISAKMP HDR (%u)"
-	    , (unsigned) pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), md->hdr.isa_length);
+
+	if (md->packet_pbs.roof != md->message_pbs.roof)
+	{
+		plog("size (%u) differs from size specified in ISAKMP HDR (%u)"
+			, (unsigned) pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), md->hdr.isa_length);
 #ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
-	if (pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs) - md->hdr.isa_length == 16)
-	    plog("Cisco VPN client appends 16 surplus NULL bytes");
-	else
+		if (pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs) - md->hdr.isa_length == 16)
+			plog("Cisco VPN client appends 16 surplus NULL bytes");
+		else
 #endif
-	return;
-    }
+		return;
+	}
 
-    switch (md->hdr.isa_xchg)
-    {
+	switch (md->hdr.isa_xchg)
+	{
 #ifdef NOTYET
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE:
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE:
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE:
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE:
 #endif
 
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT:	/* part of a Main Mode exchange */
-	if (md->hdr.isa_msgid != MAINMODE_MSGID)
-	{
-	    plog("Message ID was 0x%08lx but should be zero in Main Mode",
-		(unsigned long) md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
-	    return;
-	}
-
-	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
-	{
-	    plog("Initiator Cookie must not be zero in Main Mode message");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
-	    return;
-	}
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT:    /* part of a Main Mode exchange */
+		if (md->hdr.isa_msgid != MAINMODE_MSGID)
+		{
+			plog("Message ID was 0x%08lx but should be zero in Main Mode",
+				(unsigned long) md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
-	{
-	    /* initial message from initiator
-	     * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
-	     */
-	    if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
-	    {
-		plog("initial Main Mode message is invalid:"
-		    " its Encrypted Flag is on");
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
-		return;
-	    }
+		if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
+		{
+			plog("Initiator Cookie must not be zero in Main Mode message");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	    /* don't build a state until the message looks tasty */
-	    from_state = STATE_MAIN_R0;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* not an initial message */
+		if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
+		{
+			/* initial message from initiator
+			 * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
+			 */
+			if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
+			{
+				plog("initial Main Mode message is invalid:"
+					" its Encrypted Flag is on");
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
+				return;
+			}
 
-	    st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
-		, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+			/* don't build a state until the message looks tasty */
+			from_state = STATE_MAIN_R0;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* not an initial message */
 
-	    if (st == NULL)
-	    {
-		/* perhaps this is a first message from the responder
-		 * and contains a responder cookie that we've not yet seen.
-		 */
-		st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, zero_cookie
-		    , &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+			st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+				, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
 
-		if (st == NULL)
-		{
-		    plog("Main Mode message is part of an unknown exchange");
-		    /* XXX Could send notification back */
-		    return;
+			if (st == NULL)
+			{
+				/* perhaps this is a first message from the responder
+				 * and contains a responder cookie that we've not yet seen.
+				 */
+				st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, zero_cookie
+					, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+
+				if (st == NULL)
+				{
+					plog("Main Mode message is part of an unknown exchange");
+					/* XXX Could send notification back */
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+			set_cur_state(st);
+			from_state = st->st_state;
 		}
-	    }
-	    set_cur_state(st);
-	    from_state = st->st_state;
-	}
-	break;
+		break;
 
 #ifdef NOTYET
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_AO:
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR:
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_AO:
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR:
 #endif
 
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO:	/* an informational exchange */
-	st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
-	    , &md->sender, MAINMODE_MSGID);
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO:      /* an informational exchange */
+		st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+			, &md->sender, MAINMODE_MSGID);
 
-	if (st != NULL)
-	    set_cur_state(st);
+		if (st != NULL)
+			set_cur_state(st);
 
-	if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
-	{
-	    if (st == NULL)
-	    {
-		plog("Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
+		if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
+		{
+			if (st == NULL)
+			{
+				plog("Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
 
-	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "encrypted Informational Exchange message is invalid"
-		    " because no key is known");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
+			if (!IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(st->st_state))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "encrypted Informational Exchange message is invalid"
+					" because no key is known");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
 
-	    if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == MAINMODE_MSGID)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message is invalid because"
-		    " it has a Message ID of 0");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
-
-	    if (!reserve_msgid(st, md->hdr.isa_msgid))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message is invalid because"
-		    " it has a previously used Message ID (0x%08lx)"
-		    , (unsigned long)md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
+			if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == MAINMODE_MSGID)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message is invalid because"
+					" it has a Message ID of 0");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
 
-	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	    {
-	 	memcpy(st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
-	 	st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
-		
-		/* backup new_iv */
-		new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
-		passert(new_iv_len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
-		memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
-		restore_iv = TRUE;
-	    }
-	    init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-	    new_iv_set = TRUE;
-
-	    from_state = STATE_INFO_PROTECTED;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    if (st != NULL && IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message"
-		    " must be encrypted");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
-	    from_state = STATE_INFO;
-	}
-	break;
+			if (!reserve_msgid(st, md->hdr.isa_msgid))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message is invalid because"
+					" it has a previously used Message ID (0x%08lx)"
+					, (unsigned long)md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
 
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK:	/* part of a Quick Mode exchange */
-	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
-	{
-	    plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
-		" it has an Initiator Cookie of 0");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
-	    return;
-	}
+			if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+			{
+				memcpy(st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+				st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+				
+				/* backup new_iv */
+				new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+				passert(new_iv_len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
+				memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+				restore_iv = TRUE;
+			}
+			init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+			new_iv_set = TRUE;
 
-	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
-	{
-	    plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
-		" it has a Responder Cookie of 0");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
-	    return;
-	}
+			from_state = STATE_INFO_PROTECTED;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (st != NULL && IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(st->st_state))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message"
+					" must be encrypted");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
+			from_state = STATE_INFO;
+		}
+		break;
 
-	if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == MAINMODE_MSGID)
-	{
-	    plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
-		" it has a Message ID of 0");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
-	    return;
-	}
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK:     /* part of a Quick Mode exchange */
+		if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
+		{
+			plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
+				" it has an Initiator Cookie of 0");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
-	    , &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+		if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
+		{
+			plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
+				" it has a Responder Cookie of 0");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	if (st == NULL)
-	{
-	    /* No appropriate Quick Mode state.
-	     * See if we have a Main Mode state.
-	     * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
-	     */
-	    st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
-		, &md->sender, MAINMODE_MSGID);
-
-	    if (st == NULL)
-	    {
-		plog("Quick Mode message is for a non-existent (expired?)"
-		    " ISAKMP SA");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
+		if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == MAINMODE_MSGID)
+		{
+			plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
+				" it has a Message ID of 0");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	    set_cur_state(st);
+		st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+			, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
 
-	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Quick Mode message is unacceptable because"
-		    " it is for an incomplete ISAKMP SA");
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED /* XXX ? */);
-		return;
-	    }
-
-	    /* only accept this new Quick Mode exchange if it has a unique message ID */
-	    if (!reserve_msgid(st, md->hdr.isa_msgid))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Quick Mode I1 message is unacceptable because"
-		    " it uses a previously used Message ID 0x%08lx"
-		    " (perhaps this is a duplicated packet)"
-		    , (unsigned long) md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
-		return;
-	    }
+		if (st == NULL)
+		{
+			/* No appropriate Quick Mode state.
+			 * See if we have a Main Mode state.
+			 * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
+			 */
+			st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+				, &md->sender, MAINMODE_MSGID);
 
-	    /* Quick Mode Initial IV */
-	    init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-	    new_iv_set = TRUE;
+			if (st == NULL)
+			{
+				plog("Quick Mode message is for a non-existent (expired?)"
+					" ISAKMP SA");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
 
-	    from_state = STATE_QUICK_R0;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    set_cur_state(st);  
-	    from_state = st->st_state;
-	}
+			set_cur_state(st);
 
-	break;
+			if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Quick Mode message is unacceptable because"
+					" it is for an incomplete ISAKMP SA");
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED /* XXX ? */);
+				return;
+			}
 
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG:
-	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
-	{
-	    plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
-		" it has an Initiator Cookie of 0");
-	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
-	    return;
-	}
+			/* only accept this new Quick Mode exchange if it has a unique message ID */
+			if (!reserve_msgid(st, md->hdr.isa_msgid))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Quick Mode I1 message is unacceptable because"
+					" it uses a previously used Message ID 0x%08lx"
+					" (perhaps this is a duplicated packet)"
+					, (unsigned long) md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
+				return;
+			}
 
-	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
-	{
-	    plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
-		" it has a Responder Cookie of 0");
-	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
-	    return;
-	}
+			/* Quick Mode Initial IV */
+			init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+			new_iv_set = TRUE;
 
-	if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == 0)
-	{
-	    plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
-		" it has a Message ID of 0");
-	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
-	    return;
-	}
+			from_state = STATE_QUICK_R0;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			set_cur_state(st);  
+			from_state = st->st_state;
+		}
 
-	st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
-			, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+		break;
 
-	if (st == NULL)
-	{
-	    bool has_xauth_policy;
-
-	    /* No appropriate ModeCfg state.
-	     * See if we have a Main Mode state.
-	     * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
-	     */
-	    st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
-			    , &md->sender, 0);
-
-	    if (st == NULL)
-	    {
-		plog("ModeCfg message is for a non-existent (expired?)"
-		    " ISAKMP SA");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG:
+		if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
+		{
+			plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
+				" it has an Initiator Cookie of 0");
+			/* XXX Could send notification back */
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
+		{
+			plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
+				" it has a Responder Cookie of 0");
+			/* XXX Could send notification back */
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == 0)
+		{
+			plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
+				" it has a Message ID of 0");
+			/* XXX Could send notification back */
+			return;
+		}
 
-	    set_cur_state(st);
+		st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+						, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
 
-	    /* the XAUTH_STATUS message might have a new msgid */
-	    if (st->st_state == STATE_XAUTH_I1)
-	    {
-		init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-		new_iv_set = TRUE;
-		from_state = st->st_state;
+		if (st == NULL)
+		{
+			bool has_xauth_policy;
+
+			/* No appropriate ModeCfg state.
+			 * See if we have a Main Mode state.
+			 * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
+			 */
+			st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+							, &md->sender, 0);
+
+			if (st == NULL)
+			{
+				plog("ModeCfg message is for a non-existent (expired?)"
+					" ISAKMP SA");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
+
+			set_cur_state(st);
+
+			/* the XAUTH_STATUS message might have a new msgid */
+			if (st->st_state == STATE_XAUTH_I1)
+			{
+				init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+				new_iv_set = TRUE;
+				from_state = st->st_state;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ModeCfg message is unacceptable because"
+						" it is for an incomplete ISAKMP SA (state=%s)"
+						, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return;
+			}
+			init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+			new_iv_set = TRUE;
+
+			/*
+			 * okay, now we have to figure out if we are receiving a bogus
+			 * new message in an oustanding XAUTH server conversation
+			 * (i.e. a reply to our challenge)
+			 * (this occurs with some broken other implementations).
+			 *
+			 * or if receiving for the first time, an XAUTH challenge.
+			 *
+			 * or if we are getting a MODECFG request.
+			 *
+			 * we distinguish these states because we can not both be an
+			 * XAUTH server and client, and our policy tells us which
+			 * one we are.
+			 *
+			 * to complicate further, it is normal to start a new msgid
+			 * when going from one state to another, or when restarting
+			 * the challenge.
+			 *
+			 */
+
+			has_xauth_policy = (st->st_connection->policy
+							   & (POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
+							   != LEMPTY;
+
+			if (has_xauth_policy && !st->st_xauth.started
+			&& IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+			{
+				from_state = STATE_XAUTH_I0;
+			}
+			else if (st->st_connection->spd.that.modecfg
+			&& IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+			{
+				from_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_R0;
+			}
+			else if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
+			&& IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+			{
+				from_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_I0;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* XXX check if we are being a mode config server here */
+				plog("received ModeCfg message when in state %s, and we aren't mode config client"
+					 , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			set_cur_state(st);
+			from_state = st->st_state;
+		}
 		break;
-	    }
-
-	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ModeCfg message is unacceptable because"
-	       		" it is for an incomplete ISAKMP SA (state=%s)"
-	       		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return;
-	    }
-	    init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
-	    new_iv_set = TRUE;
-
-	    /*
-	     * okay, now we have to figure out if we are receiving a bogus
-	     * new message in an oustanding XAUTH server conversation
-	     * (i.e. a reply to our challenge)
-	     * (this occurs with some broken other implementations).
-	     *
-	     * or if receiving for the first time, an XAUTH challenge.
-	     *
-	     * or if we are getting a MODECFG request.
-	     *
-	     * we distinguish these states because we can not both be an
-	     * XAUTH server and client, and our policy tells us which
-	     * one we are.
-	     *
-	     * to complicate further, it is normal to start a new msgid
-	     * when going from one state to another, or when restarting
-	     * the challenge.
-	     *
-	     */
-
-	    has_xauth_policy = (st->st_connection->policy
-			       & (POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
-			       != LEMPTY;
-
-	    if (has_xauth_policy && !st->st_xauth.started
-	    && IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		from_state = STATE_XAUTH_I0;
-	    }
-	    else if (st->st_connection->spd.that.modecfg
-	    && IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		from_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_R0;
-	    }
-	    else if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
-	    && IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-	    {
-		from_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_I0;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* XXX check if we are being a mode config server here */
-		plog("received ModeCfg message when in state %s, and we aren't mode config client"
-		     , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-		return;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    set_cur_state(st);
-	    from_state = st->st_state;
-	}
-	break;
 
 #ifdef NOTYET
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP:
-    case ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO:
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP:
+	case ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO:
 #endif
 
-    default:
-	plog("unsupported exchange type %s in message"
-	    , enum_show(&exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg));
-	SEND_NOTIFICATION(UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* We have found a from_state, and perhaps a state object.
-     * If we need to build a new state object,
-     * we wait until the packet has been sanity checked.
-     */
-
-    /* We don't support the Commit Flag.  It is such a bad feature.
-     * It isn't protected -- neither encrypted nor authenticated.
-     * A man in the middle turns it on, leading to DoS.
-     * We just ignore it, with a warning.
-     * By placing the check here, we could easily add a policy bit
-     * to a connection to suppress the warning.  This might be useful
-     * because the Commit Flag is expected from some peers.
-     */
-    if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT)
-    {
-	plog("IKE message has the Commit Flag set but Pluto doesn't implement this feature; ignoring flag");
-    }
-
-    /* Set smc to describe this state's properties.
-     * Look up the appropriate microcode based on state and
-     * possibly Oakley Auth type.
-     */
-    passert(STATE_IKE_FLOOR <= from_state && from_state <= STATE_IKE_ROOF);
-    smc = ike_microcode_index[from_state - STATE_IKE_FLOOR];
-
-    if (st != NULL)
-    {
-	u_int16_t auth;
-
-	switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
-	{
-	case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-	case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-	    auth = OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY;
-	    break;
-	case XAUTHInitRSA:
-	case XAUTHRespRSA:
-	    auth = OAKLEY_RSA_SIG;
-	    break;
 	default:
-	    auth = st->st_oakley.auth;
+		plog("unsupported exchange type %s in message"
+			, enum_show(&exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg));
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+		return;
 	}
-	
-	while (!LHAS(smc->flags, auth))
+
+	/* We have found a from_state, and perhaps a state object.
+	 * If we need to build a new state object,
+	 * we wait until the packet has been sanity checked.
+	 */
+
+	/* We don't support the Commit Flag.  It is such a bad feature.
+	 * It isn't protected -- neither encrypted nor authenticated.
+	 * A man in the middle turns it on, leading to DoS.
+	 * We just ignore it, with a warning.
+	 * By placing the check here, we could easily add a policy bit
+	 * to a connection to suppress the warning.  This might be useful
+	 * because the Commit Flag is expected from some peers.
+	 */
+	if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT)
 	{
-	    smc++;
-	    passert(smc->state == from_state);
+		plog("IKE message has the Commit Flag set but Pluto doesn't implement this feature; ignoring flag");
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* Ignore a packet if the state has a suspended state transition
-     * Probably a duplicated packet but the original packet is not yet
-     * recorded in st->st_rpacket, so duplicate checking won't catch.
-     * ??? Should the packet be recorded earlier to improve diagnosis?
-     */
-    if (st != NULL && st->st_suspended_md != NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG, "discarding packet received during DNS lookup in %s"
-	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* Detect and handle duplicated packets.
-     * This won't work for the initial packet of an exchange
-     * because we won't have a state object to remember it.
-     * If we are in a non-receiving state (terminal), and the preceding
-     * state did transmit, then the duplicate may indicate that that
-     * transmission wasn't received -- retransmit it.
-     * Otherwise, just discard it.
-     * ??? Notification packets are like exchanges -- I hope that
-     * they are idempotent!
-     */
-    if (st != NULL
-    && st->st_rpacket.ptr != NULL
-    && st->st_rpacket.len == pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)
-    && memcmp(st->st_rpacket.ptr, md->packet_pbs.start, st->st_rpacket.len) == 0)
-    {
-	if (smc->flags & SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE)
+
+	/* Set smc to describe this state's properties.
+	 * Look up the appropriate microcode based on state and
+	 * possibly Oakley Auth type.
+	 */
+	passert(STATE_IKE_FLOOR <= from_state && from_state <= STATE_IKE_ROOF);
+	smc = ike_microcode_index[from_state - STATE_IKE_FLOOR];
+
+	if (st != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS)
-	    {
-		st->st_retransmit++;
-		loglog(RC_RETRANSMISSION
-		    , "retransmitting in response to duplicate packet; already %s"
-		    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-		send_packet(st, "retransmit in response to duplicate");
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding duplicate packet -- exhausted retransmission; already %s"
-		    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-	    }
+		u_int16_t auth;
+
+		switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+		{
+		case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+		case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+			auth = OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY;
+			break;
+		case XAUTHInitRSA:
+		case XAUTHRespRSA:
+			auth = OAKLEY_RSA_SIG;
+			break;
+		default:
+			auth = st->st_oakley.auth;
+		}
+		
+		while (!LHAS(smc->flags, auth))
+		{
+			smc++;
+			passert(smc->state == from_state);
+		}
 	}
-	else
+
+	/* Ignore a packet if the state has a suspended state transition
+	 * Probably a duplicated packet but the original packet is not yet
+	 * recorded in st->st_rpacket, so duplicate checking won't catch.
+	 * ??? Should the packet be recorded earlier to improve diagnosis?
+	 */
+	if (st != NULL && st->st_suspended_md != NULL)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding duplicate packet; already %s"
-		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+		loglog(RC_LOG, "discarding packet received during DNS lookup in %s"
+			, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+		return;
 	}
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("received encrypted packet from %s:%u"
-	    , ip_str(&md->sender), (unsigned)md->sender_port));
 
-	if (st == NULL)
+	/* Detect and handle duplicated packets.
+	 * This won't work for the initial packet of an exchange
+	 * because we won't have a state object to remember it.
+	 * If we are in a non-receiving state (terminal), and the preceding
+	 * state did transmit, then the duplicate may indicate that that
+	 * transmission wasn't received -- retransmit it.
+	 * Otherwise, just discard it.
+	 * ??? Notification packets are like exchanges -- I hope that
+	 * they are idempotent!
+	 */
+	if (st != NULL
+	&& st->st_rpacket.ptr != NULL
+	&& st->st_rpacket.len == pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)
+	&& memeq(st->st_rpacket.ptr, md->packet_pbs.start, st->st_rpacket.len))
 	{
-	    plog("discarding encrypted message for an unknown ISAKMP SA");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED /* XXX ? */);
-	    return;
+		if (smc->flags & SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE)
+		{
+			if (st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS)
+			{
+				st->st_retransmit++;
+				loglog(RC_RETRANSMISSION
+					, "retransmitting in response to duplicate packet; already %s"
+					, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+				send_packet(st, "retransmit in response to duplicate");
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding duplicate packet -- exhausted retransmission; already %s"
+					, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding duplicate packet; already %s"
+				, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+		}
+		return;
 	}
-	if (st->st_skeyid_e.ptr == (u_char *) NULL)
+
+	if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding encrypted message"
-		" because we haven't yet negotiated keying materiel");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
-	    return;
-	}
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("received encrypted packet from %s:%u"
+			, ip_str(&md->sender), (unsigned)md->sender_port));
 
-	/* Mark as encrypted */
-	md->encrypted = TRUE;
+		if (st == NULL)
+		{
+			plog("discarding encrypted message for an unknown ISAKMP SA");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED /* XXX ? */);
+			return;
+		}
+		if (st->st_skeyid_e.ptr == (u_char *) NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding encrypted message"
+				" because we haven't yet negotiated keying materiel");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("decrypting %u bytes using algorithm %s"
-	    , (unsigned) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)
-	    , enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)));
+		/* Mark as encrypted */
+		md->encrypted = TRUE;
 
-	/* do the specified decryption
-	 *
-	 * IV is from st->st_iv or (if new_iv_set) st->st_new_iv.
-	 * The new IV is placed in st->st_new_iv
-	 *
-	 * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
-	 *
-	 * XXX The IV should only be updated really if the packet
-	 * is successfully processed.
-	 * We should keep this value, check for a success return
-	 * value from the parsing routines and then replace.
-	 *
-	 * Each post phase 1 exchange generates IVs from
-	 * the last phase 1 block, not the last block sent.
-	 */
-	{
-	    const struct encrypt_desc *e = st->st_oakley.encrypter;
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("decrypting %u bytes using algorithm %s"
+			, (unsigned) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)
+			, enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)));
 
-	    if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) % e->enc_blocksize != 0)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed message: not a multiple of encryption blocksize");
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-		return;
-	    }
-
-	    /* XXX Detect weak keys */
-
-	    /* grab a copy of raw packet (for duplicate packet detection) */
-	    clonetochunk(md->raw_packet, md->packet_pbs.start
-		, pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), "raw packet");
-
-	    /* Decrypt everything after header */
-	    if (!new_iv_set)
-	    {
-		/* use old IV */
-		passert(st->st_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
-		st->st_new_iv_len = st->st_iv_len;
-		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, st->st_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
-	    }
-	    crypto_cbc_encrypt(e, FALSE, md->message_pbs.cur, 
-			    pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) , st);
-	    if (restore_iv)
-	    {
-		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
-		st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
-	    }
-	}
+		/* do the specified decryption
+		 *
+		 * IV is from st->st_iv or (if new_iv_set) st->st_new_iv.
+		 * The new IV is placed in st->st_new_iv
+		 *
+		 * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+		 *
+		 * XXX The IV should only be updated really if the packet
+		 * is successfully processed.
+		 * We should keep this value, check for a success return
+		 * value from the parsing routines and then replace.
+		 *
+		 * Each post phase 1 exchange generates IVs from
+		 * the last phase 1 block, not the last block sent.
+		 */
+		{
+			size_t crypter_block_size;
+			encryption_algorithm_t enc_alg;
+			crypter_t *crypter;
+			chunk_t data, iv;
+		    char *new_iv;
+
+			enc_alg = oakley_to_encryption_algorithm(st->st_oakley.encrypt);
+			crypter = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, enc_alg, st->st_enc_key.len);
+			crypter_block_size = crypter->get_block_size(crypter);
+
+			if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) % crypter_block_size != 0)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed message: not a multiple of encryption blocksize");
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+				return;
+			}
 
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "decrypted:\n", md->message_pbs.cur
-	    , md->message_pbs.roof - md->message_pbs.cur);
+			/* XXX Detect weak keys */
 
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:"
-	    , st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* packet was not encryped -- should it have been? */
+			/* grab a copy of raw packet (for duplicate packet detection) */
+			md->raw_packet = chunk_create(md->packet_pbs.start, pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs));
+			md->raw_packet = chunk_clone(md->raw_packet);
 
-	if (smc->flags & SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "packet rejected: should have been encrypted");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
-	    return;
+			data = chunk_create(md->message_pbs.cur, pbs_left(&md->message_pbs));
+
+			/* Decrypt everything after header */
+			if (!new_iv_set)
+			{
+				/* use old IV */
+				passert(st->st_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+				st->st_new_iv_len = st->st_iv_len;
+				memcpy(st->st_new_iv, st->st_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+			}
+
+			/* form iv by truncation */
+			st->st_new_iv_len = crypter_block_size;
+			iv = chunk_create(st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+			new_iv = alloca(crypter_block_size);
+			memcpy(new_iv, data.ptr + data.len - crypter_block_size,
+				   crypter_block_size);
+
+			crypter->set_key(crypter, st->st_enc_key);	
+			crypter->decrypt(crypter, data, iv, NULL);
+			crypter->destroy(crypter);
+
+    		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, crypter_block_size);
+			if (restore_iv)
+			{
+				memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
+				st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
+			}
+		}
+
+		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "decrypted:\n", md->message_pbs.cur
+			, md->message_pbs.roof - md->message_pbs.cur);
+
+		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:"
+			, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* Digest the message.
-     * Padding must be removed to make hashing work.
-     * Padding comes from encryption (so this code must be after decryption).
-     * Padding rules are described before the definition of
-     * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h.
-     */
-    {
-	struct payload_digest *pd = md->digest;
-	int np = md->hdr.isa_np;
-	lset_t needed = smc->req_payloads;
-	const char *excuse
-	    = LIN(SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT, smc->flags)
-		? "probable authentication failure (mismatch of preshared secrets?): "
-		: "";
-
-	while (np != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+	else
 	{
-	    struct_desc *sd = np < ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF? payload_descs[np] : NULL;
+		/* packet was not encryped -- should it have been? */
 
-	    if (pd == &md->digest[PAYLIMIT])
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "more than %d payloads in message; ignored", PAYLIMIT);
-		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-		return;
-	    }
-
-	    switch (np)
-	    {
-		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC:
-		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC:
-		    if (!st || !(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES))
-		    {
-			/*
-			 * don't accept NAT-D/NAT-OA reloc directly in message, unless
-			 * we're using NAT-T RFC
-			 */
-			sd = NULL;
-		    }
-		    break;
-	    }
-
-	    if (sd == NULL)
-	    {
-		/* payload type is out of range or requires special handling */
-		switch (np)
+		if (smc->flags & SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED)
 		{
-		case ISAKMP_NEXT_ID:
-		    sd = IS_PHASE1(from_state)
-			? &isakmp_identification_desc : &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc;
-		    break;
-		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS:
-		    np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC;  /* NAT-D relocated */
-		    sd = payload_descs[np];
-		    break;
-		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS:
-		    np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC;  /* NAT-OA relocated */
-		    sd = payload_descs[np];
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smessage ignored because it contains an unknown or"
-			" unexpected payload type (%s) at the outermost level"
-			, excuse, enum_show(&payload_names, np));
-		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
-		    return;
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "packet rejected: should have been encrypted");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
+			return;
 		}
-	    }
-
-	    {
-		lset_t s = LELEM(np);
+	}
 
-		if (LDISJOINT(s
-		, needed | smc->opt_payloads| LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_D)))
+	/* Digest the message.
+	 * Padding must be removed to make hashing work.
+	 * Padding comes from encryption (so this code must be after decryption).
+	 * Padding rules are described before the definition of
+	 * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h.
+	 */
+	{
+		struct payload_digest *pd = md->digest;
+		int np = md->hdr.isa_np;
+		lset_t needed = smc->req_payloads;
+		const char *excuse
+			= LIN(SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT, smc->flags)
+				? "probable authentication failure (mismatch of preshared secrets?): "
+				: "";
+
+		while (np != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smessage ignored because it "
-			   "contains an unexpected payload type (%s)"
-			, excuse, enum_show(&payload_names, np));
-		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
-		    return;
+			struct_desc *sd = np < ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF? payload_descs[np] : NULL;
+
+			if (pd == &md->digest[PAYLIMIT])
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "more than %d payloads in message; ignored", PAYLIMIT);
+				SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			switch (np)
+			{
+				case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC:
+				case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC:
+					if (!st || !(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES))
+					{
+						/*
+						 * don't accept NAT-D/NAT-OA reloc directly in message, unless
+						 * we're using NAT-T RFC
+						 */
+						sd = NULL;
+					}
+					break;
+			}
+
+			if (sd == NULL)
+			{
+				/* payload type is out of range or requires special handling */
+				switch (np)
+				{
+				case ISAKMP_NEXT_ID:
+					sd = IS_PHASE1(from_state)
+						? &isakmp_identification_desc : &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc;
+					break;
+				case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS:
+					np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC;  /* NAT-D relocated */
+					sd = payload_descs[np];
+					break;
+				case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS:
+					np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC;  /* NAT-OA relocated */
+					sd = payload_descs[np];
+					break;
+				default:
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smessage ignored because it contains an unknown or"
+						" unexpected payload type (%s) at the outermost level"
+						, excuse, enum_show(&payload_names, np));
+					SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+
+			{
+				lset_t s = LELEM(np);
+
+				if (LDISJOINT(s
+				, needed | smc->opt_payloads| LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_D)))
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smessage ignored because it "
+						   "contains an unexpected payload type (%s)"
+						, excuse, enum_show(&payload_names, np));
+					SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
+					return;
+				}
+				needed &= ~s;
+			}
+
+			if (!in_struct(&pd->payload, sd, &md->message_pbs, &pd->pbs))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smalformed payload in packet", excuse);
+				if (md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO)
+					SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+				return;
+			}
+
+			/* place this payload at the end of the chain for this type */
+			{
+				struct payload_digest **p;
+
+				for (p = &md->chain[np]; *p != NULL; p = &(*p)->next)
+					;
+				*p = pd;
+				pd->next = NULL;
+			}
+
+			np = pd->payload.generic.isag_np;
+			pd++;
+
+			/* since we've digested one payload happily, it is probably
+			 * the case that any decryption worked.  So we will not suggest
+			 * encryption failure as an excuse for subsequent payload
+			 * problems.
+			 */
+			excuse = "";
 		}
-		needed &= ~s;
-	    }
-
-	    if (!in_struct(&pd->payload, sd, &md->message_pbs, &pd->pbs))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smalformed payload in packet", excuse);
-		if (md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO)
-		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-		return;
-	    }
-
-	    /* place this payload at the end of the chain for this type */
-	    {
-		struct payload_digest **p;
-
-		for (p = &md->chain[np]; *p != NULL; p = &(*p)->next)
-		    ;
-		*p = pd;
-		pd->next = NULL;
-	    }
-
-	    np = pd->payload.generic.isag_np;
-	    pd++;
-
-	    /* since we've digested one payload happily, it is probably
-	     * the case that any decryption worked.  So we will not suggest
-	     * encryption failure as an excuse for subsequent payload
-	     * problems.
-	     */
-	    excuse = "";
-	}
 
-	md->digest_roof = pd;
+		md->digest_roof = pd;
 
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) != 0)
-		DBG_log("removing %d bytes of padding", (int) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)));
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) != 0)
+				DBG_log("removing %d bytes of padding", (int) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)));
 
-	md->message_pbs.roof = md->message_pbs.cur;
+		md->message_pbs.roof = md->message_pbs.cur;
 
-	/* check that all mandatory payloads appeared */
+		/* check that all mandatory payloads appeared */
 
-	if (needed != 0)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "message for %s is missing payloads %s"
-		, enum_show(&state_names, from_state)
-		, bitnamesof(payload_name, needed));
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-	    return;
+		if (needed != 0)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "message for %s is missing payloads %s"
+				, enum_show(&state_names, from_state)
+				, bitnamesof(payload_name, needed));
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+			return;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* more sanity checking: enforce most ordering constraints */
+	/* more sanity checking: enforce most ordering constraints */
 
-    if (IS_PHASE1(from_state))
-    {
-	/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5 Exchanges:
-	 * "The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange."
-	 */
-	if (md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA] != NULL
-	&& md->hdr.isa_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_SA)
+	if (IS_PHASE1(from_state))
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Phase 1 message: does not start with an SA payload");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-	    return;
+		/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5 Exchanges:
+		 * "The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange."
+		 */
+		if (md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA] != NULL
+		&& md->hdr.isa_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_SA)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Phase 1 message: does not start with an SA payload");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+			return;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else if (IS_QUICK(from_state))
-    {
-	/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode
-	 *
-	 * "In Quick Mode, a HASH payload MUST immediately follow the ISAKMP
-	 *  header and a SA payload MUST immediately follow the HASH."
-	 * [NOTE: there may be more than one SA payload, so this is not
-	 *  totally reasonable.  Probably all SAs should be so constrained.]
-	 *
-	 * "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
-	 *  party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
-	 *  then IDcr."
-	 *
-	 * "With the exception of the HASH, SA, and the optional ID payloads,
-	 *  there are no payload ordering restrictions on Quick Mode."
-	 */
-
-	if (md->hdr.isa_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+	else if (IS_QUICK(from_state))
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message: does not start with a HASH payload");
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-	    return;
-	}
+		/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode
+		 *
+		 * "In Quick Mode, a HASH payload MUST immediately follow the ISAKMP
+		 *  header and a SA payload MUST immediately follow the HASH."
+		 * [NOTE: there may be more than one SA payload, so this is not
+		 *  totally reasonable.  Probably all SAs should be so constrained.]
+		 *
+		 * "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
+		 *  party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
+		 *  then IDcr."
+		 *
+		 * "With the exception of the HASH, SA, and the optional ID payloads,
+		 *  there are no payload ordering restrictions on Quick Mode."
+		 */
 
-	{
-	    struct payload_digest *p;
-	    int i;
+		if (md->hdr.isa_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message: does not start with a HASH payload");
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+			return;
+		}
 
-	    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA], i = 1; p != NULL
-	    ; p = p->next, i++)
-	    {
-		if (p != &md->digest[i])
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message: SA payload is in wrong position");
-		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-		    return;
+			struct payload_digest *p;
+			int i;
+
+			for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA], i = 1; p != NULL
+			; p = p->next, i++)
+			{
+				if (p != &md->digest[i])
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message: SA payload is in wrong position");
+					SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode:
+		 * "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
+		 *  party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
+		 *  then IDcr."
+		 */
+		{
+			struct payload_digest *id = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+
+			if (id != NULL)
+			{
+				if (id->next == NULL || id->next->next != NULL)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message:"
+						" if any ID payload is present,"
+						" there must be exactly two");
+					SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+					return;
+				}
+				if (id+1 != id->next)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message:"
+						" the ID payloads are not adjacent");
+					SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
 
-	/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode:
-	 * "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
-	 *  party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
-	 *  then IDcr."
+	/* Ignore payloads that we don't handle:
+	 * Delete, Notification, VendorID
 	 */
+	/* XXX Handle deletions */
+	/* XXX Handle Notifications */
+	/* XXX Handle VID payloads */
 	{
-	    struct payload_digest *id = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+		struct payload_digest *p;
 
-	    if (id != NULL)
-	    {
-		if (id->next == NULL || id->next->next != NULL)
+		for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message:"
-			" if any ID payload is present,"
-			" there must be exactly two");
-		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-		    return;
+			if (p->payload.notification.isan_type != R_U_THERE
+			&&  p->payload.notification.isan_type != R_U_THERE_ACK)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring informational payload, type %s"
+					, enum_show(&notification_names, p->payload.notification.isan_type));
+			}
+			DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING, "info:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
 		}
-		if (id+1 != id->next)
+
+		for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_D]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message:"
-			" the ID payloads are not adjacent");
-		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
-		    return;
+			accept_delete(st, md, p);
+			DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING, "del:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
 		}
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* Ignore payloads that we don't handle:
-     * Delete, Notification, VendorID
-     */
-    /* XXX Handle deletions */
-    /* XXX Handle Notifications */
-    /* XXX Handle VID payloads */
-    {
-	struct payload_digest *p;
-
-	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	{
-	    if (p->payload.notification.isan_type != R_U_THERE
-	    &&  p->payload.notification.isan_type != R_U_THERE_ACK)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring informational payload, type %s"
-		    , enum_show(&notification_names, p->payload.notification.isan_type));
-	    }
-	    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING, "info:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
-	}
-
-	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_D]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	{
-	    accept_delete(st, md, p);
-	    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING, "del:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
-	}
 
-	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_VID]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	{
-	    handle_vendorid(md, p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+		for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_VID]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+		{
+			handle_vendorid(md, p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    md->from_state = from_state;
-    md->smc = smc;
-    md->st = st;
+	md->from_state = from_state;
+	md->smc = smc;
+	md->st = st;
 
-    /* possibly fill in hdr */
-    if (smc->first_out_payload != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
-	echo_hdr(md, (smc->flags & SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED) != 0
-	    , smc->first_out_payload);
+	/* possibly fill in hdr */
+	if (smc->first_out_payload != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+		echo_hdr(md, (smc->flags & SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED) != 0
+			, smc->first_out_payload);
 
-    complete_state_transition(mdp, smc->processor(md));
+	complete_state_transition(mdp, smc->processor(md));
 }
 
 /* complete job started by the state-specific state transition function */
@@ -2094,406 +2116,406 @@ process_packet(struct msg_digest **mdp)
 void
 complete_state_transition(struct msg_digest **mdp, stf_status result)
 {
-    bool has_xauth_policy;
-    bool is_xauth_server;
-    struct msg_digest *md = *mdp;
-    const struct state_microcode *smc = md->smc;
-    enum state_kind from_state = md->from_state;
-    struct state *st;
-
-    cur_state = st = md->st;	/* might have changed */
-
-    /* If state has DPD support, import it */
-    if (st && md->dpd)
-	st->st_dpd = TRUE;
-
-    switch (result)
-    {
-	case STF_IGNORE:
-	    break;
-
-	case STF_SUSPEND:
-	    /* the stf didn't complete its job: don't relase md */
-	    *mdp = NULL;
-	    break;
-
-	case STF_OK:
-	    /* advance the state */
-	    st->st_state = smc->next_state;
-
-	    /* Delete previous retransmission event.
-	     * New event will be scheduled below.
-	     */
-	    delete_event(st);
-
-	    /* replace previous receive packet with latest */
-
-	    pfreeany(st->st_rpacket.ptr);
-
-	    if (md->encrypted)
-	    {
-		/* if encrypted, duplication already done */
-		st->st_rpacket = md->raw_packet;
-		md->raw_packet.ptr = NULL;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		clonetochunk(st->st_rpacket
-		    , md->packet_pbs.start
-		    , pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), "raw packet");
-	    }
-
-	    /* free previous transmit packet */
-	    freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
-
-	    /* if requested, send the new reply packet */
-	    if (smc->flags & SMF_REPLY)
-	    {
-		close_output_pbs(&md->reply);   /* good form, but actually a no-op */
-
-		clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, md->reply.start
-		    , pbs_offset(&md->reply), "reply packet");
-
-		if (nat_traversal_enabled)
-		    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st);
-
-		/* actually send the packet
-		 * Note: this is a great place to implement "impairments"
-		 * for testing purposes.  Suppress or duplicate the
-		 * send_packet call depending on st->st_state.
-		 */
-		send_packet(st, enum_name(&state_names, from_state));
-	    }
+	bool has_xauth_policy;
+	bool is_xauth_server;
+	struct msg_digest *md = *mdp;
+	const struct state_microcode *smc = md->smc;
+	enum state_kind from_state = md->from_state;
+	struct state *st;
 
-	    /* Schedule for whatever timeout is specified */
-	    {
-		time_t delay = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-		enum event_type kind = smc->timeout_event;
-		bool agreed_time = FALSE;
-		struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	cur_state = st = md->st;    /* might have changed */
 
-		switch (kind)
-		{
-		case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:	/* Retransmit packet */
-		    delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0;
-		    break;
-
-		case EVENT_SA_REPLACE:	/* SA replacement event */
-		    if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-		    {
-			/* Note: we will defer to the "negotiated" (dictated)
-			 * lifetime if we are POLICY_DONT_REKEY.
-			 * This allows the other side to dictate
-			 * a time we would not otherwise accept
-			 * but it prevents us from having to initiate
-			 * rekeying.  The negative consequences seem
-			 * minor.
+	/* If state has DPD support, import it */
+	if (st && md->dpd)
+		st->st_dpd = TRUE;
+
+	switch (result)
+	{
+		case STF_IGNORE:
+			break;
+
+		case STF_SUSPEND:
+			/* the stf didn't complete its job: don't relase md */
+			*mdp = NULL;
+			break;
+
+		case STF_OK:
+			/* advance the state */
+			st->st_state = smc->next_state;
+
+			/* Delete previous retransmission event.
+			 * New event will be scheduled below.
 			 */
-			delay = c->sa_ike_life_seconds;
-			if ((c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
-			|| delay >= st->st_oakley.life_seconds)
+			delete_event(st);
+
+			/* replace previous receive packet with latest */
+
+			free(st->st_rpacket.ptr);
+
+			if (md->encrypted)
 			{
-			    agreed_time = TRUE;
-			    delay = st->st_oakley.life_seconds;
+				/* if encrypted, duplication already done */
+				st->st_rpacket = md->raw_packet;
+				md->raw_packet.ptr = NULL;
 			}
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			/* Delay is min of up to four things:
-			 * each can limit the lifetime.
-			 */
-			delay = c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
-			if (st->st_ah.present
-			&& delay >= st->st_ah.attrs.life_seconds)
+			else
 			{
-			    agreed_time = TRUE;
-			    delay = st->st_ah.attrs.life_seconds;
+				st->st_rpacket = chunk_create(md->packet_pbs.start,
+											  pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs));
+				st->st_rpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_rpacket);
 			}
-			if (st->st_esp.present
-			&& delay >= st->st_esp.attrs.life_seconds)
+
+			/* free previous transmit packet */
+			chunk_free(&st->st_tpacket);
+
+			/* if requested, send the new reply packet */
+			if (smc->flags & SMF_REPLY)
 			{
-			    agreed_time = TRUE;
-			    delay = st->st_esp.attrs.life_seconds;
+				close_output_pbs(&md->reply);   /* good form, but actually a no-op */
+
+				st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(md->reply.start, pbs_offset(&md->reply));
+				st->st_tpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_tpacket);
+
+				if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+					nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st);
+
+				/* actually send the packet
+				 * Note: this is a great place to implement "impairments"
+				 * for testing purposes.  Suppress or duplicate the
+				 * send_packet call depending on st->st_state.
+				 */
+				send_packet(st, enum_name(&state_names, from_state));
 			}
-			if (st->st_ipcomp.present
-			&& delay >= st->st_ipcomp.attrs.life_seconds)
+
+			/* Schedule for whatever timeout is specified */
 			{
-			    agreed_time = TRUE;
-			    delay = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.life_seconds;
+				time_t delay = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+				enum event_type kind = smc->timeout_event;
+				bool agreed_time = FALSE;
+				struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+				switch (kind)
+				{
+				case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:  /* Retransmit packet */
+					delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0;
+					break;
+
+				case EVENT_SA_REPLACE:  /* SA replacement event */
+					if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+					{
+						/* Note: we will defer to the "negotiated" (dictated)
+						 * lifetime if we are POLICY_DONT_REKEY.
+						 * This allows the other side to dictate
+						 * a time we would not otherwise accept
+						 * but it prevents us from having to initiate
+						 * rekeying.  The negative consequences seem
+						 * minor.
+						 */
+						delay = c->sa_ike_life_seconds;
+						if ((c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
+						|| delay >= st->st_oakley.life_seconds)
+						{
+							agreed_time = TRUE;
+							delay = st->st_oakley.life_seconds;
+						}
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						/* Delay is min of up to four things:
+						 * each can limit the lifetime.
+						 */
+						delay = c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
+						if (st->st_ah.present
+						&& delay >= st->st_ah.attrs.life_seconds)
+						{
+							agreed_time = TRUE;
+							delay = st->st_ah.attrs.life_seconds;
+						}
+						if (st->st_esp.present
+						&& delay >= st->st_esp.attrs.life_seconds)
+						{
+							agreed_time = TRUE;
+							delay = st->st_esp.attrs.life_seconds;
+						}
+						if (st->st_ipcomp.present
+						&& delay >= st->st_ipcomp.attrs.life_seconds)
+						{
+							agreed_time = TRUE;
+							delay = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.life_seconds;
+						}
+					}
+
+					/* By default, we plan to rekey.
+					 *
+					 * If there isn't enough time to rekey, plan to
+					 * expire.
+					 *
+					 * If we are --dontrekey, a lot more rules apply.
+					 * If we are the Initiator, use REPLACE_IF_USED.
+					 * If we are the Responder, and the dictated time
+					 * was unacceptable (too large), plan to REPLACE
+					 * (the only way to ratchet down the time).
+					 * If we are the Responder, and the dictated time
+					 * is acceptable, plan to EXPIRE.
+					 *
+					 * Important policy lies buried here.
+					 * For example, we favour the initiator over the
+					 * responder by making the initiator start rekeying
+					 * sooner.  Also, fuzz is only added to the
+					 * initiator's margin.
+					 *
+					 * Note: for ISAKMP SA, we let the negotiated
+					 * time stand (implemented by earlier logic).
+					 */
+					if (agreed_time
+					&& (c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY))
+					{
+						kind = (smc->flags & SMF_INITIATOR)
+							? EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED
+							: EVENT_SA_EXPIRE;
+					}
+					if (kind != EVENT_SA_EXPIRE)
+					{
+						unsigned long marg = c->sa_rekey_margin;
+
+						if (smc->flags & SMF_INITIATOR)
+							marg += marg
+								* c->sa_rekey_fuzz / 100.E0
+								* (rand() / (RAND_MAX + 1.E0));
+						else
+							marg /= 2;
+
+						if ((unsigned long)delay > marg)
+						{
+							delay -= marg;
+							st->st_margin = marg;
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							kind = EVENT_SA_EXPIRE;
+						}
+					}
+					break;
+
+				case EVENT_NULL:                /* non-event */
+				case EVENT_REINIT_SECRET:       /* Refresh cookie secret */
+				default:
+					bad_case(kind);
+				}
+				event_schedule(kind, delay, st);
 			}
-		    }
-
-		    /* By default, we plan to rekey.
-		     *
-		     * If there isn't enough time to rekey, plan to
-		     * expire.
-		     *
-		     * If we are --dontrekey, a lot more rules apply.
-		     * If we are the Initiator, use REPLACE_IF_USED.
-		     * If we are the Responder, and the dictated time
-		     * was unacceptable (too large), plan to REPLACE
-		     * (the only way to ratchet down the time).
-		     * If we are the Responder, and the dictated time
-		     * is acceptable, plan to EXPIRE.
-		     *
-		     * Important policy lies buried here.
-		     * For example, we favour the initiator over the
-		     * responder by making the initiator start rekeying
-		     * sooner.  Also, fuzz is only added to the
-		     * initiator's margin.
-		     *
-		     * Note: for ISAKMP SA, we let the negotiated
-		     * time stand (implemented by earlier logic).
-		     */
-		    if (agreed_time
-		    && (c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY))
-		    {
-			kind = (smc->flags & SMF_INITIATOR)
-			    ? EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED
-			    : EVENT_SA_EXPIRE;
-		    }
-		    if (kind != EVENT_SA_EXPIRE)
-		    {
-			unsigned long marg = c->sa_rekey_margin;
-
-			if (smc->flags & SMF_INITIATOR)
-			    marg += marg
-				* c->sa_rekey_fuzz / 100.E0
-				* (rand() / (RAND_MAX + 1.E0));
-			else
-			    marg /= 2;
 
-			if ((unsigned long)delay > marg)
+			/* tell whack and log of progress */
 			{
-			    delay -= marg;
-			    st->st_margin = marg;
+				const char *story = state_story[st->st_state - STATE_MAIN_R0];
+				enum rc_type w = RC_NEW_STATE + st->st_state;
+				char sadetails[128];
+				
+				sadetails[0]='\0';
+
+				if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+				{
+					char *b = sadetails;
+					const char *ini = " {";
+					const char *fin = "";
+
+					/* -1 is to leave space for "fin" */
+
+					if (st->st_esp.present)
+					{
+						snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+								 , "%sESP=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
+								 , ini
+								 , ntohl(st->st_esp.attrs.spi)
+								 , ntohl(st->st_esp.our_spi));
+						ini = " ";
+						fin = "}";
+					}
+					/* advance b to end of string */
+					b = b + strlen(b);
+
+					if (st->st_ah.present)
+					{
+						snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+								 , "%sAH=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
+								 , ini
+								 , ntohl(st->st_ah.attrs.spi)
+								 , ntohl(st->st_ah.our_spi));
+						ini = " ";
+						fin = "}";
+					}
+					/* advance b to end of string */
+					b = b + strlen(b);
+
+					if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+					{
+						snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+								 , "%sIPCOMP=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
+								 , ini
+								 , ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi)
+								 , ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.our_spi));
+						ini = " ";
+						fin = "}";
+					}
+					/* advance b to end of string */
+					b = b + strlen(b);
+
+					if (st->nat_traversal)
+					{
+						char oa[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+						addrtot(&st->nat_oa, 0, oa, sizeof(oa));
+						snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+								 , "%sNATOA=%s"
+								 , ini, oa);
+						ini = " ";
+						fin = "}";
+					}
+
+					/* advance b to end of string */
+					b = b + strlen(b);
+
+					if (st->st_dpd)
+					{
+						snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+								 , "%sDPD"
+								 , ini);
+						ini = " ";
+						fin = "}";
+					}
+
+					strcat(b, fin);
+				}
+
+				if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+				||  IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+				{
+					/* log our success */
+					plog("%s%s", story, sadetails);
+					w = RC_SUCCESS;
+				}
+
+				/* tell whack our progress */
+				whack_log(w
+					, "%s: %s%s"
+					, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+					, story, sadetails);
 			}
-			else
+
+			has_xauth_policy = (st->st_connection->policy
+							   & (POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
+							   != LEMPTY;
+			is_xauth_server =  (st->st_connection->policy
+							   & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER)
+							   != LEMPTY;
+
+			/* Should we start XAUTH as a server */
+			if (has_xauth_policy && is_xauth_server
+			&& IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			&& !st->st_xauth.started)
 			{
-			    kind = EVENT_SA_EXPIRE;
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("starting XAUTH server")
+				)
+				xauth_send_request(st);
+				break;
 			}
-		    }
-		    break;
 
-		case EVENT_NULL:		/* non-event */
-		case EVENT_REINIT_SECRET:	/* Refresh cookie secret */
-		default:
-		    bad_case(kind);
-		}
-		event_schedule(kind, delay, st);
-	    }
-
-	    /* tell whack and log of progress */
-	    {
-		const char *story = state_story[st->st_state - STATE_MAIN_R0];
-		enum rc_type w = RC_NEW_STATE + st->st_state;
-		char sadetails[128];
-		
-		sadetails[0]='\0';
+			/* Wait for XAUTH request from server */
+			if (has_xauth_policy && !is_xauth_server
+			&& IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			&& !st->st_xauth.started)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("waiting for XAUTH request from server")
+				)
+				break;
+			}
 
-		if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-		{
-		    char *b = sadetails;
-		    const char *ini = " {";
-		    const char *fin = "";
-
-		    /* -1 is to leave space for "fin" */
-
-		    if (st->st_esp.present)
-		    {
-			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
-				 , "%sESP=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
-				 , ini
-				 , ntohl(st->st_esp.attrs.spi)
-				 , ntohl(st->st_esp.our_spi));
-			ini = " ";
-			fin = "}";
-		    }
-		    /* advance b to end of string */
-		    b = b + strlen(b);
-
-		    if (st->st_ah.present)
-		    {
-			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
-				 , "%sAH=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
-				 , ini
-				 , ntohl(st->st_ah.attrs.spi)
-				 , ntohl(st->st_ah.our_spi));
-			ini = " ";
-			fin = "}";
-		    }
-		    /* advance b to end of string */
-		    b = b + strlen(b);
-
-		    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-		    {
-			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
-				 , "%sIPCOMP=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
-				 , ini
-				 , ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi)
-				 , ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.our_spi));
-			ini = " ";
-			fin = "}";
-		    }
-		    /* advance b to end of string */
-		    b = b + strlen(b);
-
-		    if (st->nat_traversal)
-		    {
-			char oa[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-			addrtot(&st->nat_oa, 0, oa, sizeof(oa));
-			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
-				 , "%sNATOA=%s"
-				 , ini, oa);
-			ini = " ";
-			fin = "}";
-		    }
-
-		    /* advance b to end of string */
-		    b = b + strlen(b);
-
-		    if (st->st_dpd)
-		    {
-			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
-				 , "%sDPD"
-				 , ini);
-			ini = " ";
-			fin = "}";
-		    }
-
-		    strcat(b, fin);
-		}
+			/* Should we start ModeConfig as a client? */
+			if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
+			&& IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			&& !(st->st_connection->policy & POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH)
+			&& !st->st_modecfg.started)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("starting ModeCfg client in pull mode")
+				)
+				modecfg_send_request(st);
+				break;
+			}
 
-		if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-		||  IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-		{
-		    /* log our success */
-		    plog("%s%s", story, sadetails);
-		    w = RC_SUCCESS;
-		}
+			/* Should we start ModeConfig as a server? */
+			if (st->st_connection->spd.that.modecfg
+			&& IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			&& !st->st_modecfg.started
+			&& (st->st_connection->policy & POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH))
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("starting ModeCfg server in push mode")
+				)
+				modecfg_send_set(st);
+				break;
+			}
 
-		/* tell whack our progress */
-		whack_log(w
-		    , "%s: %s%s"
-		    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
-		    , story, sadetails);
-	    }
-
-	    has_xauth_policy = (st->st_connection->policy
-			       & (POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
-			       != LEMPTY;
-	    is_xauth_server =  (st->st_connection->policy
-			       & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER)
-			       != LEMPTY;
-
-	    /* Should we start XAUTH as a server */
-	    if (has_xauth_policy && is_xauth_server
-	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    && !st->st_xauth.started)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("starting XAUTH server")
-		)
-		xauth_send_request(st);
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Wait for XAUTH request from server */
-	    if (has_xauth_policy && !is_xauth_server
-	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    && !st->st_xauth.started)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("waiting for XAUTH request from server")
-		)
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Should we start ModeConfig as a client? */
-	    if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
-	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    && !(st->st_connection->policy & POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH)
-	    && !st->st_modecfg.started)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("starting ModeCfg client in pull mode")
-		)
-		modecfg_send_request(st);
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Should we start ModeConfig as a server? */
-	    if (st->st_connection->spd.that.modecfg
-	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    && !st->st_modecfg.started
-	    && (st->st_connection->policy & POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH))
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("starting ModeCfg server in push mode")
-		)
-		modecfg_send_set(st);
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    /* Wait for ModeConfig set from server */
-	    if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
-	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    && !st->st_modecfg.vars_set)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("waiting for ModeCfg set from server")
-		)
-		break;
-	    }
+			/* Wait for ModeConfig set from server */
+			if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
+			&& IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			&& !st->st_modecfg.vars_set)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("waiting for ModeCfg set from server")
+				)
+				break;
+			}
 
-	    if (smc->flags & SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2)
-	    {
-		/* Initiate any Quick Mode negotiations that
-		 * were waiting to piggyback on this Keying Channel.
-		 *
-		 * ??? there is a potential race condition
-		 * if we are the responder: the initial Phase 2
-		 * message might outrun the final Phase 1 message.
-		 * I think that retransmission will recover.
-		 */
-		unpend(st);
-	    }
-
-	    if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    ||  IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-		release_whack(st);
-	    break;
-
-	case STF_INTERNAL_ERROR:
-	    whack_log(RC_INTERNALERR + md->note
-		, "%s: internal error"
-		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("state transition function for %s had internal error"
-		    , enum_name(&state_names, from_state)));
-	    break;
-
-	default:	/* a shortcut to STF_FAIL, setting md->note */
-	    passert(result > STF_FAIL);
-	    md->note = result - STF_FAIL;
-	    result = STF_FAIL;
-	    /* FALL THROUGH ... */
-	case STF_FAIL:
-	    /* As it is, we act as if this message never happened:
-	     * whatever retrying was in place, remains in place.
-	     */
-	    whack_log(RC_NOTIFICATION + md->note
-		, "%s: %s"
-		, enum_name(&state_names, (st == NULL)? STATE_MAIN_R0:st->st_state)
-		, enum_name(&notification_names, md->note));
-
-	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(md->note);
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("state transition function for %s failed: %s"
-		    , enum_name(&state_names, from_state)
-		    , enum_name(&notification_names, md->note)));
-	    break;
-    }
+			if (smc->flags & SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2)
+			{
+				/* Initiate any Quick Mode negotiations that
+				 * were waiting to piggyback on this Keying Channel.
+				 *
+				 * ??? there is a potential race condition
+				 * if we are the responder: the initial Phase 2
+				 * message might outrun the final Phase 1 message.
+				 * I think that retransmission will recover.
+				 */
+				unpend(st);
+			}
+
+			if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			||  IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+				release_whack(st);
+			break;
+
+		case STF_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+			whack_log(RC_INTERNALERR + md->note
+				, "%s: internal error"
+				, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("state transition function for %s had internal error"
+					, enum_name(&state_names, from_state)));
+			break;
+
+		default:        /* a shortcut to STF_FAIL, setting md->note */
+			passert(result > STF_FAIL);
+			md->note = result - STF_FAIL;
+			result = STF_FAIL;
+			/* FALL THROUGH ... */
+		case STF_FAIL:
+			/* As it is, we act as if this message never happened:
+			 * whatever retrying was in place, remains in place.
+			 */
+			whack_log(RC_NOTIFICATION + md->note
+				, "%s: %s"
+				, enum_name(&state_names, (st == NULL)? STATE_MAIN_R0:st->st_state)
+				, enum_name(&notification_names, md->note));
+
+			SEND_NOTIFICATION(md->note);
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("state transition function for %s failed: %s"
+					, enum_name(&state_names, from_state)
+					, enum_name(&notification_names, md->note)));
+			break;
+	}
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/demux.h b/src/pluto/demux.h
index 0348b3579..4faf6e532 100644
--- a/src/pluto/demux.h
+++ b/src/pluto/demux.h
@@ -10,13 +10,11 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: demux.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include "packet.h"
 
-struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag */
+struct state;   /* forward declaration of tag */
 extern void init_demux(void);
 extern bool send_packet(struct state *st, const char *where);
 extern void comm_handle(const struct iface *ifp);
@@ -36,9 +34,9 @@ extern u_int8_t reply_buffer[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
  */
 
 struct payload_digest {
-    pb_stream pbs;
-    union payload payload;
-    struct payload_digest *next;   /* of same kind */
+	pb_stream pbs;
+	union payload payload;
+	struct payload_digest *next;   /* of same kind */
 };
 
 /* message digest
@@ -46,30 +44,30 @@ struct payload_digest {
  */
 
 struct msg_digest {
-    struct msg_digest *next;	/* for free list */
-    chunk_t raw_packet;		/* if encrypted, received packet before decryption */
-    const struct iface *iface;	/* interface on which message arrived */
-    ip_address sender;	/* where message came from */
-    u_int16_t sender_port;	/* host order */
-    pb_stream packet_pbs;	/* whole packet */
-    pb_stream message_pbs;	/* message to be processed */
-    struct isakmp_hdr hdr;	/* message's header */
-    bool encrypted;		/* was it encrypted? */
-    enum state_kind from_state;	/* state we started in */
-    const struct state_microcode *smc;	/* microcode for initial state */
-    struct state *st;		/* current state object */
-    pb_stream reply;		/* room for reply */
-    pb_stream rbody;		/* room for reply body (after header) */
-    notification_t note;	/* reason for failure */
-    bool dpd;           	/* peer supports RFC 3706 DPD */
-    bool openpgp;		/* peer supports OpenPGP certificates */
+	struct msg_digest *next;    /* for free list */
+	chunk_t raw_packet;         /* if encrypted, received packet before decryption */
+	const struct iface *iface;  /* interface on which message arrived */
+	ip_address sender;  /* where message came from */
+	u_int16_t sender_port;      /* host order */
+	pb_stream packet_pbs;       /* whole packet */
+	pb_stream message_pbs;      /* message to be processed */
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;      /* message's header */
+	bool encrypted;             /* was it encrypted? */
+	enum state_kind from_state; /* state we started in */
+	const struct state_microcode *smc;  /* microcode for initial state */
+	struct state *st;           /* current state object */
+	pb_stream reply;            /* room for reply */
+	pb_stream rbody;            /* room for reply body (after header) */
+	notification_t note;        /* reason for failure */
+	bool dpd;                   /* peer supports RFC 3706 DPD */
+	bool openpgp;               /* peer supports OpenPGP certificates */
 
 #   define PAYLIMIT 40
-    struct payload_digest
-	digest[PAYLIMIT],
-	*digest_roof,
-	*chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF];
-	unsigned short nat_traversal_vid;
+	struct payload_digest
+		digest[PAYLIMIT],
+		*digest_roof,
+		*chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF];
+		unsigned short nat_traversal_vid;
 };
 
 extern void release_md(struct msg_digest *md);
@@ -79,11 +77,11 @@ extern void release_md(struct msg_digest *md);
  */
 
 typedef enum {
-    STF_IGNORE,	/* don't respond */
-    STF_SUSPEND,    /* unfinished -- don't release resources */
-    STF_OK,	/* success */
-    STF_INTERNAL_ERROR,	/* discard everything, we failed */
-    STF_FAIL	/* discard everything, something failed.  notification_t added. */
+	STF_IGNORE, /* don't respond */
+	STF_SUSPEND,    /* unfinished -- don't release resources */
+	STF_OK,     /* success */
+	STF_INTERNAL_ERROR, /* discard everything, we failed */
+	STF_FAIL    /* discard everything, something failed.  notification_t added. */
 } stf_status;
 
 typedef stf_status state_transition_fn(struct msg_digest *md);
diff --git a/src/pluto/dnskey.c b/src/pluto/dnskey.c
index 8ba0f7b73..ed901ade5 100644
--- a/src/pluto/dnskey.c
+++ b/src/pluto/dnskey.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: dnskey.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -26,32 +24,34 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/nameser.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <netdb.h>	/* ??? for h_errno */
+#include <netdb.h>      /* ??? for h_errno */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <utils/identification.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "id.h"
 #include "connections.h"
-#include "keys.h"	    /* needs connections.h */
+#include "keys.h"           /* needs connections.h */
 #include "dnskey.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "timer.h"
 
 /* somebody has to decide */
-#define MAX_TXT_RDATA	((MAX_KEY_BYTES * 8 / 6) + 40)	/* somewhat arbitrary overkill */
+#define MAX_TXT_RDATA   ((MAX_KEY_BYTES * 8 / 6) + 40)  /* somewhat arbitrary overkill */
 
 /* ADNS stuff */
 
-int adns_qfd = NULL_FD,	/* file descriptor for sending queries to adns (O_NONBLOCK) */
-    adns_afd = NULL_FD;	/* file descriptor for receiving answers from adns */
+int adns_qfd = NULL_FD, /* file descriptor for sending queries to adns (O_NONBLOCK) */
+	adns_afd = NULL_FD; /* file descriptor for receiving answers from adns */
 static pid_t adns_pid = 0;
-const char *pluto_adns_option = NULL;	/* path from --pluto_adns */
+const char *pluto_adns_option = NULL;   /* path from --pluto_adns */
 
 int adns_restart_count;
 #define ADNS_RESTART_MAX 20
@@ -59,152 +59,168 @@ int adns_restart_count;
 void
 init_adns(void)
 {
-    const char *adns_path = pluto_adns_option;
+	const char *adns_path = pluto_adns_option;
 #ifndef USE_LWRES
-    static const char adns_name[] = "_pluto_adns";
-    const char *helper_bin_dir = getenv("IPSEC_LIBDIR");
+	static const char adns_name[] = "_pluto_adns";
+	const char *helper_bin_dir = getenv("IPSEC_LIBDIR");
 #else /* USE_LWRES */
-    static const char adns_name[] = "lwdnsq";
-    const char *helper_bin_dir = getenv("IPSEC_EXECDIR");
+	static const char adns_name[] = "lwdnsq";
+	const char *helper_bin_dir = getenv("IPSEC_EXECDIR");
 #endif /* USE_LWRES */
-    char adns_path_space[4096];	/* plenty long? */
-    int qfds[2];
-    int afds[2];
-
-    /* find a pathname to the ADNS program */
-    if (adns_path == NULL)
-    {
-	/* pathname was not specified as an option: build it.
-	 * First, figure out the directory to be used.
-	 */
-	ssize_t n;
+	char adns_path_space[4096]; /* plenty long? */
+	int qfds[2];
+	int afds[2];
 
-	if (helper_bin_dir != NULL)
+	/* find a pathname to the ADNS program */
+	if (adns_path == NULL)
 	{
-	    n = strlen(helper_bin_dir);
-	    if ((size_t)n <= sizeof(adns_path_space) - sizeof(adns_name))
-	    {
-		strcpy(adns_path_space, helper_bin_dir);
-		if (n > 0 && adns_path_space[n -1] != '/')
-		    adns_path_space[n++] = '/';
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* The program will be in the same directory as Pluto,
-	     * so we use the sympolic link /proc/self/exe to
-	     * tell us of the path prefix.
-	     */
-	    n = readlink("/proc/self/exe", adns_path_space, sizeof(adns_path_space));
-
-	    if (n < 0)
-		exit_log_errno((e
-		    , "readlink(\"/proc/self/exe\") failed in init_adns()"));
-
-	}
-
-	if ((size_t)n > sizeof(adns_path_space) - sizeof(adns_name))
-	    exit_log("path to %s is too long", adns_name);
+		/* pathname was not specified as an option: build it.
+		 * First, figure out the directory to be used.
+		 */
+		ssize_t n;
 
-	while (n > 0 && adns_path_space[n - 1] != '/')
-	    n--;
+		if (helper_bin_dir != NULL)
+		{
+			n = strlen(helper_bin_dir);
+			if ((size_t)n <= sizeof(adns_path_space) - sizeof(adns_name))
+			{
+				strcpy(adns_path_space, helper_bin_dir);
+				if (n > 0 && adns_path_space[n -1] != '/')
+				{
+					adns_path_space[n++] = '/';
+				}
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* The program will be in the same directory as Pluto,
+			 * so we use the sympolic link /proc/self/exe to
+			 * tell us of the path prefix.
+			 */
+			n = readlink("/proc/self/exe", adns_path_space, sizeof(adns_path_space));
+
+			if (n < 0)
+			{
+				exit_log_errno((e
+					, "readlink(\"/proc/self/exe\") failed in init_adns()"));
+			}
+		}
 
-	strcpy(adns_path_space + n, adns_name);
-	adns_path = adns_path_space;
-    }
-    if (access(adns_path, X_OK) < 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "%s missing or not executable", adns_path));
+		if ((size_t)n > sizeof(adns_path_space) - sizeof(adns_name))
+		{
+			exit_log("path to %s is too long", adns_name);
+		}
 
-    if (pipe(qfds) != 0 || pipe(afds) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "pipe(2) failed in init_adns()"));
+		while (n > 0 && adns_path_space[n - 1] != '/')
+		{
+			n--;
+		}
+		strcpy(adns_path_space + n, adns_name);
+		adns_path = adns_path_space;
+	}
+	if (access(adns_path, X_OK) < 0)
+	{
+		exit_log_errno((e, "%s missing or not executable", adns_path));
+	}
 
-    adns_pid = fork();
-    switch (adns_pid)
-    {
-    case -1:
-	exit_log_errno((e, "fork() failed in init_adns()"));
+	if (pipe(qfds) != 0 || pipe(afds) != 0)
+	{
+		exit_log_errno((e, "pipe(2) failed in init_adns()"));
+	}
 
-    case 0:
-	/* child */
+	adns_pid = fork();
+	switch (adns_pid)
 	{
-	    /* Make stdin and stdout our pipes.
-	     * Take care to handle case where pipes already use these fds.
-	     */
-	    if (afds[1] == 0)
-		afds[1] = dup(afds[1]);	/* avoid being overwritten */
-	    if (qfds[0] != 0)
-	    {
-		dup2(qfds[0], 0);
+	case -1:
+		exit_log_errno((e, "fork() failed in init_adns()"));
+
+	case 0:
+		/* child */
+		{
+			/* Make stdin and stdout our pipes.
+			 * Take care to handle case where pipes already use these fds.
+			 */
+			if (afds[1] == 0)
+			{
+				afds[1] = dup(afds[1]); /* avoid being overwritten */
+			}
+			if (qfds[0] != 0)
+			{
+				dup2(qfds[0], 0);
+				close(qfds[0]);
+			}
+			if (afds[1] != 1)
+			{
+				dup2(afds[1], 1);
+				close(qfds[1]);
+			}
+			if (afds[0] > 1)
+			{
+				close(afds[0]);
+			}
+			if (afds[1] > 1)
+			{
+				close(afds[1]);
+			}
+			DBG(DBG_DNS, execlp(adns_path, adns_name, "-d", NULL));
+
+			execlp(adns_path, adns_name, NULL);
+			exit_log_errno((e, "execlp of %s failed", adns_path));
+		}
+	default:
+		/* parent */
 		close(qfds[0]);
-	    }
-	    if (afds[1] != 1)
-	    {
-		dup2(afds[1], 1);
-		close(qfds[1]);
-	    }
-	    if (afds[0] > 1)
-		close(afds[0]);
-	    if (afds[1] > 1)
+		adns_qfd = qfds[1];
+		adns_afd = afds[0];
 		close(afds[1]);
-
-	    DBG(DBG_DNS, execlp(adns_path, adns_name, "-d", NULL));
-
-	    execlp(adns_path, adns_name, NULL);
-	    exit_log_errno((e, "execlp of %s failed", adns_path));
+		fcntl(adns_qfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+		fcntl(adns_afd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+		fcntl(adns_qfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+		break;
 	}
-
-    default:
-	/* parent */
-	close(qfds[0]);
-	adns_qfd = qfds[1];
-	adns_afd = afds[0];
-	close(afds[1]);
-	fcntl(adns_qfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-	fcntl(adns_afd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-	fcntl(adns_qfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
-	break;
-    }
 }
 
 void
 stop_adns(void)
 {
-    close_any(adns_qfd);
-    adns_qfd = NULL_FD;
-    close_any(adns_afd);
-    adns_afd = NULL_FD;
-
-    if (adns_pid != 0)
-    {
-	int status;
-	pid_t p = waitpid(adns_pid, &status, 0);
+	close_any(adns_qfd);
+	adns_qfd = NULL_FD;
+	close_any(adns_afd);
+	adns_afd = NULL_FD;
 
-	if (p == -1)
-	{
-	    log_errno((e, "waitpid for ADNS process failed"));
-	}
-	else if (WIFEXITED(status))
+	if (adns_pid != 0)
 	{
-	    if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
-		plog("ADNS process exited with status %d"
-		    , (int) WEXITSTATUS(status));
-	}
-	else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
-	{
-	    plog("ADNS process terminated by signal %d", (int)WTERMSIG(status));
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    plog("wait for end of ADNS process returned odd status 0x%x\n"
-		, status);
+		int status;
+		pid_t p = waitpid(adns_pid, &status, 0);
+
+		if (p == -1)
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "waitpid for ADNS process failed"));
+		}
+		else if (WIFEXITED(status))
+		{
+			if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+			{
+				plog("ADNS process exited with status %d"
+					, (int) WEXITSTATUS(status));
+			}
+		}
+		else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+		{
+			plog("ADNS process terminated by signal %d", (int)WTERMSIG(status));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("wait for end of ADNS process returned odd status 0x%x\n"
+				, status);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 
 
 /* tricky macro to pass any hot potato */
-#define TRY(x)	{ err_t ugh = x; if (ugh != NULL) return ugh; }
+#define TRY(x)  { err_t ugh = x; if (ugh != NULL) return ugh; }
 
 
 /* Process TXT X-IPsec-Server record, accumulating relevant ones
@@ -225,246 +241,270 @@ static const char our_TXT_attr[] = our_TXT_attr_string;
 static err_t
 decode_iii(u_char **pp, struct id *gw_id)
 {
-    u_char *p = *pp + strspn(*pp, " \t");
-    u_char *e = p + strcspn(p, " \t");
-    u_char under = *e;
-
-    if (p == e)
-	return "TXT " our_TXT_attr_string " badly formed (no gateway specified)";
-
-    *e = '\0';
-    if (*p == '@')
-    {
-	/* gateway specification in this record is @FQDN */
-	err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	    return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
-		, ugh);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* gateway specification is numeric */
-	ip_address ip;
-	err_t ugh = tnatoaddr(p, e-p
-	    , strchr(p, ':') == NULL? AF_INET : AF_INET6
-	    , &ip);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	    return builddiag("malformed IP address in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
-		, ugh);
-
-	if (isanyaddr(&ip))
-	    return "gateway address must not be 0.0.0.0 or 0::0";
-
-	iptoid(&ip, gw_id);
-    }
-
-    *e = under;
-    *pp = e + strspn(e, " \t");
-
-    return NULL;
+	u_char *p = *pp + strspn(*pp, " \t");
+	u_char *e = p + strcspn(p, " \t");
+	u_char under = *e;
+
+	if (p == e)
+	{
+		return "TXT " our_TXT_attr_string " badly formed (no gateway specified)";
+	}
+	*e = '\0';
+	if (*p == '@')
+	{
+		/* gateway specification in this record is @FQDN */
+		err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
+				, ugh);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* gateway specification is numeric */
+		ip_address ip;
+		err_t ugh = tnatoaddr(p, e-p
+			, strchr(p, ':') == NULL? AF_INET : AF_INET6
+			, &ip);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			return builddiag("malformed IP address in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
+				, ugh);
+		}
+		if (isanyaddr(&ip))
+		{
+			return "gateway address must not be 0.0.0.0 or 0::0";
+		}
+		iptoid(&ip, gw_id);
+	}
+
+	*e = under;
+	*pp = e + strspn(e, " \t");
+
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static err_t
 process_txt_rr_body(u_char *str
-, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, bool doit     /* should we capture information? */
 , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
 , struct adns_continuation *const cr)
 {
-    const struct id *client_id = &cr->id;	/* subject of query */
-    u_char *p = str;
-    unsigned long pref = 0;
-    struct gw_info gi;
+	const struct id *client_id = &cr->id;       /* subject of query */
+	u_char *p = str;
+	unsigned long pref = 0;
+	struct gw_info gi;
+
+	p += strspn(p, " \t");      /* ignore leading whitespace */
 
-    p += strspn(p, " \t");	/* ignore leading whitespace */
+	/* is this for us? */
+	if (strncasecmp(p, our_TXT_attr, sizeof(our_TXT_attr)-1) != 0)
+	{
+		return NULL;    /* neither interesting nor bad */
+	}
 
-    /* is this for us? */
-    if (strncasecmp(p, our_TXT_attr, sizeof(our_TXT_attr)-1) != 0)
-	return NULL;	/* neither interesting nor bad */
+	p += sizeof(our_TXT_attr) - 1;      /* ignore our attribute name */
+	p += strspn(p, " \t");      /* ignore leading whitespace */
 
-    p += sizeof(our_TXT_attr) - 1;	/* ignore our attribute name */
-    p += strspn(p, " \t");	/* ignore leading whitespace */
+	/* decode '(' nnn ')' */
+	if (*p != '(')
+	{
+		return "X-IPsec-Server missing '('";
+	}
 
-    /* decode '(' nnn ')' */
-    if (*p != '(')
-	return "X-IPsec-Server missing '('";
+	{
+		char *e;
 
-    {
-	char *e;
+		p++;
+		pref = strtoul(p, &e, 0);
+		if ((u_char *)e == p)
+		{
+			return "malformed X-IPsec-Server priority";
+		}
+		p = e + strspn(e, " \t");
 
-	p++;
-	pref = strtoul(p, &e, 0);
-	if ((u_char *)e == p)
-	    return "malformed X-IPsec-Server priority";
+		if (*p != ')')
+		{
+			return "X-IPsec-Server priority missing ')'";
+		}
+		p++;
+		p += strspn(p, " \t");
 
-	p = e + strspn(e, " \t");
+		if (pref > 0xFFFF)
+		{
+			return "X-IPsec-Server priority larger than 0xFFFF";
+		}
+	}
 
-	if (*p != ')')
-	    return "X-IPsec-Server priority missing ')'";
+	/* time for '=' */
 
+	if (*p != '=')
+	{
+		return "X-IPsec-Server priority missing '='";
+	}
 	p++;
 	p += strspn(p, " \t");
 
-	if (pref > 0xFFFF)
-	    return "X-IPsec-Server priority larger than 0xFFFF";
-    }
-
-    /* time for '=' */
+	/* Decode iii (Security Gateway ID). */
 
-    if (*p != '=')
-	return "X-IPsec-Server priority missing '='";
+	zero(&gi);  /* before first use */
 
-    p++;
-    p += strspn(p, " \t");
+	TRY(decode_iii(&p, &gi.gw_id));     /* will need to unshare_id_content */
 
-    /* Decode iii (Security Gateway ID). */
-
-    zero(&gi);	/* before first use */
-
-    TRY(decode_iii(&p, &gi.gw_id));	/* will need to unshare_id_content */
-
-    if (!cr->sgw_specified)
-    {
-	/* we don't know the peer's ID (because we are initiating
-	 * and we don't know who to initiate with.
-	 * So we're looking for gateway specs with an IP address
-	 */
-	if (!id_is_ipaddr(&gi.gw_id))
+	if (!cr->sgw_specified)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
+		/* we don't know the peer's ID (because we are initiating
+		 * and we don't know who to initiate with.
+		 * So we're looking for gateway specs with an IP address
+		 */
+		if (!id_is_ipaddr(&gi.gw_id))
 		{
-		    char cidb[BUF_LEN];
-		    char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
-
-		    idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
-		    idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
-		    DBG_log("TXT %s record for %s: security gateway %s;"
-			" ignored because gateway's IP is unspecified"
-			, our_TXT_attr, cidb, gwidb);
-		});
-	    return NULL;	/* we cannot use this record, but it isn't wrong */
+			DBG(DBG_DNS,
+				{
+					char cidb[BUF_LEN];
+					char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+					idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
+					idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+					DBG_log("TXT %s record for %s: security gateway %s;"
+						" ignored because gateway's IP is unspecified"
+						, our_TXT_attr, cidb, gwidb);
+				});
+			return NULL;        /* we cannot use this record, but it isn't wrong */
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* We do know the peer's ID (because we are responding)
-	 * So we're looking for gateway specs specifying this known ID.
-	 */
-	const struct id *peer_id = &cr->sgw_id;
-
-	if (!same_id(peer_id, &gi.gw_id))
+	else
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
+		/* We do know the peer's ID (because we are responding)
+		 * So we're looking for gateway specs specifying this known ID.
+		 */
+		const struct id *peer_id = &cr->sgw_id;
+
+		if (!same_id(peer_id, &gi.gw_id))
 		{
-		    char cidb[BUF_LEN];
-		    char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
-		    char pidb[BUF_LEN];
-
-		    idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
-		    idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
-		    idtoa(peer_id, pidb, sizeof(pidb));
-		    DBG_log("TXT %s record for %s: security gateway %s;"
-			" ignored -- looking to confirm %s as gateway"
-			, our_TXT_attr, cidb, gwidb, pidb);
-		});
-	    return NULL;	/* we cannot use this record, but it isn't wrong */
+			DBG(DBG_DNS,
+				{
+					char cidb[BUF_LEN];
+					char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+					char pidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+					idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
+					idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+					idtoa(peer_id, pidb, sizeof(pidb));
+					DBG_log("TXT %s record for %s: security gateway %s;"
+						" ignored -- looking to confirm %s as gateway"
+						, our_TXT_attr, cidb, gwidb, pidb);
+				});
+			return NULL;        /* we cannot use this record, but it isn't wrong */
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    if (doit)
-    {
-	/* really accept gateway */
-	struct gw_info **gwip;	/* gateway insertion point */
 
-	gi.client_id = *client_id;	/* will need to unshare_id_content */
-
-	/* decode optional kkk: base 64 encoding of key */
-
-	gi.gw_key_present = *p != '\0';
-	if (gi.gw_key_present)
+	if (doit)
 	{
-	    /* Decode base 64 encoding of key.
-	     * Similar code is in process_lwdnsq_key.
-	     */
-	    u_char kb[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];	/* plenty of space for binary form of public key */
-	    chunk_t kbc;
-	    struct RSA_public_key r;
-
-	    err_t ugh = ttodatav(p, 0, 64, kb, sizeof(kb), &kbc.len
-		, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
-
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		return builddiag("malformed key data: %s", ugh);
-
-	    if (kbc.len > sizeof(kb))
-		return builddiag("key data larger than %lu bytes"
-		    , (unsigned long) sizeof(kb));
-
-	    kbc.ptr = kb;
-	    ugh = unpack_RSA_public_key(&r, &kbc);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		return builddiag("invalid key data: %s", ugh);
-
-	    /* now find a key entry to put it in */
-	    gi.key = public_key_from_rsa(&r);
-
-	    free_RSA_public_content(&r);
+		/* really accept gateway */
+		struct gw_info **gwip;  /* gateway insertion point */
 
-	    unreference_key(&cr->last_info);
-	    cr->last_info = reference_key(gi.key);
-	}
-
-	/* we're home free!  Allocate everything and add to gateways list. */
-	gi.refcnt = 1;
-	gi.pref = pref;
-	gi.key->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
-	gi.key->last_tried_time = gi.key->last_worked_time = NO_TIME;
-
-	/* find insertion point */
-	for (gwip = &cr->gateways_from_dns; *gwip != NULL && (*gwip)->pref < pref; gwip = &(*gwip)->next)
-	    ;
+		gi.client_id = *client_id;      /* will need to unshare_id_content */
 
-	DBG(DBG_DNS,
-	    {
-		char cidb[BUF_LEN];
-		char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+		/* decode optional kkk: base 64 encoding of key */
 
-		idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
-		idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+		gi.gw_key_present = *p != '\0';
 		if (gi.gw_key_present)
 		{
-		    DBG_log("gateway for %s is %s with key %s"
-			, cidb, gwidb, gi.key->u.rsa.keyid);
+			/* Decode base 64 encoding of key.
+			 * Similar code is in process_lwdnsq_key.
+			 */
+			u_char buf[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];  /* plenty of space for binary form of public key */
+			size_t sz;
+			err_t ugh;
+			chunk_t rfc3110_chunk;
+			public_key_t *key;
+
+			ugh = ttodatav(p, 0, 64, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz,
+						diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
+			if (ugh)
+			{
+				return builddiag("malformed key data: %s", ugh);
+			}
+			if (sz > sizeof(buf))
+			{
+				return builddiag("key data larger than %lu bytes",
+								 (unsigned long) sizeof(buf));
+			}
+			rfc3110_chunk = chunk_create(buf, sz);
+			key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, KEY_RSA,
+										BUILD_BLOB_RFC_3110, rfc3110_chunk,
+										BUILD_END);
+			if (key == NULL)
+			{
+				return builddiag("invalid key data");
+			}
+
+			/* now find a key entry to put it in */
+			gi.key = public_key_from_rsa(key);
+
+			unreference_key(&cr->last_info);
+			cr->last_info = reference_key(gi.key);
 		}
-		else
-		{
-		    DBG_log("gateway for %s is %s; no key specified"
-			, cidb, gwidb);
-		}
-	    });
 
-	gi.next = *gwip;
-	*gwip = clone_thing(gi, "gateway info");
-	unshare_id_content(&(*gwip)->gw_id);
-	unshare_id_content(&(*gwip)->client_id);
-    }
+		/* we're home free!  Allocate everything and add to gateways list. */
+		gi.refcnt = 1;
+		gi.pref = pref;
+		gi.key->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+		gi.key->last_tried_time = gi.key->last_worked_time = NO_TIME;
+
+		/* find insertion point */
+		for (gwip = &cr->gateways_from_dns; *gwip != NULL && (*gwip)->pref < pref; gwip = &(*gwip)->next)
+			;
+
+		DBG(DBG_DNS,
+			{
+				char cidb[BUF_LEN];
+				char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+				identification_t *keyid;
+				public_key_t *pub_key;
+
+				idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
+				idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+				pub_key = gi.key->public_key;
+				keyid = pub_key->get_id(pub_key, ID_PUBKEY_SHA1);
+
+				if (gi.gw_key_present)
+				{
+					DBG_log("gateway for %s is %s with key %Y"
+						, cidb, gwidb, keyid);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					DBG_log("gateway for %s is %s; no key specified"
+						, cidb, gwidb);
+				}
+			});
+
+		gi.next = *gwip;
+		*gwip = clone_thing(gi);
+		unshare_id_content(&(*gwip)->gw_id);
+		unshare_id_content(&(*gwip)->client_id);
+	}
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static const char *
 rr_typename(int type)
 {
-    switch (type)
-    {
-    case T_TXT:
-	return "TXT";
-    case T_KEY:
-	return "KEY";
-    default:
-	return "???";
-    }
+	switch (type)
+	{
+	case T_TXT:
+		return "TXT";
+	case T_KEY:
+		return "KEY";
+	default:
+		return "???";
+	}
 }
 
 
@@ -476,72 +516,72 @@ process_lwdnsq_key(u_char *str
 , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
 , struct adns_continuation *const cr)
 {
-    /* fields of KEY record.  See RFC 2535 3.1 KEY RDATA format. */
-    unsigned long flags	/* 16 bits */
-	, protocol	/* 8 bits */
-	, algorithm;	/* 8 bits */
-
-    char *rest = str
-	, *p
-	, *endofnumber;
-
-    /* flags */
-    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (p == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq KEY: missing flags";
-
-    flags = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
-    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
-	return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed flags";
-
-    /* protocol */
-    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (p == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq KEY: missing protocol";
-
-    protocol = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
-    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
-	return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed protocol";
-
-    /* algorithm */
-    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (p == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq KEY: missing algorithm";
-
-    algorithm = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
-    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
-	return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed algorithm";
-
-    /* is this key interesting? */
-    if (protocol == 4	/* IPSEC (RFC 2535 3.1.3) */
-    && algorithm == 1	/* RSA/MD5 (RFC 2535 3.2) */
-    && (flags & 0x8000ul) == 0	/* use for authentication (3.1.2) */
-    && (flags & 0x2CF0ul) == 0)	/* must be zero */
-    {
-	/* Decode base 64 encoding of key.
-	 * Similar code is in process_txt_rr_body.
-	 */
-	u_char kb[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];	/* plenty of space for binary form of public key */
-	chunk_t kbc;
-	err_t ugh = ttodatav(rest, 0, 64, kb, sizeof(kb), &kbc.len
-	    , diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_IGNORESPACE);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	    return builddiag("malformed key data: %s", ugh);
-
-	if (kbc.len > sizeof(kb))
-	    return builddiag("key data larger than %lu bytes"
-		, (unsigned long) sizeof(kb));
-
-	kbc.ptr = kb;
-	TRY(add_public_key(&cr->id, dns_auth_level, PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, &kbc
-	    , &cr->keys_from_dns));
-
-	/* keep a reference to last one */
-	unreference_key(&cr->last_info);
-	cr->last_info = reference_key(cr->keys_from_dns->key);
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	/* fields of KEY record.  See RFC 2535 3.1 KEY RDATA format. */
+	unsigned long flags /* 16 bits */
+		, protocol      /* 8 bits */
+		, algorithm;    /* 8 bits */
+
+	char *rest = str
+		, *p
+		, *endofnumber;
+
+	/* flags */
+	p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq KEY: missing flags";
+
+	flags = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+	if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+		return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed flags";
+
+	/* protocol */
+	p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq KEY: missing protocol";
+
+	protocol = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+	if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+		return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed protocol";
+
+	/* algorithm */
+	p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq KEY: missing algorithm";
+
+	algorithm = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+	if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+		return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed algorithm";
+
+	/* is this key interesting? */
+	if (protocol == 4   /* IPSEC (RFC 2535 3.1.3) */
+	&& algorithm == 1   /* RSA/MD5 (RFC 2535 3.2) */
+	&& (flags & 0x8000ul) == 0  /* use for authentication (3.1.2) */
+	&& (flags & 0x2CF0ul) == 0) /* must be zero */
+	{
+		/* Decode base 64 encoding of key.
+		 * Similar code is in process_txt_rr_body.
+		 */
+		u_char kb[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];      /* plenty of space for binary form of public key */
+		chunk_t kbc;
+		err_t ugh = ttodatav(rest, 0, 64, kb, sizeof(kb), &kbc.len
+			, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_IGNORESPACE);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+			return builddiag("malformed key data: %s", ugh);
+
+		if (kbc.len > sizeof(kb))
+			return builddiag("key data larger than %lu bytes"
+				, (unsigned long) sizeof(kb));
+
+		kbc.ptr = kb;
+		TRY(add_public_key(&cr->id, dns_auth_level, PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, &kbc
+			, &cr->keys_from_dns));
+
+		/* keep a reference to last one */
+		unreference_key(&cr->last_info);
+		cr->last_info = reference_key(cr->keys_from_dns->key);
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 # endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
@@ -580,158 +620,158 @@ process_lwdnsq_key(u_char *str
  *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
  */
 struct qr_header {
-    u_int16_t	id;	/* 16-bit identifier to match query */
+	u_int16_t   id;     /* 16-bit identifier to match query */
 
-    u_int16_t	stuff;	/* packed crud: */
+	u_int16_t   stuff;  /* packed crud: */
 
-#define QRS_QR	0x8000	/* QR: on if this is a response */
+#define QRS_QR  0x8000  /* QR: on if this is a response */
 
-#define QRS_OPCODE_SHIFT	11  /* OPCODE field */
-#define QRS_OPCODE_MASK	0xF
-#define QRSO_QUERY	0   /* standard query */
-#define QRSO_IQUERY	1   /* inverse query */
-#define QRSO_STATUS	2   /* server status request query */
+#define QRS_OPCODE_SHIFT        11  /* OPCODE field */
+#define QRS_OPCODE_MASK 0xF
+#define QRSO_QUERY      0   /* standard query */
+#define QRSO_IQUERY     1   /* inverse query */
+#define QRSO_STATUS     2   /* server status request query */
 
-#define QRS_AA 0x0400	/* AA: on if Authoritative Answer */
-#define QRS_TC 0x0200	/* TC: on if truncation happened */
-#define QRS_RD 0x0100	/* RD: on if recursion desired */
-#define QRS_RA 0x0080	/* RA: on if recursion available */
-#define QRS_Z  0x0040	/* Z: reserved; must be zero */
-#define QRS_AD 0x0020	/* AD: on if authentic data (RFC 2535) */
-#define QRS_CD 0x0010	/* AD: on if checking disabled (RFC 2535) */
+#define QRS_AA 0x0400   /* AA: on if Authoritative Answer */
+#define QRS_TC 0x0200   /* TC: on if truncation happened */
+#define QRS_RD 0x0100   /* RD: on if recursion desired */
+#define QRS_RA 0x0080   /* RA: on if recursion available */
+#define QRS_Z  0x0040   /* Z: reserved; must be zero */
+#define QRS_AD 0x0020   /* AD: on if authentic data (RFC 2535) */
+#define QRS_CD 0x0010   /* AD: on if checking disabled (RFC 2535) */
 
-#define QRS_RCODE_SHIFT	0 /* RCODE field: response code */
-#define QRS_RCODE_MASK	0xF
-#define QRSR_OK	    0
+#define QRS_RCODE_SHIFT 0 /* RCODE field: response code */
+#define QRS_RCODE_MASK  0xF
+#define QRSR_OK     0
 
 
-    u_int16_t qdcount;	    /* number of entries in question section */
-    u_int16_t ancount;	    /* number of resource records in answer section */
-    u_int16_t nscount;	    /* number of name server resource records in authority section */
-    u_int16_t arcount;	    /* number of resource records in additional records section */
+	u_int16_t qdcount;      /* number of entries in question section */
+	u_int16_t ancount;      /* number of resource records in answer section */
+	u_int16_t nscount;      /* number of name server resource records in authority section */
+	u_int16_t arcount;      /* number of resource records in additional records section */
 };
 
 static field_desc qr_header_fields[] = {
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "stuff", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QD Count", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Answer Count", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Authority Count", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Additional Count", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "stuff", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QD Count", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Answer Count", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Authority Count", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Additional Count", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 static struct_desc qr_header_desc = {
-    "Query Response Header",
-    qr_header_fields,
-    sizeof(struct qr_header)
+	"Query Response Header",
+	qr_header_fields,
+	sizeof(struct qr_header)
 };
 
 /* Messages for codes in RCODE (see RFC 1035 4.1.1) */
 static const err_t rcode_text[QRS_RCODE_MASK + 1] = {
-    NULL,   /* not an error */
-    "Format error - The name server was unable to interpret the query",
-    "Server failure - The name server was unable to process this query"
-	" due to a problem with the name server",
-    "Name Error - Meaningful only for responses from an authoritative name"
-	" server, this code signifies that the domain name referenced in"
-	" the query does not exist",
-    "Not Implemented - The name server does not support the requested"
-	" kind of query",
-    "Refused - The name server refuses to perform the specified operation"
-	" for policy reasons",
-    /* the rest are reserved for future use */
-    };
+	NULL,   /* not an error */
+	"Format error - The name server was unable to interpret the query",
+	"Server failure - The name server was unable to process this query"
+		" due to a problem with the name server",
+	"Name Error - Meaningful only for responses from an authoritative name"
+		" server, this code signifies that the domain name referenced in"
+		" the query does not exist",
+	"Not Implemented - The name server does not support the requested"
+		" kind of query",
+	"Refused - The name server refuses to perform the specified operation"
+		" for policy reasons",
+	/* the rest are reserved for future use */
+	};
 
 /* throw away a possibly compressed domain name */
 
 static err_t
 eat_name(pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
-    u_char *ip = pbs->cur;
-    unsigned oi = 0;
-    unsigned jump_count = 0;
-
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	u_int8_t b;
+	u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
+	u_char *ip = pbs->cur;
+	unsigned oi = 0;
+	unsigned jump_count = 0;
 
-	if (ip >= pbs->roof)
-	    return "ran out of message while skipping domain name";
-
-	b = *ip++;
-	if (jump_count == 0)
-	    pbs->cur = ip;
-
-	if (b == 0)
-	    break;
-
-	switch (b & 0xC0)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    case 0x00:
-		/* we grab the next b characters */
-		if (oi + b > NS_MAXDNAME)
-		    return "domain name too long";
+		u_int8_t b;
 
-		if (pbs->roof - ip <= b)
-		    return "domain name falls off end of message";
+		if (ip >= pbs->roof)
+			return "ran out of message while skipping domain name";
 
-		if (oi != 0)
-		    name_buf[oi++] = '.';
-
-		memcpy(name_buf + oi, ip, b);
-		oi += b;
-		ip += b;
+		b = *ip++;
 		if (jump_count == 0)
-		    pbs->cur = ip;
-		break;
-
-	    case 0xC0:
-		{
-		    unsigned ix;
-
-		    if (ip >= pbs->roof)
-			return "ran out of message in middle of compressed domain name";
-
-		    ix = ((b & ~0xC0u) << 8) | *ip++;
-		    if (jump_count == 0)
 			pbs->cur = ip;
 
-		    if (ix >= pbs_room(pbs))
-			return "impossible compressed domain name";
+		if (b == 0)
+			break;
 
-		    /* Avoid infinite loop.
-		     * There can be no more jumps than there are bytes
-		     * in the packet.  Not a tight limit, but good enough.
-		     */
-		    jump_count++;
-		    if (jump_count > pbs_room(pbs))
-			return "loop in compressed domain name";
-
-		    ip = pbs->start + ix;
+		switch (b & 0xC0)
+		{
+			case 0x00:
+				/* we grab the next b characters */
+				if (oi + b > NS_MAXDNAME)
+					return "domain name too long";
+
+				if (pbs->roof - ip <= b)
+					return "domain name falls off end of message";
+
+				if (oi != 0)
+					name_buf[oi++] = '.';
+
+				memcpy(name_buf + oi, ip, b);
+				oi += b;
+				ip += b;
+				if (jump_count == 0)
+					pbs->cur = ip;
+				break;
+
+			case 0xC0:
+				{
+					unsigned ix;
+
+					if (ip >= pbs->roof)
+						return "ran out of message in middle of compressed domain name";
+
+					ix = ((b & ~0xC0u) << 8) | *ip++;
+					if (jump_count == 0)
+						pbs->cur = ip;
+
+					if (ix >= pbs_room(pbs))
+						return "impossible compressed domain name";
+
+					/* Avoid infinite loop.
+					 * There can be no more jumps than there are bytes
+					 * in the packet.  Not a tight limit, but good enough.
+					 */
+					jump_count++;
+					if (jump_count > pbs_room(pbs))
+						return "loop in compressed domain name";
+
+					ip = pbs->start + ix;
+				}
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				return "invalid code in label";
 		}
-		break;
-
-	    default:
-		return "invalid code in label";
 	}
-    }
 
-    name_buf[oi++] = '\0';
+	name_buf[oi++] = '\0';
 
-    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("skipping name %s", name_buf));
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("skipping name %s", name_buf));
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static err_t
 eat_name_helpfully(pb_stream *pbs, const char *context)
 {
-    err_t ugh = eat_name(pbs);
+	err_t ugh = eat_name(pbs);
 
-    return ugh == NULL? ugh
-	: builddiag("malformed name within DNS record of %s: %s", context, ugh);
+	return ugh == NULL? ugh
+		: builddiag("malformed name within DNS record of %s: %s", context, ugh);
 }
 
 /* non-variable part of 4.1.2 Question Section entry:
@@ -749,20 +789,20 @@ eat_name_helpfully(pb_stream *pbs, const char *context)
  */
 
 struct qs_fixed {
-    u_int16_t qtype;
-    u_int16_t qclass;
+	u_int16_t qtype;
+	u_int16_t qclass;
 };
 
 static field_desc qs_fixed_fields[] = {
-    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QTYPE", &rr_qtype_names },
-    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QCLASS", &rr_class_names },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QTYPE", &rr_qtype_names },
+	{ ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QCLASS", &rr_class_names },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 static struct_desc qs_fixed_desc = {
-    "Question Section entry fixed part",
-    qs_fixed_fields,
-    sizeof(struct qs_fixed)
+	"Question Section entry fixed part",
+	qs_fixed_fields,
+	sizeof(struct qs_fixed)
 };
 
 /* 4.1.3. Resource record format:
@@ -789,26 +829,26 @@ static struct_desc qs_fixed_desc = {
  */
 
 struct rr_fixed {
-    u_int16_t type;
-    u_int16_t class;
-    u_int32_t ttl;	/* actually signed */
-    u_int16_t rdlength;
+	u_int16_t type;
+	u_int16_t class;
+	u_int32_t ttl;      /* actually signed */
+	u_int16_t rdlength;
 };
 
 
 static field_desc rr_fixed_fields[] = {
-    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "type", &rr_type_names },
-    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "class", &rr_class_names },
-    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "TTL", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "RD length", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "type", &rr_type_names },
+	{ ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "class", &rr_class_names },
+	{ ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "TTL", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "RD length", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 static struct_desc rr_fixed_desc = {
-    "Resource Record fixed part",
-    rr_fixed_fields,
-    /* note: following is tricky: avoids padding problems */
-    offsetof(struct rr_fixed, rdlength) + sizeof(u_int16_t)
+	"Resource Record fixed part",
+	rr_fixed_fields,
+	/* note: following is tricky: avoids padding problems */
+	offsetof(struct rr_fixed, rdlength) + sizeof(u_int16_t)
 };
 
 /* RFC 1035 3.3.14: TXT RRs have text in the RDATA field.
@@ -830,22 +870,22 @@ static struct_desc rr_fixed_desc = {
  */
 
 struct key_rdata {
-    u_int16_t flags;
-    u_int8_t protocol;
-    u_int8_t algorithm;
+	u_int16_t flags;
+	u_int8_t protocol;
+	u_int8_t algorithm;
 };
 
 static field_desc key_rdata_fields[] = {
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "flags", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "algorithm", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "flags", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "algorithm", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 static struct_desc key_rdata_desc = {
-    "KEY RR RData fixed part",
-    key_rdata_fields,
-    sizeof(struct key_rdata)
+	"KEY RR RData fixed part",
+	key_rdata_fields,
+	sizeof(struct key_rdata)
 };
 
 /* RFC 2535 4.1 SIG RDATA format:
@@ -872,30 +912,30 @@ static struct_desc key_rdata_desc = {
  */
 
 struct sig_rdata {
-    u_int16_t type_covered;
-    u_int8_t algorithm;
-    u_int8_t labels;
-    u_int32_t original_ttl;
-    u_int32_t sig_expiration;
-    u_int32_t sig_inception;
-    u_int16_t key_tag;
+	u_int16_t type_covered;
+	u_int8_t algorithm;
+	u_int8_t labels;
+	u_int32_t original_ttl;
+	u_int32_t sig_expiration;
+	u_int32_t sig_inception;
+	u_int16_t key_tag;
 };
 
 static field_desc sig_rdata_fields[] = {
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "type_covered", NULL},
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "algorithm", NULL},
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "labels", NULL},
-    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "original ttl", NULL},
-    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "sig expiration", NULL},
-    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "sig inception", NULL},
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "key tag", NULL},
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "type_covered", NULL},
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "algorithm", NULL},
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "labels", NULL},
+	{ ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "original ttl", NULL},
+	{ ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "sig expiration", NULL},
+	{ ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "sig inception", NULL},
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "key tag", NULL},
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 static struct_desc sig_rdata_desc = {
-    "SIG RR RData fixed part",
-    sig_rdata_fields,
-    sizeof(struct sig_rdata)
+	"SIG RR RData fixed part",
+	sig_rdata_fields,
+	sizeof(struct sig_rdata)
 };
 
 /* handle a KEY Resource Record. */
@@ -903,38 +943,37 @@ static struct_desc sig_rdata_desc = {
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
 static err_t
 process_key_rr(u_char *ptr, size_t len
-, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, bool doit     /* should we capture information? */
 , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
 , struct adns_continuation *const cr)
 {
-    pb_stream pbs;
-    struct key_rdata kr;
-
-    if (len < sizeof(struct key_rdata))
-	return "KEY Resource Record's RD Length is too small";
+	pb_stream pbs;
+	struct key_rdata kr;
 
-    init_pbs(&pbs, ptr, len, "KEY RR");
+	if (len < sizeof(struct key_rdata))
+		return "KEY Resource Record's RD Length is too small";
 
-    if (!in_struct(&kr, &key_rdata_desc, &pbs, NULL))
-	return "failed to get fixed part of KEY Resource Record RDATA";
+	init_pbs(&pbs, ptr, len, "KEY RR");
 
-    if (kr.protocol == 4	/* IPSEC (RFC 2535 3.1.3) */
-    && kr.algorithm == 1	/* RSA/MD5 (RFC 2535 3.2) */
-    && (kr.flags & 0x8000) == 0	/* use for authentication (3.1.2) */
-    && (kr.flags & 0x2CF0) == 0)	/* must be zero */
-    {
-	/* we have what seems to be a tasty key */
+	if (!in_struct(&kr, &key_rdata_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+		return "failed to get fixed part of KEY Resource Record RDATA";
 
-	if (doit)
+	if (kr.protocol == 4        /* IPSEC (RFC 2535 3.1.3) */
+	&& kr.algorithm == 1        /* RSA/MD5 (RFC 2535 3.2) */
+	&& (kr.flags & 0x8000) == 0 /* use for authentication (3.1.2) */
+	&& (kr.flags & 0x2CF0) == 0)        /* must be zero */
 	{
-	    chunk_t k;
+		/* we have what seems to be a tasty key */
+
+		if (doit)
+		{
+			chunk_t k = { pbs.cur, pbs_left(&pbs) };
 
-	    setchunk(k, pbs.cur, pbs_left(&pbs));
-	    TRY(add_public_key(&cr->id, dns_auth_level, PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, &k
-		, &cr->keys_from_dns));
+			TRY(add_public_key(&cr->id, dns_auth_level, PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, &k
+				, &cr->keys_from_dns));
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
@@ -946,130 +985,130 @@ process_key_rr(u_char *ptr, size_t len
 static err_t
 unpack_txt_rdata(u_char *d, size_t dlen, const u_char *s, size_t slen)
 {
-    size_t i = 0
-	, o = 0;
+	size_t i = 0
+		, o = 0;
 
-    while (i < slen)
-    {
-	size_t cl = s[i++];
+	while (i < slen)
+	{
+		size_t cl = s[i++];
 
-	if (i + cl > slen)
-	    return "TXT rr RDATA representation malformed";
+		if (i + cl > slen)
+			return "TXT rr RDATA representation malformed";
 
-	if (o + cl >= dlen)
-	    return "TXT rr RDATA too large";
+		if (o + cl >= dlen)
+			return "TXT rr RDATA too large";
 
-	memcpy(d + o, s + i, cl);
-	i += cl;
-	o += cl;
-    }
-    d[o] = '\0';
-    if (strlen(d) != o)
-	return "TXT rr RDATA contains a NUL";
+		memcpy(d + o, s + i, cl);
+		i += cl;
+		o += cl;
+	}
+	d[o] = '\0';
+	if (strlen(d) != o)
+		return "TXT rr RDATA contains a NUL";
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 static err_t
 process_txt_rr(u_char *rdata, size_t rdlen
-, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, bool doit     /* should we capture information? */
 , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
 , struct adns_continuation *const cr)
 {
-    u_char str[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES * 8 / 6 + 20];	/* space for unpacked RDATA */
+	u_char str[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES * 8 / 6 + 20];    /* space for unpacked RDATA */
 
-    TRY(unpack_txt_rdata(str, sizeof(str), rdata, rdlen));
-    return process_txt_rr_body(str, doit, dns_auth_level, cr);
+	TRY(unpack_txt_rdata(str, sizeof(str), rdata, rdlen));
+	return process_txt_rr_body(str, doit, dns_auth_level, cr);
 }
 
 static err_t
 process_answer_section(pb_stream *pbs
-, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, bool doit     /* should we capture information? */
 , enum dns_auth_level *dns_auth_level
-, u_int16_t ancount	/* number of RRs in the answer section */
+, u_int16_t ancount     /* number of RRs in the answer section */
 , struct adns_continuation *const cr)
 {
-    const int type = cr->query.type;	/* type of RR of interest */
-    unsigned c;
+	const int type = cr->query.type;    /* type of RR of interest */
+	unsigned c;
 
-    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Answer Section:"));
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Answer Section:"));
 
-    for (c = 0; c != ancount; c++)
-    {
-	struct rr_fixed rrf;
-	size_t tail;
+	for (c = 0; c != ancount; c++)
+	{
+		struct rr_fixed rrf;
+		size_t tail;
 
-	/* ??? do we need to match the name? */
+		/* ??? do we need to match the name? */
 
-	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(pbs, "Answer Section"));
+		TRY(eat_name_helpfully(pbs, "Answer Section"));
 
-	if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, pbs, NULL))
-	    return "failed to get fixed part of Answer Section Resource Record";
+		if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, pbs, NULL))
+			return "failed to get fixed part of Answer Section Resource Record";
 
-	if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(pbs))
-	    return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
+		if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(pbs))
+			return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
 
-	/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
+		/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
 
-	tail = rrf.rdlength;
+		tail = rrf.rdlength;
 
-	if (rrf.type == type && rrf.class == C_IN)
-	{
-	    err_t ugh = NULL;
+		if (rrf.type == type && rrf.class == C_IN)
+		{
+			err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	    switch (type)
-	    {
+			switch (type)
+			{
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	    case T_KEY:
-		ugh = process_key_rr(pbs->cur, tail, doit, *dns_auth_level, cr);
-		break;
+			case T_KEY:
+				ugh = process_key_rr(pbs->cur, tail, doit, *dns_auth_level, cr);
+				break;
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	    case T_TXT:
-		ugh = process_txt_rr(pbs->cur, tail, doit, *dns_auth_level, cr);
-		break;
-	    case T_SIG:
-		/* Check if SIG RR authenticates what we are learning.
-		 * The RRset covered by a SIG must have the same owner,
-		 * class, and type.
-		 * For us, the class is always C_IN, so that matches.
-		 * We decode the SIG RR's fixed part to check
-		 * that the type_covered field matches our query type
-		 * (this may be redundant).
-		 * We don't check the owner (apparently this is the
-		 * name on the record) -- we assume that it matches
-		 * or we would not have been given this SIG in the
-		 * Answer Section.
-		 *
-		 * We only look on first pass, and only if we've something
-		 * to learn.  This cuts down on useless decoding.
-		 */
-		if (!doit && *dns_auth_level == DAL_UNSIGNED)
-		{
-		    struct sig_rdata sr;
-
-		    if (!in_struct(&sr, &sig_rdata_desc, pbs, NULL))
-			ugh = "failed to get fixed part of SIG Resource Record RDATA";
-		    else if (sr.type_covered == type)
-			*dns_auth_level = DAL_SIGNED;
+			case T_TXT:
+				ugh = process_txt_rr(pbs->cur, tail, doit, *dns_auth_level, cr);
+				break;
+			case T_SIG:
+				/* Check if SIG RR authenticates what we are learning.
+				 * The RRset covered by a SIG must have the same owner,
+				 * class, and type.
+				 * For us, the class is always C_IN, so that matches.
+				 * We decode the SIG RR's fixed part to check
+				 * that the type_covered field matches our query type
+				 * (this may be redundant).
+				 * We don't check the owner (apparently this is the
+				 * name on the record) -- we assume that it matches
+				 * or we would not have been given this SIG in the
+				 * Answer Section.
+				 *
+				 * We only look on first pass, and only if we've something
+				 * to learn.  This cuts down on useless decoding.
+				 */
+				if (!doit && *dns_auth_level == DAL_UNSIGNED)
+				{
+					struct sig_rdata sr;
+
+					if (!in_struct(&sr, &sig_rdata_desc, pbs, NULL))
+						ugh = "failed to get fixed part of SIG Resource Record RDATA";
+					else if (sr.type_covered == type)
+						*dns_auth_level = DAL_SIGNED;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				ugh = builddiag("unexpected RR type %d", type);
+				break;
+			}
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+				return ugh;
 		}
-		break;
-	    default:
-		ugh = builddiag("unexpected RR type %d", type);
-		break;
-	    }
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		return ugh;
+		in_raw(NULL, tail, pbs, "RR RDATA");
 	}
-	in_raw(NULL, tail, pbs, "RR RDATA");
-    }
 
-    return doit
-	&& cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL
+	return doit
+		&& cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	&& cr->keys_from_dns == NULL
+		&& cr->keys_from_dns == NULL
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	? builddiag("no suitable %s record found in DNS", rr_typename(type))
-	: NULL;
+		? builddiag("no suitable %s record found in DNS", rr_typename(type))
+		: NULL;
 }
 
 /* process DNS answer -- TXT or KEY query */
@@ -1078,153 +1117,153 @@ static err_t
 process_dns_answer(struct adns_continuation *const cr
 , u_char ans[], int anslen)
 {
-    const int type = cr->query.type;	/* type of record being sought */
-    int r;	/* all-purpose return value holder */
-    u_int16_t c;	/* number of current RR in current answer section */
-    pb_stream pbs;
-    u_int8_t *ans_start;	/* saved position of answer section */
-    struct qr_header qr_header;
-    enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level;
+	const int type = cr->query.type;    /* type of record being sought */
+	int r;      /* all-purpose return value holder */
+	u_int16_t c;        /* number of current RR in current answer section */
+	pb_stream pbs;
+	u_int8_t *ans_start;        /* saved position of answer section */
+	struct qr_header qr_header;
+	enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level;
 
-    init_pbs(&pbs, ans, anslen, "Query Response Message");
+	init_pbs(&pbs, ans, anslen, "Query Response Message");
 
-    /* decode and check header */
+	/* decode and check header */
 
-    if (!in_struct(&qr_header, &qr_header_desc, &pbs, NULL))
-	return "malformed header";
+	if (!in_struct(&qr_header, &qr_header_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+		return "malformed header";
 
-    /* ID: nothing to do with us */
+	/* ID: nothing to do with us */
 
-    /* stuff -- lots of things */
-    if ((qr_header.stuff & QRS_QR) == 0)
-	return "not a response?!?";
+	/* stuff -- lots of things */
+	if ((qr_header.stuff & QRS_QR) == 0)
+		return "not a response?!?";
 
-    if (((qr_header.stuff >> QRS_OPCODE_SHIFT) & QRS_OPCODE_MASK) != QRSO_QUERY)
-	return "unexpected opcode";
+	if (((qr_header.stuff >> QRS_OPCODE_SHIFT) & QRS_OPCODE_MASK) != QRSO_QUERY)
+		return "unexpected opcode";
 
-    /* I don't think we care about AA */
+	/* I don't think we care about AA */
 
-    if (qr_header.stuff & QRS_TC)
-	return "response truncated";
+	if (qr_header.stuff & QRS_TC)
+		return "response truncated";
 
-    /* I don't think we care about RD, RA, or CD */
+	/* I don't think we care about RD, RA, or CD */
 
-    /* AD means "authentic data" */
-    dns_auth_level = qr_header.stuff & QRS_AD? DAL_UNSIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC;
+	/* AD means "authentic data" */
+	dns_auth_level = qr_header.stuff & QRS_AD? DAL_UNSIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC;
 
-    if (qr_header.stuff & QRS_Z)
-	return "Z bit is not zero";
+	if (qr_header.stuff & QRS_Z)
+		return "Z bit is not zero";
 
-    r = (qr_header.stuff >> QRS_RCODE_SHIFT) & QRS_RCODE_MASK;
-    if (r != 0)
-	return r < (int)elemsof(rcode_text)? rcode_text[r] : "unknown rcode";
+	r = (qr_header.stuff >> QRS_RCODE_SHIFT) & QRS_RCODE_MASK;
+	if (r != 0)
+		return r < (int)countof(rcode_text)? rcode_text[r] : "unknown rcode";
 
-    if (qr_header.ancount == 0)
-	return builddiag("no %s RR found by DNS", rr_typename(type));
+	if (qr_header.ancount == 0)
+		return builddiag("no %s RR found by DNS", rr_typename(type));
 
-    /* end of header checking */
+	/* end of header checking */
 
-    /* Question Section processing */
+	/* Question Section processing */
 
-    /* 4.1.2. Question section format:
-     *                                 1  1  1  1  1  1
-     *   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
-     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-     * |                                               |
-     * /                     QNAME                     /
-     * /                                               /
-     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-     * |                     QTYPE                     |
-     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-     * |                     QCLASS                    |
-     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
-     */
+	/* 4.1.2. Question section format:
+	 *                                 1  1  1  1  1  1
+	 *   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
+	 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+	 * |                                               |
+	 * /                     QNAME                     /
+	 * /                                               /
+	 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+	 * |                     QTYPE                     |
+	 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+	 * |                     QCLASS                    |
+	 * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+	 */
 
-    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Question Section:"));
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Question Section:"));
 
-    for (c = 0; c != qr_header.qdcount; c++)
-    {
-	struct qs_fixed qsf;
+	for (c = 0; c != qr_header.qdcount; c++)
+	{
+		struct qs_fixed qsf;
 
-	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Question Section"));
+		TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Question Section"));
 
-	if (!in_struct(&qsf, &qs_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
-	    return "failed to get fixed part of Question Section";
+		if (!in_struct(&qsf, &qs_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+			return "failed to get fixed part of Question Section";
 
-	if (qsf.qtype != type)
-	    return "unexpected QTYPE in Question Section";
+		if (qsf.qtype != type)
+			return "unexpected QTYPE in Question Section";
 
-	if (qsf.qclass != C_IN)
-	    return "unexpected QCLASS in Question Section";
-    }
+		if (qsf.qclass != C_IN)
+			return "unexpected QCLASS in Question Section";
+	}
 
-    /* rest of sections are made up of Resource Records */
+	/* rest of sections are made up of Resource Records */
 
-    /* Answer Section processing -- error checking, noting T_SIG */
+	/* Answer Section processing -- error checking, noting T_SIG */
 
-    ans_start = pbs.cur;	/* remember start of answer section */
+	ans_start = pbs.cur;        /* remember start of answer section */
 
-    TRY(process_answer_section(&pbs, FALSE, &dns_auth_level
-	, qr_header.ancount, cr));
+	TRY(process_answer_section(&pbs, FALSE, &dns_auth_level
+		, qr_header.ancount, cr));
 
-    /* Authority Section processing (just sanity checking) */
+	/* Authority Section processing (just sanity checking) */
 
-    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Authority Section:"));
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Authority Section:"));
 
-    for (c = 0; c != qr_header.nscount; c++)
-    {
-	struct rr_fixed rrf;
-	size_t tail;
+	for (c = 0; c != qr_header.nscount; c++)
+	{
+		struct rr_fixed rrf;
+		size_t tail;
 
-	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Authority Section"));
+		TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Authority Section"));
 
-	if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
-	    return "failed to get fixed part of Authority Section Resource Record";
+		if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+			return "failed to get fixed part of Authority Section Resource Record";
 
-	if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(&pbs))
-	    return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
+		if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(&pbs))
+			return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
 
-	/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
+		/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
 
-	tail = rrf.rdlength;
+		tail = rrf.rdlength;
 
-	in_raw(NULL, tail, &pbs, "RR RDATA");
-    }
+		in_raw(NULL, tail, &pbs, "RR RDATA");
+	}
 
-    /* Additional Section processing (just sanity checking) */
+	/* Additional Section processing (just sanity checking) */
 
-    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Additional Section:"));
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Additional Section:"));
 
-    for (c = 0; c != qr_header.arcount; c++)
-    {
-	struct rr_fixed rrf;
-	size_t tail;
+	for (c = 0; c != qr_header.arcount; c++)
+	{
+		struct rr_fixed rrf;
+		size_t tail;
 
-	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Additional Section"));
+		TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Additional Section"));
 
-	if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
-	    return "failed to get fixed part of Additional Section Resource Record";
+		if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+			return "failed to get fixed part of Additional Section Resource Record";
 
-	if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(&pbs))
-	    return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
+		if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(&pbs))
+			return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
 
-	/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
+		/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
 
-	tail = rrf.rdlength;
+		tail = rrf.rdlength;
 
-	in_raw(NULL, tail, &pbs, "RR RDATA");
-    }
+		in_raw(NULL, tail, &pbs, "RR RDATA");
+	}
 
-    /* done all sections */
+	/* done all sections */
 
-    /* ??? is padding legal, or can we complain if more left in record? */
+	/* ??? is padding legal, or can we complain if more left in record? */
 
-    /* process Answer Section again -- accept contents */
+	/* process Answer Section again -- accept contents */
 
-    pbs.cur = ans_start;	/* go back to start of answer section */
+	pbs.cur = ans_start;        /* go back to start of answer section */
 
-    return process_answer_section(&pbs, TRUE, &dns_auth_level
-	, qr_header.ancount, cr);
+	return process_answer_section(&pbs, TRUE, &dns_auth_level
+		, qr_header.ancount, cr);
 }
 
 #endif /* ! USE_LWRES */
@@ -1239,101 +1278,101 @@ build_dns_name(u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2]
 , const char *typename USED_BY_DEBUG
 , const char *gwname   USED_BY_DEBUG)
 {
-    /* note: all end in "." to suppress relative searches */
-    id = resolve_myid(id);
-    switch (id->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    {
-	/* XXX: this is really ugly and only temporary until addrtot can
-	 *      generate the correct format
-	 */
-	const unsigned char *b;
-	size_t bl USED_BY_DEBUG = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr, &b);
-
-	passert(bl == 4);
-	snprintf(name_buf, NS_MAXDNAME + 2, "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa."
-	    , b[3], b[2], b[1], b[0]);
-	break;
-    }
-
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-    {
-	/* ??? is this correct? */
-	const unsigned char *b;
-	size_t bl;
-	u_char *op = name_buf;
-	static const char suffix[] = "IP6.INT.";
-
-	for (bl = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr, &b); bl-- != 0; )
+	/* note: all end in "." to suppress relative searches */
+	id = resolve_myid(id);
+	switch (id->kind)
+	{
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
 	{
-	    if (op + 4 + sizeof(suffix) >= name_buf + NS_MAXDNAME + 1)
-		return "IPv6 reverse name too long";
-	    op += sprintf(op, "%x.%x.", b[bl] & 0xF, b[bl] >> 4);
+		/* XXX: this is really ugly and only temporary until addrtot can
+		 *      generate the correct format
+		 */
+		const unsigned char *b;
+		size_t bl USED_BY_DEBUG = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr, &b);
+
+		passert(bl == 4);
+		snprintf(name_buf, NS_MAXDNAME + 2, "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa."
+			, b[3], b[2], b[1], b[0]);
+		break;
 	}
-	strcpy(op, suffix);
-	break;
-    }
 
-    case ID_FQDN:
-	/* strip trailing "." characters, then add one */
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
 	{
-	    size_t il = id->name.len;
-
-	    while (il > 0 && id->name.ptr[il - 1] == '.')
-		il--;
-	    if (il > NS_MAXDNAME)
-		return "FQDN too long for domain name";
+		/* ??? is this correct? */
+		const unsigned char *b;
+		size_t bl;
+		u_char *op = name_buf;
+		static const char suffix[] = "IP6.INT.";
 
-	    memcpy(name_buf, id->name.ptr, il);
-	    strcpy(name_buf + il, ".");
+		for (bl = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr, &b); bl-- != 0; )
+		{
+			if (op + 4 + sizeof(suffix) >= name_buf + NS_MAXDNAME + 1)
+				return "IPv6 reverse name too long";
+			op += sprintf(op, "%x.%x.", b[bl] & 0xF, b[bl] >> 4);
+		}
+		strcpy(op, suffix);
+		break;
 	}
-	break;
 
-    default:
-	return "can only query DNS for key for ID that is a FQDN, IPV4_ADDR, or IPV6_ADDR";
-    }
+	case ID_FQDN:
+		/* strip trailing "." characters, then add one */
+		{
+			size_t il = id->name.len;
+
+			while (il > 0 && id->name.ptr[il - 1] == '.')
+				il--;
+			if (il > NS_MAXDNAME)
+				return "FQDN too long for domain name";
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS, DBG_log("DNS query %lu for %s for %s (gw: %s)"
-	, serial, typename, name_buf, gwname));
-    return NULL;
+			memcpy(name_buf, id->name.ptr, il);
+			strcpy(name_buf + il, ".");
+		}
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return "can only query DNS for key for ID that is a FQDN, IPV4_ADDR, or IPV6_ADDR";
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS, DBG_log("DNS query %lu for %s for %s (gw: %s)"
+		, serial, typename, name_buf, gwname));
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 void
 gw_addref(struct gw_info *gw)
 {
-    if (gw != NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("gw_addref: %p refcnt: %d++", gw, gw->refcnt))
-	gw->refcnt++;
-    }
+	if (gw != NULL)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("gw_addref: %p refcnt: %d++", gw, gw->refcnt))
+		gw->refcnt++;
+	}
 }
 
 void
 gw_delref(struct gw_info **gwp)
 {
-    struct gw_info *gw = *gwp;
-
-    if (gw != NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("gw_delref: %p refcnt: %d--", gw, gw->refcnt));
+	struct gw_info *gw = *gwp;
 
-	passert(gw->refcnt != 0);
-	gw->refcnt--;
-	if (gw->refcnt == 0)
+	if (gw != NULL)
 	{
-	    free_id_content(&gw->client_id);
-	    free_id_content(&gw->gw_id);
-	    if (gw->gw_key_present)
-		unreference_key(&gw->key);
-	    gw_delref(&gw->next);
-	    pfree(gw);	/* trickery could make this a tail-call */
+		DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("gw_delref: %p refcnt: %d--", gw, gw->refcnt));
+
+		passert(gw->refcnt != 0);
+		gw->refcnt--;
+		if (gw->refcnt == 0)
+		{
+			free_id_content(&gw->client_id);
+			free_id_content(&gw->gw_id);
+			if (gw->gw_key_present)
+				unreference_key(&gw->key);
+			gw_delref(&gw->next);
+			free(gw);   /* trickery could make this a tail-call */
+		}
+		*gwp = NULL;
 	}
-	*gwp = NULL;
-    }
 }
 
-static int adns_in_flight = 0;	/* queries outstanding */
+static int adns_in_flight = 0;  /* queries outstanding */
 
 /* Start an asynchronous DNS query.
  *
@@ -1372,123 +1411,123 @@ static int adns_in_flight = 0;	/* queries outstanding */
  * disestablishing any logging context (whack_log_fd, cur_*).
  */
 
-static struct adns_continuation *continuations = NULL;	/* newest of queue */
-static struct adns_continuation *next_query = NULL;	/* oldest not sent */
+static struct adns_continuation *continuations = NULL;  /* newest of queue */
+static struct adns_continuation *next_query = NULL;     /* oldest not sent */
 
 static struct adns_continuation *
 continuation_for_qtid(unsigned long qtid)
 {
-    struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
+	struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
 
-    if (qtid != 0)
-	for (cr = continuations; cr != NULL && cr->qtid != qtid; cr = cr->previous)
-	    ;
-    return cr;
+	if (qtid != 0)
+		for (cr = continuations; cr != NULL && cr->qtid != qtid; cr = cr->previous)
+			;
+	return cr;
 }
 
 static void
 release_adns_continuation(struct adns_continuation *cr)
 {
-    passert(cr != next_query);
-    gw_delref(&cr->gateways_from_dns);
+	passert(cr != next_query);
+	gw_delref(&cr->gateways_from_dns);
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    free_public_keys(&cr->keys_from_dns);
+	free_public_keys(&cr->keys_from_dns);
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-    unshare_id_content(&cr->id);
-    unshare_id_content(&cr->sgw_id);
-
-    /* unlink from doubly-linked list */
-    if (cr->next == NULL)
-    {
-	passert(continuations == cr);
-	continuations = cr->previous;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	passert(cr->next->previous == cr);
-	cr->next->previous = cr->previous;
-    }
-
-    if (cr->previous != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(cr->previous->next == cr);
-	cr->previous->next = cr->next;
-    }
-
-    pfree(cr);
+	unshare_id_content(&cr->id);
+	unshare_id_content(&cr->sgw_id);
+
+	/* unlink from doubly-linked list */
+	if (cr->next == NULL)
+	{
+		passert(continuations == cr);
+		continuations = cr->previous;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		passert(cr->next->previous == cr);
+		cr->next->previous = cr->previous;
+	}
+
+	if (cr->previous != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(cr->previous->next == cr);
+		cr->previous->next = cr->next;
+	}
+
+	free(cr);
 }
 
 err_t
-start_adns_query(const struct id *id	/* domain to query */
-, const struct id *sgw_id	/* if non-null, any accepted gw_info must match */
-, int type	/* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
+start_adns_query(const struct id *id    /* domain to query */
+, const struct id *sgw_id       /* if non-null, any accepted gw_info must match */
+, int type      /* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
 , cont_fn_t cont_fn
 , struct adns_continuation *cr)
 {
-    static unsigned long qtid = 1;	/* query transaction id; NOTE: static */
-    const char *typename = rr_typename(type);
-    char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
-
-    if(adns_pid == 0
-       && adns_restart_count < ADNS_RESTART_MAX)
-    {
-	plog("ADNS helper was not running. Restarting attempt %d",adns_restart_count);
-	init_adns();
-    }
-
-
-    /* Splice this in at head of doubly-linked list of continuations.
-     * Note: this must be done before any release_adns_continuation().
-     */
-    cr->next = NULL;
-    cr->previous = continuations;
-    if (continuations != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(continuations->next == NULL);
-	continuations->next = cr;
-    }
-    continuations = cr;
-
-    cr->qtid = qtid++;
-    cr->type = type;
-    cr->cont_fn = cont_fn;
-    cr->id = *id;
-    unshare_id_content(&cr->id);
-    cr->sgw_specified = sgw_id != NULL;
-    cr->sgw_id = cr->sgw_specified? *sgw_id : empty_id;
-    unshare_id_content(&cr->sgw_id);
-    cr->gateways_from_dns = NULL;
+	static unsigned long qtid = 1;      /* query transaction id; NOTE: static */
+	const char *typename = rr_typename(type);
+	char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+	if(adns_pid == 0
+	   && adns_restart_count < ADNS_RESTART_MAX)
+	{
+		plog("ADNS helper was not running. Restarting attempt %d",adns_restart_count);
+		init_adns();
+	}
+
+
+	/* Splice this in at head of doubly-linked list of continuations.
+	 * Note: this must be done before any release_adns_continuation().
+	 */
+	cr->next = NULL;
+	cr->previous = continuations;
+	if (continuations != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(continuations->next == NULL);
+		continuations->next = cr;
+	}
+	continuations = cr;
+
+	cr->qtid = qtid++;
+	cr->type = type;
+	cr->cont_fn = cont_fn;
+	cr->id = *id;
+	unshare_id_content(&cr->id);
+	cr->sgw_specified = sgw_id != NULL;
+	cr->sgw_id = cr->sgw_specified? *sgw_id : empty_id;
+	unshare_id_content(&cr->sgw_id);
+	cr->gateways_from_dns = NULL;
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    cr->keys_from_dns = NULL;
+	cr->keys_from_dns = NULL;
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    cr->debugging = cur_debugging;
+	cr->debugging = cur_debugging;
 #else
-    cr->debugging = LEMPTY;
+	cr->debugging = LEMPTY;
 #endif
 
-    idtoa(&cr->sgw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+	idtoa(&cr->sgw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
 
-    zero(&cr->query);
+	zero(&cr->query);
 
-    {
-	err_t ugh = build_dns_name(cr->query.name_buf, cr->qtid
-	    , id, typename, gwidb);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
 	{
-	    release_adns_continuation(cr);
-	    return ugh;
+		err_t ugh = build_dns_name(cr->query.name_buf, cr->qtid
+			, id, typename, gwidb);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			release_adns_continuation(cr);
+			return ugh;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (next_query == NULL)
-	next_query = cr;
+	if (next_query == NULL)
+		next_query = cr;
 
-    unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+	unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* send remaining ADNS queries (until pipe full or none left)
@@ -1501,79 +1540,79 @@ bool unsent_ADNS_queries = FALSE;
 void
 send_unsent_ADNS_queries(void)
 {
-    static const unsigned char *buf_end = NULL;	/* NOTE STATIC */
-    static const unsigned char *buf_cur = NULL;	/* NOTE STATIC */
+	static const unsigned char *buf_end = NULL; /* NOTE STATIC */
+	static const unsigned char *buf_cur = NULL; /* NOTE STATIC */
 
-    if (adns_qfd == NULL_FD)
-	return;	/* nothing useful to do */
+	if (adns_qfd == NULL_FD)
+		return; /* nothing useful to do */
 
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	if (buf_cur != buf_end)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    static int try = 0;	/* NOTE STATIC */
-	    size_t n = buf_end - buf_cur;
-	    ssize_t r = write(adns_qfd, buf_cur, n);
-
-	    if (r == -1)
-	    {
-		switch (errno)
+		if (buf_cur != buf_end)
 		{
-		case EINTR:
-		    continue;	/* try again now */
-		case EAGAIN:
-		    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("EAGAIN writing to ADNS"));
-		    break;	/* try again later */
-		default:
-		    try++;
-		    log_errno((e, "error %d writing DNS query", try));
-		    break;	/* try again later */
+			static int try = 0; /* NOTE STATIC */
+			size_t n = buf_end - buf_cur;
+			ssize_t r = write(adns_qfd, buf_cur, n);
+
+			if (r == -1)
+			{
+				switch (errno)
+				{
+				case EINTR:
+					continue;   /* try again now */
+				case EAGAIN:
+					DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("EAGAIN writing to ADNS"));
+					break;      /* try again later */
+				default:
+					try++;
+					log_errno((e, "error %d writing DNS query", try));
+					break;      /* try again later */
+				}
+				unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+				break;  /* done! */
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				passert(r >= 0);
+				try = 0;
+				buf_cur += r;
+			}
 		}
-		unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
-		break;	/* done! */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		passert(r >= 0);
-		try = 0;
-		buf_cur += r;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    if (next_query == NULL)
-	    {
-		unsent_ADNS_queries = FALSE;
-		break;	/* done! */
-	    }
+		else
+		{
+			if (next_query == NULL)
+			{
+				unsent_ADNS_queries = FALSE;
+				break;  /* done! */
+			}
 
 #ifdef USE_LWRES
-	    next_query->used = FALSE;
-	    {
-		/* NOTE STATIC: */
-		static unsigned char qbuf[LWDNSQ_CMDBUF_LEN + 1];	/* room for NUL */
-
-		snprintf(qbuf, sizeof(qbuf), "%s %lu %s\n"
-		    , rr_typename(next_query->type)
-		    , next_query->qtid
-		    , next_query->query.name_buf);
-		DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("lwdnsq query: %.*s", (int)(strlen(qbuf) - 1), qbuf));
-		buf_cur = qbuf;
-		buf_end = qbuf + strlen(qbuf);
-	    }
+			next_query->used = FALSE;
+			{
+				/* NOTE STATIC: */
+				static unsigned char qbuf[LWDNSQ_CMDBUF_LEN + 1];       /* room for NUL */
+
+				snprintf(qbuf, sizeof(qbuf), "%s %lu %s\n"
+					, rr_typename(next_query->type)
+					, next_query->qtid
+					, next_query->query.name_buf);
+				DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("lwdnsq query: %.*s", (int)(strlen(qbuf) - 1), qbuf));
+				buf_cur = qbuf;
+				buf_end = qbuf + strlen(qbuf);
+			}
 #else /* !USE_LWRES */
-	    next_query->query.debugging = next_query->debugging;
-	    next_query->query.serial = next_query->qtid;
-	    next_query->query.len = sizeof(next_query->query);
-	    next_query->query.qmagic = ADNS_Q_MAGIC;
-	    next_query->query.type = next_query->type;
-	    buf_cur = (const void *)&next_query->query;
-	    buf_end = buf_cur + sizeof(next_query->query);
+			next_query->query.debugging = next_query->debugging;
+			next_query->query.serial = next_query->qtid;
+			next_query->query.len = sizeof(next_query->query);
+			next_query->query.qmagic = ADNS_Q_MAGIC;
+			next_query->query.type = next_query->type;
+			buf_cur = (const void *)&next_query->query;
+			buf_end = buf_cur + sizeof(next_query->query);
 #endif /* !USE_LWRES */
-	    next_query = next_query->next;
-	    adns_in_flight++;
+			next_query = next_query->next;
+			adns_in_flight++;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 #ifdef USE_LWRES
@@ -1584,379 +1623,379 @@ send_unsent_ADNS_queries(void)
 static err_t
 process_lwdnsq_answer(char *ts)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    char *rest;
-    char *p;
-    char *endofnumber;
-    struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
-    unsigned long qtid;
-    time_t anstime;	/* time of answer */
-    char *atype;	/* type of answer */
-    long ttl;	/* ttl of answer; int, but long for conversion */
-    bool AuthenticatedData = FALSE;
-    static char scratch_null_str[] = "";	/* cannot be const, but isn't written */
-
-    /* query transaction id */
-    rest = ts;
-    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (p == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq: answer missing query transaction ID";
-
-    qtid = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
-    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
-	return "lwdnsq: malformed query transaction ID";
-
-    cr = continuation_for_qtid(qtid);
-    if (qtid != 0 && cr == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq: unrecognized qtid";     /* can't happen! */
-
-    /* time */
-    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (p == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq: missing time";
-
-    anstime = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
-    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
-	return "lwdnsq: malformed time";
-
-    /* TTL */
-    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (p == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq: missing TTL";
-
-    ttl = strtol(p, &endofnumber, 10);
-    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
-	return "lwdnsq: malformed TTL";
-
-    /* type */
-    atype = strsep(&rest, " \t");
-    if (atype == NULL)
-	return "lwdnsq: missing type";
-
-    /* if rest is NULL, make it "", otherwise eat whitespace after type */
-    rest = rest == NULL? scratch_null_str : rest + strspn(rest, " \t");
-
-    if (strncasecmp(atype, "AD-", 3) == 0)
-    {
-	AuthenticatedData = TRUE;
-	atype += 3;
-    }
-
-    /* deal with each type */
-
-    if (cr == NULL)
-    {
-	/* we don't actually know which this applies to */
-	return builddiag("lwdnsq: 0 qtid invalid with %s", atype);
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "START"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "DONE"))
-    {
-	if (!cr->used)
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	char *rest;
+	char *p;
+	char *endofnumber;
+	struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
+	unsigned long qtid;
+	time_t anstime;     /* time of answer */
+	char *atype;        /* type of answer */
+	long ttl;   /* ttl of answer; int, but long for conversion */
+	bool AuthenticatedData = FALSE;
+	static char scratch_null_str[] = "";        /* cannot be const, but isn't written */
+
+	/* query transaction id */
+	rest = ts;
+	p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq: answer missing query transaction ID";
+
+	qtid = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+	if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+		return "lwdnsq: malformed query transaction ID";
+
+	cr = continuation_for_qtid(qtid);
+	if (qtid != 0 && cr == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq: unrecognized qtid";     /* can't happen! */
+
+	/* time */
+	p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq: missing time";
+
+	anstime = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+	if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+		return "lwdnsq: malformed time";
+
+	/* TTL */
+	p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (p == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq: missing TTL";
+
+	ttl = strtol(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+	if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+		return "lwdnsq: malformed TTL";
+
+	/* type */
+	atype = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+	if (atype == NULL)
+		return "lwdnsq: missing type";
+
+	/* if rest is NULL, make it "", otherwise eat whitespace after type */
+	rest = rest == NULL? scratch_null_str : rest + strspn(rest, " \t");
+
+	if (strncasecmp(atype, "AD-", 3) == 0)
 	{
-	    /* "no results returned by lwdnsq" should not happen */
-	    cr->cont_fn(cr
-		, cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL
+		AuthenticatedData = TRUE;
+		atype += 3;
+	}
+
+	/* deal with each type */
+
+	if (cr == NULL)
+	{
+		/* we don't actually know which this applies to */
+		return builddiag("lwdnsq: 0 qtid invalid with %s", atype);
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "START"))
+	{
+		/* ignore */
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "DONE"))
+	{
+		if (!cr->used)
+		{
+			/* "no results returned by lwdnsq" should not happen */
+			cr->cont_fn(cr
+				, cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		  && cr->keys_from_dns == NULL
+				  && cr->keys_from_dns == NULL
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-		    ? "no results returned by lwdnsq" : NULL);
-	    cr->used = TRUE;
+					? "no results returned by lwdnsq" : NULL);
+			cr->used = TRUE;
+		}
+		reset_globals();
+		release_adns_continuation(cr);
+		adns_in_flight--;
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "RETRY"))
+	{
+		if (!cr->used)
+		{
+			cr->cont_fn(cr, rest);
+			cr->used = TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-	reset_globals();
-	release_adns_continuation(cr);
-	adns_in_flight--;
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "RETRY"))
-    {
-	if (!cr->used)
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "FATAL"))
 	{
-	    cr->cont_fn(cr, rest);
-	    cr->used = TRUE;
+		if (!cr->used)
+		{
+			cr->cont_fn(cr, rest);
+			cr->used = TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "FATAL"))
-    {
-	if (!cr->used)
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "DNSSEC"))
 	{
-	    cr->cont_fn(cr, rest);
-	    cr->used = TRUE;
+		/* ignore */
 	}
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "DNSSEC"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "NAME"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "TXT"))
-    {
-	char *end = rest + strlen(rest);
-	err_t txt_ugh;
-
-	if (*rest == '"' && end[-1] == '"')
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "NAME"))
 	{
-	    /* strip those pesky quotes */
-	    rest++;
-	    *--end = '\0';
+		/* ignore */
 	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "TXT"))
+	{
+		char *end = rest + strlen(rest);
+		err_t txt_ugh;
+
+		if (*rest == '"' && end[-1] == '"')
+		{
+			/* strip those pesky quotes */
+			rest++;
+			*--end = '\0';
+		}
 
-	txt_ugh = process_txt_rr_body(rest
-	    , TRUE
-	    , AuthenticatedData? DAL_SIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC
-	    , cr);
+		txt_ugh = process_txt_rr_body(rest
+			, TRUE
+			, AuthenticatedData? DAL_SIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC
+			, cr);
 
-	if (txt_ugh != NULL)
+		if (txt_ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_DNS,
+				DBG_log("error processing TXT resource record (%s) while processing: %s"
+						, txt_ugh, rest));
+			cr->cont_fn(cr, txt_ugh);
+			cr->used = TRUE;
+		}
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "SIG"))
+	{
+		/* record the SIG records for posterity */
+		if (cr->last_info != NULL)
+		{
+			free(cr->last_info->dns_sig);
+			cr->last_info->dns_sig = clone_str(rest);
+		}
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "A"))
+	{
+		/* ignore */
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "AAAA"))
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
-		DBG_log("error processing TXT resource record (%s) while processing: %s"
-			, txt_ugh, rest));
-	    cr->cont_fn(cr, txt_ugh);
-	    cr->used = TRUE;
+		/* ignore */
 	}
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "SIG"))
-    {
-	/* record the SIG records for posterity */
-	if (cr->last_info != NULL)
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "CNAME"))
 	{
-	    pfreeany(cr->last_info->dns_sig);
-	    cr->last_info->dns_sig = clone_str(rest, "sigrecord");
+		/* ignore */
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "CNAMEFROM"))
+	{
+		/* ignore */
+	}
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "PTR"))
+	{
+		/* ignore */
 	}
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "A"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "AAAA"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "CNAME"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "CNAMEFROM"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "PTR"))
-    {
-	/* ignore */
-    }
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "KEY"))
-    {
-	err_t key_ugh = process_lwdnsq_key(rest
-	    , AuthenticatedData? DAL_SIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC
-	    , cr);
-
-	if (key_ugh != NULL)
+	else if (strcaseeq(atype, "KEY"))
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
-		DBG_log("error processing KEY resource record (%s) while processing: %s"
-			, key_ugh, rest));
-	    cr->cont_fn(cr, key_ugh);
-	    cr->used = TRUE;
+		err_t key_ugh = process_lwdnsq_key(rest
+			, AuthenticatedData? DAL_SIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC
+			, cr);
+
+		if (key_ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_DNS,
+				DBG_log("error processing KEY resource record (%s) while processing: %s"
+						, key_ugh, rest));
+			cr->cont_fn(cr, key_ugh);
+			cr->used = TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-    else
-    {
-	ugh = "lwdnsq: unrecognized type";
-    }
-    return ugh;
+	else
+	{
+		ugh = "lwdnsq: unrecognized type";
+	}
+	return ugh;
 }
 #endif /* USE_LWRES */
 
 static void
 recover_adns_die(void)
 {
-    struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
-    
-    adns_pid = 0;
-    if(adns_restart_count < ADNS_RESTART_MAX) {
-	adns_restart_count++;
+	struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
+	
+	adns_pid = 0;
+	if(adns_restart_count < ADNS_RESTART_MAX) {
+		adns_restart_count++;
 
-	/* next DNS query will restart it */
+		/* next DNS query will restart it */
 
-	/* we have to walk the list of the outstanding requests,
-	 * and redo them!
-	 */
+		/* we have to walk the list of the outstanding requests,
+		 * and redo them!
+		 */
 
-	cr = continuations;
+		cr = continuations;
 
-	/* find the head of the list */
-	if(continuations != NULL) {
-	    for (; cr->previous != NULL; cr = cr->previous);
-	}
-	    
-	next_query = cr;
+		/* find the head of the list */
+		if(continuations != NULL) {
+			for (; cr->previous != NULL; cr = cr->previous);
+		}
+			
+		next_query = cr;
 
-	if(next_query != NULL) {
-	    unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+		if(next_query != NULL) {
+			unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 void reset_adns_restart_count(void)
 {
-    adns_restart_count=0;
+	adns_restart_count=0;
 }
 
 void
 handle_adns_answer(void)
 {
   /* These are retained across calls to handle_adns_answer. */
-    static size_t buflen = 0;	/* bytes in answer buffer */
+	static size_t buflen = 0;   /* bytes in answer buffer */
 #ifndef USE_LWRES
-    static struct adns_answer buf;
+	static struct adns_answer buf;
 #else /* USE_LWRES */
-    static char buf[LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX];
-    static char buf_copy[LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX];
+	static char buf[LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX];
+	static char buf_copy[LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX];
 #endif /* USE_LWRES */
 
-    ssize_t n;
+	ssize_t n;
 
-    passert(buflen < sizeof(buf));
-    n = read(adns_afd, (unsigned char *)&buf + buflen, sizeof(buf) - buflen);
+	passert(buflen < sizeof(buf));
+	n = read(adns_afd, (unsigned char *)&buf + buflen, sizeof(buf) - buflen);
 
-    if (n < 0)
-    {
-	if (errno != EINTR)
+	if (n < 0)
 	{
-	    log_errno((e, "error reading answer from adns"));
-	    /* ??? how can we recover? */
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "error reading answer from adns"));
+			/* ??? how can we recover? */
+		}
+		n = 0;  /* now n reflects amount read */
 	}
-	n = 0;	/* now n reflects amount read */
-    }
-    else if (n == 0)
-    {
-	/* EOF */
-	if (adns_in_flight != 0)
+	else if (n == 0)
 	{
-	    plog("EOF from ADNS with %d queries outstanding (restarts %d)"
-		 , adns_in_flight, adns_restart_count);
-	    recover_adns_die();
+		/* EOF */
+		if (adns_in_flight != 0)
+		{
+			plog("EOF from ADNS with %d queries outstanding (restarts %d)"
+				 , adns_in_flight, adns_restart_count);
+			recover_adns_die();
+		}
+		if (buflen != 0)
+		{
+			plog("EOF from ADNS with %lu bytes of a partial answer outstanding"
+				 "(restarts %d)"
+				 , (unsigned long)buflen
+				 ,  adns_restart_count);
+			recover_adns_die();
+		}
+		stop_adns();
+		return;
 	}
-	if (buflen != 0)
+	else
 	{
-	    plog("EOF from ADNS with %lu bytes of a partial answer outstanding"
-		 "(restarts %d)"
-		 , (unsigned long)buflen
-		 ,  adns_restart_count);
-	    recover_adns_die();
+		passert(adns_in_flight > 0);
 	}
-	stop_adns();
-	return;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	passert(adns_in_flight > 0);
-    }
-
-    buflen += n;
+
+	buflen += n;
 #ifndef USE_LWRES
-    while (buflen >= offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans) && buflen >= buf.len)
-    {
-	/* we've got a tasty answer -- process it */
-	err_t ugh;
-	struct adns_continuation *cr = continuation_for_qtid(buf.serial);	/* assume it works */
-	const char *typename = rr_typename(cr->query.type);
-	const char *name_buf = cr->query.name_buf;
+	while (buflen >= offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans) && buflen >= buf.len)
+	{
+		/* we've got a tasty answer -- process it */
+		err_t ugh;
+		struct adns_continuation *cr = continuation_for_qtid(buf.serial);       /* assume it works */
+		const char *typename = rr_typename(cr->query.type);
+		const char *name_buf = cr->query.name_buf;
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	passert(cr->keys_from_dns == NULL);
+		passert(cr->keys_from_dns == NULL);
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	passert(cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL);
-	adns_in_flight--;
-	if (buf.result == -1)
-	{
-	    /* newer resolvers support statp->res_h_errno as well as h_errno.
-	     * That might be better, but older resolvers don't.
-	     * See resolver(3), if you have it.
-	     * The undocumented(!) h_errno values are defined in
-	     * /usr/include/netdb.h.
-	     */
-	    switch (buf.h_errno_val)
-	    {
-	    case NO_DATA:
-		ugh = builddiag("no %s record for %s", typename, name_buf);
-		break;
-	    case HOST_NOT_FOUND:
-		ugh = builddiag("no host %s for %s record", name_buf, typename);
-		break;
-	    default:
-		ugh = builddiag("failure querying DNS for %s of %s: %s"
-		    , typename, name_buf, hstrerror(buf.h_errno_val));
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
-	else if (buf.result > (int) sizeof(buf.ans))
-	{
-	    ugh = builddiag("(INTERNAL ERROR) answer too long (%ld) for buffer"
-		, (long)buf.result);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    ugh = process_dns_answer(cr, buf.ans, buf.result);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		ugh = builddiag("failure processing %s record of DNS answer for %s: %s"
-		    , typename, name_buf, ugh);
+		passert(cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL);
+		adns_in_flight--;
+		if (buf.result == -1)
+		{
+			/* newer resolvers support statp->res_h_errno as well as h_errno.
+			 * That might be better, but older resolvers don't.
+			 * See resolver(3), if you have it.
+			 * The undocumented(!) h_errno values are defined in
+			 * /usr/include/netdb.h.
+			 */
+			switch (buf.h_errno_val)
+			{
+			case NO_DATA:
+				ugh = builddiag("no %s record for %s", typename, name_buf);
+				break;
+			case HOST_NOT_FOUND:
+				ugh = builddiag("no host %s for %s record", name_buf, typename);
+				break;
+			default:
+				ugh = builddiag("failure querying DNS for %s of %s: %s"
+					, typename, name_buf, hstrerror(buf.h_errno_val));
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+		else if (buf.result > (int) sizeof(buf.ans))
+		{
+			ugh = builddiag("(INTERNAL ERROR) answer too long (%ld) for buffer"
+				, (long)buf.result);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			ugh = process_dns_answer(cr, buf.ans, buf.result);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+				ugh = builddiag("failure processing %s record of DNS answer for %s: %s"
+					, typename, name_buf, ugh);
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS,
+			DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+				DBG_log("asynch DNS answer %lu for %s of %s"
+					, cr->query.serial, typename, name_buf);
+			else
+				DBG_log("asynch DNS answer %lu %s", cr->query.serial, ugh);
+			);
+
+		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		cr->cont_fn(cr, ugh);
+		reset_globals();
+		release_adns_continuation(cr);
+
+		/* shift out answer that we've consumed */
+		buflen -= buf.len;
+		memmove((unsigned char *)&buf, (unsigned char *)&buf + buf.len, buflen);
 	}
-	DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS,
-	    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
-	    if (ugh == NULL)
-		DBG_log("asynch DNS answer %lu for %s of %s"
-		    , cr->query.serial, typename, name_buf);
-	    else
-		DBG_log("asynch DNS answer %lu %s", cr->query.serial, ugh);
-	    );
-
-	passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-	cr->cont_fn(cr, ugh);
-	reset_globals();
-	release_adns_continuation(cr);
-
-	/* shift out answer that we've consumed */
-	buflen -= buf.len;
-	memmove((unsigned char *)&buf, (unsigned char *)&buf + buf.len, buflen);
-    }
 #else /* USE_LWRES */
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	err_t ugh;
-	char *nlp = memchr(buf, '\n', buflen);
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		err_t ugh;
+		char *nlp = memchr(buf, '\n', buflen);
 
-	if (nlp == NULL)
-	    break;
+		if (nlp == NULL)
+			break;
 
-	/* we've got a line */
-	*nlp++ = '\0';
+		/* we've got a line */
+		*nlp++ = '\0';
 
-	DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS
-	    , DBG_log("lwdns: %s", buf));
+		DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS
+			, DBG_log("lwdns: %s", buf));
 
-	/* process lwdnsq_answer may modify buf, so make a copy. */
-	buf_copy[0]='\0';
-	strncat(buf_copy, buf, sizeof(buf_copy));
+		/* process lwdnsq_answer may modify buf, so make a copy. */
+		buf_copy[0]='\0';
+		strncat(buf_copy, buf, sizeof(buf_copy));
 
-	ugh = process_lwdnsq_answer(buf_copy);
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	    plog("failure processing lwdnsq output: %s; record: %s"
-		 , ugh, buf);
+		ugh = process_lwdnsq_answer(buf_copy);
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+			plog("failure processing lwdnsq output: %s; record: %s"
+				 , ugh, buf);
 
-	passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-	reset_globals();
+		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		reset_globals();
 
-	/* shift out answer that we've consumed */
-	buflen -= nlp - buf;
-	memmove(buf, nlp, buflen);
-    }
+		/* shift out answer that we've consumed */
+		buflen -= nlp - buf;
+		memmove(buf, nlp, buflen);
+	}
 #endif /* USE_LWRES */
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/dnskey.h b/src/pluto/dnskey.h
index f69c226c8..976c715bf 100644
--- a/src/pluto/dnskey.h
+++ b/src/pluto/dnskey.h
@@ -10,14 +10,12 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: dnskey.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 extern int
-    adns_qfd,	/* file descriptor for sending queries to adns */
-    adns_afd;	/* file descriptor for receiving answers from adns */
-extern const char *pluto_adns_option;	/* path from --pluto_adns */
+	adns_qfd,   /* file descriptor for sending queries to adns */
+	adns_afd;   /* file descriptor for receiving answers from adns */
+extern const char *pluto_adns_option;   /* path from --pluto_adns */
 extern void init_adns(void);
 extern void stop_adns(void);
 extern void handle_adns_answer(void);
@@ -30,55 +28,55 @@ extern void send_unsent_ADNS_queries(void);
  * Freed by call to release_adns_continuation.
  */
 
-struct adns_continuation;	/* forward declaration (not far!) */
+struct adns_continuation;       /* forward declaration (not far!) */
 
 typedef void (*cont_fn_t)(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh);
 
 struct adns_continuation {
-    unsigned long qtid;	/* query transaction id number */
-    int type;	/* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
-    cont_fn_t cont_fn;	/* function to carry on suspended work */
-    struct id id;	/* subject of query */
-    bool sgw_specified;
-    struct id sgw_id;	/* peer, if constrained */
-    lset_t debugging;	/* only used #ifdef DEBUG, but don't want layout to change */
-    struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns;	/* answer, if looking for our TXT rrs */
+	unsigned long qtid; /* query transaction id number */
+	int type;   /* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
+	cont_fn_t cont_fn;  /* function to carry on suspended work */
+	struct id id;       /* subject of query */
+	bool sgw_specified;
+	struct id sgw_id;   /* peer, if constrained */
+	lset_t debugging;   /* only used #ifdef DEBUG, but don't want layout to change */
+	struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns;  /* answer, if looking for our TXT rrs */
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    struct pubkey_list *keys_from_dns;	/* answer, if looking for KEY rrs */
+	struct pubkey_list *keys_from_dns;  /* answer, if looking for KEY rrs */
 #endif
-    struct adns_continuation *previous, *next;
-    struct pubkey *last_info;  /* the last structure we accumulated */
+	struct adns_continuation *previous, *next;
+	struct pubkey *last_info;  /* the last structure we accumulated */
 #ifdef USE_LWRES
-    bool used;	/* have we called the cont_fn yet? */
-    struct {
-	u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
-    } query;
+	bool used;  /* have we called the cont_fn yet? */
+	struct {
+		u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
+	} query;
 #else /* ! USE_LWRES */
-    struct adns_query query;
+	struct adns_query query;
 #endif /* ! USE_LWRES */
 };
 
-extern err_t start_adns_query(const struct id *id	/* domain to query */
-    , const struct id *sgw_id	/* if non-null, any accepted gw_info must match */
-    , int type	/* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
-    , cont_fn_t cont_fn	/* continuation function */
-    , struct adns_continuation *cr);
+extern err_t start_adns_query(const struct id *id       /* domain to query */
+	, const struct id *sgw_id   /* if non-null, any accepted gw_info must match */
+	, int type  /* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
+	, cont_fn_t cont_fn /* continuation function */
+	, struct adns_continuation *cr);
 
 
 /* Gateway info gleaned from reverse DNS of client */
 struct gw_info {
-    unsigned refcnt;	/* reference counted! */
-    unsigned pref;	/* preference: lower is better */
-#define NO_TIME ((time_t) -2)	/* time_t value meaning "not_yet" */
-    struct id client_id;	/* id of client of peer */
-    struct id gw_id;	/* id of peer (if id_is_ipaddr, .ip_addr is address) */
-    bool gw_key_present;
-    struct pubkey *key;
-    struct gw_info *next;
+	unsigned refcnt;    /* reference counted! */
+	unsigned pref;      /* preference: lower is better */
+#define NO_TIME ((time_t) -2)   /* time_t value meaning "not_yet" */
+	struct id client_id;        /* id of client of peer */
+	struct id gw_id;    /* id of peer (if id_is_ipaddr, .ip_addr is address) */
+	bool gw_key_present;
+	struct pubkey *key;
+	struct gw_info *next;
 };
 
 extern void gw_addref(struct gw_info *gw)
-    , gw_delref(struct gw_info **gwp);
+	, gw_delref(struct gw_info **gwp);
 
 extern void reset_adns_restart_count(void);
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/dsa.c b/src/pluto/dsa.c
deleted file mode 100644
index c5982fbf4..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/dsa.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,476 +0,0 @@
-/* dsa.c  -  DSA signature scheme
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-
-#ifdef PLUTO
-#include <gmp.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "gcryptfix.h"
-#else /*! PLUTO */
-/* #include <config.h> */
-#endif /* !PLUTO */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifndef PLUTO
-/* #include <assert.h> */
-/* #include "util.h" */
-/* #include "mpi.h" */
-/* #include "cipher.h" */
-#endif
-
-#include "dsa.h"
-
-typedef struct {
-    MPI p;	    /* prime */
-    MPI q;	    /* group order */
-    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
-    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
-} DSA_public_key;
-
-
-typedef struct {
-    MPI p;	    /* prime */
-    MPI q;	    /* group order */
-    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
-    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
-    MPI x;	    /* secret exponent */
-} DSA_secret_key;
-
-
-static MPI gen_k( MPI q );
-static void test_keys( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned qbits );
-static int  check_secret_key( DSA_secret_key *sk );
-static void generate( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **ret_factors );
-static void sign(MPI r, MPI s, MPI input, DSA_secret_key *skey);
-static int  verify(MPI r, MPI s, MPI input, DSA_public_key *pkey);
-
-static void
-progress( int c )
-{
-    fputc( c, stderr );
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Generate a random secret exponent k less than q
- */
-static MPI
-gen_k( MPI q )
-{
-    MPI k = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(q) );
-    unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits(q);
-    unsigned int nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
-    char *rndbuf = NULL;
-
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	log_debug("choosing a random k ");
-    for(;;) {
-	if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	    progress('.');
-
-	if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 ) {
-	    m_free(rndbuf);
-	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 1, 1 );
-	}
-	else { /* change only some of the higher bits */
-	    /* we could imporove this by directly requesting more memory
-	     * at the first call to get_random_bits() and use this the here
-	     * maybe it is easier to do this directly in random.c */
-	    char *pp = get_random_bits( 32, 1, 1 );
-	    memcpy( rndbuf,pp, 4 );
-	    m_free(pp);
-	}
-	mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 );
-	if( mpi_test_bit( k, nbits-1 ) )
-	    mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
-	else {
-	    mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
-	    mpi_clear_bit( k, nbits-1 );
-	}
-
-	if( !(mpi_cmp( k, q ) < 0) ) {	/* check: k < q */
-	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-		progress('+');
-	    continue; /* no  */
-	}
-	if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) { /* check: k > 0 */
-	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-		progress('-');
-	    continue; /* no */
-	}
-	break;	/* okay */
-    }
-    m_free(rndbuf);
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	progress('\n');
-
-    return k;
-}
-
-
-static void
-test_keys( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned qbits )
-{
-    DSA_public_key pk;
-    MPI test = mpi_alloc( qbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    MPI out1_a = mpi_alloc( qbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    MPI out1_b = mpi_alloc( qbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-
-    pk.p = sk->p;
-    pk.q = sk->q;
-    pk.g = sk->g;
-    pk.y = sk->y;
-    /*mpi_set_bytes( test, qbits, get_random_byte, 0 );*/
-    {	char *p = get_random_bits( qbits, 0, 0 );
-	mpi_set_buffer( test, p, (qbits+7)/8, 0 );
-	m_free(p);
-    }
-
-    sign( out1_a, out1_b, test, sk );
-    if( !verify( out1_a, out1_b, test, &pk ) )
-	log_fatal("DSA:: sign, verify failed\n");
-
-    mpi_free( test );
-    mpi_free( out1_a );
-    mpi_free( out1_b );
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Generate a DSA key pair with a key of size NBITS
- * Returns: 2 structures filled with all needed values
- *	    and an array with the n-1 factors of (p-1)
- */
-static void
-generate( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **ret_factors )
-{
-    MPI p;    /* the prime */
-    MPI q;    /* the 160 bit prime factor */
-    MPI g;    /* the generator */
-    MPI y;    /* g^x mod p */
-    MPI x;    /* the secret exponent */
-    MPI h, e;  /* helper */
-    unsigned qbits;
-    byte *rndbuf;
-
-    assert( nbits >= 512 && nbits <= 1024 );
-
-    qbits = 160;
-    p = generate_elg_prime( 1, nbits, qbits, NULL, ret_factors );
-    /* get q out of factors */
-    q = mpi_copy((*ret_factors)[0]);
-    if( mpi_get_nbits(q) != qbits )
-	BUG();
-
-    /* find a generator g (h and e are helpers)*/
-    /* e = (p-1)/q */
-    e = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
-    mpi_sub_ui( e, p, 1 );
-    mpi_fdiv_q( e, e, q );
-    g = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
-    h = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 1 ); /* we start with 2 */
-    do {
-	mpi_add_ui( h, h, 1 );
-	/* g = h^e mod p */
-	mpi_powm( g, h, e, p );
-    } while( !mpi_cmp_ui( g, 1 ) );  /* continue until g != 1 */
-
-    /* select a random number which has these properties:
-     *	 0 < x < q-1
-     * This must be a very good random number because this
-     * is the secret part. */
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	log_debug("choosing a random x ");
-    assert( qbits >= 160 );
-    x = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(q) );
-    mpi_sub_ui( h, q, 1 );  /* put q-1 into h */
-    rndbuf = NULL;
-    do {
-	if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	    progress('.');
-	if( !rndbuf )
-	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( qbits, 2, 1 );
-	else { /* change only some of the higher bits (= 2 bytes)*/
-	    char *r = get_random_bits( 16, 2, 1 );
-	    memcpy(rndbuf, r, 16/8 );
-	    m_free(r);
-	}
-	mpi_set_buffer( x, rndbuf, (qbits+7)/8, 0 );
-	mpi_clear_highbit( x, qbits+1 );
-    } while( !( mpi_cmp_ui( x, 0 )>0 && mpi_cmp( x, h )<0 ) );
-    m_free(rndbuf);
-    mpi_free( e );
-    mpi_free( h );
-
-    /* y = g^x mod p */
-    y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
-    mpi_powm( y, g, x, p );
-
-    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-	progress('\n');
-	log_mpidump("dsa  p= ", p );
-	log_mpidump("dsa  q= ", q );
-	log_mpidump("dsa  g= ", g );
-	log_mpidump("dsa  y= ", y );
-	log_mpidump("dsa  x= ", x );
-    }
-
-    /* copy the stuff to the key structures */
-    sk->p = p;
-    sk->q = q;
-    sk->g = g;
-    sk->y = y;
-    sk->x = x;
-
-    /* now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */
-    test_keys( sk, qbits );
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Test whether the secret key is valid.
- * Returns: if this is a valid key.
- */
-static int
-check_secret_key( DSA_secret_key *sk )
-{
-    int rc;
-    MPI y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->y) );
-
-    mpi_powm( y, sk->g, sk->x, sk->p );
-    rc = !mpi_cmp( y, sk->y );
-    mpi_free( y );
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-
-/****************
- * Make a DSA signature from HASH and put it into r and s.
- */
-
-static void
-sign(MPI r, MPI s, MPI hash, DSA_secret_key *skey )
-{
-    MPI k;
-    MPI kinv;
-    MPI tmp;
-
-    /* select a random k with 0 < k < q */
-    k = gen_k( skey->q );
-
-    /* r = (a^k mod p) mod q */
-    mpi_powm( r, skey->g, k, skey->p );
-    mpi_fdiv_r( r, r, skey->q );
-
-    /* kinv = k^(-1) mod q */
-    kinv = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(k) );
-    mpi_invm(kinv, k, skey->q );
-
-    /* s = (kinv * ( hash + x * r)) mod q */
-    tmp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->p) );
-    mpi_mul( tmp, skey->x, r );
-    mpi_add( tmp, tmp, hash );
-    mpi_mulm( s , kinv, tmp, skey->q );
-
-    mpi_free(k);
-    mpi_free(kinv);
-    mpi_free(tmp);
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Returns true if the signature composed from R and S is valid.
- */
-static int
-verify(MPI r, MPI s, MPI hash, DSA_public_key *pkey )
-{
-    int rc;
-    MPI w, u1, u2, v;
-    MPI base[3];
-    MPI exp[3];
-
-
-    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( r, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( r, pkey->q ) < 0) )
-	return 0; /* assertion	0 < r < q  failed */
-    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( s, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( s, pkey->q ) < 0) )
-	return 0; /* assertion	0 < s < q  failed */
-
-    w  = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->q) );
-    u1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->q) );
-    u2 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->q) );
-    v  = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->p) );
-
-    /* w = s^(-1) mod q */
-    mpi_invm( w, s, pkey->q );
-
-    /* u1 = (hash * w) mod q */
-    mpi_mulm( u1, hash, w, pkey->q );
-
-    /* u2 = r * w mod q  */
-    mpi_mulm( u2, r, w, pkey->q );
-
-    /* v =  g^u1 * y^u2 mod p mod q */
-    base[0] = pkey->g; exp[0] = u1;
-    base[1] = pkey->y; exp[1] = u2;
-    base[2] = NULL;    exp[2] = NULL;
-    mpi_mulpowm( v, base, exp, pkey->p );
-    mpi_fdiv_r( v, v, pkey->q );
-
-    rc = !mpi_cmp( v, r );
-
-    mpi_free(w);
-    mpi_free(u1);
-    mpi_free(u2);
-    mpi_free(v);
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-/*********************************************
- **************  interface  ******************
- *********************************************/
-
-int
-dsa_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors )
-{
-    DSA_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-
-    generate( &sk, nbits, retfactors );
-    skey[0] = sk.p;
-    skey[1] = sk.q;
-    skey[2] = sk.g;
-    skey[3] = sk.y;
-    skey[4] = sk.x;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-int
-dsa_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
-{
-    DSA_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] || !skey[4] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    sk.p = skey[0];
-    sk.q = skey[1];
-    sk.g = skey[2];
-    sk.y = skey[3];
-    sk.x = skey[4];
-    if( !check_secret_key( &sk ) )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-int
-dsa_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey )
-{
-    DSA_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !data || !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] || !skey[4] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    sk.p = skey[0];
-    sk.q = skey[1];
-    sk.g = skey[2];
-    sk.y = skey[3];
-    sk.x = skey[4];
-    resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
-    resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
-    sign( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk );
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int
-dsa_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
-		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI) UNUSED, void *opaquev UNUSED)
-{
-    DSA_public_key pk;
-
-    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !data[0] || !data[1] || !hash
-	|| !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] || !pkey[3] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    pk.p = pkey[0];
-    pk.q = pkey[1];
-    pk.g = pkey[2];
-    pk.y = pkey[3];
-    if( !verify( data[0], data[1], hash, &pk ) )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-unsigned
-dsa_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey )
-{
-    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
-	return 0;
-    return mpi_get_nbits( pkey[0] );
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Return some information about the algorithm.  We need algo here to
- * distinguish different flavors of the algorithm.
- * Returns: A pointer to string describing the algorithm or NULL if
- *	    the ALGO is invalid.
- * Usage: Bit 0 set : allows signing
- *	      1 set : allows encryption
- */
-const char *
-dsa_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey, int *nenc, int *nsig,
-							 int *use )
-{
-    *npkey = 4;
-    *nskey = 5;
-    *nenc = 0;
-    *nsig = 2;
-
-    switch( algo ) {
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:   *use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; return "DSA";
-      default: *use = 0; return NULL;
-    }
-}
-
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/dsa.h b/src/pluto/dsa.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 1456d65b6..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/dsa.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-/* dsa.h  -  DSA signature scheme
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-#ifndef G10_DSA_H
-#define G10_DSA_H
-
-int dsa_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors );
-int dsa_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey );
-int dsa_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey );
-int dsa_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
-		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI), void *opaquev );
-unsigned dsa_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey );
-const char *dsa_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey,
-				    int *nenc, int *nsig, int *use );
-
-#endif /*G10_DSA_H*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/elgamal.c b/src/pluto/elgamal.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 0c099bb90..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/elgamal.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,613 +0,0 @@
-/* elgamal.c  -  ElGamal Public Key encryption
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * For a description of the algorithm, see:
- *   Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
- *   ISBN 0-471-11709-9. Pages 476 ff.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-
-#ifdef PLUTO
-#include <gmp.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "gcryptfix.h"
-#else /*! PLUTO */
-/* #include <config.h> */
-#endif /* !PLUTO */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifndef PLUTO
-/* #include "util.h" */
-/* #include "mpi.h" */
-/* #include "cipher.h" */
-#endif
-
-#include "elgamal.h"
-
-typedef struct {
-    MPI p;	    /* prime */
-    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
-    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
-} ELG_public_key;
-
-
-typedef struct {
-    MPI p;	    /* prime */
-    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
-    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
-    MPI x;	    /* secret exponent */
-} ELG_secret_key;
-
-
-static void test_keys( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits );
-static MPI gen_k( MPI p );
-static void generate( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **factors );
-static int  check_secret_key( ELG_secret_key *sk );
-static void encrypt(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey );
-static void decrypt(MPI output, MPI a, MPI b, ELG_secret_key *skey );
-static void sign(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_secret_key *skey);
-static int  verify(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey);
-
-
-static void
-progress( int c )
-{
-    fputc( c, stderr );
-}
-
-
-static void
-test_keys( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
-{
-    ELG_public_key pk;
-    MPI test = mpi_alloc( 0 );
-    MPI out1_a = mpi_alloc( nbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    MPI out1_b = mpi_alloc( nbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    MPI out2 = mpi_alloc( nbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-
-    pk.p = sk->p;
-    pk.g = sk->g;
-    pk.y = sk->y;
-
-    /*mpi_set_bytes( test, nbits, get_random_byte, 0 );*/
-    {	char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, 0, 0 );
-	mpi_set_buffer( test, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
-	m_free(p);
-    }
-
-    encrypt( out1_a, out1_b, test, &pk );
-    decrypt( out2, out1_a, out1_b, sk );
-    if( mpi_cmp( test, out2 ) )
-	log_fatal("ElGamal operation: encrypt, decrypt failed\n");
-
-    sign( out1_a, out1_b, test, sk );
-    if( !verify( out1_a, out1_b, test, &pk ) )
-	log_fatal("ElGamal operation: sign, verify failed\n");
-
-    mpi_free( test );
-    mpi_free( out1_a );
-    mpi_free( out1_b );
-    mpi_free( out2 );
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so
- * that k is relatively prime to p-1
- */
-static MPI
-gen_k( MPI p )
-{
-    MPI k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
-    MPI temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
-    MPI p_1 = mpi_copy(p);
-    unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits(p);
-    unsigned int nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
-    char *rndbuf = NULL;
-
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	log_debug("choosing a random k ");
-    mpi_sub_ui( p_1, p, 1);
-    for(;;) {
-	if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	    progress('.');
-	if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 ) {
-	    m_free(rndbuf);
-	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 1, 1 );
-	}
-	else { /* change only some of the higher bits */
-	    /* we could imporove this by directly requesting more memory
-	     * at the first call to get_random_bits() and use this the here
-	     * maybe it is easier to do this directly in random.c */
-	    char *pp = get_random_bits( 32, 1, 1 );
-	    memcpy( rndbuf,pp, 4 );
-	    m_free(pp);
-	}
-	mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 );
-
-	for(;;) {
-	    /* make sure that the number is of the exact lenght */
-	    if( mpi_test_bit( k, nbits-1 ) )
-		mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
-	    else {
-		mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
-		mpi_clear_bit( k, nbits-1 );
-	    }
-	    if( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) {  /* check: k < (p-1) */
-		if( DBG_CIPHER )
-		    progress('+');
-		break; /* no  */
-	    }
-	    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) { /* check: k > 0 */
-		if( DBG_CIPHER )
-		    progress('-');
-		break; /* no */
-	    }
-	    if( mpi_gcd( temp, k, p_1 ) )
-		goto found;  /* okay, k is relatively prime to (p-1) */
-	    mpi_add_ui( k, k, 1 );
-	}
-    }
-  found:
-    m_free(rndbuf);
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	progress('\n');
-    mpi_free(p_1);
-    mpi_free(temp);
-
-    return k;
-}
-
-/****************
- * Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS
- * Returns: 2 structures filles with all needed values
- *	    and an array with n-1 factors of (p-1)
- */
-static void
-generate(  ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **ret_factors )
-{
-    MPI p;    /* the prime */
-    MPI p_min1;
-    MPI g;
-    MPI x;    /* the secret exponent */
-    MPI y;
-    MPI temp;
-    unsigned qbits;
-    byte *rndbuf;
-
-    p_min1 = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    temp   = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    if( nbits < 512 )
-	qbits = 120;
-    else if( nbits <= 1024 )
-	qbits = 160;
-    else if( nbits <= 2048 )
-	qbits = 200;
-    else
-	qbits = 240;
-    g = mpi_alloc(1);
-    p = generate_elg_prime( 0, nbits, qbits, g, ret_factors );
-    mpi_sub_ui(p_min1, p, 1);
-
-
-    /* select a random number which has these properties:
-     *	 0 < x < p-1
-     * This must be a very good random number because this is the
-     * secret part.  The prime is public and may be shared anyway,
-     * so a random generator level of 1 is used for the prime.
-     */
-    x = mpi_alloc_secure( nbits/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	log_debug("choosing a random x ");
-    rndbuf = NULL;
-    do {
-	if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	    progress('.');
-	if( rndbuf ) { /* change only some of the higher bits */
-	    if( nbits < 16 ) {/* should never happen ... */
-		m_free(rndbuf);
-		rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 2, 1 );
-	    }
-	    else {
-		char *r = get_random_bits( 16, 2, 1 );
-		memcpy(rndbuf, r, 16/8 );
-		m_free(r);
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 2, 1 );
-	mpi_set_buffer( x, rndbuf, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
-	mpi_clear_highbit( x, nbits+1 );
-    } while( !( mpi_cmp_ui( x, 0 )>0 && mpi_cmp( x, p_min1 )<0 ) );
-    m_free(rndbuf);
-
-    y = mpi_alloc(nbits/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB);
-    mpi_powm( y, g, x, p );
-
-    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-	progress('\n');
-	log_mpidump("elg  p= ", p );
-	log_mpidump("elg  g= ", g );
-	log_mpidump("elg  y= ", y );
-	log_mpidump("elg  x= ", x );
-    }
-
-    /* copy the stuff to the key structures */
-    sk->p = p;
-    sk->g = g;
-    sk->y = y;
-    sk->x = x;
-
-    /* now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */
-    test_keys( sk, nbits - 64 );
-
-    mpi_free( p_min1 );
-    mpi_free( temp   );
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Test whether the secret key is valid.
- * Returns: if this is a valid key.
- */
-static int
-check_secret_key( ELG_secret_key *sk )
-{
-    int rc;
-    MPI y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->y) );
-
-    mpi_powm( y, sk->g, sk->x, sk->p );
-    rc = !mpi_cmp( y, sk->y );
-    mpi_free( y );
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-static void
-encrypt(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
-{
-    MPI k;
-
-    /* Note: maybe we should change the interface, so that it
-     * is possible to check that input is < p and return an
-     * error code.
-     */
-
-    k = gen_k( pkey->p );
-    mpi_powm( a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p );
-    /* b = (y^k * input) mod p
-     *	 = ((y^k mod p) * (input mod p)) mod p
-     * and because input is < p
-     *	 = ((y^k mod p) * input) mod p
-     */
-    mpi_powm( b, pkey->y, k, pkey->p );
-    mpi_mulm( b, b, input, pkey->p );
-  #if 0
-    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-	log_mpidump("elg encrypted y= ", pkey->y);
-	log_mpidump("elg encrypted p= ", pkey->p);
-	log_mpidump("elg encrypted k= ", k);
-	log_mpidump("elg encrypted M= ", input);
-	log_mpidump("elg encrypted a= ", a);
-	log_mpidump("elg encrypted b= ", b);
-    }
-  #endif
-    mpi_free(k);
-}
-
-
-
-
-static void
-decrypt(MPI output, MPI a, MPI b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
-{
-    MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( skey->p ) );
-
-    /* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
-
-    mpi_powm( t1, a, skey->x, skey->p );
-    mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
-    mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p );
-  #if 0
-    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-	log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
-	log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
-	log_mpidump("elg decrypted a= ", a);
-	log_mpidump("elg decrypted b= ", b);
-	log_mpidump("elg decrypted M= ", output);
-    }
-  #endif
-    mpi_free(t1);
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Make an Elgamal signature out of INPUT
- */
-
-static void
-sign(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
-{
-    MPI k;
-    MPI t   = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
-    MPI inv = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
-    MPI p_1 = mpi_copy(skey->p);
-
-   /*
-    * b = (t * inv) mod (p-1)
-    * b = (t * inv(k,(p-1),(p-1)) mod (p-1)
-    * b = (((M-x*a) mod (p-1)) * inv(k,(p-1),(p-1))) mod (p-1)
-    *
-    */
-    mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
-    k = gen_k( skey->p );
-    mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
-    mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
-    mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );
-    while( mpi_is_neg(t) )
-	mpi_add(t, t, p_1);
-    mpi_invm(inv, k, p_1 );
-    mpi_mulm(b, t, inv, p_1 );
-
-  #if 0
-    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-	log_mpidump("elg sign p= ", skey->p);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign g= ", skey->g);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign y= ", skey->y);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign x= ", skey->x);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign k= ", k);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign M= ", input);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign a= ", a);
-	log_mpidump("elg sign b= ", b);
-    }
-  #endif
-    mpi_free(k);
-    mpi_free(t);
-    mpi_free(inv);
-    mpi_free(p_1);
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Returns true if the signature composed of A and B is valid.
- */
-static int
-verify(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
-{
-    int rc;
-    MPI t1;
-    MPI t2;
-    MPI base[4];
-    MPI exp[4];
-
-    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) )
-	return 0; /* assertion	0 < a < p  failed */
-
-    t1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
-    t2 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
-
-  #if 0
-    /* t1 = (y^a mod p) * (a^b mod p) mod p */
-    mpi_powm( t1, pkey->y, a, pkey->p );
-    mpi_powm( t2, a, b, pkey->p );
-    mpi_mulm( t1, t1, t2, pkey->p );
-
-    /* t2 = g ^ input mod p */
-    mpi_powm( t2, pkey->g, input, pkey->p );
-
-    rc = !mpi_cmp( t1, t2 );
-  #elif 0
-    /* t1 = (y^a mod p) * (a^b mod p) mod p */
-    base[0] = pkey->y; exp[0] = a;
-    base[1] = a;       exp[1] = b;
-    base[2] = NULL;    exp[2] = NULL;
-    mpi_mulpowm( t1, base, exp, pkey->p );
-
-    /* t2 = g ^ input mod p */
-    mpi_powm( t2, pkey->g, input, pkey->p );
-
-    rc = !mpi_cmp( t1, t2 );
-  #else
-    /* t1 = g ^ - input * y ^ a * a ^ b  mod p */
-    mpi_invm(t2, pkey->g, pkey->p );
-    base[0] = t2     ; exp[0] = input;
-    base[1] = pkey->y; exp[1] = a;
-    base[2] = a;       exp[2] = b;
-    base[3] = NULL;    exp[3] = NULL;
-    mpi_mulpowm( t1, base, exp, pkey->p );
-    rc = !mpi_cmp_ui( t1, 1 );
-
-  #endif
-
-    mpi_free(t1);
-    mpi_free(t2);
-    return rc;
-}
-
-/*********************************************
- **************  interface  ******************
- *********************************************/
-
-int
-elg_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors )
-{
-    ELG_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-
-    generate( &sk, nbits, retfactors );
-    skey[0] = sk.p;
-    skey[1] = sk.g;
-    skey[2] = sk.y;
-    skey[3] = sk.x;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-int
-elg_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
-{
-    ELG_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    sk.p = skey[0];
-    sk.g = skey[1];
-    sk.y = skey[2];
-    sk.x = skey[3];
-    if( !check_secret_key( &sk ) )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
-
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-int
-elg_encrypt( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *pkey )
-{
-    ELG_public_key pk;
-
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !data || !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    pk.p = pkey[0];
-    pk.g = pkey[1];
-    pk.y = pkey[2];
-    resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( pk.p ) );
-    resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( pk.p ) );
-    encrypt( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &pk );
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int
-elg_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey )
-{
-    ELG_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !data[0] || !data[1]
-	|| !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    sk.p = skey[0];
-    sk.g = skey[1];
-    sk.y = skey[2];
-    sk.x = skey[3];
-    *result = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
-    decrypt( *result, data[0], data[1], &sk );
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int
-elg_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey )
-{
-    ELG_secret_key sk;
-
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !data || !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    sk.p = skey[0];
-    sk.g = skey[1];
-    sk.y = skey[2];
-    sk.x = skey[3];
-    resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
-    resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
-    sign( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk );
-    return 0;
-}
-
-int
-elg_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
-		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI) UNUSED, void *opaquev UNUSED)
-{
-    ELG_public_key pk;
-
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
-    if( !data[0] || !data[1] || !hash
-	|| !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
-
-    pk.p = pkey[0];
-    pk.g = pkey[1];
-    pk.y = pkey[2];
-    if( !verify( data[0], data[1], hash, &pk ) )
-	return G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-
-unsigned
-elg_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey )
-{
-    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
-	return 0;
-    return mpi_get_nbits( pkey[0] );
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Return some information about the algorithm.  We need algo here to
- * distinguish different flavors of the algorithm.
- * Returns: A pointer to string describing the algorithm or NULL if
- *	    the ALGO is invalid.
- * Usage: Bit 0 set : allows signing
- *	      1 set : allows encryption
- * NOTE: This function allows signing also for ELG-E, which is not
- * okay but a bad hack to allow to work with old gpg keys. The real check
- * is done in the gnupg ocde depending on the packet version.
- */
-const char *
-elg_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey, int *nenc, int *nsig,
-							 int *use )
-{
-    *npkey = 3;
-    *nskey = 4;
-    *nenc = 2;
-    *nsig = 2;
-
-    switch( algo ) {
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
-	*use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
-	return "ELG";
-      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
-	*use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
-	return "ELG-E";
-      default: *use = 0; return NULL;
-    }
-}
-
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/elgamal.h b/src/pluto/elgamal.h
deleted file mode 100644
index f104c2a52..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/elgamal.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-/* elgamal.h
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-#ifndef G10_ELGAMAL_H
-#define G10_ELGAMAL_H
-
-int elg_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors );
-int elg_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey );
-int elg_encrypt( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *pkey );
-int elg_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey );
-int elg_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey );
-int elg_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
-		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI), void *opaquev );
-unsigned elg_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey );
-const char *elg_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey,
-				    int *nenc, int *nsig, int *use );
-
-
-#endif /*G10_ELGAMAL_H*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/fetch.c b/src/pluto/fetch.c
index c8a98cd9b..6f7f1215f 100644
--- a/src/pluto/fetch.c
+++ b/src/pluto/fetch.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 /* Dynamic fetching of X.509 CRLs
  * Copyright (C) 2002 Stephane Laroche <stephane.laroche@colubris.com>
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: fetch.c 4632 2008-11-11 18:37:19Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -25,24 +23,17 @@
 #include <pthread.h>
 #endif
 
-#ifdef LIBCURL
-#include <curl/curl.h>
-#endif
-
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
-#ifdef LIBLDAP
-#ifndef LDAP_DEPRECATED
-#define LDAP_DEPRECATED		1
-#endif
-#include <ldap.h>
-#endif
+#include <library.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <asn1/pem.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "id.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
 #include "pem.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "ca.h"
@@ -52,13 +43,13 @@
 #include "fetch.h"
 
 fetch_req_t empty_fetch_req = {
-    NULL    , /* next */
-          0 , /* installed */
-          0 , /* trials */
+	NULL    , /* next */
+		  0 , /* installed */
+		  0 , /* trials */
   { NULL, 0}, /* issuer */
   { NULL, 0}, /* authKeyID */
   { NULL, 0}, /* authKeySerialNumber */
-    NULL      /* distributionPoints */
+	NULL      /* distributionPoints */
 };
 
 /* chained list of crl fetch requests */
@@ -79,189 +70,174 @@ static pthread_mutex_t ocsp_fetch_list_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
 static pthread_mutex_t fetch_wake_mutex      = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
 static pthread_cond_t  fetch_wake_cond       = PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER;
 
-/*
+/**
  * lock access to my certs and keys
  */
-void
-lock_certs_and_keys(const char *who)
+void lock_certs_and_keys(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&certs_and_keys_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("certs and keys locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&certs_and_keys_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("certs and keys locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to my certs and keys
+/**
+ * Unlock access to my certs and keys
  */
-void
-unlock_certs_and_keys(const char *who)
+void unlock_certs_and_keys(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("certs and keys unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&certs_and_keys_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("certs and keys unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&certs_and_keys_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * lock access to the chained authcert list
+/**
+ * Lock access to the chained authcert list
  */
-void
-lock_authcert_list(const char *who)
+void lock_authcert_list(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&authcert_list_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("authcert list locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&authcert_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("authcert list locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to the chained authcert list
+/**
+ * Unlock access to the chained authcert list
  */
-void
-unlock_authcert_list(const char *who)
+void unlock_authcert_list(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("authcert list unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&authcert_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("authcert list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&authcert_list_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * lock access to the chained crl list
+/**
+ * Lock access to the chained crl list
  */
-void
-lock_crl_list(const char *who)
+void lock_crl_list(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&crl_list_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("crl list locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&crl_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("crl list locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to the chained crl list
+/**
+ * Unlock access to the chained crl list
  */
-void
-unlock_crl_list(const char *who)
+void unlock_crl_list(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("crl list unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&crl_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("crl list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&crl_list_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * lock access to the ocsp cache
+/**
+ * Lock access to the ocsp cache
  */
-extern void
-lock_ocsp_cache(const char *who)
+extern void lock_ocsp_cache(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&ocsp_cache_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("ocsp cache locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&ocsp_cache_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("ocsp cache locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to the ocsp cache
+/**
+ * Unlock access to the ocsp cache
  */
-extern void
-unlock_ocsp_cache(const char *who)
+extern void unlock_ocsp_cache(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("ocsp cache unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ocsp_cache_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("ocsp cache unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&ocsp_cache_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * lock access to the ca info list
+/**
+ * Lock access to the ca info list
  */
-extern void
-lock_ca_info_list(const char *who)
+extern void lock_ca_info_list(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&ca_info_list_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("ca info list locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&ca_info_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("ca info list locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to the ca info list
+/**
+ * Unlock access to the ca info list
  */
-extern void
-unlock_ca_info_list(const char *who)
+extern void unlock_ca_info_list(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("ca info list unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ca_info_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("ca info list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&ca_info_list_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * lock access to the chained crl fetch request list
+/**
+ * Lock access to the chained crl fetch request list
  */
-static void
-lock_crl_fetch_list(const char *who)
+static void lock_crl_fetch_list(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&crl_fetch_list_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("crl fetch request list locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&crl_fetch_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("crl fetch request list locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to the chained crl fetch request list
+/**
+ * Unlock access to the chained crl fetch request list
  */
-static void
-unlock_crl_fetch_list(const char *who)
+static void unlock_crl_fetch_list(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("crl fetch request list unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&crl_fetch_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("crl fetch request list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&crl_fetch_list_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * lock access to the chained ocsp fetch request list
+/**
+ * Lock access to the chained ocsp fetch request list
  */
-static void
-lock_ocsp_fetch_list(const char *who)
+static void lock_ocsp_fetch_list(const char *who)
 {
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&ocsp_fetch_list_mutex);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("ocsp fetch request list locked by '%s'", who)
-    )
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&ocsp_fetch_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("ocsp fetch request list locked by '%s'", who)
+	)
 }
 
-/*
- * unlock access to the chained ocsp fetch request list
+/**
+ * Unlock access to the chained ocsp fetch request list
  */
-static void
-unlock_ocsp_fetch_list(const char *who)
+static void unlock_ocsp_fetch_list(const char *who)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("ocsp fetch request list unlocked by '%s'", who)
-    )
-    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ocsp_fetch_list_mutex);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("ocsp fetch request list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&ocsp_fetch_list_mutex);
 }
 
-/*
- * wakes up the sleeping fetch thread
+/**
+ * Wakes up the sleeping fetch thread
  */
-void
-wake_fetch_thread(const char *who)
+void wake_fetch_thread(const char *who)
 {
-    if (crl_check_interval > 0)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	    DBG_log("fetch thread wake call by '%s'", who)
-	)
-	pthread_mutex_lock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
-	pthread_cond_signal(&fetch_wake_cond);
-	pthread_mutex_unlock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
-    }
+	if (crl_check_interval > 0)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+			DBG_log("fetch thread wake call by '%s'", who)
+		)
+		pthread_mutex_lock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
+		pthread_cond_signal(&fetch_wake_cond);
+		pthread_mutex_unlock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
+	}
 }
 #else /* !THREADS */
 #define lock_crl_fetch_list(who)    /* do nothing */
@@ -270,817 +246,506 @@ wake_fetch_thread(const char *who)
 #define unlock_ocsp_fetch_list(who) /* do nothing */
 #endif /* !THREADS */
 
-/*
- *  free the dynamic memory used to store fetch requests
+/**
+ *  Free the dynamic memory used to store fetch requests
  */
-static void
-free_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req)
+static void free_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req)
 {
-    pfree(req->issuer.ptr);
-    pfreeany(req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr);
-    pfreeany(req->authKeyID.ptr);
-    free_generalNames(req->distributionPoints, TRUE);
-    pfree(req);
-}
-
-/* writes data into a dynamically resizeable chunk_t
- * needed for libcurl responses
- */
-size_t
-write_buffer(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *data)
-{
-    size_t realsize = size * nmemb;
-    chunk_t *mem = (chunk_t*)data;
-
-    mem->ptr = (u_char *)realloc(mem->ptr, mem->len + realsize);
-    if (mem->ptr) {
-	memcpy(&(mem->ptr[mem->len]), ptr, realsize);
-	mem->len += realsize;
-    }
-    return realsize;
+	free(req->issuer.ptr);
+	free(req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr);
+	free(req->authKeyID.ptr);
+	free_generalNames(req->distributionPoints, TRUE);
+	free(req);
 }
 
 #ifdef THREADS
-/*
- * fetches a binary blob from a url with libcurl
+/**
+ * Fetch an ASN.1 blob coded in PEM or DER format from a URL
  */
-static err_t
-fetch_curl(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
+bool fetch_asn1_blob(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
 {
-#ifdef LIBCURL
-    char errorbuffer[CURL_ERROR_SIZE] = "";
-    chunk_t response = empty_chunk;
-    CURLcode res;
-
-    /* get it with libcurl */
-    CURL *curl = curl_easy_init();
-
-    if (curl != NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("Trying cURL '%s'", url)
-	)
-
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, url);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_buffer);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, (void *)&response);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, errorbuffer);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, TRUE);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT);
-
-	res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
-
-	if (res == CURLE_OK)
-	{
-	    blob->len = response.len;
-	    blob->ptr = alloc_bytes(response.len, "curl blob");
-	    memcpy(blob->ptr, response.ptr, response.len);
-	}
-	else
+	DBG1("  fetching crl from '%s' ...", url);
+	if (lib->fetcher->fetch(lib->fetcher, url, blob, FETCH_END) != SUCCESS)
 	{
-	    plog("fetching uri (%s) with libcurl failed: %s", url, errorbuffer);
+		DBG1("crl fetching failed");
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
-	/* not using freeanychunk because of realloc (no leak detective) */
-	curl_free(response.ptr);
-    }
-    return strlen(errorbuffer) > 0 ? "libcurl error" : NULL;
-#else   /* !LIBCURL */
-    return "warning: not compiled with libcurl support";
-#endif  /* !LIBCURL */
-}
-
-#ifdef LIBLDAP
-/*
- * parses the result returned by an ldap query
- */
-static err_t
-parse_ldap_result(LDAP * ldap, LDAPMessage *result, chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    LDAPMessage * entry = ldap_first_entry(ldap, result);
 
-    if (entry != NULL)
-    {
-	BerElement *ber = NULL;
-	char *attr;
-	
-	attr = ldap_first_attribute(ldap, entry, &ber);
-
-	if (attr != NULL)
+	if (is_asn1(*blob))
 	{
-	    struct berval **values = ldap_get_values_len(ldap, entry, attr);
-
-	    if (values != NULL)
-	    {
-		if (values[0] != NULL)
-		{
-		    blob->len = values[0]->bv_len;
-		    blob->ptr = alloc_bytes(blob->len, "ldap blob");
-		    memcpy(blob->ptr, values[0]->bv_val, blob->len);
-		    if (values[1] != NULL)
-		    {
-			plog("warning: more than one value was fetched from LDAP URL");
-		    }
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    ugh = "no values in attribute";
-		}
-		ldap_value_free_len(values);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		ugh = ldap_err2string(ldap_result2error(ldap, entry, 0));
-	    }
-	    ldap_memfree(attr);
+		DBG2("  fetched blob coded in DER format");
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    ugh = ldap_err2string(ldap_result2error(ldap, entry, 0));
-	}
-	ber_free(ber, 0);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ugh = ldap_err2string(ldap_result2error(ldap, result, 0));
-    }
-    return ugh;
-}
-
-/*
- * fetches a binary blob from an ldap url
- */
-static err_t
-fetch_ldap_url(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    LDAPURLDesc *lurl;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    int rc;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("Trying LDAP URL '%s'", url)
-    )
-
-    rc = ldap_url_parse(url, &lurl);
-    
-    if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS)
-    {
-	LDAP *ldap = ldap_init(lurl->lud_host, lurl->lud_port);
-
-	if (ldap != NULL)
-	{
-	    int ldap_version = LDAP_VERSION3;
-	    struct timeval timeout;
+		bool pgp = FALSE;
 
-	    timeout.tv_sec  = FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT;
-	    timeout.tv_usec = 0;
-	    ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldap_version);
-	    ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &timeout);
-
-	    rc = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, NULL, NULL);
-
-	    if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS)
-	    {
-		LDAPMessage *result;
-
-		timeout.tv_sec = FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT;
-		timeout.tv_usec = 0;
-		
-		rc = ldap_search_st(ldap, lurl->lud_dn
-					, lurl->lud_scope
-					, lurl->lud_filter
-					, lurl->lud_attrs
-					, 0, &timeout, &result);
-
-		if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		if (pem_to_bin(blob, chunk_empty, &pgp) != SUCCESS)
 		{
-		    ugh = parse_ldap_result(ldap, result, blob);
-		    ldap_msgfree(result);
+			free(blob->ptr);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		if (is_asn1(*blob))
+		{
+			DBG2("  fetched blob coded in PEM format");
 		}
 		else
 		{
-		    ugh = ldap_err2string(rc);
+			DBG1("crl fetched successfully but data coded in unknown format");
+			free(blob->ptr);
+			return FALSE;
 		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		ugh = ldap_err2string(rc);
-	    }
-	    ldap_unbind_s(ldap);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    ugh = "ldap init";
-	}
-	ldap_free_urldesc(lurl);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ugh = ldap_err2string(rc);
-    }
-    return ugh;
-}
-#else   /* !LIBLDAP */
-static err_t
-fetch_ldap_url(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    return "LDAP URL fetching not activated in pluto source code";
-}
-#endif  /* !LIBLDAP */
-
-/*
- * fetch an ASN.1 blob coded in PEM or DER format from a URL
- */
-static err_t
-fetch_asn1_blob(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    if (strlen(url) >= 4 && strncasecmp(url, "ldap", 4) == 0)
-    {
-	ugh = fetch_ldap_url(url, blob);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ugh = fetch_curl(url, blob);
-    }
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-	return ugh;
-
-    if (is_asn1(*blob))
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("  fetched blob coded in DER format")
-	)
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	bool pgp = FALSE;
-
-	ugh = pemtobin(blob, NULL, "", &pgp);
-	if (ugh == NULL)
-	{
-	    if (is_asn1(*blob))
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		    DBG_log("  fetched blob coded in PEM format")
-		)
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		ugh = "blob coded in unknown format";
-		pfree(blob->ptr);
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    pfree(blob->ptr);
 	}
-    }
-    return ugh;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-/*
- * complete a distributionPoint URI with ca information
+/**
+ * Complete a distributionPoint URI with ca information
  */
-static char*
-complete_uri(chunk_t distPoint, const char *ldaphost)
+static char* complete_uri(chunk_t distPoint, const char *ldaphost)
 {
-    char *uri;
-    char *ptr  = distPoint.ptr;
-    size_t len = distPoint.len;
+	char *uri;
+	char *ptr  = distPoint.ptr;
+	size_t len = distPoint.len;
 
-    char *symbol = memchr(ptr, ':', len);
+	char *symbol = memchr(ptr, ':', len);
 
-    if (symbol != NULL)
-    {
-	size_t type_len = symbol - ptr;
-	
-	if (type_len >= 4 && strncasecmp(ptr, "ldap", 4) == 0)
+	if (symbol != NULL)
 	{
-	    ptr = symbol + 1;
-	    len -= (type_len + 1);
-
-	    if (len > 2 && *ptr++ == '/' && *ptr++ == '/')
-	    {
-		len -= 2;
-		symbol = memchr(ptr, '/', len);
+		size_t type_len = symbol - ptr;
 		
-		if (symbol != NULL && symbol - ptr == 0 && ldaphost != NULL)
+		if (type_len >= 4 && strncasecmp(ptr, "ldap", 4) == 0)
 		{
-		    uri = alloc_bytes(distPoint.len+strlen(ldaphost)+1, "uri");
-
-		    /* insert the ldaphost into the uri */
-		    sprintf(uri, "%.*s%s%.*s"
-			, (int)(distPoint.len - len), distPoint.ptr
-			, ldaphost
-			, (int)len, symbol);
-		    return uri;
+			ptr = symbol + 1;
+			len -= (type_len + 1);
+
+			if (len > 2 && *ptr++ == '/' && *ptr++ == '/')
+			{
+				len -= 2;
+				symbol = memchr(ptr, '/', len);
+				
+				if (symbol != NULL && symbol - ptr == 0 && ldaphost != NULL)
+				{
+					uri = malloc(distPoint.len + strlen(ldaphost) + 1);
+
+					/* insert the ldaphost into the uri */
+					sprintf(uri, "%.*s%s%.*s"
+						, (int)(distPoint.len - len), distPoint.ptr
+						, ldaphost
+						, (int)len, symbol);
+					return uri;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    
-    /* default action:  copy distributionPoint without change */
-    uri = alloc_bytes(distPoint.len+1, "uri");
-    sprintf(uri, "%.*s", (int)distPoint.len, distPoint.ptr);
-    return uri;
+	
+	/* default action:  copy distributionPoint without change */
+	uri = malloc(distPoint.len + 1);
+	sprintf(uri, "%.*s", (int)distPoint.len, distPoint.ptr);
+	return uri;
 }
 
-/*
- * try to fetch the crls defined by the fetch requests
+/**
+ * Try to fetch the crls defined by the fetch requests
  */
-static void
-fetch_crls(bool cache_crls)
+static void fetch_crls(bool cache_crls)
 {
-    fetch_req_t *req;
-    fetch_req_t **reqp;
-
-    lock_crl_fetch_list("fetch_crls");
-    req  =  crl_fetch_reqs;
-    reqp = &crl_fetch_reqs;
-
-    while (req != NULL)
-    {
-	bool valid_crl = FALSE;
-	chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
-	generalName_t *gn = req->distributionPoints;
-	const char *ldaphost;
-	ca_info_t *ca;
+	fetch_req_t *req;
+	fetch_req_t **reqp;
 
-	lock_ca_info_list("fetch_crls");
+	lock_crl_fetch_list("fetch_crls");
+	req  =  crl_fetch_reqs;
+	reqp = &crl_fetch_reqs;
 
-	ca = get_ca_info(req->issuer, req->authKeySerialNumber, req->authKeyID);
-	ldaphost = (ca == NULL)? NULL : ca->ldaphost;
-
-	while (gn != NULL)
+	while (req != NULL)
 	{
-	    char *uri = complete_uri(gn->name, ldaphost);
+		bool valid_crl = FALSE;
+		chunk_t blob = chunk_empty;
+		generalName_t *gn = req->distributionPoints;
+		const char *ldaphost;
+		ca_info_t *ca;
 
-	    err_t ugh = fetch_asn1_blob(uri, &blob);
-	    pfree(uri);
+		lock_ca_info_list("fetch_crls");
 
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		plog("fetch failed:  %s", ugh);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		chunk_t crl_uri;
+		ca = get_ca_info(req->issuer, req->authKeySerialNumber, req->authKeyID);
+		ldaphost = (ca == NULL)? NULL : ca->ldaphost;
 
-		clonetochunk(crl_uri, gn->name.ptr, gn->name.len, "crl uri");
-		if (insert_crl(blob, crl_uri, cache_crls))
+		while (gn != NULL)
 		{
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			DBG_log("we have a valid crl")
-		    )
-		    valid_crl = TRUE;
-		    break;
+			char *uri = complete_uri(gn->name, ldaphost);
+
+			if (fetch_asn1_blob(uri, &blob))
+			{
+				chunk_t crl_uri = chunk_clone(gn->name);
+
+				if (insert_crl(blob, crl_uri, cache_crls))
+				{
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+						DBG_log("we have a valid crl")
+					)
+					valid_crl = TRUE;
+					free(uri);
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			free(uri);
+			gn = gn->next;
 		}
-	    }
-	    gn = gn->next;
-	}
 
-	unlock_ca_info_list("fetch_crls");
+		unlock_ca_info_list("fetch_crls");
 
-	if (valid_crl)
-	{
-	    /* delete fetch request */
-	    fetch_req_t *req_free = req;
+		if (valid_crl)
+		{
+			/* delete fetch request */
+			fetch_req_t *req_free = req;
 
-	    req   = req->next;
-	    *reqp = req;
-	    free_fetch_request(req_free);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* try again next time */
-	    req->trials++;
-	    reqp = &req->next;
-	    req  =  req->next;
+			req   = req->next;
+			*reqp = req;
+			free_fetch_request(req_free);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* try again next time */
+			req->trials++;
+			reqp = &req->next;
+			req  =  req->next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    unlock_crl_fetch_list("fetch_crls");
+	unlock_crl_fetch_list("fetch_crls");
 }
 
-static void
-fetch_ocsp_status(ocsp_location_t* location)
+static void fetch_ocsp_status(ocsp_location_t* location)
 {
-#ifdef LIBCURL
-    chunk_t request;
-    chunk_t response = empty_chunk;
-
-    CURL* curl;
-    CURLcode res;
-
-    request = build_ocsp_request(location);
+	chunk_t request, response;
+	char *uri;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-    	DBG_log("sending ocsp request to location '%.*s'"
-	    , (int)location->uri.len, location->uri.ptr)
-    )
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("OCSP request", request)
-    )
-
-    /* send via http post using libcurl */
-    curl = curl_easy_init();
-
-    if (curl != NULL)
-    {
-	char errorbuffer[CURL_ERROR_SIZE];
-	struct curl_slist *headers = NULL;
-	char* uri = alloc_bytes(location->uri.len+1, "ocsp uri");
+	request = build_ocsp_request(location);
+	response = chunk_empty;
 
 	/* we need a null terminated string for curl */
+	uri = malloc(location->uri.len + 1);
 	memcpy(uri, location->uri.ptr, location->uri.len);
 	*(uri + location->uri.len) = '\0';
 
-	/* set content type header */
-	headers = curl_slist_append(headers, "Content-Type: application/ocsp-request");
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, headers);
-
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, uri);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_buffer);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, (void *)&response);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, (void*)request.ptr);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE, request.len);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, errorbuffer);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, TRUE);
-	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT);
-
-	res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
-
-	if (res == CURLE_OK)
+	DBG1("  requesting ocsp status from '%s' ...", uri);
+	if (lib->fetcher->fetch(lib->fetcher, uri, &response, 
+							FETCH_REQUEST_DATA, request,
+							FETCH_REQUEST_TYPE, "application/ocsp-request",
+							FETCH_END) == SUCCESS)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("received ocsp response")
-	    )
-	    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-		DBG_dump_chunk("OCSP response:\n", response)
-	    )
-	    parse_ocsp(location, response);
+		parse_ocsp(location, response);
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    plog("failed to fetch ocsp status from '%s': %s", uri, errorbuffer);
+		DBG1("ocsp request to %s failed", uri);
 	}
-	curl_slist_free_all(headers);
-	curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
-	pfree(uri);
-	/* not using freeanychunk because of realloc (no leak detective) */
-	curl_free(response.ptr);
-    }
-    freeanychunk(location->nonce);
-    freeanychunk(request);
-
-    /* increment the trial counter of the unresolved fetch requests */
-    {
-	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
-	
-	while (certinfo != NULL)
+
+	free(uri);
+	free(request.ptr);
+	chunk_free(&location->nonce);
+
+	/* increment the trial counter of the unresolved fetch requests */
 	{
-	    certinfo->trials++;
-	    certinfo = certinfo->next;
+		ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+		
+		while (certinfo != NULL)
+		{
+			certinfo->trials++;
+			certinfo = certinfo->next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return;
-#else   /* !LIBCURL */
-    plog("ocsp error: pluto wasn't compiled with libcurl support");
-#endif  /* !LIBCURL */
 }
 
-/*
- * try to fetch the necessary ocsp information
+/**
+ * Try to fetch the necessary ocsp information
  */
-static void
-fetch_ocsp(void)
+static void fetch_ocsp(void)
 {
-    ocsp_location_t *location;
+	ocsp_location_t *location;
 
-    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("fetch_ocsp");
-    location = ocsp_fetch_reqs;
+	lock_ocsp_fetch_list("fetch_ocsp");
+	location = ocsp_fetch_reqs;
 
-    /* fetch the ocps status for all locations */
-    while (location != NULL)
-    {
-	if (location->certinfo != NULL)
-	    fetch_ocsp_status(location);
-	location = location->next;
-    }
+	/* fetch the ocps status for all locations */
+	while (location != NULL)
+	{
+		if (location->certinfo != NULL)
+		{
+			fetch_ocsp_status(location);
+		}
+		location = location->next;
+	}
 
-    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("fetch_ocsp");
+	unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("fetch_ocsp");
 }
 
-static void*
-fetch_thread(void *arg)
+static void* fetch_thread(void *arg)
 {
-    struct timespec wait_interval;
+	struct timespec wait_interval;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("fetch thread started")
-    )
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("fetch thread started")
+	)
 
-    pthread_mutex_lock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
 
-    while(1)
-    {
-	int status;
+	while(1)
+	{
+		int status;
 
-	wait_interval.tv_nsec = 0;
-	wait_interval.tv_sec = time(NULL) + crl_check_interval;
+		wait_interval.tv_nsec = 0;
+		wait_interval.tv_sec = time(NULL) + crl_check_interval;
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("next regular crl check in %ld seconds", crl_check_interval)
-	)
-	status = pthread_cond_timedwait(&fetch_wake_cond, &fetch_wake_mutex
-					, &wait_interval);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("next regular crl check in %ld seconds", crl_check_interval)
+		)
+		status = pthread_cond_timedwait(&fetch_wake_cond, &fetch_wake_mutex
+										, &wait_interval);
 
-	if (status == ETIMEDOUT)
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log(" ");
-		DBG_log("*time to check crls and the ocsp cache")
-	    )
-	    check_ocsp();
-	    check_crls();
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("fetch thread was woken up")
-	    )
+		if (status == ETIMEDOUT)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log(" ");
+				DBG_log("*time to check crls and the ocsp cache")
+			)
+			check_ocsp();
+			check_crls();
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("fetch thread was woken up")
+			)
+		}
+		fetch_ocsp();
+		fetch_crls(cache_crls);
 	}
-	fetch_ocsp();
-	fetch_crls(cache_crls);
-    }
 }
 #endif /* THREADS*/
 
-/*
- * initializes curl and starts the fetching thread
+/**
+ * Initializes curl and starts the fetching thread
  */
-void
-init_fetch(void)
+void init_fetch(void)
 {
-#if defined(LIBCURL) || defined (THREADS)
-    int status;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef LIBCURL
-    /* init curl */
-    status = curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_NOTHING);
-    if (status != CURLE_OK)
-    {
-	plog("libcurl could not be initialized, status = %d", status);
-    }
-#endif  /* LIBCURL */
-
-    if (crl_check_interval > 0)
-    {
-#ifdef THREADS
-	status = pthread_create( &thread, NULL, fetch_thread, NULL);
-	if (status != 0)
+	if (crl_check_interval > 0)
 	{
-	    plog("fetching thread could not be started, status = %d", status);
-	}
+#ifdef THREADS
+		int status = pthread_create( &thread, NULL, fetch_thread, NULL);
+
+		if (status != 0)
+		{
+			plog("fetching thread could not be started, status = %d", status);
+		}
 #else   /* !THREADS */
-	plog("warning: not compiled with pthread support");
+		plog("warning: not compiled with pthread support");
 #endif  /* !THREADS */
-    }
+	}
 }
 
-void
-free_crl_fetch(void)
+void free_crl_fetch(void)
 {
    lock_crl_fetch_list("free_crl_fetch");
 
-    while (crl_fetch_reqs != NULL)
-    {
-	fetch_req_t *req = crl_fetch_reqs;
-	crl_fetch_reqs = req->next;
-	free_fetch_request(req);
-    }
-
-    unlock_crl_fetch_list("free_crl_fetch");
-
-#ifdef LIBCURL
-    if (crl_check_interval > 0)
-    {
-	/* cleanup curl */
-	curl_global_cleanup();
-    }
-#endif  /* LIBCURL */
+	while (crl_fetch_reqs != NULL)
+	{
+		fetch_req_t *req = crl_fetch_reqs;
+		crl_fetch_reqs = req->next;
+		free_fetch_request(req);
+	}
+
+	unlock_crl_fetch_list("free_crl_fetch");
 }
 
-/*
- * free the chained list of ocsp requests
+/**
+ * Free the chained list of ocsp requests
  */
-void
-free_ocsp_fetch(void)
+void free_ocsp_fetch(void)
 {
-    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("free_ocsp_fetch");
-    free_ocsp_locations(&ocsp_fetch_reqs);
-    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("free_ocsp_fetch");
+	lock_ocsp_fetch_list("free_ocsp_fetch");
+	free_ocsp_locations(&ocsp_fetch_reqs);
+	unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("free_ocsp_fetch");
 }
 
 
-/*
- * add additional distribution points
+/**
+ * Add additional distribution points
  */
-void
-add_distribution_points(const generalName_t *newPoints ,generalName_t **distributionPoints)
+void add_distribution_points(const generalName_t *newPoints ,generalName_t **distributionPoints)
 {
-    while (newPoints != NULL)
-    {
-	/* skip empty distribution point */
-	if (newPoints->name.len > 0)
-	{	
-	    bool add = TRUE;
-	    generalName_t *gn = *distributionPoints;
-
-	    while (gn != NULL)
-	    {
-		if (gn->kind == newPoints->kind
-		&& gn->name.len == newPoints->name.len
-		&& memcmp(gn->name.ptr, newPoints->name.ptr, gn->name.len) == 0)
-		{
-		    /* skip if the distribution point is already present */
-		    add = FALSE;
-		    break;
-	        }
-	        gn = gn->next;
-	    }
-
-	    if (add)
-	    {
-		/* clone additional distribution point */
-		gn = clone_thing(*newPoints, "generalName");
-		clonetochunk(gn->name, newPoints->name.ptr, newPoints->name.len
-		    , "crl uri");
-
-		/* insert additional CRL distribution point */
-		gn->next = *distributionPoints;
-		*distributionPoints = gn;
-	    }
+	while (newPoints != NULL)
+	{
+		/* skip empty distribution point */
+		if (newPoints->name.len > 0)
+		{       
+			bool add = TRUE;
+			generalName_t *gn = *distributionPoints;
+
+			while (gn != NULL)
+			{
+				if (gn->kind == newPoints->kind
+				&& gn->name.len == newPoints->name.len
+				&& memeq(gn->name.ptr, newPoints->name.ptr, gn->name.len))
+				{
+					/* skip if the distribution point is already present */
+					add = FALSE;
+					break;
+				}
+				gn = gn->next;
+			}
+
+			if (add)
+			{
+				/* clone additional distribution point */
+				gn = clone_thing(*newPoints);
+				gn->name = chunk_clone(newPoints->name);
+
+				/* insert additional CRL distribution point */
+				gn->next = *distributionPoints;
+				*distributionPoints = gn;
+			}
+		}
+		newPoints = newPoints->next;
 	}
-	newPoints = newPoints->next;
-    }
 }
 
-fetch_req_t*
-build_crl_fetch_request(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t authKeySerialNumber
-, chunk_t authKeyID, const generalName_t *gn)
+fetch_req_t* build_crl_fetch_request(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t authKeySerialNumber,
+									 chunk_t authKeyID, const generalName_t *gn)
 {
-    fetch_req_t *req = alloc_thing(fetch_req_t, "fetch request");
-    *req = empty_fetch_req;
-
-    /* note current time */
-    req->installed = time(NULL);
-
-    /* clone fields */
-    clonetochunk(req->issuer, issuer.ptr, issuer.len, "issuer");
-    if (authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	clonetochunk(req->authKeySerialNumber, authKeySerialNumber.ptr
-	    , authKeySerialNumber.len, "authKeySerialNumber");
-    }
-    if (authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	clonetochunk(req->authKeyID, authKeyID.ptr, authKeyID.len, "authKeyID");
-    }
-
-    /* copy distribution points */
-    add_distribution_points(gn, &req->distributionPoints);
-
-    return req;
+	fetch_req_t *req = malloc_thing(fetch_req_t);
+	*req = empty_fetch_req;
+
+	/* note current time */
+	req->installed = time(NULL);
+
+	/* clone fields */
+	req->issuer = chunk_clone(issuer);
+	req->authKeySerialNumber =  chunk_clone(authKeySerialNumber);
+	req->authKeyID = chunk_clone(authKeyID);
+
+	/* copy distribution points */
+	add_distribution_points(gn, &req->distributionPoints);
+
+	return req;
 }
 
-/*
- * add a crl fetch request to the chained list
+/**
+ * Add a crl fetch request to the chained list
  */
-void
-add_crl_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req)
+void add_crl_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req)
 {
-    fetch_req_t *r;
+	fetch_req_t *r;
 
-    lock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
-    r = crl_fetch_reqs;
+	lock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
+	r = crl_fetch_reqs;
 
-    while (r != NULL)
-    {
-	if ((req->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)? same_keyid(req->authKeyID, r->authKeyID)
-		: (same_dn(req->issuer, r->issuer)
-		&& same_serial(req->authKeySerialNumber, r->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	while (r != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* there is already a fetch request */
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("crl fetch request already exists")
-	    )
+		if ((req->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)? same_keyid(req->authKeyID, r->authKeyID)
+				: (same_dn(req->issuer, r->issuer)
+				&& same_serial(req->authKeySerialNumber, r->authKeySerialNumber)))
+		{
+			/* there is already a fetch request */
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("crl fetch request already exists")
+			)
 
-	    /* there might be new distribution points */
-	    add_distribution_points(req->distributionPoints, &r->distributionPoints);
+			/* there might be new distribution points */
+			add_distribution_points(req->distributionPoints, &r->distributionPoints);
 
-	    unlock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
-	    free_fetch_request(req);
-	    return;
+			unlock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
+			free_fetch_request(req);
+			return;
+		}
+		r = r->next;
 	}
-	r = r->next;
-    }
 
-    /* insert new fetch request at the head of the queue */
-    req->next = crl_fetch_reqs;
-    crl_fetch_reqs = req;
+	/* insert new fetch request at the head of the queue */
+	req->next = crl_fetch_reqs;
+	crl_fetch_reqs = req;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("crl fetch request added")
-    )
-    unlock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("crl fetch request added")
+	)
+	unlock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
 }
 
-/*
- * add an ocsp fetch request to the chained list
+/**
+ * Add an ocsp fetch request to the chained list
  */
-void
-add_ocsp_fetch_request(ocsp_location_t *location, chunk_t serialNumber)
+void add_ocsp_fetch_request(ocsp_location_t *location, chunk_t serialNumber)
 {
-    ocsp_certinfo_t certinfo;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t certinfo;
 
-    certinfo.serialNumber = serialNumber;
+	certinfo.serialNumber = serialNumber;
 
-    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("add_ocsp_fetch_request");
-    add_certinfo(location, &certinfo, &ocsp_fetch_reqs, TRUE);
-    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("add_ocsp_fetch_request");
+	lock_ocsp_fetch_list("add_ocsp_fetch_request");
+	add_certinfo(location, &certinfo, &ocsp_fetch_reqs, TRUE);
+	unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("add_ocsp_fetch_request");
 }
 
-/*
- * list all distribution points
+/**
+ * List all distribution points
  */
-void
-list_distribution_points(const generalName_t *gn)
+void list_distribution_points(const generalName_t *gn)
 {
-    bool first_gn = TRUE;
-
-    while (gn != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %s '%.*s'", (first_gn)? "distPts: "
-	    :"         ", (int)gn->name.len, gn->name.ptr);
-	first_gn = FALSE;
-	gn = gn->next;
-    }
+	bool first_gn = TRUE;
+
+	while (gn != NULL)
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %s '%.*s'", (first_gn)? "distPts: "
+			:"         ", (int)gn->name.len, gn->name.ptr);
+		first_gn = FALSE;
+		gn = gn->next;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- *  list all fetch requests in the chained list
+/**
+ *  List all fetch requests in the chained list
  */
-void
-list_crl_fetch_requests(bool utc)
+void list_crl_fetch_requests(bool utc)
 {
-    fetch_req_t *req;
-
-    lock_crl_fetch_list("list_crl_fetch_requests");
-    req = crl_fetch_reqs;
-
-    if (req != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of CRL fetch requests:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
-
-    while (req != NULL)
-    {
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, trials: %d"
-	    , timetoa(&req->installed, utc), req->trials);
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, req->issuer);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
-	if (req->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	fetch_req_t *req;
+
+	lock_crl_fetch_list("list_crl_fetch_requests");
+	req = crl_fetch_reqs;
+
+	if (req != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(req->authKeyID.ptr, req->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of CRL fetch requests:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
 	}
-	if (req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+
+	while (req != NULL)
 	{
-	    datatot(req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, req->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, trials: %d"
+			, &req->installed, utc, req->trials);
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, req->issuer);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+		if (req->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(req->authKeyID.ptr, req->authKeyID.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		if (req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, req->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+		}
+		list_distribution_points(req->distributionPoints);
+		req = req->next;
 	}
-	list_distribution_points(req->distributionPoints);
-	req = req->next;
-    }
-    unlock_crl_fetch_list("list_crl_fetch_requests");
+	unlock_crl_fetch_list("list_crl_fetch_requests");
 }
 
-void
-list_ocsp_fetch_requests(bool utc)
+void list_ocsp_fetch_requests(bool utc)
 {
-    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("list_ocsp_fetch_requests");
-    list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_fetch_reqs, TRUE, utc, FALSE);
-    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("list_ocsp_fetch_requests");
+	lock_ocsp_fetch_list("list_ocsp_fetch_requests");
+	list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_fetch_reqs, TRUE, utc, FALSE);
+	unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("list_ocsp_fetch_requests");
 
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/fetch.h b/src/pluto/fetch.h
index 67be12d47..f7b4eb074 100644
--- a/src/pluto/fetch.h
+++ b/src/pluto/fetch.h
@@ -11,31 +11,29 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: fetch.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include "x509.h"
 
-#define FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT	10	/* seconds */
+#define FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT       10      /* seconds */
 
-struct ocsp_location;	/* forward declaration of ocsp_location defined in ocsp.h */
+struct ocsp_location;   /* forward declaration of ocsp_location defined in ocsp.h */
 
 typedef enum {
-    FETCH_GET =  1,
-    FETCH_POST = 2
+	FETCH_GET =  1,
+	FETCH_POST = 2
 } fetch_request_t;
 
 typedef struct fetch_req fetch_req_t;
 
 struct fetch_req {
-    fetch_req_t   *next;
-    time_t        installed;
-    int           trials;
-    chunk_t       issuer;
-    chunk_t       authKeyID;
-    chunk_t	  authKeySerialNumber;
-    generalName_t *distributionPoints;
+	fetch_req_t   *next;
+	time_t        installed;
+	int           trials;
+	chunk_t       issuer;
+	chunk_t       authKeyID;
+	chunk_t       authKeySerialNumber;
+	generalName_t *distributionPoints;
 };
 
 #ifdef THREADS
@@ -67,9 +65,9 @@ extern void init_fetch(void);
 extern void free_crl_fetch(void);
 extern void free_ocsp_fetch(void);
 extern void add_distribution_points(const generalName_t *newPoints
-    , generalName_t **distributionPoints);
+	, generalName_t **distributionPoints);
 extern fetch_req_t* build_crl_fetch_request(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t authKeySerialNumber
-    , chunk_t authKeyID, const generalName_t *gn);
+	, chunk_t authKeyID, const generalName_t *gn);
 extern void add_crl_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req);
 extern void add_ocsp_fetch_request(struct ocsp_location *location, chunk_t serialNumber);
 extern void list_distribution_points(const generalName_t *gn);
diff --git a/src/pluto/foodgroups.c b/src/pluto/foodgroups.c
index 5b2836bce..ed9853fc4 100644
--- a/src/pluto/foodgroups.c
+++ b/src/pluto/foodgroups.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: foodgroups.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <string.h>
@@ -49,8 +47,8 @@ static size_t fg_path_space = 0;
  */
 
 struct fg_groups {
-    struct fg_groups *next;
-    struct connection *connection;
+	struct fg_groups *next;
+	struct connection *connection;
 };
 
 static struct fg_groups *groups = NULL;
@@ -66,10 +64,10 @@ static struct fg_groups *groups = NULL;
  */
 
 struct fg_targets {
-    struct fg_targets *next;
-    struct fg_groups *group;
-    ip_subnet subnet;
-    char *name;	/* name of instance of group conn */
+	struct fg_targets *next;
+	struct fg_groups *group;
+	ip_subnet subnet;
+	char *name; /* name of instance of group conn */
 };
 
 static struct fg_targets *targets = NULL;
@@ -83,24 +81,24 @@ struct fg_targets *new_targets;
 static int
 ipcmp(ip_address *a, ip_address *b)
 {
-    if (addrtypeof(a) != addrtypeof(b))
-    {
-	return addrtypeof(a) < addrtypeof(b)? -1 : 1;
-    }
-    else if (sameaddr(a, b))
-    {
-	return 0;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	const struct sockaddr *sa = sockaddrof(a)
-	    , *sb = sockaddrof(b);
-
-	passert(addrtypeof(a) == AF_INET);	/* not yet implemented IPv6 version :-( */
-	return (ntohl(((const struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr.s_addr)
-	    < ntohl(((const struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr.s_addr))
-	    ? -1 : 1;
-    }
+	if (addrtypeof(a) != addrtypeof(b))
+	{
+		return addrtypeof(a) < addrtypeof(b)? -1 : 1;
+	}
+	else if (sameaddr(a, b))
+	{
+		return 0;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		const struct sockaddr *sa = sockaddrof(a)
+			, *sb = sockaddrof(b);
+
+		passert(addrtypeof(a) == AF_INET);      /* not yet implemented IPv6 version :-( */
+		return (ntohl(((const struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr.s_addr)
+			< ntohl(((const struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr.s_addr))
+			? -1 : 1;
+	}
 }
 
 /* subnetcmp compares the two ip_subnet values a and b.
@@ -110,353 +108,353 @@ ipcmp(ip_address *a, ip_address *b)
 static int
 subnetcmp(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b)
 {
-    ip_address neta, maska, netb, maskb;
-    int r;
-
-    networkof(a, &neta);
-    maskof(a, &maska);
-    networkof(b, &netb);
-    maskof(b, &maskb);
-    r = ipcmp(&neta, &netb);
-    if (r == 0)
-	r = ipcmp(&maska, &maskb);
-    return r;
+	ip_address neta, maska, netb, maskb;
+	int r;
+
+	networkof(a, &neta);
+	maskof(a, &maska);
+	networkof(b, &netb);
+	maskof(b, &maskb);
+	r = ipcmp(&neta, &netb);
+	if (r == 0)
+		r = ipcmp(&maska, &maskb);
+	return r;
 }
 
 static void
 read_foodgroup(struct fg_groups *g)
 {
-    const char *fgn = g->connection->name;
-    const ip_subnet *lsn = &g->connection->spd.this.client;
-    size_t plen = strlen(policygroups_dir) + 1 + strlen(fgn) + 1;
-    struct file_lex_position flp_space;
-
-    if (plen > fg_path_space)
-    {
-	pfreeany(fg_path);
-	fg_path_space = plen + 10;
-	fg_path = alloc_bytes(fg_path_space, "policy group path");
-    }
-    snprintf(fg_path, fg_path_space, "%s/%s", policygroups_dir, fgn);
-    if (!lexopen(&flp_space, fg_path, TRUE))
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no group file \"%s\"", fg_path));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("loading group \"%s\"", fg_path);
-	for (;;)
+	const char *fgn = g->connection->name;
+	const ip_subnet *lsn = &g->connection->spd.this.client;
+	size_t plen = strlen(policygroups_dir) + 1 + strlen(fgn) + 1;
+	struct file_lex_position flp_space;
+
+	if (plen > fg_path_space)
+	{
+		free(fg_path);
+		fg_path_space = plen + 10;
+		fg_path = malloc(fg_path_space);
+	}
+	snprintf(fg_path, fg_path_space, "%s/%s", policygroups_dir, fgn);
+	if (!lexopen(&flp_space, fg_path, TRUE))
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no group file \"%s\"", fg_path));
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    switch (flp->bdry)
-	    {
-	    case B_none:
+		plog("loading group \"%s\"", fg_path);
+		for (;;)
 		{
-		    /* !!! this test is not sufficient for distinguishing address families.
-		     * We need a notation to specify that a FQDN is to be resolved to IPv6.
-		     */
-		    const struct af_info *afi = strchr(tok, ':') == NULL
-			? &af_inet4_info: &af_inet6_info;
-		    ip_subnet sn;
-		    err_t ugh;
-
-		    if (strchr(tok, '/') == NULL)
-		    {
-			/* no /, so treat as /32 or V6 equivalent */
-			ip_address t;
-
-			ugh = ttoaddr(tok, 0, afi->af, &t);
-			if (ugh == NULL)
-			    ugh = addrtosubnet(&t, &sn);
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			ugh = ttosubnet(tok, 0, afi->af, &sn);
-		    }
-
-		    if (ugh != NULL)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s \"%s\""
-			    , flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh, tok);
-		    }
-		    else if (afi->af != AF_INET)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "\"%s\" line %d: unsupported Address Family \"%s\""
-			    , flp->filename, flp->lino, tok);
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			/* Find where new entry ought to go in new_targets. */
-			struct fg_targets **pp;
-			int r;
-
-			for (pp = &new_targets; ; pp = &(*pp)->next)
-			{
-			    if (*pp == NULL)
-			    {
-				r = -1;	/* end of list is infinite */
-				break;
-			    }
-			    r = subnetcmp(lsn, &(*pp)->group->connection->spd.this.client);
-			    if (r == 0)
-				r = subnetcmp(&sn, &(*pp)->subnet);
-			    if (r <= 0)
-				break;
-			}
-
-			if (r == 0)
+			switch (flp->bdry)
 			{
-			    char source[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-			    subnettot(lsn, 0, source, sizeof(source));
-			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-				, "\"%s\" line %d: subnet \"%s\", source %s, already \"%s\""
-				, flp->filename
-				, flp->lino
-				, tok
-				, source
-				, (*pp)->group->connection->name);
+			case B_none:
+				{
+					/* !!! this test is not sufficient for distinguishing address families.
+					 * We need a notation to specify that a FQDN is to be resolved to IPv6.
+					 */
+					const struct af_info *afi = strchr(tok, ':') == NULL
+						? &af_inet4_info: &af_inet6_info;
+					ip_subnet sn;
+					err_t ugh;
+
+					if (strchr(tok, '/') == NULL)
+					{
+						/* no /, so treat as /32 or V6 equivalent */
+						ip_address t;
+
+						ugh = ttoaddr(tok, 0, afi->af, &t);
+						if (ugh == NULL)
+							ugh = addrtosubnet(&t, &sn);
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						ugh = ttosubnet(tok, 0, afi->af, &sn);
+					}
+
+					if (ugh != NULL)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s \"%s\""
+							, flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh, tok);
+					}
+					else if (afi->af != AF_INET)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "\"%s\" line %d: unsupported Address Family \"%s\""
+							, flp->filename, flp->lino, tok);
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						/* Find where new entry ought to go in new_targets. */
+						struct fg_targets **pp;
+						int r;
+
+						for (pp = &new_targets; ; pp = &(*pp)->next)
+						{
+							if (*pp == NULL)
+							{
+								r = -1; /* end of list is infinite */
+								break;
+							}
+							r = subnetcmp(lsn, &(*pp)->group->connection->spd.this.client);
+							if (r == 0)
+								r = subnetcmp(&sn, &(*pp)->subnet);
+							if (r <= 0)
+								break;
+						}
+
+						if (r == 0)
+						{
+							char source[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+							subnettot(lsn, 0, source, sizeof(source));
+							loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+								, "\"%s\" line %d: subnet \"%s\", source %s, already \"%s\""
+								, flp->filename
+								, flp->lino
+								, tok
+								, source
+								, (*pp)->group->connection->name);
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							struct fg_targets *f = malloc_thing(struct fg_targets);
+
+							f->next = *pp;
+							f->group = g;
+							f->subnet = sn;
+							f->name = NULL;
+							*pp = f;
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				(void)shift();  /* next */
+				continue;
+
+			case B_record:
+				flp->bdry = B_none;     /* eat the Record Boundary */
+				(void)shift();  /* get real first token */
+				continue;
+
+			case B_file:
+				break;  /* done */
 			}
-			else
-			{
-			    struct fg_targets *f = alloc_thing(struct fg_targets, "fg_target");
-
-			    f->next = *pp;
-			    f->group = g;
-			    f->subnet = sn;
-			    f->name = NULL;
-			    *pp = f;
-			}
-		    }
+			break;      /* if we reach here, out of loop */
 		}
-		(void)shift();	/* next */
-		continue;
-
-	    case B_record:
-		flp->bdry = B_none;	/* eat the Record Boundary */
-		(void)shift();	/* get real first token */
-		continue;
-
-	    case B_file:
-		break;	/* done */
-	    }
-	    break;	/* if we reach here, out of loop */
+		lexclose();
 	}
-	lexclose();
-    }
 }
 
 static void
 free_targets(void)
 {
-    while (targets != NULL)
-    {
-	struct fg_targets *t = targets;
-
-	targets = t->next;
-	pfreeany(t->name);
-	pfree(t);
-    }
+	while (targets != NULL)
+	{
+		struct fg_targets *t = targets;
+
+		targets = t->next;
+		free(t->name);
+		free(t);
+	}
 }
 
 void
 load_groups(void)
 {
-    passert(new_targets == NULL);
+	passert(new_targets == NULL);
 
-    /* for each group, add config file targets into new_targets */
-    {
-	struct fg_groups *g;
+	/* for each group, add config file targets into new_targets */
+	{
+		struct fg_groups *g;
 
-	for (g = groups; g != NULL; g = g->next)
-	    if (oriented(*g->connection))
-		read_foodgroup(g);
-    }
+		for (g = groups; g != NULL; g = g->next)
+			if (oriented(*g->connection))
+				read_foodgroup(g);
+	}
 
-    /* dump new_targets */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    struct fg_targets *t;
-
-	    for (t = new_targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
-	    {
-		char asource[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-		char atarget[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-		subnettot(&t->group->connection->spd.this.client
-		    , 0, asource, sizeof(asource));
-		subnettot(&t->subnet, 0, atarget, sizeof(atarget));
-		DBG_log("%s->%s %s"
-		    , asource, atarget
-		    , t->group->connection->name);
-	    }
-	});
-
-    /* determine and deal with differences between targets and new_targets.
-     * structured like a merge.
-     */
-    {
-	struct fg_targets *op = targets
-	    , *np = new_targets;
-
-	while (op != NULL && np != NULL)
-	{
-	    int r = subnetcmp(&op->group->connection->spd.this.client
-		, &np->group->connection->spd.this.client);
-
-	    if (r == 0)
-		r = subnetcmp(&op->subnet, &np->subnet);
-
-	    if (r == 0 && op->group == np->group)
-	    {
-		/* unchanged -- steal name & skip over */
-		np->name = op->name;
-		op->name = NULL;
-		op = op->next;
-		np = np->next;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* note: following cases overlap! */
-		if (r <= 0)
+	/* dump new_targets */
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
 		{
-		    remove_group_instance(op->group->connection, op->name);
-		    op = op->next;
-		}
-		if (r >= 0)
+			struct fg_targets *t;
+
+			for (t = new_targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
+			{
+				char asource[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+				char atarget[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+				subnettot(&t->group->connection->spd.this.client
+					, 0, asource, sizeof(asource));
+				subnettot(&t->subnet, 0, atarget, sizeof(atarget));
+				DBG_log("%s->%s %s"
+					, asource, atarget
+					, t->group->connection->name);
+			}
+		});
+
+	/* determine and deal with differences between targets and new_targets.
+	 * structured like a merge.
+	 */
+	{
+		struct fg_targets *op = targets
+			, *np = new_targets;
+
+		while (op != NULL && np != NULL)
 		{
-		    np->name = add_group_instance(np->group->connection, &np->subnet);
-		    np = np->next;
+			int r = subnetcmp(&op->group->connection->spd.this.client
+				, &np->group->connection->spd.this.client);
+
+			if (r == 0)
+				r = subnetcmp(&op->subnet, &np->subnet);
+
+			if (r == 0 && op->group == np->group)
+			{
+				/* unchanged -- steal name & skip over */
+				np->name = op->name;
+				op->name = NULL;
+				op = op->next;
+				np = np->next;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* note: following cases overlap! */
+				if (r <= 0)
+				{
+					remove_group_instance(op->group->connection, op->name);
+					op = op->next;
+				}
+				if (r >= 0)
+				{
+					np->name = add_group_instance(np->group->connection, &np->subnet);
+					np = np->next;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
+		for (; op != NULL; op = op->next)
+			remove_group_instance(op->group->connection, op->name);
+		for (; np != NULL; np = np->next)
+			np->name = add_group_instance(np->group->connection, &np->subnet);
+
+		/* update: new_targets replaces targets */
+		free_targets();
+		targets = new_targets;
+		new_targets = NULL;
 	}
-	for (; op != NULL; op = op->next)
-	    remove_group_instance(op->group->connection, op->name);
-	for (; np != NULL; np = np->next)
-	    np->name = add_group_instance(np->group->connection, &np->subnet);
-
-	/* update: new_targets replaces targets */
-	free_targets();
-	targets = new_targets;
-	new_targets = NULL;
-    }
 }
 
 
 void
 add_group(struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct fg_groups *g = alloc_thing(struct fg_groups, "policy group");
+	struct fg_groups *g = malloc_thing(struct fg_groups);
 
-    g->next = groups;
-    groups = g;
+	g->next = groups;
+	groups = g;
 
-    g->connection = c;
+	g->connection = c;
 }
 
 static struct fg_groups *
 find_group(const struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct fg_groups *g;
+	struct fg_groups *g;
 
