[svn-upgrade] Integrating new upstream version, strongswan (4.1.1)

author: Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org> 2007-04-12 20:30:08 +0000
committer: Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org> 2007-04-12 20:30:08 +0000
commit: b0d8ed94fe9e74afb49fdf5f11e4add29879c65c (patch)
tree: b20167235628771046e940a82a906a6d0991ee4a /src/pluto
parent: ea939d07c84d2a8e51215458063fc05e9c399290 (diff)
download: vyos-strongswan-b0d8ed94fe9e74afb49fdf5f11e4add29879c65c.tar.gz
vyos-strongswan-b0d8ed94fe9e74afb49fdf5f11e4add29879c65c.zip
134 files changed, 70586 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/pluto/Makefile.am b/src/pluto/Makefile.am
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b1b848c76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/Makefile.am
@@ -0,0 +1,140 @@
+# Makefile.am was ported from the old Makefile the most
+# painless way. Only the most important options are included,
+# further work may be necessary here...
+
+ipsec_PROGRAMS = pluto _pluto_adns
+
+pluto_SOURCES = \
+ac.c ac.h \
+alg_info.c alg_info.h \
+asn1.c asn1.h \
+ca.c ca.h \
+certs.c certs.h \
+connections.c connections.h \
+constants.c constants.h \
+cookie.c cookie.h \
+crl.c crl.h \
+crypto.c crypto.h \
+db_ops.c db_ops.h \
+defs.c defs.h \
+demux.c demux.h \
+dnskey.c dnskey.h \
+dsa.c dsa.h \
+elgamal.c elgamal.h \
+fetch.c fetch.h \
+foodgroups.c foodgroups.h \
+gcryptfix.c gcryptfix.h \
+id.c id.h \
+ike_alg.c ike_alg.h \
+ipsec_doi.c ipsec_doi.h \
+kameipsec.h \
+kernel.c kernel.h \
+kernel_alg.c kernel_alg.h \
+kernel_netlink.c kernel_netlink.h \
+kernel_noklips.c kernel_noklips.h \
+kernel_pfkey.c kernel_pfkey.h \
+keys.c keys.h \
+lex.c lex.h \
+log.c log.h \
+md2.c md2.h \
+md5.c md5.h \
+modecfg.c modecfg.h \
+mp_defs.c mp_defs.h \
+nat_traversal.c nat_traversal.h \
+ocsp.c ocsp.h \
+oid.c oid.h \
+packet.c packet.h \
+pem.c pem.h \
+pgp.c pgp.h \
+pkcs1.c pkcs1.h \
+pkcs7.c pkcs7.h \
+plutomain.c \
+primegen.c smallprime.c \
+rcv_whack.c rcv_whack.h \
+rnd.c rnd.h \
+server.c server.h \
+sha1.c sha1.h \
+smartcard.c smartcard.h \
+spdb.c spdb.h \
+state.c state.h \
+timer.c timer.h \
+vendor.c vendor.h \
+virtual.c virtual.h \
+xauth.c xauth.h \
+x509.c x509.h \
+alg/ike_alg_aes.c alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c alg/ike_alg_twofish.c \
+alg/ike_alg_serpent.c alg/ike_alg_sha2.c alg/ike_alginit.c \
+linux26/netlink.h linux26/rtnetlink.h linux26/xfrm.h \
+rsaref/pkcs11t.h rsaref/pkcs11.h rsaref/unix.h rsaref/pkcs11f.h
+
+_pluto_adns_SOURCES = adns.c adns.h
+
+INCLUDES = \
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan \
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto \
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/whack
+
+AM_CFLAGS = \
+-DIPSEC_DIR=\"${ipsecdir}\" \
+-DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" \
+-DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" \
+-DSHARED_SECRETS_FILE=\"${confdir}/ipsec.secrets\" \
+-DKERNEL26_SUPPORT -DKERNEL26_HAS_KAME_DUPLICATES \
+-DPLUTO -DKLIPS -DDEBUG -DTHREADS
+
+pluto_LDADD = \
+$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a \
+$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto/libcrypto.a \
+-lgmp -lresolv -lpthread -ldl
+
+_pluto_adns_LDADD = \
+$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a \
+-lresolv -ldl
+
+dist_man_MANS = pluto.8 ipsec.secrets.5
+EXTRA_DIST = oid.pl oid.txt
+BUILT_SOURCES = oid.c oid.h
+MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = oid.c oid.h
+
+oid.c:	oid.txt oid.pl
+	$(PERL) oid.pl
+
+oid.h:	oid.txt oid.pl
+	$(PERL) oid.pl
+
+# This compile option activates the sending of a strongSwan VID
+if USE_VENDORID
+  AM_CFLAGS += -DVENDORID
+endif
+
+# This compile option activates the support of the Cisco VPN client
+if USE_CISCO_QUIRKS
+  AM_CFLAGS += -DCISCO_QUIRKS
+endif
+
+# This compile option activates NAT traversal with IPSec transport mode
+if USE_NAT_TRANSPORT
+  AM_CFLAGS += -DI_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+endif
+
+# This compile option activates dynamic URL fetching using libcurl
+if USE_LIBCURL
+  pluto_LDADD += -lcurl
+endif
+
+# This compile option activates dynamic LDAP CRL fetching
+if USE_LIBLDAP
+  pluto_LDADD += -lldap -llber
+endif
+
+install-exec-local :
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/cacerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/ocspcerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/certs
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/acerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/aacerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/crls
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/reqs
+	mkdir -p -m 700 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/private
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/Makefile.in b/src/pluto/Makefile.in
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f996a065
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/Makefile.in
@@ -0,0 +1,878 @@
+# Makefile.in generated by automake 1.9.6 from Makefile.am.
+# @configure_input@
+
+# Copyright (C) 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002,
+# 2003, 2004, 2005  Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+# This Makefile.in is free software; the Free Software Foundation
+# gives unlimited permission to copy and/or distribute it,
+# with or without modifications, as long as this notice is preserved.
+
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+# but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law; without
+# even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
+
+@SET_MAKE@
+
+# Makefile.am was ported from the old Makefile the most
+# painless way. Only the most important options are included,
+# further work may be necessary here...
+
+srcdir = @srcdir@
+top_srcdir = @top_srcdir@
+VPATH = @srcdir@
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+build_triplet = @build@
+host_triplet = @host@
+ipsec_PROGRAMS = pluto$(EXEEXT) _pluto_adns$(EXEEXT)
+
+# This compile option activates the sending of a strongSwan VID
+@USE_VENDORID_TRUE@am__append_1 = -DVENDORID
+
+# This compile option activates the support of the Cisco VPN client
+@USE_CISCO_QUIRKS_TRUE@am__append_2 = -DCISCO_QUIRKS
+
+# This compile option activates NAT traversal with IPSec transport mode
+@USE_NAT_TRANSPORT_TRUE@am__append_3 = -DI_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+
+# This compile option activates dynamic URL fetching using libcurl
+@USE_LIBCURL_TRUE@am__append_4 = -lcurl
+
+# This compile option activates dynamic LDAP CRL fetching
+@USE_LIBLDAP_TRUE@am__append_5 = -lldap -llber
+subdir = src/pluto
+DIST_COMMON = $(dist_man_MANS) $(srcdir)/Makefile.am \
+	$(srcdir)/Makefile.in TODO
+ACLOCAL_M4 = $(top_srcdir)/aclocal.m4
+am__aclocal_m4_deps = $(top_srcdir)/configure.in
+am__configure_deps = $(am__aclocal_m4_deps) $(CONFIGURE_DEPENDENCIES) \
+	$(ACLOCAL_M4)
+mkinstalldirs = $(install_sh) -d
+CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES =
+am__installdirs = "$(DESTDIR)$(ipsecdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(man5dir)" \
+	"$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)"
+ipsecPROGRAMS_INSTALL = $(INSTALL_PROGRAM)
+PROGRAMS = $(ipsec_PROGRAMS)
+am__pluto_adns_OBJECTS = adns.$(OBJEXT)
+_pluto_adns_OBJECTS = $(am__pluto_adns_OBJECTS)
+_pluto_adns_DEPENDENCIES =  \
+	$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a
+am_pluto_OBJECTS = ac.$(OBJEXT) alg_info.$(OBJEXT) asn1.$(OBJEXT) \
+	ca.$(OBJEXT) certs.$(OBJEXT) connections.$(OBJEXT) \
+	constants.$(OBJEXT) cookie.$(OBJEXT) crl.$(OBJEXT) \
+	crypto.$(OBJEXT) db_ops.$(OBJEXT) defs.$(OBJEXT) \
+	demux.$(OBJEXT) dnskey.$(OBJEXT) dsa.$(OBJEXT) \
+	elgamal.$(OBJEXT) fetch.$(OBJEXT) foodgroups.$(OBJEXT) \
+	gcryptfix.$(OBJEXT) id.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg.$(OBJEXT) \
+	ipsec_doi.$(OBJEXT) kernel.$(OBJEXT) kernel_alg.$(OBJEXT) \
+	kernel_netlink.$(OBJEXT) kernel_noklips.$(OBJEXT) \
+	kernel_pfkey.$(OBJEXT) keys.$(OBJEXT) lex.$(OBJEXT) \
+	log.$(OBJEXT) md2.$(OBJEXT) md5.$(OBJEXT) modecfg.$(OBJEXT) \
+	mp_defs.$(OBJEXT) nat_traversal.$(OBJEXT) ocsp.$(OBJEXT) \
+	oid.$(OBJEXT) packet.$(OBJEXT) pem.$(OBJEXT) pgp.$(OBJEXT) \
+	pkcs1.$(OBJEXT) pkcs7.$(OBJEXT) plutomain.$(OBJEXT) \
+	primegen.$(OBJEXT) smallprime.$(OBJEXT) rcv_whack.$(OBJEXT) \
+	rnd.$(OBJEXT) server.$(OBJEXT) sha1.$(OBJEXT) \
+	smartcard.$(OBJEXT) spdb.$(OBJEXT) state.$(OBJEXT) \
+	timer.$(OBJEXT) vendor.$(OBJEXT) virtual.$(OBJEXT) \
+	xauth.$(OBJEXT) x509.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg_aes.$(OBJEXT) \
+	ike_alg_blowfish.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg_twofish.$(OBJEXT) \
+	ike_alg_serpent.$(OBJEXT) ike_alg_sha2.$(OBJEXT) \
+	ike_alginit.$(OBJEXT)
+pluto_OBJECTS = $(am_pluto_OBJECTS)
+am__DEPENDENCIES_1 =
+pluto_DEPENDENCIES = $(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a \
+	$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto/libcrypto.a $(am__DEPENDENCIES_1) \
+	$(am__DEPENDENCIES_1)
+DEFAULT_INCLUDES = -I. -I$(srcdir)
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+am__depfiles_maybe = depfiles
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+	$(CPPFLAGS) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
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+	$(DEFAULT_INCLUDES) $(INCLUDES) $(AM_CPPFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) \
+	$(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS)
+CCLD = $(CC)
+LINK = $(LIBTOOL) --tag=CC --mode=link $(CCLD) $(AM_CFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) \
+	$(AM_LDFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) -o $@
+SOURCES = $(_pluto_adns_SOURCES) $(pluto_SOURCES)
+DIST_SOURCES = $(_pluto_adns_SOURCES) $(pluto_SOURCES)
+man5dir = $(mandir)/man5
+man8dir = $(mandir)/man8
+NROFF = nroff
+MANS = $(dist_man_MANS)
+ETAGS = etags
+CTAGS = ctags
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+INSTALL_SCRIPT = @INSTALL_SCRIPT@
+INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM = @INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM@
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+LEX = @LEX@
+LEXLIB = @LEXLIB@
+LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT = @LEX_OUTPUT_ROOT@
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+STRIP = @STRIP@
+USE_CISCO_QUIRKS_FALSE = @USE_CISCO_QUIRKS_FALSE@
+USE_CISCO_QUIRKS_TRUE = @USE_CISCO_QUIRKS_TRUE@
+USE_LEAK_DETECTIVE_FALSE = @USE_LEAK_DETECTIVE_FALSE@
+USE_LEAK_DETECTIVE_TRUE = @USE_LEAK_DETECTIVE_TRUE@
+USE_LIBCURL_FALSE = @USE_LIBCURL_FALSE@
+USE_LIBCURL_TRUE = @USE_LIBCURL_TRUE@
+USE_LIBLDAP_FALSE = @USE_LIBLDAP_FALSE@
+USE_LIBLDAP_TRUE = @USE_LIBLDAP_TRUE@
+USE_NAT_TRANSPORT_FALSE = @USE_NAT_TRANSPORT_FALSE@
+USE_NAT_TRANSPORT_TRUE = @USE_NAT_TRANSPORT_TRUE@
+USE_SMARTCARD_FALSE = @USE_SMARTCARD_FALSE@
+USE_SMARTCARD_TRUE = @USE_SMARTCARD_TRUE@
+USE_VENDORID_FALSE = @USE_VENDORID_FALSE@
+USE_VENDORID_TRUE = @USE_VENDORID_TRUE@
+VERSION = @VERSION@
+YACC = @YACC@
+YFLAGS = @YFLAGS@
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+build_cpu = @build_cpu@
+build_os = @build_os@
+build_vendor = @build_vendor@
+confdir = @confdir@
+datadir = @datadir@
+datarootdir = @datarootdir@
+docdir = @docdir@
+dvidir = @dvidir@
+eapdir = @eapdir@
+exec_prefix = @exec_prefix@
+host = @host@
+host_alias = @host_alias@
+host_cpu = @host_cpu@
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+host_vendor = @host_vendor@
+htmldir = @htmldir@
+includedir = @includedir@
+infodir = @infodir@
+install_sh = @install_sh@
+ipsecdir = @ipsecdir@
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+psdir = @psdir@
+sbindir = @sbindir@
+sharedstatedir = @sharedstatedir@
+sysconfdir = @sysconfdir@
+target_alias = @target_alias@
+pluto_SOURCES = \
+ac.c ac.h \
+alg_info.c alg_info.h \
+asn1.c asn1.h \
+ca.c ca.h \
+certs.c certs.h \
+connections.c connections.h \
+constants.c constants.h \
+cookie.c cookie.h \
+crl.c crl.h \
+crypto.c crypto.h \
+db_ops.c db_ops.h \
+defs.c defs.h \
+demux.c demux.h \
+dnskey.c dnskey.h \
+dsa.c dsa.h \
+elgamal.c elgamal.h \
+fetch.c fetch.h \
+foodgroups.c foodgroups.h \
+gcryptfix.c gcryptfix.h \
+id.c id.h \
+ike_alg.c ike_alg.h \
+ipsec_doi.c ipsec_doi.h \
+kameipsec.h \
+kernel.c kernel.h \
+kernel_alg.c kernel_alg.h \
+kernel_netlink.c kernel_netlink.h \
+kernel_noklips.c kernel_noklips.h \
+kernel_pfkey.c kernel_pfkey.h \
+keys.c keys.h \
+lex.c lex.h \
+log.c log.h \
+md2.c md2.h \
+md5.c md5.h \
+modecfg.c modecfg.h \
+mp_defs.c mp_defs.h \
+nat_traversal.c nat_traversal.h \
+ocsp.c ocsp.h \
+oid.c oid.h \
+packet.c packet.h \
+pem.c pem.h \
+pgp.c pgp.h \
+pkcs1.c pkcs1.h \
+pkcs7.c pkcs7.h \
+plutomain.c \
+primegen.c smallprime.c \
+rcv_whack.c rcv_whack.h \
+rnd.c rnd.h \
+server.c server.h \
+sha1.c sha1.h \
+smartcard.c smartcard.h \
+spdb.c spdb.h \
+state.c state.h \
+timer.c timer.h \
+vendor.c vendor.h \
+virtual.c virtual.h \
+xauth.c xauth.h \
+x509.c x509.h \
+alg/ike_alg_aes.c alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c alg/ike_alg_twofish.c \
+alg/ike_alg_serpent.c alg/ike_alg_sha2.c alg/ike_alginit.c \
+linux26/netlink.h linux26/rtnetlink.h linux26/xfrm.h \
+rsaref/pkcs11t.h rsaref/pkcs11.h rsaref/unix.h rsaref/pkcs11f.h
+
+_pluto_adns_SOURCES = adns.c adns.h
+INCLUDES = \
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan \
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto \
+-I$(top_srcdir)/src/whack
+
+AM_CFLAGS = -DIPSEC_DIR=\"${ipsecdir}\" -DIPSEC_CONFDIR=\"${confdir}\" \
+	-DIPSEC_PIDDIR=\"${piddir}\" \
+	-DSHARED_SECRETS_FILE=\"${confdir}/ipsec.secrets\" \
+	-DKERNEL26_SUPPORT -DKERNEL26_HAS_KAME_DUPLICATES -DPLUTO \
+	-DKLIPS -DDEBUG -DTHREADS $(am__append_1) $(am__append_2) \
+	$(am__append_3)
+pluto_LDADD = $(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a \
+	$(top_srcdir)/src/libcrypto/libcrypto.a -lgmp -lresolv \
+	-lpthread -ldl $(am__append_4) $(am__append_5)
+_pluto_adns_LDADD = \
+$(top_srcdir)/src/libfreeswan/libfreeswan.a \
+-lresolv -ldl
+
+dist_man_MANS = pluto.8 ipsec.secrets.5
+EXTRA_DIST = oid.pl oid.txt
+BUILT_SOURCES = oid.c oid.h
+MAINTAINERCLEANFILES = oid.c oid.h
+all: $(BUILT_SOURCES)
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) all-am
+
+.SUFFIXES:
+.SUFFIXES: .c .lo .o .obj
+$(srcdir)/Makefile.in:  $(srcdir)/Makefile.am  $(am__configure_deps)
+	@for dep in $?; do \
+	  case '$(am__configure_deps)' in \
+	    *$$dep*) \
+	      cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh \
+		&& exit 0; \
+	      exit 1;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	echo ' cd $(top_srcdir) && $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu  src/pluto/Makefile'; \
+	cd $(top_srcdir) && \
+	  $(AUTOMAKE) --gnu  src/pluto/Makefile
+.PRECIOUS: Makefile
+Makefile: $(srcdir)/Makefile.in $(top_builddir)/config.status
+	@case '$?' in \
+	  *config.status*) \
+	    cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh;; \
+	  *) \
+	    echo ' cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $(subdir)/$@ $(am__depfiles_maybe)'; \
+	    cd $(top_builddir) && $(SHELL) ./config.status $(subdir)/$@ $(am__depfiles_maybe);; \
+	esac;
+
+$(top_builddir)/config.status: $(top_srcdir)/configure $(CONFIG_STATUS_DEPENDENCIES)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+
+$(top_srcdir)/configure:  $(am__configure_deps)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+$(ACLOCAL_M4):  $(am__aclocal_m4_deps)
+	cd $(top_builddir) && $(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) am--refresh
+install-ipsecPROGRAMS: $(ipsec_PROGRAMS)
+	@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
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+
+mostlyclean-libtool:
+	-rm -f *.lo
+
+clean-libtool:
+	-rm -rf .libs _libs
+
+distclean-libtool:
+	-rm -f libtool
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+	l2='$(man_MANS) $(dist_man_MANS) $(nodist_man_MANS)'; \
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+	  case "$$i" in \
+	    *.5*) list="$$list $$i" ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	for i in $$list; do \
+	  if test -f $(srcdir)/$$i; then file=$(srcdir)/$$i; \
+	  else file=$$i; fi; \
+	  ext=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/^.*\\.//'`; \
+	  case "$$ext" in \
+	    5*) ;; \
+	    *) ext='5' ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  inst=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/\\.[0-9a-z]*$$//'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed -e 's/^.*\///'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed '$(transform)'`.$$ext; \
+	  echo " $(INSTALL_DATA) '$$file' '$(DESTDIR)$(man5dir)/$$inst'"; \
+	  $(INSTALL_DATA) "$$file" "$(DESTDIR)$(man5dir)/$$inst"; \
+	done
+uninstall-man5:
+	@$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL)
+	@list='$(man5_MANS) $(dist_man5_MANS) $(nodist_man5_MANS)'; \
+	l2='$(man_MANS) $(dist_man_MANS) $(nodist_man_MANS)'; \
+	for i in $$l2; do \
+	  case "$$i" in \
+	    *.5*) list="$$list $$i" ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	for i in $$list; do \
+	  ext=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/^.*\\.//'`; \
+	  case "$$ext" in \
+	    5*) ;; \
+	    *) ext='5' ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  inst=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/\\.[0-9a-z]*$$//'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed -e 's/^.*\///'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed '$(transform)'`.$$ext; \
+	  echo " rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(man5dir)/$$inst'"; \
+	  rm -f "$(DESTDIR)$(man5dir)/$$inst"; \
+	done
+install-man8: $(man8_MANS) $(man_MANS)
+	@$(NORMAL_INSTALL)
+	test -z "$(man8dir)" || $(mkdir_p) "$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)"
+	@list='$(man8_MANS) $(dist_man8_MANS) $(nodist_man8_MANS)'; \
+	l2='$(man_MANS) $(dist_man_MANS) $(nodist_man_MANS)'; \
+	for i in $$l2; do \
+	  case "$$i" in \
+	    *.8*) list="$$list $$i" ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	for i in $$list; do \
+	  if test -f $(srcdir)/$$i; then file=$(srcdir)/$$i; \
+	  else file=$$i; fi; \
+	  ext=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/^.*\\.//'`; \
+	  case "$$ext" in \
+	    8*) ;; \
+	    *) ext='8' ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  inst=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/\\.[0-9a-z]*$$//'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed -e 's/^.*\///'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed '$(transform)'`.$$ext; \
+	  echo " $(INSTALL_DATA) '$$file' '$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)/$$inst'"; \
+	  $(INSTALL_DATA) "$$file" "$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)/$$inst"; \
+	done
+uninstall-man8:
+	@$(NORMAL_UNINSTALL)
+	@list='$(man8_MANS) $(dist_man8_MANS) $(nodist_man8_MANS)'; \
+	l2='$(man_MANS) $(dist_man_MANS) $(nodist_man_MANS)'; \
+	for i in $$l2; do \
+	  case "$$i" in \
+	    *.8*) list="$$list $$i" ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	done; \
+	for i in $$list; do \
+	  ext=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/^.*\\.//'`; \
+	  case "$$ext" in \
+	    8*) ;; \
+	    *) ext='8' ;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  inst=`echo $$i | sed -e 's/\\.[0-9a-z]*$$//'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed -e 's/^.*\///'`; \
+	  inst=`echo $$inst | sed '$(transform)'`.$$ext; \
+	  echo " rm -f '$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)/$$inst'"; \
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+	done
+
+ID: $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS) $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '    { files[$$0] = 1; } \
+	       END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
+	mkid -fID $$unique
+tags: TAGS
+
+TAGS:  $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES)  $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) \
+		$(TAGS_FILES) $(LISP)
+	tags=; \
+	here=`pwd`; \
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)  $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '    { files[$$0] = 1; } \
+	       END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
+	if test -z "$(ETAGS_ARGS)$$tags$$unique"; then :; else \
+	  test -n "$$unique" || unique=$$empty_fix; \
+	  $(ETAGS) $(ETAGSFLAGS) $(AM_ETAGSFLAGS) $(ETAGS_ARGS) \
+	    $$tags $$unique; \
+	fi
+ctags: CTAGS
+CTAGS:  $(HEADERS) $(SOURCES)  $(TAGS_DEPENDENCIES) \
+		$(TAGS_FILES) $(LISP)
+	tags=; \
+	here=`pwd`; \
+	list='$(SOURCES) $(HEADERS)  $(LISP) $(TAGS_FILES)'; \
+	unique=`for i in $$list; do \
+	    if test -f "$$i"; then echo $$i; else echo $(srcdir)/$$i; fi; \
+	  done | \
+	  $(AWK) '    { files[$$0] = 1; } \
+	       END { for (i in files) print i; }'`; \
+	test -z "$(CTAGS_ARGS)$$tags$$unique" \
+	  || $(CTAGS) $(CTAGSFLAGS) $(AM_CTAGSFLAGS) $(CTAGS_ARGS) \
+	     $$tags $$unique
+
+GTAGS:
+	here=`$(am__cd) $(top_builddir) && pwd` \
+	  && cd $(top_srcdir) \
+	  && gtags -i $(GTAGS_ARGS) $$here
+
+distclean-tags:
+	-rm -f TAGS ID GTAGS GRTAGS GSYMS GPATH tags
+
+distdir: $(DISTFILES)
+	@srcdirstrip=`echo "$(srcdir)" | sed 's|.|.|g'`; \
+	topsrcdirstrip=`echo "$(top_srcdir)" | sed 's|.|.|g'`; \
+	list='$(DISTFILES)'; for file in $$list; do \
+	  case $$file in \
+	    $(srcdir)/*) file=`echo "$$file" | sed "s|^$$srcdirstrip/||"`;; \
+	    $(top_srcdir)/*) file=`echo "$$file" | sed "s|^$$topsrcdirstrip/|$(top_builddir)/|"`;; \
+	  esac; \
+	  if test -f $$file || test -d $$file; then d=.; else d=$(srcdir); fi; \
+	  dir=`echo "$$file" | sed -e 's,/[^/]*$$,,'`; \
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+	    $(mkdir_p) "$(distdir)$$dir"; \
+	  else \
+	    dir=''; \
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+	  if test -d $$d/$$file; then \
+	    if test -d $(srcdir)/$$file && test $$d != $(srcdir); then \
+	      cp -pR $(srcdir)/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	    fi; \
+	    cp -pR $$d/$$file $(distdir)$$dir || exit 1; \
+	  else \
+	    test -f $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || cp -p $$d/$$file $(distdir)/$$file \
+	    || exit 1; \
+	  fi; \
+	done
+check-am: all-am
+check: $(BUILT_SOURCES)
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) check-am
+all-am: Makefile $(PROGRAMS) $(MANS)
+installdirs:
+	for dir in "$(DESTDIR)$(ipsecdir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(man5dir)" "$(DESTDIR)$(man8dir)"; do \
+	  test -z "$$dir" || $(mkdir_p) "$$dir"; \
+	done
+install: $(BUILT_SOURCES)
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) install-am
+install-exec: install-exec-am
+install-data: install-data-am
+uninstall: uninstall-am
+
+install-am: all-am
+	@$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) install-exec-am install-data-am
+
+installcheck: installcheck-am
+install-strip:
+	$(MAKE) $(AM_MAKEFLAGS) INSTALL_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" \
+	  install_sh_PROGRAM="$(INSTALL_STRIP_PROGRAM)" INSTALL_STRIP_FLAG=-s \
+	  `test -z '$(STRIP)' || \
+	    echo "INSTALL_PROGRAM_ENV=STRIPPROG='$(STRIP)'"` install
+mostlyclean-generic:
+
+clean-generic:
+
+distclean-generic:
+	-test -z "$(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)" || rm -f $(CONFIG_CLEAN_FILES)
+
+maintainer-clean-generic:
+	@echo "This command is intended for maintainers to use"
+	@echo "it deletes files that may require special tools to rebuild."
+	-test -z "$(BUILT_SOURCES)" || rm -f $(BUILT_SOURCES)
+	-test -z "$(MAINTAINERCLEANFILES)" || rm -f $(MAINTAINERCLEANFILES)
+clean: clean-am
+
+clean-am: clean-generic clean-ipsecPROGRAMS clean-libtool \
+	mostlyclean-am
+
+distclean: distclean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+distclean-am: clean-am distclean-compile distclean-generic \
+	distclean-libtool distclean-tags
+
+dvi: dvi-am
+
+dvi-am:
+
+html: html-am
+
+info: info-am
+
+info-am:
+
+install-data-am: install-ipsecPROGRAMS install-man
+
+install-exec-am: install-exec-local
+
+install-info: install-info-am
+
+install-man: install-man5 install-man8
+
+installcheck-am:
+
+maintainer-clean: maintainer-clean-am
+	-rm -rf ./$(DEPDIR)
+	-rm -f Makefile
+maintainer-clean-am: distclean-am maintainer-clean-generic
+
+mostlyclean: mostlyclean-am
+
+mostlyclean-am: mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic \
+	mostlyclean-libtool
+
+pdf: pdf-am
+
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+
+ps: ps-am
+
+ps-am:
+
+uninstall-am: uninstall-info-am uninstall-ipsecPROGRAMS uninstall-man
+
+uninstall-man: uninstall-man5 uninstall-man8
+
+.PHONY: CTAGS GTAGS all all-am check check-am clean clean-generic \
+	clean-ipsecPROGRAMS clean-libtool ctags distclean \
+	distclean-compile distclean-generic distclean-libtool \
+	distclean-tags distdir dvi dvi-am html html-am info info-am \
+	install install-am install-data install-data-am install-exec \
+	install-exec-am install-exec-local install-info \
+	install-info-am install-ipsecPROGRAMS install-man install-man5 \
+	install-man8 install-strip installcheck installcheck-am \
+	installdirs maintainer-clean maintainer-clean-generic \
+	mostlyclean mostlyclean-compile mostlyclean-generic \
+	mostlyclean-libtool pdf pdf-am ps ps-am tags uninstall \
+	uninstall-am uninstall-info-am uninstall-ipsecPROGRAMS \
+	uninstall-man uninstall-man5 uninstall-man8
+
+
+oid.c:	oid.txt oid.pl
+	$(PERL) oid.pl
+
+oid.h:	oid.txt oid.pl
+	$(PERL) oid.pl
+
+install-exec-local :
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/cacerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/ocspcerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/certs
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/acerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/aacerts
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/crls
+	mkdir -p -m 755 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/reqs
+	mkdir -p -m 700 $(confdir)/ipsec.d/private
+# Tell versions [3.59,3.63) of GNU make to not export all variables.
+# Otherwise a system limit (for SysV at least) may be exceeded.
+.NOEXPORT:
diff --git a/src/pluto/TODO b/src/pluto/TODO
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7db4a9ebc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/TODO
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+Pluto TODO list
+===============
+RCSID $Id: TODO,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+
+- should all log entries that are for errors say ERROR?
+
+- Add a "plug-in" facility so that others can add features without
+  changing the mainline code.  This is how X509/LDAP/biometric stuff
+  might be added.
+
+- (internal change only) routines for outputting payloads should plug
+  "np" into the previous payload so that a payload generating routine
+  need not know what the next payload will be.  This may be more bother
+  than it is worth.
+
+- notifications, in and out
+  + delete
+  + first contact
+  + last contact? (not part of drafts, but would be nice)
+
+- Make DNS usage for asynchronous (non-blocking)
+  + looking up KEY and TXT records during negotiation
+  + perhaps not for whack command arguments and ipsec.secrets since the
+    library code uses gethostbyname
+
+- check that ipsec auto and whack to agree on what is worth reporting
+
+- Should Pluto (rather than ipsec manual) install %passthrough conns?
+  That way Pluto would know of them.
+
+- For responding to Road Warriors, how can we decide if the RW has
+  gone away?  The rekeying event is perhaps too imprecise.  Even if
+  rekeying event is good enough, how do we know if the route should be
+  torn down?  Perhaps limiting a Phase 1 ID to one IP address would
+  help (limiting a client subnet to one peer already helps).  Perhaps
+  (in some rate-limited way) we can take an ICMP host unreachable
+  as a hint to do some authenticated and reliable probe.
+
+- it is annoying that Pluto and auto have different models for public keys.
+  + auto specifies one per connection
+  + Pluto allows one to be specified per id
+  Two connections with the same id are going to use the same key:
+  the one of the last conn to be added!
+
+  I think auto ought to be fixed.  It is hard for Pluto to warn when
+  there is a conflict since the deletion of a connection doesn't
+  prompt auto to tell pluto to delete the public key.
+
+- different connections with the same host IP addresses are randomly
+  interchangeable until the ID payload is received.  At least for the
+  Responder case (and eventually for the opportunistic Initiator).
+  Worse, all Road Warriors must be considered to have the
+  indistinguishable IP addresses.  This affects ISAKMP SA negotiation.
+  Currently, there is little flexibility in this negotiation, so the
+  problem is limited to the specification of acceptable authentication
+  method(s).  Correct, but more work than seems worthwhile, would be
+  to select the conn based on what is proposed.
+
+  Warning about such confusion at connection definition time isn't great
+  because there is no confusion when explicitly initiated (a particular
+  conn is specified).  Warning for a Road Warrior conn is possible
+  since it cannot be initiated (and has been implemented).
+
+- characterize and ameliorate DOS attacks.  Lots of rate limiting.
+
+- look at John Denker's wish list: http://www.quintillion.com/moat/wish.list
+
+- use of random numbers needs to be audited.
+
+- unknown (not just unimplemented) transforms cause a negotiation to
+  fail.  Only the transform should be rejected.
+
+- we need better policy control.  Our present flags need to be
+  modulated (forbid, allow, offer, require)
+
+- HS will specify how --copyright and --version should behave
+
+- HS will initiate project-wide terminology replacing ISAKMP SA, IPSEC
+  SA, Protection Suite, Phase 1, Main Mode, Phase 2, Quick Mode, ...
+  Simplicity and clarity will be a goal.
+
+- interface discovery ought to match what is specified in ipsec.conf.
+  This probably means grokking /proc/net/ipsec_tncfg.  Documented in
+  ipsec_tncfg(5).  This won't do for Hugh's debugging setup.
+
+
+Protocol Issues
+===============
+
+Notification and delete payloads seem to be "escape hatches" for the
+protocols.  As such, anything implemented using them seems to be
+kludged without being well designed or well situated or well
+constrained in the protocols.  Often the precise meaning (if any) or
+usage is under specified.  An implementation is allowed to ignore
+them, so they cannot really matter (but they too often do).  Their
+specification ought to be scrutinized by a protocol guru.
+
+Any extra payload in last main mode message is not protected (not
+authenticated by hash).
+
+Should notification payloads be interpreted before or after the normal
+payloads (i.e. understood in the context of, executed in the context of).
+
+What is the precise result of an INITIAL_CONNECTION?  What is a
+"system" (eg. does Phase 1 Identity count)?  What is "earlier" or
+"before" (simultaneous negotiation is possible, with time being only a
+partial order)?  Could it be used for FINAL_CONTACT (needed too)?
+
+Blasting out a pile of UDP messages, especially to a particular
+destination, is likely to provoke message loss.  The exchanges are
+just that, so they individually are self-throttling.  But what about
+multiple exchanges simultaneously?  What about notifications (example:
+when shutting down, a flurry of delete notifications are likely).
+Should the RFCs be designed to protect against this problem?
+
+draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-03.txt rekeying is way too complicated.
+Our solution looks sound and simple (we have the Responder install the
+incoming IPSEC SA before sending its first reply).  In "2.2.1.4
+Responder Pre-Set-up Security Hole", the draft claims that setting up
+the IPSEC SA early leaves the Responder open to replay attacks.  I
+think that this is wrong: the Message Id, since it must not be reused,
+serves to prove that this isn't a replay.
+
+The details for notification messages suggested by
+draft-ietf-ipsec-notifymsg-02.txt are over-complicated, just to make
+them machine-comprehensible.  I think this is over-engineering,
+justified only if another level of negotiation is contemplated (ugh!).
+Plain text is probably sufficient for informing humans (I admit that
+there is a problem with I18N).
diff --git a/src/pluto/ac.c b/src/pluto/ac.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bcf5f80d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ac.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1018 @@
+/* Support of X.509 attribute certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Ueli Galizzi, Ariane Seiler
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Martin Berner, Lukas Suter
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ac.c,v 1.12 2005/12/06 22:49:32 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "ac.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+
+/* chained list of X.509 attribute certificates */
+
+static x509acert_t *x509acerts   = NULL;
+
+/* chained list of ietfAttributes */
+
+static ietfAttrList_t *ietfAttributes = NULL;
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of ietfAttrSyntax */
+
+static const asn1Object_t ietfAttrSyntaxObjects[] =
+{
+  { 0, "ietfAttrSyntax",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "policyAuthority",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
+  { 1,   "values",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /*  3 */
+  { 2,     "octets",			ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 2,     "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  5 */
+  { 2,     "oid",			ASN1_OID,	      ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
+  { 2,     "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
+  { 2,     "string",			ASN1_UTF8STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+  { 2,     "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+  { 1,   "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,	      ASN1_END  }  /* 10 */
+};
+
+#define IETF_ATTR_OCTETS	 4
+#define IETF_ATTR_OID		 6
+#define IETF_ATTR_STRING	 8
+#define IETF_ATTR_ROOF		11
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of roleSyntax */
+
+static const asn1Object_t roleSyntaxObjects[] =
+{
+  { 0, "roleSyntax",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "roleAuthority",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
+  { 1,   "roleName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OBJ  }  /*  3 */
+};
+
+#define ROLE_ROOF		4
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of an X509 attribute certificate */
+
+static const asn1Object_t acObjects[] =
+{
+  { 0, "AttributeCertificate",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "AttributeCertificateInfo",    ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,	   "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,	      ASN1_DEF |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,	   "holder",                    ASN1_SEQUENCE,	      ASN1_NONE }, /*  3 */
+  { 3,	     "baseCertificateID",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT  }, /*  4 */
+  { 4,	       "issuer",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,	      ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
+  { 4,	       "serial",		ASN1_INTEGER,	      ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
+  { 4,         "issuerUID",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
+                                                              ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
+  { 4,         "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  8 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+  { 3,	     "entityName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
+  { 3,	     "objectDigestInfo",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 12 */
+  { 4,	       "digestedObjectType",	ASN1_ENUMERATED,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 13*/
+  { 4,	       "otherObjectTypeID",	ASN1_OID,    	      ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+  { 4,         "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 15*/
+  { 4,         "digestAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 16 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 17 */
+  { 2,	   "v2Form",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 18 */
+  { 3,	     "issuerName",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OPT |
+                                                              ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 19 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
+  { 3,	     "baseCertificateID",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 21 */
+  { 4,	       "issuerSerial",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 22 */
+  { 5,	         "issuer",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,	      ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 23 */
+  { 5,	  	 "serial",		ASN1_INTEGER,	      ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
+  { 5,           "issuerUID",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_OPT |
+                                                              ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
+  { 5,           "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 27 */
+  { 3,       "objectDigestInfo",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 28 */
+  { 4,	       "digestInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 29 */
+  { 5,  	 "digestedObjectType",	ASN1_ENUMERATED,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 30 */
+  { 5,	  	 "otherObjectTypeID",	ASN1_OID,    	      ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /* 31 */
+  { 5,           "end opt",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 32 */
+  { 5,           "digestAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 33 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 34 */
+  { 2,	   "signature",                 ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 35 */
+  { 2,	   "serialNumber",              ASN1_INTEGER,         ASN1_BODY }, /* 36 */
+  { 2,	   "attrCertValidityPeriod",    ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 37 */
+  { 3,	     "notBeforeTime",           ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 38 */
+  { 3,	     "notAfterTime",            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 39 */
+  { 2,	   "attributes",                ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 40 */
+  { 3,       "attribute",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 41 */
+  { 4,         "type",			ASN1_OID,             ASN1_BODY }, /* 42 */
+  { 4,         "values",		ASN1_SET, 	      ASN1_LOOP }, /* 43 */
+  { 5,           "value",		ASN1_EOC, 	      ASN1_RAW  }, /* 44 */
+  { 4, 	       "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,	      ASN1_END  }, /* 45 */
+  { 2,     "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 46 */
+  { 2,     "extensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 47 */
+  { 3,       "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 48 */
+  { 4,         "extnID",		ASN1_OID,             ASN1_BODY }, /* 49 */
+  { 4,         "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,         ASN1_DEF |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /* 50 */
+  { 4,         "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_BODY }, /* 51 */
+  { 2,     "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 52 */
+  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 53 */
+  { 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }  /* 54 */
+};
+
+#define AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE		 0
+#define AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_INFO		 1
+#define AC_OBJ_VERSION			 2
+#define AC_OBJ_HOLDER_ISSUER		 5
+#define AC_OBJ_HOLDER_SERIAL		 6
+#define AC_OBJ_ENTITY_NAME		10
+#define AC_OBJ_ISSUER_NAME		19
+#define AC_OBJ_ISSUER			23
+#define AC_OBJ_SIG_ALG			35
+#define AC_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER		36
+#define AC_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE		38
+#define AC_OBJ_NOT_AFTER		39
+#define AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE		42
+#define AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE		44
+#define AC_OBJ_EXTN_ID			49
+#define AC_OBJ_CRITICAL			50
+#define AC_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE		51
+#define AC_OBJ_ALGORITHM		53
+#define AC_OBJ_SIGNATURE		54
+#define AC_OBJ_ROOF			55
+
+const x509acert_t empty_ac = {
+      NULL     , /* *next */
+            0  , /* installed */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /* certificate */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*   certificateInfo */
+            1  , /*     version */
+		 /*     holder */
+		 /*       baseCertificateID */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*         holderIssuer */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*         holderSerial */
+		 /*       entityName */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*         generalNames */
+		 /*     v2Form */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*       issuerName */
+                 /*     signature */
+    OID_UNKNOWN, /*       sigAlg */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*     serialNumber */
+                 /*     attrCertValidityPeriod */
+            0  , /*       notBefore */
+            0  , /*       notAfter */
+		 /*     attributes */
+      NULL     , /*       charging */
+      NULL     , /*       groups */
+		 /*     extensions */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*       authKeyID */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*       authKeySerialNumber */
+      FALSE    , /*       noRevAvail */
+		 /*   signatureAlgorithm */
+    OID_UNKNOWN, /*     algorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /*   signature */
+};
+
+
+/*  compare two ietfAttributes, returns zero if a equals b
+ *  negative/positive if a is earlier/later in the alphabet than b
+ */
+static int
+cmp_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t *a,ietfAttr_t *b)
+{
+    int cmp_len, len, cmp_value;
+
+    /* cannot compare OID with STRING or OCTETS attributes */
+    if (a->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID && b->kind != IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID)
+	return 1;
+	
+    cmp_len = a->value.len - b->value.len;
+    len = (cmp_len < 0)? a->value.len : b->value.len;
+    cmp_value = memcmp(a->value.ptr, b->value.ptr, len);
+
+    return (cmp_value == 0)? cmp_len : cmp_value;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  add an ietfAttribute to the chained list
+ */
+static ietfAttr_t*
+add_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t *attr)
+{
+    ietfAttrList_t **listp = &ietfAttributes;
+    ietfAttrList_t *list = *listp;
+    int cmp = -1;
+
+    while (list != NULL)
+    {
+	cmp = cmp_ietfAttr(attr, list->attr);
+	if (cmp <= 0)
+	    break;
+	listp = &list->next;
+	list = *listp;
+    }
+
+    if (cmp == 0)
+    {
+	/* attribute already exists, increase count */
+	pfree(attr);
+	list->attr->count++;
+	return list->attr;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
+
+	/* new attribute, unshare value */
+	attr->value.ptr = clone_bytes(attr->value.ptr, attr->value.len
+	    , "attr value");
+	attr->count = 1;
+	time(&attr->installed);
+
+	el->attr = attr;
+	el->next = list;
+	*listp = el;
+
+	return attr;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * decodes a comma separated list of group attributes
+ */
+void
+decode_groups(char *groups, ietfAttrList_t **listp)
+{
+    if (groups == NULL)
+	return;
+
+    while (strlen(groups) > 0)
+    {
+	char *end;
+	char *next = strchr(groups, ',');
+
+	if (next == NULL)
+	   end = next = groups + strlen(groups);
+	else
+	   end = next++;
+
+	/* eat preceeding whitespace */
+	while (groups < end && *groups == ' ')
+	    groups++;
+
+	/* eat trailing whitespace */
+	while (end > groups && *(end-1) == ' ')
+	    end--;
+
+	if (groups < end)
+	{
+	    ietfAttr_t *attr   = alloc_thing(ietfAttr_t, "ietfAttr");
+	    ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
+
+	    attr->kind  = IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING;
+	    attr->value.ptr = groups;
+	    attr->value.len = end - groups;
+	    attr->count = 0;
+
+	    el->attr = add_ietfAttr(attr);
+	    el->next = *listp;
+	    *listp = el;
+	}
+
+	groups = next;
+    }
+}
+
+static bool
+same_attribute(const ietfAttr_t *a, const ietfAttr_t *b)
+{
+    return (a->kind == b->kind && a->value.len == b->value.len
+	   && memcmp(a->value.ptr, b->value.ptr, b->value.len) == 0);
+}
+
+bool
+group_membership(const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list
+	       , const char *conn
+	       , const ietfAttrList_t *conn_list)
+{
+    if (conn_list == NULL)
+	return TRUE;
+
+    while (peer_list != NULL)
+    {
+	const ietfAttr_t *peer_attr = peer_list->attr;
+	const ietfAttrList_t *list = conn_list;
+
+	while (list != NULL)
+	{
+	    ietfAttr_t *conn_attr = list->attr;
+
+	    if (same_attribute(conn_attr, peer_attr))
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("%s: peer matches group '%.*s'"
+			, conn
+			, (int)peer_attr->value.len, peer_attr->value.ptr)
+		)
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    list = list->next;
+	}
+	peer_list = peer_list->next;
+    }
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("%s: peer doesn't match any group", conn)
+	)
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+void
+unshare_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t **listp)
+{
+    ietfAttrList_t *list = *listp;
+
+    while (list != NULL)
+    {
+	ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
+
+	el->attr = list->attr;
+	el->attr->count++;
+	el->next = NULL;
+	*listp = el;
+	listp = &el->next;
+	list = list->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * parses ietfAttrSyntax
+ */
+static ietfAttrList_t*
+parse_ietfAttrSyntax(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    ietfAttrList_t *list = NULL;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < IETF_ATTR_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(ietfAttrSyntaxObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return NULL;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case IETF_ATTR_OCTETS:
+	case IETF_ATTR_OID:
+	case IETF_ATTR_STRING:
+	    {
+		ietfAttr_t *attr   = alloc_thing(ietfAttr_t, "ietfAttr");
+		ietfAttrList_t *el = alloc_thing(ietfAttrList_t, "ietfAttrList");
+
+		attr->kind  = (objectID - IETF_ATTR_OCTETS) / 2;
+		attr->value = object;
+		attr->count = 0;
+
+		el->attr = add_ietfAttr(attr);
+		el->next = list;
+		list = el;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return list;
+}
+/*
+ * parses roleSyntax
+ */
+static void
+parse_roleSyntax(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < ROLE_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(roleSyntaxObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Parses an X.509 attribute certificate
+ */
+bool
+parse_ac(chunk_t blob, x509acert_t *ac)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    bool critical;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    u_int type = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    u_int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, 0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < AC_OBJ_ROOF) {
+
+	if (!extract_object(acObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	/* those objects which will parsed further need the next higher level */
+	level++;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE:
+	    ac->certificate = object;
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_INFO:
+	    ac->certificateInfo = object;
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_VERSION:
+	    ac->version = (object.len) ? (1 + (u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  v%d", ac->version);
+	    )
+	    if (ac->version != 2)
+	    {
+		plog("v%d attribute certificates are not supported"
+		    , ac->version);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_HOLDER_ISSUER:
+	    ac->holderIssuer = get_directoryName(object, level, FALSE);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_HOLDER_SERIAL:
+	    ac->holderSerial = object;
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_ENTITY_NAME:
+	    ac->entityName = get_directoryName(object, level, TRUE);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_ISSUER_NAME:
+	    ac->issuerName = get_directoryName(object, level, FALSE);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
+	    ac->sigAlg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+	    ac->serialNumber = object;
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE:
+	    ac->notBefore = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_NOT_AFTER:
+	    ac->notAfter = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE:
+	    type = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE:
+	    {
+		switch (type) {
+		case OID_AUTHENTICATION_INFO:
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("  need to parse authenticationInfo")
+		    )
+		    break;
+		case OID_ACCESS_IDENTITY:
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("  need to parse accessIdentity")
+		    )
+		    break;
+		case OID_CHARGING_IDENTITY:
+		    ac->charging = parse_ietfAttrSyntax(object, level);
+		    break;
+		case OID_GROUP:
+		    ac->groups = parse_ietfAttrSyntax(object, level);
+		    break;
+		case OID_ROLE:
+		    parse_roleSyntax(object, level);
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
+	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_CRITICAL:
+	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
+	    {
+		switch (extn_oid) {
+		case OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS:
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("  need to parse crlDistributionPoints")
+		    )
+		    break;
+		case OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID:
+		    parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
+			, &ac->authKeyID, &ac->authKeySerialNumber);
+		    break;
+		case OID_TARGET_INFORMATION:
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("  need to parse targetInformation")
+		    )
+		    break;
+		case OID_NO_REV_AVAIL:
+		    ac->noRevAvail = TRUE;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
+	    ac->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case AC_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
+	    ac->signature = object;
+	    break;
+
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    time(&ac->installed);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  compare two X.509 attribute certificates by comparing their signatures
+ */
+static bool
+same_x509acert(x509acert_t *a, x509acert_t *b)
+{
+    return a->signature.len == b->signature.len &&
+	memcmp(a->signature.ptr, b->signature.ptr, b->signature.len) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  release an ietfAttribute, free it if count reaches zero
+ */
+static void
+release_ietfAttr(ietfAttr_t* attr)
+{
+    if (--attr->count == 0)
+    {
+	ietfAttrList_t **plist = &ietfAttributes;
+	ietfAttrList_t *list = *plist;
+
+	while (list->attr != attr)
+	{
+	    plist = &list->next;
+	    list = *plist;
+	}
+        *plist = list->next;
+	
+	pfree(attr->value.ptr);
+	pfree(attr);
+	pfree(list);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free an ietfAttrList
+ */
+void
+free_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t* list)
+{
+    while (list != NULL)
+    {
+	ietfAttrList_t *el = list;
+
+	release_ietfAttr(el->attr);
+	list = list->next;
+	pfree(el);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free a X.509 attribute certificate
+ */
+void
+free_acert(x509acert_t *ac)
+{
+    if (ac != NULL)
+    {
+	free_ietfAttrList(ac->charging);
+	free_ietfAttrList(ac->groups);
+	pfreeany(ac->certificate.ptr);
+	pfree(ac);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free first X.509 attribute certificate in the chained list
+ */
+static void
+free_first_acert(void)
+{
+    x509acert_t *first = x509acerts;
+    x509acerts = first->next;
+    free_acert(first);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Free all attribute certificates in the chained list
+ */
+void
+free_acerts(void)
+{
+    while (x509acerts != NULL)
+	free_first_acert();
+}
+
+/*
+ *  get a X.509 attribute certificate for a given holder
+ */
+x509acert_t*
+get_x509acert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial)
+{
+    x509acert_t *ac = x509acerts;
+    x509acert_t *prev_ac = NULL;
+
+    while (ac != NULL)
+    {
+	if (same_dn(issuer, ac->holderIssuer)
+	&&  same_serial(serial, ac->holderSerial))
+	{
+	    if (ac!= x509acerts)
+	    {
+		/* bring the certificate up front */
+		prev_ac->next = ac->next;
+		ac->next = x509acerts;
+		x509acerts = ac;
+	    }
+	    return ac;
+	}
+	prev_ac = ac;
+	ac = ac->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  add a X.509 attribute certificate to the chained list
+ */
+static void
+add_acert(x509acert_t *ac)
+{
+    x509acert_t *old_ac = get_x509acert(ac->holderIssuer, ac->holderSerial);
+
+    if (old_ac != NULL)
+    {
+	if (ac->notBefore >old_ac->notBefore)
+	{
+	    /* delete the old attribute cert */
+	    free_first_acert();
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("attribute cert is newer - existing cert deleted")
+	    )
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("attribute cert is not newer - existing cert kept");
+	    )
+	    free_acert(ac);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+    plog("attribute cert added");
+
+    /* insert new attribute cert at the root of the chain */
+    ac->next = x509acerts;
+    x509acerts = ac;
+}
+
+/* verify the validity of an attribute certificate by
+ * checking the notBefore and notAfter dates
+ */
+static err_t
+check_ac_validity(const x509acert_t *ac)
+{
+    time_t current_time;
+
+    time(&current_time);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  not before  : %s", timetoa(&ac->notBefore, TRUE));
+	DBG_log("  current time: %s", timetoa(&current_time, TRUE));
+	DBG_log("  not after   : %s", timetoa(&ac->notAfter, TRUE));
+    )
+
+    if (current_time < ac->notBefore)
+	return "attribute certificate is not valid yet";
+    if (current_time > ac->notAfter)
+	return "attribute certificate has expired";
+    else
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verifies a X.509 attribute certificate
+ */
+bool
+verify_x509acert(x509acert_t *ac, bool strict)
+{
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    x509cert_t *aacert;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    time_t valid_until = ac->notAfter;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->entityName);
+	DBG_log("holder: '%s'",buf);
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->issuerName);
+	DBG_log("issuer: '%s'",buf);
+    )
+    
+    ugh = check_ac_validity(ac);
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	plog("%s", ugh);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("attribute certificate is valid")
+    )
+
+    lock_authcert_list("verify_x509acert");
+    aacert = get_authcert(ac->issuerName, ac->authKeySerialNumber
+	, ac->authKeyID, AUTH_AA);
+    unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509acert");
+
+    if (aacert == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("issuer aacert not found");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("issuer aacert found")
+    )
+
+    if (!check_signature(ac->certificateInfo, ac->signature
+			 , ac->algorithm, ac->algorithm, aacert))
+    {
+	plog("attribute certificate signature is invalid");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("attribute certificate signature is valid");
+    )
+
+    return verify_x509cert(aacert, strict, &valid_until);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Loads X.509 attribute certificates
+ */
+void
+load_acerts(void)
+{
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+    /* change directory to specified path */
+    u_char *save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
+
+    if (!chdir(A_CERT_PATH))
+    {
+	struct dirent **filelist;
+	int n;
+
+	plog("Changing to directory '%s'",A_CERT_PATH);
+	n = scandir(A_CERT_PATH, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
+
+	if (n > 0)
+	{
+	    while (n--)
+	    {
+		chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+		bool pgp = FALSE;
+
+		if (load_coded_file(filelist[n]->d_name, NULL, "acert", &blob, &pgp))
+		{
+		    x509acert_t *ac = alloc_thing(x509acert_t, "x509acert");
+		    
+		    *ac = empty_ac;
+
+		    if (parse_ac(blob, ac)
+		    && verify_x509acert(ac, FALSE))
+			add_acert(ac);
+		    else
+			free_acert(ac);
+		}
+		free(filelist[n]);
+	    }
+	    free(filelist);
+	}
+    }
+    /* restore directory path */
+    chdir(save_dir);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lists group attributes separated by commas on a single line
+ */
+void
+format_groups(const ietfAttrList_t *list, char *buf, int len)
+{
+    bool first_group = TRUE;
+
+    while (list != NULL && len > 0)
+    {
+	ietfAttr_t *attr = list->attr;
+
+	if (attr->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS
+	||  attr->kind == IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING)
+	{
+	    int written = snprintf(buf, len, "%s%.*s"
+			    , (first_group)? "" : ", "
+			    , (int)attr->value.len, attr->value.ptr);
+
+	    first_group = FALSE;
+	    
+	    /* return value of snprintf() up to glibc 2.0.6 */
+	    if (written < 0)
+		break;
+
+	    buf += written;
+	    len -= written;
+	}
+	list = list->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all X.509 attribute certificates in the chained list
+ */
+void
+list_acerts(bool utc)
+{
+    x509acert_t *ac = x509acerts;
+    time_t now;
+
+    /* determine the current time */
+    time(&now);
+
+    if (ac != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 Attribute Certificates:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (ac != NULL)
+    {
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s",timetoa(&ac->installed, utc));
+	if (ac->entityName.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->entityName);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       holder:   '%s'", buf);
+	}
+	if (ac->holderIssuer.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->holderIssuer);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       hissuer:  '%s'", buf);
+	}
+	if (ac->holderSerial.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(ac->holderSerial.ptr, ac->holderSerial.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       hserial:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	if (ac->groups != NULL)
+	{
+	    format_groups(ac->groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       groups:    %s", buf);
+	}
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ac->issuerName);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+	datatot(ac->serialNumber.ptr, ac->serialNumber.len, ':'
+	    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:    %s", buf);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       validity:  not before %s %s",
+		timetoa(&ac->notBefore, utc),
+		(ac->notBefore < now)?"ok":"fatal (not valid yet)");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  not after  %s %s",
+		timetoa(&ac->notAfter, utc),
+		check_expiry(ac->notAfter, ACERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+	if (ac->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(ac->authKeyID.ptr, ac->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	if (ac->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(ac->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, ac->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+	}
+
+	ac = ac->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all group attributes in alphabetical order
+ */
+void
+list_groups(bool utc)
+{
+    ietfAttrList_t *list = ietfAttributes;
+    
+    if (list != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Group Attributes:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (list != NULL)
+    {
+	ietfAttr_t *attr = list->attr;
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, count: %d", timetoa(&attr->installed, utc),
+		attr->count);
+	
+	switch (attr->kind)
+	{
+	case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS:
+	case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING:
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %.*s", (int)attr->value.len, attr->value.ptr);
+	    break;
+	case IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID:
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       OID");
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+        }
+
+	list = list->next;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/ac.h b/src/pluto/ac.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3913d745d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+/* Support of X.509 attribute certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Ueli Galizzi, Ariane Seiler
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Martin Berner, Lukas Suter
+ 
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ac.h,v 1.8 2005/02/17 20:56:04 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _AC_H
+#define _AC_H
+
+/* definition of ietfAttribute kinds */
+
+typedef enum {
+    IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OCTETS =	0,
+    IETF_ATTRIBUTE_OID =	1,
+    IETF_ATTRIBUTE_STRING =	2
+} ietfAttribute_t;
+
+/* access structure for an ietfAttribute */
+
+typedef struct ietfAttr ietfAttr_t;
+
+struct ietfAttr {
+  time_t	   installed;
+  int		   count;
+  ietfAttribute_t  kind;
+  chunk_t	   value;
+};
+
+typedef struct ietfAttrList ietfAttrList_t;
+
+struct ietfAttrList {
+  ietfAttrList_t   *next;
+  ietfAttr_t	   *attr;
+};
+
+
+/* access structure for an X.509 attribute certificate */
+
+typedef struct x509acert x509acert_t;
+
+struct x509acert {
+  x509acert_t    *next;
+  time_t	 installed;
+  chunk_t	 certificate;
+  chunk_t	   certificateInfo;
+  u_int		     version;
+		/*   holder */
+		/*     baseCertificateID */
+  chunk_t		 holderIssuer;
+  chunk_t		 holderSerial;
+  chunk_t		 entityName;
+                /*   v2Form */
+  chunk_t	       issuerName;
+                /*   signature */
+  int                  sigAlg;
+  chunk_t	     serialNumber;
+                /*   attrCertValidityPeriod */
+  time_t               notBefore;
+  time_t               notAfter;
+		/*   attributes */
+  ietfAttrList_t       *charging;
+  ietfAttrList_t       *groups;
+		/*   extensions */
+  chunk_t              authKeyID;
+  chunk_t              authKeySerialNumber;
+  bool		       noRevAvail;
+		/* signatureAlgorithm */
+  int                algorithm;
+  chunk_t          signature;
+};
+
+/* used for initialization */
+extern const x509acert_t empty_ac;
+
+extern void unshare_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t **listp);
+extern void free_ietfAttrList(ietfAttrList_t *list);
+extern void decode_groups(char *groups, ietfAttrList_t **listp);
+extern bool group_membership(const ietfAttrList_t *my_list
+    , const char *conn, const ietfAttrList_t *conn_list);
+extern bool parse_ac(chunk_t blob, x509acert_t *ac);
+extern bool verify_x509acert(x509acert_t *ac, bool strict);
+extern x509acert_t* get_x509acert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial);
+extern void load_acerts(void);
+extern void free_acert(x509acert_t *ac);
+extern void free_acerts(void);
+extern void list_acerts(bool utc);
+extern void list_groups(bool utc);
+extern void format_groups(const ietfAttrList_t *list, char *buf, int len);
+
+
+#endif /* _AH_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/adns.c b/src/pluto/adns.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5977d23c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/adns.c
@@ -0,0 +1,615 @@
+/* Pluto Asynchronous DNS Helper Program -- for internal use only!
+ * Copyright (C) 2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: adns.c,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef USE_LWRES	/* whole file! */
+
+/* This program executes as multiple processes.  The Master process
+ * receives queries (struct adns_query messages) from Pluto and distributes
+ * them amongst Worker processes.  These Worker processes are created
+ * by the Master whenever a query arrives and no existing Worker is free.
+ * At most MAX_WORKERS will be created; after that, the Master will queue
+ * queries until a Worker becomes free.  When a Worker has an answer from
+ * the resolver, it sends the answer as a struct adns_answer message to the
+ * Master.  The Master then forwards the answer to Pluto, noting that
+ * the Worker is free to accept another query.
+ *
+ * The protocol is simple: Pluto sends a sequence of queries and receives
+ * a sequence of answers.  select(2) is used by Pluto and by the Master
+ * process to decide when to read, but writes are done without checking
+ * for readiness.  Communications is via pipes.  Since only one process
+ * can write to each pipe, messages will not be interleaved.  Fixed length
+ * records are used for simplicity.
+ *
+ * Pluto needs a way to indicate to the Master when to shut down
+ * and the Master needs to indicate this to each worker.  EOF on the pipe
+ * signifies this.
+ *
+ * The interfaces between these components are considered private to
+ * Pluto.  This allows us to get away with less checking.  This is a
+ * reason to use pipes instead of TCP/IP.
+ *
+ * Although the code uses plain old UNIX processes, it could be modified
+ * to use threads.  That might reduce resource requirements.  It would
+ * preclude running on systems without thread-safe resolvers.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <netdb.h>	/* ??? for h_errno */
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+/* GCC magic! */
+#ifdef GCC_LINT
+# define UNUSED __attribute__ ((unused))
+#else
+# define UNUSED /* ignore */
+#endif
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+
+/* shared by all processes */
+
+static const char *name;	/* program name, for messages */
+
+static bool debug = FALSE;
+
+/* Read a variable-length record from a pipe (and no more!).
+ * First bytes must be a size_t containing the length.
+ * HES_CONTINUE if record read
+ * HES_OK if EOF
+ * HES_IO_ERROR_IN if errno tells the tale.
+ * Others are errors.
+ */
+static enum helper_exit_status
+read_pipe(int fd, unsigned char *stuff, size_t minlen, size_t maxlen)
+{
+    size_t n = 0;
+    size_t goal = minlen;
+
+    do {
+	ssize_t m = read(fd, stuff + n, goal - n);
+
+	if (m == -1)
+	{
+	    if (errno != EINTR)
+	    {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input error on pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return HES_IO_ERROR_IN;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (m == 0)
+	{
+	    return HES_OK;	/* treat empty message as EOF */
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    n += m;
+	    if (n >= sizeof(size_t))
+	    {
+		goal = *(size_t *)(void *)stuff;
+		if (goal < minlen || maxlen < goal)
+		{
+		    if (debug)
+			fprintf(stderr, "%lu : [%lu, %lu]\n"
+			    , (unsigned long)goal
+			    , (unsigned long)minlen, (unsigned long)maxlen);
+		    return HES_BAD_LEN;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    } while (n < goal);
+
+    return HES_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/* Write a variable-length record to a pipe.
+ * First bytes must be a size_t containing the length.
+ * HES_CONTINUE if record written
+ * Others are errors.
+ */
+static enum helper_exit_status
+write_pipe(int fd, const unsigned char *stuff)
+{
+    size_t len = *(const size_t *)(const void *)stuff;
+    size_t n = 0;
+
+    do {
+	ssize_t m = write(fd, stuff + n, len - n);
+
+	if (m == -1)
+	{
+	    /* error, but ignore and retry if EINTR */
+	    if (errno != EINTR)
+	    {
+		syslog(LOG_ERR, "Output error from master: %s", strerror(errno));
+		return HES_IO_ERROR_OUT;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    n += m;
+	}
+    } while (n != len);
+    return HES_CONTINUE;
+}
+
+/**************** worker process ****************/
+
+/* The interface in RHL6.x and BIND distribution 8.2.2 are different,
+ * so we build some of our own :-(
+ */
+
+/* Support deprecated interface to allow for older releases of the resolver.
+ * Fake new interface!
+ * See resolver(3) bind distribution (should be in RHL6.1, but isn't).
+ * __RES was 19960801 in RHL6.2, an old resolver.
+ */
+
+#if (__RES) <= 19960801
+# define OLD_RESOLVER	1
+#endif
+
+#ifdef OLD_RESOLVER
+
+# define res_ninit(statp) res_init()
+# define res_nquery(statp, dname, class, type, answer, anslen) \
+    res_query(dname, class, type, answer, anslen)
+# define res_nclose(statp) res_close()
+
+static struct __res_state *statp = &_res;
+
+#else /* !OLD_RESOLVER */
+
+static struct __res_state my_res_state /* = { 0 } */;
+static res_state statp = &my_res_state;
+
+#endif /* !OLD_RESOLVER */
+
+static int
+worker(int qfd, int afd)
+{
+    {
+	int r = res_ninit(statp);
+
+	if (r != 0)
+	{
+	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "cannot initialize resolver");
+	    return HES_RES_INIT;
+	}
+#ifndef OLD_RESOLVER
+	statp->options |= RES_ROTATE;
+#endif
+	statp->options |= RES_DEBUG;
+    }
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	struct adns_query q;
+	struct adns_answer a;
+
+	enum helper_exit_status r = read_pipe(qfd, (unsigned char *)&q
+	    , sizeof(q), sizeof(q));
+
+	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+	    return r;	/* some kind of exit */
+
+	if (q.qmagic != ADNS_Q_MAGIC)
+	{
+	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in input from master: bad magic");
+	    return HES_BAD_MAGIC;
+	}
+
+	a.amagic = ADNS_A_MAGIC;
+	a.serial = q.serial;
+
+	a.result = res_nquery(statp, q.name_buf, C_IN, q.type, a.ans, sizeof(a.ans));
+	a.h_errno_val = h_errno;
+
+	a.len = offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans) + (a.result < 0? 0 : a.result);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (((q.debugging & IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER) && q.type == T_KEY)
+	|| ((q.debugging & IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER) && q.type == T_TXT))
+	    sleep(30);	/* delay the answer */
+#endif
+
+	/* write answer, possibly a bit at a time */
+	r = write_pipe(afd, (const unsigned char *)&a);
+
+	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+	    return r;	/* some kind of exit */
+    }
+}
+
+/**************** master process ****************/
+
+bool eof_from_pluto = FALSE;
+#define PLUTO_QFD	0	/* queries come on stdin */
+#define PLUTO_AFD	1	/* answers go out on stdout */
+
+#ifndef MAX_WORKERS
+# define MAX_WORKERS 10	/* number of in-flight queries */
+#endif
+
+struct worker_info {
+    int qfd;	/* query pipe's file descriptor */
+    int afd;	/* answer pipe's file descriptor */
+    pid_t pid;
+    bool busy;
+    void *continuation;	/* of outstanding request */
+};
+
+static struct worker_info wi[MAX_WORKERS];
+static struct worker_info *wi_roof = wi;
+
+/* request FIFO */
+
+struct query_list {
+    struct query_list *next;
+    struct adns_query aq;
+};
+
+static struct query_list *oldest_query = NULL;
+static struct query_list *newest_query;	/* undefined when oldest == NULL */
+static struct query_list *free_queries = NULL;
+
+static bool
+spawn_worker(void)
+{
+    int qfds[2];
+    int afds[2];
+    pid_t p;
+
+    if (pipe(qfds) != 0 || pipe(afds) != 0)
+    {
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "pipe(2) failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+	exit(HES_PIPE);
+    }
+
+    wi_roof->qfd = qfds[1];	/* write end of query pipe */
+    wi_roof->afd = afds[0];	/* read end of answer pipe */
+
+    p = fork();
+    if (p == -1)
+    {
+	/* fork failed: ignore if at least one worker exists */
+	if (wi_roof == wi)
+	{
+	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "fork(2) error creating first worker: %s", strerror(errno));
+	    exit(HES_FORK);
+	}
+	close(qfds[0]);
+	close(qfds[1]);
+	close(afds[0]);
+	close(afds[1]);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else if (p == 0)
+    {
+	/* child */
+	struct worker_info *w;
+
+	close(PLUTO_QFD);
+	close(PLUTO_AFD);
+	/* close all master pipes, including ours */
+	for (w = wi; w <= wi_roof; w++)
+	{
+	    close(w->qfd);
+	    close(w->afd);
+	}
+	exit(worker(qfds[0], afds[1]));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* parent */
+	struct worker_info *w = wi_roof++;
+
+	w->pid = p;
+	w->busy = FALSE;
+	close(qfds[0]);
+	close(afds[1]);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+send_eof(struct worker_info *w)
+{
+    pid_t p;
+    int status;
+
+    close(w->qfd);
+    w->qfd = NULL_FD;
+
+    close(w->afd);
+    w->afd = NULL_FD;
+
+    /* reap child */
+    p = waitpid(w->pid, &status, 0);
+    /* ignore result -- what could we do with it? */
+}
+
+static void
+forward_query(struct worker_info *w)
+{
+    struct query_list *q = oldest_query;
+
+    if (q == NULL)
+    {
+	if (eof_from_pluto)
+	    send_eof(w);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	enum helper_exit_status r
+	    = write_pipe(w->qfd, (const unsigned char *) &q->aq);
+
+	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+	    exit(r);
+
+	w->busy = TRUE;
+
+	oldest_query = q->next;
+	q->next = free_queries;
+	free_queries = q;
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+query(void)
+{
+    struct query_list *q = free_queries;
+    enum helper_exit_status r;
+
+    /* find an unused queue entry */
+    if (q == NULL)
+    {
+	q = malloc(sizeof(*q));
+	if (q == NULL)
+	{
+	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "malloc(3) failed");
+	    exit(HES_MALLOC);
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	free_queries = q->next;
+    }
+
+    r = read_pipe(PLUTO_QFD, (unsigned char *)&q->aq
+	, sizeof(q->aq), sizeof(q->aq));
+
+    if (r == HES_OK)
+    {
+	/* EOF: we're done, except for unanswered queries */
+	struct worker_info *w;
+
+	eof_from_pluto = TRUE;
+	q->next = free_queries;
+	free_queries = q;
+
+	/* Send bye-bye to unbusy processes.
+	 * Note that if there are queued queries, there won't be
+	 * any non-busy workers.
+	 */
+	for (w = wi; w != wi_roof; w++)
+	    if (!w->busy)
+		send_eof(w);
+    }
+    else if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+    {
+	exit(r);
+    }
+    else if (q->aq.qmagic != ADNS_Q_MAGIC)
+    {
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "error in query from Pluto: bad magic");
+	exit(HES_BAD_MAGIC);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct worker_info *w;
+
+	/* got a query */
+
+	/* add it to FIFO */
+	q->next = NULL;
+	if (oldest_query == NULL)
+	    oldest_query = q;
+	else
+	    newest_query->next = q;
+	newest_query = q;
+
+	/* See if any worker available */
+	for (w = wi; ; w++)
+	{
+	    if (w == wi_roof)
+	    {
+		/* no free worker */
+		if (w == wi + MAX_WORKERS)
+		    break;	/* no more to be created */
+		/* make a new one */
+		if (!spawn_worker())
+		    break;	/* cannot create one at this time */
+	    }
+	    if (!w->busy)
+	    {
+		/* assign first to free worker */
+		forward_query(w);
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return;
+}
+
+static void
+answer(struct worker_info *w)
+{
+    struct adns_answer a;
+    enum helper_exit_status r = read_pipe(w->afd, (unsigned char *)&a
+	, offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans), sizeof(a));
+
+    if (r == HES_OK)
+    {
+	/* unexpected EOF */
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "unexpected EOF from worker");
+	exit(HES_IO_ERROR_IN);
+    }
+    else if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+    {
+	exit(r);
+    }
+    else if (a.amagic != ADNS_A_MAGIC)
+    {
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input from worker error: bad magic");
+	exit(HES_BAD_MAGIC);
+    }
+    else if (a.continuation != w->continuation)
+    {
+	/* answer doesn't match query */
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "Input from worker error: continuation mismatch");
+	exit(HES_SYNC);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* pass the answer on to Pluto */
+	enum helper_exit_status r
+	    = write_pipe(PLUTO_AFD, (const unsigned char *) &a);
+
+	if (r != HES_CONTINUE)
+	    exit(r);
+	w->busy = FALSE;
+	forward_query(w);
+    }
+}
+
+/* assumption: input limited; accept blocking on output */
+static int
+master(void)
+{
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	fd_set readfds;
+	int maxfd = PLUTO_QFD;		/* approximate lower bound */
+	int ndes = 0;
+	struct worker_info *w;
+
+	FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+	if (!eof_from_pluto)
+	{
+	    FD_SET(PLUTO_QFD, &readfds);
+	    ndes++;
+	}
+	for (w = wi; w != wi_roof; w++)
+	{
+	    if (w->busy)
+	    {
+		FD_SET(w->afd, &readfds);
+		ndes++;
+		if (maxfd < w->afd)
+		    maxfd = w->afd;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (ndes == 0)
+	    return HES_OK;	/* done! */
+
+	do {
+	    ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+	} while (ndes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+	if (ndes == -1)
+	{
+	    syslog(LOG_ERR, "select(2) error: %s", strerror(errno));
+	    exit(HES_IO_ERROR_SELECT);
+	}
+	else if (ndes > 0)
+	{
+	    if (FD_ISSET(PLUTO_QFD, &readfds))
+	    {
+		query();
+		ndes--;
+	    }
+	    for (w = wi; ndes > 0 && w != wi_roof; w++)
+	    {
+		if (w->busy && FD_ISSET(w->afd, &readfds))
+		{
+		    answer(w);
+		    ndes--;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Not to be invoked by strangers -- user hostile.
+ * Mandatory args: query-fd answer-fd
+ * Optional arg: -d, signifying "debug".
+ */
+
+static void
+adns_usage(const char *fmt, const char *arg)
+{
+    const char **sp = ipsec_copyright_notice();
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "INTERNAL TO PLUTO: DO NOT EXECUTE\n");
+
+    fprintf(stderr, fmt, arg);
+    fprintf(stderr, "\n%s\n", ipsec_version_string());
+
+    for (; *sp != NULL; sp++)
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", *sp);
+
+    syslog(LOG_ERR, fmt, arg);
+    exit(HES_INVOCATION);
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc UNUSED, char **argv)
+{
+    int i = 1;
+
+    name = argv[0];
+
+    while (i < argc)
+    {
+	if (streq(argv[i], "-d"))
+	{
+	    i++;
+	    debug = TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    adns_usage("unexpected argument \"%s\"", argv[i]);
+	    /*NOTREACHED*/
+	}
+    }
+
+    return master();
+}
+
+#endif /* !USE_LWRES */
diff --git a/src/pluto/adns.h b/src/pluto/adns.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..00fc4ad07
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/adns.h
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+/* Pluto Asynchronous DNS Helper Program's Header
+ * Copyright (C) 2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: adns.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef USE_LWRES	/* whole file! */
+
+/* The interface in RHL6.x and BIND distribution 8.2.2 are different,
+ * so we build some of our own :-(
+ */
+
+# ifndef NS_MAXDNAME
+#   define NS_MAXDNAME MAXDNAME /* I hope this is long enough for IPv6 */
+# endif
+
+# ifndef NS_PACKETSZ
+#   define NS_PACKETSZ PACKETSZ
+# endif
+
+/* protocol version */
+
+#define ADNS_Q_MAGIC (((((('d' << 8) + 'n') << 8) + 's') << 8) + 4)
+#define ADNS_A_MAGIC (((((('d' << 8) + 'n') << 8) + 's') << 8) + 128 + 4)
+
+/* note: both struct adns_query and struct adns_answer must start with
+ * size_t len;
+ */
+
+struct adns_query {
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned int qmagic;
+    unsigned long serial;
+    lset_t debugging;	/* only used #ifdef DEBUG, but don't want layout to change */
+    u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
+    int type;	/* T_KEY or T_TXT */
+};
+
+struct adns_answer {
+    size_t len;
+    unsigned int amagic;
+    unsigned long serial;
+    struct adns_continuation *continuation;
+    int result;
+    int h_errno_val;
+    u_char ans[NS_PACKETSZ * 10];   /* very probably bigger than necessary */
+};
+
+enum helper_exit_status {
+    HES_CONTINUE = -1,	/* not an exit */
+    HES_OK = 0,	/* all's well that ends well (perhaps EOF) */
+    HES_INVOCATION,	/* improper invocation */
+    HES_IO_ERROR_SELECT,	/* IO error in select() */
+    HES_MALLOC,	/* malloc failed */
+    HES_IO_ERROR_IN,	/* error reading pipe */
+    HES_IO_ERROR_OUT,	/* error reading pipe */
+    HES_PIPE,	/* pipe(2) failed */
+    HES_SYNC,	/* answer from worker doesn't match query */
+    HES_FORK,	/* fork(2) failed */
+    HES_RES_INIT,	/* resolver initialization failed */
+    HES_BAD_LEN,	/* implausible .len field */
+    HES_BAD_MAGIC,	/* .magic field wrong */
+};
+
+#endif /* !USE_LWRES */
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_aes.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_aes.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..44de09b4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_aes.c
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "libaes/aes_cbc.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+#define  AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(128/BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define  AES_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  AES_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
+#define  AES_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
+
+static void
+do_aes(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
+{
+    aes_context aes_ctx;
+    char iv_bak[AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    char *new_iv = NULL;	/* logic will avoid copy to NULL */
+
+    aes_set_key(&aes_ctx, key, key_size, 0);
+
+    /*	
+     *	my AES cbc does not touch passed IV (optimization for
+     *	ESP handling), so I must "emulate" des-like IV
+     *	crunching
+     */
+    if (!enc)
+	memcpy(new_iv=iv_bak, (char*) buf + buf_len - AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE
+		, AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    AES_cbc_encrypt(&aes_ctx, buf, buf, buf_len, iv, enc);
+
+    if (enc)
+	new_iv = (char*) buf + buf_len-AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    memcpy(iv, new_iv, AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+struct encrypt_desc algo_aes =
+{
+	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_AES_CBC,
+	algo_next: 	NULL, 
+	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(aes_context),
+	enc_blocksize: 	AES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keyminlen: 	AES_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keydeflen: 	AES_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen: 	AES_KEY_MAX_LEN,
+	do_crypt: 	do_aes,
+};
+
+int ike_alg_aes_init(void);
+
+int
+ike_alg_aes_init(void)
+{
+	int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&algo_aes);
+	return ret;
+}
+/*
+IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_aes_init
+*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2bbef051b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_blowfish.c
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "libblowfish/blowfish.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+#define  BLOWFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	8  	/* block size */
+#define  BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  BLOWFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN	448
+
+
+static void
+do_blowfish(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
+{
+    BF_KEY bf_ctx;
+
+    BF_set_key(&bf_ctx, key_size , key);
+    BF_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, buf_len, &bf_ctx, iv, enc);
+}
+
+struct encrypt_desc algo_blowfish =
+{
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC,
+	algo_next: NULL, 
+	enc_ctxsize: sizeof(BF_KEY),
+	enc_blocksize: BLOWFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	keyminlen: BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keydeflen: BLOWFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+	keymaxlen: BLOWFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
+	do_crypt: do_blowfish,
+};
+
+int ike_alg_blowfish_init(void);
+
+int
+ike_alg_blowfish_init(void)
+{
+    int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&algo_blowfish);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+/*
+IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_blowfish_init
+*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fb01caa41
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_serpent.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "libserpent/serpent_cbc.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+#define  SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(128/BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define  SERPENT_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  SERPENT_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
+#define  SERPENT_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
+
+static void
+do_serpent(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_size, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
+{
+    serpent_context serpent_ctx;
+    char iv_bak[SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    char *new_iv = NULL;	/* logic will avoid copy to NULL */
+
+
+    serpent_set_key(&serpent_ctx, key, key_size);
+    /*	
+     *	my SERPENT cbc does not touch passed IV (optimization for
+     *	ESP handling), so I must "emulate" des-like IV
+     *	crunching
+     */
+    if (!enc)
+	    memcpy(new_iv=iv_bak, 
+			    (char*) buf + buf_size-SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			    SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    serpent_cbc_encrypt(&serpent_ctx, buf, buf, buf_size, iv, enc);
+
+    if (enc)
+	    new_iv = (char*) buf + buf_size-SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    memcpy(iv, new_iv, SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_serpent =
+{
+	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC,
+	algo_next: 	NULL,
+	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(struct serpent_context),
+	enc_blocksize: 	SERPENT_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+        keyminlen: 	SERPENT_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+        keydeflen: 	SERPENT_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+        keymaxlen: 	SERPENT_KEY_MAX_LEN,
+        do_crypt: 	do_serpent,
+};
+
+int ike_alg_serpent_init(void);
+
+int
+ike_alg_serpent_init(void)
+{
+    int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&encrypt_desc_serpent);
+
+    return ret;
+}
+/*
+IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_serpent_init
+*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b7c8438c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_sha2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,634 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "libsha2/sha2.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+static void
+sha256_hash_final(u_char *hash, sha256_context *ctx)
+{
+    sha256_final(ctx);
+    memcpy(hash, ctx->sha_out, SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void
+sha384_hash_final(u_char *hash, sha512_context *ctx)
+{
+    sha512_final(ctx);
+    memcpy(hash, ctx->sha_out, SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE);
+}
+
+static void
+sha512_hash_final(u_char *hash, sha512_context *ctx)
+{
+    sha512_final(ctx);
+    memcpy(hash, ctx->sha_out, SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE);
+}
+
+/* SHA-256 hash test vectors
+ * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
+ * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
+ */
+
+static const u_char sha256_short2_msg[] = {
+    0x19
+};
+
+static const u_char sha256_short2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x68, 0xaa, 0x2e, 0x2e, 0xe5, 0xdf, 0xf9, 0x6e,
+    0x33, 0x55, 0xe6, 0xc7, 0xee, 0x37, 0x3e, 0x3d,
+    0x6a, 0x4e, 0x17, 0xf7, 0x5f, 0x95, 0x18, 0xd8,
+    0x43, 0x70, 0x9c, 0x0c, 0x9b, 0xc3, 0xe3, 0xd4
+};
+
+static const u_char sha256_short4_msg[] = {
+    0xe3, 0xd7, 0x25, 0x70, 0xdc, 0xdd, 0x78, 0x7c,
+    0xe3, 0x88, 0x7a, 0xb2, 0xcd, 0x68, 0x46, 0x52
+};
+
+static const u_char sha256_short4_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x17, 0x5e, 0xe6, 0x9b, 0x02, 0xba, 0x9b, 0x58,
+    0xe2, 0xb0, 0xa5, 0xfd, 0x13, 0x81, 0x9c, 0xea,
+    0x57, 0x3f, 0x39, 0x40, 0xa9, 0x4f, 0x82, 0x51,
+    0x28, 0xcf, 0x42, 0x09, 0xbe, 0xab, 0xb4, 0xe8
+};
+
+static const u_char sha256_long2_msg[] = {
+    0x83, 0x26, 0x75, 0x4e, 0x22, 0x77, 0x37, 0x2f,
+    0x4f, 0xc1, 0x2b, 0x20, 0x52, 0x7a, 0xfe, 0xf0,
+    0x4d, 0x8a, 0x05, 0x69, 0x71, 0xb1, 0x1a, 0xd5,
+    0x71, 0x23, 0xa7, 0xc1, 0x37, 0x76, 0x00, 0x00,
+    0xd7, 0xbe, 0xf6, 0xf3, 0xc1, 0xf7, 0xa9, 0x08,
+    0x3a, 0xa3, 0x9d, 0x81, 0x0d, 0xb3, 0x10, 0x77,
+    0x7d, 0xab, 0x8b, 0x1e, 0x7f, 0x02, 0xb8, 0x4a,
+    0x26, 0xc7, 0x73, 0x32, 0x5f, 0x8b, 0x23, 0x74,
+    0xde, 0x7a, 0x4b, 0x5a, 0x58, 0xcb, 0x5c, 0x5c,
+    0xf3, 0x5b, 0xce, 0xe6, 0xfb, 0x94, 0x6e, 0x5b,
+    0xd6, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x59, 0x3a, 0x8b, 0xeb, 0x3f,
+    0x9d, 0x65, 0x92, 0xec, 0xed, 0xaa, 0x66, 0xca,
+    0x82, 0xa2, 0x9d, 0x0c, 0x51, 0xbc, 0xf9, 0x33,
+    0x62, 0x30, 0xe5, 0xd7, 0x84, 0xe4, 0xc0, 0xa4,
+    0x3f, 0x8d, 0x79, 0xa3, 0x0a, 0x16, 0x5c, 0xba,
+    0xbe, 0x45, 0x2b, 0x77, 0x4b, 0x9c, 0x71, 0x09,
+    0xa9, 0x7d, 0x13, 0x8f, 0x12, 0x92, 0x28, 0x96,
+    0x6f, 0x6c, 0x0a, 0xdc, 0x10, 0x6a, 0xad, 0x5a,
+    0x9f, 0xdd, 0x30, 0x82, 0x57, 0x69, 0xb2, 0xc6,
+    0x71, 0xaf, 0x67, 0x59, 0xdf, 0x28, 0xeb, 0x39,
+    0x3d, 0x54, 0xd6
+};
+
+static const u_char sha256_long2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x97, 0xdb, 0xca, 0x7d, 0xf4, 0x6d, 0x62, 0xc8,
+    0xa4, 0x22, 0xc9, 0x41, 0xdd, 0x7e, 0x83, 0x5b,
+    0x8a, 0xd3, 0x36, 0x17, 0x63, 0xf7, 0xe9, 0xb2,
+    0xd9, 0x5f, 0x4f, 0x0d, 0xa6, 0xe1, 0xcc, 0xbc
+};
+
+static const hash_testvector_t sha256_hash_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha256_short2_msg), sha256_short2_msg, sha256_short2_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha256_short4_msg), sha256_short4_msg, sha256_short4_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha256_long2_msg),  sha256_long2_msg,  sha256_long2_msg_digest  },
+    { 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* SHA-384 hash test vectors
+ * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
+ * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
+ */
+
+static const u_char sha384_short2_msg[] = {
+    0xb9
+};
+
+static const u_char sha384_short2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xbc, 0x80, 0x89, 0xa1, 0x90, 0x07, 0xc0, 0xb1,
+    0x41, 0x95, 0xf4, 0xec, 0xc7, 0x40, 0x94, 0xfe,
+    0xc6, 0x4f, 0x01, 0xf9, 0x09, 0x29, 0x28, 0x2c,
+    0x2f, 0xb3, 0x92, 0x88, 0x15, 0x78, 0x20, 0x8a,
+    0xd4, 0x66, 0x82, 0x8b, 0x1c, 0x6c, 0x28, 0x3d,
+    0x27, 0x22, 0xcf, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0xab, 0x69, 0x38
+};
+
+static const u_char sha384_short4_msg[] = {
+     0xa4, 0x1c, 0x49, 0x77, 0x79, 0xc0, 0x37, 0x5f,
+     0xf1, 0x0a, 0x7f, 0x4e, 0x08, 0x59, 0x17, 0x39
+};
+
+static const u_char sha384_short4_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xc9, 0xa6, 0x84, 0x43, 0xa0, 0x05, 0x81, 0x22,
+    0x56, 0xb8, 0xec, 0x76, 0xb0, 0x05, 0x16, 0xf0,
+    0xdb, 0xb7, 0x4f, 0xab, 0x26, 0xd6, 0x65, 0x91,
+    0x3f, 0x19, 0x4b, 0x6f, 0xfb, 0x0e, 0x91, 0xea,
+    0x99, 0x67, 0x56, 0x6b, 0x58, 0x10, 0x9c, 0xbc,
+    0x67, 0x5c, 0xc2, 0x08, 0xe4, 0xc8, 0x23, 0xf7
+};
+
+static const u_char sha384_long2_msg[] = {
+    0x39, 0x96, 0x69, 0xe2, 0x8f, 0x6b, 0x9c, 0x6d,
+    0xbc, 0xbb, 0x69, 0x12, 0xec, 0x10, 0xff, 0xcf,
+    0x74, 0x79, 0x03, 0x49, 0xb7, 0xdc, 0x8f, 0xbe,
+    0x4a, 0x8e, 0x7b, 0x3b, 0x56, 0x21, 0xdb, 0x0f,
+    0x3e, 0x7d, 0xc8, 0x7f, 0x82, 0x32, 0x64, 0xbb,
+    0xe4, 0x0d, 0x18, 0x11, 0xc9, 0xea, 0x20, 0x61,
+    0xe1, 0xc8, 0x4a, 0xd1, 0x0a, 0x23, 0xfa, 0xc1,
+    0x72, 0x7e, 0x72, 0x02, 0xfc, 0x3f, 0x50, 0x42,
+    0xe6, 0xbf, 0x58, 0xcb, 0xa8, 0xa2, 0x74, 0x6e,
+    0x1f, 0x64, 0xf9, 0xb9, 0xea, 0x35, 0x2c, 0x71,
+    0x15, 0x07, 0x05, 0x3c, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x33, 0x9d,
+    0x52, 0x86, 0x5f, 0x25, 0xcc, 0x22, 0xb5, 0xe8,
+    0x77, 0x84, 0xa1, 0x2f, 0xc9, 0x61, 0xd6, 0x6c,
+    0xb6, 0xe8, 0x95, 0x73, 0x19, 0x9a, 0x2c, 0xe6,
+    0x56, 0x5c, 0xbd, 0xf1, 0x3d, 0xca, 0x40, 0x38,
+    0x32, 0xcf, 0xcb, 0x0e, 0x8b, 0x72, 0x11, 0xe8,
+    0x3a, 0xf3, 0x2a, 0x11, 0xac, 0x17, 0x92, 0x9f,
+    0xf1, 0xc0, 0x73, 0xa5, 0x1c, 0xc0, 0x27, 0xaa,
+    0xed, 0xef, 0xf8, 0x5a, 0xad, 0x7c, 0x2b, 0x7c,
+    0x5a, 0x80, 0x3e, 0x24, 0x04, 0xd9, 0x6d, 0x2a,
+    0x77, 0x35, 0x7b, 0xda, 0x1a, 0x6d, 0xae, 0xed,
+    0x17, 0x15, 0x1c, 0xb9, 0xbc, 0x51, 0x25, 0xa4,
+    0x22, 0xe9, 0x41, 0xde, 0x0c, 0xa0, 0xfc, 0x50,
+    0x11, 0xc2, 0x3e, 0xcf, 0xfe, 0xfd, 0xd0, 0x96,
+    0x76, 0x71, 0x1c, 0xf3, 0xdb, 0x0a, 0x34, 0x40,
+    0x72, 0x0e ,0x16, 0x15, 0xc1, 0xf2, 0x2f, 0xbc,
+    0x3c, 0x72, 0x1d, 0xe5, 0x21, 0xe1, 0xb9, 0x9b,
+    0xa1, 0xbd, 0x55, 0x77, 0x40, 0x86, 0x42, 0x14,
+    0x7e, 0xd0, 0x96
+};
+
+static const u_char sha384_long2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x4f, 0x44, 0x0d, 0xb1, 0xe6, 0xed, 0xd2, 0x89,
+    0x9f, 0xa3, 0x35, 0xf0, 0x95, 0x15, 0xaa, 0x02,
+    0x5e, 0xe1, 0x77, 0xa7, 0x9f, 0x4b, 0x4a, 0xaf,
+    0x38, 0xe4, 0x2b, 0x5c, 0x4d, 0xe6, 0x60, 0xf5,
+    0xde, 0x8f, 0xb2, 0xa5, 0xb2, 0xfb, 0xd2, 0xa3,
+    0xcb, 0xff, 0xd2, 0x0c, 0xff, 0x12, 0x88, 0xc0
+};
+
+static const hash_testvector_t sha384_hash_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha384_short2_msg), sha384_short2_msg, sha384_short2_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha384_short4_msg), sha384_short4_msg, sha384_short4_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha384_long2_msg),  sha384_long2_msg,  sha384_long2_msg_digest  },
+    { 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* SHA-512 hash test vectors
+ * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
+ * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
+ */
+
+static const u_char sha512_short2_msg[] = {
+    0xd0
+};
+
+static const u_char sha512_short2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x99, 0x92, 0x20, 0x29, 0x38, 0xe8, 0x82, 0xe7,
+    0x3e, 0x20, 0xf6, 0xb6, 0x9e, 0x68, 0xa0, 0xa7,
+    0x14, 0x90, 0x90, 0x42, 0x3d, 0x93, 0xc8, 0x1b,
+    0xab, 0x3f, 0x21, 0x67, 0x8d, 0x4a, 0xce, 0xee,
+    0xe5, 0x0e, 0x4e, 0x8c, 0xaf, 0xad, 0xa4, 0xc8,
+    0x5a, 0x54, 0xea, 0x83, 0x06, 0x82, 0x6c, 0x4a,
+    0xd6, 0xe7, 0x4c, 0xec, 0xe9, 0x63, 0x1b, 0xfa,
+    0x8a, 0x54, 0x9b, 0x4a, 0xb3, 0xfb, 0xba, 0x15
+};
+
+static const u_char sha512_short4_msg[] = {
+    0x8d, 0x4e, 0x3c, 0x0e, 0x38, 0x89, 0x19, 0x14,
+    0x91, 0x81, 0x6e, 0x9d, 0x98, 0xbf, 0xf0, 0xa0
+};
+
+static const u_char sha512_short4_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xcb, 0x0b, 0x67, 0xa4, 0xb8, 0x71, 0x2c, 0xd7,
+    0x3c, 0x9a, 0xab, 0xc0, 0xb1, 0x99, 0xe9, 0x26,
+    0x9b, 0x20, 0x84, 0x4a, 0xfb, 0x75, 0xac, 0xbd,
+    0xd1, 0xc1, 0x53, 0xc9, 0x82, 0x89, 0x24, 0xc3,
+    0xdd, 0xed, 0xaa, 0xfe, 0x66, 0x9c, 0x5f, 0xdd,
+    0x0b, 0xc6, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x0f, 0x67, 0x73, 0x98,
+    0x82, 0x13, 0xeb, 0x1b, 0x16, 0xf5, 0x17, 0xad,
+    0x0d, 0xe4, 0xb2, 0xf0, 0xc9, 0x5c, 0x90, 0xf8
+};
+
+static const u_char sha512_long2_msg[] = {
+    0xa5, 0x5f, 0x20, 0xc4, 0x11, 0xaa, 0xd1, 0x32,
+    0x80, 0x7a, 0x50, 0x2d, 0x65, 0x82, 0x4e, 0x31,
+    0xa2, 0x30, 0x54, 0x32, 0xaa, 0x3d, 0x06, 0xd3,
+    0xe2, 0x82, 0xa8, 0xd8, 0x4e, 0x0d, 0xe1, 0xde,
+    0x69, 0x74, 0xbf, 0x49, 0x54, 0x69, 0xfc, 0x7f,
+    0x33, 0x8f, 0x80, 0x54, 0xd5, 0x8c, 0x26, 0xc4,
+    0x93, 0x60, 0xc3, 0xe8, 0x7a, 0xf5, 0x65, 0x23,
+    0xac, 0xf6, 0xd8, 0x9d, 0x03, 0xe5, 0x6f, 0xf2,
+    0xf8, 0x68, 0x00, 0x2b, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0x31, 0xed,
+    0xc4, 0x4d, 0xf2, 0xf0, 0x22, 0x3d, 0x4b, 0xb3,
+    0xb2, 0x43, 0x58, 0x6e, 0x1a, 0x7d, 0x92, 0x49,
+    0x36, 0x69, 0x4f, 0xcb, 0xba, 0xf8, 0x8d, 0x95,
+    0x19, 0xe4, 0xeb, 0x50, 0xa6, 0x44, 0xf8, 0xe4,
+    0xf9, 0x5e, 0xb0, 0xea, 0x95, 0xbc, 0x44, 0x65,
+    0xc8, 0x82, 0x1a, 0xac, 0xd2, 0xfe, 0x15, 0xab,
+    0x49, 0x81, 0x16, 0x4b, 0xbb, 0x6d, 0xc3, 0x2f,
+    0x96, 0x90, 0x87, 0xa1, 0x45, 0xb0, 0xd9, 0xcc,
+    0x9c, 0x67, 0xc2, 0x2b, 0x76, 0x32, 0x99, 0x41,
+    0x9c, 0xc4, 0x12, 0x8b, 0xe9, 0xa0, 0x77, 0xb3,
+    0xac, 0xe6, 0x34, 0x06, 0x4e, 0x6d, 0x99, 0x28,
+    0x35, 0x13, 0xdc, 0x06, 0xe7, 0x51, 0x5d, 0x0d,
+    0x73, 0x13, 0x2e, 0x9a, 0x0d, 0xc6, 0xd3, 0xb1,
+    0xf8, 0xb2, 0x46, 0xf1, 0xa9, 0x8a, 0x3f, 0xc7,
+    0x29, 0x41, 0xb1, 0xe3, 0xbb, 0x20, 0x98, 0xe8,
+    0xbf, 0x16, 0xf2, 0x68, 0xd6, 0x4f, 0x0b, 0x0f,
+    0x47, 0x07, 0xfe, 0x1e, 0xa1, 0xa1, 0x79, 0x1b,
+    0xa2, 0xf3, 0xc0, 0xc7, 0x58, 0xe5, 0xf5, 0x51,
+    0x86, 0x3a, 0x96, 0xc9, 0x49, 0xad, 0x47, 0xd7,
+    0xfb, 0x40, 0xd2
+};
+
+static const u_char sha512_long2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xc6, 0x65, 0xbe, 0xfb, 0x36, 0xda, 0x18, 0x9d,
+    0x78, 0x82, 0x2d, 0x10, 0x52, 0x8c, 0xbf, 0x3b,
+    0x12, 0xb3, 0xee, 0xf7, 0x26, 0x03, 0x99, 0x09,
+    0xc1, 0xa1, 0x6a, 0x27, 0x0d, 0x48, 0x71, 0x93,
+    0x77, 0x96, 0x6b, 0x95, 0x7a, 0x87, 0x8e, 0x72,
+    0x05, 0x84, 0x77, 0x9a, 0x62, 0x82, 0x5c, 0x18,
+    0xda, 0x26, 0x41, 0x5e, 0x49, 0xa7, 0x17, 0x6a,
+    0x89, 0x4e, 0x75, 0x10, 0xfd, 0x14, 0x51, 0xf5
+};
+
+static const hash_testvector_t sha512_hash_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha512_short2_msg), sha512_short2_msg, sha512_short2_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha512_short4_msg), sha512_short4_msg, sha512_short4_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha512_long2_msg),  sha512_long2_msg,  sha512_long2_msg_digest  },
+    { 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 hmac test vectors
+ * from RFC 4231 "Identifiers and Test Vectors for HMAC-SHA-224,
+ * HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512"
+ * December 2005, M. Nystrom, RSA Security
+ */
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac1_key[] = {
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac1_msg[] = {
+    0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac1_256[] = {
+    0xb0, 0x34, 0x4c, 0x61, 0xd8, 0xdb, 0x38, 0x53,
+    0x5c, 0xa8, 0xaf, 0xce, 0xaf, 0x0b, 0xf1, 0x2b,
+    0x88, 0x1d, 0xc2, 0x00, 0xc9, 0x83, 0x3d, 0xa7,
+    0x26, 0xe9, 0x37, 0x6c, 0x2e, 0x32, 0xcf, 0xf7
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac1_384[] = {
+    0xaf, 0xd0, 0x39, 0x44, 0xd8, 0x48, 0x95, 0x62,
+    0x6b, 0x08, 0x25, 0xf4, 0xab ,0x46, 0x90, 0x7f,
+    0x15, 0xf9, 0xda, 0xdb, 0xe4, 0x10, 0x1e, 0xc6,
+    0x82, 0xaa, 0x03, 0x4c, 0x7c, 0xeb, 0xc5, 0x9c,
+    0xfa, 0xea, 0x9e, 0xa9, 0x07, 0x6e, 0xde, 0x7f,
+    0x4a, 0xf1, 0x52, 0xe8, 0xb2, 0xfa, 0x9c, 0xb6
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac1_512[] = {
+    0x87, 0xaa, 0x7c, 0xde, 0xa5, 0xef, 0x61, 0x9d,
+    0x4f, 0xf0, 0xb4, 0x24, 0x1a, 0x1d, 0x6c, 0xb0,
+    0x23, 0x79, 0xf4, 0xe2, 0xce, 0x4e, 0xc2, 0x78,
+    0x7a, 0xd0, 0xb3, 0x05, 0x45, 0xe1, 0x7c, 0xde,
+    0xda, 0xa8, 0x33, 0xb7, 0xd6, 0xb8, 0xa7, 0x02,
+    0x03, 0x8b, 0x27, 0x4e, 0xae, 0xa3, 0xf4, 0xe4,
+    0xbe, 0x9d, 0x91, 0x4e, 0xeb, 0x61, 0xf1, 0x70,
+    0x2e, 0x69, 0x6c, 0x20, 0x3a, 0x12, 0x68, 0x54
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac2_key[] = {
+    0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac2_msg[] = {
+    0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20,
+    0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20,
+    0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68,
+    0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac2_256[] = {
+    0x5b, 0xdc, 0xc1, 0x46, 0xbf, 0x60, 0x75, 0x4e,
+    0x6a, 0x04, 0x24, 0x26, 0x08, 0x95, 0x75, 0xc7,
+    0x5a, 0x00, 0x3f, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x27, 0x39, 0x83,
+    0x9d, 0xec, 0x58, 0xb9, 0x64, 0xec, 0x38, 0x43
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac2_384[] = {
+    0xaf, 0x45, 0xd2, 0xe3, 0x76, 0x48, 0x40, 0x31,
+    0x61, 0x7f, 0x78, 0xd2, 0xb5, 0x8a, 0x6b, 0x1b,
+    0x9c, 0x7e, 0xf4, 0x64, 0xf5, 0xa0, 0x1b, 0x47,
+    0xe4, 0x2e, 0xc3, 0x73, 0x63, 0x22, 0x44, 0x5e,
+    0x8e, 0x22, 0x40, 0xca, 0x5e, 0x69, 0xe2, 0xc7,
+    0x8b, 0x32, 0x39, 0xec, 0xfa, 0xb2, 0x16, 0x49
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac2_512[] = {
+    0x16, 0x4b, 0x7a, 0x7b, 0xfc, 0xf8, 0x19, 0xe2,
+    0xe3, 0x95, 0xfb, 0xe7, 0x3b, 0x56, 0xe0, 0xa3,
+    0x87, 0xbd, 0x64, 0x22, 0x2e, 0x83, 0x1f, 0xd6,
+    0x10, 0x27, 0x0c, 0xd7, 0xea, 0x25, 0x05, 0x54,
+    0x97, 0x58, 0xbf, 0x75, 0xc0, 0x5a, 0x99, 0x4a,
+    0x6d, 0x03, 0x4f, 0x65, 0xf8, 0xf0, 0xe6, 0xfd,
+    0xca, 0xea, 0xb1, 0xa3, 0x4d, 0x4a, 0x6b, 0x4b,
+    0x63, 0x6e, 0x07, 0x0a, 0x38, 0xbc, 0xe7, 0x37
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac3_key[] = {
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac3_msg[] = {
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac3_256[] = {
+    0x77, 0x3e, 0xa9, 0x1e, 0x36, 0x80, 0x0e, 0x46,
+    0x85, 0x4d, 0xb8, 0xeb, 0xd0, 0x91, 0x81, 0xa7,
+    0x29, 0x59, 0x09, 0x8b, 0x3e, 0xf8, 0xc1, 0x22,
+    0xd9, 0x63, 0x55, 0x14, 0xce, 0xd5, 0x65, 0xfe
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac3_384[] = {
+    0x88, 0x06, 0x26, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xe6, 0xad, 0x8a,
+    0x0a, 0xa2, 0xac, 0xe0, 0x14, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x6f,
+    0x0a, 0xa6, 0x35, 0xd9, 0x47, 0xac, 0x9f, 0xeb,
+    0xe8, 0x3e, 0xf4, 0xe5, 0x59, 0x66, 0x14, 0x4b,
+    0x2a, 0x5a, 0xb3, 0x9d, 0xc1, 0x38, 0x14, 0xb9,
+    0x4e, 0x3a, 0xb6, 0xe1, 0x01, 0xa3, 0x4f, 0x27
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac3_512[] = {
+    0xfa, 0x73, 0xb0, 0x08, 0x9d, 0x56, 0xa2, 0x84,
+    0xef, 0xb0, 0xf0, 0x75, 0x6c, 0x89, 0x0b, 0xe9,
+    0xb1, 0xb5, 0xdb, 0xdd, 0x8e, 0xe8, 0x1a, 0x36,
+    0x55, 0xf8, 0x3e, 0x33, 0xb2, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x39,
+    0xbf, 0x3e, 0x84, 0x82, 0x79, 0xa7, 0x22, 0xc8,
+    0x06, 0xb4, 0x85, 0xa4, 0x7e, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x07,
+    0xb9, 0x46, 0xa3, 0x37, 0xbe, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x26,
+    0x74, 0x27, 0x88, 0x59, 0xe1, 0x32, 0x92, 0xfb
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac4_key[] = {
+    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+    0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18,
+    0x19
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac4_msg[] = {
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd 
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac4_256[] = {
+    0x82, 0x55, 0x8a, 0x38, 0x9a, 0x44, 0x3c, 0x0e,
+    0xa4, 0xcc, 0x81, 0x98, 0x99, 0xf2, 0x08, 0x3a,
+    0x85, 0xf0, 0xfa, 0xa3, 0xe5, 0x78, 0xf8, 0x07,
+    0x7a, 0x2e, 0x3f, 0xf4, 0x67, 0x29, 0x66, 0x5b
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac4_384[] = {
+    0x3e, 0x8a, 0x69, 0xb7, 0x78, 0x3c, 0x25, 0x85,
+    0x19, 0x33, 0xab, 0x62, 0x90, 0xaf, 0x6c, 0xa7,
+    0x7a, 0x99, 0x81, 0x48, 0x08, 0x50, 0x00, 0x9c,
+    0xc5, 0x57, 0x7c, 0x6e, 0x1f, 0x57, 0x3b, 0x4e,
+    0x68, 0x01, 0xdd, 0x23, 0xc4, 0xa7, 0xd6, 0x79,
+    0xcc, 0xf8, 0xa3, 0x86, 0xc6, 0x74, 0xcf, 0xfb
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac4_512[] = {
+    0xb0, 0xba, 0x46, 0x56, 0x37, 0x45, 0x8c, 0x69,
+    0x90, 0xe5, 0xa8, 0xc5, 0xf6, 0x1d, 0x4a, 0xf7,
+    0xe5, 0x76, 0xd9, 0x7f, 0xf9, 0x4b, 0x87, 0x2d,
+    0xe7, 0x6f, 0x80, 0x50, 0x36, 0x1e, 0xe3, 0xdb,
+    0xa9, 0x1c, 0xa5, 0xc1, 0x1a, 0xa2, 0x5e, 0xb4,
+    0xd6, 0x79, 0x27, 0x5c, 0xc5, 0x78, 0x80, 0x63,
+    0xa5, 0xf1, 0x97, 0x41, 0x12, 0x0c, 0x4f, 0x2d,
+    0xe2, 0xad, 0xeb, 0xeb, 0x10, 0xa2, 0x98, 0xdd
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac6_key[] = {
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac6_msg[] = {
+    0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x55, 0x73, 0x69,
+    0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65,
+    0x72, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x42,
+    0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x69, 0x7a,
+    0x65, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x2d, 0x20,
+    0x48, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79,
+    0x20, 0x46, 0x69, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac6_256[] = {
+    0x60, 0xe4, 0x31, 0x59, 0x1e, 0xe0, 0xb6, 0x7f,
+    0x0d, 0x8a, 0x26, 0xaa, 0xcb, 0xf5, 0xb7, 0x7f,
+    0x8e, 0x0b, 0xc6, 0x21, 0x37, 0x28, 0xc5, 0x14,
+    0x05, 0x46, 0x04, 0x0f, 0x0e, 0xe3, 0x7f, 0x54
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac6_384[] = {
+    0x4e, 0xce, 0x08, 0x44, 0x85, 0x81, 0x3e, 0x90,
+    0x88, 0xd2, 0xc6, 0x3a, 0x04, 0x1b, 0xc5, 0xb4,
+    0x4f, 0x9e, 0xf1, 0x01, 0x2a, 0x2b, 0x58, 0x8f,
+    0x3c, 0xd1, 0x1f, 0x05, 0x03, 0x3a, 0xc4, 0xc6,
+    0x0c, 0x2e, 0xf6, 0xab, 0x40, 0x30, 0xfe, 0x82,
+    0x96, 0x24, 0x8d, 0xf1, 0x63, 0xf4, 0x49, 0x52
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac6_512[] = {
+    0x80, 0xb2, 0x42, 0x63, 0xc7, 0xc1, 0xa3, 0xeb,
+    0xb7, 0x14, 0x93, 0xc1, 0xdd, 0x7b, 0xe8, 0xb4,
+    0x9b, 0x46, 0xd1, 0xf4, 0x1b, 0x4a, 0xee, 0xc1,
+    0x12, 0x1b, 0x01, 0x37, 0x83, 0xf8, 0xf3, 0x52,
+    0x6b, 0x56, 0xd0, 0x37, 0xe0, 0x5f, 0x25, 0x98,
+    0xbd, 0x0f, 0xd2, 0x21, 0x5d, 0x6a, 0x1e, 0x52,
+    0x95, 0xe6, 0x4f, 0x73, 0xf6, 0x3f, 0x0a, 0xec,
+    0x8b, 0x91, 0x5a, 0x98, 0x5d, 0x78, 0x65, 0x98
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac7_msg[] = {
+    0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20,
+    0x61, 0x20, 0x74, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x75,
+    0x73, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x61, 0x20, 0x6c,
+    0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
+    0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b,
+    0x2d, 0x73, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65,
+    0x79, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x61, 0x20,
+    0x6c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x74,
+    0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x62, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63,
+    0x6b, 0x2d, 0x73, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x20, 0x64,
+    0x61, 0x74, 0x61, 0x2e, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65,
+    0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x65, 0x65,
+    0x64, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x20, 0x62, 0x65,
+    0x20, 0x68, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20,
+    0x62, 0x65, 0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x65, 0x20, 0x62,
+    0x65, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x75, 0x73, 0x65,
+    0x64, 0x20, 0x62, 0x79, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65,
+    0x20, 0x48, 0x4d, 0x41, 0x43, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6c,
+    0x67, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x69, 0x74, 0x68, 0x6d, 0x2e
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac7_256[] = {
+    0x9b, 0x09, 0xff, 0xa7, 0x1b, 0x94, 0x2f, 0xcb,
+    0x27, 0x63, 0x5f, 0xbc, 0xd5, 0xb0, 0xe9, 0x44,
+    0xbf, 0xdc, 0x63, 0x64, 0x4f, 0x07, 0x13, 0x93,
+    0x8a, 0x7f, 0x51, 0x53, 0x5c, 0x3a, 0x35, 0xe2
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac7_384[] = {
+    0x66, 0x17, 0x17, 0x8e, 0x94, 0x1f, 0x02, 0x0d,
+    0x35, 0x1e, 0x2f, 0x25, 0x4e, 0x8f, 0xd3, 0x2c,
+    0x60, 0x24, 0x20, 0xfe, 0xb0, 0xb8, 0xfb, 0x9a,
+    0xdc, 0xce, 0xbb, 0x82, 0x46, 0x1e, 0x99, 0xc5,
+    0xa6, 0x78, 0xcc, 0x31, 0xe7, 0x99, 0x17, 0x6d,
+    0x38, 0x60, 0xe6, 0x11, 0x0c, 0x46, 0x52, 0x3e
+};
+
+static const u_char sha2_hmac7_512[] = {
+    0xe3, 0x7b, 0x6a, 0x77, 0x5d, 0xc8, 0x7d, 0xba,
+    0xa4, 0xdf, 0xa9, 0xf9, 0x6e, 0x5e, 0x3f, 0xfd,
+    0xde, 0xbd, 0x71, 0xf8, 0x86, 0x72, 0x89, 0x86,
+    0x5d, 0xf5, 0xa3, 0x2d, 0x20, 0xcd, 0xc9, 0x44,
+    0xb6, 0x02, 0x2c, 0xac, 0x3c, 0x49, 0x82, 0xb1,
+    0x0d, 0x5e, 0xeb, 0x55, 0xc3, 0xe4, 0xde, 0x15,
+    0x13, 0x46, 0x76, 0xfb, 0x6d, 0xe0, 0x44, 0x60,
+    0x65, 0xc9, 0x74, 0x40, 0xfa, 0x8c, 0x6a, 0x58
+};
+
+static const hmac_testvector_t sha256_hmac_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac1_key), sha2_hmac1_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac1_msg), sha2_hmac1_msg, sha2_hmac1_256 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac2_key), sha2_hmac2_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac2_msg), sha2_hmac2_msg, sha2_hmac2_256 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac3_key), sha2_hmac3_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac3_msg), sha2_hmac3_msg, sha2_hmac3_256 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac4_key), sha2_hmac4_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac4_msg), sha2_hmac4_msg, sha2_hmac4_256 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac6_msg), sha2_hmac6_msg, sha2_hmac6_256 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac7_msg), sha2_hmac7_msg, sha2_hmac7_256 },
+    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static const hmac_testvector_t sha384_hmac_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac1_key), sha2_hmac1_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac1_msg), sha2_hmac1_msg, sha2_hmac1_384 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac2_key), sha2_hmac2_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac2_msg), sha2_hmac2_msg, sha2_hmac2_384 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac3_key), sha2_hmac3_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac3_msg), sha2_hmac3_msg, sha2_hmac3_384 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac4_key), sha2_hmac4_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac4_msg), sha2_hmac4_msg, sha2_hmac4_384 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac6_msg), sha2_hmac6_msg, sha2_hmac6_384 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac7_msg), sha2_hmac7_msg, sha2_hmac7_384 },
+    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static const hmac_testvector_t sha512_hmac_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac1_key), sha2_hmac1_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac1_msg), sha2_hmac1_msg, sha2_hmac1_512 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac2_key), sha2_hmac2_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac2_msg), sha2_hmac2_msg, sha2_hmac2_512 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac3_key), sha2_hmac3_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac3_msg), sha2_hmac3_msg, sha2_hmac3_512 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac4_key), sha2_hmac4_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac4_msg), sha2_hmac4_msg, sha2_hmac4_512 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac6_msg), sha2_hmac6_msg, sha2_hmac6_512 },
+    { sizeof(sha2_hmac6_key), sha2_hmac6_key, sizeof(sha2_hmac7_msg), sha2_hmac7_msg, sha2_hmac7_512 },
+    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_256 = {
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_256,
+	algo_next: NULL,
+	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(sha256_context),
+	hash_block_size:  SHA2_256_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	hash_digest_size: SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	hash_testvectors: sha256_hash_testvectors,
+	hmac_testvectors: sha256_hmac_testvectors,
+	hash_init: (void (*)(void *))sha256_init,
+	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_char *, size_t ))sha256_write,
+	hash_final:(void (*)(u_char *, void *))sha256_hash_final
+};
+
+struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_384 = {
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_384,
+	algo_next: NULL,
+	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(sha512_context),
+	hash_block_size:  SHA2_384_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	hash_digest_size: SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	hash_testvectors: sha384_hash_testvectors,
+	hmac_testvectors: sha384_hmac_testvectors,
+	hash_init: (void (*)(void *))sha384_init,
+	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_char *, size_t ))sha512_write,
+	hash_final:(void (*)(u_char *, void *))sha384_hash_final
+};
+
+struct hash_desc hash_desc_sha2_512 = {
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA2_512,
+	algo_next: NULL,
+	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(sha512_context),
+	hash_block_size:  SHA2_512_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	hash_digest_size: SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	hash_testvectors: sha512_hash_testvectors,
+	hmac_testvectors: sha512_hmac_testvectors,
+	hash_init: (void (*)(void *))sha512_init,
+	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_char *, size_t ))sha512_write,
+	hash_final:(void (*)(u_char *, void *))sha512_hash_final
+};
+
+int ike_alg_sha2_init(void);
+
+int
+ike_alg_sha2_init(void)
+{
+    int ret
+;
+    ret = ike_alg_register_hash(&hash_desc_sha2_256);
+    if (ret)
+	goto out;
+    ret = ike_alg_register_hash(&hash_desc_sha2_384);
+    if (ret)
+	goto out;
+    ret = ike_alg_register_hash(&hash_desc_sha2_512);
+
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_sha2_init
+*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1788bc394
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alg_twofish.c
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "libtwofish/twofish_cbc.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+#define  TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(128/BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define  TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN	128
+#define  TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN	128
+#define  TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN	256
+
+static void
+do_twofish(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_size, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
+{
+    twofish_context twofish_ctx;
+    char iv_bak[TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    char *new_iv = NULL;	/* logic will avoid copy to NULL */
+
+    twofish_set_key(&twofish_ctx, key, key_size);
+    /*	
+     *	my TWOFISH cbc does not touch passed IV (optimization for
+     *	ESP handling), so I must "emulate" des-like IV
+     *	crunching
+     */
+    if (!enc)
+	    memcpy(new_iv=iv_bak, 
+			    (char*) buf + buf_size-TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			    TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    twofish_cbc_encrypt(&twofish_ctx, buf, buf, buf_size, iv, enc);
+
+    if (enc)
+	    new_iv = (char*) buf + buf_size-TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    memcpy(iv, new_iv, TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+}
+
+struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_twofish = 
+{
+	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC,
+	algo_next: 	NULL,
+	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(twofish_context),
+        enc_blocksize: 	TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+        keydeflen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+        keyminlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
+	do_crypt: 	do_twofish,
+};
+
+struct encrypt_desc encrypt_desc_twofish_ssh =
+{
+	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH,
+	algo_next: 	NULL,
+	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(twofish_context),
+        enc_blocksize: 	TWOFISH_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+        keydeflen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MIN_LEN,
+        keyminlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_DEF_LEN,
+	keymaxlen: 	TWOFISH_KEY_MAX_LEN,
+	do_crypt: 	do_twofish,
+};
+
+int ike_alg_twofish_init(void);
+
+int
+ike_alg_twofish_init(void)
+{
+    int ret = ike_alg_register_enc(&encrypt_desc_twofish);
+
+    if (ike_alg_register_enc(&encrypt_desc_twofish_ssh) < 0)
+	plog("ike_alg_twofish_init(): Experimental OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH activation failed");
+
+    return ret;
+}
+/*
+IKE_ALG_INIT_NAME: ike_alg_twofish_init
+*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg/ike_alginit.c b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alginit.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8784bf31b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg/ike_alginit.c
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+extern int ike_alg_init(void); 		int ike_alg_init(void) {
+{ extern int ike_alg_aes_init (void); ike_alg_aes_init();}
+{ extern int ike_alg_blowfish_init (void); ike_alg_blowfish_init();}
+{ extern int ike_alg_serpent_init (void); ike_alg_serpent_init();}
+{ extern int ike_alg_sha2_init (void); ike_alg_sha2_init();}
+{ extern int ike_alg_twofish_init (void); ike_alg_twofish_init();}
+return 0;}
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg_info.c b/src/pluto/alg_info.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ac5d1672f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg_info.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1205 @@
+/*
+ * Algorithm info parsing and creation functions
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * $Id: alg_info.c,v 1.5 2004/09/29 22:42:49 as Exp $
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ */
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "constants.h"
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#else
+/*
+ *	macros/functions for compilation without pluto (eg: spi for manual conns)
+ */
+#include <assert.h>
+#define passert(x) assert(x)
+extern int debug;	/* eg: spi.c */
+#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (debug) { action ; } }
+#define DBG_log(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
+#define RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+#define loglog(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, ##args);
+#define alloc_thing(thing, name) alloc_bytes(sizeof (thing), name)
+void * alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name) {
+	void *p=malloc(size);
+        if (p == NULL)
+		fprintf(stderr, "unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s",
+			(unsigned long) size, name);
+	memset(p, '\0', size);
+	return p;
+}
+#define pfreeany(ptr) free(ptr)
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
+/*
+ * sadb/ESP aa attrib converters
+ */
+int
+alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(int auth)
+{
+    int sadb_aalg = 0;
+
+    switch(auth) {
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+	    sadb_aalg = auth + 1;
+	    break;
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD:
+	    sadb_aalg = auth;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    /* loose ... */
+	    sadb_aalg = auth;
+    }
+    return sadb_aalg;
+}
+
+int /* __attribute__ ((unused)) */
+alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(int sadb_aalg)
+{
+    int auth = 0;
+
+    switch(sadb_aalg) {
+	case SADB_AALG_MD5_HMAC:
+	case SADB_AALG_SHA1_HMAC:
+	    auth = sadb_aalg - 1;
+	    break;
+	/* since they are the same ...  :)  */
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512:
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD:
+	    auth = sadb_aalg;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    /* loose ... */
+	    auth = sadb_aalg;
+    }
+    return auth;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search enum_name array with in prefixed uppercase
+ */
+static int
+enum_search_prefix (enum_names *ed, const char *prefix, const char *str, int strlen)
+{
+    char buf[64];
+    char *ptr;
+    int ret;
+    int len = sizeof(buf) - 1;	/* reserve space for final \0 */
+
+    for (ptr = buf; *prefix; *ptr++ = *prefix++, len--);
+    while (strlen-- && len-- && *str) *ptr++ = toupper(*str++);
+    *ptr = 0;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("enum_search_prefix () calling enum_search(%p, \"%s\")"
+	    , ed, buf)
+    )
+    ret = enum_search(ed, buf);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search enum_name array with in prefixed and postfixed uppercase
+ */
+static int
+enum_search_ppfix (enum_names *ed, const char *prefix, const char *postfix, const char *str, int strlen)
+{
+    char buf[64];
+    char *ptr;
+    int ret;
+    int len = sizeof(buf) - 1;	/* reserve space for final \0 */
+
+    for (ptr = buf; *prefix; *ptr++ = *prefix++, len--);
+    while (strlen-- && len-- && *str) *ptr++ = toupper(*str++);
+    while (len-- && *postfix) *ptr++ = *postfix++;
+    *ptr = 0;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("enum_search_ppfixi () calling enum_search(%p, \"%s\")"
+	    , ed, buf)
+    )
+    ret = enum_search(ed, buf);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search esp_transformid_names for a match, eg:
+ * 	"3des" <=> "ESP_3DES"
+ */
+#define ESP_MAGIC_ID 0x00ffff01
+
+static int
+ealg_getbyname_esp(const char *const str, int len)
+{
+    if (!str || !*str)
+	return -1;
+
+    /* leave special case for eg:  "id248" string */
+    if (strcmp("id", str) == 0)
+	return ESP_MAGIC_ID;
+
+    return enum_search_prefix(&esp_transformid_names, "ESP_", str, len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search auth_alg_names for a match, eg:
+ * 	"md5" <=> "AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5"
+ */
+static int
+aalg_getbyname_esp(const char *const str, int len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned num;
+
+    if (!str || !*str)
+	return -1;
+
+    /* interpret 'SHA' as 'SHA1' */
+    if (strncasecmp("SHA", str, len) == 0)
+	return enum_search(&auth_alg_names, "AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1");
+
+    ret = enum_search_prefix(&auth_alg_names,"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_", str ,len);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    ret = enum_search_prefix(&auth_alg_names,"AUTH_ALGORITHM_", str, len);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    sscanf(str, "id%d%n", &ret, &num);
+    return (ret >= 0 && num != strlen(str))? -1 : ret;
+}
+
+static int
+modp_getbyname_esp(const char *const str, int len)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!str || !*str)
+	return -1;
+    
+    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_group_names,"OAKLEY_GROUP_", str, len);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    ret = enum_search_ppfix(&oakley_group_names, "OAKLEY_GROUP_", " (extension)", str, len);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+void 
+alg_info_free(struct alg_info *alg_info)
+{
+    pfreeany(alg_info);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Raw add routine: only checks for no duplicates
+ */
+static void
+__alg_info_esp_add (struct alg_info_esp *alg_info, int ealg_id, unsigned ek_bits, int aalg_id, unsigned ak_bits)
+{
+    struct esp_info *esp_info=alg_info->esp;
+    unsigned cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt, i;
+
+    /* check for overflows */
+    passert(cnt < elemsof(alg_info->esp));
+
+    /* dont add duplicates */
+    for (i = 0; i < cnt; i++)
+    {
+	if (esp_info[i].esp_ealg_id == ealg_id
+	&& (!ek_bits || esp_info[i].esp_ealg_keylen == ek_bits)
+	&& esp_info[i].esp_aalg_id == aalg_id
+	&& (!ak_bits || esp_info[i].esp_aalg_keylen == ak_bits))
+	    return;
+    }
+
+    esp_info[cnt].esp_ealg_id = ealg_id;
+    esp_info[cnt].esp_ealg_keylen = ek_bits;
+    esp_info[cnt].esp_aalg_id = aalg_id;
+    esp_info[cnt].esp_aalg_keylen = ak_bits;
+
+    /* sadb values */
+    esp_info[cnt].encryptalg = ealg_id;
+    esp_info[cnt].authalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(aalg_id);
+    alg_info->alg_info_cnt++;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("__alg_info_esp_add() ealg=%d aalg=%d cnt=%d"
+	    , ealg_id, aalg_id, alg_info->alg_info_cnt)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * Add ESP alg info _with_ logic (policy):
+ */
+static void
+alg_info_esp_add (struct alg_info *alg_info, int ealg_id, int ek_bits, int aalg_id, int ak_bits)
+{
+    /* Policy: default to 3DES */
+    if (ealg_id == 0)
+	ealg_id = ESP_3DES;
+
+    if (ealg_id > 0)
+    {
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+	if (aalg_id > 0)
+#else
+	/* Allow no auth for manual conns (from spi.c) */
+	if (aalg_id >= 0)
+#endif
+	    __alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
+				ealg_id, ek_bits,
+				aalg_id, ak_bits);
+	else
+	{
+	    /* Policy: default to MD5 and SHA1 */
+	    __alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
+				ealg_id, ek_bits,
+				AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, ak_bits);
+	    __alg_info_esp_add((struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info,
+				ealg_id, ek_bits,
+				AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1, ak_bits);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+/**************************************
+ *
+ *	IKE alg
+ *
+ *************************************/
+/*
+ * Search oakley_enc_names for a match, eg:
+ * 	"3des_cbc" <=> "OAKLEY_3DES_CBC"
+ */
+static int
+ealg_getbyname_ike(const char *const str, int len)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!str || !*str)
+	return -1;
+
+    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_enc_names,"OAKLEY_", str, len);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    ret = enum_search_ppfix(&oakley_enc_names, "OAKLEY_", "_CBC", str, len);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search  oakley_hash_names for a match, eg:
+ * 	"md5" <=> "OAKLEY_MD5"
+ */
+static int
+aalg_getbyname_ike(const char *const str, int len)
+{
+    int ret;
+    unsigned num;
+
+    if (!str || !*str)
+	return -1;
+
+    /* interpret 'SHA1' as 'SHA' */
+    if (strncasecmp("SHA1", str, len) == 0)
+	return enum_search(&oakley_hash_names, "OAKLEY_SHA");
+
+    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_hash_names,"OAKLEY_", str, len);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    sscanf(str, "id%d%n", &ret, &num);
+    return (ret >=0 && num != strlen(str))? -1 : ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Search oakley_group_names for a match, eg:
+ * 	"modp1024" <=> "OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024"
+ */
+static int
+modp_getbyname_ike(const char *const str, int len)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    if (!str || !*str)
+	return -1;
+
+    ret = enum_search_prefix(&oakley_group_names,"OAKLEY_GROUP_", str, len);
+    if (ret >= 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    ret = enum_search_ppfix(&oakley_group_names, "OAKLEY_GROUP_", " (extension)", str, len);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+__alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info_ike *alg_info, int ealg_id, unsigned ek_bits, int aalg_id, unsigned ak_bits, int modp_id)
+{
+    struct ike_info *ike_info = alg_info->ike;
+    unsigned cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
+    unsigned i;
+
+    /* check for overflows */
+    passert(cnt < elemsof(alg_info->ike));
+
+    /* dont add duplicates */
+   for (i = 0;i < cnt; i++)
+   {
+	if (ike_info[i].ike_ealg == ealg_id
+	&& (!ek_bits || ike_info[i].ike_eklen == ek_bits)
+	&&  ike_info[i].ike_halg == aalg_id
+	&& (!ak_bits || ike_info[i].ike_hklen == ak_bits)
+	&&  ike_info[i].ike_modp==modp_id)
+	    return;
+    }
+
+    ike_info[cnt].ike_ealg = ealg_id;
+    ike_info[cnt].ike_eklen = ek_bits;
+    ike_info[cnt].ike_halg = aalg_id;
+    ike_info[cnt].ike_hklen = ak_bits;
+    ike_info[cnt].ike_modp = modp_id;
+    alg_info->alg_info_cnt++;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("__alg_info_ike_add() ealg=%d aalg=%d modp_id=%d, cnt=%d"
+		, ealg_id, aalg_id, modp_id
+		, alg_info->alg_info_cnt)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * Proposals will be built by looping over default_ike_groups array and
+ * merging alg_info (ike_info) contents
+ */
+
+static int default_ike_groups[] = { 
+    OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536,
+    OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024
+};
+
+/*	
+ *	Add IKE alg info _with_ logic (policy):
+ */
+static void
+alg_info_ike_add (struct alg_info *alg_info, int ealg_id, int ek_bits, int aalg_id, int ak_bits, int modp_id)
+{
+    int i = 0;
+    int n_groups = elemsof(default_ike_groups);
+
+    /* if specified modp_id avoid loop over default_ike_groups */
+    if (modp_id)
+    {
+	n_groups=0;
+	goto in_loop;
+    }
+	
+    for (; n_groups--; i++)
+    {
+	modp_id = default_ike_groups[i];
+in_loop:
+	/* Policy: default to 3DES */
+	if (ealg_id == 0)
+	    ealg_id = OAKLEY_3DES_CBC;
+
+	if (ealg_id > 0)
+	{
+	    if (aalg_id > 0)
+		__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
+				   ealg_id, ek_bits,
+				   aalg_id, ak_bits,
+				   modp_id);
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* Policy: default to MD5 and SHA */
+		__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
+				   ealg_id, ek_bits,
+				   OAKLEY_MD5, ak_bits,
+				   modp_id);
+		__alg_info_ike_add((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info,
+				   ealg_id, ek_bits,
+				   OAKLEY_SHA, ak_bits,
+				   modp_id);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
+/*	
+ *	Creates a new alg_info by parsing passed string		
+ */
+enum parser_state_esp {
+    ST_INI,
+    ST_EA,		/* encrypt algo   */
+    ST_EA_END,
+    ST_EK,		/* enc. key length */
+    ST_EK_END,
+    ST_AA,		/* auth algo */
+    ST_AA_END,
+    ST_AK,		/* auth. key length */
+    ST_AK_END,
+    ST_MODP,	/* modp spec */
+    ST_FLAG_STRICT,
+    ST_END,
+    ST_EOF,
+    ST_ERR
+};
+
+static const char *parser_state_esp_names[] = {
+    "ST_INI",
+    "ST_EA",
+    "ST_EA_END",
+    "ST_EK",
+    "ST_EK_END",
+    "ST_AA",
+    "ST_AA_END",
+    "ST_AK",
+    "ST_AK_END",
+    "ST_MOPD",
+    "ST_FLAG_STRICT",
+    "ST_END",
+    "ST_EOF",
+    "ST_ERR"
+};
+
+static const char*
+parser_state_name_esp(enum parser_state_esp state)
+{
+    return parser_state_esp_names[state];
+}
+
+/* XXX:jjo to implement different parser for ESP and IKE */
+struct parser_context {
+    unsigned state, old_state;
+    unsigned protoid;
+    char ealg_buf[16];
+    char aalg_buf[16];
+    char modp_buf[16];
+    int (*ealg_getbyname)(const char *const str, int len);
+    int (*aalg_getbyname)(const char *const str, int len);
+    int (*modp_getbyname)(const char *const str, int len);
+    char *ealg_str;
+    char *aalg_str;
+    char *modp_str;
+    int eklen;
+    int aklen;
+    int ch;
+    const char *err;
+};
+
+static inline void 
+parser_set_state(struct parser_context *p_ctx, enum parser_state_esp state)
+{
+    if (state != p_ctx->state)
+    {
+	p_ctx->old_state = p_ctx->state;
+	p_ctx->state = state;
+    }
+}
+
+static int 
+parser_machine(struct parser_context *p_ctx)
+{
+    int ch = p_ctx->ch;
+
+    /* special 'absolute' cases */
+    p_ctx->err = "No error.";
+
+    /* chars that end algo strings */
+    switch (ch){
+    case 0:	/* end-of-string */
+    case '!':	/* flag as strict algo list */
+    case ',':	/* algo string separator */
+	switch (p_ctx->state) {
+	case ST_EA:
+	case ST_EK:
+	case ST_AA:
+	case ST_AK:
+	case ST_MODP:
+	case ST_FLAG_STRICT:
+	    {
+		enum parser_state_esp next_state = 0;
+
+		switch (ch) {
+		case 0:
+		    next_state = ST_EOF;
+		    break;
+		case ',':
+		    next_state = ST_END;
+		    break;
+		case '!':
+		    next_state = ST_FLAG_STRICT;
+		    break;
+	        }
+	        /* ch? parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_END) : parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EOF) ; */
+	        parser_set_state(p_ctx, next_state);
+	        goto out;
+	    }
+	default:
+	    p_ctx->err = "String ended with invalid char";
+	    goto err;
+	}
+    }
+re_eval:
+    switch (p_ctx->state) {
+    case ST_INI:
+	if (isspace(ch))
+	    break;
+	if (isalnum(ch))
+	{
+	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str++) = ch;
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EA);
+	    break;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "No alphanum. char initially found";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_EA:
+	if (isalpha(ch) || ch == '_')
+	{
+	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str++) = ch;
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (isdigit(ch))
+	{
+	    /* bravely switch to enc keylen */
+	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str) = 0;
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EK);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	if (ch == '-')
+	{
+	    *(p_ctx->ealg_str) = 0;
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EA_END);
+	    break;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "No valid char found after enc alg string";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_EA_END:
+	if (isdigit(ch))
+	{
+	    /* bravely switch to enc keylen */
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EK);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	if (isalpha(ch))
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AA);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "No alphanum char found after enc alg separator";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_EK:
+	if (ch == '-')
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_EK_END);
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (isdigit(ch))
+	{
+	    p_ctx->eklen = p_ctx->eklen*10 + ch - '0';
+	    break;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non digit or valid separator found while reading enc keylen";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_EK_END:
+	if (isalpha(ch))
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AA);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non alpha char found after enc keylen end separator";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_AA:
+	if (ch == '-')
+	{
+	    *(p_ctx->aalg_str++) = 0;
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AA_END);
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (isalnum(ch) || ch == '_')
+	{
+	    *(p_ctx->aalg_str++) = ch;
+	    break;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non alphanum or valid separator found in auth string";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_AA_END:
+	if (isdigit(ch))
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AK);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	/* Only allow modpXXXX string if we have a modp_getbyname method */
+	if ((p_ctx->modp_getbyname) && isalpha(ch))
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_MODP);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non initial digit found for auth keylen";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_AK:
+	if (ch=='-')
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_AK_END);
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (isdigit(ch))
+	{
+	    p_ctx->aklen = p_ctx->aklen*10 + ch - '0';
+	    break;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non digit found for auth keylen";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_AK_END:
+	/* Only allow modpXXXX string if we have a modp_getbyname method */
+	if ((p_ctx->modp_getbyname) && isalpha(ch))
+	{
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_MODP);
+	    goto re_eval;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non alpha char found after auth keylen";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_MODP:
+	if (isalnum(ch))
+	{
+	    *(p_ctx->modp_str++) = ch;
+	    break;
+	}
+	p_ctx->err = "Non alphanum char found after in modp string";
+	goto err;
+    case ST_FLAG_STRICT:
+	if (ch == 0)
+	    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_END);
+	p_ctx->err = "Flags character(s) must be at end of whole string";
+	goto err;
+
+    /* XXX */
+    case ST_END:
+    case ST_EOF:
+    case ST_ERR:
+	break;
+    /* XXX */
+    }
+out:
+    return p_ctx->state;
+err:
+    parser_set_state(p_ctx, ST_ERR);
+    return ST_ERR;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Must be called for each "new" char, with new
+ * character in ctx.ch
+ */
+static void
+parser_init(struct parser_context *p_ctx, unsigned protoid)
+{
+    memset(p_ctx, 0, sizeof (*p_ctx));
+    p_ctx->protoid = protoid; /* XXX: jjo */
+    p_ctx->protoid = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
+    p_ctx->ealg_str = p_ctx->ealg_buf;
+    p_ctx->aalg_str = p_ctx->aalg_buf;
+    p_ctx->modp_str = p_ctx->modp_buf;
+    p_ctx->state = ST_INI;
+
+    switch (protoid) {
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+	p_ctx->ealg_getbyname = ealg_getbyname_ike;
+	p_ctx->aalg_getbyname = aalg_getbyname_ike;
+	p_ctx->modp_getbyname = modp_getbyname_ike;
+	break;
+#endif
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+	p_ctx->ealg_getbyname = ealg_getbyname_esp;
+	p_ctx->aalg_getbyname = aalg_getbyname_esp;
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+parser_alg_info_add(struct parser_context *p_ctx, struct alg_info *alg_info)
+{
+    int ealg_id = 0;
+    int aalg_id = 0;
+    int modp_id = 0;
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+    const struct oakley_group_desc *gd;
+#endif
+
+    if (*p_ctx->ealg_buf)
+    {
+	ealg_id = p_ctx->ealg_getbyname(p_ctx->ealg_buf, strlen(p_ctx->ealg_buf));
+	if (ealg_id == ESP_MAGIC_ID)
+	{
+	    ealg_id = p_ctx->eklen;
+	    p_ctx->eklen = 0;
+	}
+	if (ealg_id < 0)
+	{
+	    p_ctx->err = "enc_alg not found";
+	    return -1;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("parser_alg_info_add() ealg_getbyname(\"%s\")=%d"
+		, p_ctx->ealg_buf
+		, ealg_id)
+	)
+    }
+    if (*p_ctx->aalg_buf)
+    {
+	aalg_id = p_ctx->aalg_getbyname(p_ctx->aalg_buf, strlen(p_ctx->aalg_buf));
+	if (aalg_id < 0)
+	{
+	    p_ctx->err = "hash_alg not found";
+	    return -1;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("parser_alg_info_add() aalg_getbyname(\"%s\")=%d"
+		, p_ctx->aalg_buf
+		, aalg_id)
+	)
+    }
+    if (p_ctx->modp_getbyname && *p_ctx->modp_buf)
+    {
+	modp_id = p_ctx->modp_getbyname(p_ctx->modp_buf, strlen(p_ctx->modp_buf));
+	if (modp_id < 0)
+	{
+	    p_ctx->err = "modp group not found";
+	    return -1;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("parser_alg_info_add() modp_getbyname(\"%s\")=%d"
+		, p_ctx->modp_buf
+		, modp_id)
+	)
+    }
+    switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+	alg_info_esp_add(alg_info,
+			 ealg_id, p_ctx->eklen,
+			 aalg_id, p_ctx->aklen);
+	break;
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+	if (modp_id && !(gd = lookup_group(modp_id)))
+	{
+	    p_ctx->err = "found modp group id, but not supported";
+	    return -1;
+	}
+	alg_info_ike_add(alg_info,
+			 ealg_id, p_ctx->eklen,
+			 aalg_id, p_ctx->aklen,
+			 modp_id);
+	break;
+#endif
+    default:
+	return -1;
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+alg_info_parse_str (struct alg_info *alg_info, const char *alg_str, const char **err_p)
+{
+    struct parser_context ctx;
+    int ret;
+    const char *ptr;
+    static char err_buf[256];
+
+    *err_buf = 0;
+    parser_init(&ctx, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
+    if (err_p)
+	*err_p = NULL;
+
+    /* use default if nul esp string */
+    if (!*alg_str)
+    {
+	switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+	case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+	    alg_info_ike_add(alg_info, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	    return 0;
+#endif
+	case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+	    alg_info_esp_add(alg_info, 0, 0, 0, 0);
+	    return 0;
+	default:
+	    /* IMPOSSIBLE */
+	    passert(alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
+	}
+    }
+
+    for (ret = 0, ptr = alg_str; ret < ST_EOF;)
+    {
+	ctx.ch = *ptr++;
+	ret = parser_machine(&ctx);
+		
+	switch (ret) {
+	case ST_FLAG_STRICT:
+	    alg_info->alg_info_flags |= ALG_INFO_F_STRICT;
+	    break;
+	case ST_END:
+	case ST_EOF:
+	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("alg_info_parse_str() ealg_buf=%s aalg_buf=%s"
+			"eklen=%d  aklen=%d",
+			ctx.ealg_buf, ctx.aalg_buf,
+			ctx.eklen, ctx.aklen)
+	    )
+	    if (parser_alg_info_add(&ctx, alg_info) < 0)
+	    {
+		snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf),
+		    "%s, enc_alg=\"%s\", auth_alg=\"%s\", modp=\"%s\"",
+		    ctx.err,
+		    ctx.ealg_buf,
+		    ctx.aalg_buf,
+		    ctx.modp_buf);
+		goto err;
+	    }
+	    /* zero out for next run (ST_END) */
+	    parser_init(&ctx, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
+	    break;
+	case ST_ERR:
+	    snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf),
+		"%s, just after \"%.*s\" (old_state=%s)",
+		ctx.err,
+		(int)(ptr-alg_str-1), alg_str ,
+		parser_state_name_esp(ctx.old_state));
+	    goto err;
+	default:
+	    if (!ctx.ch)
+		break;
+	}
+    }
+    return 0;
+err:
+    if (err_p)
+	*err_p=err_buf;
+    return -1;
+}
+
+struct alg_info_esp *
+alg_info_esp_create_from_str (const char *alg_str, const char **err_p)
+{
+    struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp;
+    char esp_buf[256];
+    static char err_buf[256];
+    char *pfs_name;
+    int ret = 0;
+    /*
+     * alg_info storage should be sized dynamically
+     * but this may require 2passes to know
+     * transform count in advance.
+     */
+    alg_info_esp = alloc_thing (struct alg_info_esp, "alg_info_esp");
+    if (!alg_info_esp)
+	goto out;
+
+    pfs_name=index (alg_str, ';');
+    if (pfs_name)
+    {
+	memcpy(esp_buf, alg_str, pfs_name-alg_str);
+	esp_buf[pfs_name-alg_str] = 0;
+	alg_str = esp_buf;
+	pfs_name++;
+
+	/* if pfs strings AND first char is not '0' */
+	if (*pfs_name && pfs_name[0] != '0')
+	{
+	    ret = modp_getbyname_esp(pfs_name, strlen(pfs_name));
+	    if (ret < 0)
+	    {
+		/* Bomb if pfsgroup not found */
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		    DBG_log("alg_info_esp_create_from_str(): pfsgroup \"%s\" not found"
+			, pfs_name)
+		)
+		if (*err_p)
+		{
+		    snprintf(err_buf, sizeof(err_buf),
+			"pfsgroup \"%s\" not found",
+			pfs_name);
+
+		    *err_p = err_buf;
+		}
+		goto out;
+	    }
+	    alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup = ret;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+	alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup = 0;
+		
+    alg_info_esp->alg_info_protoid = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
+    ret = alg_info_parse_str((struct alg_info *)alg_info_esp, alg_str, err_p) ;
+out:
+    if (ret < 0)
+    {
+	pfreeany(alg_info_esp);
+	alg_info_esp = NULL;
+    }
+    return alg_info_esp;
+}
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+struct alg_info_ike *
+alg_info_ike_create_from_str (const char *alg_str, const char **err_p)
+{
+    struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike;
+    /*
+     * alg_info storage should be sized dynamically
+     * but this may require 2passes to know
+     * transform count in advance.
+     */
+    alg_info_ike = alloc_thing (struct alg_info_ike, "alg_info_ike");
+    alg_info_ike->alg_info_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
+
+    if (alg_info_parse_str((struct alg_info *)alg_info_ike,
+			   alg_str, err_p) < 0)
+    {
+	pfreeany(alg_info_ike);
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    return alg_info_ike;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * 	alg_info struct can be shared by
+ * 	several connections instances,
+ * 	handle free() with ref_cnts
+ */
+void 
+alg_info_addref(struct alg_info *alg_info)
+{
+    if (alg_info != NULL)
+    {
+	alg_info->ref_cnt++;
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("alg_info_addref() alg_info->ref_cnt=%d"
+		, alg_info->ref_cnt)
+	)
+    }
+}
+
+void
+alg_info_delref(struct alg_info **alg_info_p)
+{
+    struct alg_info *alg_info = *alg_info_p;
+
+    if (alg_info != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(alg_info->ref_cnt != 0);
+	alg_info->ref_cnt--;
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("alg_info_delref() alg_info->ref_cnt=%d"
+		, alg_info->ref_cnt)
+	)
+	if (alg_info->ref_cnt == 0)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("alg_info_delref() freeing alg_info")
+	    )
+	    alg_info_free(alg_info);
+	}
+	*alg_info_p = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+/* snprint already parsed transform list (alg_info) */
+int
+alg_info_snprint(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info *alg_info)
+{
+    char *ptr = buf;
+    int np = 0;
+    struct esp_info *esp_info;
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+    struct ike_info *ike_info;
+#endif
+    int cnt;
+	
+    switch (alg_info->alg_info_protoid) {
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+	{
+	    struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp = (struct alg_info_esp *)alg_info;
+
+	    ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info_esp, esp_info, cnt)
+	    {
+		np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d, "
+			, esp_info->esp_ealg_id
+			, (int)esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen
+			, esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
+		ptr += np;
+		buflen -= np;
+		if (buflen < 0)
+		    goto out;
+	    }
+	    if (alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
+	    {
+		np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "; pfsgroup=%d; "
+			, alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup);
+		ptr += np;
+		buflen -= np;
+		if (buflen < 0)
+		    goto out;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+	ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH((struct alg_info_ike *)alg_info, ike_info, cnt)
+	{
+	    np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d-%d, "
+		    , ike_info->ike_ealg
+		    , (int)ike_info->ike_eklen
+		    , ike_info->ike_halg
+		    , ike_info->ike_modp);
+	    ptr += np;
+	    buflen -= np;
+	    if (buflen < 0)
+		goto out;
+	}
+	break;
+#endif
+    default:
+	np = snprintf(buf, buflen, "INVALID protoid=%d\n"
+		, alg_info->alg_info_protoid);
+	ptr += np;
+	buflen -= np;
+	goto out;
+   }
+
+   np = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%s"
+	    , alg_info->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT?
+	    "strict":"");
+   ptr += np;
+   buflen -= np;
+out:
+    if (buflen < 0)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "buffer space exhausted in alg_info_snprint_ike(), buflen=%d"
+	    , buflen);
+    }
+	
+    return ptr - buf;
+}
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+int
+alg_info_snprint_esp(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info)
+{
+    char *ptr = buf;
+
+    int cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
+    struct esp_info *esp_info = alg_info->esp;
+
+    while (cnt--)
+    {
+	if (kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(esp_info->esp_ealg_id, 0, NULL)
+	&&  kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(esp_info->esp_aalg_id, NULL))
+	{
+	    u_int eklen = (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+		    ? esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen
+		    : kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(esp_info->esp_ealg_id)
+			    * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+	    u_int aklen = esp_info->esp_aalg_keylen
+		    ? esp_info->esp_aalg_keylen
+		    : kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(esp_info->esp_aalg_id)
+			    * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+	    int ret = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d_%03d, ",
+			   esp_info->esp_ealg_id, eklen,
+			   esp_info->esp_aalg_id, aklen);
+	    ptr += ret;
+	    buflen -= ret;
+	    if (buflen < 0)
+	 	break;
+	}
+	esp_info++;
+    }
+    return ptr - buf;
+}
+
+int
+alg_info_snprint_ike(char *buf, int buflen, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info)
+{
+    char *ptr = buf;
+
+    int cnt = alg_info->alg_info_cnt;
+    struct ike_info *ike_info = alg_info->ike;
+
+    while (cnt--)
+    {
+	struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc = ike_alg_get_encrypter(ike_info->ike_ealg);
+	struct hash_desc *hash_desc = ike_alg_get_hasher(ike_info->ike_halg);
+
+	if (enc_desc != NULL &&  hash_desc != NULL
+	&& lookup_group(ike_info->ike_modp))
+	{
+
+	    u_int eklen = (ike_info->ike_eklen)
+			? ike_info->ike_eklen
+			: enc_desc->keydeflen;
+
+	    u_int aklen = (ike_info->ike_hklen)
+			? ike_info->ike_hklen
+			: hash_desc->hash_digest_size * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+	    int ret = snprintf(ptr, buflen, "%d_%03d-%d_%03d-%d, ",
+			   ike_info->ike_ealg, eklen,
+			   ike_info->ike_halg, aklen,
+			   ike_info->ike_modp);
+	    ptr += ret;
+	    buflen -= ret;
+	    if (buflen < 0)
+		break;
+	}
+	ike_info++;
+    }
+    return ptr - buf;
+}
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
diff --git a/src/pluto/alg_info.h b/src/pluto/alg_info.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..cd2011dcc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/alg_info.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* Algorithm info parsing and creation functions
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: alg_info.h,v 1.4 2004/09/29 22:39:44 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef ALG_INFO_H
+#define ALG_INFO_H
+
+struct esp_info {
+	u_int8_t transid;	/* ESP transform */
+	u_int16_t auth;		/* AUTH */
+	size_t enckeylen;	/* keylength for ESP transform */
+	size_t authkeylen;	/* keylength for AUTH */
+	u_int8_t encryptalg;	/* normally  encryptalg=transid */
+	u_int8_t authalg;	/* normally  authalg=auth+1 */
+};
+
+struct ike_info {
+	u_int16_t ike_ealg;	/* high 16 bit nums for reserved */
+	u_int8_t ike_halg;
+	size_t ike_eklen;
+	size_t ike_hklen;
+	u_int16_t ike_modp;
+};
+
+#define ALG_INFO_COMMON \
+	int alg_info_cnt;		\
+	int ref_cnt;			\
+	unsigned alg_info_flags;	\
+	unsigned alg_info_protoid
+
+struct alg_info {
+	ALG_INFO_COMMON;
+};
+
+struct alg_info_esp {
+	ALG_INFO_COMMON;
+	struct esp_info esp[64];
+	int esp_pfsgroup;
+};
+
+struct alg_info_ike {
+	ALG_INFO_COMMON;
+	struct ike_info ike[64];
+};
+#define esp_ealg_id transid
+#define esp_aalg_id auth
+#define esp_ealg_keylen enckeylen	/* bits */
+#define esp_aalg_keylen authkeylen	/* bits */
+
+/*	alg_info_flags bits */
+#define ALG_INFO_F_STRICT	0x01
+
+extern int alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(int auth);
+extern int alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(int sadb_aalg);
+extern void alg_info_free(struct alg_info *alg_info);
+extern void alg_info_addref(struct alg_info *alg_info);
+extern void alg_info_delref(struct alg_info **alg_info);
+extern struct alg_info_esp* alg_info_esp_create_from_str(const char *alg_str
+    , const char **err_p);
+extern struct alg_info_ike* alg_info_ike_create_from_str(const char *alg_str
+    , const char **err_p);
+extern int alg_info_parse(const char *str);
+extern int alg_info_snprint(char *buf, int buflen
+    , struct alg_info *alg_info);
+extern int alg_info_snprint_esp(char *buf, int buflen
+    , struct alg_info_esp *alg_info);
+extern int alg_info_snprint_ike(char *buf, int buflen
+    , struct alg_info_ike *alg_info);
+#define ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(ai, ai_esp, i) \
+	for (i=(ai)->alg_info_cnt,ai_esp=(ai)->esp; i--; ai_esp++) 
+#define ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(ai, ai_ike, i) \
+	for (i=(ai)->alg_info_cnt,ai_ike=(ai)->ike; i--; ai_ike++) 
+#endif /* ALG_INFO_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/asn1.c b/src/pluto/asn1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0663bc490
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/asn1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,770 @@
+/* Simple ASN.1 parser
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: asn1.c,v 1.16 2006/01/04 21:00:43 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* some common prefabricated ASN.1 constants */
+
+static u_char ASN1_INTEGER_0_str[] = { 0x02, 0x00 };
+static u_char ASN1_INTEGER_1_str[] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x01 };
+static u_char ASN1_INTEGER_2_str[] = { 0x02, 0x01, 0x02 };
+
+const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_0 = strchunk(ASN1_INTEGER_0_str);
+const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_1 = strchunk(ASN1_INTEGER_1_str);
+const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_2 = strchunk(ASN1_INTEGER_2_str);
+
+/* some popular algorithmIdentifiers */
+
+static u_char ASN1_md5_id_str[] = {
+    0x30, 0x0C,
+          0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x02, 0x05,
+	  0x05, 0x00
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_sha1_id_str[] = {
+    0x30, 0x09,
+	  0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E,0x03, 0x02, 0x1A,
+	  0x05, 0x00
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_md5WithRSA_id_str[] = {
+    0x30, 0x0D,
+	  0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x04,
+	  0x05, 0x00
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id_str[] = {
+    0x30, 0x0D,
+	  0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05,
+	  0x05, 0x00
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_rsaEncryption_id_str[] = {
+    0x30, 0x0D,
+	  0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01,
+	  0x05, 0x00
+};
+
+const chunk_t ASN1_md5_id = strchunk(ASN1_md5_id_str);
+const chunk_t ASN1_sha1_id = strchunk(ASN1_sha1_id_str);
+const chunk_t ASN1_rsaEncryption_id = strchunk(ASN1_rsaEncryption_id_str);
+const chunk_t ASN1_md5WithRSA_id = strchunk(ASN1_md5WithRSA_id_str);
+const chunk_t ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id = strchunk(ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id_str);
+
+/* ASN.1 definiton of an algorithmIdentifier */
+
+static const asn1Object_t algorithmIdentifierObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "algorithmIdentifier",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,	   ASN1_NONE }, /* 0 */
+  { 1,   "algorithm",		ASN1_OID,	   ASN1_BODY }, /* 1 */
+  { 1,   "parameters",		ASN1_EOC,	   ASN1_RAW  }  /* 2 */
+};
+
+#define ALGORITHM_ID_ALG		1
+#define ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMETERS		2
+#define ALGORITHM_ID_ROOF		3
+
+/*
+ * return the ASN.1 encoded algorithm identifier
+ */
+chunk_t
+asn1_algorithmIdentifier(int oid)
+{
+    switch (oid)
+    {
+    case OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+	return ASN1_rsaEncryption_id;
+    case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
+	return ASN1_md5WithRSA_id;
+    case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
+	return ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id;
+    case OID_MD5:
+	return ASN1_md5_id;
+   case OID_SHA1:
+	return ASN1_sha1_id;
+   default:
+	return empty_chunk;
+    }
+}
+
+/*  If the oid is listed in the oid_names table then the corresponding
+ *  position in the oid_names table is returned otherwise -1 is returned
+ */
+int
+known_oid(chunk_t object)
+{
+    int oid = 0;
+
+    while (object.len)
+    {
+	if (oid_names[oid].octet == *object.ptr)
+	{
+	    if (--object.len == 0 || oid_names[oid].down == 0)
+	    {
+		return oid;          /* found terminal symbol */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		object.ptr++; oid++; /* advance to next hex octet */
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (oid_names[oid].next)
+		oid = oid_names[oid].next;
+	    else
+		return OID_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+    }
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Decodes the length in bytes of an ASN.1 object
+ */
+u_int
+asn1_length(chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    u_char n;
+    size_t len;
+
+    /* advance from tag field on to length field */
+    blob->ptr++;
+    blob->len--;
+
+    /* read first octet of length field */
+    n = *blob->ptr++;
+    blob->len--;
+
+    if ((n & 0x80) == 0) /* single length octet */
+	return n;
+
+    /* composite length, determine number of length octets */
+    n &= 0x7f;
+
+    if (n > blob->len)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("number of length octets is larger than ASN.1 object")
+	)
+	return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    if (n > sizeof(len))
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("number of length octets is larger than limit of %d octets"
+		, (int)sizeof(len))
+	)
+	return ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH;
+    }
+
+    len = 0;
+    
+    while (n-- > 0)
+    {
+	len = 256*len + *blob->ptr++;
+	blob->len--;
+    }
+    return len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * codes ASN.1 lengths up to a size of 16'777'215 bytes
+ */
+void
+code_asn1_length(size_t length, chunk_t *code)
+{
+    if (length < 128)
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = length;
+	code->len = 1;
+    }
+    else if (length < 256)
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = 0x81;
+	code->ptr[1] = (u_char) length;
+	code->len = 2;
+    }
+    else if (length < 65536)
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = 0x82;
+	code->ptr[1] = length >> 8;
+	code->ptr[2] = length & 0x00ff;
+	code->len = 3;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	code->ptr[0] = 0x83;
+	code->ptr[1] = length >> 16;
+	code->ptr[2] = (length >> 8) & 0x00ff;
+	code->ptr[3] = length & 0x0000ff;
+	code->len = 4;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * build an empty asn.1 object with tag and length fields already filled in
+ */
+u_char*
+build_asn1_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, size_t datalen)
+{
+    u_char length_buf[4];
+    chunk_t length = { length_buf, 0 };
+    u_char *pos;
+
+    /* code the asn.1 length field */
+    code_asn1_length(datalen, &length);
+
+    /* allocate memory for the asn.1 TLV object */
+    object->len = 1 + length.len + datalen;
+    object->ptr = alloc_bytes(object->len, "asn1 object");
+
+    /* set position pointer at the start of the object */
+    pos = object->ptr;
+
+    /* copy the asn.1 tag field and advance the pointer */
+   *pos++ = type;
+   
+   /* copy the asn.1 length field and advance the pointer */
+   chunkcpy(pos, length);
+
+   return pos;
+}
+
+/*
+ * build a simple ASN.1 object
+ */
+chunk_t
+asn1_simple_object(asn1_t tag, chunk_t content)
+{
+    chunk_t object;
+
+    u_char *pos = build_asn1_object(&object, tag, content.len);
+    chunkcpy(pos, content);
+
+    return object;
+}
+
+/* Build an ASN.1 object from a variable number of individual chunks.
+ * Depending on the mode, chunks either are moved ('m') or copied ('c').
+ */
+chunk_t
+asn1_wrap(asn1_t type, const char *mode, ...)
+{
+    chunk_t construct;
+    va_list chunks;
+    u_char *pos;
+    int i;
+    int count = strlen(mode);
+	
+    /* sum up lengths of individual chunks */ 
+    va_start(chunks, mode);
+    construct.len = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+    {
+        chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
+	construct.len += ch.len;
+    }
+    va_end(chunks);
+
+    /* allocate needed memory for construct */
+    pos = build_asn1_object(&construct, type, construct.len);
+
+    /* copy or move the chunks */
+    va_start(chunks, mode);
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+    {
+	chunk_t ch = va_arg(chunks, chunk_t);
+
+	switch (*mode++)
+	{
+	case 'm':
+	    mv_chunk(&pos, ch);
+	    break;
+	case 'c':
+	default:
+	    chunkcpy(pos, ch);
+	}
+    }
+    va_end(chunks);
+
+    return construct;
+}
+
+/*
+ * convert a MP integer into a DER coded ASN.1 object
+ */
+chunk_t
+asn1_integer_from_mpz(const mpz_t value)
+{
+    size_t bits = mpz_sizeinbase(value, 2);  /* size in bits */
+    size_t size = 1 + bits / BITS_PER_BYTE;  /* size in bytes */
+    chunk_t n = mpz_to_n(value, size);
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_INTEGER, "m", n);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  determines if a character string is of type ASN.1 printableString
+ */
+bool
+is_printablestring(chunk_t str)
+{
+    const char printablestring_charset[] =
+	"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789 '()+,-./:=?";
+    u_int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < str.len; i++)
+    {
+	if (strchr(printablestring_charset, str.ptr[i]) == NULL)
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Converts ASN.1 UTCTIME or GENERALIZEDTIME into calender time
+ */
+time_t
+asn1totime(const chunk_t *utctime, asn1_t type)
+{
+    struct tm t;
+    time_t tz_offset;
+    u_char *eot = NULL;
+
+    if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, 'Z', utctime->len)) != NULL)
+    {
+	tz_offset = 0; /* Zulu time with a zero time zone offset */
+    }
+    else if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, '+', utctime->len)) != NULL)
+    {
+	int tz_hour, tz_min;
+
+	sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min);
+	tz_offset = 3600*tz_hour + 60*tz_min;  /* positive time zone offset */
+    }
+    else if ((eot = memchr(utctime->ptr, '-', utctime->len)) != NULL)
+    {
+	int tz_hour, tz_min;
+
+	sscanf(eot+1, "%2d%2d", &tz_hour, &tz_min);
+	tz_offset = -3600*tz_hour - 60*tz_min;  /* negative time zone offset */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	return 0; /* error in time format */
+    }
+
+    {
+	const char* format = (type == ASN1_UTCTIME)? "%2d%2d%2d%2d%2d":
+						     "%4d%2d%2d%2d%2d";
+
+	sscanf(utctime->ptr, format, &t.tm_year, &t.tm_mon, &t.tm_mday,
+				     &t.tm_hour, &t.tm_min);
+    }
+
+    /* is there a seconds field? */
+    if ((eot - utctime->ptr) == ((type == ASN1_UTCTIME)?12:14))
+    {
+	sscanf(eot-2, "%2d", &t.tm_sec);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	t.tm_sec = 0;
+    }
+
+    /* representation of year */
+    if (t.tm_year >= 1900)
+    {
+	t.tm_year -= 1900;
+    }
+    else if (t.tm_year >= 100)
+    {
+	return 0;
+    }
+    else if (t.tm_year < 50)
+    {
+	t.tm_year += 100;
+    }
+
+    /* representation of month 0..11*/
+    t.tm_mon--;
+
+    /* set daylight saving time to off */
+    t.tm_isdst = 0;
+
+    /* compensate timezone */
+
+    return mktime(&t) - timezone - tz_offset;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  convert a date into ASN.1 UTCTIME or GENERALIZEDTIME format
+ */
+chunk_t
+timetoasn1(const time_t *time, asn1_t type)
+{
+    int offset;
+    const char *format;
+    char buf[TIMETOA_BUF];
+    chunk_t formatted_time;
+    struct tm *t = gmtime(time);
+
+    if (type == ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
+    {
+	format = "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ";
+	offset = 1900;
+    }
+    else /* ASN1_UTCTIME */
+    {
+	format = "%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02dZ";
+	offset = (t->tm_year < 100)? 0 : -100;
+    }
+    sprintf(buf, format, t->tm_year + offset, t->tm_mon + 1, t->tm_mday
+	  	       , t->tm_hour, t->tm_min, t->tm_sec);
+    formatted_time.ptr = buf;
+    formatted_time.len = strlen(buf);
+    return asn1_simple_object(type, formatted_time);
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Initializes the internal context of the ASN.1 parser
+ */
+void
+asn1_init(asn1_ctx_t *ctx, chunk_t blob, u_int level0,
+	bool implicit, u_int cond)
+{
+    ctx->blobs[0] = blob;
+    ctx->level0   = level0;
+    ctx->implicit = implicit;
+    ctx->cond     = cond;
+    memset(ctx->loopAddr, '\0', sizeof(ctx->loopAddr));
+}
+
+/*
+ * print the value of an ASN.1 simple object
+ */
+static void
+debug_asn1_simple_object(chunk_t object, asn1_t type, u_int cond)
+{
+    int oid;
+
+    switch (type)
+    {
+    case ASN1_OID:
+	oid = known_oid(object);
+	if (oid != OID_UNKNOWN)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  '%s'",oid_names[oid].name);
+	    )
+	    return;
+	}
+	break;
+    case ASN1_UTF8STRING:
+    case ASN1_IA5STRING:
+    case ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING:
+    case ASN1_T61STRING:
+    case ASN1_VISIBLESTRING:
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)object.len, object.ptr);
+	)
+	return;
+    case ASN1_UTCTIME:
+    case ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    time_t time = asn1totime(&object, type);
+	    DBG_log("  '%s'", timetoa(&time, TRUE));
+	)
+	return;
+    default:
+	 break;
+    }
+    DBG(cond,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("", object);
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses and extracts the next ASN.1 object
+ */
+bool
+extract_object(asn1Object_t const *objects,
+	u_int *objectID, chunk_t *object, u_int *level, asn1_ctx_t *ctx)
+{
+    asn1Object_t obj = objects[*objectID];
+    chunk_t *blob;
+    chunk_t *blob1;
+    u_char *start_ptr;
+
+    *object = empty_chunk;
+
+    if (obj.flags & ASN1_END)  /* end of loop or option found */
+    {
+	if (ctx->loopAddr[obj.level] && ctx->blobs[obj.level+1].len > 0)
+	{
+	    *objectID = ctx->loopAddr[obj.level]; /* another iteration */
+	    obj = objects[*objectID];
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    ctx->loopAddr[obj.level] = 0;         /* exit loop or option*/
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    *level = ctx->level0 + obj.level;
+    blob = ctx->blobs + obj.level;
+    blob1 = blob + 1;
+    start_ptr = blob->ptr;
+
+   /* handle ASN.1 defaults values */
+
+    if ((obj.flags & ASN1_DEF)
+    && (blob->len == 0 || *start_ptr != obj.type) )
+    {
+	/* field is missing */
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:", *level, obj.name);
+	)
+	if (obj.type & ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
+	{
+	    (*objectID)++ ;  /* skip context-specific tag */
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    /* handle ASN.1 options */
+
+    if ((obj.flags & ASN1_OPT)
+    && (blob->len == 0 || *start_ptr != obj.type))
+    {
+        /* advance to end of missing option field */
+	do
+	    (*objectID)++;
+	while (!((objects[*objectID].flags & ASN1_END)
+	      && (objects[*objectID].level == obj.level)));
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    /* an ASN.1 object must possess at least a tag and length field */
+
+    if (blob->len < 2)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  ASN.1 object smaller than 2 octets",
+		    *level, obj.name);
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    blob1->len = asn1_length(blob);
+
+    if (blob1->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH || blob->len < blob1->len)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  length of ASN.1 object invalid or too large",
+		    *level, obj.name);
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    blob1->ptr = blob->ptr;
+    blob->ptr += blob1->len;
+    blob->len -= blob1->len;
+
+    /* return raw ASN.1 object without prior type checking */
+
+    if (obj.flags & ASN1_RAW)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:", *level, obj.name);
+        )
+	object->ptr = start_ptr;
+	object->len = (size_t)(blob->ptr - start_ptr);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (*start_ptr != obj.type && !(ctx->implicit && *objectID == 0))
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s: ASN1 tag 0x%02x expected, but is 0x%02x",
+		*level, obj.name, obj.type, *start_ptr);
+	    DBG_dump("", start_ptr, (u_int)(blob->ptr - start_ptr));
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L%d - %s:", ctx->level0+obj.level, obj.name);
+    )
+
+    /* In case of "SEQUENCE OF" or "SET OF" start a loop */
+
+    if (obj.flags & ASN1_LOOP)
+    {
+	if (blob1->len > 0)
+	{
+	    /* at least one item, start the loop */
+	    ctx->loopAddr[obj.level] = *objectID + 1;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* no items, advance directly to end of loop */
+	    do
+		(*objectID)++;
+	    while (!((objects[*objectID].flags & ASN1_END)
+		  && (objects[*objectID].level == obj.level)));
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (obj.flags & ASN1_OBJ)
+    {
+	object->ptr = start_ptr;
+	object->len = (size_t)(blob->ptr - start_ptr);
+	DBG(ctx->cond,
+	    DBG_dump_chunk("", *object);
+	)
+    }
+    else if (obj.flags & ASN1_BODY)
+    {
+	*object = *blob1;
+	debug_asn1_simple_object(*object, obj.type, ctx->cond);
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse an ASN.1 simple type
+ */
+bool
+parse_asn1_simple_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, u_int level
+, const char* name)
+{
+    size_t len;
+
+    /* an ASN.1 object must possess at least a tag and length field */
+    if (object->len < 2)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  ASN.1 object smaller than 2 octets",
+		    level, name);
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (*object->ptr != type)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s: ASN1 tag 0x%02x expected, but is 0x%02x",
+		level, name, type, *object->ptr);
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    len = asn1_length(object);
+
+    if (len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH || object->len < len)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L%d - %s:  length of ASN.1 object invalid or too large",
+		    level, name);
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L%d - %s:", level, name);
+    )
+    debug_asn1_simple_object(*object, type, DBG_RAW);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts an algorithmIdentifier
+ */
+int
+parse_algorithmIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0, chunk_t *parameters)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < ALGORITHM_ID_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(algorithmIdentifierObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return OID_UNKNOWN;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case ALGORITHM_ID_ALG:
+	    alg = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case ALGORITHM_ID_PARAMETERS:
+	    if (parameters != NULL)
+		*parameters = object;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return alg;
+ }
+
+/*
+ *  tests if a blob contains a valid ASN.1 set or sequence
+ */
+bool
+is_asn1(chunk_t blob)
+{
+    u_int len;
+    u_char tag = *blob.ptr;
+
+    if (tag != ASN1_SEQUENCE && tag != ASN1_SET)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  file content is not binary ASN.1");
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    len = asn1_length(&blob);
+    if (len != blob.len)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  file size does not match ASN.1 coded length");
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/asn1.h b/src/pluto/asn1.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2a3fb3e9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/asn1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+/* Simple ASN.1 parser
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: asn1.h,v 1.14 2005/12/06 22:50:10 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ASN1_H
+#define _ASN1_H
+
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <gmp.h>
+
+#include "defs.h"
+
+/* Defines some primitive ASN1 types */
+
+typedef enum {
+    ASN1_EOC =			0x00,
+    ASN1_BOOLEAN =		0x01,
+    ASN1_INTEGER =		0x02,
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING =		0x03,
+    ASN1_OCTET_STRING = 	0x04,
+    ASN1_NULL = 		0x05,
+    ASN1_OID =			0x06,
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED =		0x0A,
+    ASN1_UTF8STRING =		0x0C,
+    ASN1_NUMERICSTRING =	0x12,
+    ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING =	0x13,
+    ASN1_T61STRING =		0x14,
+    ASN1_VIDEOTEXSTRING =	0x15,
+    ASN1_IA5STRING =		0x16,
+    ASN1_UTCTIME =		0x17,
+    ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME =	0x18,
+    ASN1_GRAPHICSTRING =	0x19,
+    ASN1_VISIBLESTRING = 	0x1A,
+    ASN1_GENERALSTRING =	0x1B,
+    ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING =	0x1C,
+    ASN1_BMPSTRING =		0x1E,
+
+    ASN1_CONSTRUCTED =		0x20,
+
+    ASN1_SEQUENCE =		0x30,
+
+    ASN1_SET =			0x31,
+
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0 =		0x80,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_1 =		0x81,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2 =		0x82,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_3 =		0x83,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_4 =		0x84,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_5 =		0x85,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6 =		0x86,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_7 =		0x87,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_S_8 =		0x88,
+
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0 =		0xA0,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1 =		0xA1,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2 =		0xA2,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3 =		0xA3,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4 =		0xA4,
+    ASN1_CONTEXT_C_5 =		0xA5
+} asn1_t;
+
+/* Definition of ASN1 flags */
+
+#define ASN1_NONE	0x00
+#define ASN1_DEF	0x01
+#define ASN1_OPT	0x02
+#define ASN1_LOOP	0x04
+#define ASN1_END	0x08
+#define ASN1_OBJ	0x10
+#define ASN1_BODY	0x20
+#define ASN1_RAW	0x40
+
+#define ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH	0xffffffff
+
+/* definition of an ASN.1 object */
+
+typedef struct {
+    u_int   level;
+    const u_char  *name;
+    asn1_t  type;
+    u_char  flags;
+} asn1Object_t;
+
+#define ASN1_MAX_LEVEL	10
+
+typedef struct {
+    bool  implicit;
+    u_int cond;
+    u_int level0;
+    u_int loopAddr[ASN1_MAX_LEVEL+1];
+    chunk_t  blobs[ASN1_MAX_LEVEL+2];
+} asn1_ctx_t;
+
+/* some common prefabricated ASN.1 constants */
+
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_0;
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_1;
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_INTEGER_2;
+
+/* some popular algorithmIdentifiers */
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_md5_id;
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_sha1_id;
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_rsaEncryption_id;
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_md5WithRSA_id;
+extern const chunk_t ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id;
+
+extern chunk_t asn1_algorithmIdentifier(int oid);
+extern int known_oid(chunk_t object);
+extern u_int asn1_length(chunk_t *blob);
+extern void code_asn1_length(size_t length, chunk_t *code);
+extern u_char* build_asn1_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, size_t datalen);
+extern chunk_t asn1_integer_from_mpz(const mpz_t value);
+extern chunk_t asn1_simple_object(asn1_t tag, chunk_t content);
+extern chunk_t asn1_wrap(asn1_t type, const char *mode, ...);
+extern bool is_printablestring(chunk_t str);
+extern time_t asn1totime(const chunk_t *utctime, asn1_t type);
+extern chunk_t timetoasn1(const time_t *time, asn1_t type);
+extern void asn1_init(asn1_ctx_t *ctx, chunk_t blob
+    , u_int level0, bool implicit, u_int cond);
+extern bool extract_object(asn1Object_t const *objects
+    , u_int *objectID, chunk_t *object, u_int *level, asn1_ctx_t *ctx);
+extern bool parse_asn1_simple_object(chunk_t *object, asn1_t type, u_int level
+    , const char* name);
+extern int parse_algorithmIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0
+    , chunk_t *parameters);
+extern bool is_asn1(chunk_t blob);
+
+#endif /* _ASN1_H */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/ca.c b/src/pluto/ca.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1be22e2f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ca.c
@@ -0,0 +1,694 @@
+/* Certification Authority (CA) support for IKE authentication
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ca.c,v 1.10 2005/12/25 12:29:55 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+
+/* chained list of X.509 authority certificates (ca, aa, and ocsp) */
+
+static x509cert_t *x509authcerts = NULL;
+
+const ca_info_t empty_ca_info = {
+      NULL	  ,  /* next */
+      NULL	  ,  /* name */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME,
+    { NULL, 0 }	  ,  /* authName */
+    { NULL, 0 }	  ,  /* authKeyID */
+    { NULL, 0 }	  ,  /* authKey SerialNumber */
+      NULL	  ,  /* ldaphost */
+      NULL	  ,  /* ldapbase */
+      NULL	  ,  /* ocspori */
+      NULL	  ,  /* crluri */
+      FALSE	     /* strictcrlpolicy */
+};
+
+/* chained list of X.509 certification authority information records */
+
+static ca_info_t *ca_infos = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * Checks if CA a is trusted by CA b
+ */
+bool
+trusted_ca(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *pathlen)
+{
+    bool match = FALSE;
+
+    /* no CA b specified -> any CA a is accepted */
+    if (b.ptr == NULL)
+    {
+	*pathlen = (a.ptr == NULL)? 0 : MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    /* no CA a specified -> trust cannot be established */
+    if (a.ptr == NULL)
+    {
+	*pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    *pathlen = 0;
+
+    /* CA a equals CA b -> we have a match */
+    if (same_dn(a, b))
+	return TRUE;
+
+    /* CA a might be a subordinate CA of b */
+    lock_authcert_list("trusted_ca");
+
+    while ((*pathlen)++ < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN)
+    {
+	x509cert_t *cacert = get_authcert(a, empty_chunk, empty_chunk, AUTH_CA);
+
+	/* cacert not found or self-signed root cacert-> exit */
+	if (cacert == NULL || same_dn(cacert->issuer, a))
+	    break;
+
+	/* does the issuer of CA a match CA b? */
+	match = same_dn(cacert->issuer, b);
+
+	/* we have a match and exit the loop */
+	if (match)
+	    break;
+
+	/* go one level up in the CA chain */
+	a = cacert->issuer;
+    }
+    
+    unlock_authcert_list("trusted_ca");
+    return match;
+}
+
+/*
+ * does our CA match one of the requested CAs?
+ */
+bool
+match_requested_ca(generalName_t *requested_ca, chunk_t our_ca, int *our_pathlen)
+{
+    /* if no ca is requested than any ca will match */
+    if (requested_ca == NULL)
+    {
+	*our_pathlen = 0;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    *our_pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN + 1;
+
+    while (requested_ca != NULL)
+    {
+	int pathlen;
+
+	if (trusted_ca(our_ca, requested_ca->name, &pathlen)
+	&& pathlen < *our_pathlen)
+	    *our_pathlen = pathlen;
+	requested_ca = requested_ca->next;
+    }
+
+    return *our_pathlen <= MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free the first authority certificate in the chain
+ */
+static void
+free_first_authcert(void)
+{
+    x509cert_t *first = x509authcerts;
+    x509authcerts = first->next;
+    free_x509cert(first);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free  all CA certificates
+ */
+void
+free_authcerts(void)
+{
+    lock_authcert_list("free_authcerts");
+
+    while (x509authcerts != NULL)
+        free_first_authcert();
+
+    unlock_authcert_list("free_authcerts");
+}
+
+/*
+ *  get a X.509 authority certificate with a given subject or keyid
+ */
+x509cert_t*
+get_authcert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid, u_char auth_flags)
+{
+    x509cert_t *cert = x509authcerts;
+    x509cert_t *prev_cert = NULL;
+
+    while (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	if (cert->authority_flags & auth_flags
+	&& ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->subjectKeyID)
+	    : (same_dn(subject, cert->subject)
+	       && same_serial(serial, cert->serialNumber))))
+	{
+	    if (cert != x509authcerts)
+	    {
+		/* bring the certificate up front */
+		prev_cert->next = cert->next;
+		cert->next = x509authcerts;
+		x509authcerts = cert;
+	    }
+	    return cert;
+	}
+	prev_cert = cert;
+	cert = cert->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * add an authority certificate to the chained list
+ */
+bool
+add_authcert(x509cert_t *cert, u_char auth_flags)
+{
+    x509cert_t *old_cert;
+
+    /* set authority flags */
+    cert->authority_flags |= auth_flags;
+
+    lock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
+
+    old_cert = get_authcert(cert->subject, cert->serialNumber
+	, cert->subjectKeyID, auth_flags);
+
+    if (old_cert != NULL)
+    {
+	if (same_x509cert(cert, old_cert))
+	{
+	    /* cert is already present, just add additional authority flags */
+	    old_cert->authority_flags |= cert->authority_flags;
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+		DBG_log("  authcert is already present and identical")
+	    )
+	    unlock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
+
+	    free_x509cert(cert);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* cert is already present but will be replaced by new cert */
+	    free_first_authcert();
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+		DBG_log("  existing authcert deleted")
+	    )
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* add new authcert to chained list */
+    cert->next = x509authcerts;
+    x509authcerts = cert;
+    share_x509cert(cert);  /* set count to one */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  authcert inserted")
+    )
+    unlock_authcert_list("add_authcert");
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Loads authority certificates
+ */
+void
+load_authcerts(const char *type, const char *path, u_char auth_flags)
+{
+    struct dirent **filelist;
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    u_char *save_dir;
+    int n;
+
+    /* change directory to specified path */
+    save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
+
+    if (chdir(path))
+    {
+	plog("Could not change to directory '%s'", path);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("Changing to directory '%s'", path);
+	n = scandir(path, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
+
+	if (n < 0)
+	    plog("  scandir() error");
+	else
+	{
+	    while (n--)
+	    {
+		cert_t cert;
+
+		if (load_cert(filelist[n]->d_name, type, &cert))
+		    add_authcert(cert.u.x509, auth_flags);
+
+		free(filelist[n]);
+	    }
+	    free(filelist);
+	}
+    }
+    /* restore directory path */
+    chdir(save_dir);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all X.509 authcerts with given auth flags in a chained list
+ */
+void
+list_authcerts(const char *caption, u_char auth_flags, bool utc)
+{
+    lock_authcert_list("list_authcerts");
+    list_x509cert_chain(caption, x509authcerts, auth_flags, utc);
+    unlock_authcert_list("list_authcerts");
+}
+
+/*
+ * get a cacert with a given subject or keyid from an alternative list
+ */
+static const x509cert_t*
+get_alt_cacert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
+    , const x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    while (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->subjectKeyID)
+	    : (same_dn(subject, cert->subject)
+	       && same_serial(serial, cert->serialNumber)))
+	{
+	    return cert;
+	}
+	cert = cert->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* establish trust into a candidate authcert by going up the trust chain.
+ * validity and revocation status are not checked.
+ */
+bool
+trust_authcert_candidate(const x509cert_t *cert, const x509cert_t *alt_chain)
+{
+    int pathlen;
+
+    lock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+
+    for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
+    {
+	const x509cert_t *authcert = NULL;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+	    DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+	    DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
+	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
+	    }
+	)
+
+	/* search in alternative chain first */
+	authcert = get_alt_cacert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+	    , cert->authKeyID, alt_chain);
+
+	if (authcert != NULL)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("issuer cacert found in alternative chain")
+	    )
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* search in trusted chain */
+	    authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+		, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+	    if (authcert != NULL)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+		)
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		plog("issuer cacert not found");
+		unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (!check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature
+			   , cert->algorithm, cert->algorithm, authcert))
+	{
+	    plog("certificate signature is invalid");
+	    unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
+	)
+
+	/* check if cert is a self-signed root ca */
+	if (pathlen > 0 && same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
+	    )
+	    unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+
+	/* go up one step in the trust chain */
+	cert = authcert;
+    }
+    plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
+    unlock_authcert_list("trust_authcert_candidate");
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  get a CA info record with a given authName or authKeyID
+ */
+ca_info_t*
+get_ca_info(chunk_t authname, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid)
+{
+    ca_info_t *ca= ca_infos;
+
+    while (ca!= NULL)
+    {
+	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, ca->authKeyID)
+	    : (same_dn(authname, ca->authName)
+	       && same_serial(serial, ca->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	{
+	    return ca;
+	}
+	ca = ca->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  free the dynamic memory used by a ca_info record
+ */
+static void
+free_ca_info(ca_info_t* ca_info)
+{
+    if (ca_info == NULL)
+	return;
+
+    pfreeany(ca_info->name);
+    pfreeany(ca_info->ldaphost);
+    pfreeany(ca_info->ldapbase);
+    pfreeany(ca_info->ocspuri);
+
+    freeanychunk(ca_info->authName);
+    freeanychunk(ca_info->authKeyID);
+    freeanychunk(ca_info->authKeySerialNumber);
+
+    free_generalNames(ca_info->crluri, TRUE);
+
+    pfree(ca_info);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free  all CA certificates
+ */
+void
+free_ca_infos(void)
+{
+    while (ca_infos != NULL)
+    {
+	ca_info_t *ca = ca_infos;
+
+	ca_infos = ca_infos->next;
+	free_ca_info(ca);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * find a CA information record by name and optionally delete it
+ */
+bool
+find_ca_info_by_name(const char *name, bool delete)
+{
+    ca_info_t **ca_p = &ca_infos;
+    ca_info_t *ca = *ca_p;
+
+    while (ca != NULL)
+    {
+	/* is there already an entry? */
+	if (streq(name, ca->name))
+	{
+	    if (delete)
+	    {
+		lock_ca_info_list("find_ca_info_by_name");
+		*ca_p = ca->next;
+		free_ca_info(ca);
+		plog("deleting ca description \"%s\"", name);
+		unlock_ca_info_list("find_ca_info_by_name");
+	    }
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+	ca_p = &ca->next;
+	ca = *ca_p;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+
+ /*
+ * adds a CA description to a chained list
+ */
+void
+add_ca_info(const whack_message_t *msg)
+{
+    smartcard_t *sc = NULL;
+    cert_t cert;
+    bool valid_cert = FALSE;
+    bool cached_cert = FALSE;
+
+    if (find_ca_info_by_name(msg->name, FALSE))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "attempt to redefine ca record \"%s\"", msg->name);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (scx_on_smartcard(msg->cacert))
+    {
+	/* load CA cert from smartcard */
+	valid_cert = scx_load_cert(msg->cacert, &sc, &cert, &cached_cert);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* load CA cert from file */
+	valid_cert = load_ca_cert(msg->cacert, &cert);
+    }
+
+    if (valid_cert)
+    {
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	x509cert_t *cacert = cert.u.x509;
+	ca_info_t *ca = NULL;
+
+	/* does the authname already exist? */
+	ca = get_ca_info(cacert->subject, cacert->serialNumber
+		, cacert->subjectKeyID);
+	
+	if (ca != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* ca_info is already present */
+	    loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "  duplicate ca information in record \"%s\" found,"
+			       "ignoring \"%s\"", ca->name, msg->name);
+	    free_x509cert(cacert);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	plog("added ca description \"%s\"", msg->name);
+
+	/* create and initialize new ca_info record */
+	ca = alloc_thing(ca_info_t, "ca info");
+	*ca = empty_ca_info;
+
+	/* name */
+	ca->name = clone_str(msg->name, "ca name");
+	    
+	/* authName */
+	clonetochunk(ca->authName, cacert->subject.ptr
+	    , cacert->subject.len, "authName");
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ca->authName);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("authname: '%s'", buf)
+	)
+
+	/* authSerialNumber */
+	clonetochunk(ca->authKeySerialNumber, cacert->serialNumber.ptr
+	    , cacert->serialNumber.len, "authKeySerialNumber");
+
+	/* authKeyID */
+	if (cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    clonetochunk(ca->authKeyID, cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr
+		, cacert->subjectKeyID.len, "authKeyID");
+	    datatot(cacert->subjectKeyID.ptr, cacert->subjectKeyID.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf)
+	    )
+	}
+
+	/* ldaphost */
+	ca->ldaphost = clone_str(msg->ldaphost, "ldaphost");
+
+	/* ldapbase */
+	ca->ldapbase = clone_str(msg->ldapbase, "ldapbase");
+
+	/* ocspuri */
+	if (msg->ocspuri != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (strncasecmp(msg->ocspuri, "http", 4) == 0)
+		ca->ocspuri = clone_str(msg->ocspuri, "ocspuri");
+	    else
+		plog("  ignoring ocspuri with unkown protocol");
+	}
+
+	/* crluri2*/
+	if (msg->crluri2 != NULL)
+	{
+	    generalName_t gn =
+		{ NULL, GN_URI, {msg->crluri2, strlen(msg->crluri2)} };
+
+	    add_distribution_points(&gn, &ca->crluri);
+	}
+
+	/* crluri */
+	if (msg->crluri != NULL)
+	{
+	    generalName_t gn =
+		{ NULL, GN_URI, {msg->crluri, strlen(msg->crluri)} };
+
+	    add_distribution_points(&gn, &ca->crluri);
+	}
+
+	/* strictrlpolicy */
+	ca->strictcrlpolicy = msg->whack_strict;
+
+	/* insert ca_info record into the chained list */
+	lock_ca_info_list("add_ca_info");
+
+	ca->next = ca_infos;
+	ca_infos = ca;
+	ca->installed = time(NULL);
+	
+	unlock_ca_info_list("add_ca_info");
+
+	/* add cacert to list of authcerts */
+	if (!cached_cert)
+	{
+	    if (add_authcert(cacert, AUTH_CA) && sc != NULL)
+	    {
+		if (sc->last_cert.type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+		    sc->last_cert.u.x509->count--;
+		sc->last_cert = cert;
+		share_cert(sc->last_cert);
+	    }
+	}
+	if (sc != NULL)
+	    time(&sc->last_load);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * list all ca_info records in the chained list
+ */
+void
+list_ca_infos(bool utc)
+{
+    ca_info_t *ca = ca_infos;
+    
+    if (ca != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 CA Information Records:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (ca != NULL)
+    {
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	/* strictpolicy per CA not supported yet
+	 *
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, \"%s\", strictcrlpolicy: %s"
+		, timetoa(&ca->installed, utc), ca->name
+		, ca->strictcrlpolicy? "yes":"no");
+	*/
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, \"%s\"", timetoa(&ca->installed, utc), ca->name);
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, ca->authName);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authname: '%s'", buf);
+	if (ca->ldaphost != NULL)
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ldaphost: '%s'", ca->ldaphost);
+	if (ca->ldapbase != NULL)
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ldapbase: '%s'", ca->ldapbase);
+	if (ca->ocspuri != NULL)
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       ocspuri:  '%s'", ca->ocspuri);
+
+	list_distribution_points(ca->crluri);
+
+	if (ca->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(ca->authKeyID.ptr, ca->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	if (ca->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(ca->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, ca->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	ca = ca->next;
+    }
+}
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/ca.h b/src/pluto/ca.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8d4602dc6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ca.h
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* Certification Authority (CA) support for IKE authentication
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ca.h,v 1.5 2005/12/25 12:28:40 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CA_H
+#define _CA_H
+
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+
+#define MAX_CA_PATH_LEN		7
+
+/* authority flags */
+
+#define AUTH_NONE	0x00	/* no authorities */
+#define AUTH_CA		0x01	/* certification authority */
+#define AUTH_AA		0x02	/* authorization authority */
+#define AUTH_OCSP	0x04	/* ocsp signing authority */
+
+/* CA info structures */
+
+typedef struct ca_info ca_info_t;
+
+struct ca_info {
+    ca_info_t       *next;
+    char	    *name;
+    time_t	    installed;
+    chunk_t	    authName;
+    chunk_t	    authKeyID;
+    chunk_t	    authKeySerialNumber;
+    char	    *ldaphost;
+    char	    *ldapbase;
+    char	    *ocspuri;
+    generalName_t   *crluri;
+    bool	    strictcrlpolicy;
+};
+
+extern bool trusted_ca(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *pathlen);
+extern bool match_requested_ca(generalName_t *requested_ca
+    , chunk_t our_ca, int *our_pathlen);
+extern x509cert_t* get_authcert(chunk_t subject, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
+    , u_char auth_flags);
+extern void load_authcerts(const char *type, const char *path
+    , u_char auth_flags);
+extern bool add_authcert(x509cert_t *cert, u_char auth_flags);
+extern void free_authcerts(void);
+extern void list_authcerts(const char *caption, u_char auth_flags, bool utc);
+extern bool trust_authcert_candidate(const x509cert_t *cert
+    , const x509cert_t *alt_chain);
+extern ca_info_t* get_ca_info(chunk_t name, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid);
+extern bool find_ca_info_by_name(const char *name, bool delete);
+extern void add_ca_info(const whack_message_t *msg);
+extern void delete_ca_info(const char *name);
+extern void free_ca_infos(void);
+extern void list_ca_infos(bool utc);
+
+#endif /* _CA_H */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/certs.c b/src/pluto/certs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..779646a98
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/certs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,287 @@
+/* Certificate support for IKE authentication
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: certs.c,v 1.8 2005/11/06 22:55:41 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "pem.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+
+/*
+ * used for initializatin of certs
+ */
+const cert_t empty_cert = {CERT_NONE, {NULL}};
+
+/*
+ * extracts the certificate to be sent to the peer
+ */
+chunk_t
+get_mycert(cert_t cert)
+{
+    switch (cert.type)
+    {
+    case CERT_PGP:
+	return cert.u.pgp->certificate;
+    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+	return cert.u.x509->certificate;
+    default:
+	return empty_chunk;
+    }
+}
+
+/* load a coded key or certificate file with autodetection
+ * of binary DER or base64 PEM ASN.1 formats and armored PGP format
+ */
+bool
+load_coded_file(const char *filename, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char *type
+, chunk_t *blob, bool *pgp)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    FILE *fd = fopen(filename, "r");
+
+    if (fd)
+    {
+	int bytes;
+	fseek(fd, 0, SEEK_END );
+	blob->len = ftell(fd);
+	rewind(fd);
+	blob->ptr = alloc_bytes(blob->len, type);
+	bytes = fread(blob->ptr, 1, blob->len, fd);
+	fclose(fd);
+	plog("  loaded %s file '%s' (%d bytes)", type, filename, bytes);
+
+	*pgp = FALSE;
+
+	/* try DER format */
+	if (is_asn1(*blob))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  file coded in DER format");
+	    )
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+
+	/* try PEM format */
+	ugh = pemtobin(blob, pass, filename, pgp);
+
+	if (ugh == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (*pgp)
+	    {
+                DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+                    DBG_log("  file coded in armored PGP format");
+                )
+                return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    if (is_asn1(*blob))
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		    DBG_log("  file coded in PEM format");
+		)
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    ugh = "file coded in unknown format, discarded";
+	}
+
+	/* a conversion error has occured */
+	plog("  %s", ugh);
+	pfree(blob->ptr);
+	*blob = empty_chunk;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("  could not open %s file '%s'", type, filename);
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Loads a PKCS#1 or PGP private RSA key file
+ */
+err_t
+load_rsa_private_key(const char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass
+, RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    bool pgp = FALSE;
+    chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+
+    const char *path = concatenate_paths(PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, filename);
+
+    if (load_coded_file(path, pass, "private key", &blob, &pgp))
+    {
+	if (pgp)
+	{
+	    if (!parse_pgp(blob, NULL, key))
+		ugh = "syntax error in PGP private key file";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (!pkcs1_parse_private_key(blob, key))
+		ugh = "syntax error in PKCS#1 private key file";
+	}
+	pfree(blob.ptr);
+    }
+    else
+	ugh = "error loading RSA private key file";
+
+    return ugh;
+}
+/*
+ *  Loads a X.509 or OpenPGP certificate
+ */
+bool
+load_cert(const char *filename, const char *label, cert_t *cert)
+{
+    bool pgp = FALSE;
+    chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+
+    /* initialize cert struct */
+    cert->type = CERT_NONE;
+    cert->u.x509 = NULL;
+
+    if (load_coded_file(filename, NULL, label, &blob, &pgp))
+    {
+	if (pgp)
+	{
+	    pgpcert_t *pgpcert = alloc_thing(pgpcert_t, "pgpcert");
+	    *pgpcert = empty_pgpcert;
+	    if (parse_pgp(blob, pgpcert, NULL))
+	    {
+		cert->type = CERT_PGP;
+		cert->u.pgp = pgpcert;
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		plog("  error in OpenPGP certificate");
+		free_pgpcert(pgpcert);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    x509cert_t *x509cert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t, "x509cert");
+	    *x509cert = empty_x509cert;
+	    if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, x509cert))
+	    {
+		cert->type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
+		cert->u.x509 = x509cert;
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		plog("  error in X.509 certificate");
+		free_x509cert(x509cert);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Loads a host certificate
+ */
+bool
+load_host_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert)
+{
+    const char *path = concatenate_paths(HOST_CERT_PATH, filename);
+
+    return load_cert(path, "host cert", cert);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Loads a CA certificate
+ */
+bool
+load_ca_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert)
+{
+    const char *path = concatenate_paths(CA_CERT_PATH, filename);
+
+    return load_cert(path, "CA cert", cert);
+}
+
+/*
+ * establish equality of two certificates
+ */
+bool
+same_cert(const cert_t *a, const cert_t *b)
+{
+    return a->type == b->type && a->u.x509 == b->u.x509;
+}
+
+/*  for each link pointing to the certif icate
+ "  increase the count by one
+ */
+void
+share_cert(cert_t cert)
+{
+    switch (cert.type)
+    {
+    case CERT_PGP:
+	share_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
+	break;
+    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+	share_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+	break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+/*  release of a certificate decreases the count by one
+ "  the certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
+ */
+void
+release_cert(cert_t cert)
+{
+   switch (cert.type)
+    {
+    case CERT_PGP:
+	release_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
+	break;
+    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+	release_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+	break;
+    default:
+        break;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all X.509 and OpenPGP end certificates
+ */
+void
+list_certs(bool utc)
+{
+    list_x509_end_certs(utc);
+    list_pgp_end_certs(utc);
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/certs.h b/src/pluto/certs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ca5acd35a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/certs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+/* Certificate support for IKE authentication
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: certs.h,v 1.7 2005/11/06 22:55:41 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CERTS_H
+#define _CERTS_H
+
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+
+/* path definitions for private keys, end certs,
+ * cacerts, attribute certs and crls
+ */
+#define PRIVATE_KEY_PATH  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/private"
+#define HOST_CERT_PATH    IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/certs"
+#define CA_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/cacerts"
+#define A_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/acerts"
+#define AA_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/aacerts"
+#define OCSP_CERT_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/ocspcerts"
+#define CRL_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/crls"
+#define REQ_PATH	  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/reqs"
+
+/* advance warning of imminent expiry of
+ * cacerts, public keys, and crls
+ */
+#define CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL	30 /* days */
+#define OCSP_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL	30 /* days */
+#define PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL		 7 /* days */
+#define CRL_WARNING_INTERVAL		 7 /* days */
+#define ACERT_WARNING_INTERVAL		 1 /* day */
+
+/* certificate access structure
+ * currently X.509 and OpenPGP certificates are supported
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    u_char type;
+    union {
+	x509cert_t *x509;
+	pgpcert_t  *pgp;
+    } u;
+} cert_t;
+
+/* used for initialization */
+extern const cert_t empty_cert;
+
+/*  do not send certificate requests
+ *  flag set in plutomain.c and used in ipsec_doi.c
+ */
+extern bool no_cr_send;
+
+extern err_t load_rsa_private_key(const char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass
+    , RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern chunk_t get_mycert(cert_t cert);
+extern bool load_coded_file(const char *filename, prompt_pass_t *pass
+    , const char *type, chunk_t *blob, bool *pgp);
+extern bool load_cert(const char *filename, const char *label
+    , cert_t *cert);
+extern bool load_host_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert);
+extern bool load_ca_cert(const char *filename, cert_t *cert);
+extern bool same_cert(const cert_t *a, const cert_t *b);
+extern void share_cert(cert_t cert);
+extern void release_cert(cert_t cert);
+extern void list_certs(bool utc);
+
+#endif /* _CERTS_H */
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/connections.c b/src/pluto/connections.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0d02b979c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/connections.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4406 @@
+/* information about connections between hosts and clients
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: connections.c,v 1.43 2006/04/29 18:16:02 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+#include "kameipsec.h"
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "ac.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "foodgroups.h"
+#include "demux.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "server.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#include "virtual.h"
+
+static void flush_pending_by_connection(struct connection *c);	/* forward */
+
+static struct connection *connections = NULL;
+
+/* struct host_pair: a nexus of information about a pair of hosts.
+ * A host is an IP address, UDP port pair.  This is a debatable choice:
+ * - should port be considered (no choice of port in standard)?
+ * - should ID be considered (hard because not always known)?
+ * - should IP address matter on our end (we don't know our end)?
+ * Only oriented connections are registered.
+ * Unoriented connections are kept on the unoriented_connections
+ * linked list (using hp_next).  For them, host_pair is NULL.
+ */
+
+struct host_pair {
+    struct {
+	ip_address addr;
+	u_int16_t port;	/* host order */
+    } me, him;
+    bool initial_connection_sent;
+    struct connection *connections;	/* connections with this pair */
+    struct pending *pending;	/* awaiting Keying Channel */
+    struct host_pair *next;
+};
+
+static struct host_pair *host_pairs = NULL;
+
+static struct connection *unoriented_connections = NULL;
+
+/* check to see that Ids of peers match */
+bool
+same_peer_ids(const struct connection *c, const struct connection *d
+, const struct id *his_id)
+{
+    return same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+	&& same_id(his_id == NULL? &c->spd.that.id : his_id, &d->spd.that.id);
+}
+
+static struct host_pair *
+find_host_pair(const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
+, const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport)
+{
+    struct host_pair *p, *prev;
+
+    /* default hisaddr to an appropriate any */
+    if (hisaddr == NULL)
+	hisaddr = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(myaddr))->any;
+	
+    if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+    {
+	/**
+	 * port is not relevant in host_pair. with nat_traversal we
+	 * always use pluto_port (500)
+	 */
+	myport = pluto_port;
+	hisport = pluto_port;
+    }
+
+    for (prev = NULL, p = host_pairs; p != NULL; prev = p, p = p->next)
+    {
+	if (sameaddr(&p->me.addr, myaddr) && p->me.port == myport
+	&& sameaddr(&p->him.addr, hisaddr) && p->him.port == hisport)
+	{
+	    if (prev != NULL)
+	    {
+		prev->next = p->next;	/* remove p from list */
+		p->next = host_pairs;	/* and stick it on front */
+		host_pairs = p;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+/* find head of list of connections with this pair of hosts */
+static struct connection *
+find_host_pair_connections(const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
+, const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport)
+{
+    struct host_pair *hp = find_host_pair(myaddr, myport, hisaddr, hisport);
+
+    if (nat_traversal_enabled && hp && hisaddr)
+    {
+	struct connection *c;
+
+	for (c = hp->connections; c != NULL; c = c->hp_next)
+	{
+	    if (c->spd.this.host_port == myport && c->spd.that.host_port == hisport)
+		return c;
+	}
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    return hp == NULL? NULL : hp->connections;
+}
+
+static void
+connect_to_host_pair(struct connection *c)
+{
+    if (oriented(*c))
+    {
+	struct host_pair *hp = find_host_pair(&c->spd.this.host_addr, c->spd.this.host_port
+	    , &c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port);
+
+	if (hp == NULL)
+	{
+	    /* no suitable host_pair -- build one */
+	    hp = alloc_thing(struct host_pair, "host_pair");
+	    hp->me.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr;
+	    hp->him.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	    hp->me.port = nat_traversal_enabled ? pluto_port : c->spd.this.host_port;
+	    hp->him.port = nat_traversal_enabled ? pluto_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
+	    hp->initial_connection_sent = FALSE;
+	    hp->connections = NULL;
+	    hp->pending = NULL;
+	    hp->next = host_pairs;
+	    host_pairs = hp;
+	}
+	c->host_pair = hp;
+	c->hp_next = hp->connections;
+	hp->connections = c;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* since this connection isn't oriented, we place it
+	 * in the unoriented_connections list instead.
+	 */
+	c->host_pair = NULL;
+	c->hp_next = unoriented_connections;
+	unoriented_connections = c;
+    }
+}
+
+/* find a connection by name.
+ * If strict, don't accept a CK_INSTANCE.
+ * Move the winner (if any) to the front.
+ * If none is found, and strict, a diagnostic is logged to whack.
+ */
+struct connection *
+con_by_name(const char *nm, bool strict)
+{
+    struct connection *p, *prev;
+
+    for (prev = NULL, p = connections; ; prev = p, p = p->ac_next)
+    {
+	if (p == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (strict)
+		whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+		    , "no connection named \"%s\"", nm);
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (streq(p->name, nm)
+	&& (!strict || p->kind != CK_INSTANCE))
+	{
+	    if (prev != NULL)
+	    {
+		prev->ac_next = p->ac_next;	/* remove p from list */
+		p->ac_next = connections;	/* and stick it on front */
+		connections = p;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+void
+release_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
+{
+    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+    {
+	/* This does everything we need.
+	 * Note that we will be called recursively by delete_connection,
+	 * but kind will be CK_GOING_AWAY.
+	 */
+	delete_connection(c, relations);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	flush_pending_by_connection(c);
+	delete_states_by_connection(c, relations);
+	unroute_connection(c);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Delete a connection */
+
+#define list_rm(etype, enext, e, ehead) { \
+	etype **ep; \
+	for (ep = &(ehead); *ep != (e); ep = &(*ep)->enext) \
+	    passert(*ep != NULL);    /* we must not come up empty-handed */ \
+	*ep = (e)->enext; \
+    }
+
+
+void
+delete_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
+{
+    struct connection *old_cur_connection
+	= cur_connection == c? NULL : cur_connection;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
+#endif
+
+    set_cur_connection(c);
+
+    /* Must be careful to avoid circularity:
+     * we mark c as going away so it won't get deleted recursively.
+     */
+    passert(c->kind != CK_GOING_AWAY);
+    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+    {
+	plog("deleting connection \"%s\" instance with peer %s {isakmp=#%lu/ipsec=#%lu}"
+	     , c->name
+	     , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+	     , c->newest_isakmp_sa, c->newest_ipsec_sa);
+	c->kind = CK_GOING_AWAY;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("deleting connection");
+    }
+    release_connection(c, relations);	/* won't delete c */
+
+    if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
+	delete_group(c);
+
+    /* free up any logging resources */
+    perpeer_logfree(c);
+
+    /* find and delete c from connections list */
+    list_rm(struct connection, ac_next, c, connections);
+    cur_connection = old_cur_connection;
+
+    /* find and delete c from the host pair list */
+    if (c->host_pair == NULL)
+    {
+	if (c->ikev1)
+	    list_rm(struct connection, hp_next, c, unoriented_connections);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct host_pair *hp = c->host_pair;
+
+	list_rm(struct connection, hp_next, c, hp->connections);
+	c->host_pair = NULL;	/* redundant, but safe */
+
+	/* if there are no more connections with this host_pair
+	 * and we haven't even made an initial contact, let's delete
+	 * this guy in case we were created by an attempted DOS attack.
+	 */
+	if (hp->connections == NULL
+	&& !hp->initial_connection_sent)
+	{
+	    passert(hp->pending == NULL);	/* ??? must deal with this! */
+	    list_rm(struct host_pair, next, hp, host_pairs);
+	    pfree(hp);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (c->kind != CK_GOING_AWAY)
+	pfreeany(c->spd.that.virt);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
+#endif
+    pfreeany(c->name);
+    free_id_content(&c->spd.this.id);
+    pfreeany(c->spd.this.updown);
+    freeanychunk(c->spd.this.ca);
+    free_ietfAttrList(c->spd.this.groups);
+    free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+    pfreeany(c->spd.that.updown);
+    freeanychunk(c->spd.that.ca);
+    free_ietfAttrList(c->spd.that.groups);
+    free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE);
+    gw_delref(&c->gw_info);
+
+    lock_certs_and_keys("delete_connection");
+    release_cert(c->spd.this.cert);
+    scx_release(c->spd.this.sc);
+    release_cert(c->spd.that.cert);
+    scx_release(c->spd.that.sc);
+    unlock_certs_and_keys("delete_connection");
+
+    alg_info_delref((struct alg_info **)&c->alg_info_esp);
+    alg_info_delref((struct alg_info **)&c->alg_info_ike);
+
+    pfree(c);
+}
+
+/* Delete connections with the specified name */
+void
+delete_connections_by_name(const char *name, bool strict)
+{
+    struct connection *c = con_by_name(name, strict);
+
+    for (; c != NULL; c = con_by_name(name, FALSE))
+	delete_connection(c, FALSE);
+}
+
+void
+delete_every_connection(void)
+{
+    while (connections != NULL)
+	delete_connection(connections, TRUE);
+}
+
+void
+release_dead_interfaces(void)
+{
+    struct host_pair *hp;
+
+    for (hp = host_pairs; hp != NULL; hp = hp->next)
+    {
+	struct connection **pp
+	    , *p;
+
+	for (pp = &hp->connections; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	{
+	    if (p->interface->change == IFN_DELETE)
+	    {
+		/* this connection's interface is going away */
+		enum connection_kind k = p->kind;
+
+		release_connection(p, TRUE);
+
+		if (k <= CK_PERMANENT)
+		{
+		    /* The connection should have survived release:
+		     * move it to the unoriented_connections list.
+		     */
+		    passert(p == *pp);
+
+		    p->interface = NULL;
+
+		    *pp = p->hp_next;	/* advance *pp */
+		    p->host_pair = NULL;
+		    p->hp_next = unoriented_connections;
+		    unoriented_connections = p;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* The connection should have vanished,
+		     * but the previous connection remains.
+		     */
+		    passert(p != *pp);
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		pp = &p->hp_next;	/* advance pp */
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* adjust orientations of connections to reflect newly added interfaces */
+void
+check_orientations(void)
+{
+    /* try to orient all the unoriented connections */
+    {
+	struct connection *c = unoriented_connections;
+
+	unoriented_connections = NULL;
+
+	while (c != NULL)
+	{
+	    struct connection *nxt = c->hp_next;
+
+	    (void)orient(c);
+	    connect_to_host_pair(c);
+	    c = nxt;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Check that no oriented connection has become double-oriented.
+     * In other words, the far side must not match one of our new interfaces.
+     */
+    {
+	struct iface *i;
+
+	for (i = interfaces; i != NULL; i = i->next)
+	{
+	    if (i->change == IFN_ADD)
+	    {
+		struct host_pair *hp;
+
+		for (hp = host_pairs; hp != NULL; hp = hp->next)
+		{
+		    if (sameaddr(&hp->him.addr, &i->addr)
+		    && (!no_klips || hp->him.port == pluto_port))
+		    {
+			/* bad news: the whole chain of connections
+			 * hanging off this host pair has both sides
+			 * matching an interface.
+			 * We'll get rid of them, using orient and
+			 * connect_to_host_pair.  But we'll be lazy
+			 * and not ditch the host_pair itself (the
+			 * cost of leaving it is slight and cannot
+			 * be induced by a foe).
+			 */
+			struct connection *c = hp->connections;
+
+			hp->connections = NULL;
+			while (c != NULL)
+			{
+			    struct connection *nxt = c->hp_next;
+
+			    c->interface = NULL;
+			    (void)orient(c);
+			    connect_to_host_pair(c);
+			    c = nxt;
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static err_t
+default_end(struct end *e, ip_address *dflt_nexthop)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    const struct af_info *afi = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&e->host_addr));
+
+    if (afi == NULL)
+	return "unknown address family in default_end";
+
+    /* default ID to IP (but only if not NO_IP -- WildCard) */
+    if (e->id.kind == ID_NONE && !isanyaddr(&e->host_addr))
+    {
+	e->id.kind = afi->id_addr;
+	e->id.ip_addr = e->host_addr;
+	e->has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* default nexthop to other side */
+    if (isanyaddr(&e->host_nexthop))
+	e->host_nexthop = *dflt_nexthop;
+
+    /* default client to subnet containing only self
+     * XXX This may mean that the client's address family doesn't match
+     * tunnel_addr_family.
+     */
+    if (!e->has_client)
+	ugh = addrtosubnet(&e->host_addr, &e->client);
+
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/* Format the topology of a connection end, leaving out defaults.
+ * Largest left end looks like: client === host : port [ host_id ] --- hop
+ * Note: if that==NULL, skip nexthop
+ * Returns strlen of formated result (length excludes NUL at end).
+ */
+size_t
+format_end(char *buf
+, size_t buf_len
+, const struct end *this
+, const struct end *that
+, bool is_left
+, lset_t policy)
+{
+    char client[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+    const char *client_sep = "";
+    char protoport[sizeof(":255/65535")];
+    const char *host = NULL;
+    char host_space[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+    char host_port[sizeof(":65535")];
+    char host_id[BUF_LEN + 2];
+    char hop[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+    const char *hop_sep = "";
+    const char *open_brackets  = "";
+    const char *close_brackets = "";
+
+    if (isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
+    {
+	switch (policy & (POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO))
+	{
+	case POLICY_GROUP:
+	    host = "%group";
+	    break;
+	case POLICY_OPPO:
+	    host = "%opportunistic";
+	    break;
+	case POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO:
+	    host = "%opportunisticgroup";
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    host = "%any";
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    client[0] = '\0';
+
+    if (is_virtual_end(this) && isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
+    {
+	host = "%virtual";
+    }
+
+    /* [client===] */
+    if (this->has_client)
+    {
+	ip_address client_net, client_mask;
+
+	networkof(&this->client, &client_net);
+	maskof(&this->client, &client_mask);
+	client_sep = "===";
+
+ 	/* {client_subnet_wildcard} */
+ 	if (this->has_client_wildcard)
+ 	{
+ 	    open_brackets  = "{";
+ 	    close_brackets = "}";
+ 	}
+
+	if (isanyaddr(&client_net) && isanyaddr(&client_mask)
+	&& (policy & (POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_OPPO)))
+	    client_sep = "";	/* boring case */
+	else if (subnetisnone(&this->client))
+	    strcpy(client, "?");
+	else
+	    subnettot(&this->client, 0, client, sizeof(client));
+    }
+    else if (this->modecfg && isanyaddr(&this->host_srcip))
+    {
+	/* we are mode config client */
+	client_sep = "===";
+	strcpy(client, "%modecfg");
+    }
+
+    /* host */
+    if (host == NULL)
+    {
+	addrtot(&this->host_addr, 0, host_space, sizeof(host_space));
+	host = host_space;
+    }
+
+    host_port[0] = '\0';
+    if (this->host_port != IKE_UDP_PORT)
+	snprintf(host_port, sizeof(host_port), ":%u"
+	    , this->host_port);
+
+    /* payload portocol and port */
+    protoport[0] = '\0';
+    if (this->has_port_wildcard)
+	snprintf(protoport, sizeof(protoport), ":%u/%%any", this->protocol);
+    else if (this->port || this->protocol)
+	snprintf(protoport, sizeof(protoport), ":%u/%u", this->protocol
+	    , this->port);
+
+    /* id, if different from host */
+    host_id[0] = '\0';
+    if (this->id.kind == ID_MYID)
+    {
+	strcpy(host_id, "[%myid]");
+    }
+    else if (!(this->id.kind == ID_NONE
+    || (id_is_ipaddr(&this->id) && sameaddr(&this->id.ip_addr, &this->host_addr))))
+    {
+	int len = idtoa(&this->id, host_id+1, sizeof(host_id)-2);
+
+	host_id[0] = '[';
+	strcpy(&host_id[len < 0? (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(host_id)-2 : 1 + len], "]");
+    }
+
+    /* [---hop] */
+    hop[0] = '\0';
+    hop_sep = "";
+    if (that != NULL && !sameaddr(&this->host_nexthop, &that->host_addr))
+    {
+	addrtot(&this->host_nexthop, 0, hop, sizeof(hop));
+	hop_sep = "---";
+    }
+
+    if (is_left)
+	snprintf(buf, buf_len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"
+	    , open_brackets, client, close_brackets
+	    , client_sep, host, host_port, host_id
+	    , protoport, hop_sep, hop);
+    else
+	snprintf(buf, buf_len, "%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s"
+	    , hop, hop_sep, host, host_port, host_id
+	    , protoport, client_sep
+	    , open_brackets, client, close_brackets);
+    return strlen(buf);
+}
+
+/* format topology of a connection.
+ * Two symmetric ends separated by ...
+ */
+#define CONNECTION_BUF	(2 * (END_BUF - 1) + 4)
+
+static size_t
+format_connection(char *buf, size_t buf_len
+		  , const struct connection *c
+		  , struct spd_route *sr)
+{
+    size_t w = format_end(buf, buf_len, &sr->this, &sr->that, TRUE, LEMPTY);
+
+    w += snprintf(buf + w, buf_len - w, "...");
+    return w + format_end(buf + w, buf_len - w, &sr->that, &sr->this, FALSE, c->policy);
+}
+
+static void
+unshare_connection_strings(struct connection *c)
+{
+    c->name = clone_str(c->name, "connection name");
+
+    unshare_id_content(&c->spd.this.id);
+    c->spd.this.updown = clone_str(c->spd.this.updown, "updown");
+    scx_share(c->spd.this.sc);
+    share_cert(c->spd.this.cert);
+    if (c->spd.this.ca.ptr != NULL)
+	clonetochunk(c->spd.this.ca, c->spd.this.ca.ptr, c->spd.this.ca.len, "ca string");
+
+    unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+    c->spd.that.updown = clone_str(c->spd.that.updown, "updown");
+    scx_share(c->spd.that.sc);
+    share_cert(c->spd.that.cert);
+    if (c->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
+	clonetochunk(c->spd.that.ca, c->spd.that.ca.ptr, c->spd.that.ca.len, "ca string");
+
+    /* increment references to algo's */
+    alg_info_addref((struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
+    alg_info_addref((struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
+}
+
+static void
+load_end_certificate(const char *filename, struct end *dst)
+{
+    time_t valid_until;
+    cert_t cert;
+    bool valid_cert = FALSE;
+    bool cached_cert = FALSE;
+
+    /* initialize end certificate */
+    dst->cert.type = CERT_NONE;
+    dst->cert.u.x509 = NULL;
+
+    /* initialize smartcard info record */
+    dst->sc = NULL;
+
+    if (filename != NULL)
+    {
+	if (scx_on_smartcard(filename))
+	{
+	    /* load cert from smartcard */
+	    valid_cert = scx_load_cert(filename, &dst->sc, &cert, &cached_cert);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* load cert from file */
+	    valid_cert = load_host_cert(filename, &cert);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (valid_cert)
+    {
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	switch (cert.type)
+	{
+	case CERT_PGP:
+	    select_pgpcert_id(cert.u.pgp, &dst->id);
+
+	    if (cached_cert)
+		dst->cert = cert;
+	    else
+	    {
+		valid_until = cert.u.pgp->until;
+		add_pgp_public_key(cert.u.pgp, cert.u.pgp->until, DAL_LOCAL);
+		dst->cert.type = cert.type;
+		dst->cert.u.pgp = add_pgpcert(cert.u.pgp);
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+	    select_x509cert_id(cert.u.x509, &dst->id);
+
+	    if (cached_cert)
+		dst->cert = cert;
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* check validity of cert */
+		valid_until = cert.u.x509->notAfter;
+		ugh = check_validity(cert.u.x509, &valid_until);
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+		    plog("  %s", ugh);
+		    free_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+		    break;
+		}
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("certificate is valid")
+		)
+		add_x509_public_key(cert.u.x509, valid_until, DAL_LOCAL);
+		dst->cert.type = cert.type;
+		dst->cert.u.x509 = add_x509cert(cert.u.x509);
+	    }
+	    /* if no CA is defined, use issuer as default */
+	    if (dst->ca.ptr == NULL)
+		dst->ca = dst->cert.u.x509->issuer;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* cache the certificate that was last retrieved from the smartcard */
+	if (dst->sc != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (!same_cert(&dst->sc->last_cert, &dst->cert))
+	    {
+		lock_certs_and_keys("load_end_certificates");
+		release_cert(dst->sc->last_cert);
+		dst->sc->last_cert = dst->cert;
+		share_cert(dst->cert);
+		unlock_certs_and_keys("load_end_certificates");
+	    }
+	    time(&dst->sc->last_load);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static bool
+extract_end(struct end *dst, const whack_end_t *src, const char *which)
+{
+    bool same_ca = FALSE;
+
+    /* decode id, if any */
+    if (src->id == NULL)
+    {
+	dst->id.kind = ID_NONE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	err_t ugh = atoid(src->id, &dst->id, TRUE);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_BADID, "bad %s --id: %s (ignored)", which, ugh);
+	    dst->id = empty_id;	/* ignore bad one */
+	}
+    }
+
+    dst->ca = empty_chunk;
+
+    /* decode CA distinguished name, if any */
+    if (src->ca != NULL)
+    {
+	if streq(src->ca, "%same")
+	    same_ca = TRUE;
+	else if (!streq(src->ca, "%any"))
+	{
+	    err_t ugh;
+
+	    dst->ca.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+	    ugh = atodn(src->ca, &dst->ca);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		plog("bad CA string '%s': %s (ignored)", src->ca, ugh);
+		dst->ca = empty_chunk;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* load local end certificate and extract ID, if any */
+    load_end_certificate(src->cert, dst);
+
+    /* does id has wildcards? */
+    dst->has_id_wildcards = id_count_wildcards(&dst->id) > 0;
+
+    /* decode group attributes, if any */
+    decode_groups(src->groups, &dst->groups);
+
+    /* the rest is simple copying of corresponding fields */
+    dst->host_addr = src->host_addr;
+    dst->host_nexthop = src->host_nexthop;
+    dst->host_srcip = src->host_srcip;
+    dst->has_natip = src->has_natip;
+    dst->client = src->client;
+    dst->protocol = src->protocol;
+    dst->port = src->port;
+    dst->has_port_wildcard = src->has_port_wildcard;
+    dst->key_from_DNS_on_demand = src->key_from_DNS_on_demand;
+    dst->has_client = src->has_client;
+    dst->has_client_wildcard = src->has_client_wildcard;
+    dst->modecfg = src->modecfg;
+    dst->hostaccess = src->hostaccess;
+    dst->sendcert = src->sendcert;
+    dst->updown = src->updown;
+    dst->host_port = src->host_port;
+
+    /* if host sourceip is defined but no client is present
+     * behind the host then set client to sourceip/32
+     */
+    if (addrbytesptr(&dst->host_srcip, NULL)
+    && !isanyaddr(&dst->host_srcip)
+    && !dst->has_natip
+    && !dst->has_client)
+    {
+	err_t ugh = addrtosubnet(&dst->host_srcip, &dst->client);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	    plog("could not assign host sourceip to client subnet");
+	else
+	    dst->has_client = TRUE;
+    }
+    return same_ca;
+}
+
+static bool
+check_connection_end(const whack_end_t *this, const whack_end_t *that
+, const whack_message_t *wm)
+{
+    if (wm->addr_family != addrtypeof(&this->host_addr)
+    || wm->addr_family != addrtypeof(&this->host_nexthop)
+    || (this->has_client? wm->tunnel_addr_family : wm->addr_family)
+      != subnettypeof(&this->client)
+    || subnettypeof(&this->client) != subnettypeof(&that->client))
+    {
+	/* this should have been diagnosed by whack, so we need not be clear
+	 * !!! overloaded use of RC_CLASH
+	 */
+	loglog(RC_CLASH, "address family inconsistency in connection");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (isanyaddr(&that->host_addr))
+    {
+	/* other side is wildcard: we must check if other conditions met */
+	if (isanyaddr(&this->host_addr))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_ORIENT, "connection must specify host IP address for our side");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (this->virt && (!isanyaddr(&this->host_addr) || this->has_client))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_CLASH,
+	    "virtual IP must only be used with %%any and without client");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;	/* happy */
+}
+
+struct connection *
+find_connection_by_reqid(uint32_t reqid)
+{
+    struct connection *c;
+
+    reqid &= ~3;
+    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
+    {
+	if (c->spd.reqid == reqid)
+	    return c;
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static uint32_t
+gen_reqid(void)
+{
+    uint32_t start;
+    static uint32_t reqid = IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX & ~3;
+
+    start = reqid;
+    do {
+	reqid += 4;
+	if (reqid == 0)
+	    reqid = (IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX & ~3) + 4;
+	if (!find_connection_by_reqid(reqid))
+	    return reqid;
+    } while (reqid != start);
+
+    exit_log("unable to allocate reqid");
+}
+
+void
+add_connection(const whack_message_t *wm)
+{
+    if (con_by_name(wm->name, FALSE) != NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "attempt to redefine connection \"%s\"", wm->name);
+    }
+    else if (wm->right.protocol != wm->left.protocol)
+    {
+	/* this should haven been diagnosed by whack
+	 * !!! overloaded use of RC_CLASH
+	 */
+	loglog(RC_CLASH, "the protocol must be the same for leftport and rightport");
+    }
+    else if (check_connection_end(&wm->right, &wm->left, wm)
+    && check_connection_end(&wm->left, &wm->right, wm))
+    {
+	bool same_rightca, same_leftca;
+	struct connection *c = alloc_thing(struct connection, "struct connection");
+
+	c->name   = wm->name;
+	c->ikev1  = wm->ikev1;
+	c->policy = wm->policy;
+
+	if ((c->policy & POLICY_COMPRESS) && !can_do_IPcomp)
+	    loglog(RC_COMMENT
+		, "ignoring --compress in \"%s\" because KLIPS is not configured to do IPCOMP"
+		, c->name);
+
+	if (wm->esp)
+	{
+	    const char *ugh;
+
+	     DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("from whack: got --esp=%s", wm->esp ? wm->esp: "NULL")
+	    )
+	    c->alg_info_esp= alg_info_esp_create_from_str(wm->esp? wm->esp : "", &ugh);
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT|DBG_CONTROL,
+		static char buf[256]="<NULL>";
+
+		if (c->alg_info_esp)
+		    alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)
+			    ,(struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
+		DBG_log("esp string values: %s", buf);
+	    )
+	    if (c->alg_info_esp)
+	    {
+		if (c->alg_info_esp->alg_info_cnt==0)
+		     loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "got 0 transforms for esp=\"%s\"", wm->esp);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		       , "esp string error: %s", ugh? ugh : "Unknown");
+	    }
+	}
+	
+	if (wm->ike)
+	{
+	    const char *ugh;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("from whack: got --ike=%s", wm->ike ? wm->ike: "NULL")
+	    )
+	    c->alg_info_ike= alg_info_ike_create_from_str(wm->ike? wm->ike : "", &ugh);
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT|DBG_CONTROL,
+		static char buf[256]="<NULL>";
+
+		if (c->alg_info_ike)
+		    alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)
+			    , (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
+		DBG_log("ike string values: %s", buf);
+	    )
+	    if (c->alg_info_ike)
+	    {
+		if (c->alg_info_ike->alg_info_cnt==0)
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "got 0 transforms for ike=\"%s\"", wm->ike);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		       , "ike string error: %s", ugh? ugh : "Unknown");
+	    }
+	}
+	
+	c->sa_ike_life_seconds = wm->sa_ike_life_seconds;
+	c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds = wm->sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
+	c->sa_rekey_margin = wm->sa_rekey_margin;
+	c->sa_rekey_fuzz = wm->sa_rekey_fuzz;
+	c->sa_keying_tries = wm->sa_keying_tries;
+
+	/* RFC 3706 DPD */
+	c->dpd_delay = wm->dpd_delay;
+	c->dpd_timeout = wm->dpd_timeout;
+	c->dpd_action = wm->dpd_action;
+
+	c->addr_family = wm->addr_family;
+	c->tunnel_addr_family = wm->tunnel_addr_family;
+
+	c->requested_ca = NULL;
+
+	same_leftca  = extract_end(&c->spd.this, &wm->left, "left");
+	same_rightca = extract_end(&c->spd.that, &wm->right, "right");
+
+	if (same_rightca)
+	    c->spd.that.ca = c->spd.this.ca;
+	else if (same_leftca)
+	    c->spd.this.ca = c->spd.that.ca;
+
+	default_end(&c->spd.this, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+	default_end(&c->spd.that, &c->spd.this.host_addr);
+
+	/* force any wildcard host IP address, any wildcard subnet
+	 * or any wildcard ID to that end
+	 */
+	if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_addr) || c->spd.this.has_client_wildcard
+	|| c->spd.this.has_port_wildcard || c->spd.this.has_id_wildcards)
+	{
+	    struct end t = c->spd.this;
+
+	    c->spd.this = c->spd.that;
+	    c->spd.that = t;
+	}
+
+	c->spd.next = NULL;
+	c->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+
+	/* set internal fields */
+	c->instance_serial = 0;
+	c->ac_next = connections;
+	connections = c;
+	c->interface = NULL;
+	c->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED;
+	c->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+	c->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+	c->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+	if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+	{
+	    c->kind = CK_GROUP;
+	    add_group(c);
+	}
+	else if ((isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr) && !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+	|| c->spd.that.has_client_wildcard || c->spd.that.has_port_wildcard
+	|| c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards)
+	{
+	    /* Opportunistic or Road Warrior or wildcard client subnet
+	     * or wildcard ID */
+	    c->kind = CK_TEMPLATE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    c->kind = CK_PERMANENT;
+	}
+	set_policy_prio(c);	/* must be after kind is set */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	c->extra_debugging = wm->debugging;
+#endif
+
+	c->gw_info = NULL;
+
+	passert(!(wm->left.virt && wm->right.virt));
+	if (wm->left.virt || wm->right.virt)
+	{
+	    passert(isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
+	    c->spd.that.virt = create_virtual(c,
+		wm->left.virt ? wm->left.virt : wm->right.virt);
+	    if (c->spd.that.virt)
+		c->spd.that.has_client = TRUE;
+	}
+
+	unshare_connection_strings(c);
+	(void)orient(c);
+
+	if (c->ikev1)
+	    connect_to_host_pair(c);
+
+	/* log all about this connection */
+	plog("added connection description \"%s\"", c->name);
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
+
+	    (void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), c, &c->spd);
+
+	    DBG_log("%s", topo);
+
+	    /* Make sure that address families can be correctly inferred
+	     * from printed ends.