-    for (g = groups; g != NULL && g->connection != c; g = g->next)
-	;
-    return g;
+	for (g = groups; g != NULL && g->connection != c; g = g->next)
+		;
+	return g;
 }
 
 void
 route_group(struct connection *c)
 {
-    /* it makes no sense to route a connection that is ISAKMP-only */
-    if (!NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy) && !HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route an ISAKMP-only group connection");
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct fg_groups *g = find_group(c);
-	struct fg_targets *t;
-
-	passert(g != NULL);
-	g->connection->policy |= POLICY_GROUTED;
-	for (t = targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
+	/* it makes no sense to route a connection that is ISAKMP-only */
+	if (!NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy) && !HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route an ISAKMP-only group connection");
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    if (t->group == g)
-	    {
-		struct connection *ci = con_by_name(t->name, FALSE);
+		struct fg_groups *g = find_group(c);
+		struct fg_targets *t;
 
-		if (ci != NULL)
+		passert(g != NULL);
+		g->connection->policy |= POLICY_GROUTED;
+		for (t = targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
 		{
-		    set_cur_connection(ci);
-		    if (!trap_connection(ci))
-			whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
-		    set_cur_connection(c);
+			if (t->group == g)
+			{
+				struct connection *ci = con_by_name(t->name, FALSE);
+
+				if (ci != NULL)
+				{
+					set_cur_connection(ci);
+					if (!trap_connection(ci))
+						whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+					set_cur_connection(c);
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 void
 unroute_group(struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct fg_groups *g = find_group(c);
-    struct fg_targets *t;
-
-    passert(g != NULL);
-    g->connection->policy &= ~POLICY_GROUTED;
-    for (t = targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
-    {
-	if (t->group == g)
+	struct fg_groups *g = find_group(c);
+	struct fg_targets *t;
+
+	passert(g != NULL);
+	g->connection->policy &= ~POLICY_GROUTED;
+	for (t = targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
 	{
-	    struct connection *ci = con_by_name(t->name, FALSE);
-
-	    if (ci != NULL)
-	    {
-		set_cur_connection(ci);
-		unroute_connection(ci);
-		set_cur_connection(c);
-	    }
+		if (t->group == g)
+		{
+			struct connection *ci = con_by_name(t->name, FALSE);
+
+			if (ci != NULL)
+			{
+				set_cur_connection(ci);
+				unroute_connection(ci);
+				set_cur_connection(c);
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 void
 delete_group(const struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct fg_groups *g;
-
-    /* find and remove from groups */
-    {
-	struct fg_groups **pp;
+	struct fg_groups *g;
 
-	for (pp = &groups; (g = *pp)->connection != c; pp = &(*pp)->next)
-	    ;
+	/* find and remove from groups */
+	{
+		struct fg_groups **pp;
 
-	*pp = g->next;
-    }
+		for (pp = &groups; (g = *pp)->connection != c; pp = &(*pp)->next)
+			;
 
-    /* find and remove from targets */
-    {
-	struct fg_targets **pp;
+		*pp = g->next;
+	}
 
-	for (pp = &targets; *pp != NULL; )
+	/* find and remove from targets */
 	{
-	    struct fg_targets *t = *pp;
-
-	    if (t->group == g)
-	    {
-		*pp = t->next;
-		remove_group_instance(t->group->connection, t->name);
-		pfree(t);
-		/* pp is ready for next iteration */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		pp = &t->next;
-	    }
+		struct fg_targets **pp;
+
+		for (pp = &targets; *pp != NULL; )
+		{
+			struct fg_targets *t = *pp;
+
+			if (t->group == g)
+			{
+				*pp = t->next;
+				remove_group_instance(t->group->connection, t->name);
+				free(t);
+				/* pp is ready for next iteration */
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				pp = &t->next;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    pfree(g);
+	free(g);
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/foodgroups.h b/src/pluto/foodgroups.h
index d66f85423..b6d3386ae 100644
--- a/src/pluto/foodgroups.h
+++ b/src/pluto/foodgroups.h
@@ -10,11 +10,9 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: foodgroups.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-struct connection;	/* forward declaration */
+struct connection;      /* forward declaration */
 extern void add_group(struct connection *c);
 extern void route_group(struct connection *c);
 extern void unroute_group(struct connection *c);
diff --git a/src/pluto/gcryptfix.c b/src/pluto/gcryptfix.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b8007046d..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/gcryptfix.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,283 +0,0 @@
-/* Routines to make gcrypt routines feel at home in Pluto.
- * Copyright (C) 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: gcryptfix.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-
-#include <gmp.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "gcryptfix.h"	/* includes <gmp.h> "defs.h" "rnd.h" */
-
-MPI
-mpi_alloc( unsigned nlimbs UNUSED )
-{
-    MPI n = alloc_bytes(sizeof *n, "mpi_alloc");
-
-    mpz_init(n);
-    return n;
-}
-
-MPI
-mpi_alloc_secure( unsigned nlimbs )
-{
-    return mpi_alloc(nlimbs);
-}
-
-MPI
-mpi_alloc_set_ui( unsigned long u)
-{
-    MPI n = alloc_bytes(sizeof *n, "mpi_copy");
-
-    mpz_init_set_ui(n, u);
-    return n;
-}
-
-MPI
-mpi_copy( MPI a )
-{
-    MPI n = alloc_bytes(sizeof *n, "mpi_copy");
-
-    mpz_init_set(n, a);
-    return n;
-}
-
-void
-mpi_free( MPI a )
-{
-    mpz_clear(a);
-    pfree(a);
-}
-
-int
-mpi_divisible_ui(MPI dividend, ulong divisor )
-{
-    ulong rem;
-    mpz_t remtoo;
-
-    mpz_init(remtoo);
-    rem = mpz_mod_ui(remtoo, dividend, divisor);
-    mpz_clear(remtoo);
-    return rem == 0;
-}
-
-unsigned
-mpi_trailing_zeros( MPI a )
-{
-    return mpz_scan1(a, 0);
-}
-
-unsigned
-mpi_get_nbits( MPI a )
-{
-    return mpz_sizeinbase(a, 2);
-}
-
-int
-mpi_test_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )
-{
-    /* inspired by gmp/mpz/clrbit.c */
-    mp_size_t li = n / mp_bits_per_limb;
-
-    if (li >= a->_mp_size)
-	return 0;
-    return (a->_mp_d[li] & ((mp_limb_t) 1 << (n % mp_bits_per_limb))) != 0;
-}
-
-void
-mpi_set_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )
-{
-    mpz_setbit(a, n);
-}
-
-void
-mpi_clear_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )
-{
-    mpz_clrbit(a, n);
-}
-
-void
-mpi_clear_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n )
-{
-    /* This seems whacky, but what do I know. */
-    mpz_fdiv_r_2exp(a, a, n);
-}
-
-void
-mpi_set_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n )
-{
-    /* This seems whacky, but what do I know. */
-    mpz_fdiv_r_2exp(a, a, n+1);
-    mpz_setbit(a, n);
-}
-
-void
-mpi_set_buffer( MPI a, const u_char *buffer, unsigned nbytes, int sign )
-{
-    /* this is a lot like n_to_mpz */
-    size_t i;
-
-    passert(sign == 0);	/* we won't hit any negative numbers */
-    mpz_init_set_ui(a, 0);
-
-    for (i = 0; i != nbytes; i++)
-    {
-	mpz_mul_ui(a, a, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
-	mpz_add_ui(a, a, buffer[i]);
-    }
-}
-
-u_char *
-get_random_bits(size_t nbits, int level UNUSED, int secure UNUSED)
-{
-    size_t nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
-    u_char *b = alloc_bytes(nbytes, "random bytes");
-
-    get_rnd_bytes(b, nbytes);
-    return b;
-}
-/**************** from gnupg-1.0.0/mpi/mpi-mpow.c
- * RES = (BASE[0] ^ EXP[0]) *  (BASE[1] ^ EXP[1]) * ... * mod M
- */
-#define barrett_mulm( w, u, v, m, y, k, r1, r2 ) mpi_mulm( (w), (u), (v), (m) )
-
-static int
-build_index( MPI *exparray, int k, int i, int t )
-{
-    int j, bitno;
-    int index = 0;
-
-    bitno = t-i;
-    for(j=k-1; j >= 0; j-- ) {
-	index <<= 1;
-	if( mpi_test_bit( exparray[j], bitno ) )
-	    index |= 1;
-    }
-    /*log_debug("t=%d i=%d index=%d\n", t, i, index );*/
-    return index;
-}
-
-void
-mpi_mulpowm( MPI res, MPI *basearray, MPI *exparray, MPI m)
-{
-    int k;	/* number of elements */
-    int t;	/* bit size of largest exponent */
-    int i, j, idx;
-    MPI *G;	/* table with precomputed values of size 2^k */
-    MPI tmp;
-  #ifdef USE_BARRETT
-    MPI barrett_y, barrett_r1, barrett_r2;
-    int barrett_k;
-  #endif
-
-    for(k=0; basearray[k]; k++ )
-	;
-    passert(k);
-    for(t=0, i=0; (tmp=exparray[i]); i++ ) {
-	/*log_mpidump("exp: ", tmp );*/
-	j = mpi_get_nbits(tmp);
-	if( j > t )
-	    t = j;
-    }
-    /*log_mpidump("mod: ", m );*/
-    passert(i==k);
-    passert(t);
-    passert( k < 10 );
-
-#ifdef PLUTO
-    m_alloc_ptrs_clear(G, 1<<k);
-#else
-    G = m_alloc_clear( (1<<k) * sizeof *G );
-#endif
-
-  #ifdef USE_BARRETT
-    barrett_y = init_barrett( m, &barrett_k, &barrett_r1, &barrett_r2 );
-  #endif
-    /* and calculate */
-    tmp =  mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(m)+1 );
-    mpi_set_ui( res, 1 );
-    for(i = 1; i <= t; i++ ) {
-	barrett_mulm(tmp, res, res, m, barrett_y, barrett_k,
-				       barrett_r1, barrett_r2 );
-	idx = build_index( exparray, k, i, t );
-	passert( idx >= 0 && idx < (1<<k) );
-	if( !G[idx] ) {
-	    if( !idx )
-		 G[0] = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 1 );
-	    else {
-		for(j=0; j < k; j++ ) {
-		    if( (idx & (1<<j) ) ) {
-			if( !G[idx] )
-			    G[idx] = mpi_copy( basearray[j] );
-			else
-			    barrett_mulm( G[idx], G[idx], basearray[j],
-					       m, barrett_y, barrett_k, barrett_r1, barrett_r2	);
-		    }
-		}
-		if( !G[idx] )
-		    G[idx] = mpi_alloc(0);
-	    }
-	}
-	barrett_mulm(res, tmp, G[idx], m, barrett_y, barrett_k, barrett_r1, barrett_r2	);
-    }
-
-    /* cleanup */
-    mpi_free(tmp);
-  #ifdef USE_BARRETT
-    mpi_free(barrett_y);
-    mpi_free(barrett_r1);
-    mpi_free(barrett_r2);
-  #endif
-    for(i=0; i < (1<<k); i++ )
-	mpi_free(G[i]);
-    m_free(G);
-}
-
-void
-log_mpidump( const char *text UNUSED, MPI a )
-{
-    /* Print number in hex -- helpful to see if they match bytes.
-     * Humans are not going to do arithmetic with the large numbers!
-     * Much code adapted from mpz_to_n.
-     */
-    u_char buf[8048];	/* this ought to be big enough */
-    size_t len = (mpz_sizeinbase(a, 16) + 1) / 2;   /* bytes */
-    MP_INT temp1, temp2;
-    int i;
-
-    passert(len <= sizeof(buf));
-
-    mpz_init(&temp1);
-    mpz_init(&temp2);
-
-    mpz_set(&temp1, a);
-
-    for (i = len-1; i >= 0; i--)
-    {
-	buf[i] = mpz_mdivmod_ui(&temp2, NULL, &temp1, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
-	mpz_set(&temp1, &temp2);
-    }
-
-    passert(mpz_sgn(&temp1) == 0);	/* we must have done all the bits */
-    mpz_clear(&temp1);
-    mpz_clear(&temp2);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-    DBG_dump(text, buf, len);
-#endif /* DEBUG */
-}
diff --git a/src/pluto/gcryptfix.h b/src/pluto/gcryptfix.h
deleted file mode 100644
index db2587c59..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/gcryptfix.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,111 +0,0 @@
-/* Definitions to make gcrypt routines feel at home in Pluto.
- * Copyright (C) 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: gcryptfix.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#define DBG_CIPHER  1	/* some day we'll do this right */
-
-/* Simulate MPI routines with gmp routines.
- * gmp's MP_INT is a stuct; MPI's MPI is a pointer to an analogous struct.
- * gmp's mpz_t is an array of one of these structs to enable magic pointer
- * conversions to make the notation convenient (but confusing).
- */
-typedef u_char byte;
-typedef MP_INT *MPI;
-
-#define BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB mp_bits_per_limb
-
-extern MPI mpi_alloc( unsigned nlimbs );
-extern MPI mpi_alloc_secure( unsigned nlimbs );
-#define mpi_alloc_like(n) mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(n))
-extern MPI mpi_alloc_set_ui( unsigned long u);
-#define mpi_set_ui(w, u) mpz_set_ui(w, u)
-#define mpi_set(w, u) mpz_set(w, u)
-extern void mpi_free( MPI a );
-extern MPI  mpi_copy( MPI a );
-extern unsigned mpi_get_nbits( MPI a );
-#define mpi_get_nlimbs(a)     ((a)->_mp_alloc)	/* dirty, but useless */
-extern void  mpi_set_buffer( MPI a, const u_char *buffer, unsigned nbytes, int sign );
-extern unsigned mpi_trailing_zeros( MPI a );
-extern int  mpi_test_bit( MPI a, unsigned n );
-extern void mpi_set_bit( MPI a, unsigned n );
-extern void mpi_clear_bit( MPI a, unsigned n );
-extern void mpi_clear_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n );
-extern void mpi_set_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n );
-#define mpi_cmp_ui(u, v) mpz_cmp_ui((u), (v))
-#define mpi_cmp(u, v) mpz_cmp((u), (v))
-#define mpi_is_neg(n) (mpz_sgn(n) < 0)
-#define mpi_add(w, u, v) mpz_add((w), (u), (v))
-#define mpi_add_ui(w, u, v) mpz_add_ui((w), (u), (v))
-#define mpi_sub_ui(w, u, v) mpz_sub_ui((w), (u), (v))
-#define mpi_subm( w, u, v, m) { mpz_sub( (w), (u), (v)) ; mpz_fdiv_r((w), (w), (m)); }
-#define mpi_mul( w, u, v) mpz_mul( (w), (u), (v))
-#define mpi_mul_ui( w, u, v) mpz_mul_ui( (w), (u), (v))
-#define mpi_mulm( w, u, v, m) { mpz_mul( (w), (u), (v)) ; mpz_fdiv_r((w), (w), (m)); }
-#define mpi_fdiv_q(quot, dividend, divisor) mpz_fdiv_q((quot), (dividend), (divisor))
-#define mpi_fdiv_r( rem, dividend, divisor ) mpz_fdiv_r( (rem), (dividend), (divisor) )
-#define mpi_fdiv_r_ui( rem, dividend, divisor )  mpz_fdiv_r_ui( (rem), (dividend), (divisor) )
-#define mpi_tdiv_q_2exp( w, u, count ) mpz_tdiv_q_2exp( (w), (u), (count) )
-extern int   mpi_divisible_ui(MPI dividend, ulong divisor );
-#define mpi_powm( res, base, exp, mod) mpz_powm( res, base, exp, mod)
-extern void mpi_mulpowm( MPI res, MPI *basearray, MPI *exparray, MPI mod);
-#define mpi_gcd( g, a, b ) ( mpz_gcd( (g), (a), (b) ), !mpi_cmp_ui( (g), 1))
-#define mpi_invm( x, a, n ) mpz_invert( (x), (a), (n) )
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-# define log_debug(f...)  DBG_log(f)
-#else
-# define log_debug(f...)  do ; while (0)	/* do nothing, carefully */
-#endif
-#define log_fatal(f...)  exit_log(f)	/* overreaction? */
-extern void log_mpidump( const char *text, MPI a );
-
-#define assert(p) passert(p)
-#define BUG() passert(FALSE)
-
-#define m_alloc_ptrs_clear(pp, n) { \
-	int c = (n); \
-	(pp) = alloc_bytes((n) * sizeof(*(pp)), "m_alloc_ptrs_clear"); \
-	while (c > 0) (pp)[--c] = NULL; \
-    }
-
-extern u_char *get_random_bits(size_t nbits, int level, int secure);
-#define m_alloc(sz) alloc_bytes((sz), "m_alloc")	/* not initialized */
-#define m_free(n) pfree(n)  /* always freeing something from get_random_bits */
-
-/* declarations from gnupg-1.0.0/include/cipher.h */
-/*-- primegen.c --*/
-MPI generate_secret_prime( unsigned nbits );
-MPI generate_public_prime( unsigned nbits );
-MPI generate_elg_prime( int mode, unsigned pbits, unsigned qbits,
-					   MPI g, MPI **factors );
-
-#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E 16     /* encrypt only ElGamal (but not for v3)*/
-#define PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA       17
-#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL   20     /* sign and encrypt elgamal */
-
-#define is_ELGAMAL(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E)
-
-#define PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG     1	    /* key is good for signatures */
-#define PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC     2	    /* key is good for encryption */
-
-/* from gnupg-1.0.0/include/errors.h */
-
-#define G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO     4 /* Unknown pubkey algorithm */
-#define G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY      7 /* Bad secret key */
-#define G10ERR_BAD_SIGN        8 /* Bad signature */
-#define G10ERR_BAD_MPI	      30
-
-/*-- smallprime.c --*/
-extern ushort small_prime_numbers[];
diff --git a/src/pluto/id.c b/src/pluto/id.c
index 8db322a5e..f34775e68 100644
--- a/src/pluto/id.c
+++ b/src/pluto/id.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: id.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -22,13 +20,12 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX	/* POSIX 1003.1-2001 says <unistd.h> defines this */
-# define HOST_NAME_MAX	255 /* upper bound, according to SUSv2 */
+#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX   /* POSIX 1003.1-2001 says <unistd.h> defines this */
+# define HOST_NAME_MAX  255 /* upper bound, according to SUSv2 */
 #endif
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -38,10 +35,10 @@
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 
-const struct id empty_id;	/* ID_NONE */
+const struct id empty_id;       /* ID_ANY */
 
 enum myid_state myid_state = MYID_UNKNOWN;
-struct id myids[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];	/* %myid */
+struct id myids[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];      /* %myid */
 char *myid_str[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];     /* string form of IDs */
 
 /* initialize id module
@@ -50,100 +47,117 @@ char *myid_str[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];     /* string form of IDs */
 void
 init_id(void)
 {
-    passert(empty_id.kind == ID_NONE);
-    myid_state = MYID_UNKNOWN;
-    {
+	passert(empty_id.kind == ID_ANY);
+	myid_state = MYID_UNKNOWN;
+	{
+		enum myid_state s;
+
+		for (s = MYID_UNKNOWN; s <= MYID_SPECIFIED; s++)
+		{
+			myids[s] = empty_id;
+			myid_str[s] = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+	set_myid(MYID_SPECIFIED, getenv("IPSECmyid"));
+	set_myid(MYID_IP, getenv("defaultrouteaddr"));
+	set_myFQDN();
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free id module
+ */
+void
+free_id(void)
+{
 	enum myid_state s;
 
 	for (s = MYID_UNKNOWN; s <= MYID_SPECIFIED; s++)
 	{
-	    myids[s] = empty_id;
-	    myid_str[s] = NULL;
+		free_id_content(&myids[s]);
+		free(myid_str[s]);
 	}
-    }
-    set_myid(MYID_SPECIFIED, getenv("IPSECmyid"));
-    set_myid(MYID_IP, getenv("defaultrouteaddr"));
-    set_myFQDN();
 }
 
 static void
 calc_myid_str(enum myid_state s)
 {
-    /* preformat the ID name */
-    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	/* preformat the ID name */
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-    idtoa(&myids[s], buf, BUF_LEN);
-    replace(myid_str[s], clone_str(buf, "myid string"));
+	idtoa(&myids[s], buf, BUF_LEN);
+	replace(myid_str[s], clone_str(buf));
 }
 
 
 void
 set_myid(enum myid_state s, char *idstr)
 {
-    if (idstr != NULL)
-    {
-	struct id id;
-	err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_BADID, "myid malformed: %s \"%s\"", ugh, idstr);
-	}
-	else
+	if (idstr != NULL)
 	{
-	    free_id_content(&myids[s]);
-	    unshare_id_content(&id);
-	    myids[s] = id;
-	    if (s == MYID_SPECIFIED)
-		myid_state = MYID_SPECIFIED;
-
-	    calc_myid_str(s);
+		struct id id;
+		err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_BADID, "myid malformed: %s \"%s\"", ugh, idstr);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			free_id_content(&myids[s]);
+			unshare_id_content(&id);
+			myids[s] = id;
+			if (s == MYID_SPECIFIED)
+				myid_state = MYID_SPECIFIED;
+
+			calc_myid_str(s);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 void
 set_myFQDN(void)
 {
-    char FQDN[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1];
-    int r = gethostname(FQDN, sizeof(FQDN));
-
-    free_id_content(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
-    myids[MYID_HOSTNAME] = empty_id;
-    if (r != 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "gethostname() failed in set_myFQDN"));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	FQDN[sizeof(FQDN) - 1] = '\0';	/* insurance */
+	char FQDN[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1];
+	int r = gethostname(FQDN, sizeof(FQDN));
 
+	free_id_content(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
+	myids[MYID_HOSTNAME] = empty_id;
+	if (r != 0)
 	{
-	    size_t len = strlen(FQDN);
-
-	    if (len > 0 && FQDN[len-1] == '.')
-	    {
-		/* nuke trailing . */
-		FQDN[len-1]='\0';
-	    }
+		log_errno((e, "gethostname() failed in set_myFQDN"));
 	}
-
-	if (!strcaseeq(FQDN, "localhost.localdomain"))
+	else
 	{
-	    clonetochunk(myids[MYID_HOSTNAME].name, FQDN, strlen(FQDN), "my FQDN");
-	    myids[MYID_HOSTNAME].kind = ID_FQDN;
-	    calc_myid_str(MYID_HOSTNAME);
+		FQDN[sizeof(FQDN) - 1] = '\0';  /* insurance */
+
+		{
+			size_t len = strlen(FQDN);
+
+			if (len > 0 && FQDN[len-1] == '.')
+			{
+				/* nuke trailing . */
+				FQDN[len-1]='\0';
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (!strcaseeq(FQDN, "localhost.localdomain"))
+		{
+			chunk_t myid_name = { FQDN, strlen(FQDN) };
+
+			myids[MYID_HOSTNAME].name = chunk_clone(myid_name);
+			myids[MYID_HOSTNAME].kind = ID_FQDN;
+			calc_myid_str(MYID_HOSTNAME);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 void
 show_myid_status(void)
 {
-    char idstr[BUF_LEN];
+	char idstr[BUF_LEN];
 
-    (void)idtoa(&myids[myid_state], idstr, sizeof(idstr));
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%%myid = %s", idstr);
+	(void)idtoa(&myids[myid_state], idstr, sizeof(idstr));
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%%myid = %s", idstr);
 }
 
 /* Convert textual form of id into a (temporary) struct id.
@@ -152,86 +166,86 @@ show_myid_status(void)
 err_t
 atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    *id = empty_id;
-
-    if (myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
-    {
-	id->kind = ID_MYID;
-    }
-    else if (strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
-    {
-	/* we interpret this as an ASCII X.501 ID_DER_ASN1_DN */
-	id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
-	id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer(); /* assign temporary buffer */
-	id->name.len = 0;
-	/* convert from LDAP style or openssl x509 -subject style to ASN.1 DN
-	 * discard optional @ character in front of DN
-	 */
-	ugh = atodn((*src == '@')?src+1:src, &id->name);
-    }
-    else if (strchr(src, '@') == NULL)
-    {
-	if (streq(src, "%any") || streq(src, "0.0.0.0"))
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	*id = empty_id;
+
+	if (myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
 	{
-	    /* any ID will be accepted */
-	    id->kind = ID_NONE;
+		id->kind = ID_MYID;
 	}
-	else
+	else if (strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
 	{
-	   /* !!! this test is not sufficient for distinguishing address families.
-	    * We need a notation to specify that a FQDN is to be resolved to IPv6.
-	    */
-	   const struct af_info *afi = strchr(src, ':') == NULL
-	? &af_inet4_info: &af_inet6_info;
-
-	   id->kind = afi->id_addr;
-	   ugh = ttoaddr(src, 0, afi->af, &id->ip_addr);
+		/* we interpret this as an ASCII X.501 ID_DER_ASN1_DN */
+		id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+		id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer(); /* assign temporary buffer */
+		id->name.len = 0;
+		/* convert from LDAP style or openssl x509 -subject style to ASN.1 DN
+		 * discard optional @ character in front of DN
+		 */
+		ugh = atodn((*src == '@')?src+1:src, &id->name);
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	if (*src == '@')
+	else if (strchr(src, '@') == NULL)
 	{
-	    if (*(src+1) == '#')
-	    {
-		/* if there is a second specifier (#) on the line
-		 * we interprete this as ID_KEY_ID
-		 */
-		id->kind = ID_KEY_ID;
-		id->name.ptr = src;
-		/* discard @~, convert from hex to bin */
-		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, id->name.ptr, strlen(src), &id->name.len);
-	    }
-	    else if (*(src+1) == '~')
-	    {
-		/* if there is a second specifier (~) on the line
-		* we interprete this as a binary ID_DER_ASN1_DN
-		*/
-		id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
-		id->name.ptr = src;
-		/* discard @~, convert from hex to bin */
-		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, id->name.ptr, strlen(src), &id->name.len);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		id->kind = ID_FQDN;
-		id->name.ptr = src+1;	/* discard @ */
-		id->name.len = strlen(src)-1;
-	    }
+		if (streq(src, "%any") || streq(src, "0.0.0.0"))
+		{
+			/* any ID will be accepted */
+			id->kind = ID_ANY;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		   /* !!! this test is not sufficient for distinguishing address families.
+			* We need a notation to specify that a FQDN is to be resolved to IPv6.
+			*/
+		   const struct af_info *afi = strchr(src, ':') == NULL
+		? &af_inet4_info: &af_inet6_info;
+
+		   id->kind = afi->id_addr;
+		   ugh = ttoaddr(src, 0, afi->af, &id->ip_addr);
+		}
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    /* We leave in @, as per DOI 4.6.2.4
-	     * (but DNS wants . instead).
-	     */
-	    id->kind = ID_USER_FQDN;
-	    id->name.ptr = src;
-	    id->name.len = strlen(src);
+		if (*src == '@')
+		{
+			if (*(src+1) == '#')
+			{
+				/* if there is a second specifier (#) on the line
+				 * we interprete this as ID_KEY_ID
+				 */
+				id->kind = ID_KEY_ID;
+				id->name.ptr = src;
+				/* discard @~, convert from hex to bin */
+				ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, id->name.ptr, strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+			}
+			else if (*(src+1) == '~')
+			{
+				/* if there is a second specifier (~) on the line
+				* we interprete this as a binary ID_DER_ASN1_DN
+				*/
+				id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+				id->name.ptr = src;
+				/* discard @~, convert from hex to bin */
+				ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, id->name.ptr, strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				id->kind = ID_FQDN;
+				id->name.ptr = src+1;   /* discard @ */
+				id->name.len = strlen(src)-1;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* We leave in @, as per DOI 4.6.2.4
+			 * (but DNS wants . instead).
+			 */
+			id->kind = ID_USER_FQDN;
+			id->name.ptr = src;
+			id->name.len = strlen(src);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return ugh;
+	return ugh;
 }
 
 
@@ -241,72 +255,72 @@ atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
 int
 keyidtoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t keyid)
 {
-    int n = datatot(keyid.ptr, keyid.len, 'x', dst, dstlen);
-    return (((size_t)n < dstlen)? n : dstlen) - 1;
+	int n = datatot(keyid.ptr, keyid.len, 'x', dst, dstlen);
+	return (((size_t)n < dstlen)? n : dstlen) - 1;
 }
 
 void
 iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id)
 {
-    *id = empty_id;
-
-    switch (addrtypeof(ip))
-    {
-    case AF_INET:
-	id->kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
-	break;
-    case AF_INET6:
-	id->kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(addrtypeof(ip));
-    }
-    id->ip_addr = *ip;
+	*id = empty_id;
+
+	switch (addrtypeof(ip))
+	{
+	case AF_INET:
+		id->kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		id->kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		bad_case(addrtypeof(ip));
+	}
+	id->ip_addr = *ip;
 }
 
 int
 idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen)
 {
-    int n;
-
-    id = resolve_myid(id);
-    switch (id->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_NONE:
-	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "(none)");
-	break;
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	n = (int)addrtot(&id->ip_addr, 0, dst, dstlen) - 1;
-	break;
-    case ID_FQDN:
-	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "@%.*s", (int)id->name.len, id->name.ptr);
-	break;
-    case ID_USER_FQDN:
-	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "%.*s", (int)id->name.len, id->name.ptr);
-	break;
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-	n = dntoa(dst, dstlen, id->name);
-	break;
-    case ID_KEY_ID:
-	n = keyidtoa(dst, dstlen, id->name);
-	break;
-    default:
-	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "unknown id kind %d", id->kind);
-	break;
-    }
-
-    /* "Sanitize" string so that log isn't endangered:
-     * replace unprintable characters with '?'.
-     */
-    if (n > 0)
-    {
-	for ( ; *dst != '\0'; dst++)
-	    if (!isprint(*dst))
-		*dst = '?';
-    }
-
-    return n;
+	int n;
+
+	id = resolve_myid(id);
+	switch (id->kind)
+	{
+	case ID_ANY:
+		n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "(none)");
+		break;
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		n = (int)addrtot(&id->ip_addr, 0, dst, dstlen) - 1;
+		break;
+	case ID_FQDN:
+		n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "@%.*s", (int)id->name.len, id->name.ptr);
+		break;
+	case ID_USER_FQDN:
+		n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "%.*s", (int)id->name.len, id->name.ptr);
+		break;
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+		n = dntoa(dst, dstlen, id->name);
+		break;
+	case ID_KEY_ID:
+		n = keyidtoa(dst, dstlen, id->name);
+		break;
+	default:
+		n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "unknown id kind %d", id->kind);
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* "Sanitize" string so that log isn't endangered:
+	 * replace unprintable characters with '?'.
+	 */
+	if (n > 0)
+	{
+		for ( ; *dst != '\0'; dst++)
+			if (!isprint(*dst))
+				*dst = '?';
+	}
+
+	return n;
 }
 
 /* Replace the shell metacharacters ', \, ", `, and $ in a character string
@@ -315,26 +329,26 @@ idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen)
 void
 escape_metachar(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dstlen)
 {
-    while (*src != '\0' && dstlen > 4)
-    {
-	switch (*src)
+	while (*src != '\0' && dstlen > 4)
 	{
-	case '\'':
-	case '\\':
-	case '"':
-	case '`':
-	case '$':
-	    sprintf(dst,"\\%s%o", (*src < 64)?"0":"", *src);
-	    dst += 4;
-	    dstlen -= 4;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    *dst++ = *src;
-	    dstlen--;
+		switch (*src)
+		{
+		case '\'':
+		case '\\':
+		case '"':
+		case '`':
+		case '$':
+			sprintf(dst,"\\%s%o", (*src < 64)?"0":"", *src);
+			dst += 4;
+			dstlen -= 4;
+			break;
+		default:
+			*dst++ = *src;
+			dstlen--;
+		}
+		src++;
 	}
-	src++;
-    }
-    *dst = '\0';
+	*dst = '\0';
 }
 
 
@@ -344,126 +358,126 @@ escape_metachar(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dstlen)
 void
 unshare_id_content(struct id *id)
 {
-    switch (id->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_FQDN:
-    case ID_USER_FQDN:
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-    case ID_KEY_ID:
-	id->name.ptr = clone_bytes(id->name.ptr, id->name.len, "keep id name");
-	break;
-    case ID_MYID:
-    case ID_NONE:
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(id->kind);
-    }
+	switch (id->kind)
+	{
+	case ID_FQDN:
+	case ID_USER_FQDN:
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	case ID_KEY_ID:
+		id->name = chunk_clone(id->name);
+		break;
+	case ID_MYID:
+	case ID_ANY:
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		break;
+	default:
+		bad_case(id->kind);
+	}
 }
 
 void
 free_id_content(struct id *id)
 {
-    switch (id->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_FQDN:
-    case ID_USER_FQDN:
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-    case ID_KEY_ID:
-	freeanychunk(id->name);
-	break;
-    case ID_MYID:
-    case ID_NONE:
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(id->kind);
-    }
+	switch (id->kind)
+	{
+	case ID_FQDN:
+	case ID_USER_FQDN:
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	case ID_KEY_ID:
+		free(id->name.ptr);
+		break;
+	case ID_MYID:
+	case ID_ANY:
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		break;
+	default:
+		bad_case(id->kind);
+	}
 }
 
 /* compare two struct id values */
 bool
 same_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b)
 {
-    a = resolve_myid(a);
-    b = resolve_myid(b);
-    if (a->kind != b->kind)
-	return FALSE;
-    switch (a->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_NONE:
-	return TRUE;	/* kind of vacuous */
-
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	return sameaddr(&a->ip_addr, &b->ip_addr);
-
-    case ID_FQDN:
-    case ID_USER_FQDN:
-	/* assumptions:
-	 * - case should be ignored
-	 * - trailing "." should be ignored (even if the only character?)
-	 */
+	a = resolve_myid(a);
+	b = resolve_myid(b);
+	if (a->kind != b->kind)
+		return FALSE;
+	switch (a->kind)
 	{
-	    size_t al = a->name.len
-		, bl = b->name.len;
-
-	    while (al > 0 && a->name.ptr[al - 1] == '.')
-		al--;
-	    while (bl > 0 && b->name.ptr[bl - 1] == '.')
-		bl--;
-	    return al == bl
-		&& strncasecmp(a->name.ptr, b->name.ptr, al) == 0;
-	}
+	case ID_ANY:
+		return TRUE;    /* kind of vacuous */
+
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		return sameaddr(&a->ip_addr, &b->ip_addr);
+
+	case ID_FQDN:
+	case ID_USER_FQDN:
+		/* assumptions:
+		 * - case should be ignored
+		 * - trailing "." should be ignored (even if the only character?)
+		 */
+		{
+			size_t al = a->name.len
+				, bl = b->name.len;
+
+			while (al > 0 && a->name.ptr[al - 1] == '.')
+				al--;
+			while (bl > 0 && b->name.ptr[bl - 1] == '.')
+				bl--;
+			return al == bl
+				&& strncasecmp(a->name.ptr, b->name.ptr, al) == 0;
+		}
 
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-	return same_dn(a->name, b->name);
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+		return same_dn(a->name, b->name);
 
-    case ID_KEY_ID:
-	return a->name.len == b->name.len
-	    && memcmp(a->name.ptr, b->name.ptr, a->name.len) == 0;
+	case ID_KEY_ID:
+		return a->name.len == b->name.len
+			&& memeq(a->name.ptr, b->name.ptr, a->name.len);
 
-    default:
-	bad_case(a->kind);
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	default:
+		bad_case(a->kind);
+	}
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 /* compare two struct id values, DNs can contain wildcards */
 bool
 match_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b, int *wildcards)
 {
-    if (b->kind == ID_NONE)
-    {
-	*wildcards = MAX_WILDCARDS;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    if (a->kind != b->kind)
-	return FALSE;
-    if (a->kind == ID_DER_ASN1_DN)
-	return match_dn(a->name, b->name, wildcards);
-    else
-    {
-	*wildcards = 0;
-	return same_id(a, b);
-    }
+	if (b->kind == ID_ANY)
+	{
+		*wildcards = MAX_WILDCARDS;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	if (a->kind != b->kind)
+		return FALSE;
+	if (a->kind == ID_DER_ASN1_DN)
+		return match_dn(a->name, b->name, wildcards);
+	else
+	{
+		*wildcards = 0;
+		return same_id(a, b);
+	}
 }
 
 /* count the numer of wildcards in an id */
 int
 id_count_wildcards(const struct id *id)
 {
-    switch (id->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_NONE:
-	return MAX_WILDCARDS;
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-	return dn_count_wildcards(id->name);
-    default:
-	return 0;
-    }
+	switch (id->kind)
+	{
+	case ID_ANY:
+		return MAX_WILDCARDS;
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+		return dn_count_wildcards(id->name);
+	default:
+		return 0;
+	}
 }
 
 /* build an ID payload
@@ -474,31 +488,31 @@ id_count_wildcards(const struct id *id)
 void
 build_id_payload(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *hd, chunk_t *tl, struct end *end)
 {
-    const struct id *id = resolve_myid(&end->id);
-
-    zero(hd);
-    hd->isaiid_idtype = id->kind;
-    switch (id->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_NONE:
-	hd->isaiid_idtype = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&end->host_addr))->id_addr;
-	tl->len = addrbytesptr(&end->host_addr
-	    , (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr);	/* sets tl->ptr too */
-	break;
-    case ID_FQDN:
-    case ID_USER_FQDN:
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-    case ID_KEY_ID:
-	*tl = id->name;
-	break;
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	tl->len = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr
-	    , (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr);	/* sets tl->ptr too */
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(id->kind);
-    }
+	const struct id *id = resolve_myid(&end->id);
+
+	zero(hd);
+	hd->isaiid_idtype = id->kind;
+	switch (id->kind)
+	{
+	case ID_ANY:
+		hd->isaiid_idtype = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&end->host_addr))->id_addr;
+		tl->len = addrbytesptr(&end->host_addr
+			, (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr);        /* sets tl->ptr too */
+		break;
+	case ID_FQDN:
+	case ID_USER_FQDN:
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	case ID_KEY_ID:
+		*tl = id->name;
+		break;
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		tl->len = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr
+			, (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr);        /* sets tl->ptr too */
+		break;
+	default:
+		bad_case(id->kind);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/id.h b/src/pluto/id.h
index 185c17f20..dc2dcdfa6 100644
--- a/src/pluto/id.h
+++ b/src/pluto/id.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: id.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _ID_H
@@ -20,25 +18,25 @@
 #include "defs.h"
 
 struct id {
-    int kind;		/* ID_* value */
-    ip_address ip_addr;	/* ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR */
-    chunk_t name;	/* ID_FQDN, ID_USER_FQDN (with @) */
-			/* ID_KEY_ID, ID_DER_ASN_DN       */
+	int kind;           /* ID_* value */
+	ip_address ip_addr; /* ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR */
+	chunk_t name;       /* ID_FQDN, ID_USER_FQDN (with @) */
+						/* ID_KEY_ID, ID_DER_ASN_DN       */
 };
 
 extern void init_id(void);
-
-extern const struct id empty_id;	/* ID_NONE */
+extern void free_id(void);
+extern const struct id empty_id;        /* ID_NONE */
 
 enum myid_state {
-    MYID_UNKNOWN,	/* not yet figured out */
-    MYID_HOSTNAME,	/* our current hostname */
-    MYID_IP,	/* our default IP address */
-    MYID_SPECIFIED	/* as specified by ipsec.conf */
+	MYID_UNKNOWN,       /* not yet figured out */
+	MYID_HOSTNAME,      /* our current hostname */
+	MYID_IP,            /* our default IP address */
+	MYID_SPECIFIED      /* as specified by ipsec.conf */
 };
 
 extern enum myid_state myid_state;
-extern struct id myids[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];	/* %myid */
+extern struct id myids[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];       /* %myid */
 extern char *myid_str[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];      /* strings */
 extern void set_myid(enum myid_state s, char *);
 extern void show_myid_status(void);
@@ -49,19 +47,19 @@ extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok);
 extern int keyidtoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t keyid);
 extern void iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id);
 extern int idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
-#define IDTOA_BUF	512
+#define IDTOA_BUF       512
 extern void escape_metachar(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
-struct end;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in connections.h) */
+struct end;     /* forward declaration of tag (defined in connections.h) */
 extern void unshare_id_content(struct id *id);
 extern void free_id_content(struct id *id);
 extern bool same_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b);
-#define MAX_WILDCARDS	15
+#define MAX_WILDCARDS   15
 extern bool match_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b, int *wildcards);
 extern int id_count_wildcards(const struct id *id);
 #define id_is_ipaddr(id) ((id)->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR || (id)->kind == ID_IPV6_ADDR)
 
-struct isakmp_ipsec_id;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in packet.h) */
+struct isakmp_ipsec_id; /* forward declaration of tag (defined in packet.h) */
 extern void
-    build_id_payload(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *hd, chunk_t *tl, struct end *end);
+	build_id_payload(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *hd, chunk_t *tl, struct end *end);
 
 #endif /* _ID_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/ike_alg.c b/src/pluto/ike_alg.c
index 6759059fa..f833f85b5 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ike_alg.c
+++ b/src/pluto/ike_alg.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* IKE modular algorithm handling interface
- * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * Copyright (C) JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ike_alg.c 3686 2008-03-28 11:48:14Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -21,16 +20,19 @@
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+#include <crypto/crypters/crypter.h>
+#include <crypto/prfs/prf.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
-
 #include "state.h"
 #include "packet.h"
+#include "keys.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "spdb.h"
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@
 
 #define return_on(var, val) do { var=val;goto return_out; } while(0);
 
-/*
+/**
  * IKE algorithm list handling - registration and lookup
  */
 
@@ -50,540 +52,371 @@
 
 static struct ike_alg *ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_MAX+1] = {NULL, NULL};
 
-/*
- * return ike_algo object by {type, id}
+/**
+ * Return ike_algo object by {type, id}
  */
-static struct ike_alg *
-ike_alg_find(u_int algo_type, u_int algo_id, u_int keysize __attribute__((unused)))
+static struct ike_alg *ike_alg_find(u_int algo_type, u_int algo_id,
+									u_int keysize __attribute__((unused)))
 {
-    struct ike_alg *e = ike_alg_base[algo_type];
+	struct ike_alg *e = ike_alg_base[algo_type];
 
-    while (e != NULL && algo_id > e->algo_id)
-    {
-	e = e->algo_next;
-    }
-    return (e != NULL && e->algo_id == algo_id) ? e : NULL;
+	while (e != NULL && algo_id > e->algo_id)
+	{
+		e = e->algo_next;
+	}
+	return (e != NULL && e->algo_id == algo_id) ? e : NULL;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * "raw" ike_alg list adding function
  */
-int
-ike_alg_add(struct ike_alg* a)
+int ike_alg_add(struct ike_alg* a)
 {
-    if (a->algo_type > IKE_ALG_MAX)
-    {
-	plog("ike_alg: Not added, invalid algorithm type");
-	return -EINVAL;
-    }
-
-    if (ike_alg_find(a->algo_type, a->algo_id, 0) != NULL)
-    {
-	plog("ike_alg: Not added, algorithm already exists");
-	return -EEXIST;
-    }
-
-    {
-	struct ike_alg **ep = &ike_alg_base[a->algo_type];
-	struct ike_alg *e = *ep;
-
-	while (e != NULL && a->algo_id > e->algo_id)
+	if (a->algo_type > IKE_ALG_MAX)
 	{
-	    ep = &e->algo_next;
-	    e = *ep;
+		plog("ike_alg: Not added, invalid algorithm type");
+		return -EINVAL;
 	}
-	*ep = a;
-	a->algo_next = e;
-	return 0;
-    }
-}
 
-/*
- * get IKE hash algorithm
- */
-struct hash_desc *ike_alg_get_hasher(u_int alg)
-{
-    return (struct hash_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_HASH, alg, 0);
-}
+	if (ike_alg_find(a->algo_type, a->algo_id, 0) != NULL)
+	{
+		plog("ike_alg: Not added, algorithm already exists");
+		return -EEXIST;
+	}
 
-/*
- * get IKE encryption algorithm
- */
-struct encrypt_desc *ike_alg_get_encrypter(u_int alg)
-{
-    return (struct encrypt_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT, alg, 0);
-}
+	{
+		struct ike_alg **ep = &ike_alg_base[a->algo_type];
+		struct ike_alg *e = *ep;
 
-/*
- * check if IKE hash algorithm is present
- */
-bool
-ike_alg_hash_present(u_int halg)
-{
-    return ike_alg_get_hasher(halg) != NULL;
+		while (e != NULL && a->algo_id > e->algo_id)
+		{
+			ep = &e->algo_next;
+			e = *ep;
+		}
+		*ep = a;
+		a->algo_next = e;
+		return 0;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- * check if IKE encryption algorithm is present
+/**
+ * Get IKE hash algorithm
  */
-bool
-ike_alg_enc_present(u_int ealg)
+struct hash_desc *ike_alg_get_hasher(u_int alg)
 {
-    return ike_alg_get_encrypter(ealg) != NULL;
+	return (struct hash_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_HASH, alg, 0);
 }
 
-/*
- * Validate and register IKE hash algorithm object
+/**
+ * Get IKE encryption algorithm
  */
-int
-ike_alg_register_hash(struct hash_desc *hash_desc)
+struct encrypt_desc *ike_alg_get_crypter(u_int alg)
 {
-    const char *alg_name = NULL;
-    int ret = 0;
-
-    if (hash_desc->algo_id > OAKLEY_HASH_MAX)
-    {
-	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d > max=%d"
-		, hash_desc->algo_id, OAKLEY_HASH_MAX);
-	return_on(ret,-EINVAL);
-    }
-
-    if (hash_desc->hash_ctx_size > sizeof (union hash_ctx))
-    {
-	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d has ctx_size=%d > hash_ctx=%d"
-	      , hash_desc->algo_id
-	      , (int)hash_desc->hash_ctx_size
-	      , (int)sizeof (union hash_ctx));
-	return_on(ret,-EOVERFLOW);
-    }
-
-    if (!(hash_desc->hash_init && hash_desc->hash_update && hash_desc->hash_final))
-    {
-	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d needs hash_init(), hash_update() and hash_final()"
-	      , hash_desc->algo_id);
-	return_on(ret,-EINVAL);
-    }
-	
-    alg_name = enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, hash_desc->algo_id);
-    if (!alg_name)
-    {
-	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d not found in constants.c:oakley_hash_names"
-	      , hash_desc->algo_id);
-	alg_name = "<NULL>";
-    }
-
-return_out:
-    if (ret == 0)
-	ret = ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)hash_desc);
-
-    plog("ike_alg: Activating %s hash: %s"
-	,alg_name, ret == 0 ? "Ok" : "FAILED");
-
-    return ret;
+	return (struct encrypt_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT, alg, 0);
 }
 
-/*
- * Validate and register IKE encryption algorithm object
+/**
+ * Get IKE dh group
  */
-int
-ike_alg_register_enc(struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc)
+struct dh_desc *ike_alg_get_dh_group(u_int alg)
 {
-    int ret = ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)enc_desc);
-
-    const char *alg_name = enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, enc_desc->algo_id);
-
-    char alg_number[20];
-    
-    /* algorithm is not listed in oakley_enc_names */
-    if (alg_name == NULL)
-    {
-	snprintf(alg_number, sizeof(alg_number), "OAKLEY_ID_%d"
-	    , enc_desc->algo_id);
-	alg_name = alg_number;
-    }
-
-    plog("ike_alg: Activating %s encryption: %s"
-	, alg_name, ret == 0 ? "Ok" : "FAILED");
-
-    return ret;
+	return (struct dh_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP, alg, 0);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Get pfsgroup for this connection
  */
-const struct oakley_group_desc *
-ike_alg_pfsgroup(struct connection *c, lset_t policy)
+const struct dh_desc *ike_alg_pfsgroup(struct connection *c, lset_t policy)
 {
-    const struct oakley_group_desc * ret = NULL;
+	const struct dh_desc *ret = NULL;
 
-    if ((policy & POLICY_PFS)
-    && c->alg_info_esp
-    && c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
-	ret = lookup_group(c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup);
-    return ret;
+	if ((policy & POLICY_PFS) &&
+		c->alg_info_esp && c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
+	{
+		ret = ike_alg_get_dh_group(c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup);
+	}
+	return ret;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Create an OAKLEY proposal based on alg_info and policy
  */
-struct db_context *
-ike_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_ike *ai , lset_t policy)
+struct db_context *ike_alg_db_new(struct connection *c, lset_t policy)
 {
-    struct db_context *db_ctx = NULL;
-    struct ike_info *ike_info;
-    struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc;
-    u_int ealg, halg, modp, eklen = 0;
-    int i;
-
-    bool is_xauth_server = (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) != LEMPTY;
-
-    if (!ai)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no IKE algorithms "
-				  "for this connection "
-				  "(check ike algorithm string)");
-	goto fail;
-    }
-    policy &= POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
-    db_ctx = db_prop_new(PROTO_ISAKMP, 8, 8 * 5);
-
-    /* for each group */
-    ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(ai, ike_info, i)
-    {
-	ealg = ike_info->ike_ealg;
-	halg = ike_info->ike_halg;
-	modp = ike_info->ike_modp;
-	eklen= ike_info->ike_eklen;
-
-	if (!ike_alg_enc_present(ealg))
-	{
-	    DBG_log("ike_alg: ike enc ealg=%d not present"
-		    , ealg);
-	    continue;
-	}
-
-	if (!ike_alg_hash_present(halg)) 
-	{
-	    DBG_log("ike_alg: ike hash halg=%d not present"
-		    , halg);
-	    continue;
-	}
+	struct alg_info_ike *ai = c->alg_info_ike;
+	struct db_context *db_ctx = NULL;
+	struct ike_info *ike_info;
+	struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc;
+	u_int ealg, halg, modp, eklen = 0;
+	int i;
 
-	enc_desc = ike_alg_get_encrypter(ealg);
-	passert(enc_desc != NULL);
+	bool is_xauth_server = (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) != LEMPTY;
 
-	if (eklen
-	&& (eklen < enc_desc->keyminlen || eklen >  enc_desc->keymaxlen))
+	if (!ai)
 	{
-	    DBG_log("ike_alg: ealg=%d (specified) keylen:%d, not valid min=%d, max=%d"
-		    , ealg
-		    , eklen
-		    , enc_desc->keyminlen
-		    , enc_desc->keymaxlen
-	    );
-	    continue;
+		whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no IKE algorithms "
+								  "for this connection "
+								  "(check ike algorithm string)");
+		goto fail;
 	}
+	policy &= POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+	db_ctx = db_prop_new(PROTO_ISAKMP, 8, 8 * 5);
 
-	if (policy & POLICY_RSASIG)
+	/* for each group */
+	ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(ai, ike_info, i)
 	{
-	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
-	    if (eklen)
-		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_RSA_SIG);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
-	}
+		ealg = ike_info->ike_ealg;
+		halg = ike_info->ike_halg;
+		modp = ike_info->ike_modp;
+		eklen= ike_info->ike_eklen;
 
-	if (policy & POLICY_PSK)
-	{
-	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
-	    if (eklen)
-		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
-	}
+		if (!ike_alg_get_crypter(ealg))
+		{
+			plog("ike alg: crypter %s not present",
+					enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, ealg));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!ike_alg_get_hasher(halg)) 
+		{
+			plog("ike alg: hasher %s not present",
+					enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, halg));
+			continue;
+		}
+		if (!ike_alg_get_dh_group(modp)) 
+		{
+			plog("ike alg: dh group %s not present",
+					enum_show(&oakley_group_names, modp));
+			continue;
+		}
+		enc_desc = ike_alg_get_crypter(ealg);
 
-	if (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
-	{
-	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
-	    if (eklen)
-		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
-		, is_xauth_server ? XAUTHRespRSA : XAUTHInitRSA);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
-	}
+		if (policy & POLICY_PUBKEY)
+		{
+			int auth_method = 0;
+			private_key_t *key = get_private_key(c);
+
+			if (key == NULL)
+			{
+				plog("ike alg: unable to locate my private key");
+				continue;
+			}
+			switch (key->get_type(key))
+			{
+				case KEY_RSA:
+					auth_method = OAKLEY_RSA_SIG;
+					break;
+				case KEY_ECDSA:
+					switch (key->get_keysize(key))
+					{
+						case 32:
+							auth_method = OAKLEY_ECDSA_256;
+							break;
+						case 48:
+							auth_method = OAKLEY_ECDSA_384;
+							break;
+						case 66:
+							auth_method = OAKLEY_ECDSA_521;
+							break;
+						default:
+							continue;
+					}
+					break;
+				default:
+					continue;
+			}
+			db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+			if (eklen)
+			{
+				db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+			}
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, auth_method);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+		}
 
-	if (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK)
-	{
-	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
-	    if (eklen)
-		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
-		, is_xauth_server ? XAUTHRespPreShared : XAUTHInitPreShared);
-	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+		if (policy & POLICY_PSK)
+		{
+			db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+			if (eklen)
+			{
+				db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+			}
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+		}
+
+		if (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
+		{
+			db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+			if (eklen)
+			{
+				db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+			}
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
+				, is_xauth_server ? XAUTHRespRSA : XAUTHInitRSA);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+		}
+
+		if (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK)
+		{
+			db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+			if (eklen)
+			{
+				db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+			}
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
+				, is_xauth_server ? XAUTHRespPreShared : XAUTHInitPreShared);
+			db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 fail:
-    return db_ctx;
+	return db_ctx;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Show registered IKE algorithms
  */
-void
-ike_alg_list(void)
+void ike_alg_list(void)
 {
-    u_int i;
-    struct ike_alg *a;
-
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKE Encryption Algorithms:");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-
-    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
-    {
-        struct encrypt_desc *desc = (struct encrypt_desc*)a;
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, blocksize: %d, keylen: %d-%d-%d"
-	    , a->algo_id
-	    , enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, a->algo_id)
-	    , (int)desc->enc_blocksize*BITS_PER_BYTE
-	    , desc->keyminlen
-	    , desc->keydeflen
-	    , desc->keymaxlen
-	);
-    }
-
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKE Hash Algorithms:");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-
-    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_HASH]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, hashsize: %d"
-	    , a->algo_id
-	    , enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, a->algo_id)
-	    , (int)((struct hash_desc *)a)->hash_digest_size*BITS_PER_BYTE
-	);
-    }
-
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKE DH Groups:");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-
-    for (i = 0; i < elemsof(oakley_group); i++)
-    {
-	const struct oakley_group_desc *gdesc=oakley_group + i;
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, groupsize: %d"
-	    , gdesc->group
-	    , enum_name(&oakley_group_names, gdesc->group)
-	    , (int)gdesc->bytes*BITS_PER_BYTE
-	);
-    }
-}
-
-/*  Show IKE algorithms for
- *    - this connection (result from ike= string)
- *    - newest SA
- */
-void
-ike_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance)
-{
-    char buf[256];
-    struct state *st;
-
-    if (c->alg_info_ike)
-    {
-	alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   IKE algorithms wanted: %s"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, buf
-	);
-
-	alg_info_snprint_ike(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, c->alg_info_ike);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   IKE algorithms found:  %s"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, buf
-	);
-    }
-
-    st = state_with_serialno(c->newest_isakmp_sa);
-    if (st)
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   IKE algorithm newest: %s_%d-%s-%s"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)
-		+7 /* strlen("OAKLEY_") */
-		/* , st->st_oakley.encrypter->keydeflen */
-		, st->st_oakley.enckeylen
-		, enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, st->st_oakley.hash)
-		+7 /* strlen("OAKLEY_") */
-		, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group)
-		+13 /* strlen("OAKLEY_GROUP_") */
-	);
-}
-
-/*
- * Apply a suite of testvectors to a hash algorithm
- */
-static bool
-ike_hash_test(const struct hash_desc *desc)
-{
-    bool hash_results = TRUE;
-    bool hmac_results = TRUE;
-
-    if (desc->hash_testvectors == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("  %s hash self-test not available", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	int i;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	char *pos;
+	int n, len;
+	struct ike_alg *a;
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKEv1 Algorithms:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+	pos = buf;
+	*pos = '\0';
+	len = BUF_LEN;
+	for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
+	{
+	    n = snprintf(pos, len, " %s", enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, a->algo_id));
+		pos += n;
+		len -= n;
+		if (len <= 0)
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "  encryption:%s", buf);
 
-	for (i = 0; desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg_digest != NULL; i++)
+	pos = buf;
+	*pos = '\0';
+	len = BUF_LEN;
+	for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_HASH]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
 	{
-	    u_char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	    bool result;
-
-	    union hash_ctx ctx;
-
-	    desc->hash_init(&ctx);
-	    desc->hash_update(&ctx, desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg
-				   ,desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg_size);
-	    desc->hash_final(digest, &ctx);
-	    result = memcmp(digest, desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg_digest
-				  , desc->hash_digest_size) == 0;
-	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-		DBG_log("  hash testvector %d: %s", i, result ? "ok":"failed")
-	    )
-	    hash_results &= result;
+	    n = snprintf(pos, len, " %s", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, a->algo_id));
+		pos += n;
+		len -= n;
+		if (len <= 0)
+		{
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	plog("  %s hash self-test %s", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id)
-				, hash_results ? "passed":"failed");
-    }
-
-    if (desc->hmac_testvectors == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("  %s hmac self-test not available", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	int i;
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "  integrity: %s", buf);
 
-	for (i = 0; desc->hmac_testvectors[i].hmac != NULL; i++)
+	pos = buf;
+	*pos = '\0';
+	len = BUF_LEN;
+	for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
 	{
-	    u_char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	    bool result;
-
-	    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-	    hmac_init(&ctx, desc, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].key
-				, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].key_size);
-	    hmac_update(&ctx, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].msg
-			     ,desc->hmac_testvectors[i].msg_size);
-	    hmac_final(digest, &ctx);
-	    result = memcmp(digest, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].hmac
-				  , desc->hash_digest_size) == 0;
-	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-		DBG_log("  hmac testvector %d: %s", i, result ? "ok":"failed")
-	    )
-	    hmac_results &= result;
+	    n = snprintf(pos, len, " %s", enum_name(&oakley_group_names, a->algo_id));
+		pos += n;
+		len -= n;
+		if (len <= 0)
+		{
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	plog("  %s hmac self-test %s", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id)
-				, hmac_results ? "passed":"failed");
-    }
-    return hash_results && hmac_results;
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "  dh-group:  %s", buf);
 }
 
-/*
- * Apply test vectors to registered encryption and hash algorithms
+/**
+ * Show IKE algorithms for this connection (result from ike= string)
+ * and newest SA
  */
-bool
-ike_alg_test(void)
+void ike_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance)
 {
-    bool all_results = TRUE;
-    struct ike_alg *a;
-
-    plog("Testing registered IKE encryption algorithms:");
-
-    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
-    {
-	plog("  %s self-test not available", enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, a->algo_id));
-    }
-
-    plog("Testing registered IKE hash algorithms:");
-
-    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_HASH]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
-    {
-        struct hash_desc *desc = (struct hash_desc*)a;
+	struct state *st = state_with_serialno(c->newest_isakmp_sa);
 
-	all_results &= ike_hash_test(desc);
-    }
-
-    if (all_results)
-	plog("All crypto self-tests passed");
-    else
-	plog("Some crypto self-tests failed");
-    return all_results;
+	if (st)
+	{
+		if (st->st_oakley.encrypt == OAKLEY_3DES_CBC)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT,
+					"\"%s\"%s:   IKE proposal: %s/%s/%s",
+					c->name, instance,
+					enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt),
+					enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, st->st_oakley.hash),
+					enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->algo_id)
+			);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT,
+					"\"%s\"%s:   IKE proposal: %s_%u/%s/%s",
+					c->name, instance,
+					enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt),
+					st->st_oakley.enckeylen,
+					enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, st->st_oakley.hash),
+					enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->algo_id)
+			);
+		}
+	}
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * ML: make F_STRICT logic consider enc,hash/auth,modp algorithms
  */
-bool
-ike_alg_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, u_int group
-, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike)
+bool ike_alg_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, u_int group,
+					  struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike)
 {
-    /*
-     * simple test to discard low key_len, will accept it only
-     * if specified in "esp" string
-     */
-    bool ealg_insecure = (key_len < 128);
-
-    if (ealg_insecure
-    || (alg_info_ike && alg_info_ike->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT))
-    {
-	int i;
-	struct ike_info *ike_info;
-
-	if (alg_info_ike)
+	/*
+	 * simple test to discard low key_len, will accept it only
+	 * if specified in "esp" string
+	 */
+	bool ealg_insecure = (key_len < 128);
+
+	if (ealg_insecure
+	|| (alg_info_ike && alg_info_ike->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT))
 	{
-	    ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(alg_info_ike, ike_info, i)
-	    {
-		if (ike_info->ike_ealg == ealg
-		&& (ike_info->ike_eklen == 0 || key_len == 0 || ike_info->ike_eklen == key_len)
-		&& ike_info->ike_halg == aalg
-		&& ike_info->ike_modp == group)
+		int i;
+		struct ike_info *ike_info;
+
+		if (alg_info_ike)
 		{
-		    if (ealg_insecure)
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "You should NOT use insecure IKE algorithms (%s)!"
-				, enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, ealg));
-		    return TRUE;
+			ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(alg_info_ike, ike_info, i)
+			{
+				if (ike_info->ike_ealg == ealg
+				&& (ike_info->ike_eklen == 0 || key_len == 0 || ike_info->ike_eklen == key_len)
+				&& ike_info->ike_halg == aalg
+				&& ike_info->ike_modp == group)
+				{
+					if (ealg_insecure)
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "You should NOT use insecure IKE algorithms (%s)!"
+								, enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, ealg));
+					return TRUE;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
+		plog("Oakley Transform [%s (%d), %s, %s] refused due to %s"
+				, enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, ealg), key_len
+				, enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, aalg)
+				, enum_name(&oakley_group_names, group)
+				, ealg_insecure ?
+					"insecure key_len and enc. alg. not listed in \"ike\" string" : "strict flag"
+		);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	plog("Oakley Transform [%s (%d), %s, %s] refused due to %s"
-		, enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, ealg), key_len
-		, enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, aalg)
-		, enum_name(&oakley_group_names, group)
-		, ealg_insecure ?
-		    "insecure key_len and enc. alg. not listed in \"ike\" string" : "strict flag"
-	);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/ike_alg.h b/src/pluto/ike_alg.h
index dbf4076c5..458d14c3a 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ike_alg.h
+++ b/src/pluto/ike_alg.h
@@ -10,85 +10,63 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ike_alg.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
- 
+
 #ifndef _IKE_ALG_H
 #define _IKE_ALG_H
 
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
 #include "connections.h"
 
 struct ike_alg {
-    u_int16_t algo_type;
-    u_int16_t algo_id;
-    struct ike_alg *algo_next;
+	u_int16_t algo_type;
+	u_int16_t algo_id;
+	struct ike_alg *algo_next;
 };
 
 struct encrypt_desc {
-    u_int16_t algo_type;
-    u_int16_t algo_id;
-    struct ike_alg *algo_next;
+	u_int16_t algo_type;
+	u_int16_t algo_id;
+	struct ike_alg *algo_next;
 
-    size_t enc_ctxsize;
-    size_t enc_blocksize;
-    u_int keydeflen;
-    u_int keymaxlen;
-    u_int keyminlen;
-    void (*do_crypt)(u_int8_t *dat, size_t datasize, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc);
+	size_t enc_blocksize;
+	u_int keydeflen;
+	u_int keymaxlen;
+	u_int keyminlen;
 };
 
-typedef struct hash_testvector hash_testvector_t;
+struct hash_desc {
+	u_int16_t algo_type;
+	u_int16_t algo_id;
+	struct ike_alg *algo_next;
 
-struct hash_testvector {
-    const size_t  msg_size;
-    const u_char *msg;
-    const u_char *msg_digest;
+	size_t hash_digest_size;
 };
 
-typedef struct hmac_testvector hmac_testvector_t;
-
-struct hmac_testvector {
-    const size_t  key_size;
-    const u_char *key;
-    const size_t  msg_size;
-    const u_char *msg;
-    const u_char *hmac;
-};
-struct hash_desc {
-    u_int16_t algo_type;
-    u_int16_t algo_id;
-    struct ike_alg *algo_next;
+struct dh_desc {
+	u_int16_t algo_type;
+	u_int16_t algo_id;
+	struct ike_alg *algo_next;
 
-    size_t hash_ctx_size;
-    size_t hash_block_size;
-    size_t hash_digest_size;
-    const hash_testvector_t *hash_testvectors;
-    const hmac_testvector_t *hmac_testvectors;
-    void (*hash_init)(void *ctx);
-    void (*hash_update)(void *ctx, const u_int8_t *in, size_t datasize);
-    void (*hash_final)(u_int8_t *out, void *ctx);
+	size_t ke_size;
 };
 
-#define IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT		0
-#define IKE_ALG_HASH		1
-#define IKE_ALG_MAX		IKE_ALG_HASH
+#define IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT         0
+#define IKE_ALG_HASH            1
+#define IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP		2
+#define IKE_ALG_MAX             IKE_ALG_DH_GROUP
 
 extern int ike_alg_add(struct ike_alg *a);
 extern struct hash_desc *ike_alg_get_hasher(u_int alg);
-extern struct encrypt_desc *ike_alg_get_encrypter(u_int alg);
-extern bool ike_alg_enc_present(u_int ealg);
-extern bool ike_alg_hash_present(u_int halg);
-extern int ike_alg_register_hash(struct hash_desc *a);
-extern int ike_alg_register_enc(struct encrypt_desc *e);
-extern const struct oakley_group_desc* ike_alg_pfsgroup(struct connection *c
-    , lset_t policy);
-extern struct db_context * ike_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_ike *ai, lset_t policy);
+extern struct encrypt_desc *ike_alg_get_crypter(u_int alg);
+extern struct dh_desc *ike_alg_get_dh_group(u_int alg);
+extern const struct dh_desc* ike_alg_pfsgroup(struct connection *c, lset_t policy);
+extern struct db_context * ike_alg_db_new(struct connection *c, lset_t policy);
 extern void ike_alg_list(void);
 extern void ike_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance);
-extern bool ike_alg_test(void);
 extern bool ike_alg_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, u_int group
-    , struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike);
+	, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike);
 extern int ike_alg_init(void);
 
 #endif /* _IKE_ALG_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c
index 9721ac583..929768ee9 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c
+++ b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* IPsec DOI and Oakley resolution routines
  * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ipsec_doi.c 5052 2009-03-30 03:47:14Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -24,16 +23,22 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>       /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>		/* for gettimeofday */
+#include <sys/time.h>           /* for gettimeofday */
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+#include <crypto/prfs/prf.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
 #include "state.h"
 #include "id.h"
 #include "x509.h"
@@ -44,25 +49,20 @@
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "keys.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
-#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "demux.h"      /* needs packet.h */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"     /* needs keys.h and adns.h */
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "cookie.h"
 #include "server.h"
 #include "spdb.h"
 #include "timer.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 #include "pkcs7.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "crypto.h"
 #include "vendor.h"
 #include "alg_info.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
@@ -74,115 +74,84 @@
  * are we sending Pluto's Vendor ID?
  */
 #ifdef VENDORID
-#define SEND_PLUTO_VID	1
+#define SEND_PLUTO_VID  1
 #else /* !VENDORID */
-#define SEND_PLUTO_VID	0
+#define SEND_PLUTO_VID  0
 #endif /* !VENDORID */
 
 /*
  * are we sending an XAUTH VID?
  */
 #ifdef XAUTH_VID
-#define SEND_XAUTH_VID	1
+#define SEND_XAUTH_VID  1
 #else /* !XAUTH_VID */
-#define SEND_XAUTH_VID	0
+#define SEND_XAUTH_VID  0
 #endif /* !XAUTH_VID */
 
 /*
  * are we sending a Cisco Unity VID?
  */
 #ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
-#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID	1
+#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID    1
 #else /* !CISCO_QUIRKS */
-#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID	0
+#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID    0
 #endif /* !CISCO_QUIRKS */
 
 /* MAGIC: perform f, a function that returns notification_t
  * and return from the ENCLOSING stf_status returning function if it fails.
  */
 #define RETURN_STF_FAILURE(f) \
-    { int r = (f); if (r != NOTHING_WRONG) return STF_FAIL + r; }
+	{ int r = (f); if (r != NOTHING_WRONG) return STF_FAIL + r; }
 
 /* create output HDR as replica of input HDR */
 void
 echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np)
 {
-    struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr;	/* mostly same as incoming header */
-
-    r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT;	/* we won't ever turn on this bit */
-    if (enc)
-	r_hdr.isa_flags |= ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
-    /* some day, we may have to set r_hdr.isa_version */
-    r_hdr.isa_np = np;
-    if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody))
-	impossible();	/* surely must have room and be well-formed */
+	struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr;  /* mostly same as incoming header */
+
+	r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT;     /* we won't ever turn on this bit */
+	if (enc)
+		r_hdr.isa_flags |= ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+	/* some day, we may have to set r_hdr.isa_version */
+	r_hdr.isa_np = np;
+	if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody))
+		impossible();   /* surely must have room and be well-formed */
 }
 
 /* Compute DH shared secret from our local secret and the peer's public value.
  * We make the leap that the length should be that of the group
  * (see quoted passage at start of ACCEPT_KE).
  */
-static void
-compute_dh_shared(struct state *st, const chunk_t g
-, const struct oakley_group_desc *group)
+static void compute_dh_shared(struct state *st, const chunk_t g)
 {
-    MP_INT mp_g, mp_shared;
-    struct timeval tv0, tv1;
-    unsigned long tv_diff;
-
-    gettimeofday(&tv0, NULL);
-    passert(st->st_sec_in_use);
-    n_to_mpz(&mp_g, g.ptr, g.len);
-    mpz_init(&mp_shared);
-    mpz_powm(&mp_shared, &mp_g, &st->st_sec, group->modulus);
-    mpz_clear(&mp_g);
-    freeanychunk(st->st_shared);	/* happens in odd error cases */
-    st->st_shared = mpz_to_n(&mp_shared, group->bytes);
-    mpz_clear(&mp_shared);
-    gettimeofday(&tv1, NULL);
-    tv_diff=(tv1.tv_sec  - tv0.tv_sec) * 1000000 + (tv1.tv_usec - tv0.tv_usec);
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, 
-    	DBG_log("compute_dh_shared(): time elapsed (%s): %ld usec"
-		, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group)
-		, tv_diff);
-       );
-    /* if took more than 200 msec ... */
-    if (tv_diff > 200000) {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "WARNING: compute_dh_shared(): for %s took "
-			"%ld usec"
-		, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group)
-		, tv_diff);
-    }
-
-    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH shared secret:\n", st->st_shared);
+	passert(st->st_dh);
+	st->st_dh->set_other_public_value(st->st_dh, g);
+	st->st_dh->get_shared_secret(st->st_dh, &st->st_shared);
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH shared secret:\n", st->st_shared);
 }
 
 /* if we haven't already done so, compute a local DH secret (st->st_sec) and
  * the corresponding public value (g).  This is emitted as a KE payload.
  */
-static bool
-build_and_ship_KE(struct state *st, chunk_t *g
-, const struct oakley_group_desc *group, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np)
+static bool build_and_ship_KE(struct state *st, chunk_t *g,
+							  const struct dh_desc *group,
+							  pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np)
 {
-    if (!st->st_sec_in_use)
-    {
-	u_char tmp[LOCALSECRETSIZE];
-	MP_INT mp_g;
-
-	get_rnd_bytes(tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE);
-	st->st_sec_in_use = TRUE;
-	n_to_mpz(&st->st_sec, tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE);
-
-	mpz_init(&mp_g);
-	mpz_powm(&mp_g, &groupgenerator, &st->st_sec, group->modulus);
-	freeanychunk(*g);	/* happens in odd error cases */
-	*g = mpz_to_n(&mp_g, group->bytes);
-	mpz_clear(&mp_g);
+	if (st->st_dh == NULL)
+	{
+		st->st_dh = lib->crypto->create_dh(lib->crypto, group->algo_id);
+		if (st->st_dh == NULL)
+		{
+			plog("Diffie Hellman group %N is not available",
+				 diffie_hellman_group_names, group->algo_id);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
+	st->st_dh->get_my_public_value(st->st_dh, g);
 	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_dump("Local DH secret:\n", tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE);
-	    DBG_dump_chunk("Public DH value sent:\n", *g));
-    }
-    return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_keyex_desc, outs, *g, "keyex value");
+		DBG_dump_chunk("Public DH value sent:\n", *g)
+	)
+	return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_keyex_desc, outs, *g, "keyex value");
 }
 
 /* accept_ke
@@ -194,21 +163,22 @@ build_and_ship_KE(struct state *st, chunk_t *g
  *  Diffie-Hellman group enforced, if necessary, by pre-pending the
  *  value with zeros.
  */
-static notification_t
-accept_KE(chunk_t *dest, const char *val_name
-, const struct oakley_group_desc *gr
-, pb_stream *pbs)
+static notification_t accept_KE(chunk_t *dest, const char *val_name,
+								const struct dh_desc *gr,
+								pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    if (pbs_left(pbs) != gr->bytes)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "KE has %u byte DH public value; %u required"
-	    , (unsigned) pbs_left(pbs), (unsigned) gr->bytes);
-	/* XXX Could send notification back */
-	return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
-    }
-    clonereplacechunk(*dest, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs), val_name);
-    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH public value received:\n", *dest);
-    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	if (pbs_left(pbs) != gr->ke_size)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "KE has %u byte DH public value; %u required"
+			, (unsigned) pbs_left(pbs), gr->ke_size);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	free(dest->ptr);
+	*dest = chunk_create(pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs));
+	*dest = chunk_clone(*dest);
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH public value received:\n", *dest);
+	return NOTHING_WRONG;
 }
 
 /* accept_PFS_KE
@@ -216,652 +186,663 @@ accept_KE(chunk_t *dest, const char *val_name
  * Check and accept optional Quick Mode KE payload for PFS.
  * Extends ACCEPT_PFS to check whether KE is allowed or required.
  */
-static notification_t
-accept_PFS_KE(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest
-, const char *val_name, const char *msg_name)
+static notification_t accept_PFS_KE(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest,
+									const char *val_name, const char *msg_name)
 {
-    struct state *st = md->st;
-    struct payload_digest *const ke_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE];
+	struct state *st = md->st;
+	struct payload_digest *const ke_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE];
 
-    if (ke_pd == NULL)
-    {
-	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing KE payload in %s message", msg_name);
-	    return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
-	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	if (st->st_pfs_group == NULL)
+	if (ke_pd == NULL)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message KE payload requires a GROUP_DESCRIPTION attribute in SA"
-		, msg_name);
-	    return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+		if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing KE payload in %s message", msg_name);
+			return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+		}
 	}
-	if (ke_pd->next != NULL)
+	else
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message contains several KE payloads; we accept at most one", msg_name);
-	    return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;	/* ??? */
+		if (st->st_pfs_group == NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message KE payload requires a GROUP_DESCRIPTION attribute in SA"
+				, msg_name);
+			return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+		}
+		if (ke_pd->next != NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message contains several KE payloads; we accept at most one", msg_name);
+			return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;     /* ??? */
+		}
+		return accept_KE(dest, val_name, st->st_pfs_group, &ke_pd->pbs);
 	}
-	return accept_KE(dest, val_name, st->st_pfs_group, &ke_pd->pbs);
-    }
-    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	return NOTHING_WRONG;
 }
 
-static bool
-build_and_ship_nonce(chunk_t *n, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np
-, const char *name)
+static bool build_and_ship_nonce(chunk_t *n, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np,
+								 const char *name)
 {
-    freeanychunk(*n);
-    setchunk(*n, alloc_bytes(DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE, name), DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE);
-    get_rnd_bytes(n->ptr, DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE);
-    return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_nonce_desc, outs, *n, name);
+	rng_t *rng;
+
+	free(n->ptr);
+	*n = chunk_create(malloc(DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE), DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE);
+	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
+	rng->get_bytes(rng, DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE, n->ptr);
+	rng->destroy(rng);
+	return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_nonce_desc, outs, *n, name);
 }
 
-static bool
-collect_rw_ca_candidates(struct msg_digest *md, generalName_t **top)
+static bool collect_rw_ca_candidates(struct msg_digest *md, generalName_t **top)
 {
-    struct connection *d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr
-	, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, LEMPTY);
+	struct connection *d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr
+		, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, LEMPTY);
 
-    for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
-    {
-	/* must be a road warrior connection */
-	if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
-	&& d->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
+	for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
 	{
-	    generalName_t *gn;
-	    bool new_entry = TRUE;
-
-	    for (gn = *top; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next)
-	    {
-		if (same_dn(gn->name, d->spd.that.ca))
+		/* must be a road warrior connection */
+		if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+		&& d->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
 		{
-		    new_entry = FALSE;
-		    break;
+			generalName_t *gn;
+			bool new_entry = TRUE;
+
+			for (gn = *top; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next)
+			{
+				if (same_dn(gn->name, d->spd.that.ca))
+				{
+					new_entry = FALSE;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			if (new_entry)
+			{
+				gn = malloc_thing(generalName_t);
+				gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME;
+				gn->name = d->spd.that.ca;
+				gn->next = *top;
+				*top = gn;
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    if (new_entry)
-	    {
-		gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
-		gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME;
-		gn->name = d->spd.that.ca;
-		gn->next = *top;
-		*top = gn;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    return *top != NULL;
+	}
+	return *top != NULL;
 }
 
-static bool
-build_and_ship_CR(u_int8_t type, chunk_t ca, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np)
+static bool build_and_ship_CR(u_int8_t type, chunk_t ca, pb_stream *outs,
+							  u_int8_t np)
 {
-    pb_stream cr_pbs;
-    struct isakmp_cr cr_hd;
-    cr_hd.isacr_np = np;
-    cr_hd.isacr_type = type;
+	pb_stream cr_pbs;
+	struct isakmp_cr cr_hd;
+	cr_hd.isacr_np = np;
+	cr_hd.isacr_type = type;
 
-    /* build CR header */
-    if (!out_struct(&cr_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc, outs, &cr_pbs))
-	return FALSE;
+	/* build CR header */
+	if (!out_struct(&cr_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc, outs, &cr_pbs))
+		return FALSE;
 
-    if (ca.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	/* build CR body containing the distinguished name of the CA */
-	if (!out_chunk(ca, &cr_pbs, "CA"))
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-    close_output_pbs(&cr_pbs);
-    return TRUE;
+	if (ca.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+		/* build CR body containing the distinguished name of the CA */
+		if (!out_chunk(ca, &cr_pbs, "CA"))
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+	close_output_pbs(&cr_pbs);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Send a notification to the peer.  We could decide
  * whether to send the notification, based on the type and the
  * destination, if we care to.
  */
-static void
-send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, struct state *encst,
-    msgid_t msgid, u_char *icookie, u_char *rcookie,
-    u_char *spi, size_t spisize, u_char protoid)
+static void send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type,
+							  struct state *encst, msgid_t msgid,
+							  u_char *icookie, u_char *rcookie,
+							  u_char *spi, size_t spisize, u_char protoid)
 {
-    u_char buffer[1024];
-    pb_stream pbs, r_hdr_pbs;
-    u_char *r_hashval    = NULL;  /* where in reply to jam hash value */
-    u_char *r_hash_start = NULL;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
-
-    passert((sndst) && (sndst->st_connection));
-
-    plog("sending %snotification %s to %s:%u"
-	, encst ? "encrypted " : ""
-	, enum_name(&notification_names, type)
-	, ip_str(&sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
-	, (unsigned)sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_port);
-
-    memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
-    init_pbs(&pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "ISAKMP notify");
-
-    /* HDR* */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
-
-	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
-	hdr.isa_np = encst ? ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH : ISAKMP_NEXT_N;
-	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
-	hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
-	hdr.isa_flags = encst ? ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION : 0;
-	if (icookie)
-	    memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	if (rcookie)
-	    memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &pbs, &r_hdr_pbs))
-	    impossible();
-    }
-
-    /* HASH -- value to be filled later */
-    if (encst)
-    {
-	pb_stream hash_pbs;
-	if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_N, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs,
-	    &hash_pbs))
-	    impossible();
-	r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;  /* remember where to plant value */
-	if (!out_zero(
-	encst->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH"))
-	    impossible();
-	close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs);
-	r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH */
-    }
-
-    /* Notification Payload */
-    {
-	pb_stream not_pbs;
-	struct isakmp_notification isan;
-
-	isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
-	isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-	isan.isan_type = type;
-	isan.isan_spisize = spisize;
-	isan.isan_protoid = protoid;
-
-	if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &not_pbs)
-	    || !out_raw(spi, spisize, &not_pbs, "spi"))
-	    impossible();
-	close_output_pbs(&not_pbs);
-    }
-
-    /* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */
-    if (encst)
-    {
-	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, encst->st_oakley.hasher, encst->st_skeyid_a);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
-	hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start);
-	hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx);
+	u_char buffer[1024];
+	pb_stream pbs, r_hdr_pbs;
+	u_char *r_hashval    = NULL;  /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+	u_char *r_hash_start = NULL;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
 
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("HASH computed:");
-	    DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size);
-	)
-    }
+	passert((sndst) && (sndst->st_connection));
 
-    /* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */
-    if (encst)
-    {
-	u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	plog("sending %snotification %s to %s:%u"
+		, encst ? "encrypted " : ""
+		, enum_name(&notification_names, type)
+		, ip_str(&sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+		, (unsigned)sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_port);
+
+	memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+	init_pbs(&pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "ISAKMP notify");
+
+	/* HDR* */
+	{
+		struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+		hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+		hdr.isa_np = encst ? ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH : ISAKMP_NEXT_N;
+		hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
+		hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
+		hdr.isa_flags = encst ? ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION : 0;
+		if (icookie)
+			memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		if (rcookie)
+			memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &pbs, &r_hdr_pbs))
+			impossible();
+	}
 
-	u_int old_iv_len = encst->st_iv_len;
-	u_int new_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len;
-
-	if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
-	    impossible();
-
-	memcpy(old_iv, encst->st_iv, old_iv_len);
-	memcpy(new_iv, encst->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
-
-	if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(encst->st_state))
-	{
-	    memcpy(encst->st_ph1_iv, encst->st_new_iv, encst->st_new_iv_len);
-	    encst->st_ph1_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len;
-	}
-	init_phase2_iv(encst, &msgid);
-	if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, encst))
-	    impossible();
-	    
-	/* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */
-	memcpy(encst->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len);
-	memcpy(encst->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
-	encst->st_iv_len = old_iv_len;
-	encst->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	close_output_pbs(&r_hdr_pbs);
-    }
-
-    /* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */
-    {
-	chunk_t saved_tpacket = sndst->st_tpacket;
-
-	setchunk(sndst->st_tpacket, pbs.start, pbs_offset(&pbs));
-	send_packet(sndst, "ISAKMP notify");
-	sndst->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
-    }
+	/* HASH -- value to be filled later */
+	if (encst)
+	{
+		pb_stream hash_pbs;
+		if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_N, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs,
+			&hash_pbs))
+			impossible();
+		r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;  /* remember where to plant value */
+		if (!out_zero(
+		encst->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH"))
+			impossible();
+		close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs);
+		r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH */
+	}
+
+	/* Notification Payload */
+	{
+		pb_stream not_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_notification isan;
+
+		isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+		isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+		isan.isan_type = type;
+		isan.isan_spisize = spisize;
+		isan.isan_protoid = protoid;
+
+		if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &not_pbs)
+			|| !out_raw(spi, spisize, &not_pbs, "spi"))
+			impossible();
+		close_output_pbs(&not_pbs);
+	}
+
+	/* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */
+	if (encst)
+	{
+		chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(msgid);
+		chunk_t msg_chunk = { r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start };
+		pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+		prf_t *prf;
+
+		prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(encst->st_oakley.hash);
+		prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		prf->set_key(prf, encst->st_skeyid_a);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, msgid_chunk, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, msg_chunk, r_hashval);
+
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("HASH computed:");
+			DBG_dump("", r_hashval, prf->get_block_size(prf));
+		)
+		prf->destroy(prf);
+	}
+
+	/* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */
+	if (encst)
+	{
+		u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+		u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+
+		u_int old_iv_len = encst->st_iv_len;
+		u_int new_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len;
+
+		if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
+			impossible();
+
+		memcpy(old_iv, encst->st_iv, old_iv_len);
+		memcpy(new_iv, encst->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+
+		if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(encst->st_state))
+		{
+			memcpy(encst->st_ph1_iv, encst->st_new_iv, encst->st_new_iv_len);
+			encst->st_ph1_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len;
+		}
+		init_phase2_iv(encst, &msgid);
+		if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, encst))
+			impossible();
+			
+		/* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */
+		memcpy(encst->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len);
+		memcpy(encst->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
+		encst->st_iv_len = old_iv_len;
+		encst->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		close_output_pbs(&r_hdr_pbs);
+	}
+
+	/* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */
+	{
+		chunk_t saved_tpacket = sndst->st_tpacket;
+
+		sndst->st_tpacket = chunk_create(pbs.start, pbs_offset(&pbs));
+		send_packet(sndst, "ISAKMP notify");
+		sndst->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
+	}
 }
 
-void
-send_notification_from_state(struct state *st, enum state_kind state,
-    u_int16_t type)
+void send_notification_from_state(struct state *st, enum state_kind state,
+								  u_int16_t type)
 {
-    struct state *p1st;
-
-    passert(st);
-
-    if (state == STATE_UNDEFINED)
-	state = st->st_state;
-
-    if (IS_QUICK(state))
-    {
-	p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
-	if ((p1st == NULL) || (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(p1st->st_state)))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-		"no Phase1 state for Quick mode notification");
-	    return;
-	}
-	send_notification(st, type, p1st, generate_msgid(p1st),
-	    st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
-    }
-    else if (IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(state) && st->st_enc_key.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	send_notification(st, type, st, generate_msgid(st),
-	    st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* no ISAKMP SA established - don't encrypt notification */
-	send_notification(st, type, NULL, 0,
-	    st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
-    }
+	struct state *p1st;
+
+	passert(st);
+
+	if (state == STATE_UNDEFINED)
+		state = st->st_state;
+
+	if (IS_QUICK(state))
+	{
+		p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+		if ((p1st == NULL) || (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(p1st->st_state)))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+				"no Phase1 state for Quick mode notification");
+			return;
+		}
+		send_notification(st, type, p1st, generate_msgid(p1st),
+			st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+	}
+	else if (IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(state) && st->st_enc_key.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+		send_notification(st, type, st, generate_msgid(st),
+			st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* no ISAKMP SA established - don't encrypt notification */
+		send_notification(st, type, NULL, 0,
+			st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+	}
 }
 
-void
-send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type)
+void send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type)
 {
-    /**
-     * Create a dummy state to be able to use send_packet in
-     * send_notification
-     *
-     * we need to set:
-     *   st_connection->that.host_addr
-     *   st_connection->that.host_port
-     *   st_connection->interface
-     */
-    struct state st;
-    struct connection cnx;
-
-    passert(md);
-
-    memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st));
-    memset(&cnx, 0, sizeof(cnx));
-    st.st_connection = &cnx;
-    cnx.spd.that.host_addr = md->sender;
-    cnx.spd.that.host_port = md->sender_port;
-    cnx.interface = md->iface;
-
-    send_notification(&st, type, NULL, 0,
-	md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+	/**
+	 * Create a dummy state to be able to use send_packet in
+	 * send_notification
+	 *
+	 * we need to set:
+	 *   st_connection->that.host_addr
+	 *   st_connection->that.host_port
+	 *   st_connection->interface
+	 */
+	struct state st;
+	struct connection cnx;
+
+	passert(md);
+
+	memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st));
+	memset(&cnx, 0, sizeof(cnx));
+	st.st_connection = &cnx;
+	cnx.spd.that.host_addr = md->sender;
+	cnx.spd.that.host_port = md->sender_port;
+	cnx.interface = md->iface;
+
+	send_notification(&st, type, NULL, 0,
+		md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
 }
 
 /* Send a Delete Notification to announce deletion of ISAKMP SA or
  * inbound IPSEC SAs.  Does nothing if no such SAs are being deleted.
  * Delete Notifications cannot announce deletion of outbound IPSEC/ISAKMP SAs.
  */
-void
-send_delete(struct state *st)
+void send_delete(struct state *st)
 {
-    pb_stream reply_pbs;
-    pb_stream r_hdr_pbs;
-    msgid_t	msgid;
-    u_char buffer[8192];
-    struct state *p1st;
-    ip_said said[EM_MAXRELSPIS];
-    ip_said *ns = said;
-    u_char
-	*r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
-	*r_hash_start;	/* start of what is to be hashed */
-    bool isakmp_sa = FALSE;
-
-    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-	p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
-	if (p1st == NULL)
+	pb_stream reply_pbs;
+	pb_stream r_hdr_pbs;
+	msgid_t     msgid;
+	u_char buffer[8192];
+	struct state *p1st;
+	ip_said said[EM_MAXRELSPIS];
+	ip_said *ns = said;
+	u_char
+		*r_hashval,     /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+		*r_hash_start;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
+	bool isakmp_sa = FALSE;
+
+	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+		p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+		if (p1st == NULL)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no Phase 1 state for Delete"));
+			return;
+		}
+
+		if (st->st_ah.present)
+		{
+			ns->spi = st->st_ah.our_spi;
+			ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr;
+			ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_AH;
+			ns++;
+		}
+		if (st->st_esp.present)
+		{
+			ns->spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
+			ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr;
+			ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
+			ns++;
+		}
+
+		passert(ns != said);    /* there must be some SAs to delete */
+	}
+	else if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+		p1st = st;
+		isakmp_sa = TRUE;
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no Phase 1 state for Delete"));
-	    return;
+		return; /* nothing to do */
 	}
 
-	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	msgid = generate_msgid(p1st);
+
+	zero(buffer);
+	init_pbs(&reply_pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "delete msg");
+
+	/* HDR* */
 	{
-	    ns->spi = st->st_ah.our_spi;
-	    ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr;
-	    ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_AH;
-	    ns++;
+		struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+		hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+		hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+		hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
+		hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
+		hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, p1st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, p1st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply_pbs, &r_hdr_pbs))
+			impossible();
 	}
-	if (st->st_esp.present)
+
+	/* HASH -- value to be filled later */
 	{
-	    ns->spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
-	    ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr;
-	    ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
-	    ns++;
-	}
-
-	passert(ns != said);    /* there must be some SAs to delete */
-    }
-    else if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-	p1st = st;
-	isakmp_sa = TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return; /* nothing to do */
-    }
-
-    msgid = generate_msgid(p1st);
-
-    zero(buffer);
-    init_pbs(&reply_pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "delete msg");
-
-    /* HDR* */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
-
-	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
-	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
-	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
-	hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
-	hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, p1st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, p1st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply_pbs, &r_hdr_pbs))
-	    impossible();
-    }
-
-    /* HASH -- value to be filled later */
-    {
-	pb_stream hash_pbs;
-
-	if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_D, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &hash_pbs))
-	    impossible();
-	r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;	/* remember where to plant value */
-	if (!out_zero(p1st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH(1)"))
-	    impossible();
-	close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs);
-	r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur;	/* hash from after HASH(1) */
-    }
-
-    /* Delete Payloads */
-    if (isakmp_sa)
-    {
-	pb_stream del_pbs;
-	struct isakmp_delete isad;
-	u_char isakmp_spi[2*COOKIE_SIZE];
-
-	isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
-	isad.isad_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-	isad.isad_spisize = (2 * COOKIE_SIZE);
-	isad.isad_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
-	isad.isad_nospi = 1;
-
-	memcpy(isakmp_spi, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	memcpy(isakmp_spi+COOKIE_SIZE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-
-	if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs)
-	|| !out_raw(&isakmp_spi, (2*COOKIE_SIZE), &del_pbs, "delete payload"))
-	    impossible();
-	close_output_pbs(&del_pbs);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	while (ns != said)
-	{
-
-	    pb_stream del_pbs;
-	    struct isakmp_delete isad;
-
-	    ns--;
-	    isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
-	    isad.isad_np = ns == said? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_D;
-	    isad.isad_spisize = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t);
-	    isad.isad_protoid = ns->proto;
-
-	    isad.isad_nospi = 1;
-	    if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs)
-	    || !out_raw(&ns->spi, sizeof(ipsec_spi_t), &del_pbs, "delete payload"))
-		impossible();
-	    close_output_pbs(&del_pbs);
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */
-    {
-	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, p1st->st_oakley.hasher, p1st->st_skeyid_a);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
-	hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start);
-	hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx);
+		pb_stream hash_pbs;
+
+		if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_D, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &hash_pbs))
+			impossible();
+		r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;       /* remember where to plant value */
+		if (!out_zero(p1st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH(1)"))
+			impossible();
+		close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs);
+		r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur;   /* hash from after HASH(1) */
+	}
 
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("HASH(1) computed:");
-	    DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size);
-	)
-    }
-
-    /* Do a dance to avoid needing a new state object.
-     * We use the Phase 1 State.  This is the one with right
-     * IV, for one thing.
-     * The tricky bits are:
-     * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_iv (but not st_iv_new)
-     * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_tpacket.
-     */
-    {
-	u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	chunk_t saved_tpacket = p1st->st_tpacket;
-
-	memcpy(old_iv, p1st->st_iv, p1st->st_iv_len);
-	init_phase2_iv(p1st, &msgid);
-
-	if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, p1st))
-	    impossible();
-
-	setchunk(p1st->st_tpacket, reply_pbs.start, pbs_offset(&reply_pbs));
-	send_packet(p1st, "delete notify");
-	p1st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
-
-	/* get back old IV for this state */
-	memcpy(p1st->st_iv, old_iv, p1st->st_iv_len);
-    }
+	/* Delete Payloads */
+	if (isakmp_sa)
+	{
+		pb_stream del_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_delete isad;
+		u_char isakmp_spi[2*COOKIE_SIZE];
+
+		isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+		isad.isad_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+		isad.isad_spisize = (2 * COOKIE_SIZE);
+		isad.isad_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
+		isad.isad_nospi = 1;
+
+		memcpy(isakmp_spi, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		memcpy(isakmp_spi+COOKIE_SIZE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+
+		if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs)
+		|| !out_raw(&isakmp_spi, (2*COOKIE_SIZE), &del_pbs, "delete payload"))
+			impossible();
+		close_output_pbs(&del_pbs);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		while (ns != said)
+		{
+
+			pb_stream del_pbs;
+			struct isakmp_delete isad;
+
+			ns--;
+			isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+			isad.isad_np = ns == said? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_D;
+			isad.isad_spisize = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t);
+			isad.isad_protoid = ns->proto;
+
+			isad.isad_nospi = 1;
+			if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs)
+			|| !out_raw(&ns->spi, sizeof(ipsec_spi_t), &del_pbs, "delete payload"))
+				impossible();
+			close_output_pbs(&del_pbs);
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */
+	{
+		chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(msgid);
+		chunk_t msg_chunk = { r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start };
+		pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+		prf_t *prf;
+
+		prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(p1st->st_oakley.hash);
+		prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		prf->set_key(prf, p1st->st_skeyid_a);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, msgid_chunk, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, msg_chunk, r_hashval);
+
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("HASH(1) computed:");
+			DBG_dump("", r_hashval, prf->get_block_size(prf));
+		)
+
+		prf->destroy(prf);
+	}
+
+	/* Do a dance to avoid needing a new state object.
+	 * We use the Phase 1 State.  This is the one with right
+	 * IV, for one thing.
+	 * The tricky bits are:
+	 * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_iv (but not st_iv_new)
+	 * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_tpacket.
+	 */
+	{
+		u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+		chunk_t saved_tpacket = p1st->st_tpacket;
+
+		memcpy(old_iv, p1st->st_iv, p1st->st_iv_len);
+		init_phase2_iv(p1st, &msgid);
+
+		if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, p1st))
+			impossible();
+
+		p1st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(reply_pbs.start, pbs_offset(&reply_pbs));
+		send_packet(p1st, "delete notify");
+		p1st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
+
+		/* get back old IV for this state */
+		memcpy(p1st->st_iv, old_iv, p1st->st_iv_len);
+	}
 }
 
-void
-accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, struct payload_digest *p)
+void accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md,
+				   struct payload_digest *p)
 {
-    struct isakmp_delete *d = &(p->payload.delete);
-    size_t sizespi;
-    int i;
-
-    if (!md->encrypted)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: not encrypted");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-	/* can't happen (if msg is encrypt), but just to be sure */
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
-	"ISAKMP SA not established");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (d->isad_nospi == 0)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: no SPI");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    switch (d->isad_protoid)
-    {
-    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-	sizespi = 2 * COOKIE_SIZE;
-	break;
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-	sizespi = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t);
-	break;
-    case PROTO_IPCOMP:
-	/* nothing interesting to delete */
-	return;
-    default:
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "ignoring Delete SA payload: unknown Protocol ID (%s)"
-	    , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (d->isad_spisize != sizespi)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "ignoring Delete SA payload: bad SPI size (%d) for %s"
-	    , d->isad_spisize, enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) != d->isad_nospi * sizespi)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "ignoring Delete SA payload: invalid payload size");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    for (i = 0; i < d->isad_nospi; i++)
-    {
-	u_char *spi = p->pbs.cur + (i * sizespi);
-
-	if (d->isad_protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
-	{
-	    /**
-	     * ISAKMP
-	     */
-	    struct state *dst = find_state(spi /*iCookie*/
-		, spi+COOKIE_SIZE /*rCookie*/
-		, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr
-		, MAINMODE_MSGID);
-
-	    if (dst == NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
-		    "ISAKMP SA not found (maybe expired)");
-	    }
-	    else if (!same_peer_ids(st->st_connection, dst->st_connection, NULL))
-	    {
-		/* we've not authenticated the relevant identities */
+	struct isakmp_delete *d = &(p->payload.delete);
+	size_t sizespi;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!md->encrypted)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: not encrypted");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+		/* can't happen (if msg is encrypt), but just to be sure */
 		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
-		    "ISAKMP SA used to convey Delete has different IDs from ISAKMP SA it deletes");
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		struct connection *oldc;
-		
-		oldc = cur_connection;
-		set_cur_connection(dst->st_connection);
+		"ISAKMP SA not established");
+		return;
+	}
 
-		if (nat_traversal_enabled)
-		    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
+	if (d->isad_nospi == 0)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: no SPI");
+		return;
+	}
 
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
-		    "deleting ISAKMP State #%lu", dst->st_serialno);
-		delete_state(dst);
-		set_cur_connection(oldc);
-	    }
+	switch (d->isad_protoid)
+	{
+	case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+		sizespi = 2 * COOKIE_SIZE;
+		break;
+	case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+	case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+		sizespi = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t);
+		break;
+	case PROTO_IPCOMP:
+		/* nothing interesting to delete */
+		return;
+	default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ignoring Delete SA payload: unknown Protocol ID (%s)"
+			, enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid));
+		return;
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (d->isad_spisize != sizespi)
 	{
-	    /**
-	     * IPSEC (ESP/AH)
-	     */
-	    bool bogus;
-	    struct state *dst = find_phase2_state_to_delete(st
-		, d->isad_protoid
-		, *(ipsec_spi_t *)spi	/* network order */
-		, &bogus);
-
-	    if (dst == NULL)
-	    {
 		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		       , "ignoring Delete SA payload: %s SA(0x%08lx) not found (%s)"
-		       , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid)
-		       , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi)
-		       , bogus ? "our SPI - bogus implementation" : "maybe expired");
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection;
-		struct connection *oldc;
-		
-		oldc = cur_connection;
-		set_cur_connection(rc);
-
-		if (nat_traversal_enabled)
-		    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
-
-		if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno
-		&& (rc->policy & POLICY_UP))
-		    {
-		    /* Last IPSec SA for a permanent connection that we
-		     * have initiated.  Replace it in a few seconds.
-		     *
-		     * Useful if the other peer is rebooting.
-		     */
-#define DELETE_SA_DELAY  EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0
-		    if (dst->st_event != NULL
-		    && dst->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE
-		    && dst->st_event->ev_time <= DELETE_SA_DELAY + now())
-		    {
-			/* Patch from Angus Lees to ignore retransmited
-			 * Delete SA.
+			, "ignoring Delete SA payload: bad SPI size (%d) for %s"
+			, d->isad_spisize, enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) != d->isad_nospi * sizespi)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ignoring Delete SA payload: invalid payload size");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0; i < d->isad_nospi; i++)
+	{
+		u_char *spi = p->pbs.cur + (i * sizespi);
+
+		if (d->isad_protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
+		{
+			/**
+			 * ISAKMP
 			 */
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
-			    "already replacing IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds"
-			    , dst->st_serialno, (int)(dst->st_event->ev_time - now()));
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
-			    "replace IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds"
-			    , dst->st_serialno, DELETE_SA_DELAY);
-			dst->st_margin = DELETE_SA_DELAY;
-			delete_event(dst);
-			event_schedule(EVENT_SA_REPLACE, DELETE_SA_DELAY, dst);
-		    }
+			struct state *dst = find_state(spi /*iCookie*/
+				, spi+COOKIE_SIZE /*rCookie*/
+				, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr
+				, MAINMODE_MSGID);
+
+			if (dst == NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
+					"ISAKMP SA not found (maybe expired)");
+			}
+			else if (!same_peer_ids(st->st_connection, dst->st_connection, NULL))
+			{
+				/* we've not authenticated the relevant identities */
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
+					"ISAKMP SA used to convey Delete has different IDs from ISAKMP SA it deletes");
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				struct connection *oldc;
+				
+				oldc = cur_connection;
+				set_cur_connection(dst->st_connection);
+
+				if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+					nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
+
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
+					"deleting ISAKMP State #%lu", dst->st_serialno);
+				delete_state(dst);
+				set_cur_connection(oldc);
+			}
 		}
 		else
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA(0x%08lx) payload: "
-			   "deleting IPSEC State #%lu"
-			   , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi)
-			   , dst->st_serialno);
-		    delete_state(dst);
-		}
+			/**
+			 * IPSEC (ESP/AH)
+			 */
+			bool bogus;
+			struct state *dst = find_phase2_state_to_delete(st
+				, d->isad_protoid
+				, *(ipsec_spi_t *)spi   /* network order */
+				, &bogus);
 
-		/* reset connection */
-		set_cur_connection(oldc);
-	    }
+			if (dst == NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+					   , "ignoring Delete SA payload: %s SA(0x%08lx) not found (%s)"
+					   , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid)
+					   , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi)
+					   , bogus ? "our SPI - bogus implementation" : "maybe expired");
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection;
+				struct connection *oldc;
+				
+				oldc = cur_connection;
+				set_cur_connection(rc);
+
+				if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+					nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
+
+				if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno
+				&& (rc->policy & POLICY_UP))
+					{
+					/* Last IPSec SA for a permanent connection that we
+					 * have initiated.  Replace it in a few seconds.
+					 *
+					 * Useful if the other peer is rebooting.
+					 */
+#define DELETE_SA_DELAY  EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0
+					if (dst->st_event != NULL
+					&& dst->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE
+					&& dst->st_event->ev_time <= DELETE_SA_DELAY + now())
+					{
+						/* Patch from Angus Lees to ignore retransmited
+						 * Delete SA.
+						 */
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
+							"already replacing IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds"
+							, dst->st_serialno, (int)(dst->st_event->ev_time - now()));
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
+							"replace IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds"
+							, dst->st_serialno, DELETE_SA_DELAY);
+						dst->st_margin = DELETE_SA_DELAY;
+						delete_event(dst);
+						event_schedule(EVENT_SA_REPLACE, DELETE_SA_DELAY, dst);
+					}
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA(0x%08lx) payload: "
+						   "deleting IPSEC State #%lu"
+						   , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi)
+						   , dst->st_serialno);
+					delete_state(dst);
+				}
+
+				/* reset connection */
+				set_cur_connection(oldc);
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* The whole message must be a multiple of 4 octets.
@@ -869,14 +850,13 @@ accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, struct payload_digest *p)
  * rfc2408 3.6 Transform Payload.
  * Note: it talks about 4 BYTE boundaries!
  */
-void
-close_message(pb_stream *pbs)
+void close_message(pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    size_t padding =  pad_up(pbs_offset(pbs), 4);
+	size_t padding =  pad_up(pbs_offset(pbs), 4);
 
-    if (padding != 0)
-	(void) out_zero(padding, pbs, "message padding");
-    close_output_pbs(pbs);
+	if (padding != 0)
+		(void) out_zero(padding, pbs, "message padding");
+	close_output_pbs(pbs);
 }
 
 /* Initiate an Oakley Main Mode exchange.
@@ -885,225 +865,220 @@ close_message(pb_stream *pbs)
  */
 static stf_status
 main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor
-    , lset_t policy, unsigned long try)
+	, lset_t policy, unsigned long try)
 {
-    struct state *st = new_state();
-    pb_stream reply;	/* not actually a reply, but you know what I mean */
-    pb_stream rbody;
-
-    int vids_to_send = 0;
-    
-    /* set up new state */
-    st->st_connection = c;
-    set_cur_state(st);	/* we must reset before exit */
-    st->st_policy = policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK;
-    st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock;
-    st->st_try = try;
-    st->st_state = STATE_MAIN_I1;
-
-    /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */
-    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    /* always send DPD Vendor ID */
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (nat_traversal_enabled)
-	vids_to_send++;
+	struct state *st = new_state();
+	pb_stream reply;    /* not actually a reply, but you know what I mean */
+	pb_stream rbody;
+
+	int vids_to_send = 0;
+	
+	/* set up new state */
+	st->st_connection = c;
+	set_cur_state(st);  /* we must reset before exit */
+	st->st_policy = policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK;
+	st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock;
+	st->st_try = try;
+	st->st_state = STATE_MAIN_I1;
+
+	/* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */
+	if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
+		vids_to_send++;
+	if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
+		vids_to_send++;
+	if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP)
+		vids_to_send++;
+	if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
+		vids_to_send++;
+	/* always send DPD Vendor ID */
+		vids_to_send++;
+	if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+		vids_to_send++;
 
    get_cookie(TRUE, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
 
-    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
+	insert_state(st);   /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
 
-    if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy))
-	add_pending(dup_any(whack_sock), st, c, policy, 1
-	    , predecessor == NULL? SOS_NOBODY : predecessor->st_serialno);
+	if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy))
+		add_pending(dup_any(whack_sock), st, c, policy, 1
+			, predecessor == NULL? SOS_NOBODY : predecessor->st_serialno);
 
-    if (predecessor == NULL)
-	plog("initiating Main Mode");
-    else
-	plog("initiating Main Mode to replace #%lu", predecessor->st_serialno);
+	if (predecessor == NULL)
+		plog("initiating Main Mode");
+	else
+		plog("initiating Main Mode to replace #%lu", predecessor->st_serialno);
 
-    /* set up reply */
-    init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
+	/* set up reply */
+	init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
 
-    /* HDR out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+	/* HDR out */
+	{
+		struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
 
-	zero(&hdr);	/* default to 0 */
-	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
-	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA;
-	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT;
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	/* R-cookie, flags and MessageID are left zero */
+		zero(&hdr);     /* default to 0 */
+		hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+		hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA;
+		hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT;
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		/* R-cookie, flags and MessageID are left zero */
 
-	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
-	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* SA out */
-    {
-	u_char *sa_start = rbody.cur;
 
-	if (!out_sa(&rbody, &oakley_sadb, st, TRUE
-	, vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE))
+	/* SA out */
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	}
+		u_char *sa_start = rbody.cur;
 
-	/* save initiator SA for later HASH */
-	passert(st->st_p1isa.ptr == NULL);	/* no leak!  (MUST be first time) */
-	clonetochunk(st->st_p1isa, sa_start, rbody.cur - sa_start
-	    , "sa in main_outI1");
-    }
+		if (!out_sa(&rbody, &oakley_sadb, st, TRUE
+		, vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 
-    /* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */
-    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN))
+		/* save initiator SA for later HASH */
+		passert(st->st_p1isa.ptr == NULL);      /* no leak!  (MUST be first time) */
+		st->st_p1isa = chunk_create(sa_start, rbody.cur - sa_start);
+		st->st_p1isa = chunk_clone(st->st_p1isa);
+	}
+
+	/* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */
+	if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */
-    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY))
+	/* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */
+	if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    /* if we  have an OpenPGP certificate we assume an
-     * OpenPGP peer and have to send the Vendor ID
-     */
-    if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &rbody, VID_OPENPGP))
+	/* if we  have an OpenPGP certificate we assume an
+	 * OpenPGP peer and have to send the Vendor ID
+	 */
+	if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &rbody, VID_OPENPGP))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */
-    if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH))
+	/* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */
+	if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &rbody, VID_MISC_DPD))
+	/* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &rbody, VID_MISC_DPD))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (nat_traversal_enabled)
-    {
-	/* Add supported NAT-Traversal VID */
-	if (!nat_traversal_add_vid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &rbody))
+	if (nat_traversal_enabled)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		/* Add supported NAT-Traversal VID */
+		if (!nat_traversal_add_vid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &rbody))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    close_message(&rbody);
-    close_output_pbs(&reply);
 
-    clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply)
-	, "reply packet for main_outI1");
+	close_message(&rbody);
+	close_output_pbs(&reply);
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply));
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_tpacket);
 
-    /* Transmit */
+	/* Transmit */
 
-    send_packet(st, "main_outI1");
+	send_packet(st, "main_outI1");
 
-    /* Set up a retransmission event, half a minute henceforth */
-    delete_event(st);
-    event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
+	/* Set up a retransmission event, half a minute henceforth */
+	delete_event(st);
+	event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
 
-    if (predecessor != NULL)
-    {
-	update_pending(predecessor, st);
-	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1
-	    , "%s: initiate, replacing #%lu"
-	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
-	    , predecessor->st_serialno);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1
-	    , "%s: initiate", enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-    }
-    reset_cur_state();
-    return STF_OK;
+	if (predecessor != NULL)
+	{
+		update_pending(predecessor, st);
+		whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1
+			, "%s: initiate, replacing #%lu"
+			, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+			, predecessor->st_serialno);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1
+			, "%s: initiate", enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+	}
+	reset_cur_state();
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
-void
-ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock
-, struct connection *c
-, lset_t policy
-, unsigned long try
-, so_serial_t replacing)
+void ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, lset_t policy,
+					   unsigned long try, so_serial_t replacing)
 {
-    /* If there's already an ISAKMP SA established, use that and
-     * go directly to Quick Mode.  We are even willing to use one
-     * that is still being negotiated, but only if we are the Initiator
-     * (thus we can be sure that the IDs are not going to change;
-     * other issues around intent might matter).
-     * Note: there is no way to initiate with a Road Warrior.
-     */
-    struct state *st = find_phase1_state(c
-	, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES | PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES);
-
-    if (st == NULL)
-    {
-	(void) main_outI1(whack_sock, c, NULL, policy, try);
-    }
-    else if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy))
-    {
-	if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	/* If there's already an ISAKMP SA established, use that and
+	 * go directly to Quick Mode.  We are even willing to use one
+	 * that is still being negotiated, but only if we are the Initiator
+	 * (thus we can be sure that the IDs are not going to change;
+	 * other issues around intent might matter).
+	 * Note: there is no way to initiate with a Road Warrior.
+	 */
+	struct state *st = find_phase1_state(c
+		, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES | PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES);
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+		(void) main_outI1(whack_sock, c, NULL, policy, try);
+	}
+	else if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy))
 	{
-	    /* leave our Phase 2 negotiation pending */
-	    add_pending(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing);
+		if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		{
+			/* leave our Phase 2 negotiation pending */
+			add_pending(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* ??? we assume that peer_nexthop_sin isn't important:
+			 * we already have it from when we negotiated the ISAKMP SA!
+			 * It isn't clear what to do with the error return.
+			 */
+			(void) quick_outI1(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing);
+		}
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    /* ??? we assume that peer_nexthop_sin isn't important:
-	     * we already have it from when we negotiated the ISAKMP SA!
-	     * It isn't clear what to do with the error return.
-	     */
-	    (void) quick_outI1(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing);
-	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	close_any(whack_sock);
-    }
+		close_any(whack_sock);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Replace SA with a fresh one that is similar
@@ -1115,221 +1090,264 @@ ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock
  * - duplicate whack fd, if live.
  * Does not delete the old state -- someone else will do that.
  */
-void
-ipsecdoi_replace(struct state *st, unsigned long try)
+void ipsecdoi_replace(struct state *st, unsigned long try)
 {
-    int whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock);
-    lset_t policy = st->st_policy;
-
-    if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-    {
-	passert(!HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy));
-	(void) main_outI1(whack_sock, st->st_connection, st, policy, try);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* Add features of actual old state to policy.  This ensures
-	 * that rekeying doesn't downgrade security.  I admit that
-	 * this doesn't capture everything.
-	 */
-	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
-	    policy |= POLICY_PFS;
-	if (st->st_ah.present)
-	{
-	    policy |= POLICY_AUTHENTICATE;
-	    if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-		policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
-	}
-	if (st->st_esp.present && st->st_esp.attrs.transid != ESP_NULL)
+	int whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock);
+	lset_t policy = st->st_policy;
+
+	if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
 	{
-	    policy |= POLICY_ENCRYPT;
-	    if (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-		policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+		passert(!HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy));
+		(void) main_outI1(whack_sock, st->st_connection, st, policy, try);
 	}
-	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	else
 	{
-	    policy |= POLICY_COMPRESS;
-	    if (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-		policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+		/* Add features of actual old state to policy.  This ensures
+		 * that rekeying doesn't downgrade security.  I admit that
+		 * this doesn't capture everything.
+		 */
+		if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+			policy |= POLICY_PFS;
+		if (st->st_ah.present)
+		{
+			policy |= POLICY_AUTHENTICATE;
+			if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+				policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+		}
+		if (st->st_esp.present && st->st_esp.attrs.transid != ESP_NULL)
+		{
+			policy |= POLICY_ENCRYPT;
+			if (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+				policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+		}
+		if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+		{
+			policy |= POLICY_COMPRESS;
+			if (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+				policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+		}
+		passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy));
+		ipsecdoi_initiate(whack_sock, st->st_connection, policy, try
+			, st->st_serialno);
 	}
-	passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy));
-	ipsecdoi_initiate(whack_sock, st->st_connection, policy, try
-	    , st->st_serialno);
-    }
 }
 
 /* SKEYID for preshared keys.
  * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1
  */
-static bool
-skeyid_preshared(struct state *st)
+static bool skeyid_preshared(struct state *st)
 {
-    const chunk_t *pss = get_preshared_secret(st->st_connection);
+	const chunk_t *pss = get_preshared_secret(st->st_connection);
 
-    if (pss == NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secret disappeared!");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, *pss);
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni);
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_nr);
-	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid, "st_skeyid in skeyid_preshared()", &ctx);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (pss == NULL)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secret disappeared!");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+		prf_t *prf;
+
+		prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+		prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		if (prf == NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%N not available to compute skeyid",
+									pseudo_random_function_names, prf_alg);
+		return FALSE;
+		}
+		free(st->st_skeyid.ptr);
+		prf->set_key(prf, *pss);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_ni, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_nr, &st->st_skeyid);
+		prf->destroy(prf);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 static bool
 skeyid_digisig(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-    chunk_t nir;
-
-    /* We need to hmac_init with the concatenation of Ni_b and Nr_b,
-     * so we have to build a temporary concatentation.
-     */
-    nir.len = st->st_ni.len + st->st_nr.len;
-    nir.ptr = alloc_bytes(nir.len, "Ni + Nr in skeyid_digisig");
-    memcpy(nir.ptr, st->st_ni.ptr, st->st_ni.len);
-    memcpy(nir.ptr+st->st_ni.len, st->st_nr.ptr, st->st_nr.len);
-    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, nir);
-    pfree(nir.ptr);
-
-    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
-    hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid, "st_skeyid in skeyid_digisig()", &ctx);
-    return TRUE;
+	chunk_t nir;
+	pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+	prf_t *prf;
+
+	prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+	prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+	if (prf == NULL)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%N not available to compute skeyid",
+								pseudo_random_function_names, prf_alg);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	free(st->st_skeyid.ptr);
+	nir = chunk_cat("cc", st->st_ni, st->st_nr);
+	prf->set_key(prf, nir);
+	prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, &st->st_skeyid);
+	prf->destroy(prf);
+	free(nir.ptr);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Generate the SKEYID_* and new IV
  * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1
  */
-static bool
-generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st)
+static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st)
 {
-    /* Generate the SKEYID */
-    switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
-    {
-	case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
-	case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-	case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-	    if (!skeyid_preshared(st))
-		return FALSE;
-	    break;
+	/* Generate the SKEYID */
+	switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+		case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+		case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+			if (!skeyid_preshared(st))
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			break;
 
-	case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
-	case XAUTHInitRSA:
-	case XAUTHRespRSA:
-	    if (!skeyid_digisig(st))
-		return FALSE;
-	    break;
+		case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+		case XAUTHInitRSA:
+		case XAUTHRespRSA:
+			if (!skeyid_digisig(st))
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			break;
 
-	case OAKLEY_DSS_SIG:
-	    /* XXX */
+		case OAKLEY_DSS_SIG:
+			/* XXX */
 
-	case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC:
-	case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV:
-	case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC:
-	case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV:
-	    /* XXX */
+		case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC:
+		case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV:
+		case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC:
+		case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV:
+			/* XXX */
 
-	default:
-	    bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth);
-    }
-
-    /* generate SKEYID_* from SKEYID */
-    {
-	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid);
-
-	/* SKEYID_D */
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1);
-	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_d, "st_skeyid_d in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx);
-
-	/* SKEYID_A */
-	hmac_reinit(&ctx);
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_skeyid_d);
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, "\1", 1);
-	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_a, "st_skeyid_a in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx);
-
-	/* SKEYID_E */
-	hmac_reinit(&ctx);
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_skeyid_a);
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hmac_update(&ctx, "\2", 1);
-	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_e, "st_skeyid_e in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx);
-    }
-
-    /* generate IV */
-    {
-	union hash_ctx hash_ctx;
-	const struct hash_desc *h = st->st_oakley.hasher;
-
-	st->st_new_iv_len = h->hash_digest_size;
-	passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+		default:
+			bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth);
+	}
+
+	/* generate SKEYID_* from SKEYID */
+	{
+		char buf_skeyid_d[] = { 0x00 };
+		char buf_skeyid_a[] = { 0x01 };
+		char buf_skeyid_e[] = { 0x02 };
+		chunk_t seed_skeyid_d = chunk_from_buf(buf_skeyid_d);
+		chunk_t seed_skeyid_a = chunk_from_buf(buf_skeyid_a);
+		chunk_t seed_skeyid_e = chunk_from_buf(buf_skeyid_e);
+		chunk_t icookie = { st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE };
+		chunk_t rcookie = { st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE };
+		pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+		prf_t *prf;
+
+		prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+		prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid);
+
+		/* SKEYID_D */
+		free(st->st_skeyid_d.ptr);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_d, &st->st_skeyid_d); 
+
+		/* SKEYID_A */
+		free(st->st_skeyid_a.ptr);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_skeyid_d, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_a, &st->st_skeyid_a); 
+
+		/* SKEYID_E */
+		free(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_skeyid_a, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL);
+		prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_e, &st->st_skeyid_e); 
+
+		prf->destroy(prf);
+	}
+
+	/* generate IV */
+	{
+		hash_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+		hasher_t *hasher;
+
+		hash_alg = oakley_to_hash_algorithm(st->st_oakley.hash);
+		hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, hash_alg);
+		st->st_new_iv_len = hasher->get_hash_size(hasher);
+		passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_dump_chunk("DH_i:", st->st_gi);
+			DBG_dump_chunk("DH_r:", st->st_gr);
+		);
+		
+		hasher->get_hash(hasher, st->st_gi, NULL);
+		hasher->get_hash(hasher, st->st_gr, st->st_new_iv);
+		hasher->destroy(hasher);
+	}
+
+	/* Oakley Keying Material
+	 * Derived from Skeyid_e: if it is not big enough, generate more
+	 * using the PRF.
+	 * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+	 */
+	{
+		size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.enckeylen/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+ 
+		/* free any existing key */
+		free(st->st_enc_key.ptr);
+
+		if (keysize > st->st_skeyid_e.len)
+		{
+			u_char keytemp[MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN + MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+			char seed_buf[] = { 0x00 };
+			chunk_t seed = chunk_from_buf(seed_buf);
+			size_t prf_block_size, i;
+			pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+			prf_t *prf;
+
+			prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+			prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+			prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_e);
+			prf_block_size = prf->get_block_size(prf);
+			
+			for (i = 0;;)
+			{
+				prf->get_bytes(prf, seed, &keytemp[i]);
+				i += prf_block_size;
+				if (i >= keysize)
+				{
+					break;
+				}
+				seed = chunk_create(&keytemp[i-prf_block_size], prf_block_size);
+			}
+			prf->destroy(prf);
+			st->st_enc_key = chunk_create(keytemp, keysize);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			st->st_enc_key = chunk_create(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr, keysize);
+		}			
+		st->st_enc_key = chunk_clone(st->st_enc_key);
+	}
 
-        DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-            DBG_dump_chunk("DH_i:", st->st_gi);
-            DBG_dump_chunk("DH_r:", st->st_gr);
-        );
-	h->hash_init(&hash_ctx);
-	h->hash_update(&hash_ctx, st->st_gi.ptr, st->st_gi.len);
-	h->hash_update(&hash_ctx, st->st_gr.ptr, st->st_gr.len);
-	h->hash_final(st->st_new_iv, &hash_ctx);
-    }
-
-    /* Oakley Keying Material
-     * Derived from Skeyid_e: if it is not big enough, generate more
-     * using the PRF.
-     * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
-     */
-    {
-	/* const size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.encrypter->keydeflen/BITS_PER_BYTE; */
-	const size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.enckeylen/BITS_PER_BYTE;
-	u_char keytemp[MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN + MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	u_char *k = st->st_skeyid_e.ptr;
-
-	if (keysize > st->st_skeyid_e.len)
-	{
-	    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-	    size_t i = 0;
-
-	    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_e);
-	    hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1);
-	    for (;;)
-	    {
-		hmac_final(&keytemp[i], &ctx);
-		i += ctx.hmac_digest_size;
-		if (i >= keysize)
-		    break;
-		hmac_reinit(&ctx);
-		hmac_update(&ctx, &keytemp[i - ctx.hmac_digest_size], ctx.hmac_digest_size);
-	    }
-	    k = keytemp;
-	}
-	clonereplacechunk(st->st_enc_key, k, keysize, "st_enc_key");
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid:  ", st->st_skeyid);
-	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_d:", st->st_skeyid_d);
-	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_a:", st->st_skeyid_a);
-	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_e:", st->st_skeyid_e);
-	DBG_dump_chunk("enc key:", st->st_enc_key);
-	DBG_dump("IV:", st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len));
-    return TRUE;
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid:  ", st->st_skeyid);
+		DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_d:", st->st_skeyid_d);
+		DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_a:", st->st_skeyid_a);
+		DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_e:", st->st_skeyid_e);
+		DBG_dump_chunk("enc key:", st->st_enc_key);
+		DBG_dump("IV:", st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len));
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Generate HASH_I or HASH_R for ISAKMP Phase I.
@@ -1338,288 +1356,126 @@ generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st)
  * If the hashi argument is TRUE, generate HASH_I; if FALSE generate HASH_R.
  * If hashus argument is TRUE, we're generating a hash for our end.
  * See RFC2409 IKE 5.
- *
- * Generating the SIG_I and SIG_R for DSS is an odd perversion of this:
- * Most of the logic is the same, but SHA-1 is used in place of HMAC-whatever.
- * The extensive common logic is embodied in main_mode_hash_body().
- * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1 and 6.1.1.2
  */
-
-typedef void (*hash_update_t)(union hash_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t) ;
-static void
-main_mode_hash_body(struct state *st
-, bool hashi	/* Initiator? */
-, const pb_stream *idpl	/* ID payload, as PBS */
-, union hash_ctx *ctx
-, void (*hash_update_void)(void *, const u_char *input, size_t))
+ static void main_mode_hash(struct state *st, chunk_t *hash, bool hashi,
+							 const pb_stream *idpl)
 {
-#define HASH_UPDATE_T (union hash_ctx *, const u_char *input, unsigned int len)
-    hash_update_t hash_update=(hash_update_t)  hash_update_void;
-#if 0	/* if desperate to debug hashing */
-#   define hash_update(ctx, input, len) { \
-	DBG_dump("hash input", input, len); \
-	(hash_update)(ctx, input, len); \
+	chunk_t icookie = { st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE };
+	chunk_t rcookie = { st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE };
+	chunk_t sa_body = { st->st_p1isa.ptr + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic),
+						st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+	chunk_t id_body = { idpl->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic),
+						pbs_offset(idpl) - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+	pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+	prf_t *prf;
+
+	switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+			prf_alg = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_256;
+			break;
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+			prf_alg = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_384;
+			break;
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+			prf_alg = PRF_HMAC_SHA2_512;
+			break;
+		default:
+			prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
 	}
-#endif
+	prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+	prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid);
 
-#   define hash_update_chunk(ctx, ch) hash_update((ctx), (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
-
-    if (hashi)
-    {
-	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gi);
-	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gr);
-	hash_update(ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hash_update(ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gr);
-	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gi);
-	hash_update(ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hash_update(ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("hashing %lu bytes of SA"
-	, (unsigned long) (st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic))));
-
-    /* SA_b */
-    hash_update(ctx, st->st_p1isa.ptr + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)
-	, st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic));
-
-    /* Hash identification payload, without generic payload header.
-     * We used to reconstruct ID Payload for this purpose, but now
-     * we use the bytes as they appear on the wire to avoid
-     * "spelling problems".
-     */
-    hash_update(ctx
-	, idpl->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)
-	, pbs_offset(idpl) - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic));
-
-#   undef hash_update_chunk
-#   undef hash_update
-}
-
-static size_t	/* length of hash */
-main_mode_hash(struct state *st
-, u_char *hash_val	/* resulting bytes */
-, bool hashi	/* Initiator? */
-, const pb_stream *idpl)	/* ID payload, as PBS; cur must be at end */
-{
-    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid);
-    main_mode_hash_body(st, hashi, idpl, &ctx.hash_ctx, ctx.h->hash_update);
-    hmac_final(hash_val, &ctx);
-    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
-}
-
-#if 0	/* only needed for DSS */
-static void
-main_mode_sha1(struct state *st
-, u_char *hash_val	/* resulting bytes */
-, size_t *hash_len	/* length of hash */
-, bool hashi	/* Initiator? */
-, const pb_stream *idpl)	/* ID payload, as PBS */
-{
-    union hash_ctx ctx;
-
-    SHA1Init(&ctx.ctx_sha1);
-    SHA1Update(&ctx.ctx_sha1, st->st_skeyid.ptr, st->st_skeyid.len);
-    *hash_len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-    main_mode_hash_body(st, hashi, idpl, &ctx
-	, (void (*)(union hash_ctx *, const u_char *, unsigned int))&SHA1Update);
-    SHA1Final(hash_val, &ctx.ctx_sha1);
-}
-#endif
-
-/* Create an RSA signature of a hash.
- * Poorly specified in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.1.1.2.
- * Use PKCS#1 version 1.5 encryption of hash (called
- * RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5) in PKCS#2.
- */
-static size_t
-RSA_sign_hash(struct connection *c
-, u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS]
-, const u_char *hash_val, size_t hash_len)
-{
-    size_t sz = 0;
-    smartcard_t *sc = c->spd.this.sc;
-
-    if (sc == NULL)		/* no smartcard */
-    {
-	const struct RSA_private_key *k = get_RSA_private_key(c);
-
-	if (k == NULL)
-	    return 0;	/* failure: no key to use */
-
-	sz = k->pub.k;
-	passert(RSA_MIN_OCTETS <= sz && 4 + hash_len < sz && sz <= RSA_MAX_OCTETS);
-	sign_hash(k, hash_val, hash_len, sig_val, sz);
-    }
-    else if (sc->valid) /* if valid pin then sign hash on the smartcard */
-    {
- 	lock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
-	if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
+	if (hashi)
 	{
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	    unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
-	    return 0;
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_gi, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_gr, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL);
 	}
-
-	sz = scx_get_keylength(sc);
-	if (sz == 0)
+	else
 	{
-	    plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard");
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	    unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
-	    return 0;
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_gr, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_gi, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL);
 	}
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("signing hash with RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
-		, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("hashing %u bytes of SA", sa_body.len)
 	)
-	sz = scx_sign_hash(sc, hash_val, hash_len, sig_val, sz) ? sz : 0;
-	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
-    }
-    return sz;
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, sa_body, NULL);
+
+	/* Hash identification payload, without generic payload header.
+	 * We used to reconstruct ID Payload for this purpose, but now
+	 * we use the bytes as they appear on the wire to avoid
+	 * "spelling problems".
+	 */
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, id_body, hash->ptr);
+	hash->len = prf->get_block_size(prf);
+	prf->destroy(prf);
 }
 
-/* Check a Main Mode RSA Signature against computed hash using RSA public key k.
- *
- * As a side effect, on success, the public key is copied into the
- * state object to record the authenticator.
- *
- * Can fail because wrong public key is used or because hash disagrees.
- * We distinguish because diagnostics should also.
- *
- * The result is NULL if the Signature checked out.
- * Otherwise, the first character of the result indicates
- * how far along failure occurred.  A greater character signifies
- * greater progress.
- *
- * Classes:
- * 0	reserved for caller
- * 1	SIG length doesn't match key length -- wrong key
- * 2-8	malformed ECB after decryption -- probably wrong key
- * 9	decrypted hash != computed hash -- probably correct key
- *
- * Although the math should be the same for generating and checking signatures,
- * it is not: the knowledge of the private key allows more efficient (i.e.
- * different) computation for encryption.
+/* Create a public key signature of a hash.
+ * Poorly specified in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.1.1.2.
+ * Use PKCS#1 version 1.5 encryption of hash (called
+ * RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5) in PKCS#2.
  */
-static err_t
-try_RSA_signature(const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN], size_t hash_len
-, const pb_stream *sig_pbs, pubkey_t *kr
-, struct state *st)
+static size_t sign_hash(signature_scheme_t scheme, struct connection *c,
+						u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS], chunk_t hash)
 {
-    const u_char *sig_val = sig_pbs->cur;
-    size_t sig_len = pbs_left(sig_pbs);
-    u_char s[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];	/* for decrypted sig_val */
-    u_char *hash_in_s = &s[sig_len - hash_len];
-    const struct RSA_public_key *k = &kr->u.rsa;
-
-    /* decrypt the signature -- reversing RSA_sign_hash */
-    if (sig_len != k->k)
-    {
-	/* XXX notification: INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION */
-	return "1" "SIG length does not match public key length";
-    }
-
-    /* actual exponentiation; see PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 */
-    {
-	chunk_t temp_s;
-	mpz_t c;
-
-	n_to_mpz(c, sig_val, sig_len);
-	mpz_powm(c, c, &k->e, &k->n);
-
-	temp_s = mpz_to_n(c, sig_len);	/* back to octets */
-	memcpy(s, temp_s.ptr, sig_len);
-	pfree(temp_s.ptr);
-	mpz_clear(c);
-    }
-
-    /* sanity check on signature: see if it matches
-     * PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting
-     */
-    {
-	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	size_t sz = 0;
+	smartcard_t *sc = c->spd.this.sc;
 
-	if (s[0] != 0x00)
-	    ugh = "2" "no leading 00";
-	else if (hash_in_s[-1] != 0x00)
-	    ugh = "3" "00 separator not present";
-	else if (s[1] == 0x01)
+	if (sc == NULL)             /* no smartcard */
 	{
-	    const u_char *p;
+		chunk_t sig;
+		private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
 
-	    for (p = &s[2]; p != hash_in_s - 1; p++)
-	    {
-		if (*p != 0xFF)
+		if (private == NULL)
 		{
-		    ugh = "4" "invalid Padding String";
-		    break;
+			return 0;   /* failure: no key to use */
 		}
-	    }
+		if (!private->sign(private, scheme, hash, &sig))
+		{
+			return 0;
+		}
+		memcpy(sig_val, sig.ptr, sig.len);
+		sz = sig.len;
+		free(sig.ptr);
 	}
-	else if (s[1] == 0x02)
+	else if (sc->valid) /* if valid pin then sign hash on the smartcard */
 	{
-	    const u_char *p;
+		lock_certs_and_keys("sign_hash");
+		if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
+		{
+			scx_release_context(sc);
+			unlock_certs_and_keys("sign_hash");
+			return 0;
+		}
 
-	    for (p = &s[2]; p != hash_in_s - 1; p++)
-	    {
-		if (*p == 0x00)
+		sz = scx_get_keylength(sc);
+		if (sz == 0)
 		{
-		    ugh = "5" "invalid Padding String";
-		    break;
+			plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard");
+			scx_release_context(sc);
+			unlock_certs_and_keys("sign_hash");
+			return 0;
 		}
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	    ugh = "6" "Block Type not 01 or 02";
 
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    /* note: it might be a good idea to make sure that
-	     * an observer cannot tell what kind of failure happened.
-	     * I don't know what this means in practice.
-	     */
-	    /* We probably selected the wrong public key for peer:
-	     * SIG Payload decrypted into malformed ECB
-	     */
-	    /* XXX notification: INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION */
-	    return ugh;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* We have the decoded hash: see if it matches. */
-    if (memcmp(hash_val, hash_in_s, hash_len) != 0)
-    {
-	/* good: header, hash, signature, and other payloads well-formed
-	 * good: we could find an RSA Sig key for the peer.
-	 * bad: hash doesn't match
-	 * Guess: sides disagree about key to be used.
-	 */
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "decrypted SIG", s, sig_len);
-	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed HASH", hash_val, hash_len);
-	/* XXX notification: INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION */
-	return "9" "authentication failure: received SIG does not match computed HASH, but message is well-formed";
-    }
-
-    /* Success: copy successful key into state.
-     * There might be an old one if we previously aborted this
-     * state transition.
-     */
-    unreference_key(&st->st_peer_pubkey);
-    st->st_peer_pubkey = reference_key(kr);
-
-    return NULL;    /* happy happy */
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("signing hash with private key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
+				, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+		)
+		sz = scx_sign_hash(sc, hash.ptr, hash.len, sig_val, sz) ? sz : 0;
+		if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+			scx_release_context(sc);
+		unlock_certs_and_keys("sign_hash");
+	}
+	return sz;
 }
 
-/* Check signature against all RSA public keys we can find.
+/* Check signature against all public keys we can find.
  * If we need keys from DNS KEY records, and they haven't been fetched,
  * return STF_SUSPEND to ask for asynch DNS lookup.
  *
@@ -1630,227 +1486,195 @@ try_RSA_signature(const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN], size_t hash_len
  * If only we had coroutines.
  */
 struct tac_state {
-    /* RSA_check_signature's args that take_a_crack needs */
-    struct state *st;
-    const u_char *hash_val;
-    size_t hash_len;
-    const pb_stream *sig_pbs;
-
-    /* state carried between calls */
-    err_t best_ugh;	/* most successful failure */
-    int tried_cnt;	/* number of keys tried */
-    char tried[50];	/* keyids of tried public keys */
-    char *tn;	/* roof of tried[] */
+	struct state *st;
+	chunk_t hash;	
+	chunk_t sig;
+	int tried_cnt;      /* number of keys tried */
 };
 
-static bool
-take_a_crack(struct tac_state *s
-, pubkey_t *kr
-, const char *story USED_BY_DEBUG)
+static bool take_a_crack(struct tac_state *s, pubkey_t *kr)
 {
-    err_t ugh = try_RSA_signature(s->hash_val, s->hash_len, s->sig_pbs
-	, kr, s->st);
-    const struct RSA_public_key *k = &kr->u.rsa;
-
-    s->tried_cnt++;
-    if (ugh == NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_CONTROL
-	    , DBG_log("an RSA Sig check passed with *%s [%s]"
-		, k->keyid, story));
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CRYPT
-	    , DBG_log("an RSA Sig check failure %s with *%s [%s]"
-		, ugh + 1, k->keyid, story));
-	if (s->best_ugh == NULL || s->best_ugh[0] < ugh[0])
-	    s->best_ugh = ugh;
-	if (ugh[0] > '0'
-	&& s->tn - s->tried + KEYID_BUF + 2 < (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(s->tried))
-	{
-	    strcpy(s->tn, " *");
-	    strcpy(s->tn + 2, k->keyid);
-	    s->tn += strlen(s->tn);
+	public_key_t *pub_key = kr->public_key;
+	identification_t *keyid = pub_key->get_id(pub_key, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1);
+	signature_scheme_t scheme;
+
+	s->tried_cnt++;
+	scheme = oakley_to_signature_scheme(s->st->st_oakley.auth);
+
+	if (pub_key->verify(pub_key, scheme, s->hash, s->sig))
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("%s check passed with keyid %Y",
+					enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, s->st->st_oakley.auth), keyid)
+		)
+		unreference_key(&s->st->st_peer_pubkey);
+		s->st->st_peer_pubkey = reference_key(kr);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("%s check failed with keyid %Y",
+					enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, s->st->st_oakley.auth), keyid)
+		)
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	return FALSE;
-    }
 }
 
-static stf_status
-RSA_check_signature(const struct id* peer
-, struct state *st
-, const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]
-, size_t hash_len
-, const pb_stream *sig_pbs
+static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer,
+								  struct state *st, chunk_t hash,
+								  const pb_stream *sig_pbs,
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-, const pubkey_list_t *keys_from_dns
+								  const pubkey_list_t *keys_from_dns,
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-, const struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
-)
+								  const struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns)
 {
-    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    struct tac_state s;
-    err_t dns_ugh = NULL;
-
-    s.st = st;
-    s.hash_val = hash_val;
-    s.hash_len = hash_len;
-    s.sig_pbs = sig_pbs;
-
-    s.best_ugh = NULL;
-    s.tried_cnt = 0;
-    s.tn = s.tried;
-
-    /* try all gateway records hung off c */
-    if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
-    {
-	struct gw_info *gw;
-
-	for (gw = c->gw_info; gw != NULL; gw = gw->next)
-	{
-	    /* only consider entries that have a key and are for our peer */
-	    if (gw->gw_key_present
-	    && same_id(&gw->gw_id, &c->spd.that.id)
-	    && take_a_crack(&s, gw->key, "key saved from DNS TXT"))
-		return STF_OK;
-	}
-    }
+	const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct tac_state s;
 
-    /* try all appropriate Public keys */
-    {
-	pubkey_list_t *p, **pp;
+	s.st = st;
+	s.hash = hash;
+	s.sig  = chunk_create(sig_pbs->cur, pbs_left(sig_pbs));
+	s.tried_cnt = 0;
 
-	pp = &pubkeys;
+	/* try all gateway records hung off c */
+	if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+	{
+		struct gw_info *gw;
 
-	for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = *pp)
+		for (gw = c->gw_info; gw != NULL; gw = gw->next)
+		{
+			/* only consider entries that have a key and are for our peer */
+			if (gw->gw_key_present && same_id(&gw->gw_id, &c->spd.that.id)&&
+				take_a_crack(&s, gw->key))
+			{
+				return STF_OK;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* try all appropriate Public keys */
 	{
-	    pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+		pubkey_list_t *p, **pp;
 
-	    if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && same_id(peer, &key->id))
-	    {
-		time_t now = time(NULL);
+		pp = &pubkeys;
 
-		/* check if found public key has expired */
-		if (key->until_time != UNDEFINED_TIME && key->until_time < now)
+		for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = *pp)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-			"cached RSA public key has expired and has been deleted");
-		    *pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
-		    continue; /* continue with next public key */
-		}
+			pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+			key_type_t type = key->public_key->get_type(key->public_key);
 
-		if (take_a_crack(&s, key, "preloaded key"))
-		return STF_OK;
-	    }
-	    pp = &p->next;
-	}
+			if (type == key_type && same_id(peer, &key->id))
+			{
+				time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+				/* check if found public key has expired */
+				if (key->until_time != UNDEFINED_TIME && key->until_time < now)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+						"cached public key has expired and has been deleted");
+					*pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
+					continue; /* continue with next public key */
+				}
+
+				if (take_a_crack(&s, key))
+				{
+					return STF_OK;
+				}
+			}
+			pp = &p->next;
+		}
    }
 
-    /* if no key was found (evidenced by best_ugh == NULL)
-     * and that side of connection is key_from_DNS_on_demand
-     * then go search DNS for keys for peer.
-     */
-    if (s.best_ugh == NULL && c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand)
-    {
-	if (gateways_from_dns != NULL)
+	/* if no key was found and that side of connection is
+	 * key_from_DNS_on_demand then go search DNS for keys for peer.
+	 */
+	if (s.tried_cnt == 0 && c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand)
 	{
-	    /* TXT keys */
-	    const struct gw_info *gwp;
+		if (gateways_from_dns != NULL)
+		{
+			/* TXT keys */
+			const struct gw_info *gwp;
 
-	    for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
-		if (gwp->gw_key_present
-		&& take_a_crack(&s, gwp->key, "key from DNS TXT"))
-		    return STF_OK;
-	}
+			for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+			{
+				if (gwp->gw_key_present && take_a_crack(&s, gwp->key))
+				{
+					return STF_OK;
+				}
+			}
+		}
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	else if (keys_from_dns != NULL)
-	{
-	    /* KEY keys */
-	    const pubkey_list_t *kr;
+		else if (keys_from_dns != NULL)
+		{
+			/* KEY keys */
+			const pubkey_list_t *kr;
 
-	    for (kr = keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
-		if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
-		&& take_a_crack(&s, kr->key, "key from DNS KEY"))
-		    return STF_OK;
-	}
+			for (kr = keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+			{
+				if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && take_a_crack(&s, kr->key))
+				{
+					return STF_OK;
+				}
+			}
+		}
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	else
-	{
-	    /* nothing yet: ask for asynch DNS lookup */
-	    return STF_SUSPEND;
+		else
+		{
+			/* nothing yet: ask for asynch DNS lookup */
+			return STF_SUSPEND;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* no acceptable key was found: diagnose */
-    {
-	char id_buf[BUF_LEN];	/* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */
 
-	(void) idtoa(peer, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf));
-
-	if (s.best_ugh == NULL)
+	/* no acceptable key was found: diagnose */
 	{
-	    if (dns_ugh == NULL)
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
-		    , id_buf);
-	    else
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
-		    "; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)"
-		    , id_buf, dns_ugh);
+		char id_buf[BUF_LEN];   /* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */
 
-	    /* ??? is this the best code there is? */
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
-	}
+		idtoa(peer, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf));
 
-	if (s.best_ugh[0] == '9')
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s", s.best_ugh + 1);
-	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    if (s.tried_cnt == 1)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		    , "Signature check (on %s) failed (wrong key?); tried%s"
-		    , id_buf, s.tried);
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("public key for %s failed:"
-			" decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB (%s)"
-			, id_buf, s.best_ugh + 1));
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		    , "Signature check (on %s) failed:"
-		      " tried%s keys but none worked."
-		    , id_buf, s.tried);
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("all %d public keys for %s failed:"
-			" best decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB (%s)"
-			, s.tried_cnt, id_buf, s.best_ugh + 1));
-	    }
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+		if (s.tried_cnt == 0)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no public key known for '%s'", id_buf);
+		}
+		else if (s.tried_cnt == 1)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "signature check for '%s' failed: "
+					" wrong key?; tried %d", id_buf, s.tried_cnt);
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("public key for '%s' failed: "
+						"decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB", id_buf)
+			)
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "signature check for '%s' failed: "
+					  "tried %d keys but none worked.", id_buf, s.tried_cnt);
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("all %d public keys for '%s' failed: "
+						"best decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB",
+						s.tried_cnt, id_buf)
+			)
+		}
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
 	}
-    }
 }
 
-static notification_t
-accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, const char *name)
+static notification_t accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest,
+								   const char *name)
 {
-    pb_stream *nonce_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE]->pbs;
-    size_t len = pbs_left(nonce_pbs);
-
-    if (len < MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE || MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE < len)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s length not between %d and %d"
-	    , name , MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE, MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE);
-	return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;	/* ??? */
-    }
-    clonereplacechunk(*dest, nonce_pbs->cur, len, "nonce");
-    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	pb_stream *nonce_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE]->pbs;
+	size_t len = pbs_left(nonce_pbs);
+
+	if (len < MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE || MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE < len)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s length not between %d and %d"
+			, name , MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE, MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE);
+		return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;       /* ??? */
+	}
+	free(dest->ptr);
+	*dest = chunk_create(nonce_pbs->cur, len);
+	*dest = chunk_clone(*dest);
+	return NOTHING_WRONG;
 }
 
 /* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header
@@ -1861,36 +1685,51 @@ accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, const char *name)
 bool
 encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st)
 {
-    const struct encrypt_desc *e = st->st_oakley.encrypter;
-    u_int8_t *enc_start = pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr);
-    size_t enc_len = pbs_offset(pbs) - sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr);
-
-    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_RAW, "encrypting:\n", enc_start, enc_len);
-
-    /* Pad up to multiple of encryption blocksize.
-     * See the description associated with the definition of
-     * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h.
-     */
-    {
-	size_t padding = pad_up(enc_len, e->enc_blocksize);
-
-	if (padding != 0)
+	u_int8_t *enc_start = pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr);
+	size_t enc_len = pbs_offset(pbs) - sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr);
+	chunk_t data, iv;
+    char *new_iv;
+	size_t crypter_block_size;
+	encryption_algorithm_t enc_alg;
+	crypter_t *crypter;
+
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_RAW, "encrypting:\n", enc_start, enc_len);
+	enc_alg = oakley_to_encryption_algorithm(st->st_oakley.encrypt);
+	crypter = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, enc_alg, st->st_enc_key.len);
+	crypter_block_size = crypter->get_block_size(crypter);
+
+	/* Pad up to multiple of encryption blocksize.
+	 * See the description associated with the definition of
+	 * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h.
+	 */
 	{
-	    if (!out_zero(padding, pbs, "encryption padding"))
-		return FALSE;
-	    enc_len += padding;
+		size_t padding = pad_up(enc_len, crypter_block_size);
+
+		if (padding != 0)
+		{
+			if (!out_zero(padding, pbs, "encryption padding"))
+				return FALSE;
+			enc_len += padding;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("encrypting using %s", enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)));
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("encrypting using %s", enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)));
+	data = chunk_create(enc_start, enc_len);
 
-    /* e->crypt(TRUE, enc_start, enc_len, st); */
-    crypto_cbc_encrypt(e, TRUE, enc_start, enc_len, st);
+	/* form iv by truncation */
+	st->st_new_iv_len = crypter_block_size;
+	iv = chunk_create(st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
 
-    update_iv(st);
-    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:", st->st_iv, st->st_iv_len);
-    close_message(pbs);
-    return TRUE;
+	crypter->set_key(crypter, st->st_enc_key);
+	crypter->encrypt(crypter, data, iv, NULL);
+	crypter->destroy(crypter);
+ 
+	new_iv = data.ptr + data.len - crypter_block_size;
+	memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, crypter_block_size);
+	update_iv(st);
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:", st->st_iv, st->st_iv_len);
+	close_message(pbs);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Compute HASH(1), HASH(2) of Quick Mode.
@@ -1899,31 +1738,33 @@ encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st)
  * Used by: quick_outI1, quick_inI1_outR1 (twice), quick_inR1_outI2
  * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5, pg. 18 or draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.2 pg 25)
  */
-static size_t
-quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof
-, const struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid, bool hash2)
+static size_t quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, u_char *start, u_char *roof,
+								const struct state *st,	const msgid_t *msgid,
+								bool hash2)
 {
-    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-#if 0	/* if desperate to debug hashing */
-#   define hmac_update(ctx, ptr, len) { \
-	DBG_dump("hash input", (ptr), (len)); \
-	(hmac_update)((ctx), (ptr), (len)); \
-    }
-    DBG_dump("hash key", st->st_skeyid_a.ptr, st->st_skeyid_a.len);
-#endif
-    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
-    hmac_update(&ctx, (const void *) msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
-    if (hash2)
-	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni);	/* include Ni_b in the hash */
-    hmac_update(&ctx, start, roof-start);
-    hmac_final(dest, &ctx);
-
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("HASH(%d) computed:", hash2 + 1);
-	DBG_dump("", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size));
-    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
-#   undef hmac_update
+	chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(*msgid);
+	chunk_t msg_chunk = { start, roof - start };
+	pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+	prf_t *prf;
+	size_t prf_block_size;
+
+	prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+	prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+	prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_a);
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, msgid_chunk, NULL);
+	if (hash2)
+	{
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_ni, NULL); /* include Ni_b in the hash */
+	}     
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, msg_chunk, dest);
+	prf_block_size = prf->get_block_size(prf);
+	prf->destroy(prf);
+
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("HASH(%d) computed:", hash2 + 1);
+		DBG_dump("", dest, prf_block_size)
+	)
+	return prf_block_size;
 }
 
 /* Compute HASH(3) in Quick Mode (part of Quick I2 message).
@@ -1932,44 +1773,54 @@ quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof
  * NOTE: this hash (unlike HASH(1) and HASH(2)) ONLY covers the
  * Message ID and Nonces.  This is a mistake.
  */
-static size_t
-quick_mode_hash3(u_char *dest, struct state *st)
+static size_t quick_mode_hash3(u_char *dest, struct state *st)
 {
-    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
-    hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1);
-    hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &st->st_msgid, sizeof(st->st_msgid));
-    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni);
-    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_nr);
-    hmac_final(dest, &ctx);
-    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "HASH(3) computed:", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size);
-    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+	char seed_buf[] = { 0x00 };
+	chunk_t seed_chunk = chunk_from_buf(seed_buf);
+	chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(st->st_msgid);
+	pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+	prf_t *prf;
+	size_t prf_block_size;
+	
+	prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+	prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+	prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_a);
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, seed_chunk, NULL );
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, msgid_chunk, NULL);
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_ni, NULL);
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_nr, dest);
+	prf_block_size = prf->get_block_size(prf);
+	prf->destroy(prf);
+
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "HASH(3) computed:", dest, prf_block_size);
+	return prf_block_size;
 }
 
 /* Compute Phase 2 IV.
  * Uses Phase 1 IV from st_iv; puts result in st_new_iv.
  */
-void
-init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid)
+void init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid)
 {
-    const struct hash_desc *h = st->st_oakley.hasher;
-    union hash_ctx ctx;
+	chunk_t iv_chunk = { st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len };
+	chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(*msgid);
+	hash_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+	hasher_t *hasher;
 
-    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last Phase 1 IV:"
-	, st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len);
+	hash_alg = oakley_to_hash_algorithm(st->st_oakley.hash);
+	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, hash_alg);
 
-    st->st_new_iv_len = h->hash_digest_size;
-    passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last Phase 1 IV:",
+				  st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len);
 
-    h->hash_init(&ctx);
-    h->hash_update(&ctx, st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len);
-    passert(*msgid != 0);
-    h->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)msgid, sizeof(*msgid));
-    h->hash_final(st->st_new_iv, &ctx);
+	st->st_new_iv_len = hasher->get_hash_size(hasher);
+	passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+		
+	hasher->get_hash(hasher, iv_chunk, NULL);
+	hasher->get_hash(hasher, msgid_chunk, st->st_new_iv);
+	hasher->destroy(hasher);
 
-    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed Phase 2 IV:"
-	, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed Phase 2 IV:",
+				  st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
 }
 
 /* Initiate quick mode.
@@ -1978,474 +1829,467 @@ init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid)
  * Note: this is not called from demux.c
  */
 
-static bool
-emit_subnet_id(ip_subnet *net
-, u_int8_t np, u_int8_t protoid, u_int16_t port, pb_stream *outs)
+static bool emit_subnet_id(ip_subnet *net, u_int8_t np, u_int8_t protoid,
+						   u_int16_t port, pb_stream *outs)
 {
-    struct isakmp_ipsec_id id;
-    pb_stream id_pbs;
-    ip_address ta;
-    const unsigned char *tbp;
-    size_t tal;
-
-    id.isaiid_np = np;
-    id.isaiid_idtype = subnetishost(net)
-		       ? aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_addr
-		       : aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_subnet;
-    id.isaiid_protoid = protoid;
-    id.isaiid_port = port;
-
-    if (!out_struct(&id, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, outs, &id_pbs))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    networkof(net, &ta);
-    tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp);
-    if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client network"))
-	return FALSE;
+	struct isakmp_ipsec_id id;
+	pb_stream id_pbs;
+	ip_address ta;
+	const unsigned char *tbp;
+	size_t tal;
+
+	id.isaiid_np = np;
+	id.isaiid_idtype = subnetishost(net)
+					   ? aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_addr
+					   : aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_subnet;
+	id.isaiid_protoid = protoid;
+	id.isaiid_port = port;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&id, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, outs, &id_pbs))
+		return FALSE;
 
-    if (!subnetishost(net))
-    {
-	maskof(net, &ta);
+	networkof(net, &ta);
 	tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp);
-	if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client mask"))
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client network"))
+		return FALSE;
+
+	if (!subnetishost(net))
+	{
+		maskof(net, &ta);
+		tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp);
+		if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client mask"))
+			return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    close_output_pbs(&id_pbs);
-    return TRUE;
+	close_output_pbs(&id_pbs);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-stf_status
-quick_outI1(int whack_sock
-, struct state *isakmp_sa
-, struct connection *c
-, lset_t policy
-, unsigned long try
-, so_serial_t replacing)
+stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa,
+					   struct connection *c, lset_t policy, unsigned long try,
+					   so_serial_t replacing)
 {
-    struct state *st = duplicate_state(isakmp_sa);
-    pb_stream reply;	/* not really a reply */
-    pb_stream rbody;
-    u_char	/* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
-	*r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
-	*r_hash_start;	/* start of what is to be hashed */
-    bool has_client = c->spd.this.has_client || c->spd.that.has_client ||
-		      c->spd.this.protocol || c->spd.that.protocol ||
-		      c->spd.this.port || c->spd.that.port;
-    
-    bool send_natoa = FALSE;
-    u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-
-    st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock;
-    st->st_connection = c;
-    set_cur_state(st);	/* we must reset before exit */
-    st->st_policy = policy;
-    st->st_try = try;
-
-    st->st_myuserprotoid = c->spd.this.protocol;
-    st->st_peeruserprotoid = c->spd.that.protocol;
-    st->st_myuserport = c->spd.this.port;
-    st->st_peeruserport = c->spd.that.port;
-
-    st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(isakmp_sa);
-    st->st_state = STATE_QUICK_I1;
-
-    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */
-
-    if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY)
-	plog("initiating Quick Mode %s {using isakmp#%lu}"
-	     , prettypolicy(policy)
-	     , isakmp_sa->st_serialno);
-    else
-	plog("initiating Quick Mode %s to replace #%lu {using isakmp#%lu}"
-	     , prettypolicy(policy)
-	     , replacing
-	     , isakmp_sa->st_serialno);
-
-    if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-    {
-	/* Duplicate nat_traversal status in new state */
-	st->nat_traversal = isakmp_sa->nat_traversal;
-
-	if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))
-	    has_client = TRUE;
-
-       nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(NULL, st);
-    }
-    else
-	st->nat_traversal = 0;
-
-    /* are we going to send a NAT-OA payload? */
-    if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)
-    && !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
-    && (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)))
-    {
-	send_natoa = TRUE;
-	np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
-		  ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS;
-    }
-
-    /* set up reply */
-    init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
-
-    /* HDR* out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
-
-	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
-	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
-	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK;
-	hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid;
-	hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
-	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* HASH(1) -- create and note space to be filled later */
-    START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA);
-
-    /* SA out */
-
-    /* 
-     * See if pfs_group has been specified for this conn,
-     * if not, fallback to old use-same-as-P1 behaviour
-     */
+	struct state *st = duplicate_state(isakmp_sa);
+	pb_stream reply;    /* not really a reply */
+	pb_stream rbody;
+	u_char      /* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
+		*r_hashval,     /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+		*r_hash_start;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
+	bool has_client = c->spd.this.has_client || c->spd.that.has_client ||
+					  c->spd.this.protocol || c->spd.that.protocol ||
+					  c->spd.this.port || c->spd.that.port;
+	
+	bool send_natoa = FALSE;
+	u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+
+	st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock;
+	st->st_connection = c;
+	set_cur_state(st);  /* we must reset before exit */
+	st->st_policy = policy;
+	st->st_try = try;
+
+	st->st_myuserprotoid = c->spd.this.protocol;
+	st->st_peeruserprotoid = c->spd.that.protocol;
+	st->st_myuserport = c->spd.this.port;
+	st->st_peeruserport = c->spd.that.port;
+
+	st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(isakmp_sa);
+	st->st_state = STATE_QUICK_I1;
+
+	insert_state(st);   /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */
+
+	if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY)
+		plog("initiating Quick Mode %s {using isakmp#%lu}"
+			 , prettypolicy(policy)
+			 , isakmp_sa->st_serialno);
+	else
+		plog("initiating Quick Mode %s to replace #%lu {using isakmp#%lu}"
+			 , prettypolicy(policy)
+			 , replacing
+			 , isakmp_sa->st_serialno);
+
+	if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	{
+		/* Duplicate nat_traversal status in new state */
+		st->nat_traversal = isakmp_sa->nat_traversal;
+
+		if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))
+			has_client = TRUE;
+
+	   nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(NULL, st);
+	}
+	else
+		st->nat_traversal = 0;
+
+	/* are we going to send a NAT-OA payload? */
+	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)
+	&& !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
+	&& (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)))
+	{
+		send_natoa = TRUE;
+		np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
+				  ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS;
+	}
+
+	/* set up reply */
+	init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
+
+	/* HDR* out */
+	{
+		struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+		hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+		hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+		hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK;
+		hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid;
+		hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* HASH(1) -- create and note space to be filled later */
+	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA);
+
+	/* SA out */
+
+	/* 
+	 * See if pfs_group has been specified for this conn,
+	 * if not, fallback to old use-same-as-P1 behaviour
+	 */
 #ifndef NO_IKE_ALG
-    if (st->st_connection)
-	    st->st_pfs_group = ike_alg_pfsgroup(st->st_connection, policy);
-    if (!st->st_pfs_group)
+	if (st->st_connection)
+			st->st_pfs_group = ike_alg_pfsgroup(st->st_connection, policy);
+	if (!st->st_pfs_group)
 #endif
-    /* If PFS specified, use the same group as during Phase 1:
-     * since no negotiation is possible, we pick one that is
-     * very likely supported.
-     */
-	    st->st_pfs_group = policy & POLICY_PFS? isakmp_sa->st_oakley.group : NULL;
-
-    /* Emit SA payload based on a subset of the policy bits.
-     * POLICY_COMPRESS is considered iff we can do IPcomp.
-     */
-    {
-	lset_t pm = POLICY_ENCRYPT | POLICY_AUTHENTICATE;
-
-	if (can_do_IPcomp)
-	    pm |= POLICY_COMPRESS;
-
-	if (!out_sa(&rbody
-	, &ipsec_sadb[(st->st_policy & pm) >> POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT]
-	, st, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
-	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* Ni out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &rbody
-    , policy & POLICY_PFS? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np
-    , "Ni"))
-    {
-	reset_cur_state();
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
+	/* If PFS specified, use the same group as during Phase 1:
+	 * since no negotiation is possible, we pick one that is
+	 * very likely supported.
+	 */
+			st->st_pfs_group = policy & POLICY_PFS? isakmp_sa->st_oakley.group : NULL;
+
+	/* Emit SA payload based on a subset of the policy bits.
+	 * POLICY_COMPRESS is considered iff we can do IPcomp.
+	 */
+	{
+		lset_t pm = POLICY_ENCRYPT | POLICY_AUTHENTICATE;
+
+		if (can_do_IPcomp)
+			pm |= POLICY_COMPRESS;
+
+		if (!out_sa(&rbody
+		, &ipsec_sadb[(st->st_policy & pm) >> POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT]
+		, st, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Ni out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &rbody
+	, policy & POLICY_PFS? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np
+	, "Ni"))
+	{
+		reset_cur_state();
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 
-    /* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */
+	/* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */
 
-    if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
-    {
-	if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group
-	, &rbody, has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np))
+	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group
+		, &rbody, has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */
-    if (has_client)
-    {
-	/* IDci (we are initiator), then IDcr (peer is responder) */
-	if (!emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.this.client
-	  , ISAKMP_NEXT_ID, st->st_myuserprotoid, st->st_myuserport, &rbody)
-	|| !emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.that.client
-	  , np, st->st_peeruserprotoid, st->st_peeruserport, &rbody))
+	/* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */
+	if (has_client)
 	{
-	    reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		/* IDci (we are initiator), then IDcr (peer is responder) */
+		if (!emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.this.client
+		  , ISAKMP_NEXT_ID, st->st_myuserprotoid, st->st_myuserport, &rbody)
+		|| !emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.that.client
+		  , np, st->st_peeruserprotoid, st->st_peeruserport, &rbody))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed */
-    if (send_natoa)
-    {
-	if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &rbody, st))
+	/* Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed */
+	if (send_natoa)
 	{
-            reset_cur_state();
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &rbody, st))
+		{
+			reset_cur_state();
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* finish computing  HASH(1), inserting it in output */
-    (void) quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody.cur
-	, st, &st->st_msgid, FALSE);
+	/* finish computing  HASH(1), inserting it in output */
+	(void) quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody.cur
+		, st, &st->st_msgid, FALSE);
 
-    /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+	/* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+
+	init_phase2_iv(isakmp_sa, &st->st_msgid);
+	st->st_new_iv_len = isakmp_sa->st_new_iv_len;
+	memcpy(st->st_new_iv, isakmp_sa->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
 
-    init_phase2_iv(isakmp_sa, &st->st_msgid);
-    st->st_new_iv_len = isakmp_sa->st_new_iv_len;
-    memcpy(st->st_new_iv, isakmp_sa->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+	if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st))
+	{
+		reset_cur_state();
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 
-    if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st))
-    {
+	/* save packet, now that we know its size */
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply));
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_tpacket);
+
+	/* send the packet */
+
+	send_packet(st, "quick_outI1");
+
+	delete_event(st);
+	event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
+
+	if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY)
+		whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1
+			, "%s: initiate"
+			, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+	else
+		whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1
+			, "%s: initiate to replace #%lu"
+			, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+			, replacing);
 	reset_cur_state();
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    /* save packet, now that we know its size */
-    clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply)
-	, "reply packet from quick_outI1");
-
-    /* send the packet */
-
-    send_packet(st, "quick_outI1");
-
-    delete_event(st);
-    event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
-
-    if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY)
-	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1
-	    , "%s: initiate"
-	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
-    else
-	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1
-	    , "%s: initiate to replace #%lu"
-	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
-	    , replacing);
-    reset_cur_state();
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 
 /*
  * Decode the CERT payload of Phase 1.
  */
-static void
-decode_cert(struct msg_digest *md)
+static void decode_cert(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct payload_digest *p;
-
-    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	struct isakmp_cert *const cert = &p->payload.cert;
-	chunk_t blob;
-	time_t valid_until;
-	blob.ptr = p->pbs.cur;
-	blob.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs);
-	if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
-	{
-	    x509cert_t cert = empty_x509cert;
-	    if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, &cert))
-	    {
-		if (verify_x509cert(&cert, strict_crl_policy, &valid_until))
+	struct payload_digest *p;
+
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+		struct isakmp_cert *const cert = &p->payload.cert;
+		chunk_t blob;
+		time_t valid_until;
+		blob.ptr = p->pbs.cur;
+		blob.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs);
+		if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+		{
+			x509cert_t cert = empty_x509cert;
+			if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, &cert))
+			{
+				if (verify_x509cert(&cert, strict_crl_policy, &valid_until))
+				{
+					DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+						DBG_log("Public key validated")
+					)
+					add_x509_public_key(&cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					plog("X.509 certificate rejected");
+				}
+				DESTROY_IF(cert.public_key);
+				free_generalNames(cert.subjectAltName, FALSE);
+				free_generalNames(cert.crlDistributionPoints, FALSE);
+			}
+			else
+				plog("Syntax error in X.509 certificate");
+		}
+		else if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509)
 		{
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("Public key validated")
-		    )
-		    add_x509_public_key(&cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED);
+			x509cert_t *cert = NULL;
+
+			if (pkcs7_parse_signedData(blob, NULL, &cert, NULL, NULL))
+				store_x509certs(&cert, strict_crl_policy);
+			else
+				plog("Syntax error in PKCS#7 wrapped X.509 certificates");
 		}
 		else
 		{
-		    plog("X.509 certificate rejected");
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate payload",
+				   enum_show(&cert_type_names, cert->isacert_type));
+			DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CERT:\n", blob);
 		}
-		free_generalNames(cert.subjectAltName, FALSE);
-		free_generalNames(cert.crlDistributionPoints, FALSE);
-	    }
-	    else
-		plog("Syntax error in X.509 certificate");
-	}
-	else if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509)
-	{
-	    x509cert_t *cert = NULL;
-
-	    if (pkcs7_parse_signedData(blob, NULL, &cert, NULL, NULL))
-		store_x509certs(&cert, strict_crl_policy);
-	    else
-		plog("Syntax error in PKCS#7 wrapped X.509 certificates");
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate payload",
-		   enum_show(&cert_type_names, cert->isacert_type));
-	    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CERT:\n", blob);
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /*
  * Decode the CR payload of Phase 1.
  */
-static void
-decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c)
+static void decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct payload_digest *p;
+	struct payload_digest *p;
 
-    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CR]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	struct isakmp_cr *const cr = &p->payload.cr;
-	chunk_t ca_name;
-	
-	ca_name.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs);
-	ca_name.ptr = (ca_name.len > 0)? p->pbs.cur : NULL;
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CR]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+		struct isakmp_cr *const cr = &p->payload.cr;
+		chunk_t ca_name;
+		
+		ca_name.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs);
+		ca_name.ptr = (ca_name.len > 0)? p->pbs.cur : NULL;
 
-	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CR", ca_name);
+		DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CR", ca_name);
 
-	if (cr->isacr_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
-	{
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		if (cr->isacr_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+		{
+			char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	    if (ca_name.len > 0)
-	    {
-		generalName_t *gn;
-		
-		if (!is_asn1(ca_name))
-		    continue;
-
-		gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
-		clonetochunk(ca_name, ca_name.ptr,ca_name.len, "ca name");
-		gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME;
-		gn->name = ca_name;
-		gn->next = c->requested_ca;
-		c->requested_ca = gn;
-	    }
-	    c->got_certrequest = TRUE;
-
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
-		dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, ca_name, "%any");
-		DBG_log("requested CA: '%s'", buf);
-	    )
+			if (ca_name.len > 0)
+			{
+				generalName_t *gn;
+				
+				if (!is_asn1(ca_name))
+					continue;
+
+				gn = malloc_thing(generalName_t);
+				ca_name = chunk_clone(ca_name);
+				gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME;
+				gn->name = ca_name;
+				gn->next = c->requested_ca;
+				c->requested_ca = gn;
+			}
+			c->got_certrequest = TRUE;
+
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+				dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, ca_name, "%any");
+				DBG_log("requested CA: '%s'", buf);
+			)
+		}
+		else
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate request payload",
+				   enum_show(&cert_type_names, cr->isacr_type));
 	}
-	else
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate request payload",
-		   enum_show(&cert_type_names, cr->isacr_type));
-    }
 }
 
 /* Decode the ID payload of Phase 1 (main_inI3_outR3 and main_inR3)
  * Note: we may change connections as a result.
  * We must be called before SIG or HASH are decoded since we
- * may change the peer's RSA key or ID.
+ * may change the peer's public key or ID.
  */
-static bool
-decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer)
+static bool decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    struct payload_digest *const id_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
-    const pb_stream *const id_pbs = &id_pld->pbs;
-    struct isakmp_id *const id = &id_pld->payload.id;
-
-    /* I think that RFC2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.6.2 is confused.
-     * It talks about the protocol ID and Port fields of the ID
-     * Payload, but they don't exist as such in Phase 1.
-     * We use more appropriate names.
-     * isaid_doi_specific_a is in place of Protocol ID.
-     * isaid_doi_specific_b is in place of Port.
-     * Besides, there is no good reason for allowing these to be
-     * other than 0 in Phase 1.
-     */
-    if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)
-    &&	 id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP
-    &&  (id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0 || id->isaid_doi_specific_b == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT))
-    {
-	DBG_log("protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload is %d/%d. "
-		"accepted with port_floating NAT-T",
-		id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b);
-    }
-    else if (!(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == 0 && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0)
-	 &&  !(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == IKE_UDP_PORT))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload must be 0/0 or %d/%d"
-	    " but are %d/%d"
-	    , IPPROTO_UDP, IKE_UDP_PORT
-	    , id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    peer->kind = id->isaid_idtype;
-
-    switch (peer->kind)
-    {
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	/* failure mode for initaddr is probably inappropriate address length */
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	struct payload_digest *const id_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+	const pb_stream *const id_pbs = &id_pld->pbs;
+	struct isakmp_id *const id = &id_pld->payload.id;
+
+	/* I think that RFC2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.6.2 is confused.
+	 * It talks about the protocol ID and Port fields of the ID
+	 * Payload, but they don't exist as such in Phase 1.
+	 * We use more appropriate names.
+	 * isaid_doi_specific_a is in place of Protocol ID.
+	 * isaid_doi_specific_b is in place of Port.
+	 * Besides, there is no good reason for allowing these to be
+	 * other than 0 in Phase 1.
+	 */
+	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)
+	&&   id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP
+	&&  (id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0 || id->isaid_doi_specific_b == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT))
 	{
-	    err_t ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)
-		, peer->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR? AF_INET : AF_INET6
-		, &peer->ip_addr);
-
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s identification payload: %s"
-		    , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind), ugh);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
+		DBG_log("protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload is %d/%d. "
+				"accepted with port_floating NAT-T",
+				id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b);
 	}
-	break;
-
-    case ID_USER_FQDN:
-	if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '@', pbs_left(id_pbs)) == NULL)
+	else if (!(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == 0 && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0)
+		 &&  !(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == IKE_UDP_PORT))
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer's ID_USER_FQDN contains no @");
-	    return FALSE;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload must be 0/0 or %d/%d"
+			" but are %d/%d"
+			, IPPROTO_UDP, IKE_UDP_PORT
+			, id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	/* FALLTHROUGH */
-    case ID_FQDN:
-	if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '\0', pbs_left(id_pbs)) != NULL)
+
+	peer->kind = id->isaid_idtype;
+
+	switch (peer->kind)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Phase 1 ID Payload of type %s contains a NUL"
-		, enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind));
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		/* failure mode for initaddr is probably inappropriate address length */
+		{
+			err_t ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)
+				, peer->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR? AF_INET : AF_INET6
+				, &peer->ip_addr);
+
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s identification payload: %s"
+					, enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind), ugh);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case ID_USER_FQDN:
+		if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '@', pbs_left(id_pbs)) == NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer's ID_USER_FQDN contains no @");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case ID_FQDN:
+		if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '\0', pbs_left(id_pbs)) != NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Phase 1 ID Payload of type %s contains a NUL"
+				, enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* ??? ought to do some more sanity check, but what? */
+		/* ??? ought to do some more sanity check, but what? */
 
-	setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
-	break;
+		peer->name = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
+		break;
 
-    case ID_KEY_ID:
-	setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
- 	    DBG_dump_chunk("KEY ID:", peer->name));
-	break;
+	case ID_KEY_ID:
+		peer->name = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_dump_chunk("KEY ID:", peer->name));
+		break;
 
-    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
-	setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
- 	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
- 	    DBG_dump_chunk("DER ASN1 DN:", peer->name));
-	break;
+	case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+		peer->name = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_dump_chunk("DER ASN1 DN:", peer->name));
+		break;
 
-    default:
-	/* XXX Could send notification back */
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unacceptable identity type (%s) in Phase 1 ID Payload"
-	    , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	default:
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unacceptable identity type (%s) in Phase 1 ID Payload"
+			, enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    {
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	{
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	plog("Peer ID is %s: '%s'",
-	    enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype), buf);
-    }
+		idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		plog("Peer ID is %s: '%s'",
+			enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype), buf);
+	}
 
-    /* check for certificates */
-    decode_cert(md);
-    return TRUE;
+	/* check for certificates */
+	decode_cert(md);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Now that we've decoded the ID payload, let's see if we
@@ -2454,111 +2298,111 @@ decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer)
  * - if the initiation was explicit, we'd be ignoring user's intent
  * - if opportunistic, we'll lose our HOLD info
  */
-static bool
-switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, bool initiator)
+static bool switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer,
+							  bool initiator)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-
-    chunk_t peer_ca = (st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL)
-    		     ? st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer : empty_chunk;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	chunk_t peer_ca = (st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL)
+					 ? st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer : chunk_empty;
 
-	dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, peer_ca, "%none");
-	DBG_log("peer CA:      '%s'", buf);
-    )
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-    if (initiator)
-    {
-	int pathlen;
+		dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, peer_ca, "%none");
+		DBG_log("peer CA:      '%s'", buf);
+	)
 
-	if (!same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer))
+	if (initiator)
 	{
-	    char expect[BUF_LEN]
-		, found[BUF_LEN];
+		int pathlen;
 
-	    idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, expect, sizeof(expect));
-	    idtoa(peer, found, sizeof(found));
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		, "we require peer to have ID '%s', but peer declares '%s'"
-		, expect, found);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
+		if (!same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer))
+		{
+			char expect[BUF_LEN]
+				, found[BUF_LEN];
+
+			idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, expect, sizeof(expect));
+			idtoa(peer, found, sizeof(found));
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "we require peer to have ID '%s', but peer declares '%s'"
+				, expect, found);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	    dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, c->spd.that.ca, "%none");
-	    DBG_log("required CA:  '%s'", buf);
-        )
+			dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, c->spd.that.ca, "%none");
+			DBG_log("required CA:  '%s'", buf);
+		)
 
-	if (!trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &pathlen))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		, "we don't accept the peer's CA");
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (!trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &pathlen))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "we don't accept the peer's CA");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct connection *r;
+	else
+	{
+		struct connection *r;
 
-	/* check for certificate requests */
-	decode_cr(md, c);
+		/* check for certificate requests */
+		decode_cr(md, c);
 
-	r = refine_host_connection(st, peer, peer_ca);
+		r = refine_host_connection(st, peer, peer_ca);
 
-	/* delete the collected certificate requests */
-	free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE);
-	c->requested_ca = NULL;
+		/* delete the collected certificate requests */
+		free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE);
+		c->requested_ca = NULL;
 
-	if (r == NULL)
-	{
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		if (r == NULL)
+		{
+			char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	    idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf));
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no suitable connection for peer '%s'", buf);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
+			idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no suitable connection for peer '%s'", buf);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	    dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, r->spd.this.ca, "%none");
-	    DBG_log("offered CA:   '%s'", buf);
-	)
+			dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, r->spd.this.ca, "%none");
+			DBG_log("offered CA:   '%s'", buf);
+		)
 
-	if (r != c)
-	{
-	    /* apparently, r is an improvement on c -- replace */
+		if (r != c)
+		{
+			/* apparently, r is an improvement on c -- replace */
 
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL
-		, DBG_log("switched from \"%s\" to \"%s\"", c->name, r->name));
-	    if (r->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
-	    {
-		/* instantiate it, filling in peer's ID */
-		r = rw_instantiate(r, &c->spd.that.host_addr
-			, c->spd.that.host_port, NULL, peer);
-	    }
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+				, DBG_log("switched from \"%s\" to \"%s\"", c->name, r->name));
+			if (r->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+			{
+				/* instantiate it, filling in peer's ID */
+				r = rw_instantiate(r, &c->spd.that.host_addr
+						, c->spd.that.host_port, NULL, peer);
+			}
 
-	    /* copy certificate request info */
-	    r->got_certrequest = c->got_certrequest;
+			/* copy certificate request info */
+			r->got_certrequest = c->got_certrequest;
 
-	    st->st_connection = r;	/* kill reference to c */
-	    set_cur_connection(r);
-	    connection_discard(c);
-	}
-	else if (c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards)
-	{
-	    free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
-	    c->spd.that.id = *peer;
-	    c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
-	    unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+			st->st_connection = r;      /* kill reference to c */
+			set_cur_connection(r);
+			connection_discard(c);
+		}
+		else if (c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards)
+		{
+			free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+			c->spd.that.id = *peer;
+			c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
+			unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Decode the variable part of an ID packet (during Quick Mode).
@@ -2566,227 +2410,218 @@ switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, bool initiator)
  * Rejects 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent because
  * (1) it is wrong and (2) we use this value for inband signalling.
  */
-static bool
-decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id
-, pb_stream *id_pbs
-, ip_subnet *net
-, const char *which)
+static bool decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs,
+						  ip_subnet *net, const char *which)
 {
-    const struct af_info *afi = NULL;
+	const struct af_info *afi = NULL;
 
-    /* Note: the following may be a pointer into static memory
-     * that may be recycled, but only if the type is not known.
-     * That case is disposed of very early -- in the first switch.
-     */
-    const char *idtypename = enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaiid_idtype);
+	/* Note: the following may be a pointer into static memory
+	 * that may be recycled, but only if the type is not known.
+	 * That case is disposed of very early -- in the first switch.
+	 */
+	const char *idtypename = enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaiid_idtype);
 
-    switch (id->isaiid_idtype)
-    {
-	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
-	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
-	    afi = &af_inet4_info;
-	    break;
-	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
-	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
-	    afi = &af_inet6_info;
-	    break;
-	case ID_FQDN:
-	    return TRUE;
-	default:
-	    /* XXX support more */
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported ID type %s"
-		, idtypename);
-	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    switch (id->isaiid_idtype)
-    {
-	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	switch (id->isaiid_idtype)
 	{
-	    ip_address temp_address;
-	    err_t ugh;
-
-	    ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs), afi->af, &temp_address);
-
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s has wrong length in Quick I1 (%s)"
-		    , which, idtypename, ugh);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    if (isanyaddr(&temp_address))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s is invalid (%s) in Quick I1"
-		    , which, idtypename, ip_str(&temp_address));
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    happy(addrtosubnet(&temp_address, net));
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL
-		, DBG_log("%s is %s", which, ip_str(&temp_address)));
-	    break;
+		case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+		case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+		case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
+			afi = &af_inet4_info;
+			break;
+		case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+		case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
+			afi = &af_inet6_info;
+			break;
+		case ID_FQDN:
+			return TRUE;
+		default:
+			/* XXX support more */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported ID type %s"
+				, idtypename);
+			/* XXX Could send notification back */
+			return FALSE;
 	}
 
-	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
-	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+	switch (id->isaiid_idtype)
 	{
-	    ip_address temp_address, temp_mask;
-	    err_t ugh;
+		case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+		case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		{
+			ip_address temp_address;
+			err_t ugh;
 
-	    if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1"
-		    , which, idtypename);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur
-		, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address);
-	    if (ugh == NULL)
-		ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz
-		    , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_mask);
-	    if (ugh == NULL)
-		ugh = initsubnet(&temp_address, masktocount(&temp_mask)
-		    , '0', net);
-	    if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net))
-		ugh = "contains only anyaddr";
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s bad subnet in Quick I1 (%s)"
-		    , which, idtypename, ugh);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+			ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs), afi->af, &temp_address);
+
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s has wrong length in Quick I1 (%s)"
+					, which, idtypename, ugh);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			if (isanyaddr(&temp_address))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s is invalid (%s) in Quick I1"
+					, which, idtypename, ip_str(&temp_address));
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			happy(addrtosubnet(&temp_address, net));
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL
+				, DBG_log("%s is %s", which, ip_str(&temp_address)));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+		case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
 		{
-		    char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			ip_address temp_address, temp_mask;
+			err_t ugh;
 
-		    subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff));
-		    DBG_log("%s is subnet %s", which, temp_buff);
-		});
-	    break;
-	}
+			if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1"
+					, which, idtypename);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur
+				, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+				ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz
+					, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_mask);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+				ugh = initsubnet(&temp_address, masktocount(&temp_mask)
+					, '0', net);
+			if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net))
+				ugh = "contains only anyaddr";
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s bad subnet in Quick I1 (%s)"
+					, which, idtypename, ugh);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+				{
+					char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
 
-	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
-	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
-	{
-	    ip_address temp_address_from, temp_address_to;
-	    err_t ugh;
+					subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff));
+					DBG_log("%s is subnet %s", which, temp_buff);
+				});
+			break;
+		}
 
-	    if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1"
-		    , which, idtypename);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_from);
-	    if (ugh == NULL)
-		ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz
-		    , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_to);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s malformed (%s) in Quick I1"
-		    , which, idtypename, ugh);
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-
-	    ugh = rangetosubnet(&temp_address_from, &temp_address_to, net);
-	    if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net))
-		ugh = "contains only anyaddr";
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		char temp_buff1[ADDRTOT_BUF], temp_buff2[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-
-		addrtot(&temp_address_from, 0, temp_buff1, sizeof(temp_buff1));
-		addrtot(&temp_address_to, 0, temp_buff2, sizeof(temp_buff2));
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload in Quick I1, %s"
-		    " %s - %s unacceptable: %s"
-		    , which, idtypename, temp_buff1, temp_buff2, ugh);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+		case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
+		case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
 		{
-		    char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			ip_address temp_address_from, temp_address_to;
+			err_t ugh;
 
-		    subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff));
-		    DBG_log("%s is subnet %s (received as range)"
-			, which, temp_buff);
-		});
-	    break;
+			if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1"
+					, which, idtypename);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_from);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+				ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz
+					, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_to);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s malformed (%s) in Quick I1"
+					, which, idtypename, ugh);
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+
+			ugh = rangetosubnet(&temp_address_from, &temp_address_to, net);
+			if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net))
+				ugh = "contains only anyaddr";
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				char temp_buff1[ADDRTOT_BUF], temp_buff2[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+				addrtot(&temp_address_from, 0, temp_buff1, sizeof(temp_buff1));
+				addrtot(&temp_address_to, 0, temp_buff2, sizeof(temp_buff2));
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload in Quick I1, %s"
+					" %s - %s unacceptable: %s"
+					, which, idtypename, temp_buff1, temp_buff2, ugh);
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+				{
+					char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+					subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff));
+					DBG_log("%s is subnet %s (received as range)"
+						, which, temp_buff);
+				});
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* set the port selector */
-    setportof(htons(id->isaiid_port), &net->addr);
+	/* set the port selector */
+	setportof(htons(id->isaiid_port), &net->addr);
 
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
-        DBG_log("%s protocol/port is %d/%d", which, id->isaiid_protoid, id->isaiid_port)
-    )
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("%s protocol/port is %d/%d", which, id->isaiid_protoid, id->isaiid_port)
+	)
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* like decode, but checks that what is received matches what was sent */
-static bool
-
-check_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id
-, pb_stream *id_pbs
-, u_int8_t *protoid
-, u_int16_t *port
-, ip_subnet *net
-, const char *which)
+static bool check_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs,
+						 u_int8_t *protoid, u_int16_t *port, ip_subnet *net,
+						 const char *which)
 {
-    ip_subnet net_temp;
+	ip_subnet net_temp;
 
-    if (!decode_net_id(id, id_pbs, &net_temp, which))
-	return FALSE;
+	if (!decode_net_id(id, id_pbs, &net_temp, which))
+		return FALSE;
 
-    if (!samesubnet(net, &net_temp)
-    || *protoid != id->isaiid_protoid || *port != id->isaiid_port)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID returned doesn't match my proposal", which);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	if (!samesubnet(net, &net_temp)
+	|| *protoid != id->isaiid_protoid || *port != id->isaiid_port)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID returned doesn't match my proposal", which);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /*
  * look for the existence of a non-expiring preloaded public key
  */
-static bool
-has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st)
+static bool has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
 
-    /* do not consider rw connections since
-     * the peer's identity must be known
-     */
-    if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT)
-    {
-	pubkey_list_t *p;
-
-	/* look for a matching RSA public key */
-	for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	/* do not consider rw connections since
+	 * the peer's identity must be known
+	 */
+	if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT)
 	{
-	    pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+		pubkey_list_t *p;
 
-	    if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA &&
-		same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &key->id) &&
-		key->until_time == UNDEFINED_TIME)
-	    {
-		/* found a preloaded public key */
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
+		/* look for a matching RSA public key */
+		for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+		{
+			pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+			key_type_t type = key->public_key->get_type(key->public_key);
+
+			if (type == KEY_RSA && same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &key->id) &&
+				key->until_time == UNDEFINED_TIME)
+			{
+				/* found a preloaded public key */
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -2794,161 +2629,181 @@ has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st)
  * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5.5
  * specifies how this is to be done.
  */
-static void
-compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st
-, u_int8_t protoid
-, struct ipsec_proto_info *pi)
+static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st, u_int8_t protoid,
+								 struct ipsec_proto_info *pi)
 {
-    size_t needed_len = 0; /* bytes of keying material needed */
-
-    /* Add up the requirements for keying material
-     * (It probably doesn't matter if we produce too much!)
-     */
-    switch (protoid)
-    {
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-	    switch (pi->attrs.transid)
-	    {
-	    case ESP_NULL:
-		needed_len = 0;
-		break;
-	    case ESP_DES:
-		needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
-		break;
-	    case ESP_3DES:
-		needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3;
-		break;
-	    default:
+	size_t needed_len = 0; /* bytes of keying material needed */
+
+	/* Add up the requirements for keying material
+	 * (It probably doesn't matter if we produce too much!)
+	 */
+	switch (protoid)
+	{
+	case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+			switch (pi->attrs.transid)
+			{
+			case ESP_NULL:
+				needed_len = 0;
+				break;
+			case ESP_DES:
+				needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+				break;
+			case ESP_3DES:
+				needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3;
+				break;
+			default:
 #ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
-		if((needed_len=kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(pi->attrs.transid))>0) {
-			/* XXX: check key_len "coupling with kernel.c's */
-			if (pi->attrs.key_len) {
-				needed_len=pi->attrs.key_len/8;
-				DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
-						"key_len=%d from peer",
-						(int)needed_len));
-			}
-			break;
-		}
+				if((needed_len=kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(pi->attrs.transid))>0) {
+						/* XXX: check key_len "coupling with kernel.c's */
+						if (pi->attrs.key_len) {
+								needed_len=pi->attrs.key_len/8;
+								DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
+												"key_len=%d from peer",
+												(int)needed_len));
+						}
+						break;
+				}
 #endif
-		bad_case(pi->attrs.transid);
-	    }
+				bad_case(pi->attrs.transid);
+			}
 
 #ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
-				    "needed_len (after ESP enc)=%d",
-				    (int)needed_len));
-	    if (kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(pi->attrs.auth, NULL)) {
-		needed_len += kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(pi->attrs.auth);
-	    } else
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
+									"needed_len (after ESP enc)=%d",
+									(int)needed_len));
+			if (kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(pi->attrs.auth, NULL)) {
+				needed_len += kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(pi->attrs.auth);
+			} else
 #endif
-	    switch (pi->attrs.auth)
-	    {
-	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
-		break;
-	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
-		needed_len += HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN;
-		break;
-	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
-		needed_len += HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN;
-		break;
-	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC:
-	    default:
-		bad_case(pi->attrs.auth);
-	    }
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
-				    "needed_len (after ESP auth)=%d",
-				    (int)needed_len));
-	    break;
-
-    case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
-	    switch (pi->attrs.transid)
-	    {
-	    case AH_MD5:
-		needed_len = HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN;
-		break;
-	    case AH_SHA:
-		needed_len = HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN;
-		break;
-	    default:
-		bad_case(pi->attrs.transid);
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-    default:
-	bad_case(protoid);
-    }
-
-    pi->keymat_len = needed_len;
-
-    /* Allocate space for the keying material.
-     * Although only needed_len bytes are desired, we
-     * must round up to a multiple of ctx.hmac_digest_size
-     * so that our buffer isn't overrun.
-     */
-    {
-	struct hmac_ctx ctx_me, ctx_peer;
-	size_t needed_space;	/* space needed for keying material (rounded up) */
-	size_t i;
-
-	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_d);
-	ctx_peer = ctx_me;	/* duplicate initial conditions */
-
-	needed_space = needed_len + pad_up(needed_len, ctx_me.hmac_digest_size);
-	replace(pi->our_keymat, alloc_bytes(needed_space, "keymat in compute_keymat()"));
-	replace(pi->peer_keymat, alloc_bytes(needed_space, "peer_keymat in quick_inI1_outR1()"));
-
-	for (i = 0;; )
-	{
-	    if (st->st_shared.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* PFS: include the g^xy */
-		hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_shared);
-		hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_shared);
-	    }
-	    hmac_update(&ctx_me, &protoid, sizeof(protoid));
-	    hmac_update(&ctx_peer, &protoid, sizeof(protoid));
-
-	    hmac_update(&ctx_me, (u_char *)&pi->our_spi, sizeof(pi->our_spi));
-	    hmac_update(&ctx_peer, (u_char *)&pi->attrs.spi, sizeof(pi->attrs.spi));
-
-	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_ni);
-	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_ni);
-
-	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_nr);
-	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_nr);
-
-	    hmac_final(pi->our_keymat + i, &ctx_me);
-	    hmac_final(pi->peer_keymat + i, &ctx_peer);
-
-	    i += ctx_me.hmac_digest_size;
-	    if (i >= needed_space)
-		break;
+			switch (pi->attrs.auth)
+			{
+			case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
+				break;
+			case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+				needed_len += HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN;
+				break;
+			case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+				needed_len += HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN;
+				break;
+			case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC:
+			default:
+				bad_case(pi->attrs.auth);
+			}
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
+									"needed_len (after ESP auth)=%d",
+									(int)needed_len));
+			break;
+
+	case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+			switch (pi->attrs.transid)
+			{
+			case AH_MD5:
+				needed_len = HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN;
+				break;
+			case AH_SHA:
+				needed_len = HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN;
+				break;
+			default:
+				bad_case(pi->attrs.transid);
+			}
+			break;
+
+	default:
+		bad_case(protoid);
+	}
+
+	pi->keymat_len = needed_len;
+
+	/* Allocate space for the keying material. Although only needed_len bytes
+	 * are desired, we must round up to a multiple of hash_size
+	 * so that our buffer isn't overrun.
+	 */
+	{
+		size_t needed_space; /* space needed for keying material (rounded up) */
+		size_t i, prf_block_size;
+		chunk_t protoid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(protoid);
+		chunk_t spi_our =  chunk_from_thing(pi->our_spi);
+		chunk_t spi_peer = chunk_from_thing(pi->attrs.spi);
+		pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+		prf_t *prf_our, *prf_peer;
+
+		prf_alg  = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+		prf_our  = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		prf_peer = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		prf_our->set_key(prf_our, st->st_skeyid_d);
+		prf_peer->set_key(prf_peer, st->st_skeyid_d);
+		prf_block_size = prf_our->get_block_size(prf_our);
+
+		needed_space = needed_len + pad_up(needed_len, prf_block_size);
+		replace(pi->our_keymat, malloc(needed_space));
+		replace(pi->peer_keymat, malloc(needed_space));
+
+		for (i = 0;; )
+		{
+			char *keymat_i_our  = pi->our_keymat + i;
+			char *keymat_i_peer = pi->peer_keymat + i;
+			chunk_t keymat_our  = { keymat_i_our,  prf_block_size };
+			chunk_t keymat_peer = { keymat_i_peer, prf_block_size };
+			
+			if (st->st_shared.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				/* PFS: include the g^xy */
+				prf_our->get_bytes(prf_our,   st->st_shared, NULL);
+				prf_peer->get_bytes(prf_peer, st->st_shared, NULL);
+			}
+			prf_our->get_bytes(prf_our,   protoid_chunk, NULL);
+			prf_peer->get_bytes(prf_peer, protoid_chunk, NULL);
+
+			prf_our->get_bytes(prf_our,   spi_our,  NULL);
+			prf_peer->get_bytes(prf_peer, spi_peer, NULL);
 
-	    /* more keying material needed: prepare to go around again */
+			prf_our->get_bytes(prf_our,   st->st_ni, NULL);
+			prf_peer->get_bytes(prf_peer, st->st_ni, NULL);
 
-	    hmac_reinit(&ctx_me);
-	    hmac_reinit(&ctx_peer);
+			prf_our->get_bytes(prf_our,   st->st_nr, keymat_i_our);
+			prf_peer->get_bytes(prf_peer, st->st_nr, keymat_i_peer);
+
+			i += prf_block_size;
+			if (i >= needed_space)
+			{
+				break;
+			}
 
-	    hmac_update(&ctx_me, pi->our_keymat + i - ctx_me.hmac_digest_size
-		, ctx_me.hmac_digest_size);
-	    hmac_update(&ctx_peer, pi->peer_keymat + i - ctx_peer.hmac_digest_size
-		, ctx_peer.hmac_digest_size);
+			/* more keying material needed: prepare to go around again */
+			prf_our->get_bytes(prf_our,   keymat_our,  NULL);
+			prf_peer->get_bytes(prf_peer, keymat_peer, NULL);
+		}
+		prf_our->destroy(prf_our);
+		prf_peer->destroy(prf_peer);
 	}
-    }
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_dump("KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->our_keymat, pi->keymat_len);
+		DBG_dump("Peer KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->peer_keymat, pi->keymat_len));
+}
 
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_dump("KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->our_keymat, pi->keymat_len);
-	DBG_dump("Peer KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->peer_keymat, pi->keymat_len));
+static void compute_keymats(struct state *st)
+{
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+		compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah);
+	if (st->st_esp.present)
+		compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp);
 }
 
-static void
-compute_keymats(struct state *st)
+static bool uses_pubkey_auth(int auth)
 {
-    if (st->st_ah.present)
-	compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah);
-    if (st->st_esp.present)
-	compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp);
+	switch (auth)
+	{
+		case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_SIG:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+		case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+		case XAUTHInitRSA:
+		case XAUTHRespRSA:
+			return TRUE;
+		default:
+			return FALSE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* State Transition Functions.
@@ -2973,261 +2828,272 @@ compute_keymats(struct state *st)
 /* Handle a Main Mode Oakley first packet (responder side).
  * HDR;SA --> HDR;SA
  */
-stf_status
-main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
-    struct state *st;
-    struct connection *c;
-    struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
-    pb_stream proposal_pbs;
-    pb_stream r_sa_pbs;
-    u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
-    lset_t policy = LEMPTY;
-    int vids_to_send = 0;
-
-    /* We preparse the peer's proposal in order to determine
-     * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK)
-     */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sa_pd->payload.sa
-	, &sa_pd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal));
-
-    backup_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_policy(&proposal_pbs
-		     , proposal.isap_notrans, &policy));
-    restore_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
-
-    /* We are only considering candidate connections that match
-     * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK)
-     */
-    c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, pluto_port
-			   , &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy);
-
-    if (c == NULL && md->iface->ike_float)
-    {
-	c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT
-		, &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy);
-    }
-
-    if (c == NULL)
-    {
-	/* See if a wildcarded connection can be found.
-	 * We cannot pick the right connection, so we're making a guess.
-	 * All Road Warrior connections are fair game:
-	 * we pick the first we come across (if any).
-	 * If we don't find any, we pick the first opportunistic
-	 * with the smallest subnet that includes the peer.
-	 * There is, of course, no necessary relationship between
-	 * an Initiator's address and that of its client,
-	 * but Food Groups kind of assumes one.
+	struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+	struct state *st;
+	struct connection *c;
+	struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+	pb_stream proposal_pbs;
+	pb_stream r_sa_pbs;
+	u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
+	lset_t policy = LEMPTY;
+	int vids_to_send = 0;
+
+	/* We preparse the peer's proposal in order to determine
+	 * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK)
+	 */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sa_pd->payload.sa
+		, &sa_pd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal));
+
+	backup_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_policy(&proposal_pbs
+					 , proposal.isap_notrans, &policy));
+	restore_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
+
+	/* We are only considering candidate connections that match
+	 * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK)
 	 */
+	c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, pluto_port
+						   , &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy);
+
+	if (c == NULL && md->iface->ike_float)
 	{
-	    struct connection *d;
+		c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT
+				, &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy);
+	}
 
-	    d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr
-		, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, policy);
+	if (c == NULL)
+	{
+		/* See if a wildcarded connection can be found.
+		 * We cannot pick the right connection, so we're making a guess.
+		 * All Road Warrior connections are fair game:
+		 * we pick the first we come across (if any).
+		 * If we don't find any, we pick the first opportunistic
+		 * with the smallest subnet that includes the peer.
+		 * There is, of course, no necessary relationship between
+		 * an Initiator's address and that of its client,
+		 * but Food Groups kind of assumes one.
+		 */
+		{
+			struct connection *d;
+
+			d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr
+				, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, policy);
+
+			for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+			{
+				if (d->kind == CK_GROUP)
+				{
+					/* ignore */
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO))
+					{
+						/* must be Road Warrior: we have a winner */
+						c = d;
+						break;
+					}
+
+					/* Opportunistic or Shunt: pick tightest match */
+					if (addrinsubnet(&md->sender, &d->spd.that.client)
+					&& (c == NULL || !subnetinsubnet(&c->spd.that.client, &d->spd.that.client)))
+						c = d;
+				}
+			}
+		}
 
-	    for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
-	    {
-		if (d->kind == CK_GROUP)
+		if (c == NULL)
 		{
-		    /* ignore */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u"
+				" but no connection has been authorized%s%s"
+				, ip_str(&md->iface->addr), ntohs(portof(&md->iface->addr))
+				, (policy != LEMPTY) ? " with policy=" : ""
+				, (policy != LEMPTY) ? bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names, policy) : "");
+			/* XXX notification is in order! */
+			return STF_IGNORE;
+		}
+		else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u"
+				" but \"%s\" forbids connection"
+				, ip_str(&md->iface->addr), pluto_port, c->name);
+			/* XXX notification is in order! */
+			return STF_IGNORE;
 		}
 		else
 		{
-		    if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO))
-		    {
-			/* must be Road Warrior: we have a winner */
-			c = d;
-			break;
-		    }
-
-		    /* Opportunistic or Shunt: pick tightest match */
-		    if (addrinsubnet(&md->sender, &d->spd.that.client)
-		    && (c == NULL || !subnetinsubnet(&c->spd.that.client, &d->spd.that.client)))
-			c = d;
+			/* Create a temporary connection that is a copy of this one.
+			 * His ID isn't declared yet.
+			 */
+			c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, NULL);
 		}
-	    }
+	}
+	else if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	{
+		/* Create an instance
+		 * This is a rare case: wildcard peer ID but static peer IP address
+		 */
+		 c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, &c->spd.that.id);
 	}
 
-	if (c == NULL)
+	/* Set up state */
+	md->st = st = new_state();
+	st->st_connection = c;
+	set_cur_state(st);  /* (caller will reset cur_state) */
+	st->st_try = 0;     /* not our job to try again from start */
+	st->st_policy = c->policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK;     /* only as accurate as connection */
+
+	memcpy(st->st_icookie, md->hdr.isa_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	get_cookie(FALSE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &md->sender);
+
+	insert_state(st);   /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
+
+	st->st_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+	st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY; /* We only support this */
+
+	if ((c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) && (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port))
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u"
-		" but no connection has been authorized%s%s"
-		, ip_str(&md->iface->addr), ntohs(portof(&md->iface->addr))
-		, (policy != LEMPTY) ? " with policy=" : ""
-		, (policy != LEMPTY) ? bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names, policy) : "");
-	    /* XXX notification is in order! */
-	    return STF_IGNORE;
+	   plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s:%u"
+			, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->spd.that.host_port);
 	}
-	else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
+	else if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u"
-		" but \"%s\" forbids connection"
-		, ip_str(&md->iface->addr), pluto_port, c->name);
-	    /* XXX notification is in order! */
-	    return STF_IGNORE;
+		plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s"
+			, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    /* Create a temporary connection that is a copy of this one.
-	     * His ID isn't declared yet.
-	     */
-	    c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, NULL);
+		plog("responding to Main Mode");
 	}
-    }
-    else if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
-    {
-	/* Create an instance
-	 * This is a rare case: wildcard peer ID but static peer IP address
-	 */
-	 c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, &c->spd.that.id);
-    }
-
-    /* Set up state */
-    md->st = st = new_state();
-    st->st_connection = c;
-    set_cur_state(st);	/* (caller will reset cur_state) */
-    st->st_try = 0;	/* not our job to try again from start */
-    st->st_policy = c->policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK;	/* only as accurate as connection */
-
-    memcpy(st->st_icookie, md->hdr.isa_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    get_cookie(FALSE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &md->sender);
-
-    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
-
-    st->st_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
-    st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY; /* We only support this */
-
-    if ((c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) && (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port))
-    {
-       plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s:%u"
-	    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->spd.that.host_port);
-    }
-    else if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-    {
-	plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s"
-	    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("responding to Main Mode");
-    }
-
-    /* parse_isakmp_sa also spits out a winning SA into our reply,
-     * so we have to build our md->reply and emit HDR before calling it.
-     */
-
-    /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */
-    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (md->openpgp)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
-	vids_to_send++;
-    /* always send DPD Vendor ID */
-	vids_to_send++;
-    if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled)
-	vids_to_send++;
-
-    /* HDR out.
-     * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because we must
-     * fill in the cookie.
-     */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr;
-
-	r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT;	/* we won't ever turn on this bit */
-	memcpy(r_hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	r_hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA;
-	if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
 
-    /* start of SA out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_sa r_sa = sa_pd->payload.sa;
+	/* parse_isakmp_sa also spits out a winning SA into our reply,
+	 * so we have to build our md->reply and emit HDR before calling it.
+	 */
 
-	r_sa.isasa_np = vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	/* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */
+	if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
+	{
+		vids_to_send++;
+	}
+	if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
+	{
+		vids_to_send++;
+	}
+	if (md->openpgp)
+	{
+		vids_to_send++;
+	}
+	if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
+	{
+		vids_to_send++;
+	}
+	/* always send DPD Vendor ID */
+		vids_to_send++;
+	if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled)
+	{
+		vids_to_send++;
+	}
 
-	if (!out_struct(&r_sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
+	/* HDR out.
+	 * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because we must
+	 * fill in the cookie.
+	 */
+	{
+		struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr;
 
-    /* SA body in and out */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs
-	,&proposal, &r_sa_pbs, st, FALSE));
+		r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT; /* we won't ever turn on this bit */
+		memcpy(r_hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		r_hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA;
+		if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 
-    /* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */
-    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &md->rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN))
+	/* start of SA out */
 	{
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		struct isakmp_sa r_sa = sa_pd->payload.sa;
+
+		r_sa.isasa_np = vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+
+		if (!out_struct(&r_sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */
-    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &md->rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY))
+	/* SA body in and out */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs
+		,&proposal, &r_sa_pbs, st, FALSE));
+
+	/* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */
+	if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
 	{
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &md->rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN))
+		{
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /*
-     * if the peer sent an OpenPGP Vendor ID we offer the same capability
-     */
-    if (md->openpgp)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &md->rbody, VID_OPENPGP))
+	/* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */
+	if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
 	{
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &md->rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY))
+		{
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */
-    if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
-    {
-	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &md->rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH))
+	/*
+	 * if the peer sent an OpenPGP Vendor ID we offer the same capability
+	 */
+	if (md->openpgp)
 	{
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &md->rbody, VID_OPENPGP))
+		{
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */
-    if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-    , &md->rbody, VID_MISC_DPD))
-    {
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
+	/* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */
+	if (SEND_XAUTH_VID)
+	{
+		if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &md->rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH))
+		{
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+	}
 
-    if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled)
-    {
-	/* reply if NAT-Traversal draft is supported */
-	st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid);
+	/* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &md->rbody, VID_MISC_DPD))
+	{
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 
-	if (st->nat_traversal
-	&& !out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, &md->rbody, md->nat_traversal_vid))
+	if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled)
 	{
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		/* reply if NAT-Traversal draft is supported */
+		st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid);
+
+		if (st->nat_traversal
+		&& !out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, &md->rbody, md->nat_traversal_vid))
+		{
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    close_message(&md->rbody);
+	close_message(&md->rbody);
 
-    /* save initiator SA for HASH */
-    clonereplacechunk(st->st_p1isa, sa_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs), "sa in main_inI1_outR1()");
+	/* save initiator SA for HASH */
+	free(st->st_p1isa.ptr);
+	st->st_p1isa = chunk_create(sa_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs));
+	st->st_p1isa = chunk_clone(st->st_p1isa);
 
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MAIN_I1: HDR, SA --> auth dependent
@@ -3240,95 +3106,94 @@ main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
  *
  * We must verify that the proposal received matches one we sent.
  */
-stf_status
-main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
 
-    u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
 
-    /* verify echoed SA */
-    {
-	u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
-	pb_stream proposal_pbs;
-	struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
-	struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
-
-	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sapd->payload.sa
-	    ,&sapd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal));
-	if (proposal.isap_notrans != 1)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "a single Transform is required in a selecting Oakley Proposal; found %u"
-	    , (unsigned)proposal.isap_notrans);
-	    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX);
-        }
-	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit
-	    , &proposal_pbs, &proposal, NULL, st, TRUE));
-    }
-
-    if (nat_traversal_enabled && md->nat_traversal_vid)
-    {
-	st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid);
-	plog("enabling possible NAT-traversal with method %s"
-	     , bitnamesof(natt_type_bitnames, st->nat_traversal));
-    }
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
-    {
-	np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
-		ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS;
-    }
-
-    /**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Ni ****************/
-
-    /* HDR out.
-     * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because the isa_np
-     * depends on the type of Auth (eventually).
-     */
-    echo_hdr(md, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_KE);
-
-    /* KE out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group
-    , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	/* verify echoed SA */
+	{
+		u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
+		pb_stream proposal_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+		struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+
+		RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sapd->payload.sa
+			,&sapd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal));
+		if (proposal.isap_notrans != 1)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "a single Transform is required in a selecting Oakley Proposal; found %u"
+			, (unsigned)proposal.isap_notrans);
+			RETURN_STF_FAILURE(BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX);
+		}
+		RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit
+			, &proposal_pbs, &proposal, NULL, st, TRUE));
+	}
+
+	if (nat_traversal_enabled && md->nat_traversal_vid)
+	{
+		st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid);
+		plog("enabling possible NAT-traversal with method %s"
+			 , bitnamesof(natt_type_bitnames, st->nat_traversal));
+	}
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+	{
+		np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
+				ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS;
+	}
+
+	/**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Ni ****************/
+
+	/* HDR out.
+	 * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because the isa_np
+	 * depends on the type of Auth (eventually).
+	 */
+	echo_hdr(md, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_KE);
+
+	/* KE out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group
+	, &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    /* Ni out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody
-    , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np, "Ni"))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
-    if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)
-    {
-	/* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */
-	pb_stream vid_pbs;
-
-	if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs);
-    }
+	/* Ni out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody
+	, (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np, "Ni"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)
+	{
+		/* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */
+		pb_stream vid_pbs;
+
+		if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs);
+	}
 #else
-    /* Ni out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody, np, "Ni"))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	/* Ni out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody, np, "Ni"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 #endif
 
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
-    {
-	if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+	{
+		if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 
-    /* finish message */
-    close_message(&md->rbody);
+	/* finish message */
+	close_message(&md->rbody);
 
-    /* Reinsert the state, using the responder cookie we just received */
-    unhash_state(st);
-    memcpy(st->st_rcookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
+	/* Reinsert the state, using the responder cookie we just received */
+	unhash_state(st);
+	memcpy(st->st_rcookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	insert_state(st);   /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
 
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MAIN_R1:
@@ -3336,140 +3201,137 @@ main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
  *
  * The following are not yet implemented:
  * PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
- *	    --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+ *          --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
  * RPKE_AUTH:
- *	    HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
- *	    --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+ *          HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+ *          --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
  */
-stf_status
-main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    pb_stream *keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs;
- 
-    /* send CR if auth is RSA and no preloaded RSA public key exists*/
-    bool RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG
-		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA
-		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA;
-    bool send_cr = !no_cr_send && RSA_auth && !has_preloaded_public_key(st);
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	pb_stream *keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs;
+
+	/* send CR if auth is RSA or ECDSA and no preloaded public key exists*/
+	bool pubkey_auth = uses_pubkey_auth(st->st_oakley.auth);
+	bool send_cr = !no_cr_send && pubkey_auth && !has_preloaded_public_key(st);
 
-    u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
 
-    /* KE in */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gi, "Gi", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs));
+	/* KE in */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gi, "Gi", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs));
 
-    /* Ni in */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni"));
+	/* Ni in */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni"));
 
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
-    {
-       nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md);
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+	{
+	   nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md);
 
-       np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
-		ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS;
-    }
-    if (st->nat_traversal)
-    {
-       nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port);
-    }
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA)
-    {
-       nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
-    }
+	   np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
+				ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS;
+	}
+	if (st->nat_traversal)
+	{
+	   nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port);
+	}
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA)
+	{
+	   nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
+	}
 
-    /* decode certificate requests */
-    st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE;
-    decode_cr(md, st->st_connection);
+	/* decode certificate requests */
+	st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE;
+	decode_cr(md, st->st_connection);
 
-    /**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Nr ****************/
+	/**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Nr ****************/
 
-    /* HDR out done */
+	/* HDR out done */
 
-    /* KE out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group
-    , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	/* KE out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group
+	, &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    /* Nr out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody
-    , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID
-	: (send_cr? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np), "Nr"))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
-    if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)
-    {
-	/* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */
-	pb_stream vid_pbs;
-
-	if (!out_generic((send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np,
-	    &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs);
-    }
+	/* Nr out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody
+	, (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID
+		: (send_cr? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np), "Nr"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)
+	{
+		/* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */
+		pb_stream vid_pbs;
+
+		if (!out_generic((send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np,
+			&isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs);
+	}
 #else
-    /* Nr out */
-    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody,
-	(send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np, "Nr"))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	/* Nr out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody,
+		(send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np, "Nr"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 #endif
 
-    /* CR out */
-    if (send_cr)
-    {
-	if (st->st_connection->kind == CK_PERMANENT)
+	/* CR out */
+	if (send_cr)
 	{
-	    if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE
-	    , st->st_connection->spd.that.ca
-	    , &md->rbody, np))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (st->st_connection->kind == CK_PERMANENT)
+		{
+			if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE
+			, st->st_connection->spd.that.ca
+			, &md->rbody, np))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			generalName_t *ca = NULL;
+
+			if (collect_rw_ca_candidates(md, &ca))
+			{
+				generalName_t *gn;
+
+				for (gn = ca; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next)
+				{
+					if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, gn->name
+					, &md->rbody
+					, gn->next == NULL ? np : ISAKMP_NEXT_CR))
+						return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+				}
+				free_generalNames(ca, FALSE);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, chunk_empty
+				, &md->rbody, np))
+					return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
 	{
-	    generalName_t *ca = NULL;
+	   if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md))
+		   return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
 
-	    if (collect_rw_ca_candidates(md, &ca))
-	    {
-		generalName_t *gn;
+	/* finish message */
+	close_message(&md->rbody);
 
-		for (gn = ca; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next)
-		{
-		    if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, gn->name
-		    , &md->rbody
-		    , gn->next == NULL ? np : ISAKMP_NEXT_CR))
-			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-		}
-		free_generalNames(ca, FALSE);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, empty_chunk
-		, &md->rbody, np))
-		    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
-    {
-       if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md))
-	   return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
-
-    /* finish message */
-    close_message(&md->rbody);
-
-    /* next message will be encrypted, but not this one.
-     * We could defer this calculation.
-     */
-    compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group);
-    if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st))
-	return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
-    update_iv(st);
-
-    return STF_OK;
+	/* next message will be encrypted, but not this one.
+	 * We could defer this calculation.
+	 */
+	compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi);
+	if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st))
+		return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+	update_iv(st);
+
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MAIN_I2:
@@ -3478,172 +3340,174 @@ main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
  *
  * The following are not yet implemented.
  * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
- *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
+ *          --> HDR*, HASH_I
  * SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
- *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
+ *          --> HDR*, HASH_I
  */
-stf_status
-main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    pb_stream *const keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs;
-    pb_stream id_pbs;	/* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */
-
-    certpolicy_t cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert;
-    cert_t mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert;
-    bool requested, send_cert, send_cr;
-
-    bool RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG
-		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA
-		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA;
-
-    int auth_payload = RSA_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
-
-    /* KE in */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gr, "Gr", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs));
-
-    /* Nr in */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr"));
-
-    /* decode certificate requests */
-    st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE;
-    decode_cr(md, st->st_connection);
-
-    /* free collected certificate requests since as initiator
-     * we don't heed them anyway
-     */
-    free_generalNames(st->st_connection->requested_ca, TRUE);
-    st->st_connection->requested_ca = NULL;
-
-    /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want
-     * or are requested to send it
-     */
-    requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED
-		&& st->st_connection->got_certrequest;
-    send_cert = RSA_auth && mycert.type != CERT_NONE
-		&& (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested);
-
-    /* send certificate request if we don't have a preloaded RSA public key */
-    send_cr = !no_cr_send && send_cert && !has_preloaded_public_key(st);
-
-    /* done parsing; initialize crypto  */
-    compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group);
-    if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st))
-	return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
-
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
-    {
-	nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md);
-    }
-    if (st->nat_traversal)
-    {
-	nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port);
-    }
-    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA)
-    {
-	nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
-    }
-
-    /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDii;HASH/SIG_I ***************/
-    /* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inI3_outR3's code */
-
-    /* HDR* out done */
-
-    /* IDii out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd;
-	chunk_t id_b;
-
-	build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this);
-	id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload;
-	if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &id_pbs)
-	|| !out_chunk(id_b, &id_pbs, "my identity"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	close_output_pbs(&id_pbs);
-    }
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	pb_stream *const keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs;
+	pb_stream id_pbs;   /* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */
 
-    /* CERT out */
-    if (RSA_auth)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("our certificate policy is %s"
-		, enum_name(&cert_policy_names, cert_policy))
-	)
-	if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE)
-	{
-	    const char *request_text = "";
+	certpolicy_t cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert;
+	cert_t mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert;
+	bool requested, send_cert, send_cr;
+	bool pubkey_auth = uses_pubkey_auth(st->st_oakley.auth);
+
+	int auth_payload = pubkey_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+
+	/* KE in */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gr, "Gr", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs));
+
+	/* Nr in */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr"));
+
+	/* decode certificate requests */
+	st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE;
+	decode_cr(md, st->st_connection);
+
+	/* free collected certificate requests since as initiator
+	 * we don't heed them anyway
+	 */
+	free_generalNames(st->st_connection->requested_ca, TRUE);
+	st->st_connection->requested_ca = NULL;
+
+	/* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want
+	 * or are requested to send it
+	 */
+	requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED
+				&& st->st_connection->got_certrequest;
+	send_cert = pubkey_auth && mycert.type != CERT_NONE
+				&& (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested);
+
+	/* send certificate request if we don't have a preloaded RSA public key */
+	send_cr = !no_cr_send && send_cert && !has_preloaded_public_key(st);
 
-	    if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED)
-		request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request";
-	    plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s"
-		, send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text);
+	/* done parsing; initialize crypto  */
+	compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr);
+	if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st))
+		return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+	{
+		nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md);
 	}
-	else
+	if (st->nat_traversal)
+	{
+		nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port);
+	}
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA)
 	{
-	    plog("we don't have a cert");
+		nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
 	}
-    }
-    if (send_cert)
-    {
-	pb_stream cert_pbs;
 
-	struct isakmp_cert cert_hd;
-	cert_hd.isacert_np = (send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG;
-	cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type;
+	/*************** build output packet HDR*;IDii;HASH/SIG_I ***************/
+	/* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inI3_outR3's code */
 
-	if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if (!out_chunk(get_mycert(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs);
-    }
+	/* HDR* out done */
 
-    /* CR out */
-    if (send_cr)
-    {
-	if (!build_and_ship_CR(mycert.type, st->st_connection->spd.that.ca
-	, &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-    }
+	/* IDii out */
+	{
+		struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd;
+		chunk_t id_b;
 
-   /* HASH_I or SIG_I out */
-    {
-	u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	size_t hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, TRUE, &id_pbs);
+		build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this);
+		id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload;
+		if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &id_pbs)
+		|| !out_chunk(id_b, &id_pbs, "my identity"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		close_output_pbs(&id_pbs);
+	}
 
-	if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+	/* CERT out */
+	if (pubkey_auth)
 	{
-	    /* HASH_I out */
-	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody
-	    , hash_val, hash_len, "HASH_I"))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("our certificate policy is %N", cert_policy_names, cert_policy)
+		)
+		if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE)
+		{
+			const char *request_text = "";
+
+			if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED)
+				request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request";
+			plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s"
+				, send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("we don't have a cert");
+		}
 	}
-	else
+	if (send_cert)
 	{
-	    /* SIG_I out */
-	    u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
-	    size_t sig_len = RSA_sign_hash(st->st_connection
-		, sig_val, hash_val, hash_len);
+		pb_stream cert_pbs;
 
-	    if (sig_len == 0)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for RSA Signature");
-		return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
-	    }
+		struct isakmp_cert cert_hd;
+		cert_hd.isacert_np = (send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG;
+		cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type;
 
-	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc
-	    , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_I"))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_chunk(cert_get_encoding(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs);
+	}
+
+	/* CR out */
+	if (send_cr)
+	{
+		if (!build_and_ship_CR(mycert.type, st->st_connection->spd.that.ca
+		, &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+   /* HASH_I or SIG_I out */
+	{
+		u_char hash_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+		chunk_t hash = chunk_from_buf(hash_buf);
+
+		main_mode_hash(st, &hash, TRUE, &id_pbs);
+
+		if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+		{
+			/* HASH_I out */
+			if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody,
+								 hash.ptr, hash.len, "HASH_I"))
+			{
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* SIG_I out */
+			u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+			signature_scheme_t scheme;
+			size_t sig_len;
+
+			scheme = oakley_to_signature_scheme(st->st_oakley.auth);
+
+			sig_len = sign_hash(scheme, st->st_connection, sig_val, hash);
+			if (sig_len == 0)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for signature");
+				return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+			}
+
+			if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc
+			, &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_I"))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+	/* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
 
-    /* st_new_iv was computed by generate_skeyids_iv */
-    if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+	/* st_new_iv was computed by generate_skeyids_iv */
+	if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;      /* ??? we may be partly committed */
 
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* Shared logic for asynchronous lookup of DNS KEY records.
@@ -3651,31 +3515,31 @@ main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md)
  */
 
 enum key_oppo_step {
-    kos_null,
-    kos_his_txt
+	kos_null,
+	kos_his_txt
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    , kos_his_key
+	, kos_his_key
 #endif
 };
 
 struct key_continuation {
-    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
-    struct msg_digest *md;
-    enum   key_oppo_step step;
-    bool                 failure_ok;
-    err_t                last_ugh;
+	struct adns_continuation ac;        /* common prefix */
+	struct msg_digest *md;
+	enum   key_oppo_step step;
+	bool                 failure_ok;
+	err_t                last_ugh;
 };
 
 typedef stf_status (key_tail_fn)(struct msg_digest *md
-				  , struct key_continuation *kc);
-static void
-report_key_dns_failure(struct id *id, err_t ugh)
+								  , struct key_continuation *kc);
+
+static void report_key_dns_failure(struct id *id, err_t ugh)
 {
-    char id_buf[BUF_LEN];	/* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */
+	char id_buf[BUF_LEN];       /* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */
 
-    (void) idtoa(id, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf));
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
-	"; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)", id_buf, ugh);
+	(void) idtoa(id, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf));
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
+		"; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)", id_buf, ugh);
 }
 
 
@@ -3688,135 +3552,145 @@ report_key_dns_failure(struct id *id, err_t ugh)
  */
 static stf_status
 main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md
-		 , bool initiator	/* are we the Initiator? */
-		 , cont_fn_t cont_fn	/* continuation function */
-		 , const struct key_continuation *kc	/* current state, can be NULL */
+				 , bool initiator       /* are we the Initiator? */
+				 , cont_fn_t cont_fn    /* continuation function */
+				 , const struct key_continuation *kc    /* current state, can be NULL */
 )
 {
-    struct state *st = md->st;
-    u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    size_t hash_len;
-    struct id peer;
-    stf_status r = STF_OK;
-
-    /* ID Payload in */
-    if (!decode_peer_id(md, &peer))
-	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-
-    /* Hash the ID Payload.
-     * main_mode_hash requires idpl->cur to be at end of payload
-     * so we temporarily set if so.
-     */
-    {
-	pb_stream *idpl = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]->pbs;
-	u_int8_t *old_cur = idpl->cur;
-
-	idpl->cur = idpl->roof;
-	hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, !initiator, idpl);
-	idpl->cur = old_cur;
-    }
-
-    switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
-    {
-    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
-    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-	{
-	    pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs;
-
-	    if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash_len
-	    || memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash_val, hash_len) != 0)
-	    {
-		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received HASH:"
-		    , hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs));
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Hash Payload does not match computed value");
-		/* XXX Could send notification back */
-		r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
-	    }
+	u_char hash_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	chunk_t hash = chunk_from_buf(hash_buf);
+	struct state *st = md->st;
+	struct id peer;
+	stf_status r = STF_OK;
+
+	/* ID Payload in */
+	if (!decode_peer_id(md, &peer))
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+	/* Hash the ID Payload.
+	 * main_mode_hash requires idpl->cur to be at end of payload
+	 * so we temporarily set if so.
+	 */
+	{
+		pb_stream *idpl = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]->pbs;
+		u_int8_t *old_cur = idpl->cur;
+
+		idpl->cur = idpl->roof;
+		main_mode_hash(st, &hash, !initiator, idpl);
+		idpl->cur = old_cur;
 	}
-	break;
 
-    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
-    case XAUTHInitRSA:
-    case XAUTHRespRSA:
-	r = RSA_check_signature(&peer, st, hash_val, hash_len
-	    , &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs
+	switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+	{
+	case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+	case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+	case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+		{
+			pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs;
+
+			if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash.len
+			|| memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash.ptr, hash.len) != 0)
+			{
+				DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received HASH:"
+					, hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs));
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Hash Payload does not match computed value");
+				/* XXX Could send notification back */
+				r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
+
+	case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+	case XAUTHInitRSA:
+	case XAUTHRespRSA:
+		r = check_signature(KEY_RSA, &peer, st, hash,
+				 &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs,
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	    , kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.keys_from_dns
+				kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.keys_from_dns,
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	    , kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.gateways_from_dns
-	    );
-
-	if (r == STF_SUSPEND)
-	{
-	    /* initiate/resume asynchronous DNS lookup for key */
-	    struct key_continuation *nkc
-		= alloc_thing(struct key_continuation, "key continuation");
-	    enum key_oppo_step step_done = kc == NULL? kos_null : kc->step;
-	    err_t ugh = NULL;
+				kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.gateways_from_dns
+			);
+	
+		if (r == STF_SUSPEND)
+		{
+			/* initiate/resume asynchronous DNS lookup for key */
+			struct key_continuation *nkc = malloc_thing(struct key_continuation);
+			enum key_oppo_step step_done = kc == NULL? kos_null : kc->step;
+			err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	    /* Record that state is used by a suspended md */
-	    passert(st->st_suspended_md == NULL);
-	    st->st_suspended_md = md;
+			/* Record that state is used by a suspended md */
+			passert(st->st_suspended_md == NULL);
+			st->st_suspended_md = md;
 
-	    nkc->failure_ok = FALSE;
-	    nkc->md = md;
+			nkc->failure_ok = FALSE;
+			nkc->md = md;
 
-	    switch (step_done)
-	    {
-	    case kos_null:
-		/* first try: look for the TXT records */
-		nkc->step = kos_his_txt;
+			switch (step_done)
+			{
+			case kos_null:
+				/* first try: look for the TXT records */
+				nkc->step = kos_his_txt;
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		nkc->failure_ok = TRUE;
+				nkc->failure_ok = TRUE;
 #endif
-		ugh = start_adns_query(&peer
-				       , &peer	/* SG itself */
-				       , T_TXT
-				       , cont_fn
-				       , &nkc->ac);
-		break;
+				ugh = start_adns_query(&peer
+									   , &peer  /* SG itself */
+									   , T_TXT
+									   , cont_fn
+									   , &nkc->ac);
+				break;
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	    case kos_his_txt:
-		/* second try: look for the KEY records */
-		nkc->step = kos_his_key;
-		ugh = start_adns_query(&peer
-				       , NULL	/* no sgw for KEY */
-				       , T_KEY
-				       , cont_fn
-				       , &nkc->ac);
-		break;
+			case kos_his_txt:
+				/* second try: look for the KEY records */
+				nkc->step = kos_his_key;
+				ugh = start_adns_query(&peer
+									   , NULL   /* no sgw for KEY */
+									   , T_KEY
+									   , cont_fn
+									   , &nkc->ac);
+				break;
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
-	    default:
-		bad_case(step_done);
-	    }
+			default:
+				bad_case(step_done);
+			}
 
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		report_key_dns_failure(&peer, ugh);
-		st->st_suspended_md = NULL;
-		r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
-	    }
-	}
-	break;
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				report_key_dns_failure(&peer, ugh);
+				st->st_suspended_md = NULL;
+				r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+			}
+		}
+		break;
 
-    default:
-	bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth);
-    }
-    if (r != STF_OK)
-	return r;
+	case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+	case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+	case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+		r = check_signature(KEY_ECDSA, &peer, st, hash,
+							&md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs,
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+							NULL,
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+							NULL);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth);
+	}
+	if (r != STF_OK)
+		return r;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("authentication succeeded"));
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("authentication succeeded"));
 
-    /*
-     * With the peer ID known, let's see if we need to switch connections.
-     */
-    if (!switch_connection(md, &peer, initiator))
-	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	/*
+	 * With the peer ID known, let's see if we need to switch connections.
+	 */
+	if (!switch_connection(md, &peer, initiator))
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
 
-    return r;
+	return r;
 }
 
 /* This continuation is called as part of either
@@ -3840,46 +3714,44 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md
  * to find authentication, or we run out of things
  * to try.
  */
-static void
-key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr
-, err_t ugh
-, key_tail_fn *tail)
+static void key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh, 
+						 key_tail_fn *tail)
 {
-    struct key_continuation *kc = (void *)cr;
-    struct state *st = kc->md->st;
+	struct key_continuation *kc = (void *)cr;
+	struct state *st = kc->md->st;
 
-    passert(cur_state == NULL);
+	passert(cur_state == NULL);
 
-    /* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */
-    if (st != NULL)
-    {
-	stf_status r;
+	/* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */
+	if (st != NULL)
+	{
+		stf_status r;
 
-	passert(st->st_suspended_md == kc->md);
-	st->st_suspended_md = NULL;	/* no longer connected or suspended */
-	cur_state = st;
+		passert(st->st_suspended_md == kc->md);
+		st->st_suspended_md = NULL;     /* no longer connected or suspended */
+		cur_state = st;
 
-	if (!kc->failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    report_key_dns_failure(&st->st_connection->spd.that.id, ugh);
-	    r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
-	}
-	else
-	{
+		if (!kc->failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			report_key_dns_failure(&st->st_connection->spd.that.id, ugh);
+			r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+		}
+		else
+		{
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	    passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt || kc->step == kos_his_key);
+			passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt || kc->step == kos_his_key);
 #else
-	    passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt);
+			passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt);
 #endif
-	    kc->last_ugh = ugh;	/* record previous error in case we need it */
-	    r = (*tail)(kc->md, kc);
-	}
-	complete_state_transition(&kc->md, r);
-    }
-    if (kc->md != NULL)
-	release_md(kc->md);
-    cur_state = NULL;
+			kc->last_ugh = ugh; /* record previous error in case we need it */
+			r = (*tail)(kc->md, kc);
+		}
+		complete_state_transition(&kc->md, r);
+	}
+	if (kc->md != NULL)
+		release_md(kc->md);
+	cur_state = NULL;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MAIN_R2:
@@ -3893,174 +3765,173 @@ key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr
  * - main_inI3_outR3_tail to finish or suspend for DNS lookup
  * - main_inI3_outR3_continue to start main_inI3_outR3_tail again
  */
-static key_tail_fn main_inI3_outR3_tail;	/* forward */
+static key_tail_fn main_inI3_outR3_tail;        /* forward */
 
-stf_status
-main_inI3_outR3(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status main_inI3_outR3(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    return main_inI3_outR3_tail(md, NULL);
+	return main_inI3_outR3_tail(md, NULL);
 }
 
-static void
-main_inI3_outR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
+static void main_inI3_outR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
 {
-    key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inI3_outR3_tail);
+	key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inI3_outR3_tail);
 }
 
 static stf_status
 main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md
 , struct key_continuation *kc)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int8_t auth_payload;
-    pb_stream r_id_pbs;	/* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */
-    certpolicy_t cert_policy;
-    cert_t mycert;
-    bool RSA_auth;
-    bool send_cert;
-    bool requested;
-
-    /* ID and HASH_I or SIG_I in
-     * Note: this may switch the connection being used!
-     */
-    {
-	stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, FALSE
-					, main_inI3_outR3_continue
-					, kc);
-
-	if (r != STF_OK)
-	    return r;
-    }
-
-    /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want
-     * or are requested to send it
-     */
-    cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert;
-    mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert;
-    requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED
-		&& st->st_connection->got_certrequest;
-    RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG
-	    || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA
-            || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA;
-    send_cert = RSA_auth
-		&& mycert.type != CERT_NONE
-		&& (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested);
-
-    /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R ***************/
-    /* proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR*
-     * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE.
-     * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially
-     * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS.
-     */
-    /* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inR2_outI3's code */
-
-    /* HDR* out
-     * If auth were PKE_AUTH or RPKE_AUTH, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH would
-     * be first payload.
-     */
-    echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_ID);
-
-    auth_payload = RSA_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
-
-    /* IDir out */
-    {
-	/* id_hd should be struct isakmp_id, but struct isakmp_ipsec_id
-	 * allows build_id_payload() to work for both phases.
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int8_t auth_payload;
+	pb_stream r_id_pbs; /* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */
+	certpolicy_t cert_policy;
+	cert_t mycert;
+	bool pubkey_auth, send_cert, requested;
+
+	/* ID and HASH_I or SIG_I in
+	 * Note: this may switch the connection being used!
 	 */
-	struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd;
-	chunk_t id_b;
-
-	build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this);
-	id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload;
-	if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &r_id_pbs)
-	|| !out_chunk(id_b, &r_id_pbs, "my identity"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	close_output_pbs(&r_id_pbs);
-    }
-
-    /* CERT out */
-    if (RSA_auth)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("our certificate policy is %s"
-		, enum_name(&cert_policy_names, cert_policy))
-	)
-	if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE)
 	{
-	    const char *request_text = "";
+		stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, FALSE
+										, main_inI3_outR3_continue
+										, kc);
 
-	    if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED)
-		request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request";
-	    plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s"
-		, send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text);
+		if (r != STF_OK)
+			return r;
 	}
-	else
+
+	/* send certificate if pubkey authentication is used, we have one
+	 * and we want or are requested to send it
+	 */
+	cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert;
+	mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert;
+	requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED
+				&& st->st_connection->got_certrequest;
+	pubkey_auth = uses_pubkey_auth(st->st_oakley.auth);
+	send_cert = pubkey_auth	&& mycert.type != CERT_NONE &&
+				(cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested);
+
+	/*************** build output packet HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R ***************/
+	/* proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR*
+	 * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE.
+	 * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially
+	 * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS.
+	 */
+	/* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inR2_outI3's code */
+
+	/* HDR* out
+	 * If auth were PKE_AUTH or RPKE_AUTH, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH would
+	 * be first payload.
+	 */
+	echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_ID);
+
+	auth_payload = pubkey_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+
+	/* IDir out */
 	{
-	    plog("we don't have a cert");
+		/* id_hd should be struct isakmp_id, but struct isakmp_ipsec_id
+		 * allows build_id_payload() to work for both phases.
+		 */
+		struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd;
+		chunk_t id_b;
+
+		build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this);
+		id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload;
+		if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &r_id_pbs)
+		|| !out_chunk(id_b, &r_id_pbs, "my identity"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		close_output_pbs(&r_id_pbs);
 	}
-    }
-    if (send_cert)
-    {
-	pb_stream cert_pbs;
 
-	struct isakmp_cert cert_hd;
-	cert_hd.isacert_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG;
-	cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type;
+	/* CERT out */
+	if (pubkey_auth)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("our certificate policy is %N", cert_policy_names, cert_policy)
+		)
+		if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE)
+		{
+			const char *request_text = "";
 
-	if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	if (!out_chunk(get_mycert(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs);
-    }
+			if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED)
+				request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request";
+			plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s"
+				, send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("we don't have a cert");
+		}
+	}
+	if (send_cert)
+	{
+		pb_stream cert_pbs;
 
-    /* HASH_R or SIG_R out */
-    {
-	u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	size_t hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, FALSE, &r_id_pbs);
+		struct isakmp_cert cert_hd;
+		cert_hd.isacert_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG;
+		cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type;
 
-	if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
-	{
-	    /* HASH_R out */
-	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody
-	    , hash_val, hash_len, "HASH_R"))
+		if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs))
 		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_chunk(cert_get_encoding(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs);
 	}
-	else
+
+	/* HASH_R or SIG_R out */
 	{
-	    /* SIG_R out */
-	    u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
-	    size_t sig_len = RSA_sign_hash(st->st_connection
-		, sig_val, hash_val, hash_len);
+		u_char hash_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+		chunk_t hash = chunk_from_buf(hash_buf);
 
-	    if (sig_len == 0)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for RSA Signature");
-		return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
-	    }
+		main_mode_hash(st, &hash, FALSE, &r_id_pbs);
 
-	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc
-	    , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_R"))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+		{
+			/* HASH_R out */
+			if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody,
+								 hash.ptr, hash.len, "HASH_R"))
+			{
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* SIG_R out */
+			u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+			signature_scheme_t scheme;
+			size_t sig_len;
+
+			scheme = oakley_to_signature_scheme(st->st_oakley.auth);
+
+			sig_len = sign_hash(scheme, st->st_connection, sig_val, hash);
+			if (sig_len == 0)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for signature");
+				return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+			}
+
+			if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc
+			, &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_R"))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header */
+	/* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header */
 
-    if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+	if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;      /* ??? we may be partly committed */
 
-    /* Last block of Phase 1 (R3), kept for Phase 2 IV generation */
-    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last encrypted block of Phase 1:"
-	, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+	/* Last block of Phase 1 (R3), kept for Phase 2 IV generation */
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last encrypted block of Phase 1:"
+		, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
 
-    ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno);
+	ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno);
 
-    /* Save Phase 1 IV */
-    st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
-    set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv);
+	/* Save Phase 1 IV */
+	st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+	set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv);
 
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MAIN_I3:
@@ -4073,48 +3944,45 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md
  * - main_inR3_continue to start main_inR3_tail again
  */
 
-static key_tail_fn main_inR3_tail;	/* forward */
+static key_tail_fn main_inR3_tail;      /* forward */
 