+	     */
+	    passert(c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.this.host_addr)
+		&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop)
+		&& (c->spd.this.has_client? c->tunnel_addr_family : c->addr_family)
+		  == subnettypeof(&c->spd.this.client)
+
+		&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+		&& c->addr_family == addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_nexthop)
+		&& (c->spd.that.has_client? c->tunnel_addr_family : c->addr_family)
+		  == subnettypeof(&c->spd.that.client));
+
+	    DBG_log("ike_life: %lus; ipsec_life: %lus; rekey_margin: %lus;"
+		" rekey_fuzz: %lu%%; keyingtries: %lu; policy: %s"
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ike_life_seconds
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_margin
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_fuzz
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_keying_tries
+		, prettypolicy(c->policy));
+	);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Derive a template connection from a group connection and target.
+ * Similar to instantiate().  Happens at whack --listen.
+ * Returns name of new connection.  May be NULL.
+ * Caller is responsible for pfreeing.
+ */
+char *
+add_group_instance(struct connection *group, const ip_subnet *target)
+{
+    char namebuf[100]
+	, targetbuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+    struct connection *t;
+    char *name = NULL;
+
+    passert(group->kind == CK_GROUP);
+    passert(oriented(*group));
+
+    /* manufacture a unique name for this template */
+    subnettot(target, 0, targetbuf, sizeof(targetbuf));
+    snprintf(namebuf, sizeof(namebuf), "%s#%s", group->name, targetbuf);
+
+    if (con_by_name(namebuf, FALSE) != NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_DUPNAME, "group name + target yields duplicate name \"%s\""
+	    , namebuf);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	t = clone_thing(*group, "group instance");
+	t->name = namebuf;
+	unshare_connection_strings(t);
+	name = clone_str(t->name, "group instance name");
+	t->spd.that.client = *target;
+	t->policy &= ~(POLICY_GROUP | POLICY_GROUTED);
+	t->kind = isanyaddr(&t->spd.that.host_addr) && !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(t->policy)
+	    ? CK_TEMPLATE : CK_INSTANCE;
+
+	/* reset log file info */
+	t->log_file_name = NULL;
+	t->log_file = NULL;
+	t->log_file_err = FALSE;
+
+	t->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+
+	if (t->spd.that.virt)
+	{
+	    DBG_log("virtual_ip not supported in group instance");
+	    t->spd.that.virt = NULL;	
+	}
+
+	/* add to connections list */
+	t->ac_next = connections;
+	connections = t;
+
+	/* same host_pair as parent: stick after parent on list */
+	group->hp_next = t;
+
+	/* route if group is routed */
+	if (group->policy & POLICY_GROUTED)
+	{
+	    if (!trap_connection(t))
+		whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+	}
+    }
+    return name;
+}
+
+/* an old target has disappeared for a group: delete instance */
+void
+remove_group_instance(const struct connection *group USED_BY_DEBUG
+, const char *name)
+{
+    passert(group->kind == CK_GROUP);
+    passert(oriented(*group));
+
+    delete_connections_by_name(name, FALSE);
+}
+
+/* Common part of instantiating a Road Warrior or Opportunistic connection.
+ * his_id can be used to carry over an ID discovered in Phase 1.
+ * It must not disagree with the one in c, but if that is unspecified,
+ * the new connection will use his_id.
+ * If his_id is NULL, and c.that.id is uninstantiated (ID_NONE), the
+ * new connection will continue to have an uninstantiated that.id.
+ * Note: instantiation does not affect port numbers.
+ *
+ * Note that instantiate can only deal with a single SPD/eroute.
+ */
+static struct connection *
+instantiate(struct connection *c, const ip_address *him
+, u_int16_t his_port
+, const struct id *his_id)
+{
+    struct connection *d;
+    int wildcards;
+
+    passert(c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE);
+    passert(c->spd.next == NULL);
+
+    c->instance_serial++;
+    d = clone_thing(*c, "temporary connection");
+    if (his_id != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(match_id(his_id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards));
+	d->spd.that.id = *his_id;
+	d->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
+    }
+    unshare_connection_strings(d);
+    unshare_ietfAttrList(&d->spd.this.groups);
+    unshare_ietfAttrList(&d->spd.that.groups);
+    d->kind = CK_INSTANCE;
+
+    passert(oriented(*d));
+    d->spd.that.host_addr = *him;
+    setportof(htons(c->spd.that.port), &d->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+    if (his_port) d->spd.that.host_port = his_port;
+
+    default_end(&d->spd.that, &d->spd.this.host_addr);
+
+    /* We cannot guess what our next_hop should be, but if it was
+     * explicitly specified as 0.0.0.0, we set it to be him.
+     * (whack will not allow nexthop to be elided in RW case.)
+     */
+    default_end(&d->spd.this, &d->spd.that.host_addr);
+    d->spd.next = NULL;
+    d->spd.reqid = gen_reqid();
+
+    /* set internal fields */
+    d->ac_next = connections;
+    connections = d;
+    d->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED;
+    d->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+    d->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+    d->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+    /* reset log file info */
+    d->log_file_name = NULL;
+    d->log_file = NULL;
+    d->log_file_err = FALSE;
+
+    connect_to_host_pair(d);
+
+    return d;
+}
+
+struct connection *
+rw_instantiate(struct connection *c, const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port
+, const ip_subnet *his_net, const struct id *his_id)
+{
+    struct connection *d = instantiate(c, him, his_port, his_id);
+
+    if (d && his_net && is_virtual_connection(c))
+    {
+	d->spd.that.client = *his_net;
+	d->spd.that.virt = NULL;
+	if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(him, his_net))
+	    d->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+    {
+	/* This must be before we know the client addresses.
+	 * Fill in one that is impossible.  This prevents anyone else from
+	 * trying to use this connection to get to a particular client
+	 */
+	d->spd.that.client = *aftoinfo(subnettypeof(&d->spd.that.client))->none;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+	, DBG_log("instantiated \"%s\" for %s" , d->name, ip_str(him)));
+    return d;
+}
+
+struct connection *
+oppo_instantiate(struct connection *c
+, const ip_address *him
+, const struct id *his_id
+, struct gw_info *gw
+, const ip_address *our_client USED_BY_DEBUG
+, const ip_address *peer_client)
+{
+    struct connection *d = instantiate(c, him, 0, his_id);
+
+    passert(d->spd.next == NULL);
+
+    /* fill in our client side */
+    if (d->spd.this.has_client)
+    {
+	/* there was a client in the abstract connection
+	 * so we demand that the required client is within that subnet.
+	 */
+	passert(addrinsubnet(our_client, &d->spd.this.client));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(our_client, &d->spd.this.client));
+	/* opportunistic connections do not use port selectors */
+	setportof(0, &d->spd.this.client.addr);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* there was no client in the abstract connection
+	 * so we demand that the required client be the host
+	 */
+	passert(sameaddr(our_client, &d->spd.this.host_addr));
+    }
+
+    /* fill in peer's client side.
+     * If the client is the peer, excise the client from the connection.
+     */
+    passert((d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+	&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &d->spd.that.client));
+    happy(addrtosubnet(peer_client, &d->spd.that.client));
+    /* opportunistic connections do not use port selectors */
+    setportof(0, &d->spd.that.client.addr);
+
+    if (sameaddr(peer_client, &d->spd.that.host_addr))
+	d->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+
+    passert(d->gw_info == NULL);
+    gw_addref(gw);
+    d->gw_info = gw;
+
+    /* Adjust routing if something is eclipsing c.
+     * It must be a %hold for us (hard to passert this).
+     * If there was another instance eclipsing, we'd be using it.
+     */
+    if (c->spd.routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+	d->spd.routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+
+    /* Remember if the template is routed:
+     * if so, this instance applies for initiation
+     * even if it is created for responding.
+     */
+    if (routed(c->spd.routing))
+	d->instance_initiation_ok = TRUE;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
+
+	(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), d, &d->spd);
+	DBG_log("instantiated \"%s\": %s", d->name, topo);
+    );
+    return d;
+}
+
+/* priority formatting */
+void
+fmt_policy_prio(policy_prio_t pp, char buf[POLICY_PRIO_BUF])
+{
+    if (pp == BOTTOM_PRIO)
+	snprintf(buf, POLICY_PRIO_BUF, "0");
+    else
+	snprintf(buf, POLICY_PRIO_BUF, "%lu,%lu"
+	    , pp>>16, (pp & ~(~(policy_prio_t)0 << 16)) >> 8);
+}
+
+/* Format any information needed to identify an instance of a connection.
+ * Fills any needed information into buf which MUST be big enough.
+ * Road Warrior: peer's IP address
+ * Opportunistic: [" " myclient "==="] " ..." peer ["===" hisclient] '\0'
+ */
+static size_t
+fmt_client(const ip_subnet *client, const ip_address *gw, const char *prefix, char buf[ADDRTOT_BUF])
+{
+    if (subnetisaddr(client, gw))
+    {
+	buf[0] = '\0';	/* compact denotation for "self" */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	char *ap;
+
+	strcpy(buf, prefix);
+	ap = buf + strlen(prefix);
+	if (subnetisnone(client))
+	    strcpy(ap, "?");	/* unknown */
+	else
+	    subnettot(client, 0, ap, SUBNETTOT_BUF);
+    }
+    return strlen(buf);
+}
+
+void
+fmt_conn_instance(const struct connection *c, char buf[CONN_INST_BUF])
+{
+    char *p = buf;
+
+    *p = '\0';
+
+    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+    {
+	if (c->instance_serial != 0)
+	{
+	    snprintf(p, CONN_INST_BUF, "[%lu]", c->instance_serial);
+	    p += strlen(p);
+	}
+
+	if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+	{
+	    size_t w = fmt_client(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr, " ", p);
+
+	    p += w;
+
+	    strcpy(p, w == 0? " ..." : "=== ...");
+	    p += strlen(p);
+
+	    addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 0, p, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+	    p += strlen(p);
+
+	    (void) fmt_client(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr, "===", p);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    *p++ = ' ';
+	    addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 0, p, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+#
+	    if (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port)
+	    {
+		p += strlen(p);
+		sprintf(p, ":%d", c->spd.that.host_port);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Find an existing connection for a trapped outbound packet.
+ * This is attempted before we bother with gateway discovery.
+ *   + this connection is routed or instance_of_routed_template
+ *     (i.e. approved for on-demand)
+ *   + this subnet contains our_client (or we are our_client)
+ *   + that subnet contains peer_client (or peer is peer_client)
+ *   + don't care about Phase 1 IDs (we don't know)
+ * Note: result may still need to be instantiated.
+ * The winner has the highest policy priority.
+ *
+ * If there are several with that priority, we give preference to
+ * the first one that is an instance.
+ *
+ * See also build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection.
+ */
+struct connection *
+find_connection_for_clients(struct spd_route **srp,
+			    const ip_address *our_client,
+			    const ip_address *peer_client,
+			    int transport_proto)
+{
+    struct connection *c = connections, *best = NULL;
+    policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+    struct spd_route *best_sr = NULL;
+    int our_port  = ntohs(portof(our_client));
+    int peer_port = ntohs(portof(peer_client));
+
+    passert(!isanyaddr(our_client) && !isanyaddr(peer_client));
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL))
+    {
+	char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF], pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	addrtot(our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+	addrtot(peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+	DBG_log("find_connection: "
+		"looking for policy for connection: %s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
+		, ocb, transport_proto, our_port, pcb, transport_proto, peer_port);
+    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
+    {
+	if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
+	    continue;
+
+	for (sr = &c->spd; best!=c && sr; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    if ((routed(sr->routing) || c->instance_initiation_ok)
+	    && addrinsubnet(our_client, &sr->this.client)
+	    && addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client)
+	    && addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client)
+	    && (!sr->this.protocol || transport_proto == sr->this.protocol)
+	    && (!sr->this.port || our_port == sr->this.port)
+	    && (!sr->that.port || peer_port == sr->that.port))
+	    {
+		char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+		char cib2[CONN_INST_BUF];
+
+		policy_prio_t prio = 8 * (c->prio + (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE))
+				   + 2 * (sr->this.port == our_port)
+				   + 2 * (sr->that.port == peer_port)
+				   +     (sr->this.protocol == transport_proto);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+		{
+		    char c_ocb[SUBNETTOT_BUF], c_pcb[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, c_ocb, sizeof(c_ocb));
+		    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, c_pcb, sizeof(c_pcb));
+		    DBG_log("find_connection: conn \"%s\"%s has compatible peers: %s->%s [pri: %ld]"
+			    , c->name
+			    , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)
+			    , c_ocb, c_pcb, prio);
+		}
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+		if (best == NULL)
+		{
+		    best = c;
+		    best_sr = sr;
+		    best_prio = prio;
+		}
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		    DBG_log("find_connection: "
+			    "comparing best \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} (child %s) to \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} (child %s)"
+			    , best->name
+			    , (fmt_conn_instance(best, cib), cib)
+			    , best_prio
+			    , best
+			    , (best->policy_next ? best->policy_next->name : "none")
+			    , c->name
+			    , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib2), cib2)
+			    , prio
+			    , c
+			    , (c->policy_next ? c->policy_next->name : "none")));
+
+		if (prio > best_prio)
+		{
+		    best = c;
+		    best_sr = sr;
+		    best_prio = prio;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (best!= NULL && NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy))
+	best = NULL;
+
+    if (srp != NULL && best != NULL)
+	*srp = best_sr;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROL))
+    {
+	if (best)
+	{
+	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+	    DBG_log("find_connection: concluding with \"%s\"%s [pri:%ld]{%p} kind=%s"
+		    , best->name
+		    , (fmt_conn_instance(best, cib), cib)
+		    , best_prio
+		    , best
+		    , enum_name(&connection_kind_names, best->kind));
+	} else {
+	    DBG_log("find_connection: concluding with empty");
+	}
+    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+    return best;
+}
+
+/* Find and instantiate a connection for an outgoing Opportunistic connection.
+ * We've already discovered its gateway.
+ * We look for a the connection such that:
+ *   + this is one of our interfaces
+ *   + this subnet contains our_client (or we are our_client)
+ *     (we will specialize the client).  We prefer the smallest such subnet.
+ *   + that subnet contains peer_clent (we will specialize the client).
+ *     We prefer the smallest such subnet.
+ *   + is opportunistic
+ *   + that peer is NO_IP
+ *   + don't care about Phase 1 IDs (probably should be default)
+ * We could look for a connection that already had the desired peer
+ * (rather than NO_IP) specified, but it doesn't seem worth the
+ * bother.
+ *
+ * We look for the routed policy applying to the narrowest subnets.
+ * We only succeed if we find such a policy AND it is satisfactory.
+ *
+ * The body of the inner loop is a lot like that in
+ * find_connection_for_clients.  In this case, we know the gateways
+ * that we need to instantiate an opportunistic connection.
+ */
+struct connection *
+build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(struct gw_info *gw
+					,const ip_address *our_client
+					,const ip_address *peer_client)
+{
+    struct iface *p;
+    struct connection *best = NULL;
+    struct spd_route *sr, *bestsr;
+    char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF], pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+    addrtot(our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+    addrtot(peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+
+    passert(!isanyaddr(our_client) && !isanyaddr(peer_client));
+
+    /* We don't know his ID yet, so gw id must be an ipaddr */
+    passert(gw->key != NULL);
+    passert(id_is_ipaddr(&gw->gw_id));
+
+    /* for each of our addresses... */
+    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	/* go through those connections with our address and NO_IP as hosts
+	 * We cannot know what port the peer would use, so we assume
+	 * that it is pluto_port (makes debugging easier).
+	 */
+	struct connection *c = find_host_pair_connections(&p->addr
+	    , pluto_port, (ip_address *)NULL, pluto_port);
+
+	for (; c != NULL; c = c->hp_next)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_OPPO,
+		DBG_log("checking %s", c->name));
+	    if (c->kind == CK_GROUP)
+	    {
+		continue;
+	    }
+
+	    for (sr = &c->spd; best!=c && sr; sr = sr->next)
+	    {
+		if (routed(sr->routing)
+		&& addrinsubnet(our_client, &sr->this.client)
+		&& addrinsubnet(peer_client, &sr->that.client))
+		{
+		    if (best == NULL)
+		    {
+			best = c;
+			break;
+		    }
+
+		    DBG(DBG_OPPO,
+			DBG_log("comparing best %s to %s"
+				, best->name, c->name));
+
+		    for (bestsr = &best->spd; best!=c && bestsr; bestsr=bestsr->next)
+		    {
+			if (!subnetinsubnet(&bestsr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
+			|| (samesubnet(&bestsr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
+			     && !subnetinsubnet(&bestsr->that.client
+						, &sr->that.client)))
+			{
+			    best = c;
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (best == NULL
+    || NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy)
+    || (best->policy & POLICY_OPPO) == LEMPTY
+    || best->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
+	return NULL;
+    else
+	return oppo_instantiate(best, &gw->gw_id.ip_addr, NULL, gw
+			      , our_client, peer_client);
+}
+
+bool
+orient(struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+
+    if (!oriented(*c))
+    {
+	struct iface *p;
+
+	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    /* Note: this loop does not stop when it finds a match:
+	     * it continues checking to catch any ambiguity.
+	     */
+	    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	    {
+		if (p->ike_float)
+		    continue;
+
+		for (;;)
+		{
+		    /* check if this interface matches this end */
+		    if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &p->addr)
+		    && (!no_klips || sr->this.host_port == pluto_port))
+		    {
+			if (oriented(*c))
+			{
+			    if (c->interface == p)
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				       , "both sides of \"%s\" are our interface %s!"
+				       , c->name, p->rname);
+			    else
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "two interfaces match \"%s\" (%s, %s)"
+				       , c->name, c->interface->rname, p->rname);
+			    c->interface = NULL;	/* withdraw orientation */
+			    return FALSE;
+			}
+			c->interface = p;
+		    }
+
+		    /* done with this interface if it doesn't match that end */
+		    if (!(sameaddr(&sr->that.host_addr, &p->addr)
+		    && (!no_klips || sr->that.host_port == pluto_port)))
+			break;
+
+		    /* swap ends and try again.
+		     * It is a little tricky to see that this loop will stop.
+		     * Only continue if the far side matches.
+		     * If both sides match, there is an error-out.
+		     */
+		    {
+			struct end t = sr->this;
+
+			sr->this = sr->that;
+			sr->that = t;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return oriented(*c);
+}
+
+void
+initiate_connection(const char *name, int whackfd)
+{
+    struct connection *c = con_by_name(name, TRUE);
+
+    if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
+    {
+	set_cur_connection(c);
+	if (!oriented(*c))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_ORIENT, "we have no ipsecN interface for either end of this connection");
+	}
+	else if (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_INITSHUNT
+		, "cannot initiate an authby=never connection");
+	}
+	else if (c->kind != CK_PERMANENT)
+	{
+	    if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr))
+		loglog(RC_NOPEERIP, "cannot initiate connection without knowing peer IP address");
+	    else
+		loglog(RC_WILDCARD, "cannot initiate connection with ID wildcards");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* We will only request an IPsec SA if policy isn't empty
+	     * (ignoring Main Mode items).
+	     * This is a fudge, but not yet important.
+	     * If we are to proceed asynchronously, whackfd will be NULL_FD.
+	     */
+	    c->policy |= POLICY_UP;
+	    /* do we have to prompt for a PIN code? */
+	    if (c->spd.this.sc != NULL && !c->spd.this.sc->valid && whackfd != NULL_FD)
+		scx_get_pin(c->spd.this.sc, whackfd);
+
+	    if (c->spd.this.sc != NULL && !c->spd.this.sc->valid)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_NOVALIDPIN, "cannot initiate connection without valid PIN");
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		ipsecdoi_initiate(whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
+		whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* protect from close */
+	    }
+	}
+	reset_cur_connection();
+    }
+    close_any(whackfd);
+}
+
+/* (Possibly) Opportunistic Initiation:
+ * Knowing clients (single IP addresses), try to build an tunnel.
+ * This may involve discovering a gateway and instantiating an
+ * Opportunistic connection.  Called when a packet is caught by
+ * a %trap, or when whack --oppohere --oppothere is used.
+ * It may turn out that an existing or non-opporunistic connnection
+ * can handle the traffic.
+ *
+ * Most of the code will be restarted if an ADNS request is made
+ * to discover the gateway.  The only difference between the first
+ * and second entry is whether gateways_from_dns is NULL or not.
+ *	initiate_opportunistic: initial entrypoint
+ *	continue_oppo: where we pickup when ADNS result arrives
+ *	initiate_opportunistic_body: main body shared by above routines
+ *	cannot_oppo: a helper function to log a diagnostic
+ * This structure repeats a lot of code when the ADNS result arrives.
+ * This seems like a waste, but anything learned the first time through
+ * may no longer be true!
+ *
+ * After the first IKE message is sent, the regular state machinery
+ * carries negotiation forward.
+ */
+
+enum find_oppo_step {
+    fos_start,
+    fos_myid_ip_txt,
+    fos_myid_hostname_txt,
+    fos_myid_ip_key,
+    fos_myid_hostname_key,
+    fos_our_client,
+    fos_our_txt,
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    fos_our_key,
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+    fos_his_client,
+    fos_done
+};
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static const char *const oppo_step_name[] = {
+    "fos_start",
+    "fos_myid_ip_txt",
+    "fos_myid_hostname_txt",
+    "fos_myid_ip_key",
+    "fos_myid_hostname_key",
+    "fos_our_client",
+    "fos_our_txt",
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    "fos_our_key",
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+    "fos_his_client",
+    "fos_done"
+};
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+struct find_oppo_bundle {
+    enum find_oppo_step step;
+    err_t want;
+    bool failure_ok;            /* if true, continue_oppo should not die on DNS failure */
+    ip_address our_client;	/* not pointer! */
+    ip_address peer_client;
+    int transport_proto;
+    bool held;
+    policy_prio_t policy_prio;
+    ipsec_spi_t failure_shunt;	/* in host order!  0 for delete. */
+    int whackfd;
+};
+
+struct find_oppo_continuation {
+    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
+    struct find_oppo_bundle b;
+};
+
+static void
+cannot_oppo(struct connection *c
+	    , struct find_oppo_bundle *b
+	    , err_t ugh)
+{
+    char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+    char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+
+    DBG(DBG_DNS | DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("Can't Opportunistically initiate for %s to %s: %s"
+	, ocb, pcb, ugh));
+
+    whack_log(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+	, "Can't Opportunistically initiate for %s to %s: %s"
+	, ocb, pcb, ugh);
+
+    if (c != NULL && c->policy_next != NULL)
+    {
+	/* there is some policy that comes afterwards */
+	struct spd_route *shunt_spd;
+	struct connection *nc = c->policy_next;
+	struct state *st;
+
+	passert(c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE);
+	passert(c->policy_next->kind == CK_PERMANENT);
+
+	DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("OE failed for %s to %s, but %s overrides shunt"
+			      , ocb, pcb, c->policy_next->name));
+
+	/*
+	 * okay, here we need add to the "next" policy, which is ought
+	 * to be an instance.
+	 * We will add another entry to the spd_route list for the specific
+	 * situation that we have.
+	 */
+
+	shunt_spd = clone_thing(nc->spd, "shunt eroute policy");
+
+	shunt_spd->next = nc->spd.next;
+	nc->spd.next = shunt_spd;
+
+	happy(addrtosubnet(&b->peer_client, &shunt_spd->that.client));
+
+	if (sameaddr(&b->peer_client, &shunt_spd->that.host_addr))
+	    shunt_spd->that.has_client = FALSE;
+
+	/*
+	 * override the tunnel destination with the one from the secondaried
+	 * policy
+	 */
+	shunt_spd->that.host_addr = nc->spd.that.host_addr;
+
+	/* now, lookup the state, and poke it up.
+	 */
+
+	st = state_with_serialno(nc->newest_ipsec_sa);
+
+	/* XXX what to do if the IPSEC SA has died? */
+	passert(st != NULL);
+
+	/* link the new connection instance to the state's list of
+	 * connections
+	 */
+
+	DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("installing state: %ld for %s to %s"
+			      , nc->newest_ipsec_sa
+			      , ocb, pcb));
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (DBGP(DBG_OPPO | DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+	{
+	    char state_buf[LOG_WIDTH];
+	    char state_buf2[LOG_WIDTH];
+	    time_t n = now();
+
+	    fmt_state(FALSE, st, n
+		      , state_buf, sizeof(state_buf)
+		      , state_buf2, sizeof(state_buf2));
+	    DBG_log("cannot_oppo, failure SA1: %s", state_buf);
+	    DBG_log("cannot_oppo, failure SA2: %s", state_buf2);
+	}
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	if (!route_and_eroute(c, shunt_spd, st))
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+		      , "failed to instantiate shunt policy %s for %s to %s"
+		      , c->name
+		      , ocb, pcb);
+	}
+	return;
+    }
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    if (b->held)
+    {
+	/* Replace HOLD with b->failure_shunt.
+	 * If no b->failure_shunt specified, use SPI_PASS -- THIS MAY CHANGE.
+	 */
+	if (b->failure_shunt == 0)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("no explicit failure shunt for %s to %s; installing %%pass"
+				  , ocb, pcb));
+	}
+
+	(void) replace_bare_shunt(&b->our_client, &b->peer_client
+	    , b->policy_prio
+	    , b->failure_shunt
+	    , b->failure_shunt != 0
+	    , b->transport_proto
+	    , ugh);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+static void initiate_opportunistic_body(struct find_oppo_bundle *b
+    , struct adns_continuation *ac, err_t ac_ugh);	/* forward */
+
+void
+initiate_opportunistic(const ip_address *our_client
+, const ip_address *peer_client
+, int transport_proto
+, bool held
+, int whackfd)
+{
+    struct find_oppo_bundle b;
+
+    b.want = (whackfd == NULL_FD ? "whack" : "acquire");
+    b.failure_ok = FALSE;
+    b.our_client = *our_client;
+    b.peer_client = *peer_client;
+    b.transport_proto = transport_proto;
+    b.held = held;
+    b.policy_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+    b.failure_shunt = 0;
+    b.whackfd = whackfd;
+    b.step = fos_start;
+    initiate_opportunistic_body(&b, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+continue_oppo(struct adns_continuation *acr, err_t ugh)
+{
+    struct find_oppo_continuation *cr = (void *)acr;	/* inherit, damn you! */
+    struct connection *c;
+    bool was_held = cr->b.held;
+    int whackfd = cr->b.whackfd;
+
+    /* note: cr->id has no resources; cr->sgw_id is id_none:
+     * neither need freeing.
+     */
+    whack_log_fd = whackfd;
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    /* Discover and record whether %hold has gone away.
+     * This could have happened while we were awaiting DNS.
+     * We must check BEFORE any call to cannot_oppo.
+     */
+    if (was_held)
+	cr->b.held = has_bare_hold(&cr->b.our_client, &cr->b.peer_client
+	    , cr->b.transport_proto);
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    /* if we're going to ignore the error, at least note it in debugging log */
+    if (cr->b.failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS,
+	    {
+		char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+		char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+		addrtot(&cr->b.our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+		addrtot(&cr->b.peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+		DBG_log("continuing from failed DNS lookup for %s, %s to %s: %s"
+		    , cr->b.want, ocb, pcb, ugh);
+	    });
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (!cr->b.failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	c = find_connection_for_clients(NULL, &cr->b.our_client, &cr->b.peer_client
+	    , cr->b.transport_proto);
+	cannot_oppo(c, &cr->b
+		    , builddiag("%s: %s", cr->b.want, ugh));
+    }
+    else if (was_held && !cr->b.held)
+    {
+	/* was_held indicates we were started due to a %trap firing
+	 * (as opposed to a "whack --oppohere --oppothere").
+	 * Since the %hold has gone, we can assume that somebody else
+	 * has beaten us to the punch.  We can go home.  But lets log it.
+	 */
+	char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	char pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	addrtot(&cr->b.our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+	addrtot(&cr->b.peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+
+	loglog(RC_COMMENT
+	    , "%%hold otherwise handled during DNS lookup for Opportunistic Initiation for %s to %s"
+	    , ocb, pcb);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	initiate_opportunistic_body(&cr->b, &cr->ac, ugh);
+	whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* was handed off */
+    }
+
+    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+    close_any(whackfd);
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+static err_t
+check_key_recs(enum myid_state try_state
+, const struct connection *c
+, struct adns_continuation *ac)
+{
+    /* Check if KEY lookup yielded good results.
+     * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+     * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+     * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+     * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+     * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+     */
+    enum myid_state old_myid_state = myid_state;
+    const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    myid_state = try_state;
+
+    if (old_myid_state != myid_state
+    && old_myid_state == MYID_SPECIFIED)
+    {
+	ugh = "%myid was specified while we were guessing";
+    }
+    else if ((our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c)) == NULL)
+    {
+	ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+    }
+    else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+    {
+	ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+	 * for checking the other side.
+	 */
+	pubkey_list_t *kr;
+
+	ugh = "no KEY RR found for us";
+	for (kr = ac->keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+	{
+	    ugh = "all our KEY RRs have the wrong public key";
+	    if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
+	    && same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &kr->key->u.rsa))
+	    {
+		ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+	myid_state = old_myid_state;
+    return ugh;
+}
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+static err_t
+check_txt_recs(enum myid_state try_state
+, const struct connection *c
+, struct adns_continuation *ac)
+{
+    /* Check if TXT lookup yielded good results.
+     * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+     * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+     * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+     * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+     * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+     */
+    enum myid_state old_myid_state = myid_state;
+    const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    myid_state = try_state;
+
+    if (old_myid_state != myid_state
+    && old_myid_state == MYID_SPECIFIED)
+    {
+	ugh = "%myid was specified while we were guessing";
+    }
+    else if ((our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c)) == NULL)
+    {
+	ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+    }
+    else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+    {
+	ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+	 * for checking the other side.
+	 */
+	struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+	ugh = "no TXT RR found for us";
+	for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+	{
+	    ugh = "all our TXT RRs have the wrong public key";
+	    if (gwp->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
+	    && same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+	    {
+		ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+	myid_state = old_myid_state;
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+
+/* note: gateways_from_dns must be NULL iff this is the first call */
+static void
+initiate_opportunistic_body(struct find_oppo_bundle *b
+, struct adns_continuation *ac
+, err_t ac_ugh)
+{
+    struct connection *c;
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+
+    /* What connection shall we use?
+     * First try for one that explicitly handles the clients.
+     */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    char ours[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	    char his[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	    int ourport;
+	    int hisport;
+
+	    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+	    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+	    ourport = ntohs(portof(&b->our_client));
+	    hisport = ntohs(portof(&b->peer_client));
+	    DBG_log("initiate on demand from %s:%d to %s:%d proto=%d state: %s because: %s"
+		, ours, ourport, his, hisport, b->transport_proto
+		, oppo_step_name[b->step], b->want);
+	});
+    if (isanyaddr(&b->our_client) || isanyaddr(&b->peer_client))
+    {
+	cannot_oppo(NULL, b, "impossible IP address");
+    }
+    else if ((c = find_connection_for_clients(&sr
+					      , &b->our_client
+					      , &b->peer_client
+					      , b->transport_proto)) == NULL)
+    {
+	/* No connection explicitly handles the clients and there
+	 * are no Opportunistic connections -- whine and give up.
+	 * The failure policy cannot be gotten from a connection; we pick %pass.
+	 */
+	cannot_oppo(NULL, b, "no routed Opportunistic template covers this pair");
+    }
+    else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
+    {
+	/* We've found a connection that can serve.
+	 * Do we have to initiate it?
+	 * Not if there is currently an IPSEC SA.
+	 * But if there is an IPSEC SA, then KLIPS would not
+	 * have generated the acquire.  So we assume that there isn't one.
+	 * This may be redundant if a non-opportunistic
+	 * negotiation is already being attempted.
+	 */
+
+	/* If we are to proceed asynchronously, b->whackfd will be NULL_FD. */
+
+	if(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+	{
+	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+	    /* there is already an instance being negotiated, no nothing */
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("found existing instance \"%s\"%s, rekeying it"
+				     , c->name
+				     , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)));
+	    /* XXX-mcr - return; */
+	}
+
+	/* otherwise, there is some kind of static conn that can handle
+	 * this connection, so we initiate it */
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	if (b->held)
+	{
+	    /* what should we do on failure? */
+	    (void) assign_hold(c, sr, b->transport_proto, &b->our_client, &b->peer_client);
+	}
+#endif
+	ipsecdoi_initiate(b->whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
+	b->whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* protect from close */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* We are handling an opportunistic situation.
+	 * This involves several DNS lookup steps that require suspension.
+	 * Note: many facts might change while we're suspended.
+	 * Here be dragons.
+	 *
+	 * The first chunk of code handles the result of the previous
+	 * DNS query (if any).  It also selects the kind of the next step.
+	 * The second chunk initiates the next DNS query (if any).
+	 */
+	enum find_oppo_step next_step;
+	err_t ugh = ac_ugh;
+	char mycredentialstr[BUF_LEN];
+	char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("creating new instance from \"%s\"%s"
+				 , c->name
+				 , (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)));
+				 
+
+	idtoa(&sr->this.id, mycredentialstr, sizeof(mycredentialstr));
+
+	passert(c->policy & POLICY_OPPO);   /* can't initiate Road Warrior connections */
+
+	/* handle any DNS answer; select next step */
+
+	switch (b->step)
+	{
+	case fos_start:
+	    /* just starting out: select first query step */
+	    next_step = fos_myid_ip_txt;
+	    break;
+
+	case fos_myid_ip_txt:	/* TXT for our default IP address as %myid */
+	    ugh = check_txt_recs(MYID_IP, c, ac);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
+		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our IP (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+				      , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+				      , ugh));
+		if (!logged_myid_ip_txt_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "can not use our IP (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+			   , ugh);
+		    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+
+		next_step = fos_myid_hostname_txt;
+		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
+		if (!logged_myid_ip_txt_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "using our IP (%s:TXT) as identity!"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]);
+		    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+
+		next_step = fos_our_client;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	case fos_myid_hostname_txt:	/* TXT for our hostname as %myid */
+	    ugh = check_txt_recs(MYID_HOSTNAME, c, ac);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* cannot use our hostname as OE identitiy for initiation */
+		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+				      , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+				      , ugh));
+		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "can not use our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity: %s"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+			   , ugh);
+		    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		next_step = fos_myid_ip_key;
+		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
+#endif
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* we can use our hostname as OE identity for initiation */
+		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "using our hostname (%s:TXT) as identity!"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
+		    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+		next_step = fos_our_client;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	case fos_myid_ip_key:	/* KEY for our default IP address as %myid */
+	    ugh = check_key_recs(MYID_IP, c, ac);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
+		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our IP (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+				      , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+				      , ugh));
+		if (!logged_myid_ip_key_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "can not use our IP (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]
+			   , ugh);
+		    logged_myid_ip_key_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+
+		next_step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
+		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
+		if (!logged_myid_ip_key_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "using our IP (%s:KEY) as identity!"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_IP]);
+		    logged_myid_ip_key_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+		next_step = fos_our_client;
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	case fos_myid_hostname_key:	/* KEY for our hostname as %myid */
+	    ugh = check_key_recs(MYID_HOSTNAME, c, ac);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* cannot use our IP as OE identitiy for initiation */
+		DBG(DBG_OPPO, DBG_log("can not use our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+				      , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+				      , ugh));
+		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "can not use our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity: %s"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+			   , ugh);
+		    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+
+		next_step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
+		ugh = NULL;	/* failure can be recovered from */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* we can use our IP as OE identity for initiation */
+		if (!logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			   , "using our hostname (%s:KEY) as identity!"
+			   , myid_str[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
+		    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = TRUE;
+		}
+		next_step = fos_our_client;
+	    }
+	    break;
+#endif
+
+	case fos_our_client:	/* TXT for our client */
+	    {
+		/* Our client is not us: we must check the TXT records.
+		 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+		 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+		 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+		 */
+		const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+
+		next_step = fos_his_client;	/* normal situation */
+
+		passert(sr != NULL);
+
+		if (our_RSA_pri == NULL)
+		{
+		    ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+		}
+		else if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &b->our_client))
+		{
+		    /* this wasn't true when we started -- bail */
+		    ugh = "our IP address changed underfoot";
+		}
+		else if (!same_id(&ac->sgw_id, &sr->this.id))
+		{
+		    /* this wasn't true when we started -- bail */
+		    ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* Similar to code in quick_inI1_outR1_tail
+		     * for checking the other side.
+		     */
+		    struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+		    ugh = "no TXT RR for our client delegates us";
+		    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+		    {
+			passert(same_id(&gwp->gw_id, &sr->this.id));
+
+			ugh = "TXT RR for our client has wrong key";
+			/* If there is a key from the TXT record,
+			 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
+			 * If there was no key, we have a tentative win:
+			 * we need to check our KEY record to be sure.
+			 */
+			if (!gwp->gw_key_present)
+			{
+			    /* Success, but the TXT had no key
+			     * so we must check our our own KEY records.
+			     */
+			    next_step = fos_our_txt;
+			    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+			    break;
+			}
+			if (same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+			{
+			    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+			    break;
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	case fos_our_txt:	/* TXT for us */
+	    {
+		/* Check if TXT lookup yielded good results.
+		 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+		 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+		 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+		 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+		 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+		 */
+		const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+
+		next_step = fos_his_client;	/* unless we decide to look for KEY RR */
+
+		if (our_RSA_pri == NULL)
+		{
+		    ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+		}
+		else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+		{
+		    ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+		     * for checking the other side.
+		     */
+		    struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+		    ugh = "no TXT RR for us";
+		    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+		    {
+			passert(same_id(&gwp->gw_id, &sr->this.id));
+
+			ugh = "TXT RR for us has wrong key";
+			if (gwp->gw_key_present
+			&& same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+			{
+			    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+				DBG_log("initiate on demand found TXT with right public key at: %s"
+					, mycredentialstr));
+			    ugh = NULL;
+			    break;
+			}
+		    }
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		    if (ugh != NULL)
+		    {
+			/* if no TXT with right key, try KEY */
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			    DBG_log("will try for KEY RR since initiate on demand found %s: %s"
+				    , ugh, mycredentialstr));
+			next_step = fos_our_key;
+			ugh = NULL;
+		    }
+#endif
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	case fos_our_key:	/* KEY for us */
+	    {
+		/* Check if KEY lookup yielded good results.
+		 * Looking up based on our ID.  Used if
+		 * client is ourself, or if TXT had no public key.
+		 * Note: if c is different this time, there is
+		 * a chance that we did the wrong query.
+		 * If so, treat as a kind of failure.
+		 */
+		const struct RSA_private_key *our_RSA_pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+
+		next_step = fos_his_client;	/* always */
+
+		if (our_RSA_pri == NULL)
+		{
+		    ugh = "we don't know our own RSA key";
+		}
+		else if (!same_id(&ac->id, &c->spd.this.id))
+		{
+		    ugh = "our ID changed underfoot";
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* Similar to code in RSA_check_signature
+		     * for checking the other side.
+		     */
+		    pubkey_list_t *kr;
+
+		    ugh = "no KEY RR found for us (and no good TXT RR)";
+		    for (kr = ac->keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+		    {
+			ugh = "all our KEY RRs have the wrong public key (and no good TXT RR)";
+			if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
+			&& same_RSA_public_key(&our_RSA_pri->pub, &kr->key->u.rsa))
+			{
+			    /* do this only once a day */
+			    if (!logged_txt_warning)
+			    {
+				loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				       , "found KEY RR but not TXT RR for %s. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html."
+				       , mycredentialstr);
+				logged_txt_warning = TRUE;
+			    }
+			    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+			    break;
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+	case fos_his_client:	/* TXT for his client */
+	    {
+		/* We've finished last DNS queries: TXT for his client.
+		 * Using the information, try to instantiate a connection
+		 * and start negotiating.
+		 * We now know the peer.  The chosing of "c" ignored this,
+		 * so we will disregard its current value.
+		 * !!! We need to randomize the entry in gw that we choose.
+		 */
+		next_step = fos_done;	/* no more queries */
+
+		c = build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(ac->gateways_from_dns
+							    , &b->our_client
+							    , &b->peer_client);
+
+		if (c == NULL)
+		{
+		    /* We cannot seem to instantiate a suitable connection:
+		     * complain clearly.
+		     */
+		    char ocb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
+			, pcb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
+			, pb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+		    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ocb, sizeof(ocb));
+		    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, pcb, sizeof(pcb));
+		    passert(id_is_ipaddr(&ac->gateways_from_dns->gw_id));
+		    addrtot(&ac->gateways_from_dns->gw_id.ip_addr, 0, pb, sizeof(pb));
+		    loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+			, "no suitable connection for opportunism"
+			  " between %s and %s with %s as peer"
+			, ocb, pcb, pb);
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+		    if (b->held)
+		    {
+			/* Replace HOLD with PASS.
+			 * The type of replacement *ought* to be
+			 * specified by policy.
+			 */
+			(void) replace_bare_shunt(&b->our_client, &b->peer_client
+			    , BOTTOM_PRIO
+			    , SPI_PASS	/* fail into PASS */
+			    , TRUE, b->transport_proto
+			    , "no suitable connection");
+		    }
+#endif
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* If we are to proceed asynchronously, b->whackfd will be NULL_FD. */
+		    passert(c->kind == CK_INSTANCE);
+		    passert(c->gw_info != NULL);
+		    passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy));
+		    passert(LHAS(LELEM(RT_UNROUTED) | LELEM(RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE), c->spd.routing));
+#ifdef KLIPS
+		    if (b->held)
+		    {
+			/* what should we do on failure? */
+			(void) assign_hold(c, &c->spd
+					   , b->transport_proto
+					   , &b->our_client, &b->peer_client);
+		    }
+#endif
+		    c->gw_info->key->last_tried_time = now();
+		    ipsecdoi_initiate(b->whackfd, c, c->policy, 1, SOS_NOBODY);
+		    b->whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* protect from close */
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	default:
+	    bad_case(b->step);
+	}
+
+	/* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    char ours[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	    char his[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	    addrtot(&b->our_client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+	    addrtot(&b->peer_client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+	    DBG_log("initiate on demand from %s to %s new state: %s with ugh: %s"
+		    , ours, his, oppo_step_name[b->step], ugh ? ugh : "ok");
+	});
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    b->policy_prio = c->prio;
+	    b->failure_shunt = shunt_policy_spi(c, FALSE);
+	    cannot_oppo(c, b, ugh);
+	}
+	else if (next_step == fos_done)
+	{
+	    /* nothing to do */
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* set up the next query */
+	    struct find_oppo_continuation *cr = alloc_thing(struct find_oppo_continuation
+		, "opportunistic continuation");
+	    struct id id;
+
+	    b->policy_prio = c->prio;
+	    b->failure_shunt = shunt_policy_spi(c, FALSE);
+	    cr->b = *b;	/* copy; start hand off of whackfd */
+	    cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;
+	    cr->b.step = next_step;
+
+	    for (sr = &c->spd
+	    ; sr!=NULL && !sameaddr(&sr->this.host_addr, &b->our_client)
+	    ; sr = sr->next)
+		;
+
+	    if (sr == NULL)
+		sr = &c->spd;
+
+	    /* If a %hold shunt has replaced the eroute for this template,
+	     * record this fact.
+	     */
+	    if (b->held
+	    && sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE && eclipsable(sr))
+	    {
+		sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED;
+		eclipse_count++;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Switch to issue next query.
+	     * A case may turn out to be unnecessary.  If so, it falls
+	     * through to the next case.
+	     * Figuring out what %myid can stand for must be done before
+	     * our client credentials are looked up: we must know what
+	     * the client credentials may use to identify us.
+	     * On the other hand, our own credentials should be looked
+	     * up after our clients in case our credentials are not
+	     * needed at all.
+	     * XXX this is a wasted effort if we don't have credentials
+	     * BUT they are not needed.
+	     */
+	    switch (next_step)
+	    {
+	    case fos_myid_ip_txt:
+		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		{
+		    cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
+		    cr->b.want = b->want = "TXT record for IP address as %myid";
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_IP]
+			, &myids[MYID_IP]
+			, T_TXT
+			, continue_oppo
+			, &cr->ac);
+		    break;
+		}
+		cr->b.step = fos_myid_hostname_txt;
+		/* fall through */
+
+	    case fos_myid_hostname_txt:
+		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		{
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		    cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
+#else
+		    cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;
+#endif
+		    cr->b.want = b->want = "TXT record for hostname as %myid";
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+			, &myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+			, T_TXT
+			, continue_oppo
+			, &cr->ac);
+		    break;
+		}
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		cr->b.step = fos_myid_ip_key;
+		/* fall through */
+
+	    case fos_myid_ip_key:
+		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		{
+		    cr->b.failure_ok = TRUE;
+		    cr->b.want = b->want = "KEY record for IP address as %myid (no good TXT)";
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_IP]
+			, (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway meaningless */
+			, T_KEY
+			, continue_oppo
+			, &cr->ac);
+		    break;
+		}
+		cr->b.step = fos_myid_hostname_key;
+		/* fall through */
+
+	    case fos_myid_hostname_key:
+		if (c->spd.this.id.kind == ID_MYID
+		&& myid_state != MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		{
+		    cr->b.failure_ok = FALSE;           /* last attempt! */
+		    cr->b.want = b->want = "KEY record for hostname as %myid (no good TXT)";
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]
+			, (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway meaningless */
+			, T_KEY
+			, continue_oppo
+			, &cr->ac);
+		    break;
+		}
+#endif
+		cr->b.step = fos_our_client;
+		/* fall through */
+
+	    case fos_our_client:	/* TXT for our client */
+		if (!sameaddr(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b->our_client))
+		{
+		    /* Check that at least one TXT(reverse(b->our_client)) is workable.
+		     * Note: {unshare|free}_id_content not needed for id: ephemeral.
+		     */
+		    cr->b.want = b->want = "our client's TXT record";
+		    iptoid(&b->our_client, &id);
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+			, &c->spd.this.id	/* we are the security gateway */
+			, T_TXT
+			, continue_oppo
+			, &cr->ac);
+		    break;
+		}
+		cr->b.step = fos_our_txt;
+		/* fall through */
+
+	    case fos_our_txt:	/* TXT for us */
+		cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE;
+		cr->b.want = b->want = "our TXT record";
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&sr->this.id
+		    , &sr->this.id	       /* we are the security gateway XXX - maybe ignore? mcr */
+		    , T_TXT
+		    , continue_oppo
+		    , &cr->ac);
+		break;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	    case fos_our_key:	/* KEY for us */
+		cr->b.want = b->want = "our KEY record";
+		cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&sr->this.id
+		    , (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway meaningless */
+		    , T_KEY
+		    , continue_oppo
+		    , &cr->ac);
+		break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+	    case fos_his_client:	/* TXT for his client */
+		/* note: {unshare|free}_id_content not needed for id: ephemeral */
+		cr->b.want = b->want = "target's TXT record";
+		cr->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+		iptoid(&b->peer_client, &id);
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+		    , (const struct id *) NULL	/* security gateway unconstrained */
+		    , T_TXT
+		    , continue_oppo
+		    , &cr->ac);
+		break;
+
+	    default:
+		bad_case(next_step);
+	    }
+
+	    if (ugh == NULL)
+		b->whackfd = NULL_FD;	/* complete hand-off */
+	    else
+		cannot_oppo(c, b, ugh);
+	}
+    }
+    close_any(b->whackfd);
+}
+
+void
+terminate_connection(const char *nm)
+{
+    /* Loop because more than one may match (master and instances)
+     * But at least one is required (enforced by con_by_name).
+     */
+    struct connection *c = con_by_name(nm, TRUE);
+
+    if (c == NULL || !c->ikev1)
+	return;
+
+    do
+    {
+	struct connection *n = c->ac_next;  /* grab this before c might disappear */
+
+	if (streq(c->name, nm)
+	&& c->kind >= CK_PERMANENT
+	&& !NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy))
+	{
+	    set_cur_connection(c);
+	    plog("terminating SAs using this connection");
+	    c->policy &= ~POLICY_UP;
+	    flush_pending_by_connection(c);
+	    delete_states_by_connection(c, FALSE);
+	    reset_cur_connection();
+	}
+	c = n;
+    } while (c != NULL);
+}
+
+/* check nexthop safety
+ * Our nexthop must not be within a routed client subnet, and vice versa.
+ * Note: we don't think this is true.  We think that KLIPS will
+ * not process a packet output by an eroute.
+ */
+#ifdef NEVER
+//bool
+//check_nexthop(const struct connection *c)
+//{
+//    struct connection *d;
+//
+//    if (addrinsubnet(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &c->spd.that.client))
+//    {
+//	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot perform routing for connection \"%s\""
+//	    " because nexthop is within peer's client network",
+//	    c->name);
+//	return FALSE;
+//    }
+//
+//    for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->next)
+//    {
+//	if (d->routing != RT_UNROUTED)
+//	{
+//	    if (addrinsubnet(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop, &d->spd.that.client))
+//	    {
+//		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot do routing for connection \"%s\"
+//		    " because nexthop is contained in"
+//		    " existing routing for connection \"%s\"",
+//		    c->name, d->name);
+//		return FALSE;
+//	    }
+//	    if (addrinsubnet(&d->spd.this.host_nexthop, &c->spd.that.client))
+//	    {
+//		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot do routing for connection \"%s\"
+//		    " because it contains nexthop of"
+//		    " existing routing for connection \"%s\"",
+//		    c->name, d->name);
+//		return FALSE;
+//	    }
+//	}
+//    }
+//    return TRUE;
+//}
+#endif /* NEVER */
+
+/* an ISAKMP SA has been established.
+ * Note the serial number, and release any connections with
+ * the same peer ID but different peer IP address.
+ */
+bool uniqueIDs = FALSE;	/* --uniqueids? */
+
+void
+ISAKMP_SA_established(struct connection *c, so_serial_t serial)
+{
+    c->newest_isakmp_sa = serial;
+
+    /* the connection is now oriented so that we are able to determine
+     * whether we are a mode config server with a virtual IP to send.
+     */
+    if (!isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_srcip) && !c->spd.that.has_natip)
+	c->spd.that.modecfg = TRUE;
+	
+    if (uniqueIDs)
+    {
+	/* for all connections: if the same Phase 1 IDs are used
+	 * for a different IP address, unorient that connection.
+	 */
+	struct connection *d;
+
+	for (d = connections; d != NULL; )
+	{
+	    struct connection *next = d->ac_next;	/* might move underneath us */
+
+	    if (d->kind >= CK_PERMANENT 
+	    && same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+	    && same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id)
+	    && (!sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &d->spd.that.host_addr) ||
+	       (c->spd.that.host_port != d->spd.that.host_port)))
+	    {
+		release_connection(d, FALSE);
+	    }
+	    d = next;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Find the connection to connection c's peer's client with the
+ * largest value of .routing.  All other things being equal,
+ * preference is given to c.  If none is routed, return NULL.
+ *
+ * If erop is non-null, set *erop to a connection sharing both
+ * our client subnet and peer's client subnet with the largest value
+ * of .routing.  If none is erouted, set *erop to NULL.
+ *
+ * The return value is used to find other connections sharing a route.
+ * *erop is used to find other connections sharing an eroute.
+ */
+struct connection *
+route_owner(struct connection *c
+	    , struct spd_route **srp
+	    , struct connection **erop
+	    , struct spd_route **esrp)
+{
+    struct connection *d
+	, *best_ro = c
+	, *best_ero = c;
+    struct spd_route *srd, *src;
+    struct spd_route *best_sr, *best_esr;
+    enum routing_t best_routing, best_erouting;
+
+    passert(oriented(*c));
+    best_sr  = NULL;
+    best_esr = NULL;
+    best_routing = c->spd.routing;
+    best_erouting = best_routing;
+
+    for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->ac_next)
+    {
+	for (srd = &d->spd; srd; srd = srd->next)
+	{
+	    if (srd->routing == RT_UNROUTED)
+		continue;
+
+	    for (src = &c->spd; src; src=src->next)
+	    {
+		if (!samesubnet(&src->that.client, &srd->that.client))
+		    continue;
+		if (src->that.protocol != srd->that.protocol)
+		    continue;
+		if (src->that.port != srd->that.port)
+		    continue;
+		passert(oriented(*d));
+		if (srd->routing > best_routing)
+		{
+		    best_ro = d;
+		    best_sr = srd;
+		    best_routing = srd->routing;
+		}
+
+		if (!samesubnet(&src->this.client, &srd->this.client))
+		    continue;
+		if (src->this.protocol != srd->this.protocol)
+		    continue;
+		if (src->this.port != srd->this.port)
+		    continue;
+		if (srd->routing > best_erouting)
+		{
+		    best_ero = d;
+		    best_esr = srd;
+		    best_erouting = srd->routing;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+	    err_t m = builddiag("route owner of \"%s\"%s %s:"
+		, c->name
+		, (fmt_conn_instance(c, cib), cib)
+		, enum_name(&routing_story, c->spd.routing));
+
+	    if (!routed(best_ro->spd.routing))
+		m = builddiag("%s NULL", m);
+	    else if (best_ro == c)
+		m = builddiag("%s self", m);
+	    else
+		m = builddiag("%s \"%s\"%s %s", m
+		    , best_ro->name
+		    , (fmt_conn_instance(best_ro, cib), cib)
+		    , enum_name(&routing_story, best_ro->spd.routing));
+
+	    if (erop != NULL)
+	    {
+		m = builddiag("%s; eroute owner:", m);
+		if (!erouted(best_ero->spd.routing))
+		    m = builddiag("%s NULL", m);
+		else if (best_ero == c)
+		    m = builddiag("%s self", m);
+		else
+		    m = builddiag("%s \"%s\"%s %s", m
+			, best_ero->name
+			, (fmt_conn_instance(best_ero, cib), cib)
+			, enum_name(&routing_story, best_ero->spd.routing));
+	    }
+
+	    DBG_log("%s", m);
+	});
+
+    if (erop != NULL)
+	*erop = erouted(best_erouting)? best_ero : NULL;
+
+    if (srp != NULL )
+    {
+	*srp = best_sr;
+	if (esrp != NULL )
+	    *esrp = best_esr;
+    }
+
+    return routed(best_routing)? best_ro : NULL;
+}
+
+/* Find a connection that owns the shunt eroute between subnets.
+ * There ought to be only one.
+ * This might get to be a bottleneck -- try hashing if it does.
+ */
+struct connection *
+shunt_owner(const ip_subnet *ours, const ip_subnet *his)
+{
+    struct connection *c;
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+
+    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
+    {
+	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    if (shunt_erouted(sr->routing)
+	    && samesubnet(ours, &sr->this.client)
+	    && samesubnet(his, &sr->that.client))
+		return c;
+	}
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Find some connection with this pair of hosts.
+ * We don't know enough to chose amongst those available.
+ * ??? no longer usefully different from find_host_pair_connections
+ */
+struct connection *
+find_host_connection(const ip_address *me, u_int16_t my_port
+, const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port, lset_t policy)
+{
+    struct connection *c = find_host_pair_connections(me, my_port, him, his_port);
+
+    if (policy != LEMPTY)
+    {
+	lset_t auth_requested  = policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+
+	/* if we have requirements for the policy,
+	 * choose the first matching connection.
+	 */
+	while (c != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (c->policy & auth_requested)
+	    {
+		break;
+	    }
+	    c = c->hp_next;
+	}
+    }
+    return c;
+}
+
+/* given an up-until-now satisfactory connection, find the best connection
+ * now that we just got the Phase 1 Id Payload from the peer.
+ *
+ * Comments in the code describe the (tricky!) matching criteria.
+ * Although this routine could handle the initiator case,
+ * it isn't currently called in this case.
+ * If it were, it could "upgrade" an Opportunistic Connection
+ * to a Road Warrior Connection if a suitable Peer ID were found.
+ *
+ * In RFC 2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
+ * in 5.1 "IKE Phase 1 Authenticated With Signatures", describing Main
+ * Mode:
+ *
+ *         Initiator                          Responder
+ *        -----------                        -----------
+ *         HDR, SA                     -->
+ *                                     <--    HDR, SA
+ *         HDR, KE, Ni                 -->
+ *                                     <--    HDR, KE, Nr
+ *         HDR*, IDii, [ CERT, ] SIG_I -->
+ *                                     <--    HDR*, IDir, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
+ *
+ * In 5.4 "Phase 1 Authenticated With a Pre-Shared Key":
+ *
+ *               HDR, SA             -->
+ *                                   <--    HDR, SA
+ *               HDR, KE, Ni         -->
+ *                                   <--    HDR, KE, Nr
+ *               HDR*, IDii, HASH_I  -->
+ *                                   <--    HDR*, IDir, HASH_R
+ *
+ * refine_host_connection could be called in two case:
+ *
+ * - the Responder receives the IDii payload:
+ *   + [PSK] after using PSK to decode this message
+ *   + before sending its IDir payload
+ *   + before using its ID in HASH_R computation
+ *   + [DSig] before using its private key to sign SIG_R
+ *   + before using the Initiator's ID in HASH_I calculation
+ *   + [DSig] before using the Initiator's public key to check SIG_I
+ *
+ * - the Initiator receives the IDir payload:
+ *   + [PSK] after using PSK to encode previous message and decode this message
+ *   + after sending its IDii payload
+ *   + after using its ID in HASH_I computation
+ *   + [DSig] after using its private key to sign SIG_I
+ *   + before using the Responder's ID to compute HASH_R
+ *   + [DSig] before using Responder's public key to check SIG_R
+ *
+ * refine_host_connection can choose a different connection, as long as
+ * nothing already used is changed.
+ *
+ * In the Initiator case, the particular connection might have been
+ * specified by whatever provoked Pluto to initiate.  For example:
+ *	whack --initiate connection-name
+ * The advantages of switching connections when we're the Initiator seem
+ * less important than the disadvantages, so after FreeS/WAN 1.9, we
+ * don't do this.
+ */
+struct connection *
+refine_host_connection(const struct state *st, const struct id *peer_id
+, chunk_t peer_ca)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    u_int16_t auth = st->st_oakley.auth;
+    struct connection *d;
+    struct connection *best_found = NULL;
+    lset_t auth_policy;
+    const chunk_t *psk = NULL;
+    bool wcpip;	/* wildcard Peer IP? */
+
+    int wildcards, our_pathlen, peer_pathlen;
+    int best_wildcards    = MAX_WILDCARDS;
+    int best_our_pathlen  = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+    int best_peer_pathlen = MAX_CA_PATH_LEN;
+
+    if (same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer_id)
+    && trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &peer_pathlen)
+    && peer_pathlen == 0
+    && match_requested_ca(c->requested_ca, c->spd.this.ca, &our_pathlen)
+    && our_pathlen == 0)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("current connection is a full match"
+		    " -- no need to look further");
+	)
+	return c;
+    }
+
+    switch (auth)
+    {
+    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+	auth_policy = POLICY_PSK;
+	psk = get_preshared_secret(c);
+	/* It should be virtually impossible to fail to find PSK:
+	 * we just used it to decode the current message!
+	 */
+	if (psk == NULL)
+	    return NULL;	/* cannot determine PSK! */
+	break;
+    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+	auth_policy = POLICY_XAUTH_PSK;
+	psk = get_preshared_secret(c);
+	if (psk == NULL)
+	    return NULL;	/* cannot determine PSK! */
+	break;
+    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+	auth_policy = POLICY_RSASIG;
+	break;
+    case XAUTHInitRSA:
+    case XAUTHRespRSA:
+	auth_policy = POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG;
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(auth);
+    }
+
+    /* The current connection won't do: search for one that will.
+     * First search for one with the same pair of hosts.
+     * If that fails, search for a suitable Road Warrior or Opportunistic
+     * connection (i.e. wildcard peer IP).
+     * We need to match:
+     * - peer_id (slightly complicated by instantiation)
+     * - if PSK auth, the key must not change (we used it to decode message)
+     * - policy-as-used must be acceptable to new connection
+     */
+    d = c->host_pair->connections;
+    for (wcpip = FALSE; ; wcpip = TRUE)
+    {
+	for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+	{
+	    const char *match_name[] = {"no", "ok"};
+
+	    bool matching_id = match_id(peer_id
+					, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards);
+	    bool matching_auth = (d->policy & auth_policy) != LEMPTY;
+
+	    bool matching_trust = trusted_ca(peer_ca
+					, d->spd.that.ca, &peer_pathlen);
+	    bool matching_request = match_requested_ca(c->requested_ca
+					, d->spd.this.ca, &our_pathlen);
+	    bool match = matching_id && matching_auth &&
+			 matching_trust && matching_request;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+		DBG_log("%s: %s match (id: %s, auth: %s, trust: %s, request: %s)"
+		    , d->name
+		    , match ? "full":" no"
+		    , match_name[matching_id]
+		    , match_name[matching_auth]
+		    , match_name[matching_trust]
+		    , match_name[matching_request])
+	    )
+
+	    /* do we have a match? */
+	    if (!match)
+		continue;
+
+	    /* ignore group connections */
+	    if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+		continue;
+
+	    if (c->spd.that.host_port != d->spd.that.host_port
+	    && d->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+	    {
+		continue;
+	    }
+
+	    switch (auth)
+	    {
+	    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+	    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+	    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+		/* secret must match the one we already used */
+		{
+		    const chunk_t *dpsk = get_preshared_secret(d);
+
+		    if (dpsk == NULL)
+			continue;	/* no secret */
+
+		    if (psk != dpsk)
+			if (psk->len != dpsk->len
+			|| memcmp(psk->ptr, dpsk->ptr, psk->len) != 0)
+			    continue;	/* different secret */
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+	    case XAUTHInitRSA:
+	    case XAUTHRespRSA:
+		/*
+		 * We must at least be able to find our private key
+		.*/
+ 		if (d->spd.this.sc == NULL		/* no smartcard */
+		&& get_RSA_private_key(d) == NULL)	/* no private key */
+		    continue;
+		break;
+
+	    default:
+		bad_case(auth);
+	    }
+
+	    /* d has passed all the tests.
+	     * We'll go with it if the Peer ID was an exact match.
+	     */
+	    if (match && wildcards == 0 && peer_pathlen == 0 && our_pathlen == 0)
+		return d;
+
+	    /* We'll remember it as best_found in case an exact
+	     * match doesn't come along.
+	     */
+	    if (best_found == NULL || wildcards < best_wildcards
+	    || ((wildcards == best_wildcards && peer_pathlen < best_peer_pathlen)
+		|| (peer_pathlen == best_peer_pathlen && our_pathlen < best_our_pathlen)))
+	    {
+		best_found = d;
+		best_wildcards = wildcards;
+		best_peer_pathlen = peer_pathlen;
+		best_our_pathlen = our_pathlen;
+	    }
+	}
+	if (wcpip)
+	    return best_found;	/* been around twice already */
+
+	/* Starting second time around.
+	 * We're willing to settle for a connection that needs Peer IP
+	 * instantiated: Road Warrior or Opportunistic.
+	 * Look on list of connections for host pair with wildcard Peer IP
+	 */
+	d = find_host_pair_connections(&c->spd.this.host_addr, c->spd.this.host_port
+	    , (ip_address *)NULL, c->spd.that.host_port);
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * With virtual addressing, we must not allow someone to use an already
+ * used (by another id) addr/net.
+ */
+static bool
+is_virtual_net_used(const ip_subnet *peer_net, const struct id *peer_id)
+{
+    struct connection *d;
+
+    for (d = connections; d != NULL; d = d->ac_next)
+    {
+	switch (d->kind)
+	{
+	case CK_PERMANENT:
+	case CK_INSTANCE:
+	    if ((subnetinsubnet(peer_net,&d->spd.that.client) ||
+		 subnetinsubnet(&d->spd.that.client,peer_net))
+	    && !same_id(&d->spd.that.id, peer_id))
+	    {
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
+		char client[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(peer_net, 0, client, sizeof(client));
+		idtoa(&d->spd.that.id, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		plog("Virtual IP %s is already used by '%s'", client, buf);
+		idtoa(peer_id, buf, sizeof(buf));
+		plog("Your ID is '%s'", buf);
+		return TRUE; /* already used by another one */
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case CK_GOING_AWAY:
+	default:
+	break;
+	}
+    }
+    return FALSE; /* you can safely use it */
+}
+
+/* find_client_connection: given a connection suitable for ISAKMP
+ * (i.e. the hosts match), find a one suitable for IPSEC
+ * (i.e. with matching clients).
+ *
+ * If we don't find an exact match (not even our current connection),
+ * we try for one that still needs instantiation.  Try Road Warrior
+ * abstract connections and the Opportunistic abstract connections.
+ * This requires inverse instantiation: abstraction.
+ *
+ * After failing to find an exact match, we abstract the peer
+ * to be NO_IP (the wildcard value).  This enables matches with
+ * Road Warrior and Opportunistic abstract connections.
+ *
+ * After failing that search, we also abstract the Phase 1 peer ID
+ * if possible.  If the peer's ID was the peer's IP address, we make
+ * it NO_ID; instantiation will make it the peer's IP address again.
+ *
+ * If searching for a Road Warrior abstract connection fails,
+ * and conditions are suitable, we search for the best Opportunistic
+ * abstract connection.
+ *
+ * Note: in the end, both Phase 1 IDs must be preserved, after any
+ * instantiation.  They are the IDs that have been authenticated.
+ */
+
+#define PATH_WEIGHT	1
+#define WILD_WEIGHT	(MAX_CA_PATH_LEN+1)
+#define PRIO_WEIGHT	(MAX_WILDCARDS+1)*WILD_WEIGHT
+
+/* fc_try: a helper function for find_client_connection */
+static struct connection *
+fc_try(const struct connection *c
+, struct host_pair *hp
+, const struct id *peer_id
+, const ip_subnet *our_net
+, const ip_subnet *peer_net
+, const u_int8_t our_protocol
+, const u_int16_t our_port
+, const u_int8_t peer_protocol
+, const u_int16_t peer_port
+, chunk_t peer_ca
+, const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list)
+{
+    struct connection *d;
+    struct connection *best = NULL;
+    policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+    int wildcards, pathlen;
+
+    const bool peer_net_is_host = subnetisaddr(peer_net, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+    for (d = hp->connections; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+    {
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+
+	if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+	    continue;
+
+	if (!(same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+	&& match_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards)
+	&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, d->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)
+	&& group_membership(peer_list, d->name, d->spd.that.groups)))
+	    continue;
+
+    	/* compare protocol and ports */
+	if (d->spd.this.protocol != our_protocol
+	||  d->spd.this.port != our_port
+	||  d->spd.that.protocol != peer_protocol
+	|| (d->spd.that.port != peer_port && !d->spd.that.has_port_wildcard))
+	    continue;
+
+	/* non-Opportunistic case:
+	 * our_client must match.
+	 *
+	 * So must peer_client, but the testing is complicated
+	 * by the fact that the peer might be a wildcard
+	 * and if so, the default value of that.client
+	 * won't match the default peer_net.  The appropriate test:
+	 *
+	 * If d has a peer client, it must match peer_net.
+	 * If d has no peer client, peer_net must just have peer itself.
+	 */
+
+	for (sr = &d->spd; best != d && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    policy_prio_t prio;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+	    {
+		char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		char s3[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d3[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
+		subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
+		subnettot(&sr->this.client,  0, s3, sizeof(s3));
+		subnettot(&sr->that.client,  0, d3, sizeof(d3));
+		DBG_log("  fc_try trying "
+			"%s:%s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d vs %s:%s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
+			, c->name, s1, c->spd.this.protocol, c->spd.this.port
+				 , d1, c->spd.that.protocol, c->spd.that.port
+			, d->name, s3, sr->this.protocol, sr->this.port
+				 , d3, sr->that.protocol, sr->that.port);
+	    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	    if (!samesubnet(&sr->this.client, our_net))
+		continue;
+
+	    if (sr->that.has_client)
+	    {
+		if (sr->that.has_client_wildcard)
+		{
+		    if (!subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &sr->that.client))
+			continue;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    if (!samesubnet(&sr->that.client, peer_net) && !is_virtual_connection(d))
+			continue;
+		    if (is_virtual_connection(d)
+		    && (!is_virtual_net_allowed(d, peer_net, &c->spd.that.host_addr)
+		        || is_virtual_net_used(peer_net, peer_id?peer_id:&c->spd.that.id)))
+			    continue;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		if (!peer_net_is_host)
+		    continue;
+	    }
+
+	    /* We've run the gauntlet -- success:
+	     * We've got an exact match of subnets.
+	     * The connection is feasible, but we continue looking for the best.
+	     * The highest priority wins, implementing eroute-like rule.
+	     * - a routed connection is preferrred
+	     * - given that, the smallest number of ID wildcards are preferred
+	     * - given that, the shortest CA pathlength is preferred
+	     */
+	    prio = PRIO_WEIGHT * routed(sr->routing)
+		 + WILD_WEIGHT * (MAX_WILDCARDS - wildcards)
+		 + PATH_WEIGHT * (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN - pathlen)
+		 + 1;
+	    if (prio > best_prio)
+	    {
+		best = d;
+		best_prio = prio;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (best != NULL && NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy))
+	best = NULL;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("  fc_try concluding with %s [%ld]"
+		, (best ? best->name : "none"), best_prio)
+    )
+    return best;
+}
+
+static struct connection *
+fc_try_oppo(const struct connection *c
+, struct host_pair *hp
+, const ip_subnet *our_net
+, const ip_subnet *peer_net
+, const u_int8_t our_protocol
+, const u_int16_t our_port
+, const u_int8_t peer_protocol
+, const u_int16_t peer_port
+, chunk_t peer_ca
+, const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list)
+{
+    struct connection *d;
+    struct connection *best = NULL;
+    policy_prio_t best_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+    int wildcards, pathlen;
+
+    for (d = hp->connections; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+    {
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+	policy_prio_t prio;
+
+	if (d->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+	    continue;
+
+	if (!(same_id(&c->spd.this.id, &d->spd.this.id)
+	&& match_id(&c->spd.that.id, &d->spd.that.id, &wildcards)
+	&& trusted_ca(peer_ca, d->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)
+	&& group_membership(peer_list, d->name, d->spd.that.groups)))
+	    continue;
+
+	/* compare protocol and ports */
+	if (d->spd.this.protocol != our_protocol
+	||  d->spd.this.port != our_port
+	||  d->spd.that.protocol != peer_protocol
+	|| (d->spd.that.port != peer_port && !d->spd.that.has_port_wildcard))
+	    continue;
+
+	/* Opportunistic case:
+	 * our_net must be inside d->spd.this.client
+	 * and peer_net must be inside d->spd.that.client
+	 * Note: this host_pair chain also has shunt
+	 * eroute conns (clear, drop), but they won't
+	 * be marked as opportunistic.
+	 */
+	for (sr = &d->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+	    {
+		char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		char s3[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d3[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
+		subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
+		subnettot(&sr->this.client,  0, s3, sizeof(s3));
+		subnettot(&sr->that.client,  0, d3, sizeof(d3));
+		DBG_log("  fc_try_oppo trying %s:%s -> %s vs %s:%s -> %s"
+			, c->name, s1, d1, d->name, s3, d3);
+	    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	    if (!subnetinsubnet(our_net, &sr->this.client)
+	    || !subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &sr->that.client))
+		continue;
+
+	    /* The connection is feasible, but we continue looking for the best.
+	     * The highest priority wins, implementing eroute-like rule.
+	     * - our smallest client subnet is preferred (longest mask)
+	     * - given that, his smallest client subnet is preferred
+	     * - given that, a routed connection is preferrred
+	     * - given that, the smallest number of ID wildcards are preferred
+	     * - given that, the shortest CA pathlength is preferred
+	     */
+	    prio = PRIO_WEIGHT * (d->prio + routed(sr->routing))
+	    	 + WILD_WEIGHT * (MAX_WILDCARDS - wildcards)
+		 + PATH_WEIGHT * (MAX_CA_PATH_LEN - pathlen);
+	    if (prio > best_prio)
+	    {
+		best = d;
+		best_prio = prio;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* if the best wasn't opportunistic, we fail: it must be a shunt */
+    if (best != NULL
+    && (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(best->policy)
+	|| (best->policy & POLICY_OPPO) == LEMPTY))
+    {
+	best = NULL;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("  fc_try_oppo concluding with %s [%ld]"
+		, (best ? best->name : "none"), best_prio)
+    )
+    return best;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the peer's CA and group attributes
+ */
+chunk_t
+get_peer_ca_and_groups(struct connection *c, const ietfAttrList_t **peer_list)
+{
+    struct state *p1st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+
+    *peer_list = NULL;
+
+    if (p1st != NULL
+    &&  p1st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL
+    &&  p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	x509acert_t *ac = get_x509acert(p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer
+				      , p1st->st_peer_pubkey->serial);;
+
+	if (ac != NULL && verify_x509acert(ac, strict_crl_policy))
+	    *peer_list = ac->groups;
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("no valid attribute cert found")
+	    )
+	}
+	return p1st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer;
+    }
+    return empty_chunk;
+}
+
+struct connection *
+find_client_connection(struct connection *c
+, const ip_subnet *our_net, const ip_subnet *peer_net
+, const u_int8_t our_protocol, const u_int16_t our_port
+, const u_int8_t peer_protocol, const u_int16_t peer_port)
+{
+    struct connection *d;
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+
+    const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL;
+    chunk_t peer_ca = get_peer_ca_and_groups(c, &peer_list);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+    {
+	char s1[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d1[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+	subnettot(our_net,  0, s1, sizeof(s1));
+	subnettot(peer_net, 0, d1, sizeof(d1));
+
+	DBG_log("find_client_connection starting with %s"
+	    , (c ? c->name : "(none)"));
+	DBG_log("  looking for %s:%d/%d -> %s:%d/%d"
+	    , s1, our_protocol, our_port
+	    , d1, peer_protocol, peer_port);
+    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+    /* give priority to current connection
+     * but even greater priority to a routed concrete connection
+     */
+    {
+	struct connection *unrouted = NULL;
+	int srnum = -1;
+
+	for (sr = &c->spd; unrouted == NULL && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    srnum++;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+	    {
+		char s2[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d2[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, s2, sizeof(s2));
+		subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, d2, sizeof(d2));
+		DBG_log("  concrete checking against sr#%d %s -> %s"
+			, srnum, s2, d2);
+	    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+	    if (samesubnet(&sr->this.client, our_net)
+	    && samesubnet(&sr->that.client, peer_net)
+	    && sr->this.protocol == our_protocol
+	    && sr->this.port == our_port
+	    && sr->that.protocol == peer_protocol
+	    && sr->that.port == peer_port
+	    && group_membership(peer_list, c->name, sr->that.groups))
+	    {
+		passert(oriented(*c));
+		if (routed(sr->routing))
+		    return c;
+
+		unrouted = c;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* exact match? */
+	d = fc_try(c, c->host_pair, NULL, our_net, peer_net
+	    , our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
+	    , peer_ca, peer_list);
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	    DBG_log("  fc_try %s gives %s"
+		    , c->name
+		    , (d ? d->name : "none"))
+	)
+
+	if (d == NULL)
+	    d = unrouted;
+    }
+
+    if (d == NULL)
+    {
+	/* look for an abstract connection to match */
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+	struct host_pair *hp = NULL;
+
+	for (sr = &c->spd; hp==NULL && sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    hp = find_host_pair(&sr->this.host_addr
+				, sr->this.host_port
+				, NULL
+				, sr->that.host_port);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    if (DBGP(DBG_CONTROLMORE))
+	    {
+		char s2[SUBNETTOT_BUF],d2[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, s2, sizeof(s2));
+		subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, d2, sizeof(d2));
+
+		DBG_log("  checking hostpair %s -> %s is %s"
+			, s2, d2
+			, (hp ? "found" : "not found"));
+	    }
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+	}
+
+	if (hp != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* RW match with actual peer_id or abstract peer_id? */
+	    d = fc_try(c, hp, NULL, our_net, peer_net
+		, our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
+		, peer_ca, peer_list);
+
+	    if (d == NULL
+	    && subnetishost(our_net)
+	    && subnetishost(peer_net))
+	    {
+		/* Opportunistic match?
+		 * Always use abstract peer_id.
+		 * Note that later instantiation will result in the same peer_id.
+		 */
+		d = fc_try_oppo(c, hp, our_net, peer_net
+		    , our_protocol, our_port, peer_protocol, peer_port
+		    , peer_ca, peer_list);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("  concluding with d = %s"
+		, (d ? d->name : "none"))
+    )
+    return d;
+}
+
+int
+connection_compare(const struct connection *ca
+, const struct connection *cb)
+{
+    int ret;
+
+    /* DBG_log("comparing %s to %s", ca->name, cb->name);  */
+
+    ret = strcasecmp(ca->name, cb->name);
+    if (ret != 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    ret = ca->kind - cb->kind;	/* note: enum connection_kind behaves like int */
+    if (ret != 0)
+	return ret;
+
+    /* same name, and same type */
+    switch (ca->kind)
+    {
+    case CK_INSTANCE:
+	return ca->instance_serial < cb->instance_serial ? -1
+	    : ca->instance_serial > cb->instance_serial ? 1
+	    : 0;
+
+    default:
+	return ca->prio < cb->prio ? -1
+	    : ca->prio > cb->prio ? 1
+	    : 0;
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+connection_compare_qsort(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+    return connection_compare(*(const struct connection *const *)a
+			    , *(const struct connection *const *)b);
+}
+
+void
+show_connections_status(bool all, const char *name)
+{
+    struct connection *c;
+    int count, i;
+    struct connection **array;
+
+    /* make an array of connections, and sort it */
+    count = 0;
+    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
+    {
+	if (c->ikev1 && (name == NULL || streq(c->name, name)))
+	    count++;
+    }
+    array = alloc_bytes(sizeof(struct connection *)*count, "connection array");
+
+    count=0;
+    for (c = connections; c != NULL; c = c->ac_next)
+    {
+	if (c->ikev1 && (name == NULL || streq(c->name, name)))
+	    array[count++]=c;
+    }
+
+    /* sort it! */
+    qsort(array, count, sizeof(struct connection *), connection_compare_qsort);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+    {
+	const char *ifn;
+	char instance[1 + 10 + 1];
+	char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
+
+	c = array[i];
+
+	ifn = oriented(*c)? c->interface->rname : "";
+
+	instance[0] = '\0';
+	if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && c->instance_serial != 0)
+	    snprintf(instance, sizeof(instance), "[%lu]", c->instance_serial);
+
+	/* show topology */
+	{
+	    char topo[CONNECTION_BUF];
+	    struct spd_route *sr = &c->spd;
+	    int num=0;
+
+	    while (sr != NULL)
+	    {
+		(void) format_connection(topo, sizeof(topo), c, sr);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "\"%s\"%s: %s; %s; eroute owner: #%lu"
+			  , c->name, instance, topo
+			  , enum_name(&routing_story, sr->routing)
+			  , sr->eroute_owner);
+		sr = sr->next;
+		num++;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (all)
+	{
+	    /* show CAs if defined */
+	    if (c->spd.this.ca.ptr != NULL || c->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		char this_ca[BUF_LEN], that_ca[BUF_LEN];
+
+		dntoa_or_null(this_ca, BUF_LEN, c->spd.this.ca, "%any");
+		dntoa_or_null(that_ca, BUF_LEN, c->spd.that.ca, "%any");
+
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		    , "\"%s\"%s:   CAs: '%s'...'%s'"
+		    , c->name
+		    , instance
+		    , this_ca
+		    , that_ca);
+	    }
+
+	    /* show group attributes if defined */
+	    if (c->spd.that.groups != NULL)
+	    {
+		char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	
+		format_groups(c->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		    , "\"%s\"%s:   groups: %s"
+		    , c->name
+		    , instance
+		    , buf);
+	    }
+
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   ike_life: %lus; ipsec_life: %lus;"
+		" rekey_margin: %lus; rekey_fuzz: %lu%%; keyingtries: %lu"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ike_life_seconds
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_margin
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_rekey_fuzz
+		, (unsigned long) c->sa_keying_tries);
+
+	    /* show DPD parameters if defined */
+	
+	    if (c->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		    , "\"%s\"%s:   dpd_action: %s;"
+		    " dpd_delay: %lus; dpd_timeout: %lus;"
+		    , c->name
+		    , instance
+		    , enum_show(&dpd_action_names, c->dpd_action)
+		    , (unsigned long) c->dpd_delay
+		    , (unsigned long) c->dpd_timeout);
+
+	    if (c->policy_next)
+	    {
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		    , "\"%s\"%s:   policy_next: %s"
+		    , c->name, instance, c->policy_next->name);
+	    }
+
+	    /* Note: we display key_from_DNS_on_demand as if policy [lr]KOD */
+	    fmt_policy_prio(c->prio, prio);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   policy: %s%s%s; prio: %s; interface: %s; "
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, prettypolicy(c->policy)
+		, c->spd.this.key_from_DNS_on_demand? "+lKOD" : ""
+		, c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand? "+rKOD" : ""
+		, prio
+		, ifn);
+	}
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+	    , "\"%s\"%s:   newest ISAKMP SA: #%ld; newest IPsec SA: #%ld; "
+	    , c->name
+	    , instance
+	    , c->newest_isakmp_sa
+	    , c->newest_ipsec_sa);
+	    
+	if (all)
+	{
+	    ike_alg_show_connection(c, instance);
+	    kernel_alg_show_connection(c, instance);
+	}
+    }
+    if (count > 0)
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+
+    pfree(array);
+}
+
+/* struct pending, the structure representing Quick Mode
+ * negotiations delayed until a Keying Channel has been negotiated.
+ * Essentially, a pending call to quick_outI1.
+ */
+
+struct pending {
+    int whack_sock;
+    struct state *isakmp_sa;
+    struct connection *connection;
+    lset_t policy;
+    unsigned long try;
+    so_serial_t replacing;
+
+    struct pending *next;
+};
+
+/* queue a Quick Mode negotiation pending completion of a suitable Main Mode */
+void
+add_pending(int whack_sock
+, struct state *isakmp_sa
+, struct connection *c
+, lset_t policy
+, unsigned long try
+, so_serial_t replacing)
+{
+    bool already_queued = FALSE;
+    struct pending *p = c->host_pair->pending;
+
+    while (p != NULL)
+    {
+	if (streq(c->name, p->connection->name))
+	{
+	    already_queued = TRUE;
+	    break;
+	}
+	p = p->next;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("Queuing pending Quick Mode with %s \"%s\"%s"
+		, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+		, c->name
+		, already_queued? " already done" : "")
+    )
+    if (already_queued)
+	return;
+
+    p = alloc_thing(struct pending, "struct pending");
+    p->whack_sock = whack_sock;
+    p->isakmp_sa = isakmp_sa;
+    p->connection = c;
+    p->policy = policy;
+    p->try = try;
+    p->replacing = replacing;
+    p->next = c->host_pair->pending;
+    c->host_pair->pending = p;
+}
+
+/* Release all the whacks awaiting the completion of this state.
+ * This is accomplished by closing all the whack socket file descriptors.
+ * We go to a lot of trouble to tell each whack, but to not tell it twice.
+ */
+void
+release_pending_whacks(struct state *st, err_t story)
+{
+    struct pending *p;
+    struct stat stst;
+
+    if (st->st_whack_sock == NULL_FD || fstat(st->st_whack_sock, &stst) != 0)
+	zero(&stst);	/* resulting st_dev/st_ino ought to be distinct */
+
+    release_whack(st);
+
+    for (p = st->st_connection->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	if (p->isakmp_sa == st && p->whack_sock != NULL_FD)
+	{
+	    struct stat pst;
+
+	    if (fstat(p->whack_sock, &pst) == 0
+	    && (stst.st_dev != pst.st_dev || stst.st_ino != pst.st_ino))
+	    {
+		passert(whack_log_fd == NULL_FD);
+		whack_log_fd = p->whack_sock;
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		    , "%s for ISAKMP SA, but releasing whack for pending IPSEC SA"
+		    , story);
+		whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+	    }
+	    close(p->whack_sock);
+	    p->whack_sock = NULL_FD;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+delete_pending(struct pending **pp)
+{
+    struct pending *p = *pp;
+
+    *pp = p->next;
+    if (p->connection != NULL)
+	connection_discard(p->connection);
+    close_any(p->whack_sock);
+    pfree(p);
+}
+
+void
+unpend(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct pending **pp
+	, *p;
+
+    for (pp = &st->st_connection->host_pair->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+    {
+	if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("unqueuing pending Quick Mode with %s \"%s\""
+		, ip_str(&p->connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+		, p->connection->name));
+	    (void) quick_outI1(p->whack_sock, st, p->connection, p->policy
+		, p->try, p->replacing);
+	    p->whack_sock = NULL_FD;	/* ownership transferred */
+	    p->connection = NULL;	/* ownership transferred */
+	    delete_pending(pp);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    pp = &p->next;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* a Main Mode negotiation has been replaced; update any pending */
+void
+update_pending(struct state *os, struct state *ns)
+{
+    struct pending *p;
+
+    for (p = os->st_connection->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	if (p->isakmp_sa == os)
+	    p->isakmp_sa = ns;
+	if (p->connection->spd.this.host_port != ns->st_connection->spd.this.host_port)
+	{
+	    p->connection->spd.this.host_port = ns->st_connection->spd.this.host_port;
+	    p->connection->spd.that.host_port = ns->st_connection->spd.that.host_port;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* a Main Mode negotiation has failed; discard any pending */
+void
+flush_pending_by_state(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct host_pair *hp = st->st_connection->host_pair;
+
+    if (hp != NULL)
+    {
+	struct pending **pp
+	    , *p;
+
+	for (pp = &hp->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	{
+	    if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+		delete_pending(pp);
+	    else
+		pp = &p->next;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* a connection has been deleted; discard any related pending */
+static void
+flush_pending_by_connection(struct connection *c)
+{
+    if (c->host_pair != NULL)
+    {
+	struct pending **pp
+	    , *p;
+
+	for (pp = &c->host_pair->pending; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	{
+	    if (p->connection == c)
+	    {
+		p->connection = NULL;	/* prevent delete_pending from releasing */
+		delete_pending(pp);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		pp = &p->next;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+show_pending_phase2(const struct host_pair *hp, const struct state *st)
+{
+    const struct pending *p;
+
+    for (p = hp->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	if (p->isakmp_sa == st)
+	{
+	    /* connection-name state-number [replacing state-number] */
+	    char cip[CONN_INST_BUF];
+
+	    fmt_conn_instance(p->connection, cip);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%lu: pending Phase 2 for \"%s\"%s replacing #%lu"
+		, p->isakmp_sa->st_serialno
+		, p->connection->name
+		, cip
+		, p->replacing);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Delete a connection if it is an instance and it is no longer in use.
+ * We must be careful to avoid circularity:
+ * we don't touch it if it is CK_GOING_AWAY.
+ */
+void
+connection_discard(struct connection *c)
+{
+    if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+    {
+	/* see if it is being used by a pending */
+	struct pending *p;
+
+	for (p = c->host_pair->pending; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	    if (p->connection == c)
+		return;	/* in use, so we're done */
+
+	if (!states_use_connection(c))
+	    delete_connection(c, FALSE);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/* A template connection's eroute can be eclipsed by
+ * either a %hold or an eroute for an instance iff
+ * the template is a /32 -> /32.  This requires some special casing.
+ */
+
+long eclipse_count = 0;
+
+struct connection *
+eclipsed(struct connection *c, struct spd_route **esrp)
+{
+    struct connection *ue;
+    struct spd_route *sr1 = &c->spd;
+
+    ue = NULL;
+
+    while (sr1 != NULL && ue != NULL)
+    {
+	for (ue = connections; ue != NULL; ue = ue->ac_next)
+	{
+	    struct spd_route *srue = &ue->spd;
+
+	    while (srue != NULL
+	    && srue->routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED
+	    && !(samesubnet(&sr1->this.client, &srue->this.client)
+		 && samesubnet(&sr1->that.client, &srue->that.client)))
+	    {
+		srue = srue->next;
+	    }
+	    if (srue != NULL && srue->routing==RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+	    {
+		*esrp = srue;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return ue;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset:4
+ * c-style: pluto
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/connections.h b/src/pluto/connections.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..df3af9dd4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/connections.h
@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+/* information about connections between hosts and clients
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: connections.h,v 1.18 2006/04/22 21:59:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONNECTIONS_H
+#define _CONNECTIONS_H
+
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include "id.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "ac.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+
+/* There are two kinds of connections:
+ * - ISAKMP connections, between hosts (for IKE communication)
+ * - IPsec connections, between clients (for secure IP communication)
+ *
+ * An ISAKMP connection looks like:
+ *   host<--->host
+ *
+ * An IPsec connection looks like:
+ *   client-subnet<-->host<->nexthop<--->nexthop<->host<-->client-subnet
+ *
+ * For the connection to be relevant to this instance of Pluto,
+ * exactly one of the hosts must be a public interface of our machine
+ * known to this instance.
+ *
+ * The client subnet might simply be the host -- this is a
+ * representation of "host mode".
+ *
+ * Each nexthop defaults to the neighbouring host's IP address.
+ * The nexthop is a property of the pair of hosts, not each
+ * individually.  It is only needed for IPsec because of the
+ * way IPsec is mixed into the kernel routing logic.  Furthermore,
+ * only this end's nexthop is actually used.  Eventually, nexthop
+ * will be unnecessary.
+ *
+ * Other information represented:
+ * - each connection has a name: a chunk of uninterpreted text
+ *   that is unique for each connection.
+ * - security requirements (currently just the "policy" flags from
+ *   the whack command to initiate the connection, but eventually
+ *   much more.  Different for ISAKMP and IPsec connections.
+ * - rekeying parameters:
+ *   + time an SA may live
+ *   + time before SA death that a rekeying should be attempted
+ *     (only by the initiator)
+ *   + number of times to attempt rekeying
+ * - With the current KLIPS, we must route packets for a client
+ *   subnet through the ipsec interface (ipsec0).  Only one
+ *   gateway can get traffic for a specific (client) subnet.
+ *   Furthermore, if the routing isn't in place, packets will
+ *   be sent in the clear.
+ *   "routing" indicates whether the routing has been done for
+ *   this connection.  Note that several connections may claim
+ *   the same routing, as long as they agree about where the
+ *   packets are to be sent.
+ * - With the current KLIPS, only one outbound IPsec SA bundle can be
+ *   used for a particular client.  This is due to a limitation
+ *   of using only routing for selection.  So only one IPsec state (SA)
+ *   may "own" the eroute.  "eroute_owner" is the serial number of
+ *   this state, SOS_NOBODY if there is none.  "routing" indicates
+ *   what kind of erouting has been done for this connection, if any.
+ *
+ * Details on routing is in constants.h
+ *
+ * Operations on Connections:
+ *
+ * - add a new connection (with all details) [whack command]
+ * - delete a connection (by name) [whack command]
+ * - initiate a connection (by name) [whack command]
+ * - find a connection (by IP addresses of hosts)
+ *   [response to peer request; finding ISAKMP connection for IPsec connection]
+ *
+ * Some connections are templates, missing the address of the peer
+ * (represented by INADDR_ANY).  These are always arranged so that the
+ * missing end is "that" (there can only be one missing end).  These can
+ * be instantiated (turned into real connections) by Pluto in one of two
+ * different ways: Road Warrior Instantiation or Opportunistic
+ * Instantiation.  A template connection is marked for Opportunistic
+ * Instantiation by specifying the peer client as 0.0.0.0/32 (or the IPV6
+ * equivalent).  Otherwise, it is suitable for Road Warrior Instantiation.
+ *
+ * Instantiation creates a new temporary connection, with the missing
+ * details filled in.  The resulting template lasts only as long as there
+ * is a state that uses it.
+ */
+
+/* connection policy priority: how important this policy is
+ * - used to implement eroute-like precedence (augmented by a small
+ *   bonus for a routed connection).
+ * - a whole number
+ * - larger is more important
+ * - three subcomponents.  In order of decreasing significance:
+ *   + length of source subnet mask (8 bits)
+ *   + length of destination subnet mask (8 bits)
+ *   + bias (8 bit)
+ * - a bias of 1 is added to allow prio BOTTOM_PRIO to be less than all
+ *   normal priorities
+ * - other bias values are created on the fly to give mild preference
+ *   to certaion conditions (eg. routedness)
+ * - priority is inherited -- an instance of a policy has the same priority
+ *   as the original policy, even though its subnets might be smaller.
+ * - display format: n,m
+ */
+typedef unsigned long policy_prio_t;
+#define BOTTOM_PRIO   ((policy_prio_t)0)	/* smaller than any real prio */
+#define set_policy_prio(c) { (c)->prio = \
+	((policy_prio_t)(c)->spd.this.client.maskbits << 16) \
+	| ((policy_prio_t)(c)->spd.that.client.maskbits << 8) \
+	| (policy_prio_t)1; }
+#define POLICY_PRIO_BUF	(3+1+3+1)
+extern void fmt_policy_prio(policy_prio_t pp, char buf[POLICY_PRIO_BUF]);
+
+struct virtual_t;
+
+struct end {
+    struct id id;
+    ip_address
+	host_addr,
+	host_nexthop,
+	host_srcip;
+    ip_subnet client;
+
+    bool key_from_DNS_on_demand;
+    bool has_client;
+    bool has_client_wildcard;
+    bool has_port_wildcard;
+    bool has_id_wildcards;
+    bool has_natip;
+    char *updown;
+    u_int16_t host_port;	/* host order */
+    u_int16_t port;		/* host order */
+    u_int8_t protocol;
+    cert_t cert;		/* end certificate */
+    chunk_t ca;			/* CA distinguished name */
+    struct ietfAttrList *groups;/* access control groups */
+    smartcard_t *sc;		/* smartcard reader and key info */
+    struct virtual_t *virt;
+    bool modecfg;		/* this end: request local address from server */
+				/* that end: give local addresses to clients */
+    bool hostaccess;		/* allow access to host via iptables INPUT/OUTPUT */
+				/* rules if client behind host is a subnet */
+    certpolicy_t sendcert;	/* whether or not to send the certificate */
+};
+
+struct spd_route {
+    struct spd_route *next;
+    struct end this;
+    struct end that;
+    so_serial_t eroute_owner;
+    enum routing_t routing;	/* level of routing in place */
+    uint32_t reqid;
+};
+
+struct connection {
+    char *name;
+    bool ikev1;
+
+    lset_t policy;
+    time_t sa_ike_life_seconds;
+    time_t sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
+    time_t sa_rekey_margin;
+    unsigned long sa_rekey_fuzz;
+    unsigned long sa_keying_tries;
+
+    /* RFC 3706 DPD */
+    time_t dpd_delay;
+    time_t dpd_timeout;
+    dpd_action_t dpd_action;
+
+    char              *log_file_name;       /* name of log file */
+    FILE              *log_file;            /* possibly open FILE */
+    CIRCLEQ_ENTRY(connection) log_link;     /* linked list of open conns */
+    bool               log_file_err;        /* only bitch once */
+
+    struct spd_route spd;
+
+    /* internal fields: */
+
+    unsigned long instance_serial;
+    policy_prio_t prio;
+    bool instance_initiation_ok;	/* this is an instance of a policy that mandates initiate */
+    enum connection_kind kind;
+    const struct iface *interface;	/* filled in iff oriented */
+
+    so_serial_t	/* state object serial number */
+	newest_isakmp_sa,
+	newest_ipsec_sa;
+
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    lset_t extra_debugging;
+#endif
+
+    /* note: if the client is the gateway, the following must be equal */
+    sa_family_t addr_family;		/* between gateways */
+    sa_family_t tunnel_addr_family;	/* between clients */
+
+    struct connection *policy_next;	/* if multiple policies,
+					   next one to apply */
+
+    struct gw_info *gw_info;
+    struct alg_info_esp *alg_info_esp;
+    struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike;
+
+    struct host_pair *host_pair;
+    struct connection *hp_next;		/* host pair list link */
+
+    struct connection *ac_next;		/* all connections list link */
+
+    generalName_t *requested_ca;	/* collected certificate requests */
+    bool got_certrequest;
+};
+
+#define oriented(c) ((c).interface != NULL)
+extern bool orient(struct connection *c);
+
+extern bool same_peer_ids(const struct connection *c
+    , const struct connection *d, const struct id *his_id);
+
+/* Format the topology of a connection end, leaving out defaults.
+ * Largest left end looks like: client === host : port [ host_id ] --- hop
+ * Note: if that==NULL, skip nexthop
+ */
+#define END_BUF	(SUBNETTOT_BUF + ADDRTOT_BUF + IDTOA_BUF + ADDRTOT_BUF + 10)
+extern size_t format_end(char *buf, size_t buf_len
+    , const struct end *this, const struct end *that
+    , bool is_left, lset_t policy);
+
+extern void add_connection(const whack_message_t *wm);
+extern void initiate_connection(const char *name, int whackfd);
+extern void initiate_opportunistic(const ip_address *our_client
+    , const ip_address *peer_client, int transport_proto, bool held, int whackfd);
+extern void terminate_connection(const char *nm);
+extern void release_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations);
+extern void delete_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations);
+extern void delete_connections_by_name(const char *name, bool strict);
+extern void delete_every_connection(void);
+extern char *add_group_instance(struct connection *group, const ip_subnet *target);
+extern void remove_group_instance(const struct connection *group, const char *name);
+extern void release_dead_interfaces(void);
+extern void check_orientations(void);
+extern struct connection *route_owner(struct connection *c
+				      , struct spd_route **srp
+				      , struct connection **erop
+				      , struct spd_route **esrp);
+extern struct connection *shunt_owner(const ip_subnet *ours
+    , const ip_subnet *his);
+
+extern bool uniqueIDs;	/* --uniqueids? */
+extern void ISAKMP_SA_established(struct connection *c, so_serial_t serial);
+
+#define his_id_was_instantiated(c) ((c)->kind == CK_INSTANCE \
+    && (id_is_ipaddr(&(c)->spd.that.id)? \
+    sameaddr(&(c)->spd.that.id.ip_addr, &(c)->spd.that.host_addr) : TRUE))
+
+struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in state.h) */
+extern struct connection
+    *con_by_name(const char *nm, bool strict),
+    *find_host_connection(const ip_address *me, u_int16_t my_port
+	, const ip_address *him, u_int16_t his_port, lset_t policy),
+    *refine_host_connection(const struct state *st, const struct id *id
+	, chunk_t peer_ca),
+    *find_client_connection(struct connection *c
+	, const ip_subnet *our_net
+	, const ip_subnet *peer_net
+	, const u_int8_t our_protocol
+	, const u_int16_t out_port
+	, const u_int8_t peer_protocol
+	, const u_int16_t peer_port),
+    *find_connection_by_reqid(uint32_t reqid);
+
+extern struct connection *
+find_connection_for_clients(struct spd_route **srp
+			    , const ip_address *our_client
+			    , const ip_address *peer_client
+			    , int transport_proto);
+
+extern chunk_t get_peer_ca_and_groups(struct connection *c
+    , const ietfAttrList_t **peer_list);
+    
+/* instantiating routines
+ * Note: connection_discard() is in state.h because all its work
+ * is looking through state objects.
+ */
+struct gw_info;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in dnskey.h) */
+struct alg_info;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in alg_info.h) */
+extern struct connection *rw_instantiate(struct connection *c
+					 , const ip_address *him
+					 , u_int16_t his_port
+					 , const ip_subnet *his_net
+					 , const struct id *his_id);
+
+extern struct connection *oppo_instantiate(struct connection *c
+					   , const ip_address *him
+					   , const struct id *his_id
+					   , struct gw_info *gw
+					   , const ip_address *our_client
+					   , const ip_address *peer_client);
+
+extern struct connection
+  *build_outgoing_opportunistic_connection(struct gw_info *gw
+					   , const ip_address *our_client
+					   , const ip_address *peer_client);
+
+/* worst case: "[" serial "] " myclient "=== ..." peer "===" hisclient '\0' */
+#define CONN_INST_BUF \
+    (2 + 10 + 1 + SUBNETTOT_BUF + 7 + ADDRTOT_BUF + 3 + SUBNETTOT_BUF + 1)
+
+extern void fmt_conn_instance(const struct connection *c
+    , char buf[CONN_INST_BUF]);
+
+/* operations on "pending", the structure representing Quick Mode
+ * negotiations delayed until a Keying Channel has been negotiated.
+ */
+
+struct pending;	/* forward declaration (opaque outside connections.c) */
+
+extern void add_pending(int whack_sock
+    , struct state *isakmp_sa
+    , struct connection *c
+    , lset_t policy
+    , unsigned long try
+    , so_serial_t replacing);
+
+extern void release_pending_whacks(struct state *st, err_t story);
+extern void unpend(struct state *st);
+extern void update_pending(struct state *os, struct state *ns);
+extern void flush_pending_by_state(struct state *st);
+extern void show_pending_phase2(const struct host_pair *hp, const struct state *st);
+
+extern void connection_discard(struct connection *c);
+
+/* A template connection's eroute can be eclipsed by
+ * either a %hold or an eroute for an instance iff
+ * the template is a /32 -> /32.  This requires some special casing.
+ */
+#define eclipsable(sr) (subnetishost(&(sr)->this.client) && subnetishost(&(sr)->that.client))
+extern long eclipse_count;
+extern struct connection *eclipsed(struct connection *c, struct spd_route **);
+
+
+/* print connection status */
+
+extern void show_connections_status(bool all, const char *name);
+extern int  connection_compare(const struct connection *ca
+    , const struct connection *cb);
+extern void update_host_pair(const char *why, struct connection *c
+    , const ip_address *myaddr, u_int16_t myport
+    , const ip_address *hisaddr, u_int16_t hisport);
+
+#endif /* _CONNECTIONS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/constants.c b/src/pluto/constants.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e7d7216ee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/constants.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1353 @@
+/* tables of names for values defined in constants.h
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: constants.c,v 1.21 2006/03/27 07:38:59 as Exp $
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Note that the array sizes are all specified; this is to enable range
+ * checking by code that only includes constants.h.
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+
+/* string naming compile-time options that have interop implications */
+
+const char compile_time_interop_options[] = ""
+#ifdef THREADS
+	" THREADS"
+#endif
+#ifdef LIBCURL
+	" LIBCURL"
+#endif
+#ifdef LIBLDAP
+	" LIBLDAP"
+#endif
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+	" SMARTCARD"
+#endif
+#ifdef VENDORID
+	" VENDORID"
+#endif
+#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
+	" CISCO_QUIRKS"
+#endif
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	" KEYRR"
+#endif
+    ;
+
+/* version */
+
+static const char *const version_name[] = {
+	"ISAKMP Version 1.0",
+};
+
+enum_names version_names =
+    { ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION<<ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION,
+	ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION<<ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION,
+	version_name, NULL };
+
+/* RFC 2459 CRL reason codes */
+
+static const char *const crl_reason_name[] = {
+	"unspecified",
+	"key compromise",
+	"ca compromise",
+	"affiliation changed",
+	"superseded",
+	"cessation of operation",
+	"certificate hold",
+	"reason #7",
+	"remove from crl"
+    };
+
+enum_names crl_reason_names =
+    { REASON_UNSPECIFIED, REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL, crl_reason_name, NULL};
+
+/* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
+
+static const char *const dpd_action_name[] = {
+	"none",
+	"clear",
+	"hold",
+	"restart"
+    };
+
+enum_names dpd_action_names =
+    { DPD_ACTION_NONE, DPD_ACTION_RESTART, dpd_action_name, NULL};
+        
+/* Timer events */
+
+static const char *const timer_event_name[] = {
+	"EVENT_NULL",
+	"EVENT_REINIT_SECRET",
+	"EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN",
+	"EVENT_SO_DISCARD",
+	"EVENT_RETRANSMIT",
+	"EVENT_SA_REPLACE",
+	"EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED",
+	"EVENT_SA_EXPIRE",
+	"EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE",
+	"EVENT_DPD",
+	"EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT",
+	"EVENT_LOG_DAILY"
+    };
+
+enum_names timer_event_names =
+    { EVENT_NULL, EVENT_LOG_DAILY, timer_event_name, NULL };
+
+/* Domain of Interpretation */
+
+static const char *const doi_name[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP",
+	"ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC",
+};
+
+enum_names doi_names = { ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP, ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC, doi_name, NULL };
+
+/* debugging settings: a set of selections for reporting
+ * These would be more naturally situated in log.h,
+ * but they are shared with whack.
+ * It turns out that "debug-" is clutter in all contexts this is used,
+ * so we leave it off.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+const char *const debug_bit_names[] = {
+	"raw",
+	"crypt",
+	"parsing",
+	"emitting",
+	"control",
+	"lifecycle",
+	"klips",
+	"dns",
+	"natt",
+	"oppo",
+	"controlmore",
+
+	"private",
+
+	"impair-delay-adns-key-answer",
+	"impair-delay-adns-txt-answer",
+	"impair-bust-mi2",
+	"impair-bust-mr2",
+
+	NULL
+    };
+#endif
+
+/* State of exchanges */
+
+static const char *const state_name[] = {
+	"STATE_MAIN_R0",
+	"STATE_MAIN_I1",
+	"STATE_MAIN_R1",
+	"STATE_MAIN_I2",
+	"STATE_MAIN_R2",
+	"STATE_MAIN_I3",
+	"STATE_MAIN_R3",
+	"STATE_MAIN_I4",
+
+	"STATE_QUICK_R0",
+	"STATE_QUICK_I1",
+	"STATE_QUICK_R1",
+	"STATE_QUICK_I2",
+	"STATE_QUICK_R2",
+
+	"STATE_INFO",
+	"STATE_INFO_PROTECTED",
+
+	"STATE_XAUTH_I0",
+	"STATE_XAUTH_R1",
+	"STATE_XAUTH_I1",
+	"STATE_XAUTH_R2",
+	"STATE_XAUTH_I2",
+	"STATE_XAUTH_R3",
+
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_R0",
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_I1",
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_R1",
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_I2",
+
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_I0",
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_R3",
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_I3",
+	"STATE_MODE_CFG_R4",
+
+	"STATE_IKE_ROOF"
+    };
+
+enum_names state_names =
+    { STATE_MAIN_R0, STATE_IKE_ROOF-1, state_name, NULL };
+
+/* story for state */
+
+const char *const state_story[] = {
+	"expecting MI1",			 /* STATE_MAIN_R0 */
+	"sent MI1, expecting MR1",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I1 */
+	"sent MR1, expecting MI2",		 /* STATE_MAIN_R1 */
+	"sent MI2, expecting MR2",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I2 */
+	"sent MR2, expecting MI3",		 /* STATE_MAIN_R2 */
+	"sent MI3, expecting MR3",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I3 */
+	"sent MR3, ISAKMP SA established",	 /* STATE_MAIN_R3 */
+	"ISAKMP SA established",		 /* STATE_MAIN_I4 */
+
+	"expecting QI1",			 /* STATE_QUICK_R0 */
+	"sent QI1, expecting QR1",		 /* STATE_QUICK_I1 */
+	"sent QR1, inbound IPsec SA installed, expecting QI2",	/* STATE_QUICK_R1 */
+	"sent QI2, IPsec SA established",	 /* STATE_QUICK_I2 */
+	"IPsec SA established",			 /* STATE_QUICK_R2 */
+
+	"got Informational Message in clear",	 /* STATE_INFO */
+	"got encrypted Informational Message",	 /* STATE_INFO_PROTECTED */
+
+	"expecting XAUTH request",		 /* STATE_XAUTH_I0 */
+	"sent XAUTH request, expecting reply",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_R1 */
+	"sent XAUTH reply, expecting status",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_I1 */
+	"sent XAUTH status, expecting ack",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_R2 */
+	"sent XAUTH ack, established",		 /* STATE_XAUTH_I2 */
+	"received XAUTH ack, established",	 /* STATE_XAUTH_R3 */
+
+	"expecting ModeCfg request",		 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 */
+	"sent ModeCfg request, expecting reply", /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I1 */
+	"sent ModeCfg reply, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R1 */
+	"received ModeCfg reply, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I2 */
+
+	"expecting ModeCfg set",		 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I0 */
+	"sent ModeCfg set, expecting ack",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R3 */
+	"sent ModeCfg ack, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_I3 */
+	"received ModeCfg ack, established",	 /* STATE_MODE_CFG_R4 */
+    };
+
+/* kind of struct connection */
+
+static const char *const connection_kind_name[] = {
+    "CK_GROUP",		/* policy group: instantiates to template */
+    "CK_TEMPLATE",	/* abstract connection, with wildcard */
+    "CK_PERMANENT",	/* normal connection */
+    "CK_INSTANCE",	/* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
+    "CK_GOING_AWAY"	/* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
+};
+
+enum_names connection_kind_names =
+    { CK_GROUP, CK_GOING_AWAY, connection_kind_name, NULL };
+
+/* routing status names */
+
+static const char *const routing_story_strings[] = {
+    "unrouted",	/* RT_UNROUTED: unrouted */
+    "unrouted HOLD",	/* RT_UNROUTED_HOLD: unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
+    "eroute eclipsed",	/* RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED: RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
+    "prospective erouted",	/* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE: routed, and prospective shunt installed */
+    "erouted HOLD",	/* RT_ROUTED_HOLD: routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
+    "fail erouted",	/* RT_ROUTED_FAILURE: routed, and failure-context shunt eroute installed */
+    "erouted",	/* RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL: routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
+    "keyed, unrouted",  /* RT_UNROUTED_KEYED: was routed+keyed, but it got turned into an outer policy */
+    };
+
+enum_names routing_story =
+    { RT_UNROUTED, RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL, routing_story_strings, NULL};
+
+/* Payload types (RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.1) */
+
+const char *const payload_name[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_SA",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_P",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_T",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_KE",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_ID",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_CR",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_N",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_D",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_VID",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_MODECFG",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_15",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_16",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_17",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_18",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_19",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-D",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-OA",
+	NULL
+    };
+
+const char *const payload_name_nat_d[] = { "ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-D",
+	"ISAKMP_NEXT_NAT-OA", NULL };
+
+static enum_names payload_names_nat_d =
+	{ ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS, ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS, payload_name_nat_d, NULL };
+	
+enum_names payload_names =
+    { ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC, payload_name, &payload_names_nat_d };
+
+/* Exchange types (note: two discontinuous ranges) */
+
+static const char *const exchange_name[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_AO",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG",
+    };
+
+static const char *const exchange_name2[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP",
+	"ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO",
+    };
+
+static enum_names exchange_desc2 =
+    { ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK, ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO, exchange_name2, NULL };
+
+enum_names exchange_names =
+    { ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE, ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG, exchange_name, &exchange_desc2 };
+
+/* Flag BITS */
+const char *const flag_bit_names[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION",
+	"ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT",
+	NULL
+    };
+
+/* Situation BITS definition for IPsec DOI */
+
+const char *const sit_bit_names[] = {
+	"SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY",
+	"SIT_SECRECY",
+	"SIT_INTEGRITY",
+	NULL
+    };
+
+/* Protocol IDs (RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.4.1) */
+
+static const char *const protocol_name[] = {
+	"PROTO_ISAKMP",
+	"PROTO_IPSEC_AH",
+	"PROTO_IPSEC_ESP",
+	"PROTO_IPCOMP",
+    };
+
+enum_names protocol_names =
+    { PROTO_ISAKMP, PROTO_IPCOMP, protocol_name, NULL };
+
+/* IPsec ISAKMP transform values */
+
+static const char *const isakmp_transform_name[] = {
+	"KEY_IKE",
+    };
+
+enum_names isakmp_transformid_names =
+    { KEY_IKE, KEY_IKE, isakmp_transform_name, NULL };
+
+/* IPsec AH transform values */
+
+static const char *const ah_transform_name[] = {
+	"AH_MD5",
+	"AH_SHA",
+	"AH_DES",
+	"AH_SHA2_256",
+	"AH_SHA2_384",
+	"AH_SHA2_512",
+	"AH_RIPEMD"
+    };
+
+enum_names ah_transformid_names =
+    { AH_MD5, AH_RIPEMD, ah_transform_name, NULL };
+
+/* IPsec ESP transform values */
+
+static const char *const esp_transform_name[] = {
+	"ESP_DES_IV64",
+	"ESP_DES",
+	"ESP_3DES",
+	"ESP_RC5",
+	"ESP_IDEA",
+	"ESP_CAST",
+	"ESP_BLOWFISH",
+	"ESP_3IDEA",
+	"ESP_DES_IV32",
+	"ESP_RC4",
+	"ESP_NULL",
+	"ESP_AES",
+	"ESP_AES-CTR",
+	"ESP_AES-CCM_8",
+	"ESP_AES-CCM_12",
+	"ESP_AES-CCM_16"
+    };
+
+/*
+ * ipsec drafts suggest "high" ESP ids values for testing,
+ * assign generic ESP_ID<num> if not officially defined
+ */
+static const char *const esp_transform_name_high[] = {
+	"ESP_SERPENT",
+	"ESP_TWOFISH"
+    };
+
+enum_names esp_transformid_names_high =
+    { ESP_SERPENT, ESP_TWOFISH, esp_transform_name_high, NULL };
+
+enum_names esp_transformid_names =
+    { ESP_DES_IV64, ESP_AES_CCM_16, esp_transform_name, &esp_transformid_names_high };
+
+/* IPCOMP transform values */
+
+static const char *const ipcomp_transform_name[] = {
+	"IPCOMP_OUI",
+	"IPCOMP_DEFLAT",
+	"IPCOMP_LZS",
+	"IPCOMP_LZJH",
+    };
+
+enum_names ipcomp_transformid_names =
+    { IPCOMP_OUI, IPCOMP_LZJH, ipcomp_transform_name, NULL };
+
+/* Identification type values */
+
+static const char *const ident_name[] = {
+	"ID_IPV4_ADDR",
+	"ID_FQDN",
+	"ID_USER_FQDN",
+	"ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET",
+	"ID_IPV6_ADDR",
+	"ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET",
+	"ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE",
+	"ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE",
+	"ID_DER_ASN1_DN",
+	"ID_DER_ASN1_GN",
+	"ID_KEY_ID",
+    };
+
+enum_names ident_names =
+    { ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_KEY_ID, ident_name, NULL };
+
+/* Certificate type values */
+
+static const char *const cert_type_name[] = {
+	"CERT_NONE",
+	"CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509",
+	"CERT_PGP",
+	"CERT_DNS_SIGNED_KEY",
+	"CERT_X509_SIGNATURE",
+	"CERT_X509_KEY_EXCHANGE",
+	"CERT_KERBEROS_TOKENS",
+	"CERT_CRL",
+	"CERT_ARL",
+	"CERT_SPKI",
+	"CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE",
+    };
+
+enum_names cert_type_names =
+    { CERT_NONE, CERT_X509_ATTRIBUTE, cert_type_name, NULL };
+
+/* Certificate policy names */
+
+static const char *const cert_policy_name[] = {
+	"ALWAYS_SEND",
+	"SEND_IF_ASKED",
+	"NEVER_SEND",
+    };
+
+enum_names cert_policy_names =
+    { CERT_ALWAYS_SEND, CERT_NEVER_SEND, cert_policy_name, NULL };
+
+/* Goal BITs for establishing an SA
+ * Note: we drop the POLICY_ prefix so that logs are more concise.
+ */
+
+const char *const sa_policy_bit_names[] = {
+	"PSK",
+	"RSASIG",
+	"ENCRYPT",
+	"AUTHENTICATE",
+	"COMPRESS",
+	"TUNNEL",
+	"PFS",
+	"DISABLEARRIVALCHECK",
+	"SHUNT0",
+	"SHUNT1",
+	"FAILSHUNT0",
+	"FAILSHUNT1",
+	"DONTREKEY",
+	"OPPORTUNISTIC",
+	"GROUP",
+	"GROUTED",
+	"UP",
+	"MODECFGPUSH",
+	"XAUTHPSK",
+	"XAUTHRSASIG",
+	"XAUTHSERVER",
+	"DONTREAUTH",
+	NULL
+    };
+
+const char *const policy_shunt_names[4] = {
+	"TRAP",
+	"PASS",
+	"DROP",
+	"REJECT",
+    };
+
+const char *const policy_fail_names[4] = {
+	"NONE",
+	"PASS",
+	"DROP",
+	"REJECT",
+    };
+
+/* Oakley transform attributes
+ * oakley_attr_bit_names does double duty: it is used for enum names
+ * and bit names.
+ */
+
+const char *const oakley_attr_bit_names[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM",
+	"OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM",
+	"OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B",
+	"OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE",
+	"OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION",
+	"OAKLEY_PRF",
+	"OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH",
+	"OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER",
+	"OAKLEY_BLOCK_SIZE",
+	NULL
+    };
+
+static const char *const oakley_var_attr_name[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME (variable length)",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE (variable length)",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO (variable length)",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A (variable length)",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B (variable length)",
+	NULL,
+	"OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION (variable length)",
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER (variable length)",
+    };
+
+static enum_names oakley_attr_desc_tv = {
+    OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+    OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV, oakley_attr_bit_names, NULL };
+
+enum_names oakley_attr_names = {
+    OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME, OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER,
+    oakley_var_attr_name, &oakley_attr_desc_tv };
+
+/* for each Oakley attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
+enum_names *oakley_attr_val_descs[] = {
+	NULL,			/* (none) */
+	&oakley_enc_names,	/* OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM */
+	&oakley_hash_names,	/* OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM */
+	&oakley_auth_names,	/* OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD */
+	&oakley_group_names,	/* OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION */
+	&oakley_group_type_names,/* OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B */
+	&oakley_lifetime_names,	/* OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION */
+	&oakley_prf_names,	/* OAKLEY_PRF */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE */
+	NULL,			/* OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER */
+    };
+
+/* IPsec DOI attributes (RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.5) */
+
+static const char *const ipsec_attr_name[] = {
+	"SA_LIFE_TYPE",
+	"SA_LIFE_DURATION",
+	"GROUP_DESCRIPTION",
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM",
+	"KEY_LENGTH",
+	"KEY_ROUNDS",
+	"COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE",
+	"COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG",
+    };
+
+static const char *const ipsec_var_attr_name[] = {
+	"SA_LIFE_DURATION (variable length)",
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	"COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG (variable length)",
+    };
+
+static enum_names ipsec_attr_desc_tv = {
+    SA_LIFE_TYPE + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+    COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+    ipsec_attr_name, NULL };
+
+enum_names ipsec_attr_names = {
+    SA_LIFE_DURATION, COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG,
+    ipsec_var_attr_name, &ipsec_attr_desc_tv };
+
+/* for each IPsec attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
+enum_names *ipsec_attr_val_descs[] = {
+	NULL,			/* (none) */
+	&sa_lifetime_names,	/* SA_LIFE_TYPE */
+	NULL,			/* SA_LIFE_DURATION */
+	&oakley_group_names,	/* GROUP_DESCRIPTION */
+	&enc_mode_names,		/* ENCAPSULATION_MODE */
+	&auth_alg_names,		/* AUTH_ALGORITHM */
+	NULL,			/* KEY_LENGTH */
+	NULL,			/* KEY_ROUNDS */
+	NULL,			/* COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE */
+	NULL,			/* COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG */
+    };
+
+/* SA Lifetime Type attribute */
+
+static const char *const sa_lifetime_name[] = {
+	"SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS",
+	"SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES",
+    };
+
+enum_names sa_lifetime_names =
+    { SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS, SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES, sa_lifetime_name, NULL };
+
+/* Encapsulation Mode attribute */
+
+static const char *const enc_mode_name[] = {
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL",
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT",
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL",
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT",
+    };
+
+static const char *const enc_udp_mode_name[] = {
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL",
+	"ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT",
+    };
+
+static enum_names enc_udp_mode_names =
+    { ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS, ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS, enc_udp_mode_name, NULL };
+
+enum_names enc_mode_names =
+    { ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL, ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC, enc_mode_name, &enc_udp_mode_names };
+
+/* Auth Algorithm attribute */
+
+static const char *const auth_alg_name[] = {
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512",
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD",
+    };
+
+static const char *const extended_auth_alg_name[] = {
+	"AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL"
+    };
+
+enum_names extended_auth_alg_names =
+    { AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL, extended_auth_alg_name, NULL };
+
+enum_names auth_alg_names =
+    { AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD, auth_alg_name
+	, &extended_auth_alg_names };
+
+/* From draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth */
+static const char *const xauth_type_name[] = {
+  "Generic",
+  "RADIUS-CHAP",
+  "OTP",
+  "S/KEY",
+};
+
+enum_names xauth_type_names =
+    { XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC, XAUTH_TYPE_SKEY, xauth_type_name, NULL};
+
+/* From draft-beaulieu-ike-xauth */
+static const char *const xauth_attr_tv_name[] = {
+	"XAUTH_TYPE",
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	NULL,
+	"XAUTH_STATUS",
+    };
+
+enum_names xauth_attr_tv_names = {
+    XAUTH_TYPE   + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV,
+    XAUTH_STATUS + ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV, xauth_attr_tv_name, NULL };
+
+static const char *const unity_attr_name[] = {
+	"UNITY_BANNER",
+	"UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD",
+	"UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN",
+	"UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME",
+	"UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE",
+	"UNITY_NATT_PORT",
+	"UNITY_LOCAL_LAN",
+	"UNITY_PFS",
+	"UNITY_FW_TYPE",
+	"UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS",
+	"UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME",
+};
+
+enum_names unity_attr_names =
+    { UNITY_BANNER , UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME, unity_attr_name , &xauth_attr_tv_names };
+
+
+static const char *const xauth_attr_name[] = {
+	"XAUTH_USER_NAME",
+	"XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD",
+	"XAUTH_PASSCODE",
+	"XAUTH_MESSAGE",
+	"XAUTH_CHALLENGE",
+	"XAUTH_DOMAIN",
+	"XAUTH_STATUS (wrong TLV syntax, should be TV)",
+	"XAUTH_NEXT_PIN",
+	"XAUTH_ANSWER",
+    };
+
+enum_names xauth_attr_names =
+    { XAUTH_USER_NAME , XAUTH_ANSWER, xauth_attr_name , &unity_attr_names };
+
+static const char *const modecfg_attr_name[] = {
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS",
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK",
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_DNS",
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS",
+	"INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY",
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP",
+	"APPLICATION_VERSION",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_DNS",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP",
+	"INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET",
+	"SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES",
+	"INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET",
+    };
+
+enum_names modecfg_attr_names =
+    { INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS, INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET, modecfg_attr_name , &xauth_attr_names };
+
+/* Oakley Lifetime Type attribute */
+
+static const char *const oakley_lifetime_name[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS",
+	"OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES",
+    };
+
+enum_names oakley_lifetime_names =
+    { OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS, OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES, oakley_lifetime_name, NULL };
+
+/* Oakley PRF attribute (none defined) */
+
+enum_names oakley_prf_names =
+    { 1, 0, NULL, NULL };
+
+/* Oakley Encryption Algorithm attribute */
+
+static const char *const oakley_enc_name[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_DES_CBC",
+	"OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC",
+	"OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC",
+	"OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC",
+	"OAKLEY_3DES_CBC",
+	"OAKLEY_CAST_CBC",
+	"OAKLEY_AES_CBC",
+    };
+
+#ifdef NO_EXTRA_IKE
+enum_names oakley_enc_names =
+    { OAKLEY_DES_CBC, OAKLEY_AES_CBC, oakley_enc_name, NULL };
+#else
+static const char *const oakley_enc_name_draft_aes_cbc_02[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_MARS_CBC"	/*	65001	*/,
+	"OAKLEY_RC6_CBC"     	/*	65002	*/,
+	"OAKLEY_ID_65003"	/*	65003	*/,
+	"OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC"	/*	65004	*/,
+	"OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC"	/*	65005	*/,
+};
+static const char *const oakley_enc_name_ssh[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH",
+};
+enum_names oakley_enc_names_ssh =
+    { OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH, oakley_enc_name_ssh
+	, NULL };
+
+enum_names oakley_enc_names_draft_aes_cbc_02 =
+    { OAKLEY_MARS_CBC, OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC, oakley_enc_name_draft_aes_cbc_02
+	, &oakley_enc_names_ssh };
+
+enum_names oakley_enc_names =
+    { OAKLEY_DES_CBC, OAKLEY_AES_CBC, oakley_enc_name
+	, &oakley_enc_names_draft_aes_cbc_02 };
+#endif
+
+/* Oakley Hash Algorithm attribute */
+
+static const char *const oakley_hash_name[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_MD5",
+	"OAKLEY_SHA",
+	"OAKLEY_TIGER",
+	"OAKLEY_SHA2_256",
+	"OAKLEY_SHA2_384",
+	"OAKLEY_SHA2_512",
+    };
+
+enum_names oakley_hash_names =
+    { OAKLEY_MD5, OAKLEY_SHA2_512, oakley_hash_name, NULL };
+
+/* Oakley Authentication Method attribute */
+
+static const char *const oakley_auth_name1[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY",
+	"OAKLEY_DSS_SIG",
+	"OAKLEY_RSA_SIG",
+	"OAKLEY_RSA_ENC",
+	"OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV",
+	"OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC",
+	"OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV",
+    };
+
+static const char *const oakley_auth_name2[] = {
+	"HybridInitRSA",
+	"HybridRespRSA",
+	"HybridInitDSS",
+	"HybridRespDSS",
+    };
+
+static const char *const oakley_auth_name3[] = {
+	"XAUTHInitPreShared",
+	"XAUTHRespPreShared",
+	"XAUTHInitDSS",
+	"XAUTHRespDSS",
+	"XAUTHInitRSA",
+	"XAUTHRespRSA",
+	"XAUTHInitRSAEncryption",
+	"XAUTHRespRSAEncryption",
+	"XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption",
+	"XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption",
+    };
+
+static enum_names oakley_auth_names1 =
+    { OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY, OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV
+	, oakley_auth_name1, NULL };
+
+static enum_names oakley_auth_names2 =
+    { HybridInitRSA, HybridRespDSS
+	, oakley_auth_name2, &oakley_auth_names1 };
+
+enum_names oakley_auth_names =
+    { XAUTHInitPreShared, XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption
+	, oakley_auth_name3, &oakley_auth_names2 };
+
+/* Oakley Group Description attribute */
+
+static const char *const oakley_group_name[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP768",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GP155",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_GP185",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536",
+    };
+
+static const char *const oakley_group_name_rfc3526[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192"
+};
+enum_names oakley_group_names_rfc3526 =
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192,
+	    oakley_group_name_rfc3526, NULL };
+
+enum_names oakley_group_names =
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP768, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536, 
+	    oakley_group_name, &oakley_group_names_rfc3526 };
+
+/* Oakley Group Type attribute */
+
+static const char *const oakley_group_type_name[] = {
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_ECP",
+	"OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N",
+    };
+
+enum_names oakley_group_type_names =
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP, OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N, oakley_group_type_name, NULL };
+
+/* Notify messages -- error types */
+
+static const char *const notification_name[] = {
+	"INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE",
+	"DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+	"SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+	"INVALID_COOKIE",
+	"INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION",
+	"INVALID_MINOR_VERSION",
+	"INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE",
+	"INVALID_FLAGS",
+	"INVALID_MESSAGE_ID",
+	"INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID",
+	"INVALID_SPI",
+	"INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID",
+	"ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+	"NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN",
+	"BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX",
+	"PAYLOAD_MALFORMED",
+	"INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION",
+	"INVALID_ID_INFORMATION",
+	"INVALID_CERT_ENCODING",
+	"INVALID_CERTIFICATE",
+	"CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED",
+	"INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY",
+	"INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION",
+	"AUTHENTICATION_FAILED",
+	"INVALID_SIGNATURE",
+	"ADDRESS_NOTIFICATION",
+	"NOTIFY_SA_LIFETIME",
+	"CERTIFICATE_UNAVAILABLE",
+	"UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE",
+	"UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS",
+    };
+
+static const char *const notification_status_name[] = {
+	"CONNECTED",
+    };
+
+static const char *const ipsec_notification_name[] = {
+	"IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME",
+	"IPSEC_REPLAY_STATUS",
+	"IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT",
+    };
+
+static const char *const notification_dpd_name[] = {
+        "R_U_THERE",
+        "R_U_THERE_ACK",
+};
+
+enum_names notification_dpd_names =
+    { R_U_THERE, R_U_THERE_ACK,
+        notification_dpd_name, NULL };
+
+enum_names ipsec_notification_names =
+    { IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME, IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT,
+	ipsec_notification_name, &notification_dpd_names };
+
+enum_names notification_status_names =
+    { CONNECTED, CONNECTED,
+	notification_status_name, &ipsec_notification_names };
+
+enum_names notification_names =
+    { INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE, UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS,
+	notification_name, &notification_status_names };
+
+/* MODECFG
+ * From draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg
+ */
+const char *const attr_msg_type_name[] = {
+	"ISAKMP_CFG_RESERVED",
+	"ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST",
+	"ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY",
+	"ISAKMP_CFG_SET",
+	"ISAKMP_CFG_ACK",
+	NULL
+    };
+
+enum_names attr_msg_type_names =
+    { 0 , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, attr_msg_type_name , NULL };
+
+/* socket address family info */
+
+static const char *const af_inet_name[] = {
+	"AF_INET",
+    };
+
+static const char *const af_inet6_name[] = {
+	"AF_INET6",
+    };
+
+static enum_names af_names6 = { AF_INET6, AF_INET6, af_inet6_name, NULL };
+
+enum_names af_names = { AF_INET, AF_INET, af_inet_name, &af_names6 };
+
+static ip_address ipv4_any, ipv6_any;
+static ip_subnet ipv4_wildcard, ipv6_wildcard;
+static ip_subnet ipv4_all, ipv6_all;
+
+const struct af_info af_inet4_info = {
+	AF_INET,
+	"AF_INET",
+	sizeof(struct in_addr),
+	sizeof(struct sockaddr_in),
+	32,
+	ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET, ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE,
+	&ipv4_any, &ipv4_wildcard, &ipv4_all,
+    };
+
+const struct af_info af_inet6_info = {
+	AF_INET6,
+	"AF_INET6",
+	sizeof(struct in6_addr),
+	sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6),
+	128,
+	ID_IPV6_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET, ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE,
+	&ipv6_any, &ipv6_wildcard, &ipv6_all,
+    };
+
+const struct af_info *
+aftoinfo(int af)
+{
+    switch (af)
+    {
+	case AF_INET:
+	    return &af_inet4_info;
+	case AF_INET6:
+	    return &af_inet6_info;
+	default:
+	    return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+bool
+subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn)
+{
+    ip_address base;
+
+    networkof(sn, &base);
+    return isanyaddr(&base) && subnetishost(sn);
+}
+
+/* BIND enumerated types */
+
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+
+static const char *const rr_type_name[] = {
+	"T_A",	/* 1 host address */
+	"T_NS",	/* 2 authoritative server */
+	"T_MD",	/* 3 mail destination */
+	"T_MF",	/* 4 mail forwarder */
+	"T_CNAME",	/* 5 canonical name */
+	"T_SOA",	/* 6 start of authority zone */
+	"T_MB",	/* 7 mailbox domain name */
+	"T_MG",	/* 8 mail group member */
+	"T_MR",	/* 9 mail rename name */
+	"T_NULL",	/* 10 null resource record */
+	"T_WKS",	/* 11 well known service */
+	"T_PTR",	/* 12 domain name pointer */
+	"T_HINFO",	/* 13 host information */
+	"T_MINFO",	/* 14 mailbox information */
+	"T_MX",	/* 15 mail routing information */
+	"T_TXT",	/* 16 text strings */
+	"T_RP",	/* 17 responsible person */
+	"T_AFSDB",	/* 18 AFS cell database */
+	"T_X25",	/* 19 X_25 calling address */
+	"T_ISDN",	/* 20 ISDN calling address */
+	"T_RT",	/* 21 router */
+	"T_NSAP",	/* 22 NSAP address */
+	"T_NSAP_PTR",	/* 23 reverse NSAP lookup (deprecated) */
+	"T_SIG",	/* 24 security signature */
+	"T_KEY",	/* 25 security key */
+	"T_PX",	/* 26 X.400 mail mapping */
+	"T_GPOS",	/* 27 geographical position (withdrawn) */
+	"T_AAAA",	/* 28 IP6 Address */
+	"T_LOC",	/* 29 Location Information */
+	"T_NXT",	/* 30 Next Valid Name in Zone */
+	"T_EID",	/* 31 Endpoint identifier */
+	"T_NIMLOC",	/* 32 Nimrod locator */
+	"T_SRV",	/* 33 Server selection */
+	"T_ATMA",	/* 34 ATM Address */
+	"T_NAPTR",	/* 35 Naming Authority PoinTeR */
+	NULL
+    };
+
+enum_names rr_type_names = { T_A, T_NAPTR, rr_type_name, NULL };
+
+/* Query type values which do not appear in resource records */
+static const char *const rr_qtype_name[] = {
+	"T_IXFR",	/* 251 incremental zone transfer */
+	"T_AXFR",	/* 252 transfer zone of authority */
+	"T_MAILB",	/* 253 transfer mailbox records */
+	"T_MAILA",	/* 254 transfer mail agent records */
+	"T_ANY",	/* 255 wildcard match */
+	NULL
+    };
+
+enum_names rr_qtype_names = { T_IXFR, T_ANY, rr_qtype_name, &rr_type_names };
+
+static const char *const rr_class_name[] = {
+	"C_IN",	/* 1 the arpa internet */
+	NULL
+    };
+
+enum_names rr_class_names = { C_IN, C_IN, rr_class_name, NULL };
+
+/*
+ * NAT-Traversal defines for nat_traveral type from nat_traversal.h
+ *
+ */
+const char *const natt_type_bitnames[] = {
+  "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00/01",    /* 0 */
+  "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02/03",
+  "RFC 3947",
+  "3",                                   /* 3 */
+  "4",   "5",   "6",   "7",
+  "8",   "9",   "10",  "11",
+  "12",  "13",  "14",  "15",
+  "16",  "17",  "18",  "19", 
+  "20",  "21",  "22",  "23",
+  "24",  "25",  "26",  "27",
+  "28",  "29",
+  "nat is behind me",
+  "nat is behind peer"
+};
+
+/* look up enum names in an enum_names */
+
+const char *
+enum_name(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val)
+{
+    enum_names	*p;
+
+    for (p = ed; p != NULL; p = p->en_next_range)
+    {
+	if (p->en_first <= val && val <= p->en_last)
+	    return p->en_names[val - p->en_first];
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* find or construct a string to describe an enum value
+ * Result may be in STATIC buffer!
+ */
+const char *
+enum_show(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val)
+{
+    const char *p = enum_name(ed, val);
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+    {
+	static char buf[12];	/* only one!  I hope that it is big enough */
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu??", val);
+	p = buf;
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+
+static char bitnamesbuf[200];   /* only one!  I hope that it is big enough! */
+
+int 
+enum_search(enum_names *ed, const char *str) 
+{
+    enum_names	*p;
+    const char *ptr;
+    unsigned en;
+
+    for (p = ed; p != NULL; p = p->en_next_range)
+	for (en = p->en_first; en <= p->en_last ;en++)
+	{
+	    ptr = p->en_names[en - p->en_first];
+	    if (ptr == 0) continue;
+	    /* if (strncmp(ptr, str, strlen(ptr))==0) */
+	    if (strcmp(ptr, str) == 0)
+		    return en;
+	}
+    return -1;
+}
+
+/* construct a string to name the bits on in a set
+ * Result may be in STATIC buffer!
+ * Note: prettypolicy depends on internal details.
+ */
+const char *
+bitnamesof(const char *const table[], lset_t val)
+{
+    char *p = bitnamesbuf;
+    lset_t bit;
+    const char *const *tp;
+
+    if (val == 0)
+	return "none";
+
+    for (tp = table, bit = 01; val != 0; bit <<= 1)
+    {
+	if (val & bit)
+	{
+	    const char *n = *tp;
+	    size_t nl;
+
+	    if (n == NULL || *n == '\0')
+	    {
+		/* no name for this bit, so use hex */
+		static char flagbuf[sizeof("0x80000000")];
+
+		snprintf(flagbuf, sizeof(flagbuf), "0x%llx", bit);
+		n = flagbuf;
+	    }
+
+	    nl = strlen(n);
+
+	    if (p != bitnamesbuf && p < bitnamesbuf+sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - 1)
+		*p++ = '+';
+
+	    if (bitnamesbuf+sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - p > (ptrdiff_t)nl)
+	    {
+		strcpy(p, n);
+		p += nl;
+	    }
+	    val -= bit;
+	}
+	if (*tp != NULL)
+	    tp++;   /* move on, but not past end */
+    }
+    *p = '\0';
+    return bitnamesbuf;
+}
+
+/* print a policy: like bitnamesof, but it also does the non-bitfields.
+ * Suppress the shunt and fail fields if 0.
+ */
+const char *
+prettypolicy(lset_t policy)
+{
+    const char *bn = bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names
+	, policy & ~(POLICY_SHUNT_MASK | POLICY_FAIL_MASK));
+    size_t len;
+    lset_t shunt = (policy & POLICY_SHUNT_MASK) >> POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT;
+    lset_t fail = (policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) >> POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT;
+
+    if (bn != bitnamesbuf)
+	bitnamesbuf[0] = '\0';
+    len = strlen(bitnamesbuf);
+    if (shunt != 0)
+    {
+	snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+%s"
+	    , policy_shunt_names[shunt]);
+	len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
+    }
+    if (fail != 0)
+    {
+	snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+failure%s"
+	    , policy_fail_names[fail]);
+	len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
+    }
+    if (NEVER_NEGOTIATE(policy))
+    {
+	snprintf(bitnamesbuf + len, sizeof(bitnamesbuf) - len, "+NEVER_NEGOTIATE");
+	len += strlen(bitnamesbuf + len);
+    }
+    return bitnamesbuf;
+}
+
+/* test a set by seeing if all bits have names */
+
+bool
+testset(const char *const table[], lset_t val)
+{
+    lset_t bit;
+    const char *const *tp;
+
+    for (tp = table, bit = 01; val != 0; bit <<= 1, tp++)
+    {
+	const char *n = *tp;
+
+	if (n == NULL || ((val & bit) && *n == '\0'))
+	    return FALSE;
+	val &= ~bit;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+const char sparse_end[] = "end of sparse names";
+
+/* look up enum names in a sparse_names */
+const char *sparse_name(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val)
+{
+    const struct sparse_name *p;
+
+    for (p = sd; p->name != sparse_end; p++)
+	if (p->val == val)
+	    return p->name;
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* find or construct a string to describe an sparse value
+ * Result may be in STATIC buffer!
+ */
+const char *
+sparse_val_show(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val)
+{
+    const char *p = sparse_name(sd, val);
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+    {
+	static char buf[12];	/* only one!  I hope that it is big enough */
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%lu??", val);
+	p = buf;
+    }
+    return p;
+}
+
+void init_constants(void)
+{
+    happy(anyaddr(AF_INET, &ipv4_any));
+    happy(anyaddr(AF_INET6, &ipv6_any));
+
+    happy(addrtosubnet(&ipv4_any, &ipv4_wildcard));
+    happy(addrtosubnet(&ipv6_any, &ipv6_wildcard));
+
+    happy(initsubnet(&ipv4_any, 0, '0', &ipv4_all));
+    happy(initsubnet(&ipv6_any, 0, '0', &ipv6_all));
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/constants.h b/src/pluto/constants.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3ab10be61
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/constants.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1269 @@
+
+/* manifest constants
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: constants.h,v 1.20 2006/02/28 19:13:33 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _CONSTANTS_H
+#define _CONSTANTS_H
+
+extern const char compile_time_interop_options[];
+
+extern void init_constants(void);
+
+/*
+ * NOTE:For debugging purposes, constants.c has tables to map numbers back to names.
+ * Any changes here should be reflected there.
+ */
+
+#define elemsof(array) (sizeof(array) / sizeof(*(array)))	/* number of elements in an array */
+
+/* Many routines return only success or failure, but wish to describe
+ * the failure in a message.  We use the convention that they return
+ * a NULL on success and a pointer to constant string on failure.
+ * The fact that the string is a constant is limiting, but it
+ * avoids storage management issues: the recipient is allowed to assume
+ * that the string will live "long enough" (usually forever).
+ * <freeswan.h> defines err_t for this return type.
+ */
+
+typedef int bool;
+#define FALSE	0
+#define TRUE	1
+
+#define NULL_FD	(-1)	/* NULL file descriptor */
+#define dup_any(fd) ((fd) == NULL_FD? NULL_FD : dup(fd))
+#define close_any(fd) { if ((fd) != NULL_FD) { close(fd); (fd) = NULL_FD; } }
+
+#define BITS_PER_BYTE	8
+
+#define streq(a, b) (strcmp((a), (b)) == 0)	/* clearer shorthand */
+#define strcaseeq(a, b) (strcasecmp((a), (b)) == 0)	/* clearer shorthand */
+
+/* set type with room for at least 64 elements for ALG opts (was 32 in stock FS) */
+
+typedef unsigned long long lset_t;
+#define LEMPTY 0ULL
+#define LELEM(opt) (1ULL << (opt))
+#define LRANGE(lwb, upb) LRANGES(LELEM(lwb), LELEM(upb))
+#define LRANGES(first, last) (last - first + last)
+#define LHAS(set, elem)  ((LELEM(elem) & (set)) != LEMPTY)
+#define LIN(subset, set)  (((subset) & (set)) == (subset))
+#define LDISJOINT(a, b)  (((a) & (b)) == LEMPTY)
+
+/* Control and lock pathnames */
+#ifndef IPSEC_PIDDIR
+# define IPSEC_PIDDIR "/var/run"
+#endif
+#ifndef DEFAULT_CTLBASE
+# define DEFAULT_CTLBASE IPSEC_PIDDIR "/pluto"
+#endif
+
+#define CTL_SUFFIX ".ctl"	/* for UNIX domain socket pathname */
+#define LOCK_SUFFIX ".pid"	/* for pluto's lock */
+#define INFO_SUFFIX ".info"     /* for UNIX domain socket for apps */
+
+/* Routines to check and display values.
+ *
+ * An enum_names describes an enumeration.
+ * enum_name() returns the name of an enum value, or NULL if invalid.
+ * enum_show() is like enum_name, except it formats a numeric representation
+ *    for any invalid value (in a static area!)
+ *
+ * bitnames() formats a display of a set of named bits (in a static area)
+ */
+
+struct enum_names {
+    unsigned long en_first;  /* first value in range */
+    unsigned long en_last;   /* last value in range (inclusive) */
+    const char *const *en_names;
+    const struct enum_names *en_next_range;	/* descriptor of next range */
+};
+
+typedef const struct enum_names enum_names;
+
+extern const char *enum_name(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val);
+extern const char *enum_show(enum_names *ed, unsigned long val);
+extern int enum_search(enum_names *ed, const char *string);
+
+extern bool testset(const char *const table[], lset_t val);
+extern const char *bitnamesof(const char *const table[], lset_t val);
+
+/* sparse_names is much like enum_names, except values are
+ * not known to be contiguous or ordered.
+ * The array of names is ended with one with the name sparse_end
+ * (this avoids having to reserve a value to signify the end).
+ * Often appropriate for enums defined by others.
+ */
+struct sparse_name {
+    unsigned long val;
+    const char *const name;
+};
+typedef const struct sparse_name sparse_names[];
+
+extern const char *sparse_name(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val);
+extern const char *sparse_val_show(sparse_names sd, unsigned long val);
+extern const char sparse_end[];
+
+#define FULL_INET_ADDRESS_SIZE    6
+
+/* Group parameters from draft-ietf-ike-01.txt section 6 */
+
+#define MODP_GENERATOR "2"
+
+#define MODP768_MODULUS \
+    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 " \
+    "29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD " \
+    "EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 " \
+    "E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+
+#define MODP1024_MODULUS \
+    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 " \
+    "29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD " \
+    "EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 " \
+    "E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED " \
+    "EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381 " \
+    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+
+#define MODP1536_MODULUS \
+    "FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 " \
+    "29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD " \
+    "EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 " \
+    "E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED " \
+    "EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D " \
+    "C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F " \
+    "83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D " \
+    "670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA237327 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF "
+
+/* draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-modp-groups-03.txt */
+#define MODP2048_MODULUS \
+	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
+	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
+	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
+	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
+	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
+	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
+	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
+	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
+	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
+	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
+	"15728E5A 8AACAA68 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+
+#define MODP3072_MODULUS \
+	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
+	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
+	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
+	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
+	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
+	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
+	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
+	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
+	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
+	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
+	"15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64" \
+	"ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D B3970F85 A6E1E4C7" \
+	"ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 1AD2EE6B" \
+	"F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
+	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31" \
+	"43DB5BFC E0FD108E 4B82D120 A93AD2CA FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+
+#define MODP4096_MODULUS \
+	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
+	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
+	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
+	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
+	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
+	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
+	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
+	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
+	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
+	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
+	"15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64" \
+	"ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D B3970F85 A6E1E4C7" \
+	"ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 1AD2EE6B" \
+	"F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
+	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31" \
+	"43DB5BFC E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7" \
+	"88719A10 BDBA5B26 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA" \
+	"2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6" \
+	"287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 233BA186 515BE7ED" \
+	"1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 D5B05AA9" \
+	"93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34063199" \
+	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+
+/* copy&pasted from rfc3526: */
+#define MODP6144_MODULUS \
+	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08" \
+	"8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B" \
+	"302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9" \
+	"A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6" \
+	"49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8" \
+	"FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
+	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C" \
+	"180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718" \
+	"3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D" \
+	"04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D" \
+	"B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226" \
+	"1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
+	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC" \
+	"E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26" \
+	"99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB" \
+	"04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2" \
+	"233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127" \
+	"D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492" \
+	"36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406" \
+	"AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918" \
+	"DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151" \
+	"2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03" \
+	"F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F" \
+	"BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA" \
+	"CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B" \
+	"B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632" \
+	"387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E" \
+	"6DCC4024 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+
+/* copy&pasted from rfc3526: */
+#define MODP8192_MODULUS \
+	"FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1" \
+	"29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD" \
+	"EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245" \
+	"E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED" \
+	"EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE45B3D" \
+	"C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 FD24CF5F" \
+	"83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D" \
+	"670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B" \
+	"E39E772C 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9" \
+	"DE2BCBF6 95581718 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510" \
+	"15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64" \
+	"ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D B3970F85 A6E1E4C7" \
+	"ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 1AD2EE6B" \
+	"F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C" \
+	"BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31" \
+	"43DB5BFC E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7" \
+	"88719A10 BDBA5B26 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA" \
+	"2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6" \
+	"287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 233BA186 515BE7ED" \
+	"1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 D5B05AA9" \
+	"93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492" \
+	"36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD" \
+	"F8FF9406 AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831" \
+	"179727B0 865A8918 DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B" \
+	"DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF" \
+	"5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 F482D7CE 6E74FEF6" \
+	"D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F BEC7E8F3" \
+	"23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA" \
+	"CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328" \
+	"06A1D58B B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C" \
+	"DA56C9EC 2EF29632 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE" \
+	"12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E 6DBE1159 74A3926F 12FEE5E4" \
+	"38777CB6 A932DF8C D8BEC4D0 73B931BA 3BC832B6 8D9DD300" \
+	"741FA7BF 8AFC47ED 2576F693 6BA42466 3AAB639C 5AE4F568" \
+	"3423B474 2BF1C978 238F16CB E39D652D E3FDB8BE FC848AD9" \
+	"22222E04 A4037C07 13EB57A8 1A23F0C7 3473FC64 6CEA306B" \
+	"4BCBC886 2F8385DD FA9D4B7F A2C087E8 79683303 ED5BDD3A" \
+	"062B3CF5 B3A278A6 6D2A13F8 3F44F82D DF310EE0 74AB6A36" \
+	"4597E899 A0255DC1 64F31CC5 0846851D F9AB4819 5DED7EA1" \
+	"B1D510BD 7EE74D73 FAF36BC3 1ECFA268 359046F4 EB879F92" \
+	"4009438B 481C6CD7 889A002E D5EE382B C9190DA6 FC026E47" \
+	"9558E447 5677E9AA 9E3050E2 765694DF C81F56E8 80B96E71" \
+	"60C980DD 98EDD3DF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF"
+#define LOCALSECRETSIZE		(256 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+
+/* limits on nonce sizes.  See RFC2409 "The internet key exchange (IKE)" 5 */
+#define MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE	8	/* bytes */
+#define DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE	16	/* bytes */
+#define MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE	256	/* bytes */
+
+#define COOKIE_SIZE 8
+#define MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE 16
+
+#define MD2_DIGEST_SIZE		(128 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define MD5_DIGEST_SIZE		(128 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE	(160 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE	(256 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE	(384 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE	(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+
+#define MD5_BLOCK_SIZE		(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE		(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA2_256_BLOCK_SIZE	(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA2_384_BLOCK_SIZE	(1024 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define SHA2_512_BLOCK_SIZE	(1024 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+
+#define DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE	(64 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+
+#define DSS_QBITS	160	/* bits in DSS's "q" (FIPS 186-1) */
+
+/* Maximum is required for SHA2_512 */
+#define MAX_DIGEST_LEN		SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE
+#define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE	SHA2_512_BLOCK_SIZE
+
+/* RFC 2404 "HMAC-SHA-1-96" section 3 */
+#define HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN    SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/* RFC 2403 "HMAC-MD5-96" section 3 */
+#define HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN    MD5_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+#define IKE_UDP_PORT	500
+
+/* RFC 2560 OCSP - certificate status */
+
+typedef enum {
+    CERT_GOOD = 	0,
+    CERT_REVOKED = 	1,
+    CERT_UNKNOWN = 	2,
+    CERT_UNDEFINED =	3
+} cert_status_t;
+
+/* RFC 2459 CRL reason codes */
+
+extern enum_names crl_reason_names;
+
+typedef enum {
+    REASON_UNSPECIFIED =		0,
+    REASON_KEY_COMPROMISE = 		1,
+    REASON_CA_COMPROMISE = 		2,
+    REASON_AFFILIATION_CHANGED =	3,
+    REASON_SUPERSEDED =			4,
+    REASON_CESSATION_OF_OPERATON =	5,
+    REASON_CERTIFICATE_HOLD =		6,
+    REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL =		8
+} crl_reason_t;
+
+/* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
+
+extern enum_names dpd_action_names;
+
+typedef enum {
+    DPD_ACTION_NONE =    0,
+    DPD_ACTION_CLEAR =   1,
+    DPD_ACTION_HOLD  =   2,
+    DPD_ACTION_RESTART = 3,
+    DPD_ACTION_UNKNOWN = 4
+} dpd_action_t;
+
+/* Timer events */
+
+extern enum_names timer_event_names;
+
+enum event_type {
+    EVENT_NULL,	/* non-event */
+    EVENT_REINIT_SECRET,	/* Refresh cookie secret */
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN,		/* scan shunt eroutes known to kernel */
+#endif
+    EVENT_SO_DISCARD,		/* discard unfinished state object */
+    EVENT_RETRANSMIT,		/* Retransmit packet */
+    EVENT_SA_REPLACE,		/* SA replacement event */
+    EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED,	/* SA replacement event */
+    EVENT_SA_EXPIRE,		/* SA expiration event */
+    EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE,	/* NAT Traversal Keepalive */
+    EVENT_DPD,			/* dead peer detection */
+    EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT,		/* dead peer detection timeout */
+    EVENT_LOG_DAILY     	/* reset certain log events/stats */
+};
+
+#define EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY		3600 /* 1 hour */
+#define EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0		10   /* 10 seconds */
+
+/* Misc. stuff */
+
+#define MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS              2
+#define MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL      20
+
+#define MAX_INPUT_UDP_SIZE             65536
+#define MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE            65536
+
+/* Version numbers */
+
+#define ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION   0x1
+#define ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION   0x0
+
+extern enum_names version_names;
+
+/* Domain of Interpretation */
+
+extern enum_names doi_names;
+
+#define ISAKMP_DOI_ISAKMP          0
+#define ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC           1
+
+/* IPsec DOI things */
+
+#define IPSEC_DOI_SITUATION_LENGTH 4
+#define IPSEC_DOI_LDI_LENGTH       4
+#define IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE         4
+
+/* SPI value 0 is invalid and values 1-255 are reserved to IANA.
+ * ESP: RFC 2402 2.4; AH: RFC 2406 2.1
+ * IPComp RFC 2393 substitutes a CPI in the place of an SPI.
+ * see also draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt.
+ * We (FreeS/WAN) reserve 0x100 to 0xFFF for manual keying, so
+ * Pluto won't generate these values.
+ */
+#define IPSEC_DOI_SPI_MIN          0x100
+#define IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN      0x1000
+
+/* debugging settings: a set of selections for reporting
+ * These would be more naturally situated in log.h,
+ * but they are shared with whack.
+ * IMPAIR_* actually change behaviour, usually badly,
+ * to aid in testing.  Naturally, these are not included in ALL.
+ *
+ * NOTE: changes here must be done in concert with changes to DBGOPT_*
+ * in whack.c.  A change to WHACK_MAGIC in whack.h will be required too.
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+extern const char *const debug_bit_names[];
+#endif
+
+#define DBG_RAW		LELEM(0)	/* raw packet I/O */
+#define DBG_CRYPT	LELEM(1)	/* encryption/decryption of messages */
+#define DBG_PARSING	LELEM(2)	/* show decoding of messages */
+#define DBG_EMITTING	LELEM(3)	/* show encoding of messages */
+#define DBG_CONTROL	LELEM(4)	/* control flow within Pluto */
+#define DBG_LIFECYCLE	LELEM(5)	/* SA lifecycle */
+#define DBG_KLIPS	LELEM(6)	/* messages to KLIPS */
+#define DBG_DNS		LELEM(7)	/* DNS activity */
+#define DBG_NATT	LELEM(8)	/* NAT-T */
+#define DBG_OPPO	LELEM(9)	/* opportunism */
+#define DBG_CONTROLMORE LELEM(10)	/* more detailed debugging */
+
+#define DBG_PRIVATE	LELEM(11)	/* private information: DANGER! */
+
+#define IMPAIR0	12	/* first bit for IMPAIR_* */
+
+#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER	LELEM(IMPAIR0+0)	/* sleep before answering */
+#define IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER	LELEM(IMPAIR0+1)	/* sleep before answering */
+#define IMPAIR_BUST_MI2	LELEM(IMPAIR0+2)	/* make MI2 really large */
+#define IMPAIR_BUST_MR2	LELEM(IMPAIR0+3)	/* make MI2 really large */
+
+#define DBG_NONE	0	/* no options on, including impairments */
+#define DBG_ALL		LRANGES(DBG_RAW, DBG_CONTROLMORE)  /* all logging options on EXCEPT DBG_PRIVATE */
+
+/* State of exchanges
+ *
+ * The name of the state describes the last message sent, not the
+ * message currently being input or output (except during retry).
+ * In effect, the state represents the last completed action.
+ *
+ * Messages are named [MQ][IR]n where
+ * - M stands for Main Mode (Phase 1);
+ *   Q stands for Quick Mode (Phase 2)
+ * - I stands for Initiator;
+ *   R stands for Responder
+ * - n, a digit, stands for the number of the message
+ *
+ * It would be more convenient if each state accepted a message
+ * and produced one.  This is the case for states at the start
+ * or end of an exchange.  To fix this, we pretend that there are
+ * MR0 and QR0 messages before the MI1 and QR1 messages.  Similarly,
+ * we pretend that there are MR4 and QR2 messages.
+ *
+ * STATE_MAIN_R0 and STATE_QUICK_R0 are intermediate states (not
+ * retained between messages) representing the state that accepts the
+ * first message of an exchange has been read but not processed.
+ *
+ * state_microcode state_microcode_table in demux.c describes
+ * other important details.
+ */
+
+extern enum_names state_names;
+extern const char *const state_story[];
+
+enum state_kind {
+    STATE_UNDEFINED,	/* 0 -- most likely accident */
+
+    /*  Opportunism states: see "Opportunistic Encryption" 2.2 */
+
+    OPPO_ACQUIRE,	/* got an ACQUIRE message for this pair */
+    OPPO_GW_DISCOVERED,	/* got TXT specifying gateway */
+
+    /* IKE states */
+
+    STATE_MAIN_R0,
+    STATE_MAIN_I1,
+    STATE_MAIN_R1,
+    STATE_MAIN_I2,
+    STATE_MAIN_R2,
+    STATE_MAIN_I3,
+    STATE_MAIN_R3,
+    STATE_MAIN_I4,
+
+    STATE_QUICK_R0,
+    STATE_QUICK_I1,
+    STATE_QUICK_R1,
+    STATE_QUICK_I2,
+    STATE_QUICK_R2,
+
+    STATE_INFO,
+    STATE_INFO_PROTECTED,
+
+    /* XAUTH states */
+
+    STATE_XAUTH_I0,              /* initiator state (client) */
+    STATE_XAUTH_R1,              /* responder state (server) */
+    STATE_XAUTH_I1,
+    STATE_XAUTH_R2,
+    STATE_XAUTH_I2,
+    STATE_XAUTH_R3,
+
+    /* Mode Config pull states */
+
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_R0,           /* responder state (server) */
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_I1,           /* initiator state (client) */
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_R1,
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_I2,
+
+    /* Mode Config push states */
+
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_I0,           /* initiator state (client) */
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_R3,           /* responder state (server) */
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_I3,
+    STATE_MODE_CFG_R4,
+
+    STATE_IKE_ROOF
+};
+
+#define STATE_IKE_FLOOR	STATE_MAIN_R0
+
+#define PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES	 (LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I2) \
+    | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4))
+#define ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES ( \
+      LELEM(STATE_MAIN_R3)     | LELEM(STATE_MAIN_I4)     \
+    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R1)    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R2) | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
+    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I1)    | LELEM(STATE_XAUTH_I2)    \
+    | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R1) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I2) \
+    | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_I3) | LELEM(STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
+
+#define IS_PHASE1(s) ((STATE_MAIN_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MAIN_I4) \
+		   || (STATE_XAUTH_I0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_XAUTH_R3) \
+		   || (STATE_MODE_CFG_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_MODE_CFG_R4))
+
+#define IS_QUICK(s) (STATE_QUICK_R0 <= (s) && (s) <= STATE_QUICK_R2)
+#define IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(s) (STATE_MAIN_I2 <= (s))
+
+#define IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) (        \
+		   (s) == STATE_MAIN_R3      \
+		|| (s) == STATE_MAIN_I4      \
+		|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_I2     \
+		|| (s) == STATE_XAUTH_R3     \
+		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R1  \
+		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I2  \
+		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_I3  \
+		|| (s) == STATE_MODE_CFG_R4)
+
+#define IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ((s) == STATE_QUICK_I2 || (s) == STATE_QUICK_R2)
+#define IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(s) ((s) == STATE_QUICK_R1)
+
+/* kind of struct connection
+ * Ordered (mostly) by concreteness.  Order is exploited.
+ */
+
+extern enum_names connection_kind_names;
+
+enum connection_kind {
+    CK_GROUP,		/* policy group: instantiates to template */
+    CK_TEMPLATE,	/* abstract connection, with wildcard */
+    CK_PERMANENT,	/* normal connection */
+    CK_INSTANCE,	/* instance of template, created for a particular attempt */
+    CK_GOING_AWAY	/* instance being deleted -- don't delete again */
+};
+
+
+/* routing status.
+ * Note: routing ignores source address, but erouting does not!
+ * Note: a connection can only be routed if it is NEVER_NEGOTIATE
+ * or HAS_IPSEC_POLICY.
+ */
+
+extern enum_names routing_story;
+
+/* note that this is assumed to be ordered! */
+enum routing_t {
+    RT_UNROUTED,	/* unrouted */
+    RT_UNROUTED_HOLD,	/* unrouted, but HOLD shunt installed */
+    RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED,	/* RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE except bare HOLD or instance has eroute */
+    RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE,	/* routed, and prospective shunt installed */
+    RT_ROUTED_HOLD,	/* routed, and HOLD shunt installed */
+    RT_ROUTED_FAILURE,	/* routed, and failure-context shunt installed */
+    RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL,	/* routed, and erouted to an IPSEC SA group */
+    RT_UNROUTED_KEYED   /* keyed, but not routed, on purpose */
+};
+
+#define routed(rs) ((rs) > RT_UNROUTED_HOLD)
+#define erouted(rs) ((rs) != RT_UNROUTED)
+#define shunt_erouted(rs) (erouted(rs) && (rs) != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+
+/* Payload types
+ * RFC2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
+ * section 3.1
+ *
+ * RESERVED 14-127
+ * Private USE 128-255
+ */
+
+extern enum_names payload_names;
+extern const char *const payload_name[];
+
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE       0	/* No other payload following */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SA         1	/* Security Association */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_P          2	/* Proposal */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_T          3	/* Transform */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_KE         4	/* Key Exchange */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ID         5	/* Identification */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT       6	/* Certificate */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_CR         7	/* Certificate Request */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH       8	/* Hash */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG        9	/* Signature */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE      10	/* Nonce */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_N          11	/* Notification */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_D          12	/* Delete */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_VID        13	/* Vendor ID */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR       14       /* Mode config Attribute */
+
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC   20	/* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (rfc) */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC  21	/* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (rfc) */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF       22	/* roof on payload types */
+
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS   130   /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-D (drafts) */
+#define ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS  131   /* NAT-Traversal: NAT-OA (drafts) */
+
+/* These values are to be used within the Type field of an Attribute (14)
+ * ISAKMP payload.
+ */
+#define ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST         1
+#define ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY           2
+#define ISAKMP_CFG_SET             3
+#define ISAKMP_CFG_ACK             4
+
+extern enum_names attr_msg_type_names;
+
+/* Mode Config attribute values */
+#define    INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS        1
+#define    INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK        2
+#define    INTERNAL_IP4_DNS            3
+#define    INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS           4
+#define    INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY     5
+#define    INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP           6
+#define    APPLICATION_VERSION         7
+#define    INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS        8
+#define    INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK        9
+#define    INTERNAL_IP6_DNS           10
+#define    INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS          11
+#define    INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP          12
+#define    INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET        13
+#define    SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES       14
+#define    INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET        15
+
+
+extern enum_names modecfg_attr_names;
+
+/* XAUTH attribute values */
+#define    XAUTH_TYPE                16520
+#define    XAUTH_USER_NAME           16521
+#define    XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD       16522
+#define    XAUTH_PASSCODE            16523
+#define    XAUTH_MESSAGE             16524
+#define    XAUTH_CHALLENGE           16525
+#define    XAUTH_DOMAIN              16526
+#define    XAUTH_STATUS              16527
+#define    XAUTH_NEXT_PIN            16528
+#define    XAUTH_ANSWER              16529
+
+#define    XAUTH_BASE                XAUTH_TYPE
+
+extern enum_names xauth_attr_names;
+
+/* ISAKMP mode config attributes specific to the Unity vendor Id */
+#define   UNITY_BANNER		    28672
+#define   UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD	    28673
+#define   UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN	    28674
+#define   UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME	    28675
+#define   UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE	    28676
+#define   UNITY_NATT_PORT	    28677
+#define   UNITY_LOCAL_LAN	    28678
+#define   UNITY_PFS		    28679
+#define   UNITY_FW_TYPE		    28680
+#define   UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS	    28681
+#define   UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME	    28682
+
+#define   UNITY_BASE                UNITY_BANNER
+
+extern enum_names unity_attr_names;
+
+/* XAUTH authentication types */
+#define XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC 0
+#define XAUTH_TYPE_CHAP    1
+#define XAUTH_TYPE_OTP     2
+#define XAUTH_TYPE_SKEY    3
+
+/* Values for XAUTH_STATUS */
+#define	XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL       0
+#define	XAUTH_STATUS_OK         1
+
+extern enum_names xauth_type_names;
+
+/* Exchange types
+ * RFC2408 "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)"
+ * section 3.1
+ *
+ * ISAKMP Future Use     6 - 31
+ * DOI Specific Use     32 - 239
+ * Private Use         240 - 255
+ *
+ * Note: draft-ietf-ipsec-dhless-enc-mode-00.txt Appendix A
+ * defines "DHless RSA Encryption" as 6.
+ */
+
+extern enum_names exchange_names;
+
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE       0
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE       1
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT     2	/* ID Protection */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AO         3	/* Authentication Only */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR       4	/* Aggressive */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO       5	/* Informational */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG   6	/* Mode Config */
+
+/* Extra exchange types, defined by Oakley
+ * RFC2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", near end of Appendix A
+ */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK      32	/* Oakley Quick Mode */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP       33	/* Oakley New Group Mode */
+/* added in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt, near end of Appendix A */
+#define ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO   34	/* Oakley Acknowledged Informational */
+
+/* Flag bits */
+
+extern const char *const flag_bit_names[];
+
+#define ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION   0x1
+#define ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT       0x2
+
+/* Situation definition for IPsec DOI */
+
+extern const char *const sit_bit_names[];
+
+#define SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY        0x01
+#define SIT_SECRECY              0x02
+#define SIT_INTEGRITY            0x04
+
+/* Protocol IDs
+ * RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.4.1
+ */
+
+extern enum_names protocol_names;
+
+#define PROTO_ISAKMP             1
+#define PROTO_IPSEC_AH           2
+#define PROTO_IPSEC_ESP          3
+#define PROTO_IPCOMP             4
+
+/* warning: trans_show uses enum_show, so same static buffer is used */
+#define trans_show(p, t) \
+    ((p)==PROTO_IPSEC_AH ? enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, (t)) \
+    : (p)==PROTO_IPSEC_ESP ? enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, (t)) \
+    : (p)==PROTO_IPCOMP ? enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, (t)) \
+    : "??")
+
+/* many transform values are moved to freeswan/ipsec_policy.h */
+
+extern enum_names isakmp_transformid_names;
+
+#define KEY_IKE               1
+
+extern enum_names ah_transformid_names;
+extern enum_names esp_transformid_names;
+extern enum_names ipcomp_transformid_names;
+
+/* the following are from RFC 2393/draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 3.3 */
+typedef u_int16_t cpi_t;
+#define IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE          2
+#define IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED  256
+#define IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED   61439
+
+/* Identification type values
+ * RFC 2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.6.2.1
+ */
+
+extern enum_names ident_names;
+extern enum_names cert_type_names;
+extern enum_names cert_policy_names;
+
+typedef enum certpolicy {
+  CERT_ALWAYS_SEND   = 0,	/* the default */
+  CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED = 1,
+  CERT_NEVER_SEND    = 2,
+
+  CERT_YES_SEND      = 3,	/* synonym for CERT_ALWAYS_SEND */
+  CERT_NO_SEND       = 4	/* synonym for CERT_NEVER_SEND  */
+} certpolicy_t;
+
+/* Policies for establishing an SA
+ *
+ * These are used to specify attributes (eg. encryption) and techniques
+ * (eg PFS) for an SA.
+ * Note: certain CD_ definitions in whack.c parallel these -- keep them
+ * in sync!
+ */
+
+extern const char *const sa_policy_bit_names[];
+extern const char *prettypolicy(lset_t policy);
+
+/* ISAKMP auth techniques (none means never negotiate) */
+#define POLICY_PSK           LELEM(0)
+#define POLICY_RSASIG        LELEM(1)
+
+#define POLICY_ISAKMP_SHIFT	0	/* log2(POLICY_PSK) */
+#define POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK	(POLICY_PSK | POLICY_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
+#define POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK	POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK	/* all so far */
+
+/* Quick Mode (IPSEC) attributes */
+#define POLICY_ENCRYPT       LELEM(2)	/* must be first of IPSEC policies */
+#define POLICY_AUTHENTICATE  LELEM(3)	/* must be second */
+#define POLICY_COMPRESS      LELEM(4)	/* must be third */
+#define POLICY_TUNNEL        LELEM(5)
+#define POLICY_PFS           LELEM(6)
+#define POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK  LELEM(7)	/* supress tunnel egress address checking */
+
+#define POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT	2	/* log2(POLICY_ENCRYPT) */
+#define POLICY_IPSEC_MASK	LRANGES(POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK)
+
+/* shunt attributes: what to do when routed without tunnel (2 bits) */
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT	8	/* log2(POLICY_SHUNT_PASS) */
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_MASK	(03ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_TRAP	(0ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT) /* default: negotiate */
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_PASS	(1ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_DROP	(2ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_SHUNT_REJECT	(3ul << POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT)
+
+/* fail attributes: what to do with failed negotiation (2 bits) */
+
+#define POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT	10	/* log2(POLICY_FAIL_PASS) */
+#define POLICY_FAIL_MASK	(03ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
+
+#define POLICY_FAIL_NONE     (0ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT) /* default */
+#define POLICY_FAIL_PASS     (1ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_FAIL_DROP     (2ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
+#define POLICY_FAIL_REJECT   (3ul << POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT)
+
+/* connection policy
+ * Other policies could vary per state object.  These live in connection.
+ */
+#define POLICY_DONT_REKEY	LELEM(12)	/* don't rekey state either Phase */
+#define POLICY_OPPO		LELEM(13)	/* is this opportunistic? */
+#define POLICY_GROUP		LELEM(14)	/* is this a group template? */
+#define POLICY_GROUTED		LELEM(15)	/* do we want this group routed? */
+#define POLICY_UP		LELEM(16)	/* do we want this up? */
+#define POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH	LELEM(17)	/* is modecfg pushed by server? */
+#define POLICY_XAUTH_PSK	LELEM(18)	/* do we support XAUTH????PreShared? */
+#define POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG	LELEM(19)	/* do we support XAUTH????RSA? */
+#define POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER	LELEM(20)	/* are we an XAUTH server? */
+#define POLICY_DONT_REAUTH	LELEM(21)	/* don't reauthenticate on rekeying, IKEv2 only */
+#define POLICY_BEET		LELEM(22)	/* bound end2end tunnel, IKEv2 */
+
+/* Any IPsec policy?  If not, a connection description
+ * is only for ISAKMP SA, not IPSEC SA.  (A pun, I admit.)
+ * Note: a connection can only be routed if it is NEVER_NEGOTIATE
+ * or HAS_IPSEC_POLICY.
+ */
+#define HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(p) (((p) & POLICY_IPSEC_MASK) != 0)
+
+/* Don't allow negotiation? */
+#define NEVER_NEGOTIATE(p)  (LDISJOINT((p), POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK))
+
+
+/* Oakley transform attributes
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ */
+
+extern enum_names oakley_attr_names;
+extern const char *const oakley_attr_bit_names[];
+
+#define OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM    1
+#define OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM          2
+#define OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD   3
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION       4
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE              5
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME             6	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE     7	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO     8	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A           9	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B          10	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE              11
+#define OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION          12	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_PRF                    13
+#define OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH             14
+#define OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE             15
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER            16	/* B/V */
+#define OAKLEY_BLOCK_SIZE             17
+
+/* for each Oakley attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
+extern enum_names *oakley_attr_val_descs[];
+
+/* IPsec DOI attributes
+ * RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.5
+ */
+
+extern enum_names ipsec_attr_names;
+
+#define SA_LIFE_TYPE             1
+#define SA_LIFE_DURATION         2	/* B/V */
+#define GROUP_DESCRIPTION        3
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE       4
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM           5
+#define KEY_LENGTH               6
+#define KEY_ROUNDS               7
+#define COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE       8
+#define COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG     9	/* B/V */
+
+/* for each IPsec attribute, which enum_names describes its values? */
+extern enum_names *ipsec_attr_val_descs[];
+
+/* SA Lifetime Type attribute
+ * RFC2407 The Internet IP security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP 4.5
+ * Default time specified in 4.5
+ *
+ * There are two defaults for IPSEC SA lifetime, SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT,
+ * and PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT.
+ * SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT is specified in RFC2407 "The Internet IP
+ * Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" 4.5.  It applies when
+ * an ISAKMP negotiation does not explicitly specify a life duration.
+ * PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT is specified in pluto(8).  It applies
+ * when a connection description does not specify --ipseclifetime.
+ * The value of SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM is our local policy.
+ */
+
+extern enum_names sa_lifetime_names;
+
+#define SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS   1
+#define SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES    2
+
+#define SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT          28800 /* eight hours (RFC2407 4.5) */
+#define PLUTO_SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT     3600 /* one hour    (pluto(8)) */
+#define SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM          86400 /* one day */
+
+#define SA_REPLACEMENT_MARGIN_DEFAULT	    540 /* (IPSEC & IKE) nine minutes */
+#define SA_REPLACEMENT_FUZZ_DEFAULT	    100 /* (IPSEC & IKE) 100% of MARGIN */
+#define SA_REPLACEMENT_RETRIES_DEFAULT	      3 /* (IPSEC & IKE) */
+
+#define SA_LIFE_DURATION_K_DEFAULT  0xFFFFFFFFlu
+
+/* Encapsulation Mode attribute */
+
+extern enum_names enc_mode_names;
+
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED 0	/* not legal -- used internally */
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL      1
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT   2
+
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC          3
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC       4
+
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS       61443
+#define ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS    61444
+
+/* Auth Algorithm attribute */
+
+extern enum_names auth_alg_names, extended_auth_alg_names;
+
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE		0  /* our private designation */
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5		1
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1	2
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC		3
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK		4
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_256	5
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_384	6
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA2_512	7
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_RIPEMD	8
+#define AUTH_ALGORITHM_NULL		251
+
+/* Oakley Lifetime Type attribute
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ * As far as I can see, there is not specification for
+ * OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT.  This could lead to interop problems!
+ * For no particular reason, we chose three hours.
+ * The value of OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM is our local policy.
+ */
+extern enum_names oakley_lifetime_names;
+
+#define OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS   1
+#define OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES 2
+
+#define OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT 10800   /* three hours */
+#define OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM 86400   /* one day */
+
+/* Oakley PRF attribute (none defined)
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ */
+extern enum_names oakley_prf_names;
+
+/* HMAC (see rfc2104.txt) */
+
+#define HMAC_IPAD            0x36
+#define HMAC_OPAD            0x5C
+
+/* Oakley Encryption Algorithm attribute
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ * and from http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/ipsec-registry
+ */
+
+extern enum_names oakley_enc_names;
+
+#define OAKLEY_DES_CBC			1
+#define OAKLEY_IDEA_CBC			2
+#define OAKLEY_BLOWFISH_CBC		3
+#define OAKLEY_RC5_R16_B64_CBC		4
+#define OAKLEY_3DES_CBC			5
+#define OAKLEY_CAST_CBC			6
+#define OAKLEY_AES_CBC			7
+
+#define OAKLEY_MARS_CBC			65001
+#define OAKLEY_RC6_CBC			65002
+#define OAKLEY_ID_65003			65003
+#define OAKLEY_SERPENT_CBC		65004
+#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC		65005
+
+#define OAKLEY_TWOFISH_CBC_SSH		65289
+
+#define OAKLEY_ENCRYPT_MAX      	65535	/* pretty useless :) */
+
+/* Oakley Hash Algorithm attribute
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ * and from http://www.isi.edu/in-notes/iana/assignments/ipsec-registry
+ */
+
+extern enum_names oakley_hash_names;
+
+#define OAKLEY_MD5              1
+#define OAKLEY_SHA              2
+#define OAKLEY_TIGER            3
+#define OAKLEY_SHA2_256         4
+#define OAKLEY_SHA2_384         5
+#define OAKLEY_SHA2_512         6
+
+#define OAKLEY_HASH_MAX         7
+
+/* Oakley Authentication Method attribute
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ * Goofy Hybrid extensions from draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-hybrid-auth-05.txt
+ * Goofy XAUTH extensions from draft-ietf-ipsec-isakmp-xauth-06.txt
+ */
+
+extern enum_names oakley_auth_names;
+
+#define OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY       1
+#define OAKLEY_DSS_SIG             2
+#define OAKLEY_RSA_SIG             3
+#define OAKLEY_RSA_ENC             4
+#define OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV         5
+#define OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC         6
+#define OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV     7
+
+#define OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF           8	/* roof on auth values THAT WE SUPPORT */
+
+#define HybridInitRSA			64221
+#define HybridRespRSA			64222
+#define HybridInitDSS			64223
+#define HybridRespDSS			64224
+
+#define XAUTHInitPreShared		65001
+#define XAUTHRespPreShared		65002
+#define XAUTHInitDSS			65003
+#define XAUTHRespDSS                    65004
+#define XAUTHInitRSA			65005
+#define XAUTHRespRSA			65006
+#define XAUTHInitRSAEncryption		65007
+#define XAUTHRespRSAEncryption		65008
+#define XAUTHInitRSARevisedEncryption	65009
+#define XAUTHRespRSARevisedEncryption	65010
+
+/* Oakley Group Description attribute
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ */
+extern enum_names oakley_group_names;
+
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP768       1
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024      2
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GP155         3
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_GP185         4
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536      5
+
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048      14
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072      15
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096      16
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144      17
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192      18
+/*	you must also touch: constants.c, crypto.c */
+
+/* Oakley Group Type attribute
+ * draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt appendix A
+ */
+extern enum_names oakley_group_type_names;
+
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_MODP     1
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_ECP      2
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE_EC2N     3
+
+
+/* Notify messages -- error types
+ * See RFC2408 ISAKMP 3.14.1
+ */
+
+extern enum_names notification_names;
+extern enum_names ipsec_notification_names;
+
+typedef enum {
+    NOTHING_WRONG =             0,  /* unofficial! */
+
+    INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE =       1,
+    DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED =          2,
+    SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED =    3,
+    INVALID_COOKIE =             4,
+    INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION =      5,
+    INVALID_MINOR_VERSION =      6,
+    INVALID_EXCHANGE_TYPE =      7,
+    INVALID_FLAGS =              8,
+    INVALID_MESSAGE_ID =         9,
+    INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID =       10,
+    INVALID_SPI =               11,
+    INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID =      12,
+    ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED =  13,
+    NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN =        14,
+    BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX =       15,
+    PAYLOAD_MALFORMED =         16,
+    INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION =   17,
+    INVALID_ID_INFORMATION =    18,
+    INVALID_CERT_ENCODING =     19,
+    INVALID_CERTIFICATE =       20,
+    CERT_TYPE_UNSUPPORTED =     21,
+    INVALID_CERT_AUTHORITY =    22,
+    INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION =  23,
+    AUTHENTICATION_FAILED =     24,
+    INVALID_SIGNATURE =         25,
+    ADDRESS_NOTIFICATION =      26,
+    NOTIFY_SA_LIFETIME =        27,
+    CERTIFICATE_UNAVAILABLE =   28,
+    UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE = 29,
+    UNEQUAL_PAYLOAD_LENGTHS =   30,
+
+    /* ISAKMP status type */
+    CONNECTED =              16384,
+
+    /* IPSEC DOI additions; status types (RFC2407 IPSEC DOI 4.6.3)
+     * These must be sent under the protection of an ISAKMP SA.
+     */
+    IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME = 24576,
+    IPSEC_REPLAY_STATUS =      24577,
+    IPSEC_INITIAL_CONTACT =    24578,
+
+    /* RFC 3706 DPD */
+    R_U_THERE =                36136,
+    R_U_THERE_ACK =            36137
+
+    } notification_t;
+
+
+/* Public key algorithm number
+ * Same numbering as used in DNSsec
+ * See RFC 2535 DNSsec 3.2 The KEY Algorithm Number Specification.
+ * Also found in BIND 8.2.2 include/isc/dst.h as DST algorithm codes.
+ */
+
+enum pubkey_alg
+{
+    PUBKEY_ALG_RSA = 1,
+    PUBKEY_ALG_DSA = 3,
+};
+
+/* Limits on size of RSA moduli.
+ * The upper bound matches that of DNSsec (see RFC 2537).
+ * The lower bound must be more than 11 octets for certain
+ * the encoding to work, but it must be much larger for any
+ * real security.  For now, we require 512 bits.
+ */
+
+#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC	12
+
+#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS	(512 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH	"RSA modulus too small for security: less than 512 bits"
+
+#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS	(8192 / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+#define RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH	"RSA modulus too large: more than 8192 bits"
+
+/* Note: RFC 2537 encoding adds a few bytes.  If you use a small
+ * modulus like 3, the overhead is only 2 bytes
+ */
+#define RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES	(RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 2)
+
+/* socket address family info */
+
+struct af_info
+{
+    int af;
+    const char *name;
+    size_t ia_sz;
+    size_t sa_sz;
+    int mask_cnt;
+    u_int8_t id_addr, id_subnet, id_range;
+    const ip_address *any;
+    const ip_subnet *none;	/* 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent */
+    const ip_subnet *all;	/* 0.0.0.0/0 or IPv6 equivalent */
+};
+
+extern const struct af_info
+    af_inet4_info,
+    af_inet6_info;
+
+extern const struct af_info *aftoinfo(int af);
+
+extern enum_names af_names;
+
+#define subnetisaddr(sn, a) (subnetishost(sn) && addrinsubnet((a), (sn)))
+extern bool subnetisnone(const ip_subnet *sn);
+
+/* BIND enumerated types */
+
+extern enum_names
+    rr_qtype_names,
+    rr_type_names,
+    rr_class_names;
+
+/* How authenticated is info that might have come from DNS?
+ * In order of increasing confidence.
+ */
+enum dns_auth_level {
+    DAL_UNSIGNED,	/* AD in response, but no signature: no authentication */
+    DAL_NOTSEC,	/* no AD in response: authentication impossible */
+    DAL_SIGNED,	/* AD and signature in response: authentic */
+    DAL_LOCAL	/* locally provided (pretty good) */
+};
+
+/*
+ * define a macro for use in error messages
+ */
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+#define RRNAME "TXT or KEY"
+#else
+#define RRNAME "TXT"
+#endif
+
+/* natt traversal types */
+extern const char *const natt_type_bitnames[];
+
+#endif /* _CONSTANTS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/cookie.c b/src/pluto/cookie.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..458120e46
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/cookie.c
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* cookie generation/verification routines.
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: cookie.c,v 1.2 2005/08/17 16:38:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "cookie.h"
+
+const u_char zero_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE];	/* guaranteed 0 */
+
+/* Generate a cookie.
+ * First argument is true if we're to create an Initiator cookie.
+ * Length SHOULD be a multiple of sizeof(u_int32_t).
+ */
+void
+get_cookie(bool initiator, u_int8_t *cookie, int length, const ip_address *addr)
+{
+    u_char buffer[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+    SHA1_CTX ctx;
+
+    do {
+	if (initiator)
+	{
+	    get_rnd_bytes(cookie, length);
+	}
+	else  /* Responder cookie */
+	{
+	    /* This looks as good as any way */
+	    size_t addr_length;
+	    static u_int32_t counter = 0;
+	    unsigned char addr_buff[
+		sizeof(union {struct in_addr A; struct in6_addr B;})];
+
+	    addr_length = addrbytesof(addr, addr_buff, sizeof(addr_buff));
+	    SHA1Init(&ctx);
+	    SHA1Update(&ctx, addr_buff, addr_length);
+	    SHA1Update(&ctx, secret_of_the_day, sizeof(secret_of_the_day));
+	    counter++;
+	    SHA1Update(&ctx, (const void *) &counter, sizeof(counter));
+	    SHA1Final(buffer, &ctx);
+	    memcpy(cookie, buffer, length);
+	}
+    } while (is_zero_cookie(cookie));	/* probably never loops */
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/cookie.h b/src/pluto/cookie.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f5b0e64d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/cookie.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* cookie generation/verification routines.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: cookie.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+extern const u_char zero_cookie[COOKIE_SIZE];	/* guaranteed 0 */
+
+extern void get_cookie(bool initiator, u_int8_t *cookie, int length
+    , const ip_address *addr);
+
+#define is_zero_cookie(cookie) all_zero((cookie), COOKIE_SIZE)
diff --git a/src/pluto/crl.c b/src/pluto/crl.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..05e8d1402
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/crl.c
@@ -0,0 +1,763 @@
+/* Support of X.509 certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: crl.c,v 1.12 2005/12/06 22:49:57 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+
+/* chained lists of X.509 crls */
+
+static x509crl_t  *x509crls      = NULL;
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of an X.509 certificate list */
+
+static const asn1Object_t crlObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "certificateList",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "tbsCertList",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,     "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  3 */
+  { 2,     "signature",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  4 */
+  { 2,     "issuer",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
+  { 2,     "thisUpdate",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  6 */
+  { 2,     "nextUpdate",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  7 */
+  { 2,     "revokedCertificates",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_LOOP }, /*  8 */
+  { 3,       "certList",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  9 */
+  { 4,         "userCertificate",	ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
+  { 4,         "revocationDate",	ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 11 */
+  { 4,         "crlEntryExtensions",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_LOOP }, /* 12 */
+  { 5,           "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
+  { 6,             "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+  { 6,             "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
+  { 6,             "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
+  { 4,         "end opt or loop",	ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 17 */
+  { 2,     "end opt or loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
+  { 2,     "optional extensions",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 19 */
+  { 3,       "crlExtensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 20 */
+  { 4,         "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 21 */
+  { 5,           "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 22 */
+  { 5,           "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 23 */
+  { 5,           "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
+  { 3,       "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 25 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 27 */
+  { 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_BODY }  /* 28 */
+ };
+
+#define CRL_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_LIST		 0
+#define CRL_OBJ_TBS_CERT_LIST			 1
+#define CRL_OBJ_VERSION				 2
+#define CRL_OBJ_SIG_ALG				 4
+#define CRL_OBJ_ISSUER				 5
+#define CRL_OBJ_THIS_UPDATE			 6
+#define CRL_OBJ_NEXT_UPDATE			 7
+#define CRL_OBJ_USER_CERTIFICATE		10
+#define CRL_OBJ_REVOCATION_DATE			11
+#define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_ID		14
+#define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_CRITICAL		15
+#define CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_VALUE		16
+#define CRL_OBJ_EXTN_ID				22
+#define CRL_OBJ_CRITICAL			23
+#define CRL_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE			24
+#define CRL_OBJ_ALGORITHM			27
+#define CRL_OBJ_SIGNATURE			28
+#define CRL_OBJ_ROOF				29
+
+
+const x509crl_t empty_x509crl = {
+      NULL        , /* *next */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME, /* installed */
+      NULL        , /* distributionPoints */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /* certificateList */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*   tbsCertList */
+            1     , /*     version */
+    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*     sigAlg */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     issuer */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME, /*     thisUpdate */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME, /*     nextUpdate */
+      NULL        , /*     revokedCertificates */
+                    /*     crlExtensions */
+                    /*       extension */
+                    /*         extnID */
+                    /*         critical */
+                    /*         extnValue */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeyID */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeySerialNumber */
+    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*   algorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }     /*   signature */
+};
+
+/*
+ *  get the X.509 CRL with a given issuer
+ */
+static x509crl_t*
+get_x509crl(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid)
+{
+    x509crl_t *crl = x509crls;
+    x509crl_t *prev_crl = NULL;
+
+    while (crl != NULL)
+    {
+	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL && crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	? same_keyid(keyid, crl->authKeyID)
+	: (same_dn(crl->issuer, issuer) && same_serial(serial, crl->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	{
+	    if (crl != x509crls)
+	    {
+		/* bring the CRL up front */
+		prev_crl->next = crl->next;
+		crl->next = x509crls;
+		x509crls = crl;
+	    }
+	    return crl;
+	}
+	prev_crl = crl;
+	crl = crl->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free the dynamic memory used to store revoked certificates
+ */
+static void
+free_revoked_certs(revokedCert_t* revokedCerts)
+{
+    while (revokedCerts != NULL)
+    {
+	revokedCert_t * revokedCert = revokedCerts;
+	revokedCerts = revokedCert->next;
+	pfree(revokedCert);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free the dynamic memory used to store CRLs
+ */
+void
+free_crl(x509crl_t *crl)
+{
+    free_revoked_certs(crl->revokedCertificates);
+    free_generalNames(crl->distributionPoints, TRUE);
+    pfree(crl->certificateList.ptr);
+    pfree(crl);
+}
+
+static void
+free_first_crl(void)
+{
+    x509crl_t *crl = x509crls;
+
+    x509crls = crl->next;
+    free_crl(crl);
+}
+
+void
+free_crls(void)
+{
+    lock_crl_list("free_crls");
+
+    while (x509crls != NULL)
+	free_first_crl();
+
+    unlock_crl_list("free_crls");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Insert X.509 CRL into chained list
+ */
+bool
+insert_crl(chunk_t blob, chunk_t crl_uri, bool cache_crl)
+{
+    x509crl_t *crl = alloc_thing(x509crl_t, "x509crl");
+
+    *crl = empty_x509crl;
+
+    if (parse_x509crl(blob, 0, crl))
+    {
+	x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
+	x509crl_t *oldcrl;
+	bool valid_sig;
+	generalName_t *gn;
+
+	/* add distribution point */
+	gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
+	gn->kind = GN_URI;
+	gn->name = crl_uri;
+	gn->next = crl->distributionPoints;
+	crl->distributionPoints = gn;
+
+	lock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+	/* get the issuer cacert */
+	issuer_cert = get_authcert(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber,
+	    crl->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+	if (issuer_cert == NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("crl issuer cacert not found");
+	    free_crl(crl);
+	    unlock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("crl issuer cacert found")
+	)
+
+	/* check the issuer's signature of the crl */
+	valid_sig = check_signature(crl->tbsCertList, crl->signature
+			, crl->algorithm, crl->algorithm, issuer_cert);
+	unlock_authcert_list("insert_crl");
+
+	if (!valid_sig)
+	{
+	    free_crl(crl);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("crl signature is valid")
+	)
+
+	lock_crl_list("insert_crl");
+	oldcrl = get_x509crl(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+	    , crl->authKeyID);
+
+	if (oldcrl != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (crl->thisUpdate > oldcrl->thisUpdate)
+	    {
+		/* keep any known CRL distribution points */
+		add_distribution_points(oldcrl->distributionPoints
+		    , &crl->distributionPoints);
+
+		/* now delete the old CRL */
+		free_first_crl();
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("thisUpdate is newer - existing crl deleted")
+		)
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		unlock_crl_list("insert_crls");
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("thisUpdate is not newer - existing crl not replaced");
+		)
+		free_crl(crl);
+		return oldcrl->nextUpdate - time(NULL) > 2*crl_check_interval;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* insert new CRL */
+	crl->next = x509crls;
+	x509crls = crl;
+
+	unlock_crl_list("insert_crl");
+
+	/* If crl caching is enabled then the crl is saved locally.
+         * Only http or ldap URIs are cached but not local file URIs.
+         * The issuer's subjectKeyID is used as a unique filename
+         */
+	if (cache_crl && strncasecmp(crl_uri.ptr, "file", 4) != 0)
+	{
+	    char path[BUF_LEN];
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	    char digest_buf[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	    chunk_t subjectKeyID = { digest_buf, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE };
+
+	    if (issuer_cert->subjectKeyID.ptr == NULL)
+		compute_subjectKeyID(issuer_cert, subjectKeyID);
+	    else
+		subjectKeyID = issuer_cert->subjectKeyID;
+
+	    datatot(subjectKeyID.ptr, subjectKeyID.len, 16, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    snprintf(path, BUF_LEN, "%s/%s.crl", CRL_PATH, buf);
+	    write_chunk(path, "crl", crl->certificateList, 0022, TRUE);
+	}
+
+	/* is the fetched crl valid? */
+	return crl->nextUpdate - time(NULL) > 2*crl_check_interval;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("  error in X.509 crl");
+	free_crl(crl);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Loads CRLs
+ */
+void
+load_crls(void)
+{
+    struct dirent **filelist;
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    u_char *save_dir;
+    int n;
+
+    /* change directory to specified path */
+    save_dir = getcwd(buf, BUF_LEN);
+    if (chdir(CRL_PATH))
+    {
+	plog("Could not change to directory '%s'", CRL_PATH);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("Changing to directory '%s'", CRL_PATH);
+	n = scandir(CRL_PATH, &filelist, file_select, alphasort);
+
+	if (n < 0)
+	    plog("  scandir() error");
+	else
+	{
+	    while (n--)
+	    {
+		bool pgp = FALSE;
+		chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+		char *filename = filelist[n]->d_name;
+
+		if (load_coded_file(filename, NULL, "crl", &blob, &pgp))
+		{
+		    chunk_t crl_uri;
+
+		    crl_uri.len = 7 + sizeof(CRL_PATH) + strlen(filename);
+		    crl_uri.ptr = alloc_bytes(crl_uri.len + 1, "crl uri");
+
+		    /* build CRL file URI */
+		    snprintf(crl_uri.ptr, crl_uri.len + 1, "file://%s/%s"
+		        , CRL_PATH, filename);
+
+		    insert_crl(blob, crl_uri, FALSE);
+		}
+		free(filelist[n]);
+	    }
+	    free(filelist);
+	}
+    }
+    /* restore directory path */
+    chdir(save_dir);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parses a CRL revocation reason code
+ */
+static crl_reason_t
+parse_crl_reasonCode(chunk_t object)
+{
+    crl_reason_t reason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    if (*object.ptr == ASN1_ENUMERATED
+    &&  asn1_length(&object) == 1)
+    {
+	reason = *object.ptr;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  '%s'", enum_name(&crl_reason_names, reason))
+    )
+    return reason;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Parses an X.509 CRL
+ */
+bool
+parse_x509crl(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509crl_t *crl)
+{
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    bool critical;
+    chunk_t extnID;
+    chunk_t userCertificate;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < CRL_OBJ_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(crlObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	/* those objects which will parsed further need the next higher level */
+	level++;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	case CRL_OBJ_CERTIFICATE_LIST:
+	    crl->certificateList = object;
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_TBS_CERT_LIST:
+	    crl->tbsCertList = object;
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_VERSION:
+	    crl->version = (object.len) ? (1+(u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  v%d", crl->version);
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
+	    crl->sigAlg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_ISSUER:
+	    crl->issuer = object;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_THIS_UPDATE:
+	    crl->thisUpdate = parse_time(object, level);
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_NEXT_UPDATE:
+	    crl->nextUpdate = parse_time(object, level);
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_USER_CERTIFICATE:
+	    userCertificate = object;
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_REVOCATION_DATE:
+	    {
+		/* put all the serial numbers and the revocation date in a chained list
+		   with revocedCertificates pointing to the first revoked certificate */
+
+		revokedCert_t *revokedCert = alloc_thing(revokedCert_t, "revokedCert");
+		revokedCert->userCertificate = userCertificate;
+		revokedCert->revocationDate = parse_time(object, level);
+		revokedCert->revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+		revokedCert->next = crl->revokedCertificates;
+		crl->revokedCertificates = revokedCert;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_ID:
+	case CRL_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
+	    extnID = object;
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_CRITICAL:
+	case CRL_OBJ_CRITICAL:
+	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_CRL_ENTRY_EXTN_VALUE:
+	case CRL_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
+	    {
+		u_int extn_oid = known_oid(extnID);
+
+		if (extn_oid == OID_CRL_REASON_CODE)
+		{
+		    crl->revokedCertificates->revocationReason =
+			parse_crl_reasonCode(object);
+		}
+		else if (extn_oid == OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID)
+		{
+		    parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
+			, &crl->authKeyID, &crl->authKeySerialNumber);
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
+	    crl->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case CRL_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
+	    crl->signature = object;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    time(&crl->installed);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*  Checks if the current certificate is revoked. It goes through the
+ *  list of revoked certificates of the corresponding crl. Either the
+ *  status CERT_GOOD or CERT_REVOKED is returned
+ */
+static cert_status_t
+check_revocation(const x509crl_t *crl, chunk_t serial
+, time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t * revocationReason)
+{
+    revokedCert_t *revokedCert = crl->revokedCertificates;
+
+    *revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+    *revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+    
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("serial number:", serial)
+    )
+
+    while(revokedCert != NULL)
+    {
+	/* compare serial numbers */
+	if (revokedCert->userCertificate.len == serial.len &&
+	    memcmp(revokedCert->userCertificate.ptr, serial.ptr, serial.len) == 0)
+	{
+	    *revocationDate = revokedCert->revocationDate;
+	    *revocationReason = revokedCert->revocationReason;
+	    return CERT_REVOKED;
+	}
+	revokedCert = revokedCert->next;
+    }
+    return CERT_GOOD;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if any crls are about to expire
+ */
+void
+check_crls(void)
+{
+    x509crl_t *crl;
+
+    lock_crl_list("check_crls");
+    crl = x509crls;
+
+    while (crl != NULL)
+    {
+	time_t time_left = crl->nextUpdate - time(NULL);
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, crl->issuer);
+	    DBG_log("issuer: '%s'",buf);
+	    if (crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(crl->authKeyID.ptr, crl->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+	    }
+	    DBG_log("%ld seconds left", time_left)
+	)
+	if (time_left < 2*crl_check_interval)
+	{
+	    fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(crl->issuer
+		, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+		, crl->authKeyID, crl->distributionPoints);
+	    add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+	}
+	crl = crl->next;
+    }
+    unlock_crl_list("check_crls");
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify if a cert hasn't been revoked by a crl
+ */
+cert_status_t
+verify_by_crl(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until, time_t *revocationDate
+, crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
+{
+    x509crl_t *crl;
+
+    ca_info_t *ca = get_ca_info(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+			      , cert->authKeyID);
+
+    generalName_t *crluri = (ca == NULL)? NULL : ca->crluri;
+
+    *revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+    *revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+    lock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+    crl = get_x509crl(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber, cert->authKeyID);
+
+    if (crl == NULL)
+    {
+	unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+	plog("crl not found");
+
+	if (cert->crlDistributionPoints != NULL)
+	{
+	    fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(cert->issuer
+		, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+		, cert->authKeyID, cert->crlDistributionPoints);
+	    add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+	}
+
+	if (crluri != NULL)
+	{
+	    fetch_req_t *req = build_crl_fetch_request(cert->issuer
+		, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+		, cert->authKeyID, crluri);
+	    add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+	}
+
+	if (cert->crlDistributionPoints != 0 || crluri != NULL)
+	{
+	    wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_crl");
+	    return CERT_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+	else
+	    return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
+	bool valid;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("crl found")
+	)
+
+	add_distribution_points(cert->crlDistributionPoints
+		, &crl->distributionPoints);
+
+	add_distribution_points(crluri
+		, &crl->distributionPoints);
+
+	lock_authcert_list("verify_by_crl");
+
+	issuer_cert = get_authcert(crl->issuer, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+		, crl->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+	valid = check_signature(crl->tbsCertList, crl->signature
+		, crl->algorithm, crl->algorithm, issuer_cert);
+	
+	unlock_authcert_list("verify_by_crl");
+
+	if (valid)
+	{
+	    cert_status_t status;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("crl signature is valid")
+	    )
+	   /* return the expiration date */
+	    *until = crl->nextUpdate;
+
+	    /* has the certificate been revoked? */
+	    status = check_revocation(crl, cert->serialNumber, revocationDate
+	    			, revocationReason);
+
+	    if (*until < time(NULL))
+	    {
+		fetch_req_t *req;
+
+		plog("crl update is overdue since %s"
+		    , timetoa(until, TRUE));
+
+		/* try to fetch a crl update */
+		req = build_crl_fetch_request(crl->issuer
+				, crl->authKeySerialNumber
+				, crl->authKeyID, crl->distributionPoints);
+		unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+
+		add_crl_fetch_request(req);
+		wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_crl");
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("crl is valid")
+		)
+	    }
+	    return status;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    unlock_crl_list("verify_by_crl");
+	    plog("crl signature is invalid");
+	    return CERT_UNKNOWN;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all X.509 crls in the chained list
+ */
+void
+list_crls(bool utc, bool strict)
+{
+    x509crl_t *crl;
+
+    lock_crl_list("list_crls");
+    crl = x509crls;
+
+    if (crl != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 CRLs:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (crl != NULL)
+    {
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	u_int revoked = 0;
+	revokedCert_t *revokedCert = crl->revokedCertificates;
+
+	/* count number of revoked certificates in CRL */
+	while (revokedCert != NULL)
+	{
+	    revoked++;
+	    revokedCert = revokedCert->next;
+        }
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, revoked certs: %d",
+		timetoa(&crl->installed, utc), revoked);
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, crl->issuer);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+
+	list_distribution_points(crl->distributionPoints);
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       updates:   this %s",
+		timetoa(&crl->thisUpdate, utc));
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  next %s %s",
+		timetoa(&crl->nextUpdate, utc),
+		check_expiry(crl->nextUpdate, CRL_WARNING_INTERVAL, strict));
+	if (crl->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(crl->authKeyID.ptr, crl->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	if (crl->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(crl->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, crl->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+	}
+
+	crl = crl->next;
+    }
+    unlock_crl_list("list_crls");
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/crl.h b/src/pluto/crl.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f985b6cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/crl.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/* Support of X.509 certificate revocation lists (CRLs)
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: crl.h,v 1.4 2005/07/18 19:36:22 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include "constants.h"
+
+/* access structure for a revoked serial number */
+
+typedef struct revokedCert revokedCert_t;
+
+struct revokedCert{
+  revokedCert_t *next;
+  chunk_t	userCertificate;
+  time_t	revocationDate;
+  crl_reason_t	revocationReason;
+};
+
+/* storage structure for an X.509 CRL */
+
+typedef struct x509crl x509crl_t;
+
+struct x509crl {
+  x509crl_t     *next;
+  time_t	 installed;
+  generalName_t *distributionPoints;
+  chunk_t        certificateList;
+  chunk_t          tbsCertList;
+  u_int              version;
+  	         /*  signature */
+  int                  sigAlg;
+  chunk_t            issuer;
+  time_t             thisUpdate;
+  time_t             nextUpdate;
+  revokedCert_t      *revokedCertificates;
+                /*   v2 extensions */
+                /*   crlExtensions */
+                /*     extension */
+                /*       extnID */
+                /*       critical */
+                /*       extnValue */
+  chunk_t		 authKeyID;
+  chunk_t		 authKeySerialNumber;
+
+                /* signatureAlgorithm */
+  int                algorithm;
+  chunk_t          signature;
+};
+
+/* apply a strict CRL policy
+ * flag set in plutomain.c and used in ipsec_doi.c and rcv_whack.c
+ */
+extern bool strict_crl_policy;
+
+/*
+ * cache the retrieved CRLs by storing them locally as a file
+ */
+extern bool cache_crls;
+
+/*
+ * check periodically for expired crls
+ */ 
+extern long crl_check_interval;
+
+/* used for initialization */
+extern const x509crl_t  empty_x509crl;
+
+extern bool parse_x509crl(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509crl_t *crl);
+extern void load_crls(void);
+extern void check_crls(void);
+extern bool insert_crl(chunk_t blob, chunk_t crl_uri, bool cache_crl);
+extern cert_status_t verify_by_crl(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until
+    , time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t *revocationReason);
+extern void list_crls(bool utc, bool strict);
+extern void free_crls(void);
+extern void free_crl(x509crl_t *crl);
diff --git a/src/pluto/crypto.c b/src/pluto/crypto.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f1b7c3f5f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/crypto.c
@@ -0,0 +1,627 @@
+/* crypto interfaces
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Andreas Steffen
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: crypto.c,v 1.5 2005/12/06 22:51:34 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H   /* stupid trick to force prototype decl in <des.h> */
+#include <libdes/des.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+
+/* moduli and generator. */
+
+static MP_INT
+    modp1024_modulus,
+    modp1536_modulus,
+    modp2048_modulus,
+    modp3072_modulus,
+    modp4096_modulus,
+    modp6144_modulus,
+    modp8192_modulus;
+
+MP_INT groupgenerator;	/* MODP group generator (2) */
+
+static void do_3des(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc);
+
+static struct encrypt_desc crypto_encryptor_3des =
+{ 	
+	algo_type: 	IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT,
+	algo_id:   	OAKLEY_3DES_CBC, 
+	algo_next: 	NULL,
+	enc_ctxsize: 	sizeof(des_key_schedule) * 3,
+	enc_blocksize: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, 
+	keydeflen: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+	keyminlen: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+	keymaxlen: 	DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3 * BITS_PER_BYTE,
+	do_crypt: 	do_3des,
+};
+
+/* MD5 hash test vectors
+ * from RFC 1321 "MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"
+ * April 1992, R. Rivest, RSA Data Security
+ */
+
+static const u_char md5_test0_msg[] = {
+
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test0_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xd4, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0xd9, 0x8f, 0x00, 0xb2, 0x04,
+    0xe9, 0x80, 0x09, 0x98, 0xec, 0xf8, 0x42, 0x7e
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test1_msg[] = {
+    0x61
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test1_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x0c, 0xc1, 0x75, 0xb9, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0xb6, 0xa8,
+    0x31, 0xc3, 0x99, 0xe2, 0x69, 0x77, 0x26, 0x61
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test2_msg[] = {
+    0x61, 0x62, 0x63
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x90, 0x01, 0x50, 0x98, 0x3c, 0xd2, 0x4f, 0xb0,
+    0xd6, 0x96, 0x3f, 0x7d, 0x28, 0xe1, 0x7f, 0x72
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test3_msg[] = {
+    0x6d, 0x65, 0x73, 0x73, 0x61, 0x67, 0x65, 0x20,
+    0x64, 0x69, 0x67, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test3_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xf9, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x7d, 0x7c, 0xb7, 0x93, 0x8d,
+    0x52, 0x5a, 0x2f, 0x31, 0xaa, 0xf1, 0x61, 0xd0
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test4_msg[] = {
+    0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66, 0x67, 0x68,
+    0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x70,
+    0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76, 0x77, 0x78,
+    0x79, 0x7a
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test4_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xc3, 0xfc, 0xd3, 0xd7, 0x61, 0x92, 0xe4, 0x00,
+    0x7d, 0xfb, 0x49, 0x6c, 0xca, 0x67, 0xe1, 0x3b
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test5_msg[] = {
+    0x41, 0x42, 0x43, 0x44, 0x45, 0x46, 0x47, 0x48,
+    0x49, 0x4a, 0x4b, 0x4c, 0x4d, 0x4e, 0x4f, 0x50,
+    0x51, 0x52, 0x53, 0x54, 0x55, 0x56, 0x57, 0x58,
+    0x59, 0x5a, 0x61, 0x62, 0x63, 0x64, 0x65, 0x66,
+    0x67, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6a, 0x6b, 0x6c, 0x6d, 0x6e,
+    0x6f, 0x70, 0x71, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74, 0x75, 0x76,
+    0x77, 0x78, 0x79, 0x7a, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33,
+    0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test5_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xd1, 0x74, 0xab, 0x98, 0xd2, 0x77, 0xd9, 0xf5,
+    0xa5, 0x61, 0x1c, 0x2c, 0x9f, 0x41, 0x9d, 0x9f
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test6_msg[] = {
+    0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
+    0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36,
+    0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34,
+    0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32,
+    0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30,
+    0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38,
+    0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36,
+    0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32, 0x33, 0x34,
+    0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30, 0x31, 0x32,
+    0x33, 0x34, 0x35, 0x36, 0x37, 0x38, 0x39, 0x30
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_test6_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x57, 0xed, 0xf4, 0xa2, 0x2b, 0xe3, 0xc9, 0x55,
+    0xac, 0x49, 0xda, 0x2e, 0x21, 0x07, 0xb6, 0x7a
+};
+
+static const hash_testvector_t md5_hash_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(md5_test0_msg), md5_test0_msg, md5_test0_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(md5_test1_msg), md5_test1_msg, md5_test1_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(md5_test2_msg), md5_test2_msg, md5_test2_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(md5_test3_msg), md5_test3_msg, md5_test3_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(md5_test4_msg), md5_test4_msg, md5_test4_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(md5_test5_msg), md5_test5_msg, md5_test5_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(md5_test6_msg), md5_test6_msg, md5_test6_msg_digest },
+    { 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* MD5 hmac test vectors
+ * from RFC 2202 "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1"
+ * September 1997, P. Cheng, IBM & R. Glenn, NIST
+ */
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac1_key[] = {
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac1_msg[] = {
+    0x48, 0x69, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x65, 0x72, 0x65
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac1[] = {
+    0x92, 0x94, 0x72, 0x7a, 0x36, 0x38, 0xbb, 0x1c,
+    0x13, 0xf4, 0x8e, 0xf8, 0x15, 0x8b, 0xfc, 0x9d
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac2_key[] = {
+    0x4a, 0x65, 0x66, 0x65
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac2_msg[] = {
+    0x77, 0x68, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x64, 0x6f, 0x20,
+    0x79, 0x61, 0x20, 0x77, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20,
+    0x66, 0x6f, 0x72, 0x20, 0x6e, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x68,
+    0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x3f
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac2[] = {
+    0x75, 0x0c, 0x78, 0x3e, 0x6a, 0xb0, 0xb5, 0x03,
+    0xea, 0xa8, 0x6e, 0x31, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xb7, 0x38
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac3_key[] = {
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac3_msg[] = {
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd, 0xdd,
+    0xdd, 0xdd
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac3[] = {
+    0x56, 0xbe, 0x34, 0x52, 0x1d, 0x14, 0x4c, 0x88,
+    0xdb, 0xb8, 0xc7, 0x33, 0xf0, 0xe8, 0xb3, 0xf6
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac4_key[] = {
+    0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08,
+    0x09, 0x0a, 0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10,
+    0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15, 0x16, 0x17, 0x18,
+    0x19
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac4_msg[] = {
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd, 0xcd,
+    0xcd, 0xcd 
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac4[] = {
+    0x69, 0x7e, 0xaf, 0x0a, 0xca, 0x3a, 0x3a, 0xea,
+    0x3a, 0x75, 0x16, 0x47, 0x46, 0xff, 0xaa, 0x79
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac6_key[] = {
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac6_msg[] = {
+    0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x55, 0x73, 0x69,
+    0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65,
+    0x72, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x42,
+    0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x69, 0x7a,
+    0x65, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x2d, 0x20,
+    0x48, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79,
+    0x20, 0x46, 0x69, 0x72, 0x73, 0x74
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac6[] = {
+    0x6b, 0x1a, 0xb7, 0xfe, 0x4b, 0xd7, 0xbf, 0x8f,
+    0x0b, 0x62, 0xe6, 0xce, 0x61, 0xb9, 0xd0, 0xcd
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac7_msg[] = {
+    0x54, 0x65, 0x73, 0x74, 0x20, 0x55, 0x73, 0x69,
+    0x6e, 0x67, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65,
+    0x72, 0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x42,
+    0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d, 0x53, 0x69, 0x7a,
+    0x65, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x61, 0x6e,
+    0x64, 0x20, 0x4c, 0x61, 0x72, 0x67, 0x65, 0x72,
+    0x20, 0x54, 0x68, 0x61, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x4f, 0x6e,
+    0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6c, 0x6f, 0x63, 0x6b, 0x2d,
+    0x53, 0x69, 0x7a, 0x65, 0x20, 0x44, 0x61, 0x74,
+    0x61
+};
+
+static const u_char md5_hmac7[] = {
+    0x6f, 0x63, 0x0f, 0xad, 0x67, 0xcd, 0xa0, 0xee,
+    0x1f, 0xb1, 0xf5, 0x62, 0xdb, 0x3a, 0xa5, 0x3e
+};
+
+static const hmac_testvector_t md5_hmac_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac1_key), md5_hmac1_key, sizeof(md5_hmac1_msg), md5_hmac1_msg, md5_hmac1 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac2_key), md5_hmac2_key, sizeof(md5_hmac2_msg), md5_hmac2_msg, md5_hmac2 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac3_key), md5_hmac3_key, sizeof(md5_hmac3_msg), md5_hmac3_msg, md5_hmac3 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac4_key), md5_hmac4_key, sizeof(md5_hmac4_msg), md5_hmac4_msg, md5_hmac4 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key), md5_hmac6_key, sizeof(md5_hmac6_msg), md5_hmac6_msg, md5_hmac6 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key), md5_hmac6_key, sizeof(md5_hmac7_msg), md5_hmac7_msg, md5_hmac7 },
+    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct hash_desc crypto_hasher_md5 =
+{ 	
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_MD5,
+	algo_next: NULL, 
+	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(MD5_CTX),
+	hash_block_size:  MD5_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	hash_digest_size: MD5_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	hash_testvectors: md5_hash_testvectors,
+	hmac_testvectors: md5_hmac_testvectors,
+	hash_init: (void (*)(void *)) MD5Init,
+	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)) MD5Update,
+	hash_final: (void (*)(u_char *, void *)) MD5Final
+};
+
+/* SHA-1 test vectors
+ * from "The Secure Hash Algorithm Validation System (SHAVS)"
+ * July 22, 2004, Lawrence E. Bassham III, NIST
+ */
+
+static const u_char sha1_short2_msg[] = {
+    0x5e
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_short2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x5e, 0x6f, 0x80, 0xa3, 0x4a, 0x97, 0x98, 0xca,
+    0xfc, 0x6a, 0x5d, 0xb9, 0x6c, 0xc5, 0x7b, 0xa4,
+    0xc4, 0xdb, 0x59, 0xc2
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_short4_msg[] = {
+    0x9a, 0x7d, 0xfd, 0xf1, 0xec, 0xea, 0xd0, 0x6e,
+    0xd6, 0x46, 0xaa, 0x55, 0xfe, 0x75, 0x71, 0x46
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_short4_msg_digest[] = {
+    0x82, 0xab, 0xff, 0x66, 0x05, 0xdb, 0xe1, 0xc1,
+    0x7d, 0xef, 0x12, 0xa3, 0x94, 0xfa, 0x22, 0xa8,
+    0x2b, 0x54, 0x4a, 0x35
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_long2_msg[] = {
+    0xf7, 0x8f, 0x92, 0x14, 0x1b, 0xcd, 0x17, 0x0a,
+    0xe8, 0x9b, 0x4f, 0xba, 0x15, 0xa1, 0xd5, 0x9f,
+    0x3f, 0xd8, 0x4d, 0x22, 0x3c, 0x92, 0x51, 0xbd,
+    0xac, 0xbb, 0xae, 0x61, 0xd0, 0x5e, 0xd1, 0x15,
+    0xa0, 0x6a, 0x7c, 0xe1, 0x17, 0xb7, 0xbe, 0xea,
+    0xd2, 0x44, 0x21, 0xde, 0xd9, 0xc3, 0x25, 0x92,
+    0xbd, 0x57, 0xed, 0xea, 0xe3, 0x9c, 0x39, 0xfa,
+    0x1f, 0xe8, 0x94, 0x6a, 0x84, 0xd0, 0xcf, 0x1f,
+    0x7b, 0xee, 0xad, 0x17, 0x13, 0xe2, 0xe0, 0x95,
+    0x98, 0x97, 0x34, 0x7f, 0x67, 0xc8, 0x0b, 0x04,
+    0x00, 0xc2, 0x09, 0x81, 0x5d, 0x6b, 0x10, 0xa6,
+    0x83, 0x83, 0x6f, 0xd5, 0x56, 0x2a, 0x56, 0xca,
+    0xb1, 0xa2, 0x8e, 0x81, 0xb6, 0x57, 0x66, 0x54,
+    0x63, 0x1c, 0xf1, 0x65, 0x66, 0xb8, 0x6e, 0x3b,
+    0x33, 0xa1, 0x08, 0xb0, 0x53, 0x07, 0xc0, 0x0a,
+    0xff, 0x14, 0xa7, 0x68, 0xed, 0x73, 0x50, 0x60,
+    0x6a, 0x0f, 0x85, 0xe6, 0xa9, 0x1d, 0x39, 0x6f,
+    0x5b, 0x5c, 0xbe, 0x57, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x38, 0x80,
+    0x7c, 0x7d, 0x52, 0x3d, 0x6d, 0x79, 0x2f, 0x6e,
+    0xbc, 0x24, 0xa4, 0xec, 0xf2, 0xb3, 0xa4, 0x27,
+    0xcd, 0xbb, 0xfb
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_long2_msg_digest[] = {
+    0xcb, 0x00, 0x82, 0xc8, 0xf1, 0x97, 0xd2, 0x60,
+    0x99, 0x1b, 0xa6, 0xa4, 0x60, 0xe7, 0x6e, 0x20,
+    0x2b, 0xad, 0x27, 0xb3
+};
+
+static const hash_testvector_t sha1_hash_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha1_short2_msg), sha1_short2_msg, sha1_short2_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha1_short4_msg), sha1_short4_msg, sha1_short4_msg_digest },
+    { sizeof(sha1_long2_msg),  sha1_long2_msg,  sha1_long2_msg_digest  },
+    { 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* SHA-1 hmac test vectors
+ * from RFC 2202 "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1"
+ * September 1997, P. Cheng, IBM & R. Glenn, NIST
+ */
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac1_key[] = {
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b,
+    0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b, 0x0b
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac1[] = {
+    0xb6, 0x17, 0x31, 0x86, 0x55, 0x05, 0x72, 0x64,
+    0xe2, 0x8b, 0xc0, 0xb6, 0xfb, 0x37, 0x8c, 0x8e,
+    0xf1, 0x46, 0xbe, 0x00
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac2[] = {
+    0xef, 0xfc, 0xdf, 0x6a, 0xe5, 0xeb, 0x2f, 0xa2,
+    0xd2, 0x74, 0x16, 0xd5, 0xf1, 0x84, 0xdf, 0x9c,
+    0x25, 0x9a, 0x7c, 0x79
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac3_key[] = {
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa,
+    0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa, 0xaa
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac3[] = {
+    0x12, 0x5d, 0x73, 0x42, 0xb9, 0xac, 0x11, 0xcd,
+    0x91, 0xa3, 0x9a, 0xf4, 0x8a, 0xa1, 0x7b, 0x4f,
+    0x63, 0xf1, 0x75, 0xd3
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac4[] = {
+    0x4c, 0x90, 0x07, 0xf4, 0x02, 0x62, 0x50, 0xc6,
+    0xbc, 0x84, 0x14, 0xf9, 0xbf, 0x50, 0xc8, 0x6c,
+    0x2d, 0x72, 0x35, 0xda
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac6[] = {
+    0xaa, 0x4a, 0xe5, 0xe1, 0x52, 0x72, 0xd0, 0x0e,
+    0x95, 0x70, 0x56, 0x37, 0xce, 0x8a, 0x3b, 0x55,
+    0xed, 0x40, 0x21, 0x12
+};
+
+static const u_char sha1_hmac7[] = {
+    0xe8, 0xe9, 0x9d, 0x0f, 0x45, 0x23, 0x7d, 0x78,
+    0x6d, 0x6b, 0xba, 0xa7, 0x96, 0x5c, 0x78, 0x08,
+    0xbb, 0xff, 0x1a, 0x91
+};
+
+static const hmac_testvector_t sha1_hmac_testvectors[] = {
+    { sizeof(sha1_hmac1_key), sha1_hmac1_key, sizeof(md5_hmac1_msg), md5_hmac1_msg, sha1_hmac1 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac2_key),  md5_hmac2_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac2_msg), md5_hmac2_msg, sha1_hmac2 },
+    { sizeof(sha1_hmac3_key), sha1_hmac3_key, sizeof(md5_hmac3_msg), md5_hmac3_msg, sha1_hmac3 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac4_key),  md5_hmac4_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac4_msg), md5_hmac4_msg, sha1_hmac4 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key),  md5_hmac6_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac6_msg), md5_hmac6_msg, sha1_hmac6 },
+    { sizeof(md5_hmac6_key),  md5_hmac6_key,  sizeof(md5_hmac7_msg), md5_hmac7_msg, sha1_hmac7 },
+    { 0, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct hash_desc crypto_hasher_sha1 =
+{ 	
+	algo_type: IKE_ALG_HASH,
+	algo_id:   OAKLEY_SHA,
+	algo_next: NULL, 
+	hash_ctx_size:    sizeof(SHA1_CTX),
+	hash_block_size:  SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
+	hash_digest_size: SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+	hash_testvectors: sha1_hash_testvectors,
+	hmac_testvectors: sha1_hmac_testvectors,
+	hash_init: (void (*)(void *)) SHA1Init,
+	hash_update: (void (*)(void *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)) SHA1Update,
+	hash_final: (void (*)(u_char *, void *)) SHA1Final
+};
+
+void
+init_crypto(void)
+{
+    if (mpz_init_set_str(&groupgenerator, MODP_GENERATOR, 10) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp1024_modulus, MODP1024_MODULUS, 16) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp1536_modulus, MODP1536_MODULUS, 16) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp2048_modulus, MODP2048_MODULUS, 16) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp3072_modulus, MODP3072_MODULUS, 16) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp4096_modulus, MODP4096_MODULUS, 16) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp6144_modulus, MODP6144_MODULUS, 16) != 0
+    || mpz_init_set_str(&modp8192_modulus, MODP8192_MODULUS, 16) != 0)
+	exit_log("mpz_init_set_str() failed in init_crypto()");
+
+    ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *) &crypto_encryptor_3des);
+    ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *) &crypto_hasher_sha1);
+    ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *) &crypto_hasher_md5);
+    ike_alg_init();
+    ike_alg_test();
+}
+
+/* Oakley group description
+ *
+ * See RFC2409 "The Internet key exchange (IKE)" 6.
+ */
+
+const struct oakley_group_desc unset_group = {0, NULL, 0};	/* magic signifier */
+
+const struct oakley_group_desc oakley_group[OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE] = {
+#   define BYTES(bits) (((bits) + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE)
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024, &modp1024_modulus, BYTES(1024) },
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536, &modp1536_modulus, BYTES(1536) },
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP2048, &modp2048_modulus, BYTES(2048) },
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP3072, &modp3072_modulus, BYTES(3072) },
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP4096, &modp4096_modulus, BYTES(4096) },
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP6144, &modp6144_modulus, BYTES(6144) },
+    { OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP8192, &modp8192_modulus, BYTES(8192) },
+#   undef BYTES
+};
+
+const struct oakley_group_desc *
+lookup_group(u_int16_t group)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i != elemsof(oakley_group); i++)
+	if (group == oakley_group[i].group)
+	    return &oakley_group[i];
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Encryption Routines
+ *
+ * Each uses and updates the state object's st_new_iv.
+ * This must already be initialized.
+ */
+
+/* encrypt or decrypt part of an IKE message using DES
+ * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+ */
+static void __attribute__ ((unused))
+do_des(bool enc, void *buf, size_t buf_len, struct state *st)
+{
+    des_key_schedule ks;
+
+    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)st->st_enc_key.ptr, ks);
+
+    passert(st->st_new_iv_len >= DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    st->st_new_iv_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;	/* truncate */
+
+    des_ncbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf, (des_cblock *)buf, buf_len,
+	ks,
+	(des_cblock *)st->st_new_iv, enc);
+}
+
+/* encrypt or decrypt part of an IKE message using 3DES
+ * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+ */
+static void
+do_3des(u_int8_t *buf, size_t buf_len, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc)
+{
+    des_key_schedule ks[3];
+
+    passert (!key_size || (key_size==(DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3)))
+    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)key + 0, ks[0]);
+    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)key + 1, ks[1]);
+    (void) des_set_key((des_cblock *)key + 2, ks[2]);
+
+    des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)buf, (des_cblock *)buf, buf_len,
+	ks[0], ks[1], ks[2],
+	(des_cblock *)iv, enc);
+}
+
+/* hash and prf routines */
+void
+crypto_cbc_encrypt(const struct encrypt_desc *e, bool enc, u_int8_t *buf, size_t size, struct state *st)
+{
+    passert(st->st_new_iv_len >= e->enc_blocksize);
+    st->st_new_iv_len = e->enc_blocksize;	/* truncate */
+
+    e->do_crypt(buf, size, st->st_enc_key.ptr, st->st_enc_key.len, st->st_new_iv, enc);
+    /*
+    e->set_key(&ctx, st->st_enc_key.ptr, st->st_enc_key.len);
+    e->cbc_crypt(&ctx, buf, size, st->st_new_iv, enc);
+    */
+}
+
+/* HMAC package
+ * rfc2104.txt specifies how HMAC works.
+ */
+
+void
+hmac_init(struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
+    const struct hash_desc *h,
+    const u_char *key, size_t key_len)
+{
+    int k;
+
+    ctx->h = h;
+    ctx->hmac_digest_size = h->hash_digest_size;
+
+    /* Prepare the two pads for the HMAC */
+
+    memset(ctx->buf1, '\0', h->hash_block_size);
+
+    if (key_len <= h->hash_block_size)
+    {
+	memcpy(ctx->buf1, key, key_len);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	h->hash_init(&ctx->hash_ctx);
+	h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, key, key_len);
+	h->hash_final(ctx->buf1, &ctx->hash_ctx);
+    }
+
+    memcpy(ctx->buf2, ctx->buf1, h->hash_block_size);
+
+    for (k = 0; k < h->hash_block_size; k++)
+    {
+	ctx->buf1[k] ^= HMAC_IPAD;
+	ctx->buf2[k] ^= HMAC_OPAD;
+    }
+
+    hmac_reinit(ctx);
+}
+
+void
+hmac_reinit(struct hmac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    ctx->h->hash_init(&ctx->hash_ctx);
+    ctx->h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, ctx->buf1, ctx->h->hash_block_size);
+}
+
+void
+hmac_update(struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
+    const u_char *data, size_t data_len)
+{
+    ctx->h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, data, data_len);
+}
+
+void
+hmac_final(u_char *output, struct hmac_ctx *ctx)
+{
+    const struct hash_desc *h = ctx->h;
+
+    h->hash_final(output, &ctx->hash_ctx);
+
+    h->hash_init(&ctx->hash_ctx);
+    h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, ctx->buf2, h->hash_block_size);
+    h->hash_update(&ctx->hash_ctx, output, h->hash_digest_size);
+    h->hash_final(output, &ctx->hash_ctx);
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/crypto.h b/src/pluto/crypto.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..48c983349
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/crypto.h
@@ -0,0 +1,108 @@
+/* crypto interfaces
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: crypto.h,v 1.6 2005/04/07 20:13:30 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU MP library */
+
+#include "libsha2/sha2.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+
+extern void init_crypto(void);
+
+/* Oakley group descriptions */
+
+extern MP_INT groupgenerator;	/* MODP group generator (2) */
+
+struct oakley_group_desc {
+    u_int16_t group;
+    MP_INT *modulus;
+    size_t bytes;
+};
+
+extern const struct oakley_group_desc unset_group;	/* magic signifier */
+extern const struct oakley_group_desc *lookup_group(u_int16_t group);
+#define OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE 7
+extern const struct oakley_group_desc oakley_group[OAKLEY_GROUP_SIZE];
+
+/* unification of cryptographic encoding/decoding algorithms
+ * The IV is taken from and returned to st->st_new_iv.
+ * This allows the old IV to be retained.
+ * Use update_iv to commit to the new IV (for example, once a packet has
+ * been validated).
+ */
+
+#define MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN0  (3 * DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+#define MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN  (256/BITS_PER_BYTE)
+
+struct state;	/* forward declaration, dammit */
+
+void crypto_cbc_encrypt(const struct encrypt_desc *e, bool enc, u_int8_t *buf, size_t size, struct state *st);
+
+#define update_iv(st)	memcpy((st)->st_iv, (st)->st_new_iv \
+    , (st)->st_iv_len = (st)->st_new_iv_len)
+
+#define set_ph1_iv(st, iv) \
+    passert((st)->st_ph1_iv_len <= sizeof((st)->st_ph1_iv)); \
+    memcpy((st)->st_ph1_iv, (iv), (st)->st_ph1_iv_len);
+
+/* unification of cryptographic hashing mechanisms */
+
+#ifndef NO_HASH_CTX
+union hash_ctx {
+	MD5_CTX ctx_md5;
+	SHA1_CTX ctx_sha1;
+	sha256_context ctx_sha256;
+	sha512_context ctx_sha512;
+    };
+
+/* HMAC package
+ * Note that hmac_ctx can be (and is) copied since there are
+ * no persistent pointers into it.
+ */
+
+struct hmac_ctx {
+    const struct hash_desc *h;	/* underlying hash function */
+    size_t hmac_digest_size;	/* copy of h->hash_digest_size */
+    union hash_ctx hash_ctx;	/* ctx for hash function */
+    u_char buf1[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    u_char buf2[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    };
+
+extern void hmac_init(
+    struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
+    const struct hash_desc *h,
+    const u_char *key,
+    size_t key_len);
+
+#define hmac_init_chunk(ctx, h, ch) hmac_init((ctx), (h), (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
+
+extern void hmac_reinit(struct hmac_ctx *ctx);	/* saves recreating pads */
+
+extern void hmac_update(
+    struct hmac_ctx *ctx,
+    const u_char *data,
+    size_t data_len);
+
+#define hmac_update_chunk(ctx, ch) hmac_update((ctx), (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
+
+extern void hmac_final(u_char *output, struct hmac_ctx *ctx);
+
+#define hmac_final_chunk(ch, name, ctx) { \
+	pfreeany((ch).ptr); \
+	(ch).len = (ctx)->hmac_digest_size; \
+	(ch).ptr = alloc_bytes((ch).len, name); \
+	hmac_final((ch).ptr, (ctx)); \
+    }
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/db_ops.c b/src/pluto/db_ops.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bbcd7918f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/db_ops.c
@@ -0,0 +1,439 @@
+/* Dynamic db (proposal, transforms, attributes) handling.
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ * 
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: db_ops.c,v 1.4 2005/04/07 20:13:44 as Exp $
+ */
+
+/* 
+ * The stratedy is to have (full contained) struct db_prop in db_context
+ * pointing to ONE dynamically sizable transform vector (trans0).
+ * Each transform stores attrib. in ONE dyn. sizable attribute vector (attrs0)
+ * in a "serialized" way (attributes storage is used in linear sequence for 
+ * subsecuent transforms).
+ *
+ * Resizing for both trans0 and attrs0 is supported:
+ * - For trans0: quite simple, just allocate and copy trans. vector content
+ *               also update trans_cur (by offset)
+ * - For attrs0: after allocating and copying attrs, I must rewrite each
+ *               trans->attrs present in trans0; to achieve this, calculate
+ *               attrs pointer offset (new minus old) and iterate over 
+ *               each transform "adding" this difference.
+ *               also update attrs_cur (by offset)
+ *
+ * db_context structure:
+ * 	+---------------------+
+ *	|  prop               |
+ *	|    .protoid         |
+ *	|    .trans           | --+
+ *	|    .trans_cnt       |   |
+ *	+---------------------+ <-+
+ *	|  trans0             | ----> { trans#1 | ... | trans#i | ...   }
+ *	+---------------------+                       ^
+ *	|  trans_cur          | ----------------------' current transf.
+ *	+---------------------+
+ *	|  attrs0             | ----> { attr#1 | ... | attr#j | ...  }
+ *	+---------------------+                      ^
+ *	|  attrs_cur          | ---------------------' current attr.
+ *	+---------------------+
+ *	| max_trans,max_attrs |  max_trans/attrs: number of elem. of each vector
+ *	+---------------------+
+ *
+ * See testing examples at end for interface usage.
+ */
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <malloc.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "spdb.h"
+#include "db_ops.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+#else
+#define passert(x) assert(x)
+extern int debug;	/* eg: spi.c */
+#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (debug) { action ; } }
+#define DBG_log(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
+#define alloc_thing(thing, name) alloc_bytes(sizeof (thing), name)
+void * alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name) {
+	void *p=malloc(size);
+        if (p == NULL)
+		fprintf(stderr, "unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s",
+			(unsigned long) size, name);
+	memset(p, '\0', size);
+	return p;
+}
+#define pfreeany(ptr) free(ptr)
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef NOT_YET
+/*
+ * 	Allocator cache:
+ * 	Because of the single-threaded nature of pluto/spdb.c, 
+ * 	alloc()/free() is exercised many times with very small
+ * 	lifetime objects.
+ * 	Just caching last object (currently it will select the
+ * 	largest) will avoid this allocation mas^Wperturbations
+ *
+ */
+struct db_ops_alloc_cache {
+	void *ptr;
+	int size;
+};
+#endif
+
+#ifndef NO_DB_OPS_STATS
+/* 	
+ * 	stats: do account for allocations 	
+ * 	displayed in db_ops_show_status() 
+ */
+struct db_ops_stats {
+	int st_curr_cnt;	/* current number of allocations */
+	int st_total_cnt;	/* total allocations so far */
+	size_t st_maxsz;	/* max. size requested */
+};
+#define DB_OPS_ZERO { 0, 0, 0};
+#define DB_OPS_STATS_DESC   "{curr_cnt, total_cnt, maxsz}"
+#define DB_OPS_STATS_STR(name)  name "={%d,%d,%d} "
+#define DB_OPS_STATS_F(st) (st).st_curr_cnt, (st).st_total_cnt, (int)(st).st_maxsz
+static struct db_ops_stats db_context_st = DB_OPS_ZERO;
+static struct db_ops_stats db_trans_st = DB_OPS_ZERO;
+static struct db_ops_stats db_attrs_st = DB_OPS_ZERO;
+static __inline__ void * alloc_bytes_st (size_t size, const char *str, struct db_ops_stats *st) 
+{
+	void *ptr = alloc_bytes(size, str);
+	if (ptr)  {
+		st->st_curr_cnt++;
+		st->st_total_cnt++;
+		if (size > st->st_maxsz) st->st_maxsz=size;
+	}	
+	return ptr;
+}
+#define ALLOC_BYTES_ST(z,s,st) alloc_bytes_st(z, s, &st);
+#define PFREE_ST(p,st)         do { st.st_curr_cnt--; pfree(p);  } while (0);
+
+#else
+
+#define ALLOC_BYTES_ST(z,s,n) alloc_bytes(z, s);
+#define PFREE_ST(p,n)         pfree(p);
+
+#endif /* NO_DB_OPS_STATS */
+/*	Initialize db object
+ *	max_trans and max_attrs can be 0, will be dynamically expanded
+ *	as a result of "add" operations
+ */
+int
+db_prop_init(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs) 
+{
+	int ret=-1;
+
+	ctx->trans0 = NULL;
+	ctx->attrs0 = NULL;
+
+	if (max_trans > 0) { /* quite silly if not */
+		ctx->trans0 = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_trans) * max_trans, 
+			"db_context->trans", db_trans_st);
+		if (!ctx->trans0) goto out;
+	}
+
+	if (max_attrs > 0) { /* quite silly if not */
+		ctx->attrs0 = ALLOC_BYTES_ST (sizeof (struct db_attr) * max_attrs,
+				"db_context->attrs", db_attrs_st);
+		if (!ctx->attrs0) goto out;
+	}
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	if (ret < 0 && ctx->trans0) {
+		PFREE_ST(ctx->trans0, db_trans_st);
+		ctx->trans0 = NULL;
+	}
+	ctx->max_trans = max_trans;
+	ctx->max_attrs = max_attrs;
+	ctx->trans_cur = ctx->trans0;
+	ctx->attrs_cur = ctx->attrs0;
+	ctx->prop.protoid = protoid;
+	ctx->prop.trans = ctx->trans0;
+	ctx->prop.trans_cnt = 0;
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/*	Expand storage for transforms by number delta_trans */
+static int
+db_trans_expand(struct db_context *ctx, int delta_trans)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+	struct db_trans *new_trans, *old_trans;
+	int max_trans = ctx->max_trans + delta_trans;
+	int offset;
+
+	old_trans = ctx->trans0;
+	new_trans = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_trans) * max_trans, 
+			"db_context->trans (expand)", db_trans_st);
+	if (!new_trans)
+		goto out;
+	memcpy(new_trans, old_trans, ctx->max_trans * sizeof(struct db_trans));
+	
+	/* update trans0 (obviously) */
+	ctx->trans0 = ctx->prop.trans = new_trans;
+	/* update trans_cur (by offset) */
+	offset = (char *)(new_trans) - (char *)(old_trans);
+
+	{
+	  char *cctx = (char *)(ctx->trans_cur);
+	  
+	  cctx += offset;
+	  ctx->trans_cur = (struct db_trans *)cctx;
+	}
+	/* update elem count */
+	ctx->max_trans = max_trans;
+	PFREE_ST(old_trans, db_trans_st);
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+/*	
+ *	Expand storage for attributes by delta_attrs number AND
+ *	rewrite trans->attr pointers
+ */
+static int
+db_attrs_expand(struct db_context *ctx, int delta_attrs)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+	struct db_attr *new_attrs, *old_attrs;
+	struct db_trans *t;
+	int ti;
+	int max_attrs = ctx->max_attrs + delta_attrs;
+	int offset;
+
+	old_attrs = ctx->attrs0;
+	new_attrs = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_attr) * max_attrs, 
+			"db_context->attrs (expand)", db_attrs_st);
+	if (!new_attrs)
+		goto out;
+
+	memcpy(new_attrs, old_attrs, ctx->max_attrs * sizeof(struct db_attr));
+	
+	/* update attrs0 and attrs_cur (obviously) */
+	offset = (char *)(new_attrs) - (char *)(old_attrs);
+	
+	{
+	  char *actx = (char *)(ctx->attrs0);
+	  
+	  actx += offset;
+	  ctx->attrs0 = (struct db_attr *)actx;
+	  
+	  actx = (char *)ctx->attrs_cur;
+	  actx += offset;
+	  ctx->attrs_cur = (struct db_attr *)actx;
+	}
+
+	/* for each transform, rewrite attrs pointer by offsetting it */
+	for (t=ctx->prop.trans, ti=0; ti < ctx->prop.trans_cnt; t++, ti++) {
+		char *actx = (char *)(t->attrs);
+ 
+		actx += offset;
+		t->attrs = (struct db_attr *)actx;
+	}
+	/* update elem count */
+	ctx->max_attrs = max_attrs;
+	PFREE_ST(old_attrs, db_attrs_st);
+	ret = 0;
+out:
+	return ret;
+}
+/*	Allocate a new db object */
+struct db_context * 
+db_prop_new(u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs) 
+{
+	struct db_context *ctx;
+	ctx = ALLOC_BYTES_ST ( sizeof (struct db_context), "db_context", db_context_st);
+	if (!ctx) goto out;
+	
+	if (db_prop_init(ctx, protoid, max_trans, max_attrs) < 0) {
+		PFREE_ST(ctx, db_context_st);
+		ctx=NULL;
+	}
+out:
+	return ctx;
+}
+/*	Free a db object */
+void
+db_destroy(struct db_context *ctx)
+{
+	if (ctx->trans0) PFREE_ST(ctx->trans0, db_trans_st);
+	if (ctx->attrs0) PFREE_ST(ctx->attrs0, db_attrs_st);
+	PFREE_ST(ctx, db_context_st);
+}
+/*	Start a new transform, expand trans0 is needed */
+int
+db_trans_add(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t transid)
+{
+	/*	skip incrementing current trans pointer the 1st time*/
+	if (ctx->trans_cur && ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt)
+		ctx->trans_cur++;
+	/*	
+	 *	Strategy: if more space is needed, expand by 
+	 *	          <current_size>/2 + 1
+	 *
+	 *	This happens to produce a "reasonable" sequence
+	 *	after few allocations, eg.:
+	 *	0,1,2,4,8,13,20,31,47
+	 */
+	if ((ctx->trans_cur - ctx->trans0) >= ctx->max_trans) {
+		/* XXX:jjo if fails should shout and flag it */
+		if (db_trans_expand(ctx, ctx->max_trans/2 + 1)<0)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	ctx->trans_cur->transid = transid;
+	ctx->trans_cur->attrs=ctx->attrs_cur;
+	ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt = 0;
+	ctx->prop.trans_cnt++;
+	return 0;
+}
+/*	Add attr copy to current transform, expanding attrs0 if needed */
+int
+db_attr_add(struct db_context *ctx, const struct db_attr *a) 
+{
+	/*	
+	 *	Strategy: if more space is needed, expand by 
+	 *	          <current_size>/2 + 1
+	 */
+	if ((ctx->attrs_cur - ctx->attrs0) >= ctx->max_attrs) {
+		/* XXX:jjo if fails should shout and flag it */
+		if (db_attrs_expand(ctx, ctx->max_attrs/2 + 1) < 0)
+			return -1;
+	}
+	*ctx->attrs_cur++=*a;
+	ctx->trans_cur->attr_cnt++;
+	return 0;
+}
+/*	Add attr copy (by value) to current transform, 
+ *	expanding attrs0 if needed, just calls db_attr_add().
+ */
+int
+db_attr_add_values(struct db_context *ctx,  u_int16_t type, u_int16_t val)
+{
+	struct db_attr attr;
+	attr.type = type;
+	attr.val = val;
+	return db_attr_add (ctx, &attr);
+}
+#ifndef NO_DB_OPS_STATS
+int
+db_ops_show_status(void)
+{
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "stats " __FILE__ ": " 
+			DB_OPS_STATS_DESC " :"
+			DB_OPS_STATS_STR("context")
+			DB_OPS_STATS_STR("trans")
+			DB_OPS_STATS_STR("attrs"),
+			DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_context_st),
+			DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_trans_st),
+			DB_OPS_STATS_F(db_attrs_st)
+			);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif /* NO_DB_OPS_STATS */
+/* 
+ * From below to end just testing stuff ....
+ */
+#ifdef TEST
+static void db_prop_print(struct db_prop *p)
+{
+	struct db_trans *t;
+	struct db_attr *a;
+	int ti, ai;
+	enum_names *n, *n_at, *n_av;
+	printf("protoid=\"%s\"\n", enum_name(&protocol_names, p->protoid));
+	for (ti=0, t=p->trans; ti< p->trans_cnt; ti++, t++) {
+		switch( t->transid) {
+			case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+				n=&isakmp_transformid_names;break;
+			case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+				n=&esp_transformid_names;break;
+			default:
+				continue;
+		}
+		printf("  transid=\"%s\"\n", 
+			enum_name(n, t->transid));
+		for (ai=0, a=t->attrs; ai < t->attr_cnt; ai++, a++) {
+			int i;
+			switch( t->transid) {
+				case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+					n_at=&oakley_attr_names;
+					i=a->type|ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+					n_av=oakley_attr_val_descs[(i)&ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+					break;
+				case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+					n_at=&ipsec_attr_names;
+					i=a->type|ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+					n_av=ipsec_attr_val_descs[(i)&ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+					break;
+				default:
+					continue;
+			}
+			printf("    type=\"%s\" value=\"%s\"\n", 
+				enum_name(n_at, i),
+				enum_name(n_av, a->val));
+		}
+	}
+
+}
+static void db_print(struct db_context *ctx) 
+{
+	printf("trans_cur diff=%d, attrs_cur diff=%d\n", 
+			ctx->trans_cur - ctx->trans0,
+			ctx->attrs_cur - ctx->attrs0);
+	db_prop_print(&ctx->prop);
+}
+
+void
+passert_fail(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no);
+void abort(void);
+void
+passert_fail(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
+{
+    fprintf(stderr, "ASSERTION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
+    abort();	/* exiting correctly doesn't always work */
+}
+int main(void) {
+	struct db_context *ctx=db_prop_new(PROTO_ISAKMP, 0, 0);
+	db_trans_add(ctx, KEY_IKE);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_3DES_CBC);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_MD5);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_RSA_SIG);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024);
+	db_trans_add(ctx, KEY_IKE);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_AES_CBC);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, OAKLEY_MD5);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536);
+	db_trans_add(ctx, ESP_3DES);
+	db_attr_add_values(ctx, AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1);
+	db_print(ctx);
+	db_destroy(ctx);
+	return 0;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/db_ops.h b/src/pluto/db_ops.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..433e75280
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/db_ops.h
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/* Dynamic db (proposal, transforms, attributes) handling.
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: db_ops.h,v 1.3 2004/09/17 12:37:37 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DB_OPS_H
+#define _DB_OPS_H
+
+/*
+ * 	Main db object, (quite proposal "oriented")
+ */
+#ifndef NO_DB_CONTEXT
+struct db_context {
+	struct db_prop prop;		/* proposal buffer (not pointer) */
+	struct db_trans *trans0;	/* transf. list, dynamically sized */
+	struct db_trans *trans_cur;	/* current transform ptr */
+	struct db_attr *attrs0;		/* attr. list, dynamically sized */
+	struct db_attr *attrs_cur;	/* current attribute ptr */
+	int max_trans;			/* size of trans list */
+	int max_attrs;			/* size of attrs list */
+};
+/*
+ * 	Allocate a new db object
+ */
+struct db_context * db_prop_new(u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs);
+/*	Initialize object for proposal building  */
+int db_prop_init(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t protoid, int max_trans, int max_attrs);
+/*	Free all resourses for this db */
+void db_destroy(struct db_context *ctx);
+
+/*	Start a new transform */
+int db_trans_add(struct db_context *ctx, u_int8_t transid);
+/*	Add a new attribute by copying db_attr content */
+int db_attr_add(struct db_context *db_ctx, const struct db_attr *attr);
+/*	Add a new attribute by value */
+int db_attr_add_values(struct db_context *ctx,  u_int16_t type, u_int16_t val);
+
+/*	Get proposal from db object */
+static __inline__ struct db_prop *db_prop_get(struct db_context *ctx) {
+	return &ctx->prop;
+}
+/*	Show stats (allocation, etc) */
+#endif /* NO_DB_CONTEXT */
+int db_ops_show_status(void);
+#endif /* _DB_OPS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/defs.c b/src/pluto/defs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ae32a480
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/defs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,374 @@
+/* misc. universal things
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: defs.c,v 1.9 2006/01/04 21:00:43 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+
+const chunk_t empty_chunk = { NULL, 0 };
+
+bool
+all_zero(const unsigned char *m, size_t len)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i != len; i++)
+	if (m[i] != '\0')
+	    return FALSE;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* memory allocation
+ *
+ * LEAK_DETECTIVE puts a wrapper around each allocation and maintains
+ * a list of live ones.  If a dead one is freed, an assertion MIGHT fail.
+ * If the live list is currupted, that will often be detected.
+ * In the end, report_leaks() is called, and the names of remaining
+ * live allocations are printed.  At the moment, it is hoped, not that
+ * the list is empty, but that there will be no surprises.
+ *
+ * Accepted Leaks:
+ * - "struct iface" and "device name" (for "discovered" net interfaces)
+ * - "struct event in event_schedule()" (events not associated with states)
+ * - "Pluto lock name" (one only, needed until end -- why bother?)
+ */
+
+#ifdef LEAK_DETECTIVE
+
+/* this magic number is 3671129837 decimal (623837458 complemented) */
+#define LEAK_MAGIC 0xDAD0FEEDul
+
+union mhdr {
+    struct {
+	const char *name;
+	union mhdr *older, *newer;
+	unsigned long magic;
+    } i;    /* info */
+    unsigned long junk;	/* force maximal alignment */
+};
+
+static union mhdr *allocs = NULL;
+
+void *alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name)
+{
+    union mhdr *p = malloc(sizeof(union mhdr) + size);
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+	exit_log("unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s"
+	    , (unsigned long) size, name);
+    p->i.name = name;
+    p->i.older = allocs;
+    if (allocs != NULL)
+	allocs->i.newer = p;
+    allocs = p;
+    p->i.newer = NULL;
+    p->i.magic = LEAK_MAGIC;
+
+    memset(p+1, '\0', size);
+    return p+1;
+}
+
+void *
+clone_bytes(const void *orig, size_t size, const char *name)
+{
+    void *p = alloc_bytes(size, name);
+
+    memcpy(p, orig, size);
+    return p;
+}
+
+void
+pfree(void *ptr)
+{
+    union mhdr *p;
+
+    passert(ptr != NULL);
+    p = ((union mhdr *)ptr) - 1;
+    passert(p->i.magic == LEAK_MAGIC);
+    if (p->i.older != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(p->i.older->i.newer == p);
+	p->i.older->i.newer = p->i.newer;
+    }
+    if (p->i.newer == NULL)
+    {
+	passert(p == allocs);
+	allocs = p->i.older;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	passert(p->i.newer->i.older == p);
+	p->i.newer->i.older = p->i.older;
+    }
+    p->i.magic = ~LEAK_MAGIC;
+    free(p);
+}
+
+void
+report_leaks(void)
+{
+    union mhdr
+	*p = allocs,
+	*pprev = NULL;
+    unsigned long n = 0;
+
+    while (p != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(p->i.magic == LEAK_MAGIC);
+	passert(pprev == p->i.newer);
+	pprev = p;
+	p = p->i.older;
+	n++;
+	if (p == NULL || pprev->i.name != p->i.name)
+	{
+	    if (n != 1)
+		plog("leak: %lu * %s", n, pprev->i.name);
+	    else
+		plog("leak: %s", pprev->i.name);
+	    n = 0;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+#else /* !LEAK_DETECTIVE */
+
+void *alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name)
+{
+    void *p = malloc(size);
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+	exit_log("unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s"
+	    , (unsigned long) size, name);
+    memset(p, '\0', size);
+    return p;
+}
+
+void *clone_bytes(const void *orig, size_t size, const char *name)
+{
+    void *p = malloc(size);
+
+    if (p == NULL)
+	exit_log("unable to malloc %lu bytes for %s"
+	    , (unsigned long) size, name);
+    memcpy(p, orig, size);
+    return p;
+}
+#endif /* !LEAK_DETECTIVE */
+
+/*  Note that there may be as many as six IDs that are temporary at
+ *  one time before unsharing the two ends of a connection. So we need
+ *  at least six temporary buffers for DER_ASN1_DN IDs.
+ *  We rotate them. Be careful!
+ */
+#define	MAX_BUF		10
+
+char*
+temporary_cyclic_buffer(void)
+{
+    static char buf[MAX_BUF][BUF_LEN];	/* MAX_BUF internal buffers */
+    static int counter = 0;			/* cyclic counter */
+
+    if (++counter == MAX_BUF) counter = 0;	/* next internal buffer */
+    return buf[counter];			/* assign temporary buffer */
+}
+
+/* concatenates two sub paths into a string with a maximum size of BUF_LEN
+ * use for temporary storage only
+ */
+const char*
+concatenate_paths(const char *a, const char *b)
+{
+    char *c;
+
+    if (*b == '/' || *b == '.')
+	return b;
+
+    c = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+    snprintf(c, BUF_LEN, "%s/%s", a, b);
+    return c;
+}
+
+/*  compare two chunks, returns zero if a equals b
+ *  negative/positive if a is earlier/later in the alphabet than b
+ */
+int
+cmp_chunk(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+{
+    int cmp_len, len, cmp_value;
+    
+    cmp_len = a.len - b.len;
+    len = (cmp_len < 0)? a.len : b.len;
+    cmp_value = memcmp(a.ptr, b.ptr, len);
+
+    return (cmp_value == 0)? cmp_len : cmp_value;
+};
+
+/* moves a chunk to a memory position, chunk is freed afterwards
+ * position pointer is advanced after the insertion point
+ */
+void
+mv_chunk(u_char **pos, chunk_t content)
+{
+    if (content.len > 0)
+    {
+	chunkcpy(*pos, content);
+	freeanychunk(content);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * write the binary contents of a chunk_t to a file
+ */
+bool
+write_chunk(const char *filename, const char *label, chunk_t ch
+, mode_t mask, bool force)
+{
+    mode_t oldmask;
+    FILE *fd;
+
+    if (!force)
+    {
+	fd = fopen(filename, "r");
+	if (fd)
+	{
+	    fclose(fd);
+	    plog("  %s file '%s' already exists", label, filename);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* set umask */
+    oldmask = umask(mask);
+
+    fd = fopen(filename, "w");
+
+    if (fd)
+    {
+	fwrite(ch.ptr, sizeof(u_char), ch.len, fd);
+	fclose(fd);
+	plog("  written %s file '%s' (%d bytes)", label, filename, (int)ch.len);
+	umask(oldmask);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("  could not open %s file '%s' for writing", label, filename);
+	umask(oldmask);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Names of the months */
+
+static const char* months[] = {
+    "Jan", "Feb", "Mar", "Apr", "May", "Jun",
+    "Jul", "Aug", "Sep", "Oct", "Nov", "Dec"
+};
+
+
+/*
+ *  Display a date either in local or UTC time
+ */
+char*
+timetoa(const time_t *time, bool utc)
+{
+    static char buf[TIMETOA_BUF];
+
+    if (*time == UNDEFINED_TIME)
+	sprintf(buf, "--- -- --:--:--%s----", (utc)?" UTC ":" ");
+    else
+    {
+	struct tm *t = (utc)? gmtime(time) : localtime(time);
+
+	sprintf(buf, "%s %02d %02d:%02d:%02d%s%04d",
+	    months[t->tm_mon], t->tm_mday, t->tm_hour, t->tm_min, t->tm_sec,
+	    (utc)?" UTC ":" ", t->tm_year + 1900
+	);
+    }
+    return buf;
+}
+
+/*  checks if the expiration date has been reached and
+ *  warns during the warning_interval of the imminent
+ *  expiry. strict=TRUE declares a fatal error,
+ *  strict=FALSE issues a warning upon expiry.
+ */
+const char*
+check_expiry(time_t expiration_date, int warning_interval, bool strict)
+{
+    time_t now;
+    int time_left;
+
+    if (expiration_date == UNDEFINED_TIME)
+      return "ok (expires never)";
+
+    /* determine the current time */
+    time(&now);
+
+    time_left = (expiration_date - now);
+    if (time_left < 0)
+	return strict? "fatal (expired)" : "warning (expired)";
+
+    if (time_left > 86400*warning_interval)
+	return "ok";
+    {
+	static char buf[35]; /* temporary storage */
+	const char* unit = "second";
+
+	if (time_left > 172800)
+	{
+	    time_left /= 86400;
+	    unit = "day";
+	}
+	else if (time_left > 7200)
+	{
+	    time_left /= 3600;
+	    unit = "hour";
+	}
+	else if (time_left > 120)
+	{
+	    time_left /= 60;
+	    unit = "minute";
+	}
+	snprintf(buf, 35, "warning (expires in %d %s%s)", time_left,
+		 unit, (time_left == 1)?"":"s");
+	return buf;
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Filter eliminating the directory entries '.' and '..'
+ */
+int
+file_select(const struct dirent *entry)
+{
+    return strcmp(entry->d_name, "." ) &&
+	   strcmp(entry->d_name, "..");
+}
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/defs.h b/src/pluto/defs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3bfb29a22
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/defs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/* misc. universal things
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: defs.h,v 1.10 2006/01/04 21:00:43 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _DEFS_H
+#define _DEFS_H
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+# define USED_BY_KLIPS	/* ignore */
+#else
+# define USED_BY_KLIPS	UNUSED
+#endif
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+# define USED_BY_DEBUG	/* ignore */
+#else
+# define USED_BY_DEBUG	UNUSED
+#endif
+
+/* Length of temporary buffers */
+
+#define BUF_LEN	      512
+
+/* type of serial number of a state object
+ * Needed in connections.h and state.h; here to simplify dependencies.
+ */
+typedef unsigned long so_serial_t;
+#define SOS_NOBODY	0	/* null serial number */
+#define SOS_FIRST	1	/* first normal serial number */
+
+/* memory allocation */
+
+extern void *alloc_bytes(size_t size, const char *name);
+#define alloc_thing(thing, name) (alloc_bytes(sizeof(thing), (name)))
+
+extern void *clone_bytes(const void *orig, size_t size, const char *name);
+#define clone_thing(orig, name) clone_bytes((const void *)&(orig), sizeof(orig), (name))
+#define clone_str(str, name) \
+    ((str) == NULL? NULL : clone_bytes((str), strlen((str))+1, (name)))
+
+#ifdef LEAK_DETECTIVE
+  extern void pfree(void *ptr);
+  extern void report_leaks(void);
+#else
+# define pfree(ptr) free(ptr)	/* ordinary stdc free */
+#endif
+#define pfreeany(p) { if ((p) != NULL) pfree(p); }
+#define replace(p, q) { pfreeany(p); (p) = (q); }
+
+
+/* chunk is a simple pointer-and-size abstraction */
+
+struct chunk {
+    u_char *ptr;
+    size_t len;
+    };
+typedef struct chunk chunk_t;
+
+#define setchunk(ch, addr, size) { (ch).ptr = (addr); (ch).len = (size); }
+#define strchunk(str) { str, sizeof(str) }
+/* NOTE: freeanychunk, unlike pfreeany, NULLs .ptr */
+#define freeanychunk(ch) { pfreeany((ch).ptr); (ch).ptr = NULL; }
+#define clonetochunk(ch, addr, size, name) \
+    { (ch).ptr = clone_bytes((addr), (ch).len = (size), name); }
+#define clonereplacechunk(ch, addr, size, name) \
+    { pfreeany((ch).ptr); clonetochunk(ch, addr, size, name); }
+#define chunkcpy(dst, chunk) \
+    { memcpy(dst, chunk.ptr, chunk.len); dst += chunk.len;}
+#define same_chunk(a, b) \
+    ( (a).len == (b).len && memcmp((a).ptr, (b).ptr, (b).len) == 0 )
+
+extern char* temporary_cyclic_buffer(void);
+extern const char* concatenate_paths(const char *a, const char *b);
+
+extern const chunk_t empty_chunk;
+
+/* compare two chunks */
+extern int cmp_chunk(chunk_t a, chunk_t b);
+
+/* move a chunk to a memory position and free it after insertion */
+extern void mv_chunk(u_char **pos, chunk_t content);
+
+/* write the binary contents of a chunk_t to a file */
+extern bool write_chunk(const char *filename, const char *label, chunk_t ch
+    ,mode_t mask, bool force);
+
+/* display a date either in local or UTC time */
+extern char* timetoa(const time_t *time, bool utc);
+
+/* warns a predefined interval before expiry */
+extern const char* check_expiry(time_t expiration_date,
+    int warning_interval, bool strict);
+
+#define MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS	5
+#define PROMPT_PASS_LEN		64
+
+/* struct used to prompt for a secret passphrase
+ * from a console with file descriptor fd
+ */
+typedef struct {
+    char secret[PROMPT_PASS_LEN+1];
+    bool prompt;
+    int fd;
+} prompt_pass_t;
+
+/* no time defined in time_t */
+#define UNDEFINED_TIME	0
+
+/* size of timetoa string buffer */
+#define TIMETOA_BUF	30
+
+/* filter eliminating the directory entries '.' and '..' */
+typedef struct dirent dirent_t;
+extern int file_select(const dirent_t *entry);
+
+/* cleanly exit Pluto */
+
+extern void exit_pluto(int /*status*/) NEVER_RETURNS;
+
+
+/* zero all bytes */
+#define zero(x) memset((x), '\0', sizeof(*(x)))
+
+/* are all bytes 0? */
+extern bool all_zero(const unsigned char *m, size_t len);
+
+/* pad_up(n, m) is the amount to add to n to make it a multiple of m */
+#define pad_up(n, m) (((m) - 1) - (((n) + (m) - 1) % (m)))
+
+#endif /* _DEFS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/demux.c b/src/pluto/demux.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7e59b184d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/demux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2499 @@
+/* demultiplex incoming IKE messages
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: demux.c,v 1.14 2006/06/22 11:58:25 as Exp $
+ */
+
+/* Ordering Constraints on Payloads
+ *
+ * rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
+ *
+ * 5 Exchanges:
+ *   "The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange."
+ *
+ *   "Except where otherwise noted, there are no requirements for ISAKMP
+ *    payloads in any message to be in any particular order."
+ *
+ * 5.3 Phase 1 Authenticated With a Revised Mode of Public Key Encryption:
+ *
+ *   "If the HASH payload is sent it MUST be the first payload of the
+ *    second message exchange and MUST be followed by the encrypted
+ *    nonce. If the HASH payload is not sent, the first payload of the
+ *    second message exchange MUST be the encrypted nonce."
+ *
+ *   "Save the requirements on the location of the optional HASH payload
+ *    and the mandatory nonce payload there are no further payload
+ *    requirements. All payloads-- in whatever order-- following the
+ *    encrypted nonce MUST be encrypted with Ke_i or Ke_r depending on the
+ *    direction."
+ *
+ * 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode
+ *
+ *   "In Quick Mode, a HASH payload MUST immediately follow the ISAKMP
+ *    header and a SA payload MUST immediately follow the HASH."
+ *   [NOTE: there may be more than one SA payload, so this is not
+ *    totally reasonable.  Probably all SAs should be so constrained.]
+ *
+ *   "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
+ *    party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
+ *    then IDcr."
+ *
+ *   "With the exception of the HASH, SA, and the optional ID payloads,
+ *    there are no payload ordering restrictions on Quick Mode."
+ */
+
+/* Unfolding of Identity -- a central mystery
+ *
+ * This concerns Phase 1 identities, those of the IKE hosts.
+ * These are the only ones that are authenticated.  Phase 2
+ * identities are for IPsec SAs.
+ *
+ * There are three case of interest:
+ *
+ * (1) We initiate, based on a whack command specifying a Connection.
+ *     We know the identity of the peer from the Connection.
+ *
+ * (2) (to be implemented) we initiate based on a flow from our client
+ *     to some IP address.
+ *     We immediately know one of the peer's client IP addresses from
+ *     the flow.  We must use this to figure out the peer's IP address
+ *     and Id.  To be solved.
+ *
+ * (3) We respond to an IKE negotiation.
+ *     We immediately know the peer's IP address.
+ *     We get an ID Payload in Main I2.
+ *
+ *     Unfortunately, this is too late for a number of things:
+ *     - the ISAKMP SA proposals have already been made (Main I1)
+ *       AND one accepted (Main R1)
+ *     - the SA includes a specification of the type of ID
+ *       authentication so this is negotiated without being told the ID.
+ *     - with Preshared Key authentication, Main I2 is encrypted
+ *       using the key, so it cannot be decoded to reveal the ID
+ *       without knowing (or guessing) which key to use.
+ *
+ *     There are three reasonable choices here for the responder:
+ *     + assume that the initiator is making wise offers since it
+ *       knows the IDs involved.  We can balk later (but not gracefully)
+ *       when we find the actual initiator ID
+ *     + attempt to infer identity by IP address.  Again, we can balk
+ *       when the true identity is revealed.  Actually, it is enough
+ *       to infer properties of the identity (eg. SA properties and
+ *       PSK, if needed).
+ *     + make all properties universal so discrimination based on
+ *       identity isn't required.  For example, always accept the same
+ *       kinds of encryption.  Accept Public Key Id authentication
+ *       since the Initiator presumably has our public key and thinks
+ *       we must have / can find his.  This approach is weakest
+ *       for preshared key since the actual key must be known to
+ *       decrypt the Initiator's ID Payload.
+ *     These choices can be blended.  For example, a class of Identities
+ *     can be inferred, sufficient to select a preshared key but not
+ *     sufficient to infer a unique identity.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>	/* only used for belt-and-suspenders select call */
+#include <sys/poll.h>	/* only used for forensic poll call */
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
+#  include <asm/types.h>	/* for __u8, __u32 */
+#  include <linux/errqueue.h>
+#  include <sys/uio.h>	/* struct iovec */
+#endif
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "cookie.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* requires connections.h */
+#include "server.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#include "vendor.h"
+#include "modecfg.h"
+
+/* This file does basic header checking and demux of
+ * incoming packets.
+ */
+
+/* forward declarations */
+static bool read_packet(struct msg_digest *md);
+static void process_packet(struct msg_digest **mdp);
+
+/* Reply messages are built in this buffer.
+ * Only one state transition function can be using it at a time
+ * so suspended STFs must save and restore it.
+ * It could be an auto variable of complete_state_transition except for the fact
+ * that when a suspended STF resumes, its reply message buffer
+ * must be at the same location -- there are pointers into it.
+ */
+u_int8_t reply_buffer[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
+
+/* state_microcode is a tuple of information parameterizing certain
+ * centralized processing of a packet.  For example, it roughly
+ * specifies what payloads are expected in this message.
+ * The microcode is selected primarily based on the state.
+ * In Phase 1, the payload structure often depends on the
+ * authentication technique, so that too plays a part in selecting
+ * the state_microcode to use.
+ */
+
+struct state_microcode {
+    enum state_kind state, next_state;
+    lset_t flags;
+    lset_t req_payloads;	/* required payloads (allows just one) */
+    lset_t opt_payloads;	/* optional payloads (any mumber) */
+    /* if not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, process_packet will emit HDR with this as np */
+    u_int8_t first_out_payload;
+    enum event_type timeout_event;
+    state_transition_fn *processor;
+};
+
+/* State Microcode Flags, in several groups */
+
+/* Oakley Auth values: to which auth values does this entry apply?
+ * Most entries will use SMF_ALL_AUTH because they apply to all.
+ * Note: SMF_ALL_AUTH matches 0 for those circumstances when no auth
+ * has been set.
+ */
+#define SMF_ALL_AUTH	LRANGE(0, OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF-1)
+#define SMF_PSK_AUTH	LELEM(OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY)
+#define SMF_DS_AUTH	(LELEM(OAKLEY_DSS_SIG) | LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_SIG))
+#define SMF_PKE_AUTH	(LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_ENC) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC))
+#define SMF_RPKE_AUTH	(LELEM(OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV) | LELEM(OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV))
+
+/* misc flags */
+
+#define SMF_INITIATOR	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 0)
+#define SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 1)
+#define SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 2)
+#define SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 3)
+#define SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 4)
+
+#define SMF_ENCRYPTED (SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED)
+
+/* this state generates a reply message */
+#define SMF_REPLY   LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 5)
+
+/* this state completes P1, so any pending P2 negotiations should start */
+#define SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2	LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTH_ROOF + 6)
+
+/* end of flags */
+
+
+static state_transition_fn	/* forward declaration */
+    unexpected,
+    informational;
+
+/* state_microcode_table is a table of all state_microcode tuples.
+ * It must be in order of state (the first element).
+ * After initialization, ike_microcode_index[s] points to the
+ * first entry in state_microcode_table for state s.
+ * Remember that each state name in Main or Quick Mode describes
+ * what has happened in the past, not what this message is.
+ */
+
+static const struct state_microcode
+    *ike_microcode_index[STATE_IKE_ROOF - STATE_IKE_FLOOR];
+
+static const struct state_microcode state_microcode_table[] = {
+#define PT(n) ISAKMP_NEXT_##n
+#define P(n) LELEM(PT(n))
+
+    /***** Phase 1 Main Mode *****/
+
+    /* No state for main_outI1: --> HDR, SA */
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_R0: I1 --> R1
+     * HDR, SA --> HDR, SA
+     */
+    { STATE_MAIN_R0, STATE_MAIN_R1
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(SA), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inI1_outR1},
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_I1: R1 --> I2
+     * HDR, SA --> auth dependent
+     * SMF_PSK_AUTH, SMF_DS_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, Ni
+     * SMF_PKE_AUTH:
+     *	--> HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
+     * SMF_RPKE_AUTH:
+     *	--> HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+     * Note: since we don't know auth at start, we cannot differentiate
+     * microcode entries based on it.
+     */
+    { STATE_MAIN_I1, STATE_MAIN_I2
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(SA), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE) /* don't know yet */
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inR1_outI2 },
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_R1: I2 --> R2
+     * SMF_PSK_AUTH, SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Ni --> HDR, KE, Nr
+     * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
+     *	    --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+     * SMF_RPKE_AUTH:
+     *	    HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+     *	    --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+     */
+    { STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_MAIN_R2
+    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(KE) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(NATD_RFC), PT(KE)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inI2_outR2 },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(HASH), PT(KE)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(NONCE) | P(KE) | P(ID), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(HASH) | P(CERT), PT(NONCE)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+    /* for states from here on, output message must be encrypted */
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_I2: R2 --> I3
+     * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I
+     * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I
+     * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+     *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
+     * SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+     *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
+     */
+    { STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_MAIN_I3
+    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(KE) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(NATD_RFC), PT(ID)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, main_inR2_outI3 },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NONCE), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(NONCE) | P(KE) | P(ID), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+    /* for states from here on, input message must be encrypted */
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_R2: I3 --> R3
+     * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I --> HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R
+     * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --> HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
+     * SMF_PKE_AUTH, SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_I --> HDR*, HASH_R
+     */
+    { STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_MAIN_R3
+    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+      | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ID) | P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inI3_outR3 },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_MAIN_R3
+    , SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+      | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ID) | P(SIG), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(CERT), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inI3_outR3 },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_R2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+      | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_I3: R3 --> done
+     * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R --> done
+     * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R --> done
+     * SMF_PKE_AUTH, SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_R --> done
+     * May initiate quick mode by calling quick_outI1
+     */
+    { STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_MAIN_I4
+    , SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
+      | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ID) | P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inR3 },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_MAIN_I4
+    , SMF_DS_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
+      | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ID) | P(SIG), P(VID) | P(CR) | P(CERT), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, main_inR3 },
+
+    { STATE_MAIN_I3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_PKE_AUTH | SMF_RPKE_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR
+      | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(HASH), P(VID) | P(CR), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, unexpected /* ??? not yet implemented */ },
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_R3: can only get here due to packet loss */
+    { STATE_MAIN_R3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY
+    , PT(NONE), EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+    /* STATE_MAIN_I4: can only get here due to packet loss */
+    { STATE_MAIN_I4, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY
+    , PT(NONE), EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+
+    /***** Phase 2 Quick Mode *****/
+
+    /* No state for quick_outI1:
+     * --> HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
+     */
+
+    /* STATE_QUICK_R0:
+     * HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
+     * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
+     * Installs inbound IPsec SAs.
+     * Because it may suspend for asynchronous DNS, first_out_payload
+     * is set to NONE to suppress early emission of HDR*.
+     * ??? it is legal to have multiple SAs, but we don't support it yet.
+     */
+    { STATE_QUICK_R0, STATE_QUICK_R1
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(HASH) | P(SA) | P(NONCE), /* P(SA) | */ P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NATOA_RFC), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, quick_inI1_outR1 },
+
+    /* STATE_QUICK_I1:
+     * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
+     * HDR*, HASH(3)
+     * Installs inbound and outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
+     * ??? it is legal to have multiple SAs, but we don't support it yet.
+     */
+    { STATE_QUICK_I1, STATE_QUICK_I2
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(HASH) | P(SA) | P(NONCE), /* P(SA) | */ P(KE) | P(ID) | P(NATOA_RFC), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, quick_inR1_outI2 },
+
+    /* STATE_QUICK_R1: HDR*, HASH(3) --> done
+     * Installs outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
+     */
+    { STATE_QUICK_R1, STATE_QUICK_R2
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , P(HASH), LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, quick_inI2 },
+
+    /* STATE_QUICK_I2: can only happen due to lost packet */
+    { STATE_QUICK_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_INITIATOR | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+    /* STATE_QUICK_R2: can only happen due to lost packet */
+    { STATE_QUICK_R2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+
+    /***** informational messages *****/
+
+    /* STATE_INFO: */
+    { STATE_INFO, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, informational },
+
+    /* STATE_INFO_PROTECTED: */
+    { STATE_INFO_PROTECTED, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , P(HASH), LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, informational },
+
+    /* XAUTH state transitions */
+    { STATE_XAUTH_I0, STATE_XAUTH_I1
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, xauth_inI0 },
+
+    { STATE_XAUTH_R1, STATE_XAUTH_R2
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_RETRANSMIT, xauth_inR1 },
+
+    { STATE_XAUTH_I1, STATE_XAUTH_I2
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, xauth_inI1 },
+
+    { STATE_XAUTH_R2, STATE_XAUTH_R3
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, xauth_inR2 },
+
+    { STATE_XAUTH_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+    { STATE_XAUTH_R3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+    /* ModeCfg pull mode state transitions */
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R0, STATE_MODE_CFG_R1
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inR0 },
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I1, STATE_MODE_CFG_I2
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inI1 },
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R1, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I2, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+   /* ModeCfg push mode state transitions */
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I0, STATE_MODE_CFG_I3
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_REPLY | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inI0 },
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R3, STATE_MODE_CFG_R4
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED | SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2
+    , P(ATTR) | P(HASH), P(VID), PT(HASH)
+    , EVENT_SA_REPLACE, modecfg_inR3 },
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_I3, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+    { STATE_MODE_CFG_R4, STATE_UNDEFINED
+    , SMF_ALL_AUTH | SMF_ENCRYPTED
+    , LEMPTY, LEMPTY, PT(NONE)
+    , EVENT_NULL, unexpected },
+
+#undef P
+#undef PT
+};
+
+void
+init_demux(void)
+{
+    /* fill ike_microcode_index:
+     * make ike_microcode_index[s] point to first entry in
+     * state_microcode_table for state s (backward scan makes this easier).
+     * Check that table is in order -- catch coding errors.
+     * For what it's worth, this routine is idempotent.
+     */
+    const struct state_microcode *t;
+
+    for (t = &state_microcode_table[elemsof(state_microcode_table) - 1];;)
+    {
+	passert(STATE_IKE_FLOOR <= t->state && t->state < STATE_IKE_ROOF);
+	ike_microcode_index[t->state - STATE_IKE_FLOOR] = t;
+	if (t == state_microcode_table)
+	    break;
+	t--;
+	passert(t[0].state <= t[1].state);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Process any message on the MSG_ERRQUEUE
+ *
+ * This information is generated because of the IP_RECVERR socket option.
+ * The API is sparsely documented, and may be LINUX-only, and only on
+ * fairly recent versions at that (hence the conditional compilation).
+ *
+ * - ip(7) describes IP_RECVERR
+ * - recvmsg(2) describes MSG_ERRQUEUE
+ * - readv(2) describes iovec
+ * - cmsg(3) describes how to process auxilliary messages
+ *
+ * ??? we should link this message with one we've sent
+ * so that the diagnostic can refer to that negotiation.
+ *
+ * ??? how long can the messge be?
+ *
+ * ??? poll(2) has a very incomplete description of the POLL* events.
+ * We assume that POLLIN, POLLOUT, and POLLERR are all we need to deal with
+ * and that POLLERR will be on iff there is a MSG_ERRQUEUE message.
+ *
+ * We have to code around a couple of surprises:
+ *
+ * - Select can say that a socket is ready to read from, and
+ *   yet a read will hang.  It turns out that a message available on the
+ *   MSG_ERRQUEUE will cause select to say something is pending, but
+ *   a normal read will hang.  poll(2) can tell when a MSG_ERRQUEUE
+ *   message is pending.
+ *
+ *   This is dealt with by calling check_msg_errqueue after select
+ *   has indicated that there is something to read, but before the
+ *   read is performed.  check_msg_errqueue will return TRUE if there
+ *   is something left to read.
+ *
+ * - A write to a socket may fail because there is a pending MSG_ERRQUEUE
+ *   message, without there being anything wrong with the write.  This
+ *   makes for confusing diagnostics.
+ *
+ *   To avoid this, we call check_msg_errqueue before a write.  True,
+ *   there is a race condition (a MSG_ERRQUEUE message might arrive
+ *   between the check and the write), but we should eliminate many
+ *   of the problematic events.  To narrow the window, the poll(2)
+ *   will await until an event happens (in the case or a write,
+ *   POLLOUT; this should be benign for POLLIN).
+ */
+
+#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
+static bool
+check_msg_errqueue(const struct iface *ifp, short interest)
+{
+    struct pollfd pfd;
+
+    pfd.fd = ifp->fd;
+    pfd.events = interest | POLLPRI | POLLOUT;
+
+    while (pfd.revents = 0
+    , poll(&pfd, 1, -1) > 0 && (pfd.revents & POLLERR))
+    {
+	u_int8_t buffer[3000];	/* hope that this is big enough */
+	union
+	{
+	    struct sockaddr sa;
+	    struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+	    struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
+	} from;
+
+	int from_len = sizeof(from);
+
+	int packet_len;
+
+	struct msghdr emh;
+	struct iovec eiov;
+	union {
+	    /* force alignment (not documented as necessary) */
+	    struct cmsghdr ecms;
+
+	    /* how much space is enough? */
+	    unsigned char space[256];
+	} ecms_buf;
+
+	struct cmsghdr *cm;
+	char fromstr[sizeof(" for message to  port 65536") + INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+	struct state *sender = NULL;
+
+	zero(&from.sa);
+	from_len = sizeof(from);
+
+	emh.msg_name = &from.sa;	/* ??? filled in? */
+	emh.msg_namelen = sizeof(from);
+	emh.msg_iov = &eiov;
+	emh.msg_iovlen = 1;
+	emh.msg_control = &ecms_buf;
+	emh.msg_controllen = sizeof(ecms_buf);
+	emh.msg_flags = 0;
+
+	eiov.iov_base = buffer;	/* see readv(2) */
+	eiov.iov_len = sizeof(buffer);
+
+	packet_len = recvmsg(ifp->fd, &emh, MSG_ERRQUEUE);
+
+	if (packet_len == -1)
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "recvmsg(,, MSG_ERRQUEUE) on %s failed in comm_handle"
+		, ifp->rname));
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if (packet_len == sizeof(buffer))
+	{
+	    plog("MSG_ERRQUEUE message longer than %lu bytes; truncated"
+		, (unsigned long) sizeof(buffer));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    sender = find_sender((size_t) packet_len, buffer);
+	}
+
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "rejected packet:\n", buffer, packet_len);
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "control:\n", emh.msg_control, emh.msg_controllen);
+	/* ??? Andi Kleen <ak@suse.de> and misc documentation
+	 * suggests that name will have the original destination
+	 * of the packet.  We seem to see msg_namelen == 0.
+	 * Andi says that this is a kernel bug and has fixed it.
+	 * Perhaps in 2.2.18/2.4.0.
+	 */
+	passert(emh.msg_name == &from.sa);
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_ALL, "name:\n", emh.msg_name
+	    , emh.msg_namelen);
+
+	fromstr[0] = '\0';	/* usual case :-( */
+	switch (from.sa.sa_family)
+	{
+	char as[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+
+	case AF_INET:
+	    if (emh.msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+		snprintf(fromstr, sizeof(fromstr)
+		, " for message to %s port %u"
+		    , inet_ntop(from.sa.sa_family
+		    , &from.sa_in4.sin_addr, as, sizeof(as))
+		    , ntohs(from.sa_in4.sin_port));
+	    break;
+	case AF_INET6:
+	    if (emh.msg_namelen == sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+		snprintf(fromstr, sizeof(fromstr)
+		    , " for message to %s port %u"
+		    , inet_ntop(from.sa.sa_family
+		    , &from.sa_in6.sin6_addr, as, sizeof(as))
+		    , ntohs(from.sa_in6.sin6_port));
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	for (cm = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&emh)
+	; cm != NULL
+	; cm = CMSG_NXTHDR(&emh,cm))
+	{
+	    if (cm->cmsg_level == SOL_IP
+	    && cm->cmsg_type == IP_RECVERR)
+	    {
+		/* ip(7) and recvmsg(2) specify:
+		 * ee_origin is SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP for ICMP
+		 *  or SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL for locally generated errors.
+		 * ee_type and ee_code are from the ICMP header.
+		 * ee_info is the discovered MTU for EMSGSIZE errors
+		 * ee_data is not used.
+		 *
+		 * ??? recvmsg(2) says "SOCK_EE_OFFENDER" but
+		 * means "SO_EE_OFFENDER".  The OFFENDER is really
+		 * the router that complained.  As such, the port
+		 * is meaningless.
+		 */
+
+		/* ??? cmsg(3) claims that CMSG_DATA returns
+		 * void *, but RFC 2292 and /usr/include/bits/socket.h
+		 * say unsigned char *.  The manual is being fixed.
+		 */
+		struct sock_extended_err *ee = (void *)CMSG_DATA(cm);
+		const char *offstr = "unspecified";
+		char offstrspace[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
+		char orname[50];
+
+		if (cm->cmsg_len > CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sock_extended_err)))
+		{
+		    const struct sockaddr *offender = SO_EE_OFFENDER(ee);
+
+		    switch (offender->sa_family)
+		    {
+		    case AF_INET:
+			offstr = inet_ntop(offender->sa_family
+			    , &((const struct sockaddr_in *)offender)->sin_addr
+			    , offstrspace, sizeof(offstrspace));
+			break;
+		    case AF_INET6:
+			offstr = inet_ntop(offender->sa_family
+			    , &((const struct sockaddr_in6 *)offender)->sin6_addr
+			    , offstrspace, sizeof(offstrspace));
+			break;
+		    default:
+			offstr = "unknown";
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+
+		switch (ee->ee_origin)
+		{
+		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_NONE:
+		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "none");
+		    break;
+		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_LOCAL:
+		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "local");
+		    break;
+		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP:
+		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname)
+			, "ICMP type %d code %d (not authenticated)"
+			, ee->ee_type, ee->ee_code
+			);
+		    break;
+		case SO_EE_ORIGIN_ICMP6:
+		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname)
+			, "ICMP6 type %d code %d (not authenticated)"
+			, ee->ee_type, ee->ee_code
+			);
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    snprintf(orname, sizeof(orname), "invalid origin %lu"
+			, (unsigned long) ee->ee_origin);
+		    break;
+		}
+
+		{
+		    struct state *old_state = cur_state;
+
+		    cur_state = sender;
+
+		    /* note dirty trick to suppress ~ at start of format
+		     * if we know what state to blame.
+		     */
+		    if ((packet_len == 1) && (buffer[0] = 0xff)
+#ifdef DEBUG
+			&& ((cur_debugging & DBG_NATT) == 0)
+#endif
+			) {
+			    /* don't log NAT-T keepalive related errors unless NATT debug is
+			     * enabled
+			     */
+		    }
+		    else
+		    plog((sender != NULL) + "~"
+			"ERROR: asynchronous network error report on %s"
+			"%s"
+			", complainant %s"
+			": %s"
+			" [errno %lu, origin %s"
+			/* ", pad %d, info %ld" */
+			/* ", data %ld" */
+			"]"
+			, ifp->rname
+			, fromstr
+			, offstr
+			, strerror(ee->ee_errno)
+			, (unsigned long) ee->ee_errno
+			, orname
+			/* , ee->ee_pad, (unsigned long)ee->ee_info */
+			/* , (unsigned long)ee->ee_data */
+			);
+		    cur_state = old_state;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* .cmsg_len is a kernel_size_t(!), but the value
+		 * certainly ought to fit in an unsigned long.
+		 */
+		plog("unknown cmsg: level %d, type %d, len %lu"
+		    , cm->cmsg_level, cm->cmsg_type
+		    , (unsigned long) cm->cmsg_len);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return (pfd.revents & interest) != 0;
+}
+#endif /* defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) */
+
+bool
+send_packet(struct state *st, const char *where)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    int port_buf;
+    bool err;
+    u_int8_t ike_pkt[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
+    u_int8_t *ptr;
+    unsigned long len;
+
+    if (c->interface->ike_float && st->st_tpacket.len != 1)
+    {
+	if ((unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len > (MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE-sizeof(u_int32_t)))
+	{
+	    DBG_log("send_packet(): really too big");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	ptr = ike_pkt;
+	/** Add Non-ESP marker **/
+	memset(ike_pkt, 0, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	memcpy(ike_pkt + sizeof(u_int32_t), st->st_tpacket.ptr,
+	    (unsigned long)st->st_tpacket.len);
+	len = (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len + sizeof(u_int32_t);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ptr = st->st_tpacket.ptr;
+	len = (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	{
+	    DBG_log("sending %lu bytes for %s through %s to %s:%u:"
+		, (unsigned long) st->st_tpacket.len
+		, where
+		, c->interface->rname
+ 		, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+		, (unsigned)c->spd.that.host_port);
+	    DBG_dump_chunk(NULL, st->st_tpacket);
+	});
+
+    /* XXX: Not very clean.  We manipulate the port of the ip_address to
+     * have a port in the sockaddr*, but we retain the original port
+     * and restore it afterwards.
+     */
+
+    port_buf = portof(&c->spd.that.host_addr);
+    setportof(htons(c->spd.that.host_port), &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
+    (void) check_msg_errqueue(c->interface, POLLOUT);
+#endif /* defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) */
+
+    err = sendto(c->interface->fd
+    	, ptr, len, 0
+    	, sockaddrof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+    	, sockaddrlenof(&c->spd.that.host_addr)) != (ssize_t)len;
+
+    /* restore port */
+    setportof(port_buf, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+    if (err)
+    {
+       /* do not log NAT-T Keep Alive packets */
+        if (streq(where, "NAT-T Keep Alive"))
+ 	    return FALSE;
+	log_errno((e, "sendto on %s to %s:%u failed in %s"
+	    , c->interface->rname
+	    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)
+	    , (unsigned)c->spd.that.host_port
+	    , where));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+static stf_status
+unexpected(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected message received in state %s"
+	, enum_name(&state_names, md->st->st_state));
+    return STF_IGNORE;
+}
+
+static stf_status
+informational(struct msg_digest *md UNUSED)
+{
+    struct payload_digest *const n_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N];
+
+    /* If the Notification Payload is not null... */
+    if (n_pld != NULL)
+    {
+        pb_stream *const n_pbs = &n_pld->pbs;
+        struct isakmp_notification *const n = &n_pld->payload.notification;
+        int disp_len;
+        char disp_buf[200];
+
+        /* Switch on Notification Type (enum) */
+        switch (n->isan_type)
+        {
+        case R_U_THERE:
+            return dpd_inI_outR(md->st, n, n_pbs);
+
+        case R_U_THERE_ACK:
+            return dpd_inR(md->st, n, n_pbs);
+        default:
+            if (pbs_left(n_pbs) >= sizeof(disp_buf)-1)
+                disp_len = sizeof(disp_buf)-1;
+            else
+                disp_len = pbs_left(n_pbs);
+            memcpy(disp_buf, n_pbs->cur, disp_len);
+            disp_buf[disp_len] = '\0';
+            break;
+        }
+    }
+    return STF_IGNORE;
+}
+
+/* message digest allocation and deallocation */
+
+static struct msg_digest *md_pool = NULL;
+
+/* free_md_pool is only used to avoid leak reports */
+void
+free_md_pool(void)
+{
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	struct msg_digest *md = md_pool;
+
+	if (md == NULL)
+	    break;
+	md_pool = md->next;
+	pfree(md);
+    }
+}
+
+static struct msg_digest *
+alloc_md(void)
+{
+    struct msg_digest *md = md_pool;
+
+    /* convenient initializer:
+     * - all pointers NULL
+     * - .note = NOTHING_WRONG
+     * - .encrypted = FALSE
+     */
+    static const struct msg_digest blank_md;
+
+    if (md == NULL)
+	md = alloc_thing(struct msg_digest, "msg_digest");
+    else
+	md_pool = md->next;
+
+    *md = blank_md;
+    md->digest_roof = md->digest;
+
+    /* note: although there may be multiple msg_digests at once
+     * (due to suspended state transitions), there is a single
+     * global reply_buffer.  It will need to be saved and restored.
+     */
+    init_pbs(&md->reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
+
+    return md;
+}
+
+void
+release_md(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    freeanychunk(md->raw_packet);
+    pfreeany(md->packet_pbs.start);
+    md->packet_pbs.start = NULL;
+    md->next = md_pool;
+    md_pool = md;
+}
+
+/* wrapper for read_packet and process_packet
+ *
+ * The main purpose of this wrapper is to factor out teardown code
+ * from the many return points in process_packet.  This amounts to
+ * releasing the msg_digest and resetting global variables.
+ *
+ * When processing of a packet is suspended (STF_SUSPEND),
+ * process_packet sets md to NULL to prevent the msg_digest being freed.
+ * Someone else must ensure that msg_digest is freed eventually.
+ *
+ * read_packet is broken out to minimize the lifetime of the
+ * enormous input packet buffer, an auto.
+ */
+void
+comm_handle(const struct iface *ifp)
+{
+    static struct msg_digest *md;
+
+#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
+    /* Even though select(2) says that there is a message,
+     * it might only be a MSG_ERRQUEUE message.  At least
+     * sometimes that leads to a hanging recvfrom.  To avoid
+     * what appears to be a kernel bug, check_msg_errqueue
+     * uses poll(2) and tells us if there is anything for us
+     * to read.
+     *
+     * This is early enough that teardown isn't required:
+     * just return on failure.
+     */
+    if (!check_msg_errqueue(ifp, POLLIN))
+	return;	/* no normal message to read */
+#endif /* defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE) */
+
+    md = alloc_md();
+    md->iface = ifp;
+
+    if (read_packet(md))
+	process_packet(&md);
+
+    if (md != NULL)
+	release_md(md);
+
+    cur_state = NULL;
+    reset_cur_connection();
+    cur_from = NULL;
+}
+
+/* read the message.
+ * Since we don't know its size, we read it into
+ * an overly large buffer and then copy it to a
+ * new, properly sized buffer.
+ */
+static bool
+read_packet(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    const struct iface *ifp = md->iface;
+    int packet_len;
+    u_int8_t *buffer;
+    u_int8_t *buffer_nat;
+    union
+    {
+	struct sockaddr sa;
+	struct sockaddr_in sa_in4;
+	struct sockaddr_in6 sa_in6;
+    } from;
+    int from_len = sizeof(from);
+    err_t from_ugh = NULL;
+    static const char undisclosed[] = "unknown source";
+
+    happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&ifp->addr), &md->sender));
+    zero(&from.sa);
+    ioctl(ifp->fd, FIONREAD, &packet_len);
+    buffer = alloc_bytes(packet_len, "buffer read packet");
+    packet_len = recvfrom(ifp->fd, buffer, packet_len, 0
+	, &from.sa, &from_len);
+
+    /* First: digest the from address.
+     * We presume that nothing here disturbs errno.
+     */
+    if (packet_len == -1
+    && from_len == sizeof(from)
+    && all_zero((const void *)&from.sa, sizeof(from)))
+    {
+	/* "from" is untouched -- not set by recvfrom */
+	from_ugh = undisclosed;
+    }
+    else if (from_len
+    < (int) (offsetof(struct sockaddr, sa_family) + sizeof(from.sa.sa_family)))
+    {
+	from_ugh = "truncated";
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	const struct af_info *afi = aftoinfo(from.sa.sa_family);
+
+	if (afi == NULL)
+	{
+	    from_ugh = "unexpected Address Family";
+	}
+	else if (from_len != (int)afi->sa_sz)
+	{
+	    from_ugh = "wrong length";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    switch (from.sa.sa_family)
+	    {
+	    case AF_INET:
+		from_ugh = initaddr((void *) &from.sa_in4.sin_addr
+		    , sizeof(from.sa_in4.sin_addr), AF_INET, &md->sender);
+		md->sender_port = ntohs(from.sa_in4.sin_port);
+		break;
+	    case AF_INET6:
+		from_ugh = initaddr((void *) &from.sa_in6.sin6_addr
+		    , sizeof(from.sa_in6.sin6_addr), AF_INET6, &md->sender);
+		md->sender_port = ntohs(from.sa_in6.sin6_port);
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* now we report any actual I/O error */
+    if (packet_len == -1)
+    {
+	if (from_ugh == undisclosed
+	&& errno == ECONNREFUSED)
+	{
+	    /* Tone down scary message for vague event:
+	     * We get "connection refused" in response to some
+	     * datagram we sent, but we cannot tell which one.
+	     */
+	    plog("some IKE message we sent has been rejected with ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details)");
+	}
+	else if (from_ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "recvfrom on %s failed; Pluto cannot decode source sockaddr in rejection: %s"
+		, ifp->rname, from_ugh));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "recvfrom on %s from %s:%u failed"
+		, ifp->rname
+		, ip_str(&md->sender), (unsigned)md->sender_port));
+	}
+
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else if (from_ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	plog("recvfrom on %s returned misformed source sockaddr: %s"
+	    , ifp->rname, from_ugh);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    cur_from = &md->sender;
+    cur_from_port = md->sender_port;
+
+    if (ifp->ike_float == TRUE)
+    {
+	u_int32_t non_esp;
+
+	if (packet_len < (int)sizeof(u_int32_t))
+	{
+	    plog("recvfrom %s:%u too small packet (%d)"
+		, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port, packet_len);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	memcpy(&non_esp, buffer, sizeof(u_int32_t));
+	if (non_esp != 0)
+	{
+	    plog("recvfrom %s:%u has no Non-ESP marker"
+		, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	packet_len -= sizeof(u_int32_t);
+	buffer_nat = alloc_bytes(packet_len, "buffer read packet");
+	memcpy(buffer_nat, buffer + sizeof(u_int32_t), packet_len);
+	pfree(buffer);
+	buffer = buffer_nat;
+    }
+
+    /* Clone actual message contents
+     * and set up md->packet_pbs to describe it.
+     */
+    init_pbs(&md->packet_pbs, buffer, packet_len, "packet");
+
+    DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+	    DBG_log("*received %d bytes from %s:%u on %s"
+		, (int) pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)
+		, ip_str(cur_from), (unsigned) cur_from_port
+		, ifp->rname);
+	});
+
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump("", md->packet_pbs.start, pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)));
+
+	if ((pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)==1) && (md->packet_pbs.start[0]==0xff))
+	{
+	    /**
+	     * NAT-T Keep-alive packets should be discared by kernel ESPinUDP
+	     * layer. But boggus keep-alive packets (sent with a non-esp marker)
+	     * can reach this point. Complain and discard them.
+	     */
+	    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		DBG_log("NAT-T keep-alive (boggus ?) should not reach this point. "
+			"Ignored. Sender: %s:%u", ip_str(cur_from),
+			(unsigned) cur_from_port);
+	    )
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+#define IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET	17
+#define IKEV2_VERSION		0x20
+
+    /* ignore IKEv2 packets - they will be handled by charon */
+    if (pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs) > IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET
+    &&  md->packet_pbs.start[IKEV2_VERSION_OFFSET] == IKEV2_VERSION)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	    DBG_log("  ignoring IKEv2 packet")
+	)
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* process an input packet, possibly generating a reply.
+ *
+ * If all goes well, this routine eventually calls a state-specific
+ * transition function.
+ */
+static void
+process_packet(struct msg_digest **mdp)
+{
+    struct msg_digest *md = *mdp;
+    const struct state_microcode *smc;
+    bool new_iv_set = FALSE;
+    bool restore_iv = FALSE;
+    u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    u_int new_iv_len = 0;
+
+    struct state *st = NULL;
+    enum state_kind from_state = STATE_UNDEFINED;	/* state we started in */
+
+#define SEND_NOTIFICATION(t) { \
+    if (st) send_notification_from_state(st, from_state, t); \
+    else send_notification_from_md(md, t); }
+
+    if (!in_struct(&md->hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->packet_pbs, &md->message_pbs))
+    {
+	/* Identify specific failures:
+	 * - bad ISAKMP major/minor version numbers
+	 */
+	if (md->packet_pbs.roof - md->packet_pbs.cur >= (ptrdiff_t)isakmp_hdr_desc.size)
+	{
+	    struct isakmp_hdr *hdr = (struct isakmp_hdr *)md->packet_pbs.cur;
+	    if ((hdr->isa_version >> ISA_MAJ_SHIFT) != ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION)
+	    {
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION);
+		return;
+	    }
+	    else if ((hdr->isa_version & ISA_MIN_MASK) != ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION)
+	    {
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MINOR_VERSION);
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+	SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (md->packet_pbs.roof != md->message_pbs.roof)
+    {
+	plog("size (%u) differs from size specified in ISAKMP HDR (%u)"
+	    , (unsigned) pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), md->hdr.isa_length);
+#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
+	if (pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs) - md->hdr.isa_length == 16)
+	    plog("Cisco VPN client appends 16 surplus NULL bytes");
+	else
+#endif
+	return;
+    }
+
+    switch (md->hdr.isa_xchg)
+    {
+#ifdef NOTYET
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_NONE:
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_BASE:
+#endif
+
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT:	/* part of a Main Mode exchange */
+	if (md->hdr.isa_msgid != MAINMODE_MSGID)
+	{
+	    plog("Message ID was 0x%08lx but should be zero in Main Mode",
+		(unsigned long) md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
+	{
+	    plog("Initiator Cookie must not be zero in Main Mode message");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
+	{
+	    /* initial message from initiator
+	     * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
+	     */
+	    if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
+	    {
+		plog("initial Main Mode message is invalid:"
+		    " its Encrypted Flag is on");
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    /* don't build a state until the message looks tasty */
+	    from_state = STATE_MAIN_R0;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* not an initial message */
+
+	    st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+		, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+
+	    if (st == NULL)
+	    {
+		/* perhaps this is a first message from the responder
+		 * and contains a responder cookie that we've not yet seen.
+		 */
+		st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, zero_cookie
+		    , &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+
+		if (st == NULL)
+		{
+		    plog("Main Mode message is part of an unknown exchange");
+		    /* XXX Could send notification back */
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+	    set_cur_state(st);
+	    from_state = st->st_state;
+	}
+	break;
+
+#ifdef NOTYET
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_AO:
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_AGGR:
+#endif
+
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO:	/* an informational exchange */
+	st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+	    , &md->sender, MAINMODE_MSGID);
+
+	if (st != NULL)
+	    set_cur_state(st);
+
+	if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
+	{
+	    if (st == NULL)
+	    {
+		plog("Informational Exchange is for an unknown (expired?) SA");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "encrypted Informational Exchange message is invalid"
+		    " because no key is known");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == MAINMODE_MSGID)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message is invalid because"
+		    " it has a Message ID of 0");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!reserve_msgid(st, md->hdr.isa_msgid))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message is invalid because"
+		    " it has a previously used Message ID (0x%08lx)"
+		    , (unsigned long)md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	    {
+	 	memcpy(st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+	 	st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+		
+		/* backup new_iv */
+		new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+		passert(new_iv_len <= MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
+		memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+		restore_iv = TRUE;
+	    }
+	    init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+	    new_iv_set = TRUE;
+
+	    from_state = STATE_INFO_PROTECTED;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (st != NULL && IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Informational Exchange message"
+		    " must be encrypted");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+	    from_state = STATE_INFO;
+	}
+	break;
+
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK:	/* part of a Quick Mode exchange */
+	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
+	{
+	    plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
+		" it has an Initiator Cookie of 0");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
+	{
+	    plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
+		" it has a Responder Cookie of 0");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_COOKIE);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == MAINMODE_MSGID)
+	{
+	    plog("Quick Mode message is invalid because"
+		" it has a Message ID of 0");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+	    , &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+	    /* No appropriate Quick Mode state.
+	     * See if we have a Main Mode state.
+	     * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
+	     */
+	    st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+		, &md->sender, MAINMODE_MSGID);
+
+	    if (st == NULL)
+	    {
+		plog("Quick Mode message is for a non-existent (expired?)"
+		    " ISAKMP SA");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    set_cur_state(st);
+
+	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Quick Mode message is unacceptable because"
+		    " it is for an incomplete ISAKMP SA");
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED /* XXX ? */);
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    /* only accept this new Quick Mode exchange if it has a unique message ID */
+	    if (!reserve_msgid(st, md->hdr.isa_msgid))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Quick Mode I1 message is unacceptable because"
+		    " it uses a previously used Message ID 0x%08lx"
+		    " (perhaps this is a duplicated packet)"
+		    , (unsigned long) md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_MESSAGE_ID);
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Quick Mode Initial IV */
+	    init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+	    new_iv_set = TRUE;
+
+	    from_state = STATE_QUICK_R0;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    set_cur_state(st);  
+	    from_state = st->st_state;
+	}
+
+	break;
+
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG:
+	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_icookie))
+	{
+	    plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
+		" it has an Initiator Cookie of 0");
+	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (is_zero_cookie(md->hdr.isa_rcookie))
+	{
+	    plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
+		" it has a Responder Cookie of 0");
+	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (md->hdr.isa_msgid == 0)
+	{
+	    plog("ModeCfg message is invalid because"
+		" it has a Message ID of 0");
+	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+			, &md->sender, md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+	    bool has_xauth_policy;
+
+	    /* No appropriate ModeCfg state.
+	     * See if we have a Main Mode state.
+	     * ??? what if this is a duplicate of another message?
+	     */
+	    st = find_state(md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie
+			    , &md->sender, 0);
+
+	    if (st == NULL)
+	    {
+		plog("ModeCfg message is for a non-existent (expired?)"
+		    " ISAKMP SA");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    set_cur_state(st);
+
+	    /* the XAUTH_STATUS message might have a new msgid */
+	    if (st->st_state == STATE_XAUTH_I1)
+	    {
+		init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+		new_iv_set = TRUE;
+		from_state = st->st_state;
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ModeCfg message is unacceptable because"
+	       		" it is for an incomplete ISAKMP SA (state=%s)"
+	       		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return;
+	    }
+	    init_phase2_iv(st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid);
+	    new_iv_set = TRUE;
+
+	    /*
+	     * okay, now we have to figure out if we are receiving a bogus
+	     * new message in an oustanding XAUTH server conversation
+	     * (i.e. a reply to our challenge)
+	     * (this occurs with some broken other implementations).
+	     *
+	     * or if receiving for the first time, an XAUTH challenge.
+	     *
+	     * or if we are getting a MODECFG request.
+	     *
+	     * we distinguish these states because we can not both be an
+	     * XAUTH server and client, and our policy tells us which
+	     * one we are.
+	     *
+	     * to complicate further, it is normal to start a new msgid
+	     * when going from one state to another, or when restarting
+	     * the challenge.
+	     *
+	     */
+
+	    has_xauth_policy = (st->st_connection->policy
+			       & (POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
+			       != LEMPTY;
+
+	    if (has_xauth_policy && !st->st_xauth.started
+	    && IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		from_state = STATE_XAUTH_I0;
+	    }
+	    else if (st->st_connection->spd.that.modecfg
+	    && IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		from_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_R0;
+	    }
+	    else if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
+	    && IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+	    {
+		from_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_I0;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* XXX check if we are being a mode config server here */
+		plog("received ModeCfg message when in state %s, and we aren't mode config client"
+		     , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    set_cur_state(st);
+	    from_state = st->st_state;
+	}
+	break;
+
+#ifdef NOTYET
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_NGRP:
+    case ISAKMP_XCHG_ACK_INFO:
+#endif
+
+    default:
+	plog("unsupported exchange type %s in message"
+	    , enum_show(&exchange_names, md->hdr.isa_xchg));
+	SEND_NOTIFICATION(UNSUPPORTED_EXCHANGE_TYPE);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* We have found a from_state, and perhaps a state object.
+     * If we need to build a new state object,
+     * we wait until the packet has been sanity checked.
+     */
+
+    /* We don't support the Commit Flag.  It is such a bad feature.
+     * It isn't protected -- neither encrypted nor authenticated.
+     * A man in the middle turns it on, leading to DoS.
+     * We just ignore it, with a warning.
+     * By placing the check here, we could easily add a policy bit
+     * to a connection to suppress the warning.  This might be useful
+     * because the Commit Flag is expected from some peers.
+     */
+    if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT)
+    {
+	plog("IKE message has the Commit Flag set but Pluto doesn't implement this feature; ignoring flag");
+    }
+
+    /* Set smc to describe this state's properties.
+     * Look up the appropriate microcode based on state and
+     * possibly Oakley Auth type.
+     */
+    passert(STATE_IKE_FLOOR <= from_state && from_state <= STATE_IKE_ROOF);
+    smc = ike_microcode_index[from_state - STATE_IKE_FLOOR];
+
+    if (st != NULL)
+    {
+	u_int16_t auth;
+
+	switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+	{
+	case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+	case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+	    auth = OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY;
+	    break;
+	case XAUTHInitRSA:
+	case XAUTHRespRSA:
+	    auth = OAKLEY_RSA_SIG;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    auth = st->st_oakley.auth;
+	}
+	
+	while (!LHAS(smc->flags, auth))
+	{
+	    smc++;
+	    passert(smc->state == from_state);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Ignore a packet if the state has a suspended state transition
+     * Probably a duplicated packet but the original packet is not yet
+     * recorded in st->st_rpacket, so duplicate checking won't catch.
+     * ??? Should the packet be recorded earlier to improve diagnosis?
+     */
+    if (st != NULL && st->st_suspended_md != NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG, "discarding packet received during DNS lookup in %s"
+	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* Detect and handle duplicated packets.
+     * This won't work for the initial packet of an exchange
+     * because we won't have a state object to remember it.
+     * If we are in a non-receiving state (terminal), and the preceding
+     * state did transmit, then the duplicate may indicate that that
+     * transmission wasn't received -- retransmit it.
+     * Otherwise, just discard it.
+     * ??? Notification packets are like exchanges -- I hope that
+     * they are idempotent!
+     */
+    if (st != NULL
+    && st->st_rpacket.ptr != NULL
+    && st->st_rpacket.len == pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs)
+    && memcmp(st->st_rpacket.ptr, md->packet_pbs.start, st->st_rpacket.len) == 0)
+    {
+	if (smc->flags & SMF_RETRANSMIT_ON_DUPLICATE)
+	{
+	    if (st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS)
+	    {
+		st->st_retransmit++;
+		loglog(RC_RETRANSMISSION
+		    , "retransmitting in response to duplicate packet; already %s"
+		    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+		send_packet(st, "retransmit in response to duplicate");
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding duplicate packet -- exhausted retransmission; already %s"
+		    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding duplicate packet; already %s"
+		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+	}
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (md->hdr.isa_flags & ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("received encrypted packet from %s:%u"
+	    , ip_str(&md->sender), (unsigned)md->sender_port));
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("discarding encrypted message for an unknown ISAKMP SA");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED /* XXX ? */);
+	    return;
+	}
+	if (st->st_skeyid_e.ptr == (u_char *) NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "discarding encrypted message"
+		" because we haven't yet negotiated keying materiel");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	/* Mark as encrypted */
+	md->encrypted = TRUE;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("decrypting %u bytes using algorithm %s"
+	    , (unsigned) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)
+	    , enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)));
+
+	/* do the specified decryption
+	 *
+	 * IV is from st->st_iv or (if new_iv_set) st->st_new_iv.
+	 * The new IV is placed in st->st_new_iv
+	 *
+	 * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+	 *
+	 * XXX The IV should only be updated really if the packet
+	 * is successfully processed.
+	 * We should keep this value, check for a success return
+	 * value from the parsing routines and then replace.
+	 *
+	 * Each post phase 1 exchange generates IVs from
+	 * the last phase 1 block, not the last block sent.
+	 */
+	{
+	    const struct encrypt_desc *e = st->st_oakley.encrypter;
+
+	    if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) % e->enc_blocksize != 0)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed message: not a multiple of encryption blocksize");
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    /* XXX Detect weak keys */
+
+	    /* grab a copy of raw packet (for duplicate packet detection) */
+	    clonetochunk(md->raw_packet, md->packet_pbs.start
+		, pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), "raw packet");
+
+	    /* Decrypt everything after header */
+	    if (!new_iv_set)
+	    {
+		/* use old IV */
+		passert(st->st_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+		st->st_new_iv_len = st->st_iv_len;
+		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, st->st_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+	    }
+	    crypto_cbc_encrypt(e, FALSE, md->message_pbs.cur, 
+			    pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) , st);
+	    if (restore_iv)
+	    {
+		memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
+		st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "decrypted:\n", md->message_pbs.cur
+	    , md->message_pbs.roof - md->message_pbs.cur);
+
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:"
+	    , st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* packet was not encryped -- should it have been? */
+
+	if (smc->flags & SMF_INPUT_ENCRYPTED)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "packet rejected: should have been encrypted");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_FLAGS);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Digest the message.
+     * Padding must be removed to make hashing work.
+     * Padding comes from encryption (so this code must be after decryption).
+     * Padding rules are described before the definition of
+     * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h.
+     */
+    {
+	struct payload_digest *pd = md->digest;
+	int np = md->hdr.isa_np;
+	lset_t needed = smc->req_payloads;
+	const char *excuse
+	    = LIN(SMF_PSK_AUTH | SMF_FIRST_ENCRYPTED_INPUT, smc->flags)
+		? "probable authentication failure (mismatch of preshared secrets?): "
+		: "";
+
+	while (np != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+	{
+	    struct_desc *sd = np < ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF? payload_descs[np] : NULL;
+
+	    if (pd == &md->digest[PAYLIMIT])
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "more than %d payloads in message; ignored", PAYLIMIT);
+		SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    switch (np)
+	    {
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC:
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC:
+		    if (!st || !(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES))
+		    {
+			/*
+			 * don't accept NAT-D/NAT-OA reloc directly in message, unless
+			 * we're using NAT-T RFC
+			 */
+			sd = NULL;
+		    }
+		    break;
+	    }
+
+	    if (sd == NULL)
+	    {
+		/* payload type is out of range or requires special handling */
+		switch (np)
+		{
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_ID:
+		    sd = IS_PHASE1(from_state)
+			? &isakmp_identification_desc : &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc;
+		    break;
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS:
+		    np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC;  /* NAT-D relocated */
+		    sd = payload_descs[np];
+		    break;
+		case ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS:
+		    np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC;  /* NAT-OA relocated */
+		    sd = payload_descs[np];
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smessage ignored because it contains an unknown or"
+			" unexpected payload type (%s) at the outermost level"
+			, excuse, enum_show(&payload_names, np));
+		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    {
+		lset_t s = LELEM(np);
+
+		if (LDISJOINT(s
+		, needed | smc->opt_payloads| LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_N) | LELEM(ISAKMP_NEXT_D)))
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smessage ignored because it "
+			   "contains an unexpected payload type (%s)"
+			, excuse, enum_show(&payload_names, np));
+		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(INVALID_PAYLOAD_TYPE);
+		    return;
+		}
+		needed &= ~s;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!in_struct(&pd->payload, sd, &md->message_pbs, &pd->pbs))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%smalformed payload in packet", excuse);
+		if (md->hdr.isa_xchg != ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO)
+		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+		return;
+	    }
+
+	    /* place this payload at the end of the chain for this type */
+	    {
+		struct payload_digest **p;
+
+		for (p = &md->chain[np]; *p != NULL; p = &(*p)->next)
+		    ;
+		*p = pd;
+		pd->next = NULL;
+	    }
+
+	    np = pd->payload.generic.isag_np;
+	    pd++;
+
+	    /* since we've digested one payload happily, it is probably
+	     * the case that any decryption worked.  So we will not suggest
+	     * encryption failure as an excuse for subsequent payload
+	     * problems.
+	     */
+	    excuse = "";
+	}
+
+	md->digest_roof = pd;
+
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    if (pbs_left(&md->message_pbs) != 0)
+		DBG_log("removing %d bytes of padding", (int) pbs_left(&md->message_pbs)));
+
+	md->message_pbs.roof = md->message_pbs.cur;
+
+	/* check that all mandatory payloads appeared */
+
+	if (needed != 0)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "message for %s is missing payloads %s"
+		, enum_show(&state_names, from_state)
+		, bitnamesof(payload_name, needed));
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* more sanity checking: enforce most ordering constraints */
+
+    if (IS_PHASE1(from_state))
+    {
+	/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5 Exchanges:
+	 * "The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange."
+	 */
+	if (md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA] != NULL
+	&& md->hdr.isa_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_SA)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Phase 1 message: does not start with an SA payload");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+    else if (IS_QUICK(from_state))
+    {
+	/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode
+	 *
+	 * "In Quick Mode, a HASH payload MUST immediately follow the ISAKMP
+	 *  header and a SA payload MUST immediately follow the HASH."
+	 * [NOTE: there may be more than one SA payload, so this is not
+	 *  totally reasonable.  Probably all SAs should be so constrained.]
+	 *
+	 * "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
+	 *  party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
+	 *  then IDcr."
+	 *
+	 * "With the exception of the HASH, SA, and the optional ID payloads,
+	 *  there are no payload ordering restrictions on Quick Mode."
+	 */
+
+	if (md->hdr.isa_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message: does not start with a HASH payload");
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	{
+	    struct payload_digest *p;
+	    int i;
+
+	    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA], i = 1; p != NULL
+	    ; p = p->next, i++)
+	    {
+		if (p != &md->digest[i])
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message: SA payload is in wrong position");
+		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* rfc2409: The Internet Key Exchange (IKE), 5.5 Phase 2 - Quick Mode:
+	 * "If ISAKMP is acting as a client negotiator on behalf of another
+	 *  party, the identities of the parties MUST be passed as IDci and
+	 *  then IDcr."
+	 */
+	{
+	    struct payload_digest *id = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+
+	    if (id != NULL)
+	    {
+		if (id->next == NULL || id->next->next != NULL)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message:"
+			" if any ID payload is present,"
+			" there must be exactly two");
+		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+		    return;
+		}
+		if (id+1 != id->next)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "malformed Quick Mode message:"
+			" the ID payloads are not adjacent");
+		    SEND_NOTIFICATION(PAYLOAD_MALFORMED);
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Ignore payloads that we don't handle:
+     * Delete, Notification, VendorID
+     */
+    /* XXX Handle deletions */
+    /* XXX Handle Notifications */
+    /* XXX Handle VID payloads */
+    {
+	struct payload_digest *p;
+
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_N]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+	    if (p->payload.notification.isan_type != R_U_THERE
+	    &&  p->payload.notification.isan_type != R_U_THERE_ACK)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring informational payload, type %s"
+		    , enum_show(&notification_names, p->payload.notification.isan_type));
+	    }
+	    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING, "info:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	}
+
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_D]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+	    accept_delete(st, md, p);
+	    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PARSING, "del:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	}
+
+	for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_VID]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+	    handle_vendorid(md, p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	}
+    }
+    md->from_state = from_state;
+    md->smc = smc;
+    md->st = st;
+
+    /* possibly fill in hdr */
+    if (smc->first_out_payload != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+	echo_hdr(md, (smc->flags & SMF_OUTPUT_ENCRYPTED) != 0
+	    , smc->first_out_payload);
+
+    complete_state_transition(mdp, smc->processor(md));
+}
+
+/* complete job started by the state-specific state transition function */
+
+void
+complete_state_transition(struct msg_digest **mdp, stf_status result)
+{
+    bool has_xauth_policy;
+    bool is_xauth_server;
+    struct msg_digest *md = *mdp;
+    const struct state_microcode *smc = md->smc;
+    enum state_kind from_state = md->from_state;
+    struct state *st;
+
+    cur_state = st = md->st;	/* might have changed */
+
+    /* If state has DPD support, import it */
+    if (st && md->dpd)
+	st->st_dpd = TRUE;
+
+    switch (result)
+    {
+	case STF_IGNORE:
+	    break;
+
+	case STF_SUSPEND:
+	    /* the stf didn't complete its job: don't relase md */
+	    *mdp = NULL;
+	    break;
+
+	case STF_OK:
+	    /* advance the state */
+	    st->st_state = smc->next_state;
+
+	    /* Delete previous retransmission event.
+	     * New event will be scheduled below.
+	     */
+	    delete_event(st);
+
+	    /* replace previous receive packet with latest */
+
+	    pfreeany(st->st_rpacket.ptr);
+
+	    if (md->encrypted)
+	    {
+		/* if encrypted, duplication already done */
+		st->st_rpacket = md->raw_packet;
+		md->raw_packet.ptr = NULL;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		clonetochunk(st->st_rpacket
+		    , md->packet_pbs.start
+		    , pbs_room(&md->packet_pbs), "raw packet");
+	    }
+
+	    /* free previous transmit packet */
+	    freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
+
+	    /* if requested, send the new reply packet */
+	    if (smc->flags & SMF_REPLY)
+	    {
+		close_output_pbs(&md->reply);   /* good form, but actually a no-op */
+
+		clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, md->reply.start
+		    , pbs_offset(&md->reply), "reply packet");
+
+		if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+		    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st);
+
+		/* actually send the packet
+		 * Note: this is a great place to implement "impairments"
+		 * for testing purposes.  Suppress or duplicate the
+		 * send_packet call depending on st->st_state.
+		 */
+		send_packet(st, enum_name(&state_names, from_state));
+	    }
+
+	    /* Schedule for whatever timeout is specified */
+	    {
+		time_t delay;
+		enum event_type kind = smc->timeout_event;
+		bool agreed_time = FALSE;
+		struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+		switch (kind)
+		{
+		case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:	/* Retransmit packet */
+		    delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0;
+		    break;
+
+		case EVENT_SA_REPLACE:	/* SA replacement event */
+		    if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+		    {
+			/* Note: we will defer to the "negotiated" (dictated)
+			 * lifetime if we are POLICY_DONT_REKEY.
+			 * This allows the other side to dictate
+			 * a time we would not otherwise accept
+			 * but it prevents us from having to initiate
+			 * rekeying.  The negative consequences seem
+			 * minor.
+			 */
+			delay = c->sa_ike_life_seconds;
+			if ((c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
+			|| delay >= st->st_oakley.life_seconds)
+			{
+			    agreed_time = TRUE;
+			    delay = st->st_oakley.life_seconds;
+			}
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			/* Delay is min of up to four things:
+			 * each can limit the lifetime.
+			 */
+			delay = c->sa_ipsec_life_seconds;
+			if (st->st_ah.present
+			&& delay >= st->st_ah.attrs.life_seconds)
+			{
+			    agreed_time = TRUE;
+			    delay = st->st_ah.attrs.life_seconds;
+			}
+			if (st->st_esp.present
+			&& delay >= st->st_esp.attrs.life_seconds)
+			{
+			    agreed_time = TRUE;
+			    delay = st->st_esp.attrs.life_seconds;
+			}
+			if (st->st_ipcomp.present
+			&& delay >= st->st_ipcomp.attrs.life_seconds)
+			{
+			    agreed_time = TRUE;
+			    delay = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.life_seconds;
+			}
+		    }
+
+		    /* By default, we plan to rekey.
+		     *
+		     * If there isn't enough time to rekey, plan to
+		     * expire.
+		     *
+		     * If we are --dontrekey, a lot more rules apply.
+		     * If we are the Initiator, use REPLACE_IF_USED.
+		     * If we are the Responder, and the dictated time
+		     * was unacceptable (too large), plan to REPLACE
+		     * (the only way to ratchet down the time).
+		     * If we are the Responder, and the dictated time
+		     * is acceptable, plan to EXPIRE.
+		     *
+		     * Important policy lies buried here.
+		     * For example, we favour the initiator over the
+		     * responder by making the initiator start rekeying
+		     * sooner.  Also, fuzz is only added to the
+		     * initiator's margin.
+		     *
+		     * Note: for ISAKMP SA, we let the negotiated
+		     * time stand (implemented by earlier logic).
+		     */
+		    if (agreed_time
+		    && (c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY))
+		    {
+			kind = (smc->flags & SMF_INITIATOR)
+			    ? EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED
+			    : EVENT_SA_EXPIRE;
+		    }
+		    if (kind != EVENT_SA_EXPIRE)
+		    {
+			unsigned long marg = c->sa_rekey_margin;
+
+			if (smc->flags & SMF_INITIATOR)
+			    marg += marg
+				* c->sa_rekey_fuzz / 100.E0
+				* (rand() / (RAND_MAX + 1.E0));
+			else
+			    marg /= 2;
+
+			if ((unsigned long)delay > marg)
+			{
+			    delay -= marg;
+			    st->st_margin = marg;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    kind = EVENT_SA_EXPIRE;
+			}
+		    }
+		    break;
+
+		case EVENT_NULL:		/* non-event */
+		case EVENT_REINIT_SECRET:	/* Refresh cookie secret */
+		default:
+		    bad_case(kind);
+		}
+		event_schedule(kind, delay, st);
+	    }
+
+	    /* tell whack and log of progress */
+	    {
+		const char *story = state_story[st->st_state - STATE_MAIN_R0];
+		enum rc_type w = RC_NEW_STATE + st->st_state;
+		char sadetails[128];
+		
+		sadetails[0]='\0';
+
+		if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		{
+		    char *b = sadetails;
+		    const char *ini = " {";
+		    const char *fin = "";
+
+		    /* -1 is to leave space for "fin" */
+
+		    if (st->st_esp.present)
+		    {
+			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+				 , "%sESP=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
+				 , ini
+				 , ntohl(st->st_esp.attrs.spi)
+				 , ntohl(st->st_esp.our_spi));
+			ini = " ";
+			fin = "}";
+		    }
+		    /* advance b to end of string */
+		    b = b + strlen(b);
+
+		    if (st->st_ah.present)
+		    {
+			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+				 , "%sAH=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
+				 , ini
+				 , ntohl(st->st_ah.attrs.spi)
+				 , ntohl(st->st_ah.our_spi));
+			ini = " ";
+			fin = "}";
+		    }
+		    /* advance b to end of string */
+		    b = b + strlen(b);
+
+		    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+		    {
+			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+				 , "%sIPCOMP=>0x%08x <0x%08x"
+				 , ini
+				 , ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi)
+				 , ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.our_spi));
+			ini = " ";
+			fin = "}";
+		    }
+		    /* advance b to end of string */
+		    b = b + strlen(b);
+
+		    if (st->nat_traversal)
+		    {
+			char oa[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+			addrtot(&st->nat_oa, 0, oa, sizeof(oa));
+			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+				 , "%sNATOA=%s"
+				 , ini, oa);
+			ini = " ";
+			fin = "}";
+		    }
+
+		    /* advance b to end of string */
+		    b = b + strlen(b);
+
+		    if (st->st_dpd)
+		    {
+			snprintf(b, sizeof(sadetails)-(b-sadetails)-1
+				 , "%sDPD"
+				 , ini);
+			ini = " ";
+			fin = "}";
+		    }
+
+		    strcat(b, fin);
+		}
+
+		if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+		||  IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		{
+		    /* log our success */
+		    plog("%s%s", story, sadetails);
+		    w = RC_SUCCESS;
+		}
+
+		/* tell whack our progress */
+		whack_log(w
+		    , "%s: %s%s"
+		    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+		    , story, sadetails);
+	    }
+
+	    has_xauth_policy = (st->st_connection->policy
+			       & (POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
+			       != LEMPTY;
+	    is_xauth_server =  (st->st_connection->policy
+			       & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER)
+			       != LEMPTY;
+
+	    /* Should we start XAUTH as a server */
+	    if (has_xauth_policy && is_xauth_server
+	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    && !st->st_xauth.started)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("starting XAUTH server")
+		)
+		xauth_send_request(st);
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Wait for XAUTH request from server */
+	    if (has_xauth_policy && !is_xauth_server
+	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    && !st->st_xauth.started)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("waiting for XAUTH request from server")
+		)
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Should we start ModeConfig as a client? */
+	    if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
+	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    && !(st->st_connection->policy & POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH)
+	    && !st->st_modecfg.started)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("starting ModeCfg client in pull mode")
+		)
+		modecfg_send_request(st);
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Should we start ModeConfig as a server? */
+	    if (st->st_connection->spd.that.modecfg
+	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    && !st->st_modecfg.started
+	    && (st->st_connection->policy & POLICY_MODECFG_PUSH))
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("starting ModeCfg server in push mode")
+		)
+		modecfg_send_set(st);
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    /* Wait for ModeConfig set from server */
+	    if (st->st_connection->spd.this.modecfg
+	    && IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    && !st->st_modecfg.vars_set)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("waiting for ModeCfg set from server")
+		)
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    if (smc->flags & SMF_RELEASE_PENDING_P2)
+	    {
+		/* Initiate any Quick Mode negotiations that
+		 * were waiting to piggyback on this Keying Channel.
+		 *
+		 * ??? there is a potential race condition
+		 * if we are the responder: the initial Phase 2
+		 * message might outrun the final Phase 1 message.
+		 * I think that retransmission will recover.
+		 */
+		unpend(st);
+	    }
+
+	    if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    ||  IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+		release_whack(st);
+	    break;
+
+	case STF_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+	    whack_log(RC_INTERNALERR + md->note
+		, "%s: internal error"
+		, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("state transition function for %s had internal error"
+		    , enum_name(&state_names, from_state)));
+	    break;
+
+	default:	/* a shortcut to STF_FAIL, setting md->note */
+	    passert(result > STF_FAIL);
+	    md->note = result - STF_FAIL;
+	    result = STF_FAIL;
+	    /* FALL THROUGH ... */
+	case STF_FAIL:
+	    /* As it is, we act as if this message never happened:
+	     * whatever retrying was in place, remains in place.
+	     */
+	    whack_log(RC_NOTIFICATION + md->note
+		, "%s: %s"
+		, enum_name(&state_names, (st == NULL)? STATE_MAIN_R0:st->st_state)
+		, enum_name(&notification_names, md->note));
+
+	    SEND_NOTIFICATION(md->note);
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("state transition function for %s failed: %s"
+		    , enum_name(&state_names, from_state)
+		    , enum_name(&notification_names, md->note)));
+	    break;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/demux.h b/src/pluto/demux.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..373dd6315
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/demux.h
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/* demultiplex incoming IKE messages
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: demux.h,v 1.4 2004/07/22 22:57:25 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include "packet.h"
+
+struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag */
+extern void init_demux(void);
+extern bool send_packet(struct state *st, const char *where);
+extern void comm_handle(const struct iface *ifp);
+
+extern u_int8_t reply_buffer[MAX_OUTPUT_UDP_SIZE];
+
+/* State transition function infrastructure
+ *
+ * com_handle parses a message, decides what state object it applies to,
+ * and calls the appropriate state transition function (STF).
+ * These declarations define the interface to these functions.
+ *
+ * Each STF must be able to be restarted up to any failure point:
+ * a later message will cause the state to be re-entered.  This
+ * explains the use of the replace macro and the care in handling
+ * MP_INT members of struct state.
+ */
+
+struct payload_digest {
+    pb_stream pbs;
+    union payload payload;
+    struct payload_digest *next;   /* of same kind */
+};
+
+/* message digest
+ * Note: raw_packet and packet_pbs are "owners" of space on heap.
+ */
+
+struct msg_digest {
+    struct msg_digest *next;	/* for free list */
+    chunk_t raw_packet;		/* if encrypted, received packet before decryption */
+    const struct iface *iface;	/* interface on which message arrived */
+    ip_address sender;	/* where message came from */
+    u_int16_t sender_port;	/* host order */
+    pb_stream packet_pbs;	/* whole packet */
+    pb_stream message_pbs;	/* message to be processed */
+    struct isakmp_hdr hdr;	/* message's header */
+    bool encrypted;		/* was it encrypted? */
+    enum state_kind from_state;	/* state we started in */
+    const struct state_microcode *smc;	/* microcode for initial state */
+    struct state *st;		/* current state object */
+    pb_stream reply;		/* room for reply */
+    pb_stream rbody;		/* room for reply body (after header) */
+    notification_t note;	/* reason for failure */
+    bool dpd;           	/* peer supports RFC 3706 DPD */
+    bool openpgp;		/* peer supports OpenPGP certificates */
+
+#   define PAYLIMIT 40
+    struct payload_digest
+	digest[PAYLIMIT],
+	*digest_roof,
+	*chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF];
+	unsigned short nat_traversal_vid;
+};
+
+extern void release_md(struct msg_digest *md);
+
+/* status for state-transition-function
+ * Note: STF_FAIL + notification_t means fail with that notification
+ */
+
+typedef enum {
+    STF_IGNORE,	/* don't respond */
+    STF_SUSPEND,    /* unfinished -- don't release resources */
+    STF_OK,	/* success */
+    STF_INTERNAL_ERROR,	/* discard everything, we failed */
+    STF_FAIL	/* discard everything, something failed.  notification_t added. */
+} stf_status;
+
+typedef stf_status state_transition_fn(struct msg_digest *md);
+
+extern void complete_state_transition(struct msg_digest **mdp, stf_status result);
+
+extern void free_md_pool(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/dnskey.c b/src/pluto/dnskey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..23863b0a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/dnskey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1962 @@
+/* Find public key in DNS
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: dnskey.c,v 1.5 2005/09/08 16:26:30 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <netdb.h>	/* ??? for h_errno */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "keys.h"	    /* needs connections.h */
+#include "dnskey.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+
+/* somebody has to decide */
+#define MAX_TXT_RDATA	((MAX_KEY_BYTES * 8 / 6) + 40)	/* somewhat arbitrary overkill */
+
+/* ADNS stuff */
+
+int adns_qfd = NULL_FD,	/* file descriptor for sending queries to adns (O_NONBLOCK) */
+    adns_afd = NULL_FD;	/* file descriptor for receiving answers from adns */
+static pid_t adns_pid = 0;
+const char *pluto_adns_option = NULL;	/* path from --pluto_adns */
+
+int adns_restart_count;
+#define ADNS_RESTART_MAX 20
+
+void
+init_adns(void)
+{
+    const char *adns_path = pluto_adns_option;
+#ifndef USE_LWRES
+    static const char adns_name[] = "_pluto_adns";
+    const char *helper_bin_dir = getenv("IPSEC_LIBDIR");
+#else /* USE_LWRES */
+    static const char adns_name[] = "lwdnsq";
+    const char *helper_bin_dir = getenv("IPSEC_EXECDIR");
+#endif /* USE_LWRES */
+    char adns_path_space[4096];	/* plenty long? */
+    int qfds[2];
+    int afds[2];
+
+    /* find a pathname to the ADNS program */
+    if (adns_path == NULL)
+    {
+	/* pathname was not specified as an option: build it.
+	 * First, figure out the directory to be used.
+	 */
+	ssize_t n;
+
+	if (helper_bin_dir != NULL)
+	{
+	    n = strlen(helper_bin_dir);
+	    if ((size_t)n <= sizeof(adns_path_space) - sizeof(adns_name))
+	    {
+		strcpy(adns_path_space, helper_bin_dir);
+		if (n > 0 && adns_path_space[n -1] != '/')
+		    adns_path_space[n++] = '/';
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* The program will be in the same directory as Pluto,
+	     * so we use the sympolic link /proc/self/exe to
+	     * tell us of the path prefix.
+	     */
+	    n = readlink("/proc/self/exe", adns_path_space, sizeof(adns_path_space));
+
+	    if (n < 0)
+		exit_log_errno((e
+		    , "readlink(\"/proc/self/exe\") failed in init_adns()"));
+
+	}
+
+	if ((size_t)n > sizeof(adns_path_space) - sizeof(adns_name))
+	    exit_log("path to %s is too long", adns_name);
+
+	while (n > 0 && adns_path_space[n - 1] != '/')
+	    n--;
+
+	strcpy(adns_path_space + n, adns_name);
+	adns_path = adns_path_space;
+    }
+    if (access(adns_path, X_OK) < 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "%s missing or not executable", adns_path));
+
+    if (pipe(qfds) != 0 || pipe(afds) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "pipe(2) failed in init_adns()"));
+
+    adns_pid = fork();
+    switch (adns_pid)
+    {
+    case -1:
+	exit_log_errno((e, "fork() failed in init_adns()"));
+
+    case 0:
+	/* child */
+	{
+	    /* Make stdin and stdout our pipes.
+	     * Take care to handle case where pipes already use these fds.
+	     */
+	    if (afds[1] == 0)
+		afds[1] = dup(afds[1]);	/* avoid being overwritten */
+	    if (qfds[0] != 0)
+	    {
+		dup2(qfds[0], 0);
+		close(qfds[0]);
+	    }
+	    if (afds[1] != 1)
+	    {
+		dup2(afds[1], 1);
+		close(qfds[1]);
+	    }
+	    if (afds[0] > 1)
+		close(afds[0]);
+	    if (afds[1] > 1)
+		close(afds[1]);
+
+	    DBG(DBG_DNS, execlp(adns_path, adns_name, "-d", NULL));
+
+	    execlp(adns_path, adns_name, NULL);
+	    exit_log_errno((e, "execlp of %s failed", adns_path));
+	}
+
+    default:
+	/* parent */
+	close(qfds[0]);
+	adns_qfd = qfds[1];
+	adns_afd = afds[0];
+	close(afds[1]);
+	fcntl(adns_qfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	fcntl(adns_afd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+	fcntl(adns_qfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK);
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+stop_adns(void)
+{
+    close_any(adns_qfd);
+    adns_qfd = NULL_FD;
+    close_any(adns_afd);
+    adns_afd = NULL_FD;
+
+    if (adns_pid != 0)
+    {
+	int status;
+	pid_t p = waitpid(adns_pid, &status, 0);
+
+	if (p == -1)
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "waitpid for ADNS process failed"));
+	}
+	else if (WIFEXITED(status))
+	{
+	    if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
+		plog("ADNS process exited with status %d"
+		    , (int) WEXITSTATUS(status));
+	}
+	else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
+	{
+	    plog("ADNS process terminated by signal %d", (int)WTERMSIG(status));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("wait for end of ADNS process returned odd status 0x%x\n"
+		, status);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+
+
+/* tricky macro to pass any hot potato */
+#define TRY(x)	{ err_t ugh = x; if (ugh != NULL) return ugh; }
+
+
+/* Process TXT X-IPsec-Server record, accumulating relevant ones
+ * in cr->gateways_from_dns, a list sorted by "preference".
+ *
+ * Format of TXT record body: X-IPsec-Server ( nnn ) = iii kkk
+ *  nnn is a 16-bit unsigned integer preference
+ *  iii is @FQDN or dotted-decimal IPv4 address or colon-hex IPv6 address
+ *  kkk is an optional RSA public signing key in base 64.
+ *
+ * NOTE: we've got to be very wary of anything we find -- bad guys
+ * might have prepared it.
+ */
+
+#define our_TXT_attr_string "X-IPsec-Server"
+static const char our_TXT_attr[] = our_TXT_attr_string;
+
+static err_t
+decode_iii(u_char **pp, struct id *gw_id)
+{
+    u_char *p = *pp + strspn(*pp, " \t");
+    u_char *e = p + strcspn(p, " \t");
+    u_char under = *e;
+
+    if (p == e)
+	return "TXT " our_TXT_attr_string " badly formed (no gateway specified)";
+
+    *e = '\0';
+    if (*p == '@')
+    {
+	/* gateway specification in this record is @FQDN */
+	err_t ugh = atoid(p, gw_id, FALSE);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	    return builddiag("malformed FQDN in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
+		, ugh);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* gateway specification is numeric */
+	ip_address ip;
+	err_t ugh = tnatoaddr(p, e-p
+	    , strchr(p, ':') == NULL? AF_INET : AF_INET6
+	    , &ip);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	    return builddiag("malformed IP address in TXT " our_TXT_attr_string ": %s"
+		, ugh);
+
+	if (isanyaddr(&ip))
+	    return "gateway address must not be 0.0.0.0 or 0::0";
+
+	iptoid(&ip, gw_id);
+    }
+
+    *e = under;
+    *pp = e + strspn(e, " \t");
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static err_t
+process_txt_rr_body(u_char *str
+, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
+, struct adns_continuation *const cr)
+{
+    const struct id *client_id = &cr->id;	/* subject of query */
+    u_char *p = str;
+    unsigned long pref = 0;
+    struct gw_info gi;
+
+    p += strspn(p, " \t");	/* ignore leading whitespace */
+
+    /* is this for us? */
+    if (strncasecmp(p, our_TXT_attr, sizeof(our_TXT_attr)-1) != 0)
+	return NULL;	/* neither interesting nor bad */
+
+    p += sizeof(our_TXT_attr) - 1;	/* ignore our attribute name */
+    p += strspn(p, " \t");	/* ignore leading whitespace */
+
+    /* decode '(' nnn ')' */
+    if (*p != '(')
+	return "X-IPsec-Server missing '('";
+
+    {
+	char *e;
+
+	p++;
+	pref = strtoul(p, &e, 0);
+	if ((u_char *)e == p)
+	    return "malformed X-IPsec-Server priority";
+
+	p = e + strspn(e, " \t");
+
+	if (*p != ')')
+	    return "X-IPsec-Server priority missing ')'";
+
+	p++;
+	p += strspn(p, " \t");
+
+	if (pref > 0xFFFF)
+	    return "X-IPsec-Server priority larger than 0xFFFF";
+    }
+
+    /* time for '=' */
+
+    if (*p != '=')
+	return "X-IPsec-Server priority missing '='";
+
+    p++;
+    p += strspn(p, " \t");
+
+    /* Decode iii (Security Gateway ID). */
+
+    zero(&gi);	/* before first use */
+
+    TRY(decode_iii(&p, &gi.gw_id));	/* will need to unshare_id_content */
+
+    if (!cr->sgw_specified)
+    {
+	/* we don't know the peer's ID (because we are initiating
+	 * and we don't know who to initiate with.
+	 * So we're looking for gateway specs with an IP address
+	 */
+	if (!id_is_ipaddr(&gi.gw_id))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
+		{
+		    char cidb[BUF_LEN];
+		    char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+		    idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
+		    idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+		    DBG_log("TXT %s record for %s: security gateway %s;"
+			" ignored because gateway's IP is unspecified"
+			, our_TXT_attr, cidb, gwidb);
+		});
+	    return NULL;	/* we cannot use this record, but it isn't wrong */
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* We do know the peer's ID (because we are responding)
+	 * So we're looking for gateway specs specifying this known ID.
+	 */
+	const struct id *peer_id = &cr->sgw_id;
+
+	if (!same_id(peer_id, &gi.gw_id))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
+		{
+		    char cidb[BUF_LEN];
+		    char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+		    char pidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+		    idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
+		    idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+		    idtoa(peer_id, pidb, sizeof(pidb));
+		    DBG_log("TXT %s record for %s: security gateway %s;"
+			" ignored -- looking to confirm %s as gateway"
+			, our_TXT_attr, cidb, gwidb, pidb);
+		});
+	    return NULL;	/* we cannot use this record, but it isn't wrong */
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (doit)
+    {
+	/* really accept gateway */
+	struct gw_info **gwip;	/* gateway insertion point */
+
+	gi.client_id = *client_id;	/* will need to unshare_id_content */
+
+	/* decode optional kkk: base 64 encoding of key */
+
+	gi.gw_key_present = *p != '\0';
+	if (gi.gw_key_present)
+	{
+	    /* Decode base 64 encoding of key.
+	     * Similar code is in process_lwdnsq_key.
+	     */
+	    u_char kb[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];	/* plenty of space for binary form of public key */
+	    chunk_t kbc;
+	    struct RSA_public_key r;
+
+	    err_t ugh = ttodatav(p, 0, 64, kb, sizeof(kb), &kbc.len
+		, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		return builddiag("malformed key data: %s", ugh);
+
+	    if (kbc.len > sizeof(kb))
+		return builddiag("key data larger than %lu bytes"
+		    , (unsigned long) sizeof(kb));
+
+	    kbc.ptr = kb;
+	    ugh = unpack_RSA_public_key(&r, &kbc);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		return builddiag("invalid key data: %s", ugh);
+
+	    /* now find a key entry to put it in */
+	    gi.key = public_key_from_rsa(&r);
+
+	    free_RSA_public_content(&r);
+
+	    unreference_key(&cr->last_info);
+	    cr->last_info = reference_key(gi.key);
+	}
+
+	/* we're home free!  Allocate everything and add to gateways list. */
+	gi.refcnt = 1;
+	gi.pref = pref;
+	gi.key->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+	gi.key->last_tried_time = gi.key->last_worked_time = NO_TIME;
+
+	/* find insertion point */
+	for (gwip = &cr->gateways_from_dns; *gwip != NULL && (*gwip)->pref < pref; gwip = &(*gwip)->next)
+	    ;
+
+	DBG(DBG_DNS,
+	    {
+		char cidb[BUF_LEN];
+		char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+		idtoa(client_id, cidb, sizeof(cidb));
+		idtoa(&gi.gw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+		if (gi.gw_key_present)
+		{
+		    DBG_log("gateway for %s is %s with key %s"
+			, cidb, gwidb, gi.key->u.rsa.keyid);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    DBG_log("gateway for %s is %s; no key specified"
+			, cidb, gwidb);
+		}
+	    });
+
+	gi.next = *gwip;
+	*gwip = clone_thing(gi, "gateway info");
+	unshare_id_content(&(*gwip)->gw_id);
+	unshare_id_content(&(*gwip)->client_id);
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static const char *
+rr_typename(int type)
+{
+    switch (type)
+    {
+    case T_TXT:
+	return "TXT";
+    case T_KEY:
+	return "KEY";
+    default:
+	return "???";
+    }
+}
+
+
+#ifdef USE_LWRES
+
+# ifdef USE_KEYRR
+static err_t
+process_lwdnsq_key(u_char *str
+, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
+, struct adns_continuation *const cr)
+{
+    /* fields of KEY record.  See RFC 2535 3.1 KEY RDATA format. */
+    unsigned long flags	/* 16 bits */
+	, protocol	/* 8 bits */
+	, algorithm;	/* 8 bits */
+
+    char *rest = str
+	, *p
+	, *endofnumber;
+
+    /* flags */
+    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq KEY: missing flags";
+
+    flags = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+	return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed flags";
+
+    /* protocol */
+    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq KEY: missing protocol";
+
+    protocol = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+	return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed protocol";
+
+    /* algorithm */
+    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq KEY: missing algorithm";
+
+    algorithm = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+	return "lwdnsq KEY: malformed algorithm";
+
+    /* is this key interesting? */
+    if (protocol == 4	/* IPSEC (RFC 2535 3.1.3) */
+    && algorithm == 1	/* RSA/MD5 (RFC 2535 3.2) */
+    && (flags & 0x8000ul) == 0	/* use for authentication (3.1.2) */
+    && (flags & 0x2CF0ul) == 0)	/* must be zero */
+    {
+	/* Decode base 64 encoding of key.
+	 * Similar code is in process_txt_rr_body.
+	 */
+	u_char kb[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];	/* plenty of space for binary form of public key */
+	chunk_t kbc;
+	err_t ugh = ttodatav(rest, 0, 64, kb, sizeof(kb), &kbc.len
+	    , diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_IGNORESPACE);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	    return builddiag("malformed key data: %s", ugh);
+
+	if (kbc.len > sizeof(kb))
+	    return builddiag("key data larger than %lu bytes"
+		, (unsigned long) sizeof(kb));
+
+	kbc.ptr = kb;
+	TRY(add_public_key(&cr->id, dns_auth_level, PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, &kbc
+	    , &cr->keys_from_dns));
+
+	/* keep a reference to last one */
+	unreference_key(&cr->last_info);
+	cr->last_info = reference_key(cr->keys_from_dns->key);
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+# endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+#else  /* ! USE_LWRES */
+
+/* structure of Query Reply (RFC 1035 4.1.1):
+ *
+ *  +---------------------+
+ *  |        Header       |
+ *  +---------------------+
+ *  |       Question      | the question for the name server
+ *  +---------------------+
+ *  |        Answer       | RRs answering the question
+ *  +---------------------+
+ *  |      Authority      | RRs pointing toward an authority
+ *  +---------------------+
+ *  |      Additional     | RRs holding additional information
+ *  +---------------------+
+ */
+
+/* Header section format (as modified by RFC 2535 6.1):
+ *                                  1  1  1  1  1  1
+ *    0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ *  |                      ID                       |
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ *  |QR|   Opcode  |AA|TC|RD|RA| Z|AD|CD|   RCODE   |
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ *  |                    QDCOUNT                    |
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ *  |                    ANCOUNT                    |
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ *  |                    NSCOUNT                    |
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ *  |                    ARCOUNT                    |
+ *  +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ */
+struct qr_header {
+    u_int16_t	id;	/* 16-bit identifier to match query */
+
+    u_int16_t	stuff;	/* packed crud: */
+
+#define QRS_QR	0x8000	/* QR: on if this is a response */
+
+#define QRS_OPCODE_SHIFT	11  /* OPCODE field */
+#define QRS_OPCODE_MASK	0xF
+#define QRSO_QUERY	0   /* standard query */
+#define QRSO_IQUERY	1   /* inverse query */
+#define QRSO_STATUS	2   /* server status request query */
+
+#define QRS_AA 0x0400	/* AA: on if Authoritative Answer */
+#define QRS_TC 0x0200	/* TC: on if truncation happened */
+#define QRS_RD 0x0100	/* RD: on if recursion desired */
+#define QRS_RA 0x0080	/* RA: on if recursion available */
+#define QRS_Z  0x0040	/* Z: reserved; must be zero */
+#define QRS_AD 0x0020	/* AD: on if authentic data (RFC 2535) */
+#define QRS_CD 0x0010	/* AD: on if checking disabled (RFC 2535) */
+
+#define QRS_RCODE_SHIFT	0 /* RCODE field: response code */
+#define QRS_RCODE_MASK	0xF
+#define QRSR_OK	    0
+
+
+    u_int16_t qdcount;	    /* number of entries in question section */
+    u_int16_t ancount;	    /* number of resource records in answer section */
+    u_int16_t nscount;	    /* number of name server resource records in authority section */
+    u_int16_t arcount;	    /* number of resource records in additional records section */
+};
+
+static field_desc qr_header_fields[] = {
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "stuff", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QD Count", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Answer Count", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Authority Count", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Additional Count", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct_desc qr_header_desc = {
+    "Query Response Header",
+    qr_header_fields,
+    sizeof(struct qr_header)
+};
+
+/* Messages for codes in RCODE (see RFC 1035 4.1.1) */
+static const err_t rcode_text[QRS_RCODE_MASK + 1] = {
+    NULL,   /* not an error */
+    "Format error - The name server was unable to interpret the query",
+    "Server failure - The name server was unable to process this query"
+	" due to a problem with the name server",
+    "Name Error - Meaningful only for responses from an authoritative name"
+	" server, this code signifies that the domain name referenced in"
+	" the query does not exist",
+    "Not Implemented - The name server does not support the requested"
+	" kind of query",
+    "Refused - The name server refuses to perform the specified operation"
+	" for policy reasons",
+    /* the rest are reserved for future use */
+    };
+
+/* throw away a possibly compressed domain name */
+
+static err_t
+eat_name(pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
+    u_char *ip = pbs->cur;
+    unsigned oi = 0;
+    unsigned jump_count = 0;
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	u_int8_t b;
+
+	if (ip >= pbs->roof)
+	    return "ran out of message while skipping domain name";
+
+	b = *ip++;
+	if (jump_count == 0)
+	    pbs->cur = ip;
+
+	if (b == 0)
+	    break;
+
+	switch (b & 0xC0)
+	{
+	    case 0x00:
+		/* we grab the next b characters */
+		if (oi + b > NS_MAXDNAME)
+		    return "domain name too long";
+
+		if (pbs->roof - ip <= b)
+		    return "domain name falls off end of message";
+
+		if (oi != 0)
+		    name_buf[oi++] = '.';
+
+		memcpy(name_buf + oi, ip, b);
+		oi += b;
+		ip += b;
+		if (jump_count == 0)
+		    pbs->cur = ip;
+		break;
+
+	    case 0xC0:
+		{
+		    unsigned ix;
+
+		    if (ip >= pbs->roof)
+			return "ran out of message in middle of compressed domain name";
+
+		    ix = ((b & ~0xC0u) << 8) | *ip++;
+		    if (jump_count == 0)
+			pbs->cur = ip;
+
+		    if (ix >= pbs_room(pbs))
+			return "impossible compressed domain name";
+
+		    /* Avoid infinite loop.
+		     * There can be no more jumps than there are bytes
+		     * in the packet.  Not a tight limit, but good enough.
+		     */
+		    jump_count++;
+		    if (jump_count > pbs_room(pbs))
+			return "loop in compressed domain name";
+
+		    ip = pbs->start + ix;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    default:
+		return "invalid code in label";
+	}
+    }
+
+    name_buf[oi++] = '\0';
+
+    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("skipping name %s", name_buf));
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static err_t
+eat_name_helpfully(pb_stream *pbs, const char *context)
+{
+    err_t ugh = eat_name(pbs);
+
+    return ugh == NULL? ugh
+	: builddiag("malformed name within DNS record of %s: %s", context, ugh);
+}
+
+/* non-variable part of 4.1.2 Question Section entry:
+ *                                 1  1  1  1  1  1
+ *   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                                               |
+ * /                     QNAME                     /
+ * /                                               /
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                     QTYPE                     |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                     QCLASS                    |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ */
+
+struct qs_fixed {
+    u_int16_t qtype;
+    u_int16_t qclass;
+};
+
+static field_desc qs_fixed_fields[] = {
+    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QTYPE", &rr_qtype_names },
+    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "QCLASS", &rr_class_names },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct_desc qs_fixed_desc = {
+    "Question Section entry fixed part",
+    qs_fixed_fields,
+    sizeof(struct qs_fixed)
+};
+
+/* 4.1.3. Resource record format:
+ *                                 1  1  1  1  1  1
+ *   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                                               |
+ * /                                               /
+ * /                      NAME                     /
+ * |                                               |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                      TYPE                     |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                     CLASS                     |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                      TTL                      |
+ * |                                               |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ * |                   RDLENGTH                    |
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--|
+ * /                     RDATA                     /
+ * /                                               /
+ * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+ */
+
+struct rr_fixed {
+    u_int16_t type;
+    u_int16_t class;
+    u_int32_t ttl;	/* actually signed */
+    u_int16_t rdlength;
+};
+
+
+static field_desc rr_fixed_fields[] = {
+    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "type", &rr_type_names },
+    { ft_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "class", &rr_class_names },
+    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "TTL", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "RD length", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct_desc rr_fixed_desc = {
+    "Resource Record fixed part",
+    rr_fixed_fields,
+    /* note: following is tricky: avoids padding problems */
+    offsetof(struct rr_fixed, rdlength) + sizeof(u_int16_t)
+};
+
+/* RFC 1035 3.3.14: TXT RRs have text in the RDATA field.
+ * It is in the form of a sequence of <character-string>s as described in 3.3.
+ * unpack_txt_rdata() deals with this peculiar representation.
+ */
+
+/* RFC 2535 3.1 KEY RDATA format:
+ *
+ *                      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |             flags             |    protocol   |   algorithm   |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |                                                               /
+ * /                          public key                           /
+ * /                                                               /
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-|
+ */
+
+struct key_rdata {
+    u_int16_t flags;
+    u_int8_t protocol;
+    u_int8_t algorithm;
+};
+
+static field_desc key_rdata_fields[] = {
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "flags", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "algorithm", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct_desc key_rdata_desc = {
+    "KEY RR RData fixed part",
+    key_rdata_fields,
+    sizeof(struct key_rdata)
+};
+
+/* RFC 2535 4.1 SIG RDATA format:
+ *
+ *                      1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |        type covered           |  algorithm    |     labels    |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |                         original TTL                          |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |                      signature expiration                     |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |                      signature inception                      |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * |            key  tag           |                               |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+         signer's name         +
+ * |                                                               /
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-/
+ * /                                                               /
+ * /                            signature                          /
+ * /                                                               /
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+
+struct sig_rdata {
+    u_int16_t type_covered;
+    u_int8_t algorithm;
+    u_int8_t labels;
+    u_int32_t original_ttl;
+    u_int32_t sig_expiration;
+    u_int32_t sig_inception;
+    u_int16_t key_tag;
+};
+
+static field_desc sig_rdata_fields[] = {
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "type_covered", NULL},
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "algorithm", NULL},
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "labels", NULL},
+    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "original ttl", NULL},
+    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "sig expiration", NULL},
+    { ft_nat, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "sig inception", NULL},
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "key tag", NULL},
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+static struct_desc sig_rdata_desc = {
+    "SIG RR RData fixed part",
+    sig_rdata_fields,
+    sizeof(struct sig_rdata)
+};
+
+/* handle a KEY Resource Record. */
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+static err_t
+process_key_rr(u_char *ptr, size_t len
+, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
+, struct adns_continuation *const cr)
+{
+    pb_stream pbs;
+    struct key_rdata kr;
+
+    if (len < sizeof(struct key_rdata))
+	return "KEY Resource Record's RD Length is too small";
+
+    init_pbs(&pbs, ptr, len, "KEY RR");
+
+    if (!in_struct(&kr, &key_rdata_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+	return "failed to get fixed part of KEY Resource Record RDATA";
+
+    if (kr.protocol == 4	/* IPSEC (RFC 2535 3.1.3) */
+    && kr.algorithm == 1	/* RSA/MD5 (RFC 2535 3.2) */
+    && (kr.flags & 0x8000) == 0	/* use for authentication (3.1.2) */
+    && (kr.flags & 0x2CF0) == 0)	/* must be zero */
+    {
+	/* we have what seems to be a tasty key */
+
+	if (doit)
+	{
+	    chunk_t k;
+
+	    setchunk(k, pbs.cur, pbs_left(&pbs));
+	    TRY(add_public_key(&cr->id, dns_auth_level, PUBKEY_ALG_RSA, &k
+		, &cr->keys_from_dns));
+	}
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+
+/* unpack TXT rr RDATA into C string.
+ * A sequence of <character-string>s as described in RFC 1035 3.3.
+ * We concatenate them.
+ */
+static err_t
+unpack_txt_rdata(u_char *d, size_t dlen, const u_char *s, size_t slen)
+{
+    size_t i = 0
+	, o = 0;
+
+    while (i < slen)
+    {
+	size_t cl = s[i++];
+
+	if (i + cl > slen)
+	    return "TXT rr RDATA representation malformed";
+
+	if (o + cl >= dlen)
+	    return "TXT rr RDATA too large";
+
+	memcpy(d + o, s + i, cl);
+	i += cl;
+	o += cl;
+    }
+    d[o] = '\0';
+    if (strlen(d) != o)
+	return "TXT rr RDATA contains a NUL";
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static err_t
+process_txt_rr(u_char *rdata, size_t rdlen
+, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
+, struct adns_continuation *const cr)
+{
+    u_char str[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES * 8 / 6 + 20];	/* space for unpacked RDATA */
+
+    TRY(unpack_txt_rdata(str, sizeof(str), rdata, rdlen));
+    return process_txt_rr_body(str, doit, dns_auth_level, cr);
+}
+
+static err_t
+process_answer_section(pb_stream *pbs
+, bool doit	/* should we capture information? */
+, enum dns_auth_level *dns_auth_level
+, u_int16_t ancount	/* number of RRs in the answer section */
+, struct adns_continuation *const cr)
+{
+    const int type = cr->query.type;	/* type of RR of interest */
+    unsigned c;
+
+    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Answer Section:"));
+
+    for (c = 0; c != ancount; c++)
+    {
+	struct rr_fixed rrf;
+	size_t tail;
+
+	/* ??? do we need to match the name? */
+
+	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(pbs, "Answer Section"));
+
+	if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, pbs, NULL))
+	    return "failed to get fixed part of Answer Section Resource Record";
+
+	if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(pbs))
+	    return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
+
+	/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
+
+	tail = rrf.rdlength;
+
+	if (rrf.type == type && rrf.class == C_IN)
+	{
+	    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	    switch (type)
+	    {
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	    case T_KEY:
+		ugh = process_key_rr(pbs->cur, tail, doit, *dns_auth_level, cr);
+		break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	    case T_TXT:
+		ugh = process_txt_rr(pbs->cur, tail, doit, *dns_auth_level, cr);
+		break;
+	    case T_SIG:
+		/* Check if SIG RR authenticates what we are learning.
+		 * The RRset covered by a SIG must have the same owner,
+		 * class, and type.
+		 * For us, the class is always C_IN, so that matches.
+		 * We decode the SIG RR's fixed part to check
+		 * that the type_covered field matches our query type
+		 * (this may be redundant).
+		 * We don't check the owner (apparently this is the
+		 * name on the record) -- we assume that it matches
+		 * or we would not have been given this SIG in the
+		 * Answer Section.
+		 *
+		 * We only look on first pass, and only if we've something
+		 * to learn.  This cuts down on useless decoding.
+		 */
+		if (!doit && *dns_auth_level == DAL_UNSIGNED)
+		{
+		    struct sig_rdata sr;
+
+		    if (!in_struct(&sr, &sig_rdata_desc, pbs, NULL))
+			ugh = "failed to get fixed part of SIG Resource Record RDATA";
+		    else if (sr.type_covered == type)
+			*dns_auth_level = DAL_SIGNED;
+		}
+		break;
+	    default:
+		ugh = builddiag("unexpected RR type %d", type);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		return ugh;
+	}
+	in_raw(NULL, tail, pbs, "RR RDATA");
+    }
+
+    return doit
+	&& cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	&& cr->keys_from_dns == NULL
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	? builddiag("no suitable %s record found in DNS", rr_typename(type))
+	: NULL;
+}
+
+/* process DNS answer -- TXT or KEY query */
+
+static err_t
+process_dns_answer(struct adns_continuation *const cr
+, u_char ans[], int anslen)
+{
+    const int type = cr->query.type;	/* type of record being sought */
+    int r;	/* all-purpose return value holder */
+    u_int16_t c;	/* number of current RR in current answer section */
+    pb_stream pbs;
+    u_int8_t *ans_start;	/* saved position of answer section */
+    struct qr_header qr_header;
+    enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level;
+
+    init_pbs(&pbs, ans, anslen, "Query Response Message");
+
+    /* decode and check header */
+
+    if (!in_struct(&qr_header, &qr_header_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+	return "malformed header";
+
+    /* ID: nothing to do with us */
+
+    /* stuff -- lots of things */
+    if ((qr_header.stuff & QRS_QR) == 0)
+	return "not a response?!?";
+
+    if (((qr_header.stuff >> QRS_OPCODE_SHIFT) & QRS_OPCODE_MASK) != QRSO_QUERY)
+	return "unexpected opcode";
+
+    /* I don't think we care about AA */
+
+    if (qr_header.stuff & QRS_TC)
+	return "response truncated";
+
+    /* I don't think we care about RD, RA, or CD */
+
+    /* AD means "authentic data" */
+    dns_auth_level = qr_header.stuff & QRS_AD? DAL_UNSIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC;
+
+    if (qr_header.stuff & QRS_Z)
+	return "Z bit is not zero";
+
+    r = (qr_header.stuff >> QRS_RCODE_SHIFT) & QRS_RCODE_MASK;
+    if (r != 0)
+	return r < (int)elemsof(rcode_text)? rcode_text[r] : "unknown rcode";
+
+    if (qr_header.ancount == 0)
+	return builddiag("no %s RR found by DNS", rr_typename(type));
+
+    /* end of header checking */
+
+    /* Question Section processing */
+
+    /* 4.1.2. Question section format:
+     *                                 1  1  1  1  1  1
+     *   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  0  1  2  3  4  5
+     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+     * |                                               |
+     * /                     QNAME                     /
+     * /                                               /
+     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+     * |                     QTYPE                     |
+     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+     * |                     QCLASS                    |
+     * +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
+     */
+
+    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Question Section:"));
+
+    for (c = 0; c != qr_header.qdcount; c++)
+    {
+	struct qs_fixed qsf;
+
+	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Question Section"));
+
+	if (!in_struct(&qsf, &qs_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+	    return "failed to get fixed part of Question Section";
+
+	if (qsf.qtype != type)
+	    return "unexpected QTYPE in Question Section";
+
+	if (qsf.qclass != C_IN)
+	    return "unexpected QCLASS in Question Section";
+    }
+
+    /* rest of sections are made up of Resource Records */
+
+    /* Answer Section processing -- error checking, noting T_SIG */
+
+    ans_start = pbs.cur;	/* remember start of answer section */
+
+    TRY(process_answer_section(&pbs, FALSE, &dns_auth_level
+	, qr_header.ancount, cr));
+
+    /* Authority Section processing (just sanity checking) */
+
+    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Authority Section:"));
+
+    for (c = 0; c != qr_header.nscount; c++)
+    {
+	struct rr_fixed rrf;
+	size_t tail;
+
+	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Authority Section"));
+
+	if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+	    return "failed to get fixed part of Authority Section Resource Record";
+
+	if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(&pbs))
+	    return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
+
+	/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
+
+	tail = rrf.rdlength;
+
+	in_raw(NULL, tail, &pbs, "RR RDATA");
+    }
+
+    /* Additional Section processing (just sanity checking) */
+
+    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("*Additional Section:"));
+
+    for (c = 0; c != qr_header.arcount; c++)
+    {
+	struct rr_fixed rrf;
+	size_t tail;
+
+	TRY(eat_name_helpfully(&pbs, "Additional Section"));
+
+	if (!in_struct(&rrf, &rr_fixed_desc, &pbs, NULL))
+	    return "failed to get fixed part of Additional Section Resource Record";
+
+	if (rrf.rdlength > pbs_left(&pbs))
+	    return "RD Length extends beyond end of message";
+
+	/* ??? should we care about ttl? */
+
+	tail = rrf.rdlength;
+
+	in_raw(NULL, tail, &pbs, "RR RDATA");
+    }
+
+    /* done all sections */
+
+    /* ??? is padding legal, or can we complain if more left in record? */
+
+    /* process Answer Section again -- accept contents */
+
+    pbs.cur = ans_start;	/* go back to start of answer section */
+
+    return process_answer_section(&pbs, TRUE, &dns_auth_level
+	, qr_header.ancount, cr);
+}
+
+#endif /* ! USE_LWRES */
+
+
+/****************************************************************/
+
+static err_t
+build_dns_name(u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2]
+, unsigned long serial USED_BY_DEBUG
+, const struct id *id
+, const char *typename USED_BY_DEBUG
+, const char *gwname   USED_BY_DEBUG)
+{
+    /* note: all end in "." to suppress relative searches */
+    id = resolve_myid(id);
+    switch (id->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    {
+	/* XXX: this is really ugly and only temporary until addrtot can
+	 *      generate the correct format
+	 */
+	const unsigned char *b;
+	size_t bl USED_BY_DEBUG = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr, &b);
+
+	passert(bl == 4);
+	snprintf(name_buf, NS_MAXDNAME + 2, "%d.%d.%d.%d.in-addr.arpa."
+	    , b[3], b[2], b[1], b[0]);
+	break;
+    }
+
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+    {
+	/* ??? is this correct? */
+	const unsigned char *b;
+	size_t bl;
+	u_char *op = name_buf;
+	static const char suffix[] = "IP6.INT.";
+
+	for (bl = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr, &b); bl-- != 0; )
+	{
+	    if (op + 4 + sizeof(suffix) >= name_buf + NS_MAXDNAME + 1)
+		return "IPv6 reverse name too long";
+	    op += sprintf(op, "%x.%x.", b[bl] & 0xF, b[bl] >> 4);
+	}
+	strcpy(op, suffix);
+	break;
+    }
+
+    case ID_FQDN:
+	/* strip trailing "." characters, then add one */
+	{
+	    size_t il = id->name.len;
+
+	    while (il > 0 && id->name.ptr[il - 1] == '.')
+		il--;
+	    if (il > NS_MAXDNAME)
+		return "FQDN too long for domain name";
+
+	    memcpy(name_buf, id->name.ptr, il);
+	    strcpy(name_buf + il, ".");
+	}
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	return "can only query DNS for key for ID that is a FQDN, IPV4_ADDR, or IPV6_ADDR";
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS, DBG_log("DNS query %lu for %s for %s (gw: %s)"
+	, serial, typename, name_buf, gwname));
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+void
+gw_addref(struct gw_info *gw)
+{
+    if (gw != NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("gw_addref: %p refcnt: %d++", gw, gw->refcnt))
+	gw->refcnt++;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+gw_delref(struct gw_info **gwp)
+{
+    struct gw_info *gw = *gwp;
+
+    if (gw != NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("gw_delref: %p refcnt: %d--", gw, gw->refcnt));
+
+	passert(gw->refcnt != 0);
+	gw->refcnt--;
+	if (gw->refcnt == 0)
+	{
+	    free_id_content(&gw->client_id);
+	    free_id_content(&gw->gw_id);
+	    if (gw->gw_key_present)
+		unreference_key(&gw->key);
+	    gw_delref(&gw->next);
+	    pfree(gw);	/* trickery could make this a tail-call */
+	}
+	*gwp = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+static int adns_in_flight = 0;	/* queries outstanding */
+
+/* Start an asynchronous DNS query.
+ *
+ * For KEY record, the result will be a list in cr->keys_from_dns.
+ * For TXT records, the result will be a list in cr->gateways_from_dns.
+ *
+ * If sgw_id is null, only consider TXT records that specify an
+ * IP address for the gatway: we need this in the initiation case.
+ *
+ * If sgw_id is non-null, only consider TXT records that specify
+ * this id as the security gatway; this is useful to the Responder
+ * for confirming claims of gateways.
+ *
+ * Continuation cr gives information for continuing when the result shows up.
+ *
+ * Two kinds of errors must be handled: synchronous (immediate)
+ * and asynchronous.  Synchronous errors are indicated by the returned
+ * value of start_adns_query; in this case, the continuation will
+ * have been freed and the continuation routine will not be called.
+ * Asynchronous errors are indicated by the ugh parameter passed to the
+ * continuation routine.
+ *
+ * After the continuation routine has completed, handle_adns_answer
+ * will free the continuation.  The continuation routine should have
+ * freed any axiliary resources.
+ *
+ * Note: in the synchronous error case, start_adns_query will have
+ * freed the continuation; this means that the caller will have to
+ * be very careful to release any auxiliary resources that were in
+ * the continuation record without using the continuation record.
+ *
+ * Either there will be an error result passed to the continuation routine,
+ * or the results will be in cr->keys_from_dns or cr->gateways_from_dns.
+ * The result variables must by left NULL by the continutation routine.
+ * The continuation routine is responsible for establishing and
+ * disestablishing any logging context (whack_log_fd, cur_*).
+ */
+
+static struct adns_continuation *continuations = NULL;	/* newest of queue */
+static struct adns_continuation *next_query = NULL;	/* oldest not sent */
+
+static struct adns_continuation *
+continuation_for_qtid(unsigned long qtid)
+{
+    struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
+
+    if (qtid != 0)
+	for (cr = continuations; cr != NULL && cr->qtid != qtid; cr = cr->previous)
+	    ;
+    return cr;
+}
+
+static void
+release_adns_continuation(struct adns_continuation *cr)
+{
+    passert(cr != next_query);
+    gw_delref(&cr->gateways_from_dns);
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    free_public_keys(&cr->keys_from_dns);
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+    unshare_id_content(&cr->id);
+    unshare_id_content(&cr->sgw_id);
+
+    /* unlink from doubly-linked list */
+    if (cr->next == NULL)
+    {
+	passert(continuations == cr);
+	continuations = cr->previous;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	passert(cr->next->previous == cr);
+	cr->next->previous = cr->previous;
+    }
+
+    if (cr->previous != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(cr->previous->next == cr);
+	cr->previous->next = cr->next;
+    }
+
+    pfree(cr);
+}
+
+err_t
+start_adns_query(const struct id *id	/* domain to query */
+, const struct id *sgw_id	/* if non-null, any accepted gw_info must match */
+, int type	/* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
+, cont_fn_t cont_fn
+, struct adns_continuation *cr)
+{
+    static unsigned long qtid = 1;	/* query transaction id; NOTE: static */
+    const char *typename = rr_typename(type);
+    char gwidb[BUF_LEN];
+
+    if(adns_pid == 0
+       && adns_restart_count < ADNS_RESTART_MAX)
+    {
+	plog("ADNS helper was not running. Restarting attempt %d",adns_restart_count);
+	init_adns();
+    }
+
+
+    /* Splice this in at head of doubly-linked list of continuations.
+     * Note: this must be done before any release_adns_continuation().
+     */
+    cr->next = NULL;
+    cr->previous = continuations;
+    if (continuations != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(continuations->next == NULL);
+	continuations->next = cr;
+    }
+    continuations = cr;
+
+    cr->qtid = qtid++;
+    cr->type = type;
+    cr->cont_fn = cont_fn;
+    cr->id = *id;
+    unshare_id_content(&cr->id);
+    cr->sgw_specified = sgw_id != NULL;
+    cr->sgw_id = cr->sgw_specified? *sgw_id : empty_id;
+    unshare_id_content(&cr->sgw_id);
+    cr->gateways_from_dns = NULL;
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    cr->keys_from_dns = NULL;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    cr->debugging = cur_debugging;
+#else
+    cr->debugging = LEMPTY;
+#endif
+
+    idtoa(&cr->sgw_id, gwidb, sizeof(gwidb));
+
+    zero(&cr->query);
+
+    {
+	err_t ugh = build_dns_name(cr->query.name_buf, cr->qtid
+	    , id, typename, gwidb);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    release_adns_continuation(cr);
+	    return ugh;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (next_query == NULL)
+	next_query = cr;
+
+    unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* send remaining ADNS queries (until pipe full or none left)
+ *
+ * This is a co-routine, so it uses static variables to
+ * preserve state across calls.
+ */
+bool unsent_ADNS_queries = FALSE;
+
+void
+send_unsent_ADNS_queries(void)
+{
+    static const unsigned char *buf_end = NULL;	/* NOTE STATIC */
+    static const unsigned char *buf_cur = NULL;	/* NOTE STATIC */
+
+    if (adns_qfd == NULL_FD)
+	return;	/* nothing useful to do */
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	if (buf_cur != buf_end)
+	{
+	    static int try = 0;	/* NOTE STATIC */
+	    size_t n = buf_end - buf_cur;
+	    ssize_t r = write(adns_qfd, buf_cur, n);
+
+	    if (r == -1)
+	    {
+		switch (errno)
+		{
+		case EINTR:
+		    continue;	/* try again now */
+		case EAGAIN:
+		    DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("EAGAIN writing to ADNS"));
+		    break;	/* try again later */
+		default:
+		    try++;
+		    log_errno((e, "error %d writing DNS query", try));
+		    break;	/* try again later */
+		}
+		unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+		break;	/* done! */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		passert(r >= 0);
+		try = 0;
+		buf_cur += r;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (next_query == NULL)
+	    {
+		unsent_ADNS_queries = FALSE;
+		break;	/* done! */
+	    }
+
+#ifdef USE_LWRES
+	    next_query->used = FALSE;
+	    {
+		/* NOTE STATIC: */
+		static unsigned char qbuf[LWDNSQ_CMDBUF_LEN + 1];	/* room for NUL */
+
+		snprintf(qbuf, sizeof(qbuf), "%s %lu %s\n"
+		    , rr_typename(next_query->type)
+		    , next_query->qtid
+		    , next_query->query.name_buf);
+		DBG(DBG_DNS, DBG_log("lwdnsq query: %.*s", (int)(strlen(qbuf) - 1), qbuf));
+		buf_cur = qbuf;
+		buf_end = qbuf + strlen(qbuf);
+	    }
+#else /* !USE_LWRES */
+	    next_query->query.debugging = next_query->debugging;
+	    next_query->query.serial = next_query->qtid;
+	    next_query->query.len = sizeof(next_query->query);
+	    next_query->query.qmagic = ADNS_Q_MAGIC;
+	    next_query->query.type = next_query->type;
+	    buf_cur = (const void *)&next_query->query;
+	    buf_end = buf_cur + sizeof(next_query->query);
+#endif /* !USE_LWRES */
+	    next_query = next_query->next;
+	    adns_in_flight++;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+#ifdef USE_LWRES
+/* Process a line of lwdnsq answer.
+ * Returns with error message iff lwdnsq result is malformed.
+ * Most errors will be in DNS data and will be handled by cr->cont_fn.
+ */
+static err_t
+process_lwdnsq_answer(char *ts)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    char *rest;
+    char *p;
+    char *endofnumber;
+    struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
+    unsigned long qtid;
+    time_t anstime;	/* time of answer */
+    char *atype;	/* type of answer */
+    long ttl;	/* ttl of answer; int, but long for conversion */
+    bool AuthenticatedData = FALSE;
+    static char scratch_null_str[] = "";	/* cannot be const, but isn't written */
+
+    /* query transaction id */
+    rest = ts;
+    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq: answer missing query transaction ID";
+
+    qtid = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+	return "lwdnsq: malformed query transaction ID";
+
+    cr = continuation_for_qtid(qtid);
+    if (qtid != 0 && cr == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq: unrecognized qtid";     /* can't happen! */
+
+    /* time */
+    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq: missing time";
+
+    anstime = strtoul(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+	return "lwdnsq: malformed time";
+
+    /* TTL */
+    p = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (p == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq: missing TTL";
+
+    ttl = strtol(p, &endofnumber, 10);
+    if (*endofnumber != '\0')
+	return "lwdnsq: malformed TTL";
+
+    /* type */
+    atype = strsep(&rest, " \t");
+    if (atype == NULL)
+	return "lwdnsq: missing type";
+
+    /* if rest is NULL, make it "", otherwise eat whitespace after type */
+    rest = rest == NULL? scratch_null_str : rest + strspn(rest, " \t");
+
+    if (strncasecmp(atype, "AD-", 3) == 0)
+    {
+	AuthenticatedData = TRUE;
+	atype += 3;
+    }
+
+    /* deal with each type */
+
+    if (cr == NULL)
+    {
+	/* we don't actually know which this applies to */
+	return builddiag("lwdnsq: 0 qtid invalid with %s", atype);
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "START"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "DONE"))
+    {
+	if (!cr->used)
+	{
+	    /* "no results returned by lwdnsq" should not happen */
+	    cr->cont_fn(cr
+		, cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		  && cr->keys_from_dns == NULL
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+		    ? "no results returned by lwdnsq" : NULL);
+	    cr->used = TRUE;
+	}
+	reset_globals();
+	release_adns_continuation(cr);
+	adns_in_flight--;
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "RETRY"))
+    {
+	if (!cr->used)
+	{
+	    cr->cont_fn(cr, rest);
+	    cr->used = TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "FATAL"))
+    {
+	if (!cr->used)
+	{
+	    cr->cont_fn(cr, rest);
+	    cr->used = TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "DNSSEC"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "NAME"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "TXT"))
+    {
+	char *end = rest + strlen(rest);
+	err_t txt_ugh;
+
+	if (*rest == '"' && end[-1] == '"')
+	{
+	    /* strip those pesky quotes */
+	    rest++;
+	    *--end = '\0';
+	}
+
+	txt_ugh = process_txt_rr_body(rest
+	    , TRUE
+	    , AuthenticatedData? DAL_SIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC
+	    , cr);
+
+	if (txt_ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
+		DBG_log("error processing TXT resource record (%s) while processing: %s"
+			, txt_ugh, rest));
+	    cr->cont_fn(cr, txt_ugh);
+	    cr->used = TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "SIG"))
+    {
+	/* record the SIG records for posterity */
+	if (cr->last_info != NULL)
+	{
+	    pfreeany(cr->last_info->dns_sig);
+	    cr->last_info->dns_sig = clone_str(rest, "sigrecord");
+	}
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "A"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "AAAA"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "CNAME"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "CNAMEFROM"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "PTR"))
+    {
+	/* ignore */
+    }
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    else if (strcaseeq(atype, "KEY"))
+    {
+	err_t key_ugh = process_lwdnsq_key(rest
+	    , AuthenticatedData? DAL_SIGNED : DAL_NOTSEC
+	    , cr);
+
+	if (key_ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_DNS,
+		DBG_log("error processing KEY resource record (%s) while processing: %s"
+			, key_ugh, rest));
+	    cr->cont_fn(cr, key_ugh);
+	    cr->used = TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+    else
+    {
+	ugh = "lwdnsq: unrecognized type";
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+#endif /* USE_LWRES */
+
+static void
+recover_adns_die(void)
+{
+    struct adns_continuation *cr = NULL;
+    
+    adns_pid = 0;
+    if(adns_restart_count < ADNS_RESTART_MAX) {
+	adns_restart_count++;
+
+	/* next DNS query will restart it */
+
+	/* we have to walk the list of the outstanding requests,
+	 * and redo them!
+	 */
+
+	cr = continuations;
+
+	/* find the head of the list */
+	if(continuations != NULL) {
+	    for (; cr->previous != NULL; cr = cr->previous);
+	}
+	    
+	next_query = cr;
+
+	if(next_query != NULL) {
+	    unsent_ADNS_queries = TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void reset_adns_restart_count(void)
+{
+    adns_restart_count=0;
+}
+
+void
+handle_adns_answer(void)
+{
+  /* These are retained across calls to handle_adns_answer. */
+    static size_t buflen = 0;	/* bytes in answer buffer */
+#ifndef USE_LWRES
+    static struct adns_answer buf;
+#else /* USE_LWRES */
+    static char buf[LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX];
+    static char buf_copy[LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX];
+#endif /* USE_LWRES */
+
+    ssize_t n;
+
+    passert(buflen < sizeof(buf));
+    n = read(adns_afd, (unsigned char *)&buf + buflen, sizeof(buf) - buflen);
+
+    if (n < 0)
+    {
+	if (errno != EINTR)
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "error reading answer from adns"));
+	    /* ??? how can we recover? */
+	}
+	n = 0;	/* now n reflects amount read */
+    }
+    else if (n == 0)
+    {
+	/* EOF */
+	if (adns_in_flight != 0)
+	{
+	    plog("EOF from ADNS with %d queries outstanding (restarts %d)"
+		 , adns_in_flight, adns_restart_count);
+	    recover_adns_die();
+	}
+	if (buflen != 0)
+	{
+	    plog("EOF from ADNS with %lu bytes of a partial answer outstanding"
+		 "(restarts %d)"
+		 , (unsigned long)buflen
+		 ,  adns_restart_count);
+	    recover_adns_die();
+	}
+	stop_adns();
+	return;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	passert(adns_in_flight > 0);
+    }
+
+    buflen += n;
+#ifndef USE_LWRES
+    while (buflen >= offsetof(struct adns_answer, ans) && buflen >= buf.len)
+    {
+	/* we've got a tasty answer -- process it */
+	err_t ugh;
+	struct adns_continuation *cr = continuation_for_qtid(buf.serial);	/* assume it works */
+	const char *typename = rr_typename(cr->query.type);
+	const char *name_buf = cr->query.name_buf;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	passert(cr->keys_from_dns == NULL);
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	passert(cr->gateways_from_dns == NULL);
+	adns_in_flight--;
+	if (buf.result == -1)
+	{
+	    /* newer resolvers support statp->res_h_errno as well as h_errno.
+	     * That might be better, but older resolvers don't.
+	     * See resolver(3), if you have it.
+	     * The undocumented(!) h_errno values are defined in
+	     * /usr/include/netdb.h.
+	     */
+	    switch (buf.h_errno_val)
+	    {
+	    case NO_DATA:
+		ugh = builddiag("no %s record for %s", typename, name_buf);
+		break;
+	    case HOST_NOT_FOUND:
+		ugh = builddiag("no host %s for %s record", name_buf, typename);
+		break;
+	    default:
+		ugh = builddiag("failure querying DNS for %s of %s: %s"
+		    , typename, name_buf, hstrerror(buf.h_errno_val));
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (buf.result > (int) sizeof(buf.ans))
+	{
+	    ugh = builddiag("(INTERNAL ERROR) answer too long (%ld) for buffer"
+		, (long)buf.result);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    ugh = process_dns_answer(cr, buf.ans, buf.result);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		ugh = builddiag("failure processing %s record of DNS answer for %s: %s"
+		    , typename, name_buf, ugh);
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS,
+	    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+	    if (ugh == NULL)
+		DBG_log("asynch DNS answer %lu for %s of %s"
+		    , cr->query.serial, typename, name_buf);
+	    else
+		DBG_log("asynch DNS answer %lu %s", cr->query.serial, ugh);
+	    );
+
+	passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+	cr->cont_fn(cr, ugh);
+	reset_globals();
+	release_adns_continuation(cr);
+
+	/* shift out answer that we've consumed */
+	buflen -= buf.len;
+	memmove((unsigned char *)&buf, (unsigned char *)&buf + buf.len, buflen);
+    }
+#else /* USE_LWRES */
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	err_t ugh;
+	char *nlp = memchr(buf, '\n', buflen);
+
+	if (nlp == NULL)
+	    break;
+
+	/* we've got a line */
+	*nlp++ = '\0';
+
+	DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL | DBG_DNS
+	    , DBG_log("lwdns: %s", buf));
+
+	/* process lwdnsq_answer may modify buf, so make a copy. */
+	buf_copy[0]='\0';
+	strncat(buf_copy, buf, sizeof(buf_copy));
+
+	ugh = process_lwdnsq_answer(buf_copy);
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	    plog("failure processing lwdnsq output: %s; record: %s"
+		 , ugh, buf);
+
+	passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+	reset_globals();
+
+	/* shift out answer that we've consumed */
+	buflen -= nlp - buf;
+	memmove(buf, nlp, buflen);
+    }
+#endif /* USE_LWRES */
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/dnskey.h b/src/pluto/dnskey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0b9f0ee33
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/dnskey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/* Find public key in DNS
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: dnskey.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern int
+    adns_qfd,	/* file descriptor for sending queries to adns */
+    adns_afd;	/* file descriptor for receiving answers from adns */
+extern const char *pluto_adns_option;	/* path from --pluto_adns */
+extern void init_adns(void);
+extern void stop_adns(void);
+extern void handle_adns_answer(void);
+
+extern bool unsent_ADNS_queries;
+extern void send_unsent_ADNS_queries(void);
+
+/* (common prefix of) stuff remembered between async query and answer.
+ * Filled in by start_adns_query.
+ * Freed by call to release_adns_continuation.
+ */
+
+struct adns_continuation;	/* forward declaration (not far!) */
+
+typedef void (*cont_fn_t)(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh);
+
+struct adns_continuation {
+    unsigned long qtid;	/* query transaction id number */
+    int type;	/* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
+    cont_fn_t cont_fn;	/* function to carry on suspended work */
+    struct id id;	/* subject of query */
+    bool sgw_specified;
+    struct id sgw_id;	/* peer, if constrained */
+    lset_t debugging;	/* only used #ifdef DEBUG, but don't want layout to change */
+    struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns;	/* answer, if looking for our TXT rrs */
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    struct pubkey_list *keys_from_dns;	/* answer, if looking for KEY rrs */
+#endif
+    struct adns_continuation *previous, *next;
+    struct pubkey *last_info;  /* the last structure we accumulated */
+#ifdef USE_LWRES
+    bool used;	/* have we called the cont_fn yet? */
+    struct {
+	u_char name_buf[NS_MAXDNAME + 2];
+    } query;
+#else /* ! USE_LWRES */
+    struct adns_query query;
+#endif /* ! USE_LWRES */
+};
+
+extern err_t start_adns_query(const struct id *id	/* domain to query */
+    , const struct id *sgw_id	/* if non-null, any accepted gw_info must match */
+    , int type	/* T_TXT or T_KEY, selecting rr type of interest */
+    , cont_fn_t cont_fn	/* continuation function */
+    , struct adns_continuation *cr);
+
+
+/* Gateway info gleaned from reverse DNS of client */
+struct gw_info {
+    unsigned refcnt;	/* reference counted! */
+    unsigned pref;	/* preference: lower is better */
+#define NO_TIME ((time_t) -2)	/* time_t value meaning "not_yet" */
+    struct id client_id;	/* id of client of peer */
+    struct id gw_id;	/* id of peer (if id_is_ipaddr, .ip_addr is address) */
+    bool gw_key_present;
+    struct pubkey *key;
+    struct gw_info *next;
+};
+
+extern void gw_addref(struct gw_info *gw)
+    , gw_delref(struct gw_info **gwp);
+
+extern void reset_adns_restart_count(void);
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/dsa.c b/src/pluto/dsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c5982fbf4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/dsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,476 @@
+/* dsa.c  -  DSA signature scheme
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#ifdef PLUTO
+#include <gmp.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "gcryptfix.h"
+#else /*! PLUTO */
+/* #include <config.h> */
+#endif /* !PLUTO */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifndef PLUTO
+/* #include <assert.h> */
+/* #include "util.h" */
+/* #include "mpi.h" */
+/* #include "cipher.h" */
+#endif
+
+#include "dsa.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    MPI p;	    /* prime */
+    MPI q;	    /* group order */
+    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
+    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
+} DSA_public_key;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    MPI p;	    /* prime */
+    MPI q;	    /* group order */
+    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
+    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
+    MPI x;	    /* secret exponent */
+} DSA_secret_key;
+
+
+static MPI gen_k( MPI q );
+static void test_keys( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned qbits );
+static int  check_secret_key( DSA_secret_key *sk );
+static void generate( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **ret_factors );
+static void sign(MPI r, MPI s, MPI input, DSA_secret_key *skey);
+static int  verify(MPI r, MPI s, MPI input, DSA_public_key *pkey);
+
+static void
+progress( int c )
+{
+    fputc( c, stderr );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a random secret exponent k less than q
+ */
+static MPI
+gen_k( MPI q )
+{
+    MPI k = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(q) );
+    unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits(q);
+    unsigned int nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
+    char *rndbuf = NULL;
+
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_debug("choosing a random k ");
+    for(;;) {
+	if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	    progress('.');
+
+	if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 ) {
+	    m_free(rndbuf);
+	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 1, 1 );
+	}
+	else { /* change only some of the higher bits */
+	    /* we could imporove this by directly requesting more memory
+	     * at the first call to get_random_bits() and use this the here
+	     * maybe it is easier to do this directly in random.c */
+	    char *pp = get_random_bits( 32, 1, 1 );
+	    memcpy( rndbuf,pp, 4 );
+	    m_free(pp);
+	}
+	mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 );
+	if( mpi_test_bit( k, nbits-1 ) )
+	    mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
+	else {
+	    mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
+	    mpi_clear_bit( k, nbits-1 );
+	}
+
+	if( !(mpi_cmp( k, q ) < 0) ) {	/* check: k < q */
+	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+		progress('+');
+	    continue; /* no  */
+	}
+	if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) { /* check: k > 0 */
+	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+		progress('-');
+	    continue; /* no */
+	}
+	break;	/* okay */
+    }
+    m_free(rndbuf);
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	progress('\n');
+
+    return k;
+}
+
+
+static void
+test_keys( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned qbits )
+{
+    DSA_public_key pk;
+    MPI test = mpi_alloc( qbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    MPI out1_a = mpi_alloc( qbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    MPI out1_b = mpi_alloc( qbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+
+    pk.p = sk->p;
+    pk.q = sk->q;
+    pk.g = sk->g;
+    pk.y = sk->y;
+    /*mpi_set_bytes( test, qbits, get_random_byte, 0 );*/
+    {	char *p = get_random_bits( qbits, 0, 0 );
+	mpi_set_buffer( test, p, (qbits+7)/8, 0 );
+	m_free(p);
+    }
+
+    sign( out1_a, out1_b, test, sk );
+    if( !verify( out1_a, out1_b, test, &pk ) )
+	log_fatal("DSA:: sign, verify failed\n");
+
+    mpi_free( test );
+    mpi_free( out1_a );
+    mpi_free( out1_b );
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a DSA key pair with a key of size NBITS
+ * Returns: 2 structures filled with all needed values
+ *	    and an array with the n-1 factors of (p-1)
+ */
+static void
+generate( DSA_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **ret_factors )
+{
+    MPI p;    /* the prime */
+    MPI q;    /* the 160 bit prime factor */
+    MPI g;    /* the generator */
+    MPI y;    /* g^x mod p */
+    MPI x;    /* the secret exponent */
+    MPI h, e;  /* helper */
+    unsigned qbits;
+    byte *rndbuf;
+
+    assert( nbits >= 512 && nbits <= 1024 );
+
+    qbits = 160;
+    p = generate_elg_prime( 1, nbits, qbits, NULL, ret_factors );
+    /* get q out of factors */
+    q = mpi_copy((*ret_factors)[0]);
+    if( mpi_get_nbits(q) != qbits )
+	BUG();
+
+    /* find a generator g (h and e are helpers)*/
+    /* e = (p-1)/q */
+    e = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
+    mpi_sub_ui( e, p, 1 );
+    mpi_fdiv_q( e, e, q );
+    g = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
+    h = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 1 ); /* we start with 2 */
+    do {
+	mpi_add_ui( h, h, 1 );
+	/* g = h^e mod p */
+	mpi_powm( g, h, e, p );
+    } while( !mpi_cmp_ui( g, 1 ) );  /* continue until g != 1 */
+
+    /* select a random number which has these properties:
+     *	 0 < x < q-1
+     * This must be a very good random number because this
+     * is the secret part. */
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_debug("choosing a random x ");
+    assert( qbits >= 160 );
+    x = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs(q) );
+    mpi_sub_ui( h, q, 1 );  /* put q-1 into h */
+    rndbuf = NULL;
+    do {
+	if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	    progress('.');
+	if( !rndbuf )
+	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( qbits, 2, 1 );
+	else { /* change only some of the higher bits (= 2 bytes)*/
+	    char *r = get_random_bits( 16, 2, 1 );
+	    memcpy(rndbuf, r, 16/8 );
+	    m_free(r);
+	}
+	mpi_set_buffer( x, rndbuf, (qbits+7)/8, 0 );
+	mpi_clear_highbit( x, qbits+1 );
+    } while( !( mpi_cmp_ui( x, 0 )>0 && mpi_cmp( x, h )<0 ) );
+    m_free(rndbuf);
+    mpi_free( e );
+    mpi_free( h );
+
+    /* y = g^x mod p */
+    y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
+    mpi_powm( y, g, x, p );
+
+    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+	progress('\n');
+	log_mpidump("dsa  p= ", p );
+	log_mpidump("dsa  q= ", q );
+	log_mpidump("dsa  g= ", g );
+	log_mpidump("dsa  y= ", y );
+	log_mpidump("dsa  x= ", x );
+    }
+
+    /* copy the stuff to the key structures */
+    sk->p = p;
+    sk->q = q;
+    sk->g = g;
+    sk->y = y;
+    sk->x = x;
+
+    /* now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */
+    test_keys( sk, qbits );
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Test whether the secret key is valid.
+ * Returns: if this is a valid key.
+ */
+static int
+check_secret_key( DSA_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    int rc;
+    MPI y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->y) );
+
+    mpi_powm( y, sk->g, sk->x, sk->p );
+    rc = !mpi_cmp( y, sk->y );
+    mpi_free( y );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+
+/****************
+ * Make a DSA signature from HASH and put it into r and s.
+ */
+
+static void
+sign(MPI r, MPI s, MPI hash, DSA_secret_key *skey )
+{
+    MPI k;
+    MPI kinv;
+    MPI tmp;
+
+    /* select a random k with 0 < k < q */
+    k = gen_k( skey->q );
+
+    /* r = (a^k mod p) mod q */
+    mpi_powm( r, skey->g, k, skey->p );
+    mpi_fdiv_r( r, r, skey->q );
+
+    /* kinv = k^(-1) mod q */
+    kinv = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(k) );
+    mpi_invm(kinv, k, skey->q );
+
+    /* s = (kinv * ( hash + x * r)) mod q */
+    tmp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(skey->p) );
+    mpi_mul( tmp, skey->x, r );
+    mpi_add( tmp, tmp, hash );
+    mpi_mulm( s , kinv, tmp, skey->q );
+
+    mpi_free(k);
+    mpi_free(kinv);
+    mpi_free(tmp);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Returns true if the signature composed from R and S is valid.
+ */
+static int
+verify(MPI r, MPI s, MPI hash, DSA_public_key *pkey )
+{
+    int rc;
+    MPI w, u1, u2, v;
+    MPI base[3];
+    MPI exp[3];
+
+
+    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( r, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( r, pkey->q ) < 0) )
+	return 0; /* assertion	0 < r < q  failed */
+    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( s, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( s, pkey->q ) < 0) )
+	return 0; /* assertion	0 < s < q  failed */
+
+    w  = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->q) );
+    u1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->q) );
+    u2 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->q) );
+    v  = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(pkey->p) );
+
+    /* w = s^(-1) mod q */
+    mpi_invm( w, s, pkey->q );
+
+    /* u1 = (hash * w) mod q */
+    mpi_mulm( u1, hash, w, pkey->q );
+
+    /* u2 = r * w mod q  */
+    mpi_mulm( u2, r, w, pkey->q );
+
+    /* v =  g^u1 * y^u2 mod p mod q */
+    base[0] = pkey->g; exp[0] = u1;
+    base[1] = pkey->y; exp[1] = u2;
+    base[2] = NULL;    exp[2] = NULL;
+    mpi_mulpowm( v, base, exp, pkey->p );
+    mpi_fdiv_r( v, v, pkey->q );
+
+    rc = !mpi_cmp( v, r );
+
+    mpi_free(w);
+    mpi_free(u1);
+    mpi_free(u2);
+    mpi_free(v);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*********************************************
+ **************  interface  ******************
+ *********************************************/
+
+int
+dsa_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors )
+{
+    DSA_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+
+    generate( &sk, nbits, retfactors );
+    skey[0] = sk.p;
+    skey[1] = sk.q;
+    skey[2] = sk.g;
+    skey[3] = sk.y;
+    skey[4] = sk.x;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+int
+dsa_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
+{
+    DSA_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] || !skey[4] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    sk.p = skey[0];
+    sk.q = skey[1];
+    sk.g = skey[2];
+    sk.y = skey[3];
+    sk.x = skey[4];
+    if( !check_secret_key( &sk ) )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+dsa_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey )
+{
+    DSA_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !data || !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] || !skey[4] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    sk.p = skey[0];
+    sk.q = skey[1];
+    sk.g = skey[2];
+    sk.y = skey[3];
+    sk.x = skey[4];
+    resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
+    resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
+    sign( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+dsa_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
+		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI) UNUSED, void *opaquev UNUSED)
+{
+    DSA_public_key pk;
+
+    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !data[0] || !data[1] || !hash
+	|| !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] || !pkey[3] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    pk.p = pkey[0];
+    pk.q = pkey[1];
+    pk.g = pkey[2];
+    pk.y = pkey[3];
+    if( !verify( data[0], data[1], hash, &pk ) )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+unsigned
+dsa_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey )
+{
+    if( algo != PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA )
+	return 0;
+    return mpi_get_nbits( pkey[0] );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return some information about the algorithm.  We need algo here to
+ * distinguish different flavors of the algorithm.
+ * Returns: A pointer to string describing the algorithm or NULL if
+ *	    the ALGO is invalid.
+ * Usage: Bit 0 set : allows signing
+ *	      1 set : allows encryption
+ */
+const char *
+dsa_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey, int *nenc, int *nsig,
+							 int *use )
+{
+    *npkey = 4;
+    *nskey = 5;
+    *nenc = 0;
+    *nsig = 2;
+
+    switch( algo ) {
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA:   *use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG; return "DSA";
+      default: *use = 0; return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/dsa.h b/src/pluto/dsa.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1456d65b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/dsa.h
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/* dsa.h  -  DSA signature scheme
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+#ifndef G10_DSA_H
+#define G10_DSA_H
+
+int dsa_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors );
+int dsa_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey );
+int dsa_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey );
+int dsa_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
+		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI), void *opaquev );
+unsigned dsa_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey );
+const char *dsa_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey,
+				    int *nenc, int *nsig, int *use );
+
+#endif /*G10_DSA_H*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/elgamal.c b/src/pluto/elgamal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0c099bb90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/elgamal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,613 @@
+/* elgamal.c  -  ElGamal Public Key encryption
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * For a description of the algorithm, see:
+ *   Bruce Schneier: Applied Cryptography. John Wiley & Sons, 1996.
+ *   ISBN 0-471-11709-9. Pages 476 ff.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#ifdef PLUTO
+#include <gmp.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "gcryptfix.h"
+#else /*! PLUTO */
+/* #include <config.h> */
+#endif /* !PLUTO */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifndef PLUTO
+/* #include "util.h" */
+/* #include "mpi.h" */
+/* #include "cipher.h" */
+#endif
+
+#include "elgamal.h"
+
+typedef struct {
+    MPI p;	    /* prime */
+    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
+    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
+} ELG_public_key;
+
+
+typedef struct {
+    MPI p;	    /* prime */
+    MPI g;	    /* group generator */
+    MPI y;	    /* g^x mod p */
+    MPI x;	    /* secret exponent */
+} ELG_secret_key;
+
+
+static void test_keys( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits );
+static MPI gen_k( MPI p );
+static void generate( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **factors );
+static int  check_secret_key( ELG_secret_key *sk );
+static void encrypt(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey );
+static void decrypt(MPI output, MPI a, MPI b, ELG_secret_key *skey );
+static void sign(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_secret_key *skey);
+static int  verify(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey);
+
+
+static void
+progress( int c )
+{
+    fputc( c, stderr );
+}
+
+
+static void
+test_keys( ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits )
+{
+    ELG_public_key pk;
+    MPI test = mpi_alloc( 0 );
+    MPI out1_a = mpi_alloc( nbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    MPI out1_b = mpi_alloc( nbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    MPI out2 = mpi_alloc( nbits / BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+
+    pk.p = sk->p;
+    pk.g = sk->g;
+    pk.y = sk->y;
+
+    /*mpi_set_bytes( test, nbits, get_random_byte, 0 );*/
+    {	char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, 0, 0 );
+	mpi_set_buffer( test, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
+	m_free(p);
+    }
+
+    encrypt( out1_a, out1_b, test, &pk );
+    decrypt( out2, out1_a, out1_b, sk );
+    if( mpi_cmp( test, out2 ) )
+	log_fatal("ElGamal operation: encrypt, decrypt failed\n");
+
+    sign( out1_a, out1_b, test, sk );
+    if( !verify( out1_a, out1_b, test, &pk ) )
+	log_fatal("ElGamal operation: sign, verify failed\n");
+
+    mpi_free( test );
+    mpi_free( out1_a );
+    mpi_free( out1_b );
+    mpi_free( out2 );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * generate a random secret exponent k from prime p, so
+ * that k is relatively prime to p-1
+ */
+static MPI
+gen_k( MPI p )
+{
+    MPI k = mpi_alloc_secure( 0 );
+    MPI temp = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(p) );
+    MPI p_1 = mpi_copy(p);
+    unsigned int nbits = mpi_get_nbits(p);
+    unsigned int nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
+    char *rndbuf = NULL;
+
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_debug("choosing a random k ");
+    mpi_sub_ui( p_1, p, 1);
+    for(;;) {
+	if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	    progress('.');
+	if( !rndbuf || nbits < 32 ) {
+	    m_free(rndbuf);
+	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 1, 1 );
+	}
+	else { /* change only some of the higher bits */
+	    /* we could imporove this by directly requesting more memory
+	     * at the first call to get_random_bits() and use this the here
+	     * maybe it is easier to do this directly in random.c */
+	    char *pp = get_random_bits( 32, 1, 1 );
+	    memcpy( rndbuf,pp, 4 );
+	    m_free(pp);
+	}
+	mpi_set_buffer( k, rndbuf, nbytes, 0 );
+
+	for(;;) {
+	    /* make sure that the number is of the exact lenght */
+	    if( mpi_test_bit( k, nbits-1 ) )
+		mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
+	    else {
+		mpi_set_highbit( k, nbits-1 );
+		mpi_clear_bit( k, nbits-1 );
+	    }
+	    if( !(mpi_cmp( k, p_1 ) < 0) ) {  /* check: k < (p-1) */
+		if( DBG_CIPHER )
+		    progress('+');
+		break; /* no  */
+	    }
+	    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( k, 0 ) > 0) ) { /* check: k > 0 */
+		if( DBG_CIPHER )
+		    progress('-');
+		break; /* no */
+	    }
+	    if( mpi_gcd( temp, k, p_1 ) )
+		goto found;  /* okay, k is relatively prime to (p-1) */
+	    mpi_add_ui( k, k, 1 );
+	}
+    }
+  found:
+    m_free(rndbuf);
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	progress('\n');
+    mpi_free(p_1);
+    mpi_free(temp);
+
+    return k;
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a key pair with a key of size NBITS
+ * Returns: 2 structures filles with all needed values
+ *	    and an array with n-1 factors of (p-1)
+ */
+static void
+generate(  ELG_secret_key *sk, unsigned nbits, MPI **ret_factors )
+{
+    MPI p;    /* the prime */
+    MPI p_min1;
+    MPI g;
+    MPI x;    /* the secret exponent */
+    MPI y;
+    MPI temp;
+    unsigned qbits;
+    byte *rndbuf;
+
+    p_min1 = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    temp   = mpi_alloc( (nbits+BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB-1)/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    if( nbits < 512 )
+	qbits = 120;
+    else if( nbits <= 1024 )
+	qbits = 160;
+    else if( nbits <= 2048 )
+	qbits = 200;
+    else
+	qbits = 240;
+    g = mpi_alloc(1);
+    p = generate_elg_prime( 0, nbits, qbits, g, ret_factors );
+    mpi_sub_ui(p_min1, p, 1);
+
+
+    /* select a random number which has these properties:
+     *	 0 < x < p-1
+     * This must be a very good random number because this is the
+     * secret part.  The prime is public and may be shared anyway,
+     * so a random generator level of 1 is used for the prime.
+     */
+    x = mpi_alloc_secure( nbits/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_debug("choosing a random x ");
+    rndbuf = NULL;
+    do {
+	if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	    progress('.');
+	if( rndbuf ) { /* change only some of the higher bits */
+	    if( nbits < 16 ) {/* should never happen ... */
+		m_free(rndbuf);
+		rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 2, 1 );
+	    }
+	    else {
+		char *r = get_random_bits( 16, 2, 1 );
+		memcpy(rndbuf, r, 16/8 );
+		m_free(r);
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    rndbuf = get_random_bits( nbits, 2, 1 );
+	mpi_set_buffer( x, rndbuf, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
+	mpi_clear_highbit( x, nbits+1 );
+    } while( !( mpi_cmp_ui( x, 0 )>0 && mpi_cmp( x, p_min1 )<0 ) );
+    m_free(rndbuf);
+
+    y = mpi_alloc(nbits/BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB);
+    mpi_powm( y, g, x, p );
+
+    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+	progress('\n');
+	log_mpidump("elg  p= ", p );
+	log_mpidump("elg  g= ", g );
+	log_mpidump("elg  y= ", y );
+	log_mpidump("elg  x= ", x );
+    }
+
+    /* copy the stuff to the key structures */
+    sk->p = p;
+    sk->g = g;
+    sk->y = y;
+    sk->x = x;
+
+    /* now we can test our keys (this should never fail!) */
+    test_keys( sk, nbits - 64 );
+
+    mpi_free( p_min1 );
+    mpi_free( temp   );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Test whether the secret key is valid.
+ * Returns: if this is a valid key.
+ */
+static int
+check_secret_key( ELG_secret_key *sk )
+{
+    int rc;
+    MPI y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(sk->y) );
+
+    mpi_powm( y, sk->g, sk->x, sk->p );
+    rc = !mpi_cmp( y, sk->y );
+    mpi_free( y );
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+encrypt(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
+{
+    MPI k;
+
+    /* Note: maybe we should change the interface, so that it
+     * is possible to check that input is < p and return an
+     * error code.
+     */
+
+    k = gen_k( pkey->p );
+    mpi_powm( a, pkey->g, k, pkey->p );
+    /* b = (y^k * input) mod p
+     *	 = ((y^k mod p) * (input mod p)) mod p
+     * and because input is < p
+     *	 = ((y^k mod p) * input) mod p
+     */
+    mpi_powm( b, pkey->y, k, pkey->p );
+    mpi_mulm( b, b, input, pkey->p );
+  #if 0
+    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+	log_mpidump("elg encrypted y= ", pkey->y);
+	log_mpidump("elg encrypted p= ", pkey->p);
+	log_mpidump("elg encrypted k= ", k);
+	log_mpidump("elg encrypted M= ", input);
+	log_mpidump("elg encrypted a= ", a);
+	log_mpidump("elg encrypted b= ", b);
+    }
+  #endif
+    mpi_free(k);
+}
+
+
+
+
+static void
+decrypt(MPI output, MPI a, MPI b, ELG_secret_key *skey )
+{
+    MPI t1 = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( skey->p ) );
+
+    /* output = b/(a^x) mod p */
+
+    mpi_powm( t1, a, skey->x, skey->p );
+    mpi_invm( t1, t1, skey->p );
+    mpi_mulm( output, b, t1, skey->p );
+  #if 0
+    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+	log_mpidump("elg decrypted x= ", skey->x);
+	log_mpidump("elg decrypted p= ", skey->p);
+	log_mpidump("elg decrypted a= ", a);
+	log_mpidump("elg decrypted b= ", b);
+	log_mpidump("elg decrypted M= ", output);
+    }
+  #endif
+    mpi_free(t1);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Make an Elgamal signature out of INPUT
+ */
+
+static void
+sign(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_secret_key *skey )
+{
+    MPI k;
+    MPI t   = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
+    MPI inv = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
+    MPI p_1 = mpi_copy(skey->p);
+
+   /*
+    * b = (t * inv) mod (p-1)
+    * b = (t * inv(k,(p-1),(p-1)) mod (p-1)
+    * b = (((M-x*a) mod (p-1)) * inv(k,(p-1),(p-1))) mod (p-1)
+    *
+    */
+    mpi_sub_ui(p_1, p_1, 1);
+    k = gen_k( skey->p );
+    mpi_powm( a, skey->g, k, skey->p );
+    mpi_mul(t, skey->x, a );
+    mpi_subm(t, input, t, p_1 );
+    while( mpi_is_neg(t) )
+	mpi_add(t, t, p_1);
+    mpi_invm(inv, k, p_1 );
+    mpi_mulm(b, t, inv, p_1 );
+
+  #if 0
+    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+	log_mpidump("elg sign p= ", skey->p);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign g= ", skey->g);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign y= ", skey->y);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign x= ", skey->x);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign k= ", k);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign M= ", input);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign a= ", a);
+	log_mpidump("elg sign b= ", b);
+    }
+  #endif
+    mpi_free(k);
+    mpi_free(t);
+    mpi_free(inv);
+    mpi_free(p_1);
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Returns true if the signature composed of A and B is valid.
+ */
+static int
+verify(MPI a, MPI b, MPI input, ELG_public_key *pkey )
+{
+    int rc;
+    MPI t1;
+    MPI t2;
+    MPI base[4];
+    MPI exp[4];
+
+    if( !(mpi_cmp_ui( a, 0 ) > 0 && mpi_cmp( a, pkey->p ) < 0) )
+	return 0; /* assertion	0 < a < p  failed */
+
+    t1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
+    t2 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(a) );
+
+  #if 0
+    /* t1 = (y^a mod p) * (a^b mod p) mod p */
+    mpi_powm( t1, pkey->y, a, pkey->p );
+    mpi_powm( t2, a, b, pkey->p );
+    mpi_mulm( t1, t1, t2, pkey->p );
+
+    /* t2 = g ^ input mod p */
+    mpi_powm( t2, pkey->g, input, pkey->p );
+
+    rc = !mpi_cmp( t1, t2 );
+  #elif 0
+    /* t1 = (y^a mod p) * (a^b mod p) mod p */
+    base[0] = pkey->y; exp[0] = a;
+    base[1] = a;       exp[1] = b;
+    base[2] = NULL;    exp[2] = NULL;
+    mpi_mulpowm( t1, base, exp, pkey->p );
+
+    /* t2 = g ^ input mod p */
+    mpi_powm( t2, pkey->g, input, pkey->p );
+
+    rc = !mpi_cmp( t1, t2 );
+  #else
+    /* t1 = g ^ - input * y ^ a * a ^ b  mod p */
+    mpi_invm(t2, pkey->g, pkey->p );
+    base[0] = t2     ; exp[0] = input;
+    base[1] = pkey->y; exp[1] = a;
+    base[2] = a;       exp[2] = b;
+    base[3] = NULL;    exp[3] = NULL;
+    mpi_mulpowm( t1, base, exp, pkey->p );
+    rc = !mpi_cmp_ui( t1, 1 );
+
+  #endif
+
+    mpi_free(t1);
+    mpi_free(t2);
+    return rc;
+}
+
+/*********************************************
+ **************  interface  ******************
+ *********************************************/
+
+int
+elg_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors )
+{
+    ELG_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+
+    generate( &sk, nbits, retfactors );
+    skey[0] = sk.p;
+    skey[1] = sk.g;
+    skey[2] = sk.y;
+    skey[3] = sk.x;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+int
+elg_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey )
+{
+    ELG_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    sk.p = skey[0];
+    sk.g = skey[1];
+    sk.y = skey[2];
+    sk.x = skey[3];
+    if( !check_secret_key( &sk ) )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY;
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+int
+elg_encrypt( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *pkey )
+{
+    ELG_public_key pk;
+
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !data || !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    pk.p = pkey[0];
+    pk.g = pkey[1];
+    pk.y = pkey[2];
+    resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( pk.p ) );
+    resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( pk.p ) );
+    encrypt( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &pk );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+elg_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey )
+{
+    ELG_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !data[0] || !data[1]
+	|| !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    sk.p = skey[0];
+    sk.g = skey[1];
+    sk.y = skey[2];
+    sk.x = skey[3];
+    *result = mpi_alloc_secure( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
+    decrypt( *result, data[0], data[1], &sk );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+elg_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey )
+{
+    ELG_secret_key sk;
+
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !data || !skey[0] || !skey[1] || !skey[2] || !skey[3] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    sk.p = skey[0];
+    sk.g = skey[1];
+    sk.y = skey[2];
+    sk.x = skey[3];
+    resarr[0] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
+    resarr[1] = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( sk.p ) );
+    sign( resarr[0], resarr[1], data, &sk );
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int
+elg_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
+		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI) UNUSED, void *opaquev UNUSED)
+{
+    ELG_public_key pk;
+
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO;
+    if( !data[0] || !data[1] || !hash
+	|| !pkey[0] || !pkey[1] || !pkey[2] )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_MPI;
+
+    pk.p = pkey[0];
+    pk.g = pkey[1];
+    pk.y = pkey[2];
+    if( !verify( data[0], data[1], hash, &pk ) )
+	return G10ERR_BAD_SIGN;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+
+unsigned
+elg_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey )
+{
+    if( !is_ELGAMAL(algo) )
+	return 0;
+    return mpi_get_nbits( pkey[0] );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return some information about the algorithm.  We need algo here to
+ * distinguish different flavors of the algorithm.
+ * Returns: A pointer to string describing the algorithm or NULL if
+ *	    the ALGO is invalid.
+ * Usage: Bit 0 set : allows signing
+ *	      1 set : allows encryption
+ * NOTE: This function allows signing also for ELG-E, which is not
+ * okay but a bad hack to allow to work with old gpg keys. The real check
+ * is done in the gnupg ocde depending on the packet version.
+ */
+const char *
+elg_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey, int *nenc, int *nsig,
+							 int *use )
+{
+    *npkey = 3;
+    *nskey = 4;
+    *nenc = 2;
+    *nsig = 2;
+
+    switch( algo ) {
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL:
+	*use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	return "ELG";
+      case PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E:
+	*use = PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG|PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC;
+	return "ELG-E";
+      default: *use = 0; return NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/elgamal.h b/src/pluto/elgamal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f104c2a52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/elgamal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+/* elgamal.h
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+#ifndef G10_ELGAMAL_H
+#define G10_ELGAMAL_H
+
+int elg_generate( int algo, unsigned nbits, MPI *skey, MPI **retfactors );
+int elg_check_secret_key( int algo, MPI *skey );
+int elg_encrypt( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *pkey );
+int elg_decrypt( int algo, MPI *result, MPI *data, MPI *skey );
+int elg_sign( int algo, MPI *resarr, MPI data, MPI *skey );
+int elg_verify( int algo, MPI hash, MPI *data, MPI *pkey,
+		    int (*cmp)(void *, MPI), void *opaquev );
+unsigned elg_get_nbits( int algo, MPI *pkey );
+const char *elg_get_info( int algo, int *npkey, int *nskey,
+				    int *nenc, int *nsig, int *use );
+
+
+#endif /*G10_ELGAMAL_H*/
diff --git a/src/pluto/fetch.c b/src/pluto/fetch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e3e56d3a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/fetch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1081 @@
+/* Dynamic fetching of X.509 CRLs
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Stephane Laroche <stephane.laroche@colubris.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: fetch.c,v 1.12 2006/05/16 14:19:27 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef THREADS
+#include <pthread.h>
+#endif
+
+#ifdef LIBCURL
+#include <curl/curl.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#ifdef LIBLDAP
+#include <ldap.h>
+#endif
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "pem.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "ocsp.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+
+fetch_req_t empty_fetch_req = {
+    NULL    , /* next */
+          0 , /* installed */
+          0 , /* trials */
+  { NULL, 0}, /* issuer */
+  { NULL, 0}, /* authKeyID */
+  { NULL, 0}, /* authKeySerialNumber */
+    NULL      /* distributionPoints */
+};
+
+/* chained list of crl fetch requests */
+static fetch_req_t *crl_fetch_reqs  = NULL;
+
+/* chained list of ocsp fetch requests */
+static ocsp_location_t *ocsp_fetch_reqs = NULL;
+
+#ifdef THREADS
+static pthread_t thread;
+static pthread_mutex_t certs_and_keys_mutex  = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t authcert_list_mutex   = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t crl_list_mutex        = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t ocsp_cache_mutex      = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t ca_info_list_mutex    = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t crl_fetch_list_mutex  = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t ocsp_fetch_list_mutex = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_mutex_t fetch_wake_mutex      = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+static pthread_cond_t  fetch_wake_cond       = PTHREAD_COND_INITIALIZER;
+
+/*
+ * lock access to my certs and keys
+ */
+void
+lock_certs_and_keys(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&certs_and_keys_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("certs and keys locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to my certs and keys
+ */
+void
+unlock_certs_and_keys(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("certs and keys unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&certs_and_keys_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock access to the chained authcert list
+ */
+void
+lock_authcert_list(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&authcert_list_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("authcert list locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to the chained authcert list
+ */
+void
+unlock_authcert_list(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("authcert list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&authcert_list_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock access to the chained crl list
+ */
+void
+lock_crl_list(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&crl_list_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("crl list locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to the chained crl list
+ */
+void
+unlock_crl_list(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("crl list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&crl_list_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock access to the ocsp cache
+ */
+extern void
+lock_ocsp_cache(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&ocsp_cache_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("ocsp cache locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to the ocsp cache
+ */
+extern void
+unlock_ocsp_cache(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("ocsp cache unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ocsp_cache_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock access to the ca info list
+ */
+extern void
+lock_ca_info_list(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&ca_info_list_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("ca info list locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to the ca info list
+ */
+extern void
+unlock_ca_info_list(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("ca info list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ca_info_list_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock access to the chained crl fetch request list
+ */
+static void
+lock_crl_fetch_list(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&crl_fetch_list_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("crl fetch request list locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to the chained crl fetch request list
+ */
+static void
+unlock_crl_fetch_list(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("crl fetch request list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&crl_fetch_list_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * lock access to the chained ocsp fetch request list
+ */
+static void
+lock_ocsp_fetch_list(const char *who)
+{
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&ocsp_fetch_list_mutex);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("ocsp fetch request list locked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+}
+
+/*
+ * unlock access to the chained ocsp fetch request list
+ */
+static void
+unlock_ocsp_fetch_list(const char *who)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("ocsp fetch request list unlocked by '%s'", who)
+    )
+    pthread_mutex_unlock(&ocsp_fetch_list_mutex);
+}
+
+/*
+ * wakes up the sleeping fetch thread
+ */
+void
+wake_fetch_thread(const char *who)
+{
+    if (crl_check_interval > 0)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	    DBG_log("fetch thread wake call by '%s'", who)
+	)
+	pthread_mutex_lock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
+	pthread_cond_signal(&fetch_wake_cond);
+	pthread_mutex_unlock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
+    }
+}
+#else /* !THREADS */
+#define lock_crl_fetch_list(who)    /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_crl_fetch_list(who)  /* do nothing */
+#define lock_ocsp_fetch_list(who)   /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_ocsp_fetch_list(who) /* do nothing */
+#endif /* !THREADS */
+
+/*
+ *  free the dynamic memory used to store fetch requests
+ */
+static void
+free_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req)
+{
+    pfree(req->issuer.ptr);
+    pfreeany(req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr);
+    pfreeany(req->authKeyID.ptr);
+    free_generalNames(req->distributionPoints, TRUE);
+    pfree(req);
+}
+
+/* writes data into a dynamically resizeable chunk_t
+ * needed for libcurl responses
+ */
+size_t
+write_buffer(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *data)
+{
+    size_t realsize = size * nmemb;
+    chunk_t *mem = (chunk_t*)data;
+
+    mem->ptr = (u_char *)realloc(mem->ptr, mem->len + realsize);
+    if (mem->ptr) {
+	memcpy(&(mem->ptr[mem->len]), ptr, realsize);
+	mem->len += realsize;
+    }
+    return realsize;
+}
+
+#ifdef THREADS
+/*
+ * fetches a binary blob from a url with libcurl
+ */
+static err_t
+fetch_curl(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
+{
+#ifdef LIBCURL
+    char errorbuffer[CURL_ERROR_SIZE] = "";
+    chunk_t response = empty_chunk;
+    CURLcode res;
+
+    /* get it with libcurl */
+    CURL *curl = curl_easy_init();
+
+    if (curl != NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("Trying cURL '%s'", url)
+	)
+
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, url);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_buffer);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, (void *)&response);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, &errorbuffer);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, TRUE);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT);
+
+	res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
+
+	if (res == CURLE_OK)
+	{
+	    blob->len = response.len;
+	    blob->ptr = alloc_bytes(response.len, "curl blob");
+	    memcpy(blob->ptr, response.ptr, response.len);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("fetching uri (%s) with libcurl failed: %s", url, errorbuffer);
+	}
+	curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
+	/* not using freeanychunk because of realloc (no leak detective) */
+	curl_free(response.ptr);
+    }
+    return strlen(errorbuffer) > 0 ? "libcurl error" : NULL;
+#else   /* !LIBCURL */
+    return "warning: not compiled with libcurl support";
+#endif  /* !LIBCURL */
+}
+
+#ifdef LIBLDAP
+/*
+ * parses the result returned by an ldap query
+ */
+static err_t
+parse_ldap_result(LDAP * ldap, LDAPMessage *result, chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    LDAPMessage * entry = ldap_first_entry(ldap, result);
+
+    if (entry != NULL)
+    {
+	BerElement *ber = NULL;
+	char *attr;
+	
+	attr = ldap_first_attribute(ldap, entry, &ber);
+
+	if (attr != NULL)
+	{
+	    struct berval **values = ldap_get_values_len(ldap, entry, attr);
+
+	    if (values != NULL)
+	    {
+		if (values[0] != NULL)
+		{
+		    blob->len = values[0]->bv_len;
+		    blob->ptr = alloc_bytes(blob->len, "ldap blob");
+		    memcpy(blob->ptr, values[0]->bv_val, blob->len);
+		    if (values[1] != NULL)
+		    {
+			plog("warning: more than one value was fetched from LDAP URL");
+		    }
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    ugh = "no values in attribute";
+		}
+		ldap_value_free_len(values);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		ugh = ldap_err2string(ldap_result2error(ldap, entry, 0));
+	    }
+	    ldap_memfree(attr);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    ugh = ldap_err2string(ldap_result2error(ldap, entry, 0));
+	}
+	ber_free(ber, 0);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ugh = ldap_err2string(ldap_result2error(ldap, result, 0));
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * fetches a binary blob from an ldap url
+ */
+static err_t
+fetch_ldap_url(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    LDAPURLDesc *lurl;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    int rc;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("Trying LDAP URL '%s'", url)
+    )
+
+    rc = ldap_url_parse(url, &lurl);
+    
+    if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS)
+    {
+	LDAP *ldap = ldap_init(lurl->lud_host, lurl->lud_port);
+
+	if (ldap != NULL)
+	{
+	    int ldap_version = LDAP_VERSION3;
+	    struct timeval timeout;
+
+	    timeout.tv_sec  = FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT;
+	    timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+	    ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_PROTOCOL_VERSION, &ldap_version);
+	    ldap_set_option(ldap, LDAP_OPT_NETWORK_TIMEOUT, &timeout);
+
+	    rc = ldap_simple_bind_s(ldap, NULL, NULL);
+
+	    if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS)
+	    {
+		LDAPMessage *result;
+
+		timeout.tv_sec = FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT;
+		timeout.tv_usec = 0;
+		
+		rc = ldap_search_st(ldap, lurl->lud_dn
+					, lurl->lud_scope
+					, lurl->lud_filter
+					, lurl->lud_attrs
+					, 0, &timeout, &result);
+
+		if (rc == LDAP_SUCCESS)
+		{
+		    ugh = parse_ldap_result(ldap, result, blob);
+		    ldap_msgfree(result);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    ugh = ldap_err2string(rc);
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		ugh = ldap_err2string(rc);
+	    }
+	    ldap_unbind_s(ldap);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    ugh = "ldap init";
+	}
+	ldap_free_urldesc(lurl);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ugh = ldap_err2string(rc);
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+#else   /* !LIBLDAP */
+static err_t
+fetch_ldap_url(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    return "LDAP URL fetching not activated in pluto source code";
+}
+#endif  /* !LIBLDAP */
+
+/*
+ * fetch an ASN.1 blob coded in PEM or DER format from a URL
+ */
+static err_t
+fetch_asn1_blob(char *url, chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    if (strlen(url) >= 4 && strncasecmp(url, "ldap", 4) == 0)
+    {
+	ugh = fetch_ldap_url(url, blob);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ugh = fetch_curl(url, blob);
+    }
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+	return ugh;
+
+    if (is_asn1(*blob))
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  fetched blob coded in DER format")
+	)
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	bool pgp = FALSE;
+
+	ugh = pemtobin(blob, NULL, "", &pgp);
+	if (ugh == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (is_asn1(*blob))
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		    DBG_log("  fetched blob coded in PEM format")
+		)
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		ugh = "blob coded in unknown format";
+		pfree(blob->ptr);
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    pfree(blob->ptr);
+	}
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * complete a distributionPoint URI with ca information
+ */
+static char*
+complete_uri(chunk_t distPoint, const char *ldaphost)
+{
+    char *uri;
+    char *ptr  = distPoint.ptr;
+    size_t len = distPoint.len;
+
+    char *symbol = memchr(ptr, ':', len);
+
+    if (symbol != NULL)
+    {
+	size_t type_len = symbol - ptr;
+	
+	if (type_len >= 4 && strncasecmp(ptr, "ldap", 4) == 0)
+	{
+	    ptr = symbol + 1;
+	    len -= (type_len + 1);
+
+	    if (len > 2 && *ptr++ == '/' && *ptr++ == '/')
+	    {
+		len -= 2;
+		symbol = memchr(ptr, '/', len);
+		
+		if (symbol != NULL && symbol - ptr == 0 && ldaphost != NULL)
+		{
+		    uri = alloc_bytes(distPoint.len+strlen(ldaphost)+1, "uri");
+
+		    /* insert the ldaphost into the uri */
+		    sprintf(uri, "%.*s%s%.*s"
+			, (int)(distPoint.len - len), distPoint.ptr
+			, ldaphost
+			, (int)len, symbol);
+		    return uri;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    
+    /* default action:  copy distributionPoint without change */
+    uri = alloc_bytes(distPoint.len+1, "uri");
+    sprintf(uri, "%.*s", (int)distPoint.len, distPoint.ptr);
+    return uri;
+}
+
+/*
+ * try to fetch the crls defined by the fetch requests
+ */
+static void
+fetch_crls(bool cache_crls)
+{
+    fetch_req_t *req;
+    fetch_req_t **reqp;
+
+    lock_crl_fetch_list("fetch_crls");
+    req  =  crl_fetch_reqs;
+    reqp = &crl_fetch_reqs;
+
+    while (req != NULL)
+    {
+	bool valid_crl = FALSE;
+	chunk_t blob = empty_chunk;
+	generalName_t *gn = req->distributionPoints;
+	const char *ldaphost;
+	ca_info_t *ca;
+
+	lock_ca_info_list("fetch_crls");
+
+	ca = get_ca_info(req->issuer, req->authKeySerialNumber, req->authKeyID);
+	ldaphost = (ca == NULL)? NULL : ca->ldaphost;
+
+	while (gn != NULL)
+	{
+	    char *uri = complete_uri(gn->name, ldaphost);
+
+	    err_t ugh = fetch_asn1_blob(uri, &blob);
+	    pfree(uri);
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		plog("fetch failed:  %s", ugh);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		chunk_t crl_uri;
+
+		clonetochunk(crl_uri, gn->name.ptr, gn->name.len, "crl uri");
+		if (insert_crl(blob, crl_uri, cache_crls))
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("we have a valid crl")
+		    )
+		    valid_crl = TRUE;
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    gn = gn->next;
+	}
+
+	unlock_ca_info_list("fetch_crls");
+
+	if (valid_crl)
+	{
+	    /* delete fetch request */
+	    fetch_req_t *req_free = req;
+
+	    req   = req->next;
+	    *reqp = req;
+	    free_fetch_request(req_free);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* try again next time */
+	    req->trials++;
+	    reqp = &req->next;
+	    req  =  req->next;
+	}
+    }
+    unlock_crl_fetch_list("fetch_crls");
+}
+
+static void
+fetch_ocsp_status(ocsp_location_t* location)
+{
+#ifdef LIBCURL
+    chunk_t request;
+    chunk_t response = empty_chunk;
+
+    CURL* curl;
+    CURLcode res;
+
+    request = build_ocsp_request(location);
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+    	DBG_log("sending ocsp request to location '%.*s'"
+	    , (int)location->uri.len, location->uri.ptr)
+    )
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("OCSP request", request)
+    )
+
+    /* send via http post using libcurl */
+    curl = curl_easy_init();
+
+    if (curl != NULL)
+    {
+	char errorbuffer[CURL_ERROR_SIZE];
+	struct curl_slist *headers = NULL;
+	char* uri = alloc_bytes(location->uri.len+1, "ocsp uri");
+
+	/* we need a null terminated string for curl */
+	memcpy(uri, location->uri.ptr, location->uri.len);
+	*(uri + location->uri.len) = '\0';
+
+	/* set content type header */
+	headers = curl_slist_append(headers, "Content-Type: application/ocsp-request");
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, headers);
+
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_URL, uri);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEFUNCTION, write_buffer);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_WRITEDATA, (void *)&response);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, request.ptr);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDSIZE, request.len);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_ERRORBUFFER, &errorbuffer);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_FAILONERROR, TRUE);
+	curl_easy_setopt(curl, CURLOPT_CONNECTTIMEOUT, FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT);
+
+	res = curl_easy_perform(curl);
+
+	if (res == CURLE_OK)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("received ocsp response")
+	    )
+	    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+		DBG_dump_chunk("OCSP response:\n", response)
+	    )
+	    parse_ocsp(location, response);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("failed to fetch ocsp status from '%s': %s", uri, errorbuffer);
+	}
+	curl_slist_free_all(headers);
+	curl_easy_cleanup(curl);
+	pfree(uri);
+	/* not using freeanychunk because of realloc (no leak detective) */
+	curl_free(response.ptr);
+    }
+    freeanychunk(location->nonce);
+    freeanychunk(request);
+
+    /* increment the trial counter of the unresolved fetch requests */
+    {
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+	
+	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+	    certinfo->trials++;
+	    certinfo = certinfo->next;
+	}
+    }
+    return;
+#else   /* !LIBCURL */
+    plog("ocsp error: pluto wasn't compiled with libcurl support");
+#endif  /* !LIBCURL */
+}
+
+/*
+ * try to fetch the necessary ocsp information
+ */
+static void
+fetch_ocsp(void)
+{
+    ocsp_location_t *location;
+
+    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("fetch_ocsp");
+    location = ocsp_fetch_reqs;
+
+    /* fetch the ocps status for all locations */
+    while (location != NULL)
+    {
+	if (location->certinfo != NULL)
+	    fetch_ocsp_status(location);
+	location = location->next;
+    }
+
+    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("fetch_ocsp");
+}
+
+static void*
+fetch_thread(void *arg)
+{
+    struct timespec wait_interval;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("fetch thread started")
+    )
+
+    pthread_mutex_lock(&fetch_wake_mutex);
+
+    while(1)
+    {
+	int status;
+
+	wait_interval.tv_nsec = 0;
+	wait_interval.tv_sec = time(NULL) + crl_check_interval;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("next regular crl check in %ld seconds", crl_check_interval)
+	)
+	status = pthread_cond_timedwait(&fetch_wake_cond, &fetch_wake_mutex
+					, &wait_interval);
+
+	if (status == ETIMEDOUT)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log(" ");
+		DBG_log("*time to check crls and the ocsp cache")
+	    )
+	    check_ocsp();
+	    check_crls();
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("fetch thread was woken up")
+	    )
+	}
+	fetch_ocsp();
+	fetch_crls(cache_crls);
+    }
+}
+#endif /* THREADS*/
+
+/*
+ * initializes curl and starts the fetching thread
+ */
+void
+init_fetch(void)
+{
+    int status;
+
+#ifdef LIBCURL
+    /* init curl */
+    status = curl_global_init(CURL_GLOBAL_NOTHING);
+    if (status != CURLE_OK)
+    {
+	plog("libcurl could not be initialized, status = %d", status);
+    }
+#endif  /* LIBCURL */
+
+    if (crl_check_interval > 0)
+    {
+#ifdef THREADS
+	status = pthread_create( &thread, NULL, fetch_thread, NULL);
+	if (status != 0)
+	{
+	    plog("fetching thread could not be started, status = %d", status);
+	}
+#else   /* !THREADS */
+	plog("warning: not compiled with pthread support");
+#endif  /* !THREADS */
+    }
+}
+
+void
+free_crl_fetch(void)
+{
+   lock_crl_fetch_list("free_crl_fetch");
+
+    while (crl_fetch_reqs != NULL)
+    {
+	fetch_req_t *req = crl_fetch_reqs;
+	crl_fetch_reqs = req->next;
+	free_fetch_request(req);
+    }
+
+    unlock_crl_fetch_list("free_crl_fetch");
+
+#ifdef LIBCURL
+    if (crl_check_interval > 0)
+    {
+	/* cleanup curl */
+	curl_global_cleanup();
+    }
+#endif  /* LIBCURL */
+}
+
+/*
+ * free the chained list of ocsp requests
+ */
+void
+free_ocsp_fetch(void)
+{
+    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("free_ocsp_fetch");
+    free_ocsp_locations(&ocsp_fetch_reqs);
+    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("free_ocsp_fetch");
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * add additional distribution points
+ */
+void
+add_distribution_points(const generalName_t *newPoints ,generalName_t **distributionPoints)
+{
+    while (newPoints != NULL)
+    {
+	/* skip empty distribution point */
+	if (newPoints->name.len > 0)
+	{	
+	    bool add = TRUE;
+	    generalName_t *gn = *distributionPoints;
+
+	    while (gn != NULL)
+	    {
+		if (gn->kind == newPoints->kind
+		&& gn->name.len == newPoints->name.len
+		&& memcmp(gn->name.ptr, newPoints->name.ptr, gn->name.len) == 0)
+		{
+		    /* skip if the distribution point is already present */
+		    add = FALSE;
+		    break;
+	        }
+	        gn = gn->next;
+	    }
+
+	    if (add)
+	    {
+		/* clone additional distribution point */
+		gn = clone_thing(*newPoints, "generalName");
+		clonetochunk(gn->name, newPoints->name.ptr, newPoints->name.len
+		    , "crl uri");
+
+		/* insert additional CRL distribution point */
+		gn->next = *distributionPoints;
+		*distributionPoints = gn;
+	    }
+	}
+	newPoints = newPoints->next;
+    }
+}
+
+fetch_req_t*
+build_crl_fetch_request(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t authKeySerialNumber
+, chunk_t authKeyID, const generalName_t *gn)
+{
+    fetch_req_t *req = alloc_thing(fetch_req_t, "fetch request");
+    *req = empty_fetch_req;
+
+    /* note current time */
+    req->installed = time(NULL);
+
+    /* clone fields */
+    clonetochunk(req->issuer, issuer.ptr, issuer.len, "issuer");
+    if (authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	clonetochunk(req->authKeySerialNumber, authKeySerialNumber.ptr
+	    , authKeySerialNumber.len, "authKeySerialNumber");
+    }
+    if (authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	clonetochunk(req->authKeyID, authKeyID.ptr, authKeyID.len, "authKeyID");
+    }
+
+    /* copy distribution points */
+    add_distribution_points(gn, &req->distributionPoints);
+
+    return req;
+}
+
+/*
+ * add a crl fetch request to the chained list
+ */
+void
+add_crl_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req)
+{
+    fetch_req_t *r;
+
+    lock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
+    r = crl_fetch_reqs;
+
+    while (r != NULL)
+    {
+	if ((req->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)? same_keyid(req->authKeyID, r->authKeyID)
+		: (same_dn(req->issuer, r->issuer)
+		&& same_serial(req->authKeySerialNumber, r->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	{
+	    /* there is already a fetch request */
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("crl fetch request already exists")
+	    )
+
+	    /* there might be new distribution points */
+	    add_distribution_points(req->distributionPoints, &r->distributionPoints);
+
+	    unlock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
+	    free_fetch_request(req);
+	    return;
+	}
+	r = r->next;
+    }
+
+    /* insert new fetch request at the head of the queue */
+    req->next = crl_fetch_reqs;
+    crl_fetch_reqs = req;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("crl fetch request added")
+    )
+    unlock_crl_fetch_list("add_crl_fetch_request");
+}
+
+/*
+ * add an ocsp fetch request to the chained list
+ */
+void
+add_ocsp_fetch_request(ocsp_location_t *location, chunk_t serialNumber)
+{
+    ocsp_certinfo_t certinfo;
+
+    certinfo.serialNumber = serialNumber;
+
+    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("add_ocsp_fetch_request");
+    add_certinfo(location, &certinfo, &ocsp_fetch_reqs, TRUE);
+    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("add_ocsp_fetch_request");
+}
+
+/*
+ * list all distribution points
+ */
+void
+list_distribution_points(const generalName_t *gn)
+{
+    bool first_gn = TRUE;
+
+    while (gn != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %s '%.*s'", (first_gn)? "distPts: "
+	    :"         ", (int)gn->name.len, gn->name.ptr);
+	first_gn = FALSE;
+	gn = gn->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all fetch requests in the chained list
+ */
+void
+list_crl_fetch_requests(bool utc)
+{
+    fetch_req_t *req;
+
+    lock_crl_fetch_list("list_crl_fetch_requests");
+    req = crl_fetch_reqs;
+
+    if (req != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of CRL fetch requests:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (req != NULL)
+    {
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, trials: %d"
+	    , timetoa(&req->installed, utc), req->trials);
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, req->issuer);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+	if (req->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(req->authKeyID.ptr, req->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	if (req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(req->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, req->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+	}
+	list_distribution_points(req->distributionPoints);
+	req = req->next;
+    }
+    unlock_crl_fetch_list("list_crl_fetch_requests");
+}
+
+void
+list_ocsp_fetch_requests(bool utc)
+{
+    lock_ocsp_fetch_list("list_ocsp_fetch_requests");
+    list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_fetch_reqs, TRUE, utc, FALSE);
+    unlock_ocsp_fetch_list("list_ocsp_fetch_requests");
+
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/fetch.h b/src/pluto/fetch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6303f37e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/fetch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* Dynamic fetching of X.509 CRLs
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Stephane Laroche <stephane.laroche@colubris.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: fetch.h,v 1.6 2005/11/25 10:08:00 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include "x509.h"
+
+#define FETCH_CMD_TIMEOUT	10	/* seconds */
+
+struct ocsp_location;	/* forward declaration of ocsp_location defined in ocsp.h */
+
+typedef enum {
+    FETCH_GET =  1,
+    FETCH_POST = 2
+} fetch_request_t;
+
+typedef struct fetch_req fetch_req_t;
+
+struct fetch_req {
+    fetch_req_t   *next;
+    time_t        installed;
+    int           trials;
+    chunk_t       issuer;
+    chunk_t       authKeyID;
+    chunk_t	  authKeySerialNumber;
+    generalName_t *distributionPoints;
+};
+
+#ifdef THREADS
+extern void lock_crl_list(const char *who);
+extern void unlock_crl_list(const char *who);
+extern void lock_ocsp_cache(const char *who);
+extern void unlock_ocsp_cache(const char *who);
+extern void lock_ca_info_list(const char *who);
+extern void unlock_ca_info_list(const char *who);
+extern void lock_authcert_list(const char *who);
+extern void unlock_authcert_list(const char *who);
+extern void lock_certs_and_keys(const char *who);
+extern void unlock_certs_and_keys(const char *who);
+extern void wake_fetch_thread(const char *who);
+#else
+#define lock_crl_list(who)          /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_crl_list(who)        /* do nothing */
+#define lock_ocsp_cache(who)        /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_ocsp_cache(who)      /* do nothing */
+#define lock_ca_info_list(who)      /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_ca_info_list(who)    /* do nothing */
+#define lock_authcert_list(who)     /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_authcert_list(who)   /* do nothing */
+#define lock_certs_and_keys(who)    /* do nothing */
+#define unlock_certs_and_keys(who)  /* do nothing */
+#define wake_fetch_thread(who)      /* do nothing */
+#endif
+extern void init_fetch(void);
+extern void free_crl_fetch(void);
+extern void free_ocsp_fetch(void);
+extern void add_distribution_points(const generalName_t *newPoints
+    , generalName_t **distributionPoints);
+extern fetch_req_t* build_crl_fetch_request(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t authKeySerialNumber
+    , chunk_t authKeyID, const generalName_t *gn);
+extern void add_crl_fetch_request(fetch_req_t *req);
+extern void add_ocsp_fetch_request(struct ocsp_location *location, chunk_t serialNumber);
+extern void list_distribution_points(const generalName_t *gn);
+extern void list_crl_fetch_requests(bool utc);
+extern void list_ocsp_fetch_requests(bool utc);
+extern size_t write_buffer(void *ptr, size_t size, size_t nmemb, void *data);
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/foodgroups.c b/src/pluto/foodgroups.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c92bdb3d4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/foodgroups.c
@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+/* Implement policy groups-style control files (aka "foodgroups")
+ * Copyright (C) 2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: foodgroups.c,v 1.2 2004/04/01 18:28:32 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "foodgroups.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "lex.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+
+
+/* Food group config files are found in directory fg_path */
+
+#ifndef POLICYGROUPSDIR
+#define POLICYGROUPSDIR IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.d/policies"
+#endif
+
+const char *policygroups_dir = POLICYGROUPSDIR;
+
+static char *fg_path = NULL;
+static size_t fg_path_space = 0;
+
+
+/* Groups is a list of connections that are policy groups.
+ * The list is updated as group connections are added and deleted.
+ */
+
+struct fg_groups {
+    struct fg_groups *next;
+    struct connection *connection;
+};
+
+static struct fg_groups *groups = NULL;
+
+
+/* Targets is a list of pairs: subnet and its policy group.
+ * This list is bulk-updated on whack --listen and
+ * incrementally updated when group connections are deleted.
+ *
+ * It is ordered by source subnet, and if those are equal, then target subnet.
+ * A subnet is compared by comparing the network, and if those are equal,
+ * comparing the mask.
+ */
+
+struct fg_targets {
+    struct fg_targets *next;
+    struct fg_groups *group;
+    ip_subnet subnet;
+    char *name;	/* name of instance of group conn */
+};
+
+static struct fg_targets *targets = NULL;
+
+struct fg_targets *new_targets;
+
+/* ipcmp compares the two ip_address values a and b.
+ * It returns -1, 0, or +1 if a is, respectively,
+ * less than, equal to, or greater than b.
+ */
+static int
+ipcmp(ip_address *a, ip_address *b)
+{
+    if (addrtypeof(a) != addrtypeof(b))
+    {
+	return addrtypeof(a) < addrtypeof(b)? -1 : 1;
+    }
+    else if (sameaddr(a, b))
+    {
+	return 0;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	const struct sockaddr *sa = sockaddrof(a)
+	    , *sb = sockaddrof(b);
+
+	passert(addrtypeof(a) == AF_INET);	/* not yet implemented IPv6 version :-( */
+	return (ntohl(((const struct sockaddr_in *)sa)->sin_addr.s_addr)
+	    < ntohl(((const struct sockaddr_in *)sb)->sin_addr.s_addr))
+	    ? -1 : 1;
+    }
+}
+
+/* subnetcmp compares the two ip_subnet values a and b.
+ * It returns -1, 0, or +1 if a is, respectively,
+ * less than, equal to, or greater than b.
+ */
+static int
+subnetcmp(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b)
+{
+    ip_address neta, maska, netb, maskb;
+    int r;
+
+    networkof(a, &neta);
+    maskof(a, &maska);
+    networkof(b, &netb);
+    maskof(b, &maskb);
+    r = ipcmp(&neta, &netb);
+    if (r == 0)
+	r = ipcmp(&maska, &maskb);
+    return r;
+}
+
+static void
+read_foodgroup(struct fg_groups *g)
+{
+    const char *fgn = g->connection->name;
+    const ip_subnet *lsn = &g->connection->spd.this.client;
+    size_t plen = strlen(policygroups_dir) + 1 + strlen(fgn) + 1;
+    struct file_lex_position flp_space;
+
+    if (plen > fg_path_space)
+    {
+	pfreeany(fg_path);
+	fg_path_space = plen + 10;
+	fg_path = alloc_bytes(fg_path_space, "policy group path");
+    }
+    snprintf(fg_path, fg_path_space, "%s/%s", policygroups_dir, fgn);
+    if (!lexopen(&flp_space, fg_path, TRUE))
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no group file \"%s\"", fg_path));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("loading group \"%s\"", fg_path);
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    switch (flp->bdry)
+	    {
+	    case B_none:
+		{
+		    /* !!! this test is not sufficient for distinguishing address families.
+		     * We need a notation to specify that a FQDN is to be resolved to IPv6.
+		     */
+		    const struct af_info *afi = strchr(tok, ':') == NULL
+			? &af_inet4_info: &af_inet6_info;
+		    ip_subnet sn;
+		    err_t ugh;
+
+		    if (strchr(tok, '/') == NULL)
+		    {
+			/* no /, so treat as /32 or V6 equivalent */
+			ip_address t;
+
+			ugh = ttoaddr(tok, 0, afi->af, &t);
+			if (ugh == NULL)
+			    ugh = addrtosubnet(&t, &sn);
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			ugh = ttosubnet(tok, 0, afi->af, &sn);
+		    }
+
+		    if (ugh != NULL)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s \"%s\""
+			    , flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh, tok);
+		    }
+		    else if (afi->af != AF_INET)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "\"%s\" line %d: unsupported Address Family \"%s\""
+			    , flp->filename, flp->lino, tok);
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			/* Find where new entry ought to go in new_targets. */
+			struct fg_targets **pp;
+			int r;
+
+			for (pp = &new_targets; ; pp = &(*pp)->next)
+			{
+			    if (*pp == NULL)
+			    {
+				r = -1;	/* end of list is infinite */
+				break;
+			    }
+			    r = subnetcmp(lsn, &(*pp)->group->connection->spd.this.client);
+			    if (r == 0)
+				r = subnetcmp(&sn, &(*pp)->subnet);
+			    if (r <= 0)
+				break;
+			}
+
+			if (r == 0)
+			{
+			    char source[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+			    subnettot(lsn, 0, source, sizeof(source));
+			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "\"%s\" line %d: subnet \"%s\", source %s, already \"%s\""
+				, flp->filename
+				, flp->lino
+				, tok
+				, source
+				, (*pp)->group->connection->name);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    struct fg_targets *f = alloc_thing(struct fg_targets, "fg_target");
+
+			    f->next = *pp;
+			    f->group = g;
+			    f->subnet = sn;
+			    f->name = NULL;
+			    *pp = f;
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+		(void)shift();	/* next */
+		continue;
+
+	    case B_record:
+		flp->bdry = B_none;	/* eat the Record Boundary */
+		(void)shift();	/* get real first token */
+		continue;
+
+	    case B_file:
+		break;	/* done */
+	    }
+	    break;	/* if we reach here, out of loop */
+	}
+	lexclose();
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+free_targets(void)
+{
+    while (targets != NULL)
+    {
+	struct fg_targets *t = targets;
+
+	targets = t->next;
+	pfreeany(t->name);
+	pfree(t);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+load_groups(void)
+{
+    passert(new_targets == NULL);
+
+    /* for each group, add config file targets into new_targets */
+    {
+	struct fg_groups *g;
+
+	for (g = groups; g != NULL; g = g->next)
+	    if (oriented(*g->connection))
+		read_foodgroup(g);
+    }
+
+    /* dump new_targets */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    struct fg_targets *t;
+
+	    for (t = new_targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
+	    {
+		char asource[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		char atarget[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		subnettot(&t->group->connection->spd.this.client
+		    , 0, asource, sizeof(asource));
+		subnettot(&t->subnet, 0, atarget, sizeof(atarget));
+		DBG_log("%s->%s %s"
+		    , asource, atarget
+		    , t->group->connection->name);
+	    }
+	});
+
+    /* determine and deal with differences between targets and new_targets.
+     * structured like a merge.