-stf_status
-main_inR3(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status main_inR3(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    return main_inR3_tail(md, NULL);
+	return main_inR3_tail(md, NULL);
 }
 
-static void
-main_inR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
+static void main_inR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
 {
-    key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inR3_tail);
+	key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inR3_tail);
 }
 
-static stf_status
-main_inR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md
-, struct key_continuation *kc)
+static stf_status main_inR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md,
+								 struct key_continuation *kc)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
 
-    /* ID and HASH_R or SIG_R in
-     * Note: this may switch the connection being used!
-     */
-    {
-	stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, TRUE, main_inR3_continue, kc);
+	/* ID and HASH_R or SIG_R in
+	 * Note: this may switch the connection being used!
+	 */
+	{
+		stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, TRUE, main_inR3_continue, kc);
 
-	if (r != STF_OK)
-	    return r;
-    }
+		if (r != STF_OK)
+			return r;
+	}
 
-    /**************** done input ****************/
+	/**************** done input ****************/
 
-    ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno);
+	ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno);
 
-    /* Save Phase 1 IV */
-    st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
-    set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv);
+	/* Save Phase 1 IV */
+	st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+	set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv);
 
 
-    update_iv(st);	/* finalize our Phase 1 IV */
+	update_iv(st);      /* finalize our Phase 1 IV */
 
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* Handle first message of Phase 2 -- Quick Mode.
@@ -4182,15 +4050,15 @@ main_inR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md
  */
 
 enum verify_oppo_step {
-    vos_fail,
-    vos_start,
-    vos_our_client,
-    vos_our_txt,
+	vos_fail,
+	vos_start,
+	vos_our_client,
+	vos_our_txt,
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    vos_our_key,
+	vos_our_key,
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-    vos_his_client,
-    vos_done
+	vos_his_client,
+	vos_done
 };
 
 static const char *const verify_step_name[] = {
@@ -4207,834 +4075,833 @@ static const char *const verify_step_name[] = {
 
 /* hold anything we can handle of a Phase 2 ID */
 struct p2id {
-    ip_subnet net;
-    u_int8_t proto;
-    u_int16_t port;
+	ip_subnet net;
+	u_int8_t proto;
+	u_int16_t port;
 };
 
 struct verify_oppo_bundle {
-    enum verify_oppo_step step;
-    bool failure_ok;      /* if true, quick_inI1_outR1_continue will try
-			   * other things on DNS failure */
-    struct msg_digest *md;
-    struct p2id my, his;
-    unsigned int new_iv_len;	/* p1st's might change */
-    u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    /* int whackfd; */	/* not needed because we are Responder */
+	enum verify_oppo_step step;
+	bool failure_ok;      /* if true, quick_inI1_outR1_continue will try
+						   * other things on DNS failure */
+	struct msg_digest *md;
+	struct p2id my, his;
+	unsigned int new_iv_len;    /* p1st's might change */
+	u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	/* int whackfd; */  /* not needed because we are Responder */
 };
 
 struct verify_oppo_continuation {
-    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
-    struct verify_oppo_bundle b;
+	struct adns_continuation ac;        /* common prefix */
+	struct verify_oppo_bundle b;
 };
 
 static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
-    , struct adns_continuation *ac);
+	, struct adns_continuation *ac);
 
-stf_status
-quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    const struct state *const p1st = md->st;
-    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
-    struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
-    struct verify_oppo_bundle b;
-
-    /* HASH(1) in */
-    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md
-	, quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof
-	    , p1st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid, FALSE)
-	, "HASH(1)", "Quick I1");
-
-    /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in
-     * We do this now (probably out of physical order) because
-     * we wish to select the correct connection before we consult
-     * it for policy.
-     */
-
-    if (id_pd != NULL)
-    {
-	/* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */
-
-	/* IDci (initiator is peer) */
-
-	if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs
-	, &b.his.net, "peer client"))
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-
-	/* Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */
-
-	if (id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_idtype == ID_FQDN)
-	    happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net));
-
-	/* End Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */
-
-	b.his.proto = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid;
-	b.his.port = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port;
-	b.his.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.his.port);
-
-	/* IDcr (we are responder) */
-
-	if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs
-	, &b.my.net, "our client"))
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-        
-	b.my.proto = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid;
-	b.my.port = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port;
-	b.my.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.my.port);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* implicit IDci and IDcr: peer and self */
-	if (!sameaddrtype(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr))
-	    return STF_FAIL;
-
-	happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b.my.net));
-	happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net));
-	b.his.proto = b.my.proto = 0;
-	b.his.port = b.my.port = 0;
-    }
-    b.step = vos_start;
-    b.md = md;
-    b.new_iv_len = p1st->st_new_iv_len;
-    memcpy(b.new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv_len);
-    return quick_inI1_outR1_tail(&b, NULL);
+	const struct state *const p1st = md->st;
+	struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+	struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+	struct verify_oppo_bundle b;
+
+	/* HASH(1) in */
+	CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md
+		, quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof
+			, p1st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid, FALSE)
+		, "HASH(1)", "Quick I1");
+
+	/* [ IDci, IDcr ] in
+	 * We do this now (probably out of physical order) because
+	 * we wish to select the correct connection before we consult
+	 * it for policy.
+	 */
+
+	if (id_pd != NULL)
+	{
+		/* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */
+
+		/* IDci (initiator is peer) */
+
+		if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs
+		, &b.his.net, "peer client"))
+			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+		/* Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */
+
+		if (id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_idtype == ID_FQDN)
+			happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net));
+
+		/* End Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */
+
+		b.his.proto = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid;
+		b.his.port = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port;
+		b.his.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.his.port);
+
+		/* IDcr (we are responder) */
+
+		if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs
+		, &b.my.net, "our client"))
+			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+		
+		b.my.proto = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid;
+		b.my.port = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port;
+		b.my.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.my.port);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* implicit IDci and IDcr: peer and self */
+		if (!sameaddrtype(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr))
+			return STF_FAIL;
+
+		happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b.my.net));
+		happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net));
+		b.his.proto = b.my.proto = 0;
+		b.his.port = b.my.port = 0;
+	}
+	b.step = vos_start;
+	b.md = md;
+	b.new_iv_len = p1st->st_new_iv_len;
+	memcpy(b.new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv_len);
+	return quick_inI1_outR1_tail(&b, NULL);
 }
 
 static void
 report_verify_failure(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, err_t ugh)
 {
-    struct state *st = b->md->st;
-    char fgwb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
-	, cb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-    ip_address client;
-    err_t which = NULL;
-
-    switch (b->step)
-    {
-    case vos_our_client:
-    case vos_our_txt:
+	struct state *st = b->md->st;
+	char fgwb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
+		, cb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	ip_address client;
+	err_t which = NULL;
+
+	switch (b->step)
+	{
+	case vos_our_client:
+	case vos_our_txt:
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    case vos_our_key:
+	case vos_our_key:
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	which = "our";
-	networkof(&b->my.net, &client);
-	break;
-
-    case vos_his_client:
-	which = "his";
-	networkof(&b->his.net, &client);
-	break;
-
-    case vos_start:
-    case vos_done:
-    case vos_fail:
-    default:
-	bad_case(b->step);
-    }
-
-    addrtot(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0, fgwb, sizeof(fgwb));
-    addrtot(&client, 0, cb, sizeof(cb));
-    loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE
-	, "gateway %s wants connection with %s as %s client, but DNS fails to confirm delegation: %s"
-	, fgwb, cb, which, ugh);
+		which = "our";
+		networkof(&b->my.net, &client);
+		break;
+
+	case vos_his_client:
+		which = "his";
+		networkof(&b->his.net, &client);
+		break;
+
+	case vos_start:
+	case vos_done:
+	case vos_fail:
+	default:
+		bad_case(b->step);
+	}
+
+	addrtot(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0, fgwb, sizeof(fgwb));
+	addrtot(&client, 0, cb, sizeof(cb));
+	loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+		, "gateway %s wants connection with %s as %s client, but DNS fails to confirm delegation: %s"
+		, fgwb, cb, which, ugh);
 }
 
-static void
-quick_inI1_outR1_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
+static void quick_inI1_outR1_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
 {
-    stf_status r;
-    struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc = (void *)cr;
-    struct verify_oppo_bundle *b = &vc->b;
-    struct state *st = b->md->st;
-
-    passert(cur_state == NULL);
-    /* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */
-    if (st != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(st->st_suspended_md == b->md);
-	st->st_suspended_md = NULL;	/* no longer connected or suspended */
-	cur_state = st;
-	if (!b->failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
-	    r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-	}
-	else
+	stf_status r;
+	struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc = (void *)cr;
+	struct verify_oppo_bundle *b = &vc->b;
+	struct state *st = b->md->st;
+
+	passert(cur_state == NULL);
+	/* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */
+	if (st != NULL)
 	{
-	    r = quick_inI1_outR1_tail(b, cr);
+		passert(st->st_suspended_md == b->md);
+		st->st_suspended_md = NULL;     /* no longer connected or suspended */
+		cur_state = st;
+		if (!b->failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
+			r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			r = quick_inI1_outR1_tail(b, cr);
+		}
+		complete_state_transition(&b->md, r);
 	}
-	complete_state_transition(&b->md, r);
-    }
-    if (b->md != NULL)
-	release_md(b->md);
-    cur_state = NULL;
+	if (b->md != NULL)
+		release_md(b->md);
+	cur_state = NULL;
 }
 
-static stf_status
-quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
-, enum verify_oppo_step next_step)
+static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b,
+											   enum verify_oppo_step next_step)
 {
-    struct msg_digest *md = b->md;
-    struct state *p1st = md->st;
-    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
-    struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc
-	= alloc_thing(struct verify_oppo_continuation, "verify continuation");
-    struct id id	/* subject of query */
-	, *our_id	/* needed for myid playing */
-	, our_id_space;	/* ephemeral: no need for unshare_id_content */
-    ip_address client;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    /* Record that state is used by a suspended md */
-    b->step = next_step;    /* not just vc->b.step */
-    vc->b = *b;
-    passert(p1st->st_suspended_md == NULL);
-    p1st->st_suspended_md = b->md;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	    char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-	    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
-	    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
-
-	    DBG_log("responding with DNS query - from %s to %s new state: %s"
-		    , ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]);
-	});
-
-    /* Resolve %myid in a cheesy way.
-     * We have to do the resolution because start_adns_query
-     * et al have insufficient information to do so.
-     * If %myid is already known, we'll use that value
-     * (XXX this may be a mistake: it could be stale).
-     * If %myid is unknown, we should check to see if
-     * there are credentials for the IP address or the FQDN.
-     * Instead, we'll just assume the IP address since we are
-     * acting as the responder and only the IP address would
-     * have gotten it to us.
-     * We don't even try to do this for the other side:
-     * %myid makes no sense for the other side (but it is syntactically
-     * legal).
-     */
-    our_id = resolve_myid(&c->spd.this.id);
-    if (our_id->kind == ID_NONE)
-    {
-	iptoid(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &our_id_space);
-	our_id = &our_id_space;
-    }
-
-    switch (next_step)
-    {
-    case vos_our_client:
-	networkof(&b->my.net, &client);
-	iptoid(&client, &id);
-	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
-	ugh = start_adns_query(&id
-	    , our_id
-	    , T_TXT
-	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
-	    , &vc->ac);
-	break;
-
-    case vos_our_txt:
-	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE;
-	ugh = start_adns_query(our_id
-	    , our_id	/* self as SG */
-	    , T_TXT
-	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
-	    , &vc->ac);
-	break;
+	struct msg_digest *md = b->md;
+	struct state *p1st = md->st;
+	struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+	struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc = malloc_thing(struct verify_oppo_continuation);
+	struct id id        /* subject of query */
+		, *our_id       /* needed for myid playing */
+		, our_id_space; /* ephemeral: no need for unshare_id_content */
+	ip_address client;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	/* Record that state is used by a suspended md */
+	b->step = next_step;    /* not just vc->b.step */
+	vc->b = *b;
+	passert(p1st->st_suspended_md == NULL);
+	p1st->st_suspended_md = b->md;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+			subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+			subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+
+			DBG_log("responding with DNS query - from %s to %s new state: %s"
+					, ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]);
+		});
+
+	/* Resolve %myid in a cheesy way.
+	 * We have to do the resolution because start_adns_query
+	 * et al have insufficient information to do so.
+	 * If %myid is already known, we'll use that value
+	 * (XXX this may be a mistake: it could be stale).
+	 * If %myid is unknown, we should check to see if
+	 * there are credentials for the IP address or the FQDN.
+	 * Instead, we'll just assume the IP address since we are
+	 * acting as the responder and only the IP address would
+	 * have gotten it to us.
+	 * We don't even try to do this for the other side:
+	 * %myid makes no sense for the other side (but it is syntactically
+	 * legal).
+	 */
+	our_id = resolve_myid(&c->spd.this.id);
+	if (our_id->kind == ID_ANY)
+	{
+		iptoid(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &our_id_space);
+		our_id = &our_id_space;
+	}
+
+	switch (next_step)
+	{
+	case vos_our_client:
+		networkof(&b->my.net, &client);
+		iptoid(&client, &id);
+		vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+			, our_id
+			, T_TXT
+			, quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+			, &vc->ac);
+		break;
+
+	case vos_our_txt:
+		vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE;
+		ugh = start_adns_query(our_id
+			, our_id    /* self as SG */
+			, T_TXT
+			, quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+			, &vc->ac);
+		break;
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    case vos_our_key:
-	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
-	ugh = start_adns_query(our_id
-	    , NULL
-	    , T_KEY
-	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
-	    , &vc->ac);
-	break;
+	case vos_our_key:
+		vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+		ugh = start_adns_query(our_id
+			, NULL
+			, T_KEY
+			, quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+			, &vc->ac);
+		break;
 #endif
 
-    case vos_his_client:
-	networkof(&b->his.net, &client);
-	iptoid(&client, &id);
-	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
-	ugh = start_adns_query(&id
-	    , &c->spd.that.id
-	    , T_TXT
-	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
-	    , &vc->ac);
-	break;
-
-    default:
-	bad_case(next_step);
-    }
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	/* note: we'd like to use vc->b but vc has been freed
-	 * so we have to use b.  This is why we plunked next_state
-	 * into b, not just vc->b.
-	 */
-	report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
-	p1st->st_suspended_md = NULL;
-	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return STF_SUSPEND;
-    }
+	case vos_his_client:
+		networkof(&b->his.net, &client);
+		iptoid(&client, &id);
+		vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+			, &c->spd.that.id
+			, T_TXT
+			, quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+			, &vc->ac);
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		bad_case(next_step);
+	}
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		/* note: we'd like to use vc->b but vc has been freed
+		 * so we have to use b.  This is why we plunked next_state
+		 * into b, not just vc->b.
+		 */
+		report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
+		p1st->st_suspended_md = NULL;
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return STF_SUSPEND;
+	}
 }
 
-static enum verify_oppo_step
-quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
-, struct adns_continuation *ac
-, struct state *p1st)
+static enum verify_oppo_step quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(
+										struct verify_oppo_bundle *b,
+										struct adns_continuation *ac,
+										struct state *p1st)
 {
-    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
-    enum verify_oppo_step next_step = vos_our_client;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	    char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-	    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
-	    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
-	    DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s state: %s"
-		    , ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]);
-	});
-
-    /* process just completed DNS query (if any) */
-    switch (b->step)
-    {
-    case vos_start:
-	/* no query to digest */
-	next_step = vos_our_client;
-	break;
-
-    case vos_our_client:
-	next_step = vos_his_client;
-	{
-	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
-	    struct gw_info *gwp;
-
-	    if (pri == NULL)
-	    {
-		ugh = "we don't know our own key";
-		break;
-	    }
-	    ugh = "our client does not delegate us as its Security Gateway";
-	    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
-	    {
-		ugh = "our client delegates us as its Security Gateway but with the wrong public key";
-		/* If there is no key in the TXT record,
-		 * we count it as a win, but we will have
-		 * to separately fetch and check the KEY record.
-		 * If there is a key from the TXT record,
-		 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
-		 */
-		if (!gwp->gw_key_present)
-		{
-		    next_step = vos_our_txt;
-		    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-		    break;
-		}
-		else if (same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+	struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+	enum verify_oppo_step next_step = vos_our_client;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
 		{
-		    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-	}
-	break;
+			char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+			subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+			subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+			DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s state: %s"
+					, ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]);
+		});
 
-    case vos_our_txt:
-	next_step = vos_his_client;
+	/* process just completed DNS query (if any) */
+	switch (b->step)
 	{
-	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+	case vos_start:
+		/* no query to digest */
+		next_step = vos_our_client;
+		break;
+
+	case vos_our_client:
+		next_step = vos_his_client;
+		{
+			private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
+			struct gw_info *gwp;
 
-	    if (pri == NULL)
-	    {
-		ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+			if (private == NULL)
+			{
+				ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+				break;
+			}
+			ugh = "our client does not delegate us as its Security Gateway";
+			for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+			{
+				ugh = "our client delegates us as its Security Gateway but with the wrong public key";
+				/* If there is no key in the TXT record,
+				 * we count it as a win, but we will have
+				 * to separately fetch and check the KEY record.
+				 * If there is a key from the TXT record,
+				 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
+				 */
+				if (!gwp->gw_key_present)
+				{
+					next_step = vos_our_txt;
+					ugh = NULL; /* good! */
+					break;
+				}
+				else if (private->belongs_to(private, gwp->key->public_key))
+				{
+					ugh = NULL; /* good! */
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		break;
-	    }
-	    {
-		struct gw_info *gwp;
 
-		for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+	case vos_our_txt:
+		next_step = vos_his_client;
 		{
+			private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
+
+			if (private == NULL)
+			{
+				ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+				break;
+			}
+			{
+				struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+				for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+				{
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		    /* not an error yet, because we have to check KEY RR as well */
-		    ugh = NULL;
+					/* not an error yet, because we have to check KEY RR as well */
+					ugh = NULL;
 #else
-		    ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key";
+					ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key";
 #endif
-		    if (gwp->gw_key_present
-		    && same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
-		    {
-			ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-			break;
-		    }
+					if (gwp->gw_key_present
+					&& private->belongs_to(private, gwp->key->public_key))
+					{
+						ugh = NULL;     /* good! */
+						break;
+					}
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		    next_step = vos_our_key;
+					next_step = vos_our_key;
 #endif
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	}
-	break;
+		break;
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    case vos_our_key:
-	next_step = vos_his_client;
-	{
-	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+	case vos_our_key:
+		next_step = vos_his_client;
+		{
+			private_key_t *private = get_private_key(c);
 
-	    if (pri == NULL)
-	    {
-		ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+			if (private == NULL)
+			{
+				ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+				break;
+			}
+			{
+				pubkey_list_t *kp;
+
+				ugh = "our client delegation depends on our missing " RRNAME " record";
+				for (kp = ac->keys_from_dns; kp != NULL; kp = kp->next)
+				{
+					ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key";
+					if (private->belongs_to(private, kp->key->public_key))
+					{
+						/* do this only once a day */
+						if (!logged_txt_warning)
+						{
+							loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "found KEY RR but not TXT RR. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html.");
+							logged_txt_warning = TRUE;
+						}
+						ugh = NULL;     /* good! */
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
+		}
 		break;
-	    }
-	    {
-		pubkey_list_t *kp;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
-		ugh = "our client delegation depends on our missing " RRNAME " record";
-		for (kp = ac->keys_from_dns; kp != NULL; kp = kp->next)
+	case vos_his_client:
+		next_step = vos_done;
 		{
-		    ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key";
-		    if (same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &kp->key->u.rsa))
-		    {
-			/* do this only once a day */
-			if (!logged_txt_warning)
+			public_key_t *pub_key;
+			identification_t *p1st_keyid;
+			struct gw_info *gwp;
+		
+			/* check that the public key that authenticated
+			 * the ISAKMP SA (p1st) will do for this gateway.
+			 */
+			pub_key = p1st->st_peer_pubkey->public_key;
+			p1st_keyid = pub_key->get_id(pub_key, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1);
+
+			ugh = "peer's client does not delegate to peer";
+			for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
 			{
-			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "found KEY RR but not TXT RR. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html.");
-			    logged_txt_warning = TRUE;
+				ugh = "peer and its client disagree about public key";
+				/* If there is a key from the TXT record,
+				 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
+				 * If there was no key, we claim a match since
+				 * it implies fetching a KEY from the same
+				 * place we must have gotten it.
+				 */
+				if (!gwp->gw_key_present || p1st_keyid->equals(p1st_keyid,
+					 gwp->key->public_key->get_id(gwp->key->public_key,
+												  ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1))
+				   )
+				{
+					ugh = NULL; /* good! */
+					break;
+				}
 			}
-			ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-			break;
-		    }
 		}
-	    }
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		bad_case(b->step);
 	}
-	break;
-#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 
-    case vos_his_client:
-	next_step = vos_done;
+	if (ugh != NULL)
 	{
-	    struct gw_info *gwp;
-
-	    /* check that the public key that authenticated
-	     * the ISAKMP SA (p1st) will do for this gateway.
-	     */
-
-	    ugh = "peer's client does not delegate to peer";
-	    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
-	    {
-		ugh = "peer and its client disagree about public key";
-		/* If there is a key from the TXT record,
-		 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
-		 * If there was no key, we claim a match since
-		 * it implies fetching a KEY from the same
-		 * place we must have gotten it.
-		 */
-		if (!gwp->gw_key_present
-		|| same_RSA_public_key(&p1st->st_peer_pubkey->u.rsa
-		, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
-		{
-		    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
+		report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
+		next_step = vos_fail;
 	}
-	break;
-
-    default:
-	bad_case(b->step);
-    }
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
-	next_step = vos_fail;
-    }
-    return next_step;
+	return next_step;
 }
 
-static stf_status
-quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
-, struct adns_continuation *ac)
+static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b,
+										struct adns_continuation *ac)
 {
-    struct msg_digest *md = b->md;
-    struct state *const p1st = md->st;
-    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
-    struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
-    ip_subnet *our_net = &b->my.net
-	, *his_net = &b->his.net;
-
-    u_char	/* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
-	*r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
-	*r_hash_start;	/* from where to start hashing */
-
-    /* Now that we have identities of client subnets, we must look for
-     * a suitable connection (our current one only matches for hosts).
-     */
-    {
-	struct connection *p = find_client_connection(c
-	    , our_net, his_net, b->my.proto, b->my.port, b->his.proto, b->his.port);
-
-	if (p == NULL)
-	{
-	    /* This message occurs in very puzzling circumstances
-	     * so we must add as much information and beauty as we can.
-	     */
-	    struct end
-		me = c->spd.this,
-		he = c->spd.that;
-	    char buf[2*SUBNETTOT_BUF + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 2*BUF_LEN + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 12]; /* + 12 for separating */
-	    size_t l;
-
-	    me.client = *our_net;
-	    me.has_client = !subnetisaddr(our_net, &me.host_addr);
-	    me.protocol = b->my.proto;
-	    me.port = b->my.port;
-
-	    he.client = *his_net;
-	    he.has_client = !subnetisaddr(his_net, &he.host_addr);
-	    he.protocol = b->his.proto;
-	    he.port = b->his.port;
-
-	    l = format_end(buf, sizeof(buf), &me, NULL, TRUE, LEMPTY);
-	    l += snprintf(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, "...");
-	    (void)format_end(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, &he, NULL, FALSE, LEMPTY);
-	    plog("cannot respond to IPsec SA request"
-		" because no connection is known for %s"
-		, buf);
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-	}
-	else if (p != c)
-	{
-	    /* We've got a better connection: it can support the
-	     * specified clients.  But it may need instantiation.
-	     */
-	    if (p->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
-	    {
-		/* Yup, it needs instantiation.  How much?
-		 * Is it a Road Warrior connection (simple)
-		 * or is it an Opportunistic connection (needing gw validation)?
-		 */
-		if (p->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
-		{
-		    /* Opportunistic case: delegation must be verified.
-		     * Here be dragons.
-		     */
-		    enum verify_oppo_step next_step;
-		    ip_address our_client, his_client;
-
-		    passert(subnetishost(our_net) && subnetishost(his_net));
-		    networkof(our_net, &our_client);
-		    networkof(his_net, &his_client);
-
-		    next_step = quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(b, ac, p1st);
-		    if (next_step == vos_fail)
-			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	struct msg_digest *md = b->md;
+	struct state *const p1st = md->st;
+	struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+	struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+	ip_subnet *our_net = &b->my.net
+		, *his_net = &b->his.net;
 
-		    /* short circuit: if peer's client is self,
-		     * accept that we've verified delegation in Phase 1
-		     */
-		    if (next_step == vos_his_client
-		    && sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &his_client))
-			next_step = vos_done;
+	u_char      /* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
+		*r_hashval,     /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+		*r_hash_start;  /* from where to start hashing */
 
-		    /* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			{
-			    char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-			    char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-			    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
-			    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
-
-			    DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s new state: %s"
-				    , ours, his, verify_step_name[next_step]);
-			});
-
-		    /* start next DNS query and suspend (if necessary) */
-		    if (next_step != vos_done)
-			return quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(b, next_step);
-
-		    /* Instantiate inbound Opportunistic connection,
-		     * carrying over authenticated peer ID
-		     * and filling in a few more details.
-		     * We used to include gateways_from_dns, but that
-		     * seems pointless at this stage of negotiation.
-		     * We should record DNS sec use, if any -- belongs in
-		     * state during perhaps.
-		     */
-		    p = oppo_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.id
-			, NULL, &our_client, &his_client);
-		}
-		else
+	/* Now that we have identities of client subnets, we must look for
+	 * a suitable connection (our current one only matches for hosts).
+	 */
+	{
+		struct connection *p = find_client_connection(c
+			, our_net, his_net, b->my.proto, b->my.port, b->his.proto, b->his.port);
+
+		if (p == NULL)
 		{
-		    /* Plain Road Warrior:
-		     * instantiate, carrying over authenticated peer ID
-		     */
-		    p = rw_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port
-				, his_net, &c->spd.that.id);
+			/* This message occurs in very puzzling circumstances
+			 * so we must add as much information and beauty as we can.
+			 */
+			struct end
+				me = c->spd.this,
+				he = c->spd.that;
+			char buf[2*SUBNETTOT_BUF + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 2*BUF_LEN + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 12]; /* + 12 for separating */
+			size_t l;
+
+			me.client = *our_net;
+			me.has_client = !subnetisaddr(our_net, &me.host_addr);
+			me.protocol = b->my.proto;
+			me.port = b->my.port;
+
+			he.client = *his_net;
+			he.has_client = !subnetisaddr(his_net, &he.host_addr);
+			he.protocol = b->his.proto;
+			he.port = b->his.port;
+
+			l = format_end(buf, sizeof(buf), &me, NULL, TRUE, LEMPTY);
+			l += snprintf(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, "...");
+			(void)format_end(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, &he, NULL, FALSE, LEMPTY);
+			plog("cannot respond to IPsec SA request"
+				" because no connection is known for %s"
+				, buf);
+			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
 		}
-	    }
+		else if (p != c)
+		{
+			/* We've got a better connection: it can support the
+			 * specified clients.  But it may need instantiation.
+			 */
+			if (p->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+			{
+				/* Yup, it needs instantiation.  How much?
+				 * Is it a Road Warrior connection (simple)
+				 * or is it an Opportunistic connection (needing gw validation)?
+				 */
+				if (p->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+				{
+					/* Opportunistic case: delegation must be verified.
+					 * Here be dragons.
+					 */
+					enum verify_oppo_step next_step;
+					ip_address our_client, his_client;
+
+					passert(subnetishost(our_net) && subnetishost(his_net));
+					networkof(our_net, &our_client);
+					networkof(his_net, &his_client);
+
+					next_step = quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(b, ac, p1st);
+					if (next_step == vos_fail)
+						return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+					/* short circuit: if peer's client is self,
+					 * accept that we've verified delegation in Phase 1
+					 */
+					if (next_step == vos_his_client
+					&& sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &his_client))
+						next_step = vos_done;
+
+					/* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+						{
+							char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+							char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+							subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+							subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+
+							DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s new state: %s"
+									, ours, his, verify_step_name[next_step]);
+						});
+
+					/* start next DNS query and suspend (if necessary) */
+					if (next_step != vos_done)
+						return quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(b, next_step);
+
+					/* Instantiate inbound Opportunistic connection,
+					 * carrying over authenticated peer ID
+					 * and filling in a few more details.
+					 * We used to include gateways_from_dns, but that
+					 * seems pointless at this stage of negotiation.
+					 * We should record DNS sec use, if any -- belongs in
+					 * state during perhaps.
+					 */
+					p = oppo_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.id
+						, NULL, &our_client, &his_client);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* Plain Road Warrior:
+					 * instantiate, carrying over authenticated peer ID
+					 */
+					p = rw_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port
+								, his_net, &c->spd.that.id);
+				}
+			}
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	    /* temporarily bump up cur_debugging to get "using..." message
-	     * printed if we'd want it with new connection.
-	     */
-	    {
-		lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
-
-		cur_debugging |= p->extra_debugging;
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("using connection \"%s\"", p->name));
-		cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
-	    }
+			/* temporarily bump up cur_debugging to get "using..." message
+			 * printed if we'd want it with new connection.
+			 */
+			{
+				lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
+
+				cur_debugging |= p->extra_debugging;
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("using connection \"%s\"", p->name));
+				cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
+			}
 #endif
-	    c = p;
-	}
-	/* fill in the client's true ip address/subnet */
-	if (p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard)
-	{
-	    p->spd.that.client = *his_net;
-	    p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard = FALSE;
-	}
-	else if (is_virtual_connection(c))
-	{
-	    c->spd.that.client = *his_net;
-	    c->spd.that.virt = NULL;
-	    if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, his_net))
-		c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
-	}
+			c = p;
+		}
+		/* fill in the client's true ip address/subnet */
+		if (p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard)
+		{
+			p->spd.that.client = *his_net;
+			p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard = FALSE;
+		}
+		else if (is_virtual_connection(c))
+		{
+			c->spd.that.client = *his_net;
+			c->spd.that.virt = NULL;
+			if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, his_net))
+				c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* fill in the client's true port */
-	if (p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard)
-	{
-	    int port = htons(b->his.port);
+		/* fill in the client's true port */
+		if (p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard)
+		{
+			int port = htons(b->his.port);
 
-	    setportof(port, &p->spd.that.host_addr);
-	    setportof(port, &p->spd.that.client.addr);
+			setportof(port, &p->spd.that.host_addr);
+			setportof(port, &p->spd.that.client.addr);
 
-	    p->spd.that.port = b->his.port;
-	    p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard = FALSE;
+			p->spd.that.port = b->his.port;
+			p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard = FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* now that we are sure of our connection, create our new state */
-    {
-	struct state *const st = duplicate_state(p1st);
-
-	/* first: fill in missing bits of our new state object
-	 * note: we don't copy over st_peer_pubkey, the public key
-	 * that authenticated the ISAKMP SA.  We only need it in this
-	 * routine, so we can "reach back" to p1st to get it.
-	 */
 
-	if (st->st_connection != c)
+	/* now that we are sure of our connection, create our new state */
 	{
-	    struct connection *t = st->st_connection;
+		struct state *const st = duplicate_state(p1st);
 
-	    st->st_connection = c;
-	    set_cur_connection(c);
-	    connection_discard(t);
-	}
+		/* first: fill in missing bits of our new state object
+		 * note: we don't copy over st_peer_pubkey, the public key
+		 * that authenticated the ISAKMP SA.  We only need it in this
+		 * routine, so we can "reach back" to p1st to get it.
+		 */
 
-	st->st_try = 0;	/* not our job to try again from start */
+		if (st->st_connection != c)
+		{
+			struct connection *t = st->st_connection;
 
-	st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;
+			st->st_connection = c;
+			set_cur_connection(c);
+			connection_discard(t);
+		}
 
-	st->st_new_iv_len = b->new_iv_len;
-	memcpy(st->st_new_iv, b->new_iv, b->new_iv_len);
+		st->st_try = 0; /* not our job to try again from start */
 
-	set_cur_state(st);	/* (caller will reset) */
-	md->st = st;	/* feed back new state */
+		st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;
 
-	st->st_peeruserprotoid = b->his.proto;
-	st->st_peeruserport = b->his.port;
-	st->st_myuserprotoid = b->my.proto;
-	st->st_myuserport = b->my.port;
+		st->st_new_iv_len = b->new_iv_len;
+		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, b->new_iv, b->new_iv_len);
 
-	insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */
+		set_cur_state(st);      /* (caller will reset) */
+		md->st = st;    /* feed back new state */
 
-	/* copy the connection's
-	 * IPSEC policy into our state.  The ISAKMP policy is water under
-	 * the bridge, I think.  It will reflect the ISAKMP SA that we
-	 * are using.
-	 */
-	st->st_policy = (p1st->st_policy & POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK)
-	    | (c->policy & ~POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK);
+		st->st_peeruserprotoid = b->his.proto;
+		st->st_peeruserport = b->his.port;
+		st->st_myuserprotoid = b->my.proto;
+		st->st_myuserport = b->my.port;
 
-	if (p1st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-	{
-	    st->nat_traversal = p1st->nat_traversal;
-	    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    st->nat_traversal = 0;
-	}
-	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA))
-	{
-	    nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md);
-	}
+		insert_state(st);       /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */
 
-	/* Start the output packet.
-	 *
-	 * proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR*
-	 * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE.
-	 * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially
-	 * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS.
-	 *
-	 * We build the reply packet as we parse the message since
-	 * the parse_ipsec_sa_body emits the reply SA
-	 */
+		/* copy the connection's
+		 * IPSEC policy into our state.  The ISAKMP policy is water under
+		 * the bridge, I think.  It will reflect the ISAKMP SA that we
+		 * are using.
+		 */
+		st->st_policy = (p1st->st_policy & POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK)
+			| (c->policy & ~POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK);
 
-	/* HDR* out */
-	echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH);
+		if (p1st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		{
+			st->nat_traversal = p1st->nat_traversal;
+			nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			st->nat_traversal = 0;
+		}
+		if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA))
+		{
+			nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md);
+		}
 
-	/* HASH(2) out -- first pass */
-	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA);
+		/* Start the output packet.
+		 *
+		 * proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR*
+		 * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE.
+		 * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially
+		 * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS.
+		 *
+		 * We build the reply packet as we parse the message since
+		 * the parse_ipsec_sa_body emits the reply SA
+		 */
 
-	/* process SA (in and out) */
-	{
-	    struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
-	    pb_stream r_sa_pbs;
-	    struct isakmp_sa sa = sapd->payload.sa;
+		/* HDR* out */
+		echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH);
 
-	    /* sa header is unchanged -- except for np */
-	    sa.isasa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE;
-	    if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		/* HASH(2) out -- first pass */
+		START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA);
 
-	    /* parse and accept body */
-	    st->st_pfs_group = &unset_group;
-	    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sapd->pbs
-		    , &sapd->payload.sa, &r_sa_pbs, FALSE, st));
-	}
+		/* process SA (in and out) */
+		{
+			struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+			pb_stream r_sa_pbs;
+			struct isakmp_sa sa = sapd->payload.sa;
+
+			/* sa header is unchanged -- except for np */
+			sa.isasa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE;
+			if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+			/* parse and accept body */
+			st->st_pfs_group = &unset_group;
+			RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sapd->pbs
+					, &sapd->payload.sa, &r_sa_pbs, FALSE, st));
+		}
 
-	passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group);
+		passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group);
 
-	if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_PFS) && st->st_pfs_group == NULL)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "we require PFS but Quick I1 SA specifies no GROUP_DESCRIPTION");
-	    return STF_FAIL + NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;	/* ??? */
-	}
+		if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_PFS) && st->st_pfs_group == NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "we require PFS but Quick I1 SA specifies no GROUP_DESCRIPTION");
+			return STF_FAIL + NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;       /* ??? */
+		}
 
-	/* Ni in */
-	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni"));
+		/* Ni in */
+		RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni"));
 
-	/* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */
-	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gi, "Gi", "Quick Mode I1"));
+		/* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */
+		RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gi, "Gi", "Quick Mode I1"));
 
-	plog("responding to Quick Mode");
+		plog("responding to Quick Mode");
 
-	/**** finish reply packet: Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] ****/
+		/**** finish reply packet: Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] ****/
 
-	/* Nr out */
-	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody
-	, st->st_pfs_group != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-	, "Nr"))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		/* Nr out */
+		if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody
+		, st->st_pfs_group != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		, "Nr"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-	/* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */
+		/* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */
 
-	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
-	{
-	    if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group
-	    , &md->rbody, id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE))
-		    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+		{
+			if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group
+			, &md->rbody, id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE))
+					return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-	    /* MPZ-Operations might be done after sending the packet... */
-	    compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group);
-	}
+			/* MPZ-Operations might be done after sending the packet... */
+			compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi);
+		}
 
-	/* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */
-	if  (id_pd != NULL)
-	{
-	    struct isakmp_ipsec_id *p = (void *)md->rbody.cur;	/* UGH! */
+		/* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */
+		if  (id_pd != NULL)
+		{
+			struct isakmp_ipsec_id *p = (void *)md->rbody.cur;  /* UGH! */
 
-	    if (!out_raw(id_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDci"))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	    p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_ID;
+			if (!out_raw(id_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDci"))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_ID;
 
-	    p = (void *)md->rbody.cur;	/* UGH! */
+			p = (void *)md->rbody.cur;  /* UGH! */
 
-	    if (!out_raw(id_pd->next->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->next->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDcr"))
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	    p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-	}
+			if (!out_raw(id_pd->next->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->next->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDcr"))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+		}
 
-	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)
-	&& (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))
-	&& (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT))
-	{
-	    /** Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed and if we use Transport Mode */
-	    if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md->st))
-	    {
-		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-	    }
-	}
-	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-	&& (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT)
-	&& (c->spd.that.has_client))
-	{
-	    /** Remove client **/
-	    addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client);
-	    c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
-	}
+		if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)
+		&& (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))
+		&& (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT))
+		{
+			/** Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed and if we use Transport Mode */
+			if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md->st))
+			{
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+			}
+		}
+		if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		&& (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT)
+		&& (c->spd.that.has_client))
+		{
+			/** Remove client **/
+			addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client);
+			c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* Compute reply HASH(2) and insert in output */
-	(void)quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, md->rbody.cur
-	    , st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE);
+		/* Compute reply HASH(2) and insert in output */
+		(void)quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, md->rbody.cur
+			, st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE);
 
-	/* Derive new keying material */
-	compute_keymats(st);
+		/* Derive new keying material */
+		compute_keymats(st);
 
-	/* Tell the kernel to establish the new inbound SA
-	 * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
-	 * We do this before any state updating so that
-	 * failure won't look like success.
-	 */
-	if (!install_inbound_ipsec_sa(st))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+		/* Tell the kernel to establish the new inbound SA
+		 * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
+		 * We do this before any state updating so that
+		 * failure won't look like success.
+		 */
+		if (!install_inbound_ipsec_sa(st))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  /* ??? we may be partly committed */
 
-	/* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+		/* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
 
-	if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+		if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  /* ??? we may be partly committed */
 
-	return STF_OK;
-    }
+		return STF_OK;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
  * Initialize RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection
  */
-static void
-dpd_init(struct state *st)
+static void dpd_init(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct state *p1st = find_state(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
-				, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0);
-    
-    if (p1st == NULL)
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "could not find phase 1 state for DPD");
-    else if (p1st->st_dpd)
-    {
-	plog("Dead Peer Detection (RFC 3706) enabled");
-	/* randomize the first DPD event */
-        
-	event_schedule(EVENT_DPD
-	    , (0.5 + rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.E0)) * st->st_connection->dpd_delay
-	    , st);
-    }
+	struct state *p1st = find_state(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
+								, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0);
+	
+	if (p1st == NULL)
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "could not find phase 1 state for DPD");
+	else if (p1st->st_dpd)
+	{
+		plog("Dead Peer Detection (RFC 3706) enabled");
+		/* randomize the first DPD event */
+		
+		event_schedule(EVENT_DPD
+			, (0.5 + rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.E0)) * st->st_connection->dpd_delay
+			, st);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Handle (the single) message from Responder in Quick Mode.
@@ -5043,152 +4910,151 @@ dpd_init(struct state *st)
  * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5)
  * Installs inbound and outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
  */
-stf_status
-quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
 
-    /* HASH(2) in */
-    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md
-	, quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof
-	    , st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE)
-	, "HASH(2)", "Quick R1");
-
-    /* SA in */
-    {
-	struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+	/* HASH(2) in */
+	CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md
+		, quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof
+			, st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE)
+		, "HASH(2)", "Quick R1");
 
-	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sa_pd->pbs
-	    , &sa_pd->payload.sa, NULL, TRUE, st));
-    }
+	/* SA in */
+	{
+		struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
 
-    /* Nr in */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr"));
+		RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sa_pd->pbs
+			, &sa_pd->payload.sa, NULL, TRUE, st));
+	}
 
-    /* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */
-    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gr, "Gr", "Quick Mode R1"));
+	/* Nr in */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr"));
 
-    if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
-	compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group);
+	/* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gr, "Gr", "Quick Mode R1"));
 
-    /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in; these must match what we sent */
+	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+		compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr);
 
-    {
-	struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+	/* [ IDci, IDcr ] in; these must match what we sent */
 
-	if (id_pd != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */
+		struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
 
-	    /* IDci (we are initiator) */
+		if (id_pd != NULL)
+		{
+			/* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */
 
-	    if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs
-	    , &st->st_myuserprotoid, &st->st_myuserport
-	    , &st->st_connection->spd.this.client
-	    , "our client"))
-		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+			/* IDci (we are initiator) */
 
-	    /* IDcr (responder is peer) */
+			if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs
+			, &st->st_myuserprotoid, &st->st_myuserport
+			, &st->st_connection->spd.this.client
+			, "our client"))
+				return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
 
-	    if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs
-	    , &st->st_peeruserprotoid, &st->st_peeruserport
-	    , &st->st_connection->spd.that.client
-	    , "peer client"))
-		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* no IDci, IDcr: we must check that the defaults match our proposal */
-	    if (!subnetisaddr(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr)
-	    || !subnetisaddr(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IDci, IDcr payloads missing in message"
-		    " but default does not match proposal");
-		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-	    }
+			/* IDcr (responder is peer) */
+
+			if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs
+			, &st->st_peeruserprotoid, &st->st_peeruserport
+			, &st->st_connection->spd.that.client
+			, "peer client"))
+				return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* no IDci, IDcr: we must check that the defaults match our proposal */
+			if (!subnetisaddr(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr)
+			|| !subnetisaddr(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IDci, IDcr payloads missing in message"
+					" but default does not match proposal");
+				return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* check the peer's group attributes */
-    
-    {
-	const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL;
+	/* check the peer's group attributes */
 	
-	get_peer_ca_and_groups(st->st_connection, &peer_list);
-
-	if (!group_membership(peer_list, st->st_connection->name
-		, st->st_connection->spd.that.groups))
 	{
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL;
+		
+		get_peer_ca_and_groups(st->st_connection, &peer_list);
 
-	    format_groups(st->st_connection->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer is not member of one of the groups: %s"
-		, buf);
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
-	}
-    }
+		if (!group_membership(peer_list, st->st_connection->name
+				, st->st_connection->spd.that.groups))
+		{
+			char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA))
-	{
-	    nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md);
+			format_groups(st->st_connection->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer is not member of one of the groups: %s"
+				, buf);
+			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+		}
 	}
 
-    /* ??? We used to copy the accepted proposal into the state, but it was
-     * never used.  From sa_pd->pbs.start, length pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs).
-     */
+		if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA))
+		{
+			nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md);
+		}
+
+	/* ??? We used to copy the accepted proposal into the state, but it was
+	 * never used.  From sa_pd->pbs.start, length pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs).
+	 */
 
-    /**************** build reply packet HDR*, HASH(3) ****************/
+	/**************** build reply packet HDR*, HASH(3) ****************/
 
-    /* HDR* out done */
+	/* HDR* out done */
 
-    /* HASH(3) out -- since this is the only content, no passes needed */
-    {
-	u_char	/* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
-	    *r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
-	    *r_hash_start;	/* start of what is to be hashed */
+	/* HASH(3) out -- since this is the only content, no passes needed */
+	{
+		u_char  /* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
+			*r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+			*r_hash_start;      /* start of what is to be hashed */
 
-	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE);
-	(void)quick_mode_hash3(r_hashval, st);
-    }
+		START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE);
+		(void)quick_mode_hash3(r_hashval, st);
+	}
 
-    /* Derive new keying material */
-    compute_keymats(st);
+	/* Derive new keying material */
+	compute_keymats(st);
 
-    /* Tell the kernel to establish the inbound, outbound, and routing part
-     * of the new SA (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
-     * We do this before any state updating so that
-     * failure won't look like success.
-     */
-    if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	/* Tell the kernel to establish the inbound, outbound, and routing part
+	 * of the new SA (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
+	 * We do this before any state updating so that
+	 * failure won't look like success.
+	 */
+	if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-    /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+	/* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
 
-    if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+	if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;      /* ??? we may be partly committed */
 
-    {
-      DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inR1_outI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)"
-			       , st->st_connection->name
-			       , st->st_connection->instance_serial
-			       , st->st_serialno
-			       , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa
-			       , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner));
-    }
-    
-    st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno;
+	{
+	  DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inR1_outI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)"
+							   , st->st_connection->name
+							   , st->st_connection->instance_serial
+							   , st->st_serialno
+							   , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa
+							   , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner));
+	}
+	
+	st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno;
 
-    /* note (presumed) success */
-    if (c->gw_info != NULL)
-	c->gw_info->key->last_worked_time = now();
+	/* note (presumed) success */
+	if (c->gw_info != NULL)
+		c->gw_info->key->last_worked_time = now();
 
-    /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */
-    if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
-	dpd_init(st);
+	/* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */
+	if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+		dpd_init(st);
 
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* Handle last message of Quick Mode.
@@ -5196,245 +5062,253 @@ quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
  * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5)
  * Installs outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
  */
-stf_status
-quick_inI2(struct msg_digest *md)
+stf_status quick_inI2(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-
-    /* HASH(3) in */
-    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, quick_mode_hash3(hash_val, st)
-	, "HASH(3)", "Quick I2");
-
-    /* Tell the kernel to establish the outbound and routing part of the new SA
-     * (the previous state established inbound)
-     * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
-     * We do this before any state updating so that
-     * failure won't look like success.
-     */
-    if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE))
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
-    {
-      DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)"
-			       , st->st_connection->name
-			       , st->st_connection->instance_serial
-			       , st->st_serialno
-			       , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa
-			       , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner));
-    }
-
-    st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno;
-
-    update_iv(st);	/* not actually used, but tidy */
-
-    /* note (presumed) success */
-    {
-	struct gw_info *gw = st->st_connection->gw_info;
-
-	if (gw != NULL)
-	    gw->key->last_worked_time = now();
-    }
-
-    /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */
-    if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
-	dpd_init(st);
-
-    return STF_OK;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+
+	/* HASH(3) in */
+	CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, quick_mode_hash3(hash_val, st)
+		, "HASH(3)", "Quick I2");
+
+	/* Tell the kernel to establish the outbound and routing part of the new SA
+	 * (the previous state established inbound)
+	 * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
+	 * We do this before any state updating so that
+	 * failure won't look like success.
+	 */
+	if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	{
+	  DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)"
+							   , st->st_connection->name
+							   , st->st_connection->instance_serial
+							   , st->st_serialno
+							   , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa
+							   , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner));
+	}
+
+	st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno;
+
+	update_iv(st);      /* not actually used, but tidy */
+
+	/* note (presumed) success */
+	{
+		struct gw_info *gw = st->st_connection->gw_info;
+
+		if (gw != NULL)
+			gw->key->last_worked_time = now();
+	}
+
+	/* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */
+	if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+		dpd_init(st);
+
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
-static stf_status
-send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type
-    , const void *data, size_t len)
+static stf_status send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type,
+										   const void *data, size_t len)
 {
-    msgid_t msgid;
-    pb_stream reply;
-    pb_stream rbody;
-    u_char
-	*r_hashval,     /* where in reply to jam hash value */
-	*r_hash_start;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
-        
-    msgid = generate_msgid(st);
-    
-    init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "ISAKMP notify");
-
-    /* HDR* */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
-
-        hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
-        hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
-        hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
-        hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
-        hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
-        memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-        memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-        if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
-            impossible();
-    }
-    /* HASH -- create and note space to be filled later */
-    START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_N);
-
-    /* NOTIFY */
-    {
-        pb_stream notify_pbs;
-        struct isakmp_notification isan;
-
-        isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-        isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
-        isan.isan_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
-        isan.isan_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE * 2;  
-        isan.isan_type = type;
-        if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &rbody, &notify_pbs))
-            return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-        if (!out_raw(st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &notify_pbs, "notify icookie"))
-            return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  
-        if (!out_raw(st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &notify_pbs, "notify rcookie"))
-            return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  
-        if (data != NULL && len > 0)
-            if (!out_raw(data, len, &notify_pbs, "notify data"))
-                return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;    
-        close_output_pbs(&notify_pbs);
-    }
-            
-    {
-        /* finish computing HASH */     
-        struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-        hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
-        hmac_update(&ctx, (const u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
-        hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, rbody.cur-r_hash_start);
-        hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx);  
-
-        DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-                DBG_log("HASH computed:");
-                DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size));
-    }
-
-    /* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */
-    {
-	u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-	u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	msgid_t msgid;
+	pb_stream reply;
+	pb_stream rbody;
+	u_char
+		*r_hashval,     /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+		*r_hash_start;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
+		
+	msgid = generate_msgid(st);
+	
+	init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "ISAKMP notify");
+
+	/* HDR* */
+	{
+		struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+		hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+		hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+		hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
+		hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
+		hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
+			impossible();
+	}
+	/* HASH -- create and note space to be filled later */
+	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_N);
 
-	u_int old_iv_len = st->st_iv_len;
-	u_int new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+	/* NOTIFY */
+	{
+		pb_stream notify_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_notification isan;
+
+		isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+		isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+		isan.isan_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
+		isan.isan_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE * 2;  
+		isan.isan_type = type;
+		if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &rbody, &notify_pbs))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		if (!out_raw(st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &notify_pbs, "notify icookie"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  
+		if (!out_raw(st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &notify_pbs, "notify rcookie"))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  
+		if (data != NULL && len > 0)
+			if (!out_raw(data, len, &notify_pbs, "notify data"))
+				return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;    
+		close_output_pbs(&notify_pbs);
+	}
+			
+	{
+		/* finish computing HASH */     
+		chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(msgid);
+		chunk_t msg_chunk = { r_hash_start, rbody.cur-r_hash_start };
+		pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+		prf_t *prf;
+
+		prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+		prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+		prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_a);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, msgid_chunk, NULL);
+		prf->get_bytes(prf, msg_chunk, r_hashval);
+
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("HASH computed:");
+			DBG_dump("", r_hashval, prf->get_block_size(prf));
+		)
+		prf->destroy(prf);
+	}
+
+	/* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */
+	{
+		u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+		u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
 
-	if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		u_int old_iv_len = st->st_iv_len;
+		u_int new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
 
-	memcpy(old_iv, st->st_iv, old_iv_len);
-	memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+		if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 
-	init_phase2_iv(st, &msgid);
-	if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-     
-	/* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */
-	memcpy(st->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len);
-	memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
-	st->st_iv_len = old_iv_len;
-	st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
-    }
-
-    /* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */
-    {
-        chunk_t saved_tpacket = st->st_tpacket;
-
-        setchunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply));
-        send_packet(st, "ISAKMP notify");
-        st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
-    }
-
-    return STF_IGNORE;
+		memcpy(old_iv, st->st_iv, old_iv_len);
+		memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+
+		init_phase2_iv(st, &msgid);
+		if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	
+		/* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */
+		memcpy(st->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len);
+		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
+		st->st_iv_len = old_iv_len;
+		st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
+	}
+
+	/* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */
+	{
+		chunk_t saved_tpacket = st->st_tpacket;
+
+		st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply));
+		send_packet(st, "ISAKMP notify");
+		st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
+	}
+
+	return STF_IGNORE;
 }
 
 /*
  * DPD Out Initiator
  */
-void
-dpd_outI(struct state *p2st)
+void dpd_outI(struct state *p2st)
 {
-    struct state *st;
-    u_int32_t seqno;
-    time_t tm;
-    time_t idle_time;
-    time_t delay = p2st->st_connection->dpd_delay;
-    time_t timeout = p2st->st_connection->dpd_timeout;
-
-    /* find the newest related Phase 1 state */
-    st = find_phase1_state(p2st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
-
-    if (st == NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not find newest phase 1 state");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* If no DPD, then get out of here */
-    if (!st->st_dpd)
- 	return;
-
-    /* schedule the next periodic DPD event */
-    event_schedule(EVENT_DPD, delay, p2st);
-
-    /* Current time */
-    tm = now();
-
-    /* Make sure we really need to invoke DPD */
-    if (!was_eroute_idle(p2st, delay, &idle_time))
-    {
+	struct state *st;
+	u_int32_t seqno;
+	time_t tm;
+	time_t idle_time;
+	time_t delay = p2st->st_connection->dpd_delay;
+	time_t timeout = p2st->st_connection->dpd_timeout;
+
+	/* find the newest related Phase 1 state */
+	st = find_phase1_state(p2st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not find newest phase 1 state");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* If no DPD, then get out of here */
+	if (!st->st_dpd)
+		return;
+
+	/* schedule the next periodic DPD event */
+	event_schedule(EVENT_DPD, delay, p2st);
+
+	/* Current time */
+	tm = now();
+
+	/* Make sure we really need to invoke DPD */
+	if (!was_eroute_idle(p2st, delay, &idle_time))
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("recent eroute activity %u seconds ago, "
+					"no need to send DPD notification"
+				  , (int)idle_time)
+		)
+		st->st_last_dpd = tm;
+		delete_dpd_event(st);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* If an R_U_THERE has been sent or received recently, or if a
+	 * companion Phase 2 SA has shown eroute activity,
+	 * then we don't need to invoke DPD.
+	 */
+	if (tm < st->st_last_dpd + delay)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("recent DPD activity %u seconds ago, "
+					"no need to send DPD notification"
+				  , (int)(tm - st->st_last_dpd))
+		)
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		return;
+
+	if (!st->st_dpd_seqno)
+	{
+		rng_t *rng;
+
+		/* Get a non-zero random value that has room to grow */
+		rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
+		rng->get_bytes(rng, sizeof(st->st_dpd_seqno), (u_char *)&st->st_dpd_seqno);
+		rng->destroy(rng);
+		st->st_dpd_seqno &= 0x7fff;
+		st->st_dpd_seqno++;
+	}
+	seqno = htonl(st->st_dpd_seqno);
+
+	if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE, &seqno, sizeof(seqno)) != STF_IGNORE)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not send R_U_THERE");
+		return;
+	}
 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("recent eroute activity %u seconds ago, "
-		    "no need to send DPD notification"
-		  , (int)idle_time)
+		DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", st->st_dpd_seqno)
 	)
+	st->st_dpd_expectseqno = st->st_dpd_seqno++;
 	st->st_last_dpd = tm;
-	delete_dpd_event(st);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* If an R_U_THERE has been sent or received recently, or if a
-     * companion Phase 2 SA has shown eroute activity,
-     * then we don't need to invoke DPD.
-     */
-    if (tm < st->st_last_dpd + delay)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("recent DPD activity %u seconds ago, "
-	    	    "no need to send DPD notification"
-		  , (int)(tm - st->st_last_dpd))
-	)
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	return;
-
-    if (!st->st_dpd_seqno)
-    {
-	/* Get a non-zero random value that has room to grow */
-	get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&st->st_dpd_seqno, sizeof(st->st_dpd_seqno));
-	st->st_dpd_seqno &= 0x7fff;
-	st->st_dpd_seqno++;
-    }
-    seqno = htonl(st->st_dpd_seqno);
-
-    if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE, &seqno, sizeof(seqno)) != STF_IGNORE)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not send R_U_THERE");
-	return;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", st->st_dpd_seqno)
-    )
-    st->st_dpd_expectseqno = st->st_dpd_seqno++;
-    st->st_last_dpd = tm;
-    /* Only schedule a new timeout if there isn't one currently,
-     * or if it would be sooner than the current timeout. */
-    if (st->st_dpd_event == NULL
-    || st->st_dpd_event->ev_time > tm + timeout)
-    {
-	delete_dpd_event(st);
-	event_schedule(EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT, timeout, st);
-    }
+	/* Only schedule a new timeout if there isn't one currently,
+	 * or if it would be sooner than the current timeout. */
+	if (st->st_dpd_event == NULL
+	|| st->st_dpd_event->ev_time > tm + timeout)
+	{
+		delete_dpd_event(st);
+		event_schedule(EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT, timeout, st);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -5444,139 +5318,139 @@ stf_status
 dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs)
 {
    time_t tm = now();
-    u_int32_t seqno;
-
-    if (st == NULL || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received R_U_THERE for unestablished ISAKMP SA");
-        return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
-    if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2)
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid SPI length (%d)", n->isan_spisize);
-        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-
-    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
-    {
+	u_int32_t seqno;
+
+	if (st == NULL || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received R_U_THERE for unestablished ISAKMP SA");
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+	if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid SPI length (%d)", n->isan_spisize);
+		return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+	{
 #ifdef APPLY_CRISCO
-        /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
+		/* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
 #else
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid icookie (broken Cisco?)");
-        return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid icookie (broken Cisco?)");
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
 #endif
-    }
-    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
-
-    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid rcookie (broken Cisco?)");
-	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
-    }
-    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
-
-    if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno))
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid data length (%d)"
-	    , (int) pbs_left(pbs));
-        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-
-    seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", seqno)
-    )
-
-    if (st->st_dpd_peerseqno && seqno <= st->st_dpd_peerseqno) {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received old or duplicate R_U_THERE");
-        return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
-
-    st->st_dpd_peerseqno = seqno;
-    delete_dpd_event(st);
-
-    if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE_ACK, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs)) != STF_IGNORE)
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD Info: could not send R_U_THERE_ACK");
-        return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u", seqno)
-    )
-
-    st->st_last_dpd = tm;
-    return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+	pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+	if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid rcookie (broken Cisco?)");
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+	}
+	pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+	if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid data length (%d)"
+			, (int) pbs_left(pbs));
+		return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", seqno)
+	)
+
+	if (st->st_dpd_peerseqno && seqno <= st->st_dpd_peerseqno) {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received old or duplicate R_U_THERE");
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+
+	st->st_dpd_peerseqno = seqno;
+	delete_dpd_event(st);
+
+	if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE_ACK, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs)) != STF_IGNORE)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD Info: could not send R_U_THERE_ACK");
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u", seqno)
+	)
+
+	st->st_last_dpd = tm;
+	return STF_IGNORE;
 }
 
 /*
  * DPD out Responder
  */
-stf_status
-dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs)
+stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n,
+				   pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    u_int32_t seqno;
+	u_int32_t seqno;
 
-    if (st == NULL || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "DPD: Received R_U_THERE_ACK for unestablished ISAKMP SA");
-        return STF_FAIL;
-    }
+	if (st == NULL || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "DPD: Received R_U_THERE_ACK for unestablished ISAKMP SA");
+		return STF_FAIL;
+	}
 
    if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2)
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid SPI length (%d)"
-	    , n->isan_spisize);
-        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-
-    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
-    {
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid SPI length (%d)"
+			, n->isan_spisize);
+		return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+	{
 #ifdef APPLY_CRISCO
-        /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
+		/* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
 #else
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid icookie");
-        return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid icookie");
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
 #endif
-    }
-    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+	}
+	pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
 
-    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
-    {
+	if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+	{
 #ifdef APPLY_CRISCO
-        /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
+		/* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
 #else
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid rcookie");
-        return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid rcookie");
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
 #endif
-    }
-    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
-
-    if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno))
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , " DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid data length (%d)"
-	    , (int) pbs_left(pbs));
-        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-
-    seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u"
-	, seqno)
-    )
-
-    if (!st->st_dpd_expectseqno && seqno != st->st_dpd_expectseqno)
-    {
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has unexpected sequence number");
-        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-
-    st->st_dpd_expectseqno = 0;
-    delete_dpd_event(st);
-    return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+	pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+	if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, " DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid data length (%d)"
+			, (int) pbs_left(pbs));
+		return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u"
+		, seqno)
+	)
+
+	if (!st->st_dpd_expectseqno && seqno != st->st_dpd_expectseqno)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has unexpected sequence number");
+		return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	st->st_dpd_expectseqno = 0;
+	delete_dpd_event(st);
+	return STF_IGNORE;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -5589,67 +5463,67 @@ dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs)
 void
 dpd_timeout(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct state *newest_phase1_st;
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    int action = st->st_connection->dpd_action;
-    char cname[BUF_LEN];
-
-    passert(action == DPD_ACTION_HOLD
-	 || action == DPD_ACTION_CLEAR
-	 || DPD_ACTION_RESTART);
-
-    /* is there a newer phase1_state? */
-    newest_phase1_st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
-    if (newest_phase1_st != NULL && newest_phase1_st != st)
-    {
-	plog("DPD: Phase1 state #%ld has been superseded by #%ld"
-	     " - timeout ignored"
-	     , st->st_serialno, newest_phase1_st->st_serialno);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: No response from peer - declaring peer dead");
-
-    /* delete the state, which is probably in phase 2 */
-    set_cur_connection(c);
-    plog("DPD: Terminating all SAs using this connection");
-    delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE);
-    reset_cur_connection();
-
-    switch (action)
-    {
-    case DPD_ACTION_HOLD:
-	/* dpdaction=hold - Wipe the SA's but %trap the eroute so we don't
-	 * leak traffic.  Also, being in %trap means new packets will
-	 * force an initiation of the conn again.
-	 */
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Putting connection \"%s\" into %%trap", c->name);
-	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-	    delete_connection(c, TRUE);
-	break;
-    case DPD_ACTION_CLEAR:
-	/* dpdaction=clear - Wipe the SA & eroute - everything */
-        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Clearing connection \"%s\"", c->name);
-        unroute_connection(c);
-	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-	    delete_connection(c, TRUE);
-	break;
-    case DPD_ACTION_RESTART:
-	/* dpdaction=restart - Restart connection,
-	 * except if roadwarrior connection
-	 */
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Restarting connection \"%s\"", c->name);
-	unroute_connection(c);
-
-	/* caching the connection name before deletion */
-	strncpy(cname, c->name, BUF_LEN);
-
-	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-	    delete_connection(c, TRUE);
-	initiate_connection(cname, NULL_FD);
-	break;
-    default:
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: unknown action");
-    }
+	struct state *newest_phase1_st;
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	int action = st->st_connection->dpd_action;
+	char cname[BUF_LEN];
+
+	passert(action == DPD_ACTION_HOLD
+		 || action == DPD_ACTION_CLEAR
+		 || DPD_ACTION_RESTART);
+
+	/* is there a newer phase1_state? */
+	newest_phase1_st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+	if (newest_phase1_st != NULL && newest_phase1_st != st)
+	{
+		plog("DPD: Phase1 state #%ld has been superseded by #%ld"
+			 " - timeout ignored"
+			 , st->st_serialno, newest_phase1_st->st_serialno);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: No response from peer - declaring peer dead");
+
+	/* delete the state, which is probably in phase 2 */
+	set_cur_connection(c);
+	plog("DPD: Terminating all SAs using this connection");
+	delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE);
+	reset_cur_connection();
+
+	switch (action)
+	{
+	case DPD_ACTION_HOLD:
+		/* dpdaction=hold - Wipe the SA's but %trap the eroute so we don't
+		 * leak traffic.  Also, being in %trap means new packets will
+		 * force an initiation of the conn again.
+		 */
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Putting connection \"%s\" into %%trap", c->name);
+		if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+			delete_connection(c, TRUE);
+		break;
+	case DPD_ACTION_CLEAR:
+		/* dpdaction=clear - Wipe the SA & eroute - everything */
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Clearing connection \"%s\"", c->name);
+		unroute_connection(c);
+		if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+			delete_connection(c, TRUE);
+		break;
+	case DPD_ACTION_RESTART:
+		/* dpdaction=restart - Restart connection,
+		 * except if roadwarrior connection
+		 */
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Restarting connection \"%s\"", c->name);
+		unroute_connection(c);
+
+		/* caching the connection name before deletion */
+		strncpy(cname, c->name, BUF_LEN);
+
+		if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+			delete_connection(c, TRUE);
+		initiate_connection(cname, NULL_FD);
+		break;
+	default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: unknown action");
+	}
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h
index 60b5e4e31..2e242e903 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h
+++ b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h
@@ -10,55 +10,53 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ipsec_doi.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 extern void echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np);
 
 extern void ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock, struct connection *c
-    , lset_t policy, unsigned long try, so_serial_t replacing);
+	, lset_t policy, unsigned long try, so_serial_t replacing);
 
 extern void ipsecdoi_replace(struct state *st, unsigned long try);
 
 extern void init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid);
 
 extern stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock
-    , struct state *isakmp_sa
-    , struct connection *c
-    , lset_t policy
-    , unsigned long try
-    , so_serial_t replacing);
+	, struct state *isakmp_sa
+	, struct connection *c
+	, lset_t policy
+	, unsigned long try
+	, so_serial_t replacing);
 
 extern state_transition_fn
-    main_inI1_outR1,
-    main_inR1_outI2,
-    main_inI2_outR2,
-    main_inR2_outI3,
-    main_inI3_outR3,
-    main_inR3,
-    quick_inI1_outR1,
-    quick_inR1_outI2,
-    quick_inI2;
+	main_inI1_outR1,
+	main_inR1_outI2,
+	main_inI2_outR2,
+	main_inR2_outI3,
+	main_inI3_outR3,
+	main_inR3,
+	quick_inI1_outR1,
+	quick_inR1_outI2,
+	quick_inI2;
 
 extern void send_delete(struct state *st);
 extern void accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md
-    , struct payload_digest *p);
+	, struct payload_digest *p);
 extern void close_message(pb_stream *pbs);
 extern bool encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st);
 
 
 extern void send_notification_from_state(struct state *st,
-    enum state_kind state, u_int16_t type);
+	enum state_kind state, u_int16_t type);
 extern void send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type);
 
 extern const char *init_pluto_vendorid(void);
 
 extern void dpd_outI(struct state *st);
 extern stf_status dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st
-            , struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *n_pbs);
+			, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *n_pbs);
 extern stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st
-            , struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *n_pbs);
+			, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *n_pbs);
 extern void dpd_timeout(struct state *st);
 
 /* START_HASH_PAYLOAD
@@ -70,14 +68,14 @@ extern void dpd_timeout(struct state *st);
  * - it references variables local to the caller (r_hashval, r_hash_start, st)
  */
 #define START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, np) { \
-    pb_stream hash_pbs; \
-    if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_hash_desc, &(rbody), &hash_pbs)) \
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
-    r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;	/* remember where to plant value */ \
-    if (!out_zero(st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH")) \
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
-    close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); \
-    r_hash_start = (rbody).cur;	/* hash from after HASH payload */ \
+	pb_stream hash_pbs; \
+	if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_hash_desc, &(rbody), &hash_pbs)) \
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
+	r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;   /* remember where to plant value */ \
+	if (!out_zero(st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH")) \
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
+	close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); \
+	r_hash_start = (rbody).cur; /* hash from after HASH payload */ \
 }
 
 /* CHECK_QUICK_HASH
@@ -88,17 +86,17 @@ extern void dpd_timeout(struct state *st);
  *   expression to reference them (hash_val, hash_pbs)
  */
 #define CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, do_hash, hash_name, msg_name) { \
-	pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs; \
-	u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; \
-	size_t hash_len = do_hash; \
-	if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash_len \
-	|| memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash_val, hash_len) != 0) \
-	{ \
-	    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received " hash_name ":", hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs)); \
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received " hash_name " does not match computed value in " msg_name); \
-	    /* XXX Could send notification back */ \
-	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; \
-	} \
-    }
+		pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs; \
+		u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; \
+		size_t hash_len = do_hash; \
+		if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash_len \
+		|| memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash_val, hash_len) != 0) \
+		{ \
+			DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received " hash_name ":", hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs)); \
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received " hash_name " does not match computed value in " msg_name); \
+			/* XXX Could send notification back */ \
+			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; \
+		} \
+	}
 
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/kameipsec.h b/src/pluto/kameipsec.h
index 5f08c7d38..5e9d8ce99 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kameipsec.h
+++ b/src/pluto/kameipsec.h
@@ -3,45 +3,45 @@
 
 /* The definitions, required to talk to KAME racoon IKE. */
 
-#define IPSEC_PORT_ANY		0
-#define IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY	255
-#define IPSEC_PROTO_ANY		255
+#define IPSEC_PORT_ANY          0
+#define IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY       255
+#define IPSEC_PROTO_ANY         255
 
 enum {
-	IPSEC_MODE_ANY		= 0,	/* We do not support this for SA */
-	IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT	= 1,
-	IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL	= 2
+		IPSEC_MODE_ANY          = 0,    /* We do not support this for SA */
+		IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT    = 1,
+		IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL       = 2
 };
 
 enum {
-	IPSEC_DIR_ANY		= 0,
-	IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND	= 1,
-	IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND	= 2,
-	IPSEC_DIR_FWD		= 3,	/* It is our own */
-	IPSEC_DIR_MAX		= 4,
-	IPSEC_DIR_INVALID	= 5
+		IPSEC_DIR_ANY           = 0,
+		IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND       = 1,
+		IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND      = 2,
+		IPSEC_DIR_FWD           = 3,    /* It is our own */
+		IPSEC_DIR_MAX           = 4,
+		IPSEC_DIR_INVALID       = 5
 };
 
 enum {
-	IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD	= 0,
-	IPSEC_POLICY_NONE	= 1,
-	IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC	= 2,
-	IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST	= 3,
-	IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS	= 4
+		IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD    = 0,
+		IPSEC_POLICY_NONE       = 1,
+		IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC      = 2,
+		IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST    = 3,
+		IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS     = 4
 };
 
 enum {
-	IPSEC_LEVEL_DEFAULT	= 0,
-	IPSEC_LEVEL_USE		= 1,
-	IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE	= 2,
-	IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE	= 3
+		IPSEC_LEVEL_DEFAULT     = 0,
+		IPSEC_LEVEL_USE         = 1,
+		IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE     = 2,
+		IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE      = 3
 };
 
-#define IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX	0x3fff
+#define IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX  0x3fff
 
 #define IPSEC_REPLAYWSIZE  32
 
 #define IP_IPSEC_POLICY 16
 #define IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY 34
 
-#endif	/* __IPSEC_H */
+#endif  /* __IPSEC_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel.c b/src/pluto/kernel.c
index d42ac3372..f698de2c8 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel.c
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel.c 3846 2008-04-18 17:01:45Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -31,12 +29,14 @@
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
 #include <signal.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>	/* for select(2) */
-#include <sys/types.h>	/* for select(2) */
+#include <sys/time.h>   /* for select(2) */
+#include <sys/types.h>  /* for select(2) */
 #include <pfkeyv2.h>
 #include <pfkey.h>
 #include "kameipsec.h"
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
 #include "id.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "state.h"
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "ca.h"
 #include "server.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 #include "keys.h"
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 #include "alg_info.h"
@@ -69,7 +68,7 @@ bool can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;  /* can system actually perform IPCOMP? */
  * logic loses track and swats them?  64 is the best KLIPS can do.
  * And 32 is the best XFRM can do...
  */
-#define REPLAY_WINDOW	64
+#define REPLAY_WINDOW   64
 #define REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM      32
 
 /* test if the routes required for two different connections agree
@@ -77,11 +76,11 @@ bool can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;  /* can system actually perform IPCOMP? */
  * testing that the interfaces and nexthops match.
  */
 #define routes_agree(c, d) ((c)->interface == (d)->interface \
-	&& sameaddr(&(c)->spd.this.host_nexthop, &(d)->spd.this.host_nexthop))
+		&& sameaddr(&(c)->spd.this.host_nexthop, &(d)->spd.this.host_nexthop))
 
 #ifndef KLIPS
 
-bool no_klips = TRUE;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
+bool no_klips = TRUE;   /* don't actually use KLIPS */
 
 #else /* !KLIPS */
 
@@ -96,50 +95,49 @@ bool no_klips = TRUE;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
  * which %holds are news and which others should expire.
  */
 
-#define SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL	(60 * 2)   /* time between scans of eroutes */
+#define SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL     (60 * 2)   /* time between scans of eroutes */
 
 /* SHUNT_PATIENCE only has resolution down to a multiple of the sample rate,
  * SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL.
  * By making SHUNT_PATIENCE an odd multiple of half of SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL,
  * we minimize the effects of jitter.
  */
-#define SHUNT_PATIENCE	(SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL * 15 / 2)	/* inactivity timeout */
+#define SHUNT_PATIENCE  (SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL * 15 / 2)  /* inactivity timeout */
 
 struct bare_shunt {
-    policy_prio_t policy_prio;
-    ip_subnet ours;
-    ip_subnet his;
-    ip_said said;
-    int transport_proto;
-    unsigned long count;
-    time_t last_activity;
-    char *why;
-    struct bare_shunt *next;
+	policy_prio_t policy_prio;
+	ip_subnet ours;
+	ip_subnet his;
+	ip_said said;
+	int transport_proto;
+	unsigned long count;
+	time_t last_activity;
+	char *why;
+	struct bare_shunt *next;
 };
 
 static struct bare_shunt *bare_shunts = NULL;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-static void
-DBG_bare_shunt(const char *op, const struct bare_shunt *bs)
+static void DBG_bare_shunt(const char *op, const struct bare_shunt *bs)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	{
-	    int ourport = ntohs(portof(&(bs)->ours.addr));
-	    int hisport = ntohs(portof(&(bs)->his.addr));
-	    char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	    char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	    char sat[SATOT_BUF];
-	    char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
-
-	    subnettot(&(bs)->ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
-	    subnettot(&(bs)->his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
-	    satot(&(bs)->said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
-	    fmt_policy_prio(bs->policy_prio, prio);
-	    DBG_log("%s bare shunt %p %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d %s    %s"
-		, op, (const void *)(bs), ourst, ourport, hist, hisport
-		, sat, (bs)->transport_proto, prio, (bs)->why);
-	});
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		{
+			int ourport = ntohs(portof(&(bs)->ours.addr));
+			int hisport = ntohs(portof(&(bs)->his.addr));
+			char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			char sat[SATOT_BUF];
+			char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
+
+			subnettot(&(bs)->ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+			subnettot(&(bs)->his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+			satot(&(bs)->said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
+			fmt_policy_prio(bs->policy_prio, prio);
+			DBG_log("%s bare shunt %p %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d %s    %s"
+				, op, (const void *)(bs), ourst, ourport, hist, hisport
+				, sat, (bs)->transport_proto, prio, (bs)->why);
+		});
 }
 #else /* !DEBUG */
 #define DBG_bare_shunt(op, bs) {}
@@ -152,112 +150,108 @@ DBG_bare_shunt(const char *op, const struct bare_shunt *bs)
 struct eroute_info *orphaned_holds = NULL;
 
 /* forward declaration */
-static bool shunt_eroute(struct connection *c
-			 , struct spd_route *sr
-			 , enum routing_t rt_kind
-			 , unsigned int op, const char *opname);
-static void set_text_said(char *text_said
-			  , const ip_address *dst
-			  , ipsec_spi_t spi
-			  , int proto);
+static bool shunt_eroute(struct connection *c, struct spd_route *sr,
+						 enum routing_t rt_kind, unsigned int op,
+						 const char *opname);
+
+static void set_text_said(char *text_said, const ip_address *dst,
+						  ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto);
 
-bool no_klips = FALSE;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
+bool no_klips = FALSE;  /* don't actually use KLIPS */
 
 static const struct pfkey_proto_info null_proto_info[2] = {
+		{
+				proto: IPPROTO_ESP,
+				encapsulation: ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT,
+				reqid: 0
+		},
+		{
+				proto: 0,
+				encapsulation: 0,
+				reqid: 0
+		}
+};
+
+void record_and_initiate_opportunistic(const ip_subnet *ours,
+									   const ip_subnet *his,
+									   int transport_proto, const char *why)
+{
+	passert(samesubnettype(ours, his));
+
+	/* Add to bare shunt list.
+	 * We need to do this because the shunt was installed by KLIPS
+	 * which can't do this itself.
+	 */
 	{
-		proto: IPPROTO_ESP,
-		encapsulation: ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT,
-		reqid: 0
-	},
+		struct bare_shunt *bs = malloc_thing(struct bare_shunt);
+
+		bs->why = clone_str(why);
+		bs->ours = *ours;
+		bs->his = *his;
+		bs->transport_proto = transport_proto;
+		bs->policy_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+
+		bs->said.proto = SA_INT;
+		bs->said.spi = htonl(SPI_HOLD);
+		bs->said.dst = *aftoinfo(subnettypeof(ours))->any;
+
+		bs->count = 0;
+		bs->last_activity = now();
+
+		bs->next = bare_shunts;
+		bare_shunts = bs;
+		DBG_bare_shunt("add", bs);
+	}
+
+	/* actually initiate opportunism */
 	{
-	        proto: 0,
-		encapsulation: 0,
-		reqid: 0
+		ip_address src, dst;
+
+		networkof(ours, &src);
+		networkof(his, &dst);
+		initiate_opportunistic(&src, &dst, transport_proto, TRUE, NULL_FD);
 	}
-};
 
-void
-record_and_initiate_opportunistic(const ip_subnet *ours
-				  , const ip_subnet *his
-				  , int transport_proto
-				  , const char *why)
-{
-    passert(samesubnettype(ours, his));
-
-    /* Add to bare shunt list.
-     * We need to do this because the shunt was installed by KLIPS
-     * which can't do this itself.
-     */
-    {
-	struct bare_shunt *bs = alloc_thing(struct bare_shunt, "bare shunt");
-
-	bs->why = clone_str(why, "story for bare shunt");
-	bs->ours = *ours;
-	bs->his = *his;
-	bs->transport_proto = transport_proto;
-	bs->policy_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
-
-	bs->said.proto = SA_INT;
-	bs->said.spi = htonl(SPI_HOLD);
-	bs->said.dst = *aftoinfo(subnettypeof(ours))->any;
-
-	bs->count = 0;
-	bs->last_activity = now();
-
-	bs->next = bare_shunts;
-	bare_shunts = bs;
-	DBG_bare_shunt("add", bs);
-    }
-
-    /* actually initiate opportunism */
-    {
-	ip_address src, dst;
-
-	networkof(ours, &src);
-	networkof(his, &dst);
-	initiate_opportunistic(&src, &dst, transport_proto, TRUE, NULL_FD);
-    }
-
-    /* if present, remove from orphaned_holds list.
-     * NOTE: we do this last in case ours or his is a pointer into a member.
-     */
-    {
-	struct eroute_info **pp, *p;
-
-	for (pp = &orphaned_holds; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &p->next)
-	{
-	    if (samesubnet(ours, &p->ours)
-	    && samesubnet(his, &p->his)
-	    && transport_proto == p->transport_proto
-	    && portof(&ours->addr) == portof(&p->ours.addr)
-	    && portof(&his->addr) == portof(&p->his.addr))
-	    {
-		*pp = p->next;
-		pfree(p);
-		break;
-	    }
+	/* if present, remove from orphaned_holds list.
+	 * NOTE: we do this last in case ours or his is a pointer into a member.
+	 */
+	{
+		struct eroute_info **pp, *p;
+
+		for (pp = &orphaned_holds; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &p->next)
+		{
+			if (samesubnet(ours, &p->ours)
+			&& samesubnet(his, &p->his)
+			&& transport_proto == p->transport_proto
+			&& portof(&ours->addr) == portof(&p->ours.addr)
+			&& portof(&his->addr) == portof(&p->his.addr))
+			{
+				*pp = p->next;
+				free(p);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 #endif /* KLIPS */
 
 static unsigned get_proto_reqid(unsigned base, int proto)
 {
-    switch (proto)
-    {
-    default:
-    case IPPROTO_COMP:
-	base++;
-	/* fall through */
-    case IPPROTO_ESP:
-	base++;
-	/* fall through */
-    case IPPROTO_AH:
-	break;
-    }
-
-    return base;
+	switch (proto)
+	{
+	default:
+	case IPPROTO_COMP:
+		base++;
+		/* fall through */
+	case IPPROTO_ESP:
+		base++;
+		/* fall through */
+	case IPPROTO_AH:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	return base;
 }
 
 /* Generate Unique SPI numbers.
@@ -281,33 +275,39 @@ static unsigned get_proto_reqid(unsigned base, int proto)
  * check if the number was previously used (assuming that no
  * SPI lives longer than 4G of its successors).
  */
-ipsec_spi_t
-get_ipsec_spi(ipsec_spi_t avoid, int proto, struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
+ipsec_spi_t get_ipsec_spi(ipsec_spi_t avoid, int proto, struct spd_route *sr,
+						  bool tunnel)
 {
-    static ipsec_spi_t spi = 0;	/* host order, so not returned directly! */
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	static ipsec_spi_t spi = 0; /* host order, so not returned directly! */
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	rng_t *rng;
 
-    set_text_said(text_said, &sr->this.host_addr, 0, proto);
+	set_text_said(text_said, &sr->this.host_addr, 0, proto);
 
-    if (kernel_ops->get_spi)
-	return kernel_ops->get_spi(&sr->that.host_addr
-	    , &sr->this.host_addr, proto, tunnel
-	    , get_proto_reqid(sr->reqid, proto)
-	    , IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN, 0xffffffff
-	    , text_said);
-
-    spi++;
-    while (spi < IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN || spi == ntohl(avoid))
-	get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&spi, sizeof(spi));
+	if (kernel_ops->get_spi)
+	{
+		return kernel_ops->get_spi(&sr->that.host_addr
+			, &sr->this.host_addr, proto, tunnel
+			, get_proto_reqid(sr->reqid, proto)
+			, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN, 0xffffffff
+			, text_said);
+	}
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	spi++;
+	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
+	while (spi < IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN || spi == ntohl(avoid))
 	{
-	    ipsec_spi_t spi_net = htonl(spi);
+		rng->get_bytes(rng, sizeof(spi), (u_char *)&spi);
+	}
+	rng->destroy(rng);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			ipsec_spi_t spi_net = htonl(spi);
 
-	    DBG_dump("generate SPI:", (u_char *)&spi_net, sizeof(spi_net));
-	});
+			DBG_dump("generate SPI:", (u_char *)&spi_net, sizeof(spi_net));
+		});
 
-    return htonl(spi);
+	return htonl(spi);
 }
 
 /* Generate Unique CPI numbers.
@@ -318,38 +318,40 @@ get_ipsec_spi(ipsec_spi_t avoid, int proto, struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
  * If we can't find one easily, return 0 (a bad SPI,
  * no matter what order) indicating failure.
  */
-ipsec_spi_t
-get_my_cpi(struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
+ipsec_spi_t get_my_cpi(struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
 {
-    static cpi_t
-	first_busy_cpi = 0,
-	latest_cpi;
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	static cpi_t first_busy_cpi = 0, latest_cpi;
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	rng_t *rng;
 
-    set_text_said(text_said, &sr->this.host_addr, 0, IPPROTO_COMP);
+	set_text_said(text_said, &sr->this.host_addr, 0, IPPROTO_COMP);
 
-    if (kernel_ops->get_spi)
-	return kernel_ops->get_spi(&sr->that.host_addr
-	    , &sr->this.host_addr, IPPROTO_COMP, tunnel
-	    , get_proto_reqid(sr->reqid, IPPROTO_COMP)
-	    , IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED, IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED
-	    , text_said);
+	if (kernel_ops->get_spi)
+	{
+		return kernel_ops->get_spi(&sr->that.host_addr
+			, &sr->this.host_addr, IPPROTO_COMP, tunnel
+			, get_proto_reqid(sr->reqid, IPPROTO_COMP)
+			, IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED, IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED
+			, text_said);
+	}
 
-    while (!(IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED <= first_busy_cpi && first_busy_cpi < IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED))
-    {
-	get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&first_busy_cpi, sizeof(first_busy_cpi));
-	latest_cpi = first_busy_cpi;
-    }
+	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
+	while (!(IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED <= first_busy_cpi && first_busy_cpi < IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED))
+	{
+		rng->get_bytes(rng, sizeof(first_busy_cpi), (u_char *)&first_busy_cpi);
+		latest_cpi = first_busy_cpi;
+	}
+	rng->destroy(rng);
 
-    latest_cpi++;
+	latest_cpi++;
 
-    if (latest_cpi == first_busy_cpi)
-	find_my_cpi_gap(&latest_cpi, &first_busy_cpi);
+	if (latest_cpi == first_busy_cpi)
+		find_my_cpi_gap(&latest_cpi, &first_busy_cpi);
 
-    if (latest_cpi > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
-	latest_cpi = IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED;
+	if (latest_cpi > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
+		latest_cpi = IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED;
 
-    return htonl((ipsec_spi_t)latest_cpi);
+	return htonl((ipsec_spi_t)latest_cpi);
 }
 
 /* invoke the updown script to do the routing and firewall commands required
@@ -386,872 +388,864 @@ get_my_cpi(struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
  */
 
 #ifndef DEFAULT_UPDOWN
-# define DEFAULT_UPDOWN	"ipsec _updown"
+# define DEFAULT_UPDOWN "ipsec _updown"
 #endif
 
-static bool
-do_command(struct connection *c, struct spd_route *sr, const char *verb)
+static bool do_command(struct connection *c, struct spd_route *sr,
+					   const char *verb)
 {
-    char cmd[1536];	/* arbitrary limit on shell command length */
-    const char *verb_suffix;
+	char cmd[1536];     /* arbitrary limit on shell command length */
+	const char *verb_suffix;
 
-    /* figure out which verb suffix applies */
-    {
-	const char *hs, *cs;
-
-	switch (addrtypeof(&sr->this.host_addr))
+	/* figure out which verb suffix applies */
 	{
-	    case AF_INET:
-		hs = "-host";
-		cs = "-client";
-		break;
-	    case AF_INET6:
-		hs = "-host-v6";
-		cs = "-client-v6";
-		break;
-	    default:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown address family");
-		return FALSE;
-	}
-	verb_suffix = subnetisaddr(&sr->this.client, &sr->this.host_addr)
-	    ? hs : cs;
-    }
-
-    /* form the command string */
-    {
-	char
-            nexthop_str[sizeof("PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='' ") +ADDRTOT_BUF] = "",
-            srcip_str[sizeof("PLUTO_MY_SOURCEIP='' ")+ADDRTOT_BUF] = "",
-	    me_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
-	    myid_str[BUF_LEN],
-	    myclient_str[SUBNETTOT_BUF],
-	    myclientnet_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
-	    myclientmask_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
-	    peer_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
-	    peerid_str[BUF_LEN],
-	    peerclient_str[SUBNETTOT_BUF],
-	    peerclientnet_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
-	    peerclientmask_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
-	    peerca_str[BUF_LEN],
-	    secure_myid_str[BUF_LEN] = "",
-	    secure_peerid_str[BUF_LEN] = "",
-	    secure_peerca_str[BUF_LEN] = "";
-	ip_address ta;
-	pubkey_list_t *p;
-
-	if (addrbytesptr(&sr->this.host_nexthop, NULL)
-	&& !isanyaddr(&sr->this.host_nexthop))
-	{
-	    char *n;
-
-	    strcpy(nexthop_str, "PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='");
-	    n = nexthop_str + strlen(nexthop_str);
-
-	    addrtot(&sr->this.host_nexthop, 0
-		    ,n , sizeof(nexthop_str)-strlen(nexthop_str));
-	    strncat(nexthop_str, "' ", sizeof(nexthop_str));
-	}
-
-	if (addrbytesptr(&sr->this.host_srcip, NULL)
-	&& !isanyaddr(&sr->this.host_srcip))
-        {
-	    char *n;
-
-	    strcpy(srcip_str, "PLUTO_MY_SOURCEIP='");
-	    n = srcip_str + strlen(srcip_str);
-
-	    addrtot(&sr->this.host_srcip, 0
-		    ,n , sizeof(srcip_str)-strlen(srcip_str));
-            strncat(srcip_str, "' ", sizeof(srcip_str));
-        }
-
-	addrtot(&sr->this.host_addr, 0, me_str, sizeof(me_str));
-	idtoa(&sr->this.id, myid_str, sizeof(myid_str));
-	escape_metachar(myid_str, secure_myid_str, sizeof(secure_myid_str));
-	subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, myclient_str, sizeof(myclientnet_str));
-	networkof(&sr->this.client, &ta);
-	addrtot(&ta, 0, myclientnet_str, sizeof(myclientnet_str));
-	maskof(&sr->this.client, &ta);
-	addrtot(&ta, 0, myclientmask_str, sizeof(myclientmask_str));
-
-	addrtot(&sr->that.host_addr, 0, peer_str, sizeof(peer_str));
-	idtoa(&sr->that.id, peerid_str, sizeof(peerid_str));
-	escape_metachar(peerid_str, secure_peerid_str, sizeof(secure_peerid_str));
-	subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, peerclient_str, sizeof(peerclientnet_str));
-	networkof(&sr->that.client, &ta);
-	addrtot(&ta, 0, peerclientnet_str, sizeof(peerclientnet_str));
-	maskof(&sr->that.client, &ta);
-	addrtot(&ta, 0, peerclientmask_str, sizeof(peerclientmask_str));
-
-	for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	{
-	    pubkey_t *key = p->key;
-	    int pathlen;
-
-	    if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && same_id(&sr->that.id, &key->id)
-	    && trusted_ca(key->issuer, sr->that.ca, &pathlen))
-	    {
-		dntoa_or_null(peerca_str, BUF_LEN, key->issuer, "");
-		escape_metachar(peerca_str, secure_peerca_str, sizeof(secure_peerca_str));
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
-
-	if (-1 == snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd)
-	    , "2>&1 "	/* capture stderr along with stdout */
-	    "PLUTO_VERSION='1.1' "	/* change VERSION when interface spec changes */
-	    "PLUTO_VERB='%s%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_CONNECTION='%s' "
-	    "%s"	/* optional PLUTO_NEXT_HOP */
-	    "PLUTO_INTERFACE='%s' "
-	    "%s"	/* optional PLUTO_HOST_ACCESS */
-	    "PLUTO_REQID='%u' "
-	    "PLUTO_ME='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_MY_ID='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_MY_PORT='%u' "
-	    "PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='%u' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_ID='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='%s' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_PORT='%u' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='%u' "
-	    "PLUTO_PEER_CA='%s' "
-	    "%s"	/* optional PLUTO_MY_SRCIP */
-	    "%s"	/* actual script */
-	    , verb, verb_suffix
-	    , c->name
-	    , nexthop_str
-	    , c->interface->vname
-	    , sr->this.hostaccess? "PLUTO_HOST_ACCESS='1' " : ""
-	    , sr->reqid + 1	/* ESP requid */
-	    , me_str
-	    , secure_myid_str
-	    , myclient_str
-	    , myclientnet_str
-	    , myclientmask_str
-	    , sr->this.port
-	    , sr->this.protocol
-	    , peer_str
-	    , secure_peerid_str
-	    , peerclient_str
-	    , peerclientnet_str
-	    , peerclientmask_str
-	    , sr->that.port
-	    , sr->that.protocol
-	    , secure_peerca_str
-	    , srcip_str
-	    , sr->this.updown == NULL? DEFAULT_UPDOWN : sr->this.updown))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command too long!", verb, verb_suffix);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("executing %s%s: %s"
-	, verb, verb_suffix, cmd));
+		const char *hs, *cs;
 
-#ifdef KLIPS
-    if (!no_klips)
-    {
-	/* invoke the script, catching stderr and stdout
-	 * It may be of concern that some file descriptors will
-	 * be inherited.  For the ones under our control, we
-	 * have done fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) to prevent this.
-	 * Any used by library routines (perhaps the resolver or syslog)
-	 * will remain.
-	 */
-	FILE *f = popen(cmd, "r");
-
-	if (f == NULL)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to popen %s%s command", verb, verb_suffix);
-	    return FALSE;
+		switch (addrtypeof(&sr->this.host_addr))
+		{
+			case AF_INET:
+				hs = "-host";
+				cs = "-client";
+				break;
+			case AF_INET6:
+				hs = "-host-v6";
+				cs = "-client-v6";
+				break;
+			default:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown address family");
+				return FALSE;
+		}
+		verb_suffix = subnetisaddr(&sr->this.client, &sr->this.host_addr)
+			? hs : cs;
 	}
 
-	/* log any output */
-	for (;;)
+	/* form the command string */
 	{
-	    /* if response doesn't fit in this buffer, it will be folded */
-	    char resp[256];
+		char
+			nexthop_str[sizeof("PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='' ") +ADDRTOT_BUF] = "",
+			srcip_str[sizeof("PLUTO_MY_SOURCEIP='' ")+ADDRTOT_BUF] = "",
+			me_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+			myid_str[BUF_LEN],
+			myclient_str[SUBNETTOT_BUF],
+			myclientnet_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+			myclientmask_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+			peer_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+			peerid_str[BUF_LEN],
+			peerclient_str[SUBNETTOT_BUF],
+			peerclientnet_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+			peerclientmask_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+			peerca_str[BUF_LEN],
+			secure_myid_str[BUF_LEN] = "",
+			secure_peerid_str[BUF_LEN] = "",
+			secure_peerca_str[BUF_LEN] = "";
+		ip_address ta;
+		pubkey_list_t *p;
+
+		if (addrbytesptr(&sr->this.host_nexthop, NULL)
+		&& !isanyaddr(&sr->this.host_nexthop))
+		{
+			char *n;
+
+			strcpy(nexthop_str, "PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='");
+			n = nexthop_str + strlen(nexthop_str);
+
+			addrtot(&sr->this.host_nexthop, 0
+					,n , sizeof(nexthop_str)-strlen(nexthop_str));
+			strncat(nexthop_str, "' ", sizeof(nexthop_str));
+		}
 
-	    if (fgets(resp, sizeof(resp), f) == NULL)
-	    {
-		if (ferror(f))
+		if (addrbytesptr(&sr->this.host_srcip, NULL)
+		&& !isanyaddr(&sr->this.host_srcip))
 		{
-		    log_errno((e, "fgets failed on output of %s%s command"
-			, verb, verb_suffix));
-		    return FALSE;
+			char *n;
+
+			strcpy(srcip_str, "PLUTO_MY_SOURCEIP='");
+			n = srcip_str + strlen(srcip_str);
+
+			addrtot(&sr->this.host_srcip, 0
+					,n , sizeof(srcip_str)-strlen(srcip_str));
+			strncat(srcip_str, "' ", sizeof(srcip_str));
 		}
-		else
+
+		addrtot(&sr->this.host_addr, 0, me_str, sizeof(me_str));
+		idtoa(&sr->this.id, myid_str, sizeof(myid_str));
+		escape_metachar(myid_str, secure_myid_str, sizeof(secure_myid_str));
+		subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, myclient_str, sizeof(myclientnet_str));
+		networkof(&sr->this.client, &ta);
+		addrtot(&ta, 0, myclientnet_str, sizeof(myclientnet_str));
+		maskof(&sr->this.client, &ta);
+		addrtot(&ta, 0, myclientmask_str, sizeof(myclientmask_str));
+
+		addrtot(&sr->that.host_addr, 0, peer_str, sizeof(peer_str));
+		idtoa(&sr->that.id, peerid_str, sizeof(peerid_str));
+		escape_metachar(peerid_str, secure_peerid_str, sizeof(secure_peerid_str));
+		subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, peerclient_str, sizeof(peerclientnet_str));
+		networkof(&sr->that.client, &ta);
+		addrtot(&ta, 0, peerclientnet_str, sizeof(peerclientnet_str));
+		maskof(&sr->that.client, &ta);
+		addrtot(&ta, 0, peerclientmask_str, sizeof(peerclientmask_str));
+
+		for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 		{
-		    passert(feof(f));
-		    break;
+			pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+			key_type_t type = key->public_key->get_type(key->public_key);
+			int pathlen;
+
+			if (type == KEY_RSA && same_id(&sr->that.id, &key->id) &&
+				trusted_ca(key->issuer, sr->that.ca, &pathlen))
+			{
+				dntoa_or_null(peerca_str, BUF_LEN, key->issuer, "");
+				escape_metachar(peerca_str, secure_peerca_str, sizeof(secure_peerca_str));
+				break;
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		char *e = resp + strlen(resp);
 
-		if (e > resp && e[-1] == '\n')
-		    e[-1] = '\0';	/* trim trailing '\n' */
-		plog("%s%s output: %s", verb, verb_suffix, resp);
-	    }
+		if (-1 == snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd)
+			, "2>&1 "   /* capture stderr along with stdout */
+			"PLUTO_VERSION='1.1' "      /* change VERSION when interface spec changes */
+			"PLUTO_VERB='%s%s' "
+			"PLUTO_CONNECTION='%s' "
+			"%s"        /* optional PLUTO_NEXT_HOP */
+			"PLUTO_INTERFACE='%s' "
+			"%s"        /* optional PLUTO_HOST_ACCESS */
+			"PLUTO_REQID='%u' "
+			"PLUTO_ME='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_MY_ID='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_MY_PORT='%u' "
+			"PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='%u' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_ID='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='%s' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_PORT='%u' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='%u' "
+			"PLUTO_PEER_CA='%s' "
+			"%s"        /* optional PLUTO_MY_SRCIP */
+			"%s"        /* actual script */
+			, verb, verb_suffix
+			, c->name
+			, nexthop_str
+			, c->interface->vname
+			, sr->this.hostaccess? "PLUTO_HOST_ACCESS='1' " : ""
+			, sr->reqid + 1     /* ESP requid */
+			, me_str
+			, secure_myid_str
+			, myclient_str
+			, myclientnet_str
+			, myclientmask_str
+			, sr->this.port
+			, sr->this.protocol
+			, peer_str
+			, secure_peerid_str
+			, peerclient_str
+			, peerclientnet_str
+			, peerclientmask_str
+			, sr->that.port
+			, sr->that.protocol
+			, secure_peerca_str
+			, srcip_str
+			, sr->this.updown == NULL? DEFAULT_UPDOWN : sr->this.updown))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command too long!", verb, verb_suffix);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
 
-	/* report on and react to return code */
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("executing %s%s: %s"
+		, verb, verb_suffix, cmd));
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	if (!no_klips)
 	{
-	    int r = pclose(f);
+		/* invoke the script, catching stderr and stdout
+		 * It may be of concern that some file descriptors will
+		 * be inherited.  For the ones under our control, we
+		 * have done fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) to prevent this.
+		 * Any used by library routines (perhaps the resolver or syslog)
+		 * will remain.
+		 */
+		FILE *f = popen(cmd, "r");
 
-	    if (r == -1)
-	    {
-		log_errno((e, "pclose failed for %s%s command"
-		    , verb, verb_suffix));
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    else if (WIFEXITED(r))
-	    {
-		if (WEXITSTATUS(r) != 0)
+		if (f == NULL)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with status %d"
-			, verb, verb_suffix, WEXITSTATUS(r));
-		    return FALSE;
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to popen %s%s command", verb, verb_suffix);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		/* log any output */
+		for (;;)
+		{
+			/* if response doesn't fit in this buffer, it will be folded */
+			char resp[256];
+
+			if (fgets(resp, sizeof(resp), f) == NULL)
+			{
+				if (ferror(f))
+				{
+					log_errno((e, "fgets failed on output of %s%s command"
+						, verb, verb_suffix));
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					passert(feof(f));
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				char *e = resp + strlen(resp);
+
+				if (e > resp && e[-1] == '\n')
+					e[-1] = '\0';       /* trim trailing '\n' */
+				plog("%s%s output: %s", verb, verb_suffix, resp);
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* report on and react to return code */
+		{
+			int r = pclose(f);
+
+			if (r == -1)
+			{
+				log_errno((e, "pclose failed for %s%s command"
+					, verb, verb_suffix));
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			else if (WIFEXITED(r))
+			{
+				if (WEXITSTATUS(r) != 0)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with status %d"
+						, verb, verb_suffix, WEXITSTATUS(r));
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+			}
+			else if (WIFSIGNALED(r))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with signal %d"
+					, verb, verb_suffix, WTERMSIG(r));
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with unknown status %d"
+					, verb, verb_suffix, r);
+				return FALSE;
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else if (WIFSIGNALED(r))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with signal %d"
-		    , verb, verb_suffix, WTERMSIG(r));
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with unknown status %d"
-		    , verb, verb_suffix, r);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 #endif /* KLIPS */
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* Check that we can route (and eroute).  Diagnose if we cannot. */
 
 enum routability {
-    route_impossible = 0,
-    route_easy = 1,
-    route_nearconflict = 2,
-    route_farconflict = 3
+	route_impossible = 0,
+	route_easy = 1,
+	route_nearconflict = 2,
+	route_farconflict = 3
 };
 
-static enum routability
-could_route(struct connection *c)
+static enum routability could_route(struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct spd_route *esr, *rosr;
-    struct connection *ero	/* who, if anyone, owns our eroute? */
-	, *ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, &ero, &esr); /* who owns our route? */
-
-    /* it makes no sense to route a connection that is ISAKMP-only */
-    if (!NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy) && !HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route an ISAKMP-only connection");
-	return route_impossible;
-    }
-
-    /* if this is a Road Warrior template, we cannot route.
-     * Opportunistic template is OK.
-     */
-    if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(c->policy & POLICY_OPPO))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route Road Warrior template");
-	return route_impossible;
-    }
-
-    /* if we don't know nexthop, we cannot route */
-    if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route connection without knowing our nexthop");
-	return route_impossible;
-    }
-
-    /* if routing would affect IKE messages, reject */
-    if (!no_klips
-    && c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT
-    && c->spd.this.host_port != IKE_UDP_PORT
-    && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot install route: peer is within its client");
-	return route_impossible;
-    }
-
-    /* If there is already a route for peer's client subnet
-     * and it disagrees about interface or nexthop, we cannot steal it.
-     * Note: if this connection is already routed (perhaps for another
-     * state object), the route will agree.
-     * This is as it should be -- it will arise during rekeying.
-     */
-    if (ro != NULL && !routes_agree(ro, c))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot route -- route already in use for \"%s\""
-	    , ro->name);
-	return route_impossible;  /* another connection already
-				     using the eroute */
-    }
+	struct spd_route *esr, *rosr;
+	struct connection *ero      /* who, if anyone, owns our eroute? */
+		, *ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, &ero, &esr); /* who owns our route? */
 
-#ifdef KLIPS
-    /* if there is an eroute for another connection, there is a problem */
-    if (ero != NULL && ero != c)
-    {
-	struct connection *ero2, *ero_top;
-	struct connection *inside, *outside;
-
-	/*
-	 * note, wavesec (PERMANENT) goes *outside* and
-	 * OE goes *inside* (TEMPLATE)
+	/* it makes no sense to route a connection that is ISAKMP-only */
+	if (!NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy) && !HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route an ISAKMP-only connection");
+		return route_impossible;
+	}
+
+	/* if this is a Road Warrior template, we cannot route.
+	 * Opportunistic template is OK.
 	 */
-	inside = NULL;
-	outside= NULL;
-	if (ero->kind == CK_PERMANENT
-	   && c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(c->policy & POLICY_OPPO))
 	{
-	    outside = ero;
-	    inside = c;
+		loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route Road Warrior template");
+		return route_impossible;
 	}
-	else if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT
-		&& ero->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+
+	/* if we don't know nexthop, we cannot route */
+	if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop))
 	{
-	    outside = c;
-	    inside = ero;
+		loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route connection without knowing our nexthop");
+		return route_impossible;
 	}
 
-	/* okay, check again, with correct order */
-	if (outside && outside->kind == CK_PERMANENT
-	    && inside && inside->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	/* if routing would affect IKE messages, reject */
+	if (!no_klips
+	&& c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT
+	&& c->spd.this.host_port != IKE_UDP_PORT
+	&& addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client))
 	{
-	    char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot install route: peer is within its client");
+		return route_impossible;
+	}
 
-	    /* this is a co-terminal attempt of the "near" kind. */
-	    /* when chaining, we chain from inside to outside */
+	/* If there is already a route for peer's client subnet
+	 * and it disagrees about interface or nexthop, we cannot steal it.
+	 * Note: if this connection is already routed (perhaps for another
+	 * state object), the route will agree.
+	 * This is as it should be -- it will arise during rekeying.
+	 */
+	if (ro != NULL && !routes_agree(ro, c))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot route -- route already in use for \"%s\""
+			, ro->name);
+		return route_impossible;  /* another connection already
+									 using the eroute */
+	}
 
-	    /* XXX permit multiple deep connections? */
-	    passert(inside->policy_next == NULL);
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	/* if there is an eroute for another connection, there is a problem */
+	if (ero != NULL && ero != c)
+	{
+		struct connection *ero2, *ero_top;
+		struct connection *inside, *outside;
 
-	    inside->policy_next = outside;
+		/*
+		 * note, wavesec (PERMANENT) goes *outside* and
+		 * OE goes *inside* (TEMPLATE)
+		 */
+		inside = NULL;
+		outside= NULL;
+		if (ero->kind == CK_PERMANENT
+		   && c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+		{
+			outside = ero;
+			inside = c;
+		}
+		else if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT
+				&& ero->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+		{
+			outside = c;
+			inside = ero;
+		}
 
-	    /* since we are going to steal the eroute from the secondary
-	     * policy, we need to make sure that it no longer thinks that
-	     * it owns the eroute.
-	     */
-	    outside->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
-	    outside->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED_KEYED;
+		/* okay, check again, with correct order */
+		if (outside && outside->kind == CK_PERMANENT
+			&& inside && inside->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+		{
+			char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
 
-	    /* set the priority of the new eroute owner to be higher
-	     * than that of the current eroute owner
-	     */
-	    inside->prio = outside->prio + 1;
+			/* this is a co-terminal attempt of the "near" kind. */
+			/* when chaining, we chain from inside to outside */
 
-	    fmt_conn_instance(inside, inst);
+			/* XXX permit multiple deep connections? */
+			passert(inside->policy_next == NULL);
 
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		   , "conflict on eroute (%s), switching eroute to %s and linking %s"
-		   , inst, inside->name, outside->name);
+			inside->policy_next = outside;
 
-	    return route_nearconflict;
-	}
+			/* since we are going to steal the eroute from the secondary
+			 * policy, we need to make sure that it no longer thinks that
+			 * it owns the eroute.
+			 */
+			outside->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+			outside->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED_KEYED;
 
-	/* look along the chain of policies for one with the same name */
-	ero_top = ero;
+			/* set the priority of the new eroute owner to be higher
+			 * than that of the current eroute owner
+			 */
+			inside->prio = outside->prio + 1;
 
-	for (ero2 = ero; ero2 != NULL; ero2 = ero->policy_next)
-	{
-	    if (ero2->kind == CK_TEMPLATE
-	    && streq(ero2->name, c->name))
-		break;
-	}
+			fmt_conn_instance(inside, inst);
 
-	/* If we fell of the end of the list, then we found no TEMPLATE
-	 * so there must be a conflict that we can't resolve.
-	 * As the names are not equal, then we aren't replacing/rekeying.
-	 */
-	if (ero2 == NULL)
-	{
-	    char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				   , "conflict on eroute (%s), switching eroute to %s and linking %s"
+				   , inst, inside->name, outside->name);
+
+			return route_nearconflict;
+		}
+
+		/* look along the chain of policies for one with the same name */
+		ero_top = ero;
+
+		for (ero2 = ero; ero2 != NULL; ero2 = ero->policy_next)
+		{
+			if (ero2->kind == CK_TEMPLATE
+			&& streq(ero2->name, c->name))
+				break;
+		}
+
+		/* If we fell of the end of the list, then we found no TEMPLATE
+		 * so there must be a conflict that we can't resolve.
+		 * As the names are not equal, then we aren't replacing/rekeying.
+		 */
+		if (ero2 == NULL)
+		{
+			char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
 
-	    fmt_conn_instance(ero, inst);
+			fmt_conn_instance(ero, inst);
 
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		, "cannot install eroute -- it is in use for \"%s\"%s #%lu"
-		, ero->name, inst, esr->eroute_owner);
-	    return FALSE;	/* another connection already using the eroute */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "cannot install eroute -- it is in use for \"%s\"%s #%lu"
+				, ero->name, inst, esr->eroute_owner);
+			return FALSE;       /* another connection already using the eroute */
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #endif /* KLIPS */
-    return route_easy;
+	return route_easy;
 }
 
-bool
-trap_connection(struct connection *c)
+bool trap_connection(struct connection *c)
 {
-    switch (could_route(c))
-    {
-    case route_impossible:
-	return FALSE;
-
-    case route_nearconflict:
-    case route_easy:
-	/* RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL is treated specially: we don't override
-	 * because we don't want to lose track of the IPSEC_SAs etc.
-	 */
-	if (c->spd.routing < RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+	switch (could_route(c))
 	{
-	    return route_and_eroute(c, &c->spd, NULL);
+	case route_impossible:
+		return FALSE;
+
+	case route_nearconflict:
+	case route_easy:
+		/* RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL is treated specially: we don't override
+		 * because we don't want to lose track of the IPSEC_SAs etc.
+		 */
+		if (c->spd.routing < RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+		{
+			return route_and_eroute(c, &c->spd, NULL);
+		}
+		return TRUE;
+
+	case route_farconflict:
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	return TRUE;
 
-    case route_farconflict:
 	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    return FALSE;
 }
 
-/* delete any eroute for a connection and unroute it if route isn't shared */
-void
-unroute_connection(struct connection *c)
+/**
+ * Delete any eroute for a connection and unroute it if route isn't shared
+ */
+void unroute_connection(struct connection *c)
 {
-    struct spd_route *sr;
-    enum routing_t cr;
-
-    for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
-    {
-	cr = sr->routing;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+	enum routing_t cr;
 
-	if (erouted(cr))
+	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
 	{
-	    /* cannot handle a live one */
-	    passert(sr->routing != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+		cr = sr->routing;
+
+		if (erouted(cr))
+		{
+			/* cannot handle a live one */
+			passert(sr->routing != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
 #ifdef KLIPS
-	    shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_UNROUTED, ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+			shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_UNROUTED, ERO_DELETE, "delete");
 #endif
-	}
+		}
 
-	sr->routing = RT_UNROUTED;  /* do now so route_owner won't find us */
+		sr->routing = RT_UNROUTED;  /* do now so route_owner won't find us */
 
-	/* only unroute if no other connection shares it */
-	if (routed(cr) && route_owner(c, NULL, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
-	    (void) do_command(c, sr, "unroute");
-    }
+		/* only unroute if no other connection shares it */
+		if (routed(cr) && route_owner(c, NULL, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+			(void) do_command(c, sr, "unroute");
+	}
 }
 
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
 
-static void
-set_text_said(char *text_said, const ip_address *dst, ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto)
+static void set_text_said(char *text_said, const ip_address *dst,
+						  ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto)
 {
-    ip_said said;
+	ip_said said;
 
-    initsaid(dst, spi, proto, &said);
-    satot(&said, 0, text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+	initsaid(dst, spi, proto, &said);
+	satot(&said, 0, text_said, SATOT_BUF);
 }
 
 /* find an entry in the bare_shunt table.
  * Trick: return a pointer to the pointer to the entry;
  * this allows the entry to be deleted.
  */
-static struct bare_shunt **
-bare_shunt_ptr(const ip_subnet *ours, const ip_subnet *his, int transport_proto)
+static struct bare_shunt** bare_shunt_ptr(const ip_subnet *ours,
+										  const ip_subnet *his, 
+										  int transport_proto)
 {
-    struct bare_shunt *p, **pp;
-
-    for (pp = &bare_shunts; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &p->next)
-    {
-	if (samesubnet(ours, &p->ours)
-	&& samesubnet(his, &p->his)
-	&& transport_proto == p->transport_proto
-	&& portof(&ours->addr) == portof(&p->ours.addr)
-	&& portof(&his->addr) == portof(&p->his.addr))
-	    return pp;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	struct bare_shunt *p, **pp;
+
+	for (pp = &bare_shunts; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &p->next)
+	{
+		if (samesubnet(ours, &p->ours)
+		&& samesubnet(his, &p->his)
+		&& transport_proto == p->transport_proto
+		&& portof(&ours->addr) == portof(&p->ours.addr)
+		&& portof(&his->addr) == portof(&p->his.addr))
+			return pp;
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* free a bare_shunt entry, given a pointer to the pointer */
-static void
-free_bare_shunt(struct bare_shunt **pp)
+static void free_bare_shunt(struct bare_shunt **pp)
 {
-    if (pp == NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("delete bare shunt: null pointer")
-	)
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct bare_shunt *p = *pp;
-
-	*pp = p->next;
-	DBG_bare_shunt("delete", p);
-	pfree(p->why);
-	pfree(p);
-    }
+	if (pp == NULL)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("delete bare shunt: null pointer")
+		)
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		struct bare_shunt *p = *pp;
+
+		*pp = p->next;
+		DBG_bare_shunt("delete", p);
+		free(p->why);
+		free(p);
+	}
 }
 
 void
 show_shunt_status(void)
 {
-    struct bare_shunt *bs;
-
-    for (bs = bare_shunts; bs != NULL; bs = bs->next)
-    {
-	/* Print interesting fields.  Ignore count and last_active. */
-
-	int ourport = ntohs(portof(&bs->ours.addr));
-	int hisport = ntohs(portof(&bs->his.addr));
-	char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	char sat[SATOT_BUF];
-	char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
-
-	subnettot(&(bs)->ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
-	subnettot(&(bs)->his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
-	satot(&(bs)->said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
-	fmt_policy_prio(bs->policy_prio, prio);
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d %s    %s"
-	    , ourst, ourport, hist, hisport, sat, bs->transport_proto
-	    , prio, bs->why);
-    }
-    if (bare_shunts != NULL)
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+	struct bare_shunt *bs;
+
+	for (bs = bare_shunts; bs != NULL; bs = bs->next)
+	{
+		/* Print interesting fields.  Ignore count and last_active. */
+
+		int ourport = ntohs(portof(&bs->ours.addr));
+		int hisport = ntohs(portof(&bs->his.addr));
+		char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		char sat[SATOT_BUF];
+		char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(&(bs)->ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+		subnettot(&(bs)->his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+		satot(&(bs)->said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
+		fmt_policy_prio(bs->policy_prio, prio);
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d %s    %s"
+			, ourst, ourport, hist, hisport, sat, bs->transport_proto
+			, prio, bs->why);
+	}
+	if (bare_shunts != NULL)
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);    /* spacer */
 }
 
 /* Setup an IPsec route entry.
  * op is one of the ERO_* operators.
  */
 
-static bool
-raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
-	   , const ip_subnet *this_client
-	   , const ip_address *that_host
-	   , const ip_subnet *that_client
-	   , ipsec_spi_t spi
-	   , unsigned int proto
-	   , unsigned int satype
-	   , unsigned int transport_proto
-	   , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
-	   , time_t use_lifetime
-	   , unsigned int op
-	   , const char *opname USED_BY_DEBUG)
+static bool raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host,
+					   const ip_subnet *this_client,
+					   const ip_address *that_host,
+					   const ip_subnet *that_client,
+		   			   ipsec_spi_t spi,
+		   			   unsigned int proto,
+					   unsigned int satype,
+					   unsigned int transport_proto,
+					   const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info,
+					   time_t use_lifetime,
+					   unsigned int op,
+					   const char *opname USED_BY_DEBUG)
 {
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
 
-    set_text_said(text_said, that_host, spi, proto);
+	set_text_said(text_said, that_host, spi, proto);
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_KLIPS,
-	{
-	    int sport = ntohs(portof(&this_client->addr));
-	    int dport = ntohs(portof(&that_client->addr));
-	    char mybuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	    char peerbuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-	    subnettot(this_client, 0, mybuf, sizeof(mybuf));
-	    subnettot(that_client, 0, peerbuf, sizeof(peerbuf));
-	    DBG_log("%s eroute %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d"
-		, opname, mybuf, sport, peerbuf, dport
-		, text_said, transport_proto);
-	});
-
-    return kernel_ops->raw_eroute(this_host, this_client
-	, that_host, that_client, spi, satype, transport_proto, proto_info
-	, use_lifetime, op, text_said);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_KLIPS,
+		{
+			int sport = ntohs(portof(&this_client->addr));
+			int dport = ntohs(portof(&that_client->addr));
+			char mybuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			char peerbuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+			subnettot(this_client, 0, mybuf, sizeof(mybuf));
+			subnettot(that_client, 0, peerbuf, sizeof(peerbuf));
+			DBG_log("%s eroute %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d"
+				, opname, mybuf, sport, peerbuf, dport
+				, text_said, transport_proto);
+		});
+
+	return kernel_ops->raw_eroute(this_host, this_client
+		, that_host, that_client, spi, satype, transport_proto, proto_info
+		, use_lifetime, op, text_said);
 }
 
 /* test to see if %hold remains */
-bool
-has_bare_hold(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst, int transport_proto)
+bool has_bare_hold(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst,
+				   int transport_proto)
 {
-    ip_subnet this_client, that_client;
-    struct bare_shunt **bspp;
-
-    passert(addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst));
-    happy(addrtosubnet(src, &this_client));
-    happy(addrtosubnet(dst, &that_client));
-    bspp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_client, &that_client, transport_proto);
-    return bspp != NULL
-	&& (*bspp)->said.proto == SA_INT && (*bspp)->said.spi == htonl(SPI_HOLD);
+	ip_subnet this_client, that_client;
+	struct bare_shunt **bspp;
+
+	passert(addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(src, &this_client));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(dst, &that_client));
+	bspp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_client, &that_client, transport_proto);
+	return bspp != NULL
+		&& (*bspp)->said.proto == SA_INT && (*bspp)->said.spi == htonl(SPI_HOLD);
 }
 
 
 /* Replace (or delete) a shunt that is in the bare_shunts table.
  * Issues the PF_KEY commands and updates the bare_shunts table.
  */
-bool
-replace_bare_shunt(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst
-		   , policy_prio_t policy_prio
-		   , ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi	/* in host order! */
-		   , bool repl	/* if TRUE, replace; if FALSE, delete */
-		   , unsigned int transport_proto
-		   , const char *why)
+bool replace_bare_shunt(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst,
+						policy_prio_t policy_prio, ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi,
+						bool repl, unsigned int transport_proto, const char *why)
 {
-    ip_subnet this_client, that_client;
-    ip_subnet this_broad_client, that_broad_client;
-    const ip_address *null_host = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(src))->any;
-
-    passert(addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst));
-    happy(addrtosubnet(src, &this_client));
-    happy(addrtosubnet(dst, &that_client));
-    this_broad_client = this_client;
-    that_broad_client = that_client;
-    setportof(0, &this_broad_client.addr);
-    setportof(0, &that_broad_client.addr);
-
-    if (repl)
-    {
-	struct bare_shunt **bs_pp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_broad_client
-						 , &that_broad_client, 0);
-
-	/* is there already a broad host-to-host bare shunt? */
-	if (bs_pp == NULL)
-	{
-	    if (raw_eroute(null_host, &this_broad_client, null_host, &that_broad_client
-			   , htonl(shunt_spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-			   , 0, null_proto_info
-			   , SHUNT_PATIENCE, ERO_ADD, why))
-	    {
-		struct bare_shunt *bs = alloc_thing(struct bare_shunt, "bare shunt");
-
-		bs->ours = this_broad_client;
-		bs->his =  that_broad_client;
-		bs->transport_proto = 0;
-		bs->said.proto = SA_INT;
-		bs->why = clone_str(why, "bare shunt story");
-		bs->policy_prio = policy_prio;
-		bs->said.spi = htonl(shunt_spi);
-		bs->said.dst = *null_host;
-		bs->count = 0;
-		bs->last_activity = now();
-		bs->next = bare_shunts;
-		bare_shunts = bs;
-		DBG_bare_shunt("add", bs);
-	    }
+	ip_subnet this_client, that_client;
+	ip_subnet this_broad_client, that_broad_client;
+	const ip_address *null_host = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(src))->any;
+
+	passert(addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(src, &this_client));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(dst, &that_client));
+	this_broad_client = this_client;
+	that_broad_client = that_client;
+	setportof(0, &this_broad_client.addr);
+	setportof(0, &that_broad_client.addr);
+
+	if (repl)
+	{
+		struct bare_shunt **bs_pp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_broad_client
+												 , &that_broad_client, 0);
+
+		/* is there already a broad host-to-host bare shunt? */
+		if (bs_pp == NULL)
+		{
+			if (raw_eroute(null_host, &this_broad_client, null_host, &that_broad_client
+						   , htonl(shunt_spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+						   , 0, null_proto_info
+						   , SHUNT_PATIENCE, ERO_ADD, why))
+			{
+				struct bare_shunt *bs = malloc_thing(struct bare_shunt);
+
+				bs->ours = this_broad_client;
+				bs->his =  that_broad_client;
+				bs->transport_proto = 0;
+				bs->said.proto = SA_INT;
+				bs->why = clone_str(why);
+				bs->policy_prio = policy_prio;
+				bs->said.spi = htonl(shunt_spi);
+				bs->said.dst = *null_host;
+				bs->count = 0;
+				bs->last_activity = now();
+				bs->next = bare_shunts;
+				bare_shunts = bs;
+				DBG_bare_shunt("add", bs);
+			}
+		}
+		shunt_spi = SPI_HOLD;
 	}
-	shunt_spi = SPI_HOLD;
-    }
 
-    if (raw_eroute(null_host, &this_client, null_host, &that_client
-		   , htonl(shunt_spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-		   , transport_proto, null_proto_info
-		   , SHUNT_PATIENCE, ERO_DELETE, why))
-    {
-	struct bare_shunt **bs_pp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_client, &that_client
-					, transport_proto);
+	if (raw_eroute(null_host, &this_client, null_host, &that_client
+				   , htonl(shunt_spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+				   , transport_proto, null_proto_info
+				   , SHUNT_PATIENCE, ERO_DELETE, why))
+	{
+		struct bare_shunt **bs_pp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_client, &that_client
+										, transport_proto);
 
-	/* delete bare eroute */
-	free_bare_shunt(bs_pp);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+		/* delete bare eroute */
+		free_bare_shunt(bs_pp);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 }
 
-static bool
-eroute_connection(struct spd_route *sr
-, ipsec_spi_t spi, unsigned int proto, unsigned int satype
-, const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
-, unsigned int op, const char *opname)
+static bool eroute_connection(struct spd_route *sr, ipsec_spi_t spi,
+							  unsigned int proto, unsigned int satype,
+							  const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info,
+							  unsigned int op, const char *opname)
 {
-    const ip_address *peer = &sr->that.host_addr;
-    char buf2[256];
+	const ip_address *peer = &sr->that.host_addr;
+	char buf2[256];
 
-    snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2)
-	     , "eroute_connection %s", opname);
+	snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2)
+			 , "eroute_connection %s", opname);
 
-    if (proto == SA_INT)
-	peer = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(peer))->any;
+	if (proto == SA_INT)
+		peer = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(peer))->any;
 
-    return raw_eroute(&sr->this.host_addr, &sr->this.client
-		      , peer
-		      , &sr->that.client
-		      , spi, proto, satype
-		      , sr->this.protocol, proto_info, 0, op, buf2);
+	return raw_eroute(&sr->this.host_addr, &sr->this.client
+					  , peer
+					  , &sr->that.client
+					  , spi, proto, satype
+					  , sr->this.protocol, proto_info, 0, op, buf2);
 }
 
 /* assign a bare hold to a connection */
 
-bool
-assign_hold(struct connection *c USED_BY_DEBUG
-	    , struct spd_route *sr
-	    , int transport_proto
-	    , const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst)
+bool assign_hold(struct connection *c USED_BY_DEBUG, struct spd_route *sr,
+				 int transport_proto,
+				 const ip_address *src,
+				 const ip_address *dst)
 {
-    /* either the automatically installed %hold eroute is broad enough
-     * or we try to add a broader one and delete the automatic one.
-     * Beware: this %hold might be already handled, but still squeak
-     * through because of a race.
-     */
-    enum routing_t ro = sr->routing	/* routing, old */
-	, rn = ro;			/* routing, new */
-
-    passert(LHAS(LELEM(CK_PERMANENT) | LELEM(CK_INSTANCE), c->kind));
-    /* figure out what routing should become */
-    switch (ro)
-    {
-    case RT_UNROUTED:
-	rn = RT_UNROUTED_HOLD;
-	break;
-    case RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE:
-	rn = RT_ROUTED_HOLD;
-	break;
-    default:
-	/* no change: this %hold is old news and should just be deleted */
-	break;
-    }
-
-    /* we need a broad %hold, not the narrow one.
-     * First we ensure that there is a broad %hold.
-     * There may already be one (race condition): no need to create one.
-     * There may already be a %trap: replace it.
-     * There may not be any broad eroute: add %hold.
-     * Once the broad %hold is in place, delete the narrow one.
-     */
-    if (rn != ro)
-    {
-	if (erouted(ro)
-	? !eroute_connection(sr, htonl(SPI_HOLD), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-		, null_proto_info
-		, ERO_REPLACE, "replace %trap with broad %hold")
-	: !eroute_connection(sr, htonl(SPI_HOLD), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-		, null_proto_info
-		, ERO_ADD, "add broad %hold"))
-	{
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-    }
-    if (!replace_bare_shunt(src, dst, BOTTOM_PRIO, SPI_HOLD, FALSE
-    , transport_proto, "delete narrow %hold"))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    sr->routing = rn;
-    return TRUE;
+	/* either the automatically installed %hold eroute is broad enough
+	 * or we try to add a broader one and delete the automatic one.
+	 * Beware: this %hold might be already handled, but still squeak
+	 * through because of a race.
+	 */
+	enum routing_t ro = sr->routing     /* routing, old */
+		, rn = ro;                      /* routing, new */
+
+	passert(LHAS(LELEM(CK_PERMANENT) | LELEM(CK_INSTANCE), c->kind));
+	/* figure out what routing should become */
+	switch (ro)
+	{
+	case RT_UNROUTED:
+		rn = RT_UNROUTED_HOLD;
+		break;
+	case RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE:
+		rn = RT_ROUTED_HOLD;
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* no change: this %hold is old news and should just be deleted */
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* we need a broad %hold, not the narrow one.
+	 * First we ensure that there is a broad %hold.
+	 * There may already be one (race condition): no need to create one.
+	 * There may already be a %trap: replace it.
+	 * There may not be any broad eroute: add %hold.
+	 * Once the broad %hold is in place, delete the narrow one.
+	 */
+	if (rn != ro)
+	{
+		if (erouted(ro)
+		? !eroute_connection(sr, htonl(SPI_HOLD), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+				, null_proto_info
+				, ERO_REPLACE, "replace %trap with broad %hold")
+		: !eroute_connection(sr, htonl(SPI_HOLD), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+				, null_proto_info
+				, ERO_ADD, "add broad %hold"))
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!replace_bare_shunt(src, dst, BOTTOM_PRIO, SPI_HOLD, FALSE
+	, transport_proto, "delete narrow %hold"))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	sr->routing = rn;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* install or remove eroute for SA Group */
-static bool
-sag_eroute(struct state *st, struct spd_route *sr
-	   , unsigned op, const char *opname)
+static bool sag_eroute(struct state *st, struct spd_route *sr,
+					   unsigned op, const char *opname)
 {
-    u_int inner_proto = 0;
-    u_int inner_satype = 0;
-    ipsec_spi_t inner_spi = 0;
-    struct pfkey_proto_info proto_info[4];
-    int i;
-    bool tunnel;
-
-    /* figure out the SPI and protocol (in two forms)
-     * for the innermost transformation.
-     */
-
-    i = sizeof(proto_info) / sizeof(proto_info[0]) - 1;
-    proto_info[i].proto = 0;
-    tunnel = FALSE;
-
-    if (st->st_ah.present)
-    {
-	inner_spi = st->st_ah.attrs.spi;
-	inner_proto = SA_AH;
-	inner_satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
-
-	i--;
-	proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_AH;
-	proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation;
-	tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-	proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid;
-    }
-
-    if (st->st_esp.present)
-    {
-	inner_spi = st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
-	inner_proto = SA_ESP;
-	inner_satype = SADB_SATYPE_ESP;
-
-	i--;
-	proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
-	proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
-	tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-	proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid + 1;
-    }
-
-    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-    {
-	inner_spi = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi;
-	inner_proto = SA_COMP;
-	inner_satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP;
-
-	i--;
-	proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
-	proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation;
-	tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-	proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid + 2;
-    }
-
-    if (i == sizeof(proto_info) / sizeof(proto_info[0]) - 1)
-    {
-	impossible();	/* no transform at all! */
-    }
-
-    if (tunnel)
-    {
-	int j;
-
-	inner_spi = st->st_tunnel_out_spi;
-	inner_proto = SA_IPIP;
-	inner_satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
-
-	proto_info[i].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-	for (j = i + 1; proto_info[j].proto; j++)
-	{
-	    proto_info[j].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
-	}
-    }
-
-    return eroute_connection(sr
-	, inner_spi, inner_proto, inner_satype, proto_info + i
-	, op, opname);
+	u_int inner_proto = 0;
+	u_int inner_satype = 0;
+	ipsec_spi_t inner_spi = 0;
+	struct pfkey_proto_info proto_info[4];
+	int i;
+	bool tunnel;
+
+	/* figure out the SPI and protocol (in two forms)
+	 * for the innermost transformation.
+	 */
+
+	i = sizeof(proto_info) / sizeof(proto_info[0]) - 1;
+	proto_info[i].proto = 0;
+	tunnel = FALSE;
+
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+		inner_spi = st->st_ah.attrs.spi;
+		inner_proto = SA_AH;
+		inner_satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
+
+		i--;
+		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation;
+		tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid;
+	}
+
+	if (st->st_esp.present)
+	{
+		inner_spi = st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+		inner_proto = SA_ESP;
+		inner_satype = SADB_SATYPE_ESP;
+
+		i--;
+		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+		tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid + 1;
+	}
+
+	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	{
+		inner_spi = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi;
+		inner_proto = SA_COMP;
+		inner_satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP;
+
+		i--;
+		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation;
+		tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid + 2;
+	}
+
+	if (i == sizeof(proto_info) / sizeof(proto_info[0]) - 1)
+	{
+		impossible();   /* no transform at all! */
+	}
+
+	if (tunnel)
+	{
+		int j;
+
+		inner_spi = st->st_tunnel_out_spi;
+		inner_proto = SA_IPIP;
+		inner_satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
+
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		for (j = i + 1; proto_info[j].proto; j++)
+		{
+			proto_info[j].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return eroute_connection(sr
+		, inner_spi, inner_proto, inner_satype, proto_info + i
+		, op, opname);
 }
 
 /* compute a (host-order!) SPI to implement the policy in connection c */
 ipsec_spi_t
 shunt_policy_spi(struct connection *c, bool prospective)
 {
-    /* note: these are in host order :-( */
-    static const ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi[] =
-    {
-	SPI_TRAP,	/* --initiateontraffic */
-	SPI_PASS,	/* --pass */
-	SPI_DROP,	/* --drop */
-	SPI_REJECT,	/* --reject */
-    };
-
-    static const ipsec_spi_t fail_spi[] =
-    {
-	0,	/* --none*/
-	SPI_PASS,	/* --failpass */
-	SPI_DROP,	/* --faildrop */
-	SPI_REJECT,	/* --failreject */
-    };
-
-    return prospective
-	? shunt_spi[(c->policy & POLICY_SHUNT_MASK) >> POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT]
-	: fail_spi[(c->policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) >> POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT];
+	/* note: these are in host order :-( */
+	static const ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi[] =
+	{
+		SPI_TRAP,       /* --initiateontraffic */
+		SPI_PASS,       /* --pass */
+		SPI_DROP,       /* --drop */
+		SPI_REJECT,     /* --reject */
+	};
+
+	static const ipsec_spi_t fail_spi[] =
+	{
+		0,      /* --none*/
+		SPI_PASS,       /* --failpass */
+		SPI_DROP,       /* --faildrop */
+		SPI_REJECT,     /* --failreject */
+	};
+
+	return prospective
+		? shunt_spi[(c->policy & POLICY_SHUNT_MASK) >> POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT]
+		: fail_spi[(c->policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) >> POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT];
 }
 
 /* Add/replace/delete a shunt eroute.
@@ -1261,89 +1255,87 @@ shunt_policy_spi(struct connection *c, bool prospective)
  * If negotiation has failed, the choice between %trap/%pass/%drop/%reject
  * is specified in the policy of connection c.
  */
-static bool
-shunt_eroute(struct connection *c
-, struct spd_route *sr
-, enum routing_t rt_kind
-, unsigned int op, const char *opname)
+static bool shunt_eroute(struct connection *c, struct spd_route *sr,
+						 enum routing_t rt_kind,
+						 unsigned int op, const char *opname)
 {
-    /* We are constructing a special SAID for the eroute.
-     * The destination doesn't seem to matter, but the family does.
-     * The protocol is SA_INT -- mark this as shunt.
-     * The satype has no meaning, but is required for PF_KEY header!
-     * The SPI signifies the kind of shunt.
-     */
-    ipsec_spi_t spi = shunt_policy_spi(c, rt_kind == RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE);
-    bool ok;
-
-    if (spi == 0)
-    {
-	/* we're supposed to end up with no eroute: rejig op and opname */
-	switch (op)
-	{
-	case ERO_REPLACE:
-	    /* replace with nothing == delete */
-	    op = ERO_DELETE;
-	    opname = "delete";
-	    break;
-	case ERO_ADD:
-	    /* add nothing == do nothing */
-	    return TRUE;
-	case ERO_DELETE:
-	    /* delete remains delete */
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    bad_case(op);
-	}
-    }
-    if (sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED && c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
-    {
-	/* We think that we have an eroute, but we don't.
-	 * Adjust the request and account for eclipses.
+	/* We are constructing a special SAID for the eroute.
+	 * The destination doesn't seem to matter, but the family does.
+	 * The protocol is SA_INT -- mark this as shunt.
+	 * The satype has no meaning, but is required for PF_KEY header!
+	 * The SPI signifies the kind of shunt.
 	 */
-	passert(eclipsable(sr));
-	switch (op)
-	{
-	case ERO_REPLACE:
-	    /* really an add */
-	    op = ERO_ADD;
-	    opname = "replace eclipsed";
-	    eclipse_count--;
-	    break;
-	case ERO_DELETE:
-	    /* delete unnecessary: we don't actually have an eroute */
-	    eclipse_count--;
-	    return TRUE;
-	case ERO_ADD:
-	default:
-	    bad_case(op);
+	ipsec_spi_t spi = shunt_policy_spi(c, rt_kind == RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE);
+	bool ok;
+
+	if (spi == 0)
+	{
+		/* we're supposed to end up with no eroute: rejig op and opname */
+		switch (op)
+		{
+		case ERO_REPLACE:
+			/* replace with nothing == delete */
+			op = ERO_DELETE;
+			opname = "delete";
+			break;
+		case ERO_ADD:
+			/* add nothing == do nothing */
+			return TRUE;
+		case ERO_DELETE:
+			/* delete remains delete */
+			break;
+		default:
+			bad_case(op);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else if (eclipse_count > 0 && op == ERO_DELETE && eclipsable(sr))
-    {
-	/* maybe we are uneclipsing something */
-	struct spd_route *esr;
-	struct connection *ue = eclipsed(c, &esr);
-
-	if (ue != NULL)
-	{
-	    esr->routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
-	    return shunt_eroute(ue, esr
-				, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE, ERO_REPLACE, "restoring eclipsed");
-	}
-    }
-
-    ok = TRUE;
-    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute)
-    {
-	ok = raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
-	    , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
-	    , htonl(spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-	    , 0, null_proto_info, 0
-	    , op | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT), opname);
-    }
-    return eroute_connection(sr, htonl(spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-	, null_proto_info, op, opname) && ok;
+	if (sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED && c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	{
+		/* We think that we have an eroute, but we don't.
+		 * Adjust the request and account for eclipses.
+		 */
+		passert(eclipsable(sr));
+		switch (op)
+		{
+		case ERO_REPLACE:
+			/* really an add */
+			op = ERO_ADD;
+			opname = "replace eclipsed";
+			eclipse_count--;
+			break;
+		case ERO_DELETE:
+			/* delete unnecessary: we don't actually have an eroute */
+			eclipse_count--;
+			return TRUE;
+		case ERO_ADD:
+		default:
+			bad_case(op);
+		}
+	}
+	else if (eclipse_count > 0 && op == ERO_DELETE && eclipsable(sr))
+	{
+		/* maybe we are uneclipsing something */
+		struct spd_route *esr;
+		struct connection *ue = eclipsed(c, &esr);
+
+		if (ue != NULL)
+		{
+			esr->routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+			return shunt_eroute(ue, esr
+								, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE, ERO_REPLACE, "restoring eclipsed");
+		}
+	}
+
+	ok = TRUE;
+	if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute)
+	{
+		ok = raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
+			, &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
+			, htonl(spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+			, 0, null_proto_info, 0
+			, op | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT), opname);
+	}
+	return eroute_connection(sr, htonl(spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+		, null_proto_info, op, opname) && ok;
 }
 
 
@@ -1357,28 +1349,27 @@ shunt_eroute(struct connection *c
  * The task here is to remove the ":p" part so that the rest can be read
  * by another routine.
  */
-static const char *
-read_proto(const char * s, size_t * len, int * transport_proto)
+static const char *read_proto(const char * s, size_t * len, int * transport_proto)
 {
-    const char * p;
-    const char * ugh;
-    unsigned long proto;
-    size_t l;
-
-    l = *len;
-    p = memchr(s, ':', l);
-    if (p == 0) {
-        *transport_proto = 0;
-        return 0;
-    }
-    ugh = ttoul(p+1, l-((p-s)+1), 10, &proto);
-    if (ugh != 0)
-        return ugh;
-    if (proto > 65535)
-        return "protocol number is too large, legal range is 0-65535";
-    *len = p-s;
-    *transport_proto = proto;
-    return 0;
+	const char * p;
+	const char * ugh;
+	unsigned long proto;
+	size_t l;
+
+	l = *len;
+	p = memchr(s, ':', l);
+	if (p == 0) {
+		*transport_proto = 0;
+		return 0;
+	}
+	ugh = ttoul(p+1, l-((p-s)+1), 10, &proto);
+	if (ugh != 0)
+		return ugh;
+	if (proto > 65535)
+		return "protocol number is too large, legal range is 0-65535";
+	*len = p-s;
+	*transport_proto = proto;
+	return 0;
 }
 
 
@@ -1407,937 +1398,931 @@ read_proto(const char * s, size_t * len, int * transport_proto)
  * searching for each is sequential.  If this becomes a problem, faster
  * searches could be implemented (hash or radix tree, for example).
  */
-void
-scan_proc_shunts(void)
+void scan_proc_shunts(void)
 {
-    static const char procname[] = "/proc/net/ipsec_eroute";
-    FILE *f;
-    time_t nw = now();
-    int lino;
-    struct eroute_info *expired = NULL;
-
-    event_schedule(EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN, SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL, NULL);
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-    	DBG_log("scanning for shunt eroutes")
-    )
-
-    /* free any leftover entries: they will be refreshed if still current */
-    while (orphaned_holds != NULL)
-    {
-	struct eroute_info *p = orphaned_holds;
-
-	orphaned_holds = p->next;
-	pfree(orphaned_holds);
-    }
-
-    /* decode the /proc file.  Don't do anything strenuous to it
-     * (certainly no PF_KEY stuff) to minimize the chance that it
-     * might change underfoot.
-     */
-
-    f = fopen(procname, "r");
-    if (f == NULL)
-	return;
-
-    /* for each line... */
-    for (lino = 1; ; lino++)
-    {
-	unsigned char buf[1024];  /* should be big enough */
-	chunk_t field[10];	  /* 10 is loose upper bound */
-	chunk_t *ff = NULL;	  /* fixed fields (excluding optional count) */
-	int fi;
-	struct eroute_info eri;
-	char *cp;
-	err_t context = ""
-	    , ugh = NULL;
-
-	cp = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f);
-	if (cp == NULL)
-	    break;
-
-	/* break out each field
-	 * Note: if there are too many fields, just stop;
-	 * it will be diagnosed a little later.
-	 */
-	for (fi = 0; fi < (int)elemsof(field); fi++)
+	static const char procname[] = "/proc/net/ipsec_eroute";
+	FILE *f;
+	time_t nw = now();
+	int lino;
+	struct eroute_info *expired = NULL;
+
+	event_schedule(EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN, SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL, NULL);
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("scanning for shunt eroutes")
+	)
+
+	/* free any leftover entries: they will be refreshed if still current */
+	while (orphaned_holds != NULL)
 	{
-	    static const char sep[] = " \t\n";	/* field-separating whitespace */
-	    size_t w;
+		struct eroute_info *p = orphaned_holds;
 
-	    cp += strspn(cp, sep);	/* find start of field */
-	    w = strcspn(cp, sep);	/* find width of field */
-	    setchunk(field[fi], cp, w);
-	    cp += w;
-	    if (w == 0)
-		break;
+		orphaned_holds = p->next;
+		free(orphaned_holds);
 	}
 
-	/* This odd do-hickey is to share error reporting code.
-	 * A break will get to that common code.  The setting
-	 * of "ugh" and "context" parameterize it.
+	/* decode the /proc file.  Don't do anything strenuous to it
+	 * (certainly no PF_KEY stuff) to minimize the chance that it
+	 * might change underfoot.
 	 */
-	do {
-	    /* Old entries have no packet count; new ones do.
-	     * check if things are as they should be.
-	     */
-	    if (fi == 5)
-		ff = &field[0];	/* old form, with no count */
-	    else if (fi == 6)
-		ff = &field[1];	/* new form, with count */
-	    else
-	    {
-		ugh = "has wrong number of fields";
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    if (ff[1].len != 2
-	    || strncmp(ff[1].ptr, "->", 2) != 0
-	    || ff[3].len != 2
-	    || strncmp(ff[3].ptr, "=>", 2) != 0)
-	    {
-		ugh = "is missing -> or =>";
-		break;
-	    }
 
-	    /* actually digest fields of interest */
+	f = fopen(procname, "r");
+	if (f == NULL)
+		return;
 
-	    /* packet count */
+	/* for each line... */
+	for (lino = 1; ; lino++)
+	{
+		unsigned char buf[1024];  /* should be big enough */
+		chunk_t field[10];        /* 10 is loose upper bound */
+		chunk_t *ff = NULL;       /* fixed fields (excluding optional count) */
+		int fi;
+		struct eroute_info eri;
+		char *cp;
+		err_t context = ""
+			, ugh = NULL;
+
+		cp = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f);
+		if (cp == NULL)
+			break;
 
-	    eri.count = 0;
-	    if (ff != field)
-	    {
-		context = "count field is malformed: ";
-		ugh = ttoul(field[0].ptr, field[0].len, 10, &eri.count);
-		if (ugh != NULL)
-		    break;
-	    }
+		/* break out each field
+		 * Note: if there are too many fields, just stop;
+		 * it will be diagnosed a little later.
+		 */
+		for (fi = 0; fi < (int)countof(field); fi++)
+		{
+			static const char sep[] = " \t\n";  /* field-separating whitespace */
+			size_t w;
+
+			cp += strspn(cp, sep);      /* find start of field */
+			w = strcspn(cp, sep);       /* find width of field */
+			field[fi] = chunk_create(cp, w);
+			cp += w;
+			if (w == 0)
+				break;
+		}
 
-	    /* our client */
+		/* This odd do-hickey is to share error reporting code.
+		 * A break will get to that common code.  The setting
+		 * of "ugh" and "context" parameterize it.
+		 */
+		do {
+			/* Old entries have no packet count; new ones do.
+			 * check if things are as they should be.
+			 */
+			if (fi == 5)
+				ff = &field[0]; /* old form, with no count */
+			else if (fi == 6)
+				ff = &field[1]; /* new form, with count */
+			else
+			{
+				ugh = "has wrong number of fields";
+				break;
+			}
 
-	    context = "source subnet field malformed: ";
-	    ugh = ttosubnet(ff[0].ptr, ff[0].len, AF_INET, &eri.ours);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		break;
+			if (ff[1].len != 2
+			|| strncmp(ff[1].ptr, "->", 2) != 0
+			|| ff[3].len != 2
+			|| strncmp(ff[3].ptr, "=>", 2) != 0)
+			{
+				ugh = "is missing -> or =>";
+				break;
+			}
 
-	    /* his client */
+			/* actually digest fields of interest */
 
-	    context = "destination subnet field malformed: ";
-	    ugh = ttosubnet(ff[2].ptr, ff[2].len, AF_INET, &eri.his);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		break;
+			/* packet count */
 
-	    /* SAID */
+			eri.count = 0;
+			if (ff != field)
+			{
+				context = "count field is malformed: ";
+				ugh = ttoul(field[0].ptr, field[0].len, 10, &eri.count);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+					break;
+			}
 
-	    context = "SA ID field malformed: ";
-            ugh = read_proto(ff[4].ptr, &ff[4].len, &eri.transport_proto);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		break;
-	    ugh = ttosa(ff[4].ptr, ff[4].len, &eri.said);
-	} while (FALSE);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    plog("INTERNAL ERROR: %s line %d %s%s"
-		, procname, lino, context, ugh);
-	    continue;	/* ignore rest of line */
-	}
-
-	/* Now we have decoded eroute, let's consider it.
-	 * For shunt eroutes:
-	 *
-	 * %hold: if not known, add to orphaned_holds list for initiation
-	 *    because ACQUIRE might have been lost.
-	 *
-	 * %pass, %drop, %reject: determine if idle; if so, blast it away.
-	 *    Can occur bare (if DNS provided insufficient information)
-	 *    or with a connection (failure context).
-	 *    Could even be installed by ipsec manual.
-	 *
-	 * %trap: always welcome.
-	 *
-	 * For other eroutes: find state and record count change
-	 */
-	if (eri.said.proto == SA_INT)
-	{
-	    /* shunt eroute */
-	    switch (ntohl(eri.said.spi))
-	    {
-	    case SPI_HOLD:
-		if (bare_shunt_ptr(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.transport_proto) == NULL
-		&& shunt_owner(&eri.ours, &eri.his) == NULL)
+			/* our client */
+
+			context = "source subnet field malformed: ";
+			ugh = ttosubnet(ff[0].ptr, ff[0].len, AF_INET, &eri.ours);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+				break;
+
+			/* his client */
+
+			context = "destination subnet field malformed: ";
+			ugh = ttosubnet(ff[2].ptr, ff[2].len, AF_INET, &eri.his);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+				break;
+
+			/* SAID */
+
+			context = "SA ID field malformed: ";
+			ugh = read_proto(ff[4].ptr, &ff[4].len, &eri.transport_proto);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+				break;
+			ugh = ttosa(ff[4].ptr, ff[4].len, &eri.said);
+		} while (FALSE);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
 		{
-		    int ourport = ntohs(portof(&eri.ours.addr));
-		    int hisport = ntohs(portof(&eri.his.addr));
-		    char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-		    char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-		    char sat[SATOT_BUF];
-
-		    subnettot(&eri.ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
-		    subnettot(&eri.his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
-		    satot(&eri.said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
-
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			DBG_log("add orphaned shunt %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d"
-			    , ourst, ourport, hist, hisport, sat, eri.transport_proto)
-		     )
-		    eri.next = orphaned_holds;
-		    orphaned_holds = clone_thing(eri, "orphaned %hold");
+			plog("INTERNAL ERROR: %s line %d %s%s"
+				, procname, lino, context, ugh);
+			continue;   /* ignore rest of line */
 		}
-		break;
 
-	    case SPI_PASS:
-	    case SPI_DROP:
-	    case SPI_REJECT:
-		/* nothing sensible to do if we don't have counts */
-		if (ff != field)
+		/* Now we have decoded eroute, let's consider it.
+		 * For shunt eroutes:
+		 *
+		 * %hold: if not known, add to orphaned_holds list for initiation
+		 *    because ACQUIRE might have been lost.
+		 *
+		 * %pass, %drop, %reject: determine if idle; if so, blast it away.
+		 *    Can occur bare (if DNS provided insufficient information)
+		 *    or with a connection (failure context).
+		 *    Could even be installed by ipsec manual.
+		 *
+		 * %trap: always welcome.
+		 *
+		 * For other eroutes: find state and record count change
+		 */
+		if (eri.said.proto == SA_INT)
 		{
-		    struct bare_shunt **bs_pp
-			= bare_shunt_ptr(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.transport_proto);
-
-		    if (bs_pp != NULL)
-		    {
-			struct bare_shunt *bs = *bs_pp;
-
-			if (eri.count != bs->count)
+			/* shunt eroute */
+			switch (ntohl(eri.said.spi))
 			{
-			    bs->count = eri.count;
-			    bs->last_activity = nw;
+			case SPI_HOLD:
+				if (bare_shunt_ptr(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.transport_proto) == NULL
+				&& shunt_owner(&eri.ours, &eri.his) == NULL)
+				{
+					int ourport = ntohs(portof(&eri.ours.addr));
+					int hisport = ntohs(portof(&eri.his.addr));
+					char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+					char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+					char sat[SATOT_BUF];
+
+					subnettot(&eri.ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+					subnettot(&eri.his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+					satot(&eri.said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
+
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+						DBG_log("add orphaned shunt %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d"
+							, ourst, ourport, hist, hisport, sat, eri.transport_proto)
+					 )
+					eri.next = orphaned_holds;
+					orphaned_holds = clone_thing(eri);
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case SPI_PASS:
+			case SPI_DROP:
+			case SPI_REJECT:
+				/* nothing sensible to do if we don't have counts */
+				if (ff != field)
+				{
+					struct bare_shunt **bs_pp
+						= bare_shunt_ptr(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.transport_proto);
+
+					if (bs_pp != NULL)
+					{
+						struct bare_shunt *bs = *bs_pp;
+
+						if (eri.count != bs->count)
+						{
+							bs->count = eri.count;
+							bs->last_activity = nw;
+						}
+						else if (nw - bs->last_activity > SHUNT_PATIENCE)
+						{
+							eri.next = expired;
+							expired = clone_thing(eri);
+						}
+					}
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case SPI_TRAP:
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				bad_case(ntohl(eri.said.spi));
 			}
-			else if (nw - bs->last_activity > SHUNT_PATIENCE)
-			{
-			    eri.next = expired;
-			    expired = clone_thing(eri, "expired %pass");
-			}
-		    }
 		}
-		break;
-
-	    case SPI_TRAP:
-		break;
+		else
+		{
+			/* regular (non-shunt) eroute */
+			state_eroute_usage(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.count, nw);
+		}
+	}   /* for each line */
+	fclose(f);
 
-	    default:
-		bad_case(ntohl(eri.said.spi));
-	    }
-	}
-	else
+	/* Now that we've finished processing the /proc file,
+	 * it is safe to delete the expired %pass shunts.
+	 */
+	while (expired != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* regular (non-shunt) eroute */
-	    state_eroute_usage(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.count, nw);
-	}
-    }	/* for each line */
-    fclose(f);
-
-    /* Now that we've finished processing the /proc file,
-     * it is safe to delete the expired %pass shunts.
-     */
-    while (expired != NULL)
-    {
-	struct eroute_info *p = expired;
-	ip_address src, dst;
-
-	networkof(&p->ours, &src);
-	networkof(&p->his, &dst);
-	(void) replace_bare_shunt(&src, &dst
-	    , BOTTOM_PRIO	/* not used because we are deleting.  This value is a filler */
-	    , SPI_PASS	/* not used because we are deleting.  This value is a filler */
-	    , FALSE, p->transport_proto, "delete expired bare shunts");
-	expired = p->next;
-	pfree(p);
-    }
+		struct eroute_info *p = expired;
+		ip_address src, dst;
+
+		networkof(&p->ours, &src);
+		networkof(&p->his, &dst);
+		(void) replace_bare_shunt(&src, &dst
+			, BOTTOM_PRIO       /* not used because we are deleting.  This value is a filler */
+			, SPI_PASS  /* not used because we are deleting.  This value is a filler */
+			, FALSE, p->transport_proto, "delete expired bare shunts");
+		expired = p->next;
+		free(p);
+	}
 }
 
-static bool
-del_spi(ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto
-, const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dest)
+static bool del_spi(ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto,
+					const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dest)
 {
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
-    struct kernel_sa sa;
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	struct kernel_sa sa;
 
-    set_text_said(text_said, dest, spi, proto);
+	set_text_said(text_said, dest, spi, proto);
 
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("delete %s", text_said));
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("delete %s", text_said));
 
-    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-    sa.spi = spi;
-    sa.proto = proto;
-    sa.src = src;
-    sa.dst = dest;
-    sa.text_said = text_said;
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.spi = spi;
+	sa.proto = proto;
+	sa.src = src;
+	sa.dst = dest;
+	sa.text_said = text_said;
 
-    return kernel_ops->del_sa(&sa);
+	return kernel_ops->del_sa(&sa);
 }
 
 /* Setup a pair of SAs. Code taken from setsa.c and spigrp.c, in
  * ipsec-0.5.
  */
 
-static bool
-setup_half_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound)
+static bool setup_half_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound)
 {
-    /* Build an inbound or outbound SA */
-
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    ip_subnet src, dst;
-    ip_subnet src_client, dst_client;
-    ipsec_spi_t inner_spi = 0;
-    u_int proto = 0;
-    u_int satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
-    bool replace;
-
-    /* SPIs, saved for spigrouping or undoing, if necessary */
-    struct kernel_sa
-	said[EM_MAXRELSPIS],
-	*said_next = said;
-
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
-    int encapsulation;
-
-    replace = inbound && (kernel_ops->get_spi != NULL);
-
-    src.maskbits = 0;
-    dst.maskbits = 0;
-
-    if (inbound)
-    {
-	src.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
-	dst.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr;
-	src_client = c->spd.that.client;
-	dst_client = c->spd.this.client;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	src.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr,
-	dst.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
-	src_client = c->spd.this.client;
-	dst_client = c->spd.that.client;
-    }
-
-    encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
-    if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-	|| st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-	|| st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-    {
-	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-    }
-
-    memset(said, 0, sizeof(said));
-
-    /* If we are tunnelling, set up IP in IP pseudo SA */
-
-    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute)
-    {
-	inner_spi = 256;
-	proto = SA_IPIP;
-	satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
-    }
-    else if (encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-    {
-	/* XXX hack alert -- we SHOULD NOT HAVE TO HAVE A DIFFERENT SPI
-	 * XXX FOR IP-in-IP ENCAPSULATION!
-	 */
+	/* Build an inbound or outbound SA */
 
-	ipsec_spi_t ipip_spi;
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	ip_subnet src, dst;
+	ip_subnet src_client, dst_client;
+	ipsec_spi_t inner_spi = 0;
+	u_int proto = 0;
+	u_int satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
+	bool replace;
 
-	/* Allocate an SPI for the tunnel.
-	 * Since our peer will never see this,
-	 * and it comes from its own number space,
-	 * it is purely a local implementation wart.
-	 */
+	/* SPIs, saved for spigrouping or undoing, if necessary */
+	struct kernel_sa
+		said[EM_MAXRELSPIS],
+		*said_next = said;
+
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	int encapsulation;
+
+	replace = inbound && (kernel_ops->get_spi != NULL);
+
+	src.maskbits = 0;
+	dst.maskbits = 0;
+
+	if (inbound)
+	{
+		src.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		dst.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr;
+		src_client = c->spd.that.client;
+		dst_client = c->spd.this.client;
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    static ipsec_spi_t last_tunnel_spi = IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN;
+		src.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr,
+		dst.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		src_client = c->spd.this.client;
+		dst_client = c->spd.that.client;
+	}
 
-	    ipip_spi = htonl(++last_tunnel_spi);
-	    if (inbound)
-		st->st_tunnel_in_spi = ipip_spi;
-	    else
-		st->st_tunnel_out_spi = ipip_spi;
+	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+	if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+		|| st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+		|| st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+	{
+		encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
 	}
 
-	set_text_said(text_said
-	    , &c->spd.that.host_addr, ipip_spi, SA_IPIP);
+	memset(said, 0, sizeof(said));
 
-	said_next->src = &src.addr;
-	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
-	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
-	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
-	said_next->spi = ipip_spi;
-	said_next->satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
-	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+	/* If we are tunnelling, set up IP in IP pseudo SA */
 
-	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
-	    goto fail;
+	if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute)
+	{
+		inner_spi = 256;
+		proto = SA_IPIP;
+		satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
+	}
+	else if (encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+	{
+		/* XXX hack alert -- we SHOULD NOT HAVE TO HAVE A DIFFERENT SPI
+		 * XXX FOR IP-in-IP ENCAPSULATION!
+		 */
 
-	said_next++;
+		ipsec_spi_t ipip_spi;
 
-	inner_spi = ipip_spi;
-	proto = SA_IPIP;
-	satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
-    }
+		/* Allocate an SPI for the tunnel.
+		 * Since our peer will never see this,
+		 * and it comes from its own number space,
+		 * it is purely a local implementation wart.
+		 */
+		{
+			static ipsec_spi_t last_tunnel_spi = IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN;
 
-    /* set up IPCOMP SA, if any */
+			ipip_spi = htonl(++last_tunnel_spi);
+			if (inbound)
+				st->st_tunnel_in_spi = ipip_spi;
+			else
+				st->st_tunnel_out_spi = ipip_spi;
+		}
 
-    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-    {
-	ipsec_spi_t ipcomp_spi = inbound? st->st_ipcomp.our_spi : st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi;
-	unsigned compalg;
+		set_text_said(text_said
+			, &c->spd.that.host_addr, ipip_spi, SA_IPIP);
 
-	switch (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.transid)
-	{
-	    case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:
-		compalg = SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE;
-		break;
+		said_next->src = &src.addr;
+		said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+		said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+		said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+		said_next->spi = ipip_spi;
+		said_next->satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
+		said_next->text_said = text_said;
 
-	    default:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPCOMP transform %s not implemented"
-		    , enum_name(&ipcomp_transformid_names, st->st_ipcomp.attrs.transid));
-		goto fail;
-	}
+		if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+			goto fail;
 
-	set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, ipcomp_spi, SA_COMP);
+		said_next++;
 
-	said_next->src = &src.addr;
-	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
-	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
-	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
-	said_next->spi = ipcomp_spi;
-	said_next->satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP;
-	said_next->compalg = compalg;
-	said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
-	said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid + 2;
-	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+		inner_spi = ipip_spi;
+		proto = SA_IPIP;
+		satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
+	}
 
-	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
-	    goto fail;
+	/* set up IPCOMP SA, if any */
 
-	said_next++;
+	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	{
+		ipsec_spi_t ipcomp_spi = inbound? st->st_ipcomp.our_spi : st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi;
+		unsigned compalg;
 
-	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
-    }
+		switch (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.transid)
+		{
+			case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:
+				compalg = SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPCOMP transform %s not implemented"
+					, enum_name(&ipcomp_transformid_names, st->st_ipcomp.attrs.transid));
+				goto fail;
+		}
 
-    /* set up ESP SA, if any */
+		set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, ipcomp_spi, SA_COMP);
 
-    if (st->st_esp.present)
-    {
-	ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = inbound? st->st_esp.our_spi : st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
-	u_char *esp_dst_keymat = inbound? st->st_esp.our_keymat : st->st_esp.peer_keymat;
-	const struct esp_info *ei;
-	u_int16_t key_len;
-
-	static const struct esp_info esp_info[] = {
-	    { ESP_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
-		0, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
-		SADB_EALG_NULL, SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC },
-	    { ESP_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
-		0, HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN,
-		SADB_EALG_NULL, SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC },
-
-	    { ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,
-		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, 0,
-		SADB_EALG_DESCBC, SADB_AALG_NONE },
-	    { ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
-		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
-		SADB_EALG_DESCBC, SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC },
-	    { ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
-		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN, SADB_EALG_DESCBC, SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC },
-
-	    { ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,
-		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, 0,
-		SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, SADB_AALG_NONE },
-	    { ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
-		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
-		SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC },
-	    { ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
-		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN,
-		SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC },
-	};
+		said_next->src = &src.addr;
+		said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+		said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+		said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+		said_next->spi = ipcomp_spi;
+		said_next->satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP;
+		said_next->compalg = compalg;
+		said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
+		said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid + 2;
+		said_next->text_said = text_said;
 
-	u_int8_t natt_type = 0;
-	u_int16_t natt_sport = 0;
-	u_int16_t natt_dport = 0;
-	ip_address natt_oa;
+		if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+			goto fail;
 
-	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-	{
-	    natt_type = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING) ?
-		ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_ESP : ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE;
-	    natt_sport = inbound? c->spd.that.host_port : c->spd.this.host_port;
-	    natt_dport = inbound? c->spd.this.host_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
-	    natt_oa = st->nat_oa;
+		said_next++;
+
+		encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
 	}
 
-	for (ei = esp_info; ; ei++)
+	/* set up ESP SA, if any */
+
+	if (st->st_esp.present)
 	{
-	    if (ei == &esp_info[elemsof(esp_info)])
-	    {
-		/* Check for additional kernel alg */
-#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
-		if ((ei=kernel_alg_esp_info(st->st_esp.attrs.transid, 
-					st->st_esp.attrs.auth))!=NULL) {
-			break;
+		ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = inbound? st->st_esp.our_spi : st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+		u_char *esp_dst_keymat = inbound? st->st_esp.our_keymat : st->st_esp.peer_keymat;
+		const struct esp_info *ei;
+		u_int16_t key_len;
+
+		static const struct esp_info esp_info[] = {
+			{ ESP_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
+				0, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
+				SADB_EALG_NULL, SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC },
+			{ ESP_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
+				0, HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN,
+				SADB_EALG_NULL, SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC },
+
+			{ ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,
+				DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, 0,
+				SADB_EALG_DESCBC, SADB_AALG_NONE },
+			{ ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
+				DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
+				SADB_EALG_DESCBC, SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC },
+			{ ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
+				DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+				HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN, SADB_EALG_DESCBC, SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC },
+
+			{ ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,
+				DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, 0,
+				SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, SADB_AALG_NONE },
+			{ ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
+				DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
+				SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC },
+			{ ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
+				DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN,
+				SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC },
+		};
+
+		u_int8_t natt_type = 0;
+		u_int16_t natt_sport = 0;
+		u_int16_t natt_dport = 0;
+		ip_address natt_oa;
+
+		if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		{
+			natt_type = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING) ?
+				ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_ESP : ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE;
+			natt_sport = inbound? c->spd.that.host_port : c->spd.this.host_port;
+			natt_dport = inbound? c->spd.this.host_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
+			natt_oa = st->nat_oa;
 		}
-#endif
 
-		/* note: enum_show may use a static buffer, so two
-		 * calls in one printf would be a mistake.
-		 * enum_name does the same job, without a static buffer,
-		 * assuming the name will be found.
-		 */
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP transform %s / auth %s not implemented yet"
-		    , enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid)
-		    , enum_name(&auth_alg_names, st->st_esp.attrs.auth));
-		goto fail;
-	    }
-
-	    if (st->st_esp.attrs.transid == ei->transid
-	    && st->st_esp.attrs.auth == ei->auth)
-		break;
-	}
+		for (ei = esp_info; ; ei++)
+		{
+			if (ei == &esp_info[countof(esp_info)])
+			{
+				/* Check for additional kernel alg */
+#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
+				if ((ei=kernel_alg_esp_info(st->st_esp.attrs.transid, 
+										st->st_esp.attrs.auth))!=NULL) {
+						break;
+				}
+#endif
 
-	key_len = st->st_esp.attrs.key_len/8;
-	if (key_len)
-	{
-	    /* XXX: must change to check valid _range_ key_len */
-	    if (key_len > ei->enckeylen)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP transform %s passed key_len=%d > %d",
-		    enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid),
-		    (int)key_len, (int)ei->enckeylen);
-		goto fail;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    key_len = ei->enckeylen;
-	}
-	/* Grrrrr.... f*cking 7 bits jurassic algos  */
+				/* note: enum_show may use a static buffer, so two
+				 * calls in one printf would be a mistake.
+				 * enum_name does the same job, without a static buffer,
+				 * assuming the name will be found.
+				 */
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP transform %s / auth %s not implemented yet"
+					, enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid)
+					, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, st->st_esp.attrs.auth));
+				goto fail;
+			}
 
-	/* 168 bits in kernel, need 192 bits for keymat_len */
-	if (ei->transid == ESP_3DES && key_len == 21) 
-	    key_len = 24;
+			if (st->st_esp.attrs.transid == ei->transid
+			&& st->st_esp.attrs.auth == ei->auth)
+				break;
+		}
 
-	/* 56 bits in kernel, need 64 bits for keymat_len */
-	if (ei->transid == ESP_DES && key_len == 7) 
-	    key_len = 8;
+		key_len = st->st_esp.attrs.key_len/8;
+		if (key_len)
+		{
+			/* XXX: must change to check valid _range_ key_len */
+			if (key_len > ei->enckeylen)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP transform %s passed key_len=%d > %d",
+					enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid),
+					(int)key_len, (int)ei->enckeylen);
+				goto fail;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			key_len = ei->enckeylen;
+		}
+		/* Grrrrr.... f*cking 7 bits jurassic algos  */
+
+		/* 168 bits in kernel, need 192 bits for keymat_len */
+		if (ei->transid == ESP_3DES && key_len == 21) 
+			key_len = 24;
+
+		/* 56 bits in kernel, need 64 bits for keymat_len */
+		if (ei->transid == ESP_DES && key_len == 7) 
+			key_len = 8;
+
+		/* divide up keying material */
+		/* passert(st->st_esp.keymat_len == ei->enckeylen + ei->authkeylen); */
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS|DBG_CONTROL|DBG_PARSING, 
+			if(st->st_esp.keymat_len != key_len + ei->authkeylen)
+				DBG_log("keymat_len=%d key_len=%d authkeylen=%d",
+						st->st_esp.keymat_len, (int)key_len, (int)ei->authkeylen);
+		)
+		passert(st->st_esp.keymat_len == key_len + ei->authkeylen);
+
+		set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, esp_spi, SA_ESP);
+
+		said_next->src = &src.addr;
+		said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+		said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+		said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+		said_next->spi = esp_spi;
+		said_next->satype = SADB_SATYPE_ESP;
+		said_next->replay_window = (kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS) ? REPLAY_WINDOW : REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM;
+		said_next->authalg = ei->authalg;
+		said_next->authkeylen = ei->authkeylen;
+		/* said_next->authkey = esp_dst_keymat + ei->enckeylen; */
+		said_next->authkey = esp_dst_keymat + key_len;
+		said_next->encalg = ei->encryptalg;
+		/* said_next->enckeylen = ei->enckeylen; */
+		said_next->enckeylen = key_len;
+		said_next->enckey = esp_dst_keymat;
+		said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
+		said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid + 1;
+		said_next->natt_sport = natt_sport;
+		said_next->natt_dport = natt_dport;
+		said_next->transid = st->st_esp.attrs.transid;
+		said_next->natt_type = natt_type;
+		said_next->natt_oa = &natt_oa;
+		said_next->text_said = text_said;
+
+		if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+			goto fail;
+
+		said_next++;
+
+		encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+	}
 
-	/* divide up keying material */
-	/* passert(st->st_esp.keymat_len == ei->enckeylen + ei->authkeylen); */
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS|DBG_CONTROL|DBG_PARSING, 
-	    if(st->st_esp.keymat_len != key_len + ei->authkeylen)
-		DBG_log("keymat_len=%d key_len=%d authkeylen=%d",
-			st->st_esp.keymat_len, (int)key_len, (int)ei->authkeylen);
-	)
-	passert(st->st_esp.keymat_len == key_len + ei->authkeylen);
-
-	set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, esp_spi, SA_ESP);
-
-	said_next->src = &src.addr;
-	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
-	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
-	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
-	said_next->spi = esp_spi;
-	said_next->satype = SADB_SATYPE_ESP;
-	said_next->replay_window = (kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS) ? REPLAY_WINDOW : REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM;
-	said_next->authalg = ei->authalg;
-	said_next->authkeylen = ei->authkeylen;
-	/* said_next->authkey = esp_dst_keymat + ei->enckeylen; */
-	said_next->authkey = esp_dst_keymat + key_len;
-	said_next->encalg = ei->encryptalg;
-	/* said_next->enckeylen = ei->enckeylen; */
-	said_next->enckeylen = key_len;
-	said_next->enckey = esp_dst_keymat;
-	said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
-	said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid + 1;
-	said_next->natt_sport = natt_sport;
-	said_next->natt_dport = natt_dport;
-	said_next->transid = st->st_esp.attrs.transid;
-	said_next->natt_type = natt_type;
-	said_next->natt_oa = &natt_oa;
-	said_next->text_said = text_said;
-
-	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
-	    goto fail;
-
-	said_next++;
+	/* set up AH SA, if any */
 
-	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
-    }
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+		ipsec_spi_t ah_spi = inbound? st->st_ah.our_spi : st->st_ah.attrs.spi;
+		u_char *ah_dst_keymat = inbound? st->st_ah.our_keymat : st->st_ah.peer_keymat;
 
-    /* set up AH SA, if any */
+		unsigned char authalg;
 
-    if (st->st_ah.present)
-    {
-	ipsec_spi_t ah_spi = inbound? st->st_ah.our_spi : st->st_ah.attrs.spi;
-	u_char *ah_dst_keymat = inbound? st->st_ah.our_keymat : st->st_ah.peer_keymat;
+		switch (st->st_ah.attrs.auth)
+		{
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+			authalg = SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC;
+			break;
 
-	unsigned char authalg;
+		case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+			authalg = SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC;
+			break;
 
-	switch (st->st_ah.attrs.auth)
-	{
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
-	    authalg = SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC;
-	    break;
+		default:
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s not implemented yet"
+				, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, st->st_ah.attrs.auth));
+			goto fail;
+		}
 
-	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
-	    authalg = SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC;
-	    break;
+		set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, ah_spi, SA_AH);
 
-	default:
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s not implemented yet"
-		, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, st->st_ah.attrs.auth));
-	    goto fail;
-	}
+		said_next->src = &src.addr;
+		said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+		said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+		said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+		said_next->spi = ah_spi;
+		said_next->satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
+		said_next->replay_window = (kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS) ? REPLAY_WINDOW : REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM;
+		said_next->authalg = authalg;
+		said_next->authkeylen = st->st_ah.keymat_len;
+		said_next->authkey = ah_dst_keymat;
+		said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
+		said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid;
+		said_next->text_said = text_said;
 
-	set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, ah_spi, SA_AH);
+		if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+			goto fail;
 
-	said_next->src = &src.addr;
-	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
-	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
-	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
-	said_next->spi = ah_spi;
-	said_next->satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
-	said_next->replay_window = (kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS) ? REPLAY_WINDOW : REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM;
-	said_next->authalg = authalg;
-	said_next->authkeylen = st->st_ah.keymat_len;
-	said_next->authkey = ah_dst_keymat;
-	said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
-	said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid;
-	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+		said_next++;
 
-	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
-	    goto fail;
+		encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+	}
 
-	said_next++;
+	if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	|| st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	|| st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+	{
+		encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+	}
 
-	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
-    }
-
-    if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-    || st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-    || st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-    {
-	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-    }
-
-    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute ? c->spd.eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY
-	: encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-    {
-	/* If inbound, and policy does not specifie DISABLEARRIVALCHECK,
-	 * tell KLIPS to enforce the IP addresses appropriate for this tunnel.
-	 * Note reversed ends.
-	 * Not much to be done on failure.
-	 */
-	if (inbound && (c->policy & POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK) == 0)
+	if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute ? c->spd.eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY
+		: encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
 	{
-	    struct pfkey_proto_info proto_info[4];
-	    int i = 0;
-	    
-	    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-	    {
-		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
-		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation;
-		proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid + 2;
-		i++;
-	    }
-	    
-	    if (st->st_esp.present)
-	    {
-		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
-		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
-		proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid + 1;
-		i++;
-	    }
-	    
-	    if (st->st_ah.present)
-	    {
-		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_AH;
-		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation;
-		proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid;
-		i++;
-	    }
-	    
-	    proto_info[i].proto = 0;
-	    
-	    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute
-		&& encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-	    {
-		proto_info[0].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-		for (i = 1; proto_info[i].proto; i++)
+		/* If inbound, and policy does not specifie DISABLEARRIVALCHECK,
+		 * tell KLIPS to enforce the IP addresses appropriate for this tunnel.
+		 * Note reversed ends.
+		 * Not much to be done on failure.
+		 */
+		if (inbound && (c->policy & POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK) == 0)
 		{
-		    proto_info[i].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+			struct pfkey_proto_info proto_info[4];
+			int i = 0;
+			
+			if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+			{
+				proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
+				proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation;
+				proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid + 2;
+				i++;
+			}
+			
+			if (st->st_esp.present)
+			{
+				proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+				proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+				proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid + 1;
+				i++;
+			}
+			
+			if (st->st_ah.present)
+			{
+				proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+				proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation;
+				proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid;
+				i++;
+			}
+			
+			proto_info[i].proto = 0;
+			
+			if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute
+				&& encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+			{
+				proto_info[0].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+				for (i = 1; proto_info[i].proto; i++)
+				{
+					proto_info[i].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+				}
+			}
+			
+			/* MCR - should be passed a spd_eroute structure here */
+			(void) raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
+							  , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
+							  , inner_spi, proto, satype, c->spd.this.protocol
+							  , proto_info, 0
+							  , ERO_ADD_INBOUND, "add inbound");
 		}
-	    }
-	    
-	    /* MCR - should be passed a spd_eroute structure here */
-	    (void) raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
-			      , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
-			      , inner_spi, proto, satype, c->spd.this.protocol
-			      , proto_info, 0
-			      , ERO_ADD_INBOUND, "add inbound");
-	}
-    }
-
-    /* If there are multiple SPIs, group them. */
-    
-    if (kernel_ops->grp_sa && said_next > &said[1])
-    {
-	struct kernel_sa *s;
+	}
+
+	/* If there are multiple SPIs, group them. */
 	
-	/* group SAs, two at a time, inner to outer (backwards in said[])
-	 * The grouping is by pairs.  So if said[] contains ah esp ipip,
-	 * the grouping would be ipip:esp, esp:ah.
-	 */
-	for (s = said; s < said_next-1; s++)
-	{
-	    char
-		text_said0[SATOT_BUF],
-		text_said1[SATOT_BUF];
-
-	    /* group s[1] and s[0], in that order */
-	    
-	    set_text_said(text_said0, s[0].dst, s[0].spi, s[0].proto);
-	    set_text_said(text_said1, s[1].dst, s[1].spi, s[1].proto);
-	    
-	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("grouping %s and %s", text_said1, text_said0));
-	    
-	    s[0].text_said = text_said0;
-	    s[1].text_said = text_said1;
-	    
-	    if (!kernel_ops->grp_sa(s + 1, s))
-		goto fail;
-	}
-	/* could update said, but it will not be used */
-    }
-
-    return TRUE;
+	if (kernel_ops->grp_sa && said_next > &said[1])
+	{
+		struct kernel_sa *s;
+		
+		/* group SAs, two at a time, inner to outer (backwards in said[])
+		 * The grouping is by pairs.  So if said[] contains ah esp ipip,
+		 * the grouping would be ipip:esp, esp:ah.
+		 */
+		for (s = said; s < said_next-1; s++)
+		{
+			char
+				text_said0[SATOT_BUF],
+				text_said1[SATOT_BUF];
+
+			/* group s[1] and s[0], in that order */
+			
+			set_text_said(text_said0, s[0].dst, s[0].spi, s[0].proto);
+			set_text_said(text_said1, s[1].dst, s[1].spi, s[1].proto);
+			
+			DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("grouping %s and %s", text_said1, text_said0));
+			
+			s[0].text_said = text_said0;
+			s[1].text_said = text_said1;
+			
+			if (!kernel_ops->grp_sa(s + 1, s))
+				goto fail;
+		}
+		/* could update said, but it will not be used */
+	}
+
+	return TRUE;
 
 fail:
-    {
-	/* undo the done SPIs */
-	while (said_next-- != said)
-	    (void) del_spi(said_next->spi, said_next->proto
-		, &src.addr, said_next->dst);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	{
+		/* undo the done SPIs */
+		while (said_next-- != said)
+			(void) del_spi(said_next->spi, said_next->proto
+				, &src.addr, said_next->dst);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* teardown_ipsec_sa is a canibalized version of setup_ipsec_sa */
 
-static bool
-teardown_half_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound)
+static bool teardown_half_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound)
 {
-    /* We need to delete AH, ESP, and IP in IP SPIs.
-     * But if there is more than one, they have been grouped
-     * so deleting any one will do.  So we just delete the
-     * first one found.  It may or may not be the only one.
-     */
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    struct {
-	unsigned proto;
-	struct ipsec_proto_info *info;
-    } protos[4];
-    int i;
-    bool result;
-
-    i = 0;
-    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute && inbound
-	&& c->spd.eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
-    {
-	(void) raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
-	    , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
-	    , 256, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC, c->spd.this.protocol
-	    , null_proto_info, 0
-	    , ERO_DEL_INBOUND, "delete inbound");
-    }
-
-    if (!kernel_ops->grp_sa)
-    {
-	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	/* We need to delete AH, ESP, and IP in IP SPIs.
+	 * But if there is more than one, they have been grouped
+	 * so deleting any one will do.  So we just delete the
+	 * first one found.  It may or may not be the only one.
+	 */
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct {
+		unsigned proto;
+		struct ipsec_proto_info *info;
+	} protos[4];
+	int i;
+	bool result;
+
+	i = 0;
+	if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute && inbound
+		&& c->spd.eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
 	{
-	    protos[i].info = &st->st_ah;
-	    protos[i].proto = SA_AH;
-	    i++;
+		(void) raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
+			, &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
+			, 256, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC, c->spd.this.protocol
+			, null_proto_info, 0
+			, ERO_DEL_INBOUND, "delete inbound");
 	}
 
-	if (st->st_esp.present)
+	if (!kernel_ops->grp_sa)
 	{
-	    protos[i].info = &st->st_esp;
-	    protos[i].proto = SA_ESP;
-	    i++;
-	}
+		if (st->st_ah.present)
+		{
+			protos[i].info = &st->st_ah;
+			protos[i].proto = SA_AH;
+			i++;
+		}
 
-	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-	{
-	    protos[i].info = &st->st_ipcomp;
-	    protos[i].proto = SA_COMP;
-	    i++;
-	}
-    }
-    else if (st->st_ah.present)
-    {
-	protos[i].info = &st->st_ah;
-	protos[i].proto = SA_AH;
-	i++;
-    }
-    else if (st->st_esp.present)
-    {
-	protos[i].info = &st->st_esp;
-	protos[i].proto = SA_ESP;
-	i++;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	impossible();	/* neither AH nor ESP in outbound SA bundle! */
-    }
-    protos[i].proto = 0;
-
-    result = TRUE;
-    for (i = 0; protos[i].proto; i++)
-    {
-	unsigned proto = protos[i].proto;
-	ipsec_spi_t spi;
-	const ip_address *src, *dst;
+		if (st->st_esp.present)
+		{
+			protos[i].info = &st->st_esp;
+			protos[i].proto = SA_ESP;
+			i++;
+		}
 
-	if (inbound)
+		if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+		{
+			protos[i].info = &st->st_ipcomp;
+			protos[i].proto = SA_COMP;
+			i++;
+		}
+	}
+	else if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+		protos[i].info = &st->st_ah;
+		protos[i].proto = SA_AH;
+		i++;
+	}
+	else if (st->st_esp.present)
 	{
-	    spi = protos[i].info->our_spi;
-	    src = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
-	    dst = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+		protos[i].info = &st->st_esp;
+		protos[i].proto = SA_ESP;
+		i++;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    spi = protos[i].info->attrs.spi;
-	    src = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
-	    dst = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		impossible();   /* neither AH nor ESP in outbound SA bundle! */
 	}
+	protos[i].proto = 0;
+
+	result = TRUE;
+	for (i = 0; protos[i].proto; i++)
+	{
+		unsigned proto = protos[i].proto;
+		ipsec_spi_t spi;
+		const ip_address *src, *dst;
+
+		if (inbound)
+		{
+			spi = protos[i].info->our_spi;
+			src = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+			dst = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			spi = protos[i].info->attrs.spi;
+			src = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+			dst = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		}
 
-	result &= del_spi(spi, proto, src, dst);
-    }
-    return result;
+		result &= del_spi(spi, proto, src, dst);
+	}
+	return result;
 }
 
 /*
  * get information about a given sa
  */
-bool
-get_sa_info(struct state *st, bool inbound, u_int *bytes, time_t *use_time)
+bool get_sa_info(struct state *st, bool inbound, u_int *bytes, time_t *use_time)
 {
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
-    struct kernel_sa sa;
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	struct kernel_sa sa;
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
 
-    *use_time = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	*use_time = UNDEFINED_TIME;
 
-    if (kernel_ops->get_sa == NULL || !st->st_esp.present)
-	return FALSE;
+	if (kernel_ops->get_sa == NULL || !st->st_esp.present)
+		return FALSE;
 
-    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-    sa.proto = SA_ESP;
-
-    if (inbound)
-    {
-	sa.src = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
-	sa.dst = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
-	sa.spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	sa.src = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
-	sa.dst = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
-	sa.spi = st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
-    }
-    set_text_said(text_said, sa.dst, sa.spi, sa.proto);
-
-    sa.text_said = text_said;
-
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("get %s", text_said)
-    )
-    if (!kernel_ops->get_sa(&sa, bytes))
-	return FALSE;
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("  current: %d bytes", *bytes)
-    )
-
-    if (st->st_serialno == c->spd.eroute_owner)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("get %sbound policy with reqid %u"
-		, inbound? "in":"out", (u_int)c->spd.reqid + 1)
-	)
-	sa.transport_proto = c->spd.this.protocol;
-	sa.encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.proto = SA_ESP;
 
 	if (inbound)
 	{
-	    sa.src_client = &c->spd.that.client;
-	    sa.dst_client = &c->spd.this.client;
+		sa.src = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		sa.dst = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+		sa.spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    sa.src_client = &c->spd.this.client;
-	    sa.dst_client = &c->spd.that.client;
+		sa.src = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+		sa.dst = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		sa.spi = st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
 	}
-	if (!kernel_ops->get_policy(&sa, inbound, use_time))
-	    return FALSE;
+	set_text_said(text_said, sa.dst, sa.spi, sa.proto);
+
+	sa.text_said = text_said;
+
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("get %s", text_said)
+	)
+	if (!kernel_ops->get_sa(&sa, bytes))
+		return FALSE;
 	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("  use_time: %s", timetoa(use_time, FALSE))
+		DBG_log("  current: %d bytes", *bytes)
 	)
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+
+	if (st->st_serialno == c->spd.eroute_owner)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("get %sbound policy with reqid %u"
+				, inbound? "in":"out", (u_int)c->spd.reqid + 1)
+		)
+		sa.transport_proto = c->spd.this.protocol;
+		sa.encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+
+		if (inbound)
+		{
+			sa.src_client = &c->spd.that.client;
+			sa.dst_client = &c->spd.this.client;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			sa.src_client = &c->spd.this.client;
+			sa.dst_client = &c->spd.that.client;
+		}
+		if (!kernel_ops->get_policy(&sa, inbound, use_time))
+			return FALSE;
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("  use_time: %T", use_time, FALSE)
+		)
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 const struct kernel_ops *kernel_ops;
 
 #endif /* KLIPS */
 
-void
-init_kernel(void)
+void init_kernel(void)
 {
 #ifdef KLIPS
 
-    if (no_klips)
-    {
-	kernel_ops = &noklips_kernel_ops;
-	return;
-    }
+	if (no_klips)
+	{
+		kernel_ops = &noklips_kernel_ops;
+		return;
+	}
 
-    init_pfkey();
+	init_pfkey();
 
-    kernel_ops = &klips_kernel_ops;
+	kernel_ops = &klips_kernel_ops;
 
 #if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
-    {
-	bool linux_ipsec = 0;
-	struct stat buf;
-
-	linux_ipsec = (stat("/proc/net/pfkey", &buf) == 0);
-	if (linux_ipsec)
-	    {
-		plog("Using Linux 2.6 IPsec interface code");
-		kernel_ops = &linux_kernel_ops;
-	    }
-	else
-	    {
-		plog("Using KLIPS IPsec interface code");
-	    }
-    }
+	{
+		bool linux_ipsec = 0;
+		struct stat buf;
+
+		linux_ipsec = (stat("/proc/net/pfkey", &buf) == 0);
+		if (linux_ipsec)
+			{
+				plog("Using Linux 2.6 IPsec interface code");
+				kernel_ops = &linux_kernel_ops;
+			}
+		else
+			{
+				plog("Using KLIPS IPsec interface code");
+			}
+	}
 #endif
 
-    if (kernel_ops->init)
-    {
-	kernel_ops->init();
-    }
+	if (kernel_ops->init)
+	{
+		kernel_ops->init();
+	}
 
-    /* register SA types that we can negotiate */
-    can_do_IPcomp = FALSE;  /* until we get a response from KLIPS */
-    kernel_ops->pfkey_register();
+	/* register SA types that we can negotiate */
+	can_do_IPcomp = FALSE;  /* until we get a response from KLIPS */
+	kernel_ops->pfkey_register();
 
-    if (!kernel_ops->policy_lifetime)
-    {
-	event_schedule(EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN, SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL, NULL);
-    }
+	if (!kernel_ops->policy_lifetime)
+	{
+		event_schedule(EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN, SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL, NULL);
+	}
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -2345,60 +2330,59 @@ init_kernel(void)
  * The Responder will subsequently use install_ipsec_sa for the outbound.
  * The Initiator uses install_ipsec_sa to install both at once.
  */
-bool
-install_inbound_ipsec_sa(struct state *st)
+bool install_inbound_ipsec_sa(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct connection *const c = st->st_connection;
-
-    /* If our peer has a fixed-address client, check if we already
-     * have a route for that client that conflicts.  We will take this
-     * as proof that that route and the connections using it are
-     * obsolete and should be eliminated.  Interestingly, this is
-     * the only case in which we can tell that a connection is obsolete.
-     */
-    passert(c->kind == CK_PERMANENT || c->kind == CK_INSTANCE);
-    if (c->spd.that.has_client)
-    {
-	for (;;)
-	{
-	    struct spd_route *esr;
-	    struct connection *o = route_owner(c, &esr, NULL, NULL);
-
-	    if (o == NULL)
-		break;	/* nobody has a route */
-
-	    /* note: we ignore the client addresses at this end */
-	    if (sameaddr(&o->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr)
-	    && o->interface == c->interface)
-		break;	/* existing route is compatible */
-
-	    if (o->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && streq(o->name, c->name))
-		break;	/* ??? is this good enough?? */
-
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "route to peer's client conflicts with \"%s\" %s; releasing old connection to free the route"
-		, o->name, ip_str(&o->spd.that.host_addr));
-	    release_connection(o, FALSE);
-	}
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route"));
-    /* check that we will be able to route and eroute */
-    switch (could_route(c))
-    {
-    case route_easy:
-    case route_nearconflict:
-	break;
-
-    default:
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	struct connection *const c = st->st_connection;
+
+	/* If our peer has a fixed-address client, check if we already
+	 * have a route for that client that conflicts.  We will take this
+	 * as proof that that route and the connections using it are
+	 * obsolete and should be eliminated.  Interestingly, this is
+	 * the only case in which we can tell that a connection is obsolete.
+	 */
+	passert(c->kind == CK_PERMANENT || c->kind == CK_INSTANCE);
+	if (c->spd.that.has_client)
+	{
+		for (;;)
+		{
+			struct spd_route *esr;
+			struct connection *o = route_owner(c, &esr, NULL, NULL);
+
+			if (o == NULL)
+				break;  /* nobody has a route */
+
+			/* note: we ignore the client addresses at this end */
+			if (sameaddr(&o->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr)
+			&& o->interface == c->interface)
+				break;  /* existing route is compatible */
+
+			if (o->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && streq(o->name, c->name))
+				break;  /* ??? is this good enough?? */
+
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "route to peer's client conflicts with \"%s\" %s; releasing old connection to free the route"
+				, o->name, ip_str(&o->spd.that.host_addr));
+			release_connection(o, FALSE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route"));
+	/* check that we will be able to route and eroute */
+	switch (could_route(c))
+	{
+	case route_easy:
+	case route_nearconflict:
+		break;
+
+	default:
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    /* (attempt to) actually set up the SAs */
-    return setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
+	/* (attempt to) actually set up the SAs */
+	return setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
 #else /* !KLIPS */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_inbound_ipsec_sa()"));
-    return TRUE;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_inbound_ipsec_sa()"));
+	return TRUE;
 #endif /* !KLIPS */
 }
 
@@ -2407,481 +2391,479 @@ install_inbound_ipsec_sa(struct state *st)
  * Any SA Group must have already been created.
  * On failure, steps will be unwound.
  */
-bool
-route_and_eroute(struct connection *c USED_BY_KLIPS
-		 , struct spd_route *sr USED_BY_KLIPS
-		 , struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS)
+bool route_and_eroute(struct connection *c USED_BY_KLIPS,
+					  struct spd_route *sr USED_BY_KLIPS,
+					  struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS)
 {
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    struct spd_route *esr;
-    struct spd_route *rosr;
-    struct connection *ero	/* who, if anyone, owns our eroute? */
-	, *ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, &ero, &esr);
-    bool eroute_installed = FALSE
-	, firewall_notified = FALSE
-	, route_installed = FALSE;
-
-    struct connection *ero_top;
-    struct bare_shunt **bspp;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("route_and_eroute with c: %s (next: %s) ero:%s esr:{%p} ro:%s rosr:{%p} and state: %lu"
-		, c->name
-		, (c->policy_next ? c->policy_next->name : "none")
-		, ero ? ero->name : "null"
-		, esr 
-		, ro ? ro->name : "null"
-		, rosr
-		, st ? st->st_serialno : 0));
-
-    /* look along the chain of policies for one with the same name */
-    ero_top = ero;
+	struct spd_route *esr;
+	struct spd_route *rosr;
+	struct connection *ero      /* who, if anyone, owns our eroute? */
+		, *ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, &ero, &esr);
+	bool eroute_installed = FALSE
+		, firewall_notified = FALSE
+		, route_installed = FALSE;
+
+	struct connection *ero_top;
+	struct bare_shunt **bspp;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("route_and_eroute with c: %s (next: %s) ero:%s esr:{%p} ro:%s rosr:{%p} and state: %lu"
+				, c->name
+				, (c->policy_next ? c->policy_next->name : "none")
+				, ero ? ero->name : "null"
+				, esr 
+				, ro ? ro->name : "null"
+				, rosr
+				, st ? st->st_serialno : 0));
+
+	/* look along the chain of policies for one with the same name */
+	ero_top = ero;
 
 #if 0
-    /* XXX - mcr this made sense before, and likely will make sense
-     * again, so I'l leaving this to remind me what is up */
-    if (ero!= NULL && ero->routing == RT_UNROUTED_KEYED)
-	ero = NULL;
-
-    for (ero2 = ero; ero2 != NULL; ero2 = ero->policy_next)
-	if ((ero2->kind == CK_TEMPLATE || ero2->kind==CK_SECONDARY)
-	&& streq(ero2->name, c->name))
-	    break;
+	/* XXX - mcr this made sense before, and likely will make sense
+	 * again, so I'l leaving this to remind me what is up */
+	if (ero!= NULL && ero->routing == RT_UNROUTED_KEYED)
+		ero = NULL;
+
+	for (ero2 = ero; ero2 != NULL; ero2 = ero->policy_next)
+		if ((ero2->kind == CK_TEMPLATE || ero2->kind==CK_SECONDARY)
+		&& streq(ero2->name, c->name))
+			break;
 #endif
 
-    bspp = (ero == NULL)
-	? bare_shunt_ptr(&sr->this.client, &sr->that.client, sr->this.protocol)
-	: NULL;
+	bspp = (ero == NULL)
+		? bare_shunt_ptr(&sr->this.client, &sr->that.client, sr->this.protocol)
+		: NULL;
 
-    /* install the eroute */
+	/* install the eroute */
 
-    passert(bspp == NULL || ero == NULL);	/* only one non-NULL */
+	passert(bspp == NULL || ero == NULL);       /* only one non-NULL */
 
-    if (bspp != NULL || ero != NULL)
-    {
-	/* We're replacing an eroute */
+	if (bspp != NULL || ero != NULL)
+	{
+		/* We're replacing an eroute */
 
-	/* if no state provided, then install a shunt for later */
-	if (st == NULL)
-	    eroute_installed = shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE
-					    , ERO_REPLACE, "replace");
-	else
-	    eroute_installed = sag_eroute(st, sr, ERO_REPLACE, "replace");
+		/* if no state provided, then install a shunt for later */
+		if (st == NULL)
+			eroute_installed = shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE
+											, ERO_REPLACE, "replace");
+		else
+			eroute_installed = sag_eroute(st, sr, ERO_REPLACE, "replace");
 
 #if 0
-	/* XXX - MCR. I previously felt that this was a bogus check */
-	if (ero != NULL && ero != c && esr != sr)
-	{
-	    /* By elimination, we must be eclipsing ero.  Check. */
-	    passert(ero->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && streq(ero->name, c->name));
-	    passert(LHAS(LELEM(RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE) | LELEM(RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
-		, esr->routing));
-	    passert(samesubnet(&esr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
-		&& samesubnet(&esr->that.client, &sr->that.client));
-	}
+		/* XXX - MCR. I previously felt that this was a bogus check */
+		if (ero != NULL && ero != c && esr != sr)
+		{
+			/* By elimination, we must be eclipsing ero.  Check. */
+			passert(ero->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && streq(ero->name, c->name));
+			passert(LHAS(LELEM(RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE) | LELEM(RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+				, esr->routing));
+			passert(samesubnet(&esr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
+				&& samesubnet(&esr->that.client, &sr->that.client));
+		}
 #endif
-	/* remember to free bspp iff we make it out of here alive */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* we're adding an eroute */
-
-	/* if no state provided, then install a shunt for later */
-	if (st == NULL)
-	    eroute_installed = shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE
-					    , ERO_ADD, "add");
-	else
-	    eroute_installed = sag_eroute(st, sr, ERO_ADD, "add");
-    }
-
-    /* notify the firewall of a new tunnel */
-
-    if (eroute_installed)
-    {
-	/* do we have to notify the firewall?  Yes, if we are installing
-	 * a tunnel eroute and the firewall wasn't notified
-	 * for a previous tunnel with the same clients.  Any Previous
-	 * tunnel would have to be for our connection, so the actual
-	 * test is simple.
-	 */
-	firewall_notified = st == NULL	/* not a tunnel eroute */
-	    || sr->eroute_owner != SOS_NOBODY	/* already notified */
-	    || do_command(c, sr, "up");	/* go ahead and notify */
-    }
-
-    /* install the route */
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: %s"
-		, firewall_notified ? "true" : "false"));
-    if (!firewall_notified)
-    {
-	/* we're in trouble -- don't do routing */
-    }
-    else if (ro == NULL)
-    {
-	/* a new route: no deletion required, but preparation is */
-	(void) do_command(c, sr, "prepare");	/* just in case; ignore failure */
-	route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
-    }
-    else if (routed(sr->routing)
-    || routes_agree(ro, c))
-    {
-	route_installed = TRUE;	/* nothing to be done */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* Some other connection must own the route
-	 * and the route must disagree.  But since could_route
-	 * must have allowed our stealing it, we'll do so.
-	 *
-	 * A feature of LINUX allows us to install the new route
-	 * before deleting the old if the nexthops differ.
-	 * This reduces the "window of vulnerability" when packets
-	 * might flow in the clear.
-	 */
-	if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_nexthop, &esr->this.host_nexthop))
-	{
-	    (void) do_command(ro, sr, "unroute");
-	    route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
+		/* remember to free bspp iff we make it out of here alive */
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
-	    (void) do_command(ro, sr, "unroute");
+		/* we're adding an eroute */
+
+		/* if no state provided, then install a shunt for later */
+		if (st == NULL)
+			eroute_installed = shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE
+											, ERO_ADD, "add");
+		else
+			eroute_installed = sag_eroute(st, sr, ERO_ADD, "add");
 	}
 
-	/* record unrouting */
-	if (route_installed)
-	{
-	    do {
-		passert(!erouted(rosr->routing));
-		rosr->routing = RT_UNROUTED;
+	/* notify the firewall of a new tunnel */
 
-		/* no need to keep old value */
-		ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, NULL, NULL);
-	    } while (ro != NULL);
+	if (eroute_installed)
+	{
+		/* do we have to notify the firewall?  Yes, if we are installing
+		 * a tunnel eroute and the firewall wasn't notified
+		 * for a previous tunnel with the same clients.  Any Previous
+		 * tunnel would have to be for our connection, so the actual
+		 * test is simple.
+		 */
+		firewall_notified = st == NULL  /* not a tunnel eroute */
+			|| sr->eroute_owner != SOS_NOBODY   /* already notified */
+			|| do_command(c, sr, "up"); /* go ahead and notify */
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* all done -- clean up */
-    if (route_installed)
-    {
-	/* Success! */
+	/* install the route */
 
-	if (bspp != NULL)
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: %s"
+				, firewall_notified ? "true" : "false"));
+	if (!firewall_notified)
 	{
-	    free_bare_shunt(bspp);
+		/* we're in trouble -- don't do routing */
 	}
-	else if (ero != NULL && ero != c)
+	else if (ro == NULL)
 	{
-	    /* check if ero is an ancestor of c. */
-	    struct connection *ero2;
-
-	    for (ero2 = c; ero2 != NULL && ero2 != c; ero2 = ero2->policy_next)
-		;
-
-	    if (ero2 == NULL)
-	    {
-		/* By elimination, we must be eclipsing ero.  Checked above. */
-		if (ero->spd.routing != RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
-		{
-		    ero->spd.routing = RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED;
-		    eclipse_count++;
-		}
-	    }
+		/* a new route: no deletion required, but preparation is */
+		(void) do_command(c, sr, "prepare");    /* just in case; ignore failure */
+		route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
 	}
-
-	if (st == NULL)
+	else if (routed(sr->routing)
+	|| routes_agree(ro, c))
 	{
-	    passert(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY);
-	    sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+		route_installed = TRUE; /* nothing to be done */
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
-	    sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL;
+		/* Some other connection must own the route
+		 * and the route must disagree.  But since could_route
+		 * must have allowed our stealing it, we'll do so.
+		 *
+		 * A feature of LINUX allows us to install the new route
+		 * before deleting the old if the nexthops differ.
+		 * This reduces the "window of vulnerability" when packets
+		 * might flow in the clear.
+		 */
+		if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_nexthop, &esr->this.host_nexthop))
+		{
+			(void) do_command(ro, sr, "unroute");
+			route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
+			(void) do_command(ro, sr, "unroute");
+		}
 
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("route_and_eroute: instance \"%s\"%s, setting eroute_owner {spd=%p,sr=%p} to #%ld (was #%ld) (newest_ipsec_sa=#%ld)"
-			, st->st_connection->name
-			, (fmt_conn_instance(st->st_connection, cib), cib)
-			, &st->st_connection->spd, sr
-			, st->st_serialno
-			, sr->eroute_owner
-			, st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa));
-	    sr->eroute_owner = st->st_serialno;
-	}
+		/* record unrouting */
+		if (route_installed)
+		{
+			do {
+				passert(!erouted(rosr->routing));
+				rosr->routing = RT_UNROUTED;
 
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* Failure!  Unwind our work. */
-	if (firewall_notified && sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
-	    (void) do_command(c, sr, "down");
+				/* no need to keep old value */
+				ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, NULL, NULL);
+			} while (ro != NULL);
+		}
+	}
 
-	if (eroute_installed)
+	/* all done -- clean up */
+	if (route_installed)
 	{
-	    /* Restore original eroute, if we can.
-	     * Since there is nothing much to be done if the restoration
-	     * fails, ignore success or failure.
-	     */
-	    if (bspp != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* Restore old bare_shunt.
-		 * I don't think that this case is very likely.
-		 * Normally a bare shunt would have been assigned
-		 * to a connection before we've gotten this far.
-		 */
-		struct bare_shunt *bs = *bspp;
-
-		(void) raw_eroute(&bs->said.dst	/* should be useless */
-		    , &bs->ours
-		    , &bs->said.dst	/* should be useless */
-		    , &bs->his
-		    , bs->said.spi	/* network order */
-		    , SA_INT
-		    , SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
-		    , 0
-		    , null_proto_info
-		    , SHUNT_PATIENCE
-		    , ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
-	    }
-	    else if (ero != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* restore ero's former glory */
-		if (esr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
+		/* Success! */
+
+		if (bspp != NULL)
 		{
-		    /* note: normal or eclipse case */
-		    (void) shunt_eroute(ero, esr
-					, esr->routing, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+			free_bare_shunt(bspp);
 		}
-		else
+		else if (ero != NULL && ero != c)
 		{
-		    /* Try to find state that owned eroute.
-		     * Don't do anything if it cannot be found.
-		     * This case isn't likely since we don't run
-		     * the updown script when replacing a SA group
-		     * with its successor (for the same conn).
-		     */
-		    struct state *ost = state_with_serialno(esr->eroute_owner);
-
-		    if (ost != NULL)
-			(void) sag_eroute(ost, esr, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+			/* check if ero is an ancestor of c. */
+			struct connection *ero2;
+
+			for (ero2 = c; ero2 != NULL && ero2 != c; ero2 = ero2->policy_next)
+				;
+
+			if (ero2 == NULL)
+			{
+				/* By elimination, we must be eclipsing ero.  Checked above. */
+				if (ero->spd.routing != RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+				{
+					ero->spd.routing = RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED;
+					eclipse_count++;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* there was no previous eroute: delete whatever we installed */
+
 		if (st == NULL)
-		    (void) shunt_eroute(c, sr
-					, sr->routing, ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+		{
+			passert(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY);
+			sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+		}
 		else
-		    (void) sag_eroute(st, sr
-				      , ERO_DELETE, "delete");
-	    }
+		{
+			char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+			sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL;
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("route_and_eroute: instance \"%s\"%s, setting eroute_owner {spd=%p,sr=%p} to #%ld (was #%ld) (newest_ipsec_sa=#%ld)"
+						, st->st_connection->name
+						, (fmt_conn_instance(st->st_connection, cib), cib)
+						, &st->st_connection->spd, sr
+						, st->st_serialno
+						, sr->eroute_owner
+						, st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa));
+			sr->eroute_owner = st->st_serialno;
+		}
+
+		return TRUE;
 	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* Failure!  Unwind our work. */
+		if (firewall_notified && sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
+			(void) do_command(c, sr, "down");
 
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+		if (eroute_installed)
+		{
+			/* Restore original eroute, if we can.
+			 * Since there is nothing much to be done if the restoration
+			 * fails, ignore success or failure.
+			 */
+			if (bspp != NULL)
+			{
+				/* Restore old bare_shunt.
+				 * I don't think that this case is very likely.
+				 * Normally a bare shunt would have been assigned
+				 * to a connection before we've gotten this far.
+				 */
+				struct bare_shunt *bs = *bspp;
+
+				(void) raw_eroute(&bs->said.dst /* should be useless */
+					, &bs->ours
+					, &bs->said.dst     /* should be useless */
+					, &bs->his
+					, bs->said.spi      /* network order */
+					, SA_INT
+					, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+					, 0
+					, null_proto_info
+					, SHUNT_PATIENCE
+					, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+			}
+			else if (ero != NULL)
+			{
+				/* restore ero's former glory */
+				if (esr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
+				{
+					/* note: normal or eclipse case */
+					(void) shunt_eroute(ero, esr
+										, esr->routing, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* Try to find state that owned eroute.
+					 * Don't do anything if it cannot be found.
+					 * This case isn't likely since we don't run
+					 * the updown script when replacing a SA group
+					 * with its successor (for the same conn).
+					 */
+					struct state *ost = state_with_serialno(esr->eroute_owner);
+
+					if (ost != NULL)
+						(void) sag_eroute(ost, esr, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* there was no previous eroute: delete whatever we installed */
+				if (st == NULL)
+					(void) shunt_eroute(c, sr
+										, sr->routing, ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+				else
+					(void) sag_eroute(st, sr
+									  , ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+			}
+		}
+
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 #else /* !KLIPS */
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 #endif /* !KLIPS */
 }
 
-bool
-install_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_also USED_BY_KLIPS)
+bool install_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_also USED_BY_KLIPS)
 {
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    struct spd_route *sr;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_ipsec_sa() for #%ld: %s"
-			     , st->st_serialno
-			     , inbound_also?
-			     "inbound and outbound" : "outbound only"));
-
-    switch (could_route(st->st_connection))
-    {
-    case route_easy:
-    case route_nearconflict:
-	break;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
 
-    default:
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_ipsec_sa() for #%ld: %s"
+							 , st->st_serialno
+							 , inbound_also?
+							 "inbound and outbound" : "outbound only"));
 
-    /* (attempt to) actually set up the SA group */
-    if ((inbound_also && !setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE))
-    || !setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE))
-	return FALSE;
+	switch (could_route(st->st_connection))
+	{
+	case route_easy:
+	case route_nearconflict:
+		break;
 
-    for (sr = &st->st_connection->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("sr for #%ld: %s"
-				 , st->st_serialno
-				 , enum_name(&routing_story, sr->routing)));
+	default:
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-	/*
-	 * if the eroute owner is not us, then make it us.
-	 * See test co-terminal-02, pluto-rekey-01, pluto-unit-02/oppo-twice
-	 */
-	pexpect(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY
-		|| sr->routing >= RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+	/* (attempt to) actually set up the SA group */
+	if ((inbound_also && !setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE))
+	|| !setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE))
+		return FALSE;
 
-	if (sr->eroute_owner != st->st_serialno
-	    && sr->routing != RT_UNROUTED_KEYED)
+	for (sr = &st->st_connection->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
 	{
-	    if (!route_and_eroute(st->st_connection, sr, st))
-	    {
-		delete_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
-		/* XXX go and unroute any SRs that were successfully
-		 * routed already.
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("sr for #%ld: %s"
+								 , st->st_serialno
+								 , enum_name(&routing_story, sr->routing)));
+
+		/*
+		 * if the eroute owner is not us, then make it us.
+		 * See test co-terminal-02, pluto-rekey-01, pluto-unit-02/oppo-twice
 		 */
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
+		pexpect(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY
+				|| sr->routing >= RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+
+		if (sr->eroute_owner != st->st_serialno
+			&& sr->routing != RT_UNROUTED_KEYED)
+		{
+			if (!route_and_eroute(st->st_connection, sr, st))
+			{
+				delete_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
+				/* XXX go and unroute any SRs that were successfully
+				 * routed already.
+				 */
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #else /* !KLIPS */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_ipsec_sa() %s"
-	, inbound_also? "inbound and oubound" : "outbound only"));
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_ipsec_sa() %s"
+		, inbound_also? "inbound and oubound" : "outbound only"));
 
-    switch (could_route(st->st_connection))
-    {
-    case route_easy:
-    case route_nearconflict:
-	break;
+	switch (could_route(st->st_connection))
+	{
+	case route_easy:
+	case route_nearconflict:
+		break;
 
-    default:
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	default:
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
 
 #endif /* !KLIPS */
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* delete an IPSEC SA.
  * we may not succeed, but we bull ahead anyway because
  * we cannot do anything better by recognizing failure
  */
-void
-delete_ipsec_sa(struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS, bool inbound_only USED_BY_KLIPS)
+void delete_ipsec_sa(struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS,
+					 bool inbound_only USED_BY_KLIPS)
 {
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    if (!inbound_only)
-    {
-	/* If the state is the eroute owner, we must adjust
-	 * the routing for the connection.
-	 */
-	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-	struct spd_route *sr;
-
-	passert(st->st_connection);
-
-	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+	if (!inbound_only)
 	{
-	    if (sr->eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
-	    && sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
-	    {
-		sr->eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
-
-		/* Routing should become RT_ROUTED_FAILURE,
-		 * but if POLICY_FAIL_NONE, then we just go
-		 * right back to RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE as if no
-		 * failure happened.
+		/* If the state is the eroute owner, we must adjust
+		 * the routing for the connection.
 		 */
-		sr->routing = (c->policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) == POLICY_FAIL_NONE
-		    ? RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE : RT_ROUTED_FAILURE;
+		struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+		struct spd_route *sr;
 
-		(void) do_command(c, sr, "down");
-		if ((c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
-		&& c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-		{
-		    /* in this special case, even if the connection
-		     * is still alive (due to an ISAKMP SA),
-		     * we get rid of routing.
-		     * Even though there is still an eroute, the c->routing
-		     * setting will convince unroute_connection to delete it.
-		     * unroute_connection would be upset if c->routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL
-		     */
-		    unroute_connection(c);
-		}
-		else
+		passert(st->st_connection);
+
+		for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
 		{
-		    (void) shunt_eroute(c, sr, sr->routing, ERO_REPLACE, "replace with shunt");
+			if (sr->eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
+			&& sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+			{
+				sr->eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+				/* Routing should become RT_ROUTED_FAILURE,
+				 * but if POLICY_FAIL_NONE, then we just go
+				 * right back to RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE as if no
+				 * failure happened.
+				 */
+				sr->routing = (c->policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) == POLICY_FAIL_NONE
+					? RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE : RT_ROUTED_FAILURE;
+
+				(void) do_command(c, sr, "down");
+				if ((c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
+				&& c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+				{
+					/* in this special case, even if the connection
+					 * is still alive (due to an ISAKMP SA),
+					 * we get rid of routing.
+					 * Even though there is still an eroute, the c->routing
+					 * setting will convince unroute_connection to delete it.
+					 * unroute_connection would be upset if c->routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL
+					 */
+					unroute_connection(c);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					(void) shunt_eroute(c, sr, sr->routing, ERO_REPLACE, "replace with shunt");
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
+		(void) teardown_half_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
 	}
-	(void) teardown_half_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
-    }
-    (void) teardown_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
+	(void) teardown_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
 #else /* !KLIPS */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("if I knew how, I'd eroute() and teardown_ipsec_sa()"));
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("if I knew how, I'd eroute() and teardown_ipsec_sa()"));
 #endif /* !KLIPS */
 }
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
 static bool update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (struct state *st, bool inbound)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
-    struct kernel_sa sa;	
-    ip_address
-	src = inbound? c->spd.that.host_addr : c->spd.this.host_addr,
-	dst = inbound? c->spd.this.host_addr : c->spd.that.host_addr;
-
-    ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = inbound? st->st_esp.our_spi : st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
-
-    u_int16_t
-	natt_sport = inbound? c->spd.that.host_port : c->spd.this.host_port,
-	natt_dport = inbound? c->spd.this.host_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
-
-    set_text_said(text_said, &dst, esp_spi, SA_ESP);
-
-    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
-    sa.spi = esp_spi;
-    sa.src = &src;
-    sa.dst = &dst;
-    sa.text_said = text_said;
-    sa.authalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(st->st_esp.attrs.auth);
-    sa.natt_sport = natt_sport;
-    sa.natt_dport = natt_dport;
-    sa.transid = st->st_esp.attrs.transid;
-
-    return kernel_ops->add_sa(&sa, TRUE);
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	struct kernel_sa sa;        
+	ip_address
+		src = inbound? c->spd.that.host_addr : c->spd.this.host_addr,
+		dst = inbound? c->spd.this.host_addr : c->spd.that.host_addr;
+
+	ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = inbound? st->st_esp.our_spi : st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+
+	u_int16_t
+		natt_sport = inbound? c->spd.that.host_port : c->spd.this.host_port,
+		natt_dport = inbound? c->spd.this.host_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
+
+	set_text_said(text_said, &dst, esp_spi, SA_ESP);
+
+	memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+	sa.spi = esp_spi;
+	sa.src = &src;
+	sa.dst = &dst;
+	sa.text_said = text_said;
+	sa.authalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(st->st_esp.attrs.auth);
+	sa.natt_sport = natt_sport;
+	sa.natt_dport = natt_dport;
+	sa.transid = st->st_esp.attrs.transid;
+
+	return kernel_ops->add_sa(&sa, TRUE);
 }
 #endif
 
 bool update_ipsec_sa (struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS)
 {
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-	if (st->st_esp.present && (
-	   (!update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, TRUE)) ||
-	   (!update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, FALSE))))
+	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
 	{
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (st->st_esp.present && (
+		   (!update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, TRUE)) ||
+		   (!update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, FALSE))))
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else if (IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-	if (st->st_esp.present && !update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, FALSE))
+	else if (IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
 	{
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (st->st_esp.present && !update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, FALSE))
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG_log("assert failed at %s:%d st_state=%d", __FILE__, __LINE__, st->st_state);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	else
+	{
+		DBG_log("assert failed at %s:%d st_state=%d", __FILE__, __LINE__, st->st_state);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 #else /* !KLIPS */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("if I knew how, I'd update_ipsec_sa()"));
-    return TRUE;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("if I knew how, I'd update_ipsec_sa()"));
+	return TRUE;
 #endif /* !KLIPS */
 }
 
@@ -2890,106 +2872,105 @@ bool update_ipsec_sa (struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS)
  * If FALSE, DPD is not necessary. We also return TRUE for errors, as they
  * could mean that the SA is broken and needs to be replace anyway.
  */
-bool
-was_eroute_idle(struct state *st, time_t idle_max, time_t *idle_time)
+bool was_eroute_idle(struct state *st, time_t idle_max, time_t *idle_time)
 {
-    static const char procname[] = "/proc/net/ipsec_spi";
-    FILE *f;
-    char buf[1024];
-    u_int bytes;
-    int ret = TRUE;
-
-    passert(st != NULL);
-
-    f = fopen(procname, "r");
-    if (f == NULL)
-    {
-	/* Can't open the file, perhaps were are on 26sec? */
-	time_t use_time;
-
-	if (get_sa_info(st, TRUE, &bytes, &use_time)
-	&& use_time != UNDEFINED_TIME)
-	{
-	    *idle_time = time(NULL) - use_time;
-	    ret = *idle_time >= idle_max;
-	}
-    }
-    else 
-    {
-	while (f != NULL)
-	{
-	    char *line;
-	    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
-	    u_int8_t proto = 0;
-	    ip_address dst;
-	    ip_said said;
-	    ipsec_spi_t spi = 0;
-	    static const char idle[] = "idle=";
-
-	    dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr; /* inbound SA */
-	    if (st->st_ah.present)
-	    {
-		proto = SA_AH;
-		spi = st->st_ah.our_spi;
-	    }
-	    if (st->st_esp.present)
-	    {
-		proto = SA_ESP;
-		spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
-	    }
-
-	    if (proto == 0 && spi == 0)
-	    {
-		ret = TRUE;
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    initsaid(&dst, spi, proto, &said);
-	    satot(&said, 'x', text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+	static const char procname[] = "/proc/net/ipsec_spi";
+	FILE *f;
+	char buf[1024];
+	u_int bytes;
+	int ret = TRUE;
 
-	    line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f);
-	    if (line == NULL)
-	    {
-		/* Reached end of list */
-		ret = TRUE;
-		break;
-	    }
+	passert(st != NULL);
 
-	    if (strncmp(line, text_said, strlen(text_said)) == 0)
-	    {
-		/* we found a match, now try to find idle= */
-		char *p = strstr(line, idle);
+	f = fopen(procname, "r");
+	if (f == NULL)
+	{
+		/* Can't open the file, perhaps were are on 26sec? */
+		time_t use_time;
 
-		if (p == NULL)
+		if (get_sa_info(st, TRUE, &bytes, &use_time)
+		&& use_time != UNDEFINED_TIME)
 		{
-		    /* SAs which haven't been used yet don't have it */
-		    ret = TRUE; /* it didn't have traffic */
-		    break;
+			*idle_time = time(NULL) - use_time;
+			ret = *idle_time >= idle_max;
 		}
-		p += sizeof(idle)-1;
-		if (*p == '\0')
-		{
-		    ret = TRUE; /* be paranoid */
-		    break;
-		}
-		if (sscanf(p, "%d", (int *) idle_time) <= 0)
-		{
-		    ret = TRUE;
-		    break;
-		}
-		if (*idle_time >= idle_max)
-		{
-		    ret = TRUE;
-		    break;
-		}
-		else
+	}
+	else 
+	{
+		while (f != NULL)
 		{
-		    ret = FALSE;
-		    break;
+			char *line;
+			char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+			u_int8_t proto = 0;
+			ip_address dst;
+			ip_said said;
+			ipsec_spi_t spi = 0;
+			static const char idle[] = "idle=";
+
+			dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr; /* inbound SA */
+			if (st->st_ah.present)
+			{
+				proto = SA_AH;
+				spi = st->st_ah.our_spi;
+			}
+			if (st->st_esp.present)
+			{
+				proto = SA_ESP;
+				spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
+			}
+
+			if (proto == 0 && spi == 0)
+			{
+				ret = TRUE;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			initsaid(&dst, spi, proto, &said);
+			satot(&said, 'x', text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+
+			line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f);
+			if (line == NULL)
+			{
+				/* Reached end of list */
+				ret = TRUE;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (strneq(line, text_said, strlen(text_said)))
+			{
+				/* we found a match, now try to find idle= */
+				char *p = strstr(line, idle);
+
+				if (p == NULL)
+				{
+					/* SAs which haven't been used yet don't have it */
+					ret = TRUE; /* it didn't have traffic */
+					break;
+				}
+				p += sizeof(idle)-1;
+				if (*p == '\0')
+				{
+					ret = TRUE; /* be paranoid */
+					break;
+				}
+				if (sscanf(p, "%d", (int *) idle_time) <= 0)
+				{
+					ret = TRUE;
+					break;
+				}
+				if (*idle_time >= idle_max)
+				{
+					ret = TRUE;
+					break;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					ret = FALSE;
+					break;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
+		fclose(f);
 	}
-	fclose(f);
-    }
-    return ret;
+	return ret;
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel.h b/src/pluto/kernel.h
index fdc2bf0a8..06850abfd 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel.h
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel.h
@@ -10,13 +10,11 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include "connections.h"
 
-extern bool no_klips;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
+extern bool no_klips;   /* don't actually use KLIPS */
 extern bool can_do_IPcomp;  /* can system actually perform IPCOMP? */
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
@@ -28,96 +26,96 @@ extern bool can_do_IPcomp;  /* can system actually perform IPCOMP? */
  * limited to appropriate source and destination addresses.
  */
 
-#define ERO_MASK	0xFF
-#define ERO_FLAG_SHIFT	8
+#define ERO_MASK        0xFF
+#define ERO_FLAG_SHIFT  8
 
-#define ERO_DELETE	SADB_X_DELFLOW
-#define ERO_ADD	SADB_X_ADDFLOW
-#define ERO_REPLACE	(SADB_X_ADDFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_REPLACEFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
-#define ERO_ADD_INBOUND	(SADB_X_ADDFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
-#define ERO_DEL_INBOUND	(SADB_X_DELFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+#define ERO_DELETE      SADB_X_DELFLOW
+#define ERO_ADD SADB_X_ADDFLOW
+#define ERO_REPLACE     (SADB_X_ADDFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_REPLACEFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+#define ERO_ADD_INBOUND (SADB_X_ADDFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+#define ERO_DEL_INBOUND (SADB_X_DELFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
 
 struct pfkey_proto_info {
-	int proto;
-	int encapsulation;
-	unsigned reqid;
+		int proto;
+		int encapsulation;
+		unsigned reqid;
 };
 struct sadb_msg;
 
 struct kernel_sa {
-	const ip_address *src;
-	const ip_address *dst;
+		const ip_address *src;
+		const ip_address *dst;
 
-	const ip_subnet *src_client;
-	const ip_subnet *dst_client;
+		const ip_subnet *src_client;
+		const ip_subnet *dst_client;
 
-	ipsec_spi_t spi;
-	unsigned proto;
-	unsigned satype;
-	unsigned transport_proto;
-	unsigned replay_window;
-	unsigned reqid;
+		ipsec_spi_t spi;
+		unsigned proto;
+		unsigned satype;
+		unsigned transport_proto;
+		unsigned replay_window;
+		unsigned reqid;
 
-	unsigned authalg;
-	unsigned authkeylen;
-	char *authkey;
+		unsigned authalg;
+		unsigned authkeylen;
+		char *authkey;
 
-	unsigned encalg;
-	unsigned enckeylen;
-	char *enckey;
+		unsigned encalg;
+		unsigned enckeylen;
+		char *enckey;
 
-	unsigned compalg;
+		unsigned compalg;
 
-	int encapsulation;
+		int encapsulation;
 
-	u_int16_t natt_sport, natt_dport;
-	u_int8_t transid, natt_type;
-	ip_address *natt_oa;
+		u_int16_t natt_sport, natt_dport;
+		u_int8_t transid, natt_type;
+		ip_address *natt_oa;
 
-	const char *text_said;
+		const char *text_said;
 };
 
 struct kernel_ops {
-	enum {
-	        KERNEL_TYPE_NONE,
-		KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS,
-		KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX,
-	} type;
-	bool inbound_eroute;
-	bool policy_lifetime;
-	int *async_fdp;
-
-	void (*init)(void);
-	void (*pfkey_register)(void);
-	void (*pfkey_register_response)(const struct sadb_msg *msg);
-	void (*process_queue)(void);
-	void (*process_msg)(void);
-	bool (*raw_eroute)(const ip_address *this_host,
-			   const ip_subnet *this_client,
-			   const ip_address *that_host,
-			   const ip_subnet *that_client,
-			   ipsec_spi_t spi,
-			   unsigned int satype,
-			   unsigned int transport_proto,
-			   const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info,
-			   time_t use_lifetime,
-			   unsigned int op,
-			   const char *text_said);
-	bool (*get_policy)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool inbound,
-			   time_t *use_time);
-	bool (*add_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace);
-	bool (*grp_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa_outer,
-		       const struct kernel_sa *sa_inner);
-	bool (*del_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa);
-	bool (*get_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, u_int *bytes);
-	ipsec_spi_t (*get_spi)(const ip_address *src,
-			       const ip_address *dst,
-			       int proto,
-			       bool tunnel_mode,
-			       unsigned reqid,
-			       ipsec_spi_t min,
-			       ipsec_spi_t max,
-			       const char *text_said);
+		enum {
+				KERNEL_TYPE_NONE,
+				KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS,
+				KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX,
+		} type;
+		bool inbound_eroute;
+		bool policy_lifetime;
+		int *async_fdp;
+
+		void (*init)(void);
+		void (*pfkey_register)(void);
+		void (*pfkey_register_response)(const struct sadb_msg *msg);
+		void (*process_queue)(void);
+		void (*process_msg)(void);
+		bool (*raw_eroute)(const ip_address *this_host,
+						   const ip_subnet *this_client,
+						   const ip_address *that_host,
+						   const ip_subnet *that_client,
+						   ipsec_spi_t spi,
+						   unsigned int satype,
+						   unsigned int transport_proto,
+						   const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info,
+						   time_t use_lifetime,
+						   unsigned int op,
+						   const char *text_said);
+		bool (*get_policy)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool inbound,
+						   time_t *use_time);
+		bool (*add_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace);
+		bool (*grp_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa_outer,
+					   const struct kernel_sa *sa_inner);
+		bool (*del_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa);
+		bool (*get_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, u_int *bytes);
+		ipsec_spi_t (*get_spi)(const ip_address *src,
+							   const ip_address *dst,
+							   int proto,
+							   bool tunnel_mode,
+							   unsigned reqid,
+							   ipsec_spi_t min,
+							   ipsec_spi_t max,
+							   const char *text_said);
 };
 
 
@@ -126,13 +124,13 @@ extern const struct kernel_ops *kernel_ops;
 /* information from /proc/net/ipsec_eroute */
 
 struct eroute_info {
-    unsigned long count;
-    ip_subnet ours;
-    ip_subnet his;
-    ip_address dst;
-    ip_said	said;
-    int transport_proto;
-    struct eroute_info *next;
+	unsigned long count;
+	ip_subnet ours;
+	ip_subnet his;
+	ip_address dst;
+	ip_said     said;
+	int transport_proto;
+	struct eroute_info *next;
 };
 
 extern struct eroute_info *orphaned_holds;
@@ -144,13 +142,13 @@ extern void show_shunt_status(void);
  * Is there a PF_KEY equivalent?
  */
 #ifndef EM_MAXRELSPIS
-# define EM_MAXRELSPIS 4	/* AH ESP IPCOMP IPIP */
+# define EM_MAXRELSPIS 4        /* AH ESP IPCOMP IPIP */
 #endif
 
 extern void record_and_initiate_opportunistic(const ip_subnet *
-					      , const ip_subnet *
-					      , int transport_proto
-					      , const char *why);
+											  , const ip_subnet *
+											  , int transport_proto
+											  , const char *why);
 
 extern void init_kernel(void);
 
@@ -160,39 +158,39 @@ extern bool trap_connection(struct connection *c);
 extern void unroute_connection(struct connection *c);
 
 extern bool has_bare_hold(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst
-			  , int transport_proto);
+						  , int transport_proto);
 
 extern bool replace_bare_shunt(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst
-			       , policy_prio_t policy_prio
-			       , ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi	/* in host order! */
-			       , bool repl
-			       , unsigned int transport_proto
-			       , const char *why);
+							   , policy_prio_t policy_prio
+							   , ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi  /* in host order! */
+							   , bool repl
+							   , unsigned int transport_proto
+							   , const char *why);
 
 extern bool assign_hold(struct connection *c
-			, struct spd_route *sr
-			, int transport_proto
-			, const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst);
+						, struct spd_route *sr
+						, int transport_proto
+						, const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst);
 
 extern ipsec_spi_t shunt_policy_spi(struct connection *c, bool prospective);
 
 
-struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag */
+struct state;   /* forward declaration of tag */
 extern ipsec_spi_t get_ipsec_spi(ipsec_spi_t avoid
-				 , int proto
-				 , struct spd_route *sr
-				 , bool tunnel_mode);
+								 , int proto
+								 , struct spd_route *sr
+								 , bool tunnel_mode);
 extern ipsec_spi_t get_my_cpi(struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel_mode);
 
 extern bool install_inbound_ipsec_sa(struct state *st);
 extern bool install_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_also);
 extern void delete_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_only);
 extern bool route_and_eroute(struct connection *c
-			     , struct spd_route *sr
-			     , struct state *st);
+							 , struct spd_route *sr
+							 , struct state *st);
 extern bool was_eroute_idle(struct state *st, time_t idle_max
-    , time_t *idle_time);
+	, time_t *idle_time);
 extern bool get_sa_info(struct state *st, bool inbound, u_int *bytes
-    , time_t *use_time);
+	, time_t *use_time);
 
 extern bool update_ipsec_sa(struct state *st);
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c
index 571d9cc9b..1590bdf02 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* Kernel runtime algorithm handling interface
- * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * Copyright (C) JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_alg.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -27,7 +26,6 @@
 #include <pfkey.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -38,22 +36,10 @@
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "kernel_alg.h"
 #include "alg_info.h"
-
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
 #include "log.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "db_ops.h"
-#else
-/*
- *	macros/functions for compilation without pluto (eg: spi for manual conns)
- */
-extern int debug;
-#include <assert.h>
-#define passert(x) assert(x)
-#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (debug) { action ; } }
-#define DBG_log(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
-#define plog(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
 /* ALG storage */
 static struct sadb_alg esp_aalg[SADB_AALG_MAX+1];
 static struct sadb_alg esp_ealg[SADB_EALG_MAX+1];
@@ -62,714 +48,669 @@ static int esp_aalg_num = 0;
 
 #define ESP_EALG_PRESENT(algo) (((algo)<=SADB_EALG_MAX)&&(esp_ealg[(algo)].sadb_alg_id==(algo)))
 #define ESP_EALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(algo) \
-	for (algo=SADB_EALG_MAX; algo >0 ; algo--) \
-		if (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(algo))
+		for (algo=SADB_EALG_MAX; algo >0 ; algo--) \
+				if (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(algo))
 #define ESP_AALG_PRESENT(algo) ((algo<=SADB_AALG_MAX)&&(esp_aalg[(algo)].sadb_alg_id==(algo)))
 #define ESP_AALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(algo) \
-	for (algo=SADB_AALG_MAX; algo >0 ; algo--) \
-		if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(algo))
+		for (algo=SADB_AALG_MAX; algo >0 ; algo--) \
+				if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(algo))
 
-static struct sadb_alg*
-sadb_alg_ptr (int satype, int exttype, int alg_id, int rw)
+static struct sadb_alg* sadb_alg_ptr (int satype, int exttype, int alg_id,
+									  int rw)
 {
-    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
-
-    switch (exttype)
-    {
-    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH:
-	if (alg_id > SADB_AALG_MAX)
-	    return NULL;
-	break;
-    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT:
-	if (alg_id > SADB_EALG_MAX)
-	    return NULL;
-	break;
-    default:
-	return NULL;
-    }
-
-    switch (satype)
-    {
-    case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
-	alg_p = (exttype == SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT)?
-		    &esp_ealg[alg_id] : &esp_aalg[alg_id];
-	/* get for write: increment elem count */
-	if (rw)
+	struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
+
+	switch (exttype)
 	{
-	    (exttype == SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT)?
-		esp_ealg_num++ : esp_aalg_num++;
+	case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH:
+		if (alg_id > SADB_AALG_MAX)
+			return NULL;
+		break;
+	case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT:
+		if (alg_id > SADB_EALG_MAX)
+			return NULL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		return NULL;
 	}
-	break;
-    case SADB_SATYPE_AH:
-    default:
-	return NULL;
-    }
-    
-    return alg_p;
+
+	switch (satype)
+	{
+	case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+		alg_p = (exttype == SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT)?
+					&esp_ealg[alg_id] : &esp_aalg[alg_id];
+		/* get for write: increment elem count */
+		if (rw)
+		{
+			(exttype == SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT)?
+				esp_ealg_num++ : esp_aalg_num++;
+		}
+		break;
+	case SADB_SATYPE_AH:
+	default:
+		return NULL;
+	}
+	
+	return alg_p;
 }
 
-const struct sadb_alg *
-kernel_alg_sadb_alg_get(int satype, int exttype, int alg_id)
+const struct sadb_alg* kernel_alg_sadb_alg_get(int satype, int exttype,
+											   int alg_id)
 {
-    return sadb_alg_ptr(satype, exttype, alg_id, 0);
+	return sadb_alg_ptr(satype, exttype, alg_id, 0);
 }
 
 /*
- * 	Forget previous registration
+ *      Forget previous registration
  */
-static void 
-kernel_alg_init(void)
+static void kernel_alg_init(void)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("alg_init(): memset(%p, 0, %d) memset(%p, 0, %d)",
-		&esp_aalg,  (int)sizeof (esp_aalg),
-		&esp_ealg,  (int)sizeof (esp_ealg))
-    )
-    memset (&esp_aalg, 0, sizeof (esp_aalg));
-    memset (&esp_ealg, 0, sizeof (esp_ealg));
-    esp_ealg_num=esp_aalg_num = 0;
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("alg_init(): memset(%p, 0, %d) memset(%p, 0, %d)",
+				&esp_aalg,  (int)sizeof (esp_aalg),
+				&esp_ealg,  (int)sizeof (esp_ealg))
+	)
+	memset (&esp_aalg, 0, sizeof (esp_aalg));
+	memset (&esp_ealg, 0, sizeof (esp_ealg));
+	esp_ealg_num=esp_aalg_num = 0;
 }
 
-static int
-kernel_alg_add(int satype, int exttype, const struct sadb_alg *sadb_alg)
+static int kernel_alg_add(int satype, int exttype,
+						  const struct sadb_alg *sadb_alg)
 {
-    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
-    int alg_id = sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id;
-
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_add(): satype=%d, exttype=%d, alg_id=%d",
-		satype, exttype, sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id)
-    )
-    if (!(alg_p = sadb_alg_ptr(satype, exttype, alg_id, 1)))
-	return -1;
-
-    /* This logic "mimics" KLIPS: first algo implementation will be used */
-    if (alg_p->sadb_alg_id)
-    {
+	struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
+	int alg_id = sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id;
+
 	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_add(): discarding already setup "
-		    "satype=%d, exttype=%d, alg_id=%d",
-		    satype, exttype, sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id)
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_add(): satype=%d, exttype=%d, alg_id=%d",
+				satype, exttype, sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id)
 	)
-	return 0;
-    }
-    *alg_p = *sadb_alg;
-    return 1;
+	if (!(alg_p = sadb_alg_ptr(satype, exttype, alg_id, 1)))
+		return -1;
+
+	/* This logic "mimics" KLIPS: first algo implementation will be used */
+	if (alg_p->sadb_alg_id)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("kernel_alg_add(): discarding already setup "
+					"satype=%d, exttype=%d, alg_id=%d",
+					satype, exttype, sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id)
+		)
+		return 0;
+	}
+	*alg_p = *sadb_alg;
+	return 1;
 }
 
-bool
-kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(u_int alg_id, u_int key_len,
-		struct alg_info_esp *alg_info __attribute__((unused)))
+bool kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(u_int alg_id, u_int key_len,
+					struct alg_info_esp *alg_info __attribute__((unused)))
 {
-    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
-
-    /*
-     * test #1: encrypt algo must be present
-     */
-    int ret = ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id);
-    if (!ret) goto out;
-
-    alg_p = &esp_ealg[alg_id];
-    
-    /*
-     * test #2: if key_len specified, it must be in range
-     */
-    if (key_len
-    && (key_len < alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits || key_len > alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits))
-    {
-	plog("kernel_alg_db_add() key_len not in range: alg_id=%d, "
-	     "key_len=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d"
-	     , alg_id, key_len
-	     , alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
-	     , alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits);
-	ret = FALSE;
-    }
+	struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
+
+	/*
+	 * test #1: encrypt algo must be present
+	 */
+	int ret = ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id);
+	if (!ret) goto out;
+
+	alg_p = &esp_ealg[alg_id];
+	
+	/*
+	 * test #2: if key_len specified, it must be in range
+	 */
+	if (key_len
+	&& (key_len < alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits || key_len > alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits))
+	{
+		plog("kernel_alg_db_add() key_len not in range: alg_id=%d, "
+			 "key_len=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d"
+			 , alg_id, key_len
+			 , alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
+			 , alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits);
+		ret = FALSE;
+	}
 
 out:
-    if (ret)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(%d,%d): "
-		    "alg_id=%d, "
-		    "alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
-		    "res=%d, ret=%d"
-		    , alg_id, key_len
-		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_id
-		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_ivlen
-		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
-		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
-		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_reserved
-		    , ret);
-	)
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(%d,%d): NO", alg_id, key_len);
-	)
-    }
-    return ret;
+	if (ret)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(%d,%d): "
+					"alg_id=%d, "
+					"alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
+					"res=%d, ret=%d"
+					, alg_id, key_len
+					, alg_p->sadb_alg_id
+					, alg_p->sadb_alg_ivlen
+					, alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
+					, alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
+					, alg_p->sadb_alg_reserved
+					, ret);
+		)
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(%d,%d): NO", alg_id, key_len);
+		)
+	}
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /* 
  * ML: make F_STRICT logic consider enc,auth algorithms 
  */
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-bool
-kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info)
+bool kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg,
+							 struct alg_info_esp *alg_info)
 {
-    int ealg_insecure;
-
-    /*
-     * key_len passed comes from esp_attrs read from peer
-     * For many older algoritms (eg 3DES) this key_len is fixed
-     * and get passed as 0.
-     * ... then get default key_len
-     */
-    if (key_len == 0)
-	key_len = kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(ealg) * BITS_PER_BYTE;
-
-    /*
-     * simple test to toss low key_len, will accept it only
-     * if specified in "esp" string
-     */
-    ealg_insecure = (key_len < 128) ;
-
-    if (ealg_insecure
-    || (alg_info && alg_info->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT))
-    {
-	int i;
-	struct esp_info *esp_info;
+	int ealg_insecure;
 