+     */
+    {
+	struct fg_targets *op = targets
+	    , *np = new_targets;
+
+	while (op != NULL && np != NULL)
+	{
+	    int r = subnetcmp(&op->group->connection->spd.this.client
+		, &np->group->connection->spd.this.client);
+
+	    if (r == 0)
+		r = subnetcmp(&op->subnet, &np->subnet);
+
+	    if (r == 0 && op->group == np->group)
+	    {
+		/* unchanged -- steal name & skip over */
+		np->name = op->name;
+		op->name = NULL;
+		op = op->next;
+		np = np->next;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* note: following cases overlap! */
+		if (r <= 0)
+		{
+		    remove_group_instance(op->group->connection, op->name);
+		    op = op->next;
+		}
+		if (r >= 0)
+		{
+		    np->name = add_group_instance(np->group->connection, &np->subnet);
+		    np = np->next;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	for (; op != NULL; op = op->next)
+	    remove_group_instance(op->group->connection, op->name);
+	for (; np != NULL; np = np->next)
+	    np->name = add_group_instance(np->group->connection, &np->subnet);
+
+	/* update: new_targets replaces targets */
+	free_targets();
+	targets = new_targets;
+	new_targets = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+
+void
+add_group(struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct fg_groups *g = alloc_thing(struct fg_groups, "policy group");
+
+    g->next = groups;
+    groups = g;
+
+    g->connection = c;
+}
+
+static struct fg_groups *
+find_group(const struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct fg_groups *g;
+
+    for (g = groups; g != NULL && g->connection != c; g = g->next)
+	;
+    return g;
+}
+
+void
+route_group(struct connection *c)
+{
+    /* it makes no sense to route a connection that is ISAKMP-only */
+    if (!NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy) && !HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route an ISAKMP-only group connection");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct fg_groups *g = find_group(c);
+	struct fg_targets *t;
+
+	passert(g != NULL);
+	g->connection->policy |= POLICY_GROUTED;
+	for (t = targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
+	{
+	    if (t->group == g)
+	    {
+		struct connection *ci = con_by_name(t->name, FALSE);
+
+		if (ci != NULL)
+		{
+		    set_cur_connection(ci);
+		    if (!trap_connection(ci))
+			whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+		    set_cur_connection(c);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+unroute_group(struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct fg_groups *g = find_group(c);
+    struct fg_targets *t;
+
+    passert(g != NULL);
+    g->connection->policy &= ~POLICY_GROUTED;
+    for (t = targets; t != NULL; t = t->next)
+    {
+	if (t->group == g)
+	{
+	    struct connection *ci = con_by_name(t->name, FALSE);
+
+	    if (ci != NULL)
+	    {
+		set_cur_connection(ci);
+		unroute_connection(ci);
+		set_cur_connection(c);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+delete_group(const struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct fg_groups *g;
+
+    /* find and remove from groups */
+    {
+	struct fg_groups **pp;
+
+	for (pp = &groups; (g = *pp)->connection != c; pp = &(*pp)->next)
+	    ;
+
+	*pp = g->next;
+    }
+
+    /* find and remove from targets */
+    {
+	struct fg_targets **pp;
+
+	for (pp = &targets; *pp != NULL; )
+	{
+	    struct fg_targets *t = *pp;
+
+	    if (t->group == g)
+	    {
+		*pp = t->next;
+		remove_group_instance(t->group->connection, t->name);
+		pfree(t);
+		/* pp is ready for next iteration */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		pp = &t->next;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    pfree(g);
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/foodgroups.h b/src/pluto/foodgroups.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7cbbccc44
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/foodgroups.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/* Implement policygroups-style control files (aka "foodgroups")
+ * Copyright (C) 2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: foodgroups.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+struct connection;	/* forward declaration */
+extern void add_group(struct connection *c);
+extern void route_group(struct connection *c);
+extern void unroute_group(struct connection *c);
+extern void delete_group(const struct connection *c);
+
+extern const char *policygroups_dir;
+extern void load_groups(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/gcryptfix.c b/src/pluto/gcryptfix.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1ebacdcf6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/gcryptfix.c
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
+/* Routines to make gcrypt routines feel at home in Pluto.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: gcryptfix.c,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include <gmp.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "gcryptfix.h"	/* includes <gmp.h> "defs.h" "rnd.h" */
+
+MPI
+mpi_alloc( unsigned nlimbs UNUSED )
+{
+    MPI n = alloc_bytes(sizeof *n, "mpi_alloc");
+
+    mpz_init(n);
+    return n;
+}
+
+MPI
+mpi_alloc_secure( unsigned nlimbs )
+{
+    return mpi_alloc(nlimbs);
+}
+
+MPI
+mpi_alloc_set_ui( unsigned long u)
+{
+    MPI n = alloc_bytes(sizeof *n, "mpi_copy");
+
+    mpz_init_set_ui(n, u);
+    return n;
+}
+
+MPI
+mpi_copy( MPI a )
+{
+    MPI n = alloc_bytes(sizeof *n, "mpi_copy");
+
+    mpz_init_set(n, a);
+    return n;
+}
+
+void
+mpi_free( MPI a )
+{
+    mpz_clear(a);
+    pfree(a);
+}
+
+int
+mpi_divisible_ui(MPI dividend, ulong divisor )
+{
+    ulong rem;
+    mpz_t remtoo;
+
+    mpz_init(remtoo);
+    rem = mpz_mod_ui(remtoo, dividend, divisor);
+    mpz_clear(remtoo);
+    return rem == 0;
+}
+
+unsigned
+mpi_trailing_zeros( MPI a )
+{
+    return mpz_scan1(a, 0);
+}
+
+unsigned
+mpi_get_nbits( MPI a )
+{
+    return mpz_sizeinbase(a, 2);
+}
+
+int
+mpi_test_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )
+{
+    /* inspired by gmp/mpz/clrbit.c */
+    mp_size_t li = n / mp_bits_per_limb;
+
+    if (li >= a->_mp_size)
+	return 0;
+    return (a->_mp_d[li] & ((mp_limb_t) 1 << (n % mp_bits_per_limb))) != 0;
+}
+
+void
+mpi_set_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )
+{
+    mpz_setbit(a, n);
+}
+
+void
+mpi_clear_bit( MPI a, unsigned n )
+{
+    mpz_clrbit(a, n);
+}
+
+void
+mpi_clear_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n )
+{
+    /* This seems whacky, but what do I know. */
+    mpz_fdiv_r_2exp(a, a, n);
+}
+
+void
+mpi_set_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n )
+{
+    /* This seems whacky, but what do I know. */
+    mpz_fdiv_r_2exp(a, a, n+1);
+    mpz_setbit(a, n);
+}
+
+void
+mpi_set_buffer( MPI a, const u_char *buffer, unsigned nbytes, int sign )
+{
+    /* this is a lot like n_to_mpz */
+    size_t i;
+
+    passert(sign == 0);	/* we won't hit any negative numbers */
+    mpz_init_set_ui(a, 0);
+
+    for (i = 0; i != nbytes; i++)
+    {
+	mpz_mul_ui(a, a, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
+	mpz_add_ui(a, a, buffer[i]);
+    }
+}
+
+u_char *
+get_random_bits(size_t nbits, int level UNUSED, int secure UNUSED)
+{
+    size_t nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
+    u_char *b = alloc_bytes(nbytes, "random bytes");
+
+    get_rnd_bytes(b, nbytes);
+    return b;
+}
+/**************** from gnupg-1.0.0/mpi/mpi-mpow.c
+ * RES = (BASE[0] ^ EXP[0]) *  (BASE[1] ^ EXP[1]) * ... * mod M
+ */
+#define barrett_mulm( w, u, v, m, y, k, r1, r2 ) mpi_mulm( (w), (u), (v), (m) )
+
+static int
+build_index( MPI *exparray, int k, int i, int t )
+{
+    int j, bitno;
+    int index = 0;
+
+    bitno = t-i;
+    for(j=k-1; j >= 0; j-- ) {
+	index <<= 1;
+	if( mpi_test_bit( exparray[j], bitno ) )
+	    index |= 1;
+    }
+    /*log_debug("t=%d i=%d index=%d\n", t, i, index );*/
+    return index;
+}
+
+void
+mpi_mulpowm( MPI res, MPI *basearray, MPI *exparray, MPI m)
+{
+    int k;	/* number of elements */
+    int t;	/* bit size of largest exponent */
+    int i, j, idx;
+    MPI *G;	/* table with precomputed values of size 2^k */
+    MPI tmp;
+  #ifdef USE_BARRETT
+    MPI barrett_y, barrett_r1, barrett_r2;
+    int barrett_k;
+  #endif
+
+    for(k=0; basearray[k]; k++ )
+	;
+    passert(k);
+    for(t=0, i=0; (tmp=exparray[i]); i++ ) {
+	/*log_mpidump("exp: ", tmp );*/
+	j = mpi_get_nbits(tmp);
+	if( j > t )
+	    t = j;
+    }
+    /*log_mpidump("mod: ", m );*/
+    passert(i==k);
+    passert(t);
+    passert( k < 10 );
+
+#ifdef PLUTO
+    m_alloc_ptrs_clear(G, 1<<k);
+#else
+    G = m_alloc_clear( (1<<k) * sizeof *G );
+#endif
+
+  #ifdef USE_BARRETT
+    barrett_y = init_barrett( m, &barrett_k, &barrett_r1, &barrett_r2 );
+  #endif
+    /* and calculate */
+    tmp =  mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(m)+1 );
+    mpi_set_ui( res, 1 );
+    for(i = 1; i <= t; i++ ) {
+	barrett_mulm(tmp, res, res, m, barrett_y, barrett_k,
+				       barrett_r1, barrett_r2 );
+	idx = build_index( exparray, k, i, t );
+	passert( idx >= 0 && idx < (1<<k) );
+	if( !G[idx] ) {
+	    if( !idx )
+		 G[0] = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 1 );
+	    else {
+		for(j=0; j < k; j++ ) {
+		    if( (idx & (1<<j) ) ) {
+			if( !G[idx] )
+			    G[idx] = mpi_copy( basearray[j] );
+			else
+			    barrett_mulm( G[idx], G[idx], basearray[j],
+					       m, barrett_y, barrett_k, barrett_r1, barrett_r2	);
+		    }
+		}
+		if( !G[idx] )
+		    G[idx] = mpi_alloc(0);
+	    }
+	}
+	barrett_mulm(res, tmp, G[idx], m, barrett_y, barrett_k, barrett_r1, barrett_r2	);
+    }
+
+    /* cleanup */
+    mpi_free(tmp);
+  #ifdef USE_BARRETT
+    mpi_free(barrett_y);
+    mpi_free(barrett_r1);
+    mpi_free(barrett_r2);
+  #endif
+    for(i=0; i < (1<<k); i++ )
+	mpi_free(G[i]);
+    m_free(G);
+}
+
+void
+log_mpidump( const char *text UNUSED, MPI a )
+{
+    /* Print number in hex -- helpful to see if they match bytes.
+     * Humans are not going to do arithmetic with the large numbers!
+     * Much code adapted from mpz_to_n.
+     */
+    u_char buf[8048];	/* this ought to be big enough */
+    size_t len = (mpz_sizeinbase(a, 16) + 1) / 2;   /* bytes */
+    MP_INT temp1, temp2;
+    int i;
+
+    passert(len <= sizeof(buf));
+
+    mpz_init(&temp1);
+    mpz_init(&temp2);
+
+    mpz_set(&temp1, a);
+
+    for (i = len-1; i >= 0; i--)
+    {
+	buf[i] = mpz_mdivmod_ui(&temp2, NULL, &temp1, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
+	mpz_set(&temp1, &temp2);
+    }
+
+    passert(mpz_sgn(&temp1) == 0);	/* we must have done all the bits */
+    mpz_clear(&temp1);
+    mpz_clear(&temp2);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    DBG_dump(text, buf, len);
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/gcryptfix.h b/src/pluto/gcryptfix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..637ecbc8d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/gcryptfix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
+/* Definitions to make gcrypt routines feel at home in Pluto.
+ * Copyright (C) 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: gcryptfix.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#define DBG_CIPHER  1	/* some day we'll do this right */
+
+/* Simulate MPI routines with gmp routines.
+ * gmp's MP_INT is a stuct; MPI's MPI is a pointer to an analogous struct.
+ * gmp's mpz_t is an array of one of these structs to enable magic pointer
+ * conversions to make the notation convenient (but confusing).
+ */
+typedef u_char byte;
+typedef MP_INT *MPI;
+
+#define BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB mp_bits_per_limb
+
+extern MPI mpi_alloc( unsigned nlimbs );
+extern MPI mpi_alloc_secure( unsigned nlimbs );
+#define mpi_alloc_like(n) mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(n))
+extern MPI mpi_alloc_set_ui( unsigned long u);
+#define mpi_set_ui(w, u) mpz_set_ui(w, u)
+#define mpi_set(w, u) mpz_set(w, u)
+extern void mpi_free( MPI a );
+extern MPI  mpi_copy( MPI a );
+extern unsigned mpi_get_nbits( MPI a );
+#define mpi_get_nlimbs(a)     ((a)->_mp_alloc)	/* dirty, but useless */
+extern void  mpi_set_buffer( MPI a, const u_char *buffer, unsigned nbytes, int sign );
+extern unsigned mpi_trailing_zeros( MPI a );
+extern int  mpi_test_bit( MPI a, unsigned n );
+extern void mpi_set_bit( MPI a, unsigned n );
+extern void mpi_clear_bit( MPI a, unsigned n );
+extern void mpi_clear_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n );
+extern void mpi_set_highbit( MPI a, unsigned n );
+#define mpi_cmp_ui(u, v) mpz_cmp_ui((u), (v))
+#define mpi_cmp(u, v) mpz_cmp((u), (v))
+#define mpi_is_neg(n) (mpz_sgn(n) < 0)
+#define mpi_add(w, u, v) mpz_add((w), (u), (v))
+#define mpi_add_ui(w, u, v) mpz_add_ui((w), (u), (v))
+#define mpi_sub_ui(w, u, v) mpz_sub_ui((w), (u), (v))
+#define mpi_subm( w, u, v, m) { mpz_sub( (w), (u), (v)) ; mpz_fdiv_r((w), (w), (m)); }
+#define mpi_mul( w, u, v) mpz_mul( (w), (u), (v))
+#define mpi_mul_ui( w, u, v) mpz_mul_ui( (w), (u), (v))
+#define mpi_mulm( w, u, v, m) { mpz_mul( (w), (u), (v)) ; mpz_fdiv_r((w), (w), (m)); }
+#define mpi_fdiv_q(quot, dividend, divisor) mpz_fdiv_q((quot), (dividend), (divisor))
+#define mpi_fdiv_r( rem, dividend, divisor ) mpz_fdiv_r( (rem), (dividend), (divisor) )
+#define mpi_fdiv_r_ui( rem, dividend, divisor )  mpz_fdiv_r_ui( (rem), (dividend), (divisor) )
+#define mpi_tdiv_q_2exp( w, u, count ) mpz_tdiv_q_2exp( (w), (u), (count) )
+extern int   mpi_divisible_ui(MPI dividend, ulong divisor );
+#define mpi_powm( res, base, exp, mod) mpz_powm( res, base, exp, mod)
+extern void mpi_mulpowm( MPI res, MPI *basearray, MPI *exparray, MPI mod);
+#define mpi_gcd( g, a, b ) ( mpz_gcd( (g), (a), (b) ), !mpi_cmp_ui( (g), 1))
+#define mpi_invm( x, a, n ) mpz_invert( (x), (a), (n) )
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+# define log_debug(f...)  DBG_log(f)
+#else
+# define log_debug(f...)  do ; while (0)	/* do nothing, carefully */
+#endif
+#define log_fatal(f...)  exit_log(f)	/* overreaction? */
+extern void log_mpidump( const char *text, MPI a );
+
+#define assert(p) passert(p)
+#define BUG() passert(FALSE)
+
+#define m_alloc_ptrs_clear(pp, n) { \
+	int c = (n); \
+	(pp) = alloc_bytes((n) * sizeof(*(pp)), "m_alloc_ptrs_clear"); \
+	while (c > 0) (pp)[--c] = NULL; \
+    }
+
+extern u_char *get_random_bits(size_t nbits, int level, int secure);
+#define m_alloc(sz) alloc_bytes((sz), "m_alloc")	/* not initialized */
+#define m_free(n) pfree(n)  /* always freeing something from get_random_bits */
+
+/* declarations from gnupg-1.0.0/include/cipher.h */
+/*-- primegen.c --*/
+MPI generate_secret_prime( unsigned nbits );
+MPI generate_public_prime( unsigned nbits );
+MPI generate_elg_prime( int mode, unsigned pbits, unsigned qbits,
+					   MPI g, MPI **factors );
+
+#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E 16     /* encrypt only ElGamal (but not for v3)*/
+#define PUBKEY_ALGO_DSA       17
+#define PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL   20     /* sign and encrypt elgamal */
+
+#define is_ELGAMAL(a) ((a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL || (a)==PUBKEY_ALGO_ELGAMAL_E)
+
+#define PUBKEY_USAGE_SIG     1	    /* key is good for signatures */
+#define PUBKEY_USAGE_ENC     2	    /* key is good for encryption */
+
+/* from gnupg-1.0.0/include/errors.h */
+
+#define G10ERR_PUBKEY_ALGO     4 /* Unknown pubkey algorithm */
+#define G10ERR_BAD_SECKEY      7 /* Bad secret key */
+#define G10ERR_BAD_SIGN        8 /* Bad signature */
+#define G10ERR_BAD_MPI	      30
+
+/*-- smallprime.c --*/
+extern ushort small_prime_numbers[];
diff --git a/src/pluto/id.c b/src/pluto/id.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4e75ec2e9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/id.c
@@ -0,0 +1,509 @@
+/* identity representation, as in IKE ID Payloads (RFC 2407 DOI 4.6.2.1)
+ * Copyright (C) 1999-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: id.c,v 1.4 2005/08/15 20:07:08 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX	/* POSIX 1003.1-2001 says <unistd.h> defines this */
+# define HOST_NAME_MAX	255 /* upper bound, according to SUSv2 */
+#endif
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+
+const struct id empty_id;	/* ID_NONE */
+
+enum myid_state myid_state = MYID_UNKNOWN;
+struct id myids[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];	/* %myid */
+char *myid_str[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];     /* string form of IDs */
+
+/* initialize id module
+ * Fills in myid from environment variable IPSECmyid or defaultrouteaddr
+ */
+void
+init_id(void)
+{
+    passert(empty_id.kind == ID_NONE);
+    myid_state = MYID_UNKNOWN;
+    {
+	enum myid_state s;
+
+	for (s = MYID_UNKNOWN; s <= MYID_SPECIFIED; s++)
+	{
+	    myids[s] = empty_id;
+	    myid_str[s] = NULL;
+	}
+    }
+    set_myid(MYID_SPECIFIED, getenv("IPSECmyid"));
+    set_myid(MYID_IP, getenv("defaultrouteaddr"));
+    set_myFQDN();
+}
+
+static void
+calc_myid_str(enum myid_state s)
+{
+    /* preformat the ID name */
+    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+    idtoa(&myids[s], buf, BUF_LEN);
+    replace(myid_str[s], clone_str(buf, "myid string"));
+}
+
+
+void
+set_myid(enum myid_state s, char *idstr)
+{
+    if (idstr != NULL)
+    {
+	struct id id;
+	err_t ugh = atoid(idstr, &id, FALSE);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_BADID, "myid malformed: %s \"%s\"", ugh, idstr);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    free_id_content(&myids[s]);
+	    unshare_id_content(&id);
+	    myids[s] = id;
+	    if (s == MYID_SPECIFIED)
+		myid_state = MYID_SPECIFIED;
+
+	    calc_myid_str(s);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+set_myFQDN(void)
+{
+    char FQDN[HOST_NAME_MAX + 1];
+    int r = gethostname(FQDN, sizeof(FQDN));
+
+    free_id_content(&myids[MYID_HOSTNAME]);
+    myids[MYID_HOSTNAME] = empty_id;
+    if (r != 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "gethostname() failed in set_myFQDN"));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	FQDN[sizeof(FQDN) - 1] = '\0';	/* insurance */
+
+	{
+	    size_t len = strlen(FQDN);
+
+	    if (len > 0 && FQDN[len-1] == '.')
+	    {
+		/* nuke trailing . */
+		FQDN[len-1]='\0';
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (!strcaseeq(FQDN, "localhost.localdomain"))
+	{
+	    clonetochunk(myids[MYID_HOSTNAME].name, FQDN, strlen(FQDN), "my FQDN");
+	    myids[MYID_HOSTNAME].kind = ID_FQDN;
+	    calc_myid_str(MYID_HOSTNAME);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+show_myid_status(void)
+{
+    char idstr[BUF_LEN];
+
+    (void)idtoa(&myids[myid_state], idstr, sizeof(idstr));
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%%myid = %s", idstr);
+}
+
+/* Convert textual form of id into a (temporary) struct id.
+ * Note that if the id is to be kept, unshare_id_content will be necessary.
+ */
+err_t
+atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    *id = empty_id;
+
+    if (myid_ok && streq("%myid", src))
+    {
+	id->kind = ID_MYID;
+    }
+    else if (strchr(src, '=') != NULL)
+    {
+	/* we interpret this as an ASCII X.501 ID_DER_ASN1_DN */
+	id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+	id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer(); /* assign temporary buffer */
+	id->name.len = 0;
+	/* convert from LDAP style or openssl x509 -subject style to ASN.1 DN
+	 * discard optional @ character in front of DN
+	 */
+	ugh = atodn((*src == '@')?src+1:src, &id->name);
+    }
+    else if (strchr(src, '@') == NULL)
+    {
+	if (streq(src, "%any") || streq(src, "0.0.0.0"))
+	{
+	    /* any ID will be accepted */
+	    id->kind = ID_NONE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	   /* !!! this test is not sufficient for distinguishing address families.
+	    * We need a notation to specify that a FQDN is to be resolved to IPv6.
+	    */
+	   const struct af_info *afi = strchr(src, ':') == NULL
+	? &af_inet4_info: &af_inet6_info;
+
+	   id->kind = afi->id_addr;
+	   ugh = ttoaddr(src, 0, afi->af, &id->ip_addr);
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	if (*src == '@')
+	{
+	    if (*(src+1) == '#')
+	    {
+		/* if there is a second specifier (#) on the line
+		 * we interprete this as ID_KEY_ID
+		 */
+		id->kind = ID_KEY_ID;
+		id->name.ptr = src;
+		/* discard @~, convert from hex to bin */
+		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, id->name.ptr, strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+	    }
+	    else if (*(src+1) == '~')
+	    {
+		/* if there is a second specifier (~) on the line
+		* we interprete this as a binary ID_DER_ASN1_DN
+		*/
+		id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+		id->name.ptr = src;
+		/* discard @~, convert from hex to bin */
+		ugh = ttodata(src+2, 0, 16, id->name.ptr, strlen(src), &id->name.len);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		id->kind = ID_FQDN;
+		id->name.ptr = src+1;	/* discard @ */
+		id->name.len = strlen(src)-1;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* We leave in @, as per DOI 4.6.2.4
+	     * (but DNS wants . instead).
+	     */
+	    id->kind = ID_USER_FQDN;
+	    id->name.ptr = src;
+	    id->name.len = strlen(src);
+	}
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Converts a binary key ID into hexadecimal format
+ */
+int
+keyidtoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t keyid)
+{
+    int n = datatot(keyid.ptr, keyid.len, 'x', dst, dstlen);
+    return (((size_t)n < dstlen)? n : dstlen) - 1;
+}
+
+void
+iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id)
+{
+    *id = empty_id;
+
+    switch (addrtypeof(ip))
+    {
+    case AF_INET:
+	id->kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+	break;
+    case AF_INET6:
+	id->kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(addrtypeof(ip));
+    }
+    id->ip_addr = *ip;
+}
+
+int
+idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen)
+{
+    int n;
+
+    id = resolve_myid(id);
+    switch (id->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_NONE:
+	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "(none)");
+	break;
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	n = (int)addrtot(&id->ip_addr, 0, dst, dstlen) - 1;
+	break;
+    case ID_FQDN:
+	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "@%.*s", (int)id->name.len, id->name.ptr);
+	break;
+    case ID_USER_FQDN:
+	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "%.*s", (int)id->name.len, id->name.ptr);
+	break;
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	n = dntoa(dst, dstlen, id->name);
+	break;
+    case ID_KEY_ID:
+	n = keyidtoa(dst, dstlen, id->name);
+	break;
+    default:
+	n = snprintf(dst, dstlen, "unknown id kind %d", id->kind);
+	break;
+    }
+
+    /* "Sanitize" string so that log isn't endangered:
+     * replace unprintable characters with '?'.
+     */
+    if (n > 0)
+    {
+	for ( ; *dst != '\0'; dst++)
+	    if (!isprint(*dst))
+		*dst = '?';
+    }
+
+    return n;
+}
+
+/* Replace the shell metacharacters ', \, ", `, and $ in a character string
+ * by escape sequences consisting of their octal values
+ */
+void
+escape_metachar(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dstlen)
+{
+    while (*src != '\0' && dstlen > 4)
+    {
+	switch (*src)
+	{
+	case '\'':
+	case '\\':
+	case '"':
+	case '`':
+	case '$':
+	    sprintf(dst,"\\%s%o", (*src < 64)?"0":"", *src);
+	    dst += 4;
+	    dstlen -= 4;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    *dst++ = *src;
+	    dstlen--;
+	}
+	src++;
+    }
+    *dst = '\0';
+}
+
+
+/* Make private copy of string in struct id.
+ * This is needed if the result of atoid is to be kept.
+ */
+void
+unshare_id_content(struct id *id)
+{
+    switch (id->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_FQDN:
+    case ID_USER_FQDN:
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+    case ID_KEY_ID:
+	id->name.ptr = clone_bytes(id->name.ptr, id->name.len, "keep id name");
+	break;
+    case ID_MYID:
+    case ID_NONE:
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(id->kind);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+free_id_content(struct id *id)
+{
+    switch (id->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_FQDN:
+    case ID_USER_FQDN:
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+    case ID_KEY_ID:
+	freeanychunk(id->name);
+	break;
+    case ID_MYID:
+    case ID_NONE:
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(id->kind);
+    }
+}
+
+/* compare two struct id values */
+bool
+same_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b)
+{
+    a = resolve_myid(a);
+    b = resolve_myid(b);
+    if (a->kind != b->kind)
+	return FALSE;
+    switch (a->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_NONE:
+	return TRUE;	/* kind of vacuous */
+
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	return sameaddr(&a->ip_addr, &b->ip_addr);
+
+    case ID_FQDN:
+    case ID_USER_FQDN:
+	/* assumptions:
+	 * - case should be ignored
+	 * - trailing "." should be ignored (even if the only character?)
+	 */
+	{
+	    size_t al = a->name.len
+		, bl = b->name.len;
+
+	    while (al > 0 && a->name.ptr[al - 1] == '.')
+		al--;
+	    while (bl > 0 && b->name.ptr[bl - 1] == '.')
+		bl--;
+	    return al == bl
+		&& strncasecmp(a->name.ptr, b->name.ptr, al) == 0;
+	}
+
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	return same_dn(a->name, b->name);
+
+    case ID_KEY_ID:
+	return a->name.len == b->name.len
+	    && memcmp(a->name.ptr, b->name.ptr, a->name.len) == 0;
+
+    default:
+	bad_case(a->kind);
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/* compare two struct id values, DNs can contain wildcards */
+bool
+match_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b, int *wildcards)
+{
+    if (b->kind == ID_NONE)
+    {
+	*wildcards = MAX_WILDCARDS;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    if (a->kind != b->kind)
+	return FALSE;
+    if (a->kind == ID_DER_ASN1_DN)
+	return match_dn(a->name, b->name, wildcards);
+    else
+    {
+	*wildcards = 0;
+	return same_id(a, b);
+    }
+}
+
+/* count the numer of wildcards in an id */
+int
+id_count_wildcards(const struct id *id)
+{
+    switch (id->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_NONE:
+	return MAX_WILDCARDS;
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	return dn_count_wildcards(id->name);
+    default:
+	return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/* build an ID payload
+ * Note: no memory is allocated for the body of the payload (tl->ptr).
+ * We assume it will end up being a pointer into a sufficiently
+ * stable datastructure.  It only needs to last a short time.
+ */
+void
+build_id_payload(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *hd, chunk_t *tl, struct end *end)
+{
+    const struct id *id = resolve_myid(&end->id);
+
+    zero(hd);
+    hd->isaiid_idtype = id->kind;
+    switch (id->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_NONE:
+	hd->isaiid_idtype = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&end->host_addr))->id_addr;
+	tl->len = addrbytesptr(&end->host_addr
+	    , (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr);	/* sets tl->ptr too */
+	break;
+    case ID_FQDN:
+    case ID_USER_FQDN:
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+    case ID_KEY_ID:
+	*tl = id->name;
+	break;
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	tl->len = addrbytesptr(&id->ip_addr
+	    , (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr);	/* sets tl->ptr too */
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(id->kind);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset:4
+ * c-style: pluto
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/id.h b/src/pluto/id.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4fe9ef227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/id.h
@@ -0,0 +1,67 @@
+/* identity representation, as in IKE ID Payloads (RFC 2407 DOI 4.6.2.1)
+ * Copyright (C) 1999-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: id.h,v 1.5 2005/08/15 20:07:08 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _ID_H
+#define _ID_H
+
+#include "defs.h"
+
+struct id {
+    int kind;		/* ID_* value */
+    ip_address ip_addr;	/* ID_IPV4_ADDR, ID_IPV6_ADDR */
+    chunk_t name;	/* ID_FQDN, ID_USER_FQDN (with @) */
+			/* ID_KEY_ID, ID_DER_ASN_DN       */
+};
+
+extern void init_id(void);
+
+extern const struct id empty_id;	/* ID_NONE */
+
+enum myid_state {
+    MYID_UNKNOWN,	/* not yet figured out */
+    MYID_HOSTNAME,	/* our current hostname */
+    MYID_IP,	/* our default IP address */
+    MYID_SPECIFIED	/* as specified by ipsec.conf */
+};
+
+extern enum myid_state myid_state;
+extern struct id myids[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];	/* %myid */
+extern char *myid_str[MYID_SPECIFIED+1];      /* strings */
+extern void set_myid(enum myid_state s, char *);
+extern void show_myid_status(void);
+#define resolve_myid(id) ((id)->kind == ID_MYID? &myids[myid_state] : (id))
+extern void set_myFQDN(void);
+
+extern err_t atoid(char *src, struct id *id, bool myid_ok);
+extern int keyidtoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t keyid);
+extern void iptoid(const ip_address *ip, struct id *id);
+extern int idtoa(const struct id *id, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
+#define IDTOA_BUF	512
+extern void escape_metachar(const char *src, char *dst, size_t dstlen);
+struct end;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in connections.h) */
+extern void unshare_id_content(struct id *id);
+extern void free_id_content(struct id *id);
+extern bool same_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b);
+#define MAX_WILDCARDS	15
+extern bool match_id(const struct id *a, const struct id *b, int *wildcards);
+extern int id_count_wildcards(const struct id *id);
+#define id_is_ipaddr(id) ((id)->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR || (id)->kind == ID_IPV6_ADDR)
+
+struct isakmp_ipsec_id;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in packet.h) */
+extern void
+    build_id_payload(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *hd, chunk_t *tl, struct end *end);
+
+#endif /* _ID_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/ike_alg.c b/src/pluto/ike_alg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c6514b4b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ike_alg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,592 @@
+/* IKE modular algorithm handling interface
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ike_alg.c,v 1.6 2004/09/17 21:29:50 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+
+#include "state.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "spdb.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "db_ops.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+
+#define return_on(var, val) do { var=val;goto return_out; } while(0);
+
+/*
+ * IKE algorithm list handling - registration and lookup
+ */
+
+/* Modular IKE algorithm storage structure */
+
+static struct ike_alg *ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_MAX+1] = {NULL, NULL};
+
+/*
+ * return ike_algo object by {type, id}
+ */
+static struct ike_alg *
+ike_alg_find(u_int algo_type, u_int algo_id, u_int keysize __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+    struct ike_alg *e = ike_alg_base[algo_type];
+
+    while (e != NULL && algo_id > e->algo_id)
+    {
+	e = e->algo_next;
+    }
+    return (e != NULL && e->algo_id == algo_id) ? e : NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * "raw" ike_alg list adding function
+ */
+int
+ike_alg_add(struct ike_alg* a)
+{
+    if (a->algo_type > IKE_ALG_MAX)
+    {
+	plog("ike_alg: Not added, invalid algorithm type");
+	return -EINVAL;
+    }
+
+    if (ike_alg_find(a->algo_type, a->algo_id, 0) != NULL)
+    {
+	plog("ike_alg: Not added, algorithm already exists");
+	return -EEXIST;
+    }
+
+    {
+	struct ike_alg **ep = &ike_alg_base[a->algo_type];
+	struct ike_alg *e = *ep;
+
+	while (e != NULL && a->algo_id > e->algo_id)
+	{
+	    ep = &e->algo_next;
+	    e = *ep;
+	}
+	*ep = a;
+	a->algo_next = e;
+	return 0;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * get IKE hash algorithm
+ */
+struct hash_desc *ike_alg_get_hasher(u_int alg)
+{
+    return (struct hash_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_HASH, alg, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get IKE encryption algorithm
+ */
+struct encrypt_desc *ike_alg_get_encrypter(u_int alg)
+{
+    return (struct encrypt_desc *) ike_alg_find(IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT, alg, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if IKE hash algorithm is present
+ */
+bool
+ike_alg_hash_present(u_int halg)
+{
+    return ike_alg_get_hasher(halg) != NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if IKE encryption algorithm is present
+ */
+bool
+ike_alg_enc_present(u_int ealg)
+{
+    return ike_alg_get_encrypter(ealg) != NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate and register IKE hash algorithm object
+ */
+int
+ike_alg_register_hash(struct hash_desc *hash_desc)
+{
+    const char *alg_name = NULL;
+    int ret = 0;
+
+    if (hash_desc->algo_id > OAKLEY_HASH_MAX)
+    {
+	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d > max=%d"
+		, hash_desc->algo_id, OAKLEY_HASH_MAX);
+	return_on(ret,-EINVAL);
+    }
+
+    if (hash_desc->hash_ctx_size > sizeof (union hash_ctx))
+    {
+	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d has ctx_size=%d > hash_ctx=%d"
+	      , hash_desc->algo_id
+	      , (int)hash_desc->hash_ctx_size
+	      , (int)sizeof (union hash_ctx));
+	return_on(ret,-EOVERFLOW);
+    }
+
+    if (!(hash_desc->hash_init && hash_desc->hash_update && hash_desc->hash_final))
+    {
+	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d needs hash_init(), hash_update() and hash_final()"
+	      , hash_desc->algo_id);
+	return_on(ret,-EINVAL);
+    }
+	
+    alg_name = enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, hash_desc->algo_id);
+    if (!alg_name)
+    {
+	plog ("ike_alg: hash alg=%d not found in constants.c:oakley_hash_names"
+	      , hash_desc->algo_id);
+	alg_name = "<NULL>";
+    }
+
+return_out:
+    if (ret == 0)
+	ret = ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)hash_desc);
+
+    plog("ike_alg: Activating %s hash: %s"
+	,alg_name, ret == 0 ? "Ok" : "FAILED");
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Validate and register IKE encryption algorithm object
+ */
+int
+ike_alg_register_enc(struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc)
+{
+    int ret = ike_alg_add((struct ike_alg *)enc_desc);
+
+    const char *alg_name = enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, enc_desc->algo_id);
+
+    char alg_number[20];
+    
+    /* algorithm is not listed in oakley_enc_names */
+    if (alg_name == NULL)
+    {
+	snprintf(alg_number, sizeof(alg_number), "OAKLEY_ID_%d"
+	    , enc_desc->algo_id);
+	alg_name = alg_number;
+    }
+
+    plog("ike_alg: Activating %s encryption: %s"
+	, alg_name, ret == 0 ? "Ok" : "FAILED");
+
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get pfsgroup for this connection
+ */
+const struct oakley_group_desc *
+ike_alg_pfsgroup(struct connection *c, lset_t policy)
+{
+    const struct oakley_group_desc * ret = NULL;
+
+    if ((policy & POLICY_PFS)
+    && c->alg_info_esp
+    && c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
+	ret = lookup_group(c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an OAKLEY proposal based on alg_info and policy
+ */
+struct db_context *
+ike_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_ike *ai , lset_t policy)
+{
+    struct db_context *db_ctx = NULL;
+    struct ike_info *ike_info;
+    struct encrypt_desc *enc_desc;
+    u_int ealg, halg, modp, eklen = 0;
+    int i;
+
+    bool is_xauth_server = (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) != LEMPTY;
+
+    if (!ai)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no IKE algorithms "
+				  "for this connection "
+				  "(check ike algorithm string)");
+	goto fail;
+    }
+    policy &= POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+    db_ctx = db_prop_new(PROTO_ISAKMP, 8, 8 * 5);
+
+    /* for each group */
+    ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(ai, ike_info, i)
+    {
+	ealg = ike_info->ike_ealg;
+	halg = ike_info->ike_halg;
+	modp = ike_info->ike_modp;
+	eklen= ike_info->ike_eklen;
+
+	if (!ike_alg_enc_present(ealg))
+	{
+	    DBG_log("ike_alg: ike enc ealg=%d not present"
+		    , ealg);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	if (!ike_alg_hash_present(halg)) 
+	{
+	    DBG_log("ike_alg: ike hash halg=%d not present"
+		    , halg);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	enc_desc = ike_alg_get_encrypter(ealg);
+	passert(enc_desc != NULL);
+
+	if (eklen
+	&& (eklen < enc_desc->keyminlen || eklen >  enc_desc->keymaxlen))
+	{
+	    DBG_log("ike_alg: ealg=%d (specified) keylen:%d, not valid min=%d, max=%d"
+		    , ealg
+		    , eklen
+		    , enc_desc->keyminlen
+		    , enc_desc->keymaxlen
+	    );
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	if (policy & POLICY_RSASIG)
+	{
+	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+	    if (eklen)
+		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_RSA_SIG);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+	}
+
+	if (policy & POLICY_PSK)
+	{
+	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+	    if (eklen)
+		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD, OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+	}
+
+	if (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG)
+	{
+	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+	    if (eklen)
+		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
+		, is_xauth_server ? XAUTHRespRSA : XAUTHInitRSA);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+	}
+
+	if (policy & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK)
+	{
+	    db_trans_add(db_ctx, KEY_IKE);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM, ealg);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM, halg);
+	    if (eklen)
+		db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH, eklen);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD
+		, is_xauth_server ? XAUTHRespPreShared : XAUTHInitPreShared);
+	    db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION, modp);
+	}
+    }
+fail:
+    return db_ctx;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Show registered IKE algorithms
+ */
+void
+ike_alg_list(void)
+{
+    u_int i;
+    struct ike_alg *a;
+
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKE Encryption Algorithms:");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
+    {
+        struct encrypt_desc *desc = (struct encrypt_desc*)a;
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, blocksize: %d, keylen: %d-%d-%d"
+	    , a->algo_id
+	    , enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, a->algo_id)
+	    , (int)desc->enc_blocksize*BITS_PER_BYTE
+	    , desc->keyminlen
+	    , desc->keydeflen
+	    , desc->keymaxlen
+	);
+    }
+
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKE Hash Algorithms:");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_HASH]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, hashsize: %d"
+	    , a->algo_id
+	    , enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, a->algo_id)
+	    , (int)((struct hash_desc *)a)->hash_digest_size*BITS_PER_BYTE
+	);
+    }
+
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered IKE DH Groups:");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+    for (i = 0; i < elemsof(oakley_group); i++)
+    {
+	const struct oakley_group_desc *gdesc=oakley_group + i;
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, groupsize: %d"
+	    , gdesc->group
+	    , enum_name(&oakley_group_names, gdesc->group)
+	    , (int)gdesc->bytes*BITS_PER_BYTE
+	);
+    }
+}
+
+/*  Show IKE algorithms for
+ *    - this connection (result from ike= string)
+ *    - newest SA
+ */
+void
+ike_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance)
+{
+    char buf[256];
+    struct state *st;
+
+    if (c->alg_info_ike)
+    {
+	alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_ike);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   IKE algorithms wanted: %s"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, buf
+	);
+
+	alg_info_snprint_ike(buf, sizeof(buf)-1, c->alg_info_ike);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   IKE algorithms found:  %s"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, buf
+	);
+    }
+
+    st = state_with_serialno(c->newest_isakmp_sa);
+    if (st)
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   IKE algorithm newest: %s_%d-%s-%s"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)
+		+7 /* strlen("OAKLEY_") */
+		/* , st->st_oakley.encrypter->keydeflen */
+		, st->st_oakley.enckeylen
+		, enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, st->st_oakley.hash)
+		+7 /* strlen("OAKLEY_") */
+		, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group)
+		+13 /* strlen("OAKLEY_GROUP_") */
+	);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply a suite of testvectors to a hash algorithm
+ */
+static bool
+ike_hash_test(const struct hash_desc *desc)
+{
+    bool hash_results = TRUE;
+    bool hmac_results = TRUE;
+
+    if (desc->hash_testvectors == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("  %s hash self-test not available", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg_digest != NULL; i++)
+	{
+	    u_char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	    bool result;
+
+	    union hash_ctx ctx;
+
+	    desc->hash_init(&ctx);
+	    desc->hash_update(&ctx, desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg
+				   ,desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg_size);
+	    desc->hash_final(digest, &ctx);
+	    result = memcmp(digest, desc->hash_testvectors[i].msg_digest
+				  , desc->hash_digest_size) == 0;
+	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("  hash testvector %d: %s", i, result ? "ok":"failed")
+	    )
+	    hash_results &= result;
+	}
+	plog("  %s hash self-test %s", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id)
+				, hash_results ? "passed":"failed");
+    }
+
+    if (desc->hmac_testvectors == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("  %s hmac self-test not available", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; desc->hmac_testvectors[i].hmac != NULL; i++)
+	{
+	    u_char digest[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	    bool result;
+
+	    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+	    hmac_init(&ctx, desc, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].key
+				, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].key_size);
+	    hmac_update(&ctx, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].msg
+			     ,desc->hmac_testvectors[i].msg_size);
+	    hmac_final(digest, &ctx);
+	    result = memcmp(digest, desc->hmac_testvectors[i].hmac
+				  , desc->hash_digest_size) == 0;
+	    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("  hmac testvector %d: %s", i, result ? "ok":"failed")
+	    )
+	    hmac_results &= result;
+	}
+	plog("  %s hmac self-test %s", enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, desc->algo_id)
+				, hmac_results ? "passed":"failed");
+    }
+    return hash_results && hmac_results;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Apply test vectors to registered encryption and hash algorithms
+ */
+bool
+ike_alg_test(void)
+{
+    bool all_results = TRUE;
+    struct ike_alg *a;
+
+    plog("Testing registered IKE encryption algorithms:");
+
+    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
+    {
+	
+        struct encrypt_desc *desc = (struct encrypt_desc*)a;
+
+	plog("  %s self-test not available", enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, a->algo_id));
+    }
+
+    plog("Testing registered IKE hash algorithms:");
+
+    for (a = ike_alg_base[IKE_ALG_HASH]; a != NULL; a = a->algo_next)
+    {
+        struct hash_desc *desc = (struct hash_desc*)a;
+
+	all_results &= ike_hash_test(desc);
+    }
+
+    if (all_results)
+	plog("All crypto self-tests passed");
+    else
+	plog("Some crypto self-tests failed");
+    return all_results;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ML: make F_STRICT logic consider enc,hash/auth,modp algorithms
+ */
+bool
+ike_alg_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, u_int group
+, struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike)
+{
+    /*
+     * simple test to discard low key_len, will accept it only
+     * if specified in "esp" string
+     */
+    bool ealg_insecure = (key_len < 128);
+
+    if (ealg_insecure
+    || (alg_info_ike && alg_info_ike->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT))
+    {
+	int i;
+	struct ike_info *ike_info;
+
+	if (alg_info_ike)
+	{
+	    ALG_INFO_IKE_FOREACH(alg_info_ike, ike_info, i)
+	    {
+		if (ike_info->ike_ealg == ealg
+		&& (ike_info->ike_eklen == 0 || key_len == 0 || ike_info->ike_eklen == key_len)
+		&& ike_info->ike_halg == aalg
+		&& ike_info->ike_modp == group)
+		{
+		    if (ealg_insecure)
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "You should NOT use insecure IKE algorithms (%s)!"
+				, enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, ealg));
+		    return TRUE;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	plog("Oakley Transform [%s (%d), %s, %s] refused due to %s"
+		, enum_name(&oakley_enc_names, ealg), key_len
+		, enum_name(&oakley_hash_names, aalg)
+		, enum_name(&oakley_group_names, group)
+		, ealg_insecure ?
+		    "insecure key_len and enc. alg. not listed in \"ike\" string" : "strict flag"
+	);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/ike_alg.h b/src/pluto/ike_alg.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..19e2e591c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ike_alg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,94 @@
+/* IKE modular algorithm handling interface
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ike_alg.h,v 1.3 2004/09/16 23:22:22 as Exp $
+ */
+ 
+#ifndef _IKE_ALG_H
+#define _IKE_ALG_H
+
+#include "connections.h"
+
+struct ike_alg {
+    u_int16_t algo_type;
+    u_int16_t algo_id;
+    struct ike_alg *algo_next;
+};
+
+struct encrypt_desc {
+    u_int16_t algo_type;
+    u_int16_t algo_id;
+    struct ike_alg *algo_next;
+
+    size_t enc_ctxsize;
+    size_t enc_blocksize;
+    u_int keydeflen;
+    u_int keymaxlen;
+    u_int keyminlen;
+    void (*do_crypt)(u_int8_t *dat, size_t datasize, u_int8_t *key, size_t key_size, u_int8_t *iv, bool enc);
+};
+
+typedef struct hash_testvector hash_testvector_t;
+
+struct hash_testvector {
+    const size_t  msg_size;
+    const u_char *msg;
+    const u_char *msg_digest;
+};
+
+typedef struct hmac_testvector hmac_testvector_t;
+
+struct hmac_testvector {
+    const size_t  key_size;
+    const u_char *key;
+    const size_t  msg_size;
+    const u_char *msg;
+    const u_char *hmac;
+};
+struct hash_desc {
+    u_int16_t algo_type;
+    u_int16_t algo_id;
+    struct ike_alg *algo_next;
+
+    size_t hash_ctx_size;
+    size_t hash_block_size;
+    size_t hash_digest_size;
+    const hash_testvector_t *hash_testvectors;
+    const hmac_testvector_t *hmac_testvectors;
+    void (*hash_init)(void *ctx);
+    void (*hash_update)(void *ctx, const u_int8_t *in, size_t datasize);
+    void (*hash_final)(u_int8_t *out, void *ctx);
+};
+
+#define IKE_ALG_ENCRYPT		0
+#define IKE_ALG_HASH		1
+#define IKE_ALG_MAX		IKE_ALG_HASH
+
+extern int ike_alg_add(struct ike_alg *a);
+extern struct hash_desc *ike_alg_get_hasher(u_int alg);
+extern struct encrypt_desc *ike_alg_get_encrypter(u_int alg);
+extern bool ike_alg_enc_present(u_int ealg);
+extern bool ike_alg_hash_present(u_int halg);
+extern int ike_alg_register_hash(struct hash_desc *a);
+extern int ike_alg_register_enc(struct encrypt_desc *e);
+extern const struct oakley_group_desc* ike_alg_pfsgroup(struct connection *c
+    , lset_t policy);
+extern struct db_context * ike_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_ike *ai, lset_t policy);
+extern void ike_alg_list(void);
+extern void ike_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance);
+extern bool ike_alg_test(void);
+extern bool ike_alg_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, u_int group
+    , struct alg_info_ike *alg_info_ike);
+extern int ike_alg_init(void);
+
+#endif /* _IKE_ALG_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/ipsec.secrets.5 b/src/pluto/ipsec.secrets.5
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3cce4d3f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ipsec.secrets.5
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
+.TH IPSEC.SECRETS 5 "28 March 1999"
+.SH NAME
+ipsec.secrets \- secrets for IKE/IPsec authentication
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+The file \fIipsec.secrets\fP holds a table of secrets.
+These secrets are used by \fIipsec_pluto\fP(8), the FreeS/WAN Internet Key
+Exchange daemon, to authenticate other hosts.
+Currently there are two kinds of secrets: preshared secrets and
+.\" the private part of DSS keys.
+RSA private keys.
+.LP
+It is vital that these secrets be protected.  The file should be owned
+by the super-user,
+and its permissions should be set to block all access by others.
+.LP
+The file is a sequence of entries and include directives.
+Here is an example.  Each entry or directive must start at the
+left margin, but if it continues beyond a single line, each continuation
+line must be indented.
+.LP
+.RS
+.nf
+# sample /etc/ipsec.secrets file for 10.1.0.1
+10.1.0.1 10.2.0.1: PSK "secret shared by two hosts"
+
+# an entry may be split across lines,
+# but indentation matters
+www.xs4all.nl @www.kremvax.ru
+\ \ \ \ 10.6.0.1 10.7.0.1 1.8.0.1: PSK "secret shared by 5"
+
+.\" # Private part of our DSS key, in base 64,
+.\" # as generated by BIND 8.2.1's dnskeygen.
+.\" # Since this is the default key for this host,
+.\" # there is no need to specify indices.
+.\" : DSS 0siMs0N/hfRoCBMXA6plPtuv58/+c=
+# an RSA private key.
+# note that the lines are too wide for a
+# man page, so ... has been substituted for
+# the truncated part
+@my.com: rsa {
+\ \ \ \ Modulus:\ 0syXpo/6waam+ZhSs8Lt6jnBzu3C4grtt...
+\ \ \ \ PublicExponent:\ 0sAw==
+\ \ \ \ PrivateExponent:\ 0shlGbVR1m8Z+7rhzSyenCaBN...
+\ \ \ \ Prime1:\ 0s8njV7WTxzVzRz7AP+0OraDxmEAt1BL5l...
+\ \ \ \ Prime2:\ 0s1LgR7/oUMo9BvfU8yRFNos1s211KX5K0...
+\ \ \ \ Exponent1:\ 0soaXj85ihM5M2inVf/NfHmtLutVz4r...
+\ \ \ \ Exponent2:\ 0sjdAL9VFizF+BKU4ohguJFzOd55OG6...
+\ \ \ \ Coefficient:\ 0sK1LWwgnNrNFGZsS/2GuMBg9nYVZ...
+\ \ \ \ }
+
+include ipsec.*.secrets	# get secrets from other files
+.fi
+.RE
+.LP
+Each entry in the file is a list of indices, followed by a secret.
+The two parts are separated by a colon (\fB:\fP) that is
+followed by whitespace or a newline.  For compatability
+with the previous form of this file, if the key part is just a
+double-quoted string the colon may be left out.
+.LP
+An index is an IP address, or a Fully Qualified Domain Name, user@FQDN,
+\fB%any\fP or \fB%any6\fP (other kinds may come).  An IP address may be written
+in the familiar dotted quad form or as a domain name to be looked up
+when the file is loaded
+(or in any of the forms supported by the FreeS/WAN \fIipsec_ttoaddr\fP(3)
+routine).  In many cases it is a bad idea to use domain names because
+the name server may not be running or may be insecure.  To denote a
+Fully Qualified Domain Name (as opposed to an IP address denoted by
+its domain name), precede the name with an at sign (\fB@\fP).
+.LP
+Matching IDs with indices is fairly straightforward: they have to be
+equal.  In the case of a ``Road Warrior'' connection, if an equal
+match is not found for the Peer's ID, and it is in the form of an IP
+address, an index of \fB%any\fP will match the peer's IP address if IPV4
+and \fB%any6\fP will match a the peer's IP address if IPV6.
+Currently, the obsolete notation \fB0.0.0.0\fP may be used in place of
+\fB%any\fP.
+.LP
+An additional complexity
+arises in the case of authentication by preshared secret: the
+responder will need to look up the secret before the Peer's ID payload has
+been decoded, so the ID used will be the IP address.
+.LP
+To authenticate a connection between two hosts, the entry that most
+specifically matches the host and peer IDs is used.  An entry with no
+index will match any host and peer.  More specifically, an entry with one index will
+match a host and peer if the index matches the host's ID (the peer isn't
+considered).  Still more specifically, an entry with multiple indices will match a host and
+peer if the host ID and peer ID each match one of the indices.  If the key
+is for an asymmetric authentication technique (i.e. a public key
+system such as RSA), an entry with multiple indices will match a host
+and peer even if only the host ID matches an index (it is presumed that the
+multiple indices are all identities of the host).
+It is acceptable for two entries to be the best match as
+long as they agree about the secret or private key.
+.LP
+Authentication by preshared secret requires that both systems find the
+identical secret (the secret is not actually transmitted by the IKE
+protocol).  If both the host and peer appear in the index list, the
+same entry will be suitable for both systems so verbatim copying
+between systems can be used.  This naturally extends to larger groups
+sharing the same secret.  Thus multiple-index entries are best for PSK
+authentication.
+.LP
+Authentication by RSA Signatures requires that each host have its own private
+key.  A host could reasonably use a different private keys
+for different interfaces and for different peers.  But it would not
+be normal to share entries between systems.  Thus thus no-index and
+one-index forms of entry often make sense for RSA Signature authentication.
+.LP
+The key part of an entry may start with a token indicating the kind of
+key.  ``RSA'' signifies RSA private key and ``PSK'' signifies
+PreShared Key (case is ignored).  For compatability with previous
+forms of this file, PSK is the default.
+.LP
+A preshared secret is most conveniently represented as a sequence of
+characters, delimited by the double-quote
+character (\fB"\fP).  The sequence cannot contain a newline or
+double-quote.  Strictly speaking, the secret is actually the sequence
+of bytes that is used in the file to represent the sequence of
+characters (excluding the delimiters).
+A preshared secret may also be represented, without quotes, in any form supported by
+\fIipsec_ttodata\fP(3).
+.LP
+An RSA private key is a composite of eight generally large numbers.  The notation
+used is a brace-enclosed list of field name and value pairs (see the example above).
+A suitable key, in a suitable format, may be generated by \fIipsec_rsasigkey\fP(8).
+The structure is very similar to that used by BIND 8.2.2 or later, but note that
+the numbers must have a ``0s'' prefix if they are in base 64.  The order of
+the fields is fixed.
+.LP
+The first token an entry must start in
+the first column of its line.  Subsequent tokens must be
+separated by whitespace,
+except for a colon token, which only needs to be followed by whitespace.
+A newline is taken as whitespace, but every
+line of an entry after the first must be indented.
+.LP
+Whitespace at the end of a line is ignored (except in the 0t
+notation for a key).  At the start of line or
+after whitespace, \fB#\fP and the following text up to the end of the
+line is treated as a comment.  Within entries, all lines must be
+indented (except for lines with no tokens).
+Outside entries, no line may be indented (this is to make sure that
+the file layout reflects its structure).
+.LP
+An include directive causes the contents of the named file to be processed
+before continuing with the current file.  The filename is subject to
+``globbing'' as in \fIsh\fP(1), so every file with a matching name
+is processed.  Includes may be nested to a modest
+depth (10, currently).  If the filename doesn't start with a \fB/\fP, the
+directory containing the current file is prepended to the name.  The
+include directive is a line that starts with the word \fBinclude\fP,
+followed by whitespace, followed by the filename (which must not contain
+whitespace).
+.SH FILES
+/etc/ipsec.secrets
+.SH SEE ALSO
+The rest of the FreeS/WAN distribution, in particular
+\fIipsec.conf\fP(5),
+\fIipsec\fP(8),
+\fIipsec_newhostkey\fP(8),
+\fIipsec_rsasigkey\fP(8),
+\fIipsec_showhostkey\fP(8),
+\fIipsec_auto\fP(8) \fB\-\-rereadsecrets\fP,
+and \fIipsec_pluto\fP(8) \fB\-\-listen\fP,.
+.br
+BIND 8.2.2 or later, ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/
+.SH HISTORY
+Designed for the FreeS/WAN project
+<http://www.freeswan.org>
+by D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+.SH BUGS
+If an ID is \fB0.0.0.0\fP, it will match \fB%any\fP;
+if it is \fB0::0\fP, it will match \fB%any6\fP.
diff --git a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1c22b299b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c
@@ -0,0 +1,5630 @@
+/* IPsec DOI and Oakley resolution routines
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ipsec_doi.c,v 1.39 2006/04/22 21:59:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>		/* for gettimeofday */
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "cookie.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "spdb.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "pkcs7.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "vendor.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#include "virtual.h"
+
+/*
+ * are we sending Pluto's Vendor ID?
+ */
+#ifdef VENDORID
+#define SEND_PLUTO_VID	1
+#else /* !VENDORID */
+#define SEND_PLUTO_VID	0
+#endif /* !VENDORID */
+
+/*
+ * are we sending a Cisco Unity VID?
+ */
+#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
+#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID	1
+#else /* !CISCO_QUIRKS */
+#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID	0
+#endif /* !CISCO_QUIRKS */
+
+/* MAGIC: perform f, a function that returns notification_t
+ * and return from the ENCLOSING stf_status returning function if it fails.
+ */
+#define RETURN_STF_FAILURE(f) \
+    { int r = (f); if (r != NOTHING_WRONG) return STF_FAIL + r; }
+
+/* create output HDR as replica of input HDR */
+void
+echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np)
+{
+    struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr;	/* mostly same as incoming header */
+
+    r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT;	/* we won't ever turn on this bit */
+    if (enc)
+	r_hdr.isa_flags |= ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+    /* some day, we may have to set r_hdr.isa_version */
+    r_hdr.isa_np = np;
+    if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody))
+	impossible();	/* surely must have room and be well-formed */
+}
+
+/* Compute DH shared secret from our local secret and the peer's public value.
+ * We make the leap that the length should be that of the group
+ * (see quoted passage at start of ACCEPT_KE).
+ */
+static void
+compute_dh_shared(struct state *st, const chunk_t g
+, const struct oakley_group_desc *group)
+{
+    MP_INT mp_g, mp_shared;
+    struct timeval tv0, tv1;
+    unsigned long tv_diff;
+
+    gettimeofday(&tv0, NULL);
+    passert(st->st_sec_in_use);
+    n_to_mpz(&mp_g, g.ptr, g.len);
+    mpz_init(&mp_shared);
+    mpz_powm(&mp_shared, &mp_g, &st->st_sec, group->modulus);
+    mpz_clear(&mp_g);
+    freeanychunk(st->st_shared);	/* happens in odd error cases */
+    st->st_shared = mpz_to_n(&mp_shared, group->bytes);
+    mpz_clear(&mp_shared);
+    gettimeofday(&tv1, NULL);
+    tv_diff=(tv1.tv_sec  - tv0.tv_sec) * 1000000 + (tv1.tv_usec - tv0.tv_usec);
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, 
+    	DBG_log("compute_dh_shared(): time elapsed (%s): %ld usec"
+		, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group)
+		, tv_diff);
+       );
+    /* if took more than 200 msec ... */
+    if (tv_diff > 200000) {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "WARNING: compute_dh_shared(): for %s took "
+			"%ld usec"
+		, enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group)
+		, tv_diff);
+    }
+
+    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH shared secret:\n", st->st_shared);
+}
+
+/* if we haven't already done so, compute a local DH secret (st->st_sec) and
+ * the corresponding public value (g).  This is emitted as a KE payload.
+ */
+static bool
+build_and_ship_KE(struct state *st, chunk_t *g
+, const struct oakley_group_desc *group, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np)
+{
+    if (!st->st_sec_in_use)
+    {
+	u_char tmp[LOCALSECRETSIZE];
+	MP_INT mp_g;
+
+	get_rnd_bytes(tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE);
+	st->st_sec_in_use = TRUE;
+	n_to_mpz(&st->st_sec, tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE);
+
+	mpz_init(&mp_g);
+	mpz_powm(&mp_g, &groupgenerator, &st->st_sec, group->modulus);
+	freeanychunk(*g);	/* happens in odd error cases */
+	*g = mpz_to_n(&mp_g, group->bytes);
+	mpz_clear(&mp_g);
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_dump("Local DH secret:\n", tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE);
+	    DBG_dump_chunk("Public DH value sent:\n", *g));
+    }
+    return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_keyex_desc, outs, *g, "keyex value");
+}
+
+/* accept_ke
+ *
+ * Check and accept DH public value (Gi or Gr) from peer's message.
+ * According to RFC2409 "The Internet key exchange (IKE)" 5:
+ *  The Diffie-Hellman public value passed in a KE payload, in either
+ *  a phase 1 or phase 2 exchange, MUST be the length of the negotiated
+ *  Diffie-Hellman group enforced, if necessary, by pre-pending the
+ *  value with zeros.
+ */
+static notification_t
+accept_KE(chunk_t *dest, const char *val_name
+, const struct oakley_group_desc *gr
+, pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    if (pbs_left(pbs) != gr->bytes)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "KE has %u byte DH public value; %u required"
+	    , (unsigned) pbs_left(pbs), (unsigned) gr->bytes);
+	/* XXX Could send notification back */
+	return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+    }
+    clonereplacechunk(*dest, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs), val_name);
+    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH public value received:\n", *dest);
+    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+}
+
+/* accept_PFS_KE
+ *
+ * Check and accept optional Quick Mode KE payload for PFS.
+ * Extends ACCEPT_PFS to check whether KE is allowed or required.
+ */
+static notification_t
+accept_PFS_KE(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest
+, const char *val_name, const char *msg_name)
+{
+    struct state *st = md->st;
+    struct payload_digest *const ke_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE];
+
+    if (ke_pd == NULL)
+    {
+	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing KE payload in %s message", msg_name);
+	    return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	if (st->st_pfs_group == NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message KE payload requires a GROUP_DESCRIPTION attribute in SA"
+		, msg_name);
+	    return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	if (ke_pd->next != NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message contains several KE payloads; we accept at most one", msg_name);
+	    return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;	/* ??? */
+	}
+	return accept_KE(dest, val_name, st->st_pfs_group, &ke_pd->pbs);
+    }
+    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+}
+
+static bool
+build_and_ship_nonce(chunk_t *n, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np
+, const char *name)
+{
+    freeanychunk(*n);
+    setchunk(*n, alloc_bytes(DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE, name), DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE);
+    get_rnd_bytes(n->ptr, DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE);
+    return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_nonce_desc, outs, *n, name);
+}
+
+static bool
+collect_rw_ca_candidates(struct msg_digest *md, generalName_t **top)
+{
+    struct connection *d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr
+	, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, LEMPTY);
+
+    for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+    {
+	/* must be a road warrior connection */
+	if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+	&& d->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    generalName_t *gn;
+	    bool new_entry = TRUE;
+
+	    for (gn = *top; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next)
+	    {
+		if (same_dn(gn->name, d->spd.that.ca))
+		{
+		    new_entry = FALSE;
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    if (new_entry)
+	    {
+		gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
+		gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME;
+		gn->name = d->spd.that.ca;
+		gn->next = *top;
+		*top = gn;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return *top != NULL;
+}
+
+static bool
+build_and_ship_CR(u_int8_t type, chunk_t ca, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np)
+{
+    pb_stream cr_pbs;
+    struct isakmp_cr cr_hd;
+    cr_hd.isacr_np = np;
+    cr_hd.isacr_type = type;
+
+    /* build CR header */
+    if (!out_struct(&cr_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc, outs, &cr_pbs))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (ca.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	/* build CR body containing the distinguished name of the CA */
+	if (!out_chunk(ca, &cr_pbs, "CA"))
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+    close_output_pbs(&cr_pbs);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Send a notification to the peer.  We could decide
+ * whether to send the notification, based on the type and the
+ * destination, if we care to.
+ */
+static void
+send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, struct state *encst,
+    msgid_t msgid, u_char *icookie, u_char *rcookie,
+    u_char *spi, size_t spisize, u_char protoid)
+{
+    u_char buffer[1024];
+    pb_stream pbs, r_hdr_pbs;
+    u_char *r_hashval    = NULL;  /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+    u_char *r_hash_start = NULL;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
+
+    passert((sndst) && (sndst->st_connection));
+
+    plog("sending %snotification %s to %s:%u"
+	, encst ? "encrypted " : ""
+	, enum_name(&notification_names, type)
+	, ip_str(&sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+	, (unsigned)sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_port);
+
+    memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+    init_pbs(&pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "ISAKMP notify");
+
+    /* HDR* */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+	hdr.isa_np = encst ? ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH : ISAKMP_NEXT_N;
+	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
+	hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
+	hdr.isa_flags = encst ? ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION : 0;
+	if (icookie)
+	    memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	if (rcookie)
+	    memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &pbs, &r_hdr_pbs))
+	    impossible();
+    }
+
+    /* HASH -- value to be filled later */
+    if (encst)
+    {
+	pb_stream hash_pbs;
+	if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_N, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs,
+	    &hash_pbs))
+	    impossible();
+	r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;  /* remember where to plant value */
+	if (!out_zero(
+	encst->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH"))
+	    impossible();
+	close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs);
+	r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH */
+    }
+
+    /* Notification Payload */
+    {
+	pb_stream not_pbs;
+	struct isakmp_notification isan;
+
+	isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+	isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	isan.isan_type = type;
+	isan.isan_spisize = spisize;
+	isan.isan_protoid = protoid;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &not_pbs)
+	    || !out_raw(spi, spisize, &not_pbs, "spi"))
+	    impossible();
+	close_output_pbs(&not_pbs);
+    }
+
+    /* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */
+    if (encst)
+    {
+	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, encst->st_oakley.hasher, encst->st_skeyid_a);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
+	hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start);
+	hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx);
+
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("HASH computed:");
+	    DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size);
+	)
+    }
+
+    /* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */
+    if (encst)
+    {
+	u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+
+	u_int old_iv_len = encst->st_iv_len;
+	u_int new_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len;
+
+	if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
+	    impossible();
+
+	memcpy(old_iv, encst->st_iv, old_iv_len);
+	memcpy(new_iv, encst->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+
+	if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(encst->st_state))
+	{
+	    memcpy(encst->st_ph1_iv, encst->st_new_iv, encst->st_new_iv_len);
+	    encst->st_ph1_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len;
+	}
+	init_phase2_iv(encst, &msgid);
+	if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, encst))
+	    impossible();
+	    
+	/* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */
+	memcpy(encst->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len);
+	memcpy(encst->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
+	encst->st_iv_len = old_iv_len;
+	encst->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	close_output_pbs(&r_hdr_pbs);
+    }
+
+    /* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */
+    {
+	chunk_t saved_tpacket = sndst->st_tpacket;
+
+	setchunk(sndst->st_tpacket, pbs.start, pbs_offset(&pbs));
+	send_packet(sndst, "ISAKMP notify");
+	sndst->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+send_notification_from_state(struct state *st, enum state_kind state,
+    u_int16_t type)
+{
+    struct state *p1st;
+
+    passert(st);
+
+    if (state == STATE_UNDEFINED)
+	state = st->st_state;
+
+    if (IS_QUICK(state))
+    {
+	p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+	if ((p1st == NULL) || (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(p1st->st_state)))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+		"no Phase1 state for Quick mode notification");
+	    return;
+	}
+	send_notification(st, type, p1st, generate_msgid(p1st),
+	    st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+    }
+    else if (IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(state) && st->st_enc_key.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	send_notification(st, type, st, generate_msgid(st),
+	    st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* no ISAKMP SA established - don't encrypt notification */
+	send_notification(st, type, NULL, 0,
+	    st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type)
+{
+    /**
+     * Create a dummy state to be able to use send_packet in
+     * send_notification
+     *
+     * we need to set:
+     *   st_connection->that.host_addr
+     *   st_connection->that.host_port
+     *   st_connection->interface
+     */
+    struct state st;
+    struct connection cnx;
+
+    passert(md);
+
+    memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st));
+    memset(&cnx, 0, sizeof(cnx));
+    st.st_connection = &cnx;
+    cnx.spd.that.host_addr = md->sender;
+    cnx.spd.that.host_port = md->sender_port;
+    cnx.interface = md->iface;
+
+    send_notification(&st, type, NULL, 0,
+	md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP);
+}
+
+/* Send a Delete Notification to announce deletion of ISAKMP SA or
+ * inbound IPSEC SAs.  Does nothing if no such SAs are being deleted.
+ * Delete Notifications cannot announce deletion of outbound IPSEC/ISAKMP SAs.
+ */
+void
+send_delete(struct state *st)
+{
+    pb_stream reply_pbs;
+    pb_stream r_hdr_pbs;
+    msgid_t	msgid;
+    u_char buffer[8192];
+    struct state *p1st;
+    ip_said said[EM_MAXRELSPIS];
+    ip_said *ns = said;
+    u_char
+	*r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
+	*r_hash_start;	/* start of what is to be hashed */
+    bool isakmp_sa = FALSE;
+
+    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+	p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+	if (p1st == NULL)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no Phase 1 state for Delete"));
+	    return;
+	}
+
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+	    ns->spi = st->st_ah.our_spi;
+	    ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr;
+	    ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_AH;
+	    ns++;
+	}
+	if (st->st_esp.present)
+	{
+	    ns->spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
+	    ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr;
+	    ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP;
+	    ns++;
+	}
+
+	passert(ns != said);    /* there must be some SAs to delete */
+    }
+    else if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+	p1st = st;
+	isakmp_sa = TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	return; /* nothing to do */
+    }
+
+    msgid = generate_msgid(p1st);
+
+    zero(buffer);
+    init_pbs(&reply_pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "delete msg");
+
+    /* HDR* */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
+	hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
+	hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, p1st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, p1st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply_pbs, &r_hdr_pbs))
+	    impossible();
+    }
+
+    /* HASH -- value to be filled later */
+    {
+	pb_stream hash_pbs;
+
+	if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_D, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &hash_pbs))
+	    impossible();
+	r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;	/* remember where to plant value */
+	if (!out_zero(p1st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH(1)"))
+	    impossible();
+	close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs);
+	r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur;	/* hash from after HASH(1) */
+    }
+
+    /* Delete Payloads */
+    if (isakmp_sa)
+    {
+	pb_stream del_pbs;
+	struct isakmp_delete isad;
+	u_char isakmp_spi[2*COOKIE_SIZE];
+
+	isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+	isad.isad_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	isad.isad_spisize = (2 * COOKIE_SIZE);
+	isad.isad_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
+	isad.isad_nospi = 1;
+
+	memcpy(isakmp_spi, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(isakmp_spi+COOKIE_SIZE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+
+	if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs)
+	|| !out_raw(&isakmp_spi, (2*COOKIE_SIZE), &del_pbs, "delete payload"))
+	    impossible();
+	close_output_pbs(&del_pbs);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	while (ns != said)
+	{
+
+	    pb_stream del_pbs;
+	    struct isakmp_delete isad;
+
+	    ns--;
+	    isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+	    isad.isad_np = ns == said? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_D;
+	    isad.isad_spisize = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t);
+	    isad.isad_protoid = ns->proto;
+
+	    isad.isad_nospi = 1;
+	    if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs)
+	    || !out_raw(&ns->spi, sizeof(ipsec_spi_t), &del_pbs, "delete payload"))
+		impossible();
+	    close_output_pbs(&del_pbs);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */
+    {
+	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, p1st->st_oakley.hasher, p1st->st_skeyid_a);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
+	hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start);
+	hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx);
+
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("HASH(1) computed:");
+	    DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size);
+	)
+    }
+
+    /* Do a dance to avoid needing a new state object.
+     * We use the Phase 1 State.  This is the one with right
+     * IV, for one thing.
+     * The tricky bits are:
+     * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_iv (but not st_iv_new)
+     * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_tpacket.
+     */
+    {
+	u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	chunk_t saved_tpacket = p1st->st_tpacket;
+
+	memcpy(old_iv, p1st->st_iv, p1st->st_iv_len);
+	init_phase2_iv(p1st, &msgid);
+
+	if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, p1st))
+	    impossible();
+
+	setchunk(p1st->st_tpacket, reply_pbs.start, pbs_offset(&reply_pbs));
+	send_packet(p1st, "delete notify");
+	p1st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
+
+	/* get back old IV for this state */
+	memcpy(p1st->st_iv, old_iv, p1st->st_iv_len);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, struct payload_digest *p)
+{
+    struct isakmp_delete *d = &(p->payload.delete);
+    size_t sizespi;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!md->encrypted)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: not encrypted");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+	/* can't happen (if msg is encrypt), but just to be sure */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
+	"ISAKMP SA not established");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (d->isad_nospi == 0)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: no SPI");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    switch (d->isad_protoid)
+    {
+    case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+	sizespi = 2 * COOKIE_SIZE;
+	break;
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+	sizespi = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t);
+	break;
+    case PROTO_IPCOMP:
+	/* nothing interesting to delete */
+	return;
+    default:
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "ignoring Delete SA payload: unknown Protocol ID (%s)"
+	    , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (d->isad_spisize != sizespi)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "ignoring Delete SA payload: bad SPI size (%d) for %s"
+	    , d->isad_spisize, enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) != d->isad_nospi * sizespi)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "ignoring Delete SA payload: invalid payload size");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    for (i = 0; i < d->isad_nospi; i++)
+    {
+	u_char *spi = p->pbs.cur + (i * sizespi);
+
+	if (d->isad_protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
+	{
+	    /**
+	     * ISAKMP
+	     */
+	    struct state *dst = find_state(spi /*iCookie*/
+		, spi+COOKIE_SIZE /*rCookie*/
+		, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr
+		, MAINMODE_MSGID);
+
+	    if (dst == NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
+		    "ISAKMP SA not found (maybe expired)");
+	    }
+	    else if (!same_peer_ids(st->st_connection, dst->st_connection, NULL))
+	    {
+		/* we've not authenticated the relevant identities */
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: "
+		    "ISAKMP SA used to convey Delete has different IDs from ISAKMP SA it deletes");
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		struct connection *oldc;
+		
+		oldc = cur_connection;
+		set_cur_connection(dst->st_connection);
+
+		if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+		    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
+
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
+		    "deleting ISAKMP State #%lu", dst->st_serialno);
+		delete_state(dst);
+		set_cur_connection(oldc);
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /**
+	     * IPSEC (ESP/AH)
+	     */
+	    bool bogus;
+	    struct state *dst = find_phase2_state_to_delete(st
+		, d->isad_protoid
+		, *(ipsec_spi_t *)spi	/* network order */
+		, &bogus);
+
+	    if (dst == NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		       , "ignoring Delete SA payload: %s SA(0x%08lx) not found (%s)"
+		       , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid)
+		       , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi)
+		       , bogus ? "our SPI - bogus implementation" : "maybe expired");
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection;
+		struct connection *oldc;
+		
+		oldc = cur_connection;
+		set_cur_connection(rc);
+
+		if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+		    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst);
+
+		if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno
+		&& (rc->policy & POLICY_UP))
+		    {
+		    /* Last IPSec SA for a permanent connection that we
+		     * have initiated.  Replace it in a few seconds.
+		     *
+		     * Useful if the other peer is rebooting.
+		     */
+#define DELETE_SA_DELAY  EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0
+		    if (dst->st_event != NULL
+		    && dst->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE
+		    && dst->st_event->ev_time <= DELETE_SA_DELAY + now())
+		    {
+			/* Patch from Angus Lees to ignore retransmited
+			 * Delete SA.
+			 */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
+			    "already replacing IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds"
+			    , dst->st_serialno, (int)(dst->st_event->ev_time - now()));
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: "
+			    "replace IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds"
+			    , dst->st_serialno, DELETE_SA_DELAY);
+			dst->st_margin = DELETE_SA_DELAY;
+			delete_event(dst);
+			event_schedule(EVENT_SA_REPLACE, DELETE_SA_DELAY, dst);
+		    }
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA(0x%08lx) payload: "
+			   "deleting IPSEC State #%lu"
+			   , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi)
+			   , dst->st_serialno);
+		    delete_state(dst);
+		}
+
+		/* reset connection */
+		set_cur_connection(oldc);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* The whole message must be a multiple of 4 octets.
+ * I'm not sure where this is spelled out, but look at
+ * rfc2408 3.6 Transform Payload.
+ * Note: it talks about 4 BYTE boundaries!
+ */
+void
+close_message(pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    size_t padding =  pad_up(pbs_offset(pbs), 4);
+
+    if (padding != 0)
+	(void) out_zero(padding, pbs, "message padding");
+    close_output_pbs(pbs);
+}
+
+/* Initiate an Oakley Main Mode exchange.
+ * --> HDR;SA
+ * Note: this is not called from demux.c
+ */
+static stf_status
+main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor
+    , lset_t policy, unsigned long try)
+{
+    struct state *st = new_state();
+    pb_stream reply;	/* not actually a reply, but you know what I mean */
+    pb_stream rbody;
+
+    int vids_to_send = 0;
+    
+    /* set up new state */
+    st->st_connection = c;
+    set_cur_state(st);	/* we must reset before exit */
+    st->st_policy = policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK;
+    st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock;
+    st->st_try = try;
+    st->st_state = STATE_MAIN_I1;
+
+    /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */
+    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
+	vids_to_send++;
+    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
+	vids_to_send++;
+    if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP)
+	vids_to_send++;
+    /* always send XAUTH Vendor ID */
+	vids_to_send++;
+    /* always send DPD Vendor ID */
+	vids_to_send++;
+    if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+	vids_to_send++;
+
+   get_cookie(TRUE, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &c->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
+
+    if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy))
+	add_pending(dup_any(whack_sock), st, c, policy, 1
+	    , predecessor == NULL? SOS_NOBODY : predecessor->st_serialno);
+
+    if (predecessor == NULL)
+	plog("initiating Main Mode");
+    else
+	plog("initiating Main Mode to replace #%lu", predecessor->st_serialno);
+
+    /* set up reply */
+    init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
+
+    /* HDR out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+	zero(&hdr);	/* default to 0 */
+	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA;
+	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT;
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	/* R-cookie, flags and MessageID are left zero */
+
+	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* SA out */
+    {
+	u_char *sa_start = rbody.cur;
+	lset_t auth_policy = policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+
+	if (!out_sa(&rbody, &oakley_sadb, st, TRUE
+	, vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/* save initiator SA for later HASH */
+	passert(st->st_p1isa.ptr == NULL);	/* no leak!  (MUST be first time) */
+	clonetochunk(st->st_p1isa, sa_start, rbody.cur - sa_start
+	    , "sa in main_outI1");
+    }
+
+    /* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */
+    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */
+    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+    /* if we  have an OpenPGP certificate we assume an
+     * OpenPGP peer and have to send the Vendor ID
+     */
+    if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP)
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &rbody, VID_OPENPGP))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */
+    if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+    , &rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH))
+    {
+	reset_cur_state();
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &rbody, VID_MISC_DPD))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (nat_traversal_enabled)
+    {
+	/* Add supported NAT-Traversal VID */
+	if (!nat_traversal_add_vid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &rbody))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    close_message(&rbody);
+    close_output_pbs(&reply);
+
+    clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply)
+	, "reply packet for main_outI1");
+
+    /* Transmit */
+
+    send_packet(st, "main_outI1");
+
+    /* Set up a retransmission event, half a minute henceforth */
+    delete_event(st);
+    event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
+
+    if (predecessor != NULL)
+    {
+	update_pending(predecessor, st);
+	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1
+	    , "%s: initiate, replacing #%lu"
+	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+	    , predecessor->st_serialno);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1
+	    , "%s: initiate", enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+    }
+    reset_cur_state();
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+void
+ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock
+, struct connection *c
+, lset_t policy
+, unsigned long try
+, so_serial_t replacing)
+{
+    /* If there's already an ISAKMP SA established, use that and
+     * go directly to Quick Mode.  We are even willing to use one
+     * that is still being negotiated, but only if we are the Initiator
+     * (thus we can be sure that the IDs are not going to change;
+     * other issues around intent might matter).
+     * Note: there is no way to initiate with a Road Warrior.
+     */
+    struct state *st = find_phase1_state(c
+	, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES | PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES);
+
+    if (st == NULL)
+    {
+	(void) main_outI1(whack_sock, c, NULL, policy, try);
+    }
+    else if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy))
+    {
+	if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+	    /* leave our Phase 2 negotiation pending */
+	    add_pending(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* ??? we assume that peer_nexthop_sin isn't important:
+	     * we already have it from when we negotiated the ISAKMP SA!
+	     * It isn't clear what to do with the error return.
+	     */
+	    (void) quick_outI1(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing);
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	close_any(whack_sock);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Replace SA with a fresh one that is similar
+ *
+ * Shares some logic with ipsecdoi_initiate, but not the same!
+ * - we must not reuse the ISAKMP SA if we are trying to replace it!
+ * - if trying to replace IPSEC SA, use ipsecdoi_initiate to build
+ *   ISAKMP SA if needed.
+ * - duplicate whack fd, if live.
+ * Does not delete the old state -- someone else will do that.
+ */
+void
+ipsecdoi_replace(struct state *st, unsigned long try)
+{
+    int whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock);
+    lset_t policy = st->st_policy;
+
+    if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+    {
+	passert(!HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy));
+	(void) main_outI1(whack_sock, st->st_connection, st, policy, try);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* Add features of actual old state to policy.  This ensures
+	 * that rekeying doesn't downgrade security.  I admit that
+	 * this doesn't capture everything.
+	 */
+	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+	    policy |= POLICY_PFS;
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+	    policy |= POLICY_AUTHENTICATE;
+	    if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+	}
+	if (st->st_esp.present && st->st_esp.attrs.transid != ESP_NULL)
+	{
+	    policy |= POLICY_ENCRYPT;
+	    if (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+	}
+	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	{
+	    policy |= POLICY_COMPRESS;
+	    if (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL;
+	}
+	passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy));
+	ipsecdoi_initiate(whack_sock, st->st_connection, policy, try
+	    , st->st_serialno);
+    }
+}
+
+/* SKEYID for preshared keys.
+ * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1
+ */
+static bool
+skeyid_preshared(struct state *st)
+{
+    const chunk_t *pss = get_preshared_secret(st->st_connection);
+
+    if (pss == NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secret disappeared!");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, *pss);
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni);
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_nr);
+	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid, "st_skeyid in skeyid_preshared()", &ctx);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+static bool
+skeyid_digisig(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+    chunk_t nir;
+
+    /* We need to hmac_init with the concatenation of Ni_b and Nr_b,
+     * so we have to build a temporary concatentation.
+     */
+    nir.len = st->st_ni.len + st->st_nr.len;
+    nir.ptr = alloc_bytes(nir.len, "Ni + Nr in skeyid_digisig");
+    memcpy(nir.ptr, st->st_ni.ptr, st->st_ni.len);
+    memcpy(nir.ptr+st->st_ni.len, st->st_nr.ptr, st->st_nr.len);
+    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, nir);
+    pfree(nir.ptr);
+
+    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
+    hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid, "st_skeyid in skeyid_digisig()", &ctx);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Generate the SKEYID_* and new IV
+ * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1
+ */
+static bool
+generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st)
+{
+    /* Generate the SKEYID */
+    switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+    {
+	case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+	case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+	case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+	    if (!skeyid_preshared(st))
+		return FALSE;
+	    break;
+
+	case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+	case XAUTHInitRSA:
+	case XAUTHRespRSA:
+	    if (!skeyid_digisig(st))
+		return FALSE;
+	    break;
+
+	case OAKLEY_DSS_SIG:
+	    /* XXX */
+
+	case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC:
+	case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV:
+	case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC:
+	case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV:
+	    /* XXX */
+
+	default:
+	    bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth);
+    }
+
+    /* generate SKEYID_* from SKEYID */
+    {
+	struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid);
+
+	/* SKEYID_D */
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1);
+	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_d, "st_skeyid_d in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx);
+
+	/* SKEYID_A */
+	hmac_reinit(&ctx);
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_skeyid_d);
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, "\1", 1);
+	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_a, "st_skeyid_a in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx);
+
+	/* SKEYID_E */
+	hmac_reinit(&ctx);
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_skeyid_a);
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hmac_update(&ctx, "\2", 1);
+	hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_e, "st_skeyid_e in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx);
+    }
+
+    /* generate IV */
+    {
+	union hash_ctx hash_ctx;
+	const struct hash_desc *h = st->st_oakley.hasher;
+
+	st->st_new_iv_len = h->hash_digest_size;
+	passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+
+        DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+            DBG_dump_chunk("DH_i:", st->st_gi);
+            DBG_dump_chunk("DH_r:", st->st_gr);
+        );
+	h->hash_init(&hash_ctx);
+	h->hash_update(&hash_ctx, st->st_gi.ptr, st->st_gi.len);
+	h->hash_update(&hash_ctx, st->st_gr.ptr, st->st_gr.len);
+	h->hash_final(st->st_new_iv, &hash_ctx);
+    }
+
+    /* Oakley Keying Material
+     * Derived from Skeyid_e: if it is not big enough, generate more
+     * using the PRF.
+     * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B
+     */
+    {
+	/* const size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.encrypter->keydeflen/BITS_PER_BYTE; */
+	const size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.enckeylen/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	u_char keytemp[MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN + MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	u_char *k = st->st_skeyid_e.ptr;
+
+	if (keysize > st->st_skeyid_e.len)
+	{
+	    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+	    size_t i = 0;
+
+	    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_e);
+	    hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1);
+	    for (;;)
+	    {
+		hmac_final(&keytemp[i], &ctx);
+		i += ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+		if (i >= keysize)
+		    break;
+		hmac_reinit(&ctx);
+		hmac_update(&ctx, &keytemp[i - ctx.hmac_digest_size], ctx.hmac_digest_size);
+	    }
+	    k = keytemp;
+	}
+	clonereplacechunk(st->st_enc_key, k, keysize, "st_enc_key");
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid:  ", st->st_skeyid);
+	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_d:", st->st_skeyid_d);
+	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_a:", st->st_skeyid_a);
+	DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_e:", st->st_skeyid_e);
+	DBG_dump_chunk("enc key:", st->st_enc_key);
+	DBG_dump("IV:", st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len));
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Generate HASH_I or HASH_R for ISAKMP Phase I.
+ * This will *not* generate other hash payloads (eg. Phase II or Quick Mode,
+ * New Group Mode, or ISAKMP Informational Exchanges).
+ * If the hashi argument is TRUE, generate HASH_I; if FALSE generate HASH_R.
+ * If hashus argument is TRUE, we're generating a hash for our end.
+ * See RFC2409 IKE 5.
+ *
+ * Generating the SIG_I and SIG_R for DSS is an odd perversion of this:
+ * Most of the logic is the same, but SHA-1 is used in place of HMAC-whatever.
+ * The extensive common logic is embodied in main_mode_hash_body().
+ * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1 and 6.1.1.2
+ */
+
+typedef void (*hash_update_t)(union hash_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t) ;
+static void
+main_mode_hash_body(struct state *st
+, bool hashi	/* Initiator? */
+, const pb_stream *idpl	/* ID payload, as PBS */
+, union hash_ctx *ctx
+, void (*hash_update_void)(void *, const u_char *input, size_t))
+{
+#define HASH_UPDATE_T (union hash_ctx *, const u_char *input, unsigned int len)
+    hash_update_t hash_update=(hash_update_t)  hash_update_void;
+#if 0	/* if desperate to debug hashing */
+#   define hash_update(ctx, input, len) { \
+	DBG_dump("hash input", input, len); \
+	(hash_update)(ctx, input, len); \
+	}
+#endif
+
+#   define hash_update_chunk(ctx, ch) hash_update((ctx), (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
+
+    if (hashi)
+    {
+	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gi);
+	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gr);
+	hash_update(ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hash_update(ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gr);
+	hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gi);
+	hash_update(ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hash_update(ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("hashing %lu bytes of SA"
+	, (unsigned long) (st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic))));
+
+    /* SA_b */
+    hash_update(ctx, st->st_p1isa.ptr + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)
+	, st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic));
+
+    /* Hash identification payload, without generic payload header.
+     * We used to reconstruct ID Payload for this purpose, but now
+     * we use the bytes as they appear on the wire to avoid
+     * "spelling problems".
+     */
+    hash_update(ctx
+	, idpl->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)
+	, pbs_offset(idpl) - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic));
+
+#   undef hash_update_chunk
+#   undef hash_update
+}
+
+static size_t	/* length of hash */
+main_mode_hash(struct state *st
+, u_char *hash_val	/* resulting bytes */
+, bool hashi	/* Initiator? */
+, const pb_stream *idpl)	/* ID payload, as PBS; cur must be at end */
+{
+    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid);
+    main_mode_hash_body(st, hashi, idpl, &ctx.hash_ctx, ctx.h->hash_update);
+    hmac_final(hash_val, &ctx);
+    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+}
+
+#if 0	/* only needed for DSS */
+static void
+main_mode_sha1(struct state *st
+, u_char *hash_val	/* resulting bytes */
+, size_t *hash_len	/* length of hash */
+, bool hashi	/* Initiator? */
+, const pb_stream *idpl)	/* ID payload, as PBS */
+{
+    union hash_ctx ctx;
+
+    SHA1Init(&ctx.ctx_sha1);
+    SHA1Update(&ctx.ctx_sha1, st->st_skeyid.ptr, st->st_skeyid.len);
+    *hash_len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+    main_mode_hash_body(st, hashi, idpl, &ctx
+	, (void (*)(union hash_ctx *, const u_char *, unsigned int))&SHA1Update);
+    SHA1Final(hash_val, &ctx.ctx_sha1);
+}
+#endif
+
+/* Create an RSA signature of a hash.
+ * Poorly specified in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.1.1.2.
+ * Use PKCS#1 version 1.5 encryption of hash (called
+ * RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5) in PKCS#2.
+ */
+static size_t
+RSA_sign_hash(struct connection *c
+, u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS]
+, const u_char *hash_val, size_t hash_len)
+{
+    size_t sz = 0;
+    smartcard_t *sc = c->spd.this.sc;
+
+    if (sc == NULL)		/* no smartcard */
+    {
+	const struct RSA_private_key *k = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+
+	if (k == NULL)
+	    return 0;	/* failure: no key to use */
+
+	sz = k->pub.k;
+	passert(RSA_MIN_OCTETS <= sz && 4 + hash_len < sz && sz <= RSA_MAX_OCTETS);
+	sign_hash(k, hash_val, hash_len, sig_val, sz);
+    }
+    else if (sc->valid) /* if valid pin then sign hash on the smartcard */
+    {
+ 	lock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
+	if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
+	{
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	    unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
+	    return 0;
+	}
+
+	sz = scx_get_keylength(sc);
+	if (sz == 0)
+	{
+	    plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard");
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	    unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
+	    return 0;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("signing hash with RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
+		, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+	)
+	sz = scx_sign_hash(sc, hash_val, hash_len, sig_val, sz) ? sz : 0;
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash");
+    }
+    return sz;
+}
+
+/* Check a Main Mode RSA Signature against computed hash using RSA public key k.
+ *
+ * As a side effect, on success, the public key is copied into the
+ * state object to record the authenticator.
+ *
+ * Can fail because wrong public key is used or because hash disagrees.
+ * We distinguish because diagnostics should also.
+ *
+ * The result is NULL if the Signature checked out.
+ * Otherwise, the first character of the result indicates
+ * how far along failure occurred.  A greater character signifies
+ * greater progress.
+ *
+ * Classes:
+ * 0	reserved for caller
+ * 1	SIG length doesn't match key length -- wrong key
+ * 2-8	malformed ECB after decryption -- probably wrong key
+ * 9	decrypted hash != computed hash -- probably correct key
+ *
+ * Although the math should be the same for generating and checking signatures,
+ * it is not: the knowledge of the private key allows more efficient (i.e.
+ * different) computation for encryption.
+ */
+static err_t
+try_RSA_signature(const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN], size_t hash_len
+, const pb_stream *sig_pbs, pubkey_t *kr
+, struct state *st)
+{
+    const u_char *sig_val = sig_pbs->cur;
+    size_t sig_len = pbs_left(sig_pbs);
+    u_char s[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];	/* for decrypted sig_val */
+    u_char *hash_in_s = &s[sig_len - hash_len];
+    const struct RSA_public_key *k = &kr->u.rsa;
+
+    /* decrypt the signature -- reversing RSA_sign_hash */
+    if (sig_len != k->k)
+    {
+	/* XXX notification: INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION */
+	return "1" "SIG length does not match public key length";
+    }
+
+    /* actual exponentiation; see PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 */
+    {
+	chunk_t temp_s;
+	mpz_t c;
+
+	n_to_mpz(c, sig_val, sig_len);
+	mpz_powm(c, c, &k->e, &k->n);
+
+	temp_s = mpz_to_n(c, sig_len);	/* back to octets */
+	memcpy(s, temp_s.ptr, sig_len);
+	pfree(temp_s.ptr);
+	mpz_clear(c);
+    }
+
+    /* sanity check on signature: see if it matches
+     * PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting
+     */
+    {
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	if (s[0] != 0x00)
+	    ugh = "2" "no leading 00";
+	else if (hash_in_s[-1] != 0x00)
+	    ugh = "3" "00 separator not present";
+	else if (s[1] == 0x01)
+	{
+	    const u_char *p;
+
+	    for (p = &s[2]; p != hash_in_s - 1; p++)
+	    {
+		if (*p != 0xFF)
+		{
+		    ugh = "4" "invalid Padding String";
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (s[1] == 0x02)
+	{
+	    const u_char *p;
+
+	    for (p = &s[2]; p != hash_in_s - 1; p++)
+	    {
+		if (*p == 0x00)
+		{
+		    ugh = "5" "invalid Padding String";
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    ugh = "6" "Block Type not 01 or 02";
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* note: it might be a good idea to make sure that
+	     * an observer cannot tell what kind of failure happened.
+	     * I don't know what this means in practice.
+	     */
+	    /* We probably selected the wrong public key for peer:
+	     * SIG Payload decrypted into malformed ECB
+	     */
+	    /* XXX notification: INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION */
+	    return ugh;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* We have the decoded hash: see if it matches. */
+    if (memcmp(hash_val, hash_in_s, hash_len) != 0)
+    {
+	/* good: header, hash, signature, and other payloads well-formed
+	 * good: we could find an RSA Sig key for the peer.
+	 * bad: hash doesn't match
+	 * Guess: sides disagree about key to be used.
+	 */
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "decrypted SIG", s, sig_len);
+	DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed HASH", hash_val, hash_len);
+	/* XXX notification: INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION */
+	return "9" "authentication failure: received SIG does not match computed HASH, but message is well-formed";
+    }
+
+    /* Success: copy successful key into state.
+     * There might be an old one if we previously aborted this
+     * state transition.
+     */
+    unreference_key(&st->st_peer_pubkey);
+    st->st_peer_pubkey = reference_key(kr);
+
+    return NULL;    /* happy happy */
+}
+
+/* Check signature against all RSA public keys we can find.
+ * If we need keys from DNS KEY records, and they haven't been fetched,
+ * return STF_SUSPEND to ask for asynch DNS lookup.
+ *
+ * Note: parameter keys_from_dns contains results of DNS lookup for key
+ * or is NULL indicating lookup not yet tried.
+ *
+ * take_a_crack is a helper function.  Mostly forensic.
+ * If only we had coroutines.
+ */
+struct tac_state {
+    /* RSA_check_signature's args that take_a_crack needs */
+    struct state *st;
+    const u_char *hash_val;
+    size_t hash_len;
+    const pb_stream *sig_pbs;
+
+    /* state carried between calls */
+    err_t best_ugh;	/* most successful failure */
+    int tried_cnt;	/* number of keys tried */
+    char tried[50];	/* keyids of tried public keys */
+    char *tn;	/* roof of tried[] */
+};
+
+static bool
+take_a_crack(struct tac_state *s
+, pubkey_t *kr
+, const char *story USED_BY_DEBUG)
+{
+    err_t ugh = try_RSA_signature(s->hash_val, s->hash_len, s->sig_pbs
+	, kr, s->st);
+    const struct RSA_public_key *k = &kr->u.rsa;
+
+    s->tried_cnt++;
+    if (ugh == NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_CONTROL
+	    , DBG_log("an RSA Sig check passed with *%s [%s]"
+		, k->keyid, story));
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CRYPT
+	    , DBG_log("an RSA Sig check failure %s with *%s [%s]"
+		, ugh + 1, k->keyid, story));
+	if (s->best_ugh == NULL || s->best_ugh[0] < ugh[0])
+	    s->best_ugh = ugh;
+	if (ugh[0] > '0'
+	&& s->tn - s->tried + KEYID_BUF + 2 < (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(s->tried))
+	{
+	    strcpy(s->tn, " *");
+	    strcpy(s->tn + 2, k->keyid);
+	    s->tn += strlen(s->tn);
+	}
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+static stf_status
+RSA_check_signature(const struct id* peer
+, struct state *st
+, const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]
+, size_t hash_len
+, const pb_stream *sig_pbs
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+, const pubkey_list_t *keys_from_dns
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+, const struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
+)
+{
+    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    struct tac_state s;
+    err_t dns_ugh = NULL;
+
+    s.st = st;
+    s.hash_val = hash_val;
+    s.hash_len = hash_len;
+    s.sig_pbs = sig_pbs;
+
+    s.best_ugh = NULL;
+    s.tried_cnt = 0;
+    s.tn = s.tried;
+
+    /* try all gateway records hung off c */
+    if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+    {
+	struct gw_info *gw;
+
+	for (gw = c->gw_info; gw != NULL; gw = gw->next)
+	{
+	    /* only consider entries that have a key and are for our peer */
+	    if (gw->gw_key_present
+	    && same_id(&gw->gw_id, &c->spd.that.id)
+	    && take_a_crack(&s, gw->key, "key saved from DNS TXT"))
+		return STF_OK;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* try all appropriate Public keys */
+    {
+	pubkey_list_t *p, **pp;
+
+	pp = &pubkeys;
+
+	for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = *pp)
+	{
+	    pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+
+	    if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && same_id(peer, &key->id))
+	    {
+		time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+		/* check if found public key has expired */
+		if (key->until_time != UNDEFINED_TIME && key->until_time < now)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+			"cached RSA public key has expired and has been deleted");
+		    *pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
+		    continue; /* continue with next public key */
+		}
+
+		if (take_a_crack(&s, key, "preloaded key"))
+		return STF_OK;
+	    }
+	    pp = &p->next;
+	}
+   }
+
+    /* if no key was found (evidenced by best_ugh == NULL)
+     * and that side of connection is key_from_DNS_on_demand
+     * then go search DNS for keys for peer.
+     */
+    if (s.best_ugh == NULL && c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand)
+    {
+	if (gateways_from_dns != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* TXT keys */
+	    const struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+	    for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+		if (gwp->gw_key_present
+		&& take_a_crack(&s, gwp->key, "key from DNS TXT"))
+		    return STF_OK;
+	}
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	else if (keys_from_dns != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* KEY keys */
+	    const pubkey_list_t *kr;
+
+	    for (kr = keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next)
+		if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA
+		&& take_a_crack(&s, kr->key, "key from DNS KEY"))
+		    return STF_OK;
+	}
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	else
+	{
+	    /* nothing yet: ask for asynch DNS lookup */
+	    return STF_SUSPEND;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* no acceptable key was found: diagnose */
+    {
+	char id_buf[BUF_LEN];	/* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */
+
+	(void) idtoa(peer, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf));
+
+	if (s.best_ugh == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (dns_ugh == NULL)
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
+		    , id_buf);
+	    else
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
+		    "; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)"
+		    , id_buf, dns_ugh);
+
+	    /* ??? is this the best code there is? */
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	}
+
+	if (s.best_ugh[0] == '9')
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s", s.best_ugh + 1);
+	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (s.tried_cnt == 1)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		    , "Signature check (on %s) failed (wrong key?); tried%s"
+		    , id_buf, s.tried);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("public key for %s failed:"
+			" decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB (%s)"
+			, id_buf, s.best_ugh + 1));
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		    , "Signature check (on %s) failed:"
+		      " tried%s keys but none worked."
+		    , id_buf, s.tried);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("all %d public keys for %s failed:"
+			" best decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB (%s)"
+			, s.tried_cnt, id_buf, s.best_ugh + 1));
+	    }
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static notification_t
+accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, const char *name)
+{
+    pb_stream *nonce_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE]->pbs;
+    size_t len = pbs_left(nonce_pbs);
+
+    if (len < MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE || MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE < len)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s length not between %d and %d"
+	    , name , MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE, MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE);
+	return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;	/* ??? */
+    }
+    clonereplacechunk(*dest, nonce_pbs->cur, len, "nonce");
+    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+}
+
+/* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header
+ * IV is fetched from st->st_new_iv and stored into st->st_iv.
+ * The theory is that there will be no "backing out", so we commit to IV.
+ * We also close the pbs.
+ */
+bool
+encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st)
+{
+    const struct encrypt_desc *e = st->st_oakley.encrypter;
+    u_int8_t *enc_start = pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr);
+    size_t enc_len = pbs_offset(pbs) - sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr);
+
+    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_RAW, "encrypting:\n", enc_start, enc_len);
+
+    /* Pad up to multiple of encryption blocksize.
+     * See the description associated with the definition of
+     * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h.
+     */
+    {
+	size_t padding = pad_up(enc_len, e->enc_blocksize);
+
+	if (padding != 0)
+	{
+	    if (!out_zero(padding, pbs, "encryption padding"))
+		return FALSE;
+	    enc_len += padding;
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("encrypting using %s", enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt)));
+
+    /* e->crypt(TRUE, enc_start, enc_len, st); */
+    crypto_cbc_encrypt(e, TRUE, enc_start, enc_len, st);
+
+    update_iv(st);
+    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:", st->st_iv, st->st_iv_len);
+    close_message(pbs);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Compute HASH(1), HASH(2) of Quick Mode.
+ * HASH(1) is part of Quick I1 message.
+ * HASH(2) is part of Quick R1 message.
+ * Used by: quick_outI1, quick_inI1_outR1 (twice), quick_inR1_outI2
+ * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5, pg. 18 or draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.2 pg 25)
+ */
+static size_t
+quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof
+, const struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid, bool hash2)
+{
+    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+#if 0	/* if desperate to debug hashing */
+#   define hmac_update(ctx, ptr, len) { \
+	DBG_dump("hash input", (ptr), (len)); \
+	(hmac_update)((ctx), (ptr), (len)); \
+    }
+    DBG_dump("hash key", st->st_skeyid_a.ptr, st->st_skeyid_a.len);
+#endif
+    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
+    hmac_update(&ctx, (const void *) msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
+    if (hash2)
+	hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni);	/* include Ni_b in the hash */
+    hmac_update(&ctx, start, roof-start);
+    hmac_final(dest, &ctx);
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("HASH(%d) computed:", hash2 + 1);
+	DBG_dump("", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size));
+    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+#   undef hmac_update
+}
+
+/* Compute HASH(3) in Quick Mode (part of Quick I2 message).
+ * Used by: quick_inR1_outI2, quick_inI2
+ * See RFC2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)" 5.5.
+ * NOTE: this hash (unlike HASH(1) and HASH(2)) ONLY covers the
+ * Message ID and Nonces.  This is a mistake.
+ */
+static size_t
+quick_mode_hash3(u_char *dest, struct state *st)
+{
+    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
+    hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1);
+    hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &st->st_msgid, sizeof(st->st_msgid));
+    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni);
+    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_nr);
+    hmac_final(dest, &ctx);
+    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "HASH(3) computed:", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size);
+    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+}
+
+/* Compute Phase 2 IV.
+ * Uses Phase 1 IV from st_iv; puts result in st_new_iv.
+ */
+void
+init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid)
+{
+    const struct hash_desc *h = st->st_oakley.hasher;
+    union hash_ctx ctx;
+
+    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last Phase 1 IV:"
+	, st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len);
+
+    st->st_new_iv_len = h->hash_digest_size;
+    passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv));
+
+    h->hash_init(&ctx);
+    h->hash_update(&ctx, st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len);
+    passert(*msgid != 0);
+    h->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)msgid, sizeof(*msgid));
+    h->hash_final(st->st_new_iv, &ctx);
+
+    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed Phase 2 IV:"
+	, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+}
+
+/* Initiate quick mode.
+ * --> HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
+ * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5)
+ * Note: this is not called from demux.c
+ */
+
+static bool
+emit_subnet_id(ip_subnet *net
+, u_int8_t np, u_int8_t protoid, u_int16_t port, pb_stream *outs)
+{
+    struct isakmp_ipsec_id id;
+    pb_stream id_pbs;
+    ip_address ta;
+    const unsigned char *tbp;
+    size_t tal;
+
+    id.isaiid_np = np;
+    id.isaiid_idtype = subnetishost(net)
+		       ? aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_addr
+		       : aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_subnet;
+    id.isaiid_protoid = protoid;
+    id.isaiid_port = port;
+
+    if (!out_struct(&id, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, outs, &id_pbs))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    networkof(net, &ta);
+    tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp);
+    if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client network"))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (!subnetishost(net))
+    {
+	maskof(net, &ta);
+	tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp);
+	if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client mask"))
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    close_output_pbs(&id_pbs);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+stf_status
+quick_outI1(int whack_sock
+, struct state *isakmp_sa
+, struct connection *c
+, lset_t policy
+, unsigned long try
+, so_serial_t replacing)
+{
+    struct state *st = duplicate_state(isakmp_sa);
+    pb_stream reply;	/* not really a reply */
+    pb_stream rbody;
+    u_char	/* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
+	*r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
+	*r_hash_start;	/* start of what is to be hashed */
+    bool has_client = c->spd.this.has_client || c->spd.that.has_client ||
+		      c->spd.this.protocol || c->spd.that.protocol ||
+		      c->spd.this.port || c->spd.that.port;
+    
+    bool send_natoa = FALSE;
+    u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+
+    st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock;
+    st->st_connection = c;
+    set_cur_state(st);	/* we must reset before exit */
+    st->st_policy = policy;
+    st->st_try = try;
+
+    st->st_myuserprotoid = c->spd.this.protocol;
+    st->st_peeruserprotoid = c->spd.that.protocol;
+    st->st_myuserport = c->spd.this.port;
+    st->st_peeruserport = c->spd.that.port;
+
+    st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(isakmp_sa);
+    st->st_state = STATE_QUICK_I1;
+
+    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */
+
+    if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY)
+	plog("initiating Quick Mode %s {using isakmp#%lu}"
+	     , prettypolicy(policy)
+	     , isakmp_sa->st_serialno);
+    else
+	plog("initiating Quick Mode %s to replace #%lu {using isakmp#%lu}"
+	     , prettypolicy(policy)
+	     , replacing
+	     , isakmp_sa->st_serialno);
+
+    if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+    {
+	/* Duplicate nat_traversal status in new state */
+	st->nat_traversal = isakmp_sa->nat_traversal;
+
+	if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))
+	    has_client = TRUE;
+
+       nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(NULL, st);
+    }
+    else
+	st->nat_traversal = 0;
+
+    /* are we going to send a NAT-OA payload? */
+    if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)
+    && !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
+    && (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)))
+    {
+	send_natoa = TRUE;
+	np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
+		  ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS;
+    }
+
+    /* set up reply */
+    init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet");
+
+    /* HDR* out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK;
+	hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid;
+	hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* HASH(1) -- create and note space to be filled later */
+    START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA);
+
+    /* SA out */
+
+    /* 
+     * See if pfs_group has been specified for this conn,
+     * if not, fallback to old use-same-as-P1 behaviour
+     */
+#ifndef NO_IKE_ALG
+    if (st->st_connection)
+	    st->st_pfs_group = ike_alg_pfsgroup(st->st_connection, policy);
+    if (!st->st_pfs_group)
+#endif
+    /* If PFS specified, use the same group as during Phase 1:
+     * since no negotiation is possible, we pick one that is
+     * very likely supported.
+     */
+	    st->st_pfs_group = policy & POLICY_PFS? isakmp_sa->st_oakley.group : NULL;
+
+    /* Emit SA payload based on a subset of the policy bits.
+     * POLICY_COMPRESS is considered iff we can do IPcomp.
+     */
+    {
+	lset_t pm = POLICY_ENCRYPT | POLICY_AUTHENTICATE;
+
+	if (can_do_IPcomp)
+	    pm |= POLICY_COMPRESS;
+
+	if (!out_sa(&rbody
+	, &ipsec_sadb[(st->st_policy & pm) >> POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT]
+	, st, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Ni out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &rbody
+    , policy & POLICY_PFS? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np
+    , "Ni"))
+    {
+	reset_cur_state();
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */
+
+    if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+    {
+	if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group
+	, &rbody, has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */
+    if (has_client)
+    {
+	/* IDci (we are initiator), then IDcr (peer is responder) */
+	if (!emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.this.client
+	  , ISAKMP_NEXT_ID, st->st_myuserprotoid, st->st_myuserport, &rbody)
+	|| !emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.that.client
+	  , np, st->st_peeruserprotoid, st->st_peeruserport, &rbody))
+	{
+	    reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed */
+    if (send_natoa)
+    {
+	if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &rbody, st))
+	{
+            reset_cur_state();
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* finish computing  HASH(1), inserting it in output */
+    (void) quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody.cur
+	, st, &st->st_msgid, FALSE);
+
+    /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+
+    init_phase2_iv(isakmp_sa, &st->st_msgid);
+    st->st_new_iv_len = isakmp_sa->st_new_iv_len;
+    memcpy(st->st_new_iv, isakmp_sa->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+
+    if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st))
+    {
+	reset_cur_state();
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* save packet, now that we know its size */
+    clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply)
+	, "reply packet from quick_outI1");
+
+    /* send the packet */
+
+    send_packet(st, "quick_outI1");
+
+    delete_event(st);
+    event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
+
+    if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY)
+	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1
+	    , "%s: initiate"
+	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state));
+    else
+	whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1
+	    , "%s: initiate to replace #%lu"
+	    , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+	    , replacing);
+    reset_cur_state();
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Decode the CERT payload of Phase 1.
+ */
+static void
+decode_cert(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct payload_digest *p;
+
+    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	struct isakmp_cert *const cert = &p->payload.cert;
+	chunk_t blob;
+	time_t valid_until;
+	blob.ptr = p->pbs.cur;
+	blob.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs);
+	if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+	{
+	    x509cert_t cert = empty_x509cert;
+	    if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, &cert))
+	    {
+		if (verify_x509cert(&cert, strict_crl_policy, &valid_until))
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("Public key validated")
+		    )
+		    add_x509_public_key(&cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    plog("X.509 certificate rejected");
+		}
+		free_generalNames(cert.subjectAltName, FALSE);
+		free_generalNames(cert.crlDistributionPoints, FALSE);
+	    }
+	    else
+		plog("Syntax error in X.509 certificate");
+	}
+	else if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509)
+	{
+	    x509cert_t *cert = NULL;
+
+	    if (pkcs7_parse_signedData(blob, NULL, &cert, NULL, NULL))
+		store_x509certs(&cert, strict_crl_policy);
+	    else
+		plog("Syntax error in PKCS#7 wrapped X.509 certificates");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate payload",
+		   enum_show(&cert_type_names, cert->isacert_type));
+	    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CERT:\n", blob);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decode the CR payload of Phase 1.
+ */
+static void
+decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct payload_digest *p;
+
+    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CR]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	struct isakmp_cr *const cr = &p->payload.cr;
+	chunk_t ca_name;
+	
+	ca_name.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs);
+	ca_name.ptr = (ca_name.len > 0)? p->pbs.cur : NULL;
+
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CR", ca_name);
+
+	if (cr->isacr_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+	{
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    if (ca_name.len > 0)
+	    {
+		generalName_t *gn;
+		
+		if (!is_asn1(ca_name))
+		    continue;
+
+		gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
+		clonetochunk(ca_name, ca_name.ptr,ca_name.len, "ca name");
+		gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME;
+		gn->name = ca_name;
+		gn->next = c->requested_ca;
+		c->requested_ca = gn;
+	    }
+	    c->got_certrequest = TRUE;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+		dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, ca_name, "%any");
+		DBG_log("requested CA: '%s'", buf);
+	    )
+	}
+	else
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate request payload",
+		   enum_show(&cert_type_names, cr->isacr_type));
+    }
+}
+
+/* Decode the ID payload of Phase 1 (main_inI3_outR3 and main_inR3)
+ * Note: we may change connections as a result.
+ * We must be called before SIG or HASH are decoded since we
+ * may change the peer's RSA key or ID.
+ */
+static bool
+decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    struct payload_digest *const id_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+    const pb_stream *const id_pbs = &id_pld->pbs;
+    struct isakmp_id *const id = &id_pld->payload.id;
+
+    /* I think that RFC2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.6.2 is confused.
+     * It talks about the protocol ID and Port fields of the ID
+     * Payload, but they don't exist as such in Phase 1.
+     * We use more appropriate names.
+     * isaid_doi_specific_a is in place of Protocol ID.
+     * isaid_doi_specific_b is in place of Port.
+     * Besides, there is no good reason for allowing these to be
+     * other than 0 in Phase 1.
+     */
+    if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)
+    &&	 id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP
+    &&  (id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0 || id->isaid_doi_specific_b == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT))
+    {
+	DBG_log("protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload is %d/%d. "
+		"accepted with port_floating NAT-T",
+		id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b);
+    }
+    else if (!(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == 0 && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0)
+	 &&  !(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == IKE_UDP_PORT))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload must be 0/0 or %d/%d"
+	    " but are %d/%d"
+	    , IPPROTO_UDP, IKE_UDP_PORT
+	    , id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    peer->kind = id->isaid_idtype;
+
+    switch (peer->kind)
+    {
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	/* failure mode for initaddr is probably inappropriate address length */
+	{
+	    err_t ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)
+		, peer->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR? AF_INET : AF_INET6
+		, &peer->ip_addr);
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s identification payload: %s"
+		    , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind), ugh);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+    case ID_USER_FQDN:
+	if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '@', pbs_left(id_pbs)) == NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer's ID_USER_FQDN contains no @");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	/* FALLTHROUGH */
+    case ID_FQDN:
+	if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '\0', pbs_left(id_pbs)) != NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Phase 1 ID Payload of type %s contains a NUL"
+		, enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind));
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* ??? ought to do some more sanity check, but what? */
+
+	setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
+	break;
+
+    case ID_KEY_ID:
+	setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+ 	    DBG_dump_chunk("KEY ID:", peer->name));
+	break;
+
+    case ID_DER_ASN1_DN:
+	setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs));
+ 	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+ 	    DBG_dump_chunk("DER ASN1 DN:", peer->name));
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	/* XXX Could send notification back */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unacceptable identity type (%s) in Phase 1 ID Payload"
+	    , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    {
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	plog("Peer ID is %s: '%s'",
+	    enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype), buf);
+    }
+
+    /* check for certificates */
+    decode_cert(md);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Now that we've decoded the ID payload, let's see if we
+ * need to switch connections.
+ * We must not switch horses if we initiated:
+ * - if the initiation was explicit, we'd be ignoring user's intent
+ * - if opportunistic, we'll lose our HOLD info
+ */
+static bool
+switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, bool initiator)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    chunk_t peer_ca = (st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL)
+    		     ? st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer : empty_chunk;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, peer_ca, "%none");
+	DBG_log("peer CA:      '%s'", buf);
+    )
+
+    if (initiator)
+    {
+	int pathlen;
+
+	if (!same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer))
+	{
+	    char expect[BUF_LEN]
+		, found[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, expect, sizeof(expect));
+	    idtoa(peer, found, sizeof(found));
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "we require peer to have ID '%s', but peer declares '%s'"
+		, expect, found);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, c->spd.this.ca, "%none");
+	    DBG_log("required CA:  '%s'", buf);
+        )
+
+	if (!trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &pathlen))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "we don't accept the peer's CA");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct connection *r;
+
+	/* check for certificate requests */
+	decode_cr(md, c);
+
+	r = refine_host_connection(st, peer, peer_ca);
+
+	/* delete the collected certificate requests */
+	free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE);
+	c->requested_ca = NULL;
+
+	if (r == NULL)
+	{
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf));
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no suitable connection for peer '%s'", buf);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, r->spd.this.ca, "%none");
+	    DBG_log("offered CA:   '%s'", buf);
+	)
+
+	if (r != c)
+	{
+	    /* apparently, r is an improvement on c -- replace */
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+		, DBG_log("switched from \"%s\" to \"%s\"", c->name, r->name));
+	    if (r->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	    {
+		/* instantiate it, filling in peer's ID */
+		r = rw_instantiate(r, &c->spd.that.host_addr
+			, c->spd.that.host_port, NULL, peer);
+	    }
+
+	    /* copy certificate request info */
+	    r->got_certrequest = c->got_certrequest;
+
+	    st->st_connection = r;	/* kill reference to c */
+	    set_cur_connection(r);
+	    connection_discard(c);
+	}
+	else if (c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards)
+	{
+	    free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+	    c->spd.that.id = *peer;
+	    c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE;
+	    unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id);
+	}
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Decode the variable part of an ID packet (during Quick Mode).
+ * This is designed for packets that identify clients, not peers.
+ * Rejects 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent because
+ * (1) it is wrong and (2) we use this value for inband signalling.
+ */
+static bool
+decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id
+, pb_stream *id_pbs
+, ip_subnet *net
+, const char *which)
+{
+    const struct af_info *afi = NULL;
+
+    /* Note: the following may be a pointer into static memory
+     * that may be recycled, but only if the type is not known.
+     * That case is disposed of very early -- in the first switch.
+     */
+    const char *idtypename = enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaiid_idtype);
+
+    switch (id->isaiid_idtype)
+    {
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
+	    afi = &af_inet4_info;
+	    break;
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
+	    afi = &af_inet6_info;
+	    break;
+	case ID_FQDN:
+	    return TRUE;
+	default:
+	    /* XXX support more */
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported ID type %s"
+		, idtypename);
+	    /* XXX Could send notification back */
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    switch (id->isaiid_idtype)
+    {
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	{
+	    ip_address temp_address;
+	    err_t ugh;
+
+	    ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs), afi->af, &temp_address);
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s has wrong length in Quick I1 (%s)"
+		    , which, idtypename, ugh);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    if (isanyaddr(&temp_address))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s is invalid (%s) in Quick I1"
+		    , which, idtypename, ip_str(&temp_address));
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    happy(addrtosubnet(&temp_address, net));
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL
+		, DBG_log("%s is %s", which, ip_str(&temp_address)));
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET:
+	{
+	    ip_address temp_address, temp_mask;
+	    err_t ugh;
+
+	    if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1"
+		    , which, idtypename);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur
+		, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address);
+	    if (ugh == NULL)
+		ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz
+		    , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_mask);
+	    if (ugh == NULL)
+		ugh = initsubnet(&temp_address, masktocount(&temp_mask)
+		    , '0', net);
+	    if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net))
+		ugh = "contains only anyaddr";
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s bad subnet in Quick I1 (%s)"
+		    , which, idtypename, ugh);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+		    char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		    subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff));
+		    DBG_log("%s is subnet %s", which, temp_buff);
+		});
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE:
+	case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE:
+	{
+	    ip_address temp_address_from, temp_address_to;
+	    err_t ugh;
+
+	    if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1"
+		    , which, idtypename);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_from);
+	    if (ugh == NULL)
+		ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz
+		    , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_to);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s malformed (%s) in Quick I1"
+		    , which, idtypename, ugh);
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+
+	    ugh = rangetosubnet(&temp_address_from, &temp_address_to, net);
+	    if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net))
+		ugh = "contains only anyaddr";
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		char temp_buff1[ADDRTOT_BUF], temp_buff2[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+		addrtot(&temp_address_from, 0, temp_buff1, sizeof(temp_buff1));
+		addrtot(&temp_address_to, 0, temp_buff2, sizeof(temp_buff2));
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload in Quick I1, %s"
+		    " %s - %s unacceptable: %s"
+		    , which, idtypename, temp_buff1, temp_buff2, ugh);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+		{
+		    char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+		    subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff));
+		    DBG_log("%s is subnet %s (received as range)"
+			, which, temp_buff);
+		});
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* set the port selector */
+    setportof(htons(id->isaiid_port), &net->addr);
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL,
+        DBG_log("%s protocol/port is %d/%d", which, id->isaiid_protoid, id->isaiid_port)
+    )
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* like decode, but checks that what is received matches what was sent */
+static bool
+
+check_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id
+, pb_stream *id_pbs
+, u_int8_t *protoid
+, u_int16_t *port
+, ip_subnet *net
+, const char *which)
+{
+    ip_subnet net_temp;
+
+    if (!decode_net_id(id, id_pbs, &net_temp, which))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (!samesubnet(net, &net_temp)
+    || *protoid != id->isaiid_protoid || *port != id->isaiid_port)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID returned doesn't match my proposal", which);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * look for the existence of a non-expiring preloaded public key
+ */
+static bool
+has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    /* do not consider rw connections since
+     * the peer's identity must be known
+     */
+    if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT)
+    {
+	pubkey_list_t *p;
+
+	/* look for a matching RSA public key */
+	for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+	    pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+
+	    if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA &&
+		same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &key->id) &&
+		key->until_time == UNDEFINED_TIME)
+	    {
+		/* found a preloaded public key */
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Produce the new key material of Quick Mode.
+ * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5.5
+ * specifies how this is to be done.
+ */
+static void
+compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st
+, u_int8_t protoid
+, struct ipsec_proto_info *pi)
+{
+    size_t needed_len; /* bytes of keying material needed */
+
+    /* Add up the requirements for keying material
+     * (It probably doesn't matter if we produce too much!)
+     */
+    switch (protoid)
+    {
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+	    switch (pi->attrs.transid)
+	    {
+	    case ESP_NULL:
+		needed_len = 0;
+		break;
+	    case ESP_DES:
+		needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		break;
+	    case ESP_3DES:
+		needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3;
+		break;
+	    default:
+#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
+		if((needed_len=kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(pi->attrs.transid))>0) {
+			/* XXX: check key_len "coupling with kernel.c's */
+			if (pi->attrs.key_len) {
+				needed_len=pi->attrs.key_len/8;
+				DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
+						"key_len=%d from peer",
+						(int)needed_len));
+			}
+			break;
+		}
+#endif
+		bad_case(pi->attrs.transid);
+	    }
+
+#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
+				    "needed_len (after ESP enc)=%d",
+				    (int)needed_len));
+	    if (kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(pi->attrs.auth, NULL)) {
+		needed_len += kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(pi->attrs.auth);
+	    } else
+#endif
+	    switch (pi->attrs.auth)
+	    {
+	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
+		break;
+	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+		needed_len += HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN;
+		break;
+	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+		needed_len += HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN;
+		break;
+	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC:
+	    default:
+		bad_case(pi->attrs.auth);
+	    }
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:"
+				    "needed_len (after ESP auth)=%d",
+				    (int)needed_len));
+	    break;
+
+    case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+	    switch (pi->attrs.transid)
+	    {
+	    case AH_MD5:
+		needed_len = HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN;
+		break;
+	    case AH_SHA:
+		needed_len = HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN;
+		break;
+	    default:
+		bad_case(pi->attrs.transid);
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+    default:
+	bad_case(protoid);
+    }
+
+    pi->keymat_len = needed_len;
+
+    /* Allocate space for the keying material.
+     * Although only needed_len bytes are desired, we
+     * must round up to a multiple of ctx.hmac_digest_size
+     * so that our buffer isn't overrun.
+     */
+    {
+	struct hmac_ctx ctx_me, ctx_peer;
+	size_t needed_space;	/* space needed for keying material (rounded up) */
+	size_t i;
+
+	hmac_init_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_d);
+	ctx_peer = ctx_me;	/* duplicate initial conditions */
+
+	needed_space = needed_len + pad_up(needed_len, ctx_me.hmac_digest_size);
+	replace(pi->our_keymat, alloc_bytes(needed_space, "keymat in compute_keymat()"));
+	replace(pi->peer_keymat, alloc_bytes(needed_space, "peer_keymat in quick_inI1_outR1()"));
+
+	for (i = 0;; )
+	{
+	    if (st->st_shared.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* PFS: include the g^xy */
+		hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_shared);
+		hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_shared);
+	    }
+	    hmac_update(&ctx_me, &protoid, sizeof(protoid));
+	    hmac_update(&ctx_peer, &protoid, sizeof(protoid));
+
+	    hmac_update(&ctx_me, (u_char *)&pi->our_spi, sizeof(pi->our_spi));
+	    hmac_update(&ctx_peer, (u_char *)&pi->attrs.spi, sizeof(pi->attrs.spi));
+
+	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_ni);
+	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_ni);
+
+	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_nr);
+	    hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_nr);
+
+	    hmac_final(pi->our_keymat + i, &ctx_me);
+	    hmac_final(pi->peer_keymat + i, &ctx_peer);
+
+	    i += ctx_me.hmac_digest_size;
+	    if (i >= needed_space)
+		break;
+
+	    /* more keying material needed: prepare to go around again */
+
+	    hmac_reinit(&ctx_me);
+	    hmac_reinit(&ctx_peer);
+
+	    hmac_update(&ctx_me, pi->our_keymat + i - ctx_me.hmac_digest_size
+		, ctx_me.hmac_digest_size);
+	    hmac_update(&ctx_peer, pi->peer_keymat + i - ctx_peer.hmac_digest_size
+		, ctx_peer.hmac_digest_size);
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_dump("KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->our_keymat, pi->keymat_len);
+	DBG_dump("Peer KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->peer_keymat, pi->keymat_len));
+}
+
+static void
+compute_keymats(struct state *st)
+{
+    if (st->st_ah.present)
+	compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah);
+    if (st->st_esp.present)
+	compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp);
+}
+
+/* State Transition Functions.
+ *
+ * The definition of state_microcode_table in demux.c is a good
+ * overview of these routines.
+ *
+ * - Called from process_packet; result handled by complete_state_transition
+ * - struct state_microcode member "processor" points to these
+ * - these routine definitionss are in state order
+ * - these routines must be restartable from any point of error return:
+ *   beware of memory allocated before any error.
+ * - output HDR is usually emitted by process_packet (if state_microcode
+ *   member first_out_payload isn't ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE).
+ *
+ * The transition functions' functions include:
+ * - process and judge payloads
+ * - update st_iv (result of decryption is in st_new_iv)
+ * - build reply packet
+ */
+
+/* Handle a Main Mode Oakley first packet (responder side).
+ * HDR;SA --> HDR;SA
+ */
+stf_status
+main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+    struct state *st;
+    struct connection *c;
+    struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+    pb_stream proposal_pbs;
+    pb_stream r_sa_pbs;
+    u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
+    lset_t policy = LEMPTY;
+    int vids_to_send = 0;
+
+    /* We preparse the peer's proposal in order to determine
+     * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK)
+     */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sa_pd->payload.sa
+	, &sa_pd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal));
+
+    backup_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_policy(&proposal_pbs
+		     , proposal.isap_notrans, &policy));
+    restore_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
+
+    /* We are only considering candidate connections that match
+     * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK)
+     */
+    c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, pluto_port
+			   , &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy);
+
+    if (c == NULL && md->iface->ike_float)
+    {
+	c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT
+		, &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy);
+    }
+
+    if (c == NULL)
+    {
+	/* See if a wildcarded connection can be found.
+	 * We cannot pick the right connection, so we're making a guess.
+	 * All Road Warrior connections are fair game:
+	 * we pick the first we come across (if any).
+	 * If we don't find any, we pick the first opportunistic
+	 * with the smallest subnet that includes the peer.
+	 * There is, of course, no necessary relationship between
+	 * an Initiator's address and that of its client,
+	 * but Food Groups kind of assumes one.
+	 */
+	{
+	    struct connection *d;
+
+	    d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr
+		, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, policy);
+
+	    for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next)
+	    {
+		if (d->kind == CK_GROUP)
+		{
+		    /* ignore */
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO))
+		    {
+			/* must be Road Warrior: we have a winner */
+			c = d;
+			break;
+		    }
+
+		    /* Opportunistic or Shunt: pick tightest match */
+		    if (addrinsubnet(&md->sender, &d->spd.that.client)
+		    && (c == NULL || !subnetinsubnet(&c->spd.that.client, &d->spd.that.client)))
+			c = d;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (c == NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u"
+		" but no connection has been authorized%s%s"
+		, ip_str(&md->iface->addr), ntohs(portof(&md->iface->addr))
+		, (policy != LEMPTY) ? " with policy=" : ""
+		, (policy != LEMPTY) ? bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names, policy) : "");
+	    /* XXX notification is in order! */
+	    return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+	else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u"
+		" but \"%s\" forbids connection"
+		, ip_str(&md->iface->addr), pluto_port, c->name);
+	    /* XXX notification is in order! */
+	    return STF_IGNORE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* Create a temporary connection that is a copy of this one.
+	     * His ID isn't declared yet.
+	     */
+	    c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, NULL);
+	}
+    }
+    else if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+    {
+	/* Create an instance
+	 * This is a rare case: wildcard peer ID but static peer IP address
+	 */
+	 c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, &c->spd.that.id);
+    }
+
+    /* Set up state */
+    md->st = st = new_state();
+    st->st_connection = c;
+    set_cur_state(st);	/* (caller will reset cur_state) */
+    st->st_try = 0;	/* not our job to try again from start */
+    st->st_policy = c->policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK;	/* only as accurate as connection */
+
+    memcpy(st->st_icookie, md->hdr.isa_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    get_cookie(FALSE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &md->sender);
+
+    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
+
+    st->st_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+    st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY; /* We only support this */
+
+    if ((c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) && (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port))
+    {
+       plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s:%u"
+	    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->spd.that.host_port);
+    }
+    else if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+    {
+	plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s"
+	    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("responding to Main Mode");
+    }
+
+    /* parse_isakmp_sa also spits out a winning SA into our reply,
+     * so we have to build our md->reply and emit HDR before calling it.
+     */
+
+    /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */
+    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
+	vids_to_send++;
+    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
+	vids_to_send++;
+    if (md->openpgp)
+	vids_to_send++;
+    /* always send XAUTH Vendor ID */
+	vids_to_send++;
+    /* always send DPD Vendor ID */
+	vids_to_send++;
+    if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled)
+	vids_to_send++;
+
+    /* HDR out.
+     * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because we must
+     * fill in the cookie.
+     */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr;
+
+	r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT;	/* we won't ever turn on this bit */
+	memcpy(r_hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	r_hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA;
+	if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* start of SA out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_sa r_sa = sa_pd->payload.sa;
+
+	r_sa.isasa_np = vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&r_sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* SA body in and out */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs
+	,&proposal, &r_sa_pbs, st, FALSE));
+
+    /* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */
+    if (SEND_PLUTO_VID)
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &md->rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN))
+	{
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */
+    if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID)
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &md->rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY))
+	{
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * if the peer sent an OpenPGP Vendor ID we offer the same capability
+     */
+    if (md->openpgp)
+    {
+	if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &md->rbody, VID_OPENPGP))
+	{
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */
+    if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+    , &md->rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH))
+    {
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */
+    if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+    , &md->rbody, VID_MISC_DPD))
+    {
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled)
+    {
+	/* reply if NAT-Traversal draft is supported */
+	st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid);
+
+	if (st->nat_traversal
+	&& !out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, &md->rbody, md->nat_traversal_vid))
+	{
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    close_message(&md->rbody);
+
+    /* save initiator SA for HASH */
+    clonereplacechunk(st->st_p1isa, sa_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs), "sa in main_inI1_outR1()");
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MAIN_I1: HDR, SA --> auth dependent
+ * PSK_AUTH, DS_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, Ni
+ *
+ * The following are not yet implemented:
+ * PKE_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
+ * RPKE_AUTH: --> HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i,
+ *                <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+ *
+ * We must verify that the proposal received matches one we sent.
+ */
+stf_status
+main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+
+    u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+
+    /* verify echoed SA */
+    {
+	u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
+	pb_stream proposal_pbs;
+	struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+	struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sapd->payload.sa
+	    ,&sapd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal));
+	if (proposal.isap_notrans != 1)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "a single Transform is required in a selecting Oakley Proposal; found %u"
+	    , (unsigned)proposal.isap_notrans);
+	    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX);
+        }
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit
+	    , &proposal_pbs, &proposal, NULL, st, TRUE));
+    }
+
+    if (nat_traversal_enabled && md->nat_traversal_vid)
+    {
+	st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid);
+	plog("enabling possible NAT-traversal with method %s"
+	     , bitnamesof(natt_type_bitnames, st->nat_traversal));
+    }
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+    {
+	np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
+		ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS;
+    }
+
+    /**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Ni ****************/
+
+    /* HDR out.
+     * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because the isa_np
+     * depends on the type of Auth (eventually).
+     */
+    echo_hdr(md, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_KE);
+
+    /* KE out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group
+    , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    /* Ni out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody
+    , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np, "Ni"))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)
+    {
+	/* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */
+	pb_stream vid_pbs;
+
+	if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs);
+    }
+#else
+    /* Ni out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody, np, "Ni"))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+#endif
+
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+    {
+	if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* finish message */
+    close_message(&md->rbody);
+
+    /* Reinsert the state, using the responder cookie we just received */
+    unhash_state(st);
+    memcpy(st->st_rcookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MAIN_R1:
+ * PSK_AUTH, DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Ni --> HDR, KE, Nr
+ *
+ * The following are not yet implemented:
+ * PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r
+ *	    --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+ * RPKE_AUTH:
+ *	    HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i]
+ *	    --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+ */
+stf_status
+main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    pb_stream *keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs;
+ 
+    /* send CR if auth is RSA and no preloaded RSA public key exists*/
+    bool RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG
+		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA
+		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA;
+    bool send_cr = !no_cr_send && RSA_auth && !has_preloaded_public_key(st);
+
+    u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+
+    /* KE in */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gi, "Gi", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs));
+
+    /* Ni in */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni"));
+
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+    {
+       nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md);
+
+       np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ?
+		ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS;
+    }
+    if (st->nat_traversal)
+    {
+       nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port);
+    }
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA)
+    {
+       nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
+    }
+
+    /* decode certificate requests */
+    st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE;
+    decode_cr(md, st->st_connection);
+
+    /**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Nr ****************/
+
+    /* HDR out done */
+
+    /* KE out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group
+    , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    /* Nr out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody
+    , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID
+	: (send_cr? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np), "Nr"))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)
+    {
+	/* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */
+	pb_stream vid_pbs;
+
+	if (!out_generic((send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np,
+	    &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs);
+    }
+#else
+    /* Nr out */
+    if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody,
+	(send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np, "Nr"))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+#endif
+
+    /* CR out */
+    if (send_cr)
+    {
+	if (st->st_connection->kind == CK_PERMANENT)
+	{
+	    if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE
+	    , st->st_connection->spd.that.ca
+	    , &md->rbody, np))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    generalName_t *ca = NULL;
+
+	    if (collect_rw_ca_candidates(md, &ca))
+	    {
+		generalName_t *gn;
+
+		for (gn = ca; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next)
+		{
+		    if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, gn->name
+		    , &md->rbody
+		    , gn->next == NULL ? np : ISAKMP_NEXT_CR))
+			return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+		}
+		free_generalNames(ca, FALSE);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, empty_chunk
+		, &md->rbody, np))
+		    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+    {
+       if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md))
+	   return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+    /* finish message */
+    close_message(&md->rbody);
+
+    /* next message will be encrypted, but not this one.
+     * We could defer this calculation.
+     */
+    compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group);
+    if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st))
+	return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+    update_iv(st);
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MAIN_I2:
+ * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I
+ * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I
+ *
+ * The following are not yet implemented.
+ * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i
+ *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
+ * SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r
+ *	    --> HDR*, HASH_I
+ */
+stf_status
+main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    pb_stream *const keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs;
+    pb_stream id_pbs;	/* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */
+
+    certpolicy_t cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert;
+    cert_t mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert;
+    bool requested, send_cert, send_cr;
+
+    bool RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG
+		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA
+		 || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA;
+
+    int auth_payload = RSA_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+
+    /* KE in */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gr, "Gr", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs));
+
+    /* Nr in */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr"));
+
+    /* decode certificate requests */
+    st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE;
+    decode_cr(md, st->st_connection);
+
+    /* free collected certificate requests since as initiator
+     * we don't heed them anyway
+     */
+    free_generalNames(st->st_connection->requested_ca, TRUE);
+    st->st_connection->requested_ca = NULL;
+
+    /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want
+     * or are requested to send it
+     */
+    requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED
+		&& st->st_connection->got_certrequest;
+    send_cert = RSA_auth && mycert.type != CERT_NONE
+		&& (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested);
+
+    /* send certificate request if we don't have a preloaded RSA public key */
+    send_cr = !no_cr_send && send_cert && !has_preloaded_public_key(st);
+
+    /* done parsing; initialize crypto  */
+    compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group);
+    if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st))
+	return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD)
+    {
+	nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md);
+    }
+    if (st->nat_traversal)
+    {
+	nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port);
+    }
+    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA)
+    {
+	nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
+    }
+
+    /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDii;HASH/SIG_I ***************/
+    /* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inI3_outR3's code */
+
+    /* HDR* out done */
+
+    /* IDii out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd;
+	chunk_t id_b;
+
+	build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this);
+	id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload;
+	if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &id_pbs)
+	|| !out_chunk(id_b, &id_pbs, "my identity"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	close_output_pbs(&id_pbs);
+    }
+
+    /* CERT out */
+    if (RSA_auth)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("our certificate policy is %s"
+		, enum_name(&cert_policy_names, cert_policy))
+	)
+	if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE)
+	{
+	    const char *request_text = "";
+
+	    if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED)
+		request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request";
+	    plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s"
+		, send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("we don't have a cert");
+	}
+    }
+    if (send_cert)
+    {
+	pb_stream cert_pbs;
+
+	struct isakmp_cert cert_hd;
+	cert_hd.isacert_np = (send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG;
+	cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (!out_chunk(get_mycert(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs);
+    }
+
+    /* CR out */
+    if (send_cr)
+    {
+	if (!build_and_ship_CR(mycert.type, st->st_connection->spd.that.ca
+	, &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+    }
+
+   /* HASH_I or SIG_I out */
+    {
+	u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	size_t hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, TRUE, &id_pbs);
+
+	if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+	{
+	    /* HASH_I out */
+	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody
+	    , hash_val, hash_len, "HASH_I"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* SIG_I out */
+	    u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+	    size_t sig_len = RSA_sign_hash(st->st_connection
+		, sig_val, hash_val, hash_len);
+
+	    if (sig_len == 0)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for RSA Signature");
+		return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc
+	    , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_I"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+
+    /* st_new_iv was computed by generate_skeyids_iv */
+    if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* Shared logic for asynchronous lookup of DNS KEY records.
+ * Used for STATE_MAIN_R2 and STATE_MAIN_I3.
+ */
+
+enum key_oppo_step {
+    kos_null,
+    kos_his_txt
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    , kos_his_key
+#endif
+};
+
+struct key_continuation {
+    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
+    struct msg_digest *md;
+    enum   key_oppo_step step;
+    bool                 failure_ok;
+    err_t                last_ugh;
+};
+
+typedef stf_status (key_tail_fn)(struct msg_digest *md
+				  , struct key_continuation *kc);
+static void
+report_key_dns_failure(struct id *id, err_t ugh)
+{
+    char id_buf[BUF_LEN];	/* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */
+
+    (void) idtoa(id, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf));
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'"
+	"; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)", id_buf, ugh);
+}
+
+
+/* Processs the Main Mode ID Payload and the Authenticator
+ * (Hash or Signature Payload).
+ * If a DNS query is still needed to get the other host's public key,
+ * the query is initiated and STF_SUSPEND is returned.
+ * Note: parameter kc is a continuation containing the results from
+ * the previous DNS query, or NULL indicating no query has been issued.
+ */
+static stf_status
+main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md
+		 , bool initiator	/* are we the Initiator? */
+		 , cont_fn_t cont_fn	/* continuation function */
+		 , const struct key_continuation *kc	/* current state, can be NULL */
+)
+{
+    struct state *st = md->st;
+    u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    size_t hash_len;
+    struct id peer;
+    stf_status r = STF_OK;
+
+    /* ID Payload in */
+    if (!decode_peer_id(md, &peer))
+	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+    /* Hash the ID Payload.
+     * main_mode_hash requires idpl->cur to be at end of payload
+     * so we temporarily set if so.
+     */
+    {
+	pb_stream *idpl = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]->pbs;
+	u_int8_t *old_cur = idpl->cur;
+
+	idpl->cur = idpl->roof;
+	hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, !initiator, idpl);
+	idpl->cur = old_cur;
+    }
+
+    switch (st->st_oakley.auth)
+    {
+    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+	{
+	    pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs;
+
+	    if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash_len
+	    || memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash_val, hash_len) != 0)
+	    {
+		DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received HASH:"
+		    , hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs));
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Hash Payload does not match computed value");
+		/* XXX Could send notification back */
+		r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION;
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+    case XAUTHInitRSA:
+    case XAUTHRespRSA:
+	r = RSA_check_signature(&peer, st, hash_val, hash_len
+	    , &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	    , kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.keys_from_dns
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	    , kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.gateways_from_dns
+	    );
+
+	if (r == STF_SUSPEND)
+	{
+	    /* initiate/resume asynchronous DNS lookup for key */
+	    struct key_continuation *nkc
+		= alloc_thing(struct key_continuation, "key continuation");
+	    enum key_oppo_step step_done = kc == NULL? kos_null : kc->step;
+	    err_t ugh;
+
+	    /* Record that state is used by a suspended md */
+	    passert(st->st_suspended_md == NULL);
+	    st->st_suspended_md = md;
+
+	    nkc->failure_ok = FALSE;
+	    nkc->md = md;
+
+	    switch (step_done)
+	    {
+	    case kos_null:
+		/* first try: look for the TXT records */
+		nkc->step = kos_his_txt;
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		nkc->failure_ok = TRUE;
+#endif
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&peer
+				       , &peer	/* SG itself */
+				       , T_TXT
+				       , cont_fn
+				       , &nkc->ac);
+		break;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	    case kos_his_txt:
+		/* second try: look for the KEY records */
+		nkc->step = kos_his_key;
+		ugh = start_adns_query(&peer
+				       , NULL	/* no sgw for KEY */
+				       , T_KEY
+				       , cont_fn
+				       , &nkc->ac);
+		break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+	    default:
+		bad_case(step_done);
+	    }
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		report_key_dns_failure(&peer, ugh);
+		st->st_suspended_md = NULL;
+		r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth);
+    }
+    if (r != STF_OK)
+	return r;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("authentication succeeded"));
+
+    /*
+     * With the peer ID known, let's see if we need to switch connections.
+     */
+    if (!switch_connection(md, &peer, initiator))
+	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+    return r;
+}
+
+/* This continuation is called as part of either
+ * the main_inI3_outR3 state or main_inR3 state.
+ *
+ * The "tail" function is the corresponding tail
+ * function main_inI3_outR3_tail | main_inR3_tail,
+ * either directly when the state is started, or via
+ * adns continuation.
+ *
+ * Basically, we go around in a circle:
+ *   main_in?3* -> key_continue
+ *                ^            \
+ *               /              V
+ *             adns            main_in?3*_tail
+ *              ^               |
+ *               \              V
+ *                main_id_and_auth
+ *
+ * until such time as main_id_and_auth is able
+ * to find authentication, or we run out of things
+ * to try.
+ */
+static void
+key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr
+, err_t ugh
+, key_tail_fn *tail)
+{
+    struct key_continuation *kc = (void *)cr;
+    struct state *st = kc->md->st;
+
+    passert(cur_state == NULL);
+
+    /* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */
+    if (st != NULL)
+    {
+	stf_status r;
+
+	passert(st->st_suspended_md == kc->md);
+	st->st_suspended_md = NULL;	/* no longer connected or suspended */
+	cur_state = st;
+
+	if (!kc->failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    report_key_dns_failure(&st->st_connection->spd.that.id, ugh);
+	    r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	    passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt || kc->step == kos_his_key);
+#else
+	    passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt);
+#endif
+	    kc->last_ugh = ugh;	/* record previous error in case we need it */
+	    r = (*tail)(kc->md, kc);
+	}
+	complete_state_transition(&kc->md, r);
+    }
+    if (kc->md != NULL)
+	release_md(kc->md);
+    cur_state = NULL;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MAIN_R2:
+ * PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I --> HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R
+ * DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --> HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
+ * PKE_AUTH, RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_I --> HDR*, HASH_R
+ *
+ * Broken into parts to allow asynchronous DNS lookup.
+ *
+ * - main_inI3_outR3 to start
+ * - main_inI3_outR3_tail to finish or suspend for DNS lookup
+ * - main_inI3_outR3_continue to start main_inI3_outR3_tail again
+ */
+static key_tail_fn main_inI3_outR3_tail;	/* forward */
+
+stf_status
+main_inI3_outR3(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    return main_inI3_outR3_tail(md, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+main_inI3_outR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
+{
+    key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inI3_outR3_tail);
+}
+
+static stf_status
+main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md
+, struct key_continuation *kc)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int8_t auth_payload;
+    pb_stream r_id_pbs;	/* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */
+    certpolicy_t cert_policy;
+    cert_t mycert;
+    bool RSA_auth;
+    bool send_cert;
+    bool requested;
+
+    /* ID and HASH_I or SIG_I in
+     * Note: this may switch the connection being used!
+     */
+    {
+	stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, FALSE
+					, main_inI3_outR3_continue
+					, kc);
+
+	if (r != STF_OK)
+	    return r;
+    }
+
+    /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want
+     * or are requested to send it
+     */
+    cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert;
+    mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert;
+    requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED
+		&& st->st_connection->got_certrequest;
+    RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG
+	    || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA
+            || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA;
+    send_cert = RSA_auth
+		&& mycert.type != CERT_NONE
+		&& (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested);
+
+    /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R ***************/
+    /* proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR*
+     * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE.
+     * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially
+     * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS.
+     */
+    /* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inR2_outI3's code */
+
+    /* HDR* out
+     * If auth were PKE_AUTH or RPKE_AUTH, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH would
+     * be first payload.
+     */
+    echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_ID);
+
+    auth_payload = RSA_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+
+    /* IDir out */
+    {
+	/* id_hd should be struct isakmp_id, but struct isakmp_ipsec_id
+	 * allows build_id_payload() to work for both phases.
+	 */
+	struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd;
+	chunk_t id_b;
+
+	build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this);
+	id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload;
+	if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &r_id_pbs)
+	|| !out_chunk(id_b, &r_id_pbs, "my identity"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	close_output_pbs(&r_id_pbs);
+    }
+
+    /* CERT out */
+    if (RSA_auth)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("our certificate policy is %s"
+		, enum_name(&cert_policy_names, cert_policy))
+	)
+	if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE)
+	{
+	    const char *request_text = "";
+
+	    if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED)
+		request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request";
+	    plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s"
+		, send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("we don't have a cert");
+	}
+    }
+    if (send_cert)
+    {
+	pb_stream cert_pbs;
+
+	struct isakmp_cert cert_hd;
+	cert_hd.isacert_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG;
+	cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	if (!out_chunk(get_mycert(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs);
+    }
+
+    /* HASH_R or SIG_R out */
+    {
+	u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	size_t hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, FALSE, &r_id_pbs);
+
+	if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH)
+	{
+	    /* HASH_R out */
+	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody
+	    , hash_val, hash_len, "HASH_R"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* SIG_R out */
+	    u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+	    size_t sig_len = RSA_sign_hash(st->st_connection
+		, sig_val, hash_val, hash_len);
+
+	    if (sig_len == 0)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for RSA Signature");
+		return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc
+	    , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_R"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header */
+
+    if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+
+    /* Last block of Phase 1 (R3), kept for Phase 2 IV generation */
+    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last encrypted block of Phase 1:"
+	, st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len);
+
+    ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno);
+
+    /* Save Phase 1 IV */
+    st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+    set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv);
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MAIN_I3:
+ * Handle HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R from responder.
+ *
+ * Broken into parts to allow asynchronous DNS for KEY records.
+ *
+ * - main_inR3 to start
+ * - main_inR3_tail to finish or suspend for DNS lookup
+ * - main_inR3_continue to start main_inR3_tail again
+ */
+
+static key_tail_fn main_inR3_tail;	/* forward */
+
+stf_status
+main_inR3(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    return main_inR3_tail(md, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+main_inR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
+{
+    key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inR3_tail);
+}
+
+static stf_status
+main_inR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md
+, struct key_continuation *kc)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+
+    /* ID and HASH_R or SIG_R in
+     * Note: this may switch the connection being used!
+     */
+    {
+	stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, TRUE, main_inR3_continue, kc);
+
+	if (r != STF_OK)
+	    return r;
+    }
+
+    /**************** done input ****************/
+
+    ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno);
+
+    /* Save Phase 1 IV */
+    st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+    set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv);
+
+
+    update_iv(st);	/* finalize our Phase 1 IV */
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* Handle first message of Phase 2 -- Quick Mode.
+ * HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
+ * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
+ * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5)
+ * Installs inbound IPsec SAs.
+ * Although this seems early, we know enough to do so, and
+ * this way we know that it is soon enough to catch all
+ * packets that other side could send using this IPsec SA.
+ *
+ * Broken into parts to allow asynchronous DNS for TXT records:
+ *
+ * - quick_inI1_outR1 starts the ball rolling.
+ *   It checks and parses enough to learn the Phase 2 IDs
+ *
+ * - quick_inI1_outR1_tail does the rest of the job
+ *   unless DNS must be consulted.  In that case,
+ *   it starts a DNS query, salts away what is needed
+ *   to continue, and suspends.  Calls
+ *   + quick_inI1_outR1_start_query
+ *   + quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer
+ *
+ * - quick_inI1_outR1_continue will restart quick_inI1_outR1_tail
+ *   when DNS comes back with an answer.
+ *
+ * A big chunk of quick_inI1_outR1_tail is executed twice.
+ * This is necessary because the set of connections
+ * might change while we are awaiting DNS.
+ * When first called, gateways_from_dns == NULL.  If DNS is
+ * consulted asynchronously, gateways_from_dns != NULL the second time.
+ * Remember that our state object might disappear too!
+ *
+ *
+ * If the connection is opportunistic, we must verify delegation.
+ *
+ * 1. Check that we are authorized to be SG for
+ *    our client.  We look for the TXT record that
+ *    delegates us.  We also check that the public
+ *    key (if present) matches the private key we used.
+ *    Eventually, we should probably require DNSsec
+ *    authentication for our side.
+ *
+ * 2. If our client TXT record did not include a
+ *    public key, check the KEY record indicated
+ *    by the identity in the TXT record.
+ *
+ * 3. If the peer's client is the peer itself, we
+ *    consider it authenticated.  Otherwise, we check
+ *    the TXT record for the client to see that
+ *    the identity of the SG matches the peer and
+ *    that some public key (if present in the TXT)
+ *    matches.  We need not check the public key if
+ *    it isn't in the TXT record.
+ *
+ * Since p isn't yet instantiated, we need to look
+ * in c for description of peer.
+ *
+ * We cannot afford to block waiting for a DNS query.
+ * The code here is structured as two halves:
+ * - process the result of just completed
+ *   DNS query (if any)
+ * - if another query is needed, initiate the next
+ *   DNS query and suspend
+ */
+
+enum verify_oppo_step {
+    vos_fail,
+    vos_start,
+    vos_our_client,
+    vos_our_txt,
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    vos_our_key,
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+    vos_his_client,
+    vos_done
+};
+
+static const char *const verify_step_name[] = {
+  "vos_fail",
+  "vos_start",
+  "vos_our_client",
+  "vos_our_txt",
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+  "vos_our_key",
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+  "vos_his_client",
+  "vos_done"
+};
+
+/* hold anything we can handle of a Phase 2 ID */
+struct p2id {
+    ip_subnet net;
+    u_int8_t proto;
+    u_int16_t port;
+};
+
+struct verify_oppo_bundle {
+    enum verify_oppo_step step;
+    bool failure_ok;      /* if true, quick_inI1_outR1_continue will try
+			   * other things on DNS failure */
+    struct msg_digest *md;
+    struct p2id my, his;
+    unsigned int new_iv_len;	/* p1st's might change */
+    u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    /* int whackfd; */	/* not needed because we are Responder */
+};
+
+struct verify_oppo_continuation {
+    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
+    struct verify_oppo_bundle b;
+};
+
+static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
+    , struct adns_continuation *ac);
+
+stf_status
+quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    const struct state *const p1st = md->st;
+    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+    struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+    struct verify_oppo_bundle b;
+
+    /* HASH(1) in */
+    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md
+	, quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof
+	    , p1st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid, FALSE)
+	, "HASH(1)", "Quick I1");
+
+    /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in
+     * We do this now (probably out of physical order) because
+     * we wish to select the correct connection before we consult
+     * it for policy.
+     */
+
+    if (id_pd != NULL)
+    {
+	/* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */
+
+	/* IDci (initiator is peer) */
+
+	if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs
+	, &b.his.net, "peer client"))
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+	/* Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */
+
+	if (id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_idtype == ID_FQDN)
+	    happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net));
+
+	/* End Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */
+
+	b.his.proto = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid;
+	b.his.port = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port;
+	b.his.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.his.port);
+
+	/* IDcr (we are responder) */
+
+	if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs
+	, &b.my.net, "our client"))
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+        
+	b.my.proto = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid;
+	b.my.port = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port;
+	b.my.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.my.port);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* implicit IDci and IDcr: peer and self */
+	if (!sameaddrtype(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr))
+	    return STF_FAIL;
+
+	happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b.my.net));
+	happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net));
+	b.his.proto = b.my.proto = 0;
+	b.his.port = b.my.port = 0;
+    }
+    b.step = vos_start;
+    b.md = md;
+    b.new_iv_len = p1st->st_new_iv_len;
+    memcpy(b.new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv_len);
+    return quick_inI1_outR1_tail(&b, NULL);
+}
+
+static void
+report_verify_failure(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, err_t ugh)
+{
+    struct state *st = b->md->st;
+    char fgwb[ADDRTOT_BUF]
+	, cb[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+    ip_address client;
+    err_t which;
+
+    switch (b->step)
+    {
+    case vos_our_client:
+    case vos_our_txt:
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    case vos_our_key:
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	which = "our";
+	networkof(&b->my.net, &client);
+	break;
+
+    case vos_his_client:
+	which = "his";
+	networkof(&b->his.net, &client);
+	break;
+
+    case vos_start:
+    case vos_done:
+    case vos_fail:
+    default:
+	bad_case(b->step);
+    }
+
+    addrtot(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0, fgwb, sizeof(fgwb));
+    addrtot(&client, 0, cb, sizeof(cb));
+    loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE
+	, "gateway %s wants connection with %s as %s client, but DNS fails to confirm delegation: %s"
+	, fgwb, cb, which, ugh);
+}
+
+static void
+quick_inI1_outR1_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh)
+{
+    stf_status r;
+    struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc = (void *)cr;
+    struct verify_oppo_bundle *b = &vc->b;
+    struct state *st = b->md->st;
+
+    passert(cur_state == NULL);
+    /* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */
+    if (st != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(st->st_suspended_md == b->md);
+	st->st_suspended_md = NULL;	/* no longer connected or suspended */
+	cur_state = st;
+	if (!b->failure_ok && ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
+	    r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    r = quick_inI1_outR1_tail(b, cr);
+	}
+	complete_state_transition(&b->md, r);
+    }
+    if (b->md != NULL)
+	release_md(b->md);
+    cur_state = NULL;
+}
+
+static stf_status
+quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
+, enum verify_oppo_step next_step)
+{
+    struct msg_digest *md = b->md;
+    struct state *p1st = md->st;
+    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+    struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc
+	= alloc_thing(struct verify_oppo_continuation, "verify continuation");
+    struct id id	/* subject of query */
+	, *our_id	/* needed for myid playing */
+	, our_id_space;	/* ephemeral: no need for unshare_id_content */
+    ip_address client;
+    err_t ugh;
+
+    /* Record that state is used by a suspended md */
+    b->step = next_step;    /* not just vc->b.step */
+    vc->b = *b;
+    passert(p1st->st_suspended_md == NULL);
+    p1st->st_suspended_md = b->md;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	    char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+	    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+	    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+
+	    DBG_log("responding with DNS query - from %s to %s new state: %s"
+		    , ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]);
+	});
+
+    /* Resolve %myid in a cheesy way.
+     * We have to do the resolution because start_adns_query
+     * et al have insufficient information to do so.
+     * If %myid is already known, we'll use that value
+     * (XXX this may be a mistake: it could be stale).
+     * If %myid is unknown, we should check to see if
+     * there are credentials for the IP address or the FQDN.
+     * Instead, we'll just assume the IP address since we are
+     * acting as the responder and only the IP address would
+     * have gotten it to us.
+     * We don't even try to do this for the other side:
+     * %myid makes no sense for the other side (but it is syntactically
+     * legal).
+     */
+    our_id = resolve_myid(&c->spd.this.id);
+    if (our_id->kind == ID_NONE)
+    {
+	iptoid(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &our_id_space);
+	our_id = &our_id_space;
+    }
+
+    switch (next_step)
+    {
+    case vos_our_client:
+	networkof(&b->my.net, &client);
+	iptoid(&client, &id);
+	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+	ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+	    , our_id
+	    , T_TXT
+	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+	    , &vc->ac);
+	break;
+
+    case vos_our_txt:
+	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE;
+	ugh = start_adns_query(our_id
+	    , our_id	/* self as SG */
+	    , T_TXT
+	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+	    , &vc->ac);
+	break;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    case vos_our_key:
+	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+	ugh = start_adns_query(our_id
+	    , NULL
+	    , T_KEY
+	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+	    , &vc->ac);
+	break;
+#endif
+
+    case vos_his_client:
+	networkof(&b->his.net, &client);
+	iptoid(&client, &id);
+	vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE;
+	ugh = start_adns_query(&id
+	    , &c->spd.that.id
+	    , T_TXT
+	    , quick_inI1_outR1_continue
+	    , &vc->ac);
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	bad_case(next_step);
+    }
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	/* note: we'd like to use vc->b but vc has been freed
+	 * so we have to use b.  This is why we plunked next_state
+	 * into b, not just vc->b.
+	 */
+	report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
+	p1st->st_suspended_md = NULL;
+	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	return STF_SUSPEND;
+    }
+}
+
+static enum verify_oppo_step
+quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
+, struct adns_continuation *ac
+, struct state *p1st)
+{
+    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+    enum verify_oppo_step next_step;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	    char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+	    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+	    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+	    DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s state: %s"
+		    , ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]);
+	});
+
+    /* process just completed DNS query (if any) */
+    switch (b->step)
+    {
+    case vos_start:
+	/* no query to digest */
+	next_step = vos_our_client;
+	break;
+
+    case vos_our_client:
+	next_step = vos_his_client;
+	{
+	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+	    struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+	    if (pri == NULL)
+	    {
+		ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+		break;
+	    }
+	    ugh = "our client does not delegate us as its Security Gateway";
+	    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+	    {
+		ugh = "our client delegates us as its Security Gateway but with the wrong public key";
+		/* If there is no key in the TXT record,
+		 * we count it as a win, but we will have
+		 * to separately fetch and check the KEY record.
+		 * If there is a key from the TXT record,
+		 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
+		 */
+		if (!gwp->gw_key_present)
+		{
+		    next_step = vos_our_txt;
+		    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+		    break;
+		}
+		else if (same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+		{
+		    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+    case vos_our_txt:
+	next_step = vos_his_client;
+	{
+	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+
+	    if (pri == NULL)
+	    {
+		ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+		break;
+	    }
+	    {
+		struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+		for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+		{
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		    /* not an error yet, because we have to check KEY RR as well */
+		    ugh = NULL;
+#else
+		    ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key";
+#endif
+		    if (gwp->gw_key_present
+		    && same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+		    {
+			ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+			break;
+		    }
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		    next_step = vos_our_key;
+#endif
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    case vos_our_key:
+	next_step = vos_his_client;
+	{
+	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c);
+
+	    if (pri == NULL)
+	    {
+		ugh = "we don't know our own key";
+		break;
+	    }
+	    {
+		pubkey_list_t *kp;
+
+		ugh = "our client delegation depends on our missing " RRNAME " record";
+		for (kp = ac->keys_from_dns; kp != NULL; kp = kp->next)
+		{
+		    ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key";
+		    if (same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &kp->key->u.rsa))
+		    {
+			/* do this only once a day */
+			if (!logged_txt_warning)
+			{
+			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "found KEY RR but not TXT RR. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html.");
+			    logged_txt_warning = TRUE;
+			}
+			ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+
+    case vos_his_client:
+	next_step = vos_done;
+	{
+	    struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+	    /* check that the public key that authenticated
+	     * the ISAKMP SA (p1st) will do for this gateway.
+	     */
+
+	    ugh = "peer's client does not delegate to peer";
+	    for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+	    {
+		ugh = "peer and its client disagree about public key";
+		/* If there is a key from the TXT record,
+		 * we count it as a win if we match the key.
+		 * If there was no key, we claim a match since
+		 * it implies fetching a KEY from the same
+		 * place we must have gotten it.
+		 */
+		if (!gwp->gw_key_present
+		|| same_RSA_public_key(&p1st->st_peer_pubkey->u.rsa
+		, &gwp->key->u.rsa))
+		{
+		    ugh = NULL;	/* good! */
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	bad_case(b->step);
+    }
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	report_verify_failure(b, ugh);
+	next_step = vos_fail;
+    }
+    return next_step;
+}
+
+static stf_status
+quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b
+, struct adns_continuation *ac)
+{
+    struct msg_digest *md = b->md;
+    struct state *const p1st = md->st;
+    struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection;
+    struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+    ip_subnet *our_net = &b->my.net
+	, *his_net = &b->his.net;
+
+    u_char	/* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
+	*r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
+	*r_hash_start;	/* from where to start hashing */
+
+    /* Now that we have identities of client subnets, we must look for
+     * a suitable connection (our current one only matches for hosts).
+     */
+    {
+	struct connection *p = find_client_connection(c
+	    , our_net, his_net, b->my.proto, b->my.port, b->his.proto, b->his.port);
+
+	if (p == NULL)
+	{
+	    /* This message occurs in very puzzling circumstances
+	     * so we must add as much information and beauty as we can.
+	     */
+	    struct end
+		me = c->spd.this,
+		he = c->spd.that;
+	    char buf[2*SUBNETTOT_BUF + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 2*BUF_LEN + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 12]; /* + 12 for separating */
+	    size_t l;
+
+	    me.client = *our_net;
+	    me.has_client = !subnetisaddr(our_net, &me.host_addr);
+	    me.protocol = b->my.proto;
+	    me.port = b->my.port;
+
+	    he.client = *his_net;
+	    he.has_client = !subnetisaddr(his_net, &he.host_addr);
+	    he.protocol = b->his.proto;
+	    he.port = b->his.port;
+
+	    l = format_end(buf, sizeof(buf), &me, NULL, TRUE, LEMPTY);
+	    l += snprintf(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, "...");
+	    (void)format_end(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, &he, NULL, FALSE, LEMPTY);
+	    plog("cannot respond to IPsec SA request"
+		" because no connection is known for %s"
+		, buf);
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	else if (p != c)
+	{
+	    /* We've got a better connection: it can support the
+	     * specified clients.  But it may need instantiation.
+	     */
+	    if (p->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	    {
+		/* Yup, it needs instantiation.  How much?
+		 * Is it a Road Warrior connection (simple)
+		 * or is it an Opportunistic connection (needing gw validation)?
+		 */
+		if (p->policy & POLICY_OPPO)
+		{
+		    /* Opportunistic case: delegation must be verified.
+		     * Here be dragons.
+		     */
+		    enum verify_oppo_step next_step;
+		    ip_address our_client, his_client;
+
+		    passert(subnetishost(our_net) && subnetishost(his_net));
+		    networkof(our_net, &our_client);
+		    networkof(his_net, &his_client);
+
+		    next_step = quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(b, ac, p1st);
+		    if (next_step == vos_fail)
+			return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+		    /* short circuit: if peer's client is self,
+		     * accept that we've verified delegation in Phase 1
+		     */
+		    if (next_step == vos_his_client
+		    && sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &his_client))
+			next_step = vos_done;
+
+		    /* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			{
+			    char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+			    char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+			    subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours));
+			    subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his));
+
+			    DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s new state: %s"
+				    , ours, his, verify_step_name[next_step]);
+			});
+
+		    /* start next DNS query and suspend (if necessary) */
+		    if (next_step != vos_done)
+			return quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(b, next_step);
+
+		    /* Instantiate inbound Opportunistic connection,
+		     * carrying over authenticated peer ID
+		     * and filling in a few more details.
+		     * We used to include gateways_from_dns, but that
+		     * seems pointless at this stage of negotiation.
+		     * We should record DNS sec use, if any -- belongs in
+		     * state during perhaps.
+		     */
+		    p = oppo_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.id
+			, NULL, &our_client, &his_client);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* Plain Road Warrior:
+		     * instantiate, carrying over authenticated peer ID
+		     */
+		    p = rw_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port
+				, his_net, &c->spd.that.id);
+		}
+	    }
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    /* temporarily bump up cur_debugging to get "using..." message
+	     * printed if we'd want it with new connection.
+	     */
+	    {
+		lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
+
+		cur_debugging |= p->extra_debugging;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("using connection \"%s\"", p->name));
+		cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
+	    }
+#endif
+	    c = p;
+	}
+	/* fill in the client's true ip address/subnet */
+	if (p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard)
+	{
+	    p->spd.that.client = *his_net;
+	    p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard = FALSE;
+	}
+	else if (is_virtual_connection(c))
+	{
+	    c->spd.that.client = *his_net;
+	    c->spd.that.virt = NULL;
+	    if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, his_net))
+		c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* fill in the client's true port */
+	if (p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard)
+	{
+	    int port = htons(b->his.port);
+
+	    setportof(port, &p->spd.that.host_addr);
+	    setportof(port, &p->spd.that.client.addr);
+
+	    p->spd.that.port = b->his.port;
+	    p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard = FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* now that we are sure of our connection, create our new state */
+    {
+	struct state *const st = duplicate_state(p1st);
+
+	/* first: fill in missing bits of our new state object
+	 * note: we don't copy over st_peer_pubkey, the public key
+	 * that authenticated the ISAKMP SA.  We only need it in this
+	 * routine, so we can "reach back" to p1st to get it.
+	 */
+
+	if (st->st_connection != c)
+	{
+	    struct connection *t = st->st_connection;
+
+	    st->st_connection = c;
+	    set_cur_connection(c);
+	    connection_discard(t);
+	}
+
+	st->st_try = 0;	/* not our job to try again from start */
+
+	st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;
+
+	st->st_new_iv_len = b->new_iv_len;
+	memcpy(st->st_new_iv, b->new_iv, b->new_iv_len);
+
+	set_cur_state(st);	/* (caller will reset) */
+	md->st = st;	/* feed back new state */
+
+	st->st_peeruserprotoid = b->his.proto;
+	st->st_peeruserport = b->his.port;
+	st->st_myuserprotoid = b->my.proto;
+	st->st_myuserport = b->my.port;
+
+	insert_state(st);	/* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */
+
+	/* copy the connection's
+	 * IPSEC policy into our state.  The ISAKMP policy is water under
+	 * the bridge, I think.  It will reflect the ISAKMP SA that we
+	 * are using.
+	 */
+	st->st_policy = (p1st->st_policy & POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK)
+	    | (c->policy & ~POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK);
+
+	if (p1st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	{
+	    st->nat_traversal = p1st->nat_traversal;
+	    nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    st->nat_traversal = 0;
+	}
+	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA))
+	{
+	    nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md);
+	}
+
+	/* Start the output packet.
+	 *
+	 * proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR*
+	 * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE.
+	 * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially
+	 * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS.
+	 *
+	 * We build the reply packet as we parse the message since
+	 * the parse_ipsec_sa_body emits the reply SA
+	 */
+
+	/* HDR* out */
+	echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH);
+
+	/* HASH(2) out -- first pass */
+	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA);
+
+	/* process SA (in and out) */
+	{
+	    struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+	    pb_stream r_sa_pbs;
+	    struct isakmp_sa sa = sapd->payload.sa;
+
+	    /* sa header is unchanged -- except for np */
+	    sa.isasa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE;
+	    if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	    /* parse and accept body */
+	    st->st_pfs_group = &unset_group;
+	    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sapd->pbs
+		    , &sapd->payload.sa, &r_sa_pbs, FALSE, st));
+	}
+
+	passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group);
+
+	if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_PFS) && st->st_pfs_group == NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "we require PFS but Quick I1 SA specifies no GROUP_DESCRIPTION");
+	    return STF_FAIL + NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;	/* ??? */
+	}
+
+	/* Ni in */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni"));
+
+	/* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gi, "Gi", "Quick Mode I1"));
+
+	plog("responding to Quick Mode");
+
+	/**** finish reply packet: Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] ****/
+
+	/* Nr out */
+	if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody
+	, st->st_pfs_group != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+	, "Nr"))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	/* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */
+
+	if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group
+	    , &md->rbody, id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE))
+		    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	    /* MPZ-Operations might be done after sending the packet... */
+	    compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group);
+	}
+
+	/* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */
+	if  (id_pd != NULL)
+	{
+	    struct isakmp_ipsec_id *p = (void *)md->rbody.cur;	/* UGH! */
+
+	    if (!out_raw(id_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDci"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	    p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_ID;
+
+	    p = (void *)md->rbody.cur;	/* UGH! */
+
+	    if (!out_raw(id_pd->next->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->next->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDcr"))
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	    p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	}
+
+	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)
+	&& (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))
+	&& (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT))
+	{
+	    /** Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed and if we use Transport Mode */
+	    if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md->st))
+	    {
+		return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	    }
+	}
+	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	&& (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT)
+	&& (c->spd.that.has_client))
+	{
+	    /** Remove client **/
+	    addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client);
+	    c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* Compute reply HASH(2) and insert in output */
+	(void)quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, md->rbody.cur
+	    , st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE);
+
+	/* Derive new keying material */
+	compute_keymats(st);
+
+	/* Tell the kernel to establish the new inbound SA
+	 * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
+	 * We do this before any state updating so that
+	 * failure won't look like success.
+	 */
+	if (!install_inbound_ipsec_sa(st))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+
+	/* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+
+	if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+
+	return STF_OK;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection
+ */
+static void
+dpd_init(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct state *p1st = find_state(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
+				, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0);
+    
+    if (p1st == NULL)
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "could not find phase 1 state for DPD");
+    else if (p1st->st_dpd)
+    {
+	plog("Dead Peer Detection (RFC 3706) enabled");
+	/* randomize the first DPD event */
+        
+	event_schedule(EVENT_DPD
+	    , (0.5 + rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.E0)) * st->st_connection->dpd_delay
+	    , st);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Handle (the single) message from Responder in Quick Mode.
+ * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] -->
+ * HDR*, HASH(3)
+ * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5)
+ * Installs inbound and outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
+ */
+stf_status
+quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    /* HASH(2) in */
+    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md
+	, quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof
+	    , st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE)
+	, "HASH(2)", "Quick R1");
+
+    /* SA in */
+    {
+	struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA];
+
+	RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sa_pd->pbs
+	    , &sa_pd->payload.sa, NULL, TRUE, st));
+    }
+
+    /* Nr in */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr"));
+
+    /* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */
+    RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gr, "Gr", "Quick Mode R1"));
+
+    if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+	compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group);
+
+    /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in; these must match what we sent */
+
+    {
+	struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID];
+
+	if (id_pd != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */
+
+	    /* IDci (we are initiator) */
+
+	    if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs
+	    , &st->st_myuserprotoid, &st->st_myuserport
+	    , &st->st_connection->spd.this.client
+	    , "our client"))
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+
+	    /* IDcr (responder is peer) */
+
+	    if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs
+	    , &st->st_peeruserprotoid, &st->st_peeruserport
+	    , &st->st_connection->spd.that.client
+	    , "peer client"))
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* no IDci, IDcr: we must check that the defaults match our proposal */
+	    if (!subnetisaddr(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr)
+	    || !subnetisaddr(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IDci, IDcr payloads missing in message"
+		    " but default does not match proposal");
+		return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* check the peer's group attributes */
+    
+    {
+	const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL;
+	
+	get_peer_ca_and_groups(st->st_connection, &peer_list);
+
+	if (!group_membership(peer_list, st->st_connection->name
+		, st->st_connection->spd.that.groups))
+	{
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    format_groups(st->st_connection->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer is not member of one of the groups: %s"
+		, buf);
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION;
+	}
+    }
+
+	if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	&&  (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA))
+	{
+	    nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md);
+	}
+
+    /* ??? We used to copy the accepted proposal into the state, but it was
+     * never used.  From sa_pd->pbs.start, length pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs).
+     */
+
+    /**************** build reply packet HDR*, HASH(3) ****************/
+
+    /* HDR* out done */
+
+    /* HASH(3) out -- since this is the only content, no passes needed */
+    {
+	u_char	/* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */
+	    *r_hashval,	/* where in reply to jam hash value */
+	    *r_hash_start;	/* start of what is to be hashed */
+
+	START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE);
+	(void)quick_mode_hash3(r_hashval, st);
+    }
+
+    /* Derive new keying material */
+    compute_keymats(st);
+
+    /* Tell the kernel to establish the inbound, outbound, and routing part
+     * of the new SA (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
+     * We do this before any state updating so that
+     * failure won't look like success.
+     */
+    if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */
+
+    if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;	/* ??? we may be partly committed */
+
+    {
+      DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inR1_outI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)"
+			       , st->st_connection->name
+			       , st->st_connection->instance_serial
+			       , st->st_serialno
+			       , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa
+			       , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner));
+    }
+    
+    st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno;
+
+    /* note (presumed) success */
+    if (c->gw_info != NULL)
+	c->gw_info->key->last_worked_time = now();
+
+    /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */
+    if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+	dpd_init(st);
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* Handle last message of Quick Mode.
+ * HDR*, HASH(3) -> done
+ * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5)
+ * Installs outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc.
+ */
+stf_status
+quick_inI2(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+
+    /* HASH(3) in */
+    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, quick_mode_hash3(hash_val, st)
+	, "HASH(3)", "Quick I2");
+
+    /* Tell the kernel to establish the outbound and routing part of the new SA
+     * (the previous state established inbound)
+     * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support).
+     * We do this before any state updating so that
+     * failure won't look like success.
+     */
+    if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE))
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+    {
+      DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)"
+			       , st->st_connection->name
+			       , st->st_connection->instance_serial
+			       , st->st_serialno
+			       , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa
+			       , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner));
+    }
+
+    st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno;
+
+    update_iv(st);	/* not actually used, but tidy */
+
+    /* note (presumed) success */
+    {
+	struct gw_info *gw = st->st_connection->gw_info;
+
+	if (gw != NULL)
+	    gw->key->last_worked_time = now();
+    }
+
+    /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */
+    if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+	dpd_init(st);
+
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+static stf_status
+send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type
+    , const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+    msgid_t msgid;
+    pb_stream reply;
+    pb_stream rbody;
+    u_char
+	*r_hashval,     /* where in reply to jam hash value */
+	*r_hash_start;  /* start of what is to be hashed */
+        
+    msgid = generate_msgid(st);
+    
+    init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "ISAKMP notify");
+
+    /* HDR* */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+        hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+        hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+        hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO;
+        hdr.isa_msgid = msgid;
+        hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+        memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+        memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+        if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody))
+            impossible();
+    }
+    /* HASH -- create and note space to be filled later */
+    START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_N);
+
+    /* NOTIFY */
+    {
+        pb_stream notify_pbs;
+        struct isakmp_notification isan;
+
+        isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+        isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;
+        isan.isan_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP;
+        isan.isan_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE * 2;  
+        isan.isan_type = type;
+        if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &rbody, &notify_pbs))
+            return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+        if (!out_raw(st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &notify_pbs, "notify icookie"))
+            return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  
+        if (!out_raw(st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &notify_pbs, "notify rcookie"))
+            return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;  
+        if (data != NULL && len > 0)
+            if (!out_raw(data, len, &notify_pbs, "notify data"))
+                return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;    
+        close_output_pbs(&notify_pbs);
+    }
+            
+    {
+        /* finish computing HASH */     
+        struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+        hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
+        hmac_update(&ctx, (const u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t));
+        hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, rbody.cur-r_hash_start);
+        hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx);  
+
+        DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+                DBG_log("HASH computed:");
+                DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size));
+    }
+
+    /* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */
+    {
+	u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+	u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+
+	u_int old_iv_len = st->st_iv_len;
+	u_int new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len;
+
+	if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN)
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	memcpy(old_iv, st->st_iv, old_iv_len);
+	memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len);
+
+	init_phase2_iv(st, &msgid);
+	if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+     
+	/* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */
+	memcpy(st->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len);
+	memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len);
+	st->st_iv_len = old_iv_len;
+	st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len;
+    }
+
+    /* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */
+    {
+        chunk_t saved_tpacket = st->st_tpacket;
+
+        setchunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply));
+        send_packet(st, "ISAKMP notify");
+        st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket;
+    }
+
+    return STF_IGNORE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DPD Out Initiator
+ */
+void
+dpd_outI(struct state *p2st)
+{
+    struct state *st;
+    u_int32_t seqno;
+    time_t tm;
+    time_t idle_time;
+    time_t delay = p2st->st_connection->dpd_delay;
+    time_t timeout = p2st->st_connection->dpd_timeout;
+
+    /* find the newest related Phase 1 state */
+    st = find_phase1_state(p2st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+
+    if (st == NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not find newest phase 1 state");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* If no DPD, then get out of here */
+    if (!st->st_dpd)
+ 	return;
+
+    /* schedule the next periodic DPD event */
+    event_schedule(EVENT_DPD, delay, p2st);
+
+    /* Current time */
+    tm = now();
+
+    /* Make sure we really need to invoke DPD */
+    if (!was_eroute_idle(p2st, delay, &idle_time))
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("recent eroute activity %u seconds ago, "
+		    "no need to send DPD notification"
+		  , (int)idle_time)
+	)
+	st->st_last_dpd = tm;
+	delete_dpd_event(st);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* If an R_U_THERE has been sent or received recently, or if a
+     * companion Phase 2 SA has shown eroute activity,
+     * then we don't need to invoke DPD.
+     */
+    if (tm < st->st_last_dpd + delay)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("recent DPD activity %u seconds ago, "
+	    	    "no need to send DPD notification"
+		  , (int)(tm - st->st_last_dpd))
+	)
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	return;
+
+    if (!st->st_dpd_seqno)
+    {
+	/* Get a non-zero random value that has room to grow */
+	get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&st->st_dpd_seqno, sizeof(st->st_dpd_seqno));
+	st->st_dpd_seqno &= 0x7fff;
+	st->st_dpd_seqno++;
+    }
+    seqno = htonl(st->st_dpd_seqno);
+
+    if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE, &seqno, sizeof(seqno)) != STF_IGNORE)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not send R_U_THERE");
+	return;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", st->st_dpd_seqno)
+    )
+    st->st_dpd_expectseqno = st->st_dpd_seqno++;
+    st->st_last_dpd = tm;
+    /* Only schedule a new timeout if there isn't one currently,
+     * or if it would be sooner than the current timeout. */
+    if (st->st_dpd_event == NULL
+    || st->st_dpd_event->ev_time > tm + timeout)
+    {
+	delete_dpd_event(st);
+	event_schedule(EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT, timeout, st);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * DPD in Initiator, out Responder
+ */
+stf_status
+dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+   time_t tm = now();
+    u_int32_t seqno;
+
+    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received R_U_THERE for unestablished ISKAMP SA");
+        return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+    if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2)
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid SPI length (%d)", n->isan_spisize);
+        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+
+    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+    {
+#ifdef APPLY_CRISCO
+        /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
+#else
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid icookie (broken Cisco?)");
+        return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+#endif
+    }
+    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid rcookie (broken Cisco?)");
+	return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+    }
+    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+    if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno))
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid data length (%d)"
+	    , (int) pbs_left(pbs));
+        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+
+    seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", seqno)
+    )
+
+    if (st->st_dpd_peerseqno && seqno <= st->st_dpd_peerseqno) {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received old or duplicate R_U_THERE");
+        return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+
+    st->st_dpd_peerseqno = seqno;
+    delete_dpd_event(st);
+
+    if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE_ACK, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs)) != STF_IGNORE)
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD Info: could not send R_U_THERE_ACK");
+        return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u", seqno)
+    )
+
+    st->st_last_dpd = tm;
+    return STF_IGNORE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DPD out Responder
+ */
+stf_status
+dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    u_int32_t seqno;
+
+    if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "DPD: Received R_U_THERE_ACK for unestablished ISKAMP SA");
+        return STF_FAIL;
+    }
+
+   if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2)
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid SPI length (%d)"
+	    , n->isan_spisize);
+        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+
+    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+    {
+#ifdef APPLY_CRISCO
+        /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
+#else
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid icookie");
+        return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+#endif
+    }
+    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+    if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0)
+    {
+#ifdef APPLY_CRISCO
+        /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */
+#else
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid rcookie");
+        return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE;
+#endif
+    }
+    pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE;
+
+    if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno))
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , " DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid data length (%d)"
+	    , (int) pbs_left(pbs));
+        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+
+    seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u"
+	, seqno)
+    )
+
+    if (!st->st_dpd_expectseqno && seqno != st->st_dpd_expectseqno)
+    {
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has unexpected sequence number");
+        return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+
+    st->st_dpd_expectseqno = 0;
+    delete_dpd_event(st);
+    return STF_IGNORE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * DPD Timeout Function
+ *
+ * This function is called when a timeout DPD_EVENT occurs.  We set clear/trap
+ * both the SA and the eroutes, depending on what the connection definition
+ * tells us (either 'hold' or 'clear')
+ */
+void
+dpd_timeout(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct state *newest_phase1_st;
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    int action = st->st_connection->dpd_action;
+
+    passert(action == DPD_ACTION_HOLD
+	 || action == DPD_ACTION_CLEAR
+	 || DPD_ACTION_RESTART);
+
+    /* is there a newer phase1_state? */
+    newest_phase1_st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES);
+    if (newest_phase1_st != NULL && newest_phase1_st != st)
+    {
+	plog("DPD: Phase1 state #%ld has been superseded by #%ld"
+	     " - timeout ignored"
+	     , st->st_serialno, newest_phase1_st->st_serialno);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: No response from peer - declaring peer dead");
+
+    /* delete the state, which is probably in phase 2 */
+    set_cur_connection(c);
+    plog("DPD: Terminating all SAs using this connection");
+    delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE);
+    reset_cur_connection();
+
+    switch (action)
+    {
+    case DPD_ACTION_HOLD:
+	/* dpdaction=hold - Wipe the SA's but %trap the eroute so we don't
+	 * leak traffic.  Also, being in %trap means new packets will
+	 * force an initiation of the conn again.
+	 */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Putting connection into %%trap");
+	break;
+    case DPD_ACTION_CLEAR:
+	/* dpdaction=clear - Wipe the SA & eroute - everything */
+        loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Clearing connection");
+        unroute_connection(c);
+	break;
+    case DPD_ACTION_RESTART:
+	/* dpdaction=restart - Restart connection,
+	 * except if roadwarrior connection
+	 */
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Restarting connection");
+	unroute_connection(c);
+	initiate_connection(c->name, NULL_FD);
+	break;
+    default:
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: unknown action");
+    }
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80b12c31d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.h
@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+/* IPsec DOI and Oakley resolution routines
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: ipsec_doi.h,v 1.3 2005/01/06 22:10:44 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern void echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np);
+
+extern void ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock, struct connection *c
+    , lset_t policy, unsigned long try, so_serial_t replacing);
+
+extern void ipsecdoi_replace(struct state *st, unsigned long try);
+
+extern void init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid);
+
+extern stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock
+    , struct state *isakmp_sa
+    , struct connection *c
+    , lset_t policy
+    , unsigned long try
+    , so_serial_t replacing);
+
+extern state_transition_fn
+    main_inI1_outR1,
+    main_inR1_outI2,
+    main_inI2_outR2,
+    main_inR2_outI3,
+    main_inI3_outR3,
+    main_inR3,
+    quick_inI1_outR1,
+    quick_inR1_outI2,
+    quick_inI2;
+
+extern void send_delete(struct state *st);
+extern void accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md
+    , struct payload_digest *p);
+extern void close_message(pb_stream *pbs);
+extern bool encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st);
+
+
+extern void send_notification_from_state(struct state *st,
+    enum state_kind state, u_int16_t type);
+extern void send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type);
+
+extern const char *init_pluto_vendorid(void);
+
+extern void dpd_outI(struct state *st);
+extern stf_status dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st
+            , struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *n_pbs);
+extern stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st
+            , struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *n_pbs);
+extern void dpd_timeout(struct state *st);
+
+/* START_HASH_PAYLOAD
+ *
+ * Emit a to-be-filled-in hash payload, noting the field start (r_hashval)
+ * and the start of the part of the message to be hashed (r_hash_start).
+ * This macro is magic.
+ * - it can cause the caller to return
+ * - it references variables local to the caller (r_hashval, r_hash_start, st)
+ */
+#define START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, np) { \
+    pb_stream hash_pbs; \
+    if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_hash_desc, &(rbody), &hash_pbs)) \
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
+    r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur;	/* remember where to plant value */ \
+    if (!out_zero(st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH")) \
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; \
+    close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); \
+    r_hash_start = (rbody).cur;	/* hash from after HASH payload */ \
+}
+
+/* CHECK_QUICK_HASH
+ *
+ * This macro is magic -- it cannot be expressed as a function.
+ * - it causes the caller to return!
+ * - it declares local variables and expects the "do_hash" argument
+ *   expression to reference them (hash_val, hash_pbs)
+ */
+#define CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, do_hash, hash_name, msg_name) { \
+	pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs; \
+	u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; \
+	size_t hash_len = do_hash; \
+	if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash_len \
+	|| memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash_val, hash_len) != 0) \
+	{ \
+	    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received " hash_name ":", hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs)); \
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received " hash_name " does not match computed value in " msg_name); \
+	    /* XXX Could send notification back */ \
+	    return STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; \
+	} \
+    }
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/kameipsec.h b/src/pluto/kameipsec.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5f08c7d38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kameipsec.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+#ifndef __IPSEC_H
+#define __IPSEC_H 1
+
+/* The definitions, required to talk to KAME racoon IKE. */
+
+#define IPSEC_PORT_ANY		0
+#define IPSEC_ULPROTO_ANY	255
+#define IPSEC_PROTO_ANY		255
+
+enum {
+	IPSEC_MODE_ANY		= 0,	/* We do not support this for SA */
+	IPSEC_MODE_TRANSPORT	= 1,
+	IPSEC_MODE_TUNNEL	= 2
+};
+
+enum {
+	IPSEC_DIR_ANY		= 0,
+	IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND	= 1,
+	IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND	= 2,
+	IPSEC_DIR_FWD		= 3,	/* It is our own */
+	IPSEC_DIR_MAX		= 4,
+	IPSEC_DIR_INVALID	= 5
+};
+
+enum {
+	IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD	= 0,
+	IPSEC_POLICY_NONE	= 1,
+	IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC	= 2,
+	IPSEC_POLICY_ENTRUST	= 3,
+	IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS	= 4
+};
+
+enum {
+	IPSEC_LEVEL_DEFAULT	= 0,
+	IPSEC_LEVEL_USE		= 1,
+	IPSEC_LEVEL_REQUIRE	= 2,
+	IPSEC_LEVEL_UNIQUE	= 3
+};
+
+#define IPSEC_MANUAL_REQID_MAX	0x3fff
+
+#define IPSEC_REPLAYWSIZE  32
+
+#define IP_IPSEC_POLICY 16
+#define IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY 34
+
+#endif	/* __IPSEC_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel.c b/src/pluto/kernel.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..663fa7230
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2995 @@
+/* routines that interface with the kernel's IPsec mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel.c,v 1.26 2006/04/29 18:16:02 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>	/* for select(2) */
+#include <sys/types.h>	/* for select(2) */
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+#include "kameipsec.h"
+#endif /* KLIPS */
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "kernel_netlink.h"
+#include "kernel_pfkey.h"
+#include "kernel_noklips.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+
+
+bool can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;  /* can system actually perform IPCOMP? */
+
+/* How far can IPsec messages arrive out of order before the anti-replay
+ * logic loses track and swats them?  64 is the best KLIPS can do.
+ * And 32 is the best XFRM can do...
+ */
+#define REPLAY_WINDOW	64
+#define REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM      32
+
+/* test if the routes required for two different connections agree
+ * It is assumed that the destination subnets agree; we are only
+ * testing that the interfaces and nexthops match.
+ */
+#define routes_agree(c, d) ((c)->interface == (d)->interface \
+	&& sameaddr(&(c)->spd.this.host_nexthop, &(d)->spd.this.host_nexthop))
+
+#ifndef KLIPS
+
+bool no_klips = TRUE;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
+
+#else /* !KLIPS */
+
+/* bare (connectionless) shunt (eroute) table
+ *
+ * Bare shunts are those that don't "belong" to a connection.
+ * This happens because some %trapped traffic hasn't yet or cannot be
+ * assigned to a connection.  The usual reason is that we cannot discover
+ * the peer SG.  Another is that even when the peer has been discovered,
+ * it may be that no connection matches all the particulars.
+ * We record them so that, with scanning, we can discover
+ * which %holds are news and which others should expire.
+ */
+
+#define SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL	(60 * 2)   /* time between scans of eroutes */
+
+/* SHUNT_PATIENCE only has resolution down to a multiple of the sample rate,
+ * SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL.
+ * By making SHUNT_PATIENCE an odd multiple of half of SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL,
+ * we minimize the effects of jitter.
+ */
+#define SHUNT_PATIENCE	(SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL * 15 / 2)	/* inactivity timeout */
+
+struct bare_shunt {
+    policy_prio_t policy_prio;
+    ip_subnet ours;
+    ip_subnet his;
+    ip_said said;
+    int transport_proto;
+    unsigned long count;
+    time_t last_activity;
+    char *why;
+    struct bare_shunt *next;
+};
+
+static struct bare_shunt *bare_shunts = NULL;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+DBG_bare_shunt(const char *op, const struct bare_shunt *bs)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	{
+	    int ourport = ntohs(portof(&(bs)->ours.addr));
+	    int hisport = ntohs(portof(&(bs)->his.addr));
+	    char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	    char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	    char sat[SATOT_BUF];
+	    char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
+
+	    subnettot(&(bs)->ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+	    subnettot(&(bs)->his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+	    satot(&(bs)->said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
+	    fmt_policy_prio(bs->policy_prio, prio);
+	    DBG_log("%s bare shunt %p %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d %s    %s"
+		, op, (const void *)(bs), ourst, ourport, hist, hisport
+		, sat, (bs)->transport_proto, prio, (bs)->why);
+	});
+}
+#else /* !DEBUG */
+#define DBG_bare_shunt(op, bs) {}
+#endif /* !DEBUG */
+
+/* The orphaned_holds table records %holds for which we
+ * scan_proc_shunts found no representation of in any connection.
+ * The corresponding ACQUIRE message might have been lost.
+ */
+struct eroute_info *orphaned_holds = NULL;
+
+/* forward declaration */
+static bool shunt_eroute(struct connection *c
+			 , struct spd_route *sr
+			 , enum routing_t rt_kind
+			 , unsigned int op, const char *opname);
+static void set_text_said(char *text_said
+			  , const ip_address *dst
+			  , ipsec_spi_t spi
+			  , int proto);
+
+bool no_klips = FALSE;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
+
+static const struct pfkey_proto_info null_proto_info[2] = {
+	{
+		proto: IPPROTO_ESP,
+		encapsulation: ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT,
+		reqid: 0
+	},
+	{
+	        proto: 0,
+		encapsulation: 0,
+		reqid: 0
+	}
+};
+
+void
+record_and_initiate_opportunistic(const ip_subnet *ours
+				  , const ip_subnet *his
+				  , int transport_proto
+				  , const char *why)
+{
+    passert(samesubnettype(ours, his));
+
+    /* Add to bare shunt list.
+     * We need to do this because the shunt was installed by KLIPS
+     * which can't do this itself.
+     */
+    {
+	struct bare_shunt *bs = alloc_thing(struct bare_shunt, "bare shunt");
+
+	bs->why = clone_str(why, "story for bare shunt");
+	bs->ours = *ours;
+	bs->his = *his;
+	bs->transport_proto = transport_proto;
+	bs->policy_prio = BOTTOM_PRIO;
+
+	bs->said.proto = SA_INT;
+	bs->said.spi = htonl(SPI_HOLD);
+	bs->said.dst = *aftoinfo(subnettypeof(ours))->any;
+
+	bs->count = 0;
+	bs->last_activity = now();
+
+	bs->next = bare_shunts;
+	bare_shunts = bs;
+	DBG_bare_shunt("add", bs);
+    }
+
+    /* actually initiate opportunism */
+    {
+	ip_address src, dst;
+
+	networkof(ours, &src);
+	networkof(his, &dst);
+	initiate_opportunistic(&src, &dst, transport_proto, TRUE, NULL_FD);
+    }
+
+    /* if present, remove from orphaned_holds list.
+     * NOTE: we do this last in case ours or his is a pointer into a member.
+     */
+    {
+	struct eroute_info **pp, *p;
+
+	for (pp = &orphaned_holds; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &p->next)
+	{
+	    if (samesubnet(ours, &p->ours)
+	    && samesubnet(his, &p->his)
+	    && transport_proto == p->transport_proto
+	    && portof(&ours->addr) == portof(&p->ours.addr)
+	    && portof(&his->addr) == portof(&p->his.addr))
+	    {
+		*pp = p->next;
+		pfree(p);
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+#endif /* KLIPS */
+
+static unsigned get_proto_reqid(unsigned base, int proto)
+{
+    switch (proto)
+    {
+    default:
+    case IPPROTO_COMP:
+	base++;
+	/* fall through */
+    case IPPROTO_ESP:
+	base++;
+	/* fall through */
+    case IPPROTO_AH:
+	break;
+    }
+
+    return base;
+}
+
+/* Generate Unique SPI numbers.
+ *
+ * The specs say that the number must not be less than IPSEC_DOI_SPI_MIN.
+ * Pluto generates numbers not less than IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN,
+ * reserving numbers in between for manual keying (but we cannot so
+ * restrict numbers generated by our peer).
+ * XXX This should be replaced by a call to the kernel when
+ * XXX we get an API.
+ * The returned SPI is in network byte order.
+ * We use a random number as the initial SPI so that there is
+ * a good chance that different Pluto instances will choose
+ * different SPIs.  This is good for two reasons.
+ * - the keying material for the initiator and responder only
+ *   differs if the SPIs differ.
+ * - if Pluto is restarted, it would otherwise recycle the SPI
+ *   numbers and confuse everything.  When the kernel generates
+ *   SPIs, this will no longer matter.
+ * We then allocate numbers sequentially.  Thus we don't have to
+ * check if the number was previously used (assuming that no
+ * SPI lives longer than 4G of its successors).
+ */
+ipsec_spi_t
+get_ipsec_spi(ipsec_spi_t avoid, int proto, struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
+{
+    static ipsec_spi_t spi = 0;	/* host order, so not returned directly! */
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+
+    set_text_said(text_said, &sr->this.host_addr, 0, proto);
+
+    if (kernel_ops->get_spi)
+	return kernel_ops->get_spi(&sr->that.host_addr
+	    , &sr->this.host_addr, proto, tunnel
+	    , get_proto_reqid(sr->reqid, proto)
+	    , IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN, 0xffffffff
+	    , text_said);
+
+    spi++;
+    while (spi < IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN || spi == ntohl(avoid))
+	get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&spi, sizeof(spi));
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    ipsec_spi_t spi_net = htonl(spi);
+
+	    DBG_dump("generate SPI:", (u_char *)&spi_net, sizeof(spi_net));
+	});
+
+    return htonl(spi);
+}
+
+/* Generate Unique CPI numbers.
+ * The result is returned as an SPI (4 bytes) in network order!
+ * The real bits are in the nework-low-order 2 bytes.
+ * Modelled on get_ipsec_spi, but range is more limited:
+ * 256-61439.
+ * If we can't find one easily, return 0 (a bad SPI,
+ * no matter what order) indicating failure.
+ */
+ipsec_spi_t
+get_my_cpi(struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel)
+{
+    static cpi_t
+	first_busy_cpi = 0,
+	latest_cpi;
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+
+    set_text_said(text_said, &sr->this.host_addr, 0, IPPROTO_COMP);
+
+    if (kernel_ops->get_spi)
+	return kernel_ops->get_spi(&sr->that.host_addr
+	    , &sr->this.host_addr, IPPROTO_COMP, tunnel
+	    , get_proto_reqid(sr->reqid, IPPROTO_COMP)
+	    , IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED, IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED
+	    , text_said);
+
+    while (!(IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED <= first_busy_cpi && first_busy_cpi < IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED))
+    {
+	get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&first_busy_cpi, sizeof(first_busy_cpi));
+	latest_cpi = first_busy_cpi;
+    }
+
+    latest_cpi++;
+
+    if (latest_cpi == first_busy_cpi)
+	find_my_cpi_gap(&latest_cpi, &first_busy_cpi);
+
+    if (latest_cpi > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
+	latest_cpi = IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED;
+
+    return htonl((ipsec_spi_t)latest_cpi);
+}
+
+/* invoke the updown script to do the routing and firewall commands required
+ *
+ * The user-specified updown script is run.  Parameters are fed to it in
+ * the form of environment variables.  All such environment variables
+ * have names starting with "PLUTO_".
+ *
+ * The operation to be performed is specified by PLUTO_VERB.  This
+ * verb has a suffix "-host" if the client on this end is just the
+ * host; otherwise the suffix is "-client".  If the address family
+ * of the host is IPv6, an extra suffix of "-v6" is added.
+ *
+ * "prepare-host" and "prepare-client" are used to delete a route
+ * that may exist (due to forces outside of Pluto).  It is used to
+ * prepare for pluto creating a route.
+ *
+ * "route-host" and "route-client" are used to install a route.
+ * Since routing is based only on destination, the PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_*
+ * values are probably of no use (using them may signify a bug).
+ *
+ * "unroute-host" and "unroute-client" are used to delete a route.
+ * Since routing is based only on destination, the PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_*
+ * values are probably of no use (using them may signify a bug).
+ *
+ * "up-host" and "up-client" are run when an eroute is added (not replaced).
+ * They are useful for adjusting a firewall: usually for adding a rule
+ * to let processed packets flow between clients.  Note that only
+ * one eroute may exist for a pair of client subnets but inbound
+ * IPsec SAs may persist without an eroute.
+ *
+ * "down-host" and "down-client" are run when an eroute is deleted.
+ * They are useful for adjusting a firewall.
+ */
+
+#ifndef DEFAULT_UPDOWN
+# define DEFAULT_UPDOWN	"ipsec _updown"
+#endif
+
+static bool
+do_command(struct connection *c, struct spd_route *sr, const char *verb)
+{
+    char cmd[1536];	/* arbitrary limit on shell command length */
+    const char *verb_suffix;
+
+    /* figure out which verb suffix applies */
+    {
+	const char *hs, *cs;
+
+	switch (addrtypeof(&sr->this.host_addr))
+	{
+	    case AF_INET:
+		hs = "-host";
+		cs = "-client";
+		break;
+	    case AF_INET6:
+		hs = "-host-v6";
+		cs = "-client-v6";
+		break;
+	    default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown address family");
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	verb_suffix = subnetisaddr(&sr->this.client, &sr->this.host_addr)
+	    ? hs : cs;
+    }
+
+    /* form the command string */
+    {
+	char
+            nexthop_str[sizeof("PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='' ") +ADDRTOT_BUF] = "",
+            srcip_str[sizeof("PLUTO_MY_SOURCEIP='' ")+ADDRTOT_BUF] = "",
+	    me_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+	    myid_str[BUF_LEN],
+	    myclient_str[SUBNETTOT_BUF],
+	    myclientnet_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+	    myclientmask_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+	    peer_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+	    peerid_str[BUF_LEN],
+	    peerclient_str[SUBNETTOT_BUF],
+	    peerclientnet_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+	    peerclientmask_str[ADDRTOT_BUF],
+	    peerca_str[BUF_LEN],
+	    secure_myid_str[BUF_LEN] = "",
+	    secure_peerid_str[BUF_LEN] = "",
+	    secure_peerca_str[BUF_LEN] = "";
+	ip_address ta;
+	pubkey_list_t *p;
+
+	if (addrbytesptr(&sr->this.host_nexthop, NULL)
+	&& !isanyaddr(&sr->this.host_nexthop))
+	{
+	    char *n;
+
+	    strcpy(nexthop_str, "PLUTO_NEXT_HOP='");
+	    n = nexthop_str + strlen(nexthop_str);
+
+	    addrtot(&sr->this.host_nexthop, 0
+		    ,n , sizeof(nexthop_str)-strlen(nexthop_str));
+	    strncat(nexthop_str, "' ", sizeof(nexthop_str));
+	}
+
+	if (addrbytesptr(&sr->this.host_srcip, NULL)
+	&& !isanyaddr(&sr->this.host_srcip))
+        {
+	    char *n;
+
+	    strcpy(srcip_str, "PLUTO_MY_SOURCEIP='");
+	    n = srcip_str + strlen(srcip_str);
+
+	    addrtot(&sr->this.host_srcip, 0
+		    ,n , sizeof(srcip_str)-strlen(srcip_str));
+            strncat(srcip_str, "' ", sizeof(srcip_str));
+        }
+
+	addrtot(&sr->this.host_addr, 0, me_str, sizeof(me_str));
+	idtoa(&sr->this.id, myid_str, sizeof(myid_str));
+	escape_metachar(myid_str, secure_myid_str, sizeof(secure_myid_str));
+	subnettot(&sr->this.client, 0, myclient_str, sizeof(myclientnet_str));
+	networkof(&sr->this.client, &ta);
+	addrtot(&ta, 0, myclientnet_str, sizeof(myclientnet_str));
+	maskof(&sr->this.client, &ta);
+	addrtot(&ta, 0, myclientmask_str, sizeof(myclientmask_str));
+
+	addrtot(&sr->that.host_addr, 0, peer_str, sizeof(peer_str));
+	idtoa(&sr->that.id, peerid_str, sizeof(peerid_str));
+	escape_metachar(peerid_str, secure_peerid_str, sizeof(secure_peerid_str));
+	subnettot(&sr->that.client, 0, peerclient_str, sizeof(peerclientnet_str));
+	networkof(&sr->that.client, &ta);
+	addrtot(&ta, 0, peerclientnet_str, sizeof(peerclientnet_str));
+	maskof(&sr->that.client, &ta);
+	addrtot(&ta, 0, peerclientmask_str, sizeof(peerclientmask_str));
+
+	for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	{
+	    pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+	    int pathlen;
+
+	    if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && same_id(&sr->that.id, &key->id)
+	    && trusted_ca(key->issuer, sr->that.ca, &pathlen))
+	    {
+		dntoa_or_null(peerca_str, BUF_LEN, key->issuer, "");
+		escape_metachar(peerca_str, secure_peerca_str, sizeof(secure_peerca_str));
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (-1 == snprintf(cmd, sizeof(cmd)
+	    , "2>&1 "	/* capture stderr along with stdout */
+	    "PLUTO_VERSION='1.1' "	/* change VERSION when interface spec changes */
+	    "PLUTO_VERB='%s%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_CONNECTION='%s' "
+	    "%s"	/* optional PLUTO_NEXT_HOP */
+	    "PLUTO_INTERFACE='%s' "
+	    "%s"	/* optional PLUTO_HOST_ACCESS */
+	    "PLUTO_REQID='%u' "
+	    "PLUTO_ME='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_MY_ID='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_MY_CLIENT='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_MY_PORT='%u' "
+	    "PLUTO_MY_PROTOCOL='%u' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_ID='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK='%s' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_PORT='%u' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_PROTOCOL='%u' "
+	    "PLUTO_PEER_CA='%s' "
+	    "%s"	/* optional PLUTO_MY_SRCIP */
+	    "%s"	/* actual script */
+	    , verb, verb_suffix
+	    , c->name
+	    , nexthop_str
+	    , c->interface->vname
+	    , sr->this.hostaccess? "PLUTO_HOST_ACCESS='1' " : ""
+	    , sr->reqid + 1	/* ESP requid */
+	    , me_str
+	    , secure_myid_str
+	    , myclient_str
+	    , myclientnet_str
+	    , myclientmask_str
+	    , sr->this.port
+	    , sr->this.protocol
+	    , peer_str
+	    , secure_peerid_str
+	    , peerclient_str
+	    , peerclientnet_str
+	    , peerclientmask_str
+	    , sr->that.port
+	    , sr->that.protocol
+	    , secure_peerca_str
+	    , srcip_str
+	    , sr->this.updown == NULL? DEFAULT_UPDOWN : sr->this.updown))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command too long!", verb, verb_suffix);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("executing %s%s: %s"
+	, verb, verb_suffix, cmd));
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    if (!no_klips)
+    {
+	/* invoke the script, catching stderr and stdout
+	 * It may be of concern that some file descriptors will
+	 * be inherited.  For the ones under our control, we
+	 * have done fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) to prevent this.
+	 * Any used by library routines (perhaps the resolver or syslog)
+	 * will remain.
+	 */
+	FILE *f = popen(cmd, "r");
+
+	if (f == NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to popen %s%s command", verb, verb_suffix);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* log any output */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    /* if response doesn't fit in this buffer, it will be folded */
+	    char resp[256];
+
+	    if (fgets(resp, sizeof(resp), f) == NULL)
+	    {
+		if (ferror(f))
+		{
+		    log_errno((e, "fgets failed on output of %s%s command"
+			, verb, verb_suffix));
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    passert(feof(f));
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		char *e = resp + strlen(resp);
+
+		if (e > resp && e[-1] == '\n')
+		    e[-1] = '\0';	/* trim trailing '\n' */
+		plog("%s%s output: %s", verb, verb_suffix, resp);
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* report on and react to return code */
+	{
+	    int r = pclose(f);
+
+	    if (r == -1)
+	    {
+		log_errno((e, "pclose failed for %s%s command"
+		    , verb, verb_suffix));
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    else if (WIFEXITED(r))
+	    {
+		if (WEXITSTATUS(r) != 0)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with status %d"
+			, verb, verb_suffix, WEXITSTATUS(r));
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else if (WIFSIGNALED(r))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with signal %d"
+		    , verb, verb_suffix, WTERMSIG(r));
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s%s command exited with unknown status %d"
+		    , verb, verb_suffix, r);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+#endif /* KLIPS */
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* Check that we can route (and eroute).  Diagnose if we cannot. */
+
+enum routability {
+    route_impossible = 0,
+    route_easy = 1,
+    route_nearconflict = 2,
+    route_farconflict = 3
+};
+
+static enum routability
+could_route(struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct spd_route *esr, *rosr;
+    struct connection *ero	/* who, if anyone, owns our eroute? */
+	, *ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, &ero, &esr); /* who owns our route? */
+
+    /* it makes no sense to route a connection that is ISAKMP-only */
+    if (!NEVER_NEGOTIATE(c->policy) && !HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(c->policy))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route an ISAKMP-only connection");
+	return route_impossible;
+    }
+
+    /* if this is a Road Warrior template, we cannot route.
+     * Opportunistic template is OK.
+     */
+    if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(c->policy & POLICY_OPPO))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route Road Warrior template");
+	return route_impossible;
+    }
+
+    /* if we don't know nexthop, we cannot route */
+    if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_nexthop))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_ROUTE, "cannot route connection without knowing our nexthop");
+	return route_impossible;
+    }
+
+    /* if routing would affect IKE messages, reject */
+    if (!no_klips
+    && c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT
+    && c->spd.this.host_port != IKE_UDP_PORT
+    && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot install route: peer is within its client");
+	return route_impossible;
+    }
+
+    /* If there is already a route for peer's client subnet
+     * and it disagrees about interface or nexthop, we cannot steal it.
+     * Note: if this connection is already routed (perhaps for another
+     * state object), the route will agree.
+     * This is as it should be -- it will arise during rekeying.
+     */
+    if (ro != NULL && !routes_agree(ro, c))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "cannot route -- route already in use for \"%s\""
+	    , ro->name);
+	return route_impossible;  /* another connection already
+				     using the eroute */
+    }
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    /* if there is an eroute for another connection, there is a problem */
+    if (ero != NULL && ero != c)
+    {
+	struct connection *ero2, *ero_top;
+	struct connection *inside, *outside;
+
+	/*
+	 * note, wavesec (PERMANENT) goes *outside* and
+	 * OE goes *inside* (TEMPLATE)
+	 */
+	inside = NULL;
+	outside= NULL;
+	if (ero->kind == CK_PERMANENT
+	   && c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	{
+	    outside = ero;
+	    inside = c;
+	}
+	else if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT
+		&& ero->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	{
+	    outside = c;
+	    inside = ero;
+	}
+
+	/* okay, check again, with correct order */
+	if (outside && outside->kind == CK_PERMANENT
+	    && inside && inside->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+	{
+	    char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
+
+	    /* this is a co-terminal attempt of the "near" kind. */
+	    /* when chaining, we chain from inside to outside */
+
+	    /* XXX permit multiple deep connections? */
+	    passert(inside->policy_next == NULL);
+
+	    inside->policy_next = outside;
+
+	    /* since we are going to steal the eroute from the secondary
+	     * policy, we need to make sure that it no longer thinks that
+	     * it owns the eroute.
+	     */
+	    outside->spd.eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+	    outside->spd.routing = RT_UNROUTED_KEYED;
+
+	    /* set the priority of the new eroute owner to be higher
+	     * than that of the current eroute owner
+	     */
+	    inside->prio = outside->prio + 1;
+
+	    fmt_conn_instance(inside, inst);
+
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		   , "conflict on eroute (%s), switching eroute to %s and linking %s"
+		   , inst, inside->name, outside->name);
+
+	    return route_nearconflict;
+	}
+
+	/* look along the chain of policies for one with the same name */
+	ero_top = ero;
+
+	for (ero2 = ero; ero2 != NULL; ero2 = ero->policy_next)
+	{
+	    if (ero2->kind == CK_TEMPLATE
+	    && streq(ero2->name, c->name))
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* If we fell of the end of the list, then we found no TEMPLATE
+	 * so there must be a conflict that we can't resolve.
+	 * As the names are not equal, then we aren't replacing/rekeying.
+	 */
+	if (ero2 == NULL)
+	{
+	    char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
+
+	    fmt_conn_instance(ero, inst);
+
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "cannot install eroute -- it is in use for \"%s\"%s #%lu"
+		, ero->name, inst, esr->eroute_owner);
+	    return FALSE;	/* another connection already using the eroute */
+	}
+    }
+#endif /* KLIPS */
+    return route_easy;
+}
+
+bool
+trap_connection(struct connection *c)
+{
+    switch (could_route(c))
+    {
+    case route_impossible:
+	return FALSE;
+
+    case route_nearconflict:
+    case route_easy:
+	/* RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL is treated specially: we don't override
+	 * because we don't want to lose track of the IPSEC_SAs etc.
+	 */
+	if (c->spd.routing < RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+	{
+	    return route_and_eroute(c, &c->spd, NULL);
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+
+    case route_farconflict:
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/* delete any eroute for a connection and unroute it if route isn't shared */
+void
+unroute_connection(struct connection *c)
+{
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+    enum routing_t cr;
+
+    for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+    {
+	cr = sr->routing;
+
+	if (erouted(cr))
+	{
+	    /* cannot handle a live one */
+	    passert(sr->routing != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	    shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_UNROUTED, ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+#endif
+	}
+
+	sr->routing = RT_UNROUTED;  /* do now so route_owner won't find us */
+
+	/* only unroute if no other connection shares it */
+	if (routed(cr) && route_owner(c, NULL, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+	    (void) do_command(c, sr, "unroute");
+    }
+}
+
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+
+static void
+set_text_said(char *text_said, const ip_address *dst, ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto)
+{
+    ip_said said;
+
+    initsaid(dst, spi, proto, &said);
+    satot(&said, 0, text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+}
+
+/* find an entry in the bare_shunt table.
+ * Trick: return a pointer to the pointer to the entry;
+ * this allows the entry to be deleted.
+ */
+static struct bare_shunt **
+bare_shunt_ptr(const ip_subnet *ours, const ip_subnet *his, int transport_proto)
+{
+    struct bare_shunt *p, **pp;
+
+    for (pp = &bare_shunts; (p = *pp) != NULL; pp = &p->next)
+    {
+	if (samesubnet(ours, &p->ours)
+	&& samesubnet(his, &p->his)
+	&& transport_proto == p->transport_proto
+	&& portof(&ours->addr) == portof(&p->ours.addr)
+	&& portof(&his->addr) == portof(&p->his.addr))
+	    return pp;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* free a bare_shunt entry, given a pointer to the pointer */
+static void
+free_bare_shunt(struct bare_shunt **pp)
+{
+    if (pp == NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("delete bare shunt: null pointer")
+	)
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct bare_shunt *p = *pp;
+
+	*pp = p->next;
+	DBG_bare_shunt("delete", p);
+	pfree(p->why);
+	pfree(p);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+show_shunt_status(void)
+{
+    struct bare_shunt *bs;
+
+    for (bs = bare_shunts; bs != NULL; bs = bs->next)
+    {
+	/* Print interesting fields.  Ignore count and last_active. */
+
+	int ourport = ntohs(portof(&bs->ours.addr));
+	int hisport = ntohs(portof(&bs->his.addr));
+	char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	char sat[SATOT_BUF];
+	char prio[POLICY_PRIO_BUF];
+
+	subnettot(&(bs)->ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+	subnettot(&(bs)->his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+	satot(&(bs)->said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
+	fmt_policy_prio(bs->policy_prio, prio);
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d %s    %s"
+	    , ourst, ourport, hist, hisport, sat, bs->transport_proto
+	    , prio, bs->why);
+    }
+    if (bare_shunts != NULL)
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+}
+
+/* Setup an IPsec route entry.
+ * op is one of the ERO_* operators.
+ */
+
+static bool
+raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
+	   , const ip_subnet *this_client
+	   , const ip_address *that_host
+	   , const ip_subnet *that_client
+	   , ipsec_spi_t spi
+	   , unsigned int proto
+	   , unsigned int satype
+	   , unsigned int transport_proto
+	   , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
+	   , time_t use_lifetime
+	   , unsigned int op
+	   , const char *opname USED_BY_DEBUG)
+{
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+
+    set_text_said(text_said, that_host, spi, proto);
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_KLIPS,
+	{
+	    int sport = ntohs(portof(&this_client->addr));
+	    int dport = ntohs(portof(&that_client->addr));
+	    char mybuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	    char peerbuf[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+	    subnettot(this_client, 0, mybuf, sizeof(mybuf));
+	    subnettot(that_client, 0, peerbuf, sizeof(peerbuf));
+	    DBG_log("%s eroute %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d"
+		, opname, mybuf, sport, peerbuf, dport
+		, text_said, transport_proto);
+	});
+
+    return kernel_ops->raw_eroute(this_host, this_client
+	, that_host, that_client, spi, satype, transport_proto, proto_info
+	, use_lifetime, op, text_said);
+}
+
+/* test to see if %hold remains */
+bool
+has_bare_hold(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst, int transport_proto)
+{
+    ip_subnet this_client, that_client;
+    struct bare_shunt **bspp;
+
+    passert(addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst));
+    happy(addrtosubnet(src, &this_client));
+    happy(addrtosubnet(dst, &that_client));
+    bspp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_client, &that_client, transport_proto);
+    return bspp != NULL
+	&& (*bspp)->said.proto == SA_INT && (*bspp)->said.spi == htonl(SPI_HOLD);
+}
+
+
+/* Replace (or delete) a shunt that is in the bare_shunts table.
+ * Issues the PF_KEY commands and updates the bare_shunts table.
+ */
+bool
+replace_bare_shunt(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst
+		   , policy_prio_t policy_prio
+		   , ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi	/* in host order! */
+		   , bool repl	/* if TRUE, replace; if FALSE, delete */
+		   , unsigned int transport_proto
+		   , const char *why)
+{
+    ip_subnet this_client, that_client;
+    ip_subnet this_broad_client, that_broad_client;
+    const ip_address *null_host = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(src))->any;
+
+    passert(addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst));
+    happy(addrtosubnet(src, &this_client));
+    happy(addrtosubnet(dst, &that_client));
+    this_broad_client = this_client;
+    that_broad_client = that_client;
+    setportof(0, &this_broad_client.addr);
+    setportof(0, &that_broad_client.addr);
+
+    if (repl)
+    {
+	struct bare_shunt **bs_pp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_broad_client
+						 , &that_broad_client, 0);
+
+	/* is there already a broad host-to-host bare shunt? */
+	if (bs_pp == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (raw_eroute(null_host, &this_broad_client, null_host, &that_broad_client
+			   , htonl(shunt_spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+			   , 0, null_proto_info
+			   , SHUNT_PATIENCE, ERO_ADD, why))
+	    {
+		struct bare_shunt *bs = alloc_thing(struct bare_shunt, "bare shunt");
+
+		bs->ours = this_broad_client;
+		bs->his =  that_broad_client;
+		bs->transport_proto = 0;
+		bs->said.proto = SA_INT;
+		bs->why = clone_str(why, "bare shunt story");
+		bs->policy_prio = policy_prio;
+		bs->said.spi = htonl(shunt_spi);
+		bs->said.dst = *null_host;
+		bs->count = 0;
+		bs->last_activity = now();
+		bs->next = bare_shunts;
+		bare_shunts = bs;
+		DBG_bare_shunt("add", bs);
+	    }
+	}
+	shunt_spi = SPI_HOLD;
+    }
+
+    if (raw_eroute(null_host, &this_client, null_host, &that_client
+		   , htonl(shunt_spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+		   , transport_proto, null_proto_info
+		   , SHUNT_PATIENCE, ERO_DELETE, why))
+    {
+	struct bare_shunt **bs_pp = bare_shunt_ptr(&this_client, &that_client
+					, transport_proto);
+
+	/* delete bare eroute */
+	free_bare_shunt(bs_pp);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+static bool
+eroute_connection(struct spd_route *sr
+, ipsec_spi_t spi, unsigned int proto, unsigned int satype
+, const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
+, unsigned int op, const char *opname)
+{
+    const ip_address *peer = &sr->that.host_addr;
+    char buf2[256];
+
+    snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2)
+	     , "eroute_connection %s", opname);
+
+    if (proto == SA_INT)
+	peer = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(peer))->any;
+
+    return raw_eroute(&sr->this.host_addr, &sr->this.client
+		      , peer
+		      , &sr->that.client
+		      , spi, proto, satype
+		      , sr->this.protocol, proto_info, 0, op, buf2);
+}
+
+/* assign a bare hold to a connection */
+
+bool
+assign_hold(struct connection *c USED_BY_DEBUG
+	    , struct spd_route *sr
+	    , int transport_proto
+	    , const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst)
+{
+    /* either the automatically installed %hold eroute is broad enough
+     * or we try to add a broader one and delete the automatic one.
+     * Beware: this %hold might be already handled, but still squeak
+     * through because of a race.
+     */
+    enum routing_t ro = sr->routing	/* routing, old */
+	, rn = ro;			/* routing, new */
+
+    passert(LHAS(LELEM(CK_PERMANENT) | LELEM(CK_INSTANCE), c->kind));
+    /* figure out what routing should become */
+    switch (ro)
+    {
+    case RT_UNROUTED:
+	rn = RT_UNROUTED_HOLD;
+	break;
+    case RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE:
+	rn = RT_ROUTED_HOLD;
+	break;
+    default:
+	/* no change: this %hold is old news and should just be deleted */
+	break;
+    }
+
+    /* we need a broad %hold, not the narrow one.
+     * First we ensure that there is a broad %hold.
+     * There may already be one (race condition): no need to create one.
+     * There may already be a %trap: replace it.
+     * There may not be any broad eroute: add %hold.
+     * Once the broad %hold is in place, delete the narrow one.
+     */
+    if (rn != ro)
+    {
+	if (erouted(ro)
+	? !eroute_connection(sr, htonl(SPI_HOLD), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+		, null_proto_info
+		, ERO_REPLACE, "replace %trap with broad %hold")
+	: !eroute_connection(sr, htonl(SPI_HOLD), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+		, null_proto_info
+		, ERO_ADD, "add broad %hold"))
+	{
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+    if (!replace_bare_shunt(src, dst, BOTTOM_PRIO, SPI_HOLD, FALSE
+    , transport_proto, "delete narrow %hold"))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    sr->routing = rn;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* install or remove eroute for SA Group */
+static bool
+sag_eroute(struct state *st, struct spd_route *sr
+	   , unsigned op, const char *opname)
+{
+    u_int inner_proto = 0;
+    u_int inner_satype = 0;
+    ipsec_spi_t inner_spi = 0;
+    struct pfkey_proto_info proto_info[4];
+    int i;
+    bool tunnel;
+
+    /* figure out the SPI and protocol (in two forms)
+     * for the innermost transformation.
+     */
+
+    i = sizeof(proto_info) / sizeof(proto_info[0]) - 1;
+    proto_info[i].proto = 0;
+    tunnel = FALSE;
+
+    if (st->st_ah.present)
+    {
+	inner_spi = st->st_ah.attrs.spi;
+	inner_proto = SA_AH;
+	inner_satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
+
+	i--;
+	proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+	proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation;
+	tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+	proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid;
+    }
+
+    if (st->st_esp.present)
+    {
+	inner_spi = st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+	inner_proto = SA_ESP;
+	inner_satype = SADB_SATYPE_ESP;
+
+	i--;
+	proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+	proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+	tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+	proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid + 1;
+    }
+
+    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+    {
+	inner_spi = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi;
+	inner_proto = SA_COMP;
+	inner_satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP;
+
+	i--;
+	proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
+	proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation;
+	tunnel |= proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+	proto_info[i].reqid = sr->reqid + 2;
+    }
+
+    if (i == sizeof(proto_info) / sizeof(proto_info[0]) - 1)
+    {
+	impossible();	/* no transform at all! */
+    }
+
+    if (tunnel)
+    {
+	int j;
+
+	inner_spi = st->st_tunnel_out_spi;
+	inner_proto = SA_IPIP;
+	inner_satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
+
+	proto_info[i].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+	for (j = i + 1; proto_info[j].proto; j++)
+	{
+	    proto_info[j].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return eroute_connection(sr
+	, inner_spi, inner_proto, inner_satype, proto_info + i
+	, op, opname);
+}
+
+/* compute a (host-order!) SPI to implement the policy in connection c */
+ipsec_spi_t
+shunt_policy_spi(struct connection *c, bool prospective)
+{
+    /* note: these are in host order :-( */
+    static const ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi[] =
+    {
+	SPI_TRAP,	/* --initiateontraffic */
+	SPI_PASS,	/* --pass */
+	SPI_DROP,	/* --drop */
+	SPI_REJECT,	/* --reject */
+    };
+
+    static const ipsec_spi_t fail_spi[] =
+    {
+	0,	/* --none*/
+	SPI_PASS,	/* --failpass */
+	SPI_DROP,	/* --faildrop */
+	SPI_REJECT,	/* --failreject */
+    };
+
+    return prospective
+	? shunt_spi[(c->policy & POLICY_SHUNT_MASK) >> POLICY_SHUNT_SHIFT]
+	: fail_spi[(c->policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) >> POLICY_FAIL_SHIFT];
+}
+
+/* Add/replace/delete a shunt eroute.
+ * Such an eroute determines the fate of packets without the use
+ * of any SAs.  These are defaults, in effect.
+ * If a negotiation has not been attempted, use %trap.
+ * If negotiation has failed, the choice between %trap/%pass/%drop/%reject
+ * is specified in the policy of connection c.
+ */
+static bool
+shunt_eroute(struct connection *c
+, struct spd_route *sr
+, enum routing_t rt_kind
+, unsigned int op, const char *opname)
+{
+    /* We are constructing a special SAID for the eroute.
+     * The destination doesn't seem to matter, but the family does.
+     * The protocol is SA_INT -- mark this as shunt.
+     * The satype has no meaning, but is required for PF_KEY header!
+     * The SPI signifies the kind of shunt.
+     */
+    ipsec_spi_t spi = shunt_policy_spi(c, rt_kind == RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE);
+    bool ok;
+
+    if (spi == 0)
+    {
+	/* we're supposed to end up with no eroute: rejig op and opname */
+	switch (op)
+	{
+	case ERO_REPLACE:
+	    /* replace with nothing == delete */
+	    op = ERO_DELETE;
+	    opname = "delete";
+	    break;
+	case ERO_ADD:
+	    /* add nothing == do nothing */
+	    return TRUE;
+	case ERO_DELETE:
+	    /* delete remains delete */
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    bad_case(op);
+	}
+    }
+    if (sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED && c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE)
+    {
+	/* We think that we have an eroute, but we don't.
+	 * Adjust the request and account for eclipses.
+	 */
+	passert(eclipsable(sr));
+	switch (op)
+	{
+	case ERO_REPLACE:
+	    /* really an add */
+	    op = ERO_ADD;
+	    opname = "replace eclipsed";
+	    eclipse_count--;
+	    break;
+	case ERO_DELETE:
+	    /* delete unnecessary: we don't actually have an eroute */
+	    eclipse_count--;
+	    return TRUE;
+	case ERO_ADD:
+	default:
+	    bad_case(op);
+	}
+    }
+    else if (eclipse_count > 0 && op == ERO_DELETE && eclipsable(sr))
+    {
+	/* maybe we are uneclipsing something */
+	struct spd_route *esr;
+	struct connection *ue = eclipsed(c, &esr);
+
+	if (ue != NULL)
+	{
+	    esr->routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+	    return shunt_eroute(ue, esr
+				, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE, ERO_REPLACE, "restoring eclipsed");
+	}
+    }
+
+    ok = TRUE;
+    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute)
+    {
+	ok = raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
+	    , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
+	    , htonl(spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+	    , 0, null_proto_info, 0
+	    , op | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT), opname);
+    }
+    return eroute_connection(sr, htonl(spi), SA_INT, SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+	, null_proto_info, op, opname) && ok;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * This is only called when s is a likely SAID with  trailing protocol i.e.
+ * it has the form :-
+ *
+ *   %<keyword>:p
+ *   <ip-proto><spi>@a.b.c.d:p
+ *
+ * The task here is to remove the ":p" part so that the rest can be read
+ * by another routine.
+ */
+static const char *
+read_proto(const char * s, size_t * len, int * transport_proto)
+{
+    const char * p;
+    const char * ugh;
+    unsigned long proto;
+    size_t l;
+
+    l = *len;
+    p = memchr(s, ':', l);
+    if (p == 0) {
+        *transport_proto = 0;
+        return 0;
+    }
+    ugh = ttoul(p+1, l-((p-s)+1), 10, &proto);
+    if (ugh != 0)
+        return ugh;
+    if (proto > 65535)
+        return "protocol number is too large, legal range is 0-65535";
+    *len = p-s;
+    *transport_proto = proto;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/* scan /proc/net/ipsec_eroute every once in a while, looking for:
+ *
+ * - %hold shunts of which Pluto isn't aware.  This situation could
+ *   be caused by lost ACQUIRE messages.  When found, they will
+ *   added to orphan_holds.  This in turn will lead to Opportunistic
+ *   initiation.
+ *
+ * - other kinds of shunts that haven't been used recently.  These will be
+ *   deleted.  They represent OE failures.
+ *
+ * - recording recent uses of tunnel eroutes so that rekeying decisions
+ *   can be made for OE connections.
+ *
+ * Here are some sample lines:
+ * 10         10.3.2.1.0/24    -> 0.0.0.0/0          => %trap
+ * 259        10.3.2.1.115/32  -> 10.19.75.161/32    => tun0x1002@10.19.75.145
+ * 71         10.44.73.97/32   -> 0.0.0.0/0          => %trap
+ * 4119       10.44.73.97/32   -> 10.114.121.41/32   => %pass
+ * Newer versions of KLIPS start each line with a 32-bit packet count.
+ * If available, the count is used to detect whether a %pass shunt is in use.
+ *
+ * NOTE: execution time is quadratic in the number of eroutes since the
+ * searching for each is sequential.  If this becomes a problem, faster
+ * searches could be implemented (hash or radix tree, for example).
+ */
+void
+scan_proc_shunts(void)
+{
+    static const char procname[] = "/proc/net/ipsec_eroute";
+    FILE *f;
+    time_t nw = now();
+    int lino;
+    struct eroute_info *expired = NULL;
+
+    event_schedule(EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN, SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL, NULL);
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+    	DBG_log("scanning for shunt eroutes")
+    )
+
+    /* free any leftover entries: they will be refreshed if still current */
+    while (orphaned_holds != NULL)
+    {
+	struct eroute_info *p = orphaned_holds;
+
+	orphaned_holds = p->next;
+	pfree(orphaned_holds);
+    }
+
+    /* decode the /proc file.  Don't do anything strenuous to it
+     * (certainly no PF_KEY stuff) to minimize the chance that it
+     * might change underfoot.
+     */
+
+    f = fopen(procname, "r");
+    if (f == NULL)
+	return;
+
+    /* for each line... */
+    for (lino = 1; ; lino++)
+    {
+	unsigned char buf[1024];  /* should be big enough */
+	chunk_t field[10];	  /* 10 is loose upper bound */
+	chunk_t *ff = NULL;	  /* fixed fields (excluding optional count) */
+	int fi;
+	struct eroute_info eri;
+	char *cp;
+	err_t context = ""
+	    , ugh = NULL;
+
+	cp = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f);
+	if (cp == NULL)
+	    break;
+
+	/* break out each field
+	 * Note: if there are too many fields, just stop;
+	 * it will be diagnosed a little later.
+	 */
+	for (fi = 0; fi < (int)elemsof(field); fi++)
+	{
+	    static const char sep[] = " \t\n";	/* field-separating whitespace */
+	    size_t w;
+
+	    cp += strspn(cp, sep);	/* find start of field */
+	    w = strcspn(cp, sep);	/* find width of field */
+	    setchunk(field[fi], cp, w);
+	    cp += w;
+	    if (w == 0)
+		break;
+	}
+
+	/* This odd do-hickey is to share error reporting code.
+	 * A break will get to that common code.  The setting
+	 * of "ugh" and "context" parameterize it.
+	 */
+	do {
+	    /* Old entries have no packet count; new ones do.
+	     * check if things are as they should be.
+	     */
+	    if (fi == 5)
+		ff = &field[0];	/* old form, with no count */
+	    else if (fi == 6)
+		ff = &field[1];	/* new form, with count */
+	    else
+	    {
+		ugh = "has wrong number of fields";
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    if (ff[1].len != 2
+	    || strncmp(ff[1].ptr, "->", 2) != 0
+	    || ff[3].len != 2
+	    || strncmp(ff[3].ptr, "=>", 2) != 0)
+	    {
+		ugh = "is missing -> or =>";
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    /* actually digest fields of interest */
+
+	    /* packet count */
+
+	    eri.count = 0;
+	    if (ff != field)
+	    {
+		context = "count field is malformed: ";
+		ugh = ttoul(field[0].ptr, field[0].len, 10, &eri.count);
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		    break;
+	    }
+
+	    /* our client */
+
+	    context = "source subnet field malformed: ";
+	    ugh = ttosubnet(ff[0].ptr, ff[0].len, AF_INET, &eri.ours);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		break;
+
+	    /* his client */
+
+	    context = "destination subnet field malformed: ";
+	    ugh = ttosubnet(ff[2].ptr, ff[2].len, AF_INET, &eri.his);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		break;
+
+	    /* SAID */
+
+	    context = "SA ID field malformed: ";
+            ugh = read_proto(ff[4].ptr, &ff[4].len, &eri.transport_proto);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		break;
+	    ugh = ttosa(ff[4].ptr, ff[4].len, &eri.said);
+	} while (FALSE);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("INTERNAL ERROR: %s line %d %s%s"
+		, procname, lino, context, ugh);
+	    continue;	/* ignore rest of line */
+	}
+
+	/* Now we have decoded eroute, let's consider it.
+	 * For shunt eroutes:
+	 *
+	 * %hold: if not known, add to orphaned_holds list for initiation
+	 *    because ACQUIRE might have been lost.
+	 *
+	 * %pass, %drop, %reject: determine if idle; if so, blast it away.
+	 *    Can occur bare (if DNS provided insufficient information)
+	 *    or with a connection (failure context).
+	 *    Could even be installed by ipsec manual.
+	 *
+	 * %trap: always welcome.
+	 *
+	 * For other eroutes: find state and record count change
+	 */
+	if (eri.said.proto == SA_INT)
+	{
+	    /* shunt eroute */
+	    switch (ntohl(eri.said.spi))
+	    {
+	    case SPI_HOLD:
+		if (bare_shunt_ptr(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.transport_proto) == NULL
+		&& shunt_owner(&eri.ours, &eri.his) == NULL)
+		{
+		    int ourport = ntohs(portof(&eri.ours.addr));
+		    int hisport = ntohs(portof(&eri.his.addr));
+		    char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		    char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+		    char sat[SATOT_BUF];
+
+		    subnettot(&eri.ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+		    subnettot(&eri.his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+		    satot(&eri.said, 0, sat, sizeof(sat));
+
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("add orphaned shunt %s:%d -> %s:%d => %s:%d"
+			    , ourst, ourport, hist, hisport, sat, eri.transport_proto)
+		     )
+		    eri.next = orphaned_holds;
+		    orphaned_holds = clone_thing(eri, "orphaned %hold");
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case SPI_PASS:
+	    case SPI_DROP:
+	    case SPI_REJECT:
+		/* nothing sensible to do if we don't have counts */
+		if (ff != field)
+		{
+		    struct bare_shunt **bs_pp
+			= bare_shunt_ptr(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.transport_proto);
+
+		    if (bs_pp != NULL)
+		    {
+			struct bare_shunt *bs = *bs_pp;
+
+			if (eri.count != bs->count)
+			{
+			    bs->count = eri.count;
+			    bs->last_activity = nw;
+			}
+			else if (nw - bs->last_activity > SHUNT_PATIENCE)
+			{
+			    eri.next = expired;
+			    expired = clone_thing(eri, "expired %pass");
+			}
+		    }
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case SPI_TRAP:
+		break;
+
+	    default:
+		bad_case(ntohl(eri.said.spi));
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* regular (non-shunt) eroute */
+	    state_eroute_usage(&eri.ours, &eri.his, eri.count, nw);
+	}
+    }	/* for each line */
+    fclose(f);
+
+    /* Now that we've finished processing the /proc file,
+     * it is safe to delete the expired %pass shunts.
+     */
+    while (expired != NULL)
+    {
+	struct eroute_info *p = expired;
+	ip_address src, dst;
+
+	networkof(&p->ours, &src);
+	networkof(&p->his, &dst);
+	(void) replace_bare_shunt(&src, &dst
+	    , BOTTOM_PRIO	/* not used because we are deleting.  This value is a filler */
+	    , SPI_PASS	/* not used because we are deleting.  This value is a filler */
+	    , FALSE, p->transport_proto, "delete expired bare shunts");
+	expired = p->next;
+	pfree(p);
+    }
+}
+
+static bool
+del_spi(ipsec_spi_t spi, int proto
+, const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dest)
+{
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+    struct kernel_sa sa;
+
+    set_text_said(text_said, dest, spi, proto);
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("delete %s", text_said));
+
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.spi = spi;
+    sa.proto = proto;
+    sa.src = src;
+    sa.dst = dest;
+    sa.text_said = text_said;
+
+    return kernel_ops->del_sa(&sa);
+}
+
+/* Setup a pair of SAs. Code taken from setsa.c and spigrp.c, in
+ * ipsec-0.5.
+ */
+
+static bool
+setup_half_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound)
+{
+    /* Build an inbound or outbound SA */
+
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    ip_subnet src, dst;
+    ip_subnet src_client, dst_client;
+    ipsec_spi_t inner_spi = 0;
+    u_int proto = 0;
+    u_int satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
+    bool replace;
+
+    /* SPIs, saved for spigrouping or undoing, if necessary */
+    struct kernel_sa
+	said[EM_MAXRELSPIS],
+	*said_next = said;
+
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+    int encapsulation;
+
+    replace = inbound && (kernel_ops->get_spi != NULL);
+
+    src.maskbits = 0;
+    dst.maskbits = 0;
+
+    if (inbound)
+    {
+	src.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	dst.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr;
+	src_client = c->spd.that.client;
+	dst_client = c->spd.this.client;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	src.addr = c->spd.this.host_addr,
+	dst.addr = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	src_client = c->spd.this.client;
+	dst_client = c->spd.that.client;
+    }
+
+    encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+    if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	|| st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	|| st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+    {
+	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+    }
+
+    memset(said, 0, sizeof(said));
+
+    /* If we are tunnelling, set up IP in IP pseudo SA */
+
+    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute)
+    {
+	inner_spi = 256;
+	proto = SA_IPIP;
+	satype = SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC;
+    }
+    else if (encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+    {
+	/* XXX hack alert -- we SHOULD NOT HAVE TO HAVE A DIFFERENT SPI
+	 * XXX FOR IP-in-IP ENCAPSULATION!
+	 */
+
+	ipsec_spi_t ipip_spi;
+
+	/* Allocate an SPI for the tunnel.
+	 * Since our peer will never see this,
+	 * and it comes from its own number space,
+	 * it is purely a local implementation wart.
+	 */
+	{
+	    static ipsec_spi_t last_tunnel_spi = IPSEC_DOI_SPI_OUR_MIN;
+
+	    ipip_spi = htonl(++last_tunnel_spi);
+	    if (inbound)
+		st->st_tunnel_in_spi = ipip_spi;
+	    else
+		st->st_tunnel_out_spi = ipip_spi;
+	}
+
+	set_text_said(text_said
+	    , &c->spd.that.host_addr, ipip_spi, SA_IPIP);
+
+	said_next->src = &src.addr;
+	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+	said_next->spi = ipip_spi;
+	said_next->satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
+	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+
+	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+	    goto fail;
+
+	said_next++;
+
+	inner_spi = ipip_spi;
+	proto = SA_IPIP;
+	satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP;
+    }
+
+    /* set up IPCOMP SA, if any */
+
+    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+    {
+	ipsec_spi_t ipcomp_spi = inbound? st->st_ipcomp.our_spi : st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi;
+	unsigned compalg;
+
+	switch (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.transid)
+	{
+	    case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:
+		compalg = SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE;
+		break;
+
+	    default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPCOMP transform %s not implemented"
+		    , enum_name(&ipcomp_transformid_names, st->st_ipcomp.attrs.transid));
+		goto fail;
+	}
+
+	set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, ipcomp_spi, SA_COMP);
+
+	said_next->src = &src.addr;
+	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+	said_next->spi = ipcomp_spi;
+	said_next->satype = SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP;
+	said_next->compalg = compalg;
+	said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
+	said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid + 2;
+	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+
+	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+	    goto fail;
+
+	said_next++;
+
+	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+    }
+
+    /* set up ESP SA, if any */
+
+    if (st->st_esp.present)
+    {
+	ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = inbound? st->st_esp.our_spi : st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+	u_char *esp_dst_keymat = inbound? st->st_esp.our_keymat : st->st_esp.peer_keymat;
+	const struct esp_info *ei;
+	u_int16_t key_len;
+
+	static const struct esp_info esp_info[] = {
+	    { ESP_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
+		0, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
+		SADB_EALG_NULL, SADB_AALG_MD5_HMAC },
+	    { ESP_NULL, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
+		0, HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN,
+		SADB_EALG_NULL, SADB_AALG_SHA1_HMAC },
+
+	    { ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,
+		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, 0,
+		SADB_EALG_DES_CBC, SADB_AALG_NONE },
+	    { ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
+		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
+		SADB_EALG_DES_CBC, SADB_AALG_MD5_HMAC },
+	    { ESP_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
+		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN, SADB_EALG_DES_CBC, SADB_AALG_SHA1_HMAC },
+
+	    { ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,
+		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, 0,
+		SADB_EALG_3DES_CBC, SADB_AALG_NONE },
+	    { ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5,
+		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN,
+		SADB_EALG_3DES_CBC, SADB_AALG_MD5_HMAC },
+	    { ESP_3DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1,
+		DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3, HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN,
+		SADB_EALG_3DES_CBC, SADB_AALG_SHA1_HMAC },
+	};
+
+	u_int8_t natt_type = 0;
+	u_int16_t natt_sport = 0;
+	u_int16_t natt_dport = 0;
+	ip_address natt_oa;
+
+	if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	{
+	    natt_type = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING) ?
+		ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_ESP : ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE;
+	    natt_sport = inbound? c->spd.that.host_port : c->spd.this.host_port;
+	    natt_dport = inbound? c->spd.this.host_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
+	    natt_oa = st->nat_oa;
+	}
+
+	for (ei = esp_info; ; ei++)
+	{
+	    if (ei == &esp_info[elemsof(esp_info)])
+	    {
+		/* Check for additional kernel alg */
+#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
+		if ((ei=kernel_alg_esp_info(st->st_esp.attrs.transid, 
+					st->st_esp.attrs.auth))!=NULL) {
+			break;
+		}
+#endif
+
+		/* note: enum_show may use a static buffer, so two
+		 * calls in one printf would be a mistake.
+		 * enum_name does the same job, without a static buffer,
+		 * assuming the name will be found.
+		 */
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP transform %s / auth %s not implemented yet"
+		    , enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid)
+		    , enum_name(&auth_alg_names, st->st_esp.attrs.auth));
+		goto fail;
+	    }
+
+	    if (st->st_esp.attrs.transid == ei->transid
+	    && st->st_esp.attrs.auth == ei->auth)
+		break;
+	}
+
+	key_len = st->st_esp.attrs.key_len/8;
+	if (key_len)
+	{
+	    /* XXX: must change to check valid _range_ key_len */
+	    if (key_len > ei->enckeylen)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP transform %s passed key_len=%d > %d",
+		    enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid),
+		    (int)key_len, (int)ei->enckeylen);
+		goto fail;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    key_len = ei->enckeylen;
+	}
+	/* Grrrrr.... f*cking 7 bits jurassic algos  */
+
+	/* 168 bits in kernel, need 192 bits for keymat_len */
+	if (ei->transid == ESP_3DES && key_len == 21) 
+	    key_len = 24;
+
+	/* 56 bits in kernel, need 64 bits for keymat_len */
+	if (ei->transid == ESP_DES && key_len == 7) 
+	    key_len = 8;
+
+	/* divide up keying material */
+	/* passert(st->st_esp.keymat_len == ei->enckeylen + ei->authkeylen); */
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS|DBG_CONTROL|DBG_PARSING, 
+	    if(st->st_esp.keymat_len != key_len + ei->authkeylen)
+		DBG_log("keymat_len=%d key_len=%d authkeylen=%d",
+			st->st_esp.keymat_len, (int)key_len, (int)ei->authkeylen);
+	)
+	passert(st->st_esp.keymat_len == key_len + ei->authkeylen);
+
+	set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, esp_spi, SA_ESP);
+
+	said_next->src = &src.addr;
+	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+	said_next->spi = esp_spi;
+	said_next->satype = SADB_SATYPE_ESP;
+	said_next->replay_window = (kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS) ? REPLAY_WINDOW : REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM;
+	said_next->authalg = ei->authalg;
+	said_next->authkeylen = ei->authkeylen;
+	/* said_next->authkey = esp_dst_keymat + ei->enckeylen; */
+	said_next->authkey = esp_dst_keymat + key_len;
+	said_next->encalg = ei->encryptalg;
+	/* said_next->enckeylen = ei->enckeylen; */
+	said_next->enckeylen = key_len;
+	said_next->enckey = esp_dst_keymat;
+	said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
+	said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid + 1;
+	said_next->natt_sport = natt_sport;
+	said_next->natt_dport = natt_dport;
+	said_next->transid = st->st_esp.attrs.transid;
+	said_next->natt_type = natt_type;
+	said_next->natt_oa = &natt_oa;
+	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+
+	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+	    goto fail;
+
+	said_next++;
+
+	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+    }
+
+    /* set up AH SA, if any */
+
+    if (st->st_ah.present)
+    {
+	ipsec_spi_t ah_spi = inbound? st->st_ah.our_spi : st->st_ah.attrs.spi;
+	u_char *ah_dst_keymat = inbound? st->st_ah.our_keymat : st->st_ah.peer_keymat;
+
+	unsigned char authalg;
+
+	switch (st->st_ah.attrs.auth)
+	{
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+	    authalg = SADB_AALG_MD5_HMAC;
+	    break;
+
+	case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+	    authalg = SADB_AALG_SHA1_HMAC;
+	    break;
+
+	default:
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s not implemented yet"
+		, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, st->st_ah.attrs.auth));
+	    goto fail;
+	}
+
+	set_text_said(text_said, &dst.addr, ah_spi, SA_AH);
+
+	said_next->src = &src.addr;
+	said_next->dst = &dst.addr;
+	said_next->src_client = &src_client;
+	said_next->dst_client = &dst_client;
+	said_next->spi = ah_spi;
+	said_next->satype = SADB_SATYPE_AH;
+	said_next->replay_window = (kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS) ? REPLAY_WINDOW : REPLAY_WINDOW_XFRM;
+	said_next->authalg = authalg;
+	said_next->authkeylen = st->st_ah.keymat_len;
+	said_next->authkey = ah_dst_keymat;
+	said_next->encapsulation = encapsulation;
+	said_next->reqid = c->spd.reqid;
+	said_next->text_said = text_said;
+
+	if (!kernel_ops->add_sa(said_next, replace))
+	    goto fail;
+
+	said_next++;
+
+	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+    }
+
+    if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+    || st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+    || st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+    {
+	encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+    }
+
+    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute ? c->spd.eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY
+	: encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+    {
+	/* If inbound, and policy does not specifie DISABLEARRIVALCHECK,
+	 * tell KLIPS to enforce the IP addresses appropriate for this tunnel.
+	 * Note reversed ends.
+	 * Not much to be done on failure.
+	 */
+	if (inbound && (c->policy & POLICY_DISABLEARRIVALCHECK) == 0)
+	{
+	    struct pfkey_proto_info proto_info[4];
+	    int i = 0;
+	    
+	    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	    {
+		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation;
+		proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid + 2;
+		i++;
+	    }
+	    
+	    if (st->st_esp.present)
+	    {
+		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+		proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid + 1;
+		i++;
+	    }
+	    
+	    if (st->st_ah.present)
+	    {
+		proto_info[i].proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation = st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation;
+		proto_info[i].reqid = c->spd.reqid;
+		i++;
+	    }
+	    
+	    proto_info[i].proto = 0;
+	    
+	    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute
+		&& encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+	    {
+		proto_info[0].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		for (i = 1; proto_info[i].proto; i++)
+		{
+		    proto_info[i].encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+		}
+	    }
+	    
+	    /* MCR - should be passed a spd_eroute structure here */
+	    (void) raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
+			      , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
+			      , inner_spi, proto, satype, c->spd.this.protocol
+			      , proto_info, 0
+			      , ERO_ADD_INBOUND, "add inbound");
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* If there are multiple SPIs, group them. */
+    
+    if (kernel_ops->grp_sa && said_next > &said[1])
+    {
+	struct kernel_sa *s;
+	
+	/* group SAs, two at a time, inner to outer (backwards in said[])
+	 * The grouping is by pairs.  So if said[] contains ah esp ipip,
+	 * the grouping would be ipip:esp, esp:ah.
+	 */
+	for (s = said; s < said_next-1; s++)
+	{
+	    char
+		text_said0[SATOT_BUF],
+		text_said1[SATOT_BUF];
+
+	    /* group s[1] and s[0], in that order */
+	    
+	    set_text_said(text_said0, s[0].dst, s[0].spi, s[0].proto);
+	    set_text_said(text_said1, s[1].dst, s[1].spi, s[1].proto);
+	    
+	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("grouping %s and %s", text_said1, text_said0));
+	    
+	    s[0].text_said = text_said0;
+	    s[1].text_said = text_said1;
+	    
+	    if (!kernel_ops->grp_sa(s + 1, s))
+		goto fail;
+	}
+	/* could update said, but it will not be used */
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;
+
+fail:
+    {
+	/* undo the done SPIs */
+	while (said_next-- != said)
+	    (void) del_spi(said_next->spi, said_next->proto
+		, &src.addr, said_next->dst);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* teardown_ipsec_sa is a canibalized version of setup_ipsec_sa */
+
+static bool
+teardown_half_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound)
+{
+    /* We need to delete AH, ESP, and IP in IP SPIs.
+     * But if there is more than one, they have been grouped
+     * so deleting any one will do.  So we just delete the
+     * first one found.  It may or may not be the only one.
+     */
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    struct {
+	unsigned proto;
+	struct ipsec_proto_info *info;
+    } protos[4];
+    int i;
+    bool result;
+
+    i = 0;
+    if (kernel_ops->inbound_eroute && inbound
+	&& c->spd.eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
+    {
+	(void) raw_eroute(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client
+	    , &c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.this.client
+	    , 256, IPSEC_PROTO_ANY, SADB_SATYPE_UNSPEC, c->spd.this.protocol
+	    , null_proto_info, 0
+	    , ERO_DEL_INBOUND, "delete inbound");
+    }
+
+    if (!kernel_ops->grp_sa)
+    {
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+	    protos[i].info = &st->st_ah;
+	    protos[i].proto = SA_AH;
+	    i++;
+	}
+
+	if (st->st_esp.present)
+	{
+	    protos[i].info = &st->st_esp;
+	    protos[i].proto = SA_ESP;
+	    i++;
+	}
+
+	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	{
+	    protos[i].info = &st->st_ipcomp;
+	    protos[i].proto = SA_COMP;
+	    i++;
+	}
+    }
+    else if (st->st_ah.present)
+    {
+	protos[i].info = &st->st_ah;
+	protos[i].proto = SA_AH;
+	i++;
+    }
+    else if (st->st_esp.present)
+    {
+	protos[i].info = &st->st_esp;
+	protos[i].proto = SA_ESP;
+	i++;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	impossible();	/* neither AH nor ESP in outbound SA bundle! */
+    }
+    protos[i].proto = 0;
+
+    result = TRUE;
+    for (i = 0; protos[i].proto; i++)
+    {
+	unsigned proto = protos[i].proto;
+	ipsec_spi_t spi;
+	const ip_address *src, *dst;
+
+	if (inbound)
+	{
+	    spi = protos[i].info->our_spi;
+	    src = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	    dst = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    spi = protos[i].info->attrs.spi;
+	    src = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+	    dst = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	}
+
+	result &= del_spi(spi, proto, src, dst);
+    }
+    return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get information about a given sa
+ */
+bool
+get_sa_info(struct state *st, bool inbound, u_int *bytes, time_t *use_time)
+{
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+    struct kernel_sa sa;
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    *use_time = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+
+    if (kernel_ops->get_sa == NULL || !st->st_esp.present)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.proto = SA_ESP;
+
+    if (inbound)
+    {
+	sa.src = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	sa.dst = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+	sa.spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	sa.src = &c->spd.this.host_addr;
+	sa.dst = &c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	sa.spi = st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+    }
+    set_text_said(text_said, sa.dst, sa.spi, sa.proto);
+
+    sa.text_said = text_said;
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("get %s", text_said)
+    )
+    if (!kernel_ops->get_sa(&sa, bytes))
+	return FALSE;
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("  current: %d bytes", *bytes)
+    )
+
+    if (st->st_serialno == c->spd.eroute_owner)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("get %sbound policy with reqid %u"
+		, inbound? "in":"out", (u_int)c->spd.reqid + 1)
+	)
+	sa.transport_proto = c->spd.this.protocol;
+	sa.encapsulation = st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation;
+
+	if (inbound)
+	{
+	    sa.src_client = &c->spd.that.client;
+	    sa.dst_client = &c->spd.this.client;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    sa.src_client = &c->spd.this.client;
+	    sa.dst_client = &c->spd.that.client;
+	}
+	if (!kernel_ops->get_policy(&sa, inbound, use_time))
+	    return FALSE;
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("  use_time: %s", timetoa(use_time, FALSE))
+	)
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+const struct kernel_ops *kernel_ops;
+
+#endif /* KLIPS */
+
+void
+init_kernel(void)
+{
+#ifdef KLIPS
+
+    if (no_klips)
+    {
+	kernel_ops = &noklips_kernel_ops;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    init_pfkey();
+
+    kernel_ops = &klips_kernel_ops;
+
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+    {
+	bool linux_ipsec = 0;
+	struct stat buf;
+
+	linux_ipsec = (stat("/proc/net/pfkey", &buf) == 0);
+	if (linux_ipsec)
+	    {
+		plog("Using Linux 2.6 IPsec interface code");
+		kernel_ops = &linux_kernel_ops;
+	    }
+	else
+	    {
+		plog("Using KLIPS IPsec interface code");
+	    }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (kernel_ops->init)
+    {
+	kernel_ops->init();
+    }
+
+    /* register SA types that we can negotiate */
+    can_do_IPcomp = FALSE;  /* until we get a response from KLIPS */
+    kernel_ops->pfkey_register();
+
+    if (!kernel_ops->policy_lifetime)
+    {
+	event_schedule(EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN, SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL, NULL);
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Note: install_inbound_ipsec_sa is only used by the Responder.
+ * The Responder will subsequently use install_ipsec_sa for the outbound.
+ * The Initiator uses install_ipsec_sa to install both at once.
+ */
+bool
+install_inbound_ipsec_sa(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct connection *const c = st->st_connection;
+
+    /* If our peer has a fixed-address client, check if we already
+     * have a route for that client that conflicts.  We will take this
+     * as proof that that route and the connections using it are
+     * obsolete and should be eliminated.  Interestingly, this is
+     * the only case in which we can tell that a connection is obsolete.
+     */
+    passert(c->kind == CK_PERMANENT || c->kind == CK_INSTANCE);
+    if (c->spd.that.has_client)
+    {
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    struct spd_route *esr;
+	    struct connection *o = route_owner(c, &esr, NULL, NULL);
+
+	    if (o == NULL)
+		break;	/* nobody has a route */
+
+	    /* note: we ignore the client addresses at this end */
+	    if (sameaddr(&o->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr)
+	    && o->interface == c->interface)
+		break;	/* existing route is compatible */
+
+	    if (o->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && streq(o->name, c->name))
+		break;	/* ??? is this good enough?? */
+
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "route to peer's client conflicts with \"%s\" %s; releasing old connection to free the route"
+		, o->name, ip_str(&o->spd.that.host_addr));
+	    release_connection(o, FALSE);
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_inbound_ipsec_sa() checking if we can route"));
+    /* check that we will be able to route and eroute */
+    switch (could_route(c))
+    {
+    case route_easy:
+    case route_nearconflict:
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    /* (attempt to) actually set up the SAs */
+    return setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
+#else /* !KLIPS */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_inbound_ipsec_sa()"));
+    return TRUE;
+#endif /* !KLIPS */
+}
+
+/* Install a route and then a prospective shunt eroute or an SA group eroute.
+ * Assumption: could_route gave a go-ahead.
+ * Any SA Group must have already been created.
+ * On failure, steps will be unwound.
+ */
+bool
+route_and_eroute(struct connection *c USED_BY_KLIPS
+		 , struct spd_route *sr USED_BY_KLIPS
+		 , struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS)
+{
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    struct spd_route *esr;
+    struct spd_route *rosr;
+    struct connection *ero	/* who, if anyone, owns our eroute? */
+	, *ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, &ero, &esr);
+    bool eroute_installed = FALSE
+	, firewall_notified = FALSE
+	, route_installed = FALSE;
+
+    struct connection *ero_top;
+    struct bare_shunt **bspp;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("route_and_eroute with c: %s (next: %s) ero:%s esr:{%p} ro:%s rosr:{%p} and state: %lu"
+		, c->name
+		, (c->policy_next ? c->policy_next->name : "none")
+		, ero ? ero->name : "null"
+		, esr 
+		, ro ? ro->name : "null"
+		, rosr
+		, st ? st->st_serialno : 0));
+
+    /* look along the chain of policies for one with the same name */
+    ero_top = ero;
+
+#if 0
+    /* XXX - mcr this made sense before, and likely will make sense
+     * again, so I'l leaving this to remind me what is up */
+    if (ero!= NULL && ero->routing == RT_UNROUTED_KEYED)
+	ero = NULL;
+
+    for (ero2 = ero; ero2 != NULL; ero2 = ero->policy_next)
+	if ((ero2->kind == CK_TEMPLATE || ero2->kind==CK_SECONDARY)
+	&& streq(ero2->name, c->name))
+	    break;
+#endif
+
+    bspp = (ero == NULL)
+	? bare_shunt_ptr(&sr->this.client, &sr->that.client, sr->this.protocol)
+	: NULL;
+
+    /* install the eroute */
+
+    passert(bspp == NULL || ero == NULL);	/* only one non-NULL */
+
+    if (bspp != NULL || ero != NULL)
+    {
+	/* We're replacing an eroute */
+
+	/* if no state provided, then install a shunt for later */
+	if (st == NULL)
+	    eroute_installed = shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE
+					    , ERO_REPLACE, "replace");
+	else
+	    eroute_installed = sag_eroute(st, sr, ERO_REPLACE, "replace");
+
+#if 0
+	/* XXX - MCR. I previously felt that this was a bogus check */
+	if (ero != NULL && ero != c && esr != sr)
+	{
+	    /* By elimination, we must be eclipsing ero.  Check. */
+	    passert(ero->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && streq(ero->name, c->name));
+	    passert(LHAS(LELEM(RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE) | LELEM(RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+		, esr->routing));
+	    passert(samesubnet(&esr->this.client, &sr->this.client)
+		&& samesubnet(&esr->that.client, &sr->that.client));
+	}
+#endif
+	/* remember to free bspp iff we make it out of here alive */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* we're adding an eroute */
+
+	/* if no state provided, then install a shunt for later */
+	if (st == NULL)
+	    eroute_installed = shunt_eroute(c, sr, RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE
+					    , ERO_ADD, "add");
+	else
+	    eroute_installed = sag_eroute(st, sr, ERO_ADD, "add");
+    }
+
+    /* notify the firewall of a new tunnel */
+
+    if (eroute_installed)
+    {
+	/* do we have to notify the firewall?  Yes, if we are installing
+	 * a tunnel eroute and the firewall wasn't notified
+	 * for a previous tunnel with the same clients.  Any Previous
+	 * tunnel would have to be for our connection, so the actual
+	 * test is simple.
+	 */
+	firewall_notified = st == NULL	/* not a tunnel eroute */
+	    || sr->eroute_owner != SOS_NOBODY	/* already notified */
+	    || do_command(c, sr, "up");	/* go ahead and notify */
+    }
+
+    /* install the route */
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("route_and_eroute: firewall_notified: %s"
+		, firewall_notified ? "true" : "false"));
+    if (!firewall_notified)
+    {
+	/* we're in trouble -- don't do routing */
+    }
+    else if (ro == NULL)
+    {
+	/* a new route: no deletion required, but preparation is */
+	(void) do_command(c, sr, "prepare");	/* just in case; ignore failure */
+	route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
+    }
+    else if (routed(sr->routing)
+    || routes_agree(ro, c))
+    {
+	route_installed = TRUE;	/* nothing to be done */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* Some other connection must own the route
+	 * and the route must disagree.  But since could_route
+	 * must have allowed our stealing it, we'll do so.
+	 *
+	 * A feature of LINUX allows us to install the new route
+	 * before deleting the old if the nexthops differ.
+	 * This reduces the "window of vulnerability" when packets
+	 * might flow in the clear.
+	 */
+	if (sameaddr(&sr->this.host_nexthop, &esr->this.host_nexthop))
+	{
+	    (void) do_command(ro, sr, "unroute");
+	    route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    route_installed = do_command(c, sr, "route");
+	    (void) do_command(ro, sr, "unroute");
+	}
+
+	/* record unrouting */
+	if (route_installed)
+	{
+	    do {
+		passert(!erouted(rosr->routing));
+		rosr->routing = RT_UNROUTED;
+
+		/* no need to keep old value */
+		ro = route_owner(c, &rosr, NULL, NULL);
+	    } while (ro != NULL);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* all done -- clean up */
+    if (route_installed)
+    {
+	/* Success! */
+
+	if (bspp != NULL)
+	{
+	    free_bare_shunt(bspp);
+	}
+	else if (ero != NULL && ero != c)
+	{
+	    /* check if ero is an ancestor of c. */
+	    struct connection *ero2;
+
+	    for (ero2 = c; ero2 != NULL && ero2 != c; ero2 = ero2->policy_next)
+		;
+
+	    if (ero2 == NULL)
+	    {
+		/* By elimination, we must be eclipsing ero.  Checked above. */
+		if (ero->spd.routing != RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED)
+		{
+		    ero->spd.routing = RT_ROUTED_ECLIPSED;
+		    eclipse_count++;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+	    passert(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY);
+	    sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    char cib[CONN_INST_BUF];
+	    sr->routing = RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("route_and_eroute: instance \"%s\"%s, setting eroute_owner {spd=%p,sr=%p} to #%ld (was #%ld) (newest_ipsec_sa=#%ld)"
+			, st->st_connection->name
+			, (fmt_conn_instance(st->st_connection, cib), cib)
+			, &st->st_connection->spd, sr
+			, st->st_serialno
+			, sr->eroute_owner
+			, st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa));
+	    sr->eroute_owner = st->st_serialno;
+	}
+
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* Failure!  Unwind our work. */
+	if (firewall_notified && sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
+	    (void) do_command(c, sr, "down");
+
+	if (eroute_installed)
+	{
+	    /* Restore original eroute, if we can.
+	     * Since there is nothing much to be done if the restoration
+	     * fails, ignore success or failure.
+	     */
+	    if (bspp != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* Restore old bare_shunt.
+		 * I don't think that this case is very likely.
+		 * Normally a bare shunt would have been assigned
+		 * to a connection before we've gotten this far.
+		 */
+		struct bare_shunt *bs = *bspp;
+
+		(void) raw_eroute(&bs->said.dst	/* should be useless */
+		    , &bs->ours
+		    , &bs->said.dst	/* should be useless */
+		    , &bs->his
+		    , bs->said.spi	/* network order */
+		    , SA_INT
+		    , SADB_X_SATYPE_INT
+		    , 0
+		    , null_proto_info
+		    , SHUNT_PATIENCE
+		    , ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+	    }
+	    else if (ero != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* restore ero's former glory */
+		if (esr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY)
+		{
+		    /* note: normal or eclipse case */
+		    (void) shunt_eroute(ero, esr
+					, esr->routing, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* Try to find state that owned eroute.
+		     * Don't do anything if it cannot be found.
+		     * This case isn't likely since we don't run
+		     * the updown script when replacing a SA group
+		     * with its successor (for the same conn).
+		     */
+		    struct state *ost = state_with_serialno(esr->eroute_owner);
+
+		    if (ost != NULL)
+			(void) sag_eroute(ost, esr, ERO_REPLACE, "restore");
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* there was no previous eroute: delete whatever we installed */
+		if (st == NULL)
+		    (void) shunt_eroute(c, sr
+					, sr->routing, ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+		else
+		    (void) sag_eroute(st, sr
+				      , ERO_DELETE, "delete");
+	    }
+	}
+
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+#else /* !KLIPS */
+    return TRUE;
+#endif /* !KLIPS */
+}
+
+bool
+install_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_also USED_BY_KLIPS)
+{
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_ipsec_sa() for #%ld: %s"
+			     , st->st_serialno
+			     , inbound_also?
+			     "inbound and outbound" : "outbound only"));
+
+    switch (could_route(st->st_connection))
+    {
+    case route_easy:
+    case route_nearconflict:
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* (attempt to) actually set up the SA group */
+    if ((inbound_also && !setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE))
+    || !setup_half_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    for (sr = &st->st_connection->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("sr for #%ld: %s"
+				 , st->st_serialno
+				 , enum_name(&routing_story, sr->routing)));
+
+	/*
+	 * if the eroute owner is not us, then make it us.
+	 * See test co-terminal-02, pluto-rekey-01, pluto-unit-02/oppo-twice
+	 */
+	pexpect(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY
+		|| sr->routing >= RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+
+	if (sr->eroute_owner != st->st_serialno
+	    && sr->routing != RT_UNROUTED_KEYED)
+	{
+	    if (!route_and_eroute(st->st_connection, sr, st))
+	    {
+		delete_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
+		/* XXX go and unroute any SRs that were successfully
+		 * routed already.
+		 */
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+#else /* !KLIPS */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("install_ipsec_sa() %s"
+	, inbound_also? "inbound and oubound" : "outbound only"));
+
+    switch (could_route(st->st_connection))
+    {
+    case route_easy:
+    case route_nearconflict:
+	break;
+
+    default:
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+
+#endif /* !KLIPS */
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* delete an IPSEC SA.
+ * we may not succeed, but we bull ahead anyway because
+ * we cannot do anything better by recognizing failure
+ */
+void
+delete_ipsec_sa(struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS, bool inbound_only USED_BY_KLIPS)
+{
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    if (!inbound_only)
+    {
+	/* If the state is the eroute owner, we must adjust
+	 * the routing for the connection.
+	 */
+	struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+	struct spd_route *sr;
+
+	passert(st->st_connection);
+
+	for (sr = &c->spd; sr; sr = sr->next)
+	{
+	    if (sr->eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
+	    && sr->routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+	    {
+		sr->eroute_owner = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+		/* Routing should become RT_ROUTED_FAILURE,
+		 * but if POLICY_FAIL_NONE, then we just go
+		 * right back to RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE as if no
+		 * failure happened.
+		 */
+		sr->routing = (c->policy & POLICY_FAIL_MASK) == POLICY_FAIL_NONE
+		    ? RT_ROUTED_PROSPECTIVE : RT_ROUTED_FAILURE;
+
+		(void) do_command(c, sr, "down");
+		if ((c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
+		&& c->kind == CK_INSTANCE)
+		{
+		    /* in this special case, even if the connection
+		     * is still alive (due to an ISAKMP SA),
+		     * we get rid of routing.
+		     * Even though there is still an eroute, the c->routing
+		     * setting will convince unroute_connection to delete it.
+		     * unroute_connection would be upset if c->routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL
+		     */
+		    unroute_connection(c);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    (void) shunt_eroute(c, sr, sr->routing, ERO_REPLACE, "replace with shunt");
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	(void) teardown_half_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
+    }
+    (void) teardown_half_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
+#else /* !KLIPS */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("if I knew how, I'd eroute() and teardown_ipsec_sa()"));
+#endif /* !KLIPS */
+}
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+static bool update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (struct state *st, bool inbound)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+    struct kernel_sa sa;	
+    ip_address
+	src = inbound? c->spd.that.host_addr : c->spd.this.host_addr,
+	dst = inbound? c->spd.this.host_addr : c->spd.that.host_addr;
+
+    ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = inbound? st->st_esp.our_spi : st->st_esp.attrs.spi;
+
+    u_int16_t
+	natt_sport = inbound? c->spd.that.host_port : c->spd.this.host_port,
+	natt_dport = inbound? c->spd.this.host_port : c->spd.that.host_port;
+
+    set_text_said(text_said, &dst, esp_spi, SA_ESP);
+
+    memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
+    sa.spi = esp_spi;
+    sa.src = &src;
+    sa.dst = &dst;
+    sa.text_said = text_said;
+    sa.authalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(st->st_esp.attrs.auth);
+    sa.natt_sport = natt_sport;
+    sa.natt_dport = natt_dport;
+    sa.transid = st->st_esp.attrs.transid;
+
+    return kernel_ops->add_sa(&sa, TRUE);
+}
+#endif
+
+bool update_ipsec_sa (struct state *st USED_BY_KLIPS)
+{
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+	if (st->st_esp.present && (
+	   (!update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, TRUE)) ||
+	   (!update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, FALSE))))
+	{
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+    else if (IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+	if (st->st_esp.present && !update_nat_t_ipsec_esp_sa (st, FALSE))
+	{
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG_log("assert failed at %s:%d st_state=%d", __FILE__, __LINE__, st->st_state);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+#else /* !KLIPS */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("if I knew how, I'd update_ipsec_sa()"));
+    return TRUE;
+#endif /* !KLIPS */
+}
+
+/* Check if there was traffic on given SA during the last idle_max
+ * seconds. If TRUE, the SA was idle and DPD exchange should be performed.
+ * If FALSE, DPD is not necessary. We also return TRUE for errors, as they
+ * could mean that the SA is broken and needs to be replace anyway.
+ */
+bool
+was_eroute_idle(struct state *st, time_t idle_max, time_t *idle_time)
+{
+    static const char procname[] = "/proc/net/ipsec_spi";
+    FILE *f;
+    char buf[1024];
+    u_int bytes;
+    int ret = TRUE;
+
+    passert(st != NULL);
+
+    f = fopen(procname, "r");
+    if (f == NULL)
+    {
+	/* Can't open the file, perhaps were are on 26sec? */
+	time_t use_time;
+
+	if (get_sa_info(st, TRUE, &bytes, &use_time)
+	&& use_time != UNDEFINED_TIME)
+	{
+	    *idle_time = time(NULL) - use_time;
+	    ret = *idle_time >= idle_max;
+	}
+    }
+    else 
+    {
+	while (f != NULL)
+	{
+	    char *line;
+	    char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	    u_int8_t proto = 0;
+	    ip_address dst;
+	    ip_said said;
+	    ipsec_spi_t spi = 0;
+	    static const char idle[] = "idle=";
+
+	    dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr; /* inbound SA */
+	    if (st->st_ah.present)
+	    {
+		proto = SA_AH;
+		spi = st->st_ah.our_spi;
+	    }
+	    if (st->st_esp.present)
+	    {
+		proto = SA_ESP;
+		spi = st->st_esp.our_spi;
+	    }
+
+	    if (proto == 0 && spi == 0)
+	    {
+		ret = TRUE;
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    initsaid(&dst, spi, proto, &said);
+	    satot(&said, 'x', text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+
+	    line = fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f);
+	    if (line == NULL)
+	    {
+		/* Reached end of list */
+		ret = TRUE;
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    if (strncmp(line, text_said, strlen(text_said)) == 0)
+	    {
+		/* we found a match, now try to find idle= */
+		char *p = strstr(line, idle);
+
+		if (p == NULL)
+		{
+		    /* SAs which haven't been used yet don't have it */
+		    ret = TRUE; /* it didn't have traffic */
+		    break;
+		}
+		p += sizeof(idle)-1;
+		if (*p == '\0')
+		{
+		    ret = TRUE; /* be paranoid */
+		    break;
+		}
+		if (sscanf(p, "%d", (int *) idle_time) <= 0)
+		{
+		    ret = TRUE;
+		    break;
+		}
+		if (*idle_time >= idle_max)
+		{
+		    ret = TRUE;
+		    break;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    ret = FALSE;
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	fclose(f);
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel.h b/src/pluto/kernel.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e7ff08c7b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel.h
@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+/* declarations of routines that interface with the kernel's IPsec mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel.h,v 1.10 2006/03/08 22:12:37 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include "connections.h"
+
+extern bool no_klips;	/* don't actually use KLIPS */
+extern bool can_do_IPcomp;  /* can system actually perform IPCOMP? */
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+/* Declare eroute things early enough for uses.
+ *
+ * Flags are encoded above the low-order byte of verbs.
+ * "real" eroutes are only outbound.  Inbound eroutes don't exist,
+ * but an addflow with an INBOUND flag allows IPIP tunnels to be
+ * limited to appropriate source and destination addresses.
+ */
+
+#define ERO_MASK	0xFF
+#define ERO_FLAG_SHIFT	8
+
+#define ERO_DELETE	SADB_X_DELFLOW
+#define ERO_ADD	SADB_X_ADDFLOW
+#define ERO_REPLACE	(SADB_X_ADDFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_REPLACEFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+#define ERO_ADD_INBOUND	(SADB_X_ADDFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+#define ERO_DEL_INBOUND	(SADB_X_DELFLOW | (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+
+struct pfkey_proto_info {
+	int proto;
+	int encapsulation;
+	unsigned reqid;
+};
+struct sadb_msg;
+
+struct kernel_sa {
+	const ip_address *src;
+	const ip_address *dst;
+
+	const ip_subnet *src_client;
+	const ip_subnet *dst_client;
+
+	ipsec_spi_t spi;
+	unsigned proto;
+	unsigned satype;
+	unsigned transport_proto;
+	unsigned replay_window;
+	unsigned reqid;
+
+	unsigned authalg;
+	unsigned authkeylen;
+	char *authkey;
+
+	unsigned encalg;
+	unsigned enckeylen;
+	char *enckey;
+
+	unsigned compalg;
+
+	int encapsulation;
+
+	u_int16_t natt_sport, natt_dport;
+	u_int8_t transid, natt_type;
+	ip_address *natt_oa;
+
+	const char *text_said;
+};
+
+struct kernel_ops {
+	enum {
+	        KERNEL_TYPE_NONE,
+		KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS,
+		KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX,
+	} type;
+	bool inbound_eroute;
+	bool policy_lifetime;
+	int *async_fdp;
+
+	void (*init)(void);
+	void (*pfkey_register)(void);
+	void (*pfkey_register_response)(const struct sadb_msg *msg);
+	void (*process_queue)(void);
+	void (*process_msg)(void);
+	bool (*raw_eroute)(const ip_address *this_host,
+			   const ip_subnet *this_client,
+			   const ip_address *that_host,
+			   const ip_subnet *that_client,
+			   ipsec_spi_t spi,
+			   unsigned int satype,
+			   unsigned int transport_proto,
+			   const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info,
+			   time_t use_lifetime,
+			   unsigned int op,
+			   const char *text_said);
+	bool (*get_policy)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool inbound,
+			   time_t *use_time);
+	bool (*add_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace);
+	bool (*grp_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa_outer,
+		       const struct kernel_sa *sa_inner);
+	bool (*del_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa);
+	bool (*get_sa)(const struct kernel_sa *sa, u_int *bytes);
+	ipsec_spi_t (*get_spi)(const ip_address *src,
+			       const ip_address *dst,
+			       int proto,
+			       bool tunnel_mode,
+			       unsigned reqid,
+			       ipsec_spi_t min,
+			       ipsec_spi_t max,
+			       const char *text_said);
+};
+
+
+extern const struct kernel_ops *kernel_ops;
+
+/* information from /proc/net/ipsec_eroute */
+
+struct eroute_info {
+    unsigned long count;
+    ip_subnet ours;
+    ip_subnet his;
+    ip_address dst;
+    ip_said	said;
+    int transport_proto;
+    struct eroute_info *next;
+};
+
+extern struct eroute_info *orphaned_holds;
+
+extern void show_shunt_status(void);
+#endif
+
+/* A netlink header defines EM_MAXRELSPIS, the max number of SAs in a group.
+ * Is there a PF_KEY equivalent?
+ */
+#ifndef EM_MAXRELSPIS
+# define EM_MAXRELSPIS 4	/* AH ESP IPCOMP IPIP */
+#endif
+
+extern void record_and_initiate_opportunistic(const ip_subnet *
+					      , const ip_subnet *
+					      , int transport_proto
+					      , const char *why);
+
+extern void init_kernel(void);
+
+extern void scan_proc_shunts(void);
+
+extern bool trap_connection(struct connection *c);
+extern void unroute_connection(struct connection *c);
+
+extern bool has_bare_hold(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst
+			  , int transport_proto);
+
+extern bool replace_bare_shunt(const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst
+			       , policy_prio_t policy_prio
+			       , ipsec_spi_t shunt_spi	/* in host order! */
+			       , bool repl
+			       , unsigned int transport_proto
+			       , const char *why);
+
+extern bool assign_hold(struct connection *c
+			, struct spd_route *sr
+			, int transport_proto
+			, const ip_address *src, const ip_address *dst);
+
+extern ipsec_spi_t shunt_policy_spi(struct connection *c, bool prospective);
+
+
+struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag */
+extern ipsec_spi_t get_ipsec_spi(ipsec_spi_t avoid
+				 , int proto
+				 , struct spd_route *sr
+				 , bool tunnel_mode);
+extern ipsec_spi_t get_my_cpi(struct spd_route *sr, bool tunnel_mode);
+
+extern bool install_inbound_ipsec_sa(struct state *st);
+extern bool install_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_also);
+extern void delete_ipsec_sa(struct state *st, bool inbound_only);
+extern bool route_and_eroute(struct connection *c
+			     , struct spd_route *sr
+			     , struct state *st);
+extern bool was_eroute_idle(struct state *st, time_t idle_max
+    , time_t *idle_time);
+extern bool get_sa_info(struct state *st, bool inbound, u_int *bytes
+    , time_t *use_time);
+
+extern bool update_ipsec_sa(struct state *st);
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..91dfaff59
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,775 @@
+/* Kernel runtime algorithm handling interface
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_alg.c,v 1.9 2005/08/17 16:31:24 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "spdb.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "db_ops.h"
+#else
+/*
+ *	macros/functions for compilation without pluto (eg: spi for manual conns)
+ */
+extern int debug;
+#include <assert.h>
+#define passert(x) assert(x)
+#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (debug) { action ; } }
+#define DBG_log(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
+#define plog(x, args...) fprintf(stderr, x "\n" , ##args);
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+/* ALG storage */
+static struct sadb_alg esp_aalg[SADB_AALG_MAX+1];
+static struct sadb_alg esp_ealg[SADB_EALG_MAX+1];
+static int esp_ealg_num = 0;
+static int esp_aalg_num = 0;
+
+#define ESP_EALG_PRESENT(algo) (((algo)<=SADB_EALG_MAX)&&(esp_ealg[(algo)].sadb_alg_id==(algo)))
+#define ESP_EALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(algo) \
+	for (algo=SADB_EALG_MAX; algo >0 ; algo--) \
+		if (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(algo))
+#define ESP_AALG_PRESENT(algo) ((algo<=SADB_AALG_MAX)&&(esp_aalg[(algo)].sadb_alg_id==(algo)))
+#define ESP_AALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(algo) \
+	for (algo=SADB_AALG_MAX; algo >0 ; algo--) \
+		if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(algo))
+
+static struct sadb_alg*
+sadb_alg_ptr (int satype, int exttype, int alg_id, int rw)
+{
+    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
+
+    switch (exttype)
+    {
+    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH:
+	if (alg_id > SADB_AALG_MAX)
+	    return NULL;
+	break;
+    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT:
+	if (alg_id > SADB_EALG_MAX)
+	    return NULL;
+	break;
+    default:
+	return NULL;
+    }
+
+    switch (satype)
+    {
+    case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+	alg_p = (exttype == SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT)?
+		    &esp_ealg[alg_id] : &esp_aalg[alg_id];
+	/* get for write: increment elem count */
+	if (rw)
+	{
+	    (exttype == SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT)?
+		esp_ealg_num++ : esp_aalg_num++;
+	}
+	break;
+    case SADB_SATYPE_AH:
+    default:
+	return NULL;
+    }
+    
+    return alg_p;
+}
+
+const struct sadb_alg *
+kernel_alg_sadb_alg_get(int satype, int exttype, int alg_id)
+{
+    return sadb_alg_ptr(satype, exttype, alg_id, 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * 	Forget previous registration
+ */
+static void 
+kernel_alg_init(void)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("alg_init(): memset(%p, 0, %d) memset(%p, 0, %d)",
+		&esp_aalg,  (int)sizeof (esp_aalg),
+		&esp_ealg,  (int)sizeof (esp_ealg))
+    )
+    memset (&esp_aalg, 0, sizeof (esp_aalg));
+    memset (&esp_ealg, 0, sizeof (esp_ealg));
+    esp_ealg_num=esp_aalg_num = 0;
+}
+
+static int
+kernel_alg_add(int satype, int exttype, const struct sadb_alg *sadb_alg)
+{
+    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
+    int alg_id = sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id;
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_add(): satype=%d, exttype=%d, alg_id=%d",
+		satype, exttype, sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id)
+    )
+    if (!(alg_p = sadb_alg_ptr(satype, exttype, alg_id, 1)))
+	return -1;
+
+    /* This logic "mimics" KLIPS: first algo implementation will be used */
+    if (alg_p->sadb_alg_id)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_add(): discarding already setup "
+		    "satype=%d, exttype=%d, alg_id=%d",
+		    satype, exttype, sadb_alg->sadb_alg_id)
+	)
+	return 0;
+    }
+    *alg_p = *sadb_alg;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+bool
+kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(u_int alg_id, u_int key_len,
+		struct alg_info_esp *alg_info __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * test #1: encrypt algo must be present
+     */
+    int ret = ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id);
+    if (!ret) goto out;
+
+    alg_p = &esp_ealg[alg_id];
+    
+    /*
+     * test #2: if key_len specified, it must be in range
+     */
+    if (key_len
+    && (key_len < alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits || key_len > alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits))
+    {
+	plog("kernel_alg_db_add() key_len not in range: alg_id=%d, "
+	     "key_len=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d"
+	     , alg_id, key_len
+	     , alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
+	     , alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits);
+	ret = FALSE;
+    }
+
+out:
+    if (ret)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(%d,%d): "
+		    "alg_id=%d, "
+		    "alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
+		    "res=%d, ret=%d"
+		    , alg_id, key_len
+		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_id
+		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_ivlen
+		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
+		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
+		    , alg_p->sadb_alg_reserved
+		    , ret);
+	)
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(%d,%d): NO", alg_id, key_len);
+	)
+    }
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * ML: make F_STRICT logic consider enc,auth algorithms 
+ */
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+bool
+kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info)
+{
+    int ealg_insecure;
+
+    /*
+     * key_len passed comes from esp_attrs read from peer
+     * For many older algoritms (eg 3DES) this key_len is fixed
+     * and get passed as 0.
+     * ... then get default key_len
+     */
+    if (key_len == 0)
+	key_len = kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(ealg) * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+    /*
+     * simple test to toss low key_len, will accept it only
+     * if specified in "esp" string
+     */
+    ealg_insecure = (key_len < 128) ;
+
+    if (ealg_insecure
+    || (alg_info && alg_info->alg_info_flags & ALG_INFO_F_STRICT))
+    {
+	int i;
+	struct esp_info *esp_info;
+
+	if (alg_info)
+	{
+	    ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info, esp_info, i)
+	    {
+		if (esp_info->esp_ealg_id == ealg
+		&& (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen == 0 || key_len == 0
+		    || esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen == key_len)
+		&&  esp_info->esp_aalg_id == aalg)
+		{
+		    if (ealg_insecure)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "You should NOT use insecure ESP algorithms [%s (%d)]!"
+			    , enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, ealg), key_len);
+		    }
+		    return TRUE;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+	plog("IPSec Transform [%s (%d), %s] refused due to %s",
+		enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, ealg), key_len,
+		enum_name(&auth_alg_names, aalg),
+		ealg_insecure ? "insecure key_len and enc. alg. not listed in \"esp\" string" : "strict flag");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
+/*	
+ *	Load kernel_alg arrays from /proc
+ * 	used in manual mode from klips/utils/spi.c
+ */
+int
+kernel_alg_proc_read(void)
+{
+    int satype;
+    int supp_exttype;
+    int alg_id, ivlen, minbits, maxbits;
+    struct sadb_alg sadb_alg;
+    int ret;
+    char buf[128];
+
+    FILE *fp=fopen("/proc/net/pf_key_supported", "r");
+
+    if (!fp)
+	return -1;
+
+    kernel_alg_init();
+
+    while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp))
+    {
+	if (buf[0] != ' ') /* skip titles */
+	    continue;
+
+	sscanf(buf, "%d %d %d %d %d %d"
+		,&satype, &supp_exttype
+		, &alg_id, &ivlen
+		, &minbits, &maxbits);
+
+	switch (satype)
+	{
+	case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+	    switch(supp_exttype)
+	    {
+	    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH:
+	    case SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT:
+		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_id = alg_id;
+		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_ivlen = ivlen;
+		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_minbits = minbits;
+		sadb_alg.sadb_alg_maxbits = maxbits;
+		ret = kernel_alg_add(satype, supp_exttype, &sadb_alg);
+		DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+		    DBG_log("kernel_alg_proc_read() alg_id=%d, "
+			    "alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
+			    "ret=%d"
+			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_id
+			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_ivlen
+			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_minbits
+			    , sadb_alg.sadb_alg_maxbits
+			    , ret)
+		)
+	    }
+	default:
+	    continue;
+	}
+    }
+    fclose(fp);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*	
+ *	Load kernel_alg arrays pluto's SADB_REGISTER	
+ * 	user by pluto/kernel.c
+ */
+
+void
+kernel_alg_register_pfkey(const struct sadb_msg *msg_buf, int buflen)
+{
+    /* Trick: one 'type-mangle-able' pointer to ease offset/assign */
+    union {
+	const struct sadb_msg *msg;
+	const struct sadb_supported *supported;
+	const struct sadb_ext *ext;
+	const struct sadb_alg *alg;
+	const char *ch;
+    } sadb;
+
+    int satype;
+    int msglen;
+    int i = 0;
+
+    /* Initialize alg arrays */
+    kernel_alg_init();
+    satype = msg_buf->sadb_msg_satype;
+    sadb.msg = msg_buf;
+    msglen = sadb.msg->sadb_msg_len*IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+    msglen -= sizeof(struct sadb_msg);
+    buflen -= sizeof(struct sadb_msg);
+    passert(buflen > 0);
+
+    sadb.msg++;
+
+    while(msglen)
+    {
+	int supp_exttype = sadb.supported->sadb_supported_exttype;
+	int supp_len = sadb.supported->sadb_supported_len*IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_%s: "
+		    "sadb_msg_len=%d sadb_supported_len=%d"
+		    , satype==SADB_SATYPE_ESP? "ESP" : "AH"
+		    , msg_buf->sadb_msg_len, supp_len)
+	)
+	sadb.supported++;
+	msglen -= supp_len;
+	buflen -= supp_len;
+	passert(buflen >= 0);
+
+	for (supp_len -= sizeof(struct sadb_supported);
+	     supp_len;
+	     supp_len -= sizeof(struct sadb_alg), sadb.alg++,i++)
+	{
+	    int ret = kernel_alg_add(satype, supp_exttype, sadb.alg);
+
+	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("kernel_alg_register_pfkey(): SADB_SATYPE_%s: "
+			"alg[%d], exttype=%d, satype=%d, alg_id=%d, "
+			"alg_ivlen=%d, alg_minbits=%d, alg_maxbits=%d, "
+			"res=%d, ret=%d"
+			, satype==SADB_SATYPE_ESP? "ESP" : "AH"
+			, i
+			, supp_exttype
+			, satype
+			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_id
+			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_ivlen
+			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_minbits
+			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_maxbits
+			, sadb.alg->sadb_alg_reserved
+			, ret)
+	    )
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+u_int
+kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(u_int alg_id)
+{
+    u_int keylen = 0;
+
+    if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id))
+	goto none;
+
+    keylen = esp_ealg[alg_id].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+    switch (alg_id)
+    {
+	/*
+	 * this is veryUgly[TM]
+	 * Peer should have sent KEY_LENGTH attribute for ESP_AES
+	 * but if not do force it to 128 instead of using sadb_alg_maxbits
+	 * from kernel.
+	 */
+	case ESP_AES:
+	    keylen = 128/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	    break;
+    }
+
+none:	
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen():"
+		"alg_id=%d, keylen=%d",
+		alg_id, keylen)
+    )
+    return keylen;
+}
+
+struct sadb_alg *
+kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(u_int alg_id)
+{
+    struct sadb_alg *sadb_alg = (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(alg_id))
+		? &esp_ealg[alg_id] : NULL;
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(): alg_id=%d, sadb_alg=%p"
+		, alg_id, sadb_alg)
+    )
+    return sadb_alg;
+}
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+void kernel_alg_list(void)
+{
+    u_int sadb_id;
+
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered ESP Encryption Algorithms:");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+    for (sadb_id = 1; sadb_id <= SADB_EALG_MAX; sadb_id++)
+    {
+	if (ESP_EALG_PRESENT(sadb_id))
+	{
+	    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = &esp_ealg[sadb_id];
+
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, blocksize: %d, keylen: %d-%d"
+		, sadb_id
+		, enum_name(&esp_transformid_names, sadb_id)
+		, alg_p->sadb_alg_ivlen
+		, alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
+		, alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
+	    );
+	}
+    }
+    
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of registered ESP Authentication Algorithms:");
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+
+    for (sadb_id = 1; sadb_id <= SADB_AALG_MAX; sadb_id++)
+    {
+	if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(sadb_id))
+	{
+	    u_int aaid = alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(sadb_id);
+	    struct sadb_alg *alg_p = &esp_aalg[sadb_id];
+
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "#%-5d %s, keylen: %d-%d"
+		, aaid
+		, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, aaid)
+		, alg_p->sadb_alg_minbits
+		, alg_p->sadb_alg_maxbits
+	    );
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+void
+kernel_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance)
+{
+    char buf[256];
+    struct state *st;
+
+    if (c->alg_info_esp)
+    {
+	alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof(buf), (struct alg_info *)c->alg_info_esp);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP algorithms wanted: %s"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, buf);
+    }
+    if (c->alg_info_esp)
+    {
+	alg_info_snprint_esp(buf, sizeof(buf), c->alg_info_esp);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP algorithms loaded: %s"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, buf);
+    }
+    st = state_with_serialno(c->newest_ipsec_sa);
+    if (st && st->st_esp.present)
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT
+		, "\"%s\"%s:   ESP algorithm newest: %s_%d-%s; pfsgroup=%s"
+		, c->name
+		, instance
+		, enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, st->st_esp.attrs.transid)
+		+4 /* strlen("ESP_") */
+		, st->st_esp.attrs.key_len
+		, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, st->st_esp.attrs.auth)+
+		+15 /* strlen("AUTH_ALGORITHM_") */
+		, c->policy & POLICY_PFS ?
+			c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup ?
+					enum_show(&oakley_group_names, 
+						c->alg_info_esp->esp_pfsgroup)
+						+13 /*strlen("OAKLEY_GROUP_")*/
+				: "<Phase1>"
+			: "<N/A>"
+	);
+}
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
+
+bool
+kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(u_int auth,
+		struct alg_info_esp *alg_info __attribute__((unused)))
+{
+    return ESP_AALG_PRESENT(alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth));
+}
+
+u_int
+kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(u_int auth)
+{
+    u_int sadb_aalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth);
+
+    u_int a_keylen = (sadb_aalg)
+		   ? esp_aalg[sadb_aalg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE
+		   : 0;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT | DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(auth=%d, sadb_aalg=%d): "
+		"a_keylen=%d", auth, sadb_aalg, a_keylen)
+    )
+    return a_keylen;
+}
+
+struct esp_info *
+kernel_alg_esp_info(int transid, int auth)
+{
+    int sadb_aalg, sadb_ealg;
+    static struct esp_info ei_buf;
+
+    sadb_ealg = transid;
+    sadb_aalg = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(auth);
+
+    if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(sadb_ealg))
+	goto none;
+    if (!ESP_AALG_PRESENT(sadb_aalg))
+	goto none;
+
+    memset(&ei_buf, 0, sizeof (ei_buf));
+    ei_buf.transid = transid;
+    ei_buf.auth = auth;
+
+    /* don't return "default" keylen because this value is used from
+     * setup_half_ipsec_sa() to "validate" keylen
+     * In effect,  enckeylen will be used as "max" value
+     */
+    ei_buf.enckeylen = esp_ealg[sadb_ealg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+    ei_buf.authkeylen = esp_aalg[sadb_aalg].sadb_alg_maxbits/BITS_PER_BYTE;
+    ei_buf.encryptalg = sadb_ealg;
+    ei_buf.authalg = sadb_aalg;
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_info():"
+		"transid=%d, auth=%d, ei=%p, "
+		"enckeylen=%d, authkeylen=%d, encryptalg=%d, authalg=%d",
+		transid, auth, &ei_buf,
+		(int)ei_buf.enckeylen, (int)ei_buf.authkeylen,
+		ei_buf.encryptalg, ei_buf.authalg)
+    )
+    return &ei_buf;
+
+none:
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_esp_info():"
+		"transid=%d, auth=%d, ei=NULL",
+		transid, auth)
+    )
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+static void
+kernel_alg_policy_algorithms(struct esp_info *esp_info)
+{
+    u_int ealg_id = esp_info->esp_ealg_id;
+
+    switch(ealg_id)
+    {
+    case 0:
+    case ESP_DES:
+    case ESP_3DES:
+    case ESP_NULL:
+    case ESP_CAST:
+            break;
+    default:
+	if (!esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+	{
+	    /* algos that need  KEY_LENGTH
+	     *
+	     * Note: this is a very dirty hack ;-)
+	     * Idea: Add a key_length_needed attribute to
+	     * esp_ealg ??
+	     */
+	    esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen = esp_ealg[ealg_id].sadb_alg_maxbits;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static bool 
+kernel_alg_db_add(struct db_context *db_ctx, struct esp_info *esp_info, lset_t policy)
+{
+    u_int ealg_id, aalg_id;
+
+    ealg_id = esp_info->esp_ealg_id;
+
+    if (!ESP_EALG_PRESENT(ealg_id))
+    {
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_add() kernel enc ealg_id=%d not present", ealg_id);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    
+    if (!(policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE))    /* skip ESP auth attrs for AH */
+    {
+	aalg_id = alg_info_esp_aa2sadb(esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
+
+	if (!ESP_AALG_PRESENT(aalg_id))
+	{
+	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_add() kernel auth "
+		    "aalg_id=%d not present", aalg_id);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* do algo policy */
+    kernel_alg_policy_algorithms(esp_info);
+
+    /*	open new transformation */
+    db_trans_add(db_ctx, ealg_id);
+
+    /* add ESP auth attr */
+    if (!(policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE))
+	db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, AUTH_ALGORITHM, esp_info->esp_aalg_id);
+
+    /* add keylegth if specified in esp= string */
+    if (esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen)
+	db_attr_add_values(db_ctx, KEY_LENGTH, esp_info->esp_ealg_keylen);
+	
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*	
+ *	Create proposal with runtime kernel algos, merging
+ *	with passed proposal if not NULL
+ *
+ *	for now this function does free() previous returned
+ *	malloced pointer (this quirk allows easier spdb.c change)
+ */
+struct db_context * 
+kernel_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_esp *alg_info, lset_t policy )
+{
+    const struct esp_info *esp_info;
+    struct esp_info tmp_esp_info;
+    struct db_context *ctx_new=NULL;
+    struct db_trans *t;
+    struct db_prop  *prop;
+    u_int trans_cnt;
+    int tn = 0;
+
+    if (!(policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT))	/* not possible, I think  */
+	return NULL;
+
+    trans_cnt = esp_ealg_num * esp_aalg_num;
+    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_prop_new() initial trans_cnt=%d"
+		, trans_cnt)
+    )
+
+    /* pass aprox. number of transforms and attributes */
+    ctx_new = db_prop_new(PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, trans_cnt, trans_cnt * 2);
+
+    /*
+     * Loop: for each element (struct esp_info) of alg_info,
+     *       if kernel support is present then build the transform (and attrs)
+     *       if NULL alg_info, propose everything ...
+     */
+
+    if (alg_info)
+    {
+	int i;
+
+	ALG_INFO_ESP_FOREACH(alg_info, esp_info, i)
+	{
+	    tmp_esp_info = *esp_info;
+	    kernel_alg_db_add(ctx_new, &tmp_esp_info, policy);
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	u_int ealg_id;
+	
+	ESP_EALG_FOR_EACH_UPDOWN(ealg_id)
+	{
+	    u_int aalg_id;
+
+	    tmp_esp_info.esp_ealg_id = ealg_id;
+	    tmp_esp_info.esp_ealg_keylen = 0;
+
+	    for (aalg_id = 1; aalg_id <= SADB_AALG_MAX; aalg_id++)
+	    {
+		if (ESP_AALG_PRESENT(aalg_id))
+		{
+		    tmp_esp_info.esp_aalg_id = alg_info_esp_sadb2aa(aalg_id);
+		    tmp_esp_info.esp_aalg_keylen = 0;
+		    kernel_alg_db_add(ctx_new, &tmp_esp_info, policy);
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    prop = db_prop_get(ctx_new);
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_EMITTING,
+	DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_prop_new() "
+		"will return p_new->protoid=%d, p_new->trans_cnt=%d"
+		, prop->protoid, prop->trans_cnt)
+    )
+
+    for (t = prop->trans, tn = 0; tn < prop->trans_cnt; tn++)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_EMITTING,
+	    DBG_log("kernel_alg_db_prop_new() "
+		    "    trans[%d]: transid=%d, attr_cnt=%d, "
+		    "attrs[0].type=%d, attrs[0].val=%d"
+		    , tn
+		    , t[tn].transid, t[tn].attr_cnt
+		    , t[tn].attrs[0].type, t[tn].attrs[0].val)
+	)
+    }
+    return ctx_new;
+}
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..483e97da1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_alg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+/* Kernel runtime algorithm handling interface definitions
+ * Author: JuanJo Ciarlante <jjo-ipsec@mendoza.gov.ar>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_alg.h,v 1.5 2005/08/17 16:31:24 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KERNEL_ALG_H
+#define _KERNEL_ALG_H
+
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "spdb.h"
+
+/* status info */
+extern void kernel_alg_show_status(void);
+void kernel_alg_show_connection(struct connection *c, const char *instance);
+
+/* Registration messages from pluto */
+extern void kernel_alg_register_pfkey(const struct sadb_msg *msg, int buflen);
+
+/* ESP interface */
+extern struct sadb_alg *kernel_alg_esp_sadb_alg(u_int alg_id);
+extern u_int kernel_alg_esp_ivlen(u_int alg_id);
+extern bool kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(u_int alg_id, u_int key_len, struct alg_info_esp *nfo);
+extern bool kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(u_int ealg, u_int key_len, u_int aalg, struct alg_info_esp *alg_info);
+extern u_int kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(u_int alg_id);
+extern bool kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(u_int auth, struct alg_info_esp *nfo);
+extern u_int kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(u_int auth);
+extern int kernel_alg_proc_read(void);
+extern void kernel_alg_list(void);
+
+/* get sadb_alg for passed args */
+extern const struct sadb_alg * kernel_alg_sadb_alg_get(int satype, int exttype, int alg_id);
+
+extern struct db_context * kernel_alg_db_new(struct alg_info_esp *ai, lset_t policy);
+struct esp_info * kernel_alg_esp_info(int esp_id, int auth_id);
+#endif /* _KERNEL_ALG_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1947ddbac
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1219 @@
+/* netlink interface to the kernel's IPsec mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Herbert Xu.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_netlink.c,v 1.24 2006/03/10 14:49:43 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "kameipsec.h"
+#include "linux26/rtnetlink.h"
+#include "linux26/xfrm.h"
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "kernel_netlink.h"
+#include "kernel_pfkey.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+
+/* Minimum priority number in SPD used by pluto. */
+#define MIN_SPD_PRIORITY 1024
+
+static int netlinkfd = NULL_FD;
+static int netlink_bcast_fd = NULL_FD;
+
+#define NE(x) { x, #x }	/* Name Entry -- shorthand for sparse_names */
+
+static sparse_names xfrm_type_names = {
+	NE(NLMSG_NOOP),
+	NE(NLMSG_ERROR),
+	NE(NLMSG_DONE),
+	NE(NLMSG_OVERRUN),
+
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_NEWSA),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_DELSA),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_GETSA),
+
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY),
+
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE),
+
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY),
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_UPDSA),
+
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE),
+
+	NE(XFRM_MSG_MAX),
+
+	{ 0, sparse_end }
+};
+
+#undef NE
+
+/* Authentication algorithms */
+static sparse_names aalg_list = {
+	{ SADB_X_AALG_NULL, "digest_null" },
+	{ SADB_AALG_MD5_HMAC, "md5" },
+	{ SADB_AALG_SHA1_HMAC, "sha1" },
+	{ SADB_AALG_SHA2_256_HMAC, "sha256" },
+	{ SADB_AALG_SHA2_384_HMAC, "sha384" },
+	{ SADB_AALG_SHA2_512_HMAC, "sha512" },
+	{ SADB_AALG_RIPEMD_160_HMAC, "ripemd160" },
+	{ SADB_X_AALG_NULL, "null" },
+	{ 0, sparse_end }
+};
+
+/* Encryption algorithms */
+static sparse_names ealg_list = {
+	{ SADB_EALG_NULL, "cipher_null" },
+	{ SADB_EALG_DES_CBC, "des" },
+	{ SADB_EALG_3DES_CBC, "des3_ede" },
+	{ SADB_EALG_IDEA_CBC, "idea" },
+	{ SADB_EALG_CAST_CBC, "cast128" },
+	{ SADB_EALG_BLOWFISH_CBC, "blowfish" },
+	{ SADB_EALG_AES_CBC, "aes" },
+	{ SADB_X_EALG_SERPENT_CBC, "serpent" },
+	{ SADB_X_EALG_TWOFISH_CBC, "twofish" },
+	{ 0, sparse_end }
+};
+
+/* Compression algorithms */
+static sparse_names calg_list = {
+	{ SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE, "deflate" },
+	{ SADB_X_CALG_LZS, "lzs" },
+	{ SADB_X_CALG_LZJH, "lzjh" },
+	{ 0, sparse_end }
+};
+
+/** ip2xfrm - Take an IP address and convert to an xfrm.
+ *
+ * @param addr ip_address
+ * @param xaddr xfrm_address_t - IPv[46] Address from addr is copied here.
+ */
+static void
+ip2xfrm(const ip_address *addr, xfrm_address_t *xaddr)
+{
+    if (addr->u.v4.sin_family == AF_INET)
+    {
+	xaddr->a4 = addr->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	memcpy(xaddr->a6, &addr->u.v6.sin6_addr, sizeof(xaddr->a6));
+    }
+}
+
+/** init_netlink - Initialize the netlink inferface.  Opens the sockets and
+ * then binds to the broadcast socket.
+ */
+static void
+init_netlink(void)
+{
+    struct sockaddr_nl addr;
+
+    netlinkfd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_XFRM);
+
+    if (netlinkfd < 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() in init_netlink()"));
+
+    if (fcntl(netlinkfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) in init_netlink()"));
+
+    netlink_bcast_fd = socket(AF_NETLINK, SOCK_DGRAM, NETLINK_XFRM);
+
+    if (netlink_bcast_fd < 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() for bcast in init_netlink()"));
+
+    if (fcntl(netlink_bcast_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) for bcast in init_netlink()"));
+
+    if (fcntl(netlink_bcast_fd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(O_NONBLOCK) for bcast in init_netlink()"));
+
+    addr.nl_family = AF_NETLINK;
+    addr.nl_pid = getpid();
+    addr.nl_groups = XFRMGRP_ACQUIRE | XFRMGRP_EXPIRE;
+    if (bind(netlink_bcast_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "Failed to bind bcast socket in init_netlink()"));
+}
+
+/** send_netlink_msg
+ *
+ * @param hdr - Data to be sent.
+ * @param rbuf - Return Buffer - contains data returned from the send.
+ * @param rbuf_len - Length of rbuf
+ * @param description - String - user friendly description of what is 
+ *                      being attempted.  Used for diagnostics
+ * @param text_said - String
+ * @return bool True if the message was succesfully sent.
+ */
+static bool
+send_netlink_msg(struct nlmsghdr *hdr, struct nlmsghdr *rbuf, size_t rbuf_len
+, const char *description, const char *text_said)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct nlmsgerr e;
+	char data[1024];
+    } rsp;
+
+    size_t len;
+    ssize_t r;
+    struct sockaddr_nl addr;
+    static uint32_t seq;
+
+    if (no_klips)
+    {
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    hdr->nlmsg_seq = ++seq;
+    len = hdr->nlmsg_len;
+    do {
+	r = write(netlinkfd, hdr, len);
+    } while (r < 0 && errno == EINTR);
+    if (r < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e
+	    , "netlink write() of %s message"
+	      " for %s %s failed"
+	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+	    , description, text_said));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else if ((size_t)r != len)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "ERROR: netlink write() of %s message"
+	      " for %s %s truncated: %ld instead of %lu"
+	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+	    , description, text_said
+	    , (long)r, (unsigned long)len);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    for (;;) {
+	socklen_t alen;
+
+	alen = sizeof(addr);
+	r = recvfrom(netlinkfd, &rsp, sizeof(rsp), 0
+	    , (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen);
+	if (r < 0)
+	{
+	    if (errno == EINTR)
+	    {
+		continue;
+	    }
+	    log_errno((e
+		, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+		  " for %s %s failed"
+		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+		, description, text_said));
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	else if ((size_t) r < sizeof(rsp.n))
+	{
+	    plog("netlink read truncated message: %ld bytes; ignore message"
+		, (long) r);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	else if (addr.nl_pid != 0)
+	{
+	    /* not for us: ignore */
+	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("netlink: ignoring %s message from process %u"
+		    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
+		    , addr.nl_pid));
+	    continue;
+	}
+	else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_seq != seq)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("netlink: ignoring out of sequence (%u/%u) message %s"
+		    , rsp.n.nlmsg_seq, seq
+		    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)));
+	    continue;
+	}
+	break;
+    }
+
+    if (rsp.n.nlmsg_len > (size_t) r)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+	      " for %s %s was truncated: %ld instead of %lu"
+	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+	    , description, text_said
+	    , (long) len, (unsigned long) rsp.n.nlmsg_len);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_type != NLMSG_ERROR
+    && (rbuf && rsp.n.nlmsg_type != rbuf->nlmsg_type))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+	      " for %s %s was of wrong type (%s)"
+	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+	    , description, text_said
+	    , sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else if (rbuf)
+    {
+	if ((size_t) r > rbuf_len)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+		, "netlink recvfrom() of response to our %s message"
+		  " for %s %s was too long: %ld > %lu"
+		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+		, description, text_said
+		, (long)r, (unsigned long)rbuf_len);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	memcpy(rbuf, &rsp, r);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else if (rsp.n.nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR && rsp.e.error)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	    , "ERROR: netlink response for %s %s included errno %d: %s"
+	    , description, text_said
+	    , -rsp.e.error
+	    , strerror(-rsp.e.error));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/** netlink_policy -
+ *
+ * @param hdr - Data to check
+ * @param enoent_ok - Boolean - OK or not OK.
+ * @param text_said - String
+ * @return boolean
+ */
+static bool
+netlink_policy(struct nlmsghdr *hdr, bool enoent_ok, const char *text_said)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct nlmsgerr e;
+    } rsp;
+    int error;
+
+    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = NLMSG_ERROR;
+    if (!send_netlink_msg(hdr, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "policy", text_said))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    error = -rsp.e.error;
+    if (!error)
+    {
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (error == ENOENT && enoent_ok)
+    {
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	, "ERROR: netlink %s response for flow %s included errno %d: %s"
+	, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, hdr->nlmsg_type)
+	, text_said
+	, error
+	, strerror(error));
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/** netlink_raw_eroute
+ *
+ * @param this_host ip_address
+ * @param this_client ip_subnet
+ * @param that_host ip_address
+ * @param that_client ip_subnet
+ * @param spi
+ * @param proto int (Currently unused) Contains protocol (u=tcp, 17=udp, etc...)
+ * @param transport_proto int (Currently unused) 0=tunnel, 1=transport
+ * @param satype int
+ * @param proto_info 
+ * @param lifetime (Currently unused)
+ * @param ip int
+ * @return boolean True if successful
+ */
+static bool
+netlink_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
+		 , const ip_subnet *this_client
+		 , const ip_address *that_host
+		 , const ip_subnet *that_client
+		 , ipsec_spi_t spi
+		 , unsigned int satype
+		 , unsigned int transport_proto
+		 , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info
+		 , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
+		 , unsigned int op
+		 , const char *text_said)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	union {
+	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_info p;
+	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
+	} u;
+	char data[1024];
+    } req;
+    int shift;
+    int dir;
+    int family;
+    int policy;
+    bool ok;
+    bool enoent_ok;
+
+    policy = IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC;
+
+    if (satype == SADB_X_SATYPE_INT)
+    {
+	/* shunt route */
+	switch (ntohl(spi))
+	{
+	case SPI_PASS:
+	    policy = IPSEC_POLICY_NONE;
+	    break;
+	case SPI_DROP:
+	case SPI_REJECT:
+	default:
+	    policy = IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD;
+	    break;
+	case SPI_TRAP:
+	case SPI_TRAPSUBNET:
+	case SPI_HOLD:
+	    if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+	    {
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
+
+    family = that_client->addr.u.v4.sin_family;
+    shift = (family == AF_INET) ? 5 : 7;
+
+    req.u.p.sel.sport = portof(&this_client->addr);
+    req.u.p.sel.dport = portof(&that_client->addr);
+    req.u.p.sel.sport_mask = (req.u.p.sel.sport) ? ~0:0;
+    req.u.p.sel.dport_mask = (req.u.p.sel.dport) ? ~0:0;
+    ip2xfrm(&this_client->addr, &req.u.p.sel.saddr);
+    ip2xfrm(&that_client->addr, &req.u.p.sel.daddr);
+    req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s = this_client->maskbits;
+    req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d = that_client->maskbits;
+    req.u.p.sel.proto = transport_proto;
+    req.u.p.sel.family = family;
+
+    dir = XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
+    if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_INFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+    {
+	dir = XFRM_POLICY_IN;
+    }
+
+    if ((op & ERO_MASK) == ERO_DELETE)
+    {
+	req.u.id.dir = dir;
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY;
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.u.id)));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+    	int src, dst;
+
+	req.u.p.dir = dir;
+
+    	src = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s;
+    	dst = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d;
+	if (dir != XFRM_POLICY_OUT) {
+	    src = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_d;
+	    dst = req.u.p.sel.prefixlen_s;
+	}
+	req.u.p.priority = MIN_SPD_PRIORITY
+	    + (((2 << shift) - src) << shift)
+	    + (2 << shift) - dst;
+
+	req.u.p.action = XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW;
+	if (policy == IPSEC_POLICY_DISCARD)
+	{
+	    req.u.p.action = XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK;
+	}
+	req.u.p.lft.soft_use_expires_seconds = use_lifetime;
+	req.u.p.lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+	req.u.p.lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+	req.u.p.lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+	req.u.p.lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
+	if (op & (SADB_X_SAFLAGS_REPLACEFLOW << ERO_FLAG_SHIFT))
+	{
+	    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY;
+	}
+	req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.u.p)));
+    }
+
+    if (policy == IPSEC_POLICY_IPSEC && (op & ERO_MASK) != ERO_DELETE)
+    {
+	struct rtattr *attr;
+	struct xfrm_user_tmpl tmpl[4];
+	int i;
+
+	memset(tmpl, 0, sizeof(tmpl));
+	for (i = 0; proto_info[i].proto; i++)
+	{
+	    tmpl[i].reqid = proto_info[i].reqid;
+	    tmpl[i].id.proto = proto_info[i].proto;
+	    tmpl[i].optional =
+		proto_info[i].proto == IPPROTO_COMP && dir != XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
+	    tmpl[i].aalgos = tmpl[i].ealgos = tmpl[i].calgos = ~0;
+	    tmpl[i].mode =
+		proto_info[i].encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+
+	    if (!tmpl[i].mode)
+	    {
+		continue;
+	    }
+
+	    ip2xfrm(this_host, &tmpl[i].saddr);
+	    ip2xfrm(that_host, &tmpl[i].id.daddr);
+	}
+
+	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)&req + req.n.nlmsg_len);
+	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_TMPL;
+	attr->rta_len = i * sizeof(tmpl[0]);
+	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), tmpl, attr->rta_len);
+	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(attr->rta_len);
+	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+    }
+
+    enoent_ok = FALSE;
+    if (op == ERO_DEL_INBOUND)
+    {
+	enoent_ok = TRUE;
+    }
+    else if (op == ERO_DELETE && ntohl(spi) == SPI_HOLD)
+    {
+	enoent_ok = TRUE;
+    }
+
+    ok = netlink_policy(&req.n, enoent_ok, text_said);
+    switch (dir)
+    {
+    case XFRM_POLICY_IN:
+	if (req.n.nlmsg_type == XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY)
+	{
+	    req.u.id.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+	}
+	else if (!ok)
+	{
+	    break;
+	}
+	else if (proto_info[0].encapsulation != ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	&& satype != SADB_X_SATYPE_INT)
+	{
+	    break;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    req.u.p.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+	}
+	ok &= netlink_policy(&req.n, enoent_ok, text_said);
+	break;
+    }
+
+    return ok;
+}
+
+/** netlink_add_sa - Add an SA into the kernel SPDB via netlink
+ *
+ * @param sa Kernel SA to add/modify
+ * @param replace boolean - true if this replaces an existing SA
+ * @return bool True if successfull
+ */
+static bool
+netlink_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct xfrm_usersa_info p;
+	char data[1024];
+    } req;
+    struct rtattr *attr;
+
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
+    req.n.nlmsg_type = replace ? XFRM_MSG_UPDSA : XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
+
+    ip2xfrm(sa->src, &req.p.saddr);
+    ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.p.id.daddr);
+
+    req.p.id.spi = sa->spi;
+    req.p.id.proto = satype2proto(sa->satype);
+    req.p.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
+    req.p.mode = (sa->encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL);
+    req.p.replay_window = sa->replay_window;
+    req.p.reqid = sa->reqid;
+    req.p.lft.soft_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+    req.p.lft.soft_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+    req.p.lft.hard_byte_limit = XFRM_INF;
+    req.p.lft.hard_packet_limit = XFRM_INF;
+
+    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.p)));
+
+    attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)&req + req.n.nlmsg_len);
+
+    if (sa->authalg)
+    {
+	struct xfrm_algo algo;
+	const char *name;
+
+	name = sparse_name(aalg_list, sa->authalg);
+	if (!name) {
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown authentication algorithm: %u"
+		, sa->authalg);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
+	algo.alg_key_len = sa->authkeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_AUTH;
+	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo) + sa->authkeylen);
+
+	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
+	memcpy((char *)RTA_DATA(attr) + sizeof(algo), sa->authkey
+	    , sa->authkeylen);
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
+    }
+
+    if (sa->encalg)
+    {
+	struct xfrm_algo algo;
+	const char *name;
+
+	name = sparse_name(ealg_list, sa->encalg);
+	if (!name) {
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown encryption algorithm: %u"
+		, sa->encalg);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
+	algo.alg_key_len = sa->enckeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT;
+	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo) + sa->enckeylen);
+
+	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
+	memcpy((char *)RTA_DATA(attr) + sizeof(algo), sa->enckey
+	    , sa->enckeylen);
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
+    }
+
+    if (sa->compalg)
+    {
+	struct xfrm_algo algo;
+	const char *name;
+
+	name = sparse_name(calg_list, sa->compalg);
+	if (!name) {
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown compression algorithm: %u"
+		, sa->compalg);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	strcpy(algo.alg_name, name);
+	algo.alg_key_len = 0;
+
+	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ALG_COMP;
+	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(algo));
+
+	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &algo, sizeof(algo));
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
+    }
+
+    if (sa->natt_type)
+    {
+	struct xfrm_encap_tmpl natt;
+
+	natt.encap_type = sa->natt_type;
+	natt.encap_sport = ntohs(sa->natt_sport);
+	natt.encap_dport = ntohs(sa->natt_dport);
+	memset (&natt.encap_oa, 0, sizeof (natt.encap_oa));
+
+	attr->rta_type = XFRMA_ENCAP;
+	attr->rta_len = RTA_LENGTH(sizeof(natt));
+
+	memcpy(RTA_DATA(attr), &natt, sizeof(natt));
+
+	req.n.nlmsg_len += attr->rta_len;
+	attr = (struct rtattr *)((char *)attr + attr->rta_len);
+    }
+
+    return send_netlink_msg(&req.n, NULL, 0, "Add SA", sa->text_said);
+}
+
+/** netlink_del_sa - Delete an SA from the Kernel
+ *
+ * @param sa Kernel SA to be deleted
+ * @return bool True if successfull
+ */
+static bool
+netlink_del_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct xfrm_usersa_id id;
+	char data[1024];
+    } req;
+
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST | NLM_F_ACK;
+    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_DELSA;
+
+    ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.id.daddr);
+
+    req.id.spi = sa->spi;
+    req.id.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
+    req.id.proto = sa->proto;
+
+    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+
+    return send_netlink_msg(&req.n, NULL, 0, "Del SA", sa->text_said);
+}
+
+static bool
+netlink_error(const char *req_type, const struct nlmsghdr *n
+, const struct nlmsgerr *e, int rsp_size)
+{
+    if (n->nlmsg_type == NLMSG_ERROR)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("%s returned with errno %d: %s"
+	    , req_type
+	    , -e->error
+	    , strerror(-e->error))
+	)
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(rsp_size))
+    {
+	plog("%s returned message with length %lu < %lu bytes"
+	    , req_type
+	    , (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
+	    , (unsigned long) rsp_size);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+static bool
+netlink_get_policy(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool inbound, time_t *use_time)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
+    } req;
+
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	union {
+	    struct nlmsgerr e;
+	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_info info;
+	} u;
+	char data[1024];
+    } rsp;
+
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY;
+
+    req.id.sel.sport = portof(&sa->src_client->addr);
+    req.id.sel.dport = portof(&sa->dst_client->addr);
+    req.id.sel.sport_mask = (req.id.sel.sport) ? ~0:0;
+    req.id.sel.dport_mask = (req.id.sel.dport) ? ~0:0;
+    ip2xfrm(&sa->src_client->addr, &req.id.sel.saddr);
+    ip2xfrm(&sa->dst_client->addr, &req.id.sel.daddr);
+    req.id.sel.prefixlen_s = sa->src_client->maskbits;
+    req.id.sel.prefixlen_d = sa->dst_client->maskbits;
+    req.id.sel.proto = sa->transport_proto;
+    req.id.sel.family = sa->dst_client->addr.u.v4.sin_family;
+
+    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
+
+    req.id.dir = (inbound)? XFRM_POLICY_IN:XFRM_POLICY_OUT;
+
+    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    *use_time = (time_t)rsp.u.info.curlft.use_time;
+
+    if (inbound && sa->encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+    {
+	time_t use_time_fwd;
+
+	req.id.dir = XFRM_POLICY_FWD;
+
+	if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
+	    return FALSE;
+
+        use_time_fwd = (time_t)rsp.u.info.curlft.use_time;
+	*use_time = (*use_time > use_time_fwd)? *use_time : use_time_fwd;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/** netlink_get_sa - Get information about an SA from the Kernel
+ *
+ * @param sa Kernel SA to be queried
+ * @return bool True if successfull
+ */
+static bool
+netlink_get_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, u_int *bytes)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct xfrm_usersa_id id;
+    } req;
+
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	union {
+	    struct nlmsgerr e;
+	    struct xfrm_usersa_info info;
+	} u;
+	char data[1024];
+    } rsp;
+
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETSA;
+
+    ip2xfrm(sa->dst, &req.id.daddr);
+
+    req.id.spi = sa->spi;
+    req.id.family = sa->src->u.v4.sin_family;
+    req.id.proto = sa->proto;
+
+    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
+
+    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get SA", sa->text_said))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETSA", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.info)))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    *bytes = (u_int) rsp.u.info.curlft.bytes;
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void
+linux_pfkey_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg)
+{
+    switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype)
+    {
+    case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
+	    kernel_alg_register_pfkey(msg, msg->sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN);
+#endif
+	    break;
+    case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP:
+	can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;
+	break;
+    default:
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+/** linux_pfkey_register - Register via PFKEY our capabilities
+ *
+ */
+static void
+linux_pfkey_register(void)
+{
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_AH, "AH");
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_ESP, "ESP");
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP, "IPCOMP");
+    pfkey_close();
+}
+
+/** Create ip_address out of xfrm_address_t.
+ *
+ * @param family 
+ * @param src xfrm formatted IP address
+ * @param dst ip_address formatted destination
+ * @return err_t NULL if okay, otherwise an error
+ */
+static err_t
+xfrm_to_ip_address(unsigned family, const xfrm_address_t *src, ip_address *dst)
+{
+    switch (family)
+    {
+    case AF_INET:   /* IPv4 */
+    case AF_UNSPEC: /* Unspecified, we assume IPv4 */
+	initaddr((const void *) &src->a4, sizeof(src->a4), AF_INET, dst);
+	return NULL;
+    case AF_INET6:  /* IPv6 */
+	initaddr((const void *) &src->a6, sizeof(src->a6), AF_INET6, dst);
+	return NULL;
+    default:
+	return "unknown address family";
+    }
+}
+
+/* Create a pair of ip_address's out of xfrm_sel.
+ *
+ * @param sel xfrm selector
+ * @param src ip_address formatted source
+ * @param dst ip_address formatted destination
+ * @return err_t NULL if okay, otherwise an error
+ */
+static err_t
+xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(const struct xfrm_selector *sel
+		    , ip_address *src
+		    , ip_address *dst)
+{
+    int family;
+    err_t ugh;
+
+    family = sel->family;
+
+    if ((ugh = xfrm_to_ip_address(family, &sel->saddr, src))
+	|| (ugh = xfrm_to_ip_address(family, &sel->daddr, dst)))
+	return ugh;
+
+    /* family has been verified in xfrm_to_ip_address. */
+    if (family == AF_INET)
+    {
+	src->u.v4.sin_port = sel->sport;
+	dst->u.v4.sin_port = sel->dport;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	src->u.v6.sin6_port = sel->sport;
+	dst->u.v6.sin6_port = sel->dport;
+    }
+
+   return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+netlink_acquire(struct nlmsghdr *n)
+{
+    struct xfrm_user_acquire *acquire;
+    ip_address src, dst;
+    ip_subnet ours, his;
+    unsigned transport_proto;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*acquire)))
+    {
+	plog("netlink_acquire got message with length %lu < %lu bytes; ignore message"
+	    , (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
+	    , (unsigned long) sizeof(*acquire));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    acquire = NLMSG_DATA(n);
+    transport_proto = acquire->sel.proto;
+
+    /* XXX also the type of src/dst should be checked to make sure
+     *     that they aren't v4 to v6 or something goofy
+     */
+   
+    if (!(ugh = xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(&acquire->sel, &src, &dst))
+    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(&src, &ours))
+    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(&dst, &his)))
+	record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&ours, &his, transport_proto
+	    , "%acquire-netlink");
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+	plog("XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE message from kernel malformed: %s", ugh);
+}
+
+static void
+netlink_shunt_expire(struct xfrm_userpolicy_info *pol)
+{
+    ip_address src, dst;
+    unsigned transport_proto;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+  
+    transport_proto = pol->sel.proto;
+
+    if (!(ugh = xfrm_sel_to_ip_pair(&pol->sel, &src, &dst)))
+    {
+	plog("XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE message from kernel malformed: %s", ugh);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    replace_bare_shunt(&src, &dst, BOTTOM_PRIO, SPI_PASS, FALSE, transport_proto
+	, "delete expired bare shunt");
+}
+
+static void
+netlink_policy_expire(struct nlmsghdr *n)
+{
+    struct xfrm_user_polexpire *upe;
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct xfrm_userpolicy_id id;
+    } req;
+
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	union {
+	    struct nlmsgerr e;
+	    struct xfrm_userpolicy_info pol;
+	} u;
+	char data[1024];
+    } rsp;
+
+    if (n->nlmsg_len < NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(*upe)))
+    {
+	plog("netlink_policy_expire got message with length %lu < %lu bytes; ignore message"
+	    , (unsigned long) n->nlmsg_len
+	    , (unsigned long) sizeof(*upe));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    upe = NLMSG_DATA(n);
+    req.id.dir = upe->pol.dir;
+    req.id.index = upe->pol.index;
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY;
+    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.id)));
+
+    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY;
+
+    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get policy", "?"))
+	return;
+
+    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.pol)))
+	return;
+
+    if (req.id.index != rsp.u.pol.index)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("netlink_policy_expire: policy was replaced: "
+		    "dir=%d, oldindex=%d, newindex=%d"
+		, req.id.dir, req.id.index, rsp.u.pol.index));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (upe->pol.curlft.add_time != rsp.u.pol.curlft.add_time)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("netlink_policy_expire: policy was replaced "
+		    " and you have won the lottery: "
+		    "dir=%d, index=%d"
+		, req.id.dir, req.id.index));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    switch (upe->pol.dir)
+    {
+    case XFRM_POLICY_OUT:
+	netlink_shunt_expire(&rsp.u.pol);
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+static bool
+netlink_get(void)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	char data[1024];
+    } rsp;
+    ssize_t r;
+    struct sockaddr_nl addr;
+    socklen_t alen;
+
+    alen = sizeof(addr);
+    r = recvfrom(netlink_bcast_fd, &rsp, sizeof(rsp), 0
+	, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &alen);
+    if (r < 0)
+    {
+	if (errno == EAGAIN)
+	    return FALSE;
+	if (errno != EINTR)
+	    log_errno((e, "recvfrom() failed in netlink_get"));
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else if ((size_t) r < sizeof(rsp.n))
+    {
+	plog("netlink_get read truncated message: %ld bytes; ignore message"
+	    , (long) r);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else if (addr.nl_pid != 0)
+    {
+	/* not for us: ignore */
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("netlink_get: ignoring %s message from process %u"
+		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
+		, addr.nl_pid));
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else if ((size_t) r != rsp.n.nlmsg_len)
+    {
+	plog("netlink_get read message with length %ld that doesn't equal nlmsg_len %lu bytes; ignore message"
+	    , (long) r
+	    , (unsigned long) rsp.n.nlmsg_len);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("netlink_get: %s message"
+		, sparse_val_show(xfrm_type_names, rsp.n.nlmsg_type)));
+
+    switch (rsp.n.nlmsg_type)
+    {
+    case XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE:
+	netlink_acquire(&rsp.n);
+	break;
+    case XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE:
+	netlink_policy_expire(&rsp.n);
+	break;
+    default:
+	/* ignored */
+	break;
+    }
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void
+netlink_process_msg(void)
+{
+    while (netlink_get())
+	;
+}
+
+static ipsec_spi_t
+netlink_get_spi(const ip_address *src
+, const ip_address *dst
+, int proto
+, bool tunnel_mode
+, unsigned reqid
+, ipsec_spi_t min
+, ipsec_spi_t max
+, const char *text_said)
+{
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	struct xfrm_userspi_info spi;
+    } req;
+
+    struct {
+	struct nlmsghdr n;
+	union {
+	    struct nlmsgerr e;
+	    struct xfrm_usersa_info sa;
+	} u;
+	char data[1024];
+    } rsp;
+
+    memset(&req, 0, sizeof(req));
+    req.n.nlmsg_flags = NLM_F_REQUEST;
+    req.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI;
+
+    ip2xfrm(src, &req.spi.info.saddr);
+    ip2xfrm(dst, &req.spi.info.id.daddr);
+    req.spi.info.mode = tunnel_mode;
+    req.spi.info.reqid = reqid;
+    req.spi.info.id.proto = proto;
+    req.spi.info.family = src->u.v4.sin_family;
+    req.spi.min = min;
+    req.spi.max = max;
+
+    req.n.nlmsg_len = NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(sizeof(req.spi)));
+    rsp.n.nlmsg_type = XFRM_MSG_NEWSA;
+
+    if (!send_netlink_msg(&req.n, &rsp.n, sizeof(rsp), "Get SPI", text_said))
+	return 0;
+
+    if (netlink_error("XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI", &rsp.n, &rsp.u.e, sizeof(rsp.u.sa)))
+	return 0;
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("netlink_get_spi: allocated 0x%x for %s"
+	    , ntohl(rsp.u.sa.id.spi), text_said));
+    return rsp.u.sa.id.spi;
+}
+
+const struct kernel_ops linux_kernel_ops = {
+	type: KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX,
+	inbound_eroute: 1,
+	policy_lifetime: 1,
+	async_fdp: &netlink_bcast_fd,
+
+	init: init_netlink,
+	pfkey_register: linux_pfkey_register,
+	pfkey_register_response: linux_pfkey_register_response,
+	process_msg: netlink_process_msg,
+	raw_eroute: netlink_raw_eroute,
+	get_policy: netlink_get_policy,
+	add_sa: netlink_add_sa,
+	del_sa: netlink_del_sa,
+	get_sa: netlink_get_sa,
+	process_queue: NULL,
+	grp_sa: NULL,
+	get_spi: netlink_get_spi,
+};
+#endif /* linux && KLIPS */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1b5f42e48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_netlink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* declarations of routines that interface with the kernel's pfkey mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003  Herbert Xu
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_netlink.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#if defined(KLIPS) && defined(linux)
+extern const struct kernel_ops linux_kernel_ops;
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..570bb0470
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.c
@@ -0,0 +1,126 @@
+/* interface to fake kernel interface, used for testing pluto in-vitro.
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Michael Richardson <mcr@freeswan.org>
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Herbert Xu.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_noklips.c,v 1.5 2006/02/04 00:01:22 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "kernel_noklips.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+
+void
+init_noklips(void)
+{
+  return;
+}
+
+/* asynchronous messages from our queue */
+static void
+noklips_dequeue(void)
+{
+}
+
+/* asynchronous messages directly from PF_KEY socket */
+static void
+noklips_event(void)
+{
+}
+
+static void
+noklips_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg UNUSED)
+{
+}
+
+static void
+noklips_register(void)
+{
+}
+
+static bool
+noklips_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host UNUSED
+		   , const ip_subnet *this_client UNUSED
+		   , const ip_address *that_host UNUSED
+		   , const ip_subnet *that_client UNUSED
+		   , ipsec_spi_t spi UNUSED
+		   , unsigned int satype UNUSED
+		   , unsigned int transport_proto UNUSED
+		   , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info UNUSED
+		   , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
+		   , unsigned int op UNUSED
+		   , const char *text_said UNUSED)
+{
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
+static bool
+noklips_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa UNUSED
+	       , bool replace UNUSED)
+{
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
+static bool
+noklips_grp_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa0 UNUSED
+	       , const struct kernel_sa *sa1 UNUSED)
+{
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
+static bool
+noklips_del_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa UNUSED)
+{
+  return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+const struct kernel_ops noklips_kernel_ops = {
+	type: KERNEL_TYPE_NONE,
+	async_fdp: NULL,
+	
+	init: init_noklips,
+	pfkey_register: noklips_register,
+	pfkey_register_response: noklips_register_response,
+	process_queue: noklips_dequeue,
+	process_msg: noklips_event,
+	raw_eroute: noklips_raw_eroute,
+	add_sa: noklips_add_sa,
+	grp_sa: noklips_grp_sa,
+	del_sa: noklips_del_sa,
+	get_sa: NULL,
+	get_spi: NULL,
+        inbound_eroute: FALSE,
+	policy_lifetime: FALSE
+};
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fe4e77ec4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_noklips.h
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+/* declarations of routines that interface with the kernel's pfkey mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003  Herbert Xu
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_noklips.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern void init_noklips(void);
+extern const struct kernel_ops noklips_kernel_ops;
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ced7a1453
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.c
@@ -0,0 +1,926 @@
+/* pfkey interface to the kernel's IPsec mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Herbert Xu.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_pfkey.c,v 1.8 2006/02/04 00:01:22 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include <sys/select.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "kernel_pfkey.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "demux.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+
+
+static int pfkeyfd = NULL_FD;
+
+typedef u_int32_t pfkey_seq_t;
+static pfkey_seq_t pfkey_seq = 0;	/* sequence number for our PF_KEY messages */
+
+static pid_t pid;
+
+#define NE(x) { x, #x }	/* Name Entry -- shorthand for sparse_names */
+
+static sparse_names pfkey_type_names = {
+	NE(SADB_RESERVED),
+	NE(SADB_GETSPI),
+	NE(SADB_UPDATE),
+	NE(SADB_ADD),
+	NE(SADB_DELETE),
+	NE(SADB_GET),
+	NE(SADB_ACQUIRE),
+	NE(SADB_REGISTER),
+	NE(SADB_EXPIRE),
+	NE(SADB_FLUSH),
+	NE(SADB_DUMP),
+	NE(SADB_X_PROMISC),
+	NE(SADB_X_PCHANGE),
+	NE(SADB_X_GRPSA),
+	NE(SADB_X_ADDFLOW),
+	NE(SADB_X_DELFLOW),
+	NE(SADB_X_DEBUG),
+	NE(SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING),
+	NE(SADB_MAX),	
+	{ 0, sparse_end }
+};
+
+#ifdef NEVER /* not needed yet */
+static sparse_names pfkey_ext_names = {
+	NE(SADB_EXT_RESERVED),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_SA),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_CURRENT),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_HARD),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_LIFETIME_SOFT),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_PROXY),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_SRC),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_IDENTITY_DST),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_SENSITIVITY),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_PROPOSAL),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_AUTH),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_SUPPORTED_ENCRYPT),
+	NE(SADB_EXT_SPIRANGE),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_KMPRIVATE),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_SATYPE2),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_SA2),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST2),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_FLOW),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_FLOW),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_MASK),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_MASK),
+	NE(SADB_X_EXT_DEBUG),
+	{ 0, sparse_end }
+};
+#endif /* NEVER */
+
+#undef NE
+
+void
+init_pfkey(void)
+{
+    pid = getpid();
+
+    /* open PF_KEY socket */
+
+    pfkeyfd = socket(PF_KEY, SOCK_RAW, PF_KEY_V2);
+
+    if (pfkeyfd == -1)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() in init_pfkeyfd()"));
+
+#ifdef NEVER	/* apparently unsupported! */
+    if (fcntl(pfkeyfd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(O_NONBLOCK) in init_pfkeyfd()"));
+#endif
+    if (fcntl(pfkeyfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) != 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "fcntl(FD_CLOEXEC) in init_pfkeyfd()"));
+
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	DBG_log("process %u listening for PF_KEY_V2 on file descriptor %d", (unsigned)pid, pfkeyfd));
+}
+
+/* Kinds of PF_KEY message from the kernel:
+ * - response to a request from us
+ *   + ACK/NAK
+ *   + Register: indicates transforms supported by kernel
+ *   + SPI requested by getspi
+ * - Acquire, requesting us to deal with trapped clear packet
+ * - expiration of of one of our SAs
+ * - messages to other processes
+ *
+ * To minimize the effect on the event-driven structure of Pluto,
+ * responses are dealt with synchronously.  We hope that the Kernel
+ * produces them synchronously.  We must "read ahead" in the PF_KEY
+ * stream, saving Acquire and Expiry messages that are encountered.
+ * We ignore messages to other processes.
+ */
+
+typedef union {
+	unsigned char bytes[PFKEYv2_MAX_MSGSIZE];
+	struct sadb_msg msg;
+    } pfkey_buf;
+
+/* queue of unprocessed PF_KEY messages input from kernel
+ * Note that the pfkey_buf may be partly allocated, reflecting
+ * the variable length nature of the messages.  So the link field
+ * must come first.
+ */
+typedef struct pfkey_item {
+	struct pfkey_item *next;
+	pfkey_buf buf;
+    } pfkey_item;
+
+static pfkey_item *pfkey_iq_head = NULL;	/* oldest */
+static pfkey_item *pfkey_iq_tail;	/* youngest */
+
+static bool
+pfkey_input_ready(void)
+{
+    fd_set readfds;
+    int ndes;
+    struct timeval tm;
+
+    tm.tv_sec = 0;	/* don't wait at all */
+    tm.tv_usec = 0;
+
+    FD_ZERO(&readfds);	/* we only care about pfkeyfd */
+    FD_SET(pfkeyfd, &readfds);
+
+    do {
+	ndes = select(pfkeyfd + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &tm);
+    } while (ndes == -1 && errno == EINTR);
+
+    if (ndes < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "select() failed in pfkey_get()"));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (ndes == 0)
+	return FALSE;	/* nothing to read */
+
+    passert(ndes == 1 && FD_ISSET(pfkeyfd, &readfds));
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* get a PF_KEY message from kernel.
+ * Returns TRUE is message found, FALSE if no message pending,
+ * and aborts or keeps trying when an error is encountered.
+ * The only validation of the message is that the message length
+ * received matches that in the message header, and that the message
+ * is for this process.
+ */
+static bool
+pfkey_get(pfkey_buf *buf)
+{
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	/* len must be less than PFKEYv2_MAX_MSGSIZE,
+	 * so it should fit in an int.  We use this fact when printing it.
+	 */
+	ssize_t len;
+
+	if (!pfkey_input_ready())
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	len = read(pfkeyfd, buf->bytes, sizeof(buf->bytes));
+
+	if (len < 0)
+	{
+	    if (errno == EAGAIN)
+		return FALSE;
+
+	    log_errno((e, "read() failed in pfkey_get()"));
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	else if ((size_t) len < sizeof(buf->msg))
+	{
+	    plog("pfkey_get read truncated PF_KEY message: %d bytes; ignoring message"
+		, (int) len);
+	}
+	else if ((size_t) len != buf->msg.sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN)
+	{
+	    plog("pfkey_get read PF_KEY message with length %d that doesn't equal sadb_msg_len %u * %u; ignoring message"
+		, (int) len
+		, (unsigned) buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
+		, (unsigned) IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN);
+	}
+	else if (!(buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == (unsigned)pid
+	|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0 && buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_ACQUIRE)
+	|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_REGISTER)
+	|| (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0 && buf->msg.sadb_msg_type == SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING)))
+	{
+	    /* not for us: ignore */
+	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("pfkey_get: ignoring PF_KEY %s message %u for process %u"
+		    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+		    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
+		    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+		DBG_log("pfkey_get: %s message %u"
+		    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+		    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq));
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* get a response to a specific message */
+static bool
+pfkey_get_response(pfkey_buf *buf, pfkey_seq_t seq)
+{
+    while (pfkey_get(buf))
+    {
+	if (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == (unsigned)pid
+	&& buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq == seq)
+	{
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* Not for us: queue it. */
+	    size_t bl = buf->msg.sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+	    pfkey_item *it = alloc_bytes(offsetof(pfkey_item, buf) + bl, "pfkey_item");
+
+	    memcpy(&it->buf, buf, bl);
+
+	    it->next = NULL;
+	    if (pfkey_iq_head == NULL)
+	    {
+		pfkey_iq_head = it;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		pfkey_iq_tail->next = it;
+	    }
+	    pfkey_iq_tail = it;
+	}
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/* Process a SADB_REGISTER message from the kernel.
+ * This will be a response to one of ours, but it may be asynchronous
+ * (if kernel modules are loaded and unloaded).
+ * Some sanity checking has already been performed.
+ */
+static void
+klips_pfkey_register_response(const struct sadb_msg *msg)
+{
+    /* Find out what the kernel can support.
+     * In fact, the only question at the moment
+     * is whether it can support IPcomp.
+     * So we ignore the rest.
+     * ??? we really should pay attention to what transforms are supported.
+     */
+    switch (msg->sadb_msg_satype)
+    {
+    case SADB_SATYPE_AH:
+	break;
+    case SADB_SATYPE_ESP:
+#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG
+	kernel_alg_register_pfkey(msg, sizeof (pfkey_buf));
+#endif
+	break;
+    case SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP:
+	/* ??? There ought to be an extension to list the
+	 * supported algorithms, but RFC 2367 doesn't
+	 * list one for IPcomp.  KLIPS uses SADB_X_CALG_DEFLATE.
+	 * Since we only implement deflate, we'll assume this.
+	 */
+	can_do_IPcomp = TRUE;
+	break;
+    case SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP:
+	break;
+    default:
+	break;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Processs a SADB_ACQUIRE message from KLIPS.
+ * Try to build an opportunistic connection!
+ * See RFC 2367 "PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2" 3.1.6
+ * <base, address(SD), (address(P)), (identity(SD),) (sensitivity,) proposal>
+ * - extensions for source and data IP addresses
+ * - optional extensions for identity [not useful for us?]
+ * - optional extension for sensitivity [not useful for us?]
+ * - expension for proposal [not useful for us?]
+ *
+ * ??? We must use the sequence number in creating an SA.
+ * We actually need to create up to 4 SAs each way.  Which one?
+ * I guess it depends on the protocol present in the sadb_msg_satype.
+ * For now, we'll ignore this requirement.
+ *
+ * ??? We need some mechanism to make sure that multiple ACQUIRE messages
+ * don't cause a whole bunch of redundant negotiations.
+ */
+static void
+process_pfkey_acquire(pfkey_buf *buf, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+{
+    struct sadb_address *srcx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC];
+    struct sadb_address *dstx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST];
+    int src_proto = srcx->sadb_address_proto;
+    int dst_proto = dstx->sadb_address_proto;
+    ip_address *src = (ip_address*)&srcx[1];
+    ip_address *dst = (ip_address*)&dstx[1];
+    ip_subnet ours, his;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    /* assumption: we're only catching our own outgoing packets
+     * so source is our end and destination is the other end.
+     * Verifying this is not actually convenient.
+     *
+     * This stylized control structure yields a complaint or
+     * desired results.  For compactness, a pointer value is
+     * treated as a boolean.  Logically, the structure is:
+     * keep going as long as things are OK.
+     */
+    if (buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid == 0	/* we only wish to hear from kernel */
+    && !(ugh = src_proto == dst_proto? NULL : "src and dst protocols differ")
+    && !(ugh = addrtypeof(src) == addrtypeof(dst)? NULL : "conflicting address types")
+    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(src, &ours))
+    && !(ugh = addrtosubnet(dst, &his)))
+	record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&ours, &his, src_proto, "%acquire");
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+	plog("SADB_ACQUIRE message from KLIPS malformed: %s", ugh);
+
+}
+
+/* Handle PF_KEY messages from the kernel that are not dealt with
+ * synchronously.  In other words, all but responses to PF_KEY messages
+ * that we sent.
+ */
+static void
+pfkey_async(pfkey_buf *buf)
+{
+    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+
+    if (pfkey_msg_parse(&buf->msg, NULL, extensions, EXT_BITS_OUT))
+    {
+	plog("pfkey_async:"
+	    " unparseable PF_KEY message:"
+	    " %s len=%d, errno=%d, seq=%d, pid=%d; message ignored"
+	    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_errno
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("pfkey_async:"
+	    " %s len=%u, errno=%u, satype=%u, seq=%u, pid=%u"
+	    , sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_len
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_errno
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_satype
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_seq
+	    , buf->msg.sadb_msg_pid));
+
+	switch (buf->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+	{
+	case SADB_REGISTER:
+	    kernel_ops->pfkey_register_response(&buf->msg);
+	    break;
+	case SADB_ACQUIRE:
+	    /* to simulate loss of ACQUIRE, delete this call */
+	    process_pfkey_acquire(buf, extensions);
+	    break;
+	case SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING:
+	    process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(&(buf->msg), extensions);
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    /* ignored */
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* asynchronous messages from our queue */
+static void
+pfkey_dequeue(void)
+{
+    while (pfkey_iq_head != NULL)
+    {
+	pfkey_item *it = pfkey_iq_head;
+
+	pfkey_async(&it->buf);
+	pfkey_iq_head = it->next;
+	pfree(it);
+    }
+
+    /* Handle any orphaned holds, but only if no pfkey input is pending.
+     * For each, we initiate Opportunistic.
+     * note: we don't need to advance the pointer because
+     * record_and_initiate_opportunistic will remove the current
+     * record each time we call it.
+     */
+    while (orphaned_holds != NULL && !pfkey_input_ready())
+      record_and_initiate_opportunistic(&orphaned_holds->ours
+					, &orphaned_holds->his
+					, orphaned_holds->transport_proto
+					, "%hold found-pfkey");
+
+}
+
+/* asynchronous messages directly from PF_KEY socket */
+static void
+pfkey_event(void)
+{
+    pfkey_buf buf;
+
+    if (pfkey_get(&buf))
+	pfkey_async(&buf);
+}
+
+static bool
+pfkey_build(int error
+, const char *description
+, const char *text_said
+, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+{
+    if (error == 0)
+    {
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "building of %s %s failed, code %d"
+	    , description, text_said, error);
+	pfkey_extensions_free(extensions);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* pfkey_extensions_init + pfkey_build + pfkey_msg_hdr_build */
+static bool
+pfkey_msg_start(u_int8_t msg_type
+, u_int8_t satype
+, const char *description
+, const char *text_said
+, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+{
+    pfkey_extensions_init(extensions);
+    return pfkey_build(pfkey_msg_hdr_build(&extensions[0], msg_type
+	    , satype, 0, ++pfkey_seq, pid)
+	, description, text_said, extensions);
+}
+
+/* pfkey_build + pfkey_address_build */
+static bool
+pfkeyext_address(u_int16_t exttype
+, const ip_address *address
+, const char *description
+, const char *text_said
+, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+{
+    /* the following variable is only needed to silence
+     * a warning caused by the fact that the argument
+     * to sockaddrof is NOT pointer to const!
+     */
+    ip_address t = *address;
+
+    return pfkey_build(pfkey_address_build(extensions + exttype
+	    , exttype, 0, 0, sockaddrof(&t))
+	, description, text_said, extensions);
+}
+
+/* pfkey_build + pfkey_x_protocol_build */
+static bool
+pfkeyext_protocol(int transport_proto
+, const char *description
+, const char *text_said
+, struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+{
+    return (transport_proto == 0)? TRUE 
+	: pfkey_build(
+	    pfkey_x_protocol_build(extensions + SADB_X_EXT_PROTOCOL, transport_proto)
+	    , description, text_said, extensions);
+}
+
+
+/* Finish (building, sending, accepting response for) PF_KEY message.
+ * If response isn't NULL, the response from the kernel will be
+ * placed there (and its errno field will not be examined).
+ * Returns TRUE iff all appears well.
+ */
+static bool
+finish_pfkey_msg(struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]
+, const char *description
+, const char *text_said
+, pfkey_buf *response)
+{
+    struct sadb_msg *pfkey_msg;
+    bool success = TRUE;
+    int error;
+
+    error = pfkey_msg_build(&pfkey_msg, extensions, EXT_BITS_IN);
+
+    if (error != 0)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "pfkey_msg_build of %s %s failed, code %d"
+	    , description, text_said, error);
+	success = FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	size_t len = pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_len * IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("finish_pfkey_msg: %s message %u for %s %s"
+		, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+		, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
+		, description, text_said);
+	    DBG_dump(NULL, (void *) pfkey_msg, len));
+
+	if (!no_klips)
+	{
+	    ssize_t r = write(pfkeyfd, pfkey_msg, len);
+
+	    if (r != (ssize_t)len)
+	    {
+		if (r < 0)
+		{
+		    log_errno((e
+			, "pfkey write() of %s message %u"
+			  " for %s %s failed"
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names
+			    , pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+			, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
+			, description, text_said));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ERROR: pfkey write() of %s message %u"
+			  " for %s %s truncated: %ld instead of %ld"
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names
+			    , pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+			, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_seq
+			, description, text_said
+			, (long)r, (long)len);
+		}
+		success = FALSE;
+
+		/* if we were compiled with debugging, but we haven't already
+		 * dumped the KLIPS command, do so.
+		 */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		if ((cur_debugging & DBG_KLIPS) == 0)
+		    DBG_dump(NULL, (void *) pfkey_msg, len);
+#endif
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* Check response from KLIPS.
+		 * It ought to be an echo, perhaps with additional info.
+		 * If the caller wants it, response will point to space.
+		 */
+		pfkey_buf b;
+		pfkey_buf *bp = response != NULL? response : &b;
+
+		if (!pfkey_get_response(bp, ((struct sadb_msg *) extensions[0])->sadb_msg_seq))
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ERROR: no response to our PF_KEY %s message for %s %s"
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+			, description, text_said);
+		    success = FALSE;
+		}
+		else if (pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type != bp->msg.sadb_msg_type)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "FreeS/WAN ERROR: response to our PF_KEY %s message for %s %s was of wrong type (%s)"
+			, sparse_name(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+			, description, text_said
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, bp->msg.sadb_msg_type));
+		    success = FALSE;
+		}
+		else if (response == NULL && bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno != 0)
+		{
+		    /* KLIPS is signalling a problem */
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "ERROR: PF_KEY %s response for %s %s included errno %u: %s"
+			, sparse_val_show(pfkey_type_names, pfkey_msg->sadb_msg_type)
+			, description, text_said
+			, (unsigned) bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno
+			, strerror(bp->msg.sadb_msg_errno));
+		    success = FALSE;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* all paths must exit this way to free resources */
+    pfkey_extensions_free(extensions);
+    pfkey_msg_free(&pfkey_msg);
+    return success;
+}
+
+/*  register SA types that can be negotiated */
+void
+pfkey_register_proto(unsigned satype, const char *satypename)
+{
+    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+    pfkey_buf pfb;
+
+    if (!(pfkey_msg_start(SADB_REGISTER
+      , satype
+      , satypename, NULL, extensions)
+    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, satypename, "", &pfb)))
+    {
+	/* ??? should this be loglog */
+	plog("no KLIPS support for %s", satypename);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	kernel_ops->pfkey_register_response(&pfb.msg);
+	DBG(DBG_KLIPS,
+	    DBG_log("%s registered with kernel.", satypename));
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+klips_pfkey_register(void)
+{
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_AH, "AH");
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_SATYPE_ESP, "ESP");
+    can_do_IPcomp = FALSE;  /* until we get a response from KLIPS */
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_COMP, "IPCOMP");
+    pfkey_register_proto(SADB_X_SATYPE_IPIP, "IPIP");
+}
+
+static bool
+pfkey_raw_eroute(const ip_address *this_host
+		 , const ip_subnet *this_client
+		 , const ip_address *that_host
+		 , const ip_subnet *that_client
+		 , ipsec_spi_t spi
+		 , unsigned int satype
+		 , unsigned int transport_proto
+		 , const struct pfkey_proto_info *proto_info UNUSED
+		 , time_t use_lifetime UNUSED
+		 , unsigned int op
+		 , const char *text_said)
+{
+    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+    ip_address
+	sflow_ska,
+	dflow_ska,
+	smask_ska,
+	dmask_ska;
+    int sport = ntohs(portof(&this_client->addr));
+    int dport = ntohs(portof(&that_client->addr));
+
+    networkof(this_client, &sflow_ska);
+    maskof(this_client, &smask_ska);
+    setportof(sport ? ~0:0, &smask_ska);
+
+    networkof(that_client, &dflow_ska);
+    maskof(that_client, &dmask_ska);
+    setportof(dport ? ~0:0, &dmask_ska);
+
+    if (!pfkey_msg_start(op & ERO_MASK, satype
+		       , "pfkey_msg_hdr flow", text_said, extensions))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (op != ERO_DELETE)
+    {
+	if (!(pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+					 , SADB_EXT_SA
+					 , spi	/* in network order */
+					 , 0, 0, 0, 0, op >> ERO_FLAG_SHIFT)
+			  , "pfkey_sa add flow", text_said, extensions)
+
+	    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, this_host
+		, "pfkey_addr_s add flow", text_said, extensions)
+
+	    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, that_host
+				, "pfkey_addr_d add flow", text_said
+				, extensions)))
+	{
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_FLOW, &sflow_ska
+			  , "pfkey_addr_sflow", text_said, extensions))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_FLOW, &dflow_ska
+			, "pfkey_addr_dflow", text_said, extensions))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC_MASK, &smask_ska
+			, "pfkey_addr_smask", text_said, extensions))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST_MASK, &dmask_ska
+			, "pfkey_addr_dmask", text_said, extensions))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!pfkeyext_protocol(transport_proto
+			, "pfkey_x_protocol", text_said, extensions))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "flow", text_said, NULL);
+}
+
+static bool
+pfkey_add_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa, bool replace)
+{
+    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+
+    return pfkey_msg_start(replace ? SADB_UPDATE : SADB_ADD, sa->satype
+	, "pfkey_msg_hdr Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+	    , SADB_EXT_SA
+	    , sa->spi	/* in network order */
+	    , sa->replay_window, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE
+	    , sa->authalg, sa->encalg ? sa->encalg: sa->compalg, 0)
+	, "pfkey_sa Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, sa->src
+	, "pfkey_addr_s Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa->dst
+	, "pfkey_addr_d Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && (sa->authkeylen == 0
+	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_key_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH]
+		, SADB_EXT_KEY_AUTH, sa->authkeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE
+		, sa->authkey)
+	    , "pfkey_key_a Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
+
+    && (sa->enckeylen == 0
+	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_key_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT]
+		, SADB_EXT_KEY_ENCRYPT, sa->enckeylen * BITS_PER_BYTE
+		, sa->enckey)
+	    , "pfkey_key_e Add SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
+
+    && (sa->natt_type == 0
+	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_type_build(
+		&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_TYPE], sa->natt_type),
+		"pfkey_nat_t_type Add ESP SA",  sa->text_said, extensions))
+    && (sa->natt_sport == 0
+	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_port_build(
+			&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT], SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_SPORT,
+			sa->natt_sport), "pfkey_nat_t_sport Add ESP SA", sa->text_said,
+			extensions))
+    && (sa->natt_dport == 0
+	|| pfkey_build(pfkey_x_nat_t_port_build(
+			&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT], SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_DPORT,
+			sa->natt_dport), "pfkey_nat_t_dport Add ESP SA", sa->text_said,
+			extensions))
+    && (sa->natt_type == 0 || isanyaddr(sa->natt_oa)
+	|| pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_NAT_T_OA, sa->natt_oa
+	    , "pfkey_nat_t_oa Add ESP SA", sa->text_said, extensions))
+
+    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "Add SA", sa->text_said, NULL);
+
+}
+
+static bool
+pfkey_grp_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa0, const struct kernel_sa *sa1)
+{
+    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+
+    return pfkey_msg_start(SADB_X_GRPSA, sa1->satype
+	, "pfkey_msg_hdr group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+	    , SADB_EXT_SA
+	    , sa1->spi	/* in network order */
+	    , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+	, "pfkey_sa group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa1->dst
+	, "pfkey_addr_d group", sa1->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkey_build(pfkey_x_satype_build(&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_SATYPE2]
+	    , sa0->satype)
+	, "pfkey_satype group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_X_EXT_SA2]
+	    , SADB_X_EXT_SA2
+	    , sa0->spi	/* in network order */
+	    , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)
+	, "pfkey_sa2 group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_X_EXT_ADDRESS_DST2, sa0->dst
+	, "pfkey_addr_d2 group", sa0->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "group", sa1->text_said, NULL);
+}
+
+static bool
+pfkey_del_sa(const struct kernel_sa *sa)
+{
+    struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1];
+
+    return pfkey_msg_start(SADB_DELETE, proto2satype(sa->proto)
+	, "pfkey_msg_hdr delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkey_build(pfkey_sa_build(&extensions[SADB_EXT_SA]
+	    , SADB_EXT_SA
+	    , sa->spi	/* in host order */
+	    , 0, SADB_SASTATE_MATURE, 0, 0, 0)
+	, "pfkey_sa delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC, sa->src
+	, "pfkey_addr_s delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && pfkeyext_address(SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST, sa->dst
+	, "pfkey_addr_d delete SA", sa->text_said, extensions)
+
+    && finish_pfkey_msg(extensions, "Delete SA", sa->text_said, NULL);
+}
+
+void
+pfkey_close(void)
+{
+    while (pfkey_iq_head != NULL)
+    {
+	pfkey_item *it = pfkey_iq_head;
+
+	pfkey_iq_head = it->next;
+	pfree(it);
+    }
+
+    close(pfkeyfd);
+    pfkeyfd = NULL_FD;
+}
+
+const struct kernel_ops klips_kernel_ops = {
+	type: KERNEL_TYPE_KLIPS,
+	async_fdp: &pfkeyfd,
+
+	pfkey_register: klips_pfkey_register,
+	pfkey_register_response: klips_pfkey_register_response,
+	process_queue: pfkey_dequeue,
+	process_msg: pfkey_event,
+	raw_eroute: pfkey_raw_eroute,
+	add_sa: pfkey_add_sa,
+	grp_sa: pfkey_grp_sa,
+	del_sa: pfkey_del_sa,
+	get_sa: NULL,
+	get_spi: NULL,
+        inbound_eroute: FALSE,
+	policy_lifetime: FALSE,
+	init: NULL
+};
+#endif /* KLIPS */
diff --git a/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9dbcdd341
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/kernel_pfkey.h
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+/* declarations of routines that interface with the kernel's pfkey mechanism
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003  Herbert Xu
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: kernel_pfkey.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+extern void init_pfkey(void);
+extern void pfkey_register_proto(unsigned satype, const char *satypename);
+extern void pfkey_close(void);
+extern const struct kernel_ops klips_kernel_ops;
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/keys.c b/src/pluto/keys.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..eed81230f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/keys.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1514 @@
+/* mechanisms for preshared keys (public, private, and preshared secrets)
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: keys.c,v 1.24 2006/01/27 08:59:40 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <glob.h>
+#ifndef GLOB_ABORTED
+# define GLOB_ABORTED    GLOB_ABEND	/* fix for old versions */
+#endif
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "lex.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "xauth.h"
+
+const char *shared_secrets_file = SHARED_SECRETS_FILE;
+
+typedef struct id_list id_list_t;
+
+struct id_list {
+    struct id id;
+    id_list_t *next;
+};
+
+typedef struct secret secret_t;
+
+struct secret {
+    id_list_t *ids;
+    enum PrivateKeyKind kind;
+    union {
+	chunk_t preshared_secret;
+	RSA_private_key_t RSA_private_key;
+	xauth_t xauth_secret;
+	smartcard_t *smartcard;
+    } u;
+    secret_t *next;
+};
+
+static pubkey_t*
+allocate_RSA_public_key(const cert_t cert)
+{
+    pubkey_t *pk = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey");
+    chunk_t e, n;
+
+    switch (cert.type)
+    {
+    case CERT_PGP:
+	e = cert.u.pgp->publicExponent;
+	n = cert.u.pgp->modulus;
+	break;
+    case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE:
+	e = cert.u.x509->publicExponent;
+	n = cert.u.x509->modulus;
+	break;
+    default:
+	plog("RSA public key allocation error");
+    }
+
+    init_RSA_public_key(&pk->u.rsa, e, n);
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	RSA_show_public_key(&pk->u.rsa)
+    )
+
+    pk->alg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
+    pk->id  = empty_id;
+    pk->issuer = empty_chunk;
+    pk->serial = empty_chunk;
+
+    return pk;
+}
+
+/*
+ * free a public key struct
+ */
+static void
+free_public_key(pubkey_t *pk)
+{
+    free_id_content(&pk->id);
+    freeanychunk(pk->issuer);
+    freeanychunk(pk->serial);
+
+    /* algorithm-specific freeing */
+    switch (pk->alg)
+    {
+    case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+	free_RSA_public_content(&pk->u.rsa);
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(pk->alg);
+    }
+    pfree(pk);
+}
+
+secret_t *secrets = NULL;
+
+/* find the struct secret associated with the combination of
+ * me and the peer.  We match the Id (if none, the IP address).
+ * Failure is indicated by a NULL.
+ */
+static const secret_t *
+get_secret(const struct connection *c, enum PrivateKeyKind kind, bool asym)
+{
+    enum {	/* bits */
+	match_default = 01,
+	match_him = 02,
+	match_me = 04
+    };
+
+    unsigned int best_match = 0;
+    secret_t *best = NULL;
+    secret_t *s;
+    const struct id *my_id  = &c->spd.this.id
+	          , *his_id = &c->spd.that.id;
+    struct id rw_id;
+
+    /* is there a certificate assigned to this connection? */
+    if (kind == PPK_RSA && c->spd.this.cert.type != CERT_NONE)
+    {
+	pubkey_t *my_public_key = allocate_RSA_public_key(c->spd.this.cert);
+
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+	{
+	    if (s->kind == kind &&
+		same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &my_public_key->u.rsa))
+	    {
+		best = s;
+		break; /* we have found the private key - no sense in searching further */
+	    }
+	}
+	free_public_key(my_public_key);
+	return best;
+    }
+
+    if (his_id_was_instantiated(c))
+    {
+	/* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */
+	rw_id.kind = c->spd.that.id.kind;
+	rw_id.name = empty_chunk;
+	happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr));
+	his_id = &rw_id;
+    }
+    else if (kind == PPK_PSK
+    && (c->policy & (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK))
+    && ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && c->spd.that.id.kind == ID_NONE) ||
+        (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && id_is_ipaddr(&c->spd.that.id))))
+    {
+	/* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */
+	rw_id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+	happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr));
+	his_id = &rw_id;
+    }
+
+    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+    {
+	if (s->kind == kind)
+	{
+	    unsigned int match = 0;
+
+	    if (s->ids == NULL)
+	    {
+		/* a default (signified by lack of ids):
+		 * accept if no more specific match found
+		 */
+		match = match_default;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* check if both ends match ids */
+		id_list_t *i;
+
+		for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = i->next)
+		{
+		    if (same_id(my_id, &i->id))
+			match |= match_me;
+
+		    if (same_id(his_id, &i->id))
+			match |= match_him;
+		}
+
+		/* If our end matched the only id in the list,
+		 * default to matching any peer.
+		 * A more specific match will trump this.
+		 */
+		if (match == match_me
+		&& s->ids->next == NULL)
+		    match |= match_default;
+	    }
+
+	    switch (match)
+	    {
+	    case match_me:
+		/* if this is an asymmetric (eg. public key) system,
+		 * allow this-side-only match to count, even if
+		 * there are other ids in the list.
+		 */
+		if (!asym)
+		    break;
+		/* FALLTHROUGH */
+	    case match_default:	/* default all */
+	    case match_me | match_default:	/* default peer */
+	    case match_me | match_him:	/* explicit */
+		if (match == best_match)
+		{
+		    /* two good matches are equally good:
+		     * do they agree?
+		     */
+		    bool same = FALSE;
+
+		    switch (kind)
+		    {
+		    case PPK_PSK:
+			same = s->u.preshared_secret.len == best->u.preshared_secret.len
+			    && memcmp(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr, best->u.preshared_secret.ptr, s->u.preshared_secret.len) == 0;
+			break;
+		    case PPK_RSA:
+			/* Dirty trick: since we have code to compare
+			 * RSA public keys, but not private keys, we
+			 * make the assumption that equal public keys
+			 * mean equal private keys.  This ought to work.
+			 */
+			same = same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub
+					      , &best->u.RSA_private_key.pub);
+			break;
+		    default:
+			bad_case(kind);
+		    }
+		    if (!same)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "multiple ipsec.secrets entries with distinct secrets match endpoints:"
+			    " first secret used");
+			best = s;	/* list is backwards: take latest in list */
+		    }
+		}
+		else if (match > best_match)
+		{
+		    /* this is the best match so far */
+		    best_match = match;
+		    best = s;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return best;
+}
+
+/* find the appropriate preshared key (see get_secret).
+ * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer.
+ * Note: the result is not to be freed by the caller.
+ */
+const chunk_t *
+get_preshared_secret(const struct connection *c)
+{
+    const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_PSK, FALSE);
+
+    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	if (s == NULL)
+	    DBG_log("no Preshared Key Found");
+	else
+	    DBG_dump_chunk("Preshared Key", s->u.preshared_secret);
+    )
+    return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.preshared_secret;
+}
+
+/* check the existence of an RSA private key matching an RSA public
+ * key contained in an X.509 or OpenPGP certificate
+ */
+bool
+has_private_key(cert_t cert)
+{
+    secret_t *s;
+    bool has_key = FALSE;
+    pubkey_t *pubkey = allocate_RSA_public_key(cert);
+
+    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+    {
+	if (s->kind == PPK_RSA &&
+	    same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &pubkey->u.rsa))
+	{
+	    has_key = TRUE;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    free_public_key(pubkey);
+    return has_key;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the matching RSA private key belonging to a given X.509 certificate
+ */
+const RSA_private_key_t*
+get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    secret_t *s;
+    const RSA_private_key_t *pri = NULL;
+    const cert_t c = {CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert}};
+
+    pubkey_t *pubkey = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
+
+    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+    {
+	if (s->kind == PPK_RSA &&
+	    same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &pubkey->u.rsa))
+	{
+	    pri = &s->u.RSA_private_key;
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    free_public_key(pubkey);
+    return pri;
+}
+
+/* find the appropriate RSA private key (see get_secret).
+ * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer.
+ */
+const RSA_private_key_t *
+get_RSA_private_key(const struct connection *c)
+{
+    const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_RSA, TRUE);
+
+    return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.RSA_private_key;
+}
+
+/* digest a secrets file
+ *
+ * The file is a sequence of records.  A record is a maximal sequence of
+ * tokens such that the first, and only the first, is in the first column
+ * of a line.
+ *
+ * Tokens are generally separated by whitespace and are key words, ids,
+ * strings, or data suitable for ttodata(3).  As a nod to convention,
+ * a trailing ":" on what would otherwise be a token is taken as a
+ * separate token.  If preceded by whitespace, a "#" is taken as starting
+ * a comment: it and the rest of the line are ignored.
+ *
+ * One kind of record is an include directive.  It starts with "include".
+ * The filename is the only other token in the record.
+ * If the filename does not start with /, it is taken to
+ * be relative to the directory containing the current file.
+ *
+ * The other kind of record describes a key.  It starts with a
+ * sequence of ids and ends with key information.  Each id
+ * is an IP address, a Fully Qualified Domain Name (which will immediately
+ * be resolved), or @FQDN which will be left as a name.
+ *
+ * The key part can be in several forms.
+ *
+ * The old form of the key is still supported: a simple
+ * quoted strings (with no escapes) is taken as a preshred key.
+ *
+ * The new form starts the key part with a ":".
+ *
+ * For Preshared Key, use the "PSK" keyword, and follow it by a string
+ * or a data token suitable for ttodata(3).
+ *
+ * For RSA Private Key, use the "RSA" keyword, followed by a
+ * brace-enclosed list of key field keywords and data values.
+ * The data values are large integers to be decoded by ttodata(3).
+ * The fields are a subset of those used by BIND 8.2 and have the
+ * same names.
+ */
+
+/* parse PSK from file */
+static err_t
+process_psk_secret(chunk_t *psk)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')
+    {
+	clonetochunk(*psk, tok+1, flp->cur - tok  - 2, "PSK");
+	(void) shift();
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];	/* limit on size of binary representation of key */
+	size_t sz;
+
+	ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz
+	    , diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS);
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* ttodata didn't like PSK data */
+	    ugh = builddiag("PSK data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    clonetochunk(*psk, buf, sz, "PSK");
+	    (void) shift();
+	}
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/* Parse fields of RSA private key.
+ * A braced list of keyword and value pairs.
+ * At the moment, each field is required, in order.
+ * The fields come from BIND 8.2's representation
+ */
+static err_t
+process_rsa_secret(RSA_private_key_t *rsak)
+{
+    char buf[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES];	/* limit on size of binary representation of key */
+    const struct fld *p;
+
+    /* save bytes of Modulus and PublicExponent for keyid calculation */
+    unsigned char ebytes[sizeof(buf)];
+    unsigned char *eb_next = ebytes;
+    chunk_t pub_bytes[2];
+    chunk_t *pb_next = &pub_bytes[0];
+
+    for (p = RSA_private_field; p < &RSA_private_field[RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS]; p++)
+    {
+	size_t sz;
+	err_t ugh;
+
+	if (!shift())
+	{
+	    return "premature end of RSA key";
+	}
+	else if (!tokeqword(p->name))
+	{
+	    return builddiag("%s keyword not found where expected in RSA key"
+		, p->name);
+	}
+	else if (!(shift()
+	&& (!tokeq(":") || shift())))	/* ignore optional ":" */
+	{
+	    return "premature end of RSA key";
+	}
+	else if (NULL != (ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok
+	, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space)
+	, TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS)))
+	{
+	    /* in RSA key, ttodata didn't like */
+	    return builddiag("RSA data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    MP_INT *n = (MP_INT *) ((char *)rsak + p->offset);
+
+	    n_to_mpz(n, buf, sz);
+	    if (pb_next < &pub_bytes[elemsof(pub_bytes)])
+	    {
+		if (eb_next - ebytes + sz > sizeof(ebytes))
+		    return "public key takes too many bytes";
+
+		setchunk(*pb_next, eb_next, sz);
+		memcpy(eb_next, buf, sz);
+		eb_next += sz;
+		pb_next++;
+	    }
+#if 0	/* debugging info that compromises security */
+	    {
+		size_t sz = mpz_sizeinbase(n, 16);
+		char buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS * 2 + 2];	/* ought to be big enough */
+
+		passert(sz <= sizeof(buf));
+		mpz_get_str(buf, 16, n);
+
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s: %s", p->name, buf);
+	    }
+#endif
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* We require an (indented) '}' and the end of the record.
+     * We break down the test so that the diagnostic will be
+     * more helpful.  Some people don't seem to wish to indent
+     * the brace!
+     */
+    if (!shift() || !tokeq("}"))
+    {
+	return "malformed end of RSA private key -- indented '}' required";
+    }
+    else if (shift())
+    {
+	return "malformed end of RSA private key -- unexpected token after '}'";
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	unsigned bits = mpz_sizeinbase(&rsak->pub.n, 2);
+
+	rsak->pub.k = (bits + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	rsak->pub.keyid[0] = '\0';	/* in case of splitkeytoid failure */
+	splitkeytoid(pub_bytes[1].ptr, pub_bytes[1].len
+	    , pub_bytes[0].ptr, pub_bytes[0].len
+	    , rsak->pub.keyid, sizeof(rsak->pub.keyid));
+	return RSA_private_key_sanity(rsak);
+    }
+}
+
+/* process rsa key file protected with optional passphrase which can either be
+ * read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for by using whack
+ */
+static err_t
+process_rsa_keyfile(RSA_private_key_t *rsak, int whackfd)
+{
+    char filename[BUF_LEN];
+    prompt_pass_t pass;
+
+    memset(filename,'\0', BUF_LEN);
+    memset(pass.secret,'\0', sizeof(pass.secret));
+    pass.prompt = FALSE;
+    pass.fd = whackfd;
+
+    /* we expect the filename of a PKCS#1 private key file */
+
+    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted filename */
+	memcpy(filename, tok+1, flp->cur - tok - 2);
+    else
+    	memcpy(filename, tok, flp->cur - tok);
+
+    if (shift())
+    {
+	/* we expect an appended passphrase or passphrase prompt*/
+	if (tokeqword("%prompt"))
+	{
+	    if (pass.fd == NULL_FD)
+		return "RSA private key file -- enter passphrase using 'ipsec secrets'";
+	    pass.prompt = TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    char *passphrase = tok;
+	    size_t len = flp->cur - passphrase;
+
+	    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted passphrase */
+	    {
+		passphrase++;
+		len -= 2;
+	    }
+	    if (len > PROMPT_PASS_LEN)
+		return "RSA private key file -- passphrase exceeds 64 characters";
+
+	    memcpy(pass.secret, passphrase, len);
+	}
+	if (shift())
+	    return "RSA private key file -- unexpected token after passphrase";
+    }
+    return load_rsa_private_key(filename, &pass, rsak);
+}
+
+/*
+ * process xauth secret read from ipsec.secrets
+ */
+static err_t
+process_xauth(secret_t *s)
+{
+    chunk_t user_name;
+
+    s->kind = PPK_XAUTH;
+
+    if (!shift())
+	return "missing xauth user name";
+    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')  /* quoted user name */
+    {
+	user_name.ptr = tok + 1;
+	user_name.len = flp->cur - tok - 2;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	user_name.ptr = tok;
+	user_name.len = flp->cur - tok;
+    }
+    plog("  loaded xauth credentials of user '%.*s'"
+		, user_name.len
+		, user_name.ptr);
+    clonetochunk(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name
+	, user_name.ptr, user_name.len, "xauth user name");
+
+    if (!shift())
+	return "missing xauth user password";
+    return process_psk_secret(&s->u.xauth_secret.user_password);
+}
+
+/* get XAUTH secret from chained secrets lists
+ * only one entry is currently supported
+ */
+static bool
+xauth_get_secret(xauth_t *xauth_secret)
+{
+    secret_t *s;
+    bool found = FALSE;
+
+    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+    {
+	if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH)
+	{
+	    if (found)
+	    {
+		plog("found multiple xauth secrets - first selected");
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		found = TRUE;
+		*xauth_secret = s->u.xauth_secret;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return found;
+}
+
+/*
+ * find a matching secret
+ */
+static bool
+xauth_verify_secret(const xauth_t *xauth_secret)
+{
+    bool found = FALSE;
+    secret_t *s;
+
+    for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next)
+    {
+	if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH)
+	{
+	    if (!same_chunk(xauth_secret->user_name, s->u.xauth_secret.user_name))
+		continue;
+	    found = TRUE;
+	    if (same_chunk(xauth_secret->user_password, s->u.xauth_secret.user_password))
+		return TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+    plog("xauth user '%.*s' %s"
+       , xauth_secret->user_name.len, xauth_secret->user_name.ptr
+       , found? "sent wrong password":"not found");
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * the global xauth_module struct is defined here
+ */
+xauth_module_t xauth_module;
+
+/*
+ * assign the default xauth functions to any null function pointers
+ */
+void
+xauth_defaults(void)
+{
+    if (xauth_module.get_secret == NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("xauth module: using default get_secret() function")
+	)
+	xauth_module.get_secret = xauth_get_secret;
+    }
+    if (xauth_module.verify_secret == NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("xauth module: using default verify_secret() function")
+	)
+	xauth_module.verify_secret = xauth_verify_secret;
+    }
+};
+
+/*
+ * process pin read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for it using whack
+ */
+static err_t
+process_pin(secret_t *s, int whackfd)
+{
+    smartcard_t *sc;
+    const char *pin_status = "no pin";
+
+    s->kind = PPK_PIN;
+
+    /* looking for the smartcard keyword */
+    if (!shift() || strncmp(tok, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) != 0)
+	 return "PIN keyword must be followed by %smartcard<reader>:<id>";
+
+    sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(tok + strlen(SCX_TOKEN)));
+    s->u.smartcard = sc;
+    scx_share(sc);
+    if (sc->pin.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	scx_free_pin(&sc->pin);
+    }
+    sc->valid = FALSE;
+
+    if (!shift())
+	return "PIN statement must be terminated either by <pin code>, %pinpad or %prompt";
+
+    if (tokeqword("%prompt"))
+    {
+	shift();
+	/* if whackfd exists, whack will be used to prompt for a pin */
+	if (whackfd != NULL_FD)
+	    pin_status = scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd) ? "valid pin" : "invalid pin";
+	else
+	    pin_status = "pin entry via prompt";
+    }
+    else if (tokeqword("%pinpad"))
+    {
+	shift();
+	/* pin will be entered via pin pad during verification */
+	clonetochunk(sc->pin, "", 0, "empty pin");
+	sc->pinpad = TRUE;
+	sc->valid = TRUE;
+	pin_status = "pin entry via pad";
+	if (pkcs11_keep_state)
+	    scx_verify_pin(sc);
+    }
+    else
+    {	
+	/* we read the pin directly from ipsec.secrets */
+	err_t ugh = process_psk_secret(&sc->pin);
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	return ugh;
+	/* verify the pin */
+	pin_status = scx_verify_pin(sc) ? "valid PIN" : "invalid PIN";
+    }
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    {
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	if (sc->any_slot)
+	    snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot");
+	else
+	    snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %lu", sc->slot);
+
+        plog("  %s for #%d (%s, id: %s)"
+	    , pin_status, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id);
+    }
+#else
+    plog("  warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+#endif
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+process_secret(secret_t *s, int whackfd)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    s->kind = PPK_PSK;	/* default */
+    if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'')
+    {
+	/* old PSK format: just a string */
+	ugh = process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret);
+    }
+    else if (tokeqword("psk"))
+    {
+	/* preshared key: quoted string or ttodata format */
+	ugh = !shift()? "unexpected end of record in PSK"
+	    : process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret);
+    }
+    else if (tokeqword("rsa"))
+    {
+	/* RSA key: the fun begins.
+	 * A braced list of keyword and value pairs.
+	 */
+	s->kind = PPK_RSA;
+	if (!shift())
+	{
+	    ugh = "bad RSA key syntax";
+	}
+	else if (tokeq("{"))
+	{
+	    ugh = process_rsa_secret(&s->u.RSA_private_key);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	   ugh = process_rsa_keyfile(&s->u.RSA_private_key, whackfd);
+	}
+    }
+    else if (tokeqword("xauth"))
+    {
+	ugh = process_xauth(s);
+    }
+    else if (tokeqword("pin"))
+    {
+	ugh = process_pin(s, whackfd);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ugh = builddiag("unrecognized key format: %s", tok);
+    }
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s"
+	    , flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh);
+	pfree(s);
+    }
+    else if (flushline("expected record boundary in key"))
+    {
+	/* gauntlet has been run: install new secret */
+	lock_certs_and_keys("process_secret");
+	s->next = secrets;
+	secrets = s;
+	unlock_certs_and_keys("process_secrets");
+    }
+}
+
+static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd);	/* forward declaration */
+
+static void
+process_secret_records(int whackfd)
+{
+    /* read records from ipsec.secrets and load them into our table */
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	(void)flushline(NULL);	/* silently ditch leftovers, if any */
+	if (flp->bdry == B_file)
+	    break;
+
+	flp->bdry = B_none;	/* eat the Record Boundary */
+	(void)shift();	/* get real first token */
+
+	if (tokeqword("include"))
+	{
+	    /* an include directive */
+	    char fn[MAX_TOK_LEN];	/* space for filename (I hope) */
+	    char *p = fn;
+	    char *end_prefix = strrchr(flp->filename, '/');
+
+	    if (!shift())
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of include directive"
+		    , flp->filename, flp->lino);
+		continue;   /* abandon this record */
+	    }
+
+	    /* if path is relative and including file's pathname has
+	     * a non-empty dirname, prefix this path with that dirname.
+	     */
+	    if (tok[0] != '/' && end_prefix != NULL)
+	    {
+		size_t pl = end_prefix - flp->filename + 1;
+
+		/* "clamp" length to prevent problems now;
+		 * will be rediscovered and reported later.
+		 */
+		if (pl > sizeof(fn))
+		    pl = sizeof(fn);
+		memcpy(fn, flp->filename, pl);
+		p += pl;
+	    }
+	    if (flp->cur - tok >= &fn[sizeof(fn)] - p)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: include pathname too long"
+		    , flp->filename, flp->lino);
+		continue;   /* abandon this record */
+	    }
+	    strcpy(p, tok);
+	    (void) shift();	/* move to Record Boundary, we hope */
+	    if (flushline("ignoring malformed INCLUDE -- expected Record Boundary after filename"))
+	    {
+		process_secrets_file(fn, whackfd);
+		tok = NULL;	/* correct, but probably redundant */
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* expecting a list of indices and then the key info */
+	    secret_t *s = alloc_thing(secret_t, "secret");
+
+	    s->ids = NULL;
+	    s->kind = PPK_PSK;	/* default */
+	    setchunk(s->u.preshared_secret, NULL, 0);
+	    s->next = NULL;
+
+	    for (;;)
+	    {
+		if (tok[0] == '"' || tok[0] == '\'')
+		{
+		    /* found key part */
+		    process_secret(s, whackfd);
+		    break;
+		}
+		else if (tokeq(":"))
+		{
+		    /* found key part */
+		    shift();	/* discard explicit separator */
+		    process_secret(s, whackfd);
+		    break;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* an id
+		     * See RFC2407 IPsec Domain of Interpretation 4.6.2
+		     */
+		    struct id id;
+		    err_t ugh;
+
+		    if (tokeq("%any"))
+		    {
+			id = empty_id;
+			id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+			ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET, &id.ip_addr);
+		    }
+		    else if (tokeq("%any6"))
+		    {
+			id = empty_id;
+			id.kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
+			ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET6, &id.ip_addr);
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			ugh = atoid(tok, &id, FALSE);
+		    }
+
+		    if (ugh != NULL)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "ERROR \"%s\" line %d: index \"%s\" %s"
+			    , flp->filename, flp->lino, tok, ugh);
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			id_list_t *i = alloc_thing(id_list_t
+			    , "id_list");
+
+			i->id = id;
+			unshare_id_content(&i->id);
+			i->next = s->ids;
+			s->ids = i;
+			/* DBG_log("id type %d: %s %.*s", i->kind, ip_str(&i->ip_addr), (int)i->name.len, i->name.ptr); */
+		    }
+		    if (!shift())
+		    {
+			/* unexpected Record Boundary or EOF */
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of id list"
+			    , flp->filename, flp->lino);
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static int
+globugh(const char *epath, int eerrno)
+{
+    log_errno_routine(eerrno, "problem with secrets file \"%s\"", epath);
+    return 1;	/* stop glob */
+}
+
+static void
+process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd)
+{
+    struct file_lex_position pos;
+    char **fnp;
+    glob_t globbuf;
+
+    pos.depth = flp == NULL? 0 : flp->depth + 1;
+
+    if (pos.depth > 10)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secrets file \"%s\" nested too deeply", file_pat);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* do globbing */
+    {
+	int r = glob(file_pat, GLOB_ERR, globugh, &globbuf);
+
+	if (r != 0)
+	{
+	    switch (r)
+	    {
+	    case GLOB_NOSPACE:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "out of space processing secrets filename \"%s\"", file_pat);
+		break;
+	    case GLOB_ABORTED:
+		break;	/* already logged */
+	    case GLOB_NOMATCH:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no secrets filename matched \"%s\"", file_pat);
+		break;
+	    default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown glob error %d", r);
+		break;
+	    }
+	    globfree(&globbuf);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* for each file... */
+    for (fnp = globbuf.gl_pathv; *fnp != NULL; fnp++)
+    {
+	if (lexopen(&pos, *fnp, FALSE))
+	{
+	    plog("loading secrets from \"%s\"", *fnp);
+	    (void) flushline("file starts with indentation (continuation notation)");
+	    process_secret_records(whackfd);
+	    lexclose();
+	}
+    }
+
+    globfree(&globbuf);
+}
+
+void
+free_preshared_secrets(void)
+{
+    lock_certs_and_keys("free_preshared_secrets");
+
+    if (secrets != NULL)
+    {
+	secret_t *s, *ns;
+
+	plog("forgetting secrets");
+
+	for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = ns)
+	{
+	    id_list_t *i, *ni;
+
+	    ns = s->next;	/* grab before freeing s */
+	    for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = ni)
+	    {
+		ni = i->next;	/* grab before freeing i */
+		free_id_content(&i->id);
+		pfree(i);
+	    }
+	    switch (s->kind)
+	    {
+	    case PPK_PSK:
+		pfree(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr);
+		break;
+	    case PPK_RSA:
+		free_RSA_private_content(&s->u.RSA_private_key);
+		break;
+	    case PPK_XAUTH:
+		pfree(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr);
+		pfree(s->u.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr);
+		break;
+	    case PPK_PIN:
+		scx_release(s->u.smartcard);
+		break;
+	    default:
+		bad_case(s->kind);
+	    }
+	    pfree(s);
+	}
+	secrets = NULL;
+    }
+
+    unlock_certs_and_keys("free_preshard_secrets");
+}
+
+void
+load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd)
+{
+    free_preshared_secrets();
+    (void) process_secrets_file(shared_secrets_file, whackfd);
+}
+
+/* public key machinery
+ * Note: caller must set dns_auth_level.
+ */
+
+pubkey_t *
+public_key_from_rsa(const RSA_public_key_t *k)
+{
+    pubkey_t *p = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey");
+
+    p->id = empty_id;	/* don't know, doesn't matter */
+    p->issuer = empty_chunk;
+    p->serial = empty_chunk;
+    p->alg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
+
+    memcpy(p->u.rsa.keyid, k->keyid, sizeof(p->u.rsa.keyid));
+    p->u.rsa.k = k->k;
+    mpz_init_set(&p->u.rsa.e, &k->e);
+    mpz_init_set(&p->u.rsa.n, &k->n);
+
+    /* note that we return a 1 reference count upon creation:
+     * invariant: recount > 0.
+     */
+    p->refcnt = 1;
+    time(&p->installed_time);
+    return p;
+}
+
+/* Free a public key record.
+ * As a convenience, this returns a pointer to next.
+ */
+pubkey_list_t *
+free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p)
+{
+    pubkey_list_t *nxt = p->next;
+
+    if (p->key != NULL)
+	unreference_key(&p->key);
+    pfree(p);
+    return nxt;
+}
+
+void
+free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys)
+{
+    while (*keys != NULL)
+	*keys = free_public_keyentry(*keys);
+}
+
+/* root of chained public key list */
+
+pubkey_list_t *pubkeys = NULL;	/* keys from ipsec.conf */
+
+void
+free_remembered_public_keys(void)
+{
+    free_public_keys(&pubkeys);
+}
+
+/* transfer public keys from *keys list to front of pubkeys list */
+void
+transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+, pubkey_list_t **keys
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+)
+{
+    {
+	struct gw_info *gwp;
+
+	for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next)
+	{
+	    pubkey_list_t *pl = alloc_thing(pubkey_list_t, "from TXT");
+
+	    pl->key = gwp->key;	/* note: this is a transfer */
+	    gwp->key = NULL;	/* really, it is! */
+	    pl->next = pubkeys;
+	    pubkeys = pl;
+	}
+    }
+
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    {
+	pubkey_list_t **pp = keys;
+
+	while (*pp != NULL)
+	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
+	*pp = pubkeys;
+	pubkeys = *keys;
+	*keys = NULL;
+    }
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+}
+
+/* decode of RSA pubkey chunk
+ * - format specified in RFC 2537 RSA/MD5 Keys and SIGs in the DNS
+ * - exponent length in bytes (1 or 3 octets)
+ *   + 1 byte if in [1, 255]
+ *   + otherwise 0x00 followed by 2 bytes of length
+ * - exponent
+ * - modulus
+ */
+err_t
+unpack_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, const chunk_t *pubkey)
+{
+    chunk_t exp;
+    chunk_t mod;
+
+    if (pubkey->len < 3)
+	return "RSA public key blob way to short";	/* not even room for length! */
+
+    if (pubkey->ptr[0] != 0x00)
+    {
+	setchunk(exp, pubkey->ptr + 1, pubkey->ptr[0]);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	setchunk(exp, pubkey->ptr + 3
+	    , (pubkey->ptr[1] << BITS_PER_BYTE) + pubkey->ptr[2]);
+    }
+
+    if (pubkey->len - (exp.ptr - pubkey->ptr) < exp.len + RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC)
+	return "RSA public key blob too short";
+
+    mod.ptr = exp.ptr + exp.len;
+    mod.len = &pubkey->ptr[pubkey->len] - mod.ptr;
+
+    if (mod.len < RSA_MIN_OCTETS)
+	return RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH;
+
+    if (mod.len > RSA_MAX_OCTETS)
+	return RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH;
+
+    init_RSA_public_key(rsa, exp, mod);
+    rsa->k = mpz_sizeinbase(&rsa->n, 2);	/* size in bits, for a start */
+    rsa->k = (rsa->k + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE;	/* now octets */
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	RSA_show_public_key(rsa)
+    )
+
+    if (rsa->k != mod.len)
+    {
+	mpz_clear(&rsa->e);
+	mpz_clear(&rsa->n);
+	return "RSA modulus shorter than specified";
+    }
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+install_public_key(pubkey_t *pk, pubkey_list_t **head)
+{
+    pubkey_list_t *p = alloc_thing(pubkey_list_t, "pubkey entry");
+
+    unshare_id_content(&pk->id);
+
+    /* copy issuer dn */
+    if (pk->issuer.ptr != NULL)
+	pk->issuer.ptr = clone_bytes(pk->issuer.ptr, pk->issuer.len, "issuer dn");
+
+    /* copy serial number */
+    if (pk->serial.ptr != NULL)
+	pk->serial.ptr = clone_bytes(pk->serial.ptr, pk->serial.len, "serialNumber");
+
+    /* store the time the public key was installed */
+    time(&pk->installed_time);
+
+    /* install new key at front */
+    p->key = reference_key(pk);
+    p->next = *head;
+    *head = p;
+}
+
+
+void
+delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, enum pubkey_alg alg
+, chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial)
+{
+    pubkey_list_t **pp, *p;
+    pubkey_t *pk;
+
+    for (pp = &pubkeys; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+    {
+	pk = p->key;
+
+	if (same_id(id, &pk->id) && pk->alg == alg
+	&& (issuer.ptr == NULL || pk->issuer.ptr == NULL
+	    || same_dn(issuer, pk->issuer))
+	&& same_serial(serial, pk->serial))
+	    *pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
+	else
+	    pp = &p->next;
+    }
+}
+
+pubkey_t *
+reference_key(pubkey_t *pk)
+{
+    pk->refcnt++;
+    return pk;
+}
+
+void
+unreference_key(pubkey_t **pkp)
+{
+    pubkey_t *pk = *pkp;
+    char b[BUF_LEN];
+
+    if (pk == NULL)
+	return;
+
+    /* print stuff */
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	idtoa(&pk->id, b, sizeof(b));
+	DBG_log("unreference key: %p %s cnt %d--", pk, b, pk->refcnt)
+    )
+
+    /* cancel out the pointer */
+    *pkp = NULL;
+
+    passert(pk->refcnt != 0);
+    pk->refcnt--;
+    if (pk->refcnt == 0)
+	free_public_key(pk);
+}
+
+err_t
+add_public_key(const struct id *id
+, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
+, enum pubkey_alg alg
+, const chunk_t *key
+, pubkey_list_t **head)
+{
+    pubkey_t *pk = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey");
+
+    /* first: algorithm-specific decoding of key chunk */
+    switch (alg)
+    {
+    case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+	{
+	    err_t ugh = unpack_RSA_public_key(&pk->u.rsa, key);
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		pfree(pk);
+		return ugh;
+	    }
+	}
+	break;
+    default:
+	bad_case(alg);
+    }
+
+    pk->id = *id;
+    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+    pk->alg = alg;
+    pk->until_time = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+    pk->issuer = empty_chunk;
+    pk->serial = empty_chunk;
+       
+    install_public_key(pk, head);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* extract id and public key from x.509 certificate and
+ * insert it into a pubkeyrec
+ */
+void
+add_x509_public_key(x509cert_t *cert , time_t until
+    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level)
+{
+    generalName_t *gn;
+    pubkey_t *pk;
+    cert_t c = { CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert} };
+
+    /* we support RSA only */
+    if (cert->subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm != PUBKEY_ALG_RSA)
+	return;
+
+    /* ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN  (X.509 subject field) */
+    pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
+    pk->id.kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+    pk->id.name = cert->subject;
+    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+    pk->until_time = until;
+    pk->issuer = cert->issuer;
+    pk->serial = cert->serialNumber;
+    delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, pk->issuer, pk->serial);
+    install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+
+    gn = cert->subjectAltName;
+
+    while (gn != NULL) /* insert all subjectAltNames */
+    {
+	struct id id = empty_id;
+
+	gntoid(&id, gn);
+	if (id.kind != ID_NONE)
+	{
+	    pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
+	    pk->id = id;
+	    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+	    pk->until_time = until;
+	    pk->issuer = cert->issuer;
+	    pk->serial = cert->serialNumber;
+	    delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, pk->issuer, pk->serial);
+	    install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+	}
+	gn = gn->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/* extract id and public key from OpenPGP certificate and
+ * insert it into a pubkeyrec
+ */
+void
+add_pgp_public_key(pgpcert_t *cert , time_t until
+    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level)
+{
+    pubkey_t *pk;
+    cert_t c;
+
+    c.type = CERT_PGP;
+    c.u.pgp = cert;
+
+    /* we support RSA only */
+    if (cert->pubkeyAlg != PUBKEY_ALG_RSA)
+    {
+	plog("  RSA public keys supported only");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
+    pk->id.kind = ID_KEY_ID;
+    pk->id.name.ptr = cert->fingerprint;
+    pk->id.name.len = PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE;
+    pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level;
+    pk->until_time = until;
+    delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, empty_chunk, empty_chunk);
+    install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys);
+}
+
+/*  when a X.509 certificate gets revoked, all instances of
+ *  the corresponding public key must be removed
+ */
+void
+remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    const cert_t c = {CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert}};
+    pubkey_list_t *p, **pp;
+    pubkey_t *revoked_pk;
+
+    revoked_pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c);
+    p          = pubkeys;
+    pp         = &pubkeys;
+
+    while(p != NULL)
+   {
+	if (same_RSA_public_key(&p->key->u.rsa, &revoked_pk->u.rsa))
+	{
+	    /* remove p from list and free memory */
+	    *pp = free_public_keyentry(p);
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+		"invalid RSA public key deleted");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    pp = &p->next;
+	}
+	p =*pp;
+    }
+    free_public_key(revoked_pk);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all public keys in the chained list
+ */
+void list_public_keys(bool utc)
+{
+    pubkey_list_t *p = pubkeys;
+
+    if (p != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Public Keys:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (p != NULL)
+    {
+	pubkey_t *key = p->key;
+
+	if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA)
+	{
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	    char expires_buf[TIMETOA_BUF];
+
+	    idtoa(&key->id, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    strcpy(expires_buf, timetoa(&key->until_time, utc));
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, %4d RSA Key %s, until %s %s",
+
+		timetoa(&key->installed_time, utc), 8*key->u.rsa.k, key->u.rsa.keyid,
+		expires_buf,
+		check_expiry(key->until_time, PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       %s '%s'",
+		enum_show(&ident_names, key->id.kind), buf);
+	    if (key->issuer.len > 0)
+	    {
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, key->issuer);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       issuer: '%s'", buf);
+	    }
+	    if (key->serial.len > 0)
+	    {
+		datatot(key->serial.ptr, key->serial.len, ':'
+			, buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT,"       serial:  %s", buf);
+	    }
+	}
+	p = p->next;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/keys.h b/src/pluto/keys.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..415bdc3c1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/keys.h
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+/* mechanisms for preshared keys (public, private, and preshared secrets)
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: keys.h,v 1.7 2006/01/26 20:10:34 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _KEYS_H
+#define _KEYS_H
+
+#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU Multi-Precision library */
+
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+
+#ifndef SHARED_SECRETS_FILE
+# define SHARED_SECRETS_FILE  IPSEC_CONFDIR "/ipsec.secrets"
+#endif
+
+const char *shared_secrets_file;
+
+extern void load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd);
+extern void free_preshared_secrets(void);
+
+enum PrivateKeyKind {
+    PPK_PSK,
+ /* PPK_DSS, */	/* not implemented */
+    PPK_RSA,
+    PPK_XAUTH,
+    PPK_PIN
+};
+
+extern void xauth_defaults(void);
+
+/* forward declaration */
+struct connection;
+
+extern const chunk_t *get_preshared_secret(const struct connection *c);
+extern err_t unpack_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, const chunk_t *pubkey);
+extern const RSA_private_key_t *get_RSA_private_key(const struct connection *c);
+extern const RSA_private_key_t *get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert);
+
+/* public key machinery  */
+
+typedef struct pubkey pubkey_t;
+
+struct pubkey {
+    struct id id;
+    unsigned refcnt;	/* reference counted! */
+    enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level;
+    char *dns_sig;
+    time_t installed_time
+	, last_tried_time
+	, last_worked_time
+	, until_time;
+    chunk_t issuer;
+    chunk_t serial;
+    enum pubkey_alg alg;
+    union {
+	RSA_public_key_t rsa;
+    } u;
+};
+
+typedef struct pubkey_list pubkey_list_t;
+
+struct pubkey_list {
+    pubkey_t *key;
+    pubkey_list_t *next;
+};
+
+extern pubkey_list_t *pubkeys;	/* keys from ipsec.conf or from certs */
+
+extern pubkey_t *public_key_from_rsa(const RSA_public_key_t *k);
+extern pubkey_list_t *free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p);
+extern void free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys);
+extern void free_remembered_public_keys(void);
+extern void delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, enum pubkey_alg alg
+    , chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial);
+
+extern pubkey_t *reference_key(pubkey_t *pk);
+extern void unreference_key(pubkey_t **pkp);
+
+extern err_t add_public_key(const struct id *id
+    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level
+    , enum pubkey_alg alg
+    , const chunk_t *key
+    , pubkey_list_t **head);
+
+extern bool has_private_key(cert_t cert);
+extern void add_x509_public_key(x509cert_t *cert, time_t until
+    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level);
+extern void add_pgp_public_key(pgpcert_t *cert, time_t until
+    , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level);
+extern void remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert);
+extern void list_public_keys(bool utc);
+
+struct gw_info;	/* forward declaration of tag (defined in dnskey.h) */
+extern void transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    , pubkey_list_t **keys
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+    );
+
+#endif /* _KEYS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/lex.c b/src/pluto/lex.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5c811725a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/lex.c
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@
+/* lexer (lexical analyzer) for control files
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: lex.c,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+#include "lex.h"
+
+struct file_lex_position *flp = NULL;
+
+/* Open a file for lexical processing.
+ * new_flp and name must point into storage with will live
+ * at least until the file is closed.
+ */
+bool
+lexopen(struct file_lex_position *new_flp, const char *name, bool optional)
+{
+    FILE *f = fopen(name, "r");
+
+    if (f == NULL)
+    {
+	if (!optional || errno != ENOENT)
+	    log_errno((e, "could not open \"%s\"", name));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	new_flp->previous = flp;
+	flp = new_flp;
+	flp->filename = name;
+	flp->fp = f;
+	flp->lino = 0;
+	flp->bdry = B_none;
+
+	flp->cur = flp->buffer;	/* nothing loaded yet */
+	flp->under = *flp->cur = '\0';
+
+	(void) shift();	/* prime tok */
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+lexclose(void)
+{
+    fclose(flp->fp);
+    flp = flp->previous;
+}
+
+/* Token decoding: shift() loads the next token into tok.
+ * Iff a token starts at the left margin, it is considered
+ * to be the first in a record.  We create a special condition,
+ * Record Boundary (analogous to EOF), just before such a token.
+ * We are unwilling to shift through a record boundary:
+ * it must be overridden first.
+ * Returns FALSE iff Record Boundary or EOF (i.e. no token);
+ * tok will then be NULL.
+ */
+
+char *tok;
+#define tokeq(s) (streq(tok, (s)))
+#define tokeqword(s) (strcasecmp(tok, (s)) == 0)
+
+bool
+shift(void)
+{
+    char *p = flp->cur;
+    char *sor = NULL;	/* start of record for any new lines */
+
+    passert(flp->bdry == B_none);
+
+    *p = flp->under;
+    flp->under = '\0';
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	switch (*p)
+	{
+	case '\0':	/* end of line */
+	case '#':	/* comment to end of line: treat as end of line */
+	    /* get the next line */
+	    if (fgets(flp->buffer, sizeof(flp->buffer)-1, flp->fp) == NULL)
+	    {
+		flp->bdry = B_file;
+		tok = flp->cur = NULL;
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* strip trailing whitespace, including \n */
+
+		for (p = flp->buffer+strlen(flp->buffer)-1
+		; p>flp->buffer && isspace(p[-1]); p--)
+		    ;
+		*p = '\0';
+
+		flp->lino++;
+		sor = p = flp->buffer;
+	    }
+	    break;	/* try again for a token */
+
+	case ' ':	/* whitespace */
+	case '\t':
+	    p++;
+	    break;	/* try again for a token */
+
+	case '"':	/* quoted token */
+	case '\'':
+	    if (p != sor)
+	    {
+		/* we have a quoted token: note and advance to its end */
+		tok = p;
+		p = strchr(p+1, *p);
+		if (p == NULL)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unterminated string"
+			, flp->filename, flp->lino);
+		    p = tok + strlen(tok);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    p++;	/* include delimiter in token */
+		}
+
+		/* remember token delimiter and replace with '\0' */
+		flp->under = *p;
+		*p = '\0';
+		flp->cur = p;
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	    /* FALL THROUGH */
+	default:
+	    if (p != sor)
+	    {
+		/* we seem to have a token: note and advance to its end */
+		tok = p;
+
+		if (p[0] == '0' && p[1] == 't')
+		{
+		    /* 0t... token goes to end of line */
+		    p += strlen(p);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* "ordinary" token: up to whitespace or end of line */
+		    do {
+			p++;
+		    } while (*p != '\0' && !isspace(*p))
+			;
+
+		    /* fudge to separate ':' from a preceding adjacent token */
+		    if (p-1 > tok && p[-1] == ':')
+			p--;
+		}
+
+		/* remember token delimiter and replace with '\0' */
+		flp->under = *p;
+		*p = '\0';
+		flp->cur = p;
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+
+	    /* we have a start-of-record: return it, deferring "real" token */
+	    flp->bdry = B_record;
+	    tok = NULL;
+	    flp->under = *p;
+	    flp->cur = p;
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* ensures we are at a Record (or File) boundary, optionally warning if not */
+
+bool
+flushline(const char *m)
+{
+    if (flp->bdry != B_none)
+    {
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	if (m != NULL)
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s", flp->filename, flp->lino, m);
+	do ; while (shift());
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/lex.h b/src/pluto/lex.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..fb6c15236
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/lex.h
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* lexer (lexical analyzer) for control files
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: lex.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#define MAX_TOK_LEN 2048    /* includes terminal '\0' */
+struct file_lex_position
+{
+    int depth;	/* how deeply we are nested */
+    const char *filename;
+    FILE *fp;
+    enum { B_none, B_record, B_file } bdry;	/* current boundary */
+    int lino;	/* line number in file */
+    char buffer[MAX_TOK_LEN + 1];    /* note: one extra char for our use (jamming '"') */
+    char *cur;	/* cursor */
+    char under;	/* except in shift(): character orignally at *cur */
+    struct file_lex_position *previous;
+};
+
+extern struct file_lex_position *flp;
+
+extern bool lexopen(struct file_lex_position *new_flp, const char *name, bool optional);
+extern void lexclose(void);
+
+
+/* Token decoding: shift() loads the next token into tok.
+ * Iff a token starts at the left margin, it is considered
+ * to be the first in a record.  We create a special condition,
+ * Record Boundary (analogous to EOF), just before such a token.
+ * We are unwilling to shift through a record boundary:
+ * it must be overridden first.
+ * Returns FALSE iff Record Boundary or EOF (i.e. no token);
+ * tok will then be NULL.
+ */
+
+extern char *tok;
+#define tokeq(s) (streq(tok, (s)))
+#define tokeqword(s) (strcasecmp(tok, (s)) == 0)
+
+extern bool shift(void);
+extern bool flushline(const char *m);
diff --git a/src/pluto/linux26/netlink.h b/src/pluto/linux26/netlink.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6b0896da6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/linux26/netlink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#ifndef __LINUX_NETLINK_H
+#define __LINUX_NETLINK_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h> /* for sa_family_t */
+
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE		0	/* Routing/device hook				*/
+#define NETLINK_SKIP		1	/* Reserved for ENskip  			*/
+#define NETLINK_USERSOCK	2	/* Reserved for user mode socket protocols 	*/
+#define NETLINK_FIREWALL	3	/* Firewalling hook				*/
+#define NETLINK_TCPDIAG		4	/* TCP socket monitoring			*/
+#define NETLINK_NFLOG		5	/* netfilter/iptables ULOG */
+#define NETLINK_XFRM		6	/* ipsec */
+#define NETLINK_ARPD		8
+#define NETLINK_ROUTE6		11	/* af_inet6 route comm channel */
+#define NETLINK_IP6_FW		13
+#define NETLINK_DNRTMSG		14	/* DECnet routing messages */
+#define NETLINK_TAPBASE		16	/* 16 to 31 are ethertap */
+
+#define MAX_LINKS 32		
+
+struct sockaddr_nl
+{
+	sa_family_t	nl_family;	/* AF_NETLINK	*/
+	unsigned short	nl_pad;		/* zero		*/
+	uint32_t	nl_pid;		/* process pid	*/
+       	uint32_t	nl_groups;	/* multicast groups mask */
+};
+
+struct nlmsghdr
+{
+	uint32_t	nlmsg_len;	/* Length of message including header */
+	uint16_t	nlmsg_type;	/* Message content */
+	uint16_t	nlmsg_flags;	/* Additional flags */
+	uint32_t	nlmsg_seq;	/* Sequence number */
+	uint32_t	nlmsg_pid;	/* Sending process PID */
+};
+
+/* Flags values */
+
+#define NLM_F_REQUEST		1	/* It is request message. 	*/
+#define NLM_F_MULTI		2	/* Multipart message, terminated by NLMSG_DONE */
+#define NLM_F_ACK		4	/* Reply with ack, with zero or error code */
+#define NLM_F_ECHO		8	/* Echo this request 		*/
+
+/* Modifiers to GET request */
+#define NLM_F_ROOT	0x100	/* specify tree	root	*/
+#define NLM_F_MATCH	0x200	/* return all matching	*/
+#define NLM_F_ATOMIC	0x400	/* atomic GET		*/
+#define NLM_F_DUMP	(NLM_F_ROOT|NLM_F_MATCH)
+
+/* Modifiers to NEW request */
+#define NLM_F_REPLACE	0x100	/* Override existing		*/
+#define NLM_F_EXCL	0x200	/* Do not touch, if it exists	*/
+#define NLM_F_CREATE	0x400	/* Create, if it does not exist	*/
+#define NLM_F_APPEND	0x800	/* Add to end of list		*/
+
+/*
+   4.4BSD ADD		NLM_F_CREATE|NLM_F_EXCL
+   4.4BSD CHANGE	NLM_F_REPLACE
+
+   True CHANGE		NLM_F_CREATE|NLM_F_REPLACE
+   Append		NLM_F_CREATE
+   Check		NLM_F_EXCL
+ */
+
+#define NLMSG_ALIGNTO	4
+#define NLMSG_ALIGN(len) ( ((len)+NLMSG_ALIGNTO-1) & ~(NLMSG_ALIGNTO-1) )
+#define NLMSG_LENGTH(len) ((len)+NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct nlmsghdr)))
+#define NLMSG_SPACE(len) NLMSG_ALIGN(NLMSG_LENGTH(len))
+#define NLMSG_DATA(nlh)  ((void*)(((char*)nlh) + NLMSG_LENGTH(0)))
+#define NLMSG_NEXT(nlh,len)	 ((len) -= NLMSG_ALIGN((nlh)->nlmsg_len), \
+				  (struct nlmsghdr*)(((char*)(nlh)) + NLMSG_ALIGN((nlh)->nlmsg_len)))
+#define NLMSG_OK(nlh,len) ((len) > 0 && (nlh)->nlmsg_len >= sizeof(struct nlmsghdr) && \
+			   (nlh)->nlmsg_len <= (len))
+#define NLMSG_PAYLOAD(nlh,len) ((nlh)->nlmsg_len - NLMSG_SPACE((len)))
+
+#define NLMSG_NOOP		0x1	/* Nothing.		*/
+#define NLMSG_ERROR		0x2	/* Error		*/
+#define NLMSG_DONE		0x3	/* End of a dump	*/
+#define NLMSG_OVERRUN		0x4	/* Data lost		*/
+
+struct nlmsgerr
+{
+	int		error;
+	struct nlmsghdr msg;
+};
+
+#define NET_MAJOR 36		/* Major 36 is reserved for networking 						*/
+#endif	/* __LINUX_NETLINK_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/linux26/rtnetlink.h b/src/pluto/linux26/rtnetlink.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..341bc1f86
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/linux26/rtnetlink.h
@@ -0,0 +1,562 @@
+#ifndef __LINUX_RTNETLINK_H
+#define __LINUX_RTNETLINK_H
+
+#include "netlink.h"
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define RTNL_DEBUG 1
+
+
+/****
+ *		Routing/neighbour discovery messages.
+ ****/
+
+/* Types of messages */
+
+#define RTM_BASE	0x10
+
+#define	RTM_NEWLINK	(RTM_BASE+0)
+#define	RTM_DELLINK	(RTM_BASE+1)
+#define	RTM_GETLINK	(RTM_BASE+2)
+#define	RTM_SETLINK	(RTM_BASE+3)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWADDR	(RTM_BASE+4)
+#define	RTM_DELADDR	(RTM_BASE+5)
+#define	RTM_GETADDR	(RTM_BASE+6)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWROUTE	(RTM_BASE+8)
+#define	RTM_DELROUTE	(RTM_BASE+9)
+#define	RTM_GETROUTE	(RTM_BASE+10)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWNEIGH	(RTM_BASE+12)
+#define	RTM_DELNEIGH	(RTM_BASE+13)
+#define	RTM_GETNEIGH	(RTM_BASE+14)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWRULE	(RTM_BASE+16)
+#define	RTM_DELRULE	(RTM_BASE+17)
+#define	RTM_GETRULE	(RTM_BASE+18)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWQDISC	(RTM_BASE+20)
+#define	RTM_DELQDISC	(RTM_BASE+21)
+#define	RTM_GETQDISC	(RTM_BASE+22)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWTCLASS	(RTM_BASE+24)
+#define	RTM_DELTCLASS	(RTM_BASE+25)
+#define	RTM_GETTCLASS	(RTM_BASE+26)
+
+#define	RTM_NEWTFILTER	(RTM_BASE+28)
+#define	RTM_DELTFILTER	(RTM_BASE+29)
+#define	RTM_GETTFILTER	(RTM_BASE+30)
+
+#define	RTM_MAX		(RTM_BASE+31)
+
+/* 
+   Generic structure for encapsulation optional route information.
+   It is reminiscent of sockaddr, but with sa_family replaced
+   with attribute type.
+ */
+
+struct rtattr
+{
+	unsigned short	rta_len;
+	unsigned short	rta_type;
+};
+
+/* Macros to handle rtattributes */
+
+#define RTA_ALIGNTO	4
+#define RTA_ALIGN(len) ( ((len)+RTA_ALIGNTO-1) & ~(RTA_ALIGNTO-1) )
+#define RTA_OK(rta,len) ((len) > 0 && (rta)->rta_len >= sizeof(struct rtattr) && \
+			 (rta)->rta_len <= (len))
+#define RTA_NEXT(rta,attrlen)	((attrlen) -= RTA_ALIGN((rta)->rta_len), \
+				 (struct rtattr*)(((char*)(rta)) + RTA_ALIGN((rta)->rta_len)))
+#define RTA_LENGTH(len)	(RTA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtattr)) + (len))
+#define RTA_SPACE(len)	RTA_ALIGN(RTA_LENGTH(len))
+#define RTA_DATA(rta)   ((void*)(((char*)(rta)) + RTA_LENGTH(0)))
+#define RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) ((int)((rta)->rta_len) - RTA_LENGTH(0))
+
+
+
+
+/******************************************************************************
+ *		Definitions used in routing table administation.
+ ****/
+
+struct rtmsg
+{
+	unsigned char		rtm_family;
+	unsigned char		rtm_dst_len;
+	unsigned char		rtm_src_len;
+	unsigned char		rtm_tos;
+
+	unsigned char		rtm_table;	/* Routing table id */
+	unsigned char		rtm_protocol;	/* Routing protocol; see below	*/
+	unsigned char		rtm_scope;	/* See below */	
+	unsigned char		rtm_type;	/* See below	*/
+
+	unsigned		rtm_flags;
+};
+
+/* rtm_type */
+
+enum
+{
+	RTN_UNSPEC,
+	RTN_UNICAST,		/* Gateway or direct route	*/
+	RTN_LOCAL,		/* Accept locally		*/
+	RTN_BROADCAST,		/* Accept locally as broadcast,
+				   send as broadcast */
+	RTN_ANYCAST,		/* Accept locally as broadcast,
+				   but send as unicast */
+	RTN_MULTICAST,		/* Multicast route		*/
+	RTN_BLACKHOLE,		/* Drop				*/
+	RTN_UNREACHABLE,	/* Destination is unreachable   */
+	RTN_PROHIBIT,		/* Administratively prohibited	*/
+	RTN_THROW,		/* Not in this table		*/
+	RTN_NAT,		/* Translate this address	*/
+	RTN_XRESOLVE,		/* Use external resolver	*/
+};
+
+#define RTN_MAX RTN_XRESOLVE
+
+
+/* rtm_protocol */
+
+#define RTPROT_UNSPEC	0
+#define RTPROT_REDIRECT	1	/* Route installed by ICMP redirects;
+				   not used by current IPv4 */
+#define RTPROT_KERNEL	2	/* Route installed by kernel		*/
+#define RTPROT_BOOT	3	/* Route installed during boot		*/
+#define RTPROT_STATIC	4	/* Route installed by administrator	*/
+
+/* Values of protocol >= RTPROT_STATIC are not interpreted by kernel;
+   they just passed from user and back as is.
+   It will be used by hypothetical multiple routing daemons.
+   Note that protocol values should be standardized in order to
+   avoid conflicts.
+ */
+
+#define RTPROT_GATED	8	/* Apparently, GateD */
+#define RTPROT_RA	9	/* RDISC/ND router advertisments */
+#define RTPROT_MRT	10	/* Merit MRT */
+#define RTPROT_ZEBRA	11	/* Zebra */
+#define RTPROT_BIRD	12	/* BIRD */
+#define RTPROT_DNROUTED	13	/* DECnet routing daemon */
+
+/* rtm_scope
+
+   Really it is not scope, but sort of distance to the destination.
+   NOWHERE are reserved for not existing destinations, HOST is our
+   local addresses, LINK are destinations, located on directly attached
+   link and UNIVERSE is everywhere in the Universe.
+
+   Intermediate values are also possible f.e. interior routes
+   could be assigned a value between UNIVERSE and LINK.
+*/
+
+enum rt_scope_t
+{
+	RT_SCOPE_UNIVERSE=0,
+/* User defined values  */
+	RT_SCOPE_SITE=200,
+	RT_SCOPE_LINK=253,
+	RT_SCOPE_HOST=254,
+	RT_SCOPE_NOWHERE=255
+};
+
+/* rtm_flags */
+
+#define RTM_F_NOTIFY		0x100	/* Notify user of route change	*/
+#define RTM_F_CLONED		0x200	/* This route is cloned		*/
+#define RTM_F_EQUALIZE		0x400	/* Multipath equalizer: NI	*/
+
+/* Reserved table identifiers */
+
+enum rt_class_t
+{
+	RT_TABLE_UNSPEC=0,
+/* User defined values */
+	RT_TABLE_DEFAULT=253,
+	RT_TABLE_MAIN=254,
+	RT_TABLE_LOCAL=255
+};
+#define RT_TABLE_MAX RT_TABLE_LOCAL
+
+
+
+/* Routing message attributes */
+
+enum rtattr_type_t
+{
+	RTA_UNSPEC,
+	RTA_DST,
+	RTA_SRC,
+	RTA_IIF,
+	RTA_OIF,
+	RTA_GATEWAY,
+	RTA_PRIORITY,
+	RTA_PREFSRC,
+	RTA_METRICS,
+	RTA_MULTIPATH,
+	RTA_PROTOINFO,
+	RTA_FLOW,
+	RTA_CACHEINFO,
+	RTA_SESSION,
+};
+
+#define RTA_MAX RTA_SESSION
+
+#define RTM_RTA(r)  ((struct rtattr*)(((char*)(r)) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtmsg))))
+#define RTM_PAYLOAD(n) NLMSG_PAYLOAD(n,sizeof(struct rtmsg))
+
+/* RTM_MULTIPATH --- array of struct rtnexthop.
+ *
+ * "struct rtnexthop" describres all necessary nexthop information,
+ * i.e. parameters of path to a destination via this nextop.
+ *
+ * At the moment it is impossible to set different prefsrc, mtu, window
+ * and rtt for different paths from multipath.
+ */
+
+struct rtnexthop
+{
+	unsigned short		rtnh_len;
+	unsigned char		rtnh_flags;
+	unsigned char		rtnh_hops;
+	int			rtnh_ifindex;
+};
+
+/* rtnh_flags */
+
+#define RTNH_F_DEAD		1	/* Nexthop is dead (used by multipath)	*/
+#define RTNH_F_PERVASIVE	2	/* Do recursive gateway lookup	*/
+#define RTNH_F_ONLINK		4	/* Gateway is forced on link	*/
+
+/* Macros to handle hexthops */
+
+#define RTNH_ALIGNTO	4
+#define RTNH_ALIGN(len) ( ((len)+RTNH_ALIGNTO-1) & ~(RTNH_ALIGNTO-1) )
+#define RTNH_OK(rtnh,len) ((rtnh)->rtnh_len >= sizeof(struct rtnexthop) && \
+			   ((int)(rtnh)->rtnh_len) <= (len))
+#define RTNH_NEXT(rtnh)	((struct rtnexthop*)(((char*)(rtnh)) + RTNH_ALIGN((rtnh)->rtnh_len)))
+#define RTNH_LENGTH(len) (RTNH_ALIGN(sizeof(struct rtnexthop)) + (len))
+#define RTNH_SPACE(len)	RTNH_ALIGN(RTNH_LENGTH(len))
+#define RTNH_DATA(rtnh)   ((struct rtattr*)(((char*)(rtnh)) + RTNH_LENGTH(0)))
+
+/* RTM_CACHEINFO */
+
+struct rta_cacheinfo
+{
+	uint32_t	rta_clntref;
+	uint32_t	rta_lastuse;
+	int32_t	rta_expires;
+	uint32_t	rta_error;
+	uint32_t	rta_used;
+
+#define RTNETLINK_HAVE_PEERINFO 1
+	uint32_t	rta_id;
+	uint32_t	rta_ts;
+	uint32_t	rta_tsage;
+};
+
+/* RTM_METRICS --- array of struct rtattr with types of RTAX_* */
+
+enum
+{
+	RTAX_UNSPEC,
+#define RTAX_UNSPEC RTAX_UNSPEC
+	RTAX_LOCK,
+#define RTAX_LOCK RTAX_LOCK
+	RTAX_MTU,
+#define RTAX_MTU RTAX_MTU
+	RTAX_WINDOW,
+#define RTAX_WINDOW RTAX_WINDOW
+	RTAX_RTT,
+#define RTAX_RTT RTAX_RTT
+	RTAX_RTTVAR,
+#define RTAX_RTTVAR RTAX_RTTVAR
+	RTAX_SSTHRESH,
+#define RTAX_SSTHRESH RTAX_SSTHRESH
+	RTAX_CWND,
+#define RTAX_CWND RTAX_CWND
+	RTAX_ADVMSS,
+#define RTAX_ADVMSS RTAX_ADVMSS
+	RTAX_REORDERING,
+#define RTAX_REORDERING RTAX_REORDERING
+};
+
+#define RTAX_MAX RTAX_REORDERING
+
+struct rta_session
+{
+	uint8_t	proto;
+
+	union {
+		struct {
+			uint16_t	sport;
+			uint16_t	dport;
+		} ports;
+
+		struct {
+			uint8_t		type;
+			uint8_t		code;
+			uint16_t	ident;
+		} icmpt;
+
+		uint32_t		spi;
+	} u;
+};
+
+
+/*********************************************************
+ *		Interface address.
+ ****/
+
+struct ifaddrmsg
+{
+	unsigned char	ifa_family;
+	unsigned char	ifa_prefixlen;	/* The prefix length		*/
+	unsigned char	ifa_flags;	/* Flags			*/
+	unsigned char	ifa_scope;	/* See above			*/
+	int		ifa_index;	/* Link index			*/
+};
+
+enum
+{
+	IFA_UNSPEC,
+	IFA_ADDRESS,
+	IFA_LOCAL,
+	IFA_LABEL,
+	IFA_BROADCAST,
+	IFA_ANYCAST,
+	IFA_CACHEINFO
+};
+
+#define IFA_MAX IFA_CACHEINFO
+
+/* ifa_flags */
+
+#define IFA_F_SECONDARY		0x01
+#define IFA_F_TEMPORARY		IFA_F_SECONDARY
+
+#define IFA_F_DEPRECATED	0x20
+#define IFA_F_TENTATIVE		0x40
+#define IFA_F_PERMANENT		0x80
+
+struct ifa_cacheinfo
+{
+	int32_t	ifa_prefered;
+	int32_t	ifa_valid;
+};
+
+
+#define IFA_RTA(r)  ((struct rtattr*)(((char*)(r)) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ifaddrmsg))))
+#define IFA_PAYLOAD(n) NLMSG_PAYLOAD(n,sizeof(struct ifaddrmsg))
+
+/*
+   Important comment:
+   IFA_ADDRESS is prefix address, rather than local interface address.
+   It makes no difference for normally configured broadcast interfaces,
+   but for point-to-point IFA_ADDRESS is DESTINATION address,
+   local address is supplied in IFA_LOCAL attribute.
+ */
+
+/**************************************************************
+ *		Neighbour discovery.
+ ****/
+
+struct ndmsg
+{
+	unsigned char	ndm_family;
+	unsigned char	ndm_pad1;
+	unsigned short	ndm_pad2;
+	int		ndm_ifindex;	/* Link index			*/
+	uint16_t	ndm_state;
+	uint8_t		ndm_flags;
+	uint8_t		ndm_type;
+};
+
+enum
+{
+	NDA_UNSPEC,
+	NDA_DST,
+	NDA_LLADDR,
+	NDA_CACHEINFO
+};
+
+#define NDA_MAX NDA_CACHEINFO
+
+#define NDA_RTA(r)  ((struct rtattr*)(((char*)(r)) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ndmsg))))
+#define NDA_PAYLOAD(n) NLMSG_PAYLOAD(n,sizeof(struct ndmsg))
+
+/*
+ *	Neighbor Cache Entry Flags
+ */
+
+#define NTF_PROXY	0x08	/* == ATF_PUBL */
+#define NTF_ROUTER	0x80
+
+/*
+ *	Neighbor Cache Entry States.
+ */
+
+#define NUD_INCOMPLETE	0x01
+#define NUD_REACHABLE	0x02
+#define NUD_STALE	0x04
+#define NUD_DELAY	0x08
+#define NUD_PROBE	0x10
+#define NUD_FAILED	0x20
+
+/* Dummy states */
+#define NUD_NOARP	0x40
+#define NUD_PERMANENT	0x80
+#define NUD_NONE	0x00
+
+
+struct nda_cacheinfo
+{
+	uint32_t		ndm_confirmed;
+	uint32_t		ndm_used;
+	uint32_t		ndm_updated;
+	uint32_t		ndm_refcnt;
+};
+
+/****
+ *		General form of address family dependent message.
+ ****/
+
+struct rtgenmsg
+{
+	unsigned char		rtgen_family;
+};
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ *		Link layer specific messages.
+ ****/
+
+/* struct ifinfomsg
+ * passes link level specific information, not dependent
+ * on network protocol.
+ */
+
+struct ifinfomsg
+{
+	unsigned char	ifi_family;
+	unsigned char	__ifi_pad;
+	unsigned short	ifi_type;		/* ARPHRD_* */
+	int		ifi_index;		/* Link index	*/
+	unsigned	ifi_flags;		/* IFF_* flags	*/
+	unsigned	ifi_change;		/* IFF_* change mask */
+};
+
+enum
+{
+	IFLA_UNSPEC,
+	IFLA_ADDRESS,
+	IFLA_BROADCAST,
+	IFLA_IFNAME,
+	IFLA_MTU,
+	IFLA_LINK,
+	IFLA_QDISC,
+	IFLA_STATS,
+	IFLA_COST,
+#define IFLA_COST IFLA_COST
+	IFLA_PRIORITY,
+#define IFLA_PRIORITY IFLA_PRIORITY
+	IFLA_MASTER,
+#define IFLA_MASTER IFLA_MASTER
+	IFLA_WIRELESS,		/* Wireless Extension event - see wireless.h */
+#define IFLA_WIRELESS IFLA_WIRELESS
+};
+
+
+#define IFLA_MAX IFLA_WIRELESS
+
+#define IFLA_RTA(r)  ((struct rtattr*)(((char*)(r)) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct ifinfomsg))))
+#define IFLA_PAYLOAD(n) NLMSG_PAYLOAD(n,sizeof(struct ifinfomsg))
+
+/* ifi_flags.
+
+   IFF_* flags.
+
+   The only change is:
+   IFF_LOOPBACK, IFF_BROADCAST and IFF_POINTOPOINT are
+   more not changeable by user. They describe link media
+   characteristics and set by device driver.
+
+   Comments:
+   - Combination IFF_BROADCAST|IFF_POINTOPOINT is invalid
+   - If neiher of these three flags are set;
+     the interface is NBMA.
+
+   - IFF_MULTICAST does not mean anything special:
+   multicasts can be used on all not-NBMA links.
+   IFF_MULTICAST means that this media uses special encapsulation
+   for multicast frames. Apparently, all IFF_POINTOPOINT and
+   IFF_BROADCAST devices are able to use multicasts too.
+ */
+
+/* IFLA_LINK.
+   For usual devices it is equal ifi_index.
+   If it is a "virtual interface" (f.e. tunnel), ifi_link
+   can point to real physical interface (f.e. for bandwidth calculations),
+   or maybe 0, what means, that real media is unknown (usual
+   for IPIP tunnels, when route to endpoint is allowed to change)
+ */
+
+/*****************************************************************
+ *		Traffic control messages.
+ ****/
+
+struct tcmsg
+{
+	unsigned char	tcm_family;
+	unsigned char	tcm__pad1;
+	unsigned short	tcm__pad2;
+	int		tcm_ifindex;
+	uint32_t	tcm_handle;
+	uint32_t	tcm_parent;
+	uint32_t	tcm_info;
+};
+
+enum
+{
+	TCA_UNSPEC,
+	TCA_KIND,
+	TCA_OPTIONS,
+	TCA_STATS,
+	TCA_XSTATS,
+	TCA_RATE,
+};
+
+#define TCA_MAX TCA_RATE
+
+#define TCA_RTA(r)  ((struct rtattr*)(((char*)(r)) + NLMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct tcmsg))))
+#define TCA_PAYLOAD(n) NLMSG_PAYLOAD(n,sizeof(struct tcmsg))
+
+
+/* SUMMARY: maximal rtattr understood by kernel */
+
+#define RTATTR_MAX		RTA_MAX
+
+/* RTnetlink multicast groups */
+
+#define RTMGRP_LINK		1
+#define RTMGRP_NOTIFY		2
+#define RTMGRP_NEIGH		4
+#define RTMGRP_TC		8
+
+#define RTMGRP_IPV4_IFADDR	0x10
+#define RTMGRP_IPV4_MROUTE	0x20
+#define RTMGRP_IPV4_ROUTE	0x40
+
+#define RTMGRP_IPV6_IFADDR	0x100
+#define RTMGRP_IPV6_MROUTE	0x200
+#define RTMGRP_IPV6_ROUTE	0x400
+
+#define RTMGRP_DECnet_IFADDR    0x1000
+#define RTMGRP_DECnet_ROUTE     0x4000
+
+/* End of information exported to user level */
+
+#endif	/* __LINUX_RTNETLINK_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/linux26/xfrm.h b/src/pluto/linux26/xfrm.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4269ae29b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/linux26/xfrm.h
@@ -0,0 +1,233 @@
+#ifndef _LINUX_XFRM_H
+#define _LINUX_XFRM_H
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/* All of the structures in this file may not change size as they are
+ * passed into the kernel from userspace via netlink sockets.
+ */
+
+/* Structure to encapsulate addresses. I do not want to use
+ * "standard" structure. My apologies.
+ */
+typedef union
+{
+	uint32_t	a4;
+	uint32_t	a6[4];
+} xfrm_address_t;
+
+/* Ident of a specific xfrm_state. It is used on input to lookup
+ * the state by (spi,daddr,ah/esp) or to store information about
+ * spi, protocol and tunnel address on output.
+ */
+struct xfrm_id
+{
+	xfrm_address_t	daddr;
+	uint32_t	spi;
+	uint8_t		proto;
+};
+
+/* Selector, used as selector both on policy rules (SPD) and SAs. */
+
+struct xfrm_selector
+{
+	xfrm_address_t	daddr;
+	xfrm_address_t	saddr;
+	uint16_t	dport;
+	uint16_t	dport_mask;
+	uint16_t	sport;
+	uint16_t	sport_mask;
+	uint16_t	family;
+	uint8_t		prefixlen_d;
+	uint8_t		prefixlen_s;
+	uint8_t		proto;
+	int		ifindex;
+	uid_t		user;
+};
+
+#define XFRM_INF (~(uint64_t)0)
+
+struct xfrm_lifetime_cfg
+{
+	uint64_t	soft_byte_limit;
+	uint64_t	hard_byte_limit;
+	uint64_t	soft_packet_limit;
+	uint64_t	hard_packet_limit;
+	uint64_t	soft_add_expires_seconds;
+	uint64_t	hard_add_expires_seconds;
+	uint64_t	soft_use_expires_seconds;
+	uint64_t	hard_use_expires_seconds;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_lifetime_cur
+{
+	uint64_t	bytes;
+	uint64_t	packets;
+	uint64_t	add_time;
+	uint64_t	use_time;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_replay_state
+{
+	uint32_t	oseq;
+	uint32_t	seq;
+	uint32_t	bitmap;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_algo {
+	char	alg_name[64];
+	int	alg_key_len;    /* in bits */
+	char	alg_key[0];
+};
+
+struct xfrm_stats {
+	uint32_t	replay_window;
+	uint32_t	replay;
+	uint32_t	integrity_failed;
+};
+
+enum
+{
+	XFRM_POLICY_IN	= 0,
+	XFRM_POLICY_OUT	= 1,
+	XFRM_POLICY_FWD	= 2,
+	XFRM_POLICY_MAX	= 3
+};
+
+enum
+{
+	XFRM_SHARE_ANY,		/* No limitations */
+	XFRM_SHARE_SESSION,	/* For this session only */
+	XFRM_SHARE_USER,	/* For this user only */
+	XFRM_SHARE_UNIQUE	/* Use once */
+};
+
+/* Netlink configuration messages.  */
+#define XFRM_MSG_BASE		0x10
+
+#define XFRM_MSG_NEWSA		(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 0)
+#define XFRM_MSG_DELSA		(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 1)
+#define XFRM_MSG_GETSA		(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 2)
+
+#define XFRM_MSG_NEWPOLICY	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 3)
+#define XFRM_MSG_DELPOLICY	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 4)
+#define XFRM_MSG_GETPOLICY	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 5)
+
+#define XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 6)
+#define XFRM_MSG_ACQUIRE	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 7)
+#define XFRM_MSG_EXPIRE		(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 8)
+
+#define XFRM_MSG_UPDPOLICY	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 9)
+#define XFRM_MSG_UPDSA		(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 10)
+
+#define XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE	(XFRM_MSG_BASE + 11)
+
+#define XFRM_MSG_MAX		(XFRM_MSG_POLEXPIRE+1)
+
+struct xfrm_user_tmpl {
+	struct xfrm_id		id;
+	uint16_t		family;
+	xfrm_address_t		saddr;
+	uint32_t		reqid;
+	uint8_t			mode;
+	uint8_t			share;
+	uint8_t			optional;
+	uint32_t		aalgos;
+	uint32_t		ealgos;
+	uint32_t		calgos;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_encap_tmpl {
+	uint16_t		encap_type;
+	uint16_t		encap_sport;
+	uint16_t		encap_dport;
+	xfrm_address_t		encap_oa;
+};
+
+/* Netlink message attributes.  */
+enum xfrm_attr_type_t {
+	XFRMA_UNSPEC,
+	XFRMA_ALG_AUTH,		/* struct xfrm_algo */
+	XFRMA_ALG_CRYPT,	/* struct xfrm_algo */
+	XFRMA_ALG_COMP,		/* struct xfrm_algo */
+	XFRMA_ENCAP,		/* struct xfrm_algo + struct xfrm_encap_tmpl */
+	XFRMA_TMPL,		/* 1 or more struct xfrm_user_tmpl */
+
+#define XFRMA_MAX XFRMA_TMPL
+};
+
+struct xfrm_usersa_info {
+	struct xfrm_selector		sel;
+	struct xfrm_id			id;
+	xfrm_address_t			saddr;
+	struct xfrm_lifetime_cfg	lft;
+	struct xfrm_lifetime_cur	curlft;
+	struct xfrm_stats		stats;
+	uint32_t			seq;
+	uint32_t			reqid;
+	uint16_t			family;
+	uint8_t				mode; /* 0=transport,1=tunnel */
+	uint8_t				replay_window;
+	uint8_t				flags;
+#define XFRM_STATE_NOECN	1
+};
+
+struct xfrm_usersa_id {
+	xfrm_address_t			daddr;
+	uint32_t			spi;
+	uint16_t			family;
+	uint8_t				proto;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_userspi_info {
+	struct xfrm_usersa_info		info;
+	uint32_t			min;
+	uint32_t			max;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_userpolicy_info {
+	struct xfrm_selector		sel;
+	struct xfrm_lifetime_cfg	lft;
+	struct xfrm_lifetime_cur	curlft;
+	uint32_t			priority;
+	uint32_t			index;
+	uint8_t				dir;
+	uint8_t				action;
+#define XFRM_POLICY_ALLOW	0
+#define XFRM_POLICY_BLOCK	1
+	uint8_t				flags;
+#define XFRM_POLICY_LOCALOK	1	/* Allow user to override global policy */
+	uint8_t				share;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_userpolicy_id {
+	struct xfrm_selector		sel;
+	uint32_t			index;
+	uint8_t				dir;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_user_acquire {
+	struct xfrm_id			id;
+	xfrm_address_t			saddr;
+	struct xfrm_selector		sel;
+	struct xfrm_userpolicy_info	policy;
+	uint32_t			aalgos;
+	uint32_t			ealgos;
+	uint32_t			calgos;
+	uint32_t			seq;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_user_expire {
+	struct xfrm_usersa_info		state;
+	uint8_t				hard;
+};
+
+struct xfrm_user_polexpire {
+	struct xfrm_userpolicy_info	pol;
+	uint8_t				hard;
+};
+
+#define XFRMGRP_ACQUIRE		1
+#define XFRMGRP_EXPIRE		2
+
+#endif /* _LINUX_XFRM_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/log.c b/src/pluto/log.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..36997122c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/log.c
@@ -0,0 +1,841 @@
+/* error logging functions
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: log.c,v 1.8 2006/04/29 18:16:02 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>	/* used only if MSG_NOSIGNAL not defined */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <libgen.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* needs connections.h */
+#include "timer.h"
+
+/* close one per-peer log */
+static void perpeer_logclose(struct connection *c);	/* forward */
+
+
+bool
+    log_to_stderr = TRUE,	/* should log go to stderr? */
+    log_to_syslog = TRUE,	/* should log go to syslog? */
+    log_to_perpeer= FALSE;	/* should log go to per-IP file? */
+
+bool
+    logged_txt_warning = FALSE;  /* should we complain about finding KEY? */
+
+/* should we complain when we find no local id */
+bool
+    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = FALSE,
+    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning   = FALSE,
+    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = FALSE,
+    logged_myid_ip_key_warning   = FALSE;
+
+/* may include trailing / */
+const char *base_perpeer_logdir = PERPEERLOGDIR;
+static int perpeer_count = 0;
+
+/* from sys/queue.h */
+static CIRCLEQ_HEAD(,connection) perpeer_list;
+
+
+/* Context for logging.
+ *
+ * Global variables: must be carefully adjusted at transaction boundaries!
+ * If the context provides a whack file descriptor, messages
+ * should be copied to it -- see whack_log()
+ */
+int whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;	/* only set during whack_handle() */
+struct state *cur_state = NULL;	/* current state, for diagnostics */
+struct connection *cur_connection = NULL;	/* current connection, for diagnostics */
+const ip_address *cur_from = NULL;	/* source of current current message */
+u_int16_t cur_from_port;	/* host order */
+
+void
+init_log(const char *program)
+{
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	setbuf(stderr, NULL);
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	openlog(program, LOG_CONS | LOG_NDELAY | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
+
+    CIRCLEQ_INIT(&perpeer_list);
+}
+
+void
+close_peerlog(void)
+{
+    /* end of circular queue is given by pointer to "HEAD"
+     * BUT if the queue is not initialized, this won't be true
+     * so we must guard by test perpeer_list.cqh_first != NULL
+     */
+    if (perpeer_list.cqh_first != NULL)
+	while (perpeer_list.cqh_first != (void *)&perpeer_list)
+	    perpeer_logclose(perpeer_list.cqh_first);
+}
+
+void
+close_log(void)
+{
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	closelog();
+
+    close_peerlog();
+}
+
+/* Sanitize character string in situ: turns dangerous characters into \OOO.
+ * With a bit of work, we could use simpler reps for \\, \r, etc.,
+ * but this is only to protect against something that shouldn't be used.
+ * Truncate resulting string to what fits in buffer.
+ */
+static size_t
+sanitize(char *buf, size_t size)
+{
+#   define UGLY_WIDTH	4	/* width for ugly character: \OOO */
+    size_t len;
+    size_t added = 0;
+    char *p;
+
+    passert(size >= UGLY_WIDTH);	/* need room to swing cat */
+
+    /* find right side of string to be sanitized and count
+     * number of columns to be added.  Stop on end of string
+     * or lack of room for more result.
+     */
+    for (p = buf; *p != '\0' && &p[added] < &buf[size - UGLY_WIDTH]; )
+    {
+	unsigned char c = *p++;
+
+	if (c == '\\' || !isprint(c))
+	    added += UGLY_WIDTH - 1;
+    }
+
+    /* at this point, p points after last original character to be
+     * included.  added is how many characters are added to sanitize.
+     * so p[added] will point after last sanitized character.
+     */
+
+    p[added] = '\0';
+    len = &p[added] - buf;
+
+    /* scan backwards, copying characters to their new home
+     * and inserting the expansions for ugly characters.
+     * It is finished when no more shifting is required.
+     * This is a predecrement loop.
+     */
+    while (added != 0)
+    {
+	char fmtd[UGLY_WIDTH + 1];
+	unsigned char c;
+
+	while ((c = *--p) != '\\' && isprint(c))
+	    p[added] = c;
+	added -= UGLY_WIDTH - 1;
+	snprintf(fmtd, sizeof(fmtd), "\\%03o", c);
+	memcpy(p + added, fmtd, UGLY_WIDTH);
+    }
+    return len;
+#   undef UGLY_WIDTH
+}
+
+/* format a string for the log, with suitable prefixes.
+ * A format starting with ~ indicates that this is a reprocessing
+ * of the message, so prefixing and quoting is suppressed.
+ */
+static void
+fmt_log(char *buf, size_t buf_len, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+    bool reproc = *fmt == '~';
+    size_t ps;
+    struct connection *c = cur_state != NULL ? cur_state->st_connection
+	: cur_connection;
+
+    buf[0] = '\0';
+    if (reproc)
+	fmt++;	/* ~ at start of format suppresses this prefix */
+    else if (c != NULL)
+    {
+	/* start with name of connection */
+	char *const be = buf + buf_len;
+	char *bp = buf;
+
+	snprintf(bp, be - bp, "\"%s\"", c->name);
+	bp += strlen(bp);
+
+	/* if it fits, put in any connection instance information */
+	if (be - bp > CONN_INST_BUF)
+	{
+	    fmt_conn_instance(c, bp);
+	    bp += strlen(bp);
+	}
+
+	if (cur_state != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* state number */
+	    snprintf(bp, be - bp, " #%lu", cur_state->st_serialno);
+	    bp += strlen(bp);
+	}
+	snprintf(bp, be - bp, ": ");
+    }
+    else if (cur_from != NULL)
+    {
+	/* peer's IP address */
+	/* Note: must not use ip_str() because our caller might! */
+	char ab[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	(void) addrtot(cur_from, 0, ab, sizeof(ab));
+	snprintf(buf, buf_len, "packet from %s:%u: "
+	    , ab, (unsigned)cur_from_port);
+    }
+
+    ps = strlen(buf);
+    vsnprintf(buf + ps, buf_len - ps, fmt, ap);
+    if (!reproc)
+	(void)sanitize(buf, buf_len);
+}
+
+static void
+perpeer_logclose(struct connection *c)
+{
+    /* only free/close things if we had used them! */
+    if (c->log_file != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(perpeer_count > 0);
+
+	CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(&perpeer_list, c, log_link);
+	perpeer_count--;
+	fclose(c->log_file);
+	c->log_file=NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+void
+perpeer_logfree(struct connection *c)
+{
+    perpeer_logclose(c);
+    if (c->log_file_name != NULL)
+    {
+	pfree(c->log_file_name);
+	c->log_file_name = NULL;
+	c->log_file_err = FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* open the per-peer log */
+static void
+open_peerlog(struct connection *c)
+{
+    syslog(LOG_INFO, "opening log file for conn %s", c->name);
+
+    if (c->log_file_name == NULL)
+    {
+	char peername[ADDRTOT_BUF], dname[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	int  peernamelen, lf_len;
+
+	addrtot(&c->spd.that.host_addr, 'Q', peername, sizeof(peername));
+	peernamelen = strlen(peername);
+
+	/* copy IP address, turning : and . into / */
+	{
+	    char c, *p, *q;
+
+	    p = peername;
+	    q = dname;
+	    do {
+		c = *p++;
+		if (c == '.' || c == ':')
+		    c = '/';
+		*q++ = c;
+	    } while (c != '\0');
+	}
+
+	lf_len = peernamelen * 2
+	    + strlen(base_perpeer_logdir)
+	    + sizeof("//.log")
+	    + 1;
+	c->log_file_name = alloc_bytes(lf_len, "per-peer log file name");
+
+	fprintf(stderr, "base dir |%s| dname |%s| peername |%s|"
+		, base_perpeer_logdir, dname, peername);
+	snprintf(c->log_file_name, lf_len, "%s/%s/%s.log"
+		 , base_perpeer_logdir, dname, peername);
+
+	syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "conn %s logfile is %s", c->name, c->log_file_name);
+    }
+
+    /* now open the file, creating directories if necessary */
+
+    {  /* create the directory */
+	char *dname;
+	int   bpl_len = strlen(base_perpeer_logdir);
+	char *slashloc;
+
+	dname = clone_str(c->log_file_name, "temp copy of file name");
+	dname = dirname(dname);
+
+	if (access(dname, W_OK) != 0)
+	{
+	    if (errno != ENOENT)
+	    {
+		if (c->log_file_err)
+		{
+		    syslog(LOG_CRIT, "can not write to %s: %s"
+			   , dname, strerror(errno));
+		    c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+		    pfree(dname);
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    /* directory does not exist, walk path creating dirs */
+	    /* start at base_perpeer_logdir */
+	    slashloc = dname + bpl_len;
+	    slashloc++;    /* since, by construction there is a slash
+			      right there */
+
+	    while (*slashloc != '\0')
+	    {
+		char saveslash;
+
+		/* look for next slash */
+		while (*slashloc != '\0' && *slashloc != '/') slashloc++;
+
+		saveslash = *slashloc;
+
+		*slashloc = '\0';
+
+		if (mkdir(dname, 0750) != 0 && errno != EEXIST)
+		{
+		    syslog(LOG_CRIT, "can not create dir %s: %s"
+			   , dname, strerror(errno));
+		    c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+		    pfree(dname);
+		    return;
+		}
+		syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "created new directory %s", dname);
+		*slashloc = saveslash;
+		slashloc++;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	pfree(dname);
+    }
+
+    c->log_file = fopen(c->log_file_name, "a");
+    if (c->log_file == NULL)
+    {
+	if (c->log_file_err)
+	{
+	    syslog(LOG_CRIT, "logging system can not open %s: %s"
+		   , c->log_file_name, strerror(errno));
+	    c->log_file_err = TRUE;
+	}
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* look for a connection to close! */
+    while (perpeer_count >= MAX_PEERLOG_COUNT)
+    {
+	/* can not be NULL because perpeer_count > 0 */
+	passert(perpeer_list.cqh_last != (void *)&perpeer_list);
+
+	perpeer_logclose(perpeer_list.cqh_last);
+    }
+
+    /* insert this into the list */
+    CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(&perpeer_list, c, log_link);
+    passert(c->log_file != NULL);
+    perpeer_count++;
+}
+
+/* log a line to cur_connection's log */
+static void
+peerlog(const char *prefix, const char *m)
+{
+    if (cur_connection == NULL)
+    {
+	/* we can not log it in this case. Oh well. */
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (cur_connection->log_file == NULL)
+    {
+	open_peerlog(cur_connection);
+    }
+
+    /* despite our attempts above, we may not be able to open the file. */
+    if (cur_connection->log_file != NULL)
+    {
+	char datebuf[32];
+	time_t n;
+	struct tm *t;
+
+	time(&n);
+	t = localtime(&n);
+
+	strftime(datebuf, sizeof(datebuf), "%Y-%m-%d %T", t);
+	fprintf(cur_connection->log_file, "%s %s%s\n", datebuf, prefix, m);
+
+	/* now move it to the front of the list */
+	CIRCLEQ_REMOVE(&perpeer_list, cur_connection, log_link);
+	CIRCLEQ_INSERT_HEAD(&perpeer_list, cur_connection, log_link);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+plog(const char *message, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+    va_start(args, message);
+    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+    va_end(args);
+
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m);
+    if (log_to_perpeer)
+	peerlog("", m);
+
+    whack_log(RC_LOG, "~%s", m);
+}
+
+void
+loglog(int mess_no, const char *message, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+    va_start(args, message);
+    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+    va_end(args);
+
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m);
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m);
+    if (log_to_perpeer)
+	peerlog("", m);
+
+    whack_log(mess_no, "~%s", m);
+}
+
+void
+log_errno_routine(int e, const char *message, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+    va_start(args, message);
+    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+    va_end(args);
+
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	fprintf(stderr, "ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s\n", m, e, strerror(e));
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+    if (log_to_perpeer)
+    {
+	peerlog(strerror(e), m);
+    }
+
+    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	, "~ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+}
+
+void
+exit_log(const char *message, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+    va_start(args, message);
+    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+    va_end(args);
+
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: %s\n", m);
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "FATAL ERROR: %s", m);
+    if (log_to_perpeer)
+	peerlog("FATAL ERROR: ", m);
+
+    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "~FATAL ERROR: %s", m);
+
+    exit_pluto(1);
+}
+
+void
+exit_log_errno_routine(int e, const char *message, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+    va_start(args, message);
+    fmt_log(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+    va_end(args);
+
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	fprintf(stderr, "FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s\n", m, e, strerror(e));
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	syslog(LOG_ERR, "FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+    if (log_to_perpeer)
+	peerlog(strerror(e), m);
+
+    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+	, "~FATAL ERROR: %s. Errno %d: %s", m, e, strerror(e));
+
+    exit_pluto(1);
+}
+
+/* emit message to whack.
+ * form is "ddd statename text" where
+ * - ddd is a decimal status code (RC_*) as described in whack.h
+ * - text is a human-readable annotation
+ */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static volatile sig_atomic_t dying_breath = FALSE;
+#endif
+
+void
+whack_log(int mess_no, const char *message, ...)
+{
+    int wfd = whack_log_fd != NULL_FD ? whack_log_fd
+	: cur_state != NULL ? cur_state->st_whack_sock
+	: NULL_FD;
+
+    if (wfd != NULL_FD
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    || dying_breath
+#endif
+    )
+    {
+	va_list args;
+	char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+	int prelen = snprintf(m, sizeof(m), "%03d ", mess_no);
+
+	passert(prelen >= 0);
+
+	va_start(args, message);
+	fmt_log(m+prelen, sizeof(m)-prelen, message, args);
+	va_end(args);
+
+#if DEBUG
+	if (dying_breath)
+	{
+	    /* status output copied to log */
+	    if (log_to_stderr)
+		fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", m + prelen);
+	    if (log_to_syslog)
+		syslog(LOG_WARNING, "%s", m + prelen);
+	    if (log_to_perpeer)
+		peerlog("", m);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	if (wfd != NULL_FD)
+	{
+	    /* write to whack socket, but suppress possible SIGPIPE */
+	    size_t len = strlen(m);
+#ifdef MSG_NOSIGNAL	/* depends on version of glibc??? */
+	    m[len] = '\n';	/* don't need NUL, do need NL */
+	    (void) send(wfd, m, len + 1, MSG_NOSIGNAL);
+#else /* !MSG_NOSIGNAL */
+	    int r;
+	    struct sigaction act
+		, oldact;
+
+	    m[len] = '\n';	/* don't need NUL, do need NL */
+	    act.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
+	    sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
+	    act.sa_flags = 0;	/* no nothing */
+	    r = sigaction(SIGPIPE, &act, &oldact);
+	    passert(r == 0);
+
+	    (void) write(wfd, m, len + 1);
+
+	    r = sigaction(SIGPIPE, &oldact, NULL);
+	    passert(r == 0);
+#endif /* !MSG_NOSIGNAL */
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Build up a diagnostic in a static buffer.
+ * Although this would be a generally useful function, it is very
+ * hard to come up with a discipline that prevents different uses
+ * from interfering.  It is intended that by limiting it to building
+ * diagnostics, we will avoid this problem.
+ * Juggling is performed to allow an argument to be a previous
+ * result: the new string may safely depend on the old one.  This
+ * restriction is not checked in any way: violators will produce
+ * confusing results (without crashing!).
+ */
+char diag_space[sizeof(diag_space)];
+
+err_t
+builddiag(const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+    static char diag_space[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+    char t[sizeof(diag_space)];	/* build result here first */
+    va_list args;
+
+    va_start(args, fmt);
+    t[0] = '\0';	/* in case nothing terminates string */
+    vsnprintf(t, sizeof(t), fmt, args);
+    va_end(args);
+    strcpy(diag_space, t);
+    return diag_space;
+}
+
+/* Debugging message support */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+
+void
+switch_fail(int n, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
+{
+    char buf[30];
+
+    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "case %d unexpected", n);
+    passert_fail(buf, file_str, line_no);
+}
+
+void
+passert_fail(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
+{
+    /* we will get a possibly unplanned prefix.  Hope it works */
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ASSERTION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
+    if (!dying_breath)
+    {
+	dying_breath = TRUE;
+	show_status(TRUE, NULL);
+    }
+    abort();	/* exiting correctly doesn't always work */
+}
+
+void
+pexpect_log(const char *pred_str, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no)
+{
+    /* we will get a possibly unplanned prefix.  Hope it works */
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "EXPECTATION FAILED at %s:%lu: %s", file_str, line_no, pred_str);
+}
+
+lset_t
+    base_debugging = DBG_NONE,	/* default to reporting nothing */
+    cur_debugging =  DBG_NONE;
+
+void
+extra_debugging(const struct connection *c)
+{
+    if(c == NULL)
+    {
+	reset_debugging();
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (c!= NULL && c->extra_debugging != 0)
+    {
+	plog("enabling for connection: %s"
+	    , bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, c->extra_debugging & ~cur_debugging));
+	cur_debugging |= c->extra_debugging;
+    }
+}
+
+/* log a debugging message (prefixed by "| ") */
+
+void
+DBG_log(const char *message, ...)
+{
+    va_list args;
+    char m[LOG_WIDTH];	/* longer messages will be truncated */
+
+    va_start(args, message);
+    vsnprintf(m, sizeof(m), message, args);
+    va_end(args);
+
+    (void)sanitize(m, sizeof(m));
+
+    if (log_to_stderr)
+	fprintf(stderr, "| %s\n", m);
+    if (log_to_syslog)
+	syslog(LOG_DEBUG, "| %s", m);
+    if (log_to_perpeer)
+	peerlog("| ", m);
+}
+
+/* dump raw bytes in hex to stderr (for lack of any better destination) */
+
+void
+DBG_dump(const char *label, const void *p, size_t len)
+{
+#   define DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH 20	/* arbitrary modest boundary */
+#   define DUMP_WIDTH	(4 * (1 + 4 * 3) + 1)
+    char buf[DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH + DUMP_WIDTH];
+    char *bp;
+    const unsigned char *cp = p;
+
+    bp = buf;
+
+    if (label != NULL && label[0] != '\0')
+    {
+	/* Handle the label.  Care must be taken to avoid buffer overrun. */
+	size_t llen = strlen(label);
+
+	if (llen + 1 > sizeof(buf))
+	{
+	    DBG_log("%s", label);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    strcpy(buf, label);
+	    if (buf[llen-1] == '\n')
+	    {
+		buf[llen-1] = '\0';	/* get rid of newline */
+		DBG_log("%s", buf);
+	    }
+	    else if (llen < DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH)
+	    {
+		bp = buf + llen;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		DBG_log("%s", buf);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    do {
+	int i, j;
+
+	for (i = 0; len!=0 && i!=4; i++)
+	{
+	    *bp++ = ' ';
+	    for (j = 0; len!=0 && j!=4; len--, j++)
+	    {
+		static const char hexdig[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+		*bp++ = ' ';
+		*bp++ = hexdig[(*cp >> 4) & 0xF];
+		*bp++ = hexdig[*cp & 0xF];
+		cp++;
+	    }
+	}
+	*bp = '\0';
+	DBG_log("%s", buf);
+	bp = buf;
+    } while (len != 0);
+#   undef DUMP_LABEL_WIDTH
+#   undef DUMP_WIDTH
+}
+
+#endif /* DEBUG */
+
+void
+show_status(bool all, const char *name)
+{
+    if (all)
+    {
+	show_ifaces_status();
+	show_myid_status();
+	show_debug_status();
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+    }
+    show_connections_status(all, name);
+    show_states_status(all, name);
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    show_shunt_status();
+#endif
+}
+
+/* ip_str: a simple to use variant of addrtot.
+ * It stores its result in a static buffer.