-	if (alg_info)
+	/*
+	 * key_len passed comes from esp_attrs read from peer
+	 * For many older algoritms (eg 3DES) this key_len is fixed
+	 * and get passed as 0.
+	 * ... then get default key_len
+	 */
+	if (key_len == 0)
+		key_len = kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(ealg) * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+	/*
+	 * simple test to toss low key_len, will accept it only
+	 * if specified in "esp" string
+	 */
+	ealg_insecure = (key_len < 128) ;
+
+	if (ealg_insecure
+	|| (alg_info && alg_info->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT))
 	{
-	    ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info, esp_info, i)
-	    {
-		if (esp_info->esp_ealg_id == ealg
-		&& (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen == 0 || key_len == 0
-		    || esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen == key_len)
-		&&  esp_info->esp_aalg_id == aalg)
+		int i;
+		struct esp_info *esp_info;
+
+		if (alg_info)
 		{
-		    if (ealg_insecure)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "You should NOT use insecure ESP algorithms [%s (%d)]!"
-			    , enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, ealg), key_len);
-		    }
-		    return TRUE;
+			ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info, esp_info, i)
+			{
+				if (esp_info->esp_ealg_id == ealg
+				&& (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen == 0 || key_len == 0
+					|| esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen == key_len)
+				&&  esp_info->esp_aalg_id == aalg)
+				{
+					if (ealg_insecure)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "You should NOT use insecure ESP algorithms [%s (%d)]!"
+							, enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, ealg), key_len);
+					}
+					return TRUE;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
+		plog("IPSec Transform [%s (%d), %s] refused due to %s",
+				enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, ealg), key_len,
+				enum_name(&auth_alg_names, aalg),
+				ealg_insecure ? "insecure key_len and enc. alg. not listed in \"esp\" string" : "strict flag");
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	plog("IPSec Transform [%s (%d), %s] refused due to %s",
-		enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, ealg), key_len,
-		enum_name(&auth_alg_names, aalg),
-		ealg_insecure ? "insecure key_len and enc. alg. not listed in \"esp\" string" : "strict flag");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
 
-/*	
- *	Load kernel_alg arrays from /proc
- * 	used in manual mode from klips/utils/spi.c
+/**      
+ * Load kernel_alg arrays from /proc used in manual mode from klips/utils/spi.c
  */
-int
-kernel_alg_proc_read(void)
+int kernel_alg_proc_read(void)
 {
-    int satype;
-    int supp_exttype;
-    int alg_id, ivlen, minbits, maxbits;
-    struct sadb_alg sadb_alg;
-    int ret;
-    char buf[128];
+	int satype;
+	int supp_exttype;
+	int alg_id, ivlen, minbits, maxbits;
+	struct sadb_alg sadb_alg;
+	int ret;
+	char buf[128];
 
-    FILE *fp=fopen("/proc/net/pf_key_supported", "r");
+	FILE *fp=fopen("/proc/net/pf_key_supported", "r");
 
-    if (!fp)
-	return -1;
+	if (!fp)
+		return -1;
 
-    kernel_alg_init();
+	kernel_alg_init();
 
-    while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp))
-    {
-	if (buf[0] != ' ') /* skip titles */
-	    continue;
+	while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp))
+	{
+		if (buf[0] != ' ') /* skip titles */
+			continue;
 
-	sscanf(buf, "%d %d %d %d %d %d"
-		,&satype, &supp_exttype
-		, &alg_id, &ivlen
-		, &minbits, &maxbits);
+		sscanf(buf, "%d %d %d %d %d %d"
+				,&satype, &supp_exttype
+				, &alg_id, &ivlen
+				, &minbits, &maxbits);
 
-	switch (satype)
-	{
-	case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
-	    switch(supp_exttype)
-	    {
-	    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH:
-	    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT:
-		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_id = alg_id;
-		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_ivlen = ivlen;
-		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_minbits = minbits;
-		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_maxbits = maxbits;
-		ret = kernel_alg_add(satype, supp_exttype, &sadb_alg);
-		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-		    DBG_log("kernel_alg_proc_read() alg_id=%d, "
-			    "alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
-			    "ret=%d"
-			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_id
-			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_ivlen
-			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_minbits
-			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_maxbits
-			    , ret)
-		)
-	    }
-	default:
-	    continue;
+		switch (satype)
+		{
+		case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+			switch(supp_exttype)
+			{
+			case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH:
+			case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT:
+				sadb_alg.sadb_alg_id = alg_id;
+				sadb_alg.sadb_alg_ivlen = ivlen;
+				sadb_alg.sadb_alg_minbits = minbits;
+				sadb_alg.sadb_alg_maxbits = maxbits;
+				ret = kernel_alg_add(satype, supp_exttype, &sadb_alg);
+				DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+					DBG_log("kernel_alg_proc_read() alg_id=%d, "
+							"alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
+							"ret=%d"
+							, sadb_alg.sadb_alg_id
+							, sadb_alg.sadb_alg_ivlen
+							, sadb_alg.sadb_alg_minbits
+							, sadb_alg.sadb_alg_maxbits
+							, ret)
+				)
+			}
+		default:
+			continue;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    fclose(fp);
-    return 0;
+	fclose(fp);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-/*	
- *	Load kernel_alg arrays pluto's SADB_REGISTER	
- * 	user by pluto/kernel.c
+/**     
+ * Load kernel_alg arrays pluto's SADB_REGISTER user by pluto/kernel.c
  */
-
-void
-kernel_alg_register_pfkey(const struct sadb_msg *msg_buf, int buflen)
+void kernel_alg_register_pfkey(const struct sadb_msg *msg_buf, int buflen)
 {
-    /* Trick: one 'type-mangle-able' pointer to ease offset/assign */
-    union {
-	const struct sadb_msg *msg;
-	const struct sadb_supported *supported;
-	const struct sadb_ext *ext;
-	const struct sadb_alg *alg;
-	const char *ch;
-    } sadb;
-
-    int satype;
-    int msglen;
-    int i = 0;
-
-    /* Initialize alg arrays */
-    kernel_alg_init();
-    satype = msg_buf->sadb_msg_satype;
-    sadb.msg = msg_buf;
-    msglen = sadb.msg->sadb_msg_len*IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
-    msglen -= sizeof(struct sadb_msg);
-    buflen -= sizeof(struct sadb_msg);
-    passert(buflen > 0);
-
-    sadb.msg++;
-
-    while(msglen)
-    {
-	int supp_exttype = sadb.supported->sadb_supported_exttype;
-	int supp_len = sadb.supported->sadb_supported_len*IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
-
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_%s: "
-		    "sadb_msg_len=%d sadb_supported_len=%d"
-		    , satype==SADB_SATYPE_ESP? "ESP" : "AH"
-		    , msg_buf->sadb_msg_len, supp_len)
-	)
-	sadb.supported++;
-	msglen -= supp_len;
-	buflen -= supp_len;
-	passert(buflen >= 0);
-
-	for (supp_len -= sizeof(struct sadb_supported);
-	     supp_len;
-	     supp_len -= sizeof(struct sadb_alg), sadb.alg++,i++)
+	/* Trick: one 'type-mangle-able' pointer to ease offset/assign */
+	union {
+		const struct sadb_msg *msg;
+		const struct sadb_supported *supported;
+		const struct sadb_ext *ext;
+		const struct sadb_alg *alg;
+		const char *ch;
+	} sadb;
+
+	int satype;
+	int msglen;
+	int i = 0;
+
+	/* Initialize alg arrays */
+	kernel_alg_init();
+	satype = msg_buf->sadb_msg_satype;
+	sadb.msg = msg_buf;
+	msglen = sadb.msg->sadb_msg_len*IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+	msglen -= sizeof(struct sadb_msg);
+	buflen -= sizeof(struct sadb_msg);
+	passert(buflen > 0);
+
+	sadb.msg++;
+
+	while(msglen)
 	{
-	    int ret = kernel_alg_add(satype, supp_exttype, sadb.alg);
-
-	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-		DBG_log("kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_%s: "
-			"alg[%d], exttype=%d, satype=%d, alg_id=%d, "
-			"alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
-			"res=%d, ret=%d"
-			, satype==SADB_SATYPE_ESP? "ESP" : "AH"
-			, i
-			, supp_exttype
-			, satype
-			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_id
-			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_ivlen
-			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_minbits
-			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_maxbits
-			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_reserved
-			, ret)
-	    )
+		int supp_exttype = sadb.supported->sadb_supported_exttype;
+		int supp_len = sadb.supported->sadb_supported_len*IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_%s: "
+					"sadb_msg_len=%d sadb_supported_len=%d"
+					, satype==SADB_SATYPE_ESP? "ESP" : "AH"
+					, msg_buf->sadb_msg_len, supp_len)
+		)
+		sadb.supported++;
+		msglen -= supp_len;
+		buflen -= supp_len;
+		passert(buflen >= 0);
+
+		for (supp_len -= sizeof(struct sadb_supported);
+			 supp_len;
+			 supp_len -= sizeof(struct sadb_alg), sadb.alg++,i++)
+		{
+			int ret = kernel_alg_add(satype, supp_exttype, sadb.alg);
+
+			DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+				DBG_log("kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_%s: "
+						"alg[%d], exttype=%d, satype=%d, alg_id=%d, "
+						"alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
+						"res=%d, ret=%d"
+						, satype==SADB_SATYPE_ESP? "ESP" : "AH"
+						, i
+						, supp_exttype
+						, satype
+						, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_id
+						, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_ivlen
+						, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_minbits
+						, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_maxbits
+						, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_reserved
+						, ret)
+			)
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
-u_int
-kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(u_int alg_id)
+u_int kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(u_int alg_id)
 {
-    u_int keylen = 0;
+	u_int keylen = 0;
 
-    if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id))
-	goto none;
+	if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id))
+		goto none;
 
-    keylen = esp_ealg[alg_id].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	keylen = esp_ealg[alg_id].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
 
-    switch (alg_id)
-    {
-	/*
-	 * this is veryUgly[TM]
-	 * Peer should have sent KEY_LENGTH attribute for ESP_AES
-	 * but if not do force it to 128 instead of using sadb_alg_maxbits
-	 * from kernel.
-	 */
-	case ESP_AES:
-	    keylen = 128/BITS_PER_BYTE;
-	    break;
-    }
-
-none:	
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen():"
-		"alg_id=%d, keylen=%d",
-		alg_id, keylen)
-    )
-    return keylen;
+	switch (alg_id)
+	{
+		/*
+		 * this is veryUgly[TM]
+		 * Peer should have sent KEY_LENGTH attribute for ESP_AES
+		 * but if not do force it to 128 instead of using sadb_alg_maxbits
+		 * from kernel.
+		 */
+		case ESP_AES:
+			keylen = 128/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+			break;
+	}
+
+none:   
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen():"
+				"alg_id=%d, keylen=%d",
+				alg_id, keylen)
+	)
+	return keylen;
 }
 
-struct sadb_alg *
-kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(u_int alg_id)
+struct sadb_alg* kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(u_int alg_id)
 {
-    struct sadb_alg *sadb_alg = (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id))
-		? &esp_ealg[alg_id] : NULL;
-
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(): alg_id=%d, sadb_alg=%p"
-		, alg_id, sadb_alg)
-    )
-    return sadb_alg;
+	struct sadb_alg *sadb_alg = (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id))
+				? &esp_ealg[alg_id] : NULL;
+
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(): alg_id=%d, sadb_alg=%p"
+				, alg_id, sadb_alg)
+	)
+	return sadb_alg;
 }
 
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
 void kernel_alg_list(void)
 {
-    u_int sadb_id;
-
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered ESP Encryption Algorithms:");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-
-    for (sadb_id = 1; sadb_id <= SADB_EALG_MAX; sadb_id++)
-    {
-	if (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(sadb_id))
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	char *pos;
+	int n, len;
+	u_int sadb_id;
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered ESP Algorithms:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+	pos = buf;
+	*pos = '\0';
+	len = BUF_LEN;
+	for (sadb_id = 1; sadb_id <= SADB_EALG_MAX; sadb_id++)
 	{
-	    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = &esp_ealg[sadb_id];
-
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, blocksize: %d, keylen: %d-%d"
-		, sadb_id
-		, enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, sadb_id)
-		, alg_p->sadb_alg_ivlen
-		, alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
-		, alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
-	    );
+		if (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(sadb_id))
+		{
+			n = snprintf(pos, len, " %s",
+						 enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, sadb_id));
+			pos += n;
+			len -= n;
+			if (len <= 0)
+			{
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered ESP Authentication Algorithms:");
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-
-    for (sadb_id = 1; sadb_id <= SADB_AALG_MAX; sadb_id++)
-    {
-	if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(sadb_id))
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "  encryption:%s", buf);
+	
+	pos = buf;
+	*pos = '\0';
+	len = BUF_LEN;
+	for (sadb_id = 1; sadb_id <= SADB_AALG_MAX; sadb_id++)
 	{
-	    u_int aaid = alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(sadb_id);
-	    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = &esp_aalg[sadb_id];
-
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, keylen: %d-%d"
-		, aaid
-		, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, aaid)
-		, alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
-		, alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
-	    );
+		if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(sadb_id))
+		{
+			u_int aaid = alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(sadb_id);
+
+			n = snprintf(pos, len, " %s", enum_name(&auth_alg_names, aaid));
+			pos += n;
+			len -= n;
+			if (len <= 0)
+			{
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "  integrity: %s", buf);
 }
 
-void
-kernel_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance)
+void kernel_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance)
 {
-    char buf[256];
-    struct state *st;
-
-    if (c->alg_info_esp)
-    {
-	alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf), (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP algorithms wanted: %s"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, buf);
-    }
-    if (c->alg_info_esp)
-    {
-	alg_info_snprint_esp(buf, sizeof(buf), c->alg_info_esp);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP algorithms loaded: %s"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, buf);
-    }
-    st = state_with_serialno(c->newest_ipsec_sa);
-    if (st && st->st_esp.present)
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
-		, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP algorithm newest: %s_%d-%s; pfsgroup=%s"
-		, c->name
-		, instance
-		, enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid)
-		+4 /* strlen("ESP_") */
-		, st->st_esp.attrs.key_len
-		, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, st->st_esp.attrs.auth)+
-		+15 /* strlen("AUTH_ALGORITHM_") */
-		, c->policy & POLICY_PFS ?
-			c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup ?
-					enum_show(&oakley_group_names, 
-						c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
-						+13 /*strlen("OAKLEY_GROUP_")*/
-				: "<Phase1>"
-			: "<N/A>"
-	);
+	struct state *st = state_with_serialno(c->newest_ipsec_sa);
+
+	if (st && st->st_esp.present)
+	{
+		const char *aalg_name, *pfsgroup_name;
+
+		aalg_name = (c->policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE) ?
+					enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, st->st_ah.attrs.transid):
+					enum_show(&auth_alg_names, st->st_esp.attrs.auth);
+
+		pfsgroup_name = (c->policy & POLICY_PFS) ?
+						(c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup) ?
+							enum_show(&oakley_group_names, 
+										  c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup) :
+							"<Phase1>" : "<N/A>";
+
+		if (st->st_esp.attrs.key_len)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP%s proposal: %s_%u/%s/%s",
+				c->name, instance,
+				(st->st_ah.present) ? "/AH" : "",
+				enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid),
+				st->st_esp.attrs.key_len, aalg_name, pfsgroup_name);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP%s proposal: %s/%s/%s",
+				c->name, instance,
+				(st->st_ah.present) ? "/AH" : "",
+				enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid),
+				aalg_name, pfsgroup_name);
+		}
+	}
 }
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
 
-bool
-kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(u_int auth,
-		struct alg_info_esp *alg_info __attribute__((unused)))
+bool kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(u_int auth,
+					struct alg_info_esp *alg_info __attribute__((unused)))
 {
-    return ESP_AALG_PRESENT(alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth));
+	return ESP_AALG_PRESENT(alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth));
 }
 
-u_int
-kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(u_int auth)
+u_int kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(u_int auth)
 {
-    u_int sadb_aalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth);
+	u_int sadb_aalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth);
 
-    u_int a_keylen = (sadb_aalg)
-		   ? esp_aalg[sadb_aalg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE
-		   : 0;
+	u_int a_keylen = (sadb_aalg)
+				   ? esp_aalg[sadb_aalg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE
+				   : 0;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(auth=%d, sadb_aalg=%d): "
-		"a_keylen=%d", auth, sadb_aalg, a_keylen)
-    )
-    return a_keylen;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(auth=%d, sadb_aalg=%d): "
+				"a_keylen=%d", auth, sadb_aalg, a_keylen)
+	)
+	return a_keylen;
 }
 
-struct esp_info *
-kernel_alg_esp_info(int transid, int auth)
+struct esp_info* kernel_alg_esp_info(int transid, int auth)
 {
-    int sadb_aalg, sadb_ealg;
-    static struct esp_info ei_buf;
-
-    sadb_ealg = transid;
-    sadb_aalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth);
-
-    if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(sadb_ealg))
-	goto none;
-    if (!ESP_AALG_PRESENT(sadb_aalg))
-	goto none;
-
-    memset(&ei_buf, 0, sizeof (ei_buf));
-    ei_buf.transid = transid;
-    ei_buf.auth = auth;
-
-    /* don't return "default" keylen because this value is used from
-     * setup_half_ipsec_sa() to "validate" keylen
-     * In effect,  enckeylen will be used as "max" value
-     */
-    ei_buf.enckeylen = esp_ealg[sadb_ealg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
-    ei_buf.authkeylen = esp_aalg[sadb_aalg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
-    ei_buf.encryptalg = sadb_ealg;
-    ei_buf.authalg = sadb_aalg;
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_info():"
-		"transid=%d, auth=%d, ei=%p, "
-		"enckeylen=%d, authkeylen=%d, encryptalg=%d, authalg=%d",
-		transid, auth, &ei_buf,
-		(int)ei_buf.enckeylen, (int)ei_buf.authkeylen,
-		ei_buf.encryptalg, ei_buf.authalg)
-    )
-    return &ei_buf;
+	int sadb_aalg, sadb_ealg;
+	static struct esp_info ei_buf;
+
+	sadb_ealg = transid;
+	sadb_aalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth);
+
+	if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(sadb_ealg))
+		goto none;
+	if (!ESP_AALG_PRESENT(sadb_aalg))
+		goto none;
+
+	memset(&ei_buf, 0, sizeof (ei_buf));
+	ei_buf.transid = transid;
+	ei_buf.auth = auth;
+
+	/* don't return "default" keylen because this value is used from
+	 * setup_half_ipsec_sa() to "validate" keylen
+	 * In effect,  enckeylen will be used as "max" value
+	 */
+	ei_buf.enckeylen = esp_ealg[sadb_ealg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	ei_buf.authkeylen = esp_aalg[sadb_aalg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	ei_buf.encryptalg = sadb_ealg;
+	ei_buf.authalg = sadb_aalg;
+
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_info():"
+				"transid=%d, auth=%d, ei=%p, "
+				"enckeylen=%d, authkeylen=%d, encryptalg=%d, authalg=%d",
+				transid, auth, &ei_buf,
+				(int)ei_buf.enckeylen, (int)ei_buf.authkeylen,
+				ei_buf.encryptalg, ei_buf.authalg)
+	)
+	return &ei_buf;
 
 none:
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_info():"
-		"transid=%d, auth=%d, ei=NULL",
-		transid, auth)
-    )
-    return NULL;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_info():"
+				"transid=%d, auth=%d, ei=NULL",
+				transid, auth)
+	)
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-static void
-kernel_alg_policy_algorithms(struct esp_info *esp_info)
+static void kernel_alg_policy_algorithms(struct esp_info *esp_info)
 {
-    u_int ealg_id = esp_info->esp_ealg_id;
-
-    switch(ealg_id)
-    {
-    case 0:
-    case ESP_DES:
-    case ESP_3DES:
-    case ESP_NULL:
-    case ESP_CAST:
-            break;
-    default:
-	if (!esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+	u_int ealg_id = esp_info->esp_ealg_id;
+
+	switch(ealg_id)
 	{
-	    /* algos that need  KEY_LENGTH
-	     *
-	     * Note: this is a very dirty hack ;-)
-	     * Idea: Add a key_length_needed attribute to
-	     * esp_ealg ??
-	     */
-	    esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen = esp_ealg[ealg_id].sadb_alg_maxbits;
+	case 0:
+	case ESP_DES:
+	case ESP_3DES:
+	case ESP_NULL:
+	case ESP_CAST:
+			break;
+	default:
+		if (!esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+		{
+			/* algos that need  KEY_LENGTH
+			 *
+			 * Note: this is a very dirty hack ;-)
+			 * Idea: Add a key_length_needed attribute to
+			 * esp_ealg ??
+			 */
+			esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen = esp_ealg[ealg_id].sadb_alg_maxbits;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
-static bool 
-kernel_alg_db_add(struct db_context *db_ctx, struct esp_info *esp_info, lset_t policy)
+static bool kernel_alg_db_add(struct db_context *db_ctx,
+							  struct esp_info *esp_info, lset_t policy)
 {
-    u_int ealg_id, aalg_id;
-
-    ealg_id = esp_info->esp_ealg_id;
+	u_int ealg_id, aalg_id;
 
-    if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(ealg_id))
-    {
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_add() kernel enc ealg_id=%d not present", ealg_id);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    
-    if (!(policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE))    /* skip ESP auth attrs for AH */
-    {
-	aalg_id = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
+	ealg_id = esp_info->esp_ealg_id;
 
-	if (!ESP_AALG_PRESENT(aalg_id))
+	if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(ealg_id))
 	{
-	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_add() kernel auth "
-		    "aalg_id=%d not present", aalg_id);
-	    return FALSE;
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_add() kernel enc ealg_id=%d not present", ealg_id);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-    }
+	
+	if (!(policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE))    /* skip ESP auth attrs for AH */
+	{
+		aalg_id = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
 
-    /* do algo policy */
-    kernel_alg_policy_algorithms(esp_info);
+		if (!ESP_AALG_PRESENT(aalg_id))
+		{
+			DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_add() kernel auth "
+					"aalg_id=%d not present", aalg_id);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
 
-    /*	open new transformation */
-    db_trans_add(db_ctx, ealg_id);
+	/* do algo policy */
+	kernel_alg_policy_algorithms(esp_info);
 
-    /* add ESP auth attr */
-    if (!(policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE))
-	db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, AUTH_ALGORITHM, esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
+	/*  open new transformation */
+	db_trans_add(db_ctx, ealg_id);
 
-    /* add keylegth if specified in esp= string */
-    if (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
-	db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, KEY_LENGTH, esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen);
-	
-    return TRUE;
+	/* add ESP auth attr */
+	if (!(policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE))
+		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, AUTH_ALGORITHM, esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
+
+	/* add keylegth if specified in esp= string */
+	if (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, KEY_LENGTH, esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen);
+		
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-/*	
- *	Create proposal with runtime kernel algos, merging
- *	with passed proposal if not NULL
+/*      
+ *      Create proposal with runtime kernel algos, merging
+ *      with passed proposal if not NULL
  *
- *	for now this function does free() previous returned
- *	malloced pointer (this quirk allows easier spdb.c change)
+ *      for now this function does free() previous returned
+ *      malloced pointer (this quirk allows easier spdb.c change)
  */
-struct db_context * 
-kernel_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_esp *alg_info, lset_t policy )
+struct db_context* kernel_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_esp *alg_info,
+									 lset_t policy )
 {
-    const struct esp_info *esp_info;
-    struct esp_info tmp_esp_info;
-    struct db_context *ctx_new=NULL;
-    struct db_trans *t;
-    struct db_prop  *prop;
-    u_int trans_cnt;
-    int tn = 0;
-
-    if (!(policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT))	/* not possible, I think  */
-	return NULL;
+	const struct esp_info *esp_info;
+	struct esp_info tmp_esp_info;
+	struct db_context *ctx_new = NULL;
+	struct db_prop  *prop;
+	u_int trans_cnt = esp_ealg_num * esp_aalg_num;
 
-    trans_cnt = esp_ealg_num * esp_aalg_num;
-    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_prop_new() initial trans_cnt=%d"
-		, trans_cnt)
-    )
-
-    /* pass aprox. number of transforms and attributes */
-    ctx_new = db_prop_new(PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, trans_cnt, trans_cnt * 2);
+	if (!(policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT))     /* not possible, I think  */
+	{
+		return NULL;
+	}
 
-    /*
-     * Loop: for each element (struct esp_info) of alg_info,
-     *       if kernel support is present then build the transform (and attrs)
-     *       if NULL alg_info, propose everything ...
-     */
+	/* pass aprox. number of transforms and attributes */
+	ctx_new = db_prop_new(PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, trans_cnt, trans_cnt * 2);
 
-    if (alg_info)
-    {
-	int i;
+	/*
+	 * Loop: for each element (struct esp_info) of alg_info,
+	 *       if kernel support is present then build the transform (and attrs)
+	 *       if NULL alg_info, propose everything ...
+	 */
 
-	ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info, esp_info, i)
+	if (alg_info)
 	{
-	    tmp_esp_info = *esp_info;
-	    kernel_alg_db_add(ctx_new, &tmp_esp_info, policy);
+		int i;
+
+		ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info, esp_info, i)
+		{
+			tmp_esp_info = *esp_info;
+			kernel_alg_db_add(ctx_new, &tmp_esp_info, policy);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	u_int ealg_id;
-	
-	ESP_EALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(ealg_id)
+	else
 	{
-	    u_int aalg_id;
-
-	    tmp_esp_info.esp_ealg_id = ealg_id;
-	    tmp_esp_info.esp_ealg_keylen = 0;
-
-	    for (aalg_id = 1; aalg_id <= SADB_AALG_MAX; aalg_id++)
-	    {
-		if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(aalg_id))
+		u_int ealg_id;
+		
+		ESP_EALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(ealg_id)
 		{
-		    tmp_esp_info.esp_aalg_id = alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(aalg_id);
-		    tmp_esp_info.esp_aalg_keylen = 0;
-		    kernel_alg_db_add(ctx_new, &tmp_esp_info, policy);
+			u_int aalg_id;
+
+			tmp_esp_info.esp_ealg_id = ealg_id;
+			tmp_esp_info.esp_ealg_keylen = 0;
+
+			for (aalg_id = 1; aalg_id <= SADB_AALG_MAX; aalg_id++)
+			{
+				if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(aalg_id))
+				{
+					tmp_esp_info.esp_aalg_id = alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(aalg_id);
+					tmp_esp_info.esp_aalg_keylen = 0;
+					kernel_alg_db_add(ctx_new, &tmp_esp_info, policy);
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-
-    prop = db_prop_get(ctx_new);
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_EMITTING,
-	DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_prop_new() "
-		"will return p_new->protoid=%d, p_new->trans_cnt=%d"
-		, prop->protoid, prop->trans_cnt)
-    )
-
-    for (t = prop->trans, tn = 0; tn < prop->trans_cnt; tn++)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_EMITTING,
-	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_prop_new() "
-		    "    trans[%d]: transid=%d, attr_cnt=%d, "
-		    "attrs[0].type=%d, attrs[0].val=%d"
-		    , tn
-		    , t[tn].transid, t[tn].attr_cnt
-		    , t[tn].attrs[0].type, t[tn].attrs[0].val)
-	)
-    }
-    return ctx_new;
+	prop = db_prop_get(ctx_new);
+	return ctx_new;
 }
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h
index 14c2664aa..5ce8c3003 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_alg.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _KERNEL_ALG_H
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c
index 4269de66e..b4b4774c7 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_netlink.c 3850 2008-04-18 20:01:49Z andreas $
  */
 
 #if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
@@ -39,7 +37,7 @@
 #include "kernel_netlink.h"
 #include "kernel_pfkey.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 #include "kernel_alg.h"
 
 /* Minimum priority number in SPD used by pluto. */
@@ -48,72 +46,72 @@
 static int netlinkfd = NULL_FD;
 static int netlink_bcast_fd = NULL_FD;
 
-#define NE(x) { x, #x }	/* Name Entry -- shorthand for sparse_names */
+#define NE(x) { x, #x } /* Name Entry -- shorthand for sparse_names */
 
 static sparse_names xfrm_type_names = {
-	NE(NLMSG_NOOP),
-	NE(NLMSG_ERROR),
-	NE(NLMSG_DONE),
-	NE(NLMSG_OVERRUN),
+		NE(NLMSG_NOOP),
+		NE(NLMSG_ERROR),
+		NE(NLMSG_DONE),
+		NE(NLMSG_OVERRUN),
 
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_NEWSA),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_DELSA),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_GETSA),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_NEWSA),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_DELSA),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_GETSA),
 
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY),
 
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE),
 
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY),
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_UPDSA),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_UPDSA),
 
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE),
 
-	NE(XFRM_MSG_MAX),
+		NE(XFRM_MSG_MAX),
 
-	{ 0, sparse_end }
+		{ 0, sparse_end }
 };
 
 #undef NE
 
 /* Authentication algorithms */
 static sparse_names aalg_list = {
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_NULL, "digest_null" },
-	{ SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC, "md5" },
-	{ SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC, "sha1" },
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC, "sha256" },
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384HMAC, "sha384" },
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC, "sha512" },
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC, "ripemd160" },
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC, "xcbc(aes)"},
-	{ SADB_X_AALG_NULL, "null" },
-	{ 0, sparse_end }
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_NULL, "digest_null" },
+		{ SADB_AALG_MD5HMAC, "md5" },
+		{ SADB_AALG_SHA1HMAC, "sha1" },
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_256HMAC, "sha256" },
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_384HMAC, "sha384" },
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_SHA2_512HMAC, "sha512" },
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_RIPEMD160HMAC, "ripemd160" },
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_AES_XCBC_MAC, "xcbc(aes)"},
+		{ SADB_X_AALG_NULL, "null" },
+		{ 0, sparse_end }
 };
 
 /* Encryption algorithms */
 static sparse_names ealg_list = {
-	{ SADB_EALG_NULL, "cipher_null" },
-	{ SADB_EALG_DESCBC, "des" },
-	{ SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, "des3_ede" },
-	{ SADB_X_EALG_CASTCBC, "cast128" },
-	{ SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC, "blowfish" },
-	{ SADB_X_EALG_AESCBC, "aes" },
-	{ SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC, "cbc(camellia)" },
-	{ SADB_X_EALG_SERPENTCBC, "serpent" },
-	{ SADB_X_EALG_TWOFISHCBC, "twofish" },
-	{ 0, sparse_end }
+		{ SADB_EALG_NULL, "cipher_null" },
+		{ SADB_EALG_DESCBC, "des" },
+		{ SADB_EALG_3DESCBC, "des3_ede" },
+		{ SADB_X_EALG_CASTCBC, "cast128" },
+		{ SADB_X_EALG_BLOWFISHCBC, "blowfish" },
+		{ SADB_X_EALG_AESCBC, "aes" },
+		{ SADB_X_EALG_CAMELLIACBC, "cbc(camellia)" },
+		{ SADB_X_EALG_SERPENTCBC, "serpent" },
+		{ SADB_X_EALG_TWOFISHCBC, "twofish" },
+		{ 0, sparse_end }
 };
 
 /* Compression algorithms */
 static sparse_names calg_list = {
-	{ SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE, "deflate" },
-	{ SADB_X_CALG_LZS, "lzs" },
-	{ SADB_X_CALG_LZJH, "lzjh" },
-	{ 0, sparse_end }
+		{ SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE, "deflate" },
+		{ SADB_X_CALG_LZS, "lzs" },
+		{ SADB_X_CALG_LZJH, "lzjh" },
+		{ 0, sparse_end }
 };
 
 /** ip2xfrm - Take an IP address and convert to an xfrm.
@@ -124,14 +122,14 @@ static sparse_names calg_list = {
 static void
 ip2xfrm(const ip_address *addr, xfrm_address_t *xaddr)
 {
-    if (addr->u.v4.sin_family == AF_INET)
-    {
-	xaddr->a4 = addr->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	memcpy(xaddr->a6, &addr->u.v6.sin6_addr, sizeof(xaddr->a6));
-    }
+	if (addr->u.v4.sin_family == AF_INET)
+	{
+		xaddr->a4 = addr->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		memcpy(xaddr->a6, &addr->u.v6.sin6_addr, sizeof(xaddr->a6));
+	}
 }
 
 /** init_netlink - Initialize the netlink inferface.  Opens the sockets and
@@ -140,32 +138,32 @@ ip2xfrm(const ip_address *addr, xfrm_address_t *xaddr)
 static void
 init_netlink(void)
 {
-    struct sockaddr_nl addr;
+	struct sockaddr_nl addr;
 
-    netlinkfd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_XFRM);
+	netlinkfd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_XFRM);
 
-    if (netlinkfd < 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() in init_netlink()"));
+	if (netlinkfd < 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "socket() in init_netlink()"));
 
-    if (fcntl(netlinkfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) in init_netlink()"));
+	if (fcntl(netlinkfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) in init_netlink()"));
 
-    netlink_bcast_fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_XFRM);
+	netlink_bcast_fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_XFRM);
 
-    if (netlink_bcast_fd < 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() for bcast in init_netlink()"));
+	if (netlink_bcast_fd < 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "socket() for bcast in init_netlink()"));
 
-    if (fcntl(netlink_bcast_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) for bcast in init_netlink()"));
+	if (fcntl(netlink_bcast_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) for bcast in init_netlink()"));
 
-    if (fcntl(netlink_bcast_fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(O_NONBLOCK) for bcast in init_netlink()"));
+	if (fcntl(netlink_bcast_fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(O_NONBLOCK) for bcast in init_netlink()"));
 
-    addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
-    addr.nl_pid = getpid();
-    addr.nl_groups = XFRMGRP_ACQUIRE | XFRMGRP_EXPIRE;
-    if (bind(netlink_bcast_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "Failed to bind bcast socket in init_netlink()"));
+	addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
+	addr.nl_pid = getpid();
+	addr.nl_groups = XFRMGRP_ACQUIRE | XFRMGRP_EXPIRE;
+	if (bind(netlink_bcast_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "Failed to bind bcast socket in init_netlink()"));
 }
 
 /** send_netlink_msg
@@ -182,139 +180,139 @@ static bool
 send_netlink_msg(struct nlmsghdr *hdr, struct nlmsghdr *rbuf, size_t rbuf_len
 , const char *description, const char *text_said)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct nlmsgerr e;
-	char data[1024];
-    } rsp;
-
-    size_t len;
-    ssize_t r;
-    struct sockaddr_nl addr;
-    static uint32_t seq;
-
-    if (no_klips)
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    hdr->nlmsg_seq = ++seq;
-    len = hdr->nlmsg_len;
-    do {
-	r = write(netlinkfd, hdr, len);
-    } while (r < 0 && errno == EINTR);
-    if (r < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e
-	    , "netlink write() of %s message"
-	      " for %s %s failed"
-	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-	    , description, text_said));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else if ((size_t)r != len)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "ERROR: netlink write() of %s message"
-	      " for %s %s truncated: %ld instead of %lu"
-	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-	    , description, text_said
-	    , (long)r, (unsigned long)len);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    for (;;) {
-	socklen_t alen;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct nlmsgerr e;
+		char data[1024];
+	} rsp;
+
+	size_t len;
+	ssize_t r;
+	struct sockaddr_nl addr;
+	static uint32_t seq;
+
+	if (no_klips)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-	alen = sizeof(addr);
-	r = recvfrom(netlinkfd, &rsp, sizeof(rsp), 0
-	    , (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen);
+	hdr->nlmsg_seq = ++seq;
+	len = hdr->nlmsg_len;
+	do {
+		r = write(netlinkfd, hdr, len);
+	} while (r < 0 && errno == EINTR);
 	if (r < 0)
 	{
-	    if (errno == EINTR)
-	    {
-		continue;
-	    }
-	    log_errno((e
-		, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
-		  " for %s %s failed"
-		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-		, description, text_said));
-	    return FALSE;
+		log_errno((e
+			, "netlink write() of %s message"
+			  " for %s %s failed"
+			, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+			, description, text_said));
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else if ((size_t) r < sizeof(rsp.n))
+	else if ((size_t)r != len)
 	{
-	    plog("netlink read truncated message: %ld bytes; ignore message"
-		, (long) r);
-	    continue;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ERROR: netlink write() of %s message"
+			  " for %s %s truncated: %ld instead of %lu"
+			, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+			, description, text_said
+			, (long)r, (unsigned long)len);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else if (addr.nl_pid != 0)
+
+	for (;;) {
+		socklen_t alen;
+
+		alen = sizeof(addr);
+		r = recvfrom(netlinkfd, &rsp, sizeof(rsp), 0
+			, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen);
+		if (r < 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EINTR)
+			{
+				continue;
+			}
+			log_errno((e
+				, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+				  " for %s %s failed"
+				, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+				, description, text_said));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		else if ((size_t) r < sizeof(rsp.n))
+		{
+			plog("netlink read truncated message: %ld bytes; ignore message"
+				, (long) r);
+			continue;
+		}
+		else if (addr.nl_pid != 0)
+		{
+			/* not for us: ignore */
+			DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+				DBG_log("netlink: ignoring %s message from process %u"
+					, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
+					, addr.nl_pid));
+			continue;
+		}
+		else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_seq != seq)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+				DBG_log("netlink: ignoring out of sequence (%u/%u) message %s"
+					, rsp.n.nlmsg_seq, seq
+					, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)));
+			continue;
+		}
+		break;
+	}
+
+	if (rsp.n.nlmsg_len > (size_t) r)
 	{
-	    /* not for us: ignore */
-	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-		DBG_log("netlink: ignoring %s message from process %u"
-		    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
-		    , addr.nl_pid));
-	    continue;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+			  " for %s %s was truncated: %ld instead of %lu"
+			, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+			, description, text_said
+			, (long) len, (unsigned long) rsp.n.nlmsg_len);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_seq != seq)
+	else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR
+	&& (rbuf && rsp.n.nlmsg_type != rbuf->nlmsg_type))
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-		DBG_log("netlink: ignoring out of sequence (%u/%u) message %s"
-		    , rsp.n.nlmsg_seq, seq
-		    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)));
-	    continue;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+			  " for %s %s was of wrong type (%s)"
+			, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+			, description, text_said
+			, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type));
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	break;
-    }
-
-    if (rsp.n.nlmsg_len > (size_t) r)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
-	      " for %s %s was truncated: %ld instead of %lu"
-	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-	    , description, text_said
-	    , (long) len, (unsigned long) rsp.n.nlmsg_len);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR
-    && (rbuf && rsp.n.nlmsg_type != rbuf->nlmsg_type))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
-	      " for %s %s was of wrong type (%s)"
-	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-	    , description, text_said
-	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else if (rbuf)
-    {
-	if ((size_t) r > rbuf_len)
+	else if (rbuf)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-		, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
-		  " for %s %s was too long: %ld > %lu"
-		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-		, description, text_said
-		, (long)r, (unsigned long)rbuf_len);
-	    return FALSE;
+		if ((size_t) r > rbuf_len)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+				  " for %s %s was too long: %ld > %lu"
+				, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+				, description, text_said
+				, (long)r, (unsigned long)rbuf_len);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		memcpy(rbuf, &rsp, r);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR && rsp.e.error)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ERROR: netlink response for %s %s included errno %d: %s"
+			, description, text_said
+			, -rsp.e.error
+			, strerror(-rsp.e.error));
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	memcpy(rbuf, &rsp, r);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR && rsp.e.error)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	    , "ERROR: netlink response for %s %s included errno %d: %s"
-	    , description, text_said
-	    , -rsp.e.error
-	    , strerror(-rsp.e.error));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /** netlink_policy -
@@ -327,36 +325,36 @@ send_netlink_msg(struct nlmsghdr *hdr, struct nlmsghdr *rbuf, size_t rbuf_len
 static bool
 netlink_policy(struct nlmsghdr *hdr, bool enoent_ok, const char *text_said)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct nlmsgerr e;
-    } rsp;
-    int error;
-
-    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = NLMSG_ERROR;
-    if (!send_netlink_msg(hdr, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "policy", text_said))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct nlmsgerr e;
+	} rsp;
+	int error;
+
+	rsp.n.nlmsg_type = NLMSG_ERROR;
+	if (!send_netlink_msg(hdr, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "policy", text_said))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    error = -rsp.e.error;
-    if (!error)
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	error = -rsp.e.error;
+	if (!error)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-    if (error == ENOENT && enoent_ok)
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	, "ERROR: netlink %s response for flow %s included errno %d: %s"
-	, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
-	, text_said
-	, error
-	, strerror(error));
-    return FALSE;
+	if (error == ENOENT && enoent_ok)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "ERROR: netlink %s response for flow %s included errno %d: %s"
+		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+		, text_said
+		, error
+		, strerror(error));
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 /** netlink_raw_eroute
@@ -376,192 +374,192 @@ netlink_policy(struct nlmsghdr *hdr, bool enoent_ok, const char *text_said)
  */
 static bool
 netlink_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
-		 , const ip_subnet *this_client
-		 , const ip_address *that_host
-		 , const ip_subnet *that_client
-		 , ipsec_spi_t spi
-		 , unsigned int satype
-		 , unsigned int transport_proto
-		 , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
-		 , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
-		 , unsigned int op
-		 , const char *text_said)
+				 , const ip_subnet *this_client
+				 , const ip_address *that_host
+				 , const ip_subnet *that_client
+				 , ipsec_spi_t spi
+				 , unsigned int satype
+				 , unsigned int transport_proto
+				 , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
+				 , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
+				 , unsigned int op
+				 , const char *text_said)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	union {
-	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_info p;
-	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
-	} u;
-	char data[1024];
-    } req;
-    int shift;
-    int dir;
-    int family;
-    int policy;
-    bool ok;
-    bool enoent_ok;
-
-    policy = IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC;
-
-    if (satype == SADB_X_SATYPE_INT)
-    {
-	/* shunt route */
-	switch (ntohl(spi))
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		union {
+			struct xfrm_userpolicy_info p;
+			struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
+		} u;
+		char data[1024];
+	} req;
+	int shift;
+	int dir;
+	int family;
+	int policy;
+	bool ok;
+	bool enoent_ok;
+
+	policy = IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC;
+
+	if (satype == SADB_X_SATYPE_INT)
 	{
-	case SPI_PASS:
-	    policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE;
-	    break;
-	case SPI_DROP:
-	case SPI_REJECT:
-	default:
-	    policy = IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD;
-	    break;
-	case SPI_TRAP:
-	case SPI_TRAPSUBNET:
-	case SPI_HOLD:
-	    if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
-	    {
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	}
-    }
-
-    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
-
-    family = that_client->addr.u.v4.sin_family;
-    shift = (family == AF_INET) ? 5 : 7;
-
-    req.u.p.sel.sport = portof(&this_client->addr);
-    req.u.p.sel.dport = portof(&that_client->addr);
-    req.u.p.sel.sport_mask = (req.u.p.sel.sport) ? ~0:0;
-    req.u.p.sel.dport_mask = (req.u.p.sel.dport) ? ~0:0;
-    ip2xfrm(&this_client->addr, &req.u.p.sel.saddr);
-    ip2xfrm(&that_client->addr, &req.u.p.sel.daddr);
-    req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s = this_client->maskbits;
-    req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d = that_client->maskbits;
-    req.u.p.sel.proto = transport_proto;
-    req.u.p.sel.family = family;
-
-    dir = XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
-    if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
-    {
-	dir = XFRM_POLICY_IN;
-    }
-
-    if ((op & ERO_MASK) == ERO_DELETE)
-    {
-	req.u.id.dir = dir;
-	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
-	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.u.id)));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-    	int src, dst;
-
-	req.u.p.dir = dir;
-
-    	src = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s;
-    	dst = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d;
-	if (dir != XFRM_POLICY_OUT) {
-	    src = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d;
-	    dst = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s;
+		/* shunt route */
+		switch (ntohl(spi))
+		{
+		case SPI_PASS:
+			policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE;
+			break;
+		case SPI_DROP:
+		case SPI_REJECT:
+		default:
+			policy = IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD;
+			break;
+		case SPI_TRAP:
+		case SPI_TRAPSUBNET:
+		case SPI_HOLD:
+			if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+			{
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	req.u.p.priority = MIN_SPD_PRIORITY
-	    + (((2 << shift) - src) << shift)
-	    + (2 << shift) - dst;
 
-	req.u.p.action = XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW;
-	if (policy == IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD)
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
+
+	family = that_client->addr.u.v4.sin_family;
+	shift = (family == AF_INET) ? 5 : 7;
+
+	req.u.p.sel.sport = portof(&this_client->addr);
+	req.u.p.sel.dport = portof(&that_client->addr);
+	req.u.p.sel.sport_mask = (req.u.p.sel.sport) ? ~0:0;
+	req.u.p.sel.dport_mask = (req.u.p.sel.dport) ? ~0:0;
+	ip2xfrm(&this_client->addr, &req.u.p.sel.saddr);
+	ip2xfrm(&that_client->addr, &req.u.p.sel.daddr);
+	req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s = this_client->maskbits;
+	req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d = that_client->maskbits;
+	req.u.p.sel.proto = transport_proto;
+	req.u.p.sel.family = family;
+
+	dir = XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
+	if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
 	{
-	    req.u.p.action = XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK;
+		dir = XFRM_POLICY_IN;
 	}
-	req.u.p.lft.soft_use_expires_seconds = use_lifetime;
-	req.u.p.lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
-	req.u.p.lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
-	req.u.p.lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
-	req.u.p.lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
-
-	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
-	if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_REPLACEFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+
+	if ((op & ERO_MASK) == ERO_DELETE)
 	{
-	    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY;
+		req.u.id.dir = dir;
+		req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
+		req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.u.id)));
 	}
-	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.u.p)));
-    }
-
-    if (policy == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC && (op & ERO_MASK) != ERO_DELETE)
-    {
-	struct rtattr *attr;
-	struct xfrm_user_tmpl tmpl[4];
-	int i;
-
-	memset(tmpl, 0, sizeof(tmpl));
-	for (i = 0; proto_info[i].proto; i++)
+	else
 	{
-	    tmpl[i].reqid = proto_info[i].reqid;
-	    tmpl[i].id.proto = proto_info[i].proto;
-	    tmpl[i].optional =
-		proto_info[i].proto == IPPROTO_COMP && dir != XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
-	    tmpl[i].aalgos = tmpl[i].ealgos = tmpl[i].calgos = ~0;
-	    tmpl[i].mode =
-		proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-
-	    if (!tmpl[i].mode)
-	    {
-		continue;
-	    }
-
-	    ip2xfrm(this_host, &tmpl[i].saddr);
-	    ip2xfrm(that_host, &tmpl[i].id.daddr);
+		int src, dst;
+
+		req.u.p.dir = dir;
+
+		src = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s;
+		dst = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d;
+		if (dir != XFRM_POLICY_OUT) {
+			src = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d;
+			dst = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s;
+		}
+		req.u.p.priority = MIN_SPD_PRIORITY
+			+ (((2 << shift) - src) << shift)
+			+ (2 << shift) - dst;
+
+		req.u.p.action = XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW;
+		if (policy == IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD)
+		{
+			req.u.p.action = XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK;
+		}
+		req.u.p.lft.soft_use_expires_seconds = use_lifetime;
+		req.u.p.lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+		req.u.p.lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+		req.u.p.lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+		req.u.p.lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+
+		req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
+		if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_REPLACEFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+		{
+			req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY;
+		}
+		req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.u.p)));
 	}
 
-	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)&req + req.n.nlmsg_len);
-	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_TMPL;
-	attr->rta_len = i * sizeof(tmpl[0]);
-	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), tmpl, attr->rta_len);
-	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(attr->rta_len);
-	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
-    }
-
-    enoent_ok = FALSE;
-    if (op == ERO_DEL_INBOUND)
-    {
-	enoent_ok = TRUE;
-    }
-    else if (op == ERO_DELETE && ntohl(spi) == SPI_HOLD)
-    {
-	enoent_ok = TRUE;
-    }
-
-    ok = netlink_policy(&req.n, enoent_ok, text_said);
-    switch (dir)
-    {
-    case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
-	if (req.n.nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
+	if (policy == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC && (op & ERO_MASK) != ERO_DELETE)
 	{
-	    req.u.id.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+		struct rtattr *attr;
+		struct xfrm_user_tmpl tmpl[4];
+		int i;
+
+		memset(tmpl, 0, sizeof(tmpl));
+		for (i = 0; proto_info[i].proto; i++)
+		{
+			tmpl[i].reqid = proto_info[i].reqid;
+			tmpl[i].id.proto = proto_info[i].proto;
+			tmpl[i].optional =
+				proto_info[i].proto == IPPROTO_COMP && dir != XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
+			tmpl[i].aalgos = tmpl[i].ealgos = tmpl[i].calgos = ~0;
+			tmpl[i].mode =
+				proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+
+			if (!tmpl[i].mode)
+			{
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			ip2xfrm(this_host, &tmpl[i].saddr);
+			ip2xfrm(that_host, &tmpl[i].id.daddr);
+		}
+
+		attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)&req + req.n.nlmsg_len);
+		attr->rta_type = XFRMA_TMPL;
+		attr->rta_len = i * sizeof(tmpl[0]);
+		memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), tmpl, attr->rta_len);
+		attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(attr->rta_len);
+		req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
 	}
-	else if (!ok)
+
+	enoent_ok = FALSE;
+	if (op == ERO_DEL_INBOUND)
 	{
-	    break;
+		enoent_ok = TRUE;
 	}
-	else if (proto_info[0].encapsulation != ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-	&& satype != SADB_X_SATYPE_INT)
+	else if (op == ERO_DELETE && ntohl(spi) == SPI_HOLD)
 	{
-	    break;
+		enoent_ok = TRUE;
 	}
-	else
+
+	ok = netlink_policy(&req.n, enoent_ok, text_said);
+	switch (dir)
 	{
-	    req.u.p.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+	case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
+		if (req.n.nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
+		{
+			req.u.id.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+		}
+		else if (!ok)
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+		else if (proto_info[0].encapsulation != ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+		&& satype != SADB_X_SATYPE_INT)
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			req.u.p.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+		}
+		ok &= netlink_policy(&req.n, enoent_ok, text_said);
+		break;
 	}
-	ok &= netlink_policy(&req.n, enoent_ok, text_said);
-	break;
-    }
 
-    return ok;
+	return ok;
 }
 
 /** netlink_add_sa - Add an SA into the kernel SPDB via netlink
@@ -573,130 +571,130 @@ netlink_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
 static bool
 netlink_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct xfrm_usersa_info p;
-	char data[1024];
-    } req;
-    struct rtattr *attr;
-
-    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
-    req.n.nlmsg_type = replace ? XFRM_MSG_UPDSA : XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
-
-    ip2xfrm(sa->src, &req.p.saddr);
-    ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.p.id.daddr);
-
-    req.p.id.spi = sa->spi;
-    req.p.id.proto = satype2proto(sa->satype);
-    req.p.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
-    req.p.mode = (sa->encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL);
-    req.p.replay_window = sa->replay_window;
-    req.p.reqid = sa->reqid;
-    req.p.lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
-    req.p.lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
-    req.p.lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
-    req.p.lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
-
-    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.p)));
-
-    attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)&req + req.n.nlmsg_len);
-
-    if (sa->authalg)
-    {
-	struct xfrm_algo algo;
-	const char *name;
-
-	name = sparse_name(aalg_list, sa->authalg);
-	if (!name) {
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown authentication algorithm: %u"
-		, sa->authalg);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct xfrm_usersa_info p;
+		char data[1024];
+	} req;
+	struct rtattr *attr;
+
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = replace ? XFRM_MSG_UPDSA : XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
 
-	strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
-	algo.alg_key_len = sa->authkeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	ip2xfrm(sa->src, &req.p.saddr);
+	ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.p.id.daddr);
 
-	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_AUTH;
-	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo) + sa->authkeylen);
+	req.p.id.spi = sa->spi;
+	req.p.id.proto = satype2proto(sa->satype);
+	req.p.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
+	req.p.mode = (sa->encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL);
+	req.p.replay_window = sa->replay_window;
+	req.p.reqid = sa->reqid;
+	req.p.lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+	req.p.lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+	req.p.lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+	req.p.lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
 
-	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
-	memcpy((char *)RTA_DATA(attr) + sizeof(algo), sa->authkey
-	    , sa->authkeylen);
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.p)));
 
-	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
-	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
-    }
+	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)&req + req.n.nlmsg_len);
+
+	if (sa->authalg)
+	{
+		struct xfrm_algo algo;
+		const char *name;
 
-    if (sa->encalg)
-    {
-	struct xfrm_algo algo;
-	const char *name;
+		name = sparse_name(aalg_list, sa->authalg);
+		if (!name) {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown authentication algorithm: %u"
+				, sa->authalg);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	name = sparse_name(ealg_list, sa->encalg);
-	if (!name) {
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown encryption algorithm: %u"
-		, sa->encalg);
-	    return FALSE;
+		strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
+		algo.alg_key_len = sa->authkeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+		attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_AUTH;
+		attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo) + sa->authkeylen);
+
+		memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
+		memcpy((char *)RTA_DATA(attr) + sizeof(algo), sa->authkey
+			, sa->authkeylen);
+
+		req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+		attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
 	}
 
-	strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
-	algo.alg_key_len = sa->enckeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	if (sa->encalg)
+	{
+		struct xfrm_algo algo;
+		const char *name;
 
-	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT;
-	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo) + sa->enckeylen);
+		name = sparse_name(ealg_list, sa->encalg);
+		if (!name) {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown encryption algorithm: %u"
+				, sa->encalg);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
-	memcpy((char *)RTA_DATA(attr) + sizeof(algo), sa->enckey
-	    , sa->enckeylen);
+		strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
+		algo.alg_key_len = sa->enckeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE;
 
-	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
-	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
-    }
+		attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT;
+		attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo) + sa->enckeylen);
 
-    if (sa->compalg)
-    {
-	struct xfrm_algo algo;
-	const char *name;
+		memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
+		memcpy((char *)RTA_DATA(attr) + sizeof(algo), sa->enckey
+			, sa->enckeylen);
 
-	name = sparse_name(calg_list, sa->compalg);
-	if (!name) {
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown compression algorithm: %u"
-		, sa->compalg);
-	    return FALSE;
+		req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+		attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
 	}
 
-	strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
-	algo.alg_key_len = 0;
+	if (sa->compalg)
+	{
+		struct xfrm_algo algo;
+		const char *name;
 
-	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_COMP;
-	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo));
+		name = sparse_name(calg_list, sa->compalg);
+		if (!name) {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown compression algorithm: %u"
+				, sa->compalg);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
+		strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
+		algo.alg_key_len = 0;
 
-	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
-	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
-    }
+		attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_COMP;
+		attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo));
 
-    if (sa->natt_type)
-    {
-	struct xfrm_encap_tmpl natt;
+		memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
 
-	natt.encap_type = sa->natt_type;
-	natt.encap_sport = ntohs(sa->natt_sport);
-	natt.encap_dport = ntohs(sa->natt_dport);
-	memset (&natt.encap_oa, 0, sizeof (natt.encap_oa));
+		req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+		attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
+	}
 
-	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ENCAP;
-	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(natt));
+	if (sa->natt_type)
+	{
+		struct xfrm_encap_tmpl natt;
+
+		natt.encap_type = sa->natt_type;
+		natt.encap_sport = ntohs(sa->natt_sport);
+		natt.encap_dport = ntohs(sa->natt_dport);
+		memset (&natt.encap_oa, 0, sizeof (natt.encap_oa));
 
-	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &natt, sizeof(natt));
+		attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ENCAP;
+		attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(natt));
 
-	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
-	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
-    }
+		memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &natt, sizeof(natt));
 
-    return send_netlink_msg(&req.n, NULL, 0, "Add SA", sa->text_said);
+		req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+		attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
+	}
+
+	return send_netlink_msg(&req.n, NULL, 0, "Add SA", sa->text_said);
 }
 
 /** netlink_del_sa - Delete an SA from the Kernel
@@ -707,113 +705,113 @@ netlink_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace)
 static bool
 netlink_del_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct xfrm_usersa_id id;
-	char data[1024];
-    } req;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct xfrm_usersa_id id;
+		char data[1024];
+	} req;
 
-    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
-    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_DELSA;
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_DELSA;
 
-    ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.id.daddr);
+	ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.id.daddr);
 
-    req.id.spi = sa->spi;
-    req.id.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
-    req.id.proto = sa->proto;
+	req.id.spi = sa->spi;
+	req.id.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
+	req.id.proto = sa->proto;
 
-    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
 
-    return send_netlink_msg(&req.n, NULL, 0, "Del SA", sa->text_said);
+	return send_netlink_msg(&req.n, NULL, 0, "Del SA", sa->text_said);
 }
 
 static bool
 netlink_error(const char *req_type, const struct nlmsghdr *n
 , const struct nlmsgerr *e, int rsp_size)
 {
-    if (n->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("%s returned with errno %d: %s"
-	    , req_type
-	    , -e->error
-	    , strerror(-e->error))
-	)
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(rsp_size))
-    {
-	plog("%s returned message with length %lu < %lu bytes"
-	    , req_type
-	    , (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
-	    , (unsigned long) rsp_size);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	if (n->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("%s returned with errno %d: %s"
+			, req_type
+			, -e->error
+			, strerror(-e->error))
+		)
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(rsp_size))
+	{
+		plog("%s returned message with length %lu < %lu bytes"
+			, req_type
+			, (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
+			, (unsigned long) rsp_size);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 static bool
 netlink_get_policy(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool inbound, time_t *use_time)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
-    } req;
-
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	union {
-	    struct nlmsgerr e;
-	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_info info;
-	} u;
-	char data[1024];
-    } rsp;
-
-    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
-    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY;
-
-    req.id.sel.sport = portof(&sa->src_client->addr);
-    req.id.sel.dport = portof(&sa->dst_client->addr);
-    req.id.sel.sport_mask = (req.id.sel.sport) ? ~0:0;
-    req.id.sel.dport_mask = (req.id.sel.dport) ? ~0:0;
-    ip2xfrm(&sa->src_client->addr, &req.id.sel.saddr);
-    ip2xfrm(&sa->dst_client->addr, &req.id.sel.daddr);
-    req.id.sel.prefixlen_s = sa->src_client->maskbits;
-    req.id.sel.prefixlen_d = sa->dst_client->maskbits;
-    req.id.sel.proto = sa->transport_proto;
-    req.id.sel.family = sa->dst_client->addr.u.v4.sin_family;
-
-    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
-    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
-
-    req.id.dir = (inbound)? XFRM_POLICY_IN:XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
-
-    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
-	return FALSE;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
+	} req;
+
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		union {
+			struct nlmsgerr e;
+			struct xfrm_userpolicy_info info;
+		} u;
+		char data[1024];
+	} rsp;
+
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY;
+
+	req.id.sel.sport = portof(&sa->src_client->addr);
+	req.id.sel.dport = portof(&sa->dst_client->addr);
+	req.id.sel.sport_mask = (req.id.sel.sport) ? ~0:0;
+	req.id.sel.dport_mask = (req.id.sel.dport) ? ~0:0;
+	ip2xfrm(&sa->src_client->addr, &req.id.sel.saddr);
+	ip2xfrm(&sa->dst_client->addr, &req.id.sel.daddr);
+	req.id.sel.prefixlen_s = sa->src_client->maskbits;
+	req.id.sel.prefixlen_d = sa->dst_client->maskbits;
+	req.id.sel.proto = sa->transport_proto;
+	req.id.sel.family = sa->dst_client->addr.u.v4.sin_family;
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+	rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
+
+	req.id.dir = (inbound)? XFRM_POLICY_IN:XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
 
-    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
-	return FALSE;
+	if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
+		return FALSE;
+
+	if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
+		return FALSE;
 
-    *use_time = (time_t)rsp.u.info.curlft.use_time;
+	*use_time = (time_t)rsp.u.info.curlft.use_time;
 
-    if (inbound && sa->encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-    {
-	time_t use_time_fwd;
+	if (inbound && sa->encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+	{
+		time_t use_time_fwd;
 
-	req.id.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+		req.id.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
 
-	if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
+			return FALSE;
 
-	if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
+			return FALSE;
 
-        use_time_fwd = (time_t)rsp.u.info.curlft.use_time;
-	*use_time = (*use_time > use_time_fwd)? *use_time : use_time_fwd;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+		use_time_fwd = (time_t)rsp.u.info.curlft.use_time;
+		*use_time = (*use_time > use_time_fwd)? *use_time : use_time_fwd;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 
@@ -825,60 +823,60 @@ netlink_get_policy(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool inbound, time_t *use_time)
 static bool
 netlink_get_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, u_int *bytes)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct xfrm_usersa_id id;
-    } req;
-
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	union {
-	    struct nlmsgerr e;
-	    struct xfrm_usersa_info info;
-	} u;
-	char data[1024];
-    } rsp;
-
-    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
-    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETSA;
-
-    ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.id.daddr);
-
-    req.id.spi = sa->spi;
-    req.id.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
-    req.id.proto = sa->proto;
-
-    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
-    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
-
-    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get SA", sa->text_said))
-	return FALSE;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct xfrm_usersa_id id;
+	} req;
 
-    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETSA", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
-	return FALSE;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		union {
+			struct nlmsgerr e;
+			struct xfrm_usersa_info info;
+		} u;
+		char data[1024];
+	} rsp;
+
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETSA;
+
+	ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.id.daddr);
 
-    *bytes = (u_int) rsp.u.info.curlft.bytes;
+	req.id.spi = sa->spi;
+	req.id.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
+	req.id.proto = sa->proto;
 
-    return TRUE;
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+	rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
+
+	if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get SA", sa->text_said))
+		return FALSE;
+
+	if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETSA", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
+		return FALSE;
+
+	*bytes = (u_int) rsp.u.info.curlft.bytes;
+
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 static void
 linux_pfkey_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg)
 {
-    switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype)
-    {
-    case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+	switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype)
+	{
+	case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
 #ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
-	    kernel_alg_register_pfkey(msg, msg->sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN);
+			kernel_alg_register_pfkey(msg, msg->sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN);
 #endif
-	    break;
-    case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP:
-	can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;
-	break;
-    default:
-	break;
-    }
+			break;
+	case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP:
+		can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 /** linux_pfkey_register - Register via PFKEY our capabilities
@@ -887,10 +885,10 @@ linux_pfkey_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg)
 static void
 linux_pfkey_register(void)
 {
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_AH, "AH");
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_ESP, "ESP");
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP, "IPCOMP");
-    pfkey_close();
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_AH, "AH");
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_ESP, "ESP");
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP, "IPCOMP");
+	pfkey_close();
 }
 
 /** Create ip_address out of xfrm_address_t.
@@ -903,18 +901,18 @@ linux_pfkey_register(void)
 static err_t
 xfrm_to_ip_address(unsigned family, const xfrm_address_t *src, ip_address *dst)
 {
-    switch (family)
-    {
-    case AF_INET:   /* IPv4 */
-    case AF_UNSPEC: /* Unspecified, we assume IPv4 */
-	initaddr((const void *) &src->a4, sizeof(src->a4), AF_INET, dst);
-	return NULL;
-    case AF_INET6:  /* IPv6 */
-	initaddr((const void *) &src->a6, sizeof(src->a6), AF_INET6, dst);
-	return NULL;
-    default:
-	return "unknown address family";
-    }
+	switch (family)
+	{
+	case AF_INET:   /* IPv4 */
+	case AF_UNSPEC: /* Unspecified, we assume IPv4 */
+		initaddr((const void *) &src->a4, sizeof(src->a4), AF_INET, dst);
+		return NULL;
+	case AF_INET6:  /* IPv6 */
+		initaddr((const void *) &src->a6, sizeof(src->a6), AF_INET6, dst);
+		return NULL;
+	default:
+		return "unknown address family";
+	}
 }
 
 /* Create a pair of ip_address's out of xfrm_sel.
@@ -926,29 +924,29 @@ xfrm_to_ip_address(unsigned family, const xfrm_address_t *src, ip_address *dst)
  */
 static err_t
 xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(const struct xfrm_selector *sel
-		    , ip_address *src
-		    , ip_address *dst)
+					, ip_address *src
+					, ip_address *dst)
 {
-    int family;
-    err_t ugh;
-
-    family = sel->family;
-
-    if ((ugh = xfrm_to_ip_address(family, &sel->saddr, src))
-	|| (ugh = xfrm_to_ip_address(family, &sel->daddr, dst)))
-	return ugh;
-
-    /* family has been verified in xfrm_to_ip_address. */
-    if (family == AF_INET)
-    {
-	src->u.v4.sin_port = sel->sport;
-	dst->u.v4.sin_port = sel->dport;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	src->u.v6.sin6_port = sel->sport;
-	dst->u.v6.sin6_port = sel->dport;
-    }
+	int family;
+	err_t ugh;
+
+	family = sel->family;
+
+	if ((ugh = xfrm_to_ip_address(family, &sel->saddr, src))
+		|| (ugh = xfrm_to_ip_address(family, &sel->daddr, dst)))
+		return ugh;
+
+	/* family has been verified in xfrm_to_ip_address. */
+	if (family == AF_INET)
+	{
+		src->u.v4.sin_port = sel->sport;
+		dst->u.v4.sin_port = sel->dport;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		src->u.v6.sin6_port = sel->sport;
+		dst->u.v6.sin6_port = sel->dport;
+	}
 
    return NULL;
 }
@@ -956,194 +954,194 @@ xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(const struct xfrm_selector *sel
 static void
 netlink_acquire(struct nlmsghdr *n)
 {
-    struct xfrm_user_acquire *acquire;
-    ip_address src, dst;
-    ip_subnet ours, his;
-    unsigned transport_proto;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*acquire)))
-    {
-	plog("netlink_acquire got message with length %lu < %lu bytes; ignore message"
-	    , (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
-	    , (unsigned long) sizeof(*acquire));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    acquire = NLMSG_DATA(n);
-    transport_proto = acquire->sel.proto;
-
-    /* XXX also the type of src/dst should be checked to make sure
-     *     that they aren't v4 to v6 or something goofy
-     */
-   
-    if (!(ugh = xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(&acquire->sel, &src, &dst))
-    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(&src, &ours))
-    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(&dst, &his)))
-	record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&ours, &his, transport_proto
-	    , "%acquire-netlink");
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-	plog("XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE message from kernel malformed: %s", ugh);
+	struct xfrm_user_acquire *acquire;
+	ip_address src, dst;
+	ip_subnet ours, his;
+	unsigned transport_proto;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*acquire)))
+	{
+		plog("netlink_acquire got message with length %lu < %lu bytes; ignore message"
+			, (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
+			, (unsigned long) sizeof(*acquire));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	acquire = NLMSG_DATA(n);
+	transport_proto = acquire->sel.proto;
+
+	/* XXX also the type of src/dst should be checked to make sure
+	 *     that they aren't v4 to v6 or something goofy
+	 */
+
+	if (!(ugh = xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(&acquire->sel, &src, &dst))
+	&& !(ugh = addrtosubnet(&src, &ours))
+	&& !(ugh = addrtosubnet(&dst, &his)))
+		record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&ours, &his, transport_proto
+			, "%acquire-netlink");
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+		plog("XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE message from kernel malformed: %s", ugh);
 }
 
 static void
 netlink_shunt_expire(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *pol)
 {
-    ip_address src, dst;
-    unsigned transport_proto;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-  
-    transport_proto = pol->sel.proto;
-
-    if (!(ugh = xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(&pol->sel, &src, &dst)))
-    {
-	plog("XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE message from kernel malformed: %s", ugh);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    replace_bare_shunt(&src, &dst, BOTTOM_PRIO, SPI_PASS, FALSE, transport_proto
-	, "delete expired bare shunt");
+	ip_address src, dst;
+	unsigned transport_proto;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	transport_proto = pol->sel.proto;
+
+	if (!(ugh = xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(&pol->sel, &src, &dst)))
+	{
+		plog("XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE message from kernel malformed: %s", ugh);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	replace_bare_shunt(&src, &dst, BOTTOM_PRIO, SPI_PASS, FALSE, transport_proto
+		, "delete expired bare shunt");
 }
 
 static void
 netlink_policy_expire(struct nlmsghdr *n)
 {
-    struct xfrm_user_polexpire *upe;
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
-    } req;
-
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	union {
-	    struct nlmsgerr e;
-	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_info pol;
-	} u;
-	char data[1024];
-    } rsp;
-
-    if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*upe)))
-    {
-	plog("netlink_policy_expire got message with length %lu < %lu bytes; ignore message"
-	    , (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
-	    , (unsigned long) sizeof(*upe));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    upe = NLMSG_DATA(n);
-    req.id.dir = upe->pol.dir;
-    req.id.index = upe->pol.index;
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
-    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY;
-    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
-
-    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
-
-    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
-	return;
-
-    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.pol)))
-	return;
-
-    if (req.id.index != rsp.u.pol.index)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("netlink_policy_expire: policy was replaced: "
-		    "dir=%d, oldindex=%d, newindex=%d"
-		, req.id.dir, req.id.index, rsp.u.pol.index));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (upe->pol.curlft.add_time != rsp.u.pol.curlft.add_time)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("netlink_policy_expire: policy was replaced "
-		    " and you have won the lottery: "
-		    "dir=%d, index=%d"
-		, req.id.dir, req.id.index));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    switch (upe->pol.dir)
-    {
-    case XFRM_POLICY_OUT:
-	netlink_shunt_expire(&rsp.u.pol);
-	break;
-    }
+	struct xfrm_user_polexpire *upe;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
+	} req;
+
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		union {
+			struct nlmsgerr e;
+			struct xfrm_userpolicy_info pol;
+		} u;
+		char data[1024];
+	} rsp;
+
+	if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*upe)))
+	{
+		plog("netlink_policy_expire got message with length %lu < %lu bytes; ignore message"
+			, (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
+			, (unsigned long) sizeof(*upe));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	upe = NLMSG_DATA(n);
+	req.id.dir = upe->pol.dir;
+	req.id.index = upe->pol.index;
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY;
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+
+	rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
+
+	if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
+		return;
+
+	if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.pol)))
+		return;
+
+	if (req.id.index != rsp.u.pol.index)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("netlink_policy_expire: policy was replaced: "
+					"dir=%d, oldindex=%d, newindex=%d"
+				, req.id.dir, req.id.index, rsp.u.pol.index));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (upe->pol.curlft.add_time != rsp.u.pol.curlft.add_time)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("netlink_policy_expire: policy was replaced "
+					" and you have won the lottery: "
+					"dir=%d, index=%d"
+				, req.id.dir, req.id.index));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	switch (upe->pol.dir)
+	{
+	case XFRM_POLICY_OUT:
+		netlink_shunt_expire(&rsp.u.pol);
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 static bool
 netlink_get(void)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	char data[1024];
-    } rsp;
-    ssize_t r;
-    struct sockaddr_nl addr;
-    socklen_t alen;
-
-    alen = sizeof(addr);
-    r = recvfrom(netlink_bcast_fd, &rsp, sizeof(rsp), 0
-	, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen);
-    if (r < 0)
-    {
-	if (errno == EAGAIN)
-	    return FALSE;
-	if (errno != EINTR)
-	    log_errno((e, "recvfrom() failed in netlink_get"));
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else if ((size_t) r < sizeof(rsp.n))
-    {
-	plog("netlink_get read truncated message: %ld bytes; ignore message"
-	    , (long) r);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else if (addr.nl_pid != 0)
-    {
-	/* not for us: ignore */
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		char data[1024];
+	} rsp;
+	ssize_t r;
+	struct sockaddr_nl addr;
+	socklen_t alen;
+
+	alen = sizeof(addr);
+	r = recvfrom(netlink_bcast_fd, &rsp, sizeof(rsp), 0
+		, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen);
+	if (r < 0)
+	{
+		if (errno == EAGAIN)
+			return FALSE;
+		if (errno != EINTR)
+			log_errno((e, "recvfrom() failed in netlink_get"));
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else if ((size_t) r < sizeof(rsp.n))
+	{
+		plog("netlink_get read truncated message: %ld bytes; ignore message"
+			, (long) r);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else if (addr.nl_pid != 0)
+	{
+		/* not for us: ignore */
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("netlink_get: ignoring %s message from process %u"
+				, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
+				, addr.nl_pid));
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else if ((size_t) r != rsp.n.nlmsg_len)
+	{
+		plog("netlink_get read message with length %ld that doesn't equal nlmsg_len %lu bytes; ignore message"
+			, (long) r
+			, (unsigned long) rsp.n.nlmsg_len);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+
 	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("netlink_get: ignoring %s message from process %u"
-		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
-		, addr.nl_pid));
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else if ((size_t) r != rsp.n.nlmsg_len)
-    {
-	plog("netlink_get read message with length %ld that doesn't equal nlmsg_len %lu bytes; ignore message"
-	    , (long) r
-	    , (unsigned long) rsp.n.nlmsg_len);
+		DBG_log("netlink_get: %s message"
+				, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)));
+
+	switch (rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
+	{
+	case XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE:
+		netlink_acquire(&rsp.n);
+		break;
+	case XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE:
+		netlink_policy_expire(&rsp.n);
+		break;
+	default:
+		/* ignored */
+		break;
+	}
+
 	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("netlink_get: %s message"
-		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)));
-
-    switch (rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
-    {
-    case XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE:
-	netlink_acquire(&rsp.n);
-	break;
-    case XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE:
-	netlink_policy_expire(&rsp.n);
-	break;
-    default:
-	/* ignored */
-	break;
-    }
-
-    return TRUE;
 }
 
 static void
 netlink_process_msg(void)
 {
-    while (netlink_get())
-	;
+	while (netlink_get())
+		;
 }
 
 static ipsec_spi_t
@@ -1156,65 +1154,65 @@ netlink_get_spi(const ip_address *src
 , ipsec_spi_t max
 , const char *text_said)
 {
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	struct xfrm_userspi_info spi;
-    } req;
-
-    struct {
-	struct nlmsghdr n;
-	union {
-	    struct nlmsgerr e;
-	    struct xfrm_usersa_info sa;
-	} u;
-	char data[1024];
-    } rsp;
-
-    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
-    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
-    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI;
-
-    ip2xfrm(src, &req.spi.info.saddr);
-    ip2xfrm(dst, &req.spi.info.id.daddr);
-    req.spi.info.mode = tunnel_mode;
-    req.spi.info.reqid = reqid;
-    req.spi.info.id.proto = proto;
-    req.spi.info.family = src->u.v4.sin_family;
-    req.spi.min = min;
-    req.spi.max = max;
-
-    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.spi)));
-    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
-
-    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get SPI", text_said))
-	return 0;
-
-    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.sa)))
-	return 0;
-
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x%x for %s"
-	    , ntohl(rsp.u.sa.id.spi), text_said));
-    return rsp.u.sa.id.spi;
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		struct xfrm_userspi_info spi;
+	} req;
+
+	struct {
+		struct nlmsghdr n;
+		union {
+			struct nlmsgerr e;
+			struct xfrm_usersa_info sa;
+		} u;
+		char data[1024];
+	} rsp;
+
+	memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+	req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI;
+
+	ip2xfrm(src, &req.spi.info.saddr);
+	ip2xfrm(dst, &req.spi.info.id.daddr);
+	req.spi.info.mode = tunnel_mode;
+	req.spi.info.reqid = reqid;
+	req.spi.info.id.proto = proto;
+	req.spi.info.family = src->u.v4.sin_family;
+	req.spi.min = min;
+	req.spi.max = max;
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.spi)));
+	rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
+
+	if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get SPI", text_said))
+		return 0;
+
+	if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.sa)))
+		return 0;
+
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x%x for %s"
+			, ntohl(rsp.u.sa.id.spi), text_said));
+	return rsp.u.sa.id.spi;
 }
 
 const struct kernel_ops linux_kernel_ops = {
-	type: KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX,
-	inbound_eroute: 1,
-	policy_lifetime: 1,
-	async_fdp: &netlink_bcast_fd,
-
-	init: init_netlink,
-	pfkey_register: linux_pfkey_register,
-	pfkey_register_response: linux_pfkey_register_response,
-	process_msg: netlink_process_msg,
-	raw_eroute: netlink_raw_eroute,
-	get_policy: netlink_get_policy,
-	add_sa: netlink_add_sa,
-	del_sa: netlink_del_sa,
-	get_sa: netlink_get_sa,
-	process_queue: NULL,
-	grp_sa: NULL,
-	get_spi: netlink_get_spi,
+		type: KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX,
+		inbound_eroute: 1,
+		policy_lifetime: 1,
+		async_fdp: &netlink_bcast_fd,
+
+		init: init_netlink,
+		pfkey_register: linux_pfkey_register,
+		pfkey_register_response: linux_pfkey_register_response,
+		process_msg: netlink_process_msg,
+		raw_eroute: netlink_raw_eroute,
+		get_policy: netlink_get_policy,
+		add_sa: netlink_add_sa,
+		del_sa: netlink_del_sa,
+		get_sa: netlink_get_sa,
+		process_queue: NULL,
+		grp_sa: NULL,
+		get_spi: netlink_get_spi,
 };
 #endif /* linux && KLIPS */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h
index 91ba71c5c..65163c966 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_netlink.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #if defined(KLIPS) && defined(linux)
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c
index 4ac3eb153..82a6ab648 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_noklips.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <errno.h>
@@ -39,7 +37,7 @@
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "kernel_noklips.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 
 void
 init_noklips(void)
@@ -71,30 +69,30 @@ noklips_register(void)
 
 static bool
 noklips_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host UNUSED
-		   , const ip_subnet *this_client UNUSED
-		   , const ip_address *that_host UNUSED
-		   , const ip_subnet *that_client UNUSED
-		   , ipsec_spi_t spi UNUSED
-		   , unsigned int satype UNUSED
-		   , unsigned int transport_proto UNUSED
-		   , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info UNUSED
-		   , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
-		   , unsigned int op UNUSED
-		   , const char *text_said UNUSED)
+				   , const ip_subnet *this_client UNUSED
+				   , const ip_address *that_host UNUSED
+				   , const ip_subnet *that_client UNUSED
+				   , ipsec_spi_t spi UNUSED
+				   , unsigned int satype UNUSED
+				   , unsigned int transport_proto UNUSED
+				   , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info UNUSED
+				   , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
+				   , unsigned int op UNUSED
+				   , const char *text_said UNUSED)
 {
   return TRUE;
 }
 
 static bool
 noklips_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa UNUSED
-	       , bool replace UNUSED)
+			   , bool replace UNUSED)
 {
   return TRUE;
 }
 
 static bool
 noklips_grp_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa0 UNUSED
-	       , const struct kernel_sa *sa1 UNUSED)
+			   , const struct kernel_sa *sa1 UNUSED)
 {
   return TRUE;
 }
@@ -107,20 +105,20 @@ noklips_del_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa UNUSED)
 
 
 const struct kernel_ops noklips_kernel_ops = {
-	type: KERNEL_TYPE_NONE,
-	async_fdp: NULL,
-	
-	init: init_noklips,
-	pfkey_register: noklips_register,
-	pfkey_register_response: noklips_register_response,
-	process_queue: noklips_dequeue,
-	process_msg: noklips_event,
-	raw_eroute: noklips_raw_eroute,
-	add_sa: noklips_add_sa,
-	grp_sa: noklips_grp_sa,
-	del_sa: noklips_del_sa,
-	get_sa: NULL,
-	get_spi: NULL,
-        inbound_eroute: FALSE,
-	policy_lifetime: FALSE
+		type: KERNEL_TYPE_NONE,
+		async_fdp: NULL,
+		
+		init: init_noklips,
+		pfkey_register: noklips_register,
+		pfkey_register_response: noklips_register_response,
+		process_queue: noklips_dequeue,
+		process_msg: noklips_event,
+		raw_eroute: noklips_raw_eroute,
+		add_sa: noklips_add_sa,
+		grp_sa: noklips_grp_sa,
+		del_sa: noklips_del_sa,
+		get_sa: NULL,
+		get_spi: NULL,
+		inbound_eroute: FALSE,
+		policy_lifetime: FALSE
 };
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h
index db819eed7..3da55d80b 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_noklips.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 extern void init_noklips(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c
index 742afaf52..7ac405fd4 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_pfkey.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
@@ -40,7 +38,7 @@
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "kernel_pfkey.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 #include "demux.h"
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 #include "alg_info.h"
@@ -50,64 +48,64 @@
 static int pfkeyfd = NULL_FD;
 
 typedef u_int32_t pfkey_seq_t;
-static pfkey_seq_t pfkey_seq = 0;	/* sequence number for our PF_KEY messages */
+static pfkey_seq_t pfkey_seq = 0;       /* sequence number for our PF_KEY messages */
 
 static pid_t pid;
 
-#define NE(x) { x, #x }	/* Name Entry -- shorthand for sparse_names */
+#define NE(x) { x, #x } /* Name Entry -- shorthand for sparse_names */
 
 static sparse_names pfkey_type_names = {
-	NE(SADB_RESERVED),
-	NE(SADB_GETSPI),
-	NE(SADB_UPDATE),
-	NE(SADB_ADD),
-	NE(SADB_DELETE),
-	NE(SADB_GET),
-	NE(SADB_ACQUIRE),
-	NE(SADB_REGISTER),
-	NE(SADB_EXPIRE),
-	NE(SADB_FLUSH),
-	NE(SADB_DUMP),
-	NE(SADB_X_PROMISC),
-	NE(SADB_X_PCHANGE),
-	NE(SADB_X_GRPSA),
-	NE(SADB_X_ADDFLOW),
-	NE(SADB_X_DELFLOW),
-	NE(SADB_X_DEBUG),
-	NE(SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING),
-	NE(SADB_MAX),	
-	{ 0, sparse_end }
+		NE(SADB_RESERVED),
+		NE(SADB_GETSPI),
+		NE(SADB_UPDATE),
+		NE(SADB_ADD),
+		NE(SADB_DELETE),
+		NE(SADB_GET),
+		NE(SADB_ACQUIRE),
+		NE(SADB_REGISTER),
+		NE(SADB_EXPIRE),
+		NE(SADB_FLUSH),
+		NE(SADB_DUMP),
+		NE(SADB_X_PROMISC),
+		NE(SADB_X_PCHANGE),
+		NE(SADB_X_GRPSA),
+		NE(SADB_X_ADDFLOW),
+		NE(SADB_X_DELFLOW),
+		NE(SADB_X_DEBUG),
+		NE(SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING),
+		NE(SADB_MAX),   
+		{ 0, sparse_end }
 };
 
 #ifdef NEVER /* not needed yet */
 static sparse_names pfkey_ext_names = {
-	NE(SADB_EXT_RESERVED),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_SA),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT),
-	NE(SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_SATYPE2),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_SA2),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST2),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_FLOW),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_FLOW),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_MASK),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_MASK),
-	NE(SADB_X_EXT_DEBUG),
-	{ 0, sparse_end }
+		NE(SADB_EXT_RESERVED),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_SA),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT),
+		NE(SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_SATYPE2),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_SA2),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST2),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_FLOW),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_FLOW),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_MASK),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_MASK),
+		NE(SADB_X_EXT_DEBUG),
+		{ 0, sparse_end }
 };
 #endif /* NEVER */
 
@@ -116,24 +114,24 @@ static sparse_names pfkey_ext_names = {
 void
 init_pfkey(void)
 {
-    pid = getpid();
+	pid = getpid();
 
-    /* open PF_KEY socket */
+	/* open PF_KEY socket */
 
-    pfkeyfd = socket(PF_KEY, SOCK_RAW, PF_KEY_V2);
+	pfkeyfd = socket(PF_KEY, SOCK_RAW, PF_KEY_V2);
 
-    if (pfkeyfd == -1)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() in init_pfkeyfd()"));
+	if (pfkeyfd == -1)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "socket() in init_pfkeyfd()"));
 
-#ifdef NEVER	/* apparently unsupported! */
-    if (fcntl(pfkeyfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(O_NONBLOCK) in init_pfkeyfd()"));
+#ifdef NEVER    /* apparently unsupported! */
+	if (fcntl(pfkeyfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(O_NONBLOCK) in init_pfkeyfd()"));
 #endif
-    if (fcntl(pfkeyfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) in init_pfkeyfd()"));
+	if (fcntl(pfkeyfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) in init_pfkeyfd()"));
 
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	DBG_log("process %u listening for PF_KEY_V2 on file descriptor %d", (unsigned)pid, pfkeyfd));
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("process %u listening for PF_KEY_V2 on file descriptor %d", (unsigned)pid, pfkeyfd));
 }
 
 /* Kinds of PF_KEY message from the kernel:
@@ -153,9 +151,9 @@ init_pfkey(void)
  */
 
 typedef union {
-	unsigned char bytes[PFKEYv2_MAX_MSGSIZE];
-	struct sadb_msg msg;
-    } pfkey_buf;
+		unsigned char bytes[PFKEYv2_MAX_MSGSIZE];
+		struct sadb_msg msg;
+	} pfkey_buf;
 
 /* queue of unprocessed PF_KEY messages input from kernel
  * Note that the pfkey_buf may be partly allocated, reflecting
@@ -163,41 +161,41 @@ typedef union {
  * must come first.
  */
 typedef struct pfkey_item {
-	struct pfkey_item *next;
-	pfkey_buf buf;
-    } pfkey_item;
+		struct pfkey_item *next;
+		pfkey_buf buf;
+	} pfkey_item;
 
-static pfkey_item *pfkey_iq_head = NULL;	/* oldest */
-static pfkey_item *pfkey_iq_tail;	/* youngest */
+static pfkey_item *pfkey_iq_head = NULL;        /* oldest */
+static pfkey_item *pfkey_iq_tail;       /* youngest */
 
 static bool
 pfkey_input_ready(void)
 {
-    fd_set readfds;
-    int ndes;
-    struct timeval tm;
+	fd_set readfds;
+	int ndes;
+	struct timeval tm;
 
-    tm.tv_sec = 0;	/* don't wait at all */
-    tm.tv_usec = 0;
+	tm.tv_sec = 0;      /* don't wait at all */
+	tm.tv_usec = 0;
 
-    FD_ZERO(&readfds);	/* we only care about pfkeyfd */
-    FD_SET(pfkeyfd, &readfds);
+	FD_ZERO(&readfds);  /* we only care about pfkeyfd */
+	FD_SET(pfkeyfd, &readfds);
 
-    do {
-	ndes = select(pfkeyfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &tm);
-    } while (ndes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+	do {
+		ndes = select(pfkeyfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &tm);
+	} while (ndes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
 
-    if (ndes < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "select() failed in pfkey_get()"));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (ndes < 0)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "select() failed in pfkey_get()"));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (ndes == 0)
-	return FALSE;	/* nothing to read */
+	if (ndes == 0)
+		return FALSE;   /* nothing to read */
 
-    passert(ndes == 1 && FD_ISSET(pfkeyfd, &readfds));
-    return TRUE;
+	passert(ndes == 1 && FD_ISSET(pfkeyfd, &readfds));
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* get a PF_KEY message from kernel.
@@ -210,93 +208,93 @@ pfkey_input_ready(void)
 static bool
 pfkey_get(pfkey_buf *buf)
 {
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	/* len must be less than PFKEYv2_MAX_MSGSIZE,
-	 * so it should fit in an int.  We use this fact when printing it.
-	 */
-	ssize_t len;
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		/* len must be less than PFKEYv2_MAX_MSGSIZE,
+		 * so it should fit in an int.  We use this fact when printing it.
+		 */
+		ssize_t len;
 
-	if (!pfkey_input_ready())
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (!pfkey_input_ready())
+			return FALSE;
 
-	len = read(pfkeyfd, buf->bytes, sizeof(buf->bytes));
+		len = read(pfkeyfd, buf->bytes, sizeof(buf->bytes));
 
-	if (len < 0)
-	{
-	    if (errno == EAGAIN)
-		return FALSE;
+		if (len < 0)
+		{
+			if (errno == EAGAIN)
+				return FALSE;
 
-	    log_errno((e, "read() failed in pfkey_get()"));
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	else if ((size_t) len < sizeof(buf->msg))
-	{
-	    plog("pfkey_get read truncated PF_KEY message: %d bytes; ignoring message"
-		, (int) len);
-	}
-	else if ((size_t) len != buf->msg.sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN)
-	{
-	    plog("pfkey_get read PF_KEY message with length %d that doesn't equal sadb_msg_len %u * %u; ignoring message"
-		, (int) len
-		, (unsigned) buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
-		, (unsigned) IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN);
-	}
-	else if (!(buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == (unsigned)pid
-	|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0 && buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_ACQUIRE)
-	|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_REGISTER)
-	|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0 && buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING)))
-	{
-	    /* not for us: ignore */
-	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-		DBG_log("pfkey_get: ignoring PF_KEY %s message %u for process %u"
-		    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
-		    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
-		    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid));
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-		DBG_log("pfkey_get: %s message %u"
-		    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
-		    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq));
-	    return TRUE;
+			log_errno((e, "read() failed in pfkey_get()"));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		else if ((size_t) len < sizeof(buf->msg))
+		{
+			plog("pfkey_get read truncated PF_KEY message: %d bytes; ignoring message"
+				, (int) len);
+		}
+		else if ((size_t) len != buf->msg.sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN)
+		{
+			plog("pfkey_get read PF_KEY message with length %d that doesn't equal sadb_msg_len %u * %u; ignoring message"
+				, (int) len
+				, (unsigned) buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
+				, (unsigned) IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN);
+		}
+		else if (!(buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == (unsigned)pid
+		|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0 && buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_ACQUIRE)
+		|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_REGISTER)
+		|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0 && buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING)))
+		{
+			/* not for us: ignore */
+			DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+				DBG_log("pfkey_get: ignoring PF_KEY %s message %u for process %u"
+					, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+					, buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
+					, buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+				DBG_log("pfkey_get: %s message %u"
+					, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+					, buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq));
+			return TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* get a response to a specific message */
 static bool
 pfkey_get_response(pfkey_buf *buf, pfkey_seq_t seq)
 {
-    while (pfkey_get(buf))
-    {
-	if (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == (unsigned)pid
-	&& buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq == seq)
+	while (pfkey_get(buf))
 	{
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* Not for us: queue it. */
-	    size_t bl = buf->msg.sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
-	    pfkey_item *it = alloc_bytes(offsetof(pfkey_item, buf) + bl, "pfkey_item");
-
-	    memcpy(&it->buf, buf, bl);
-
-	    it->next = NULL;
-	    if (pfkey_iq_head == NULL)
-	    {
-		pfkey_iq_head = it;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		pfkey_iq_tail->next = it;
-	    }
-	    pfkey_iq_tail = it;
+		if (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == (unsigned)pid
+		&& buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq == seq)
+		{
+			return TRUE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* Not for us: queue it. */
+			size_t bl = buf->msg.sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+			pfkey_item *it = malloc(offsetof(pfkey_item, buf) + bl);
+
+			memcpy(&it->buf, buf, bl);
+
+			it->next = NULL;
+			if (pfkey_iq_head == NULL)
+			{
+				pfkey_iq_head = it;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				pfkey_iq_tail->next = it;
+			}
+			pfkey_iq_tail = it;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 /* Process a SADB_REGISTER message from the kernel.
@@ -307,34 +305,34 @@ pfkey_get_response(pfkey_buf *buf, pfkey_seq_t seq)
 static void
 klips_pfkey_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg)
 {
-    /* Find out what the kernel can support.
-     * In fact, the only question at the moment
-     * is whether it can support IPcomp.
-     * So we ignore the rest.
-     * ??? we really should pay attention to what transforms are supported.
-     */
-    switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype)
-    {
-    case SADB_SATYPE_AH:
-	break;
-    case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+	/* Find out what the kernel can support.
+	 * In fact, the only question at the moment
+	 * is whether it can support IPcomp.
+	 * So we ignore the rest.
+	 * ??? we really should pay attention to what transforms are supported.
+	 */
+	switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype)
+	{
+	case SADB_SATYPE_AH:
+		break;
+	case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
 #ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
-	kernel_alg_register_pfkey(msg, sizeof (pfkey_buf));
+		kernel_alg_register_pfkey(msg, sizeof (pfkey_buf));
 #endif
-	break;
-    case SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP:
-	/* ??? There ought to be an extension to list the
-	 * supported algorithms, but RFC 2367 doesn't
-	 * list one for IPcomp.  KLIPS uses SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE.
-	 * Since we only implement deflate, we'll assume this.
-	 */
-	can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;
-	break;
-    case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP:
-	break;
-    default:
-	break;
-    }
+		break;
+	case SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP:
+		/* ??? There ought to be an extension to list the
+		 * supported algorithms, but RFC 2367 doesn't
+		 * list one for IPcomp.  KLIPS uses SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE.
+		 * Since we only implement deflate, we'll assume this.
+		 */
+		can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;
+		break;
+	case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP:
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
 }
 
 /* Processs a SADB_ACQUIRE message from KLIPS.
@@ -357,33 +355,33 @@ klips_pfkey_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg)
 static void
 process_pfkey_acquire(pfkey_buf *buf, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
 {
-    struct sadb_address *srcx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC];
-    struct sadb_address *dstx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST];
-    int src_proto = srcx->sadb_address_proto;
-    int dst_proto = dstx->sadb_address_proto;
-    ip_address *src = (ip_address*)&srcx[1];
-    ip_address *dst = (ip_address*)&dstx[1];
-    ip_subnet ours, his;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    /* assumption: we're only catching our own outgoing packets
-     * so source is our end and destination is the other end.
-     * Verifying this is not actually convenient.
-     *
-     * This stylized control structure yields a complaint or
-     * desired results.  For compactness, a pointer value is
-     * treated as a boolean.  Logically, the structure is:
-     * keep going as long as things are OK.
-     */
-    if (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0	/* we only wish to hear from kernel */
-    && !(ugh = src_proto == dst_proto? NULL : "src and dst protocols differ")
-    && !(ugh = addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst)? NULL : "conflicting address types")
-    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(src, &ours))
-    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(dst, &his)))
-	record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&ours, &his, src_proto, "%acquire");
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-	plog("SADB_ACQUIRE message from KLIPS malformed: %s", ugh);
+	struct sadb_address *srcx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC];
+	struct sadb_address *dstx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST];
+	int src_proto = srcx->sadb_address_proto;
+	int dst_proto = dstx->sadb_address_proto;
+	ip_address *src = (ip_address*)&srcx[1];
+	ip_address *dst = (ip_address*)&dstx[1];
+	ip_subnet ours, his;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	/* assumption: we're only catching our own outgoing packets
+	 * so source is our end and destination is the other end.
+	 * Verifying this is not actually convenient.
+	 *
+	 * This stylized control structure yields a complaint or
+	 * desired results.  For compactness, a pointer value is
+	 * treated as a boolean.  Logically, the structure is:
+	 * keep going as long as things are OK.
+	 */
+	if (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0      /* we only wish to hear from kernel */
+	&& !(ugh = src_proto == dst_proto? NULL : "src and dst protocols differ")
+	&& !(ugh = addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst)? NULL : "conflicting address types")
+	&& !(ugh = addrtosubnet(src, &ours))
+	&& !(ugh = addrtosubnet(dst, &his)))
+		record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&ours, &his, src_proto, "%acquire");
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+		plog("SADB_ACQUIRE message from KLIPS malformed: %s", ugh);
 
 }
 
@@ -394,73 +392,73 @@ process_pfkey_acquire(pfkey_buf *buf, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX +
 static void
 pfkey_async(pfkey_buf *buf)
 {
-    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
-
-    if (pfkey_msg_parse(&buf->msg, NULL, extensions, EXT_BITS_OUT))
-    {
-	plog("pfkey_async:"
-	    " unparseable PF_KEY message:"
-	    " %s len=%d, errno=%d, seq=%d, pid=%d; message ignored"
-	    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_errno
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("pfkey_async:"
-	    " %s len=%u, errno=%u, satype=%u, seq=%u, pid=%u"
-	    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_errno
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_satype
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
-	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid));
-
-	switch (buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+
+	if (pfkey_msg_parse(&buf->msg, NULL, extensions, EXT_BITS_OUT))
 	{
-	case SADB_REGISTER:
-	    kernel_ops->pfkey_register_response(&buf->msg);
-	    break;
-	case SADB_ACQUIRE:
-	    /* to simulate loss of ACQUIRE, delete this call */
-	    process_pfkey_acquire(buf, extensions);
-	    break;
-	case SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING:
-	    process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(&(buf->msg), extensions);
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    /* ignored */
-	    break;
+		plog("pfkey_async:"
+			" unparseable PF_KEY message:"
+			" %s len=%d, errno=%d, seq=%d, pid=%d; message ignored"
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_errno
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("pfkey_async:"
+			" %s len=%u, errno=%u, satype=%u, seq=%u, pid=%u"
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_errno
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_satype
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
+			, buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid));
+
+		switch (buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+		{
+		case SADB_REGISTER:
+			kernel_ops->pfkey_register_response(&buf->msg);
+			break;
+		case SADB_ACQUIRE:
+			/* to simulate loss of ACQUIRE, delete this call */
+			process_pfkey_acquire(buf, extensions);
+			break;
+		case SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING:
+			process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(&(buf->msg), extensions);
+			break;
+		default:
+			/* ignored */
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* asynchronous messages from our queue */
 static void
 pfkey_dequeue(void)
 {
-    while (pfkey_iq_head != NULL)
-    {
-	pfkey_item *it = pfkey_iq_head;
-
-	pfkey_async(&it->buf);
-	pfkey_iq_head = it->next;
-	pfree(it);
-    }
-
-    /* Handle any orphaned holds, but only if no pfkey input is pending.
-     * For each, we initiate Opportunistic.
-     * note: we don't need to advance the pointer because
-     * record_and_initiate_opportunistic will remove the current
-     * record each time we call it.
-     */
-    while (orphaned_holds != NULL && !pfkey_input_ready())
-      record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&orphaned_holds->ours
-					, &orphaned_holds->his
-					, orphaned_holds->transport_proto
-					, "%hold found-pfkey");
+	while (pfkey_iq_head != NULL)
+	{
+		pfkey_item *it = pfkey_iq_head;
+
+		pfkey_async(&it->buf);
+		pfkey_iq_head = it->next;
+		free(it);
+	}
+
+	/* Handle any orphaned holds, but only if no pfkey input is pending.
+	 * For each, we initiate Opportunistic.
+	 * note: we don't need to advance the pointer because
+	 * record_and_initiate_opportunistic will remove the current
+	 * record each time we call it.
+	 */
+	while (orphaned_holds != NULL && !pfkey_input_ready())
+	  record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&orphaned_holds->ours
+										, &orphaned_holds->his
+										, orphaned_holds->transport_proto
+										, "%hold found-pfkey");
 
 }
 
@@ -468,10 +466,10 @@ pfkey_dequeue(void)
 static void
 pfkey_event(void)
 {
-    pfkey_buf buf;
+	pfkey_buf buf;
 
-    if (pfkey_get(&buf))
-	pfkey_async(&buf);
+	if (pfkey_get(&buf))
+		pfkey_async(&buf);
 }
 
 static bool
@@ -480,17 +478,17 @@ pfkey_build(int error
 , const char *text_said
 , struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
 {
-    if (error == 0)
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "building of %s %s failed, code %d"
-	    , description, text_said, error);
-	pfkey_extensions_free(extensions);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (error == 0)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "building of %s %s failed, code %d"
+			, description, text_said, error);
+		pfkey_extensions_free(extensions);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* pfkey_extensions_init + pfkey_build + pfkey_msg_hdr_build */
@@ -501,10 +499,10 @@ pfkey_msg_start(u_int8_t msg_type
 , const char *text_said
 , struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
 {
-    pfkey_extensions_init(extensions);
-    return pfkey_build(pfkey_msg_hdr_build(&extensions[0], msg_type
-	    , satype, 0, ++pfkey_seq, pid)
-	, description, text_said, extensions);
+	pfkey_extensions_init(extensions);
+	return pfkey_build(pfkey_msg_hdr_build(&extensions[0], msg_type
+			, satype, 0, ++pfkey_seq, pid)
+		, description, text_said, extensions);
 }
 
 /* pfkey_build + pfkey_address_build */
@@ -515,15 +513,15 @@ pfkeyext_address(u_int16_t exttype
 , const char *text_said
 , struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
 {
-    /* the following variable is only needed to silence
-     * a warning caused by the fact that the argument
-     * to sockaddrof is NOT pointer to const!
-     */
-    ip_address t = *address;
-
-    return pfkey_build(pfkey_address_build(extensions + exttype
-	    , exttype, 0, 0, sockaddrof(&t))
-	, description, text_said, extensions);
+	/* the following variable is only needed to silence
+	 * a warning caused by the fact that the argument
+	 * to sockaddrof is NOT pointer to const!
+	 */
+	ip_address t = *address;
+
+	return pfkey_build(pfkey_address_build(extensions + exttype
+			, exttype, 0, 0, sockaddrof(&t))
+		, description, text_said, extensions);
 }
 
 /* pfkey_build + pfkey_x_protocol_build */
@@ -533,10 +531,10 @@ pfkeyext_protocol(int transport_proto
 , const char *text_said
 , struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
 {
-    return (transport_proto == 0)? TRUE 
-	: pfkey_build(
-	    pfkey_x_protocol_build(extensions + SADB_X_EXT_PROTOCOL, transport_proto)
-	    , description, text_said, extensions);
+	return (transport_proto == 0)? TRUE 
+		: pfkey_build(
+			pfkey_x_protocol_build(extensions + SADB_X_EXT_PROTOCOL, transport_proto)
+			, description, text_said, extensions);
 }
 
 
@@ -551,376 +549,376 @@ finish_pfkey_msg(struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]
 , const char *text_said
 , pfkey_buf *response)
 {
-    struct sadb_msg *pfkey_msg;
-    bool success = TRUE;
-    int error;
-
-    error = pfkey_msg_build(&pfkey_msg, extensions, EXT_BITS_IN);
-
-    if (error != 0)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "pfkey_msg_build of %s %s failed, code %d"
-	    , description, text_said, error);
-	success = FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	size_t len = pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+	struct sadb_msg *pfkey_msg;
+	bool success = TRUE;
+	int error;
 
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("finish_pfkey_msg: %s message %u for %s %s"
-		, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
-		, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
-		, description, text_said);
-	    DBG_dump(NULL, (void *) pfkey_msg, len));
+	error = pfkey_msg_build(&pfkey_msg, extensions, EXT_BITS_IN);
 
-	if (!no_klips)
+	if (error != 0)
 	{
-	    ssize_t r = write(pfkeyfd, pfkey_msg, len);
-
-	    if (r != (ssize_t)len)
-	    {
-		if (r < 0)
-		{
-		    log_errno((e
-			, "pfkey write() of %s message %u"
-			  " for %s %s failed"
-			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names
-			    , pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
-			, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
-			, description, text_said));
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			, "ERROR: pfkey write() of %s message %u"
-			  " for %s %s truncated: %ld instead of %ld"
-			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names
-			    , pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
-			, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
-			, description, text_said
-			, (long)r, (long)len);
-		}
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "pfkey_msg_build of %s %s failed, code %d"
+			, description, text_said, error);
 		success = FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		size_t len = pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
 
-		/* if we were compiled with debugging, but we haven't already
-		 * dumped the KLIPS command, do so.
-		 */
-#ifdef DEBUG
-		if ((cur_debugging & DBG_KLIPS) == 0)
-		    DBG_dump(NULL, (void *) pfkey_msg, len);
-#endif
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* Check response from KLIPS.
-		 * It ought to be an echo, perhaps with additional info.
-		 * If the caller wants it, response will point to space.
-		 */
-		pfkey_buf b;
-		pfkey_buf *bp = response != NULL? response : &b;
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("finish_pfkey_msg: %s message %u for %s %s"
+				, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+				, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
+				, description, text_said);
+			DBG_dump(NULL, (void *) pfkey_msg, len));
 
-		if (!pfkey_get_response(bp, ((struct sadb_msg *) extensions[0])->sadb_msg_seq))
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			, "ERROR: no response to our PF_KEY %s message for %s %s"
-			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
-			, description, text_said);
-		    success = FALSE;
-		}
-		else if (pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type != bp->msg.sadb_msg_type)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			, "FreeS/WAN ERROR: response to our PF_KEY %s message for %s %s was of wrong type (%s)"
-			, sparse_name(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
-			, description, text_said
-			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, bp->msg.sadb_msg_type));
-		    success = FALSE;
-		}
-		else if (response == NULL && bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno != 0)
+		if (!no_klips)
 		{
-		    /* KLIPS is signalling a problem */
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			, "ERROR: PF_KEY %s response for %s %s included errno %u: %s"
-			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
-			, description, text_said
-			, (unsigned) bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno
-			, strerror(bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno));
-		    success = FALSE;
+			ssize_t r = write(pfkeyfd, pfkey_msg, len);
+
+			if (r != (ssize_t)len)
+			{
+				if (r < 0)
+				{
+					log_errno((e
+						, "pfkey write() of %s message %u"
+						  " for %s %s failed"
+						, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names
+							, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+						, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
+						, description, text_said));
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						, "ERROR: pfkey write() of %s message %u"
+						  " for %s %s truncated: %ld instead of %ld"
+						, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names
+							, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+						, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
+						, description, text_said
+						, (long)r, (long)len);
+				}
+				success = FALSE;
+
+				/* if we were compiled with debugging, but we haven't already
+				 * dumped the KLIPS command, do so.
+				 */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+				if ((cur_debugging & DBG_KLIPS) == 0)
+					DBG_dump(NULL, (void *) pfkey_msg, len);
+#endif
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* Check response from KLIPS.
+				 * It ought to be an echo, perhaps with additional info.
+				 * If the caller wants it, response will point to space.
+				 */
+				pfkey_buf b;
+				pfkey_buf *bp = response != NULL? response : &b;
+
+				if (!pfkey_get_response(bp, ((struct sadb_msg *) extensions[0])->sadb_msg_seq))
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						, "ERROR: no response to our PF_KEY %s message for %s %s"
+						, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+						, description, text_said);
+					success = FALSE;
+				}
+				else if (pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type != bp->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						, "FreeS/WAN ERROR: response to our PF_KEY %s message for %s %s was of wrong type (%s)"
+						, sparse_name(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+						, description, text_said
+						, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, bp->msg.sadb_msg_type));
+					success = FALSE;
+				}
+				else if (response == NULL && bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno != 0)
+				{
+					/* KLIPS is signalling a problem */
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						, "ERROR: PF_KEY %s response for %s %s included errno %u: %s"
+						, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+						, description, text_said
+						, (unsigned) bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno
+						, strerror(bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno));
+					success = FALSE;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* all paths must exit this way to free resources */
-    pfkey_extensions_free(extensions);
-    pfkey_msg_free(&pfkey_msg);
-    return success;
+	/* all paths must exit this way to free resources */
+	pfkey_extensions_free(extensions);
+	pfkey_msg_free(&pfkey_msg);
+	return success;
 }
 
 /*  register SA types that can be negotiated */
 void
 pfkey_register_proto(unsigned satype, const char *satypename)
 {
-    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
-    pfkey_buf pfb;
-
-    if (!(pfkey_msg_start(SADB_REGISTER
-      , satype
-      , satypename, NULL, extensions)
-    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, satypename, "", &pfb)))
-    {
-	/* ??? should this be loglog */
-	plog("no KLIPS support for %s", satypename);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	kernel_ops->pfkey_register_response(&pfb.msg);
-	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
-	    DBG_log("%s registered with kernel.", satypename));
-    }
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+	pfkey_buf pfb;
+
+	if (!(pfkey_msg_start(SADB_REGISTER
+	  , satype
+	  , satypename, NULL, extensions)
+	&& finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, satypename, "", &pfb)))
+	{
+		/* ??? should this be loglog */
+		plog("no KLIPS support for %s", satypename);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		kernel_ops->pfkey_register_response(&pfb.msg);
+		DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+			DBG_log("%s registered with kernel.", satypename));
+	}
 }
 
 static void
 klips_pfkey_register(void)
 {
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_AH, "AH");
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_ESP, "ESP");
-    can_do_IPcomp = FALSE;  /* until we get a response from KLIPS */
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP, "IPCOMP");
-    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP, "IPIP");
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_AH, "AH");
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_ESP, "ESP");
+	can_do_IPcomp = FALSE;  /* until we get a response from KLIPS */
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP, "IPCOMP");
+	pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP, "IPIP");
 }
 
 static bool
 pfkey_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
-		 , const ip_subnet *this_client
-		 , const ip_address *that_host
-		 , const ip_subnet *that_client
-		 , ipsec_spi_t spi
-		 , unsigned int satype
-		 , unsigned int transport_proto
-		 , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info UNUSED
-		 , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
-		 , unsigned int op
-		 , const char *text_said)
+				 , const ip_subnet *this_client
+				 , const ip_address *that_host
+				 , const ip_subnet *that_client
+				 , ipsec_spi_t spi
+				 , unsigned int satype
+				 , unsigned int transport_proto
+				 , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info UNUSED
+				 , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
+				 , unsigned int op
+				 , const char *text_said)
 {
-    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
-    ip_address
-	sflow_ska,
-	dflow_ska,
-	smask_ska,
-	dmask_ska;
-    int sport = ntohs(portof(&this_client->addr));
-    int dport = ntohs(portof(&that_client->addr));
-
-    networkof(this_client, &sflow_ska);
-    maskof(this_client, &smask_ska);
-    setportof(sport ? ~0:0, &smask_ska);
-
-    networkof(that_client, &dflow_ska);
-    maskof(that_client, &dmask_ska);
-    setportof(dport ? ~0:0, &dmask_ska);
-
-    if (!pfkey_msg_start(op & ERO_MASK, satype
-		       , "pfkey_msg_hdr flow", text_said, extensions))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (op != ERO_DELETE)
-    {
-	if (!(pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
-					 , SADB_EXT_SA
-					 , spi	/* in network order */
-					 , 0, 0, 0, 0, op >> ERO_FLAG_SHIFT)
-			  , "pfkey_sa add flow", text_said, extensions)
-
-	    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, this_host
-		, "pfkey_addr_s add flow", text_said, extensions)
-
-	    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, that_host
-				, "pfkey_addr_d add flow", text_said
-				, extensions)))
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+	ip_address
+		sflow_ska,
+		dflow_ska,
+		smask_ska,
+		dmask_ska;
+	int sport = ntohs(portof(&this_client->addr));
+	int dport = ntohs(portof(&that_client->addr));
+
+	networkof(this_client, &sflow_ska);
+	maskof(this_client, &smask_ska);
+	setportof(sport ? ~0:0, &smask_ska);
+
+	networkof(that_client, &dflow_ska);
+	maskof(that_client, &dmask_ska);
+	setportof(dport ? ~0:0, &dmask_ska);
+
+	if (!pfkey_msg_start(op & ERO_MASK, satype
+					   , "pfkey_msg_hdr flow", text_said, extensions))
 	{
-	    return FALSE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_FLOW, &sflow_ska
-			  , "pfkey_addr_sflow", text_said, extensions))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (op != ERO_DELETE)
+	{
+		if (!(pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+										 , SADB_EXT_SA
+										 , spi  /* in network order */
+										 , 0, 0, 0, 0, op >> ERO_FLAG_SHIFT)
+						  , "pfkey_sa add flow", text_said, extensions)
+
+			&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, this_host
+				, "pfkey_addr_s add flow", text_said, extensions)
+
+			&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, that_host
+								, "pfkey_addr_d add flow", text_said
+								, extensions)))
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
 
-    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_FLOW, &dflow_ska
-			, "pfkey_addr_dflow", text_said, extensions))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_FLOW, &sflow_ska
+						  , "pfkey_addr_sflow", text_said, extensions))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_MASK, &smask_ska
-			, "pfkey_addr_smask", text_said, extensions))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_FLOW, &dflow_ska
+						, "pfkey_addr_dflow", text_said, extensions))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_MASK, &dmask_ska
-			, "pfkey_addr_dmask", text_said, extensions))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_MASK, &smask_ska
+						, "pfkey_addr_smask", text_said, extensions))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (!pfkeyext_protocol(transport_proto
-			, "pfkey_x_protocol", text_said, extensions))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_MASK, &dmask_ska
+						, "pfkey_addr_dmask", text_said, extensions))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	if (!pfkeyext_protocol(transport_proto
+						, "pfkey_x_protocol", text_said, extensions))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    return finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "flow", text_said, NULL);
+	return finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "flow", text_said, NULL);
 }
 
 static bool
 pfkey_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace)
 {
-    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
-
-    return pfkey_msg_start(replace ? SADB_UPDATE : SADB_ADD, sa->satype
-	, "pfkey_msg_hdr Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
-
-    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
-	    , SADB_EXT_SA
-	    , sa->spi	/* in network order */
-	    , sa->replay_window, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
-	    , sa->authalg, sa->encalg ? sa->encalg: sa->compalg, 0)
-	, "pfkey_sa Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
-
-    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, sa->src
-	, "pfkey_addr_s Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
-
-    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa->dst
-	, "pfkey_addr_d Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
-
-    && (sa->authkeylen == 0
-	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_key_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH]
-		, SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH, sa->authkeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE
-		, sa->authkey)
-	    , "pfkey_key_a Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
-
-    && (sa->enckeylen == 0
-	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_key_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT]
-		, SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT, sa->enckeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE
-		, sa->enckey)
-	    , "pfkey_key_e Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
-
-    && (sa->natt_type == 0
-	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_type_build(
-		&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_TYPE], sa->natt_type),
-		"pfkey_nat_t_type Add ESP SA",  sa->text_said, extensions))
-    && (sa->natt_sport == 0
-	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_port_build(
-			&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT], SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT,
-			sa->natt_sport), "pfkey_nat_t_sport Add ESP SA", sa->text_said,
-			extensions))
-    && (sa->natt_dport == 0
-	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_port_build(
-			&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT], SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT,
-			sa->natt_dport), "pfkey_nat_t_dport Add ESP SA", sa->text_said,
-			extensions))
-    && (sa->natt_type == 0 || isanyaddr(sa->natt_oa)
-	|| pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OA, sa->natt_oa
-	    , "pfkey_nat_t_oa Add ESP SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
-
-    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "Add SA", sa->text_said, NULL);
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+
+	return pfkey_msg_start(replace ? SADB_UPDATE : SADB_ADD, sa->satype
+		, "pfkey_msg_hdr Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+	&& pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+			, SADB_EXT_SA
+			, sa->spi   /* in network order */
+			, sa->replay_window, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
+			, sa->authalg, sa->encalg ? sa->encalg: sa->compalg, 0)
+		, "pfkey_sa Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+	&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, sa->src
+		, "pfkey_addr_s Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+	&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa->dst
+		, "pfkey_addr_d Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+	&& (sa->authkeylen == 0
+		|| pfkey_build(pfkey_key_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH]
+				, SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH, sa->authkeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE
+				, sa->authkey)
+			, "pfkey_key_a Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
+
+	&& (sa->enckeylen == 0
+		|| pfkey_build(pfkey_key_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT]
+				, SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT, sa->enckeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE
+				, sa->enckey)
+			, "pfkey_key_e Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
+
+	&& (sa->natt_type == 0
+		|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_type_build(
+				&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_TYPE], sa->natt_type),
+				"pfkey_nat_t_type Add ESP SA",  sa->text_said, extensions))
+	&& (sa->natt_sport == 0
+		|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_port_build(
+						&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT], SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT,
+						sa->natt_sport), "pfkey_nat_t_sport Add ESP SA", sa->text_said,
+						extensions))
+	&& (sa->natt_dport == 0
+		|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_port_build(
+						&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT], SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT,
+						sa->natt_dport), "pfkey_nat_t_dport Add ESP SA", sa->text_said,
+						extensions))
+	&& (sa->natt_type == 0 || isanyaddr(sa->natt_oa)
+		|| pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OA, sa->natt_oa
+			, "pfkey_nat_t_oa Add ESP SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
+
+	&& finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "Add SA", sa->text_said, NULL);
 
 }
 
 static bool
 pfkey_grp_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa0, const struct kernel_sa *sa1)
 {
-    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
 
-    return pfkey_msg_start(SADB_X_GRPSA, sa1->satype
-	, "pfkey_msg_hdr group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
+	return pfkey_msg_start(SADB_X_GRPSA, sa1->satype
+		, "pfkey_msg_hdr group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
-	    , SADB_EXT_SA
-	    , sa1->spi	/* in network order */
-	    , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
-	, "pfkey_sa group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+			, SADB_EXT_SA
+			, sa1->spi  /* in network order */
+			, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+		, "pfkey_sa group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa1->dst
-	, "pfkey_addr_d group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa1->dst
+		, "pfkey_addr_d group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkey_build(pfkey_x_satype_build(&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_SATYPE2]
-	    , sa0->satype)
-	, "pfkey_satype group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkey_build(pfkey_x_satype_build(&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_SATYPE2]
+			, sa0->satype)
+		, "pfkey_satype group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_SA2]
-	    , SADB_X_EXT_SA2
-	    , sa0->spi	/* in network order */
-	    , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
-	, "pfkey_sa2 group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_SA2]
+			, SADB_X_EXT_SA2
+			, sa0->spi  /* in network order */
+			, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+		, "pfkey_sa2 group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST2, sa0->dst
-	, "pfkey_addr_d2 group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST2, sa0->dst
+		, "pfkey_addr_d2 group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "group", sa1->text_said, NULL);
+	&& finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "group", sa1->text_said, NULL);
 }
 
 static bool
 pfkey_del_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa)
 {
-    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
 
-    return pfkey_msg_start(SADB_DELETE, proto2satype(sa->proto)
-	, "pfkey_msg_hdr delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+	return pfkey_msg_start(SADB_DELETE, proto2satype(sa->proto)
+		, "pfkey_msg_hdr delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
-	    , SADB_EXT_SA
-	    , sa->spi	/* in host order */
-	    , 0, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE, 0, 0, 0)
-	, "pfkey_sa delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+			, SADB_EXT_SA
+			, sa->spi   /* in host order */
+			, 0, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE, 0, 0, 0)
+		, "pfkey_sa delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, sa->src
-	, "pfkey_addr_s delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, sa->src
+		, "pfkey_addr_s delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa->dst
-	, "pfkey_addr_d delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+	&& pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa->dst
+		, "pfkey_addr_d delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
 
-    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "Delete SA", sa->text_said, NULL);
+	&& finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "Delete SA", sa->text_said, NULL);
 }
 
 void
 pfkey_close(void)
 {
-    while (pfkey_iq_head != NULL)
-    {
-	pfkey_item *it = pfkey_iq_head;
+	while (pfkey_iq_head != NULL)
+	{
+		pfkey_item *it = pfkey_iq_head;
 
-	pfkey_iq_head = it->next;
-	pfree(it);
-    }
+		pfkey_iq_head = it->next;
+		free(it);
+	}
 
-    close(pfkeyfd);
-    pfkeyfd = NULL_FD;
+	close(pfkeyfd);
+	pfkeyfd = NULL_FD;
 }
 
 const struct kernel_ops klips_kernel_ops = {
-	type: KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS,
-	async_fdp: &pfkeyfd,
-
-	pfkey_register: klips_pfkey_register,
-	pfkey_register_response: klips_pfkey_register_response,
-	process_queue: pfkey_dequeue,
-	process_msg: pfkey_event,
-	raw_eroute: pfkey_raw_eroute,
-	add_sa: pfkey_add_sa,
-	grp_sa: pfkey_grp_sa,
-	del_sa: pfkey_del_sa,
-	get_sa: NULL,
-	get_spi: NULL,
-        inbound_eroute: FALSE,
-	policy_lifetime: FALSE,
-	init: NULL
+		type: KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS,
+		async_fdp: &pfkeyfd,
+
+		pfkey_register: klips_pfkey_register,
+		pfkey_register_response: klips_pfkey_register_response,
+		process_queue: pfkey_dequeue,
+		process_msg: pfkey_event,
+		raw_eroute: pfkey_raw_eroute,
+		add_sa: pfkey_add_sa,
+		grp_sa: pfkey_grp_sa,
+		del_sa: pfkey_del_sa,
+		get_sa: NULL,
+		get_spi: NULL,
+		inbound_eroute: FALSE,
+		policy_lifetime: FALSE,
+		init: NULL
 };
 #endif /* KLIPS */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h
index 23ac982e8..ad20a5888 100644
--- a/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: kernel_pfkey.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
diff --git a/src/pluto/keys.c b/src/pluto/keys.c
index 1aed7a63f..6dfbd6732 100644
--- a/src/pluto/keys.c
+++ b/src/pluto/keys.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: keys.c 3738 2008-04-02 19:04:45Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stddef.h>
@@ -25,33 +23,34 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>       /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <glob.h>
 #ifndef GLOB_ABORTED
-# define GLOB_ABORTED    GLOB_ABEND	/* fix for old versions */
+# define GLOB_ABORTED    GLOB_ABEND     /* fix for old versions */
 #endif
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
 #include "id.h"
 #include "x509.h"
-#include "pgp.h"
+#include "pgpcert.h"
 #include "certs.h"
 #include "smartcard.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "state.h"
 #include "lex.h"
 #include "keys.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
-#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"     /* needs keys.h and adns.h */
 #include "log.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 #include "timer.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 #include "xauth.h"
@@ -61,77 +60,34 @@ const char *shared_secrets_file = SHARED_SECRETS_FILE;
 typedef struct id_list id_list_t;
 
 struct id_list {
-    struct id id;
-    id_list_t *next;
+	struct id id;
+	id_list_t *next;
 };
 
 typedef struct secret secret_t;
 
 struct secret {
-    id_list_t *ids;
-    enum PrivateKeyKind kind;
-    union {
-	chunk_t preshared_secret;
-	RSA_private_key_t RSA_private_key;
-	xauth_t xauth_secret;
-	smartcard_t *smartcard;
-    } u;
-    secret_t *next;
+	id_list_t *ids;
+	enum PrivateKeyKind kind;
+	union {
+		chunk_t        preshared_secret;
+		xauth_t        xauth_secret;
+		private_key_t *private_key;
+		smartcard_t   *smartcard;
+	} u;
+	secret_t *next;
 };
 
-static pubkey_t*
-allocate_RSA_public_key(const cert_t cert)
-{
-    pubkey_t *pk = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey");
-    chunk_t e = empty_chunk, n = empty_chunk;
-
-    switch (cert.type)
-    {
-    case CERT_PGP:
-	e = cert.u.pgp->publicExponent;
-	n = cert.u.pgp->modulus;
-	break;
-    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
-	e = cert.u.x509->publicExponent;
-	n = cert.u.x509->modulus;
-	break;
-    default:
-	plog("RSA public key allocation error");
-    }
-
-    init_RSA_public_key(&pk->u.rsa, e, n);
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	RSA_show_public_key(&pk->u.rsa)
-    )
-
-    pk->alg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
-    pk->id  = empty_id;
-    pk->issuer = empty_chunk;
-    pk->serial = empty_chunk;
-
-    return pk;
-}
-
 /*
  * free a public key struct
  */
-static void
-free_public_key(pubkey_t *pk)
+static void free_public_key(pubkey_t *pk)
 {
-    free_id_content(&pk->id);
-    freeanychunk(pk->issuer);
-    freeanychunk(pk->serial);
-
-    /* algorithm-specific freeing */
-    switch (pk->alg)
-    {
-    case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
-	free_RSA_public_content(&pk->u.rsa);
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(pk->alg);
-    }
-    pfree(pk);
+	DESTROY_IF(pk->public_key);
+	free_id_content(&pk->id);
+	free(pk->issuer.ptr);
+	free(pk->serial.ptr);
+	free(pk);
 }
 
 secret_t *secrets = NULL;
@@ -140,227 +96,215 @@ secret_t *secrets = NULL;
  * me and the peer.  We match the Id (if none, the IP address).
  * Failure is indicated by a NULL.
  */
-static const secret_t *
-get_secret(const struct connection *c, enum PrivateKeyKind kind, bool asym)
+static const secret_t* get_secret(const struct connection *c,
+								  enum PrivateKeyKind kind, bool asym)
 {
-    enum {	/* bits */
-	match_default = 01,
-	match_him = 02,
-	match_me = 04
-    };
-
-    unsigned int best_match = 0;
-    secret_t *best = NULL;
-    secret_t *s;
-    const struct id *my_id  = &c->spd.this.id
-	          , *his_id = &c->spd.that.id;
-    struct id rw_id;
-
-    /* is there a certificate assigned to this connection? */
-    if (kind == PPK_RSA && c->spd.this.cert.type != CERT_NONE)
-    {
-	pubkey_t *my_public_key = allocate_RSA_public_key(c->spd.this.cert);
-
-	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+	enum {      /* bits */
+		match_default = 0x01,
+		match_him     = 0x02,
+		match_me      = 0x04
+	};
+
+	unsigned int best_match = 0;
+	secret_t *best = NULL;
+	secret_t *s;
+	const struct id *my_id  = &c->spd.this.id
+				  , *his_id = &c->spd.that.id;
+	struct id rw_id;
+
+	/* is there a certificate assigned to this connection? */
+	if (kind == PPK_PUBKEY && c->spd.this.cert.type != CERT_NONE)
 	{
-	    if (s->kind == kind &&
-		same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &my_public_key->u.rsa))
-	    {
-		best = s;
-		break; /* we have found the private key - no sense in searching further */
-	    }
-	}
-	free_public_key(my_public_key);
-	return best;
-    }
-
-    if (his_id_was_instantiated(c))
-    {
-	/* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */
-	rw_id.kind = c->spd.that.id.kind;
-	rw_id.name = empty_chunk;
-	happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr));
-	his_id = &rw_id;
-    }
-    else if (kind == PPK_PSK
-    && (c->policy & (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
-    && ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && c->spd.that.id.kind == ID_NONE) ||
-        (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && id_is_ipaddr(&c->spd.that.id))))
-    {
-	/* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */
-	rw_id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
-	happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr));
-	his_id = &rw_id;
-    }
-
-    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
-    {
-	if (s->kind == kind)
-	{
-	    unsigned int match = 0;
+		public_key_t *pub_key = cert_get_public_key(c->spd.this.cert);
 
-	    if (s->ids == NULL)
-	    {
-		/* a default (signified by lack of ids):
-		 * accept if no more specific match found
-		 */
-		match = match_default;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* check if both ends match ids */
-		id_list_t *i;
-
-		for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = i->next)
+		for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
 		{
-		    if (same_id(my_id, &i->id))
-			match |= match_me;
-
-		    if (same_id(his_id, &i->id))
-			match |= match_him;
+			if (s->kind == kind &&
+				s->u.private_key->belongs_to(s->u.private_key, pub_key))
+			{
+				best = s;
+				break; /* we have found the private key - no sense in searching further */
+			}
 		}
+		return best;
+	}
 
-		/* If our end matched the only id in the list,
-		 * default to matching any peer.
-		 * A more specific match will trump this.
-		 */
-		if (match == match_me
-		&& s->ids->next == NULL)
-		    match |= match_default;
-	    }
-
-	    switch (match)
-	    {
-	    case match_me:
-		/* if this is an asymmetric (eg. public key) system,
-		 * allow this-side-only match to count, even if
-		 * there are other ids in the list.
-		 */
-		if (!asym)
-		    break;
-		/* FALLTHROUGH */
-	    case match_default:	/* default all */
-	    case match_me | match_default:	/* default peer */
-	    case match_me | match_him:	/* explicit */
-		if (match == best_match)
-		{
-		    /* two good matches are equally good:
-		     * do they agree?
-		     */
-		    bool same = FALSE;
-
-		    switch (kind)
-		    {
-		    case PPK_PSK:
-			same = s->u.preshared_secret.len == best->u.preshared_secret.len
-			    && memcmp(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr, best->u.preshared_secret.ptr, s->u.preshared_secret.len) == 0;
-			break;
-		    case PPK_RSA:
-			/* Dirty trick: since we have code to compare
-			 * RSA public keys, but not private keys, we
-			 * make the assumption that equal public keys
-			 * mean equal private keys.  This ought to work.
-			 */
-			same = same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub
-					      , &best->u.RSA_private_key.pub);
-			break;
-		    default:
-			bad_case(kind);
-		    }
-		    if (!same)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "multiple ipsec.secrets entries with distinct secrets match endpoints:"
-			    " first secret used");
-			best = s;	/* list is backwards: take latest in list */
-		    }
-		}
-		else if (match > best_match)
+	if (his_id_was_instantiated(c))
+	{
+		/* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */
+		rw_id.kind = c->spd.that.id.kind;
+		rw_id.name = chunk_empty;
+		happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr));
+		his_id = &rw_id;
+	}
+	else if (kind == PPK_PSK
+	&& (c->policy & (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
+	&& ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && c->spd.that.id.kind == ID_ANY) ||
+		(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && id_is_ipaddr(&c->spd.that.id))))
+	{
+		/* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */
+		rw_id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+		happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr));
+		his_id = &rw_id;
+	}
+
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+	{
+		if (s->kind == kind)
 		{
-		    /* this is the best match so far */
-		    best_match = match;
-		    best = s;
+			unsigned int match = 0;
+
+			if (s->ids == NULL)
+			{
+				/* a default (signified by lack of ids):
+				 * accept if no more specific match found
+				 */
+				match = match_default;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* check if both ends match ids */
+				id_list_t *i;
+
+				for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = i->next)
+				{
+					if (same_id(my_id, &i->id))
+					{
+						match |= match_me;
+					}
+					if (same_id(his_id, &i->id))
+					{
+						match |= match_him;
+					}
+				}
+
+				/* If our end matched the only id in the list,
+				 * default to matching any peer.
+				 * A more specific match will trump this.
+				 */
+				if (match == match_me && s->ids->next == NULL)
+				{
+					match |= match_default;
+				}
+			}
+
+			switch (match)
+			{
+			case match_me:
+				/* if this is an asymmetric (eg. public key) system,
+				 * allow this-side-only match to count, even if
+				 * there are other ids in the list.
+				 */
+				if (!asym)
+				{
+					break;
+				}
+				/* FALLTHROUGH */
+			case match_default: /* default all */
+			case match_me | match_default:      /* default peer */
+			case match_me | match_him:  /* explicit */
+				if (match == best_match)
+				{
+					/* two good matches are equally good:
+					 * do they agree?
+					 */
+					bool same = FALSE;
+
+					switch (kind)
+					{
+					case PPK_PSK:
+						same = s->u.preshared_secret.len == best->u.preshared_secret.len
+								&& memeq(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr, best->u.preshared_secret.ptr, s->u.preshared_secret.len);
+						break;
+					case PPK_PUBKEY:
+						same = s->u.private_key->equals(s->u.private_key, best->u.private_key);
+						break;
+					default:
+						bad_case(kind);
+					}
+					if (!same)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "multiple ipsec.secrets entries with distinct secrets match endpoints:"
+							" first secret used");
+						best = s;       /* list is backwards: take latest in list */
+					}
+				}
+				else if (match > best_match)
+				{
+					/* this is the best match so far */
+					best_match = match;
+					best = s;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    return best;
+	return best;
 }
 
 /* find the appropriate preshared key (see get_secret).
  * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer.
  * Note: the result is not to be freed by the caller.
  */
-const chunk_t *
-get_preshared_secret(const struct connection *c)
+const chunk_t* get_preshared_secret(const struct connection *c)
 {
-    const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_PSK, FALSE);
+	const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_PSK, FALSE);
 
-    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	if (s == NULL)
-	    DBG_log("no Preshared Key Found");
-	else
-	    DBG_dump_chunk("Preshared Key", s->u.preshared_secret);
-    )
-    return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.preshared_secret;
+	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+		if (s == NULL)
+			DBG_log("no Preshared Key Found");
+		else
+			DBG_dump_chunk("Preshared Key", s->u.preshared_secret);
+	)
+	return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.preshared_secret;
 }
 
-/* check the existence of an RSA private key matching an RSA public
- * key contained in an X.509 or OpenPGP certificate
+/* check the existence of a private key matching a public key contained
+ * in an X.509 or OpenPGP certificate
  */
-bool
-has_private_key(cert_t cert)
+bool has_private_key(cert_t cert)
 {
-    secret_t *s;
-    bool has_key = FALSE;
-    pubkey_t *pubkey = allocate_RSA_public_key(cert);
-
-    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
-    {
-	if (s->kind == PPK_RSA &&
-	    same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &pubkey->u.rsa))
+	secret_t *s;
+	bool has_key = FALSE;
+	public_key_t *pub_key = cert_get_public_key(cert);
+
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
 	{
-	    has_key = TRUE;
-	    break;
+		if (s->kind == PPK_PUBKEY &&
+			s->u.private_key->belongs_to(s->u.private_key, pub_key))
+		{
+			has_key = TRUE;
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    free_public_key(pubkey);
-    return has_key;
+	return has_key;
 }
 
 /*
- * get the matching RSA private key belonging to a given X.509 certificate
+ * get the matching private key belonging to a given X.509 certificate
  */
-const RSA_private_key_t*
-get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
+private_key_t* get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    secret_t *s;
-    const RSA_private_key_t *pri = NULL;
-    const cert_t c = {CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {(x509cert_t*)cert}};
-
-    pubkey_t *pubkey = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
+	secret_t *s;
 
-    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
-    {
-	if (s->kind == PPK_RSA &&
-	    same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &pubkey->u.rsa))
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
 	{
-	    pri = &s->u.RSA_private_key;
-	    break;
+		if (s->kind == PPK_PUBKEY &&
+			s->u.private_key->belongs_to(s->u.private_key, cert->public_key))
+		{
+			return s->u.private_key;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    free_public_key(pubkey);
-    return pri;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/* find the appropriate RSA private key (see get_secret).
+/* find the appropriate private key (see get_secret).
  * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer.
  */
-const RSA_private_key_t *
-get_RSA_private_key(const struct connection *c)
+private_key_t* get_private_key(const struct connection *c)
 {
-    const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_RSA, TRUE);
+	const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_PUBKEY, TRUE);
 
-    return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.RSA_private_key;
+	return s == NULL? NULL : s->u.private_key;
 }
 
 /* digest a secrets file
@@ -403,1100 +347,1071 @@ get_RSA_private_key(const struct connection *c)
  */
 
 /* parse PSK from file */
-static err_t
-process_psk_secret(chunk_t *psk)
+static err_t process_psk_secret(chunk_t *psk)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')
-    {
-	clonetochunk(*psk, tok+1, flp->cur - tok  - 2, "PSK");
-	(void) shift();
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];	/* limit on size of binary representation of key */
-	size_t sz;
-
-	ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz
-	    , diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
-	if (ugh != NULL)
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')
 	{
-	    /* ttodata didn't like PSK data */
-	    ugh = builddiag("PSK data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok);
+		chunk_t secret = { tok + 1, flp->cur - tok  -2 };
+
+		*psk = chunk_clone(secret);
+		(void) shift();
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    clonetochunk(*psk, buf, sz, "PSK");
-	    (void) shift();
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];      /* limit on size of binary representation of key */
+		size_t sz;
+
+		ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz
+			, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			/* ttodata didn't like PSK data */
+			ugh = builddiag("PSK data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			chunk_t secret = { buf, sz };
+			*psk = chunk_clone(secret);
+			(void) shift();
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return ugh;
+	return ugh;
 }
 
-/* Parse fields of RSA private key.
- * A braced list of keyword and value pairs.
- * At the moment, each field is required, in order.
- * The fields come from BIND 8.2's representation
+typedef enum rsa_private_key_part_t rsa_private_key_part_t;
+
+enum rsa_private_key_part_t {
+	RSA_PART_MODULUS          = 0,
+	RSA_PART_PUBLIC_EXPONENT  = 1,
+	RSA_PART_PRIVATE_EXPONENT = 2,
+	RSA_PART_PRIME1           = 3,
+	RSA_PART_PRIME2           = 4,
+	RSA_PART_EXPONENT1        = 5,
+	RSA_PART_EXPONENT2        = 6,
+	RSA_PART_COEFFICIENT      = 7
+}; 
+
+const char *rsa_private_key_part_names[] = {
+	"Modulus",
+	"PublicExponent",
+	"PrivateExponent",
+	"Prime1",
+	"Prime2",
+	"Exponent1",
+	"Exponent2",
+	"Coefficient"
+};
+
+/**
+ * Parse fields of an RSA private key in BIND 8.2's representation
+ * consistiong of a braced list of keyword and value pairs in required order.
+ * Conversion into ASN.1 DER encoded PKCS#1 representation.
  */
-static err_t
-process_rsa_secret(RSA_private_key_t *rsak)
+static err_t process_rsa_secret(private_key_t **key)
 {
-    char buf[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];	/* limit on size of binary representation of key */
-    const struct fld *p;
-
-    /* save bytes of Modulus and PublicExponent for keyid calculation */
-    unsigned char ebytes[sizeof(buf)];
-    unsigned char *eb_next = ebytes;
-    chunk_t pub_bytes[2];
-    chunk_t *pb_next = &pub_bytes[0];
-
-    for (p = RSA_private_field; p < &RSA_private_field[RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS]; p++)
-    {
-	size_t sz;
+	chunk_t asn1_chunk[countof(rsa_private_key_part_names)];
+	chunk_t pkcs1_chunk;
+	u_char buf[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];   /* limit on size of binary representation of key */
+	rsa_private_key_part_t part, p;
+	size_t sz, len = 0;
 	err_t ugh;
 
-	if (!shift())
+	for (part = RSA_PART_MODULUS; part <= RSA_PART_COEFFICIENT; part++)
 	{
-	    return "premature end of RSA key";
+		chunk_t rsa_private_key_part;
+		const char *keyword = rsa_private_key_part_names[part];
+
+		if (!shift())
+		{
+			ugh = "premature end of RSA key";
+			goto end;
+		}
+		if (!tokeqword(keyword))
+		{
+			ugh = builddiag("%s keyword not found where expected in RSA key"
+				, keyword);
+			goto end;
+		}
+		if (!(shift() && (!tokeq(":") || shift())))   /* ignore optional ":" */
+		{
+			ugh = "premature end of RSA key";
+			goto end;
+		}
+		ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz,
+					   diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
+		if (ugh)
+		{
+			ugh = builddiag("RSA data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok);
+			part++;
+			goto end;
+		}
+		rsa_private_key_part = chunk_create(buf, sz);
+		asn1_chunk[part] = asn1_integer("c", rsa_private_key_part);
+		len += asn1_chunk[part].len;
 	}
-	else if (!tokeqword(p->name))
+
+	/* We require an (indented) '}' and the end of the record.
+	 * We break down the test so that the diagnostic will be more helpful.
+	 * Some people don't seem to wish to indent the brace!
+	 */
+	if (!shift() || !tokeq("}"))
 	{
-	    return builddiag("%s keyword not found where expected in RSA key"
-		, p->name);
+		ugh = "malformed end of RSA private key -- indented '}' required";
+		goto end;
 	}
-	else if (!(shift()
-	&& (!tokeq(":") || shift())))	/* ignore optional ":" */
+	if (shift())
 	{
-	    return "premature end of RSA key";
+		ugh = "malformed end of RSA private key -- unexpected token after '}'";
+		goto end;
 	}
-	else if (NULL != (ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok
-	, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space)
-	, TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS)))
+
+	pkcs1_chunk = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "ccccccccc",
+					 		ASN1_INTEGER_0,
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_MODULUS],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_PUBLIC_EXPONENT],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_PRIVATE_EXPONENT],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_PRIME1],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_PRIME2],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_EXPONENT1],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_EXPONENT2],
+							asn1_chunk[RSA_PART_COEFFICIENT]);
+
+	*key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, KEY_RSA,
+										  BUILD_BLOB_ASN1_DER, pkcs1_chunk,
+										  BUILD_END);
+	free(pkcs1_chunk.ptr);
+	if (*key == NULL)
 	{
-	    /* in RSA key, ttodata didn't like */
-	    return builddiag("RSA data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok);
+		ugh = "parsing of RSA private key failed";
 	}
-	else
+
+end:
+	/* clean up and return */
+	for (p = RSA_PART_MODULUS ; p < part; p++)
 	{
-	    MP_INT *n = (MP_INT *) ((char *)rsak + p->offset);
-
-	    n_to_mpz(n, buf, sz);
-	    if (pb_next < &pub_bytes[elemsof(pub_bytes)])
-	    {
-		if (eb_next - ebytes + sz > sizeof(ebytes))
-		    return "public key takes too many bytes";
-
-		setchunk(*pb_next, eb_next, sz);
-		memcpy(eb_next, buf, sz);
-		eb_next += sz;
-		pb_next++;
-	    }
-#if 0	/* debugging info that compromises security */
-	    {
-		size_t sz = mpz_sizeinbase(n, 16);
-		char buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS * 2 + 2];	/* ought to be big enough */
-
-		passert(sz <= sizeof(buf));
-		mpz_get_str(buf, 16, n);
-
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s: %s", p->name, buf);
-	    }
-#endif
+		free(asn1_chunk[p].ptr);
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* We require an (indented) '}' and the end of the record.
-     * We break down the test so that the diagnostic will be
-     * more helpful.  Some people don't seem to wish to indent
-     * the brace!
-     */
-    if (!shift() || !tokeq("}"))
-    {
-	return "malformed end of RSA private key -- indented '}' required";
-    }
-    else if (shift())
-    {
-	return "malformed end of RSA private key -- unexpected token after '}'";
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	unsigned bits = mpz_sizeinbase(&rsak->pub.n, 2);
-
-	rsak->pub.k = (bits + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
-	rsak->pub.keyid[0] = '\0';	/* in case of splitkeytoid failure */
-	splitkeytoid(pub_bytes[1].ptr, pub_bytes[1].len
-	    , pub_bytes[0].ptr, pub_bytes[0].len
-	    , rsak->pub.keyid, sizeof(rsak->pub.keyid));
-	return RSA_private_key_sanity(rsak);
-    }
+	return ugh;	
 }
 
-/* process rsa key file protected with optional passphrase which can either be
+/**
+ * process a key file protected with optional passphrase which can either be
  * read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for by using whack
  */
-static err_t
-process_rsa_keyfile(RSA_private_key_t *rsak, int whackfd)
+static err_t process_keyfile(private_key_t **key, key_type_t type, int whackfd)
 {
-    char filename[BUF_LEN];
-    prompt_pass_t pass;
-
-    memset(filename,'\0', BUF_LEN);
-    memset(pass.secret,'\0', sizeof(pass.secret));
-    pass.prompt = FALSE;
-    pass.fd = whackfd;
+	char filename[BUF_LEN];
+	prompt_pass_t pass;
 
-    /* we expect the filename of a PKCS#1 private key file */
+	memset(filename,'\0', BUF_LEN);
+	memset(pass.secret,'\0', sizeof(pass.secret));
+	pass.prompt = FALSE;
+	pass.fd = whackfd;
 
-    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted filename */
-	memcpy(filename, tok+1, flp->cur - tok - 2);
-    else
-    	memcpy(filename, tok, flp->cur - tok);
+	/* we expect the filename of a PKCS#1 private key file */
 
-    if (shift())
-    {
-	/* we expect an appended passphrase or passphrase prompt*/
-	if (tokeqword("%prompt"))
-	{
-	    if (pass.fd == NULL_FD)
-		return "RSA private key file -- enter passphrase using 'ipsec secrets'";
-	    pass.prompt = TRUE;
-	}
+	if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted filename */
+		memcpy(filename, tok+1, flp->cur - tok - 2);
 	else
+		memcpy(filename, tok, flp->cur - tok);
+
+	if (shift())
 	{
-	    char *passphrase = tok;
-	    size_t len = flp->cur - passphrase;
-
-	    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted passphrase */
-	    {
-		passphrase++;
-		len -= 2;
-	    }
-	    if (len > PROMPT_PASS_LEN)
-		return "RSA private key file -- passphrase exceeds 64 characters";
-
-	    memcpy(pass.secret, passphrase, len);
+		/* we expect an appended passphrase or passphrase prompt*/
+		if (tokeqword("%prompt"))
+		{
+			if (pass.fd == NULL_FD)
+			{
+				return "Private key file -- enter passphrase using 'ipsec secrets'";
+			}
+			pass.prompt = TRUE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			char *passphrase = tok;
+			size_t len = flp->cur - passphrase;
+
+			if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted passphrase */
+			{
+				passphrase++;
+				len -= 2;
+			}
+			if (len > PROMPT_PASS_LEN)
+			{
+				return "Private key file -- passphrase exceeds 64 characters";
+			}
+			memcpy(pass.secret, passphrase, len);
+		}
+		if (shift())
+		{
+			return "Private key file -- unexpected token after passphrase";
+		}
 	}
-	if (shift())
-	    return "RSA private key file -- unexpected token after passphrase";
-    }
-    return load_rsa_private_key(filename, &pass, rsak);
+	*key = load_private_key(filename, &pass, type);
+
+	return key ? NULL : "Private key file -- could not be loaded";
 }
 
-/*
- * process xauth secret read from ipsec.secrets
+/**
+ * Process xauth secret read from ipsec.secrets
  */
-static err_t
-process_xauth(secret_t *s)
+static err_t process_xauth(secret_t *s)
 {
-    chunk_t user_name;
-
-    s->kind = PPK_XAUTH;
-
-    if (!shift())
-	return "missing xauth user name";
-    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted user name */
-    {
-	user_name.ptr = tok + 1;
-	user_name.len = flp->cur - tok - 2;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	user_name.ptr = tok;
-	user_name.len = flp->cur - tok;
-    }
-    plog("  loaded xauth credentials of user '%.*s'"
-		, user_name.len
-		, user_name.ptr);
-    clonetochunk(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name
-	, user_name.ptr, user_name.len, "xauth user name");
-
-    if (!shift())
-	return "missing xauth user password";
-    return process_psk_secret(&s->u.xauth_secret.user_password);
+	chunk_t user_name;
+
+	s->kind = PPK_XAUTH;
+
+	if (!shift())
+		return "missing xauth user name";
+	if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted user name */
+	{
+		user_name.ptr = tok + 1;
+		user_name.len = flp->cur - tok - 2;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		user_name.ptr = tok;
+		user_name.len = flp->cur - tok;
+	}
+	plog("  loaded xauth credentials of user '%.*s'"
+				, user_name.len
+				, user_name.ptr);
+	s->u.xauth_secret.user_name = chunk_clone(user_name);
+
+	if (!shift())
+		return "missing xauth user password";
+	return process_psk_secret(&s->u.xauth_secret.user_password);
 }
 
-/* get XAUTH secret from chained secrets lists
+/**
+ * Get XAUTH secret from chained secrets lists
  * only one entry is currently supported
  */
-static bool
-xauth_get_secret(xauth_t *xauth_secret)
+static bool xauth_get_secret(xauth_t *xauth_secret)
 {
-    secret_t *s;
-    bool found = FALSE;
+	secret_t *s;
+	bool found = FALSE;
 
-    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
-    {
-	if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH)
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
 	{
-	    if (found)
-	    {
-		plog("found multiple xauth secrets - first selected");
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		found = TRUE;
-		*xauth_secret = s->u.xauth_secret;
-	    }
+		if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH)
+		{
+			if (found)
+			{
+				plog("found multiple xauth secrets - first selected");
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				found = TRUE;
+				*xauth_secret = s->u.xauth_secret;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return found;
+	return found;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * find a matching secret
  */
-static bool
-xauth_verify_secret(const xauth_peer_t *peer, const xauth_t *xauth_secret)
+static bool xauth_verify_secret(const xauth_peer_t *peer,
+								const xauth_t *xauth_secret)
 {
-    bool found = FALSE;
-    secret_t *s;
+	bool found = FALSE;
+	secret_t *s;
 
-    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
-    {
-	if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH)
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
 	{
-	    if (!same_chunk(xauth_secret->user_name, s->u.xauth_secret.user_name))
-		continue;
-	    found = TRUE;
-	    if (same_chunk(xauth_secret->user_password, s->u.xauth_secret.user_password))
-		return TRUE;
+		if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH)
+		{
+			if (!chunk_equals(xauth_secret->user_name, s->u.xauth_secret.user_name))
+			{
+				continue;
+			}
+			found = TRUE;
+			if (chunk_equals(xauth_secret->user_password, s->u.xauth_secret.user_password))
+			{
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    plog("xauth user '%.*s' %s"
-       , xauth_secret->user_name.len, xauth_secret->user_name.ptr
-       , found? "sent wrong password":"not found");
-    return FALSE;
+	plog("xauth user '%.*s' %s"
+	   , xauth_secret->user_name.len, xauth_secret->user_name.ptr
+	   , found? "sent wrong password":"not found");
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * the global xauth_module struct is defined here
  */
 xauth_module_t xauth_module;
 
-/*
- * assign the default xauth functions to any null function pointers
+/**
+ * Assign the default xauth functions to any null function pointers
  */
-void
-xauth_defaults(void)
+void xauth_defaults(void)
 {
-    if (xauth_module.get_secret == NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("xauth module: using default get_secret() function")
-	)
-	xauth_module.get_secret = xauth_get_secret;
-    }
-    if (xauth_module.verify_secret == NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("xauth module: using default verify_secret() function")
-	)
-	xauth_module.verify_secret = xauth_verify_secret;
-    }
+	if (xauth_module.get_secret == NULL)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("xauth module: using default get_secret() function")
+		)
+		xauth_module.get_secret = xauth_get_secret;
+	}
+	if (xauth_module.verify_secret == NULL)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("xauth module: using default verify_secret() function")
+		)
+		xauth_module.verify_secret = xauth_verify_secret;
+	}
 };
 
-/*
- * process pin read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for it using whack
+/**
+ * Process pin read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for it using whack
  */
-static err_t
-process_pin(secret_t *s, int whackfd)
+static err_t process_pin(secret_t *s, int whackfd)
 {
-    smartcard_t *sc;
-    const char *pin_status = "no pin";
-
-    s->kind = PPK_PIN;
-
-    /* looking for the smartcard keyword */
-    if (!shift() || strncmp(tok, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) != 0)
-	 return "PIN keyword must be followed by %smartcard<reader>:<id>";
-
-    sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(tok + strlen(SCX_TOKEN)));
-    s->u.smartcard = sc;
-    scx_share(sc);
-    if (sc->pin.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	scx_free_pin(&sc->pin);
-    }
-    sc->valid = FALSE;
-
-    if (!shift())
-	return "PIN statement must be terminated either by <pin code>, %pinpad or %prompt";
-
-    if (tokeqword("%prompt"))
-    {
-	shift();
-	/* if whackfd exists, whack will be used to prompt for a pin */
-	if (whackfd != NULL_FD)
-	    pin_status = scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd) ? "valid pin" : "invalid pin";
+	smartcard_t *sc;
+	const char *pin_status = "no pin";
+
+	s->kind = PPK_PIN;
+
+	/* looking for the smartcard keyword */
+	if (!shift() || strncmp(tok, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) != 0)
+		 return "PIN keyword must be followed by %smartcard<reader>:<id>";
+
+	sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(tok + strlen(SCX_TOKEN)));
+	s->u.smartcard = sc;
+	scx_share(sc);
+	if (sc->pin.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		scx_free_pin(&sc->pin);
+	}
+	sc->valid = FALSE;
+
+	if (!shift())
+		return "PIN statement must be terminated either by <pin code>, %pinpad or %prompt";
+
+	if (tokeqword("%prompt"))
+	{
+		shift();
+		/* if whackfd exists, whack will be used to prompt for a pin */
+		if (whackfd != NULL_FD)
+			pin_status = scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd) ? "valid pin" : "invalid pin";
+		else
+			pin_status = "pin entry via prompt";
+	}
+	else if (tokeqword("%pinpad"))
+	{
+		chunk_t empty_pin = { "", 0 };
+
+		shift();
+
+		/* pin will be entered via pin pad during verification */
+		sc->pin = chunk_clone(empty_pin);
+		sc->pinpad = TRUE;
+		sc->valid = TRUE;
+		pin_status = "pin entry via pad";
+		if (pkcs11_keep_state)
+		{
+			scx_verify_pin(sc);
+		}
+	}
 	else
-	    pin_status = "pin entry via prompt";
-    }
-    else if (tokeqword("%pinpad"))
-    {
-	shift();
-	/* pin will be entered via pin pad during verification */
-	clonetochunk(sc->pin, "", 0, "empty pin");
-	sc->pinpad = TRUE;
-	sc->valid = TRUE;
-	pin_status = "pin entry via pad";
-	if (pkcs11_keep_state)
-	    scx_verify_pin(sc);
-    }
-    else
-    {	
-	/* we read the pin directly from ipsec.secrets */
-	err_t ugh = process_psk_secret(&sc->pin);
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	return ugh;
-	/* verify the pin */
-	pin_status = scx_verify_pin(sc) ? "valid PIN" : "invalid PIN";
-    }
+	{   
+		/* we read the pin directly from ipsec.secrets */
+		err_t ugh = process_psk_secret(&sc->pin);
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		return ugh;
+		/* verify the pin */
+		pin_status = scx_verify_pin(sc) ? "valid PIN" : "invalid PIN";
+	}
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    {
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	{
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	if (sc->any_slot)
-	    snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot");
-	else
-	    snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %lu", sc->slot);
+		if (sc->any_slot)
+			snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot");
+		else
+			snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %lu", sc->slot);
 
-        plog("  %s for #%d (%s, id: %s)"
-	    , pin_status, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id);
-    }
+		plog("  %s for #%d (%s, id: %s)"
+			, pin_status, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id);
+	}
 #else
-    plog("  warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+	plog("  warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
 #endif
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-static void
-log_psk(secret_t *s)
+static void log_psk(secret_t *s)
 {
-    int n = 0;
-    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    id_list_t *id_list = s->ids;
-
-    if (id_list == NULL)
-    {
-	n = snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "%%any");
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	do
+	int n = 0;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	id_list_t *id_list = s->ids;
+
+	if (id_list == NULL)
 	{
-	    n += idtoa(&id_list->id, buf + n, BUF_LEN - n);
-	    if (n >= BUF_LEN)
-	    {
-		n = BUF_LEN - 1;
-		break;
-	    }
-	    else if (n < BUF_LEN - 1)
-	    {
-		n += snprintf(buf + n, BUF_LEN - n, " ");
-	    }
-	    id_list = id_list->next;
+		n = snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "%%any");
 	}
-	while (id_list);
-    }
-    plog("  loaded shared key for %.*s", n, buf);
+	else
+	{
+		do
+		{
+			n += idtoa(&id_list->id, buf + n, BUF_LEN - n);
+			if (n >= BUF_LEN)
+			{
+				n = BUF_LEN - 1;
+				break;
+			}
+			else if (n < BUF_LEN - 1)
+			{
+				n += snprintf(buf + n, BUF_LEN - n, " ");
+			}
+			id_list = id_list->next;
+		}
+		while (id_list);
+	}
+	plog("  loaded shared key for %.*s", n, buf);
 }
 
-static void
-process_secret(secret_t *s, int whackfd)
+static void process_secret(secret_t *s, int whackfd)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    s->kind = PPK_PSK;	/* default */
-    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')
-    {
-	/* old PSK format: just a string */
-	log_psk(s);
-	ugh = process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret);
-    }
-    else if (tokeqword("psk"))
-    {
-	/* preshared key: quoted string or ttodata format */
-	log_psk(s);
-	ugh = !shift()? "unexpected end of record in PSK"
-	    : process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret);
-    }
-    else if (tokeqword("rsa"))
-    {
-	/* RSA key: the fun begins.
-	 * A braced list of keyword and value pairs.
-	 */
-	s->kind = PPK_RSA;
-	if (!shift())
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	s->kind = PPK_PSK;  /* default */
+	if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')
+	{
+		/* old PSK format: just a string */
+		log_psk(s);
+		ugh = process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret);
+	}
+	else if (tokeqword("psk"))
+	{
+		/* preshared key: quoted string or ttodata format */
+		log_psk(s);
+		ugh = !shift()? "unexpected end of record in PSK"
+			: process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret);
+	}
+	else if (tokeqword("rsa"))
+	{
+		/* RSA key: the fun begins.
+		 * A braced list of keyword and value pairs.
+		 */
+		s->kind = PPK_PUBKEY;
+		if (!shift())
+		{
+			ugh = "bad RSA key syntax";
+		}
+		else if (tokeq("{"))
+		{
+			ugh = process_rsa_secret(&s->u.private_key);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		   ugh = process_keyfile(&s->u.private_key, KEY_RSA, whackfd);
+		}
+	}
+	else if (tokeqword("ecdsa"))
+	{
+		s->kind = PPK_PUBKEY;
+		if (!shift())
+		{
+			ugh = "bad ECDSA key syntax";
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		   ugh = process_keyfile(&s->u.private_key, KEY_ECDSA, whackfd);
+		}
+	}
+	else if (tokeqword("xauth"))
 	{
-	    ugh = "bad RSA key syntax";
+		ugh = process_xauth(s);
 	}
-	else if (tokeq("{"))
+	else if (tokeqword("pin"))
 	{
-	    ugh = process_rsa_secret(&s->u.RSA_private_key);
+		ugh = process_pin(s, whackfd);
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	   ugh = process_rsa_keyfile(&s->u.RSA_private_key, whackfd);
+		ugh = builddiag("unrecognized key format: %s", tok);
 	}
-    }
-    else if (tokeqword("xauth"))
-    {
-	ugh = process_xauth(s);
-    }
-    else if (tokeqword("pin"))
-    {
-	ugh = process_pin(s, whackfd);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ugh = builddiag("unrecognized key format: %s", tok);
-    }
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s"
-	    , flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh);
-	pfree(s);
-    }
-    else if (flushline("expected record boundary in key"))
-    {
-	/* gauntlet has been run: install new secret */
-	lock_certs_and_keys("process_secret");
-	s->next = secrets;
-	secrets = s;
-	unlock_certs_and_keys("process_secrets");
-    }
-}
-
-static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd);	/* forward declaration */
-
-static void
-process_secret_records(int whackfd)
-{
-    /* read records from ipsec.secrets and load them into our table */
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	(void)flushline(NULL);	/* silently ditch leftovers, if any */
-	if (flp->bdry == B_file)
-	    break;
-
-	flp->bdry = B_none;	/* eat the Record Boundary */
-	(void)shift();	/* get real first token */
 
-	if (tokeqword("include"))
+	if (ugh != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* an include directive */
-	    char fn[MAX_TOK_LEN];	/* space for filename (I hope) */
-	    char *p = fn;
-	    char *end_prefix = strrchr(flp->filename, '/');
-
-	    if (!shift())
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of include directive"
-		    , flp->filename, flp->lino);
-		continue;   /* abandon this record */
-	    }
-
-	    /* if path is relative and including file's pathname has
-	     * a non-empty dirname, prefix this path with that dirname.
-	     */
-	    if (tok[0] != '/' && end_prefix != NULL)
-	    {
-		size_t pl = end_prefix - flp->filename + 1;
-
-		/* "clamp" length to prevent problems now;
-		 * will be rediscovered and reported later.
-		 */
-		if (pl > sizeof(fn))
-		    pl = sizeof(fn);
-		memcpy(fn, flp->filename, pl);
-		p += pl;
-	    }
-	    if (flp->cur - tok >= &fn[sizeof(fn)] - p)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: include pathname too long"
-		    , flp->filename, flp->lino);
-		continue;   /* abandon this record */
-	    }
-	    strcpy(p, tok);
-	    (void) shift();	/* move to Record Boundary, we hope */
-	    if (flushline("ignoring malformed INCLUDE -- expected Record Boundary after filename"))
-	    {
-		process_secrets_file(fn, whackfd);
-		tok = NULL;	/* correct, but probably redundant */
-	    }
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s"
+			, flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh);
+		free(s);
 	}
-	else
+	else if (flushline("expected record boundary in key"))
 	{
-	    /* expecting a list of indices and then the key info */
-	    secret_t *s = alloc_thing(secret_t, "secret");
+		/* gauntlet has been run: install new secret */
+		lock_certs_and_keys("process_secret");
+		s->next = secrets;
+		secrets = s;
+		unlock_certs_and_keys("process_secrets");
+	}
+}
 
-	    s->ids = NULL;
-	    s->kind = PPK_PSK;	/* default */
-	    setchunk(s->u.preshared_secret, NULL, 0);
-	    s->next = NULL;
+static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd);    /* forward declaration */
 
-	    for (;;)
-	    {
-		if (tok[0] == '"' || tok[0] == '\'')
+static void process_secret_records(int whackfd)
+{
+	/* read records from ipsec.secrets and load them into our table */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		(void)flushline(NULL);  /* silently ditch leftovers, if any */
+		if (flp->bdry == B_file)
 		{
-		    /* found key part */
-		    process_secret(s, whackfd);
-		    break;
+			break;
 		}
-		else if (tokeq(":"))
+		flp->bdry = B_none;     /* eat the Record Boundary */
+		(void)shift();  /* get real first token */
+
+		if (tokeqword("include"))
 		{
-		    /* found key part */
-		    shift();	/* discard explicit separator */
-		    process_secret(s, whackfd);
-		    break;
+			/* an include directive */
+			char fn[MAX_TOK_LEN];       /* space for filename (I hope) */
+			char *p = fn;
+			char *end_prefix = strrchr(flp->filename, '/');
+
+			if (!shift())
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of include directive"
+					, flp->filename, flp->lino);
+				continue;   /* abandon this record */
+			}
+
+			/* if path is relative and including file's pathname has
+			 * a non-empty dirname, prefix this path with that dirname.
+			 */
+			if (tok[0] != '/' && end_prefix != NULL)
+			{
+				size_t pl = end_prefix - flp->filename + 1;
+
+				/* "clamp" length to prevent problems now;
+				 * will be rediscovered and reported later.
+				 */
+				if (pl > sizeof(fn))
+				{
+					pl = sizeof(fn);
+				}
+				memcpy(fn, flp->filename, pl);
+				p += pl;
+			}
+			if (flp->cur - tok >= &fn[sizeof(fn)] - p)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: include pathname too long"
+					, flp->filename, flp->lino);
+				continue;   /* abandon this record */
+			}
+			strcpy(p, tok);
+			(void) shift();     /* move to Record Boundary, we hope */
+			if (flushline("ignoring malformed INCLUDE -- expected Record Boundary after filename"))
+			{
+				process_secrets_file(fn, whackfd);
+				tok = NULL;     /* correct, but probably redundant */
+			}
 		}
 		else
 		{
-		    /* an id
-		     * See RFC2407 IPsec Domain of Interpretation 4.6.2
-		     */
-		    struct id id;
-		    err_t ugh;
-
-		    if (tokeq("%any"))
-		    {
-			id = empty_id;
-			id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
-			ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET, &id.ip_addr);
-		    }
-		    else if (tokeq("%any6"))
-		    {
-			id = empty_id;
-			id.kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
-			ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET6, &id.ip_addr);
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			ugh = atoid(tok, &id, FALSE);
-		    }
-
-		    if (ugh != NULL)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "ERROR \"%s\" line %d: index \"%s\" %s"
-			    , flp->filename, flp->lino, tok, ugh);
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			id_list_t *i = alloc_thing(id_list_t
-			    , "id_list");
-
-			i->id = id;
-			unshare_id_content(&i->id);
-			i->next = s->ids;
-			s->ids = i;
-			/* DBG_log("id type %d: %s %.*s", i->kind, ip_str(&i->ip_addr), (int)i->name.len, i->name.ptr); */
-		    }
-		    if (!shift())
-		    {
-			/* unexpected Record Boundary or EOF */
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of id list"
-			    , flp->filename, flp->lino);
-			break;
-		    }
+			/* expecting a list of indices and then the key info */
+			secret_t *s = malloc_thing(secret_t);
+
+			zero(s);
+			s->ids = NULL;
+			s->kind = PPK_PSK;  /* default */
+			s->u.preshared_secret = chunk_empty;
+			s->next = NULL;
+
+			for (;;)
+			{
+				if (tok[0] == '"' || tok[0] == '\'')
+				{
+					/* found key part */
+					process_secret(s, whackfd);
+					break;
+				}
+				else if (tokeq(":"))
+				{
+					/* found key part */
+					shift();    /* discard explicit separator */
+					process_secret(s, whackfd);
+					break;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* an id
+					 * See RFC2407 IPsec Domain of Interpretation 4.6.2
+					 */
+					struct id id;
+					err_t ugh;
+
+					if (tokeq("%any"))
+					{
+						id = empty_id;
+						id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+						ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET, &id.ip_addr);
+					}
+					else if (tokeq("%any6"))
+					{
+						id = empty_id;
+						id.kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
+						ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET6, &id.ip_addr);
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						ugh = atoid(tok, &id, FALSE);
+					}
+
+					if (ugh != NULL)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "ERROR \"%s\" line %d: index \"%s\" %s"
+							, flp->filename, flp->lino, tok, ugh);
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						id_list_t *i = malloc_thing(id_list_t);
+
+						i->id = id;
+						unshare_id_content(&i->id);
+						i->next = s->ids;
+						s->ids = i;
+						/* DBG_log("id type %d: %s %.*s", i->kind, ip_str(&i->ip_addr), (int)i->name.len, i->name.ptr); */
+					}
+					if (!shift())
+					{
+						/* unexpected Record Boundary or EOF */
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of id list"
+							, flp->filename, flp->lino);
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 }
 
-static int
-globugh(const char *epath, int eerrno)
+static int globugh(const char *epath, int eerrno)
 {
-    log_errno_routine(eerrno, "problem with secrets file \"%s\"", epath);
-    return 1;	/* stop glob */
+	log_errno_routine(eerrno, "problem with secrets file \"%s\"", epath);
+	return 1;   /* stop glob */
 }
 
-static void
-process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd)
+static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd)
 {
-    struct file_lex_position pos;
-    char **fnp;
-    glob_t globbuf;
-
-    pos.depth = flp == NULL? 0 : flp->depth + 1;
+	struct file_lex_position pos;
+	char **fnp;
+	glob_t globbuf;
 
-    if (pos.depth > 10)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secrets file \"%s\" nested too deeply", file_pat);
-	return;
-    }
+	pos.depth = flp == NULL? 0 : flp->depth + 1;
 
-    /* do globbing */
-    {
-	int r = glob(file_pat, GLOB_ERR, globugh, &globbuf);
+	if (pos.depth > 10)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secrets file \"%s\" nested too deeply", file_pat);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	if (r != 0)
+	/* do globbing */
 	{
-	    switch (r)
-	    {
-	    case GLOB_NOSPACE:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "out of space processing secrets filename \"%s\"", file_pat);
-		break;
-	    case GLOB_ABORTED:
-		break;	/* already logged */
-	    case GLOB_NOMATCH:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no secrets filename matched \"%s\"", file_pat);
-		break;
-	    default:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown glob error %d", r);
-		break;
-	    }
-	    globfree(&globbuf);
-	    return;
+		int r = glob(file_pat, GLOB_ERR, globugh, &globbuf);
+
+		if (r != 0)
+		{
+			switch (r)
+			{
+			case GLOB_NOSPACE:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "out of space processing secrets filename \"%s\"", file_pat);
+				break;
+			case GLOB_ABORTED:
+				break;  /* already logged */
+			case GLOB_NOMATCH:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no secrets filename matched \"%s\"", file_pat);
+				break;
+			default:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown glob error %d", r);
+				break;
+			}
+			globfree(&globbuf);
+			return;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* for each file... */
-    for (fnp = globbuf.gl_pathv; *fnp != NULL; fnp++)
-    {
-	if (lexopen(&pos, *fnp, FALSE))
+	/* for each file... */
+	for (fnp = globbuf.gl_pathv; *fnp != NULL; fnp++)
 	{
-	    plog("loading secrets from \"%s\"", *fnp);
-	    (void) flushline("file starts with indentation (continuation notation)");
-	    process_secret_records(whackfd);
-	    lexclose();
+		if (lexopen(&pos, *fnp, FALSE))
+		{
+			plog("loading secrets from \"%s\"", *fnp);
+			(void) flushline("file starts with indentation (continuation notation)");
+			process_secret_records(whackfd);
+			lexclose();
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    globfree(&globbuf);
+	globfree(&globbuf);
 }
 
-void
-free_preshared_secrets(void)
+void free_preshared_secrets(void)
 {
-    lock_certs_and_keys("free_preshared_secrets");
+	lock_certs_and_keys("free_preshared_secrets");
 
-    if (secrets != NULL)
-    {
-	secret_t *s, *ns;
+	if (secrets != NULL)
+	{
+		secret_t *s, *ns;
 
-	plog("forgetting secrets");
+		plog("forgetting secrets");
 
-	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = ns)
-	{
-	    id_list_t *i, *ni;
-
-	    ns = s->next;	/* grab before freeing s */
-	    for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = ni)
-	    {
-		ni = i->next;	/* grab before freeing i */
-		free_id_content(&i->id);
-		pfree(i);
-	    }
-	    switch (s->kind)
-	    {
-	    case PPK_PSK:
-		pfree(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr);
-		break;
-	    case PPK_RSA:
-		free_RSA_private_content(&s->u.RSA_private_key);
-		break;
-	    case PPK_XAUTH:
-		pfree(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr);
-		pfree(s->u.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr);
-		break;
-	    case PPK_PIN:
-		scx_release(s->u.smartcard);
-		break;
-	    default:
-		bad_case(s->kind);
-	    }
-	    pfree(s);
+		for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = ns)
+		{
+			id_list_t *i, *ni;
+
+			ns = s->next;       /* grab before freeing s */
+			for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = ni)
+			{
+				ni = i->next;   /* grab before freeing i */
+				free_id_content(&i->id);
+				free(i);
+			}
+			switch (s->kind)
+			{
+			case PPK_PSK:
+				free(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr);
+				break;
+			case PPK_PUBKEY:
+				DESTROY_IF(s->u.private_key);
+				break;
+			case PPK_XAUTH:
+				free(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr);
+				free(s->u.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr);
+				break;
+			case PPK_PIN:
+				scx_release(s->u.smartcard);
+				break;
+			default:
+				bad_case(s->kind);
+			}
+			free(s);
+		}
+		secrets = NULL;
 	}
-	secrets = NULL;
-    }
 
-    unlock_certs_and_keys("free_preshard_secrets");
+	unlock_certs_and_keys("free_preshard_secrets");
 }
 
-void
-load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd)
+void load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd)
 {
-    free_preshared_secrets();
-    (void) process_secrets_file(shared_secrets_file, whackfd);
+	free_preshared_secrets();
+	(void) process_secrets_file(shared_secrets_file, whackfd);
 }
 
 /* public key machinery
  * Note: caller must set dns_auth_level.
  */
 
-pubkey_t *
-public_key_from_rsa(const RSA_public_key_t *k)
+pubkey_t* public_key_from_rsa(public_key_t *key)
 {
-    pubkey_t *p = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey");
-
-    p->id = empty_id;	/* don't know, doesn't matter */
-    p->issuer = empty_chunk;
-    p->serial = empty_chunk;
-    p->alg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
-
-    memcpy(p->u.rsa.keyid, k->keyid, sizeof(p->u.rsa.keyid));
-    p->u.rsa.k = k->k;
-    mpz_init_set(&p->u.rsa.e, &k->e);
-    mpz_init_set(&p->u.rsa.n, &k->n);
-
-    /* note that we return a 1 reference count upon creation:
-     * invariant: recount > 0.
-     */
-    p->refcnt = 1;
-    time(&p->installed_time);
-    return p;
+	pubkey_t *p = malloc_thing(pubkey_t);
+
+	zero(p);
+	p->id = empty_id;   /* don't know, doesn't matter */
+	p->issuer = chunk_empty;
+	p->serial = chunk_empty;
+	p->public_key = key;
+
+	/* note that we return a 1 reference count upon creation:
+	 * invariant: recount > 0.
+	 */
+	p->refcnt = 1;
+	time(&p->installed_time);
+	return p;
 }
 
 /* Free a public key record.
  * As a convenience, this returns a pointer to next.
  */
-pubkey_list_t *
-free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p)
+pubkey_list_t* free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p)
 {
-    pubkey_list_t *nxt = p->next;
+	pubkey_list_t *nxt = p->next;
 
-    if (p->key != NULL)
-	unreference_key(&p->key);
-    pfree(p);
-    return nxt;
+	if (p->key != NULL)
+	{
+		unreference_key(&p->key);
+	}
+	free(p);
+	return nxt;
 }
 
-void
-free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys)
+void free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys)
 {
-    while (*keys != NULL)
-	*keys = free_public_keyentry(*keys);
+	while (*keys != NULL)
+	{
+		*keys = free_public_keyentry(*keys);
+	}
 }
 
 /* root of chained public key list */
 
-pubkey_list_t *pubkeys = NULL;	/* keys from ipsec.conf */
+pubkey_list_t *pubkeys = NULL;  /* keys from ipsec.conf */
 
-void
-free_remembered_public_keys(void)
+void free_remembered_public_keys(void)
 {
-    free_public_keys(&pubkeys);
+	free_public_keys(&pubkeys);
 }
 
-/* transfer public keys from *keys list to front of pubkeys list */
-void
-transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
+/**
+ * Transfer public keys from *keys list to front of pubkeys list
+ */
+void transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
 , pubkey_list_t **keys
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 )
 {
-    {
-	struct gw_info *gwp;
-
-	for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
 	{
-	    pubkey_list_t *pl = alloc_thing(pubkey_list_t, "from TXT");
+		struct gw_info *gwp;
 
-	    pl->key = gwp->key;	/* note: this is a transfer */
-	    gwp->key = NULL;	/* really, it is! */
-	    pl->next = pubkeys;
-	    pubkeys = pl;
+		for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+		{
+			pubkey_list_t *pl = malloc_thing(pubkey_list_t);
+
+			pl->key = gwp->key; /* note: this is a transfer */
+			gwp->key = NULL;    /* really, it is! */
+			pl->next = pubkeys;
+			pubkeys = pl;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    {
-	pubkey_list_t **pp = keys;
-
-	while (*pp != NULL)
-	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
-	*pp = pubkeys;
-	pubkeys = *keys;
-	*keys = NULL;
-    }
+	{
+		pubkey_list_t **pp = keys;
+
+		while (*pp != NULL)
+		{
+			pp = &(*pp)->next;
+		}
+		*pp = pubkeys;
+		pubkeys = *keys;
+		*keys = NULL;
+	}
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
 }
 
-/* decode of RSA pubkey chunk
- * - format specified in RFC 2537 RSA/MD5 Keys and SIGs in the DNS
- * - exponent length in bytes (1 or 3 octets)
- *   + 1 byte if in [1, 255]
- *   + otherwise 0x00 followed by 2 bytes of length
- * - exponent
- * - modulus
- */
-err_t
-unpack_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, const chunk_t *pubkey)
-{
-    chunk_t exp;
-    chunk_t mod;
-
-    if (pubkey->len < 3)
-	return "RSA public key blob way to short";	/* not even room for length! */
-
-    if (pubkey->ptr[0] != 0x00)
-    {
-	setchunk(exp, pubkey->ptr + 1, pubkey->ptr[0]);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	setchunk(exp, pubkey->ptr + 3
-	    , (pubkey->ptr[1] << BITS_PER_BYTE) + pubkey->ptr[2]);
-    }
-
-    if (pubkey->len - (exp.ptr - pubkey->ptr) < exp.len + RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC)
-	return "RSA public key blob too short";
-
-    mod.ptr = exp.ptr + exp.len;
-    mod.len = &pubkey->ptr[pubkey->len] - mod.ptr;
-
-    if (mod.len < RSA_MIN_OCTETS)
-	return RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH;
-
-    if (mod.len > RSA_MAX_OCTETS)
-	return RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH;
-
-    init_RSA_public_key(rsa, exp, mod);
-    rsa->k = mpz_sizeinbase(&rsa->n, 2);	/* size in bits, for a start */
-    rsa->k = (rsa->k + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE;	/* now octets */
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	RSA_show_public_key(rsa)
-    )
-
-    if (rsa->k != mod.len)
-    {
-	mpz_clear(&rsa->e);
-	mpz_clear(&rsa->n);
-	return "RSA modulus shorter than specified";
-    }
-
-    return NULL;
-}
 
-static void
-install_public_key(pubkey_t *pk, pubkey_list_t **head)
+static void install_public_key(pubkey_t *pk, pubkey_list_t **head)
 {
-    pubkey_list_t *p = alloc_thing(pubkey_list_t, "pubkey entry");
+	pubkey_list_t *p = malloc_thing(pubkey_list_t);
 
-    unshare_id_content(&pk->id);
+	unshare_id_content(&pk->id);
 
-    /* copy issuer dn */
-    if (pk->issuer.ptr != NULL)
-	pk->issuer.ptr = clone_bytes(pk->issuer.ptr, pk->issuer.len, "issuer dn");
+	/* copy issuer dn */
+	pk->issuer = chunk_clone(pk->issuer);
 
-    /* copy serial number */
-    if (pk->serial.ptr != NULL)
-	pk->serial.ptr = clone_bytes(pk->serial.ptr, pk->serial.len, "serialNumber");
+	/* copy serial number */
+	pk->serial = chunk_clone(pk->serial);
 
-    /* store the time the public key was installed */
-    time(&pk->installed_time);
+	/* store the time the public key was installed */
+	time(&pk->installed_time);
 
-    /* install new key at front */
-    p->key = reference_key(pk);
-    p->next = *head;
-    *head = p;
+	/* install new key at front */
+	p->key = reference_key(pk);
+	p->next = *head;
+	*head = p;
 }
 
-
-void
-delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, enum pubkey_alg alg
-, chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial)
+void delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, key_type_t type,
+						chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial)
 {
-    pubkey_list_t **pp, *p;
-    pubkey_t *pk;
-
-    for (pp = &pubkeys; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
-    {
-	pk = p->key;
-
-	if (same_id(id, &pk->id) && pk->alg == alg
-	&& (issuer.ptr == NULL || pk->issuer.ptr == NULL
-	    || same_dn(issuer, pk->issuer))
-	&& same_serial(serial, pk->serial))
-	    *pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
-	else
-	    pp = &p->next;
-    }
+	pubkey_list_t **pp, *p;
+	pubkey_t *pk;
+	key_type_t pk_type;
+
+	for (pp = &pubkeys; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	{
+		pk = p->key;
+		pk_type = pk->public_key->get_type(pk->public_key);
+
+		if (same_id(id, &pk->id) && pk_type == type
+		&& (issuer.ptr == NULL || pk->issuer.ptr == NULL
+			|| same_dn(issuer, pk->issuer))
+		&& same_serial(serial, pk->serial))
+		{
+			*pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			pp = &p->next;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
-pubkey_t *
-reference_key(pubkey_t *pk)
+pubkey_t* reference_key(pubkey_t *pk)
 {
-    pk->refcnt++;
-    return pk;
+	pk->refcnt++;
+	return pk;
 }
 
 void
 unreference_key(pubkey_t **pkp)
 {
-    pubkey_t *pk = *pkp;
-    char b[BUF_LEN];
+	pubkey_t *pk = *pkp;
+	char b[BUF_LEN];
 
-    if (pk == NULL)
-	return;
+	if (pk == NULL)
+	{
+		return;
+	}
 
-    /* print stuff */
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	idtoa(&pk->id, b, sizeof(b));
-	DBG_log("unreference key: %p %s cnt %d--", pk, b, pk->refcnt)
-    )
+	/* print stuff */
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		idtoa(&pk->id, b, sizeof(b));
+		DBG_log("unreference key: %p %s cnt %d--", pk, b, pk->refcnt)
+	)
 
-    /* cancel out the pointer */
-    *pkp = NULL;
+	/* cancel out the pointer */
+	*pkp = NULL;
 
-    passert(pk->refcnt != 0);
-    pk->refcnt--;
-    if (pk->refcnt == 0)
-	free_public_key(pk);
+	passert(pk->refcnt != 0);
+	pk->refcnt--;
+	if (pk->refcnt == 0)
+	{
+		free_public_key(pk);
+	}
 }
 
-err_t
-add_public_key(const struct id *id
-, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
-, enum pubkey_alg alg
-, const chunk_t *key
-, pubkey_list_t **head)
+bool add_public_key(const struct id *id, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level,
+					enum pubkey_alg alg, chunk_t rfc3110_key,
+					pubkey_list_t **head)
 {
-    pubkey_t *pk = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey");
+	public_key_t *key = NULL;
+	pubkey_t *pk;
 
-    /* first: algorithm-specific decoding of key chunk */
-    switch (alg)
-    {
-    case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+   /* first: algorithm-specific decoding of key chunk */
+	switch (alg)
 	{
-	    err_t ugh = unpack_RSA_public_key(&pk->u.rsa, key);
-
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		pfree(pk);
-		return ugh;
-	    }
+		case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+			key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PUBLIC_KEY, KEY_RSA,
+										BUILD_BLOB_RFC_3110, rfc3110_key,
+										BUILD_END);
+			if (key == NULL)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			bad_case(alg);
 	}
-	break;
-    default:
-	bad_case(alg);
-    }
-
-    pk->id = *id;
-    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
-    pk->alg = alg;
-    pk->until_time = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-    pk->issuer = empty_chunk;
-    pk->serial = empty_chunk;
-       
-    install_public_key(pk, head);
-    return NULL;
+
+	pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t);
+	zero(pk);
+	pk->public_key = key;
+	pk->id = *id;
+	pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+	pk->until_time = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	pk->issuer = chunk_empty;
+	pk->serial = chunk_empty;
+	install_public_key(pk, head);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /* extract id and public key from x.509 certificate and
  * insert it into a pubkeyrec
  */
-void
-add_x509_public_key(x509cert_t *cert , time_t until
-    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level)
+void add_x509_public_key(x509cert_t *cert , time_t until,
+						 enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level)
 {
-    generalName_t *gn;
-    pubkey_t *pk;
-    cert_t c = { CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert} };
-
-    /* we support RSA only */
-    if (cert->subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm != PUBKEY_ALG_RSA)
-	return;
-
-    /* ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN  (X.509 subject field) */
-    pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
-    pk->id.kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
-    pk->id.name = cert->subject;
-    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
-    pk->until_time = until;
-    pk->issuer = cert->issuer;
-    pk->serial = cert->serialNumber;
-    delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, pk->issuer, pk->serial);
-    install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
-
-    gn = cert->subjectAltName;
-
-    while (gn != NULL) /* insert all subjectAltNames */
-    {
-	struct id id = empty_id;
-
-	gntoid(&id, gn);
-	if (id.kind != ID_NONE)
+	generalName_t *gn;
+	pubkey_t *pk;
+	key_type_t pk_type;
+
+	/* ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN  (X.509 subject field) */
+	pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t);
+	zero(pk);
+	pk->public_key = cert->public_key->get_ref(cert->public_key);
+	pk->id.kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+	pk->id.name = cert->subject;
+	pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+	pk->until_time = until;
+	pk->issuer = cert->issuer;
+	pk->serial = cert->serialNumber;
+	pk_type = pk->public_key->get_type(pk->public_key);
+	delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk_type, pk->issuer, pk->serial);
+	install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+
+	gn = cert->subjectAltName;
+
+	while (gn != NULL) /* insert all subjectAltNames */
 	{
-	    pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
-	    pk->id = id;
-	    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
-	    pk->until_time = until;
-	    pk->issuer = cert->issuer;
-	    pk->serial = cert->serialNumber;
-	    delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, pk->issuer, pk->serial);
-	    install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+		struct id id = empty_id;
+
+		gntoid(&id, gn);
+		if (id.kind != ID_ANY)
+		{
+			pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t);
+			zero(pk);
+			pk->public_key = cert->public_key->get_ref(cert->public_key);
+			pk->id = id;
+			pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+			pk->until_time = until;
+			pk->issuer = cert->issuer;
+			pk->serial = cert->serialNumber;
+			delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk_type, pk->issuer, pk->serial);
+			install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+		}
+		gn = gn->next;
 	}
-	gn = gn->next;
-    }
 }
 
 /* extract id and public key from OpenPGP certificate and
  * insert it into a pubkeyrec
  */
-void
-add_pgp_public_key(pgpcert_t *cert , time_t until
-    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level)
+void add_pgp_public_key(pgpcert_t *cert , time_t until,
+						enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level)
 {
-    pubkey_t *pk;
-    cert_t c;
-
-    c.type = CERT_PGP;
-    c.u.pgp = cert;
-
-    /* we support RSA only */
-    if (cert->pubkeyAlg != PUBKEY_ALG_RSA)
-    {
-	plog("  RSA public keys supported only");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
-    pk->id.kind = ID_KEY_ID;
-    pk->id.name.ptr = cert->fingerprint;
-    pk->id.name.len = PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE;
-    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
-    pk->until_time = until;
-    delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, empty_chunk, empty_chunk);
-    install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+	pubkey_t *pk;
+	key_type_t pk_type;
+
+	pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t);
+	zero(pk);
+	pk->public_key = cert->public_key->get_ref(cert->public_key);
+	pk->id.kind = ID_KEY_ID;
+	pk->id.name = cert->fingerprint->get_encoding(cert->fingerprint);
+	pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+	pk->until_time = until;
+	pk_type = pk->public_key->get_type(pk->public_key);
+	delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk_type, chunk_empty, chunk_empty);
+	install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
 }
 
 /*  when a X.509 certificate gets revoked, all instances of
  *  the corresponding public key must be removed
  */
-void
-remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
+void remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    const cert_t c = {CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {(x509cert_t*)cert}};
-    pubkey_list_t *p, **pp;
-    pubkey_t *revoked_pk;
+	public_key_t *revoked_key = cert->public_key;
+	pubkey_list_t *p, **pp;
 
-    revoked_pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
-    p          = pubkeys;
-    pp         = &pubkeys;
+	p  = pubkeys;
+	pp = &pubkeys;
 
-    while(p != NULL)
-   {
-	if (same_RSA_public_key(&p->key->u.rsa, &revoked_pk->u.rsa))
-	{
-	    /* remove p from list and free memory */
-	    *pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-		"invalid RSA public key deleted");
-	}
-	else
+	while(p != NULL)
 	{
-	    pp = &p->next;
+		if (revoked_key->equals(revoked_key, p->key->public_key))
+		{
+			/* remove p from list and free memory */
+			*pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid public key deleted");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			pp = &p->next;
+		}
+		p =*pp;
 	}
-	p =*pp;
-    }
-    free_public_key(revoked_pk);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1504,45 +1419,41 @@ remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
  */
 void list_public_keys(bool utc)
 {
-    pubkey_list_t *p = pubkeys;
-
-    if (p != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Public Keys:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
+	pubkey_list_t *p = pubkeys;
 
-    while (p != NULL)
-    {
-	pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+	if (p != NULL)
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Public Keys:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	}
 
-	if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA)
+	while (p != NULL)
 	{
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	    char expires_buf[TIMETOA_BUF];
-
-	    idtoa(&key->id, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    strcpy(expires_buf, timetoa(&key->until_time, utc));
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, %4d RSA Key %s, until %s %s",
-
-		timetoa(&key->installed_time, utc), 8*key->u.rsa.k, key->u.rsa.keyid,
-		expires_buf,
-		check_expiry(key->until_time, PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       %s '%s'",
-		enum_show(&ident_names, key->id.kind), buf);
-	    if (key->issuer.len > 0)
-	    {
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, key->issuer);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       issuer: '%s'", buf);
-	    }
-	    if (key->serial.len > 0)
-	    {
-		datatot(key->serial.ptr, key->serial.len, ':'
-			, buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       serial:  %s", buf);
-	    }
+		pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+		public_key_t *public = key->public_key;
+		identification_t *keyid = public->get_id(public, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1);
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+		idtoa(&key->id, buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"%T, '%s'", &key->installed_time, utc, buf);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:  %N %4d bits, until %T %s",
+			key_type_names, public->get_type(public),
+			public->get_keysize(public) * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+			&key->until_time, utc,
+			check_expiry(key->until_time, PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       keyid:   %Y", keyid);
+		if (key->issuer.len > 0)
+		{
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, key->issuer);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       issuer: '%s'", buf);
+		}
+		if (key->serial.len > 0)
+		{
+			datatot(key->serial.ptr, key->serial.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       serial:  %s", buf);
+		}
+		p = p->next;
 	}
-	p = p->next;
-    }
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/keys.h b/src/pluto/keys.h
index b06e536a5..8bc94d839 100644
--- a/src/pluto/keys.h
+++ b/src/pluto/keys.h
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* mechanisms for preshared keys (public, private, and preshared secrets)
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen, Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,16 +11,14 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: keys.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _KEYS_H
 #define _KEYS_H
 
-#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU Multi-Precision library */
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
 
-#include "pkcs1.h"
 #include "certs.h"
 
 #ifndef SHARED_SECRETS_FILE
@@ -32,11 +31,10 @@ extern void load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd);
 extern void free_preshared_secrets(void);
 
 enum PrivateKeyKind {
-    PPK_PSK,
- /* PPK_DSS, */	/* not implemented */
-    PPK_RSA,
-    PPK_XAUTH,
-    PPK_PIN
+	PPK_PSK,
+	PPK_PUBKEY,
+	PPK_XAUTH,
+	PPK_PIN
 };
 
 extern void xauth_defaults(void);
@@ -45,69 +43,64 @@ extern void xauth_defaults(void);
 struct connection;
 
 extern const chunk_t *get_preshared_secret(const struct connection *c);
-extern err_t unpack_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, const chunk_t *pubkey);
-extern const RSA_private_key_t *get_RSA_private_key(const struct connection *c);
-extern const RSA_private_key_t *get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert);
+extern private_key_t *get_private_key(const struct connection *c);
+extern private_key_t *get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert);
 
 /* public key machinery  */
 
 typedef struct pubkey pubkey_t;
 
 struct pubkey {
-    struct id id;
-    unsigned refcnt;	/* reference counted! */
-    enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level;
-    char *dns_sig;
-    time_t installed_time
-	, last_tried_time
-	, last_worked_time
-	, until_time;
-    chunk_t issuer;
-    chunk_t serial;
-    enum pubkey_alg alg;
-    union {
-	RSA_public_key_t rsa;
-    } u;
+	struct id id;
+	unsigned refcnt;    /* reference counted! */
+	enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level;
+	char *dns_sig;
+	time_t installed_time
+		, last_tried_time
+		, last_worked_time
+		, until_time;
+	chunk_t issuer;
+	chunk_t serial;
+	public_key_t *public_key;
 };
 
 typedef struct pubkey_list pubkey_list_t;
 
 struct pubkey_list {
-    pubkey_t *key;
-    pubkey_list_t *next;
+	pubkey_t *key;
+	pubkey_list_t *next;
 };
 
-extern pubkey_list_t *pubkeys;	/* keys from ipsec.conf or from certs */
+extern pubkey_list_t *pubkeys;  /* keys from ipsec.conf or from certs */
 
-extern pubkey_t *public_key_from_rsa(const RSA_public_key_t *k);
+extern pubkey_t *public_key_from_rsa(public_key_t *key);
 extern pubkey_list_t *free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p);
 extern void free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys);
 extern void free_remembered_public_keys(void);
-extern void delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, enum pubkey_alg alg
-    , chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial);
-
+extern void delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, key_type_t type,
+							   chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial);
 extern pubkey_t *reference_key(pubkey_t *pk);
 extern void unreference_key(pubkey_t **pkp);
 
-extern err_t add_public_key(const struct id *id
-    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
-    , enum pubkey_alg alg
-    , const chunk_t *key
-    , pubkey_list_t **head);
+extern bool add_public_key(const struct id *id,
+						   enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level,
+						   enum pubkey_alg alg,
+						   chunk_t rfc3110_key,
+						   pubkey_list_t **head);
 
 extern bool has_private_key(cert_t cert);
 extern void add_x509_public_key(x509cert_t *cert, time_t until
-    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level);
+	, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level);
 extern void add_pgp_public_key(pgpcert_t *cert, time_t until
-    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level);
+	, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level);
 extern void remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert);
 extern void list_public_keys(bool utc);
 
-struct gw_info;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in dnskey.h) */
+struct gw_info; /* forward declaration of tag (defined in dnskey.h) */
 extern void transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    , pubkey_list_t **keys
+	, pubkey_list_t **keys
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-    );
+	);
 
 #endif /* _KEYS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/lex.c b/src/pluto/lex.c
index 08ab43876..f48d24a54 100644
--- a/src/pluto/lex.c
+++ b/src/pluto/lex.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: lex.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 #include "lex.h"
 
 struct file_lex_position *flp = NULL;
@@ -39,36 +37,36 @@ struct file_lex_position *flp = NULL;
 bool
 lexopen(struct file_lex_position *new_flp, const char *name, bool optional)
 {
-    FILE *f = fopen(name, "r");
-
-    if (f == NULL)
-    {
-	if (!optional || errno != ENOENT)
-	    log_errno((e, "could not open \"%s\"", name));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	new_flp->previous = flp;
-	flp = new_flp;
-	flp->filename = name;
-	flp->fp = f;
-	flp->lino = 0;
-	flp->bdry = B_none;
-
-	flp->cur = flp->buffer;	/* nothing loaded yet */
-	flp->under = *flp->cur = '\0';
-
-	(void) shift();	/* prime tok */
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	FILE *f = fopen(name, "r");
+
+	if (f == NULL)
+	{
+		if (!optional || errno != ENOENT)
+			log_errno((e, "could not open \"%s\"", name));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		new_flp->previous = flp;
+		flp = new_flp;
+		flp->filename = name;
+		flp->fp = f;
+		flp->lino = 0;
+		flp->bdry = B_none;
+
+		flp->cur = flp->buffer; /* nothing loaded yet */
+		flp->under = *flp->cur = '\0';
+
+		(void) shift(); /* prime tok */
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 void
 lexclose(void)
 {
-    fclose(flp->fp);
-    flp = flp->previous;
+	fclose(flp->fp);
+	flp = flp->previous;
 }
 
 /* Token decoding: shift() loads the next token into tok.
@@ -88,110 +86,110 @@ char *tok;
 bool
 shift(void)
 {
-    char *p = flp->cur;
-    char *sor = NULL;	/* start of record for any new lines */
+	char *p = flp->cur;
+	char *sor = NULL;   /* start of record for any new lines */
 
-    passert(flp->bdry == B_none);
+	passert(flp->bdry == B_none);
 
-    *p = flp->under;
-    flp->under = '\0';
+	*p = flp->under;
+	flp->under = '\0';
 
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	switch (*p)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	case '\0':	/* end of line */
-	case '#':	/* comment to end of line: treat as end of line */
-	    /* get the next line */
-	    if (fgets(flp->buffer, sizeof(flp->buffer)-1, flp->fp) == NULL)
-	    {
-		flp->bdry = B_file;
-		tok = flp->cur = NULL;
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* strip trailing whitespace, including \n */
-
-		for (p = flp->buffer+strlen(flp->buffer)-1
-		; p>flp->buffer && isspace(p[-1]); p--)
-		    ;
-		*p = '\0';
-
-		flp->lino++;
-		sor = p = flp->buffer;
-	    }
-	    break;	/* try again for a token */
-
-	case ' ':	/* whitespace */
-	case '\t':
-	    p++;
-	    break;	/* try again for a token */
-
-	case '"':	/* quoted token */
-	case '\'':
-	    if (p != sor)
-	    {
-		/* we have a quoted token: note and advance to its end */
-		tok = p;
-		p = strchr(p+1, *p);
-		if (p == NULL)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unterminated string"
-			, flp->filename, flp->lino);
-		    p = tok + strlen(tok);
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    p++;	/* include delimiter in token */
-		}
-
-		/* remember token delimiter and replace with '\0' */
-		flp->under = *p;
-		*p = '\0';
-		flp->cur = p;
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-	    /* FALL THROUGH */
-	default:
-	    if (p != sor)
-	    {
-		/* we seem to have a token: note and advance to its end */
-		tok = p;
-
-		if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 't')
+		switch (*p)
 		{
-		    /* 0t... token goes to end of line */
-		    p += strlen(p);
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    /* "ordinary" token: up to whitespace or end of line */
-		    do {
+		case '\0':      /* end of line */
+		case '#':       /* comment to end of line: treat as end of line */
+			/* get the next line */
+			if (fgets(flp->buffer, sizeof(flp->buffer)-1, flp->fp) == NULL)
+			{
+				flp->bdry = B_file;
+				tok = flp->cur = NULL;
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* strip trailing whitespace, including \n */
+
+				for (p = flp->buffer+strlen(flp->buffer)-1
+				; p>flp->buffer && isspace(p[-1]); p--)
+					;
+				*p = '\0';
+
+				flp->lino++;
+				sor = p = flp->buffer;
+			}
+			break;      /* try again for a token */
+
+		case ' ':       /* whitespace */
+		case '\t':
 			p++;
-		    } while (*p != '\0' && !isspace(*p))
-			;
-
-		    /* fudge to separate ':' from a preceding adjacent token */
-		    if (p-1 > tok && p[-1] == ':')
-			p--;
+			break;      /* try again for a token */
+
+		case '"':       /* quoted token */
+		case '\'':
+			if (p != sor)
+			{
+				/* we have a quoted token: note and advance to its end */
+				tok = p;
+				p = strchr(p+1, *p);
+				if (p == NULL)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unterminated string"
+						, flp->filename, flp->lino);
+					p = tok + strlen(tok);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					p++;        /* include delimiter in token */
+				}
+
+				/* remember token delimiter and replace with '\0' */
+				flp->under = *p;
+				*p = '\0';
+				flp->cur = p;
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+			/* FALL THROUGH */
+		default:
+			if (p != sor)
+			{
+				/* we seem to have a token: note and advance to its end */
+				tok = p;
+
+				if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 't')
+				{
+					/* 0t... token goes to end of line */
+					p += strlen(p);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* "ordinary" token: up to whitespace or end of line */
+					do {
+						p++;
+					} while (*p != '\0' && !isspace(*p))
+						;
+
+					/* fudge to separate ':' from a preceding adjacent token */
+					if (p-1 > tok && p[-1] == ':')
+						p--;
+				}
+
+				/* remember token delimiter and replace with '\0' */
+				flp->under = *p;
+				*p = '\0';
+				flp->cur = p;
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+
+			/* we have a start-of-record: return it, deferring "real" token */
+			flp->bdry = B_record;
+			tok = NULL;
+			flp->under = *p;
+			flp->cur = p;
+			return FALSE;
 		}
-
-		/* remember token delimiter and replace with '\0' */
-		flp->under = *p;
-		*p = '\0';
-		flp->cur = p;
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
-
-	    /* we have a start-of-record: return it, deferring "real" token */
-	    flp->bdry = B_record;
-	    tok = NULL;
-	    flp->under = *p;
-	    flp->cur = p;
-	    return FALSE;
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* ensures we are at a Record (or File) boundary, optionally warning if not */
@@ -199,15 +197,15 @@ shift(void)
 bool
 flushline(const char *m)
 {
-    if (flp->bdry != B_none)
-    {
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	if (m != NULL)
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s", flp->filename, flp->lino, m);
-	do ; while (shift());
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (flp->bdry != B_none)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (m != NULL)
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s", flp->filename, flp->lino, m);
+		do ; while (shift());
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/lex.h b/src/pluto/lex.h
index 450149c64..f16769144 100644
--- a/src/pluto/lex.h
+++ b/src/pluto/lex.h
@@ -10,22 +10,20 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: lex.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #define MAX_TOK_LEN 2048    /* includes terminal '\0' */
 struct file_lex_position
 {
-    int depth;	/* how deeply we are nested */
-    const char *filename;
-    FILE *fp;
-    enum { B_none, B_record, B_file } bdry;	/* current boundary */
-    int lino;	/* line number in file */
-    char buffer[MAX_TOK_LEN + 1];    /* note: one extra char for our use (jamming '"') */
-    char *cur;	/* cursor */
-    char under;	/* except in shift(): character orignally at *cur */
-    struct file_lex_position *previous;
+	int depth;  /* how deeply we are nested */
+	const char *filename;
+	FILE *fp;
+	enum { B_none, B_record, B_file } bdry;     /* current boundary */
+	int lino;   /* line number in file */
+	char buffer[MAX_TOK_LEN + 1];    /* note: one extra char for our use (jamming '"') */
+	char *cur;  /* cursor */
+	char under; /* except in shift(): character orignally at *cur */
+	struct file_lex_position *previous;
 };
 
 extern struct file_lex_position *flp;
diff --git a/src/pluto/log.c b/src/pluto/log.c
index b7c1ba8b8..e34409f1c 100644
--- a/src/pluto/log.c
+++ b/src/pluto/log.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* error logging functions
  * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001 D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: log.c 4246 2008-08-03 18:01:21Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -23,13 +22,15 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
-#include <signal.h>	/* used only if MSG_NOSIGNAL not defined */
+#include <signal.h>     /* used only if MSG_NOSIGNAL not defined */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 #include <libgen.h>
 #include <sys/stat.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
+#include <library.h>
+#include <debug.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -38,27 +39,27 @@
 #include "state.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "kernel.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* needs connections.h */
+#include "whack.h"      /* needs connections.h */
 #include "timer.h"
 
 /* close one per-peer log */
-static void perpeer_logclose(struct connection *c);	/* forward */
+static void perpeer_logclose(struct connection *c);     /* forward */
 
 
 bool
-    log_to_stderr = TRUE,	/* should log go to stderr? */
-    log_to_syslog = TRUE,	/* should log go to syslog? */
-    log_to_perpeer= FALSE;	/* should log go to per-IP file? */
+	log_to_stderr = TRUE,       /* should log go to stderr? */
+	log_to_syslog = TRUE,       /* should log go to syslog? */
+	log_to_perpeer= FALSE;      /* should log go to per-IP file? */
 
 bool
-    logged_txt_warning = FALSE;  /* should we complain about finding KEY? */
+	logged_txt_warning = FALSE;  /* should we complain about finding KEY? */
 
 /* should we complain when we find no local id */
 bool
-    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = FALSE,
-    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning   = FALSE,
-    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = FALSE,
-    logged_myid_ip_key_warning   = FALSE;
+	logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = FALSE,
+	logged_myid_ip_txt_warning   = FALSE,
+	logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = FALSE,
+	logged_myid_ip_key_warning   = FALSE;
 
 /* may include trailing / */
 const char *base_perpeer_logdir = PERPEERLOGDIR;
@@ -74,42 +75,110 @@ static TAILQ_HEAD(perpeer, connection) perpeer_list;
  * If the context provides a whack file descriptor, messages
  * should be copied to it -- see whack_log()
  */
-int whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;	/* only set during whack_handle() */
-struct state *cur_state = NULL;	/* current state, for diagnostics */
-struct connection *cur_connection = NULL;	/* current connection, for diagnostics */
-const ip_address *cur_from = NULL;	/* source of current current message */
-u_int16_t cur_from_port;	/* host order */
+int whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;     /* only set during whack_handle() */
+struct state *cur_state = NULL; /* current state, for diagnostics */
+struct connection *cur_connection = NULL;       /* current connection, for diagnostics */
+const ip_address *cur_from = NULL;      /* source of current current message */
+u_int16_t cur_from_port;        /* host order */
+
+/**
+ * pluto dbg function for libstrongswan
+ */
+static void pluto_dbg(int level, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+	int priority = LOG_INFO;
+	int debug_level;
+	char buffer[8192];
+	char *current = buffer, *next;
+	va_list args;
+
+	if (cur_debugging & DBG_PRIVATE)
+	{
+		debug_level = 4;
+	}
+	else if (cur_debugging & DBG_RAW)
+	{
+		debug_level = 3;
+	}	
+	else if (cur_debugging & DBG_PARSING)
+	{
+		debug_level = 2;
+	}
+	else 
+	{
+		debug_level = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (level <= debug_level)
+	{
+		va_start(args, fmt);
+
+		if (log_to_stderr)
+		{
+			if (level > 1)
+			{
+				fprintf(stderr, "| ");
+			}
+			vfprintf(stderr, fmt, args);
+			fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+		}
+		if (log_to_syslog)
+		{
+			/* write in memory buffer first */
+			vsnprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), fmt, args);
+
+			/* do a syslog with every line */
+			while (current)
+			{
+				next = strchr(current, '\n');
+				if (next)
+				{
+					*(next++) = '\0';
+				}
+				syslog(priority, "%s%s\n", (level > 1)? "| ":"", current);
+				current = next;
+			}
+		}
+		va_end(args);
+	}
+}
 
 void
 init_log(const char *program)
 {
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	setbuf(stderr, NULL);
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	openlog(program, LOG_CONS | LOG_NDELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+	/* enable pluto debugging hook for libstrongswan */
+	dbg = pluto_dbg;
 
-    TAILQ_INIT(&perpeer_list);
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+	{
+		setbuf(stderr, NULL);
+	}
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+	{
+		openlog(program, LOG_CONS | LOG_NDELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+	}
+	TAILQ_INIT(&perpeer_list);
 }
 
 void
 close_peerlog(void)
 {
-    /* exit if the queue has not been initialized */
-    if (perpeer_list.tqh_first == NULL)
-      return;
+	/* exit if the queue has not been initialized */
+	if (perpeer_list.tqh_first == NULL)
+	  return;
 
-    /* end of queue is given by pointer to "HEAD" */
-    while (TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer) != (void *)&perpeer_list)
-       perpeer_logclose(TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer));
+	/* end of queue is given by pointer to "HEAD" */
+	while (TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer) != (void *)&perpeer_list)
+	   perpeer_logclose(TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer));
 }
 
 void
 close_log(void)
 {
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	closelog();
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		closelog();
 
-    close_peerlog();
+	close_peerlog();
 }
 
 /* Sanitize character string in situ: turns dangerous characters into \OOO.
@@ -120,50 +189,50 @@ close_log(void)
 static size_t
 sanitize(char *buf, size_t size)
 {
-#   define UGLY_WIDTH	4	/* width for ugly character: \OOO */
-    size_t len;
-    size_t added = 0;
-    char *p;
-
-    passert(size >= UGLY_WIDTH);	/* need room to swing cat */
-
-    /* find right side of string to be sanitized and count
-     * number of columns to be added.  Stop on end of string
-     * or lack of room for more result.
-     */
-    for (p = buf; *p != '\0' && &p[added] < &buf[size - UGLY_WIDTH]; )
-    {
-	unsigned char c = *p++;
-
-	if (c == '\\' || !isprint(c))
-	    added += UGLY_WIDTH - 1;
-    }
-
-    /* at this point, p points after last original character to be
-     * included.  added is how many characters are added to sanitize.
-     * so p[added] will point after last sanitized character.
-     */
-
-    p[added] = '\0';
-    len = &p[added] - buf;
-
-    /* scan backwards, copying characters to their new home
-     * and inserting the expansions for ugly characters.
-     * It is finished when no more shifting is required.
-     * This is a predecrement loop.
-     */
-    while (added != 0)
-    {
-	char fmtd[UGLY_WIDTH + 1];
-	unsigned char c;
-
-	while ((c = *--p) != '\\' && isprint(c))
-	    p[added] = c;
-	added -= UGLY_WIDTH - 1;
-	snprintf(fmtd, sizeof(fmtd), "\\%03o", c);
-	memcpy(p + added, fmtd, UGLY_WIDTH);
-    }
-    return len;
+#   define UGLY_WIDTH   4       /* width for ugly character: \OOO */
+	size_t len;
+	size_t added = 0;
+	char *p;
+
+	passert(size >= UGLY_WIDTH);        /* need room to swing cat */
+
+	/* find right side of string to be sanitized and count
+	 * number of columns to be added.  Stop on end of string
+	 * or lack of room for more result.
+	 */
+	for (p = buf; *p != '\0' && &p[added] < &buf[size - UGLY_WIDTH]; )
+	{
+		unsigned char c = *p++;
+
+		if (c == '\\' || !isprint(c))
+			added += UGLY_WIDTH - 1;
+	}
+
+	/* at this point, p points after last original character to be
+	 * included.  added is how many characters are added to sanitize.
+	 * so p[added] will point after last sanitized character.
+	 */
+
+	p[added] = '\0';
+	len = &p[added] - buf;
+
+	/* scan backwards, copying characters to their new home
+	 * and inserting the expansions for ugly characters.
+	 * It is finished when no more shifting is required.
+	 * This is a predecrement loop.
+	 */
+	while (added != 0)
+	{
+		char fmtd[UGLY_WIDTH + 1];
+		unsigned char c;
+
+		while ((c = *--p) != '\\' && isprint(c))
+			p[added] = c;
+		added -= UGLY_WIDTH - 1;
+		snprintf(fmtd, sizeof(fmtd), "\\%03o", c);
+		memcpy(p + added, fmtd, UGLY_WIDTH);
+	}
+	return len;
 #   undef UGLY_WIDTH
 }
 
@@ -174,349 +243,348 @@ sanitize(char *buf, size_t size)
 static void
 fmt_log(char *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
 {
-    bool reproc = *fmt == '~';
-    size_t ps;
-    struct connection *c = cur_state != NULL ? cur_state->st_connection
-	: cur_connection;
-
-    buf[0] = '\0';
-    if (reproc)
-	fmt++;	/* ~ at start of format suppresses this prefix */
-    else if (c != NULL)
-    {
-	/* start with name of connection */
-	char *const be = buf + buf_len;
-	char *bp = buf;
-
-	snprintf(bp, be - bp, "\"%s\"", c->name);
-	bp += strlen(bp);
-
-	/* if it fits, put in any connection instance information */
-	if (be - bp > CONN_INST_BUF)
+	bool reproc = *fmt == '~';
+	size_t ps;
+	struct connection *c = cur_state != NULL ? cur_state->st_connection
+		: cur_connection;
+
+	buf[0] = '\0';
+	if (reproc)
+		fmt++;  /* ~ at start of format suppresses this prefix */
+	else if (c != NULL)
 	{
-	    fmt_conn_instance(c, bp);
-	    bp += strlen(bp);
-	}
+		/* start with name of connection */
+		char *const be = buf + buf_len;
+		char *bp = buf;
+
+		snprintf(bp, be - bp, "\"%s\"", c->name);
+		bp += strlen(bp);
+
+		/* if it fits, put in any connection instance information */
+		if (be - bp > CONN_INST_BUF)
+		{
+			fmt_conn_instance(c, bp);
+			bp += strlen(bp);
+		}
 
-	if (cur_state != NULL)
+		if (cur_state != NULL)
+		{
+			/* state number */
+			snprintf(bp, be - bp, " #%lu", cur_state->st_serialno);
+			bp += strlen(bp);
+		}
+		snprintf(bp, be - bp, ": ");
+	}
+	else if (cur_from != NULL)
 	{
-	    /* state number */
-	    snprintf(bp, be - bp, " #%lu", cur_state->st_serialno);
-	    bp += strlen(bp);
+		/* peer's IP address */
+		/* Note: must not use ip_str() because our caller might! */
+		char ab[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+		(void) addrtot(cur_from, 0, ab, sizeof(ab));
+		snprintf(buf, buf_len, "packet from %s:%u: "
+			, ab, (unsigned)cur_from_port);
 	}
-	snprintf(bp, be - bp, ": ");
-    }
-    else if (cur_from != NULL)
-    {
-	/* peer's IP address */
-	/* Note: must not use ip_str() because our caller might! */
-	char ab[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-
-	(void) addrtot(cur_from, 0, ab, sizeof(ab));
-	snprintf(buf, buf_len, "packet from %s:%u: "
-	    , ab, (unsigned)cur_from_port);
-    }
-
-    ps = strlen(buf);
-    vsnprintf(buf + ps, buf_len - ps, fmt, ap);
-    if (!reproc)
-	(void)sanitize(buf, buf_len);
+
+	ps = strlen(buf);
+	vsnprintf(buf + ps, buf_len - ps, fmt, ap);
+	if (!reproc)
+		(void)sanitize(buf, buf_len);
 }
 
 static void
 perpeer_logclose(struct connection *c)
 {
-    /* only free/close things if we had used them! */
-    if (c->log_file != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(perpeer_count > 0);
-
-	TAILQ_REMOVE(&perpeer_list, c, log_link);
-	perpeer_count--;
-	fclose(c->log_file);
-	c->log_file=NULL;
-    }
+	/* only free/close things if we had used them! */
+	if (c->log_file != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(perpeer_count > 0);
+
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&perpeer_list, c, log_link);
+		perpeer_count--;
+		fclose(c->log_file);
+		c->log_file=NULL;
+	}
 }
 
 void
 perpeer_logfree(struct connection *c)
 {
-    perpeer_logclose(c);
-    if (c->log_file_name != NULL)
-    {
-	pfree(c->log_file_name);
-	c->log_file_name = NULL;
-	c->log_file_err = FALSE;
-    }
+	perpeer_logclose(c);
+	if (c->log_file_name != NULL)
+	{
+		free(c->log_file_name);
+		c->log_file_name = NULL;
+		c->log_file_err = FALSE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* open the per-peer log */
 static void
 open_peerlog(struct connection *c)
 {
-    syslog(LOG_INFO, "opening log file for conn %s", c->name);
+	syslog(LOG_INFO, "opening log file for conn %s", c->name);
 
-    if (c->log_file_name == NULL)
-    {
-	char peername[ADDRTOT_BUF], dname[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	int  peernamelen, lf_len;
-
-	addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 'Q', peername, sizeof(peername));
-	peernamelen = strlen(peername);
-
-	/* copy IP address, turning : and . into / */
+	if (c->log_file_name == NULL)
 	{
-	    char c, *p, *q;
-
-	    p = peername;
-	    q = dname;
-	    do {
-		c = *p++;
-		if (c == '.' || c == ':')
-		    c = '/';
-		*q++ = c;
-	    } while (c != '\0');
-	}
-
-	lf_len = peernamelen * 2
-	    + strlen(base_perpeer_logdir)
-	    + sizeof("//.log")
-	    + 1;
-	c->log_file_name = alloc_bytes(lf_len, "per-peer log file name");
-
-	fprintf(stderr, "base dir |%s| dname |%s| peername |%s|"
-		, base_perpeer_logdir, dname, peername);
-	snprintf(c->log_file_name, lf_len, "%s/%s/%s.log"
-		 , base_perpeer_logdir, dname, peername);
+		char peername[ADDRTOT_BUF], dname[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+		int  peernamelen, lf_len;
 
-	syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "conn %s logfile is %s", c->name, c->log_file_name);
-    }
+		addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 'Q', peername, sizeof(peername));
+		peernamelen = strlen(peername);
 
-    /* now open the file, creating directories if necessary */
-
-    {  /* create the directory */
-	char *dname;
-	int   bpl_len = strlen(base_perpeer_logdir);
-	char *slashloc;
-
-	dname = clone_str(c->log_file_name, "temp copy of file name");
-	dname = dirname(dname);
-
-	if (access(dname, W_OK) != 0)
-	{
-	    if (errno != ENOENT)
-	    {
-		if (c->log_file_err)
+		/* copy IP address, turning : and . into / */
 		{
-		    syslog(LOG_CRIT, "can not write to %s: %s"
-			   , dname, strerror(errno));
-		    c->log_file_err = TRUE;
-		    pfree(dname);
-		    return;
+			char c, *p, *q;
+
+			p = peername;
+			q = dname;
+			do {
+				c = *p++;
+				if (c == '.' || c == ':')
+					c = '/';
+				*q++ = c;
+			} while (c != '\0');
 		}
-	    }
 
-	    /* directory does not exist, walk path creating dirs */
-	    /* start at base_perpeer_logdir */
-	    slashloc = dname + bpl_len;
-	    slashloc++;    /* since, by construction there is a slash
-			      right there */
+		lf_len = peernamelen * 2
+			+ strlen(base_perpeer_logdir)
+			+ sizeof("//.log")
+			+ 1;
+		c->log_file_name = malloc(lf_len);
+
+		fprintf(stderr, "base dir |%s| dname |%s| peername |%s|"
+				, base_perpeer_logdir, dname, peername);
+		snprintf(c->log_file_name, lf_len, "%s/%s/%s.log"
+				 , base_perpeer_logdir, dname, peername);
 
-	    while (*slashloc != '\0')
-	    {
-		char saveslash;
+		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "conn %s logfile is %s", c->name, c->log_file_name);
+	}
 
-		/* look for next slash */
-		while (*slashloc != '\0' && *slashloc != '/') slashloc++;
+	/* now open the file, creating directories if necessary */
 
-		saveslash = *slashloc;
+	{  /* create the directory */
+		char *dname;
+		int   bpl_len = strlen(base_perpeer_logdir);
+		char *slashloc;
 
-		*slashloc = '\0';
+		dname = clone_str(c->log_file_name);
+		dname = dirname(dname);
 
-		if (mkdir(dname, 0750) != 0 && errno != EEXIST)
+		if (access(dname, W_OK) != 0)
 		{
-		    syslog(LOG_CRIT, "can not create dir %s: %s"
-			   , dname, strerror(errno));
-		    c->log_file_err = TRUE;
-		    pfree(dname);
-		    return;
+			if (errno != ENOENT)
+			{
+				if (c->log_file_err)
+				{
+					syslog(LOG_CRIT, "can not write to %s: %s"
+						   , dname, strerror(errno));
+					c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+					free(dname);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+
+			/* directory does not exist, walk path creating dirs */
+			/* start at base_perpeer_logdir */
+			slashloc = dname + bpl_len;
+			slashloc++;    /* since, by construction there is a slash
+							  right there */
+
+			while (*slashloc != '\0')
+			{
+				char saveslash;
+
+				/* look for next slash */
+				while (*slashloc != '\0' && *slashloc != '/') slashloc++;
+
+				saveslash = *slashloc;
+
+				*slashloc = '\0';
+
+				if (mkdir(dname, 0750) != 0 && errno != EEXIST)
+				{
+					syslog(LOG_CRIT, "can not create dir %s: %s"
+						   , dname, strerror(errno));
+					c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+					free(dname);
+					return;
+				}
+				syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "created new directory %s", dname);
+				*slashloc = saveslash;
+				slashloc++;
+			}
 		}
-		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "created new directory %s", dname);
-		*slashloc = saveslash;
-		slashloc++;
-	    }
+		free(dname);
 	}
 
-	pfree(dname);
-    }
+	c->log_file = fopen(c->log_file_name, "a");
+	if (c->log_file == NULL)
+	{
+		if (c->log_file_err)
+		{
+			syslog(LOG_CRIT, "logging system can not open %s: %s"
+				   , c->log_file_name, strerror(errno));
+			c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+		}
+		return;
+	}
 
-    c->log_file = fopen(c->log_file_name, "a");
-    if (c->log_file == NULL)
-    {
-	if (c->log_file_err)
+	/* look for a connection to close! */
+	while (perpeer_count >= MAX_PEERLOG_COUNT)
 	{
-	    syslog(LOG_CRIT, "logging system can not open %s: %s"
-		   , c->log_file_name, strerror(errno));
-	    c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+		/* can not be NULL because perpeer_count > 0 */
+		passert(TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer) != (void *)&perpeer_list);
+
+		perpeer_logclose(TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer));
 	}
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* look for a connection to close! */
-    while (perpeer_count >= MAX_PEERLOG_COUNT)
-    {
-	/* can not be NULL because perpeer_count > 0 */
-	passert(TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer) != (void *)&perpeer_list);
-
-	perpeer_logclose(TAILQ_LAST(&perpeer_list, perpeer));
-    }
-
-    /* insert this into the list */
-    TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&perpeer_list, c, log_link);
-    passert(c->log_file != NULL);
-    perpeer_count++;
+
+	/* insert this into the list */
+	TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&perpeer_list, c, log_link);
+	passert(c->log_file != NULL);
+	perpeer_count++;
 }
 
 /* log a line to cur_connection's log */
 static void
 peerlog(const char *prefix, const char *m)
 {
-    if (cur_connection == NULL)
-    {
-	/* we can not log it in this case. Oh well. */
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (cur_connection->log_file == NULL)
-    {
-	open_peerlog(cur_connection);
-    }
-
-    /* despite our attempts above, we may not be able to open the file. */
-    if (cur_connection->log_file != NULL)
-    {
-	char datebuf[32];
-	time_t n;
-	struct tm *t;
-
-	time(&n);
-	t = localtime(&n);
-
-	strftime(datebuf, sizeof(datebuf), "%Y-%m-%d %T", t);
-	fprintf(cur_connection->log_file, "%s %s%s\n", datebuf, prefix, m);
-
-	/* now move it to the front of the list */
-	TAILQ_REMOVE(&perpeer_list, cur_connection, log_link);
-	TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&perpeer_list, cur_connection, log_link);
-    }
+	if (cur_connection == NULL)
+	{
+		/* we can not log it in this case. Oh well. */
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (cur_connection->log_file == NULL)
+	{
+		open_peerlog(cur_connection);
+	}
+
+	/* despite our attempts above, we may not be able to open the file. */
+	if (cur_connection->log_file != NULL)
+	{
+		char datebuf[32];
+		time_t n;
+		struct tm *t;
+
+		time(&n);
+		t = localtime(&n);
+
+		strftime(datebuf, sizeof(datebuf), "%Y-%m-%d %T", t);
+		fprintf(cur_connection->log_file, "%s %s%s\n", datebuf, prefix, m);
+
+		/* now move it to the front of the list */
+		TAILQ_REMOVE(&perpeer_list, cur_connection, log_link);
+		TAILQ_INSERT_HEAD(&perpeer_list, cur_connection, log_link);
+	}
 }
 
 void
 plog(const char *message, ...)
 {
-    va_list args;
-    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
 
-    va_start(args, message);
-    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
-    va_end(args);
+	va_start(args, message);
+	fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+	va_end(args);
 
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m);
-    if (log_to_perpeer)
-	peerlog("", m);
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m);
+	if (log_to_perpeer)
+		peerlog("", m);
 
-    whack_log(RC_LOG, "~%s", m);
+	whack_log(RC_LOG, "~%s", m);
 }
 
 void
 loglog(int mess_no, const char *message, ...)
 {
-    va_list args;
-    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
 
-    va_start(args, message);
-    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
-    va_end(args);
+	va_start(args, message);
+	fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+	va_end(args);
 
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m);
-    if (log_to_perpeer)
-	peerlog("", m);
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m);
+	if (log_to_perpeer)
+		peerlog("", m);
 
-    whack_log(mess_no, "~%s", m);
+	whack_log(mess_no, "~%s", m);
 }
 
 void
 log_errno_routine(int e, const char *message, ...)
 {
-    va_list args;
-    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
-
-    va_start(args, message);
-    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
-    va_end(args);
-
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s\n", m, e, strerror(e));
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
-    if (log_to_perpeer)
-    {
-	peerlog(strerror(e), m);
-    }
-
-    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	, "~ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+	va_start(args, message);
+	fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s\n", m, e, strerror(e));
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+	if (log_to_perpeer)
+	{
+		peerlog(strerror(e), m);
+	}
+
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "~ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
 }
 
 void
 exit_log(const char *message, ...)
 {
-    va_list args;
-    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
 
-    va_start(args, message);
-    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
-    va_end(args);
+	va_start(args, message);
+	fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+	va_end(args);
 
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: %s\n", m);
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "FATAL ERROR: %s", m);
-    if (log_to_perpeer)
-	peerlog("FATAL ERROR: ", m);
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: %s\n", m);
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "FATAL ERROR: %s", m);
+	if (log_to_perpeer)
+		peerlog("FATAL ERROR: ", m);
 
-    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "~FATAL ERROR: %s", m);
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "~FATAL ERROR: %s", m);
 
-    exit_pluto(1);
+	exit_pluto(1);
 }
 
 void
 exit_log_errno_routine(int e, const char *message, ...)
 {
-    va_list args;
-    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
 
-    va_start(args, message);
-    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
-    va_end(args);
+	va_start(args, message);
+	fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+	va_end(args);
 
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s\n", m, e, strerror(e));
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	syslog(LOG_ERR, "FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
-    if (log_to_perpeer)
-	peerlog(strerror(e), m);
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s\n", m, e, strerror(e));
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+	if (log_to_perpeer)
+		peerlog(strerror(e), m);
 
-    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-	, "~FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "~FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
 
-    exit_pluto(1);
+	exit_pluto(1);
 }
 
 /* emit message to whack.
@@ -531,65 +599,65 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t dying_breath = FALSE;
 void
 whack_log(int mess_no, const char *message, ...)
 {
-    int wfd = whack_log_fd != NULL_FD ? whack_log_fd
-	: cur_state != NULL ? cur_state->st_whack_sock
-	: NULL_FD;
+	int wfd = whack_log_fd != NULL_FD ? whack_log_fd
+		: cur_state != NULL ? cur_state->st_whack_sock
+		: NULL_FD;
 
-    if (wfd != NULL_FD
+	if (wfd != NULL_FD
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    || dying_breath
+	|| dying_breath
 #endif
-    )
-    {
-	va_list args;
-	char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
-	int prelen = snprintf(m, sizeof(m), "%03d ", mess_no);
+	)
+	{
+		va_list args;
+		char m[LOG_WIDTH];      /* longer messages will be truncated */
+		int prelen = snprintf(m, sizeof(m), "%03d ", mess_no);
 
-	passert(prelen >= 0);
+		passert(prelen >= 0);
 
-	va_start(args, message);
-	fmt_log(m+prelen, sizeof(m)-prelen, message, args);
-	va_end(args);
+		va_start(args, message);
+		fmt_log(m+prelen, sizeof(m)-prelen, message, args);
+		va_end(args);
 
 #if DEBUG
-	if (dying_breath)
-	{
-	    /* status output copied to log */
-	    if (log_to_stderr)
-		fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m + prelen);
-	    if (log_to_syslog)
-		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m + prelen);
-	    if (log_to_perpeer)
-		peerlog("", m);
-	}
+		if (dying_breath)
+		{
+			/* status output copied to log */
+			if (log_to_stderr)
+				fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m + prelen);
+			if (log_to_syslog)
+				syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m + prelen);
+			if (log_to_perpeer)
+				peerlog("", m);
+		}
 #endif
 
-	if (wfd != NULL_FD)
-	{
-	    /* write to whack socket, but suppress possible SIGPIPE */
-	    size_t len = strlen(m);
-#ifdef MSG_NOSIGNAL	/* depends on version of glibc??? */
-	    m[len] = '\n';	/* don't need NUL, do need NL */
-	    (void) send(wfd, m, len + 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+		if (wfd != NULL_FD)
+		{
+			/* write to whack socket, but suppress possible SIGPIPE */
+			size_t len = strlen(m);
+#ifdef MSG_NOSIGNAL     /* depends on version of glibc??? */
+			m[len] = '\n';      /* don't need NUL, do need NL */
+			(void) send(wfd, m, len + 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
 #else /* !MSG_NOSIGNAL */
-	    int r;
-	    struct sigaction act
-		, oldact;
+			int r;
+			struct sigaction act
+				, oldact;
 
-	    m[len] = '\n';	/* don't need NUL, do need NL */
-	    act.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
-	    sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
-	    act.sa_flags = 0;	/* no nothing */
-	    r = sigaction(SIGPIPE, &act, &oldact);
-	    passert(r == 0);
+			m[len] = '\n';      /* don't need NUL, do need NL */
+			act.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+			sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
+			act.sa_flags = 0;   /* no nothing */
+			r = sigaction(SIGPIPE, &act, &oldact);
+			passert(r == 0);
 
-	    (void) write(wfd, m, len + 1);
+			(void) write(wfd, m, len + 1);
 
-	    r = sigaction(SIGPIPE, &oldact, NULL);
-	    passert(r == 0);
+			r = sigaction(SIGPIPE, &oldact, NULL);
+			passert(r == 0);
 #endif /* !MSG_NOSIGNAL */
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Build up a diagnostic in a static buffer.
@@ -607,16 +675,16 @@ char diag_space[sizeof(diag_space)];
 err_t
 builddiag(const char *fmt, ...)
 {
-    static char diag_space[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
-    char t[sizeof(diag_space)];	/* build result here first */
-    va_list args;
-
-    va_start(args, fmt);
-    t[0] = '\0';	/* in case nothing terminates string */
-    vsnprintf(t, sizeof(t), fmt, args);
-    va_end(args);
-    strcpy(diag_space, t);
-    return diag_space;
+	static char diag_space[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
+	char t[sizeof(diag_space)]; /* build result here first */
+	va_list args;
+
+	va_start(args, fmt);
+	t[0] = '\0';        /* in case nothing terminates string */
+	vsnprintf(t, sizeof(t), fmt, args);
+	va_end(args);
+	strcpy(diag_space, t);
+	return diag_space;
 }
 
 /* Debugging message support */
@@ -626,51 +694,51 @@ builddiag(const char *fmt, ...)
 void
 switch_fail(int n, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
 {
-    char buf[30];
+	char buf[30];
 
-    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "case %d unexpected", n);
-    passert_fail(buf, file_str, line_no);
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "case %d unexpected", n);
+	passert_fail(buf, file_str, line_no);
 }
 
 void
 passert_fail(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
 {
-    /* we will get a possibly unplanned prefix.  Hope it works */
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ASSERTION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
-    if (!dying_breath)
-    {
-	dying_breath = TRUE;
-	show_status(TRUE, NULL);
-    }
-    abort();	/* exiting correctly doesn't always work */
+	/* we will get a possibly unplanned prefix.  Hope it works */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ASSERTION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
+	if (!dying_breath)
+	{
+		dying_breath = TRUE;
+		show_status(TRUE, NULL);
+	}
+	abort();    /* exiting correctly doesn't always work */
 }
 
 void
 pexpect_log(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
 {
-    /* we will get a possibly unplanned prefix.  Hope it works */
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "EXPECTATION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
+	/* we will get a possibly unplanned prefix.  Hope it works */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "EXPECTATION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
 }
 
 lset_t
-    base_debugging = DBG_NONE,	/* default to reporting nothing */
-    cur_debugging =  DBG_NONE;
+	base_debugging = DBG_NONE,  /* default to reporting nothing */
+	cur_debugging =  DBG_NONE;
 
 void
 extra_debugging(const struct connection *c)
 {
-    if(c == NULL)
-    {
-	reset_debugging();
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (c!= NULL && c->extra_debugging != 0)
-    {
-	plog("enabling for connection: %s"
-	    , bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, c->extra_debugging & ~cur_debugging));
-	cur_debugging |= c->extra_debugging;
-    }
+	if(c == NULL)
+	{
+		reset_debugging();
+		return;
+	}
+
+	if (c!= NULL && c->extra_debugging != 0)
+	{
+		plog("enabling for connection: %s"
+			, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, c->extra_debugging & ~cur_debugging));
+		cur_debugging |= c->extra_debugging;
+	}
 }
 
 /* log a debugging message (prefixed by "| ") */
@@ -678,21 +746,21 @@ extra_debugging(const struct connection *c)
 void
 DBG_log(const char *message, ...)
 {
-    va_list args;
-    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];  /* longer messages will be truncated */
 
-    va_start(args, message);
-    vsnprintf(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
-    va_end(args);
+	va_start(args, message);
+	vsnprintf(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+	va_end(args);
 
-    (void)sanitize(m, sizeof(m));
+	(void)sanitize(m, sizeof(m));
 
-    if (log_to_stderr)
-	fprintf(stderr, "| %s\n", m);
-    if (log_to_syslog)
-	syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "| %s", m);
-    if (log_to_perpeer)
-	peerlog("| ", m);
+	if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "| %s\n", m);
+	if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "| %s", m);
+	if (log_to_perpeer)
+		peerlog("| ", m);
 }
 
 /* dump raw bytes in hex to stderr (for lack of any better destination) */
@@ -700,82 +768,99 @@ DBG_log(const char *message, ...)
 void
 DBG_dump(const char *label, const void *p, size_t len)
 {
-#   define DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH 20	/* arbitrary modest boundary */
-#   define DUMP_WIDTH	(4 * (1 + 4 * 3) + 1)
-    char buf[DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH + DUMP_WIDTH];
-    char *bp;
-    const unsigned char *cp = p;
-
-    bp = buf;
+#   define DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH 20  /* arbitrary modest boundary */
+#   define DUMP_WIDTH   (4 * (1 + 4 * 3) + 1)
+	char buf[DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH + DUMP_WIDTH];
+	char *bp;
+	const unsigned char *cp = p;
 
-    if (label != NULL && label[0] != '\0')
-    {
-	/* Handle the label.  Care must be taken to avoid buffer overrun. */
-	size_t llen = strlen(label);
+	bp = buf;
 
-	if (llen + 1 > sizeof(buf))
+	if (label != NULL && label[0] != '\0')
 	{
-	    DBG_log("%s", label);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    strcpy(buf, label);
-	    if (buf[llen-1] == '\n')
-	    {
-		buf[llen-1] = '\0';	/* get rid of newline */
-		DBG_log("%s", buf);
-	    }
-	    else if (llen < DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH)
-	    {
-		bp = buf + llen;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		DBG_log("%s", buf);
-	    }
+		/* Handle the label.  Care must be taken to avoid buffer overrun. */
+		size_t llen = strlen(label);
+
+		if (llen + 1 > sizeof(buf))
+		{
+			DBG_log("%s", label);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			strcpy(buf, label);
+			if (buf[llen-1] == '\n')
+			{
+				buf[llen-1] = '\0';     /* get rid of newline */
+				DBG_log("%s", buf);
+			}
+			else if (llen < DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH)
+			{
+				bp = buf + llen;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				DBG_log("%s", buf);
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    do {
-	int i, j;
+	do {
+		int i, j;
 
-	for (i = 0; len!=0 && i!=4; i++)
-	{
-	    *bp++ = ' ';
-	    for (j = 0; len!=0 && j!=4; len--, j++)
-	    {
-		static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789abcdef";
-
-		*bp++ = ' ';
-		*bp++ = hexdig[(*cp >> 4) & 0xF];
-		*bp++ = hexdig[*cp & 0xF];
-		cp++;
-	    }
-	}
-	*bp = '\0';
-	DBG_log("%s", buf);
-	bp = buf;
-    } while (len != 0);
+		for (i = 0; len!=0 && i!=4; i++)
+		{
+			*bp++ = ' ';
+			for (j = 0; len!=0 && j!=4; len--, j++)
+			{
+				static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+				*bp++ = ' ';
+				*bp++ = hexdig[(*cp >> 4) & 0xF];
+				*bp++ = hexdig[*cp & 0xF];
+				cp++;
+			}
+		}
+		*bp = '\0';
+		DBG_log("%s", buf);
+		bp = buf;
+	} while (len != 0);
 #   undef DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH
 #   undef DUMP_WIDTH
 }
 