+ * This means that newer calls overwrite the storage of older calls.
+ * Note: this is not used in any of the logging functions, so their
+ * callers may use it.
+ */
+const char *
+ip_str(const ip_address *src)
+{
+    static char buf[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+    addrtot(src, 0, buf, sizeof(buf));
+    return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ * a routine that attempts to schedule itself daily.
+ *
+ */
+
+void
+daily_log_reset(void)
+{
+    /* now perform actions */
+    logged_txt_warning = FALSE;
+
+    logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning = FALSE;
+    logged_myid_ip_txt_warning   = FALSE;
+    logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning = FALSE;
+    logged_myid_ip_key_warning   = FALSE;
+}
+
+void
+daily_log_event(void)
+{
+    struct tm *ltime;
+    time_t n, interval;
+
+    /* attempt to schedule oneself to midnight, local time
+     * do this by getting seconds in the day, and delaying
+     * by 86400 - hour*3600+minutes*60+seconds.
+     */
+    time(&n);
+    ltime = localtime(&n);
+    interval = (24 * 60 * 60)
+      - (ltime->tm_sec
+	 + ltime->tm_min  * 60
+	 + ltime->tm_hour * 3600);
+
+    event_schedule(EVENT_LOG_DAILY, interval, NULL);
+
+    daily_log_reset();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset:4
+ * c-style: pluto
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/log.h b/src/pluto/log.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a4eae9d1c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/log.h
@@ -0,0 +1,236 @@
+/* logging definitions
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: log.h,v 1.4 2005/07/11 18:33:45 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#define LOG_WIDTH   1024    /* roof of number of chars in log line */
+
+#ifndef PERPEERLOGDIR
+#define PERPEERLOGDIR "/var/log/pluto/peer"
+#endif
+
+/* our versions of assert: log result */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+
+extern void passert_fail(const char *pred_str
+    , const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no) NEVER_RETURNS;
+
+extern void pexpect_log(const char *pred_str
+			, const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no);
+
+# define impossible() passert_fail("impossible", __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+extern void switch_fail(int n
+    , const char *file_str, unsigned long line_no) NEVER_RETURNS;
+
+# define bad_case(n) switch_fail((int) n, __FILE__, __LINE__)
+
+# define passert(pred) { \
+	if (!(pred)) \
+	    passert_fail(#pred, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+    }
+
+# define pexpect(pred) { \
+	if (!(pred)) \
+	    pexpect_log(#pred, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+    }
+
+/* assert that an err_t is NULL; evaluate exactly once */
+# define happy(x) { \
+	err_t ugh = x; \
+	if (ugh != NULL) \
+	    passert_fail(ugh, __FILE__, __LINE__); \
+    }
+
+#else /*!DEBUG*/
+
+# define impossible() abort()
+# define bad_case(n) abort()
+# define passert(pred)  { }	/* do nothing */
+# define happy(x)  { (void) x; }	/* evaluate non-judgementally */
+
+#endif /*!DEBUG*/
+
+
+extern bool
+    log_to_stderr,	/* should log go to stderr? */
+    log_to_syslog,	/* should log go to syslog? */
+    log_to_perpeer;     /* should log go to per-IP file? */
+
+extern const char *base_perpeer_logdir;
+
+/* maximum number of files to keep open for per-peer log files */
+#define MAX_PEERLOG_COUNT 16
+
+/* Context for logging.
+ *
+ * Global variables: must be carefully adjusted at transaction boundaries!
+ * All are to be left in RESET condition and will be checked.
+ * There are several pairs of routines to set and reset them.
+ * If the context provides a whack file descriptor, messages
+ * should be copied to it -- see whack_log()
+ */
+extern int whack_log_fd;	/* only set during whack_handle() */
+extern struct state *cur_state;	/* current state, for diagnostics */
+extern struct connection *cur_connection;	/* current connection, for diagnostics */
+extern const ip_address *cur_from;	/* source of current current message */
+extern u_int16_t cur_from_port;	/* host order */
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+
+  extern lset_t cur_debugging;	/* current debugging level */
+
+  extern void extra_debugging(const struct connection *c);
+
+# define reset_debugging() { cur_debugging = base_debugging; }
+
+# define GLOBALS_ARE_RESET() (whack_log_fd == NULL_FD \
+    && cur_state == NULL \
+    && cur_connection == NULL \
+    && cur_from == NULL \
+    && cur_debugging == base_debugging)
+
+#else /*!DEBUG*/
+
+# define extra_debugging(c)  { }
+
+# define reset_debugging() { }
+
+# define GLOBALS_ARE_RESET() (whack_log_fd == NULL_FD \
+    && cur_state == NULL \
+    && cur_connection == NULL \
+    && cur_from == NULL)
+
+#endif /*!DEBUG*/
+
+#define reset_globals() { \
+    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD; \
+    cur_state = NULL; \
+    cur_from = NULL; \
+    reset_cur_connection(); \
+    }
+
+
+#define set_cur_connection(c) { \
+    cur_connection = (c); \
+    extra_debugging(c); \
+    }
+
+#define reset_cur_connection() { \
+    cur_connection = NULL; \
+    reset_debugging(); \
+    }
+
+
+#define set_cur_state(s) { \
+    cur_state = (s); \
+    extra_debugging((s)->st_connection); \
+    }
+
+#define reset_cur_state() { \
+    cur_state = NULL; \
+    reset_debugging(); \
+    }
+
+extern void init_log(const char *program);
+extern void close_log(void);
+extern void plog(const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(1);
+extern void exit_log(const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(1) NEVER_RETURNS;
+
+/* close of all per-peer logging */
+extern void close_peerlog(void);
+
+/* free all per-peer log resources */
+extern void perpeer_logfree(struct connection *c);
+
+
+
+/* the following routines do a dance to capture errno before it is changed
+ * A call must doubly parenthesize the argument list (no varargs macros).
+ * The first argument must be "e", the local variable that captures errno.
+ */
+#define log_errno(a) { int e = errno; log_errno_routine a; }
+extern void log_errno_routine(int e, const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(2);
+#define exit_log_errno(a) { int e = errno; exit_log_errno_routine a; }
+extern void exit_log_errno_routine(int e, const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(2) NEVER_RETURNS NEVER_RETURNS;
+
+extern void whack_log(int mess_no, const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(2);
+
+/* Log to both main log and whack log
+ * Much like log, actually, except for specifying mess_no.
+ */
+extern void loglog(int mess_no, const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(2);
+
+/* show status, usually on whack log */
+extern void show_status(bool all, const char *name);
+
+/* Build up a diagnostic in a static buffer.
+ * Although this would be a generally useful function, it is very
+ * hard to come up with a discipline that prevents different uses
+ * from interfering.  It is intended that by limiting it to building
+ * diagnostics, we will avoid this problem.
+ * Juggling is performed to allow an argument to be a previous
+ * result: the new string may safely depend on the old one.  This
+ * restriction is not checked in any way: violators will produce
+ * confusing results (without crashing!).
+ */
+extern char diag_space[LOG_WIDTH];	/* output buffer, but can be occupied at call */
+extern err_t builddiag(const char *fmt, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(1);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+
+extern lset_t base_debugging;	/* bits selecting what to report */
+
+#define DBGP(cond)         (cur_debugging & (cond))
+#define DBG(cond, action)   { if (DBGP(cond)) { action ; } }
+
+extern void DBG_log(const char *message, ...) PRINTF_LIKE(1);
+extern void DBG_dump(const char *label, const void *p, size_t len);
+#define DBG_dump_chunk(label, ch) DBG_dump(label, (ch).ptr, (ch).len)
+
+#else /*!DEBUG*/
+
+#define DBG(cond, action)	{ }	/* do nothing */
+
+#endif /*!DEBUG*/
+
+#define DBG_cond_dump(cond, label, p, len) DBG(cond, DBG_dump(label, p, len))
+#define DBG_cond_dump_chunk(cond, label, ch) DBG(cond, DBG_dump_chunk(label, ch))
+
+
+/* ip_str: a simple to use variant of addrtot.
+ * It stores its result in a static buffer.
+ * This means that newer calls overwrite the storage of older calls.
+ * Note: this is not used in any of the logging functions, so their
+ * callers may use it.
+ */
+extern const char *ip_str(const ip_address *src);
+
+/*
+ * call this routine to reset daily items.
+ */
+extern void daily_log_reset(void);
+extern void daily_log_event(void);
+
+/*
+ * some events are to be logged only occasionally.
+ */
+extern bool logged_txt_warning;
+extern bool logged_myid_ip_txt_warning;
+extern bool logged_myid_ip_key_warning;
+extern bool logged_myid_fqdn_txt_warning;
+extern bool logged_myid_fqdn_key_warning;
diff --git a/src/pluto/md2.c b/src/pluto/md2.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d6465477d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/md2.c
@@ -0,0 +1,237 @@
+/* MD2C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD2 message-digest algorithm
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (C) 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All
+   rights reserved.
+
+   License to copy and use this software is granted for
+   non-commercial Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail provided that it is
+   identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD2 Message Digest
+   Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
+   or this function.
+
+   RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
+   the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
+   software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
+   without express or implied warranty of any kind.
+
+   These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
+   documentation and/or software.
+ */
+
+#include "md2.h"
+
+#define HAVEMEMCOPY 1	/* use ISO C's memcpy and memset */
+
+static void MD2Transform PROTO_LIST
+  ((unsigned char [16], unsigned char [16], const unsigned char [16]));
+
+#ifdef HAVEMEMCOPY
+#include <memory.h>
+#define MD2_memcpy	memcpy
+#define MD2_memset	memset
+#else
+#ifdef HAVEBCOPY
+#define MD2_memcpy(_a,_b,_c) memcpy((_a), (_b),(_c))
+#define MD2_memset(_a,_b,_c) memset((_a), '\0',(_c))
+#else
+static void MD2_memcpy PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, CONST_POINTER, unsigned int));
+static void MD2_memset PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, int, unsigned int));
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* Permutation of 0..255 constructed from the digits of pi. It gives a
+   "random" nonlinear byte substitution operation.
+ */
+static unsigned char PI_SUBST[256] = {
+  41, 46, 67, 201, 162, 216, 124, 1, 61, 54, 84, 161, 236, 240, 6,
+  19, 98, 167, 5, 243, 192, 199, 115, 140, 152, 147, 43, 217, 188,
+  76, 130, 202, 30, 155, 87, 60, 253, 212, 224, 22, 103, 66, 111, 24,
+  138, 23, 229, 18, 190, 78, 196, 214, 218, 158, 222, 73, 160, 251,
+  245, 142, 187, 47, 238, 122, 169, 104, 121, 145, 21, 178, 7, 63,
+  148, 194, 16, 137, 11, 34, 95, 33, 128, 127, 93, 154, 90, 144, 50,
+  39, 53, 62, 204, 231, 191, 247, 151, 3, 255, 25, 48, 179, 72, 165,
+  181, 209, 215, 94, 146, 42, 172, 86, 170, 198, 79, 184, 56, 210,
+  150, 164, 125, 182, 118, 252, 107, 226, 156, 116, 4, 241, 69, 157,
+  112, 89, 100, 113, 135, 32, 134, 91, 207, 101, 230, 45, 168, 2, 27,
+  96, 37, 173, 174, 176, 185, 246, 28, 70, 97, 105, 52, 64, 126, 15,
+  85, 71, 163, 35, 221, 81, 175, 58, 195, 92, 249, 206, 186, 197,
+  234, 38, 44, 83, 13, 110, 133, 40, 132, 9, 211, 223, 205, 244, 65,
+  129, 77, 82, 106, 220, 55, 200, 108, 193, 171, 250, 36, 225, 123,
+  8, 12, 189, 177, 74, 120, 136, 149, 139, 227, 99, 232, 109, 233,
+  203, 213, 254, 59, 0, 29, 57, 242, 239, 183, 14, 102, 88, 208, 228,
+  166, 119, 114, 248, 235, 117, 75, 10, 49, 68, 80, 180, 143, 237,
+  31, 26, 219, 153, 141, 51, 159, 17, 131, 20
+};
+
+static const unsigned char *PADDING[] = {
+  (const unsigned char *)"",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\001",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\002\002",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\003\003\003",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\004\004\004\004",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\005\005\005\005\005",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\006\006\006\006\006\006",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\007\007\007\007\007\007\007",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\010\010\010\010\010\010\010\010",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\011\011\011\011\011\011\011\011\011",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\012\012\012\012\012\012\012\012\012\012",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013\013",
+  (const unsigned char *)"\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014\014",
+  (const unsigned char *)
+    "\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015\015",
+  (const unsigned char *)
+    "\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016\016",
+  (const unsigned char *)
+    "\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017\017",
+  (const unsigned char *)
+    "\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020\020"
+};
+
+/* MD2 initialization. Begins an MD2 operation, writing a new context.
+ */
+void MD2Init (context)
+MD2_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
+{
+  context->count = 0;
+  MD2_memset ((POINTER)context->state, 0, sizeof (context->state));
+  MD2_memset
+    ((POINTER)context->checksum, 0, sizeof (context->checksum));
+}
+
+/* MD2 block update operation. Continues an MD2 message-digest
+     operation, processing another message block, and updating the
+     context.
+ */
+void MD2Update (context, input, inputLen)
+MD2_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
+const unsigned char *input;                          /* input block */
+unsigned int inputLen;                     /* length of input block */
+{
+  unsigned int i, index, partLen;
+
+  /* Update number of bytes mod 16 */
+  index = context->count;
+  context->count = (index + inputLen) & 0xf;
+
+  partLen = 16 - index;
+
+  /* Transform as many times as possible.
+    */
+  if (inputLen >= partLen) {
+    MD2_memcpy
+      ((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONST_POINTER)input, partLen);
+    MD2Transform (context->state, context->checksum, context->buffer);
+
+    for (i = partLen; i + 15 < inputLen; i += 16)
+      MD2Transform (context->state, context->checksum, &input[i]);
+
+    index = 0;
+  }
+  else
+    i = 0;
+
+  /* Buffer remaining input */
+  MD2_memcpy
+    ((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONST_POINTER)&input[i],
+     inputLen-i);
+}
+
+/* MD2 finalization. Ends an MD2 message-digest operation, writing the
+     message digest and zeroizing the context.
+ */
+void MD2Final (digest, context)
+
+unsigned char digest[16];                         /* message digest */
+MD2_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
+{
+  unsigned int index, padLen;
+
+  /* Pad out to multiple of 16.
+   */
+  index = context->count;
+  padLen = 16 - index;
+  MD2Update (context, PADDING[padLen], padLen);
+
+  /* Extend with checksum */
+  MD2Update (context, context->checksum, 16);
+
+  /* Store state in digest */
+  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)digest, (POINTER)context->state, 16);
+
+  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
+   */
+  MD2_memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context));
+}
+
+/* MD2 basic transformation. Transforms state and updates checksum
+     based on block.
+ */
+static void MD2Transform (state, checksum, block)
+unsigned char state[16];
+unsigned char checksum[16];
+const unsigned char block[16];
+{
+  unsigned int i, j, t;
+  unsigned char x[48];
+
+  /* Form encryption block from state, block, state ^ block.
+   */
+  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)x, (CONST_POINTER)state, 16);
+  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)x+16, (CONST_POINTER)block, 16);
+  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+    x[i+32] = state[i] ^ block[i];
+
+  /* Encrypt block (18 rounds).
+   */
+  t = 0;
+  for (i = 0; i < 18; i++) {
+    for (j = 0; j < 48; j++)
+      t = x[j] ^= PI_SUBST[t];
+    t = (t + i) & 0xff;
+  }
+
+  /* Save new state */
+  MD2_memcpy ((POINTER)state, (POINTER)x, 16);
+
+  /* Update checksum.
+   */
+  t = checksum[15];
+  for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+    t = checksum[i] ^= PI_SUBST[block[i] ^ t];
+
+  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
+   */
+  MD2_memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x));
+}
+
+#ifndef HAVEMEMCOPY
+#ifndef HAVEBCOPY
+/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible.
+ */
+static void MD2_memcpy (output, input, len)
+POINTER output;
+POINTER input;
+unsigned int len;
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+    output[i] = input[i];
+}
+
+/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible.
+ */
+static void MD2_memset (output, value, len)
+POINTER output;
+int value;
+unsigned int len;
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+    ((char *)output)[i] = (char)value;
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/md2.h b/src/pluto/md2.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b3b48dd92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/md2.h
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+#ifndef _GLOBAL_H_
+#define _GLOBAL_H_
+/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants
+ */
+
+/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports
+     function argument prototyping.
+   The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already
+     been defined with C compiler flags.
+ */
+#ifndef PROTOTYPES
+#define PROTOTYPES 1
+#endif
+
+/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */
+typedef unsigned char *POINTER;
+typedef const unsigned char *CONST_POINTER;
+
+/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */
+typedef unsigned short int UINT2;
+
+/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */
+typedef unsigned long int UINT4;
+
+/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above.
+   If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it
+     returns an empty list.
+ */
+
+#if PROTOTYPES
+#define PROTO_LIST(list) list
+#else
+#define PROTO_LIST(list) ()
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* MD2.H - header file for MD2C.C
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (C) 1990-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1990. All
+   rights reserved.
+
+   License to copy and use this software is granted for
+   non-commercial Internet Privacy-Enhanced Mail provided that it is
+   identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD2 Message Digest
+   Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
+   or this function.
+
+   RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
+   the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
+   software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
+   without express or implied warranty of any kind.
+
+   These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
+   documentation and/or software.
+ */
+
+/* MD2 context. */
+typedef struct {
+  unsigned char state[16];                                 /* state */
+  unsigned char checksum[16];                           /* checksum */
+  unsigned int count;                 /* number of bytes, modulo 16 */
+  unsigned char buffer[16];                         /* input buffer */
+} MD2_CTX;
+
+void MD2Init PROTO_LIST ((MD2_CTX *));
+void MD2Update PROTO_LIST
+  ((MD2_CTX *, const unsigned char *, unsigned int));
+void MD2Final PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16], MD2_CTX *));
+
+#define _MD2_H_
diff --git a/src/pluto/md5.c b/src/pluto/md5.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..5d75e38a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/md5.c
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+/*
+ * The rest of the code is derived from MD5C.C by RSADSI. Minor cosmetic
+ * changes to accomodate it in the kernel by ji.
+ * Minor changes to make 64 bit clean by Peter Onion (i.e. using u_int*_t).
+ */
+
+/* MD5C.C - RSA Data Security, Inc., MD5 message-digest algorithm
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
+rights reserved.
+
+License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
+is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
+Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
+or this function.
+
+License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
+that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
+Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
+mentioning or referencing the derived work.
+
+RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
+the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
+software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
+without express or implied warranty of any kind.
+
+These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
+documentation and/or software.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Additions by JI
+ *
+ * HAVEMEMCOPY is defined if mem* routines are available
+ *
+ * HAVEHTON is defined if htons() and htonl() can be used
+ * for big/little endian conversions
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>	/* for u_int*_t */
+#include <endian.h>	/* sets BYTE_ORDER, LITTLE_ENDIAN, and BIG_ENDIAN */
+
+#include "md5.h"
+
+#define HAVEMEMCOPY 1	/* use ISO C's memcpy and memset */
+
+/* Constants for MD5Transform routine.
+ */
+
+#define S11 7
+#define S12 12
+#define S13 17
+#define S14 22
+#define S21 5
+#define S22 9
+#define S23 14
+#define S24 20
+#define S31 4
+#define S32 11
+#define S33 16
+#define S34 23
+#define S41 6
+#define S42 10
+#define S43 15
+#define S44 21
+
+#define MD5Transform _MD5Transform
+
+static void MD5Transform PROTO_LIST ((UINT4 [4], const unsigned char [64]));
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define Encode MD5_memcpy
+#define Decode MD5_memcpy
+#else
+static void Encode PROTO_LIST
+  ((unsigned char *, UINT4 *, unsigned int));
+static void Decode PROTO_LIST
+  ((UINT4 *, unsigned char *, unsigned int));
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVEMEMCOPY
+#include <memory.h>
+#define MD5_memcpy	memcpy
+#define MD5_memset	memset
+#else
+#ifdef HAVEBCOPY
+#define MD5_memcpy(_a,_b,_c) memcpy((_a), (_b),(_c))
+#define MD5_memset(_a,_b,_c) memset((_a), '\0',(_c))
+#else
+static void MD5_memcpy PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, POINTER, unsigned int));
+static void MD5_memset PROTO_LIST ((POINTER, int, unsigned int));
+#endif
+#endif
+static unsigned char PADDING[64] = {
+  0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+  0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
+};
+
+/* F, G, H and I are basic MD5 functions.
+ */
+#define F(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
+#define G(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
+#define H(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
+#define I(x, y, z) ((y) ^ ((x) | (~z)))
+
+/* ROTATE_LEFT rotates x left n bits.
+ */
+#define ROTATE_LEFT(x, n) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
+
+/* FF, GG, HH, and II transformations for rounds 1, 2, 3, and 4.
+Rotation is separate from addition to prevent recomputation.
+ */
+#define FF(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += F ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+  }
+#define GG(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += G ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+  }
+#define HH(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += H ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+  }
+#define II(a, b, c, d, x, s, ac) { \
+ (a) += I ((b), (c), (d)) + (x) + (UINT4)(ac); \
+ (a) = ROTATE_LEFT ((a), (s)); \
+ (a) += (b); \
+  }
+
+/* MD5 initialization. Begins an MD5 operation, writing a new context.
+ */
+void MD5Init (context)
+MD5_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
+{
+  context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
+  /* Load magic initialization constants.
+*/
+  context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+  context->state[1] = 0xefcdab89;
+  context->state[2] = 0x98badcfe;
+  context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+}
+
+/* MD5 block update operation. Continues an MD5 message-digest
+  operation, processing another message block, and updating the
+  context.
+ */
+void MD5Update (context, input, inputLen)
+MD5_CTX *context;                                        /* context */
+const unsigned char *input;                          /* input block */
+UINT4 inputLen;                            /* length of input block */
+{
+  UINT4 i;
+  unsigned int index, partLen;
+
+  /* Compute number of bytes mod 64 */
+  index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3F);
+
+  /* Update number of bits */
+  if ((context->count[0] += (inputLen << 3)) < (inputLen << 3))
+	context->count[1]++;
+  context->count[1] += (inputLen >> 29);
+
+  partLen = 64 - index;
+
+  /* Transform as many times as possible. */
+  if (inputLen >= partLen) {
+	MD5_memcpy((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONSTPOINTER)input, partLen);
+	MD5Transform (context->state, context->buffer);
+
+	for (i = partLen; i + 63 < inputLen; i += 64)
+	    MD5Transform (context->state, &input[i]);
+
+	index = 0;
+  }
+  else
+	i = 0;
+
+  /* Buffer remaining input */
+  MD5_memcpy((POINTER)&context->buffer[index], (CONSTPOINTER)&input[i], inputLen-i);
+}
+
+/* MD5 finalization. Ends an MD5 message-digest operation, writing the
+  the message digest and zeroizing the context.
+ */
+void MD5Final (digest, context)
+unsigned char digest[16];                         /* message digest */
+MD5_CTX *context;                                       /* context */
+{
+  unsigned char bits[8];
+  unsigned int index, padLen;
+
+  /* Save number of bits */
+  Encode (bits, context->count, 8);
+
+  /* Pad out to 56 mod 64.
+*/
+  index = (unsigned int)((context->count[0] >> 3) & 0x3f);
+  padLen = (index < 56) ? (56 - index) : (120 - index);
+  MD5Update (context, PADDING, padLen);
+
+  /* Append length (before padding) */
+  MD5Update (context, bits, 8);
+
+  if (digest != NULL)			/* Bill Simpson's padding */
+  {
+	  /* store state in digest */
+	  Encode (digest, context->state, 16);
+
+	  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
+	   */
+	  MD5_memset ((POINTER)context, 0, sizeof (*context));
+  }
+}
+
+/* MD5 basic transformation. Transforms state based on block.
+ */
+static void MD5Transform (state, block)
+UINT4 state[4];
+const unsigned char block[64];
+{
+  UINT4 a = state[0], b = state[1], c = state[2], d = state[3], x[16];
+
+  Decode (x, block, 64);
+
+  /* Round 1 */
+  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S11, 0xd76aa478); /* 1 */
+  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 1], S12, 0xe8c7b756); /* 2 */
+  FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S13, 0x242070db); /* 3 */
+  FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 3], S14, 0xc1bdceee); /* 4 */
+  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S11, 0xf57c0faf); /* 5 */
+  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 5], S12, 0x4787c62a); /* 6 */
+  FF (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S13, 0xa8304613); /* 7 */
+  FF (b, c, d, a, x[ 7], S14, 0xfd469501); /* 8 */
+  FF (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S11, 0x698098d8); /* 9 */
+  FF (d, a, b, c, x[ 9], S12, 0x8b44f7af); /* 10 */
+  FF (c, d, a, b, x[10], S13, 0xffff5bb1); /* 11 */
+  FF (b, c, d, a, x[11], S14, 0x895cd7be); /* 12 */
+  FF (a, b, c, d, x[12], S11, 0x6b901122); /* 13 */
+  FF (d, a, b, c, x[13], S12, 0xfd987193); /* 14 */
+  FF (c, d, a, b, x[14], S13, 0xa679438e); /* 15 */
+  FF (b, c, d, a, x[15], S14, 0x49b40821); /* 16 */
+
+ /* Round 2 */
+  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], S21, 0xf61e2562); /* 17 */
+  GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 6], S22, 0xc040b340); /* 18 */
+  GG (c, d, a, b, x[11], S23, 0x265e5a51); /* 19 */
+  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 0], S24, 0xe9b6c7aa); /* 20 */
+  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S21, 0xd62f105d); /* 21 */
+  GG (d, a, b, c, x[10], S22,  0x2441453); /* 22 */
+  GG (c, d, a, b, x[15], S23, 0xd8a1e681); /* 23 */
+  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 4], S24, 0xe7d3fbc8); /* 24 */
+  GG (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S21, 0x21e1cde6); /* 25 */
+  GG (d, a, b, c, x[14], S22, 0xc33707d6); /* 26 */
+  GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S23, 0xf4d50d87); /* 27 */
+  GG (b, c, d, a, x[ 8], S24, 0x455a14ed); /* 28 */
+  GG (a, b, c, d, x[13], S21, 0xa9e3e905); /* 29 */
+  GG (d, a, b, c, x[ 2], S22, 0xfcefa3f8); /* 30 */
+  GG (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S23, 0x676f02d9); /* 31 */
+  GG (b, c, d, a, x[12], S24, 0x8d2a4c8a); /* 32 */
+
+  /* Round 3 */
+  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 5], S31, 0xfffa3942); /* 33 */
+  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 8], S32, 0x8771f681); /* 34 */
+  HH (c, d, a, b, x[11], S33, 0x6d9d6122); /* 35 */
+  HH (b, c, d, a, x[14], S34, 0xfde5380c); /* 36 */
+  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 1], S31, 0xa4beea44); /* 37 */
+  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 4], S32, 0x4bdecfa9); /* 38 */
+  HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 7], S33, 0xf6bb4b60); /* 39 */
+  HH (b, c, d, a, x[10], S34, 0xbebfbc70); /* 40 */
+  HH (a, b, c, d, x[13], S31, 0x289b7ec6); /* 41 */
+  HH (d, a, b, c, x[ 0], S32, 0xeaa127fa); /* 42 */
+  HH (c, d, a, b, x[ 3], S33, 0xd4ef3085); /* 43 */
+  HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 6], S34,  0x4881d05); /* 44 */
+  HH (a, b, c, d, x[ 9], S31, 0xd9d4d039); /* 45 */
+  HH (d, a, b, c, x[12], S32, 0xe6db99e5); /* 46 */
+  HH (c, d, a, b, x[15], S33, 0x1fa27cf8); /* 47 */
+  HH (b, c, d, a, x[ 2], S34, 0xc4ac5665); /* 48 */
+
+  /* Round 4 */
+  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 0], S41, 0xf4292244); /* 49 */
+  II (d, a, b, c, x[ 7], S42, 0x432aff97); /* 50 */
+  II (c, d, a, b, x[14], S43, 0xab9423a7); /* 51 */
+  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 5], S44, 0xfc93a039); /* 52 */
+  II (a, b, c, d, x[12], S41, 0x655b59c3); /* 53 */
+  II (d, a, b, c, x[ 3], S42, 0x8f0ccc92); /* 54 */
+  II (c, d, a, b, x[10], S43, 0xffeff47d); /* 55 */
+  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 1], S44, 0x85845dd1); /* 56 */
+  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 8], S41, 0x6fa87e4f); /* 57 */
+  II (d, a, b, c, x[15], S42, 0xfe2ce6e0); /* 58 */
+  II (c, d, a, b, x[ 6], S43, 0xa3014314); /* 59 */
+  II (b, c, d, a, x[13], S44, 0x4e0811a1); /* 60 */
+  II (a, b, c, d, x[ 4], S41, 0xf7537e82); /* 61 */
+  II (d, a, b, c, x[11], S42, 0xbd3af235); /* 62 */
+  II (c, d, a, b, x[ 2], S43, 0x2ad7d2bb); /* 63 */
+  II (b, c, d, a, x[ 9], S44, 0xeb86d391); /* 64 */
+
+  state[0] += a;
+  state[1] += b;
+  state[2] += c;
+  state[3] += d;
+
+  /* Zeroize sensitive information.
+*/
+  MD5_memset ((POINTER)x, 0, sizeof (x));
+}
+
+#if BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN
+
+/* Encodes input (UINT4) into output (unsigned char). Assumes len is
+  a multiple of 4.
+ */
+static void Encode (output, input, len)
+unsigned char *output;
+UINT4 *input;
+unsigned int len;
+{
+  unsigned int i, j;
+
+  for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4) {
+ output[j] = (unsigned char)(input[i] & 0xff);
+ output[j+1] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 8) & 0xff);
+ output[j+2] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 16) & 0xff);
+ output[j+3] = (unsigned char)((input[i] >> 24) & 0xff);
+  }
+}
+
+/* Decodes input (unsigned char) into output (UINT4). Assumes len is
+  a multiple of 4.
+ */
+static void Decode (output, input, len)
+UINT4 *output;
+unsigned char *input;
+unsigned int len;
+{
+  unsigned int i, j;
+
+  for (i = 0, j = 0; j < len; i++, j += 4)
+ output[i] = ((UINT4)input[j]) | (((UINT4)input[j+1]) << 8) |
+   (((UINT4)input[j+2]) << 16) | (((UINT4)input[j+3]) << 24);
+}
+
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVEMEMCOPY
+#ifndef HAVEBCOPY
+/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memcpy if possible.
+ */
+
+static void MD5_memcpy (output, input, len)
+POINTER output;
+POINTER input;
+unsigned int len;
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+
+ output[i] = input[i];
+}
+
+/* Note: Replace "for loop" with standard memset if possible.
+ */
+static void MD5_memset (output, value, len)
+POINTER output;
+int value;
+unsigned int len;
+{
+  unsigned int i;
+
+  for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ ((char *)output)[i] = (char)value;
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/md5.h b/src/pluto/md5.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9b29bc46e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/md5.h
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+#ifndef _GLOBAL_H_
+#define _GLOBAL_H_
+/* GLOBAL.H - RSAREF types and constants
+ */
+
+/* PROTOTYPES should be set to one if and only if the compiler supports
+     function argument prototyping.
+   The following makes PROTOTYPES default to 0 if it has not already
+     been defined with C compiler flags.
+ */
+#ifndef PROTOTYPES
+#define PROTOTYPES 1
+#endif
+
+/* POINTER defines a generic pointer type */
+typedef unsigned char *POINTER;
+typedef const unsigned char *CONSTPOINTER;
+
+/* UINT2 defines a two byte word */
+typedef u_int16_t UINT2;
+
+/* UINT4 defines a four byte word */
+typedef u_int32_t UINT4;
+
+/* PROTO_LIST is defined depending on how PROTOTYPES is defined above.
+   If using PROTOTYPES, then PROTO_LIST returns the list, otherwise it
+     returns an empty list.
+ */
+
+#if PROTOTYPES
+#define PROTO_LIST(list) list
+#else
+#define PROTO_LIST(list) ()
+#endif
+
+#endif
+
+/* MD5.H - header file for MD5C.C
+ */
+
+/* Copyright (C) 1991-2, RSA Data Security, Inc. Created 1991. All
+rights reserved.
+
+License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it
+is identified as the "RSA Data Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest
+Algorithm" in all material mentioning or referencing this software
+or this function.
+
+License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided
+that such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Data
+Security, Inc. MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm" in all material
+mentioning or referencing the derived work.
+
+RSA Data Security, Inc. makes no representations concerning either
+the merchantability of this software or the suitability of this
+software for any particular purpose. It is provided "as is"
+without express or implied warranty of any kind.
+
+These notices must be retained in any copies of any part of this
+documentation and/or software.
+ */
+
+/* MD5 context. */
+typedef struct {
+  UINT4 state[4];                                   /* state (ABCD) */
+  UINT4 count[2];        /* number of bits, modulo 2^64 (lsb first) */
+  unsigned char buffer[64];                         /* input buffer */
+} MD5_CTX;
+
+void MD5Init PROTO_LIST ((MD5_CTX *));
+void MD5Update PROTO_LIST
+  ((MD5_CTX *, const unsigned char *, UINT4));
+void MD5Final PROTO_LIST ((unsigned char [16], MD5_CTX *));
+
+#define _MD5_H_
diff --git a/src/pluto/modecfg.c b/src/pluto/modecfg.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ab44a113e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/modecfg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1078 @@
+/* Mode config related functions
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Colubris Networks
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Sean Mathews - Nu Tech Software Solutions, inc.
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Xelerance Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2006-2007 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: modecfg.c,v 1.6 2006/04/24 20:44:57 as Exp $
+ *
+ * This code originally written by Colubris Networks, Inc.
+ * Extraction of patch and porting to 1.99 codebases by Xelerance Corporation
+ * Porting to 2.x by Sean Mathews
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "demux.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "modecfg.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "xauth.h"
+
+#define MAX_XAUTH_TRIES		3
+
+#define SUPPORTED_ATTR_SET   ( LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)         \
+                             | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK)         \
+                             | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_DNS)             \
+                             | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS)            \
+                             | LELEM(APPLICATION_VERSION)          \
+                             )
+
+#define SUPPORTED_UNITY_ATTR_SET ( LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE) )
+
+#define UNITY_BANNER_STR    "Welcome to strongSwan - the Linux VPN Solution!\n"
+
+/*
+ * Addresses assigned (usually via ModeCfg) to the Initiator
+ */
+typedef struct internal_addr internal_addr_t;
+
+struct internal_addr
+{
+    lset_t attr_set;
+    lset_t xauth_attr_set;
+    lset_t unity_attr_set;
+
+    /* ModeCfg variables */
+    ip_address ipaddr;
+    ip_address dns[2];
+    ip_address wins[2];
+
+    char *unity_banner;
+
+    /* XAUTH variables */
+    u_int16_t  xauth_type;
+    xauth_t    xauth_secret;
+    bool       xauth_status;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Initialize an internal_addr struct
+ */
+static void
+init_internal_addr(internal_addr_t *ia)
+{
+    ia->attr_set = LEMPTY;
+    ia->xauth_attr_set = LEMPTY;
+    ia->xauth_secret.user_name = empty_chunk;
+    ia->xauth_secret.user_password = empty_chunk;
+    ia->xauth_type = XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC;
+    ia->xauth_status = XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
+    ia->unity_attr_set = LEMPTY;
+    ia->unity_banner = NULL;
+
+    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->ipaddr);
+    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->dns[0]);
+    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->dns[1]);
+    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->wins[0]);
+    anyaddr(AF_INET, &ia->wins[1]);
+}
+
+/*
+ * get internal IP address for a connection
+ */
+static void
+get_internal_addr(struct connection *c, internal_addr_t *ia)
+{
+    if (isanyaddr(&c->spd.that.host_srcip))
+    {
+	/* not defined in connection - fetch it from LDAP */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	ia->ipaddr = c->spd.that.host_srcip;
+
+	addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip));
+	plog("assigning virtual IP source address %s", srcip);
+    }
+
+    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))	/* We got an IP address, send it */
+    {
+	c->spd.that.client.addr     = ia->ipaddr;
+	c->spd.that.client.maskbits = 32;
+	c->spd.that.has_client      = TRUE;
+	
+	ia->attr_set = LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
+		     | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK);
+    }
+
+    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->dns[0]))	/* We got DNS addresses, send them */
+	ia->attr_set |= LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_DNS);
+
+    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->wins[0]))	/* We got WINS addresses, send them */
+	ia->attr_set |= LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Set srcip and client subnet to internal IP address
+ */
+static bool
+set_internal_addr(struct connection *c, internal_addr_t *ia)
+{
+    if (ia->attr_set & LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
+    && !isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))
+    {
+	if (addrbytesptr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, NULL) == 0
+	|| isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip)
+	|| sameaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, &ia->ipaddr))
+	{
+	    char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	    addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip));
+	    plog("setting virtual IP source address to %s", srcip);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    char old_srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	    char new_srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+
+	    addrtot(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, 0, old_srcip, sizeof(old_srcip));
+	    addrtot(&ia->ipaddr, 0, new_srcip, sizeof(new_srcip));
+	    plog("replacing virtual IP source address %s by %s"
+		, old_srcip, new_srcip);
+	}
+	
+	/* setting srcip */
+	c->spd.this.host_srcip = ia->ipaddr;
+
+	/* setting client subnet to srcip/32 */
+	addrtosubnet(&ia->ipaddr, &c->spd.this.client);
+	setportof(0, &c->spd.this.client.addr);
+	c->spd.this.has_client = TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compute HASH of Mode Config.
+ */
+static size_t
+modecfg_hash(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof
+	    , const struct state *st)
+{
+    struct hmac_ctx ctx;
+
+    hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a);
+    hmac_update(&ctx, (const u_char *) &st->st_msgid, sizeof(st->st_msgid));
+    hmac_update(&ctx, start, roof-start);
+    hmac_final(dest, &ctx);
+
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("ModeCfg HASH computed:");
+ 	DBG_dump("", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size)
+    ) 
+    return ctx.hmac_digest_size;
+}
+
+
+/* 
+ * Generate an IKE message containing ModeCfg information (eg: IP, DNS, WINS)
+ */
+static stf_status
+modecfg_build_msg(struct state *st, pb_stream *rbody
+				  , u_int16_t msg_type
+				  , internal_addr_t *ia
+				  , u_int16_t ap_id)
+{
+    u_char *r_hash_start, *r_hashval;
+
+    START_HASH_PAYLOAD(*rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR);
+
+    /* ATTR out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_mode_attr attrh;
+	struct isakmp_attribute attr;
+	pb_stream strattr,attrval;
+	int attr_type;
+	int dns_idx, wins_idx;
+	bool dont_advance;
+	bool is_xauth_attr_set = ia->xauth_attr_set != LEMPTY;
+	bool is_unity_attr_set = ia->unity_attr_set != LEMPTY;
+	lset_t attr_set = ia->attr_set;
+
+	attrh.isama_np         = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+	attrh.isama_type       = msg_type;
+	attrh.isama_identifier = ap_id;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&attrh, &isakmp_attr_desc, rbody, &strattr))
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+	attr_type = 0;
+	dns_idx = 0;
+	wins_idx = 0;
+
+	while (attr_set != LEMPTY || is_xauth_attr_set || is_unity_attr_set)
+	{
+	    if (attr_set == LEMPTY)
+	    {
+		if (is_xauth_attr_set)
+	  	{
+		    attr_set = ia->xauth_attr_set;
+		    attr_type = XAUTH_BASE;
+		    is_xauth_attr_set = FALSE;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    attr_set = ia->unity_attr_set;
+		    attr_type = UNITY_BASE;
+		    is_unity_attr_set = FALSE;
+		}
+	    }
+	
+	    dont_advance = FALSE;
+
+	    if (attr_set & 1)
+	    {
+		const u_char *byte_ptr;
+		u_int len;
+
+		/* ISAKMP attr out */
+		if (attr_type == XAUTH_TYPE)
+		{
+		    attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+		    attr.isaat_lv = ia->xauth_type;
+		}
+		else if (attr_type == XAUTH_STATUS)
+		{
+		    attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+		    attr.isaat_lv = ia->xauth_status;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    attr.isaat_af_type = attr_type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
+		}
+		out_struct(&attr, &isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc, &strattr, &attrval);
+
+		switch (attr_type)
+		{
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS:
+		    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->ipaddr))
+		    {
+			len = addrbytesptr(&ia->ipaddr, &byte_ptr);
+ 			out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_addr");
+		    }
+ 		    break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK:
+		    {
+ 			u_int  mask;
+#if 0
+			char mask[4],bits[8]={0x00,0x80,0xc0,0xe0,0xf0,0xf8,0xfc,0xfe};
+			int t,m=st->st_connection->that.host_addr.maskbit;
+			for (t=0; t<4; t++)
+			{
+			    if (m < 8)
+				mask[t] = bits[m];
+			    else
+				mask[t] = 0xff;
+			    m -= 8;
+			}
+#endif				    
+			if (st->st_connection->spd.this.client.maskbits == 0)
+ 			    mask = 0;
+ 			else
+ 			    mask = 0xffffffff * 1;
+			    out_raw(&mask, 4, &attrval, "IP4_mask");
+		    }
+		    break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET:
+		    {
+			char mask[4];
+			char bits[8] = {0x00,0x80,0xc0,0xe0,0xf0,0xf8,0xfc,0xfe};
+			int t;
+			int m = st->st_connection->spd.this.client.maskbits;
+
+			for (t = 0; t < 4; t++)
+			{
+			    if (m < 8)
+				mask[t] = bits[m];
+			    else
+				mask[t] = 0xff;
+			    m -= 8;
+			    if (m < 0)
+			        m = 0;
+			}
+			len = addrbytesptr(&st->st_connection->spd.this.client.addr, &byte_ptr);
+			out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_subnet");
+			out_raw(mask, sizeof(mask), &attrval, "IP4_submsk");
+		    }
+		    break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS:
+		    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
+		    {
+ 		    	len = addrbytesptr(&ia->dns[dns_idx++], &byte_ptr);
+ 		        out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_dns");
+		    }
+		    if (dns_idx < 2 && !isanyaddr(&ia->dns[dns_idx]))
+		    {
+			dont_advance = TRUE;
+		    }
+ 		    break;
+		case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS:
+		    if (!isanyaddr(&ia->wins[wins_idx]))
+		    {
+			len = addrbytesptr(&ia->wins[wins_idx++], &byte_ptr);
+			out_raw(byte_ptr, len, &attrval, "IP4_wins");
+		    }
+		    if (wins_idx < 2 && !isanyaddr(&ia->wins[wins_idx]))
+		    {
+			dont_advance = TRUE;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		case XAUTH_TYPE:
+		    break;
+		case XAUTH_USER_NAME:
+		    if (ia->xauth_secret.user_name.ptr != NULL)
+		    {
+			out_raw(ia->xauth_secret.user_name.ptr
+			      , ia->xauth_secret.user_name.len
+			      , &attrval, "xauth_user_name");
+		    }
+		    break;
+		case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD:
+		    if (ia->xauth_secret.user_password.ptr != NULL)
+		    {
+			out_raw(ia->xauth_secret.user_password.ptr
+			      , ia->xauth_secret.user_password.len
+			      , &attrval, "xauth_user_password");
+		    }
+		    break;
+		case XAUTH_STATUS:
+		    break;
+		case UNITY_BANNER:
+		    if (ia->unity_banner != NULL)
+		    {
+			out_raw(ia->unity_banner
+			      , strlen(ia->unity_banner)
+			      , &attrval, "UNITY_BANNER");
+		    }
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    plog("attempt to send unsupported mode cfg attribute %s."
+			 , enum_show(&modecfg_attr_names, attr_type));
+		    break;
+		}
+		close_output_pbs(&attrval);
+	    }
+	    if (!dont_advance)
+	    {
+		attr_type++;
+		attr_set >>= 1;
+	    }
+	}
+	close_message(&strattr);
+    }
+
+    modecfg_hash(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody->cur, st);
+    close_message(rbody);
+    encrypt_message(rbody, st);
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send ModeCfg message
+ */
+static stf_status
+modecfg_send_msg(struct state *st, int isama_type, internal_addr_t *ia)
+{
+    pb_stream msg;
+    pb_stream rbody;
+    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+    /* set up attr */
+    init_pbs(&msg, buf, sizeof(buf), "ModeCfg msg buffer");
+
+    /* this is the beginning of a new exchange */
+    st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(st);
+    init_phase2_iv(st, &st->st_msgid);
+
+    /* HDR out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_hdr hdr;
+
+	zero(&hdr);	/* default to 0 */
+	hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION;
+	hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH;
+	hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_MODE_CFG;
+	hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION;
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid;
+
+	if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &msg, &rbody))
+	{
+	    return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* ATTR out */
+    modecfg_build_msg(st, &rbody
+			, isama_type
+			, ia
+			, 0 /* XXX isama_id */
+		     );
+
+    freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
+    clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, msg.start, pbs_offset(&msg), "ModeCfg msg");
+
+    /* Transmit */
+    send_packet(st, "ModeCfg msg");
+
+    if (st->st_event->ev_type != EVENT_RETRANSMIT)
+    {
+	delete_event(st);
+	event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st);
+    }
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a ModeCfg attribute payload
+ */
+static stf_status
+modecfg_parse_attributes(pb_stream *attrs, internal_addr_t *ia)
+{
+    struct isakmp_attribute attr;
+    pb_stream strattr;
+
+    while (pbs_left(attrs) >= sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute))
+    {
+	u_int16_t attr_type;
+	u_int16_t attr_len;
+
+	if (!in_struct(&attr, &isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc, attrs, &strattr))
+	{
+	    return STF_FAIL;
+	}
+	attr_type = attr.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK;
+	attr_len  = attr.isaat_lv;
+
+	switch (attr_type)
+	{
+	case INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS:
+	    if (attr_len == 4)
+	    {
+		initaddr((char *)(strattr.cur), 4, AF_INET, &ia->ipaddr);
+	    }
+	    /* fall through to set attribute flag */
+	case INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK:
+	case INTERNAL_IP4_DNS:
+	case INTERNAL_IP4_SUBNET:
+	case INTERNAL_IP4_NBNS:
+	case INTERNAL_ADDRESS_EXPIRY:
+	case INTERNAL_IP4_DHCP:
+	case INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS:
+	case INTERNAL_IP6_NETMASK:
+	case INTERNAL_IP6_DNS:
+	case INTERNAL_IP6_NBNS:
+	case INTERNAL_IP6_DHCP:
+	case SUPPORTED_ATTRIBUTES:
+	case INTERNAL_IP6_SUBNET:
+	    ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+	    break;
+	case APPLICATION_VERSION:
+	    if (attr_len > 0)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		    DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
+		)
+	    }
+	    ia->attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type);
+	    break;
+	case XAUTH_TYPE:
+	    ia->xauth_type = attr.isaat_lv;
+	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+	    break;
+	case XAUTH_USER_NAME:
+	    setchunk(ia->xauth_secret.user_name, strattr.cur, attr_len);
+	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+	    break;
+	case XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD:
+	    setchunk(ia->xauth_secret.user_password, strattr.cur, attr_len);
+	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+	    break;
+	case XAUTH_STATUS:
+	    ia->xauth_status = attr.isaat_lv;
+	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+	    break;
+	case XAUTH_MESSAGE:
+	    if (attr_len > 0)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		    DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
+		)
+	    }
+	    /* fall through to set attribute flag */
+	case XAUTH_PASSCODE:
+	case XAUTH_CHALLENGE:
+	case XAUTH_DOMAIN:
+	case XAUTH_NEXT_PIN:
+	case XAUTH_ANSWER:
+	    ia->xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - XAUTH_BASE);
+	    break;
+	case UNITY_DDNS_HOSTNAME:
+	    if (attr_len > 0)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		    DBG_log("   '%.*s'", attr_len, strattr.cur)
+		)
+	    }
+	    /* fall through to set attribute flag */
+	case UNITY_BANNER:
+	case UNITY_SAVE_PASSWD:
+	case UNITY_DEF_DOMAIN:
+	case UNITY_SPLITDNS_NAME:
+	case UNITY_SPLIT_INCLUDE:
+	case UNITY_NATT_PORT:
+	case UNITY_LOCAL_LAN:
+	case UNITY_PFS:
+	case UNITY_FW_TYPE:
+	case UNITY_BACKUP_SERVERS:
+	    ia->unity_attr_set |= LELEM(attr_type - UNITY_BASE);
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    plog("unsupported ModeCfg attribute %s received."
+		, enum_show(&modecfg_attr_names, attr_type));
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * Parse a ModeCfg message
+ */
+static stf_status
+modecfg_parse_msg(struct msg_digest *md, int isama_type, u_int16_t *isama_id
+		, internal_addr_t *ia)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    struct payload_digest *p;
+    stf_status stat;
+
+    st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid;
+
+    CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, modecfg_hash(hash_val
+				    , hash_pbs->roof
+				    , md->message_pbs.roof, st)
+		       , "MODECFG-HASH", "ISAKMP_CFG_MSG");
+
+    /* process the ModeCfg payloads received */
+    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR]; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	internal_addr_t ia_candidate;
+
+	init_internal_addr(&ia_candidate);
+
+	if (p->payload.attribute.isama_type == isama_type)
+	{
+	    *isama_id = p->payload.attribute.isama_identifier;
+
+	    stat = modecfg_parse_attributes(&p->pbs, &ia_candidate);
+	    if (stat == STF_OK)
+	    {
+		/* return with a valid set of attributes */
+		*ia = ia_candidate;
+		return STF_OK;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("expected %s, got %s instead (ignored)"
+		, enum_name(&attr_msg_type_names, isama_type)
+		, enum_name(&attr_msg_type_names, p->payload.attribute.isama_type));
+
+	    stat = modecfg_parse_attributes(&p->pbs, &ia_candidate);
+	}
+	if (stat != STF_OK)
+	    return stat;
+    }
+    return STF_IGNORE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send ModeCfg request message from client to server in pull mode
+ */
+stf_status
+modecfg_send_request(struct state *st)
+{
+    stf_status stat;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+
+    ia.attr_set = LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS)
+	        | LELEM(INTERNAL_IP4_NETMASK);
+
+    plog("sending ModeCfg request");
+    st->st_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_I1;
+    stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &ia);
+    if (stat == STF_OK)
+	st->st_modecfg.started = TRUE;
+    return stat;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MODE_CFG_R0:
+ * HDR*, HASH, ATTR(REQ=IP) --> HDR*, HASH, ATTR(REPLY=IP)
+ *
+ * used in ModeCfg pull mode, on the server (responder)
+ */
+stf_status
+modecfg_inR0(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    bool want_unity_banner;
+    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+
+    want_unity_banner = (ia.unity_attr_set & LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE)) != LEMPTY;
+
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+    get_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+
+    if (want_unity_banner)
+    {
+	ia.unity_banner = UNITY_BANNER_STR;
+	ia.unity_attr_set |= LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE);
+    }
+
+    plog("sending ModeCfg reply");
+
+    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+				     , ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY
+				     , &ia
+				     , isama_id);
+    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	return stat_build;
+
+    st->st_msgid = 0;
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MODE_CFG_I1:
+ * HDR*, HASH, ATTR(REPLY=IP)
+ *
+ * used in ModeCfg pull mode, on the client (initiator) 
+ */
+stf_status
+modecfg_inI1(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    stf_status stat;
+
+    plog("parsing ModeCfg reply");
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+
+    st->st_modecfg.vars_set = set_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+    st->st_msgid = 0;
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Send ModeCfg set message from server to client in push mode
+ */
+stf_status
+modecfg_send_set(struct state *st)
+{
+    stf_status stat;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+    get_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+
+#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
+    ia.unity_banner = UNITY_BANNER_STR;
+    ia.unity_attr_set |= LELEM(UNITY_BANNER - UNITY_BASE);
+#endif
+
+   plog("sending ModeCfg set");
+    st->st_state = STATE_MODE_CFG_R3;
+    stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &ia);
+    if (stat == STF_OK)
+	st->st_modecfg.started = TRUE;
+    return stat;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MODE_CFG_I0:
+ *  HDR*, HASH, ATTR(SET=IP) --> HDR*, HASH, ATTR(ACK,OK)
+ *
+ * used in ModeCfg push mode, on the client (initiator).
+ */
+stf_status
+modecfg_inI0(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    lset_t attr_set, unity_attr_set;
+    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+
+    plog("parsing ModeCfg set");
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+
+    st->st_modecfg.vars_set = set_internal_addr(st->st_connection, &ia);
+
+    /* prepare ModeCfg ack which sends zero length attributes */
+    attr_set = ia.attr_set;
+    unity_attr_set = ia.unity_attr_set;
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+    ia.attr_set = attr_set & SUPPORTED_ATTR_SET;
+    ia.unity_attr_set = unity_attr_set & SUPPORTED_UNITY_ATTR_SET;
+
+    plog("sending ModeCfg ack");
+
+    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+			 	     , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK
+			 	     , &ia
+			 	     , isama_id);
+    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	return stat_build;
+
+    st->st_msgid = 0;
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_MODE_CFG_R3:
+ * HDR*, HASH, ATTR(ACK,OK)
+ *
+ * used in ModeCfg push mode, on the server (responder)
+ */
+stf_status
+modecfg_inR3(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    stf_status stat;
+
+    plog("parsing ModeCfg ack");
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+
+    st->st_msgid = 0;
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Send XAUTH credentials request (username + password)
+ */
+stf_status
+xauth_send_request(struct state *st)
+{
+    stf_status stat;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+    ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME     - XAUTH_BASE)
+		      | LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE);
+
+    plog("sending XAUTH request");
+    st->st_state = STATE_XAUTH_R1;
+    stat = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &ia);
+    if (stat == STF_OK)
+	st->st_xauth.started = TRUE;
+    return stat;
+}
+
+/* STATE_XAUTH_I0:
+ * HDR*, HASH, ATTR(REQ) --> HDR*, HASH, ATTR(REPLY=USERNAME/PASSWORD)
+ *
+ * used on the XAUTH client (initiator)
+ */
+stf_status
+xauth_inI0(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+    bool xauth_type_present;
+
+    plog("parsing XAUTH request");
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REQUEST, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+ 
+    /* check XAUTH attributes */
+    xauth_type_present = (ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_TYPE - XAUTH_BASE)) != LEMPTY;
+
+    if (xauth_type_present && ia.xauth_type != XAUTH_TYPE_GENERIC)
+    {
+	plog("xauth type %s is not supported", enum_name(&xauth_type_names, ia.xauth_type));
+	stat = STF_FAIL;
+    }
+    else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+    {
+	plog("user name attribute is missing in XAUTH request");
+	stat = STF_FAIL;
+    }
+    else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+    {
+	plog("user password attribute is missing in XAUTH request");
+	stat = STF_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    /* prepare XAUTH reply */
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+
+    if (stat == STF_OK)
+    {
+	/* get user credentials using a plugin function */
+	if (!xauth_module.get_secret(&ia.xauth_secret))
+	{
+	    plog("xauth user credentials not found");
+	    stat = STF_FAIL;
+	}
+    }
+    if (stat == STF_OK)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("my xauth user name is '%.*s'"
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.len
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr)
+	)
+	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	    DBG_log("my xauth user password is '%.*s'"
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.len
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr)
+	)
+	ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME     - XAUTH_BASE)
+		 	  | LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE);
+        if (xauth_type_present)
+	    ia.xauth_attr_set |= LELEM(XAUTH_TYPE - XAUTH_BASE);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE);
+	ia.xauth_status = XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
+    }
+
+    plog("sending XAUTH reply");
+
+    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+				     , ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY
+				     , &ia
+				     , isama_id);
+    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	return stat_build;
+
+    if (stat == STF_OK)
+    {
+	st->st_xauth.started = TRUE;
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	return STF_OK;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* send XAUTH reply msg and then delete ISAKMP SA */
+	freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
+	clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, md->reply.start
+	    , pbs_offset(&md->reply), "XAUTH reply msg");
+	send_packet(st, "XAUTH reply msg");
+	delete_state(st);
+	return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* STATE_XAUTH_R1:
+ *  HDR*, HASH, ATTR(REPLY=USERNAME/PASSWORD) --> HDR*, HASH, ATTR(STATUS)
+ *
+ *  used on the XAUTH server (responder)
+ */
+stf_status
+xauth_inR1(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+
+    plog("parsing XAUTH reply");
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_REPLY, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+ 
+    /* did the client return an XAUTH FAIL status? */
+    if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE)) != LEMPTY)
+    {
+	plog("received FAIL status in XAUTH reply");
+
+	/* client is not able to do XAUTH, delete ISAKMP SA */
+	delete_state(st);
+	return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+
+    /* check XAUTH reply */
+    if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_NAME - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+    {
+	plog("user name attribute is missing in XAUTH reply");
+	st->st_xauth.status = FALSE;
+    }
+    else if ((ia.xauth_attr_set & LELEM(XAUTH_USER_PASSWORD - XAUTH_BASE)) == LEMPTY)
+    {
+	plog("user password attribute is missing in XAUTH reply");
+	st->st_xauth.status = FALSE;
+    }
+    else 
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("peer xauth user name is '%.*s'"
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.len
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr)
+	)
+	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	    DBG_log("peer xauth user password is '%.*s'"
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.len
+		   , ia.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr)
+	)
+	/* verify the user credentials using a plugn function */
+	st->st_xauth.status = xauth_module.verify_secret(&ia.xauth_secret);
+	plog("extended authentication %s", st->st_xauth.status? "was successful":"failed");
+    }
+
+    /* prepare XAUTH set which sends the authentication status */
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+    ia.xauth_attr_set = LELEM(XAUTH_STATUS - XAUTH_BASE);
+    ia.xauth_status = (st->st_xauth.status)? XAUTH_STATUS_OK : XAUTH_STATUS_FAIL;
+
+    plog("sending XAUTH status:");
+
+    stat_build = modecfg_send_msg(st, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &ia);
+    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	return stat_build;
+    return STF_OK;
+}
+
+/* STATE_XAUTH_I1:
+ * HDR*, HASH, ATTR(STATUS) --> HDR*, HASH, ATTR(ACK)
+ *
+ * used on the XAUTH client (initiator)
+ */
+stf_status
+xauth_inI1(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    stf_status stat, stat_build;
+
+    plog("parsing XAUTH status");
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_SET, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+    {
+	/* notification payload - not exactly the right choice, but okay */
+	md->note = ATTRIBUTES_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+	return stat;
+    }
+
+    st->st_xauth.status = ia.xauth_status;
+    plog("extended authentication %s", st->st_xauth.status? "was successful":"failed");
+
+    plog("sending XAUTH ack");
+    init_internal_addr(&ia);
+    stat_build = modecfg_build_msg(st, &md->rbody
+				     , ISAKMP_CFG_ACK
+				     , &ia
+				     , isama_id);
+    if (stat_build != STF_OK)
+	return stat_build;
+ 
+    if (st->st_xauth.status)
+    {
+	st->st_msgid = 0;
+	return STF_OK;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* send XAUTH ack msg and then delete ISAKMP SA */
+	freeanychunk(st->st_tpacket);
+	clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, md->reply.start
+	    , pbs_offset(&md->reply), "XAUTH ack msg");
+	send_packet(st, "XAUTH ack msg");
+	delete_state(st);
+	return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* STATE_XAUTH_R2:
+ * HDR*, ATTR(STATUS), HASH --> Done
+ *
+ * used on the XAUTH server (responder)
+ */
+stf_status
+xauth_inR2(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct state *const st = md->st;
+    u_int16_t isama_id;
+    internal_addr_t ia;
+    stf_status stat;
+
+    plog("parsing XAUTH ack");
+
+    stat = modecfg_parse_msg(md, ISAKMP_CFG_ACK, &isama_id, &ia);
+    if (stat != STF_OK)
+	return stat;
+
+    st->st_msgid = 0;
+    if (st->st_xauth.status)
+    {
+	return STF_OK;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	delete_state(st);
+	return STF_IGNORE;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/modecfg.h b/src/pluto/modecfg.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..68b7ef446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/modecfg.h
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+/* Mode Config related functions
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2002 Colubris Networks
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Xelerance Corporation
+ * 
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: modecfg.h,v 1.1 2005/01/06 22:10:15 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MODECFG_H
+#define _MODECFG_H
+
+struct state;
+struct msg_digest;
+
+/* ModeConfig pull mode start function */
+extern stf_status modecfg_send_request(struct state *st);
+
+/* ModeConfig pull mode state transition functions */
+extern stf_status modecfg_inR0(struct msg_digest *md);
+extern stf_status modecfg_inI1(struct msg_digest *md);
+
+/* ModeConfig push mode start function */
+extern stf_status modecfg_send_set(struct state *st);
+
+/* ModeConfig push mode state transition functions */
+extern stf_status modecfg_inI0(struct msg_digest *md);
+extern stf_status modecfg_inR3(struct msg_digest *md);
+
+/* XAUTH start function */
+extern stf_status xauth_send_request(struct state *st);
+
+/* XAUTH state transition funcgtions */
+extern stf_status xauth_inI0(struct msg_digest *md);
+extern stf_status xauth_inR1(struct msg_digest *md);
+extern stf_status xauth_inI1(struct msg_digest *md);
+extern stf_status xauth_inR2(struct msg_digest *md);
+
+#endif /* _MODECFG_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/mp_defs.c b/src/pluto/mp_defs.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..7ad896751
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/mp_defs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+/* some multiprecision utilities
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: mp_defs.c,v 1.1 2006/01/05 12:37:11 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+/* Convert MP_INT to network form (binary octets, big-endian).
+ * We do the malloc; caller must eventually do free.
+ */
+chunk_t
+mpz_to_n(const MP_INT *mp, size_t bytes)
+{
+    chunk_t r;
+    MP_INT temp1, temp2;
+    int i;
+
+    r.len = bytes;
+    r.ptr = alloc_bytes(r.len, "host representation of large integer");
+
+    mpz_init(&temp1);
+    mpz_init(&temp2);
+
+    mpz_set(&temp1, mp);
+
+    for (i = r.len-1; i >= 0; i--)
+    {
+	r.ptr[i] = mpz_mdivmod_ui(&temp2, NULL, &temp1, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
+	mpz_set(&temp1, &temp2);
+    }
+
+    passert(mpz_sgn(&temp1) == 0);	/* we must have done all the bits */
+    mpz_clear(&temp1);
+    mpz_clear(&temp2);
+
+    return r;
+}
+
+/* Convert network form (binary bytes, big-endian) to MP_INT.
+ * The *mp must not be previously mpz_inited.
+ */
+void
+n_to_mpz(MP_INT *mp, const u_char *nbytes, size_t nlen)
+{
+    size_t i;
+
+    mpz_init_set_ui(mp, 0);
+
+    for (i = 0; i != nlen; i++)
+    {
+	mpz_mul_ui(mp, mp, 1 << BITS_PER_BYTE);
+	mpz_add_ui(mp, mp, nbytes[i]);
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/mp_defs.h b/src/pluto/mp_defs.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..744a028d1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/mp_defs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+/* some multiprecision utilities
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: mp_defs.h,v 1.2 2006/01/06 11:40:45 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _MP_DEFS_H
+#define _MP_DEFS_H
+
+#include <gmp.h>
+
+#include "defs.h"
+
+extern void n_to_mpz(MP_INT *mp, const u_char *nbytes, size_t nlen);
+extern chunk_t mpz_to_n(const MP_INT *mp, size_t bytes);
+
+/* var := mod(base ** exp, mod), ensuring var is mpz_inited */
+#define mpz_init_powm(flag, var, base, exp, mod) { \
+    if (!(flag)) \
+	mpz_init(&(var)); \
+    (flag) = TRUE; \
+    mpz_powm(&(var), &(base), &(exp), (mod)); \
+    }
+
+#endif /* _MP_DEFS_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4a52cc107
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,866 @@
+/* FreeS/WAN NAT-Traversal
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: nat_traversal.c,v 1.8 2005/01/06 22:36:58 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <signal.h>     /* used only if MSG_NOSIGNAL not defined */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "demux.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "cookie.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h"
+#include "vendor.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+
+/* #define FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL */
+#define NAT_D_DEBUG
+#define NAT_T_SUPPORT_LAST_DRAFTS
+
+#ifndef SOL_UDP
+#define SOL_UDP 17
+#endif
+
+#ifndef UDP_ESPINUDP
+#define UDP_ESPINUDP    100
+#endif
+
+#define DEFAULT_KEEP_ALIVE_PERIOD  20
+
+#ifdef _IKE_ALG_H
+/* Alg patch: hash_digest_len -> hash_digest_size */
+#define hash_digest_len hash_digest_size
+#endif
+
+bool nat_traversal_enabled = FALSE;
+bool nat_traversal_support_non_ike = FALSE;
+bool nat_traversal_support_port_floating = FALSE;
+
+static unsigned int _kap = 0;
+static unsigned int _ka_evt = 0;
+static bool _force_ka = 0;
+
+static const char *natt_version = "0.6c";
+
+void init_nat_traversal (bool activate, unsigned int keep_alive_period,
+	bool fka, bool spf)
+{
+    nat_traversal_enabled = activate;
+    nat_traversal_support_non_ike = activate;
+#ifdef NAT_T_SUPPORT_LAST_DRAFTS
+    nat_traversal_support_port_floating = activate ? spf : FALSE;
+#endif
+    _force_ka = fka;
+    _kap = keep_alive_period ? keep_alive_period : DEFAULT_KEEP_ALIVE_PERIOD;
+    plog("  including NAT-Traversal patch (Version %s)%s%s%s"
+	 , natt_version, activate ? "" : " [disabled]"
+	 , activate & fka ? " [Force KeepAlive]" : ""
+	 , activate & !spf ? " [Port Floating disabled]" : "");
+}
+
+static void disable_nat_traversal (int type)
+{
+    if (type == ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE)
+	nat_traversal_support_non_ike = FALSE;
+    else
+	nat_traversal_support_port_floating = FALSE;
+
+    if (!nat_traversal_support_non_ike &&
+        !nat_traversal_support_port_floating)
+	    nat_traversal_enabled = FALSE;
+}
+
+static void _natd_hash(const struct hash_desc *hasher, char *hash,
+	u_int8_t *icookie, u_int8_t *rcookie,
+	const ip_address *ip, u_int16_t port)
+{
+    union hash_ctx ctx;
+
+    if (is_zero_cookie(icookie))
+	DBG_log("_natd_hash: Warning, icookie is zero !!");
+    if (is_zero_cookie(rcookie))
+	DBG_log("_natd_hash: Warning, rcookie is zero !!");
+
+    /**
+     * draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01.txt
+     *
+     *   HASH = HASH(CKY-I | CKY-R | IP | Port)
+     *
+     * All values in network order
+     */
+    hasher->hash_init(&ctx);
+    hasher->hash_update(&ctx, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    hasher->hash_update(&ctx, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    switch (addrtypeof(ip)) {
+    case AF_INET:
+	hasher->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)&ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr
+		, sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr));
+	break;
+    case AF_INET6:
+	hasher->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)&ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr
+		, sizeof(ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr));
+	break;
+    }
+    hasher->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)&port, sizeof(u_int16_t));
+    hasher->hash_final(hash, &ctx);
+#ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
+    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	DBG_log("_natd_hash: hasher=%p(%d)", hasher, (int)hasher->hash_digest_len);
+	DBG_dump("_natd_hash: icookie=", icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	DBG_dump("_natd_hash: rcookie=", rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	switch (addrtypeof(ip)) {
+	case AF_INET:
+	    DBG_dump("_natd_hash: ip=", &ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr
+		, sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr));
+	    break;
+	}
+	DBG_log("_natd_hash: port=%d", port);
+	DBG_dump("_natd_hash: hash=", hash, hasher->hash_digest_len);
+    );
+#endif
+}
+
+/* Add NAT-Traversal VIDs (supported ones)
+ * used when we are Initiator
+ */
+bool nat_traversal_add_vid(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs)
+{
+    bool r = TRUE;
+
+    if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating)
+    {
+	u_int8_t last_np = nat_traversal_support_non_ike ?
+				ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np;
+
+	if (r)
+	    r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_RFC);
+	if (r)
+	    r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_03);
+	if (r)
+	    r = out_vendorid(ISAKMP_NEXT_VID, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_02);
+	if (r)
+	    r = out_vendorid(last_np, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_02_N);
+    }
+    if (nat_traversal_support_non_ike)
+    {
+	if (r)
+	    r = out_vendorid(np, outs, VID_NATT_IETF_00);
+    }
+    return r;
+}
+
+u_int32_t nat_traversal_vid_to_method(unsigned short nat_t_vid)
+{
+    switch (nat_t_vid)
+    {
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_00:
+	return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01);
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_02:
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_02_N:
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_03:
+	return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03);
+    case VID_NATT_RFC:
+	return LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC);
+    }
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void nat_traversal_natd_lookup(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    struct payload_digest *p;
+    struct state *st = md->st;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!st || !md->iface || !st->st_oakley.hasher)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+		, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /** Count NAT-D **/
+    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC], i=0; p != NULL; p = p->next, i++);
+
+    /*
+     * We need at least 2 NAT-D (1 for us, many for peer)
+     */
+    if (i < 2)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+	    "NAT-Traversal: Only %d NAT-D - Aborting NAT-Traversal negociation", i);
+	st->nat_traversal = 0;
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * First one with my IP & port
+     */
+    p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC];
+    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie,
+	&(md->iface->addr), ntohs(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_port));
+
+    if (!(pbs_left(&p->pbs) == st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len &&
+	  memcmp(p->pbs.cur, hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len) == 0))
+    {
+#ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	    DBG_log("NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME");
+	    DBG_dump("expected NAT-D:", hash
+	    		, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len);
+	    DBG_dump("received NAT-D:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	)
+#endif
+	st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The others with sender IP & port
+     */
+    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie,
+		&(md->sender), ntohs(md->sender_port));
+    for (p = p->next, i=0 ; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len &&
+	    memcmp(p->pbs.cur, hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len) == 0)
+	{
+	    i++;
+	}
+    }
+    if (!i)
+    {
+#ifdef NAT_D_DEBUG
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	    DBG_log("NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER");
+	    DBG_dump("expected NAT-D:", hash
+			, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len);
+	    p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC];
+	    for (p = p->next, i=0 ; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	    {
+		DBG_dump("received NAT-D:", p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	    }
+	)
+#endif
+	st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER);
+    }
+#ifdef FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL
+    st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER);
+    st->nat_traversal |= LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME);
+#endif
+}
+
+bool nat_traversal_add_natd(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
+	struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    char hash[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    struct state *st = md->st;
+
+    if (!st || !st->st_oakley.hasher)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+			, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+	DBG_log("sending NATD payloads")
+    )
+	
+    /*
+     * First one with sender IP & port
+     */
+    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie,
+	is_zero_cookie(st->st_rcookie) ? md->hdr.isa_rcookie : st->st_rcookie,
+	&(md->sender),
+#ifdef FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL
+	0
+#else
+	ntohs(md->sender_port)
+#endif
+    );
+    if (!out_generic_raw((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES
+	? ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS), &isakmp_nat_d, outs,
+	hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len, "NAT-D"))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Second one with my IP & port
+     */
+    _natd_hash(st->st_oakley.hasher, hash, st->st_icookie,
+	is_zero_cookie(st->st_rcookie) ? md->hdr.isa_rcookie : st->st_rcookie,
+	&(md->iface->addr),
+#ifdef FORCE_NAT_TRAVERSAL
+	0
+#else
+	ntohs(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_port)
+#endif
+    );
+    return (out_generic_raw(np, &isakmp_nat_d, outs,
+	hash, st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_len, "NAT-D"));
+}
+
+/*
+ * nat_traversal_natoa_lookup()
+ * 
+ * Look for NAT-OA in message
+ */
+void nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(struct msg_digest *md)
+{
+    struct payload_digest *p;
+    struct state *st = md->st;
+    int i;
+    ip_address ip;
+
+    if (!st || !md->iface)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+		, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* Initialize NAT-OA */
+    anyaddr(AF_INET, &st->nat_oa);
+
+    /* Count NAT-OA **/
+    for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC], i=0; p != NULL; p = p->next, i++);
+
+    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	DBG_log("NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA.", i)
+    )
+
+    if (i == 0)
+	return;
+
+    if (!(st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER)))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA. "
+			"ignored because peer is not NATed", i);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (i > 1)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %d NAT-OA. "
+		"using first, ignoring others", i);
+    }
+
+    /* Take first */
+    p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC];
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_dump("NAT-OA:", p->pbs.start, pbs_room(&p->pbs));
+    );
+
+    switch (p->payload.nat_oa.isanoa_idtype)
+    {
+    case ID_IPV4_ADDR:
+	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == sizeof(struct in_addr))
+	{
+	    initaddr(p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs), AF_INET, &ip);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received IPv4 NAT-OA "
+			"with invalid IP size (%d)", (int)pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	    return;
+	}
+	break;
+    case ID_IPV6_ADDR:
+	if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) == sizeof(struct in6_addr))
+	{
+	    initaddr(p->pbs.cur, pbs_left(&p->pbs), AF_INET6, &ip);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received IPv6 NAT-OA "
+			"with invalid IP size (%d)", (int)pbs_left(&p->pbs));
+	    return;
+	}
+	break;
+    default:
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
+			"invalid ID Type (%d) in NAT-OA - ignored",
+			p->payload.nat_oa.isanoa_idtype);
+	    return;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	{
+	    char ip_t[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	    addrtot(&ip, 0, ip_t, sizeof(ip_t));
+	
+	    DBG_log("received NAT-OA: %s", ip_t);
+	}
+    )
+
+    if (isanyaddr(&ip))
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: received %%any NAT-OA...");
+    else
+	st->nat_oa = ip;
+}
+
+bool nat_traversal_add_natoa(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
+	struct state *st)
+{
+    struct isakmp_nat_oa natoa;
+    pb_stream pbs;
+    unsigned char ip_val[sizeof(struct in6_addr)];
+    size_t ip_len = 0;
+    ip_address *ip;
+
+    if ((!st) || (!st->st_connection))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: assert failed %s:%d"
+			, __FILE__, __LINE__);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    ip = &(st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr);
+
+    memset(&natoa, 0, sizeof(natoa));
+    natoa.isanoa_np = np;
+
+    switch (addrtypeof(ip))
+    {
+    case AF_INET:
+	ip_len = sizeof(ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr);
+	memcpy(ip_val, &ip->u.v4.sin_addr.s_addr, ip_len);
+	natoa.isanoa_idtype = ID_IPV4_ADDR;
+	break;
+    case AF_INET6:
+	ip_len = sizeof(ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr);
+	memcpy(ip_val, &ip->u.v6.sin6_addr.s6_addr, ip_len);
+	natoa.isanoa_idtype = ID_IPV6_ADDR;
+	break;
+    default:
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
+			"invalid addrtypeof()=%d", addrtypeof(ip));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!out_struct(&natoa, &isakmp_nat_oa, outs, &pbs))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (!out_raw(ip_val, ip_len, &pbs, "NAT-OA"))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	DBG_dump("NAT-OA (S):", ip_val, ip_len)
+    )
+
+    close_output_pbs(&pbs);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+void nat_traversal_show_result (u_int32_t nt, u_int16_t sport)
+{
+    const char *mth = NULL, *rslt = NULL;
+
+    switch (nt & NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD)
+    {
+    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01):
+	mth = natt_type_bitnames[0];
+	break;
+    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03):
+	mth = natt_type_bitnames[1];
+	break;
+    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC):
+	mth = natt_type_bitnames[2];
+	break;
+    }
+    
+    switch (nt & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+    {
+    case 0:
+	rslt = "no NAT detected";
+	break;
+    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME):
+	rslt = "i am NATed";
+	break;
+    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER):
+	rslt = "peer is NATed";
+	break;
+    case LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER):
+	rslt = "both are NATed";
+	break;
+    }
+
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+	"NAT-Traversal: Result using %s: %s",
+	mth ? mth : "unknown method",
+	rslt ? rslt : "unknown result"
+    );
+
+    if ((nt & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER))
+    &&	(sport == IKE_UDP_PORT)
+    &&	((nt & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)==0))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+		"Warning: peer is NATed but source port is still udp/%d. "
+		"Ipsec-passthrough NAT device suspected -- NAT-T may not work.",
+		IKE_UDP_PORT
+	);
+    }
+}
+
+int nat_traversal_espinudp_socket (int sk, u_int32_t type)
+{
+    int r = setsockopt(sk, SOL_UDP, UDP_ESPINUDP, &type, sizeof(type));
+
+    if (r < 0 && errno == ENOPROTOOPT)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+		"NAT-Traversal: ESPINUDP(%d) not supported by kernel -- "
+		"NAT-T disabled", type);
+	disable_nat_traversal(type);
+    }
+    return r;
+}
+
+void nat_traversal_new_ka_event (void)
+{
+    if (_ka_evt)
+	return;  /* event already scheduled */
+
+    event_schedule(EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE, _kap, NULL);
+    _ka_evt = 1;
+}
+
+static void nat_traversal_send_ka (struct state *st)
+{
+    static unsigned char ka_payload = 0xff;
+    chunk_t sav;
+
+    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	DBG_log("ka_event: send NAT-KA to %s:%d",
+		ip_str(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr),
+		st->st_connection->spd.that.host_port);
+    )
+
+    /* save state chunk */
+    setchunk(sav, st->st_tpacket.ptr, st->st_tpacket.len);
+
+    /* send keep alive */
+    setchunk(st->st_tpacket, &ka_payload, 1);
+    send_packet(st, "NAT-T Keep Alive");
+
+    /* restore state chunk */
+    setchunk(st->st_tpacket, sav.ptr, sav.len);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Find ISAKMP States with NAT-T and send keep-alive
+ */
+static void nat_traversal_ka_event_state (struct state *st, void *data)
+{
+    unsigned int *_kap_st = (unsigned int *)data;
+    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    if (!c)
+	return;
+
+    if ((st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_R3 || st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I4)
+    &&	(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+    &&	((st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) || _force_ka))
+    {
+	/*
+	 * - ISAKMP established
+	 * - NAT-Traversal detected
+	 * - NAT-KeepAlive needed (we are NATed)
+	 */
+	if (c->newest_isakmp_sa != st->st_serialno)
+	{
+	    /*
+	     * if newest is also valid, ignore this one, we will only use
+	     * newest.
+	     */
+	    struct state *st_newest;
+
+	    st_newest = state_with_serialno(c->newest_isakmp_sa);
+	    if (st_newest
+	    && (st_newest->st_state == STATE_MAIN_R3 || st_newest->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I4)
+	    && (st_newest->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+	    && ((st_newest->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) || _force_ka))
+	    {
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+	set_cur_state(st);
+	nat_traversal_send_ka(st);
+	reset_cur_state();
+	(*_kap_st)++;
+    }
+}
+
+void nat_traversal_ka_event (void)
+{
+    unsigned int _kap_st = 0;
+
+    _ka_evt = 0;  /* ready to be reschedule */
+
+    for_each_state((void *)nat_traversal_ka_event_state, &_kap_st);
+
+    /* if there are still states who needs Keep-Alive, schedule new event */
+    if (_kap_st)
+	nat_traversal_new_ka_event();
+}
+
+struct _new_mapp_nfo {
+	ip_address addr;
+	u_int16_t sport, dport;
+};
+
+static void nat_traversal_find_new_mapp_state (struct state *st, void *data)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    struct _new_mapp_nfo *nfo = (struct _new_mapp_nfo *)data;
+
+    if (c != NULL
+    && sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &(nfo->addr))
+    &&	c->spd.that.host_port == nfo->sport)
+    {
+
+	/* change host port */
+	c->spd.that.host_port = nfo->dport;
+
+	if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	||  IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	{
+	    if (!update_ipsec_sa(st))
+	    {
+		/*
+		 * If ipsec update failed, restore old port or we'll
+		 * not be able to update anymore.
+		 */
+		c->spd.that.host_port = nfo->sport;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static int nat_traversal_new_mapping(const ip_address *src, u_int16_t sport,
+	const ip_address *dst, u_int16_t dport)
+{
+    char srca[ADDRTOT_BUF], dsta[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+    struct _new_mapp_nfo nfo;
+
+    addrtot(src, 0, srca, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+    addrtot(dst, 0, dsta, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+
+    if (!sameaddr(src, dst))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "nat_traversal_new_mapping: "
+		"address change currently not supported [%s:%d,%s:%d]",
+		srca, sport, dsta, dport);
+	return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (sport == dport)
+    {
+	/* no change */
+	return 0;
+    }
+
+    DBG_log("NAT-T: new mapping %s:%d/%d)", srca, sport, dport);
+
+    nfo.addr = *src;
+    nfo.sport = sport;
+    nfo.dport = dport;
+
+    for_each_state((void *)nat_traversal_find_new_mapp_state, &nfo);
+
+    return 0;
+}
+
+void nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(struct msg_digest *md, struct state *st)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st ? st->st_connection : NULL;
+    struct iface *i = NULL;
+
+    if ((st == NULL) || (c == NULL))
+	return;
+
+    if (md)
+    {
+	/*
+	 * If source port has changed, update (including other states and
+	 * established kernel SA)
+	 */
+	if (c->spd.that.host_port != md->sender_port)
+	{
+	    nat_traversal_new_mapping(&c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port,
+			&c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * If interface type has changed, update local port (500/4500)
+	 */
+	if ((c->spd.this.host_port == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT && !md->iface->ike_float)
+	||  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT &&  md->iface->ike_float))
+	{
+	    c->spd.this.host_port = (md->iface->ike_float)
+		? NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT : pluto_port;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		DBG_log("NAT-T: updating local port to %d", c->spd.this.host_port);
+	    );
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If we're initiator and NAT-T (with port floating) is detected, we
+     * need to change port (MAIN_I3 or QUICK_I1)
+     */
+    if ((st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I3 || st->st_state == STATE_QUICK_I1)
+    &&	(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING)
+    &&	(st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+    &&	(c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT))
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	    DBG_log("NAT-T: floating to port %d", NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
+	)
+	c->spd.this.host_port = NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT;
+	c->spd.that.host_port = NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT;
+	/*
+	 * Also update pending connections or they will be deleted if uniqueids
+	 * option is set.
+	 */
+	update_pending(st, st);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Find valid interface according to local port (500/4500)
+     */
+    if ((c->spd.this.host_port == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT && !c->interface->ike_float)
+    ||  (c->spd.this.host_port != NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT &&  c->interface->ike_float))
+    {
+	for (i = interfaces; i !=  NULL; i = i->next)
+	{
+	    if (sameaddr(&c->interface->addr, &i->addr)
+	    && i->ike_float != c->interface->ike_float)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_NATT,
+		    DBG_log("NAT-T: using interface %s:%d", i->rname,
+			i->ike_float ? NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT : pluto_port);
+		)
+		c->interface = i;
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo {
+	struct sadb_sa *sa;
+	ip_address src, dst;
+	u_int16_t sport, dport;
+};
+
+static void nat_t_new_klips_mapp (struct state *st, void *data)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo *nfo = (struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo *)data;
+
+    if (c != NULL && st->st_esp.present
+    &&	sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &(nfo->src))
+    &&  st->st_esp.our_spi == nfo->sa->sadb_sa_spi)
+    {
+	nat_traversal_new_mapping(&c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.host_port,
+				  &(nfo->dst), nfo->dport);
+    }
+}
+
+void process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(
+	struct sadb_msg *msg __attribute__ ((unused)),
+	struct sadb_ext *extensions[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1])
+{
+    struct _new_klips_mapp_nfo nfo;
+    struct sadb_address *srcx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_SRC];
+    struct sadb_address *dstx = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_ADDRESS_DST];
+    struct sockaddr *srca, *dsta;
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    nfo.sa = (void *) extensions[SADB_EXT_SA];
+
+    if (!nfo.sa || !srcx || !dstx)
+    {
+	plog("SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING message from KLIPS malformed: "
+		"got NULL params");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    srca = ((struct sockaddr *)(void *)&srcx[1]);
+    dsta = ((struct sockaddr *)(void *)&dstx[1]);
+
+    if (srca->sa_family != AF_INET || dsta->sa_family != AF_INET)
+    {
+	ugh = "only AF_INET supported";
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	char text_said[SATOT_BUF];
+	char _srca[ADDRTOT_BUF], _dsta[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+	ip_said said;
+
+	initaddr((const void *) &((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_addr,
+			sizeof(((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_addr),
+			srca->sa_family, &(nfo.src));
+	nfo.sport = ntohs(((const struct sockaddr_in *)srca)->sin_port);
+	initaddr((const void *) &((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_addr,
+			sizeof(((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_addr),
+			dsta->sa_family, &(nfo.dst));
+	nfo.dport = ntohs(((const struct sockaddr_in *)dsta)->sin_port);
+
+	DBG(DBG_NATT,
+	    initsaid(&nfo.src, nfo.sa->sadb_sa_spi, SA_ESP, &said);
+	    satot(&said, 0, text_said, SATOT_BUF);
+	    addrtot(&nfo.src, 0, _srca, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+	    addrtot(&nfo.dst, 0, _dsta, ADDRTOT_BUF);
+	    DBG_log("new klips mapping %s %s:%d %s:%d",
+			text_said, _srca, nfo.sport, _dsta, nfo.dport);
+	)
+
+	for_each_state((void *)nat_t_new_klips_mapp, &nfo);
+    }
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+	plog("SADB_X_NAT_T_NEW_MAPPING message from KLIPS malformed: %s", ugh);
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..71222c54c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/nat_traversal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+/* FreeS/WAN NAT-Traversal
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2003 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: nat_traversal.h,v 1.4 2004/07/27 21:11:30 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _NAT_TRAVERSAL_H
+#define _NAT_TRAVERSAL_H
+
+#include "packet.h"
+
+#define NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01     1
+#define NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03     2
+#define NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC            3
+
+#define NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME    30
+#define NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER  31
+
+#define NAT_TRAVERSAL_METHOD  (0xffffffff - LELEM(30) - LELEM(31))
+
+/**
+ * NAT-Traversal methods which need NAT-D
+ */
+#define NAT_T_WITH_NATD \
+	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
+	LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+/**
+ * NAT-Traversal methods which need NAT-OA
+ */
+#define NAT_T_WITH_NATOA \
+	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
+	LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+/**
+ * NAT-Traversal methods which use NAT-KeepAlive
+ */
+#define NAT_T_WITH_KA \
+	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_00_01) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | \
+	LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+/**
+ * NAT-Traversal methods which use floating port
+ */
+#define NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING \
+	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_IETF_02_03) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+
+/**
+ * NAT-Traversal methods which use officials values (RFC)
+ */
+#define NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES \
+	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_RFC) )
+
+/**
+ * NAT-Traversal detected
+ */
+#define NAT_T_DETECTED \
+	( LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME) | LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_PEER) )
+
+/**
+ * NAT-T Port Floating
+ */
+#define NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT     4500
+
+void init_nat_traversal (bool activate, unsigned int keep_alive_period,
+	bool fka, bool spf);
+
+extern bool nat_traversal_enabled;
+extern bool nat_traversal_support_non_ike;
+extern bool nat_traversal_support_port_floating;
+
+/**
+ * NAT-D
+ */
+void nat_traversal_natd_lookup(struct msg_digest *md);
+#ifndef PB_STREAM_UNDEFINED
+bool nat_traversal_add_natd(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
+	struct msg_digest *md);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * NAT-OA
+ */
+void nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(struct msg_digest *md);
+#ifndef PB_STREAM_UNDEFINED
+bool nat_traversal_add_natoa(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs,
+	struct state *st);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * NAT-keep_alive
+ */
+void nat_traversal_new_ka_event (void);
+void nat_traversal_ka_event (void);
+
+void nat_traversal_show_result (u_int32_t nt, u_int16_t sport);
+
+int nat_traversal_espinudp_socket (int sk, u_int32_t type);
+
+/**
+ * Vendor ID
+ */
+#ifndef PB_STREAM_UNDEFINED
+bool nat_traversal_add_vid(u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs);
+#endif
+u_int32_t nat_traversal_vid_to_method(unsigned short nat_t_vid);
+
+void nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(struct msg_digest *md, struct state *st);
+
+/**
+ * New NAT mapping
+ */
+#ifdef __PFKEY_V2_H
+void process_pfkey_nat_t_new_mapping(
+	struct sadb_msg *,
+	struct sadb_ext *[SADB_EXT_MAX + 1]);
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * IKE port floating
+ */
+bool
+nat_traversal_port_float(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, bool in);
+
+/**
+ * Encapsulation mode macro (see demux.c)
+ */
+#define NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st,nat_t_policy) ( \
+	((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) \
+		? ( ((nat_t_policy) & POLICY_TUNNEL) \
+			? ( ((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) \
+				? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC) \
+				: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS) \
+			  ) \
+			: ( ((st)->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) \
+				? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC) \
+				: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS) \
+			  ) \
+		  ) \
+		: ( ((st)->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL) \
+			? (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL) \
+			: (ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT) \
+		  ) \
+	)
+
+#endif /* _NAT_TRAVERSAL_H */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/ocsp.c b/src/pluto/ocsp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..a338be446
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ocsp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1568 @@
+/* Support of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Christoph Gysin, Simon Zwahlen
+ * Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "ocsp.h"
+
+#define NONCE_LENGTH		16
+
+static const char *const cert_status_names[] = {
+    "good",
+    "revoked",
+    "unknown",
+    "undefined"
+};
+
+
+static const char *const response_status_names[] = {
+    "successful",
+    "malformed request",
+    "internal error",
+    "try later",
+    "signature required",
+    "unauthorized"
+};
+
+/* response container */
+typedef struct response response_t;
+
+struct response {
+    chunk_t  tbs;
+    chunk_t  responder_id_name;
+    chunk_t  responder_id_key;
+    time_t   produced_at;
+    chunk_t  responses;
+    chunk_t  nonce;
+    int      algorithm;
+    chunk_t  signature;
+};
+
+const response_t empty_response = {
+    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* tbs */
+    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* responder_id_name */
+    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* responder_id_key */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME,	/* produced_at */
+    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* single_response */
+    { NULL, 0 }   ,	/* nonce */
+    OID_UNKNOWN   ,	/* signature_algorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }		/* signature */
+};
+
+/* single response container */
+typedef struct single_response single_response_t;
+
+struct single_response {
+    single_response_t *next;
+    int               hash_algorithm;
+    chunk_t           issuer_name_hash;
+    chunk_t           issuer_key_hash;
+    chunk_t           serialNumber;
+    cert_status_t     status;
+    time_t            revocationTime;
+    crl_reason_t      revocationReason;
+    time_t            thisUpdate;
+    time_t            nextUpdate;
+};
+
+const single_response_t empty_single_response = {
+      NULL            ,	/* *next */
+    OID_UNKNOWN       ,	/* hash_algorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }       ,	/* issuer_name_hash */
+    { NULL, 0 }       ,	/* issuer_key_hash */
+    { NULL, 0 }       ,	/* serial_number */
+    CERT_UNDEFINED    ,	/* status */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME    ,	/* revocationTime */
+    REASON_UNSPECIFIED,	/* revocationReason */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME    ,	/* this_update */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME	/* next_update */
+};
+
+
+/* list of single requests */
+typedef struct request_list request_list_t;
+struct request_list {
+    chunk_t request;
+    request_list_t *next;
+};
+
+/* some OCSP specific prefabricated ASN.1 constants */
+
+static u_char ASN1_nonce_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x02
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_nonce_oid = strchunk(ASN1_nonce_oid_str);
+
+static u_char ASN1_response_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x04
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_response_oid = strchunk(ASN1_response_oid_str);
+
+static u_char ASN1_response_content_str[] = {
+    0x04, 0x0D,
+	  0x30, 0x0B,
+		0x06, 0x09, 0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x07, 0x30, 0x01, 0x01
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_response_content = strchunk(ASN1_response_content_str);
+
+/* default OCSP uri */
+static chunk_t ocsp_default_uri;
+
+/* ocsp cache: pointer to first element */
+static ocsp_location_t *ocsp_cache = NULL;
+
+/* static temporary storage for ocsp requestor information */
+static x509cert_t *ocsp_requestor_cert = NULL;
+
+static smartcard_t *ocsp_requestor_sc = NULL;
+
+static const struct RSA_private_key *ocsp_requestor_pri = NULL;
+
+/* asn.1 definitions for parsing */
+
+static const asn1Object_t ocspResponseObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "OCSPResponse",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "responseStatus",              ASN1_ENUMERATED,   ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "responseBytesContext",        ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT  }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,     "responseBytes",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  3 */
+  { 3,       "responseType",            ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 3,       "response",                ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                     ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  6 */
+};
+
+#define OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS	1
+#define OCSP_RESPONSE_TYPE	4
+#define OCSP_RESPONSE		5
+#define OCSP_RESPONSE_ROOF	7
+
+static const asn1Object_t basicResponseObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "BasicOCSPResponse",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "tbsResponseData",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,     "versionContext",            ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_NONE |
+							      ASN1_DEF  }, /*  2 */
+  { 3,       "version",                 ASN1_INTEGER,         ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+  { 2,     "responderIdContext",        ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT  }, /*  4 */
+  { 3,       "responderIdByName",       ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  5 */
+  { 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  6 */
+  { 2,     "responderIdContext",        ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,     ASN1_OPT  }, /*  7 */
+  { 3,       "responderIdByKey",        ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+  { 2,     "end choice",                ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+  { 2,     "producedAt",                ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
+  { 2,     "responses",                 ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 11 */
+  { 2,     "responseExtensionsContext", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 12 */
+  { 3,       "responseExtensions",      ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 13 */
+  { 4,         "extension",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_NONE }, /* 14 */
+  { 5,           "extnID",              ASN1_OID,             ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
+  { 5,           "critical",            ASN1_BOOLEAN,         ASN1_BODY |
+							      ASN1_DEF  }, /* 16 */
+  { 5,           "extnValue",           ASN1_OCTET_STRING,    ASN1_BODY }, /* 17 */
+  { 4,         "end loop",              ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",                   ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /* 19 */
+  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",          ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_RAW  }, /* 20 */
+  { 1,   "signature",                   ASN1_BIT_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 21 */
+  { 1,   "certsContext",                ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,     ASN1_OPT  }, /* 22 */
+  { 2,     "certs",                     ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_LOOP }, /* 23 */
+  { 3,       "certificate",             ASN1_SEQUENCE,        ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 24 */
+  { 2,     "end loop",                  ASN1_EOC,	      ASN1_END  }, /* 25 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                     ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }  /* 26 */
+};
+
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_TBS_DATA		 1
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION		 3
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_NAME	 5
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_KEY	 8
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_PRODUCED_AT	10
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_RESPONSES	11
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_ID		15
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_CRITICAL		16
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE	17
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM	20
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_SIGNATURE	21
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_CERTIFICATE	24
+#define BASIC_RESPONSE_ROOF		27
+
+static const asn1Object_t responsesObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "responses",                   ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "singleResponse",            ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_RAW  }, /*  1 */
+  { 0, "end loop",                    ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }  /*  2 */
+};
+
+#define RESPONSES_SINGLE_RESPONSE	 1
+#define RESPONSES_ROOF			 3
+
+static const asn1Object_t singleResponseObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "singleResponse",            ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "certID",                  ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,     "algorithm",             ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_RAW  }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,     "issuerNameHash",        ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+  { 2,     "issuerKeyHash",         ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 2,     "serialNumber",          ASN1_INTEGER,           ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+  { 1,   "certStatusGood",          ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0,       ASN1_OPT  }, /*  6 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
+  { 1,   "certStatusRevoked",       ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,       ASN1_OPT  }, /*  8 */
+  { 2,     "revocationTime",        ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,   ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
+  { 2,     "revocationReason",      ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 10 */
+  { 3,       "crlReason",           ASN1_ENUMERATED,        ASN1_BODY }, /* 11 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",               ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 12 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 13 */
+  { 1,   "certStatusUnknown",       ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 14 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 15 */
+  { 1,   "thisUpdate",              ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,   ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
+  { 1,   "nextUpdateContext",       ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 17 */
+  { 2,     "nextUpdate",            ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME,   ASN1_BODY }, /* 18 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 19 */
+  { 1,   "singleExtensionsContext", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,       ASN1_OPT  }, /* 20 */
+  { 2,     "singleExtensions",      ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_LOOP }, /* 21 */
+  { 3,       "extension",           ASN1_SEQUENCE,          ASN1_NONE }, /* 22 */
+  { 4,         "extnID",            ASN1_OID,               ASN1_BODY }, /* 23 */
+  { 4,         "critical",          ASN1_BOOLEAN,           ASN1_BODY |
+							    ASN1_DEF  }, /* 24 */
+  { 4,         "extnValue",         ASN1_OCTET_STRING,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
+  { 2,     "end loop",              ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }, /* 26 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",                 ASN1_EOC,               ASN1_END  }  /* 27 */
+};
+
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM			 2
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_NAME_HASH		 3
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_KEY_HASH			 4
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_SERIAL_NUMBER			 5
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_GOOD		 6
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOKED		 8
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOCATION_TIME	 9
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_CRL_REASON		11
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_UNKNOWN		14
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_THIS_UPDATE			16
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_NEXT_UPDATE			18
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_ID				23
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_CRITICAL			24
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE			25
+#define SINGLE_RESPONSE_ROOF				28
+
+/* build an ocsp location from certificate information
+ * without unsharing its contents
+ */
+static bool
+build_ocsp_location(const x509cert_t *cert, ocsp_location_t *location)
+{
+    static u_char digest[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];  /* temporary storage */
+
+    location->uri = cert->accessLocation;
+
+    if (location->uri.ptr == NULL)
+    {
+	ca_info_t *ca = get_ca_info(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+		, cert->authKeyID);
+	if (ca != NULL && ca->ocspuri != NULL)
+	    setchunk(location->uri, ca->ocspuri, strlen(ca->ocspuri))
+	else
+	    /* abort if no ocsp location uri is defined */
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+    
+    setchunk(location->authNameID, digest, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+    compute_digest(cert->issuer, OID_SHA1, &location->authNameID);
+
+    location->next = NULL;
+    location->issuer = cert->issuer;
+    location->authKeyID = cert->authKeyID;
+    location->authKeySerialNumber = cert->authKeySerialNumber;
+    
+    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr == NULL) 
+    {
+	x509cert_t *authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer
+		, cert->authKeySerialNumber, cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+	if (authcert != NULL)
+	{
+	    location->authKeyID = authcert->subjectKeyID;
+	    location->authKeySerialNumber = authcert->serialNumber;
+	}
+    }
+
+    location->nonce = empty_chunk;
+    location->certinfo = NULL;
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compare two ocsp locations for equality
+ */
+static bool
+same_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *a, const ocsp_location_t *b)
+{
+    return ((a->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+		? same_keyid(a->authKeyID, b->authKeyID)
+		: (same_dn(a->issuer, b->issuer)
+		    && same_serial(a->authKeySerialNumber, b->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	    && same_chunk(a->uri, b->uri);
+}
+
+/*
+ * find an existing ocsp location in a chained list
+ */
+ocsp_location_t*
+get_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t * loc, ocsp_location_t *chain)
+{
+
+    while (chain != NULL)
+    {
+	if (same_ocsp_location(loc, chain))
+	    return chain;
+	chain = chain->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+ 
+/* retrieves the status of a cert from the ocsp cache
+ * returns CERT_UNDEFINED if no status is found
+ */
+static cert_status_t
+get_ocsp_status(const ocsp_location_t *loc, chunk_t serialNumber
+    ,time_t *nextUpdate, time_t *revocationTime, crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
+{
+    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
+    int cmp = -1;
+
+    /* find location */
+    ocsp_location_t *location = get_ocsp_location(loc, ocsp_cache);
+
+    if (location == NULL)
+	return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+
+    /* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
+    certinfop = &location->certinfo;
+    certinfo = *certinfop;
+
+    while (certinfo != NULL)
+    {
+	cmp = cmp_chunk(serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
+	if (cmp <= 0)
+	    break;
+	certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+	certinfo = *certinfop;
+    }
+
+    if (cmp == 0)
+    {
+	*nextUpdate = certinfo->nextUpdate;
+	*revocationTime = certinfo->revocationTime;
+	*revocationReason = certinfo->revocationReason;
+	return certinfo->status;
+    }
+
+    return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * verify the ocsp status of a certificate
+ */
+cert_status_t
+verify_by_ocsp(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until
+, time_t *revocationDate, crl_reason_t *revocationReason)
+{
+    cert_status_t status;
+    ocsp_location_t location;
+    time_t nextUpdate = 0;
+
+    *revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+    *revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+    
+    /* is an ocsp location defined? */
+    if (!build_ocsp_location(cert, &location))
+	return CERT_UNDEFINED;
+
+    lock_ocsp_cache("verify_by_ocsp");
+    status = get_ocsp_status(&location, cert->serialNumber, &nextUpdate
+	, revocationDate, revocationReason);
+    unlock_ocsp_cache("verify_by_ocsp");
+
+    if (status == CERT_UNDEFINED || nextUpdate < time(NULL))
+    {
+	plog("ocsp status is stale or not in cache");
+	add_ocsp_fetch_request(&location, cert->serialNumber);
+
+	/* inititate fetching of ocsp status */
+	wake_fetch_thread("verify_by_ocsp");
+    }
+    *until = nextUpdate;
+    return status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if an ocsp status is about to expire
+ */
+void
+check_ocsp(void)
+{
+    ocsp_location_t *location;
+
+    lock_ocsp_cache("check_ocsp");
+    location = ocsp_cache;
+    
+    while (location != NULL)
+    {
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	bool first = TRUE;
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+
+	while (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (!certinfo->once)
+	    {
+		time_t time_left = certinfo->nextUpdate - time(NULL);
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    if (first)
+		    {
+			dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
+			DBG_log("issuer: '%s'", buf);
+			if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+			{
+			    datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len
+				, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+			    DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+			}
+			first = FALSE;
+		    }
+		    datatot(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr, certinfo->serialNumber.len
+			, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+		    DBG_log("serial: %s, %ld seconds left", buf, time_left)
+		)
+
+		if (time_left < 2*crl_check_interval)
+		    add_ocsp_fetch_request(location, certinfo->serialNumber);
+	    }
+	    certinfo = certinfo->next;
+	}
+	location = location->next;
+    }
+    unlock_ocsp_cache("check_ocsp");
+}
+
+/*
+ *  frees the allocated memory of a certinfo struct
+ */
+static void
+free_certinfo(ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo)
+{
+    freeanychunk(certinfo->serialNumber);
+    pfree(certinfo);
+}
+
+/*
+ * frees all certinfos in a chained list
+ */
+static void
+free_certinfos(ocsp_certinfo_t *chain)
+{
+    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo;
+
+    while (chain != NULL)
+    {
+	certinfo = chain;
+	chain = chain->next;
+	free_certinfo(certinfo);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * frees the memory allocated to an ocsp location including all certinfos
+ */
+static void
+free_ocsp_location(ocsp_location_t* location)
+{
+    freeanychunk(location->issuer);
+    freeanychunk(location->authNameID);
+    freeanychunk(location->authKeyID);
+    freeanychunk(location->authKeySerialNumber);
+    freeanychunk(location->uri);
+    free_certinfos(location->certinfo);
+    pfree(location);
+}
+
+/*
+ * free a chained list of ocsp locations
+ */
+void
+free_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t **chain)
+{
+    while (*chain != NULL)
+    {
+	ocsp_location_t *location = *chain;
+	*chain = location->next;
+	free_ocsp_location(location);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * free the ocsp cache
+ */
+void
+free_ocsp_cache(void)
+{
+    lock_ocsp_cache("free_ocsp_cache");
+    free_ocsp_locations(&ocsp_cache);
+    unlock_ocsp_cache("free_ocsp_cache");
+}
+
+/*
+ * frees the ocsp cache and global variables
+ */
+void
+free_ocsp(void)
+{
+    pfreeany(ocsp_default_uri.ptr);
+    free_ocsp_cache();
+}
+
+/*
+ * list a chained list of ocsp_locations
+ */
+void
+list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t *location, bool requests, bool utc
+, bool strict)
+{
+    bool first = TRUE;
+
+    while (location != NULL)
+    {
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+
+	if (certinfo != NULL)
+	{
+	    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    if (first)
+	    {
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of OCSP %s:", requests?
+		    "fetch requests":"responses");
+		first = FALSE;
+            }
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	    if (location->issuer.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:  '%s'", buf);
+	    }
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       uri:     '%.*s'", (int)location->uri.len
+		, location->uri.ptr);
+	    if (location->authNameID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(location->authNameID.ptr, location->authNameID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authname: %s", buf);
+	    }
+	    if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:  %s", buf);
+	    }
+	    if (location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(location->authKeySerialNumber.ptr
+		    , location->authKeySerialNumber.len, ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:  %s", buf);
+	    }
+	    while (certinfo != NULL)
+	    {
+		char thisUpdate[TIMETOA_BUF];
+
+		strcpy(thisUpdate, timetoa(&certinfo->thisUpdate, utc));
+
+		if (requests)
+		{
+		    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, trials: %d", thisUpdate
+			, certinfo->trials);
+		}
+		else if (certinfo->once)
+		{
+		    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, onetime use%s", thisUpdate
+			, (certinfo->nextUpdate < time(NULL))? " (expired)": "");
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, until %s %s", thisUpdate
+			, timetoa(&certinfo->nextUpdate, utc)
+			, check_expiry(certinfo->nextUpdate, OCSP_WARNING_INTERVAL, strict));
+		}
+		datatot(certinfo->serialNumber.ptr, certinfo->serialNumber.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:   %s, %s", buf
+		    , cert_status_names[certinfo->status]);
+		certinfo = certinfo->next;
+	    }
+	}
+	location = location->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * list the ocsp cache
+ */
+void
+list_ocsp_cache(bool utc, bool strict)
+{
+    lock_ocsp_cache("list_ocsp_cache");
+    list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_cache, FALSE, utc, strict);
+    unlock_ocsp_cache("list_ocsp_cache");
+}
+
+static bool
+get_ocsp_requestor_cert(ocsp_location_t *location)
+{
+    x509cert_t *cert = NULL;
+
+    /* initialize temporary static storage */
+    ocsp_requestor_cert = NULL;
+    ocsp_requestor_sc   = NULL;
+    ocsp_requestor_pri  = NULL;
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	/* looking for a certificate from the same issuer */
+	cert = get_x509cert(location->issuer, location->authKeySerialNumber
+		    ,location->authKeyID, cert);
+   	if (cert == NULL)
+	    break;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+	    DBG_log("candidate: '%s'", buf);
+	)
+
+	if (cert->smartcard)
+	{
+	    /* look for a matching private key on a smartcard */
+	    smartcard_t *sc = scx_get(cert);
+
+	    if (sc != NULL)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("matching smartcard found")
+		)
+		if (sc->valid)
+		{
+		    ocsp_requestor_cert = cert;
+		    ocsp_requestor_sc = sc;
+		    return TRUE;
+		}
+		plog("unable to sign ocsp request without PIN");
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* look for a matching private key in the chained list */
+	    const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_x509_private_key(cert);
+
+	    if (pri != NULL)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("matching private key found")
+		)
+		ocsp_requestor_cert = cert;
+		ocsp_requestor_pri = pri;
+		return TRUE;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+static chunk_t
+generate_signature(chunk_t digest, smartcard_t *sc
+    , const RSA_private_key_t *pri)
+{
+    chunk_t sigdata;
+    u_char *pos;
+    size_t siglen = 0;
+
+    if (sc != NULL)
+    {
+	/* RSA signature is done on smartcard */
+
+	if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
+	{
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	    return empty_chunk;
+	}
+
+	siglen = scx_get_keylength(sc);
+
+	if (siglen == 0)
+	{
+	    plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard");
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	    return empty_chunk;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("signing hash with RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
+		, (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+	)
+
+	pos = build_asn1_object(&sigdata, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
+	*pos++ = 0x00;
+	scx_sign_hash(sc, digest.ptr, digest.len, pos, siglen);
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* RSA signature is done in software */
+	siglen = pri->pub.k;
+	pos = build_asn1_object(&sigdata, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
+	*pos++ = 0x00;
+	sign_hash(pri, digest.ptr, digest.len, pos, siglen);
+    }
+    return sigdata;
+}
+
+/*
+ * build signature into ocsp request
+ * gets built only if a request cert with
+ * a corresponding private key is found
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_signature(chunk_t tbsRequest)
+{
+    chunk_t sigdata, certs;
+    chunk_t digest_info;
+
+    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    chunk_t digest_raw = { digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN };
+
+    if (!compute_digest(tbsRequest, OID_SHA1, &digest_raw))
+	return empty_chunk;
+
+    /* according to PKCS#1 v2.1 digest must be packaged into
+     * an ASN.1 structure for encryption
+     */
+    digest_info = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+	, ASN1_sha1_id
+	, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest_raw));
+
+    /* generate the RSA signature */
+    sigdata = generate_signature(digest_info
+	, ocsp_requestor_sc
+	, ocsp_requestor_pri);
+    freeanychunk(digest_info);
+
+    /* has the RSA signature generation been successful? */
+    if (sigdata.ptr == NULL)
+	return empty_chunk;
+
+    /* include our certificate */
+    certs = asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, "m"
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SEQUENCE
+		    , ocsp_requestor_cert->certificate
+		  )
+	    );
+
+    /* build signature comprising algorithm, signature and cert */
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, "m"
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
+		    , ASN1_sha1WithRSA_id
+		    , sigdata
+		    , certs
+		  )
+	   );
+}
+
+/* build request (into requestList)
+ * no singleRequestExtensions used
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_request(ocsp_location_t *location, ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo)
+{
+    chunk_t reqCert = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmm"
+		, ASN1_sha1_id
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->authNameID)
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->authKeyID)
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, certinfo->serialNumber));
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "m", reqCert);
+}
+
+/*
+ * build requestList (into TBSRequest)
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_request_list(ocsp_location_t *location)
+{
+    chunk_t requestList;
+    request_list_t *reqs = NULL;
+    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo = location->certinfo;
+    u_char *pos;
+
+    size_t datalen = 0;
+
+    /* build content */
+    while (certinfo != NULL)
+    {
+	/* build request for every certificate in list
+	 * and store them in a chained list
+	 */
+	request_list_t *req = alloc_thing(request_list_t, "ocsp request");
+
+	req->request = build_request(location, certinfo);
+	req->next = reqs;
+	reqs = req;
+
+	datalen += req->request.len;
+	certinfo = certinfo->next;
+    }
+
+    pos = build_asn1_object(&requestList, ASN1_SEQUENCE
+	    , datalen);
+
+    /* copy all in chained list, free list afterwards */
+    while (reqs != NULL)
+    {
+ 	request_list_t *req = reqs;
+
+	mv_chunk(&pos, req->request);
+	reqs = reqs->next;
+	pfree(req);
+    }
+
+    return requestList;
+}
+
+/*
+ * build requestorName (into TBSRequest)
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_requestor_name(void)
+{
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1, "m"
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4
+		    , ocsp_requestor_cert->subject));
+}
+
+/*
+ * build nonce extension (into requestExtensions)
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_nonce_extension(ocsp_location_t *location)
+{
+    /* generate a random nonce */
+    location->nonce.ptr = alloc_bytes(NONCE_LENGTH, "ocsp nonce"),
+    location->nonce.len = NONCE_LENGTH;
+    get_rnd_bytes(location->nonce.ptr, NONCE_LENGTH);
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, ASN1_nonce_oid
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, location->nonce));
+}
+
+/*
+ * build requestExtensions (into TBSRequest)
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_request_ext(ocsp_location_t *location)
+{
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2, "m"
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+		    , build_nonce_extension(location)
+		    , asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cc"
+			, ASN1_response_oid
+			, ASN1_response_content
+		      )
+		  )
+	    );
+}
+
+/*
+ * build TBSRequest (into OCSPRequest)
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_tbs_request(ocsp_location_t *location, bool has_requestor_cert)
+{
+    /* version is skipped since the default is ok */
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mmm"
+		, (has_requestor_cert)
+			? build_requestor_name()
+			: empty_chunk
+		, build_request_list(location)
+		, build_request_ext(location));
+}
+
+/* assembles an ocsp request to given location
+ * and sets nonce field in location to the sent nonce
+ */
+chunk_t
+build_ocsp_request(ocsp_location_t *location)
+{
+    bool has_requestor_cert;
+    chunk_t tbsRequest, signature;
+    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("assembling ocsp request");
+	dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, location->issuer);
+	DBG_log("issuer: '%s'", buf);
+	if (location->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	{
+	    datatot(location->authKeyID.ptr, location->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    DBG_log("authkey: %s", buf);
+	}
+    )
+    lock_certs_and_keys("build_ocsp_request");
+
+    /* looks for requestor cert and matching private key */
+    has_requestor_cert = get_ocsp_requestor_cert(location);
+
+    /* build content */
+    tbsRequest = build_tbs_request(location, has_requestor_cert);
+
+    /* sign tbsReuqest */
+    signature = (has_requestor_cert)? build_signature(tbsRequest)
+				    : empty_chunk;
+
+    unlock_certs_and_keys("build_ocsp_request");
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+		, tbsRequest
+		, signature);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if the OCSP response has a valid signature
+ */
+static bool
+valid_ocsp_response(response_t *res)
+{
+    int pathlen;
+    x509cert_t *authcert;
+
+    lock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+
+    authcert = get_authcert(res->responder_id_name, empty_chunk
+		    , res->responder_id_key, AUTH_OCSP | AUTH_CA);
+
+    if (authcert == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("no matching ocsp signer cert found");
+	unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("ocsp signer cert found")
+    )
+
+    if (!check_signature(res->tbs, res->signature, res->algorithm
+		       , res->algorithm, authcert))
+    {
+	plog("signature of ocsp response is invalid");
+	unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("signature of ocsp response is valid")
+    )
+
+
+    for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
+    {
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+	time_t until;
+
+	x509cert_t *cert = authcert;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+	    DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+	    DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
+	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
+	    }
+	)
+
+	ugh = check_validity(authcert, &until);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("%s", ugh);
+	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	    return FALSE;
+        }
+	
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("certificate is valid")
+	)
+	
+	authcert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+	    , cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+	if (authcert == NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("issuer cacert not found");
+	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+	)
+
+	if (!check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature
+			   , cert->algorithm, cert->algorithm, authcert))
+	{
+	    plog("certificate signature is invalid");
+	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
+	)
+
+	/* check if cert is self-signed */
+	if (same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
+	    )
+	    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+    plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
+    unlock_authcert_list("valid_ocsp_response");
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse a basic OCSP response
+ */
+static bool
+parse_basic_ocsp_response(chunk_t blob, int level0, response_t *res)
+{
+    u_int level, version;
+    u_int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    bool critical;
+    chunk_t object;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < BASIC_RESPONSE_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(basicResponseObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	    return FALSE;
+	
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_TBS_DATA:
+	    res->tbs = object;
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION:
+	    version = (object.len)? (1 + (u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+	    if (version != OCSP_BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION)
+	    {
+		plog("wrong ocsp basic response version (version= %i)",  version);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_NAME:
+	    res->responder_id_name = object;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_ID_BY_KEY:
+	    res->responder_id_key = object;
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_PRODUCED_AT:
+	    res->produced_at = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_RESPONSES:
+	    res->responses = object;
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_ID:
+	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_CRITICAL:
+	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE:
+	    if (extn_oid == OID_NONCE)
+		res->nonce = object;
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM:
+	    res->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level+1, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_SIGNATURE:
+	    res->signature = object;
+	    break;
+	case BASIC_RESPONSE_CERTIFICATE:
+	    {
+		chunk_t blob;
+		x509cert_t *cert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t, "ocspcert");
+
+		clonetochunk(blob, object.ptr, object.len, "ocspcert blob");
+		*cert = empty_x509cert;
+
+		if (parse_x509cert(blob, level+1, cert)
+		&& cert->isOcspSigner
+		&& trust_authcert_candidate(cert, NULL))
+		{
+		    add_authcert(cert, AUTH_OCSP);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("embedded ocsp certificate rejected")
+		    )
+		    free_x509cert(cert);
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * parse an ocsp response and return the result as a response_t struct
+ */
+static response_status
+parse_ocsp_response(chunk_t blob, response_t * res)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    response_status rStatus = STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+    u_int ocspResponseType = OID_UNKNOWN;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, 0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < OCSP_RESPONSE_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(ocspResponseObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	    return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	case OCSP_RESPONSE_STATUS:
+	    rStatus = (response_status) *object.ptr;
+
+	    switch (rStatus)
+	    {
+	    case STATUS_SUCCESSFUL:
+		break;
+	    case STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST:
+	    case STATUS_INTERNALERROR:
+	    case STATUS_TRYLATER:
+	    case STATUS_SIGREQUIRED:
+	    case STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED:
+		plog("ocsp response: server said '%s'"
+		    , response_status_names[rStatus]);
+		return rStatus;
+	    default:
+		return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case OCSP_RESPONSE_TYPE:
+	    ocspResponseType = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case OCSP_RESPONSE:
+	    {
+		switch (ocspResponseType) {
+		case OID_BASIC:
+		    if (!parse_basic_ocsp_response(object, level+1, res))
+			return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("ocsp response is not of type BASIC");
+			DBG_dump_chunk("ocsp response OID: ", object);
+		    )
+		    return STATUS_INTERNALERROR;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return rStatus;
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse a basic OCSP response
+ */
+static bool
+parse_ocsp_single_response(chunk_t blob, int level0, single_response_t *sres)
+{
+    u_int level, extn_oid;
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    bool critical;
+    chunk_t object;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < SINGLE_RESPONSE_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(singleResponseObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ALGORITHM:
+	    sres->hash_algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level+1, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_NAME_HASH:
+	    sres->issuer_name_hash = object;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_ISSUER_KEY_HASH:
+	    sres->issuer_key_hash = object;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+	    sres->serialNumber = object;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_GOOD:
+	    sres->status = CERT_GOOD;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOKED:
+	    sres->status = CERT_REVOKED;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_REVOCATION_TIME:
+	    sres->revocationTime = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_CRL_REASON:
+	    sres->revocationReason = (object.len == 1)
+		? *object.ptr : REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CERT_STATUS_UNKNOWN:
+	    sres->status = CERT_UNKNOWN;
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_THIS_UPDATE:
+	    sres->thisUpdate = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_NEXT_UPDATE:
+	    sres->nextUpdate = asn1totime(&object, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_ID:
+	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_CRITICAL:
+	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+	    )
+	case SINGLE_RESPONSE_EXT_VALUE:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * add an ocsp location to a chained list
+ */
+ocsp_location_t*
+add_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_location_t **chain)
+{
+    ocsp_location_t *location = alloc_thing(ocsp_location_t, "ocsp location");
+
+    /* unshare location fields */
+    clonetochunk(location->issuer
+		, loc->issuer.ptr, loc->issuer.len
+		, "ocsp issuer");
+
+    clonetochunk(location->authNameID
+		, loc->authNameID.ptr, loc->authNameID.len
+		, "ocsp authNameID");
+
+    if (loc->authKeyID.ptr == NULL)
+	location->authKeyID = empty_chunk;
+    else
+	clonetochunk(location->authKeyID
+		, loc->authKeyID.ptr, loc->authKeyID.len
+		, "ocsp authKeyID");
+
+    if (loc->authKeySerialNumber.ptr == NULL)
+	location->authKeySerialNumber = empty_chunk;
+    else
+	clonetochunk(location->authKeySerialNumber
+    		, loc->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, loc->authKeySerialNumber.len
+		, "ocsp authKeySerialNumber");
+
+    clonetochunk(location->uri
+		, loc->uri.ptr, loc->uri.len
+		, "ocsp uri");
+
+    location->certinfo = NULL;
+
+    /* insert new ocsp location in front of chain */
+    location->next = *chain;
+    *chain = location;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("new ocsp location added")
+    )
+
+    return location;
+}
+
+/*
+ * add a certinfo struct to a chained list
+ */
+void
+add_certinfo(ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_certinfo_t *info, ocsp_location_t **chain
+    , bool request)
+{
+    ocsp_location_t *location;
+    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
+    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    time_t now;
+    int cmp = -1;
+
+    location = get_ocsp_location(loc, *chain);
+    if (location == NULL)
+	location = add_ocsp_location(loc, chain);
+
+    /* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
+    certinfop = &location->certinfo;
+    certinfo = *certinfop;
+
+    while (certinfo != NULL)
+    {
+	cmp = cmp_chunk(info->serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
+	if (cmp <= 0)
+	    break;
+	certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+	certinfo = *certinfop;
+    }
+
+    if (cmp != 0)
+    {
+	/* add a new certinfo entry */
+	ocsp_certinfo_t *cnew = alloc_thing(ocsp_certinfo_t, "ocsp certinfo");
+	clonetochunk(cnew->serialNumber, info->serialNumber.ptr
+	    , info->serialNumber.len, "serialNumber");
+	cnew->next = certinfo;
+	*certinfop = cnew;
+	certinfo = cnew;
+    }
+	
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	datatot(info->serialNumber.ptr, info->serialNumber.len, ':'
+	    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+	DBG_log("ocsp %s for serial %s %s"
+	    , request?"fetch request":"certinfo"
+	    , buf
+	    , (cmp == 0)? (request?"already exists":"updated"):"added")
+    )
+
+    time(&now);
+   
+    if (request)
+    {
+	certinfo->status = CERT_UNDEFINED;
+	
+	if (cmp != 0)
+	    certinfo->thisUpdate = now;
+
+	certinfo->nextUpdate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	certinfo->status = info->status;
+	certinfo->revocationTime = info->revocationTime;
+	certinfo->revocationReason = info->revocationReason;
+	
+	certinfo->thisUpdate = (info->thisUpdate != UNDEFINED_TIME)?
+	    info->thisUpdate : now;
+
+	certinfo->once = (info->nextUpdate == UNDEFINED_TIME);
+
+	certinfo->nextUpdate = (certinfo->once)?
+	    (now + OCSP_DEFAULT_VALID_TIME) : info->nextUpdate;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * process received ocsp single response and add it to ocsp cache
+ */
+static void
+process_single_response(ocsp_location_t *location, single_response_t *sres)
+{
+    ocsp_certinfo_t *certinfo, **certinfop;
+    int cmp = -1;
+
+    if (sres->hash_algorithm != OID_SHA1)
+    {
+	plog("only SHA-1 hash supported in OCSP single response");
+	return;
+    }
+    if (!(same_chunk(sres->issuer_name_hash, location->authNameID)
+    &&   same_chunk(sres->issuer_key_hash, location->authKeyID)))
+    {
+	plog("ocsp single response has wrong issuer");
+	return;
+    }
+    
+    /* traverse list of certinfos in increasing order */
+    certinfop = &location->certinfo;
+    certinfo = *certinfop;
+
+    while (certinfo != NULL)
+    {
+	cmp = cmp_chunk(sres->serialNumber, certinfo->serialNumber);
+	if (cmp <= 0)
+	    break;
+	certinfop = &certinfo->next;
+	certinfo = *certinfop;
+    }
+
+    if (cmp != 0)
+    {
+	plog("received unrequested cert status from ocsp server");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* unlink cert from ocsp fetch request list */
+    *certinfop = certinfo->next;
+    
+    /* update certinfo using the single response information */
+    certinfo->thisUpdate = sres->thisUpdate;
+    certinfo->nextUpdate = sres->nextUpdate;
+    certinfo->status = sres->status;
+    certinfo->revocationTime = sres->revocationTime;
+    certinfo->revocationReason = sres->revocationReason;
+    
+    /* add or update certinfo in ocsp cache */
+    lock_ocsp_cache("process_single_response");
+    add_certinfo(location, certinfo, &ocsp_cache, FALSE);
+    unlock_ocsp_cache("process_single_response");
+
+    /* free certinfo unlinked from ocsp fetch request list */
+    free_certinfo(certinfo);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ *  parse and verify ocsp response and update the ocsp cache
+ */
+void
+parse_ocsp(ocsp_location_t *location, chunk_t blob)
+{
+    response_t res = empty_response;
+
+    /* parse the ocsp response without looking at the single responses yet */
+    response_status status = parse_ocsp_response(blob, &res);
+
+    if (status != STATUS_SUCCESSFUL)
+    {
+	plog("error in ocsp response");
+	return;
+    }
+    /* check if there was a nonce in the request */
+    if (location->nonce.ptr != NULL && res.nonce.ptr == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("ocsp response contains no nonce, replay attack possible");
+    }
+    /* check if the nonce is identical */
+    if (res.nonce.ptr != NULL && !same_chunk(res.nonce, location->nonce))
+    {
+	plog("invalid nonce in ocsp response");
+	return;
+    }
+    /* check if the response is signed by a trusted key */
+    if (!valid_ocsp_response(&res))
+    {
+	plog("invalid ocsp response");
+	return;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("valid ocsp response")
+    )
+
+    /* now parse the single responses one at a time */
+    {
+	u_int level;
+	asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+	chunk_t object;
+	int objectID = 0;
+
+	asn1_init(&ctx, res.responses, 0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+	while (objectID < RESPONSES_ROOF)
+	{
+	    if (!extract_object(responsesObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+		return;
+	    
+	    if (objectID == RESPONSES_SINGLE_RESPONSE)
+	    {
+		single_response_t sres = empty_single_response;
+
+		if (parse_ocsp_single_response(object, level+1, &sres))
+		{
+		    process_single_response(location, &sres);
+		}
+	    }
+	    objectID++;
+	}
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/ocsp.h b/src/pluto/ocsp.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..49e1026ec
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/ocsp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+/* Support of the Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) Support
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Christoph Gysin, Simon Zwahlen
+ * Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "constants.h"
+
+/* constants */
+
+#define OCSP_BASIC_RESPONSE_VERSION	1
+#define OCSP_DEFAULT_VALID_TIME		120  /* validity of one-time response in seconds */
+#define OCSP_WARNING_INTERVAL		2    /* days */
+
+/* OCSP response status */
+
+typedef enum {
+    STATUS_SUCCESSFUL = 	0,
+    STATUS_MALFORMEDREQUEST = 	1,
+    STATUS_INTERNALERROR = 	2,
+    STATUS_TRYLATER = 		3,
+    STATUS_SIGREQUIRED = 	5,
+    STATUS_UNAUTHORIZED= 	6
+} response_status;
+
+/* OCSP access structures */
+
+typedef struct ocsp_certinfo ocsp_certinfo_t;
+
+struct ocsp_certinfo {
+    ocsp_certinfo_t  *next;
+    int              trials;
+    chunk_t          serialNumber;
+    cert_status_t    status;
+    bool             once;
+    crl_reason_t     revocationReason;
+    time_t           revocationTime;
+    time_t           thisUpdate;
+    time_t           nextUpdate;
+};
+
+typedef struct ocsp_location ocsp_location_t;
+
+struct ocsp_location {
+    ocsp_location_t  *next;
+    chunk_t          issuer;
+    chunk_t          authNameID;
+    chunk_t          authKeyID;
+    chunk_t	     authKeySerialNumber;
+    chunk_t          uri;
+    chunk_t          nonce;
+    ocsp_certinfo_t  *certinfo;
+};
+
+extern ocsp_location_t* get_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc
+    , ocsp_location_t *chain);
+extern ocsp_location_t* add_ocsp_location(const ocsp_location_t *loc
+    , ocsp_location_t **chain);
+extern void add_certinfo(ocsp_location_t *loc, ocsp_certinfo_t *info
+    , ocsp_location_t **chain, bool request);
+extern void check_ocsp(void);
+extern cert_status_t verify_by_ocsp(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until
+    , time_t *revocationTime, crl_reason_t *revocationReason);
+extern bool ocsp_set_request_cert(char* path);
+extern void ocsp_set_default_uri(char* uri);
+extern void ocsp_cache_add_cert(const x509cert_t* cert);
+extern chunk_t build_ocsp_request(ocsp_location_t* location);
+extern void parse_ocsp(ocsp_location_t* location, chunk_t blob);
+extern void list_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t *location, bool requests
+    , bool utc, bool strict);
+extern void list_ocsp_cache(bool utc, bool strict);
+extern void free_ocsp_locations(ocsp_location_t **chain);
+extern void free_ocsp_cache(void);
+extern void free_ocsp(void);
+extern void ocsp_purge_cache(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/oid.c b/src/pluto/oid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4b0632de2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/oid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,197 @@
+/* List of some useful object identifiers (OIDs)
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * 
+ * This file has been automatically generated by the script oid.pl
+ * Do not edit manually!
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "oid.h"
+
+const oid_t oid_names[] = {
+  {0x02,                       7, 1, "ITU-T Administration"   },  /*   0 */
+  {  0x82,                     0, 1, ""                       },  /*   1 */
+  {    0x06,                   0, 1, "Germany ITU-T member"   },  /*   2 */
+  {      0x01,                 0, 1, "Deutsche Telekom AG"    },  /*   3 */
+  {        0x0A,               0, 1, ""                       },  /*   4 */
+  {          0x07,             0, 1, ""                       },  /*   5 */
+  {            0x14,           0, 0, "ND"                     },  /*   6 */
+  {0x09,                      18, 1, "data"                   },  /*   7 */
+  {  0x92,                     0, 1, ""                       },  /*   8 */
+  {    0x26,                   0, 1, ""                       },  /*   9 */
+  {      0x89,                 0, 1, ""                       },  /*  10 */
+  {        0x93,               0, 1, ""                       },  /*  11 */
+  {          0xF2,             0, 1, ""                       },  /*  12 */
+  {            0x2C,           0, 1, ""                       },  /*  13 */
+  {              0x64,         0, 1, "pilot"                  },  /*  14 */
+  {                0x01,       0, 1, "pilotAttributeType"     },  /*  15 */
+  {                  0x01,    17, 0, "UID"                    },  /*  16 */
+  {                  0x19,     0, 0, "DC"                     },  /*  17 */
+  {0x55,                      51, 1, "X.500"                  },  /*  18 */
+  {  0x04,                    36, 1, "X.509"                  },  /*  19 */
+  {    0x03,                  21, 0, "CN"                     },  /*  20 */
+  {    0x04,                  22, 0, "S"                      },  /*  21 */
+  {    0x05,                  23, 0, "SN"                     },  /*  22 */
+  {    0x06,                  24, 0, "C"                      },  /*  23 */
+  {    0x07,                  25, 0, "L"                      },  /*  24 */
+  {    0x08,                  26, 0, "ST"                     },  /*  25 */
+  {    0x0A,                  27, 0, "O"                      },  /*  26 */
+  {    0x0B,                  28, 0, "OU"                     },  /*  27 */
+  {    0x0C,                  29, 0, "T"                      },  /*  28 */
+  {    0x0D,                  30, 0, "D"                      },  /*  29 */
+  {    0x24,                  31, 0, "userCertificate"        },  /*  30 */
+  {    0x29,                  32, 0, "N"                      },  /*  31 */
+  {    0x2A,                  33, 0, "G"                      },  /*  32 */
+  {    0x2B,                  34, 0, "I"                      },  /*  33 */
+  {    0x2D,                  35, 0, "ID"                     },  /*  34 */
+  {    0x48,                   0, 0, "role"                   },  /*  35 */
+  {  0x1D,                     0, 1, "id-ce"                  },  /*  36 */
+  {    0x09,                  38, 0, "subjectDirectoryAttrs"  },  /*  37 */
+  {    0x0E,                  39, 0, "subjectKeyIdentifier"   },  /*  38 */
+  {    0x0F,                  40, 0, "keyUsage"               },  /*  39 */
+  {    0x10,                  41, 0, "privateKeyUsagePeriod"  },  /*  40 */
+  {    0x11,                  42, 0, "subjectAltName"         },  /*  41 */
+  {    0x12,                  43, 0, "issuerAltName"          },  /*  42 */
+  {    0x13,                  44, 0, "basicConstraints"       },  /*  43 */
+  {    0x15,                  45, 0, "reasonCode"             },  /*  44 */
+  {    0x1F,                  46, 0, "crlDistributionPoints"  },  /*  45 */
+  {    0x20,                  47, 0, "certificatePolicies"    },  /*  46 */
+  {    0x23,                  48, 0, "authorityKeyIdentifier" },  /*  47 */
+  {    0x25,                  49, 0, "extendedKeyUsage"       },  /*  48 */
+  {    0x37,                  50, 0, "targetInformation"      },  /*  49 */
+  {    0x38,                   0, 0, "noRevAvail"             },  /*  50 */
+  {0x2A,                      88, 1, ""                       },  /*  51 */
+  {  0x86,                     0, 1, ""                       },  /*  52 */
+  {    0x48,                   0, 1, ""                       },  /*  53 */
+  {      0x86,                 0, 1, ""                       },  /*  54 */
+  {        0xF7,               0, 1, ""                       },  /*  55 */
+  {          0x0D,             0, 1, "RSADSI"                 },  /*  56 */
+  {            0x01,          83, 1, "PKCS"                   },  /*  57 */
+  {              0x01,        66, 1, "PKCS-1"                 },  /*  58 */
+  {                0x01,      60, 0, "rsaEncryption"          },  /*  59 */
+  {                0x02,      61, 0, "md2WithRSAEncryption"   },  /*  60 */
+  {                0x04,      62, 0, "md5WithRSAEncryption"   },  /*  61 */
+  {                0x05,      63, 0, "sha-1WithRSAEncryption" },  /*  62 */
+  {                0x0B,      64, 0, "sha256WithRSAEncryption"},  /*  63 */
+  {                0x0C,      65, 0, "sha384WithRSAEncryption"},  /*  64 */
+  {                0x0D,       0, 0, "sha512WithRSAEncryption"},  /*  65 */
+  {              0x07,        73, 1, "PKCS-7"                 },  /*  66 */
+  {                0x01,      68, 0, "data"                   },  /*  67 */
+  {                0x02,      69, 0, "signedData"             },  /*  68 */
+  {                0x03,      70, 0, "envelopedData"          },  /*  69 */
+  {                0x04,      71, 0, "signedAndEnvelopedData" },  /*  70 */
+  {                0x05,      72, 0, "digestedData"           },  /*  71 */
+  {                0x06,       0, 0, "encryptedData"          },  /*  72 */
+  {              0x09,         0, 1, "PKCS-9"                 },  /*  73 */
+  {                0x01,      75, 0, "E"                      },  /*  74 */
+  {                0x02,      76, 0, "unstructuredName"       },  /*  75 */
+  {                0x03,      77, 0, "contentType"            },  /*  76 */
+  {                0x04,      78, 0, "messageDigest"          },  /*  77 */
+  {                0x05,      79, 0, "signingTime"            },  /*  78 */
+  {                0x06,      80, 0, "counterSignature"       },  /*  79 */
+  {                0x07,      81, 0, "challengePassword"      },  /*  80 */
+  {                0x08,      82, 0, "unstructuredAddress"    },  /*  81 */
+  {                0x0E,       0, 0, "extensionRequest"       },  /*  82 */
+  {            0x02,          86, 1, "digestAlgorithm"        },  /*  83 */
+  {              0x02,        85, 0, "md2"                    },  /*  84 */
+  {              0x05,         0, 0, "md5"                    },  /*  85 */
+  {            0x03,           0, 1, "encryptionAlgorithm"    },  /*  86 */
+  {              0x07,         0, 0, "3des-ede-cbc"           },  /*  87 */
+  {0x2B,                     149, 1, ""                       },  /*  88 */
+  {  0x06,                   136, 1, "dod"                    },  /*  89 */
+  {    0x01,                   0, 1, "internet"               },  /*  90 */
+  {      0x04,               105, 1, "private"                },  /*  91 */
+  {        0x01,               0, 1, "enterprise"             },  /*  92 */
+  {          0x82,            98, 1, ""                       },  /*  93 */
+  {            0x37,           0, 1, "Microsoft"              },  /*  94 */
+  {              0x0A,         0, 1, ""                       },  /*  95 */
+  {                0x03,       0, 1, ""                       },  /*  96 */
+  {                  0x03,     0, 0, "msSGC"                  },  /*  97 */
+  {          0x89,             0, 1, ""                       },  /*  98 */
+  {            0x31,           0, 1, ""                       },  /*  99 */
+  {              0x01,         0, 1, ""                       },  /* 100 */
+  {                0x01,       0, 1, ""                       },  /* 101 */
+  {                  0x02,     0, 1, ""                       },  /* 102 */
+  {                    0x02, 104, 0, ""                       },  /* 103 */
+  {                    0x4B,   0, 0, "TCGID"                  },  /* 104 */
+  {      0x05,                 0, 1, "security"               },  /* 105 */
+  {        0x05,               0, 1, "mechanisms"             },  /* 106 */
+  {          0x07,             0, 1, "id-pkix"                },  /* 107 */
+  {            0x01,         110, 1, "id-pe"                  },  /* 108 */
+  {              0x01,         0, 0, "authorityInfoAccess"    },  /* 109 */
+  {            0x03,         120, 1, "id-kp"                  },  /* 110 */
+  {              0x01,       112, 0, "serverAuth"             },  /* 111 */
+  {              0x02,       113, 0, "clientAuth"             },  /* 112 */
+  {              0x03,       114, 0, "codeSigning"            },  /* 113 */
+  {              0x04,       115, 0, "emailProtection"        },  /* 114 */
+  {              0x05,       116, 0, "ipsecEndSystem"         },  /* 115 */
+  {              0x06,       117, 0, "ipsecTunnel"            },  /* 116 */
+  {              0x07,       118, 0, "ipsecUser"              },  /* 117 */
+  {              0x08,       119, 0, "timeStamping"           },  /* 118 */
+  {              0x09,         0, 0, "ocspSigning"            },  /* 119 */
+  {            0x08,         122, 1, "id-otherNames"          },  /* 120 */
+  {              0x05,         0, 0, "xmppAddr"               },  /* 121 */
+  {            0x0A,         127, 1, "id-aca"                 },  /* 122 */
+  {              0x01,       124, 0, "authenticationInfo"     },  /* 123 */
+  {              0x02,       125, 0, "accessIdentity"         },  /* 124 */
+  {              0x03,       126, 0, "chargingIdentity"       },  /* 125 */
+  {              0x04,         0, 0, "group"                  },  /* 126 */
+  {            0x30,           0, 1, "id-ad"                  },  /* 127 */
+  {              0x01,         0, 1, "ocsp"                   },  /* 128 */
+  {                0x01,     130, 0, "basic"                  },  /* 129 */
+  {                0x02,     131, 0, "nonce"                  },  /* 130 */
+  {                0x03,     132, 0, "crl"                    },  /* 131 */
+  {                0x04,     133, 0, "response"               },  /* 132 */
+  {                0x05,     134, 0, "noCheck"                },  /* 133 */
+  {                0x06,     135, 0, "archiveCutoff"          },  /* 134 */
+  {                0x07,       0, 0, "serviceLocator"         },  /* 135 */
+  {  0x0E,                   142, 1, "oiw"                    },  /* 136 */
+  {    0x03,                   0, 1, "secsig"                 },  /* 137 */
+  {      0x02,                 0, 1, "algorithms"             },  /* 138 */
+  {        0x07,             140, 0, "des-cbc"                },  /* 139 */
+  {        0x1A,             141, 0, "sha-1"                  },  /* 140 */
+  {        0x1D,               0, 0, "sha-1WithRSASignature"  },  /* 141 */
+  {  0x24,                     0, 1, "TeleTrusT"              },  /* 142 */
+  {    0x03,                   0, 1, "algorithm"              },  /* 143 */
+  {      0x03,                 0, 1, "signatureAlgorithm"     },  /* 144 */
+  {        0x01,               0, 1, "rsaSignature"           },  /* 145 */
+  {          0x02,           147, 0, "rsaSigWithripemd160"    },  /* 146 */
+  {          0x03,           148, 0, "rsaSigWithripemd128"    },  /* 147 */
+  {          0x04,             0, 0, "rsaSigWithripemd256"    },  /* 148 */
+  {0x60,                       0, 1, ""                       },  /* 149 */
+  {  0x86,                     0, 1, ""                       },  /* 150 */
+  {    0x48,                   0, 1, ""                       },  /* 151 */
+  {      0x01,                 0, 1, "organization"           },  /* 152 */
+  {        0x65,             160, 1, "gov"                    },  /* 153 */
+  {          0x03,             0, 1, "csor"                   },  /* 154 */
+  {            0x04,           0, 1, "nistalgorithm"          },  /* 155 */
+  {              0x02,         0, 1, "hashalgs"               },  /* 156 */
+  {                0x01,     158, 0, "id-SHA-256"             },  /* 157 */
+  {                0x02,     159, 0, "id-SHA-384"             },  /* 158 */
+  {                0x03,       0, 0, "id-SHA-512"             },  /* 159 */
+  {        0x86,               0, 1, ""                       },  /* 160 */
+  {          0xf8,             0, 1, ""                       },  /* 161 */
+  {            0x42,         174, 1, "netscape"               },  /* 162 */
+  {              0x01,       169, 1, ""                       },  /* 163 */
+  {                0x01,     165, 0, "nsCertType"             },  /* 164 */
+  {                0x03,     166, 0, "nsRevocationUrl"        },  /* 165 */
+  {                0x04,     167, 0, "nsCaRevocationUrl"      },  /* 166 */
+  {                0x08,     168, 0, "nsCaPolicyUrl"          },  /* 167 */
+  {                0x0d,       0, 0, "nsComment"              },  /* 168 */
+  {              0x03,       172, 1, "directory"              },  /* 169 */
+  {                0x01,       0, 1, ""                       },  /* 170 */
+  {                  0x03,     0, 0, "employeeNumber"         },  /* 171 */
+  {              0x04,         0, 1, "policy"                 },  /* 172 */
+  {                0x01,       0, 0, "nsSGC"                  },  /* 173 */
+  {            0x45,           0, 1, "verisign"               },  /* 174 */
+  {              0x01,         0, 1, "pki"                    },  /* 175 */
+  {                0x09,       0, 1, "attributes"             },  /* 176 */
+  {                  0x02,   178, 0, "messageType"            },  /* 177 */
+  {                  0x03,   179, 0, "pkiStatus"              },  /* 178 */
+  {                  0x04,   180, 0, "failInfo"               },  /* 179 */
+  {                  0x05,   181, 0, "senderNonce"            },  /* 180 */
+  {                  0x06,   182, 0, "recipientNonce"         },  /* 181 */
+  {                  0x07,   183, 0, "transID"                },  /* 182 */
+  {                  0x08,     0, 0, "extensionReq"           }   /* 183 */
+};
diff --git a/src/pluto/oid.h b/src/pluto/oid.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ccdfb2954
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/oid.h
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+/* Object identifiers (OIDs) used by FreeS/WAN
+ * Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ * 
+ * This file has been automatically generated by the script oid.pl
+ * Do not edit manually!
+ */
+
+typedef struct {
+    u_char octet;
+    u_int  next;
+    u_int  down;
+    const u_char *name;
+} oid_t;
+
+extern const oid_t oid_names[];
+
+#define OID_UNKNOWN			-1
+#define OID_ROLE			35
+#define OID_SUBJECT_KEY_ID		38
+#define OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME		41
+#define OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS		43
+#define OID_CRL_REASON_CODE		44
+#define OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS	45
+#define OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID		47
+#define OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE		48
+#define OID_TARGET_INFORMATION		49
+#define OID_NO_REV_AVAIL		50
+#define OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION		59
+#define OID_MD2_WITH_RSA		60
+#define OID_MD5_WITH_RSA		61
+#define OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA		62
+#define OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA		63
+#define OID_SHA384_WITH_RSA		64
+#define OID_SHA512_WITH_RSA		65
+#define OID_PKCS7_DATA			67
+#define OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA		68
+#define OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA	69
+#define OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA	70
+#define OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA		71
+#define OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA	72
+#define OID_PKCS9_EMAIL			74
+#define OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE		76
+#define OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST	77
+#define OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME		78
+#define OID_MD2				84
+#define OID_MD5				85
+#define OID_3DES_EDE_CBC		87
+#define OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS	109
+#define OID_OCSP_SIGNING		119
+#define OID_XMPP_ADDR			121
+#define OID_AUTHENTICATION_INFO		123
+#define OID_ACCESS_IDENTITY		124
+#define OID_CHARGING_IDENTITY		125
+#define OID_GROUP			126
+#define OID_OCSP			128
+#define OID_BASIC			129
+#define OID_NONCE			130
+#define OID_CRL				131
+#define OID_RESPONSE			132
+#define OID_NO_CHECK			133
+#define OID_ARCHIVE_CUTOFF		134
+#define OID_SERVICE_LOCATOR		135
+#define OID_DES_CBC			139
+#define OID_SHA1			140
+#define OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA_OIW		141
+#define OID_SHA256			157
+#define OID_SHA384			158
+#define OID_SHA512			159
+#define OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL		165
+#define OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL	166
+#define OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL		167
+#define OID_NS_COMMENT			168
+#define OID_PKI_MESSAGE_TYPE		177
+#define OID_PKI_STATUS			178
+#define OID_PKI_FAIL_INFO		179
+#define OID_PKI_SENDER_NONCE		180
+#define OID_PKI_RECIPIENT_NONCE		181
+#define OID_PKI_TRANS_ID		182
diff --git a/src/pluto/oid.pl b/src/pluto/oid.pl
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..52ac8eae0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/oid.pl
@@ -0,0 +1,123 @@
+#!/usr/bin/perl
+# Generates oid.h and oid.c out of oid.txt
+# Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+#
+# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+# under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+# Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+# option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+# WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+# or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+# for more details.
+#
+
+$copyright="Copyright (C) 2003-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur";
+$automatic="This file has been automatically generated by the script oid.pl";
+$warning="Do not edit manually!";
+
+print "oid.pl generating oid.h and oid.c\n";
+
+# Generate oid.h
+
+open(OID_H,  ">oid.h")
+    or die "could not open 'oid.h': $!";
+
+print OID_H "/* Object identifiers (OIDs) used by FreeS/WAN\n",
+	    " * ", $copyright, "\n",
+	    " * \n",
+	    " * ", $automatic, "\n",
+	    " * ", $warning, "\n",
+	    " */\n\n",
+	    "typedef struct {\n",
+	    "    u_char octet;\n",
+	    "    u_int  next;\n",
+	    "    u_int  down;\n",
+	    "    const u_char *name;\n",
+	    "} oid_t;\n",
+	    "\n",
+            "extern const oid_t oid_names[];\n",
+	    "\n",
+	    "#define OID_UNKNOWN			-1\n";
+
+# parse oid.txt
+
+open(SRC,  "<oid.txt")
+    or die "could not open 'oid.txt': $!";
+
+$counter = 0;
+$max_name = 0;
+$max_order = 0;
+
+while ($line = <SRC>)
+{
+    $line =~ m/( *?)(0x\w{2})\s+(".*?")[ \t]*?([\w_]*?)\Z/;
+
+    @order[$counter] = length($1);
+    @octet[$counter] = $2;
+    @name[$counter] = $3;
+
+    if (length($1) > $max_order)
+    {
+	$max_order = length($1);
+    }
+    if (length($3) > $max_name)
+    {
+	$max_name = length($3);
+    }
+    if (length($4) > 0)
+    {
+	printf OID_H "#define %s%s%d\n", $4, "\t" x ((39-length($4))/8), $counter;
+    }
+    $counter++;
+}
+
+close SRC;
+close OID_H;
+
+# Generate oid.c
+
+open(OID_C, ">oid.c")
+    or die "could not open 'oid.c': $!";
+
+print OID_C "/* List of some useful object identifiers (OIDs)\n",
+            " * ", $copyright, "\n",
+	    " * \n",
+	    " * ", $automatic, "\n",
+	    " * ", $warning, "\n",
+	    " */\n",
+	    "\n",
+	    "#include <stdlib.h>\n",
+	    "\n",
+	    "#include \"oid.h\"\n",
+	    "\n",
+            "const oid_t oid_names[] = {\n";
+
+for ($c = 0; $c < $counter; $c++)
+{
+    $next = 0;
+
+    for ($d = $c+1; $d < $counter && @order[$d] >= @order[$c]; $d++)
+    {
+	if (@order[$d] == @order[$c])
+	{
+	    @next[$c] = $d;
+	    last;
+	}
+    }
+
+    printf OID_C "  {%s%s,%s%3d, %d, %s%s}%s  /* %3d */\n"
+	,' '  x @order[$c]
+	, @octet[$c]
+	, ' ' x (1 + $max_order - @order[$c])
+	, @next[$c]
+	, @order[$c+1] > @order[$c]
+	, @name[$c]
+	, ' ' x ($max_name - length(@name[$c]))
+	, $c != $counter-1 ? "," : " "
+	, $c;
+}
+
+print OID_C "};\n" ;
+close OID_C;
diff --git a/src/pluto/oid.txt b/src/pluto/oid.txt
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e8750024e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/oid.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
+0x02                         "ITU-T Administration"
+  0x82                       ""
+    0x06                     "Germany ITU-T member"
+      0x01                   "Deutsche Telekom AG"
+        0x0A                 ""
+          0x07               ""
+            0x14             "ND"
+0x09                         "data"
+  0x92                       ""
+    0x26                     ""
+      0x89                   ""
+        0x93                 ""
+          0xF2               ""
+            0x2C             ""
+              0x64           "pilot"
+                0x01         "pilotAttributeType"
+                  0x01       "UID"
+                  0x19       "DC"
+0x55                         "X.500"
+  0x04                       "X.509"
+    0x03                     "CN"
+    0x04                     "S"
+    0x05                     "SN"
+    0x06                     "C"
+    0x07                     "L"
+    0x08                     "ST"
+    0x0A                     "O"
+    0x0B                     "OU"
+    0x0C                     "T"
+    0x0D                     "D"
+    0x24                     "userCertificate"
+    0x29                     "N"
+    0x2A                     "G"
+    0x2B                     "I"
+    0x2D                     "ID"
+    0x48                     "role"			OID_ROLE
+  0x1D                       "id-ce"
+    0x09                     "subjectDirectoryAttrs"
+    0x0E                     "subjectKeyIdentifier"	OID_SUBJECT_KEY_ID
+    0x0F                     "keyUsage"
+    0x10                     "privateKeyUsagePeriod"
+    0x11                     "subjectAltName"		OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME
+    0x12                     "issuerAltName"
+    0x13                     "basicConstraints"		OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS
+    0x15                     "reasonCode"		OID_CRL_REASON_CODE
+    0x1F                     "crlDistributionPoints"	OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS
+    0x20                     "certificatePolicies"
+    0x23                     "authorityKeyIdentifier"	OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID
+    0x25                     "extendedKeyUsage"		OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE
+    0x37                     "targetInformation"	OID_TARGET_INFORMATION
+    0x38                     "noRevAvail"		OID_NO_REV_AVAIL
+0x2A                         ""
+  0x86                       ""
+    0x48                     ""
+      0x86                   ""
+        0xF7                 ""
+          0x0D               "RSADSI"
+            0x01             "PKCS"
+              0x01           "PKCS-1"
+                0x01         "rsaEncryption"		OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION
+                0x02         "md2WithRSAEncryption"	OID_MD2_WITH_RSA
+                0x04         "md5WithRSAEncryption"	OID_MD5_WITH_RSA
+                0x05         "sha-1WithRSAEncryption"	OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA
+                0x0B         "sha256WithRSAEncryption"	OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA
+                0x0C         "sha384WithRSAEncryption"	OID_SHA384_WITH_RSA
+                0x0D         "sha512WithRSAEncryption"	OID_SHA512_WITH_RSA
+              0x07           "PKCS-7"
+                0x01         "data"			OID_PKCS7_DATA
+                0x02         "signedData"		OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA
+                0x03         "envelopedData"		OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA
+                0x04         "signedAndEnvelopedData"	OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA
+                0x05         "digestedData"		OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA
+                0x06         "encryptedData"		OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA
+              0x09           "PKCS-9"
+                0x01         "E"			OID_PKCS9_EMAIL
+                0x02         "unstructuredName"
+                0x03         "contentType"		OID_PKCS9_CONTENT_TYPE
+                0x04         "messageDigest"		OID_PKCS9_MESSAGE_DIGEST
+                0x05         "signingTime"		OID_PKCS9_SIGNING_TIME
+                0x06         "counterSignature"
+                0x07         "challengePassword"
+                0x08         "unstructuredAddress"
+                0x0E         "extensionRequest"
+            0x02             "digestAlgorithm"
+              0x02           "md2"			OID_MD2
+              0x05           "md5"			OID_MD5
+            0x03             "encryptionAlgorithm"
+              0x07           "3des-ede-cbc"		OID_3DES_EDE_CBC
+0x2B                         ""
+  0x06                       "dod"
+    0x01                     "internet"
+      0x04                   "private"
+        0x01                 "enterprise"
+          0x82               ""
+            0x37             "Microsoft"
+              0x0A           ""
+                0x03         ""
+                  0x03       "msSGC"
+          0x89               ""
+            0x31             ""
+              0x01           ""
+                0x01         ""
+                  0x02       ""
+                    0x02     ""
+                    0x4B     "TCGID"
+      0x05                   "security"
+        0x05                 "mechanisms"
+          0x07               "id-pkix"
+            0x01             "id-pe"
+              0x01           "authorityInfoAccess"	OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS
+            0x03             "id-kp"
+              0x01           "serverAuth"
+              0x02           "clientAuth"
+              0x03           "codeSigning"
+              0x04           "emailProtection"
+              0x05           "ipsecEndSystem"
+              0x06           "ipsecTunnel"
+              0x07           "ipsecUser"
+              0x08           "timeStamping"
+              0x09           "ocspSigning"		OID_OCSP_SIGNING
+            0x08             "id-otherNames"
+              0x05           "xmppAddr"			OID_XMPP_ADDR
+            0x0A             "id-aca"
+              0x01           "authenticationInfo"	OID_AUTHENTICATION_INFO
+              0x02           "accessIdentity"		OID_ACCESS_IDENTITY
+              0x03           "chargingIdentity"		OID_CHARGING_IDENTITY
+              0x04           "group"			OID_GROUP
+            0x30             "id-ad"
+              0x01           "ocsp"			OID_OCSP
+                0x01         "basic"			OID_BASIC
+                0x02         "nonce"			OID_NONCE
+                0x03         "crl"			OID_CRL
+                0x04         "response"			OID_RESPONSE
+                0x05         "noCheck"			OID_NO_CHECK
+                0x06         "archiveCutoff"		OID_ARCHIVE_CUTOFF
+                0x07         "serviceLocator"		OID_SERVICE_LOCATOR
+  0x0E                       "oiw"
+    0x03                     "secsig"
+      0x02                   "algorithms"
+        0x07                 "des-cbc"			OID_DES_CBC
+        0x1A                 "sha-1"			OID_SHA1
+        0x1D                 "sha-1WithRSASignature"	OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA_OIW
+  0x24                       "TeleTrusT"
+    0x03                     "algorithm"
+      0x03                   "signatureAlgorithm"
+        0x01                 "rsaSignature"
+          0x02               "rsaSigWithripemd160"
+          0x03               "rsaSigWithripemd128"
+          0x04               "rsaSigWithripemd256"
+0x60                         ""
+  0x86                       ""
+    0x48                     ""
+      0x01                   "organization"
+        0x65                 "gov"
+          0x03               "csor"
+            0x04             "nistalgorithm"
+              0x02           "hashalgs"
+                0x01         "id-SHA-256"		OID_SHA256
+                0x02         "id-SHA-384"		OID_SHA384
+                0x03         "id-SHA-512"		OID_SHA512
+        0x86                 ""
+          0xf8               ""
+            0x42             "netscape"
+              0x01           ""
+                0x01         "nsCertType"
+                0x03         "nsRevocationUrl"		OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL
+                0x04         "nsCaRevocationUrl"	OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL
+                0x08         "nsCaPolicyUrl"		OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL
+                0x0d         "nsComment"		OID_NS_COMMENT
+              0x03           "directory"
+                0x01         ""
+                  0x03       "employeeNumber"
+              0x04           "policy"
+                0x01         "nsSGC"
+            0x45             "verisign"
+              0x01           "pki"
+                0x09         "attributes"
+                  0x02       "messageType"		OID_PKI_MESSAGE_TYPE
+                  0x03       "pkiStatus"		OID_PKI_STATUS
+                  0x04       "failInfo"			OID_PKI_FAIL_INFO
+                  0x05       "senderNonce"		OID_PKI_SENDER_NONCE
+                  0x06       "recipientNonce"		OID_PKI_RECIPIENT_NONCE
+                  0x07       "transID"			OID_PKI_TRANS_ID
+                  0x08       "extensionReq"
diff --git a/src/pluto/packet.c b/src/pluto/packet.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9f04c8bb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/packet.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1244 @@
+/* parsing packets: formats and tools
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: packet.c,v 1.7 2005/01/06 22:39:04 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+
+/* ISAKMP Header: for all messages
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.1
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                          Initiator                            !
+ * !                            Cookie                             !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                          Responder                            !
+ * !                            Cookie                             !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type !     Flags     !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                          Message ID                           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                            Length                             !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+
+static field_desc isa_fields[] = {
+    { ft_raw, COOKIE_SIZE, "initiator cookie", NULL },
+    { ft_raw, COOKIE_SIZE, "responder cookie", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ISAKMP version", &version_names },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "exchange type", &exchange_names },
+    { ft_set, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "flags", flag_bit_names },
+    { ft_raw, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "message ID", NULL },
+    { ft_len, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_hdr_desc = { "ISAKMP Message", isa_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr) };
+
+/* Generic portion of all ISAKMP payloads.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.2
+ * This describes the first 32-bit chunk of all payloads.
+ * The previous next payload depends on the actual payload type.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+
+static field_desc isag_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_generic_desc = { "ISAKMP Generic Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+
+/* ISAKMP Data Attribute (generic representation within payloads)
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.3
+ * This is not a payload type.
+ * In TLV format, this is followed by a value field.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !A!       Attribute Type        !    AF=0  Attribute Length     !
+ * !F!                             !    AF=1  Attribute Value      !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * .                   AF=0  Attribute Value                       .
+ * .                   AF=1  Not Transmitted                       .
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+
+/* Oakley Attributes */
+static field_desc isaat_fields_oakley[] = {
+    { ft_af_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "af+type", &oakley_attr_names },
+    { ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP Oakley attribute",
+    isaat_fields_oakley, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
+
+/* IPsec DOI Attributes */
+static field_desc isaat_fields_ipsec[] = {
+    { ft_af_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "af+type", &ipsec_attr_names },
+    { ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP IPsec DOI attribute",
+    isaat_fields_ipsec, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
+
+/* Mode Config Attributes */
+static field_desc isaat_fields_modecfg[] = {
+    { ft_af_loose_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ModeCfg attr type", &modecfg_attr_names },
+    { ft_lv, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length/value", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP ModeCfg attribute",
+    isaat_fields_modecfg, sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Security Association Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.4
+ * A variable length Situation follows.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !              Domain of Interpretation  (DOI)                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                           Situation                           ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isasa_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_sa_desc = { "ISAKMP Security Association Payload", isasa_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_sa) };
+
+static field_desc ipsec_sit_field[] = {
+    { ft_set, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "IPsec DOI SIT", &sit_bit_names },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc ipsec_sit_desc = { "IPsec DOI SIT", ipsec_sit_field, sizeof(u_int32_t) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Proposal Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.5
+ * A variable length SPI follows.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_P
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Proposal #   !  Protocol-Id  !    SPI Size   !# of Transforms!
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                        SPI (variable)                         !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isap_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "proposal number", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", &protocol_names },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "number of transforms", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_proposal_desc = { "ISAKMP Proposal Payload", isap_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_proposal) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Transform Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.6
+ * Variable length SA Attributes follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_T
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Transform #  !  Transform-Id !           RESERVED2           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                        SA Attributes                          ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+
+/* PROTO_ISAKMP */
+static field_desc isat_fields_isakmp[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &isakmp_transformid_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (ISAKMP)",
+    isat_fields_isakmp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+
+/* PROTO_IPSEC_AH */
+static field_desc isat_fields_ah[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &ah_transformid_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_ah_transform_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (AH)",
+    isat_fields_ah, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+
+/* PROTO_IPSEC_ESP */
+static field_desc isat_fields_esp[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &esp_transformid_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_esp_transform_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (ESP)",
+    isat_fields_esp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+
+/* PROTO_IPCOMP */
+static field_desc isat_fields_ipcomp[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform number", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "transform ID", &ipcomp_transformid_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc = {
+    "ISAKMP Transform Payload (COMP)",
+    isat_fields_ipcomp, sizeof(struct isakmp_transform) };
+
+
+/* ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.7
+ * Variable Key Exchange Data follow the generic fields.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                       Key Exchange Data                       ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_keyex_desc = { "ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Identification Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.8
+ * See "struct identity" declared later.
+ * Variable length Identification Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !   ID Type     !             DOI Specific ID Data              !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                   Identification Data                         ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isaid_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },	/* ??? depends on DOI? */
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI specific A", NULL },	/* ??? depends on DOI? */
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI specific B", NULL },	/* ??? depends on DOI? */
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_identification_desc = { "ISAKMP Identification Payload", isaid_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_id) };
+
+/* IPSEC Identification Payload Content
+ * layout from RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.6.2
+ * See struct isakmp_id declared earlier.
+ * Note: Hashing skips the ISAKMP generic payload header
+ * Variable length Identification Data follow.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Next Payload !   RESERVED    !        Payload Length         !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !   ID Type     !  Protocol ID  !             Port              !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ~                     Identification Data                       ~
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isaiid_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Protocol ID", NULL },	/* ??? UDP/TCP or 0? */
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "port", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc = { "ISAKMP Identification Payload (IPsec DOI)", isaiid_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_ipsec_id) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Certificate Payload: oddball fixed field beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.9
+ * Variable length Certificate Data follow the generic fields.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Cert Encoding !                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               !
+ * ~                       Certificate Data                        ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isacert_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "cert encoding", &cert_type_names },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Note: the size field of isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc cannot be
+ * sizeof(struct isakmp_cert) because that will rounded up for padding.
+ */
+ struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc = { "ISAKMP Certificate Payload", isacert_fields, ISAKMP_CERT_SIZE };
+
+/* ISAKMP Certificate Request Payload: oddball field beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.10
+ * Variable length Certificate Types and Certificate Authorities follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_CR.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Cert. Type   !                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               !
+ * ~                    Certificate Authority                      ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isacr_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "cert type", &cert_type_names },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+/* Note: the size field of isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc cannot be
+ * sizeof(struct isakmp_cr) because that will rounded up for padding.
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc = { "ISAKMP Certificate RequestPayload", isacr_fields, ISAKMP_CR_SIZE };
+
+/* ISAKMP Hash Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.11
+ * Variable length Hash Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                           Hash Data                           ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_hash_desc = { "ISAKMP Hash Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Signature Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.12
+ * Variable length Signature Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                         Signature Data                        ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_signature_desc = { "ISAKMP Signature Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Nonce Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.13
+ * Variable length Nonce Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                            Nonce Data                         ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_nonce_desc = { "ISAKMP Nonce Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Notification Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.14
+ * This is followed by a variable length SPI
+ * and then possibly by variable length Notification Data.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_N
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !              Domain of Interpretation  (DOI)                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Protocol-ID  !   SPI Size    !      Notify Message Type      !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                       Notification Data                       ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isan_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", NULL },	/* ??? really enum: ISAKMP, IPSEC, ESP, ... */
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Notify Message Type", &notification_names },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_notification_desc = { "ISAKMP Notification Payload", isan_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_notification) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Delete Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.15
+ * This is followed by a variable length SPI.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_D
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !              Domain of Interpretation  (DOI)                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Protocol-Id  !   SPI Size    !           # of SPIs           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~               Security Parameter Index(es) (SPI)              ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isad_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 32/BITS_PER_BYTE, "DOI", &doi_names },
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "protocol ID", NULL },	/* ??? really enum: ISAKMP, IPSEC */
+    { ft_nat, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "SPI size", NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "number of SPIs", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_delete_desc = { "ISAKMP Delete Payload", isad_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_delete) };
+
+/* ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.15
+ * This is followed by a variable length VID.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                        Vendor ID (VID)                        ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_vendor_id_desc = { "ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+/* MODECFG */
+/*
+ * From draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg
+3.2. Attribute Payload
+                           1                   2                   3
+       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+     ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+     !     Type      !   RESERVED    !           Identifier          ! 
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+     !                                                               !
+     ~                           Attributes                          ~
+     !                                                               !
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+*/
+static field_desc isaattr_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Attr Msg Type", &attr_msg_type_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_nat, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "Identifier", NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_attr_desc = { "ISAKMP Mode Attribute", isaattr_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_mode_attr) };
+
+/* ISAKMP NAT-Traversal NAT-D
+ * layout from draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01.txt section 3.2
+ *
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                 HASH of the address and port                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct_desc isakmp_nat_d = { "ISAKMP NAT-D Payload", isag_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) };
+
+/* ISAKMP NAT-Traversal NAT-OA
+ * layout from draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-01.txt section 4.2
+ *
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !   ID Type     !   RESERVED    !            RESERVED           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !         IPv4 (4 octets) or IPv6 address (16 octets)           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+static field_desc isanat_oa_fields[] = {
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "next payload type", &payload_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_len, 16/BITS_PER_BYTE, "length", NULL },
+    { ft_enum, 8/BITS_PER_BYTE, "ID type", &ident_names },
+    { ft_mbz, 24/BITS_PER_BYTE, NULL, NULL },
+    { ft_end, 0, NULL, NULL }
+};
+
+struct_desc isakmp_nat_oa = { "ISAKMP NAT-OA Payload", isanat_oa_fields, sizeof(struct isakmp_nat_oa) };
+
+/* descriptor for each payload type
+ *
+ * There is a slight problem in that some payloads differ, depending
+ * on the mode.  Since this is table only used for top-level payloads,
+ * Proposal and Transform payloads need not be handled.
+ * That leaves only Identification payloads as a problem.
+ * We make all these entries NULL
+ */
+struct_desc *const payload_descs[ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF] = {
+    NULL,				/* 0 ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE (No other payload following) */
+    &isakmp_sa_desc,			/* 1 ISAKMP_NEXT_SA (Security Association) */
+    NULL,				/* 2 ISAKMP_NEXT_P (Proposal) */
+    NULL,				/* 3 ISAKMP_NEXT_T (Transform) */
+    &isakmp_keyex_desc,			/* 4 ISAKMP_NEXT_KE (Key Exchange) */
+    NULL,				/* 5 ISAKMP_NEXT_ID (Identification) */
+    &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc,	/* 6 ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT (Certificate) */
+    &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc,	/* 7 ISAKMP_NEXT_CR (Certificate Request) */
+    &isakmp_hash_desc,			/* 8 ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH (Hash) */
+    &isakmp_signature_desc,		/* 9 ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG (Signature) */
+    &isakmp_nonce_desc,			/* 10 ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE (Nonce) */
+    &isakmp_notification_desc,		/* 11 ISAKMP_NEXT_N (Notification) */
+    &isakmp_delete_desc,		/* 12 ISAKMP_NEXT_D (Delete) */
+    &isakmp_vendor_id_desc,		/* 13 ISAKMP_NEXT_VID (Vendor ID) */
+    &isakmp_attr_desc,			/* 14 ISAKMP_NEXT_ATTR (Mode Config) */
+    NULL,				/* 15 */
+    NULL,				/* 16 */
+    NULL,				/* 17 */
+    NULL,				/* 18 */
+    NULL,				/* 19 */
+    &isakmp_nat_d,              	/* 20=130 ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD (NAT-D) */
+    &isakmp_nat_oa,             	/* 20=131 ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA (NAT-OA) */
+};
+
+void
+init_pbs(pb_stream *pbs, u_int8_t *start, size_t len, const char *name)
+{
+    pbs->container = NULL;
+    pbs->desc = NULL;
+    pbs->name = name;
+    pbs->start = pbs->cur = start;
+    pbs->roof = start + len;
+    pbs->lenfld = NULL;
+    pbs->lenfld_desc = NULL;
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+
+/* print a host struct
+ *
+ * This code assumes that the network and host structure
+ * members have the same alignment and size!  This requires
+ * that all padding be explicit.
+ */
+void
+DBG_print_struct(const char *label, const void *struct_ptr
+, struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful)
+{
+    bool immediate = FALSE;
+    const u_int8_t *inp = struct_ptr;
+    field_desc *fp;
+
+    DBG_log("%s%s:", label, sd->name);
+
+    for (fp = sd->fields; fp->field_type != ft_end; fp++)
+    {
+	int i = fp->size;
+	u_int32_t n = 0;
+
+	switch (fp->field_type)
+	{
+	case ft_mbz:	/* must be zero */
+	    inp += i;
+	    break;
+	case ft_nat:		/* natural number (may be 0) */
+	case ft_len:		/* length of this struct and any following crud */
+	case ft_lv:		/* length/value field of attribute */
+	case ft_enum:		/* value from an enumeration */
+	case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+	case ft_af_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	case ft_af_loose_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	case ft_set:		/* bits representing set */
+	    switch (i)
+	    {
+	    case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		n = *(const u_int8_t *)inp;
+		break;
+	    case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		n = *(const u_int16_t *)inp;
+		break;
+	    case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		n = *(const u_int32_t *)inp;
+		break;
+	    default:
+		bad_case(i);
+	    }
+	    switch (fp->field_type)
+	    {
+	    case ft_len:	/* length of this struct and any following crud */
+	    case ft_lv:		/* length/value field of attribute */
+		if (!immediate && !len_meaningful)
+		    break;
+		/* FALL THROUGH */
+	    case ft_nat:	/* natural number (may be 0) */
+		DBG_log("   %s: %lu", fp->name, (unsigned long)n);
+		break;
+	    case ft_af_enum:	   /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+		    immediate = TRUE;
+		/* FALL THROUGH */
+	    case ft_enum:	/* value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+		DBG_log("   %s: %s", fp->name, enum_show(fp->desc, n));
+		break;
+	    case ft_set:	/* bits representing set */
+		DBG_log("   %s: %s", fp->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
+		break;
+	    default:
+		bad_case(fp->field_type);
+	    }
+	    inp += i;
+	    break;
+
+	case ft_raw:	/* bytes to be left in network-order */
+	    {
+		char m[50];	/* arbitrary limit on name width in log */
+
+		snprintf(m, sizeof(m), "   %s:", fp->name);
+		DBG_dump(m, inp, i);
+		inp += i;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    bad_case(fp->field_type);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+DBG_prefix_print_struct(const pb_stream *pbs
+, const char *label, const void *struct_ptr
+, struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful)
+{
+    /* print out a title, with a prefix of asterisks to show
+     * the nesting level.
+     */
+    char space[40];	/* arbitrary limit on label+flock-of-* */
+    size_t len = strlen(label);
+
+    if (sizeof(space) <= len)
+    {
+	DBG_print_struct(label, struct_ptr, sd, len_meaningful);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	const pb_stream *p = pbs;
+	char *pre = &space[sizeof(space) - (len + 1)];
+
+	strcpy(pre, label);
+
+	/* put at least one * out */
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    if (pre <= space)
+		break;
+	    *--pre = '*';
+	    if (p == NULL)
+		break;
+	    p = p->container;
+	}
+	DBG_print_struct(pre, struct_ptr, sd, len_meaningful);
+    }
+}
+
+#endif
+
+/* "parse" a network struct into a host struct.
+ *
+ * This code assumes that the network and host structure
+ * members have the same alignment and size!  This requires
+ * that all padding be explicit.
+ *
+ * If obj_pbs is supplied, a new pb_stream is created for the
+ * variable part of the structure (this depends on their
+ * being one length field in the structure).  The cursor of this
+ * new PBS is set to after the parsed part of the struct.
+ *
+ * This routine returns TRUE iff it succeeds.
+ */
+
+bool
+in_struct(void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd
+, pb_stream *ins, pb_stream *obj_pbs)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    u_int8_t *cur = ins->cur;
+
+    if (ins->roof - cur < (ptrdiff_t)sd->size)
+    {
+	ugh = builddiag("not enough room in input packet for %s", sd->name);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	u_int8_t *roof = cur + sd->size;    /* may be changed by a length field */
+	u_int8_t *outp = struct_ptr;
+	bool immediate = FALSE;
+	field_desc *fp;
+
+	for (fp = sd->fields; ugh == NULL; fp++)
+	{
+	    size_t i = fp->size;
+
+	    passert(ins->roof - cur >= (ptrdiff_t)i);
+	    passert(cur - ins->cur <= (ptrdiff_t)(sd->size - i));
+	    passert(outp - (cur - ins->cur) == struct_ptr);
+
+#if 0
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("%d %s"
+		, (int) (cur - ins->cur), fp->name == NULL? "" : fp->name));
+#endif
+	    switch (fp->field_type)
+	    {
+	    case ft_mbz:	/* must be zero */
+		for (; i != 0; i--)
+		{
+		    if (*cur++ != 0)
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("byte %d of %s must be zero, but is not"
+			    , (int) (cur - ins->cur), sd->name);
+			break;
+		    }
+		    *outp++ = '\0';	/* probably redundant */
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case ft_nat:	   /* natural number (may be 0) */
+	    case ft_len:	   /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+	    case ft_lv:		   /* length/value field of attribute */
+	    case ft_enum:	   /* value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_loose_enum:    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+	    case ft_af_enum:	   /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_set:	   /* bits representing set */
+	    {
+		u_int32_t n = 0;
+
+		for (; i != 0; i--)
+		    n = (n << BITS_PER_BYTE) | *cur++;
+
+		switch (fp->field_type)
+		{
+		case ft_len:	/* length of this struct and any following crud */
+		case ft_lv:	/* length/value field of attribute */
+		{
+		    u_int32_t len = fp->field_type == ft_len? n
+			: immediate? sd->size : n + sd->size;
+
+		    if (len < sd->size)
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s is smaller than minimum"
+			    , fp->name, sd->name);
+		    }
+		    else if (pbs_left(ins) < len)
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s is larger than can fit"
+			    , fp->name, sd->name);
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			roof = ins->cur + len;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		}
+		case ft_af_loose_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+			immediate = TRUE;
+		    break;
+		case ft_af_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+			immediate = TRUE;
+		    /* FALL THROUGH */
+		case ft_enum:	/* value from an enumeration */
+		    if (enum_name(fp->desc, n) == NULL)
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s has an unknown value: %lu"
+			    , fp->name, sd->name, (unsigned long)n);
+		    }
+		    /* FALL THROUGH */
+		case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+		    break;
+		case ft_set:	/* bits representing set */
+		    if (!testset(fp->desc, n))
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("bitset %s of %s has unknown member(s): %s"
+			    , fp->name, sd->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
+		    }
+		    break;
+		default:
+			break;
+		}
+		i = fp->size;
+		switch (i)
+		{
+		case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		    *(u_int8_t *)outp = n;
+		    break;
+		case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		    *(u_int16_t *)outp = n;
+		    break;
+		case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		    *(u_int32_t *)outp = n;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    bad_case(i);
+		}
+		outp += i;
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    case ft_raw:	/* bytes to be left in network-order */
+		for (; i != 0; i--)
+		{
+		    *outp++ = *cur++;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case ft_end:	/* end of field list */
+		passert(cur == ins->cur + sd->size);
+		if (obj_pbs != NULL)
+		{
+		    init_pbs(obj_pbs, ins->cur, roof - ins->cur, sd->name);
+		    obj_pbs->container = ins;
+		    obj_pbs->desc = sd;
+		    obj_pbs->cur = cur;
+		}
+		ins->cur = roof;
+		DBG(DBG_PARSING
+		    , DBG_prefix_print_struct(ins, "parse ", struct_ptr, sd, TRUE));
+		return TRUE;
+
+	    default:
+		bad_case(fp->field_type);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* some failure got us here: report it */
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+bool
+in_raw(void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *ins, const char *name)
+{
+    if (pbs_left(ins) < len)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough bytes left to get %s from %s", name, ins->name);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	if (bytes == NULL)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING
+		, DBG_log("skipping %u raw bytes of %s (%s)"
+		    , (unsigned) len, ins->name, name);
+		  DBG_dump(name, ins->cur, len));
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    memcpy(bytes, ins->cur, len);
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING
+		, DBG_log("parsing %u raw bytes of %s into %s"
+		    , (unsigned) len, ins->name, name);
+		  DBG_dump(name, bytes, len));
+	}
+	ins->cur += len;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* "emit" a host struct into a network packet.
+ *
+ * This code assumes that the network and host structure
+ * members have the same alignment and size!  This requires
+ * that all padding be explicit.
+ *
+ * If obj_pbs is non-NULL, its pbs describes a new output stream set up
+ * to contain the object.  The cursor will be left at the variable part.
+ * This new stream must subsequently be finalized by close_output_pbs().
+ *
+ * The value of any field of type ft_len is computed, not taken
+ * from the input struct.  The length is actually filled in when
+ * the object's output stream is finalized.  If obj_pbs is NULL,
+ * finalization is done by out_struct before it returns.
+ *
+ * This routine returns TRUE iff it succeeds.
+ */
+
+bool
+out_struct(const void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd
+, pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    const u_int8_t *inp = struct_ptr;
+    u_int8_t *cur = outs->cur;
+
+    DBG(DBG_EMITTING
+	, DBG_prefix_print_struct(outs, "emit ", struct_ptr, sd, obj_pbs==NULL));
+
+    if (outs->roof - cur < (ptrdiff_t)sd->size)
+    {
+	ugh = builddiag("not enough room left in output packet to place %s"
+	    , sd->name);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	bool immediate = FALSE;
+	pb_stream obj;
+	field_desc *fp;
+
+	obj.lenfld = NULL;  /* until a length field is discovered */
+	obj.lenfld_desc = NULL;
+
+	for (fp = sd->fields; ugh == NULL; fp++)
+	{
+	    size_t i = fp->size;
+
+	    passert(outs->roof - cur >= (ptrdiff_t)i);
+	    passert(cur - outs->cur <= (ptrdiff_t)(sd->size - i));
+	    passert(inp - (cur - outs->cur) == struct_ptr);
+
+#if 0
+	    DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("%d %s"
+		, (int) (cur - outs->cur), fp->name == NULL? "" : fp->name);
+#endif
+	    switch (fp->field_type)
+	    {
+	    case ft_mbz:	/* must be zero */
+		inp += i;
+		for (; i != 0; i--)
+		    *cur++ = '\0';
+		break;
+	    case ft_nat:	   /* natural number (may be 0) */
+	    case ft_len:	   /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+	    case ft_lv:		   /* length/value field of attribute */
+	    case ft_enum:	   /* value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_loose_enum:	   /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+	    case ft_af_enum:	   /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+	    case ft_set:	   /* bits representing set */
+	    {
+		u_int32_t n = 0;
+
+		switch (i)
+		{
+		case 8/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		    n = *(const u_int8_t *)inp;
+		    break;
+		case 16/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		    n = *(const u_int16_t *)inp;
+		    break;
+		case 32/BITS_PER_BYTE:
+		    n = *(const u_int32_t *)inp;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    bad_case(i);
+		}
+
+		switch (fp->field_type)
+		{
+		case ft_len:	/* length of this struct and any following crud */
+		case ft_lv:	/* length/value field of attribute */
+		    if (immediate)
+			break;	/* not a length */
+		    /* We can't check the length because it will likely
+		     * be filled in after variable part is supplied.
+		     * We do record where this is so that it can be
+		     * filled in by a subsequent close_output_pbs().
+		     */
+		    passert(obj.lenfld == NULL);	/* only one ft_len allowed */
+		    obj.lenfld = cur;
+		    obj.lenfld_desc = fp;
+		    break;
+		case ft_af_loose_enum: /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+			immediate = TRUE;
+		    break;
+		case ft_af_enum:	/* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+		    if ((n & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+			immediate = TRUE;
+		    /* FALL THROUGH */
+		case ft_enum:	/* value from an enumeration */
+		    if (enum_name(fp->desc, n) == NULL)
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("%s of %s has an unknown value: %lu"
+			    , fp->name, sd->name, (unsigned long)n);
+		    }
+		    /* FALL THROUGH */
+		case ft_loose_enum:	/* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+		    break;
+		case ft_set:	/* bits representing set */
+		    if (!testset(fp->desc, n))
+		    {
+			ugh = builddiag("bitset %s of %s has unknown member(s): %s"
+			    , fp->name, sd->name, bitnamesof(fp->desc, n));
+		    }
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+
+		while (i-- != 0)
+		{
+		    cur[i] = (u_int8_t)n;
+		    n >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+		}
+		inp += fp->size;
+		cur += fp->size;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    case ft_raw:	/* bytes to be left in network-order */
+		for (; i != 0; i--)
+		    *cur++ = *inp++;
+		break;
+	    case ft_end:	/* end of field list */
+		passert(cur == outs->cur + sd->size);
+
+		obj.container = outs;
+		obj.desc = sd;
+		obj.name = sd->name;
+		obj.start = outs->cur;
+		obj.cur = cur;
+		obj.roof = outs->roof;	/* limit of possible */
+		/* obj.lenfld and obj.lenfld_desc already set */
+
+		if (obj_pbs == NULL)
+		{
+		    close_output_pbs(&obj); /* fill in length field, if any */
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* We set outs->cur to outs->roof so that
+		     * any attempt to output something into outs
+		     * before obj is closed will trigger an error.
+		     */
+		    outs->cur = outs->roof;
+
+		    *obj_pbs = obj;
+		}
+		return TRUE;
+
+	    default:
+		bad_case(fp->field_type);
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* some failure got us here: report it */
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);	/* ??? serious, but errno not relevant */
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+bool
+out_generic(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd
+, pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs)
+{
+    struct isakmp_generic gen;
+
+    passert(sd->fields == isakmp_generic_desc.fields);
+    gen.isag_np = np;
+    return out_struct(&gen, sd, outs, obj_pbs);
+}
+
+bool
+out_generic_raw(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd
+, pb_stream *outs, const void *bytes, size_t len, const char *name)
+{
+    pb_stream pbs;
+
+    if (!out_generic(np, sd, outs, &pbs)
+    || !out_raw(bytes, len, &pbs, name))
+	return FALSE;
+    close_output_pbs(&pbs);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool
+out_raw(const void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name)
+{
+    if (pbs_left(outs) < len)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough room left to place %lu bytes of %s in %s"
+	    , (unsigned long) len, name, outs->name);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING
+	    , DBG_log("emitting %u raw bytes of %s into %s"
+		, (unsigned) len, name, outs->name);
+	      DBG_dump(name, bytes, len));
+	memcpy(outs->cur, bytes, len);
+	outs->cur += len;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+bool
+out_zero(size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name)
+{
+    if (pbs_left(outs) < len)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "not enough room left to place %s in %s", name, outs->name);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("emitting %u zero bytes of %s into %s"
+	    , (unsigned) len, name, outs->name));
+	memset(outs->cur, 0x00, len);
+	outs->cur += len;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* Record current length.
+ * Note: currently, this may be repeated any number of times;
+ * the last one wins.
+ */
+void
+close_output_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    if (pbs->lenfld != NULL)
+    {
+	u_int32_t len = pbs_offset(pbs);
+	int i = pbs->lenfld_desc->size;
+
+	if (pbs->lenfld_desc->field_type == ft_lv)
+	    len -= sizeof(struct isakmp_attribute);
+	DBG(DBG_EMITTING, DBG_log("emitting length of %s: %lu"
+	    , pbs->name, (unsigned long) len));
+	while (i-- != 0)
+	{
+	    pbs->lenfld[i] = (u_int8_t)len;
+	    len >>= BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	}
+    }
+    if (pbs->container != NULL)
+	pbs->container->cur = pbs->cur;	/* pass space utilization up */
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/packet.h b/src/pluto/packet.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..676a5e6cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/packet.h
@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
+/* parsing packets: formats and tools
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: packet.h,v 1.5 2005/01/06 22:10:15 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PACKET_H
+#define _PACKET_H
+
+/* a struct_desc describes a structure for the struct I/O routines.
+ * This requires arrays of field_desc values to describe struct fields.
+ */
+
+typedef const struct struct_desc {
+    const char *name;
+    const struct field_desc *fields;
+    size_t size;
+} struct_desc;
+
+/* Note: if an ft_af_enum field has the ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV bit set,
+ * the subsequent ft_lv field will be interpreted as an immediate value.
+ * This matches how attributes are encoded.
+ * See RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" 3.3
+ */
+
+enum field_type {
+    ft_mbz,	      /* must be zero */
+    ft_nat,	      /* natural number (may be 0) */
+    ft_len,	      /* length of this struct and any following crud */
+    ft_lv,	      /* length/value field of attribute */
+    ft_enum,	      /* value from an enumeration */
+    ft_loose_enum,    /* value from an enumeration with only some names known */
+    ft_af_loose_enum, /* Attribute Format + enumeration, some names known */
+    ft_af_enum,       /* Attribute Format + value from an enumeration */
+    ft_set,	      /* bits representing set */
+    ft_raw,	      /* bytes to be left in network-order */
+    ft_end,	      /* end of field list */
+};
+
+typedef const struct field_desc {
+    enum field_type field_type;
+    int	size;	/* size, in bytes, of field */
+    const char *name;
+    const void *desc;	/* enum_names for enum or char *[] for bits */
+} field_desc;
+
+/* The formatting of input and output of packets is done
+ * through packet_byte_stream objects.
+ * These describe a stream of bytes in memory.
+ * Several routines are provided to manipulate these objects
+ * Actual packet transfer is done elsewhere.
+ */
+typedef struct packet_byte_stream {
+    struct packet_byte_stream *container;   /* PBS of which we are part */
+    struct_desc *desc;
+    const char *name;	/* what does this PBS represent? */
+    u_int8_t
+	*start,
+	*cur,	/* current position in stream */
+	*roof;	/* byte after last in PBS (actually just a limit on output) */
+    /* For an output PBS, the length field will be filled in later so
+     * we need to record its particulars.  Note: it may not be aligned.
+     */
+    u_int8_t *lenfld;
+    field_desc *lenfld_desc;
+} pb_stream;
+
+/* For an input PBS, pbs_offset is amount of stream processed.
+ * For an output PBS, pbs_offset is current size of stream.
+ * For an input PBS, pbs_room is size of stream.
+ * For an output PBS, pbs_room is maximum size allowed.
+ */
+#define pbs_offset(pbs) ((size_t)((pbs)->cur - (pbs)->start))
+#define pbs_room(pbs) ((size_t)((pbs)->roof - (pbs)->start))
+#define pbs_left(pbs) ((size_t)((pbs)->roof - (pbs)->cur))
+
+extern void init_pbs(pb_stream *pbs, u_int8_t *start, size_t len, const char *name);
+
+extern bool in_struct(void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd,
+    pb_stream *ins, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
+extern bool in_raw(void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *ins, const char *name);
+
+extern bool out_struct(const void *struct_ptr, struct_desc *sd,
+    pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
+extern bool out_generic(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd,
+    pb_stream *outs, pb_stream *obj_pbs);
+extern bool out_generic_raw(u_int8_t np, struct_desc *sd,
+    pb_stream *outs, const void *bytes, size_t len, const char *name);
+#define out_generic_chunk(np, sd, outs, ch, name) \
+	out_generic_raw(np, sd, outs, (ch).ptr, (ch).len, name)
+extern bool out_zero(size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name);
+extern bool out_raw(const void *bytes, size_t len, pb_stream *outs, const char *name);
+#define out_chunk(ch, outs, name) out_raw((ch).ptr, (ch).len, (outs), (name))
+extern void close_output_pbs(pb_stream *pbs);
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+extern void DBG_print_struct(const char *label, const void *struct_ptr,
+    struct_desc *sd, bool len_meaningful);
+#endif
+
+/* ISAKMP Header: for all messages
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.1
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                          Initiator                            !
+ * !                            Cookie                             !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                          Responder                            !
+ * !                            Cookie                             !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Next Payload ! MjVer ! MnVer ! Exchange Type !     Flags     !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                          Message ID                           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                            Length                             !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * Although the drafts are a little unclear, there are a few
+ * places that specify that messages should be padded with 0x00
+ * octets (bytes) to make the length a multiple of something.
+ *
+ * RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" 3.6 specifies that all messages will be
+ * padded to be a multiple of 4 octets in length.
+ * ??? This looks vestigial, and we ignore this requirement.
+ *
+ * RFC 2409 "IKE" Appedix B specifies:
+ *     Each message should be padded up to the nearest block size
+ *     using bytes containing 0x00.
+ * ??? This does not appear to be limited to encrypted messages,
+ * but it surely must be: the block size is meant to be the encryption
+ * block size, and that is meaningless for a non-encrypted message.
+ *
+ * RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.3 specifies:
+ *     Encrypted payloads are padded up to the nearest block size.
+ *     All padding bytes, except for the last one, contain 0x00. The
+ *     last byte of the padding contains the number of the padding
+ *     bytes used, excluding the last one. Note that this means there
+ *     will always be padding.
+ * ??? This is nuts since payloads are not padded, messages are.
+ * It also contradicts Appendix B.  So we ignore it.
+ *
+ * Summary: we pad encrypted output messages with 0x00 to bring them
+ * up to a multiple of the encryption block size.  On input, we require
+ * that any encrypted portion of a message be a multiple of the encryption
+ * block size.   After any decryption, we ignore padding (any bytes after
+ * the first payload that specifies a next payload of none; we don't
+ * require them to be zero).
+ */
+
+struct isakmp_hdr
+{
+    u_int8_t    isa_icookie[COOKIE_SIZE];
+    u_int8_t    isa_rcookie[COOKIE_SIZE];
+    u_int8_t    isa_np;                 /* Next payload */
+    u_int8_t	isa_version;	/* high-order 4 bits: Major; low order 4: Minor */
+#define ISA_MAJ_SHIFT	4
+#define ISA_MIN_MASK	(~((~0u) << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT))
+    u_int8_t    isa_xchg;		/* Exchange type */
+    u_int8_t    isa_flags;
+    u_int32_t   isa_msgid;		/* Message ID (RAW) */
+    u_int32_t   isa_length;		/* Length of message */
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_hdr_desc;
+
+/* Generic portion of all ISAKMP payloads.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.2
+ * This describes the first 32-bit chunk of all payloads.
+ * The previous next payload depends on the actual payload type.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_generic
+{
+    u_int8_t    isag_np;
+    u_int8_t    isag_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isag_length;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_generic_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Data Attribute (generic representation within payloads)
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.3
+ * This is not a payload type.
+ * In TLV format, this is followed by a value field.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !A!       Attribute Type        !    AF=0  Attribute Length     !
+ * !F!                             !    AF=1  Attribute Value      !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * .                   AF=0  Attribute Value                       .
+ * .                   AF=1  Not Transmitted                       .
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_attribute
+{
+    /* The high order bit of isaat_af_type is the Attribute Format
+     * If it is off, the format is TLV: lv is the length of the following
+     * attribute value.
+     * If it is on, the format is TV: lv is the value of the attribute.
+     * ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK is the mask in host form.
+     *
+     * The low order 15 bits of isaat_af_type is the Attribute Type.
+     * ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK is the mask in host form.
+     */
+    u_int16_t isaat_af_type;   /* high order bit: AF; lower 15: rtype */
+    u_int16_t isaat_lv;			/* Length or value */
+};
+
+#define ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK 0x8000
+#define ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK /* value in lv */
+#define ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV 0 /* length in lv; value follows */
+
+#define ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK 0x7FFF
+
+extern struct_desc
+    isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc,
+    isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Security Association Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.4
+ * A variable length Situation follows.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_SA
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !              Domain of Interpretation  (DOI)                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                           Situation                           ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_sa
+{
+    u_int8_t  isasa_np;			/* Next payload */
+    u_int8_t  isasa_reserved;
+    u_int16_t isasa_length;		/* Payload length */
+    u_int32_t isasa_doi;		/* DOI */
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_sa_desc;
+
+extern struct_desc ipsec_sit_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Proposal Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.5
+ * A variable length SPI follows.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_P
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Proposal #   !  Protocol-Id  !    SPI Size   !# of Transforms!
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                        SPI (variable)                         !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_proposal
+{
+    u_int8_t    isap_np;
+    u_int8_t    isap_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isap_length;
+    u_int8_t    isap_proposal;
+    u_int8_t    isap_protoid;
+    u_int8_t    isap_spisize;
+    u_int8_t    isap_notrans;		/* Number of transforms */
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_proposal_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Transform Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.6
+ * Variable length SA Attributes follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_T
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Transform #  !  Transform-Id !           RESERVED2           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                        SA Attributes                          ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_transform
+{
+    u_int8_t    isat_np;
+    u_int8_t    isat_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isat_length;
+    u_int8_t    isat_transnum;		/* Number of the transform */
+    u_int8_t    isat_transid;
+    u_int16_t   isat_reserved2;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc
+    isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc,
+    isakmp_ah_transform_desc,
+    isakmp_esp_transform_desc,
+    isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Key Exchange Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.7
+ * Variable Key Exchange Data follow the generic fields.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_KE
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                       Key Exchange Data                       ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+extern struct_desc isakmp_keyex_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Identification Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.8
+ * See "struct identity" declared later.
+ * Variable length Identification Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_ID
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !   ID Type     !             DOI Specific ID Data              !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                   Identification Data                         ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_id
+{
+    u_int8_t    isaid_np;
+    u_int8_t    isaid_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isaid_length;
+    u_int8_t    isaid_idtype;
+    u_int8_t    isaid_doi_specific_a;
+    u_int16_t   isaid_doi_specific_b;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_identification_desc;
+
+/* IPSEC Identification Payload Content
+ * layout from RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.6.2
+ * See struct isakmp_id declared earlier.
+ * Note: Hashing skips the ISAKMP generic payload header
+ * Variable length Identification Data follow.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Next Payload !   RESERVED    !        Payload Length         !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !   ID Type     !  Protocol ID  !             Port              !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ~                     Identification Data                       ~
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_ipsec_id
+{
+    u_int8_t    isaiid_np;
+    u_int8_t    isaiid_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isaiid_length;
+    u_int8_t    isaiid_idtype;
+    u_int8_t    isaiid_protoid;
+    u_int16_t   isaiid_port;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Certificate Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.9
+ * Variable length Certificate Data follow the generic fields.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Cert Encoding !                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               !
+ * ~                       Certificate Data                        ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_cert
+{
+    u_int8_t    isacert_np;
+    u_int8_t    isacert_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isacert_length;
+    u_int8_t    isacert_type;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: this packet type has a fixed portion that is not a
+ * multiple of 4 octets.  This means that sizeof(struct isakmp_cert)
+ * yields the wrong value for the length.
+ */
+#define ISAKMP_CERT_SIZE		5
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Certificate Request Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.10
+ * Variable length Certificate Types and Certificate Authorities follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_CR.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Cert. Type   !                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+                                               !
+ * ~                    Certificate Authority                      ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_cr
+{
+    u_int8_t    isacr_np;
+    u_int8_t    isacr_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isacr_length;
+    u_int8_t    isacr_type;
+};
+
+/* NOTE: this packet type has a fixed portion that is not a
+ * multiple of 4 octets.  This means that sizeof(struct isakmp_cr)
+ * yields the wrong value for the length.
+ */
+#define ISAKMP_CR_SIZE		5
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Hash Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.11
+ * Variable length Hash Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                           Hash Data                           ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+extern struct_desc isakmp_hash_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Signature Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.12
+ * Variable length Signature Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                         Signature Data                        ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+extern struct_desc isakmp_signature_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Nonce Payload: no fixed fields beyond the generic ones.
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.13
+ * Variable length Nonce Data follow.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE.
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                            Nonce Data                         ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+extern struct_desc isakmp_nonce_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Notification Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.14
+ * This is followed by a variable length SPI
+ * and then possibly by variable length Notification Data.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_N
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !              Domain of Interpretation  (DOI)                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Protocol-ID  !   SPI Size    !      Notify Message Type      !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                Security Parameter Index (SPI)                 ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                       Notification Data                       ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_notification
+{
+    u_int8_t    isan_np;
+    u_int8_t    isan_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isan_length;
+    u_int32_t   isan_doi;
+    u_int8_t    isan_protoid;
+    u_int8_t    isan_spisize;
+    u_int16_t   isan_type;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_notification_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Delete Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.15
+ * This is followed by a variable length SPI.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_D
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !              Domain of Interpretation  (DOI)                  !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !  Protocol-Id  !   SPI Size    !           # of SPIs           !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~               Security Parameter Index(es) (SPI)              ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+struct isakmp_delete
+{
+    u_int8_t    isad_np;
+    u_int8_t    isad_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isad_length;
+    u_int32_t   isad_doi;
+    u_int8_t    isad_protoid;
+    u_int8_t    isad_spisize;
+    u_int16_t   isad_nospi;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_delete_desc;
+
+/* From draft-dukes-ike-mode-cfg
+3.2. Attribute Payload
+                           1                   2                   3
+       0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+     ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+     !     Type      !   RESERVED    !           Identifier          !
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+     !                                                               !
+     !                                                               !
+     ~                           Attributes                          ~
+     !                                                               !
+     +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+*/
+struct isakmp_mode_attr
+{
+    u_int8_t    isama_np;
+    u_int8_t    isama_reserved;
+    u_int16_t   isama_length;
+    u_int8_t    isama_type;
+    u_int8_t    isama_reserved2;
+    u_int16_t   isama_identifier;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_attr_desc;
+extern struct_desc isakmp_modecfg_attribute_desc;
+
+/* ISAKMP Vendor ID Payload
+ * layout from RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 3.15
+ * This is followed by a variable length VID.
+ * Previous next payload: ISAKMP_NEXT_VID
+ *                      1                   2                   3
+ *  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * ! Next Payload  !   RESERVED    !         Payload Length        !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ * !                                                               !
+ * ~                        Vendor ID (VID)                        ~
+ * !                                                               !
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ */
+extern struct_desc isakmp_vendor_id_desc;
+
+struct isakmp_nat_oa
+{
+    u_int8_t    isanoa_np;
+    u_int8_t    isanoa_reserved_1;
+    u_int16_t   isanoa_length;
+    u_int8_t    isanoa_idtype;
+    u_int8_t    isanoa_reserved_2;
+    u_int16_t   isanoa_reserved_3;
+};
+
+extern struct_desc isakmp_nat_d;
+extern struct_desc isakmp_nat_oa;
+
+/* union of all payloads */
+
+union payload {
+    struct isakmp_generic generic;
+    struct isakmp_sa sa;
+    struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+    struct isakmp_transform transform;
+    struct isakmp_id id;    /* Main Mode */
+    struct isakmp_cert cert;
+    struct isakmp_cr cr;
+    struct isakmp_ipsec_id ipsec_id;	/* Quick Mode */
+    struct isakmp_notification notification;
+    struct isakmp_delete delete;
+    struct isakmp_nat_oa nat_oa;
+    struct isakmp_mode_attr attribute;
+};
+
+/* descriptor for each payload type
+ *
+ * There is a slight problem in that some payloads differ, depending
+ * on the mode.  Since this is table only used for top-level payloads,
+ * Proposal and Transform payloads need not be handled.
+ * That leaves only Identification payloads as a problem.
+ * We make all these entries NULL
+ */
+extern struct_desc *const payload_descs[ISAKMP_NEXT_ROOF];
+
+#endif /* _PACKET_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/pem.c b/src/pluto/pem.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..db6d0d7e3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pem.c
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+/* Loading of PEM encoded files with optional encryption
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pem.c,v 1.4 2005/08/17 16:31:24 as Exp $
+ */
+
+/* decrypt a PEM encoded data block using DES-EDE3-CBC
+ * see RFC 1423 PEM: Algorithms, Modes and Identifiers
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#define HEADER_DES_LOCL_H   /* stupid trick to force prototype decl in <des.h> */
+#include <libdes/des.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "pem.h"
+
+/*
+ * check the presence of a pattern in a character string
+ */
+static bool
+present(const char* pattern, chunk_t* ch)
+{
+    u_int pattern_len = strlen(pattern);
+
+    if (ch->len >= pattern_len && strncmp(ch->ptr, pattern, pattern_len) == 0)
+    {
+	ch->ptr += pattern_len;
+	ch->len -= pattern_len;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * compare string with chunk
+ */
+static bool
+match(const char *pattern, const chunk_t *ch)
+{
+    return ch->len == strlen(pattern) &&
+	   strncmp(pattern, ch->ptr, ch->len) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * find a boundary of the form -----tag name-----
+ */
+static bool
+find_boundary(const char* tag, chunk_t *line)
+{
+    chunk_t name = empty_chunk;
+
+    if (!present("-----", line))
+	return FALSE;
+    if (!present(tag, line))
+	return FALSE;
+    if (*line->ptr != ' ')
+	return FALSE;
+    line->ptr++;  line->len--;
+
+    /* extract name */
+    name.ptr = line->ptr;
+    while (line->len > 0)
+    {
+	if (present("-----", line))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  -----%s %.*s-----",
+			tag, (int)name.len, name.ptr);
+	    )
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+	line->ptr++;  line->len--;  name.len++;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * eat whitespace
+ */
+static void
+eat_whitespace(chunk_t *src)
+{
+    while (src->len > 0 && (*src->ptr == ' ' || *src->ptr == '\t'))
+    {
+	src->ptr++;  src->len--;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts a token ending with a given termination symbol
+ */
+static bool
+extract_token(chunk_t *token, char termination, chunk_t *src)
+{
+    u_char *eot = memchr(src->ptr, termination, src->len);
+
+    /* initialize empty token */
+    *token = empty_chunk;
+
+    if (eot == NULL) /* termination symbol not found */
+	return FALSE;
+
+    /* extract token */
+    token->ptr = src->ptr;
+    token->len = (u_int)(eot - src->ptr);
+
+    /* advance src pointer after termination symbol */
+    src->ptr = eot + 1;
+    src->len -= (token->len + 1);
+
+   return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts a name: value pair from the PEM header
+ */
+static bool
+extract_parameter(chunk_t *name, chunk_t *value, chunk_t *line)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  %.*s", (int)line->len, line->ptr);
+    )
+
+    /* extract name */
+    if (!extract_token(name,':', line))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    eat_whitespace(line);
+
+    /* extract value */
+    *value = *line;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  fetches a new line terminated by \n or \r\n
+ */
+static bool
+fetchline(chunk_t *src, chunk_t *line)
+{
+    if (src->len == 0) /* end of src reached */
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (extract_token(line, '\n', src))
+    {
+	if (line->len > 0 && *(line->ptr + line->len -1) == '\r')
+	    line->len--;  /* remove optional \r */
+    }
+    else /*last line ends without newline */
+    {
+	*line = *src;
+	src->ptr += src->len;
+	src->len = 0;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * decrypts a DES-EDE-CBC encrypted data block
+ */
+static bool
+pem_decrypt_3des(chunk_t *blob, chunk_t *iv, const char *passphrase)
+{
+    MD5_CTX context;
+    u_char digest[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+    u_char des_iv[DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE];
+    u_char key[24];
+    des_cblock *deskey = (des_cblock *)key;
+    des_key_schedule ks[3];
+    u_char padding, *last_padding_pos, *first_padding_pos;
+
+    /* Convert passphrase to 3des key */
+    MD5Init(&context);
+    MD5Update(&context, passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+    MD5Update(&context, iv->ptr, iv->len);
+    MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
+    memcpy(key, digest, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+    MD5Init(&context);
+    MD5Update(&context, digest, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+    MD5Update(&context, passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+    MD5Update(&context, iv->ptr, iv->len);
+    MD5Final(digest, &context);
+
+    memcpy(key + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, digest, 24 - MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+    (void) des_set_key(&deskey[0], ks[0]);
+    (void) des_set_key(&deskey[1], ks[1]);
+    (void) des_set_key(&deskey[2], ks[2]);
+
+    /* decrypt data block */
+    memcpy(des_iv, iv->ptr, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock *)blob->ptr, (des_cblock *)blob->ptr,
+	blob->len, ks[0], ks[1], ks[2], (des_cblock *)des_iv, FALSE);
+
+    /* determine amount of padding */
+    last_padding_pos = blob->ptr + blob->len - 1;
+    padding = *last_padding_pos;
+    first_padding_pos = (padding > blob->len)?
+			 blob->ptr : last_padding_pos - padding;
+
+    /* check the padding pattern */
+    while (--last_padding_pos > first_padding_pos)
+    {
+	if (*last_padding_pos != padding)
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* remove padding */
+    blob->len -= padding;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * optionally prompts for a passphrase before decryption
+ * currently we support DES-EDE3-CBC, only
+ */
+static err_t
+pem_decrypt(chunk_t *blob, chunk_t *iv, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("  decrypting file using 'DES-EDE3-CBC'");
+    )
+    if (iv->len != DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+	return "size of DES-EDE3-CBC IV is not 8 bytes";
+
+    if (pass == NULL)
+	return "no passphrase available";
+
+    /* do we prompt for the passphrase? */
+    if (pass->prompt && pass->fd != NULL_FD)
+    {
+	int i;
+	chunk_t blob_copy;
+ 	err_t ugh = "invalid passphrase, too many trials";
+
+	whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need passphrase for '%s'", label);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS; i++)
+	{
+	    int n;
+
+	    if (i > 0)
+	    whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid passphrase, please try again");
+
+	    n = read(pass->fd, pass->secret, PROMPT_PASS_LEN);
+
+	    if (n == -1)
+	    {
+		err_t ugh = "read(whackfd) failed";
+
+		whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,ugh);
+		return ugh;
+	    }
+
+	    pass->secret[n-1] = '\0';
+	    
+	    if (strlen(pass->secret) == 0)
+	    {
+	        err_t ugh = "no passphrase entered, aborted";
+
+		whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
+		return ugh;
+	    }
+
+	    clonetochunk(blob_copy, blob->ptr, blob->len, "blob copy");
+
+	    if (pem_decrypt_3des(blob, iv, pass->secret))
+	    {
+		whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid passphrase");
+		pfree(blob_copy.ptr);
+		return NULL;
+	    }
+	    
+	    /* blob is useless after wrong decryption, restore the original */
+	    pfree(blob->ptr);
+	    *blob = blob_copy;
+	}
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, ugh);
+	return ugh;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	if (pem_decrypt_3des(blob, iv, pass->secret))
+	    return NULL;
+	else
+	    return "invalid passphrase";
+    }
+}
+
+/*  Converts a PEM encoded file into its binary form
+ *
+ *  RFC 1421 Privacy Enhancement for Electronic Mail, February 1993
+ *  RFC 934 Message Encapsulation, January 1985
+ */
+err_t
+pemtobin(chunk_t *blob, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label, bool *pgp)
+{
+    typedef enum {
+	PEM_PRE    = 0,
+	PEM_MSG    = 1,
+	PEM_HEADER = 2,
+	PEM_BODY   = 3,
+	PEM_POST   = 4,
+	PEM_ABORT  = 5
+    } state_t;
+
+    bool encrypted = FALSE;
+
+    state_t state  = PEM_PRE;
+
+    chunk_t src    = *blob;
+    chunk_t dst    = *blob;
+    chunk_t line   = empty_chunk;
+    chunk_t iv     = empty_chunk;
+
+    u_char iv_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+
+    /* zero size of converted blob */
+    dst.len = 0;
+
+    /* zero size of IV */
+    iv.ptr = iv_buf;
+    iv.len = 0;
+
+    while (fetchline(&src, &line))
+    {
+	if (state == PEM_PRE)
+	{
+	    if (find_boundary("BEGIN", &line))
+	    {
+		*pgp = FALSE;
+		state = PEM_MSG;
+	    }
+	    continue;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (find_boundary("END", &line))
+	    {
+		state = PEM_POST;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if (state == PEM_MSG)
+	    {
+		state = (memchr(line.ptr, ':', line.len) == NULL)?
+			    PEM_BODY : PEM_HEADER;
+	    }
+	    if (state == PEM_HEADER)
+	    {
+		chunk_t name  = empty_chunk;
+		chunk_t value = empty_chunk;
+
+		/* an empty line separates HEADER and BODY */
+		if (line.len == 0)
+		{
+		    state = PEM_BODY;
+		    continue;
+		}
+
+	        /* we are looking for a name: value pair */
+		if (!extract_parameter(&name, &value, &line))
+		    continue;
+
+		if (match("Proc-Type", &name) && *value.ptr == '4')
+			encrypted = TRUE;
+		else if (match("DEK-Info", &name))
+		{
+		    const char *ugh = NULL;
+		    size_t len = 0;
+		    chunk_t dek;
+
+		    if (!extract_token(&dek, ',', &value))
+			dek = value;
+
+		    /* we support DES-EDE3-CBC encrypted files, only */
+		    if (!match("DES-EDE3-CBC", &dek))
+			return "we support DES-EDE3-CBC encrypted files, only";
+
+		    eat_whitespace(&value);
+		    ugh = ttodata(value.ptr, value.len, 16,
+		    		  iv.ptr, MAX_DIGEST_LEN, &len);
+		    if (ugh)
+			return "error in IV";
+
+		    iv.len = len;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else /* state is PEM_BODY */
+	    {
+		const char *ugh = NULL;
+		size_t len = 0;
+		chunk_t data;
+
+		/* remove any trailing whitespace */
+		if (!extract_token(&data ,' ', &line))
+		    data = line;
+
+		/* check for PGP armor checksum */
+		if (*data.ptr == '=')
+		{
+		    *pgp = TRUE;
+		    data.ptr++;
+		    data.len--;
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("  Armor checksum: %.*s", (int)data.len, data.ptr);
+		    )
+		    continue;
+		}
+
+		ugh = ttodata(data.ptr, data.len, 64,
+			      dst.ptr, blob->len - dst.len, &len);
+		if (ugh)
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("  %s", ugh);
+		    )
+		    state = PEM_ABORT;
+		    break;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    dst.ptr += len;
+		    dst.len += len;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    /* set length to size of binary blob */
+    blob->len = dst.len;
+
+    if (state != PEM_POST)
+	return "file coded in unknown format, discarded";
+
+    if (encrypted)
+	return pem_decrypt(blob, &iv, pass, label);
+    else
+	return NULL;
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/pem.h b/src/pluto/pem.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..815b5d85b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pem.h
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+/* Loading of PEM encoded files with optional encryption
+ * Copyright (C) 2001-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pem.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern err_t pemtobin(chunk_t *blob, prompt_pass_t *pass, const char* label
+    , bool *pgp);
diff --git a/src/pluto/pgp.c b/src/pluto/pgp.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..307303f6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pgp.c
@@ -0,0 +1,647 @@
+/* Support of OpenPGP certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pgp.c,v 1.7 2006/01/04 21:00:43 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "pgp.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+
+/*
+ * chained list of OpenPGP end certificates
+ */
+static pgpcert_t *pgpcerts   = NULL;
+
+/*
+ * OpenPGP packet tags defined in section 4.3 of RFC 2440
+ */
+#define PGP_PKT_RESERVED		 0
+#define PGP_PKT_PUBKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY	 1
+#define PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE		 2
+#define PGP_PKT_SYMKEY_ENC_SESSION_KEY	 3
+#define PGP_PKT_ONE_PASS_SIGNATURE_PKT	 4
+#define PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY		 5
+#define PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY		 6
+#define PGP_PKT_SECRET_SUBKEY		 7
+#define PGP_PKT_COMPRESSED_DATA		 8
+#define PGP_PKT_SYMKEY_ENC_DATA		 9
+#define PGP_PKT_MARKER			10
+#define PGP_PKT_LITERAL_DATA		11
+#define PGP_PKT_TRUST			12
+#define PGP_PKT_USER_ID			13
+#define PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_SUBKEY		14
+#define PGP_PKT_ROOF			15
+
+static const char *const pgp_packet_type_name[] = {
+    "Reserved",
+    "Public-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet",
+    "Signature Packet",
+    "Symmetric-Key Encrypted Session Key Packet",
+    "One-Pass Signature Packet",
+    "Secret Key Packet",
+    "Public Key Packet",
+    "Secret Subkey Packet",
+    "Compressed Data Packet",
+    "Symmetrically Encrypted Data Packet",
+    "Marker Packet",
+    "Literal Data Packet",
+    "Trust Packet",
+    "User ID Packet",
+    "Public Subkey Packet"
+};
+
+/*
+ * OpenPGP public key algorithms defined in section 9.1 of RFC 2440
+ */
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA 		 1
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_ENC_ONLY	 2
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY	 3
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ELGAMAL_ENC_ONLY	16
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_DSA		17
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ECC		18
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ECDSA		19
+#define PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_ELGAMAL		20
+
+/*
+ * OpenPGP symmetric key algorithms defined in section 9.2 of RFC 2440
+  */
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_PLAIN	 0
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_IDEA	 1
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_3DES	 2
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_CAST5	 3
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_BLOWFISH	 4
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_SAFER	 5
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_DES		 6
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_AES		 7
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_AES_192	 8
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_AES_256	 9
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_TWOFISH	10
+#define PGP_SYM_ALG_ROOF	11
+
+static const char *const pgp_sym_alg_name[] = {
+    "Plaintext",
+    "IDEA",
+    "3DES",
+    "CAST5",
+    "Blowfish",
+    "SAFER",
+    "DES",
+    "AES",
+    "AES-192",
+    "AES-256",
+    "Twofish"
+};
+
+/*
+ * Size of PGP Key ID
+ */
+#define PGP_KEYID_SIZE		8
+
+const pgpcert_t empty_pgpcert = {
+      NULL     , /* *next */
+            0  , /* installed */
+            0  , /* count */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /* certificate */
+            0  , /* created */
+            0  , /* until */
+            0  , /* pubkeyAlgorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /* modulus */
+    { NULL, 0 }, /* publicExponent */
+       ""        /* fingerprint */
+};
+
+static size_t
+pgp_size(chunk_t *blob, int len)
+{
+    size_t size = 0;
+
+    blob->len -= len;
+    while (len-- > 0)
+	size = 256*size + *blob->ptr++;
+    return size;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts the length of a PGP packet
+ */
+static size_t
+pgp_old_packet_length(chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    /* bits 0 and 1 define the packet length type */
+    int len_type = 0x03 & *blob->ptr++;
+
+    blob->len--;
+
+    /* len_type: 0 -> 1 byte, 1 -> 2 bytes, 2 -> 4 bytes */
+    return pgp_size(blob, (len_type == 0)? 1: len_type << 1);
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts PGP packet version (V3 or V4)
+ */
+static u_char
+pgp_version(chunk_t *blob)
+{
+    u_char version = *blob->ptr++;
+    blob->len--;
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L3 - version:");
+	DBG_log("  V%d", version)
+    )
+    return version;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse OpenPGP public key packet defined in section 5.5.2 of RFC 2440
+ */
+static bool
+parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+    u_char version = pgp_version(packet);
+
+    if (version < 3 || version > 4)
+    {
+	plog("PGP packet version V%d not supported", version);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* creation date - 4 bytes */
+    cert->created = (time_t)pgp_size(packet, 4);
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L3 - created:");
+	DBG_log("  %s", timetoa(&cert->created, TRUE))
+    )
+
+    if (version == 3)
+    {
+	/* validity in days - 2 bytes */
+	cert->until   = (time_t)pgp_size(packet, 2);
+
+	/* validity of 0 days means that the key never expires */
+	if (cert->until > 0)
+	    cert->until = cert->created + 24*3600*cert->until;
+
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L3 - until:");
+	    DBG_log("  %s", timetoa(&cert->until, TRUE));
+	)
+    }
+
+    /* public key algorithm - 1 byte */
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L3 - public key algorithm:")
+    )
+
+    switch (pgp_size(packet, 1))
+    {
+    case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA:
+    case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_RSA_SIGN_ONLY:
+	cert->pubkeyAlg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  RSA")
+	)
+	/* modulus n */
+	cert->modulus.len = (pgp_size(packet, 2)+7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	cert->modulus.ptr = packet->ptr;
+	packet->ptr += cert->modulus.len;
+	packet->len -= cert->modulus.len;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L3 - modulus:")
+	)
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", cert->modulus);
+
+	/* public exponent e */
+	cert->publicExponent.len = (pgp_size(packet, 2)+7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+	cert->publicExponent.ptr = packet->ptr;
+	packet->ptr += cert->publicExponent.len;
+	packet->len -= cert->publicExponent.len;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L3 - public exponent:")
+	)
+	DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", cert->publicExponent);
+
+	if (version == 3)
+	{
+	    /* a V3 fingerprint is the MD5 hash of modulus and public exponent */
+            MD5_CTX context;
+            MD5Init(&context);
+            MD5Update(&context, cert->modulus.ptr, cert->modulus.len);
+	    MD5Update(&context, cert->publicExponent.ptr, cert->publicExponent.len);
+            MD5Final(cert->fingerprint, &context);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("  computation of V4 key ID not implemented yet");
+	}
+	break;
+    case PGP_PUBKEY_ALG_DSA:
+	cert->pubkeyAlg = PUBKEY_ALG_DSA;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  DSA")
+	)
+	plog("  DSA public keys not supported");
+	return FALSE;
+     default:
+	cert->pubkeyAlg = 0;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("  other")
+	)
+	plog(" exotic not RSA public keys not supported");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse OpenPGP secret key packet defined in section 5.5.3 of RFC 2440
+ */
+static bool
+parse_pgp_secretkey_packet(chunk_t *packet, RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    int i, s2k;
+    pgpcert_t cert = empty_pgpcert;
+
+    if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(packet, &cert))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    init_RSA_public_key((RSA_public_key_t *)key, cert.publicExponent
+					       , cert.modulus);
+
+    /* string-to-key usage */
+    s2k = pgp_size(packet, 1);
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L3 - string-to-key:  %d", s2k)
+    )
+
+    if (s2k == 255)
+    {
+	plog("  string-to-key specifiers not supported");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (s2k >= PGP_SYM_ALG_ROOF)
+    {
+	plog("  undefined symmetric key algorithm");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* a known symmetric key algorithm is specified*/
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  %s", pgp_sym_alg_name[s2k])
+    )
+
+    /* private key is unencrypted */
+    if (s2k == PGP_SYM_ALG_PLAIN)
+    {
+	for (i = 2; i < RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS; i++)
+	{
+	    mpz_t u;  /* auxiliary variable */
+
+	    /* compute offset to private key component i*/
+	    MP_INT *n = (MP_INT*)((char *)key + RSA_private_field[i].offset);
+
+	    switch (i)
+	    {
+	    case 2:
+	    case 3:
+	    case 4:
+		{
+		    size_t len = (pgp_size(packet, 2)+7) / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+
+		    n_to_mpz(n, packet->ptr, len);
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("L3 - %s:", RSA_private_field[i].name)
+		    )
+		    DBG_cond_dump(DBG_PRIVATE, "", packet->ptr, len);
+		    packet->ptr += len;
+		    packet->len -= len;
+		}
+		break;
+	    case 5:		/* dP = d mod (p-1) */
+		mpz_init(u);
+		mpz_sub_ui(u, &key->p, 1);
+		mpz_mod(n, &key->d, u);
+		mpz_clear(u);
+		break;
+	    case 6:		/* dQ = d mod (q-1) */
+		mpz_init(u);
+		mpz_sub_ui(u, &key->q, 1);
+		mpz_mod(n, &key->d, u);
+		mpz_clear(u);
+		break;
+	    case 7:		/* qInv = (q^-1) mod p */
+		mpz_invert(n, &key->q, &key->p);
+		if (mpz_cmp_ui(n, 0) < 0)
+		    mpz_add(n, n, &key->p);
+		passert(mpz_cmp(n, &key->p) < 0);
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    plog("  %s encryption not supported",  pgp_sym_alg_name[s2k]);
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse OpenPGP signature packet defined in section 5.2.2 of RFC 2440
+ */
+static bool
+parse_pgp_signature_packet(chunk_t *packet, pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+    time_t created;
+    chunk_t keyid;
+    u_char  sig_type;
+    u_char version = pgp_version(packet);
+
+    /* we parse only V3 signature packets */
+    if (version != 3)
+	return TRUE;
+
+    /* size byte must have the value 5 */
+    if (pgp_size(packet, 1) != 5)
+    {
+	plog(" size must be 5");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* signature type - 1 byte */
+    sig_type = (u_char)pgp_size(packet, 1);
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L3 - signature type:  0x%2x", sig_type)
+    )
+
+    /* creation date - 4 bytes */
+    created = (time_t)pgp_size(packet, 4);
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L3 - created:");
+	DBG_log("  %s", timetoa(&cert->created, TRUE))
+    )
+
+    /* key ID of signer - 8 bytes */
+    keyid.ptr = packet->ptr;
+    keyid.len = PGP_KEYID_SIZE;
+    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "L3 - key ID of signer", keyid);
+
+   return TRUE;
+}
+
+bool
+parse_pgp(chunk_t blob, pgpcert_t *cert, RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("L0 - PGP file:")
+    )
+    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", blob);
+
+    if (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	/* parse a PGP certificate file */
+	cert->certificate = blob;
+	time(&cert->installed);
+    }
+    else if (key == NULL)
+    {
+	/* should not occur, nothing to parse */
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    while (blob.len > 0)
+    {
+	chunk_t packet = empty_chunk;
+	u_char packet_tag = *blob.ptr;
+
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("L1 - PGP packet:  tag= 0x%2x", packet_tag)
+	)
+
+	/* bit 7 must be set */
+	if (!(packet_tag & 0x80))
+	{
+	    plog("  incorrect Packet Tag");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* bit 6 set defines new packet format */
+	if (packet_tag & 0x40)
+	{
+	    plog("  new PGP packet format not supported");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    int packet_type = (packet_tag & 0x3C) >> 2;
+
+	    packet.len = pgp_old_packet_length(&blob);
+	    packet.ptr = blob.ptr;
+	    blob.ptr += packet.len;
+	    blob.len -= packet.len;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s (%d), old format, %d bytes",
+		    (packet_type < PGP_PKT_ROOF) ?