 #endif /* DEBUG */
 
-void
-show_status(bool all, const char *name)
+static void show_loaded_plugins()
 {
-    if (all)
-    {
-	show_ifaces_status();
-	show_myid_status();
-	show_debug_status();
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
-    }
-    show_connections_status(all, name);
-    show_states_status(all, name);
+	char buf[BUF_LEN], *plugin;
+	int len = 0;
+	enumerator_t *enumerator;
+	
+	buf[0] = '\0';	
+	enumerator = lib->plugins->create_plugin_enumerator(lib->plugins);
+	while (len < BUF_LEN && enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &plugin))
+	{
+		len += snprintf(&buf[len], BUF_LEN-len, "%s ", plugin);
+	}
+	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "loaded plugins: %s", buf);
+}
+
+void show_status(bool all, const char *name)
+{
+	if (all)
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "Status of IKEv1 pluto daemon (strongSwan "VERSION"):");
+		show_ifaces_status();
+		show_myid_status();
+		show_loaded_plugins();
+		show_debug_status();
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);    /* spacer */
+	}
+	show_connections_status(all, name);
+	show_states_status(all, name);
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    show_shunt_status();
+	show_shunt_status();
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -788,10 +873,10 @@ show_status(bool all, const char *name)
 const char *
 ip_str(const ip_address *src)
 {
-    static char buf[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	static char buf[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-    addrtot(src, 0, buf, sizeof(buf));
-    return buf;
+	addrtot(src, 0, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	return buf;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -802,35 +887,31 @@ ip_str(const ip_address *src)
 void
 daily_log_reset(void)
 {
-    /* now perform actions */
-    logged_txt_warning = FALSE;
+	/* now perform actions */
+	logged_txt_warning = FALSE;
 
-    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = FALSE;
-    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning   = FALSE;
-    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = FALSE;
-    logged_myid_ip_key_warning   = FALSE;
+	logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = FALSE;
+	logged_myid_ip_txt_warning   = FALSE;
+	logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = FALSE;
+	logged_myid_ip_key_warning   = FALSE;
 }
 
 void
 daily_log_event(void)
 {
-    struct tm *ltime;
-    time_t n, interval;
-
-    /* attempt to schedule oneself to midnight, local time
-     * do this by getting seconds in the day, and delaying
-     * by 86400 - hour*3600+minutes*60+seconds.
-     */
-    time(&n);
-    ltime = localtime(&n);
-    interval = (24 * 60 * 60)
-      - (ltime->tm_sec
-	 + ltime->tm_min  * 60
-	 + ltime->tm_hour * 3600);
-
-    event_schedule(EVENT_LOG_DAILY, interval, NULL);
-
-    daily_log_reset();
+	struct tm lt;
+	time_t t, interval;
+
+	/* attempt to schedule oneself to midnight, local time
+	 * do this by getting seconds in the day, and delaying
+	 * by 86400 - 3600*hours - 60*minutes - seconds.
+	 */
+	time(&t);
+	localtime_r(&t, &lt);
+	interval = 3600 * (24 - lt.tm_hour) - 60 * lt.tm_min - lt.tm_sec;
+
+	event_schedule(EVENT_LOG_DAILY, interval, NULL);
+	daily_log_reset();
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/log.h b/src/pluto/log.h
index db0fb0202..52c01bbd4 100644
--- a/src/pluto/log.h
+++ b/src/pluto/log.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: log.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
@@ -27,49 +25,49 @@
 #ifdef DEBUG
 
 extern void passert_fail(const char *pred_str
-    , const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no) NEVER_RETURNS;
+	, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no) NEVER_RETURNS;
 
 extern void pexpect_log(const char *pred_str
-			, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no);
+						, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no);
 
 # define impossible() passert_fail("impossible", __FILE__, __LINE__)
 
 extern void switch_fail(int n
-    , const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no) NEVER_RETURNS;
+	, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no) NEVER_RETURNS;
 
 # define bad_case(n) switch_fail((int) n, __FILE__, __LINE__)
 
 # define passert(pred) { \
-	if (!(pred)) \
-	    passert_fail(#pred, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
-    }
+		if (!(pred)) \
+			passert_fail(#pred, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+	}
 
 # define pexpect(pred) { \
-	if (!(pred)) \
-	    pexpect_log(#pred, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
-    }
+		if (!(pred)) \
+			pexpect_log(#pred, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+	}
 
 /* assert that an err_t is NULL; evaluate exactly once */
 # define happy(x) { \
-	err_t ugh = x; \
-	if (ugh != NULL) \
-	    passert_fail(ugh, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
-    }
+		err_t ugh = x; \
+		if (ugh != NULL) \
+			passert_fail(ugh, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+	}
 
 #else /*!DEBUG*/
 
 # define impossible() abort()
 # define bad_case(n) abort()
-# define passert(pred)  { }	/* do nothing */
-# define happy(x)  { (void) x; }	/* evaluate non-judgementally */
+# define passert(pred)  { }     /* do nothing */
+# define happy(x)  { (void) x; }        /* evaluate non-judgementally */
 
 #endif /*!DEBUG*/
 
 
 extern bool
-    log_to_stderr,	/* should log go to stderr? */
-    log_to_syslog,	/* should log go to syslog? */
-    log_to_perpeer;     /* should log go to per-IP file? */
+	log_to_stderr,      /* should log go to stderr? */
+	log_to_syslog,      /* should log go to syslog? */
+	log_to_perpeer;     /* should log go to per-IP file? */
 
 extern const char *base_perpeer_logdir;
 
@@ -84,25 +82,25 @@ extern const char *base_perpeer_logdir;
  * If the context provides a whack file descriptor, messages
  * should be copied to it -- see whack_log()
  */
-extern int whack_log_fd;	/* only set during whack_handle() */
-extern struct state *cur_state;	/* current state, for diagnostics */
-extern struct connection *cur_connection;	/* current connection, for diagnostics */
-extern const ip_address *cur_from;	/* source of current current message */
-extern u_int16_t cur_from_port;	/* host order */
+extern int whack_log_fd;        /* only set during whack_handle() */
+extern struct state *cur_state; /* current state, for diagnostics */
+extern struct connection *cur_connection;       /* current connection, for diagnostics */
+extern const ip_address *cur_from;      /* source of current current message */
+extern u_int16_t cur_from_port; /* host order */
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
 
-  extern lset_t cur_debugging;	/* current debugging level */
+  extern lset_t cur_debugging;  /* current debugging level */
 
   extern void extra_debugging(const struct connection *c);
 
 # define reset_debugging() { cur_debugging = base_debugging; }
 
 # define GLOBALS_ARE_RESET() (whack_log_fd == NULL_FD \
-    && cur_state == NULL \
-    && cur_connection == NULL \
-    && cur_from == NULL \
-    && cur_debugging == base_debugging)
+	&& cur_state == NULL \
+	&& cur_connection == NULL \
+	&& cur_from == NULL \
+	&& cur_debugging == base_debugging)
 
 #else /*!DEBUG*/
 
@@ -111,40 +109,40 @@ extern u_int16_t cur_from_port;	/* host order */
 # define reset_debugging() { }
 
 # define GLOBALS_ARE_RESET() (whack_log_fd == NULL_FD \
-    && cur_state == NULL \
-    && cur_connection == NULL \
-    && cur_from == NULL)
+	&& cur_state == NULL \
+	&& cur_connection == NULL \
+	&& cur_from == NULL)
 
 #endif /*!DEBUG*/
 
 #define reset_globals() { \
-    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD; \
-    cur_state = NULL; \
-    cur_from = NULL; \
-    reset_cur_connection(); \
-    }
+	whack_log_fd = NULL_FD; \
+	cur_state = NULL; \
+	cur_from = NULL; \
+	reset_cur_connection(); \
+	}
 
 
 #define set_cur_connection(c) { \
-    cur_connection = (c); \
-    extra_debugging(c); \
-    }
+	cur_connection = (c); \
+	extra_debugging(c); \
+	}
 
 #define reset_cur_connection() { \
-    cur_connection = NULL; \
-    reset_debugging(); \
-    }
+	cur_connection = NULL; \
+	reset_debugging(); \
+	}
 
 
 #define set_cur_state(s) { \
-    cur_state = (s); \
-    extra_debugging((s)->st_connection); \
-    }
+	cur_state = (s); \
+	extra_debugging((s)->st_connection); \
+	}
 
 #define reset_cur_state() { \
-    cur_state = NULL; \
-    reset_debugging(); \
-    }
+	cur_state = NULL; \
+	reset_debugging(); \
+	}
 
 extern void init_log(const char *program);
 extern void close_log(void);
@@ -188,12 +186,12 @@ extern void show_status(bool all, const char *name);
  * restriction is not checked in any way: violators will produce
  * confusing results (without crashing!).
  */
-extern char diag_space[LOG_WIDTH];	/* output buffer, but can be occupied at call */
+extern char diag_space[LOG_WIDTH];      /* output buffer, but can be occupied at call */
 extern err_t builddiag(const char *fmt, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(1);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
 
-extern lset_t base_debugging;	/* bits selecting what to report */
+extern lset_t base_debugging;   /* bits selecting what to report */
 
 #define DBGP(cond)         (cur_debugging & (cond))
 #define DBG(cond, action)   { if (DBGP(cond)) { action ; } }
@@ -204,7 +202,7 @@ extern void DBG_dump(const char *label, const void *p, size_t len);
 
 #else /*!DEBUG*/
 
-#define DBG(cond, action)	{ }	/* do nothing */
+#define DBG(cond, action)       { }     /* do nothing */
 
 #endif /*!DEBUG*/
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/md2.c b/src/pluto/md2.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d6465477d..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/md2.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,237 +0,0 @@
-/* MD2C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD2 message-digest algorithm
- */
-
-/* Copyright (C) 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All
-   rights reserved.
-
-   License to copy and use this software is granted for
-   non-commercial Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail provided that it is
-   identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD2 Message Digest
-   Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
-   or this function.
-
-   RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
-   the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
-   software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
-   without express or implied warranty of any kind.
-
-   These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
-   documentation and/or software.
- */
-
-#include "md2.h"
-
-#define HAVEMEMCOPY 1	/* use ISO C's memcpy and memset */
-
-static void MD2Transform PROTO_LIST
-  ((unsigned char [16], unsigned char [16], const unsigned char [16]));
-
-#ifdef HAVEMEMCOPY
-#include <memory.h>
-#define MD2_memcpy	memcpy
-#define MD2_memset	memset
-#else
-#ifdef HAVEBCOPY
-#define MD2_memcpy(_a,_b,_c) memcpy((_a), (_b),(_c))
-#define MD2_memset(_a,_b,_c) memset((_a), '\0',(_c))
-#else
-static void MD2_memcpy PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, CONST_POINTER, unsigned int));
-static void MD2_memset PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, int, unsigned int));
-#endif
-#endif
-
-/* Permutation of 0..255 constructed from the digits of pi. It gives a
-   "random" nonlinear byte substitution operation.
- */
-static unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = {
-  41, 46, 67, 201, 162, 216, 124, 1, 61, 54, 84, 161, 236, 240, 6,
-  19, 98, 167, 5, 243, 192, 199, 115, 140, 152, 147, 43, 217, 188,
-  76, 130, 202, 30, 155, 87, 60, 253, 212, 224, 22, 103, 66, 111, 24,
-  138, 23, 229, 18, 190, 78, 196, 214, 218, 158, 222, 73, 160, 251,
-  245, 142, 187, 47, 238, 122, 169, 104, 121, 145, 21, 178, 7, 63,
-  148, 194, 16, 137, 11, 34, 95, 33, 128, 127, 93, 154, 90, 144, 50,
-  39, 53, 62, 204, 231, 191, 247, 151, 3, 255, 25, 48, 179, 72, 165,
-  181, 209, 215, 94, 146, 42, 172, 86, 170, 198, 79, 184, 56, 210,
-  150, 164, 125, 182, 118, 252, 107, 226, 156, 116, 4, 241, 69, 157,
-  112, 89, 100, 113, 135, 32, 134, 91, 207, 101, 230, 45, 168, 2, 27,
-  96, 37, 173, 174, 176, 185, 246, 28, 70, 97, 105, 52, 64, 126, 15,
-  85, 71, 163, 35, 221, 81, 175, 58, 195, 92, 249, 206, 186, 197,
-  234, 38, 44, 83, 13, 110, 133, 40, 132, 9, 211, 223, 205, 244, 65,
-  129, 77, 82, 106, 220, 55, 200, 108, 193, 171, 250, 36, 225, 123,
-  8, 12, 189, 177, 74, 120, 136, 149, 139, 227, 99, 232, 109, 233,
-  203, 213, 254, 59, 0, 29, 57, 242, 239, 183, 14, 102, 88, 208, 228,
-  166, 119, 114, 248, 235, 117, 75, 10, 49, 68, 80, 180, 143, 237,
-  31, 26, 219, 153, 141, 51, 159, 17, 131, 20
-};
-
-static const unsigned char *PADDING[] = {
-  (const unsigned char *)"",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\001",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\002\002",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\003\003\003",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\004\004\004\004",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\005\005\005\005\005",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\006\006\006\006\006\006",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\007\007\007\007\007\007\007",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\010\010\010\010\010\010\010\010",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\011\011\011\011\011\011\011\011\011",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\012\012\012\012\012\012\012\012\012\012",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013",
-  (const unsigned char *)"\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014",
-  (const unsigned char *)
-    "\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015",
-  (const unsigned char *)
-    "\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016",
-  (const unsigned char *)
-    "\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017",
-  (const unsigned char *)
-    "\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020"
-};
-
-/* MD2 initialization. Begins an MD2 operation, writing a new context.
- */
-void MD2Init (context)
-MD2_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
-{
-  context->count = 0;
-  MD2_memset ((POINTER)context->state, 0, sizeof (context->state));
-  MD2_memset
-    ((POINTER)context->checksum, 0, sizeof (context->checksum));
-}
-
-/* MD2 block update operation. Continues an MD2 message-digest
-     operation, processing another message block, and updating the
-     context.
- */
-void MD2Update (context, input, inputLen)
-MD2_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
-const unsigned char *input;                          /* input block */
-unsigned int inputLen;                     /* length of input block */
-{
-  unsigned int i, index, partLen;
-
-  /* Update number of bytes mod 16 */
-  index = context->count;
-  context->count = (index + inputLen) & 0xf;
-
-  partLen = 16 - index;
-
-  /* Transform as many times as possible.
-    */
-  if (inputLen >= partLen) {
-    MD2_memcpy
-      ((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONST_POINTER)input, partLen);
-    MD2Transform (context->state, context->checksum, context->buffer);
-
-    for (i = partLen; i + 15 < inputLen; i += 16)
-      MD2Transform (context->state, context->checksum, &input[i]);
-
-    index = 0;
-  }
-  else
-    i = 0;
-
-  /* Buffer remaining input */
-  MD2_memcpy
-    ((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONST_POINTER)&input[i],
-     inputLen-i);
-}
-
-/* MD2 finalization. Ends an MD2 message-digest operation, writing the
-     message digest and zeroizing the context.
- */
-void MD2Final (digest, context)
-
-unsigned char digest[16];                         /* message digest */
-MD2_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
-{
-  unsigned int index, padLen;
-
-  /* Pad out to multiple of 16.
-   */
-  index = context->count;
-  padLen = 16 - index;
-  MD2Update (context, PADDING[padLen], padLen);
-
-  /* Extend with checksum */
-  MD2Update (context, context->checksum, 16);
-
-  /* Store state in digest */
-  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)digest, (POINTER)context->state, 16);
-
-  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
-   */
-  MD2_memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context));
-}
-
-/* MD2 basic transformation. Transforms state and updates checksum
-     based on block.
- */
-static void MD2Transform (state, checksum, block)
-unsigned char state[16];
-unsigned char checksum[16];
-const unsigned char block[16];
-{
-  unsigned int i, j, t;
-  unsigned char x[48];
-
-  /* Form encryption block from state, block, state ^ block.
-   */
-  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)x, (CONST_POINTER)state, 16);
-  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)x+16, (CONST_POINTER)block, 16);
-  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-    x[i+32] = state[i] ^ block[i];
-
-  /* Encrypt block (18 rounds).
-   */
-  t = 0;
-  for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) {
-    for (j = 0; j < 48; j++)
-      t = x[j] ^= PI_SUBST[t];
-    t = (t + i) & 0xff;
-  }
-
-  /* Save new state */
-  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)state, (POINTER)x, 16);
-
-  /* Update checksum.
-   */
-  t = checksum[15];
-  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
-    t = checksum[i] ^= PI_SUBST[block[i] ^ t];
-
-  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
-   */
-  MD2_memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x));
-}
-
-#ifndef HAVEMEMCOPY
-#ifndef HAVEBCOPY
-/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible.
- */
-static void MD2_memcpy (output, input, len)
-POINTER output;
-POINTER input;
-unsigned int len;
-{
-  unsigned int i;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-    output[i] = input[i];
-}
-
-/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible.
- */
-static void MD2_memset (output, value, len)
-POINTER output;
-int value;
-unsigned int len;
-{
-  unsigned int i;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-    ((char *)output)[i] = (char)value;
-}
-#endif
-#endif
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/md2.h b/src/pluto/md2.h
deleted file mode 100644
index b3b48dd92..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/md2.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _GLOBAL_H_
-#define _GLOBAL_H_
-/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants
- */
-
-/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports
-     function argument prototyping.
-   The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already
-     been defined with C compiler flags.
- */
-#ifndef PROTOTYPES
-#define PROTOTYPES 1
-#endif
-
-/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */
-typedef unsigned char *POINTER;
-typedef const unsigned char *CONST_POINTER;
-
-/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */
-typedef unsigned short int UINT2;
-
-/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */
-typedef unsigned long int UINT4;
-
-/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above.
-   If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it
-     returns an empty list.
- */
-
-#if PROTOTYPES
-#define PROTO_LIST(list) list
-#else
-#define PROTO_LIST(list) ()
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
-/* MD2.H - header file for MD2C.C
- */
-
-/* Copyright (C) 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All
-   rights reserved.
-
-   License to copy and use this software is granted for
-   non-commercial Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail provided that it is
-   identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD2 Message Digest
-   Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
-   or this function.
-
-   RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
-   the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
-   software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
-   without express or implied warranty of any kind.
-
-   These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
-   documentation and/or software.
- */
-
-/* MD2 context. */
-typedef struct {
-  unsigned char state[16];                                 /* state */
-  unsigned char checksum[16];                           /* checksum */
-  unsigned int count;                 /* number of bytes, modulo 16 */
-  unsigned char buffer[16];                         /* input buffer */
-} MD2_CTX;
-
-void MD2Init PROTO_LIST ((MD2_CTX *));
-void MD2Update PROTO_LIST
-  ((MD2_CTX *, const unsigned char *, unsigned int));
-void MD2Final PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16], MD2_CTX *));
-
-#define _MD2_H_
diff --git a/src/pluto/md5.c b/src/pluto/md5.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 5d75e38a4..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/md5.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,385 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * The rest of the code is derived from MD5C.C by RSADSI. Minor cosmetic
- * changes to accomodate it in the kernel by ji.
- * Minor changes to make 64 bit clean by Peter Onion (i.e. using u_int*_t).
- */
-
-/* MD5C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5 message-digest algorithm
- */
-
-/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
-rights reserved.
-
-License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
-is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
-Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
-or this function.
-
-License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
-that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
-Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
-mentioning or referencing the derived work.
-
-RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
-the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
-software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
-without express or implied warranty of any kind.
-
-These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
-documentation and/or software.
- */
-
-/*
- * Additions by JI
- *
- * HAVEMEMCOPY is defined if mem* routines are available
- *
- * HAVEHTON is defined if htons() and htonl() can be used
- * for big/little endian conversions
- *
- */
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>	/* for u_int*_t */
-#include <endian.h>	/* sets BYTE_ORDER, LITTLE_ENDIAN, and BIG_ENDIAN */
-
-#include "md5.h"
-
-#define HAVEMEMCOPY 1	/* use ISO C's memcpy and memset */
-
-/* Constants for MD5Transform routine.
- */
-
-#define S11 7
-#define S12 12
-#define S13 17
-#define S14 22
-#define S21 5
-#define S22 9
-#define S23 14
-#define S24 20
-#define S31 4
-#define S32 11
-#define S33 16
-#define S34 23
-#define S41 6
-#define S42 10
-#define S43 15
-#define S44 21
-
-#define MD5Transform _MD5Transform
-
-static void MD5Transform PROTO_LIST ((UINT4 [4], const unsigned char [64]));
-
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
-#define Encode MD5_memcpy
-#define Decode MD5_memcpy
-#else
-static void Encode PROTO_LIST
-  ((unsigned char *, UINT4 *, unsigned int));
-static void Decode PROTO_LIST
-  ((UINT4 *, unsigned char *, unsigned int));
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVEMEMCOPY
-#include <memory.h>
-#define MD5_memcpy	memcpy
-#define MD5_memset	memset
-#else
-#ifdef HAVEBCOPY
-#define MD5_memcpy(_a,_b,_c) memcpy((_a), (_b),(_c))
-#define MD5_memset(_a,_b,_c) memset((_a), '\0',(_c))
-#else
-static void MD5_memcpy PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, POINTER, unsigned int));
-static void MD5_memset PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, int, unsigned int));
-#endif
-#endif
-static unsigned char PADDING[64] = {
-  0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
-  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
-/* F, G, H and I are basic MD5 functions.
- */
-#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
-#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
-#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
-#define I(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | (~z)))
-
-/* ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits.
- */
-#define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
-
-/* FF, GG, HH, and II transformations for rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.
-Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation.
- */
-#define FF(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
- (a) += F ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
- (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
- (a) += (b); \
-  }
-#define GG(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
- (a) += G ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
- (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
- (a) += (b); \
-  }
-#define HH(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
- (a) += H ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
- (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
- (a) += (b); \
-  }
-#define II(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
- (a) += I ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
- (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
- (a) += (b); \
-  }
-
-/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context.
- */
-void MD5Init (context)
-MD5_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
-{
-  context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
-  /* Load magic initialization constants.
-*/
-  context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
-  context->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
-  context->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
-  context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
-}
-
-/* MD5 block update operation. Continues an MD5 message-digest
-  operation, processing another message block, and updating the
-  context.
- */
-void MD5Update (context, input, inputLen)
-MD5_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
-const unsigned char *input;                          /* input block */
-UINT4 inputLen;                            /* length of input block */
-{
-  UINT4 i;
-  unsigned int index, partLen;
-
-  /* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */
-  index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3F);
-
-  /* Update number of bits */
-  if ((context->count[0] += (inputLen << 3)) < (inputLen << 3))
-	context->count[1]++;
-  context->count[1] += (inputLen >> 29);
-
-  partLen = 64 - index;
-
-  /* Transform as many times as possible. */
-  if (inputLen >= partLen) {
-	MD5_memcpy((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONSTPOINTER)input, partLen);
-	MD5Transform (context->state, context->buffer);
-
-	for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64)
-	    MD5Transform (context->state, &input[i]);
-
-	index = 0;
-  }
-  else
-	i = 0;
-
-  /* Buffer remaining input */
-  MD5_memcpy((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONSTPOINTER)&input[i], inputLen-i);
-}
-
-/* MD5 finalization. Ends an MD5 message-digest operation, writing the
-  the message digest and zeroizing the context.
- */
-void MD5Final (digest, context)
-unsigned char digest[16];                         /* message digest */
-MD5_CTX *context;                                       /* context */
-{
-  unsigned char bits[8];
-  unsigned int index, padLen;
-
-  /* Save number of bits */
-  Encode (bits, context->count, 8);
-
-  /* Pad out to 56 mod 64.
-*/
-  index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f);
-  padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : (120 - index);
-  MD5Update (context, PADDING, padLen);
-
-  /* Append length (before padding) */
-  MD5Update (context, bits, 8);
-
-  if (digest != NULL)			/* Bill Simpson's padding */
-  {
-	  /* store state in digest */
-	  Encode (digest, context->state, 16);
-
-	  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
-	   */
-	  MD5_memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context));
-  }
-}
-
-/* MD5 basic transformation. Transforms state based on block.
- */
-static void MD5Transform (state, block)
-UINT4 state[4];
-const unsigned char block[64];
-{
-  UINT4 a = state[0], b = state[1], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16];
-
-  Decode (x, block, 64);
-
-  /* Round 1 */
-  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S11, 0xd76aa478); /* 1 */
-  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 1], S12, 0xe8c7b756); /* 2 */
-  FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S13, 0x242070db); /* 3 */
-  FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 3], S14, 0xc1bdceee); /* 4 */
-  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S11, 0xf57c0faf); /* 5 */
-  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 5], S12, 0x4787c62a); /* 6 */
-  FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S13, 0xa8304613); /* 7 */
-  FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 7], S14, 0xfd469501); /* 8 */
-  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S11, 0x698098d8); /* 9 */
-  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 9], S12, 0x8b44f7af); /* 10 */
-  FF (c, d, a, b, x[10], S13, 0xffff5bb1); /* 11 */
-  FF (b, c, d, a, x[11], S14, 0x895cd7be); /* 12 */
-  FF (a, b, c, d, x[12], S11, 0x6b901122); /* 13 */
-  FF (d, a, b, c, x[13], S12, 0xfd987193); /* 14 */
-  FF (c, d, a, b, x[14], S13, 0xa679438e); /* 15 */
-  FF (b, c, d, a, x[15], S14, 0x49b40821); /* 16 */
-
- /* Round 2 */
-  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], S21, 0xf61e2562); /* 17 */
-  GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 6], S22, 0xc040b340); /* 18 */
-  GG (c, d, a, b, x[11], S23, 0x265e5a51); /* 19 */
-  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 0], S24, 0xe9b6c7aa); /* 20 */
-  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S21, 0xd62f105d); /* 21 */
-  GG (d, a, b, c, x[10], S22,  0x2441453); /* 22 */
-  GG (c, d, a, b, x[15], S23, 0xd8a1e681); /* 23 */
-  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 4], S24, 0xe7d3fbc8); /* 24 */
-  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S21, 0x21e1cde6); /* 25 */
-  GG (d, a, b, c, x[14], S22, 0xc33707d6); /* 26 */
-  GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S23, 0xf4d50d87); /* 27 */
-  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 8], S24, 0x455a14ed); /* 28 */
-  GG (a, b, c, d, x[13], S21, 0xa9e3e905); /* 29 */
-  GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 2], S22, 0xfcefa3f8); /* 30 */
-  GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S23, 0x676f02d9); /* 31 */
-  GG (b, c, d, a, x[12], S24, 0x8d2a4c8a); /* 32 */
-
-  /* Round 3 */
-  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S31, 0xfffa3942); /* 33 */
-  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 8], S32, 0x8771f681); /* 34 */
-  HH (c, d, a, b, x[11], S33, 0x6d9d6122); /* 35 */
-  HH (b, c, d, a, x[14], S34, 0xfde5380c); /* 36 */
-  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], S31, 0xa4beea44); /* 37 */
-  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 4], S32, 0x4bdecfa9); /* 38 */
-  HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S33, 0xf6bb4b60); /* 39 */
-  HH (b, c, d, a, x[10], S34, 0xbebfbc70); /* 40 */
-  HH (a, b, c, d, x[13], S31, 0x289b7ec6); /* 41 */
-  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 0], S32, 0xeaa127fa); /* 42 */
-  HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S33, 0xd4ef3085); /* 43 */
-  HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 6], S34,  0x4881d05); /* 44 */
-  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S31, 0xd9d4d039); /* 45 */
-  HH (d, a, b, c, x[12], S32, 0xe6db99e5); /* 46 */
-  HH (c, d, a, b, x[15], S33, 0x1fa27cf8); /* 47 */
-  HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 2], S34, 0xc4ac5665); /* 48 */
-
-  /* Round 4 */
-  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S41, 0xf4292244); /* 49 */
-  II (d, a, b, c, x[ 7], S42, 0x432aff97); /* 50 */
-  II (c, d, a, b, x[14], S43, 0xab9423a7); /* 51 */
-  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 5], S44, 0xfc93a039); /* 52 */
-  II (a, b, c, d, x[12], S41, 0x655b59c3); /* 53 */
-  II (d, a, b, c, x[ 3], S42, 0x8f0ccc92); /* 54 */
-  II (c, d, a, b, x[10], S43, 0xffeff47d); /* 55 */
-  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 1], S44, 0x85845dd1); /* 56 */
-  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S41, 0x6fa87e4f); /* 57 */
-  II (d, a, b, c, x[15], S42, 0xfe2ce6e0); /* 58 */
-  II (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S43, 0xa3014314); /* 59 */
-  II (b, c, d, a, x[13], S44, 0x4e0811a1); /* 60 */
-  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S41, 0xf7537e82); /* 61 */
-  II (d, a, b, c, x[11], S42, 0xbd3af235); /* 62 */
-  II (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S43, 0x2ad7d2bb); /* 63 */
-  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 9], S44, 0xeb86d391); /* 64 */
-
-  state[0] += a;
-  state[1] += b;
-  state[2] += c;
-  state[3] += d;
-
-  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
-*/
-  MD5_memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x));
-}
-
-#if BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN
-
-/* Encodes input (UINT4) into output (unsigned char). Assumes len is
-  a multiple of 4.
- */
-static void Encode (output, input, len)
-unsigned char *output;
-UINT4 *input;
-unsigned int len;
-{
-  unsigned int i, j;
-
-  for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) {
- output[j] = (unsigned char)(input[i] & 0xff);
- output[j+1] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 8) & 0xff);
- output[j+2] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 16) & 0xff);
- output[j+3] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 24) & 0xff);
-  }
-}
-
-/* Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UINT4). Assumes len is
-  a multiple of 4.
- */
-static void Decode (output, input, len)
-UINT4 *output;
-unsigned char *input;
-unsigned int len;
-{
-  unsigned int i, j;
-
-  for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4)
- output[i] = ((UINT4)input[j]) | (((UINT4)input[j+1]) << 8) |
-   (((UINT4)input[j+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)input[j+3]) << 24);
-}
-
-#endif
-
-#ifndef HAVEMEMCOPY
-#ifndef HAVEBCOPY
-/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible.
- */
-
-static void MD5_memcpy (output, input, len)
-POINTER output;
-POINTER input;
-unsigned int len;
-{
-  unsigned int i;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-
- output[i] = input[i];
-}
-
-/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible.
- */
-static void MD5_memset (output, value, len)
-POINTER output;
-int value;
-unsigned int len;
-{
-  unsigned int i;
-
-  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
- ((char *)output)[i] = (char)value;
-}
-#endif
-#endif
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/md5.h b/src/pluto/md5.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 9b29bc46e..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/md5.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-#ifndef _GLOBAL_H_
-#define _GLOBAL_H_
-/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants
- */
-
-/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports
-     function argument prototyping.
-   The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already
-     been defined with C compiler flags.
- */
-#ifndef PROTOTYPES
-#define PROTOTYPES 1
-#endif
-
-/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */
-typedef unsigned char *POINTER;
-typedef const unsigned char *CONSTPOINTER;
-
-/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */
-typedef u_int16_t UINT2;
-
-/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */
-typedef u_int32_t UINT4;
-
-/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above.
-   If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it
-     returns an empty list.
- */
-
-#if PROTOTYPES
-#define PROTO_LIST(list) list
-#else
-#define PROTO_LIST(list) ()
-#endif
-
-#endif
-
-/* MD5.H - header file for MD5C.C
- */
-
-/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
-rights reserved.
-
-License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
-is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
-Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
-or this function.
-
-License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
-that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
-Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
-mentioning or referencing the derived work.
-
-RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
-the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
-software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
-without express or implied warranty of any kind.
-
-These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
-documentation and/or software.
- */
-
-/* MD5 context. */
-typedef struct {
-  UINT4 state[4];                                   /* state (ABCD) */
-  UINT4 count[2];        /* number of bits, modulo 2^64 (lsb first) */
-  unsigned char buffer[64];                         /* input buffer */
-} MD5_CTX;
-
-void MD5Init PROTO_LIST ((MD5_CTX *));
-void MD5Update PROTO_LIST
-  ((MD5_CTX *, const unsigned char *, UINT4));
-void MD5Final PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16], MD5_CTX *));
-
-#define _MD5_H_
diff --git a/src/pluto/modecfg.c b/src/pluto/modecfg.c
index 93624588a..228827f2a 100644
--- a/src/pluto/modecfg.c
+++ b/src/pluto/modecfg.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Colubris Networks
  * Copyright (C) 2003 Sean Mathews - Nu Tech Software Solutions, inc.
  * Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Xelerance Corporation
- * Copyright (C) 2006-2007 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ * Copyright (C) 2006-2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
  *
- * RCSID $Id: modecfg.c 3738 2008-04-02 19:04:45Z andreas $
- *
  * This code originally written by Colubris Networks, Inc.
  * Extraction of patch and porting to 1.99 codebases by Xelerance Corporation
  * Porting to 2.x by Sean Mathews
@@ -27,6 +25,9 @@
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/prfs/prf.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "state.h"
@@ -34,21 +35,23 @@
 #include "timer.h"
 #include "ipsec_doi.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include "modecfg.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "xauth.h"
 
-#define MAX_XAUTH_TRIES		3
+#define MAX_XAUTH_TRIES         3
+#define DNS_SERVER_MAX          2
+#define NBNS_SERVER_MAX         2
 
 #define SUPPORTED_ATTR_SET   ( LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)         \
-                             | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK)         \
-                             | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_DNS)             \
-                             | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS)            \
-                             | LELEM(APPLICATION_VERSION)          \
-                             )
+							 | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK)         \
+							 | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_DNS)             \
+							 | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS)            \
+							 | LELEM(APPLICATION_VERSION)          \
+							 | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP6_DNS)             \
+							 | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS)            \
+							 )
 
 #define SUPPORTED_UNITY_ATTR_SET ( LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE) )
 
@@ -61,21 +64,21 @@ typedef struct internal_addr internal_addr_t;
 
 struct internal_addr
 {
-    lset_t attr_set;
-    lset_t xauth_attr_set;
-    lset_t unity_attr_set;
+	lset_t attr_set;
+	lset_t xauth_attr_set;
+	lset_t unity_attr_set;
 
-    /* ModeCfg variables */
-    ip_address ipaddr;
-    ip_address dns[2];
-    ip_address wins[2];
+	/* ModeCfg variables */
+	ip_address ipaddr;
+	ip_address dns[DNS_SERVER_MAX];
+	ip_address nbns[NBNS_SERVER_MAX];
 
-    char *unity_banner;
+	char *unity_banner;
 
-    /* XAUTH variables */
-    u_int16_t  xauth_type;
-    xauth_t    xauth_secret;
-    bool       xauth_status;
+	/* XAUTH variables */
+	u_int16_t  xauth_type;
+	xauth_t    xauth_secret;
+	bool       xauth_status;
 };
 
 /*
@@ -84,20 +87,30 @@ struct internal_addr
 static void
 init_internal_addr(internal_addr_t *ia)
 {
-    ia->attr_set = LEMPTY;
-    ia->xauth_attr_set = LEMPTY;
-    ia->xauth_secret.user_name = empty_chunk;
-    ia->xauth_secret.user_password = empty_chunk;
-    ia->xauth_type = XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC;
-    ia->xauth_status = XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
-    ia->unity_attr_set = LEMPTY;
-    ia->unity_banner = NULL;
-
-    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->ipaddr);
-    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->dns[0]);
-    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->dns[1]);
-    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->wins[0]);
-    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->wins[1]);
+	int i;
+
+	ia->attr_set = LEMPTY;
+	ia->xauth_attr_set = LEMPTY;
+	ia->xauth_secret.user_name = chunk_empty;
+	ia->xauth_secret.user_password = chunk_empty;
+	ia->xauth_type = XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC;
+	ia->xauth_status = XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
+	ia->unity_attr_set = LEMPTY;
+	ia->unity_banner = NULL;
+
+	anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->ipaddr);
+
+	/* initialize DNS server information */
+	for (i = 0; i < DNS_SERVER_MAX; i++)
+	{
+		anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->dns[i]);
+	}
+
+	/* initialize WINS server information */
+	for (i = 0; i < NBNS_SERVER_MAX; i++)
+	{
+		anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->nbns[i]);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -106,97 +119,152 @@ init_internal_addr(internal_addr_t *ia)
 static void
 get_internal_addr(struct connection *c, internal_addr_t *ia)
 {
-    if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_srcip))
-    {
-	/* not defined in connection - fetch it from LDAP */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-
-	ia->ipaddr = c->spd.that.host_srcip;
-
-	addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip));
-	plog("assigning virtual IP source address %s", srcip);
-    }
-
-    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))	/* We got an IP address, send it */
-    {
-	c->spd.that.client.addr     = ia->ipaddr;
-	c->spd.that.client.maskbits = 32;
-	c->spd.that.has_client      = TRUE;
-	
-	ia->attr_set = LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
-		     | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK);
-    }
-
-    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->dns[0]))	/* We got DNS addresses, send them */
-	ia->attr_set |= LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_DNS);
-
-    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->wins[0]))	/* We got WINS addresses, send them */
-	ia->attr_set |= LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS);
+	int i, dns_idx = 0, nbns_idx = 0;
+
+	if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_srcip))
+	{
+		/* not defined in connection - fetch it from LDAP */
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+		ia->ipaddr = c->spd.that.host_srcip;
+
+		addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip));
+		plog("assigning virtual IP source address %s", srcip);
+	}
+
+	if (!isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))        /* We got an IP address, send it */
+	{
+		c->spd.that.client.addr     = ia->ipaddr;
+		c->spd.that.client.maskbits = 32;
+		c->spd.that.has_client      = TRUE;
+		
+		ia->attr_set = LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
+					 | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK);
+	}
+
+	/* assign DNS servers */
+	for (i = 1; i <= DNS_SERVER_MAX; i++)
+	{
+		char dns_key[16], *dns_str;
+
+		snprintf(dns_key, sizeof(dns_key), "pluto.dns%d", i);
+		dns_str = lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings, dns_key, NULL);
+		if (dns_str)
+		{
+			err_t ugh;
+			sa_family_t family = strchr(dns_str, ':') ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
+
+			ugh = ttoaddr(dns_str, 0, family, &ia->dns[dns_idx]);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				plog("error in DNS server address: %s", ugh);
+				continue;
+			}
+			plog("assigning DNS server %s to peer", dns_str);
+
+			/* differentiate between IP4 and IP6 in modecfg_build_msg() */ 
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_DNS);
+			dns_idx++;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* assign WINS servers */
+	for (i = 1; i <= NBNS_SERVER_MAX; i++)
+	{
+		char nbns_key[16], *nbns_str;
+
+		snprintf(nbns_key, sizeof(nbns_key), "pluto.nbns%d", i);
+		nbns_str = lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings, nbns_key, NULL);
+		if (nbns_str)
+		{
+			err_t ugh;
+			sa_family_t family = strchr(nbns_str, ':') ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
+
+			ugh = ttoaddr(nbns_str, 0, family, &ia->nbns[nbns_idx]);
+			if (ugh != NULL)
+			{
+				plog("error in WINS server address: %s", ugh);
+				continue;
+			}
+			plog("assigning NBNS server %s to peer", nbns_str);
+
+			/* differentiate between IP4 and IP6 in modecfg_build_msg() */ 
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS);
+			nbns_idx++;
+		}
+	}
 }
 
+
 /*
  * Set srcip and client subnet to internal IP address
  */
 static bool
 set_internal_addr(struct connection *c, internal_addr_t *ia)
 {
-    if (ia->attr_set & LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
-    && !isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))
-    {
-	if (addrbytesptr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, NULL) == 0
-	|| isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip)
-	|| sameaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, &ia->ipaddr))
+	if (ia->attr_set & LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
+	&& !isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))
 	{
-	    char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+		if (addrbytesptr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, NULL) == 0
+		|| isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip)
+		|| sameaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, &ia->ipaddr))
+		{
+			char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-	    addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip));
-	    plog("setting virtual IP source address to %s", srcip);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    char old_srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	    char new_srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip));
+			plog("setting virtual IP source address to %s", srcip);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			char old_srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			char new_srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 
-	    addrtot(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, 0, old_srcip, sizeof(old_srcip));
-	    addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, new_srcip, sizeof(new_srcip));
-	    plog("replacing virtual IP source address %s by %s"
-		, old_srcip, new_srcip);
+			addrtot(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, 0, old_srcip, sizeof(old_srcip));
+			addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, new_srcip, sizeof(new_srcip));
+			plog("replacing virtual IP source address %s by %s"
+				, old_srcip, new_srcip);
+		}
+		
+		/* setting srcip */
+		c->spd.this.host_srcip = ia->ipaddr;
+
+		/* setting client subnet to srcip/32 */
+		addrtosubnet(&ia->ipaddr, &c->spd.this.client);
+		setportof(0, &c->spd.this.client.addr);
+		c->spd.this.has_client = TRUE;
+		return TRUE;
 	}
-	
-	/* setting srcip */
-	c->spd.this.host_srcip = ia->ipaddr;
-
-	/* setting client subnet to srcip/32 */
-	addrtosubnet(&ia->ipaddr, &c->spd.this.client);
-	setportof(0, &c->spd.this.client.addr);
-	c->spd.this.has_client = TRUE;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 /*
  * Compute HASH of Mode Config.
  */
-static size_t
-modecfg_hash(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof
-	    , const struct state *st)
+static size_t modecfg_hash(u_char *dest, u_char *start, u_char *roof,
+						   const struct state *st)
 {
-    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
-
-    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
-    hmac_update(&ctx, (const u_char *) &st->st_msgid, sizeof(st->st_msgid));
-    hmac_update(&ctx, start, roof-start);
-    hmac_final(dest, &ctx);
-
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("ModeCfg HASH computed:");
- 	DBG_dump("", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size)
-    ) 
-    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+	chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(st->st_msgid);
+	chunk_t msg_chunk = { start, roof - start };
+	size_t prf_block_size;
+	pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg;
+	prf_t *prf;
+
+	prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash);
+	prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg);
+	prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_a);
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, msgid_chunk, NULL);
+	prf->get_bytes(prf, msg_chunk, dest);
+	prf_block_size = prf->get_block_size(prf);
+	prf->destroy(prf);
+
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("ModeCfg HASH computed:");
+		DBG_dump("", dest, prf_block_size)
+	) 
+	return prf_block_size;
 }
 
 
@@ -205,202 +273,222 @@ modecfg_hash(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof
  */
 static stf_status
 modecfg_build_msg(struct state *st, pb_stream *rbody
-				  , u_int16_t msg_type
-				  , internal_addr_t *ia
-				  , u_int16_t ap_id)
+								  , u_int16_t msg_type
+								  , internal_addr_t *ia
+								  , u_int16_t ap_id)
 {
-    u_char *r_hash_start, *r_hashval;
+	u_char *r_hash_start, *r_hashval;
 
-    START_HASH_PAYLOAD(*rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR);
+	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(*rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR);
 
-    /* ATTR out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_mode_attr attrh;
-	struct isakmp_attribute attr;
-	pb_stream strattr,attrval;
-	int attr_type;
-	int dns_idx, wins_idx;
-	bool dont_advance;
-	bool is_xauth_attr_set = ia->xauth_attr_set != LEMPTY;
-	bool is_unity_attr_set = ia->unity_attr_set != LEMPTY;
-	lset_t attr_set = ia->attr_set;
-
-	attrh.isama_np         = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-	attrh.isama_type       = msg_type;
-	attrh.isama_identifier = ap_id;
-
-	if (!out_struct(&attrh, &isakmp_attr_desc, rbody, &strattr))
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-
-	attr_type = 0;
-	dns_idx = 0;
-	wins_idx = 0;
-
-	while (attr_set != LEMPTY || is_xauth_attr_set || is_unity_attr_set)
+	/* ATTR out */
 	{
-	    if (attr_set == LEMPTY)
-	    {
-		if (is_xauth_attr_set)
-	  	{
-		    attr_set = ia->xauth_attr_set;
-		    attr_type = XAUTH_BASE;
-		    is_xauth_attr_set = FALSE;
-		}
-		else
+		struct isakmp_mode_attr attrh;
+		struct isakmp_attribute attr;
+		pb_stream strattr,attrval;
+		int attr_type, dns_attr_type, nbns_attr_type;
+		int dns_idx, nbns_idx;
+		bool dont_advance;
+		bool is_xauth_attr_set = ia->xauth_attr_set != LEMPTY;
+		bool is_unity_attr_set = ia->unity_attr_set != LEMPTY;
+		lset_t attr_set = ia->attr_set;
+
+		attrh.isama_np         = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+		attrh.isama_type       = msg_type;
+		attrh.isama_identifier = ap_id;
+
+		if (!out_struct(&attrh, &isakmp_attr_desc, rbody, &strattr))
 		{
-		    attr_set = ia->unity_attr_set;
-		    attr_type = UNITY_BASE;
-		    is_unity_attr_set = FALSE;
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		}
-	    }
-	
-	    dont_advance = FALSE;
+		attr_type = 0;
+		dns_idx = 0;
+		nbns_idx = 0;
 
-	    if (attr_set & 1)
-	    {
-		const u_char *byte_ptr;
-		u_int len;
-
-		/* ISAKMP attr out */
-		if (attr_type == XAUTH_TYPE)
-		{
-		    attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
-		    attr.isaat_lv = ia->xauth_type;
-		}
-		else if (attr_type == XAUTH_STATUS)
+		while (attr_set != LEMPTY || is_xauth_attr_set || is_unity_attr_set)
 		{
-		    attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
-		    attr.isaat_lv = ia->xauth_status;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
-		}
-		out_struct(&attr, &isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc, &strattr, &attrval);
-
-		switch (attr_type)
-		{
-		case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS:
-		    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))
-		    {
-			len = addrbytesptr(&ia->ipaddr, &byte_ptr);
- 			out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_addr");
-		    }
- 		    break;
-		case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK:
-		    {
- 			u_int  mask;
-#if 0
-			char mask[4],bits[8]={0x00,0x80,0xc0,0xe0,0xf0,0xf8,0xfc,0xfe};
-			int t,m=st->st_connection->that.host_addr.maskbit;
-			for (t=0; t<4; t++)
+			if (attr_set == LEMPTY)
 			{
-			    if (m < 8)
-				mask[t] = bits[m];
-			    else
-				mask[t] = 0xff;
-			    m -= 8;
+				if (is_xauth_attr_set)
+				{
+					attr_set = ia->xauth_attr_set;
+					attr_type = XAUTH_BASE;
+					is_xauth_attr_set = FALSE;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					attr_set = ia->unity_attr_set;
+					attr_type = UNITY_BASE;
+					is_unity_attr_set = FALSE;
+				}
 			}
-#endif				    
-			if (st->st_connection->spd.this.client.maskbits == 0)
- 			    mask = 0;
- 			else
- 			    mask = 0xffffffff * 1;
-			    out_raw(&mask, 4, &attrval, "IP4_mask");
-		    }
-		    break;
-		case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET:
-		    {
-			char mask[4];
-			char bits[8] = {0x00,0x80,0xc0,0xe0,0xf0,0xf8,0xfc,0xfe};
-			int t;
-			int m = st->st_connection->spd.this.client.maskbits;
+		
+			dont_advance = FALSE;
 
-			for (t = 0; t < 4; t++)
+			if (attr_set & 1)
 			{
-			    if (m < 8)
-				mask[t] = bits[m];
-			    else
-				mask[t] = 0xff;
-			    m -= 8;
-			    if (m < 0)
-			        m = 0;
+				const u_char *byte_ptr;
+				u_int len;
+
+				/* ISAKMP attr out */
+				if (attr_type == XAUTH_TYPE)
+				{
+					attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+					attr.isaat_lv = ia->xauth_type;
+				}
+				else if (attr_type == XAUTH_STATUS)
+				{
+					attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+					attr.isaat_lv = ia->xauth_status;
+				}
+				else if (attr_type == INTERNAL_IP4_DNS && !isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
+				{
+					dns_attr_type = (addrtypeof(&ia->dns[dns_idx]) == AF_INET) ?
+										INTERNAL_IP4_DNS : INTERNAL_IP6_DNS;
+					attr.isaat_af_type = dns_attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
+
+				}
+				else if (attr_type == INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS && !isanyaddr(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx]))
+				{
+					nbns_attr_type = (addrtypeof(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx]) == AF_INET) ?
+										INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS : INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS;
+					attr.isaat_af_type = nbns_attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
+
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
+				}
+				out_struct(&attr, &isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc, &strattr, &attrval);
+
+				switch (attr_type)
+				{
+				case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS:
+					if (!isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))
+					{
+						len = addrbytesptr(&ia->ipaddr, &byte_ptr);
+						out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_addr");
+					}
+					break;
+				case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK:
+					{
+						u_int  mask;
+#if 0
+						char mask[4],bits[8]={0x00,0x80,0xc0,0xe0,0xf0,0xf8,0xfc,0xfe};
+						int t,m=st->st_connection->that.host_addr.maskbit;
+						for (t=0; t<4; t++)
+						{
+							if (m < 8)
+								mask[t] = bits[m];
+							else
+								mask[t] = 0xff;
+							m -= 8;
+						}
+#endif                              
+						if (st->st_connection->spd.this.client.maskbits == 0)
+						{
+							mask = 0;
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							mask = 0xffffffff * 1;
+							out_raw(&mask, 4, &attrval, "IP4_mask");
+						}
+					}
+					break;
+				case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET:
+					{
+						char mask[4];
+						char bits[8] = {0x00,0x80,0xc0,0xe0,0xf0,0xf8,0xfc,0xfe};
+						int t;
+						int m = st->st_connection->spd.this.client.maskbits;
+
+						for (t = 0; t < 4; t++)
+						{
+							mask[t] = (m < 8) ? bits[m] : 0xff;
+							m -= 8;
+							if (m < 0)
+							{
+								m = 0;
+							}
+						}
+						len = addrbytesptr(&st->st_connection->spd.this.client.addr, &byte_ptr);
+						out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_subnet");
+						out_raw(mask, sizeof(mask), &attrval, "IP4_submsk");
+					}
+					break;
+				case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS:
+				case INTERNAL_IP6_DNS:
+					if (!isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
+					{
+						len = addrbytesptr(&ia->dns[dns_idx++], &byte_ptr);
+						out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP_dns");
+					}
+					if (dns_idx < DNS_SERVER_MAX && !isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
+					{
+						dont_advance = TRUE;
+					}
+					break;
+				case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS:
+				case INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS:
+					if (!isanyaddr(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx]))
+					{
+						len = addrbytesptr(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx++], &byte_ptr);
+						out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP_nbns");
+					}
+					if (nbns_idx < NBNS_SERVER_MAX && !isanyaddr(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx]))
+					{
+						dont_advance = TRUE;
+					}
+					break;
+				case XAUTH_TYPE:
+					break;
+				case XAUTH_USER_NAME:
+					if (ia->xauth_secret.user_name.ptr != NULL)
+					{
+						out_raw(ia->xauth_secret.user_name.ptr
+							  , ia->xauth_secret.user_name.len
+							  , &attrval, "xauth_user_name");
+					}
+					break;
+				case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD:
+					if (ia->xauth_secret.user_password.ptr != NULL)
+					{
+						out_raw(ia->xauth_secret.user_password.ptr
+							  , ia->xauth_secret.user_password.len
+							  , &attrval, "xauth_user_password");
+					}
+					break;
+				case XAUTH_STATUS:
+					break;
+				case UNITY_BANNER:
+					if (ia->unity_banner != NULL)
+					{
+						out_raw(ia->unity_banner
+							  , strlen(ia->unity_banner)
+							  , &attrval, "UNITY_BANNER");
+					}
+					break;
+				default:
+					plog("attempt to send unsupported mode cfg attribute %s."
+						 , enum_show(&modecfg_attr_names, attr_type));
+					break;
+				}
+				close_output_pbs(&attrval);
+			}
+			if (!dont_advance)
+			{
+				attr_type++;
+				attr_set >>= 1;
 			}
-			len = addrbytesptr(&st->st_connection->spd.this.client.addr, &byte_ptr);
-			out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_subnet");
-			out_raw(mask, sizeof(mask), &attrval, "IP4_submsk");
-		    }
-		    break;
-		case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS:
-		    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
-		    {
- 		    	len = addrbytesptr(&ia->dns[dns_idx++], &byte_ptr);
- 		        out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_dns");
-		    }
-		    if (dns_idx < 2 && !isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
-		    {
-			dont_advance = TRUE;
-		    }
- 		    break;
-		case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS:
-		    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->wins[wins_idx]))
-		    {
-			len = addrbytesptr(&ia->wins[wins_idx++], &byte_ptr);
-			out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_wins");
-		    }
-		    if (wins_idx < 2 && !isanyaddr(&ia->wins[wins_idx]))
-		    {
-			dont_advance = TRUE;
-		    }
-		    break;
-		case XAUTH_TYPE:
-		    break;
-		case XAUTH_USER_NAME:
-		    if (ia->xauth_secret.user_name.ptr != NULL)
-		    {
-			out_raw(ia->xauth_secret.user_name.ptr
-			      , ia->xauth_secret.user_name.len
-			      , &attrval, "xauth_user_name");
-		    }
-		    break;
-		case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD:
-		    if (ia->xauth_secret.user_password.ptr != NULL)
-		    {
-			out_raw(ia->xauth_secret.user_password.ptr
-			      , ia->xauth_secret.user_password.len
-			      , &attrval, "xauth_user_password");
-		    }
-		    break;
-		case XAUTH_STATUS:
-		    break;
-		case UNITY_BANNER:
-		    if (ia->unity_banner != NULL)
-		    {
-			out_raw(ia->unity_banner
-			      , strlen(ia->unity_banner)
-			      , &attrval, "UNITY_BANNER");
-		    }
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    plog("attempt to send unsupported mode cfg attribute %s."
-			 , enum_show(&modecfg_attr_names, attr_type));
-		    break;
 		}
-		close_output_pbs(&attrval);
-	    }
-	    if (!dont_advance)
-	    {
-		attr_type++;
-		attr_set >>= 1;
-	    }
+		close_message(&strattr);
 	}
-	close_message(&strattr);
-    }
 
-    modecfg_hash(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody->cur, st);
-    close_message(rbody);
-    encrypt_message(rbody, st);
-    return STF_OK;
+	modecfg_hash(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody->cur, st);
+	close_message(rbody);
+	encrypt_message(rbody, st);
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -409,55 +497,56 @@ modecfg_build_msg(struct state *st, pb_stream *rbody
 static stf_status
 modecfg_send_msg(struct state *st, int isama_type, internal_addr_t *ia)
 {
-    pb_stream msg;
-    pb_stream rbody;
-    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-    /* set up attr */
-    init_pbs(&msg, buf, sizeof(buf), "ModeCfg msg buffer");
-
-    /* this is the beginning of a new exchange */
-    st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(st);
-    init_phase2_iv(st, &st->st_msgid);
-
-    /* HDR out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
-
-	zero(&hdr);	/* default to 0 */
-	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
-	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
-	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG;
-	hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid;
-
-	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &msg, &rbody))
+	pb_stream msg;
+	pb_stream rbody;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	/* set up attr */
+	init_pbs(&msg, buf, sizeof(buf), "ModeCfg msg buffer");
+
+	/* this is the beginning of a new exchange */
+	st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(st);
+	init_phase2_iv(st, &st->st_msgid);
+
+	/* HDR out */
 	{
-	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+		zero(&hdr);     /* default to 0 */
+		hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+		hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+		hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG;
+		hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid;
+
+		if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &msg, &rbody))
+		{
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* ATTR out */
-    modecfg_build_msg(st, &rbody
-			, isama_type
-			, ia
-			, 0 /* XXX isama_id */
-		     );
-
-    freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
-    clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, msg.start, pbs_offset(&msg), "ModeCfg msg");
-
-    /* Transmit */
-    send_packet(st, "ModeCfg msg");
-
-    if (st->st_event->ev_type != EVENT_RETRANSMIT)
-    {
-	delete_event(st);
-	event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
-    }
-    return STF_OK;
+
+	/* ATTR out */
+	modecfg_build_msg(st, &rbody
+						, isama_type
+						, ia
+						, 0 /* XXX isama_id */
+					 );
+
+	free(st->st_tpacket.ptr);
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(msg.start, pbs_offset(&msg));
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_tpacket);
+
+	/* Transmit */
+	send_packet(st, "ModeCfg msg");
+
+	if (st->st_event->ev_type != EVENT_RETRANSMIT)
+	{
+		delete_event(st);
+		event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
+	}
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -466,111 +555,184 @@ modecfg_send_msg(struct state *st, int isama_type, internal_addr_t *ia)
 static stf_status
 modecfg_parse_attributes(pb_stream *attrs, internal_addr_t *ia)
 {
-    struct isakmp_attribute attr;
-    pb_stream strattr;
-
-    while (pbs_left(attrs) >= sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute))
-    {
-	u_int16_t attr_type;
-	u_int16_t attr_len;
+	struct isakmp_attribute attr;
+	pb_stream strattr;
+	err_t ugh;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	int dns_idx = 0;
+	int nbns_idx = 0;
 
-	if (!in_struct(&attr, &isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc, attrs, &strattr))
+	while (pbs_left(attrs) >= sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute))
 	{
-	    return STF_FAIL;
-	}
-	attr_type = attr.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK;
-	attr_len  = attr.isaat_lv;
+		u_int16_t attr_type;
+		u_int16_t attr_len;
 
-	switch (attr_type)
-	{
-	case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS:
-	    if (attr_len == 4)
-	    {
-		initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 4, AF_INET, &ia->ipaddr);
-	    }
-	    /* fall through to set attribute flag */
-	case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK:
-	case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS:
-	case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET:
-	case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS:
-	case INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY:
-	case INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP:
-	case INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS:
-	case INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK:
-	case INTERNAL_IP6_DNS:
-	case INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS:
-	case INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP:
-	case SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES:
-	case INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET:
-	    ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
-	    break;
-	case APPLICATION_VERSION:
-	    if (attr_len > 0)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		    DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
-		)
-	    }
-	    ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
-	    break;
-	case XAUTH_TYPE:
-	    ia->xauth_type = attr.isaat_lv;
-	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
-	    break;
-	case XAUTH_USER_NAME:
-	    setchunk(ia->xauth_secret.user_name, strattr.cur, attr_len);
-	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
-	    break;
-	case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD:
-	    setchunk(ia->xauth_secret.user_password, strattr.cur, attr_len);
-	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
-	    break;
-	case XAUTH_STATUS:
-	    ia->xauth_status = attr.isaat_lv;
-	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
-	    break;
-	case XAUTH_MESSAGE:
-	    if (attr_len > 0)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		    DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
-		)
-	    }
-	    /* fall through to set attribute flag */
-	case XAUTH_PASSCODE:
-	case XAUTH_CHALLENGE:
-	case XAUTH_DOMAIN:
-	case XAUTH_NEXT_PIN:
-	case XAUTH_ANSWER:
-	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
-	    break;
-	case UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME:
-	    if (attr_len > 0)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		    DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
-		)
-	    }
-	    /* fall through to set attribute flag */
-	case UNITY_BANNER:
-	case UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD:
-	case UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN:
-	case UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME:
-	case UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE:
-	case UNITY_NATT_PORT:
-	case UNITY_LOCAL_LAN:
-	case UNITY_PFS:
-	case UNITY_FW_TYPE:
-	case UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS:
-	    ia->unity_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - UNITY_BASE);
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    plog("unsupported ModeCfg attribute %s received."
-		, enum_show(&modecfg_attr_names, attr_type));
-	    break;
+		if (!in_struct(&attr, &isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc, attrs, &strattr))
+		{
+			return STF_FAIL;
+		}
+		attr_type = attr.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK;
+		attr_len  = attr.isaat_lv;
+
+		switch (attr_type)
+		{
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS:
+			if (attr_len == 4)
+			{
+				ugh = initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 4, AF_INET, &ia->ipaddr);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					plog("received invalid virtual IPv4 address: %s", ugh);
+				}
+			}
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS:
+			if (attr_len == 4 && dns_idx < DNS_SERVER_MAX)
+			{
+				ugh = initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 4, AF_INET, &ia->dns[dns_idx]);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					plog("received invalid IPv4 DNS server address: %s", ugh);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					addrtot(&ia->dns[dns_idx], 0, buf, BUF_LEN);
+					plog("received IPv4 DNS server address %s", buf);
+					dns_idx++;
+				}
+			}
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS:
+			if (attr_len == 4 && nbns_idx < NBNS_SERVER_MAX)
+			{
+				ugh = initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 4, AF_INET, &ia->nbns[nbns_idx]);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					plog("received invalid IPv4 WINS server address: %s", ugh);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					addrtot(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx], 0, buf, BUF_LEN);
+					plog("received IPv4 WINS server address %s", buf);
+					nbns_idx++;
+				}
+			}
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP6_DNS:
+			if (attr_len == 16 && dns_idx < DNS_SERVER_MAX)
+			{
+				ugh = initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 16, AF_INET6, &ia->dns[dns_idx]);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					plog("received invalid IPv6 DNS server address: %s", ugh);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					addrtot(&ia->dns[dns_idx], 0, buf, BUF_LEN);
+					plog("received IPv6 DNS server address %s", buf);
+					dns_idx++;
+				}
+			}
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS:
+			if (attr_len == 16 && nbns_idx < NBNS_SERVER_MAX)
+			{
+				ugh = initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 16, AF_INET6, &ia->nbns[nbns_idx]);
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					plog("received invalid IPv6 WINS server address: %s", ugh);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					addrtot(&ia->nbns[nbns_idx], 0, buf, BUF_LEN);
+					plog("received IPv6 WINS server address %s", buf);
+					nbns_idx++;
+				}
+			}
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK:
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET:
+		case INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY:
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP:
+		case INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS:
+		case INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK:
+		case INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP:
+		case SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES:
+		case INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET:
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case APPLICATION_VERSION:
+			if (attr_len > 0)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+					DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
+				)
+			}
+			ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+			break;
+		case XAUTH_TYPE:
+			ia->xauth_type = attr.isaat_lv;
+			ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+			break;
+		case XAUTH_USER_NAME:
+			ia->xauth_secret.user_name = chunk_create(strattr.cur, attr_len);
+			ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+			break;
+		case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD:
+			ia->xauth_secret.user_password = chunk_create(strattr.cur, attr_len);
+			ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+			break;
+		case XAUTH_STATUS:
+			ia->xauth_status = attr.isaat_lv;
+			ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+			break;
+		case XAUTH_MESSAGE:
+			if (attr_len > 0)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+					DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
+				)
+			}
+			/* fall through to set attribute flag */
+		case XAUTH_PASSCODE:
+		case XAUTH_CHALLENGE:
+		case XAUTH_DOMAIN:
+		case XAUTH_NEXT_PIN:
+		case XAUTH_ANSWER:
+			ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+			break;
+		case UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME:
+			if (attr_len > 0)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+					DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
+				)
+			}
+			/* fall through to set attribute flag */
+		case UNITY_BANNER:
+		case UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD:
+		case UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN:
+		case UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME:
+		case UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE:
+		case UNITY_NATT_PORT:
+		case UNITY_LOCAL_LAN:
+		case UNITY_PFS:
+		case UNITY_FW_TYPE:
+		case UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS:
+			ia->unity_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - UNITY_BASE);
+			break;
+		default:
+			plog("unsupported ModeCfg attribute %s received."
+				, enum_show(&modecfg_attr_names, attr_type));
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return STF_OK;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* 
@@ -578,50 +740,52 @@ modecfg_parse_attributes(pb_stream *attrs, internal_addr_t *ia)
  */
 static stf_status
 modecfg_parse_msg(struct msg_digest *md, int isama_type, u_int16_t *isama_id
-		, internal_addr_t *ia)
+				, internal_addr_t *ia)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    struct payload_digest *p;
-    stf_status stat;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	struct payload_digest *p;
+	stf_status stat;
 
-    st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;
+	st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;
 
-    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, modecfg_hash(hash_val
-				    , hash_pbs->roof
-				    , md->message_pbs.roof, st)
-		       , "MODECFG-HASH", "ISAKMP_CFG_MSG");
+	CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, modecfg_hash(hash_val
+									, hash_pbs->roof
+									, md->message_pbs.roof, st)
+					   , "MODECFG-HASH", "ISAKMP_CFG_MSG");
 
-    /* process the ModeCfg payloads received */
-    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	internal_addr_t ia_candidate;
+	/* process the ModeCfg payloads received */
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+		internal_addr_t ia_candidate;
 
-	init_internal_addr(&ia_candidate);
+		init_internal_addr(&ia_candidate);
 
-	if (p->payload.attribute.isama_type == isama_type)
-	{
-	    *isama_id = p->payload.attribute.isama_identifier;
+		if (p->payload.attribute.isama_type == isama_type)
+		{
+			*isama_id = p->payload.attribute.isama_identifier;
 
-	    stat = modecfg_parse_attributes(&p->pbs, &ia_candidate);
-	    if (stat == STF_OK)
-	    {
-		/* return with a valid set of attributes */
-		*ia = ia_candidate;
-		return STF_OK;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    plog("expected %s, got %s instead (ignored)"
-		, enum_name(&attr_msg_type_names, isama_type)
-		, enum_name(&attr_msg_type_names, p->payload.attribute.isama_type));
+			stat = modecfg_parse_attributes(&p->pbs, &ia_candidate);
+			if (stat == STF_OK)
+			{
+				/* return with a valid set of attributes */
+				*ia = ia_candidate;
+				return STF_OK;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("expected %s, got %s instead (ignored)"
+				, enum_name(&attr_msg_type_names, isama_type)
+				, enum_name(&attr_msg_type_names, p->payload.attribute.isama_type));
 
-	    stat = modecfg_parse_attributes(&p->pbs, &ia_candidate);
+			stat = modecfg_parse_attributes(&p->pbs, &ia_candidate);
+		}
+		if (stat != STF_OK)
+		{
+			return stat;
+		}
 	}
-	if (stat != STF_OK)
-	    return stat;
-    }
-    return STF_IGNORE;
+	return STF_IGNORE;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -630,20 +794,22 @@ modecfg_parse_msg(struct msg_digest *md, int isama_type, u_int16_t *isama_id
 stf_status
 modecfg_send_request(struct state *st)
 {
-    stf_status stat;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
 
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
 
-    ia.attr_set = LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
-	        | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK);
+	ia.attr_set = LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
+				| LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK);
 
-    plog("sending ModeCfg request");
-    st->st_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_I1;
-    stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &ia);
-    if (stat == STF_OK)
-	st->st_modecfg.started = TRUE;
-    return stat;
+	plog("sending ModeCfg request");
+	st->st_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_I1;
+	stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &ia);
+	if (stat == STF_OK)
+	{
+		st->st_modecfg.started = TRUE;
+	}
+	return stat;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R0:
@@ -654,38 +820,40 @@ modecfg_send_request(struct state *st)
 stf_status
 modecfg_inR0(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    bool want_unity_banner;
-    stf_status stat, stat_build;
-
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
-
-    want_unity_banner = (ia.unity_attr_set & LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE)) != LEMPTY;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	bool want_unity_banner;
+	stf_status stat, stat_build;
 
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-    get_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat;
+	}
 
-    if (want_unity_banner)
-    {
-	ia.unity_banner = UNITY_BANNER_STR;
-	ia.unity_attr_set |= LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE);
-    }
+	want_unity_banner = (ia.unity_attr_set & LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE)) != LEMPTY;
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	get_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
 
-    plog("sending ModeCfg reply");
+	if (want_unity_banner)
+	{
+		ia.unity_banner = UNITY_BANNER_STR;
+		ia.unity_attr_set |= LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE);
+	}
 
-    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
-				     , ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY
-				     , &ia
-				     , isama_id);
-    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
-	return stat_build;
+	plog("sending ModeCfg reply");
 
-    st->st_msgid = 0;
-    return STF_OK;
+	stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+									 , ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY
+									 , &ia
+									 , isama_id);
+	if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat_build;
+	}
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I1:
@@ -696,20 +864,21 @@ modecfg_inR0(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 modecfg_inI1(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    stf_status stat;
-
-    plog("parsing ModeCfg reply");
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat;
 
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
+	plog("parsing ModeCfg reply");
 
-    st->st_modecfg.vars_set = set_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
-    st->st_msgid = 0;
-    return STF_OK;
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat;
+	}
+	st->st_modecfg.vars_set = set_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 
@@ -719,23 +888,25 @@ modecfg_inI1(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 modecfg_send_set(struct state *st)
 {
-    stf_status stat;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
 
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-    get_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	get_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
 
 #ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
-    ia.unity_banner = UNITY_BANNER_STR;
-    ia.unity_attr_set |= LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE);
+	ia.unity_banner = UNITY_BANNER_STR;
+	ia.unity_attr_set |= LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE);
 #endif
 
    plog("sending ModeCfg set");
-    st->st_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_R3;
-    stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &ia);
-    if (stat == STF_OK)
-	st->st_modecfg.started = TRUE;
-    return stat;
+	st->st_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_R3;
+	stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &ia);
+	if (stat == STF_OK)
+	{
+		st->st_modecfg.started = TRUE;
+	}
+	return stat;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I0:
@@ -746,38 +917,40 @@ modecfg_send_set(struct state *st)
 stf_status
 modecfg_inI0(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    lset_t attr_set, unity_attr_set;
-    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	lset_t attr_set, unity_attr_set;
+	stf_status stat, stat_build;
 
-    plog("parsing ModeCfg set");
+	plog("parsing ModeCfg set");
 
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
-
-    st->st_modecfg.vars_set = set_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
-
-    /* prepare ModeCfg ack which sends zero length attributes */
-    attr_set = ia.attr_set;
-    unity_attr_set = ia.unity_attr_set;
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-    ia.attr_set = attr_set & SUPPORTED_ATTR_SET;
-    ia.unity_attr_set = unity_attr_set & SUPPORTED_UNITY_ATTR_SET;
-
-    plog("sending ModeCfg ack");
-
-    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
-			 	     , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK
-			 	     , &ia
-			 	     , isama_id);
-    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
-	return stat_build;
-
-    st->st_msgid = 0;
-    return STF_OK;
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat;
+	}
+	st->st_modecfg.vars_set = set_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+
+	/* prepare ModeCfg ack which sends zero length attributes */
+	attr_set = ia.attr_set;
+	unity_attr_set = ia.unity_attr_set;
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	ia.attr_set = attr_set & SUPPORTED_ATTR_SET;
+	ia.unity_attr_set = unity_attr_set & SUPPORTED_UNITY_ATTR_SET;
+
+	plog("sending ModeCfg ack");
+
+	stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+									 , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK
+									 , &ia
+									 , isama_id);
+	if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat_build;
+	}
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R3:
@@ -788,19 +961,20 @@ modecfg_inI0(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 modecfg_inR3(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    stf_status stat;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat;
 
-    plog("parsing ModeCfg ack");
-
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
+	plog("parsing ModeCfg ack");
 
-    st->st_msgid = 0;
-    return STF_OK;
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat;
+	}
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -809,19 +983,21 @@ modecfg_inR3(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 xauth_send_request(struct state *st)
 {
-    stf_status stat;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-    ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME     - XAUTH_BASE)
-		      | LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE);
-
-    plog("sending XAUTH request");
-    st->st_state = STATE_XAUTH_R1;
-    stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &ia);
-    if (stat == STF_OK)
-	st->st_xauth.started = TRUE;
-    return stat;
+	stf_status stat;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME     - XAUTH_BASE)
+					  | LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE);
+
+	plog("sending XAUTH request");
+	st->st_state = STATE_XAUTH_R1;
+	stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &ia);
+	if (stat == STF_OK)
+	{
+		st->st_xauth.started = TRUE;
+	}
+	return stat;
 }
 
 /* STATE_XAUTH_I0:
@@ -832,97 +1008,102 @@ xauth_send_request(struct state *st)
 stf_status
 xauth_inI0(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    stf_status stat, stat_build;
-    bool xauth_type_present;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat, stat_build;
+	bool xauth_type_present;
 
-    plog("parsing XAUTH request");
+	plog("parsing XAUTH request");
 
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
- 
-    /* check XAUTH attributes */
-    xauth_type_present = (ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_TYPE - XAUTH_BASE)) != LEMPTY;
-
-    if (xauth_type_present && ia.xauth_type != XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC)
-    {
-	plog("xauth type %s is not supported", enum_name(&xauth_type_names, ia.xauth_type));
-	stat = STF_FAIL;
-    }
-    else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
-    {
-	plog("user name attribute is missing in XAUTH request");
-	stat = STF_FAIL;
-    }
-    else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
-    {
-	plog("user password attribute is missing in XAUTH request");
-	stat = STF_FAIL;
-    }
-
-    /* prepare XAUTH reply */
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-
-    if (stat == STF_OK)
-    {
-	/* get user credentials using a plugin function */
-	if (!xauth_module.get_secret(&ia.xauth_secret))
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
 	{
-	    plog("xauth user credentials not found");
-	    stat = STF_FAIL;
+		return stat;
 	}
-    }
-    if (stat == STF_OK)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("my xauth user name is '%.*s'"
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.len
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr)
-	)
-	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	    DBG_log("my xauth user password is '%.*s'"
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.len
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr)
-	)
-	ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME     - XAUTH_BASE)
-		 	  | LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE);
-        if (xauth_type_present)
-	    ia.xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(XAUTH_TYPE - XAUTH_BASE);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE);
-	ia.xauth_status = XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
-    }
 
-    plog("sending XAUTH reply");
+	/* check XAUTH attributes */
+	xauth_type_present = (ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_TYPE - XAUTH_BASE)) != LEMPTY;
 
-    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
-				     , ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY
-				     , &ia
-				     , isama_id);
-    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
-	return stat_build;
+	if (xauth_type_present && ia.xauth_type != XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC)
+	{
+		plog("xauth type %s is not supported", enum_name(&xauth_type_names, ia.xauth_type));
+		stat = STF_FAIL;
+	}
+	else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+	{
+		plog("user name attribute is missing in XAUTH request");
+		stat = STF_FAIL;
+	}
+	else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+	{
+		plog("user password attribute is missing in XAUTH request");
+		stat = STF_FAIL;
+	}
 
-    if (stat == STF_OK)
-    {
-	st->st_xauth.started = TRUE;
-	st->st_msgid = 0;
-	return STF_OK;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* send XAUTH reply msg and then delete ISAKMP SA */
-	freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
-	clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, md->reply.start
-	    , pbs_offset(&md->reply), "XAUTH reply msg");
-	send_packet(st, "XAUTH reply msg");
-	delete_state(st);
-	return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
+	/* prepare XAUTH reply */
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+
+	if (stat == STF_OK)
+	{
+		/* get user credentials using a plugin function */
+		if (!xauth_module.get_secret(&ia.xauth_secret))
+		{
+			plog("xauth user credentials not found");
+			stat = STF_FAIL;
+		}
+	}
+	if (stat == STF_OK)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("my xauth user name is '%.*s'"
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.len
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr)
+		)
+		DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+			DBG_log("my xauth user password is '%.*s'"
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.len
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr)
+		)
+		ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME     - XAUTH_BASE)
+						  | LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE);
+		if (xauth_type_present)
+		{
+			ia.xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(XAUTH_TYPE - XAUTH_BASE);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE);
+		ia.xauth_status = XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
+	}
+
+	plog("sending XAUTH reply");
+
+	stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+									 , ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY
+									 , &ia
+									 , isama_id);
+	if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat_build;
+	}
+	if (stat == STF_OK)
+	{
+		st->st_xauth.started = TRUE;
+		st->st_msgid = 0;
+		return STF_OK;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* send XAUTH reply msg and then delete ISAKMP SA */
+		free(st->st_tpacket.ptr);
+		st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(md->reply.start, pbs_offset(&md->reply));
+		st->st_tpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_tpacket);
+		send_packet(st, "XAUTH reply msg");
+		delete_state(st);
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* STATE_XAUTH_R1:
@@ -933,72 +1114,76 @@ xauth_inI0(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 xauth_inR1(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat, stat_build;
 
-    plog("parsing XAUTH reply");
+	plog("parsing XAUTH reply");
 
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
- 
-    /* did the client return an XAUTH FAIL status? */
-    if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE)) != LEMPTY)
-    {
-	plog("received FAIL status in XAUTH reply");
-
-	/* client is not able to do XAUTH, delete ISAKMP SA */
-	delete_state(st);
-	return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
-
-    /* check XAUTH reply */
-    if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
-    {
-	plog("user name attribute is missing in XAUTH reply");
-	st->st_xauth.status = FALSE;
-    }
-    else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
-    {
-	plog("user password attribute is missing in XAUTH reply");
-	st->st_xauth.status = FALSE;
-    }
-    else 
-    {
-	xauth_peer_t peer;
-
-	peer.conn_name = st->st_connection->name;
-	addrtot(&md->sender, 0, peer.ip_address, sizeof(peer.ip_address));
-	idtoa(&md->st->st_connection->spd.that.id, peer.id, sizeof(peer.id));
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("peer xauth user name is '%.*s'"
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.len
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr)
-	)
-	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	    DBG_log("peer xauth user password is '%.*s'"
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.len
-		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr)
-	)
-	/* verify the user credentials using a plugin function */
-	st->st_xauth.status = xauth_module.verify_secret(&peer, &ia.xauth_secret);
-	plog("extended authentication %s", st->st_xauth.status? "was successful":"failed");
-    }
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat;
+	}
+
+	/* did the client return an XAUTH FAIL status? */
+	if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE)) != LEMPTY)
+	{
+		plog("received FAIL status in XAUTH reply");
+
+		/* client is not able to do XAUTH, delete ISAKMP SA */
+		delete_state(st);
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+
+	/* check XAUTH reply */
+	if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+	{
+		plog("user name attribute is missing in XAUTH reply");
+		st->st_xauth.status = FALSE;
+	}
+	else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+	{
+		plog("user password attribute is missing in XAUTH reply");
+		st->st_xauth.status = FALSE;
+	}
+	else 
+	{
+		xauth_peer_t peer;
+
+		peer.conn_name = st->st_connection->name;
+		addrtot(&md->sender, 0, peer.ip_address, sizeof(peer.ip_address));
+		idtoa(&md->st->st_connection->spd.that.id, peer.id, sizeof(peer.id));
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("peer xauth user name is '%.*s'"
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.len
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr)
+		)
+		DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+			DBG_log("peer xauth user password is '%.*s'"
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.len
+				   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr)
+		)
+		/* verify the user credentials using a plugin function */
+		st->st_xauth.status = xauth_module.verify_secret(&peer, &ia.xauth_secret);
+		plog("extended authentication %s", st->st_xauth.status? "was successful":"failed");
+	}
 
-    /* prepare XAUTH set which sends the authentication status */
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-    ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE);
-    ia.xauth_status = (st->st_xauth.status)? XAUTH_STATUS_OK : XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
+	/* prepare XAUTH set which sends the authentication status */
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE);
+	ia.xauth_status = (st->st_xauth.status)? XAUTH_STATUS_OK : XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
 
-    plog("sending XAUTH status:");
+	plog("sending XAUTH status:");
 
-    stat_build = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &ia);
-    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
-	return stat_build;
-    return STF_OK;
+	stat_build = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &ia);
+	if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat_build;
+	}
+	return STF_OK;
 }
 
 /* STATE_XAUTH_I1:
@@ -1009,47 +1194,48 @@ xauth_inR1(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 xauth_inI1(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    stf_status stat, stat_build;
-
-    plog("parsing XAUTH status");
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-    {
-	/* notification payload - not exactly the right choice, but okay */
-	md->note = ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-	return stat;
-    }
-
-    st->st_xauth.status = ia.xauth_status;
-    plog("extended authentication %s", st->st_xauth.status? "was successful":"failed");
-
-    plog("sending XAUTH ack");
-    init_internal_addr(&ia);
-    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
-				     , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK
-				     , &ia
-				     , isama_id);
-    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
-	return stat_build;
- 
-    if (st->st_xauth.status)
-    {
-	st->st_msgid = 0;
-	return STF_OK;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* send XAUTH ack msg and then delete ISAKMP SA */
-	freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
-	clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, md->reply.start
-	    , pbs_offset(&md->reply), "XAUTH ack msg");
-	send_packet(st, "XAUTH ack msg");
-	delete_state(st);
-	return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat, stat_build;
+
+	plog("parsing XAUTH status");
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		/* notification payload - not exactly the right choice, but okay */
+		md->note = ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+		return stat;
+	}
+
+	st->st_xauth.status = ia.xauth_status;
+	plog("extended authentication %s", st->st_xauth.status? "was successful":"failed");
+
+	plog("sending XAUTH ack");
+	init_internal_addr(&ia);
+	stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+									 , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK
+									 , &ia
+									 , isama_id);
+	if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat_build;
+	}
+	if (st->st_xauth.status)
+	{
+		st->st_msgid = 0;
+		return STF_OK;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* send XAUTH ack msg and then delete ISAKMP SA */
+		free(st->st_tpacket.ptr);
+		st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(md->reply.start, pbs_offset(&md->reply));
+		st->st_tpacket = chunk_clone(st->st_tpacket);
+		send_packet(st, "XAUTH ack msg");
+		delete_state(st);
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* STATE_XAUTH_R2:
@@ -1060,25 +1246,26 @@ xauth_inI1(struct msg_digest *md)
 stf_status
 xauth_inR2(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct state *const st = md->st;
-    u_int16_t isama_id;
-    internal_addr_t ia;
-    stf_status stat;
+	struct state *const st = md->st;
+	u_int16_t isama_id;
+	internal_addr_t ia;
+	stf_status stat;
 
-    plog("parsing XAUTH ack");
+	plog("parsing XAUTH ack");
 
-    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, &isama_id, &ia);
-    if (stat != STF_OK)
-	return stat;
-
-    st->st_msgid = 0;
-    if (st->st_xauth.status)
-    {
-	return STF_OK;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	delete_state(st);
-	return STF_IGNORE;
-    }
+	stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, &isama_id, &ia);
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	{
+		return stat;
+	}
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	if (st->st_xauth.status)
+	{
+		return STF_OK;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		delete_state(st);
+		return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/modecfg.h b/src/pluto/modecfg.h
index 95481de89..86bfc6ed2 100644
--- a/src/pluto/modecfg.h
+++ b/src/pluto/modecfg.h
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: modecfg.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _MODECFG_H
diff --git a/src/pluto/mp_defs.c b/src/pluto/mp_defs.c
deleted file mode 100644
index cdae8ee79..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/mp_defs.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
-/* some multiprecision utilities
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: mp_defs.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-
-/* Convert MP_INT to network form (binary octets, big-endian).
- * We do the malloc; caller must eventually do free.
- */
-chunk_t
-mpz_to_n(const MP_INT *mp, size_t bytes)
-{
-    chunk_t r;
-    MP_INT temp1, temp2;
-    int i;
-
-    r.len = bytes;
-    r.ptr = alloc_bytes(r.len, "host representation of large integer");
-
-    mpz_init(&temp1);
-    mpz_init(&temp2);
-
-    mpz_set(&temp1, mp);
-
-    for (i = r.len-1; i >= 0; i--)
-    {
-	r.ptr[i] = mpz_mdivmod_ui(&temp2, NULL, &temp1, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
-	mpz_set(&temp1, &temp2);
-    }
-
-    passert(mpz_sgn(&temp1) == 0);	/* we must have done all the bits */
-    mpz_clear(&temp1);
-    mpz_clear(&temp2);
-
-    return r;
-}
-
-/* Convert network form (binary bytes, big-endian) to MP_INT.
- * The *mp must not be previously mpz_inited.
- */
-void
-n_to_mpz(MP_INT *mp, const u_char *nbytes, size_t nlen)
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    mpz_init_set_ui(mp, 0);
-
-    for (i = 0; i != nlen; i++)
-    {
-	mpz_mul_ui(mp, mp, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
-	mpz_add_ui(mp, mp, nbytes[i]);
-    }
-}
diff --git a/src/pluto/mp_defs.h b/src/pluto/mp_defs.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e0ec74df8..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/mp_defs.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-/* some multiprecision utilities
- * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: mp_defs.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#ifndef _MP_DEFS_H
-#define _MP_DEFS_H
-
-#include <gmp.h>
-
-#include "defs.h"
-
-extern void n_to_mpz(MP_INT *mp, const u_char *nbytes, size_t nlen);
-extern chunk_t mpz_to_n(const MP_INT *mp, size_t bytes);
-
-/* var := mod(base ** exp, mod), ensuring var is mpz_inited */
-#define mpz_init_powm(flag, var, base, exp, mod) { \
-    if (!(flag)) \
-	mpz_init(&(var)); \
-    (flag) = TRUE; \
-    mpz_powm(&(var), &(base), &(exp), (mod)); \
-    }
-
-#endif /* _MP_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c
index 95ce9e32e..de3972fe2 100644
--- a/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c
+++ b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* FreeS/WAN NAT-Traversal
  * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: nat_traversal.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -26,10 +25,12 @@
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 #include <pfkeyv2.h>
 #include <pfkey.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
@@ -42,8 +43,6 @@
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "timer.h"
 #include "cookie.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
 #include "crypto.h"
 #include "vendor.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
@@ -79,81 +78,91 @@ static bool _force_ka = 0;
 static const char *natt_version = "0.6c";
 
 void init_nat_traversal (bool activate, unsigned int keep_alive_period,
-	bool fka, bool spf)
+		bool fka, bool spf)
 {
-    nat_traversal_enabled = activate;
-    nat_traversal_support_non_ike = activate;
+	nat_traversal_enabled = activate;
+	nat_traversal_support_non_ike = activate;
 #ifdef NAT_T_SUPPORT_LAST_DRAFTS
-    nat_traversal_support_port_floating = activate ? spf : FALSE;
+	nat_traversal_support_port_floating = activate ? spf : FALSE;
 #endif
-    _force_ka = fka;
-    _kap = keep_alive_period ? keep_alive_period : DEFAULT_KEEP_ALIVE_PERIOD;
-    plog("  including NAT-Traversal patch (Version %s)%s%s%s"
-	 , natt_version, activate ? "" : " [disabled]"
-	 , activate & fka ? " [Force KeepAlive]" : ""
-	 , activate & !spf ? " [Port Floating disabled]" : "");
+	_force_ka = fka;
+	_kap = keep_alive_period ? keep_alive_period : DEFAULT_KEEP_ALIVE_PERIOD;
+	plog("  including NAT-Traversal patch (Version %s)%s%s%s"
+		 , natt_version, activate ? "" : " [disabled]"
+		 , activate & fka ? " [Force KeepAlive]" : ""
+		 , activate & !spf ? " [Port Floating disabled]" : "");
 }
 
 static void disable_nat_traversal (int type)
 {
-    if (type == ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE)
-	nat_traversal_support_non_ike = FALSE;
-    else
-	nat_traversal_support_port_floating = FALSE;
-
-    if (!nat_traversal_support_non_ike &&
-        !nat_traversal_support_port_floating)
-	    nat_traversal_enabled = FALSE;
+	if (type == ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE)
+		nat_traversal_support_non_ike = FALSE;
+	else
+		nat_traversal_support_port_floating = FALSE;
+
+	if (!nat_traversal_support_non_ike &&
+		!nat_traversal_support_port_floating)
+			nat_traversal_enabled = FALSE;
 }
 
-static void _natd_hash(const struct hash_desc *hasher, char *hash,
-	u_int8_t *icookie, u_int8_t *rcookie,
-	const ip_address *ip, u_int16_t port)
+static void _natd_hash(const struct hash_desc *oakley_hasher, char *hash,
+		u_int8_t *icookie, u_int8_t *rcookie,
+		const ip_address *ip, u_int16_t port)
 {
-    union hash_ctx ctx;
-
-    if (is_zero_cookie(icookie))
-	DBG_log("_natd_hash: Warning, icookie is zero !!");
-    if (is_zero_cookie(rcookie))
-	DBG_log("_natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !!");
-
-    /**
-     * draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01.txt
-     *
-     *   HASH = HASH(CKY-I | CKY-R | IP | Port)
-     *
-     * All values in network order
-     */
-    hasher->hash_init(&ctx);
-    hasher->hash_update(&ctx, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    hasher->hash_update(&ctx, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    switch (addrtypeof(ip)) {
-    case AF_INET:
-	hasher->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)&ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr
-		, sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr));
-	break;
-    case AF_INET6:
-	hasher->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)&ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr
-		, sizeof(ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr));
-	break;
-    }
-    hasher->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)&port, sizeof(u_int16_t));
-    hasher->hash_final(hash, &ctx);
-#ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
-    DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	DBG_log("_natd_hash: hasher=%p(%d)", hasher, (int)hasher->hash_digest_len);
-	DBG_dump("_natd_hash: icookie=", icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	DBG_dump("_natd_hash: rcookie=", rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	switch (addrtypeof(ip)) {
-	case AF_INET:
-	    DBG_dump("_natd_hash: ip=", &ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr
-		, sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr));
-	    break;
+	if (is_zero_cookie(icookie))
+	{
+		DBG_log("_natd_hash: Warning, icookie is zero !!");
 	}
-	DBG_log("_natd_hash: port=%d", port);
-	DBG_dump("_natd_hash: hash=", hash, hasher->hash_digest_len);
-    );
+	if (is_zero_cookie(rcookie))
+	{
+		DBG_log("_natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !!");
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01.txt
+	 *
+	 *   HASH = HASH(CKY-I | CKY-R | IP | Port)
+	 *
+	 * All values in network order
+	 */
+	{
+		chunk_t icookie_chunk = { icookie, COOKIE_SIZE };
+		chunk_t rcookie_chunk = { rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE };
+		chunk_t port_chunk = chunk_from_thing(port);
+		chunk_t addr_chunk;
+		hash_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+		hasher_t *hasher;
+		size_t hash_size;
+
+		hash_alg = oakley_to_hash_algorithm(oakley_hasher->algo_id);
+		hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, hash_alg);
+		hasher->get_hash(hasher, icookie_chunk, NULL);
+		hasher->get_hash(hasher, rcookie_chunk, NULL);
+		switch (addrtypeof(ip))
+		{
+			case AF_INET:
+				addr_chunk = chunk_from_thing(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
+				break;
+			case AF_INET6:
+				addr_chunk = chunk_from_thing(ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+				break;
+			default:
+				addr_chunk = chunk_empty; /* should never occur */ 
+		}
+		hasher->get_hash(hasher, addr_chunk, NULL);
+		hasher->get_hash(hasher, port_chunk, hash);
+		hash_size = hasher->get_hash_size(hasher);
+		hasher->destroy(hasher);
+#ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
+		DBG(DBG_NATT,
+			DBG_dump_chunk("_natd_hash: icookie=", icookie_chunk);
+			DBG_dump_chunk("_natd_hash: rcookie=", rcookie_chunk);
+			DBG_dump_chunk("_natd_hash: ip=", addr_chunk);
+			DBG_log("_natd_hash: port=%d", port);
+			DBG_dump("_natd_hash: hash=", hash, hash_size);
+		)
 #endif
+	}
 }
 
 /* Add NAT-Traversal VIDs (supported ones)
@@ -161,180 +170,180 @@ static void _natd_hash(const struct hash_desc *hasher, char *hash,
  */
 bool nat_traversal_add_vid(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs)
 {
-    bool r = TRUE;
-
-    if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating)
-    {
-	u_int8_t last_np = nat_traversal_support_non_ike ?
-				ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np;
-
-	if (r)
-	    r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_RFC);
-	if (r)
-	    r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_03);
-	if (r)
-	    r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_02);
-	if (r)
-	    r = out_vendorid(last_np, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_02_N);
-    }
-    if (nat_traversal_support_non_ike)
-    {
-	if (r)
-	    r = out_vendorid(np, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_00);
-    }
-    return r;
+	bool r = TRUE;
+
+	if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating)
+	{
+		u_int8_t last_np = nat_traversal_support_non_ike ?
+								ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np;
+
+		if (r)
+			r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_RFC);
+		if (r)
+			r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_03);
+		if (r)
+			r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_02);
+		if (r)
+			r = out_vendorid(last_np, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_02_N);
+	}
+	if (nat_traversal_support_non_ike)
+	{
+		if (r)
+			r = out_vendorid(np, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_00);
+	}
+	return r;
 }
 
 u_int32_t nat_traversal_vid_to_method(unsigned short nat_t_vid)
 {
-    switch (nat_t_vid)
-    {
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_00:
-	return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01);
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_02:
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_02_N:
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_03:
-	return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03);
-    case VID_NATT_RFC:
-	return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC);
-    }
-    return 0;
+	switch (nat_t_vid)
+	{
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_00:
+		return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01);
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_02:
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_02_N:
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_03:
+		return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03);
+	case VID_NATT_RFC:
+		return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC);
+	}
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void nat_traversal_natd_lookup(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    struct payload_digest *p;
-    struct state *st = md->st;
-    int i;
-
-    if (!st || !md->iface || !st->st_oakley.hasher)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
-		, __FILE__, __LINE__);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /** Count NAT-D **/
-    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC], i=0; p != NULL; p = p->next, i++);
-
-    /*
-     * We need at least 2 NAT-D (1 for us, many for peer)
-     */
-    if (i < 2)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-	    "NAT-Traversal: Only %d NAT-D - Aborting NAT-Traversal negociation", i);
-	st->nat_traversal = 0;
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * First one with my IP & port
-     */
-    p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC];
-    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie,
-	&(md->iface->addr), ntohs(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_port));
-
-    if (!(pbs_left(&p->pbs) == st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len &&
-	  memcmp(p->pbs.cur, hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len) == 0))
-    {
+	char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	struct payload_digest *p;
+	struct state *st = md->st;
+	int i;
+
+	if (!st || !md->iface || !st->st_oakley.hasher)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+				, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/** Count NAT-D **/
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC], i=0; p != NULL; p = p->next, i++);
+
+	/*
+	 * We need at least 2 NAT-D (1 for us, many for peer)
+	 */
+	if (i < 2)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+			"NAT-Traversal: Only %d NAT-D - Aborting NAT-Traversal negociation", i);
+		st->nat_traversal = 0;
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * First one with my IP & port
+	 */
+	p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC];
+	_natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie,
+		&(md->iface->addr), ntohs(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_port));
+
+	if (!(pbs_left(&p->pbs) == st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len &&
+		  memeq(p->pbs.cur, hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len)))
+	{
 #ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
-	DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	    DBG_log("NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME");
-	    DBG_dump("expected NAT-D:", hash
-	    		, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len);
-	    DBG_dump("received NAT-D:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
-	)
+		DBG(DBG_NATT,
+			DBG_log("NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME");
+			DBG_dump("expected NAT-D:", hash
+						, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len);
+			DBG_dump("received NAT-D:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+		)
 #endif
-	st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * The others with sender IP & port
-     */
-    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie,
-		&(md->sender), ntohs(md->sender_port));
-    for (p = p->next, i=0 ; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len &&
-	    memcmp(p->pbs.cur, hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len) == 0)
-	{
-	    i++;
-	}
-    }
-    if (!i)
-    {
+		st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * The others with sender IP & port
+	 */
+	_natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie,
+				&(md->sender), ntohs(md->sender_port));
+	for (p = p->next, i=0 ; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+		if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len &&
+			memeq(p->pbs.cur, hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len))
+		{
+			i++;
+		}
+	}
+	if (!i)
+	{
 #ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
-	DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	    DBG_log("NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER");
-	    DBG_dump("expected NAT-D:", hash
-			, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len);
-	    p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC];
-	    for (p = p->next, i=0 ; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	    {
-		DBG_dump("received NAT-D:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
-	    }
-	)
+		DBG(DBG_NATT,
+			DBG_log("NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER");
+			DBG_dump("expected NAT-D:", hash
+						, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len);
+			p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC];
+			for (p = p->next, i=0 ; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+			{
+				DBG_dump("received NAT-D:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+			}
+		)
 #endif
-	st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER);
-    }
+		st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER);
+	}
 #ifdef FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL
-    st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER);
-    st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME);
+	st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER);
+	st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME);
 #endif
 }
 
 bool nat_traversal_add_natd(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
-	struct msg_digest *md)
+		struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    struct state *st = md->st;
-
-    if (!st || !st->st_oakley.hasher)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
-			, __FILE__, __LINE__);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
-	DBG_log("sending NATD payloads")
-    )
-	
-    /*
-     * First one with sender IP & port
-     */
-    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie,
-	is_zero_cookie(st->st_rcookie) ? md->hdr.isa_rcookie : st->st_rcookie,
-	&(md->sender),
+	char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	struct state *st = md->st;
+
+	if (!st || !st->st_oakley.hasher)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+						, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+		DBG_log("sending NATD payloads")
+	)
+		
+	/*
+	 * First one with sender IP & port
+	 */
+	_natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie,
+		is_zero_cookie(st->st_rcookie) ? md->hdr.isa_rcookie : st->st_rcookie,
+		&(md->sender),
 #ifdef FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL
-	0
+		0
 #else
-	ntohs(md->sender_port)
+		ntohs(md->sender_port)
 #endif
-    );
-    if (!out_generic_raw((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES
-	? ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS), &isakmp_nat_d, outs,
-	hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len, "NAT-D"))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Second one with my IP & port
-     */
-    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie,
-	is_zero_cookie(st->st_rcookie) ? md->hdr.isa_rcookie : st->st_rcookie,
-	&(md->iface->addr),
+	);
+	if (!out_generic_raw((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES
+		? ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS), &isakmp_nat_d, outs,
+		hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len, "NAT-D"))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Second one with my IP & port
+	 */
+	_natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie,
+		is_zero_cookie(st->st_rcookie) ? md->hdr.isa_rcookie : st->st_rcookie,
+		&(md->iface->addr),
 #ifdef FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL
-	0
+		0
 #else
-	ntohs(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_port)
+		ntohs(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_port)
 #endif
-    );
-    return (out_generic_raw(np, &isakmp_nat_d, outs,
-	hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len, "NAT-D"));
+	);
+	return (out_generic_raw(np, &isakmp_nat_d, outs,
+		hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len, "NAT-D"));
 }
 
 /*
@@ -344,245 +353,245 @@ bool nat_traversal_add_natd(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
  */
 void nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(struct msg_digest *md)
 {
-    struct payload_digest *p;
-    struct state *st = md->st;
-    int i;
-    ip_address ip;
-
-    if (!st || !md->iface)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
-		, __FILE__, __LINE__);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* Initialize NAT-OA */
-    anyaddr(AF_INET, &st->nat_oa);
-
-    /* Count NAT-OA **/
-    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC], i=0; p != NULL; p = p->next, i++);
-
-    DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	DBG_log("NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA.", i)
-    )
-
-    if (i == 0)
-	return;
-
-    if (!(st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER)))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA. "
-			"ignored because peer is not NATed", i);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    if (i > 1)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA. "
-		"using first, ignoring others", i);
-    }
-
-    /* Take first */
-    p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC];
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_dump("NAT-OA:", p->pbs.start, pbs_room(&p->pbs));
-    );
-
-    switch (p->payload.nat_oa.isanoa_idtype)
-    {
-    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
-	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == sizeof(struct in_addr))
-	{
-	    initaddr(p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs), AF_INET, &ip);
-	}
-	else
+	struct payload_digest *p;
+	struct state *st = md->st;
+	int i;
+	ip_address ip;
+
+	if (!st || !md->iface)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received IPv4 NAT-OA "
-			"with invalid IP size (%d)", (int)pbs_left(&p->pbs));
-	    return;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+				, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return;
 	}
-	break;
-    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
-	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+
+	/* Initialize NAT-OA */
+	anyaddr(AF_INET, &st->nat_oa);
+
+	/* Count NAT-OA **/
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC], i=0; p != NULL; p = p->next, i++);
+
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		DBG_log("NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA.", i)
+	)
+
+	if (i == 0)
+		return;
+
+	if (!(st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER)))
 	{
-	    initaddr(p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs), AF_INET6, &ip);
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA. "
+						"ignored because peer is not NATed", i);
+		return;
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (i > 1)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received IPv6 NAT-OA "
-			"with invalid IP size (%d)", (int)pbs_left(&p->pbs));
-	    return;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA. "
+				"using first, ignoring others", i);
 	}
-	break;
-    default:
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
-			"invalid ID Type (%d) in NAT-OA - ignored",
-			p->payload.nat_oa.isanoa_idtype);
-	    return;
-    }
 
-    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	/* Take first */
+	p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC];
+
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_dump("NAT-OA:", p->pbs.start, pbs_room(&p->pbs));
+	);
+
+	switch (p->payload.nat_oa.isanoa_idtype)
 	{
-	    char ip_t[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	    addrtot(&ip, 0, ip_t, sizeof(ip_t));
-	
-	    DBG_log("received NAT-OA: %s", ip_t);
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+		if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == sizeof(struct in_addr))
+		{
+			initaddr(p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs), AF_INET, &ip);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received IPv4 NAT-OA "
+						"with invalid IP size (%d)", (int)pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+		if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+		{
+			initaddr(p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs), AF_INET6, &ip);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received IPv6 NAT-OA "
+						"with invalid IP size (%d)", (int)pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+			return;
+		}
+		break;
+	default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
+						"invalid ID Type (%d) in NAT-OA - ignored",
+						p->payload.nat_oa.isanoa_idtype);
+			return;
 	}
-    )
 
-    if (isanyaddr(&ip))
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %%any NAT-OA...");
-    else
-	st->nat_oa = ip;
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		{
+			char ip_t[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			addrtot(&ip, 0, ip_t, sizeof(ip_t));
+		
+			DBG_log("received NAT-OA: %s", ip_t);
+		}
+	)
+
+	if (isanyaddr(&ip))
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %%any NAT-OA...");
+	else
+		st->nat_oa = ip;
 }
 
 bool nat_traversal_add_natoa(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
-	struct state *st)
+		struct state *st)
 {
-    struct isakmp_nat_oa natoa;
-    pb_stream pbs;
-    unsigned char ip_val[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
-    size_t ip_len = 0;
-    ip_address *ip;
-
-    if ((!st) || (!st->st_connection))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
-			, __FILE__, __LINE__);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    ip = &(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr);
-
-    memset(&natoa, 0, sizeof(natoa));
-    natoa.isanoa_np = np;
-
-    switch (addrtypeof(ip))
-    {
-    case AF_INET:
-	ip_len = sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
-	memcpy(ip_val, &ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr, ip_len);
-	natoa.isanoa_idtype = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
-	break;
-    case AF_INET6:
-	ip_len = sizeof(ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr);
-	memcpy(ip_val, &ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, ip_len);
-	natoa.isanoa_idtype = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
-	break;
-    default:
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
-			"invalid addrtypeof()=%d", addrtypeof(ip));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (!out_struct(&natoa, &isakmp_nat_oa, outs, &pbs))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    if (!out_raw(ip_val, ip_len, &pbs, "NAT-OA"))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	DBG_dump("NAT-OA (S):", ip_val, ip_len)
-    )
-
-    close_output_pbs(&pbs);
-    return TRUE;
+	struct isakmp_nat_oa natoa;
+	pb_stream pbs;
+	unsigned char ip_val[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
+	size_t ip_len = 0;
+	ip_address *ip;
+
+	if ((!st) || (!st->st_connection))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+						, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	ip = &(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr);
+
+	memset(&natoa, 0, sizeof(natoa));
+	natoa.isanoa_np = np;
+
+	switch (addrtypeof(ip))
+	{
+	case AF_INET:
+		ip_len = sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
+		memcpy(ip_val, &ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr, ip_len);
+		natoa.isanoa_idtype = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+		break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+		ip_len = sizeof(ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+		memcpy(ip_val, &ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, ip_len);
+		natoa.isanoa_idtype = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
+		break;
+	default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
+						"invalid addrtypeof()=%d", addrtypeof(ip));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	if (!out_struct(&natoa, &isakmp_nat_oa, outs, &pbs))
+		return FALSE;
+
+	if (!out_raw(ip_val, ip_len, &pbs, "NAT-OA"))
+		return FALSE;
+
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		DBG_dump("NAT-OA (S):", ip_val, ip_len)
+	)
+
+	close_output_pbs(&pbs);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 void nat_traversal_show_result (u_int32_t nt, u_int16_t sport)
 {
-    const char *mth = NULL, *rslt = NULL;
-
-    switch (nt & NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD)
-    {
-    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01):
-	mth = natt_type_bitnames[0];
-	break;
-    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03):
-	mth = natt_type_bitnames[1];
-	break;
-    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC):
-	mth = natt_type_bitnames[2];
-	break;
-    }
-    
-    switch (nt & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-    {
-    case 0:
-	rslt = "no NAT detected";
-	break;
-    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME):
-	rslt = "i am NATed";
-	break;
-    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER):
-	rslt = "peer is NATed";
-	break;
-    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER):
-	rslt = "both are NATed";
-	break;
-    }
-
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-	"NAT-Traversal: Result using %s: %s",
-	mth ? mth : "unknown method",
-	rslt ? rslt : "unknown result"
-    );
-
-    if ((nt & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER))
-    &&	(sport == IKE_UDP_PORT)
-    &&	((nt & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)==0))
-    {
+	const char *mth = NULL, *rslt = NULL;
+
+	switch (nt & NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD)
+	{
+	case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01):
+		mth = natt_type_bitnames[0];
+		break;
+	case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03):
+		mth = natt_type_bitnames[1];
+		break;
+	case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC):
+		mth = natt_type_bitnames[2];
+		break;
+	}
+	
+	switch (nt & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	{
+	case 0:
+		rslt = "no NAT detected";
+		break;
+	case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME):
+		rslt = "i am NATed";
+		break;
+	case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER):
+		rslt = "peer is NATed";
+		break;
+	case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER):
+		rslt = "both are NATed";
+		break;
+	}
+
 	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-		"Warning: peer is NATed but source port is still udp/%d. "
-		"Ipsec-passthrough NAT device suspected -- NAT-T may not work.",
-		IKE_UDP_PORT
+		"NAT-Traversal: Result using %s: %s",
+		mth ? mth : "unknown method",
+		rslt ? rslt : "unknown result"
 	);
-    }
+
+	if ((nt & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER))
+	&&  (sport == IKE_UDP_PORT)
+	&&  ((nt & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)==0))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+				"Warning: peer is NATed but source port is still udp/%d. "
+				"Ipsec-passthrough NAT device suspected -- NAT-T may not work.",
+				IKE_UDP_PORT
+		);
+	}
 }
 
 int nat_traversal_espinudp_socket (int sk, u_int32_t type)
 {
-    int r = setsockopt(sk, SOL_UDP, UDP_ESPINUDP, &type, sizeof(type));
+	int r = setsockopt(sk, SOL_UDP, UDP_ESPINUDP, &type, sizeof(type));
 
-    if (r < 0 && errno == ENOPROTOOPT)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-		"NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(%d) not supported by kernel -- "
-		"NAT-T disabled", type);
-	disable_nat_traversal(type);
-    }
-    return r;
+	if (r < 0 && errno == ENOPROTOOPT)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+				"NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(%d) not supported by kernel -- "
+				"NAT-T disabled", type);
+		disable_nat_traversal(type);
+	}
+	return r;
 }
 
 void nat_traversal_new_ka_event (void)
 {
-    if (_ka_evt)
-	return;  /* event already scheduled */
+	if (_ka_evt)
+		return;  /* event already scheduled */
 
-    event_schedule(EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE, _kap, NULL);
-    _ka_evt = 1;
+	event_schedule(EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE, _kap, NULL);
+	_ka_evt = 1;
 }
 
 static void nat_traversal_send_ka (struct state *st)
 {
-    static unsigned char ka_payload = 0xff;
-    chunk_t sav;
+	static unsigned char ka_payload = 0xff;
+	chunk_t sav;
 
-    DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	DBG_log("ka_event: send NAT-KA to %s:%d",
-		ip_str(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr),
-		st->st_connection->spd.that.host_port);
-    )
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		DBG_log("ka_event: send NAT-KA to %s:%d",
+				ip_str(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr),
+				st->st_connection->spd.that.host_port);
+	)
 
-    /* save state chunk */
-    setchunk(sav, st->st_tpacket.ptr, st->st_tpacket.len);
+	/* save state chunk */
+	sav = st->st_tpacket;
 
-    /* send keep alive */
-    setchunk(st->st_tpacket, &ka_payload, 1);
-    send_packet(st, "NAT-T Keep Alive");
+	/* send keep alive */
+	st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(&ka_payload, 1);
+	send_packet(st, "NAT-T Keep Alive");
 
-    /* restore state chunk */
-    setchunk(st->st_tpacket, sav.ptr, sav.len);
+	/* restore state chunk */
+	st->st_tpacket = sav;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -590,277 +599,277 @@ static void nat_traversal_send_ka (struct state *st)
  */
 static void nat_traversal_ka_event_state (struct state *st, void *data)
 {
-    unsigned int *_kap_st = (unsigned int *)data;
-    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-
-    if (!c)
-	return;
+	unsigned int *_kap_st = (unsigned int *)data;
+	const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
 
-    if ((st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_R3 || st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I4)
-    &&	(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-    &&	((st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) || _force_ka))
-    {
-	/*
-	 * - ISAKMP established
-	 * - NAT-Traversal detected
-	 * - NAT-KeepAlive needed (we are NATed)
-	 */
-	if (c->newest_isakmp_sa != st->st_serialno)
-	{
-	    /*
-	     * if newest is also valid, ignore this one, we will only use
-	     * newest.
-	     */
-	    struct state *st_newest;
-
-	    st_newest = state_with_serialno(c->newest_isakmp_sa);
-	    if (st_newest
-	    && (st_newest->st_state == STATE_MAIN_R3 || st_newest->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I4)
-	    && (st_newest->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-	    && ((st_newest->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) || _force_ka))
-	    {
+	if (!c)
 		return;
-	    }
+
+	if ((st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_R3 || st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I4)
+	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	&&  ((st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) || _force_ka))
+	{
+		/*
+		 * - ISAKMP established
+		 * - NAT-Traversal detected
+		 * - NAT-KeepAlive needed (we are NATed)
+		 */
+		if (c->newest_isakmp_sa != st->st_serialno)
+		{
+			/*
+			 * if newest is also valid, ignore this one, we will only use
+			 * newest.
+			 */
+			struct state *st_newest;
+
+			st_newest = state_with_serialno(c->newest_isakmp_sa);
+			if (st_newest
+			&& (st_newest->st_state == STATE_MAIN_R3 || st_newest->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I4)
+			&& (st_newest->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+			&& ((st_newest->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) || _force_ka))
+			{
+				return;
+			}
+		}
+		set_cur_state(st);
+		nat_traversal_send_ka(st);
+		reset_cur_state();
+		(*_kap_st)++;
 	}
-	set_cur_state(st);
-	nat_traversal_send_ka(st);
-	reset_cur_state();
-	(*_kap_st)++;
-    }
 }
 
 void nat_traversal_ka_event (void)
 {
-    unsigned int _kap_st = 0;
+	unsigned int _kap_st = 0;
 
-    _ka_evt = 0;  /* ready to be reschedule */
+	_ka_evt = 0;  /* ready to be reschedule */
 
-    for_each_state((void *)nat_traversal_ka_event_state, &_kap_st);
+	for_each_state((void *)nat_traversal_ka_event_state, &_kap_st);
 
-    /* if there are still states who needs Keep-Alive, schedule new event */
-    if (_kap_st)
-	nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
+	/* if there are still states who needs Keep-Alive, schedule new event */
+	if (_kap_st)
+		nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
 }
 
 struct _new_mapp_nfo {
-	ip_address addr;
-	u_int16_t sport, dport;
+		ip_address addr;
+		u_int16_t sport, dport;
 };
 
 static void nat_traversal_find_new_mapp_state (struct state *st, void *data)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    struct _new_mapp_nfo *nfo = (struct _new_mapp_nfo *)data;
-
-    if (c != NULL
-    && sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &(nfo->addr))
-    &&	c->spd.that.host_port == nfo->sport)
-    {
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct _new_mapp_nfo *nfo = (struct _new_mapp_nfo *)data;
 
-	/* change host port */
-	c->spd.that.host_port = nfo->dport;
-
-	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	||  IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	if (c != NULL
+	&& sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &(nfo->addr))
+	&&  c->spd.that.host_port == nfo->sport)
 	{
-	    if (!update_ipsec_sa(st))
-	    {
-		/*
-		 * If ipsec update failed, restore old port or we'll
-		 * not be able to update anymore.
-		 */
-		c->spd.that.host_port = nfo->sport;
-	    }
+
+		/* change host port */
+		c->spd.that.host_port = nfo->dport;
+
+		if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+		||  IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		{
+			if (!update_ipsec_sa(st))
+			{
+				/*
+				 * If ipsec update failed, restore old port or we'll
+				 * not be able to update anymore.
+				 */
+				c->spd.that.host_port = nfo->sport;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 static int nat_traversal_new_mapping(const ip_address *src, u_int16_t sport,
-	const ip_address *dst, u_int16_t dport)
+		const ip_address *dst, u_int16_t dport)
 {
-    char srca[ADDRTOT_BUF], dsta[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-    struct _new_mapp_nfo nfo;
-
-    addrtot(src, 0, srca, ADDRTOT_BUF);
-    addrtot(dst, 0, dsta, ADDRTOT_BUF);
-
-    if (!sameaddr(src, dst))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "nat_traversal_new_mapping: "
-		"address change currently not supported [%s:%d,%s:%d]",
-		srca, sport, dsta, dport);
-	return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (sport == dport)
-    {
-	/* no change */
-	return 0;
-    }
+	char srca[ADDRTOT_BUF], dsta[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	struct _new_mapp_nfo nfo;
 
-    DBG_log("NAT-T: new mapping %s:%d/%d)", srca, sport, dport);
+	addrtot(src, 0, srca, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+	addrtot(dst, 0, dsta, ADDRTOT_BUF);
 
-    nfo.addr = *src;
-    nfo.sport = sport;
-    nfo.dport = dport;
+	if (!sameaddr(src, dst))
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "nat_traversal_new_mapping: "
+				"address change currently not supported [%s:%d,%s:%d]",
+				srca, sport, dsta, dport);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	if (sport == dport)
+	{
+		/* no change */
+		return 0;
+	}
 
-    for_each_state((void *)nat_traversal_find_new_mapp_state, &nfo);
+	DBG_log("NAT-T: new mapping %s:%d/%d)", srca, sport, dport);
 
-    return 0;
+	nfo.addr = *src;
+	nfo.sport = sport;
+	nfo.dport = dport;
+
+	for_each_state((void *)nat_traversal_find_new_mapp_state, &nfo);
+
+	return 0;
 }
 
 void nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(struct msg_digest *md, struct state *st)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st ? st->st_connection : NULL;
-    struct iface *i = NULL;
+	struct connection *c = st ? st->st_connection : NULL;
+	struct iface *i = NULL;
 
-    if ((st == NULL) || (c == NULL))
-	return;
+	if ((st == NULL) || (c == NULL))
+		return;
 
-    if (md)
-    {
-	/*
-	 * If source port has changed, update (including other states and
-	 * established kernel SA)
-	 */
-	if (c->spd.that.host_port != md->sender_port)
+	if (md)
 	{
-	    nat_traversal_new_mapping(&c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port,
-			&c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port);
+		/*
+		 * If source port has changed, update (including other states and
+		 * established kernel SA)
+		 */
+		if (c->spd.that.host_port != md->sender_port)
+		{
+			nat_traversal_new_mapping(&c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port,
+						&c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port);
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * If interface type has changed, update local port (500/4500)
+		 */
+		if ((c->spd.this.host_port == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT && !md->iface->ike_float)
+		||  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT &&  md->iface->ike_float))
+		{
+			c->spd.this.host_port = (md->iface->ike_float)
+				? NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT : pluto_port;
+
+			DBG(DBG_NATT,
+				DBG_log("NAT-T: updating local port to %d", c->spd.this.host_port);
+			);
+		}
 	}
 
 	/*
-	 * If interface type has changed, update local port (500/4500)
-	 */
-	if ((c->spd.this.host_port == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT && !md->iface->ike_float)
-	||  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT &&  md->iface->ike_float))
-	{
-	    c->spd.this.host_port = (md->iface->ike_float)
-		? NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT : pluto_port;
-
-	    DBG(DBG_NATT,
-		DBG_log("NAT-T: updating local port to %d", c->spd.this.host_port);
-	    );
-	}
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * If we're initiator and NAT-T (with port floating) is detected, we
-     * need to change port (MAIN_I3 or QUICK_I1)
-     */
-    if ((st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I3 || st->st_state == STATE_QUICK_I1)
-    &&	(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)
-    &&	(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-    &&	(c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT))
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	    DBG_log("NAT-T: floating to port %d", NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
-	)
-	c->spd.this.host_port = NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT;
-	c->spd.that.host_port = NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT;
-	/*
-	 * Also update pending connections or they will be deleted if uniqueids
-	 * option is set.
+	 * If we're initiator and NAT-T (with port floating) is detected, we
+	 * need to change port (MAIN_I3 or QUICK_I1)
 	 */
-	update_pending(st, st);
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Find valid interface according to local port (500/4500)
-     */
-    if ((c->spd.this.host_port == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT && !c->interface->ike_float)
-    ||  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT &&  c->interface->ike_float))
-    {
-	for (i = interfaces; i !=  NULL; i = i->next)
-	{
-	    if (sameaddr(&c->interface->addr, &i->addr)
-	    && i->ike_float != c->interface->ike_float)
-	    {
+	if ((st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I3 || st->st_state == STATE_QUICK_I1)
+	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)
+	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	&&  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT))
+	{
 		DBG(DBG_NATT,
-		    DBG_log("NAT-T: using interface %s:%d", i->rname,
-			i->ike_float ? NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT : pluto_port);
+			DBG_log("NAT-T: floating to port %d", NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
 		)
-		c->interface = i;
-		break;
-	    }
+		c->spd.this.host_port = NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT;
+		c->spd.that.host_port = NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT;
+		/*
+		 * Also update pending connections or they will be deleted if uniqueids
+		 * option is set.
+		 */
+		update_pending(st, st);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Find valid interface according to local port (500/4500)
+	 */
+	if ((c->spd.this.host_port == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT && !c->interface->ike_float)
+	||  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT &&  c->interface->ike_float))
+	{
+		for (i = interfaces; i !=  NULL; i = i->next)
+		{
+			if (sameaddr(&c->interface->addr, &i->addr)
+			&& i->ike_float != c->interface->ike_float)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_NATT,
+					DBG_log("NAT-T: using interface %s:%d", i->rname,
+						i->ike_float ? NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT : pluto_port);
+				)
+				c->interface = i;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo {
-	struct sadb_sa *sa;
-	ip_address src, dst;
-	u_int16_t sport, dport;
+		struct sadb_sa *sa;
+		ip_address src, dst;
+		u_int16_t sport, dport;
 };
 
 static void nat_t_new_klips_mapp (struct state *st, void *data)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo *nfo = (struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo *)data;
-
-    if (c != NULL && st->st_esp.present
-    &&	sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &(nfo->src))
-    &&  st->st_esp.our_spi == nfo->sa->sadb_sa_spi)
-    {
-	nat_traversal_new_mapping(&c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port,
-				  &(nfo->dst), nfo->dport);
-    }
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo *nfo = (struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo *)data;
+
+	if (c != NULL && st->st_esp.present
+	&&  sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &(nfo->src))
+	&&  st->st_esp.our_spi == nfo->sa->sadb_sa_spi)
+	{
+		nat_traversal_new_mapping(&c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port,
+								  &(nfo->dst), nfo->dport);
+	}
 }
 
 void process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(
-	struct sadb_msg *msg __attribute__ ((unused)),
-	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+		struct sadb_msg *msg __attribute__ ((unused)),
+		struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
 {
-    struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo nfo;
-    struct sadb_address *srcx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC];
-    struct sadb_address *dstx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST];
-    struct sockaddr *srca, *dsta;
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    nfo.sa = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_SA];
-
-    if (!nfo.sa || !srcx || !dstx)
-    {
-	plog("SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING message from KLIPS malformed: "
-		"got NULL params");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    srca = ((struct sockaddr *)(void *)&srcx[1]);
-    dsta = ((struct sockaddr *)(void *)&dstx[1]);
-
-    if (srca->sa_family != AF_INET || dsta->sa_family != AF_INET)
-    {
-	ugh = "only AF_INET supported";
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
-	char _srca[ADDRTOT_BUF], _dsta[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-	ip_said said;
-
-	initaddr((const void *) &((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_addr,
-			sizeof(((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_addr),
-			srca->sa_family, &(nfo.src));
-	nfo.sport = ntohs(((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_port);
-	initaddr((const void *) &((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_addr,
-			sizeof(((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_addr),
-			dsta->sa_family, &(nfo.dst));
-	nfo.dport = ntohs(((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_port);
+	struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo nfo;
+	struct sadb_address *srcx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC];
+	struct sadb_address *dstx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST];
+	struct sockaddr *srca, *dsta;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	DBG(DBG_NATT,
-	    initsaid(&nfo.src, nfo.sa->sadb_sa_spi, SA_ESP, &said);
-	    satot(&said, 0, text_said, SATOT_BUF);
-	    addrtot(&nfo.src, 0, _srca, ADDRTOT_BUF);
-	    addrtot(&nfo.dst, 0, _dsta, ADDRTOT_BUF);
-	    DBG_log("new klips mapping %s %s:%d %s:%d",
-			text_said, _srca, nfo.sport, _dsta, nfo.dport);
-	)
+	nfo.sa = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_SA];
 
-	for_each_state((void *)nat_t_new_klips_mapp, &nfo);
-    }
+	if (!nfo.sa || !srcx || !dstx)
+	{
+		plog("SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING message from KLIPS malformed: "
+				"got NULL params");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	srca = ((struct sockaddr *)(void *)&srcx[1]);
+	dsta = ((struct sockaddr *)(void *)&dstx[1]);
+
+	if (srca->sa_family != AF_INET || dsta->sa_family != AF_INET)
+	{
+		ugh = "only AF_INET supported";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+		char _srca[ADDRTOT_BUF], _dsta[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+		ip_said said;
+
+		initaddr((const void *) &((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_addr,
+						sizeof(((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_addr),
+						srca->sa_family, &(nfo.src));
+		nfo.sport = ntohs(((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_port);
+		initaddr((const void *) &((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_addr,
+						sizeof(((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_addr),
+						dsta->sa_family, &(nfo.dst));
+		nfo.dport = ntohs(((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_port);
+
+		DBG(DBG_NATT,
+			initsaid(&nfo.src, nfo.sa->sadb_sa_spi, SA_ESP, &said);
+			satot(&said, 0, text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+			addrtot(&nfo.src, 0, _srca, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+			addrtot(&nfo.dst, 0, _dsta, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+			DBG_log("new klips mapping %s %s:%d %s:%d",
+						text_said, _srca, nfo.sport, _dsta, nfo.dport);
+		)
+
+		for_each_state((void *)nat_t_new_klips_mapp, &nfo);
+	}
 
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-	plog("SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING message from KLIPS malformed: %s", ugh);
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+		plog("SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING message from KLIPS malformed: %s", ugh);
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h
index 9041d84de..98b0a2bc0 100644
--- a/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h
+++ b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: nat_traversal.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _NAT_TRAVERSAL_H
@@ -32,37 +30,37 @@
  * NAT-Traversal methods which need NAT-D
  */
 #define NAT_T_WITH_NATD \
-	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
-	LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+		( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
+		LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
 /**
  * NAT-Traversal methods which need NAT-OA
  */
 #define NAT_T_WITH_NATOA \
-	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
-	LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+		( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
+		LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
 /**
  * NAT-Traversal methods which use NAT-KeepAlive
  */
 #define NAT_T_WITH_KA \
-	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
-	LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+		( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
+		LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
 /**
  * NAT-Traversal methods which use floating port
  */
 #define NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING \
-	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+		( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
 
 /**
  * NAT-Traversal methods which use officials values (RFC)
  */
 #define NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES \
-	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+		( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
 
 /**
  * NAT-Traversal detected
  */
 #define NAT_T_DETECTED \
-	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER) )
+		( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER) )
 
 /**
  * NAT-T Port Floating
@@ -70,7 +68,7 @@
 #define NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT     4500
 
 void init_nat_traversal (bool activate, unsigned int keep_alive_period,
-	bool fka, bool spf);
+		bool fka, bool spf);
 
 extern bool nat_traversal_enabled;
 extern bool nat_traversal_support_non_ike;
@@ -82,7 +80,7 @@ extern bool nat_traversal_support_port_floating;
 void nat_traversal_natd_lookup(struct msg_digest *md);
 #ifndef PB_STREAM_UNDEFINED
 bool nat_traversal_add_natd(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
-	struct msg_digest *md);
+		struct msg_digest *md);
 #endif
 
 /**
@@ -91,7 +89,7 @@ bool nat_traversal_add_natd(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
 void nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(struct msg_digest *md);
 #ifndef PB_STREAM_UNDEFINED
 bool nat_traversal_add_natoa(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
-	struct state *st);
+		struct state *st);
 #endif
 
 /**
@@ -119,8 +117,8 @@ void nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(struct msg_digest *md, struct state *st);
  */
 #ifdef __PFKEY_V2_H
 void process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(
-	struct sadb_msg *,
-	struct sadb_ext *[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]);
+		struct sadb_msg *,
+		struct sadb_ext *[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]);
 #endif
 
 /**
@@ -133,22 +131,22 @@ nat_traversal_port_float(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, bool in);
  * Encapsulation mode macro (see demux.c)
  */
 #define NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st,nat_t_policy) ( \
-	((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) \
-		? ( ((nat_t_policy) & POLICY_TUNNEL) \
-			? ( ((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) \
-				? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC) \
-				: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS) \
-			  ) \
-			: ( ((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) \
-				? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC) \
-				: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS) \
-			  ) \
-		  ) \
-		: ( ((st)->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL) \
-			? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL) \
-			: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT) \
-		  ) \
-	)
+		((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) \
+				? ( ((nat_t_policy) & POLICY_TUNNEL) \
+						? ( ((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) \
+								? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC) \
+								: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS) \
+						  ) \
+						: ( ((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) \
+								? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC) \
+								: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS) \
+						  ) \
+				  ) \
+				: ( ((st)->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL) \
+						? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL) \
+						: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT) \
+				  ) \
+		)
 
 #endif /* _NAT_TRAVERSAL_H */
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/ocsp.c b/src/pluto/ocsp.c
index 74b86bf19..80164fa1d 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ocsp.c
+++ b/src/pluto/ocsp.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ocsp.c 4827 2009-01-09 01:36:13Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <unistd.h>
@@ -24,7 +22,13 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
+#include <asn1/oid.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -32,120 +36,116 @@
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "crl.h"
 #include "ca.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
 #include "certs.h"
 #include "smartcard.h"
-#include <asn1/oid.h>
 #include "whack.h"
-#include "pkcs1.h"
 #include "keys.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 #include "ocsp.h"
 
-#define NONCE_LENGTH		16
+#define NONCE_LENGTH            16
 
 static const char *const cert_status_names[] = {
-    "good",
-    "revoked",
-    "unknown",
-    "undefined"
+	"good",
+	"revoked",
+	"unknown",
+	"undefined"
 };
 
 
 static const char *const response_status_names[] = {
-    "successful",
-    "malformed request",
-    "internal error",
-    "try later",
-    "status #4",
-    "signature required",
-    "unauthorized"
+	"successful",
+	"malformed request",
+	"internal error",
+	"try later",
+	"status #4",
+	"signature required",
+	"unauthorized"
 };
 
 /* response container */
 typedef struct response response_t;
 
 struct response {
-    chunk_t  tbs;
-    chunk_t  responder_id_name;
-    chunk_t  responder_id_key;
-    time_t   produced_at;
-    chunk_t  responses;
-    chunk_t  nonce;
-    int      algorithm;
-    chunk_t  signature;
+	chunk_t  tbs;
+	chunk_t  responder_id_name;
+	chunk_t  responder_id_key;
+	time_t   produced_at;
+	chunk_t  responses;
+	chunk_t  nonce;
+	int      algorithm;
+	chunk_t  signature;
 };
 
 const response_t empty_response = {
-    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* tbs */
-    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* responder_id_name */
-    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* responder_id_key */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME,	/* produced_at */
-    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* single_response */
-    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* nonce */
-    OID_UNKNOWN   ,	/* signature_algorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }		/* signature */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,     /* tbs */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,     /* responder_id_name */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,     /* responder_id_key */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME,     /* produced_at */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,     /* single_response */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   ,     /* nonce */
+	OID_UNKNOWN   ,     /* signature_algorithm */
+	{ NULL, 0 }         /* signature */
 };
 
 /* single response container */
 typedef struct single_response single_response_t;
 
 struct single_response {
-    single_response_t *next;
-    int               hash_algorithm;
-    chunk_t           issuer_name_hash;
-    chunk_t           issuer_key_hash;
-    chunk_t           serialNumber;
-    cert_status_t     status;
-    time_t            revocationTime;
-    crl_reason_t      revocationReason;
-    time_t            thisUpdate;
-    time_t            nextUpdate;
+	single_response_t *next;
+	int               hash_algorithm;
+	chunk_t           issuer_name_hash;
+	chunk_t           issuer_key_hash;
+	chunk_t           serialNumber;
+	cert_status_t     status;
+	time_t            revocationTime;
+	crl_reason_t      revocationReason;
+	time_t            thisUpdate;
+	time_t            nextUpdate;
 };
 
 const single_response_t empty_single_response = {
-      NULL            ,	/* *next */
-    OID_UNKNOWN       ,	/* hash_algorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }       ,	/* issuer_name_hash */
-    { NULL, 0 }       ,	/* issuer_key_hash */
-    { NULL, 0 }       ,	/* serial_number */
-    CERT_UNDEFINED    ,	/* status */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME    ,	/* revocationTime */
-    REASON_UNSPECIFIED,	/* revocationReason */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME    ,	/* this_update */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME	/* next_update */
+	  NULL            , /* *next */
+	OID_UNKNOWN       , /* hash_algorithm */
+	{ NULL, 0 }       , /* issuer_name_hash */
+	{ NULL, 0 }       , /* issuer_key_hash */
+	{ NULL, 0 }       , /* serial_number */
+	CERT_UNDEFINED    , /* status */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME    , /* revocationTime */
+	REASON_UNSPECIFIED, /* revocationReason */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME    , /* this_update */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME      /* next_update */
 };
 
 
 /* list of single requests */
 typedef struct request_list request_list_t;
 struct request_list {
-    chunk_t request;
-    request_list_t *next;
+	chunk_t request;
+	request_list_t *next;
 };
 
 /* some OCSP specific prefabricated ASN.1 constants */
 
 static u_char ASN1_nonce_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x02
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x02
 };
 
-static const chunk_t ASN1_nonce_oid = strchunk(ASN1_nonce_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_nonce_oid = chunk_from_buf(ASN1_nonce_oid_str);
 
 static u_char ASN1_response_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x04
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x04
 };
 
-static const chunk_t ASN1_response_oid = strchunk(ASN1_response_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_response_oid = chunk_from_buf(ASN1_response_oid_str);
 
 static u_char ASN1_response_content_str[] = {
-    0x04, 0x0D,
-	  0x30, 0x0B,
-		0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x01
+	0x04, 0x0D,
+		  0x30, 0x0B,
+				0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x01
 };
 
-static const chunk_t ASN1_response_content = strchunk(ASN1_response_content_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_response_content = chunk_from_buf(ASN1_response_content_str);
 
 /* default OCSP uri */
 static chunk_t ocsp_default_uri;
@@ -158,57 +158,60 @@ static x509cert_t *ocsp_requestor_cert = NULL;
 
 static smartcard_t *ocsp_requestor_sc = NULL;
 
-static const struct RSA_private_key *ocsp_requestor_pri = NULL;
-
-/* asn.1 definitions for parsing */
+static private_key_t *ocsp_requestor_key = NULL;
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of ocspResponse
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t ocspResponseObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "OCSPResponse",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "responseStatus",              ASN1_ENUMERATED,   ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "responseBytesContext",        ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT  }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,     "responseBytes",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  3 */
-  { 3,       "responseType",            ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 3,       "response",                ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                     ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  6 */
+	{ 0, "OCSPResponse",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_NONE }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "responseStatus",		ASN1_ENUMERATED,	ASN1_BODY }, /* 1 */
+	{ 1,   "responseBytesContext",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	ASN1_OPT  }, /* 2 */
+	{ 2,     "responseBytes",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_NONE }, /* 3 */
+	{ 3,       "responseType",		ASN1_OID,			ASN1_BODY }, /* 4 */
+	{ 3,       "response",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,	ASN1_BODY }, /* 5 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END  }, /* 6 */
+	{ 0, "exit",					ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_EXIT }
 };
-
 #define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS	1
-#define OCSP_RESPONSE_TYPE	4
-#define OCSP_RESPONSE		5
-#define OCSP_RESPONSE_ROOF	7
+#define OCSP_RESPONSE_TYPE		4
+#define OCSP_RESPONSE			5
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of basicResponse
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t basicResponseObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "BasicOCSPResponse",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "tbsResponseData",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,     "versionContext",            ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_NONE |
-							      ASN1_DEF  }, /*  2 */
-  { 3,       "version",                 ASN1_INTEGER,         ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
-  { 2,     "responderIdContext",        ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT  }, /*  4 */
-  { 3,       "responderIdByName",       ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
-  { 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  6 */
-  { 2,     "responderIdContext",        ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,     ASN1_OPT  }, /*  7 */
-  { 3,       "responderIdByKey",        ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
-  { 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
-  { 2,     "producedAt",                ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
-  { 2,     "responses",                 ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 11 */
-  { 2,     "responseExtensionsContext", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 12 */
-  { 3,       "responseExtensions",      ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 13 */
-  { 4,         "extension",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 14 */
-  { 5,           "extnID",              ASN1_OID,             ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
-  { 5,           "critical",            ASN1_BOOLEAN,         ASN1_BODY |
-							      ASN1_DEF  }, /* 16 */
-  { 5,           "extnValue",           ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_BODY }, /* 17 */
-  { 4,         "end loop",              ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",                   ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 19 */
-  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",          ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 20 */
-  { 1,   "signature",                   ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 21 */
-  { 1,   "certsContext",                ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 22 */
-  { 2,     "certs",                     ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 23 */
-  { 3,       "certificate",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 24 */
-  { 2,     "end loop",                  ASN1_EOC,	      ASN1_END  }, /* 25 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                     ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }  /* 26 */
+	{ 0, "BasicOCSPResponse",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "tbsResponseData",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+	{ 2,     "versionContext",				ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,		ASN1_NONE |
+																	ASN1_DEF  }, /*  2 */
+	{ 3,       "version",					ASN1_INTEGER,			ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+	{ 2,     "responderIdContext",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,		ASN1_OPT  }, /*  4 */
+	{ 3,       "responderIdByName",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
+	{ 2,     "end choice",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /*  6 */
+	{ 2,     "responderIdContext",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,		ASN1_OPT  }, /*  7 */
+	{ 3,       "responderIdByKey",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+	{ 2,     "end choice",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+	{ 2,     "producedAt",					ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,	ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
+	{ 2,     "responses",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 11 */
+	{ 2,     "responseExtensionsContext",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,		ASN1_OPT  }, /* 12 */
+	{ 3,       "responseExtensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_LOOP }, /* 13 */
+	{ 4,         "extension",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_NONE }, /* 14 */
+	{ 5,           "extnID",				ASN1_OID,				ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
+	{ 5,           "critical",				ASN1_BOOLEAN,			ASN1_BODY |
+																	ASN1_DEF  }, /* 16 */
+	{ 5,           "extnValue",				ASN1_OCTET_STRING,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 17 */
+	{ 4,         "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",						ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 19 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",			ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_RAW  }, /* 20 */
+	{ 1,   "signature",						ASN1_BIT_STRING,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 21 */
+	{ 1,   "certsContext",					ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,		ASN1_OPT  }, /* 22 */
+	{ 2,     "certs",						ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_LOOP }, /* 23 */
+	{ 3,       "certificate",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_RAW  }, /* 24 */
+	{ 2,     "end loop",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 25 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",						ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+	{ 0, "exit",							ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_EXIT }
 };
-
 #define BASIC_RESPONSE_TBS_DATA		 1
 #define BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION		 3
 #define BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_NAME	 5
@@ -221,1349 +224,1326 @@ static const asn1Object_t basicResponseObjects[] = {
 #define BASIC_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM	20
 #define BASIC_RESPONSE_SIGNATURE	21
 #define BASIC_RESPONSE_CERTIFICATE	24
-#define BASIC_RESPONSE_ROOF		27
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of responses
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t responsesObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "responses",                   ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "singleResponse",            ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_RAW  }, /*  1 */
-  { 0, "end loop",                    ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }  /*  2 */
+	{ 0, "responses",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,	ASN1_LOOP }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "singleResponse",	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /* 1 */
+	{ 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_END  }, /* 2 */
+	{ 0, "exit",				ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_EXIT }
 };
+#define RESPONSES_SINGLE_RESPONSE	1
 
-#define RESPONSES_SINGLE_RESPONSE	 1
-#define RESPONSES_ROOF			 3
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of singleResponse
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t singleResponseObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "singleResponse",            ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "certID",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,     "algorithm",             ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_RAW  }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,     "issuerNameHash",        ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
-  { 2,     "issuerKeyHash",         ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 2,     "serialNumber",          ASN1_INTEGER,           ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
-  { 1,   "certStatusGood",          ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0,       ASN1_OPT  }, /*  6 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
-  { 1,   "certStatusRevoked",       ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,       ASN1_OPT  }, /*  8 */
-  { 2,     "revocationTime",        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,   ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
-  { 2,     "revocationReason",      ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 10 */
-  { 3,       "crlReason",           ASN1_ENUMERATED,        ASN1_BODY }, /* 11 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",               ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 12 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 13 */
-  { 1,   "certStatusUnknown",       ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 14 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 15 */
-  { 1,   "thisUpdate",              ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,   ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
-  { 1,   "nextUpdateContext",       ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 17 */
-  { 2,     "nextUpdate",            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,   ASN1_BODY }, /* 18 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 19 */
-  { 1,   "singleExtensionsContext", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 20 */
-  { 2,     "singleExtensions",      ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_LOOP }, /* 21 */
-  { 3,       "extension",           ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_NONE }, /* 22 */
-  { 4,         "extnID",            ASN1_OID,               ASN1_BODY }, /* 23 */
-  { 4,         "critical",          ASN1_BOOLEAN,           ASN1_BODY |
-							    ASN1_DEF  }, /* 24 */
-  { 4,         "extnValue",         ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
-  { 2,     "end loop",              ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }  /* 27 */
+	{ 0, "singleResponse",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "certID",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
+	{ 2,     "algorithm",				ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_RAW  }, /*  2 */
+	{ 2,     "issuerNameHash",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+	{ 2,     "issuerKeyHash",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+	{ 2,     "serialNumber",			ASN1_INTEGER,			ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+	{ 1,   "certStatusGood",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0,		ASN1_OPT  }, /*  6 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
+	{ 1,   "certStatusRevoked",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,		ASN1_OPT  }, /*  8 */
+	{ 2,     "revocationTime",			ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,	ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
+	{ 2,     "revocationReason",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,		ASN1_OPT  }, /* 10 */
+	{ 3,       "crlReason",				ASN1_ENUMERATED,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 11 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 12 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 13 */
+	{ 1,   "certStatusUnknown",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,		ASN1_OPT  }, /* 14 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 15 */
+	{ 1,   "thisUpdate",				ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,	ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
+	{ 1,   "nextUpdateContext",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,		ASN1_OPT  }, /* 17 */
+	{ 2,     "nextUpdate",				ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,	ASN1_BODY }, /* 18 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 19 */
+	{ 1,   "singleExtensionsContext",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,		ASN1_OPT  }, /* 20 */
+	{ 2,     "singleExtensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_LOOP }, /* 21 */
+	{ 3,       "extension",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,			ASN1_NONE }, /* 22 */
+	{ 4,         "extnID",				ASN1_OID,				ASN1_BODY }, /* 23 */
+	{ 4,         "critical",			ASN1_BOOLEAN,			ASN1_BODY |
+																ASN1_DEF  }, /* 24 */
+	{ 4,         "extnValue",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
+	{ 2,     "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_END  }, /* 27 */
+	{ 0, "exit",						ASN1_EOC,				ASN1_EXIT }
 };
-
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM			 2
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_NAME_HASH		 3
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_KEY_HASH			 4
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_SERIAL_NUMBER			 5
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_GOOD		 6
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOKED		 8
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM					 2
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_NAME_HASH			 3
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_KEY_HASH				 4
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_SERIAL_NUMBER				 5
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_GOOD			 6
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOKED			 8
 #define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOCATION_TIME	 9
 #define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_CRL_REASON		11
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_UNKNOWN		14
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_THIS_UPDATE			16
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_NEXT_UPDATE			18
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_ID				23
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CRITICAL			24
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE			25
-#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ROOF				28
-
-/* build an ocsp location from certificate information
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_UNKNOWN			14
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_THIS_UPDATE					16
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_NEXT_UPDATE					18
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_ID						23
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CRITICAL					24
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE					25
+
+/*
+ * Build an ocsp location from certificate information
  * without unsharing its contents
  */
-static bool
-build_ocsp_location(const x509cert_t *cert, ocsp_location_t *location)
+static bool build_ocsp_location(const x509cert_t *cert, ocsp_location_t *location)
 {
-    static u_char digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];  /* temporary storage */
+	hasher_t *hasher;
+	static u_char digest[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];  /* temporary storage */
+	
+	location->uri = cert->accessLocation;
 
-    location->uri = cert->accessLocation;
+	if (location->uri.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		ca_info_t *ca = get_ca_info(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+				, cert->authKeyID);
+		if (ca != NULL && ca->ocspuri != NULL)
+		{
+			location->uri = chunk_create(ca->ocspuri, strlen(ca->ocspuri));
+		}
+		else
+		{   /* abort if no ocsp location uri is defined */
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
+	
+	/* compute authNameID from as SHA-1 hash of issuer DN */
+	location->authNameID = chunk_create(digest, HASH_SIZE_SHA1);
+	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_SHA1);
+	if (hasher == NULL)
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+ 	hasher->get_hash(hasher, cert->issuer, digest);
+	hasher->destroy(hasher);
 
-    if (location->uri.ptr == NULL)
-    {
-	ca_info_t *ca = get_ca_info(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-		, cert->authKeyID);
-	if (ca != NULL && ca->ocspuri != NULL)
-	    setchunk(location->uri, ca->ocspuri, strlen(ca->ocspuri))
-	else
-	    /* abort if no ocsp location uri is defined */
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-    
-    setchunk(location->authNameID, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
-    compute_digest(cert->issuer, OID_SHA1, &location->authNameID);
-
-    location->next = NULL;
-    location->issuer = cert->issuer;
-    location->authKeyID = cert->authKeyID;
-    location->authKeySerialNumber = cert->authKeySerialNumber;
-    
-    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr == NULL) 
-    {
-	x509cert_t *authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer
-		, cert->authKeySerialNumber, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
-
-	if (authcert != NULL)
+	location->next = NULL;
+	location->issuer = cert->issuer;
+	location->authKeyID = cert->authKeyID;
+	location->authKeySerialNumber = cert->authKeySerialNumber;
+	
+	if (cert->authKeyID.ptr == NULL) 
 	{
-	    location->authKeyID = authcert->subjectKeyID;
-	    location->authKeySerialNumber = authcert->serialNumber;
+		x509cert_t *authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer
+				, cert->authKeySerialNumber, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+		if (authcert != NULL)
+		{
+			location->authKeyID = authcert->subjectKeyID;
+			location->authKeySerialNumber = authcert->serialNumber;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    location->nonce = empty_chunk;
-    location->certinfo = NULL;
+	location->nonce = chunk_empty;
+	location->certinfo = NULL;
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-/*
- * compare two ocsp locations for equality
+/**
+ * Compare two ocsp locations for equality
  */
-static bool
-same_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *a, const ocsp_location_t *b)
+static bool same_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *a, const ocsp_location_t *b)
 {
-    return ((a->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-		? same_keyid(a->authKeyID, b->authKeyID)
-		: (same_dn(a->issuer, b->issuer)
-		    && same_serial(a->authKeySerialNumber, b->authKeySerialNumber)))
-	    && same_chunk(a->uri, b->uri);
+	return ((a->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+				? same_keyid(a->authKeyID, b->authKeyID)
+				: (same_dn(a->issuer, b->issuer)
+					&& same_serial(a->authKeySerialNumber, b->authKeySerialNumber)))
+			&& chunk_equals(a->uri, b->uri);
 }
 
-/*
- * find an existing ocsp location in a chained list
+/**
+ * Find an existing ocsp location in a chained list
  */
-ocsp_location_t*
-get_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t * loc, ocsp_location_t *chain)
+ocsp_location_t* get_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t * loc, ocsp_location_t *chain)
 {
 
-    while (chain != NULL)
-    {
-	if (same_ocsp_location(loc, chain))
-	    return chain;
-	chain = chain->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	while (chain != NULL)
+	{
+		if (same_ocsp_location(loc, chain))
+			return chain;
+		chain = chain->next;
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
- 
-/* retrieves the status of a cert from the ocsp cache
+
+/**
+ * Retrieves the status of a cert from the ocsp cache
  * returns CERT_UNDEFINED if no status is found
  */
-static cert_status_t
-get_ocsp_status(const ocsp_location_t *loc, chunk_t serialNumber
-    ,time_t *nextUpdate, time_t *revocationTime, crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
+static cert_status_t get_ocsp_status(const ocsp_location_t *loc,
+									 chunk_t serialNumber,
+									 time_t *nextUpdate, time_t *revocationTime,
+									 crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
 {
-    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
-    int cmp = -1;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
+	int cmp = -1;
 
-    /* find location */
-    ocsp_location_t *location = get_ocsp_location(loc, ocsp_cache);
+	/* find location */
+	ocsp_location_t *location = get_ocsp_location(loc, ocsp_cache);
 
-    if (location == NULL)
-	return CERT_UNDEFINED;
-
-    /* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
-    certinfop = &location->certinfo;
-    certinfo = *certinfop;
+	if (location == NULL)
+		return CERT_UNDEFINED;
 
-    while (certinfo != NULL)
-    {
-	cmp = cmp_chunk(serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
-	if (cmp <= 0)
-	    break;
-	certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+	/* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
+	certinfop = &location->certinfo;
 	certinfo = *certinfop;
-    }
 
-    if (cmp == 0)
-    {
-	*nextUpdate = certinfo->nextUpdate;
-	*revocationTime = certinfo->revocationTime;
-	*revocationReason = certinfo->revocationReason;
-	return certinfo->status;
-    }
+	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+		cmp = chunk_compare(serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+		certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+		certinfo = *certinfop;
+	}
+
+	if (cmp == 0)
+	{
+		*nextUpdate = certinfo->nextUpdate;
+		*revocationTime = certinfo->revocationTime;
+		*revocationReason = certinfo->revocationReason;
+		return certinfo->status;
+	}
 
-    return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+	return CERT_UNDEFINED;
 }
 
-/*
- * verify the ocsp status of a certificate
+/**
+ * Verify the ocsp status of a certificate
  */
-cert_status_t
-verify_by_ocsp(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until
-, time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
+cert_status_t verify_by_ocsp(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until,
+							 time_t *revocationDate,
+							 crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
 {
-    cert_status_t status;
-    ocsp_location_t location;
-    time_t nextUpdate = 0;
-
-    *revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-    *revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
-    
-    /* is an ocsp location defined? */
-    if (!build_ocsp_location(cert, &location))
-	return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+	cert_status_t status;
+	ocsp_location_t location;
+	time_t nextUpdate = 0;
+
+	*revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	*revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+	
+	/* is an ocsp location defined? */
+	if (!build_ocsp_location(cert, &location))
+		return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+
+	lock_ocsp_cache("verify_by_ocsp");
+	status = get_ocsp_status(&location, cert->serialNumber, &nextUpdate
+		, revocationDate, revocationReason);
+	unlock_ocsp_cache("verify_by_ocsp");
+
+	if (status == CERT_UNDEFINED || nextUpdate < time(NULL))
+	{
+		plog("ocsp status is stale or not in cache");
+		add_ocsp_fetch_request(&location, cert->serialNumber);
 
-    lock_ocsp_cache("verify_by_ocsp");
-    status = get_ocsp_status(&location, cert->serialNumber, &nextUpdate
-	, revocationDate, revocationReason);
-    unlock_ocsp_cache("verify_by_ocsp");
-
-    if (status == CERT_UNDEFINED || nextUpdate < time(NULL))
-    {
-	plog("ocsp status is stale or not in cache");
-	add_ocsp_fetch_request(&location, cert->serialNumber);
-
-	/* inititate fetching of ocsp status */
-	wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_ocsp");
-    }
-    *until = nextUpdate;
-    return status;
+		/* inititate fetching of ocsp status */
+		wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_ocsp");
+	}
+	*until = nextUpdate;
+	return status;
 }
 
-/*
- * check if an ocsp status is about to expire
+/**
+ * Check if an ocsp status is about to expire
  */
-void
-check_ocsp(void)
+void check_ocsp(void)
 {
-    ocsp_location_t *location;
-
-    lock_ocsp_cache("check_ocsp");
-    location = ocsp_cache;
-    
-    while (location != NULL)
-    {
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	bool first = TRUE;
-	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+	ocsp_location_t *location;
 
-	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	lock_ocsp_cache("check_ocsp");
+	location = ocsp_cache;
+	
+	while (location != NULL)
 	{
-	    if (!certinfo->once)
-	    {
-		time_t time_left = certinfo->nextUpdate - time(NULL);
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		bool first = TRUE;
+		ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
 
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    if (first)
-		    {
-			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
-			DBG_log("issuer: '%s'", buf);
-			if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		while (certinfo != NULL)
+		{
+			if (!certinfo->once)
 			{
-			    datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len
-				, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
-			    DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+				time_t time_left = certinfo->nextUpdate - time(NULL);
+
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					if (first)
+					{
+						dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
+						DBG_log("issuer: '%s'", buf);
+						if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+						{
+							datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len
+								, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+							DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+						}
+						first = FALSE;
+					}
+					datatot(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr, certinfo->serialNumber.len
+						, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+					DBG_log("serial: %s, %ld seconds left", buf, time_left)
+				)
+
+				if (time_left < 2*crl_check_interval)
+					add_ocsp_fetch_request(location, certinfo->serialNumber);
 			}
-			first = FALSE;
-		    }
-		    datatot(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr, certinfo->serialNumber.len
-			, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
-		    DBG_log("serial: %s, %ld seconds left", buf, time_left)
-		)
-
-		if (time_left < 2*crl_check_interval)
-		    add_ocsp_fetch_request(location, certinfo->serialNumber);
-	    }
-	    certinfo = certinfo->next;
+			certinfo = certinfo->next;
+		}
+		location = location->next;
 	}
-	location = location->next;
-    }
-    unlock_ocsp_cache("check_ocsp");
+	unlock_ocsp_cache("check_ocsp");
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  frees the allocated memory of a certinfo struct
  */
-static void
-free_certinfo(ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo)
+static void free_certinfo(ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo)
 {
-    freeanychunk(certinfo->serialNumber);
-    pfree(certinfo);
+	free(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr);
+	free(certinfo);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * frees all certinfos in a chained list
  */
-static void
-free_certinfos(ocsp_certinfo_t *chain)
+static void free_certinfos(ocsp_certinfo_t *chain)
 {
-    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo;
 
-    while (chain != NULL)
-    {
-	certinfo = chain;
-	chain = chain->next;
-	free_certinfo(certinfo);
-    }
+	while (chain != NULL)
+	{
+		certinfo = chain;
+		chain = chain->next;
+		free_certinfo(certinfo);
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- * frees the memory allocated to an ocsp location including all certinfos
+/**
+ * Frees the memory allocated to an ocsp location including all certinfos
  */
-static void
-free_ocsp_location(ocsp_location_t* location)
+static void free_ocsp_location(ocsp_location_t* location)
 {
-    freeanychunk(location->issuer);
-    freeanychunk(location->authNameID);
-    freeanychunk(location->authKeyID);
-    freeanychunk(location->authKeySerialNumber);
-    freeanychunk(location->uri);
-    free_certinfos(location->certinfo);
-    pfree(location);
+	free(location->issuer.ptr);
+	free(location->authNameID.ptr);
+	free(location->authKeyID.ptr);
+	free(location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr);
+	free(location->uri.ptr);
+	free_certinfos(location->certinfo);
+	free(location);
 }
 
 /*
- * free a chained list of ocsp locations
+ * Free a chained list of ocsp locations
  */
-void
-free_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t **chain)
+void free_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t **chain)
 {
-    while (*chain != NULL)
-    {
-	ocsp_location_t *location = *chain;
-	*chain = location->next;
-	free_ocsp_location(location);
-    }
+	while (*chain != NULL)
+	{
+		ocsp_location_t *location = *chain;
+		*chain = location->next;
+		free_ocsp_location(location);
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- * free the ocsp cache
+/**
+ * Free the ocsp cache
  */
-void
-free_ocsp_cache(void)
+void free_ocsp_cache(void)
 {
-    lock_ocsp_cache("free_ocsp_cache");
-    free_ocsp_locations(&ocsp_cache);
-    unlock_ocsp_cache("free_ocsp_cache");
+	lock_ocsp_cache("free_ocsp_cache");
+	free_ocsp_locations(&ocsp_cache);
+	unlock_ocsp_cache("free_ocsp_cache");
 }
 
-/*
- * frees the ocsp cache and global variables
+/**
+ * Frees the ocsp cache and global variables
  */
-void
-free_ocsp(void)
+void free_ocsp(void)
 {
-    pfreeany(ocsp_default_uri.ptr);
-    free_ocsp_cache();
+	free(ocsp_default_uri.ptr);
+	free_ocsp_cache();
 }
 
-/*
- * list a chained list of ocsp_locations
+/**
+ * List a chained list of ocsp_locations
  */
-void
-list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t *location, bool requests, bool utc
-, bool strict)
+void list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t *location, bool requests,
+						 bool utc, bool strict)
 {
-    bool first = TRUE;
-
-    while (location != NULL)
-    {
-	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+	bool first = TRUE;
 
-	if (certinfo != NULL)
+	while (location != NULL)
 	{
-	    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	    if (first)
-	    {
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of OCSP %s:", requests?
-		    "fetch requests":"responses");
-		first = FALSE;
-            }
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	    if (location->issuer.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:  '%s'", buf);
-	    }
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       uri:     '%.*s'", (int)location->uri.len
-		, location->uri.ptr);
-	    if (location->authNameID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(location->authNameID.ptr, location->authNameID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authname: %s", buf);
-	    }
-	    if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:  %s", buf);
-	    }
-	    if (location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr
-		    , location->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:  %s", buf);
-	    }
-	    while (certinfo != NULL)
-	    {
-		char thisUpdate[TIMETOA_BUF];
-
-		strcpy(thisUpdate, timetoa(&certinfo->thisUpdate, utc));
-
-		if (requests)
-		{
-		    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, trials: %d", thisUpdate
-			, certinfo->trials);
-		}
-		else if (certinfo->once)
-		{
-		    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, onetime use%s", thisUpdate
-			, (certinfo->nextUpdate < time(NULL))? " (expired)": "");
-		}
-		else
+		ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+
+		if (certinfo != NULL)
 		{
-		    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, until %s %s", thisUpdate
-			, timetoa(&certinfo->nextUpdate, utc)
-			, check_expiry(certinfo->nextUpdate, OCSP_WARNING_INTERVAL, strict));
+			u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+			if (first)
+			{
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of OCSP %s:", requests?
+					"fetch requests":"responses");
+				first = FALSE;
+			}
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+			if (location->issuer.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:  '%s'", buf);
+			}
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       uri:     '%.*s'", (int)location->uri.len
+				, location->uri.ptr);
+			if (location->authNameID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(location->authNameID.ptr, location->authNameID.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authname: %s", buf);
+			}
+			if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:  %s", buf);
+			}
+			if (location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr
+					, location->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:  %s", buf);
+			}
+			while (certinfo != NULL)
+			{
+				char thisUpdate[BUF_LEN];
+
+				snprintf(thisUpdate, BUF_LEN, "%T", &certinfo->thisUpdate, utc);
+
+				if (requests)
+				{
+					whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, trials: %d", thisUpdate
+						, certinfo->trials);
+				}
+				else if (certinfo->once)
+				{
+					whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, onetime use%s", thisUpdate
+						, (certinfo->nextUpdate < time(NULL))? " (expired)": "");
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, until %T %s", thisUpdate
+						, &certinfo->nextUpdate, utc
+						, check_expiry(certinfo->nextUpdate, OCSP_WARNING_INTERVAL, strict));
+				}
+				datatot(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr, certinfo->serialNumber.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:   %s, %s", buf
+					, cert_status_names[certinfo->status]);
+				certinfo = certinfo->next;
+			}
 		}
-		datatot(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr, certinfo->serialNumber.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:   %s, %s", buf
-		    , cert_status_names[certinfo->status]);
-		certinfo = certinfo->next;
-	    }
+		location = location->next;
 	}
-	location = location->next;
-    }
 }
 
-/*
- * list the ocsp cache
+/**
+ * List the ocsp cache
  */
-void
-list_ocsp_cache(bool utc, bool strict)
+void list_ocsp_cache(bool utc, bool strict)
 {
-    lock_ocsp_cache("list_ocsp_cache");
-    list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_cache, FALSE, utc, strict);
-    unlock_ocsp_cache("list_ocsp_cache");
+	lock_ocsp_cache("list_ocsp_cache");
+	list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_cache, FALSE, utc, strict);
+	unlock_ocsp_cache("list_ocsp_cache");
 }
 
-static bool
-get_ocsp_requestor_cert(ocsp_location_t *location)
+static bool get_ocsp_requestor_cert(ocsp_location_t *location)
 {
-    x509cert_t *cert = NULL;
+	x509cert_t *cert = NULL;
 
-    /* initialize temporary static storage */
-    ocsp_requestor_cert = NULL;
-    ocsp_requestor_sc   = NULL;
-    ocsp_requestor_pri  = NULL;
+	/* initialize temporary static storage */
+	ocsp_requestor_cert = NULL;
+	ocsp_requestor_sc   = NULL;
+	ocsp_requestor_key  = NULL;
 
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	/* looking for a certificate from the same issuer */
-	cert = get_x509cert(location->issuer, location->authKeySerialNumber
-		    ,location->authKeyID, cert);
-   	if (cert == NULL)
-	    break;
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
-	    DBG_log("candidate: '%s'", buf);
-	)
-
-	if (cert->smartcard)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    /* look for a matching private key on a smartcard */
-	    smartcard_t *sc = scx_get(cert);
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+		/* looking for a certificate from the same issuer */
+		cert = get_x509cert(location->issuer, location->authKeySerialNumber
+					,location->authKeyID, cert);
+		if (cert == NULL)
+			break;
 
-	    if (sc != NULL)
-	    {
 		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("matching smartcard found")
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+			DBG_log("candidate: '%s'", buf);
 		)
-		if (sc->valid)
+
+		if (cert->smartcard)
 		{
-		    ocsp_requestor_cert = cert;
-		    ocsp_requestor_sc = sc;
-		    return TRUE;
+			/* look for a matching private key on a smartcard */
+			smartcard_t *sc = scx_get(cert);
+
+			if (sc != NULL)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("matching smartcard found")
+				)
+				if (sc->valid)
+				{
+					ocsp_requestor_cert = cert;
+					ocsp_requestor_sc = sc;
+					return TRUE;
+				}
+				plog("unable to sign ocsp request without PIN");
+			}
 		}
-		plog("unable to sign ocsp request without PIN");
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* look for a matching private key in the chained list */
-	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_x509_private_key(cert);
+		else
+		{
+			/* look for a matching private key in the chained list */
+			private_key_t *private = get_x509_private_key(cert);
 
-	    if (pri != NULL)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("matching private key found")
-		)
-		ocsp_requestor_cert = cert;
-		ocsp_requestor_pri = pri;
-		return TRUE;
-	    }
+			if (private != NULL)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("matching private key found")
+				)
+				ocsp_requestor_cert = cert;
+				ocsp_requestor_key = private;
+				return TRUE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-static chunk_t
-generate_signature(chunk_t digest, smartcard_t *sc
-    , const RSA_private_key_t *pri)
+static chunk_t sc_build_sha1_signature(chunk_t tbs, smartcard_t *sc)
 {
-    chunk_t sigdata;
-    u_char *pos;
-    size_t siglen = 0;
-
-    if (sc != NULL)
-    {
-	/* RSA signature is done on smartcard */
+	hasher_t *hasher;
+	u_char *pos;
+	u_char digest_buf[HASH_SIZE_SHA1];
+	chunk_t digest = chunk_from_buf(digest_buf);
+	chunk_t digest_info, sigdata;
+	size_t siglen = 0;
 
 	if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
 	{
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	    return empty_chunk;
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return chunk_empty;
 	}
 
 	siglen = scx_get_keylength(sc);
 
 	if (siglen == 0)
 	{
-	    plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard");
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	    return empty_chunk;
+		plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard");
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return chunk_empty;
 	}
 
 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("signing hash with RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
-		, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+		DBG_log("signing hash with RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
+			, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
 	)
 
-	pos = build_asn1_object(&sigdata, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
+	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_SHA1);
+	if (hasher == NULL)
+	{
+		return chunk_empty;
+	}
+ 	hasher->get_hash(hasher, tbs, digest_buf);
+	hasher->destroy(hasher);
+
+	/* according to PKCS#1 v2.1 digest must be packaged into
+	 * an ASN.1 structure for encryption
+	 */
+	digest_info = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(OID_SHA1)
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest));
+
+	pos = asn1_build_object(&sigdata, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
 	*pos++ = 0x00;
-	scx_sign_hash(sc, digest.ptr, digest.len, pos, siglen);
+	scx_sign_hash(sc, digest_info.ptr, digest_info.len, pos, siglen);
+	free(digest_info.ptr);
+
 	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* RSA signature is done in software */
-	siglen = pri->pub.k;
-	pos = build_asn1_object(&sigdata, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
-	*pos++ = 0x00;
-	sign_hash(pri, digest.ptr, digest.len, pos, siglen);
-    }
-    return sigdata;
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+	}
+	return sigdata;
 }
 
-/*
- * build signature into ocsp request
- * gets built only if a request cert with
- * a corresponding private key is found
+/**
+ * build signature into ocsp request gets built only if a request cert
+ * with a corresponding private key is found
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_signature(chunk_t tbsRequest)
+static chunk_t build_signature(chunk_t tbsRequest)
 {
-    chunk_t sigdata, certs;
-    chunk_t digest_info;
-
-    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    chunk_t digest_raw = { digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN };
-
-    if (!compute_digest(tbsRequest, OID_SHA1, &digest_raw))
-	return empty_chunk;
-
-    /* according to PKCS#1 v2.1 digest must be packaged into
-     * an ASN.1 structure for encryption
-     */
-    digest_info = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-	, ASN1_sha1_id
-	, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest_raw));
-
-    /* generate the RSA signature */
-    sigdata = generate_signature(digest_info
-	, ocsp_requestor_sc
-	, ocsp_requestor_pri);
-    freeanychunk(digest_info);
-
-    /* has the RSA signature generation been successful? */
-    if (sigdata.ptr == NULL)
-	return empty_chunk;
-
-    /* include our certificate */
-    certs = asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, "m"
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SEQUENCE
-		    , ocsp_requestor_cert->certificate
-		  )
-	    );
-
-    /* build signature comprising algorithm, signature and cert */
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, "m"
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
-		    , ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id
-		    , sigdata
-		    , certs
-		  )
-	   );
+	chunk_t sigdata, certs;
+
+	if (ocsp_requestor_sc != NULL)
+	{
+		/* RSA signature is done on smartcard */
+		sigdata = sc_build_sha1_signature(tbsRequest, ocsp_requestor_sc);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* RSA signature is done in software */
+		sigdata = x509_build_signature(tbsRequest, OID_SHA1, ocsp_requestor_key,
+									   TRUE);
+	}
+	if (sigdata.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		return chunk_empty;
+	}
+
+	/* include our certificate */
+	certs = asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, "m"
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SEQUENCE
+					, ocsp_requestor_cert->certificate
+				  )
+			);
+
+	/* build signature comprising algorithm, signature and cert */
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, "m"
+				, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
+					, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA)
+					, sigdata
+					, certs
+				  )
+		   );
 }
 
-/* build request (into requestList)
+/**
+ * Build request (into requestList)
  * no singleRequestExtensions used
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_request(ocsp_location_t *location, ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo)
+static chunk_t build_request(ocsp_location_t *location, ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo)
 {
-    chunk_t reqCert = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmm"
-		, ASN1_sha1_id
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->authNameID)
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->authKeyID)
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, certinfo->serialNumber));
+	chunk_t reqCert = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmm"
+				, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(OID_SHA1)
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->authNameID)
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->authKeyID)
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, certinfo->serialNumber));
 
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "m", reqCert);
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "m", reqCert);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * build requestList (into TBSRequest)
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_request_list(ocsp_location_t *location)
+static chunk_t build_request_list(ocsp_location_t *location)
 {
-    chunk_t requestList;
-    request_list_t *reqs = NULL;
-    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
-    u_char *pos;
-
-    size_t datalen = 0;
-
-    /* build content */
-    while (certinfo != NULL)
-    {
-	/* build request for every certificate in list
-	 * and store them in a chained list
-	 */
-	request_list_t *req = alloc_thing(request_list_t, "ocsp request");
+	chunk_t requestList;
+	request_list_t *reqs = NULL;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+	u_char *pos;
 
-	req->request = build_request(location, certinfo);
-	req->next = reqs;
-	reqs = req;
+	size_t datalen = 0;
 
-	datalen += req->request.len;
-	certinfo = certinfo->next;
-    }
+	/* build content */
+	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+		/* build request for every certificate in list
+		 * and store them in a chained list
+		 */
+		request_list_t *req = malloc_thing(request_list_t);
+
+		req->request = build_request(location, certinfo);
+		req->next = reqs;
+		reqs = req;
+
+		datalen += req->request.len;
+		certinfo = certinfo->next;
+	}
 
-    pos = build_asn1_object(&requestList, ASN1_SEQUENCE
-	    , datalen);
+	pos = asn1_build_object(&requestList, ASN1_SEQUENCE, datalen);
 
-    /* copy all in chained list, free list afterwards */
-    while (reqs != NULL)
-    {
- 	request_list_t *req = reqs;
+	/* copy all in chained list, free list afterwards */
+	while (reqs != NULL)
+	{
+		request_list_t *req = reqs;
 
-	mv_chunk(&pos, req->request);
-	reqs = reqs->next;
-	pfree(req);
-    }
+		mv_chunk(&pos, req->request);
+		reqs = reqs->next;
+		free(req);
+	}
 
-    return requestList;
+	return requestList;
 }
 
-/*
- * build requestorName (into TBSRequest)
+/**
+ * Build requestorName (into TBSRequest)
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_requestor_name(void)
+static chunk_t build_requestor_name(void)
 {
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1, "m"
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4
-		    , ocsp_requestor_cert->subject));
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1, "m"
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4
+					, ocsp_requestor_cert->subject));
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * build nonce extension (into requestExtensions)
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_nonce_extension(ocsp_location_t *location)
+static chunk_t build_nonce_extension(ocsp_location_t *location)
 {
-    /* generate a random nonce */
-    location->nonce.ptr = alloc_bytes(NONCE_LENGTH, "ocsp nonce"),
-    location->nonce.len = NONCE_LENGTH;
-    get_rnd_bytes(location->nonce.ptr, NONCE_LENGTH);
-
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		, ASN1_nonce_oid
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->nonce));
+	rng_t *rng;
+
+	/* generate a random nonce */
+	location->nonce.ptr = malloc(NONCE_LENGTH),
+	location->nonce.len = NONCE_LENGTH;
+	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_STRONG);
+	rng->get_bytes(rng, location->nonce.len, location->nonce.ptr);
+	rng->destroy(rng);
+
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+				, ASN1_nonce_oid
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->nonce));
 }
 
-/*
- * build requestExtensions (into TBSRequest)
+/**
+ * Build requestExtensions (into TBSRequest)
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_request_ext(ocsp_location_t *location)
+static chunk_t build_request_ext(ocsp_location_t *location)
 {
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2, "m"
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
-		    , build_nonce_extension(location)
-		    , asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cc"
-			, ASN1_response_oid
-			, ASN1_response_content
-		      )
-		  )
-	    );
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2, "m"
+				, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+					, build_nonce_extension(location)
+					, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cc"
+						, ASN1_response_oid
+						, ASN1_response_content
+					  )
+				  )
+			);
 }
 
-/*
- * build TBSRequest (into OCSPRequest)
+/**
+ * Build TBSRequest (into OCSPRequest)
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_tbs_request(ocsp_location_t *location, bool has_requestor_cert)
+static chunk_t build_tbs_request(ocsp_location_t *location, bool has_requestor_cert)
 {
-    /* version is skipped since the default is ok */
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mmm"
-		, (has_requestor_cert)
-			? build_requestor_name()
-			: empty_chunk
-		, build_request_list(location)
-		, build_request_ext(location));
+	/* version is skipped since the default is ok */
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mmm"
+				, (has_requestor_cert)
+						? build_requestor_name()
+						: chunk_empty
+				, build_request_list(location)
+				, build_request_ext(location));
 }
 
-/* assembles an ocsp request to given location
+/**
+ * Assembles an ocsp request to given location
  * and sets nonce field in location to the sent nonce
  */
-chunk_t
-build_ocsp_request(ocsp_location_t *location)
+chunk_t build_ocsp_request(ocsp_location_t *location)
 {
-    bool has_requestor_cert;
-    chunk_t tbsRequest, signature;
-    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("assembling ocsp request");
-	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
-	DBG_log("issuer: '%s'", buf);
-	if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	{
-	    datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
-	}
-    )
-    lock_certs_and_keys("build_ocsp_request");
+	bool has_requestor_cert;
+	chunk_t tbsRequest, signature;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-    /* looks for requestor cert and matching private key */
-    has_requestor_cert = get_ocsp_requestor_cert(location);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("assembling ocsp request");
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
+		DBG_log("issuer: '%s'", buf);
+		if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		{
+			datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len, ':'
+				, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+		}
+	)
+	lock_certs_and_keys("build_ocsp_request");
+
+	/* looks for requestor cert and matching private key */
+	has_requestor_cert = get_ocsp_requestor_cert(location);
 
-    /* build content */
-    tbsRequest = build_tbs_request(location, has_requestor_cert);
+	/* build content */
+	tbsRequest = build_tbs_request(location, has_requestor_cert);
 
-    /* sign tbsReuqest */
-    signature = (has_requestor_cert)? build_signature(tbsRequest)
-				    : empty_chunk;
+	/* sign tbsReuqest */
+	signature = (has_requestor_cert)? build_signature(tbsRequest)
+									: chunk_empty;
 
-    unlock_certs_and_keys("build_ocsp_request");
+	unlock_certs_and_keys("build_ocsp_request");
 
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
-		, tbsRequest
-		, signature);
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+				, tbsRequest
+				, signature);
 }
 
-/*
- * check if the OCSP response has a valid signature
+/**
+ * Check if the OCSP response has a valid signature
  */
-static bool
-valid_ocsp_response(response_t *res)
+static bool valid_ocsp_response(response_t *res)
 {
-    int pathlen;
-    x509cert_t *authcert;
+	int pathlen;
+	x509cert_t *authcert;
 
-    lock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	lock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
 
-    authcert = get_authcert(res->responder_id_name, empty_chunk
-		    , res->responder_id_key, AUTH_OCSP | AUTH_CA);
-
-    if (authcert == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("no matching ocsp signer cert found");
-	unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("ocsp signer cert found")
-    )
-
-    if (!check_signature(res->tbs, res->signature, res->algorithm
-		       , res->algorithm, authcert))
-    {
-	plog("signature of ocsp response is invalid");
-	unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("signature of ocsp response is valid")
-    )
-
-
-    for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
-    {
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	err_t ugh = NULL;
-	time_t until;
-
-	x509cert_t *cert = authcert;
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
-	    DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
-	    DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
-	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
-	    }
-	)
-
-	ugh = check_validity(authcert, &until);
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    plog("%s", ugh);
-	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-	    return FALSE;
-        }
-	
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("certificate is valid")
-	)
-	
-	authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-	    , cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+	authcert = get_authcert(res->responder_id_name, chunk_empty
+					, res->responder_id_key, AUTH_OCSP | AUTH_CA);
 
 	if (authcert == NULL)
 	{
-	    plog("issuer cacert not found");
-	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-	    return FALSE;
+		plog("no matching ocsp signer cert found");
+		unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+		DBG_log("ocsp signer cert found")
 	)
 
-	if (!check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature
-			   , cert->algorithm, cert->algorithm, authcert))
+	if (!x509_check_signature(res->tbs, res->signature, res->algorithm, authcert))
 	{
-	    plog("certificate signature is invalid");
-	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-	    return FALSE;
+		plog("signature of ocsp response is invalid");
+		unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
+		DBG_log("signature of ocsp response is valid")
 	)
 
-	/* check if cert is self-signed */
-	if (same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+
+	for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
-	    )
-	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-	    return TRUE;
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		err_t ugh = NULL;
+		time_t until;
+
+		x509cert_t *cert = authcert;
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+			DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+			DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
+			if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
+			}
+		)
+
+		ugh = check_validity(authcert, &until);
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			plog("%s", ugh);
+			unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("certificate is valid")
+		)
+		
+		authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+			, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+		if (authcert == NULL)
+		{
+			plog("issuer cacert not found");
+			unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+		)
+
+		if (!x509_check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature,
+								  cert->algorithm, authcert))
+		{
+			plog("certificate signature is invalid");
+			unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
+		)
+
+		/* check if cert is self-signed */
+		if (same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
+			)
+			unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+			return TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
-    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
-    return FALSE;
+	plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
+	unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-/*
- * parse a basic OCSP response
+/**
+ * Parse a basic OCSP response
  */
-static bool
-parse_basic_ocsp_response(chunk_t blob, int level0, response_t *res)
+static bool parse_basic_ocsp_response(chunk_t blob, int level0, response_t *res)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    bool critical;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level, version;
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    int objectID = 0;
-    int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < BASIC_RESPONSE_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(basicResponseObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	    return FALSE;
-	
-	switch (objectID)
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	u_int version;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	int objectID;
+	int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+	bool critical;
+
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(basicResponseObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_TBS_DATA:
-	    res->tbs = object;
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION:
-	    version = (object.len)? (1 + (u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
-	    if (version != OCSP_BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION)
-	    {
-		plog("wrong ocsp basic response version (version= %i)",  version);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_NAME:
-	    res->responder_id_name = object;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_KEY:
-	    res->responder_id_key = object;
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_PRODUCED_AT:
-	    res->produced_at = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_RESPONSES:
-	    res->responses = object;
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_ID:
-	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_CRITICAL:
-	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE:
-	    if (extn_oid == OID_NONCE)
-		res->nonce = object;
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM:
-	    res->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level+1, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_SIGNATURE:
-	    res->signature = object;
-	    break;
-	case BASIC_RESPONSE_CERTIFICATE:
-	    {
-		chunk_t blob;
-		x509cert_t *cert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t, "ocspcert");
-
-		clonetochunk(blob, object.ptr, object.len, "ocspcert blob");
-		*cert = empty_x509cert;
-
-		if (parse_x509cert(blob, level+1, cert)
-		&& cert->isOcspSigner
-		&& trust_authcert_candidate(cert, NULL))
+		switch (objectID)
 		{
-		    add_authcert(cert, AUTH_OCSP);
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("embedded ocsp certificate rejected")
-		    )
-		    free_x509cert(cert);
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_TBS_DATA:
+			res->tbs = object;
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION:
+			version = (object.len)? (1 + (u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+			if (version != OCSP_BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION)
+			{
+				plog("wrong ocsp basic response version (version= %i)",  version);
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_NAME:
+			res->responder_id_name = object;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+				DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+			)
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_KEY:
+			res->responder_id_key = object;
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_PRODUCED_AT:
+			res->produced_at = asn1_to_time(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_RESPONSES:
+			res->responses = object;
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_ID:
+			extn_oid = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_CRITICAL:
+			critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+			)
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE:
+			if (extn_oid == OID_NONCE)
+				res->nonce = object;
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM:
+			res->algorithm = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object,
+								parser->get_level(parser)+1, NULL);
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_SIGNATURE:
+			res->signature = object;
+			break;
+		case BASIC_RESPONSE_CERTIFICATE:
+			{
+				chunk_t blob = chunk_clone(object);
+				x509cert_t *cert = malloc_thing(x509cert_t);
+
+				*cert = empty_x509cert;
+
+				if (parse_x509cert(blob, parser->get_level(parser)+1, cert)
+				&& cert->isOcspSigner
+				&& trust_authcert_candidate(cert, NULL))
+				{
+					add_authcert(cert, AUTH_OCSP);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+						DBG_log("embedded ocsp certificate rejected")
+					)
+					free_x509cert(cert);
+				}
+			}
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
+
 }
 
 
-/*
- * parse an ocsp response and return the result as a response_t struct
+/**
+ * Parse an ocsp response and return the result as a response_t struct
  */
-static response_status
-parse_ocsp_response(chunk_t blob, response_t * res)
+static response_status parse_ocsp_response(chunk_t blob, response_t * res)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    int ocspResponseType = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    response_status rStatus = STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, 0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < OCSP_RESPONSE_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(ocspResponseObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	    return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS:
-	    rStatus = (response_status) *object.ptr;
-
-	    switch (rStatus)
-	    {
-	    case STATUS_SUCCESSFUL:
-		break;
-	    case STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST:
-	    case STATUS_INTERNALERROR:
-	    case STATUS_TRYLATER:
-	    case STATUS_SIGREQUIRED:
-	    case STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED:
-		plog("ocsp response: server said '%s'"
-		    , response_status_names[rStatus]);
-		return rStatus;
-	    default:
-		return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case OCSP_RESPONSE_TYPE:
-	    ocspResponseType = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case OCSP_RESPONSE:
-	    {
-		switch (ocspResponseType) {
-		case OID_BASIC:
-		    if (!parse_basic_ocsp_response(object, level+1, res))
-			return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			DBG_log("ocsp response is not of type BASIC");
-			DBG_dump_chunk("ocsp response OID: ", object);
-		    )
-		    return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	int ocspResponseType = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+	response_status rStatus = STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(ocspResponseObjects, blob);
+
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		switch (objectID) {
+		case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS:
+			rStatus = (response_status) *object.ptr;
+
+			switch (rStatus)
+			{
+			case STATUS_SUCCESSFUL:
+				break;
+			case STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST:
+			case STATUS_INTERNALERROR:
+			case STATUS_TRYLATER:
+			case STATUS_SIGREQUIRED:
+			case STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED:
+				plog("ocsp response: server said '%s'"
+					, response_status_names[rStatus]);
+				goto end;
+			default:
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case OCSP_RESPONSE_TYPE:
+			ocspResponseType = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case OCSP_RESPONSE:
+			{
+				switch (ocspResponseType) {
+				case OID_BASIC:
+					success = parse_basic_ocsp_response(object,
+									parser->get_level(parser)+1, res);
+					break;
+				default:
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+						DBG_log("ocsp response is not of type BASIC");
+						DBG_dump_chunk("ocsp response OID: ", object);
+					)
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return rStatus;
+	success &= parser->success(parser);
+
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return rStatus;
 }
 
-/*
- * parse a basic OCSP response
+/**
+ * Parse a basic OCSP response
  */
-static bool
-parse_ocsp_single_response(chunk_t blob, int level0, single_response_t *sres)
+static bool parse_ocsp_single_response(chunk_t blob, int level0,
+									   single_response_t *sres)
 {
-    u_int level, extn_oid;
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    bool critical;
-    chunk_t object;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	u_int extn_oid;
+	int objectID;
+	bool critical;
+	bool success = FALSE;
 
-    while (objectID < SINGLE_RESPONSE_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(singleResponseObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	    return FALSE;
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(singleResponseObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 
-	switch (objectID)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM:
-	    sres->hash_algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level+1, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_NAME_HASH:
-	    sres->issuer_name_hash = object;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_KEY_HASH:
-	    sres->issuer_key_hash = object;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_SERIAL_NUMBER:
-	    sres->serialNumber = object;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_GOOD:
-	    sres->status = CERT_GOOD;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOKED:
-	    sres->status = CERT_REVOKED;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOCATION_TIME:
-	    sres->revocationTime = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_CRL_REASON:
-	    sres->revocationReason = (object.len == 1)
-		? *object.ptr : REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_UNKNOWN:
-	    sres->status = CERT_UNKNOWN;
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_THIS_UPDATE:
-	    sres->thisUpdate = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_NEXT_UPDATE:
-	    sres->nextUpdate = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_ID:
-	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CRITICAL:
-	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
-	    )
-	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE:
-	    break;
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM:
+			sres->hash_algorithm = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object,
+										parser->get_level(parser)+1, NULL);
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_NAME_HASH:
+			sres->issuer_name_hash = object;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_KEY_HASH:
+			sres->issuer_key_hash = object;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+			sres->serialNumber = object;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_GOOD:
+			sres->status = CERT_GOOD;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOKED:
+			sres->status = CERT_REVOKED;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOCATION_TIME:
+			sres->revocationTime = asn1_to_time(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_CRL_REASON:
+			sres->revocationReason = (object.len == 1)
+				? *object.ptr : REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_UNKNOWN:
+			sres->status = CERT_UNKNOWN;
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_THIS_UPDATE:
+			sres->thisUpdate = asn1_to_time(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_NEXT_UPDATE:
+			sres->nextUpdate = asn1_to_time(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_ID:
+			extn_oid = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CRITICAL:
+			critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+			)
+		case SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE:
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
 }
 
-/*
- * add an ocsp location to a chained list
+/**
+ * Add an ocsp location to a chained list
  */
-ocsp_location_t*
-add_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_location_t **chain)
+ocsp_location_t* add_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc,
+								   ocsp_location_t **chain)
 {
-    ocsp_location_t *location = alloc_thing(ocsp_location_t, "ocsp location");
-
-    /* unshare location fields */
-    clonetochunk(location->issuer
-		, loc->issuer.ptr, loc->issuer.len
-		, "ocsp issuer");
-
-    clonetochunk(location->authNameID
-		, loc->authNameID.ptr, loc->authNameID.len
-		, "ocsp authNameID");
-
-    if (loc->authKeyID.ptr == NULL)
-	location->authKeyID = empty_chunk;
-    else
-	clonetochunk(location->authKeyID
-		, loc->authKeyID.ptr, loc->authKeyID.len
-		, "ocsp authKeyID");
-
-    if (loc->authKeySerialNumber.ptr == NULL)
-	location->authKeySerialNumber = empty_chunk;
-    else
-	clonetochunk(location->authKeySerialNumber
-    		, loc->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, loc->authKeySerialNumber.len
-		, "ocsp authKeySerialNumber");
-
-    clonetochunk(location->uri
-		, loc->uri.ptr, loc->uri.len
-		, "ocsp uri");
-
-    location->certinfo = NULL;
-
-    /* insert new ocsp location in front of chain */
-    location->next = *chain;
-    *chain = location;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("new ocsp location added")
-    )
-
-    return location;
+	ocsp_location_t *location = malloc_thing(ocsp_location_t);
+
+	/* unshare location fields */
+	location->issuer = chunk_clone(loc->issuer);
+	location->authNameID = chunk_clone(loc->authNameID);
+	location->authKeyID = chunk_clone(loc->authKeyID);
+	location->authKeySerialNumber = chunk_clone(loc->authKeySerialNumber);
+	location->uri = chunk_clone(loc->uri);
+	location->certinfo = NULL;
+
+	/* insert new ocsp location in front of chain */
+	location->next = *chain;
+	*chain = location;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("new ocsp location added")
+	)
+
+	return location;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * add a certinfo struct to a chained list
  */
-void
-add_certinfo(ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_certinfo_t *info, ocsp_location_t **chain
-    , bool request)
+void add_certinfo(ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_certinfo_t *info,
+				  ocsp_location_t **chain, bool request)
 {
-    ocsp_location_t *location;
-    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
-    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    time_t now;
-    int cmp = -1;
-
-    location = get_ocsp_location(loc, *chain);
-    if (location == NULL)
-	location = add_ocsp_location(loc, chain);
-
-    /* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
-    certinfop = &location->certinfo;
-    certinfo = *certinfop;
-
-    while (certinfo != NULL)
-    {
-	cmp = cmp_chunk(info->serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
-	if (cmp <= 0)
-	    break;
-	certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+	ocsp_location_t *location;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	time_t now;
+	int cmp = -1;
+
+	location = get_ocsp_location(loc, *chain);
+	if (location == NULL)
+	{
+		location = add_ocsp_location(loc, chain);
+	}
+
+	/* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
+	certinfop = &location->certinfo;
 	certinfo = *certinfop;
-    }
-
-    if (cmp != 0)
-    {
-	/* add a new certinfo entry */
-	ocsp_certinfo_t *cnew = alloc_thing(ocsp_certinfo_t, "ocsp certinfo");
-	clonetochunk(cnew->serialNumber, info->serialNumber.ptr
-	    , info->serialNumber.len, "serialNumber");
-	cnew->next = certinfo;
-	*certinfop = cnew;
-	certinfo = cnew;
-    }
-	
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	datatot(info->serialNumber.ptr, info->serialNumber.len, ':'
-	    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-	DBG_log("ocsp %s for serial %s %s"
-	    , request?"fetch request":"certinfo"
-	    , buf
-	    , (cmp == 0)? (request?"already exists":"updated"):"added")
-    )
-
-    time(&now);
-   
-    if (request)
-    {
-	certinfo->status = CERT_UNDEFINED;
-	
+
+	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+		cmp = chunk_compare(info->serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+		certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+		certinfo = *certinfop;
+	}
+
 	if (cmp != 0)
-	    certinfo->thisUpdate = now;
-
-	certinfo->nextUpdate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	certinfo->status = info->status;
-	certinfo->revocationTime = info->revocationTime;
-	certinfo->revocationReason = info->revocationReason;
-	
-	certinfo->thisUpdate = (info->thisUpdate != UNDEFINED_TIME)?
-	    info->thisUpdate : now;
+	{
+		/* add a new certinfo entry */
+		ocsp_certinfo_t *cnew = malloc_thing(ocsp_certinfo_t);
+
+		cnew->serialNumber = chunk_clone(info->serialNumber);
+		cnew->next = certinfo;
+		*certinfop = cnew;
+		certinfo = cnew;
+	}
+		
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		datatot(info->serialNumber.ptr, info->serialNumber.len, ':'
+			, buf, BUF_LEN);
+		DBG_log("ocsp %s for serial %s %s"
+			, request?"fetch request":"certinfo"
+			, buf
+			, (cmp == 0)? (request?"already exists":"updated"):"added")
+	)
+
+	time(&now);
+
+	if (request)
+	{
+		certinfo->status = CERT_UNDEFINED;
+		
+		if (cmp != 0)
+		{
+			certinfo->thisUpdate = now;
+		}
+		certinfo->nextUpdate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		certinfo->status = info->status;
+		certinfo->revocationTime = info->revocationTime;
+		certinfo->revocationReason = info->revocationReason;
+		
+		certinfo->thisUpdate = (info->thisUpdate != UNDEFINED_TIME)?
+			info->thisUpdate : now;
 
-	certinfo->once = (info->nextUpdate == UNDEFINED_TIME);
+		certinfo->once = (info->nextUpdate == UNDEFINED_TIME);
 
-	certinfo->nextUpdate = (certinfo->once)?
-	    (now + OCSP_DEFAULT_VALID_TIME) : info->nextUpdate;
-    }
+		certinfo->nextUpdate = (certinfo->once)?
+			(now + OCSP_DEFAULT_VALID_TIME) : info->nextUpdate;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- * process received ocsp single response and add it to ocsp cache
+/**
+ * Process received ocsp single response and add it to ocsp cache
  */
-static void
-process_single_response(ocsp_location_t *location, single_response_t *sres)
+static void process_single_response(ocsp_location_t *location,
+									single_response_t *sres)
 {
-    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
-    int cmp = -1;
-
-    if (sres->hash_algorithm != OID_SHA1)
-    {
-	plog("only SHA-1 hash supported in OCSP single response");
-	return;
-    }
-    if (!(same_chunk(sres->issuer_name_hash, location->authNameID)
-    &&   same_chunk(sres->issuer_key_hash, location->authKeyID)))
-    {
-	plog("ocsp single response has wrong issuer");
-	return;
-    }
-    
-    /* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
-    certinfop = &location->certinfo;
-    certinfo = *certinfop;
-
-    while (certinfo != NULL)
-    {
-	cmp = cmp_chunk(sres->serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
-	if (cmp <= 0)
-	    break;
-	certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
+	int cmp = -1;
+
+	if (sres->hash_algorithm != OID_SHA1)
+	{
+		plog("only SHA-1 hash supported in OCSP single response");
+		return;
+	}
+	if (!(chunk_equals(sres->issuer_name_hash, location->authNameID)
+	&&   chunk_equals(sres->issuer_key_hash, location->authKeyID)))
+	{
+		plog("ocsp single response has wrong issuer");
+		return;
+	}
+	
+	/* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
+	certinfop = &location->certinfo;
 	certinfo = *certinfop;
-    }
-
-    if (cmp != 0)
-    {
-	plog("received unrequested cert status from ocsp server");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* unlink cert from ocsp fetch request list */
-    *certinfop = certinfo->next;
-    
-    /* update certinfo using the single response information */
-    certinfo->thisUpdate = sres->thisUpdate;
-    certinfo->nextUpdate = sres->nextUpdate;
-    certinfo->status = sres->status;
-    certinfo->revocationTime = sres->revocationTime;
-    certinfo->revocationReason = sres->revocationReason;
-    
-    /* add or update certinfo in ocsp cache */
-    lock_ocsp_cache("process_single_response");
-    add_certinfo(location, certinfo, &ocsp_cache, FALSE);
-    unlock_ocsp_cache("process_single_response");
-
-    /* free certinfo unlinked from ocsp fetch request list */
-    free_certinfo(certinfo);
 
+	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+		cmp = chunk_compare(sres->serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
+		if (cmp <= 0)
+			break;
+		certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+		certinfo = *certinfop;
+	}
+
+	if (cmp != 0)
+	{
+		plog("received unrequested cert status from ocsp server");
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/* unlink cert from ocsp fetch request list */
+	*certinfop = certinfo->next;
+	
+	/* update certinfo using the single response information */
+	certinfo->thisUpdate = sres->thisUpdate;
+	certinfo->nextUpdate = sres->nextUpdate;
+	certinfo->status = sres->status;
+	certinfo->revocationTime = sres->revocationTime;
+	certinfo->revocationReason = sres->revocationReason;
+	
+	/* add or update certinfo in ocsp cache */
+	lock_ocsp_cache("process_single_response");
+	add_certinfo(location, certinfo, &ocsp_cache, FALSE);
+	unlock_ocsp_cache("process_single_response");
+
+	/* free certinfo unlinked from ocsp fetch request list */
+	free_certinfo(certinfo);
 }
 
-/*
- *  parse and verify ocsp response and update the ocsp cache
+/**
+ *  Parse and verify ocsp response and update the ocsp cache
  */
-void
-parse_ocsp(ocsp_location_t *location, chunk_t blob)
+void parse_ocsp(ocsp_location_t *location, chunk_t blob)
 {
-    response_t res = empty_response;
-
-    /* parse the ocsp response without looking at the single responses yet */
-    response_status status = parse_ocsp_response(blob, &res);
-
-    if (status != STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
-    {
-	plog("error in ocsp response");
-	return;
-    }
-    /* check if there was a nonce in the request */
-    if (location->nonce.ptr != NULL && res.nonce.ptr == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("ocsp response contains no nonce, replay attack possible");
-    }
-    /* check if the nonce is identical */
-    if (res.nonce.ptr != NULL && !same_chunk(res.nonce, location->nonce))
-    {
-	plog("invalid nonce in ocsp response");
-	return;
-    }
-    /* check if the response is signed by a trusted key */
-    if (!valid_ocsp_response(&res))
-    {
-	plog("invalid ocsp response");
-	return;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("valid ocsp response")
-    )
-
-    /* now parse the single responses one at a time */
-    {
-	u_int level;
-	asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-	chunk_t object;
-	int objectID = 0;
+	response_t res = empty_response;
 
-	asn1_init(&ctx, res.responses, 0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	/* parse the ocsp response without looking at the single responses yet */
+	response_status status = parse_ocsp_response(blob, &res);
 
-	while (objectID < RESPONSES_ROOF)
+	if (status != STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
+	{
+		plog("error in ocsp response");
+		return;
+	}
+	/* check if there was a nonce in the request */
+	if (location->nonce.ptr != NULL && res.nonce.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		plog("ocsp response contains no nonce, replay attack possible");
+	}
+	/* check if the nonce is identical */
+	if (res.nonce.ptr != NULL && !chunk_equals(res.nonce, location->nonce))
+	{
+		plog("invalid nonce in ocsp response");
+		return;
+	}
+	/* check if the response is signed by a trusted key */
+	if (!valid_ocsp_response(&res))
 	{
-	    if (!extract_object(responsesObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+		plog("invalid ocsp response");
 		return;
-	    
-	    if (objectID == RESPONSES_SINGLE_RESPONSE)
-	    {
-		single_response_t sres = empty_single_response;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("valid ocsp response")
+	)
 
-		if (parse_ocsp_single_response(object, level+1, &sres))
+	/* now parse the single responses one at a time */
+	{
+		asn1_parser_t *parser;
+		chunk_t object;
+		int objectID;
+
+		parser = asn1_parser_create(responsesObjects, res.responses);
+
+		while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 		{
-		    process_single_response(location, &sres);
+			if (objectID == RESPONSES_SINGLE_RESPONSE)
+			{
+				single_response_t sres = empty_single_response;
+
+				if (!parse_ocsp_single_response(object,
+						 				parser->get_level(parser)+1, &sres))
+				{
+					goto end;
+				}
+				process_single_response(location, &sres);
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    objectID++;
+end:
+		parser->destroy(parser);
 	}
-    }
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/ocsp.h b/src/pluto/ocsp.h
index 6bf42831b..d8ee7bd8c 100644
--- a/src/pluto/ocsp.h
+++ b/src/pluto/ocsp.h
@@ -11,27 +11,25 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: ocsp.h 3253 2007-10-06 21:39:00Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include "constants.h"
 
 /* constants */
 
-#define OCSP_BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION	1
-#define OCSP_DEFAULT_VALID_TIME		120  /* validity of one-time response in seconds */
-#define OCSP_WARNING_INTERVAL		2    /* days */
+#define OCSP_BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION     1
+#define OCSP_DEFAULT_VALID_TIME         120  /* validity of one-time response in seconds */
+#define OCSP_WARNING_INTERVAL           2    /* days */
 
 /* OCSP response status */
 
 typedef enum {
-    STATUS_SUCCESSFUL = 	0,
-    STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST = 	1,
-    STATUS_INTERNALERROR = 	2,
-    STATUS_TRYLATER = 		3,
-    STATUS_SIGREQUIRED = 	5,
-    STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED= 	6
+	STATUS_SUCCESSFUL =         0,
+	STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST =   1,
+	STATUS_INTERNALERROR =      2,
+	STATUS_TRYLATER =           3,
+	STATUS_SIGREQUIRED =        5,
+	STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED=        6
 } response_status;
 
 /* OCSP access structures */
@@ -39,46 +37,46 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef struct ocsp_certinfo ocsp_certinfo_t;
 
 struct ocsp_certinfo {
-    ocsp_certinfo_t  *next;
-    int              trials;
-    chunk_t          serialNumber;
-    cert_status_t    status;
-    bool             once;
-    crl_reason_t     revocationReason;
-    time_t           revocationTime;
-    time_t           thisUpdate;
-    time_t           nextUpdate;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t  *next;
+	int              trials;
+	chunk_t          serialNumber;
+	cert_status_t    status;
+	bool             once;
+	crl_reason_t     revocationReason;
+	time_t           revocationTime;
+	time_t           thisUpdate;
+	time_t           nextUpdate;
 };
 
 typedef struct ocsp_location ocsp_location_t;
 
 struct ocsp_location {
-    ocsp_location_t  *next;
-    chunk_t          issuer;
-    chunk_t          authNameID;
-    chunk_t          authKeyID;
-    chunk_t	     authKeySerialNumber;
-    chunk_t          uri;
-    chunk_t          nonce;
-    ocsp_certinfo_t  *certinfo;
+	ocsp_location_t  *next;
+	chunk_t          issuer;
+	chunk_t          authNameID;
+	chunk_t          authKeyID;
+	chunk_t          authKeySerialNumber;
+	chunk_t          uri;
+	chunk_t          nonce;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t  *certinfo;
 };
 
 extern ocsp_location_t* get_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc
-    , ocsp_location_t *chain);
+	, ocsp_location_t *chain);
 extern ocsp_location_t* add_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc
-    , ocsp_location_t **chain);
+	, ocsp_location_t **chain);
 extern void add_certinfo(ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_certinfo_t *info
-    , ocsp_location_t **chain, bool request);
+	, ocsp_location_t **chain, bool request);
 extern void check_ocsp(void);
 extern cert_status_t verify_by_ocsp(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until
-    , time_t *revocationTime, crl_reason_t *revocationReason);
+	, time_t *revocationTime, crl_reason_t *revocationReason);
 extern bool ocsp_set_request_cert(char* path);
 extern void ocsp_set_default_uri(char* uri);
 extern void ocsp_cache_add_cert(const x509cert_t* cert);
 extern chunk_t build_ocsp_request(ocsp_location_t* location);
 extern void parse_ocsp(ocsp_location_t* location, chunk_t blob);
 extern void list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t *location, bool requests
-    , bool utc, bool strict);
+	, bool utc, bool strict);
 extern void list_ocsp_cache(bool utc, bool strict);
 extern void free_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t **chain);
 extern void free_ocsp_cache(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/packet.c b/src/pluto/packet.c
index e8a3a1e11..01967efed 100644
--- a/src/pluto/packet.c
+++ b/src/pluto/packet.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: packet.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 
 /* ISAKMP Header: for all messages
  * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.1
@@ -49,15 +47,15 @@
  */
 
 static field_desc isa_fields[] = {
-    { ft_raw, COOKIE_SIZE, "initiator cookie", NULL },
-    { ft_raw, COOKIE_SIZE, "responder cookie", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ISAKMP version", &version_names },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "exchange type", &exchange_names },
-    { ft_set, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "flags", flag_bit_names },
-    { ft_raw, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "message ID", NULL },
-    { ft_len, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_raw, COOKIE_SIZE, "initiator cookie", NULL },
+	{ ft_raw, COOKIE_SIZE, "responder cookie", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ISAKMP version", &version_names },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "exchange type", &exchange_names },
+	{ ft_set, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "flags", flag_bit_names },
+	{ ft_raw, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "message ID", NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_hdr_desc = { "ISAKMP Message", isa_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr) };
@@ -74,10 +72,10 @@ struct_desc isakmp_hdr_desc = { "ISAKMP Message", isa_fields, sizeof(struct isak
  */
 
 static field_desc isag_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_generic_desc = { "ISAKMP Generic Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
@@ -100,36 +98,36 @@ struct_desc isakmp_generic_desc = { "ISAKMP Generic Payload", isag_fields, sizeo
 
 /* Oakley Attributes */
 static field_desc isaat_fields_oakley[] = {
-    { ft_af_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "af+type", &oakley_attr_names },
-    { ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_af_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "af+type", &oakley_attr_names },
+	{ ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP Oakley attribute",
-    isaat_fields_oakley, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
+	"ISAKMP Oakley attribute",
+	isaat_fields_oakley, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
 
 /* IPsec DOI Attributes */
 static field_desc isaat_fields_ipsec[] = {
-    { ft_af_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "af+type", &ipsec_attr_names },
-    { ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_af_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "af+type", &ipsec_attr_names },
+	{ ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute",
-    isaat_fields_ipsec, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
+	"ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute",
+	isaat_fields_ipsec, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
 
 /* Mode Config Attributes */
 static field_desc isaat_fields_modecfg[] = {
-    { ft_af_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ModeCfg attr type", &modecfg_attr_names },
-    { ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_af_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ModeCfg attr type", &modecfg_attr_names },
+	{ ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP ModeCfg attribute",
-    isaat_fields_modecfg, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
+	"ISAKMP ModeCfg attribute",
+	isaat_fields_modecfg, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
 
 /* ISAKMP Security Association Payload
  * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.4
@@ -148,18 +146,18 @@ struct_desc isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc = {
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isasa_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_sa_desc = { "ISAKMP Security Association Payload", isasa_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_sa) };
 
 static field_desc ipsec_sit_field[] = {
-    { ft_set, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "IPsec DOI SIT", &sit_bit_names },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_set, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "IPsec DOI SIT", &sit_bit_names },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc ipsec_sit_desc = { "IPsec DOI SIT", ipsec_sit_field, sizeof(u_int32_t) };
@@ -179,14 +177,14 @@ struct_desc ipsec_sit_desc = { "IPsec DOI SIT", ipsec_sit_field, sizeof(u_int32_
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isap_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "proposal number", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", &protocol_names },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "number of transforms", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "proposal number", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", &protocol_names },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "number of transforms", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_proposal_desc = { "ISAKMP Proposal Payload", isap_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_proposal) };
@@ -210,63 +208,63 @@ struct_desc isakmp_proposal_desc = { "ISAKMP Proposal Payload", isap_fields, siz
 
 /* PROTO_ISAKMP */
 static field_desc isat_fields_isakmp[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &isakmp_transformid_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &isakmp_transformid_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)",
-    isat_fields_isakmp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+	"ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)",
+	isat_fields_isakmp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
 
 /* PROTO_IPSEC_AH */
 static field_desc isat_fields_ah[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &ah_transformid_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &ah_transformid_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_ah_transform_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (AH)",
-    isat_fields_ah, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+	"ISAKMP Transform Payload (AH)",
+	isat_fields_ah, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
 
 /* PROTO_IPSEC_ESP */
 static field_desc isat_fields_esp[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &esp_transformid_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &esp_transformid_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_esp_transform_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)",
-    isat_fields_esp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+	"ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)",
+	isat_fields_esp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
 
 /* PROTO_IPCOMP */
 static field_desc isat_fields_ipcomp[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &ipcomp_transformid_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &ipcomp_transformid_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc = {
-    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (COMP)",
-    isat_fields_ipcomp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+	"ISAKMP Transform Payload (COMP)",
+	isat_fields_ipcomp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
 
 
 /* ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
@@ -303,13 +301,13 @@ struct_desc isakmp_keyex_desc = { "ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload", isag_fields, si
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isaid_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },	/* ??? depends on DOI? */
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI specific A", NULL },	/* ??? depends on DOI? */
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI specific B", NULL },	/* ??? depends on DOI? */
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },      /* ??? depends on DOI? */
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI specific A", NULL },        /* ??? depends on DOI? */
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI specific B", NULL },       /* ??? depends on DOI? */
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_identification_desc = { "ISAKMP Identification Payload", isaid_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_id) };
@@ -330,13 +328,13 @@ struct_desc isakmp_identification_desc = { "ISAKMP Identification Payload", isai
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isaiid_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Protocol ID", NULL },	/* ??? UDP/TCP or 0? */
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "port", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Protocol ID", NULL },   /* ??? UDP/TCP or 0? */
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "port", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc = { "ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)", isaiid_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_ipsec_id) };
@@ -357,11 +355,11 @@ struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc = { "ISAKMP Identification Payload
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isacert_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "cert encoding", &cert_type_names },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "cert encoding", &cert_type_names },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 /* Note: the size field of isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc cannot be
@@ -385,11 +383,11 @@ static field_desc isacert_fields[] = {
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isacr_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "cert type", &cert_type_names },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "cert type", &cert_type_names },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 /* Note: the size field of isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc cannot be
@@ -469,14 +467,14 @@ struct_desc isakmp_nonce_desc = { "ISAKMP Nonce Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(st
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isan_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", NULL },	/* ??? really enum: ISAKMP, IPSEC, ESP, ... */
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Notify Message Type", &notification_names },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", NULL },   /* ??? really enum: ISAKMP, IPSEC, ESP, ... */
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Notify Message Type", &notification_names },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_notification_desc = { "ISAKMP Notification Payload", isan_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_notification) };
@@ -500,14 +498,14 @@ struct_desc isakmp_notification_desc = { "ISAKMP Notification Payload", isan_fie
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isad_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", NULL },	/* ??? really enum: ISAKMP, IPSEC */
-    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "number of SPIs", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", NULL },   /* ??? really enum: ISAKMP, IPSEC */
+	{ ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "number of SPIs", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_delete_desc = { "ISAKMP Delete Payload", isad_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_delete) };
@@ -532,26 +530,26 @@ struct_desc isakmp_vendor_id_desc = { "ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload", isag_fields, s
 /*
  * From draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg
 3.2. Attribute Payload
-                           1                   2                   3
-       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-     ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-     !     Type      !   RESERVED    !           Identifier          ! 
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-     !                                                               !
-     ~                           Attributes                          ~
-     !                                                               !
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+						   1                   2                   3
+	   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+	 ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+	 !     Type      !   RESERVED    !           Identifier          ! 
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+	 !                                                               !
+	 ~                           Attributes                          ~
+	 !                                                               !
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 */
 static field_desc isaattr_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Attr Msg Type", &attr_msg_type_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Identifier", NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Attr Msg Type", &attr_msg_type_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Identifier", NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_attr_desc = { "ISAKMP Mode Attribute", isaattr_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_mode_attr) };
@@ -581,12 +579,12 @@ struct_desc isakmp_nat_d = { "ISAKMP NAT-D Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct
  * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
  */
 static field_desc isanat_oa_fields[] = {
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
-    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },
-    { ft_mbz, 24/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
-    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+	{ ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },
+	{ ft_mbz, 24/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+	{ ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
 };
 
 struct_desc isakmp_nat_oa = { "ISAKMP NAT-OA Payload", isanat_oa_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_nat_oa) };
@@ -600,40 +598,40 @@ struct_desc isakmp_nat_oa = { "ISAKMP NAT-OA Payload", isanat_oa_fields, sizeof(
  * We make all these entries NULL
  */
 struct_desc *const payload_descs[ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF] = {
-    NULL,				/* 0 ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (No other payload following) */
-    &isakmp_sa_desc,			/* 1 ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (Security Association) */
-    NULL,				/* 2 ISAKMP_NEXT_P (Proposal) */
-    NULL,				/* 3 ISAKMP_NEXT_T (Transform) */
-    &isakmp_keyex_desc,			/* 4 ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (Key Exchange) */
-    NULL,				/* 5 ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (Identification) */
-    &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc,	/* 6 ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT (Certificate) */
-    &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc,	/* 7 ISAKMP_NEXT_CR (Certificate Request) */
-    &isakmp_hash_desc,			/* 8 ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (Hash) */
-    &isakmp_signature_desc,		/* 9 ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG (Signature) */
-    &isakmp_nonce_desc,			/* 10 ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (Nonce) */
-    &isakmp_notification_desc,		/* 11 ISAKMP_NEXT_N (Notification) */
-    &isakmp_delete_desc,		/* 12 ISAKMP_NEXT_D (Delete) */
-    &isakmp_vendor_id_desc,		/* 13 ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (Vendor ID) */
-    &isakmp_attr_desc,			/* 14 ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR (Mode Config) */
-    NULL,				/* 15 */
-    NULL,				/* 16 */
-    NULL,				/* 17 */
-    NULL,				/* 18 */
-    NULL,				/* 19 */
-    &isakmp_nat_d,              	/* 20=130 ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD (NAT-D) */
-    &isakmp_nat_oa,             	/* 20=131 ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA (NAT-OA) */
+	NULL,                               /* 0 ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (No other payload following) */
+	&isakmp_sa_desc,                    /* 1 ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (Security Association) */
+	NULL,                               /* 2 ISAKMP_NEXT_P (Proposal) */
+	NULL,                               /* 3 ISAKMP_NEXT_T (Transform) */
+	&isakmp_keyex_desc,                 /* 4 ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (Key Exchange) */
+	NULL,                               /* 5 ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (Identification) */
+	&isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc,     /* 6 ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT (Certificate) */
+	&isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc,        /* 7 ISAKMP_NEXT_CR (Certificate Request) */
+	&isakmp_hash_desc,                  /* 8 ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (Hash) */
+	&isakmp_signature_desc,             /* 9 ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG (Signature) */
+	&isakmp_nonce_desc,                 /* 10 ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (Nonce) */
+	&isakmp_notification_desc,          /* 11 ISAKMP_NEXT_N (Notification) */
+	&isakmp_delete_desc,                /* 12 ISAKMP_NEXT_D (Delete) */
+	&isakmp_vendor_id_desc,             /* 13 ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (Vendor ID) */
+	&isakmp_attr_desc,                  /* 14 ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR (Mode Config) */
+	NULL,                               /* 15 */
+	NULL,                               /* 16 */
+	NULL,                               /* 17 */
+	NULL,                               /* 18 */
+	NULL,                               /* 19 */
+	&isakmp_nat_d,                      /* 20=130 ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD (NAT-D) */
+	&isakmp_nat_oa,                     /* 20=131 ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA (NAT-OA) */
 };
 
 void
 init_pbs(pb_stream *pbs, u_int8_t *start, size_t len, const char *name)
 {
-    pbs->container = NULL;
-    pbs->desc = NULL;
-    pbs->name = name;
-    pbs->start = pbs->cur = start;
-    pbs->roof = start + len;
-    pbs->lenfld = NULL;
-    pbs->lenfld_desc = NULL;
+	pbs->container = NULL;
+	pbs->desc = NULL;
+	pbs->name = name;
+	pbs->start = pbs->cur = start;
+	pbs->roof = start + len;
+	pbs->lenfld = NULL;
+	pbs->lenfld_desc = NULL;
 }
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
@@ -648,85 +646,85 @@ void
 DBG_print_struct(const char *label, const void *struct_ptr
 , struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful)
 {
-    bool immediate = FALSE;
-    const u_int8_t *inp = struct_ptr;
-    field_desc *fp;
-
-    DBG_log("%s%s:", label, sd->name);
+	bool immediate = FALSE;
+	const u_int8_t *inp = struct_ptr;
+	field_desc *fp;
 
-    for (fp = sd->fields; fp->field_type != ft_end; fp++)
-    {
-	int i = fp->size;
-	u_int32_t n = 0;
+	DBG_log("%s%s:", label, sd->name);
 
-	switch (fp->field_type)
+	for (fp = sd->fields; fp->field_type != ft_end; fp++)
 	{
-	case ft_mbz:	/* must be zero */
-	    inp += i;
-	    break;
-	case ft_nat:		/* natural number (may be 0) */
-	case ft_len:		/* length of this struct and any following crud */
-	case ft_lv:		/* length/value field of attribute */
-	case ft_enum:		/* value from an enumeration */
-	case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-	case ft_af_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	case ft_af_loose_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	case ft_set:		/* bits representing set */
-	    switch (i)
-	    {
-	    case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		n = *(const u_int8_t *)inp;
-		break;
-	    case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		n = *(const u_int16_t *)inp;
-		break;
-	    case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		n = *(const u_int32_t *)inp;
-		break;
-	    default:
-		bad_case(i);
-	    }
-	    switch (fp->field_type)
-	    {
-	    case ft_len:	/* length of this struct and any following crud */
-	    case ft_lv:		/* length/value field of attribute */
-		if (!immediate && !len_meaningful)
-		    break;
-		/* FALL THROUGH */
-	    case ft_nat:	/* natural number (may be 0) */
-		DBG_log("   %s: %lu", fp->name, (unsigned long)n);
-		break;
-	    case ft_af_enum:	   /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-		if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
-		    immediate = TRUE;
-		/* FALL THROUGH */
-	    case ft_enum:	/* value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-		DBG_log("   %s: %s", fp->name, enum_show(fp->desc, n));
-		break;
-	    case ft_set:	/* bits representing set */
-		DBG_log("   %s: %s", fp->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
-		break;
-	    default:
-		bad_case(fp->field_type);
-	    }
-	    inp += i;
-	    break;
-
-	case ft_raw:	/* bytes to be left in network-order */
-	    {
-		char m[50];	/* arbitrary limit on name width in log */
-
-		snprintf(m, sizeof(m), "   %s:", fp->name);
-		DBG_dump(m, inp, i);
-		inp += i;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    bad_case(fp->field_type);
+		int i = fp->size;
+		u_int32_t n = 0;
+
+		switch (fp->field_type)
+		{
+		case ft_mbz:    /* must be zero */
+			inp += i;
+			break;
+		case ft_nat:            /* natural number (may be 0) */
+		case ft_len:            /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+		case ft_lv:             /* length/value field of attribute */
+		case ft_enum:           /* value from an enumeration */
+		case ft_loose_enum:     /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+		case ft_af_enum:        /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		case ft_af_loose_enum:  /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		case ft_set:            /* bits representing set */
+			switch (i)
+			{
+			case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+				n = *(const u_int8_t *)inp;
+				break;
+			case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+				n = *(const u_int16_t *)inp;
+				break;
+			case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+				n = *(const u_int32_t *)inp;
+				break;
+			default:
+				bad_case(i);
+			}
+			switch (fp->field_type)
+			{
+			case ft_len:        /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+			case ft_lv:         /* length/value field of attribute */
+				if (!immediate && !len_meaningful)
+					break;
+				/* FALL THROUGH */
+			case ft_nat:        /* natural number (may be 0) */
+				DBG_log("   %s: %lu", fp->name, (unsigned long)n);
+				break;
+			case ft_af_enum:       /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+				if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+					immediate = TRUE;
+				/* FALL THROUGH */
+			case ft_enum:       /* value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_loose_enum: /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+				DBG_log("   %s: %s", fp->name, enum_show(fp->desc, n));
+				break;
+			case ft_set:        /* bits representing set */
+				DBG_log("   %s: %s", fp->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
+				break;
+			default:
+				bad_case(fp->field_type);
+			}
+			inp += i;
+			break;
+
+		case ft_raw:    /* bytes to be left in network-order */
+			{
+				char m[50];     /* arbitrary limit on name width in log */
+
+				snprintf(m, sizeof(m), "   %s:", fp->name);
+				DBG_dump(m, inp, i);
+				inp += i;
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			bad_case(fp->field_type);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 static void
@@ -734,35 +732,35 @@ DBG_prefix_print_struct(const pb_stream *pbs
 , const char *label, const void *struct_ptr
 , struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful)
 {
-    /* print out a title, with a prefix of asterisks to show
-     * the nesting level.
-     */
-    char space[40];	/* arbitrary limit on label+flock-of-* */
-    size_t len = strlen(label);
-
-    if (sizeof(space) <= len)
-    {
-	DBG_print_struct(label, struct_ptr, sd, len_meaningful);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	const pb_stream *p = pbs;
-	char *pre = &space[sizeof(space) - (len + 1)];
-
-	strcpy(pre, label);
-
-	/* put at least one * out */
-	for (;;)
+	/* print out a title, with a prefix of asterisks to show
+	 * the nesting level.
+	 */
+	char space[40];     /* arbitrary limit on label+flock-of-* */
+	size_t len = strlen(label);
+
+	if (sizeof(space) <= len)
+	{
+		DBG_print_struct(label, struct_ptr, sd, len_meaningful);
+	}
+	else
 	{
-	    if (pre <= space)
-		break;
-	    *--pre = '*';
-	    if (p == NULL)
-		break;
-	    p = p->container;
+		const pb_stream *p = pbs;
+		char *pre = &space[sizeof(space) - (len + 1)];
+
+		strcpy(pre, label);
+
+		/* put at least one * out */
+		for (;;)
+		{
+			if (pre <= space)
+				break;
+			*--pre = '*';
+			if (p == NULL)
+				break;
+			p = p->container;
+		}
+		DBG_print_struct(pre, struct_ptr, sd, len_meaningful);
 	}
-	DBG_print_struct(pre, struct_ptr, sd, len_meaningful);
-    }
 }
 
 #endif
@@ -785,191 +783,191 @@ bool
 in_struct(void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd
 , pb_stream *ins, pb_stream *obj_pbs)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    u_int8_t *cur = ins->cur;
-
-    if (ins->roof - cur < (ptrdiff_t)sd->size)
-    {
-	ugh = builddiag("not enough room in input packet for %s", sd->name);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	u_int8_t *roof = cur + sd->size;    /* may be changed by a length field */
-	u_int8_t *outp = struct_ptr;
-	bool immediate = FALSE;
-	field_desc *fp;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	u_int8_t *cur = ins->cur;
 
-	for (fp = sd->fields; ugh == NULL; fp++)
+	if (ins->roof - cur < (ptrdiff_t)sd->size)
 	{
-	    size_t i = fp->size;
-
-	    passert(ins->roof - cur >= (ptrdiff_t)i);
-	    passert(cur - ins->cur <= (ptrdiff_t)(sd->size - i));
-	    passert(outp - (cur - ins->cur) == struct_ptr);
-
-#if 0
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("%d %s"
-		, (int) (cur - ins->cur), fp->name == NULL? "" : fp->name));
-#endif
-	    switch (fp->field_type)
-	    {
-	    case ft_mbz:	/* must be zero */
-		for (; i != 0; i--)
-		{
-		    if (*cur++ != 0)
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("byte %d of %s must be zero, but is not"
-			    , (int) (cur - ins->cur), sd->name);
-			break;
-		    }
-		    *outp++ = '\0';	/* probably redundant */
-		}
-		break;
-
-	    case ft_nat:	   /* natural number (may be 0) */
-	    case ft_len:	   /* length of this struct and any following crud */
-	    case ft_lv:		   /* length/value field of attribute */
-	    case ft_enum:	   /* value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_loose_enum:    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-	    case ft_af_enum:	   /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_set:	   /* bits representing set */
-	    {
-		u_int32_t n = 0;
-
-		for (; i != 0; i--)
-		    n = (n << BITS_PER_BYTE) | *cur++;
+		ugh = builddiag("not enough room in input packet for %s", sd->name);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		u_int8_t *roof = cur + sd->size;    /* may be changed by a length field */
+		u_int8_t *outp = struct_ptr;
+		bool immediate = FALSE;
+		field_desc *fp;
 
-		switch (fp->field_type)
-		{
-		case ft_len:	/* length of this struct and any following crud */
-		case ft_lv:	/* length/value field of attribute */
-		{
-		    u_int32_t len = fp->field_type == ft_len? n
-			: immediate? sd->size : n + sd->size;
-
-		    if (len < sd->size)
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s is smaller than minimum"
-			    , fp->name, sd->name);
-		    }
-		    else if (pbs_left(ins) < len)
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s is larger than can fit"
-			    , fp->name, sd->name);
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			roof = ins->cur + len;
-		    }
-		    break;
-		}
-		case ft_af_loose_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
-			immediate = TRUE;
-		    break;
-		case ft_af_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
-			immediate = TRUE;
-		    /* FALL THROUGH */
-		case ft_enum:	/* value from an enumeration */
-		    if (enum_name(fp->desc, n) == NULL)
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s has an unknown value: %lu"
-			    , fp->name, sd->name, (unsigned long)n);
-		    }
-		    /* FALL THROUGH */
-		case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-		    break;
-		case ft_set:	/* bits representing set */
-		    if (!testset(fp->desc, n))
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("bitset %s of %s has unknown member(s): %s"
-			    , fp->name, sd->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
-		    }
-		    break;
-		default:
-			break;
-		}
-		i = fp->size;
-		switch (i)
+		for (fp = sd->fields; ugh == NULL; fp++)
 		{
-		case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		    *(u_int8_t *)outp = n;
-		    break;
-		case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		    *(u_int16_t *)outp = n;
-		    break;
-		case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		    *(u_int32_t *)outp = n;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    bad_case(i);
-		}
-		outp += i;
-		break;
-	    }
+			size_t i = fp->size;
 
-	    case ft_raw:	/* bytes to be left in network-order */
-		for (; i != 0; i--)
-		{
-		    *outp++ = *cur++;
-		}
-		break;
+			passert(ins->roof - cur >= (ptrdiff_t)i);
+			passert(cur - ins->cur <= (ptrdiff_t)(sd->size - i));
+			passert(outp - (cur - ins->cur) == struct_ptr);
 
-	    case ft_end:	/* end of field list */
-		passert(cur == ins->cur + sd->size);
-		if (obj_pbs != NULL)
-		{
-		    init_pbs(obj_pbs, ins->cur, roof - ins->cur, sd->name);
-		    obj_pbs->container = ins;
-		    obj_pbs->desc = sd;
-		    obj_pbs->cur = cur;
+#if 0
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("%d %s"
+				, (int) (cur - ins->cur), fp->name == NULL? "" : fp->name));
+#endif
+			switch (fp->field_type)
+			{
+			case ft_mbz:        /* must be zero */
+				for (; i != 0; i--)
+				{
+					if (*cur++ != 0)
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("byte %d of %s must be zero, but is not"
+							, (int) (cur - ins->cur), sd->name);
+						break;
+					}
+					*outp++ = '\0';     /* probably redundant */
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case ft_nat:           /* natural number (may be 0) */
+			case ft_len:           /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+			case ft_lv:            /* length/value field of attribute */
+			case ft_enum:          /* value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_loose_enum:    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+			case ft_af_enum:       /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_set:           /* bits representing set */
+			{
+				u_int32_t n = 0;
+
+				for (; i != 0; i--)
+					n = (n << BITS_PER_BYTE) | *cur++;
+
+				switch (fp->field_type)
+				{
+				case ft_len:    /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+				case ft_lv:     /* length/value field of attribute */
+				{
+					u_int32_t len = fp->field_type == ft_len? n
+						: immediate? sd->size : n + sd->size;
+
+					if (len < sd->size)
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("%s of %s is smaller than minimum"
+							, fp->name, sd->name);
+					}
+					else if (pbs_left(ins) < len)
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("%s of %s is larger than can fit"
+							, fp->name, sd->name);
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						roof = ins->cur + len;
+					}
+					break;
+				}
+				case ft_af_loose_enum:  /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+					if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+						immediate = TRUE;
+					break;
+				case ft_af_enum:        /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+					if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+						immediate = TRUE;
+					/* FALL THROUGH */
+				case ft_enum:   /* value from an enumeration */
+					if (enum_name(fp->desc, n) == NULL)
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("%s of %s has an unknown value: %lu"
+							, fp->name, sd->name, (unsigned long)n);
+					}
+					/* FALL THROUGH */
+				case ft_loose_enum:     /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+					break;
+				case ft_set:    /* bits representing set */
+					if (!testset(fp->desc, n))
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("bitset %s of %s has unknown member(s): %s"
+							, fp->name, sd->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
+					}
+					break;
+				default:
+						break;
+				}
+				i = fp->size;
+				switch (i)
+				{
+				case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+					*(u_int8_t *)outp = n;
+					break;
+				case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+					*(u_int16_t *)outp = n;
+					break;
+				case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+					*(u_int32_t *)outp = n;
+					break;
+				default:
+					bad_case(i);
+				}
+				outp += i;
+				break;
+			}
+
+			case ft_raw:        /* bytes to be left in network-order */
+				for (; i != 0; i--)
+				{
+					*outp++ = *cur++;
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case ft_end:        /* end of field list */
+				passert(cur == ins->cur + sd->size);
+				if (obj_pbs != NULL)
+				{
+					init_pbs(obj_pbs, ins->cur, roof - ins->cur, sd->name);
+					obj_pbs->container = ins;
+					obj_pbs->desc = sd;
+					obj_pbs->cur = cur;
+				}
+				ins->cur = roof;
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING
+					, DBG_prefix_print_struct(ins, "parse ", struct_ptr, sd, TRUE));
+				return TRUE;
+
+			default:
+				bad_case(fp->field_type);
+			}
 		}
-		ins->cur = roof;
-		DBG(DBG_PARSING
-		    , DBG_prefix_print_struct(ins, "parse ", struct_ptr, sd, TRUE));
-		return TRUE;
-
-	    default:
-		bad_case(fp->field_type);
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* some failure got us here: report it */
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
-    return FALSE;
+	/* some failure got us here: report it */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 bool
 in_raw(void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *ins, const char *name)
 {
-    if (pbs_left(ins) < len)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough bytes left to get %s from %s", name, ins->name);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	if (bytes == NULL)
+	if (pbs_left(ins) < len)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING
-		, DBG_log("skipping %u raw bytes of %s (%s)"
-		    , (unsigned) len, ins->name, name);
-		  DBG_dump(name, ins->cur, len));
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough bytes left to get %s from %s", name, ins->name);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    memcpy(bytes, ins->cur, len);
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING
-		, DBG_log("parsing %u raw bytes of %s into %s"
-		    , (unsigned) len, ins->name, name);
-		  DBG_dump(name, bytes, len));
+		if (bytes == NULL)
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING
+				, DBG_log("skipping %u raw bytes of %s (%s)"
+					, (unsigned) len, ins->name, name);
+				  DBG_dump(name, ins->cur, len));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			memcpy(bytes, ins->cur, len);
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING
+				, DBG_log("parsing %u raw bytes of %s into %s"
+					, (unsigned) len, ins->name, name);
+				  DBG_dump(name, bytes, len));
+		}
+		ins->cur += len;
+		return TRUE;
 	}
-	ins->cur += len;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
 }
 
 /* "emit" a host struct into a network packet.
@@ -994,227 +992,227 @@ bool
 out_struct(const void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd
 , pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    const u_int8_t *inp = struct_ptr;
-    u_int8_t *cur = outs->cur;
-
-    DBG(DBG_EMITTING
-	, DBG_prefix_print_struct(outs, "emit ", struct_ptr, sd, obj_pbs==NULL));
-
-    if (outs->roof - cur < (ptrdiff_t)sd->size)
-    {
-	ugh = builddiag("not enough room left in output packet to place %s"
-	    , sd->name);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	bool immediate = FALSE;
-	pb_stream obj;
-	field_desc *fp;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	const u_int8_t *inp = struct_ptr;
+	u_int8_t *cur = outs->cur;
 
-	obj.lenfld = NULL;  /* until a length field is discovered */
-	obj.lenfld_desc = NULL;
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING
+		, DBG_prefix_print_struct(outs, "emit ", struct_ptr, sd, obj_pbs==NULL));
 
-	for (fp = sd->fields; ugh == NULL; fp++)
+	if (outs->roof - cur < (ptrdiff_t)sd->size)
 	{
-	    size_t i = fp->size;
-
-	    passert(outs->roof - cur >= (ptrdiff_t)i);
-	    passert(cur - outs->cur <= (ptrdiff_t)(sd->size - i));
-	    passert(inp - (cur - outs->cur) == struct_ptr);
-
-#if 0
-	    DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("%d %s"
-		, (int) (cur - outs->cur), fp->name == NULL? "" : fp->name);
-#endif
-	    switch (fp->field_type)
-	    {
-	    case ft_mbz:	/* must be zero */
-		inp += i;
-		for (; i != 0; i--)
-		    *cur++ = '\0';
-		break;
-	    case ft_nat:	   /* natural number (may be 0) */
-	    case ft_len:	   /* length of this struct and any following crud */
-	    case ft_lv:		   /* length/value field of attribute */
-	    case ft_enum:	   /* value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_loose_enum:	   /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-	    case ft_af_enum:	   /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-	    case ft_set:	   /* bits representing set */
-	    {
-		u_int32_t n = 0;
+		ugh = builddiag("not enough room left in output packet to place %s"
+			, sd->name);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		bool immediate = FALSE;
+		pb_stream obj;
+		field_desc *fp;
 
-		switch (i)
-		{
-		case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		    n = *(const u_int8_t *)inp;
-		    break;
-		case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		    n = *(const u_int16_t *)inp;
-		    break;
-		case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
-		    n = *(const u_int32_t *)inp;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    bad_case(i);
-		}
+		obj.lenfld = NULL;  /* until a length field is discovered */
+		obj.lenfld_desc = NULL;
 
-		switch (fp->field_type)
+		for (fp = sd->fields; ugh == NULL; fp++)
 		{
-		case ft_len:	/* length of this struct and any following crud */
-		case ft_lv:	/* length/value field of attribute */
-		    if (immediate)
-			break;	/* not a length */
-		    /* We can't check the length because it will likely
-		     * be filled in after variable part is supplied.
-		     * We do record where this is so that it can be
-		     * filled in by a subsequent close_output_pbs().
-		     */
-		    passert(obj.lenfld == NULL);	/* only one ft_len allowed */
-		    obj.lenfld = cur;
-		    obj.lenfld_desc = fp;
-		    break;
-		case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
-			immediate = TRUE;
-		    break;
-		case ft_af_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
-			immediate = TRUE;
-		    /* FALL THROUGH */
-		case ft_enum:	/* value from an enumeration */
-		    if (enum_name(fp->desc, n) == NULL)
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s has an unknown value: %lu"
-			    , fp->name, sd->name, (unsigned long)n);
-		    }
-		    /* FALL THROUGH */
-		case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-		    break;
-		case ft_set:	/* bits representing set */
-		    if (!testset(fp->desc, n))
-		    {
-			ugh = builddiag("bitset %s of %s has unknown member(s): %s"
-			    , fp->name, sd->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
-		    }
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    break;
-		}
+			size_t i = fp->size;
 
-		while (i-- != 0)
-		{
-		    cur[i] = (u_int8_t)n;
-		    n >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
-		}
-		inp += fp->size;
-		cur += fp->size;
-		break;
-	    }
-	    case ft_raw:	/* bytes to be left in network-order */
-		for (; i != 0; i--)
-		    *cur++ = *inp++;
-		break;
-	    case ft_end:	/* end of field list */
-		passert(cur == outs->cur + sd->size);
-
-		obj.container = outs;
-		obj.desc = sd;
-		obj.name = sd->name;
-		obj.start = outs->cur;
-		obj.cur = cur;
-		obj.roof = outs->roof;	/* limit of possible */
-		/* obj.lenfld and obj.lenfld_desc already set */
-
-		if (obj_pbs == NULL)
-		{
-		    close_output_pbs(&obj); /* fill in length field, if any */
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    /* We set outs->cur to outs->roof so that
-		     * any attempt to output something into outs
-		     * before obj is closed will trigger an error.
-		     */
-		    outs->cur = outs->roof;
+			passert(outs->roof - cur >= (ptrdiff_t)i);
+			passert(cur - outs->cur <= (ptrdiff_t)(sd->size - i));
+			passert(inp - (cur - outs->cur) == struct_ptr);
 
-		    *obj_pbs = obj;
+#if 0
+			DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("%d %s"
+				, (int) (cur - outs->cur), fp->name == NULL? "" : fp->name);
+#endif
+			switch (fp->field_type)
+			{
+			case ft_mbz:        /* must be zero */
+				inp += i;
+				for (; i != 0; i--)
+					*cur++ = '\0';
+				break;
+			case ft_nat:           /* natural number (may be 0) */
+			case ft_len:           /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+			case ft_lv:            /* length/value field of attribute */
+			case ft_enum:          /* value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_loose_enum:    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+			case ft_af_enum:       /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+			case ft_set:           /* bits representing set */
+			{
+				u_int32_t n = 0;
+
+				switch (i)
+				{
+				case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+					n = *(const u_int8_t *)inp;
+					break;
+				case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+					n = *(const u_int16_t *)inp;
+					break;
+				case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+					n = *(const u_int32_t *)inp;
+					break;
+				default:
+					bad_case(i);
+				}
+
+				switch (fp->field_type)
+				{
+				case ft_len:    /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+				case ft_lv:     /* length/value field of attribute */
+					if (immediate)
+						break;  /* not a length */
+					/* We can't check the length because it will likely
+					 * be filled in after variable part is supplied.
+					 * We do record where this is so that it can be
+					 * filled in by a subsequent close_output_pbs().
+					 */
+					passert(obj.lenfld == NULL);        /* only one ft_len allowed */
+					obj.lenfld = cur;
+					obj.lenfld_desc = fp;
+					break;
+				case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+					if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+						immediate = TRUE;
+					break;
+				case ft_af_enum:        /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+					if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+						immediate = TRUE;
+					/* FALL THROUGH */
+				case ft_enum:   /* value from an enumeration */
+					if (enum_name(fp->desc, n) == NULL)
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("%s of %s has an unknown value: %lu"
+							, fp->name, sd->name, (unsigned long)n);
+					}
+					/* FALL THROUGH */
+				case ft_loose_enum:     /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+					break;
+				case ft_set:    /* bits representing set */
+					if (!testset(fp->desc, n))
+					{
+						ugh = builddiag("bitset %s of %s has unknown member(s): %s"
+							, fp->name, sd->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
+					}
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+
+				while (i-- != 0)
+				{
+					cur[i] = (u_int8_t)n;
+					n >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+				}
+				inp += fp->size;
+				cur += fp->size;
+				break;
+			}
+			case ft_raw:        /* bytes to be left in network-order */
+				for (; i != 0; i--)
+					*cur++ = *inp++;
+				break;
+			case ft_end:        /* end of field list */
+				passert(cur == outs->cur + sd->size);
+
+				obj.container = outs;
+				obj.desc = sd;
+				obj.name = sd->name;
+				obj.start = outs->cur;
+				obj.cur = cur;
+				obj.roof = outs->roof;  /* limit of possible */
+				/* obj.lenfld and obj.lenfld_desc already set */
+
+				if (obj_pbs == NULL)
+				{
+					close_output_pbs(&obj); /* fill in length field, if any */
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* We set outs->cur to outs->roof so that
+					 * any attempt to output something into outs
+					 * before obj is closed will trigger an error.
+					 */
+					outs->cur = outs->roof;
+
+					*obj_pbs = obj;
+				}
+				return TRUE;
+
+			default:
+				bad_case(fp->field_type);
+			}
 		}
-		return TRUE;
-
-	    default:
-		bad_case(fp->field_type);
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* some failure got us here: report it */
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);	/* ??? serious, but errno not relevant */
-    return FALSE;
+	/* some failure got us here: report it */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);        /* ??? serious, but errno not relevant */
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 bool
 out_generic(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd
 , pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs)
 {
-    struct isakmp_generic gen;
+	struct isakmp_generic gen;
 
-    passert(sd->fields == isakmp_generic_desc.fields);
-    gen.isag_np = np;
-    return out_struct(&gen, sd, outs, obj_pbs);
+	passert(sd->fields == isakmp_generic_desc.fields);
+	gen.isag_np = np;
+	return out_struct(&gen, sd, outs, obj_pbs);
 }
 
 bool
 out_generic_raw(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd
 , pb_stream *outs, const void *bytes, size_t len, const char *name)
 {
-    pb_stream pbs;
+	pb_stream pbs;
 
-    if (!out_generic(np, sd, outs, &pbs)
-    || !out_raw(bytes, len, &pbs, name))
-	return FALSE;
-    close_output_pbs(&pbs);
-    return TRUE;
+	if (!out_generic(np, sd, outs, &pbs)
+	|| !out_raw(bytes, len, &pbs, name))
+		return FALSE;
+	close_output_pbs(&pbs);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 bool
 out_raw(const void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name)
 {
-    if (pbs_left(outs) < len)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough room left to place %lu bytes of %s in %s"
-	    , (unsigned long) len, name, outs->name);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_EMITTING
-	    , DBG_log("emitting %u raw bytes of %s into %s"
-		, (unsigned) len, name, outs->name);
-	      DBG_dump(name, bytes, len));
-	memcpy(outs->cur, bytes, len);
-	outs->cur += len;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (pbs_left(outs) < len)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough room left to place %lu bytes of %s in %s"
+			, (unsigned long) len, name, outs->name);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_EMITTING
+			, DBG_log("emitting %u raw bytes of %s into %s"
+				, (unsigned) len, name, outs->name);
+			  DBG_dump(name, bytes, len));
+		memcpy(outs->cur, bytes, len);
+		outs->cur += len;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 bool
 out_zero(size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name)
 {
-    if (pbs_left(outs) < len)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough room left to place %s in %s", name, outs->name);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("emitting %u zero bytes of %s into %s"
-	    , (unsigned) len, name, outs->name));
-	memset(outs->cur, 0x00, len);
-	outs->cur += len;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (pbs_left(outs) < len)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough room left to place %s in %s", name, outs->name);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("emitting %u zero bytes of %s into %s"
+			, (unsigned) len, name, outs->name));
+		memset(outs->cur, 0x00, len);
+		outs->cur += len;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* Record current length.
@@ -1224,21 +1222,21 @@ out_zero(size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name)
 void
 close_output_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    if (pbs->lenfld != NULL)
-    {
-	u_int32_t len = pbs_offset(pbs);
-	int i = pbs->lenfld_desc->size;
-
-	if (pbs->lenfld_desc->field_type == ft_lv)
-	    len -= sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute);
-	DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("emitting length of %s: %lu"
-	    , pbs->name, (unsigned long) len));
-	while (i-- != 0)
+	if (pbs->lenfld != NULL)
 	{
-	    pbs->lenfld[i] = (u_int8_t)len;
-	    len >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+		u_int32_t len = pbs_offset(pbs);
+		int i = pbs->lenfld_desc->size;
+
+		if (pbs->lenfld_desc->field_type == ft_lv)
+			len -= sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute);
+		DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("emitting length of %s: %lu"
+			, pbs->name, (unsigned long) len));
+		while (i-- != 0)
+		{
+			pbs->lenfld[i] = (u_int8_t)len;
+			len >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    if (pbs->container != NULL)
-	pbs->container->cur = pbs->cur;	/* pass space utilization up */
+	if (pbs->container != NULL)
+		pbs->container->cur = pbs->cur; /* pass space utilization up */
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/packet.h b/src/pluto/packet.h
index 1eadf0e02..1510b81a0 100644
--- a/src/pluto/packet.h
+++ b/src/pluto/packet.h
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: packet.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _PACKET_H
@@ -23,9 +21,9 @@
  */
 
 typedef const struct struct_desc {
-    const char *name;
-    const struct field_desc *fields;
-    size_t size;
+	const char *name;
+	const struct field_desc *fields;
+	size_t size;
 } struct_desc;
 
 /* Note: if an ft_af_enum field has the ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV bit set,
@@ -35,24 +33,24 @@ typedef const struct struct_desc {
  */
 
 enum field_type {
-    ft_mbz,	      /* must be zero */
-    ft_nat,	      /* natural number (may be 0) */
-    ft_len,	      /* length of this struct and any following crud */
-    ft_lv,	      /* length/value field of attribute */
-    ft_enum,	      /* value from an enumeration */
-    ft_loose_enum,    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
-    ft_af_loose_enum, /* Attribute Format + enumeration, some names known */
-    ft_af_enum,       /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
-    ft_set,	      /* bits representing set */
-    ft_raw,	      /* bytes to be left in network-order */
-    ft_end,	      /* end of field list */
+	ft_mbz,           /* must be zero */
+	ft_nat,           /* natural number (may be 0) */
+	ft_len,           /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+	ft_lv,            /* length/value field of attribute */
+	ft_enum,          /* value from an enumeration */
+	ft_loose_enum,    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+	ft_af_loose_enum, /* Attribute Format + enumeration, some names known */
+	ft_af_enum,       /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	ft_set,           /* bits representing set */
+	ft_raw,           /* bytes to be left in network-order */
+	ft_end,           /* end of field list */
 };
 
 typedef const struct field_desc {
-    enum field_type field_type;
-    int	size;	/* size, in bytes, of field */
-    const char *name;
-    const void *desc;	/* enum_names for enum or char *[] for bits */
+	enum field_type field_type;
+	int size;   /* size, in bytes, of field */
+	const char *name;
+	const void *desc;   /* enum_names for enum or char *[] for bits */
 } field_desc;
 
 /* The formatting of input and output of packets is done
@@ -62,18 +60,18 @@ typedef const struct field_desc {
  * Actual packet transfer is done elsewhere.
  */
 typedef struct packet_byte_stream {
-    struct packet_byte_stream *container;   /* PBS of which we are part */
-    struct_desc *desc;
-    const char *name;	/* what does this PBS represent? */
-    u_int8_t
-	*start,
-	*cur,	/* current position in stream */
-	*roof;	/* byte after last in PBS (actually just a limit on output) */
-    /* For an output PBS, the length field will be filled in later so
-     * we need to record its particulars.  Note: it may not be aligned.
-     */
-    u_int8_t *lenfld;
-    field_desc *lenfld_desc;
+	struct packet_byte_stream *container;   /* PBS of which we are part */
+	struct_desc *desc;
+	const char *name;   /* what does this PBS represent? */
+	u_int8_t
+		*start,
+		*cur,   /* current position in stream */
+		*roof;  /* byte after last in PBS (actually just a limit on output) */
+	/* For an output PBS, the length field will be filled in later so
+	 * we need to record its particulars.  Note: it may not be aligned.
+	 */
+	u_int8_t *lenfld;
+	field_desc *lenfld_desc;
 } pb_stream;
 
 /* For an input PBS, pbs_offset is amount of stream processed.
@@ -88,17 +86,17 @@ typedef struct packet_byte_stream {
 extern void init_pbs(pb_stream *pbs, u_int8_t *start, size_t len, const char *name);
 
 extern bool in_struct(void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd,
-    pb_stream *ins, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
+	pb_stream *ins, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
 extern bool in_raw(void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *ins, const char *name);
 
 extern bool out_struct(const void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd,
-    pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
+	pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
 extern bool out_generic(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd,
-    pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
+	pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
 extern bool out_generic_raw(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd,
-    pb_stream *outs, const void *bytes, size_t len, const char *name);
+	pb_stream *outs, const void *bytes, size_t len, const char *name);
 #define out_generic_chunk(np, sd, outs, ch, name) \
-	out_generic_raw(np, sd, outs, (ch).ptr, (ch).len, name)
+		out_generic_raw(np, sd, outs, (ch).ptr, (ch).len, name)
 extern bool out_zero(size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name);
 extern bool out_raw(const void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name);
 #define out_chunk(ch, outs, name) out_raw((ch).ptr, (ch).len, (outs), (name))
@@ -106,7 +104,7 @@ extern void close_output_pbs(pb_stream *pbs);
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
 extern void DBG_print_struct(const char *label, const void *struct_ptr,
-    struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful);
+	struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful);
 #endif
 
 /* ISAKMP Header: for all messages
@@ -160,16 +158,16 @@ extern void DBG_print_struct(const char *label, const void *struct_ptr,
 
 struct isakmp_hdr
 {
-    u_int8_t    isa_icookie[COOKIE_SIZE];
-    u_int8_t    isa_rcookie[COOKIE_SIZE];
-    u_int8_t    isa_np;                 /* Next payload */
-    u_int8_t	isa_version;	/* high-order 4 bits: Major; low order 4: Minor */
-#define ISA_MAJ_SHIFT	4
-#define ISA_MIN_MASK	(~((~0u) << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT))
-    u_int8_t    isa_xchg;		/* Exchange type */
-    u_int8_t    isa_flags;
-    u_int32_t   isa_msgid;		/* Message ID (RAW) */
-    u_int32_t   isa_length;		/* Length of message */
+	u_int8_t    isa_icookie[COOKIE_SIZE];
+	u_int8_t    isa_rcookie[COOKIE_SIZE];
+	u_int8_t    isa_np;                 /* Next payload */
+	u_int8_t    isa_version;    /* high-order 4 bits: Major; low order 4: Minor */
+#define ISA_MAJ_SHIFT   4
+#define ISA_MIN_MASK    (~((~0u) << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT))
+	u_int8_t    isa_xchg;               /* Exchange type */
+	u_int8_t    isa_flags;
+	u_int32_t   isa_msgid;              /* Message ID (RAW) */
+	u_int32_t   isa_length;             /* Length of message */
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_hdr_desc;
@@ -186,9 +184,9 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_hdr_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_generic
 {
-    u_int8_t    isag_np;
-    u_int8_t    isag_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isag_length;
+	u_int8_t    isag_np;
+	u_int8_t    isag_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isag_length;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_generic_desc;
@@ -209,17 +207,17 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_generic_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_attribute
 {
-    /* The high order bit of isaat_af_type is the Attribute Format
-     * If it is off, the format is TLV: lv is the length of the following
-     * attribute value.
-     * If it is on, the format is TV: lv is the value of the attribute.
-     * ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK is the mask in host form.
-     *
-     * The low order 15 bits of isaat_af_type is the Attribute Type.
-     * ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK is the mask in host form.
-     */
-    u_int16_t isaat_af_type;   /* high order bit: AF; lower 15: rtype */
-    u_int16_t isaat_lv;			/* Length or value */
+	/* The high order bit of isaat_af_type is the Attribute Format
+	 * If it is off, the format is TLV: lv is the length of the following
+	 * attribute value.
+	 * If it is on, the format is TV: lv is the value of the attribute.
+	 * ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK is the mask in host form.
+	 *
+	 * The low order 15 bits of isaat_af_type is the Attribute Type.
+	 * ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK is the mask in host form.
+	 */
+	u_int16_t isaat_af_type;   /* high order bit: AF; lower 15: rtype */
+	u_int16_t isaat_lv;                 /* Length or value */
 };
 
 #define ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK 0x8000
@@ -229,8 +227,8 @@ struct isakmp_attribute
 #define ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK 0x7FFF
 
 extern struct_desc
-    isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc,
-    isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+	isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc,
+	isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
 
 /* ISAKMP Security Association Payload
  * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.4
@@ -250,10 +248,10 @@ extern struct_desc
  */
 struct isakmp_sa
 {
-    u_int8_t  isasa_np;			/* Next payload */
-    u_int8_t  isasa_reserved;
-    u_int16_t isasa_length;		/* Payload length */
-    u_int32_t isasa_doi;		/* DOI */
+	u_int8_t  isasa_np;                 /* Next payload */
+	u_int8_t  isasa_reserved;
+	u_int16_t isasa_length;             /* Payload length */
+	u_int32_t isasa_doi;                /* DOI */
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_sa_desc;
@@ -276,13 +274,13 @@ extern struct_desc ipsec_sit_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_proposal
 {
-    u_int8_t    isap_np;
-    u_int8_t    isap_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isap_length;
-    u_int8_t    isap_proposal;
-    u_int8_t    isap_protoid;
-    u_int8_t    isap_spisize;
-    u_int8_t    isap_notrans;		/* Number of transforms */
+	u_int8_t    isap_np;
+	u_int8_t    isap_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isap_length;
+	u_int8_t    isap_proposal;
+	u_int8_t    isap_protoid;
+	u_int8_t    isap_spisize;
+	u_int8_t    isap_notrans;           /* Number of transforms */
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_proposal_desc;
@@ -305,19 +303,19 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_proposal_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_transform
 {
-    u_int8_t    isat_np;
-    u_int8_t    isat_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isat_length;
-    u_int8_t    isat_transnum;		/* Number of the transform */
-    u_int8_t    isat_transid;
-    u_int16_t   isat_reserved2;
+	u_int8_t    isat_np;
+	u_int8_t    isat_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isat_length;
+	u_int8_t    isat_transnum;          /* Number of the transform */
+	u_int8_t    isat_transid;
+	u_int16_t   isat_reserved2;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc
-    isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc,
-    isakmp_ah_transform_desc,
-    isakmp_esp_transform_desc,
-    isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc;
+	isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc,
+	isakmp_ah_transform_desc,
+	isakmp_esp_transform_desc,
+	isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc;
 
 /* ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
  * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.7
@@ -354,12 +352,12 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_keyex_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_id
 {
-    u_int8_t    isaid_np;
-    u_int8_t    isaid_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isaid_length;
-    u_int8_t    isaid_idtype;
-    u_int8_t    isaid_doi_specific_a;
-    u_int16_t   isaid_doi_specific_b;
+	u_int8_t    isaid_np;
+	u_int8_t    isaid_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isaid_length;
+	u_int8_t    isaid_idtype;
+	u_int8_t    isaid_doi_specific_a;
+	u_int16_t   isaid_doi_specific_b;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_identification_desc;
@@ -381,12 +379,12 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_identification_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_ipsec_id
 {
-    u_int8_t    isaiid_np;
-    u_int8_t    isaiid_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isaiid_length;
-    u_int8_t    isaiid_idtype;
-    u_int8_t    isaiid_protoid;
-    u_int16_t   isaiid_port;
+	u_int8_t    isaiid_np;
+	u_int8_t    isaiid_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isaiid_length;
+	u_int8_t    isaiid_idtype;
+	u_int8_t    isaiid_protoid;
+	u_int16_t   isaiid_port;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc;
@@ -408,17 +406,17 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_cert
 {
-    u_int8_t    isacert_np;
-    u_int8_t    isacert_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isacert_length;
-    u_int8_t    isacert_type;
+	u_int8_t    isacert_np;
+	u_int8_t    isacert_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isacert_length;
+	u_int8_t    isacert_type;
 };
 
 /* NOTE: this packet type has a fixed portion that is not a
  * multiple of 4 octets.  This means that sizeof(struct isakmp_cert)
  * yields the wrong value for the length.
  */
-#define ISAKMP_CERT_SIZE		5
+#define ISAKMP_CERT_SIZE                5
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc;
 
@@ -439,17 +437,17 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_cr
 {
-    u_int8_t    isacr_np;
-    u_int8_t    isacr_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isacr_length;
-    u_int8_t    isacr_type;
+	u_int8_t    isacr_np;
+	u_int8_t    isacr_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isacr_length;
+	u_int8_t    isacr_type;
 };
 
 /* NOTE: this packet type has a fixed portion that is not a
  * multiple of 4 octets.  This means that sizeof(struct isakmp_cr)
  * yields the wrong value for the length.
  */
-#define ISAKMP_CR_SIZE		5
+#define ISAKMP_CR_SIZE          5
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc;
 
@@ -526,13 +524,13 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_nonce_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_notification
 {
-    u_int8_t    isan_np;
-    u_int8_t    isan_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isan_length;
-    u_int32_t   isan_doi;
-    u_int8_t    isan_protoid;
-    u_int8_t    isan_spisize;
-    u_int16_t   isan_type;
+	u_int8_t    isan_np;
+	u_int8_t    isan_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isan_length;
+	u_int32_t   isan_doi;
+	u_int8_t    isan_protoid;
+	u_int8_t    isan_spisize;
+	u_int16_t   isan_type;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_notification_desc;
@@ -557,40 +555,40 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_notification_desc;
  */
 struct isakmp_delete
 {
-    u_int8_t    isad_np;
-    u_int8_t    isad_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isad_length;
-    u_int32_t   isad_doi;
-    u_int8_t    isad_protoid;
-    u_int8_t    isad_spisize;
-    u_int16_t   isad_nospi;
+	u_int8_t    isad_np;
+	u_int8_t    isad_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isad_length;
+	u_int32_t   isad_doi;
+	u_int8_t    isad_protoid;
+	u_int8_t    isad_spisize;
+	u_int16_t   isad_nospi;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_delete_desc;
 
 /* From draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg
 3.2. Attribute Payload
-                           1                   2                   3
-       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-     ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-     !     Type      !   RESERVED    !           Identifier          !
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
-     !                                                               !
-     !                                                               !
-     ~                           Attributes                          ~
-     !                                                               !
-     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+						   1                   2                   3
+	   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+	 ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+	 !     Type      !   RESERVED    !           Identifier          !
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+	 !                                                               !
+	 !                                                               !
+	 ~                           Attributes                          ~
+	 !                                                               !
+	 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
 */
 struct isakmp_mode_attr
 {
-    u_int8_t    isama_np;
-    u_int8_t    isama_reserved;
-    u_int16_t   isama_length;
-    u_int8_t    isama_type;
-    u_int8_t    isama_reserved2;
-    u_int16_t   isama_identifier;
+	u_int8_t    isama_np;
+	u_int8_t    isama_reserved;
+	u_int16_t   isama_length;
+	u_int8_t    isama_type;
+	u_int8_t    isama_reserved2;
+	u_int16_t   isama_identifier;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_attr_desc;
@@ -614,12 +612,12 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_vendor_id_desc;
 
 struct isakmp_nat_oa
 {
-    u_int8_t    isanoa_np;
-    u_int8_t    isanoa_reserved_1;
-    u_int16_t   isanoa_length;
-    u_int8_t    isanoa_idtype;
-    u_int8_t    isanoa_reserved_2;
-    u_int16_t   isanoa_reserved_3;
+	u_int8_t    isanoa_np;
+	u_int8_t    isanoa_reserved_1;
+	u_int16_t   isanoa_length;
+	u_int8_t    isanoa_idtype;
+	u_int8_t    isanoa_reserved_2;
+	u_int16_t   isanoa_reserved_3;
 };
 
 extern struct_desc isakmp_nat_d;
@@ -628,18 +626,18 @@ extern struct_desc isakmp_nat_oa;
 /* union of all payloads */
 
 union payload {
-    struct isakmp_generic generic;
-    struct isakmp_sa sa;
-    struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
-    struct isakmp_transform transform;
-    struct isakmp_id id;    /* Main Mode */
-    struct isakmp_cert cert;
-    struct isakmp_cr cr;
-    struct isakmp_ipsec_id ipsec_id;	/* Quick Mode */
-    struct isakmp_notification notification;
-    struct isakmp_delete delete;
-    struct isakmp_nat_oa nat_oa;
-    struct isakmp_mode_attr attribute;
+	struct isakmp_generic generic;
+	struct isakmp_sa sa;
+	struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+	struct isakmp_transform transform;
+	struct isakmp_id id;    /* Main Mode */
+	struct isakmp_cert cert;
+	struct isakmp_cr cr;
+	struct isakmp_ipsec_id ipsec_id;    /* Quick Mode */
+	struct isakmp_notification notification;
+	struct isakmp_delete delete;
+	struct isakmp_nat_oa nat_oa;
+	struct isakmp_mode_attr attribute;
 };
 
 /* descriptor for each payload type
diff --git a/src/pluto/pem.c b/src/pluto/pem.c
index 5ebe4b576..646447c1a 100644
--- a/src/pluto/pem.c
+++ b/src/pluto/pem.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* Loading of PEM encoded files with optional encryption
- * Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ * HSR Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pem.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 /* decrypt a PEM encoded data block using DES-EDE3-CBC
@@ -27,437 +26,101 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H   /* stupid trick to force prototype decl in <des.h> */
-#include <libdes/des.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <asn1/pem.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "md5.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "pem.h"
 
-/*
- * check the presence of a pattern in a character string
- */
-static bool
-present(const char* pattern, chunk_t* ch)
-{
-    u_int pattern_len = strlen(pattern);
-
-    if (ch->len >= pattern_len && strncmp(ch->ptr, pattern, pattern_len) == 0)
-    {
-	ch->ptr += pattern_len;
-	ch->len -= pattern_len;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
-}
-
-/*
- * compare string with chunk
- */
-static bool
-match(const char *pattern, const chunk_t *ch)
-{
-    return ch->len == strlen(pattern) &&
-	   strncmp(pattern, ch->ptr, ch->len) == 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * find a boundary of the form -----tag name-----
- */
-static bool
-find_boundary(const char* tag, chunk_t *line)
-{
-    chunk_t name = empty_chunk;
-
-    if (!present("-----", line))
-	return FALSE;
-    if (!present(tag, line))
-	return FALSE;
-    if (*line->ptr != ' ')
-	return FALSE;
-    line->ptr++;  line->len--;
-
-    /* extract name */
-    name.ptr = line->ptr;
-    while (line->len > 0)
-    {
-	if (present("-----", line))
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  -----%s %.*s-----",
-			tag, (int)name.len, name.ptr);
-	    )
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-	line->ptr++;  line->len--;  name.len++;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
-}
-
-/*
- * eat whitespace
- */
-static void
-eat_whitespace(chunk_t *src)
-{
-    while (src->len > 0 && (*src->ptr == ' ' || *src->ptr == '\t'))
-    {
-	src->ptr++;  src->len--;
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * extracts a token ending with a given termination symbol
- */
-static bool
-extract_token(chunk_t *token, char termination, chunk_t *src)
-{
-    u_char *eot = memchr(src->ptr, termination, src->len);
-
-    /* initialize empty token */
-    *token = empty_chunk;
-
-    if (eot == NULL) /* termination symbol not found */
-	return FALSE;
-
-    /* extract token */
-    token->ptr = src->ptr;
-    token->len = (u_int)(eot - src->ptr);
-
-    /* advance src pointer after termination symbol */
-    src->ptr = eot + 1;
-    src->len -= (token->len + 1);
-
-   return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * extracts a name: value pair from the PEM header
- */
-static bool
-extract_parameter(chunk_t *name, chunk_t *value, chunk_t *line)
-{
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  %.*s", (int)line->len, line->ptr);
-    )
-
-    /* extract name */
-    if (!extract_token(name,':', line))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    eat_whitespace(line);
-
-    /* extract value */
-    *value = *line;
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- *  fetches a new line terminated by \n or \r\n
- */
-static bool
-fetchline(chunk_t *src, chunk_t *line)
-{
-    if (src->len == 0) /* end of src reached */
-	return FALSE;
-
-    if (extract_token(line, '\n', src))
-    {
-	if (line->len > 0 && *(line->ptr + line->len -1) == '\r')
-	    line->len--;  /* remove optional \r */
-    }
-    else /*last line ends without newline */
-    {
-	*line = *src;
-	src->ptr += src->len;
-	src->len = 0;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * decrypts a DES-EDE-CBC encrypted data block
- */
-static bool
-pem_decrypt_3des(chunk_t *blob, chunk_t *iv, const char *passphrase)
-{
-    MD5_CTX context;
-    u_char digest[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
-    u_char des_iv[DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
-    u_char key[24];
-    des_cblock *deskey = (des_cblock *)key;
-    des_key_schedule ks[3];
-    u_char padding, *last_padding_pos, *first_padding_pos;
-
-    /* Convert passphrase to 3des key */
-    MD5Init(&context);
-    MD5Update(&context, passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-    MD5Update(&context, iv->ptr, iv->len);
-    MD5Final(digest, &context);
-
-    memcpy(key, digest, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-    MD5Init(&context);
-    MD5Update(&context, digest, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-    MD5Update(&context, passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-    MD5Update(&context, iv->ptr, iv->len);
-    MD5Final(digest, &context);
-
-    memcpy(key + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, 24 - MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-    (void) des_set_key(&deskey[0], ks[0]);
-    (void) des_set_key(&deskey[1], ks[1]);
-    (void) des_set_key(&deskey[2], ks[2]);
-
-    /* decrypt data block */
-    memcpy(des_iv, iv->ptr, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-    des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)blob->ptr, (des_cblock *)blob->ptr,
-	blob->len, ks[0], ks[1], ks[2], (des_cblock *)des_iv, FALSE);
-
-    /* determine amount of padding */
-    last_padding_pos = blob->ptr + blob->len - 1;
-    padding = *last_padding_pos;
-    first_padding_pos = (padding > blob->len)?
-			 blob->ptr : last_padding_pos - padding;
-
-    /* check the padding pattern */
-    while (--last_padding_pos > first_padding_pos)
-    {
-	if (*last_padding_pos != padding)
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* remove padding */
-    blob->len -= padding;
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * optionally prompts for a passphrase before decryption
- * currently we support DES-EDE3-CBC, only
+/**
+ *  Converts a PEM encoded file into its binary form
+ *  RFC 1421 Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail, February 1993
+ *  RFC 934 Message Encapsulation, January 1985
  */
-static err_t
-pem_decrypt(chunk_t *blob, chunk_t *iv, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label)
+err_t pemtobin(chunk_t *blob, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label, bool *pgp)
 {
-    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("  decrypting file using 'DES-EDE3-CBC'");
-    )
-    if (iv->len != DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE)
-	return "size of DES-EDE3-CBC IV is not 8 bytes";
-
-    if (pass == NULL)
-	return "no passphrase available";
+	chunk_t password = chunk_empty;
 
-    /* do we prompt for the passphrase? */
-    if (pass->prompt && pass->fd != NULL_FD)
-    {
-	int i;
-	chunk_t blob_copy;
- 	err_t ugh = "invalid passphrase, too many trials";
-
-	whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need passphrase for '%s'", label);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS; i++)
+	/* do we prompt for the passphrase? */
+	if (pass && pass->prompt && pass->fd != NULL_FD)
 	{
-	    int n;
-
-	    if (i > 0)
-	    whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid passphrase, please try again");
-
-	    n = read(pass->fd, pass->secret, PROMPT_PASS_LEN);
-
-	    if (n == -1)
-	    {
-		err_t ugh = "read(whackfd) failed";
-
-		whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,ugh);
-		return ugh;
-	    }
+		int i;
+		chunk_t blob_copy;
+		err_t ugh = "invalid passphrase, too many trials";
+		status_t status;
 
-	    pass->secret[n-1] = '\0';
-	    
-	    if (strlen(pass->secret) == 0)
-	    {
-	        err_t ugh = "no passphrase entered, aborted";
+		whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need passphrase for '%s'", label);
 
+		for (i = 0; i < MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS; i++)
+		{
+			int n;
+
+			if (i > 0)
+			{
+				whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid passphrase, please try again");
+			}
+			n = read(pass->fd, pass->secret, PROMPT_PASS_LEN);
+
+			if (n == -1)
+			{
+				err_t ugh = "read(whackfd) failed";
+
+				whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,ugh);
+				return ugh;
+			}
+
+			pass->secret[n-1] = '\0';
+			
+			if (strlen(pass->secret) == 0)
+			{
+				err_t ugh = "no passphrase entered, aborted";
+
+				whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
+				return ugh;
+			}
+
+			blob_copy = chunk_clone(*blob);
+			password = chunk_create(pass->secret, strlen(pass->secret));
+
+			status = pem_to_bin(blob, password, pgp);
+			if (status != INVALID_ARG)
+			{
+				if (status == SUCCESS)
+				{
+					whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid passphrase");
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%N, aborted", status_names, status);
+				}
+				free(blob_copy.ptr);
+				return NULL;
+			}
+			
+			/* blob is useless after wrong decryption, restore the original */
+			free(blob->ptr);
+			*blob = blob_copy;
+		}
 		whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
 		return ugh;
-	    }
-
-	    clonetochunk(blob_copy, blob->ptr, blob->len, "blob copy");
-
-	    if (pem_decrypt_3des(blob, iv, pass->secret))
-	    {
-		whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid passphrase");
-		pfree(blob_copy.ptr);
-		return NULL;
-	    }
-	    
-	    /* blob is useless after wrong decryption, restore the original */
-	    pfree(blob->ptr);
-	    *blob = blob_copy;
-	}
-	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
-	return ugh;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	if (pem_decrypt_3des(blob, iv, pass->secret))
-	    return NULL;
-	else
-	    return "invalid passphrase";
-    }
-}
-
-/*  Converts a PEM encoded file into its binary form
- *
- *  RFC 1421 Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail, February 1993
- *  RFC 934 Message Encapsulation, January 1985
- */
-err_t
-pemtobin(chunk_t *blob, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label, bool *pgp)
-{
-    typedef enum {
-	PEM_PRE    = 0,
-	PEM_MSG    = 1,
-	PEM_HEADER = 2,
-	PEM_BODY   = 3,
-	PEM_POST   = 4,
-	PEM_ABORT  = 5
-    } state_t;
-
-    bool encrypted = FALSE;
-
-    state_t state  = PEM_PRE;
-
-    chunk_t src    = *blob;
-    chunk_t dst    = *blob;
-    chunk_t line   = empty_chunk;
-    chunk_t iv     = empty_chunk;
-
-    u_char iv_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-
-    /* zero size of converted blob */
-    dst.len = 0;
-
-    /* zero size of IV */
-    iv.ptr = iv_buf;
-    iv.len = 0;
-
-    while (fetchline(&src, &line))
-    {
-	if (state == PEM_PRE)
-	{
-	    if (find_boundary("BEGIN", &line))
-	    {
-		*pgp = FALSE;
-		state = PEM_MSG;
-	    }
-	    continue;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    if (find_boundary("END", &line))
-	    {
-		state = PEM_POST;
-		break;
-	    }
-	    if (state == PEM_MSG)
-	    {
-		state = (memchr(line.ptr, ':', line.len) == NULL)?
-			    PEM_BODY : PEM_HEADER;
-	    }
-	    if (state == PEM_HEADER)
-	    {
-		chunk_t name  = empty_chunk;
-		chunk_t value = empty_chunk;
-
-		/* an empty line separates HEADER and BODY */
-		if (line.len == 0)
-		{
-		    state = PEM_BODY;
-		    continue;
-		}
-
-	        /* we are looking for a name: value pair */
-		if (!extract_parameter(&name, &value, &line))
-		    continue;
-
-		if (match("Proc-Type", &name) && *value.ptr == '4')
-			encrypted = TRUE;
-		else if (match("DEK-Info", &name))
+		if (pass)
 		{
-		    const char *ugh = NULL;
-		    size_t len = 0;
-		    chunk_t dek;
-
-		    if (!extract_token(&dek, ',', &value))
-			dek = value;
-
-		    /* we support DES-EDE3-CBC encrypted files, only */
-		    if (!match("DES-EDE3-CBC", &dek))
-			return "we support DES-EDE3-CBC encrypted files, only";
-
-		    eat_whitespace(&value);
-		    ugh = ttodata(value.ptr, value.len, 16,
-		    		  iv.ptr, MAX_DIGEST_LEN, &len);
-		    if (ugh)
-			return "error in IV";
-
-		    iv.len = len;
+			password = chunk_create(pass->secret, strlen(pass->secret));
 		}
-	    }
-	    else /* state is PEM_BODY */
-	    {
-		const char *ugh = NULL;
-		size_t len = 0;
-		chunk_t data;
-
-		/* remove any trailing whitespace */
-		if (!extract_token(&data ,' ', &line))
-		    data = line;
-
-		/* check for PGP armor checksum */
-		if (*data.ptr == '=')
+		if (pem_to_bin(blob, password, pgp) == SUCCESS)
 		{
-		    *pgp = TRUE;
-		    data.ptr++;
-		    data.len--;
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("  Armor checksum: %.*s", (int)data.len, data.ptr);
-		    )
-		    continue;
-		}
-
-		ugh = ttodata(data.ptr, data.len, 64,
-			      dst.ptr, blob->len - dst.len, &len);
-		if (ugh)
-		{
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("  %s", ugh);
-		    )
-		    state = PEM_ABORT;
-		    break;
+			return NULL;
 		}
 		else
 		{
-		    dst.ptr += len;
-		    dst.len += len;
+			return "pem to bin conversion failed";
 		}
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    /* set length to size of binary blob */
-    blob->len = dst.len;
-
-    if (state != PEM_POST)
-	return "file coded in unknown format, discarded";
-
-    if (encrypted)
-	return pem_decrypt(blob, &iv, pass, label);
-    else
-	return NULL;
+	}	
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/pem.h b/src/pluto/pem.h
index e74915cb2..5e97b99ed 100644
--- a/src/pluto/pem.h
+++ b/src/pluto/pem.h
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /* Loading of PEM encoded files with optional encryption
- * Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil 
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,9 +12,7 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pem.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-extern err_t pemtobin(chunk_t *blob, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label
-    , bool *pgp);
+extern err_t pemtobin(chunk_t *blob, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label,
+					  bool *pgp);
diff --git a/src/pluto/pgp.c b/src/pluto/pgp.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b956ce4d7..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/pgp.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,647 +0,0 @@
-/* Support of OpenPGP certificates
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pgp.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <time.h>
-
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "id.h"
-#include "pgp.h"
-#include "certs.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "whack.h"
-#include "pkcs1.h"
-#include "keys.h"
-
-/*
- * chained list of OpenPGP end certificates
- */
-static pgpcert_t *pgpcerts   = NULL;
-
-/*
- * OpenPGP packet tags defined in section 4.3 of RFC 2440
- */
-#define PGP_PKT_RESERVED		 0
-#define PGP_PKT_PUBKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY	 1
-#define PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE		 2
-#define PGP_PKT_SYMKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY	 3
-#define PGP_PKT_ONE_PASS_SIGNATURE_PKT	 4
-#define PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY		 5
-#define PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY		 6
-#define PGP_PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY		 7
-#define PGP_PKT_COMPRESSED_DATA		 8
-#define PGP_PKT_SYMKEY_ENC_DATA		 9
-#define PGP_PKT_MARKER			10
-#define PGP_PKT_LITERAL_DATA		11
-#define PGP_PKT_TRUST			12
-#define PGP_PKT_USER_ID			13
-#define PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY		14
-#define PGP_PKT_ROOF			15
-
-static const char *const pgp_packet_type_name[] = {
-    "Reserved",
-    "Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet",
-    "Signature Packet",
-    "Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet",
-    "One-Pass Signature Packet",
-    "Secret Key Packet",
-    "Public Key Packet",
-    "Secret Subkey Packet",
-    "Compressed Data Packet",
-    "Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet",
-    "Marker Packet",
-    "Literal Data Packet",
-    "Trust Packet",
-    "User ID Packet",
-    "Public Subkey Packet"
-};
-
-/*
- * OpenPGP public key algorithms defined in section 9.1 of RFC 2440
- */
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA 		 1
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_ENC_ONLY	 2
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY	 3
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY	16
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_DSA		17
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ECC		18
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ECDSA		19
-#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ELGAMAL		20
-
-/*
- * OpenPGP symmetric key algorithms defined in section 9.2 of RFC 2440
-  */
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_PLAIN	 0
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_IDEA	 1
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_3DES	 2
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_CAST5	 3
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_BLOWFISH	 4
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_SAFER	 5
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_DES		 6
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_AES		 7
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_AES_192	 8
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_AES_256	 9
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_TWOFISH	10
-#define PGP_SYM_ALG_ROOF	11
-
-static const char *const pgp_sym_alg_name[] = {
-    "Plaintext",
-    "IDEA",
-    "3DES",
-    "CAST5",
-    "Blowfish",
-    "SAFER",
-    "DES",
-    "AES",
-    "AES-192",
-    "AES-256",
-    "Twofish"
-};
-
-/*
- * Size of PGP Key ID
- */
-#define PGP_KEYID_SIZE		8
-
-const pgpcert_t empty_pgpcert = {
-      NULL     , /* *next */
-            0  , /* installed */
-            0  , /* count */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /* certificate */
-            0  , /* created */
-            0  , /* until */
-            0  , /* pubkeyAlgorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /* modulus */
-    { NULL, 0 }, /* publicExponent */
-       ""        /* fingerprint */
-};
-
-static size_t
-pgp_size(chunk_t *blob, int len)
-{
-    size_t size = 0;
-
-    blob->len -= len;
-    while (len-- > 0)
-	size = 256*size + *blob->ptr++;
-    return size;
-}
-
-/*
- * extracts the length of a PGP packet
- */
-static size_t
-pgp_old_packet_length(chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    /* bits 0 and 1 define the packet length type */
-    int len_type = 0x03 & *blob->ptr++;
-
-    blob->len--;
-
-    /* len_type: 0 -> 1 byte, 1 -> 2 bytes, 2 -> 4 bytes */
-    return pgp_size(blob, (len_type == 0)? 1: len_type << 1);
-}
-
-/*
- * extracts PGP packet version (V3 or V4)
- */
-static u_char
-pgp_version(chunk_t *blob)
-{
-    u_char version = *blob->ptr++;
-    blob->len--;
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L3 - version:");
-	DBG_log("  V%d", version)
-    )
-    return version;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse OpenPGP public key packet defined in section 5.5.2 of RFC 2440
- */
-static bool
-parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
-{
-    u_char version = pgp_version(packet);
-
-    if (version < 3 || version > 4)
-    {
-	plog("PGP packet version V%d not supported", version);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* creation date - 4 bytes */
-    cert->created = (time_t)pgp_size(packet, 4);
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L3 - created:");
-	DBG_log("  %s", timetoa(&cert->created, TRUE))
-    )
-
-    if (version == 3)
-    {
-	/* validity in days - 2 bytes */
-	cert->until   = (time_t)pgp_size(packet, 2);
-
-	/* validity of 0 days means that the key never expires */
-	if (cert->until > 0)
-	    cert->until = cert->created + 24*3600*cert->until;
-
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L3 - until:");
-	    DBG_log("  %s", timetoa(&cert->until, TRUE));
-	)
-    }
-
-    /* public key algorithm - 1 byte */
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L3 - public key algorithm:")
-    )
-
-    switch (pgp_size(packet, 1))
-    {
-    case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
-    case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY:
-	cert->pubkeyAlg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("  RSA")
-	)
-	/* modulus n */
-	cert->modulus.len = (pgp_size(packet, 2)+7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
-	cert->modulus.ptr = packet->ptr;
-	packet->ptr += cert->modulus.len;
-	packet->len -= cert->modulus.len;
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L3 - modulus:")
-	)
-	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", cert->modulus);
-
-	/* public exponent e */
-	cert->publicExponent.len = (pgp_size(packet, 2)+7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
-	cert->publicExponent.ptr = packet->ptr;
-	packet->ptr += cert->publicExponent.len;
-	packet->len -= cert->publicExponent.len;
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L3 - public exponent:")
-	)
-	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", cert->publicExponent);
-
-	if (version == 3)
-	{
-	    /* a V3 fingerprint is the MD5 hash of modulus and public exponent */
-            MD5_CTX context;
-            MD5Init(&context);
-            MD5Update(&context, cert->modulus.ptr, cert->modulus.len);
-	    MD5Update(&context, cert->publicExponent.ptr, cert->publicExponent.len);
-            MD5Final(cert->fingerprint, &context);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    plog("  computation of V4 key ID not implemented yet");
-	}
-	break;
-    case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_DSA:
-	cert->pubkeyAlg = PUBKEY_ALG_DSA;
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("  DSA")
-	)
-	plog("  DSA public keys not supported");
-	return FALSE;
-     default:
-	cert->pubkeyAlg = 0;
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("  other")
-	)
-	plog(" exotic not RSA public keys not supported");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse OpenPGP secret key packet defined in section 5.5.3 of RFC 2440
- */
-static bool
-parse_pgp_secretkey_packet(chunk_t *packet, RSA_private_key_t *key)
-{
-    int i, s2k;
-    pgpcert_t cert = empty_pgpcert;
-
-    if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(packet, &cert))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    init_RSA_public_key((RSA_public_key_t *)key, cert.publicExponent
-					       , cert.modulus);
-
-    /* string-to-key usage */
-    s2k = pgp_size(packet, 1);
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L3 - string-to-key:  %d", s2k)
-    )
-
-    if (s2k == 255)
-    {
-	plog("  string-to-key specifiers not supported");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (s2k >= PGP_SYM_ALG_ROOF)
-    {
-	plog("  undefined symmetric key algorithm");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* a known symmetric key algorithm is specified*/
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  %s", pgp_sym_alg_name[s2k])
-    )
-
-    /* private key is unencrypted */
-    if (s2k == PGP_SYM_ALG_PLAIN)
-    {
-	for (i = 2; i < RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS; i++)
-	{
-	    mpz_t u;  /* auxiliary variable */
-
-	    /* compute offset to private key component i*/
-	    MP_INT *n = (MP_INT*)((char *)key + RSA_private_field[i].offset);
-
-	    switch (i)
-	    {
-	    case 2:
-	    case 3:
-	    case 4:
-		{
-		    size_t len = (pgp_size(packet, 2)+7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
-
-		    n_to_mpz(n, packet->ptr, len);
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("L3 - %s:", RSA_private_field[i].name)
-		    )
-		    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PRIVATE, "", packet->ptr, len);
-		    packet->ptr += len;
-		    packet->len -= len;
-		}
-		break;
-	    case 5:		/* dP = d mod (p-1) */
-		mpz_init(u);
-		mpz_sub_ui(u, &key->p, 1);
-		mpz_mod(n, &key->d, u);
-		mpz_clear(u);
-		break;
-	    case 6:		/* dQ = d mod (q-1) */
-		mpz_init(u);
-		mpz_sub_ui(u, &key->q, 1);
-		mpz_mod(n, &key->d, u);
-		mpz_clear(u);
-		break;
-	    case 7:		/* qInv = (q^-1) mod p */
-		mpz_invert(n, &key->q, &key->p);
-		if (mpz_cmp_ui(n, 0) < 0)
-		    mpz_add(n, n, &key->p);
-		passert(mpz_cmp(n, &key->p) < 0);
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    plog("  %s encryption not supported",  pgp_sym_alg_name[s2k]);
-    return FALSE;
-}
-
-/*
- * Parse OpenPGP signature packet defined in section 5.2.2 of RFC 2440
- */
-static bool
-parse_pgp_signature_packet(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
-{
-    time_t created;
-    chunk_t keyid;
-    u_char  sig_type;
-    u_char version = pgp_version(packet);
-
-    /* we parse only V3 signature packets */
-    if (version != 3)
-	return TRUE;
-
-    /* size byte must have the value 5 */
-    if (pgp_size(packet, 1) != 5)
-    {
-	plog(" size must be 5");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* signature type - 1 byte */
-    sig_type = (u_char)pgp_size(packet, 1);
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L3 - signature type:  0x%2x", sig_type)
-    )
-
-    /* creation date - 4 bytes */
-    created = (time_t)pgp_size(packet, 4);
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L3 - created:");
-	DBG_log("  %s", timetoa(&cert->created, TRUE))
-    )
-
-    /* key ID of signer - 8 bytes */
-    keyid.ptr = packet->ptr;
-    keyid.len = PGP_KEYID_SIZE;
-    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "L3 - key ID of signer", keyid);
-
-   return TRUE;
-}
-
-bool
-parse_pgp(chunk_t blob, pgpcert_t *cert, RSA_private_key_t *key)
-{
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("L0 - PGP file:")
-    )
-    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", blob);
-
-    if (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	/* parse a PGP certificate file */
-	cert->certificate = blob;
-	time(&cert->installed);
-    }
-    else if (key == NULL)
-    {
-	/* should not occur, nothing to parse */
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    while (blob.len > 0)
-    {
-	chunk_t packet = empty_chunk;
-	u_char packet_tag = *blob.ptr;
-
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("L1 - PGP packet:  tag= 0x%2x", packet_tag)
-	)
-
-	/* bit 7 must be set */
-	if (!(packet_tag & 0x80))
-	{
-	    plog("  incorrect Packet Tag");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-
-	/* bit 6 set defines new packet format */
-	if (packet_tag & 0x40)
-	{
-	    plog("  new PGP packet format not supported");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    int packet_type = (packet_tag & 0x3C) >> 2;
-
-	    packet.len = pgp_old_packet_length(&blob);
-	    packet.ptr = blob.ptr;
-	    blob.ptr += packet.len;
-	    blob.len -= packet.len;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s (%d), old format, %d bytes",
-		    (packet_type < PGP_PKT_ROOF) ?
-		    pgp_packet_type_name[packet_type] :
-		    "Undefined Packet Type", packet_type, (int)packet.len);
-		DBG_log("L2 - body:")
-	    )
-	    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", packet);
-
-	    if (cert != NULL)
-	    {
-		/* parse a PGP certificate */
-		switch (packet_type)
-		{
-		case PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
-		    if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(&packet, cert))
-			return FALSE;
-		    break;
-		case PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE:
-		    if (!parse_pgp_signature_packet(&packet, cert))
-			return FALSE;
-		    break;
-		case PGP_PKT_USER_ID:
-		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			DBG_log("L3 - user ID:");
-			DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)packet.len, packet.ptr)
-		    )
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* parse a PGP private key file */
-		switch (packet_type)
-		{
-		case PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY:
-		    if (!parse_pgp_secretkey_packet(&packet, key))
-			return FALSE;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-	}
-    }
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- *  compare two OpenPGP certificates
- */
-static bool
-same_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *a, pgpcert_t *b)
-{
-    return a->certificate.len == b->certificate.len &&
-	memcmp(a->certificate.ptr, b->certificate.ptr, b->certificate.len) == 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * for each link pointing to the certificate increase the count by one
- */
-void
-share_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
-{
-    if (cert != NULL)
- 	cert->count++;
-}
-
-/*
- * select the OpenPGP keyid as ID
- */
-void
-select_pgpcert_id(pgpcert_t *cert, struct id *end_id)
-{
-    end_id->kind = ID_KEY_ID;
-    end_id->name.len = PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE;
-    end_id->name.ptr = cert->fingerprint;
-    end_id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
-    memcpy(end_id->name.ptr, cert->fingerprint, PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE);
-}
-
-/*
- *  add an OpenPGP user/host certificate to the chained list
- */
-pgpcert_t*
-add_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
-{
-    pgpcert_t *c = pgpcerts;
-
-    while (c != NULL)
-    {
-	if (same_pgpcert(c, cert)) /* already in chain, free cert */
-	{
-	    free_pgpcert(cert);
-	    return c;
-	}
-	c = c->next;
-    }
-
-    /* insert new cert at the root of the chain */
-    cert->next = pgpcerts;
-    pgpcerts = cert;
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  pgp cert inserted")
-    )
-    return cert;
-}
-
-/*  release of a certificate decreases the count by one
- "  the certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
- */
-void
-release_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
-{
-    if (cert != NULL && --cert->count == 0)
-    {
-	pgpcert_t **pp = &pgpcerts;
-	while (*pp != cert)
-	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
-        *pp = cert->next;
-	free_pgpcert(cert);
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- *  free a PGP certificate
- */
-void
-free_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
-{
-    if (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	if (cert->certificate.ptr != NULL)
-	    pfree(cert->certificate.ptr);
-	pfree(cert);
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- *  list all PGP end certificates in a chained list
- */
-void
-list_pgp_end_certs(bool utc)
-{
-   pgpcert_t *cert = pgpcerts;
-   time_t now;
-
-    /* determine the current time */
-    time(&now);
-
-    if (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of PGP End certificates:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
-
-    while (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	unsigned keysize;
-	char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	cert_t c;
-
-	c.type = CERT_PGP;
-	c.u.pgp = cert;
-
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, count: %d", timetoa(&cert->installed, utc), cert->count);
-	datatot(cert->fingerprint, PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE, 'x', buf, BUF_LEN);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       fingerprint:  %s", buf);
-	form_keyid(cert->publicExponent, cert->modulus, buf, &keysize);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:   %4d RSA Key %s%s", 8*keysize, buf,
-		(has_private_key(c))? ", has private key" : "");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       created:  %s", timetoa(&cert->created, utc));
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       until:    %s %s", timetoa(&cert->until, utc),
-		check_expiry(cert->until, CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
-	cert = cert->next;
-    }
-}
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/pgpcert.c b/src/pluto/pgpcert.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7fb8232d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pgpcert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,496 @@
+/* Support of OpenPGP certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * HSR - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include <library.h>
+#include <pgp/pgp.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "pgpcert.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+
+/**
+ * Chained list of OpenPGP end certificates
+ */
+static pgpcert_t *pgpcerts   = NULL;
+
+/**
+ * Size of PGP Key ID
+ */
+#define PGP_KEYID_SIZE          8
+
+const pgpcert_t pgpcert_empty = {
+	  NULL     , /* next */
+            0  , /* version */
+			0  , /* installed */
+			0  , /* count */
+	{ NULL, 0 }, /* certificate */
+			0  , /* created */
+			0  , /* until */
+	  NULL     , /* public key */
+	  NULL       /* fingerprint */
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * Extracts the length of a PGP packet
+ */
+static size_t pgp_old_packet_length(chunk_t *blob)
+{
+	/* bits 0 and 1 define the packet length type */
+	int len_type = 0x03 & *blob->ptr++;
+
+	blob->len--;
+
+	/* len_type: 0 -> 1 byte, 1 -> 2 bytes, 2 -> 4 bytes */
+	return pgp_length(blob, (len_type == 0)? 1: len_type << 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Extracts PGP packet version (V3 or V4)
+ */
+static u_char pgp_version(chunk_t *blob)
+{
+	u_char version = *blob->ptr++;
+	blob->len--;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L3 - version:");
+		DBG_log("  V%d", version)
+	)
+	return version;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse OpenPGP signature packet defined in section 5.2.2 of RFC 2440
+ */
+static bool parse_pgp_signature_packet(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	time_t created;
+	chunk_t keyid;
+	u_char  sig_type;
+	u_char version = pgp_version(packet);
+
+	/* we parse only V3 signature packets */
+	if (version != 3)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+
+	/* size byte must have the value 5 */
+	if (pgp_length(packet, 1) != 5)
+	{
+		plog("  size must be 5");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* signature type - 1 byte */
+	sig_type = (u_char)pgp_length(packet, 1);
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L3 - signature type:  0x%2x", sig_type)
+	)
+
+	/* creation date - 4 bytes */
+	created = (time_t)pgp_length(packet, 4);
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L3 - created:");
+		DBG_log("  %T", &cert->created, TRUE)
+	)
+
+	/* key ID of signer - 8 bytes */
+	keyid.ptr = packet->ptr;
+	keyid.len = PGP_KEYID_SIZE;
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "L3 - key ID of signer", keyid);
+
+   return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parses the version and validity of an OpenPGP public key packet
+ */
+static bool parse_pgp_pubkey_version_validity(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	cert->version = pgp_version(packet);
+
+	if (cert->version < 3 || cert->version > 4)
+	{
+		plog("OpenPGP packet version V%d not supported", cert->version);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* creation date - 4 bytes */
+	cert->created = (time_t)pgp_length(packet, 4);
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L3 - created:");
+		DBG_log("  %T", &cert->created, TRUE)
+	)
+
+	if (cert->version == 3)
+	{
+		/* validity in days - 2 bytes */
+		cert->until   = (time_t)pgp_length(packet, 2);
+
+		/* validity of 0 days means that the key never expires */
+		if (cert->until > 0)
+		{
+			cert->until = cert->created + 24*3600*cert->until;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("L3 - until:");
+			DBG_log("  %T", &cert->until, TRUE);
+		)
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parse OpenPGP public key packet defined in section 5.5.2 of RFC 4880
+ */
+static bool parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	pgp_pubkey_alg_t pubkey_alg;
+	public_key_t *key;
+
+	if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_version_validity(packet, cert))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* public key algorithm - 1 byte */
+	pubkey_alg = pgp_length(packet, 1);
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L3 - public key algorithm:");
+		DBG_log("  %N", pgp_pubkey_alg_names, pubkey_alg)
+	)
+	
+	switch (pubkey_alg)
+	{
+		case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+		case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY:
+			key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PUBLIC_KEY, KEY_RSA,
+												 BUILD_BLOB_PGP, *packet,
+												 BUILD_END);
+			if (key == NULL)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			cert->public_key = key;
+
+			if (cert->version == 3)
+			{
+				cert->fingerprint = key->get_id(key, ID_KEY_ID);
+				if (cert->fingerprint == NULL)
+				{
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				plog("  computation of V4 key ID not implemented yet");
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			break;
+	 	default:
+			plog("  non RSA public keys not supported");
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse OpenPGP secret key packet defined in section 5.5.3 of RFC 4880
+ */
+static bool parse_pgp_secretkey_packet(chunk_t *packet, private_key_t **key)
+{
+	pgp_pubkey_alg_t pubkey_alg;
+	pgpcert_t cert = pgpcert_empty;
+
+	if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_version_validity(packet, &cert))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* public key algorithm - 1 byte */
+	pubkey_alg = pgp_length(packet, 1);
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L3 - public key algorithm:");
+		DBG_log("  %N", pgp_pubkey_alg_names, pubkey_alg)
+	)
+	
+	switch (pubkey_alg)
+	{
+		case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+		case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY:
+			*key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, KEY_RSA,
+												  BUILD_BLOB_PGP, *packet,
+												  BUILD_END);
+			break;
+	 	default:
+			plog("  non RSA private keys not supported");
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+	return (*key != NULL);
+}
+
+bool parse_pgp(chunk_t blob, pgpcert_t *cert, private_key_t **key)
+{
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("L0 - PGP file:")
+	)
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", blob);
+
+	if (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		/* parse a PGP certificate file */
+		cert->certificate = blob;
+		time(&cert->installed);
+	}
+	else if (key == NULL)
+	{
+		/* should not occur, nothing to parse */
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	while (blob.len > 0)
+	{
+		chunk_t packet = chunk_empty;
+		u_char packet_tag = *blob.ptr;
+
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("L1 - PGP packet:  tag= 0x%2x", packet_tag)
+		)
+
+		/* bit 7 must be set */
+		if (!(packet_tag & 0x80))
+		{
+			plog("  incorrect Packet Tag");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		/* bit 6 set defines new packet format */
+		if (packet_tag & 0x40)
+		{
+			plog("  new PGP packet format not supported");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			int packet_type = (packet_tag & 0x3C) >> 2;
+
+			packet.len = pgp_old_packet_length(&blob);
+			packet.ptr = blob.ptr;
+			blob.ptr += packet.len;
+			blob.len -= packet.len;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %N (%d), old format, %u bytes",
+						pgp_packet_tag_names, packet_type,
+						packet_type, packet.len);
+				DBG_log("L2 - body:")
+			)
+			DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", packet);
+
+			if (cert != NULL)
+			{
+				/* parse a PGP certificate */
+				switch (packet_type)
+				{
+					case PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+						if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(&packet, cert))
+						{
+							return FALSE;
+						}
+						break;
+					case PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE:
+						if (!parse_pgp_signature_packet(&packet, cert))
+						{
+							return FALSE;
+						}
+						break;
+					case PGP_PKT_USER_ID:
+						DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+							DBG_log("L3 - user ID:");
+							DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)packet.len, packet.ptr)
+						)
+						break;
+					default:
+						break;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* parse a PGP private key file */
+				switch (packet_type)
+				{
+					case PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+						if (!parse_pgp_secretkey_packet(&packet, key))
+						{
+							return FALSE;
+						}
+						break;
+					case PGP_PKT_USER_ID:
+						DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+							DBG_log("L3 - user ID:");
+							DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)packet.len, packet.ptr)
+						)
+						break;
+					default:
+						break;
+				}
+
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+}
+
+/**
+ *  Compare two OpenPGP certificates
+ */
+static bool same_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *a, pgpcert_t *b)
+{
+	return a->certificate.len == b->certificate.len &&
+		memeq(a->certificate.ptr, b->certificate.ptr, b->certificate.len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * For each link pointing to the certificate increase the count by one
+ */
+void share_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	if (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		cert->count++;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Select the OpenPGP keyid as ID
+ */
+void select_pgpcert_id(pgpcert_t *cert, struct id *end_id)
+{
+	end_id->kind = ID_KEY_ID;
+	end_id->name = cert->fingerprint->get_encoding(cert->fingerprint);
+}
+
+/**
+ *  Add an OpenPGP user/host certificate to the chained list
+ */
+pgpcert_t* add_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	pgpcert_t *c = pgpcerts;
+
+	while (c != NULL)
+	{
+		if (same_pgpcert(c, cert)) /* already in chain, free cert */
+		{
+			free_pgpcert(cert);
+			return c;
+		}
+		c = c->next;
+	}
+
+	/* insert new cert at the root of the chain */
+	cert->next = pgpcerts;
+	pgpcerts = cert;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  pgp cert inserted")
+	)
+	return cert;
+}
+
+/**
+ *  Release of a certificate decreases the count by one.
+ *  The certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
+ */
+void release_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	if (cert != NULL && --cert->count == 0)
+	{
+		pgpcert_t **pp = &pgpcerts;
+		while (*pp != cert)
+		{
+			pp = &(*pp)->next;
+		}
+		*pp = cert->next;
+		free_pgpcert(cert);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ *  Free a PGP certificate
+ */
+void free_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+	if (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		DESTROY_IF(cert->public_key);
+		DESTROY_IF(cert->fingerprint);
+		free(cert->certificate.ptr);
+		free(cert);
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ *  List all PGP end certificates in a chained list
+ */
+void list_pgp_end_certs(bool utc)
+{
+   pgpcert_t *cert = pgpcerts;
+   time_t now;
+
+	/* determine the current time */
+	time(&now);
+
+	if (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of PGP End certificates:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	}
+
+	while (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		public_key_t *key = cert->public_key;
+		cert_t c;
+
+		c.type = CERT_PGP;
+		c.u.pgp = cert;
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, count: %d", &cert->installed, utc, cert->count);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       digest:   %Y", cert->fingerprint);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       created:  %T", &cert->created, utc);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       until:    %T %s", &cert->until, utc,
+				check_expiry(cert->until, CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:   %N %4d bits%s",
+				key_type_names, key->get_type(key),
+				key->get_keysize(key) * BITS_PER_BYTE,				
+				has_private_key(c)? ", has private key" : "");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       keyid:    %Y",
+				key->get_id(key, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1));
+		cert = cert->next;
+	}
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/pgp.h b/src/pluto/pgpcert.h
index 514265086..727648391 100644
--- a/src/pluto/pgp.h
+++ b/src/pluto/pgpcert.h
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
 /* Support of OpenPGP certificates
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * HSR - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,18 +12,19 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pgp.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-#ifndef _PGP_H
-#define _PGP_H
+#ifndef _PGPCERT_H
+#define _PGPCERT_H
+
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
 
-#include "pkcs1.h"
 /*
  * Length of PGP V3 fingerprint
  */
-#define PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE	MD5_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE    HASH_SIZE_MD5
 
 typedef char fingerprint_t[PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE];
 
@@ -30,20 +33,19 @@ typedef char fingerprint_t[PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE];
 typedef struct pgpcert pgpcert_t;
 
 struct pgpcert {
-  pgpcert_t	    *next;
-  time_t	    installed;
-  int		    count;
-  chunk_t	    certificate;
-  time_t	    created;
-  time_t	    until;
-  enum pubkey_alg   pubkeyAlg;
-  chunk_t	    modulus;
-  chunk_t	    publicExponent;
-  fingerprint_t	    fingerprint;
+	pgpcert_t        *next;
+	int              version;
+	time_t           installed;
+	int              count;
+	chunk_t          certificate;
+	time_t           created;
+	time_t           until;
+	public_key_t     *public_key;
+	identification_t *fingerprint;
 };
 
-extern const pgpcert_t empty_pgpcert;
-extern bool parse_pgp(chunk_t blob, pgpcert_t *cert, RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern const pgpcert_t pgpcert_empty;
+extern bool parse_pgp(chunk_t blob, pgpcert_t *cert, private_key_t **key);
 extern void share_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
 extern void select_pgpcert_id(pgpcert_t *cert, struct id *end_id);
 extern pgpcert_t* add_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
@@ -51,4 +53,4 @@ extern void list_pgp_end_certs(bool utc);
 extern void release_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
 extern void free_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
 
-#endif /* _PGP_H */
+#endif /* _PGPCERT_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs1.c b/src/pluto/pkcs1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 49a06a8bc..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/pkcs1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,676 +0,0 @@
-/* Support of PKCS#1 private key data structures
- * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
- * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pkcs1.c 3427 2008-01-27 20:17:15Z andreas $
- */
-
-#include <stddef.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include <libsha2/sha2.h>
-
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include <asn1/oid.h>
-#include "log.h"
-#include "pkcs1.h"
-#include "md2.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-
-const struct fld RSA_private_field[] =
-{
-    { "Modulus",         offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, pub.n) },
-    { "PublicExponent",  offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, pub.e) },
-
-    { "PrivateExponent", offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, d) },
-    { "Prime1",          offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, p) },
-    { "Prime2",          offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, q) },
-    { "Exponent1",       offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, dP) },
-    { "Exponent2",       offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, dQ) },
-    { "Coefficient",     offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, qInv) },
-};
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of a PKCS#1 RSA private key */
-
-static const asn1Object_t privkeyObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "RSAPrivateKey",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "modulus",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 1,   "publicExponent",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
-  { 1,   "privateExponent",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 1,   "prime1",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
-  { 1,   "prime2",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
-  { 1,   "exponent1",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
-  { 1,   "exponent2",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
-  { 1,   "coefficient",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
-  { 1,   "otherPrimeInfos",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_LOOP }, /* 10 */
-  { 2,     "otherPrimeInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 11 */
-  { 3,       "prime",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
-  { 3,       "exponent",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 13 */
-  { 3,       "coefficient",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
-  { 1,   "end opt or loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /* 15 */
-};
-
-#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_VERSION		 1
-#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS		 2
-#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_PUB_EXP		 3
-#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_COEFF		 9
-#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_ROOF		16
-
-
-/*
- * forms the FreeS/WAN keyid from the public exponent e and modulus n
- */
-void
-form_keyid(chunk_t e, chunk_t n, char* keyid, unsigned *keysize)
-{
-    /* eliminate leading zero bytes in modulus from ASN.1 coding */
-    while (n.len > 1 && *n.ptr == 0x00)
-    {
-	n.ptr++;  n.len--;
-    }
-
-    /* form the FreeS/WAN keyid */
-    keyid[0] = '\0';	/* in case of splitkeytoid failure */
-    splitkeytoid(e.ptr, e.len, n.ptr, n.len, keyid, KEYID_BUF);
-
-    /* return the RSA modulus size in octets */
-    *keysize = n.len;
-}
-
-/*
- * initialize an RSA_public_key_t object
- */
-void
-init_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, chunk_t e, chunk_t n)
-{
-    n_to_mpz(&rsa->e, e.ptr, e.len);
-    n_to_mpz(&rsa->n, n.ptr, n.len);
-
-    form_keyid(e, n, rsa->keyid, &rsa->k);
-}
-
-#ifdef DEBUG
-static void
-RSA_show_key_fields(RSA_private_key_t *k, int fieldcnt)
-{
-    const struct fld *p;
-
-    DBG_log(" keyid: *%s", k->pub.keyid);
-
-    for (p = RSA_private_field; p < &RSA_private_field[fieldcnt]; p++)
-    {
-	MP_INT *n = (MP_INT *) ((char *)k + p->offset);
-	size_t sz = mpz_sizeinbase(n, 16);
-	char buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS * 2 + 2];	/* ought to be big enough */
-
-	passert(sz <= sizeof(buf));
-	mpz_get_str(buf, 16, n);
-
-	DBG_log(" %s: 0x%s", p->name, buf);
-    }
-}
-
-/* debugging info that compromises security! */
-void
-RSA_show_private_key(RSA_private_key_t *k)
-{
-    RSA_show_key_fields(k, elemsof(RSA_private_field));
-}
-
-void
-RSA_show_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *k)
-{
-    /* Kludge: pretend that it is a private key, but only display the
-     * first two fields (which are the public key).
-     */
-    passert(offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, pub) == 0);
-    RSA_show_key_fields((RSA_private_key_t *)k, 2);
-}
-#endif
-
-err_t
-RSA_private_key_sanity(RSA_private_key_t *k)
-{
-    /* note that the *last* error found is reported */
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    mpz_t t, u, q1;
-
-#ifdef DEBUG	/* debugging info that compromises security */
-    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, RSA_show_private_key(k));
-#endif
-
-    /* PKCS#1 1.5 section 6 requires modulus to have at least 12 octets.
-     * We actually require more (for security).
-     */
-    if (k->pub.k < RSA_MIN_OCTETS)
-	return RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH;
-
-    /* we picked a max modulus size to simplify buffer allocation */
-    if (k->pub.k > RSA_MAX_OCTETS)
-	return RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH;
-
-    mpz_init(t);
-    mpz_init(u);
-    mpz_init(q1);
-
-    /* check that n == p * q */
-    mpz_mul(u, &k->p, &k->q);
-    if (mpz_cmp(u, &k->pub.n) != 0)
-	ugh = "n != p * q";
-
-    /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */
-    mpz_sub_ui(t, &k->p, 1);
-    mpz_mod(t, t, &k->pub.e);
-    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 0) == 0)
-	ugh = "e divides p-1";
-
-    mpz_sub_ui(t, &k->q, 1);
-    mpz_mod(t, t, &k->pub.e);
-    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 0) == 0)
-	ugh = "e divides q-1";
-
-    /* check that d is e^-1 (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)) */
-    /* see PKCS#1v2, aka RFC 2437, for the "lcm" */
-    mpz_sub_ui(q1, &k->q, 1);
-    mpz_sub_ui(u, &k->p, 1);
-    mpz_gcd(t, u, q1);		/* t := gcd(p-1, q-1) */
-    mpz_mul(u, u, q1);		/* u := (p-1) * (q-1) */
-    mpz_divexact(u, u, t);	/* u := lcm(p-1, q-1) */
-
-    mpz_mul(t, &k->d, &k->pub.e);
-    mpz_mod(t, t, u);
-    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 1) != 0)
-	ugh = "(d * e) mod (lcm(p-1, q-1)) != 1";
-
-    /* check that dP is d mod (p-1) */
-    mpz_sub_ui(u, &k->p, 1);
-    mpz_mod(t, &k->d, u);
-    if (mpz_cmp(t, &k->dP) != 0)
-	ugh = "dP is not congruent to d mod (p-1)";
-
-    /* check that dQ is d mod (q-1) */
-    mpz_sub_ui(u, &k->q, 1);
-    mpz_mod(t, &k->d, u);
-    if (mpz_cmp(t, &k->dQ) != 0)
-	ugh = "dQ is not congruent to d mod (q-1)";
-
-    /* check that qInv is (q^-1) mod p */
-    mpz_mul(t, &k->qInv, &k->q);
-    mpz_mod(t, t, &k->p);
-    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 1) != 0)
-	ugh = "qInv is not conguent ot (q^-1) mod p";
-
-    mpz_clear(t);
-    mpz_clear(u);
-    mpz_clear(q1);
-    return ugh;
-}
-
-/*
- * Check the equality of two RSA public keys
- */
-bool
-same_RSA_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *a, const RSA_public_key_t *b)
-{
-    return a == b
-    || (a->k == b->k && mpz_cmp(&a->n, &b->n) == 0 && mpz_cmp(&a->e, &b->e) == 0);
-}
-
-/*
- *  Parses a PKCS#1 private key
- */
-bool
-pkcs1_parse_private_key(chunk_t blob, RSA_private_key_t *key)
-{
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object, modulus, exp;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, 0, FALSE, DBG_PRIVATE);
-
-    while (objectID < PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_ROOF) {
-
-	if (!extract_object(privkeyObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
-
-	if (objectID == PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_VERSION)
-	{
-	    if (object.len > 0 && *object.ptr != 0)
-	    {
-		plog("  wrong PKCS#1 private key version");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	}
-	else if (objectID >= PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS &&
-		 objectID <= PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_COEFF)
-	{
-	    MP_INT *u = (MP_INT *) ((char *)key
-		+ RSA_private_field[objectID - PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS].offset);
-
-	    n_to_mpz(u, object.ptr, object.len);
-
-	    if (objectID == PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS)
-		modulus = object;
-	    else if (objectID == PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_PUB_EXP)
-		exp = object;
-	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    form_keyid(exp, modulus, key->pub.keyid, &key->pub.k);
-    ugh = RSA_private_key_sanity(key);
-    return (ugh == NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- *  compute a digest over a binary blob
- */
-bool
-compute_digest(chunk_t tbs, int alg, chunk_t *digest)
-{
-    switch (alg)
-    {
-    case OID_MD2:
-    case OID_MD2_WITH_RSA:
-	{
-	    MD2_CTX context;
-
-	    MD2Init(&context);
-	    MD2Update(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
-	    MD2Final(digest->ptr, &context);
-	    digest->len = MD2_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-     case OID_MD5:
-     case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
-	{
-	    MD5_CTX context;
-
-	    MD5Init(&context);
-	    MD5Update(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
-	    MD5Final(digest->ptr, &context);
-	    digest->len = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-     case OID_SHA1:
-     case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
-     case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA_OIW:
-	{
-	    SHA1_CTX context;
-
-	    SHA1Init(&context);
-	    SHA1Update(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
-	    SHA1Final(digest->ptr, &context);
-	    digest->len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-     case OID_SHA256:
-     case OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA:
-	{
-	    sha256_context context;
-
-	    sha256_init(&context);
-	    sha256_write(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
-	    sha256_final(&context);
-	    memcpy(digest->ptr, context.sha_out, SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	    digest->len = SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-     case OID_SHA384:
-     case OID_SHA384_WITH_RSA:
-	{
-	    sha512_context context;
-
-	    sha384_init(&context);
-	    sha512_write(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
-	    sha512_final(&context);
-	    memcpy(digest->ptr, context.sha_out, SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	    digest->len = SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-     case OID_SHA512:
-     case OID_SHA512_WITH_RSA:
-	{
-	    sha512_context context;
-
-	    sha512_init(&context);
-	    sha512_write(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
-	    sha512_final(&context);
-	    memcpy(digest->ptr, context.sha_out, SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE);
-	    digest->len = SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-     default:
-	digest->len = 0;
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * compute an RSA signature with PKCS#1 padding
- */
-void
-sign_hash(const RSA_private_key_t *k, const u_char *hash_val, size_t hash_len
-    , u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len)
-{
-    chunk_t ch;
-    mpz_t t1, t2;
-    size_t padlen;
-    u_char *p = sig_val;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("signing hash with RSA Key *%s", k->pub.keyid)
-    )
-    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting */
-    *p++ = 0x00;
-    *p++ = 0x01;	/* BT (block type) 01 */
-    padlen = sig_len - 3 - hash_len;
-    memset(p, 0xFF, padlen);
-    p += padlen;
-    *p++ = 0x00;
-    memcpy(p, hash_val, hash_len);
-    passert(p + hash_len - sig_val == (ptrdiff_t)sig_len);
-
-    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.2 octet-string-to-integer conversion */
-    n_to_mpz(t1, sig_val, sig_len);	/* (could skip leading 0x00) */
-
-    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.3 RSA computation y = x^c mod n
-     * Better described in PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 RSADP.
-     * There are two methods, depending on the form of the private key.
-     * We use the one based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
-     */
-    mpz_init(t2);
-
-    mpz_powm(t2, t1, &k->dP, &k->p);	/* m1 = c^dP mod p */
-
-    mpz_powm(t1, t1, &k->dQ, &k->q);	/* m2 = c^dQ mod Q */
-
-    mpz_sub(t2, t2, t1);	/* h = qInv (m1 - m2) mod p */
-    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &k->p);
-    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &k->qInv);
-    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &k->p);
-
-    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &k->q);	/* m = m2 + h q */
-    mpz_add(t1, t1, t2);
-
-    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.4 integer-to-octet-string conversion */
-    ch = mpz_to_n(t1, sig_len);
-    memcpy(sig_val, ch.ptr, sig_len);
-    pfree(ch.ptr);
-
-    mpz_clear(t1);
-    mpz_clear(t2);
-}
-
-/*
- * encrypt data with an RSA public key after padding
- */
-chunk_t
-RSA_encrypt(const RSA_public_key_t *key, chunk_t in)
-{
-    u_char padded[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
-    u_char *pos = padded;
-    int padding = key->k - in.len - 3;
-    int i;
-
-    if (padding < 8 || key->k > RSA_MAX_OCTETS)
-	return empty_chunk;
-
-    /* add padding according to PKCS#1 7.2.1 1.+2. */
-    *pos++ = 0x00;
-    *pos++ = 0x02;
-
-    /* pad with pseudo random bytes unequal to zero */
-    for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
-    {
-	get_rnd_bytes(pos, padding);
-	while (!*pos)
-	{
-	    get_rnd_bytes(pos, 1);
-	}
-	pos++;
-    }
-
-    /* append the padding terminator */
-    *pos++ = 0x00;
-
-    /* now add the data */
-    memcpy(pos, in.ptr, in.len);
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("data for rsa encryption:\n", in);
-	DBG_dump("padded data for rsa encryption:\n", padded, key->k)
-    )
-
-    /* convert chunk to integer (PKCS#1 7.2.1 3.a) */
-    {
-	chunk_t out;
-	mpz_t m, c;
-
-	mpz_init(c);
-	n_to_mpz(m, padded, key->k);
-
-	/* encrypt(PKCS#1 7.2.1 3.b) */
-	mpz_powm(c, m, &key->e, &key->n);
-
-	/* convert integer back to a chunk (PKCS#1 7.2.1 3.c) */
-	out = mpz_to_n(c, key->k);
-	mpz_clear(c);
-	mpz_clear(m);
-
-	DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	    DBG_dump_chunk("rsa encrypted data:\n", out)
-	)
-	return out;
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * decrypt data with an RSA private key and remove padding
- */
-bool
-RSA_decrypt(const RSA_private_key_t *key, chunk_t in, chunk_t *out)
-{
-    chunk_t padded;
-    u_char *pos;
-    mpz_t t1, t2;
-
-    n_to_mpz(t1, in.ptr,in.len);
-
-    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.3 RSA computation y = x^c mod n
-     * Better described in PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 RSADP.
-     * There are two methods, depending on the form of the private key.
-     * We use the one based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
-     */
-    mpz_init(t2);
-
-    mpz_powm(t2, t1, &key->dP, &key->p);	/* m1 = c^dP mod p */
-    mpz_powm(t1, t1, &key->dQ, &key->q);	/* m2 = c^dQ mod Q */
-
-    mpz_sub(t2, t2, t1);	/* h = qInv (m1 - m2) mod p */
-    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &key->p);
-    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &key->qInv);
-    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &key->p);
-
-    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &key->q);	/* m = m2 + h q */
-    mpz_add(t1, t1, t2);
-
-    padded = mpz_to_n(t1, key->pub.k);
-    mpz_clear(t1);
-    mpz_clear(t2);
-
-    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("rsa decrypted data with padding:\n", padded)
-    )
-    pos = padded.ptr;
-
-    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting (EB = 00 || 02 || PS || 00 || D) */
-
-    /* check for hex pattern 00 02 in decrypted message */
-    if ((*pos++ != 0x00) || (*(pos++) != 0x02))
-    {
-	plog("incorrect padding - probably wrong RSA key");
-	freeanychunk(padded);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    padded.len -= 2;
-
-    /* the plaintext data starts after first 0x00 byte */
-    while (padded.len-- > 0 && *pos++ != 0x00)
-
-    if (padded.len == 0)
-    {
-	plog("no plaintext data");
-	freeanychunk(padded);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    clonetochunk(*out, pos, padded.len, "decrypted data");
-    freeanychunk(padded);
-    return TRUE;
-}
-
-/*
- * build signatureValue
- */
-chunk_t
-pkcs1_build_signature(chunk_t tbs, int hash_alg, const RSA_private_key_t *key
-, bool bit_string)
-{
-
-    size_t siglen = key->pub.k;
-
-    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    chunk_t digest = { digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN };
-    chunk_t digestInfo, alg_id, signatureValue;
-    u_char *pos;
-
-    switch (hash_alg)
-    {
-    case OID_MD5:
-    case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
-	alg_id = ASN1_md5_id;
-	break;
-    case OID_SHA1:
-    case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
-	alg_id = ASN1_sha1_id;
-	break;
-    default:
-	return empty_chunk;
-    }
-    compute_digest(tbs, hash_alg, &digest);
-
-    /* according to PKCS#1 v2.1 digest must be packaged into
-     * an ASN.1 structure for encryption
-     */
-    digestInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		    , alg_id
-		    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest));
-
-    /* generate the RSA signature */
-    if (bit_string)
-    {
-	pos = build_asn1_object(&signatureValue, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
-	*pos++ = 0x00;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	pos = build_asn1_object(&signatureValue, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, siglen);
-    }
-    sign_hash(key, digestInfo.ptr, digestInfo.len, pos, siglen);
-    pfree(digestInfo.ptr);
-
-    return signatureValue;
-}
-
-/*
- * build a DER-encoded PKCS#1 private key object
- */
-chunk_t
-pkcs1_build_private_key(const RSA_private_key_t *key)
-{
-    chunk_t pkcs1 = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmmmmmmm"
-			, ASN1_INTEGER_0
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->pub.n)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->pub.e)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->d)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->p)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->q)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->dP)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->dQ)
-			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->qInv));
-
-    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("PKCS#1 encoded private key:", pkcs1)
-    )
-    return pkcs1;
-}
-
-/*
- * build a DER-encoded PKCS#1 public key object
- */
-chunk_t
-pkcs1_build_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
-{
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
-		, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&rsa->n)
-		, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&rsa->e));
-}
-
-/*
- * build a DER-encoded publicKeyInfo object
- */
-chunk_t
-pkcs1_build_publicKeyInfo(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
-{
-    chunk_t publicKey;
-    chunk_t rawKey = pkcs1_build_public_key(rsa);
-
-    u_char *pos = build_asn1_object(&publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING
-			, 1 + rawKey.len);
-    *pos++ = 0x00;
-    mv_chunk(&pos, rawKey);
-
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		, ASN1_rsaEncryption_id
-		, publicKey);	
-}
-void
-free_RSA_public_content(RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
-{
-    mpz_clear(&rsa->n);
-    mpz_clear(&rsa->e);
-}
-
-void
-free_RSA_private_content(RSA_private_key_t *rsak)
-{
-    free_RSA_public_content(&rsak->pub);
-    mpz_clear(&rsak->d);
-    mpz_clear(&rsak->p);
-    mpz_clear(&rsak->q);
-    mpz_clear(&rsak->dP);
-    mpz_clear(&rsak->dQ);
-    mpz_clear(&rsak->qInv);
-}
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs1.h b/src/pluto/pkcs1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 16a6f02b9..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/pkcs1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
-/* Support of PKCS#1 private key data structures
- * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
- * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pkcs1.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-#ifndef _PKCS1_H
-#define _PKCS1_H
-
-#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU Multi Precision library */
-
-#include "defs.h"
-
-typedef struct RSA_public_key RSA_public_key_t;
-
-struct RSA_public_key
-{
-    char keyid[KEYID_BUF];	/* see ipsec_keyblobtoid(3) */
-
-    /* length of modulus n in octets: [RSA_MIN_OCTETS, RSA_MAX_OCTETS] */
-    unsigned k;
-
-    /* public: */
-    MP_INT
-	n,	/* modulus: p * q */
-	e;	/* exponent: relatively prime to (p-1) * (q-1) [probably small] */
-};
-
-typedef struct RSA_private_key RSA_private_key_t;
-
-struct RSA_private_key {
-    struct RSA_public_key pub;	/* must be at start for RSA_show_public_key */
-
-    MP_INT
-	d,	/* private exponent: (e^-1) mod ((p-1) * (q-1)) */
-	/* help for Chinese Remainder Theorem speedup: */
-	p,	/* first secret prime */
-	q,	/* second secret prime */
-	dP,	/* first factor's exponent: (e^-1) mod (p-1) == d mod (p-1) */
-	dQ,	/* second factor's exponent: (e^-1) mod (q-1) == d mod (q-1) */
-	qInv;	/* (q^-1) mod p */
-};
-
-struct fld {
-    const char *name;
-    size_t offset;
-};
-
-extern const struct fld RSA_private_field[];
-#define RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS	8
-
-extern void init_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, chunk_t e, chunk_t n);
-extern bool pkcs1_parse_private_key(chunk_t blob, RSA_private_key_t *key);
-extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_private_key(const RSA_private_key_t *key);
-extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa);
-extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_publicKeyInfo(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa);
-extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_signature(chunk_t tbs, int hash_alg
-    , const RSA_private_key_t *key, bool bit_string);
-extern bool compute_digest(chunk_t tbs, int alg, chunk_t *digest);
-extern void sign_hash(const RSA_private_key_t *k, const u_char *hash_val
-    , size_t hash_len, u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len);
-extern chunk_t RSA_encrypt(const RSA_public_key_t *key, chunk_t in);
-extern bool RSA_decrypt(const RSA_private_key_t *key, chunk_t in
-    , chunk_t *out);
-extern bool same_RSA_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *a
-    , const RSA_public_key_t *b);
-extern void form_keyid(chunk_t e, chunk_t n, char* keyid, unsigned *keysize);
-extern err_t RSA_private_key_sanity(RSA_private_key_t *k);
-#ifdef DEBUG
-extern void RSA_show_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *k);
-extern void RSA_show_private_key(RSA_private_key_t *k);
-#endif
-extern void free_RSA_public_content(RSA_public_key_t *rsa);
-extern void free_RSA_private_content(RSA_private_key_t *rsak);
-
-#endif /* _PKCS1_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs7.c b/src/pluto/pkcs7.c
index 60636f385..7248b042f 100644
--- a/src/pluto/pkcs7.c
+++ b/src/pluto/pkcs7.c
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
 /* Support of PKCS#7 data structures
  * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
- * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * HSR Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -12,564 +13,562 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pkcs7.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
 #include <string.h>
-#include <libdes/des.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
+#include <asn1/oid.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
+#include <crypto/crypters/crypter.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include <asn1/oid.h>
-#include "log.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "certs.h"
 #include "pkcs7.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
 
 const contentInfo_t empty_contentInfo = {
-    OID_UNKNOWN , /* type */
-    { NULL, 0 }   /* content */
+	OID_UNKNOWN , /* type */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   /* content */
 };
 
-/* ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 ContentInfo type */
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 ContentInfo type
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t contentInfoObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "contentInfo",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "contentType",			ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "content",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,	   ASN1_END  }  /*  3 */
+	{ 0, "contentInfo",                     ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE          }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "contentType",                   ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY          }, /*  1 */
+	{ 1,   "content",                       ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",                       ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /*  3 */
+	{ 0, "exit",                            ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_EXIT          }
 };
+#define PKCS7_INFO_TYPE         1
+#define PKCS7_INFO_CONTENT      2
 
-#define PKCS7_INFO_TYPE		1
-#define PKCS7_INFO_CONTENT	2
-#define PKCS7_INFO_ROOF		4
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 signedData type */
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 signedData type
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t signedDataObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "signedData",			  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "version",			  ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "digestAlgorithms",		  ASN1_SET,          ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,     "algorithm",			  ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  3 */
-  { 1,   "end loop",			  ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  4 */
-  { 1,   "contentInfo",			  ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  5 */
-  { 1,   "certificates",		  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  6 */
-  { 2,      "certificate",		  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  7 */
-  { 1,   "end opt or loop",		  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /*  8 */
-  { 1,   "crls",			  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
-							     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  9 */
-  { 2,	    "crl",			  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
-  { 1,   "end opt or loop",		  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
-  { 1,   "signerInfos",			  ASN1_SET,	     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 12 */
-  { 2,     "signerInfo",		  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
-  { 3,       "version",			  ASN1_INTEGER,	     ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
-  { 3,       "issuerAndSerialNumber",	  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
-  { 4,         "issuer",	          ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 16 */
-  { 4,         "serial",	          ASN1_INTEGER,	     ASN1_BODY }, /* 17 */
-  { 3,       "digestAlgorithm",		  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_RAW  }, /* 18 */
-  { 3,       "authenticatedAttributes",	  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 19 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
-  { 3,       "digestEncryptionAlgorithm", ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_RAW  }, /* 21 */
-  { 3,       "encryptedDigest",		  ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 22 */
-  { 3,       "unauthenticatedAttributes", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 23 */
-  { 3,       "end opt",			  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /* 24 */
-  { 1,   "end loop",			  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }  /* 25 */
+	{ 0, "signedData",                      ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE          }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "version",                       ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY          }, /*  1 */
+	{ 1,   "digestAlgorithms",              ASN1_SET,          ASN1_LOOP          }, /*  2 */
+	{ 2,     "algorithm",                   ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /*  3 */
+	{ 1,   "end loop",                      ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /*  4 */
+	{ 1,   "contentInfo",                   ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /*  5 */
+	{ 1,   "certificates",                  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_LOOP }, /*  6 */
+	{ 2,      "certificate",                ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /*  7 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt or loop",               ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /*  8 */
+	{ 1,   "crls",                          ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_LOOP }, /*  9 */
+	{ 2,      "crl",                        ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /* 10 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt or loop",               ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 11 */
+	{ 1,   "signerInfos",                   ASN1_SET,          ASN1_LOOP          }, /* 12 */
+	{ 2,     "signerInfo",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE          }, /* 13 */
+	{ 3,       "version",                   ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY          }, /* 14 */
+	{ 3,       "issuerAndSerialNumber",     ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_BODY          }, /* 15 */
+	{ 4,         "issuer",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /* 16 */
+	{ 4,         "serial",                  ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY          }, /* 17 */
+	{ 3,       "digestAlgorithm",           ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /* 18 */
+	{ 3,       "authenticatedAttributes",   ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 19 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",                   ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 20 */
+	{ 3,       "digestEncryptionAlgorithm", ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /* 21 */
+	{ 3,       "encryptedDigest",           ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY          }, /* 22 */
+	{ 3,       "unauthenticatedAttributes", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT           }, /* 23 */
+	{ 3,       "end opt",                   ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 24 */
+	{ 1,   "end loop",                      ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 25 */
+	{ 0, "exit",                            ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_EXIT          }
 };
+#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ALG                 3
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_CONTENT_INFO        5
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_CERT                7
+#define PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO               13
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_ISSUER             16
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_SERIAL_NUMBER      17
+#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ALGORITHM          18
+#define PKCS7_AUTH_ATTRIBUTES           19
+#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ENC_ALGORITHM      21
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DIGEST          22
 
-#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ALG	 	 3
-#define PKCS7_SIGNED_CONTENT_INFO	 5
-#define PKCS7_SIGNED_CERT	 	 7
-#define PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO		13
-#define PKCS7_SIGNED_ISSUER		16
-#define PKCS7_SIGNED_SERIAL_NUMBER	17
-#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ALGORITHM		18
-#define PKCS7_AUTH_ATTRIBUTES		19
-#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ENC_ALGORITHM	21
-#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DIGEST		22
-#define PKCS7_SIGNED_ROOF		26
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 envelopedData type */
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 envelopedData type
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t envelopedDataObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "envelopedData",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "version",				ASN1_INTEGER, 		ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "recipientInfos",			ASN1_SET,    		ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,     "recipientInfo",			ASN1_SEQUENCE, 		ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
-  { 3,       "version",				ASN1_INTEGER, 		ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 3,       "issuerAndSerialNumber",	        ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
-  { 4,         "issuer",	        	ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  6 */
-  { 4,         "serial",	        	ASN1_INTEGER,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
-  { 3,       "encryptionAlgorithm",	       	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /*  8 */
-  { 3,       "encryptedKey",		       	ASN1_OCTET_STRING,	ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
-  { 1,   "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_END  }, /* 10 */
-  { 1,   "encryptedContentInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 11 */
-  { 2,     "contentType",			ASN1_OID,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
-  { 2,     "contentEncryptionAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /* 13 */
-  { 2,     "encryptedContent",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0, 	ASN1_BODY }  /* 14 */
+	{ 0, "envelopedData",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "version",                      ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+	{ 1,   "recipientInfos",               ASN1_SET,          ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
+	{ 2,     "recipientInfo",              ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+	{ 3,       "version",                  ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+	{ 3,       "issuerAndSerialNumber",    ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+	{ 4,         "issuer",                 ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  6 */
+	{ 4,         "serial",                 ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
+	{ 3,       "encryptionAlgorithm",      ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  8 */
+	{ 3,       "encryptedKey",             ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
+	{ 1,   "end loop",                     ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 10 */
+	{ 1,   "encryptedContentInfo",         ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 11 */
+	{ 2,     "contentType",                ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
+	{ 2,     "contentEncryptionAlgorithm", ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 13 */
+	{ 2,     "encryptedContent",           ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0,  ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+	{ 0, "exit",                           ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_EXIT }
 };
+#define PKCS7_ENVELOPED_VERSION          1
+#define PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION     4
+#define PKCS7_ISSUER                     6
+#define PKCS7_SERIAL_NUMBER              7
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTION_ALG             8
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_KEY              9
+#define PKCS7_CONTENT_TYPE              12
+#define PKCS7_CONTENT_ENC_ALGORITHM     13
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT         14
+#define PKCS7_ENVELOPED_ROOF            15
 
-#define PKCS7_ENVELOPED_VERSION		 1
-#define PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION	 4
-#define PKCS7_ISSUER			 6
-#define PKCS7_SERIAL_NUMBER		 7
-#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTION_ALG		 8
-#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_KEY		 9
-#define PKCS7_CONTENT_TYPE		12
-#define PKCS7_CONTENT_ENC_ALGORITHM	13
-#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT		14
-#define PKCS7_ENVELOPED_ROOF		15
-
-/* PKCS7 contentInfo OIDs */
+/**
+ * PKCS7 contentInfo OIDs
+ */
 
 static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01
 };
 
 static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02
 };
 
 static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03
 };
 
 static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x04
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x04
 };
 
 static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05
 };
 
 static char ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06
 };
 
 static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid = 
-			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid = 
-			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid_str);
 
-/* 3DES and DES encryption OIDs */
+/**
+ * 3DES and DES encryption OIDs
+ */
 
 static u_char ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x03, 0x07
+	0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x03, 0x07
 };
 
 static u_char ASN1_des_cbc_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x07
+	0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x07
 };
 
 static const chunk_t ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid = 
-			strchunk(ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_des_cbc_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_des_cbc_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_des_cbc_oid_str);
 
-/* PKCS#7 attribute type OIDs */
+/**
+ * PKCS#7 attribute type OIDs
+ */
 
 static u_char ASN1_contentType_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x03
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x03
 };
 
 static u_char ASN1_messageDigest_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x04
+	0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x04
 };
 
 static const chunk_t ASN1_contentType_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_contentType_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_contentType_oid_str);
 static const chunk_t ASN1_messageDigest_oid =
-			strchunk(ASN1_messageDigest_oid_str);
+						chunk_from_buf(ASN1_messageDigest_oid_str);
 
-/*
+/**
  * Parse PKCS#7 ContentInfo object
  */
-bool
-pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, contentInfo_t *cInfo)
+bool pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, contentInfo_t *cInfo)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	bool success = FALSE;
 
-    while (objectID < PKCS7_INFO_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(contentInfoObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(contentInfoObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 
-	if (objectID == PKCS7_INFO_TYPE)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	    cInfo->type = known_oid(object);
-	    if (cInfo->type < OID_PKCS7_DATA
-	    ||  cInfo->type > OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA)
-	    {
-		plog("unknown pkcs7 content type");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	}
-	else if (objectID == PKCS7_INFO_CONTENT)
-	{
-	    cInfo->content = object;
+		if (objectID == PKCS7_INFO_TYPE)
+		{
+			cInfo->type = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			if (cInfo->type < OID_PKCS7_DATA
+			||  cInfo->type > OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA)
+			{
+				DBG1("unknown pkcs7 content type");
+				goto end;
+			}
+		}
+		else if (objectID == PKCS7_INFO_CONTENT)
+		{
+			cInfo->content = object;
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Parse a PKCS#7 signedData object
  */
-bool
-pkcs7_parse_signedData(chunk_t blob, contentInfo_t *data, x509cert_t **cert
-, chunk_t *attributes, const x509cert_t *cacert)
+bool pkcs7_parse_signedData(chunk_t blob, contentInfo_t *data, x509cert_t **cert,
+							chunk_t *attributes, const x509cert_t *cacert)
 {
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int digest_alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    int enc_alg    = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    int signerInfos = 0;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    contentInfo_t cInfo = empty_contentInfo;
-    chunk_t encrypted_digest = empty_chunk;
-
-    if (!pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(blob, 0, &cInfo))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    if (cInfo.type != OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
-    {
-	plog("pkcs7 content type is not signedData");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, cInfo.content, 2, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < PKCS7_SIGNED_ROOF)
-   {
-	if (!extract_object(signedDataObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
-
-	switch (objectID)
-	{
-	case PKCS7_DIGEST_ALG:
-	    digest_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_SIGNED_CONTENT_INFO:
-	    if (data != NULL)
-	    {
-		pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(object, level, data);
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_SIGNED_CERT:
-	    if (cert != NULL)
-	    {
-		chunk_t cert_blob;
-
-		x509cert_t *newcert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t
-					, "pkcs7 wrapped x509cert");
-
-		clonetochunk(cert_blob, object.ptr, object.len
-			    , "pkcs7 cert blob");
-		*newcert = empty_x509cert;
-
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-		    DBG_log("parsing pkcs7-wrapped certificate")
-		)
-		if (parse_x509cert(cert_blob, level+1, newcert))
-		{
-		    newcert->next = *cert;
-		    *cert = newcert;
-		}
-	        else
-		{
-		    free_x509cert(newcert);
-	    	}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO:
-	    signerInfos++;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  signer #%d", signerInfos)
-	    )
-	    break;	
-	case PKCS7_SIGNED_ISSUER:
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_AUTH_ATTRIBUTES:
-	    if (attributes != NULL)
-	    {
-		*attributes = object;
-		*attributes->ptr = ASN1_SET;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_DIGEST_ALGORITHM:
-	    digest_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_DIGEST_ENC_ALGORITHM:
-	    enc_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DIGEST:
-	    encrypted_digest = object;
-	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-
-    /* check the signature only if a cacert is available */
-    if (cacert != NULL)
-    {
-	if (signerInfos == 0)
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int digest_alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	int enc_alg    = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	int signerInfos = 0;
+	int objectID;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+
+	contentInfo_t cInfo = empty_contentInfo;
+	chunk_t encrypted_digest = chunk_empty;
+
+	if (!pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(blob, 0, &cInfo))
 	{
-	    plog("no signerInfo object found");
-	    return FALSE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else if (signerInfos > 1)
+	if (cInfo.type != OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
 	{
-	    plog("more than one signerInfo object found");
-	    return FALSE;
+		DBG1("pkcs7 content type is not signedData");
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	if (attributes->ptr == NULL)
+
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(signedDataObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, 2);
+
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	    plog("no authenticatedAttributes object found");
-	    return FALSE;
+		u_int level = parser->get_level(parser);
+
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+		case PKCS7_DIGEST_ALG:
+			digest_alg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_SIGNED_CONTENT_INFO:
+			if (data != NULL)
+			{
+				pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(object, level, data);
+			}
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_SIGNED_CERT:
+			if (cert != NULL)
+			{
+				chunk_t cert_blob = chunk_clone(object);
+				x509cert_t *newcert = malloc_thing(x509cert_t);
+
+				*newcert = empty_x509cert;
+
+				DBG2("  parsing pkcs7-wrapped certificate");
+				if (parse_x509cert(cert_blob, level+1, newcert))
+				{
+					newcert->next = *cert;
+					*cert = newcert;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					free_x509cert(newcert);
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO:
+			signerInfos++;
+			DBG2("  signer #%d", signerInfos);
+			break;      
+		case PKCS7_SIGNED_ISSUER:
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+			DBG2("  '%s'",buf);
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_AUTH_ATTRIBUTES:
+			if (attributes != NULL)
+			{
+				*attributes = object;
+				*attributes->ptr = ASN1_SET;
+			}
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_DIGEST_ALGORITHM:
+			digest_alg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_DIGEST_ENC_ALGORITHM:
+			enc_alg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DIGEST:
+			encrypted_digest = object;
+		}
 	}
-	if (!check_signature(*attributes, encrypted_digest, digest_alg
-	   , enc_alg, cacert))
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	if (!success)
 	{
-	    plog("invalid signature");
-	    return FALSE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else
+
+	/* check the signature only if a cacert is available */
+	if (cacert != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("signature is valid")
-	    )
+		public_key_t *key = cacert->public_key;
+		signature_scheme_t scheme = SIGN_RSA_EMSA_PKCS1_SHA1;
+
+		if (signerInfos == 0)
+		{
+			DBG1("no signerInfo object found");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		else if (signerInfos > 1)
+		{
+			DBG1("more than one signerInfo object found");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		if (attributes->ptr == NULL)
+		{
+			DBG1("no authenticatedAttributes object found");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		if (enc_alg != OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+		{
+			DBG1("only RSA digest encryption supported");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		/* determine signature scheme */
+		scheme = signature_scheme_from_oid(digest_alg);
+
+		if (scheme == SIGN_UNKNOWN)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		if (key->verify(key, scheme, *attributes, encrypted_digest))
+		{
+			DBG2("signature is valid");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBG1("invalid signature");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Parse a PKCS#7 envelopedData object
  */
-bool
-pkcs7_parse_envelopedData(chunk_t blob, chunk_t *data
-, chunk_t serialNumber, const RSA_private_key_t *key)
+bool pkcs7_parse_envelopedData(chunk_t blob, chunk_t *data,
+							   chunk_t serialNumber,
+							   private_key_t *key)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    chunk_t iv                = empty_chunk;
-    chunk_t symmetric_key     = empty_chunk;
-    chunk_t encrypted_content = empty_chunk;
-
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    u_int level;
-    u_int total_keys = 3;
-    int enc_alg         = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    int content_enc_alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    contentInfo_t cInfo = empty_contentInfo;
-    *data = empty_chunk;
-
-    if (!pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(blob, 0, &cInfo))
-	goto failed;
-
-    if (cInfo.type != OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA)
-    {
-	plog("pkcs7 content type is not envelopedData");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, cInfo.content, 2, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < PKCS7_ENVELOPED_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(envelopedDataObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     goto failed;
-
-	switch (objectID)
-	{
-	case PKCS7_ENVELOPED_VERSION:
-	if (*object.ptr != 0)
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	chunk_t iv                = chunk_empty;
+	chunk_t symmetric_key     = chunk_empty;
+	chunk_t encrypted_content = chunk_empty;
+
+	crypter_t *crypter = NULL;
+
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	int enc_alg         = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	int content_enc_alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	int objectID;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+
+	contentInfo_t cInfo = empty_contentInfo;
+	*data = chunk_empty;
+
+	if (!pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(blob, 0, &cInfo))
 	{
-	    plog("envelopedData version is not 0");
-	    goto failed;
-	}
-	break;
-	case PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION:
-	    if (*object.ptr != 0)
-	    {
-		plog("recipient info version is not 0");
-		goto failed;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_ISSUER:
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'", buf)
-	    )
-	    break;	
-	case PKCS7_SERIAL_NUMBER:
-	    if (!same_chunk(serialNumber, object))
-	    {
-		plog("serial numbers do not match");
-		goto failed;
-	    }	
-	    break;	
-	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTION_ALG:
-	    enc_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    if (enc_alg != OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
-	    {
-		plog("only rsa encryption supported");
-		goto failed;
-	    } 
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_KEY:
-	    if (!RSA_decrypt(key, object, &symmetric_key))
-	    {
-		plog("symmetric key could not be decrypted with rsa");
-		goto failed;
-	    }
-	    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-		DBG_dump_chunk("symmetric key :", symmetric_key)
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_CONTENT_TYPE:
-	    if (known_oid(object) != OID_PKCS7_DATA)
-	    {
-		 plog("encrypted content not of type pkcs7 data");
-		 goto failed;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_CONTENT_ENC_ALGORITHM:
-	    content_enc_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, &iv);
-
-	    switch (content_enc_alg)
-	    {
-	    case OID_DES_CBC:
-		total_keys = 1;
-		break;
-	    case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
-		total_keys = 3;
-		break;
-	    default:
-		plog("Only DES and 3DES supported for symmetric encryption");
-		goto failed;
-	    }
-	    if (symmetric_key.len != (total_keys * DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE))
-	    {
-		plog("key length is not %d",(total_keys * DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE));
-		goto failed;
-	    }
-	    if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&iv, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, level+1, "IV"))
-	    {
-		plog("IV could not be parsed");
 		goto failed;
-	    }
-	    if (iv.len != DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE)
-	    {
-		plog("IV has wrong length");
+	}
+	if (cInfo.type != OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA)
+	{
+		DBG1("pkcs7 content type is not envelopedData");
 		goto failed;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT:
-	    encrypted_content = object;
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
 
-    /* decrypt the content */
-    {
-	u_int i;
-	des_cblock des_key[3], des_iv;
-	des_key_schedule key_s[3];
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(envelopedDataObjects, cInfo.content);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, 2);
 
-	memcpy((char *)des_key, symmetric_key.ptr, symmetric_key.len);
-	memcpy((char *)des_iv, iv.ptr, iv.len);
-
-	for (i = 0; i < total_keys; i++)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	    if (des_set_key(&des_key[i], key_s[i]))
-	    {
-		plog("des key schedule failed");
-		goto failed;
-	    }
-	}
+		u_int level = parser->get_level(parser);
 
-	data->len = encrypted_content.len;
-	data->ptr = alloc_bytes(data->len, "decrypted data");
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+		case PKCS7_ENVELOPED_VERSION:
+		if (*object.ptr != 0)
+		{
+			DBG1("envelopedData version is not 0");
+			goto end;
+		}
+		break;
+		case PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION:
+			if (*object.ptr != 0)
+			{
+				DBG1("recipient info version is not 0");
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_ISSUER:
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+			DBG2("  '%s'", buf);
+			break;      
+		case PKCS7_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+			if (!chunk_equals(serialNumber, object))
+			{
+				DBG1("serial numbers do not match");
+				goto end;
+			}   
+			break;      
+		case PKCS7_ENCRYPTION_ALG:
+			enc_alg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			if (enc_alg != OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+			{
+				DBG1("only rsa encryption supported");
+				goto end;
+			} 
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_KEY:
+			if (!key->decrypt(key, object, &symmetric_key))
+			{
+				DBG1("symmetric key could not be decrypted with rsa");
+				goto end;
+			}
+			DBG4("symmetric key %B", &symmetric_key);
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_CONTENT_TYPE:
+			if (asn1_known_oid(object) != OID_PKCS7_DATA)
+			{
+				 DBG1("encrypted content not of type pkcs7 data");
+				 goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_CONTENT_ENC_ALGORITHM:
+			content_enc_alg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, &iv);
+	
+			if (content_enc_alg == OID_UNKNOWN)
+			{
+				DBG1("unknown content encryption algorithm");
+				goto end;
+			}
+			if (!asn1_parse_simple_object(&iv, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, level+1, "IV"))
+			{
+				DBG1("IV could not be parsed");
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT:
+			encrypted_content = object;
+			break;
+		}
+	}
+	success = parser->success(parser);
 
-	switch (content_enc_alg)
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	if (!success)
 	{
-	case OID_DES_CBC:
-	    des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)encrypted_content.ptr
-			  , (des_cblock*)data->ptr, data->len
-			  , key_s[0], &des_iv, DES_DECRYPT);
-	    break;
-	case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
-	    des_ede3_cbc_encrypt( (des_cblock*)encrypted_content.ptr
-				, (des_cblock*)data->ptr, data->len
-				, key_s[0], key_s[1], key_s[2]
-				, &des_iv, DES_DECRYPT);
+		goto failed;
 	}
-	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	    DBG_dump_chunk("decrypted content with padding:\n", *data)
-	)
-    }
- 
-    /* remove the padding */
-    {
-	u_char *pos = data->ptr + data->len - 1;
-	u_char pattern = *pos;
-	size_t padding = pattern;
-
-	if (padding > data->len)
+	success = FALSE;
+
+	/* decrypt the content */
 	{
-	    plog("padding greater than data length");
-	    goto failed;
+		encryption_algorithm_t alg;
+		size_t key_size;
+		crypter_t *crypter;
+
+		alg = encryption_algorithm_from_oid(content_enc_alg, &key_size);
+		if (alg == ENCR_UNDEFINED)
+		{
+			DBG1("unsupported content encryption algorithm");
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		crypter = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg, key_size);
+		if (crypter == NULL)
+		{
+			DBG1("crypter %N not available", encryption_algorithm_names, alg);
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		if (symmetric_key.len != crypter->get_key_size(crypter))
+		{
+			DBG1("symmetric key length %d is wrong", symmetric_key.len);
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		if (iv.len != crypter->get_block_size(crypter))
+		{
+			DBG1("IV length %d is wrong", iv.len);
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		crypter->set_key(crypter, symmetric_key);
+		crypter->decrypt(crypter, encrypted_content, iv, data);
+		DBG4("decrypted content with padding: %B", data);
 	}
-	data->len -= padding;
 
-	while (padding-- > 0)
+	/* remove the padding */
 	{
-	    if (*pos-- != pattern)
-	    {
-		plog("wrong padding pattern");
-		goto failed;
-	    }
+		u_char *pos = data->ptr + data->len - 1;
+		u_char pattern = *pos;
+		size_t padding = pattern;
+
+		if (padding > data->len)
+		{
+			DBG1("padding greater than data length");
+			goto failed;
+		}
+		data->len -= padding;
+
+		while (padding-- > 0)
+		{
+			if (*pos-- != pattern)
+			{
+				DBG1("wrong padding pattern");
+				goto failed;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    freeanychunk(symmetric_key);
-    return TRUE;
+	success = TRUE;
 
 failed:
-    freeanychunk(symmetric_key);
-    pfreeany(data->ptr);
-    return FALSE;
+	DESTROY_IF(crypter);
+	chunk_clear(&symmetric_key);
+	if (!success)
+	{
+		free(data->ptr);
+	}
+	return success;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -577,12 +576,11 @@ failed:
  *
  * @return ASN.1 encoded contentType attribute
  */
-chunk_t
-pkcs7_contentType_attribute(void)
+chunk_t pkcs7_contentType_attribute(void)
 {
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		, ASN1_contentType_oid
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SET, ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid));
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+				, ASN1_contentType_oid
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SET, ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -594,269 +592,228 @@ pkcs7_contentType_attribute(void)
  * @return ASN.1 encoded messageDigest attribute
  * 
  */
-chunk_t
-pkcs7_messageDigest_attribute(chunk_t content, int digest_alg)
+chunk_t pkcs7_messageDigest_attribute(chunk_t content, int digest_alg)
 {
-    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    chunk_t digest = { digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN };
-
-    compute_digest(content, digest_alg, &digest);
-
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		, ASN1_messageDigest_oid
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m"
-		    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest)
-		  )
-	   );
+	chunk_t digest;
+	hash_algorithm_t hash_alg;
+	hasher_t *hasher;
+
+	hash_alg = hasher_algorithm_from_oid(digest_alg);
+	hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, hash_alg);
+	hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, content, &digest);
+	hasher->destroy(hasher);
+
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm",
+				ASN1_messageDigest_oid,
+					asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m",
+						asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m", digest)
+					)
+				);
 }
-/*
+
+/**
  * build a DER-encoded contentInfo object
  */
-static chunk_t
-pkcs7_build_contentInfo(contentInfo_t *cInfo)
+static chunk_t pkcs7_build_contentInfo(contentInfo_t *cInfo)
 {
-    chunk_t content_type;
-
-    /* select DER-encoded OID for pkcs7 contentInfo type */
-    switch(cInfo->type)
-    {
-    case OID_PKCS7_DATA:
-	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid;
-	break;
-    case OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
-	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid;
-	break;
-    case OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
-	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid;
-	break;
-    case OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
-	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid;
-	break;
-    case OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
-	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid;
-	break;
-    case OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
-	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid;
-	break;
-    case OID_UNKNOWN:
-    default:
-	fprintf(stderr, "invalid pkcs7 contentInfo type");
-	return empty_chunk;
-    }
-
-    return (cInfo->content.ptr == NULL)
-	? asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SEQUENCE, content_type)
-	: asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-	    , content_type
-	    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, cInfo->content)
-          );
+	chunk_t content_type;
+
+	/* select DER-encoded OID for pkcs7 contentInfo type */
+	switch(cInfo->type)
+	{
+	case OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+		content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid;
+		break;
+	case OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+		content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid;
+		break;
+	case OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+		content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid;
+		break;
+	case OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+		content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid;
+		break;
+	case OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+		content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid;
+		break;
+	case OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+		content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid;
+		break;
+	case OID_UNKNOWN:
+	default:
+		DBG1("invalid pkcs7 contentInfo type");
+		return chunk_empty;
+	}
+
+	return (cInfo->content.ptr == NULL)
+		? asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SEQUENCE, content_type)
+		: asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+			, content_type
+			, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, cInfo->content)
+		  );
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * build issuerAndSerialNumber object
  */
-chunk_t
-pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(const x509cert_t *cert)
+chunk_t pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(const x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		, cert->issuer
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, cert->serialNumber));
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+				, cert->issuer
+				, asn1_integer("c", cert->serialNumber));
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * create a signed pkcs7 contentInfo object
  */
-chunk_t
-pkcs7_build_signedData(chunk_t data, chunk_t attributes, const x509cert_t *cert
-, int digest_alg, const RSA_private_key_t *key)
+chunk_t pkcs7_build_signedData(chunk_t data, chunk_t attributes,
+							   const x509cert_t *cert, int digest_alg,
+							   private_key_t *key)
 {
-    contentInfo_t pkcs7Data, signedData;
-    chunk_t authenticatedAttributes, encryptedDigest, signerInfo, cInfo;
-
-    chunk_t digestAlgorithm = asn1_algorithmIdentifier(digest_alg);
-
-    if (attributes.ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	encryptedDigest = pkcs1_build_signature(attributes, digest_alg
-				, key, FALSE);
-	clonetochunk(authenticatedAttributes, attributes.ptr, attributes.len
-	    , "authenticatedAttributes");
-	*authenticatedAttributes.ptr = ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	encryptedDigest = (data.ptr == NULL)? empty_chunk
-		: pkcs1_build_signature(data, digest_alg, key, FALSE);
-	authenticatedAttributes = empty_chunk;
-    }
-
-    signerInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmcmcm"
-		, ASN1_INTEGER_1
-		, pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(cert)
-		, digestAlgorithm
-		, authenticatedAttributes
-		, ASN1_rsaEncryption_id
-		, encryptedDigest);
-
-    pkcs7Data.type    = OID_PKCS7_DATA;
-    pkcs7Data.content = (data.ptr == NULL)? empty_chunk
-		: asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, data);
-
-    signedData.type = OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
-    signedData.content = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmmm"
-		, ASN1_INTEGER_1
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SET, digestAlgorithm)
-		, pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&pkcs7Data)
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, cert->certificate)
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m", signerInfo));
-
-    cInfo = pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&signedData);
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("signedData:\n", cInfo)
-    )
-
-    freeanychunk(pkcs7Data.content);
-    freeanychunk(signedData.content);
-    return cInfo;
+	contentInfo_t pkcs7Data, signedData;
+	chunk_t authenticatedAttributes, encryptedDigest, signerInfo, cInfo;
+
+	chunk_t digestAlgorithm = asn1_algorithmIdentifier(digest_alg);
+
+	if (attributes.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+		encryptedDigest = x509_build_signature(attributes, digest_alg, key,
+											   FALSE);
+		authenticatedAttributes = chunk_clone(attributes);
+		*authenticatedAttributes.ptr = ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		encryptedDigest = (data.ptr == NULL)? chunk_empty
+				: x509_build_signature(data, digest_alg, key, FALSE);
+		authenticatedAttributes = chunk_empty;
+	}
+
+	signerInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmcmcm"
+				, ASN1_INTEGER_1
+				, pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(cert)
+				, digestAlgorithm
+				, authenticatedAttributes
+				, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+				, encryptedDigest);
+
+	pkcs7Data.type    = OID_PKCS7_DATA;
+	pkcs7Data.content = (data.ptr == NULL)? chunk_empty
+				: asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, data);
+
+	signedData.type = OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
+	signedData.content = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmmm"
+				, ASN1_INTEGER_1
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SET, digestAlgorithm)
+				, pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&pkcs7Data)
+				, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, cert->certificate)
+				, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m", signerInfo));
+
+	cInfo = pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&signedData);
+	DBG3("signedData %B", &cInfo);
+
+	free(pkcs7Data.content.ptr);
+	free(signedData.content.ptr);
+	return cInfo;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * create a symmetrically encrypted pkcs7 contentInfo object
  */
-chunk_t
-pkcs7_build_envelopedData(chunk_t data, const x509cert_t *cert, int cipher)
+chunk_t pkcs7_build_envelopedData(chunk_t data, const x509cert_t *cert, int enc_alg)
 {
-    bool des_check_key_save;
-    des_key_schedule ks[3];
-    des_cblock key[3], des_iv, des_iv_buf;
-
-    chunk_t iv = { (u_char *)des_iv_buf, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE };
-    chunk_t out;
-    chunk_t cipher_oid;
-
-    u_int total_keys, i;
-    size_t padding = pad_up(data.len, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-
-    RSA_public_key_t public_key;
-
-    init_RSA_public_key(&public_key, cert->publicExponent
-				   , cert->modulus);
-
-    if (padding == 0)
-	padding += DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
-
-    out.len = data.len + padding;
-    out.ptr = alloc_bytes(out.len, "DES-encrypted output");
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("padding %d bytes of data to multiple DES block size of %d bytes"
-		, (int)data.len, (int)out.len)
-    )
-
-    /* copy data */
-    memcpy(out.ptr, data.ptr, data.len);
-    /* append padding */
-    memset(out.ptr + data.len, padding, padding);
-
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("Padded unencrypted data:\n", out)
-    )
-
-    /* select OID and keylength for specified cipher */
-    switch (cipher)
-    {
-    case OID_DES_CBC:
-	 total_keys = 1;
-	 cipher_oid = ASN1_des_cbc_oid;
-	 break;
-    case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
-    default:
-	total_keys = 3;
-	cipher_oid = ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("pkcs7 encryption cipher: %s", oid_names[cipher].name)
-    )
-
-    /* generate a strong random key for DES/3DES */
-    des_check_key_save = des_check_key;
-    des_check_key = TRUE;
-    for (i = 0; i < total_keys;i++)
-    {
-	for (;;)
+	encryption_algorithm_t alg;
+	size_t alg_key_size;
+	chunk_t symmetricKey, protectedKey, iv, in, out;
+	crypter_t *crypter;
+
+	alg = encryption_algorithm_from_oid(enc_alg, &alg_key_size);
+	crypter = lib->crypto->create_crypter(lib->crypto, alg,
+										  alg_key_size/BITS_PER_BYTE);
+	if (crypter == NULL)
 	{
-	    get_rnd_bytes((char*)key[i], DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-	    des_set_odd_parity(&key[i]);
-	    if (!des_set_key(&key[i], ks[i]))
-		break;
-	    plog("weak DES key discarded - we try again");
+		DBG1("crypter for %N not available", encryption_algorithm_names, alg);
+		return chunk_empty;
+	}
+
+	/* generate a true random symmetric encryption key and a pseudo-random iv */
+	{
+		rng_t *rng;
+		
+		rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_TRUE);
+		rng->allocate_bytes(rng, crypter->get_key_size(crypter), &symmetricKey);
+		DBG4("symmetric encryption key %B", &symmetricKey);
+		rng->destroy(rng);
+
+		rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
+		rng->allocate_bytes(rng, crypter->get_block_size(crypter), &iv);
+		DBG4("initialization vector: %B", &iv);
+		rng->destroy(rng);
+	}
+
+	/* pad the data to a multiple of the block size */
+	{
+		size_t block_size = crypter->get_block_size(crypter);
+		size_t padding = block_size - data.len % block_size;
+
+		in.len = data.len + padding;
+		in.ptr = malloc(in.len);
+
+		DBG2("padding %u bytes of data to multiple block size of %u bytes",
+		 	 data.len, in.len);
+
+		/* copy data */
+		memcpy(in.ptr, data.ptr, data.len);
+		/* append padding */
+		memset(in.ptr + data.len, padding, padding);
+	}
+	DBG3("padded unencrypted data %B", &in);
+
+	/* symmetric encryption of data object */
+	crypter->set_key(crypter, symmetricKey);
+	crypter->encrypt(crypter, in, iv, &out);
+	crypter->destroy(crypter);
+    DBG3("encrypted data %B", &out);
+
+	cert->public_key->encrypt(cert->public_key, symmetricKey, &protectedKey);
+
+	/* build pkcs7 enveloped data object */ 
+	{
+		
+		chunk_t contentEncryptionAlgorithm = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+					, asn1_build_known_oid(enc_alg)
+					, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, iv));
+		
+		chunk_t encryptedContentInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
+					, ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid
+					, contentEncryptionAlgorithm
+					, asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0, "m", out));
+
+		chunk_t encryptedKey = asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m"
+					, protectedKey);
+
+		chunk_t recipientInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmcm"
+					, ASN1_INTEGER_0
+					, pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(cert)
+					, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+					, encryptedKey);
+
+		chunk_t cInfo;
+		contentInfo_t envelopedData;
+
+		envelopedData.type = OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA;
+		envelopedData.content = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
+					, ASN1_INTEGER_0
+					, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m", recipientInfo)
+					, encryptedContentInfo);
+
+		cInfo = pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&envelopedData);
+		DBG3("envelopedData %B", &cInfo);
+
+		free(envelopedData.content.ptr);
+		free(symmetricKey.ptr);
+		free(in.ptr);
+		free(iv.ptr);
+		return cInfo;
 	}
-	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
-	    DBG_dump("DES key:", key[i], 8)
-	)
-    }
-    des_check_key = des_check_key_save;
-
-    /* generate an iv for DES/3DES CBC */
-    get_rnd_bytes(des_iv, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-    memcpy(iv.ptr, des_iv, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("DES IV :", iv)
-    )
-
-    /* encryption using specified cipher */
-    switch (cipher)
-    {
-    case OID_DES_CBC:
-	des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)out.ptr, (des_cblock*)out.ptr, out.len
-		       , ks[0], &des_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
-	break;
-    case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
-    default:
-	des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)out.ptr, (des_cblock*)out.ptr, out.len
-			    , ks[0], ks[1], ks[2], &des_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);	
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("Encrypted data:\n", out));
-	
-    /* build pkcs7 enveloped data object */ 
-    {
-	chunk_t contentEncryptionAlgorithm = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		    , cipher_oid
-		    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, iv));
-	
-	chunk_t encryptedContentInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
-		    , ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid
-		    , contentEncryptionAlgorithm
-		    , asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0, "m", out));
-
-        chunk_t plainKey = { (u_char *)key, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * total_keys };
-
-	chunk_t encryptedKey = asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m"
-		    , RSA_encrypt(&public_key, plainKey));
-
-	chunk_t recipientInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmcm"
-		    , ASN1_INTEGER_0
-		    , pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(cert)
-		    , ASN1_rsaEncryption_id
-		    , encryptedKey);
-
-        chunk_t cInfo;
-	contentInfo_t envelopedData;
-
-        envelopedData.type = OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA;
-	envelopedData.content = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
-		    , ASN1_INTEGER_0
-		    , asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m", recipientInfo)
-		    , encryptedContentInfo);
-
-	cInfo = pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&envelopedData);
-	DBG(DBG_RAW,
-	    DBG_dump_chunk("envelopedData:\n", cInfo)
-	)
-
-	free_RSA_public_content(&public_key);
-	freeanychunk(envelopedData.content);
-	return cInfo;
-    }
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs7.h b/src/pluto/pkcs7.h
index a577f8022..028822dfe 100644
--- a/src/pluto/pkcs7.h
+++ b/src/pluto/pkcs7.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* Support of PKCS#7 data structures
  * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
- * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2009 Andreas Steffen
+ *
  * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
@@ -12,15 +13,14 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: pkcs7.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _PKCS7_H
 #define _PKCS7_H
 
+#include <crypto/crypters/crypter.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "pkcs1.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 
 /* Access structure for a PKCS#7 ContentInfo object */
@@ -28,24 +28,24 @@
 typedef struct contentInfo contentInfo_t;
 
 struct contentInfo {
-    int     type;
-    chunk_t content;
+	int     type;
+	chunk_t content;
 };
 
 extern const contentInfo_t empty_contentInfo;
 
-extern bool pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(chunk_t blob, u_int level0
-    , contentInfo_t *cInfo);
-extern bool pkcs7_parse_signedData(chunk_t blob, contentInfo_t *data
-    , x509cert_t **cert, chunk_t *attributes, const x509cert_t *cacert);
-extern bool pkcs7_parse_envelopedData(chunk_t blob, chunk_t *data
-    , chunk_t serialNumber, const RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern bool pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(chunk_t blob, u_int level0,
+	contentInfo_t *cInfo);
+extern bool pkcs7_parse_signedData(chunk_t blob, contentInfo_t *data,
+	x509cert_t **cert, chunk_t *attributes, const x509cert_t *cacert);
+extern bool pkcs7_parse_envelopedData(chunk_t blob, chunk_t *data,
+	chunk_t serialNumber, private_key_t *key);
 extern chunk_t pkcs7_contentType_attribute(void);
 extern chunk_t pkcs7_messageDigest_attribute(chunk_t content, int digest_alg);
 extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(const x509cert_t *cert);
-extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_signedData(chunk_t data, chunk_t attributes
-    ,const x509cert_t *cert, int digest_alg, const RSA_private_key_t *key);
-extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_envelopedData(chunk_t data, const x509cert_t *cert
-    , int cipher);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_signedData(chunk_t data, chunk_t attributes,
+	const x509cert_t *cert, int digest_alg, private_key_t *key);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_envelopedData(chunk_t data, const x509cert_t *cert,
+	int enc_alg);
 
 #endif /* _PKCS7_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/plutomain.c b/src/pluto/plutomain.c
index a39934f1f..39367cafa 100644
--- a/src/pluto/plutomain.c
+++ b/src/pluto/plutomain.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* Pluto main program
  * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001 D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: plutomain.c 4313 2008-08-29 09:24:14Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -27,7 +26,7 @@
 #include <fcntl.h>
 #include <getopt.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>       /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 #include <sys/prctl.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
@@ -39,6 +38,16 @@
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <debug.h>
+#include <utils/enumerator.h>
+#include <utils/optionsfrom.h>
+
+#ifdef INTEGRITY_TEST
+#include <fips/fips.h>
+#include <fips/fips_signature.h>
+#endif /* INTEGRITY_TEST */
+
 #include <pfkeyv2.h>
 #include <pfkey.h>
 
@@ -51,91 +60,88 @@
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "foodgroups.h"
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "demux.h"      /* needs packet.h */
 #include "server.h"
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "keys.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
-#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
-#include "rnd.h"
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"     /* needs keys.h and adns.h */
 #include "state.h"
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
 #include "ocsp.h"
 #include "crl.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 #include "xauth.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "crypto.h"	/* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "crypto.h"
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 #include "virtual.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "vendor.h"
 
-static void
-usage(const char *mess)
+static void usage(const char *mess)
 {
-    if (mess != NULL && *mess != '\0')
-	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mess);
-    fprintf(stderr
-	, "Usage: pluto"
-	    " [--help]"
-	    " [--version]"
-	    " [--optionsfrom <filename>]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--nofork]"
-	    " [--stderrlog]"
-	    " [--noklips]"
-	    " [--nocrsend]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--strictcrlpolicy]"
-	    " [--crlcheckinterval <interval>]"
-	    " [--cachecrls]"
-	    " [--uniqueids]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--interface <ifname>]"
-	    " [--ikeport <port-number>]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--ctlbase <path>]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--perpeerlogbase <path>] [--perpeerlog]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--secretsfile <secrets-file>]"
-	    " [--policygroupsdir <policygroups-dir>]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--adns <pathname>]"
-	    "[--pkcs11module <path>]"
-	    "[--pkcs11keepstate]"
-	    "[--pkcs11initargs <string>]"
+	if (mess != NULL && *mess != '\0')
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mess);
+	fprintf(stderr
+		, "Usage: pluto"
+			" [--help]"
+			" [--version]"
+			" [--optionsfrom <filename>]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--nofork]"
+			" [--stderrlog]"
+			" [--noklips]"
+			" [--nocrsend]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--strictcrlpolicy]"
+			" [--crlcheckinterval <interval>]"
+			" [--cachecrls]"
+			" [--uniqueids]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--interface <ifname>]"
+			" [--ikeport <port-number>]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--ctlbase <path>]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--perpeerlogbase <path>] [--perpeerlog]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--secretsfile <secrets-file>]"
+			" [--policygroupsdir <policygroups-dir>]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--adns <pathname>]"
+			"[--pkcs11module <path>]"
+			"[--pkcs11keepstate]"
+			"[--pkcs11initargs <string>]"
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--debug-none]"
-	    " [--debug-all]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--debug-raw]"
-	    " [--debug-crypt]"
-	    " [--debug-parsing]"
-	    " [--debug-emitting]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--debug-control]"
-	    " [--debug-lifecycle]"
-	    " [--debug-klips]"
-	    " [--debug-dns]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--debug-oppo]"
-	    " [--debug-controlmore]"
-	    " [--debug-private]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--debug-none]"
+			" [--debug-all]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--debug-raw]"
+			" [--debug-crypt]"
+			" [--debug-parsing]"
+			" [--debug-emitting]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--debug-control]"
+			" [--debug-lifecycle]"
+			" [--debug-klips]"
+			" [--debug-dns]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--debug-oppo]"
+			" [--debug-controlmore]"
+			" [--debug-private]"
+			" [--debug-natt]"
 #endif
-	    " [ --debug-natt]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--nat_traversal] [--keep_alive <delay_sec>]"
-	    " \\\n\t"
-	    "[--force_keepalive] [--disable_port_floating]"
-	   " \\\n\t"
-	   "[--virtual_private <network_list>]"
-	    "\n"
-	"strongSwan %s\n"
-	, ipsec_version_code());
-    exit_pluto(mess == NULL? 0 : 1);
+ 		    " \\\n\t"
+			"[--nat_traversal] [--keep_alive <delay_sec>]"
+			" \\\n\t"
+			"[--force_keepalive] [--disable_port_floating]"
+		    " \\\n\t"
+		    "[--virtual_private <network_list>]"
+			"\n"
+		    "strongSwan "VERSION"\n");
+	exit_pluto(mess == NULL? 0 : 1);
 }
 
 
@@ -150,53 +156,51 @@ static char pluto_lock[sizeof(ctl_addr.sun_path)] = DEFAULT_CTLBASE LOCK_SUFFIX;
 static bool pluto_lock_created = FALSE;
 
 /* create lockfile, or die in the attempt */
-static int
-create_lock(void)
+static int create_lock(void)
 {
-    int fd = open(pluto_lock, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC
-	, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
+	int fd = open(pluto_lock, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC
+		, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
 
-    if (fd < 0)
-    {
-	if (errno == EEXIST)
+	if (fd < 0)
 	{
-	    fprintf(stderr, "pluto: lock file \"%s\" already exists\n"
-		, pluto_lock);
-	    exit_pluto(10);
+		if (errno == EEXIST)
+		{
+			fprintf(stderr, "pluto: lock file \"%s\" already exists\n"
+				, pluto_lock);
+			exit_pluto(10);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			fprintf(stderr
+				, "pluto: unable to create lock file \"%s\" (%d %s)\n"
+				, pluto_lock, errno, strerror(errno));
+			exit_pluto(1);
+		}
 	}
-	else
-	{
-	    fprintf(stderr
-		, "pluto: unable to create lock file \"%s\" (%d %s)\n"
-		, pluto_lock, errno, strerror(errno));
-	    exit_pluto(1);
-	}
-    }
-    pluto_lock_created = TRUE;
-    return fd;
+	pluto_lock_created = TRUE;
+	return fd;
 }
 
-static bool
-fill_lock(int lockfd, pid_t pid)
+static bool fill_lock(int lockfd, pid_t pid)
 {
-    char buf[30];	/* holds "<pid>\n" */
-    int len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u\n", (unsigned int) pid);
-    bool ok = len > 0 && write(lockfd, buf, len) == len;
+	char buf[30];       /* holds "<pid>\n" */
+	int len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u\n", (unsigned int) pid);
+	bool ok = len > 0 && write(lockfd, buf, len) == len;
 
-    close(lockfd);
-    return ok;
+	close(lockfd);
+	return ok;
 }
 
-static void
-delete_lock(void)
+static void delete_lock(void)
 {
-    if (pluto_lock_created)
-    {
-	delete_ctl_socket();
-	unlink(pluto_lock);	/* is noting failure useful? */
-    }
+	if (pluto_lock_created)
+	{
+		delete_ctl_socket();
+		unlink(pluto_lock);     /* is noting failure useful? */
+	}
 }
 
+
 /* by default pluto sends certificate requests to its peers */
 bool no_cr_send = FALSE;
 
@@ -223,459 +227,504 @@ bool pkcs11_proxy = FALSE;
  */
 static const char *pkcs11_init_args = NULL;
 
-int
-main(int argc, char **argv)
+/* options read by optionsfrom */
+options_t *options;
+
+/**
+ * Log loaded plugins
+ */
+static void print_plugins()
+{
+	char buf[BUF_LEN], *plugin;
+	int len = 0;
+	enumerator_t *enumerator;
+	
+	buf[0] = '\0';	
+	enumerator = lib->plugins->create_plugin_enumerator(lib->plugins);
+	while (len < BUF_LEN && enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &plugin))
+	{
+		len += snprintf(&buf[len], BUF_LEN-len, "%s ", plugin);
+	}
+	enumerator->destroy(enumerator);
+	DBG1("loaded plugins: %s", buf);
+}
+
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
 {
-    bool fork_desired = TRUE;
-    bool log_to_stderr_desired = FALSE;
-    bool nat_traversal = FALSE;
-    bool nat_t_spf = TRUE;  /* support port floating */
-    unsigned int keep_alive = 0;
-    bool force_keepalive = FALSE;
-    char *virtual_private = NULL;
-    int lockfd;
+	bool fork_desired = TRUE;
+	bool log_to_stderr_desired = FALSE;
+	bool nat_traversal = FALSE;
+	bool nat_t_spf = TRUE;  /* support port floating */
+	unsigned int keep_alive = 0;
+	bool force_keepalive = FALSE;
+	char *virtual_private = NULL;
+	int lockfd;
 #ifdef CAPABILITIES
-    cap_t caps;
-    int keep[] = { CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE };
+	cap_t caps;
+	int keep[] = { CAP_NET_ADMIN, CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE };
 #endif /* CAPABILITIES */
 
-    /* handle arguments */
-    for (;;)
-    {
-#	define DBG_OFFSET 256
-	static const struct option long_opts[] = {
-	    /* name, has_arg, flag, val */
-	    { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
-	    { "version", no_argument, NULL, 'v' },
-	    { "optionsfrom", required_argument, NULL, '+' },
-	    { "nofork", no_argument, NULL, 'd' },
-	    { "stderrlog", no_argument, NULL, 'e' },
-	    { "noklips", no_argument, NULL, 'n' },
-	    { "nocrsend", no_argument, NULL, 'c' },
-	    { "strictcrlpolicy", no_argument, NULL, 'r' },
-	    { "crlcheckinterval", required_argument, NULL, 'x'},
-	    { "cachecrls", no_argument, NULL, 'C' },
-	    { "uniqueids", no_argument, NULL, 'u' },
-	    { "interface", required_argument, NULL, 'i' },
-	    { "ikeport", required_argument, NULL, 'p' },
-	    { "ctlbase", required_argument, NULL, 'b' },
-	    { "secretsfile", required_argument, NULL, 's' },
-	    { "foodgroupsdir", required_argument, NULL, 'f' },
-	    { "perpeerlogbase", required_argument, NULL, 'P' },
-	    { "perpeerlog", no_argument, NULL, 'l' },
-	    { "policygroupsdir", required_argument, NULL, 'f' },
+	/* initialize library and optionsfrom */
+	library_init(STRONGSWAN_CONF);
+	options = options_create();
+
+	/* handle arguments */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+#       define DBG_OFFSET 256
+		static const struct option long_opts[] = {
+			/* name, has_arg, flag, val */
+			{ "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
+			{ "version", no_argument, NULL, 'v' },
+			{ "optionsfrom", required_argument, NULL, '+' },
+			{ "nofork", no_argument, NULL, 'd' },
+			{ "stderrlog", no_argument, NULL, 'e' },
+			{ "noklips", no_argument, NULL, 'n' },
+			{ "nocrsend", no_argument, NULL, 'c' },
+			{ "strictcrlpolicy", no_argument, NULL, 'r' },
+			{ "crlcheckinterval", required_argument, NULL, 'x'},
+			{ "cachecrls", no_argument, NULL, 'C' },
+			{ "uniqueids", no_argument, NULL, 'u' },
+			{ "interface", required_argument, NULL, 'i' },
+			{ "ikeport", required_argument, NULL, 'p' },
+			{ "ctlbase", required_argument, NULL, 'b' },
+			{ "secretsfile", required_argument, NULL, 's' },
+			{ "foodgroupsdir", required_argument, NULL, 'f' },
+			{ "perpeerlogbase", required_argument, NULL, 'P' },
+			{ "perpeerlog", no_argument, NULL, 'l' },
+			{ "policygroupsdir", required_argument, NULL, 'f' },
 #ifdef USE_LWRES
-	    { "lwdnsq", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
+			{ "lwdnsq", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
 #else /* !USE_LWRES */
-	    { "adns", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
+			{ "adns", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
 #endif /* !USE_LWRES */
-	    { "pkcs11module", required_argument, NULL, 'm' },
-	    { "pkcs11keepstate", no_argument, NULL, 'k' },
-	    { "pkcs11initargs", required_argument, NULL, 'z' },
-	    { "pkcs11proxy", no_argument, NULL, 'y' },
-	    { "nat_traversal", no_argument, NULL, '1' },
-	    { "keep_alive", required_argument, NULL, '2' },
-	    { "force_keepalive", no_argument, NULL, '3' },
-	    { "disable_port_floating", no_argument, NULL, '4' },
-	    { "debug-natt", no_argument, NULL, '5' },
-	    { "virtual_private", required_argument, NULL, '6' },
+			{ "pkcs11module", required_argument, NULL, 'm' },
+			{ "pkcs11keepstate", no_argument, NULL, 'k' },
+			{ "pkcs11initargs", required_argument, NULL, 'z' },
+			{ "pkcs11proxy", no_argument, NULL, 'y' },
+			{ "nat_traversal", no_argument, NULL, '1' },
+			{ "keep_alive", required_argument, NULL, '2' },
+			{ "force_keepalive", no_argument, NULL, '3' },
+			{ "disable_port_floating", no_argument, NULL, '4' },
+			{ "debug-natt", no_argument, NULL, '5' },
+			{ "virtual_private", required_argument, NULL, '6' },
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	    { "debug-none", no_argument, NULL, 'N' },
-	    { "debug-all", no_argument, NULL, 'A' },
-	    { "debug-raw", no_argument, NULL, DBG_RAW + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-crypt", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CRYPT + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-parsing", no_argument, NULL, DBG_PARSING + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-emitting", no_argument, NULL, DBG_EMITTING + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-control", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CONTROL + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-lifecycle", no_argument, NULL, DBG_LIFECYCLE + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-klips", no_argument, NULL, DBG_KLIPS + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-dns", no_argument, NULL, DBG_DNS + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-oppo", no_argument, NULL, DBG_OPPO + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-controlmore", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CONTROLMORE + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "debug-private", no_argument, NULL, DBG_PRIVATE + DBG_OFFSET },
-
-	    { "impair-delay-adns-key-answer", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "impair-delay-adns-txt-answer", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "impair-bust-mi2", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_BUST_MI2 + DBG_OFFSET },
-	    { "impair-bust-mr2", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_BUST_MR2 + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-none", no_argument, NULL, 'N' },
+			{ "debug-all", no_argument, NULL, 'A' },
+			{ "debug-raw", no_argument, NULL, DBG_RAW + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-crypt", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CRYPT + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-parsing", no_argument, NULL, DBG_PARSING + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-emitting", no_argument, NULL, DBG_EMITTING + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-control", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CONTROL + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-lifecycle", no_argument, NULL, DBG_LIFECYCLE + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-klips", no_argument, NULL, DBG_KLIPS + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-dns", no_argument, NULL, DBG_DNS + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-oppo", no_argument, NULL, DBG_OPPO + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-controlmore", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CONTROLMORE + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "debug-private", no_argument, NULL, DBG_PRIVATE + DBG_OFFSET },
+
+			{ "impair-delay-adns-key-answer", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "impair-delay-adns-txt-answer", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "impair-bust-mi2", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_BUST_MI2 + DBG_OFFSET },
+			{ "impair-bust-mr2", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_BUST_MR2 + DBG_OFFSET },
 #endif
-	    { 0,0,0,0 }
-	    };
-	/* Note: we don't like the way short options get parsed
-	 * by getopt_long, so we simply pass an empty string as
-	 * the list.  It could be "hvdenp:l:s:" "NARXPECK".
-	 */
-	int c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "", long_opts, NULL);
-
-	/* Note: "breaking" from case terminates loop */
-	switch (c)
-	{
-	case EOF:	/* end of flags */
-	    break;
-
-	case 0: /* long option already handled */
-	    continue;
-
-	case ':':	/* diagnostic already printed by getopt_long */
-	case '?':	/* diagnostic already printed by getopt_long */
-	    usage("");
-	    break;   /* not actually reached */
-
-	case 'h':	/* --help */
-	    usage(NULL);
-	    break;	/* not actually reached */
-
-	case 'v':	/* --version */
-	    {
-		const char **sp = ipsec_copyright_notice();
-
-		printf("%s%s\n", ipsec_version_string(),
-				 compile_time_interop_options);
-		for (; *sp != NULL; sp++)
-		    puts(*sp);
-	    }
-	    exit_pluto(0);
-	    break;	/* not actually reached */
-
-	case '+':	/* --optionsfrom <filename> */
-	    optionsfrom(optarg, &argc, &argv, optind, stderr);
-	    /* does not return on error */
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'd':	/* --nofork*/
-	    fork_desired = FALSE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'e':	/* --stderrlog */
-	    log_to_stderr_desired = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'n':	/* --noklips */
-	    no_klips = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'c':	/* --nocrsend */
-	    no_cr_send = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'r':	/* --strictcrlpolicy */
-	    strict_crl_policy = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'x':	/* --crlcheckinterval <time>*/
-            if (optarg == NULL || !isdigit(optarg[0]))
-                usage("missing interval time");
-
-            {
-                char *endptr;
-                long interval = strtol(optarg, &endptr, 0);
-
-                if (*endptr != '\0' || endptr == optarg
-                || interval <= 0)
-                    usage("<interval-time> must be a positive number");
-                crl_check_interval = interval;
-            }
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'C':	/* --cachecrls */
-	    cache_crls = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'u':	/* --uniqueids */
-	    uniqueIDs = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'i':	/* --interface <ifname> */
-	    if (!use_interface(optarg))
-		usage("too many --interface specifications");
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'p':	/* --port <portnumber> */
-	    if (optarg == NULL || !isdigit(optarg[0]))
-		usage("missing port number");
-
-	    {
-		char *endptr;
-		long port = strtol(optarg, &endptr, 0);
-
-		if (*endptr != '\0' || endptr == optarg
-		|| port <= 0 || port > 0x10000)
-		    usage("<port-number> must be a number between 1 and 65535");
-		pluto_port = port;
-	    }
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'b':	/* --ctlbase <path> */
-	    if (snprintf(ctl_addr.sun_path, sizeof(ctl_addr.sun_path)
-	    , "%s%s", optarg, CTL_SUFFIX) == -1)
-		usage("<path>" CTL_SUFFIX " too long for sun_path");
-	    if (snprintf(info_addr.sun_path, sizeof(info_addr.sun_path)
-	    , "%s%s", optarg, INFO_SUFFIX) == -1)
-		usage("<path>" INFO_SUFFIX " too long for sun_path");
-	    if (snprintf(pluto_lock, sizeof(pluto_lock)
-	    , "%s%s", optarg, LOCK_SUFFIX) == -1)
-		usage("<path>" LOCK_SUFFIX " must fit");
-	    continue;
-
-	case 's':	/* --secretsfile <secrets-file> */
-	    shared_secrets_file = optarg;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'f':	/* --policygroupsdir <policygroups-dir> */
-	    policygroups_dir = optarg;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'a':	/* --adns <pathname> */
-	    pluto_adns_option = optarg;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'm':	/* --pkcs11module <pathname> */
-	    pkcs11_module_path = optarg;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'k':	/* --pkcs11keepstate */
-	    pkcs11_keep_state = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'y':	/* --pkcs11proxy */
-	    pkcs11_proxy = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'z':	/* --pkcs11initargs */
-	    pkcs11_init_args = optarg;
-	    continue;
+			{ 0,0,0,0 }
+			};
+		/* Note: we don't like the way short options get parsed
+		 * by getopt_long, so we simply pass an empty string as
+		 * the list.  It could be "hvdenp:l:s:" "NARXPECK".
+		 */
+		int c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "", long_opts, NULL);
+
+		/* Note: "breaking" from case terminates loop */
+		switch (c)
+		{
+		case EOF:       /* end of flags */
+			break;
+
+		case 0: /* long option already handled */
+			continue;
+
+		case ':':       /* diagnostic already printed by getopt_long */
+		case '?':       /* diagnostic already printed by getopt_long */
+			usage("");
+			break;   /* not actually reached */
+
+		case 'h':       /* --help */
+			usage(NULL);
+			break;      /* not actually reached */
+
+		case 'v':       /* --version */
+			{
+				const char **sp = ipsec_copyright_notice();
+
+				printf("strongSwan "VERSION"%s\n", compile_time_interop_options);
+				for (; *sp != NULL; sp++)
+					puts(*sp);
+			}
+			exit_pluto(0);
+			break;      /* not actually reached */
+
+		case '+':       /* --optionsfrom <filename> */
+			if (!options->from(options, optarg, &argc, &argv, optind))
+			{
+				exit_pluto(1);
+			}
+			continue;
+
+		case 'd':       /* --nofork*/
+			fork_desired = FALSE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'e':       /* --stderrlog */
+			log_to_stderr_desired = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'n':       /* --noklips */
+			no_klips = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'c':       /* --nocrsend */
+			no_cr_send = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'r':       /* --strictcrlpolicy */
+			strict_crl_policy = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'x':       /* --crlcheckinterval <time>*/
+			if (optarg == NULL || !isdigit(optarg[0]))
+				usage("missing interval time");
+
+			{
+				char *endptr;
+				long interval = strtol(optarg, &endptr, 0);
+
+				if (*endptr != '\0' || endptr == optarg
+				|| interval <= 0)
+					usage("<interval-time> must be a positive number");
+				crl_check_interval = interval;
+			}
+			continue;
+
+		case 'C':       /* --cachecrls */
+			cache_crls = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'u':       /* --uniqueids */
+			uniqueIDs = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'i':       /* --interface <ifname> */
+			if (!use_interface(optarg))
+				usage("too many --interface specifications");
+			continue;
+
+		case 'p':       /* --port <portnumber> */
+			if (optarg == NULL || !isdigit(optarg[0]))
+				usage("missing port number");
+
+			{
+				char *endptr;
+				long port = strtol(optarg, &endptr, 0);
+
+				if (*endptr != '\0' || endptr == optarg
+				|| port <= 0 || port > 0x10000)
+					usage("<port-number> must be a number between 1 and 65535");
+				pluto_port = port;
+			}
+			continue;
+
+		case 'b':       /* --ctlbase <path> */
+			if (snprintf(ctl_addr.sun_path, sizeof(ctl_addr.sun_path)
+			, "%s%s", optarg, CTL_SUFFIX) == -1)
+				usage("<path>" CTL_SUFFIX " too long for sun_path");
+			if (snprintf(info_addr.sun_path, sizeof(info_addr.sun_path)
+			, "%s%s", optarg, INFO_SUFFIX) == -1)
+				usage("<path>" INFO_SUFFIX " too long for sun_path");
+			if (snprintf(pluto_lock, sizeof(pluto_lock)
+			, "%s%s", optarg, LOCK_SUFFIX) == -1)
+				usage("<path>" LOCK_SUFFIX " must fit");
+			continue;
+
+		case 's':       /* --secretsfile <secrets-file> */
+			shared_secrets_file = optarg;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'f':       /* --policygroupsdir <policygroups-dir> */
+			policygroups_dir = optarg;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'a':       /* --adns <pathname> */
+			pluto_adns_option = optarg;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'm':       /* --pkcs11module <pathname> */
+			pkcs11_module_path = optarg;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'k':       /* --pkcs11keepstate */
+			pkcs11_keep_state = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'y':       /* --pkcs11proxy */
+			pkcs11_proxy = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'z':       /* --pkcs11initargs */
+			pkcs11_init_args = optarg;
+			continue;
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	case 'N':	/* --debug-none */
-	    base_debugging = DBG_NONE;
-	    continue;
+		case 'N':       /* --debug-none */
+			base_debugging = DBG_NONE;
+			continue;
 
-	case 'A':	/* --debug-all */
-	    base_debugging = DBG_ALL;
-	    continue;
+		case 'A':       /* --debug-all */
+			base_debugging = DBG_ALL;
+			continue;
 #endif
 
-	case 'P':       /* --perpeerlogbase */
-	    base_perpeer_logdir = optarg;
-	    continue;
-
-	case 'l':
-	    log_to_perpeer = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-
-	case '1':	/* --nat_traversal */
-	    nat_traversal = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-	case '2':	/* --keep_alive */
-	    keep_alive = atoi(optarg);
-	    continue;
-	case '3':	/* --force_keepalive */
-	    force_keepalive = TRUE;
-	    continue;
-	case '4':	/* --disable_port_floating */
-	    nat_t_spf = FALSE;
-	    continue;
-	case '5':	/* --debug-nat_t */
-	    base_debugging |= DBG_NATT;
-	    continue;
-	case '6':	/* --virtual_private */
-	    virtual_private = optarg;
-	    continue;
-
-	default:
+		case 'P':       /* --perpeerlogbase */
+			base_perpeer_logdir = optarg;
+			continue;
+
+		case 'l':
+			log_to_perpeer = TRUE;
+			continue;
+
+		case '1':       /* --nat_traversal */
+			nat_traversal = TRUE;
+			continue;
+		case '2':       /* --keep_alive */
+			keep_alive = atoi(optarg);
+			continue;
+		case '3':       /* --force_keepalive */
+			force_keepalive = TRUE;
+			continue;
+		case '4':       /* --disable_port_floating */
+			nat_t_spf = FALSE;
+			continue;
+		case '5':       /* --debug-nat_t */
+			base_debugging |= DBG_NATT;
+			continue;
+		case '6':       /* --virtual_private */
+			virtual_private = optarg;
+			continue;
+
+		default:
 #ifdef DEBUG
-	    if (c >= DBG_OFFSET)
-	    {
-		base_debugging |= c - DBG_OFFSET;
-		continue;
-	    }
-#	undef DBG_OFFSET
+			if (c >= DBG_OFFSET)
+			{
+				base_debugging |= c - DBG_OFFSET;
+				continue;
+			}
+#       undef DBG_OFFSET
 #endif
-	    bad_case(c);
+			bad_case(c);
+		}
+		break;
 	}
-	break;
-    }
-    if (optind != argc)
-	usage("unexpected argument");
-    reset_debugging();
-    lockfd = create_lock();
+	if (optind != argc)
+		usage("unexpected argument");
+	reset_debugging();
+	lockfd = create_lock();
 
-    /* select between logging methods */
+	/* select between logging methods */
 
-    if (log_to_stderr_desired)
-	log_to_syslog = FALSE;
-    else
-	log_to_stderr = FALSE;
+	if (log_to_stderr_desired)
+	{
+		log_to_syslog = FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		log_to_stderr = FALSE;
+	}
 
-    /* set the logging function of pfkey debugging */
+	/* set the logging function of pfkey debugging */
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    pfkey_debug_func = DBG_log;
+	pfkey_debug_func = DBG_log;
 #else
-    pfkey_debug_func = NULL;
+	pfkey_debug_func = NULL;
 #endif
 
-    /* create control socket.
-     * We must create it before the parent process returns so that
-     * there will be no race condition in using it.  The easiest
-     * place to do this is before the daemon fork.
-     */
-    {
-	err_t ugh = init_ctl_socket();
-
-	if (ugh != NULL)
+	/* create control socket.
+	 * We must create it before the parent process returns so that
+	 * there will be no race condition in using it.  The easiest
+	 * place to do this is before the daemon fork.
+	 */
 	{
-	    fprintf(stderr, "pluto: %s", ugh);
-	    exit_pluto(1);
+		err_t ugh = init_ctl_socket();
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			fprintf(stderr, "pluto: %s", ugh);
+			exit_pluto(1);
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* If not suppressed, do daemon fork */
+	/* If not suppressed, do daemon fork */
 
-    if (fork_desired)
-    {
+	if (fork_desired)
 	{
-	    pid_t pid = fork();
+		{
+			pid_t pid = fork();
+
+			if (pid < 0)
+			{
+				int e = errno;
+
+				fprintf(stderr, "pluto: fork failed (%d %s)\n",
+					errno, strerror(e));
+				exit_pluto(1);
+			}
+
+			if (pid != 0)
+			{
+				/* parent: die, after filling PID into lock file.
+				 * must not use exit_pluto: lock would be removed!
+				 */
+				exit(fill_lock(lockfd, pid)? 0 : 1);
+			}
+		}
+
+		if (setsid() < 0)
+		{
+			int e = errno;
+
+			fprintf(stderr, "setsid() failed in main(). Errno %d: %s\n",
+				errno, strerror(e));
+			exit_pluto(1);
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* no daemon fork: we have to fill in lock file */
+		(void) fill_lock(lockfd, getpid());
+		fprintf(stdout, "Pluto initialized\n");
+		fflush(stdout);
+	}
 
-	    if (pid < 0)
-	    {
-		int e = errno;
+	/* Close everything but ctl_fd and (if needed) stderr.
+	 * There is some danger that a library that we don't know
+	 * about is using some fd that we don't know about.
+	 * I guess we'll soon find out.
+	 */
+	{
+		int i;
+
+		for (i = getdtablesize() - 1; i >= 0; i--)  /* Bad hack */
+		{
+			if ((!log_to_stderr || i != 2) && i != ctl_fd)
+				close(i);
+		}
+
+		/* make sure that stdin, stdout, stderr are reserved */
+		if (open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY) != 0)
+			abort();
+		if (dup2(0, 1) != 1)
+			abort();
+		if (!log_to_stderr && dup2(0, 2) != 2)
+			abort();
+	}
 
-		fprintf(stderr, "pluto: fork failed (%d %s)\n",
-		    errno, strerror(e));
-		exit_pluto(1);
-	    }
+	init_constants();
+	init_log("pluto");
 
-	    if (pid != 0)
-	    {
-		/* parent: die, after filling PID into lock file.
-		 * must not use exit_pluto: lock would be removed!
-		 */
-		exit(fill_lock(lockfd, pid)? 0 : 1);
-	    }
-	}
+	/* Note: some scripts may look for this exact message -- don't change
+	 * ipsec barf was one, but it no longer does.
+	 */
+	plog("Starting IKEv1 pluto daemon (strongSwan "VERSION")%s",
+		 compile_time_interop_options);
 
-	if (setsid() < 0)
-	{
-	    int e = errno;
+	/* load plugins, further infrastructure may need it */
+	lib->plugins->load(lib->plugins, IPSEC_PLUGINDIR, 
+		lib->settings->get_str(lib->settings, "pluto.load", PLUGINS));
+	print_plugins();
 
-	    fprintf(stderr, "setsid() failed in main(). Errno %d: %s\n",
-		errno, strerror(e));
-	    exit_pluto(1);
+#ifdef INTEGRITY_TEST
+	DBG1("integrity test of libstrongswan code");
+	if (fips_verify_hmac_signature(hmac_key, hmac_signature))
+	{
+		DBG1("  integrity test passed");
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* no daemon fork: we have to fill in lock file */
-	(void) fill_lock(lockfd, getpid());
-	fprintf(stdout, "Pluto initialized\n");
-	fflush(stdout);
-    }
-
-    /* Close everything but ctl_fd and (if needed) stderr.
-     * There is some danger that a library that we don't know
-     * about is using some fd that we don't know about.
-     * I guess we'll soon find out.
-     */
-    {
-	int i;
-
-	for (i = getdtablesize() - 1; i >= 0; i--)  /* Bad hack */
+	else
 	{
-	    if ((!log_to_stderr || i != 2) && i != ctl_fd)
-		close(i);
+		DBG1("  integrity test failed");
+		abort();
 	}
-
-	/* make sure that stdin, stdout, stderr are reserved */
-	if (open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY) != 0)
-	    abort();
-	if (dup2(0, 1) != 1)
-	    abort();
-	if (!log_to_stderr && dup2(0, 2) != 2)
-	    abort();
-    }
-
-    init_constants();
-    init_log("pluto");
-
-    /* Note: some scripts may look for this exact message -- don't change
-     * ipsec barf was one, but it no longer does.
-     */
-    plog("Starting Pluto (strongSwan Version %s%s)"
-	, ipsec_version_code()
-	, compile_time_interop_options);
-
-    init_nat_traversal(nat_traversal, keep_alive, force_keepalive, nat_t_spf);
-    init_virtual_ip(virtual_private);
-    scx_init(pkcs11_module_path, pkcs11_init_args);   /* load and initialize PKCS #11 module */
-    xauth_init();		    /* load and initialize XAUTH module */
-    init_rnd_pool();
-    init_secret();
-    init_states();
-    init_crypto();
-    init_demux();
-    init_kernel();
-    init_adns();
-    init_id();
-    init_fetch();
-
-    /* drop unneeded capabilities and change UID/GID */
-
-    prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1);
-	
+#endif /* INTEGRITY_TEST */
+
+	init_nat_traversal(nat_traversal, keep_alive, force_keepalive, nat_t_spf);
+	init_virtual_ip(virtual_private);
+	scx_init(pkcs11_module_path, pkcs11_init_args);
+	xauth_init();
+	init_secret();
+	init_states();
+	init_crypto();
+	init_demux();
+	init_kernel();
+	init_adns();
+	init_id();
+	init_fetch();
+
+	/* drop unneeded capabilities and change UID/GID */
+	prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, 1);
+		
 #ifdef IPSEC_GROUP
-    {
-	struct group group, *grp;
-    char buf[1024];
-
-	if (getgrnam_r(IPSEC_GROUP, &group, buf, sizeof(buf), &grp) != 0 ||
-		grp == NULL || setgid(grp->gr_gid) != 0)
 	{
-	    plog("unable to change daemon group");
-	    abort();
+		struct group group, *grp;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+		if (getgrnam_r(IPSEC_GROUP, &group, buf, sizeof(buf), &grp) != 0 ||
+				grp == NULL || setgid(grp->gr_gid) != 0)
+		{
+			plog("unable to change daemon group");
+			abort();
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #endif
 #ifdef IPSEC_USER
-    {
-	struct passwd passwd, *pwp;
-    char buf[1024];
-
-	if (getpwnam_r(IPSEC_USER, &passwd, buf, sizeof(buf), &pwp) != 0 ||
-		pwp == NULL || setuid(pwp->pw_uid) != 0)
 	{
-	    plog("unable to change daemon user");
-	    abort();
-	}
-	}
+		struct passwd passwd, *pwp;
+	char buf[1024];
+
+		if (getpwnam_r(IPSEC_USER, &passwd, buf, sizeof(buf), &pwp) != 0 ||
+				pwp == NULL || setuid(pwp->pw_uid) != 0)
+		{
+			plog("unable to change daemon user");
+			abort();
+		}
+		}
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CAPABILITIES
-    caps = cap_init();
-    cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 2, keep, CAP_SET);
-    cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_INHERITABLE, 2, keep, CAP_SET);
-    cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 2, keep, CAP_SET);
-    if (cap_set_proc(caps) != 0)
-    {
-	plog("unable to drop daemon capabilities");
-	abort();
-    }
-    cap_free(caps);
+	caps = cap_init();
+	cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_EFFECTIVE, 2, keep, CAP_SET);
+	cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_INHERITABLE, 2, keep, CAP_SET);
+	cap_set_flag(caps, CAP_PERMITTED, 2, keep, CAP_SET);
+	if (cap_set_proc(caps) != 0)
+	{
+		plog("unable to drop daemon capabilities");
+		abort();
+	}
+	cap_free(caps);
 #endif /* CAPABILITIES */
 
-    /* loading X.509 CA certificates */
-    load_authcerts("CA cert", CA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_CA);
-    /* loading X.509 AA certificates */
-    load_authcerts("AA cert", AA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_AA);
-    /* loading X.509 OCSP certificates */
-    load_authcerts("OCSP cert", OCSP_CERT_PATH, AUTH_OCSP);
-    /* loading X.509 CRLs */
-    load_crls();
-    /* loading attribute certificates (experimental) */
-    load_acerts();
-
-    daily_log_event();
-    call_server();
-    return -1;	/* Shouldn't ever reach this */
+	/* loading X.509 CA certificates */
+	load_authcerts("CA cert", CA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_CA);
+	/* loading X.509 AA certificates */
+	load_authcerts("AA cert", AA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_AA);
+	/* loading X.509 OCSP certificates */
+	load_authcerts("OCSP cert", OCSP_CERT_PATH, AUTH_OCSP);
+	/* loading X.509 CRLs */
+	load_crls();
+	/* loading attribute certificates (experimental) */
+	load_acerts();
+
+	daily_log_event();
+	call_server();
+	return -1;  /* Shouldn't ever reach this */
 }
 
 /* leave pluto, with status.
@@ -686,31 +735,33 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  *  1 general discomfort
  * 10 lock file exists
  */
-void
-exit_pluto(int status)
+void exit_pluto(int status)
 {
-    reset_globals();	/* needed because we may be called in odd state */
-    free_preshared_secrets();
-    free_remembered_public_keys();
-    delete_every_connection();
-    free_crl_fetch();		/* free chain of crl fetch requests */
-    free_ocsp_fetch();		/* free chain of ocsp fetch requests */
-    free_authcerts();		/* free chain of X.509 authority certificates */
-    free_crls();		/* free chain of X.509 CRLs */
-    free_acerts();		/* free chain of X.509 attribute certificates */
-    free_ca_infos();		/* free chain of X.509 CA information records */
-    free_ocsp();		/* free ocsp cache */
-    free_ifaces();
-    scx_finalize();		/* finalize and unload PKCS #11 module */
-    xauth_finalize();		/* finalize and unload XAUTH module */
-    stop_adns();
-    free_md_pool();
-    delete_lock();
-#ifdef LEAK_DETECTIVE
-    report_leaks();
-#endif /* LEAK_DETECTIVE */
-    close_log();
-    exit(status);
+	reset_globals();    /* needed because we may be called in odd state */
+	free_preshared_secrets();
+	free_remembered_public_keys();
+	delete_every_connection();
+	free_crl_fetch();           /* free chain of crl fetch requests */
+	free_ocsp_fetch();          /* free chain of ocsp fetch requests */
+	free_authcerts();           /* free chain of X.509 authority certificates */
+	free_crls();                /* free chain of X.509 CRLs */
+	free_acerts();              /* free chain of X.509 attribute certificates */
+	free_ca_infos();            /* free chain of X.509 CA information records */
+	free_ocsp();                /* free ocsp cache */
+	free_ifaces();
+	scx_finalize();             /* finalize and unload PKCS #11 module */
+	xauth_finalize();           /* finalize and unload XAUTH module */
+	stop_adns();
+	free_md_pool();
+	free_crypto();
+	free_id();                  /* free myids */
+	free_events();              /* free remaining events */
+	free_vendorid();			/* free all vendor id records */
+	delete_lock();
+	options->destroy(options);
+	library_deinit();
+	close_log();
+	exit(status);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/primegen.c b/src/pluto/primegen.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 159490345..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/primegen.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,593 +0,0 @@
-/* primegen.c - prime number generator
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- *
- * ***********************************************************************
- * The algorithm used to generate practically save primes is due to
- * Lim and Lee as described in the CRYPTO '97 proceedings (ISBN3540633847)
- * page 260.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-
-#ifdef PLUTO
-#include <gmp.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "gcryptfix.h"
-#else /*! PLUTO */
-/* #include <assert.h> */
-/* #include <config.h> */
-/* #include "util.h" */
-/* #include "mpi.h" */
-/* #include "cipher.h" */
-#endif /* !PLUTO */
-
-static int no_of_small_prime_numbers;
-static MPI gen_prime( unsigned	nbits, int mode, int randomlevel );
-static int check_prime( MPI prime, MPI val_2 );
-static int is_prime( MPI n, unsigned steps, int *count );
-static void m_out_of_n( char *array, int m, int n );
-
-
-static void
-progress( int c )
-{
-    fputc( c, stderr );
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Generate a prime number (stored in secure memory)
- */
-MPI
-generate_secret_prime( unsigned  nbits )
-{
-    MPI prime;
-
-    prime = gen_prime( nbits, 1, 2 );
-    progress('\n');
-    return prime;
-}
-
-MPI
-generate_public_prime( unsigned  nbits )
-{
-    MPI prime;
-
-    prime = gen_prime( nbits, 0, 2 );
-    progress('\n');
-    return prime;
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * We do not need to use the strongest RNG because we gain no extra
- * security from it - The prime number is public and we could also
- * offer the factors for those who are willing to check that it is
- * indeed a strong prime.
- *
- * mode 0: Standard
- *	1: Make sure that at least one factor is of size qbits.
- */
-MPI
-generate_elg_prime( int mode, unsigned pbits, unsigned qbits,
-		    MPI g, MPI **ret_factors )
-{
-    int n;  /* number of factors */
-    int m;  /* number of primes in pool */
-    unsigned fbits; /* length of prime factors */
-    MPI *factors; /* current factors */
-    MPI *pool;	/* pool of primes */
-    MPI q;	/* first prime factor (variable)*/
-    MPI prime;	/* prime test value */
-    MPI q_factor; /* used for mode 1 */
-    byte *perms = NULL;
-    int i, j;
-    int count1, count2;
-    unsigned nprime;
-    unsigned req_qbits = qbits; /* the requested q bits size */
-    MPI val_2  = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
-
-    /* find number of needed prime factors */
-    for(n=1; (pbits - qbits - 1) / n  >= qbits; n++ )
-	;
-    n--;
-    if( !n || (mode==1 && n < 2) )
-	log_fatal("can't gen prime with pbits=%u qbits=%u\n", pbits, qbits );
-    if( mode == 1 ) {
-	n--;
-	fbits = (pbits - 2*req_qbits -1) / n;
-	qbits =  pbits - req_qbits - n*fbits;
-    }
-    else {
-	fbits = (pbits - req_qbits -1) / n;
-	qbits = pbits - n*fbits;
-    }
-    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-	log_debug("gen prime: pbits=%u qbits=%u fbits=%u/%u n=%d\n",
-		    pbits, req_qbits, qbits, fbits, n  );
-    prime = mpi_alloc( (pbits + BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1) /  BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
-    q = gen_prime( qbits, 0, 1 );
-    q_factor = mode==1? gen_prime( req_qbits, 0, 1 ) : NULL;
-
-    /* allocate an array to hold the factors + 2 for later usage */
-#ifdef PLUTO
-    m_alloc_ptrs_clear(factors, n+2);
-#else
-    factors = m_alloc_clear( (n+2) * sizeof *factors );
-#endif
-
-    /* make a pool of 3n+5 primes (this is an arbitrary value) */
-    m = n*3+5;
-    if( mode == 1 )
-	m += 5; /* need some more for DSA */
-    if( m < 25 )
-	m = 25;
-#ifdef PLUTO
-    m_alloc_ptrs_clear(pool, m);
-#else
-    pool = m_alloc_clear( m * sizeof *pool );
-#endif
-
-    /* permutate over the pool of primes */
-    count1=count2=0;
-    do {
-      next_try:
-	if( !perms ) {
-	    /* allocate new primes */
-	    for(i=0; i < m; i++ ) {
-		mpi_free(pool[i]);
-		pool[i] = NULL;
-	    }
-	    /* init m_out_of_n() */
-#ifdef PLUTO
-	    perms = alloc_bytes( m, "perms" );
-#else
-	    perms = m_alloc_clear( m );
-#endif
-	    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
-		perms[i] = 1;
-		pool[i] = gen_prime( fbits, 0, 1 );
-		factors[i] = pool[i];
-	    }
-	}
-	else {
-	    m_out_of_n( perms, n, m );
-	    for(i=j=0; i < m && j < n ; i++ )
-		if( perms[i] ) {
-		    if( !pool[i] )
-			pool[i] = gen_prime( fbits, 0, 1 );
-		    factors[j++] = pool[i];
-		}
-	    if( i == n ) {
-		m_free(perms); perms = NULL;
-		progress('!');
-		goto next_try;	/* allocate new primes */
-	    }
-	}
-
-	mpi_set( prime, q );
-	mpi_mul_ui( prime, prime, 2 );
-	if( mode == 1 )
-	    mpi_mul( prime, prime, q_factor );
-	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
-	    mpi_mul( prime, prime, factors[i] );
-	mpi_add_ui( prime, prime, 1 );
-	nprime = mpi_get_nbits(prime);
-	if( nprime < pbits ) {
-	    if( ++count1 > 20 ) {
-		count1 = 0;
-		qbits++;
-		progress('>');
-		q = gen_prime( qbits, 0, 1 );
-		goto next_try;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	    count1 = 0;
-	if( nprime > pbits ) {
-	    if( ++count2 > 20 ) {
-		count2 = 0;
-		qbits--;
-		progress('<');
-		q = gen_prime( qbits, 0, 1 );
-		goto next_try;
-	    }
-	}
-	else
-	    count2 = 0;
-    } while( !(nprime == pbits && check_prime( prime, val_2 )) );
-
-    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-	progress('\n');
-	log_mpidump( "prime    : ", prime );
-	log_mpidump( "factor  q: ", q );
-	if( mode == 1 )
-	    log_mpidump( "factor q0: ", q_factor );
-	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
-	    log_mpidump( "factor pi: ", factors[i] );
-	log_debug("bit sizes: prime=%u, q=%u", mpi_get_nbits(prime), mpi_get_nbits(q) );
-	if( mode == 1 )
-	    fprintf(stderr, ", q0=%u", mpi_get_nbits(q_factor) );
-	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
-	    fprintf(stderr, ", p%d=%u", i, mpi_get_nbits(factors[i]) );
-	progress('\n');
-    }
-
-    if( ret_factors ) { /* caller wants the factors */
-#ifdef PLUTO
-	m_alloc_ptrs_clear(*ret_factors, n+2);
-#else
-	*ret_factors = m_alloc_clear( (n+2) * sizeof **ret_factors);
-#endif
-	if( mode == 1 ) {
-	    i = 0;
-	    (*ret_factors)[i++] = mpi_copy( q_factor );
-	    for(; i <= n; i++ )
-		(*ret_factors)[i] = mpi_copy( factors[i] );
-	}
-	else {
-	    for(; i < n; i++ )
-		(*ret_factors)[i] = mpi_copy( factors[i] );
-	}
-    }
-
-    if( g ) { /* create a generator (start with 3)*/
-	MPI tmp   = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(prime) );
-	MPI b	  = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(prime) );
-	MPI pmin1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(prime) );
-
-	if( mode == 1 )
-	    BUG(); /* not yet implemented */
-	factors[n] = q;
-	factors[n+1] = mpi_alloc_set_ui(2);
-	mpi_sub_ui( pmin1, prime, 1 );
-	mpi_set_ui(g,2);
-	do {
-	    mpi_add_ui(g, g, 1);
-	    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
-#ifdef PLUTO
-		log_mpidump("checking g: ", g);
-#else
-		log_debug("checking g: ");
-		mpi_print( stderr, g, 1 );
-#endif
-	    }
-	    else
-		progress('^');
-	    for(i=0; i < n+2; i++ ) {
-		/*fputc('~', stderr);*/
-		mpi_fdiv_q(tmp, pmin1, factors[i] );
-		/* (no mpi_pow(), but it is okay to use this with mod prime) */
-		mpi_powm(b, g, tmp, prime );
-		if( !mpi_cmp_ui(b, 1) )
-		    break;
-	    }
-	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
-		progress('\n');
-	} while( i < n+2 );
-	mpi_free(factors[n+1]);
-	mpi_free(tmp);
-	mpi_free(b);
-	mpi_free(pmin1);
-    }
-    if( !DBG_CIPHER )
-	progress('\n');
-
-    m_free( factors );	/* (factors are shallow copies) */
-    for(i=0; i < m; i++ )
-	mpi_free( pool[i] );
-    m_free( pool );
-    m_free(perms);
-    mpi_free(val_2);
-    return prime;
-}
-
-
-
-static MPI
-gen_prime( unsigned  nbits, int secret, int randomlevel )
-{
-    unsigned  nlimbs;
-    MPI prime, ptest, pminus1, val_2, val_3, result;
-    int i;
-    unsigned x, step;
-    unsigned count1, count2;
-    int *mods;
-
-    if( 0 && DBG_CIPHER )
-	log_debug("generate a prime of %u bits ", nbits );
-
-    if( !no_of_small_prime_numbers ) {
-	for(i=0; small_prime_numbers[i]; i++ )
-	    no_of_small_prime_numbers++;
-    }
-    mods = m_alloc( no_of_small_prime_numbers * sizeof *mods );
-    /* make nbits fit into MPI implementation */
-    nlimbs = (nbits + BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1) /	BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
-    val_2  = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
-    val_3 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 3);
-    prime  = secret? mpi_alloc_secure( nlimbs ): mpi_alloc( nlimbs );
-    result = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
-    pminus1= mpi_alloc_like( prime );
-    ptest  = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
-    count1 = count2 = 0;
-    for(;;) {  /* try forvever */
-	int dotcount=0;
-
-	/* generate a random number */
-	{   char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, randomlevel, secret );
-	    mpi_set_buffer( prime, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
-	    m_free(p);
-	}
-
-	/* set high order bit to 1, set low order bit to 1 */
-	mpi_set_highbit( prime, nbits-1 );
-	mpi_set_bit( prime, 0 );
-
-	/* calculate all remainders */
-	for(i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ )
-	    mods[i] = mpi_fdiv_r_ui(NULL, prime, x);
-
-	/* now try some primes starting with prime */
-	for(step=0; step < 20000; step += 2 ) {
-	    /* check against all the small primes we have in mods */
-	    count1++;
-	    for(i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ ) {
-		while( mods[i] + step >= x )
-		    mods[i] -= x;
-		if( !(mods[i] + step) )
-		    break;
-	    }
-	    if( x )
-		continue;   /* found a multiple of an already known prime */
-
-	    mpi_add_ui( ptest, prime, step );
-
-	    /* do a faster Fermat test */
-	    count2++;
-	    mpi_sub_ui( pminus1, ptest, 1);
-	    mpi_powm( result, val_2, pminus1, ptest );
-	    if( !mpi_cmp_ui( result, 1 ) ) { /* not composite */
-		/* perform stronger tests */
-		if( is_prime(ptest, 5, &count2 ) ) {
-		    if( !mpi_test_bit( ptest, nbits-1 ) ) {
-			progress('\n');
-			log_debug("overflow in prime generation\n");
-			break; /* step loop, continue with a new prime */
-		    }
-
-		    mpi_free(val_2);
-		    mpi_free(val_3);
-		    mpi_free(result);
-		    mpi_free(pminus1);
-		    mpi_free(prime);
-		    m_free(mods);
-		    return ptest;
-		}
-	    }
-	    if( ++dotcount == 10 ) {
-		progress('.');
-		dotcount = 0;
-	    }
-	}
-	progress(':'); /* restart with a new random value */
-    }
-}
-
-/****************
- * Returns: true if this may be a prime
- */
-static int
-check_prime( MPI prime, MPI val_2 )
-{
-    int i;
-    unsigned x;
-    int count=0;
-
-    /* check against small primes */
-    for(i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ ) {
-	if( mpi_divisible_ui( prime, x ) )
-	    return 0;
-    }
-
-    /* a quick fermat test */
-    {
-	MPI result = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
-	MPI pminus1 = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
-	mpi_sub_ui( pminus1, prime, 1);
-	mpi_powm( result, val_2, pminus1, prime );
-	mpi_free( pminus1 );
-	if( mpi_cmp_ui( result, 1 ) ) { /* if composite */
-	    mpi_free( result );
-	    progress('.');
-	    return 0;
-	}
-	mpi_free( result );
-    }
-
-    /* perform stronger tests */
-    if( is_prime(prime, 5, &count ) )
-	return 1; /* is probably a prime */
-    progress('.');
-    return 0;
-}
-
-
-/****************
- * Return true if n is probably a prime
- */
-static int
-is_prime( MPI n, unsigned steps, int *count )
-{
-    MPI x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
-    MPI y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
-    MPI z = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
-    MPI nminus1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
-    MPI a2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
-    MPI q;
-    unsigned i, j, k;
-    int rc = 0;
-    unsigned nbits = mpi_get_nbits( n );
-
-    mpi_sub_ui( nminus1, n, 1 );
-
-    /* find q and k, so that n = 1 + 2^k * q */
-    q = mpi_copy( nminus1 );
-    k = mpi_trailing_zeros( q );
-    mpi_tdiv_q_2exp(q, q, k);
-
-    for(i=0 ; i < steps; i++ ) {
-	++*count;
-	if( !i ) {
-	    mpi_set_ui( x, 2 );
-	}
-	else {
-	    /*mpi_set_bytes( x, nbits-1, get_random_byte, 0 );*/
-	    {	char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, 0, 0 );
-		mpi_set_buffer( x, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
-		m_free(p);
-	    }
-	    /* make sure that the number is smaller than the prime
-	     * and keep the randomness of the high bit */
-	    if( mpi_test_bit( x, nbits-2 ) ) {
-		mpi_set_highbit( x, nbits-2 ); /* clear all higher bits */
-	    }
-	    else {
-		mpi_set_highbit( x, nbits-2 );
-		mpi_clear_bit( x, nbits-2 );
-	    }
-	    assert( mpi_cmp( x, nminus1 ) < 0 && mpi_cmp_ui( x, 1 ) > 0 );
-	}
-	mpi_powm( y, x, q, n);
-	if( mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) && mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ) ) {
-	    for( j=1; j < k && mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ); j++ ) {
-		mpi_powm(y, y, a2, n);
-		if( !mpi_cmp_ui( y, 1 ) )
-		    goto leave; /* not a prime */
-	    }
-	    if( mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ) )
-		goto leave; /* not a prime */
-	}
-	progress('+');
-    }
-    rc = 1; /* may be a prime */
-
-  leave:
-    mpi_free( x );
-    mpi_free( y );
-    mpi_free( z );
-    mpi_free( nminus1 );
-    mpi_free( q );
-
-    return rc;
-}
-
-
-static void
-m_out_of_n( char *array, int m, int n )
-{
-    int i=0, i1=0, j=0, jp=0,  j1=0, k1=0, k2=0;
-
-    if( !m || m >= n )
-	return;
-
-    if( m == 1 ) { /* special case */
-	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
-	    if( array[i] ) {
-		array[i++] = 0;
-		if( i >= n )
-		    i = 0;
-		array[i] = 1;
-		return;
-	    }
-	BUG();
-    }
-
-    for(j=1; j < n; j++ ) {
-	if( array[n-1] == array[n-j-1] )
-	    continue;
-	j1 = j;
-	break;
-    }
-
-    if( m & 1 ) { /* m is odd */
-	if( array[n-1] ) {
-	    if( j1 & 1 ) {
-		k1 = n - j1;
-		k2 = k1+2;
-		if( k2 > n )
-		    k2 = n;
-		goto leave;
-	    }
-	    goto scan;
-	}
-	k2 = n - j1 - 1;
-	if( k2 == 0 ) {
-	    k1 = i;
-	    k2 = n - j1;
-	}
-	else if( array[k2] && array[k2-1] )
-	    k1 = n;
-	else
-	    k1 = k2 + 1;
-    }
-    else { /* m is even */
-	if( !array[n-1] ) {
-	    k1 = n - j1;
-	    k2 = k1 + 1;
-	    goto leave;
-	}
-
-	if( !(j1 & 1) ) {
-	    k1 = n - j1;
-	    k2 = k1+2;
-	    if( k2 > n )
-		k2 = n;
-	    goto leave;
-	}
-      scan:
-	jp = n - j1 - 1;
-	for(i=1; i <= jp; i++ ) {
-	    i1 = jp + 2 - i;
-	    if( array[i1-1]  ) {
-		if( array[i1-2] ) {
-		    k1 = i1 - 1;
-		    k2 = n - j1;
-		}
-		else {
-		    k1 = i1 - 1;
-		    k2 = n + 1 - j1;
-		}
-		goto leave;
-	    }
-	}
-	k1 = 1;
-	k2 = n + 1 - m;
-    }
-  leave:
-    array[k1-1] = !array[k1-1];
-    array[k2-1] = !array[k2-1];
-}
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c
index 00fed63ea..013deb446 100644
--- a/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c
+++ b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: rcv_whack.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>       /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 
@@ -42,17 +40,17 @@
 #include "smartcard.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "foodgroups.h"
-#include "whack.h"	/* needs connections.h */
+#include "whack.h"      /* needs connections.h */
 #include "packet.h"
-#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "demux.h"      /* needs packet.h */
 #include "state.h"
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "rcv_whack.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "keys.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
-#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"     /* needs keys.h and adns.h */
 #include "server.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 #include "ocsp.h"
@@ -63,186 +61,186 @@
 /* helper variables and function to decode strings from whack message */
 
 static char *next_str
-    , *str_roof;
+	, *str_roof;
 
 static bool
 unpack_str(char **p)
 {
-    char *end = memchr(next_str, '\0', str_roof - next_str);
-
-    if (end == NULL)
-    {
-	return FALSE;	/* fishy: no end found */
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	*p = next_str == end? NULL : next_str;
-	next_str = end + 1;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	char *end = memchr(next_str, '\0', str_roof - next_str);
+
+	if (end == NULL)
+	{
+		return FALSE;   /* fishy: no end found */
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		*p = next_str == end? NULL : next_str;
+		next_str = end + 1;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 /* bits loading keys from asynchronous DNS */
 
 enum key_add_attempt {
-    ka_TXT,
+	ka_TXT,
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-    ka_KEY,
+	ka_KEY,
 #endif
-    ka_roof	/* largest value + 1 */
+	ka_roof     /* largest value + 1 */
 };
 
 struct key_add_common {
-    int refCount;
-    char *diag[ka_roof];
-    int whack_fd;
-    bool success;
+	int refCount;
+	char *diag[ka_roof];
+	int whack_fd;
+	bool success;
 };
 
 struct key_add_continuation {
-    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
-    struct key_add_common *common;	/* common data */
-    enum key_add_attempt lookingfor;
+	struct adns_continuation ac;        /* common prefix */
+	struct key_add_common *common;      /* common data */
+	enum key_add_attempt lookingfor;
 };
 
 static void
 key_add_ugh(const struct id *keyid, err_t ugh)
 {
-    char name[BUF_LEN];	/* longer IDs will be truncated in message */
+	char name[BUF_LEN]; /* longer IDs will be truncated in message */
 
-    (void)idtoa(keyid, name, sizeof(name));
-    loglog(RC_NOKEY
-	, "failure to fetch key for %s from DNS: %s", name, ugh);
+	(void)idtoa(keyid, name, sizeof(name));
+	loglog(RC_NOKEY
+		, "failure to fetch key for %s from DNS: %s", name, ugh);
 }
 
 /* last one out: turn out the lights */
 static void
 key_add_merge(struct key_add_common *oc, const struct id *keyid)
 {
-    if (oc->refCount == 0)
-    {
-	enum key_add_attempt kaa;
-
-	/* if no success, print all diagnostics */
-	if (!oc->success)
-	    for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
-		key_add_ugh(keyid, oc->diag[kaa]);
+	if (oc->refCount == 0)
+	{
+		enum key_add_attempt kaa;
 
-	for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
-	    pfreeany(oc->diag[kaa]);
+		/* if no success, print all diagnostics */
+		if (!oc->success)
+			for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
+				key_add_ugh(keyid, oc->diag[kaa]);
 
-	close(oc->whack_fd);
-	pfree(oc);
-    }
+		for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
+		{
+			free(oc->diag[kaa]);
+		}
+		close(oc->whack_fd);
+		free(oc);
+	}
 }
 
 static void
 key_add_continue(struct adns_continuation *ac, err_t ugh)
 {
-    struct key_add_continuation *kc = (void *) ac;
-    struct key_add_common *oc = kc->common;
-
-    passert(whack_log_fd == NULL_FD);
-    whack_log_fd = oc->whack_fd;
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	oc->diag[kc->lookingfor] = clone_str(ugh, "key add error");
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	oc->success = TRUE;
-	transfer_to_public_keys(kc->ac.gateways_from_dns
+	struct key_add_continuation *kc = (void *) ac;
+	struct key_add_common *oc = kc->common;
+
+	passert(whack_log_fd == NULL_FD);
+	whack_log_fd = oc->whack_fd;
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		oc->diag[kc->lookingfor] = clone_str(ugh);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		oc->success = TRUE;
+		transfer_to_public_keys(kc->ac.gateways_from_dns
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-	    , &kc->ac.keys_from_dns
+			, &kc->ac.keys_from_dns
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-	    );
-    }
+			);
+	}
 
-    oc->refCount--;
-    key_add_merge(oc, &ac->id);
-    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+	oc->refCount--;
+	key_add_merge(oc, &ac->id);
+	whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
 }
 
 static void
 key_add_request(const whack_message_t *msg)
 {
-    struct id keyid;
-    err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE);
-
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_BADID, "bad --keyid \"%s\": %s", msg->keyid, ugh);
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	if (!msg->whack_addkey)
-	    delete_public_keys(&keyid, msg->pubkey_alg
-		, empty_chunk, empty_chunk);
-
-	if (msg->keyval.len == 0)
-	{
-	    struct key_add_common *oc
-		= alloc_thing(struct key_add_common
-			      , "key add common things");
-	    enum key_add_attempt kaa;
-
-	    /* initialize state shared by queries */
-	    oc->refCount = 0;
-	    oc->whack_fd = dup_any(whack_log_fd);
-	    oc->success = FALSE;
-
-	    for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
-	    {
-		struct key_add_continuation *kc
-		    = alloc_thing(struct key_add_continuation
-			, "key add continuation");
-
-		oc->diag[kaa] = NULL;
-		oc->refCount++;
-		kc->common = oc;
-		kc->lookingfor = kaa;
-		switch (kaa)
+	struct id keyid;
+	err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_BADID, "bad --keyid \"%s\": %s", msg->keyid, ugh);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		if (!msg->whack_addkey)
+			delete_public_keys(&keyid, msg->pubkey_alg
+				, chunk_empty, chunk_empty);
+
+		if (msg->keyval.len == 0)
 		{
-		case ka_TXT:
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&keyid
-			, &keyid	/* same */
-			, T_TXT
-			, key_add_continue
-			, &kc->ac);
-		    break;
+			struct key_add_common *oc = malloc_thing(struct key_add_common);
+			enum key_add_attempt kaa;
+
+			/* initialize state shared by queries */
+			oc->refCount = 0;
+			oc->whack_fd = dup_any(whack_log_fd);
+			oc->success = FALSE;
+
+			for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
+			{
+				struct key_add_continuation *kc;
+
+				oc->diag[kaa] = NULL;
+				oc->refCount++;
+				kc = malloc_thing(struct key_add_continuation);
+				kc->common = oc;
+				kc->lookingfor = kaa;
+
+				switch (kaa)
+				{
+				case ka_TXT:
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&keyid
+						, &keyid        /* same */
+						, T_TXT
+						, key_add_continue
+						, &kc->ac);
+					break;
 #ifdef USE_KEYRR
-		case ka_KEY:
-		    ugh = start_adns_query(&keyid
-			, NULL
-			, T_KEY
-			, key_add_continue
-			, &kc->ac);
-		    break;
+				case ka_KEY:
+					ugh = start_adns_query(&keyid
+						, NULL
+						, T_KEY
+						, key_add_continue
+						, &kc->ac);
+					break;
 #endif /* USE_KEYRR */
-		default:
-		    bad_case(kaa);	/* suppress gcc warning */
+				default:
+					bad_case(kaa);      /* suppress gcc warning */
+				}
+				if (ugh != NULL)
+				{
+					oc->diag[kaa] = clone_str(ugh);
+					oc->refCount--;
+				}
+			}
+
+			/* Done launching queries.
+			 * Handle total failure case.
+			 */
+			key_add_merge(oc, &keyid);
 		}
-		if (ugh != NULL)
+		else
 		{
-		    oc->diag[kaa] = clone_str(ugh, "early key add failure");
-		    oc->refCount--;
+			if (!add_public_key(&keyid, DAL_LOCAL, msg->pubkey_alg, msg->keyval,
+				&pubkeys))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "failed to add public key");
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-
-	    /* Done launching queries.
-	     * Handle total failure case.
-	     */
-	    key_add_merge(oc, &keyid);
 	}
-	else
-	{
-	    ugh = add_public_key(&keyid, DAL_LOCAL, msg->pubkey_alg
-		, &msg->keyval, &pubkeys);
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s", ugh);
-	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Handle a kernel request. Supposedly, there's a message in
@@ -251,430 +249,431 @@ key_add_request(const whack_message_t *msg)
 void
 whack_handle(int whackctlfd)
 {
-    whack_message_t msg;
-    struct sockaddr_un whackaddr;
-    int whackaddrlen = sizeof(whackaddr);
-    int whackfd = accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen);
-    /* Note: actual value in n should fit in int.  To print, cast to int. */
-    ssize_t n;
-
-    if (whackfd < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "accept() failed in whack_handle()"));
-	return;
-    }
-    if (fcntl(whackfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "failed to set CLOEXEC in whack_handle()"));
-	close(whackfd);
-	return;
-    }
+	whack_message_t msg;
+	struct sockaddr_un whackaddr;
+	int whackaddrlen = sizeof(whackaddr);
+	int whackfd = accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen);
+	/* Note: actual value in n should fit in int.  To print, cast to int. */
+	ssize_t n;
+
+	if (whackfd < 0)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "accept() failed in whack_handle()"));
+		return;
+	}
+	if (fcntl(whackfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "failed to set CLOEXEC in whack_handle()"));
+		close(whackfd);
+		return;
+	}
 
-    n = read(whackfd, &msg, sizeof(msg));
+	n = read(whackfd, &msg, sizeof(msg));
 
-    if (n == -1)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "read() failed in whack_handle()"));
-	close(whackfd);
-	return;
-    }
+	if (n == -1)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "read() failed in whack_handle()"));
+		close(whackfd);
+		return;
+	}
 
-    whack_log_fd = whackfd;
+	whack_log_fd = whackfd;
 
-    /* sanity check message */
-    {
-	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	/* sanity check message */
+	{
+		err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	next_str = msg.string;
-	str_roof = (char *)&msg + n;
+		next_str = msg.string;
+		str_roof = (char *)&msg + n;
 
-	if ((size_t)n < offsetof(whack_message_t, whack_shutdown) + sizeof(msg.whack_shutdown))
+		if ((size_t)n < offsetof(whack_message_t, whack_shutdown) + sizeof(msg.whack_shutdown))
+		{
+			ugh = builddiag("ignoring runt message from whack: got %d bytes", (int)n);
+		}
+		else if (msg.magic != WHACK_MAGIC)
+		{
+			if (msg.magic == WHACK_BASIC_MAGIC)
+			{
+				/* Only shutdown command.  Simpler inter-version compatability. */
+				if (msg.whack_shutdown)
+				{
+					plog("shutting down");
+					exit_pluto(0);      /* delete lock and leave, with 0 status */
+				}
+				ugh = "";       /* bail early, but without complaint */
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				ugh = builddiag("ignoring message from whack with bad magic %d; should be %d; probably wrong version"
+					, msg.magic, WHACK_MAGIC);
+			}
+		}
+		else if (next_str > str_roof)
+		{
+			ugh = builddiag("ignoring truncated message from whack: got %d bytes; expected %u"
+				, (int) n, (unsigned) sizeof(msg));
+		}
+		else if (!unpack_str(&msg.name)         /* string  1 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.id)            /* string  2 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.cert)          /* string  3 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.ca)            /* string  4 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.groups)        /* string  5 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.updown)        /* string  6 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.virt)          /* string  7 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.id)           /* string  8 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.cert)         /* string  9 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.ca)           /* string 10 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.groups)       /* string 11 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.updown)       /* string 12 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.virt)         /* string 13 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.keyid)              /* string 14 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.myid)               /* string 15 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.cacert)             /* string 16 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.ldaphost)           /* string 17 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.ldapbase)           /* string 18 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.crluri)             /* string 19 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.crluri2)            /* string 20 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.ocspuri)            /* string 21 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.ike)                /* string 22 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.esp)                /* string 23 */
+		|| !unpack_str(&msg.sc_data)            /* string 24 */
+		|| str_roof - next_str != (ptrdiff_t)msg.keyval.len)    /* check chunk */
+		{
+			ugh = "message from whack contains bad string";
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			msg.keyval.ptr = next_str;  /* grab chunk */
+		}
+
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			if (*ugh != '\0')
+				loglog(RC_BADWHACKMESSAGE, "%s", ugh);
+			whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+			close(whackfd);
+			return;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (msg.whack_options)
 	{
-	    ugh = builddiag("ignoring runt message from whack: got %d bytes", (int)n);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		if (msg.name == NULL)
+		{
+			/* we do a two-step so that if either old or new would
+			 * cause the message to print, it will be printed.
+			 */
+			cur_debugging |= msg.debugging;
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+				, DBG_log("base debugging = %s"
+					, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, msg.debugging)));
+			cur_debugging = base_debugging = msg.debugging;
+		}
+		else if (!msg.whack_connection)
+		{
+			struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+
+			if (c != NULL)
+			{
+				c->extra_debugging = msg.debugging;
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+					, DBG_log("\"%s\" extra_debugging = %s"
+						, c->name
+						, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, c->extra_debugging)));
+			}
+		}
+#endif
+	}
+
+	if (msg.whack_myid)
+		set_myid(MYID_SPECIFIED, msg.myid);
+
+	/* Deleting combined with adding a connection works as replace.
+	 * To make this more useful, in only this combination,
+	 * delete will silently ignore the lack of the connection.
+	 */
+	if (msg.whack_delete)
+	{
+		if (msg.whack_ca)
+			find_ca_info_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+		else
+			delete_connections_by_name(msg.name, !msg.whack_connection);
 	}
-	else if (msg.magic != WHACK_MAGIC)
+
+	if (msg.whack_deletestate)
 	{
-	    if (msg.magic == WHACK_BASIC_MAGIC)
-	    {
-		/* Only shutdown command.  Simpler inter-version compatability. */
-		if (msg.whack_shutdown)
+		struct state *st = state_with_serialno(msg.whack_deletestateno);
+
+		if (st == NULL)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME, "no state #%lu to delete"
+				, msg.whack_deletestateno);
+		}
+		else
 		{
-		    plog("shutting down");
-		    exit_pluto(0);	/* delete lock and leave, with 0 status */
+			delete_state(st);
 		}
-		ugh = "";	/* bail early, but without complaint */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		ugh = builddiag("ignoring message from whack with bad magic %d; should be %d; probably wrong version"
-		    , msg.magic, WHACK_MAGIC);
-	    }
-	}
-	else if (next_str > str_roof)
-	{
-	    ugh = builddiag("ignoring truncated message from whack: got %d bytes; expected %u"
-		, (int) n, (unsigned) sizeof(msg));
-	}
-	else if (!unpack_str(&msg.name)		/* string  1 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.id)		/* string  2 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.cert)		/* string  3 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.ca)		/* string  4 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.groups)	/* string  5 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.updown)	/* string  6 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.virt)		/* string  7 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.id)		/* string  8 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.cert)		/* string  9 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.ca)		/* string 10 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.groups)	/* string 11 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.updown)	/* string 12 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.virt)		/* string 13 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.keyid)		/* string 14 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.myid)		/* string 15 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.cacert)		/* string 16 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ldaphost)		/* string 17 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ldapbase)		/* string 18 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.crluri)		/* string 19 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.crluri2)		/* string 20 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ocspuri)		/* string 21 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ike)		/* string 22 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.esp)		/* string 23 */
-	|| !unpack_str(&msg.sc_data)		/* string 24 */
-	|| str_roof - next_str != (ptrdiff_t)msg.keyval.len)	/* check chunk */
-	{
-	    ugh = "message from whack contains bad string";
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (msg.whack_crash)
+		delete_states_by_peer(&msg.whack_crash_peer);
+
+	if (msg.whack_connection)
+		add_connection(&msg);
+
+	if (msg.whack_ca && msg.cacert != NULL)
+		add_ca_info(&msg);
+		
+	/* process "listen" before any operation that could require it */
+	if (msg.whack_listen)
+	{
+		close_peerlog();    /* close any open per-peer logs */
+		plog("listening for IKE messages");
+		listening = TRUE;
+		daily_log_reset();
+		reset_adns_restart_count();
+		set_myFQDN();
+		find_ifaces();
+		load_preshared_secrets(NULL_FD);
+		load_groups();
+	}
+	if (msg.whack_unlisten)
 	{
-	    msg.keyval.ptr = next_str;	/* grab chunk */
+		plog("no longer listening for IKE messages");
+		listening = FALSE;
 	}
 
-	if (ugh != NULL)
+	if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_SECRETS)
 	{
-	    if (*ugh != '\0')
-		loglog(RC_BADWHACKMESSAGE, "%s", ugh);
-	    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
-	    close(whackfd);
-	    return;
+		load_preshared_secrets(whackfd);
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (msg.whack_options)
-    {
-#ifdef DEBUG
-	if (msg.name == NULL)
-	{
-	    /* we do a two-step so that if either old or new would
-	     * cause the message to print, it will be printed.
-	     */
-	    cur_debugging |= msg.debugging;
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL
-		, DBG_log("base debugging = %s"
-		    , bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, msg.debugging)));
-	    cur_debugging = base_debugging = msg.debugging;
-	}
-	else if (!msg.whack_connection)
-	{
-	    struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
-
-	    if (c != NULL)
-	    {
-		c->extra_debugging = msg.debugging;
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL
-		    , DBG_log("\"%s\" extra_debugging = %s"
-			, c->name
-			, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, c->extra_debugging)));
-	    }
+	if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_CACERTS)
+	{
+		load_authcerts("CA cert", CA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_CA);
 	}
-#endif
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_myid)
-	set_myid(MYID_SPECIFIED, msg.myid);
-
-    /* Deleting combined with adding a connection works as replace.
-     * To make this more useful, in only this combination,
-     * delete will silently ignore the lack of the connection.
-     */
-    if (msg.whack_delete)
-    {
-    	if (msg.whack_ca)
-	    find_ca_info_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
-	else
-	    delete_connections_by_name(msg.name, !msg.whack_connection);
-    }
 
-    if (msg.whack_deletestate)
-    {
-	struct state *st = state_with_serialno(msg.whack_deletestateno);
+	if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_AACERTS)
+	{
+		load_authcerts("AA cert", AA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_AA);
+	}
 
-	if (st == NULL)
+	if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_OCSPCERTS)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME, "no state #%lu to delete"
-		, msg.whack_deletestateno);
+		load_authcerts("OCSP cert", OCSP_CERT_PATH, AUTH_OCSP);
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_ACERTS)
 	{
-	    delete_state(st);
-	}
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_crash)
-	delete_states_by_peer(&msg.whack_crash_peer);
-
-    if (msg.whack_connection)
-	add_connection(&msg);
-
-    if (msg.whack_ca && msg.cacert != NULL)
-	add_ca_info(&msg);
-	
-    /* process "listen" before any operation that could require it */
-    if (msg.whack_listen)
-    {
-	close_peerlog();    /* close any open per-peer logs */
-	plog("listening for IKE messages");
-	listening = TRUE;
-	daily_log_reset();
-	reset_adns_restart_count();
-	set_myFQDN();
-	find_ifaces();
-	load_preshared_secrets(NULL_FD);
-	load_groups();
-    }
-    if (msg.whack_unlisten)
-    {
-	plog("no longer listening for IKE messages");
-	listening = FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_SECRETS)
-    {
-	load_preshared_secrets(whackfd);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_CACERTS)
-    {
-	load_authcerts("CA cert", CA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_CA);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_AACERTS)
-    {
-	load_authcerts("AA cert", AA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_AA);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_OCSPCERTS)
-    {
-	load_authcerts("OCSP cert", OCSP_CERT_PATH, AUTH_OCSP);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_ACERTS)
-    {
-	load_acerts();
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_CRLS)
-    {
-	load_crls();
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_purgeocsp)
-    {
-	free_ocsp_fetch();
-	free_ocsp_cache();
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_ALGS)
-    {
-	ike_alg_list();
-	kernel_alg_list();
-    }
+		load_acerts();
+	}
+
+	if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_CRLS)
+	{
+		load_crls();
+	}
+
+	if (msg.whack_purgeocsp)
+	{
+		free_ocsp_fetch();
+		free_ocsp_cache();
+	}
+
    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_PUBKEYS)
-    {
-	list_public_keys(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CERTS)
-    {
-	list_certs(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CACERTS)
-    {
-	list_authcerts("CA", AUTH_CA, msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_AACERTS)
-    {
-	list_authcerts("AA", AUTH_AA, msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_OCSPCERTS)
-    {
-	list_authcerts("OCSP", AUTH_OCSP, msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_ACERTS)
-    {
-	list_acerts(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_GROUPS)
-    {
-	list_groups(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CAINFOS)
-    {
-	list_ca_infos(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CRLS)
-    {
-	list_crls(msg.whack_utc, strict_crl_policy);
-	list_crl_fetch_requests(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_OCSP)
-    {
-	list_ocsp_cache(msg.whack_utc, strict_crl_policy);
-	list_ocsp_fetch_requests(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CARDS)
-    {
-	scx_list(msg.whack_utc);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_key)
-    {
-	/* add a public key */
-	key_add_request(&msg);
-    }
-
-    if (msg.whack_route)
-    {
-	if (!listening)
-	{
-	    whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before --route");
-	}
-	if (msg.name == NULL)
-	{
-	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
-		, "whack --route requires a connection name");
+	{
+		list_public_keys(msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CERTS)
 	{
-	    struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+		list_certs(msg.whack_utc);
+	}
 
-	    if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
-	    {
-		set_cur_connection(c);
-		if (!oriented(*c))
-		    whack_log(RC_ORIENT
-			, "we have no ipsecN interface for either end of this connection");
-		else if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
-		    route_group(c);
-		else if (!trap_connection(c))
-		    whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
-		reset_cur_connection();
-	    }
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CACERTS)
+	{
+		list_authcerts("CA", AUTH_CA, msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (msg.whack_unroute)
-    {
-	if (msg.name == NULL)
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_AACERTS)
 	{
-	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
-		, "whack --unroute requires a connection name");
+		list_authcerts("AA", AUTH_AA, msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_OCSPCERTS)
 	{
-	    struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+		list_authcerts("OCSP", AUTH_OCSP, msg.whack_utc);
+	}
 
-	    if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
-	    {
-		struct spd_route *sr;
-		int fail = 0;
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_ACERTS)
+	{
+		list_acerts(msg.whack_utc);
+	}
 
-		set_cur_connection(c);
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_GROUPS)
+	{
+		list_groups(msg.whack_utc);
+	}
 
-		for (sr = &c->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
-		{
-		    if (sr->routing >= RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
-			fail++;
-		}
-		if (fail > 0)
-		    whack_log(RC_RTBUSY, "cannot unroute: route busy");
-		else if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
-		    unroute_group(c);
-		else
-		    unroute_connection(c);
-		reset_cur_connection();
-	    }
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CAINFOS)
+	{
+		list_ca_infos(msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (msg.whack_initiate)
-    {
-	if (!listening)
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CRLS)
 	{
-	    whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before --initiate");
+		list_crls(msg.whack_utc, strict_crl_policy);
+		list_crl_fetch_requests(msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-	else if (msg.name == NULL)
+
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_OCSP)
 	{
-	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
-		, "whack --initiate requires a connection name");
+		list_ocsp_cache(msg.whack_utc, strict_crl_policy);
+		list_ocsp_fetch_requests(msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CARDS)
 	{
-	    initiate_connection(msg.name
-		, msg.whack_async? NULL_FD : dup_any(whackfd));
+		scx_list(msg.whack_utc);
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (msg.whack_oppo_initiate)
-    {
-	if (!listening)
-	    whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before opportunistic initiation");
-	else
-	    initiate_opportunistic(&msg.oppo_my_client, &msg.oppo_peer_client, 0
-		, FALSE
-		, msg.whack_async? NULL_FD : dup_any(whackfd));
-    }
+	if (msg.whack_list & LIST_ALGS)
+	{
+		ike_alg_list();
+		kernel_alg_list();
+	}
 
-    if (msg.whack_terminate)
-    {
-	if (msg.name == NULL)
+	if (msg.whack_key)
 	{
-	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
-		, "whack --terminate requires a connection name");
+		/* add a public key */
+		key_add_request(&msg);
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (msg.whack_route)
 	{
-	    terminate_connection(msg.name);
+		if (!listening)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before --route");
+		}
+		if (msg.name == NULL)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+				, "whack --route requires a connection name");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+
+			if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
+			{
+				set_cur_connection(c);
+				if (!oriented(*c))
+					whack_log(RC_ORIENT
+						, "we have no ipsecN interface for either end of this connection");
+				else if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+					route_group(c);
+				else if (!trap_connection(c))
+					whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+				reset_cur_connection();
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (msg.whack_status)
-	show_status(msg.whack_statusall, msg.name);
+	if (msg.whack_unroute)
+	{
+		if (msg.name == NULL)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+				, "whack --unroute requires a connection name");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+
+			if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
+			{
+				struct spd_route *sr;
+				int fail = 0;
+
+				set_cur_connection(c);
+
+				for (sr = &c->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+				{
+					if (sr->routing >= RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+						fail++;
+				}
+				if (fail > 0)
+					whack_log(RC_RTBUSY, "cannot unroute: route busy");
+				else if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+					unroute_group(c);
+				else
+					unroute_connection(c);
+				reset_cur_connection();
+			}
+		}
+	}
 
-    if (msg.whack_shutdown)
-    {
-	plog("shutting down");
-	exit_pluto(0);	/* delete lock and leave, with 0 status */
-    }
+	if (msg.whack_initiate)
+	{
+		if (!listening)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before --initiate");
+		}
+		else if (msg.name == NULL)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+				, "whack --initiate requires a connection name");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			initiate_connection(msg.name
+				, msg.whack_async? NULL_FD : dup_any(whackfd));
+		}
+	}
 
-    if (msg.whack_sc_op != SC_OP_NONE)
-    {
-	if (pkcs11_proxy)
-	    scx_op_via_whack(msg.sc_data, msg.inbase, msg.outbase
-			   , msg.whack_sc_op, msg.keyid, whackfd);
-	else
-	   plog("pkcs11 access to smartcard not allowed (set pkcs11proxy=yes)");
-    }
+	if (msg.whack_oppo_initiate)
+	{
+		if (!listening)
+			whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before opportunistic initiation");
+		else
+			initiate_opportunistic(&msg.oppo_my_client, &msg.oppo_peer_client, 0
+				, FALSE
+				, msg.whack_async? NULL_FD : dup_any(whackfd));
+	}
+
+	if (msg.whack_terminate)
+	{
+		if (msg.name == NULL)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+				, "whack --terminate requires a connection name");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			terminate_connection(msg.name);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (msg.whack_status)
+		show_status(msg.whack_statusall, msg.name);
+
+	if (msg.whack_shutdown)
+	{
+		plog("shutting down");
+		exit_pluto(0);  /* delete lock and leave, with 0 status */
+	}
 
-    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
-    close(whackfd);
+	if (msg.whack_sc_op != SC_OP_NONE)
+	{
+		if (pkcs11_proxy)
+			scx_op_via_whack(msg.sc_data, msg.inbase, msg.outbase
+						   , msg.whack_sc_op, msg.keyid, whackfd);
+		else
+		   plog("pkcs11 access to smartcard not allowed (set pkcs11proxy=yes)");
+	}
+
+	whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+	close(whackfd);
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h
index e0582202f..66edaaf80 100644
--- a/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h
+++ b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: rcv_whack.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 extern void whack_handle(int kernelfd);
diff --git a/src/pluto/rnd.c b/src/pluto/rnd.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 7941034d8..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/rnd.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,250 +0,0 @@
-/* randomness machinery
- * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
- * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: rnd.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-/* A true random number generator (we hope)
- *
- * Under LINUX ("linux" predefined), use /dev/urandom.
- * Under OpenBSD ("__OpenBSD__" predefined), use arc4random().
- * Otherwise use our own random number generator based on clock skew.
- *   I (ADK) first heard of the idea from John Ioannidis, who heard it
- *   from Matt Blaze and/or Jack Lacy.
- * ??? Why is mixing need for linux but not OpenBSD?
- */
-
-/* Pluto's uses of randomness:
- *
- * - Setting up the "secret_of_the_day".  This changes every hour!  20
- *   bytes a shot.  It is used in building responder cookies.
- *
- * - generating initiator cookies (8 bytes, once per Phase 1 initiation).
- *
- * - 32 bytes per DH local secret.  Once per Main Mode exchange and once
- *   per Quick Mode Exchange with PFS.  (Size is our choice, with
- *   tradeoffs.)
- *
- * - 16 bytes per nonce we generate.  Once per Main Mode exchange and
- *   once per Quick Mode exchange.  (Again, we choose the size.)
- *
- * - 4 bytes per SPI number that we generate.  We choose the SPIs for all
- *   inbound SPIs, one to three per IPSEC SA (one for AH (rare, probably)
- *   one for ESP (almost always), and one for tunnel (very common)).
- *   I don't actually know how the kernel would generate these numbers --
- *   currently Pluto generates them; this isn't the way things will be
- *   done in the future.
- *
- * - 4 bytes per Message ID we need to generate.  One per Quick Mode
- *   exchange.  Eventually, one per informational exchange.
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <signal.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <errno.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-
-#include <freeswan.h>
-
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "timer.h"
-
-#ifdef linux
-# define USE_DEV_RANDOM	1
-# define RANDOM_PATH    DEV_URANDOM
-#else
-# ifdef __OpenBSD__
-#  define USE_ARC4RANDOM
-# else
-#   define USE_CLOCK_SLEW
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#ifdef USE_ARC4RANDOM
-
-#define get_rnd_byte() (arc4random() % 256)
-
-#else	/**** start of large #else ****/
-
-#ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
-static int random_fd = NULL_FD;
-#endif
-
-#define RANDOM_POOL_SIZE   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
-static u_char random_pool[RANDOM_POOL_SIZE];
-
-#ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
-
-/* Generate (what we hope is) a true random byte using /dev/urandom  */
-static u_char
-generate_rnd_byte(void)
-{
-    u_char c;
-
-    if (read(random_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) == -1)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "read() failed in get_rnd_byte()"));
-
-    return c;
-}
-
-#else /* !USE_DEV_RANDOM */
-
-/* Generate (what we hope is) a true random byte using the clock skew trick.
- * Note: this code is not maintained!  In particular, LINUX signal(2)
- * semantics changed with glibc2 (and not for the better).  It isn't clear
- * that this code will work.  We keep the code because someday it might
- * come in handy.
- */
-# error "This code is not maintained.  Please define USE_DEV_RANDOM."
-
-static volatile sig_atomic_t i, j, k;
-
-/* timer signal handler */
-static void
-rnd_handler(int ignore_me UNUSED)
-{
-    k <<= 1;	/* Shift left by 1 */
-    j++;
-    k |= (i & 0x1); /* Get lsbit of counter */
-
-    if (j != 8)
-	signal(SIGVTALRM, rnd_handler);
-}
-
-static u_char
-generate_rnd_byte(void)
-{
-    struct itimerval tmval, ntmval;
-
-# ifdef NEVER	/* ??? */
-#  ifdef linux
-    int mask = siggetmask();
-
-    mask |= SIGVTALRM;
-    sigsetmask(mask);
-#  endif
-# endif
-
-    i = 0;
-    j = 0;
-
-    ntmval.it_interval.tv_sec = 0;
-    ntmval.it_interval.tv_usec = 1;
-    ntmval.it_value.tv_sec = 0;
-    ntmval.it_value.tv_usec = 1;
-    signal(SIGVTALRM, rnd_handler);
-    setitimer(ITIMER_VIRTUAL, &ntmval, &tmval);
-
-    while (j != 8)
-	i++;
-
-    setitimer(ITIMER_VIRTUAL, &tmval, &ntmval);
-    signal(SIGVTALRM, SIG_IGN);
-
-# ifdef NEVER	/* ??? */
-#  ifdef linux
-    mask ^= SIGVTALRM;
-    sigsetmask(mask);
-#  endif
-# endif
-
-    return k;
-}
-
-#endif /* !USE_DEV_RANDOM */
-
-static void
-mix_pool(void)
-{
-    SHA1_CTX ctx;
-
-    SHA1Init(&ctx);
-    SHA1Update(&ctx, random_pool, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE);
-    SHA1Final(random_pool, &ctx);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get a single random byte.
- */
-static u_char
-get_rnd_byte(void)
-{
-    random_pool[RANDOM_POOL_SIZE - 1] = generate_rnd_byte();
-    random_pool[0] = generate_rnd_byte();
-    mix_pool();
-    return random_pool[0];
-}
-
-#endif /* !USE_ARC4RANDOM */	/**** end of large #else ****/
-
-void
-get_rnd_bytes(u_char *buffer, int length)
-{
-    int i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
-	buffer[i] = get_rnd_byte();
-}
-
-/*
- * Initialize the random pool.
- */
-void
-init_rnd_pool(void)
-{
-#ifndef USE_ARC4RANDOM
-# ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
-    DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("opening %s", RANDOM_PATH));
-    random_fd = open(RANDOM_PATH, O_RDONLY);
-    if (random_fd == -1)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "open of %s failed in init_rnd_pool()", RANDOM_PATH));
-    fcntl(random_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
-# endif
-
-    get_rnd_bytes(random_pool, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE);
-    mix_pool();
-#endif /* !USE_ARC4RANDOM */
-
-    /* start of rand(3) on the right foot */
-    {
-	unsigned int seed;
-
-	get_rnd_bytes((void *)&seed, sizeof(seed));
-	srand(seed);
-    }
-}
-
-u_char    secret_of_the_day[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-#ifndef NO_PLUTO
-
-void
-init_secret(void)
-{
-    /*
-     * Generate the secret value for responder cookies, and
-     * schedule an event for refresh.
-     */
-    get_rnd_bytes(secret_of_the_day, sizeof(secret_of_the_day));
-    event_schedule(EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY, NULL);
-}
-
-#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
diff --git a/src/pluto/rnd.h b/src/pluto/rnd.h
deleted file mode 100644
index e32b68b47..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/rnd.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-/* randomness machinery
- * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
- *
- * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
- * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
- * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
- * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
- *
- * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
- * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
- * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
- * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: rnd.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
- */
-
-extern u_char    secret_of_the_day[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
-
-extern void get_rnd_bytes(u_char *buffer, int length);
-extern void init_rnd_pool(void);
-extern void init_secret(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/server.c b/src/pluto/server.c
index b0e158503..21f65f4f8 100644
--- a/src/pluto/server.c
+++ b/src/pluto/server.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: server.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -27,7 +25,7 @@
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <sys/un.h>
 #ifdef SOLARIS
-# include <sys/sockio.h>	/* for Solaris 2.6: defines SIOCGIFCONF */
+# include <sys/sockio.h>        /* for Solaris 2.6: defines SIOCGIFCONF */
 #endif
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <arpa/inet.h>
@@ -38,7 +36,7 @@
 #include <net/if.h>
 #include <sys/ioctl.h>
 #include <resolv.h>
-#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>       /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
@@ -55,9 +53,9 @@
 #include "demux.h"  /* needs packet.h */
 #include "rcv_whack.h"
 #include "keys.h"
-#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
-#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
-#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "adns.h"       /* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"     /* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "whack.h"      /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
 
 #include <pfkeyv2.h>
 #include <pfkey.h>
@@ -68,10 +66,10 @@
  *  Server main loop and socket initialization routines.
  */
 
-static const int on = TRUE;	/* by-reference parameter; constant, we hope */
+static const int on = TRUE;     /* by-reference parameter; constant, we hope */
 
 /* control (whack) socket */
-int ctl_fd = NULL_FD;	/* file descriptor of control (whack) socket */
+int ctl_fd = NULL_FD;   /* file descriptor of control (whack) socket */
 struct sockaddr_un ctl_addr = { AF_UNIX, DEFAULT_CTLBASE CTL_SUFFIX };
 
 /* info (showpolicy) socket */
@@ -86,121 +84,121 @@ struct sockaddr_un info_addr= { AF_UNIX, DEFAULT_CTLBASE INFO_SUFFIX };
 err_t
 init_ctl_socket(void)
 {
-    err_t failed = NULL;
-
-    delete_ctl_socket();	/* preventative medicine */
-    ctl_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-    if (ctl_fd == -1)
-	failed = "create";
-    else if (fcntl(ctl_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
-	failed = "fcntl FD+CLOEXEC";
-    else if (setsockopt(ctl_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
-	failed = "setsockopt";
-    else
-    {
-	/* to keep control socket secure, use umask */
-	mode_t ou = umask(~S_IRWXU);
-
-	if (bind(ctl_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ctl_addr
-	, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(ctl_addr.sun_path)) < 0)
-	    failed = "bind";
-	umask(ou);
-    }
-
-    /* 5 is a haphazardly chosen limit for the backlog.
-     * Rumour has it that this is the max on BSD systems.
-     */
-    if (failed == NULL && listen(ctl_fd, 5) < 0)
-	failed = "listen() on";
-
-    return failed == NULL? NULL : builddiag("could not %s control socket: %d %s"
-	    , failed, errno, strerror(errno));
+	err_t failed = NULL;
+
+	delete_ctl_socket();        /* preventative medicine */
+	ctl_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+	if (ctl_fd == -1)
+		failed = "create";
+	else if (fcntl(ctl_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
+		failed = "fcntl FD+CLOEXEC";
+	else if (setsockopt(ctl_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		failed = "setsockopt";
+	else
+	{
+		/* to keep control socket secure, use umask */
+		mode_t ou = umask(~S_IRWXU);
+
+		if (bind(ctl_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ctl_addr
+		, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(ctl_addr.sun_path)) < 0)
+			failed = "bind";
+		umask(ou);
+	}
+
+	/* 5 is a haphazardly chosen limit for the backlog.
+	 * Rumour has it that this is the max on BSD systems.
+	 */
+	if (failed == NULL && listen(ctl_fd, 5) < 0)
+		failed = "listen() on";
+
+	return failed == NULL? NULL : builddiag("could not %s control socket: %d %s"
+			, failed, errno, strerror(errno));
 }
 
 void
 delete_ctl_socket(void)
 {
-    /* Is noting failure useful?  Not when used as preventative medicine. */
-    unlink(ctl_addr.sun_path);
+	/* Is noting failure useful?  Not when used as preventative medicine. */
+	unlink(ctl_addr.sun_path);
 }
 
-bool listening = FALSE;	/* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
+bool listening = FALSE; /* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
 
-struct iface *interfaces = NULL;	/* public interfaces */
+struct iface *interfaces = NULL;        /* public interfaces */
 
 /* Initialize the interface sockets. */
 
 static void
 mark_ifaces_dead(void)
 {
-    struct iface *p;
+	struct iface *p;
 
-    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	p->change = IFN_DELETE;
+	for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+		p->change = IFN_DELETE;
 }
 
 static void
 free_dead_ifaces(void)
 {
-    struct iface *p;
-    bool some_dead = FALSE
-	, some_new = FALSE;
+	struct iface *p;
+	bool some_dead = FALSE
+		, some_new = FALSE;
 
-    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-    {
-	if (p->change == IFN_DELETE)
-	{
-	    plog("shutting down interface %s/%s %s"
-		, p->vname, p->rname, ip_str(&p->addr));
-	    some_dead = TRUE;
-	}
-	else if (p->change == IFN_ADD)
+	for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
 	{
-	    some_new = TRUE;
+		if (p->change == IFN_DELETE)
+		{
+			plog("shutting down interface %s/%s %s"
+				, p->vname, p->rname, ip_str(&p->addr));
+			some_dead = TRUE;
+		}
+		else if (p->change == IFN_ADD)
+		{
+			some_new = TRUE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    if (some_dead)
-    {
-	struct iface **pp;
 
-	release_dead_interfaces();
-	for (pp = &interfaces; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	if (some_dead)
 	{
-	    if (p->change == IFN_DELETE)
-	    {
-		*pp = p->next;	/* advance *pp */
-		pfree(p->vname);
-		pfree(p->rname);
-		close(p->fd);
-		pfree(p);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		pp = &p->next;	/* advance pp */
-	    }
+		struct iface **pp;
+
+		release_dead_interfaces();
+		for (pp = &interfaces; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+		{
+			if (p->change == IFN_DELETE)
+			{
+				*pp = p->next;  /* advance *pp */
+				free(p->vname);
+				free(p->rname);
+				close(p->fd);
+				free(p);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				pp = &p->next;  /* advance pp */
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* this must be done after the release_dead_interfaces
-     * in case some to the newly unoriented connections can
-     * become oriented here.
-     */
-    if (some_dead || some_new)
-	check_orientations();
+
+	/* this must be done after the release_dead_interfaces
+	 * in case some to the newly unoriented connections can
+	 * become oriented here.
+	 */
+	if (some_dead || some_new)
+		check_orientations();
 }
 
 void
 free_ifaces(void)
 {
-    mark_ifaces_dead();
-    free_dead_ifaces();
+	mark_ifaces_dead();
+	free_dead_ifaces();
 }
 
 struct raw_iface {
-    ip_address addr;
-    char name[IFNAMSIZ + 20];	/* what would be a safe size? */
-    struct raw_iface *next;
+	ip_address addr;
+	char name[IFNAMSIZ + 20];   /* what would be a safe size? */
+	struct raw_iface *next;
 };
 
 /* Called to handle --interface <ifname>
@@ -212,15 +210,15 @@ static int pluto_ifn_roof = 0;
 bool
 use_interface(const char *rifn)
 {
-    if (pluto_ifn_roof >= (int)elemsof(pluto_ifn))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	pluto_ifn[pluto_ifn_roof++] = rifn;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (pluto_ifn_roof >= (int)countof(pluto_ifn))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		pluto_ifn[pluto_ifn_roof++] = rifn;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 }
 
 #ifndef IPSECDEVPREFIX
@@ -230,538 +228,542 @@ use_interface(const char *rifn)
 static struct raw_iface *
 find_raw_ifaces4(void)
 {
-    int j;	/* index into buf */
-    struct ifconf ifconf;
-    struct ifreq buf[300];	/* for list of interfaces -- arbitrary limit */
-    struct raw_iface *rifaces = NULL;
-    int master_sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);    /* Get a UDP socket */
-
-    /* get list of interfaces with assigned IPv4 addresses from system */
-
-    if (master_sock == -1)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() failed in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
-
-    if (setsockopt(master_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR
-    , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "setsockopt() in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
-
-    /* bind the socket */
-    {
-	ip_address any;
-
-	happy(anyaddr(AF_INET, &any));
-	setportof(htons(pluto_port), &any);
-	if (bind(master_sock, sockaddrof(&any), sockaddrlenof(&any)) < 0)
-	    exit_log_errno((e, "bind() failed in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
-    }
-
-    /* Get local interfaces.  See netdevice(7). */
-    ifconf.ifc_len = sizeof(buf);
-    ifconf.ifc_buf = (void *) buf;
-    zero(buf);
-
-    if (ioctl(master_sock, SIOCGIFCONF, &ifconf) == -1)
-	exit_log_errno((e, "ioctl(SIOCGIFCONF) in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
-
-    /* Add an entry to rifaces for each interesting interface. */
-    for (j = 0; (j+1) * sizeof(*buf) <= (size_t)ifconf.ifc_len; j++)
-    {
-	struct raw_iface ri;
-	const struct sockaddr_in *rs = (struct sockaddr_in *) &buf[j].ifr_addr;
-	struct ifreq auxinfo;
-
-	/* ignore all but AF_INET interfaces */
-	if (rs->sin_family != AF_INET)
-	    continue;	/* not interesting */
-
-	/* build a NUL-terminated copy of the rname field */
-	memcpy(ri.name, buf[j].ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
-	ri.name[IFNAMSIZ] = '\0';
-
-	/* ignore if our interface names were specified, and this isn't one */
-	if (pluto_ifn_roof != 0)
+	int j;      /* index into buf */
+	struct ifconf ifconf;
+	struct ifreq buf[300];      /* for list of interfaces -- arbitrary limit */
+	struct raw_iface *rifaces = NULL;
+	int master_sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);    /* Get a UDP socket */
+
+	/* get list of interfaces with assigned IPv4 addresses from system */
+
+	if (master_sock == -1)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "socket() failed in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
+
+	if (setsockopt(master_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR
+	, (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "setsockopt() in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
+
+	/* bind the socket */
 	{
-	    int i;
+		ip_address any;
 
-	    for (i = 0; i != pluto_ifn_roof; i++)
-		if (streq(ri.name, pluto_ifn[i]))
-		    break;
-	    if (i == pluto_ifn_roof)
-		continue;	/* not found -- skip */
+		happy(anyaddr(AF_INET, &any));
+		setportof(htons(pluto_port), &any);
+		if (bind(master_sock, sockaddrof(&any), sockaddrlenof(&any)) < 0)
+			exit_log_errno((e, "bind() failed in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
 	}
 
-	/* Find out stuff about this interface.  See netdevice(7). */
-	zero(&auxinfo);	/* paranoia */
-	memcpy(auxinfo.ifr_name, buf[j].ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
-	if (ioctl(master_sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &auxinfo) == -1)
-	    exit_log_errno((e
-		, "ioctl(SIOCGIFFLAGS) for %s in find_raw_ifaces4()"
-		, ri.name));
-	if (!(auxinfo.ifr_flags & IFF_UP))
-	    continue;	/* ignore an interface that isn't UP */
+	/* Get local interfaces.  See netdevice(7). */
+	ifconf.ifc_len = sizeof(buf);
+	ifconf.ifc_buf = (void *) buf;
+	zero(buf);
 
-	/* ignore unconfigured interfaces */
-	if (rs->sin_addr.s_addr == 0)
-	    continue;
+	if (ioctl(master_sock, SIOCGIFCONF, &ifconf) == -1)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "ioctl(SIOCGIFCONF) in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
 
-	happy(initaddr((const void *)&rs->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)
-	    , AF_INET, &ri.addr));
+	/* Add an entry to rifaces for each interesting interface. */
+	for (j = 0; (j+1) * sizeof(*buf) <= (size_t)ifconf.ifc_len; j++)
+	{
+		struct raw_iface ri;
+		const struct sockaddr_in *rs = (struct sockaddr_in *) &buf[j].ifr_addr;
+		struct ifreq auxinfo;
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("found %s with address %s"
-	    , ri.name, ip_str(&ri.addr)));
-	ri.next = rifaces;
-	rifaces = clone_thing(ri, "struct raw_iface");
-    }
+		/* ignore all but AF_INET interfaces */
+		if (rs->sin_family != AF_INET)
+			continue;   /* not interesting */
 
-    close(master_sock);
+		/* build a NUL-terminated copy of the rname field */
+		memcpy(ri.name, buf[j].ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
+		ri.name[IFNAMSIZ] = '\0';
 
-    return rifaces;
+		/* ignore if our interface names were specified, and this isn't one */
+		if (pluto_ifn_roof != 0)
+		{
+			int i;
+
+			for (i = 0; i != pluto_ifn_roof; i++)
+				if (streq(ri.name, pluto_ifn[i]))
+					break;
+			if (i == pluto_ifn_roof)
+				continue;       /* not found -- skip */
+		}
+
+		/* Find out stuff about this interface.  See netdevice(7). */
+		zero(&auxinfo); /* paranoia */
+		memcpy(auxinfo.ifr_name, buf[j].ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
+		if (ioctl(master_sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &auxinfo) == -1)
+			exit_log_errno((e
+				, "ioctl(SIOCGIFFLAGS) for %s in find_raw_ifaces4()"
+				, ri.name));
+		if (!(auxinfo.ifr_flags & IFF_UP))
+			continue;   /* ignore an interface that isn't UP */
+
+		/* ignore unconfigured interfaces */
+		if (rs->sin_addr.s_addr == 0)
+			continue;
+
+		happy(initaddr((const void *)&rs->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)
+			, AF_INET, &ri.addr));
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("found %s with address %s"
+			, ri.name, ip_str(&ri.addr)));
+		ri.next = rifaces;
+		rifaces = clone_thing(ri);
+	}
+
+	close(master_sock);
+
+	return rifaces;
 }
 
 static struct raw_iface *
 find_raw_ifaces6(void)
 {
 
-    /* Get list of interfaces with IPv6 addresses from system from /proc/net/if_inet6).
-     *
-     * Documentation of format?
-     * RTFS: linux-2.2.16/net/ipv6/addrconf.c:iface_proc_info()
-     *       linux-2.4.9-13/net/ipv6/addrconf.c:iface_proc_info()
-     *
-     * Sample from Gerhard's laptop:
-     *	00000000000000000000000000000001 01 80 10 80       lo
-     *	30490009000000000000000000010002 02 40 00 80   ipsec0
-     *	30490009000000000000000000010002 07 40 00 80     eth0
-     *	fe80000000000000025004fffefd5484 02 0a 20 80   ipsec0
-     *	fe80000000000000025004fffefd5484 07 0a 20 80     eth0
-     *
-     * Each line contains:
-     * - IPv6 address: 16 bytes, in hex, no punctuation
-     * - ifindex: 1 byte, in hex
-     * - prefix_len: 1 byte, in hex
-     * - scope (e.g. global, link local): 1 byte, in hex
-     * - flags: 1 byte, in hex
-     * - device name: string, followed by '\n'
-     */
-    struct raw_iface *rifaces = NULL;
-    static const char proc_name[] = "/proc/net/if_inet6";
-    FILE *proc_sock = fopen(proc_name, "r");
-
-    if (proc_sock == NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("could not open %s", proc_name));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	for (;;)
+	/* Get list of interfaces with IPv6 addresses from system from /proc/net/if_inet6).
+	 *
+	 * Documentation of format?
+	 * RTFS: linux-2.2.16/net/ipv6/addrconf.c:iface_proc_info()
+	 *       linux-2.4.9-13/net/ipv6/addrconf.c:iface_proc_info()
+	 *
+	 * Sample from Gerhard's laptop:
+	 *  00000000000000000000000000000001 01 80 10 80       lo
+	 *  30490009000000000000000000010002 02 40 00 80   ipsec0
+	 *  30490009000000000000000000010002 07 40 00 80     eth0
+	 *  fe80000000000000025004fffefd5484 02 0a 20 80   ipsec0
+	 *  fe80000000000000025004fffefd5484 07 0a 20 80     eth0
+	 *
+	 * Each line contains:
+	 * - IPv6 address: 16 bytes, in hex, no punctuation
+	 * - ifindex: 1 byte, in hex
+	 * - prefix_len: 1 byte, in hex
+	 * - scope (e.g. global, link local): 1 byte, in hex
+	 * - flags: 1 byte, in hex
+	 * - device name: string, followed by '\n'
+	 */
+	struct raw_iface *rifaces = NULL;
+	static const char proc_name[] = "/proc/net/if_inet6";
+	FILE *proc_sock = fopen(proc_name, "r");
+
+	if (proc_sock == NULL)
 	{
-	    struct raw_iface ri;
-	    unsigned short xb[8];	/* IPv6 address as 8 16-bit chunks */
-	    char sb[8*5];	/* IPv6 address as string-with-colons */
-	    unsigned int if_idx;	/* proc field, not used */
-	    unsigned int plen;	/* proc field, not used */
-	    unsigned int scope;	/* proc field, used to exclude link-local */
-	    unsigned int dad_status;	/* proc field, not used */
-	    /* ??? I hate and distrust scanf -- DHR */
-	    int r = fscanf(proc_sock
-		, "%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx"
-		  " %02x %02x %02x %02x %20s\n"
-		, xb+0, xb+1, xb+2, xb+3, xb+4, xb+5, xb+6, xb+7
-		, &if_idx, &plen, &scope, &dad_status, ri.name);
-
-	    /* ??? we should diagnose any problems */
-	    if (r != 13)
-		break;
-
-	    /* ignore addresses with link local scope.
-	     * From linux-2.4.9-13/include/net/ipv6.h:
-	     * IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL	0x0020U
-	     * IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_MASK	0x00f0U
-	     */
-	    if ((scope & 0x00f0U) == 0x0020U)
-		continue;
-
-	    snprintf(sb, sizeof(sb)
-		, "%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x"
-		, xb[0], xb[1], xb[2], xb[3], xb[4], xb[5], xb[6], xb[7]);
-
-	    happy(ttoaddr(sb, 0, AF_INET6, &ri.addr));
-
-	    if (!isunspecaddr(&ri.addr))
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL
-		    , DBG_log("found %s with address %s"
-			, ri.name, sb));
-		ri.next = rifaces;
-		rifaces = clone_thing(ri, "struct raw_iface");
-	    }
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("could not open %s", proc_name));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		for (;;)
+		{
+			struct raw_iface ri;
+			unsigned short xb[8];       /* IPv6 address as 8 16-bit chunks */
+			char sb[8*5];       /* IPv6 address as string-with-colons */
+			unsigned int if_idx;        /* proc field, not used */
+			unsigned int plen;  /* proc field, not used */
+			unsigned int scope; /* proc field, used to exclude link-local */
+			unsigned int dad_status;    /* proc field, not used */
+			/* ??? I hate and distrust scanf -- DHR */
+			int r = fscanf(proc_sock
+				, "%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx"
+				  " %02x %02x %02x %02x %20s\n"
+				, xb+0, xb+1, xb+2, xb+3, xb+4, xb+5, xb+6, xb+7
+				, &if_idx, &plen, &scope, &dad_status, ri.name);
+
+			/* ??? we should diagnose any problems */
+			if (r != 13)
+				break;
+
+			/* ignore addresses with link local scope.
+			 * From linux-2.4.9-13/include/net/ipv6.h:
+			 * IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL      0x0020U
+			 * IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_MASK     0x00f0U
+			 */
+			if ((scope & 0x00f0U) == 0x0020U)
+				continue;
+
+			snprintf(sb, sizeof(sb)
+				, "%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x"
+				, xb[0], xb[1], xb[2], xb[3], xb[4], xb[5], xb[6], xb[7]);
+
+			happy(ttoaddr(sb, 0, AF_INET6, &ri.addr));
+
+			if (!isunspecaddr(&ri.addr))
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+					, DBG_log("found %s with address %s"
+						, ri.name, sb));
+				ri.next = rifaces;
+				rifaces = clone_thing(ri);
+			}
+		}
+		fclose(proc_sock);
 	}
-	fclose(proc_sock);
-    }
 
-    return rifaces;
+	return rifaces;
 }
 
 #if 1
 static int
 create_socket(struct raw_iface *ifp, const char *v_name, int port)
 {
-    int fd = socket(addrtypeof(&ifp->addr), SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
-    int fcntl_flags;
+	int fd = socket(addrtypeof(&ifp->addr), SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
+	int fcntl_flags;
 
-    if (fd < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "socket() in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	return -1;
-    }
+	if (fd < 0)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "socket() in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+		return -1;
+	}
 
 #if 1
-    /* Set socket Nonblocking */
-    if ((fcntl_flags=fcntl(fd, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
-	if (!(fcntl_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
-	    fcntl_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
-	    fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl_flags);
+	/* Set socket Nonblocking */
+	if ((fcntl_flags=fcntl(fd, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
+		if (!(fcntl_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+			fcntl_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
+			fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl_flags);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-#endif
-
-    if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "fcntl(,, FD_CLOEXEC) in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	close(fd);
-	return -1;
-    }
-
-    if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR
-    , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	close(fd);
-	return -1;
-    }
-
-    /* To improve error reporting.  See ip(7). */
-#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
-    if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR
-    , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "setsockopt IP_RECVERR in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	close(fd);
-	return -1;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /* With IPv6, there is no fragmentation after
-     * it leaves our interface.  PMTU discovery
-     * is mandatory but doesn't work well with IKE (why?).
-     * So we must set the IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU option.
-     * See draft-ietf-ipngwg-rfc2292bis-01.txt 11.1
-     */
-#ifdef IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU	/* YUCK: not always defined */
-    if (addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET6
-    && setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU
-      , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	close(fd);
-	return -1;
-    }
 #endif
 
-#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
-    if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
-    {
-	struct sadb_x_policy policy;
-	int level, opt;
-
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_len = sizeof(policy) / IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY;
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS;
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_dir = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND;
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_reserved = 0;
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_id = 0;
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_reserved2 = 0;
-
-	if (addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET6)
+	if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
 	{
-	    level = IPPROTO_IPV6;
-	    opt = IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY;
+		log_errno((e, "fcntl(,, FD_CLOEXEC) in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR
+	, (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
 	{
-	    level = IPPROTO_IP;
-	    opt = IP_IPSEC_POLICY;
+		log_errno((e, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
 	}
 
-	if (setsockopt(fd, level, opt
-	  , &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
+	/* To improve error reporting.  See ip(7). */
+#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
+	if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR
+	, (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
 	{
-	    log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPSEC_POLICY in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	    close(fd);
-	    return -1;
+		log_errno((e, "setsockopt IP_RECVERR in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
 	}
+#endif
 
-	policy.sadb_x_policy_dir = IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND;
+	/* With IPv6, there is no fragmentation after
+	 * it leaves our interface.  PMTU discovery
+	 * is mandatory but doesn't work well with IKE (why?).
+	 * So we must set the IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU option.
+	 * See draft-ietf-ipngwg-rfc2292bis-01.txt 11.1
+	 */
+#ifdef IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU /* YUCK: not always defined */
+	if (addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET6
+	&& setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU
+	  , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+#endif
 
-	if (setsockopt(fd, level, opt
-	  , &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+	if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
 	{
-	    log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPSEC_POLICY in process_raw_ifaces()"));
-	    close(fd);
-	    return -1;
+		struct sadb_x_policy policy;
+		int level, opt;
+
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_len = sizeof(policy) / IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY;
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS;
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_dir = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND;
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_reserved = 0;
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_id = 0;
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_reserved2 = 0;
+
+		if (addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET6)
+		{
+			level = IPPROTO_IPV6;
+			opt = IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			level = IPPROTO_IP;
+			opt = IP_IPSEC_POLICY;
+		}
+
+		if (setsockopt(fd, level, opt
+		  , &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPSEC_POLICY in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+			close(fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+		policy.sadb_x_policy_dir = IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND;
+
+		if (setsockopt(fd, level, opt
+		  , &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
+		{
+			log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPSEC_POLICY in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+			close(fd);
+			return -1;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #endif
 
-    setportof(htons(port), &ifp->addr);
-    if (bind(fd, sockaddrof(&ifp->addr), sockaddrlenof(&ifp->addr)) < 0)
-    {
-	log_errno((e, "bind() for %s/%s %s:%u in process_raw_ifaces()"
-	    , ifp->name, v_name
-	    , ip_str(&ifp->addr), (unsigned) port));
-	close(fd);
-	return -1;
-    }
-    setportof(htons(pluto_port), &ifp->addr);
-    return fd;
+	setportof(htons(port), &ifp->addr);
+	if (bind(fd, sockaddrof(&ifp->addr), sockaddrlenof(&ifp->addr)) < 0)
+	{
+		log_errno((e, "bind() for %s/%s %s:%u in process_raw_ifaces()"
+			, ifp->name, v_name
+			, ip_str(&ifp->addr), (unsigned) port));
+		close(fd);
+		return -1;
+	}
+	setportof(htons(pluto_port), &ifp->addr);
+	return fd;
 }
 #endif
 
 static void
 process_raw_ifaces(struct raw_iface *rifaces)
 {
-    struct raw_iface *ifp;
-
-    /* Find all virtual/real interface pairs.
-     * For each real interface...
-     */
-    for (ifp = rifaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
-    {
-	struct raw_iface *v = NULL;	/* matching ipsecX interface */
-	struct raw_iface fake_v;
-	bool after = FALSE; /* has vfp passed ifp on the list? */
-	bool bad = FALSE;
-	struct raw_iface *vfp;
-
-	/* ignore if virtual (ipsec*) interface */
-	if (strncmp(ifp->name, IPSECDEVPREFIX, sizeof(IPSECDEVPREFIX)-1) == 0)
-	    continue;
-
-	for (vfp = rifaces; vfp != NULL; vfp = vfp->next)
+	struct raw_iface *ifp;
+
+	/* Find all virtual/real interface pairs.
+	 * For each real interface...
+	 */
+	for (ifp = rifaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
 	{
-	    if (vfp == ifp)
-	    {
-		after = TRUE;
-	    }
-	    else if (sameaddr(&ifp->addr, &vfp->addr))
-	    {
-		/* Different entries with matching IP addresses.
-		 * Many interesting cases.
-		 */
-		if (strncmp(vfp->name, IPSECDEVPREFIX, sizeof(IPSECDEVPREFIX)-1) == 0)
+		struct raw_iface *v = NULL;     /* matching ipsecX interface */
+		struct raw_iface fake_v;
+		bool after = FALSE; /* has vfp passed ifp on the list? */
+		bool bad = FALSE;
+		struct raw_iface *vfp;
+
+		/* ignore if virtual (ipsec*) interface */
+		if (strneq(ifp->name, IPSECDEVPREFIX, sizeof(IPSECDEVPREFIX)-1))
 		{
-		    if (v != NULL  && !streq(v->name, vfp->name))
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "ipsec interfaces %s and %s share same address %s"
-			    , v->name, vfp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr));
-			bad = TRUE;
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			v = vfp;	/* current winner */
-		    }
+			continue;
 		}
-		else
+
+		for (vfp = rifaces; vfp != NULL; vfp = vfp->next)
 		{
-		    /* ugh: a second real interface with the same IP address
-		     * "after" allows us to avoid double reporting.
-		     */
-#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
-		    if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
-		    {
-			if (after)
+			if (vfp == ifp)
 			{
-			    bad = TRUE;
-			    break;
+				after = TRUE;
 			}
-			continue;
-		    }
+			else if (sameaddr(&ifp->addr, &vfp->addr))
+			{
+				/* Different entries with matching IP addresses.
+				 * Many interesting cases.
+				 */
+				if (strneq(vfp->name, IPSECDEVPREFIX, sizeof(IPSECDEVPREFIX)-1))
+				{
+					if (v != NULL  && !streq(v->name, vfp->name))
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "ipsec interfaces %s and %s share same address %s"
+							, v->name, vfp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr));
+						bad = TRUE;
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						v = vfp;        /* current winner */
+					}
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* ugh: a second real interface with the same IP address
+					 * "after" allows us to avoid double reporting.
+					 */
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+					if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
+					{
+						if (after)
+						{
+							bad = TRUE;
+							break;
+						}
+						continue;
+					}
 #endif
-		    if (after)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "IP interfaces %s and %s share address %s!"
-			    , ifp->name, vfp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr));
-		    }
-		    bad = TRUE;
+					if (after)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "IP interfaces %s and %s share address %s!"
+							, ifp->name, vfp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr));
+					}
+					bad = TRUE;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	}
 
-	if (bad)
-	    continue;
+		if (bad)
+			continue;
 
 #if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
-	if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
-	{
-	    v = ifp;
-	    goto add_entry;
-	}
+		if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
+		{
+			v = ifp;
+			goto add_entry;
+		}
 #endif
 
-	/* what if we didn't find a virtual interface? */
-	if (v == NULL)
-	{
-	    if (no_klips)
-	    {
-		/* kludge for testing: invent a virtual device */
-		static const char fvp[] = "virtual";
-		fake_v = *ifp;
-		passert(sizeof(fake_v.name) > sizeof(fvp));
-		strcpy(fake_v.name, fvp);
-		addrtot(&ifp->addr, 0, fake_v.name + sizeof(fvp) - 1
-		    , sizeof(fake_v.name) - (sizeof(fvp) - 1));
-		v = &fake_v;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			DBG_log("IP interface %s %s has no matching ipsec* interface -- ignored"
-			    , ifp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr)));
-		continue;
-	    }
-	}
+		/* what if we didn't find a virtual interface? */
+		if (v == NULL)
+		{
+			if (no_klips)
+			{
+				/* kludge for testing: invent a virtual device */
+				static const char fvp[] = "virtual";
+				fake_v = *ifp;
+				passert(sizeof(fake_v.name) > sizeof(fvp));
+				strcpy(fake_v.name, fvp);
+				addrtot(&ifp->addr, 0, fake_v.name + sizeof(fvp) - 1
+					, sizeof(fake_v.name) - (sizeof(fvp) - 1));
+				v = &fake_v;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+						DBG_log("IP interface %s %s has no matching ipsec* interface -- ignored"
+							, ifp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr)));
+				continue;
+			}
+		}
 
-	/* We've got all we need; see if this is a new thing:
-	 * search old interfaces list.
-	 */
+		/* We've got all we need; see if this is a new thing:
+		 * search old interfaces list.
+		 */
 #if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
 add_entry:
 #endif
-	{
-	    struct iface **p = &interfaces;
-
-	    for (;;)
-	    {
-		struct iface *q = *p;
-
-		/* search is over if at end of list */
-		if (q == NULL)
 		{
-		    /* matches nothing -- create a new entry */
-		    int fd = create_socket(ifp, v->name, pluto_port);
-
-		    if (fd < 0)
-			break;
-
-		    if (nat_traversal_support_non_ike
-		    && addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET)
-		    {
-			nat_traversal_espinudp_socket(fd, ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE);
-		    }
-
-		    q = alloc_thing(struct iface, "struct iface");
-		    q->rname = clone_str(ifp->name, "real device name");
-		    q->vname = clone_str(v->name, "virtual device name");
-		    q->addr = ifp->addr;
-		    q->fd = fd;
-		    q->next = interfaces;
-		    q->change = IFN_ADD;
-		    interfaces = q;
-		    plog("adding interface %s/%s %s:%d"
-			, q->vname, q->rname, ip_str(&q->addr), pluto_port);
-
-		    if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating
-		    && addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET)
-		    {
-			fd = create_socket(ifp, v->name, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
-			if (fd < 0)
-			    break;
-			nat_traversal_espinudp_socket(fd,
-			    ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_ESP);
-			q = alloc_thing(struct iface, "struct iface");
-			q->rname = clone_str(ifp->name, "real device name");
-			q->vname = clone_str(v->name, "virtual device name");
-			q->addr = ifp->addr;
-			setportof(htons(NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT), &q->addr);
-			q->fd = fd;
-			q->next = interfaces;
-			q->change = IFN_ADD;
-			q->ike_float = TRUE;
-			interfaces = q;
-			plog("adding interface %s/%s %s:%d",
-			q->vname, q->rname, ip_str(&q->addr), NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
-		    }
-		    break;
-		}
+			struct iface **p = &interfaces;
 
-		/* search over if matching old entry found */
-		if (streq(q->rname, ifp->name)
-		&& streq(q->vname, v->name)
-		&& sameaddr(&q->addr, &ifp->addr))
-		{
-		    /* matches -- rejuvinate old entry */
-		    q->change = IFN_KEEP;
-
-		    /* look for other interfaces to keep (due to NAT-T) */
-		    for (q = q->next ; q ; q = q->next)
-		    {
-			if (streq(q->rname, ifp->name)
-			&& streq(q->vname, v->name)
-			&& sameaddr(&q->addr, &ifp->addr))
+			for (;;)
 			{
-			    q->change = IFN_KEEP;
-			}
-		    }
-		    break;
+				struct iface *q = *p;
+
+				/* search is over if at end of list */
+				if (q == NULL)
+				{
+					/* matches nothing -- create a new entry */
+					int fd = create_socket(ifp, v->name, pluto_port);
+
+					if (fd < 0)
+						break;
+
+					if (nat_traversal_support_non_ike
+					&& addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET)
+					{
+						nat_traversal_espinudp_socket(fd, ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE);
+					}
+
+					q = malloc_thing(struct iface);
+					zero(q);
+					q->rname = clone_str(ifp->name);
+					q->vname = clone_str(v->name);
+					q->addr = ifp->addr;
+					q->fd = fd;
+					q->next = interfaces;
+					q->change = IFN_ADD;
+					interfaces = q;
+					plog("adding interface %s/%s %s:%d"
+						, q->vname, q->rname, ip_str(&q->addr), pluto_port);
+
+					if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating
+					&& addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET)
+					{
+						fd = create_socket(ifp, v->name, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
+						if (fd < 0)
+							break;
+						nat_traversal_espinudp_socket(fd,
+							ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_ESP);
+						q = malloc_thing(struct iface);
+						zero(q);
+						q->rname = clone_str(ifp->name);
+						q->vname = clone_str(v->name);
+						q->addr = ifp->addr;
+						setportof(htons(NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT), &q->addr);
+						q->fd = fd;
+						q->next = interfaces;
+						q->change = IFN_ADD;
+						q->ike_float = TRUE;
+						interfaces = q;
+						plog("adding interface %s/%s %s:%d",
+						q->vname, q->rname, ip_str(&q->addr), NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
+					}
+					break;
+				}
+
+				/* search over if matching old entry found */
+				if (streq(q->rname, ifp->name)
+				&& streq(q->vname, v->name)
+				&& sameaddr(&q->addr, &ifp->addr))
+				{
+					/* matches -- rejuvinate old entry */
+					q->change = IFN_KEEP;
+
+					/* look for other interfaces to keep (due to NAT-T) */
+					for (q = q->next ; q ; q = q->next)
+					{
+						if (streq(q->rname, ifp->name)
+						&& streq(q->vname, v->name)
+						&& sameaddr(&q->addr, &ifp->addr))
+						{
+							q->change = IFN_KEEP;
+						}
+					}
+					break;
+				}
+
+				/* try again */
+				p = &q->next;
+			} /* for (;;) */
 		}
-
-		/* try again */
-		p = &q->next;
-	    } /* for (;;) */
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* delete the raw interfaces list */
-    while (rifaces != NULL)
-    {
-	struct raw_iface *t = rifaces;
+	/* delete the raw interfaces list */
+	while (rifaces != NULL)
+	{
+		struct raw_iface *t = rifaces;
 
-	rifaces = t->next;
-	pfree(t);
-    }
+		rifaces = t->next;
+		free(t);
+	}
 }
 
 void
 find_ifaces(void)
 {
-    mark_ifaces_dead();
-    process_raw_ifaces(find_raw_ifaces4());
-    process_raw_ifaces(find_raw_ifaces6());
+	mark_ifaces_dead();
+	process_raw_ifaces(find_raw_ifaces4());
+	process_raw_ifaces(find_raw_ifaces6());
 
-    free_dead_ifaces();	    /* ditch remaining old entries */
+	free_dead_ifaces();     /* ditch remaining old entries */
 
-    if (interfaces == NULL)
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no public interfaces found");
+	if (interfaces == NULL)
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no public interfaces found");
 }
 
 void
 show_ifaces_status(void)
 {
-    struct iface *p;
+	struct iface *p;
 
-    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "interface %s/%s %s:%d"
-	    , p->vname, p->rname, ip_str(&p->addr), ntohs(portof(&p->addr)));
+	for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "interface %s/%s %s:%d"
+			, p->vname, p->rname, ip_str(&p->addr), ntohs(portof(&p->addr)));
 }
 
 void
 show_debug_status(void)
 {
 #ifdef DEBUG
-    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "debug %s"
-	, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, cur_debugging));
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "debug options: %s"
+		, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, cur_debugging));
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -770,7 +772,7 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t sighupflag = FALSE;
 static void
 huphandler(int sig UNUSED)
 {
-    sighupflag = TRUE;
+	sighupflag = TRUE;
 }
 
 static volatile sig_atomic_t sigtermflag = FALSE;
@@ -778,7 +780,7 @@ static volatile sig_atomic_t sigtermflag = FALSE;
 static void
 termhandler(int sig UNUSED)
 {
-    sigtermflag = TRUE;
+	sigtermflag = TRUE;
 }
 
 /* call_server listens for incoming ISAKMP packets and Whack messages,
@@ -787,206 +789,206 @@ termhandler(int sig UNUSED)
 void
 call_server(void)
 {
-    struct iface *ifp;
+	struct iface *ifp;
 
-    /* catch SIGHUP and SIGTERM */
-    {
-	int r;
-	struct sigaction act;
+	/* catch SIGHUP and SIGTERM */
+	{
+		int r;
+		struct sigaction act;
+
+		act.sa_handler = &huphandler;
+		sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
+		act.sa_flags = 0;       /* no SA_ONESHOT, no SA_RESTART, no nothing */
+		r = sigaction(SIGHUP, &act, NULL);
+		passert(r == 0);
+
+		act.sa_handler = &termhandler;
+		r = sigaction(SIGTERM, &act, NULL);
+		passert(r == 0);
+	}
 
-	act.sa_handler = &huphandler;
-	sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
-	act.sa_flags = 0;	/* no SA_ONESHOT, no SA_RESTART, no nothing */
-	r = sigaction(SIGHUP, &act, NULL);
-	passert(r == 0);
+	for (;;)
+	{
+		fd_set readfds;
+		fd_set writefds;
+		int ndes;
 
-	act.sa_handler = &termhandler;
-	r = sigaction(SIGTERM, &act, NULL);
-	passert(r == 0);
-    }
+		/* wait for next interesting thing */
 
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	fd_set readfds;
-	fd_set writefds;
-	int ndes;
+		for (;;)
+		{
+			long next_time = next_event();   /* time to any pending timer event */
+			int maxfd = ctl_fd;
 
-	/* wait for next interesting thing */
+			if (sigtermflag)
+				exit_pluto(0);
 
-	for (;;)
-	{
-	    long next_time = next_event();   /* time to any pending timer event */
-	    int maxfd = ctl_fd;
-
-	    if (sigtermflag)
-		exit_pluto(0);
-
-	    if (sighupflag)
-	    {
-		/* Ignorant folks think poking any daemon with SIGHUP
-		 * is polite.  We catch it and tell them otherwise.
-		 * There is one use: unsticking a hung recvfrom.
-		 * This sticking happens sometimes -- kernel bug?
-		 */
-		sighupflag = FALSE;
-		plog("Pluto ignores SIGHUP -- perhaps you want \"whack --listen\"");
-	    }
-
-	    FD_ZERO(&readfds);
-	    FD_ZERO(&writefds);
-	    FD_SET(ctl_fd, &readfds);
-
-	    /* the only write file-descriptor of interest */
-	    if (adns_qfd != NULL_FD && unsent_ADNS_queries)
-	    {
-		if (maxfd < adns_qfd)
-		    maxfd = adns_qfd;
-		FD_SET(adns_qfd, &writefds);
-	    }
-
-	    if (adns_afd != NULL_FD)
-	    {
-		if (maxfd < adns_afd)
-		    maxfd = adns_afd;
-		FD_SET(adns_afd, &readfds);
-	    }
+			if (sighupflag)
+			{
+				/* Ignorant folks think poking any daemon with SIGHUP
+				 * is polite.  We catch it and tell them otherwise.
+				 * There is one use: unsticking a hung recvfrom.
+				 * This sticking happens sometimes -- kernel bug?
+				 */
+				sighupflag = FALSE;
+				plog("Pluto ignores SIGHUP -- perhaps you want \"whack --listen\"");
+			}
+
+			FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+			FD_ZERO(&writefds);
+			FD_SET(ctl_fd, &readfds);
+
+			/* the only write file-descriptor of interest */
+			if (adns_qfd != NULL_FD && unsent_ADNS_queries)
+			{
+				if (maxfd < adns_qfd)
+					maxfd = adns_qfd;
+				FD_SET(adns_qfd, &writefds);
+			}
+
+			if (adns_afd != NULL_FD)
+			{
+				if (maxfd < adns_afd)
+					maxfd = adns_afd;
+				FD_SET(adns_afd, &readfds);
+			}
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
-	    if (!no_klips)
-	    {
-		int fd = *kernel_ops->async_fdp;
-
-		if (kernel_ops->process_queue)
-		    kernel_ops->process_queue();
-		if (maxfd < fd)
-		    maxfd = fd;
-		passert(!FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds));
-		FD_SET(fd, &readfds);
-	    }
+			if (!no_klips)
+			{
+				int fd = *kernel_ops->async_fdp;
+
+				if (kernel_ops->process_queue)
+					kernel_ops->process_queue();
+				if (maxfd < fd)
+					maxfd = fd;
+				passert(!FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds));
+				FD_SET(fd, &readfds);
+			}
 #endif
 
-	    if (listening)
-	    {
-		for (ifp = interfaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
-		{
-		    if (maxfd < ifp->fd)
-			maxfd = ifp->fd;
-		    passert(!FD_ISSET(ifp->fd, &readfds));
-		    FD_SET(ifp->fd, &readfds);
-		}
-	    }
-
-	    if (next_time == -1)
-	    {
-		/* select without timer */
-
-		ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, NULL);
-	    }
-	    else if (next_time == 0)
-	    {
-		/* timer without select: there is a timer event pending,
-		 * and it should fire now so don't bother to do the select.
-		 */
-		ndes = 0;	/* signify timer expiration */
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* select with timer */
+			if (listening)
+			{
+				for (ifp = interfaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
+				{
+					if (maxfd < ifp->fd)
+						maxfd = ifp->fd;
+					passert(!FD_ISSET(ifp->fd, &readfds));
+					FD_SET(ifp->fd, &readfds);
+				}
+			}
 
-		struct timeval tm;
+			if (next_time == -1)
+			{
+				/* select without timer */
 
-		tm.tv_sec = next_time;
-		tm.tv_usec = 0;
-		ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, &tm);
-	    }
+				ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, NULL);
+			}
+			else if (next_time == 0)
+			{
+				/* timer without select: there is a timer event pending,
+				 * and it should fire now so don't bother to do the select.
+				 */
+				ndes = 0;       /* signify timer expiration */
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* select with timer */
 
-	    if (ndes != -1)
-		break;	/* success */
+				struct timeval tm;
 
-	    if (errno != EINTR)
-		exit_log_errno((e, "select() failed in call_server()"));
+				tm.tv_sec = next_time;
+				tm.tv_usec = 0;
+				ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, &tm);
+			}
 
-	    /* retry if terminated by signal */
-	}
+			if (ndes != -1)
+				break;  /* success */
 
-	/* figure out what is interesting */
+			if (errno != EINTR)
+				exit_log_errno((e, "select() failed in call_server()"));
 
-	if (ndes == 0)
-	{
-	    /* timer event */
+			/* retry if terminated by signal */
+		}
 
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
-		DBG_log("*time to handle event"));
+		/* figure out what is interesting */
 
-	    handle_timer_event();
-	    passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /* at least one file descriptor is ready */
-
-	    if (adns_qfd != NULL_FD && FD_ISSET(adns_qfd, &writefds))
-	    {
-		passert(ndes > 0);
-		send_unsent_ADNS_queries();
-		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-		ndes--;
-	    }
-
-	    if (adns_afd != NULL_FD && FD_ISSET(adns_afd, &readfds))
-	    {
-		passert(ndes > 0);
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
-		    DBG_log("*received adns message"));
-		handle_adns_answer();
-		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-		ndes--;
-	    }
+		if (ndes == 0)
+		{
+			/* timer event */
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+				DBG_log("*time to handle event"));
+
+			handle_timer_event();
+			passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* at least one file descriptor is ready */
+
+			if (adns_qfd != NULL_FD && FD_ISSET(adns_qfd, &writefds))
+			{
+				passert(ndes > 0);
+				send_unsent_ADNS_queries();
+				passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+				ndes--;
+			}
+
+			if (adns_afd != NULL_FD && FD_ISSET(adns_afd, &readfds))
+			{
+				passert(ndes > 0);
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+					DBG_log("*received adns message"));
+				handle_adns_answer();
+				passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+				ndes--;
+			}
 
 #ifdef KLIPS
-	    if (!no_klips && FD_ISSET(*kernel_ops->async_fdp, &readfds))
-	    {
-		passert(ndes > 0);
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
-		    DBG_log("*received kernel message"));
-		kernel_ops->process_msg();
-		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-		ndes--;
-	    }
+			if (!no_klips && FD_ISSET(*kernel_ops->async_fdp, &readfds))
+			{
+				passert(ndes > 0);
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+					DBG_log("*received kernel message"));
+				kernel_ops->process_msg();
+				passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+				ndes--;
+			}
 #endif
 
-	    for (ifp = interfaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
-	    {
-		if (FD_ISSET(ifp->fd, &readfds))
-		{
-		    /* comm_handle will print DBG_CONTROL intro,
-		     * with more info than we have here.
-		     */
-
-		    passert(ndes > 0);
-		    comm_handle(ifp);
-		    passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-		    ndes--;
+			for (ifp = interfaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
+			{
+				if (FD_ISSET(ifp->fd, &readfds))
+				{
+					/* comm_handle will print DBG_CONTROL intro,
+					 * with more info than we have here.
+					 */
+
+					passert(ndes > 0);
+					comm_handle(ifp);
+					passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+					ndes--;
+				}
+			}
+
+			if (FD_ISSET(ctl_fd, &readfds))
+			{
+				passert(ndes > 0);
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+					DBG_log("*received whack message"));
+				whack_handle(ctl_fd);
+				passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+				ndes--;
+			}
+
+			passert(ndes == 0);
 		}
-	    }
-
-	    if (FD_ISSET(ctl_fd, &readfds))
-	    {
-		passert(ndes > 0);
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
-		    DBG_log("*received whack message"));
-		whack_handle(ctl_fd);
-		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-		ndes--;
-	    }
-
-	    passert(ndes == 0);
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/server.h b/src/pluto/server.h
index d0d46a5f4..b8123f6dc 100644
--- a/src/pluto/server.h
+++ b/src/pluto/server.h
@@ -10,20 +10,18 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: server.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-extern int ctl_fd;	/* file descriptor of control (whack) socket */
-extern struct sockaddr_un ctl_addr;	/* address of control (whack) socket */
+extern int ctl_fd;      /* file descriptor of control (whack) socket */
+extern struct sockaddr_un ctl_addr;     /* address of control (whack) socket */
 
-extern int info_fd;	/* file descriptor of control (info) socket */
-extern struct sockaddr_un info_addr;	/* address of control (info) socket */
+extern int info_fd;     /* file descriptor of control (info) socket */
+extern struct sockaddr_un info_addr;    /* address of control (info) socket */
 
 extern err_t init_ctl_socket(void);
 extern void delete_ctl_socket(void);
 
-extern bool listening;	/* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
+extern bool listening;  /* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
 
 
 /* interface: a terminal point for IKE traffic, IPsec transport mode
@@ -35,16 +33,16 @@ extern bool listening;	/* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
  * Note: the port for IKE is always implicitly UDP/pluto_port.
  */
 struct iface {
-    char *vname;	/* virtual (ipsec) device name */
-    char *rname;	/* real device name */
-    ip_address addr;	/* interface IP address */
-    int fd;	/* file descriptor of socket for IKE UDP messages */
-    struct iface *next;
-    bool ike_float;
-    enum { IFN_ADD, IFN_KEEP, IFN_DELETE } change;
+	char *vname;        /* virtual (ipsec) device name */
+	char *rname;        /* real device name */
+	ip_address addr;    /* interface IP address */
+	int fd;     /* file descriptor of socket for IKE UDP messages */
+	struct iface *next;
+	bool ike_float;
+	enum { IFN_ADD, IFN_KEEP, IFN_DELETE } change;
 };
 
-extern struct iface *interfaces;	/* public interfaces */
+extern struct iface *interfaces;        /* public interfaces */
 
 extern bool use_interface(const char *rifn);
 extern void find_ifaces(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/sha1.c b/src/pluto/sha1.c
deleted file mode 100644
index bbf062876..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/sha1.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-/*
-SHA-1 in C
-By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
-100% Public Domain
-
-Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
-"abc"
-  A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
-"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
-  84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
-A million repetitions of "a"
-  34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
-*/
-
-/* #define LITTLE_ENDIAN * This should be #define'd already, if true. */
-/* #define SHA1HANDSOFF * Copies data before messing with it. */
-
-#define SHA1HANDSOFF
-
-#include <string.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>	/* for u_int*_t */
-#include <endian.h>    /* sets BYTE_ORDER, LITTLE_ENDIAN, and BIG_ENDIAN */
-
-#include "sha1.h"
-
-#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
-
-/* blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand. */
-/* I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay */
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
-#define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
-    |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
-#elif BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
-#define blk0(i) block->l[i]
-#else
-#error "Endianness not defined!"
-#endif
-#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
-    ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
-
-/* (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations used in SHA1 */
-#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
-#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
-#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
-#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
-#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
-
-
-/* Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm. */
-
-void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const unsigned char buffer[64])
-{
-u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e;
-typedef union {
-    unsigned char c[64];
-    u_int32_t l[16];
-} CHAR64LONG16;
-#ifdef SHA1HANDSOFF
-CHAR64LONG16 block[1];  /* use array to appear as a pointer */
-    memcpy(block, buffer, 64);
-#else
-    /* The following had better never be used because it causes the
-     * pointer-to-const buffer to be cast into a pointer to non-const.
-     * And the result is written through.  I threw a "const" in, hoping
-     * this will cause a diagnostic.
-     */
-CHAR64LONG16* block = (const CHAR64LONG16*)buffer;
-#endif
-    /* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
-    a = state[0];
-    b = state[1];
-    c = state[2];
-    d = state[3];
-    e = state[4];
-    /* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
-    R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
-    R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
-    R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
-    R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
-    R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
-    R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
-    R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
-    R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
-    R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
-    R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
-    R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
-    R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
-    R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
-    R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
-    R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
-    R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
-    R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
-    R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
-    R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
-    R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
-    /* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
-    state[0] += a;
-    state[1] += b;
-    state[2] += c;
-    state[3] += d;
-    state[4] += e;
-    /* Wipe variables */
-    a = b = c = d = e = 0;
-#ifdef SHA1HANDSOFF
-    memset(block, '\0', sizeof(block));
-#endif
-}
-
-
-/* SHA1Init - Initialize new context */
-
-void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX* context)
-{
-    /* SHA1 initialization constants */
-    context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
-    context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
-    context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
-    context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
-    context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
-    context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
-}
-
-
-/* Run your data through this. */
-
-void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX* context, const unsigned char* data, u_int32_t len)
-{
-u_int32_t i;
-u_int32_t j;
-
-    j = context->count[0];
-    if ((context->count[0] += len << 3) < j)
-	context->count[1]++;
-    context->count[1] += (len>>29);
-    j = (j >> 3) & 63;
-    if ((j + len) > 63) {
-        memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
-        SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
-        for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64) {
-            SHA1Transform(context->state, &data[i]);
-        }
-        j = 0;
-    }
-    else i = 0;
-    memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
-}
-
-
-/* Add padding and return the message digest. */
-
-void SHA1Final(unsigned char digest[20], SHA1_CTX* context)
-{
-unsigned i;
-unsigned char finalcount[8];
-unsigned char c;
-
-#if 0	/* untested "improvement" by DHR */
-    /* Convert context->count to a sequence of bytes
-     * in finalcount.  Second element first, but
-     * big-endian order within element.
-     * But we do it all backwards.
-     */
-    unsigned char *fcp = &finalcount[8];
-
-    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
-    {
-	u_int32_t t = context->count[i];
-	int j;
-
-	for (j = 0; j < 4; t >>= 8, j++)
-	    *--fcp = (unsigned char) t
-    }
-#else
-    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
-        finalcount[i] = (unsigned char)((context->count[(i >= 4 ? 0 : 1)]
-         >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);  /* Endian independent */
-    }
-#endif
-    c = 0200;
-    SHA1Update(context, &c, 1);
-    while ((context->count[0] & 504) != 448) {
-	c = 0000;
-        SHA1Update(context, &c, 1);
-    }
-    SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8);  /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
-    for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
-        digest[i] = (unsigned char)
-         ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
-    }
-    /* Wipe variables */
-    memset(context, '\0', sizeof(*context));
-    memset(&finalcount, '\0', sizeof(finalcount));
-}
diff --git a/src/pluto/sha1.h b/src/pluto/sha1.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 64b3d2f5d..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/sha1.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-/*
-SHA-1 in C
-By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
-100% Public Domain
-*/
-
-typedef struct {
-    u_int32_t state[5];
-    u_int32_t count[2];
-    unsigned char buffer[64];
-} SHA1_CTX;
-
-void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const unsigned char buffer[64]);
-void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX* context);
-void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX* context, const unsigned char* data, u_int32_t len);
-void SHA1Final(unsigned char digest[20], SHA1_CTX* context);
diff --git a/src/pluto/smallprime.c b/src/pluto/smallprime.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 87497d096..000000000
--- a/src/pluto/smallprime.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-/* smallprime.c - List of small primes
- *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
- *
- * This file is part of GnuPG.
- *
- * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
- * (at your option) any later version.
- *
- * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
- * GNU General Public License for more details.
- *
- * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
- * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
- */
-
-#ifdef PLUTO
-#include <gmp.h>
-#include <freeswan.h>
-#include "constants.h"
-#include "defs.h"
-#include "gcryptfix.h"
-#else
-/* #include <config.h> */
-/* #include <stdio.h> */
-/* #include <stdlib.h> */
-/* #include "util.h" */
-/* #include "types.h" */
-#endif
-
-/* Note: 2 is not included because it can be tested more easily
- * by looking at bit 0. The last entry in this list is marked by a zero
- */
-ushort
-small_prime_numbers[] = {
-    3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43,
-    47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101,
-    103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151,
-    157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199,
-    211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263,
-    269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317,
-    331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383,
-    389, 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443,
-    449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503,
-    509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577,
-    587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, 641,
-    643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, 701,
-    709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769,
-    773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839,
-    853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, 911,
-    919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, 983,
-    991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033,
-    1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091,
-    1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151,
-    1153, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213,
-    1217, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277,
-    1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307,
-    1319, 1321, 1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, 1381, 1399,
-    1409, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451,
-    1453, 1459, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493,
-    1499, 1511, 1523, 1531, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559,
-    1567, 1571, 1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609,
-    1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667,
-    1669, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733,
-    1741, 1747, 1753, 1759, 1777, 1783, 1787, 1789,
-    1801, 1811, 1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871,
-    1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931,
-    1933, 1949, 1951, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997,
-    1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, 2039, 2053,
-    2063, 2069, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111,
-    2113, 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161,
-    2179, 2203, 2207, 2213, 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243,
-    2251, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, 2297,
-    2309, 2311, 2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357,
-    2371, 2377, 2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411,
-    2417, 2423, 2437, 2441, 2447, 2459, 2467, 2473,
-    2477, 2503, 2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551,
-    2557, 2579, 2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633,
-    2647, 2657, 2659, 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687,
-    2689, 2693, 2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, 2719, 2729,
-    2731, 2741, 2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791,
-    2797, 2801, 2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851,
-    2857, 2861, 2879, 2887, 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917,
-    2927, 2939, 2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, 2999,
-    3001, 3011, 3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061,
-    3067, 3079, 3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137,
-    3163, 3167, 3169, 3181, 3187, 3191, 3203, 3209,
-    3217, 3221, 3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271,
-    3299, 3301, 3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331,
-    3343, 3347, 3359, 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391,
-    3407, 3413, 3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, 3463, 3467,
-    3469, 3491, 3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533,
-    3539, 3541, 3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583,
-    3593, 3607, 3613, 3617, 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643,
-    3659, 3671, 3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, 3709,
-    3719, 3727, 3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779,
-    3793, 3797, 3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851,
-    3853, 3863, 3877, 3881, 3889, 3907, 3911, 3917,
-    3919, 3923, 3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989,
-    4001, 4003, 4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049,
-    4051, 4057, 4073, 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111,
-    4127, 4129, 4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, 4159, 4177,
-    4201, 4211, 4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243,
-    4253, 4259, 4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297,
-    4327, 4337, 4339, 4349, 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391,
-    4397, 4409, 4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, 4457,
-    4463, 4481, 4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519,
-    4523, 4547, 4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597,
-    4603, 4621, 4637, 4639, 4643, 4649, 4651, 4657,
-    4663, 4673, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729,
-    4733, 4751, 4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799,
-    4801, 4813, 4817, 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889,
-    4903, 4909, 4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, 4943, 4951,
-    4957, 4967, 4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999,
-    0
-};
-
-
diff --git a/src/pluto/smartcard.c b/src/pluto/smartcard.c
index 937c3f93a..7e4452d89 100644
--- a/src/pluto/smartcard.c
+++ b/src/pluto/smartcard.c
@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2005 Michael Joosten
  *
  * Copyright (C) 2005 Andreas Steffen
- * Hochschule für Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -17,8 +17,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: smartcard.c 3686 2008-03-28 11:48:14Z martin $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -30,7 +28,9 @@
 #include <dlfcn.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 
@@ -40,7 +40,6 @@
 #endif
 
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "ca.h"
@@ -50,7 +49,7 @@
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 
-#define DEFAULT_BASE	16
+#define DEFAULT_BASE    16
 
 /* chained list of smartcard records */
 static smartcard_t *smartcards   = NULL;
@@ -59,30 +58,30 @@ static smartcard_t *smartcards   = NULL;
 static int sc_number = 0;
 
 const smartcard_t empty_sc = {
-      NULL		 , /* next */
-            0		 , /* last_load */
-    { CERT_NONE, {NULL} }, /* last_cert */
-            0		 , /* count */
-            0		 , /* number */
-       999999		 , /* slot */
-      NULL		 , /* id */
-      NULL		 , /* label */
-    { NULL, 0 }		 , /* pin */
-      FALSE		 , /* pinpad */
-      FALSE		 , /* valid */
-      FALSE		 , /* session_opened */
-      FALSE		 , /* logged_in */
-      TRUE		 , /* any_slot */
-	    0L		 , /* session */
+	  NULL               , /* next */
+			0            , /* last_load */
+	{ CERT_NONE, {NULL} }, /* last_cert */
+			0            , /* count */
+			0            , /* number */
+	   999999            , /* slot */
+	  NULL               , /* id */
+	  NULL               , /* label */
+	{ NULL, 0 }          , /* pin */
+	  FALSE              , /* pinpad */
+	  FALSE              , /* valid */
+	  FALSE              , /* session_opened */
+	  FALSE              , /* logged_in */
+	  TRUE               , /* any_slot */
+			0L           , /* session */
 };
 
-#ifdef SMARTCARD	/* compile with smartcard support */
+#ifdef SMARTCARD        /* compile with smartcard support */
 
-#define SCX_MAGIC	0xd00bed00
+#define SCX_MAGIC       0xd00bed00
 
 struct scx_pkcs11_module {
-        u_int _magic;
-        void *handle;
+		u_int _magic;
+		void *handle;
 };
 
 typedef struct scx_pkcs11_module scx_pkcs11_module_t;
@@ -95,292 +94,292 @@ static CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pkcs11_functions = NULL_PTR;
 /* crytoki v2.11 - return values of PKCS #11 functions*/
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name[] = {
-	"CKR_OK",
-	"CKR_CANCEL",
-	"CKR_HOST_MEMORY",
-	"CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID",
-	"CKR_FLAGS_INVALID",
-	"CKR_GENERAL_ERROR",
-	"CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED",
-	"CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD",
-	"CKR_NO_EVENT",
-	"CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS",
-	"CKR_CANT_LOCK"
-    };
+		"CKR_OK",
+		"CKR_CANCEL",
+		"CKR_HOST_MEMORY",
+		"CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID",
+		"CKR_FLAGS_INVALID",
+		"CKR_GENERAL_ERROR",
+		"CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED",
+		"CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD",
+		"CKR_NO_EVENT",
+		"CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS",
+		"CKR_CANT_LOCK"
+	};
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_10[] = {
-	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY",
-	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE",
-	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID"
-    };
+		"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY",
+		"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE",
+		"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID"
+	};
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_20[] = {
-	"CKR_DATA_INVALID", 
-	"CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE"
-    };
+		"CKR_DATA_INVALID", 
+		"CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE"
+	};
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_30[] = {
-	"CKR_DEVICE_ERROR",
-	"CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY",
-	"CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED"
-    };
+		"CKR_DEVICE_ERROR",
+		"CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY",
+		"CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED"
+	};
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_40[] = {
-	"CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID",
-	"CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE"
-    };
+		"CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID",
+		"CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE"
+	};
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_50[] = {
-	"CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED",
-	"CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL",
-	"CKR_0x52_UNDEFINED",
-	"CKR_0x53_UNDEFINED",
-	"CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED"
-    };
+		"CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED",
+		"CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL",
+		"CKR_0x52_UNDEFINED",
+		"CKR_0x53_UNDEFINED",
+		"CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED"
+	};
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_60[] = {
-	"CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE",
-	"CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
-	"CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT",
-	"CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED",
-	"CKR_KEY_CHANGED",
-	"CKR_KEY_NEEDED",
-	"CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE",
-	"CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED",
-	"CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE",
-	"CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE"
-     };
+		"CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE",
+		"CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
+		"CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT",
+		"CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED",
+		"CKR_KEY_CHANGED",
+		"CKR_KEY_NEEDED",
+		"CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE",
+		"CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED",
+		"CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE",
+		"CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_70[] = {
-	"CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID",
-	"CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID"
-     };
+		"CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID",
+		"CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_80[] = {
-	"CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID"
-     };
+		"CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_90[] = {
-	"CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE",
-	"CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED"
-     };
+		"CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE",
+		"CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_A0[] = {
-	"CKR_PIN_INCORRECT",
-	"CKR_PIN_INVALID",
-	"CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE",
-	"CKR_PIN_EXPIRED",
-	"CKR_PIN_LOCKED"
-     };
+		"CKR_PIN_INCORRECT",
+		"CKR_PIN_INVALID",
+		"CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE",
+		"CKR_PIN_EXPIRED",
+		"CKR_PIN_LOCKED"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_B0[] = {
-	"CKR_SESSION_CLOSED",
-	"CKR_SESSION_COUNT",
-	"CKR_0xB2_UNDEFINED",
-	"CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED",
-	"CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY",
-	"CKR_SESSION_EXISTS",
-	"CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS",
-	"CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS"
-     };
+		"CKR_SESSION_CLOSED",
+		"CKR_SESSION_COUNT",
+		"CKR_0xB2_UNDEFINED",
+		"CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+		"CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY",
+		"CKR_SESSION_EXISTS",
+		"CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS",
+		"CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_C0[] = {
-	"CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE"
-     };
+		"CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_D0[] = {
-	"CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE",
-	"CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT"
-     };
+		"CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE",
+		"CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_E0[] = {
-	"CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT",
-	"CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED",
-	"CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED"
-     };
+		"CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT",
+		"CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED",
+		"CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_F0[] = {
-	"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
-	"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT"
-     };
+		"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
+		"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_100[] = {
-	"CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN",
-	"CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN",
-	"CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED",
-	"CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN",
-	"CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES"
-     };
+		"CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN",
+		"CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN",
+		"CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED",
+		"CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN",
+		"CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_110[] = {
-	"CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID",
-	"CKR_0x111_UNDEFINED",
-	"CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE",
-	"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
-	"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
-	"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT"
-     };
+		"CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID",
+		"CKR_0x111_UNDEFINED",
+		"CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE",
+		"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
+		"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
+		"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_120[] = {
-	"CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED",
-	"CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG"
-     };
+		"CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+		"CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_130[] = {
-	"CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID"
-     };
+		"CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_150[] = {
-	"CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL"
-     };
+		"CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_160[] = {
-	"CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID"
-     };
+		"CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_170[] = {
-	"CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE"
-     };
+		"CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_180[] = {
-	"CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE"
-     };
+		"CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_190[] = {
-	"CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED",
-	"CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED"
-     };
+		"CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED",
+		"CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_1A0[] = {
-	"CKR_MUTEX_BAD",
-	"CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED"
-     };
+		"CKR_MUTEX_BAD",
+		"CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_200[] = {
-	"CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED"
-     };
+		"CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED"
+	 };
 
 static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_vendor[] = {
-	"CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED"
-     };
+		"CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED"
+	 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_vendor =
-    { CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED, CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_vendor, NULL };
+	{ CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED, CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_vendor, NULL };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_200 =
-    { CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_200, &pkcs11_return_names_vendor };
+	{ CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_200, &pkcs11_return_names_vendor };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_1A0 =
-    { CKR_MUTEX_BAD, CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_1A0, &pkcs11_return_names_200 };
+	{ CKR_MUTEX_BAD, CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_1A0, &pkcs11_return_names_200 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_190 =
-    { CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_190, &pkcs11_return_names_1A0 };
+	{ CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_190, &pkcs11_return_names_1A0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_180 =
-    { CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE, CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE
-	, pkcs11_return_name_180, &pkcs11_return_names_190 };
+	{ CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE, CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE
+		, pkcs11_return_name_180, &pkcs11_return_names_190 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_170 =
-    { CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE, CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE
-	, pkcs11_return_name_170, &pkcs11_return_names_180 };
+	{ CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE, CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE
+		, pkcs11_return_name_170, &pkcs11_return_names_180 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_160 =
-    { CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID, CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID
-	, pkcs11_return_name_160, &pkcs11_return_names_170 };
+	{ CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID, CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID
+		, pkcs11_return_name_160, &pkcs11_return_names_170 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_150 =
-    { CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
-	, pkcs11_return_name_150, &pkcs11_return_names_160 };
+	{ CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+		, pkcs11_return_name_150, &pkcs11_return_names_160 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_130 =
-    { CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID
-	, pkcs11_return_name_130, &pkcs11_return_names_150 };
+	{ CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID
+		, pkcs11_return_name_130, &pkcs11_return_names_150 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_120 =
-    { CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG
-	, pkcs11_return_name_120, &pkcs11_return_names_130 };
+	{ CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG
+		, pkcs11_return_name_120, &pkcs11_return_names_130 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_110 =
-    { CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID, CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT
-	, pkcs11_return_name_110, &pkcs11_return_names_120 };
+	{ CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID, CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT
+		, pkcs11_return_name_110, &pkcs11_return_names_120 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_100 =
-    { CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
-	, pkcs11_return_name_100, &pkcs11_return_names_110 };
+	{ CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
+		, pkcs11_return_name_100, &pkcs11_return_names_110 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_F0 =
-    { CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT
-	, pkcs11_return_name_F0, &pkcs11_return_names_100 };
+	{ CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT
+		, pkcs11_return_name_F0, &pkcs11_return_names_100 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_E0 =
-    { CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_E0, &pkcs11_return_names_F0 };
+	{ CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_E0, &pkcs11_return_names_F0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_D0 =
-    { CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT
-	, pkcs11_return_name_D0,&pkcs11_return_names_E0 };
+	{ CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT
+		, pkcs11_return_name_D0,&pkcs11_return_names_E0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_C0 =
-    { CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE
-	, pkcs11_return_name_C0, &pkcs11_return_names_D0 };
+	{ CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE
+		, pkcs11_return_name_C0, &pkcs11_return_names_D0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_B0 =
-    { CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS
-	, pkcs11_return_name_B0, &pkcs11_return_names_C0 };
+	{ CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS
+		, pkcs11_return_name_B0, &pkcs11_return_names_C0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_A0 =
-    { CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_A0, &pkcs11_return_names_B0 };
+	{ CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_A0, &pkcs11_return_names_B0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_90 =
-    { CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_90, &pkcs11_return_names_A0 };
+	{ CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_90, &pkcs11_return_names_A0 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_80 =
-    { CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID
-	, pkcs11_return_name_80, &pkcs11_return_names_90 };
+	{ CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID
+		, pkcs11_return_name_80, &pkcs11_return_names_90 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_70 =
-    { CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID
-	, pkcs11_return_name_70, &pkcs11_return_names_80 };
+	{ CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID
+		, pkcs11_return_name_70, &pkcs11_return_names_80 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_60 =
-    { CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE
-	, pkcs11_return_name_60, &pkcs11_return_names_70 };
+	{ CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE
+		, pkcs11_return_name_60, &pkcs11_return_names_70 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_50 =
-    { CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_50, &pkcs11_return_names_60 };
+	{ CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_50, &pkcs11_return_names_60 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_40 =
-    { CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE
-	, pkcs11_return_name_40, &pkcs11_return_names_50 };
+	{ CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE
+		, pkcs11_return_name_40, &pkcs11_return_names_50 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_30 =
-    { CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED
-	, pkcs11_return_name_30, &pkcs11_return_names_40 };
+	{ CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED
+		, pkcs11_return_name_30, &pkcs11_return_names_40 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_20 =
-    { CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE
-	, pkcs11_return_name_20, &pkcs11_return_names_30 };
+	{ CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE
+		, pkcs11_return_name_20, &pkcs11_return_names_30 };
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_10 =
-    { CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID
-	, pkcs11_return_name_10, &pkcs11_return_names_20};
+	{ CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID
+		, pkcs11_return_name_10, &pkcs11_return_names_20};
 
 static enum_names pkcs11_return_names =
-    { CKR_OK, CKR_CANT_LOCK
-	, pkcs11_return_name, &pkcs11_return_names_10};
+	{ CKR_OK, CKR_CANT_LOCK
+		, pkcs11_return_name, &pkcs11_return_names_10};
 
 /*
  * Unload a PKCS#11 module.
@@ -390,49 +389,49 @@ static enum_names pkcs11_return_names =
 static CK_RV
 scx_unload_pkcs11_module(scx_pkcs11_module_t *mod)
 {
-    if (!mod || mod->_magic != SCX_MAGIC)
-	return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+	if (!mod || mod->_magic != SCX_MAGIC)
+		return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 
-    if (dlclose(mod->handle) < 0)
-	return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+	if (dlclose(mod->handle) < 0)
+		return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
 
-    memset(mod, 0, sizeof(*mod));
-    pfree(mod);
-    return CKR_OK;
+	memset(mod, 0, sizeof(*mod));
+	free(mod);
+	return CKR_OK;
 }
 
 static scx_pkcs11_module_t*
 scx_load_pkcs11_module(const char *name, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR funcs)
 {
-    CK_RV (*c_get_function_list)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
-    scx_pkcs11_module_t *mod;
-    void *handle;
-    int rv;
+	CK_RV (*c_get_function_list)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
+	scx_pkcs11_module_t *mod;
+	void *handle;
+	int rv;
 
-    if (name == NULL || *name == '\0')
-	return NULL;
+	if (name == NULL || *name == '\0')
+		return NULL;
 
-    /* Try to load PKCS#11 library module*/
-    handle = dlopen(name, RTLD_NOW);
-    if (handle == NULL)
-	return NULL;
+	/* Try to load PKCS#11 library module*/
+	handle = dlopen(name, RTLD_NOW);
+	if (handle == NULL)
+		return NULL;
 
-    mod = alloc_thing(scx_pkcs11_module_t, "scx_pkcs11_module");
-    mod->_magic = SCX_MAGIC;
-    mod->handle = handle;
+	mod = malloc_thing(scx_pkcs11_module_t);
+	mod->_magic = SCX_MAGIC;
+	mod->handle = handle;
 
    /* Get the list of function pointers */
-    c_get_function_list = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR))
-	    dlsym(mod->handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
-    if (!c_get_function_list)
-	goto failed;
+	c_get_function_list = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR))
+			dlsym(mod->handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
+	if (!c_get_function_list)
+		goto failed;
 
-    rv = c_get_function_list(funcs);
-    if (rv == CKR_OK)
-	return mod;
+	rv = c_get_function_list(funcs);
+	if (rv == CKR_OK)
+		return mod;
 
 failed: scx_unload_pkcs11_module(mod);
-	return NULL;
+		return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -442,78 +441,78 @@ static bool
 scx_find_cert_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object
 , smartcard_t *sc, cert_t *cert)
 {
-    size_t hex_len, label_len;
-    u_char *hex_id = NULL;
-    chunk_t blob;
-    x509cert_t *x509cert;
-
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
-	{ CKA_ID,    NULL_PTR, 0L },
-	{ CKA_LABEL, NULL_PTR, 0L },
-	{ CKA_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0L }
-    };
-
-    /* initialize the return argument */
-    *cert = empty_cert;
-
-    /* get the length of the attributes first */
-    CK_RV rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, attr, 3);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("couldn't read the attribute sizes: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    pfreeany(sc->label);
-
-    hex_id    = alloc_bytes(attr[0].ulValueLen, "hex id");
-    hex_len   = attr[0].ulValueLen;
-    sc->label = alloc_bytes(attr[1].ulValueLen + 1, "sc label");
-    label_len = attr[1].ulValueLen;
-    blob.ptr  = alloc_bytes(attr[2].ulValueLen, "x509cert blob");
-    blob.len  = attr[2].ulValueLen;
-
-    attr[0].pValue = hex_id;
-    attr[1].pValue = sc->label;
-    attr[2].pValue = blob.ptr;
-
-    /* now get the attributes */
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, attr, 3);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("couldn't read the attributes: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	pfree(hex_id);
-	pfreeany(sc->label);
-	pfree(blob.ptr);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	size_t hex_len, label_len;
+	u_char *hex_id = NULL;
+	chunk_t blob;
+	x509cert_t *x509cert;
+
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+		{ CKA_ID,    NULL_PTR, 0L },
+		{ CKA_LABEL, NULL_PTR, 0L },
+		{ CKA_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0L }
+	};
+
+	/* initialize the return argument */
+	*cert = cert_empty;
+
+	/* get the length of the attributes first */
+	CK_RV rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("couldn't read the attribute sizes: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	free(sc->label);
+
+	hex_id    = malloc(attr[0].ulValueLen);
+	hex_len   = attr[0].ulValueLen;
+	sc->label = malloc(attr[1].ulValueLen + 1);
+	label_len = attr[1].ulValueLen;
+	blob.ptr  = malloc(attr[2].ulValueLen);
+	blob.len  = attr[2].ulValueLen;
+
+	attr[0].pValue = hex_id;
+	attr[1].pValue = sc->label;
+	attr[2].pValue = blob.ptr;
+
+	/* now get the attributes */
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("couldn't read the attributes: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		free(hex_id);
+		free(sc->label);
+		free(blob.ptr);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    pfreeany(sc->id);
+	free(sc->id);
 
-    /* convert id from hex to ASCII */
-    sc->id = alloc_bytes(2*hex_len + 1, " sc id");
-    datatot(hex_id, hex_len, 16, sc->id, 2*hex_len + 1);
-    pfree(hex_id);
+	/* convert id from hex to ASCII */
+	sc->id = malloc(2*hex_len + 1);
+	datatot(hex_id, hex_len, 16, sc->id, 2*hex_len + 1);
+	free(hex_id);
 
-    /* safeguard in case the label is not null terminated */
-    sc->label[label_len] = '\0';
+	/* safeguard in case the label is not null terminated */
+	sc->label[label_len] = '\0';
 
-    /* parse the retrieved cert */
-    x509cert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t, "x509cert");
-    *x509cert = empty_x509cert;
-    x509cert->smartcard = TRUE;
+	/* parse the retrieved cert */
+	x509cert = malloc_thing(x509cert_t);
+	*x509cert = empty_x509cert;
+	x509cert->smartcard = TRUE;
 
-    if (!parse_x509cert(blob, 0, x509cert))
-    {
-	plog("failed to load cert from smartcard, error in X.509 certificate");
-	free_x509cert(x509cert);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    cert->type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
-    cert->u.x509 = x509cert;
-    return TRUE;
+	if (!parse_x509cert(blob, 0, x509cert))
+	{
+		plog("failed to load cert from smartcard, error in X.509 certificate");
+		free_x509cert(x509cert);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	cert->type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
+	cert->u.x509 = x509cert;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -522,96 +521,96 @@ scx_find_cert_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object
 static void
 scx_find_cert_objects(CK_SLOT_ID slot, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
 {
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{ CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class) }};
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, 1);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_FindObjectsInit: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
-	CK_ULONG obj_count = 0;
-	err_t ugh;
-	time_t valid_until;
-	smartcard_t *sc;
-	x509cert_t *cert;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{ CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class) }};
 
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjects(session, &object, 1, &obj_count);
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, 1);
 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_FindObjects: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    break;
-	}
-
-	/* no objects left */
-	if (obj_count == 0)
-	    break;
-
-	/* create and initialize a new smartcard object */
-	sc  = alloc_thing(smartcard_t, "smartcard");
-	*sc = empty_sc;
-	sc->any_slot = FALSE;
-	sc->slot  = slot;
-
-        if (!scx_find_cert_object(session, object, sc, &sc->last_cert))
-	{
-	    scx_free(sc);
-	    continue;
+		plog("error in C_FindObjectsInit: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return;
 	}
- 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("found cert in %s with id: %s, label: '%s'"
-		, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id, sc->label)
-	)
 
-	/* check validity of certificate */
-	cert = sc->last_cert.u.x509;
-	valid_until = cert->notAfter;
-	ugh = check_validity(cert, &valid_until);
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    plog("  %s", ugh);
-	    free_x509cert(cert);
-	    scx_free(sc);
-	    continue;
-	}
-	else
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	 	DBG_log("  certificate is valid")
-	    )
+		CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+		CK_ULONG obj_count = 0;
+		err_t ugh;
+		time_t valid_until;
+		smartcard_t *sc;
+		x509cert_t *cert;
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjects(session, &object, 1, &obj_count);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_FindObjects: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* no objects left */
+		if (obj_count == 0)
+			break;
+
+		/* create and initialize a new smartcard object */
+		sc  = malloc_thing(smartcard_t);
+		*sc = empty_sc;
+		sc->any_slot = FALSE;
+		sc->slot  = slot;
+
+		if (!scx_find_cert_object(session, object, sc, &sc->last_cert))
+		{
+			scx_free(sc);
+			continue;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("found cert in %s with id: %s, label: '%s'"
+				, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id, sc->label)
+		)
+
+		/* check validity of certificate */
+		cert = sc->last_cert.u.x509;
+		valid_until = cert->notAfter;
+		ugh = check_validity(cert, &valid_until);
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			plog("  %s", ugh);
+			free_x509cert(cert);
+			scx_free(sc);
+			continue;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("  certificate is valid")
+			)
+		}
+
+		sc = scx_add(sc);
+
+		/* put end entity and ca certificates into different chains */
+		if (cert->isCA)
+		{
+			sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_authcert(cert, AUTH_CA);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			add_x509_public_key(cert, valid_until, DAL_LOCAL);
+			sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_x509cert(cert);
+		}
+
+		share_cert(sc->last_cert);
+		time(&sc->last_load);
 	}
 
-	sc = scx_add(sc);
-
-	/* put end entity and ca certificates into different chains */
-	if (cert->isCA)
-	{
-	    sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_authcert(cert, AUTH_CA);
-	}
-	else
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
 	{
-	    add_x509_public_key(cert, valid_until, DAL_LOCAL);
-	    sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_x509cert(cert);
+		plog("error in C_FindObjectsFinal: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
 	}
-
-	share_cert(sc->last_cert);
-	time(&sc->last_load);
-    }
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_FindObjectsFinal: %s"
-	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-    }
 }
 
 /*
@@ -620,74 +619,74 @@ scx_find_cert_objects(CK_SLOT_ID slot, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
 static void
 scx_find_all_cert_objects(void)
 {
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slots = NULL_PTR;
-    CK_ULONG slot_count = 0;
-    CK_ULONG i;
-
-    if (!scx_initialized)
-    {
-	plog("pkcs11 module not initialized");
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* read size, always returns CKR_OK ! */
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL_PTR, &slot_count);
-
-    /* allocate memory for the slots */
-    slots = (CK_SLOT_ID *)alloc_bytes(slot_count * sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID), "slots");
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, slots, &slot_count);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_GetSlotList: %s", enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	pfreeany(slots);
-	return;
-    }
-
-    /* look in every slot for certificate objects */
-    for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++)
-    {
-	CK_SLOT_ID slot = slots[i];
-	CK_SLOT_INFO info;
-	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
-
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotInfo(slot, &info);
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slots = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG slot_count = 0;
+	CK_ULONG i;
 
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	if (!scx_initialized)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_GetSlotInfo: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    continue;
-	}
-	
-	if (!(info.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
-	{
-	    plog("no token present in slot %lu", slot);
-	    continue;
+		plog("pkcs11 module not initialized");
+		return;
 	}
 
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_OpenSession(slot
-		, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &session);
+	/* read size, always returns CKR_OK ! */
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL_PTR, &slot_count);
+
+	/* allocate memory for the slots */
+	slots = (CK_SLOT_ID *)malloc(slot_count * sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, slots, &slot_count);
 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
 	{
-	    plog("failed to open a session on slot %lu: %s"
-		, slot, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    continue;
+		plog("error in C_GetSlotList: %s", enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		free(slots);
+		return;
 	}
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld for searching slot %lu", session, slot)
-	)
-	scx_find_cert_objects(slot, session);
 
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(session);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	/* look in every slot for certificate objects */
+	for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		CK_SLOT_ID slot = slots[i];
+		CK_SLOT_INFO info;
+		CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotInfo(slot, &info);
+
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_GetSlotInfo: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			continue;
+		}
+		
+		if (!(info.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
+		{
+			plog("no token present in slot %lu", slot);
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_OpenSession(slot
+				, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("failed to open a session on slot %lu: %s"
+				, slot, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			continue;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+			DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld for searching slot %lu", session, slot)
+		)
+		scx_find_cert_objects(slot, session);
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    pfreeany(slots);
+	free(slots);
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -701,52 +700,52 @@ void
 scx_init(const char* module, const char *init_args)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS args = { .pReserved = (char *)init_args, };
-    CK_RV rv;
+	CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS args = { .pReserved = (char *)init_args, };
+	CK_RV rv;
 
-    if (scx_initialized)
-    {
-	plog("weird - pkcs11 module seems already to be initialized");
-	return;
-    }
+	if (scx_initialized)
+	{
+		plog("weird - pkcs11 module seems already to be initialized");
+		return;
+	}
 
-    if (module == NULL)
+	if (module == NULL)
 #ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB
-	module = PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB;
+		module = PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB;
 #else
-    {
-	plog("no pkcs11 module defined");
-	return;
-    }
+	{
+		plog("no pkcs11 module defined");
+		return;
+	}
 #endif
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("pkcs11 module '%s' loading...", module)
-    )
-    pkcs11_module = scx_load_pkcs11_module(module, &pkcs11_functions);
-    if (pkcs11_module == NULL)
-    {
-	 plog("failed to load pkcs11 module '%s'", module);
-	 return;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("pkcs11 module initializing...")
-    )
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Initialize(init_args ? &args : NULL);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("failed to initialize pkcs11 module: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    scx_initialized = TRUE;
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("pkcs11 module loaded and initialized")
-    )
-
-    scx_find_all_cert_objects();
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 module '%s' loading...", module)
+	)
+	pkcs11_module = scx_load_pkcs11_module(module, &pkcs11_functions);
+	if (pkcs11_module == NULL)
+	{
+		 plog("failed to load pkcs11 module '%s'", module);
+		 return;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 module initializing...")
+	)
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Initialize(init_args ? &args : NULL);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("failed to initialize pkcs11 module: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return;
+	}
+
+	scx_initialized = TRUE;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 module loaded and initialized")
+	)
+
+	scx_find_all_cert_objects();
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -757,27 +756,27 @@ void
 scx_finalize(void)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    while (smartcards != NULL)
-    {
-	scx_release(smartcards);
-    }
-
-    if (pkcs11_functions != NULL_PTR)
-    {
-	pkcs11_functions->C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
-	pkcs11_functions = NULL_PTR;
-    }
-
-    if (pkcs11_module != NULL)
-    {
-	scx_unload_pkcs11_module(pkcs11_module);
-	pkcs11_module = NULL;
-    }
-
-    scx_initialized = FALSE;
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("pkcs11 module finalized and unloaded")
-    )
+	while (smartcards != NULL)
+	{
+		scx_release(smartcards);
+	}
+
+	if (pkcs11_functions != NULL_PTR)
+	{
+		pkcs11_functions->C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
+		pkcs11_functions = NULL_PTR;
+	}
+
+	if (pkcs11_module != NULL)
+	{
+		scx_unload_pkcs11_module(pkcs11_module);
+		pkcs11_module = NULL;
+	}
+
+	scx_initialized = FALSE;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 module finalized and unloaded")
+	)
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -787,7 +786,7 @@ scx_finalize(void)
 bool
 scx_on_smartcard(const char *filename)
 {
-    return strncmp(filename, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) == 0;
+	return strneq(filename, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN));
 }
 
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
@@ -795,55 +794,55 @@ scx_on_smartcard(const char *filename)
  * find a specific object on the smartcard 
  */
 static bool
-scx_pkcs11_find_object(	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, 
-			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR object, 
-			CK_OBJECT_CLASS class, 
-			const char* id)
+scx_pkcs11_find_object( CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, 
+						CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR object, 
+						CK_OBJECT_CLASS class, 
+						const char* id)
 {
-    size_t len;
-    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_ULONG obj_count = 0;
-    CK_ULONG attr_count = 1;
-
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
-	{ CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class) },
-	{ CKA_ID, &buf, 0L }
-    };
-
-    if (id != NULL)
-    {
-	ttodata(id, strlen(id), 16, buf, BUF_LEN, &len);
-	attr[1].ulValueLen = len;
-	attr_count = 2;
-    }
-
-    /* get info for certificate with id */
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, attr_count);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_FindObjectsInit: %s"
-	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	size_t len;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_ULONG obj_count = 0;
+	CK_ULONG attr_count = 1;
 
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjects(session, object, 1,  &obj_count);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_FindObjects: %s"
-	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+		{ CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class) },
+		{ CKA_ID, &buf, 0L }
+	};
 
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_FindObjectsFinal: %s"
-	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (id != NULL)
+	{
+		ttodata(id, strlen(id), 16, buf, BUF_LEN, &len);
+		attr[1].ulValueLen = len;
+		attr_count = 2;
+	}
+
+	/* get info for certificate with id */
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, attr_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_FindObjectsInit: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjects(session, object, 1,  &obj_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_FindObjects: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    return (obj_count != 0);
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_FindObjectsFinal: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	return (obj_count != 0);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -852,54 +851,54 @@ scx_pkcs11_find_object(	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
 static bool
 scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(smartcard_t *sc, CK_SLOT_ID slot)
 {
-    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
-    CK_SLOT_INFO info;
-
-    CK_RV rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotInfo(slot, &info);
-
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_GetSlotInfo: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	 return FALSE;
-    }
-	
-    if (!(info.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
-    {
-	plog("no token present in slot %lu", slot);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_OpenSession(slot
-		, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &session);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("failed to open a session on slot %lu: %s"
-	    , slot, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+	CK_SLOT_INFO info;
+
+	CK_RV rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotInfo(slot, &info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_GetSlotInfo: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		 return FALSE;
+	}
+		
+	if (!(info.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
+	{
+		plog("no token present in slot %lu", slot);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_OpenSession(slot
+				, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("failed to open a session on slot %lu: %s"
+			, slot, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld for searching slot %lu", session, slot)
+	)
+
+	/* check if there is a certificate on the card in the specified slot */
+	if (scx_pkcs11_find_object(session, &object, CKO_CERTIFICATE, sc->id))
+	{
+		sc->slot = slot;
+		sc->any_slot = FALSE;
+		sc->session = session;
+		sc->session_opened = TRUE;
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+		
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	}
 	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
-	DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld for searching slot %lu", session, slot)
-    )
-
-    /* check if there is a certificate on the card in the specified slot */
-    if (scx_pkcs11_find_object(session, &object, CKO_CERTIFICATE, sc->id))
-    {
-	sc->slot = slot;
-	sc->any_slot = FALSE;
-	sc->session = session;
-	sc->session_opened = TRUE;
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-	
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(session);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-    }
-    return FALSE;
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -910,74 +909,74 @@ bool
 scx_establish_context(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    bool id_found = FALSE;
-
-    if (!scx_initialized)
-    {
-	plog("pkcs11 module not initialized");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	bool id_found = FALSE;
 
-    if (sc->session_opened)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld already open", sc->session)
-	)
-	return TRUE;
-    }
-
-    if (!sc->any_slot)
-	id_found = scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(sc, sc->slot);
-
-    if (!id_found)
-    {
-	CK_RV rv;
-	CK_SLOT_ID slot;
-	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slots = NULL_PTR;
-	CK_ULONG slot_count = 0;
-	CK_ULONG i;
+	if (!scx_initialized)
+	{
+		plog("pkcs11 module not initialized");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-	/* read size, always returns CKR_OK ! */
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL_PTR, &slot_count);
+	if (sc->session_opened)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld already open", sc->session)
+		)
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-	/* allocate memory for the slots */
-	slots = (CK_SLOT_ID *)alloc_bytes(slot_count * sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID), "slots");
+	if (!sc->any_slot)
+		id_found = scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(sc, sc->slot);
 
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, slots, &slot_count);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	if (!id_found)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_GetSlotList: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    pfreeany(slots);
-	    return FALSE;
-        }
+		CK_RV rv;
+		CK_SLOT_ID slot;
+		CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slots = NULL_PTR;
+		CK_ULONG slot_count = 0;
+		CK_ULONG i;
+
+		/* read size, always returns CKR_OK ! */
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL_PTR, &slot_count);
+
+		/* allocate memory for the slots */
+		slots = (CK_SLOT_ID *)malloc(slot_count * sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, slots, &slot_count);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_GetSlotList: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			free(slots);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		/* look in every slot for a certificate with a given object ID */
+		for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++)
+		{
+			slot = slots[i];
+			id_found = scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(sc, slot);
+			if (id_found)
+				break;
+		}
+		free(slots);
+	}
 
-        /* look in every slot for a certificate with a given object ID */
-	for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++)
+	if (id_found)
 	{
-	    slot = slots[i];
-	    id_found = scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(sc, slot);
-	    if (id_found)
-	        break;
-        }
-	pfreeany(slots)
-    }
-
-    if (id_found)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("found token with id %s in slot %lu", sc->id, sc->slot);
-	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld opened", sc->session)
-	)
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("  no certificate with id %s found on smartcard", sc->id);
-    }
-    return id_found;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("found token with id %s in slot %lu", sc->id, sc->slot);
+			DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld opened", sc->session)
+		)
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		plog("  no certificate with id %s found on smartcard", sc->id);
+	}
+	return id_found;
 #else
-    plog("warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
-    return FALSE;
+	plog("warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+	return FALSE;
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -988,41 +987,41 @@ bool
 scx_login(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
+	CK_RV rv;
+
+	if (sc->logged_in)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login already done", sc->session)
+		)
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+		
+	if (sc->pin.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		plog("unable to log in without PIN!");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	if (!sc->session_opened)
+	{
+		plog("session not opened");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (sc->logged_in)
-    {
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Login(sc->session, CKU_USER 
+								, (CK_UTF8CHAR *) sc->pin.ptr, sc->pin.len);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
+	{
+		plog("unable to login: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login already done", sc->session)
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login successful", sc->session)
 	)
+	sc->logged_in = TRUE;
 	return TRUE;
-    }
-	
-    if (sc->pin.ptr == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("unable to log in without PIN!");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (!sc->session_opened)
-    {
-	plog("session not opened");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Login(sc->session, CKU_USER 
-				, (CK_UTF8CHAR *) sc->pin.ptr, sc->pin.len);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
-    {
-	plog("unable to login: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login successful", sc->session)
-    )
-    sc->logged_in = TRUE;
-    return TRUE;
 #else
    return FALSE;
 #endif
@@ -1035,17 +1034,17 @@ scx_login(smartcard_t *sc)
 static void
 scx_logout(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
-    CK_RV rv;
-    
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Logout(sc->session);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-	plog("error in C_Logout: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-    else
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld logout", sc->session)
-	)
-    sc->logged_in = FALSE;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Logout(sc->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		plog("error in C_Logout: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	else
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld logout", sc->session)
+		)
+	sc->logged_in = FALSE;
 }
 #endif
 
@@ -1057,27 +1056,27 @@ void
 scx_release_context(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
-
-    if (!scx_initialized)
-	return;
+	CK_RV rv;
 
-    if (sc->session_opened)
-    {
-	if (sc->logged_in)
-	    scx_logout(sc);
+	if (!scx_initialized)
+		return;
 
-	sc->session_opened = FALSE;
-	
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(sc->session);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-	    plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	else
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-		DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld closed", sc->session)
-	    )
-    }
+	if (sc->session_opened)
+	{
+		if (sc->logged_in)
+			scx_logout(sc);
+
+		sc->session_opened = FALSE;
+		
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(sc->session);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		else
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+				DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld closed", sc->session)
+			)
+	}
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -1088,64 +1087,64 @@ bool
 scx_load_cert(const char *filename, smartcard_t **scp, cert_t *cert
 , bool *cached)
 {
-#ifdef SMARTCARD	/* compile with smartcard support */
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+#ifdef SMARTCARD        /* compile with smartcard support */
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
 
-    const char *number_slot_id = filename + strlen(SCX_TOKEN);
+	const char *number_slot_id = filename + strlen(SCX_TOKEN);
 
-    smartcard_t *sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(number_slot_id));
+	smartcard_t *sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(number_slot_id));
 
-    /* return the smartcard object */
-    *scp = sc;
+	/* return the smartcard object */
+	*scp = sc;
 
-    /* is there a cached smartcard certificate? */
-    *cached = sc->last_cert.type != CERT_NONE
-	      && (time(NULL) - sc->last_load) < SCX_CERT_CACHE_INTERVAL;
+	/* is there a cached smartcard certificate? */
+	*cached = sc->last_cert.type != CERT_NONE
+			  && (time(NULL) - sc->last_load) < SCX_CERT_CACHE_INTERVAL;
 
-    if (*cached)
-    {
-	*cert = sc->last_cert;
-	plog("  using cached cert from smartcard #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
-		, sc->number
-		, scx_print_slot(sc, "")
-		, sc->id
-		, sc->label);
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (*cached)
+	{
+		*cert = sc->last_cert;
+		plog("  using cached cert from smartcard #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
+				, sc->number
+				, scx_print_slot(sc, "")
+				, sc->id
+				, sc->label);
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-    if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    /* find the certificate object */
-    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_CERTIFICATE, sc->id))
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	/* find the certificate object */
+	if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_CERTIFICATE, sc->id))
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    /* retrieve the certificate object */
-    if (!scx_find_cert_object(sc->session, object, sc, cert))
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	/* retrieve the certificate object */
+	if (!scx_find_cert_object(sc->session, object, sc, cert))
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	scx_release_context(sc);
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+		scx_release_context(sc);
 
-    plog("  loaded cert from smartcard #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
-	, sc->number
-	, scx_print_slot(sc, "")
-	, sc->id
-	, sc->label);
+	plog("  loaded cert from smartcard #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
+		, sc->number
+		, scx_print_slot(sc, "")
+		, sc->id
+		, sc->label);
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 #else
-    plog("  warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
-    return FALSE;
+	plog("  warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+	return FALSE;
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -1162,58 +1161,58 @@ scx_load_cert(const char *filename, smartcard_t **scp, cert_t *cert
 smartcard_t*
 scx_parse_number_slot_id(const char *number_slot_id)
 {
-    int len = strlen(number_slot_id);
-    smartcard_t *sc = alloc_thing(smartcard_t, "smartcard");
-
-    /* assign default values */
-    *sc = empty_sc;
-
-    if (len == 0)			/* default: use certificate #1 */
-    {
-	sc->number = 1;	
-    }
-    else if (*number_slot_id == '#')	/* #number scheme */
-    {
-	err_t ugh;
-	unsigned long ul;
-
-	ugh = atoul(number_slot_id+1, len-1 , 10, &ul);
-	if (ugh == NULL)
-	    sc->number = (int)ul;
-	else
-	    plog("error parsing smartcard number: %s", ugh);
-    }
-    else				/* slot:id scheme */
-    {
-	int slot_len = len;
-	char *p = strchr(number_slot_id, ':');
-
-	if (p != NULL)
-	{
-	    int id_len = len - (p + 1 - number_slot_id);
-	    slot_len -= (1 + id_len);
-
-	    if (id_len > 0)		/* we have an id */
-		sc->id = p + 1;
-	}
-	if (slot_len > 0)		/* we have a slot */
-	{
-	    err_t ugh = NULL;
-	    unsigned long ul;
-
-	    ugh = atoul(number_slot_id, slot_len, 10, &ul);
-	    if (ugh == NULL)
-	    {
-		sc->slot = ul;
-                sc->any_slot = FALSE;
-	    }
-	    else
-		plog("error parsing smartcard slot number: %s", ugh);
-	}
-    }
-    /* unshare the id string */
-    sc->id = clone_str(sc->id, "key id");
-    return sc;
+	int len = strlen(number_slot_id);
+	smartcard_t *sc = malloc_thing(smartcard_t);
+
+	/* assign default values */
+	*sc = empty_sc;
+
+	if (len == 0)                       /* default: use certificate #1 */
+	{
+		sc->number = 1; 
+	}
+	else if (*number_slot_id == '#')    /* #number scheme */
+	{
+		err_t ugh;
+		unsigned long ul;
+
+		ugh = atoul(number_slot_id+1, len-1 , 10, &ul);
+		if (ugh == NULL)
+			sc->number = (int)ul;
+		else
+			plog("error parsing smartcard number: %s", ugh);
+	}
+	else                                /* slot:id scheme */
+	{
+		int slot_len = len;
+		char *p = strchr(number_slot_id, ':');
+
+		if (p != NULL)
+		{
+			int id_len = len - (p + 1 - number_slot_id);
+			slot_len -= (1 + id_len);
+
+			if (id_len > 0)             /* we have an id */
+				sc->id = p + 1;
+		}
+		if (slot_len > 0)               /* we have a slot */
+		{
+			err_t ugh = NULL;
+			unsigned long ul;
+
+			ugh = atoul(number_slot_id, slot_len, 10, &ul);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+			{
+				sc->slot = ul;
+				sc->any_slot = FALSE;
+			}
+			else
+				plog("error parsing smartcard slot number: %s", ugh);
+		}
+	}
+	/* unshare the id string */
+	sc->id = clone_str(sc->id);
+	return sc;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1223,49 +1222,49 @@ bool
 scx_verify_pin(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
-    
-    if (!sc->pinpad)
-	sc->valid = FALSE;
+	CK_RV rv;
+	
+	if (!sc->pinpad)
+		sc->valid = FALSE;
 
-    if (sc->pin.ptr == NULL)
-    {
-	plog("unable to verify without PIN");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (sc->pin.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		plog("unable to verify without PIN");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    /* establish context */
-    if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	/* establish context */
+	if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Login(sc->session, CKU_USER,
-			      (CK_UTF8CHAR *) sc->pin.ptr, sc->pin.len);
-    if (rv == CKR_OK || rv == CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
-    {
-	sc->valid = TRUE;
-	sc->logged_in = TRUE;
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log((rv == CKR_OK)
-		? "PIN code correct"
-		: "already logged in, no PIN entry required");
-	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login successful", sc->session)
-        )
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	    DBG_log("PIN code incorrect")
-        )
-    }
-    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	scx_release_context(sc);
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Login(sc->session, CKU_USER,
+							  (CK_UTF8CHAR *) sc->pin.ptr, sc->pin.len);
+	if (rv == CKR_OK || rv == CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
+	{
+		sc->valid = TRUE;
+		sc->logged_in = TRUE;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log((rv == CKR_OK)
+				? "PIN code correct"
+				: "already logged in, no PIN entry required");
+			DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login successful", sc->session)
+		)
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+			DBG_log("PIN code incorrect")
+		)
+	}
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+		scx_release_context(sc);
 #else
-    sc->valid = FALSE;
+	sc->valid = FALSE;
 #endif
-    return sc->valid;
+	return sc->valid;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1276,105 +1275,105 @@ scx_sign_hash(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
 , u_char *out, size_t outlen)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
-    CK_ULONG siglen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
-    CK_BBOOL sign_flag, decrypt_flag;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
-	{ CKA_SIGN,    &sign_flag,    sizeof(sign_flag) },
-	{ CKA_DECRYPT, &decrypt_flag, sizeof(decrypt_flag) }
-    };
-
-    if (!sc->logged_in)
-    	return FALSE;
-
-    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
-    {
-	plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+	CK_ULONG siglen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+	CK_BBOOL sign_flag, decrypt_flag;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+		{ CKA_SIGN,    &sign_flag,    sizeof(sign_flag) },
+		{ CKA_DECRYPT, &decrypt_flag, sizeof(decrypt_flag) }
+	};
+
+	if (!sc->logged_in)
+		return FALSE;
 
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 2);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("couldn't read the private key attributes: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("RSA key flags: sign = %s, decrypt = %s"
-	    , (sign_flag)?    "true":"false"
-	    , (decrypt_flag)? "true":"false")
-    )
-
-    if (sign_flag)
-    {
-	CK_MECHANISM mech  = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
-
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_SignInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_SignInit: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    return FALSE;
+		plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Sign(sc->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen
-		, out, &siglen);
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 2);
 	if (rv != CKR_OK)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_Sign: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    return FALSE;
-    	}
-    }
-    else if (decrypt_flag)
-    {
-	CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL_PTR, 0 };
-	size_t padlen;
-	u_char *p = out ;
-
-	/* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting */
-	*p++ = 0x00;
-	*p++ = 0x01;	/* BT (block type) 01 */
-	padlen = outlen - 3 - inlen;
-	memset(p, 0xFF, padlen);
-	p += padlen;
-	*p++ = 0x00;
-	memcpy(p, in, inlen);
+		plog("couldn't read the private key attributes: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("RSA key flags: sign = %s, decrypt = %s"
+			, (sign_flag)?    "true":"false"
+			, (decrypt_flag)? "true":"false")
+	)
 
-	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_DecryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	if (sign_flag)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_DecryptInit: %s"
-	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    return FALSE;
-        }
-
-        rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Decrypt(sc->session, out, outlen
-		, out, &siglen);
-	if (rv != CKR_OK)
-        {
-	    plog("error in C_Decrypt: %s"
-	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    return FALSE;
-        }
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	plog("private key has neither sign nor decrypt flag set");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+		CK_MECHANISM mech  = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_SignInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_SignInit: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Sign(sc->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen
+				, out, &siglen);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_Sign: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
+	else if (decrypt_flag)
+	{
+		CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+		size_t padlen;
+		u_char *p = out ;
+
+		/* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting */
+		*p++ = 0x00;
+		*p++ = 0x01;    /* BT (block type) 01 */
+		padlen = outlen - 3 - inlen;
+		memset(p, 0xFF, padlen);
+		p += padlen;
+		*p++ = 0x00;
+		memcpy(p, in, inlen);
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_DecryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_DecryptInit: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Decrypt(sc->session, out, outlen
+				, out, &siglen);
+		if (rv != CKR_OK)
+		{
+			plog("error in C_Decrypt: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		plog("private key has neither sign nor decrypt flag set");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (siglen > (CK_ULONG)outlen)
-    {
-	plog("signature length (%lu) larger than allocated buffer (%d)"
-	    , siglen, (int)outlen);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	if (siglen > (CK_ULONG)outlen)
+	{
+		plog("signature length (%lu) larger than allocated buffer (%d)"
+			, siglen, (int)outlen);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 #else
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -1386,132 +1385,146 @@ scx_encrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
 , u_char *out, size_t *outlen)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
-    CK_ULONG len = (CK_ULONG)(*outlen);
-    CK_BBOOL encrypt_flag;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
-	{ CKA_MODULUS,         NULL_PTR, 0L },
-	{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL_PTR, 0L },
-	{ CKA_ENCRYPT,         &encrypt_flag, sizeof(encrypt_flag) }
-    };
-    CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
-
-    if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, sc->id))
-    {
-	plog("unable to find public key with id '%s'", sc->id);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 3);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("couldn't read the public key attributes: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+	CK_ULONG len = (CK_ULONG)(*outlen);
+	CK_BBOOL encrypt_flag;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+		{ CKA_MODULUS,         NULL_PTR, 0L },
+		{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL_PTR, 0L },
+		{ CKA_ENCRYPT,         &encrypt_flag, sizeof(encrypt_flag) }
+	};
+	CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+
+	if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+			return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (!encrypt_flag)
-    {
-	plog("public key cannot be used for encryption");
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-	
-    /* there must be enough space left for the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding */
-    if (inlen > attr[0].ulValueLen - 11)
-    {
-	plog("smartcard input data length (%d) exceeds maximum of %lu bytes"
-		, (int)inlen, attr[0].ulValueLen - 11);
-	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_EncryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
-
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	if (rv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
-	{
-	    RSA_public_key_t rsa;
-	    chunk_t plain_text = {(u_char*)in, inlen};
-	    chunk_t cipher_text; 
-
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("doing RSA encryption in software")
-	    )
-	    attr[0].pValue = alloc_bytes(attr[0].ulValueLen, "modulus");
-	    attr[1].pValue = alloc_bytes(attr[1].ulValueLen, "exponent");
-
-	    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 2);
-	    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-	    {
-		plog("couldn't read modulus and public exponent: %s"
-		    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-		pfree(attr[0].pValue);
-		pfree(attr[1].pValue);
+	if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, sc->id))
+	{
+		plog("unable to find public key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 3);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("couldn't read the public key attributes: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
 		scx_release_context(sc);
 		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    rsa.k = attr[0].ulValueLen;
-	    n_to_mpz(&rsa.n, attr[0].pValue, attr[0].ulValueLen);
-	    n_to_mpz(&rsa.e, attr[1].pValue, attr[1].ulValueLen);
-	    pfree(attr[0].pValue);
-	    pfree(attr[1].pValue);
-
-	    cipher_text = RSA_encrypt(&rsa, plain_text);
-	    free_RSA_public_content(&rsa);
-	    if (cipher_text.ptr == NULL)
-	    {
-		plog("smartcard input data length is too large");
-		if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-		    scx_release_context(sc);
-	        return FALSE;
-	    }
-
-	    memcpy(out, cipher_text.ptr, cipher_text.len);
-	    *outlen = cipher_text.len;
-	    freeanychunk(cipher_text);
-	    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	}
+
+	if (!encrypt_flag)
+	{
+		plog("public key cannot be used for encryption");
 		scx_release_context(sc);
-	    return TRUE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else
+		
+	/* there must be enough space left for the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding */
+	if (inlen > attr[0].ulValueLen - 11)
 	{
-	    plog("error in C_EncryptInit: %s"
-		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	    scx_release_context(sc);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("doing RSA encryption on smartcard")
-    )
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Encrypt(sc->session, (u_char*)in, inlen
-		, out, &len);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_Encrypt: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	scx_release_context(sc);
+		plog("smartcard input data length (%d) exceeds maximum of %lu bytes"
+				, (int)inlen, attr[0].ulValueLen - 11);
+		if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+			scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_EncryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		if (rv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+		{
+			public_key_t *key;
+			chunk_t rsa_modulus, rsa_exponent, rsa_key, cipher_text;
+			chunk_t plain_text = {(u_char*)in, inlen};
+
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("doing RSA encryption in software")
+			)
+			attr[0].pValue = malloc(attr[0].ulValueLen);
+			attr[1].pValue = malloc(attr[1].ulValueLen);
+
+			rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 2);
+			if (rv != CKR_OK)
+			{
+				plog("couldn't read modulus and public exponent: %s"
+					, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+				free(attr[0].pValue);
+				free(attr[1].pValue);
+				scx_release_context(sc);
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			rsa_modulus  = chunk_create((u_char*) attr[0].pValue,
+									    (size_t)  attr[0].ulValueLen);
+			rsa_exponent = chunk_create((u_char*) attr[1].pValue,
+									    (size_t)  attr[1].ulValueLen);
+			rsa_key = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm",
+								asn1_integer("m", rsa_modulus),
+								asn1_integer("m", rsa_exponent));
+			key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PUBLIC_KEY, KEY_RSA,	
+								BUILD_BLOB_ASN1_DER, rsa_key, BUILD_END);
+			free(rsa_key.ptr);
+			if (key == NULL)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			key->encrypt(key, plain_text, &cipher_text);
+			key->destroy(key);
+
+			if (cipher_text.ptr == NULL)
+			{
+				plog("smartcard input data length is too large");
+				if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+				{
+					scx_release_context(sc);
+				}
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+
+			memcpy(out, cipher_text.ptr, cipher_text.len);
+			*outlen = cipher_text.len;
+			free(cipher_text.ptr);
+
+			if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+			{
+				scx_release_context(sc);
+			}
+			return TRUE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("error in C_EncryptInit: %s"
+				, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+			scx_release_context(sc);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
 
-    *outlen = (size_t)len;
-    return TRUE;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("doing RSA encryption on smartcard")
+	)
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Encrypt(sc->session, (u_char*)in, inlen
+				, out, &len);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_Encrypt: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+
+	*outlen = (size_t)len;
+	return TRUE;
 #else
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 #endif
 }
 /* 
@@ -1522,70 +1535,70 @@ scx_decrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
 , u_char *out, size_t *outlen)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
-    CK_ULONG len = (CK_ULONG)(*outlen);
-    CK_BBOOL decrypt_flag;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
-	{ CKA_DECRYPT, &decrypt_flag, sizeof(decrypt_flag) }
-    };
-    CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
-
-    if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
-    {
-	plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+	CK_ULONG len = (CK_ULONG)(*outlen);
+	CK_BBOOL decrypt_flag;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+		{ CKA_DECRYPT, &decrypt_flag, sizeof(decrypt_flag) }
+	};
+	CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+
+	if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+			return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 1);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("couldn't read the private key attributes: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
+	{
+		plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    if (!decrypt_flag)
-    {
-	plog("private key cannot be used for decryption");
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-	
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_log("doing RSA decryption on smartcard")
-    )
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_DecryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_DecryptInit: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Decrypt(sc->session, (u_char*)in, inlen
-		, out, &len);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("error in C_Decrypt: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
-	scx_release_context(sc);
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 1);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("couldn't read the private key attributes: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    *outlen = (size_t)len;
-    return TRUE;
+	if (!decrypt_flag)
+	{
+		plog("private key cannot be used for decryption");
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+		
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("doing RSA decryption on smartcard")
+	)
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_DecryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_DecryptInit: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Decrypt(sc->session, (u_char*)in, inlen
+				, out, &len);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("error in C_Decrypt: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+
+	*outlen = (size_t)len;
+	return TRUE;
 #else
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -1597,92 +1610,92 @@ bool
 scx_op_via_whack(const char* msg, int inbase, int outbase, sc_op_t op
 , const char* keyid, int whackfd)
 {
-    char inbuf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
-    char outbuf[2*RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 1];
-    size_t outlen = sizeof(inbuf);
-    size_t inlen;
-    smartcard_t *sc,*sc_new;
+	char inbuf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+	char outbuf[2*RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 1];
+	size_t outlen = sizeof(inbuf);
+	size_t inlen;
+	smartcard_t *sc,*sc_new;
 
-    const char *number_slot_id = "";
+	const char *number_slot_id = "";
 
-    err_t ugh = ttodata(msg, 0, inbase, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), &inlen);
+	err_t ugh = ttodata(msg, 0, inbase, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), &inlen);
 
-    /* no prefix - use default base */
-    if (ugh != NULL  && inbase == 0)
-       ugh = ttodata(msg, 0, DEFAULT_BASE, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), &inlen);
+	/* no prefix - use default base */
+	if (ugh != NULL  && inbase == 0)
+	   ugh = ttodata(msg, 0, DEFAULT_BASE, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), &inlen);
 
-    if (ugh != NULL)
-    {
-	plog("format error in smartcard input data: %s", ugh);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    if (keyid != NULL)
-    {
-	number_slot_id = (strncmp(keyid, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) == 0)
-			 ? keyid + strlen(SCX_TOKEN) : keyid;
-    }
-
-    sc_new = scx_parse_number_slot_id(number_slot_id);
-    sc = scx_add(sc_new);
-    if (sc == sc_new)
-	scx_share(sc);
-
-    DBG((op == SC_OP_ENCRYPT)? DBG_PRIVATE:DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump("smartcard input data:\n", inbuf, inlen)
-    )
-
-    if (op == SC_OP_DECRYPT)
-    {
-	if (!sc->valid && whackfd != NULL_FD)
-	    scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd);
-
-	if (!sc->valid)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_NOVALIDPIN, "cannot decrypt without valid PIN");
-	    return FALSE;
-        }
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-	DBG_log("using RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
-	    , (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
-    )
-
-    switch (op)
-    {
-    case SC_OP_ENCRYPT:
-	if (!scx_encrypt(sc, inbuf, inlen, inbuf, &outlen))
-	    return FALSE;
-	break;
-    case SC_OP_DECRYPT:
-	if (!scx_decrypt(sc, inbuf, inlen, inbuf, &outlen))
-	    return FALSE;
-	break;
-    default:
-	break;
-    }
-
-    DBG((op == SC_OP_DECRYPT)? DBG_PRIVATE:DBG_RAW,
-	DBG_dump("smartcard output data:\n", inbuf, outlen)
-    )
-
-    if (outbase == 0)  /* use default base */ 
-	outbase = DEFAULT_BASE;
-
-    if (outbase == 256) /* ascii plain text */
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%.*s", (int)outlen, inbuf);
-    else
-    {
-	outlen = datatot(inbuf, outlen, outbase, outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
-	if (outlen == 0)
-	{
-	    plog("error in output format conversion");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-    	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s", outbuf);
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+		plog("format error in smartcard input data: %s", ugh);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	if (keyid != NULL)
+	{
+		number_slot_id = (strneq(keyid, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)))
+						 ? keyid + strlen(SCX_TOKEN) : keyid;
+	}
+
+	sc_new = scx_parse_number_slot_id(number_slot_id);
+	sc = scx_add(sc_new);
+	if (sc == sc_new)
+		scx_share(sc);
+
+	DBG((op == SC_OP_ENCRYPT)? DBG_PRIVATE:DBG_RAW,
+		DBG_dump("smartcard input data:\n", inbuf, inlen)
+	)
+
+	if (op == SC_OP_DECRYPT)
+	{
+		if (!sc->valid && whackfd != NULL_FD)
+			scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd);
+
+		if (!sc->valid)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_NOVALIDPIN, "cannot decrypt without valid PIN");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("using RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
+			, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+	)
+
+	switch (op)
+	{
+	case SC_OP_ENCRYPT:
+		if (!scx_encrypt(sc, inbuf, inlen, inbuf, &outlen))
+			return FALSE;
+		break;
+	case SC_OP_DECRYPT:
+		if (!scx_decrypt(sc, inbuf, inlen, inbuf, &outlen))
+			return FALSE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
+	}
+
+	DBG((op == SC_OP_DECRYPT)? DBG_PRIVATE:DBG_RAW,
+		DBG_dump("smartcard output data:\n", inbuf, outlen)
+	)
+
+	if (outbase == 0)  /* use default base */ 
+		outbase = DEFAULT_BASE;
+
+	if (outbase == 256) /* ascii plain text */
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%.*s", (int)outlen, inbuf);
+	else
+	{
+		outlen = datatot(inbuf, outlen, outbase, outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
+		if (outlen == 0)
+		{
+			plog("error in output format conversion");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s", outbuf);
+	}
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
  /*
@@ -1692,32 +1705,32 @@ size_t
 scx_get_keylength(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    CK_RV rv;
-    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
-    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{ CKA_MODULUS, NULL_PTR, 0}};
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+	CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{ CKA_MODULUS, NULL_PTR, 0}};
 
-    if (!sc->logged_in)
-    	return FALSE;
+	if (!sc->logged_in)
+		return FALSE;
 
-    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
-    {
-	plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* get the length of the private key */
-    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object
-		, (CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR)&attr, 1);
-    if (rv != CKR_OK)
-    {
-	plog("failed to get key length: %s"
-	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
+	{
+		plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* get the length of the private key */
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object
+				, (CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR)&attr, 1);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+		plog("failed to get key length: %s"
+			, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    return attr[0].ulValueLen;	/*Return key length in bytes */
+	return attr[0].ulValueLen;  /*Return key length in bytes */
 #else
-    return 0;
+	return 0;
 #endif
 }
 
@@ -1728,54 +1741,55 @@ bool
 scx_get_pin(smartcard_t *sc, int whackfd)
 {
 #ifdef SMARTCARD
-    char pin[BUF_LEN];
-    int i, n;
+	char pin[BUF_LEN];
+	int i, n;
 
-    whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need PIN for #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
-	, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id, sc->label);
+	whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need PIN for #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
+		, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id, sc->label);
 
-    for (i = 0; i < SCX_MAX_PIN_TRIALS; i++)
-    {
-	if (i > 0)
-	    whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid PIN, please try again");
-
-	n = read(whackfd, pin, BUF_LEN);
-
-	if (n == -1)
+	for (i = 0; i < SCX_MAX_PIN_TRIALS; i++)
 	{
-	    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "read(whackfd) failed");
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (i > 0)
+			whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid PIN, please try again");
+
+		n = read(whackfd, pin, BUF_LEN);
+
+		if (n == -1)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "read(whackfd) failed");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		if (strlen(pin) == 0)
+		{
+			whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no PIN entered, aborted");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		sc->pin.ptr = pin;
+		sc->pin.len = strlen(pin);
+
+		/* verify the pin */
+		if (scx_verify_pin(sc))
+		{
+			sc->pin = chunk_create(pin, strlen(pin));
+			sc->pin = chunk_clone(sc->pin);
+			break;
+		}
+
+		/* wrong pin - we try another round */
+		sc->pin = chunk_empty;
 	}
 
-	if (strlen(pin) == 0)
-	{
-	    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no PIN entered, aborted");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-
-	sc->pin.ptr = pin;
-	sc->pin.len = strlen(pin);
-
-	/* verify the pin */
-	if (scx_verify_pin(sc))
-	{
-	    clonetochunk(sc->pin, pin, strlen(pin), "pin");
-	    break;
-	}
-
-	/* wrong pin - we try another round */
-	sc->pin = empty_chunk;
-    }
-
-    if (sc->valid)
-	whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid PIN");
-    else
-	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid PIN, too many trials");
+	if (sc->valid)
+		whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid PIN");
+	else
+		whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid PIN, too many trials");
 #else
-    sc->valid = FALSE;
-    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+	sc->valid = FALSE;
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
 #endif
-    return sc->valid;
+	return sc->valid;
 }
 
 
@@ -1785,13 +1799,13 @@ scx_get_pin(smartcard_t *sc, int whackfd)
 void
 scx_free_pin(chunk_t *pin)
 {
-    if (pin->ptr != NULL)
-    {
-	/* clear pin field in memory */
-	memset(pin->ptr, '\0', pin->len);
-	pfree(pin->ptr);
-	*pin = empty_chunk;
-    }
+	if (pin->ptr != NULL)
+	{
+		/* clear pin field in memory */
+		memset(pin->ptr, '\0', pin->len);
+		free(pin->ptr);
+		*pin = chunk_empty;
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1800,14 +1814,14 @@ scx_free_pin(chunk_t *pin)
 void
 scx_free(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
-    if (sc != NULL)
-    {
-	scx_release_context(sc);
-	pfreeany(sc->id);
-	pfreeany(sc->label);
-	scx_free_pin(&sc->pin);
-	pfree(sc);
-    }
+	if (sc != NULL)
+	{
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		free(sc->id);
+		free(sc->label);
+		scx_free_pin(&sc->pin);
+		free(sc);
+	}
 }
 
 /*  release of a smartcard record decreases the count by one
@@ -1816,15 +1830,15 @@ scx_free(smartcard_t *sc)
 void
 scx_release(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
-    if (sc != NULL && --sc->count == 0)
-    {
-	smartcard_t **pp = &smartcards;
-	while (*pp != sc)
-	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
-        *pp = sc->next;
-	release_cert(sc->last_cert);
-	scx_free(sc);
-    }
+	if (sc != NULL && --sc->count == 0)
+	{
+		smartcard_t **pp = &smartcards;
+		while (*pp != sc)
+			pp = &(*pp)->next;
+		*pp = sc->next;
+		release_cert(sc->last_cert);
+		scx_free(sc);
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1833,17 +1847,17 @@ scx_release(smartcard_t *sc)
 static bool
 scx_same(smartcard_t *a, smartcard_t *b)
 {
-    if  (a->number && b->number)
-    {
-	/* same number */
-	return a->number == b->number;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* same id and/or same slot */
-        return (!a->id || (b->id && streq(a->id, b->id)))
-	    && (a->any_slot || b->any_slot || a->slot == b->slot);
-    }
+	if  (a->number && b->number)
+	{
+		/* same number */
+		return a->number == b->number;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* same id and/or same slot */
+		return (!a->id || (b->id && streq(a->id, b->id)))
+			&& (a->any_slot || b->any_slot || a->slot == b->slot);
+	}
 }
 
 /*  for each link pointing to the smartcard record
@@ -1852,8 +1866,8 @@ scx_same(smartcard_t *a, smartcard_t *b)
 void
 scx_share(smartcard_t *sc)
 {
-    if (sc != NULL)
- 	sc->count++;
+	if (sc != NULL)
+		sc->count++;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1862,28 +1876,28 @@ scx_share(smartcard_t *sc)
 smartcard_t*
 scx_add(smartcard_t *smartcard)
 {
-    smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
-    smartcard_t **psc = &smartcards;
-
-    while (sc != NULL)
-    {
-	if (scx_same(smartcard, sc)) /* already in chain, free smartcard record */
-	{
-	    scx_free(smartcard);
-	    return sc;
-	}
-        psc = &sc->next;
-	sc = sc->next;
-    }
-
-    /* insert new smartcard record at the end of the chain */
-    *psc = smartcard;
-    smartcard->number = ++sc_number;
-    smartcard->count = 1;
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  smartcard #%d added", sc_number)
-    )
-    return smartcard;
+	smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
+	smartcard_t **psc = &smartcards;
+
+	while (sc != NULL)
+	{
+		if (scx_same(smartcard, sc)) /* already in chain, free smartcard record */
+		{
+			scx_free(smartcard);
+			return sc;
+		}
+		psc = &sc->next;
+		sc = sc->next;
+	}
+
+	/* insert new smartcard record at the end of the chain */
+	*psc = smartcard;
+	smartcard->number = ++sc_number;
+	smartcard->count = 1;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  smartcard #%d added", sc_number)
+	)
+	return smartcard;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1892,15 +1906,15 @@ scx_add(smartcard_t *smartcard)
 smartcard_t*
 scx_get(x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
-
-    while (sc != NULL)
-    {
-	if (sc->last_cert.u.x509 == cert)
-	    return sc;
-	sc = sc->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
+
+	while (sc != NULL)
+	{
+		if (sc->last_cert.u.x509 == cert)
+			return sc;
+		sc = sc->next;
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1909,13 +1923,13 @@ scx_get(x509cert_t *cert)
 char *
 scx_print_slot(smartcard_t *sc, const char *whitespace)
 {
-    char *buf = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+	char *buf = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
 
-    if (sc->any_slot)
-	snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot");
-    else
-	snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %s%lu", whitespace, sc->slot);
-    return buf;
+	if (sc->any_slot)
+		snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot");
+	else
+		snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %s%lu", whitespace, sc->slot);
+	return buf;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1924,39 +1938,39 @@ scx_print_slot(smartcard_t *sc, const char *whitespace)
 void
 scx_list(bool utc)
 {
-    smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
-
-    if (sc != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Smartcard Objects:");
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-    }
-
-    while (sc != NULL)
-    {
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, #%d, count: %d"
-	    , timetoa(&sc->last_load, utc)
-	    , sc->number
-	    , sc->count);
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %s, session %s, logged %s, has %s"
-	    , scx_print_slot(sc, "    ")
-	    , sc->session_opened? "opened" : "closed"
-	    , sc->logged_in? "in" : "out"
-	    , sc->pinpad? "pin pad" 
-		: ((sc->pin.ptr == NULL)? "no pin"
-		    : sc->valid? "valid pin" : "invalid pin"));
-	if (sc->id != NULL)
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       id:       %s", sc->id);
-	if (sc->label != NULL)
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       label:   '%s'", sc->label);
-	if (sc->last_cert.type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
-	{
-	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
-
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, sc->last_cert.u.x509->subject);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subject: '%s'", buf);
-	}
-	sc = sc->next;
-    }
+	smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
+
+	if (sc != NULL)
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Smartcard Objects:");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	}
+
+	while (sc != NULL)
+	{
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, #%d, count: %d"
+			, &sc->last_load, utc
+			, sc->number
+			, sc->count);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %s, session %s, logged %s, has %s"
+			, scx_print_slot(sc, "    ")
+			, sc->session_opened? "opened" : "closed"
+			, sc->logged_in? "in" : "out"
+			, sc->pinpad? "pin pad" 
+				: ((sc->pin.ptr == NULL)? "no pin"
+					: sc->valid? "valid pin" : "invalid pin"));
+		if (sc->id != NULL)
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       id:       %s", sc->id);
+		if (sc->label != NULL)
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       label:   '%s'", sc->label);
+		if (sc->last_cert.type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+		{
+			char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, sc->last_cert.u.x509->subject);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subject: '%s'", buf);
+		}
+		sc = sc->next;
+	}
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/smartcard.h b/src/pluto/smartcard.h
index 69510171c..60a0fccfc 100644
--- a/src/pluto/smartcard.h
+++ b/src/pluto/smartcard.h
@@ -12,8 +12,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: smartcard.h 4709 2008-11-27 10:20:25Z martin $
  */
 
 #ifndef _SMARTCARD_H
@@ -21,19 +19,19 @@
 
 #include "certs.h"
 
-#define SCX_TOKEN		  "%smartcard"
-#define SCX_CERT_CACHE_INTERVAL	  60 /* seconds */
-#define SCX_MAX_PIN_TRIALS	  3
+#define SCX_TOKEN                 "%smartcard"
+#define SCX_CERT_CACHE_INTERVAL   60 /* seconds */
+#define SCX_MAX_PIN_TRIALS        3
 
 /* smartcard operations, update copy in whack.h */
 
 #ifndef SC_OP_T
 #define SC_OP_T
 typedef enum {
-    SC_OP_NONE =    0,
-    SC_OP_ENCRYPT = 1,
-    SC_OP_DECRYPT = 2,
-    SC_OP_SIGN =    3,
+	SC_OP_NONE =    0,
+	SC_OP_ENCRYPT = 1,
+	SC_OP_DECRYPT = 2,
+	SC_OP_SIGN =    3,
 } sc_op_t;
 #endif /* SC_OP_T */
 
@@ -42,21 +40,21 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef struct smartcard smartcard_t;
 
 struct smartcard {
-    smartcard_t  *next;
-    time_t	  last_load;
-    cert_t	  last_cert;
-    int		  count;
-    int		  number;
-    unsigned long slot;
-    char	  *id;
-    char	 *label;
-    chunk_t	  pin;
-    bool	  pinpad;
-    bool	  valid;
-    bool	  session_opened;
-    bool	  logged_in;
-    bool	  any_slot;
-    long	  session;
+	smartcard_t  *next;
+	time_t        last_load;
+	cert_t        last_cert;
+	int           count;
+	int           number;
+	unsigned long slot;
+	char          *id;
+	char         *label;
+	chunk_t       pin;
+	bool          pinpad;
+	bool          valid;
+	bool          session_opened;
+	bool          logged_in;
+	bool          any_slot;
+	long          session;
 };
 
 extern const smartcard_t empty_sc;
@@ -78,17 +76,17 @@ extern bool scx_establish_context(smartcard_t *sc);
 extern bool scx_login(smartcard_t *sc);
 extern bool scx_on_smartcard(const char *filename);
 extern bool scx_load_cert(const char *filename, smartcard_t **scp
-    , cert_t *cert, bool *cached);
+	, cert_t *cert, bool *cached);
 extern bool scx_verify_pin(smartcard_t *sc);
 extern void scx_share(smartcard_t *sc);
 extern bool scx_sign_hash(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
-    , u_char *out, size_t outlen);
+	, u_char *out, size_t outlen);
 extern bool scx_encrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
-    , u_char *out, size_t *outlen);
+	, u_char *out, size_t *outlen);
 extern bool scx_decrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
-    , u_char *out, size_t *outlen);
+	, u_char *out, size_t *outlen);
 extern bool scx_op_via_whack(const char* msg, int inbase, int outbase
-    , sc_op_t op, const char *keyid, int whackfd);
+	, sc_op_t op, const char *keyid, int whackfd);
 extern bool scx_get_pin(smartcard_t *sc, int whackfd);
 extern size_t scx_get_keylength(smartcard_t *sc);
 extern smartcard_t* scx_add(smartcard_t *sc);
diff --git a/src/pluto/spdb.c b/src/pluto/spdb.c
index 9d1bf8843..b8f4a3c23 100644
--- a/src/pluto/spdb.c
+++ b/src/pluto/spdb.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: spdb.c 3845 2008-04-18 17:00:30Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -23,7 +21,6 @@
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
@@ -36,16 +33,14 @@
 #include "log.h"
 #include "spdb.h"
 #include "whack.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "crypto.h"
 #include "alg_info.h"
 #include "kernel_alg.h"
 #include "ike_alg.h"
 #include "db_ops.h"
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 
-#define AD(x) x, elemsof(x)	/* Array Description */
+#define AD(x) x, countof(x)     /* Array Description */
 #define AD_NULL NULL, 0
 
 /**************** Oakely (main mode) SA database ****************/
@@ -53,7 +48,7 @@
 /* array of proposals to be conjoined (can only be one for Oakley) */
 
 static struct db_prop oakley_pc[] =
-    { { PROTO_ISAKMP, AD_NULL } };
+	{ { PROTO_ISAKMP, AD_NULL } };
 
 /* array of proposal conjuncts (can only be one) */
 
@@ -67,131 +62,131 @@ struct db_sa oakley_sadb = { AD(oakley_props) };
 /* arrays of attributes for transforms */
 
 static struct db_attr espsha1_attr[] = {
-    { AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 },
-    };
+	{ AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 },
+	};
 
 static struct db_attr ah_HMAC_SHA1_attr[] = {
-    { AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 },
-    };
+	{ AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 },
+	};
 
 /* arrays of transforms, each in in preference order */
 
 static struct db_trans espa_trans[] = {
-    { ESP_3DES, AD(espsha1_attr) },
-    };
+	{ ESP_3DES, AD(espsha1_attr) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_trans esp_trans[] = {
-    { ESP_3DES, AD_NULL },
-    };
+	{ ESP_3DES, AD_NULL },
+	};
 
 #ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
 static struct db_trans espnull_trans[] = {
-    { ESP_NULL, AD(espsha1_attr) },
-    };
+	{ ESP_NULL, AD(espsha1_attr) },
+	};
 #endif /* SUPPORT_ESP_NULL */
 
 static struct db_trans ah_trans[] = {
-    { AH_SHA, AD(ah_HMAC_SHA1_attr) },
-    };
+	{ AH_SHA, AD(ah_HMAC_SHA1_attr) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_trans ipcomp_trans[] = {
-    { IPCOMP_DEFLATE, AD_NULL },
-    };
+	{ IPCOMP_DEFLATE, AD_NULL },
+	};
 
 /* arrays of proposals to be conjoined */
 
 static struct db_prop ah_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+	};
 
 #ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
 static struct db_prop espnull_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espnull_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espnull_trans) },
+	};
 #endif /* SUPPORT_ESP_NULL */
 
 static struct db_prop esp_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espa_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espa_trans) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop ah_esp_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(esp_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(esp_trans) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop compress_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop ah_compress_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
-    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+	{ PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+	};
 
 #ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
 static struct db_prop espnull_compress_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espnull_trans) },
-    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espnull_trans) },
+	{ PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+	};
 #endif /* SUPPORT_ESP_NULL */
 
 static struct db_prop esp_compress_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espa_trans) },
-    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espa_trans) },
+	{ PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop ah_esp_compress_pc[] = {
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
-    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(esp_trans) },
-    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
-    };
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+	{ PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(esp_trans) },
+	{ PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+	};
 
 /* arrays of proposal alternatives (each element is a conjunction) */
 
 static struct db_prop_conj ah_props[] = {
-    { AD(ah_pc) },
+	{ AD(ah_pc) },
 #ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
-    { AD(espnull_pc) }
+	{ AD(espnull_pc) }
 #endif
-    };
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop_conj esp_props[] =
-    { { AD(esp_pc) } };
+	{ { AD(esp_pc) } };
 
 static struct db_prop_conj ah_esp_props[] =
-    { { AD(ah_esp_pc) } };
+	{ { AD(ah_esp_pc) } };
 
 static struct db_prop_conj compress_props[] = {
-    { AD(compress_pc) },
-    };
+	{ AD(compress_pc) },
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop_conj ah_compress_props[] = {
-    { AD(ah_compress_pc) },
+	{ AD(ah_compress_pc) },
 #ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
-    { AD(espnull_compress_pc) }
+	{ AD(espnull_compress_pc) }
 #endif
-    };
+	};
 
 static struct db_prop_conj esp_compress_props[] =
-    { { AD(esp_compress_pc) } };
+	{ { AD(esp_compress_pc) } };
 
 static struct db_prop_conj ah_esp_compress_props[] =
-    { { AD(ah_esp_compress_pc) } };
+	{ { AD(ah_esp_compress_pc) } };
 
 /* The IPsec sadb is subscripted by a bitset (subset of policy)
  * with members from { POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_AUTHENTICATE, POLICY_COMPRESS }
  * shifted right by POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT.
  */
 struct db_sa ipsec_sadb[1 << 3] = {
-    { AD_NULL },	/* none */
-    { AD(esp_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT */
-    { AD(ah_props) },	/* POLICY_AUTHENTICATE */
-    { AD(ah_esp_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_AUTHENTICATE */
-    { AD(compress_props) },	/* POLICY_COMPRESS */
-    { AD(esp_compress_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_COMPRESS */
-    { AD(ah_compress_props) },	/* POLICY_AUTHENTICATE+POLICY_COMPRESS */
-    { AD(ah_esp_compress_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_AUTHENTICATE+POLICY_COMPRESS */
-    };
+	{ AD_NULL },        /* none */
+	{ AD(esp_props) },  /* POLICY_ENCRYPT */
+	{ AD(ah_props) },   /* POLICY_AUTHENTICATE */
+	{ AD(ah_esp_props) },       /* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_AUTHENTICATE */
+	{ AD(compress_props) },     /* POLICY_COMPRESS */
+	{ AD(esp_compress_props) }, /* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_COMPRESS */
+	{ AD(ah_compress_props) },  /* POLICY_AUTHENTICATE+POLICY_COMPRESS */
+	{ AD(ah_esp_compress_props) },      /* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_AUTHENTICATE+POLICY_COMPRESS */
+	};
 
 #undef AD
 #undef AD_NULL
@@ -204,41 +199,41 @@ out_attr(int type
 , enum_names **attr_val_descs USED_BY_DEBUG
 , pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    struct isakmp_attribute attr;
-
-    if (val >> 16 == 0)
-    {
-	/* short value: use TV form */
-	attr.isaat_af_type = type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
-	attr.isaat_lv = val;
-	if (!out_struct(&attr, attr_desc, pbs, NULL))
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* This is a real fudge!  Since we rarely use long attributes
-	 * and since this is the only place where we can cause an
-	 * ISAKMP message length to be other than a multiple of 4 octets,
-	 * we force the length of the value to be a multiple of 4 octets.
-	 * Furthermore, we only handle values up to 4 octets in length.
-	 * Voila: a fixed format!
-	 */
-	pb_stream val_pbs;
-	u_int32_t nval = htonl(val);
-
-	attr.isaat_af_type = type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
-	if (!out_struct(&attr, attr_desc, pbs, &val_pbs)
-	|| !out_raw(&nval, sizeof(nval), &val_pbs, "long attribute value"))
-	    return FALSE;
-	close_output_pbs(&val_pbs);
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
-	enum_names *d = attr_val_descs[type];
-
-	if (d != NULL)
-	    DBG_log("    [%lu is %s]"
-		, val, enum_show(d, val)));
-    return TRUE;
+	struct isakmp_attribute attr;
+
+	if (val >> 16 == 0)
+	{
+		/* short value: use TV form */
+		attr.isaat_af_type = type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+		attr.isaat_lv = val;
+		if (!out_struct(&attr, attr_desc, pbs, NULL))
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* This is a real fudge!  Since we rarely use long attributes
+		 * and since this is the only place where we can cause an
+		 * ISAKMP message length to be other than a multiple of 4 octets,
+		 * we force the length of the value to be a multiple of 4 octets.
+		 * Furthermore, we only handle values up to 4 octets in length.
+		 * Voila: a fixed format!
+		 */
+		pb_stream val_pbs;
+		u_int32_t nval = htonl(val);
+
+		attr.isaat_af_type = type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
+		if (!out_struct(&attr, attr_desc, pbs, &val_pbs)
+		|| !out_raw(&nval, sizeof(nval), &val_pbs, "long attribute value"))
+			return FALSE;
+		close_output_pbs(&val_pbs);
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+		enum_names *d = attr_val_descs[type];
+
+		if (d != NULL)
+			DBG_log("    [%lu is %s]"
+				, val, enum_show(d, val)));
+	return TRUE;
 }
 #define return_on(var, val) do { var=val;goto return_out; } while(0);
 /* Output an SA, as described by a db_sa.
@@ -251,336 +246,336 @@ out_sa(pb_stream *outs
 , bool oakley_mode
 , u_int8_t np)
 {
-    pb_stream sa_pbs;
-    int pcn;
-    bool ret = FALSE;
-    bool ah_spi_generated = FALSE
-	, esp_spi_generated = FALSE
-	, ipcomp_cpi_generated = FALSE;
+	pb_stream sa_pbs;
+	int pcn;
+	bool ret = FALSE;
+	bool ah_spi_generated = FALSE
+		, esp_spi_generated = FALSE
+		, ipcomp_cpi_generated = FALSE;
 #if !defined NO_KERNEL_ALG || !defined NO_IKE_ALG
-    struct db_context *db_ctx = NULL;
+	struct db_context *db_ctx = NULL;
 #endif
 
-    /* SA header out */
-    {
-	struct isakmp_sa sa;
-
-	sa.isasa_np = np;
-	st->st_doi = sa.isasa_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;	/* all we know */
-	if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, outs, &sa_pbs))
-	    return_on(ret, FALSE);
-    }
-
-    /* within SA: situation out */
-    st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY;
-    if (!out_struct(&st->st_situation, &ipsec_sit_desc, &sa_pbs, NULL))
-	return_on(ret, FALSE);
-
-    /* within SA: Proposal Payloads
-     *
-     * Multiple Proposals with the same number are simultaneous
-     * (conjuncts) and must deal with different protocols (AH or ESP).
-     * Proposals with different numbers are alternatives (disjuncts),
-     * in preference order.
-     * Proposal numbers must be monotonic.
-     * See RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" 4.2
-     */
-
-    for (pcn = 0; pcn != sadb->prop_conj_cnt; pcn++)
-    {
-	struct db_prop_conj *pc = &sadb->prop_conjs[pcn];
-	int pn;
-
-	for (pn = 0; pn != pc->prop_cnt; pn++)
+	/* SA header out */
 	{
-	    struct db_prop *p = &pc->props[pn];
-	    pb_stream proposal_pbs;
-	    struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
-	    struct_desc *trans_desc = NULL;
-	    struct_desc *attr_desc = NULL;
-	    enum_names **attr_val_descs = NULL;
-	    int tn;
-	    bool tunnel_mode;
-
-	    tunnel_mode = (pn == pc->prop_cnt-1)
-		&& (st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL);
-
-	    /* Proposal header */
-	    proposal.isap_np = pcn == sadb->prop_conj_cnt-1 && pn == pc->prop_cnt-1
-		? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_P;
-	    proposal.isap_proposal = pcn;
-	    proposal.isap_protoid = p->protoid;
-	    proposal.isap_spisize = oakley_mode ? 0
-		: p->protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP ? IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
-		: IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE;
-
-	    /* In quick mode ONLY, create proposal for runtime kernel algos.
-	     *  Replace ESP proposals with runtime created one
-	     */
-	    if (!oakley_mode && p->protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_ESP)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-		    if (st->st_connection->alg_info_esp)
-		    {
-			static char buf[256]="";
-
-			alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof (buf),
-				(struct alg_info *)st->st_connection->alg_info_esp);
-			DBG_log(buf);
-		    }
-		)
-		db_ctx = kernel_alg_db_new(st->st_connection->alg_info_esp, st->st_policy);
-		p = db_prop_get(db_ctx);
-
-		if (!p || p->trans_cnt == 0)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-			"empty IPSEC SA proposal to send "
-			"(no kernel algorithms for esp selection)");
-		    return_on(ret, FALSE);
-		}
-	    }
-
-	    if (oakley_mode && p->protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
-		    if (st->st_connection->alg_info_ike)
-		    {
-			static char buf[256]="";
-
-			alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof (buf),
-				(struct alg_info *)st->st_connection->alg_info_ike);
-			DBG_log(buf);
-		    }
-		)
-		db_ctx = ike_alg_db_new(st->st_connection->alg_info_ike, st->st_policy);
-		p = db_prop_get(db_ctx);
-
-		if (!p || p->trans_cnt == 0)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-			"empty ISAKMP SA proposal to send "
-			"(no algorithms for ike selection?)");
-		    return_on(ret, FALSE);
-		}
-	    }
-
-	    proposal.isap_notrans = p->trans_cnt;
-	    if (!out_struct(&proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, &sa_pbs, &proposal_pbs))
-		return_on(ret, FALSE);
+		struct isakmp_sa sa;
 
-	    /* Per-protocols stuff:
-	     * Set trans_desc.
-	     * Set attr_desc.
-	     * Set attr_val_descs.
-	     * If not oakley_mode, emit SPI.
-	     * We allocate SPIs on demand.
-	     * All ESPs in an SA will share a single SPI.
-	     * All AHs in an SAwill share a single SPI.
-	     * AHs' SPI will be distinct from ESPs'.
-	     * This latter is needed because KLIPS doesn't
-	     * use the protocol when looking up a (dest, protocol, spi).
-	     * ??? If multiple ESPs are composed, how should their SPIs
-	     * be allocated?
-	     */
-	    {
-		ipsec_spi_t *spi_ptr = NULL;
-		int proto = 0;
-		bool *spi_generated = NULL;
-
-		switch (p->protoid)
-		{
-		case PROTO_ISAKMP:
-		    passert(oakley_mode);
-		    trans_desc = &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc;
-		    attr_desc = &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc;
-		    attr_val_descs = oakley_attr_val_descs;
-		    /* no SPI needed */
-		    break;
-		case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
-		    passert(!oakley_mode);
-		    trans_desc = &isakmp_ah_transform_desc;
-		    attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
-		    attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
-		    spi_ptr = &st->st_ah.our_spi;
-		    spi_generated = &ah_spi_generated;
-		    proto = IPPROTO_AH;
-		    break;
-		case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-		    passert(!oakley_mode);
-		    trans_desc = &isakmp_esp_transform_desc;
-		    attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
-		    attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
-		    spi_ptr = &st->st_esp.our_spi;
-		    spi_generated = &esp_spi_generated;
-		    proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
-		    break;
-		case PROTO_IPCOMP:
-		    passert(!oakley_mode);
-		    trans_desc = &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc;
-		    attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
-		    attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
-
-		    /* a CPI isn't quite the same as an SPI
-		     * so we use specialized code to emit it.
-		     */
-		    if (!ipcomp_cpi_generated)
-		    {
-			st->st_ipcomp.our_spi = get_my_cpi(
-			    &st->st_connection->spd, tunnel_mode);
-			if (st->st_ipcomp.our_spi == 0)
-			    return_on(ret, FALSE);	/* problem generating CPI */
-
-			ipcomp_cpi_generated = TRUE;
-		    }
-		    /* CPI is stored in network low order end of an
-		     * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
-		     */
-		    if (!out_raw((u_char *)&st->st_ipcomp.our_spi
-		     + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
-		    , IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
-		    , &proposal_pbs, "CPI"))
-			return_on(ret, FALSE);
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    bad_case(p->protoid);
-		}
-		if (spi_ptr != NULL)
-		{
-		    if (!*spi_generated)
-		    {
-			*spi_ptr = get_ipsec_spi(0
-			    , proto
-			    , &st->st_connection->spd
-			    , tunnel_mode);
-			if (*spi_ptr == 0)
-			    return FALSE;
-			*spi_generated = TRUE;
-		    }
-		    if (!out_raw((u_char *)spi_ptr, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE
-		    , &proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+		sa.isasa_np = np;
+		st->st_doi = sa.isasa_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;   /* all we know */
+		if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, outs, &sa_pbs))
 			return_on(ret, FALSE);
-		}
-	    }
+	}
 
-	    /* within proposal: Transform Payloads */
-	    for (tn = 0; tn != p->trans_cnt; tn++)
-	    {
-		struct db_trans *t = &p->trans[tn];
-		pb_stream trans_pbs;
-		struct isakmp_transform trans;
-		int an;
+	/* within SA: situation out */
+	st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY;
+	if (!out_struct(&st->st_situation, &ipsec_sit_desc, &sa_pbs, NULL))
+		return_on(ret, FALSE);
 
-		trans.isat_np = (tn == p->trans_cnt - 1)
-		    ? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_T;
-		trans.isat_transnum = tn;
-		trans.isat_transid = t->transid;
-		if (!out_struct(&trans, trans_desc, &proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs))
-		    return_on(ret, FALSE);
+	/* within SA: Proposal Payloads
+	 *
+	 * Multiple Proposals with the same number are simultaneous
+	 * (conjuncts) and must deal with different protocols (AH or ESP).
+	 * Proposals with different numbers are alternatives (disjuncts),
+	 * in preference order.
+	 * Proposal numbers must be monotonic.
+	 * See RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" 4.2
+	 */
 
-		/* Within tranform: Attributes. */
+	for (pcn = 0; pcn != sadb->prop_conj_cnt; pcn++)
+	{
+		struct db_prop_conj *pc = &sadb->prop_conjs[pcn];
+		int pn;
 
-		/* For Phase 2 / Quick Mode, GROUP_DESCRIPTION is
-		 * automatically generated because it must be the same
-		 * in every transform.  Except IPCOMP.
-		 */
-		if (p->protoid != PROTO_IPCOMP
-		&& st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+		for (pn = 0; pn != pc->prop_cnt; pn++)
 		{
-		    passert(!oakley_mode);
-		    passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group);
-		    out_attr(GROUP_DESCRIPTION, st->st_pfs_group->group
-			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			, &trans_pbs);
-		}
+			struct db_prop *p = &pc->props[pn];
+			pb_stream proposal_pbs;
+			struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+			struct_desc *trans_desc = NULL;
+			struct_desc *attr_desc = NULL;
+			enum_names **attr_val_descs = NULL;
+			int tn;
+			bool tunnel_mode;
+
+			tunnel_mode = (pn == pc->prop_cnt-1)
+				&& (st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL);
+
+			/* Proposal header */
+			proposal.isap_np = pcn == sadb->prop_conj_cnt-1 && pn == pc->prop_cnt-1
+				? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_P;
+			proposal.isap_proposal = pcn;
+			proposal.isap_protoid = p->protoid;
+			proposal.isap_spisize = oakley_mode ? 0
+				: p->protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP ? IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+				: IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE;
+
+			/* In quick mode ONLY, create proposal for runtime kernel algos.
+			 *  Replace ESP proposals with runtime created one
+			 */
+			if (!oakley_mode && p->protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_ESP)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+					if (st->st_connection->alg_info_esp)
+					{
+						static char buf[BUF_LEN]="";
+
+						alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof (buf),
+								(struct alg_info *)st->st_connection->alg_info_esp);
+						DBG_log("esp proposal: %s", buf);
+					}
+				)
+				db_ctx = kernel_alg_db_new(st->st_connection->alg_info_esp, st->st_policy);
+				p = db_prop_get(db_ctx);
+
+				if (!p || p->trans_cnt == 0)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+						"empty IPSEC SA proposal to send "
+						"(no kernel algorithms for esp selection)");
+					return_on(ret, FALSE);
+				}
+			}
 
-		/* automatically generate duration
-		 * and, for Phase 2 / Quick Mode, encapsulation.
-		 */
-		if (oakley_mode)
-		{
-		    out_attr(OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE, OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS
-			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			, &trans_pbs);
-		    out_attr(OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION
-			, st->st_connection->sa_ike_life_seconds
-			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			, &trans_pbs);
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    /* RFC 2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.5 specifies that
-		     * the default is "unspecified (host-dependent)".
-		     * This makes little sense, so we always specify it.
-		     *
-		     * Unlike other IPSEC transforms, IPCOMP defaults
-		     * to Transport Mode, so we can exploit the default
-		     * (draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1).
-		     */
-		    if (p->protoid != PROTO_IPCOMP
-		    || st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
-		    {
-#ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
-			if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-			&& !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL))
+			if (oakley_mode && p->protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
 			{
-			    /* Inform user that we will not respect policy and only
-			     * propose Tunnel Mode
-			     */
-			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
-				"Transport Mode not allowed due to security concerns -- "
-				"using Tunnel mode");
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+					if (st->st_connection->alg_info_ike)
+					{
+						static char buf[BUF_LEN]="";
+
+						alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof (buf),
+								(struct alg_info *)st->st_connection->alg_info_ike);
+						DBG_log("ike proposal: %s", buf);
+					}
+				)
+				db_ctx = ike_alg_db_new(st->st_connection, st->st_policy);
+				p = db_prop_get(db_ctx);
+
+				if (!p || p->trans_cnt == 0)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+						"empty ISAKMP SA proposal to send "
+						"(no algorithms for ike selection?)");
+					return_on(ret, FALSE);
+				}
 			}
+
+			proposal.isap_notrans = p->trans_cnt;
+			if (!out_struct(&proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, &sa_pbs, &proposal_pbs))
+				return_on(ret, FALSE);
+
+			/* Per-protocols stuff:
+			 * Set trans_desc.
+			 * Set attr_desc.
+			 * Set attr_val_descs.
+			 * If not oakley_mode, emit SPI.
+			 * We allocate SPIs on demand.
+			 * All ESPs in an SA will share a single SPI.
+			 * All AHs in an SAwill share a single SPI.
+			 * AHs' SPI will be distinct from ESPs'.
+			 * This latter is needed because KLIPS doesn't
+			 * use the protocol when looking up a (dest, protocol, spi).
+			 * ??? If multiple ESPs are composed, how should their SPIs
+			 * be allocated?
+			 */
+			{
+				ipsec_spi_t *spi_ptr = NULL;
+				int proto = 0;
+				bool *spi_generated = NULL;
+
+				switch (p->protoid)
+				{
+				case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+					passert(oakley_mode);
+					trans_desc = &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc;
+					attr_desc = &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc;
+					attr_val_descs = oakley_attr_val_descs;
+					/* no SPI needed */
+					break;
+				case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+					passert(!oakley_mode);
+					trans_desc = &isakmp_ah_transform_desc;
+					attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+					attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
+					spi_ptr = &st->st_ah.our_spi;
+					spi_generated = &ah_spi_generated;
+					proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+					break;
+				case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+					passert(!oakley_mode);
+					trans_desc = &isakmp_esp_transform_desc;
+					attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+					attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
+					spi_ptr = &st->st_esp.our_spi;
+					spi_generated = &esp_spi_generated;
+					proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+					break;
+				case PROTO_IPCOMP:
+					passert(!oakley_mode);
+					trans_desc = &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc;
+					attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+					attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
+
+					/* a CPI isn't quite the same as an SPI
+					 * so we use specialized code to emit it.
+					 */
+					if (!ipcomp_cpi_generated)
+					{
+						st->st_ipcomp.our_spi = get_my_cpi(
+							&st->st_connection->spd, tunnel_mode);
+						if (st->st_ipcomp.our_spi == 0)
+							return_on(ret, FALSE);      /* problem generating CPI */
+
+						ipcomp_cpi_generated = TRUE;
+					}
+					/* CPI is stored in network low order end of an
+					 * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
+					 */
+					if (!out_raw((u_char *)&st->st_ipcomp.our_spi
+					 + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+					, IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+					, &proposal_pbs, "CPI"))
+						return_on(ret, FALSE);
+					break;
+				default:
+					bad_case(p->protoid);
+				}
+				if (spi_ptr != NULL)
+				{
+					if (!*spi_generated)
+					{
+						*spi_ptr = get_ipsec_spi(0
+							, proto
+							, &st->st_connection->spd
+							, tunnel_mode);
+						if (*spi_ptr == 0)
+							return FALSE;
+						*spi_generated = TRUE;
+					}
+					if (!out_raw((u_char *)spi_ptr, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE
+					, &proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+						return_on(ret, FALSE);
+				}
+			}
+
+			/* within proposal: Transform Payloads */
+			for (tn = 0; tn != p->trans_cnt; tn++)
+			{
+				struct db_trans *t = &p->trans[tn];
+				pb_stream trans_pbs;
+				struct isakmp_transform trans;
+				int an;
+
+				trans.isat_np = (tn == p->trans_cnt - 1)
+					? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_T;
+				trans.isat_transnum = tn;
+				trans.isat_transid = t->transid;
+				if (!out_struct(&trans, trans_desc, &proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs))
+					return_on(ret, FALSE);
+
+				/* Within tranform: Attributes. */
+
+				/* For Phase 2 / Quick Mode, GROUP_DESCRIPTION is
+				 * automatically generated because it must be the same
+				 * in every transform.  Except IPCOMP.
+				 */
+				if (p->protoid != PROTO_IPCOMP
+				&& st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+				{
+					passert(!oakley_mode);
+					passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group);
+					out_attr(GROUP_DESCRIPTION, st->st_pfs_group->algo_id
+						, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+						, &trans_pbs);
+				}
+
+				/* automatically generate duration
+				 * and, for Phase 2 / Quick Mode, encapsulation.
+				 */
+				if (oakley_mode)
+				{
+					out_attr(OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE, OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS
+						, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+						, &trans_pbs);
+					out_attr(OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION
+						, st->st_connection->sa_ike_life_seconds
+						, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+						, &trans_pbs);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* RFC 2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.5 specifies that
+					 * the default is "unspecified (host-dependent)".
+					 * This makes little sense, so we always specify it.
+					 *
+					 * Unlike other IPSEC transforms, IPCOMP defaults
+					 * to Transport Mode, so we can exploit the default
+					 * (draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1).
+					 */
+					if (p->protoid != PROTO_IPCOMP
+					|| st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
+					{
+#ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+						if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+						&& !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL))
+						{
+							/* Inform user that we will not respect policy and only
+							 * propose Tunnel Mode
+							 */
+							loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
+								"Transport Mode not allowed due to security concerns -- "
+								"using Tunnel mode");
+						}
 #endif
-			out_attr(ENCAPSULATION_MODE
+						out_attr(ENCAPSULATION_MODE
 #ifdef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
-			    , NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st, st->st_policy)
+							, NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st, st->st_policy)
 #else
-				/* If NAT-T is detected, use UDP_TUNNEL as long as Transport
-				 * Mode has security concerns.
-				 *
-				 * User has been informed of that
-				 */
-			    , NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st, POLICY_TUNNEL)
+								/* If NAT-T is detected, use UDP_TUNNEL as long as Transport
+								 * Mode has security concerns.
+								 *
+								 * User has been informed of that
+								 */
+							, NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st, POLICY_TUNNEL)
 #endif
-			    , attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			    , &trans_pbs);
-		    }
-		    out_attr(SA_LIFE_TYPE, SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS
-			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			, &trans_pbs);
-		    out_attr(SA_LIFE_DURATION
-			, st->st_connection->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
-			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			, &trans_pbs);
-		}
-
-		/* spit out attributes from table */
-		for (an = 0; an != t->attr_cnt; an++)
-		{
-		    struct db_attr *a = &t->attrs[an];
-
-		    out_attr(a->type, a->val
-			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
-			, &trans_pbs);
+							, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+							, &trans_pbs);
+					}
+					out_attr(SA_LIFE_TYPE, SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS
+						, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+						, &trans_pbs);
+					out_attr(SA_LIFE_DURATION
+						, st->st_connection->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
+						, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+						, &trans_pbs);
+				}
+
+				/* spit out attributes from table */
+				for (an = 0; an != t->attr_cnt; an++)
+				{
+					struct db_attr *a = &t->attrs[an];
+
+					out_attr(a->type, a->val
+						, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+						, &trans_pbs);
+				}
+
+				close_output_pbs(&trans_pbs);
+			}
+			close_output_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
 		}
-
-		close_output_pbs(&trans_pbs);
-	    }
-	    close_output_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
+		/* end of a conjunction of proposals */
 	}
-	/* end of a conjunction of proposals */
-    }
-    close_output_pbs(&sa_pbs);
-    ret = TRUE;
+	close_output_pbs(&sa_pbs);
+	ret = TRUE;
 
 return_out:
 
 #if !defined NO_KERNEL_ALG || !defined NO_IKE_ALG
-    if (db_ctx)
-	    db_destroy(db_ctx);
+	if (db_ctx)
+			db_destroy(db_ctx);
 #endif
-    return ret;
+	return ret;
 }
 
 /* Handle long form of duration attribute.
@@ -590,27 +585,27 @@ return_out:
 static u_int32_t
 decode_long_duration(pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    u_int32_t val = 0;
-
-    /* ignore leading zeros */
-    while (pbs_left(pbs) != 0 && *pbs->cur == '\0')
-	pbs->cur++;
-
-    if (pbs_left(pbs) > sizeof(val))
-    {
-	/* "clamp" too large value to max representable value */
-	val -= 1;	/* portable way to get to maximum value */
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("   too large duration clamped to: %lu"
-	    , (unsigned long)val));
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* decode number */
-	while (pbs_left(pbs) != 0)
-	    val = (val << BITS_PER_BYTE) | *pbs->cur++;
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("   long duration: %lu", (unsigned long)val));
-    }
-    return val;
+	u_int32_t val = 0;
+
+	/* ignore leading zeros */
+	while (pbs_left(pbs) != 0 && *pbs->cur == '\0')
+		pbs->cur++;
+
+	if (pbs_left(pbs) > sizeof(val))
+	{
+		/* "clamp" too large value to max representable value */
+		val -= 1;       /* portable way to get to maximum value */
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("   too large duration clamped to: %lu"
+			, (unsigned long)val));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		/* decode number */
+		while (pbs_left(pbs) != 0)
+			val = (val << BITS_PER_BYTE) | *pbs->cur++;
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("   long duration: %lu", (unsigned long)val));
+	}
+	return val;
 }
 
 /* Preparse the body of an ISAKMP SA Payload and
@@ -621,99 +616,99 @@ decode_long_duration(pb_stream *pbs)
  */
 notification_t
 preparse_isakmp_sa_body(const struct isakmp_sa *sa
-		      , pb_stream *sa_pbs
-		      , u_int32_t *ipsecdoisit
-		      , pb_stream *proposal_pbs
-		      , struct isakmp_proposal *proposal)
+					  , pb_stream *sa_pbs
+					  , u_int32_t *ipsecdoisit
+					  , pb_stream *proposal_pbs
+					  , struct isakmp_proposal *proposal)
 {
-    /* DOI */
-    if (sa->isasa_doi != ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unknown/unsupported DOI %s", enum_show(&doi_names, sa->isasa_doi));
-	/* XXX Could send notification back */
-	return DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-    }
-
-    /* Situation */
-    if (!in_struct(ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, sa_pbs, NULL))
-	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-
-    if (*ipsecdoisit != SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec DOI situation (%s)"
-	    , bitnamesof(sit_bit_names, *ipsecdoisit));
-	/* XXX Could send notification back */
-	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-    }
-
-    /* The rules for ISAKMP SAs are scattered.
-     * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5 says that there
-     * can only be one SA, and it can have only one proposal in it.
-     * There may well be multiple transforms.
-     */
-    if (!in_struct(proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, proposal_pbs))
-	return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-
-    if (proposal->isap_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload must be alone in Oakley SA; found %s following Proposal"
-	    , enum_show(&payload_names, proposal->isap_np));
-	return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-
-    if (proposal->isap_protoid != PROTO_ISAKMP)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected Protocol ID (%s) found in Oakley Proposal"
-	    , enum_show(&protocol_names, proposal->isap_protoid));
-	return INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID;
-    }
-
-    /* Just what should we accept for the SPI field?
-     * The RFC is sort of contradictory.  We will ignore the SPI
-     * as long as it is of the proper size.
-     *
-     * From RFC2408 2.4 Identifying Security Associations:
-     *   During phase 1 negotiations, the initiator and responder cookies
-     *   determine the ISAKMP SA. Therefore, the SPI field in the Proposal
-     *   payload is redundant and MAY be set to 0 or it MAY contain the
-     *   transmitting entity's cookie.
-     *
-     * From RFC2408 3.5 Proposal Payload:
-     *    o  SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by
-     *       the Protocol-Id.  In the case of ISAKMP, the Initiator and
-     *       Responder cookie pair from the ISAKMP Header is the ISAKMP SPI,
-     *       therefore, the SPI Size is irrelevant and MAY be from zero (0) to
-     *       sixteen (16).  If the SPI Size is non-zero, the content of the
-     *       SPI field MUST be ignored.  If the SPI Size is not a multiple of
-     *       4 octets it will have some impact on the SPI field and the
-     *       alignment of all payloads in the message.  The Domain of
-     *       Interpretation (DOI) will dictate the SPI Size for other
-     *       protocols.
-     */
-    if (proposal->isap_spisize == 0)
-    {
-	/* empty (0) SPI -- fine */
-    }
-    else if (proposal->isap_spisize <= MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE)
-    {
-	u_char junk_spi[MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE];
-
-	if (!in_raw(junk_spi, proposal->isap_spisize, proposal_pbs, "Oakley SPI"))
-	    return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid SPI size (%u) in Oakley Proposal"
-	    , (unsigned)proposal->isap_spisize);
-	return INVALID_SPI;
-    }
-    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	/* DOI */
+	if (sa->isasa_doi != ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unknown/unsupported DOI %s", enum_show(&doi_names, sa->isasa_doi));
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	/* Situation */
+	if (!in_struct(ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, sa_pbs, NULL))
+		return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+	if (*ipsecdoisit != SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec DOI situation (%s)"
+			, bitnamesof(sit_bit_names, *ipsecdoisit));
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+	/* The rules for ISAKMP SAs are scattered.
+	 * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5 says that there
+	 * can only be one SA, and it can have only one proposal in it.
+	 * There may well be multiple transforms.
+	 */
+	if (!in_struct(proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, proposal_pbs))
+		return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+
+	if (proposal->isap_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload must be alone in Oakley SA; found %s following Proposal"
+			, enum_show(&payload_names, proposal->isap_np));
+		return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+
+	if (proposal->isap_protoid != PROTO_ISAKMP)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected Protocol ID (%s) found in Oakley Proposal"
+			, enum_show(&protocol_names, proposal->isap_protoid));
+		return INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID;
+	}
+
+	/* Just what should we accept for the SPI field?
+	 * The RFC is sort of contradictory.  We will ignore the SPI
+	 * as long as it is of the proper size.
+	 *
+	 * From RFC2408 2.4 Identifying Security Associations:
+	 *   During phase 1 negotiations, the initiator and responder cookies
+	 *   determine the ISAKMP SA. Therefore, the SPI field in the Proposal
+	 *   payload is redundant and MAY be set to 0 or it MAY contain the
+	 *   transmitting entity's cookie.
+	 *
+	 * From RFC2408 3.5 Proposal Payload:
+	 *    o  SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by
+	 *       the Protocol-Id.  In the case of ISAKMP, the Initiator and
+	 *       Responder cookie pair from the ISAKMP Header is the ISAKMP SPI,
+	 *       therefore, the SPI Size is irrelevant and MAY be from zero (0) to
+	 *       sixteen (16).  If the SPI Size is non-zero, the content of the
+	 *       SPI field MUST be ignored.  If the SPI Size is not a multiple of
+	 *       4 octets it will have some impact on the SPI field and the
+	 *       alignment of all payloads in the message.  The Domain of
+	 *       Interpretation (DOI) will dictate the SPI Size for other
+	 *       protocols.
+	 */
+	if (proposal->isap_spisize == 0)
+	{
+		/* empty (0) SPI -- fine */
+	}
+	else if (proposal->isap_spisize <= MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE)
+	{
+		u_char junk_spi[MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE];
+
+		if (!in_raw(junk_spi, proposal->isap_spisize, proposal_pbs, "Oakley SPI"))
+			return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid SPI size (%u) in Oakley Proposal"
+			, (unsigned)proposal->isap_spisize);
+		return INVALID_SPI;
+	}
+	return NOTHING_WRONG;
 }
 
 static struct {
-    u_int8_t *start;
-    u_int8_t *cur;
-    u_int8_t *roof;
+	u_int8_t *start;
+	u_int8_t *cur;
+	u_int8_t *roof;
 } backup;
 
 /*
@@ -722,9 +717,9 @@ static struct {
 void
 backup_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    backup.start = pbs->start;
-    backup.cur   = pbs->cur;
-    backup.roof  = pbs->roof;
+	backup.start = pbs->start;
+	backup.cur   = pbs->cur;
+	backup.roof  = pbs->roof;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -733,9 +728,9 @@ backup_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
 void
 restore_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
 {
-    pbs->start = backup.start;
-    pbs->cur   = backup.cur;
-    pbs->roof  = backup.roof;
+	pbs->start = backup.start;
+	pbs->cur   = backup.cur;
+	pbs->roof  = backup.roof;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -743,90 +738,93 @@ restore_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
  */
 notification_t
 parse_isakmp_policy(pb_stream *proposal_pbs
-		  , u_int notrans
-		  , lset_t *policy)
+				  , u_int notrans
+				  , lset_t *policy)
 {
-    int last_transnum = -1;
+	int last_transnum = -1;
 
-    *policy = LEMPTY;
+	*policy = LEMPTY;
 
-    while (notrans--)
-    {
-	pb_stream trans_pbs;
-	u_char *attr_start;
-	size_t attr_len;
-	struct isakmp_transform trans;
+	while (notrans--)
+	{
+		pb_stream trans_pbs;
+		u_char *attr_start;
+		size_t attr_len;
+		struct isakmp_transform trans;
 
-	if (!in_struct(&trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs))
-	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		if (!in_struct(&trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs))
+			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
 
-	if (trans.isat_transnum <= last_transnum)
-	{
-	    /* picky, picky, picky */
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Transform Numbers are not monotonically increasing"
-		" in Oakley Proposal");
-	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	}
-	last_transnum = trans.isat_transnum;
+		if (trans.isat_transnum <= last_transnum)
+		{
+			/* picky, picky, picky */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Transform Numbers are not monotonically increasing"
+				" in Oakley Proposal");
+			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+		last_transnum = trans.isat_transnum;
 
-	if (trans.isat_transid != KEY_IKE)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "expected KEY_IKE but found %s in Oakley Transform"
-		, enum_show(&isakmp_transformid_names, trans.isat_transid));
-	    return INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID;
-	}
+		if (trans.isat_transid != KEY_IKE)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "expected KEY_IKE but found %s in Oakley Transform"
+				, enum_show(&isakmp_transformid_names, trans.isat_transid));
+			return INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID;
+		}
 
-	attr_start = trans_pbs.cur;
-	attr_len = pbs_left(&trans_pbs);
+		attr_start = trans_pbs.cur;
+		attr_len = pbs_left(&trans_pbs);
 
-	/* preprocess authentication attributes only */
-	while (pbs_left(&trans_pbs) != 0)
-	{
-	    struct isakmp_attribute a;
-	    pb_stream attr_pbs;
+		/* preprocess authentication attributes only */
+		while (pbs_left(&trans_pbs) != 0)
+		{
+			struct isakmp_attribute a;
+			pb_stream attr_pbs;
 
-	    if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc, &trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+			if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc, &trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
 
-	    passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
+			passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
 
-	    switch (a.isaat_af_type)
-	    {
-	    case OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		switch (a.isaat_lv)
-		{
-		case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
-		    *policy |= POLICY_PSK;
-		    break;
-		case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
-		    *policy |= POLICY_RSASIG;
-		    break;
-		case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER;
-		    /* fall through */
-		case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_PSK;
-		    break;
-		case XAUTHInitRSA:
-		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER;
-		    /* fall through */
-		case XAUTHRespRSA:
-		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    break;
+			switch (a.isaat_af_type)
+			{
+			case OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				switch (a.isaat_lv)
+				{
+				case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+					*policy |= POLICY_PSK;
+					break;
+				case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+				case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+				case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+				case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+					*policy |= POLICY_PUBKEY;
+					break;
+				case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+					*policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER;
+					/* fall through */
+				case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+					*policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_PSK;
+					break;
+				case XAUTHInitRSA:
+					*policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER;
+					/* fall through */
+				case XAUTHRespRSA:
+					*policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG;
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+			default:
+				break;
+			}
 		}
-		break;
-	    default:
-		break;
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("preparse_isakmp_policy: peer requests %s authentication"
-		, prettypolicy(*policy))
-    )
-    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("preparse_isakmp_policy: peer requests %s authentication"
+				, prettypolicy(*policy))
+	)
+	return NOTHING_WRONG;
 }
 
 /* 
@@ -835,22 +833,22 @@ parse_isakmp_policy(pb_stream *proposal_pbs
 static err_t
 find_preshared_key(struct state* st)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
 
-    if (get_preshared_secret(c) == NULL)
-    {
-	char my_id[BUF_LEN], his_id[BUF_LEN];
+	if (get_preshared_secret(c) == NULL)
+	{
+		char my_id[BUF_LEN], his_id[BUF_LEN];
 
-	idtoa(&c->spd.this.id, my_id, sizeof(my_id));
-	if (his_id_was_instantiated(c))
-	    strcpy(his_id, "%any");
-	else
-	    idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, his_id, sizeof(his_id));
-	ugh = builddiag("Can't authenticate: no preshared key found for `%s' and `%s'"
-			, my_id, his_id);
-    }
-    return ugh;
+		idtoa(&c->spd.this.id, my_id, sizeof(my_id));
+		if (his_id_was_instantiated(c))
+			strcpy(his_id, "%any");
+		else
+			idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, his_id, sizeof(his_id));
+		ugh = builddiag("Can't authenticate: no preshared key found for `%s' and `%s'"
+						, my_id, his_id);
+	}
+	return ugh;
 }
 
 /* Parse the body of an ISAKMP SA Payload (i.e. Phase 1 / Main Mode).
@@ -864,429 +862,432 @@ find_preshared_key(struct state* st)
  */
 notification_t
 parse_isakmp_sa_body(u_int32_t ipsecdoisit
-		   , pb_stream *proposal_pbs
-		   , struct isakmp_proposal *proposal
-		   , pb_stream *r_sa_pbs
-		   , struct state *st
-		   , bool initiator)
+				   , pb_stream *proposal_pbs
+				   , struct isakmp_proposal *proposal
+				   , pb_stream *r_sa_pbs
+				   , struct state *st
+				   , bool initiator)
 {
-    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    unsigned no_trans_left;
-
-    /* for each transform payload... */
-    no_trans_left = proposal->isap_notrans;
-
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	pb_stream trans_pbs;
-	u_char *attr_start;
-	size_t attr_len;
-	struct isakmp_transform trans;
-	lset_t seen_attrs = 0;
-	lset_t seen_durations = 0;
-	u_int16_t life_type = 0;
-	struct oakley_trans_attrs ta;
-	err_t ugh = NULL;	/* set to diagnostic when problem detected */
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	unsigned no_trans_left;
 
-	/* initialize only optional field in ta */
-	ta.life_seconds = OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT;	/* When this SA expires (seconds) */
+	/* for each transform payload... */
+	no_trans_left = proposal->isap_notrans;
 
-	if (no_trans_left == 0)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "number of Transform Payloads disagrees with Oakley Proposal Payload");
-	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	}
-
-	in_struct(&trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs);
-	attr_start = trans_pbs.cur;
-	attr_len = pbs_left(&trans_pbs);
-
-	/* process all the attributes that make up the transform */
+		pb_stream trans_pbs;
+		u_char *attr_start;
+		size_t attr_len;
+		struct isakmp_transform trans;
+		lset_t seen_attrs = 0;
+		lset_t seen_durations = 0;
+		u_int16_t life_type = 0;
+		struct oakley_trans_attrs ta;
+		err_t ugh = NULL;       /* set to diagnostic when problem detected */
 
-	while (pbs_left(&trans_pbs) != 0)
-	{
-	    struct isakmp_attribute a;
-	    pb_stream attr_pbs;
-	    u_int32_t val;	/* room for larger values */
+		/* initialize only optional field in ta */
+		ta.life_seconds = OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT;    /* When this SA expires (seconds) */
 
-	    if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc, &trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		if (no_trans_left == 0)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "number of Transform Payloads disagrees with Oakley Proposal Payload");
+			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
 
-	    passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
+		in_struct(&trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs);
+		attr_start = trans_pbs.cur;
+		attr_len = pbs_left(&trans_pbs);
 
-	    if (LHAS(seen_attrs, a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK))
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "repeated %s attribute in Oakley Transform %u"
-		    , enum_show(&oakley_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type)
-		    , trans.isat_transnum);
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	    }
+		/* process all the attributes that make up the transform */
 
-	    seen_attrs |= LELEM(a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK);
+		while (pbs_left(&trans_pbs) != 0)
+		{
+			struct isakmp_attribute a;
+			pb_stream attr_pbs;
+			u_int32_t val;      /* room for larger values */
 
-	    val = a.isaat_lv;
+			if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc, &trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
 
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    {
-		enum_names *vdesc = oakley_attr_val_descs
-		    [a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+			passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
 
-		if (vdesc != NULL)
-		{
-		    const char *nm = enum_name(vdesc, val);
+			if (LHAS(seen_attrs, a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK))
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "repeated %s attribute in Oakley Transform %u"
+					, enum_show(&oakley_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type)
+					, trans.isat_transnum);
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+			}
 
-		    if (nm != NULL)
-			DBG_log("   [%u is %s]", (unsigned)val, nm);
-		}
-	    });
+			seen_attrs |= LELEM(a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK);
 
-	    switch (a.isaat_af_type)
-	    {
-	    case OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		if (ike_alg_enc_present(val))
-		{
-		    ta.encrypt = val;
-		    ta.encrypter = ike_alg_get_encrypter(val);
-		    ta.enckeylen = ta.encrypter->keydeflen;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
-			    , enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, val));
-		}
-		break;
+			val = a.isaat_lv;
 
-	    case OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		if (ike_alg_hash_present(val))
-		{
-		    ta.hash = val;
-		    ta.hasher = ike_alg_get_hasher(val);
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
-			    , enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, val));
-		}
-		break;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			{
+				enum_names *vdesc = oakley_attr_val_descs
+					[a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
 
-	    case OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		{
-		    /* check that authentication method is acceptable */
-		    lset_t iap = st->st_policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+				if (vdesc != NULL)
+				{
+					const char *nm = enum_name(vdesc, val);
 
-		    /* is the initiator the XAUTH client? */
-		    bool xauth_init = ( initiator && (st->st_policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) == LEMPTY)
-				   || (!initiator && (st->st_policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) != LEMPTY);
+					if (nm != NULL)
+						DBG_log("   [%u is %s]", (unsigned)val, nm);
+				}
+			});
 
-		    switch (val)
-		    {
-		    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
-			if ((iap & POLICY_PSK) == LEMPTY)
-			{
-			    ugh = "policy does not allow OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY authentication";
-			}
-			else
-			{
-			    ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
-			    ta.auth = OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY;
-			}
-			break;
-		    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
-			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK) == LEMPTY || !xauth_init)
-			{
-			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHInitPreShared authentication";
-			}
-			else
-			{
-			    ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
-			    ta.auth = XAUTHInitPreShared;
-			}
-			break;
-		    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
-			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK) == LEMPTY || xauth_init)
-			{
-			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHRespPreShared authentication";
-			}
-			else
-			{
-			    ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
-			    ta.auth = XAUTHRespPreShared;
-			}
-			break;
-		    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
-			/* Accept if policy specifies RSASIG or is default */
-			if ((iap & POLICY_RSASIG) == LEMPTY)
-			{
-			    ugh = "policy does not allow OAKLEY_RSA_SIG authentication";
-			}
-			else
-			{
-			    ta.auth = OAKLEY_RSA_SIG;
-			}
-			break;
-		    case XAUTHInitRSA:
-			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG) == LEMPTY || !xauth_init)
+			switch (a.isaat_af_type)
 			{
-			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHInitRSA authentication";
-			}
-			else
-			{
-			    ta.auth = XAUTHInitRSA;
-			}
-			break;
-		    case XAUTHRespRSA:
-			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG) == LEMPTY || xauth_init)
-			{
-			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHRespRSA authentication";
+			case OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				if (ike_alg_get_crypter(val))
+				{
+					ta.encrypt = val;
+					ta.encrypter = ike_alg_get_crypter(val);
+					ta.enckeylen = ta.encrypter->keydeflen;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
+							, enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, val));
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				if (ike_alg_get_hasher(val))
+				{
+					ta.hash = val;
+					ta.hasher = ike_alg_get_hasher(val);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
+							, enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, val));
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				{
+					/* check that authentication method is acceptable */
+					lset_t iap = st->st_policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+
+					/* is the initiator the XAUTH client? */
+					bool xauth_init = ( initiator && (st->st_policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) == LEMPTY)
+								   || (!initiator && (st->st_policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) != LEMPTY);
+
+					switch (val)
+					{
+					case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+						if ((iap & POLICY_PSK) == LEMPTY)
+						{
+							ugh = "policy does not allow pre-shared key authentication";
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
+							ta.auth = OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY;
+						}
+						break;
+					case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+						if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK) == LEMPTY || !xauth_init)
+						{
+							ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHInitPreShared authentication";
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
+							ta.auth = XAUTHInitPreShared;
+						}
+						break;
+					case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+						if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK) == LEMPTY || xauth_init)
+						{
+							ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHRespPreShared authentication";
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
+							ta.auth = XAUTHRespPreShared;
+						}
+						break;
+					case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+					case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256:
+					case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384:
+					case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521:
+						if ((iap & POLICY_PUBKEY) == LEMPTY)
+						{
+							ugh = "policy does not allow public key authentication";
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							ta.auth = val;
+						}
+						break;
+					case XAUTHInitRSA:
+						if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG) == LEMPTY || !xauth_init)
+						{
+							ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHInitRSA authentication";
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							ta.auth = XAUTHInitRSA;
+						}
+						break;
+					case XAUTHRespRSA:
+						if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG) == LEMPTY || xauth_init)
+						{
+							ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHRespRSA authentication";
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							ta.auth = XAUTHRespRSA;
+						}
+						break;
+					default:
+						ugh = builddiag("Pluto does not support %s authentication"
+							, enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, val));
+						break;
+					}
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				ta.group = ike_alg_get_dh_group(val);
+				if (ta.group == NULL)
+				{
+					ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
+							, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, val));
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				switch (val)
+				{
+				case OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS:
+				case OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES:
+					if (LHAS(seen_durations, val))
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+								, "attribute OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE value %s repeated"
+								, enum_show(&oakley_lifetime_names, val));
+						return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+					}
+					seen_durations |= LELEM(val);
+					life_type = val;
+					break;
+				default:
+					ugh = builddiag("unknown value %s"
+							, enum_show(&oakley_lifetime_names, val));
+					break;
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+				val = decode_long_duration(&attr_pbs);
+				/* fall through */
+			case OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE))
+				{
+					ugh = "OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION attribute not preceded by OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE attribute";
+					break;
+				}
+				seen_attrs &= ~(LELEM(OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION) | LELEM(OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE));
+
+				switch (life_type)
+				{
+				case OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS:
+					if (val > OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM)
+					{
+#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
+						plog("peer requested %lu seconds"
+										" which exceeds our limit %d seconds"
+										, (long) val
+										, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
+						plog("lifetime reduced to %d seconds "
+										"(todo: IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME notification)"
+										, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
+						val = OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM;
+#else
+						ugh = builddiag("peer requested %lu seconds"
+										" which exceeds our limit %d seconds"
+										, (long) val
+										, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
+#endif
+					}   
+					ta.life_seconds = val;
+					break;
+				case OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES:
+					ta.life_kilobytes = val;
+					break;
+				default:
+					bad_case(life_type);
+				}
+				break;
+
+			case OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				if ((seen_attrs & LELEM(OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM)) == 0)
+				{
+					ugh = "OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute not preceded by "
+						  "OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM attribute";
+					break;
+				}
+				if (ta.encrypter == NULL)
+				{
+					ugh = "NULL encrypter with seen OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM";
+					break;
+				}
+				/*
+				 * check if this keylen is compatible with specified algorithm
+				 */
+				if (val
+				&& (val < ta.encrypter->keyminlen || val > ta.encrypter->keymaxlen))
+				{
+					ugh = "peer proposed key length not valid for "
+						  "encryption algorithm specified";
+				}
+				ta.enckeylen = val;
+				break;
+#if 0 /* not yet supported */
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_PRF | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+			case OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+#endif
+			default:
+				/* fix compiler warning */
+				memset(&ta, 0, sizeof(ta));
+				ugh = "unsupported OAKLEY attribute";
+				break;
 			}
-			else
+
+			if (ugh != NULL)
 			{
-			    ta.auth = XAUTHRespRSA;
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s.  Attribute %s"
+					, ugh, enum_show(&oakley_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+				break;
 			}
-			break;
-		    default:
-			ugh = builddiag("Pluto does not support %s authentication"
-			    , enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, val));
-			break;
-		    }
 		}
-		break;
 
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		ta.group = lookup_group(val);
-		if (ta.group == NULL)
+		/*
+		 * ML: at last check for allowed transforms in alg_info_ike
+		 *     (ALG_INFO_F_STRICT flag)
+		 */
+		if (ugh == NULL)
 		{
-		    ugh = "only OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 and OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536 supported";
+			if (!ike_alg_ok_final(ta.encrypt, ta.enckeylen, ta.hash,
+				ta.group ? ta.group->algo_id : -1, c->alg_info_ike))
+			{
+				ugh = "OAKLEY proposal refused";
+			}
 		}
-		break;
 
-	    case OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		switch (val)
+		if (ugh == NULL)
 		{
-		case OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS:
-		case OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES:
-		    if (LHAS(seen_durations, val))
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-				, "attribute OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE value %s repeated"
-				, enum_show(&oakley_lifetime_names, val));
-			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-		    }
-		    seen_durations |= LELEM(val);
-		    life_type = val;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    ugh = builddiag("unknown value %s"
-			    , enum_show(&oakley_lifetime_names, val));
-		    break;
-		}
-		break;
+			/* a little more checking is in order */
+			{
+				lset_t missing
+					= ~seen_attrs
+					& (LELEM(OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM)
+					  | LELEM(OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM)
+					  | LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD)
+					  | LELEM(OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION));
+
+				if (missing)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing mandatory attribute(s) %s in Oakley Transform %u"
+						, bitnamesof(oakley_attr_bit_names, missing)
+						, trans.isat_transnum);
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				}
+			}
+			/* We must have liked this transform.
+			 * Lets finish early and leave.
+			 */
 
-	    case OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-		val = decode_long_duration(&attr_pbs);
-		/* fall through */
-	    case OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE))
-		{
-		    ugh = "OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION attribute not preceded by OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE attribute";
-		    break;
-		}
-		seen_attrs &= ~(LELEM(OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION) | LELEM(OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE));
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CRYPT
+				, DBG_log("Oakley Transform %u accepted", trans.isat_transnum));
 
-		switch (life_type)
-		{
-		case OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS:
-		    if (val > OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM)
-		    {
-#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
-			plog("peer requested %lu seconds"
-					" which exceeds our limit %d seconds"
-					, (long) val
-					, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
-			plog("lifetime reduced to %d seconds "
-                             		"(todo: IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME notification)"
-					, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
-			val = OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM;
-#else
-			ugh = builddiag("peer requested %lu seconds"
-					" which exceeds our limit %d seconds"
-					, (long) val
-					, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
-#endif
-		    }	
-		    ta.life_seconds = val;
-		    break;
-		case OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES:
-		    ta.life_kilobytes = val;
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    bad_case(life_type);
-		}
-		break;
-
-	    case OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		if ((seen_attrs & LELEM(OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM)) == 0)
-		{
-		    ugh = "OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute not preceded by "
-			  "OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM attribute";
-		    break;
-		}
-		if (ta.encrypter == NULL)
-		{
-		    ugh = "NULL encrypter with seen OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM";
-		    break;
-		}
-		/*
-		 * check if this keylen is compatible with specified algorithm
-		 */
-		if (val
-		&& (val < ta.encrypter->keyminlen || val > ta.encrypter->keymaxlen))
-		{
-		    ugh = "peer proposed key length not valid for "
-			  "encryption algorithm specified";
-		}
-		ta.enckeylen = val;
-		break;
-#if 0 /* not yet supported */
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_PRF | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-#endif
-	    default:
-		/* fix compiler warning */
-		memset(&ta, 0, sizeof(ta));
-		ugh = "unsupported OAKLEY attribute";
-		break;
-	    }
-
-	    if (ugh != NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s.  Attribute %s"
-		    , ugh, enum_show(&oakley_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
+			if (r_sa_pbs != NULL)
+			{
+				struct isakmp_proposal r_proposal = *proposal;
+				pb_stream r_proposal_pbs;
+				struct isakmp_transform r_trans = trans;
+				pb_stream r_trans_pbs;
 
-	/*
-	 * ML: at last check for allowed transforms in alg_info_ike
-	 *     (ALG_INFO_F_STRICT flag)
-	 */
-	if (ugh == NULL)
-	{
-	    if (!ike_alg_ok_final(ta.encrypt, ta.enckeylen, ta.hash,
-		ta.group ? ta.group->group : -1, c->alg_info_ike))
-	    {
-		ugh = "OAKLEY proposal refused";
-	    }
-	}
+				/* Situation */
+				if (!out_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, r_sa_pbs, NULL))
+					impossible();
 
-	if (ugh == NULL)
-	{
-	    /* a little more checking is in order */
-	    {
-		lset_t missing
-		    = ~seen_attrs
-		    & (LELEM(OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM)
-		      | LELEM(OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM)
-		      | LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD)
-		      | LELEM(OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION));
-
-		if (missing)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing mandatory attribute(s) %s in Oakley Transform %u"
-			, bitnamesof(oakley_attr_bit_names, missing)
-			, trans.isat_transnum);
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-		}
-	    }
-	    /* We must have liked this transform.
-	     * Lets finish early and leave.
-	     */
-
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CRYPT
-		, DBG_log("Oakley Transform %u accepted", trans.isat_transnum));
-
-	    if (r_sa_pbs != NULL)
-	    {
-		struct isakmp_proposal r_proposal = *proposal;
-		pb_stream r_proposal_pbs;
-		struct isakmp_transform r_trans = trans;
-		pb_stream r_trans_pbs;
-
-		/* Situation */
-		if (!out_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, r_sa_pbs, NULL))
-		    impossible();
-
-		/* Proposal */
+				/* Proposal */
 #ifdef EMIT_ISAKMP_SPI
-		r_proposal.isap_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE;
+				r_proposal.isap_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE;
 #else
-		r_proposal.isap_spisize = 0;
+				r_proposal.isap_spisize = 0;
 #endif
-		r_proposal.isap_notrans = 1;
-		if (!out_struct(&r_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, r_sa_pbs, &r_proposal_pbs))
-		    impossible();
+				r_proposal.isap_notrans = 1;
+				if (!out_struct(&r_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, r_sa_pbs, &r_proposal_pbs))
+					impossible();
 
-		/* SPI */
+				/* SPI */
 #ifdef EMIT_ISAKMP_SPI
-		if (!out_raw(my_cookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &r_proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
-		    impossible();
-		r_proposal.isap_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE;
+				if (!out_raw(my_cookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &r_proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+					impossible();
+				r_proposal.isap_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE;
 #else
-		/* none (0) */
+				/* none (0) */
 #endif
 
-		/* Transform */
-		r_trans.isat_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-		if (!out_struct(&r_trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, &r_proposal_pbs, &r_trans_pbs))
-		    impossible();
-
-		if (!out_raw(attr_start, attr_len, &r_trans_pbs, "attributes"))
-		    impossible();
-		close_output_pbs(&r_trans_pbs);
-		close_output_pbs(&r_proposal_pbs);
-		close_output_pbs(r_sa_pbs);
-	    }
-
-	    /* copy over the results */
-	    st->st_oakley = ta;
-	    return NOTHING_WRONG;
-	}
+				/* Transform */
+				r_trans.isat_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+				if (!out_struct(&r_trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, &r_proposal_pbs, &r_trans_pbs))
+					impossible();
 
-	/* on to next transform */
-	no_trans_left--;
+				if (!out_raw(attr_start, attr_len, &r_trans_pbs, "attributes"))
+					impossible();
+				close_output_pbs(&r_trans_pbs);
+				close_output_pbs(&r_proposal_pbs);
+				close_output_pbs(r_sa_pbs);
+			}
 
-	if (trans.isat_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
-	{
-	    if (no_trans_left != 0)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "number of Transform Payloads disagrees with Oakley Proposal Payload");
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	}
-	if (trans.isat_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_T)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected %s payload in Oakley Proposal"
-		, enum_show(&payload_names, proposal->isap_np));
-	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+			/* copy over the results */
+			st->st_oakley = ta;
+			return NOTHING_WRONG;
+		}
+
+		/* on to next transform */
+		no_trans_left--;
+
+		if (trans.isat_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+		{
+			if (no_trans_left != 0)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "number of Transform Payloads disagrees with Oakley Proposal Payload");
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+		if (trans.isat_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_T)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected %s payload in Oakley Proposal"
+				, enum_show(&payload_names, proposal->isap_np));
+			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no acceptable Oakley Transform");
-    return NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no acceptable Oakley Transform");
+	return NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
 }
 
 /* Parse the body of an IPsec SA Payload (i.e. Phase 2 / Quick Mode).
@@ -1315,14 +1316,14 @@ parse_isakmp_sa_body(u_int32_t ipsecdoisit
  */
 
 static const struct ipsec_trans_attrs null_ipsec_trans_attrs = {
-    0,					/* transid (NULL, for now) */
-    0,					/* spi */
-    SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT,		/* life_seconds */
-    SA_LIFE_DURATION_K_DEFAULT,		/* life_kilobytes */
-    ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED,	/* encapsulation */
-    AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,		/* auth */
-    0,					/* key_len */
-    0,					/* key_rounds */
+	0,                                  /* transid (NULL, for now) */
+	0,                                  /* spi */
+	SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT,           /* life_seconds */
+	SA_LIFE_DURATION_K_DEFAULT,         /* life_kilobytes */
+	ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED,     /* encapsulation */
+	AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,                /* auth */
+	0,                                  /* key_len */
+	0,                                  /* key_rounds */
 };
 
 static bool
@@ -1331,988 +1332,988 @@ parse_ipsec_transform(struct isakmp_transform *trans
 , pb_stream *prop_pbs
 , pb_stream *trans_pbs
 , struct_desc *trans_desc
-, int previous_transnum	/* or -1 if none */
+, int previous_transnum /* or -1 if none */
 , bool selection
 , bool is_last
 , bool is_ipcomp
-, struct state *st)	/* current state object */
+, struct state *st)     /* current state object */
 {
-    lset_t seen_attrs = 0;
-    lset_t seen_durations = 0;
-    u_int16_t life_type = 0;
-    const struct oakley_group_desc *pfs_group = NULL;
-
-    if (!in_struct(trans, trans_desc, prop_pbs, trans_pbs))
-	return FALSE;
-
-    if (trans->isat_transnum <= previous_transnum)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Transform Numbers in Proposal are not monotonically increasing");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    switch (trans->isat_np)
-    {
-	case ISAKMP_NEXT_T:
-	    if (is_last)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload has more Transforms than specified");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE:
-	    if (!is_last)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload has fewer Transforms than specified");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "expecting Transform Payload, but found %s in Proposal"
-		, enum_show(&payload_names, trans->isat_np));
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    *attrs = null_ipsec_trans_attrs;
-    attrs->transid = trans->isat_transid;
-
-    while (pbs_left(trans_pbs) != 0)
-    {
-	struct isakmp_attribute a;
-	pb_stream attr_pbs;
-	enum_names *vdesc;
-	u_int32_t val;	/* room for larger value */
-	bool ipcomp_inappropriate = is_ipcomp;	/* will get reset if OK */
-
-	if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc, trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
-	    return FALSE;
-
-	passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
-
-	if (LHAS(seen_attrs, a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "repeated %s attribute in IPsec Transform %u"
-		, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type)
-		, trans->isat_transnum);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-
-	seen_attrs |= LELEM(a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK);
+	lset_t seen_attrs = 0;
+	lset_t seen_durations = 0;
+	u_int16_t life_type = 0;
+	const struct dh_desc *pfs_group = NULL;
 
-	val = a.isaat_lv;
+	if (!in_struct(trans, trans_desc, prop_pbs, trans_pbs))
+		return FALSE;
 
-	vdesc  = ipsec_attr_val_descs[a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
-	if (vdesc != NULL)
+	if (trans->isat_transnum <= previous_transnum)
 	{
-	    if (enum_name(vdesc, val) == NULL)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid value %u for attribute %s in IPsec Transform"
-		    , (unsigned)val, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Transform Numbers in Proposal are not monotonically increasing");
 		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING
-		, if ((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
-		    DBG_log("   [%u is %s]"
-			, (unsigned)val, enum_show(vdesc, val)));
 	}
 
-	switch (a.isaat_af_type)
+	switch (trans->isat_np)
 	{
-	    case SA_LIFE_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
-		if (LHAS(seen_durations, val))
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "attribute SA_LIFE_TYPE value %s repeated in message"
-			, enum_show(&sa_lifetime_names, val));
-		    return FALSE;
-		}
-		seen_durations |= LELEM(val);
-		life_type = val;
-		break;
-	    case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-		val = decode_long_duration(&attr_pbs);
-		/* fall through */
-	    case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
-		if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, SA_LIFE_DURATION))
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SA_LIFE_DURATION IPsec attribute not preceded by SA_LIFE_TYPE attribute");
-		    return FALSE;
-		}
-		seen_attrs &= ~(LELEM(SA_LIFE_DURATION) | LELEM(SA_LIFE_TYPE));
-
-		switch (life_type)
-		{
-		    case SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS:
-			/* silently limit duration to our maximum */
-			attrs->life_seconds = val <= SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM
-			    ? val : SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM;
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_T:
+			if (is_last)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload has more Transforms than specified");
+				return FALSE;
+			}
 			break;
-		    case SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES:
-			attrs->life_kilobytes = val;
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE:
+			if (!is_last)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload has fewer Transforms than specified");
+				return FALSE;
+			}
 			break;
-		    default:
-			bad_case(life_type);
-		}
-		break;
-	    case GROUP_DESCRIPTION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		if (is_ipcomp)
+		default:
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "expecting Transform Payload, but found %s in Proposal"
+				, enum_show(&payload_names, trans->isat_np));
+			return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	*attrs = null_ipsec_trans_attrs;
+	attrs->transid = trans->isat_transid;
+
+	while (pbs_left(trans_pbs) != 0)
+	{
+		struct isakmp_attribute a;
+		pb_stream attr_pbs;
+		enum_names *vdesc;
+		u_int32_t val;  /* room for larger value */
+		bool ipcomp_inappropriate = is_ipcomp;  /* will get reset if OK */
+
+		if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc, trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
+			return FALSE;
+
+		passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
+
+		if (LHAS(seen_attrs, a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK))
 		{
-		    /* Accept reluctantly.  Should not happen, according to
-		     * draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1.
-		     */
-		    ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
-		    loglog(RC_COMMENT
-			, "IPCA (IPcomp SA) contains GROUP_DESCRIPTION."
-			"  Ignoring inapproprate attribute.");
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "repeated %s attribute in IPsec Transform %u"
+				, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type)
+				, trans->isat_transnum);
+			return FALSE;
 		}
-		pfs_group = lookup_group(val);
-		if (pfs_group == NULL)
+
+		seen_attrs |= LELEM(a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK);
+
+		val = a.isaat_lv;
+
+		vdesc  = ipsec_attr_val_descs[a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+		if (vdesc != NULL)
 		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "only OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 and OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536 supported for PFS");
-		    return FALSE;
+			if (enum_name(vdesc, val) == NULL)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid value %u for attribute %s in IPsec Transform"
+					, (unsigned)val, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING
+				, if ((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+					DBG_log("   [%u is %s]"
+						, (unsigned)val, enum_show(vdesc, val)));
 		}
-		break;
-	    case ENCAPSULATION_MODE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
-		switch (val)
+
+		switch (a.isaat_af_type)
 		{
-		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL:
-		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT:
-		    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is not detected"
-			    , enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
-			/*
-			 * Accept it anyway because SSH-Sentinel does not
-			 * use UDP_TUNNEL or UDP_TRANSPORT for the diagnostic.
-			 *
-			 * remove when SSH-Sentinel is fixed
-			 */
+			case SA_LIFE_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+				if (LHAS(seen_durations, val))
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "attribute SA_LIFE_TYPE value %s repeated in message"
+						, enum_show(&sa_lifetime_names, val));
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+				seen_durations |= LELEM(val);
+				life_type = val;
+				break;
+			case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+				val = decode_long_duration(&attr_pbs);
+				/* fall through */
+			case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+				if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, SA_LIFE_DURATION))
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SA_LIFE_DURATION IPsec attribute not preceded by SA_LIFE_TYPE attribute");
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+				seen_attrs &= ~(LELEM(SA_LIFE_DURATION) | LELEM(SA_LIFE_TYPE));
+
+				switch (life_type)
+				{
+					case SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS:
+						/* silently limit duration to our maximum */
+						attrs->life_seconds = val <= SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM
+							? val : SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM;
+						break;
+					case SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES:
+						attrs->life_kilobytes = val;
+						break;
+					default:
+						bad_case(life_type);
+				}
+				break;
+			case GROUP_DESCRIPTION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				if (is_ipcomp)
+				{
+					/* Accept reluctantly.  Should not happen, according to
+					 * draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1.
+					 */
+					ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+					loglog(RC_COMMENT
+						, "IPCA (IPcomp SA) contains GROUP_DESCRIPTION."
+						"  Ignoring inapproprate attribute.");
+				}
+				pfs_group = ike_alg_get_dh_group(val);
+				if (pfs_group == NULL)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "only OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 and OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536 supported for PFS");
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+				break;
+			case ENCAPSULATION_MODE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+				switch (val)
+				{
+				case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL:
+				case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT:
+					if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is not detected"
+							, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+						/*
+						 * Accept it anyway because SSH-Sentinel does not
+						 * use UDP_TUNNEL or UDP_TRANSPORT for the diagnostic.
+						 *
+						 * remove when SSH-Sentinel is fixed
+						 */
 #ifdef I_DONT_CARE_OF_SSH_SENTINEL
-			return FALSE;
+						return FALSE;
 #endif
-		    }
-		    attrs->encapsulation = val;
-		    break;
-		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS:
+					}
+					attrs->encapsulation = val;
+					break;
+				case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS:
 #ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			, "NAT-Traversal: Transport mode disabled due to security concerns");
-		    return FALSE;
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+						, "NAT-Traversal: Transport mode disabled due to security concerns");
+					return FALSE;
 #endif
-		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS:
-		    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "%s must only be used with old IETF drafts"
-			    , enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
-			return FALSE;
-		    }
-		    else if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-		    {
-			attrs->encapsulation = val
-				- ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS
-				+ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-		    }
-		    else
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is detected"
-			    , enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
-			return FALSE;
-		    }
-		    break;
-		    case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC:
+				case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS:
+					if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "%s must only be used with old IETF drafts"
+							, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+						return FALSE;
+					}
+					else if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+					{
+						attrs->encapsulation = val
+								- ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS
+								+ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+					}
+					else
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is detected"
+							, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+						return FALSE;
+					}
+					break;
+					case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC:
 #ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "NAT-Traversal: Transport mode disabled due "
-			      "to security concerns");
-			return FALSE;
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "NAT-Traversal: Transport mode disabled due "
+							  "to security concerns");
+						return FALSE;
 #endif
-		    case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC:
-			if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-			&& (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES))
-			{
-			    attrs->encapsulation = val
-					- ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC
-					+ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-			}
-			else if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
-			{
-			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-				, "%s must only be used with NAT-T RFC"
-				, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
-			    return FALSE;
-			}
-			else
-			{
-			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-				, "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is detected"
-				, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
-			    return FALSE;
-			}
-			break;
-		    default:
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "unknown ENCAPSULATION_MODE %d in IPSec SA", val);
-			return FALSE;
-		}
-		break;
-	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		attrs->auth = val;
-		break;
-	    case KEY_LENGTH | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		attrs->key_len = val;
-		break;
-	    case KEY_ROUNDS | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		attrs->key_rounds = val;
-		break;
+					case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC:
+						if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+						&& (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES))
+						{
+							attrs->encapsulation = val
+										- ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC
+										+ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+						}
+						else if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+						{
+							loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+								, "%s must only be used with NAT-T RFC"
+								, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+							return FALSE;
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+								, "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is detected"
+								, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+							return FALSE;
+						}
+						break;
+					default:
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "unknown ENCAPSULATION_MODE %d in IPSec SA", val);
+						return FALSE;
+				}
+				break;
+			case AUTH_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				attrs->auth = val;
+				break;
+			case KEY_LENGTH | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				attrs->key_len = val;
+				break;
+			case KEY_ROUNDS | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				attrs->key_rounds = val;
+				break;
 #if 0 /* not yet implemented */
-	    case COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		break;
-	    case COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
-		break;
-
-	    case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-		break;
-	    case COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
-		break;
+			case COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				break;
+			case COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+				break;
+
+			case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+				break;
+			case COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+				break;
 #endif
-	    default:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec attribute %s"
-		    , enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
-		return FALSE;
-	}
-	if (ipcomp_inappropriate)
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec attribute %s inappropriate for IPCOMP"
-		, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
-	    return FALSE;
+			default:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec attribute %s"
+					, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+				return FALSE;
+		}
+		if (ipcomp_inappropriate)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec attribute %s inappropriate for IPCOMP"
+				, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    /* Although an IPCOMP SA (IPCA) ought not to have a pfs_group,
-     * if it does, demand that it be consistent.
-     * See draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1.
-     */
-    if (!is_ipcomp || pfs_group != NULL)
-    {
-	if (st->st_pfs_group == &unset_group)
-	    st->st_pfs_group = pfs_group;
-
-	if (st->st_pfs_group != pfs_group)
+
+	/* Although an IPCOMP SA (IPCA) ought not to have a pfs_group,
+	 * if it does, demand that it be consistent.
+	 * See draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1.
+	 */
+	if (!is_ipcomp || pfs_group != NULL)
 	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "GROUP_DESCRIPTION inconsistent with that of %s in IPsec SA"
-		, selection? "the Proposal" : "a previous Transform");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-    }
+		if (st->st_pfs_group == &unset_group)
+			st->st_pfs_group = pfs_group;
 
-    if (LHAS(seen_attrs, SA_LIFE_DURATION))
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SA_LIFE_TYPE IPsec attribute not followed by SA_LIFE_DURATION attribute in message");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+		if (st->st_pfs_group != pfs_group)
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "GROUP_DESCRIPTION inconsistent with that of %s in IPsec SA"
+				, selection? "the Proposal" : "a previous Transform");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+	}
 
-    if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, ENCAPSULATION_MODE))
-    {
-	if (is_ipcomp)
+	if (LHAS(seen_attrs, SA_LIFE_DURATION))
 	{
-	    /* draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1:
-	     * "If the Encapsulation Mode is unspecified,
-	     * the default value of Transport Mode is assumed."
-	     * This contradicts/overrides the DOI (quuoted below).
-	     */
-	    attrs->encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SA_LIFE_TYPE IPsec attribute not followed by SA_LIFE_DURATION attribute in message");
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	else
+
+	if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, ENCAPSULATION_MODE))
 	{
-	    /* ??? Technically, RFC 2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.5 specifies that
-	     * the default is "unspecified (host-dependent)".
-	     * This makes little sense, so we demand that it be specified.
-	     */
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Transform must specify ENCAPSULATION_MODE");
-	    return FALSE;
+		if (is_ipcomp)
+		{
+			/* draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1:
+			 * "If the Encapsulation Mode is unspecified,
+			 * the default value of Transport Mode is assumed."
+			 * This contradicts/overrides the DOI (quuoted below).
+			 */
+			attrs->encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/* ??? Technically, RFC 2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.5 specifies that
+			 * the default is "unspecified (host-dependent)".
+			 * This makes little sense, so we demand that it be specified.
+			 */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Transform must specify ENCAPSULATION_MODE");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* ??? should check for key_len and/or key_rounds if required */
+	/* ??? should check for key_len and/or key_rounds if required */
 
-    return TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 static void
 echo_proposal(
-    struct isakmp_proposal r_proposal,	/* proposal to emit */
-    struct isakmp_transform r_trans,	/* winning transformation within it */
-    u_int8_t np,			/* Next Payload for proposal */
-    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,		/* SA PBS into which to emit */
-    struct ipsec_proto_info *pi,	/* info about this protocol instance */
-    struct_desc *trans_desc,		/* descriptor for this transformation */
-    pb_stream *trans_pbs,		/* PBS for incoming transform */
-    struct spd_route *sr,		/* host details for the association */
-    bool tunnel_mode)			/* true for inner most tunnel SA */
+	struct isakmp_proposal r_proposal,  /* proposal to emit */
+	struct isakmp_transform r_trans,    /* winning transformation within it */
+	u_int8_t np,                        /* Next Payload for proposal */
+	pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,                /* SA PBS into which to emit */
+	struct ipsec_proto_info *pi,        /* info about this protocol instance */
+	struct_desc *trans_desc,            /* descriptor for this transformation */
+	pb_stream *trans_pbs,               /* PBS for incoming transform */
+	struct spd_route *sr,               /* host details for the association */
+	bool tunnel_mode)                   /* true for inner most tunnel SA */
 {
-    pb_stream r_proposal_pbs;
-    pb_stream r_trans_pbs;
-
-    /* Proposal */
-    r_proposal.isap_np = np;
-    r_proposal.isap_notrans = 1;
-    if (!out_struct(&r_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, r_sa_pbs, &r_proposal_pbs))
-	impossible();
-
-    /* allocate and emit our CPI/SPI */
-    if (r_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP)
-    {
-	/* CPI is stored in network low order end of an
-	 * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
-	 * Note: we may fail to generate a satisfactory CPI,
-	 * but we'll ignore that.
-	 */
-	pi->our_spi = get_my_cpi(sr, tunnel_mode);
-	out_raw((u_char *) &pi->our_spi
-	     + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
-	    , IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
-	    , &r_proposal_pbs, "CPI");
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	pi->our_spi = get_ipsec_spi(pi->attrs.spi
-	    , r_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_AH ?
-		IPPROTO_AH : IPPROTO_ESP
-	    , sr
-	    , tunnel_mode);
-	/* XXX should check for errors */
-	out_raw((u_char *) &pi->our_spi, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE
-	    , &r_proposal_pbs, "SPI");
-    }
-
-    /* Transform */
-    r_trans.isat_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
-    if (!out_struct(&r_trans, trans_desc, &r_proposal_pbs, &r_trans_pbs))
-	impossible();
-
-    /* Transform Attributes: pure echo */
-    trans_pbs->cur = trans_pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_transform);
-    if (!out_raw(trans_pbs->cur, pbs_left(trans_pbs)
-    , &r_trans_pbs, "attributes"))
-	impossible();
-
-    close_output_pbs(&r_trans_pbs);
-    close_output_pbs(&r_proposal_pbs);
-}
+	pb_stream r_proposal_pbs;
+	pb_stream r_trans_pbs;
 
-notification_t
-parse_ipsec_sa_body(
-    pb_stream *sa_pbs,		/* body of input SA Payload */
-    const struct isakmp_sa *sa,	/* header of input SA Payload */
-    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,	/* if non-NULL, where to emit body of winning SA */
-    bool selection,		/* if this SA is a selection, only one transform may appear */
-    struct state *st)		/* current state object */
-{
-    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-    u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
-    pb_stream next_proposal_pbs;
-
-    struct isakmp_proposal next_proposal;
-    ipsec_spi_t next_spi;
-
-    bool next_full = TRUE;
-
-    /* DOI */
-    if (sa->isasa_doi != ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unknown or unsupported DOI %s", enum_show(&doi_names, sa->isasa_doi));
-	/* XXX Could send notification back */
-	return DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-    }
-
-    /* Situation */
-    if (!in_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, sa_pbs, NULL))
-	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-
-    if (ipsecdoisit != SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
-    {
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec DOI situation (%s)"
-	    , bitnamesof(sit_bit_names, ipsecdoisit));
-	/* XXX Could send notification back */
-	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
-    }
-
-    /* The rules for IPsec SAs are scattered.
-     * RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 4.2 gives some info.
-     * There may be multiple proposals.  Those with identical proposal
-     * numbers must be considered as conjuncts.  Those with different
-     * numbers are disjuncts.
-     * Each proposal may have several transforms, each considered
-     * an alternative.
-     * Each transform may have several attributes, all applying.
-     *
-     * To handle the way proposals are combined, we need to do a
-     * look-ahead.
-     */
-
-    if (!in_struct(&next_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, &next_proposal_pbs))
-	return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-
-    /* for each conjunction of proposals... */
-    while (next_full)
-    {
-	int propno = next_proposal.isap_proposal;
-	pb_stream ah_prop_pbs, esp_prop_pbs, ipcomp_prop_pbs;
-	struct isakmp_proposal ah_proposal = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
-	struct isakmp_proposal esp_proposal = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
-	struct isakmp_proposal ipcomp_proposal = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
-	ipsec_spi_t ah_spi = 0;
-	ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = 0;
-	ipsec_spi_t ipcomp_cpi = 0;
-	bool ah_seen = FALSE;
-	bool esp_seen = FALSE;
-	bool ipcomp_seen = FALSE;
-	bool tunnel_mode = FALSE;
-	int inner_proto = 0;
-	u_int16_t well_known_cpi = 0;
-
-	pb_stream ah_trans_pbs, esp_trans_pbs, ipcomp_trans_pbs;
-	struct isakmp_transform ah_trans, esp_trans, ipcomp_trans;
-	struct ipsec_trans_attrs ah_attrs, esp_attrs, ipcomp_attrs;
-
-	/* for each proposal in the conjunction */
-	do {
-
-	    if (next_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP)
-	    {
-		/* IPCOMP CPI */
-		if (next_proposal.isap_spisize == IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE)
-		{
-		    /* This code is to accommodate those peculiar
-		     * implementations that send a CPI in the bottom of an
-		     * SPI-sized field.
-		     * See draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1
-		     */
-		    u_int8_t filler[IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE];
-
-		    if (!in_raw(filler, sizeof(filler)
-		     , &next_proposal_pbs, "CPI filler")
-		    || !all_zero(filler, sizeof(filler)))
-			return INVALID_SPI;
-		}
-		else if (next_proposal.isap_spisize != IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal with improper CPI size (%u)"
-			, next_proposal.isap_spisize);
-		    return INVALID_SPI;
-		}
+	/* Proposal */
+	r_proposal.isap_np = np;
+	r_proposal.isap_notrans = 1;
+	if (!out_struct(&r_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, r_sa_pbs, &r_proposal_pbs))
+		impossible();
 
-		/* We store CPI in the low order of a network order
+	/* allocate and emit our CPI/SPI */
+	if (r_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP)
+	{
+		/* CPI is stored in network low order end of an
 		 * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
+		 * Note: we may fail to generate a satisfactory CPI,
+		 * but we'll ignore that.
 		 */
-		zero(&next_spi);
-		if (!in_raw((u_char *)&next_spi
-		  + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
-		, IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE, &next_proposal_pbs, "CPI"))
-		    return INVALID_SPI;
-
-		/* If sanity ruled, CPIs would have to be such that
-		 * the SAID (the triple (CPI, IPCOM, destination IP))
-		 * would be unique, just like for SPIs.  But there is a
-		 * perversion where CPIs can be well-known and consequently
-		 * the triple is not unique.  We hide this fact from
-		 * ourselves by fudging the top 16 bits to make
-		 * the property true internally!
-		 */
-		switch (ntohl(next_spi))
-		{
-		case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:
-		    well_known_cpi = ntohl(next_spi);
-		    next_spi = uniquify_his_cpi(next_spi, st);
-		    if (next_spi == 0)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
-			    , "IPsec Proposal contains well-known CPI that I cannot uniquify");
-			return INVALID_SPI;
-		    }
-		    break;
-		default:
-		    if (ntohl(next_spi) < IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED
-		    || ntohl(next_spi) > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
-		    {
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains CPI from non-negotiated range (0x%lx)"
-			    , (unsigned long) ntohl(next_spi));
-			return INVALID_SPI;
-		    }
-		    break;
-		}
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* AH or ESP SPI */
-		if (next_proposal.isap_spisize != IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal with improper SPI size (%u)"
-			, next_proposal.isap_spisize);
-		    return INVALID_SPI;
-		}
-
-		if (!in_raw((u_char *)&next_spi, sizeof(next_spi), &next_proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
-		    return INVALID_SPI;
+		pi->our_spi = get_my_cpi(sr, tunnel_mode);
+		out_raw((u_char *) &pi->our_spi
+			 + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+			, IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+			, &r_proposal_pbs, "CPI");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		pi->our_spi = get_ipsec_spi(pi->attrs.spi
+			, r_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_AH ?
+				IPPROTO_AH : IPPROTO_ESP
+			, sr
+			, tunnel_mode);
+		/* XXX should check for errors */
+		out_raw((u_char *) &pi->our_spi, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE
+			, &r_proposal_pbs, "SPI");
+	}
 
-		/* SPI value 0 is invalid and values 1-255 are reserved to IANA.
-		 * RFC 2402 (ESP) 2.4, RFC 2406 (AH) 2.1
-		 * IPCOMP???
-		 */
-		if (ntohl(next_spi) < IPSEC_DOI_SPI_MIN)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains invalid SPI (0x%lx)"
-			, (unsigned long) ntohl(next_spi));
-		    return INVALID_SPI;
-		}
-	    }
+	/* Transform */
+	r_trans.isat_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	if (!out_struct(&r_trans, trans_desc, &r_proposal_pbs, &r_trans_pbs))
+		impossible();
 
-	    if (next_proposal.isap_notrans == 0)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains no Transforms");
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	    }
+	/* Transform Attributes: pure echo */
+	trans_pbs->cur = trans_pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_transform);
+	if (!out_raw(trans_pbs->cur, pbs_left(trans_pbs)
+	, &r_trans_pbs, "attributes"))
+		impossible();
 
-	    switch (next_proposal.isap_protoid)
-	    {
-	    case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
-		if (ah_seen)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous AH Proposals");
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-		}
-		ah_seen = TRUE;
-		ah_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
-		ah_proposal = next_proposal;
-		ah_spi = next_spi;
-		break;
+	close_output_pbs(&r_trans_pbs);
+	close_output_pbs(&r_proposal_pbs);
+}
 
-	    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
-		if (esp_seen)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous ESP Proposals");
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-		}
-		esp_seen = TRUE;
-		esp_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
-		esp_proposal = next_proposal;
-		esp_spi = next_spi;
-		break;
+notification_t
+parse_ipsec_sa_body(
+	pb_stream *sa_pbs,          /* body of input SA Payload */
+	const struct isakmp_sa *sa, /* header of input SA Payload */
+	pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,        /* if non-NULL, where to emit body of winning SA */
+	bool selection,             /* if this SA is a selection, only one transform may appear */
+	struct state *st)           /* current state object */
+{
+	const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
+	pb_stream next_proposal_pbs;
 
-	    case PROTO_IPCOMP:
-		if (ipcomp_seen)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous IPCOMP Proposals");
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-		}
-		ipcomp_seen = TRUE;
-		ipcomp_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
-		ipcomp_proposal = next_proposal;
-		ipcomp_cpi = next_spi;
-		break;
-
-	    default:
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected Protocol ID (%s) in IPsec Proposal"
-		    , enum_show(&protocol_names, next_proposal.isap_protoid));
-		return INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID;
-	    }
-
-	    /* refill next_proposal */
-	    if (next_proposal.isap_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
-	    {
-		next_full = FALSE;
-		break;
-	    }
-	    else if (next_proposal.isap_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_P)
-	    {
-		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected in Proposal: %s"
-		    , enum_show(&payload_names, next_proposal.isap_np));
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	    }
+	struct isakmp_proposal next_proposal;
+	ipsec_spi_t next_spi;
 
-	    if (!in_struct(&next_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, &next_proposal_pbs))
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	} while (next_proposal.isap_proposal == propno);
-
-	/* Now that we have all conjuncts, we should try
-	 * the Cartesian product of eachs tranforms!
-	 * At the moment, we take short-cuts on account of
-	 * our rudimentary hard-wired policy.
-	 * For now, we find an acceptable AH (if any)
-	 * and then an acceptable ESP.  The only interaction
-	 * is that the ESP acceptance can know whether there
-	 * was an acceptable AH and hence not require an AUTH.
-	 */
+	bool next_full = TRUE;
 
-	if (ah_seen)
+	/* DOI */
+	if (sa->isasa_doi != ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC)
 	{
-	    int previous_transnum = -1;
-	    int tn;
-
-	    for (tn = 0; tn != ah_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
-	    {
-		int ok_transid = 0;
-		bool ok_auth = FALSE;
-
-		if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&ah_trans
-		, &ah_attrs
-		, &ah_prop_pbs
-		, &ah_trans_pbs
-		, &isakmp_ah_transform_desc
-		, previous_transnum
-		, selection
-		, tn == ah_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
-		, FALSE
-		, st))
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-
-		previous_transnum = ah_trans.isat_transnum;
-
-		/* we must understand ah_attrs.transid
-		 * COMBINED with ah_attrs.auth.
-		 * See RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.4.3
-		 * The following combinations are legal,
-		 * but we don't implement all of them:
-		 * It seems as if each auth algorithm
-		 * only applies to one ah transid.
-		 * AH_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5
-		 * AH_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK (unimplemented)
-		 * AH_SHA, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1
-		 * AH_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC (unimplemented)
-		 */
-		switch (ah_attrs.auth)
-		{
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
-			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "AUTH_ALGORITHM attribute missing in AH Transform");
-			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unknown or unsupported DOI %s", enum_show(&doi_names, sa->isasa_doi));
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+	}
 
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
-			ok_auth = TRUE;
-			/* fall through */
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK:
-			ok_transid = AH_MD5;
-			break;
+	/* Situation */
+	if (!in_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, sa_pbs, NULL))
+		return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
 
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
-			ok_auth = TRUE;
-			ok_transid = AH_SHA;
-			break;
-
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC:
-			ok_transid = AH_DES;
-			break;
-		}
-		if (ah_attrs.transid != ok_transid)
-		{
-		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s attribute inappropriate in %s Transform"
-			, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, ah_attrs.auth)
-			, enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, ah_attrs.transid));
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-		}
-		if (!ok_auth)
-		{
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			, DBG_log("%s attribute unsupported"
-			    " in %s Transform from %s"
-			    , enum_name(&auth_alg_names, ah_attrs.auth)
-			    , enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, ah_attrs.transid)
-			    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-		    continue;   /* try another */
-		}
-		break;	/* we seem to be happy */
-	    }
-	    if (tn == ah_proposal.isap_notrans)
-		continue;	/* we didn't find a nice one */
-	    ah_attrs.spi = ah_spi;
-	    inner_proto = IPPROTO_AH;
-	    if (ah_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-		tunnel_mode = TRUE;
+	if (ipsecdoisit != SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
+	{
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec DOI situation (%s)"
+			, bitnamesof(sit_bit_names, ipsecdoisit));
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
 	}
 
-	if (esp_seen)
+	/* The rules for IPsec SAs are scattered.
+	 * RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 4.2 gives some info.
+	 * There may be multiple proposals.  Those with identical proposal
+	 * numbers must be considered as conjuncts.  Those with different
+	 * numbers are disjuncts.
+	 * Each proposal may have several transforms, each considered
+	 * an alternative.
+	 * Each transform may have several attributes, all applying.
+	 *
+	 * To handle the way proposals are combined, we need to do a
+	 * look-ahead.
+	 */
+
+	if (!in_struct(&next_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, &next_proposal_pbs))
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+	/* for each conjunction of proposals... */
+	while (next_full)
 	{
-	    int previous_transnum = -1;
-	    int tn;
-
-	    for (tn = 0; tn != esp_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
-	    {
-		if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&esp_trans
-		, &esp_attrs
-		, &esp_prop_pbs
-		, &esp_trans_pbs
-		, &isakmp_esp_transform_desc
-		, previous_transnum
-		, selection
-		, tn == esp_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
-		, FALSE
-		, st))
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-
-		previous_transnum = esp_trans.isat_transnum;
-
-		/* set default key length for AES encryption */
-		if (!esp_attrs.key_len && esp_attrs.transid == ESP_AES)
-		{
-		    esp_attrs.key_len = 128; /* bits */
-		}
+		int propno = next_proposal.isap_proposal;
+		pb_stream ah_prop_pbs, esp_prop_pbs, ipcomp_prop_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_proposal ah_proposal = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+		struct isakmp_proposal esp_proposal = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+		struct isakmp_proposal ipcomp_proposal = {0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0};
+		ipsec_spi_t ah_spi = 0;
+		ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = 0;
+		ipsec_spi_t ipcomp_cpi = 0;
+		bool ah_seen = FALSE;
+		bool esp_seen = FALSE;
+		bool ipcomp_seen = FALSE;
+		bool tunnel_mode = FALSE;
+		int inner_proto = 0;
+		u_int16_t well_known_cpi = 0;
+
+		pb_stream ah_trans_pbs, esp_trans_pbs, ipcomp_trans_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_transform ah_trans, esp_trans, ipcomp_trans;
+		struct ipsec_trans_attrs ah_attrs, esp_attrs, ipcomp_attrs;
+
+		/* for each proposal in the conjunction */
+		do {
+
+			if (next_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP)
+			{
+				/* IPCOMP CPI */
+				if (next_proposal.isap_spisize == IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE)
+				{
+					/* This code is to accommodate those peculiar
+					 * implementations that send a CPI in the bottom of an
+					 * SPI-sized field.
+					 * See draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1
+					 */
+					u_int8_t filler[IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE];
+
+					if (!in_raw(filler, sizeof(filler)
+					 , &next_proposal_pbs, "CPI filler")
+					|| !all_zero(filler, sizeof(filler)))
+						return INVALID_SPI;
+				}
+				else if (next_proposal.isap_spisize != IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal with improper CPI size (%u)"
+						, next_proposal.isap_spisize);
+					return INVALID_SPI;
+				}
+
+				/* We store CPI in the low order of a network order
+				 * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
+				 */
+				zero(&next_spi);
+				if (!in_raw((u_char *)&next_spi
+				  + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+				, IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE, &next_proposal_pbs, "CPI"))
+					return INVALID_SPI;
+
+				/* If sanity ruled, CPIs would have to be such that
+				 * the SAID (the triple (CPI, IPCOM, destination IP))
+				 * would be unique, just like for SPIs.  But there is a
+				 * perversion where CPIs can be well-known and consequently
+				 * the triple is not unique.  We hide this fact from
+				 * ourselves by fudging the top 16 bits to make
+				 * the property true internally!
+				 */
+				switch (ntohl(next_spi))
+				{
+				case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:
+					well_known_cpi = ntohl(next_spi);
+					next_spi = uniquify_his_cpi(next_spi, st);
+					if (next_spi == 0)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+							, "IPsec Proposal contains well-known CPI that I cannot uniquify");
+						return INVALID_SPI;
+					}
+					break;
+				default:
+					if (ntohl(next_spi) < IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED
+					|| ntohl(next_spi) > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
+					{
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains CPI from non-negotiated range (0x%lx)"
+							, (unsigned long) ntohl(next_spi));
+						return INVALID_SPI;
+					}
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* AH or ESP SPI */
+				if (next_proposal.isap_spisize != IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal with improper SPI size (%u)"
+						, next_proposal.isap_spisize);
+					return INVALID_SPI;
+				}
+
+				if (!in_raw((u_char *)&next_spi, sizeof(next_spi), &next_proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+					return INVALID_SPI;
+
+				/* SPI value 0 is invalid and values 1-255 are reserved to IANA.
+				 * RFC 2402 (ESP) 2.4, RFC 2406 (AH) 2.1
+				 * IPCOMP???
+				 */
+				if (ntohl(next_spi) < IPSEC_DOI_SPI_MIN)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains invalid SPI (0x%lx)"
+						, (unsigned long) ntohl(next_spi));
+					return INVALID_SPI;
+				}
+			}
 
-		if (!kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(esp_attrs.transid, esp_attrs.key_len
-		    ,c->alg_info_esp))
-		{
-		    switch (esp_attrs.transid)
-		    {
-		    case ESP_3DES:
-			break;
-#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL	/* should be about as secure as AH-only */
-		    case ESP_NULL:
-			if (esp_attrs.auth == AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE)
+			if (next_proposal.isap_notrans == 0)
 			{
-			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP_NULL requires auth algorithm");
-			    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains no Transforms");
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
 			}
-			if (st->st_policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT)
+
+			switch (next_proposal.isap_protoid)
 			{
-			    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-				    , DBG_log("ESP_NULL Transform Proposal from %s"
-					" does not satisfy POLICY_ENCRYPT"
-					, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-			    continue;   /* try another */
+			case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+				if (ah_seen)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous AH Proposals");
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				}
+				ah_seen = TRUE;
+				ah_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
+				ah_proposal = next_proposal;
+				ah_spi = next_spi;
+				break;
+
+			case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+				if (esp_seen)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous ESP Proposals");
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				}
+				esp_seen = TRUE;
+				esp_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
+				esp_proposal = next_proposal;
+				esp_spi = next_spi;
+				break;
+
+			case PROTO_IPCOMP:
+				if (ipcomp_seen)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous IPCOMP Proposals");
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				}
+				ipcomp_seen = TRUE;
+				ipcomp_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
+				ipcomp_proposal = next_proposal;
+				ipcomp_cpi = next_spi;
+				break;
+
+			default:
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected Protocol ID (%s) in IPsec Proposal"
+					, enum_show(&protocol_names, next_proposal.isap_protoid));
+				return INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID;
 			}
-			break;
-#endif
-		    default:
-			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			    , DBG_log("unsupported ESP Transform %s from %s"
-				, enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, esp_attrs.transid)
-				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-			continue;   /* try another */
-		    }
-		}
 
-		if (!kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(esp_attrs.auth, c->alg_info_esp))
-		{
-		    switch (esp_attrs.auth)
-		    {
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
-			if (!ah_seen)
+			/* refill next_proposal */
+			if (next_proposal.isap_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
 			{
-			    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-				, DBG_log("ESP from %s must either have AUTH or be combined with AH"
-				    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-			    continue;   /* try another */
+				next_full = FALSE;
+				break;
+			}
+			else if (next_proposal.isap_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_P)
+			{
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected in Proposal: %s"
+					, enum_show(&payload_names, next_proposal.isap_np));
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
 			}
-			break;
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
-		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
-			break;
-		    default:
-			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			    , DBG_log("unsupported ESP auth alg %s from %s"
-				, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, esp_attrs.auth)
-				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-			continue;   /* try another */
-		    }
-		}
 
-		/* A last check for allowed transforms in alg_info_esp
-		 * (ALG_INFO_F_STRICT flag)
+			if (!in_struct(&next_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, &next_proposal_pbs))
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		} while (next_proposal.isap_proposal == propno);
+
+		/* Now that we have all conjuncts, we should try
+		 * the Cartesian product of eachs tranforms!
+		 * At the moment, we take short-cuts on account of
+		 * our rudimentary hard-wired policy.
+		 * For now, we find an acceptable AH (if any)
+		 * and then an acceptable ESP.  The only interaction
+		 * is that the ESP acceptance can know whether there
+		 * was an acceptable AH and hence not require an AUTH.
 		 */
-		if (!kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(esp_attrs.transid, esp_attrs.key_len
-		    ,esp_attrs.auth, c->alg_info_esp))
-		{
-		    continue;
-		}
 
-		if (ah_seen && ah_attrs.encapsulation != esp_attrs.encapsulation)
+		if (ah_seen)
 		{
-		    /* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			, DBG_log("AH and ESP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+			int previous_transnum = -1;
+			int tn;
+
+			for (tn = 0; tn != ah_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
+			{
+				int ok_transid = 0;
+				bool ok_auth = FALSE;
+
+				if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&ah_trans
+				, &ah_attrs
+				, &ah_prop_pbs
+				, &ah_trans_pbs
+				, &isakmp_ah_transform_desc
+				, previous_transnum
+				, selection
+				, tn == ah_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
+				, FALSE
+				, st))
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+				previous_transnum = ah_trans.isat_transnum;
+
+				/* we must understand ah_attrs.transid
+				 * COMBINED with ah_attrs.auth.
+				 * See RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.4.3
+				 * The following combinations are legal,
+				 * but we don't implement all of them:
+				 * It seems as if each auth algorithm
+				 * only applies to one ah transid.
+				 * AH_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5
+				 * AH_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK (unimplemented)
+				 * AH_SHA, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1
+				 * AH_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC (unimplemented)
+				 */
+				switch (ah_attrs.auth)
+				{
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
+						loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "AUTH_ALGORITHM attribute missing in AH Transform");
+						return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+						ok_auth = TRUE;
+						/* fall through */
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK:
+						ok_transid = AH_MD5;
+						break;
+
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+						ok_auth = TRUE;
+						ok_transid = AH_SHA;
+						break;
+
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC:
+						ok_transid = AH_DES;
+						break;
+				}
+				if (ah_attrs.transid != ok_transid)
+				{
+					loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s attribute inappropriate in %s Transform"
+						, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, ah_attrs.auth)
+						, enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, ah_attrs.transid));
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				}
+				if (!ok_auth)
+				{
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+						, DBG_log("%s attribute unsupported"
+							" in %s Transform from %s"
+							, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, ah_attrs.auth)
+							, enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, ah_attrs.transid)
+							, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+					continue;   /* try another */
+				}
+				break;  /* we seem to be happy */
+			}
+			if (tn == ah_proposal.isap_notrans)
+				continue;       /* we didn't find a nice one */
+			ah_attrs.spi = ah_spi;
+			inner_proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+			if (ah_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+				tunnel_mode = TRUE;
 		}
 
-		break;	/* we seem to be happy */
-	    }
-	    if (tn == esp_proposal.isap_notrans)
-		continue;	/* we didn't find a nice one */
-	    
-	    esp_attrs.spi = esp_spi;
-	    inner_proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
-	    if (esp_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-		tunnel_mode = TRUE;
-	}
-	else if (st->st_policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT)
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-		, DBG_log("policy for \"%s\" requires encryption but ESP not in Proposal from %s"
-		    , c->name, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-	    continue;	/* we needed encryption, but didn't find ESP */
-	}
-	else if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE) && !ah_seen)
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-		, DBG_log("policy for \"%s\" requires authentication"
-		    " but none in Proposal from %s"
-		    , c->name, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-	    continue;	/* we need authentication, but we found neither ESP nor AH */
-	}
+		if (esp_seen)
+		{
+			int previous_transnum = -1;
+			int tn;
 
-	if (ipcomp_seen)
-	{
-	    int previous_transnum = -1;
-	    int tn;
-
-#ifdef NEVER	/* we think IPcomp is working now */
-	    /**** FUDGE TO PREVENT UNREQUESTED IPCOMP:
-	     **** NEEDED BECAUSE OUR IPCOMP IS EXPERIMENTAL (UNSTABLE).
-	     ****/
-	    if (!(st->st_policy & POLICY_COMPRESS))
-	    {
-		plog("compression proposed by %s, but policy for \"%s\" forbids it"
-		    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->name);
-		continue;	/* unwanted compression proposal */
-	    }
+			for (tn = 0; tn != esp_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
+			{
+				if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&esp_trans
+				, &esp_attrs
+				, &esp_prop_pbs
+				, &esp_trans_pbs
+				, &isakmp_esp_transform_desc
+				, previous_transnum
+				, selection
+				, tn == esp_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
+				, FALSE
+				, st))
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+				previous_transnum = esp_trans.isat_transnum;
+
+				/* set default key length for AES encryption */
+				if (!esp_attrs.key_len && esp_attrs.transid == ESP_AES)
+				{
+					esp_attrs.key_len = 128; /* bits */
+				}
+
+				if (!kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(esp_attrs.transid, esp_attrs.key_len
+					,c->alg_info_esp))
+				{
+					switch (esp_attrs.transid)
+					{
+					case ESP_3DES:
+						break;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL /* should be about as secure as AH-only */
+					case ESP_NULL:
+						if (esp_attrs.auth == AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE)
+						{
+							loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP_NULL requires auth algorithm");
+							return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+						}
+						if (st->st_policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT)
+						{
+							DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+									, DBG_log("ESP_NULL Transform Proposal from %s"
+										" does not satisfy POLICY_ENCRYPT"
+										, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+							continue;   /* try another */
+						}
+						break;
 #endif
-	    if (!can_do_IPcomp)
-	    {
-		plog("compression proposed by %s, but KLIPS is not configured with IPCOMP"
-		    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
-		continue;
-	    }
-
-	    if (well_known_cpi != 0 && !ah_seen && !esp_seen)
-	    {
-		plog("illegal proposal: bare IPCOMP used with well-known CPI");
-		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-	    }
-
-	    for (tn = 0; tn != ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
-	    {
-		if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&ipcomp_trans
-		, &ipcomp_attrs
-		, &ipcomp_prop_pbs
-		, &ipcomp_trans_pbs
-		, &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc
-		, previous_transnum
-		, selection
-		, tn == ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
-		, TRUE
-		, st))
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
-
-		previous_transnum = ipcomp_trans.isat_transnum;
-
-		if (well_known_cpi != 0 && ipcomp_attrs.transid != well_known_cpi)
-		{
-		    plog("illegal proposal: IPCOMP well-known CPI disagrees with transform");
-		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+					default:
+						DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+							, DBG_log("unsupported ESP Transform %s from %s"
+								, enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, esp_attrs.transid)
+								, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+						continue;   /* try another */
+					}
+				}
+
+				if (!kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(esp_attrs.auth, c->alg_info_esp))
+				{
+					switch (esp_attrs.auth)
+					{
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
+						if (!ah_seen)
+						{
+							DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+								, DBG_log("ESP from %s must either have AUTH or be combined with AH"
+									, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+							continue;   /* try another */
+						}
+						break;
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+					case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+						break;
+					default:
+						DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+							, DBG_log("unsupported ESP auth alg %s from %s"
+								, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, esp_attrs.auth)
+								, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+						continue;   /* try another */
+					}
+				}
+
+				/* A last check for allowed transforms in alg_info_esp
+				 * (ALG_INFO_F_STRICT flag)
+				 */
+				if (!kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(esp_attrs.transid, esp_attrs.key_len
+					,esp_attrs.auth, c->alg_info_esp))
+				{
+					continue;
+				}
+
+				if (ah_seen && ah_attrs.encapsulation != esp_attrs.encapsulation)
+				{
+					/* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+						, DBG_log("AH and ESP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+				}
+
+				break;  /* we seem to be happy */
+			}
+			if (tn == esp_proposal.isap_notrans)
+				continue;       /* we didn't find a nice one */
+			
+			esp_attrs.spi = esp_spi;
+			inner_proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+			if (esp_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+				tunnel_mode = TRUE;
 		}
-
-		switch (ipcomp_attrs.transid)
+		else if (st->st_policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT)
 		{
-		    case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:    /* all we can handle! */
-			break;
-
-		    default:
 			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			    , DBG_log("unsupported IPCOMP Transform %s from %s"
-				, enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, ipcomp_attrs.transid)
-				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
-			continue;   /* try another */
+				, DBG_log("policy for \"%s\" requires encryption but ESP not in Proposal from %s"
+					, c->name, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			continue;   /* we needed encryption, but didn't find ESP */
 		}
-
-		if (ah_seen && ah_attrs.encapsulation != ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation)
-		{
-		    /* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			, DBG_log("AH and IPCOMP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
-		} else if (esp_seen && esp_attrs.encapsulation != ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation)
+		else if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE) && !ah_seen)
 		{
-		    /* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
-			, DBG_log("ESP and IPCOMP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+				, DBG_log("policy for \"%s\" requires authentication"
+					" but none in Proposal from %s"
+					, c->name, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			continue;   /* we need authentication, but we found neither ESP nor AH */
 		}
 
-		break;	/* we seem to be happy */
-	    }
-	    if (tn == ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans)
-		continue;	/* we didn't find a nice one */
-	    ipcomp_attrs.spi = ipcomp_cpi;
-	    inner_proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
-	    if (ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
-		tunnel_mode = TRUE;
-	}
+		if (ipcomp_seen)
+		{
+			int previous_transnum = -1;
+			int tn;
+
+#ifdef NEVER    /* we think IPcomp is working now */
+			/**** FUDGE TO PREVENT UNREQUESTED IPCOMP:
+			 **** NEEDED BECAUSE OUR IPCOMP IS EXPERIMENTAL (UNSTABLE).
+			 ****/
+			if (!(st->st_policy & POLICY_COMPRESS))
+			{
+				plog("compression proposed by %s, but policy for \"%s\" forbids it"
+					, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->name);
+				continue;       /* unwanted compression proposal */
+			}
+#endif
+			if (!can_do_IPcomp)
+			{
+				plog("compression proposed by %s, but KLIPS is not configured with IPCOMP"
+					, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
+				continue;
+			}
 
-	/* Eureka: we liked what we saw -- accept it. */
+			if (well_known_cpi != 0 && !ah_seen && !esp_seen)
+			{
+				plog("illegal proposal: bare IPCOMP used with well-known CPI");
+				return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+			}
 
-	if (r_sa_pbs != NULL)
-	{
-	    /* emit what we've accepted */
+			for (tn = 0; tn != ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
+			{
+				if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&ipcomp_trans
+				, &ipcomp_attrs
+				, &ipcomp_prop_pbs
+				, &ipcomp_trans_pbs
+				, &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc
+				, previous_transnum
+				, selection
+				, tn == ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
+				, TRUE
+				, st))
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+				previous_transnum = ipcomp_trans.isat_transnum;
+
+				if (well_known_cpi != 0 && ipcomp_attrs.transid != well_known_cpi)
+				{
+					plog("illegal proposal: IPCOMP well-known CPI disagrees with transform");
+					return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+				}
+
+				switch (ipcomp_attrs.transid)
+				{
+					case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:    /* all we can handle! */
+						break;
+
+					default:
+						DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+							, DBG_log("unsupported IPCOMP Transform %s from %s"
+								, enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, ipcomp_attrs.transid)
+								, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+						continue;   /* try another */
+				}
+
+				if (ah_seen && ah_attrs.encapsulation != ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation)
+				{
+					/* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+						, DBG_log("AH and IPCOMP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+				} else if (esp_seen && esp_attrs.encapsulation != ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation)
+				{
+					/* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+						, DBG_log("ESP and IPCOMP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+				}
+
+				break;  /* we seem to be happy */
+			}
+			if (tn == ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans)
+				continue;       /* we didn't find a nice one */
+			ipcomp_attrs.spi = ipcomp_cpi;
+			inner_proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
+			if (ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+				tunnel_mode = TRUE;
+		}
 
-	    /* Situation */
-	    if (!out_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, r_sa_pbs, NULL))
-		impossible();
+		/* Eureka: we liked what we saw -- accept it. */
 
-	    /* AH proposal */
-	    if (ah_seen)
-		echo_proposal(ah_proposal
-		    , ah_trans
-		    , esp_seen || ipcomp_seen? ISAKMP_NEXT_P : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-		    , r_sa_pbs
-		    , &st->st_ah
-		    , &isakmp_ah_transform_desc
-		    , &ah_trans_pbs
-		    , &st->st_connection->spd
-		    , tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_AH);
-
-	    /* ESP proposal */
-	    if (esp_seen)
-		echo_proposal(esp_proposal
-		    , esp_trans
-		    , ipcomp_seen? ISAKMP_NEXT_P : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-		    , r_sa_pbs
-		    , &st->st_esp
-		    , &isakmp_esp_transform_desc
-		    , &esp_trans_pbs
-		    , &st->st_connection->spd
-		    , tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_ESP);
-
-	    /* IPCOMP proposal */
-	    if (ipcomp_seen)
-		echo_proposal(ipcomp_proposal
-		    , ipcomp_trans
-		    , ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
-		    , r_sa_pbs
-		    , &st->st_ipcomp
-		    , &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc
-		    , &ipcomp_trans_pbs
-		    , &st->st_connection->spd
-		    , tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_COMP);
-
-	    close_output_pbs(r_sa_pbs);
-	}
+		if (r_sa_pbs != NULL)
+		{
+			/* emit what we've accepted */
+
+			/* Situation */
+			if (!out_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, r_sa_pbs, NULL))
+				impossible();
+
+			/* AH proposal */
+			if (ah_seen)
+				echo_proposal(ah_proposal
+					, ah_trans
+					, esp_seen || ipcomp_seen? ISAKMP_NEXT_P : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+					, r_sa_pbs
+					, &st->st_ah
+					, &isakmp_ah_transform_desc
+					, &ah_trans_pbs
+					, &st->st_connection->spd
+					, tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_AH);
+
+			/* ESP proposal */
+			if (esp_seen)
+				echo_proposal(esp_proposal
+					, esp_trans
+					, ipcomp_seen? ISAKMP_NEXT_P : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+					, r_sa_pbs
+					, &st->st_esp
+					, &isakmp_esp_transform_desc
+					, &esp_trans_pbs
+					, &st->st_connection->spd
+					, tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_ESP);
+
+			/* IPCOMP proposal */
+			if (ipcomp_seen)
+				echo_proposal(ipcomp_proposal
+					, ipcomp_trans
+					, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+					, r_sa_pbs
+					, &st->st_ipcomp
+					, &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc
+					, &ipcomp_trans_pbs
+					, &st->st_connection->spd
+					, tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_COMP);
+
+			close_output_pbs(r_sa_pbs);
+		}
 
-	/* save decoded version of winning SA in state */
+		/* save decoded version of winning SA in state */
 
-	st->st_ah.present = ah_seen;
-	if (ah_seen)
-	    st->st_ah.attrs = ah_attrs;
+		st->st_ah.present = ah_seen;
+		if (ah_seen)
+			st->st_ah.attrs = ah_attrs;
 
-	st->st_esp.present = esp_seen;
-	if (esp_seen)
-	    st->st_esp.attrs = esp_attrs;
+		st->st_esp.present = esp_seen;
+		if (esp_seen)
+			st->st_esp.attrs = esp_attrs;
 
-	st->st_ipcomp.present = ipcomp_seen;
-	if (ipcomp_seen)
-	    st->st_ipcomp.attrs = ipcomp_attrs;
+		st->st_ipcomp.present = ipcomp_seen;
+		if (ipcomp_seen)
+			st->st_ipcomp.attrs = ipcomp_attrs;
 
-	return NOTHING_WRONG;
-    }
+		return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	}
 
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA");
-    return NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA");
+	return NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/spdb.h b/src/pluto/spdb.h
index b098e247a..221cc00bb 100644
--- a/src/pluto/spdb.h
+++ b/src/pluto/spdb.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: spdb.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _SPDB_H
@@ -25,39 +23,39 @@
  * Note: only "basic" values are represented so far.
  */
 struct db_attr {
-    u_int16_t type;	/* ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV is implied; 0 for end */
-    u_int16_t val;
+	u_int16_t type;     /* ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV is implied; 0 for end */
+	u_int16_t val;
 };
 
 /* transform */
 struct db_trans {
-    u_int8_t transid;	/* Transform-Id */
-    struct db_attr *attrs;	/* array */
-    int attr_cnt;	/* number of elements */
+	u_int8_t transid;   /* Transform-Id */
+	struct db_attr *attrs;      /* array */
+	int attr_cnt;       /* number of elements */
 };
 
 /* proposal */
 struct db_prop {
-    u_int8_t protoid;	/* Protocol-Id */
-    struct db_trans *trans;	/* array (disjunction) */
-    int trans_cnt;	/* number of elements */
-    /* SPI size and value isn't part of DB */
+	u_int8_t protoid;   /* Protocol-Id */
+	struct db_trans *trans;     /* array (disjunction) */
+	int trans_cnt;      /* number of elements */
+	/* SPI size and value isn't part of DB */
 };
 
 /* conjunction of proposals */
 struct db_prop_conj {
-    struct db_prop *props;	/* array */
-    int prop_cnt;	/* number of elements */
+	struct db_prop *props;      /* array */
+	int prop_cnt;       /* number of elements */
 };
 
 /* security association */
 struct db_sa {
-    struct db_prop_conj *prop_conjs;	/* array */
-    int prop_conj_cnt;	/* number of elements */
-    /* Hardwired for now;
-     * DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC
-     * Situation: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY
-     */
+	struct db_prop_conj *prop_conjs;    /* array */
+	int prop_conj_cnt;  /* number of elements */
+	/* Hardwired for now;
+	 * DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC
+	 * Situation: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY
+	 */
 };
 
 /* The oakley sadb */
@@ -72,38 +70,38 @@ extern struct db_sa ipsec_sadb[1 << 3];
 struct state;
 
 extern bool out_sa(
-    pb_stream *outs,
-    struct db_sa *sadb,
-    struct state *st,
-    bool oakley_mode,
-    u_int8_t np);
+	pb_stream *outs,
+	struct db_sa *sadb,
+	struct state *st,
+	bool oakley_mode,
+	u_int8_t np);
 
 extern notification_t preparse_isakmp_sa_body(
-    const struct isakmp_sa *sa,	/* header of input SA Payload */
-    pb_stream *sa_pbs,		/* body of input SA Payload */
-    u_int32_t *ipsecdoisit,	/* IPsec DOI SIT bitset */
-    pb_stream *proposal_pbs,	/* body of proposal Payload */
-    struct isakmp_proposal *proposal);
+	const struct isakmp_sa *sa, /* header of input SA Payload */
+	pb_stream *sa_pbs,          /* body of input SA Payload */
+	u_int32_t *ipsecdoisit,     /* IPsec DOI SIT bitset */
+	pb_stream *proposal_pbs,    /* body of proposal Payload */
+	struct isakmp_proposal *proposal);
 
 extern notification_t parse_isakmp_policy(
-    pb_stream *proposal_pbs,	/* body of proposal Payload */
-    u_int notrans,		/* number of transforms */
-    lset_t *policy);		/* RSA, PSK or XAUTH policy */
+	pb_stream *proposal_pbs,    /* body of proposal Payload */
+	u_int notrans,              /* number of transforms */
+	lset_t *policy);            /* RSA, PSK or XAUTH policy */
 
 extern notification_t parse_isakmp_sa_body(
-    u_int32_t ipsecdoisit,	/* IPsec DOI SIT bitset */
-    pb_stream *proposal_pbs,	/* body of proposal Payload */
-    struct isakmp_proposal *proposal,
-    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,	/* if non-NULL, where to emit winning SA */
-    struct state *st,		/* current state object */
-    bool initiator);		/* is caller initiator? */
+	u_int32_t ipsecdoisit,      /* IPsec DOI SIT bitset */
+	pb_stream *proposal_pbs,    /* body of proposal Payload */
+	struct isakmp_proposal *proposal,
+	pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,        /* if non-NULL, where to emit winning SA */
+	struct state *st,           /* current state object */
+	bool initiator);            /* is caller initiator? */
 
 extern notification_t parse_ipsec_sa_body(
-    pb_stream *sa_pbs,		/* body of input SA Payload */
-    const struct isakmp_sa *sa,	/* header of input SA Payload */
-    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,	/* if non-NULL, where to emit winning SA */
-    bool selection,		/* if this SA is a selection, only one tranform can appear */
-    struct state *st);		/* current state object */
+	pb_stream *sa_pbs,          /* body of input SA Payload */
+	const struct isakmp_sa *sa, /* header of input SA Payload */
+	pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,        /* if non-NULL, where to emit winning SA */
+	bool selection,             /* if this SA is a selection, only one tranform can appear */
+	struct state *st);          /* current state object */
 
 extern void backup_pbs(pb_stream *pbs);
 extern void restore_pbs(pb_stream *pbs);
diff --git a/src/pluto/state.c b/src/pluto/state.c
index 5372e86f5..6ce0d50e5 100644
--- a/src/pluto/state.c
+++ b/src/pluto/state.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: state.c 4924 2009-03-10 21:13:18Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -28,29 +26,28 @@
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "state.h"
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "packet.h"	/* so we can calculate sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr) */
-#include "keys.h"	/* for free_public_key */
-#include "rnd.h"
+#include "packet.h"     /* so we can calculate sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr) */
+#include "keys.h"       /* for free_public_key */
 #include "timer.h"
 #include "whack.h"
-#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
-
-#include "sha1.h"
-#include "md5.h"
-#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "demux.h"      /* needs packet.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "crypto.h"
 
 /*
  * Global variables: had to go somewhere, might as well be this file.
  */
 
-u_int16_t pluto_port = IKE_UDP_PORT;	/* Pluto's port */
+u_int16_t pluto_port = IKE_UDP_PORT;    /* Pluto's port */
 
 /*
  * This file has the functions that handle the
@@ -79,51 +76,53 @@ u_int16_t pluto_port = IKE_UDP_PORT;	/* Pluto's port */
 
 struct msgid_list
 {
-    msgid_t               msgid; /* network order */
-    struct msgid_list     *next;
+	msgid_t               msgid; /* network order */
+	struct msgid_list     *next;
 };
 
-bool
-reserve_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa, msgid_t msgid)
+bool reserve_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa, msgid_t msgid)
 {
-    struct msgid_list *p;
+	struct msgid_list *p;
 
-    passert(msgid != MAINMODE_MSGID);
-    passert(IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(isakmp_sa->st_state));
+	passert(msgid != MAINMODE_MSGID);
+	passert(IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(isakmp_sa->st_state));
 
-    for (p = isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids; p != NULL; p = p->next)
-	if (p->msgid == msgid)
-	    return FALSE;
+	for (p = isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+		if (p->msgid == msgid)
+			return FALSE;
 
-    p = alloc_thing(struct msgid_list, "msgid");
-    p->msgid = msgid;
-    p->next = isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids;
-    isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids = p;
-    return TRUE;
+	p = malloc_thing(struct msgid_list);
+	p->msgid = msgid;
+	p->next = isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids;
+	isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids = p;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-msgid_t
-generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa)
+msgid_t generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa)
 {
-    int timeout = 100;	/* only try so hard for unique msgid */
-    msgid_t msgid;
+	int timeout = 100;  /* only try so hard for unique msgid */
+	msgid_t msgid;
+	rng_t *rng;
 
-    passert(IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(isakmp_sa->st_state));
+	passert(IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(isakmp_sa->st_state));
+	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
 
-    for (;;)
-    {
-	get_rnd_bytes((void *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid));
-	if (msgid != 0 && reserve_msgid(isakmp_sa, msgid))
-	    break;
-
-	if (--timeout == 0)
+	for (;;)
 	{
-	    plog("gave up looking for unique msgid; using 0x%08lx"
-		, (unsigned long) msgid);
-	    break;
+		rng->get_bytes(rng, sizeof(msgid), (void *) &msgid);
+		if (msgid != 0 && reserve_msgid(isakmp_sa, msgid))
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+		if (--timeout == 0)
+		{
+			plog("gave up looking for unique msgid; using 0x%08lx"
+				, (unsigned long) msgid);
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return msgid;
+	rng->destroy(rng);
+	return msgid;
 }
 
 
@@ -133,63 +132,61 @@ generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa)
 
 static struct state *statetable[STATE_TABLE_SIZE];
 
-static struct state **
-state_hash(const u_char *icookie, const u_char *rcookie, const ip_address *peer)
+static struct state **state_hash(const u_char *icookie, const u_char *rcookie,
+								 const ip_address *peer)
 {
-    u_int i = 0, j;
-    const unsigned char *byte_ptr;
-    size_t length = addrbytesptr(peer, &byte_ptr);
+	u_int i = 0, j;
+	const unsigned char *byte_ptr;
+	size_t length = addrbytesptr(peer, &byte_ptr);
 
-    DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CONTROL,
-	DBG_dump("ICOOKIE:", icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	DBG_dump("RCOOKIE:", rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-	DBG_dump("peer:", byte_ptr, length));
+	DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_dump("ICOOKIE:", icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		DBG_dump("RCOOKIE:", rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+		DBG_dump("peer:", byte_ptr, length));
 
-    /* XXX the following hash is pretty pathetic */
+	/* XXX the following hash is pretty pathetic */
 
-    for (j = 0; j < COOKIE_SIZE; j++)
-	i = i * 407 + icookie[j] + rcookie[j];
+	for (j = 0; j < COOKIE_SIZE; j++)
+		i = i * 407 + icookie[j] + rcookie[j];
 
-    for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
-	i = i * 613 + byte_ptr[j];
+	for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
+		i = i * 613 + byte_ptr[j];
 
-    i = i % STATE_TABLE_SIZE;
+	i = i % STATE_TABLE_SIZE;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("state hash entry %d", i));
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("state hash entry %d", i));
 
-    return &statetable[i];
+	return &statetable[i];
 }
 
 /* Get a state object.
  * Caller must schedule an event for this object so that it doesn't leak.
  * Caller must insert_state().
  */
-struct state *
-new_state(void)
+struct state *new_state(void)
 {
-    static const struct state blank_state;	/* initialized all to zero & NULL */
-    static so_serial_t next_so = SOS_FIRST;
-    struct state *st;
-
-    st = clone_thing(blank_state, "struct state in new_state()");
-    st->st_serialno = next_so++;
-    passert(next_so > SOS_FIRST);	/* overflow can't happen! */
-    st->st_whack_sock = NULL_FD;
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("creating state object #%lu at %p",
-	st->st_serialno, (void *) st));
-    return st;
+	static const struct state blank_state;      /* initialized all to zero & NULL */
+	static so_serial_t next_so = SOS_FIRST;
+	struct state *st;
+
+	st = clone_thing(blank_state);
+	st->st_serialno = next_so++;
+	passert(next_so > SOS_FIRST);       /* overflow can't happen! */
+	st->st_whack_sock = NULL_FD;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("creating state object #%lu at %p",
+		st->st_serialno, (void *) st));
+	return st;
 }
 
 /*
  * Initialize the state table (and mask*).
  */
-void
-init_states(void)
+void init_states(void)
 {
-    int i;
+	int i;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-	statetable[i] = (struct state *) NULL;
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+		statetable[i] = (struct state *) NULL;
 }
 
 /* Find the state object with this serial number.
@@ -199,627 +196,619 @@ init_states(void)
  * If this turns out to be a significant CPU hog, it could be
  * improved to use a hash table rather than sequential seartch.
  */
-struct state *
-state_with_serialno(so_serial_t sn)
+struct state *state_with_serialno(so_serial_t sn)
 {
-    if (sn >= SOS_FIRST)
-    {
-	struct state *st;
-	int i;
+	if (sn >= SOS_FIRST)
+	{
+		struct state *st;
+		int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-	    for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
-		if (st->st_serialno == sn)
-		    return st;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+		for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+			for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+				if (st->st_serialno == sn)
+					return st;
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 /* Insert a state object in the hash table. The object is inserted
  * at the begining of list.
  * Needs cookies, connection, and msgid.
  */
-void
-insert_state(struct state *st)
+void insert_state(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct state **p = state_hash(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
-	, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr);
-
-    passert(st->st_hashchain_prev == NULL && st->st_hashchain_next == NULL);
-
-    if (*p != NULL)
-    {
-	passert((*p)->st_hashchain_prev == NULL);
-	(*p)->st_hashchain_prev = st;
-    }
-    st->st_hashchain_next = *p;
-    *p = st;
-
-    /* Ensure that somebody is in charge of killing this state:
-     * if no event is scheduled for it, schedule one to discard the state.
-     * If nothing goes wrong, this event will be replaced by
-     * a more appropriate one.
-     */
-    if (st->st_event == NULL)
-	event_schedule(EVENT_SO_DISCARD, 0, st);
+	struct state **p = state_hash(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
+		, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+	passert(st->st_hashchain_prev == NULL && st->st_hashchain_next == NULL);
+
+	if (*p != NULL)
+	{
+		passert((*p)->st_hashchain_prev == NULL);
+		(*p)->st_hashchain_prev = st;
+	}
+	st->st_hashchain_next = *p;
+	*p = st;
+
+	/* Ensure that somebody is in charge of killing this state:
+	 * if no event is scheduled for it, schedule one to discard the state.
+	 * If nothing goes wrong, this event will be replaced by
+	 * a more appropriate one.
+	 */
+	if (st->st_event == NULL)
+		event_schedule(EVENT_SO_DISCARD, 0, st);
 }
 
 /* unlink a state object from the hash table, but don't free it
  */
-void
-unhash_state(struct state *st)
+void unhash_state(struct state *st)
 {
-    /* unlink from forward chain */
-    struct state **p = st->st_hashchain_prev == NULL
-	? state_hash(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
-		     , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
-	: &st->st_hashchain_prev->st_hashchain_next;
-
-    /* unlink from forward chain */
-    passert(*p == st);
-    *p = st->st_hashchain_next;
-
-    /* unlink from backward chain */
-    if (st->st_hashchain_next != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(st->st_hashchain_next->st_hashchain_prev == st);
-	st->st_hashchain_next->st_hashchain_prev = st->st_hashchain_prev;
-    }
-
-    st->st_hashchain_next = st->st_hashchain_prev = NULL;
+	/* unlink from forward chain */
+	struct state **p = st->st_hashchain_prev == NULL
+		? state_hash(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
+					 , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+		: &st->st_hashchain_prev->st_hashchain_next;
+
+	/* unlink from forward chain */
+	passert(*p == st);
+	*p = st->st_hashchain_next;
+
+	/* unlink from backward chain */
+	if (st->st_hashchain_next != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(st->st_hashchain_next->st_hashchain_prev == st);
+		st->st_hashchain_next->st_hashchain_prev = st->st_hashchain_prev;
+	}
+
+	st->st_hashchain_next = st->st_hashchain_prev = NULL;
 }
 
 /* Free the Whack socket file descriptor.
  * This has the side effect of telling Whack that we're done.
  */
-void
-release_whack(struct state *st)
+void release_whack(struct state *st)
 {
-    close_any(st->st_whack_sock);
+	close_any(st->st_whack_sock);
 }
 
-/* delete a state object */
-void
-delete_state(struct state *st)
+/**
+ * Delete a state object
+ */
+void delete_state(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct connection *const c = st->st_connection;
-    struct state *old_cur_state = cur_state == st? NULL : cur_state;
-
-    set_cur_state(st);
+	struct connection *const c = st->st_connection;
+	struct state *old_cur_state = cur_state == st? NULL : cur_state;
 
-    /* If DPD is enabled on this state object, clear any pending events */
-    if(st->st_dpd_event != NULL)
-            delete_dpd_event(st);
+	set_cur_state(st);
 
-    /* if there is a suspended state transition, disconnect us */
-    if (st->st_suspended_md != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(st->st_suspended_md->st == st);
-	st->st_suspended_md->st = NULL;
-    }
+	/* If DPD is enabled on this state object, clear any pending events */
+	if(st->st_dpd_event != NULL)
+			delete_dpd_event(st);
 
-    /* tell the other side of any IPSEC SAs that are going down */
-    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-    || IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	send_delete(st);
+	/* if there is a suspended state transition, disconnect us */
+	if (st->st_suspended_md != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(st->st_suspended_md->st == st);
+		st->st_suspended_md->st = NULL;
+	}
 
-    delete_event(st);	/* delete any pending timer event */
+	/* tell the other side of any IPSEC SAs that are going down */
+	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	|| IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		send_delete(st);
 
-    /* Ditch anything pending on ISAKMP SA being established.
-     * Note: this must be done before the unhash_state to prevent
-     * flush_pending_by_state inadvertently and prematurely
-     * deleting our connection.
-     */
-    flush_pending_by_state(st);
+	delete_event(st);   /* delete any pending timer event */
 
-    /* effectively, this deletes any ISAKMP SA that this state represents */
-    unhash_state(st);
+	/* Ditch anything pending on ISAKMP SA being established.
+	 * Note: this must be done before the unhash_state to prevent
+	 * flush_pending_by_state inadvertently and prematurely
+	 * deleting our connection.
+	 */
+	flush_pending_by_state(st);
 
-    /* tell kernel to delete any IPSEC SA
-     * ??? we ought to tell peer to delete IPSEC SAs
-     */
-    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	delete_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
-    else if (IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-	delete_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
+	/* effectively, this deletes any ISAKMP SA that this state represents */
+	unhash_state(st);
 
-    if (c->newest_ipsec_sa == st->st_serialno)
-	c->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+	/* tell kernel to delete any IPSEC SA
+	 * ??? we ought to tell peer to delete IPSEC SAs
+	 */
+	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		delete_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
+	else if (IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		delete_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
 
-    if (c->newest_isakmp_sa == st->st_serialno)
-	c->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+	if (c->newest_ipsec_sa == st->st_serialno)
+		c->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
 
-    st->st_connection = NULL;	/* we might be about to free it */
-    cur_state = old_cur_state;	/* without st_connection, st isn't complete */
-    connection_discard(c);
+	if (c->newest_isakmp_sa == st->st_serialno)
+		c->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
 
-    release_whack(st);
+	st->st_connection = NULL;   /* we might be about to free it */
+	cur_state = old_cur_state;  /* without st_connection, st isn't complete */
+	connection_discard(c);
 
-    /* from here on we are just freeing RAM */
+	release_whack(st);
 
-    {
-	struct msgid_list *p = st->st_used_msgids;
+	/* from here on we are just freeing RAM */
 
-	while (p != NULL)
 	{
-	    struct msgid_list *q = p;
-	    p = p->next;
-	    pfree(q);
+		struct msgid_list *p = st->st_used_msgids;
+
+		while (p != NULL)
+		{
+			struct msgid_list *q = p;
+			p = p->next;
+			free(q);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-
-    unreference_key(&st->st_peer_pubkey);
-
-    if (st->st_sec_in_use)
-	mpz_clear(&(st->st_sec));
-
-    pfreeany(st->st_tpacket.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_rpacket.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_p1isa.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_gi.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_gr.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_shared.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_ni.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_nr.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid_d.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid_a.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_enc_key.ptr);
-    pfreeany(st->st_ah.our_keymat);
-    pfreeany(st->st_ah.peer_keymat);
-    pfreeany(st->st_esp.our_keymat);
-    pfreeany(st->st_esp.peer_keymat);
-
-    pfree(st);
+
+	unreference_key(&st->st_peer_pubkey);
+
+	DESTROY_IF(st->st_dh);
+
+	free(st->st_tpacket.ptr);
+	free(st->st_rpacket.ptr);
+	free(st->st_p1isa.ptr);
+	free(st->st_gi.ptr);
+	free(st->st_gr.ptr);
+	free(st->st_shared.ptr);
+	free(st->st_ni.ptr);
+	free(st->st_nr.ptr);
+	free(st->st_skeyid.ptr);
+	free(st->st_skeyid_d.ptr);
+	free(st->st_skeyid_a.ptr);
+	free(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr);
+	free(st->st_enc_key.ptr);
+	free(st->st_ah.our_keymat);
+	free(st->st_ah.peer_keymat);
+	free(st->st_esp.our_keymat);
+	free(st->st_esp.peer_keymat);
+
+	free(st);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Is a connection in use by some state?
  */
-bool
-states_use_connection(struct connection *c)
+bool states_use_connection(struct connection *c)
 {
-    /* are there any states still using it? */
-    struct state *st = NULL;
-    int i;
+	/* are there any states still using it? */
+	struct state *st = NULL;
+	int i;
 
-    for (i = 0; st == NULL && i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
-	    if (st->st_connection == c)
-		return TRUE;
+	for (i = 0; st == NULL && i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+			if (st->st_connection == c)
+				return TRUE;
 
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-/*
- * delete all states that were created for a given connection.
+/**
+ * Delete all states that were created for a given connection.
  * if relations == TRUE, then also delete states that share
  * the same phase 1 SA.
  */
-void
-delete_states_by_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
+void delete_states_by_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
 {
-    int pass;
-    /* this kludge avoids an n^2 algorithm */
-    enum connection_kind ck = c->kind;
-    struct spd_route *sr;
-
-    /* save this connection's isakmp SA, since it will get set to later SOS_NOBODY */
-    so_serial_t parent_sa = c->newest_isakmp_sa;
-
-    if (ck == CK_INSTANCE)
-	c->kind = CK_GOING_AWAY;
-
-    /* We take two passes so that we delete any ISAKMP SAs last.
-     * This allows Delete Notifications to be sent.
-     * ?? We could probably double the performance by caching any
-     * ISAKMP SA states found in the first pass, avoiding a second.
-     */
-    for (pass = 0; pass != 2; pass++)
-    {
-	int i;
-
-	/* For each hash chain... */
-	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	int pass;
+	/* this kludge avoids an n^2 algorithm */
+	enum connection_kind ck = c->kind;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+
+	/* save this connection's isakmp SA, since it will get set to later SOS_NOBODY */
+	so_serial_t parent_sa = c->newest_isakmp_sa;
+
+	if (ck == CK_INSTANCE)
+		c->kind = CK_GOING_AWAY;
+
+	/* We take two passes so that we delete any ISAKMP SAs last.
+	 * This allows Delete Notifications to be sent.
+	 * ?? We could probably double the performance by caching any
+	 * ISAKMP SA states found in the first pass, avoiding a second.
+	 */
+	for (pass = 0; pass != 2; pass++)
 	{
-	    struct state *st;
+		int i;
 
-	    /* For each state in the hash chain... */
-	    for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; )
-	    {
-		struct state *this = st;
+		/* For each hash chain... */
+		for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+		{
+			struct state *st;
+
+			/* For each state in the hash chain... */
+			for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; )
+			{
+				struct state *this = st;
 
-		st = st->st_hashchain_next;	/* before this is deleted */
+				st = st->st_hashchain_next;     /* before this is deleted */
 
 
-                if ((this->st_connection == c
-			|| (relations && parent_sa != SOS_NOBODY
-			&& this->st_clonedfrom == parent_sa))
-			&& (pass == 1 || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(this->st_state)))
-                {
-                    struct state *old_cur_state
-                        = cur_state == this? NULL : cur_state;
+				if ((this->st_connection == c
+						|| (relations && parent_sa != SOS_NOBODY
+						&& this->st_clonedfrom == parent_sa))
+						&& (pass == 1 || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(this->st_state)))
+				{
+					struct state *old_cur_state
+						= cur_state == this? NULL : cur_state;
 #ifdef DEBUG
-		    lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
+					lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
 #endif
 
-		    set_cur_state(this);
-		    plog("deleting state (%s)"
-			, enum_show(&state_names, this->st_state));
-		    delete_state(this);
-		    cur_state = old_cur_state;
+					set_cur_state(this);
+					plog("deleting state (%s)"
+						, enum_show(&state_names, this->st_state));
+					delete_state(this);
+					cur_state = old_cur_state;
 #ifdef DEBUG
-		    cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
+					cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
 #endif
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    
-    sr = &c->spd;
-    while (sr != NULL)
-    {
-	passert(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY);
-	passert(sr->routing != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
-	sr = sr->next;
-    }
-    c->kind = ck;
+	
+	sr = &c->spd;
+	while (sr != NULL)
+	{
+		passert(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY);
+		passert(sr->routing != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+		sr = sr->next;
+	}
+	c->kind = ck;
 }
 
-/* Walk through the state table, and delete each state whose phase 1 (IKE)
+/**
+ * Walk through the state table, and delete each state whose phase 1 (IKE)
  * peer is among those given.
  */
-void
-delete_states_by_peer(ip_address *peer)
+void delete_states_by_peer(ip_address *peer)
 {
-    char peerstr[ADDRTOT_BUF];
-    int i;
-
-    addrtot(peer, 0, peerstr, sizeof(peerstr));
+	char peerstr[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	int i;
 
-    /* For each hash chain... */
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	struct state *st;
+	addrtot(peer, 0, peerstr, sizeof(peerstr));
 
-	/* For each state in the hash chain... */
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; )
+	/* For each hash chain... */
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    struct state *this = st;
-	    struct spd_route *sr;
-	    struct connection *c = this->st_connection;
-
-	    st = st->st_hashchain_next;	/* before this is deleted */
+		struct state *st;
 
-	    /* ??? Is it not the case that the peer is the same for all spds? */
-	    for (sr = &c->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
-	    {
-		if (sameaddr(&sr->that.host_addr, peer))
+		/* For each state in the hash chain... */
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; )
 		{
-		    plog("peer %s for connection %s deleting - claimed to have crashed"
-			 , peerstr
-			 , c->name);
-		    delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE);
-		    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
-	    		delete_connection(c, TRUE);
-		    break;	/* can only delete it once */
+			struct state *this = st;
+			struct spd_route *sr;
+			struct connection *c = this->st_connection;
+
+			st = st->st_hashchain_next; /* before this is deleted */
+
+			/* ??? Is it not the case that the peer is the same for all spds? */
+			for (sr = &c->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+			{
+				if (sameaddr(&sr->that.host_addr, peer))
+				{
+					plog("peer %s for connection %s deleting - claimed to have crashed"
+						 , peerstr
+						 , c->name);
+					delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE);
+					if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+						delete_connection(c, TRUE);
+					break;      /* can only delete it once */
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 }
 
 /* Duplicate a Phase 1 state object, to create a Phase 2 object.
  * Caller must schedule an event for this object so that it doesn't leak.
  * Caller must insert_state().
  */
-struct state *
-duplicate_state(struct state *st)
+struct state *duplicate_state(struct state *st)
 {
-    struct state *nst;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("duplicating state object #%lu",
-	st->st_serialno));
-
-    /* record use of the Phase 1 state */
-    st->st_outbound_count++;
-    st->st_outbound_time = now();
-
-    nst = new_state();
-
-    memcpy(nst->st_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    memcpy(nst->st_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
-    
-    nst->st_connection = st->st_connection;
-    nst->st_doi = st->st_doi;
-    nst->st_situation = st->st_situation;
-    nst->st_clonedfrom = st->st_serialno;
-    nst->st_oakley = st->st_oakley;
-    nst->st_modecfg = st->st_modecfg;
-
-#   define clone_chunk(ch, name) \
-	clonetochunk(nst->ch, st->ch.ptr, st->ch.len, name)
-
-    clone_chunk(st_skeyid_d, "st_skeyid_d in duplicate_state");
-    clone_chunk(st_skeyid_a, "st_skeyid_a in duplicate_state");
-    clone_chunk(st_skeyid_e, "st_skeyid_e in duplicate_state");
-    clone_chunk(st_enc_key, "st_enc_key in duplicate_state");
-
-#   undef clone_chunk
-
-    return nst;
+	struct state *nst;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("duplicating state object #%lu",
+		st->st_serialno));
+
+	/* record use of the Phase 1 state */
+	st->st_outbound_count++;
+	st->st_outbound_time = now();
+
+	nst = new_state();
+
+	memcpy(nst->st_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(nst->st_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	
+	nst->st_connection = st->st_connection;
+	nst->st_doi = st->st_doi;
+	nst->st_situation = st->st_situation;
+	nst->st_clonedfrom = st->st_serialno;
+	nst->st_oakley = st->st_oakley;
+	nst->st_modecfg = st->st_modecfg;
+	nst->st_skeyid_d = chunk_clone(st->st_skeyid_d);
+	nst->st_skeyid_a = chunk_clone(st->st_skeyid_a);
+	nst->st_skeyid_e = chunk_clone(st->st_skeyid_e);
+	nst->st_enc_key = chunk_clone(st->st_enc_key);
+
+	return nst;
 }
 
 #if 1
 void for_each_state(void *(f)(struct state *, void *data), void *data)
 {
-	struct state *st, *ocs = cur_state;
-	int i;
-	for (i=0; i<STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++) {
-		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next) {
-			set_cur_state(st);
-			f(st, data);
+		struct state *st, *ocs = cur_state;
+		int i;
+		for (i=0; i<STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++) {
+				for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next) {
+						set_cur_state(st);
+						f(st, data);
+				}
 		}
-	}
-	cur_state = ocs;
+		cur_state = ocs;
 }
 #endif
 
-/*
+/**
  * Find a state object.
  */
-struct state *
-find_state(const u_char *icookie
-, const u_char *rcookie
-, const ip_address *peer
-, msgid_t /*network order*/ msgid)
+struct state *find_state(const u_char *icookie, const u_char *rcookie,
+						 const ip_address *peer, msgid_t msgid)
 {
-    struct state *st = *state_hash(icookie, rcookie, peer);
-
-    while (st != (struct state *) NULL)
-	if (sameaddr(peer, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
-	&& memcmp(icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) == 0
-	&& memcmp(rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) == 0
-	&& msgid == st->st_msgid)
-	    break;
-	else
-	    st = st->st_hashchain_next;
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	if (st == NULL)
-	    DBG_log("state object not found");
-	else
-	    DBG_log("state object #%lu found, in %s"
-		, st->st_serialno
-		, enum_show(&state_names, st->st_state)));
+	struct state *st = *state_hash(icookie, rcookie, peer);
 
-    return st;
+	while (st != (struct state *) NULL)
+	{
+		if (sameaddr(peer, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+		&& memeq(icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE)
+		&& memeq(rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE)
+		&& msgid == st->st_msgid)
+		{
+			break;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			st = st->st_hashchain_next;
+		}
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		if (st == NULL)
+			DBG_log("state object not found");
+		else
+			DBG_log("state object #%lu found, in %s"
+				, st->st_serialno
+				, enum_show(&state_names, st->st_state)));
+
+	return st;
 }
 
-/* Find the state that sent a packet
+/**
+ * Find the state that sent a packet
  * ??? this could be expensive -- it should be rate-limited to avoid DoS
  */
-struct state *
-find_sender(size_t packet_len, u_char *packet)
+struct state *find_sender(size_t packet_len, u_char *packet)
 {
-    int i;
-    struct state *st;
-
-    if (packet_len >= sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr))
-	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-	    for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
-		if (st->st_tpacket.ptr != NULL
-		&& st->st_tpacket.len == packet_len
-		&& memcmp(st->st_tpacket.ptr, packet, packet_len) == 0)
-		    return st;
+	int i;
+	struct state *st;
 
-    return NULL;
+	if (packet_len >= sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr))
+	{
+		for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+		{
+			for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+			{
+				if (st->st_tpacket.ptr != NULL
+				&& st->st_tpacket.len == packet_len
+				&& memeq(st->st_tpacket.ptr, packet, packet_len))
+				{
+					return st;
+				}
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-struct state *
-find_phase2_state_to_delete(const struct state *p1st
-, u_int8_t protoid
-, ipsec_spi_t spi
-, bool *bogus)
+struct state *find_phase2_state_to_delete(const struct state *p1st,
+										  u_int8_t protoid, ipsec_spi_t spi,
+										  bool *bogus)
 {
-    struct state *st;
-    int i;
+	struct state *st;
+	int i;
 
-    *bogus = FALSE;
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	*bogus = FALSE;
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-	    && p1st->st_connection->host_pair == st->st_connection->host_pair
-	    && same_peer_ids(p1st->st_connection, st->st_connection, NULL))
-	    {
-		struct ipsec_proto_info *pr = protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_AH
-		    ? &st->st_ah : &st->st_esp;
-
-		if (pr->present)
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
 		{
-		    if (pr->attrs.spi == spi)
-			return st;
-		    if (pr->our_spi == spi)
-			*bogus = TRUE;
+			if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+			&& p1st->st_connection->host_pair == st->st_connection->host_pair
+			&& same_peer_ids(p1st->st_connection, st->st_connection, NULL))
+			{
+				struct ipsec_proto_info *pr = protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_AH
+					? &st->st_ah : &st->st_esp;
+
+				if (pr->present)
+				{
+					if (pr->attrs.spi == spi)
+						return st;
+					if (pr->our_spi == spi)
+						*bogus = TRUE;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/* Find newest Phase 1 negotiation state object for suitable for connection c
+/**
+ * Find newest Phase 1 negotiation state object for suitable for connection c
  */
-struct state *
-find_phase1_state(const struct connection *c, lset_t ok_states)
+struct state *find_phase1_state(const struct connection *c, lset_t ok_states)
 {
-    struct state
-	*st,
-	*best = NULL;
-    int i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
-	    if (LHAS(ok_states, st->st_state)
-	    && c->host_pair == st->st_connection->host_pair
-	    && same_peer_ids(c, st->st_connection, NULL)
-	    && (best == NULL || best->st_serialno < st->st_serialno))
-		best = st;
-
-    return best;
+	struct state
+		*st,
+		*best = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+			if (LHAS(ok_states, st->st_state)
+			&& c->host_pair == st->st_connection->host_pair
+			&& same_peer_ids(c, st->st_connection, NULL)
+			&& (best == NULL || best->st_serialno < st->st_serialno))
+				best = st;
+
+	return best;
 }
 
-void
-state_eroute_usage(ip_subnet *ours, ip_subnet *his
-, unsigned long count, time_t nw)
+void state_eroute_usage(ip_subnet *ours, ip_subnet *his, unsigned long count,
+						time_t nw)
 {
-    struct state *st;
-    int i;
+	struct state *st;
+	int i;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-
-	    /* XXX spd-enum */
-	    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
-		&& c->spd.eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
-		&& c->spd.routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL
-		&& samesubnet(&c->spd.this.client, ours)
-		&& samesubnet(&c->spd.that.client, his))
-	    {
-		if (st->st_outbound_count != count)
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
 		{
-		    st->st_outbound_count = count;
-		    st->st_outbound_time = nw;
+			struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+			/* XXX spd-enum */
+			if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+				&& c->spd.eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
+				&& c->spd.routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL
+				&& samesubnet(&c->spd.this.client, ours)
+				&& samesubnet(&c->spd.that.client, his))
+			{
+				if (st->st_outbound_count != count)
+				{
+					st->st_outbound_count = count;
+					st->st_outbound_time = nw;
+				}
+				return;
+			}
 		}
-		return;
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	{
-	    char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-	    char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
-
-	    subnettot(ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
-	    subnettot(his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
-	    DBG_log("unknown tunnel eroute %s -> %s found in scan"
-		, ourst, hist);
-	});
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+			char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+			subnettot(ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+			subnettot(his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+			DBG_log("unknown tunnel eroute %s -> %s found in scan"
+				, ourst, hist);
+		});
 }
 
-void fmt_state(bool all, struct state *st, time_t n
-, char *state_buf, size_t state_buf_len
-, char *state_buf2, size_t state_buf2_len)
+void fmt_state(bool all, struct state *st, time_t n, char *state_buf,
+			   size_t state_buf_len, char *state_buf2, size_t state_buf2_len)
 {
-    /* what the heck is interesting about a state? */
-    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
-
-    long delta = st->st_event->ev_time >= n
-	? (long)(st->st_event->ev_time - n)
-	: -(long)(n - st->st_event->ev_time);
-
-    char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
-    const char *np1 = c->newest_isakmp_sa == st->st_serialno
-	? "; newest ISAKMP" : "";
-    const char *np2 = c->newest_ipsec_sa == st->st_serialno
-	? "; newest IPSEC" : "";
-    /* XXX spd-enum */
-    const char *eo = c->spd.eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
-	? "; eroute owner" : "";
-    const char *dpd = (all && st->st_dpd && c->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
-		      ? "; DPD active" : "";
-    
-    passert(st->st_event != 0);
-
-    fmt_conn_instance(c, inst);
-
-    snprintf(state_buf, state_buf_len
-	, "#%lu: \"%s\"%s %s (%s); %s in %lds%s%s%s%s"
-	, st->st_serialno
-	, c->name, inst
-	, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
-	, state_story[st->st_state - STATE_MAIN_R0]
-	, enum_name(&timer_event_names, st->st_event->ev_type)
-	, delta
-	, np1, np2, eo, dpd);
-
-    /* print out SPIs if SAs are established */
-    if (state_buf2_len != 0)
-	state_buf2[0] = '\0';	/* default to empty */
-    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
-    {
-
-	bool tunnel;
-	char buf[SATOT_BUF*6 + 2*20 + 1];
-	const char *p_end = buf + sizeof(buf);
-	char *p = buf;
-
-#	define add_said(adst, aspi, aproto) { \
-	    ip_said s; \
-	    \
-	    initsaid(adst, aspi, aproto, &s); \
-	    if (p < p_end - 1) \
-	    { \
-		*p++ = ' '; \
-		p += satot(&s, 0, p, p_end - p) - 1; \
-	    } \
-	}
+	/* what the heck is interesting about a state? */
+	const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+	long delta = st->st_event->ev_time >= n
+		? (long)(st->st_event->ev_time - n)
+		: -(long)(n - st->st_event->ev_time);
+
+	char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
+	const char *np1 = c->newest_isakmp_sa == st->st_serialno
+		? "; newest ISAKMP" : "";
+	const char *np2 = c->newest_ipsec_sa == st->st_serialno
+		? "; newest IPSEC" : "";
+	/* XXX spd-enum */
+	const char *eo = c->spd.eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
+		? "; eroute owner" : "";
+	const char *dpd = (all && st->st_dpd && c->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+					  ? "; DPD active" : "";
+	
+	passert(st->st_event != 0);
+
+	fmt_conn_instance(c, inst);
+
+	snprintf(state_buf, state_buf_len
+		, "#%lu: \"%s\"%s %s (%s); %N in %lds%s%s%s%s"
+		, st->st_serialno
+		, c->name, inst
+		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+		, state_story[st->st_state - STATE_MAIN_R0]
+		, timer_event_names, st->st_event->ev_type
+		, delta
+		, np1, np2, eo, dpd);
+
+	/* print out SPIs if SAs are established */
+	if (state_buf2_len != 0)
+		state_buf2[0] = '\0';   /* default to empty */
+	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
 
-#	define add_sa_info(st, inbound) { \
-	    u_int bytes; \
-	    time_t use_time; \
-	    \
-	    if (get_sa_info(st, inbound, &bytes, &use_time)) \
-	    { \
-		p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, " (%'u bytes", bytes); \
-		if (bytes > 0 && use_time != UNDEFINED_TIME) \
-		    p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, ", %ds ago", (int)(now - use_time)); \
-		p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, ")"); \
-	    } \
-	}
+		bool tunnel;
+		char buf[SATOT_BUF*6 + 2*20 + 1];
+		const char *p_end = buf + sizeof(buf);
+		char *p = buf;
+
+#       define add_said(adst, aspi, aproto) { \
+			ip_said s; \
+			\
+			initsaid(adst, aspi, aproto, &s); \
+			if (p < p_end - 1) \
+			{ \
+				*p++ = ' '; \
+				p += satot(&s, 0, p, p_end - p) - 1; \
+			} \
+		}
 
-	*p = '\0';
-	if (st->st_ah.present)
-	{
-	    add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_ah.attrs.spi, SA_AH);
-	    add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_ah.our_spi, SA_AH);
-	}
-	if (st->st_esp.present)
-	{
-	    time_t now = time(NULL);
+#       define add_sa_info(st, inbound) { \
+			u_int bytes; \
+			time_t use_time; \
+			\
+			if (get_sa_info(st, inbound, &bytes, &use_time)) \
+			{ \
+				p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, " (%'u bytes", bytes); \
+				if (bytes > 0 && use_time != UNDEFINED_TIME) \
+					p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, ", %ds ago", (int)(now - use_time)); \
+				p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, ")"); \
+			} \
+		}
 
-	    add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_esp.attrs.spi, SA_ESP);
-	    add_sa_info(st, FALSE);
-	    add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_esp.our_spi, SA_ESP);
-	    add_sa_info(st, TRUE);
-	}
-	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-	{
-	    add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi, SA_COMP);
-	    add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_ipcomp.our_spi, SA_COMP);
-	}
+		*p = '\0';
+		if (st->st_ah.present)
+		{
+			add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_ah.attrs.spi, SA_AH);
+			add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_ah.our_spi, SA_AH);
+		}
+		if (st->st_esp.present)
+		{
+			time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+			add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_esp.attrs.spi, SA_ESP);
+			add_sa_info(st, FALSE);
+			add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_esp.our_spi, SA_ESP);
+			add_sa_info(st, TRUE);
+		}
+		if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+		{
+			add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi, SA_COMP);
+			add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_ipcomp.our_spi, SA_COMP);
+		}
 #ifdef KLIPS
-	tunnel =  st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-	       || st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
-	       || st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
-	p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, "; %s", tunnel? "tunnel":"transport");
+		tunnel =  st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+			   || st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+			   || st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, "; %s", tunnel? "tunnel":"transport");
 #endif
 
-	snprintf(state_buf2, state_buf2_len
-	    , "#%lu: \"%s\"%s%s"
-	    , st->st_serialno
-	    , c->name, inst
-	    , buf);
+		snprintf(state_buf2, state_buf2_len
+			, "#%lu: \"%s\"%s%s"
+			, st->st_serialno
+			, c->name, inst
+			, buf);
 
-#	undef add_said
-#	undef add_sa_info
-    }
+#       undef add_said
+#       undef add_sa_info
+	}
 }
 
 /*
@@ -831,82 +820,80 @@ void fmt_state(bool all, struct state *st, time_t n
  *  isakmp_sa (XXX probably wrong)
  *
  */
-static int
-state_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
+static int state_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
 {
-    const struct state *sap = *(const struct state *const *)a;
-    struct connection *ca = sap->st_connection;
-    const struct state *sbp = *(const struct state *const *)b;
-    struct connection *cb = sbp->st_connection;
+	const struct state *sap = *(const struct state *const *)a;
+	struct connection *ca = sap->st_connection;
+	const struct state *sbp = *(const struct state *const *)b;
+	struct connection *cb = sbp->st_connection;
 
-    /* DBG_log("comparing %s to %s", ca->name, cb->name); */
+	/* DBG_log("comparing %s to %s", ca->name, cb->name); */
 
-    return connection_compare(ca, cb);
+	return connection_compare(ca, cb);
 }
 
-void
-show_states_status(bool all, const char *name)
+void show_states_status(bool all, const char *name)
 {
-    time_t n = now();
-    int i;
-    char state_buf[LOG_WIDTH];
-    char state_buf2[LOG_WIDTH];
-    int count;
-    struct state **array;
-
-    /* make count of states */
-    count = 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	struct state *st;
+	time_t n = now();
+	int i;
+	char state_buf[LOG_WIDTH];
+	char state_buf2[LOG_WIDTH];
+	int count;
+	struct state **array;
 
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	/* make count of states */
+	count = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    if (name == NULL || streq(name, st->st_connection->name))
-		count++;
-	}
-    }
+		struct state *st;
 
-    /* build the array */
-    array = alloc_bytes(sizeof(struct state *)*count, "state array");
-    count = 0;
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	struct state *st;
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+		{
+			if (name == NULL || streq(name, st->st_connection->name))
+				count++;
+		}
+	}
 
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	/* build the array */
+	array = malloc(sizeof(struct state *)*count);
+	count = 0;
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    if (name == NULL || streq(name, st->st_connection->name))
-		array[count++]=st;
+		struct state *st;
+
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+		{
+			if (name == NULL || streq(name, st->st_connection->name))
+				array[count++]=st;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    /* sort it! */
-    qsort(array, count, sizeof(struct state *), state_compare);
+	/* sort it! */
+	qsort(array, count, sizeof(struct state *), state_compare);
 
-    /* now print sorted results */
-    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
-    {
-	struct state *st;
+	/* now print sorted results */
+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+	{
+		struct state *st;
 
-	st = array[i];
+		st = array[i];
 
-	fmt_state(all, st, n
-		  , state_buf, sizeof(state_buf)
-		  , state_buf2, sizeof(state_buf2));
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, state_buf);
-	if (state_buf2[0] != '\0')
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, state_buf2);
+		fmt_state(all, st, n
+				  , state_buf, sizeof(state_buf)
+				  , state_buf2, sizeof(state_buf2));
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, state_buf);
+		if (state_buf2[0] != '\0')
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, state_buf2);
 
-	/* show any associated pending Phase 2s */
-	if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-	    show_pending_phase2(st->st_connection->host_pair, st);
-    }
-    if (count > 0)
-	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+		/* show any associated pending Phase 2s */
+		if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+			show_pending_phase2(st->st_connection->host_pair, st);
+	}
+	if (count > 0)
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);    /* spacer */
 
-    /* free the array */
-    pfree(array);
+	/* free the array */
+	free(array);
 }
 
 /* Given that we've used up a range of unused CPI's,
@@ -915,49 +902,48 @@ show_states_status(bool all, const char *name)
  * If we can't find one easily, choose 0 (a bad SPI,
  * no matter what order) indicating failure.
  */
-void
-find_my_cpi_gap(cpi_t *latest_cpi, cpi_t *first_busy_cpi)
+void find_my_cpi_gap(cpi_t *latest_cpi, cpi_t *first_busy_cpi)
 {
-    int tries = 0;
-    cpi_t base = *latest_cpi;
-    cpi_t closest;
-    int i;
+	int tries = 0;
+	cpi_t base = *latest_cpi;
+	cpi_t closest;
+	int i;
 
 startover:
-    closest = ~0;	/* not close at all */
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	struct state *st;
-
-	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	closest = ~0;       /* not close at all */
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
-	    {
-		cpi_t c = ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.our_spi) - base;
+		struct state *st;
 
-		if (c < closest)
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
 		{
-		    if (c == 0)
-		    {
-			/* oops: next spot is occupied; start over */
-			if (++tries == 20)
+			if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
 			{
-			    /* FAILURE */
-			    *latest_cpi = *first_busy_cpi = 0;
-			    return;
+				cpi_t c = ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.our_spi) - base;
+
+				if (c < closest)
+				{
+					if (c == 0)
+					{
+						/* oops: next spot is occupied; start over */
+						if (++tries == 20)
+						{
+							/* FAILURE */
+							*latest_cpi = *first_busy_cpi = 0;
+							return;
+						}
+						base++;
+						if (base > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
+							base = IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED;
+						goto startover; /* really a tail call */
+					}
+					closest = c;
+				}
 			}
-			base++;
-			if (base > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
-			    base = IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED;
-			goto startover;	/* really a tail call */
-		    }
-		    closest = c;
 		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    *latest_cpi = base;	/* base is first in next free range */
-    *first_busy_cpi = closest + base;	/* and this is the roof */
+	*latest_cpi = base; /* base is first in next free range */
+	*first_busy_cpi = closest + base;   /* and this is the roof */
 }
 
 /* Muck with high-order 16 bits of this SPI in order to make
@@ -968,38 +954,42 @@ startover:
  * If we can't find one easily, return 0 (a bad SPI,
  * no matter what order) indicating failure.
  */
-ipsec_spi_t
-uniquify_his_cpi(ipsec_spi_t cpi, struct state *st)
+ipsec_spi_t uniquify_his_cpi(ipsec_spi_t cpi, struct state *st)
 {
-    int tries = 0;
-    int i;
+	int tries = 0;
+	int i;
+	rng_t *rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_WEAK);
 
 startover:
 
-    /* network order makes first two bytes our target */
-    get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&cpi, 2);
-
-    /* Make sure that the result is unique.
-     * Hard work.  If there is no unique value, we'll loop forever!
-     */
-    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
-    {
-	struct state *s;
+	/* network order makes first two bytes our target */
+	rng->get_bytes(rng, 2, (u_char *)&cpi);
 
-	for (s = statetable[i]; s != NULL; s = s->st_hashchain_next)
+	/* Make sure that the result is unique.
+	 * Hard work.  If there is no unique value, we'll loop forever!
+	 */
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
 	{
-	    if (s->st_ipcomp.present
-	    && sameaddr(&s->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr
-	      , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
-	    && cpi == s->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi)
-	    {
-		if (++tries == 20)
-		    return 0;	/* FAILURE */
-		goto startover;
-	    }
+		struct state *s;
+
+		for (s = statetable[i]; s != NULL; s = s->st_hashchain_next)
+		{
+			if (s->st_ipcomp.present
+			&& sameaddr(&s->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr
+			  , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+			&& cpi == s->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi)
+			{
+				if (++tries == 20)
+				{
+					rng->destroy(rng);
+					return 0;   /* FAILURE */
+				}
+				goto startover;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    return cpi;
+	rng->destroy(rng);
+	return cpi;
 }
 
 /*
diff --git a/src/pluto/state.h b/src/pluto/state.h
index 220dce341..a059c52b4 100644
--- a/src/pluto/state.h
+++ b/src/pluto/state.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 /* state and event objects
  * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
  * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -11,15 +12,14 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: state.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <sys/socket.h>
 #include <netinet/in.h>
 #include <time.h>
-#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU MP library */
+
+#include <crypto/diffie_hellman.h>
 
 #include "connections.h"
 
@@ -40,10 +40,10 @@
  * than specified by draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-06.txt.
  */
 
-typedef u_int32_t msgid_t;	/* Network order! */
+typedef u_int32_t msgid_t;      /* Network order! */
 #define MAINMODE_MSGID    ((msgid_t) 0)
 
-struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag */
+struct state;   /* forward declaration of tag */
 extern bool reserve_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa, msgid_t msgid);
 extern msgid_t generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa);
 
@@ -54,17 +54,17 @@ extern msgid_t generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa);
  * Names are chosen to match corresponding names in state.
  */
 struct oakley_trans_attrs {
-    u_int16_t encrypt;		/* Encryption algorithm */
-    u_int16_t enckeylen;	/* encryption key len (bits) */
-    const struct encrypt_desc *encrypter;	/* package of encryption routines */
-    u_int16_t hash;		/* Hash algorithm */
-    const struct hash_desc *hasher;	/* package of hashing routines */
-    u_int16_t auth;		/* Authentication method */
-    const struct oakley_group_desc *group;	/* Oakley group */
-    time_t life_seconds;	/* When this SA expires (seconds) */
-    u_int32_t life_kilobytes;	/* When this SA is exhausted (kilobytes) */
+	u_int16_t encrypt;          /* Encryption algorithm */
+	u_int16_t enckeylen;        /* encryption key len (bits) */
+	const struct encrypt_desc *encrypter;   /* package of encryption routines */
+	u_int16_t hash;             /* Hash algorithm */
+	const struct hash_desc *hasher;         /* package of hashing routines */
+	u_int16_t auth;             /* Authentication method */
+	const struct dh_desc *group;            /* Diffie-Hellman group */
+	time_t life_seconds;        /* When this SA expires (seconds) */
+	u_int32_t life_kilobytes;   /* When this SA is exhausted (kilobytes) */
 #if 0 /* not yet */
-    u_int16_t prf;		/* Pseudo Random Function */
+	u_int16_t prf;              /* Pseudo Random Function */
 #endif
 };
 
@@ -74,28 +74,28 @@ struct oakley_trans_attrs {
  * for ESP, and a funny one for IPCOMP.
  */
 struct ipsec_trans_attrs {
-    u_int8_t transid;	/* transform id */
-    ipsec_spi_t spi;	/* his SPI */
-    time_t life_seconds;		/* When this SA expires */
-    u_int32_t life_kilobytes;	/* When this SA expires */
-    u_int16_t encapsulation;
-    u_int16_t auth;
-    u_int16_t key_len;
-    u_int16_t key_rounds;
+	u_int8_t transid;   /* transform id */
+	ipsec_spi_t spi;    /* his SPI */
+	time_t life_seconds;                /* When this SA expires */
+	u_int32_t life_kilobytes;   /* When this SA expires */
+	u_int16_t encapsulation;
+	u_int16_t auth;
+	u_int16_t key_len;
+	u_int16_t key_rounds;
 #if 0 /* not implemented yet */
-    u_int16_t cmprs_dict_sz;
-    u_int32_t cmprs_alg;
+	u_int16_t cmprs_dict_sz;
+	u_int32_t cmprs_alg;
 #endif
 };
 
 /* IPsec per protocol state information */
 struct ipsec_proto_info {
-    bool present;	/* was this transform specified? */
-    struct ipsec_trans_attrs attrs;
-    ipsec_spi_t our_spi;
-    u_int16_t keymat_len;	/* same for both */
-    u_char *our_keymat;
-    u_char *peer_keymat;
+	bool present;       /* was this transform specified? */
+	struct ipsec_trans_attrs attrs;
+	ipsec_spi_t our_spi;
+	u_int16_t keymat_len;       /* same for both */
+	u_char *our_keymat;
+	u_char *peer_keymat;
 };
 
 /* state object: record the state of a (possibly nascent) SA
@@ -107,135 +107,133 @@ struct ipsec_proto_info {
  */
 struct state
 {
-    so_serial_t        st_serialno;            /* serial number (for seniority) */
-    so_serial_t        st_clonedfrom;          /* serial number of parent */
+	so_serial_t        st_serialno;            /* serial number (for seniority) */
+	so_serial_t        st_clonedfrom;          /* serial number of parent */
 
-    struct connection *st_connection;          /* connection for this SA */
+	struct connection *st_connection;          /* connection for this SA */
 
-    int                st_whack_sock;          /* fd for our Whack TCP socket.
-                                                * Single copy: close when freeing struct.
-                                                */
+	int                st_whack_sock;          /* fd for our Whack TCP socket.
+												* Single copy: close when freeing struct.
+												*/
 
-    struct msg_digest *st_suspended_md;        /* suspended state-transition */
+	struct msg_digest *st_suspended_md;        /* suspended state-transition */
 
-    struct oakley_trans_attrs st_oakley;
+	struct oakley_trans_attrs st_oakley;
 
-    struct ipsec_proto_info st_ah;
-    struct ipsec_proto_info st_esp;
-    struct ipsec_proto_info st_ipcomp;
+	struct ipsec_proto_info st_ah;
+	struct ipsec_proto_info st_esp;
+	struct ipsec_proto_info st_ipcomp;
 #ifdef KLIPS
-    ipsec_spi_t        st_tunnel_in_spi;          /* KLUDGE */
-    ipsec_spi_t        st_tunnel_out_spi;         /* KLUDGE */
+	ipsec_spi_t        st_tunnel_in_spi;          /* KLUDGE */
+	ipsec_spi_t        st_tunnel_out_spi;         /* KLUDGE */
 #endif
 
-    const struct oakley_group_desc *st_pfs_group;	/* group for Phase 2 PFS */
+	const struct dh_desc *st_pfs_group;        /* group for Phase 2 PFS */
 
-    u_int32_t          st_doi;                 /* Domain of Interpretation */
-    u_int32_t          st_situation;
+	u_int32_t          st_doi;                 /* Domain of Interpretation */
+	u_int32_t          st_situation;
 
-    lset_t             st_policy;              /* policy for IPsec SA */
+	lset_t             st_policy;              /* policy for IPsec SA */
 
-    msgid_t            st_msgid;               /* MSG-ID from header.  Network Order! */
+	msgid_t            st_msgid;               /* MSG-ID from header.  Network Order! */
 
-    /* only for a state representing an ISAKMP SA */
-    struct msgid_list  *st_used_msgids;        /* used-up msgids */
+	/* only for a state representing an ISAKMP SA */
+	struct msgid_list  *st_used_msgids;        /* used-up msgids */
 
 /* symmetric stuff */
 
   /* initiator stuff */
-    chunk_t            st_gi;                  /* Initiator public value */
-    u_int8_t           st_icookie[COOKIE_SIZE];/* Initiator Cookie */
-    chunk_t            st_ni;                  /* Ni nonce */
+	chunk_t            st_gi;                  /* Initiator public value */
+	u_int8_t           st_icookie[COOKIE_SIZE];/* Initiator Cookie */
+	chunk_t            st_ni;                  /* Ni nonce */
 
   /* responder stuff */
-    chunk_t            st_gr;                  /* Responder public value */
-    u_int8_t           st_rcookie[COOKIE_SIZE];/* Responder Cookie */
-    chunk_t            st_nr;                  /* Nr nonce */
+	chunk_t            st_gr;                  /* Responder public value */
+	u_int8_t           st_rcookie[COOKIE_SIZE];/* Responder Cookie */
+	chunk_t            st_nr;                  /* Nr nonce */
 
 
   /* my stuff */
 
-    chunk_t            st_tpacket;             /* Transmitted packet */
+	chunk_t            st_tpacket;             /* Transmitted packet */
 
-    /* Phase 2 ID payload info about my user */
-    u_int8_t           st_myuserprotoid;       /* IDcx.protoid */
-    u_int16_t          st_myuserport;
+	/* Phase 2 ID payload info about my user */
+	u_int8_t           st_myuserprotoid;       /* IDcx.protoid */
+	u_int16_t          st_myuserport;
 
   /* his stuff */
 
-    chunk_t            st_rpacket;             /* Received packet */
+	chunk_t            st_rpacket;             /* Received packet */
 
-    /* Phase 2 ID payload info about peer's user */
-    u_int8_t           st_peeruserprotoid;     /* IDcx.protoid */
-    u_int16_t          st_peeruserport;
+	/* Phase 2 ID payload info about peer's user */
+	u_int8_t           st_peeruserprotoid;     /* IDcx.protoid */
+	u_int16_t          st_peeruserport;
 
 /* end of symmetric stuff */
 
-    u_int8_t           st_sec_in_use;          /* bool: does st_sec hold a value */
-    MP_INT             st_sec;                 /* Our local secret value */
-
-    chunk_t            st_shared;              /* Derived shared secret
-                                                * Note: during Quick Mode,
-                                                * presence indicates PFS
-                                                * selected.
-                                                */
-
-    /* In a Phase 1 state, preserve peer's public key after authentication */
-    struct pubkey     *st_peer_pubkey;
-
-    enum state_kind    st_state;               /* State of exchange */
-    u_int8_t           st_retransmit;          /* Number of retransmits */
-    unsigned long      st_try;                 /* number of times rekeying attempted */
-                                               /* 0 means the only time */
-    time_t             st_margin;              /* life after EVENT_SA_REPLACE */
-    unsigned long      st_outbound_count;      /* traffic through eroute */
-    time_t             st_outbound_time;       /* time of last change to st_outbound_count */
-    chunk_t            st_p1isa;               /* Phase 1 initiator SA (Payload) for HASH */
-    chunk_t            st_skeyid;              /* Key material */
-    chunk_t            st_skeyid_d;            /* KM for non-ISAKMP key derivation */
-    chunk_t            st_skeyid_a;            /* KM for ISAKMP authentication */
-    chunk_t            st_skeyid_e;            /* KM for ISAKMP encryption */
-    u_char             st_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];  /* IV for encryption */
-    u_char             st_new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    u_char             st_ph1_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; /* IV at end if phase 1 */
-    unsigned int       st_iv_len;
-    unsigned int       st_new_iv_len;
-    unsigned int       st_ph1_iv_len;
-
-    chunk_t            st_enc_key;             /* Oakley Encryption key */
-
-    struct event      *st_event;               /* backpointer for certain events */
-    struct state      *st_hashchain_next;      /* Next in list */
-    struct state      *st_hashchain_prev;      /* Previous in list */
-
-    struct {
-	bool vars_set;
-	bool started;
-    } st_modecfg;
-
-    struct {
-	int attempt;
-	bool started;
-	bool status;
-    } st_xauth;
-
-    u_int32_t         nat_traversal;
-    ip_address        nat_oa;
-
-    /* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
-    bool                st_dpd;			/* Peer supports DPD */
-    time_t              st_last_dpd;		/* Time of last DPD transmit */
-    u_int32_t           st_dpd_seqno;		/* Next R_U_THERE to send */
-    u_int32_t           st_dpd_expectseqno;	/* Next R_U_THERE_ACK to receive */
-    u_int32_t           st_dpd_peerseqno;	/* global variables */
-    struct event        *st_dpd_event;		/* backpointer for DPD events */
-
-    u_int32_t	      st_seen_vendorid;		/* Bit field about recognized Vendor ID */
+	diffie_hellman_t  *st_dh;                  /* Our local DH secret value */
+	chunk_t            st_shared;              /* Derived shared secret
+												* Note: during Quick Mode,
+												* presence indicates PFS
+												* selected.
+												*/
+
+	/* In a Phase 1 state, preserve peer's public key after authentication */
+	struct pubkey     *st_peer_pubkey;
+
+	enum state_kind    st_state;               /* State of exchange */
+	u_int8_t           st_retransmit;          /* Number of retransmits */
+	unsigned long      st_try;                 /* number of times rekeying attempted */
+											   /* 0 means the only time */
+	time_t             st_margin;              /* life after EVENT_SA_REPLACE */
+	unsigned long      st_outbound_count;      /* traffic through eroute */
+	time_t             st_outbound_time;       /* time of last change to st_outbound_count */
+	chunk_t            st_p1isa;               /* Phase 1 initiator SA (Payload) for HASH */
+	chunk_t            st_skeyid;              /* Key material */
+	chunk_t            st_skeyid_d;            /* KM for non-ISAKMP key derivation */
+	chunk_t            st_skeyid_a;            /* KM for ISAKMP authentication */
+	chunk_t            st_skeyid_e;            /* KM for ISAKMP encryption */
+	u_char             st_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];  /* IV for encryption */
+	u_char             st_new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	u_char             st_ph1_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; /* IV at end if phase 1 */
+	unsigned int       st_iv_len;
+	unsigned int       st_new_iv_len;
+	unsigned int       st_ph1_iv_len;
+
+	chunk_t            st_enc_key;             /* Oakley Encryption key */
+
+	struct event      *st_event;               /* backpointer for certain events */
+	struct state      *st_hashchain_next;      /* Next in list */
+	struct state      *st_hashchain_prev;      /* Previous in list */
+
+	struct {
+		bool vars_set;
+		bool started;
+	} st_modecfg;
+
+	struct {
+		int attempt;
+		bool started;
+		bool status;
+	} st_xauth;
+
+	u_int32_t         nat_traversal;
+	ip_address        nat_oa;
+
+	/* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
+	bool                st_dpd;                 /* Peer supports DPD */
+	time_t              st_last_dpd;            /* Time of last DPD transmit */
+	u_int32_t           st_dpd_seqno;           /* Next R_U_THERE to send */
+	u_int32_t           st_dpd_expectseqno;     /* Next R_U_THERE_ACK to receive */
+	u_int32_t           st_dpd_peerseqno;       /* global variables */
+	struct event        *st_dpd_event;          /* backpointer for DPD events */
+
+	u_int32_t         st_seen_vendorid;         /* Bit field about recognized Vendor ID */
 };
 
 /* global variables */
 
-extern u_int16_t pluto_port;	/* Pluto's port */
+extern u_int16_t pluto_port;    /* Pluto's port */
 
 extern bool states_use_connection(struct connection *c);
 
@@ -247,27 +245,27 @@ extern void insert_state(struct state *st);
 extern void unhash_state(struct state *st);
 extern void release_whack(struct state *st);
 extern void state_eroute_usage(ip_subnet *ours, ip_subnet *his
-    , unsigned long count, time_t nw);
+	, unsigned long count, time_t nw);
 extern void delete_state(struct state *st);
 extern void delete_states_by_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations);
 
 extern struct state
-    *duplicate_state(struct state *st),
-    *find_state(const u_char *icookie
-	, const u_char *rcookie
-	, const ip_address *peer
-	, msgid_t msgid),
-    *state_with_serialno(so_serial_t sn),
-    *find_phase2_state_to_delete(const struct state *p1st, u_int8_t protoid
-	, ipsec_spi_t spi, bool *bogus),
-    *find_phase1_state(const struct connection *c, lset_t ok_states),
-    *find_sender(size_t packet_len, u_char *packet);
+	*duplicate_state(struct state *st),
+	*find_state(const u_char *icookie
+		, const u_char *rcookie
+		, const ip_address *peer
+		, msgid_t msgid),
+	*state_with_serialno(so_serial_t sn),
+	*find_phase2_state_to_delete(const struct state *p1st, u_int8_t protoid
+		, ipsec_spi_t spi, bool *bogus),
+	*find_phase1_state(const struct connection *c, lset_t ok_states),
+	*find_sender(size_t packet_len, u_char *packet);
 
 extern void show_states_status(bool all, const char *name);
 extern void for_each_state(void *(f)(struct state *, void *data), void *data);
 extern void find_my_cpi_gap(cpi_t *latest_cpi, cpi_t *first_busy_cpi);
 extern ipsec_spi_t uniquify_his_cpi(ipsec_spi_t cpi, struct state *st);
 extern void fmt_state(bool all, struct state *st, time_t n
-		     , char *state_buf, size_t state_buf_len
-		     , char *state_buf2, size_t state_buf_len2);
+					 , char *state_buf, size_t state_buf_len
+					 , char *state_buf2, size_t state_buf_len2);
 extern void delete_states_by_peer(ip_address *peer);
diff --git a/src/pluto/timer.c b/src/pluto/timer.c
index aea293098..ecbee740f 100644
--- a/src/pluto/timer.c
+++ b/src/pluto/timer.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: timer.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -26,36 +24,39 @@
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/rngs/rng.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "state.h"
 #include "demux.h"
-#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"  /* needs demux.h and state.h */
 #include "kernel.h"
 #include "server.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "rnd.h"
 #include "timer.h"
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "nat_traversal.h"
 
-/* monotonic version of time(3) */
-time_t
-now(void)
+/**
+ * monotonic version of time(3)
+ */
+time_t now(void)
 {
-    static time_t delta = 0
-	, last_time = 0;
-    time_t n = time((time_t)NULL);
-
-    passert(n != (time_t)-1);
-    if (last_time > n)
-    {
-	plog("time moved backwards %ld seconds", (long)(last_time - n));
-	delta += last_time - n;
-    }
-    last_time = n;
-    return n + delta;
+	static time_t delta = 0
+		, last_time = 0;
+	time_t n = time((time_t)NULL);
+
+	passert(n != (time_t)-1);
+	if (last_time > n)
+	{
+		plog("time moved backwards %ld seconds", (long)(last_time - n));
+		delta += last_time - n;
+	}
+	last_time = n;
+	return n + delta;
 }
 
 /* This file has the event handling routines. Events are
@@ -66,467 +67,495 @@ now(void)
 
 static struct event *evlist = (struct event *) NULL;
 
-/*
+/**
  * This routine places an event in the event list.
  */
-void
-event_schedule(enum event_type type, time_t tm, struct state *st)
+void event_schedule(enum event_type type, time_t tm, struct state *st)
 {
-    struct event *ev = alloc_thing(struct event, "struct event in event_schedule()");
-
-    ev->ev_type = type;
-    ev->ev_time = tm + now();
-    ev->ev_state = st;
-
-    /* If the event is associated with a state, put a backpointer to the
-     * event in the state object, so we can find and delete the event
-     * if we need to (for example, if we receive a reply).
-     */
-    if (st != NULL)
-    {
-	if (type == EVENT_DPD || type == EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT)
+	struct event *ev = malloc_thing(struct event);
+
+	ev->ev_type = type;
+	ev->ev_time = tm + now();
+	ev->ev_state = st;
+
+	/* If the event is associated with a state, put a backpointer to the
+	 * event in the state object, so we can find and delete the event
+	 * if we need to (for example, if we receive a reply).
+	 */
+	if (st != NULL)
+	{
+		if (type == EVENT_DPD || type == EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT)
+		{
+			passert(st->st_dpd_event == NULL);
+			st->st_dpd_event = ev;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			passert(st->st_event == NULL);
+			st->st_event = ev;
+		}
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		if (st == NULL)
+			DBG_log("inserting event %N, timeout in %lu seconds"
+				, timer_event_names, type, (unsigned long)tm);
+		else
+			DBG_log("inserting event %N, timeout in %lu seconds for #%lu"
+				, timer_event_names, type, (unsigned long)tm
+				, ev->ev_state->st_serialno));
+
+	if (evlist == (struct event *) NULL
+	|| evlist->ev_time >= ev->ev_time)
 	{
-	    passert(st->st_dpd_event == NULL);
-	    st->st_dpd_event = ev;
+		ev->ev_next = evlist;
+		evlist = ev;
 	}
 	else
 	{
-	    passert(st->st_event == NULL);
-	    st->st_event = ev;
-	}
-    }
+		struct event *evt;
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	if (st == NULL)
-	    DBG_log("inserting event %s, timeout in %lu seconds"
-		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, type), (unsigned long)tm);
-	else
-	    DBG_log("inserting event %s, timeout in %lu seconds for #%lu"
-		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, type), (unsigned long)tm
-		, ev->ev_state->st_serialno));
-
-    if (evlist == (struct event *) NULL
-    || evlist->ev_time >= ev->ev_time)
-    {
-	ev->ev_next = evlist;
-	evlist = ev;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	struct event *evt;
-
-	for (evt = evlist; evt->ev_next != NULL; evt = evt->ev_next)
-	    if (evt->ev_next->ev_time >= ev->ev_time)
-		break;
-
-#ifdef NEVER	/* this seems to be overkill */
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    if (evt->ev_state == NULL)
-		DBG_log("event added after event %s"
-		    , enum_show(&timer_event_names, evt->ev_type));
-	    else
-		DBG_log("event added after event %s for #%lu"
-		    , enum_show(&timer_event_names, evt->ev_type)
-		    , evt->ev_state->st_serialno));
+		for (evt = evlist; evt->ev_next != NULL; evt = evt->ev_next)
+			if (evt->ev_next->ev_time >= ev->ev_time)
+				break;
+
+#ifdef NEVER    /* this seems to be overkill */
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			if (evt->ev_state == NULL)
+				DBG_log("event added after event %N"
+					, timer_event_names, evt->ev_type);
+			else
+				DBG_log("event added after event %N for #%lu"
+					, timer_event_names, evt->ev_type,
+					, evt->ev_state->st_serialno));
 #endif /* NEVER */
 
-	ev->ev_next = evt->ev_next;
-	evt->ev_next = ev;
-    }
+		ev->ev_next = evt->ev_next;
+		evt->ev_next = ev;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Generate the secret value for responder cookies, and
+ * schedule an event for refresh.
+ */
+void init_secret(void)
+{
+	rng_t *rng;
+	 
+	rng = lib->crypto->create_rng(lib->crypto, RNG_STRONG);
+	rng->get_bytes(rng, sizeof(secret_of_the_day), secret_of_the_day);
+	rng->destroy(rng);
+    event_schedule(EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY, NULL);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Handle the first event on the list.
  */
-void
-handle_timer_event(void)
+void handle_timer_event(void)
 {
-    time_t tm;
-    struct event *ev = evlist;
-    int type;
-    struct state *st;
-    struct connection *c = NULL;
-    ip_address peer;
-
-    if (ev == (struct event *) NULL)    /* Just paranoid */
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("empty event list, yet we're called"));
-	return;
-    }
-
-    type = ev->ev_type;
-    st = ev->ev_state;
-
-    tm = now();
-
-    if (tm < ev->ev_time)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("called while no event expired (%lu/%lu, %s)"
-	    , (unsigned long)tm, (unsigned long)ev->ev_time
-	    , enum_show(&timer_event_names, type)));
-
-	/* This will happen if the most close-to-expire event was
-	 * a retransmission or cleanup, and we received a packet
-	 * at the same time as the event expired. Due to the processing
-	 * order in call_server(), the packet processing will happen first,
-	 * and the event will be removed.
-	 */
-	return;
-    }
-
-    evlist = evlist->ev_next;		/* Ok, we'll handle this event */
-
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	if (evlist != (struct event *) NULL)
-	    DBG_log("event after this is %s in %ld seconds"
-		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type)
-		, (long) (evlist->ev_time - tm)));
-
-    /* for state-associated events, pick up the state pointer
-     * and remove the backpointer from the state object.
-     * We'll eventually either schedule a new event, or delete the state.
-     */
-    passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
-    if (st != NULL)
-    {
-	c = st->st_connection;
-	if (type  == EVENT_DPD || type == EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT)
+	time_t tm;
+	struct event *ev = evlist;
+	int type;
+	struct state *st;
+	struct connection *c = NULL;
+	ip_address peer;
+
+	if (ev == (struct event *) NULL)    /* Just paranoid */
 	{
-	    passert(st->st_dpd_event == ev);
-	    st->st_dpd_event = NULL;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("empty event list, yet we're called"));
+		return;
 	}
-	else 
+
+	type = ev->ev_type;
+	st = ev->ev_state;
+
+	tm = now();
+
+	if (tm < ev->ev_time)
 	{
-	    passert(st->st_event == ev);
-	    st->st_event = NULL;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("called while no event expired (%lu/%lu, %N)"
+			, (unsigned long)tm, (unsigned long)ev->ev_time
+			, timer_event_names, type));
+
+		/* This will happen if the most close-to-expire event was
+		 * a retransmission or cleanup, and we received a packet
+		 * at the same time as the event expired. Due to the processing
+		 * order in call_server(), the packet processing will happen first,
+		 * and the event will be removed.
+		 */
+		return;
 	}
-	peer = c->spd.that.host_addr;
-	set_cur_state(st);
-    }
-
-    switch (type)
-    {
-	case EVENT_REINIT_SECRET:
-	    passert(st == NULL);
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET handled"));
-	    init_secret();
-	    break;
 
-#ifdef KLIPS
-	case EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN:
-	    passert(st == NULL);
-	    scan_proc_shunts();
-	    break;
-#endif
+	evlist = evlist->ev_next;           /* Ok, we'll handle this event */
 
-	case EVENT_LOG_DAILY:
-	    daily_log_event();
-	    break;
-
-	case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:
-	    /* Time to retransmit, or give up.
-	     *
-	     * Generally, we'll only try to send the message
-	     * MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS times.  Each time we double
-	     * our patience.
-	     *
-	     * As a special case, if this is the first initiating message
-	     * of a Main Mode exchange, and we have been directed to try
-	     * forever, we'll extend the number of retransmissions to
-	     * MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL times, with all these
-	     * extended attempts having the same patience.  The intention
-	     * is to reduce the bother when nobody is home.
-	     */
-	    {
-		time_t delay = 0;
-
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log(
-		    "handling event EVENT_RETRANSMIT for %s \"%s\" #%lu"
-		    , ip_str(&peer), c->name, st->st_serialno));
-
-		if (st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS)
-		    delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 << (st->st_retransmit + 1);
-		else if (st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I1
-		&& c->sa_keying_tries == 0
-		&& st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL)
-		    delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 << MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS;
-
-		if (delay != 0)
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		if (evlist != (struct event *) NULL)
+			DBG_log("event after this is %N in %ld seconds"
+				, timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type
+				, (long) (evlist->ev_time - tm)));
+
+	/* for state-associated events, pick up the state pointer
+	 * and remove the backpointer from the state object.
+	 * We'll eventually either schedule a new event, or delete the state.
+	 */
+	passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+	if (st != NULL)
+	{
+		c = st->st_connection;
+		if (type  == EVENT_DPD || type == EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT)
 		{
-		    st->st_retransmit++;
-		    whack_log(RC_RETRANSMISSION
-			, "%s: retransmission; will wait %lus for response"
-			, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
-			, (unsigned long)delay);
-		    send_packet(st, "EVENT_RETRANSMIT");
-		    event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, delay, st);
+			passert(st->st_dpd_event == ev);
+			st->st_dpd_event = NULL;
 		}
-		else
+		else 
 		{
-		    /* check if we've tried rekeying enough times.
-		     * st->st_try == 0 means that this should be the only try.
-		     * c->sa_keying_tries == 0 means that there is no limit.
-		     */
-		    unsigned long try = st->st_try;
-		    unsigned long try_limit = c->sa_keying_tries;
-		    const char *details = "";
-
-		    switch (st->st_state)
-		    {
-		    case STATE_MAIN_I3:
-			details = ".  Possible authentication failure:"
-			    " no acceptable response to our"
-			    " first encrypted message";
-			break;
-		    case STATE_MAIN_I1:
-			details = ".  No response (or no acceptable response) to our"
-			    " first IKE message";
-			break;
-		    case STATE_QUICK_I1:
-			if (c->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY)
-			    details = ".  No acceptable response to our"
-				" first Quick Mode message:"
-				" perhaps peer likes no proposal";
+			passert(st->st_event == ev);
+			st->st_event = NULL;
+		}
+		peer = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+		set_cur_state(st);
+	}
+
+	switch (type)
+	{
+		case EVENT_REINIT_SECRET:
+			passert(st == NULL);
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET handled"));
+			init_secret();
 			break;
-		    default:
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+		case EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN:
+			passert(st == NULL);
+			scan_proc_shunts();
 			break;
-		    }
-		    loglog(RC_NORETRANSMISSION
-			, "max number of retransmissions (%d) reached %s%s"
-			, st->st_retransmit
-			, enum_show(&state_names, st->st_state), details);
-		    if (try != 0 && try != try_limit)
-		    {
-			/* A lot like EVENT_SA_REPLACE, but over again.
-			 * Since we know that st cannot be in use,
-			 * we can delete it right away.
-			 */
-			char story[80];	/* arbitrary limit */
+#endif
 
-			try++;
-			snprintf(story, sizeof(story), try_limit == 0
-			    ? "starting keying attempt %ld of an unlimited number"
-			    : "starting keying attempt %ld of at most %ld"
-			    , try, try_limit);
+		case EVENT_LOG_DAILY:
+			daily_log_event();
+			break;
 
-			if (st->st_whack_sock != NULL_FD)
+		case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:
+			/* Time to retransmit, or give up.
+			 *
+			 * Generally, we'll only try to send the message
+			 * MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS times.  Each time we double
+			 * our patience.
+			 *
+			 * As a special case, if this is the first initiating message
+			 * of a Main Mode exchange, and we have been directed to try
+			 * forever, we'll extend the number of retransmissions to
+			 * MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL times, with all these
+			 * extended attempts having the same patience.  The intention
+			 * is to reduce the bother when nobody is home.
+			 */
 			{
-			    /* Release whack because the observer will get bored. */
-			    loglog(RC_COMMENT, "%s, but releasing whack"
-				, story);
-			    release_pending_whacks(st, story);
+				time_t delay = 0;
+
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log(
+					"handling event EVENT_RETRANSMIT for %s \"%s\" #%lu"
+					, ip_str(&peer), c->name, st->st_serialno));
+
+				if (st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS)
+					delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 << (st->st_retransmit + 1);
+				else if (st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I1
+				&& c->sa_keying_tries == 0
+				&& st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL)
+					delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 << MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS;
+
+				if (delay != 0)
+				{
+					st->st_retransmit++;
+					whack_log(RC_RETRANSMISSION
+						, "%s: retransmission; will wait %lus for response"
+						, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+						, (unsigned long)delay);
+					send_packet(st, "EVENT_RETRANSMIT");
+					event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, delay, st);
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					/* check if we've tried rekeying enough times.
+					 * st->st_try == 0 means that this should be the only try.
+					 * c->sa_keying_tries == 0 means that there is no limit.
+					 */
+					unsigned long try = st->st_try;
+					unsigned long try_limit = c->sa_keying_tries;
+					const char *details = "";
+
+					switch (st->st_state)
+					{
+					case STATE_MAIN_I3:
+						details = ".  Possible authentication failure:"
+							" no acceptable response to our"
+							" first encrypted message";
+						break;
+					case STATE_MAIN_I1:
+						details = ".  No response (or no acceptable response) to our"
+							" first IKE message";
+						break;
+					case STATE_QUICK_I1:
+						if (c->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY)
+							details = ".  No acceptable response to our"
+								" first Quick Mode message:"
+								" perhaps peer likes no proposal";
+						break;
+					default:
+						break;
+					}
+					loglog(RC_NORETRANSMISSION
+						, "max number of retransmissions (%d) reached %s%s"
+						, st->st_retransmit
+						, enum_show(&state_names, st->st_state), details);
+					if (try != 0 && try != try_limit)
+					{
+						/* A lot like EVENT_SA_REPLACE, but over again.
+						 * Since we know that st cannot be in use,
+						 * we can delete it right away.
+						 */
+						char story[80]; /* arbitrary limit */
+
+						try++;
+						snprintf(story, sizeof(story), try_limit == 0
+							? "starting keying attempt %ld of an unlimited number"
+							: "starting keying attempt %ld of at most %ld"
+							, try, try_limit);
+
+						if (st->st_whack_sock != NULL_FD)
+						{
+							/* Release whack because the observer will get bored. */
+							loglog(RC_COMMENT, "%s, but releasing whack"
+								, story);
+							release_pending_whacks(st, story);
+						}
+						else
+						{
+							/* no whack: just log to syslog */
+							plog("%s", story);
+						}
+						ipsecdoi_replace(st, try);
+					}
+					delete_state(st);
+				}
 			}
-			else
+			break;
+
+		case EVENT_SA_REPLACE:
+		case EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED:
 			{
-			    /* no whack: just log to syslog */
-			    plog("%s", story);
+				so_serial_t newest = IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)
+					? c->newest_isakmp_sa : c->newest_ipsec_sa;
+
+				if (newest != st->st_serialno
+				&& newest != SOS_NOBODY)
+				{
+					/* not very interesting: no need to replace */
+					DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+						, plog("not replacing stale %s SA: #%lu will do"
+							, IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"
+							, newest));
+				}
+				else if (type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED
+				&& st->st_outbound_time <= tm - c->sa_rekey_margin)
+				{
+					/* we observed no recent use: no need to replace
+					 *
+					 * The sampling effects mean that st_outbound_time
+					 * could be up to SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL more recent
+					 * than actual traffic because the sampler looks at change
+					 * over that interval.
+					 * st_outbound_time could also not yet reflect traffic
+					 * in the last SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL.
+					 * We expect that SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL is smaller than
+					 * c->sa_rekey_margin so that the effects of this will
+					 * be unimportant.
+					 * This is just an optimization: correctness is not
+					 * at stake.
+					 *
+					 * Note: we are abusing the DBG mechanism to control
+					 * normal log output.
+					 */
+					DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+						, plog("not replacing stale %s SA: inactive for %lus"
+							, IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"
+							, (unsigned long)(tm - st->st_outbound_time)));
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+						, plog("replacing stale %s SA"
+							, IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"));
+					ipsecdoi_replace(st, 1);
+				}
+				delete_dpd_event(st);
+				event_schedule(EVENT_SA_EXPIRE, st->st_margin, st);
 			}
-			ipsecdoi_replace(st, try);
-		    }
-		    delete_state(st);
-		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-
-	case EVENT_SA_REPLACE:
-	case EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED:
-	    {
-		so_serial_t newest = IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)
-		    ? c->newest_isakmp_sa : c->newest_ipsec_sa;
-
-		if (newest != st->st_serialno
-		&& newest != SOS_NOBODY)
-		{
-		    /* not very interesting: no need to replace */
-		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
-			, plog("not replacing stale %s SA: #%lu will do"
-			    , IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"
-			    , newest));
-		}
-		else if (type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED
-		&& st->st_outbound_time <= tm - c->sa_rekey_margin)
-		{
-		    /* we observed no recent use: no need to replace
-		     *
-		     * The sampling effects mean that st_outbound_time
-		     * could be up to SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL more recent
-		     * than actual traffic because the sampler looks at change
-		     * over that interval.
-		     * st_outbound_time could also not yet reflect traffic
-		     * in the last SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL.
-		     * We expect that SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL is smaller than
-		     * c->sa_rekey_margin so that the effects of this will
-		     * be unimportant.
-		     * This is just an optimization: correctness is not
-		     * at stake.
-		     *
-		     * Note: we are abusing the DBG mechanism to control
-		     * normal log output.
-		     */
-		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
-			, plog("not replacing stale %s SA: inactive for %lus"
-			    , IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"
-			    , (unsigned long)(tm - st->st_outbound_time)));
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
-			, plog("replacing stale %s SA"
-			    , IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"));
-		    ipsecdoi_replace(st, 1);
-		}
-		delete_dpd_event(st);
-		event_schedule(EVENT_SA_EXPIRE, st->st_margin, st);
-	    }
-	    break;
+			break;
 
-	case EVENT_SA_EXPIRE:
-	    {
-		const char *satype;
-		so_serial_t latest;
+		case EVENT_SA_EXPIRE:
+			{
+				const char *satype;
+				so_serial_t latest;
+
+				if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+				{
+					satype = "ISAKMP";
+					latest = c->newest_isakmp_sa;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					satype = "IPsec";
+					latest = c->newest_ipsec_sa;
+				}
+
+				if (st->st_serialno != latest)
+				{
+					/* not very interesting: already superseded */
+					DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+						, plog("%s SA expired (superseded by #%lu)"
+							, satype, latest));
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					plog("%s SA expired (%s)", satype
+						, (c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
+							? "--dontrekey"
+							: "LATEST!"
+						);
+				}
+			}
+			/* FALLTHROUGH */
+		case EVENT_SO_DISCARD:
+			/* Delete this state object.  It must be in the hash table. */
+			delete_state(st);
+			break;
 
-		if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
-		{
-		    satype = "ISAKMP";
-		    latest = c->newest_isakmp_sa;
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    satype = "IPsec";
-		    latest = c->newest_ipsec_sa;
-		}
+		case EVENT_DPD:
+			dpd_outI(st);
+			break;
+		case EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT:
+			dpd_timeout(st);
+			break;
+		case EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE:
+			nat_traversal_ka_event();
+			break;
+		default:
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "INTERNAL ERROR: ignoring unknown expiring event %N"
+				, timer_event_names, type);
+	}
 
-		if (st->st_serialno != latest)
-		{
-		    /* not very interesting: already superseded */
-		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
-			, plog("%s SA expired (superseded by #%lu)"
-			    , satype, latest));
-		}
-		else
-		{
-		    plog("%s SA expired (%s)", satype
-			, (c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
-			    ? "--dontrekey"
-			    : "LATEST!"
-			);
-		}
-	    }
-	    /* FALLTHROUGH */
-	case EVENT_SO_DISCARD:
-	    /* Delete this state object.  It must be in the hash table. */
-	    delete_state(st);
-	    break;
-
-	case EVENT_DPD:
-	    dpd_outI(st);
-	    break;
-	case EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT:
-	    dpd_timeout(st);
-	    break;
-	case EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE:
-	    nat_traversal_ka_event();
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "INTERNAL ERROR: ignoring unknown expiring event %s"
-		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, type));
-    }
-
-    pfree(ev);
-    reset_cur_state();
+	free(ev);
+	reset_cur_state();
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Return the time until the next event in the queue
  * expires (never negative), or -1 if no jobs in queue.
  */
-long
-next_event(void)
+long next_event(void)
 {
-    time_t tm;
+	time_t tm;
+
+	if (evlist == (struct event *) NULL)
+		return -1;
 
-    if (evlist == (struct event *) NULL)
-	return -1;
+	tm = now();
 
-    tm = now();
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		if (evlist->ev_state == NULL)
+			DBG_log("next event %N in %ld seconds"
+				, timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type
+				, (long)evlist->ev_time - (long)tm);
+		else
+			DBG_log("next event %N in %ld seconds for #%lu"
+				, timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type
+				, (long)evlist->ev_time - (long)tm
+				, evlist->ev_state->st_serialno));
 
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	if (evlist->ev_state == NULL)
-	    DBG_log("next event %s in %ld seconds"
-		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type)
-		, (long)evlist->ev_time - (long)tm);
+	if (evlist->ev_time - tm <= 0)
+		return 0;
 	else
-	    DBG_log("next event %s in %ld seconds for #%lu"
-		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type)
-		, (long)evlist->ev_time - (long)tm
-		, evlist->ev_state->st_serialno));
-
-    if (evlist->ev_time - tm <= 0)
-	return 0;
-    else
-	return evlist->ev_time - tm;
+		return evlist->ev_time - tm;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Delete an event.
  */
-void
-delete_event(struct state *st)
+void delete_event(struct state *st)
 {
-    if (st->st_event != (struct event *) NULL)
-    {
-	struct event **ev;
-
-	for (ev = &evlist; ; ev = &(*ev)->ev_next)
+	if (st->st_event != (struct event *) NULL)
 	{
-	    if (*ev == NULL)
-	    {
-		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event %s to be deleted not found",
-		    enum_show(&timer_event_names, st->st_event->ev_type)));
-		break;
-	    }
-	    if ((*ev) == st->st_event)
-	    {
-		*ev = (*ev)->ev_next;
-
-		if (st->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_RETRANSMIT)
-		    st->st_retransmit = 0;
-		pfree(st->st_event);
-		st->st_event = (struct event *) NULL;
-
-		break;
-	    }
+		struct event **ev;
+
+		for (ev = &evlist; ; ev = &(*ev)->ev_next)
+		{
+			if (*ev == NULL)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event %N to be deleted not found",
+					timer_event_names, st->st_event->ev_type));
+				break;
+			}
+			if ((*ev) == st->st_event)
+			{
+				*ev = (*ev)->ev_next;
+
+				if (st->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_RETRANSMIT)
+				{
+					st->st_retransmit = 0;
+				}
+				free(st->st_event);
+				st->st_event = (struct event *) NULL;
+
+				break;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-    }
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Delete a DPD event.
  */
-void
-delete_dpd_event(struct state *st)
+void delete_dpd_event(struct state *st)
 {
-    if (st->st_dpd_event != (struct event *) NULL)
-    {
-        struct event **ev;
-
-        for (ev = &evlist; ; ev = &(*ev)->ev_next)
-        {
-            if (*ev == NULL)
-            {
-                DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event %s to be deleted not found",
-                    enum_show(&timer_event_names, st->st_dpd_event->ev_type)));
-                break;
-            }
-            if ((*ev) == st->st_dpd_event)
-            {
-                *ev = (*ev)->ev_next;
-                pfree(st->st_dpd_event);
-                st->st_dpd_event = (struct event *) NULL;
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    }
+	if (st->st_dpd_event != (struct event *) NULL)
+	{
+		struct event **ev;
+
+		for (ev = &evlist; ; ev = &(*ev)->ev_next)
+		{
+			if (*ev == NULL)
+			{
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event %N to be deleted not found",
+					timer_event_names, st->st_dpd_event->ev_type));
+				break;
+			}
+			if ((*ev) == st->st_dpd_event)
+			{
+				*ev = (*ev)->ev_next;
+				free(st->st_dpd_event);
+				st->st_dpd_event = (struct event *) NULL;
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+	}
 }
 
+/**
+ * Free remaining events
+ */
+void free_events(void)
+{
+	struct event *ev_tmp, *ev;
+
+	ev = evlist;
+	evlist = NULL;
+
+	while (ev)
+	{
+		ev_tmp = ev;
+		ev = ev->ev_next;
+		free(ev_tmp);
+	}
+}
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/timer.h b/src/pluto/timer.h
index c772d37f9..322aeba6a 100644
--- a/src/pluto/timer.h
+++ b/src/pluto/timer.h
@@ -10,20 +10,18 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: timer.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
-extern time_t now(void);	/* careful version of time(2) */
+extern time_t now(void);        /* careful version of time(2) */
 
-struct state;	/* forward declaration */
+struct state;   /* forward declaration */
 
 struct event
 {
-    time_t          ev_time;
-    int             ev_type;        /* Event type */
-    struct state   *ev_state;       /* Pointer to relevant state (if any) */
-    struct event   *ev_next;        /* Pointer to next event */
+	time_t          ev_time;
+	int             ev_type;        /* Event type */
+	struct state   *ev_state;       /* Pointer to relevant state (if any) */
+	struct event   *ev_next;        /* Pointer to next event */
 };
 
 extern void event_schedule(enum event_type type, time_t tm, struct state *st);
@@ -32,3 +30,5 @@ extern long next_event(void);
 extern void delete_event(struct state *st);
 extern void delete_dpd_event(struct state *st);
 extern void daily_log_event(void);
+extern void free_events(void);
+extern void init_secret(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/vendor.c b/src/pluto/vendor.c
index f957bf39b..ff145eb38 100644
--- a/src/pluto/vendor.c
+++ b/src/pluto/vendor.c
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 /* ISAKMP VendorID
  * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -10,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: vendor.c 5052 2009-03-30 03:47:14Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -20,10 +19,12 @@
 #include <sys/queue.h>
 #include <freeswan.h>
 
+#include <library.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
+
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
-#include "md5.h"
 #include "connections.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "demux.h"
@@ -88,232 +89,226 @@
 #define VID_SUBSTRING  (VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH)
 
 struct vid_struct {
-	enum known_vendorid id;
-	unsigned short flags;
-	const char *data;
-	const char *descr;
-	const char *vid;
-	u_int vid_len;
+		enum known_vendorid id;
+		unsigned short flags;
+		const char *data;
+		const char *descr;
+		chunk_t vid;
 };
 
 #define DEC_MD5_VID_D(id,str,descr) \
-	{ VID_##id, VID_MD5HASH, str, descr, NULL, 0 },
+		{ VID_##id, VID_MD5HASH, str, descr, { NULL, 0 } },
 #define DEC_MD5_VID(id,str) \
-	{ VID_##id, VID_MD5HASH, str, NULL, NULL, 0 },
-#define DEC_FSWAN_VID(id,str,descr) \
-	{ VID_##id, VID_FSWAN_HASH, str, descr, NULL, 0 },
+		{ VID_##id, VID_MD5HASH, str, NULL, { NULL, 0 } },
 
 static struct vid_struct _vid_tab[] = {
 
-	/* Implementation names */
-
-	{ VID_OPENPGP, VID_STRING, "OpenPGP10171", "OpenPGP", NULL, 0 },
-
-	DEC_MD5_VID(KAME_RACOON, "KAME/racoon")
-
-	{ VID_MS_NT5, VID_MD5HASH | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
-		"MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY", NULL, NULL, 0 },
-
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL, "SSH Sentinel")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_1, "SSH Sentinel 1.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_2, "SSH Sentinel 1.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_3, "SSH Sentinel 1.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_4, "SSH Sentinel 1.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1, "SSH Sentinel 1.4.1")
-
-	/* These ones come from SSH vendors.txt */
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_0,
-		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_1,
-		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_2,
-		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_2_1,
-		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_2_2,
-		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_0_0,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.0.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_0,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_1,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_2,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_3_0_0,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_3_0_1,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_0_0,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_0_1,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_1_0,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_2_0,
-		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.2.0")
-
-	/* note: md5('CISCO-UNITY') = 12f5f28c457168a9702d9fe274cc02d4 */
-	{ VID_CISCO_UNITY, VID_KEEP, NULL, "Cisco-Unity",
-		"\x12\xf5\xf2\x8c\x45\x71\x68\xa9\x70\x2d\x9f\xe2\x74\xcc\x01\x00",
-		16 },
-
-	{ VID_CISCO3K, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH,
-          NULL, "Cisco VPN 3000 Series" , "\x1f\x07\xf7\x0e\xaa\x65\x14\xd3\xb0\xfa\x96\x54\x2a\x50", 14},
-
-	{ VID_CISCO_IOS, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, 
-	  NULL, "Cisco IOS Device", "\x3e\x98\x40\x48", 4},
-
-	/*
-	 * Timestep VID seen:
-	 *   - 54494d455354455020312053475720313532302033313520322e303145303133
-	 *     = 'TIMESTEP 1 SGW 1520 315 2.01E013'
-	 */
-	{ VID_TIMESTEP, VID_STRING | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII, "TIMESTEP",
-		NULL, NULL, 0 },
-
-	/*
-	 * Netscreen:
-	 * 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100  (HeartBeat_Notify + 386b0100)
-	 */
-	{ VID_MISC_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY, VID_STRING | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
-		"HeartBeat_Notify", "HeartBeat Notify", NULL, 0 },
-
-	/*
-	 * MacOS X
-	 */
-	{ VID_MACOSX, VID_STRING|VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA, "Mac OSX 10.x",
-	  "\x4d\xf3\x79\x28\xe9\xfc\x4f\xd1\xb3\x26\x21\x70\xd5\x15\xc6\x62", NULL, 0},
-
-	/*
-	 * Openswan
-	 */
-	DEC_FSWAN_VID(OPENSWAN2, "Openswan 2.2.0", "Openswan 2.2.0")
-	
-	/* NCP */
-	{ VID_NCP_SERVER, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "NCP Server",
-	    "\xc6\xf5\x7a\xc3\x98\xf4\x93\x20\x81\x45\xb7\x58", 12},
-	{ VID_NCP_CLIENT, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "NCP Client",
-	    "\xeb\x4c\x1b\x78\x8a\xfd\x4a\x9c\xb7\x73\x0a\x68", 12},
-
-	/*
-	 * Windows Vista (and Windows Server 2008?)
-	 */
-	DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP, "MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP2, "IKE CGA version 1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP3, "MS-MamieExists")
-
-	/*
-	 * strongSwan
-	 */
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN,       "strongSwan 4.2.14")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_13,"strongSwan 4.2.13")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_12,"strongSwan 4.2.12")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_11,"strongSwan 4.2.11")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_10,"strongSwan 4.2.10")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_9, "strongSwan 4.2.9")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_8, "strongSwan 4.2.8")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_7, "strongSwan 4.2.7")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_6, "strongSwan 4.2.6")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_5, "strongSwan 4.2.5")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_4, "strongSwan 4.2.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_3, "strongSwan 4.2.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_2, "strongSwan 4.2.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_1, "strongSwan 4.2.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_0, "strongSwan 4.2.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_11,"strongSwan 4.1.11")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_10,"strongSwan 4.1.10")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_9, "strongSwan 4.1.9")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_8, "strongSwan 4.1.8")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_7, "strongSwan 4.1.7")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_6, "strongSwan 4.1.6")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_5, "strongSwan 4.1.5")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_4, "strongSwan 4.1.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_3, "strongSwan 4.1.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_2, "strongSwan 4.1.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_1, "strongSwan 4.1.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_0, "strongSwan 4.1.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_7, "strongSwan 4.0.7")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_6, "strongSwan 4.0.6")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_5, "strongSwan 4.0.5")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_4, "strongSwan 4.0.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_3, "strongSwan 4.0.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_2, "strongSwan 4.0.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_1, "strongSwan 4.0.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_0, "strongSwan 4.0.0")
-
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_8, "strongSwan 2.8.9")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_8, "strongSwan 2.8.8")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_7, "strongSwan 2.8.7")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_6, "strongSwan 2.8.6")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_5, "strongSwan 2.8.5")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_4, "strongSwan 2.8.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_3, "strongSwan 2.8.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_2, "strongSwan 2.8.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_1, "strongSwan 2.8.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_0, "strongSwan 2.8.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_3, "strongSwan 2.7.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_2, "strongSwan 2.7.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_1, "strongSwan 2.7.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_0, "strongSwan 2.7.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_4, "strongSwan 2.6.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_3, "strongSwan 2.6.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_2, "strongSwan 2.6.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_1, "strongSwan 2.6.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_0, "strongSwan 2.6.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_7, "strongSwan 2.5.7")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_6, "strongSwan 2.5.6")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_5, "strongSwan 2.5.5")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_4, "strongSwan 2.5.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_3, "strongSwan 2.5.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_2, "strongSwan 2.5.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_1, "strongSwan 2.5.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_0, "strongSwan 2.5.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_4, "strongSwan 2.4.4")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_3, "strongSwan 2.4.3")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_2, "strongSwan 2.4.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_1, "strongSwan 2.4.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_0, "strongSwan 2.4.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_2, "strongSwan 2.3.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_1, "strongSwan 2.3.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_0, "strongSwan 2.3.0")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_2, "strongSwan 2.2.2")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_1, "strongSwan 2.2.1")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_0, "strongSwan 2.2.0")
-
-	/* NAT-Traversal */
-
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_STENBERG_01, "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_STENBERG_02, "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_HUTTUNEN, "ESPThruNAT")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_HUTTUNEN_ESPINUDP, "draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_00, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_02, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02")
-	/* hash in draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02 contains '\n'... Accept both */
-	DEC_MD5_VID_D(NATT_IETF_02_N, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n", "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_03, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03")
-	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_RFC, "RFC 3947")
-
-	/* misc */
-	
-	{ VID_MISC_XAUTH, VID_KEEP, NULL, "XAUTH",
-	    "\x09\x00\x26\x89\xdf\xd6\xb7\x12", 8 },
-
-	{ VID_MISC_DPD, VID_KEEP, NULL, "Dead Peer Detection",
-	    "\xaf\xca\xd7\x13\x68\xa1\xf1\xc9\x6b\x86\x96\xfc\x77\x57\x01\x00", 16 },
-
-	DEC_MD5_VID(MISC_FRAGMENTATION, "FRAGMENTATION")
-	
-	DEC_MD5_VID(INITIAL_CONTACT, "Vid-Initial-Contact")
-
-	/**
-	 * Cisco VPN 3000
-	 */
-	{ VID_MISC_FRAGMENTATION, VID_MD5HASH | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
-	    "FRAGMENTATION", NULL, NULL, 0 },
-
-	/* -- */
-	{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }
+		/* Implementation names */
+
+		{ VID_OPENPGP, VID_STRING, "OpenPGP10171", "OpenPGP", { NULL, 0 } },
+
+		DEC_MD5_VID(KAME_RACOON, "KAME/racoon")
+
+		{ VID_MS_NT5, VID_MD5HASH | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
+				"MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY", NULL, { NULL, 0 } },
+
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL, "SSH Sentinel")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_1, "SSH Sentinel 1.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_2, "SSH Sentinel 1.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_3, "SSH Sentinel 1.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_4, "SSH Sentinel 1.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1, "SSH Sentinel 1.4.1")
+
+		/* These ones come from SSH vendors.txt */
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_0,
+				"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_1,
+				"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_2,
+				"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_2_1,
+				"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_2_2,
+				"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_0_0,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.0.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_0,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_1,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_2,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_3_0_0,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_3_0_1,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_0_0,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_0_1,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_1_0,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_2_0,
+				"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.2.0")
+
+		/* note: md5('CISCO-UNITY') = 12f5f28c457168a9702d9fe274cc02d4 */
+		{ VID_CISCO_UNITY, VID_KEEP, NULL, "Cisco-Unity",
+		  { "\x12\xf5\xf2\x8c\x45\x71\x68\xa9\x70\x2d\x9f\xe2\x74\xcc\x01\x00", 16 } },
+
+		{ VID_CISCO3K, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "Cisco VPN 3000 Series" ,
+		  { "\x1f\x07\xf7\x0e\xaa\x65\x14\xd3\xb0\xfa\x96\x54\x2a\x50", 14 } },
+
+		{ VID_CISCO_IOS, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, 
+		  NULL, "Cisco IOS Device", { "\x3e\x98\x40\x48", 4 } },
+
+		/*
+		 * Timestep VID seen:
+		 *   - 54494d455354455020312053475720313532302033313520322e303145303133
+		 *     = 'TIMESTEP 1 SGW 1520 315 2.01E013'
+		 */
+		{ VID_TIMESTEP, VID_STRING | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII, "TIMESTEP",
+				NULL, { NULL, 0 } },
+
+		/*
+		 * Netscreen:
+		 * 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100  (HeartBeat_Notify + 386b0100)
+		 */
+		{ VID_MISC_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY, VID_STRING | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
+				"HeartBeat_Notify", "HeartBeat Notify", { NULL, 0 } },
+		/*
+		 * MacOS X
+		 */
+		{ VID_MACOSX, VID_STRING|VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA, "Mac OSX 10.x",
+		  "\x4d\xf3\x79\x28\xe9\xfc\x4f\xd1\xb3\x26\x21\x70\xd5\x15\xc6\x62", { NULL, 0 } },
+
+		/* NCP */
+		{ VID_NCP_SERVER, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "NCP Server",
+			{ "\xc6\xf5\x7a\xc3\x98\xf4\x93\x20\x81\x45\xb7\x58", 12 } },
+		{ VID_NCP_CLIENT, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "NCP Client",
+			{ "\xeb\x4c\x1b\x78\x8a\xfd\x4a\x9c\xb7\x73\x0a\x68", 12 } },
+
+		/*
+		 * Windows Vista (and Windows Server 2008?)
+		 */
+		DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP, "MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP2, "IKE CGA version 1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP3, "MS-MamieExists")
+
+		/*
+		 * strongSwan
+		 */
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN,       "strongSwan 4.3.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_3_1, "strongSwan 4.3.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_3_0, "strongSwan 4.3.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_15,"strongSwan 4.2.15")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_14,"strongSwan 4.2.14")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_13,"strongSwan 4.2.13")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_12,"strongSwan 4.2.12")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_11,"strongSwan 4.2.11")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_10,"strongSwan 4.2.10")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_9, "strongSwan 4.2.9")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_8, "strongSwan 4.2.8")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_7, "strongSwan 4.2.7")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_6, "strongSwan 4.2.6")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_5, "strongSwan 4.2.5")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_4, "strongSwan 4.2.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_3, "strongSwan 4.2.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_2, "strongSwan 4.2.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_1, "strongSwan 4.2.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_2_0, "strongSwan 4.2.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_11,"strongSwan 4.1.11")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_10,"strongSwan 4.1.10")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_9, "strongSwan 4.1.9")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_8, "strongSwan 4.1.8")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_7, "strongSwan 4.1.7")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_6, "strongSwan 4.1.6")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_5, "strongSwan 4.1.5")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_4, "strongSwan 4.1.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_3, "strongSwan 4.1.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_2, "strongSwan 4.1.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_1, "strongSwan 4.1.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_0, "strongSwan 4.1.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_7, "strongSwan 4.0.7")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_6, "strongSwan 4.0.6")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_5, "strongSwan 4.0.5")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_4, "strongSwan 4.0.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_3, "strongSwan 4.0.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_2, "strongSwan 4.0.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_1, "strongSwan 4.0.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_0, "strongSwan 4.0.0")
+
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_9, "strongSwan 2.8.9")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_8, "strongSwan 2.8.8")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_7, "strongSwan 2.8.7")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_6, "strongSwan 2.8.6")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_5, "strongSwan 2.8.5")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_4, "strongSwan 2.8.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_3, "strongSwan 2.8.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_2, "strongSwan 2.8.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_1, "strongSwan 2.8.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_0, "strongSwan 2.8.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_3, "strongSwan 2.7.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_2, "strongSwan 2.7.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_1, "strongSwan 2.7.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_0, "strongSwan 2.7.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_4, "strongSwan 2.6.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_3, "strongSwan 2.6.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_2, "strongSwan 2.6.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_1, "strongSwan 2.6.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_0, "strongSwan 2.6.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_7, "strongSwan 2.5.7")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_6, "strongSwan 2.5.6")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_5, "strongSwan 2.5.5")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_4, "strongSwan 2.5.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_3, "strongSwan 2.5.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_2, "strongSwan 2.5.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_1, "strongSwan 2.5.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_0, "strongSwan 2.5.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_4, "strongSwan 2.4.4")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_3, "strongSwan 2.4.3")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_2, "strongSwan 2.4.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_1, "strongSwan 2.4.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_0, "strongSwan 2.4.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_2, "strongSwan 2.3.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_1, "strongSwan 2.3.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_0, "strongSwan 2.3.0")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_2, "strongSwan 2.2.2")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_1, "strongSwan 2.2.1")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_0, "strongSwan 2.2.0")
+
+		/* NAT-Traversal */
+
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_STENBERG_01, "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_STENBERG_02, "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_HUTTUNEN, "ESPThruNAT")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_HUTTUNEN_ESPINUDP, "draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_00, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_02, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02")
+		/* hash in draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02 contains '\n'... Accept both */
+		DEC_MD5_VID_D(NATT_IETF_02_N, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n", "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_03, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03")
+		DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_RFC, "RFC 3947")
+
+		/* misc */
+		
+		{ VID_MISC_XAUTH, VID_KEEP, NULL, "XAUTH",
+			{ "\x09\x00\x26\x89\xdf\xd6\xb7\x12", 8 } },
+
+		{ VID_MISC_DPD, VID_KEEP, NULL, "Dead Peer Detection",
+			{ "\xaf\xca\xd7\x13\x68\xa1\xf1\xc9\x6b\x86\x96\xfc\x77\x57\x01\x00", 16 } },
+
+		DEC_MD5_VID(MISC_FRAGMENTATION, "FRAGMENTATION")
+		
+		DEC_MD5_VID(INITIAL_CONTACT, "Vid-Initial-Contact")
+
+		/**
+		 * Cisco VPN 3000
+		 */
+		{ VID_MISC_FRAGMENTATION, VID_MD5HASH | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
+			"FRAGMENTATION", NULL, { NULL, 0 } },
+
+		/* -- */
+		{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, { NULL, 0 } }
 
 };
 
@@ -321,239 +316,211 @@ static const char _hexdig[] = "0123456789abcdef";
 
 static int _vid_struct_init = 0;
 
-void
-init_vendorid(void)
+void init_vendorid(void)
 {
-    struct vid_struct *vid;
-    MD5_CTX ctx;
-    int i;
+	hasher_t *hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_MD5);
+	struct vid_struct *vid;
 
-    for (vid = _vid_tab; vid->id; vid++)
-    {
-	if (vid->flags & VID_STRING)
-	{
-	    /** VendorID is a string **/
-	    vid->vid = strdup(vid->data);
-	    vid->vid_len = strlen(vid->data);
-	}
-	else if (vid->flags & VID_MD5HASH)
+	for (vid = _vid_tab; vid->id; vid++)
 	{
-	    /** VendorID is a string to hash with MD5 **/
-	    char *vidm =  malloc(MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-
-	    vid->vid = vidm;
-	    if (vidm)
-	    {
-		MD5Init(&ctx);
-		MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)vid->data, strlen(vid->data));
-		MD5Final(vidm, &ctx);
-		vid->vid_len = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE;
-	    }
-	}
-	else if (vid->flags & VID_FSWAN_HASH)
-	{
-	    /** FreeS/WAN 2.00+ specific hash **/
-#define FSWAN_VID_SIZE 12
-	    unsigned char hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
-	    char *vidm =  malloc(FSWAN_VID_SIZE);
-
-	    vid->vid = vidm;
-	    if (vidm)
-	    {
-		MD5Init(&ctx);
-		MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)vid->data, strlen(vid->data));
-		MD5Final(hash, &ctx);
-		vidm[0] = 'O';
-		vidm[1] = 'E';
-#if FSWAN_VID_SIZE - 2 <= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE
-		memcpy(vidm + 2, hash, FSWAN_VID_SIZE - 2);
-#else
-		memcpy(vidm + 2, hash, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-		memset(vidm + 2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, '\0',
-			FSWAN_VID_SIZE - 2 - MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
-#endif
-		for (i = 2; i < FSWAN_VID_SIZE; i++)
+		if (vid->flags & VID_STRING)
+		{
+			/** VendorID is a string **/
+			vid->vid = chunk_create((u_char *)vid->data, strlen(vid->data));
+			vid->vid = chunk_clone(vid->vid);
+		}
+		else if (vid->flags & VID_MD5HASH)
+		{
+			chunk_t vid_data = { (u_char *)vid->data, strlen(vid->data) };
+			
+			/** VendorID is a string to hash with MD5 **/
+		 	hasher->allocate_hash(hasher, vid_data, &vid->vid);
+		}
+
+		if (vid->descr == NULL)
 		{
-		    vidm[i] &= 0x7f;
-		    vidm[i] |= 0x40;
+			/** Find something to display **/
+			vid->descr = vid->data;
 		}
-		vid->vid_len = FSWAN_VID_SIZE;
-	    }
 	}
+	hasher->destroy(hasher);
+	_vid_struct_init = 1;
+}
+
+void free_vendorid(void)
+{
+	struct vid_struct *vid;
 
-	if (vid->descr == NULL)
+	for (vid = _vid_tab; vid->id; vid++)
 	{
-	    /** Find something to display **/
-	    vid->descr = vid->data;
+		if (vid->flags & (VID_STRING | VID_MD5HASH | VID_FSWAN_HASH))
+		{
+			free(vid->vid.ptr);
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    _vid_struct_init = 1;
 }
 
-static void
-handle_known_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md
-, const char *vidstr, size_t len, struct vid_struct *vid)
+static void handle_known_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md, const char *vidstr,
+								   size_t len, struct vid_struct *vid)
 {
-    char vid_dump[128];
-    bool vid_useful = FALSE;
-    size_t i, j;
-
-    switch (vid->id) {
-    /* Remote side supports OpenPGP certificates */
-    case VID_OPENPGP:
-	md->openpgp = TRUE;
-	vid_useful = TRUE;
-	break;
-
-    /*
-     * Use most recent supported NAT-Traversal method and ignore the
-     * other ones (implementations will send all supported methods but
-     * only one will be used)
-     *
-     * Note: most recent == higher id in vendor.h
-     */
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_00:
-	if (!nat_traversal_support_non_ike)
-	    break;
-	if ((nat_traversal_enabled) && (!md->nat_traversal_vid))
-	{
-	    md->nat_traversal_vid = vid->id;
-	    vid_useful = TRUE;
+	char vid_dump[128];
+	bool vid_useful = FALSE;
+	size_t i, j;
+
+	switch (vid->id) {
+	/* Remote side supports OpenPGP certificates */
+	case VID_OPENPGP:
+		md->openpgp = TRUE;
+		vid_useful = TRUE;
+		break;
+
+	/*
+	 * Use most recent supported NAT-Traversal method and ignore the
+	 * other ones (implementations will send all supported methods but
+	 * only one will be used)
+	 *
+	 * Note: most recent == higher id in vendor.h
+	 */
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_00:
+		if (!nat_traversal_support_non_ike)
+			break;
+		if ((nat_traversal_enabled) && (!md->nat_traversal_vid))
+		{
+			md->nat_traversal_vid = vid->id;
+			vid_useful = TRUE;
+		}
+		break;
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_02:
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_02_N:
+	case VID_NATT_IETF_03:
+	case VID_NATT_RFC:
+		if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating
+		&& md->nat_traversal_vid < vid->id)
+		{
+			md->nat_traversal_vid = vid->id;
+			vid_useful = TRUE;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	/* Remote side would like to do DPD with us on this connection */
+	case VID_MISC_DPD:
+		md->dpd = TRUE;
+		vid_useful = TRUE;
+		break;
+	case VID_MISC_XAUTH:
+		vid_useful = TRUE;
+		break;
+	default:
+		break;
 	}
-	break;
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_02:
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_02_N:
-    case VID_NATT_IETF_03:
-    case VID_NATT_RFC:
-	if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating
-	&& md->nat_traversal_vid < vid->id)
+
+	if (vid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA)
 	{
-	    md->nat_traversal_vid = vid->id;
-	    vid_useful = TRUE;
+		/* Dump description + Hexa */
+		memset(vid_dump, 0, sizeof(vid_dump));
+		snprintf(vid_dump, sizeof(vid_dump), "%s ",
+				 vid->descr ? vid->descr : "");
+		for (i = strlen(vid_dump), j = vid->vid.len;
+			 j < len && i < sizeof(vid_dump) - 2;
+			 i += 2, j++)
+		{
+			vid_dump[i] = _hexdig[(vidstr[j] >> 4) & 0xF];
+			vid_dump[i+1] = _hexdig[vidstr[j] & 0xF];
+		}
 	}
-	break;
-
-    /* Remote side would like to do DPD with us on this connection */
-    case VID_MISC_DPD:
-	md->dpd = TRUE;
-	vid_useful = TRUE;
-	break;
-    case VID_MISC_XAUTH:
-	vid_useful = TRUE;
-	break;
-    default:
-	break;
-    }
-
-    if (vid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA)
-    {
-	/* Dump description + Hexa */
-	memset(vid_dump, 0, sizeof(vid_dump));
-	snprintf(vid_dump, sizeof(vid_dump), "%s ",
-		 vid->descr ? vid->descr : "");
-	for (i = strlen(vid_dump), j = vid->vid_len;
-	     j < len && i < sizeof(vid_dump) - 2;
-	     i += 2, j++)
+	else if (vid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII)
 	{
-	    vid_dump[i] = _hexdig[(vidstr[j] >> 4) & 0xF];
-	    vid_dump[i+1] = _hexdig[vidstr[j] & 0xF];
+		/* Dump ASCII content */
+		memset(vid_dump, 0, sizeof(vid_dump));
+		for (i = 0; i < len && i < sizeof(vid_dump) - 1; i++)
+		{
+			vid_dump[i] = (isprint(vidstr[i])) ? vidstr[i] : '.';
+		}
 	}
-    }
-    else if (vid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII)
-    {
-	/* Dump ASCII content */
-	memset(vid_dump, 0, sizeof(vid_dump));
-	for (i = 0; i < len && i < sizeof(vid_dump) - 1; i++)
+	else
 	{
-	    vid_dump[i] = (isprint(vidstr[i])) ? vidstr[i] : '.';
+		/* Dump description (descr) */
+		snprintf(vid_dump, sizeof(vid_dump), "%s",
+				 vid->descr ? vid->descr : "");
 	}
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	/* Dump description (descr) */
-	snprintf(vid_dump, sizeof(vid_dump), "%s",
-		 vid->descr ? vid->descr : "");
-    }
-
-    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s Vendor ID payload [%s]",
-	    vid_useful ? "received" : "ignoring", vid_dump);
+
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s Vendor ID payload [%s]",
+			vid_useful ? "received" : "ignoring", vid_dump);
 }
 
-void
-handle_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md, const char *vid, size_t len)
+void handle_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md, const char *vid, size_t len)
 {
-    struct vid_struct *pvid;
+	struct vid_struct *pvid;
 
-    if (!_vid_struct_init)
-	init_vendorid();
+	if (!_vid_struct_init)
+		init_vendorid();
 
-    /*
-     * Find known VendorID in _vid_tab
-     */
-    for (pvid = _vid_tab; pvid->id; pvid++)
-    {
-	if (pvid->vid && vid && pvid->vid_len && len)
+	/*
+	 * Find known VendorID in _vid_tab
+	 */
+	for (pvid = _vid_tab; pvid->id; pvid++)
 	{
-	    if (pvid->vid_len == len)
-	    {
-		if (memcmp(pvid->vid, vid, len) == 0)
+		if (pvid->vid.ptr && vid && pvid->vid.len && len)
 		{
-		    handle_known_vendorid(md, vid, len, pvid);
-		    return;
+			if (pvid->vid.len == len)
+			{
+				if (memeq(pvid->vid.ptr, vid, len))
+				{
+					handle_known_vendorid(md, vid, len, pvid);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
+			else if ((pvid->vid.len < len) && (pvid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING))
+			{
+				if (memeq(pvid->vid.ptr, vid, pvid->vid.len))
+				{
+					handle_known_vendorid(md, vid, len, pvid);
+					return;
+				}
+			}
 		}
-	    }
-	    else if ((pvid->vid_len < len) && (pvid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING))
-	    {
-		if (memcmp(pvid->vid, vid, pvid->vid_len) == 0)
-		{
-		    handle_known_vendorid(md, vid, len, pvid);
-		    return;
-		}
-	    }
 	}
-    }
 
-    /*
-     * Unknown VendorID. Log the beginning.
-     */
-    {
-	char log_vid[2*MAX_LOG_VID_LEN+1];
-	size_t i;
+	/*
+	 * Unknown VendorID. Log the beginning.
+	 */
+	{
+		char log_vid[2*MAX_LOG_VID_LEN+1];
+		size_t i;
 
-	memset(log_vid, 0, sizeof(log_vid));
+		memset(log_vid, 0, sizeof(log_vid));
 
-	for (i = 0; i < len && i < MAX_LOG_VID_LEN; i++)
-	{
-	    log_vid[2*i] = _hexdig[(vid[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
-	    log_vid[2*i+1] = _hexdig[vid[i] & 0xF];
+		for (i = 0; i < len && i < MAX_LOG_VID_LEN; i++)
+		{
+			log_vid[2*i] = _hexdig[(vid[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
+			log_vid[2*i+1] = _hexdig[vid[i] & 0xF];
+		}
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Vendor ID payload [%s%s]",
+			   log_vid, (len>MAX_LOG_VID_LEN) ? "..." : "");
 	}
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Vendor ID payload [%s%s]",
-	       log_vid, (len>MAX_LOG_VID_LEN) ? "..." : "");
-    }
 }
 
 /**
  * Add a vendor id payload to the msg
  */
-bool
-out_vendorid (u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs, enum known_vendorid vid)
+bool out_vendorid (u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs, enum known_vendorid vid)
 {
-    struct vid_struct *pvid;
+	struct vid_struct *pvid;
 
-    if (!_vid_struct_init)
-	init_vendorid();
+	if (!_vid_struct_init)
+		init_vendorid();
 
-    for (pvid = _vid_tab; pvid->id && pvid->id != vid; pvid++);
+	for (pvid = _vid_tab; pvid->id && pvid->id != vid; pvid++);
 
-    if (pvid->id != vid)
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* not found */
-    if (!pvid->vid)
-	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* not initialized */
+	if (pvid->id != vid)
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* not found */
+	if (!pvid->vid.ptr)
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* not initialized */
 
-    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
-	DBG_log("out_vendorid(): sending [%s]", pvid->descr)
-    )
-    return out_generic_raw(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, outs,
-		pvid->vid, pvid->vid_len, "V_ID");
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+		DBG_log("out_vendorid(): sending [%s]", pvid->descr)
+	)
+	return out_generic_raw(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, outs,
+				pvid->vid.ptr, pvid->vid.len, "V_ID");
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/vendor.h b/src/pluto/vendor.h
index 2c8c24b34..164c1aa6d 100644
--- a/src/pluto/vendor.h
+++ b/src/pluto/vendor.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: vendor.h 5052 2009-03-30 03:47:14Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _VENDOR_H_
@@ -19,140 +17,144 @@
 
 enum known_vendorid {
 /* 1 - 100 : Implementation names */
-  VID_OPENPGP			=  1,
-  VID_KAME_RACOON		=  2,
-  VID_MS_NT5			=  3,
-  VID_SSH_SENTINEL		=  4,
-  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_1		=  5,
-  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_2		=  6,
-  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_3		=  7,
-  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4		=  8,
-  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1	=  9,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_0		= 10,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_1		= 11,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_2		= 12,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_2_1		= 13,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_2_2		= 14,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_0_0		= 15,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_0		= 16,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_1		= 17,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_2		= 18,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_3_0_0		= 19,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_3_0_1		= 20,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_0_0		= 21,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_0_1		= 22,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_1_0		= 23,
-  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_2_0		= 24,
-  VID_CISCO_UNITY		= 25,
-  VID_CISCO3K			= 26,
-  VID_CISCO_IOS			= 27,
-  VID_TIMESTEP			= 28,
-  VID_SAFENET			= 29,
-  VID_MACOSX			= 30,
-  VID_OPENSWAN2			= 31,
-  VID_NCP_SERVER		= 32,
-  VID_NCP_CLIENT		= 33,
-  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP		= 34,
-  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP2		= 35,
-  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP3		= 36,
+  VID_OPENPGP                   =  1,
+  VID_KAME_RACOON               =  2,
+  VID_MS_NT5                    =  3,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL              =  4,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_1          =  5,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_2          =  6,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_3          =  7,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4          =  8,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1        =  9,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_0           = 10,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_1           = 11,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_2           = 12,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_2_1           = 13,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_2_2           = 14,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_0_0           = 15,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_0           = 16,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_1           = 17,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_2           = 18,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_3_0_0           = 19,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_3_0_1           = 20,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_0_0           = 21,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_0_1           = 22,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_1_0           = 23,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_2_0           = 24,
+  VID_CISCO_UNITY               = 25,
+  VID_CISCO3K                   = 26,
+  VID_CISCO_IOS                 = 27,
+  VID_TIMESTEP                  = 28,
+  VID_SAFENET                   = 29,
+  VID_MACOSX                    = 30,
+  VID_NCP_SERVER                = 31,
+  VID_NCP_CLIENT                = 32,
+  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP              = 33,
+  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP2             = 34,
+  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP3             = 35,
 
-  VID_STRONGSWAN		= 37,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_0		= 38,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_1		= 39,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_2		= 40,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_0		= 41,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_1		= 42,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_2		= 43,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_0		= 44,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_1		= 45,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_2		= 46,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_3		= 47,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_4		= 48,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_0		= 49,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_1		= 50,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_2		= 51,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_3		= 52,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_4		= 53,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_5		= 54,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_6		= 55,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_7		= 56,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_0		= 57,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_1		= 58,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_2		= 59,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_3		= 60,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_4		= 61,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_0		= 62,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_1		= 63,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_2		= 64,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_3		= 65,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_0		= 66,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_1		= 67,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_2		= 68,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_3		= 69,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_4		= 70,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_5		= 71,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_6		= 72,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_7		= 73,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_8		= 74,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_9		= 75,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN                = 37,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_0          = 38,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_1          = 39,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_2          = 40,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_0          = 41,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_1          = 42,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_2          = 43,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_0          = 44,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_1          = 45,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_2          = 46,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_3          = 47,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_4          = 48,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_0          = 49,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_1          = 50,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_2          = 51,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_3          = 52,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_4          = 53,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_5          = 54,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_6          = 55,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_7          = 56,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_0          = 57,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_1          = 58,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_2          = 59,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_3          = 60,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_4          = 61,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_0          = 62,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_1          = 63,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_2          = 64,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_3          = 65,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_0          = 66,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_1          = 67,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_2          = 68,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_3          = 69,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_4          = 70,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_5          = 71,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_6          = 72,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_7          = 73,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_8          = 74,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_9          = 75,
 
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_0		= 80,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_1		= 81,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_2		= 82,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_3		= 83,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_4		= 84,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_5		= 85,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_6		= 86,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_7		= 87,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_0		= 88,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_1		= 89,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_2		= 90,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_3		= 91,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_4		= 92,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_5		= 93,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_6		= 94,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_7		= 95,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_8		= 96,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_9		= 97,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_10		= 98,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_11		= 99,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_0          = 80,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_1          = 81,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_2          = 82,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_3          = 83,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_4          = 84,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_5          = 85,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_6          = 86,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_7          = 87,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_0          = 88,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_1          = 89,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_2          = 90,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_3          = 91,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_4          = 92,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_5          = 93,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_6          = 94,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_7          = 95,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_8          = 96,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_9          = 97,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_10         = 98,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_11         = 99,
 
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_0		=100,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_1		=101,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_2		=102,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_3		=103,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_4		=104,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_5		=105,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_6		=106,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_7		=107,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_8		=108,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_9		=109,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_10		=110,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_11		=111,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_12		=112,
-  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_13		=113,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_0          =100,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_1          =101,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_2          =102,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_3          =103,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_4          =104,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_5          =105,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_6          =106,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_7          =107,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_8          =108,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_9          =109,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_10         =110,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_11         =111,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_12         =112,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_13         =113,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_14         =114,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_2_15         =115,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_3_0          =116,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_3_1          =117,
 
   /* 101 - 200 : NAT-Traversal */
-  VID_NATT_STENBERG_01		=151,
-  VID_NATT_STENBERG_02		=152,
-  VID_NATT_HUTTUNEN		=153,
-  VID_NATT_HUTTUNEN_ESPINUDP	=154,
-  VID_NATT_IETF_00		=155,
-  VID_NATT_IETF_02_N		=156,
-  VID_NATT_IETF_02		=157,
-  VID_NATT_IETF_03		=158,
-  VID_NATT_RFC			=159,
+  VID_NATT_STENBERG_01          =151,
+  VID_NATT_STENBERG_02          =152,
+  VID_NATT_HUTTUNEN             =153,
+  VID_NATT_HUTTUNEN_ESPINUDP    =154,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_00              =155,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_02_N            =156,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_02              =157,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_03              =158,
+  VID_NATT_RFC                  =159,
 
   /* 201 - 300 : Misc */
-  VID_MISC_XAUTH		=201,
-  VID_MISC_DPD			=202,
-  VID_MISC_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY	=203,
-  VID_MISC_FRAGMENTATION	=204,
-  VID_INITIAL_CONTACT		=205,
-  VID_CISCO3K_FRAGMENTATION	=206
+  VID_MISC_XAUTH                =201,
+  VID_MISC_DPD                  =202,
+  VID_MISC_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY     =203,
+  VID_MISC_FRAGMENTATION        =204,
+  VID_INITIAL_CONTACT           =205,
+  VID_CISCO3K_FRAGMENTATION     =206
 };
 
 void init_vendorid(void);
+void free_vendorid(void);
 
 struct msg_digest;
 void handle_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md, const char *vid, size_t len);
diff --git a/src/pluto/virtual.c b/src/pluto/virtual.c
index 4a81ee283..2067bde01 100644
--- a/src/pluto/virtual.c
+++ b/src/pluto/virtual.c
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: virtual.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
@@ -35,9 +33,9 @@
 #define F_VIRTUAL_HOST        32
 
 struct virtual_t {
-    unsigned short flags;
-    unsigned short n_net;
-    ip_subnet net[0];
+	unsigned short flags;
+	unsigned short n_net;
+	ip_subnet net[0];
 };
 
 static ip_subnet *private_net_ok=NULL, *private_net_ko=NULL;
@@ -49,123 +47,119 @@ static unsigned short private_net_ok_len=0, private_net_ko_len=0;
  */
 static bool
 _read_subnet(const char *src, size_t len, ip_subnet *dst, ip_subnet *dstko,
-    bool *isok)
+	bool *isok)
 {
-    bool ok;
-    int af;
-
-    if ((len > 4) && (strncmp(src, "%v4:", 4)==0))
-    {
-	af = AF_INET;
-    }
-    else if ((len > 4) && (strncmp(src, "%v6:", 4)==0))
-    {
-	af = AF_INET6;
-    }
-    else
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
+	bool ok;
+	int af;
+
+	if ((len > 4) && (strneq(src, "%v4:", 4)))
+	{
+		af = AF_INET;
+	}
+	else if ((len > 4) && (strneq(src, "%v6:", 4)))
+	{
+		af = AF_INET6;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    ok = (src[4] != '!');
-    src += ok ? 4 : 5;
-    len -= ok ? 4 : 5;
+	ok = (src[4] != '!');
+	src += ok ? 4 : 5;
+	len -= ok ? 4 : 5;
 
-    if (!len)
-	return FALSE;
-    if (!ok && !dstko)
-	return FALSE;
+	if (!len)
+		return FALSE;
+	if (!ok && !dstko)
+		return FALSE;
 
-    passert ( ((ok)?(dst):(dstko))!=NULL );
+	passert ( ((ok)?(dst):(dstko))!=NULL );
 
-    if (ttosubnet(src, len, af, ((ok)?(dst):(dstko))))
-    {
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-    if (isok)
-	*isok = ok;
-    return TRUE;
+	if (ttosubnet(src, len, af, ((ok)?(dst):(dstko))))
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (isok)
+		*isok = ok;
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 void
 init_virtual_ip(const char *private_list)
 {
-    const char *next, *str=private_list;
-    unsigned short ign = 0, i_ok, i_ko;
-    ip_subnet sub;
-    bool ok;
-
-    /** Count **/
-    private_net_ok_len=0;
-    private_net_ko_len=0;
-
-    while (str)
-    {
-	next = strchr(str,',');
-	if (!next)
-	    next = str + strlen(str);
-	if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &sub, &sub, &ok))
-	    if (ok)
-		private_net_ok_len++;
-	    else
-		private_net_ko_len++;
-	else
-	    ign++;
-	str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
-    }
-
-    if (!ign)
-    {
-	/** Allocate **/
-	if (private_net_ok_len)
-	{
-	    private_net_ok = (ip_subnet *)alloc_bytes(
-		(private_net_ok_len*sizeof(ip_subnet)),
-		"private_net_ok subnets");
-	}
-	if (private_net_ko_len)
-	{
-	    private_net_ko = (ip_subnet *)alloc_bytes(
-		(private_net_ko_len*sizeof(ip_subnet)),
-		"private_net_ko subnets");
-	}
-	if ((private_net_ok_len && !private_net_ok)
-	||  (private_net_ko_len && !private_net_ko))
-	{
-	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-		"can't alloc in init_virtual_ip");
-	    pfreeany(private_net_ok);
-	    private_net_ok = NULL;
-	    pfreeany(private_net_ko);
-	    private_net_ko = NULL;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    /** Fill **/
-	    str = private_list;
-	    i_ok = 0;
-	    i_ko = 0;
+	const char *next, *str=private_list;
+	unsigned short ign = 0, i_ok, i_ko;
+	ip_subnet sub;
+	bool ok;
 
-	    while (str)
-	    {
+	/** Count **/
+	private_net_ok_len=0;
+	private_net_ko_len=0;
+
+	while (str)
+	{
 		next = strchr(str,',');
 		if (!next)
-		    next = str + strlen(str);
-		if (_read_subnet(str, next-str,
-		   &(private_net_ok[i_ok]), &(private_net_ko[i_ko]), &ok))
+			next = str + strlen(str);
+		if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &sub, &sub, &ok))
+			if (ok)
+				private_net_ok_len++;
+			else
+				private_net_ko_len++;
+		else
+			ign++;
+		str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (!ign)
+	{
+		/** Allocate **/
+		if (private_net_ok_len)
 		{
-		    if (ok)
-			i_ok++;
-		    else
-			i_ko++;
+			private_net_ok = (ip_subnet *)malloc(private_net_ok_len * sizeof(ip_subnet));
+		}
+		if (private_net_ko_len)
+		{
+			private_net_ko = (ip_subnet *)malloc(private_net_ko_len * sizeof(ip_subnet));
+		}
+		if ((private_net_ok_len && !private_net_ok)
+		||  (private_net_ko_len && !private_net_ko))
+		{
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+				"can't alloc in init_virtual_ip");
+			free(private_net_ok);
+			private_net_ok = NULL;
+			free(private_net_ko);
+			private_net_ko = NULL;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			/** Fill **/
+			str = private_list;
+			i_ok = 0;
+			i_ko = 0;
+
+			while (str)
+			{
+				next = strchr(str,',');
+				if (!next)
+					next = str + strlen(str);
+				if (_read_subnet(str, next-str,
+				   &(private_net_ok[i_ok]), &(private_net_ko[i_ko]), &ok))
+				{
+					if (ok)
+						i_ok++;
+					else
+						i_ko++;
+				}
+				str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+			}
 		}
-		str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
-	    }
 	}
-    }
-    else
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
-	    "%d bad entries in virtual_private - none loaded", ign);
+	else
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+			"%d bad entries in virtual_private - none loaded", ign);
 }
 
 /**
@@ -188,147 +182,146 @@ init_virtual_ip(const char *private_list)
 struct virtual_t
 *create_virtual(const struct connection *c, const char *string)
 {
-    unsigned short flags=0, n_net=0, i;
-    const char *str = string, *next, *first_net=NULL;
-    ip_subnet sub;
-    struct virtual_t *v;
+	unsigned short flags=0, n_net=0, i;
+	const char *str = string, *next, *first_net=NULL;
+	ip_subnet sub;
+	struct virtual_t *v;
 
-    if (!string || string[0] == '\0')
-	return NULL;
+	if (!string || string[0] == '\0')
+		return NULL;
 
-    if (strlen(string) >= 6 && strncmp(string,"vhost:",6) == 0)
-    {
-	flags |= F_VIRTUAL_HOST;
-	str += 6;
-    }
-    else if (strlen(string) >= 5 && strncmp(string,"vnet:",5) == 0)
-	str += 5;
-    else
-	goto fail;
-
-    /**
-     * Parse string : fill flags & count subnets
-     */
-    while ((str) && (*str))
-    {
-	next = strchr(str,',');
-	if (!next) next = str + strlen(str);
-	if (next-str == 3 && strncmp(str, "%no", 3) == 0)
-	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_NO;
-#if 0
-	else if (next-str == 4 && strncmp(str, "%ike", 4) == 0)
-	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_IKE_CONFIG;
-	else if (next-str == 5 && strncmp(str, "%dhcp", 5) == 0)
-	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_DHCP;
-#endif
-	else if (next-str == 5 && strncmp(str, "%priv", 5) == 0)
-	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE;
-	else if (next-str == 4 && strncmp(str, "%all", 4) == 0)
-	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_ALL;
-	else if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &sub, NULL, NULL))
+	if (strlen(string) >= 6 && strneq(string,"vhost:",6))
 	{
-	    n_net++;
-	    if (!first_net)
-		first_net = str;
+		flags |= F_VIRTUAL_HOST;
+		str += 6;
 	}
+	else if (strlen(string) >= 5 && strneq(string,"vnet:",5))
+		str += 5;
 	else
-	    goto fail;
-	
-	str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
-    }
-
-    v = (struct virtual_t *)alloc_bytes(
-	sizeof(struct virtual_t) + (n_net*sizeof(ip_subnet)),
-	"virtual description");
-    if (!v) goto fail;
-
-    v->flags = flags;
-    v->n_net = n_net;
-    if (n_net && first_net)
-    {
+		goto fail;
+
 	/**
-	 * Save subnets in newly allocated struct
+	 * Parse string : fill flags & count subnets
 	 */
-	for (str = first_net, i = 0; str && *str; )
+	while ((str) && (*str))
 	{
-	    next = strchr(str,',');
-	    if (!next) next = str + strlen(str);
-	    if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &(v->net[i]), NULL, NULL))
-		i++;
-	    str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+		next = strchr(str,',');
+		if (!next) next = str + strlen(str);
+		if (next-str == 3 && strneq(str, "%no", 3))
+			flags |= F_VIRTUAL_NO;
+#if 0
+		else if (next-str == 4 && strneq(str, "%ike", 4))
+			flags |= F_VIRTUAL_IKE_CONFIG;
+		else if (next-str == 5 && strneq(str, "%dhcp", 5))
+			flags |= F_VIRTUAL_DHCP;
+#endif
+		else if (next-str == 5 && strneq(str, "%priv", 5))
+			flags |= F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE;
+		else if (next-str == 4 && strneq(str, "%all", 4))
+			flags |= F_VIRTUAL_ALL;
+		else if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &sub, NULL, NULL))
+		{
+			n_net++;
+			if (!first_net)
+				first_net = str;
+		}
+		else
+			goto fail;
+		
+		str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
 	}
-    }
 
-    return v;
+	v = (struct virtual_t *)malloc(sizeof(struct virtual_t) +
+								  (n_net * sizeof(ip_subnet)));
+	if (!v) goto fail;
+
+	v->flags = flags;
+	v->n_net = n_net;
+	if (n_net && first_net)
+	{
+		/**
+		 * Save subnets in newly allocated struct
+		 */
+		for (str = first_net, i = 0; str && *str; )
+		{
+			next = strchr(str,',');
+			if (!next) next = str + strlen(str);
+			if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &(v->net[i]), NULL, NULL))
+				i++;
+			str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return v;
 
 fail:
-    plog("invalid virtual string [%s] - "
-	"virtual selection disabled for connection '%s'", string, c->name);
-    return NULL;
+	plog("invalid virtual string [%s] - "
+		"virtual selection disabled for connection '%s'", string, c->name);
+	return NULL;
 }
 
 bool
 is_virtual_end(const struct end *that)
 {
-    return ((that->virt)?TRUE:FALSE);
+	return ((that->virt)?TRUE:FALSE);
 }
 
 bool
 is_virtual_connection(const struct connection *c)
 {
-    return ((c->spd.that.virt)?TRUE:FALSE);
+	return ((c->spd.that.virt)?TRUE:FALSE);
 }
 
 static bool
 net_in_list(const ip_subnet *peer_net, const ip_subnet *list,
-    unsigned short len)
+	unsigned short len)
 {
-    unsigned short i;
+	unsigned short i;
 
-    if (!list || !len)
-	return FALSE;
+	if (!list || !len)
+		return FALSE;
 
-    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
-    {
-	if (subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &(list[i])))
-	    return TRUE;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+	{
+		if (subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &(list[i])))
+			return TRUE;
+	}
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
 bool
 is_virtual_net_allowed(const struct connection *c, const ip_subnet *peer_net,
-	const ip_address *his_addr)
+		const ip_address *his_addr)
 {
-    if (c->spd.that.virt == NULL)
-	return FALSE;
+	if (c->spd.that.virt == NULL)
+		return FALSE;
 
-    if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_HOST)
-    &&  !subnetishost(peer_net))
-	return FALSE;
+	if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_HOST)
+	&&  !subnetishost(peer_net))
+		return FALSE;
 
-    if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_NO)
-    &&  subnetishost(peer_net) &&  addrinsubnet(his_addr, peer_net))
-	return TRUE;
+	if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_NO)
+	&&  subnetishost(peer_net) &&  addrinsubnet(his_addr, peer_net))
+		return TRUE;
 
-    if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE)
-    &&   net_in_list(peer_net, private_net_ok, private_net_ok_len)
-    &&  !net_in_list(peer_net, private_net_ko, private_net_ko_len))
-	return TRUE;
+	if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE)
+	&&   net_in_list(peer_net, private_net_ok, private_net_ok_len)
+	&&  !net_in_list(peer_net, private_net_ko, private_net_ko_len))
+		return TRUE;
 
-    if (c->spd.that.virt->n_net
-    &&  net_in_list(peer_net, c->spd.that.virt->net, c->spd.that.virt->n_net))
-	return TRUE;
-    
-    if (c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_ALL)
-    {
-	/** %all must only be used for testing - log it **/
-	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Warning - "
-	    "v%s:%%all must only be used for testing",
-	    (c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_HOST) ? "host" : "net");
-	return TRUE;
-    }
+	if (c->spd.that.virt->n_net
+	&&  net_in_list(peer_net, c->spd.that.virt->net, c->spd.that.virt->n_net))
+		return TRUE;
+	
+	if (c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_ALL)
+	{
+		/** %all must only be used for testing - log it **/
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Warning - "
+			"v%s:%%all must only be used for testing",
+			(c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_HOST) ? "host" : "net");
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-    return FALSE;
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/virtual.h b/src/pluto/virtual.h
index 9fe9bdd8d..e64407c81 100644
--- a/src/pluto/virtual.h
+++ b/src/pluto/virtual.h
@@ -10,8 +10,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: virtual.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _VIRTUAL_IP_H
@@ -20,12 +18,12 @@
 extern void init_virtual_ip(const char *private_list);
 
 extern struct virtual_t *create_virtual(const struct connection *c,
-    const char *string);
+	const char *string);
 
 extern bool is_virtual_end(const struct end *that);
 extern bool is_virtual_connection(const struct connection *c);
 extern bool is_virtual_net_allowed(const struct connection *c,
-    const ip_subnet *peer_net, const ip_address *his_addr);
+	const ip_subnet *peer_net, const ip_address *his_addr);
 
 #endif /* _VIRTUAL_IP_H */
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/x509.c b/src/pluto/x509.c
index c61de6edc..0953f18f5 100644
--- a/src/pluto/x509.c
+++ b/src/pluto/x509.c
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2000 Andreas Hess, Patric Lichtsteiner, Roger Wegmann
  * Copyright (C) 2001 Marco Bertossa, Andreas Schleiss
  * Copyright (C) 2002 Mario Strasser
- * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -13,8 +13,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: x509.c 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -26,16 +24,16 @@
 #include <sys/types.h>
 
 #include <freeswan.h>
-#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include <asn1/asn1.h>
+#include <asn1/asn1_parser.h>
+#include <asn1/oid.h>
+#include <crypto/hashers/hasher.h>
 
 #include "constants.h"
 #include "defs.h"
-#include "mp_defs.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "id.h"
-#include "asn1.h"
-#include <asn1/oid.h>
-#include "pkcs1.h"
 #include "x509.h"
 #include "crl.h"
 #include "ca.h"
@@ -44,298 +42,243 @@
 #include "whack.h"
 #include "fetch.h"
 #include "ocsp.h"
-#include "sha1.h"
-
-/* chained lists of X.509 end certificates */
 
+/**
+ * Chained lists of X.509 end certificates
+ */
 static x509cert_t *x509certs     = NULL;
 
-/* ASN.1 definition of a basicConstraints extension */
-
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of a basicConstraints extension 
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t basicConstraintsObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "basicConstraints",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "CA",				ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,   "pathLenConstraint",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  3 */
+	{ 0, "basicConstraints",	ASN1_SEQUENCE, ASN1_NONE          }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "CA",				ASN1_BOOLEAN,  ASN1_DEF|ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+	{ 1,   "pathLenConstraint",	ASN1_INTEGER,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,      ASN1_END           }, /*  3 */
+	{ 0, "exit",				ASN1_EOC,      ASN1_EXIT          }
 };
-
 #define BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA	1
-#define BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_ROOF	4
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of time */
 
-static const asn1Object_t timeObjects[] = {
-  { 0,   "utcTime",			ASN1_UTCTIME,         ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
-  { 0,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  1 */
-  { 0,   "generalizeTime",		ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_OPT |
-							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 0,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }  /*  3 */
-};
-
-#define TIME_UTC		0
-#define TIME_GENERALIZED	2
-#define TIME_ROOF		4
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of a keyIdentifier */
-
-static const asn1Object_t keyIdentifierObjects[] = {
-  { 0,   "keyIdentifier",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }  /*  0 */
-};
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of a authorityKeyIdentifier extension */
-
-static const asn1Object_t authorityKeyIdentifierObjects[] = {
-  { 0,   "authorityKeyIdentifier",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,     "keyIdentifier",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
-  { 1,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
-  { 1,     "authorityCertIssuer",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  3 */
-  { 1,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  4 */
-  { 1,     "authorityCertSerialNumber",	ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
-  { 1,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  6 */
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of a authorityKeyIdentifier extension 
+ */
+static const asn1Object_t authKeyIdentifierObjects[] = {
+	{ 0, "authorityKeyIdentifier",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,	  ASN1_NONE          }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "keyIdentifier",				ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0, ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY }, /* 1 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,		  ASN1_END           }, /* 2 */
+	{ 1,   "authorityCertIssuer",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1, ASN1_OPT|ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 3 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,		  ASN1_END           }, /* 4 */
+	{ 1,   "authorityCertSerialNumber",	ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2, ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY }, /* 5 */
+	{ 1,   "end opt",					ASN1_EOC,		  ASN1_END           }, /* 6 */
+	{ 0, "exit",						ASN1_EOC,		  ASN1_EXIT          }
 };
-
-#define AUTH_KEY_ID_KEY_ID		1
+#define AUTH_KEY_ID_KEY_ID			1
 #define AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_ISSUER		3
 #define AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_SERIAL		5
-#define AUTH_KEY_ID_ROOF		7
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of a authorityInfoAccess extension */
 
-static const asn1Object_t authorityInfoAccessObjects[] = {
-  { 0,   "authorityInfoAccess",         ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,     "accessDescription",         ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,       "accessMethod",            ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 2,       "accessLocation",          ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  3 */
-  { 0,   "end loop",                    ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  4 */
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of a authorityInfoAccess extension 
+ */
+static const asn1Object_t authInfoAccessObjects[] = {
+	{ 0, "authorityInfoAccess",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,	ASN1_LOOP }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "accessDescription",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,	ASN1_NONE }, /* 1 */
+	{ 2,     "accessMethod",	ASN1_OID,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 2 */
+	{ 2,     "accessLocation",	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /* 3 */
+	{ 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_END  }, /* 4 */
+	{ 0, "exit",				ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_EXIT }
 };
-
 #define AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_METHOD		2
 #define AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION	3
-#define AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_ROOF		5
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of a extendedKeyUsage extension */
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of a extendedKeyUsage extension
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t extendedKeyUsageObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "extendedKeyUsage",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "keyPurposeID",		ASN1_OID,     	   ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
-  { 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,	   ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
+	{ 0, "extendedKeyUsage",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,	ASN1_LOOP }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "keyPurposeID",		ASN1_OID,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 1 */
+	{ 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_END  }, /* 2 */
+	{ 0, "exit",				ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_EXIT }
 };
-
 #define EXT_KEY_USAGE_PURPOSE_ID	1
-#define EXT_KEY_USAGE_ROOF		3
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of generalNames */
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of generalNames 
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t generalNamesObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "generalNames",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "generalName",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  1 */
-  { 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  2 */
+	{ 0, "generalNames",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,	ASN1_LOOP }, /* 0 */
+	{ 1,   "generalName",	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /* 1 */
+	{ 0, "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_END  }, /* 2 */
+	{ 0, "exit",			ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_EXIT }
 };
-
 #define GENERAL_NAMES_GN	1
-#define GENERAL_NAMES_ROOF	3
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of generalName */
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of generalName 
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t generalNameObjects[] = {
-  { 0,   "otherName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  1 */
-  { 0,   "rfc822Name",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_1,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  3 */
-  { 0,   "dnsName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  5 */
-  { 0,   "x400Address",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_3,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
-  { 0,   "directoryName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
-  { 0,   "ediPartyName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_5,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
-  { 0,   "uniformResourceIdentifier",	ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 13 */
-  { 0,   "ipAddress",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_7,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 15 */
-  { 0,   "registeredID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_8,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
-  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /* 17 */
+	{ 0, "otherName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  0 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /*  1 */
+	{ 0, "rfc822Name",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_1,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  2 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END 			}, /*  3 */
+	{ 0, "dnsName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  4 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /*  5 */
+	{ 0, "x400Address",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_3,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  6 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /*  7 */
+	{ 0, "directoryName",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  8 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /*  9 */
+	{ 0, "ediPartyName",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_5,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /* 10 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /* 11 */
+	{ 0, "URI",				ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /* 12 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /* 13 */
+	{ 0, "ipAddress",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_7,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /* 14 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /* 15 */
+	{ 0, "registeredID",	ASN1_CONTEXT_S_8,  ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /* 16 */
+	{ 0, "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END				}, /* 17 */
+	{ 0, "exit",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_EXIT			}
 };
-
-#define GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME	 0
-#define GN_OBJ_RFC822_NAME	 2
-#define GN_OBJ_DNS_NAME		 4
-#define GN_OBJ_X400_ADDRESS	 6
+#define GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME	 	 0
+#define GN_OBJ_RFC822_NAME	 	 2
+#define GN_OBJ_DNS_NAME		 	 4
+#define GN_OBJ_X400_ADDRESS	 	 6
 #define GN_OBJ_DIRECTORY_NAME	 8
 #define GN_OBJ_EDI_PARTY_NAME	10
-#define GN_OBJ_URI		12
-#define GN_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS	14
+#define GN_OBJ_URI				12
+#define GN_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS		14
 #define GN_OBJ_REGISTERED_ID	16
-#define GN_OBJ_ROOF		18
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of otherName */
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of otherName 
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t otherNameObjects[] = {
-  {0, "type-id",			ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
-  {0, "value",				ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_BODY }  /*  1 */
+	{0, "type-id",	ASN1_OID,			ASN1_BODY	}, /* 0 */
+	{0, "value",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	ASN1_BODY	}, /* 1 */
+	{0, "exit",		ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_EXIT	}
 };
-
 #define ON_OBJ_ID_TYPE		0
 #define ON_OBJ_VALUE		1
-#define ON_OBJ_ROOF		2
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of crlDistributionPoints */
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of crlDistributionPoints
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t crlDistributionPointsObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "crlDistributionPoints",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "DistributionPoint",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,     "distributionPoint",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
-  { 3,       "fullName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  3 */
-  { 3,       "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  4 */
-  { 3,       "nameRelativeToCRLIssuer",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
-  { 3,       "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  6 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
-  { 2,     "reasons",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
-  { 2,     "crlIssuer",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,  ASN1_OPT |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
-  { 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 12 */
+	{ 0, "crlDistributionPoints",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_LOOP			}, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "DistributionPoint",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_NONE			}, /*  1 */
+	{ 2,     "distributionPoint",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	ASN1_OPT|ASN1_LOOP	}, /*  2 */
+	{ 3,       "fullName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,	ASN1_OPT|ASN1_OBJ	}, /*  3 */
+	{ 3,       "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END			}, /*  4 */
+	{ 3,       "nameRelToCRLIssuer",ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,	ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  5 */
+	{ 3,       "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END			}, /*  6 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END			}, /*  7 */
+	{ 2,     "reasons",				ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,	ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /*  8 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END			}, /*  9 */
+	{ 2,     "crlIssuer",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,	ASN1_OPT|ASN1_BODY	}, /* 10 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END			}, /* 11 */
+	{ 0, "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_END			}, /* 12 */
+	{ 0, "exit",					ASN1_EOC,			ASN1_EXIT			}
 };
-
 #define CRL_DIST_POINTS_FULLNAME	 3
-#define CRL_DIST_POINTS_ROOF		13
-
-/* ASN.1 definition of an X.509v3 certificate */
 
+/**
+ * ASN.1 definition of an X.509v3 x509_cert
+ */
 static const asn1Object_t certObjects[] = {
-  { 0, "certificate",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
-  { 1,   "tbsCertificate",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
-  { 2,     "DEFAULT v1",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_DEF  }, /*  2 */
-  { 3,       "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
-  { 2,     "serialNumber",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
-  { 2,     "signature",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  5 */
-  { 2,     "issuer",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  6 */
-  { 2,     "validity",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  7 */
-  { 3,       "notBefore",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  8 */
-  { 3,       "notAfter",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  9 */
-  { 2,     "subject",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
-  { 2,     "subjectPublicKeyInfo",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 11 */
-  { 3,       "algorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 12 */
-  { 3,       "subjectPublicKey",	ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
-  { 4,         "RSAPublicKey",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 14 */
-  { 5,           "modulus",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
-  { 5,           "publicExponent",	ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
-  { 2,     "issuerUniqueID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 17 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
-  { 2,     "subjectUniqueID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 19 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
-  { 2,     "optional extensions",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 21 */
-  { 3,       "extensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 22 */
-  { 4,         "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 23 */
-  { 5,           "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
-  { 5,           "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
-							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
-  { 5,           "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 26 */
-  { 3,       "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 27 */
-  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 28 */
-  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 29 */
-  { 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_BODY }  /* 30 */
+	{ 0, "x509",					ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /*  0 */
+	{ 1,   "tbsCertificate",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /*  1 */
+	{ 2,     "DEFAULT v1",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_DEF           }, /*  2 */
+	{ 3,       "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY          }, /*  3 */
+	{ 2,     "serialNumber",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY          }, /*  4 */
+	{ 2,     "signature",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /*  5 */
+	{ 2,     "issuer",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /*  6 */
+	{ 2,     "validity",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE          }, /*  7 */
+	{ 3,       "notBefore",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /*  8 */
+	{ 3,       "notAfter",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /*  9 */
+	{ 2,     "subject",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ           }, /* 10 */
+	{ 2,     "subjectPublicKeyInfo",ASN1_SEQUENCE,	   ASN1_RAW           }, /* 11 */
+	{ 2,     "issuerUniqueID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT           }, /* 12 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 13 */
+	{ 2,     "subjectUniqueID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,  ASN1_OPT           }, /* 14 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 15 */
+	{ 2,     "optional extensions",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3,  ASN1_OPT           }, /* 16 */
+	{ 3,       "extensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP          }, /* 17 */
+	{ 4,         "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE          }, /* 18 */
+	{ 5,           "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY          }, /* 19 */
+	{ 5,           "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF|ASN1_BODY }, /* 20 */
+	{ 5,           "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY          }, /* 21 */
+	{ 3,       "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 22 */
+	{ 2,     "end opt",				ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END           }, /* 23 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW           }, /* 24 */
+	{ 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_BODY          }, /* 25 */
+	{ 0, "exit",					ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_EXIT          }
 };
-
-#define X509_OBJ_CERTIFICATE			 0
-#define X509_OBJ_TBS_CERTIFICATE		 1
-#define X509_OBJ_VERSION			 3
-#define X509_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER			 4
-#define X509_OBJ_SIG_ALG			 5
-#define X509_OBJ_ISSUER 			 6
-#define X509_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE			 8
-#define X509_OBJ_NOT_AFTER			 9
-#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT			10
-#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM	12
-#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY		13
-#define X509_OBJ_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY			14
-#define X509_OBJ_MODULUS			15
-#define X509_OBJ_PUBLIC_EXPONENT		16
-#define X509_OBJ_EXTN_ID			24
-#define X509_OBJ_CRITICAL			25
-#define X509_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE			26
-#define X509_OBJ_ALGORITHM			29
-#define X509_OBJ_SIGNATURE			30
-#define X509_OBJ_ROOF				31
-
+#define X509_OBJ_CERTIFICATE                     0
+#define X509_OBJ_TBS_CERTIFICATE                 1
+#define X509_OBJ_VERSION                         3
+#define X509_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER                   4
+#define X509_OBJ_SIG_ALG                         5
+#define X509_OBJ_ISSUER                          6
+#define X509_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE                      8
+#define X509_OBJ_NOT_AFTER                       9
+#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT                        10
+#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO        11
+#define X509_OBJ_EXTN_ID                        19
+#define X509_OBJ_CRITICAL                       20
+#define X509_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE                     21
+#define X509_OBJ_ALGORITHM                      24
+#define X509_OBJ_SIGNATURE                      25
 
 const x509cert_t empty_x509cert = {
-      NULL        , /* *next */
-    UNDEFINED_TIME, /* installed */
-            0     , /* count */
-      FALSE       , /* smartcard */
-     AUTH_NONE    , /* authority_flags */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /* certificate */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*   tbsCertificate */
-            1	  , /*     version */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     serialNumber */
-    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*     sigAlg */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     issuer */
-                    /*     validity */
-            0     , /*       notBefore */
-            0     , /*       notAfter */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     subject */
-                    /*     subjectPublicKeyInfo */
-    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*       subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*       subjectPublicKey */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*         modulus */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*         publicExponent */
-                    /*     issuerUniqueID */
-                    /*     subjectUniqueID */
-                    /*     extensions */
-                    /*       extension */
-                    /*         extnID */
-                    /*         critical */
-                    /*         extnValue */
-      FALSE       , /*           isCA */
-      FALSE       , /*           isOcspSigner */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           subjectKeyID */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeyID */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeySerialNumber */
-    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           accessLocation */
-      NULL        , /*           subjectAltName */
-      NULL        , /*           crlDistributionPoints */
-    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*   algorithm */
-    { NULL, 0 }     /*   signature */
+	  NULL        , /* *next */
+	UNDEFINED_TIME, /* installed */
+			0     , /* count */
+	  FALSE       , /* smartcard */
+	 AUTH_NONE    , /* authority_flags */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /* certificate */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*   tbsCertificate */
+			1     , /*     version */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*     serialNumber */
+	OID_UNKNOWN   , /*     sigAlg */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*     issuer */
+					/*     validity */
+			0     , /*       notBefore */
+			0     , /*       notAfter */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*     subject */
+	  NULL        , /*     public_key */
+					/*     issuerUniqueID */
+					/*     subjectUniqueID */
+					/*     extensions */
+					/*       extension */
+					/*         extnID */
+					/*         critical */
+					/*         extnValue */
+	  FALSE       , /*           isCA */
+	  FALSE       , /*           isOcspSigner */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           subjectKeyID */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeyID */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeySerialNumber */
+	{ NULL, 0 }   , /*           accessLocation */
+	  NULL        , /*           subjectAltName */
+	  NULL        , /*           crlDistributionPoints */
+	OID_UNKNOWN   , /*   algorithm */
+	{ NULL, 0 }     /*   signature */
 };
 
 /* coding of X.501 distinguished name */
 
 typedef struct {
-    const u_char *name;
-    chunk_t oid;
-    u_char type;
+	const u_char *name;
+	chunk_t oid;
+	u_char type;
 } x501rdn_t;
 
 /* X.501 acronyms for well known object identifiers (OIDs) */
 
 static u_char oid_ND[]  = {0x02, 0x82, 0x06, 0x01,
-			   0x0A, 0x07, 0x14};
+						   0x0A, 0x07, 0x14};
 static u_char oid_UID[] = {0x09, 0x92, 0x26, 0x89, 0x93,
-			   0xF2, 0x2C, 0x64, 0x01, 0x01};
+						   0xF2, 0x2C, 0x64, 0x01, 0x01};
 static u_char oid_DC[]  = {0x09, 0x92, 0x26, 0x89, 0x93,
-			   0xF2, 0x2C, 0x64, 0x01, 0x19};
+						   0xF2, 0x2C, 0x64, 0x01, 0x19};
 static u_char oid_CN[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x03};
 static u_char oid_S[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x04};
 static u_char oid_SN[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x05};
@@ -351,13 +294,13 @@ static u_char oid_G[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x2A};
 static u_char oid_I[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x2B};
 static u_char oid_ID[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x2D};
 static u_char oid_EN[]  = {0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x86,
-			   0xF8, 0x42, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03};
+						   0xF8, 0x42, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03};
 static u_char oid_E[]   = {0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7,
-			   0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01};
+						   0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01};
 static u_char oid_UN[]  = {0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7,
-			   0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x02};
+						   0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x02};
 static u_char oid_TCGID[] = {0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x89,
-			     0x31, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x4B};
+							 0x31, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x4B};
 
 static const x501rdn_t x501rdns[] = {
   {"ND"              , {oid_ND,     7}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
@@ -391,1850 +334,1804 @@ static const x501rdn_t x501rdns[] = {
 #define X501_RDN_ROOF   26
 
 static u_char ASN1_subjectAltName_oid_str[] = {
-    0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x11
+	0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x11
 };
 
-static const chunk_t ASN1_subjectAltName_oid = strchunk(ASN1_subjectAltName_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_subjectAltName_oid = chunk_from_buf(ASN1_subjectAltName_oid_str);
 
-static void
-update_chunk(chunk_t *ch, int n)
+static void update_chunk(chunk_t *ch, int n)
 {
-    n = (n > -1 && n < (int)ch->len)? n : (int)ch->len-1;
-    ch->ptr += n; ch->len -= n;
+	n = (n > -1 && n < (int)ch->len)? n : (int)ch->len-1;
+	ch->ptr += n; ch->len -= n;
 }
 
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Pointer is set to the first RDN in a DN
  */
-static err_t
-init_rdn(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *rdn, chunk_t *attribute, bool *next)
+static err_t init_rdn(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *rdn, chunk_t *attribute, bool *next)
 {
-    *rdn = empty_chunk;
-    *attribute = empty_chunk;
-
-    /* a DN is a SEQUENCE OF RDNs */
+	*rdn = chunk_empty;
+	*attribute = chunk_empty;
 
-    if (*dn.ptr != ASN1_SEQUENCE)
-    {
-	return "DN is not a SEQUENCE";
-    }
+	/* a DN is a SEQUENCE OF RDNs */
 
-    rdn->len = asn1_length(&dn);
+	if (*dn.ptr != ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+	{
+		return "DN is not a SEQUENCE";
+	}
 
-    if (rdn->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
-	return "Invalid RDN length";
+	rdn->len = asn1_length(&dn);
 
-    rdn->ptr = dn.ptr;
+	if (rdn->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	{
+		return "Invalid RDN length";
+	}
+	rdn->ptr = dn.ptr;
 
-    /* are there any RDNs ? */
-    *next = rdn->len > 0;
+	/* are there any RDNs ? */
+	*next = rdn->len > 0;
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Fetches the next RDN in a DN
  */
-static err_t
-get_next_rdn(chunk_t *rdn, chunk_t * attribute, chunk_t *oid, chunk_t *value
-, asn1_t *type, bool *next)
+static err_t get_next_rdn(chunk_t *rdn, chunk_t * attribute, chunk_t *oid,
+						  chunk_t *value, asn1_t *type, bool *next)
 {
-    chunk_t body;
+	chunk_t body;
 
-    /* initialize return values */
-    *oid   = empty_chunk;
-    *value = empty_chunk;
+	/* initialize return values */
+	*oid   = chunk_empty;
+	*value = chunk_empty;
 
-    /* if all attributes have been parsed, get next rdn */
-    if (attribute->len <= 0)
-    {
-	/* an RDN is a SET OF attributeTypeAndValue */
-	if (*rdn->ptr != ASN1_SET)
-	    return "RDN is not a SET";
-
-	attribute->len = asn1_length(rdn);
-	
-	if (attribute->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
-	    return "Invalid attribute length";
-
-	attribute->ptr = rdn->ptr;
-
-	/* advance to start of next RDN */
-	rdn->ptr += attribute->len;
-	rdn->len -= attribute->len;
-    }
-
-    /* an attributeTypeAndValue is a SEQUENCE */
-    if (*attribute->ptr != ASN1_SEQUENCE)
- 	return "attributeTypeAndValue is not a SEQUENCE";
-
-    /* extract the attribute body */
-    body.len = asn1_length(attribute);
-    
-    if (body.len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
-	return "Invalid attribute body length";
+	/* if all attributes have been parsed, get next rdn */
+	if (attribute->len <= 0)
+	{
+		/* an RDN is a SET OF attributeTypeAndValue */
+		if (*rdn->ptr != ASN1_SET)
+		{
+			return "RDN is not a SET";
+		}
+		attribute->len = asn1_length(rdn);
+		
+		if (attribute->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+		{
+			return "Invalid attribute length";
+		}
+		attribute->ptr = rdn->ptr;
 
-    body.ptr = attribute->ptr;
-    
-    /* advance to start of next attribute */
-    attribute->ptr += body.len;
-    attribute->len -= body.len;
+		/* advance to start of next RDN */
+		rdn->ptr += attribute->len;
+		rdn->len -= attribute->len;
+	}
 
-    /* attribute type is an OID */
-    if (*body.ptr != ASN1_OID)
-	return "attributeType is not an OID";
+	/* an attributeTypeAndValue is a SEQUENCE */
+	if (*attribute->ptr != ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+	{
+		return "attributeTypeAndValue is not a SEQUENCE";
+	}
 
-    /* extract OID */
-    oid->len = asn1_length(&body);
-    
-    if (oid->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
-	return "Invalid attribute OID length";
+	/* extract the attribute body */
+	body.len = asn1_length(attribute);
+	
+	if (body.len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	{
+		return "Invalid attribute body length";
+	}
+	body.ptr = attribute->ptr;
+	
+	/* advance to start of next attribute */
+	attribute->ptr += body.len;
+	attribute->len -= body.len;
 
-    oid->ptr = body.ptr;
+	/* attribute type is an OID */
+	if (*body.ptr != ASN1_OID)
+	{
+		return "attributeType is not an OID";
+	}
 
-    /* advance to the attribute value */
-    body.ptr += oid->len;
-    body.len -= oid->len;
+	/* extract OID */
+	oid->len = asn1_length(&body);
+	
+	if (oid->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)  
+	{
+		return "Invalid attribute OID length";
+	}
+	oid->ptr = body.ptr;
 
-    /* extract string type */
-    *type = *body.ptr;
+	/* advance to the attribute value */
+	body.ptr += oid->len;
+	body.len -= oid->len;
 
-    /* extract string value */
-    value->len = asn1_length(&body);
-    
-    if (value->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
-	return "Invalid attribute string length";
+	/* extract string type */
+	*type = *body.ptr;
 
-    value->ptr = body.ptr;
+	/* extract string value */
+	value->len = asn1_length(&body);
+	
+	if (value->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	{
+		return "Invalid attribute string length";
+	}
+	value->ptr = body.ptr;
 
-    /* are there any RDNs left? */
-    *next = rdn->len > 0 || attribute->len > 0;
+	/* are there any RDNs left? */
+	*next = rdn->len > 0 || attribute->len > 0;
 
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Parses an ASN.1 distinguished name int its OID/value pairs
  */
-static err_t
-dn_parse(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *str)
+static err_t dn_parse(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *str)
 {
-    chunk_t rdn, oid, attribute, value;
-    asn1_t type;
-    int oid_code;
-    bool next;
-    bool first = TRUE;
+	chunk_t rdn, oid, attribute, value;
+	asn1_t type;
+	int oid_code;
+	bool next;
+	bool first = TRUE;
 
-    err_t ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
+	err_t ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
 
-    if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
-        return ugh;
+	if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+	{
+		return ugh;
+	}
 
-    while (next)
-    {
-	ugh = get_next_rdn(&rdn, &attribute, &oid, &value, &type, &next);
+	while (next)
+	{
+		ugh = get_next_rdn(&rdn, &attribute, &oid, &value, &type, &next);
 
-	if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
-	    return ugh;
+		if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+		{
+			return ugh;
+		}
 
-	if (first)		/* first OID/value pair */
-	    first = FALSE;
-	else			/* separate OID/value pair by a comma */
-	    update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,", "));
+		if (first)              /* first OID/value pair */
+		{
+			first = FALSE;
+		}
+		else                    /* separate OID/value pair by a comma */
+		{
+			update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,", "));
+		}
 
-	/* print OID */
-	oid_code = known_oid(oid);
-	if (oid_code == OID_UNKNOWN)	/* OID not found in list */
-	    hex_str(oid, str);
-	else
-	    update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"%s",
-			      oid_names[oid_code].name));
+		/* print OID */
+		oid_code = asn1_known_oid(oid);
+		if (oid_code == OID_UNKNOWN)    /* OID not found in list */
+		{
+			hex_str(oid, str);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"%s",
+							  oid_names[oid_code].name));
+		}
 
-	/* print value */
-	update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"=%.*s",
-			      (int)value.len,value.ptr));
-    }
-    return NULL;
+		/* print value */
+		update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"=%.*s",
+							  (int)value.len,value.ptr));
+	}
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Count the number of wildcard RDNs in a distinguished name
  */
-int
-dn_count_wildcards(chunk_t dn)
+int dn_count_wildcards(chunk_t dn)
 {
-    chunk_t rdn, attribute, oid, value;
-    asn1_t type;
-    bool next;
-    int wildcards = 0;
+	chunk_t rdn, attribute, oid, value;
+	asn1_t type;
+	bool next;
+	int wildcards = 0;
 
-    err_t ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
+	err_t ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
 
-    if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
-        return -1;
+	if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+	{
+		return -1;
+	}
 
-    while (next)
-    {
-	ugh = get_next_rdn(&rdn, &attribute, &oid, &value, &type, &next);
+	while (next)
+	{
+		ugh = get_next_rdn(&rdn, &attribute, &oid, &value, &type, &next);
 
-	if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
-	    return -1;
-	if (value.len == 1 && *value.ptr == '*')
-	    wildcards++; /* we have found a wildcard RDN */
-    }
-    return wildcards;
+		if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+		{
+			return -1;
+		}
+		if (value.len == 1 && *value.ptr == '*')
+		{
+			wildcards++; /* we have found a wildcard RDN */
+		}
+	}
+	return wildcards;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Prints a binary string in hexadecimal form
  */
-void
-hex_str(chunk_t bin, chunk_t *str)
+void hex_str(chunk_t bin, chunk_t *str)
 {
-    u_int i;
-    update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"0x"));
-    for (i=0; i < bin.len; i++)
-	update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"%02X",*bin.ptr++));
+	u_int i;
+	update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"0x"));
+	for (i=0; i < bin.len; i++)
+		update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"%02X",*bin.ptr++));
 }
 
 
-/*  Converts a binary DER-encoded ASN.1 distinguished name
+/** Converts a binary DER-encoded ASN.1 distinguished name
  *  into LDAP-style human-readable ASCII format
  */
-int
-dntoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn)
+int dntoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn)
 {
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-    chunk_t str;
-
-    str.ptr = dst;
-    str.len = dstlen;
-    ugh = dn_parse(dn, &str);
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	chunk_t str;
 
-    if (ugh != NULL) /* error, print DN as hex string */
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	    DBG_log("error in DN parsing: %s", ugh)
-	)
 	str.ptr = dst;
 	str.len = dstlen;
-	hex_str(dn, &str);
-    }
-    return (int)(dstlen - str.len);
+	ugh = dn_parse(dn, &str);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL) /* error, print DN as hex string */
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("error in DN parsing: %s", ugh)
+		)
+		str.ptr = dst;
+		str.len = dstlen;
+		hex_str(dn, &str);
+	}
+	return (int)(dstlen - str.len);
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  * Same as dntoa but prints a special string for a null dn
  */
-int
-dntoa_or_null(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn, const char* null_dn)
+int dntoa_or_null(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn, const char* null_dn)
 {
-    if (dn.ptr == NULL)
-	return snprintf(dst, dstlen, "%s", null_dn);
+	if (dn.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		return snprintf(dst, dstlen, "%s", null_dn);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return dntoa(dst, dstlen, dn);
+	}
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * Codes ASN.1 lengths up to a size of 16'777'215 bytes
+ */
+static void code_asn1_length(size_t length, chunk_t *code)
+{
+    if (length < 128)
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = length;
+	code->len = 1;
+    }
+    else if (length < 256)
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = 0x81;
+	code->ptr[1] = (u_char) length;
+	code->len = 2;
+    }
+    else if (length < 65536)
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = 0x82;
+	code->ptr[1] = length >> 8;
+	code->ptr[2] = length & 0x00ff;
+	code->len = 3;
+    }
     else
-	return dntoa(dst, dstlen, dn);
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = 0x83;
+	code->ptr[1] = length >> 16;
+	code->ptr[2] = (length >> 8) & 0x00ff;
+	code->ptr[3] = length & 0x0000ff;
+	code->len = 4;
+    }
 }
 
-/*  Converts an LDAP-style human-readable ASCII-encoded
+/**
+ *  Converts an LDAP-style human-readable ASCII-encoded
  *  ASN.1 distinguished name into binary DER-encoded format
  */
-err_t
-atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
+err_t atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
 {
   /* finite state machine for atodn */
 
-    typedef enum {
-	SEARCH_OID =	0,
-	READ_OID =	1,
-	SEARCH_NAME =	2,
-	READ_NAME =	3,
-        UNKNOWN_OID =	4
-    } state_t;
-
-    u_char oid_len_buf[3];
-    u_char name_len_buf[3];
-    u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[3];
-    u_char rdn_set_len_buf[3];
-    u_char dn_seq_len_buf[3];
-
-    chunk_t asn1_oid_len     = { oid_len_buf,     0 };
-    chunk_t asn1_name_len    = { name_len_buf,    0 };
-    chunk_t asn1_rdn_seq_len = { rdn_seq_len_buf, 0 };
-    chunk_t asn1_rdn_set_len = { rdn_set_len_buf, 0 };
-    chunk_t asn1_dn_seq_len  = { dn_seq_len_buf,  0 };
-    chunk_t oid  = empty_chunk;
-    chunk_t name = empty_chunk;
-
-    int whitespace  = 0;
-    int rdn_seq_len = 0;
-    int rdn_set_len = 0;
-    int dn_seq_len  = 0;
-    int pos         = 0;
-
-    err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-    u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 4;
-
-    state_t state = SEARCH_OID;
-
-    do
-    {
-        switch (state)
+	typedef enum {
+		SEARCH_OID =    0,
+		READ_OID =      1,
+		SEARCH_NAME =   2,
+		READ_NAME =     3,
+		UNKNOWN_OID =   4
+	} state_t;
+
+	u_char oid_len_buf[3];
+	u_char name_len_buf[3];
+	u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[3];
+	u_char rdn_set_len_buf[3];
+	u_char dn_seq_len_buf[3];
+
+	chunk_t asn1_oid_len     = { oid_len_buf,     0 };
+	chunk_t asn1_name_len    = { name_len_buf,    0 };
+	chunk_t asn1_rdn_seq_len = { rdn_seq_len_buf, 0 };
+	chunk_t asn1_rdn_set_len = { rdn_set_len_buf, 0 };
+	chunk_t asn1_dn_seq_len  = { dn_seq_len_buf,  0 };
+	chunk_t oid  = chunk_empty;
+	chunk_t name = chunk_empty;
+
+	int whitespace  = 0;
+	int rdn_seq_len = 0;
+	int rdn_set_len = 0;
+	int dn_seq_len  = 0;
+	int pos         = 0;
+
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 4;
+
+	state_t state = SEARCH_OID;
+
+	do
 	{
-	case SEARCH_OID:
-	    if (*src != ' ' && *src != '/' && *src !=  ',')
-	    {
-		oid.ptr = src;
-		oid.len = 1;
-		state = READ_OID;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case READ_OID:
-	    if (*src != ' ' && *src != '=')
-		oid.len++;
-	    else
-	    {
-		for (pos = 0; pos < X501_RDN_ROOF; pos++)
+		switch (state)
 		{
-		    if (strlen(x501rdns[pos].name) == oid.len &&
-			strncasecmp(x501rdns[pos].name, oid.ptr, oid.len) == 0)
-			break; /* found a valid OID */
-		}
-		if (pos == X501_RDN_ROOF)
-		{
-		    ugh = "unknown OID in distinguished name";
-		    state = UNKNOWN_OID;
-		    break;
+		case SEARCH_OID:
+			if (*src != ' ' && *src != '/' && *src !=  ',')
+			{
+				oid.ptr = src;
+				oid.len = 1;
+				state = READ_OID;
+			}
+			break;
+		case READ_OID:
+			if (*src != ' ' && *src != '=')
+			{
+				oid.len++;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				for (pos = 0; pos < X501_RDN_ROOF; pos++)
+				{
+					if (strlen(x501rdns[pos].name) == oid.len &&
+						strncasecmp(x501rdns[pos].name, oid.ptr, oid.len) == 0)
+					{
+						break; /* found a valid OID */
+					}
+				}
+				if (pos == X501_RDN_ROOF)
+				{
+					ugh = "unknown OID in distinguished name";
+					state = UNKNOWN_OID;
+					break;
+				}
+				code_asn1_length(x501rdns[pos].oid.len, &asn1_oid_len);
+
+				/* reset oid and change state */
+				oid = chunk_empty;
+				state = SEARCH_NAME;
+			}
+			break;
+		case SEARCH_NAME:
+			if (*src != ' ' && *src != '=')
+			{
+				name.ptr = src;
+				name.len = 1;
+				whitespace = 0;
+				state = READ_NAME;
+			}
+			break;
+		case READ_NAME:
+			if (*src != ',' && *src != '/' && *src != '\0')
+			{
+				name.len++;
+				if (*src == ' ')
+				{
+					whitespace++;
+				}
+				else
+				{
+					whitespace = 0;
+				}
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				name.len -= whitespace;
+				code_asn1_length(name.len, &asn1_name_len);
+
+				/* compute the length of the relative distinguished name sequence */
+				rdn_seq_len = 1 + asn1_oid_len.len + x501rdns[pos].oid.len +
+							  1 + asn1_name_len.len + name.len;
+				code_asn1_length(rdn_seq_len, &asn1_rdn_seq_len);
+
+				/* compute the length of the relative distinguished name set */
+				rdn_set_len = 1 + asn1_rdn_seq_len.len + rdn_seq_len;
+				code_asn1_length(rdn_set_len, &asn1_rdn_set_len);
+
+				/* encode the relative distinguished name */
+				*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
+				chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
+				*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+				chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
+				*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
+				chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
+				chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
+				/* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
+				*dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+					&& !asn1_is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
+				chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
+				chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
+
+				/* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
+				dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
+
+				/* reset name and change state */
+				name = chunk_empty;
+				state = SEARCH_OID;
+			}
+			break;
+		case UNKNOWN_OID:
+			break;
 		}
-		code_asn1_length(x501rdns[pos].oid.len, &asn1_oid_len);
-
-		/* reset oid and change state */
-		oid = empty_chunk;
-		state = SEARCH_NAME;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case SEARCH_NAME:
-	    if (*src != ' ' && *src != '=')
-	    {
-		name.ptr = src;
-		name.len = 1;
-		whitespace = 0;
-		state = READ_NAME;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case READ_NAME:
-	    if (*src != ',' && *src != '/' && *src != '\0')
-	    {
-		name.len++;
-		if (*src == ' ')
-		    whitespace++;
-		else
-		    whitespace = 0;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		name.len -= whitespace;
-		code_asn1_length(name.len, &asn1_name_len);
-
-		/* compute the length of the relative distinguished name sequence */
-		rdn_seq_len = 1 + asn1_oid_len.len + x501rdns[pos].oid.len +
-			      1 + asn1_name_len.len + name.len;
-		code_asn1_length(rdn_seq_len, &asn1_rdn_seq_len);
-
-		/* compute the length of the relative distinguished name set */
-		rdn_set_len = 1 + asn1_rdn_seq_len.len + rdn_seq_len;
-		code_asn1_length(rdn_set_len, &asn1_rdn_set_len);
-
-		/* encode the relative distinguished name */
-		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
-		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
-		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
-		/* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
-		*dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
-		    && !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
-		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
-
-		/* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
-		dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
-
-		/* reset name and change state */
-		name = empty_chunk;
-		state = SEARCH_OID;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case UNKNOWN_OID:
-	    break;
-	}
-    } while (*src++ != '\0');
-
-    /* complete the distinguished name sequence*/
-    code_asn1_length(dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
-    dn->ptr += 3 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
-    dn->len =  1 + asn1_dn_seq_len.len + dn_seq_len;
-    dn_ptr = dn->ptr;
-    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
-    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_dn_seq_len);
-    return ugh;
+	} while (*src++ != '\0');
+
+	/* complete the distinguished name sequence*/
+	code_asn1_length(dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
+	dn->ptr += 3 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
+	dn->len =  1 + asn1_dn_seq_len.len + dn_seq_len;
+	dn_ptr = dn->ptr;
+	*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+	chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_dn_seq_len);
+	return ugh;
 }
 
-/*  compare two distinguished names by
- *  comparing the individual RDNs
+/**
+ * compare two distinguished names by comparing the individual RDNs
  */
-bool
-same_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+bool same_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
 {
-    chunk_t rdn_a, rdn_b, attribute_a, attribute_b;
-    chunk_t oid_a, oid_b, value_a, value_b;
-    asn1_t type_a, type_b;
-    bool next_a, next_b;
+	chunk_t rdn_a, rdn_b, attribute_a, attribute_b;
+	chunk_t oid_a, oid_b, value_a, value_b;
+	asn1_t type_a, type_b;
+	bool next_a, next_b;
 
-    /* same lengths for the DNs */
-    if (a.len != b.len)
-	return FALSE;
+	/* same lengths for the DNs */
+	if (a.len != b.len)
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
 
-    /* try a binary comparison first */
-    if (memcmp(a.ptr, b.ptr, b.len) == 0)
-	return TRUE;
- 
-    /* initialize DN parsing */
-    if (init_rdn(a, &rdn_a, &attribute_a, &next_a) != NULL
-    ||  init_rdn(b, &rdn_b, &attribute_b, &next_b) != NULL)
-	return FALSE;
+	/* try a binary comparison first */
+	if (memeq(a.ptr, b.ptr, b.len))
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
 
-    /* fetch next RDN pair */
-    while (next_a && next_b)
-    {
-	/* parse next RDNs and check for errors */
-	if (get_next_rdn(&rdn_a, &attribute_a, &oid_a, &value_a, &type_a, &next_a) != NULL
-	||  get_next_rdn(&rdn_b, &attribute_b, &oid_b, &value_b, &type_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+	/* initialize DN parsing */
+	if (init_rdn(a, &rdn_a, &attribute_a, &next_a) != NULL
+	||  init_rdn(b, &rdn_b, &attribute_b, &next_b) != NULL)
 	{
-	    return FALSE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 
-	/* OIDs must agree */
-	if (oid_a.len != oid_b.len || memcmp(oid_a.ptr, oid_b.ptr, oid_b.len) != 0)
-	    return FALSE;
+	/* fetch next RDN pair */
+	while (next_a && next_b)
+	{
+		/* parse next RDNs and check for errors */
+		if (get_next_rdn(&rdn_a, &attribute_a, &oid_a, &value_a, &type_a, &next_a) != NULL
+		||  get_next_rdn(&rdn_b, &attribute_b, &oid_b, &value_b, &type_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		/* OIDs must agree */
+		if (oid_a.len != oid_b.len || memcmp(oid_a.ptr, oid_b.ptr, oid_b.len) != 0)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* same lengths for values */
-	if (value_a.len != value_b.len)
-	    return FALSE;
+		/* same lengths for values */
+		if (value_a.len != value_b.len)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* printableStrings and email RDNs require uppercase comparison */
-	if (type_a == type_b && (type_a == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
-	   (type_a == ASN1_IA5STRING && known_oid(oid_a) == OID_PKCS9_EMAIL)))
-	{
-	    if (strncasecmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
-		return FALSE;
+		/* printableStrings and email RDNs require uppercase comparison */
+		if (type_a == type_b && (type_a == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
+		   (type_a == ASN1_IA5STRING && asn1_known_oid(oid_a) == OID_PKCS9_EMAIL)))
+		{
+			if (strncasecmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (strncmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-	else
+	/* both DNs must have same number of RDNs */
+	if (next_a || next_b)
 	{
-	    if (strncmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
 		return FALSE;
 	}
-    }
-    /* both DNs must have same number of RDNs */
-    if (next_a || next_b)
-	return FALSE;
 
-    /* the two DNs are equal! */
-    return TRUE;
+	/* the two DNs are equal! */
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
 
-/*  compare two distinguished names by comparing the individual RDNs.
+/**
+ *  Compare two distinguished names by comparing the individual RDNs.
  *  A single'*' character designates a wildcard RDN in DN b.
  */
-bool
-match_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *wildcards)
+bool match_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *wildcards)
 {
-    chunk_t rdn_a, rdn_b, attribute_a, attribute_b;
-    chunk_t oid_a, oid_b, value_a, value_b;
-    asn1_t type_a,  type_b;
-    bool next_a, next_b;
+	chunk_t rdn_a, rdn_b, attribute_a, attribute_b;
+	chunk_t oid_a, oid_b, value_a, value_b;
+	asn1_t type_a,  type_b;
+	bool next_a, next_b;
 
-    /* initialize wildcard counter */
-    *wildcards = 0;
+	/* initialize wildcard counter */
+	*wildcards = 0;
 
-    /* initialize DN parsing */
-    if (init_rdn(a, &rdn_a, &attribute_a, &next_a) != NULL
-    ||  init_rdn(b, &rdn_b, &attribute_b, &next_b) != NULL)
-    	return FALSE;
-
-    /* fetch next RDN pair */
-    while (next_a && next_b)
-    {
-	/* parse next RDNs and check for errors */
-	if (get_next_rdn(&rdn_a, &attribute_a, &oid_a, &value_a, &type_a, &next_a) != NULL
-	||  get_next_rdn(&rdn_b, &attribute_b, &oid_b, &value_b, &type_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+	/* initialize DN parsing */
+	if (init_rdn(a, &rdn_a, &attribute_a, &next_a) != NULL
+	||  init_rdn(b, &rdn_b, &attribute_b, &next_b) != NULL)
 	{
-	    return FALSE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
 
-	/* OIDs must agree */
-	if (oid_a.len != oid_b.len || memcmp(oid_a.ptr, oid_b.ptr, oid_b.len) != 0)
-	    return FALSE;
-
-	/* does rdn_b contain a wildcard? */
-	if (value_b.len == 1 && *value_b.ptr == '*')
+	/* fetch next RDN pair */
+	while (next_a && next_b)
 	{
-	    (*wildcards)++;
-	    continue;
-	}
+		/* parse next RDNs and check for errors */
+		if (get_next_rdn(&rdn_a, &attribute_a, &oid_a, &value_a, &type_a, &next_a) != NULL
+		||  get_next_rdn(&rdn_b, &attribute_b, &oid_b, &value_b, &type_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* same lengths for values */
-	if (value_a.len != value_b.len)
-	    return FALSE;
+		/* OIDs must agree */
+		if (oid_a.len != oid_b.len || memcmp(oid_a.ptr, oid_b.ptr, oid_b.len) != 0)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	/* printableStrings and email RDNs require uppercase comparison */
-	if (type_a == type_b && (type_a == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
-	   (type_a == ASN1_IA5STRING && known_oid(oid_a) == OID_PKCS9_EMAIL)))
-	{
-	    if (strncasecmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
-		return FALSE;
+		/* does rdn_b contain a wildcard? */
+		if (value_b.len == 1 && *value_b.ptr == '*')
+		{
+			(*wildcards)++;
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/* same lengths for values */
+		if (value_a.len != value_b.len)
+		{
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+
+		/* printableStrings and email RDNs require uppercase comparison */
+		if (type_a == type_b && (type_a == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
+		   (type_a == ASN1_IA5STRING && asn1_known_oid(oid_a) == OID_PKCS9_EMAIL)))
+		{
+			if (strncasecmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			if (strncmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+			{
+				return FALSE;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-	else
+
+	/* both DNs must have same number of RDNs */
+	if (next_a || next_b)
 	{
-	    if (strncmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
 		return FALSE;
 	}
-    }
-    /* both DNs must have same number of RDNs */
-    if (next_a || next_b)
-	return FALSE;
 
-    /* the two DNs match! */
-    return TRUE;
+	/* the two DNs match! */
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-/*
- *  compare two X.509 certificates by comparing their signatures
+/**
+ *  Compare two X.509 certificates by comparing their signatures
  */
-bool
-same_x509cert(const x509cert_t *a, const x509cert_t *b)
+bool same_x509cert(const x509cert_t *a, const x509cert_t *b)
 {
-    return same_chunk(a->signature, b->signature);
+	return chunk_equals(a->signature, b->signature);
 }
 
-/*  for each link pointing to the certificate
- "  increase the count by one
+/**
+ * For each link pointing to the certificate increase the count by one
  */
-void
-share_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+void share_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    if (cert != NULL)
- 	cert->count++;
+	if (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		cert->count++;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- *  add a X.509 user/host certificate to the chained list
+/**
+ *  Add a X.509 user/host certificate to the chained list
  */
-x509cert_t*
-add_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+x509cert_t* add_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    x509cert_t *c = x509certs;
+	x509cert_t *c = x509certs;
 
-    while (c != NULL)
-    {
-	if (same_x509cert(c, cert)) /* already in chain, free cert */
+	while (c != NULL)
 	{
-	    free_x509cert(cert);
-	    return c;
+		if (same_x509cert(c, cert)) /* already in chain, free cert */
+		{
+			free_x509cert(cert);
+			return c;
+		}
+		c = c->next;
 	}
-	c = c->next;
-    }
 
-    /* insert new cert at the root of the chain */
-    lock_certs_and_keys("add_x509cert");
-    cert->next = x509certs;
-    x509certs = cert;
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_log("  x509 cert inserted")
-    )
-    unlock_certs_and_keys("add_x509cert");
-    return cert;
+	/* insert new cert at the root of the chain */
+	lock_certs_and_keys("add_x509cert");
+	cert->next = x509certs;
+	x509certs = cert;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  x509 cert inserted")
+	)
+	unlock_certs_and_keys("add_x509cert");
+	return cert;
 }
 
-/*
- * choose either subject DN or a subjectAltName as connection end ID
+/**
+ * Choose either subject DN or a subjectAltName as connection end ID
  */
-void
-select_x509cert_id(x509cert_t *cert, struct id *end_id)
+void select_x509cert_id(x509cert_t *cert, struct id *end_id)
 {
-    bool copy_subject_dn = TRUE;	 /* ID is subject DN */
+	bool copy_subject_dn = TRUE;         /* ID is subject DN */
 
-    if (end_id->kind != ID_NONE) /* check for matching subjectAltName */
-    {
-	generalName_t *gn = cert->subjectAltName;
-
-	while (gn != NULL)
+	if (end_id->kind != ID_ANY) /* check for matching subjectAltName */
 	{
-	    struct id id = empty_id;
+		generalName_t *gn = cert->subjectAltName;
 
-	    gntoid(&id, gn);
-	    if (same_id(&id, end_id))
-	    {
-		copy_subject_dn = FALSE; /* take subjectAltName instead */
-		break;
-	    }
-	    gn = gn->next;
+		while (gn != NULL)
+		{
+			struct id id = empty_id;
+
+			gntoid(&id, gn);
+			if (same_id(&id, end_id))
+			{
+				copy_subject_dn = FALSE; /* take subjectAltName instead */
+				break;
+			}
+			gn = gn->next;
+		}
 	}
-    }
 
-    if (copy_subject_dn)
-    {
-	if (end_id->kind != ID_NONE && end_id->kind != ID_DER_ASN1_DN)
+	if (copy_subject_dn)
 	{
-	     char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		if (end_id->kind != ID_ANY && end_id->kind != ID_DER_ASN1_DN)
+		{
+			 char buf[BUF_LEN];
 
-	     idtoa(end_id, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	     plog("  no subjectAltName matches ID '%s', replaced by subject DN", buf);
+			 idtoa(end_id, buf, BUF_LEN);
+			 plog("  no subjectAltName matches ID '%s', replaced by subject DN", buf);
+		}
+		end_id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+		end_id->name.len = cert->subject.len;
+		end_id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+		memcpy(end_id->name.ptr, cert->subject.ptr, cert->subject.len);
 	}
-	end_id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
-	end_id->name.len = cert->subject.len;
-	end_id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
-	memcpy(end_id->name.ptr, cert->subject.ptr, cert->subject.len);
-    }
 }
 
-/*
- * check for equality between two key identifiers
+/**
+ * Check for equality between two key identifiers
  */
-bool
-same_keyid(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+bool same_keyid(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
 {
-    if (a.ptr == NULL || b.ptr == NULL)
-	return FALSE;
-
-    return same_chunk(a, b);
+	if (a.ptr == NULL || b.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	return chunk_equals(a, b);
 }
 
-/*
- * check for equality between two serial numbers
+/**
+ * Check for equality between two serial numbers
  */
-bool
-same_serial(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+bool same_serial(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
 {
-    /* do not compare serial numbers if one of them is not defined */
-    if (a.ptr == NULL || b.ptr == NULL)
-	return TRUE;
-
-    return same_chunk(a, b);
+	/* do not compare serial numbers if one of them is not defined */
+	if (a.ptr == NULL || b.ptr == NULL)
+	{
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+	return chunk_equals(a, b);
 }
 
-/*
- *  get a X.509 certificate with a given issuer found at a certain position
+/**
+ * Get a X.509 certificate with a given issuer found at a certain position
  */
-x509cert_t*
-get_x509cert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid, x509cert_t *chain)
+x509cert_t* get_x509cert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid,
+						 x509cert_t *chain)
 {
-    x509cert_t *cert = (chain != NULL)? chain->next : x509certs;
+	x509cert_t *cert = (chain != NULL)? chain->next : x509certs;
 
-    while (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->authKeyID)
-	    : (same_dn(issuer, cert->issuer)
-	       && same_serial(serial, cert->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	while (cert != NULL)
 	{
-	    return cert;
+		if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->authKeyID)
+			: (same_dn(issuer, cert->issuer)
+			   && same_serial(serial, cert->authKeySerialNumber)))
+		{
+			return cert;
+		}
+		cert = cert->next;
 	}
-	cert = cert->next;
-    }
-    return NULL;
+	return NULL;
 }
 
-/*
- * encode a linked list of subjectAltNames
+/**
+ * Encode a linked list of subjectAltNames
  */
-chunk_t
-build_subjectAltNames(generalName_t *subjectAltNames)
+chunk_t build_subjectAltNames(generalName_t *subjectAltNames)
 {
-    u_char *pos;
-    chunk_t names;
-    size_t len = 0;
-    generalName_t *gn = subjectAltNames;
-	
+	u_char *pos;
+	chunk_t names;
+	size_t len = 0;
+	generalName_t *gn = subjectAltNames;
+		
    /* compute the total size of the ASN.1 attributes object */
-    while (gn != NULL)
-    {
-	len += gn->name.len;
-	gn = gn->next;
-    }
+	while (gn != NULL)
+	{
+		len += gn->name.len;
+		gn = gn->next;
+	}
 
-    pos = build_asn1_object(&names, ASN1_SEQUENCE, len);
+	pos = asn1_build_object(&names, ASN1_SEQUENCE, len);
 
-    gn = subjectAltNames;
-    while (gn != NULL)
-    {
-	chunkcpy(pos, gn->name);
-	gn = gn->next;
-    }
+	gn = subjectAltNames;
+	while (gn != NULL)
+	{
+		chunkcpy(pos, gn->name);
+		gn = gn->next;
+	}
 
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
-		, ASN1_subjectAltName_oid
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m", names));
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+				, ASN1_subjectAltName_oid
+				, asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m", names));
 }
 
-/*
- * build a to-be-signed X.509 certificate body
+/**
+ * Build a to-be-signed X.509 certificate body
  */
-static chunk_t
-build_tbs_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, const RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
+static chunk_t build_tbs_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, public_key_t *rsa)
 {
-    /* version is always X.509v3 */
-    chunk_t version = asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, ASN1_INTEGER_2);
+	/* version is always X.509v3 */
+	chunk_t version = asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, ASN1_INTEGER_2);
 
-    chunk_t extensions = empty_chunk;
+	chunk_t extensions = chunk_empty;
 
-    if (cert->subjectAltName != NULL)
-    {
-	extensions = asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3, "m"
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "m"
-		, build_subjectAltNames(cert->subjectAltName)));
-    }
+	chunk_t key = rsa->get_encoding(rsa);
 
-    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mmccmcmm"
-		, version
-		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, cert->serialNumber)
-		, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(cert->sigAlg)
-		, cert->issuer
-		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
-		    , timetoasn1(&cert->notBefore, ASN1_UTCTIME) 
-		    , timetoasn1(&cert->notAfter,  ASN1_UTCTIME)
-		  )
-		, cert->subject
-		, pkcs1_build_publicKeyInfo(rsa)
-		, extensions
-	   );
+	chunk_t keyInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm",
+							asn1_algorithmIdentifier(OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION), 
+							asn1_bitstring("m", key));	
+
+	if (cert->subjectAltName != NULL)
+	{
+		extensions = asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3, "m"
+				, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "m"
+				, build_subjectAltNames(cert->subjectAltName)));
+	}
+
+	return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mmccmcmm"
+				, version
+				, asn1_integer("c", cert->serialNumber)
+				, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(cert->sigAlg)
+				, cert->issuer
+				, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+					, asn1_from_time(&cert->notBefore, ASN1_UTCTIME) 
+					, asn1_from_time(&cert->notAfter,  ASN1_UTCTIME)
+				  )
+				, cert->subject
+				, keyInfo
+				, extensions
+		   );
 }
 
-/*
- * build a DER-encoded X.509 certificate
+/**
+ * Build a DER-encoded X.509 certificate
  */
-void
-build_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, const RSA_public_key_t *cert_key
-, const RSA_private_key_t *signer_key)
+void build_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, public_key_t *cert_key,
+					private_key_t *signer_key)
 {
-    chunk_t tbs_cert = build_tbs_x509cert(cert, cert_key);
+	chunk_t tbs_cert = build_tbs_x509cert(cert, cert_key);
 
-    chunk_t signature = pkcs1_build_signature(tbs_cert, cert->sigAlg
-			    , signer_key, TRUE);
+	chunk_t signature = x509_build_signature(tbs_cert, cert->sigAlg
+								, signer_key, TRUE);
 
-    cert->certificate = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mcm"
-				, tbs_cert
-				, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(cert->sigAlg)
-				, signature);
+	cert->certificate = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mcm"
+								, tbs_cert
+								, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(cert->sigAlg)
+								, signature);
 }
 
-/*
- *  free the dynamic memory used to store generalNames
+/**
+ * Free the dynamic memory used to store generalNames
  */
-void
-free_generalNames(generalName_t* gn, bool free_name)
+void free_generalNames(generalName_t* gn, bool free_name)
 {
-    while (gn != NULL)
-    {
-	generalName_t *gn_top = gn;
-	if (free_name)
+	while (gn != NULL)
 	{
-	    pfree(gn->name.ptr);
+		generalName_t *gn_top = gn;
+		if (free_name)
+		{
+			free(gn->name.ptr);
+		}
+		gn = gn->next;
+		free(gn_top);
 	}
-	gn = gn->next;
-	pfree(gn_top);
-    }
 }
 
-/*
- *  free a X.509 certificate
+/**
+ *  Free a X.509 certificate
  */
-void
-free_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+void free_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    if (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	free_generalNames(cert->subjectAltName, FALSE);
-	free_generalNames(cert->crlDistributionPoints, FALSE);
-	pfreeany(cert->certificate.ptr);
-	pfree(cert);
-	cert = NULL;
-    }
+	if (cert != NULL)
+	{
+		DESTROY_IF(cert->public_key);
+		free_generalNames(cert->subjectAltName, FALSE);
+		free_generalNames(cert->crlDistributionPoints, FALSE);
+		free(cert->certificate.ptr);
+		free(cert);
+		cert = NULL;
+	}
 }
 
-/*  release of a certificate decreases the count by one
- "  the certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
+/**
+ * Release of a certificate decreases the count by one
+ * the certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
  */
-void
-release_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+void release_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    if (cert != NULL && --cert->count == 0)
-    {
-	x509cert_t **pp = &x509certs;
-	while (*pp != cert)
-	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
-        *pp = cert->next;
-	free_x509cert(cert);
-    }
+	if (cert != NULL && --cert->count == 0)
+	{
+		x509cert_t **pp = &x509certs;
+		while (*pp != cert)
+		{
+			pp = &(*pp)->next;
+		}
+		*pp = cert->next;
+		free_x509cert(cert);
+	}
 }
 
-
-/*
- * stores a chained list of end certs and CA certs
+/**
+ * Stores a chained list of end certs and CA certs
  */
-void
-store_x509certs(x509cert_t **firstcert, bool strict)
+void store_x509certs(x509cert_t **firstcert, bool strict)
 {
-    x509cert_t *cacerts = NULL;
-    x509cert_t **pp = firstcert;
+	x509cert_t *cacerts = NULL;
+	x509cert_t **pp = firstcert;
 
-    /* first extract CA certs, discarding root CA certs */
+	/* first extract CA certs, discarding root CA certs */
 
-    while (*pp != NULL)
-    {
-	x509cert_t *cert = *pp;
-
-	if (cert->isCA)
+	while (*pp != NULL)
 	{
-	    *pp = cert->next;
-	    
-	    /* we don't accept self-signed CA certs */
-	    if (same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
-	    {
-		plog("self-signed cacert rejected");
-		free_x509cert(cert);
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		/* insertion into temporary chain of candidate CA certs */
-		cert->next = cacerts;
-		cacerts = cert;
-	    }
+		x509cert_t *cert = *pp;
+
+		if (cert->isCA)
+		{
+			*pp = cert->next;
+			
+			/* we don't accept self-signed CA certs */
+			if (same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+			{
+				plog("self-signed cacert rejected");
+				free_x509cert(cert);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+				/* insertion into temporary chain of candidate CA certs */
+				cert->next = cacerts;
+				cacerts = cert;
+			}
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			pp = &cert->next;
+		}
 	}
-	else
-	    pp = &cert->next;
-    }
 
-    /* now verify the candidate CA certs */
-    
-    while (cacerts != NULL)
-    {
-	x509cert_t *cert = cacerts;
+	/* now verify the candidate CA certs */
 	
-	cacerts = cacerts->next;
-
-	if (trust_authcert_candidate(cert, cacerts))
-	{
-	    add_authcert(cert, AUTH_CA);
-	}
-	else
+	while (cacerts != NULL)
 	{
-	    plog("intermediate cacert rejected");
-	    free_x509cert(cert);
-	}
-    }
-    
-    /* now verify the end certificates */
+		x509cert_t *cert = cacerts;
+		
+		cacerts = cacerts->next;
 
-    pp = firstcert;
+		if (trust_authcert_candidate(cert, cacerts))
+		{
+			add_authcert(cert, AUTH_CA);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("intermediate cacert rejected");
+			free_x509cert(cert);
+		}
+	}
+	
+	/* now verify the end certificates */
 
-    while (*pp != NULL)
-    {
-	time_t valid_until;
-	x509cert_t *cert = *pp;
+	pp = firstcert;
 
-	if (verify_x509cert(cert, strict, &valid_until))
+	while (*pp != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("public key validated")
-	    )
-	    add_x509_public_key(cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED);
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    plog("X.509 certificate rejected");
+		time_t valid_until;
+		x509cert_t *cert = *pp;
+
+		if (verify_x509cert(cert, strict, &valid_until))
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("public key validated")
+			)
+			add_x509_public_key(cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			plog("X.509 certificate rejected");
+		}
+		*pp = cert->next;
+		free_x509cert(cert);
 	}
-	*pp = cert->next;
-	free_x509cert(cert);
-    }
 }
 
-/*
- *  decrypts an RSA signature using the issuer's certificate
+/**
+ * Check if a signature over binary blob is genuine
  */
-static bool
-decrypt_sig(chunk_t sig, int alg, const x509cert_t *issuer_cert,
-	    chunk_t *digest)
+bool x509_check_signature(chunk_t tbs, chunk_t sig, int algorithm,
+						  const x509cert_t *issuer_cert)
 {
-    switch (alg)
-    {
-	chunk_t decrypted;
-
-	case OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
-	case OID_MD2_WITH_RSA:
-	case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
-	case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
-	case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA_OIW:
-	case OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA:
-	case OID_SHA384_WITH_RSA:
-	case OID_SHA512_WITH_RSA:
+	public_key_t *key = issuer_cert->public_key;
+	signature_scheme_t scheme = signature_scheme_from_oid(algorithm);
+
+	if (scheme == SIGN_UNKNOWN)
 	{
-	    mpz_t s;
-	    RSA_public_key_t rsa;
-
-	    init_RSA_public_key(&rsa, issuer_cert->publicExponent
-				    , issuer_cert->modulus);
-
-	    /* decrypt the signature s = s^e mod n */
-	    n_to_mpz(s, sig.ptr, sig.len);
-	    mpz_powm(s, s, &rsa.e, &rsa.n);
-
-	    /* convert back to bytes */
-	    decrypted = mpz_to_n(s, rsa.k);
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_dump_chunk("  decrypted signature: ", decrypted)
-	    )
-
-	    /*  copy the least significant bits of decrypted signature
-	     *  into the digest string
-	    */
-	    memcpy(digest->ptr, decrypted.ptr + decrypted.len - digest->len,
-		   digest->len);
-
-	    /* free memory */
-	    free_RSA_public_content(&rsa);
-	    pfree(decrypted.ptr);
-	    mpz_clear(s);
-	    return TRUE;
+		return FALSE;
 	}
-	default:
-	    digest->len = 0;
-	    return FALSE;
-    }
+	return key->verify(key, scheme, tbs, sig); 
 }
 
-/*
- *   Check if a signature over binary blob is genuine
+/**
+ * Build an ASN.1 encoded PKCS#1 signature over a binary blob
  */
-bool
-check_signature(chunk_t tbs, chunk_t sig, int digest_alg, int enc_alg
-, const x509cert_t *issuer_cert)
+chunk_t x509_build_signature(chunk_t tbs, int algorithm, private_key_t *key,
+							 bool bit_string)
 {
-    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    u_char decrypted_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
-    chunk_t digest = {digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN};
-    chunk_t decrypted = {decrypted_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN};
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	if (digest_alg != OID_UNKNOWN)
-	    DBG_log("signature digest algorithm: '%s'",oid_names[digest_alg].name);
-	else
-	    DBG_log("unknown signature digest algorithm");
-    )
+	chunk_t signature;
+	signature_scheme_t scheme = signature_scheme_from_oid(algorithm);
 
-    if (!compute_digest(tbs, digest_alg, &digest))
-    {
-	plog("  digest algorithm not supported");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	DBG_dump_chunk("  digest:", digest)
-    )
-
-    decrypted.len = digest.len; /* we want the same digest length */
-
-    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-	if (enc_alg != OID_UNKNOWN)
-	    DBG_log("signature encryption algorithm: '%s'",oid_names[enc_alg].name);
-	else
-	    DBG_log("unknown signature encryption algorithm");
-    )
-
-    if (!decrypt_sig(sig, enc_alg, issuer_cert, &decrypted))
-    {
-    	plog("  decryption algorithm not supported");
-	return FALSE;
-    }
-
-    /* check if digests are equal */
-    return !memcmp(decrypted.ptr, digest.ptr, digest.len);
+	if (scheme == SIGN_UNKNOWN || !key->sign(key, scheme, tbs, &signature))
+	{
+		return chunk_empty;
+	} 
+	return (bit_string) ? asn1_bitstring("m", signature)
+						: asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m", signature);
 }
 
-/*
- * extracts the basicConstraints extension
+/**
+ * Extracts the basicConstraints extension
  */
-static bool
-parse_basicConstraints(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static bool parse_basicConstraints(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    bool isCA = FALSE;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_ROOF) {
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	bool isCA = FALSE;
 
-	if (!extract_object(basicConstraintsObjects, &objectID,
-			    &object,&level, &ctx))
-	     break;
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(basicConstraintsObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 
-	if (objectID == BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	    isCA = object.len && *object.ptr;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s",(isCA)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
-	    )
+		if (objectID == BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA)
+		{
+			isCA = object.len && *object.ptr;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %s",(isCA)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+			)
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return isCA;
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+
+	return isCA;
 }
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Converts a X.500 generalName into an ID
  */
-void
-gntoid(struct id *id, const generalName_t *gn)
+void gntoid(struct id *id, const generalName_t *gn)
 {
-    switch(gn->kind)
-    {
-    case GN_DNS_NAME:		/* ID type: ID_FQDN */
-	id->kind = ID_FQDN;
-	id->name = gn->name;
-	break;
-    case GN_IP_ADDRESS:		/* ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR */
+	switch(gn->kind)
 	{
-	    const struct af_info *afi = &af_inet4_info;
-	    err_t ugh = NULL;
+	case GN_DNS_NAME:           /* ID type: ID_FQDN */
+		id->kind = ID_FQDN;
+		id->name = gn->name;
+		break;
+	case GN_IP_ADDRESS:         /* ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR */
+		{
+			const struct af_info *afi = &af_inet4_info;
+			err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	    id->kind = afi->id_addr;
-	    ugh = initaddr(gn->name.ptr, gn->name.len, afi->af, &id->ip_addr);
+			id->kind = afi->id_addr;
+			ugh = initaddr(gn->name.ptr, gn->name.len, afi->af, &id->ip_addr);
+		}
+		break;
+	case GN_RFC822_NAME:        /* ID type: ID_USER_FQDN */
+		id->kind = ID_USER_FQDN;
+		id->name = gn->name;
+		break;
+	default:
+		id->kind = ID_ANY;
+		id->name = chunk_empty;
 	}
-	break;
-    case GN_RFC822_NAME:	/* ID type: ID_USER_FQDN */
-	id->kind = ID_USER_FQDN;
-	id->name = gn->name;
-	break;
-    default:
-	id->kind = ID_NONE;
-	id->name = empty_chunk;
-    }
 }
 
-/* compute the subjectKeyIdentifier according to section 4.2.1.2 of RFC 3280
+/**
+ * Compute the subjectKeyIdentifier according to section 4.2.1.2 of RFC 3280
  * as the 160 bit SHA-1 hash of the public key
  */
-void
-compute_subjectKeyID(x509cert_t *cert, chunk_t subjectKeyID)
+bool compute_subjectKeyID(x509cert_t *cert, chunk_t subjectKeyID)
 {
-    SHA1_CTX context;
-
-    SHA1Init(&context);
-    SHA1Update(&context
-	      , cert->subjectPublicKey.ptr
-	      , cert->subjectPublicKey.len);
-    SHA1Final(subjectKeyID.ptr, &context);
-    subjectKeyID.len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	identification_t *keyid;
+	chunk_t encoding;
+
+	keyid = cert->public_key->get_id(cert->public_key, ID_PUBKEY_SHA1);
+	if (keyid == NULL)
+	{
+		plog("  unable to compute subjectKeyID");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	encoding = keyid->get_encoding(keyid);
+	memcpy(subjectKeyID.ptr, encoding.ptr, subjectKeyID.len);
+	return TRUE;
 }
 
-/*
- * extracts an otherName
+/**
+ * Extracts an otherName
  */
-static bool
-parse_otherName(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static bool parse_otherName(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    u_int level;
-    int oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	int oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	bool success = FALSE;
 
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < ON_OBJ_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(otherNameObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(otherNameObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 
-	switch (objectID)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	case ON_OBJ_ID_TYPE:
-	    oid = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case ON_OBJ_VALUE:
-	    if (oid == OID_XMPP_ADDR)
-	    {
-		if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&object, ASN1_UTF8STRING
-					     , level + 1, "xmppAddr"))
+		switch (objectID)
 		{
-		    return FALSE;
+		case ON_OBJ_ID_TYPE:
+			oid = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case ON_OBJ_VALUE:
+			if (oid == OID_XMPP_ADDR)
+			{
+				if (!asn1_parse_simple_object(&object, ASN1_UTF8STRING,
+							parser->get_level(parser) + 1, "xmppAddr"))
+				{
+					goto end;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+	
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
 }
 
 
-/*
- * extracts a generalName
+/**
+ * Extracts a generalName
  */
-static generalName_t*
-parse_generalName(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static generalName_t* parse_generalName(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    u_int level;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	generalName_t *gn = NULL;
+	int objectID;
 
-    while (objectID < GN_OBJ_ROOF)
-    {
-	bool valid_gn = FALSE;
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(generalNameObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
 	
-	if (!extract_object(generalNameObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return NULL;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	case GN_OBJ_RFC822_NAME:
-	case GN_OBJ_DNS_NAME:
-	case GN_OBJ_URI:
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)object.len, object.ptr);
-	    )
-	    valid_gn = TRUE;
-	    break;
-	case GN_OBJ_DIRECTORY_NAME:
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'", buf)
-	    )
-	    valid_gn = TRUE;
-	    break;
-	case GN_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS:
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  '%d.%d.%d.%d'", *object.ptr, *(object.ptr+1),
-				      *(object.ptr+2), *(object.ptr+3));
-	    )
-	    valid_gn = TRUE;
-	    break;
-	case GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME:
-	    if (!parse_otherName(object, level + 1))
-		return NULL;
-	    break;
-	case GN_OBJ_X400_ADDRESS:
-	case GN_OBJ_EDI_PARTY_NAME:
-	case GN_OBJ_REGISTERED_ID:
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
-	}
-
-	if (valid_gn)
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	    generalName_t *gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
-	    gn->kind = (objectID - GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME) / 2;
-	    gn->name = object;
-	    gn->next = NULL;
-	    return gn;
-        }
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return NULL;
-}
-
-
-/*
- * extracts one or several GNs and puts them into a chained list
- */
-static generalName_t*
-parse_generalNames(chunk_t blob, int level0, bool implicit)
-{
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    generalName_t *top_gn = NULL;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, implicit, DBG_RAW);
+		bool valid_gn = FALSE;
+		
+		switch (objectID) {
+		case GN_OBJ_RFC822_NAME:
+		case GN_OBJ_DNS_NAME:
+		case GN_OBJ_URI:
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)object.len, object.ptr);
+			)
+			valid_gn = TRUE;
+			break;
+		case GN_OBJ_DIRECTORY_NAME:
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+				DBG_log("  '%s'", buf)
+			)
+			valid_gn = TRUE;
+			break;
+		case GN_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS:
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  '%d.%d.%d.%d'", *object.ptr, *(object.ptr+1),
+									  *(object.ptr+2), *(object.ptr+3));
+			)
+			valid_gn = TRUE;
+			break;
+		case GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME:
+			if (!parse_otherName(object, parser->get_level(parser)+1))
+			{
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case GN_OBJ_X400_ADDRESS:
+		case GN_OBJ_EDI_PARTY_NAME:
+		case GN_OBJ_REGISTERED_ID:
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 
-    while (objectID < GENERAL_NAMES_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(generalNamesObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return NULL;
-	     
-	if (objectID == GENERAL_NAMES_GN)
-	{
-	    generalName_t *gn = parse_generalName(object, level+1);
-	    if (gn != NULL)
-	    {
-		gn->next = top_gn;
-		top_gn = gn;
-	    }
+		if (valid_gn)
+		{
+			gn = malloc_thing(generalName_t);
+			gn->kind = (objectID - GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME) / 2;
+			gn->name = object;
+			gn->next = NULL;
+			goto end;
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return top_gn;
+	
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return gn;
 }
 
-/*
- * returns a directoryName
+/**
+ * Extracts one or several GNs and puts them into a chained list
  */
-chunk_t get_directoryName(chunk_t blob, int level, bool implicit)
+static generalName_t* parse_generalNames(chunk_t blob, int level0, bool implicit)
 {
-    chunk_t name = empty_chunk;
-    generalName_t * gn = parse_generalNames(blob, level, implicit);
-
-    if (gn != NULL && gn->kind == GN_DIRECTORY_NAME)
-	name= gn->name;
-
-    free_generalNames(gn, FALSE);
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	generalName_t *top_gn = NULL;
+
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(generalNamesObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+	parser->set_flags(parser, implicit, FALSE);
+	
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		if (objectID == GENERAL_NAMES_GN)
+		{
+			generalName_t *gn = parse_generalName(object,
+										parser->get_level(parser)+1);
+			if (gn)
+			{
+				gn->next = top_gn;
+				top_gn = gn;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	parser->destroy(parser);
 
-    return name;
+	return top_gn;
 }
 
-/*
- * extracts and converts a UTCTIME or GENERALIZEDTIME object
+/**
+ * Returns a directoryName
  */
-time_t
-parse_time(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+chunk_t get_directoryName(chunk_t blob, int level, bool implicit)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	chunk_t name = chunk_empty;
+	generalName_t * gn = parse_generalNames(blob, level, implicit);
 
-    while (objectID < TIME_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(timeObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return UNDEFINED_TIME;
-
-	if (objectID == TIME_UTC || objectID == TIME_GENERALIZED)
+	if (gn != NULL && gn->kind == GN_DIRECTORY_NAME)
 	{
-	    return asn1totime(&object, (objectID == TIME_UTC)
-			? ASN1_UTCTIME : ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+		name= gn->name;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return UNDEFINED_TIME;
- }
-
-/*
- * extracts a keyIdentifier
- */
-static chunk_t
-parse_keyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0, bool implicit)
-{
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, implicit, DBG_RAW);
-
-    extract_object(keyIdentifierObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx);
-    return object;
+	free_generalNames(gn, FALSE);
+	return name;
 }
 
-/*
- * extracts an authoritykeyIdentifier
+/**
+ * Extracts an authoritykeyIdentifier
  */
-void
-parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0
-    , chunk_t *authKeyID, chunk_t *authKeySerialNumber)
+void parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0,
+								  chunk_t *authKeyID,
+								  chunk_t *authKeySerialNumber)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
 
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(authKeyIdentifierObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+	
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		switch (objectID)
+		{
+		case AUTH_KEY_ID_KEY_ID:
+			*authKeyID = object;
+			break;
+		case AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_ISSUER:
+			{
+				generalName_t * gn = parse_generalNames(object,
+					 					parser->get_level(parser) + 1, TRUE);
 
-    while (objectID < AUTH_KEY_ID_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(authorityKeyIdentifierObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	case AUTH_KEY_ID_KEY_ID:
-	    *authKeyID = parse_keyIdentifier(object, level+1, TRUE);
-	    break;
-	case AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_ISSUER:
-	    {
-		generalName_t * gn = parse_generalNames(object, level+1, TRUE);
-
-		free_generalNames(gn, FALSE);
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_SERIAL:
-	    *authKeySerialNumber = object;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
+				free_generalNames(gn, FALSE);
+			}
+			break;
+		case AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_SERIAL:
+			*authKeySerialNumber = object;
+			break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
+	parser->destroy(parser);
 }
 
-/*
- * extracts an authorityInfoAcess location
+/**
+ * Extracts an authorityInfoAcess location
  */
-static void
-parse_authorityInfoAccess(chunk_t blob, int level0, chunk_t *accessLocation)
+static void parse_authorityInfoAccess(chunk_t blob, int level0,
+									  chunk_t *accessLocation)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    int accessMethod = OID_UNKNOWN;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	int accessMethod = OID_UNKNOWN;
 
-    while (objectID < AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(authorityInfoAccessObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	case AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_METHOD:
-	    accessMethod = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION:
-	    {
-		switch (accessMethod)
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(authInfoAccessObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+	
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		switch (objectID)
 		{
-		case OID_OCSP:
-		    if (*object.ptr == ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6)
-		    {
-			if (asn1_length(&object) == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
-			    return;
-
-			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-			    DBG_log("  '%.*s'",(int)object.len, object.ptr)
-			)
-
-			/* only HTTP(S) URIs accepted */
-			if (strncasecmp(object.ptr, "http", 4) == 0)
+		case AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_METHOD:
+			accessMethod = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION:
 			{
-			    *accessLocation = object;
-			    return;
+				switch (accessMethod)
+				{
+				case OID_OCSP:
+					if (*object.ptr == ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6)
+					{
+						if (asn1_length(&object) == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+						{
+							goto end;
+						}
+						DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+							DBG_log("  '%.*s'",(int)object.len, object.ptr)
+						)
+
+						/* only HTTP(S) URIs accepted */
+						if (strncasecmp(object.ptr, "http", 4) == 0)
+						{
+							*accessLocation = object;
+							goto end;
+						}
+					}
+					plog("warning: ignoring OCSP InfoAccessLocation with unkown protocol");
+					break;
+				default:
+					/* unkown accessMethod, ignoring */
+					break;
+				}
 			}
-		    }
-		    plog("warning: ignoring OCSP InfoAccessLocation with unkown protocol");
-		    break;
+			break;
 		default:
-		    /* unkown accessMethod, ignoring */
-		    break;
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-
+	
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
 }
 
-/*
- * extracts extendedKeyUsage OIDs
+/**
+ * Extracts extendedKeyUsage OIDs
  */
-static bool
-parse_extendedKeyUsage(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static bool parse_extendedKeyUsage(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	bool ocsp_signing = FALSE;
 
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(extendedKeyUsageObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+	
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		if (objectID == EXT_KEY_USAGE_PURPOSE_ID
+		&& asn1_known_oid(object) == OID_OCSP_SIGNING)
+		{
+			ocsp_signing = TRUE;
+		}
+	}
+	parser->destroy(parser);
 
-    while (objectID < EXT_KEY_USAGE_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(extendedKeyUsageObjects, &objectID
-			    , &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
-
-	if (objectID == EXT_KEY_USAGE_PURPOSE_ID
-	&& known_oid(object) == OID_OCSP_SIGNING)
-	    return TRUE;
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return FALSE;
+	return ocsp_signing;
 }
 
-/*  extracts one or several crlDistributionPoints and puts them into
- *  a chained list
+/**
+ * Extracts one or several crlDistributionPoints
+ * and puts them into a chained list
  */
-static generalName_t*
-parse_crlDistributionPoints(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+static generalName_t* parse_crlDistributionPoints(chunk_t blob, int level0)
 {
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
 
-    generalName_t *top_gn = NULL;      /* top of the chained list */
-    generalName_t **tail_gn = &top_gn; /* tail of the chained list */
+	generalName_t *top_gn = NULL;      /* top of the chained list */
+	generalName_t **tail_gn = &top_gn; /* tail of the chained list */
 
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < CRL_DIST_POINTS_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(crlDistributionPointsObjects, &objectID,
-			    &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return NULL;
-
-	if (objectID == CRL_DIST_POINTS_FULLNAME)
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(crlDistributionPointsObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+	
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
 	{
-	    generalName_t *gn = parse_generalNames(object, level+1, TRUE);
-	    /* append extracted generalNames to existing chained list */
-	    *tail_gn = gn;
-	    /* find new tail of the chained list */
-            while (gn != NULL)
-	    {
-		tail_gn = &gn->next;  gn = gn->next;
-	    }
+		if (objectID == CRL_DIST_POINTS_FULLNAME)
+		{
+			generalName_t *gn;
+
+			gn = parse_generalNames(object, parser->get_level(parser)+1, TRUE);
+			/* append extracted generalNames to existing chained list */
+			*tail_gn = gn;
+			/* find new tail of the chained list */
+			while (gn != NULL)
+			{
+				tail_gn = &gn->next;  gn = gn->next;
+			}
+		}
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    return top_gn;
-}
+	parser->destroy(parser);
 
+	return top_gn;
+}
 
-/*
+/**
  *  Parses an X.509v3 certificate
  */
-bool
-parse_x509cert(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509cert_t *cert)
+bool parse_x509cert(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509cert_t *cert)
 {
-    u_char  buf[BUF_LEN];
-    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
-    bool critical;
-    chunk_t object;
-    u_int level;
-    int objectID = 0;
-    int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
-
-    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
-
-    while (objectID < X509_OBJ_ROOF)
-    {
-	if (!extract_object(certObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
-	     return FALSE;
-
-	/* those objects which will parsed further need the next higher level */
-	level++;
-
-	switch (objectID) {
-	case X509_OBJ_CERTIFICATE:
-	    cert->certificate = object;
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_TBS_CERTIFICATE:
-	    cert->tbsCertificate = object;
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_VERSION:
-	    cert->version = (object.len) ? (1+(u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  v%d", cert->version);
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER:
-	    cert->serialNumber = object;
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
-	    cert->sigAlg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_ISSUER:
-	    cert->issuer = object;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE:
-	    cert->notBefore = parse_time(object, level);
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_NOT_AFTER:
-	    cert->notAfter = parse_time(object, level);
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT:
-	    cert->subject = object;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
-		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM:
-	    if (parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL) == OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
-		cert->subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
-	    else
-	    {
-		plog("  unsupported public key algorithm");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY:
-	    if (ctx.blobs[4].len > 0 && *ctx.blobs[4].ptr == 0x00)
-	    {
-		/* skip initial bit string octet defining 0 unused bits */
-		ctx.blobs[4].ptr++; ctx.blobs[4].len--;
-	    }
-	    else
-	    {
-		plog("  invalid RSA public key format");
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:
-	    cert->subjectPublicKey = object;
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_MODULUS:
-	    if (object.len < RSA_MIN_OCTETS + 1)
-	    {
-		plog("  " RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    if (object.len > RSA_MAX_OCTETS + (size_t)(*object.ptr == 0x00))
-	    {
-		plog("  " RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH);
-		return FALSE;
-	    }
-	    cert->modulus = object;
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
-	    cert->publicExponent = object;
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
-	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_CRITICAL:
-	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
-	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
-		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
-	    )
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
-	    {
-		switch (extn_oid) {
-		case OID_SUBJECT_KEY_ID:
-		    cert->subjectKeyID =
-			parse_keyIdentifier(object, level, FALSE);
-		    break;
-		case OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
-		    cert->subjectAltName =
-			parse_generalNames(object, level, FALSE);
-		    break;
-		case OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
-		    cert->isCA =
-			parse_basicConstraints(object, level);
-		    break;
-		case OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS:
-		    cert->crlDistributionPoints =
-			parse_crlDistributionPoints(object, level);
-		    break;
-		 case OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID:
-		    parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
-			, &cert->authKeyID, &cert->authKeySerialNumber);
-		    break;
-		case OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS:
-		    parse_authorityInfoAccess(object, level, &cert->accessLocation);
-		    break;
-		case OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
-		    cert->isOcspSigner = parse_extendedKeyUsage(object, level);
-		    break;
-		case OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL:
-		case OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL:
-		case OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL:
-		case OID_NS_COMMENT:
-		    if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&object, ASN1_IA5STRING
-		    , level, oid_names[extn_oid].name))
-		    {
-			return FALSE;
-		    }
-		    break;
+	u_char  buf[BUF_LEN];
+	asn1_parser_t *parser;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID;
+	int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+	bool critical;
+	bool success = FALSE;
+
+	parser = asn1_parser_create(certObjects, blob);
+	parser->set_top_level(parser, level0);
+
+	while (parser->iterate(parser, &objectID, &object))
+	{
+		u_int level = parser->get_level(parser) + 1;
+		
+		switch (objectID) {
+		case X509_OBJ_CERTIFICATE:
+			cert->certificate = object;
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_TBS_CERTIFICATE:
+			cert->tbsCertificate = object;
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_VERSION:
+			cert->version = (object.len) ? (1+(u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  v%d", cert->version);
+			)
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+			cert->serialNumber = object;
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
+			cert->sigAlg = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_ISSUER:
+			cert->issuer = object;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+				DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+			)
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE:
+			cert->notBefore = asn1_parse_time(object, level);
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_NOT_AFTER:
+			cert->notAfter = asn1_parse_time(object, level);
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT:
+			cert->subject = object;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+				DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+			)
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_INFO:
+			cert->public_key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PUBLIC_KEY,
+						KEY_ANY, BUILD_BLOB_ASN1_DER, object, BUILD_END);
+			if (cert->public_key == NULL)
+			{
+				goto end;
+			}
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
+			extn_oid = asn1_known_oid(object);
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_CRITICAL:
+			critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+				DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+			)
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
+			{
+				switch (extn_oid) {
+				case OID_SUBJECT_KEY_ID:
+					if (!asn1_parse_simple_object(&object, ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
+												  level, "keyIdentifier"))
+					{
+						goto end;
+					}
+					cert->subjectKeyID = object;
+					break;
+				case OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
+					cert->subjectAltName =
+						parse_generalNames(object, level, FALSE);
+					break;
+				case OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
+					cert->isCA =
+						parse_basicConstraints(object, level);
+					break;
+				case OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS:
+					cert->crlDistributionPoints =
+						parse_crlDistributionPoints(object, level);
+					break;
+				 case OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID:
+					parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
+						, &cert->authKeyID, &cert->authKeySerialNumber);
+					break;
+				case OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS:
+					parse_authorityInfoAccess(object, level, &cert->accessLocation);
+					break;
+				case OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
+					cert->isOcspSigner = parse_extendedKeyUsage(object, level);
+					break;
+				case OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL:
+				case OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL:
+				case OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL:
+				case OID_NS_COMMENT:
+					if (!asn1_parse_simple_object(&object, ASN1_IA5STRING
+					, level, oid_names[extn_oid].name))
+					{
+						goto end;
+					}
+					break;
+				default:
+					break;
+				}
+			}
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
+			cert->algorithm = asn1_parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+			break;
+		case X509_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
+			cert->signature = object;
+			break;
 		default:
-		    break;
+			break;
 		}
-	    }
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
-	    cert->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
-	    break;
-	case X509_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
-	    cert->signature = object;
-	    break;
-	default:
-	    break;
 	}
-	objectID++;
-    }
-    time(&cert->installed);
-    return TRUE;
+	success = parser->success(parser);
+	time(&cert->installed);
+
+end:
+	parser->destroy(parser);
+	return success;
 }
 
-/* verify the validity of a certificate by
+/**
+ * Verify the validity of a certificate by
  * checking the notBefore and notAfter dates
  */
-err_t
-check_validity(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until)
+err_t check_validity(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until)
 {
-    time_t current_time;
+	time_t current_time;
 
-    time(&current_time);
-    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
-	DBG_log("  not before  : %s", timetoa(&cert->notBefore, TRUE));
-	DBG_log("  current time: %s", timetoa(&current_time, TRUE));
-	DBG_log("  not after   : %s", timetoa(&cert->notAfter, TRUE));
-    )
-
-    if (cert->notAfter < *until) *until = cert->notAfter;
+	time(&current_time);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+		DBG_log("  not before  : %T", &cert->notBefore, TRUE);
+		DBG_log("  current time: %T", &current_time, TRUE);
+		DBG_log("  not after   : %T", &cert->notAfter, TRUE);
+	)
 
-    if (current_time < cert->notBefore)
-	return "certificate is not valid yet";
-    if (current_time > cert->notAfter)
-	return "certificate has expired";
-    else
-	return NULL;
+	if (cert->notAfter < *until)
+	{
+		*until = cert->notAfter;
+	}
+	if (current_time < cert->notBefore)
+	{
+		return "certificate is not valid yet";
+	}
+	if (current_time > cert->notAfter)
+	{
+		return "certificate has expired";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+		return NULL;
+	}
 }
 
-/*
- *  verifies a X.509 certificate
+/**
+ * Verifies a X.509 certificate
  */
-bool
-verify_x509cert(const x509cert_t *cert, bool strict, time_t *until)
+bool verify_x509cert(const x509cert_t *cert, bool strict, time_t *until)
 {
-    int pathlen;
+	int pathlen;
 
-    *until = cert->notAfter;
+	*until = cert->notAfter;
 
-    for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
-    {
-	x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
-	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	err_t ugh = NULL;
-
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
-	    DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
-	    DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
-	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
-	    }
-	)
+	for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
+	{
+		x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
+		u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		err_t ugh = NULL;
 
-	ugh = check_validity(cert, until);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+			DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+			DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
+			if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+					, buf, BUF_LEN);
+				DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
+			}
+		)
 
-	if (ugh != NULL)
-	{
-	    plog("%s", ugh);
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
+		ugh = check_validity(cert, until);
 
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("certificate is valid")
-	)
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+			plog("%s", ugh);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
 
-	lock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
-	issuer_cert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
-	    , cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("certificate is valid")
+		)
 
-	if (issuer_cert == NULL)
-	{
-	    plog("issuer cacert not found");
-	    unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
-	)
+		lock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+		issuer_cert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+			, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
 
-	if (!check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature
-			   , cert->algorithm, cert->algorithm, issuer_cert))
-	{
-	    plog("certificate signature is invalid");
-	    unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
-	    return FALSE;
-	}
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
-	)
-	unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+		if (issuer_cert == NULL)
+		{
+			plog("issuer cacert not found");
+			unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+		)
 
-	/* check if cert is a self-signed root ca */
-	if (pathlen > 0 && same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
-	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
-	    )
-	    return TRUE;
-	}
-	else
-	{
-	    time_t nextUpdate = *until;
-	    time_t revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
-	    crl_reason_t revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
-
-	    /* first check certificate revocation using ocsp */
-	    cert_status_t status = verify_by_ocsp(cert, &nextUpdate
-		, &revocationDate, &revocationReason);
-
-	    /* if ocsp service is not available then fall back to crl */
-	    if ((status == CERT_UNDEFINED)
-	    ||  (status == CERT_UNKNOWN && strict))
-	    {
-		status = verify_by_crl(cert, &nextUpdate, &revocationDate
-		    , &revocationReason);
-	    }
- 
-	    switch (status)
-	    {
-	    case CERT_GOOD:
-		/* if status information is stale */
-		if (strict && nextUpdate < time(NULL))
+		if (!x509_check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature,
+								  cert->algorithm, issuer_cert))
 		{
-		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-			DBG_log("certificate is good but status is stale")
-		    )
-		    remove_x509_public_key(cert);
-		    return FALSE;
+			plog("certificate signature is invalid");
+			unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+			return FALSE;
 		}
 		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		    DBG_log("certificate is good")
+			DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
 		)
-		
-		/* with strict crl policy the public key must have the same
-		 * lifetime as the validity of the ocsp status or crl lifetime
-		 */
-		if (strict && nextUpdate < *until)
-		    *until = nextUpdate;
-		break;
-	    case CERT_REVOKED:
-		plog("certificate was revoked on %s, reason: %s"
-		    , timetoa(&revocationDate, TRUE)
-		    , enum_name(&crl_reason_names, revocationReason));
-		remove_x509_public_key(cert);
-		return FALSE;
-	    case CERT_UNKNOWN:
-	    case CERT_UNDEFINED:
-	    default:
-		plog("certificate status unknown");
-		if (strict)
+		unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+
+		/* check if cert is a self-signed root ca */
+		if (pathlen > 0 && same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
 		{
-		    remove_x509_public_key(cert);
-		    return FALSE;
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
+			)
+			return TRUE;
 		}
-		break;
-	    }
-	}
+		else
+		{
+			time_t nextUpdate = *until;
+			time_t revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+			crl_reason_t revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
 
-	/* go up one step in the trust chain */
-	cert = issuer_cert;
-    }
-    plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
-    return FALSE;
+			/* first check certificate revocation using ocsp */
+			cert_status_t status = verify_by_ocsp(cert, &nextUpdate
+				, &revocationDate, &revocationReason);
+
+			/* if ocsp service is not available then fall back to crl */
+			if ((status == CERT_UNDEFINED)
+			||  (status == CERT_UNKNOWN && strict))
+			{
+				status = verify_by_crl(cert, &nextUpdate, &revocationDate
+					, &revocationReason);
+			}
+
+			switch (status)
+			{
+			case CERT_GOOD:
+				/* if status information is stale */
+				if (strict && nextUpdate < time(NULL))
+				{
+					DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+						DBG_log("certificate is good but status is stale")
+					)
+					remove_x509_public_key(cert);
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+				DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+					DBG_log("certificate is good")
+				)
+				
+				/* with strict crl policy the public key must have the same
+				 * lifetime as the validity of the ocsp status or crl lifetime
+				 */
+				if (strict && nextUpdate < *until)
+				{
+					*until = nextUpdate;
+				}
+				break;
+			case CERT_REVOKED:
+				plog("certificate was revoked on %T, reason: %N"
+					, &revocationDate, TRUE
+					, crl_reason_names, revocationReason);
+				remove_x509_public_key(cert);
+				return FALSE;
+			case CERT_UNKNOWN:
+			case CERT_UNDEFINED:
+			default:
+				plog("certificate status unknown");
+				if (strict)
+				{
+					remove_x509_public_key(cert);
+					return FALSE;
+				}
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
+		/* go up one step in the trust chain */
+		cert = issuer_cert;
+	}
+	plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
+	return FALSE;
 }
 
-/*
- *  list all X.509 certs in a chained list
+/**
+ * List all X.509 certs in a chained list
  */
-void
-list_x509cert_chain(const char *caption, x509cert_t* cert, u_char auth_flags
- , bool utc)
+void list_x509cert_chain(const char *caption, x509cert_t* cert,
+						 u_char auth_flags, bool utc)
 {
-    bool first = TRUE;
-    time_t now;
+	bool first = TRUE;
+	time_t now;
 
-    /* determine the current time */
-    time(&now);
+	/* determine the current time */
+	time(&now);
 
-    while (cert != NULL)
-    {
-	if (auth_flags == AUTH_NONE || (auth_flags & cert->authority_flags))
+	while (cert != NULL)
 	{
-	    unsigned keysize;
-	    char keyid[KEYID_BUF];
-	    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
-	    cert_t c;
-
-	    c.type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
-	    c.u.x509 = cert;
-
-	    if (first)
-	    {
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 %s Certificates:", caption);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
-		first = FALSE;
-	    }
-
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, count: %d", timetoa(&cert->installed, utc),
-		cert->count);
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subject:  '%s'", buf);
-	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
-	    datatot(cert->serialNumber.ptr, cert->serialNumber.len, ':'
-		, buf, BUF_LEN);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:    %s", buf);
-	    form_keyid(cert->publicExponent, cert->modulus, keyid, &keysize);
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:    %4d RSA Key %s%s"
-		, 8*keysize, keyid
-		, cert->smartcard ? ", on smartcard" :
-		(has_private_key(c)? ", has private key" : ""));
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       validity:  not before %s %s",
-		timetoa(&cert->notBefore, utc),
-		(cert->notBefore < now)?"ok":"fatal (not valid yet)");
-	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  not after  %s %s",
-		timetoa(&cert->notAfter, utc),
-		check_expiry(cert->notAfter, CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
-	    if (cert->subjectKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(cert->subjectKeyID.ptr, cert->subjectKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subjkey:   %s", buf);
-	    }
-	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
-		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
-	    }
-	    if (cert->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
-	    {
-		datatot(cert->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, cert->authKeySerialNumber.len
-		    , ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
-		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
-	    }
+		if (auth_flags == AUTH_NONE || (auth_flags & cert->authority_flags))
+		{
+			u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+			public_key_t *key = cert->public_key;
+			cert_t c;
+
+			c.type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
+			c.u.x509 = cert;
+
+			if (first)
+			{
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 %s Certificates:", caption);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+				first = FALSE;
+			}
+
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%T, count: %d", &cert->installed, utc,
+				cert->count);
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subject:  '%s'", buf);
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+			datatot(cert->serialNumber.ptr, cert->serialNumber.len, ':',
+				 buf, BUF_LEN);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:    %s", buf);
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       validity:  not before %T %s",
+				&cert->notBefore, utc,
+				(cert->notBefore < now)?"ok":"fatal (not valid yet)");
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  not after  %T %s",
+				&cert->notAfter, utc,
+				check_expiry(cert->notAfter, CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:    %N %4d bits%s",
+				key_type_names, key->get_type(key),
+				key->get_keysize(key) * BITS_PER_BYTE,				
+				cert->smartcard ? ", on smartcard" :
+				(has_private_key(c)? ", has private key" : ""));
+			whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       keyid:     %Y",
+				key->get_id(key, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1));
+			if (cert->subjectKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(cert->subjectKeyID.ptr, cert->subjectKeyID.len, ':',
+						buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subjkey:   %s", buf);
+			}
+			if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':',
+						buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+			}
+			if (cert->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+				datatot(cert->authKeySerialNumber.ptr,
+						cert->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+				whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+			}
+		}
+		cert = cert->next;
 	}
-	cert = cert->next;
-    }
 }
 
-/*
- *  list all X.509 end certificates in a chained list
+/**
+ * List all X.509 end certificates in a chained list
  */
-void
-list_x509_end_certs(bool utc)
+void list_x509_end_certs(bool utc)
 {
-    list_x509cert_chain("End", x509certs, AUTH_NONE, utc);
+	list_x509cert_chain("End", x509certs, AUTH_NONE, utc);
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/x509.h b/src/pluto/x509.h
index 67730bbd0..ab0fbac9e 100644
--- a/src/pluto/x509.h
+++ b/src/pluto/x509.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  * Copyright (C) 2000 Andreas Hess, Patric Lichtsteiner, Roger Wegmann
  * Copyright (C) 2001 Marco Bertossa, Andreas Schleiss
  * Copyright (C) 2002 Mario Strasser
- * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2009 Andreas Steffen, Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
  *
  * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
  * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
@@ -13,28 +13,29 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: x509.h 3252 2007-10-06 21:24:50Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _X509_H
 #define _X509_H
 
-#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include <credentials/keys/public_key.h>
+#include <credentials/keys/private_key.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
 #include "id.h"
 
 /* Definition of generalNames kinds */
 
 typedef enum {
-    GN_OTHER_NAME =		0,
-    GN_RFC822_NAME =		1,
-    GN_DNS_NAME =		2,
-    GN_X400_ADDRESS =		3,
-    GN_DIRECTORY_NAME =		4,
-    GN_EDI_PARTY_NAME = 	5,
-    GN_URI =			6,
-    GN_IP_ADDRESS =		7,
-    GN_REGISTERED_ID =		8
+	GN_OTHER_NAME =             0,
+	GN_RFC822_NAME =            1,
+	GN_DNS_NAME =               2,
+	GN_X400_ADDRESS =           3,
+	GN_DIRECTORY_NAME =         4,
+	GN_EDI_PARTY_NAME =         5,
+	GN_URI =                    6,
+	GN_IP_ADDRESS =             7,
+	GN_REGISTERED_ID =          8
 } generalNames_t;
 
 /* access structure for a GeneralName */
@@ -42,9 +43,9 @@ typedef enum {
 typedef struct generalName generalName_t;
 
 struct generalName {
-    generalName_t   *next;
-    generalNames_t  kind;
-    chunk_t         name;
+	generalName_t   *next;
+	generalNames_t  kind;
+	chunk_t         name;
 };
 
 /* access structure for an X.509v3 certificate */
@@ -52,46 +53,42 @@ struct generalName {
 typedef struct x509cert x509cert_t;
 
 struct x509cert {
-  x509cert_t     *next;
-  time_t	 installed;
-  int		 count;
-  bool		 smartcard;
-  u_char	 authority_flags;
-  chunk_t	 certificate;
-  chunk_t          tbsCertificate;
-  u_int              version;
-  chunk_t            serialNumber;
-                /*   signature */
-  int                  sigAlg;
-  chunk_t            issuer;
-                /*   validity */
-  time_t               notBefore;
-  time_t               notAfter;
-  chunk_t            subject;
-                /*   subjectPublicKeyInfo */
-  enum pubkey_alg      subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm;
-  chunk_t              subjectPublicKey;
-  chunk_t                modulus;
-  chunk_t                publicExponent;
-                /*   issuerUniqueID */
-                /*   subjectUniqueID */
-                /*   v3 extensions */
-                /*   extension */
-                /*     extension */
-                /*       extnID */
-                /*       critical */
-                /*       extnValue */
-  bool			   isCA;
-  bool			   isOcspSigner; /* ocsp */
-  chunk_t		   subjectKeyID;
-  chunk_t		   authKeyID;
-  chunk_t		   authKeySerialNumber;
-  chunk_t		   accessLocation; /* ocsp */
-  generalName_t		   *subjectAltName;
-  generalName_t		   *crlDistributionPoints;
-		/* signatureAlgorithm */
-  int                algorithm;
-  chunk_t          signature;
+	x509cert_t     *next;
+	time_t         installed;
+	int            count;
+	bool           smartcard;
+	u_char         authority_flags;
+	chunk_t        certificate;
+	chunk_t          tbsCertificate;
+	u_int              version;
+	chunk_t            serialNumber;
+				  /*   signature */
+	int                  sigAlg;
+  	chunk_t            issuer;
+				  /*   validity */
+	time_t               notBefore;
+	time_t               notAfter;
+	chunk_t            subject;
+	public_key_t       *public_key;  
+				  /*   issuerUniqueID */
+				  /*   subjectUniqueID */
+				  /*   v3 extensions */
+				  /*   extension */
+				  /*     extension */
+				  /*       extnID */
+				  /*       critical */
+				  /*       extnValue */
+	bool                     isCA;
+	bool                     isOcspSigner; /* ocsp */
+	chunk_t                  subjectKeyID;
+	chunk_t                  authKeyID;
+	chunk_t                  authKeySerialNumber;
+	chunk_t                  accessLocation; /* ocsp */
+	generalName_t            *subjectAltName;
+	generalName_t            *crlDistributionPoints;
+				  /* signatureAlgorithm */
+	int                algorithm;
+	chunk_t          signature;
 };
 
 /* used for initialization */
@@ -105,33 +102,37 @@ extern bool same_x509cert(const x509cert_t *a, const x509cert_t *b);
 extern void hex_str(chunk_t bin, chunk_t *str);
 extern int dn_count_wildcards(chunk_t dn);
 extern int dntoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn);
-extern int dntoa_or_null(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn
-    , const char* null_dn);
+extern int dntoa_or_null(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn,
+						 const char* null_dn);
 extern err_t atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn);
 extern void gntoid(struct id *id, const generalName_t *gn);
-extern void compute_subjectKeyID(x509cert_t *cert, chunk_t subjectKeyID);
+extern bool compute_subjectKeyID(x509cert_t *cert, chunk_t subjectKeyID);
 extern void select_x509cert_id(x509cert_t *cert, struct id *end_id);
 extern bool parse_x509cert(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509cert_t *cert);
 extern time_t parse_time(chunk_t blob, int level0);
 extern void parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0
-    , chunk_t *authKeyID, chunk_t *authKeySerialNumber);
+	, chunk_t *authKeyID, chunk_t *authKeySerialNumber);
 extern chunk_t get_directoryName(chunk_t blob, int level, bool implicit);
 extern err_t check_validity(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until);
-extern bool check_signature(chunk_t tbs, chunk_t sig, int digest_alg
-    , int enc_alg, const x509cert_t *issuer_cert);
+
+extern bool x509_check_signature(chunk_t tbs, chunk_t sig, int algorithm,
+								 const x509cert_t *issuer_cert);
+extern chunk_t x509_build_signature(chunk_t tbs, int algorithm,
+									private_key_t *key, bool bit_string);
+
 extern bool verify_x509cert(const x509cert_t *cert, bool strict, time_t *until);
 extern x509cert_t* add_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
-extern x509cert_t* get_x509cert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
-    , x509cert_t* chain);
-extern void build_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, const RSA_public_key_t *cert_key
-    , const RSA_private_key_t *signer_key);
+extern x509cert_t* get_x509cert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid,
+								x509cert_t* chain);
+extern void build_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, public_key_t *cert_key,
+						   private_key_t *signer_key);
 extern chunk_t build_subjectAltNames(generalName_t *subjectAltNames);
 extern void share_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
 extern void release_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
 extern void free_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
 extern void store_x509certs(x509cert_t **firstcert, bool strict);
-extern void list_x509cert_chain(const char *caption, x509cert_t* cert
-    , u_char auth_flags, bool utc);
+extern void list_x509cert_chain(const char *caption, x509cert_t* cert,
+								u_char auth_flags, bool utc);
 extern void list_x509_end_certs(bool utc);
 extern void free_generalNames(generalName_t* gn, bool free_name);
 
diff --git a/src/pluto/xauth.c b/src/pluto/xauth.c
index 8f4dc2460..af2d72d71 100644
--- a/src/pluto/xauth.c
+++ b/src/pluto/xauth.c
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: xauth.c 3738 2008-04-02 19:04:45Z andreas $
  */
 
 #include <dlfcn.h>
@@ -29,51 +27,51 @@ void
 xauth_init(void)
 {
 #ifdef XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB
-    xauth_module.handle = dlopen(XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB, RTLD_NOW);
+	xauth_module.handle = dlopen(XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB, RTLD_NOW);
 
-    if (xauth_module.handle != NULL)
-    {
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    DBG_log("xauth module '%s' loading'", XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB)
-	)
-	xauth_module.get_secret = (bool (*) (const xauth_t*))
-			dlsym(xauth_module.handle, "get_secret");
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    if (xauth_module.get_secret != NULL)
-	    {
-		DBG_log("xauth module: found get_secret() function");
-	    }
-	)
-	xauth_module.verify_secret = (bool (*) (const xauth_peer_t*, const xauth_t*))
-			dlsym(xauth_module.handle, "verify_secret");
-	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-	    if (xauth_module.verify_secret != NULL)
-	    {
-		DBG_log("xauth module: found verify_secret() function");
-	    }
-	)
-    }
+	if (xauth_module.handle != NULL)
+	{
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("xauth module '%s' loading'", XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB)
+		)
+		xauth_module.get_secret = (bool (*) (const xauth_t*))
+						dlsym(xauth_module.handle, "get_secret");
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			if (xauth_module.get_secret != NULL)
+			{
+				DBG_log("xauth module: found get_secret() function");
+			}
+		)
+		xauth_module.verify_secret = (bool (*) (const xauth_peer_t*, const xauth_t*))
+						dlsym(xauth_module.handle, "verify_secret");
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			if (xauth_module.verify_secret != NULL)
+			{
+				DBG_log("xauth module: found verify_secret() function");
+			}
+		)
+	}
 #endif
-    /* any null function pointers will be filled in by default functions */
-    xauth_defaults();
+	/* any null function pointers will be filled in by default functions */
+	xauth_defaults();
 }
 
 void
 xauth_finalize(void)
 {
 #ifdef XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB
-    if (xauth_module.handle != NULL)
-    {
-	if (dlclose(xauth_module.handle))
-	{
-	    plog("failed to unload xauth module");
-	}
-	else
+	if (xauth_module.handle != NULL)
 	{
-	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
-		DBG_log("xauth module unloaded")
-	    )
+		if (dlclose(xauth_module.handle))
+		{
+			plog("failed to unload xauth module");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("xauth module unloaded")
+			)
+		}
 	}
-    }
 #endif
 }
diff --git a/src/pluto/xauth.h b/src/pluto/xauth.h
index fd7e5399f..8ab125ac4 100644
--- a/src/pluto/xauth.h
+++ b/src/pluto/xauth.h
@@ -11,8 +11,6 @@
  * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
  * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
  * for more details.
- *
- * RCSID $Id: xauth.h 3738 2008-04-02 19:04:45Z andreas $
  */
 
 #ifndef _XAUTH_H
@@ -26,20 +24,20 @@
 struct chunk_t;
 
 typedef struct {
-    char *conn_name;
-    char id[BUF_LEN];
-    char ip_address[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	char *conn_name;
+	char id[BUF_LEN];
+	char ip_address[ADDRTOT_BUF];
 } xauth_peer_t;
 
 typedef struct {
-    chunk_t user_name;
-    chunk_t user_password;
+	chunk_t user_name;
+	chunk_t user_password;
 } xauth_t;
 
 typedef struct {
-    void *handle;
-    bool (*get_secret) (xauth_t *xauth_secret);
-    bool (*verify_secret) (const xauth_peer_t *peer, const xauth_t *xauth_secret);
+	void *handle;
+	bool (*get_secret) (xauth_t *xauth_secret);
+	bool (*verify_secret) (const xauth_peer_t *peer, const xauth_t *xauth_secret);
 } xauth_module_t;
 
 extern xauth_module_t xauth_module;