+		    pgp_packet_type_name[packet_type] :
+		    "Undefined Packet Type", packet_type, (int)packet.len);
+		DBG_log("L2 - body:")
+	    )
+	    DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_RAW, "", packet);
+
+	    if (cert != NULL)
+	    {
+		/* parse a PGP certificate */
+		switch (packet_type)
+		{
+		case PGP_PKT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+		    if (!parse_pgp_pubkey_packet(&packet, cert))
+			return FALSE;
+		    break;
+		case PGP_PKT_SIGNATURE:
+		    if (!parse_pgp_signature_packet(&packet, cert))
+			return FALSE;
+		    break;
+		case PGP_PKT_USER_ID:
+		    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			DBG_log("L3 - user ID:");
+			DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)packet.len, packet.ptr)
+		    )
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* parse a PGP private key file */
+		switch (packet_type)
+		{
+		case PGP_PKT_SECRET_KEY:
+		    if (!parse_pgp_secretkey_packet(&packet, key))
+			return FALSE;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  compare two OpenPGP certificates
+ */
+static bool
+same_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *a, pgpcert_t *b)
+{
+    return a->certificate.len == b->certificate.len &&
+	memcmp(a->certificate.ptr, b->certificate.ptr, b->certificate.len) == 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * for each link pointing to the certificate increase the count by one
+ */
+void
+share_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+    if (cert != NULL)
+ 	cert->count++;
+}
+
+/*
+ * select the OpenPGP keyid as ID
+ */
+void
+select_pgpcert_id(pgpcert_t *cert, struct id *end_id)
+{
+    end_id->kind = ID_KEY_ID;
+    end_id->name.len = PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE;
+    end_id->name.ptr = cert->fingerprint;
+    end_id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+    memcpy(end_id->name.ptr, cert->fingerprint, PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  add an OpenPGP user/host certificate to the chained list
+ */
+pgpcert_t*
+add_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+    pgpcert_t *c = pgpcerts;
+
+    while (c != NULL)
+    {
+	if (same_pgpcert(c, cert)) /* already in chain, free cert */
+	{
+	    free_pgpcert(cert);
+	    return c;
+	}
+	c = c->next;
+    }
+
+    /* insert new cert at the root of the chain */
+    cert->next = pgpcerts;
+    pgpcerts = cert;
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  pgp cert inserted")
+    )
+    return cert;
+}
+
+/*  release of a certificate decreases the count by one
+ "  the certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
+ */
+void
+release_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+    if (cert != NULL && --cert->count == 0)
+    {
+	pgpcert_t **pp = &pgpcerts;
+	while (*pp != cert)
+	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
+        *pp = cert->next;
+	free_pgpcert(cert);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free a PGP certificate
+ */
+void
+free_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert)
+{
+    if (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	if (cert->certificate.ptr != NULL)
+	    pfree(cert->certificate.ptr);
+	pfree(cert);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all PGP end certificates in a chained list
+ */
+void
+list_pgp_end_certs(bool utc)
+{
+   pgpcert_t *cert = pgpcerts;
+   time_t now;
+
+    /* determine the current time */
+    time(&now);
+
+    if (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of PGP End certificates:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	unsigned keysize;
+	char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	cert_t c;
+
+	c.type = CERT_PGP;
+	c.u.pgp = cert;
+
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, count: %d", timetoa(&cert->installed, utc), cert->count);
+	datatot(cert->fingerprint, PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE, 'x', buf, BUF_LEN);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       fingerprint:  %s", buf);
+	form_keyid(cert->publicExponent, cert->modulus, buf, &keysize);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:   %4d RSA Key %s%s", 8*keysize, buf,
+		(has_private_key(c))? ", has private key" : "");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       created:  %s", timetoa(&cert->created, utc));
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       until:    %s %s", timetoa(&cert->until, utc),
+		check_expiry(cert->until, CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+	cert = cert->next;
+    }
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/pgp.h b/src/pluto/pgp.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4f34debc9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pgp.h
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/* Support of OpenPGP certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pgp.h,v 1.3 2005/08/07 07:50:09 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PGP_H
+#define _PGP_H
+
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+/*
+ * Length of PGP V3 fingerprint
+ */
+#define PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE	MD5_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+typedef char fingerprint_t[PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE];
+
+/* access structure for an OpenPGP certificate */
+
+typedef struct pgpcert pgpcert_t;
+
+struct pgpcert {
+  pgpcert_t	    *next;
+  time_t	    installed;
+  int		    count;
+  chunk_t	    certificate;
+  time_t	    created;
+  time_t	    until;
+  enum pubkey_alg   pubkeyAlg;
+  chunk_t	    modulus;
+  chunk_t	    publicExponent;
+  fingerprint_t	    fingerprint;
+};
+
+extern const pgpcert_t empty_pgpcert;
+extern bool parse_pgp(chunk_t blob, pgpcert_t *cert, RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern void share_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
+extern void select_pgpcert_id(pgpcert_t *cert, struct id *end_id);
+extern pgpcert_t* add_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
+extern void list_pgp_end_certs(bool utc);
+extern void release_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
+extern void free_pgpcert(pgpcert_t *cert);
+
+#endif /* _PGP_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs1.c b/src/pluto/pkcs1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..ade5fdd94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pkcs1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,674 @@
+/* Support of PKCS#1 private key data structures
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pkcs1.c,v 1.17 2006/01/04 21:00:43 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <libsha2/sha2.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "md2.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+
+const struct fld RSA_private_field[] =
+{
+    { "Modulus",         offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, pub.n) },
+    { "PublicExponent",  offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, pub.e) },
+
+    { "PrivateExponent", offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, d) },
+    { "Prime1",          offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, p) },
+    { "Prime2",          offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, q) },
+    { "Exponent1",       offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, dP) },
+    { "Exponent2",       offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, dQ) },
+    { "Coefficient",     offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, qInv) },
+};
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of a PKCS#1 RSA private key */
+
+static const asn1Object_t privkeyObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "RSAPrivateKey",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "modulus",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 1,   "publicExponent",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+  { 1,   "privateExponent",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 1,   "prime1",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+  { 1,   "prime2",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
+  { 1,   "exponent1",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
+  { 1,   "exponent2",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+  { 1,   "coefficient",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
+  { 1,   "otherPrimeInfos",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_LOOP }, /* 10 */
+  { 2,     "otherPrimeInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 11 */
+  { 3,       "prime",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
+  { 3,       "exponent",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 13 */
+  { 3,       "coefficient",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+  { 1,   "end opt or loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /* 15 */
+};
+
+#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_VERSION		 1
+#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS		 2
+#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_PUB_EXP		 3
+#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_COEFF		 9
+#define PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_ROOF		16
+
+
+/*
+ * forms the FreeS/WAN keyid from the public exponent e and modulus n
+ */
+void
+form_keyid(chunk_t e, chunk_t n, char* keyid, unsigned *keysize)
+{
+    /* eliminate leading zero bytes in modulus from ASN.1 coding */
+    while (n.len > 1 && *n.ptr == 0x00)
+    {
+	n.ptr++;  n.len--;
+    }
+
+    /* form the FreeS/WAN keyid */
+    keyid[0] = '\0';	/* in case of splitkeytoid failure */
+    splitkeytoid(e.ptr, e.len, n.ptr, n.len, keyid, KEYID_BUF);
+
+    /* return the RSA modulus size in octets */
+    *keysize = n.len;
+}
+
+/*
+ * initialize an RSA_public_key_t object
+ */
+void
+init_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, chunk_t e, chunk_t n)
+{
+    n_to_mpz(&rsa->e, e.ptr, e.len);
+    n_to_mpz(&rsa->n, n.ptr, n.len);
+
+    form_keyid(e, n, rsa->keyid, &rsa->k);
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+static void
+RSA_show_key_fields(RSA_private_key_t *k, int fieldcnt)
+{
+    const struct fld *p;
+
+    DBG_log(" keyid: *%s", k->pub.keyid);
+
+    for (p = RSA_private_field; p < &RSA_private_field[fieldcnt]; p++)
+    {
+	MP_INT *n = (MP_INT *) ((char *)k + p->offset);
+	size_t sz = mpz_sizeinbase(n, 16);
+	char buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS * 2 + 2];	/* ought to be big enough */
+
+	passert(sz <= sizeof(buf));
+	mpz_get_str(buf, 16, n);
+
+	DBG_log(" %s: 0x%s", p->name, buf);
+    }
+}
+
+/* debugging info that compromises security! */
+void
+RSA_show_private_key(RSA_private_key_t *k)
+{
+    RSA_show_key_fields(k, elemsof(RSA_private_field));
+}
+
+void
+RSA_show_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *k)
+{
+    /* Kludge: pretend that it is a private key, but only display the
+     * first two fields (which are the public key).
+     */
+    passert(offsetof(RSA_private_key_t, pub) == 0);
+    RSA_show_key_fields((RSA_private_key_t *)k, 2);
+}
+#endif
+
+err_t
+RSA_private_key_sanity(RSA_private_key_t *k)
+{
+    /* note that the *last* error found is reported */
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    mpz_t t, u, q1;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG	/* debugging info that compromises security */
+    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, RSA_show_private_key(k));
+#endif
+
+    /* PKCS#1 1.5 section 6 requires modulus to have at least 12 octets.
+     * We actually require more (for security).
+     */
+    if (k->pub.k < RSA_MIN_OCTETS)
+	return RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH;
+
+    /* we picked a max modulus size to simplify buffer allocation */
+    if (k->pub.k > RSA_MAX_OCTETS)
+	return RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH;
+
+    mpz_init(t);
+    mpz_init(u);
+    mpz_init(q1);
+
+    /* check that n == p * q */
+    mpz_mul(u, &k->p, &k->q);
+    if (mpz_cmp(u, &k->pub.n) != 0)
+	ugh = "n != p * q";
+
+    /* check that e divides neither p-1 nor q-1 */
+    mpz_sub_ui(t, &k->p, 1);
+    mpz_mod(t, t, &k->pub.e);
+    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 0) == 0)
+	ugh = "e divides p-1";
+
+    mpz_sub_ui(t, &k->q, 1);
+    mpz_mod(t, t, &k->pub.e);
+    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 0) == 0)
+	ugh = "e divides q-1";
+
+    /* check that d is e^-1 (mod lcm(p-1, q-1)) */
+    /* see PKCS#1v2, aka RFC 2437, for the "lcm" */
+    mpz_sub_ui(q1, &k->q, 1);
+    mpz_sub_ui(u, &k->p, 1);
+    mpz_gcd(t, u, q1);		/* t := gcd(p-1, q-1) */
+    mpz_mul(u, u, q1);		/* u := (p-1) * (q-1) */
+    mpz_divexact(u, u, t);	/* u := lcm(p-1, q-1) */
+
+    mpz_mul(t, &k->d, &k->pub.e);
+    mpz_mod(t, t, u);
+    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 1) != 0)
+	ugh = "(d * e) mod (lcm(p-1, q-1)) != 1";
+
+    /* check that dP is d mod (p-1) */
+    mpz_sub_ui(u, &k->p, 1);
+    mpz_mod(t, &k->d, u);
+    if (mpz_cmp(t, &k->dP) != 0)
+	ugh = "dP is not congruent to d mod (p-1)";
+
+    /* check that dQ is d mod (q-1) */
+    mpz_sub_ui(u, &k->q, 1);
+    mpz_mod(t, &k->d, u);
+    if (mpz_cmp(t, &k->dQ) != 0)
+	ugh = "dQ is not congruent to d mod (q-1)";
+
+    /* check that qInv is (q^-1) mod p */
+    mpz_mul(t, &k->qInv, &k->q);
+    mpz_mod(t, t, &k->p);
+    if (mpz_cmp_ui(t, 1) != 0)
+	ugh = "qInv is not conguent ot (q^-1) mod p";
+
+    mpz_clear(t);
+    mpz_clear(u);
+    mpz_clear(q1);
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check the equality of two RSA public keys
+ */
+bool
+same_RSA_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *a, const RSA_public_key_t *b)
+{
+    return a == b
+    || (a->k == b->k && mpz_cmp(&a->n, &b->n) == 0 && mpz_cmp(&a->e, &b->e) == 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Parses a PKCS#1 private key
+ */
+bool
+pkcs1_parse_private_key(chunk_t blob, RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object, modulus, exp;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, 0, FALSE, DBG_PRIVATE);
+
+    while (objectID < PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_ROOF) {
+
+	if (!extract_object(privkeyObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	if (objectID == PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_VERSION)
+	{
+	    if (object.len > 0 && *object.ptr != 0)
+	    {
+		plog("  wrong PKCS#1 private key version");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (objectID >= PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS &&
+		 objectID <= PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_COEFF)
+	{
+	    MP_INT *u = (MP_INT *) ((char *)key
+		+ RSA_private_field[objectID - PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS].offset);
+
+	    n_to_mpz(u, object.ptr, object.len);
+
+	    if (objectID == PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_MODULUS)
+		modulus = object;
+	    else if (objectID == PKCS1_PRIV_KEY_PUB_EXP)
+		exp = object;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    form_keyid(exp, modulus, key->pub.keyid, &key->pub.k);
+    ugh = RSA_private_key_sanity(key);
+    return (ugh == NULL);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  compute a digest over a binary blob
+ */
+bool
+compute_digest(chunk_t tbs, int alg, chunk_t *digest)
+{
+    switch (alg)
+    {
+    case OID_MD2:
+    case OID_MD2_WITH_RSA:
+	{
+	    MD2_CTX context;
+
+	    MD2Init(&context);
+	    MD2Update(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
+	    MD2Final(digest->ptr, &context);
+	    digest->len = MD2_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+     case OID_MD5:
+     case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
+	{
+	    MD5_CTX context;
+
+	    MD5Init(&context);
+	    MD5Update(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
+	    MD5Final(digest->ptr, &context);
+	    digest->len = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+     case OID_SHA1:
+     case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
+     case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA_OIW:
+	{
+	    SHA1_CTX context;
+
+	    SHA1Init(&context);
+	    SHA1Update(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
+	    SHA1Final(digest->ptr, &context);
+	    digest->len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+     case OID_SHA256:
+     case OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA:
+	{
+	    sha256_context context;
+
+	    sha256_init(&context);
+	    sha256_write(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
+	    sha256_final(&context);
+	    memcpy(digest->ptr, context.sha_out, SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	    digest->len = SHA2_256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+     case OID_SHA384:
+     case OID_SHA384_WITH_RSA:
+	{
+	    sha512_context context;
+
+	    sha384_init(&context);
+	    sha512_write(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
+	    sha512_final(&context);
+	    memcpy(digest->ptr, context.sha_out, SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	    digest->len = SHA2_384_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+     case OID_SHA512:
+     case OID_SHA512_WITH_RSA:
+	{
+	    sha512_context context;
+
+	    sha512_init(&context);
+	    sha512_write(&context, tbs.ptr, tbs.len);
+	    sha512_final(&context);
+	    memcpy(digest->ptr, context.sha_out, SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE);
+	    digest->len = SHA2_512_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+     default:
+	digest->len = 0;
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * compute an RSA signature with PKCS#1 padding
+ */
+void
+sign_hash(const RSA_private_key_t *k, const u_char *hash_val, size_t hash_len
+    , u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len)
+{
+    chunk_t ch;
+    mpz_t t1, t2;
+    size_t padlen;
+    u_char *p = sig_val;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("signing hash with RSA Key *%s", k->pub.keyid)
+    )
+    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting */
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    *p++ = 0x01;	/* BT (block type) 01 */
+    padlen = sig_len - 3 - hash_len;
+    memset(p, 0xFF, padlen);
+    p += padlen;
+    *p++ = 0x00;
+    memcpy(p, hash_val, hash_len);
+    passert(p + hash_len - sig_val == (ptrdiff_t)sig_len);
+
+    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.2 octet-string-to-integer conversion */
+    n_to_mpz(t1, sig_val, sig_len);	/* (could skip leading 0x00) */
+
+    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.3 RSA computation y = x^c mod n
+     * Better described in PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 RSADP.
+     * There are two methods, depending on the form of the private key.
+     * We use the one based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
+     */
+    mpz_init(t2);
+
+    mpz_powm(t2, t1, &k->dP, &k->p);	/* m1 = c^dP mod p */
+
+    mpz_powm(t1, t1, &k->dQ, &k->q);	/* m2 = c^dQ mod Q */
+
+    mpz_sub(t2, t2, t1);	/* h = qInv (m1 - m2) mod p */
+    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &k->p);
+    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &k->qInv);
+    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &k->p);
+
+    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &k->q);	/* m = m2 + h q */
+    mpz_add(t1, t1, t2);
+
+    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.4 integer-to-octet-string conversion */
+    ch = mpz_to_n(t1, sig_len);
+    memcpy(sig_val, ch.ptr, sig_len);
+    pfree(ch.ptr);
+
+    mpz_clear(t1);
+    mpz_clear(t2);
+}
+
+/*
+ * encrypt data with an RSA public key after padding
+ */
+chunk_t
+RSA_encrypt(const RSA_public_key_t *key, chunk_t in)
+{
+    u_char padded[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+    u_char *pos = padded;
+    int padding = key->k - in.len - 3;
+    int i;
+
+    if (padding < 8 || key->k > RSA_MAX_OCTETS)
+	return empty_chunk;
+
+    /* add padding according to PKCS#1 7.2.1 1.+2. */
+    *pos++ = 0x00;
+    *pos++ = 0x02;
+
+    /* pad with pseudo random bytes unequal to zero */
+    get_rnd_bytes(pos, padding);
+    for (i = 0; i < padding; i++)
+    {
+	while (!*pos)
+ 	  get_rnd_bytes(pos, 1);
+	pos++;
+    }
+
+    /* append the padding terminator */
+    *pos++ = 0x00;
+
+    /* now add the data */
+    memcpy(pos, in.ptr, in.len);
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("data for rsa encryption:\n", in);
+	DBG_dump("padded data for rsa encryption:\n", padded, key->k)
+    )
+
+    /* convert chunk to integer (PKCS#1 7.2.1 3.a) */
+    {
+	chunk_t out;
+	mpz_t m, c;
+
+	mpz_init(c);
+	n_to_mpz(m, padded, key->k);
+
+	/* encrypt(PKCS#1 7.2.1 3.b) */
+	mpz_powm(c, m, &key->e, &key->n);
+
+	/* convert integer back to a chunk (PKCS#1 7.2.1 3.c) */
+	out = mpz_to_n(c, key->k);
+	mpz_clear(c);
+	mpz_clear(m);
+
+	DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	    DBG_dump_chunk("rsa encrypted data:\n", out)
+	)
+	return out;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * decrypt data with an RSA private key and remove padding
+ */
+bool
+RSA_decrypt(const RSA_private_key_t *key, chunk_t in, chunk_t *out)
+{
+    chunk_t padded;
+    u_char *pos;
+    mpz_t t1, t2;
+
+    n_to_mpz(t1, in.ptr,in.len);
+
+    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.3 RSA computation y = x^c mod n
+     * Better described in PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 RSADP.
+     * There are two methods, depending on the form of the private key.
+     * We use the one based on the Chinese Remainder Theorem.
+     */
+    mpz_init(t2);
+
+    mpz_powm(t2, t1, &key->dP, &key->p);	/* m1 = c^dP mod p */
+    mpz_powm(t1, t1, &key->dQ, &key->q);	/* m2 = c^dQ mod Q */
+
+    mpz_sub(t2, t2, t1);	/* h = qInv (m1 - m2) mod p */
+    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &key->p);
+    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &key->qInv);
+    mpz_mod(t2, t2, &key->p);
+
+    mpz_mul(t2, t2, &key->q);	/* m = m2 + h q */
+    mpz_add(t1, t1, t2);
+
+    padded = mpz_to_n(t1, key->pub.k);
+    mpz_clear(t1);
+    mpz_clear(t2);
+
+    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("rsa decrypted data with padding:\n", padded)
+    )
+    pos = padded.ptr;
+
+    /* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting (EB = 00 || 02 || PS || 00 || D) */
+
+    /* check for hex pattern 00 02 in decrypted message */
+    if ((*pos++ != 0x00) || (*(pos++) != 0x02))
+    {
+	plog("incorrect padding - probably wrong RSA key");
+	freeanychunk(padded);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    padded.len -= 2;
+
+    /* the plaintext data starts after first 0x00 byte */
+    while (padded.len-- > 0 && *pos++ != 0x00)
+
+    if (padded.len == 0)
+    {
+	plog("no plaintext data");
+	freeanychunk(padded);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    clonetochunk(*out, pos, padded.len, "decrypted data");
+    freeanychunk(padded);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * build signatureValue
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs1_build_signature(chunk_t tbs, int hash_alg, const RSA_private_key_t *key
+, bool bit_string)
+{
+
+    size_t siglen = key->pub.k;
+
+    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    chunk_t digest = { digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN };
+    chunk_t digestInfo, alg_id, signatureValue;
+    u_char *pos;
+
+    switch (hash_alg)
+    {
+    case OID_MD5:
+    case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
+	alg_id = ASN1_md5_id;
+	break;
+    case OID_SHA1:
+    case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
+	alg_id = ASN1_sha1_id;
+	break;
+    default:
+	return empty_chunk;
+    }
+    compute_digest(tbs, hash_alg, &digest);
+
+    /* according to PKCS#1 v2.1 digest must be packaged into
+     * an ASN.1 structure for encryption
+     */
+    digestInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		    , alg_id
+		    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest));
+
+    /* generate the RSA signature */
+    if (bit_string)
+    {
+	pos = build_asn1_object(&signatureValue, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1 + siglen);
+	*pos++ = 0x00;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	pos = build_asn1_object(&signatureValue, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, siglen);
+    }
+    sign_hash(key, digestInfo.ptr, digestInfo.len, pos, siglen);
+    pfree(digestInfo.ptr);
+
+    return signatureValue;
+}
+
+/*
+ * build a DER-encoded PKCS#1 private key object
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs1_build_private_key(const RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    chunk_t pkcs1 = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmmmmmmm"
+			, ASN1_INTEGER_0
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->pub.n)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->pub.e)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->d)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->p)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->q)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->dP)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->dQ)
+			, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&key->qInv));
+
+    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("PKCS#1 encoded private key:", pkcs1)
+    )
+    return pkcs1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * build a DER-encoded PKCS#1 public key object
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs1_build_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
+{
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+		, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&rsa->n)
+		, asn1_integer_from_mpz(&rsa->e));
+}
+
+/*
+ * build a DER-encoded publicKeyInfo object
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs1_build_publicKeyInfo(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
+{
+    chunk_t publicKey;
+    chunk_t rawKey = pkcs1_build_public_key(rsa);
+
+    u_char *pos = build_asn1_object(&publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING
+			, 1 + rawKey.len);
+    *pos++ = 0x00;
+    mv_chunk(&pos, rawKey);
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, ASN1_rsaEncryption_id
+		, publicKey);	
+}
+void
+free_RSA_public_content(RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
+{
+    mpz_clear(&rsa->n);
+    mpz_clear(&rsa->e);
+}
+
+void
+free_RSA_private_content(RSA_private_key_t *rsak)
+{
+    free_RSA_public_content(&rsak->pub);
+    mpz_clear(&rsak->d);
+    mpz_clear(&rsak->p);
+    mpz_clear(&rsak->q);
+    mpz_clear(&rsak->dP);
+    mpz_clear(&rsak->dQ);
+    mpz_clear(&rsak->qInv);
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs1.h b/src/pluto/pkcs1.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c927db0f8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pkcs1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+/* Support of PKCS#1 private key data structures
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pkcs1.h,v 1.14 2005/12/06 22:52:12 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS1_H
+#define _PKCS1_H
+
+#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU Multi Precision library */
+
+#include "defs.h"
+
+typedef struct RSA_public_key RSA_public_key_t;
+
+struct RSA_public_key
+{
+    char keyid[KEYID_BUF];	/* see ipsec_keyblobtoid(3) */
+
+    /* length of modulus n in octets: [RSA_MIN_OCTETS, RSA_MAX_OCTETS] */
+    unsigned k;
+
+    /* public: */
+    MP_INT
+	n,	/* modulus: p * q */
+	e;	/* exponent: relatively prime to (p-1) * (q-1) [probably small] */
+};
+
+typedef struct RSA_private_key RSA_private_key_t;
+
+struct RSA_private_key {
+    struct RSA_public_key pub;	/* must be at start for RSA_show_public_key */
+
+    MP_INT
+	d,	/* private exponent: (e^-1) mod ((p-1) * (q-1)) */
+	/* help for Chinese Remainder Theorem speedup: */
+	p,	/* first secret prime */
+	q,	/* second secret prime */
+	dP,	/* first factor's exponent: (e^-1) mod (p-1) == d mod (p-1) */
+	dQ,	/* second factor's exponent: (e^-1) mod (q-1) == d mod (q-1) */
+	qInv;	/* (q^-1) mod p */
+};
+
+struct fld {
+    const char *name;
+    size_t offset;
+};
+
+extern const struct fld RSA_private_field[];
+#define RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS	8
+
+extern void init_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, chunk_t e, chunk_t n);
+extern bool pkcs1_parse_private_key(chunk_t blob, RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_private_key(const RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa);
+extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_publicKeyInfo(const RSA_public_key_t *rsa);
+extern chunk_t pkcs1_build_signature(chunk_t tbs, int hash_alg
+    , const RSA_private_key_t *key, bool bit_string);
+extern bool compute_digest(chunk_t tbs, int alg, chunk_t *digest);
+extern void sign_hash(const RSA_private_key_t *k, const u_char *hash_val
+    , size_t hash_len, u_char *sig_val, size_t sig_len);
+extern chunk_t RSA_encrypt(const RSA_public_key_t *key, chunk_t in);
+extern bool RSA_decrypt(const RSA_private_key_t *key, chunk_t in
+    , chunk_t *out);
+extern bool same_RSA_public_key(const RSA_public_key_t *a
+    , const RSA_public_key_t *b);
+extern void form_keyid(chunk_t e, chunk_t n, char* keyid, unsigned *keysize);
+extern err_t RSA_private_key_sanity(RSA_private_key_t *k);
+#ifdef DEBUG
+extern void RSA_show_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *k);
+extern void RSA_show_private_key(RSA_private_key_t *k);
+#endif
+extern void free_RSA_public_content(RSA_public_key_t *rsa);
+extern void free_RSA_private_content(RSA_private_key_t *rsak);
+
+#endif /* _PKCS1_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs7.c b/src/pluto/pkcs7.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3068c0c94
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pkcs7.c
@@ -0,0 +1,862 @@
+/* Support of PKCS#7 data structures
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pkcs7.c,v 1.13 2005/12/22 22:11:24 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <libdes/des.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "pkcs7.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+
+const contentInfo_t empty_contentInfo = {
+    OID_UNKNOWN , /* type */
+    { NULL, 0 }   /* content */
+};
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 ContentInfo type */
+
+static const asn1Object_t contentInfoObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "contentInfo",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "contentType",			ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "content",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,	   ASN1_END  }  /*  3 */
+};
+
+#define PKCS7_INFO_TYPE		1
+#define PKCS7_INFO_CONTENT	2
+#define PKCS7_INFO_ROOF		4
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 signedData type */
+
+static const asn1Object_t signedDataObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "signedData",			  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "version",			  ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "digestAlgorithms",		  ASN1_SET,          ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,     "algorithm",			  ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  3 */
+  { 1,   "end loop",			  ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  4 */
+  { 1,   "contentInfo",			  ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  5 */
+  { 1,   "certificates",		  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  6 */
+  { 2,      "certificate",		  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  7 */
+  { 1,   "end opt or loop",		  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /*  8 */
+  { 1,   "crls",			  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
+							     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  9 */
+  { 2,	    "crl",			  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
+  { 1,   "end opt or loop",		  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
+  { 1,   "signerInfos",			  ASN1_SET,	     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 12 */
+  { 2,     "signerInfo",		  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
+  { 3,       "version",			  ASN1_INTEGER,	     ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+  { 3,       "issuerAndSerialNumber",	  ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
+  { 4,         "issuer",	          ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 16 */
+  { 4,         "serial",	          ASN1_INTEGER,	     ASN1_BODY }, /* 17 */
+  { 3,       "digestAlgorithm",		  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_RAW  }, /* 18 */
+  { 3,       "authenticatedAttributes",	  ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 19 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
+  { 3,       "digestEncryptionAlgorithm", ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_RAW  }, /* 21 */
+  { 3,       "encryptedDigest",		  ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 22 */
+  { 3,       "unauthenticatedAttributes", ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 23 */
+  { 3,       "end opt",			  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }, /* 24 */
+  { 1,   "end loop",			  ASN1_EOC,	     ASN1_END  }  /* 25 */
+};
+
+#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ALG	 	 3
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_CONTENT_INFO	 5
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_CERT	 	 7
+#define PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO		13
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_ISSUER		16
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_SERIAL_NUMBER	17
+#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ALGORITHM		18
+#define PKCS7_AUTH_ATTRIBUTES		19
+#define PKCS7_DIGEST_ENC_ALGORITHM	21
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DIGEST		22
+#define PKCS7_SIGNED_ROOF		26
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of the PKCS#7 envelopedData type */
+
+static const asn1Object_t envelopedDataObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "envelopedData",				ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "version",				ASN1_INTEGER, 		ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "recipientInfos",			ASN1_SET,    		ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,     "recipientInfo",			ASN1_SEQUENCE, 		ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+  { 3,       "version",				ASN1_INTEGER, 		ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 3,       "issuerAndSerialNumber",	        ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+  { 4,         "issuer",	        	ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  6 */
+  { 4,         "serial",	        	ASN1_INTEGER,		ASN1_BODY }, /*  7 */
+  { 3,       "encryptionAlgorithm",	       	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /*  8 */
+  { 3,       "encryptedKey",		       	ASN1_OCTET_STRING,	ASN1_BODY }, /*  9 */
+  { 1,   "end loop",				ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_END  }, /* 10 */
+  { 1,   "encryptedContentInfo",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,		ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 11 */
+  { 2,     "contentType",			ASN1_OID,		ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
+  { 2,     "contentEncryptionAlgorithm",	ASN1_EOC,		ASN1_RAW  }, /* 13 */
+  { 2,     "encryptedContent",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0, 	ASN1_BODY }  /* 14 */
+};
+
+#define PKCS7_ENVELOPED_VERSION		 1
+#define PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION	 4
+#define PKCS7_ISSUER			 6
+#define PKCS7_SERIAL_NUMBER		 7
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTION_ALG		 8
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_KEY		 9
+#define PKCS7_CONTENT_TYPE		12
+#define PKCS7_CONTENT_ENC_ALGORITHM	13
+#define PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT		14
+#define PKCS7_ENVELOPED_ROOF		15
+
+/* PKCS7 contentInfo OIDs */
+
+static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x01
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x02
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x03
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x04
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x05
+};
+
+static char ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x07, 0x06
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid = 
+			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid = 
+			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid_str);
+
+/* 3DES and DES encryption OIDs */
+
+static u_char ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x08, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x03, 0x07
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_des_cbc_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x05, 0x2B, 0x0E, 0x03, 0x02, 0x07
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid = 
+			strchunk(ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_des_cbc_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_des_cbc_oid_str);
+
+/* PKCS#7 attribute type OIDs */
+
+static u_char ASN1_contentType_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x03
+};
+
+static u_char ASN1_messageDigest_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x09, 0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7, 0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x04
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_contentType_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_contentType_oid_str);
+static const chunk_t ASN1_messageDigest_oid =
+			strchunk(ASN1_messageDigest_oid_str);
+
+/*
+ * Parse PKCS#7 ContentInfo object
+ */
+bool
+pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, contentInfo_t *cInfo)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < PKCS7_INFO_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(contentInfoObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	if (objectID == PKCS7_INFO_TYPE)
+	{
+	    cInfo->type = known_oid(object);
+	    if (cInfo->type < OID_PKCS7_DATA
+	    ||  cInfo->type > OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA)
+	    {
+		plog("unknown pkcs7 content type");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (objectID == PKCS7_INFO_CONTENT)
+	{
+	    cInfo->content = object;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#7 signedData object
+ */
+bool
+pkcs7_parse_signedData(chunk_t blob, contentInfo_t *data, x509cert_t **cert
+, chunk_t *attributes, const x509cert_t *cacert)
+{
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int digest_alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int enc_alg    = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int signerInfos = 0;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    contentInfo_t cInfo = empty_contentInfo;
+    chunk_t encrypted_digest = empty_chunk;
+
+    if (!pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(blob, 0, &cInfo))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (cInfo.type != OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA)
+    {
+	plog("pkcs7 content type is not signedData");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, cInfo.content, 2, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < PKCS7_SIGNED_ROOF)
+   {
+	if (!extract_object(signedDataObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case PKCS7_DIGEST_ALG:
+	    digest_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_SIGNED_CONTENT_INFO:
+	    if (data != NULL)
+	    {
+		pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(object, level, data);
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_SIGNED_CERT:
+	    if (cert != NULL)
+	    {
+		chunk_t cert_blob;
+
+		x509cert_t *newcert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t
+					, "pkcs7 wrapped x509cert");
+
+		clonetochunk(cert_blob, object.ptr, object.len
+			    , "pkcs7 cert blob");
+		*newcert = empty_x509cert;
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		    DBG_log("parsing pkcs7-wrapped certificate")
+		)
+		if (parse_x509cert(cert_blob, level+1, newcert))
+		{
+		    newcert->next = *cert;
+		    *cert = newcert;
+		}
+	        else
+		{
+		    free_x509cert(newcert);
+	    	}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO:
+	    signerInfos++;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  signer #%d", signerInfos)
+	    )
+	    break;	
+	case PKCS7_SIGNED_ISSUER:
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_AUTH_ATTRIBUTES:
+	    if (attributes != NULL)
+	    {
+		*attributes = object;
+		*attributes->ptr = ASN1_SET;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_DIGEST_ALGORITHM:
+	    digest_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_DIGEST_ENC_ALGORITHM:
+	    enc_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DIGEST:
+	    encrypted_digest = object;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+
+    /* check the signature only if a cacert is available */
+    if (cacert != NULL)
+    {
+	if (signerInfos == 0)
+	{
+	    plog("no signerInfo object found");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	else if (signerInfos > 1)
+	{
+	    plog("more than one signerInfo object found");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (attributes->ptr == NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("no authenticatedAttributes object found");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (!check_signature(*attributes, encrypted_digest, digest_alg
+	   , enc_alg, cacert))
+	{
+	    plog("invalid signature");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("signature is valid")
+	    )
+	}
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse a PKCS#7 envelopedData object
+ */
+bool
+pkcs7_parse_envelopedData(chunk_t blob, chunk_t *data
+, chunk_t serialNumber, const RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    chunk_t iv                = empty_chunk;
+    chunk_t symmetric_key     = empty_chunk;
+    chunk_t encrypted_content = empty_chunk;
+
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    u_int level;
+    u_int total_keys = 3;
+    int enc_alg         = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int content_enc_alg = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    contentInfo_t cInfo = empty_contentInfo;
+    *data = empty_chunk;
+
+    if (!pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(blob, 0, &cInfo))
+	goto failed;
+
+    if (cInfo.type != OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA)
+    {
+	plog("pkcs7 content type is not envelopedData");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, cInfo.content, 2, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < PKCS7_ENVELOPED_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(envelopedDataObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     goto failed;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case PKCS7_ENVELOPED_VERSION:
+	if (*object.ptr != 0)
+	{
+	    plog("envelopedData version is not 0");
+	    goto failed;
+	}
+	break;
+	case PKCS7_RECIPIENT_INFO_VERSION:
+	    if (*object.ptr != 0)
+	    {
+		plog("recipient info version is not 0");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_ISSUER:
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'", buf)
+	    )
+	    break;	
+	case PKCS7_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+	    if (!same_chunk(serialNumber, object))
+	    {
+		plog("serial numbers do not match");
+		goto failed;
+	    }	
+	    break;	
+	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTION_ALG:
+	    enc_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    if (enc_alg != OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+	    {
+		plog("only rsa encryption supported");
+		goto failed;
+	    } 
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_KEY:
+	    if (!RSA_decrypt(key, object, &symmetric_key))
+	    {
+		plog("symmetric key could not be decrypted with rsa");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	    DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+		DBG_dump_chunk("symmetric key :", symmetric_key)
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_CONTENT_TYPE:
+	    if (known_oid(object) != OID_PKCS7_DATA)
+	    {
+		 plog("encrypted content not of type pkcs7 data");
+		 goto failed;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_CONTENT_ENC_ALGORITHM:
+	    content_enc_alg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, &iv);
+
+	    switch (content_enc_alg)
+	    {
+	    case OID_DES_CBC:
+		total_keys = 1;
+		break;
+	    case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
+		total_keys = 3;
+		break;
+	    default:
+		plog("Only DES and 3DES supported for symmetric encryption");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	    if (symmetric_key.len != (total_keys * DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE))
+	    {
+		plog("key length is not %d",(total_keys * DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE));
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	    if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&iv, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, level+1, "IV"))
+	    {
+		plog("IV could not be parsed");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	    if (iv.len != DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE)
+	    {
+		plog("IV has wrong length");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_CONTENT:
+	    encrypted_content = object;
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+
+    /* decrypt the content */
+    {
+	u_int i;
+	des_cblock des_key[3], des_iv;
+	des_key_schedule key_s[3];
+
+	memcpy((char *)des_key, symmetric_key.ptr, symmetric_key.len);
+	memcpy((char *)des_iv, iv.ptr, iv.len);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < total_keys; i++)
+	{
+	    if (des_set_key(&des_key[i], key_s[i]))
+	    {
+		plog("des key schedule failed");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	data->len = encrypted_content.len;
+	data->ptr = alloc_bytes(data->len, "decrypted data");
+
+	switch (content_enc_alg)
+	{
+	case OID_DES_CBC:
+	    des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)encrypted_content.ptr
+			  , (des_cblock*)data->ptr, data->len
+			  , key_s[0], &des_iv, DES_DECRYPT);
+	    break;
+	case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
+	    des_ede3_cbc_encrypt( (des_cblock*)encrypted_content.ptr
+				, (des_cblock*)data->ptr, data->len
+				, key_s[0], key_s[1], key_s[2]
+				, &des_iv, DES_DECRYPT);
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	    DBG_dump_chunk("decrypted content with padding:\n", *data)
+	)
+    }
+ 
+    /* remove the padding */
+    {
+	u_char *pos = data->ptr + data->len - 1;
+	u_char pattern = *pos;
+	size_t padding = pattern;
+
+	if (padding > data->len)
+	{
+	    plog("padding greater than data length");
+	    goto failed;
+	}
+	data->len -= padding;
+
+	while (padding-- > 0)
+	{
+	    if (*pos-- != pattern)
+	    {
+		plog("wrong padding pattern");
+		goto failed;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    freeanychunk(symmetric_key);
+    return TRUE;
+
+failed:
+    freeanychunk(symmetric_key);
+    pfreeany(data->ptr);
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Builds a contentType attribute
+ *
+ * @return ASN.1 encoded contentType attribute
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs7_contentType_attribute(void)
+{
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, ASN1_contentType_oid
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SET, ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid));
+}
+
+/**
+ * @brief Builds a messageDigest attribute
+ * 
+ * 
+ * @param[in] blob content to create digest of
+ * @param[in] digest_alg digest algorithm to be used
+ * @return ASN.1 encoded messageDigest attribute
+ * 
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs7_messageDigest_attribute(chunk_t content, int digest_alg)
+{
+    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    chunk_t digest = { digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN };
+
+    compute_digest(content, digest_alg, &digest);
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, ASN1_messageDigest_oid
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m"
+		    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, digest)
+		  )
+	   );
+}
+/*
+ * build a DER-encoded contentInfo object
+ */
+static chunk_t
+pkcs7_build_contentInfo(contentInfo_t *cInfo)
+{
+    chunk_t content_type;
+
+    /* select DER-encoded OID for pkcs7 contentInfo type */
+    switch(cInfo->type)
+    {
+    case OID_PKCS7_DATA:
+	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid;
+	break;
+    case OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA:
+	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_signed_data_oid;
+	break;
+    case OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_enveloped_data_oid;
+	break;
+    case OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_ENVELOPED_DATA:
+	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_signed_enveloped_data_oid;
+	break;
+    case OID_PKCS7_DIGESTED_DATA:
+	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_digested_data_oid;
+	break;
+    case OID_PKCS7_ENCRYPTED_DATA:
+	content_type = ASN1_pkcs7_encrypted_data_oid;
+	break;
+    case OID_UNKNOWN:
+    default:
+	fprintf(stderr, "invalid pkcs7 contentInfo type");
+	return empty_chunk;
+    }
+
+    return (cInfo->content.ptr == NULL)
+	? asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SEQUENCE, content_type)
+	: asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+	    , content_type
+	    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, cInfo->content)
+          );
+}
+
+/*
+ * build issuerAndSerialNumber object
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(const x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, cert->issuer
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, cert->serialNumber));
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a signed pkcs7 contentInfo object
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs7_build_signedData(chunk_t data, chunk_t attributes, const x509cert_t *cert
+, int digest_alg, const RSA_private_key_t *key)
+{
+    contentInfo_t pkcs7Data, signedData;
+    chunk_t authenticatedAttributes, encryptedDigest, signerInfo, cInfo;
+
+    chunk_t digestAlgorithm = asn1_algorithmIdentifier(digest_alg);
+
+    if (attributes.ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	encryptedDigest = pkcs1_build_signature(attributes, digest_alg
+				, key, FALSE);
+	clonetochunk(authenticatedAttributes, attributes.ptr, attributes.len
+	    , "authenticatedAttributes");
+	*authenticatedAttributes.ptr = ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	encryptedDigest = (data.ptr == NULL)? empty_chunk
+		: pkcs1_build_signature(data, digest_alg, key, FALSE);
+	authenticatedAttributes = empty_chunk;
+    }
+
+    signerInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmcmcm"
+		, ASN1_INTEGER_1
+		, pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(cert)
+		, digestAlgorithm
+		, authenticatedAttributes
+		, ASN1_rsaEncryption_id
+		, encryptedDigest);
+
+    pkcs7Data.type    = OID_PKCS7_DATA;
+    pkcs7Data.content = (data.ptr == NULL)? empty_chunk
+		: asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, data);
+
+    signedData.type = OID_PKCS7_SIGNED_DATA;
+    signedData.content = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmmmm"
+		, ASN1_INTEGER_1
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_SET, digestAlgorithm)
+		, pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&pkcs7Data)
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, cert->certificate)
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m", signerInfo));
+
+    cInfo = pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&signedData);
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("signedData:\n", cInfo)
+    )
+
+    freeanychunk(pkcs7Data.content);
+    freeanychunk(signedData.content);
+    return cInfo;
+}
+
+/*
+ * create a symmetrically encrypted pkcs7 contentInfo object
+ */
+chunk_t
+pkcs7_build_envelopedData(chunk_t data, const x509cert_t *cert, int cipher)
+{
+    bool des_check_key_save;
+    des_key_schedule ks[3];
+    des_cblock key[3], des_iv, des_iv_buf;
+
+    chunk_t iv = { (u_char *)des_iv_buf, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE };
+    chunk_t out;
+    chunk_t cipher_oid;
+
+    u_int total_keys, i;
+    size_t padding = pad_up(data.len, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+    RSA_public_key_t public_key;
+
+    init_RSA_public_key(&public_key, cert->publicExponent
+				   , cert->modulus);
+
+    if (padding == 0)
+	padding += DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+    out.len = data.len + padding;
+    out.ptr = alloc_bytes(out.len, "DES-encrypted output");
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("padding %d bytes of data to multiple DES block size of %d bytes"
+		, (int)data.len, (int)out.len)
+    )
+
+    /* copy data */
+    memcpy(out.ptr, data.ptr, data.len);
+    /* append padding */
+    memset(out.ptr + data.len, padding, padding);
+
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("Padded unencrypted data:\n", out)
+    )
+
+    /* select OID and keylength for specified cipher */
+    switch (cipher)
+    {
+    case OID_DES_CBC:
+	 total_keys = 1;
+	 cipher_oid = ASN1_des_cbc_oid;
+	 break;
+    case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
+    default:
+	total_keys = 3;
+	cipher_oid = ASN1_3des_ede_cbc_oid;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("pkcs7 encryption cipher: %s", oid_names[cipher].name)
+    )
+
+    /* generate a strong random key for DES/3DES */
+    des_check_key_save = des_check_key;
+    des_check_key = TRUE;
+    for (i = 0; i < total_keys;i++)
+    {
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    get_rnd_bytes((char*)key[i], DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	    des_set_odd_parity(&key[i]);
+	    if (!des_set_key(&key[i], ks[i]))
+		break;
+	    plog("weak DES key discarded - we try again");
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_PRIVATE,
+	    DBG_dump("DES key:", key[i], 8)
+	)
+    }
+    des_check_key = des_check_key_save;
+
+    /* generate an iv for DES/3DES CBC */
+    get_rnd_bytes(des_iv, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    memcpy(iv.ptr, des_iv, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE);
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("DES IV :", iv)
+    )
+
+    /* encryption using specified cipher */
+    switch (cipher)
+    {
+    case OID_DES_CBC:
+	des_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)out.ptr, (des_cblock*)out.ptr, out.len
+		       , ks[0], &des_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);
+	break;
+    case OID_3DES_EDE_CBC:
+    default:
+	des_ede3_cbc_encrypt((des_cblock*)out.ptr, (des_cblock*)out.ptr, out.len
+			    , ks[0], ks[1], ks[2], &des_iv, DES_ENCRYPT);	
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("Encrypted data:\n", out));
+	
+    /* build pkcs7 enveloped data object */ 
+    {
+	chunk_t contentEncryptionAlgorithm = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		    , cipher_oid
+		    , asn1_simple_object(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, iv));
+	
+	chunk_t encryptedContentInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
+		    , ASN1_pkcs7_data_oid
+		    , contentEncryptionAlgorithm
+		    , asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0, "m", out));
+
+        chunk_t plainKey = { (u_char *)key, DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * total_keys };
+
+	chunk_t encryptedKey = asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m"
+		    , RSA_encrypt(&public_key, plainKey));
+
+	chunk_t recipientInfo = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmcm"
+		    , ASN1_INTEGER_0
+		    , pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(cert)
+		    , ASN1_rsaEncryption_id
+		    , encryptedKey);
+
+        chunk_t cInfo;
+	contentInfo_t envelopedData;
+
+        envelopedData.type = OID_PKCS7_ENVELOPED_DATA;
+	envelopedData.content = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cmm"
+		    , ASN1_INTEGER_0
+		    , asn1_wrap(ASN1_SET, "m", recipientInfo)
+		    , encryptedContentInfo);
+
+	cInfo = pkcs7_build_contentInfo(&envelopedData);
+	DBG(DBG_RAW,
+	    DBG_dump_chunk("envelopedData:\n", cInfo)
+	)
+
+	free_RSA_public_content(&public_key);
+	freeanychunk(envelopedData.content);
+	return cInfo;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/pkcs7.h b/src/pluto/pkcs7.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..38c633f4e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pkcs7.h
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* Support of PKCS#7 data structures
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Jan Hutter, Martin Willi
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: pkcs7.h,v 1.10 2005/12/22 22:11:24 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS7_H
+#define _PKCS7_H
+
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+
+/* Access structure for a PKCS#7 ContentInfo object */
+
+typedef struct contentInfo contentInfo_t;
+
+struct contentInfo {
+    int     type;
+    chunk_t content;
+};
+
+extern const contentInfo_t empty_contentInfo;
+
+extern bool pkcs7_parse_contentInfo(chunk_t blob, u_int level0
+    , contentInfo_t *cInfo);
+extern bool pkcs7_parse_signedData(chunk_t blob, contentInfo_t *data
+    , x509cert_t **cert, chunk_t *attributes, const x509cert_t *cacert);
+extern bool pkcs7_parse_envelopedData(chunk_t blob, chunk_t *data
+    , chunk_t serialNumber, const RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_contentType_attribute(void);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_messageDigest_attribute(chunk_t content, int digest_alg);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_issuerAndSerialNumber(const x509cert_t *cert);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_signedData(chunk_t data, chunk_t attributes
+    ,const x509cert_t *cert, int digest_alg, const RSA_private_key_t *key);
+extern chunk_t pkcs7_build_envelopedData(chunk_t data, const x509cert_t *cert
+    , int cipher);
+
+#endif /* _PKCS7_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/pluto.8 b/src/pluto/pluto.8
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..b80d13772
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/pluto.8
@@ -0,0 +1,1649 @@
+.TH IPSEC_PLUTO 8 "28 March 1999"
+.SH NAME
+ipsec pluto \- IPsec IKE keying daemon
+.br
+ipsec whack \- control interface for IPSEC keying daemon
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.na
+.nh
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec pluto
+[\-\-help]
+[\-\-version]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-nofork]
+[\-\-stderrlog]
+[\-\-noklips]
+[\-\-uniqueids]
+[\fB\-\-interface\fP \fIinterfacename\fP]
+[\-\-ikeport\ \c
+\fIportnumber\fP]
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-secretsfile\ \c
+\fIsecrets\(hyfile\fP]
+[\-\-adns \fIpathname\fP]
+[\-\-lwdnsq \fIpathname\fP]
+[\-\-perpeerlog]
+[\-\-perpeerlogbase\ \c
+\fIdirname\fP]
+[\-\-debug\(hynone]
+[\-\-debug\(hyall]
+[\-\-debug\(hyraw]
+[\-\-debug\(hycrypt]
+[\-\-debug\(hyparsing]
+[\-\-debug\(hyemitting]
+[\-\-debug\(hycontrol]
+[\-\-debug\(hylifecycle]
+[\-\-debug\(hyklips]
+[\-\-debug\(hydns]
+[\-\-debug\(hyoppo]
+[\-\-debug\(hyprivate]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+[\-\-help]
+[\-\-version]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-name\ \c
+\fIconnection-name\fP
+.br
+[\-\-id\ \c
+\fIid\fP] \c
+[\-\-host\ \c
+\fIip\(hyaddress\fP]
+[\-\-ikeport\ \c
+\fIport\(hynumber\fP]
+[\-\-nexthop\ \c
+\fIip\(hyaddress\fP]
+[\-\-client\ \c
+\fIsubnet\fP]
+[\-\-dnskeyondemand]
+[\-\-updown\ \c
+\fIupdown\fP]
+.br
+\-\-to
+.br
+[\-\-id\ \c
+\fIid\fP]
+[\-\-host\ \c
+\fIip\(hyaddress\fP]
+[\-\-ikeport\ \c
+\fIport\(hynumber\fP]
+[\-\-nexthop\ \c
+\fIip\(hyaddress\fP]
+[\-\-client\ \c
+\fIsubnet\fP]
+[\-\-dnskeyondemand]
+[\-\-updown\ \c
+\fIupdown\fP]
+.br
+[\-\-psk]
+[\-\-rsasig]
+[\-\-encrypt]
+[\-\-authenticate]
+[\-\-compress]
+[\-\-tunnel]
+[\-\-pfs]
+[\-\-disablearrivalcheck]
+[\-\-ipv4]
+[\-\-ipv6]
+[\-\-tunnelipv4]
+[\-\-tunnelipv6]
+[\-\-ikelifetime\ \c
+\fIseconds\fP]
+[\-\-ipseclifetime\ \c
+\fIseconds\fP]
+[\-\-rekeymargin\ \c
+\fIseconds\fP]
+[\-\-rekeyfuzz\ \c
+\fIpercentage\fP]
+[\-\-keyingtries\ \c
+\fIcount\fP]
+[\-\-dontrekey]
+[\-\-delete]
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-keyid\ \c
+\fIid\fP
+[\-\-addkey]
+[\-\-pubkeyrsa\ \c
+\fIkey\fP]
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-myid\ \c
+\fIid\fP
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-listen|\-\-unlisten
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-route|\-\-unroute
+\-\-name\ \c
+\fIconnection-name\fP
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-initiate|\-\-terminate
+\-\-name\ \c
+\fIconnection-name\fP
+[\-\-asynchronous]
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+[\-\-tunnelipv4]
+[\-\-tunnelipv6]
+\-\-oppohere \fIip\(hyaddress\fP
+\-\-oppothere \fIip\(hyaddress\fP
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-delete
+\-\-name\ \c
+\fIconnection-name\fP
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-deletestate\ \c
+\fIstate-number\fP
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+[\-\-name\ \c
+\fIconnection-name\fP]
+[\-\-debug\(hynone]
+[\-\-debug\(hyall]
+[\-\-debug\(hyraw]
+[\-\-debug\(hycrypt]
+[\-\-debug\(hyparsing]
+[\-\-debug\(hyemitting]
+[\-\-debug\(hycontrol]
+[\-\-debug\(hylifecycle]
+[\-\-debug\(hyklips]
+[\-\-debug\(hydns]
+[\-\-debug\(hyoppo]
+[\-\-debug\(hyprivate]
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-status
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.HP
+.ft B
+ipsec whack
+\-\-shutdown
+[\-\-ctlbase\ \c
+\fIpath\fP]
+[\-\-optionsfrom\ \c
+\fIfilename\fP]
+[\-\-label\ \c
+\fIstring\fP]
+.ft R
+.hy
+.ad
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.BR pluto
+is an IKE (``IPsec Key Exchange'') daemon.
+.BR whack
+is an auxiliary program to allow requests to be made to a running
+.BR pluto .
+.LP
+.BR pluto
+is used to automatically build shared ``security associations'' on a
+system that has IPsec, the secure IP protocol.
+In other words,
+.BR pluto
+can eliminate much of the work of manual keying.
+The actual
+secure transmission of packets is the responsibility of other parts of
+the system (see
+.BR KLIPS ,
+the companion implementation of IPsec).
+\fIipsec_auto\fP(8) provides a more convenient interface to
+\fBpluto\fP and \fBwhack\fP.
+.SS IKE's Job
+.LP
+A \fISecurity Association\fP (\fISA\fP) is an agreement between two network nodes on
+how to process certain traffic between them.  This processing involves
+encapsulation, authentication, encryption, or compression.
+.LP
+IKE can be deployed on a network node to negotiate Security
+Associations for that node.  These IKE implementations can only
+negotiate with other IKE implementations, so IKE must be on each node
+that is to be an endpoint of an IKE-negotiated Security Association.
+No other nodes need to be running IKE.
+.LP
+An IKE instance (i.e. an IKE implementation on a particular network
+node) communicates with another IKE instance using UDP IP packets, so
+there must be a route between the nodes in each direction.
+.LP
+The negotiation of Security Associations requires a number of choices
+that involve tradeoffs between security, convenience, trust, and
+efficiency.  These are policy issues and are normally specified to the
+IKE instance by the system administrator.
+.LP
+IKE deals with two kinds of Security Associations.  The first part of
+a negotiation between IKE instances is to build an ISAKMP SA.  An
+ISAKMP SA is used to protect communication between the two IKEs.
+IPsec SAs can then be built by the IKEs \- these are used to carry
+protected IP traffic between the systems.
+.LP
+The negotiation of the ISAKMP SA is known as Phase 1.  In theory,
+Phase 1 can be accomplished by a couple of different exchange types,
+but we only implement one called Main Mode (we don't implement
+Aggressive Mode).
+.LP
+Any negotiation under the protection of an ISAKMP SA, including the
+negotiation of IPsec SAs, is part of Phase 2.  The exchange type
+that we use to negotiate an IPsec SA is called Quick Mode.
+.LP
+IKE instances must be able to authenticate each other as part of their
+negotiation of an ISAKMP SA.  This can be done by several mechanisms
+described in the draft standards.
+.LP
+IKE negotiation can be initiated by any instance with any other.  If
+both can find an agreeable set of characteristics for a Security
+Association, and both recognize each others authenticity, they can set
+up a Security Association.  The standards do not specify what causes
+an IKE instance to initiate a negotiation.
+.LP
+In summary, an IKE instance is prepared to automate the management of
+Security Associations in an IPsec environment, but a number of issues
+are considered policy and are left in the system administrator's hands.
+.SS Pluto
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP is an implementation of IKE.  It runs as a daemon on a network
+node.  Currently, this network node must be a LINUX system running the
+\fBKLIPS\fP implementation of IPsec.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP only implements a subset of IKE.  This is enough for it to
+interoperate with other instances of \fBpluto\fP, and many other IKE
+implementations.  We are working on implementing more of IKE.
+.LP
+The policy for acceptable characteristics for Security Associations is
+mostly hardwired into the code of \fBpluto\fP (spdb.c).  Eventually
+this will be moved into a security policy database with reasonable
+expressive power and more convenience.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP uses shared secrets or RSA signatures to authenticate
+peers with whom it is negotiating.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP initiates negotiation of a Security Association when it is
+manually prodded: the program \fBwhack\fP is run to trigger this.
+It will also initiate a negotiation when \fBKLIPS\fP traps an outbound packet
+for Opportunistic Encryption.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP implements ISAKMP SAs itself.  After it has negotiated the
+characteristics of an IPsec SA, it directs \fBKLIPS\fP to implement it.
+It also invokes a script to adjust any firewall and issue \fIroute\fP(8)
+commands to direct IP packets through \fBKLIPS\fP.
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP shuts down, it closes all Security Associations.
+.SS Before Running Pluto
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP runs as a daemon with userid root.  Before running it, a few
+things must be set up.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP requires \fBKLIPS\fP, the FreeS/WAN implementation of IPsec.
+All of the components of \fBKLIPS\fP and \fBpluto\fP should be installed.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP supports multiple public networks (that is, networks
+that are considered insecure and thus need to have their traffic
+encrypted or authenticated).  It discovers the
+public interfaces to use by looking at all interfaces that are
+configured (the \fB\-\-interface\fP option can be used to limit
+the interfaces considered).
+It does this only when \fBwhack\fP tells it to \-\-listen,
+so the interfaces must be configured by then.  Each interface with a name of the form
+\fBipsec\fP[\fB0\fP-\fB9\fP] is taken as a \fBKLIPS\fP virtual public interface.
+Another network interface with the same IP address (there should be only
+one) is taken as the corresponding real public
+interface.  \fIifconfig\fP(8) with the \fB\-a\fP flag will show
+the name and status of each network interface.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP requires a database of preshared secrets and RSA private keys.
+This is described in the
+.IR ipsec.secrets (5).
+\fBpluto\fP is told of RSA public keys via \fBwhack\fP commands.
+If the connection is Opportunistic, and no RSA public key is known,
+\fBpluto\fP will attempt to fetch RSA keys using the Domain Name System.
+.SS Setting up \fBKLIPS\fP for \fBpluto\fP
+.LP
+The most basic network topology that \fBpluto\fP supports has two security
+gateways negotiating on behalf of client subnets.  The diagram of RGB's
+testbed is a good example (see \fIklips/doc/rgb_setup.txt\fP).
+.LP
+The file \fIINSTALL\fP in the base directory of this distribution
+explains how to start setting up the whole system, including \fBKLIPS\fP.
+.LP
+Make sure that the security gateways have routes to each other.  This
+is usually covered by the default route, but may require issuing
+.IR route (8)
+commands.  The route must go through a particular IP
+interface (we will assume it is \fIeth0\fP, but it need not be).  The
+interface that connects the security gateway to its client must be a
+different one.
+.LP
+It is necessary to issue a
+.IR ipsec_tncfg (8)
+command on each gateway.  The required command is:
+
+\ \ \ ipsec tncfg \-\-attach\ \-\-virtual\ ipsec0 \-\-physical\ eth0
+
+A command to set up the ipsec0 virtual interface will also need to be
+run.  It will have the same parameters as the command used to set up
+the physical interface to which it has just been connected using
+.IR ipsec_tncfg (8).
+.SS ipsec.secrets file
+.LP
+A \fBpluto\fP daemon and another IKE daemon (for example, another instance
+of \fBpluto\fP) must convince each other that they are who they are supposed
+to be before any negotiation can succeed.  This authentication is
+accomplished by using either secrets that have been shared beforehand
+(manually) or by using RSA signatures.  There are other techniques,
+but they have not been implemented in \fBpluto\fP.
+.LP
+The file \fI/etc/ipsec.secrets\fP is used to keep preshared secret keys
+and RSA private keys for
+authentication with other IKE daemons.  For debugging, there is an
+argument to the \fBpluto\fP command to use a different file.
+This file is described in
+.IR ipsec.secrets (5).
+.SS Running Pluto
+.LP
+To fire up the daemon, just type \fBpluto\fP (be sure to be running as
+the superuser).
+The default IKE port number is 500, the UDP port assigned by IANA for IKE Daemons.
+\fBpluto\fP must be run by the superuser to be able to use the UDP 500 port.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP attempts to create a lockfile with the name
+\fI/var/run/pluto.pid\fP.  If the lockfile cannot be created,
+\fBpluto\fP exits \- this prevents multiple \fBpluto\fPs from
+competing  Any ``leftover'' lockfile must be removed before
+\fBpluto\fP will run.  \fBpluto\fP writes its pid into this file so
+that scripts can find it.  This lock will not function properly if it
+is on an NFS volume (but sharing locks on multiple machines doesn't
+make sense anyway).
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP then forks and the parent exits.  This is the conventional
+``daemon fork''.  It can make debugging awkward, so there is an option
+to suppress this fork.
+.LP
+All logging, including diagnostics, is sent to
+.IR syslog (3)
+with facility=authpriv;
+it decides where to put these messages (possibly in /var/log/secure).
+Since this too can make debugging awkward, there is an option to
+steer logging to stderr.
+.LP
+If the \fB\-\-perpeerlog\fP option is given, then pluto will open
+a log file per connection. By default, this is in /var/log/pluto/peer,
+in a subdirectory formed by turning all dot (.) [IPv4} or colon (:)
+[IPv6] into slashes (/).
+.LP
+The base directory can be changed with the \fB\-\-perpeerlogbase\fP.
+.LP
+Once \fBpluto\fP is started, it waits for requests from \fBwhack\fP.
+.SS Pluto's Internal State
+.LP
+To understand how to use \fBpluto\fP, it is helpful to understand a little
+about its internal state.  Furthermore, the terminology is needed to decipher
+some of the diagnostic messages.
+.LP
+The \fI(potential) connection\fP database describes attributes of a
+connection.  These include the IP addresses of the hosts and client
+subnets and the security characteristics desired.  \fBpluto\fP
+requires this information (simply called a connection) before it can
+respond to a request to build an SA.  Each connection is given a name
+when it is created, and all references are made using this name.
+.LP
+During the IKE exchange to build an SA, the information about the
+negotiation is represented in a \fIstate object\fP.  Each state object
+reflects how far the negotiation has reached.  Once the negotiation is
+complete and the SA established, the state object remains to represent
+the SA.  When the SA is terminated, the state object is discarded.
+Each State object is given a serial number and this is used to refer
+to the state objects in logged messages.
+.LP
+Each state object corresponds to a connection and can be thought of
+as an instantiation of that connection.
+At any particular time, there may be any number of state objects
+corresponding to a particular connection.
+Often there is one representing an ISAKMP SA and another representing
+an IPsec SA.
+.LP
+\fBKLIPS\fP hooks into the routing code in a LINUX kernel.
+Traffic to be processed by an IPsec SA must be directed through
+\fBKLIPS\fP by routing commands.  Furthermore, the processing to be
+done is specified by \fIipsec eroute(8)\fP commands.
+\fBpluto\fP takes the responsibility of managing both of these special
+kinds of routes.
+.LP
+Each connection may be routed, and must be while it has an IPsec SA.
+The connection specifies the characteristics of the route: the
+interface on this machine, the ``gateway'' (the nexthop),
+and the peer's client subnet.  Two
+connections may not be simultaneously routed if they are for the same
+peer's client subnet but use different interfaces or gateways
+(\fBpluto\fP's logic does not reflect any advanced routing capabilities).
+.LP
+Each eroute is associated with the state object for an IPsec SA
+because it has the particular characteristics of the SA.
+Two eroutes conflict if they specify the identical local
+and remote clients (unlike for routes, the local clients are
+taken into account).
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP needs to install a route for a connection,
+it must make sure that no conflicting route is in use.  If another
+connection has a conflicting route, that route will be taken down, as long
+as there is no IPsec SA instantiating that connection.
+If there is such an IPsec SA, the attempt to install a route will fail.
+.LP
+There is an exception.  If \fBpluto\fP, as Responder, needs to install
+a route to a fixed client subnet for a connection, and there is
+already a conflicting route, then the SAs using the route are deleted
+to make room for the new SAs.  The rationale is that the new
+connection is probably more current.  The need for this usually is a
+product of Road Warrior connections (these are explained later; they
+cannot be used to initiate).
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP needs to install an eroute for an IPsec SA (for a
+state object), first the state object's connection must be routed (if
+this cannot be done, the eroute and SA will not be installed).
+If a conflicting eroute is already in place for another connection,
+the eroute and SA will not be installed (but note that the routing
+exception mentioned above may have already deleted potentially conflicting SAs).
+If another IPsec
+SA for the same connection already has an eroute, all its outgoing traffic
+is taken over by the new eroute.  The incoming traffic will still be
+processed.  This characteristic is exploited during rekeying.
+.LP
+All of these routing characteristics are expected change when
+\fBKLIPS\fP is modified to use the firewall hooks in the LINUX 2.4.x
+kernel.
+.SS Using Whack
+.LP
+\fBwhack\fP is used to command a running \fBpluto\fP.
+\fBwhack\fP uses a UNIX domain socket to speak to \fBpluto\fP
+(by default, \fI/var/pluto.ctl\fP).
+.LP
+\fBwhack\fP has an intricate argument syntax.
+This syntax allows many different functions to be specified.
+The help form shows the usage or version information.
+The connection form gives \fBpluto\fP a description of a potential connection.
+The public key form informs \fBpluto\fP of the RSA public key for a potential peer.
+The delete form deletes a connection description and all SAs corresponding
+to it.
+The listen form tells \fBpluto\fP to start or stop listening on the public interfaces
+for IKE requests from peers.
+The route form tells \fBpluto\fP to set up routing for a connection;
+the unroute form undoes this.
+The initiate form tells \fBpluto\fP to negotiate an SA corresponding to a connection.
+The terminate form tells \fBpluto\fP to remove all SAs corresponding to a connection,
+including those being negotiated.
+The status form displays the \fBpluto\fP's internal state.
+The debug form tells \fBpluto\fP to change the selection of debugging output
+``on the fly''.  The shutdown form tells
+\fBpluto\fP to shut down, deleting all SAs.
+.LP
+Most options are specific to one of the forms, and will be described
+with that form.  There are three options that apply to all forms.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ctlbase\fP\ \fIpath\fP
+\fIpath\fP.ctl is used as the UNIX domain socket for talking
+to \fBpluto\fP.
+This option facilitates debugging.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-optionsfrom\fP\ \fIfilename\fP
+adds the contents of the file to the argument list.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-label\fP\ \fIstring\fP
+adds the string to all error messages generated by \fBwhack\fP.
+.LP
+The help form of \fBwhack\fP is self-explanatory.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-help\fP
+display the usage message.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-version\fP
+display the version of \fBwhack\fP.
+.LP
+The connection form describes a potential connection to \fBpluto\fP.
+\fBpluto\fP needs to know what connections can and should be negotiated.
+When \fBpluto\fP is the initiator, it needs to know what to propose.
+When \fBpluto\fP is the responder, it needs to know enough to decide whether
+is is willing to set up the proposed connection.
+.LP
+The description of a potential connection can specify a large number
+of details.  Each connection has a unique name.  This name will appear
+in a updown shell command, so it should not contain punctuation
+that would make the command ill-formed.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-name\fP\ \fIconnection-name\fP
+.LP
+The topology of
+a connection is symmetric, so to save space here is half a picture:
+
+\ \ \ client_subnet<\-\->host:ikeport<\-\->nexthop<\-\-\-
+
+A similar trick is used in the flags.  The same flag names are used for
+both ends.  Those before the \fB\-\-to\fP flag describe the left side
+and those afterwards describe the right side.  When \fBpluto\fP attempts
+to use the connection, it decides whether it is the left side or the right
+side of the connection, based on the IP numbers of its interfaces.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-id\fP\ \fIid\fP
+the identity of the end.  Currently, this can be an IP address (specified
+as dotted quad or as a Fully Qualified Domain Name, which will be resolved
+immediately) or as a Fully Qualified Domain Name itself (prefixed by ``@''
+to signify that it should not be resolved), or as user@FQDN, or as the
+magic value \fB%myid\fP.
+\fBPluto\fP only authenticates the identity, and does not use it for
+addressing, so, for example, an IP address need not be the one to which
+packets are to be sent.  If the option is absent, the
+identity defaults to the IP address specified by \fB\-\-host\fP.
+\fB%myid\fP allows the identity to be separately specified (by the \fBpluto\fP or \fBwhack\fP option \fB\-\-myid\fP
+or by the \fBipsec.conf\fP(5) \fBconfig setup\fP parameter \fPmyid\fP).
+Otherwise, \fBpluto\fP tries to guess what \fB%myid\fP should stand for:
+the IP address of \fB%defaultroute\fP, if it is supported by a suitable TXT record in the reverse domain for that IP address,
+or the system's hostname, if it is supported by a suitable TXT record in its forward domain.
+.\" The identity is transmitted in the IKE protocol, and is what is authenticated.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-host\fP\ \fIip\(hyaddress\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-host\fP\ \fB%any\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-host\fP\ \fB%opportunistic\fP
+the IP address of the end (generally the public interface).
+If \fBpluto\fP is to act as a responder
+for IKE negotiations initiated from unknown IP addresses (the
+``Road Warrior'' case), the
+IP address should be specified as \fB%any\fP (currently,
+the obsolete notation \fB0.0.0.0\fP is also accepted for this).
+If \fBpluto\fP is to opportunistically initiate the connection,
+use \fB%opportunistic\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ikeport\fP\ \fIport\(hynumber\fP
+the UDP port that IKE listens to on that host.  The default is 500.
+(\fBpluto\fP on this machine uses the port specified by its own command
+line argument, so this only affects where \fBpluto\fP sends messages.)
+.TP
+\fB\-\-nexthop\fP\ \fIip\(hyaddress\fP
+where to route packets for the peer's client (presumably for the peer too,
+but it will not be used for this).
+When \fBpluto\fP installs an IPsec SA, it issues a route command.
+It uses the nexthop as the gateway.
+The default is the peer's IP address (this can be explicitly written as
+\fB%direct\fP; the obsolete notation \fB0.0.0.0\fP is accepted).
+This option is necessary if \fBpluto\fP's host's interface used for sending
+packets to the peer is neither point-to-point nor directly connected to the
+peer.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-client\fP\ \fIsubnet\fP
+the subnet for which the IPsec traffic will be destined.  If not specified,
+the host will be the client.
+The subnet can be specified in any of the forms supported by \fIipsec_atosubnet\fP(3).
+The general form is \fIaddress\fP/\fImask\fP.  The \fIaddress\fP can be either
+a domain name or four decimal numbers (specifying octets) separated by dots.
+The most convenient form of the \fImask\fP is a decimal integer, specifying
+the number of leading one bits in the mask.  So, for example, 10.0.0.0/8
+would specify the class A network ``Net 10''.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-dnskeyondemand]\fP
+specifies that when an RSA public key is needed to authenticate this
+host, and it isn't already known, fetch it from DNS.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-updown\fP\ \fIupdown\fP
+specifies an external shell command to be run whenever \fBpluto\fP
+brings up or down a connection.
+The script is used to build a shell command, so it may contain positional
+parameters, but ought not to have punctuation that would cause the
+resulting command to be ill-formed.
+The default is \fIipsec _updown\fP.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-to\fP
+separates the specification of the left and right ends of the connection.
+.LP
+The potential connection description also specifies characteristics of
+rekeying and security.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-psk\fP
+Propose and allow preshared secret authentication for IKE peers.  This authentication
+requires that each side use the same secret.  May be combined with \fB\-\-rsasig\fP;
+at least one must be specified.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-rsasig\fP
+Propose and allow RSA signatures for authentication of IKE peers.  This authentication
+requires that each side have have a private key of its own and know the
+public key of its peer.  May be combined with \fB\-\-psk\fP;
+at least one must be specified.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-encrypt\fP
+All proposed or accepted IPsec SAs will include non-null ESP.
+The actual choices of transforms are wired into \fBpluto\fP.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-authenticate\fP
+All proposed IPsec SAs will include AH.
+All accepted IPsec SAs will include AH or ESP with authentication.
+The actual choices of transforms are wired into \fBpluto\fP.
+Note that this has nothing to do with IKE authentication.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-compress\fP
+All proposed IPsec SAs will include IPCOMP (compression).
+This will be ignored if KLIPS is not configured with IPCOMP support.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-tunnel\fP
+the IPsec SA should use tunneling.  Implicit if the SA is for clients.
+Must only be used with \fB\-\-authenticate\fP or \fB\-\-encrypt\fP.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ipv4\fP
+The host addresses will be interpreted as IPv4 addresses.  This is the
+default.  Note that for a connection, all host addresses must be of
+the same Address Family (IPv4 and IPv6 use different Address Families).
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ipv6\fP
+The host addresses (including nexthop) will be interpreted as IPv6 addresses.
+Note that for a connection, all host addresses must be of
+the same Address Family (IPv4 and IPv6 use different Address Families).
+.TP
+\fB\-\-tunnelipv4\fP
+The client addresses will be interpreted as IPv4 addresses.  The default is
+to match what the host will be.  This does not imply \fB\-\-tunnel\fP so the
+flag can be safely used when no tunnel is actually specified.
+Note that for a connection, all tunnel addresses must be of the same
+Address Family.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-tunnelipv6\fP
+The client addresses will be interpreted as IPv6 addresses.  The default is
+to match what the host will be.  This does not imply \fB\-\-tunnel\fP so the
+flag can be safely used when no tunnel is actually specified.
+Note that for a connection, all tunnel addresses must be of the same
+Address Family.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-pfs\fP
+There should be Perfect Forward Secrecy \- new keying material will
+be generated for each IPsec SA rather than being derived from the ISAKMP
+SA keying material.
+Since the group to be used cannot be negotiated (a dubious feature of the
+standard), \fBpluto\fP will propose the same group that was used during Phase 1.
+We don't implement a stronger form of PFS which would require that the
+ISAKMP SA be deleted after the IPSEC SA is negotiated.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-disablearrivalcheck\fP
+If the connection is a tunnel, allow packets arriving through the tunnel
+to have any source and destination addresses.
+.LP
+If none of the \fB\-\-encrypt\fP, \fB\-\-authenticate\fP, \fB\-\-compress\fP,
+or \fB\-\-pfs\fP flags is given, the initiating the connection will
+only build an ISAKMP SA.  For such a connection, client subnets have
+no meaning and must not be specified.
+.LP
+More work is needed to allow for flexible policies.  Currently
+policy is hardwired in the source file spdb.c.  The ISAKMP SAs may use
+Oakley groups MODP1024 and MODP1536; 3DES encryption; SHA1-96
+and MD5-96 authentication.  The IPsec SAs may use 3DES and
+MD5-96 or SHA1-96 for ESP, or just MD5-96 or SHA1-96 for AH.
+IPCOMP Compression is always Deflate.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ikelifetime\fP\ \fIseconds\fP
+how long \fBpluto\fP will propose that an ISAKMP SA be allowed to live.
+The default is 10800 (three hours) and the maximum is 86400 (one day).
+This option will not affect what is accepted.
+\fBpluto\fP will reject proposals that exceed the maximum.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ipseclifetime\fP\ \fIseconds\fP
+how long \fBpluto\fP will propose that an IPsec SA be allowed to live.
+The default is 3600 (one hour) and the maximum is 86400 (one day).
+This option will not affect what is accepted.
+\fBpluto\fP will reject proposals that exceed the maximum.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-rekeymargin\fP\ \fIseconds\fP
+how long before an SA's expiration should \fBpluto\fP try to negotiate
+a replacement SA.  This will only happen if \fBpluto\fP was the initiator.
+The default is 540 (nine minutes).
+.TP
+\fB\-\-rekeyfuzz\fP\ \fIpercentage\fP
+maximum size of random component to add to rekeymargin, expressed as
+a percentage of rekeymargin.  \fBpluto\fP will select a delay uniformly
+distributed within this range.  By default, the percentage will be 100.
+If greater determinism is desired, specify 0.  It may be appropriate
+for the percentage to be much larger than 100.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-keyingtries\fP\ \fIcount\fP
+how many times \fBpluto\fP should try to negotiate an SA,
+either for the first time or for rekeying.
+A value of 0 is interpreted as a very large number: never give up.
+The default is three.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-dontrekey\fP
+A misnomer.
+Only rekey a connection if we were the Initiator and there was recent
+traffic on the existing connection.
+This applies to Phase 1 and Phase 2.
+This is currently the only automatic way for a connection to terminate.
+It may be useful with Road Warrior or Opportunistic connections.
+.br
+Since SA lifetime negotiation is take-it-or-leave it, a Responder
+normally uses the shorter of the negotiated or the configured lifetime.
+This only works because if the lifetime is shorter than negotiated,
+the Responder will rekey in time so that everything works.
+This interacts badly with \fB\-\-dontrekey\fP.  In this case,
+the Responder will end up rekeying to rectify a shortfall in an IPsec SA
+lifetime; for an ISAKMP SA, the Responder will accept the negotiated
+lifetime.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-delete\fP
+when used in the connection form, it causes any previous connection
+with this name to be deleted before this one is added.  Unlike a
+normal delete, no diagnostic is produced if there was no previous
+connection to delete.  Any routing in place for the connection is undone.
+.LP
+The delete form deletes a named connection description and any
+SAs established or negotiations initiated using this connection.
+Any routing in place for the connection is undone.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-delete\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-name\fP\ \fIconnection-name\fP
+.LP
+The deletestate form deletes the state object with the specified serial number.
+This is useful for selectively deleting instances of connections.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-deletestate\fP\ \fIstate-number\fP
+.LP
+The route form of the \fBwhack\fP command tells \fBpluto\fP to set up
+routing for a connection.
+Although like a traditional route, it uses an ipsec device as a
+virtual interface.
+Once routing is set up, no packets will be
+sent ``in the clear'' to the peer's client specified in the connection.
+A TRAP shunt eroute will be installed; if outbound traffic is caught,
+Pluto will initiate the connection.
+An explicit \fBwhack\fP route is not always needed: if it hasn't been
+done when an IPsec SA is being installed, one will be automatically attempted.
+.LP
+When a routing is attempted for a connection, there must not already
+be a routing for a different connection with the same subnet but different
+interface or destination, or if
+there is, it must not be being used by an IPsec SA.  Otherwise the
+attempt will fail.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-route\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-name\fP\ \fIconnection-name\fP
+.LP
+The unroute form of the \fBwhack\fP command tells \fBpluto\fP to undo
+a routing.  \fBpluto\fP will refuse if an IPsec SA is using the connection.
+If another connection is sharing the same routing, it will be left in place.
+Without a routing, packets will be sent without encryption or authentication.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-unroute\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-name\fP\ \fIconnection-name\fP
+.LP
+The initiate form tells \fBpluto\fP to initiate a negotiation with another
+\fBpluto\fP (or other IKE daemon) according to the named connection.
+Initiation requires a route that \fB\-\-route\fP would provide;
+if none is in place at the time an IPsec SA is being installed,
+\fBpluto\fP attempts to set one up.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-initiate\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-name\fP\ \fIconnection-name\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-asynchronous
+.LP
+The initiate form of the \fBwhack\fP command will relay back from
+\fBpluto\fP status information via the UNIX domain socket (unless
+\-\-asynchronous is specified).  The status information is meant to
+look a bit like that from \fBFTP\fP.  Currently \fBwhack\fP simply
+copies this to stderr.  When the request is finished (eg. the SAs are
+established or \fBpluto\fP gives up), \fBpluto\fP closes the channel,
+causing \fBwhack\fP to terminate.
+.LP
+The opportunistic initiate form is mainly used for debugging.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-tunnelipv4\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-tunnelipv6\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-oppohere\fP\ \fIip-address\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-oppothere\fP\ \fIip-address\fP
+.LP
+This will cause \fBpluto\fP to attempt to opportunistically initiate a
+connection from here to the there, even if a previous attempt
+had been made.
+The whack log will show the progress of this attempt.
+.LP
+The terminate form tells \fBpluto\fP to delete any SAs that use the specified
+connection and to stop any negotiations in process.
+It does not prevent new negotiations from starting (the delete form
+has this effect).
+.TP
+\fB\-\-terminate\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-name\fP\ \fIconnection-name\fP
+.LP
+The public key for informs \fBpluto\fP of the RSA public key for a potential peer.
+Private keys must be kept secret, so they are kept in
+.IR ipsec.secrets (5).
+.TP
+\fB\-\-keyid\ \fP\fIid\fP
+specififies the identity of the peer for which a public key should be used.
+Its form is identical to the identity in the connection.
+If no public key is specified, \fBpluto\fP attempts to find KEY records
+from DNS for the id (if a FQDN) or through reverse lookup (if an IP address).
+Note that there several interesting ways in which this is not secure.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-addkey\fP
+specifies that the new key is added to the collection; otherwise the
+new key replaces any old ones.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-pubkeyrsa\ \fP\fIkey\fP
+specifies the value of the RSA public key.  It is a sequence of bytes
+as described in RFC 2537 ``RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS)''.
+It is denoted in a way suitable for \fIipsec_ttodata\fP(3).
+For example, a base 64 numeral starts with 0s.
+.LP
+The listen form tells \fBpluto\fP to start listening for IKE requests
+on its public interfaces.  To avoid race conditions, it is normal to
+load the appropriate connections into \fBpluto\fP before allowing it
+to listen.  If \fBpluto\fP isn't listening, it is pointless to
+initiate negotiations, so it will refuse requests to do so.  Whenever
+the listen form is used, \fBpluto\fP looks for public interfaces and
+will notice when new ones have been added and when old ones have been
+removed.  This is also the trigger for \fBpluto\fP to read the
+\fIipsec.secrets\fP file.  So listen may useful more than once.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-listen\fP
+start listening for IKE traffic on public interfaces.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-unlisten\fP
+stop listening for IKE traffic on public interfaces.
+.LP
+The status form will display information about the internal state of
+\fBpluto\fP: information about each potential connection, about
+each state object, and about each shunt that \fBpluto\fP is managing
+without an associated connection.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-status\fP
+.LP
+The shutdown form is the proper way to shut down \fBpluto\fP.
+It will tear down the SAs on this machine that \fBpluto\fP has negotiated.
+It does not inform its peers, so the SAs on their machines remain.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-shutdown\fP
+.SS Examples
+.LP
+It would be normal to start \fBpluto\fP in one of the system initialization
+scripts.  It needs to be run by the superuser.  Generally, no arguments are needed.
+To run in manually, the superuser can simply type
+
+\ \ \ ipsec pluto
+
+The command will immediately return, but a \fBpluto\fP process will be left
+running, waiting for requests from \fBwhack\fP or a peer.
+.LP
+Using \fBwhack\fP, several potential connections would be described:
+.HP
+.na
+\ \ \ ipsec whack \-\-name\ silly
+\-\-host\ 127.0.0.1 \-\-to \-\-host\ 127.0.0.2
+\-\-ikelifetime\ 900 \-\-ipseclifetime\ 800 \-\-keyingtries\ 3
+.ad
+.LP
+Since this silly connection description specifies neither encryption,
+authentication, nor tunneling, it could only be used to establish
+an ISAKMP SA.
+.HP
+.na
+\ \ \ ipsec whack \-\-name\ secret \-\-host\ 10.0.0.1 \-\-client\ 10.0.1.0/24
+\-\-to \-\-host\ 10.0.0.2 \-\-client\ 10.0.2.0/24
+\-\-encrypt
+.ad
+.LP
+This is something that must be done on both sides.  If the other
+side is \fBpluto\fP, the same \fBwhack\fP command could be used on it
+(the command syntax is designed to not distinguish which end is ours).
+.LP
+Now that the connections are specified, \fBpluto\fP is ready to handle
+requests and replies via the public interfaces.  We must tell it to discover
+those interfaces and start accepting messages from peers:
+
+\ \ \ ipsec whack \-\-listen
+.LP
+If we don't immediately wish to bring up a secure connection between
+the two clients, we might wish to prevent insecure traffic.
+The routing form asks \fBpluto\fP to cause the packets sent from
+our client to the peer's client to be routed through the ipsec0
+device; if there is no SA, they will be discarded:
+
+\ \ \ ipsec whack \-\-route secret
+.LP
+Finally, we are ready to get \fBpluto\fP to initiate negotiation
+for an IPsec SA (and implicitly, an ISAKMP SA):
+
+\ \ \ ipsec whack \-\-initiate\ \-\-name\ secret
+
+A small log of interesting events will appear on standard output
+(other logging is sent to syslog).
+.LP
+\fBwhack\fP can also be used to terminate \fBpluto\fP cleanly, tearing down
+all SAs that it has negotiated.
+
+\ \ \ ipsec whack \-\-shutdown
+
+Notification of any IPSEC SA deletion, but not ISAKMP SA deletion
+is sent to the peer.  Unfortunately, such Notification is not reliable.
+Furthermore, \fBpluto\fP itself ignores Notifications.
+.SS The updown command
+.LP
+Whenever \fBpluto\fP brings a connection up or down, it invokes
+the updown command.  This command is specified using the \fB\-\-updown\fP
+option.  This allows for customized control over routing and firewall manipulation.
+.LP
+The updown is invoked for five different operations.  Each of
+these operations can be for our client subnet or for our host itself.
+.TP
+\fBprepare-host\fP or \fBprepare-client\fP
+is run before bringing up a new connection if no other connection
+with the same clients is up.  Generally, this is useful for deleting a
+route that might have been set up before \fBpluto\fP was run or
+perhaps by some agent not known to \fBpluto\fP.
+.TP
+\fBroute-host\fP or \fBroute-client\fP
+is run when bringing up a connection for a new peer client subnet
+(even if \fBprepare-host\fP or \fBprepare-client\fP was run).  The
+command should install a suitable route.  Routing decisions are based
+only on the destination (peer's client) subnet address, unlike eroutes
+which discriminate based on source too.
+.TP
+\fBunroute-host\fP or \fBunroute-client\fP
+is run when bringing down the last connection for a particular peer
+client subnet.  It should undo what the \fBroute-host\fP or \fBroute-client\fP
+did.
+.TP
+\fBup-host\fP or \fBup-client\fP
+is run when bringing up a tunnel eroute with a pair of client subnets
+that does not already have a tunnel eroute.
+This command should install firewall rules as appropriate.
+It is generally a good idea to allow IKE messages (UDP port 500)
+travel between the hosts.
+.TP
+\fBdown-host\fP or \fBdown-client\fP
+is run when bringing down the eroute for a pair of client subnets.
+This command should delete firewall rules as appropriate.  Note that
+there may remain some inbound IPsec SAs with these client subnets.
+.LP
+The script is passed a large number of environment variables to specify
+what needs to be done.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_VERSION\fP
+indicates what version of this interface is being used.  This document
+describes version 1.1.  This is upwardly compatible with version 1.0.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_VERB\fP
+specifies the name of the operation to be performed
+(\fBprepare-host\fP,r \fBprepare-client\fP,
+\fBup-host\fP, \fBup-client\fP,
+\fBdown-host\fP, or \fBdown-client\fP).  If the address family for
+security gateway to security gateway communications is IPv6, then
+a suffix of -v6 is added to the verb.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_CONNECTION\fP
+is the name of the connection for which we are routing.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_NEXT_HOP\fP
+is the next hop to which packets bound for the peer must be sent.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_INTERFACE\fP
+is the name of the ipsec interface to be used.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_ME\fP
+is the IP address of our host.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_MY_CLIENT\fP
+is the IP address / count of our client subnet.
+If the client is just the host, this will be the host's own IP address / max
+(where max is 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6).
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET\fP
+is the IP address of our client net.
+If the client is just the host, this will be the host's own IP address.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK\fP
+is the mask for our client net.
+If the client is just the host, this will be 255.255.255.255.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_PEER\fP
+is the IP address of our peer.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_PEER_CLIENT\fP
+is the IP address / count of the peer's client subnet.
+If the client is just the peer, this will be the peer's own IP address / max
+(where max is 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6).
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET\fP
+is the IP address of the peer's client net.
+If the client is just the peer, this will be the peer's own IP address.
+.TP
+\fBPLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK\fP
+is the mask for the peer's client net.
+If the client is just the peer, this will be 255.255.255.255.
+.LP
+All output sent by the script to stderr or stdout is logged.  The
+script should return an exit status of 0 if and only if it succeeds.
+.LP
+\fBPluto\fP waits for the script to finish and will not do any other
+processing while it is waiting.
+The script may assume that \fBpluto\fP will not change anything
+while the script runs.
+The script should avoid doing anything that takes much time and it
+should not issue any command that requires processing by \fBpluto\fP.
+Either of these activities could be performed by a background
+subprocess of the script.
+.SS Rekeying
+.LP
+When an SA that was initiated by \fBpluto\fP has only a bit of
+lifetime left,
+\fBpluto\fP will initiate the creation of a new SA.  This applies to
+ISAKMP and IPsec SAs.
+The rekeying will be initiated when the SA's remaining lifetime is
+less than the rekeymargin plus a random percentage, between 0 and
+rekeyfuzz, of the rekeymargin.
+.LP
+Similarly, when an SA that was initiated by the peer has only a bit of
+lifetime left, \fBpluto\fP will try to initiate the creation of a
+replacement.
+To give preference to the initiator, this rekeying will only be initiated
+when the SA's remaining lifetime is half of rekeymargin.
+If rekeying is done by the responder, the roles will be reversed: the
+responder for the old SA will be the initiator for the replacement.
+The former initiator might also initiate rekeying, so there may
+be redundant SAs created.
+To avoid these complications, make sure that rekeymargin is generous.
+.LP
+One risk of having the former responder initiate is that perhaps
+none of its proposals is acceptable to the former initiator
+(they have not been used in a successful negotiation).
+To reduce the chances of this happening, and to prevent loss of security,
+the policy settings are taken from the old SA (this is the case even if
+the former initiator is initiating).
+These may be stricter than those of the connection.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP will not rekey an SA if that SA is not the most recent of its
+type (IPsec or ISAKMP) for its potential connection.
+This avoids creating redundant SAs.
+.LP
+The random component in the rekeying time (rekeyfuzz) is intended to
+make certain pathological patterns of rekeying unstable.  If both
+sides decide to rekey at the same time, twice as many SAs as necessary
+are created.  This could become a stable pattern without the
+randomness.
+.LP
+Another more important case occurs when a security gateway has SAs
+with many other security gateways.  Each of these connections might
+need to be rekeyed at the same time.  This would cause a high peek
+requirement for resources (network bandwidth, CPU time, entropy for
+random numbers).  The rekeyfuzz can be used to stagger the rekeying
+times.
+.LP
+Once a new set of SAs has been negotiated, \fBpluto\fP will never send
+traffic on a superseded one.  Traffic will be accepted on an old SA
+until it expires.
+.SS Selecting a Connection When Responding: Road Warrior Support
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP receives an initial Main Mode message, it needs to
+decide which connection this message is for.  It picks based solely on
+the source and destination IP addresses of the message.  There might
+be several connections with suitable IP addresses, in which case one
+of them is arbitrarily chosen.  (The ISAKMP SA proposal contained in
+the message could be taken into account, but it is not.)
+.LP
+The ISAKMP SA is negotiated before the parties pass further
+identifying information, so all ISAKMP SA characteristics specified in
+the connection description should be the same for every connection
+with the same two host IP addresses.  At the moment, the only
+characteristic that might differ is authentication method.
+.LP
+Up to this point,
+all configuring has presumed that the IP addresses
+are known to all parties ahead of time.  This will not work
+when either end is mobile (or assigned a dynamic IP address for other
+reasons).  We call this situation ``Road Warrior''.  It is fairly tricky
+and has some important limitations, most of which are features of
+the IKE protocol.
+.LP
+Only the initiator may be mobile:
+the initiator may have an IP number unknown to the responder.  When
+the responder doesn't recognize the IP address on the first Main Mode
+packet, it looks for a connection with itself as one end and \fB%any\fP
+as the other.
+If it cannot find one, it refuses to negotiate.  If it
+does find one, it creates a temporary connection that is a duplicate
+except with the \fB%any\fP replaced by the source IP address from the
+packet; if there was no identity specified for the peer, the new IP
+address will be used.
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP is using one of these temporary connections and
+needs to find the preshared secret or RSA private key in \fIipsec.secrets\fP,
+and and the connection specified no identity for the peer, \fB%any\fP
+is used as its identity.  After all, the real IP address was apparently
+unknown to the configuration, so it is unreasonable to require that
+it be used in this table.
+.LP
+Part way into the Phase 1 (Main Mode) negotiation using one of these
+temporary connection descriptions, \fBpluto\fP will be receive an
+Identity Payload.  At this point, \fBpluto\fP checks for a more
+appropriate connection, one with an identity for the peer that matches
+the payload but which would use the same keys so-far used for
+authentication.  If it finds one, it will switch to using this better
+connection (or a temporary derived from this, if it has \fB%any\fP
+for the peer's IP address).  It may even turn out that no connection
+matches the newly discovered identity, including the current connection;
+if so, \fBpluto\fP terminates negotiation.
+.LP
+Unfortunately, if preshared secret authentication is being used, the
+Identity Payload is encrypted using this secret, so the secret must be
+selected by the responder without knowing this payload.  This
+limits there to being at most one preshared secret for all Road Warrior
+systems connecting to a host.  RSA Signature authentications does not
+require that the responder know how to select the initiator's public key
+until after the initiator's Identity Payload is decoded (using the
+responder's private key, so that must be preselected).
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP is responding to a Quick Mode negotiation via one of these
+temporary connection descriptions, it may well find that the subnets
+specified by the initiator don't match those in the temporary
+connection description.  If so, it will look for a connection with
+matching subnets, its own host address, a peer address of \fB%any\fP
+and matching identities.
+If it finds one, a new temporary connection is derived from this one
+and used for the Quick Mode negotiation of IPsec SAs.  If it does not
+find one, \fBpluto\fP terminates negotiation.
+.LP
+Be sure to specify an appropriate nexthop for the responder
+to send a message to the initiator: \fBpluto\fP has no way of guessing
+it (if forwarding isn't required, use an explicit \fB%direct\fP as the nexthop
+and the IP address of the initiator will be filled in; the obsolete
+notation \fB0.0.0.0\fP is still accepted).
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP has no special provision for the initiator side.  The current
+(possibly dynamic) IP address and nexthop must be used in defining
+connections.  These must be
+properly configured each time the initiator's IP address changes.
+\fBpluto\fP has no mechanism to do this automatically.
+.LP
+Although we call this Road Warrior Support, it could also be used to
+support encrypted connections with anonymous initiators.  The
+responder's organization could announce the preshared secret that would be used
+with unrecognized initiators and let anyone connect.  Of course the initiator's
+identity would not be authenticated.
+.LP
+If any Road Warrior connections are supported, \fBpluto\fP cannot
+reject an exchange initiated by an unknown host until it has
+determined that the secret is not shared or the signature is invalid.
+This must await the
+third Main Mode message from the initiator.  If no Road Warrior
+connection is supported, the first message from an unknown source
+would be rejected.  This has implications for ease of debugging
+configurations and for denial of service attacks.
+.LP
+Although a Road Warrior connection must be initiated by the mobile
+side, the other side can and will rekey using the temporary connection
+it has created.  If the Road Warrior wishes to be able to disconnect,
+it is probably wise to set \fB\-\-keyingtries\fP to 1 in the
+connection on the non-mobile side to prevent it trying to rekey the
+connection.  Unfortunately, there is no mechanism to unroute the
+connection automatically.
+.SS Debugging
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP accepts several optional arguments, useful mostly for debugging.
+Except for \fB\-\-interface\fP, each should appear at most once.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-interface\fP \fIinterfacename\fP
+specifies that the named real public network interface should be considered.
+The interface name specified should not be \fBipsec\fP\fIN\fP.
+If the option doesn't appear, all interfaces are considered.
+To specify several interfaces, use the option once for each.
+One use of this option is to specify which interface should be used
+when two or more share the same IP address.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ikeport\fP \fIport-number\fP
+changes the UDP port that \fBpluto\fP will use
+(default, specified by IANA: 500)
+.TP
+\fB\-\-ctlbase\fP \fIpath\fP
+basename for control files.
+\fIpath\fP.ctl is the socket through which \fBwhack\fP communicates with
+\fBpluto\fP.
+\fIpath\fP.pid is the lockfile to prevent multiple \fBpluto\fP instances.
+The default is \fI/var/run/pluto\fP).
+.TP
+\fB\-\-secretsfile\fP \fIfile\fP
+specifies the file for authentication secrets
+(default: \fI/etc/ipsec.secrets\fP).
+This name is subject to ``globbing'' as in \fIsh\fP(1),
+so every file with a matching name is processed.
+Quoting is generally needed to prevent the shell from doing the globbing.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-adns\fP \fIpathname\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-lwdnsq\fP \fIpathname\fP
+specifies where to find \fBpluto\fP's helper program for asynchronous DNS lookup.
+\fBpluto\fP can be built to use one of two helper programs: \fB_pluto_adns\fP
+or \fBlwdnsq\fP.  You must use the program for which it was built.
+By default, \fBpluto\fP will look for the program in
+\fB$IPSEC_DIR\fP (if that environment variable is defined) or, failing that,
+in the same directory as \fBpluto\fP.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-nofork\fP
+disable ``daemon fork'' (default is to fork).  In addition, after the
+lock file and control socket are created, print the line ``Pluto
+initialized'' to standard out.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-noklips\fP
+don't actually implement negotiated IPsec SAs
+.TP
+\fB\-\-uniqueids\fP
+if this option has been selected, whenever a new ISAKMP SA is
+established, any connection with the same Peer ID but a different
+Peer IP address is unoriented (causing all its SAs to be deleted).
+This helps clean up dangling SAs when a connection is lost and
+then regained at another IP address.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-stderrlog\fP
+log goes to standard out {default is to use \fIsyslogd\fP(8))
+.LP
+For example
+.TP
+pluto \-\-secretsfile\ ipsec.secrets \-\-ctlbase\ pluto.base \-\-ikeport\ 8500 \-\-nofork \-\-noklips \-\-stderrlog
+.LP
+lets one test \fBpluto\fP without using the superuser account.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP is willing to produce a prodigious amount of debugging
+information.  To do so, it must be compiled with \-DDEBUG.  There are
+several classes of debugging output, and \fBpluto\fP may be directed to
+produce a selection of them.  All lines of
+debugging output are prefixed with ``|\ '' to distinguish them from error
+messages.
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP is invoked, it may be given arguments to specify
+which classes to output.  The current options are:
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-raw\fP
+show the raw bytes of messages
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-crypt\fP
+show the encryption and decryption of messages
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-parsing\fP
+show the structure of input messages
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-emitting\fP
+show the structure of output messages
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-control\fP
+show \fBpluto\fP's decision making
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-lifecycle\fP
+[this option is temporary] log more detail of lifecycle of SAs
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-klips\fP
+show \fBpluto\fP's interaction with \fBKLIPS\fP
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-dns\fP
+show \fBpluto\fP's interaction with \fBDNS\fP for KEY and TXT records
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-oppo\fP
+show why \fBpluto\fP didn't find a suitable DNS TXT record to authorize opportunistic initiation
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-all\fP
+all of the above
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-private\fP
+allow debugging output with private keys.
+.TP
+\fB\-\-debug-none\fP
+none of the above
+.LP
+The debug form of the
+\fBwhack\fP command will change the selection in a running
+\fBpluto\fP.
+If a connection name is specified, the flags are added whenever
+\fBpluto\fP has identified that it is dealing with that connection.
+Unfortunately, this is often part way into the operation being observed.
+.LP
+For example, to start a \fBpluto\fP with a display of the structure of input
+and output:
+.IP
+pluto \-\-debug-emitting \-\-debug-parsing
+.LP
+To later change this \fBpluto\fP to only display raw bytes:
+.IP
+whack \-\-debug-raw
+.LP
+For testing, SSH's IKE test page is quite useful:
+.IP
+\fIhttp://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/\fP
+.LP
+Hint: ISAKMP SAs are often kept alive by IKEs even after the IPsec SA
+is established.  This allows future IPsec SA's to be negotiated
+directly.  If one of the IKEs is restarted, the other may try to use
+the ISAKMP SA but the new IKE won't know about it.  This can lead to
+much confusion.  \fBpluto\fP is not yet smart enough to get out of such a
+mess.
+.SS Pluto's Behaviour When Things Go Wrong
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP doesn't understand or accept a message, it just
+ignores the message.  It is not yet capable of communicating the
+problem to the other IKE daemon (in the future it might use
+Notifications to accomplish this in many cases).  It does log a diagnostic.
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP gets no response from a message, it resends the same
+message (a message will be sent at most three times).  This is
+appropriate: UDP is unreliable.
+.LP
+When pluto gets a message that it has already seen, there are many
+cases when it notices and discards it.  This too is appropriate for UDP.
+.LP
+Combine these three rules, and you can explain many apparently
+mysterious behaviours.  In a \fBpluto\fP log, retrying isn't usually the
+interesting event.  The critical thing is either earlier (\fBpluto\fP
+got a message which it didn't like and so ignored, so it was still
+awaiting an acceptable message and got impatient) or on the other
+system (\fBpluto\fP didn't send a reply because it wasn't happy with
+the previous message).
+.SS Notes
+.LP
+If \fBpluto\fP is compiled without \-DKLIPS, it negotiates Security
+Associations but never ask the kernel to put them in place and never
+makes routing changes.  This allows \fBpluto\fP to be tested on systems
+without \fBKLIPS\fP, but makes it rather useless.
+.LP
+Each IPsec SA is assigned an SPI, a 32-bit number used to refer to the SA.
+The IKE protocol lets the destination of the SA choose the SPI.
+The range 0 to 0xFF is reserved for IANA.
+\fBPluto\fP also avoids choosing an SPI in the range 0x100 to 0xFFF,
+leaving these SPIs free for manual keying.
+Remember that the peer, if not \fBpluto\fP, may well chose
+SPIs in this range.
+.SS Policies
+.LP
+This catalogue of policies may be of use when trying to configure
+\fBPluto\fP and another IKE implementation to interoperate.
+.LP
+In Phase 1, only Main Mode is supported.  We are not sure that
+Aggressive Mode is secure.  For one thing, it does not support
+identity protection.  It may allow more severe Denial Of Service
+attacks.
+.LP
+No Informational Exchanges are supported.  These are optional and
+since their delivery is not assured, they must not matter.
+It is the case that some IKE implementations won't interoperate
+without Informational Exchanges, but we feel they are broken.
+.LP
+No Informational Payloads are supported.  These are optional, but
+useful.  It is of concern that these payloads are not authenticated in
+Phase 1, nor in those Phase 2 messages authenticated with HASH(3).
+.IP \(bu \w'\(bu\ 'u
+Diffie Hellman Groups MODP 1024 and MODP 1536 (2 and 5)
+are supported.
+Group MODP768 (1) is not supported because it is too weak.
+.IP \(bu
+Host authetication can be done by RSA Signatures or Pre-Shared
+Secrets.
+.IP \(bu
+3DES CBC (Cypher Block Chaining mode) is the only encryption
+supported, both for ISAKMP SAs and IPSEC SAs.
+.IP \(bu
+MD5 and SHA1 hashing are supported for packet authentication in both
+kinds of SAs.
+.IP \(bu
+The ESP, AH, or AH plus ESP are supported.  If, and only if, AH and
+ESP are combined, the ESP need not have its own authentication
+component.  The selection is controlled by the \-\-encrypt and
+\-\-authenticate flags.
+.IP \(bu
+Each of these may be combined with IPCOMP Deflate compression,
+but only if the potential connection specifies compression and only
+if KLIPS is configured with IPCOMP support.
+.IP \(bu
+The IPSEC SAs may be tunnel or transport mode, where appropriate.
+The \-\-tunnel flag controls this when \fBpluto\fP is initiating.
+.IP \(bu
+When responding to an ISAKMP SA proposal, the maximum acceptable
+lifetime is eight hours.  The default is one hour.  There is no
+minimum.  The \-\-ikelifetime flag controls this when \fBpluto\fP
+is initiating.
+.IP \(bu
+When responding to an IPSEC SA proposal, the maximum acceptable
+lifetime is one day.  The default is eight hours.  There is no
+minimum.  The \-\-ipseclifetime flag controls this when \fBpluto\fP
+is initiating.
+.IP \(bu
+PFS is acceptable, and will be proposed if the \-\-pfs flag was
+specified.  The DH group proposed will be the same as negotiated for
+Phase 1.
+.SH SIGNALS
+.LP
+\fBPluto\fP responds to \fBSIGHUP\fP by issuing a suggestion that ``\fBwhack\fP
+\-\-listen'' might have been intended.
+.LP
+\fBPluto\fP exits when it recieves \fBSIGTERM\fP.
+.SH EXIT STATUS
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP normally forks a daemon process, so the exit status is
+normally a very preliminary result.
+.TP
+0
+means that all is OK so far.
+.TP
+1
+means that something was wrong.
+.TP
+10
+means that the lock file already exists.
+.LP
+If \fBwhack\fP detects a problem, it will return an exit status of 1.
+If it received progress messages from \fBpluto\fP, it returns as status
+the value of the numeric prefix from the last such message
+that was not a message sent to syslog or a comment
+(but the prefix for success is treated as 0).
+Otherwise, the exit status is 0.
+.SH FILES
+\fI/var/run/pluto.pid\fP
+.br
+\fI/var/run/pluto.ctl\fP
+.br
+\fI/etc/ipsec.secrets\fP
+.br
+\fI$IPSEC_LIBDIR/_pluto_adns\fP
+.br
+\fI$IPSEC_EXECDIR/lwdnsq\fP
+.br
+\fI/dev/urandom\fP
+.SH ENVIRONMENT
+\fIIPSEC_LIBDIR\fP
+.br
+\fIIPSEC_EXECDIR\fP
+.br
+\fIIPSECmyid\fP
+.SH SEE ALSO
+.LP
+The rest of the FreeS/WAN distribution, in particular \fIipsec\fP(8).
+.LP
+\fIipsec_auto\fP(8) is designed to make using \fBpluto\fP more pleasant.
+Use it!
+.LP
+.IR ipsec.secrets (5)
+describes the format of the secrets file.
+.LP
+\fIipsec_atoaddr\fP(3), part of the FreeS/WAN distribution, describes the
+forms that IP addresses may take.
+\fIipsec_atosubnet\fP(3), part of the FreeS/WAN distribution, describes the
+forms that subnet specifications.
+.LP
+For more information on IPsec, the mailing list, and the relevant
+documents, see:
+.IP
+.nh
+\fIhttp://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html\fP
+.hy
+.LP
+At the time of writing, the most relevant IETF RFCs are:
+.IP
+RFC2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)
+.IP
+RFC2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)
+.IP
+RFC2407 The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP
+.LP
+The FreeS/WAN web site <htp://www.freeswan.org>
+and the mailing lists described there.
+.SH HISTORY
+This code is released under the GPL terms.
+See the accompanying file COPYING-2.0 for more details.
+The GPL does NOT apply to those pieces of code written by others
+which are included in this distribution, except as noted by the
+individual authors.
+.LP
+This software was originally written
+for the FreeS/WAN project
+<http://www.freeswan.org>
+by Angelos D. Keromytis
+(angelos@dsl.cis.upenn.edu), in May/June 1997, in Athens, Greece.
+Thanks go to John Ioannidis for his help.
+.LP
+It is currently (2000)
+being developed and maintained by D. Hugh Redelmeier
+(hugh@mimosa.com), in Canada.  The regulations of Greece and Canada
+allow us to make the code freely redistributable.
+.LP
+Kai Martius (admin@imib.med.tu-dresden.de) contributed the initial
+version of the code supporting PFS.
+.LP
+Richard Guy Briggs <rgb@conscoop.ottawa.on.ca> and Peter Onion
+<ponion@srd.bt.co.uk> added the PFKEY2 support.
+.LP
+We gratefully acknowledge that we use parts of Eric Young's \fIlibdes\fP
+package; see \fI../libdes/COPYRIGHT\fP.
+.SH BUGS
+.BR pluto
+is a work-in-progress.  It currently has many limitations.
+For example, it ignores notification messages that it receives, and
+it generates only Delete Notifications and those only for IPSEC SAs.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP does not support the Commit Flag.
+The Commit Flag is a bad feature of the IKE protocol.
+It isn't protected -- neither encrypted nor authenticated.
+A man in the middle could turn it on, leading to DoS.
+We just ignore it, with a warning.
+This should let us interoperate with
+implementations that insist on it, with minor damage.
+.LP
+\fBpluto\fP does not check that the SA returned by the Responder
+is actually one that was proposed.  It only checks that the SA is
+acceptable.  The difference is not large, but can show up in attributes
+such as SA lifetime.
+.LP
+There is no good way for a connection to be automatically terminated.
+This is a problem for Road Warrior and Opportunistic connections.
+The \fB\-\-dontrekey\fP option does prevent the SAs from
+being rekeyed on expiry.
+Additonally, if a Road Warrior connection has a client subnet with a fixed IP
+address, a negotiation with that subnet will cause any other
+connection instantiations with that same subnet to be unoriented
+(deleted, in effect).
+See also the \-\-uniqueids option for an extension of this.
+.LP
+When \fBpluto\fP sends a message to a peer that has disappeared,
+\fBpluto\fP receives incomplete information from the kernel, so it
+logs the unsatisfactory message ``some IKE message we sent has been
+rejected with ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details)''.  John
+Denker suggests that this command is useful for tracking down the
+source of these problems:
+.br
+	tcpdump -i eth0 icmp[0] != 8 and icmp[0] != 0
+.br
+Substitute your public interface for eth0 if it is different.
+.LP
+The word ``authenticate'' is used for two different features.  We must
+authenticate each IKE peer to the other.  This is an important task of
+Phase 1.  Each packet must be authenticated, both in IKE and in IPsec,
+and the method for IPsec is negotiated as an AH SA or part of an ESP SA.
+Unfortunately, the protocol has no mechanism for authenticating the Phase 2
+identities.
+.LP
+Bugs should be reported to the <users@lists.freeswan.org> mailing list.
+Caution: we cannot accept
+actual code from US residents, or even US citizens living outside the
+US, because that would bring FreeS/WAN under US export law.  Some
+other countries cause similar problems.  In general, we would prefer
+that you send detailed problem reports rather than code:  we want
+FreeS/WAN to be unquestionably freely exportable, which means being
+very careful about where the code comes from, and for a small bug fix,
+that is often more time-consuming than just reinventing the fix
+ourselves.
diff --git a/src/pluto/plutomain.c b/src/pluto/plutomain.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e235ff765
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/plutomain.c
@@ -0,0 +1,655 @@
+/* Pluto main program
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: plutomain.c,v 1.16 2005/09/25 21:30:52 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <getopt.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "ac.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "foodgroups.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "server.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "ocsp.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "xauth.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h"	/* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+#include "virtual.h"
+
+static void
+usage(const char *mess)
+{
+    if (mess != NULL && *mess != '\0')
+	fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mess);
+    fprintf(stderr
+	, "Usage: pluto"
+	    " [--help]"
+	    " [--version]"
+	    " [--optionsfrom <filename>]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--nofork]"
+	    " [--stderrlog]"
+	    " [--noklips]"
+	    " [--nocrsend]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--strictcrlpolicy]"
+	    " [--crlcheckinterval <interval>]"
+	    " [--cachecrls]"
+	    " [--uniqueids]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--interface <ifname>]"
+	    " [--ikeport <port-number>]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--ctlbase <path>]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--perpeerlogbase <path>] [--perpeerlog]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--secretsfile <secrets-file>]"
+	    " [--policygroupsdir <policygroups-dir>]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--adns <pathname>]"
+	    "[--pkcs11module <path>]"
+	    "[--pkcs11keepstate"
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--debug-none]"
+	    " [--debug-all]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--debug-raw]"
+	    " [--debug-crypt]"
+	    " [--debug-parsing]"
+	    " [--debug-emitting]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--debug-control]"
+	    " [--debug-lifecycle]"
+	    " [--debug-klips]"
+	    " [--debug-dns]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--debug-oppo]"
+	    " [--debug-controlmore]"
+	    " [--debug-private]"
+#endif
+	    " [ --debug-natt]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--nat_traversal] [--keep_alive <delay_sec>]"
+	    " \\\n\t"
+	    "[--force_keepalive] [--disable_port_floating]"
+	   " \\\n\t"
+	   "[--virtual_private <network_list>]"
+	    "\n"
+	"strongSwan %s\n"
+	, ipsec_version_code());
+    exit_pluto(mess == NULL? 0 : 1);
+}
+
+
+/* lock file support
+ * - provides convenient way for scripts to find Pluto's pid
+ * - prevents multiple Plutos competing for the same port
+ * - same basename as unix domain control socket
+ * NOTE: will not take account of sharing LOCK_DIR with other systems.
+ */
+
+static char pluto_lock[sizeof(ctl_addr.sun_path)] = DEFAULT_CTLBASE LOCK_SUFFIX;
+static bool pluto_lock_created = FALSE;
+
+/* create lockfile, or die in the attempt */
+static int
+create_lock(void)
+{
+    int fd = open(pluto_lock, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_TRUNC
+	, S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
+
+    if (fd < 0)
+    {
+	if (errno == EEXIST)
+	{
+	    fprintf(stderr, "pluto: lock file \"%s\" already exists\n"
+		, pluto_lock);
+	    exit_pluto(10);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    fprintf(stderr
+		, "pluto: unable to create lock file \"%s\" (%d %s)\n"
+		, pluto_lock, errno, strerror(errno));
+	    exit_pluto(1);
+	}
+    }
+    pluto_lock_created = TRUE;
+    return fd;
+}
+
+static bool
+fill_lock(int lockfd, pid_t pid)
+{
+    char buf[30];	/* holds "<pid>\n" */
+    int len = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%u\n", (unsigned int) pid);
+    bool ok = len > 0 && write(lockfd, buf, len) == len;
+
+    close(lockfd);
+    return ok;
+}
+
+static void
+delete_lock(void)
+{
+    if (pluto_lock_created)
+    {
+	delete_ctl_socket();
+	unlink(pluto_lock);	/* is noting failure useful? */
+    }
+}
+
+/* by default pluto sends certificate requests to its peers */
+bool no_cr_send = FALSE;
+
+/* by default the CRL policy is lenient */
+bool strict_crl_policy = FALSE;
+
+/* by default CRLs are cached locally as files */
+bool cache_crls = FALSE;
+
+/* by default pluto does not check crls dynamically */
+long crl_check_interval = 0;
+
+/* path to the PKCS#11 module */
+char *pkcs11_module_path = NULL;
+
+/* by default pluto logs out after every smartcard use */
+bool pkcs11_keep_state = FALSE;
+
+/* by default pluto does not allow pkcs11 proxy access via whack */
+bool pkcs11_proxy = FALSE;
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+    bool fork_desired = TRUE;
+    bool log_to_stderr_desired = FALSE;
+    bool nat_traversal = FALSE;
+    bool nat_t_spf = TRUE;  /* support port floating */
+    unsigned int keep_alive = 0;
+    bool force_keepalive = FALSE;
+    char *virtual_private = NULL;
+    int lockfd;
+
+    /* handle arguments */
+    for (;;)
+    {
+#	define DBG_OFFSET 256
+	static const struct option long_opts[] = {
+	    /* name, has_arg, flag, val */
+	    { "help", no_argument, NULL, 'h' },
+	    { "version", no_argument, NULL, 'v' },
+	    { "optionsfrom", required_argument, NULL, '+' },
+	    { "nofork", no_argument, NULL, 'd' },
+	    { "stderrlog", no_argument, NULL, 'e' },
+	    { "noklips", no_argument, NULL, 'n' },
+	    { "nocrsend", no_argument, NULL, 'c' },
+	    { "strictcrlpolicy", no_argument, NULL, 'r' },
+	    { "crlcheckinterval", required_argument, NULL, 'x'},
+	    { "cachecrls", no_argument, NULL, 'C' },
+	    { "uniqueids", no_argument, NULL, 'u' },
+	    { "interface", required_argument, NULL, 'i' },
+	    { "ikeport", required_argument, NULL, 'p' },
+	    { "ctlbase", required_argument, NULL, 'b' },
+	    { "secretsfile", required_argument, NULL, 's' },
+	    { "foodgroupsdir", required_argument, NULL, 'f' },
+	    { "perpeerlogbase", required_argument, NULL, 'P' },
+	    { "perpeerlog", no_argument, NULL, 'l' },
+	    { "policygroupsdir", required_argument, NULL, 'f' },
+#ifdef USE_LWRES
+	    { "lwdnsq", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
+#else /* !USE_LWRES */
+	    { "adns", required_argument, NULL, 'a' },
+#endif /* !USE_LWRES */
+	    { "pkcs11module", required_argument, NULL, 'm' },
+	    { "pkcs11keepstate", no_argument, NULL, 'k' },
+	    { "pkcs11proxy", no_argument, NULL, 'y' },
+	    { "nat_traversal", no_argument, NULL, '1' },
+	    { "keep_alive", required_argument, NULL, '2' },
+	    { "force_keepalive", no_argument, NULL, '3' },
+	    { "disable_port_floating", no_argument, NULL, '4' },
+	    { "debug-natt", no_argument, NULL, '5' },
+	    { "virtual_private", required_argument, NULL, '6' },
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    { "debug-none", no_argument, NULL, 'N' },
+	    { "debug-all", no_argument, NULL, 'A' },
+	    { "debug-raw", no_argument, NULL, DBG_RAW + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-crypt", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CRYPT + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-parsing", no_argument, NULL, DBG_PARSING + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-emitting", no_argument, NULL, DBG_EMITTING + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-control", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CONTROL + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-lifecycle", no_argument, NULL, DBG_LIFECYCLE + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-klips", no_argument, NULL, DBG_KLIPS + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-dns", no_argument, NULL, DBG_DNS + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-oppo", no_argument, NULL, DBG_OPPO + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-controlmore", no_argument, NULL, DBG_CONTROLMORE + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "debug-private", no_argument, NULL, DBG_PRIVATE + DBG_OFFSET },
+
+	    { "impair-delay-adns-key-answer", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_KEY_ANSWER + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "impair-delay-adns-txt-answer", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_DELAY_ADNS_TXT_ANSWER + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "impair-bust-mi2", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_BUST_MI2 + DBG_OFFSET },
+	    { "impair-bust-mr2", no_argument, NULL, IMPAIR_BUST_MR2 + DBG_OFFSET },
+#endif
+	    { 0,0,0,0 }
+	    };
+	/* Note: we don't like the way short options get parsed
+	 * by getopt_long, so we simply pass an empty string as
+	 * the list.  It could be "hvdenp:l:s:" "NARXPECK".
+	 */
+	int c = getopt_long(argc, argv, "", long_opts, NULL);
+
+	/* Note: "breaking" from case terminates loop */
+	switch (c)
+	{
+	case EOF:	/* end of flags */
+	    break;
+
+	case 0: /* long option already handled */
+	    continue;
+
+	case ':':	/* diagnostic already printed by getopt_long */
+	case '?':	/* diagnostic already printed by getopt_long */
+	    usage("");
+	    break;   /* not actually reached */
+
+	case 'h':	/* --help */
+	    usage(NULL);
+	    break;	/* not actually reached */
+
+	case 'v':	/* --version */
+	    {
+		const char **sp = ipsec_copyright_notice();
+
+		printf("%s%s\n", ipsec_version_string(),
+				 compile_time_interop_options);
+		for (; *sp != NULL; sp++)
+		    puts(*sp);
+	    }
+	    exit_pluto(0);
+	    break;	/* not actually reached */
+
+	case '+':	/* --optionsfrom <filename> */
+	    optionsfrom(optarg, &argc, &argv, optind, stderr);
+	    /* does not return on error */
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'd':	/* --nofork*/
+	    fork_desired = FALSE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'e':	/* --stderrlog */
+	    log_to_stderr_desired = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'n':	/* --noklips */
+	    no_klips = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'c':	/* --nocrsend */
+	    no_cr_send = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'r':	/* --strictcrlpolicy */
+	    strict_crl_policy = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'x':	/* --crlcheckinterval <time>*/
+            if (optarg == NULL || !isdigit(optarg[0]))
+                usage("missing interval time");
+
+            {
+                char *endptr;
+                long interval = strtol(optarg, &endptr, 0);
+
+                if (*endptr != '\0' || endptr == optarg
+                || interval <= 0)
+                    usage("<interval-time> must be a positive number");
+                crl_check_interval = interval;
+            }
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'C':	/* --cachecrls */
+	    cache_crls = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'u':	/* --uniqueids */
+	    uniqueIDs = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'i':	/* --interface <ifname> */
+	    if (!use_interface(optarg))
+		usage("too many --interface specifications");
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'p':	/* --port <portnumber> */
+	    if (optarg == NULL || !isdigit(optarg[0]))
+		usage("missing port number");
+
+	    {
+		char *endptr;
+		long port = strtol(optarg, &endptr, 0);
+
+		if (*endptr != '\0' || endptr == optarg
+		|| port <= 0 || port > 0x10000)
+		    usage("<port-number> must be a number between 1 and 65535");
+		pluto_port = port;
+	    }
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'b':	/* --ctlbase <path> */
+	    if (snprintf(ctl_addr.sun_path, sizeof(ctl_addr.sun_path)
+	    , "%s%s", optarg, CTL_SUFFIX) == -1)
+		usage("<path>" CTL_SUFFIX " too long for sun_path");
+	    if (snprintf(info_addr.sun_path, sizeof(info_addr.sun_path)
+	    , "%s%s", optarg, INFO_SUFFIX) == -1)
+		usage("<path>" INFO_SUFFIX " too long for sun_path");
+	    if (snprintf(pluto_lock, sizeof(pluto_lock)
+	    , "%s%s", optarg, LOCK_SUFFIX) == -1)
+		usage("<path>" LOCK_SUFFIX " must fit");
+	    continue;
+
+	case 's':	/* --secretsfile <secrets-file> */
+	    shared_secrets_file = optarg;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'f':	/* --policygroupsdir <policygroups-dir> */
+	    policygroups_dir = optarg;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'a':	/* --adns <pathname> */
+	    pluto_adns_option = optarg;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'm':	/* --pkcs11module <pathname> */
+	    pkcs11_module_path = optarg;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'k':	/* --pkcs11keepstate */
+	    pkcs11_keep_state = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'y':	/* --pkcs11proxy */
+	    pkcs11_proxy = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	case 'N':	/* --debug-none */
+	    base_debugging = DBG_NONE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'A':	/* --debug-all */
+	    base_debugging = DBG_ALL;
+	    continue;
+#endif
+
+	case 'P':       /* --perpeerlogbase */
+	    base_perpeer_logdir = optarg;
+	    continue;
+
+	case 'l':
+	    log_to_perpeer = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+
+	case '1':	/* --nat_traversal */
+	    nat_traversal = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+	case '2':	/* --keep_alive */
+	    keep_alive = atoi(optarg);
+	    continue;
+	case '3':	/* --force_keepalive */
+	    force_keepalive = TRUE;
+	    continue;
+	case '4':	/* --disable_port_floating */
+	    nat_t_spf = FALSE;
+	    continue;
+	case '5':	/* --debug-nat_t */
+	    base_debugging |= DBG_NATT;
+	    continue;
+	case '6':	/* --virtual_private */
+	    virtual_private = optarg;
+	    continue;
+
+	default:
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	    if (c >= DBG_OFFSET)
+	    {
+		base_debugging |= c - DBG_OFFSET;
+		continue;
+	    }
+#	undef DBG_OFFSET
+#endif
+	    bad_case(c);
+	}
+	break;
+    }
+    if (optind != argc)
+	usage("unexpected argument");
+    reset_debugging();
+    lockfd = create_lock();
+
+    /* select between logging methods */
+
+    if (log_to_stderr_desired)
+	log_to_syslog = FALSE;
+    else
+	log_to_stderr = FALSE;
+
+    /* set the logging function of pfkey debugging */
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    pfkey_debug_func = DBG_log;
+#else
+    pfkey_debug_func = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    /* create control socket.
+     * We must create it before the parent process returns so that
+     * there will be no race condition in using it.  The easiest
+     * place to do this is before the daemon fork.
+     */
+    {
+	err_t ugh = init_ctl_socket();
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    fprintf(stderr, "pluto: %s", ugh);
+	    exit_pluto(1);
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* If not suppressed, do daemon fork */
+
+    if (fork_desired)
+    {
+	{
+	    pid_t pid = fork();
+
+	    if (pid < 0)
+	    {
+		int e = errno;
+
+		fprintf(stderr, "pluto: fork failed (%d %s)\n",
+		    errno, strerror(e));
+		exit_pluto(1);
+	    }
+
+	    if (pid != 0)
+	    {
+		/* parent: die, after filling PID into lock file.
+		 * must not use exit_pluto: lock would be removed!
+		 */
+		exit(fill_lock(lockfd, pid)? 0 : 1);
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (setsid() < 0)
+	{
+	    int e = errno;
+
+	    fprintf(stderr, "setsid() failed in main(). Errno %d: %s\n",
+		errno, strerror(e));
+	    exit_pluto(1);
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* no daemon fork: we have to fill in lock file */
+	(void) fill_lock(lockfd, getpid());
+	fprintf(stdout, "Pluto initialized\n");
+	fflush(stdout);
+    }
+
+    /* Close everything but ctl_fd and (if needed) stderr.
+     * There is some danger that a library that we don't know
+     * about is using some fd that we don't know about.
+     * I guess we'll soon find out.
+     */
+    {
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = getdtablesize() - 1; i >= 0; i--)  /* Bad hack */
+	{
+	    if ((!log_to_stderr || i != 2) && i != ctl_fd)
+		close(i);
+	}
+
+	/* make sure that stdin, stdout, stderr are reserved */
+	if (open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY) != 0)
+	    abort();
+	if (dup2(0, 1) != 1)
+	    abort();
+	if (!log_to_stderr && dup2(0, 2) != 2)
+	    abort();
+    }
+
+    init_constants();
+    init_log("pluto");
+
+    /* Note: some scripts may look for this exact message -- don't change
+     * ipsec barf was one, but it no longer does.
+     */
+    plog("Starting Pluto (strongSwan Version %s%s)"
+	, ipsec_version_code()
+	, compile_time_interop_options);
+
+    init_nat_traversal(nat_traversal, keep_alive, force_keepalive, nat_t_spf);
+    init_virtual_ip(virtual_private);
+    scx_init(pkcs11_module_path);   /* load and initialize PKCS #11 module */
+    xauth_init();		    /* load and initialize XAUTH module */
+    init_rnd_pool();
+    init_secret();
+    init_states();
+    init_crypto();
+    init_demux();
+    init_kernel();
+    init_adns();
+    init_id();
+    init_fetch();
+
+    /* loading X.509 CA certificates */
+    load_authcerts("CA cert", CA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_CA);
+    /* loading X.509 AA certificates */
+    load_authcerts("AA cert", AA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_AA);
+    /* loading X.509 OCSP certificates */
+    load_authcerts("OCSP cert", OCSP_CERT_PATH, AUTH_OCSP);
+    /* loading X.509 CRLs */
+    load_crls();
+    /* loading attribute certificates (experimental) */
+    load_acerts();
+
+    daily_log_event();
+    call_server();
+    return -1;	/* Shouldn't ever reach this */
+}
+
+/* leave pluto, with status.
+ * Once child is launched, parent must not exit this way because
+ * the lock would be released.
+ *
+ *  0 OK
+ *  1 general discomfort
+ * 10 lock file exists
+ */
+void
+exit_pluto(int status)
+{
+    reset_globals();	/* needed because we may be called in odd state */
+    free_preshared_secrets();
+    free_remembered_public_keys();
+    delete_every_connection();
+    free_crl_fetch();		/* free chain of crl fetch requests */
+    free_ocsp_fetch();		/* free chain of ocsp fetch requests */
+    free_authcerts();		/* free chain of X.509 authority certificates */
+    free_crls();		/* free chain of X.509 CRLs */
+    free_acerts();		/* free chain of X.509 attribute certificates */
+    free_ca_infos();		/* free chain of X.509 CA information records */
+    free_ocsp();		/* free ocsp cache */
+    free_ifaces();
+    scx_finalize();		/* finalize and unload PKCS #11 module */
+    xauth_finalize();		/* finalize and unload XAUTH module */
+    stop_adns();
+    free_md_pool();
+    delete_lock();
+#ifdef LEAK_DETECTIVE
+    report_leaks();
+#endif /* LEAK_DETECTIVE */
+    close_log();
+    exit(status);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset:4
+ * c-style: pluto
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/primegen.c b/src/pluto/primegen.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..159490345
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/primegen.c
@@ -0,0 +1,593 @@
+/* primegen.c - prime number generator
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ *
+ * ***********************************************************************
+ * The algorithm used to generate practically save primes is due to
+ * Lim and Lee as described in the CRYPTO '97 proceedings (ISBN3540633847)
+ * page 260.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef PLUTO
+#include <gmp.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "gcryptfix.h"
+#else /*! PLUTO */
+/* #include <assert.h> */
+/* #include <config.h> */
+/* #include "util.h" */
+/* #include "mpi.h" */
+/* #include "cipher.h" */
+#endif /* !PLUTO */
+
+static int no_of_small_prime_numbers;
+static MPI gen_prime( unsigned	nbits, int mode, int randomlevel );
+static int check_prime( MPI prime, MPI val_2 );
+static int is_prime( MPI n, unsigned steps, int *count );
+static void m_out_of_n( char *array, int m, int n );
+
+
+static void
+progress( int c )
+{
+    fputc( c, stderr );
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Generate a prime number (stored in secure memory)
+ */
+MPI
+generate_secret_prime( unsigned  nbits )
+{
+    MPI prime;
+
+    prime = gen_prime( nbits, 1, 2 );
+    progress('\n');
+    return prime;
+}
+
+MPI
+generate_public_prime( unsigned  nbits )
+{
+    MPI prime;
+
+    prime = gen_prime( nbits, 0, 2 );
+    progress('\n');
+    return prime;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * We do not need to use the strongest RNG because we gain no extra
+ * security from it - The prime number is public and we could also
+ * offer the factors for those who are willing to check that it is
+ * indeed a strong prime.
+ *
+ * mode 0: Standard
+ *	1: Make sure that at least one factor is of size qbits.
+ */
+MPI
+generate_elg_prime( int mode, unsigned pbits, unsigned qbits,
+		    MPI g, MPI **ret_factors )
+{
+    int n;  /* number of factors */
+    int m;  /* number of primes in pool */
+    unsigned fbits; /* length of prime factors */
+    MPI *factors; /* current factors */
+    MPI *pool;	/* pool of primes */
+    MPI q;	/* first prime factor (variable)*/
+    MPI prime;	/* prime test value */
+    MPI q_factor; /* used for mode 1 */
+    byte *perms = NULL;
+    int i, j;
+    int count1, count2;
+    unsigned nprime;
+    unsigned req_qbits = qbits; /* the requested q bits size */
+    MPI val_2  = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
+
+    /* find number of needed prime factors */
+    for(n=1; (pbits - qbits - 1) / n  >= qbits; n++ )
+	;
+    n--;
+    if( !n || (mode==1 && n < 2) )
+	log_fatal("can't gen prime with pbits=%u qbits=%u\n", pbits, qbits );
+    if( mode == 1 ) {
+	n--;
+	fbits = (pbits - 2*req_qbits -1) / n;
+	qbits =  pbits - req_qbits - n*fbits;
+    }
+    else {
+	fbits = (pbits - req_qbits -1) / n;
+	qbits = pbits - n*fbits;
+    }
+    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_debug("gen prime: pbits=%u qbits=%u fbits=%u/%u n=%d\n",
+		    pbits, req_qbits, qbits, fbits, n  );
+    prime = mpi_alloc( (pbits + BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1) /  BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB );
+    q = gen_prime( qbits, 0, 1 );
+    q_factor = mode==1? gen_prime( req_qbits, 0, 1 ) : NULL;
+
+    /* allocate an array to hold the factors + 2 for later usage */
+#ifdef PLUTO
+    m_alloc_ptrs_clear(factors, n+2);
+#else
+    factors = m_alloc_clear( (n+2) * sizeof *factors );
+#endif
+
+    /* make a pool of 3n+5 primes (this is an arbitrary value) */
+    m = n*3+5;
+    if( mode == 1 )
+	m += 5; /* need some more for DSA */
+    if( m < 25 )
+	m = 25;
+#ifdef PLUTO
+    m_alloc_ptrs_clear(pool, m);
+#else
+    pool = m_alloc_clear( m * sizeof *pool );
+#endif
+
+    /* permutate over the pool of primes */
+    count1=count2=0;
+    do {
+      next_try:
+	if( !perms ) {
+	    /* allocate new primes */
+	    for(i=0; i < m; i++ ) {
+		mpi_free(pool[i]);
+		pool[i] = NULL;
+	    }
+	    /* init m_out_of_n() */
+#ifdef PLUTO
+	    perms = alloc_bytes( m, "perms" );
+#else
+	    perms = m_alloc_clear( m );
+#endif
+	    for(i=0; i < n; i++ ) {
+		perms[i] = 1;
+		pool[i] = gen_prime( fbits, 0, 1 );
+		factors[i] = pool[i];
+	    }
+	}
+	else {
+	    m_out_of_n( perms, n, m );
+	    for(i=j=0; i < m && j < n ; i++ )
+		if( perms[i] ) {
+		    if( !pool[i] )
+			pool[i] = gen_prime( fbits, 0, 1 );
+		    factors[j++] = pool[i];
+		}
+	    if( i == n ) {
+		m_free(perms); perms = NULL;
+		progress('!');
+		goto next_try;	/* allocate new primes */
+	    }
+	}
+
+	mpi_set( prime, q );
+	mpi_mul_ui( prime, prime, 2 );
+	if( mode == 1 )
+	    mpi_mul( prime, prime, q_factor );
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	    mpi_mul( prime, prime, factors[i] );
+	mpi_add_ui( prime, prime, 1 );
+	nprime = mpi_get_nbits(prime);
+	if( nprime < pbits ) {
+	    if( ++count1 > 20 ) {
+		count1 = 0;
+		qbits++;
+		progress('>');
+		q = gen_prime( qbits, 0, 1 );
+		goto next_try;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    count1 = 0;
+	if( nprime > pbits ) {
+	    if( ++count2 > 20 ) {
+		count2 = 0;
+		qbits--;
+		progress('<');
+		q = gen_prime( qbits, 0, 1 );
+		goto next_try;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    count2 = 0;
+    } while( !(nprime == pbits && check_prime( prime, val_2 )) );
+
+    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+	progress('\n');
+	log_mpidump( "prime    : ", prime );
+	log_mpidump( "factor  q: ", q );
+	if( mode == 1 )
+	    log_mpidump( "factor q0: ", q_factor );
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	    log_mpidump( "factor pi: ", factors[i] );
+	log_debug("bit sizes: prime=%u, q=%u", mpi_get_nbits(prime), mpi_get_nbits(q) );
+	if( mode == 1 )
+	    fprintf(stderr, ", q0=%u", mpi_get_nbits(q_factor) );
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	    fprintf(stderr, ", p%d=%u", i, mpi_get_nbits(factors[i]) );
+	progress('\n');
+    }
+
+    if( ret_factors ) { /* caller wants the factors */
+#ifdef PLUTO
+	m_alloc_ptrs_clear(*ret_factors, n+2);
+#else
+	*ret_factors = m_alloc_clear( (n+2) * sizeof **ret_factors);
+#endif
+	if( mode == 1 ) {
+	    i = 0;
+	    (*ret_factors)[i++] = mpi_copy( q_factor );
+	    for(; i <= n; i++ )
+		(*ret_factors)[i] = mpi_copy( factors[i] );
+	}
+	else {
+	    for(; i < n; i++ )
+		(*ret_factors)[i] = mpi_copy( factors[i] );
+	}
+    }
+
+    if( g ) { /* create a generator (start with 3)*/
+	MPI tmp   = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(prime) );
+	MPI b	  = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(prime) );
+	MPI pmin1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs(prime) );
+
+	if( mode == 1 )
+	    BUG(); /* not yet implemented */
+	factors[n] = q;
+	factors[n+1] = mpi_alloc_set_ui(2);
+	mpi_sub_ui( pmin1, prime, 1 );
+	mpi_set_ui(g,2);
+	do {
+	    mpi_add_ui(g, g, 1);
+	    if( DBG_CIPHER ) {
+#ifdef PLUTO
+		log_mpidump("checking g: ", g);
+#else
+		log_debug("checking g: ");
+		mpi_print( stderr, g, 1 );
+#endif
+	    }
+	    else
+		progress('^');
+	    for(i=0; i < n+2; i++ ) {
+		/*fputc('~', stderr);*/
+		mpi_fdiv_q(tmp, pmin1, factors[i] );
+		/* (no mpi_pow(), but it is okay to use this with mod prime) */
+		mpi_powm(b, g, tmp, prime );
+		if( !mpi_cmp_ui(b, 1) )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	    if( DBG_CIPHER )
+		progress('\n');
+	} while( i < n+2 );
+	mpi_free(factors[n+1]);
+	mpi_free(tmp);
+	mpi_free(b);
+	mpi_free(pmin1);
+    }
+    if( !DBG_CIPHER )
+	progress('\n');
+
+    m_free( factors );	/* (factors are shallow copies) */
+    for(i=0; i < m; i++ )
+	mpi_free( pool[i] );
+    m_free( pool );
+    m_free(perms);
+    mpi_free(val_2);
+    return prime;
+}
+
+
+
+static MPI
+gen_prime( unsigned  nbits, int secret, int randomlevel )
+{
+    unsigned  nlimbs;
+    MPI prime, ptest, pminus1, val_2, val_3, result;
+    int i;
+    unsigned x, step;
+    unsigned count1, count2;
+    int *mods;
+
+    if( 0 && DBG_CIPHER )
+	log_debug("generate a prime of %u bits ", nbits );
+
+    if( !no_of_small_prime_numbers ) {
+	for(i=0; small_prime_numbers[i]; i++ )
+	    no_of_small_prime_numbers++;
+    }
+    mods = m_alloc( no_of_small_prime_numbers * sizeof *mods );
+    /* make nbits fit into MPI implementation */
+    nlimbs = (nbits + BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB - 1) /	BITS_PER_MPI_LIMB;
+    val_2  = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
+    val_3 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 3);
+    prime  = secret? mpi_alloc_secure( nlimbs ): mpi_alloc( nlimbs );
+    result = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
+    pminus1= mpi_alloc_like( prime );
+    ptest  = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
+    count1 = count2 = 0;
+    for(;;) {  /* try forvever */
+	int dotcount=0;
+
+	/* generate a random number */
+	{   char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, randomlevel, secret );
+	    mpi_set_buffer( prime, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
+	    m_free(p);
+	}
+
+	/* set high order bit to 1, set low order bit to 1 */
+	mpi_set_highbit( prime, nbits-1 );
+	mpi_set_bit( prime, 0 );
+
+	/* calculate all remainders */
+	for(i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ )
+	    mods[i] = mpi_fdiv_r_ui(NULL, prime, x);
+
+	/* now try some primes starting with prime */
+	for(step=0; step < 20000; step += 2 ) {
+	    /* check against all the small primes we have in mods */
+	    count1++;
+	    for(i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ ) {
+		while( mods[i] + step >= x )
+		    mods[i] -= x;
+		if( !(mods[i] + step) )
+		    break;
+	    }
+	    if( x )
+		continue;   /* found a multiple of an already known prime */
+
+	    mpi_add_ui( ptest, prime, step );
+
+	    /* do a faster Fermat test */
+	    count2++;
+	    mpi_sub_ui( pminus1, ptest, 1);
+	    mpi_powm( result, val_2, pminus1, ptest );
+	    if( !mpi_cmp_ui( result, 1 ) ) { /* not composite */
+		/* perform stronger tests */
+		if( is_prime(ptest, 5, &count2 ) ) {
+		    if( !mpi_test_bit( ptest, nbits-1 ) ) {
+			progress('\n');
+			log_debug("overflow in prime generation\n");
+			break; /* step loop, continue with a new prime */
+		    }
+
+		    mpi_free(val_2);
+		    mpi_free(val_3);
+		    mpi_free(result);
+		    mpi_free(pminus1);
+		    mpi_free(prime);
+		    m_free(mods);
+		    return ptest;
+		}
+	    }
+	    if( ++dotcount == 10 ) {
+		progress('.');
+		dotcount = 0;
+	    }
+	}
+	progress(':'); /* restart with a new random value */
+    }
+}
+
+/****************
+ * Returns: true if this may be a prime
+ */
+static int
+check_prime( MPI prime, MPI val_2 )
+{
+    int i;
+    unsigned x;
+    int count=0;
+
+    /* check against small primes */
+    for(i=0; (x = small_prime_numbers[i]); i++ ) {
+	if( mpi_divisible_ui( prime, x ) )
+	    return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* a quick fermat test */
+    {
+	MPI result = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
+	MPI pminus1 = mpi_alloc_like( prime );
+	mpi_sub_ui( pminus1, prime, 1);
+	mpi_powm( result, val_2, pminus1, prime );
+	mpi_free( pminus1 );
+	if( mpi_cmp_ui( result, 1 ) ) { /* if composite */
+	    mpi_free( result );
+	    progress('.');
+	    return 0;
+	}
+	mpi_free( result );
+    }
+
+    /* perform stronger tests */
+    if( is_prime(prime, 5, &count ) )
+	return 1; /* is probably a prime */
+    progress('.');
+    return 0;
+}
+
+
+/****************
+ * Return true if n is probably a prime
+ */
+static int
+is_prime( MPI n, unsigned steps, int *count )
+{
+    MPI x = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
+    MPI y = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
+    MPI z = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
+    MPI nminus1 = mpi_alloc( mpi_get_nlimbs( n ) );
+    MPI a2 = mpi_alloc_set_ui( 2 );
+    MPI q;
+    unsigned i, j, k;
+    int rc = 0;
+    unsigned nbits = mpi_get_nbits( n );
+
+    mpi_sub_ui( nminus1, n, 1 );
+
+    /* find q and k, so that n = 1 + 2^k * q */
+    q = mpi_copy( nminus1 );
+    k = mpi_trailing_zeros( q );
+    mpi_tdiv_q_2exp(q, q, k);
+
+    for(i=0 ; i < steps; i++ ) {
+	++*count;
+	if( !i ) {
+	    mpi_set_ui( x, 2 );
+	}
+	else {
+	    /*mpi_set_bytes( x, nbits-1, get_random_byte, 0 );*/
+	    {	char *p = get_random_bits( nbits, 0, 0 );
+		mpi_set_buffer( x, p, (nbits+7)/8, 0 );
+		m_free(p);
+	    }
+	    /* make sure that the number is smaller than the prime
+	     * and keep the randomness of the high bit */
+	    if( mpi_test_bit( x, nbits-2 ) ) {
+		mpi_set_highbit( x, nbits-2 ); /* clear all higher bits */
+	    }
+	    else {
+		mpi_set_highbit( x, nbits-2 );
+		mpi_clear_bit( x, nbits-2 );
+	    }
+	    assert( mpi_cmp( x, nminus1 ) < 0 && mpi_cmp_ui( x, 1 ) > 0 );
+	}
+	mpi_powm( y, x, q, n);
+	if( mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) && mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ) ) {
+	    for( j=1; j < k && mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ); j++ ) {
+		mpi_powm(y, y, a2, n);
+		if( !mpi_cmp_ui( y, 1 ) )
+		    goto leave; /* not a prime */
+	    }
+	    if( mpi_cmp( y, nminus1 ) )
+		goto leave; /* not a prime */
+	}
+	progress('+');
+    }
+    rc = 1; /* may be a prime */
+
+  leave:
+    mpi_free( x );
+    mpi_free( y );
+    mpi_free( z );
+    mpi_free( nminus1 );
+    mpi_free( q );
+
+    return rc;
+}
+
+
+static void
+m_out_of_n( char *array, int m, int n )
+{
+    int i=0, i1=0, j=0, jp=0,  j1=0, k1=0, k2=0;
+
+    if( !m || m >= n )
+	return;
+
+    if( m == 1 ) { /* special case */
+	for(i=0; i < n; i++ )
+	    if( array[i] ) {
+		array[i++] = 0;
+		if( i >= n )
+		    i = 0;
+		array[i] = 1;
+		return;
+	    }
+	BUG();
+    }
+
+    for(j=1; j < n; j++ ) {
+	if( array[n-1] == array[n-j-1] )
+	    continue;
+	j1 = j;
+	break;
+    }
+
+    if( m & 1 ) { /* m is odd */
+	if( array[n-1] ) {
+	    if( j1 & 1 ) {
+		k1 = n - j1;
+		k2 = k1+2;
+		if( k2 > n )
+		    k2 = n;
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	    goto scan;
+	}
+	k2 = n - j1 - 1;
+	if( k2 == 0 ) {
+	    k1 = i;
+	    k2 = n - j1;
+	}
+	else if( array[k2] && array[k2-1] )
+	    k1 = n;
+	else
+	    k1 = k2 + 1;
+    }
+    else { /* m is even */
+	if( !array[n-1] ) {
+	    k1 = n - j1;
+	    k2 = k1 + 1;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+
+	if( !(j1 & 1) ) {
+	    k1 = n - j1;
+	    k2 = k1+2;
+	    if( k2 > n )
+		k2 = n;
+	    goto leave;
+	}
+      scan:
+	jp = n - j1 - 1;
+	for(i=1; i <= jp; i++ ) {
+	    i1 = jp + 2 - i;
+	    if( array[i1-1]  ) {
+		if( array[i1-2] ) {
+		    k1 = i1 - 1;
+		    k2 = n - j1;
+		}
+		else {
+		    k1 = i1 - 1;
+		    k2 = n + 1 - j1;
+		}
+		goto leave;
+	    }
+	}
+	k1 = 1;
+	k2 = n + 1 - m;
+    }
+  leave:
+    array[k1-1] = !array[k1-1];
+    array[k2-1] = !array[k2-1];
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6a39e7c1f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.c
@@ -0,0 +1,685 @@
+/* whack communicating routines
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: rcv_whack.c,v 1.18 2006/05/25 11:33:57 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "ac.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "foodgroups.h"
+#include "whack.h"	/* needs connections.h */
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "state.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "rcv_whack.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "server.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "ocsp.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+/* helper variables and function to decode strings from whack message */
+
+static char *next_str
+    , *str_roof;
+
+static bool
+unpack_str(char **p)
+{
+    char *end = memchr(next_str, '\0', str_roof - next_str);
+
+    if (end == NULL)
+    {
+	return FALSE;	/* fishy: no end found */
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	*p = next_str == end? NULL : next_str;
+	next_str = end + 1;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+/* bits loading keys from asynchronous DNS */
+
+enum key_add_attempt {
+    ka_TXT,
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+    ka_KEY,
+#endif
+    ka_roof	/* largest value + 1 */
+};
+
+struct key_add_common {
+    int refCount;
+    char *diag[ka_roof];
+    int whack_fd;
+    bool success;
+};
+
+struct key_add_continuation {
+    struct adns_continuation ac;	/* common prefix */
+    struct key_add_common *common;	/* common data */
+    enum key_add_attempt lookingfor;
+};
+
+static void
+key_add_ugh(const struct id *keyid, err_t ugh)
+{
+    char name[BUF_LEN];	/* longer IDs will be truncated in message */
+
+    (void)idtoa(keyid, name, sizeof(name));
+    loglog(RC_NOKEY
+	, "failure to fetch key for %s from DNS: %s", name, ugh);
+}
+
+/* last one out: turn out the lights */
+static void
+key_add_merge(struct key_add_common *oc, const struct id *keyid)
+{
+    if (oc->refCount == 0)
+    {
+	enum key_add_attempt kaa;
+
+	/* if no success, print all diagnostics */
+	if (!oc->success)
+	    for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
+		key_add_ugh(keyid, oc->diag[kaa]);
+
+	for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
+	    pfreeany(oc->diag[kaa]);
+
+	close(oc->whack_fd);
+	pfree(oc);
+    }
+}
+
+static void
+key_add_continue(struct adns_continuation *ac, err_t ugh)
+{
+    struct key_add_continuation *kc = (void *) ac;
+    struct key_add_common *oc = kc->common;
+
+    passert(whack_log_fd == NULL_FD);
+    whack_log_fd = oc->whack_fd;
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	oc->diag[kc->lookingfor] = clone_str(ugh, "key add error");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	oc->success = TRUE;
+	transfer_to_public_keys(kc->ac.gateways_from_dns
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+	    , &kc->ac.keys_from_dns
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+	    );
+    }
+
+    oc->refCount--;
+    key_add_merge(oc, &ac->id);
+    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+}
+
+static void
+key_add_request(const whack_message_t *msg)
+{
+    struct id keyid;
+    err_t ugh = atoid(msg->keyid, &keyid, FALSE);
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_BADID, "bad --keyid \"%s\": %s", msg->keyid, ugh);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	if (!msg->whack_addkey)
+	    delete_public_keys(&keyid, msg->pubkey_alg
+		, empty_chunk, empty_chunk);
+
+	if (msg->keyval.len == 0)
+	{
+	    struct key_add_common *oc
+		= alloc_thing(struct key_add_common
+			      , "key add common things");
+	    enum key_add_attempt kaa;
+
+	    /* initialize state shared by queries */
+	    oc->refCount = 0;
+	    oc->whack_fd = dup_any(whack_log_fd);
+	    oc->success = FALSE;
+
+	    for (kaa = ka_TXT; kaa != ka_roof; kaa++)
+	    {
+		struct key_add_continuation *kc
+		    = alloc_thing(struct key_add_continuation
+			, "key add continuation");
+
+		oc->diag[kaa] = NULL;
+		oc->refCount++;
+		kc->common = oc;
+		kc->lookingfor = kaa;
+		switch (kaa)
+		{
+		case ka_TXT:
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&keyid
+			, &keyid	/* same */
+			, T_TXT
+			, key_add_continue
+			, &kc->ac);
+		    break;
+#ifdef USE_KEYRR
+		case ka_KEY:
+		    ugh = start_adns_query(&keyid
+			, NULL
+			, T_KEY
+			, key_add_continue
+			, &kc->ac);
+		    break;
+#endif /* USE_KEYRR */
+		default:
+		    bad_case(kaa);	/* suppress gcc warning */
+		}
+		if (ugh != NULL)
+		{
+		    oc->diag[kaa] = clone_str(ugh, "early key add failure");
+		    oc->refCount--;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    /* Done launching queries.
+	     * Handle total failure case.
+	     */
+	    key_add_merge(oc, &keyid);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    ugh = add_public_key(&keyid, DAL_LOCAL, msg->pubkey_alg
+		, &msg->keyval, &pubkeys);
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s", ugh);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Handle a kernel request. Supposedly, there's a message in
+ * the kernelsock socket.
+ */
+void
+whack_handle(int whackctlfd)
+{
+    whack_message_t msg;
+    struct sockaddr_un whackaddr;
+    int whackaddrlen = sizeof(whackaddr);
+    int whackfd = accept(whackctlfd, (struct sockaddr *)&whackaddr, &whackaddrlen);
+    /* Note: actual value in n should fit in int.  To print, cast to int. */
+    ssize_t n;
+
+    if (whackfd < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "accept() failed in whack_handle()"));
+	return;
+    }
+    if (fcntl(whackfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "failed to set CLOEXEC in whack_handle()"));
+	close(whackfd);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    n = read(whackfd, &msg, sizeof(msg));
+
+    if (n == -1)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "read() failed in whack_handle()"));
+	close(whackfd);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    whack_log_fd = whackfd;
+
+    /* sanity check message */
+    {
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	next_str = msg.string;
+	str_roof = (char *)&msg + n;
+
+	if ((size_t)n < offsetof(whack_message_t, whack_shutdown) + sizeof(msg.whack_shutdown))
+	{
+	    ugh = builddiag("ignoring runt message from whack: got %d bytes", (int)n);
+	}
+	else if (msg.magic != WHACK_MAGIC)
+	{
+	    if (msg.magic == WHACK_BASIC_MAGIC)
+	    {
+		/* Only shutdown command.  Simpler inter-version compatability. */
+		if (msg.whack_shutdown)
+		{
+		    plog("shutting down");
+		    exit_pluto(0);	/* delete lock and leave, with 0 status */
+		}
+		ugh = "";	/* bail early, but without complaint */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		ugh = builddiag("ignoring message from whack with bad magic %d; should be %d; probably wrong version"
+		    , msg.magic, WHACK_MAGIC);
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (next_str > str_roof)
+	{
+	    ugh = builddiag("ignoring truncated message from whack: got %d bytes; expected %u"
+		, (int) n, (unsigned) sizeof(msg));
+	}
+	else if (!unpack_str(&msg.name)		/* string  1 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.id)		/* string  2 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.cert)		/* string  3 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.ca)		/* string  4 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.groups)	/* string  5 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.updown)	/* string  6 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.left.virt)		/* string  7 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.id)		/* string  8 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.cert)		/* string  9 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.ca)		/* string 10 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.groups)	/* string 11 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.updown)	/* string 12 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.right.virt)		/* string 13 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.keyid)		/* string 14 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.myid)		/* string 15 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.cacert)		/* string 16 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ldaphost)		/* string 17 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ldapbase)		/* string 18 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.crluri)		/* string 19 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.crluri2)		/* string 20 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ocspuri)		/* string 21 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.ike)		/* string 22 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.esp)		/* string 23 */
+	|| !unpack_str(&msg.sc_data)		/* string 24 */
+	|| str_roof - next_str != (ptrdiff_t)msg.keyval.len)	/* check chunk */
+	{
+	    ugh = "message from whack contains bad string";
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    msg.keyval.ptr = next_str;	/* grab chunk */
+	}
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (*ugh != '\0')
+		loglog(RC_BADWHACKMESSAGE, "%s", ugh);
+	    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+	    close(whackfd);
+	    return;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_options)
+    {
+#ifdef DEBUG
+	if (msg.name == NULL)
+	{
+	    /* we do a two-step so that if either old or new would
+	     * cause the message to print, it will be printed.
+	     */
+	    cur_debugging |= msg.debugging;
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+		, DBG_log("base debugging = %s"
+		    , bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, msg.debugging)));
+	    cur_debugging = base_debugging = msg.debugging;
+	}
+	else if (!msg.whack_connection)
+	{
+	    struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+
+	    if (c != NULL)
+	    {
+		c->extra_debugging = msg.debugging;
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+		    , DBG_log("\"%s\" extra_debugging = %s"
+			, c->name
+			, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, c->extra_debugging)));
+	    }
+	}
+#endif
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_myid)
+	set_myid(MYID_SPECIFIED, msg.myid);
+
+    /* Deleting combined with adding a connection works as replace.
+     * To make this more useful, in only this combination,
+     * delete will silently ignore the lack of the connection.
+     */
+    if (msg.whack_delete)
+    {
+    	if (msg.whack_ca)
+	    find_ca_info_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+	else
+	    delete_connections_by_name(msg.name, !msg.whack_connection);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_deletestate)
+    {
+	struct state *st = state_with_serialno(msg.whack_deletestateno);
+
+	if (st == NULL)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME, "no state #%lu to delete"
+		, msg.whack_deletestateno);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    delete_state(st);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_crash)
+	delete_states_by_peer(&msg.whack_crash_peer);
+
+    if (msg.whack_connection)
+	add_connection(&msg);
+
+    if (msg.whack_ca && msg.cacert != NULL)
+	add_ca_info(&msg);
+	
+    /* process "listen" before any operation that could require it */
+    if (msg.whack_listen)
+    {
+	close_peerlog();    /* close any open per-peer logs */
+	plog("listening for IKE messages");
+	listening = TRUE;
+	daily_log_reset();
+	reset_adns_restart_count();
+	set_myFQDN();
+	find_ifaces();
+	load_preshared_secrets(NULL_FD);
+	load_groups();
+    }
+    if (msg.whack_unlisten)
+    {
+	plog("no longer listening for IKE messages");
+	listening = FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_SECRETS)
+    {
+	load_preshared_secrets(whackfd);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_CACERTS)
+    {
+	load_authcerts("CA cert", CA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_CA);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_AACERTS)
+    {
+	load_authcerts("AA cert", AA_CERT_PATH, AUTH_AA);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_OCSPCERTS)
+    {
+	load_authcerts("OCSP cert", OCSP_CERT_PATH, AUTH_OCSP);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_ACERTS)
+    {
+	load_acerts();
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_reread & REREAD_CRLS)
+    {
+	load_crls();
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_purgeocsp)
+    {
+	free_ocsp_fetch();
+	free_ocsp_cache();
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_ALGS)
+    {
+	ike_alg_list();
+	kernel_alg_list();
+    }
+   if (msg.whack_list & LIST_PUBKEYS)
+    {
+	list_public_keys(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CERTS)
+    {
+	list_certs(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CACERTS)
+    {
+	list_authcerts("CA", AUTH_CA, msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_AACERTS)
+    {
+	list_authcerts("AA", AUTH_AA, msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_OCSPCERTS)
+    {
+	list_authcerts("OCSP", AUTH_OCSP, msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_ACERTS)
+    {
+	list_acerts(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_GROUPS)
+    {
+	list_groups(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CAINFOS)
+    {
+	list_ca_infos(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CRLS)
+    {
+	list_crls(msg.whack_utc, strict_crl_policy);
+	list_crl_fetch_requests(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_OCSP)
+    {
+	list_ocsp_cache(msg.whack_utc, strict_crl_policy);
+	list_ocsp_fetch_requests(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_list & LIST_CARDS)
+    {
+	scx_list(msg.whack_utc);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_key)
+    {
+	/* add a public key */
+	key_add_request(&msg);
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_route)
+    {
+	if (!listening)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before --route");
+	}
+	if (msg.name == NULL)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+		, "whack --route requires a connection name");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+
+	    if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
+	    {
+		set_cur_connection(c);
+		if (!oriented(*c))
+		    whack_log(RC_ORIENT
+			, "we have no ipsecN interface for either end of this connection");
+		else if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+		    route_group(c);
+		else if (!trap_connection(c))
+		    whack_log(RC_ROUTE, "could not route");
+		reset_cur_connection();
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_unroute)
+    {
+	if (msg.name == NULL)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+		, "whack --unroute requires a connection name");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    struct connection *c = con_by_name(msg.name, TRUE);
+
+	    if (c != NULL && c->ikev1)
+	    {
+		struct spd_route *sr;
+		int fail = 0;
+
+		set_cur_connection(c);
+
+		for (sr = &c->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+		{
+		    if (sr->routing >= RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL)
+			fail++;
+		}
+		if (fail > 0)
+		    whack_log(RC_RTBUSY, "cannot unroute: route busy");
+		else if (c->policy & POLICY_GROUP)
+		    unroute_group(c);
+		else
+		    unroute_connection(c);
+		reset_cur_connection();
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_initiate)
+    {
+	if (!listening)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before --initiate");
+	}
+	else if (msg.name == NULL)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+		, "whack --initiate requires a connection name");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    initiate_connection(msg.name
+		, msg.whack_async? NULL_FD : dup_any(whackfd));
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_oppo_initiate)
+    {
+	if (!listening)
+	    whack_log(RC_DEAF, "need --listen before opportunistic initiation");
+	else
+	    initiate_opportunistic(&msg.oppo_my_client, &msg.oppo_peer_client, 0
+		, FALSE
+		, msg.whack_async? NULL_FD : dup_any(whackfd));
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_terminate)
+    {
+	if (msg.name == NULL)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_UNKNOWN_NAME
+		, "whack --terminate requires a connection name");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    terminate_connection(msg.name);
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_status)
+	show_status(msg.whack_statusall, msg.name);
+
+    if (msg.whack_shutdown)
+    {
+	plog("shutting down");
+	exit_pluto(0);	/* delete lock and leave, with 0 status */
+    }
+
+    if (msg.whack_sc_op != SC_OP_NONE)
+    {
+	if (pkcs11_proxy)
+	    scx_op_via_whack(msg.sc_data, msg.inbase, msg.outbase
+			   , msg.whack_sc_op, msg.keyid, whackfd);
+	else
+	   plog("pkcs11 access to smartcard not allowed (set pkcs11proxy=yes)");
+    }
+
+    whack_log_fd = NULL_FD;
+    close(whackfd);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset:4
+ * c-style: pluto
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f42761c51
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rcv_whack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+/* whack communicating routines
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: rcv_whack.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:29 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern void whack_handle(int kernelfd);
diff --git a/src/pluto/rnd.c b/src/pluto/rnd.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..812882c6b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rnd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
+/* randomness machinery
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: rnd.c,v 1.3 2005/09/08 16:26:30 as Exp $
+ */
+
+/* A true random number generator (we hope)
+ *
+ * Under LINUX ("linux" predefined), use /dev/urandom.
+ * Under OpenBSD ("__OpenBSD__" predefined), use arc4random().
+ * Otherwise use our own random number generator based on clock skew.
+ *   I (ADK) first heard of the idea from John Ioannidis, who heard it
+ *   from Matt Blaze and/or Jack Lacy.
+ * ??? Why is mixing need for linux but not OpenBSD?
+ */
+
+/* Pluto's uses of randomness:
+ *
+ * - Setting up the "secret_of_the_day".  This changes every hour!  20
+ *   bytes a shot.  It is used in building responder cookies.
+ *
+ * - generating initiator cookies (8 bytes, once per Phase 1 initiation).
+ *
+ * - 32 bytes per DH local secret.  Once per Main Mode exchange and once
+ *   per Quick Mode Exchange with PFS.  (Size is our choice, with
+ *   tradeoffs.)
+ *
+ * - 16 bytes per nonce we generate.  Once per Main Mode exchange and
+ *   once per Quick Mode exchange.  (Again, we choose the size.)
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes per SPI number that we generate.  We choose the SPIs for all
+ *   inbound SPIs, one to three per IPSEC SA (one for AH (rare, probably)
+ *   one for ESP (almost always), and one for tunnel (very common)).
+ *   I don't actually know how the kernel would generate these numbers --
+ *   currently Pluto generates them; this isn't the way things will be
+ *   done in the future.
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes per Message ID we need to generate.  One per Quick Mode
+ *   exchange.  Eventually, one per informational exchange.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+
+#ifdef linux
+# define USE_DEV_RANDOM	1
+# define RANDOM_PATH    DEV_URANDOM
+#else
+# ifdef __OpenBSD__
+#  define USE_ARC4RANDOM
+# else
+#   define USE_CLOCK_SLEW
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+#define get_rnd_byte() (arc4random() % 256)
+
+#else	/**** start of large #else ****/
+
+#ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
+static int random_fd = NULL_FD;
+#endif
+
+#define RANDOM_POOL_SIZE   SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
+static u_char random_pool[RANDOM_POOL_SIZE];
+
+#ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
+
+/* Generate (what we hope is) a true random byte using /dev/urandom  */
+static u_char
+generate_rnd_byte(void)
+{
+    u_char c;
+
+    if (read(random_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) == -1)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "read() failed in get_rnd_byte()"));
+
+    return c;
+}
+
+#else /* !USE_DEV_RANDOM */
+
+/* Generate (what we hope is) a true random byte using the clock skew trick.
+ * Note: this code is not maintained!  In particular, LINUX signal(2)
+ * semantics changed with glibc2 (and not for the better).  It isn't clear
+ * that this code will work.  We keep the code because someday it might
+ * come in handy.
+ */
+# error "This code is not maintained.  Please define USE_DEV_RANDOM."
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t i, j, k;
+
+/* timer signal handler */
+static void
+rnd_handler(int ignore_me UNUSED)
+{
+    k <<= 1;	/* Shift left by 1 */
+    j++;
+    k |= (i & 0x1); /* Get lsbit of counter */
+
+    if (j != 8)
+	signal(SIGVTALRM, rnd_handler);
+}
+
+static u_char
+generate_rnd_byte(void)
+{
+    struct itimerval tmval, ntmval;
+
+# ifdef NEVER	/* ??? */
+#  ifdef linux
+    int mask = siggetmask();
+
+    mask |= SIGVTALRM;
+    sigsetmask(mask);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+    i = 0;
+    j = 0;
+
+    ntmval.it_interval.tv_sec = 0;
+    ntmval.it_interval.tv_usec = 1;
+    ntmval.it_value.tv_sec = 0;
+    ntmval.it_value.tv_usec = 1;
+    signal(SIGVTALRM, rnd_handler);
+    setitimer(ITIMER_VIRTUAL, &ntmval, &tmval);
+
+    while (j != 8)
+	i++;
+
+    setitimer(ITIMER_VIRTUAL, &tmval, &ntmval);
+    signal(SIGVTALRM, SIG_IGN);
+
+# ifdef NEVER	/* ??? */
+#  ifdef linux
+    mask ^= SIGVTALRM;
+    sigsetmask(mask);
+#  endif
+# endif
+
+    return k;
+}
+
+#endif /* !USE_DEV_RANDOM */
+
+static void
+mix_pool(void)
+{
+    SHA1_CTX ctx;
+
+    SHA1Init(&ctx);
+    SHA1Update(&ctx, random_pool, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE);
+    SHA1Final(random_pool, &ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a single random byte.
+ */
+static u_char
+get_rnd_byte(void)
+{
+    random_pool[RANDOM_POOL_SIZE - 1] = generate_rnd_byte();
+    random_pool[0] = generate_rnd_byte();
+    mix_pool();
+    return random_pool[0];
+}
+
+#endif /* !USE_ARC4RANDOM */	/**** end of large #else ****/
+
+void
+get_rnd_bytes(u_char *buffer, int length)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+	buffer[i] = get_rnd_byte();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the random pool.
+ */
+void
+init_rnd_pool(void)
+{
+#ifndef USE_ARC4RANDOM
+# ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
+    DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("opening %s", RANDOM_PATH));
+    random_fd = open(RANDOM_PATH, O_RDONLY);
+    if (random_fd == -1)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "open of %s failed in init_rnd_pool()", RANDOM_PATH));
+    fcntl(random_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+# endif
+
+    get_rnd_bytes(random_pool, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE);
+    mix_pool();
+#endif /* !USE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+    /* start of rand(3) on the right foot */
+    {
+	unsigned int seed;
+
+	get_rnd_bytes((void *)&seed, sizeof(seed));
+	srand(seed);
+    }
+}
+
+u_char    secret_of_the_day[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+
+void
+init_secret(void)
+{
+    /*
+     * Generate the secret value for responder cookies, and
+     * schedule an event for refresh.
+     */
+    get_rnd_bytes(secret_of_the_day, sizeof(secret_of_the_day));
+    event_schedule(EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY, NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */
diff --git a/src/pluto/rnd.h b/src/pluto/rnd.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0bd168039
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rnd.h
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/* randomness machinery
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: rnd.h,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:29 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern u_char    secret_of_the_day[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+extern void get_rnd_bytes(u_char *buffer, int length);
+extern void init_rnd_pool(void);
+extern void init_secret(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11.h b/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9261e1e4c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11.h
@@ -0,0 +1,299 @@
+/* pkcs11.h include file for PKCS #11. */
+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS11_H_
+#define _PKCS11_H_ 1
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+/* Before including this file (pkcs11.h) (or pkcs11t.h by
+ * itself), 6 platform-specific macros must be defined.  These
+ * macros are described below, and typical definitions for them
+ * are also given.  Be advised that these definitions can depend
+ * on both the platform and the compiler used (and possibly also
+ * on whether a Cryptoki library is linked statically or
+ * dynamically).
+ *
+ * In addition to defining these 6 macros, the packing convention
+ * for Cryptoki structures should be set.  The Cryptoki
+ * convention on packing is that structures should be 1-byte
+ * aligned.
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
+ * Win32 stuff, this might be done by using the following
+ * preprocessor directive before including pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(push, cryptoki, 1)
+ *
+ * and using the following preprocessor directive after including
+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(pop, cryptoki)
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, this might be done by using
+ * the following preprocessor directive before including
+ * pkcs11.h or pkcs11t.h:
+ *
+ * #pragma pack(1)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, you're on your own for this.  You might
+ * not need to do (or be able to do!) anything.
+ *
+ *
+ * Now for the macros:
+ *
+ *
+ * 1. CK_PTR: The indirection string for making a pointer to an
+ * object.  It can be used like this:
+ *
+ * typedef CK_BYTE CK_PTR CK_BYTE_PTR;
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to produce
+ * Win32 stuff, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR *
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to produce Win16 stuff, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR far *
+ *
+ * In a typical UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_PTR *
+ *
+ *
+ * 2. CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * an exportable Cryptoki library function definition out of a
+ * return type and a function name.  It should be used in the
+ * following fashion to define the exposed Cryptoki functions in
+ * a Cryptoki library:
+ *
+ * CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
+ *   CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
+ * )
+ * {
+ *   ...
+ * }
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to define a
+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __declspec(dllexport) name
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to define a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
+ * might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __export _far _pascal name
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType name
+ *
+ *
+ * 3. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * an importable Cryptoki library function declaration out of a
+ * return type and a function name.  It should be used in the
+ * following fashion:
+ *
+ * extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, C_Initialize)(
+ *   CK_VOID_PTR pReserved
+ * );
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to declare a
+ * function in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __declspec(dllimport) name
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to declare a function in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it
+ * might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __export _far _pascal name
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType name
+ *
+ *
+ * 4. CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name): A macro
+ * which makes a Cryptoki API function pointer declaration or
+ * function pointer type declaration out of a return type and a
+ * function name.  It should be used in the following fashion:
+ *
+ * // Define funcPtr to be a pointer to a Cryptoki API function
+ * // taking arguments args and returning CK_RV.
+ * CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtr)(args);
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * // Define funcPtrType to be the type of a pointer to a
+ * // Cryptoki API function taking arguments args and returning
+ * // CK_RV, and then define funcPtr to be a variable of type
+ * // funcPtrType.
+ * typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, funcPtrType)(args);
+ * funcPtrType funcPtr;
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to access
+ * functions in a Win32 Cryptoki .dll, in might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __declspec(dllimport) (* name)
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to access functions in a Win16 Cryptoki .dll, it might
+ * be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType __export _far _pascal (* name)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType (* name)
+ *
+ *
+ * 5. CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name): A macro which makes
+ * a function pointer type for an application callback out of
+ * a return type for the callback and a name for the callback.
+ * It should be used in the following fashion:
+ *
+ * CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallback)(args);
+ *
+ * to declare a function pointer, myCallback, to a callback
+ * which takes arguments args and returns a CK_RV.  It can also
+ * be used like this:
+ *
+ * typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, myCallbackType)(args);
+ * myCallbackType myCallback;
+ *
+ * If you're using Microsoft Developer Studio 5.0 to do Win32
+ * Cryptoki development, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType (* name)
+ *
+ * If you're using an earlier version of Microsoft Developer
+ * Studio to do Win16 development, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType _far _pascal (* name)
+ *
+ * In a UNIX environment, it might be defined by:
+ *
+ * #define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+ *   returnType (* name)
+ *
+ *
+ * 6. NULL_PTR: This macro is the value of a NULL pointer.
+ *
+ * In any ANSI/ISO C environment (and in many others as well),
+ * this should best be defined by
+ *
+ * #ifndef NULL_PTR
+ * #define NULL_PTR 0
+ * #endif
+ */
+
+
+/* All the various Cryptoki types and #define'd values are in the
+ * file pkcs11t.h. */
+#include "pkcs11t.h"
+
+#define __PASTE(x,y)      x##y
+
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define the "extern" form of all the entry points.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST  1
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+  extern CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(CK_RV, name)
+
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define the typedef form of all the entry points.  That is, for
+ * each Cryptoki function C_XXX, define a type CK_C_XXX which is
+ * a pointer to that kind of function.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_NEED_ARG_LIST  1
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+  typedef CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(CK_RV, __PASTE(CK_,name))
+
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+#undef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+
+/* ==============================================================
+ * Define structed vector of entry points.  A CK_FUNCTION_LIST
+ * contains a CK_VERSION indicating a library's Cryptoki version
+ * and then a whole slew of function pointers to the routines in
+ * the library.  This type was declared, but not defined, in
+ * pkcs11t.h.
+ * ==============================================================
+ */
+
+#define CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(name) \
+  __PASTE(CK_,name) name;
+  
+struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST {
+
+  CK_VERSION    version;  /* Cryptoki version */
+
+/* Pile all the function pointers into the CK_FUNCTION_LIST. */
+/* pkcs11f.h has all the information about the Cryptoki
+ * function prototypes. */
+#include "pkcs11f.h"
+
+};
+
+#undef CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO
+
+
+#undef __PASTE
+
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11f.h b/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11f.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..dec6315dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11f.h
@@ -0,0 +1,912 @@
+/* pkcs11f.h include file for PKCS #11. */
+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or 
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the 
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+/* This header file contains pretty much everything about all the */
+/* Cryptoki function prototypes.  Because this information is */
+/* used for more than just declaring function prototypes, the */
+/* order of the functions appearing herein is important, and */
+/* should not be altered. */
+
+/* General-purpose */
+
+/* C_Initialize initializes the Cryptoki library. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Initialize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_VOID_PTR   pInitArgs  /* if this is not NULL_PTR, it gets
+                            * cast to CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR
+                            * and dereferenced */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Finalize indicates that an application is done with the
+ * Cryptoki library. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Finalize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_VOID_PTR   pReserved  /* reserved.  Should be NULL_PTR */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetInfo returns general information about Cryptoki. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_INFO_PTR   pInfo  /* location that receives information */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetFunctionList returns the function list. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR ppFunctionList  /* receives pointer to
+                                            * function list */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Slot and token management */
+
+/* C_GetSlotList obtains a list of slots in the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_BBOOL       tokenPresent,  /* only slots with tokens? */
+  CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlotList,     /* receives array of slot IDs */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR   pulCount       /* receives number of slots */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetSlotInfo obtains information about a particular slot in
+ * the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSlotInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID       slotID,  /* the ID of the slot */
+  CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives the slot information */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetTokenInfo obtains information about a particular token
+ * in the system. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetTokenInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID        slotID,  /* ID of the token's slot */
+  CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives the token information */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetMechanismList obtains a list of mechanism types
+ * supported by a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismList)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,          /* ID of token's slot */
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMechanismList,  /* gets mech. array */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR          pulCount         /* gets # of mechs. */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetMechanismInfo obtains information about a particular
+ * mechanism possibly supported by a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetMechanismInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,  /* ID of the token's slot */
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE     type,    /* type of mechanism */
+  CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR pInfo    /* receives mechanism info */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_InitToken initializes a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitToken)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+/* pLabel changed from CK_CHAR_PTR to CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR for v2.10 */
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID      slotID,    /* ID of the token's slot */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pPin,      /* the SO's initial PIN */
+  CK_ULONG        ulPinLen,  /* length in bytes of the PIN */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR pLabel     /* 32-byte token label (blank padded) */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_InitPIN initializes the normal user's PIN. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_InitPIN)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pPin,      /* the normal user's PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPinLen   /* length in bytes of the PIN */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SetPIN modifies the PIN of the user who is logged in. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetPIN)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pOldPin,   /* the old PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulOldLen,  /* length of the old PIN */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pNewPin,   /* the new PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulNewLen   /* length of the new PIN */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Session management */
+
+/* C_OpenSession opens a session between an application and a
+ * token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_OpenSession)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID            slotID,        /* the slot's ID */
+  CK_FLAGS              flags,         /* from CK_SESSION_INFO */
+  CK_VOID_PTR           pApplication,  /* passed to callback */
+  CK_NOTIFY             Notify,        /* callback function */
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR phSession      /* gets session handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CloseSession closes a session between an application and a
+ * token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseSession)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CloseAllSessions closes all sessions with a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CloseAllSessions)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SLOT_ID     slotID  /* the token's slot */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetSessionInfo obtains information about the session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetSessionInfo)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE   hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR pInfo      /* receives session info */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetOperationState obtains the state of the cryptographic operation
+ * in a session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetOperationState)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,             /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOperationState,      /* gets state */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOperationStateLen  /* gets state length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SetOperationState restores the state of the cryptographic
+ * operation in a session. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetOperationState)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pOperationState,      /* holds state */
+  CK_ULONG         ulOperationStateLen,  /* holds state length */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hEncryptionKey,       /* en/decryption key */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hAuthenticationKey    /* sign/verify key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Login logs a user into a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Login)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_USER_TYPE      userType,  /* the user type */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR   pPin,      /* the user's PIN */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPinLen   /* the length of the PIN */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Logout logs a user out from a token. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Logout)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Object management */
+
+/* C_CreateObject creates a new object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CreateObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,   /* the object's template */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount,     /* attributes in template */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject  /* gets new object's handle. */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CopyObject copies an object, creating a new object for the
+ * copy. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CopyObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hObject,     /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,   /* template for new object */
+  CK_ULONG             ulCount,     /* attributes in template */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phNewObject  /* receives handle of copy */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DestroyObject destroys an object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DestroyObject)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject    /* the object's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetObjectSize gets the size of an object in bytes. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetObjectSize)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,   /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSize    /* receives size of object */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GetAttributeValue obtains the value of one or more object
+ * attributes. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetAttributeValue)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,    /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* specifies attrs; gets vals */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attributes in template */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SetAttributeValue modifies the value of one or more object
+ * attributes */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SetAttributeValue)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hObject,    /* the object's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* specifies attrs and values */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attributes in template */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_FindObjectsInit initializes a search for token and session
+ * objects that match a template. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR  pTemplate,  /* attribute values to match */
+  CK_ULONG          ulCount     /* attrs in search template */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_FindObjects continues a search for token and session
+ * objects that match a template, obtaining additional object
+ * handles. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjects)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+ CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phObject,          /* gets obj. handles */
+ CK_ULONG             ulMaxObjectCount,  /* max handles to get */
+ CK_ULONG_PTR         pulObjectCount     /* actual # returned */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_FindObjectsFinal finishes a search for token and session
+ * objects. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_FindObjectsFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Encryption and decryption */
+
+/* C_EncryptInit initializes an encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the encryption mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of encryption key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Encrypt encrypts single-part data. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Encrypt)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,               /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,           /* bytes of plaintext */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,      /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedDataLen  /* gets c-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_EncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,           /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,              /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,          /* plaintext data len */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,     /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen /* gets c-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_EncryptFinal finishes a multiple-part encryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_EncryptFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,                /* session handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLastEncryptedPart,      /* last c-text */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulLastEncryptedPartLen  /* gets last size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptInit initializes a decryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the decryption mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of decryption key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Decrypt decrypts encrypted data in a single part. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Decrypt)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,           /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedData,     /* ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedDataLen, /* ciphertext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,              /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDataLen          /* gets p-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* encrypted data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* input length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* p-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptFinal finishes a multiple-part decryption
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLastPart,      /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulLastPartLen  /* p-text size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Message digesting */
+
+/* C_DigestInit initializes a message-digesting operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism  /* the digesting mechanism */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Digest digests data in a single part. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Digest)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,        /* data to be digested */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,    /* bytes of data to digest */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pDigest,      /* gets the message digest */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDigestLen  /* gets digest length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DigestUpdate continues a multiple-part message-digesting
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* data to be digested */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* bytes of data to be digested */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DigestKey continues a multi-part message-digesting
+ * operation, by digesting the value of a secret key as part of
+ * the data already digested. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey       /* secret key to digest */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DigestFinal finishes a multiple-part message-digesting
+ * operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pDigest,      /* gets the message digest */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDigestLen  /* gets byte count of digest */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Signing and MACing */
+
+/* C_SignInit initializes a signature (private key encryption)
+ * operation, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to
+ * the data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the
+ *signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the signature mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* handle of signature key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Sign signs (encrypts with private key) data in a single
+ * part, where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the
+ * data, and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Sign)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* the data to sign */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,       /* count of bytes to sign */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignUpdate continues a multiple-part signature operation,
+ * where the signature is (will be) an appendix to the data, 
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* the data to sign */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* count of bytes to sign */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignFinal finishes a multiple-part signature operation, 
+ * returning the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignRecoverInit initializes a signature operation, where
+ * the data can be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecoverInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,   /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism, /* the signature mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey        /* handle of the signature key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignRecover signs data in a single operation, where the
+ * data can be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignRecover)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* the data to sign */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,       /* count of bytes to sign */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* gets the signature */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulSignatureLen  /* gets signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Verifying signatures and MACs */
+
+/* C_VerifyInit initializes a verification operation, where the
+ * signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext cannot
+ *  cannot be recovered from the signature (e.g. DSA). */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the verification mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* verification key */ 
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_Verify verifies a signature in a single-part operation, 
+ * where the signature is an appendix to the data, and plaintext
+ * cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_Verify)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,          /* signed data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulDataLen,      /* length of signed data */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,     /* signature */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen  /* signature length*/
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part verification
+ * operation, where the signature is an appendix to the data, 
+ * and plaintext cannot be recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,     /* signed data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen  /* length of signed data */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyFinal finishes a multiple-part verification
+ * operation, checking the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyFinal)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,       /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,     /* signature to verify */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen  /* signature length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyRecoverInit initializes a signature verification
+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecoverInit)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,  /* the verification mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey         /* verification key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_VerifyRecover verifies a signature in a single-part
+ * operation, where the data is recovered from the signature. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_VerifyRecover)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSignature,      /* signature to verify */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSignatureLen,  /* signature length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pData,           /* gets signed data */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulDataLen       /* gets signed data len */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Dual-function cryptographic operations */
+
+/* C_DigestEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part digesting
+ * and encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DigestEncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,           /* plaintext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen  /* gets c-text length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptDigestUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * digesting operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptDigestUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* ciphertext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* gets plaintext len */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_SignEncryptUpdate continues a multiple-part signing and
+ * encryption operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SignEncryptUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* the plaintext data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulPartLen,           /* plaintext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* gets ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulEncryptedPartLen  /* gets c-text length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DecryptVerifyUpdate continues a multiple-part decryption and
+ * verify operation. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DecryptVerifyUpdate)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,            /* session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pEncryptedPart,      /* ciphertext */
+  CK_ULONG          ulEncryptedPartLen,  /* ciphertext length */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pPart,               /* gets plaintext */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulPartLen           /* gets p-text length */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Key management */
+
+/* C_GenerateKey generates a secret key, creating a new key
+ * object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,  /* key generation mech. */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,   /* template for new key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulCount,     /* # of attrs in template */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey        /* gets handle of new key */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GenerateKeyPair generates a public-key/private-key pair, 
+ * creating new key objects. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateKeyPair)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,                    /* session
+                                                     * handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,                  /* key-gen
+                                                     * mech. */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pPublicKeyTemplate,          /* template
+                                                     * for pub.
+                                                     * key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulPublicKeyAttributeCount,   /* # pub.
+                                                     * attrs. */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pPrivateKeyTemplate,         /* template
+                                                     * for priv.
+                                                     * key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulPrivateKeyAttributeCount,  /* # priv.
+                                                     * attrs. */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPublicKey,                 /* gets pub.
+                                                     * key
+                                                     * handle */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phPrivateKey                 /* gets
+                                                     * priv. key
+                                                     * handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_WrapKey wraps (i.e., encrypts) a key. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WrapKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,        /* the session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR  pMechanism,      /* the wrapping mechanism */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hWrappingKey,    /* wrapping key */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE  hKey,            /* key to be wrapped */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pWrappedKey,     /* gets wrapped key */
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulWrappedKeyLen /* gets wrapped key size */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_UnwrapKey unwraps (decrypts) a wrapped key, creating a new
+ * key object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_UnwrapKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,        /* unwrapping mech. */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hUnwrappingKey,    /* unwrapping key */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR          pWrappedKey,       /* the wrapped key */
+  CK_ULONG             ulWrappedKeyLen,   /* wrapped key len */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,         /* new key template */
+  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount,  /* template length */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey              /* gets new handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_DeriveKey derives a key from a base key, creating a new key
+ * object. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_DeriveKey)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE    hSession,          /* session's handle */
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR     pMechanism,        /* key deriv. mech. */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE     hBaseKey,          /* base key */
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR     pTemplate,         /* new key template */
+  CK_ULONG             ulAttributeCount,  /* template length */
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR phKey              /* gets new handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Random number generation */
+
+/* C_SeedRandom mixes additional seed material into the token's
+ * random number generator. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_SeedRandom)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,  /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed,     /* the seed material */
+  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen  /* length of seed material */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_GenerateRandom generates random data. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GenerateRandom)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,    /* the session's handle */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       RandomData,  /* receives the random data */
+  CK_ULONG          ulRandomLen  /* # of bytes to generate */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Parallel function management */
+
+/* C_GetFunctionStatus is a legacy function; it obtains an
+ * updated status of a function running in parallel with an
+ * application. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_GetFunctionStatus)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+/* C_CancelFunction is a legacy function; it cancels a function
+ * running in parallel. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_CancelFunction)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession  /* the session's handle */
+);
+#endif
+
+
+
+/* Functions added in for Cryptoki Version 2.01 or later */
+
+/* C_WaitForSlotEvent waits for a slot event (token insertion,
+ * removal, etc.) to occur. */
+CK_PKCS11_FUNCTION_INFO(C_WaitForSlotEvent)
+#ifdef CK_NEED_ARG_LIST
+(
+  CK_FLAGS flags,        /* blocking/nonblocking flag */
+  CK_SLOT_ID_PTR pSlot,  /* location that receives the slot ID */
+  CK_VOID_PTR pRserved   /* reserved.  Should be NULL_PTR */
+);
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11t.h b/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11t.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3da20b215
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rsaref/pkcs11t.h
@@ -0,0 +1,1685 @@
+/* pkcs11t.h include file for PKCS #11. */
+/* $Revision: 1.2 $ */
+
+/* License to copy and use this software is granted provided that it is
+ * identified as "RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11 Cryptographic Token Interface
+ * (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or referencing this software.
+
+ * License is also granted to make and use derivative works provided that
+ * such works are identified as "derived from the RSA Security Inc. PKCS #11
+ * Cryptographic Token Interface (Cryptoki)" in all material mentioning or
+ * referencing the derived work.
+
+ * RSA Security Inc. makes no representations concerning either the
+ * merchantability of this software or the suitability of this software for
+ * any particular purpose. It is provided "as is" without express or implied
+ * warranty of any kind.
+ */
+
+/* See top of pkcs11.h for information about the macros that
+ * must be defined and the structure-packing conventions that
+ * must be set before including this file. */
+
+#ifndef _PKCS11T_H_
+#define _PKCS11T_H_ 1
+
+#define CK_TRUE 1
+#define CK_FALSE 0
+
+#ifndef CK_DISABLE_TRUE_FALSE
+#ifndef FALSE
+#define FALSE CK_FALSE
+#endif
+
+#ifndef TRUE
+#define TRUE CK_TRUE
+#endif
+#endif
+
+/* an unsigned 8-bit value */
+typedef unsigned char     CK_BYTE;
+
+/* an unsigned 8-bit character */
+typedef CK_BYTE           CK_CHAR;
+
+/* an 8-bit UTF-8 character */
+typedef CK_BYTE           CK_UTF8CHAR;
+
+/* a BYTE-sized Boolean flag */
+typedef CK_BYTE           CK_BBOOL;
+
+/* an unsigned value, at least 32 bits long */
+typedef unsigned long int CK_ULONG;
+
+/* a signed value, the same size as a CK_ULONG */
+/* CK_LONG is new for v2.0 */
+typedef long int          CK_LONG;
+
+/* at least 32 bits; each bit is a Boolean flag */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_FLAGS;
+
+
+/* some special values for certain CK_ULONG variables */
+#define CK_UNAVAILABLE_INFORMATION (~0UL)
+#define CK_EFFECTIVELY_INFINITE    0
+
+
+typedef CK_BYTE     CK_PTR   CK_BYTE_PTR;
+typedef CK_CHAR     CK_PTR   CK_CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_UTF8CHAR CK_PTR   CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR;
+typedef CK_ULONG    CK_PTR   CK_ULONG_PTR;
+typedef void        CK_PTR   CK_VOID_PTR;
+
+/* Pointer to a CK_VOID_PTR-- i.e., pointer to pointer to void */
+typedef CK_VOID_PTR CK_PTR CK_VOID_PTR_PTR;
+
+
+/* The following value is always invalid if used as a session */
+/* handle or object handle */
+#define CK_INVALID_HANDLE 0
+
+
+typedef struct CK_VERSION {
+  CK_BYTE       major;  /* integer portion of version number */
+  CK_BYTE       minor;  /* 1/100ths portion of version number */
+} CK_VERSION;
+
+typedef CK_VERSION CK_PTR CK_VERSION_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_INFO {
+  /* manufacturerID and libraryDecription have been changed from
+   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+  CK_VERSION    cryptokiVersion;     /* Cryptoki interface ver */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;               /* must be zero */
+
+  /* libraryDescription and libraryVersion are new for v2.0 */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   libraryDescription[32];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_VERSION    libraryVersion;          /* version of library */
+} CK_INFO;
+
+typedef CK_INFO CK_PTR    CK_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_NOTIFICATION enumerates the types of notifications that
+ * Cryptoki provides to an application */
+/* CK_NOTIFICATION has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG
+ * for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_NOTIFICATION;
+#define CKN_SURRENDER       0
+
+
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_SLOT_ID;
+
+typedef CK_SLOT_ID CK_PTR CK_SLOT_ID_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_SLOT_INFO provides information about a slot */
+typedef struct CK_SLOT_INFO {
+  /* slotDescription and manufacturerID have been changed from
+   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   slotDescription[64];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];   /* blank padded */
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;
+
+  /* hardwareVersion and firmwareVersion are new for v2.0 */
+  CK_VERSION    hardwareVersion;  /* version of hardware */
+  CK_VERSION    firmwareVersion;  /* version of firmware */
+} CK_SLOT_INFO;
+
+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
+ *      Bit Flag              Mask        Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT     0x00000001  /* a token is there */
+#define CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE  0x00000002  /* removable devices*/
+#define CKF_HW_SLOT           0x00000004  /* hardware slot */
+
+typedef CK_SLOT_INFO CK_PTR CK_SLOT_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_TOKEN_INFO provides information about a token */
+typedef struct CK_TOKEN_INFO {
+  /* label, manufacturerID, and model have been changed from
+   * CK_CHAR to CK_UTF8CHAR for v2.10 */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   label[32];           /* blank padded */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   manufacturerID[32];  /* blank padded */
+  CK_UTF8CHAR   model[16];           /* blank padded */
+  CK_CHAR       serialNumber[16];    /* blank padded */
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;               /* see below */
+
+  /* ulMaxSessionCount, ulSessionCount, ulMaxRwSessionCount,
+   * ulRwSessionCount, ulMaxPinLen, and ulMinPinLen have all been
+   * changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMaxSessionCount;     /* max open sessions */
+  CK_ULONG      ulSessionCount;        /* sess. now open */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMaxRwSessionCount;   /* max R/W sessions */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRwSessionCount;      /* R/W sess. now open */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMaxPinLen;           /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMinPinLen;           /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulTotalPublicMemory;   /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulFreePublicMemory;    /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulTotalPrivateMemory;  /* in bytes */
+  CK_ULONG      ulFreePrivateMemory;   /* in bytes */
+
+  /* hardwareVersion, firmwareVersion, and time are new for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_VERSION    hardwareVersion;       /* version of hardware */
+  CK_VERSION    firmwareVersion;       /* version of firmware */
+  CK_CHAR       utcTime[16];           /* time */
+} CK_TOKEN_INFO;
+
+/* The flags parameter is defined as follows:
+ *      Bit Flag                    Mask        Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_RNG                     0x00000001  /* has random #
+                                                 * generator */
+#define CKF_WRITE_PROTECTED         0x00000002  /* token is
+                                                 * write-
+                                                 * protected */
+#define CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED          0x00000004  /* user must
+                                                 * login */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_INITIALIZED    0x00000008  /* normal user's
+                                                 * PIN is set */
+
+/* CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED is new for v2.0.  If it is set,
+ * that means that *every* time the state of cryptographic
+ * operations of a session is successfully saved, all keys
+ * needed to continue those operations are stored in the state */
+#define CKF_RESTORE_KEY_NOT_NEEDED  0x00000020
+
+/* CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN is new for v2.0.  If it is set, that means
+ * that the token has some sort of clock.  The time on that
+ * clock is returned in the token info structure */
+#define CKF_CLOCK_ON_TOKEN          0x00000040
+
+/* CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH is new for v2.0.  If it is
+ * set, that means that there is some way for the user to login
+ * without sending a PIN through the Cryptoki library itself */
+#define CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH 0x00000100
+
+/* CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS is new for v2.0.  If it is true,
+ * that means that a single session with the token can perform
+ * dual simultaneous cryptographic operations (digest and
+ * encrypt; decrypt and digest; sign and encrypt; and decrypt
+ * and sign) */
+#define CKF_DUAL_CRYPTO_OPERATIONS  0x00000200
+
+/* CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
+ * token has been initialized using C_InitializeToken or an
+ * equivalent mechanism outside the scope of PKCS #11.
+ * Calling C_InitializeToken when this flag is set will cause
+ * the token to be reinitialized. */
+#define CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED       0x00000400
+
+/* CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION if new for v2.10. If it is
+ * true, the token supports secondary authentication for
+ * private key objects. This flag is deprecated in v2.11 and
+   onwards. */
+#define CKF_SECONDARY_AUTHENTICATION  0x00000800
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
+ * incorrect user login PIN has been entered at least once
+ * since the last successful authentication. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW       0x00010000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * supplying an incorrect user PIN will it to become locked. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY       0x00020000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the
+ * user PIN has been locked. User login to the token is not
+ * possible. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_LOCKED          0x00040000
+
+/* CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * the user PIN value is the default value set by token
+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
+ * expired by the card. */
+#define CKF_USER_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED   0x00080000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW if new for v2.10. If it is true, an
+ * incorrect SO login PIN has been entered at least once since
+ * the last successful authentication. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_COUNT_LOW         0x00100000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * supplying an incorrect SO PIN will it to become locked. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_FINAL_TRY         0x00200000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED if new for v2.10. If it is true, the SO
+ * PIN has been locked. SO login to the token is not possible.
+ */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_LOCKED            0x00400000
+
+/* CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED if new for v2.10. If it is true,
+ * the SO PIN value is the default value set by token
+ * initialization or manufacturing, or the PIN has been
+ * expired by the card. */
+#define CKF_SO_PIN_TO_BE_CHANGED     0x00800000
+
+typedef CK_TOKEN_INFO CK_PTR CK_TOKEN_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_SESSION_HANDLE is a Cryptoki-assigned value that
+ * identifies a session */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_SESSION_HANDLE;
+
+typedef CK_SESSION_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_SESSION_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_USER_TYPE enumerates the types of Cryptoki users */
+/* CK_USER_TYPE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_USER_TYPE;
+/* Security Officer */
+#define CKU_SO    0
+/* Normal user */
+#define CKU_USER  1
+/* Context specific (added in v2.20) */
+#define CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC   2
+
+/* CK_STATE enumerates the session states */
+/* CK_STATE has been changed from an enum to a CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_STATE;
+#define CKS_RO_PUBLIC_SESSION  0
+#define CKS_RO_USER_FUNCTIONS  1
+#define CKS_RW_PUBLIC_SESSION  2
+#define CKS_RW_USER_FUNCTIONS  3
+#define CKS_RW_SO_FUNCTIONS    4
+
+
+/* CK_SESSION_INFO provides information about a session */
+typedef struct CK_SESSION_INFO {
+  CK_SLOT_ID    slotID;
+  CK_STATE      state;
+  CK_FLAGS      flags;          /* see below */
+
+  /* ulDeviceError was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG      ulDeviceError;  /* device-dependent error code */
+} CK_SESSION_INFO;
+
+/* The flags are defined in the following table:
+ *      Bit Flag                Mask        Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_RW_SESSION          0x00000002  /* session is r/w */
+#define CKF_SERIAL_SESSION      0x00000004  /* no parallel */
+
+typedef CK_SESSION_INFO CK_PTR CK_SESSION_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_OBJECT_HANDLE is a token-specific identifier for an
+ * object  */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_OBJECT_HANDLE;
+
+typedef CK_OBJECT_HANDLE CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS is a value that identifies the classes (or
+ * types) of objects that Cryptoki recognizes.  It is defined
+ * as follows: */
+/* CK_OBJECT_CLASS was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_OBJECT_CLASS;
+
+/* The following classes of objects are defined: */
+/* CKO_HW_FEATURE is new for v2.10 */
+/* CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS is new for v2.11 */
+/* CKO_MECHANISM is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKO_DATA              0x00000000
+#define CKO_CERTIFICATE       0x00000001
+#define CKO_PUBLIC_KEY        0x00000002
+#define CKO_PRIVATE_KEY       0x00000003
+#define CKO_SECRET_KEY        0x00000004
+#define CKO_HW_FEATURE        0x00000005
+#define CKO_DOMAIN_PARAMETERS 0x00000006
+#define CKO_MECHANISM         0x00000007
+#define CKO_VENDOR_DEFINED    0x80000000
+
+typedef CK_OBJECT_CLASS CK_PTR CK_OBJECT_CLASS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is new for v2.10. CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE is a
+ * value that identifies the hardware feature type of an object
+ * with CK_OBJECT_CLASS equal to CKO_HW_FEATURE. */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_HW_FEATURE_TYPE;
+
+/* The following hardware feature types are defined */
+/* CKH_USER_INTERFACE is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKH_MONOTONIC_COUNTER  0x00000001
+#define CKH_CLOCK           0x00000002
+#define CKH_USER_INTERFACE  0x00000003
+#define CKH_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
+
+/* CK_KEY_TYPE is a value that identifies a key type */
+/* CK_KEY_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_KEY_TYPE;
+
+/* the following key types are defined: */
+#define CKK_RSA             0x00000000
+#define CKK_DSA             0x00000001
+#define CKK_DH              0x00000002
+
+/* CKK_ECDSA and CKK_KEA are new for v2.0 */
+/* CKK_ECDSA is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_EC is preferred. */
+#define CKK_ECDSA           0x00000003
+#define CKK_EC              0x00000003
+#define CKK_X9_42_DH        0x00000004
+#define CKK_KEA             0x00000005
+
+#define CKK_GENERIC_SECRET  0x00000010
+#define CKK_RC2             0x00000011
+#define CKK_RC4             0x00000012
+#define CKK_DES             0x00000013
+#define CKK_DES2            0x00000014
+#define CKK_DES3            0x00000015
+
+/* all these key types are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKK_CAST            0x00000016
+#define CKK_CAST3           0x00000017
+/* CKK_CAST5 is deprecated in v2.11, CKK_CAST128 is preferred. */
+#define CKK_CAST5           0x00000018
+#define CKK_CAST128         0x00000018
+#define CKK_RC5             0x00000019
+#define CKK_IDEA            0x0000001A
+#define CKK_SKIPJACK        0x0000001B
+#define CKK_BATON           0x0000001C
+#define CKK_JUNIPER         0x0000001D
+#define CKK_CDMF            0x0000001E
+#define CKK_AES             0x0000001F
+
+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKK_BLOWFISH        0x00000020
+#define CKK_TWOFISH         0x00000021
+
+#define CKK_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE is a value that identifies a certificate
+ * type */
+/* CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG
+ * for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
+
+/* The following certificate types are defined: */
+/* CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT is new for v2.10 */
+/* CKC_WTLS is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKC_X_509           0x00000000
+#define CKC_X_509_ATTR_CERT 0x00000001
+#define CKC_WTLS            0x00000002
+#define CKC_VENDOR_DEFINED  0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE is a value that identifies an attribute
+ * type */
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE;
+
+/* The CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE flag identifies an attribute which
+   consists of an array of values. */
+#define CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE    0x40000000
+
+/* The following attribute types are defined: */
+#define CKA_CLASS              0x00000000
+#define CKA_TOKEN              0x00000001
+#define CKA_PRIVATE            0x00000002
+#define CKA_LABEL              0x00000003
+#define CKA_APPLICATION        0x00000010
+#define CKA_VALUE              0x00000011
+
+/* CKA_OBJECT_ID is new for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_OBJECT_ID          0x00000012
+
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE   0x00000080
+#define CKA_ISSUER             0x00000081
+#define CKA_SERIAL_NUMBER      0x00000082
+
+/* CKA_AC_ISSUER, CKA_OWNER, and CKA_ATTR_TYPES are new
+ * for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_AC_ISSUER          0x00000083
+#define CKA_OWNER              0x00000084
+#define CKA_ATTR_TYPES         0x00000085
+
+/* CKA_TRUSTED is new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_TRUSTED            0x00000086
+
+/* CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY ...
+ * CKA_CHECK_VALUE are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_CERTIFICATE_CATEGORY        0x00000087
+#define CKA_JAVA_MIDP_SECURITY_DOMAIN   0x00000088
+#define CKA_URL                         0x00000089
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY  0x0000008A
+#define CKA_HASH_OF_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY   0x0000008B
+#define CKA_CHECK_VALUE                 0x00000090
+
+#define CKA_KEY_TYPE           0x00000100
+#define CKA_SUBJECT            0x00000101
+#define CKA_ID                 0x00000102
+#define CKA_SENSITIVE          0x00000103
+#define CKA_ENCRYPT            0x00000104
+#define CKA_DECRYPT            0x00000105
+#define CKA_WRAP               0x00000106
+#define CKA_UNWRAP             0x00000107
+#define CKA_SIGN               0x00000108
+#define CKA_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00000109
+#define CKA_VERIFY             0x0000010A
+#define CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x0000010B
+#define CKA_DERIVE             0x0000010C
+#define CKA_START_DATE         0x00000110
+#define CKA_END_DATE           0x00000111
+#define CKA_MODULUS            0x00000120
+#define CKA_MODULUS_BITS       0x00000121
+#define CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT    0x00000122
+#define CKA_PRIVATE_EXPONENT   0x00000123
+#define CKA_PRIME_1            0x00000124
+#define CKA_PRIME_2            0x00000125
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_1         0x00000126
+#define CKA_EXPONENT_2         0x00000127
+#define CKA_COEFFICIENT        0x00000128
+#define CKA_PRIME              0x00000130
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME           0x00000131
+#define CKA_BASE               0x00000132
+
+/* CKA_PRIME_BITS and CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_PRIME_BITS         0x00000133
+#define CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS      0x00000134
+#define CKA_SUB_PRIME_BITS     CKA_SUBPRIME_BITS
+/* (To retain backwards-compatibility) */
+
+#define CKA_VALUE_BITS         0x00000160
+#define CKA_VALUE_LEN          0x00000161
+
+/* CKA_EXTRACTABLE, CKA_LOCAL, CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE,
+ * CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE, CKA_MODIFIABLE, CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS,
+ * and CKA_EC_POINT are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKA_EXTRACTABLE        0x00000162
+#define CKA_LOCAL              0x00000163
+#define CKA_NEVER_EXTRACTABLE  0x00000164
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_SENSITIVE   0x00000165
+
+/* CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM is new for v2.11 */
+#define CKA_KEY_GEN_MECHANISM  0x00000166
+
+#define CKA_MODIFIABLE         0x00000170
+
+/* CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS is deprecated in v2.11,
+ * CKA_EC_PARAMS is preferred. */
+#define CKA_ECDSA_PARAMS       0x00000180
+#define CKA_EC_PARAMS          0x00000180
+
+#define CKA_EC_POINT           0x00000181
+
+/* CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH, CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS,
+ * are new for v2.10. Deprecated in v2.11 and onwards. */
+#define CKA_SECONDARY_AUTH     0x00000200
+#define CKA_AUTH_PIN_FLAGS     0x00000201
+
+/* CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE ...
+ * CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE  0x00000202
+
+#define CKA_WRAP_WITH_TRUSTED    0x00000210
+#define CKA_WRAP_TEMPLATE        (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000211)
+#define CKA_UNWRAP_TEMPLATE      (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000212)
+
+/* CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE, CKA_RESET_ON_INIT, and CKA_HAS_RESET
+ * are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKA_HW_FEATURE_TYPE    0x00000300
+#define CKA_RESET_ON_INIT      0x00000301
+#define CKA_HAS_RESET          0x00000302
+
+/* The following attributes are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKA_PIXEL_X                     0x00000400
+#define CKA_PIXEL_Y                     0x00000401
+#define CKA_RESOLUTION                  0x00000402
+#define CKA_CHAR_ROWS                   0x00000403
+#define CKA_CHAR_COLUMNS                0x00000404
+#define CKA_COLOR                       0x00000405
+#define CKA_BITS_PER_PIXEL              0x00000406
+#define CKA_CHAR_SETS                   0x00000480
+#define CKA_ENCODING_METHODS            0x00000481
+#define CKA_MIME_TYPES                  0x00000482
+#define CKA_MECHANISM_TYPE              0x00000500
+#define CKA_REQUIRED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES     0x00000501
+#define CKA_DEFAULT_CMS_ATTRIBUTES      0x00000502
+#define CKA_SUPPORTED_CMS_ATTRIBUTES    0x00000503
+#define CKA_ALLOWED_MECHANISMS          (CKF_ARRAY_ATTRIBUTE|0x00000600)
+
+#define CKA_VENDOR_DEFINED     0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_ATTRIBUTE is a structure that includes the type, length
+ * and value of an attribute */
+typedef struct CK_ATTRIBUTE {
+  CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type;
+  CK_VOID_PTR       pValue;
+
+  /* ulValueLen went from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG          ulValueLen;  /* in bytes */
+} CK_ATTRIBUTE;
+
+typedef CK_ATTRIBUTE CK_PTR CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_DATE is a structure that defines a date */
+typedef struct CK_DATE{
+  CK_CHAR       year[4];   /* the year ("1900" - "9999") */
+  CK_CHAR       month[2];  /* the month ("01" - "12") */
+  CK_CHAR       day[2];    /* the day   ("01" - "31") */
+} CK_DATE;
+
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE is a value that identifies a mechanism
+ * type */
+/* CK_MECHANISM_TYPE was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+ * v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_MECHANISM_TYPE;
+
+/* the following mechanism types are defined: */
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN      0x00000000
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS                   0x00000001
+#define CKM_RSA_9796                   0x00000002
+#define CKM_RSA_X_509                  0x00000003
+
+/* CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS, CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS
+ * are new for v2.0.  They are mechanisms which hash and sign */
+#define CKM_MD2_RSA_PKCS               0x00000004
+#define CKM_MD5_RSA_PKCS               0x00000005
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS              0x00000006
+
+/* CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS, CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS, and
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_RSA_PKCS         0x00000007
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_RSA_PKCS         0x00000008
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP              0x00000009
+
+/* CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_RSA_X9_31, CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31,
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, and CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31_KEY_PAIR_GEN     0x0000000A
+#define CKM_RSA_X9_31                  0x0000000B
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_X9_31             0x0000000C
+#define CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS               0x0000000D
+#define CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS          0x0000000E
+
+#define CKM_DSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN           0x00000010
+#define CKM_DSA                        0x00000011
+#define CKM_DSA_SHA1                   0x00000012
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN       0x00000020
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_DERIVE             0x00000021
+
+/* CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN, CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE,
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE, and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE are new for
+ * v2.11 */
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN      0x00000030
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE            0x00000031
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE     0x00000032
+#define CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE           0x00000033
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS            0x00000040
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS            0x00000041
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS            0x00000042
+#define CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000043
+#define CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000044
+#define CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS_PSS        0x00000045
+
+#define CKM_RC2_KEY_GEN                0x00000100
+#define CKM_RC2_ECB                    0x00000101
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC                    0x00000102
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC                    0x00000103
+
+/* CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000104
+#define CKM_RC2_CBC_PAD                0x00000105
+
+#define CKM_RC4_KEY_GEN                0x00000110
+#define CKM_RC4                        0x00000111
+#define CKM_DES_KEY_GEN                0x00000120
+#define CKM_DES_ECB                    0x00000121
+#define CKM_DES_CBC                    0x00000122
+#define CKM_DES_MAC                    0x00000123
+
+/* CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL and CKM_DES_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_DES_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000124
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_PAD                0x00000125
+
+#define CKM_DES2_KEY_GEN               0x00000130
+#define CKM_DES3_KEY_GEN               0x00000131
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB                   0x00000132
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC                   0x00000133
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC                   0x00000134
+
+/* CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD, CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN,
+ * CKM_CDMF_ECB, CKM_CDMF_CBC, CKM_CDMF_MAC,
+ * CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL, and CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_DES3_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000135
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_PAD               0x00000136
+#define CKM_CDMF_KEY_GEN               0x00000140
+#define CKM_CDMF_ECB                   0x00000141
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC                   0x00000142
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC                   0x00000143
+#define CKM_CDMF_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000144
+#define CKM_CDMF_CBC_PAD               0x00000145
+
+/* the following four DES mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_DES_OFB64                  0x00000150
+#define CKM_DES_OFB8                   0x00000151
+#define CKM_DES_CFB64                  0x00000152
+#define CKM_DES_CFB8                   0x00000153
+
+#define CKM_MD2                        0x00000200
+
+/* CKM_MD2_HMAC and CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC                   0x00000201
+#define CKM_MD2_HMAC_GENERAL           0x00000202
+
+#define CKM_MD5                        0x00000210
+
+/* CKM_MD5_HMAC and CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC                   0x00000211
+#define CKM_MD5_HMAC_GENERAL           0x00000212
+
+#define CKM_SHA_1                      0x00000220
+
+/* CKM_SHA_1_HMAC and CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC                 0x00000221
+#define CKM_SHA_1_HMAC_GENERAL         0x00000222
+
+/* CKM_RIPEMD128, CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC,
+ * CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL, CKM_RIPEMD160, CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC,
+ * and CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL are new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128                  0x00000230
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC             0x00000231
+#define CKM_RIPEMD128_HMAC_GENERAL     0x00000232
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160                  0x00000240
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC             0x00000241
+#define CKM_RIPEMD160_HMAC_GENERAL     0x00000242
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256                     0x00000250
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC                0x00000251
+#define CKM_SHA256_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000252
+#define CKM_SHA384                     0x00000260
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC                0x00000261
+#define CKM_SHA384_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000262
+#define CKM_SHA512                     0x00000270
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC                0x00000271
+#define CKM_SHA512_HMAC_GENERAL        0x00000272
+
+/* All of the following mechanisms are new for v2.0 */
+/* Note that CAST128 and CAST5 are the same algorithm */
+#define CKM_CAST_KEY_GEN               0x00000300
+#define CKM_CAST_ECB                   0x00000301
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC                   0x00000302
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC                   0x00000303
+#define CKM_CAST_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000304
+#define CKM_CAST_CBC_PAD               0x00000305
+#define CKM_CAST3_KEY_GEN              0x00000310
+#define CKM_CAST3_ECB                  0x00000311
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC                  0x00000312
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC                  0x00000313
+#define CKM_CAST3_MAC_GENERAL          0x00000314
+#define CKM_CAST3_CBC_PAD              0x00000315
+#define CKM_CAST5_KEY_GEN              0x00000320
+#define CKM_CAST128_KEY_GEN            0x00000320
+#define CKM_CAST5_ECB                  0x00000321
+#define CKM_CAST128_ECB                0x00000321
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC                  0x00000322
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC                0x00000322
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC                  0x00000323
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC                0x00000323
+#define CKM_CAST5_MAC_GENERAL          0x00000324
+#define CKM_CAST128_MAC_GENERAL        0x00000324
+#define CKM_CAST5_CBC_PAD              0x00000325
+#define CKM_CAST128_CBC_PAD            0x00000325
+#define CKM_RC5_KEY_GEN                0x00000330
+#define CKM_RC5_ECB                    0x00000331
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC                    0x00000332
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC                    0x00000333
+#define CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL            0x00000334
+#define CKM_RC5_CBC_PAD                0x00000335
+#define CKM_IDEA_KEY_GEN               0x00000340
+#define CKM_IDEA_ECB                   0x00000341
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC                   0x00000342
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC                   0x00000343
+#define CKM_IDEA_MAC_GENERAL           0x00000344
+#define CKM_IDEA_CBC_PAD               0x00000345
+#define CKM_GENERIC_SECRET_KEY_GEN     0x00000350
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_KEY   0x00000360
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_BASE_AND_DATA  0x00000362
+#define CKM_CONCATENATE_DATA_AND_BASE  0x00000363
+#define CKM_XOR_BASE_AND_DATA          0x00000364
+#define CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY       0x00000365
+#define CKM_SSL3_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN    0x00000370
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE     0x00000371
+#define CKM_SSL3_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE    0x00000372
+
+/* CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH, CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN,
+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE, CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE, and
+ * CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH  0x00000373
+#define CKM_TLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN     0x00000374
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE      0x00000375
+#define CKM_TLS_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE     0x00000376
+#define CKM_TLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH   0x00000377
+
+/* CKM_TLS_PRF is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_TLS_PRF                    0x00000378
+
+#define CKM_SSL3_MD5_MAC               0x00000380
+#define CKM_SSL3_SHA1_MAC              0x00000381
+#define CKM_MD5_KEY_DERIVATION         0x00000390
+#define CKM_MD2_KEY_DERIVATION         0x00000391
+#define CKM_SHA1_KEY_DERIVATION        0x00000392
+
+/* CKM_SHA256/384/512 are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_SHA256_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000393
+#define CKM_SHA384_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000394
+#define CKM_SHA512_KEY_DERIVATION      0x00000395
+
+#define CKM_PBE_MD2_DES_CBC            0x000003A0
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_DES_CBC            0x000003A1
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST_CBC           0x000003A2
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST3_CBC          0x000003A3
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST5_CBC          0x000003A4
+#define CKM_PBE_MD5_CAST128_CBC        0x000003A4
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST5_CBC         0x000003A5
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_CAST128_CBC       0x000003A5
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_128           0x000003A6
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC4_40            0x000003A7
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES3_EDE_CBC      0x000003A8
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_DES2_EDE_CBC      0x000003A9
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_128_CBC       0x000003AA
+#define CKM_PBE_SHA1_RC2_40_CBC        0x000003AB
+
+/* CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 is new for v2.10 */
+#define CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2                0x000003B0
+
+#define CKM_PBA_SHA1_WITH_SHA1_HMAC    0x000003C0
+
+/* WTLS mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_WTLS_PRE_MASTER_KEY_GEN         0x000003D0
+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE          0x000003D1
+#define CKM_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_DH_ECC   0x000003D2
+#define CKM_WTLS_PRF                        0x000003D3
+#define CKM_WTLS_SERVER_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE  0x000003D4
+#define CKM_WTLS_CLIENT_KEY_AND_MAC_DERIVE  0x000003D5
+
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_LYNKS             0x00000400
+#define CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP          0x00000401
+
+/* CKM_CMS_SIG is new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_CMS_SIG                    0x00000500
+
+/* Fortezza mechanisms */
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_KEY_GEN           0x00001000
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_ECB64             0x00001001
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CBC64             0x00001002
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_OFB64             0x00001003
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB64             0x00001004
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB32             0x00001005
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB16             0x00001006
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_CFB8              0x00001007
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_WRAP              0x00001008
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP      0x00001009
+#define CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX            0x0000100a
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_PAIR_GEN           0x00001010
+#define CKM_KEA_KEY_DERIVE             0x00001011
+#define CKM_FORTEZZA_TIMESTAMP         0x00001020
+#define CKM_BATON_KEY_GEN              0x00001030
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB128               0x00001031
+#define CKM_BATON_ECB96                0x00001032
+#define CKM_BATON_CBC128               0x00001033
+#define CKM_BATON_COUNTER              0x00001034
+#define CKM_BATON_SHUFFLE              0x00001035
+#define CKM_BATON_WRAP                 0x00001036
+
+/* CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN is deprecated in v2.11,
+ * CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN is preferred */
+#define CKM_ECDSA_KEY_PAIR_GEN         0x00001040
+#define CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN            0x00001040
+
+#define CKM_ECDSA                      0x00001041
+#define CKM_ECDSA_SHA1                 0x00001042
+
+/* CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE, CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE, and CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE
+ * are new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE               0x00001050
+#define CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE      0x00001051
+#define CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE               0x00001052
+
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_KEY_GEN            0x00001060
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_ECB128             0x00001061
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_CBC128             0x00001062
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_COUNTER            0x00001063
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_SHUFFLE            0x00001064
+#define CKM_JUNIPER_WRAP               0x00001065
+#define CKM_FASTHASH                   0x00001070
+
+/* CKM_AES_KEY_GEN, CKM_AES_ECB, CKM_AES_CBC, CKM_AES_MAC,
+ * CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL, CKM_AES_CBC_PAD, CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN,
+ * CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN, and CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN are
+ * new for v2.11 */
+#define CKM_AES_KEY_GEN                0x00001080
+#define CKM_AES_ECB                    0x00001081
+#define CKM_AES_CBC                    0x00001082
+#define CKM_AES_MAC                    0x00001083
+#define CKM_AES_MAC_GENERAL            0x00001084
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_PAD                0x00001085
+
+/* BlowFish and TwoFish are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_KEY_GEN           0x00001090
+#define CKM_BLOWFISH_CBC               0x00001091
+#define CKM_TWOFISH_KEY_GEN            0x00001092
+#define CKM_TWOFISH_CBC                0x00001093
+
+
+/* CKM_xxx_ENCRYPT_DATA mechanisms are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKM_DES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001100
+#define CKM_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001101
+#define CKM_DES3_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00001102
+#define CKM_DES3_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA      0x00001103
+#define CKM_AES_ECB_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001104
+#define CKM_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA       0x00001105
+
+#define CKM_DSA_PARAMETER_GEN          0x00002000
+#define CKM_DH_PKCS_PARAMETER_GEN      0x00002001
+#define CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN     0x00002002
+
+#define CKM_VENDOR_DEFINED             0x80000000
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM_TYPE CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM is a structure that specifies a particular
+ * mechanism  */
+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanism;
+  CK_VOID_PTR       pParameter;
+
+  /* ulParameterLen was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG          ulParameterLen;  /* in bytes */
+} CK_MECHANISM;
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_MECHANISM_INFO provides information about a particular
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_MECHANISM_INFO {
+    CK_ULONG    ulMinKeySize;
+    CK_ULONG    ulMaxKeySize;
+    CK_FLAGS    flags;
+} CK_MECHANISM_INFO;
+
+/* The flags are defined as follows:
+ *      Bit Flag               Mask        Meaning */
+#define CKF_HW                 0x00000001  /* performed by HW */
+
+/* The flags CKF_ENCRYPT, CKF_DECRYPT, CKF_DIGEST, CKF_SIGN,
+ * CKG_SIGN_RECOVER, CKF_VERIFY, CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER,
+ * CKF_GENERATE, CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR, CKF_WRAP, CKF_UNWRAP,
+ * and CKF_DERIVE are new for v2.0.  They specify whether or not
+ * a mechanism can be used for a particular task */
+#define CKF_ENCRYPT            0x00000100
+#define CKF_DECRYPT            0x00000200
+#define CKF_DIGEST             0x00000400
+#define CKF_SIGN               0x00000800
+#define CKF_SIGN_RECOVER       0x00001000
+#define CKF_VERIFY             0x00002000
+#define CKF_VERIFY_RECOVER     0x00004000
+#define CKF_GENERATE           0x00008000
+#define CKF_GENERATE_KEY_PAIR  0x00010000
+#define CKF_WRAP               0x00020000
+#define CKF_UNWRAP             0x00040000
+#define CKF_DERIVE             0x00080000
+
+/* CKF_EC_F_P, CKF_EC_F_2M, CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS, CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE,
+ * CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS, and CKF_EC_COMPRESS are new for v2.11. They
+ * describe a token's EC capabilities not available in mechanism
+ * information. */
+#define CKF_EC_F_P             0x00100000
+#define CKF_EC_F_2M            0x00200000
+#define CKF_EC_ECPARAMETERS    0x00400000
+#define CKF_EC_NAMEDCURVE      0x00800000
+#define CKF_EC_UNCOMPRESS      0x01000000
+#define CKF_EC_COMPRESS        0x02000000
+
+#define CKF_EXTENSION          0x80000000 /* FALSE for this version */
+
+typedef CK_MECHANISM_INFO CK_PTR CK_MECHANISM_INFO_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RV is a value that identifies the return value of a
+ * Cryptoki function */
+/* CK_RV was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_RV;
+
+#define CKR_OK                                0x00000000
+#define CKR_CANCEL                            0x00000001
+#define CKR_HOST_MEMORY                       0x00000002
+#define CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID                   0x00000003
+
+/* CKR_FLAGS_INVALID was removed for v2.0 */
+
+/* CKR_GENERAL_ERROR and CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_GENERAL_ERROR                     0x00000005
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED                   0x00000006
+
+/* CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD, CKR_NO_EVENT, CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS,
+ * and CKR_CANT_LOCK are new for v2.01 */
+#define CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD                     0x00000007
+#define CKR_NO_EVENT                          0x00000008
+#define CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS            0x00000009
+#define CKR_CANT_LOCK                         0x0000000A
+
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY               0x00000010
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE               0x00000011
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID            0x00000012
+#define CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID           0x00000013
+#define CKR_DATA_INVALID                      0x00000020
+#define CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE                    0x00000021
+#define CKR_DEVICE_ERROR                      0x00000030
+#define CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY                     0x00000031
+#define CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED                    0x00000032
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID            0x00000040
+#define CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE          0x00000041
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED                 0x00000050
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL             0x00000051
+
+/* CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED is new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED            0x00000054
+
+#define CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID                0x00000060
+
+/* CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE was removed for v2.0 */
+
+#define CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE                    0x00000062
+#define CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT             0x00000063
+
+/* CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED, CKR_KEY_CHANGED, CKR_KEY_NEEDED,
+ * CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE, CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED,
+ * CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE, and CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE are new for
+ * v2.0 */
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED                    0x00000064
+#define CKR_KEY_CHANGED                       0x00000065
+#define CKR_KEY_NEEDED                        0x00000066
+#define CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE                  0x00000067
+#define CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED        0x00000068
+#define CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE                 0x00000069
+#define CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE                 0x0000006A
+
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID                 0x00000070
+#define CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID           0x00000071
+
+/* CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INCONSISTENT and CKR_OBJECT_CLASS_INVALID
+ * were removed for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID             0x00000082
+#define CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE                  0x00000090
+#define CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED         0x00000091
+#define CKR_PIN_INCORRECT                     0x000000A0
+#define CKR_PIN_INVALID                       0x000000A1
+#define CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE                     0x000000A2
+
+/* CKR_PIN_EXPIRED and CKR_PIN_LOCKED are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_PIN_EXPIRED                       0x000000A3
+#define CKR_PIN_LOCKED                        0x000000A4
+
+#define CKR_SESSION_CLOSED                    0x000000B0
+#define CKR_SESSION_COUNT                     0x000000B1
+#define CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID            0x000000B3
+#define CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED    0x000000B4
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY                 0x000000B5
+#define CKR_SESSION_EXISTS                    0x000000B6
+
+/* CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS and
+ * CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS are new for v2.0 */
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS          0x000000B7
+#define CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS      0x000000B8
+
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID                 0x000000C0
+#define CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE               0x000000C1
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE               0x000000D0
+#define CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT             0x000000D1
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT                 0x000000E0
+#define CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED              0x000000E1
+#define CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED             0x000000E2
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID     0x000000F0
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE         0x000000F1
+#define CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT  0x000000F2
+#define CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN            0x00000100
+#define CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN                0x00000101
+#define CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED          0x00000102
+#define CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID                 0x00000103
+
+/* CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN and CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
+ * are new to v2.01 */
+#define CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN    0x00000104
+#define CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES               0x00000105
+
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID               0x00000110
+#define CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE             0x00000112
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID       0x00000113
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE           0x00000114
+#define CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT    0x00000115
+#define CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED         0x00000120
+
+/* These are new to v2.0 */
+#define CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG                     0x00000121
+
+/* These are new to v2.11 */
+#define CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID             0x00000130
+
+/* These are new to v2.0 */
+#define CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL                  0x00000150
+#define CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID               0x00000160
+#define CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE             0x00000170
+#define CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE                  0x00000180
+
+/* These are new to v2.01 */
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED          0x00000190
+#define CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED      0x00000191
+#define CKR_MUTEX_BAD                         0x000001A0
+#define CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED                  0x000001A1
+
+/* This is new to v2.20 */
+#define CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED                 0x00000200
+
+#define CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED                    0x80000000
+
+
+/* CK_NOTIFY is an application callback that processes events */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_NOTIFY)(
+  CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession,     /* the session's handle */
+  CK_NOTIFICATION   event,
+  CK_VOID_PTR       pApplication  /* passed to C_OpenSession */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is a structure holding a Cryptoki spec
+ * version and pointers of appropriate types to all the
+ * Cryptoki functions */
+/* CK_FUNCTION_LIST is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_FUNCTION_LIST;
+
+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR;
+
+typedef CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR CK_PTR CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_CREATEMUTEX is an application callback for creating a
+ * mutex object */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_CREATEMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR_PTR ppMutex  /* location to receive ptr to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_DESTROYMUTEX is an application callback for destroying a
+ * mutex object */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_DESTROYMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_LOCKMUTEX is an application callback for locking a mutex */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_LOCKMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_UNLOCKMUTEX is an application callback for unlocking a
+ * mutex */
+typedef CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(CK_RV, CK_UNLOCKMUTEX)(
+  CK_VOID_PTR pMutex  /* pointer to mutex */
+);
+
+
+/* CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS provides the optional arguments to
+ * C_Initialize */
+typedef struct CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS {
+  CK_CREATEMUTEX CreateMutex;
+  CK_DESTROYMUTEX DestroyMutex;
+  CK_LOCKMUTEX LockMutex;
+  CK_UNLOCKMUTEX UnlockMutex;
+  CK_FLAGS flags;
+  CK_VOID_PTR pReserved;
+} CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS;
+
+/* flags: bit flags that provide capabilities of the slot
+ *      Bit Flag                           Mask       Meaning
+ */
+#define CKF_LIBRARY_CANT_CREATE_OS_THREADS 0x00000001
+#define CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK                  0x00000002
+
+typedef CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS CK_PTR CK_C_INITIALIZE_ARGS_PTR;
+
+
+/* additional flags for parameters to functions */
+
+/* CKF_DONT_BLOCK is for the function C_WaitForSlotEvent */
+#define CKF_DONT_BLOCK     1
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_MGF_TYPE  is used to indicate the Message
+ * Generation Function (MGF) applied to a message block when
+ * formatting a message block for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption
+ * scheme. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following MGFs are defined */
+/* CKG_MGF1_SHA256, CKG_MGF1_SHA384, and CKG_MGF1_SHA512
+ * are new for v2.20 */
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA1         0x00000001
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA256       0x00000002
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA384       0x00000003
+#define CKG_MGF1_SHA512       0x00000004
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE  is used to indicate the source
+ * of the encoding parameter when formatting a message block
+ * for the PKCS #1 OAEP encryption scheme. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following encoding parameter sources are defined */
+#define CKZ_DATA_SPECIFIED    0x00000001
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_OAEP mechanism. */
+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS {
+        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE hashAlg;
+        CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
+        CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_SOURCE_TYPE source;
+        CK_VOID_PTR pSourceData;
+        CK_ULONG ulSourceDataLen;
+} CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS mechanism(s). */
+typedef struct CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS {
+        CK_MECHANISM_TYPE    hashAlg;
+        CK_RSA_PKCS_MGF_TYPE mgf;
+        CK_ULONG             sLen;
+} CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_EC_KDF_TYPE is new for v2.11. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EC_KDF_TYPE;
+
+/* The following EC Key Derivation Functions are defined */
+#define CKD_NULL                 0x00000001
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF             0x00000002
+
+/* CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_ECDH1_DERIVE and CKM_ECDH1_COFACTOR_DERIVE mechanisms,
+ * where each party contributes one key pair.
+ */
+typedef struct CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_ECMQV_DERIVE mechanism, where each party contributes two key pairs. */
+typedef struct CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+} CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECDH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_EC_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulSharedDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pSharedData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
+} CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_ECMQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* Typedefs and defines for the CKM_X9_42_DH_KEY_PAIR_GEN and the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_PARAMETER_GEN mechanisms (new for PKCS #11 v2.11) */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE;
+typedef CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following X9.42 DH key derivation functions are defined
+   (besides CKD_NULL already defined : */
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_ASN1        0x00000003
+#define CKD_SHA1_KDF_CONCATENATE 0x00000004
+
+/* CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_DERIVE key derivation mechanism, where each party
+ * contributes one key pair */
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+} CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH1_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.11.
+ * CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_X9_42_DH_HYBRID_DERIVE and CKM_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE key derivation
+ * mechanisms, where each party contributes two key pairs */
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+} CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_DH2_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_X9_42_DH_KDF_TYPE kdf;
+  CK_ULONG ulOtherInfoLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pOtherInfo;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPrivateDataLen;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateData;
+  CK_ULONG ulPublicDataLen2;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pPublicData2;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE publicKey;
+} CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_X9_42_MQV_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_KEA_DERIVE mechanism */
+/* CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_BBOOL      isSender;
+  CK_ULONG      ulRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomA;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomB;
+  CK_ULONG      ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPublicData;
+} CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_KEA_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC2_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_ECB and
+ * CKM_RC2_MAC mechanisms.  An instance of CK_RC2_PARAMS just
+ * holds the effective keysize */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_RC2_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC2_CBC
+ * mechanism */
+typedef struct CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS {
+  /* ulEffectiveBits was changed from CK_USHORT to CK_ULONG for
+   * v2.0 */
+  CK_ULONG      ulEffectiveBits;  /* effective bits (1-1024) */
+
+  CK_BYTE       iv[8];            /* IV for CBC mode */
+} CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC2_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
+ * CKM_RC2_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
+/* CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulEffectiveBits;  /* effective bits (1-1024) */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMacLength;      /* Length of MAC in bytes */
+} CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_RC2_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_ECB and
+ * CKM_RC5_MAC mechanisms */
+/* CK_RC5_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;  /* wordsize in bits */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;    /* number of rounds */
+} CK_RC5_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS provides the parameters to the CKM_RC5_CBC
+ * mechanism */
+/* CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;  /* wordsize in bits */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;    /* number of rounds */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pIv;         /* pointer to IV */
+  CK_ULONG      ulIvLen;     /* length of IV in bytes */
+} CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_RC5_CBC_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters for the
+ * CKM_RC5_MAC_GENERAL mechanism */
+/* CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulWordsize;   /* wordsize in bits */
+  CK_ULONG      ulRounds;     /* number of rounds */
+  CK_ULONG      ulMacLength;  /* Length of MAC in bytes */
+} CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_RC5_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS provides the parameters to most block
+ * ciphers' MAC_GENERAL mechanisms.  Its value is the length of
+ * the MAC */
+/* CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG          CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_MAC_GENERAL_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_DES/AES_ECB/CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS are new for v2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE      iv[8];
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
+  CK_ULONG     length;
+} CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_DES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE      iv[16];
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pData;
+  CK_ULONG     length;
+} CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_AES_CBC_ENCRYPT_DATA_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP mechanism */
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPassword;
+  CK_ULONG      ulPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG      ulPAndGLen;
+  CK_ULONG      ulQLen;
+  CK_ULONG      ulRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pRandomA;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pPrimeP;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pBaseG;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pSubprimeQ;
+} CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_SKIPJACK_PRIVATE_WRAP_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_SKIPJACK_RELAYX mechanism */
+/* CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldWrappedXLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldWrappedX;
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldPassword;
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG      ulOldRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pOldRandomA;
+  CK_ULONG      ulNewPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewPassword;
+  CK_ULONG      ulNewPublicDataLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewPublicData;
+  CK_ULONG      ulNewRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pNewRandomA;
+} CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_SKIPJACK_RELAYX_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_PBE_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pInitVector;
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR  pPassword;
+  CK_ULONG         ulPasswordLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pSalt;
+  CK_ULONG         ulSaltLen;
+  CK_ULONG         ulIteration;
+} CK_PBE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_PBE_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PBE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS provides the parameters to the
+ * CKM_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP mechanism */
+/* CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef struct CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE       bBC;     /* block contents byte */
+  CK_BYTE_PTR   pX;      /* extra data */
+  CK_ULONG      ulXLen;  /* length of extra data in bytes */
+} CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_KEY_WRAP_SET_OAEP_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pClientRandom;
+  CK_ULONG     ulClientRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pServerRandom;
+  CK_ULONG     ulServerRandomLen;
+} CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+  CK_VERSION_PTR pVersion;
+} CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_SSL3_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT {
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientMacSecret;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerMacSecret;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hClientKey;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hServerKey;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIVClient;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIVServer;
+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT;
+
+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
+
+
+typedef struct CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
+  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
+  CK_SSL3_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
+  CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+} CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_SSL3_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pSeed;
+  CK_ULONG     ulSeedLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pLabel;
+  CK_ULONG     ulLabelLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR  pOutput;
+  CK_ULONG_PTR pulOutputLen;
+} CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_TLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* WTLS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pClientRandom;
+  CK_ULONG    ulClientRandomLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pServerRandom;
+  CK_ULONG    ulServerRandomLen;
+} CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA CK_PTR CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE   DigestMechanism;
+  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA RandomInfo;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR         pVersion;
+} CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS CK_PTR \
+  CK_WTLS_MASTER_KEY_DERIVE_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE DigestMechanism;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pSeed;
+  CK_ULONG          ulSeedLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pLabel;
+  CK_ULONG          ulLabelLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR       pOutput;
+  CK_ULONG_PTR      pulOutputLen;
+} CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_PRF_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT {
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hMacSecret;
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR      pIV;
+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS {
+  CK_MECHANISM_TYPE       DigestMechanism;
+  CK_ULONG                ulMacSizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulKeySizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulIVSizeInBits;
+  CK_ULONG                ulSequenceNumber;
+  CK_BBOOL                bIsExport;
+  CK_WTLS_RANDOM_DATA     RandomInfo;
+  CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_OUT_PTR pReturnedKeyMaterial;
+} CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_WTLS_KEY_MAT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CMS is new for version 2.20 */
+typedef struct CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS {
+  CK_OBJECT_HANDLE      certificateHandle;
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pSigningMechanism;
+  CK_MECHANISM_PTR      pDigestMechanism;
+  CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR       pContentType;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequestedAttributes;
+  CK_ULONG              ulRequestedAttributesLen;
+  CK_BYTE_PTR           pRequiredAttributes;
+  CK_ULONG              ulRequiredAttributesLen;
+} CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_CMS_SIG_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+typedef struct CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA {
+  CK_BYTE_PTR pData;
+  CK_ULONG    ulLen;
+} CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA;
+
+typedef CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA CK_PTR \
+  CK_KEY_DERIVATION_STRING_DATA_PTR;
+
+
+/* The CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is used for the
+ * CKM_EXTRACT_KEY_FROM_KEY mechanism.  It specifies which bit
+ * of the base key should be used as the first bit of the
+ * derived key */
+/* CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS is new for v2.0 */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_EXTRACT_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE is used to
+ * indicate the Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) used to generate
+ * key bits using PKCS #5 PBKDF2. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following PRFs are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
+#define CKP_PKCS5_PBKD2_HMAC_SHA1 0x00000001
+
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE is used to indicate the
+ * source of the salt value when deriving a key using PKCS #5
+ * PBKDF2. */
+typedef CK_ULONG CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE_PTR;
+
+/* The following salt value sources are defined in PKCS #5 v2.0. */
+#define CKZ_SALT_SPECIFIED        0x00000001
+
+/* CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is new for v2.10.
+ * CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS is a structure that provides the
+ * parameters to the CKM_PKCS5_PBKD2 mechanism. */
+typedef struct CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS {
+        CK_PKCS5_PBKDF2_SALT_SOURCE_TYPE           saltSource;
+        CK_VOID_PTR                                pSaltSourceData;
+        CK_ULONG                                   ulSaltSourceDataLen;
+        CK_ULONG                                   iterations;
+        CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PSEUDO_RANDOM_FUNCTION_TYPE prf;
+        CK_VOID_PTR                                pPrfData;
+        CK_ULONG                                   ulPrfDataLen;
+        CK_UTF8CHAR_PTR                            pPassword;
+        CK_ULONG_PTR                               ulPasswordLen;
+} CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS;
+
+typedef CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS CK_PTR CK_PKCS5_PBKD2_PARAMS_PTR;
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/rsaref/unix.h b/src/pluto/rsaref/unix.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2e7eb6663
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/rsaref/unix.h
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+
+
+#ifndef UNIX_H
+#define UNIX_H
+
+#define CK_PTR *
+
+#define CK_DEFINE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+   returnType name
+
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+   returnType name
+
+#define CK_DECLARE_FUNCTION_POINTER(returnType, name) \
+   returnType (* name)
+
+#define CK_CALLBACK_FUNCTION(returnType, name) \
+   returnType (* name)
+
+#ifndef NULL_PTR
+#define NULL_PTR 0
+#endif
+
+#endif
diff --git a/src/pluto/server.c b/src/pluto/server.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1cc221515
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/server.c
@@ -0,0 +1,996 @@
+/* get-next-event loop
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2002  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: server.c,v 1.9 2005/09/09 14:15:35 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/un.h>
+#ifdef SOLARIS
+# include <sys/sockio.h>	/* for Solaris 2.6: defines SIOCGIFCONF */
+#endif
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <netdb.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <net/if.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <resolv.h>
+#include <arpa/nameser.h>	/* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "demux.h"  /* needs packet.h */
+#include "rcv_whack.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "adns.h"	/* needs <resolv.h> */
+#include "dnskey.h"	/* needs keys.h and adns.h */
+#include "whack.h"	/* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */
+
+#include <pfkeyv2.h>
+#include <pfkey.h>
+#include "kameipsec.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+
+/*
+ *  Server main loop and socket initialization routines.
+ */
+
+static const int on = TRUE;	/* by-reference parameter; constant, we hope */
+
+/* control (whack) socket */
+int ctl_fd = NULL_FD;	/* file descriptor of control (whack) socket */
+struct sockaddr_un ctl_addr = { AF_UNIX, DEFAULT_CTLBASE CTL_SUFFIX };
+
+/* info (showpolicy) socket */
+int policy_fd = NULL_FD;
+struct sockaddr_un info_addr= { AF_UNIX, DEFAULT_CTLBASE INFO_SUFFIX };
+
+/* Initialize the control socket.
+ * Note: this is called very early, so little infrastructure is available.
+ * It is important that the socket is created before the original
+ * Pluto process returns.
+ */
+err_t
+init_ctl_socket(void)
+{
+    err_t failed = NULL;
+
+    delete_ctl_socket();	/* preventative medicine */
+    ctl_fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+    if (ctl_fd == -1)
+	failed = "create";
+    else if (fcntl(ctl_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
+	failed = "fcntl FD+CLOEXEC";
+    else if (setsockopt(ctl_fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+	failed = "setsockopt";
+    else
+    {
+	/* to keep control socket secure, use umask */
+	mode_t ou = umask(~S_IRWXU);
+
+	if (bind(ctl_fd, (struct sockaddr *)&ctl_addr
+	, offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(ctl_addr.sun_path)) < 0)
+	    failed = "bind";
+	umask(ou);
+    }
+
+    /* 5 is a haphazardly chosen limit for the backlog.
+     * Rumour has it that this is the max on BSD systems.
+     */
+    if (failed == NULL && listen(ctl_fd, 5) < 0)
+	failed = "listen() on";
+
+    return failed == NULL? NULL : builddiag("could not %s control socket: %d %s"
+	    , failed, errno, strerror(errno));
+}
+
+void
+delete_ctl_socket(void)
+{
+    /* Is noting failure useful?  Not when used as preventative medicine. */
+    unlink(ctl_addr.sun_path);
+}
+
+bool listening = FALSE;	/* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
+
+struct iface *interfaces = NULL;	/* public interfaces */
+
+/* Initialize the interface sockets. */
+
+static void
+mark_ifaces_dead(void)
+{
+    struct iface *p;
+
+    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	p->change = IFN_DELETE;
+}
+
+static void
+free_dead_ifaces(void)
+{
+    struct iface *p;
+    bool some_dead = FALSE
+	, some_new = FALSE;
+
+    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+    {
+	if (p->change == IFN_DELETE)
+	{
+	    plog("shutting down interface %s/%s %s"
+		, p->vname, p->rname, ip_str(&p->addr));
+	    some_dead = TRUE;
+	}
+	else if (p->change == IFN_ADD)
+	{
+	    some_new = TRUE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (some_dead)
+    {
+	struct iface **pp;
+
+	release_dead_interfaces();
+	for (pp = &interfaces; (p = *pp) != NULL; )
+	{
+	    if (p->change == IFN_DELETE)
+	    {
+		*pp = p->next;	/* advance *pp */
+		pfree(p->vname);
+		pfree(p->rname);
+		close(p->fd);
+		pfree(p);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		pp = &p->next;	/* advance pp */
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* this must be done after the release_dead_interfaces
+     * in case some to the newly unoriented connections can
+     * become oriented here.
+     */
+    if (some_dead || some_new)
+	check_orientations();
+}
+
+void
+free_ifaces(void)
+{
+    mark_ifaces_dead();
+    free_dead_ifaces();
+}
+
+struct raw_iface {
+    ip_address addr;
+    char name[IFNAMSIZ + 20];	/* what would be a safe size? */
+    struct raw_iface *next;
+};
+
+/* Called to handle --interface <ifname>
+ * Semantics: if specified, only these (real) interfaces are considered.
+ */
+static const char *pluto_ifn[10];
+static int pluto_ifn_roof = 0;
+
+bool
+use_interface(const char *rifn)
+{
+    if (pluto_ifn_roof >= (int)elemsof(pluto_ifn))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	pluto_ifn[pluto_ifn_roof++] = rifn;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+}
+
+#ifndef IPSECDEVPREFIX
+# define IPSECDEVPREFIX "ipsec"
+#endif
+
+static struct raw_iface *
+find_raw_ifaces4(void)
+{
+    int j;	/* index into buf */
+    struct ifconf ifconf;
+    struct ifreq buf[300];	/* for list of interfaces -- arbitrary limit */
+    struct raw_iface *rifaces = NULL;
+    int master_sock = socket(PF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);    /* Get a UDP socket */
+
+    /* get list of interfaces with assigned IPv4 addresses from system */
+
+    if (master_sock == -1)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "socket() failed in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
+
+    if (setsockopt(master_sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR
+    , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "setsockopt() in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
+
+    /* bind the socket */
+    {
+	ip_address any;
+
+	happy(anyaddr(AF_INET, &any));
+	setportof(htons(pluto_port), &any);
+	if (bind(master_sock, sockaddrof(&any), sockaddrlenof(&any)) < 0)
+	    exit_log_errno((e, "bind() failed in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
+    }
+
+    /* Get local interfaces.  See netdevice(7). */
+    ifconf.ifc_len = sizeof(buf);
+    ifconf.ifc_buf = (void *) buf;
+    zero(buf);
+
+    if (ioctl(master_sock, SIOCGIFCONF, &ifconf) == -1)
+	exit_log_errno((e, "ioctl(SIOCGIFCONF) in find_raw_ifaces4()"));
+
+    /* Add an entry to rifaces for each interesting interface. */
+    for (j = 0; (j+1) * sizeof(*buf) <= (size_t)ifconf.ifc_len; j++)
+    {
+	struct raw_iface ri;
+	const struct sockaddr_in *rs = (struct sockaddr_in *) &buf[j].ifr_addr;
+	struct ifreq auxinfo;
+
+	/* ignore all but AF_INET interfaces */
+	if (rs->sin_family != AF_INET)
+	    continue;	/* not interesting */
+
+	/* build a NUL-terminated copy of the rname field */
+	memcpy(ri.name, buf[j].ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
+	ri.name[IFNAMSIZ] = '\0';
+
+	/* ignore if our interface names were specified, and this isn't one */
+	if (pluto_ifn_roof != 0)
+	{
+	    int i;
+
+	    for (i = 0; i != pluto_ifn_roof; i++)
+		if (streq(ri.name, pluto_ifn[i]))
+		    break;
+	    if (i == pluto_ifn_roof)
+		continue;	/* not found -- skip */
+	}
+
+	/* Find out stuff about this interface.  See netdevice(7). */
+	zero(&auxinfo);	/* paranoia */
+	memcpy(auxinfo.ifr_name, buf[j].ifr_name, IFNAMSIZ);
+	if (ioctl(master_sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &auxinfo) == -1)
+	    exit_log_errno((e
+		, "ioctl(SIOCGIFFLAGS) for %s in find_raw_ifaces4()"
+		, ri.name));
+	if (!(auxinfo.ifr_flags & IFF_UP))
+	    continue;	/* ignore an interface that isn't UP */
+
+	/* ignore unconfigured interfaces */
+	if (rs->sin_addr.s_addr == 0)
+	    continue;
+
+	happy(initaddr((const void *)&rs->sin_addr, sizeof(struct in_addr)
+	    , AF_INET, &ri.addr));
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("found %s with address %s"
+	    , ri.name, ip_str(&ri.addr)));
+	ri.next = rifaces;
+	rifaces = clone_thing(ri, "struct raw_iface");
+    }
+
+    close(master_sock);
+
+    return rifaces;
+}
+
+static struct raw_iface *
+find_raw_ifaces6(void)
+{
+
+    /* Get list of interfaces with IPv6 addresses from system from /proc/net/if_inet6).
+     *
+     * Documentation of format?
+     * RTFS: linux-2.2.16/net/ipv6/addrconf.c:iface_proc_info()
+     *       linux-2.4.9-13/net/ipv6/addrconf.c:iface_proc_info()
+     *
+     * Sample from Gerhard's laptop:
+     *	00000000000000000000000000000001 01 80 10 80       lo
+     *	30490009000000000000000000010002 02 40 00 80   ipsec0
+     *	30490009000000000000000000010002 07 40 00 80     eth0
+     *	fe80000000000000025004fffefd5484 02 0a 20 80   ipsec0
+     *	fe80000000000000025004fffefd5484 07 0a 20 80     eth0
+     *
+     * Each line contains:
+     * - IPv6 address: 16 bytes, in hex, no punctuation
+     * - ifindex: 1 byte, in hex
+     * - prefix_len: 1 byte, in hex
+     * - scope (e.g. global, link local): 1 byte, in hex
+     * - flags: 1 byte, in hex
+     * - device name: string, followed by '\n'
+     */
+    struct raw_iface *rifaces = NULL;
+    static const char proc_name[] = "/proc/net/if_inet6";
+    FILE *proc_sock = fopen(proc_name, "r");
+
+    if (proc_sock == NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("could not open %s", proc_name));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    struct raw_iface ri;
+	    unsigned short xb[8];	/* IPv6 address as 8 16-bit chunks */
+	    char sb[8*5];	/* IPv6 address as string-with-colons */
+	    unsigned int if_idx;	/* proc field, not used */
+	    unsigned int plen;	/* proc field, not used */
+	    unsigned int scope;	/* proc field, used to exclude link-local */
+	    unsigned int dad_status;	/* proc field, not used */
+	    /* ??? I hate and distrust scanf -- DHR */
+	    int r = fscanf(proc_sock
+		, "%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx%4hx"
+		  " %02x %02x %02x %02x %20s\n"
+		, xb+0, xb+1, xb+2, xb+3, xb+4, xb+5, xb+6, xb+7
+		, &if_idx, &plen, &scope, &dad_status, ri.name);
+
+	    /* ??? we should diagnose any problems */
+	    if (r != 13)
+		break;
+
+	    /* ignore addresses with link local scope.
+	     * From linux-2.4.9-13/include/net/ipv6.h:
+	     * IPV6_ADDR_LINKLOCAL	0x0020U
+	     * IPV6_ADDR_SCOPE_MASK	0x00f0U
+	     */
+	    if ((scope & 0x00f0U) == 0x0020U)
+		continue;
+
+	    snprintf(sb, sizeof(sb)
+		, "%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x:%04x"
+		, xb[0], xb[1], xb[2], xb[3], xb[4], xb[5], xb[6], xb[7]);
+
+	    happy(ttoaddr(sb, 0, AF_INET6, &ri.addr));
+
+	    if (!isunspecaddr(&ri.addr))
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL
+		    , DBG_log("found %s with address %s"
+			, ri.name, sb));
+		ri.next = rifaces;
+		rifaces = clone_thing(ri, "struct raw_iface");
+	    }
+	}
+	fclose(proc_sock);
+    }
+
+    return rifaces;
+}
+
+#if 1
+static int
+create_socket(struct raw_iface *ifp, const char *v_name, int port)
+{
+    int fd = socket(addrtypeof(&ifp->addr), SOCK_DGRAM, IPPROTO_UDP);
+    int fcntl_flags;
+
+    if (fd < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "socket() in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	return -1;
+    }
+
+#if 1
+    /* Set socket Nonblocking */
+    if ((fcntl_flags=fcntl(fd, F_GETFL)) >= 0) {
+	if (!(fcntl_flags & O_NONBLOCK)) {
+	    fcntl_flags |= O_NONBLOCK;
+	    fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl_flags);
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+
+    if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "fcntl(,, FD_CLOEXEC) in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	close(fd);
+	return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR
+    , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	close(fd);
+	return -1;
+    }
+
+    /* To improve error reporting.  See ip(7). */
+#if defined(IP_RECVERR) && defined(MSG_ERRQUEUE)
+    if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR
+    , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "setsockopt IP_RECVERR in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	close(fd);
+	return -1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    /* With IPv6, there is no fragmentation after
+     * it leaves our interface.  PMTU discovery
+     * is mandatory but doesn't work well with IKE (why?).
+     * So we must set the IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU option.
+     * See draft-ietf-ipngwg-rfc2292bis-01.txt 11.1
+     */
+#ifdef IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU	/* YUCK: not always defined */
+    if (addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET6
+    && setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU
+      , (const void *)&on, sizeof(on)) < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPV6_USE_MIN_MTU in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	close(fd);
+	return -1;
+    }
+#endif
+
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+    if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
+    {
+	struct sadb_x_policy policy;
+	int level, opt;
+
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_len = sizeof(policy) / IPSEC_PFKEYv2_ALIGN;
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_exttype = SADB_X_EXT_POLICY;
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_type = IPSEC_POLICY_BYPASS;
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_dir = IPSEC_DIR_INBOUND;
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_reserved = 0;
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_id = 0;
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_reserved2 = 0;
+
+	if (addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET6)
+	{
+	    level = IPPROTO_IPV6;
+	    opt = IPV6_IPSEC_POLICY;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    level = IPPROTO_IP;
+	    opt = IP_IPSEC_POLICY;
+	}
+
+	if (setsockopt(fd, level, opt
+	  , &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPSEC_POLICY in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	    close(fd);
+	    return -1;
+	}
+
+	policy.sadb_x_policy_dir = IPSEC_DIR_OUTBOUND;
+
+	if (setsockopt(fd, level, opt
+	  , &policy, sizeof(policy)) < 0)
+	{
+	    log_errno((e, "setsockopt IPSEC_POLICY in process_raw_ifaces()"));
+	    close(fd);
+	    return -1;
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+
+    setportof(htons(port), &ifp->addr);
+    if (bind(fd, sockaddrof(&ifp->addr), sockaddrlenof(&ifp->addr)) < 0)
+    {
+	log_errno((e, "bind() for %s/%s %s:%u in process_raw_ifaces()"
+	    , ifp->name, v_name
+	    , ip_str(&ifp->addr), (unsigned) port));
+	close(fd);
+	return -1;
+    }
+    setportof(htons(pluto_port), &ifp->addr);
+    return fd;
+}
+#endif
+
+static void
+process_raw_ifaces(struct raw_iface *rifaces)
+{
+    struct raw_iface *ifp;
+
+    /* Find all virtual/real interface pairs.
+     * For each real interface...
+     */
+    for (ifp = rifaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
+    {
+	struct raw_iface *v = NULL;	/* matching ipsecX interface */
+	struct raw_iface fake_v;
+	bool after = FALSE; /* has vfp passed ifp on the list? */
+	bool bad = FALSE;
+	struct raw_iface *vfp;
+
+	/* ignore if virtual (ipsec*) interface */
+	if (strncmp(ifp->name, IPSECDEVPREFIX, sizeof(IPSECDEVPREFIX)-1) == 0)
+	    continue;
+
+	for (vfp = rifaces; vfp != NULL; vfp = vfp->next)
+	{
+	    if (vfp == ifp)
+	    {
+		after = TRUE;
+	    }
+	    else if (sameaddr(&ifp->addr, &vfp->addr))
+	    {
+		/* Different entries with matching IP addresses.
+		 * Many interesting cases.
+		 */
+		if (strncmp(vfp->name, IPSECDEVPREFIX, sizeof(IPSECDEVPREFIX)-1) == 0)
+		{
+		    if (v != NULL  && !streq(v->name, vfp->name))
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "ipsec interfaces %s and %s share same address %s"
+			    , v->name, vfp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr));
+			bad = TRUE;
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			v = vfp;	/* current winner */
+		    }
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* ugh: a second real interface with the same IP address
+		     * "after" allows us to avoid double reporting.
+		     */
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+		    if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
+		    {
+			if (after)
+			{
+			    bad = TRUE;
+			    break;
+			}
+			continue;
+		    }
+#endif
+		    if (after)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "IP interfaces %s and %s share address %s!"
+			    , ifp->name, vfp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr));
+		    }
+		    bad = TRUE;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (bad)
+	    continue;
+
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+	if (!no_klips && kernel_ops->type == KERNEL_TYPE_LINUX)
+	{
+	    v = ifp;
+	    goto add_entry;
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* what if we didn't find a virtual interface? */
+	if (v == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (no_klips)
+	    {
+		/* kludge for testing: invent a virtual device */
+		static const char fvp[] = "virtual";
+		fake_v = *ifp;
+		passert(sizeof(fake_v.name) > sizeof(fvp));
+		strcpy(fake_v.name, fvp);
+		addrtot(&ifp->addr, 0, fake_v.name + sizeof(fvp) - 1
+		    , sizeof(fake_v.name) - (sizeof(fvp) - 1));
+		v = &fake_v;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("IP interface %s %s has no matching ipsec* interface -- ignored"
+			    , ifp->name, ip_str(&ifp->addr)));
+		continue;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* We've got all we need; see if this is a new thing:
+	 * search old interfaces list.
+	 */
+#if defined(linux) && defined(KERNEL26_SUPPORT)
+add_entry:
+#endif
+	{
+	    struct iface **p = &interfaces;
+
+	    for (;;)
+	    {
+		struct iface *q = *p;
+
+		/* search is over if at end of list */
+		if (q == NULL)
+		{
+		    /* matches nothing -- create a new entry */
+		    int fd = create_socket(ifp, v->name, pluto_port);
+
+		    if (fd < 0)
+			break;
+
+		    if (nat_traversal_support_non_ike
+		    && addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET)
+		    {
+			nat_traversal_espinudp_socket(fd, ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_IKE);
+		    }
+
+		    q = alloc_thing(struct iface, "struct iface");
+		    q->rname = clone_str(ifp->name, "real device name");
+		    q->vname = clone_str(v->name, "virtual device name");
+		    q->addr = ifp->addr;
+		    q->fd = fd;
+		    q->next = interfaces;
+		    q->change = IFN_ADD;
+		    interfaces = q;
+		    plog("adding interface %s/%s %s:%d"
+			, q->vname, q->rname, ip_str(&q->addr), pluto_port);
+
+		    if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating
+		    && addrtypeof(&ifp->addr) == AF_INET)
+		    {
+			fd = create_socket(ifp, v->name, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
+			if (fd < 0)
+			    break;
+			nat_traversal_espinudp_socket(fd,
+			    ESPINUDP_WITH_NON_ESP);
+			q = alloc_thing(struct iface, "struct iface");
+			q->rname = clone_str(ifp->name, "real device name");
+			q->vname = clone_str(v->name, "virtual device name");
+			q->addr = ifp->addr;
+			setportof(htons(NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT), &q->addr);
+			q->fd = fd;
+			q->next = interfaces;
+			q->change = IFN_ADD;
+			q->ike_float = TRUE;
+			interfaces = q;
+			plog("adding interface %s/%s %s:%d",
+			q->vname, q->rname, ip_str(&q->addr), NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT);
+		    }
+		    break;
+		}
+
+		/* search over if matching old entry found */
+		if (streq(q->rname, ifp->name)
+		&& streq(q->vname, v->name)
+		&& sameaddr(&q->addr, &ifp->addr))
+		{
+		    /* matches -- rejuvinate old entry */
+		    q->change = IFN_KEEP;
+
+		    /* look for other interfaces to keep (due to NAT-T) */
+		    for (q = q->next ; q ; q = q->next)
+		    {
+			if (streq(q->rname, ifp->name)
+			&& streq(q->vname, v->name)
+			&& sameaddr(&q->addr, &ifp->addr))
+			{
+			    q->change = IFN_KEEP;
+			}
+		    }
+		    break;
+		}
+
+		/* try again */
+		p = &q->next;
+	    } /* for (;;) */
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* delete the raw interfaces list */
+    while (rifaces != NULL)
+    {
+	struct raw_iface *t = rifaces;
+
+	rifaces = t->next;
+	pfree(t);
+    }
+}
+
+void
+find_ifaces(void)
+{
+    mark_ifaces_dead();
+    process_raw_ifaces(find_raw_ifaces4());
+    process_raw_ifaces(find_raw_ifaces6());
+
+    free_dead_ifaces();	    /* ditch remaining old entries */
+
+    if (interfaces == NULL)
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no public interfaces found");
+}
+
+void
+show_ifaces_status(void)
+{
+    struct iface *p;
+
+    for (p = interfaces; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "interface %s/%s %s:%d"
+	    , p->vname, p->rname, ip_str(&p->addr), ntohs(portof(&p->addr)));
+}
+
+void
+show_debug_status(void)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG
+    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "debug %s"
+	, bitnamesof(debug_bit_names, cur_debugging));
+#endif
+}
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t sighupflag = FALSE;
+
+static void
+huphandler(int sig UNUSED)
+{
+    sighupflag = TRUE;
+}
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t sigtermflag = FALSE;
+
+static void
+termhandler(int sig UNUSED)
+{
+    sigtermflag = TRUE;
+}
+
+/* call_server listens for incoming ISAKMP packets and Whack messages,
+ * and handles timer events.
+ */
+void
+call_server(void)
+{
+    struct iface *ifp;
+
+    /* catch SIGHUP and SIGTERM */
+    {
+	int r;
+	struct sigaction act;
+
+	act.sa_handler = &huphandler;
+	sigemptyset(&act.sa_mask);
+	act.sa_flags = 0;	/* no SA_ONESHOT, no SA_RESTART, no nothing */
+	r = sigaction(SIGHUP, &act, NULL);
+	passert(r == 0);
+
+	act.sa_handler = &termhandler;
+	r = sigaction(SIGTERM, &act, NULL);
+	passert(r == 0);
+    }
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	fd_set readfds;
+	fd_set writefds;
+	int ndes;
+
+	/* wait for next interesting thing */
+
+	for (;;)
+	{
+	    long next_time = next_event();   /* time to any pending timer event */
+	    int maxfd = ctl_fd;
+
+	    if (sigtermflag)
+		exit_pluto(0);
+
+	    if (sighupflag)
+	    {
+		/* Ignorant folks think poking any daemon with SIGHUP
+		 * is polite.  We catch it and tell them otherwise.
+		 * There is one use: unsticking a hung recvfrom.
+		 * This sticking happens sometimes -- kernel bug?
+		 */
+		sighupflag = FALSE;
+		plog("Pluto ignores SIGHUP -- perhaps you want \"whack --listen\"");
+	    }
+
+	    FD_ZERO(&readfds);
+	    FD_ZERO(&writefds);
+	    FD_SET(ctl_fd, &readfds);
+
+	    /* the only write file-descriptor of interest */
+	    if (adns_qfd != NULL_FD && unsent_ADNS_queries)
+	    {
+		if (maxfd < adns_qfd)
+		    maxfd = adns_qfd;
+		FD_SET(adns_qfd, &writefds);
+	    }
+
+	    if (adns_afd != NULL_FD)
+	    {
+		if (maxfd < adns_afd)
+		    maxfd = adns_afd;
+		FD_SET(adns_afd, &readfds);
+	    }
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	    if (!no_klips)
+	    {
+		int fd = *kernel_ops->async_fdp;
+
+		if (kernel_ops->process_queue)
+		    kernel_ops->process_queue();
+		if (maxfd < fd)
+		    maxfd = fd;
+		passert(!FD_ISSET(fd, &readfds));
+		FD_SET(fd, &readfds);
+	    }
+#endif
+
+	    if (listening)
+	    {
+		for (ifp = interfaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
+		{
+		    if (maxfd < ifp->fd)
+			maxfd = ifp->fd;
+		    passert(!FD_ISSET(ifp->fd, &readfds));
+		    FD_SET(ifp->fd, &readfds);
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    if (next_time == -1)
+	    {
+		/* select without timer */
+
+		ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, NULL);
+	    }
+	    else if (next_time == 0)
+	    {
+		/* timer without select: there is a timer event pending,
+		 * and it should fire now so don't bother to do the select.
+		 */
+		ndes = 0;	/* signify timer expiration */
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* select with timer */
+
+		struct timeval tm;
+
+		tm.tv_sec = next_time;
+		tm.tv_usec = 0;
+		ndes = select(maxfd + 1, &readfds, &writefds, NULL, &tm);
+	    }
+
+	    if (ndes != -1)
+		break;	/* success */
+
+	    if (errno != EINTR)
+		exit_log_errno((e, "select() failed in call_server()"));
+
+	    /* retry if terminated by signal */
+	}
+
+	/* figure out what is interesting */
+
+	if (ndes == 0)
+	{
+	    /* timer event */
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+		DBG_log("*time to handle event"));
+
+	    handle_timer_event();
+	    passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* at least one file descriptor is ready */
+
+	    if (adns_qfd != NULL_FD && FD_ISSET(adns_qfd, &writefds))
+	    {
+		passert(ndes > 0);
+		send_unsent_ADNS_queries();
+		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		ndes--;
+	    }
+
+	    if (adns_afd != NULL_FD && FD_ISSET(adns_afd, &readfds))
+	    {
+		passert(ndes > 0);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+		    DBG_log("*received adns message"));
+		handle_adns_answer();
+		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		ndes--;
+	    }
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	    if (!no_klips && FD_ISSET(*kernel_ops->async_fdp, &readfds))
+	    {
+		passert(ndes > 0);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+		    DBG_log("*received kernel message"));
+		kernel_ops->process_msg();
+		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		ndes--;
+	    }
+#endif
+
+	    for (ifp = interfaces; ifp != NULL; ifp = ifp->next)
+	    {
+		if (FD_ISSET(ifp->fd, &readfds))
+		{
+		    /* comm_handle will print DBG_CONTROL intro,
+		     * with more info than we have here.
+		     */
+
+		    passert(ndes > 0);
+		    comm_handle(ifp);
+		    passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		    ndes--;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    if (FD_ISSET(ctl_fd, &readfds))
+	    {
+		passert(ndes > 0);
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log(BLANK_FORMAT);
+		    DBG_log("*received whack message"));
+		whack_handle(ctl_fd);
+		passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+		ndes--;
+	    }
+
+	    passert(ndes == 0);
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset: 4
+ * End Variables:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/server.h b/src/pluto/server.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d90e47c8f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/server.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* get-next-event loop
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: server.h,v 1.2 2004/03/22 21:53:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern int ctl_fd;	/* file descriptor of control (whack) socket */
+extern struct sockaddr_un ctl_addr;	/* address of control (whack) socket */
+
+extern int info_fd;	/* file descriptor of control (info) socket */
+extern struct sockaddr_un info_addr;	/* address of control (info) socket */
+
+extern err_t init_ctl_socket(void);
+extern void delete_ctl_socket(void);
+
+extern bool listening;	/* should we pay attention to IKE messages? */
+
+
+/* interface: a terminal point for IKE traffic, IPsec transport mode
+ * and IPsec tunnels.
+ * Essentially:
+ * - an IP device (eg. eth1), and
+ * - its partner, an ipsec device (eg. ipsec0), and
+ * - their shared IP address (eg. 10.7.3.2)
+ * Note: the port for IKE is always implicitly UDP/pluto_port.
+ */
+struct iface {
+    char *vname;	/* virtual (ipsec) device name */
+    char *rname;	/* real device name */
+    ip_address addr;	/* interface IP address */
+    int fd;	/* file descriptor of socket for IKE UDP messages */
+    struct iface *next;
+    bool ike_float;
+    enum { IFN_ADD, IFN_KEEP, IFN_DELETE } change;
+};
+
+extern struct iface *interfaces;	/* public interfaces */
+
+extern bool use_interface(const char *rifn);
+extern void find_ifaces(void);
+extern void show_ifaces_status(void);
+extern void free_ifaces(void);
+extern void show_debug_status(void);
+extern void call_server(void);
+
+/* in rcv_info.c */
+extern err_t init_info_socket(void);
+extern void delete_info_socket(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/sha1.c b/src/pluto/sha1.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..bbf062876
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/sha1.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/*
+SHA-1 in C
+By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+100% Public Domain
+
+Test Vectors (from FIPS PUB 180-1)
+"abc"
+  A9993E36 4706816A BA3E2571 7850C26C 9CD0D89D
+"abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq"
+  84983E44 1C3BD26E BAAE4AA1 F95129E5 E54670F1
+A million repetitions of "a"
+  34AA973C D4C4DAA4 F61EEB2B DBAD2731 6534016F
+*/
+
+/* #define LITTLE_ENDIAN * This should be #define'd already, if true. */
+/* #define SHA1HANDSOFF * Copies data before messing with it. */
+
+#define SHA1HANDSOFF
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>	/* for u_int*_t */
+#include <endian.h>    /* sets BYTE_ORDER, LITTLE_ENDIAN, and BIG_ENDIAN */
+
+#include "sha1.h"
+
+#define rol(value, bits) (((value) << (bits)) | ((value) >> (32 - (bits))))
+
+/* blk0() and blk() perform the initial expand. */
+/* I got the idea of expanding during the round function from SSLeay */
+#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
+#define blk0(i) (block->l[i] = (rol(block->l[i],24)&0xFF00FF00) \
+    |(rol(block->l[i],8)&0x00FF00FF))
+#elif BYTE_ORDER == BIG_ENDIAN
+#define blk0(i) block->l[i]
+#else
+#error "Endianness not defined!"
+#endif
+#define blk(i) (block->l[i&15] = rol(block->l[(i+13)&15]^block->l[(i+8)&15] \
+    ^block->l[(i+2)&15]^block->l[i&15],1))
+
+/* (R0+R1), R2, R3, R4 are the different operations used in SHA1 */
+#define R0(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk0(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R1(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=((w&(x^y))^y)+blk(i)+0x5A827999+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R2(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0x6ED9EBA1+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R3(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(((w|x)&y)|(w&x))+blk(i)+0x8F1BBCDC+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+#define R4(v,w,x,y,z,i) z+=(w^x^y)+blk(i)+0xCA62C1D6+rol(v,5);w=rol(w,30);
+
+
+/* Hash a single 512-bit block. This is the core of the algorithm. */
+
+void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const unsigned char buffer[64])
+{
+u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e;
+typedef union {
+    unsigned char c[64];
+    u_int32_t l[16];
+} CHAR64LONG16;
+#ifdef SHA1HANDSOFF
+CHAR64LONG16 block[1];  /* use array to appear as a pointer */
+    memcpy(block, buffer, 64);
+#else
+    /* The following had better never be used because it causes the
+     * pointer-to-const buffer to be cast into a pointer to non-const.
+     * And the result is written through.  I threw a "const" in, hoping
+     * this will cause a diagnostic.
+     */
+CHAR64LONG16* block = (const CHAR64LONG16*)buffer;
+#endif
+    /* Copy context->state[] to working vars */
+    a = state[0];
+    b = state[1];
+    c = state[2];
+    d = state[3];
+    e = state[4];
+    /* 4 rounds of 20 operations each. Loop unrolled. */
+    R0(a,b,c,d,e, 0); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 1); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 2); R0(c,d,e,a,b, 3);
+    R0(b,c,d,e,a, 4); R0(a,b,c,d,e, 5); R0(e,a,b,c,d, 6); R0(d,e,a,b,c, 7);
+    R0(c,d,e,a,b, 8); R0(b,c,d,e,a, 9); R0(a,b,c,d,e,10); R0(e,a,b,c,d,11);
+    R0(d,e,a,b,c,12); R0(c,d,e,a,b,13); R0(b,c,d,e,a,14); R0(a,b,c,d,e,15);
+    R1(e,a,b,c,d,16); R1(d,e,a,b,c,17); R1(c,d,e,a,b,18); R1(b,c,d,e,a,19);
+    R2(a,b,c,d,e,20); R2(e,a,b,c,d,21); R2(d,e,a,b,c,22); R2(c,d,e,a,b,23);
+    R2(b,c,d,e,a,24); R2(a,b,c,d,e,25); R2(e,a,b,c,d,26); R2(d,e,a,b,c,27);
+    R2(c,d,e,a,b,28); R2(b,c,d,e,a,29); R2(a,b,c,d,e,30); R2(e,a,b,c,d,31);
+    R2(d,e,a,b,c,32); R2(c,d,e,a,b,33); R2(b,c,d,e,a,34); R2(a,b,c,d,e,35);
+    R2(e,a,b,c,d,36); R2(d,e,a,b,c,37); R2(c,d,e,a,b,38); R2(b,c,d,e,a,39);
+    R3(a,b,c,d,e,40); R3(e,a,b,c,d,41); R3(d,e,a,b,c,42); R3(c,d,e,a,b,43);
+    R3(b,c,d,e,a,44); R3(a,b,c,d,e,45); R3(e,a,b,c,d,46); R3(d,e,a,b,c,47);
+    R3(c,d,e,a,b,48); R3(b,c,d,e,a,49); R3(a,b,c,d,e,50); R3(e,a,b,c,d,51);
+    R3(d,e,a,b,c,52); R3(c,d,e,a,b,53); R3(b,c,d,e,a,54); R3(a,b,c,d,e,55);
+    R3(e,a,b,c,d,56); R3(d,e,a,b,c,57); R3(c,d,e,a,b,58); R3(b,c,d,e,a,59);
+    R4(a,b,c,d,e,60); R4(e,a,b,c,d,61); R4(d,e,a,b,c,62); R4(c,d,e,a,b,63);
+    R4(b,c,d,e,a,64); R4(a,b,c,d,e,65); R4(e,a,b,c,d,66); R4(d,e,a,b,c,67);
+    R4(c,d,e,a,b,68); R4(b,c,d,e,a,69); R4(a,b,c,d,e,70); R4(e,a,b,c,d,71);
+    R4(d,e,a,b,c,72); R4(c,d,e,a,b,73); R4(b,c,d,e,a,74); R4(a,b,c,d,e,75);
+    R4(e,a,b,c,d,76); R4(d,e,a,b,c,77); R4(c,d,e,a,b,78); R4(b,c,d,e,a,79);
+    /* Add the working vars back into context.state[] */
+    state[0] += a;
+    state[1] += b;
+    state[2] += c;
+    state[3] += d;
+    state[4] += e;
+    /* Wipe variables */
+    a = b = c = d = e = 0;
+#ifdef SHA1HANDSOFF
+    memset(block, '\0', sizeof(block));
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/* SHA1Init - Initialize new context */
+
+void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX* context)
+{
+    /* SHA1 initialization constants */
+    context->state[0] = 0x67452301;
+    context->state[1] = 0xEFCDAB89;
+    context->state[2] = 0x98BADCFE;
+    context->state[3] = 0x10325476;
+    context->state[4] = 0xC3D2E1F0;
+    context->count[0] = context->count[1] = 0;
+}
+
+
+/* Run your data through this. */
+
+void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX* context, const unsigned char* data, u_int32_t len)
+{
+u_int32_t i;
+u_int32_t j;
+
+    j = context->count[0];
+    if ((context->count[0] += len << 3) < j)
+	context->count[1]++;
+    context->count[1] += (len>>29);
+    j = (j >> 3) & 63;
+    if ((j + len) > 63) {
+        memcpy(&context->buffer[j], data, (i = 64-j));
+        SHA1Transform(context->state, context->buffer);
+        for ( ; i + 63 < len; i += 64) {
+            SHA1Transform(context->state, &data[i]);
+        }
+        j = 0;
+    }
+    else i = 0;
+    memcpy(&context->buffer[j], &data[i], len - i);
+}
+
+
+/* Add padding and return the message digest. */
+
+void SHA1Final(unsigned char digest[20], SHA1_CTX* context)
+{
+unsigned i;
+unsigned char finalcount[8];
+unsigned char c;
+
+#if 0	/* untested "improvement" by DHR */
+    /* Convert context->count to a sequence of bytes
+     * in finalcount.  Second element first, but
+     * big-endian order within element.
+     * But we do it all backwards.
+     */
+    unsigned char *fcp = &finalcount[8];
+
+    for (i = 0; i < 2; i++)
+    {
+	u_int32_t t = context->count[i];
+	int j;
+
+	for (j = 0; j < 4; t >>= 8, j++)
+	    *--fcp = (unsigned char) t
+    }
+#else
+    for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+        finalcount[i] = (unsigned char)((context->count[(i >= 4 ? 0 : 1)]
+         >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);  /* Endian independent */
+    }
+#endif
+    c = 0200;
+    SHA1Update(context, &c, 1);
+    while ((context->count[0] & 504) != 448) {
+	c = 0000;
+        SHA1Update(context, &c, 1);
+    }
+    SHA1Update(context, finalcount, 8);  /* Should cause a SHA1Transform() */
+    for (i = 0; i < 20; i++) {
+        digest[i] = (unsigned char)
+         ((context->state[i>>2] >> ((3-(i & 3)) * 8) ) & 255);
+    }
+    /* Wipe variables */
+    memset(context, '\0', sizeof(*context));
+    memset(&finalcount, '\0', sizeof(finalcount));
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/sha1.h b/src/pluto/sha1.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..64b3d2f5d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/sha1.h
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+/*
+SHA-1 in C
+By Steve Reid <steve@edmweb.com>
+100% Public Domain
+*/
+
+typedef struct {
+    u_int32_t state[5];
+    u_int32_t count[2];
+    unsigned char buffer[64];
+} SHA1_CTX;
+
+void SHA1Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const unsigned char buffer[64]);
+void SHA1Init(SHA1_CTX* context);
+void SHA1Update(SHA1_CTX* context, const unsigned char* data, u_int32_t len);
+void SHA1Final(unsigned char digest[20], SHA1_CTX* context);
diff --git a/src/pluto/smallprime.c b/src/pluto/smallprime.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..87497d096
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/smallprime.c
@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+/* smallprime.c - List of small primes
+ *	Copyright (C) 1998 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
+ *
+ * This file is part of GnuPG.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * GnuPG is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA
+ */
+
+#ifdef PLUTO
+#include <gmp.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "gcryptfix.h"
+#else
+/* #include <config.h> */
+/* #include <stdio.h> */
+/* #include <stdlib.h> */
+/* #include "util.h" */
+/* #include "types.h" */
+#endif
+
+/* Note: 2 is not included because it can be tested more easily
+ * by looking at bit 0. The last entry in this list is marked by a zero
+ */
+ushort
+small_prime_numbers[] = {
+    3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43,
+    47, 53, 59, 61, 67, 71, 73, 79, 83, 89, 97, 101,
+    103, 107, 109, 113, 127, 131, 137, 139, 149, 151,
+    157, 163, 167, 173, 179, 181, 191, 193, 197, 199,
+    211, 223, 227, 229, 233, 239, 241, 251, 257, 263,
+    269, 271, 277, 281, 283, 293, 307, 311, 313, 317,
+    331, 337, 347, 349, 353, 359, 367, 373, 379, 383,
+    389, 397, 401, 409, 419, 421, 431, 433, 439, 443,
+    449, 457, 461, 463, 467, 479, 487, 491, 499, 503,
+    509, 521, 523, 541, 547, 557, 563, 569, 571, 577,
+    587, 593, 599, 601, 607, 613, 617, 619, 631, 641,
+    643, 647, 653, 659, 661, 673, 677, 683, 691, 701,
+    709, 719, 727, 733, 739, 743, 751, 757, 761, 769,
+    773, 787, 797, 809, 811, 821, 823, 827, 829, 839,
+    853, 857, 859, 863, 877, 881, 883, 887, 907, 911,
+    919, 929, 937, 941, 947, 953, 967, 971, 977, 983,
+    991, 997, 1009, 1013, 1019, 1021, 1031, 1033,
+    1039, 1049, 1051, 1061, 1063, 1069, 1087, 1091,
+    1093, 1097, 1103, 1109, 1117, 1123, 1129, 1151,
+    1153, 1163, 1171, 1181, 1187, 1193, 1201, 1213,
+    1217, 1223, 1229, 1231, 1237, 1249, 1259, 1277,
+    1279, 1283, 1289, 1291, 1297, 1301, 1303, 1307,
+    1319, 1321, 1327, 1361, 1367, 1373, 1381, 1399,
+    1409, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1433, 1439, 1447, 1451,
+    1453, 1459, 1471, 1481, 1483, 1487, 1489, 1493,
+    1499, 1511, 1523, 1531, 1543, 1549, 1553, 1559,
+    1567, 1571, 1579, 1583, 1597, 1601, 1607, 1609,
+    1613, 1619, 1621, 1627, 1637, 1657, 1663, 1667,
+    1669, 1693, 1697, 1699, 1709, 1721, 1723, 1733,
+    1741, 1747, 1753, 1759, 1777, 1783, 1787, 1789,
+    1801, 1811, 1823, 1831, 1847, 1861, 1867, 1871,
+    1873, 1877, 1879, 1889, 1901, 1907, 1913, 1931,
+    1933, 1949, 1951, 1973, 1979, 1987, 1993, 1997,
+    1999, 2003, 2011, 2017, 2027, 2029, 2039, 2053,
+    2063, 2069, 2081, 2083, 2087, 2089, 2099, 2111,
+    2113, 2129, 2131, 2137, 2141, 2143, 2153, 2161,
+    2179, 2203, 2207, 2213, 2221, 2237, 2239, 2243,
+    2251, 2267, 2269, 2273, 2281, 2287, 2293, 2297,
+    2309, 2311, 2333, 2339, 2341, 2347, 2351, 2357,
+    2371, 2377, 2381, 2383, 2389, 2393, 2399, 2411,
+    2417, 2423, 2437, 2441, 2447, 2459, 2467, 2473,
+    2477, 2503, 2521, 2531, 2539, 2543, 2549, 2551,
+    2557, 2579, 2591, 2593, 2609, 2617, 2621, 2633,
+    2647, 2657, 2659, 2663, 2671, 2677, 2683, 2687,
+    2689, 2693, 2699, 2707, 2711, 2713, 2719, 2729,
+    2731, 2741, 2749, 2753, 2767, 2777, 2789, 2791,
+    2797, 2801, 2803, 2819, 2833, 2837, 2843, 2851,
+    2857, 2861, 2879, 2887, 2897, 2903, 2909, 2917,
+    2927, 2939, 2953, 2957, 2963, 2969, 2971, 2999,
+    3001, 3011, 3019, 3023, 3037, 3041, 3049, 3061,
+    3067, 3079, 3083, 3089, 3109, 3119, 3121, 3137,
+    3163, 3167, 3169, 3181, 3187, 3191, 3203, 3209,
+    3217, 3221, 3229, 3251, 3253, 3257, 3259, 3271,
+    3299, 3301, 3307, 3313, 3319, 3323, 3329, 3331,
+    3343, 3347, 3359, 3361, 3371, 3373, 3389, 3391,
+    3407, 3413, 3433, 3449, 3457, 3461, 3463, 3467,
+    3469, 3491, 3499, 3511, 3517, 3527, 3529, 3533,
+    3539, 3541, 3547, 3557, 3559, 3571, 3581, 3583,
+    3593, 3607, 3613, 3617, 3623, 3631, 3637, 3643,
+    3659, 3671, 3673, 3677, 3691, 3697, 3701, 3709,
+    3719, 3727, 3733, 3739, 3761, 3767, 3769, 3779,
+    3793, 3797, 3803, 3821, 3823, 3833, 3847, 3851,
+    3853, 3863, 3877, 3881, 3889, 3907, 3911, 3917,
+    3919, 3923, 3929, 3931, 3943, 3947, 3967, 3989,
+    4001, 4003, 4007, 4013, 4019, 4021, 4027, 4049,
+    4051, 4057, 4073, 4079, 4091, 4093, 4099, 4111,
+    4127, 4129, 4133, 4139, 4153, 4157, 4159, 4177,
+    4201, 4211, 4217, 4219, 4229, 4231, 4241, 4243,
+    4253, 4259, 4261, 4271, 4273, 4283, 4289, 4297,
+    4327, 4337, 4339, 4349, 4357, 4363, 4373, 4391,
+    4397, 4409, 4421, 4423, 4441, 4447, 4451, 4457,
+    4463, 4481, 4483, 4493, 4507, 4513, 4517, 4519,
+    4523, 4547, 4549, 4561, 4567, 4583, 4591, 4597,
+    4603, 4621, 4637, 4639, 4643, 4649, 4651, 4657,
+    4663, 4673, 4679, 4691, 4703, 4721, 4723, 4729,
+    4733, 4751, 4759, 4783, 4787, 4789, 4793, 4799,
+    4801, 4813, 4817, 4831, 4861, 4871, 4877, 4889,
+    4903, 4909, 4919, 4931, 4933, 4937, 4943, 4951,
+    4957, 4967, 4969, 4973, 4987, 4993, 4999,
+    0
+};
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/smartcard.c b/src/pluto/smartcard.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..744f8a6f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/smartcard.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1956 @@
+/* Support of smartcards and cryptotokens
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Christoph Gysin, Simon Zwahlen
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 David Buechi, Michael Meier
+ * Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur, Switzerland
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Michael Joosten
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule f�r Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: smartcard.c,v 1.41 2006/01/04 21:03:52 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+#include "rsaref/unix.h"
+#include "rsaref/pkcs11.h"
+#endif
+
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "smartcard.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+
+#define DEFAULT_BASE	16
+
+/* chained list of smartcard records */
+static smartcard_t *smartcards   = NULL;
+
+/* number of generated sc objects */
+static int sc_number = 0;
+
+const smartcard_t empty_sc = {
+      NULL		 , /* next */
+            0		 , /* last_load */
+    { CERT_NONE, {NULL} }, /* last_cert */
+            0		 , /* count */
+            0		 , /* number */
+       999999		 , /* slot */
+      NULL		 , /* id */
+      NULL		 , /* label */
+    { NULL, 0 }		 , /* pin */
+      FALSE		 , /* pinpad */
+      FALSE		 , /* valid */
+      FALSE		 , /* session_opened */
+      FALSE		 , /* logged_in */
+      TRUE		 , /* any_slot */
+	    0L		 , /* session */
+};
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD	/* compile with smartcard support */
+
+#define SCX_MAGIC	0xd00bed00
+
+struct scx_pkcs11_module {
+        u_int _magic;
+        void *handle;
+};
+
+typedef struct scx_pkcs11_module scx_pkcs11_module_t;
+
+/* PKCS #11 cryptoki context */
+static bool scx_initialized = FALSE;
+static scx_pkcs11_module_t *pkcs11_module = NULL_PTR;
+static CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR pkcs11_functions = NULL_PTR;
+
+/* crytoki v2.11 - return values of PKCS #11 functions*/
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name[] = {
+	"CKR_OK",
+	"CKR_CANCEL",
+	"CKR_HOST_MEMORY",
+	"CKR_SLOT_ID_INVALID",
+	"CKR_FLAGS_INVALID",
+	"CKR_GENERAL_ERROR",
+	"CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED",
+	"CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD",
+	"CKR_NO_EVENT",
+	"CKR_NEED_TO_CREATE_THREADS",
+	"CKR_CANT_LOCK"
+    };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_10[] = {
+	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY",
+	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_SENSITIVE",
+	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID"
+    };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_20[] = {
+	"CKR_DATA_INVALID", 
+	"CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE"
+    };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_30[] = {
+	"CKR_DEVICE_ERROR",
+	"CKR_DEVICE_MEMORY",
+	"CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED"
+    };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_40[] = {
+	"CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID",
+	"CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE"
+    };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_50[] = {
+	"CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED",
+	"CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_PARALLEL",
+	"CKR_0x52_UNDEFINED",
+	"CKR_0x53_UNDEFINED",
+	"CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED"
+    };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_60[] = {
+	"CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_KEY_SENSITIVE",
+	"CKR_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
+	"CKR_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT",
+	"CKR_KEY_NOT_NEEDED",
+	"CKR_KEY_CHANGED",
+	"CKR_KEY_NEEDED",
+	"CKR_KEY_INDIGESTIBLE",
+	"CKR_KEY_FUNCTION_NOT_PERMITTED",
+	"CKR_KEY_NOT_WRAPPABLE",
+	"CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_70[] = {
+	"CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID",
+	"CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_80[] = {
+	"CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_90[] = {
+	"CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE",
+	"CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_A0[] = {
+	"CKR_PIN_INCORRECT",
+	"CKR_PIN_INVALID",
+	"CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE",
+	"CKR_PIN_EXPIRED",
+	"CKR_PIN_LOCKED"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_B0[] = {
+	"CKR_SESSION_CLOSED",
+	"CKR_SESSION_COUNT",
+	"CKR_0xB2_UNDEFINED",
+	"CKR_SESSION_HANDLE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_SESSION_PARALLEL_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+	"CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY",
+	"CKR_SESSION_EXISTS",
+	"CKR_SESSION_READ_ONLY_EXISTS",
+	"CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_C0[] = {
+	"CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_D0[] = {
+	"CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE",
+	"CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_E0[] = {
+	"CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT",
+	"CKR_TOKEN_NOT_RECOGNIZED",
+	"CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_F0[] = {
+	"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
+	"CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_100[] = {
+	"CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN",
+	"CKR_USER_NOT_LOGGED_IN",
+	"CKR_USER_PIN_NOT_INITIALIZED",
+	"CKR_USER_TYPE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_USER_ANOTHER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN",
+	"CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_110[] = {
+	"CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID",
+	"CKR_0x111_UNDEFINED",
+	"CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_LEN_RANGE",
+	"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID",
+	"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_SIZE_RANGE",
+	"CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_120[] = {
+	"CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED",
+	"CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_130[] = {
+	"CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_150[] = {
+	"CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_160[] = {
+	"CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_170[] = {
+	"CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_180[] = {
+	"CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_190[] = {
+	"CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED",
+	"CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_1A0[] = {
+	"CKR_MUTEX_BAD",
+	"CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_200[] = {
+	"CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED"
+     };
+
+static const char *const pkcs11_return_name_vendor[] = {
+	"CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED"
+     };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_vendor =
+    { CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED, CKR_VENDOR_DEFINED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_vendor, NULL };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_200 =
+    { CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED, CKR_FUNCTION_REJECTED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_200, &pkcs11_return_names_vendor };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_1A0 =
+    { CKR_MUTEX_BAD, CKR_MUTEX_NOT_LOCKED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_1A0, &pkcs11_return_names_200 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_190 =
+    { CKR_CRYPTOKI_NOT_INITIALIZED, CKR_CRYPTOKI_ALREADY_INITIALIZED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_190, &pkcs11_return_names_1A0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_180 =
+    { CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE, CKR_STATE_UNSAVEABLE
+	, pkcs11_return_name_180, &pkcs11_return_names_190 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_170 =
+    { CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE, CKR_INFORMATION_SENSITIVE
+	, pkcs11_return_name_170, &pkcs11_return_names_180 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_160 =
+    { CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID, CKR_SAVED_STATE_INVALID
+	, pkcs11_return_name_160, &pkcs11_return_names_170 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_150 =
+    { CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL, CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
+	, pkcs11_return_name_150, &pkcs11_return_names_160 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_130 =
+    { CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID, CKR_DOMAIN_PARAMS_INVALID
+	, pkcs11_return_name_130, &pkcs11_return_names_150 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_120 =
+    { CKR_RANDOM_SEED_NOT_SUPPORTED, CKR_RANDOM_NO_RNG
+	, pkcs11_return_name_120, &pkcs11_return_names_130 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_110 =
+    { CKR_WRAPPED_KEY_INVALID, CKR_WRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT
+	, pkcs11_return_name_110, &pkcs11_return_names_120 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_100 =
+    { CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN, CKR_USER_TOO_MANY_TYPES
+	, pkcs11_return_name_100, &pkcs11_return_names_110 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_F0 =
+    { CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_UNWRAPPING_KEY_TYPE_INCONSISTENT
+	, pkcs11_return_name_F0, &pkcs11_return_names_100 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_E0 =
+    { CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT, CKR_TOKEN_WRITE_PROTECTED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_E0, &pkcs11_return_names_F0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_D0 =
+    { CKR_TEMPLATE_INCOMPLETE, CKR_TEMPLATE_INCONSISTENT
+	, pkcs11_return_name_D0,&pkcs11_return_names_E0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_C0 =
+    { CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID, CKR_SIGNATURE_LEN_RANGE
+	, pkcs11_return_name_C0, &pkcs11_return_names_D0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_B0 =
+    { CKR_SESSION_CLOSED, CKR_SESSION_READ_WRITE_SO_EXISTS
+	, pkcs11_return_name_B0, &pkcs11_return_names_C0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_A0 =
+    { CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LOCKED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_A0, &pkcs11_return_names_B0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_90 =
+    { CKR_OPERATION_ACTIVE, CKR_OPERATION_NOT_INITIALIZED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_90, &pkcs11_return_names_A0 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_80 =
+    { CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_OBJECT_HANDLE_INVALID
+	, pkcs11_return_name_80, &pkcs11_return_names_90 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_70 =
+    { CKR_MECHANISM_INVALID, CKR_MECHANISM_PARAM_INVALID
+	, pkcs11_return_name_70, &pkcs11_return_names_80 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_60 =
+    { CKR_KEY_HANDLE_INVALID, CKR_KEY_UNEXTRACTABLE
+	, pkcs11_return_name_60, &pkcs11_return_names_70 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_50 =
+    { CKR_FUNCTION_CANCELED, CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_50, &pkcs11_return_names_60 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_40 =
+    { CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_INVALID, CKR_ENCRYPTED_DATA_LEN_RANGE
+	, pkcs11_return_name_40, &pkcs11_return_names_50 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_30 =
+    { CKR_DEVICE_ERROR, CKR_DEVICE_REMOVED
+	, pkcs11_return_name_30, &pkcs11_return_names_40 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_20 =
+    { CKR_DATA_INVALID, CKR_DATA_LEN_RANGE
+	, pkcs11_return_name_20, &pkcs11_return_names_30 };
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names_10 =
+    { CKR_ATTRIBUTE_READ_ONLY, CKR_ATTRIBUTE_VALUE_INVALID
+	, pkcs11_return_name_10, &pkcs11_return_names_20};
+
+static enum_names pkcs11_return_names =
+    { CKR_OK, CKR_CANT_LOCK
+	, pkcs11_return_name, &pkcs11_return_names_10};
+
+/*
+ * Unload a PKCS#11 module.
+ * The calling application is responsible for cleaning up
+ * and calling C_Finalize()
+ */
+static CK_RV
+scx_unload_pkcs11_module(scx_pkcs11_module_t *mod)
+{
+    if (!mod || mod->_magic != SCX_MAGIC)
+	return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
+
+    if (dlclose(mod->handle) < 0)
+	return CKR_FUNCTION_FAILED;
+
+    memset(mod, 0, sizeof(*mod));
+    pfree(mod);
+    return CKR_OK;
+}
+
+static scx_pkcs11_module_t*
+scx_load_pkcs11_module(const char *name, CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR funcs)
+{
+    CK_RV (*c_get_function_list)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR);
+    scx_pkcs11_module_t *mod;
+    void *handle;
+    int rv;
+
+    if (name == NULL || *name == '\0')
+	return NULL;
+
+    /* Try to load PKCS#11 library module*/
+    handle = dlopen(name, RTLD_NOW);
+    if (handle == NULL)
+	return NULL;
+
+    mod = alloc_thing(scx_pkcs11_module_t, "scx_pkcs11_module");
+    mod->_magic = SCX_MAGIC;
+    mod->handle = handle;
+
+   /* Get the list of function pointers */
+    c_get_function_list = (CK_RV (*)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST_PTR_PTR))
+	    dlsym(mod->handle, "C_GetFunctionList");
+    if (!c_get_function_list)
+	goto failed;
+
+    rv = c_get_function_list(funcs);
+    if (rv == CKR_OK)
+	return mod;
+
+failed: scx_unload_pkcs11_module(mod);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * retrieve a certificate object
+ */
+static bool
+scx_find_cert_object(CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object
+, smartcard_t *sc, cert_t *cert)
+{
+    size_t hex_len, label_len;
+    u_char *hex_id = NULL;
+    chunk_t blob;
+    x509cert_t *x509cert;
+
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+	{ CKA_ID,    NULL_PTR, 0L },
+	{ CKA_LABEL, NULL_PTR, 0L },
+	{ CKA_VALUE, NULL_PTR, 0L }
+    };
+
+    /* initialize the return argument */
+    *cert = empty_cert;
+
+    /* get the length of the attributes first */
+    CK_RV rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, attr, 3);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("couldn't read the attribute sizes: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    pfreeany(sc->label);
+
+    hex_id    = alloc_bytes(attr[0].ulValueLen, "hex id");
+    hex_len   = attr[0].ulValueLen;
+    sc->label = alloc_bytes(attr[1].ulValueLen + 1, "sc label");
+    label_len = attr[1].ulValueLen;
+    blob.ptr  = alloc_bytes(attr[2].ulValueLen, "x509cert blob");
+    blob.len  = attr[2].ulValueLen;
+
+    attr[0].pValue = hex_id;
+    attr[1].pValue = sc->label;
+    attr[2].pValue = blob.ptr;
+
+    /* now get the attributes */
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, attr, 3);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("couldn't read the attributes: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	pfree(hex_id);
+	pfreeany(sc->label);
+	pfree(blob.ptr);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    pfreeany(sc->id);
+
+    /* convert id from hex to ASCII */
+    sc->id = alloc_bytes(2*hex_len + 1, " sc id");
+    datatot(hex_id, hex_len, 16, sc->id, 2*hex_len + 1);
+    pfree(hex_id);
+
+    /* safeguard in case the label is not null terminated */
+    sc->label[label_len] = '\0';
+
+    /* parse the retrieved cert */
+    x509cert = alloc_thing(x509cert_t, "x509cert");
+    *x509cert = empty_x509cert;
+    x509cert->smartcard = TRUE;
+
+    if (!parse_x509cert(blob, 0, x509cert))
+    {
+	plog("failed to load cert from smartcard, error in X.509 certificate");
+	free_x509cert(x509cert);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    cert->type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
+    cert->u.x509 = x509cert;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * search a given slot for PKCS#11 certificate objects
+ */
+static void
+scx_find_cert_objects(CK_SLOT_ID slot, CK_SESSION_HANDLE session)
+{
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{ CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class) }};
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, 1);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_FindObjectsInit: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+	CK_ULONG obj_count = 0;
+	err_t ugh;
+	time_t valid_until;
+	smartcard_t *sc;
+	x509cert_t *cert;
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjects(session, &object, 1, &obj_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_FindObjects: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* no objects left */
+	if (obj_count == 0)
+	    break;
+
+	/* create and initialize a new smartcard object */
+	sc  = alloc_thing(smartcard_t, "smartcard");
+	*sc = empty_sc;
+	sc->any_slot = FALSE;
+	sc->slot  = slot;
+
+        if (!scx_find_cert_object(session, object, sc, &sc->last_cert))
+	{
+	    scx_free(sc);
+	    continue;
+	}
+ 	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("found cert in %s with id: %s, label: '%s'"
+		, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id, sc->label)
+	)
+
+	/* check validity of certificate */
+	cert = sc->last_cert.u.x509;
+	valid_until = cert->notAfter;
+	ugh = check_validity(cert, &valid_until);
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("  %s", ugh);
+	    free_x509cert(cert);
+	    scx_free(sc);
+	    continue;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	 	DBG_log("  certificate is valid")
+	    )
+	}
+
+	sc = scx_add(sc);
+
+	/* put end entity and ca certificates into different chains */
+	if (cert->isCA)
+	    add_authcert(cert, AUTH_CA);
+	else
+	{
+	    add_x509_public_key(cert, valid_until, DAL_LOCAL);
+            sc->last_cert.u.x509 = add_x509cert(cert);
+	}
+
+	share_cert(sc->last_cert);
+	time(&sc->last_load);
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_FindObjectsFinal: %s"
+	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * search all slots for PKCS#11 certificate objects
+ */
+static void
+scx_find_all_cert_objects(void)
+{
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slots = NULL_PTR;
+    CK_ULONG slot_count = 0;
+    CK_ULONG i;
+
+    if (!scx_initialized)
+    {
+	plog("pkcs11 module not initialized");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* read size, always returns CKR_OK ! */
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL_PTR, &slot_count);
+
+    /* allocate memory for the slots */
+    slots = (CK_SLOT_ID *)alloc_bytes(slot_count * sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID), "slots");
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, slots, &slot_count);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_GetSlotList: %s", enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	pfreeany(slots);
+	return;
+    }
+
+    /* look in every slot for certificate objects */
+    for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++)
+    {
+	CK_SLOT_ID slot = slots[i];
+	CK_SLOT_INFO info;
+	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotInfo(slot, &info);
+
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_GetSlotInfo: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    continue;
+	}
+	
+	if (!(info.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
+	{
+	    plog("no token present in slot %lu", slot);
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_OpenSession(slot
+		, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("failed to open a session on slot %lu: %s"
+		, slot, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    continue;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld for searching slot %lu", session, slot)
+	)
+	scx_find_cert_objects(slot, session);
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	}
+    }
+    pfreeany(slots);
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * load and initialize PKCS#11 cryptoki module 
+ */
+void
+scx_init(const char* module)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+
+    if (scx_initialized)
+    {
+	plog("weird - pkcs11 module seems already to be initialized");
+	return;
+    }
+
+    if (module == NULL)
+#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB
+	module = PKCS11_DEFAULT_LIB;
+#else
+    {
+	plog("no pkcs11 module defined");
+	return;
+    }
+#endif
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("pkcs11 module '%s' loading...", module)
+    )
+    pkcs11_module = scx_load_pkcs11_module(module, &pkcs11_functions);
+    if (pkcs11_module == NULL)
+    {
+	 plog("failed to load pkcs11 module '%s'", module);
+	 return;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("pkcs11 module initializing...")
+    )   
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Initialize(NULL);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("failed to initialize pkcs11 module: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    scx_initialized = TRUE;
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("pkcs11 module loaded and initialized")
+    )
+
+    scx_find_all_cert_objects();
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * finalize and unload PKCS#11 cryptoki module 
+ */
+void
+scx_finalize(void)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    while (smartcards != NULL)
+    {
+	scx_release(smartcards);
+    }
+
+    if (pkcs11_functions != NULL_PTR)
+    {
+	pkcs11_functions->C_Finalize(NULL_PTR);
+	pkcs11_functions = NULL_PTR;
+    }
+
+    if (pkcs11_module != NULL)
+    {
+	scx_unload_pkcs11_module(pkcs11_module);
+	pkcs11_module = NULL;
+    }
+
+    scx_initialized = FALSE;
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("pkcs11 module finalized and unloaded")
+    )
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * does a filename contain the token %smartcard?
+ */
+bool
+scx_on_smartcard(const char *filename)
+{
+    return strncmp(filename, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) == 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+/*
+ * find a specific object on the smartcard 
+ */
+static bool
+scx_pkcs11_find_object(	CK_SESSION_HANDLE session, 
+			CK_OBJECT_HANDLE_PTR object, 
+			CK_OBJECT_CLASS class, 
+			const char* id)
+{
+    size_t len;
+    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_ULONG obj_count = 0;
+    CK_ULONG attr_count = 1;
+
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+	{ CKA_CLASS, &class, sizeof(class) },
+	{ CKA_ID, &buf, 0L }
+    };
+
+    if (id != NULL)
+    {
+	ttodata(id, strlen(id), 16, buf, BUF_LEN, &len);
+	attr[1].ulValueLen = len;
+	attr_count = 2;
+    }
+
+    /* get info for certificate with id */
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, attr_count);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_FindObjectsInit: %s"
+	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjects(session, object, 1,  &obj_count);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_FindObjects: %s"
+	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_FindObjectsFinal: %s"
+	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return (obj_count != 0);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check if a given certificate object id is found in a slot
+ */
+static bool
+scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(smartcard_t *sc, CK_SLOT_ID slot)
+{
+    CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+    CK_SLOT_INFO info;
+
+    CK_RV rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotInfo(slot, &info);
+
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_GetSlotInfo: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	 return FALSE;
+    }
+	
+    if (!(info.flags & CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
+    {
+	plog("no token present in slot %lu", slot);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_OpenSession(slot
+		, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL_PTR, NULL_PTR, &session);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("failed to open a session on slot %lu: %s"
+	    , slot, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE,
+	DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld for searching slot %lu", session, slot)
+    )
+
+    /* check if there is a certificate on the card in the specified slot */
+    if (scx_pkcs11_find_object(session, &object, CKO_CERTIFICATE, sc->id))
+    {
+	sc->slot = slot;
+	sc->any_slot = FALSE;
+	sc->session = session;
+	sc->session_opened = TRUE;
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+	
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(session);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Connect to the smart card in the reader and select the correct slot
+ */
+bool
+scx_establish_context(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    bool id_found = FALSE;
+
+    if (!scx_initialized)
+    {
+	plog("pkcs11 module not initialized");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (sc->session_opened)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld already open", sc->session)
+	)
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (!sc->any_slot)
+	id_found = scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(sc, sc->slot);
+
+    if (!id_found)
+    {
+	CK_RV rv;
+	CK_SLOT_ID slot;
+	CK_SLOT_ID_PTR slots = NULL_PTR;
+	CK_ULONG slot_count = 0;
+	CK_ULONG i;
+
+	/* read size, always returns CKR_OK ! */
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, NULL_PTR, &slot_count);
+
+	/* allocate memory for the slots */
+	slots = (CK_SLOT_ID *)alloc_bytes(slot_count * sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID), "slots");
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetSlotList(FALSE, slots, &slot_count);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_GetSlotList: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    pfreeany(slots);
+	    return FALSE;
+        }
+
+        /* look in every slot for a certificate with a given object ID */
+	for (i = 0; i < slot_count; i++)
+	{
+	    slot = slots[i];
+	    id_found = scx_find_cert_id_in_slot(sc, slot);
+	    if (id_found)
+	        break;
+        }
+	pfreeany(slots)
+    }
+
+    if (id_found)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("found token with id %s in slot %lu", sc->id, sc->slot);
+	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld opened", sc->session)
+	)
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("  no certificate with id %s found on smartcard", sc->id);
+    }
+    return id_found;
+#else
+    plog("warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+    return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * log in to a session
+ */
+bool
+scx_login(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+
+    if (sc->logged_in)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login already done", sc->session)
+	)
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+	
+    if (sc->pin.ptr == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("unable to log in without PIN!");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!sc->session_opened)
+    {
+	plog("session not opened");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Login(sc->session, CKU_USER 
+				, (CK_UTF8CHAR *) sc->pin.ptr, sc->pin.len);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
+    {
+	plog("unable to login: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login successful", sc->session)
+    )
+    sc->logged_in = TRUE;
+    return TRUE;
+#else
+   return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+/*
+ * logout from a session
+ */
+static void
+scx_logout(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+    CK_RV rv;
+    
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Logout(sc->session);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	plog("error in C_Logout: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+    else
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld logout", sc->session)
+	)
+    sc->logged_in = FALSE;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+/*
+ * Release context and disconnect from card
+ */
+void
+scx_release_context(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+
+    if (!scx_initialized)
+	return;
+
+    if (sc->session_opened)
+    {
+	if (sc->logged_in)
+	    scx_logout(sc);
+
+	sc->session_opened = FALSE;
+	
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_CloseSession(sc->session);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	    plog("error in C_CloseSession: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	else
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld closed", sc->session)
+	    )
+    }
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * Load host certificate from smartcard
+ */
+bool
+scx_load_cert(const char *filename, smartcard_t **scp, cert_t *cert
+, bool *cached)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD	/* compile with smartcard support */
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+
+    const char *number_slot_id = filename + strlen(SCX_TOKEN);
+
+    smartcard_t *sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(number_slot_id));
+
+    /* return the smartcard object */
+    *scp = sc;
+
+    /* is there a cached smartcard certificate? */
+    *cached = sc->last_cert.type != CERT_NONE
+	      && (time(NULL) - sc->last_load) < SCX_CERT_CACHE_INTERVAL;
+
+    if (*cached)
+    {
+	*cert = sc->last_cert;
+	plog("  using cached cert from smartcard #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
+		, sc->number
+		, scx_print_slot(sc, "")
+		, sc->id
+		, sc->label);
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* find the certificate object */
+    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_CERTIFICATE, sc->id))
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* retrieve the certificate object */
+    if (!scx_find_cert_object(sc->session, object, sc, cert))
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+
+    plog("  loaded cert from smartcard #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
+	, sc->number
+	, scx_print_slot(sc, "")
+	, sc->id
+	, sc->label);
+
+    return TRUE;
+#else
+    plog("  warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+    return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * parse slot number and key id
+ * the following syntax is allowed
+ *               number   slot   id
+ * %smartcard      1       -     -
+ * %smartcard#2    2       -     -
+ * %smartcard0     -       0     -
+ * %smartcard:45   -       -     45
+ * %smartcard0:45  -       0     45
+ */
+smartcard_t*
+scx_parse_number_slot_id(const char *number_slot_id)
+{
+    int len = strlen(number_slot_id);
+    smartcard_t *sc = alloc_thing(smartcard_t, "smartcard");
+
+    /* assign default values */
+    *sc = empty_sc;
+
+    if (len == 0)			/* default: use certificate #1 */
+    {
+	sc->number = 1;	
+    }
+    else if (*number_slot_id == '#')	/* #number scheme */
+    {
+	err_t ugh;
+	unsigned long ul;
+
+	ugh = atoul(number_slot_id+1, len-1 , 10, &ul);
+	if (ugh == NULL)
+	    sc->number = (int)ul;
+	else
+	    plog("error parsing smartcard number: %s", ugh);
+    }
+    else				/* slot:id scheme */
+    {
+	int slot_len = len;
+	char *p = strchr(number_slot_id, ':');
+
+	if (p != NULL)
+	{
+	    int id_len = len - (p + 1 - number_slot_id);
+	    slot_len -= (1 + id_len);
+
+	    if (id_len > 0)		/* we have an id */
+		sc->id = p + 1;
+	}
+	if (slot_len > 0)		/* we have a slot */
+	{
+	    err_t ugh = NULL;
+	    unsigned long ul;
+
+	    ugh = atoul(number_slot_id, slot_len, 10, &ul);
+	    if (ugh == NULL)
+	    {
+		sc->slot = ul;
+                sc->any_slot = FALSE;
+	    }
+	    else
+		plog("error parsing smartcard slot number: %s", ugh);
+	}
+    }
+    /* unshare the id string */
+    sc->id = clone_str(sc->id, "key id");
+    return sc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify pin on card
+ */
+bool
+scx_verify_pin(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+    
+    if (!sc->pinpad)
+	sc->valid = FALSE;
+
+    if (sc->pin.ptr == NULL)
+    {
+	plog("unable to verify without PIN");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* establish context */
+    if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Login(sc->session, CKU_USER,
+			      (CK_UTF8CHAR *) sc->pin.ptr, sc->pin.len);
+    if (rv == CKR_OK || rv == CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN)
+    {
+	sc->valid = TRUE;
+	sc->logged_in = TRUE;
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log((rv == CKR_OK)
+		? "PIN code correct"
+		: "already logged in, no PIN entry required");
+	    DBG_log("pkcs11 session #%ld login successful", sc->session)
+        )
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	    DBG_log("PIN code incorrect")
+        )
+    }
+    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+#else
+    sc->valid = FALSE;
+#endif
+    return sc->valid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Sign hash on smartcard
+ */
+bool
+scx_sign_hash(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
+, u_char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+    CK_ULONG siglen = (CK_ULONG)outlen;
+    CK_BBOOL sign_flag, decrypt_flag;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+	{ CKA_SIGN,    &sign_flag,    sizeof(sign_flag) },
+	{ CKA_DECRYPT, &decrypt_flag, sizeof(decrypt_flag) }
+    };
+
+    if (!sc->logged_in)
+    	return FALSE;
+
+    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
+    {
+	plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 2);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("couldn't read the private key attributes: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("RSA key flags: sign = %s, decrypt = %s"
+	    , (sign_flag)?    "true":"false"
+	    , (decrypt_flag)? "true":"false")
+    )
+
+    if (sign_flag)
+    {
+	CK_MECHANISM mech  = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_SignInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_SignInit: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Sign(sc->session, (CK_BYTE_PTR)in, inlen
+		, out, &siglen);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_Sign: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    return FALSE;
+    	}
+    }
+    else if (decrypt_flag)
+    {
+	CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_X_509, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+	size_t padlen;
+	u_char *p = out ;
+
+	/* PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting */
+	*p++ = 0x00;
+	*p++ = 0x01;	/* BT (block type) 01 */
+	padlen = outlen - 3 - inlen;
+	memset(p, 0xFF, padlen);
+	p += padlen;
+	*p++ = 0x00;
+	memcpy(p, in, inlen);
+
+	rv = pkcs11_functions->C_DecryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_DecryptInit: %s"
+	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    return FALSE;
+        }
+
+        rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Decrypt(sc->session, out, outlen
+		, out, &siglen);
+	if (rv != CKR_OK)
+        {
+	    plog("error in C_Decrypt: %s"
+	        , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    return FALSE;
+        }
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	plog("private key has neither sign nor decrypt flag set");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (siglen > (CK_ULONG)outlen)
+    {
+	plog("signature length (%lu) larger than allocated buffer (%d)"
+	    , siglen, (int)outlen);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+#else
+    return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* 
+ * encrypt data block with an RSA public key
+ */
+bool
+scx_encrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
+, u_char *out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+    CK_ULONG len = (CK_ULONG)(*outlen);
+    CK_BBOOL encrypt_flag;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+	{ CKA_MODULUS,         NULL_PTR, 0L },
+	{ CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, NULL_PTR, 0L },
+	{ CKA_ENCRYPT,         &encrypt_flag, sizeof(encrypt_flag) }
+    };
+    CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+
+    if (!scx_establish_context(sc))
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PUBLIC_KEY, sc->id))
+    {
+	plog("unable to find public key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 3);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("couldn't read the public key attributes: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!encrypt_flag)
+    {
+	plog("public key cannot be used for encryption");
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+	
+    /* there must be enough space left for the PKCS#1 v1.5 padding */
+    if (inlen > attr[0].ulValueLen - 11)
+    {
+	plog("smartcard input data length (%d) exceeds maximum of %lu bytes"
+		, (int)inlen, attr[0].ulValueLen - 11);
+	if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_EncryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	if (rv == CKR_FUNCTION_NOT_SUPPORTED)
+	{
+	    RSA_public_key_t rsa;
+	    chunk_t plain_text = {in, inlen};
+	    chunk_t cipher_text; 
+
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("doing RSA encryption in software")
+	    )
+	    attr[0].pValue = alloc_bytes(attr[0].ulValueLen, "modulus");
+	    attr[1].pValue = alloc_bytes(attr[1].ulValueLen, "exponent");
+
+	    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 2);
+	    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+	    {
+		plog("couldn't read modulus and public exponent: %s"
+		    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+		pfree(attr[0].pValue);
+		pfree(attr[1].pValue);
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    rsa.k = attr[0].ulValueLen;
+	    n_to_mpz(&rsa.n, attr[0].pValue, attr[0].ulValueLen);
+	    n_to_mpz(&rsa.e, attr[1].pValue, attr[1].ulValueLen);
+	    pfree(attr[0].pValue);
+	    pfree(attr[1].pValue);
+
+	    cipher_text = RSA_encrypt(&rsa, plain_text);
+	    free_RSA_public_content(&rsa);
+	    if (cipher_text.ptr == NULL)
+	    {
+		plog("smartcard input data length is too large");
+		if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+		    scx_release_context(sc);
+	        return FALSE;
+	    }
+
+	    memcpy(out, cipher_text.ptr, cipher_text.len);
+	    *outlen = cipher_text.len;
+	    freeanychunk(cipher_text);
+	    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+		scx_release_context(sc);
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("error in C_EncryptInit: %s"
+		, enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	    scx_release_context(sc);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("doing RSA encryption on smartcard")
+    )
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Encrypt(sc->session, in, inlen
+		, out, &len);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_Encrypt: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+
+    *outlen = (size_t)len;
+    return TRUE;
+#else
+    return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+/* 
+ * decrypt a data block with an RSA private key
+ */
+bool
+scx_decrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
+, u_char *out, size_t *outlen)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+    CK_ULONG len = (CK_ULONG)(*outlen);
+    CK_BBOOL decrypt_flag;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {
+	{ CKA_DECRYPT, &decrypt_flag, sizeof(decrypt_flag) }
+    };
+    CK_MECHANISM mech = { CKM_RSA_PKCS, NULL_PTR, 0 };
+
+    if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc))
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
+    {
+	plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object, attr, 1);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("couldn't read the private key attributes: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!decrypt_flag)
+    {
+	plog("private key cannot be used for decryption");
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+	
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_log("doing RSA decryption on smartcard")
+    )
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_DecryptInit(sc->session, &mech, object);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_DecryptInit: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_Decrypt(sc->session, in, inlen
+		, out, &len);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("error in C_Decrypt: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    if (!pkcs11_keep_state)
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+
+    *outlen = (size_t)len;
+    return TRUE;
+#else
+    return FALSE;
+#endif
+}
+
+/* receive an encrypted data block via whack,
+ * decrypt it using a private RSA key and
+ * return the decrypted data block via whack
+ */
+bool
+scx_op_via_whack(const char* msg, int inbase, int outbase, sc_op_t op
+, const char* keyid, int whackfd)
+{
+    char inbuf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS];
+    char outbuf[2*RSA_MAX_OCTETS + 1];
+    size_t outlen = sizeof(inbuf);
+    size_t inlen;
+    smartcard_t *sc,*sc_new;
+
+    const char *number_slot_id = "";
+
+    err_t ugh = ttodata(msg, 0, inbase, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), &inlen);
+
+    /* no prefix - use default base */
+    if (ugh != NULL  && inbase == 0)
+       ugh = ttodata(msg, 0, DEFAULT_BASE, inbuf, sizeof(inbuf), &inlen);
+
+    if (ugh != NULL)
+    {
+	plog("format error in smartcard input data: %s", ugh);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (keyid != NULL)
+    {
+	number_slot_id = (strncmp(keyid, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) == 0)
+			 ? keyid + strlen(SCX_TOKEN) : keyid;
+    }
+
+    sc_new = scx_parse_number_slot_id(number_slot_id);
+    sc = scx_add(sc_new);
+    if (sc == sc_new)
+	scx_share(sc);
+
+    DBG((op == SC_OP_ENCRYPT)? DBG_PRIVATE:DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump("smartcard input data:\n", inbuf, inlen)
+    )
+
+    if (op == SC_OP_DECRYPT)
+    {
+	if (!sc->valid && whackfd != NULL_FD)
+	    scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd);
+
+	if (!sc->valid)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_NOVALIDPIN, "cannot decrypt without valid PIN");
+	    return FALSE;
+        }
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+	DBG_log("using RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)"
+	    , (int)sc->slot, sc->id)
+    )
+
+    switch (op)
+    {
+    case SC_OP_ENCRYPT:
+	if (!scx_encrypt(sc, inbuf, inlen, inbuf, &outlen))
+	    return FALSE;
+	break;
+    case SC_OP_DECRYPT:
+	if (!scx_decrypt(sc, inbuf, inlen, inbuf, &outlen))
+	    return FALSE;
+	break;
+    default:
+	break;
+    }
+
+    DBG((op == SC_OP_DECRYPT)? DBG_PRIVATE:DBG_RAW,
+	DBG_dump("smartcard output data:\n", inbuf, outlen)
+    )
+
+    if (outbase == 0)  /* use default base */ 
+	outbase = DEFAULT_BASE;
+
+    if (outbase == 256) /* ascii plain text */
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%.*s", (int)outlen, inbuf);
+    else
+    {
+	outlen = datatot(inbuf, outlen, outbase, outbuf, sizeof(outbuf));
+	if (outlen == 0)
+	{
+	    plog("error in output format conversion");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s", outbuf);
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+ /*
+ * get length of RSA key in bytes
+ */
+size_t
+scx_get_keylength(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    CK_RV rv;
+    CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
+    CK_ATTRIBUTE attr[] = {{ CKA_MODULUS, NULL_PTR, 0}};
+
+    if (!sc->logged_in)
+    	return FALSE;
+
+    if (!scx_pkcs11_find_object(sc->session, &object, CKO_PRIVATE_KEY, sc->id))
+    {
+	plog("unable to find private key with id '%s'", sc->id);
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* get the length of the private key */
+    rv = pkcs11_functions->C_GetAttributeValue(sc->session, object
+		, (CK_ATTRIBUTE_PTR)&attr, 1);
+    if (rv != CKR_OK)
+    {
+	plog("failed to get key length: %s"
+	    , enum_show(&pkcs11_return_names, rv));
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    return attr[0].ulValueLen;	/*Return key length in bytes */
+#else
+    return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * prompt for pin and verify it
+ */
+bool
+scx_get_pin(smartcard_t *sc, int whackfd)
+{
+#ifdef SMARTCARD
+    char pin[BUF_LEN];
+    int i, n;
+
+    whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need PIN for #%d (%s, id: %s, label: '%s')"
+	, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id, sc->label);
+
+    for (i = 0; i < SCX_MAX_PIN_TRIALS; i++)
+    {
+	if (i > 0)
+	    whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid PIN, please try again");
+
+	n = read(whackfd, pin, BUF_LEN);
+
+	if (n == -1)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "read(whackfd) failed");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	if (strlen(pin) == 0)
+	{
+	    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no PIN entered, aborted");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	sc->pin.ptr = pin;
+	sc->pin.len = strlen(pin);
+
+	/* verify the pin */
+	if (scx_verify_pin(sc))
+	{
+	    clonetochunk(sc->pin, pin, strlen(pin), "pin");
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	/* wrong pin - we try another round */
+	sc->pin = empty_chunk;
+    }
+
+    if (sc->valid)
+	whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid PIN");
+    else
+	whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid PIN, too many trials");
+#else
+    sc->valid = FALSE;
+    whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!");
+#endif
+    return sc->valid;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * free the pin code
+ */
+void
+scx_free_pin(chunk_t *pin)
+{
+    if (pin->ptr != NULL)
+    {
+	/* clear pin field in memory */
+	memset(pin->ptr, '\0', pin->len);
+	pfree(pin->ptr);
+	*pin = empty_chunk;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * frees a smartcard record
+ */
+void
+scx_free(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+    if (sc != NULL)
+    {
+	scx_release_context(sc);
+	pfreeany(sc->id);
+	pfreeany(sc->label);
+	scx_free_pin(&sc->pin);
+	pfree(sc);
+    }
+}
+
+/*  release of a smartcard record decreases the count by one
+ "  the record is freed when the counter reaches zero
+ */
+void
+scx_release(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+    if (sc != NULL && --sc->count == 0)
+    {
+	smartcard_t **pp = &smartcards;
+	while (*pp != sc)
+	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
+        *pp = sc->next;
+	release_cert(sc->last_cert);
+	scx_free(sc);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  compare two smartcard records by comparing their slots and ids
+ */
+static bool
+scx_same(smartcard_t *a, smartcard_t *b)
+{
+    if  (a->number && b->number)
+    {
+	/* same number */
+	return a->number == b->number;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* same id and/or same slot */
+        return (!a->id || (b->id && streq(a->id, b->id)))
+	    && (a->any_slot || b->any_slot || a->slot == b->slot);
+    }
+}
+
+/*  for each link pointing to the smartcard record
+ "  increase the count by one
+ */
+void
+scx_share(smartcard_t *sc)
+{
+    if (sc != NULL)
+ 	sc->count++;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  adds a smartcard record to the chained list
+ */
+smartcard_t*
+scx_add(smartcard_t *smartcard)
+{
+    smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
+    smartcard_t **psc = &smartcards;
+
+    while (sc != NULL)
+    {
+	if (scx_same(smartcard, sc)) /* already in chain, free smartcard record */
+	{
+	    scx_free(smartcard);
+	    return sc;
+	}
+        psc = &sc->next;
+	sc = sc->next;
+    }
+
+    /* insert new smartcard record at the end of the chain */
+    *psc = smartcard;
+    smartcard->number = ++sc_number;
+    smartcard->count = 1;
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  smartcard #%d added", sc_number)
+    )
+    return smartcard;
+}
+
+/*
+ * get the smartcard that belongs to an X.509 certificate
+ */
+smartcard_t*
+scx_get(x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
+
+    while (sc != NULL)
+    {
+	if (sc->last_cert.u.x509 == cert)
+	    return sc;
+	sc = sc->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * prints either the slot number or 'any slot'
+ */
+char *
+scx_print_slot(smartcard_t *sc, const char *whitespace)
+{
+    char *buf = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+
+    if (sc->any_slot)
+	snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot");
+    else
+	snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %s%lu", whitespace, sc->slot);
+    return buf;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all smartcard info records in a chained list
+ */
+void
+scx_list(bool utc)
+{
+    smartcard_t *sc = smartcards;
+
+    if (sc != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Smartcard Objects:");
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+    }
+
+    while (sc != NULL)
+    {
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, #%d, count: %d"
+	    , timetoa(&sc->last_load, utc)
+	    , sc->number
+	    , sc->count);
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       %s, session %s, logged %s, has %s"
+	    , scx_print_slot(sc, "    ")
+	    , sc->session_opened? "opened" : "closed"
+	    , sc->logged_in? "in" : "out"
+	    , sc->pinpad? "pin pad" 
+		: ((sc->pin.ptr == NULL)? "no pin"
+		    : sc->valid? "valid pin" : "invalid pin"));
+	if (sc->id != NULL)
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       id:       %s", sc->id);
+	if (sc->label != NULL)
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       label:   '%s'", sc->label);
+	if (sc->last_cert.type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE)
+	{
+	    char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, sc->last_cert.u.x509->subject);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subject: '%s'", buf);
+	}
+	sc = sc->next;
+    }
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/smartcard.h b/src/pluto/smartcard.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..c004ca7dd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/smartcard.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/* Support of smartcards and cryptotokens
+ * Copyright (C) 2003 Christoph Gysin, Simon Zwahlen
+ * Copyright (C) 2004 David Buechi, Michael Meier
+ * Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: smartcard.h,v 1.14 2005/11/06 22:55:41 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SMARTCARD_H
+#define _SMARTCARD_H
+
+#include "certs.h"
+
+#define SCX_TOKEN		  "%smartcard"
+#define SCX_CERT_CACHE_INTERVAL	  60 /* seconds */
+#define SCX_MAX_PIN_TRIALS	  3
+
+/* smartcard operations */
+
+typedef enum {
+    SC_OP_NONE =    0,
+    SC_OP_ENCRYPT = 1,
+    SC_OP_DECRYPT = 2,
+    SC_OP_SIGN =    3,
+} sc_op_t;
+
+/* smartcard record */
+
+typedef struct smartcard smartcard_t;
+
+struct smartcard {
+    smartcard_t  *next;
+    time_t	  last_load;
+    cert_t	  last_cert;
+    int		  count;
+    int		  number;
+    unsigned long slot;
+    char	  *id;
+    char	 *label;
+    chunk_t	  pin;
+    bool	  pinpad;
+    bool	  valid;
+    bool	  session_opened;
+    bool	  logged_in;
+    bool	  any_slot;
+    long	  session;
+};
+
+extern const smartcard_t empty_sc;
+
+/*  keep a PKCS#11 login during the lifetime of pluto
+ *  flag set in plutomain.c and used in ipsec_doi.c and ocsp.c
+ */
+extern bool pkcs11_keep_state;
+
+/* allow other applications access to pluto's PKCS#11 interface
+ * via whack. Could be used e.g. for disk encryption
+ */
+extern bool pkcs11_proxy;
+
+extern smartcard_t* scx_parse_number_slot_id(const char *number_slot_id);
+extern void scx_init(const char *module);
+extern void scx_finalize(void);
+extern bool scx_establish_context(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern bool scx_login(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern bool scx_on_smartcard(const char *filename);
+extern bool scx_load_cert(const char *filename, smartcard_t **scp
+    , cert_t *cert, bool *cached);
+extern bool scx_verify_pin(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern void scx_share(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern bool scx_sign_hash(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
+    , u_char *out, size_t outlen);
+extern bool scx_encrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
+    , u_char *out, size_t *outlen);
+extern bool scx_decrypt(smartcard_t *sc, const u_char *in, size_t inlen
+    , u_char *out, size_t *outlen);
+extern bool scx_op_via_whack(const char* msg, int inbase, int outbase
+    , sc_op_t op, const char *keyid, int whackfd);
+extern bool scx_get_pin(smartcard_t *sc, int whackfd);
+extern size_t scx_get_keylength(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern smartcard_t* scx_add(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern smartcard_t* scx_get(x509cert_t *cert);
+extern void scx_release(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern void scx_release_context(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern void scx_free_pin(chunk_t *pin);
+extern void scx_free(smartcard_t *sc);
+extern void scx_list(bool utc);
+extern char *scx_print_slot(smartcard_t *sc, const char *whitespace);
+
+#endif /* _SMARTCARD_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/spdb.c b/src/pluto/spdb.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..996585135
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/spdb.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2314 @@
+/* Security Policy Data Base (such as it is)
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: spdb.c,v 1.9 2006/04/22 21:59:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "spdb.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+#include "alg_info.h"
+#include "kernel_alg.h"
+#include "ike_alg.h"
+#include "db_ops.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+
+#define AD(x) x, elemsof(x)	/* Array Description */
+#define AD_NULL NULL, 0
+
+/**************** Oakely (main mode) SA database ****************/
+
+/* array of proposals to be conjoined (can only be one for Oakley) */
+
+static struct db_prop oakley_pc[] =
+    { { PROTO_ISAKMP, AD_NULL } };
+
+/* array of proposal conjuncts (can only be one) */
+
+static struct db_prop_conj oakley_props[] = { { AD(oakley_pc) } };
+
+/* the sadb entry */
+struct db_sa oakley_sadb = { AD(oakley_props) };
+
+/**************** IPsec (quick mode) SA database ****************/
+
+/* arrays of attributes for transforms */
+
+static struct db_attr espsha1_attr[] = {
+    { AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 },
+    };
+
+static struct db_attr ah_HMAC_SHA1_attr[] = {
+    { AUTH_ALGORITHM, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1 },
+    };
+
+/* arrays of transforms, each in in preference order */
+
+static struct db_trans espa_trans[] = {
+    { ESP_3DES, AD(espsha1_attr) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_trans esp_trans[] = {
+    { ESP_3DES, AD_NULL },
+    };
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
+static struct db_trans espnull_trans[] = {
+    { ESP_NULL, AD(espsha1_attr) },
+    };
+#endif /* SUPPORT_ESP_NULL */
+
+static struct db_trans ah_trans[] = {
+    { AH_SHA, AD(ah_HMAC_SHA1_attr) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_trans ipcomp_trans[] = {
+    { IPCOMP_DEFLATE, AD_NULL },
+    };
+
+/* arrays of proposals to be conjoined */
+
+static struct db_prop ah_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+    };
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
+static struct db_prop espnull_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espnull_trans) },
+    };
+#endif /* SUPPORT_ESP_NULL */
+
+static struct db_prop esp_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espa_trans) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop ah_esp_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(esp_trans) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop compress_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop ah_compress_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+    };
+
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
+static struct db_prop espnull_compress_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espnull_trans) },
+    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+    };
+#endif /* SUPPORT_ESP_NULL */
+
+static struct db_prop esp_compress_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(espa_trans) },
+    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop ah_esp_compress_pc[] = {
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_AH, AD(ah_trans) },
+    { PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, AD(esp_trans) },
+    { PROTO_IPCOMP, AD(ipcomp_trans) },
+    };
+
+/* arrays of proposal alternatives (each element is a conjunction) */
+
+static struct db_prop_conj ah_props[] = {
+    { AD(ah_pc) },
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
+    { AD(espnull_pc) }
+#endif
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop_conj esp_props[] =
+    { { AD(esp_pc) } };
+
+static struct db_prop_conj ah_esp_props[] =
+    { { AD(ah_esp_pc) } };
+
+static struct db_prop_conj compress_props[] = {
+    { AD(compress_pc) },
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop_conj ah_compress_props[] = {
+    { AD(ah_compress_pc) },
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL
+    { AD(espnull_compress_pc) }
+#endif
+    };
+
+static struct db_prop_conj esp_compress_props[] =
+    { { AD(esp_compress_pc) } };
+
+static struct db_prop_conj ah_esp_compress_props[] =
+    { { AD(ah_esp_compress_pc) } };
+
+/* The IPsec sadb is subscripted by a bitset (subset of policy)
+ * with members from { POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_AUTHENTICATE, POLICY_COMPRESS }
+ * shifted right by POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT.
+ */
+struct db_sa ipsec_sadb[1 << 3] = {
+    { AD_NULL },	/* none */
+    { AD(esp_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT */
+    { AD(ah_props) },	/* POLICY_AUTHENTICATE */
+    { AD(ah_esp_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_AUTHENTICATE */
+    { AD(compress_props) },	/* POLICY_COMPRESS */
+    { AD(esp_compress_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_COMPRESS */
+    { AD(ah_compress_props) },	/* POLICY_AUTHENTICATE+POLICY_COMPRESS */
+    { AD(ah_esp_compress_props) },	/* POLICY_ENCRYPT+POLICY_AUTHENTICATE+POLICY_COMPRESS */
+    };
+
+#undef AD
+#undef AD_NULL
+
+/* output an attribute (within an SA) */
+static bool
+out_attr(int type
+, unsigned long val
+, struct_desc *attr_desc
+, enum_names **attr_val_descs USED_BY_DEBUG
+, pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    struct isakmp_attribute attr;
+
+    if (val >> 16 == 0)
+    {
+	/* short value: use TV form */
+	attr.isaat_af_type = type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV;
+	attr.isaat_lv = val;
+	if (!out_struct(&attr, attr_desc, pbs, NULL))
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* This is a real fudge!  Since we rarely use long attributes
+	 * and since this is the only place where we can cause an
+	 * ISAKMP message length to be other than a multiple of 4 octets,
+	 * we force the length of the value to be a multiple of 4 octets.
+	 * Furthermore, we only handle values up to 4 octets in length.
+	 * Voila: a fixed format!
+	 */
+	pb_stream val_pbs;
+	u_int32_t nval = htonl(val);
+
+	attr.isaat_af_type = type | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV;
+	if (!out_struct(&attr, attr_desc, pbs, &val_pbs)
+	|| !out_raw(&nval, sizeof(nval), &val_pbs, "long attribute value"))
+	    return FALSE;
+	close_output_pbs(&val_pbs);
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+	enum_names *d = attr_val_descs[type];
+
+	if (d != NULL)
+	    DBG_log("    [%lu is %s]"
+		, val, enum_show(d, val)));
+    return TRUE;
+}
+#define return_on(var, val) do { var=val;goto return_out; } while(0);
+/* Output an SA, as described by a db_sa.
+ * This has the side-effect of allocating SPIs for us.
+ */
+bool
+out_sa(pb_stream *outs
+, struct db_sa *sadb
+, struct state *st
+, bool oakley_mode
+, u_int8_t np)
+{
+    pb_stream sa_pbs;
+    int pcn;
+    bool ret = FALSE;
+    bool ah_spi_generated = FALSE
+	, esp_spi_generated = FALSE
+	, ipcomp_cpi_generated = FALSE;
+#if !defined NO_KERNEL_ALG || !defined NO_IKE_ALG
+    struct db_context *db_ctx = NULL;
+#endif
+
+    /* SA header out */
+    {
+	struct isakmp_sa sa;
+
+	sa.isasa_np = np;
+	st->st_doi = sa.isasa_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC;	/* all we know */
+	if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, outs, &sa_pbs))
+	    return_on(ret, FALSE);
+    }
+
+    /* within SA: situation out */
+    st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY;
+    if (!out_struct(&st->st_situation, &ipsec_sit_desc, &sa_pbs, NULL))
+	return_on(ret, FALSE);
+
+    /* within SA: Proposal Payloads
+     *
+     * Multiple Proposals with the same number are simultaneous
+     * (conjuncts) and must deal with different protocols (AH or ESP).
+     * Proposals with different numbers are alternatives (disjuncts),
+     * in preference order.
+     * Proposal numbers must be monotonic.
+     * See RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" 4.2
+     */
+
+    for (pcn = 0; pcn != sadb->prop_conj_cnt; pcn++)
+    {
+	struct db_prop_conj *pc = &sadb->prop_conjs[pcn];
+	int pn;
+
+	for (pn = 0; pn != pc->prop_cnt; pn++)
+	{
+	    struct db_prop *p = &pc->props[pn];
+	    pb_stream proposal_pbs;
+	    struct isakmp_proposal proposal;
+	    struct_desc *trans_desc;
+	    struct_desc *attr_desc;
+	    enum_names **attr_val_descs;
+	    int tn;
+	    bool tunnel_mode;
+
+	    tunnel_mode = (pn == pc->prop_cnt-1)
+		&& (st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL);
+
+	    /* Proposal header */
+	    proposal.isap_np = pcn == sadb->prop_conj_cnt-1 && pn == pc->prop_cnt-1
+		? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_P;
+	    proposal.isap_proposal = pcn;
+	    proposal.isap_protoid = p->protoid;
+	    proposal.isap_spisize = oakley_mode ? 0
+		: p->protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP ? IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+		: IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE;
+
+	    /* In quick mode ONLY, create proposal for runtime kernel algos.
+	     *  Replace ESP proposals with runtime created one
+	     */
+	    if (!oakley_mode && p->protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_ESP)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		    if (st->st_connection->alg_info_esp)
+		    {
+			static char buf[256]="";
+
+			alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof (buf),
+				(struct alg_info *)st->st_connection->alg_info_esp);
+			DBG_log(buf);
+		    }
+		)
+		db_ctx = kernel_alg_db_new(st->st_connection->alg_info_esp, st->st_policy);
+		p = db_prop_get(db_ctx);
+
+		if (!p || p->trans_cnt == 0)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+			"empty IPSEC SA proposal to send "
+			"(no kernel algorithms for esp selection)");
+		    return_on(ret, FALSE);
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    if (oakley_mode && p->protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT,
+		    if (st->st_connection->alg_info_ike)
+		    {
+			static char buf[256]="";
+
+			alg_info_snprint(buf, sizeof (buf),
+				(struct alg_info *)st->st_connection->alg_info_ike);
+			DBG_log(buf);
+		    }
+		)
+		db_ctx = ike_alg_db_new(st->st_connection->alg_info_ike, st->st_policy);
+		p = db_prop_get(db_ctx);
+
+		if (!p || p->trans_cnt == 0)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+			"empty ISAKMP SA proposal to send "
+			"(no algorithms for ike selection?)");
+		    return_on(ret, FALSE);
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    proposal.isap_notrans = p->trans_cnt;
+	    if (!out_struct(&proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, &sa_pbs, &proposal_pbs))
+		return_on(ret, FALSE);
+
+	    /* Per-protocols stuff:
+	     * Set trans_desc.
+	     * Set attr_desc.
+	     * Set attr_val_descs.
+	     * If not oakley_mode, emit SPI.
+	     * We allocate SPIs on demand.
+	     * All ESPs in an SA will share a single SPI.
+	     * All AHs in an SAwill share a single SPI.
+	     * AHs' SPI will be distinct from ESPs'.
+	     * This latter is needed because KLIPS doesn't
+	     * use the protocol when looking up a (dest, protocol, spi).
+	     * ??? If multiple ESPs are composed, how should their SPIs
+	     * be allocated?
+	     */
+	    {
+		ipsec_spi_t *spi_ptr = NULL;
+		int proto = 0;
+		bool *spi_generated = NULL;
+
+		switch (p->protoid)
+		{
+		case PROTO_ISAKMP:
+		    passert(oakley_mode);
+		    trans_desc = &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc;
+		    attr_desc = &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc;
+		    attr_val_descs = oakley_attr_val_descs;
+		    /* no SPI needed */
+		    break;
+		case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+		    passert(!oakley_mode);
+		    trans_desc = &isakmp_ah_transform_desc;
+		    attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+		    attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
+		    spi_ptr = &st->st_ah.our_spi;
+		    spi_generated = &ah_spi_generated;
+		    proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+		    break;
+		case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+		    passert(!oakley_mode);
+		    trans_desc = &isakmp_esp_transform_desc;
+		    attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+		    attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
+		    spi_ptr = &st->st_esp.our_spi;
+		    spi_generated = &esp_spi_generated;
+		    proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+		    break;
+		case PROTO_IPCOMP:
+		    passert(!oakley_mode);
+		    trans_desc = &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc;
+		    attr_desc = &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc;
+		    attr_val_descs = ipsec_attr_val_descs;
+
+		    /* a CPI isn't quite the same as an SPI
+		     * so we use specialized code to emit it.
+		     */
+		    if (!ipcomp_cpi_generated)
+		    {
+			st->st_ipcomp.our_spi = get_my_cpi(
+			    &st->st_connection->spd, tunnel_mode);
+			if (st->st_ipcomp.our_spi == 0)
+			    return_on(ret, FALSE);	/* problem generating CPI */
+
+			ipcomp_cpi_generated = TRUE;
+		    }
+		    /* CPI is stored in network low order end of an
+		     * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
+		     */
+		    if (!out_raw((u_char *)&st->st_ipcomp.our_spi
+		     + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+		    , IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+		    , &proposal_pbs, "CPI"))
+			return_on(ret, FALSE);
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    bad_case(p->protoid);
+		}
+		if (spi_ptr != NULL)
+		{
+		    if (!*spi_generated)
+		    {
+			*spi_ptr = get_ipsec_spi(0
+			    , proto
+			    , &st->st_connection->spd
+			    , tunnel_mode);
+			if (*spi_ptr == 0)
+			    return FALSE;
+			*spi_generated = TRUE;
+		    }
+		    if (!out_raw((u_char *)spi_ptr, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE
+		    , &proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+			return_on(ret, FALSE);
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    /* within proposal: Transform Payloads */
+	    for (tn = 0; tn != p->trans_cnt; tn++)
+	    {
+		struct db_trans *t = &p->trans[tn];
+		pb_stream trans_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_transform trans;
+		int an;
+
+		trans.isat_np = (tn == p->trans_cnt - 1)
+		    ? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_T;
+		trans.isat_transnum = tn;
+		trans.isat_transid = t->transid;
+		if (!out_struct(&trans, trans_desc, &proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs))
+		    return_on(ret, FALSE);
+
+		/* Within tranform: Attributes. */
+
+		/* For Phase 2 / Quick Mode, GROUP_DESCRIPTION is
+		 * automatically generated because it must be the same
+		 * in every transform.  Except IPCOMP.
+		 */
+		if (p->protoid != PROTO_IPCOMP
+		&& st->st_pfs_group != NULL)
+		{
+		    passert(!oakley_mode);
+		    passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group);
+		    out_attr(GROUP_DESCRIPTION, st->st_pfs_group->group
+			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			, &trans_pbs);
+		}
+
+		/* automatically generate duration
+		 * and, for Phase 2 / Quick Mode, encapsulation.
+		 */
+		if (oakley_mode)
+		{
+		    out_attr(OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE, OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS
+			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			, &trans_pbs);
+		    out_attr(OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION
+			, st->st_connection->sa_ike_life_seconds
+			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			, &trans_pbs);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* RFC 2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.5 specifies that
+		     * the default is "unspecified (host-dependent)".
+		     * This makes little sense, so we always specify it.
+		     *
+		     * Unlike other IPSEC transforms, IPCOMP defaults
+		     * to Transport Mode, so we can exploit the default
+		     * (draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1).
+		     */
+		    if (p->protoid != PROTO_IPCOMP
+		    || st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL)
+		    {
+#ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+			if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+			&& !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL))
+			{
+			    /* Inform user that we will not respect policy and only
+			     * propose Tunnel Mode
+			     */
+			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "NAT-Traversal: "
+				"Transport Mode not allowed due to security concerns -- "
+				"using Tunnel mode");
+			}
+#endif
+			out_attr(ENCAPSULATION_MODE
+#ifdef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+			    , NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st, st->st_policy)
+#else
+				/* If NAT-T is detected, use UDP_TUNNEL as long as Transport
+				 * Mode has security concerns.
+				 *
+				 * User has been informed of that
+				 */
+			    , NAT_T_ENCAPSULATION_MODE(st, POLICY_TUNNEL)
+#endif
+			    , attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			    , &trans_pbs);
+		    }
+		    out_attr(SA_LIFE_TYPE, SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS
+			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			, &trans_pbs);
+		    out_attr(SA_LIFE_DURATION
+			, st->st_connection->sa_ipsec_life_seconds
+			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			, &trans_pbs);
+		}
+
+		/* spit out attributes from table */
+		for (an = 0; an != t->attr_cnt; an++)
+		{
+		    struct db_attr *a = &t->attrs[an];
+
+		    out_attr(a->type, a->val
+			, attr_desc, attr_val_descs
+			, &trans_pbs);
+		}
+
+		close_output_pbs(&trans_pbs);
+	    }
+	    close_output_pbs(&proposal_pbs);
+	}
+	/* end of a conjunction of proposals */
+    }
+    close_output_pbs(&sa_pbs);
+    ret = TRUE;
+
+return_out:
+
+#if !defined NO_KERNEL_ALG || !defined NO_IKE_ALG
+    if (db_ctx)
+	    db_destroy(db_ctx);
+#endif
+    return ret;
+}
+
+/* Handle long form of duration attribute.
+ * The code is can only handle values that can fit in unsigned long.
+ * "Clamping" is probably an acceptable way to impose this limitation.
+ */
+static u_int32_t
+decode_long_duration(pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    u_int32_t val = 0;
+
+    /* ignore leading zeros */
+    while (pbs_left(pbs) != 0 && *pbs->cur == '\0')
+	pbs->cur++;
+
+    if (pbs_left(pbs) > sizeof(val))
+    {
+	/* "clamp" too large value to max representable value */
+	val -= 1;	/* portable way to get to maximum value */
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("   too large duration clamped to: %lu"
+	    , (unsigned long)val));
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* decode number */
+	while (pbs_left(pbs) != 0)
+	    val = (val << BITS_PER_BYTE) | *pbs->cur++;
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("   long duration: %lu", (unsigned long)val));
+    }
+    return val;
+}
+
+/* Preparse the body of an ISAKMP SA Payload and
+ * return body of ISAKMP Proposal Payload 
+ *
+ * Only IPsec DOI is accepted (what is the ISAKMP DOI?).
+ * Error response is rudimentary.
+ */
+notification_t
+preparse_isakmp_sa_body(const struct isakmp_sa *sa
+		      , pb_stream *sa_pbs
+		      , u_int32_t *ipsecdoisit
+		      , pb_stream *proposal_pbs
+		      , struct isakmp_proposal *proposal)
+{
+    /* DOI */
+    if (sa->isasa_doi != ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unknown/unsupported DOI %s", enum_show(&doi_names, sa->isasa_doi));
+	/* XXX Could send notification back */
+	return DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+
+    /* Situation */
+    if (!in_struct(ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, sa_pbs, NULL))
+	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+    if (*ipsecdoisit != SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec DOI situation (%s)"
+	    , bitnamesof(sit_bit_names, *ipsecdoisit));
+	/* XXX Could send notification back */
+	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+
+    /* The rules for ISAKMP SAs are scattered.
+     * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5 says that there
+     * can only be one SA, and it can have only one proposal in it.
+     * There may well be multiple transforms.
+     */
+    if (!in_struct(proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, proposal_pbs))
+	return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+
+    if (proposal->isap_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload must be alone in Oakley SA; found %s following Proposal"
+	    , enum_show(&payload_names, proposal->isap_np));
+	return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+
+    if (proposal->isap_protoid != PROTO_ISAKMP)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected Protocol ID (%s) found in Oakley Proposal"
+	    , enum_show(&protocol_names, proposal->isap_protoid));
+	return INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID;
+    }
+
+    /* Just what should we accept for the SPI field?
+     * The RFC is sort of contradictory.  We will ignore the SPI
+     * as long as it is of the proper size.
+     *
+     * From RFC2408 2.4 Identifying Security Associations:
+     *   During phase 1 negotiations, the initiator and responder cookies
+     *   determine the ISAKMP SA. Therefore, the SPI field in the Proposal
+     *   payload is redundant and MAY be set to 0 or it MAY contain the
+     *   transmitting entity's cookie.
+     *
+     * From RFC2408 3.5 Proposal Payload:
+     *    o  SPI Size (1 octet) - Length in octets of the SPI as defined by
+     *       the Protocol-Id.  In the case of ISAKMP, the Initiator and
+     *       Responder cookie pair from the ISAKMP Header is the ISAKMP SPI,
+     *       therefore, the SPI Size is irrelevant and MAY be from zero (0) to
+     *       sixteen (16).  If the SPI Size is non-zero, the content of the
+     *       SPI field MUST be ignored.  If the SPI Size is not a multiple of
+     *       4 octets it will have some impact on the SPI field and the
+     *       alignment of all payloads in the message.  The Domain of
+     *       Interpretation (DOI) will dictate the SPI Size for other
+     *       protocols.
+     */
+    if (proposal->isap_spisize == 0)
+    {
+	/* empty (0) SPI -- fine */
+    }
+    else if (proposal->isap_spisize <= MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE)
+    {
+	u_char junk_spi[MAX_ISAKMP_SPI_SIZE];
+
+	if (!in_raw(junk_spi, proposal->isap_spisize, proposal_pbs, "Oakley SPI"))
+	    return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid SPI size (%u) in Oakley Proposal"
+	    , (unsigned)proposal->isap_spisize);
+	return INVALID_SPI;
+    }
+    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+}
+
+static struct {
+    u_int8_t *start;
+    u_int8_t *cur;
+    u_int8_t *roof;
+} backup;
+
+/*
+ * backup the pointer into a pb_stream
+ */
+void
+backup_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    backup.start = pbs->start;
+    backup.cur   = pbs->cur;
+    backup.roof  = pbs->roof;
+}
+
+/*
+ * restore the pointer into a pb_stream
+ */
+void
+restore_pbs(pb_stream *pbs)
+{
+    pbs->start = backup.start;
+    pbs->cur   = backup.cur;
+    pbs->roof  = backup.roof;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Parse an ISAKMP Proposal Payload for RSA and PSK authentication policies
+ */
+notification_t
+parse_isakmp_policy(pb_stream *proposal_pbs
+		  , u_int notrans
+		  , lset_t *policy)
+{
+    int last_transnum = -1;
+
+    *policy = LEMPTY;
+
+    while (notrans--)
+    {
+	pb_stream trans_pbs;
+	u_char *attr_start;
+	size_t attr_len;
+	struct isakmp_transform trans;
+
+	if (!in_struct(&trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs))
+	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+	if (trans.isat_transnum <= last_transnum)
+	{
+	    /* picky, picky, picky */
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Transform Numbers are not monotonically increasing"
+		" in Oakley Proposal");
+	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	}
+	last_transnum = trans.isat_transnum;
+
+	if (trans.isat_transid != KEY_IKE)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "expected KEY_IKE but found %s in Oakley Transform"
+		, enum_show(&isakmp_transformid_names, trans.isat_transid));
+	    return INVALID_TRANSFORM_ID;
+	}
+
+	attr_start = trans_pbs.cur;
+	attr_len = pbs_left(&trans_pbs);
+
+	/* preprocess authentication attributes only */
+	while (pbs_left(&trans_pbs) != 0)
+	{
+	    struct isakmp_attribute a;
+	    pb_stream attr_pbs;
+
+	    if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc, &trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+	    passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
+
+	    switch (a.isaat_af_type)
+	    {
+	    case OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		switch (a.isaat_lv)
+		{
+		case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+		    *policy |= POLICY_PSK;
+		    break;
+		case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+		    *policy |= POLICY_RSASIG;
+		    break;
+		case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER;
+		    /* fall through */
+		case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_PSK;
+		    break;
+		case XAUTHInitRSA:
+		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER;
+		    /* fall through */
+		case XAUTHRespRSA:
+		    *policy |= POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+		break;
+	    default:
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL|DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("preparse_isakmp_policy: peer requests %s authentication"
+		, prettypolicy(*policy))
+    )
+    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+}
+
+/* 
+ * check that we can find a preshared secret
+ */
+static err_t
+find_preshared_key(struct state* st)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    if (get_preshared_secret(c) == NULL)
+    {
+	char my_id[BUF_LEN], his_id[BUF_LEN];
+
+	idtoa(&c->spd.this.id, my_id, sizeof(my_id));
+	if (his_id_was_instantiated(c))
+	    strcpy(his_id, "%any");
+	else
+	    idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, his_id, sizeof(his_id));
+	ugh = builddiag("Can't authenticate: no preshared key found for `%s' and `%s'"
+			, my_id, his_id);
+    }
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/* Parse the body of an ISAKMP SA Payload (i.e. Phase 1 / Main Mode).
+ * Various shortcuts are taken.  In particular, the policy, such as
+ * it is, is hardwired.
+ *
+ * If r_sa is non-NULL, the body of an SA representing the selected
+ * proposal is emitted.
+ *
+ * This routine is used by main_inI1_outR1() and main_inR1_outI2().
+ */
+notification_t
+parse_isakmp_sa_body(u_int32_t ipsecdoisit
+		   , pb_stream *proposal_pbs
+		   , struct isakmp_proposal *proposal
+		   , pb_stream *r_sa_pbs
+		   , struct state *st
+		   , bool initiator)
+{
+    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    unsigned no_trans_left;
+
+    /* for each transform payload... */
+    no_trans_left = proposal->isap_notrans;
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	pb_stream trans_pbs;
+	u_char *attr_start;
+	size_t attr_len;
+	struct isakmp_transform trans;
+	lset_t seen_attrs = 0;
+	lset_t seen_durations = 0;
+	u_int16_t life_type = 0;
+	struct oakley_trans_attrs ta;
+	err_t ugh = NULL;	/* set to diagnostic when problem detected */
+
+	/* initialize only optional field in ta */
+	ta.life_seconds = OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_DEFAULT;	/* When this SA expires (seconds) */
+
+	if (no_trans_left == 0)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "number of Transform Payloads disagrees with Oakley Proposal Payload");
+	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	}
+
+	in_struct(&trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, proposal_pbs, &trans_pbs);
+	attr_start = trans_pbs.cur;
+	attr_len = pbs_left(&trans_pbs);
+
+	/* process all the attributes that make up the transform */
+
+	while (pbs_left(&trans_pbs) != 0)
+	{
+	    struct isakmp_attribute a;
+	    pb_stream attr_pbs;
+	    u_int32_t val;	/* room for larger values */
+
+	    if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_oakley_attribute_desc, &trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+	    passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
+
+	    if (LHAS(seen_attrs, a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK))
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "repeated %s attribute in Oakley Transform %u"
+		    , enum_show(&oakley_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type)
+		    , trans.isat_transnum);
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	    }
+
+	    seen_attrs |= LELEM(a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK);
+
+	    val = a.isaat_lv;
+
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    {
+		enum_names *vdesc = oakley_attr_val_descs
+		    [a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+
+		if (vdesc != NULL)
+		{
+		    const char *nm = enum_name(vdesc, val);
+
+		    if (nm != NULL)
+			DBG_log("   [%u is %s]", (unsigned)val, nm);
+		}
+	    });
+
+	    switch (a.isaat_af_type)
+	    {
+	    case OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		if (ike_alg_enc_present(val))
+		{
+		    ta.encrypt = val;
+		    ta.encrypter = ike_alg_get_encrypter(val);
+		    ta.enckeylen = ta.encrypter->keydeflen;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
+			    , enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, val));
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		if (ike_alg_hash_present(val))
+		{
+		    ta.hash = val;
+		    ta.hasher = ike_alg_get_hasher(val);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    ugh = builddiag("%s is not supported"
+			    , enum_show(&oakley_hash_names, val));
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		{
+		    /* check that authentication method is acceptable */
+		    lset_t iap = st->st_policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK;
+
+		    /* is the initiator the XAUTH client? */
+		    bool xauth_init = initiator && (st->st_policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) == LEMPTY
+				  || !initiator && (st->st_policy & POLICY_XAUTH_SERVER) != LEMPTY;
+
+		    switch (val)
+		    {
+		    case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY:
+			if ((iap & POLICY_PSK) == LEMPTY)
+			{
+			    ugh = "policy does not allow OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY authentication";
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
+			    ta.auth = OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY;
+			}
+			break;
+		    case XAUTHInitPreShared:
+			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK) == LEMPTY || !xauth_init)
+			{
+			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHInitPreShared authentication";
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
+			    ta.auth = XAUTHInitPreShared;
+			}
+			break;
+		    case XAUTHRespPreShared:
+			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_PSK) == LEMPTY || xauth_init)
+			{
+			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHRespPreShared authentication";
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    ugh = find_preshared_key(st);
+			    ta.auth = XAUTHRespPreShared;
+			}
+			break;
+		    case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG:
+			/* Accept if policy specifies RSASIG or is default */
+			if ((iap & POLICY_RSASIG) == LEMPTY)
+			{
+			    ugh = "policy does not allow OAKLEY_RSA_SIG authentication";
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    ta.auth = OAKLEY_RSA_SIG;
+			}
+			break;
+		    case XAUTHInitRSA:
+			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG) == LEMPTY || !xauth_init)
+			{
+			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHInitRSA authentication";
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    ta.auth = XAUTHInitRSA;
+			}
+			break;
+		    case XAUTHRespRSA:
+			if ((iap & POLICY_XAUTH_RSASIG) == LEMPTY || xauth_init)
+			{
+			    ugh = "policy does not allow XAUTHRespRSA authentication";
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    ta.auth = XAUTHRespRSA;
+			}
+			break;
+		    default:
+			ugh = builddiag("Pluto does not support %s authentication"
+			    , enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, val));
+			break;
+		    }
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		ta.group = lookup_group(val);
+		if (ta.group == NULL)
+		{
+		    ugh = "only OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 and OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536 supported";
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		switch (val)
+		{
+		case OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS:
+		case OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES:
+		    if (LHAS(seen_durations, val))
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "attribute OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE value %s repeated"
+				, enum_show(&oakley_lifetime_names, val));
+			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		    }
+		    seen_durations |= LELEM(val);
+		    life_type = val;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    ugh = builddiag("unknown value %s"
+			    , enum_show(&oakley_lifetime_names, val));
+		    break;
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+		val = decode_long_duration(&attr_pbs);
+		/* fall through */
+	    case OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE))
+		{
+		    ugh = "OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION attribute not preceded by OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE attribute";
+		    break;
+		}
+		seen_attrs &= ~(LELEM(OAKLEY_LIFE_DURATION) | LELEM(OAKLEY_LIFE_TYPE));
+
+		switch (life_type)
+		{
+		case OAKLEY_LIFE_SECONDS:
+		    if (val > OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM)
+		    {
+#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS
+			plog("peer requested %lu seconds"
+					" which exceeds our limit %d seconds"
+					, (long) val
+					, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
+			plog("lifetime reduced to %d seconds "
+                             		"(todo: IPSEC_RESPONDER_LIFETIME notification)"
+					, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
+			val = OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM;
+#else
+			ugh = builddiag("peer requested %lu seconds"
+					" which exceeds our limit %d seconds"
+					, (long) val
+					, OAKLEY_ISAKMP_SA_LIFETIME_MAXIMUM);
+#endif
+		    }	
+		    ta.life_seconds = val;
+		    break;
+		case OAKLEY_LIFE_KILOBYTES:
+		    ta.life_kilobytes = val;
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    bad_case(life_type);
+		}
+		break;
+
+	    case OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		if ((seen_attrs & LELEM(OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM)) == 0)
+		{
+		    ugh = "OAKLEY_KEY_LENGTH attribute not preceded by "
+			  "OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM attribute";
+		    break;
+		}
+		if (ta.encrypter == NULL)
+		{
+		    ugh = "NULL encrypter with seen OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM";
+		    break;
+		}
+		/*
+		 * check if this keylen is compatible with specified algorithm
+		 */
+		if (val
+		&& (val < ta.encrypter->keyminlen || val > ta.encrypter->keymaxlen))
+		{
+		    ugh = "peer proposed key length not valid for "
+			  "encryption algorithm specified";
+		}
+		ta.enckeylen = val;
+		break;
+#if 0 /* not yet supported */
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_PRF | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_FIELD_SIZE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_PRIME | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_ONE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_GENERATOR_TWO | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_A | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_CURVE_B | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+	    case OAKLEY_GROUP_ORDER | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+#endif
+	    default:
+		ugh = "unsupported OAKLEY attribute";
+		break;
+	    }
+
+	    if (ugh != NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s.  Attribute %s"
+		    , ugh, enum_show(&oakley_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * ML: at last check for allowed transforms in alg_info_ike
+	 *     (ALG_INFO_F_STRICT flag)
+	 */
+	if (ugh == NULL)
+	{
+	    if (!ike_alg_ok_final(ta.encrypt, ta.enckeylen, ta.hash,
+		ta.group ? ta.group->group : -1, c->alg_info_ike))
+	    {
+		ugh = "OAKLEY proposal refused";
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (ugh == NULL)
+	{
+	    /* a little more checking is in order */
+	    {
+		lset_t missing
+		    = ~seen_attrs
+		    & (LELEM(OAKLEY_ENCRYPTION_ALGORITHM)
+		      | LELEM(OAKLEY_HASH_ALGORITHM)
+		      | LELEM(OAKLEY_AUTHENTICATION_METHOD)
+		      | LELEM(OAKLEY_GROUP_DESCRIPTION));
+
+		if (missing)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing mandatory attribute(s) %s in Oakley Transform %u"
+			, bitnamesof(oakley_attr_bit_names, missing)
+			, trans.isat_transnum);
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+	    }
+	    /* We must have liked this transform.
+	     * Lets finish early and leave.
+	     */
+
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CRYPT
+		, DBG_log("Oakley Transform %u accepted", trans.isat_transnum));
+
+	    if (r_sa_pbs != NULL)
+	    {
+		struct isakmp_proposal r_proposal = *proposal;
+		pb_stream r_proposal_pbs;
+		struct isakmp_transform r_trans = trans;
+		pb_stream r_trans_pbs;
+
+		/* Situation */
+		if (!out_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, r_sa_pbs, NULL))
+		    impossible();
+
+		/* Proposal */
+#ifdef EMIT_ISAKMP_SPI
+		r_proposal.isap_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE;
+#else
+		r_proposal.isap_spisize = 0;
+#endif
+		r_proposal.isap_notrans = 1;
+		if (!out_struct(&r_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, r_sa_pbs, &r_proposal_pbs))
+		    impossible();
+
+		/* SPI */
+#ifdef EMIT_ISAKMP_SPI
+		if (!out_raw(my_cookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &r_proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+		    impossible();
+		r_proposal.isap_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE;
+#else
+		/* none (0) */
+#endif
+
+		/* Transform */
+		r_trans.isat_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+		if (!out_struct(&r_trans, &isakmp_isakmp_transform_desc, &r_proposal_pbs, &r_trans_pbs))
+		    impossible();
+
+		if (!out_raw(attr_start, attr_len, &r_trans_pbs, "attributes"))
+		    impossible();
+		close_output_pbs(&r_trans_pbs);
+		close_output_pbs(&r_proposal_pbs);
+		close_output_pbs(r_sa_pbs);
+	    }
+
+	    /* copy over the results */
+	    st->st_oakley = ta;
+	    return NOTHING_WRONG;
+	}
+
+	/* on to next transform */
+	no_trans_left--;
+
+	if (trans.isat_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+	{
+	    if (no_trans_left != 0)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "number of Transform Payloads disagrees with Oakley Proposal Payload");
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	}
+	if (trans.isat_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_T)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected %s payload in Oakley Proposal"
+		, enum_show(&payload_names, proposal->isap_np));
+	    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	}
+    }
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no acceptable Oakley Transform");
+    return NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
+}
+
+/* Parse the body of an IPsec SA Payload (i.e. Phase 2 / Quick Mode).
+ *
+ * The main routine is parse_ipsec_sa_body; other functions defined
+ * between here and there are just helpers.
+ *
+ * Various shortcuts are taken.  In particular, the policy, such as
+ * it is, is hardwired.
+ *
+ * If r_sa is non-NULL, the body of an SA representing the selected
+ * proposal is emitted into it.
+ *
+ * If "selection" is true, the SA is supposed to represent the
+ * single tranform that the peer has accepted.
+ * ??? We only check that it is acceptable, not that it is one that we offered!
+ *
+ * Only IPsec DOI is accepted (what is the ISAKMP DOI?).
+ * Error response is rudimentary.
+ *
+ * Since all ISAKMP groups in all SA Payloads must match, st->st_pfs_group
+ * holds this across multiple payloads.
+ * &unset_group signifies not yet "set"; NULL signifies NONE.
+ *
+ * This routine is used by quick_inI1_outR1() and quick_inR1_outI2().
+ */
+
+static const struct ipsec_trans_attrs null_ipsec_trans_attrs = {
+    0,					/* transid (NULL, for now) */
+    0,					/* spi */
+    SA_LIFE_DURATION_DEFAULT,		/* life_seconds */
+    SA_LIFE_DURATION_K_DEFAULT,		/* life_kilobytes */
+    ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UNSPECIFIED,	/* encapsulation */
+    AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE,		/* auth */
+    0,					/* key_len */
+    0,					/* key_rounds */
+};
+
+static bool
+parse_ipsec_transform(struct isakmp_transform *trans
+, struct ipsec_trans_attrs *attrs
+, pb_stream *prop_pbs
+, pb_stream *trans_pbs
+, struct_desc *trans_desc
+, int previous_transnum	/* or -1 if none */
+, bool selection
+, bool is_last
+, bool is_ipcomp
+, struct state *st)	/* current state object */
+{
+    lset_t seen_attrs = 0;
+    lset_t seen_durations = 0;
+    u_int16_t life_type = 0;
+    const struct oakley_group_desc *pfs_group = NULL;
+
+    if (!in_struct(trans, trans_desc, prop_pbs, trans_pbs))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if (trans->isat_transnum <= previous_transnum)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Transform Numbers in Proposal are not monotonically increasing");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    switch (trans->isat_np)
+    {
+	case ISAKMP_NEXT_T:
+	    if (is_last)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload has more Transforms than specified");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE:
+	    if (!is_last)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Proposal Payload has fewer Transforms than specified");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "expecting Transform Payload, but found %s in Proposal"
+		, enum_show(&payload_names, trans->isat_np));
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    *attrs = null_ipsec_trans_attrs;
+    attrs->transid = trans->isat_transid;
+
+    while (pbs_left(trans_pbs) != 0)
+    {
+	struct isakmp_attribute a;
+	pb_stream attr_pbs;
+	enum_names *vdesc;
+	u_int32_t val;	/* room for larger value */
+	bool ipcomp_inappropriate = is_ipcomp;	/* will get reset if OK */
+
+	if (!in_struct(&a, &isakmp_ipsec_attribute_desc, trans_pbs, &attr_pbs))
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	passert((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK) < 32);
+
+	if (LHAS(seen_attrs, a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "repeated %s attribute in IPsec Transform %u"
+		, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type)
+		, trans->isat_transnum);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	seen_attrs |= LELEM(a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK);
+
+	val = a.isaat_lv;
+
+	vdesc  = ipsec_attr_val_descs[a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_RTYPE_MASK];
+	if (vdesc != NULL)
+	{
+	    if (enum_name(vdesc, val) == NULL)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid value %u for attribute %s in IPsec Transform"
+		    , (unsigned)val, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING
+		, if ((a.isaat_af_type & ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_MASK) == ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV)
+		    DBG_log("   [%u is %s]"
+			, (unsigned)val, enum_show(vdesc, val)));
+	}
+
+	switch (a.isaat_af_type)
+	{
+	    case SA_LIFE_TYPE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+		if (LHAS(seen_durations, val))
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "attribute SA_LIFE_TYPE value %s repeated in message"
+			, enum_show(&sa_lifetime_names, val));
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+		seen_durations |= LELEM(val);
+		life_type = val;
+		break;
+	    case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+		val = decode_long_duration(&attr_pbs);
+		/* fall through */
+	    case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+		if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, SA_LIFE_DURATION))
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SA_LIFE_DURATION IPsec attribute not preceded by SA_LIFE_TYPE attribute");
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+		seen_attrs &= ~(LELEM(SA_LIFE_DURATION) | LELEM(SA_LIFE_TYPE));
+
+		switch (life_type)
+		{
+		    case SA_LIFE_TYPE_SECONDS:
+			/* silently limit duration to our maximum */
+			attrs->life_seconds = val <= SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM
+			    ? val : SA_LIFE_DURATION_MAXIMUM;
+			break;
+		    case SA_LIFE_TYPE_KBYTES:
+			attrs->life_kilobytes = val;
+			break;
+		    default:
+			bad_case(life_type);
+		}
+		break;
+	    case GROUP_DESCRIPTION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		if (is_ipcomp)
+		{
+		    /* Accept reluctantly.  Should not happen, according to
+		     * draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1.
+		     */
+		    ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+		    loglog(RC_COMMENT
+			, "IPCA (IPcomp SA) contains GROUP_DESCRIPTION."
+			"  Ignoring inapproprate attribute.");
+		}
+		pfs_group = lookup_group(val);
+		if (pfs_group == NULL)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "only OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1024 and OAKLEY_GROUP_MODP1536 supported for PFS");
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+		break;
+	    case ENCAPSULATION_MODE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		ipcomp_inappropriate = FALSE;
+		switch (val)
+		{
+		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL:
+		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT:
+		    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is not detected"
+			    , enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+			/*
+			 * Accept it anyway because SSH-Sentinel does not
+			 * use UDP_TUNNEL or UDP_TRANSPORT for the diagnostic.
+			 *
+			 * remove when SSH-Sentinel is fixed
+			 */
+#ifdef I_DONT_CARE_OF_SSH_SENTINEL
+			return FALSE;
+#endif
+		    }
+		    attrs->encapsulation = val;
+		    break;
+		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_DRAFTS:
+#ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			, "NAT-Traversal: Transport mode disabled due to security concerns");
+		    return FALSE;
+#endif
+		case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS:
+		    if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "%s must only be used with old IETF drafts"
+			    , enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+			return FALSE;
+		    }
+		    else if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+		    {
+			attrs->encapsulation = val
+				- ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_DRAFTS
+				+ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+		    }
+		    else
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is detected"
+			    , enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+			return FALSE;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		    case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TRANSPORT_RFC:
+#ifndef I_KNOW_TRANSPORT_MODE_HAS_SECURITY_CONCERN_BUT_I_WANT_IT
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "NAT-Traversal: Transport mode disabled due "
+			      "to security concerns");
+			return FALSE;
+#endif
+		    case ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC:
+			if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+			&& (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES))
+			{
+			    attrs->encapsulation = val
+					- ENCAPSULATION_MODE_UDP_TUNNEL_RFC
+					+ ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+			}
+			else if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED)
+			{
+			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "%s must only be used with NAT-T RFC"
+				, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+			    return FALSE;
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+				, "%s must only be used if NAT-Traversal is detected"
+				, enum_name(&enc_mode_names, val));
+			    return FALSE;
+			}
+			break;
+		    default:
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "unknown ENCAPSULATION_MODE %d in IPSec SA", val);
+			return FALSE;
+		}
+		break;
+	    case AUTH_ALGORITHM | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		attrs->auth = val;
+		break;
+	    case KEY_LENGTH | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		attrs->key_len = val;
+		break;
+	    case KEY_ROUNDS | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		attrs->key_rounds = val;
+		break;
+#if 0 /* not yet implemented */
+	    case COMPRESS_DICT_SIZE | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		break;
+	    case COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV:
+		break;
+
+	    case SA_LIFE_DURATION | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+		break;
+	    case COMPRESS_PRIVATE_ALG | ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TLV:
+		break;
+#endif
+	    default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec attribute %s"
+		    , enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	if (ipcomp_inappropriate)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec attribute %s inappropriate for IPCOMP"
+		, enum_show(&ipsec_attr_names, a.isaat_af_type));
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* Although an IPCOMP SA (IPCA) ought not to have a pfs_group,
+     * if it does, demand that it be consistent.
+     * See draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1.
+     */
+    if (!is_ipcomp || pfs_group != NULL)
+    {
+	if (st->st_pfs_group == &unset_group)
+	    st->st_pfs_group = pfs_group;
+
+	if (st->st_pfs_group != pfs_group)
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "GROUP_DESCRIPTION inconsistent with that of %s in IPsec SA"
+		, selection? "the Proposal" : "a previous Transform");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (LHAS(seen_attrs, SA_LIFE_DURATION))
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "SA_LIFE_TYPE IPsec attribute not followed by SA_LIFE_DURATION attribute in message");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    if (!LHAS(seen_attrs, ENCAPSULATION_MODE))
+    {
+	if (is_ipcomp)
+	{
+	    /* draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1:
+	     * "If the Encapsulation Mode is unspecified,
+	     * the default value of Transport Mode is assumed."
+	     * This contradicts/overrides the DOI (quuoted below).
+	     */
+	    attrs->encapsulation = ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /* ??? Technically, RFC 2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.5 specifies that
+	     * the default is "unspecified (host-dependent)".
+	     * This makes little sense, so we demand that it be specified.
+	     */
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Transform must specify ENCAPSULATION_MODE");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* ??? should check for key_len and/or key_rounds if required */
+
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+static void
+echo_proposal(
+    struct isakmp_proposal r_proposal,	/* proposal to emit */
+    struct isakmp_transform r_trans,	/* winning transformation within it */
+    u_int8_t np,			/* Next Payload for proposal */
+    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,		/* SA PBS into which to emit */
+    struct ipsec_proto_info *pi,	/* info about this protocol instance */
+    struct_desc *trans_desc,		/* descriptor for this transformation */
+    pb_stream *trans_pbs,		/* PBS for incoming transform */
+    struct spd_route *sr,		/* host details for the association */
+    bool tunnel_mode)			/* true for inner most tunnel SA */
+{
+    pb_stream r_proposal_pbs;
+    pb_stream r_trans_pbs;
+
+    /* Proposal */
+    r_proposal.isap_np = np;
+    r_proposal.isap_notrans = 1;
+    if (!out_struct(&r_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, r_sa_pbs, &r_proposal_pbs))
+	impossible();
+
+    /* allocate and emit our CPI/SPI */
+    if (r_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP)
+    {
+	/* CPI is stored in network low order end of an
+	 * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
+	 * Note: we may fail to generate a satisfactory CPI,
+	 * but we'll ignore that.
+	 */
+	pi->our_spi = get_my_cpi(sr, tunnel_mode);
+	out_raw((u_char *) &pi->our_spi
+	     + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+	    , IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+	    , &r_proposal_pbs, "CPI");
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	pi->our_spi = get_ipsec_spi(pi->attrs.spi
+	    , r_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_AH ?
+		IPPROTO_AH : IPPROTO_ESP
+	    , sr
+	    , tunnel_mode);
+	/* XXX should check for errors */
+	out_raw((u_char *) &pi->our_spi, IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE
+	    , &r_proposal_pbs, "SPI");
+    }
+
+    /* Transform */
+    r_trans.isat_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE;
+    if (!out_struct(&r_trans, trans_desc, &r_proposal_pbs, &r_trans_pbs))
+	impossible();
+
+    /* Transform Attributes: pure echo */
+    trans_pbs->cur = trans_pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_transform);
+    if (!out_raw(trans_pbs->cur, pbs_left(trans_pbs)
+    , &r_trans_pbs, "attributes"))
+	impossible();
+
+    close_output_pbs(&r_trans_pbs);
+    close_output_pbs(&r_proposal_pbs);
+}
+
+notification_t
+parse_ipsec_sa_body(
+    pb_stream *sa_pbs,		/* body of input SA Payload */
+    const struct isakmp_sa *sa,	/* header of input SA Payload */
+    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,	/* if non-NULL, where to emit body of winning SA */
+    bool selection,		/* if this SA is a selection, only one transform may appear */
+    struct state *st)		/* current state object */
+{
+    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+    u_int32_t ipsecdoisit;
+    pb_stream next_proposal_pbs;
+
+    struct isakmp_proposal next_proposal;
+    ipsec_spi_t next_spi;
+
+    bool next_full = TRUE;
+
+    /* DOI */
+    if (sa->isasa_doi != ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unknown or unsupported DOI %s", enum_show(&doi_names, sa->isasa_doi));
+	/* XXX Could send notification back */
+	return DOI_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+
+    /* Situation */
+    if (!in_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, sa_pbs, NULL))
+	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+
+    if (ipsecdoisit != SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY)
+    {
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported IPsec DOI situation (%s)"
+	    , bitnamesof(sit_bit_names, ipsecdoisit));
+	/* XXX Could send notification back */
+	return SITUATION_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+    }
+
+    /* The rules for IPsec SAs are scattered.
+     * RFC 2408 "ISAKMP" section 4.2 gives some info.
+     * There may be multiple proposals.  Those with identical proposal
+     * numbers must be considered as conjuncts.  Those with different
+     * numbers are disjuncts.
+     * Each proposal may have several transforms, each considered
+     * an alternative.
+     * Each transform may have several attributes, all applying.
+     *
+     * To handle the way proposals are combined, we need to do a
+     * look-ahead.
+     */
+
+    if (!in_struct(&next_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, &next_proposal_pbs))
+	return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+    /* for each conjunction of proposals... */
+    while (next_full)
+    {
+	int propno = next_proposal.isap_proposal;
+	pb_stream ah_prop_pbs, esp_prop_pbs, ipcomp_prop_pbs;
+	struct isakmp_proposal ah_proposal, esp_proposal, ipcomp_proposal;
+	ipsec_spi_t ah_spi = 0;
+	ipsec_spi_t esp_spi = 0;
+	ipsec_spi_t ipcomp_cpi = 0;
+	bool ah_seen = FALSE;
+	bool esp_seen = FALSE;
+	bool ipcomp_seen = FALSE;
+	bool tunnel_mode = FALSE;
+	int inner_proto = 0;
+	u_int16_t well_known_cpi = 0;
+
+	pb_stream ah_trans_pbs, esp_trans_pbs, ipcomp_trans_pbs;
+	struct isakmp_transform ah_trans, esp_trans, ipcomp_trans;
+	struct ipsec_trans_attrs ah_attrs, esp_attrs, ipcomp_attrs;
+
+	/* for each proposal in the conjunction */
+	do {
+
+	    if (next_proposal.isap_protoid == PROTO_IPCOMP)
+	    {
+		/* IPCOMP CPI */
+		if (next_proposal.isap_spisize == IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE)
+		{
+		    /* This code is to accommodate those peculiar
+		     * implementations that send a CPI in the bottom of an
+		     * SPI-sized field.
+		     * See draft-shacham-ippcp-rfc2393bis-05.txt 4.1
+		     */
+		    u_int8_t filler[IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE];
+
+		    if (!in_raw(filler, sizeof(filler)
+		     , &next_proposal_pbs, "CPI filler")
+		    || !all_zero(filler, sizeof(filler)))
+			return INVALID_SPI;
+		}
+		else if (next_proposal.isap_spisize != IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal with improper CPI size (%u)"
+			, next_proposal.isap_spisize);
+		    return INVALID_SPI;
+		}
+
+		/* We store CPI in the low order of a network order
+		 * ipsec_spi_t.  So we start a couple of bytes in.
+		 */
+		zero(&next_spi);
+		if (!in_raw((u_char *)&next_spi
+		  + IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE - IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE
+		, IPCOMP_CPI_SIZE, &next_proposal_pbs, "CPI"))
+		    return INVALID_SPI;
+
+		/* If sanity ruled, CPIs would have to be such that
+		 * the SAID (the triple (CPI, IPCOM, destination IP))
+		 * would be unique, just like for SPIs.  But there is a
+		 * perversion where CPIs can be well-known and consequently
+		 * the triple is not unique.  We hide this fact from
+		 * ourselves by fudging the top 16 bits to make
+		 * the property true internally!
+		 */
+		switch (ntohl(next_spi))
+		{
+		case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:
+		    well_known_cpi = ntohl(next_spi);
+		    next_spi = uniquify_his_cpi(next_spi, st);
+		    if (next_spi == 0)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS
+			    , "IPsec Proposal contains well-known CPI that I cannot uniquify");
+			return INVALID_SPI;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    if (ntohl(next_spi) < IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED
+		    || ntohl(next_spi) > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
+		    {
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains CPI from non-negotiated range (0x%lx)"
+			    , (unsigned long) ntohl(next_spi));
+			return INVALID_SPI;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* AH or ESP SPI */
+		if (next_proposal.isap_spisize != IPSEC_DOI_SPI_SIZE)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal with improper SPI size (%u)"
+			, next_proposal.isap_spisize);
+		    return INVALID_SPI;
+		}
+
+		if (!in_raw((u_char *)&next_spi, sizeof(next_spi), &next_proposal_pbs, "SPI"))
+		    return INVALID_SPI;
+
+		/* SPI value 0 is invalid and values 1-255 are reserved to IANA.
+		 * RFC 2402 (ESP) 2.4, RFC 2406 (AH) 2.1
+		 * IPCOMP???
+		 */
+		if (ntohl(next_spi) < IPSEC_DOI_SPI_MIN)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains invalid SPI (0x%lx)"
+			, (unsigned long) ntohl(next_spi));
+		    return INVALID_SPI;
+		}
+	    }
+
+	    if (next_proposal.isap_notrans == 0)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec Proposal contains no Transforms");
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	    }
+
+	    switch (next_proposal.isap_protoid)
+	    {
+	    case PROTO_IPSEC_AH:
+		if (ah_seen)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous AH Proposals");
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+		ah_seen = TRUE;
+		ah_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
+		ah_proposal = next_proposal;
+		ah_spi = next_spi;
+		break;
+
+	    case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP:
+		if (esp_seen)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous ESP Proposals");
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+		esp_seen = TRUE;
+		esp_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
+		esp_proposal = next_proposal;
+		esp_spi = next_spi;
+		break;
+
+	    case PROTO_IPCOMP:
+		if (ipcomp_seen)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IPsec SA contains two simultaneous IPCOMP Proposals");
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+		ipcomp_seen = TRUE;
+		ipcomp_prop_pbs = next_proposal_pbs;
+		ipcomp_proposal = next_proposal;
+		ipcomp_cpi = next_spi;
+		break;
+
+	    default:
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected Protocol ID (%s) in IPsec Proposal"
+		    , enum_show(&protocol_names, next_proposal.isap_protoid));
+		return INVALID_PROTOCOL_ID;
+	    }
+
+	    /* refill next_proposal */
+	    if (next_proposal.isap_np == ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)
+	    {
+		next_full = FALSE;
+		break;
+	    }
+	    else if (next_proposal.isap_np != ISAKMP_NEXT_P)
+	    {
+		loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unexpected in Proposal: %s"
+		    , enum_show(&payload_names, next_proposal.isap_np));
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	    }
+
+	    if (!in_struct(&next_proposal, &isakmp_proposal_desc, sa_pbs, &next_proposal_pbs))
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	} while (next_proposal.isap_proposal == propno);
+
+	/* Now that we have all conjuncts, we should try
+	 * the Cartesian product of eachs tranforms!
+	 * At the moment, we take short-cuts on account of
+	 * our rudimentary hard-wired policy.
+	 * For now, we find an acceptable AH (if any)
+	 * and then an acceptable ESP.  The only interaction
+	 * is that the ESP acceptance can know whether there
+	 * was an acceptable AH and hence not require an AUTH.
+	 */
+
+	if (ah_seen)
+	{
+	    int previous_transnum = -1;
+	    int tn;
+
+	    for (tn = 0; tn != ah_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
+	    {
+		int ok_transid = 0;
+		bool ok_auth = FALSE;
+
+		if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&ah_trans
+		, &ah_attrs
+		, &ah_prop_pbs
+		, &ah_trans_pbs
+		, &isakmp_ah_transform_desc
+		, previous_transnum
+		, selection
+		, tn == ah_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
+		, FALSE
+		, st))
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+		previous_transnum = ah_trans.isat_transnum;
+
+		/* we must understand ah_attrs.transid
+		 * COMBINED with ah_attrs.auth.
+		 * See RFC 2407 "IPsec DOI" section 4.4.3
+		 * The following combinations are legal,
+		 * but we don't implement all of them:
+		 * It seems as if each auth algorithm
+		 * only applies to one ah transid.
+		 * AH_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5
+		 * AH_MD5, AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK (unimplemented)
+		 * AH_SHA, AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1
+		 * AH_DES, AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC (unimplemented)
+		 */
+		switch (ah_attrs.auth)
+		{
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
+			loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "AUTH_ALGORITHM attribute missing in AH Transform");
+			return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+			ok_auth = TRUE;
+			/* fall through */
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_KPDK:
+			ok_transid = AH_MD5;
+			break;
+
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+			ok_auth = TRUE;
+			ok_transid = AH_SHA;
+			break;
+
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC:
+			ok_transid = AH_DES;
+			break;
+		}
+		if (ah_attrs.transid != ok_transid)
+		{
+		    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s attribute inappropriate in %s Transform"
+			, enum_name(&auth_alg_names, ah_attrs.auth)
+			, enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, ah_attrs.transid));
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+		if (!ok_auth)
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			, DBG_log("%s attribute unsupported"
+			    " in %s Transform from %s"
+			    , enum_name(&auth_alg_names, ah_attrs.auth)
+			    , enum_show(&ah_transformid_names, ah_attrs.transid)
+			    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+		    continue;   /* try another */
+		}
+		break;	/* we seem to be happy */
+	    }
+	    if (tn == ah_proposal.isap_notrans)
+		continue;	/* we didn't find a nice one */
+	    ah_attrs.spi = ah_spi;
+	    inner_proto = IPPROTO_AH;
+	    if (ah_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		tunnel_mode = TRUE;
+	}
+
+	if (esp_seen)
+	{
+	    int previous_transnum = -1;
+	    int tn;
+
+	    for (tn = 0; tn != esp_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
+	    {
+		if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&esp_trans
+		, &esp_attrs
+		, &esp_prop_pbs
+		, &esp_trans_pbs
+		, &isakmp_esp_transform_desc
+		, previous_transnum
+		, selection
+		, tn == esp_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
+		, FALSE
+		, st))
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+		previous_transnum = esp_trans.isat_transnum;
+
+		/* set default key length for AES encryption */
+		if (!esp_attrs.key_len && esp_attrs.transid == ESP_AES)
+		{
+		    esp_attrs.key_len = 128 / BITS_PER_BYTE;
+		}
+
+		if (!kernel_alg_esp_enc_ok(esp_attrs.transid, esp_attrs.key_len
+		    ,c->alg_info_esp))
+		{
+		    switch (esp_attrs.transid)
+		    {
+		    case ESP_3DES:
+			break;
+#ifdef SUPPORT_ESP_NULL	/* should be about as secure as AH-only */
+		    case ESP_NULL:
+			if (esp_attrs.auth == AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE)
+			{
+			    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ESP_NULL requires auth algorithm");
+			    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+			}
+			if (st->st_policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT)
+			{
+			    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+				    , DBG_log("ESP_NULL Transform Proposal from %s"
+					" does not satisfy POLICY_ENCRYPT"
+					, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			    continue;   /* try another */
+			}
+			break;
+#endif
+		    default:
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			    , DBG_log("unsupported ESP Transform %s from %s"
+				, enum_show(&esp_transformid_names, esp_attrs.transid)
+				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			continue;   /* try another */
+		    }
+		}
+
+		if (!kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(esp_attrs.auth, c->alg_info_esp))
+		{
+		    switch (esp_attrs.auth)
+		    {
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE:
+			if (!ah_seen)
+			{
+			    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+				, DBG_log("ESP from %s must either have AUTH or be combined with AH"
+				    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			    continue;   /* try another */
+			}
+			break;
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5:
+		    case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1:
+			break;
+		    default:
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			    , DBG_log("unsupported ESP auth alg %s from %s"
+				, enum_show(&auth_alg_names, esp_attrs.auth)
+				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			continue;   /* try another */
+		    }
+		}
+
+		/* A last check for allowed transforms in alg_info_esp
+		 * (ALG_INFO_F_STRICT flag)
+		 */
+		if (!kernel_alg_esp_ok_final(esp_attrs.transid, esp_attrs.key_len
+		    ,esp_attrs.auth, c->alg_info_esp))
+		{
+		    continue;
+		}
+
+		if (ah_seen && ah_attrs.encapsulation != esp_attrs.encapsulation)
+		{
+		    /* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			, DBG_log("AH and ESP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+		}
+
+		break;	/* we seem to be happy */
+	    }
+	    if (tn == esp_proposal.isap_notrans)
+		continue;	/* we didn't find a nice one */
+	    
+	    esp_attrs.spi = esp_spi;
+	    inner_proto = IPPROTO_ESP;
+	    if (esp_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		tunnel_mode = TRUE;
+	}
+	else if (st->st_policy & POLICY_ENCRYPT)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+		, DBG_log("policy for \"%s\" requires encryption but ESP not in Proposal from %s"
+		    , c->name, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+	    continue;	/* we needed encryption, but didn't find ESP */
+	}
+	else if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_AUTHENTICATE) && !ah_seen)
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+		, DBG_log("policy for \"%s\" requires authentication"
+		    " but none in Proposal from %s"
+		    , c->name, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+	    continue;	/* we need authentication, but we found neither ESP nor AH */
+	}
+
+	if (ipcomp_seen)
+	{
+	    int previous_transnum = -1;
+	    int tn;
+
+#ifdef NEVER	/* we think IPcomp is working now */
+	    /**** FUDGE TO PREVENT UNREQUESTED IPCOMP:
+	     **** NEEDED BECAUSE OUR IPCOMP IS EXPERIMENTAL (UNSTABLE).
+	     ****/
+	    if (!(st->st_policy & POLICY_COMPRESS))
+	    {
+		plog("compression proposed by %s, but policy for \"%s\" forbids it"
+		    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->name);
+		continue;	/* unwanted compression proposal */
+	    }
+#endif
+	    if (!can_do_IPcomp)
+	    {
+		plog("compression proposed by %s, but KLIPS is not configured with IPCOMP"
+		    , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr));
+		continue;
+	    }
+
+	    if (well_known_cpi != 0 && !ah_seen && !esp_seen)
+	    {
+		plog("illegal proposal: bare IPCOMP used with well-known CPI");
+		return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+	    }
+
+	    for (tn = 0; tn != ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans; tn++)
+	    {
+		if (!parse_ipsec_transform(&ipcomp_trans
+		, &ipcomp_attrs
+		, &ipcomp_prop_pbs
+		, &ipcomp_trans_pbs
+		, &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc
+		, previous_transnum
+		, selection
+		, tn == ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans - 1
+		, TRUE
+		, st))
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+
+		previous_transnum = ipcomp_trans.isat_transnum;
+
+		if (well_known_cpi != 0 && ipcomp_attrs.transid != well_known_cpi)
+		{
+		    plog("illegal proposal: IPCOMP well-known CPI disagrees with transform");
+		    return BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX;
+		}
+
+		switch (ipcomp_attrs.transid)
+		{
+		    case IPCOMP_DEFLATE:    /* all we can handle! */
+			break;
+
+		    default:
+			DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			    , DBG_log("unsupported IPCOMP Transform %s from %s"
+				, enum_show(&ipcomp_transformid_names, ipcomp_attrs.transid)
+				, ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)));
+			continue;   /* try another */
+		}
+
+		if (ah_seen && ah_attrs.encapsulation != ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation)
+		{
+		    /* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			, DBG_log("AH and IPCOMP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+		} else if (esp_seen && esp_attrs.encapsulation != ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation)
+		{
+		    /* ??? This should be an error, but is it? */
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT
+			, DBG_log("ESP and IPCOMP transforms disagree about encapsulation; TUNNEL presumed"));
+		}
+
+		break;	/* we seem to be happy */
+	    }
+	    if (tn == ipcomp_proposal.isap_notrans)
+		continue;	/* we didn't find a nice one */
+	    ipcomp_attrs.spi = ipcomp_cpi;
+	    inner_proto = IPPROTO_COMP;
+	    if (ipcomp_attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL)
+		tunnel_mode = TRUE;
+	}
+
+	/* Eureka: we liked what we saw -- accept it. */
+
+	if (r_sa_pbs != NULL)
+	{
+	    /* emit what we've accepted */
+
+	    /* Situation */
+	    if (!out_struct(&ipsecdoisit, &ipsec_sit_desc, r_sa_pbs, NULL))
+		impossible();
+
+	    /* AH proposal */
+	    if (ah_seen)
+		echo_proposal(ah_proposal
+		    , ah_trans
+		    , esp_seen || ipcomp_seen? ISAKMP_NEXT_P : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		    , r_sa_pbs
+		    , &st->st_ah
+		    , &isakmp_ah_transform_desc
+		    , &ah_trans_pbs
+		    , &st->st_connection->spd
+		    , tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_AH);
+
+	    /* ESP proposal */
+	    if (esp_seen)
+		echo_proposal(esp_proposal
+		    , esp_trans
+		    , ipcomp_seen? ISAKMP_NEXT_P : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		    , r_sa_pbs
+		    , &st->st_esp
+		    , &isakmp_esp_transform_desc
+		    , &esp_trans_pbs
+		    , &st->st_connection->spd
+		    , tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_ESP);
+
+	    /* IPCOMP proposal */
+	    if (ipcomp_seen)
+		echo_proposal(ipcomp_proposal
+		    , ipcomp_trans
+		    , ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE
+		    , r_sa_pbs
+		    , &st->st_ipcomp
+		    , &isakmp_ipcomp_transform_desc
+		    , &ipcomp_trans_pbs
+		    , &st->st_connection->spd
+		    , tunnel_mode && inner_proto == IPPROTO_COMP);
+
+	    close_output_pbs(r_sa_pbs);
+	}
+
+	/* save decoded version of winning SA in state */
+
+	st->st_ah.present = ah_seen;
+	if (ah_seen)
+	    st->st_ah.attrs = ah_attrs;
+
+	st->st_esp.present = esp_seen;
+	if (esp_seen)
+	    st->st_esp.attrs = esp_attrs;
+
+	st->st_ipcomp.present = ipcomp_seen;
+	if (ipcomp_seen)
+	    st->st_ipcomp.attrs = ipcomp_attrs;
+
+	return NOTHING_WRONG;
+    }
+
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no acceptable Proposal in IPsec SA");
+    return NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN;
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/spdb.h b/src/pluto/spdb.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..0df488841
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/spdb.h
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
+/* Security Policy Data Base (such as it is)
+ * Copyright (C) 1998, 1999  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: spdb.h,v 1.4 2006/04/22 21:59:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SPDB_H
+#define _SPDB_H
+
+#include "packet.h"
+
+/* database of SA properties */
+
+/* Attribute type and value pair.
+ * Note: only "basic" values are represented so far.
+ */
+struct db_attr {
+    u_int16_t type;	/* ISAKMP_ATTR_AF_TV is implied; 0 for end */
+    u_int16_t val;
+};
+
+/* transform */
+struct db_trans {
+    u_int8_t transid;	/* Transform-Id */
+    struct db_attr *attrs;	/* array */
+    int attr_cnt;	/* number of elements */
+};
+
+/* proposal */
+struct db_prop {
+    u_int8_t protoid;	/* Protocol-Id */
+    struct db_trans *trans;	/* array (disjunction) */
+    int trans_cnt;	/* number of elements */
+    /* SPI size and value isn't part of DB */
+};
+
+/* conjunction of proposals */
+struct db_prop_conj {
+    struct db_prop *props;	/* array */
+    int prop_cnt;	/* number of elements */
+};
+
+/* security association */
+struct db_sa {
+    struct db_prop_conj *prop_conjs;	/* array */
+    int prop_conj_cnt;	/* number of elements */
+    /* Hardwired for now;
+     * DOI: ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC
+     * Situation: SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY
+     */
+};
+
+/* The oakley sadb */
+extern struct db_sa oakley_sadb;
+
+/* The ipsec sadb is subscripted by a bitset with members
+ * from POLICY_ENCRYPT, POLICY_AUTHENTICATE, POLICY_COMPRESS
+ */
+extern struct db_sa ipsec_sadb[1 << 3];
+
+/* forward declaration */
+struct state;
+
+extern bool out_sa(
+    pb_stream *outs,
+    struct db_sa *sadb,
+    struct state *st,
+    bool oakley_mode,
+    u_int8_t np);
+
+extern notification_t preparse_isakmp_sa_body(
+    const struct isakmp_sa *sa,	/* header of input SA Payload */
+    pb_stream *sa_pbs,		/* body of input SA Payload */
+    u_int32_t *ipsecdoisit,	/* IPsec DOI SIT bitset */
+    pb_stream *proposal_pbs,	/* body of proposal Payload */
+    struct isakmp_proposal *proposal);
+
+extern notification_t parse_isakmp_policy(
+    pb_stream *proposal_pbs,	/* body of proposal Payload */
+    u_int notrans,		/* number of transforms */
+    lset_t *policy);		/* RSA, PSK or XAUTH policy */
+
+extern notification_t parse_isakmp_sa_body(
+    u_int32_t ipsecdoisit,	/* IPsec DOI SIT bitset */
+    pb_stream *proposal_pbs,	/* body of proposal Payload */
+    struct isakmp_proposal *proposal,
+    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,	/* if non-NULL, where to emit winning SA */
+    struct state *st,		/* current state object */
+    bool initiator);		/* is caller initiator? */
+
+extern notification_t parse_ipsec_sa_body(
+    pb_stream *sa_pbs,		/* body of input SA Payload */
+    const struct isakmp_sa *sa,	/* header of input SA Payload */
+    pb_stream *r_sa_pbs,	/* if non-NULL, where to emit winning SA */
+    bool selection,		/* if this SA is a selection, only one tranform can appear */
+    struct state *st);		/* current state object */
+
+extern void backup_pbs(pb_stream *pbs);
+extern void restore_pbs(pb_stream *pbs);
+
+#endif /* _SPDB_H */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/state.c b/src/pluto/state.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..80c3156b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/state.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1012 @@
+/* routines for state objects
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: state.c,v 1.13 2006/04/29 18:16:02 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "packet.h"	/* so we can calculate sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr) */
+#include "keys.h"	/* for free_public_key */
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "demux.h"	/* needs packet.h */
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */
+
+/*
+ * Global variables: had to go somewhere, might as well be this file.
+ */
+
+u_int16_t pluto_port = IKE_UDP_PORT;	/* Pluto's port */
+
+/*
+ * This file has the functions that handle the
+ * state hash table and the Message ID list.
+ */
+
+/* Message-IDs
+ *
+ * A Message ID is contained in each IKE message header.
+ * For Phase 1 exchanges (Main and Aggressive), it will be zero.
+ * For other exchanges, which must be under the protection of an
+ * ISAKMP SA, the Message ID must be unique within that ISAKMP SA.
+ * Effectively, this labels the message as belonging to a particular
+ * exchange.
+ * BTW, we feel this uniqueness allows rekeying to be somewhat simpler
+ * than specified by draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-06.txt.
+ *
+ * A MessageID is a 32 bit unsigned number.  We represent the value
+ * internally in network order -- they are just blobs to us.
+ * They are unsigned numbers to make hashing and comparing easy.
+ *
+ * The following mechanism is used to allocate message IDs.  This
+ * requires that we keep track of which numbers have already been used
+ * so that we don't allocate one in use.
+ */
+
+struct msgid_list
+{
+    msgid_t               msgid; /* network order */
+    struct msgid_list     *next;
+};
+
+bool
+reserve_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa, msgid_t msgid)
+{
+    struct msgid_list *p;
+
+    passert(msgid != MAINMODE_MSGID);
+    passert(IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(isakmp_sa->st_state));
+
+    for (p = isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids; p != NULL; p = p->next)
+	if (p->msgid == msgid)
+	    return FALSE;
+
+    p = alloc_thing(struct msgid_list, "msgid");
+    p->msgid = msgid;
+    p->next = isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids;
+    isakmp_sa->st_used_msgids = p;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+msgid_t
+generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa)
+{
+    int timeout = 100;	/* only try so hard for unique msgid */
+    msgid_t msgid;
+
+    passert(IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(isakmp_sa->st_state));
+
+    for (;;)
+    {
+	get_rnd_bytes((void *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid));
+	if (msgid != 0 && reserve_msgid(isakmp_sa, msgid))
+	    break;
+
+	if (--timeout == 0)
+	{
+	    plog("gave up looking for unique msgid; using 0x%08lx"
+		, (unsigned long) msgid);
+	    break;
+	}
+    }
+    return msgid;
+}
+
+
+/* state table functions */
+
+#define STATE_TABLE_SIZE 32
+
+static struct state *statetable[STATE_TABLE_SIZE];
+
+static struct state **
+state_hash(const u_char *icookie, const u_char *rcookie, const ip_address *peer)
+{
+    u_int i = 0, j;
+    const unsigned char *byte_ptr;
+    size_t length = addrbytesptr(peer, &byte_ptr);
+
+    DBG(DBG_RAW | DBG_CONTROL,
+	DBG_dump("ICOOKIE:", icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	DBG_dump("RCOOKIE:", rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+	DBG_dump("peer:", byte_ptr, length));
+
+    /* XXX the following hash is pretty pathetic */
+
+    for (j = 0; j < COOKIE_SIZE; j++)
+	i = i * 407 + icookie[j] + rcookie[j];
+
+    for (j = 0; j < length; j++)
+	i = i * 613 + byte_ptr[j];
+
+    i = i % STATE_TABLE_SIZE;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("state hash entry %d", i));
+
+    return &statetable[i];
+}
+
+/* Get a state object.
+ * Caller must schedule an event for this object so that it doesn't leak.
+ * Caller must insert_state().
+ */
+struct state *
+new_state(void)
+{
+    static const struct state blank_state;	/* initialized all to zero & NULL */
+    static so_serial_t next_so = SOS_FIRST;
+    struct state *st;
+
+    st = clone_thing(blank_state, "struct state in new_state()");
+    st->st_serialno = next_so++;
+    passert(next_so > SOS_FIRST);	/* overflow can't happen! */
+    st->st_whack_sock = NULL_FD;
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("creating state object #%lu at %p",
+	st->st_serialno, (void *) st));
+    return st;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the state table (and mask*).
+ */
+void
+init_states(void)
+{
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	statetable[i] = (struct state *) NULL;
+}
+
+/* Find the state object with this serial number.
+ * This allows state object references that don't turn into dangerous
+ * dangling pointers: reference a state by its serial number.
+ * Returns NULL if there is no such state.
+ * If this turns out to be a significant CPU hog, it could be
+ * improved to use a hash table rather than sequential seartch.
+ */
+struct state *
+state_with_serialno(so_serial_t sn)
+{
+    if (sn >= SOS_FIRST)
+    {
+	struct state *st;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	    for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+		if (st->st_serialno == sn)
+		    return st;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Insert a state object in the hash table. The object is inserted
+ * at the begining of list.
+ * Needs cookies, connection, and msgid.
+ */
+void
+insert_state(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct state **p = state_hash(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
+	, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr);
+
+    passert(st->st_hashchain_prev == NULL && st->st_hashchain_next == NULL);
+
+    if (*p != NULL)
+    {
+	passert((*p)->st_hashchain_prev == NULL);
+	(*p)->st_hashchain_prev = st;
+    }
+    st->st_hashchain_next = *p;
+    *p = st;
+
+    /* Ensure that somebody is in charge of killing this state:
+     * if no event is scheduled for it, schedule one to discard the state.
+     * If nothing goes wrong, this event will be replaced by
+     * a more appropriate one.
+     */
+    if (st->st_event == NULL)
+	event_schedule(EVENT_SO_DISCARD, 0, st);
+}
+
+/* unlink a state object from the hash table, but don't free it
+ */
+void
+unhash_state(struct state *st)
+{
+    /* unlink from forward chain */
+    struct state **p = st->st_hashchain_prev == NULL
+	? state_hash(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie
+		     , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+	: &st->st_hashchain_prev->st_hashchain_next;
+
+    /* unlink from forward chain */
+    passert(*p == st);
+    *p = st->st_hashchain_next;
+
+    /* unlink from backward chain */
+    if (st->st_hashchain_next != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(st->st_hashchain_next->st_hashchain_prev == st);
+	st->st_hashchain_next->st_hashchain_prev = st->st_hashchain_prev;
+    }
+
+    st->st_hashchain_next = st->st_hashchain_prev = NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free the Whack socket file descriptor.
+ * This has the side effect of telling Whack that we're done.
+ */
+void
+release_whack(struct state *st)
+{
+    close_any(st->st_whack_sock);
+}
+
+/* delete a state object */
+void
+delete_state(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct connection *const c = st->st_connection;
+    struct state *old_cur_state = cur_state == st? NULL : cur_state;
+
+    set_cur_state(st);
+
+    /* If DPD is enabled on this state object, clear any pending events */
+    if(st->st_dpd_event != NULL)
+            delete_dpd_event(st);
+
+    /* if there is a suspended state transition, disconnect us */
+    if (st->st_suspended_md != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(st->st_suspended_md->st == st);
+	st->st_suspended_md->st = NULL;
+    }
+
+    /* tell the other side of any IPSEC SAs that are going down */
+    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+    || IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	send_delete(st);
+
+    delete_event(st);	/* delete any pending timer event */
+
+    /* Ditch anything pending on ISAKMP SA being established.
+     * Note: this must be done before the unhash_state to prevent
+     * flush_pending_by_state inadvertently and prematurely
+     * deleting our connection.
+     */
+    flush_pending_by_state(st);
+
+    /* effectively, this deletes any ISAKMP SA that this state represents */
+    unhash_state(st);
+
+    /* tell kernel to delete any IPSEC SA
+     * ??? we ought to tell peer to delete IPSEC SAs
+     */
+    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	delete_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE);
+    else if (IS_ONLY_INBOUND_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+	delete_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE);
+
+    if (c->newest_ipsec_sa == st->st_serialno)
+	c->newest_ipsec_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+    if (c->newest_isakmp_sa == st->st_serialno)
+	c->newest_isakmp_sa = SOS_NOBODY;
+
+    st->st_connection = NULL;	/* we might be about to free it */
+    cur_state = old_cur_state;	/* without st_connection, st isn't complete */
+    connection_discard(c);
+
+    release_whack(st);
+
+    /* from here on we are just freeing RAM */
+
+    {
+	struct msgid_list *p = st->st_used_msgids;
+
+	while (p != NULL)
+	{
+	    struct msgid_list *q = p;
+	    p = p->next;
+	    pfree(q);
+	}
+    }
+
+    unreference_key(&st->st_peer_pubkey);
+
+    if (st->st_sec_in_use)
+	mpz_clear(&(st->st_sec));
+
+    pfreeany(st->st_tpacket.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_rpacket.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_p1isa.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_gi.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_gr.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_shared.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_ni.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_nr.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid_d.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid_a.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_enc_key.ptr);
+    pfreeany(st->st_ah.our_keymat);
+    pfreeany(st->st_ah.peer_keymat);
+    pfreeany(st->st_esp.our_keymat);
+    pfreeany(st->st_esp.peer_keymat);
+
+    pfree(st);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Is a connection in use by some state?
+ */
+bool
+states_use_connection(struct connection *c)
+{
+    /* are there any states still using it? */
+    struct state *st = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; st == NULL && i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	    if (st->st_connection == c)
+		return TRUE;
+
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * delete all states that were created for a given connection.
+ * if relations == TRUE, then also delete states that share
+ * the same phase 1 SA.
+ */
+void
+delete_states_by_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations)
+{
+    int pass;
+    /* this kludge avoids an n^2 algorithm */
+    enum connection_kind ck = c->kind;
+    struct spd_route *sr;
+
+    /* save this connection's isakmp SA, since it will get set to later SOS_NOBODY */
+    so_serial_t parent_sa = c->newest_isakmp_sa;
+
+    if (ck == CK_INSTANCE)
+	c->kind = CK_GOING_AWAY;
+
+    /* We take two passes so that we delete any ISAKMP SAs last.
+     * This allows Delete Notifications to be sent.
+     * ?? We could probably double the performance by caching any
+     * ISAKMP SA states found in the first pass, avoiding a second.
+     */
+    for (pass = 0; pass != 2; pass++)
+    {
+	int i;
+
+	/* For each hash chain... */
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	{
+	    struct state *st;
+
+	    /* For each state in the hash chain... */
+	    for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; )
+	    {
+		struct state *this = st;
+
+		st = st->st_hashchain_next;	/* before this is deleted */
+
+
+                if ((this->st_connection == c
+			|| (relations && parent_sa != SOS_NOBODY
+			&& this->st_clonedfrom == parent_sa))
+			&& (pass == 1 || !IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(this->st_state)))
+                {
+                    struct state *old_cur_state
+                        = cur_state == this? NULL : cur_state;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		    lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging;
+#endif
+
+		    set_cur_state(this);
+		    plog("deleting state (%s)"
+			, enum_show(&state_names, this->st_state));
+		    delete_state(this);
+		    cur_state = old_cur_state;
+#ifdef DEBUG
+		    cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging;
+#endif
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    
+    sr = &c->spd;
+    while (sr != NULL)
+    {
+	passert(sr->eroute_owner == SOS_NOBODY);
+	passert(sr->routing != RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL);
+	sr = sr->next;
+    }
+
+    if (ck == CK_INSTANCE)
+    {
+	c->kind = ck;
+	delete_connection(c, relations);
+    }
+}
+
+/* Walk through the state table, and delete each state whose phase 1 (IKE)
+ * peer is among those given.
+ */
+void
+delete_states_by_peer(ip_address *peer)
+{
+    char peerstr[ADDRTOT_BUF];
+    int i;
+
+    addrtot(peer, 0, peerstr, sizeof(peerstr));
+
+    /* For each hash chain... */
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	struct state *st;
+
+	/* For each state in the hash chain... */
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; )
+	{
+	    struct state *this = st;
+	    struct spd_route *sr;
+	    struct connection *c = this->st_connection;
+
+	    st = st->st_hashchain_next;	/* before this is deleted */
+
+	    /* ??? Is it not the case that the peer is the same for all spds? */
+	    for (sr = &c->spd; sr != NULL; sr = sr->next)
+	    {
+		if (sameaddr(&sr->that.host_addr, peer))
+		{
+		    plog("peer %s for connection %s deleting - claimed to have crashed"
+			 , peerstr
+			 , c->name);
+		    delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE);
+		    break;	/* can only delete it once */
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/* Duplicate a Phase 1 state object, to create a Phase 2 object.
+ * Caller must schedule an event for this object so that it doesn't leak.
+ * Caller must insert_state().
+ */
+struct state *
+duplicate_state(struct state *st)
+{
+    struct state *nst;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("duplicating state object #%lu",
+	st->st_serialno));
+
+    /* record use of the Phase 1 state */
+    st->st_outbound_count++;
+    st->st_outbound_time = now();
+
+    nst = new_state();
+
+    memcpy(nst->st_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    memcpy(nst->st_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE);
+    
+    nst->st_connection = st->st_connection;
+    nst->st_doi = st->st_doi;
+    nst->st_situation = st->st_situation;
+    nst->st_clonedfrom = st->st_serialno;
+    nst->st_oakley = st->st_oakley;
+    nst->st_modecfg = st->st_modecfg;
+
+#   define clone_chunk(ch, name) \
+	clonetochunk(nst->ch, st->ch.ptr, st->ch.len, name)
+
+    clone_chunk(st_skeyid_d, "st_skeyid_d in duplicate_state");
+    clone_chunk(st_skeyid_a, "st_skeyid_a in duplicate_state");
+    clone_chunk(st_skeyid_e, "st_skeyid_e in duplicate_state");
+    clone_chunk(st_enc_key, "st_enc_key in duplicate_state");
+
+#   undef clone_chunk
+
+    return nst;
+}
+
+#if 1
+void for_each_state(void *(f)(struct state *, void *data), void *data)
+{
+	struct state *st, *ocs = cur_state;
+	int i;
+	for (i=0; i<STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++) {
+		for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next) {
+			set_cur_state(st);
+			f(st, data);
+		}
+	}
+	cur_state = ocs;
+}
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Find a state object.
+ */
+struct state *
+find_state(const u_char *icookie
+, const u_char *rcookie
+, const ip_address *peer
+, msgid_t /*network order*/ msgid)
+{
+    struct state *st = *state_hash(icookie, rcookie, peer);
+
+    while (st != (struct state *) NULL)
+	if (sameaddr(peer, &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+	&& memcmp(icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) == 0
+	&& memcmp(rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) == 0
+	&& msgid == st->st_msgid)
+	    break;
+	else
+	    st = st->st_hashchain_next;
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	if (st == NULL)
+	    DBG_log("state object not found");
+	else
+	    DBG_log("state object #%lu found, in %s"
+		, st->st_serialno
+		, enum_show(&state_names, st->st_state)));
+
+    return st;
+}
+
+/* Find the state that sent a packet
+ * ??? this could be expensive -- it should be rate-limited to avoid DoS
+ */
+struct state *
+find_sender(size_t packet_len, u_char *packet)
+{
+    int i;
+    struct state *st;
+
+    if (packet_len >= sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr))
+	for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	    for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+		if (st->st_tpacket.ptr != NULL
+		&& st->st_tpacket.len == packet_len
+		&& memcmp(st->st_tpacket.ptr, packet, packet_len) == 0)
+		    return st;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+struct state *
+find_phase2_state_to_delete(const struct state *p1st
+, u_int8_t protoid
+, ipsec_spi_t spi
+, bool *bogus)
+{
+    struct state *st;
+    int i;
+
+    *bogus = FALSE;
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	{
+	    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+	    && p1st->st_connection->host_pair == st->st_connection->host_pair
+	    && same_peer_ids(p1st->st_connection, st->st_connection, NULL))
+	    {
+		struct ipsec_proto_info *pr = protoid == PROTO_IPSEC_AH
+		    ? &st->st_ah : &st->st_esp;
+
+		if (pr->present)
+		{
+		    if (pr->attrs.spi == spi)
+			return st;
+		    if (pr->our_spi == spi)
+			*bogus = TRUE;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Find newest Phase 1 negotiation state object for suitable for connection c
+ */
+struct state *
+find_phase1_state(const struct connection *c, lset_t ok_states)
+{
+    struct state
+	*st,
+	*best = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	    if (LHAS(ok_states, st->st_state)
+	    && c->host_pair == st->st_connection->host_pair
+	    && same_peer_ids(c, st->st_connection, NULL)
+	    && (best == NULL || best->st_serialno < st->st_serialno))
+		best = st;
+
+    return best;
+}
+
+void
+state_eroute_usage(ip_subnet *ours, ip_subnet *his
+, unsigned long count, time_t nw)
+{
+    struct state *st;
+    int i;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	{
+	    struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+	    /* XXX spd-enum */
+	    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)
+		&& c->spd.eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
+		&& c->spd.routing == RT_ROUTED_TUNNEL
+		&& samesubnet(&c->spd.this.client, ours)
+		&& samesubnet(&c->spd.that.client, his))
+	    {
+		if (st->st_outbound_count != count)
+		{
+		    st->st_outbound_count = count;
+		    st->st_outbound_time = nw;
+		}
+		return;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	{
+	    char ourst[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+	    char hist[SUBNETTOT_BUF];
+
+	    subnettot(ours, 0, ourst, sizeof(ourst));
+	    subnettot(his, 0, hist, sizeof(hist));
+	    DBG_log("unknown tunnel eroute %s -> %s found in scan"
+		, ourst, hist);
+	});
+}
+
+void fmt_state(bool all, struct state *st, time_t n
+, char *state_buf, size_t state_buf_len
+, char *state_buf2, size_t state_buf2_len)
+{
+    /* what the heck is interesting about a state? */
+    const struct connection *c = st->st_connection;
+
+    long delta = st->st_event->ev_time >= n
+	? (long)(st->st_event->ev_time - n)
+	: -(long)(n - st->st_event->ev_time);
+
+    char inst[CONN_INST_BUF];
+    const char *np1 = c->newest_isakmp_sa == st->st_serialno
+	? "; newest ISAKMP" : "";
+    const char *np2 = c->newest_ipsec_sa == st->st_serialno
+	? "; newest IPSEC" : "";
+    /* XXX spd-enum */
+    const char *eo = c->spd.eroute_owner == st->st_serialno
+	? "; eroute owner" : "";
+    const char *dpd = (all && st->st_dpd && c->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE)
+		      ? "; DPD active" : "";
+    
+    passert(st->st_event != 0);
+
+    fmt_conn_instance(c, inst);
+
+    snprintf(state_buf, state_buf_len
+	, "#%lu: \"%s\"%s %s (%s); %s in %lds%s%s%s%s"
+	, st->st_serialno
+	, c->name, inst
+	, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+	, state_story[st->st_state - STATE_MAIN_R0]
+	, enum_name(&timer_event_names, st->st_event->ev_type)
+	, delta
+	, np1, np2, eo, dpd);
+
+    /* print out SPIs if SAs are established */
+    if (state_buf2_len != 0)
+	state_buf2[0] = '\0';	/* default to empty */
+    if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state))
+    {
+
+	bool tunnel;
+	char buf[SATOT_BUF*6 + 2*20 + 1];
+	const char *p_end = buf + sizeof(buf);
+	char *p = buf;
+
+#	define add_said(adst, aspi, aproto) { \
+	    ip_said s; \
+	    \
+	    initsaid(adst, aspi, aproto, &s); \
+	    if (p < p_end - 1) \
+	    { \
+		*p++ = ' '; \
+		p += satot(&s, 0, p, p_end - p) - 1; \
+	    } \
+	}
+
+#	define add_sa_info(st, inbound) { \
+	    u_int bytes; \
+	    time_t use_time; \
+	    \
+	    if (get_sa_info(st, inbound, &bytes, &use_time)) \
+	    { \
+		p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, " (%'u bytes", bytes); \
+		if (bytes > 0 && use_time != UNDEFINED_TIME) \
+		    p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, ", %ds ago", (int)(now - use_time)); \
+		p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, ")"); \
+	    } \
+	}
+
+	*p = '\0';
+	if (st->st_ah.present)
+	{
+	    add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_ah.attrs.spi, SA_AH);
+	    add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_ah.our_spi, SA_AH);
+	}
+	if (st->st_esp.present)
+	{
+	    time_t now = time(NULL);
+
+	    add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_esp.attrs.spi, SA_ESP);
+	    add_sa_info(st, FALSE);
+	    add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_esp.our_spi, SA_ESP);
+	    add_sa_info(st, TRUE);
+	}
+	if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	{
+	    add_said(&c->spd.that.host_addr, st->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi, SA_COMP);
+	    add_said(&c->spd.this.host_addr, st->st_ipcomp.our_spi, SA_COMP);
+	}
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	tunnel =  st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	       || st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL
+	       || st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL;
+	p += snprintf(p, p_end - p, "; %s", tunnel? "tunnel":"transport");
+#endif
+
+	snprintf(state_buf2, state_buf2_len
+	    , "#%lu: \"%s\"%s%s"
+	    , st->st_serialno
+	    , c->name, inst
+	    , buf);
+
+#	undef add_said
+#	undef add_sa_info
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * sorting logic is:
+ *
+ *  name
+ *  type
+ *  instance#
+ *  isakmp_sa (XXX probably wrong)
+ *
+ */
+static int
+state_compare(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+    const struct state *sap = *(const struct state *const *)a;
+    struct connection *ca = sap->st_connection;
+    const struct state *sbp = *(const struct state *const *)b;
+    struct connection *cb = sbp->st_connection;
+
+    /* DBG_log("comparing %s to %s", ca->name, cb->name); */
+
+    return connection_compare(ca, cb);
+}
+
+void
+show_states_status(bool all, const char *name)
+{
+    time_t n = now();
+    int i;
+    char state_buf[LOG_WIDTH];
+    char state_buf2[LOG_WIDTH];
+    int count;
+    struct state **array;
+
+    /* make count of states */
+    count = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	struct state *st;
+
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	{
+	    if (name == NULL || streq(name, st->st_connection->name))
+		count++;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* build the array */
+    array = alloc_bytes(sizeof(struct state *)*count, "state array");
+    count = 0;
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	struct state *st;
+
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	{
+	    if (name == NULL || streq(name, st->st_connection->name))
+		array[count++]=st;
+	}
+    }
+
+    /* sort it! */
+    qsort(array, count, sizeof(struct state *), state_compare);
+
+    /* now print sorted results */
+    for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
+    {
+	struct state *st;
+
+	st = array[i];
+
+	fmt_state(all, st, n
+		  , state_buf, sizeof(state_buf)
+		  , state_buf2, sizeof(state_buf2));
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, state_buf);
+	if (state_buf2[0] != '\0')
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, state_buf2);
+
+	/* show any associated pending Phase 2s */
+	if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+	    show_pending_phase2(st->st_connection->host_pair, st);
+    }
+    if (count > 0)
+	whack_log(RC_COMMENT, BLANK_FORMAT);	/* spacer */
+
+    /* free the array */
+    pfree(array);
+}
+
+/* Given that we've used up a range of unused CPI's,
+ * search for a new range of currently unused ones.
+ * Note: this is very expensive when not trivial!
+ * If we can't find one easily, choose 0 (a bad SPI,
+ * no matter what order) indicating failure.
+ */
+void
+find_my_cpi_gap(cpi_t *latest_cpi, cpi_t *first_busy_cpi)
+{
+    int tries = 0;
+    cpi_t base = *latest_cpi;
+    cpi_t closest;
+    int i;
+
+startover:
+    closest = ~0;	/* not close at all */
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	struct state *st;
+
+	for (st = statetable[i]; st != NULL; st = st->st_hashchain_next)
+	{
+	    if (st->st_ipcomp.present)
+	    {
+		cpi_t c = ntohl(st->st_ipcomp.our_spi) - base;
+
+		if (c < closest)
+		{
+		    if (c == 0)
+		    {
+			/* oops: next spot is occupied; start over */
+			if (++tries == 20)
+			{
+			    /* FAILURE */
+			    *latest_cpi = *first_busy_cpi = 0;
+			    return;
+			}
+			base++;
+			if (base > IPCOMP_LAST_NEGOTIATED)
+			    base = IPCOMP_FIRST_NEGOTIATED;
+			goto startover;	/* really a tail call */
+		    }
+		    closest = c;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    *latest_cpi = base;	/* base is first in next free range */
+    *first_busy_cpi = closest + base;	/* and this is the roof */
+}
+
+/* Muck with high-order 16 bits of this SPI in order to make
+ * the corresponding SAID unique.
+ * Its low-order 16 bits hold a well-known IPCOMP CPI.
+ * Oh, and remember that SPIs are stored in network order.
+ * Kludge!!!  So I name it with the non-English word "uniquify".
+ * If we can't find one easily, return 0 (a bad SPI,
+ * no matter what order) indicating failure.
+ */
+ipsec_spi_t
+uniquify_his_cpi(ipsec_spi_t cpi, struct state *st)
+{
+    int tries = 0;
+    int i;
+
+startover:
+
+    /* network order makes first two bytes our target */
+    get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&cpi, 2);
+
+    /* Make sure that the result is unique.
+     * Hard work.  If there is no unique value, we'll loop forever!
+     */
+    for (i = 0; i < STATE_TABLE_SIZE; i++)
+    {
+	struct state *s;
+
+	for (s = statetable[i]; s != NULL; s = s->st_hashchain_next)
+	{
+	    if (s->st_ipcomp.present
+	    && sameaddr(&s->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr
+	      , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr)
+	    && cpi == s->st_ipcomp.attrs.spi)
+	    {
+		if (++tries == 20)
+		    return 0;	/* FAILURE */
+		goto startover;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    return cpi;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Local Variables:
+ * c-basic-offset:4
+ * End:
+ */
diff --git a/src/pluto/state.h b/src/pluto/state.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d3a980564
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/state.h
@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+/* state and event objects
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: state.h,v 1.11 2006/03/08 22:12:37 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <gmp.h>    /* GNU MP library */
+
+#include "connections.h"
+
+/* Message ID mechanism.
+ *
+ * A Message ID is contained in each IKE message header.
+ * For Phase 1 exchanges (Main and Aggressive), it will be zero.
+ * For other exchanges, which must be under the protection of an
+ * ISAKMP SA, the Message ID must be unique within that ISAKMP SA.
+ * Effectively, this labels the message as belonging to a particular
+ * exchange.
+ *
+ * RFC2408 "ISAKMP" 3.1 "ISAKMP Header Format" (near end) states that
+ * the Message ID must be unique.  We interpret this to be "unique within
+ * one ISAKMP SA".
+ *
+ * BTW, we feel this uniqueness allows rekeying to be somewhat simpler
+ * than specified by draft-jenkins-ipsec-rekeying-06.txt.
+ */
+
+typedef u_int32_t msgid_t;	/* Network order! */
+#define MAINMODE_MSGID    ((msgid_t) 0)
+
+struct state;	/* forward declaration of tag */
+extern bool reserve_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa, msgid_t msgid);
+extern msgid_t generate_msgid(struct state *isakmp_sa);
+
+
+/* Oakley (Phase 1 / Main Mode) transform and attributes
+ * This is a flattened/decoded version of what is represented
+ * in the Transaction Payload.
+ * Names are chosen to match corresponding names in state.
+ */
+struct oakley_trans_attrs {
+    u_int16_t encrypt;		/* Encryption algorithm */
+    u_int16_t enckeylen;	/* encryption key len (bits) */
+    const struct encrypt_desc *encrypter;	/* package of encryption routines */
+    u_int16_t hash;		/* Hash algorithm */
+    const struct hash_desc *hasher;	/* package of hashing routines */
+    u_int16_t auth;		/* Authentication method */
+    const struct oakley_group_desc *group;	/* Oakley group */
+    time_t life_seconds;	/* When this SA expires (seconds) */
+    u_int32_t life_kilobytes;	/* When this SA is exhausted (kilobytes) */
+#if 0 /* not yet */
+    u_int16_t prf;		/* Pseudo Random Function */
+#endif
+};
+
+/* IPsec (Phase 2 / Quick Mode) transform and attributes
+ * This is a flattened/decoded version of what is represented
+ * by a Transaction Payload.  There may be one for AH, one
+ * for ESP, and a funny one for IPCOMP.
+ */
+struct ipsec_trans_attrs {
+    u_int8_t transid;	/* transform id */
+    ipsec_spi_t spi;	/* his SPI */
+    time_t life_seconds;		/* When this SA expires */
+    u_int32_t life_kilobytes;	/* When this SA expires */
+    u_int16_t encapsulation;
+    u_int16_t auth;
+    u_int16_t key_len;
+    u_int16_t key_rounds;
+#if 0 /* not implemented yet */
+    u_int16_t cmprs_dict_sz;
+    u_int32_t cmprs_alg;
+#endif
+};
+
+/* IPsec per protocol state information */
+struct ipsec_proto_info {
+    bool present;	/* was this transform specified? */
+    struct ipsec_trans_attrs attrs;
+    ipsec_spi_t our_spi;
+    u_int16_t keymat_len;	/* same for both */
+    u_char *our_keymat;
+    u_char *peer_keymat;
+};
+
+/* state object: record the state of a (possibly nascent) SA
+ *
+ * Invariants (violated only during short transitions):
+ * - each state object will be in statetable exactly once.
+ * - each state object will always have a pending event.
+ *   This prevents leaks.
+ */
+struct state
+{
+    so_serial_t        st_serialno;            /* serial number (for seniority) */
+    so_serial_t        st_clonedfrom;          /* serial number of parent */
+
+    struct connection *st_connection;          /* connection for this SA */
+
+    int                st_whack_sock;          /* fd for our Whack TCP socket.
+                                                * Single copy: close when freeing struct.
+                                                */
+
+    struct msg_digest *st_suspended_md;        /* suspended state-transition */
+
+    struct oakley_trans_attrs st_oakley;
+
+    struct ipsec_proto_info st_ah;
+    struct ipsec_proto_info st_esp;
+    struct ipsec_proto_info st_ipcomp;
+#ifdef KLIPS
+    ipsec_spi_t        st_tunnel_in_spi;          /* KLUDGE */
+    ipsec_spi_t        st_tunnel_out_spi;         /* KLUDGE */
+#endif
+
+    const struct oakley_group_desc *st_pfs_group;	/* group for Phase 2 PFS */
+
+    u_int32_t          st_doi;                 /* Domain of Interpretation */
+    u_int32_t          st_situation;
+
+    lset_t             st_policy;              /* policy for IPsec SA */
+
+    msgid_t            st_msgid;               /* MSG-ID from header.  Network Order! */
+
+    /* only for a state representing an ISAKMP SA */
+    struct msgid_list  *st_used_msgids;        /* used-up msgids */
+
+/* symmetric stuff */
+
+  /* initiator stuff */
+    chunk_t            st_gi;                  /* Initiator public value */
+    u_int8_t           st_icookie[COOKIE_SIZE];/* Initiator Cookie */
+    chunk_t            st_ni;                  /* Ni nonce */
+
+  /* responder stuff */
+    chunk_t            st_gr;                  /* Responder public value */
+    u_int8_t           st_rcookie[COOKIE_SIZE];/* Responder Cookie */
+    chunk_t            st_nr;                  /* Nr nonce */
+
+
+  /* my stuff */
+
+    chunk_t            st_tpacket;             /* Transmitted packet */
+
+    /* Phase 2 ID payload info about my user */
+    u_int8_t           st_myuserprotoid;       /* IDcx.protoid */
+    u_int16_t          st_myuserport;
+
+  /* his stuff */
+
+    chunk_t            st_rpacket;             /* Received packet */
+
+    /* Phase 2 ID payload info about peer's user */
+    u_int8_t           st_peeruserprotoid;     /* IDcx.protoid */
+    u_int16_t          st_peeruserport;
+
+/* end of symmetric stuff */
+
+    u_int8_t           st_sec_in_use;          /* bool: does st_sec hold a value */
+    MP_INT             st_sec;                 /* Our local secret value */
+
+    chunk_t            st_shared;              /* Derived shared secret
+                                                * Note: during Quick Mode,
+                                                * presence indicates PFS
+                                                * selected.
+                                                */
+
+    /* In a Phase 1 state, preserve peer's public key after authentication */
+    struct pubkey     *st_peer_pubkey;
+
+    enum state_kind    st_state;               /* State of exchange */
+    u_int8_t           st_retransmit;          /* Number of retransmits */
+    unsigned long      st_try;                 /* number of times rekeying attempted */
+                                               /* 0 means the only time */
+    time_t             st_margin;              /* life after EVENT_SA_REPLACE */
+    unsigned long      st_outbound_count;      /* traffic through eroute */
+    time_t             st_outbound_time;       /* time of last change to st_outbound_count */
+    chunk_t            st_p1isa;               /* Phase 1 initiator SA (Payload) for HASH */
+    chunk_t            st_skeyid;              /* Key material */
+    chunk_t            st_skeyid_d;            /* KM for non-ISAKMP key derivation */
+    chunk_t            st_skeyid_a;            /* KM for ISAKMP authentication */
+    chunk_t            st_skeyid_e;            /* KM for ISAKMP encryption */
+    u_char             st_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];  /* IV for encryption */
+    u_char             st_new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    u_char             st_ph1_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; /* IV at end if phase 1 */
+    unsigned int       st_iv_len;
+    unsigned int       st_new_iv_len;
+    unsigned int       st_ph1_iv_len;
+
+    chunk_t            st_enc_key;             /* Oakley Encryption key */
+
+    struct event      *st_event;               /* backpointer for certain events */
+    struct state      *st_hashchain_next;      /* Next in list */
+    struct state      *st_hashchain_prev;      /* Previous in list */
+
+    struct {
+	bool vars_set;
+	bool started;
+    } st_modecfg;
+
+    struct {
+	int attempt;
+	bool started;
+	bool status;
+    } st_xauth;
+
+    u_int32_t         nat_traversal;
+    ip_address        nat_oa;
+
+    /* RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection */
+    bool                st_dpd;			/* Peer supports DPD */
+    time_t              st_last_dpd;		/* Time of last DPD transmit */
+    u_int32_t           st_dpd_seqno;		/* Next R_U_THERE to send */
+    u_int32_t           st_dpd_expectseqno;	/* Next R_U_THERE_ACK to receive */
+    u_int32_t           st_dpd_peerseqno;	/* global variables */
+    struct event        *st_dpd_event;		/* backpointer for DPD events */
+
+    u_int32_t	      st_seen_vendorid;		/* Bit field about recognized Vendor ID */
+};
+
+/* global variables */
+
+extern u_int16_t pluto_port;	/* Pluto's port */
+
+extern bool states_use_connection(struct connection *c);
+
+/* state functions */
+
+extern struct state *new_state(void);
+extern void init_states(void);
+extern void insert_state(struct state *st);
+extern void unhash_state(struct state *st);
+extern void release_whack(struct state *st);
+extern void state_eroute_usage(ip_subnet *ours, ip_subnet *his
+    , unsigned long count, time_t nw);
+extern void delete_state(struct state *st);
+extern void delete_states_by_connection(struct connection *c, bool relations);
+
+extern struct state
+    *duplicate_state(struct state *st),
+    *find_state(const u_char *icookie
+	, const u_char *rcookie
+	, const ip_address *peer
+	, msgid_t msgid),
+    *state_with_serialno(so_serial_t sn),
+    *find_phase2_state_to_delete(const struct state *p1st, u_int8_t protoid
+	, ipsec_spi_t spi, bool *bogus),
+    *find_phase1_state(const struct connection *c, lset_t ok_states),
+    *find_sender(size_t packet_len, u_char *packet);
+
+extern void show_states_status(bool all, const char *name);
+extern void for_each_state(void *(f)(struct state *, void *data), void *data);
+extern void find_my_cpi_gap(cpi_t *latest_cpi, cpi_t *first_busy_cpi);
+extern ipsec_spi_t uniquify_his_cpi(ipsec_spi_t cpi, struct state *st);
+extern void fmt_state(bool all, struct state *st, time_t n
+		     , char *state_buf, size_t state_buf_len
+		     , char *state_buf2, size_t state_buf_len2);
+extern void delete_states_by_peer(ip_address *peer);
diff --git a/src/pluto/timer.c b/src/pluto/timer.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9d3f90ce3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/timer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,532 @@
+/* timer event handling
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: timer.c,v 1.5 2004/09/17 21:36:57 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#include <arpa/inet.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "state.h"
+#include "demux.h"
+#include "ipsec_doi.h"	/* needs demux.h and state.h */
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "server.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+
+/* monotonic version of time(3) */
+time_t
+now(void)
+{
+    static time_t delta = 0
+	, last_time = 0;
+    time_t n = time((time_t)NULL);
+
+    passert(n != (time_t)-1);
+    if (last_time > n)
+    {
+	plog("time moved backwards %ld seconds", (long)(last_time - n));
+	delta += last_time - n;
+    }
+    last_time = n;
+    return n + delta;
+}
+
+/* This file has the event handling routines. Events are
+ * kept as a linked list of event structures. These structures
+ * have information like event type, expiration time and a pointer
+ * to event specific data (for example, to a state structure).
+ */
+
+static struct event *evlist = (struct event *) NULL;
+
+/*
+ * This routine places an event in the event list.
+ */
+void
+event_schedule(enum event_type type, time_t tm, struct state *st)
+{
+    struct event *ev = alloc_thing(struct event, "struct event in event_schedule()");
+
+    ev->ev_type = type;
+    ev->ev_time = tm + now();
+    ev->ev_state = st;
+
+    /* If the event is associated with a state, put a backpointer to the
+     * event in the state object, so we can find and delete the event
+     * if we need to (for example, if we receive a reply).
+     */
+    if (st != NULL)
+    {
+	if (type == EVENT_DPD || type == EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT)
+	{
+	    passert(st->st_dpd_event == NULL);
+	    st->st_dpd_event = ev;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    passert(st->st_event == NULL);
+	    st->st_event = ev;
+	}
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	if (st == NULL)
+	    DBG_log("inserting event %s, timeout in %lu seconds"
+		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, type), (unsigned long)tm);
+	else
+	    DBG_log("inserting event %s, timeout in %lu seconds for #%lu"
+		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, type), (unsigned long)tm
+		, ev->ev_state->st_serialno));
+
+    if (evlist == (struct event *) NULL
+    || evlist->ev_time >= ev->ev_time)
+    {
+	ev->ev_next = evlist;
+	evlist = ev;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	struct event *evt;
+
+	for (evt = evlist; evt->ev_next != NULL; evt = evt->ev_next)
+	    if (evt->ev_next->ev_time >= ev->ev_time)
+		break;
+
+#ifdef NEVER	/* this seems to be overkill */
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    if (evt->ev_state == NULL)
+		DBG_log("event added after event %s"
+		    , enum_show(&timer_event_names, evt->ev_type));
+	    else
+		DBG_log("event added after event %s for #%lu"
+		    , enum_show(&timer_event_names, evt->ev_type)
+		    , evt->ev_state->st_serialno));
+#endif /* NEVER */
+
+	ev->ev_next = evt->ev_next;
+	evt->ev_next = ev;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Handle the first event on the list.
+ */
+void
+handle_timer_event(void)
+{
+    time_t tm;
+    struct event *ev = evlist;
+    int type;
+    struct state *st;
+    struct connection *c = NULL;
+    ip_address peer;
+
+    if (ev == (struct event *) NULL)    /* Just paranoid */
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("empty event list, yet we're called"));
+	return;
+    }
+
+    type = ev->ev_type;
+    st = ev->ev_state;
+
+    tm = now();
+
+    if (tm < ev->ev_time)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("called while no event expired (%lu/%lu, %s)"
+	    , (unsigned long)tm, (unsigned long)ev->ev_time
+	    , enum_show(&timer_event_names, type)));
+
+	/* This will happen if the most close-to-expire event was
+	 * a retransmission or cleanup, and we received a packet
+	 * at the same time as the event expired. Due to the processing
+	 * order in call_server(), the packet processing will happen first,
+	 * and the event will be removed.
+	 */
+	return;
+    }
+
+    evlist = evlist->ev_next;		/* Ok, we'll handle this event */
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	if (evlist != (struct event *) NULL)
+	    DBG_log("event after this is %s in %ld seconds"
+		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type)
+		, (long) (evlist->ev_time - tm)));
+
+    /* for state-associated events, pick up the state pointer
+     * and remove the backpointer from the state object.
+     * We'll eventually either schedule a new event, or delete the state.
+     */
+    passert(GLOBALS_ARE_RESET());
+    if (st != NULL)
+    {
+	c = st->st_connection;
+	if (type  == EVENT_DPD || type == EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT)
+	{
+	    passert(st->st_dpd_event == ev);
+	    st->st_dpd_event = NULL;
+	}
+	else 
+	{
+	    passert(st->st_event == ev);
+	    st->st_event = NULL;
+	}
+	peer = c->spd.that.host_addr;
+	set_cur_state(st);
+    }
+
+    switch (type)
+    {
+	case EVENT_REINIT_SECRET:
+	    passert(st == NULL);
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event EVENT_REINIT_SECRET handled"));
+	    init_secret();
+	    break;
+
+#ifdef KLIPS
+	case EVENT_SHUNT_SCAN:
+	    passert(st == NULL);
+	    scan_proc_shunts();
+	    break;
+#endif
+
+	case EVENT_LOG_DAILY:
+	    daily_log_event();
+	    break;
+
+	case EVENT_RETRANSMIT:
+	    /* Time to retransmit, or give up.
+	     *
+	     * Generally, we'll only try to send the message
+	     * MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS times.  Each time we double
+	     * our patience.
+	     *
+	     * As a special case, if this is the first initiating message
+	     * of a Main Mode exchange, and we have been directed to try
+	     * forever, we'll extend the number of retransmissions to
+	     * MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL times, with all these
+	     * extended attempts having the same patience.  The intention
+	     * is to reduce the bother when nobody is home.
+	     */
+	    {
+		time_t delay = 0;
+
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log(
+		    "handling event EVENT_RETRANSMIT for %s \"%s\" #%lu"
+		    , ip_str(&peer), c->name, st->st_serialno));
+
+		if (st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS)
+		    delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 << (st->st_retransmit + 1);
+		else if (st->st_state == STATE_MAIN_I1
+		&& c->sa_keying_tries == 0
+		&& st->st_retransmit < MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS_INITIAL)
+		    delay = EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 << MAXIMUM_RETRANSMISSIONS;
+
+		if (delay != 0)
+		{
+		    st->st_retransmit++;
+		    whack_log(RC_RETRANSMISSION
+			, "%s: retransmission; will wait %lus for response"
+			, enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)
+			, (unsigned long)delay);
+		    send_packet(st, "EVENT_RETRANSMIT");
+		    event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, delay, st);
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    /* check if we've tried rekeying enough times.
+		     * st->st_try == 0 means that this should be the only try.
+		     * c->sa_keying_tries == 0 means that there is no limit.
+		     */
+		    unsigned long try = st->st_try;
+		    unsigned long try_limit = c->sa_keying_tries;
+		    const char *details = "";
+
+		    switch (st->st_state)
+		    {
+		    case STATE_MAIN_I3:
+			details = ".  Possible authentication failure:"
+			    " no acceptable response to our"
+			    " first encrypted message";
+			break;
+		    case STATE_MAIN_I1:
+			details = ".  No response (or no acceptable response) to our"
+			    " first IKE message";
+			break;
+		    case STATE_QUICK_I1:
+			if (c->newest_ipsec_sa == SOS_NOBODY)
+			    details = ".  No acceptable response to our"
+				" first Quick Mode message:"
+				" perhaps peer likes no proposal";
+			break;
+		    default:
+			break;
+		    }
+		    loglog(RC_NORETRANSMISSION
+			, "max number of retransmissions (%d) reached %s%s"
+			, st->st_retransmit
+			, enum_show(&state_names, st->st_state), details);
+		    if (try != 0 && try != try_limit)
+		    {
+			/* A lot like EVENT_SA_REPLACE, but over again.
+			 * Since we know that st cannot be in use,
+			 * we can delete it right away.
+			 */
+			char story[80];	/* arbitrary limit */
+
+			try++;
+			snprintf(story, sizeof(story), try_limit == 0
+			    ? "starting keying attempt %ld of an unlimited number"
+			    : "starting keying attempt %ld of at most %ld"
+			    , try, try_limit);
+
+			if (st->st_whack_sock != NULL_FD)
+			{
+			    /* Release whack because the observer will get bored. */
+			    loglog(RC_COMMENT, "%s, but releasing whack"
+				, story);
+			    release_pending_whacks(st, story);
+			}
+			else
+			{
+			    /* no whack: just log to syslog */
+			    plog("%s", story);
+			}
+			ipsecdoi_replace(st, try);
+		    }
+		    delete_state(st);
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	case EVENT_SA_REPLACE:
+	case EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED:
+	    {
+		so_serial_t newest = IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)
+		    ? c->newest_isakmp_sa : c->newest_ipsec_sa;
+
+		if (newest != st->st_serialno
+		&& newest != SOS_NOBODY)
+		{
+		    /* not very interesting: no need to replace */
+		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+			, plog("not replacing stale %s SA: #%lu will do"
+			    , IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"
+			    , newest));
+		}
+		else if (type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE_IF_USED
+		&& st->st_outbound_time <= tm - c->sa_rekey_margin)
+		{
+		    /* we observed no recent use: no need to replace
+		     *
+		     * The sampling effects mean that st_outbound_time
+		     * could be up to SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL more recent
+		     * than actual traffic because the sampler looks at change
+		     * over that interval.
+		     * st_outbound_time could also not yet reflect traffic
+		     * in the last SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL.
+		     * We expect that SHUNT_SCAN_INTERVAL is smaller than
+		     * c->sa_rekey_margin so that the effects of this will
+		     * be unimportant.
+		     * This is just an optimization: correctness is not
+		     * at stake.
+		     *
+		     * Note: we are abusing the DBG mechanism to control
+		     * normal log output.
+		     */
+		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+			, plog("not replacing stale %s SA: inactive for %lus"
+			    , IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"
+			    , (unsigned long)(tm - st->st_outbound_time)));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+			, plog("replacing stale %s SA"
+			    , IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)? "ISAKMP" : "IPsec"));
+		    ipsecdoi_replace(st, 1);
+		}
+		delete_dpd_event(st);
+		event_schedule(EVENT_SA_EXPIRE, st->st_margin, st);
+	    }
+	    break;
+
+	case EVENT_SA_EXPIRE:
+	    {
+		const char *satype;
+		so_serial_t latest;
+
+		if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state))
+		{
+		    satype = "ISAKMP";
+		    latest = c->newest_isakmp_sa;
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    satype = "IPsec";
+		    latest = c->newest_ipsec_sa;
+		}
+
+		if (st->st_serialno != latest)
+		{
+		    /* not very interesting: already superseded */
+		    DBG(DBG_LIFECYCLE
+			, plog("%s SA expired (superseded by #%lu)"
+			    , satype, latest));
+		}
+		else
+		{
+		    plog("%s SA expired (%s)", satype
+			, (c->policy & POLICY_DONT_REKEY)
+			    ? "--dontrekey"
+			    : "LATEST!"
+			);
+		}
+	    }
+	    /* FALLTHROUGH */
+	case EVENT_SO_DISCARD:
+	    /* Delete this state object.  It must be in the hash table. */
+	    delete_state(st);
+	    break;
+
+	case EVENT_DPD:
+	    dpd_outI(st);
+	    break;
+	case EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT:
+	    dpd_timeout(st);
+	    break;
+	case EVENT_NAT_T_KEEPALIVE:
+	    nat_traversal_ka_event();
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "INTERNAL ERROR: ignoring unknown expiring event %s"
+		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, type));
+    }
+
+    pfree(ev);
+    reset_cur_state();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the time until the next event in the queue
+ * expires (never negative), or -1 if no jobs in queue.
+ */
+long
+next_event(void)
+{
+    time_t tm;
+
+    if (evlist == (struct event *) NULL)
+	return -1;
+
+    tm = now();
+
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	if (evlist->ev_state == NULL)
+	    DBG_log("next event %s in %ld seconds"
+		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type)
+		, (long)evlist->ev_time - (long)tm);
+	else
+	    DBG_log("next event %s in %ld seconds for #%lu"
+		, enum_show(&timer_event_names, evlist->ev_type)
+		, (long)evlist->ev_time - (long)tm
+		, evlist->ev_state->st_serialno));
+
+    if (evlist->ev_time - tm <= 0)
+	return 0;
+    else
+	return evlist->ev_time - tm;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delete an event.
+ */
+void
+delete_event(struct state *st)
+{
+    if (st->st_event != (struct event *) NULL)
+    {
+	struct event **ev;
+
+	for (ev = &evlist; ; ev = &(*ev)->ev_next)
+	{
+	    if (*ev == NULL)
+	    {
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event %s to be deleted not found",
+		    enum_show(&timer_event_names, st->st_event->ev_type)));
+		break;
+	    }
+	    if ((*ev) == st->st_event)
+	    {
+		*ev = (*ev)->ev_next;
+
+		if (st->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_RETRANSMIT)
+		    st->st_retransmit = 0;
+		pfree(st->st_event);
+		st->st_event = (struct event *) NULL;
+
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * Delete a DPD event.
+ */
+void
+delete_dpd_event(struct state *st)
+{
+    if (st->st_dpd_event != (struct event *) NULL)
+    {
+        struct event **ev;
+
+        for (ev = &evlist; ; ev = &(*ev)->ev_next)
+        {
+            if (*ev == NULL)
+            {
+                DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("event %s to be deleted not found",
+                    enum_show(&timer_event_names, st->st_dpd_event->ev_type)));
+                break;
+            }
+            if ((*ev) == st->st_dpd_event)
+            {
+                *ev = (*ev)->ev_next;
+                pfree(st->st_dpd_event);
+                st->st_dpd_event = (struct event *) NULL;
+                break;
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/timer.h b/src/pluto/timer.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..92464192c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/timer.h
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/* timing machinery
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001  D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: timer.h,v 1.2 2004/07/29 18:33:45 as Exp $
+ */
+
+extern time_t now(void);	/* careful version of time(2) */
+
+struct state;	/* forward declaration */
+
+struct event
+{
+    time_t          ev_time;
+    int             ev_type;        /* Event type */
+    struct state   *ev_state;       /* Pointer to relevant state (if any) */
+    struct event   *ev_next;        /* Pointer to next event */
+};
+
+extern void event_schedule(enum event_type type, time_t tm, struct state *st);
+extern void handle_timer_event(void);
+extern long next_event(void);
+extern void delete_event(struct state *st);
+extern void delete_dpd_event(struct state *st);
+extern void daily_log_event(void);
diff --git a/src/pluto/vendor.c b/src/pluto/vendor.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..e888d5e16
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/vendor.c
@@ -0,0 +1,528 @@
+/* ISAKMP VendorID
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2005 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: vendor.c,v 1.35 2006/04/12 16:44:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "md5.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "packet.h"
+#include "demux.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "vendor.h"
+#include "kernel.h"
+#include "nat_traversal.h"
+
+/**
+ * Unknown/Special VID:
+ *
+ * SafeNet SoftRemote 8.0.0:
+ *  47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5010201010201010310382e302e3020284275696c6420313029000000
+ *  >> 382e302e3020284275696c6420313029 = '8.0.0 (Build 10)'
+ *  da8e937880010000
+ *
+ * SafeNet SoftRemote 9.0.1
+ *  47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5010201010201010310392e302e3120284275696c6420313229000000
+ *  >> 392e302e3120284275696c6420313229 = '9.0.1 (Build 12)'
+ *  da8e937880010000
+ *
+ * Netscreen:
+ *  d6b45f82f24bacb288af59a978830ab7
+ *  cf49908791073fb46439790fdeb6aeed981101ab0000000500000300
+ *
+ * Cisco:
+ *  1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500300 (VPN 3000 version 3.0.0)
+ *  1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500301 (VPN 3000 version 3.0.1)
+ *  1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500305 (VPN 3000 version 3.0.5)
+ *  1f07f70eaa6514d3b0fa96542a500407 (VPN 3000 version 4.0.7)
+ *  (Can you see the pattern?)
+ *  afcad71368a1f1c96b8696fc77570100 (Non-RFC Dead Peer Detection ?)
+ *  c32364b3b4f447eb17c488ab2a480a57
+ *  6d761ddc26aceca1b0ed11fabbb860c4
+ *  5946c258f99a1a57b03eb9d1759e0f24 (From a Cisco VPN 3k)
+ *  ebbc5b00141d0c895e11bd395902d690 (From a Cisco VPN 3k)
+ *
+ * Microsoft L2TP (???):
+ *  47bbe7c993f1fc13b4e6d0db565c68e5010201010201010310382e312e3020284275696c6420313029000000
+ *  >> 382e312e3020284275696c6420313029 = '8.1.0 (Build 10)'
+ *  3025dbd21062b9e53dc441c6aab5293600000000
+ *  da8e937880010000
+ *
+ * 3COM-superstack
+ *    da8e937880010000
+ *    404bf439522ca3f6
+ *
+
+ * If someone know what they mean, mail me.
+ */
+
+#define MAX_LOG_VID_LEN    32
+
+#define VID_KEEP                   0x0000
+#define VID_MD5HASH                0x0001
+#define VID_STRING                 0x0002
+#define VID_FSWAN_HASH             0x0004
+
+#define VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA     0x0100
+#define VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII    0x0200
+#define VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH        0x0400
+#define VID_SUBSTRING  (VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH)
+
+struct vid_struct {
+	enum known_vendorid id;
+	unsigned short flags;
+	const char *data;
+	const char *descr;
+	const char *vid;
+	u_int vid_len;
+};
+
+#define DEC_MD5_VID_D(id,str,descr) \
+	{ VID_##id, VID_MD5HASH, str, descr, NULL, 0 },
+#define DEC_MD5_VID(id,str) \
+	{ VID_##id, VID_MD5HASH, str, NULL, NULL, 0 },
+#define DEC_FSWAN_VID(id,str,descr) \
+	{ VID_##id, VID_FSWAN_HASH, str, descr, NULL, 0 },
+
+static struct vid_struct _vid_tab[] = {
+
+	/* Implementation names */
+
+	{ VID_OPENPGP, VID_STRING, "OpenPGP10171", "OpenPGP", NULL, 0 },
+
+	DEC_MD5_VID(KAME_RACOON, "KAME/racoon")
+
+	{ VID_MS_NT5, VID_MD5HASH | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
+		"MS NT5 ISAKMPOAKLEY", NULL, NULL, 0 },
+
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL, "SSH Sentinel")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_1, "SSH Sentinel 1.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_2, "SSH Sentinel 1.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_3, "SSH Sentinel 1.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_4, "SSH Sentinel 1.4")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1, "SSH Sentinel 1.4.1")
+
+	/* These ones come from SSH vendors.txt */
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_0,
+		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_1,
+		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_1_2,
+		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.1.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_2_1,
+		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_1_2_2,
+		"Ssh Communications Security IPSEC Express version 1.2.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_0_0,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.0.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_0,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_1,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_2_1_2,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 2.1.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_3_0_0,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_3_0_1,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 3.0.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_0_0,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_0_1,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.0.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_1_0,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.1.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(SSH_IPSEC_4_2_0,
+		"SSH Communications Security IPSEC Express version 4.2.0")
+
+	/* note: md5('CISCO-UNITY') = 12f5f28c457168a9702d9fe274cc02d4 */
+	{ VID_CISCO_UNITY, VID_KEEP, NULL, "Cisco-Unity",
+		"\x12\xf5\xf2\x8c\x45\x71\x68\xa9\x70\x2d\x9f\xe2\x74\xcc\x01\x00",
+		16 },
+
+	{ VID_CISCO3K, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH,
+          NULL, "Cisco VPN 3000 Series" , "\x1f\x07\xf7\x0e\xaa\x65\x14\xd3\xb0\xfa\x96\x54\x2a\x50", 14},
+
+	{ VID_CISCO_IOS, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, 
+	  NULL, "Cisco IOS Device", "\x3e\x98\x40\x48", 4},
+
+	/*
+	 * Timestep VID seen:
+	 *   - 54494d455354455020312053475720313532302033313520322e303145303133
+	 *     = 'TIMESTEP 1 SGW 1520 315 2.01E013'
+	 */
+	{ VID_TIMESTEP, VID_STRING | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII, "TIMESTEP",
+		NULL, NULL, 0 },
+
+	/*
+	 * Netscreen:
+	 * 4865617274426561745f4e6f74696679386b0100  (HeartBeat_Notify + 386b0100)
+	 */
+	{ VID_MISC_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY, VID_STRING | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
+		"HeartBeat_Notify", "HeartBeat Notify", NULL, 0 },
+
+	/*
+	 * MacOS X
+	 */
+	{ VID_MACOSX, VID_STRING|VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA, "Mac OSX 10.x",
+	  "\x4d\xf3\x79\x28\xe9\xfc\x4f\xd1\xb3\x26\x21\x70\xd5\x15\xc6\x62", NULL, 0},
+
+	/*
+	 * Openswan
+	 */
+	DEC_FSWAN_VID(OPENSWAN2, "Openswan 2.2.0", "Openswan 2.2.0")
+	
+	/* NCP */
+	{ VID_NCP_SERVER, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "NCP Server",
+	    "\xc6\xf5\x7a\xc3\x98\xf4\x93\x20\x81\x45\xb7\x58", 12},
+	{ VID_NCP_CLIENT, VID_KEEP | VID_SUBSTRING_MATCH, NULL, "NCP Client",
+	    "\xeb\x4c\x1b\x78\x8a\xfd\x4a\x9c\xb7\x73\x0a\x68", 12},
+
+	/*
+	 * Windows Vista (and Longhorn?)
+	 */
+	DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP, "MS-Negotiation Discovery Capable")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(VISTA_AUTHIP2, "IKE CGA version 1")
+
+	/*
+	 * strongSwan
+	 */
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN,       "strongSwan 4.1.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_1_0, "strongSwan 4.1.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_7, "strongSwan 4.0.7")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_6, "strongSwan 4.0.6")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_5, "strongSwan 4.0.5")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_4, "strongSwan 4.0.4")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_3, "strongSwan 4.0.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_2, "strongSwan 4.0.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_1, "strongSwan 4.0.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_4_0_0, "strongSwan 4.0.0")
+
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_4, "strongSwan 2.8.4")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_3, "strongSwan 2.8.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_2, "strongSwan 2.8.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_1, "strongSwan 2.8.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_8_0, "strongSwan 2.8.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_3, "strongSwan 2.7.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_2, "strongSwan 2.7.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_1, "strongSwan 2.7.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_7_0, "strongSwan 2.7.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_4, "strongSwan 2.6.4")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_3, "strongSwan 2.6.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_2, "strongSwan 2.6.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_1, "strongSwan 2.6.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_6_0, "strongSwan 2.6.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_7, "strongSwan 2.5.7")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_6, "strongSwan 2.5.6")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_5, "strongSwan 2.5.5")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_4, "strongSwan 2.5.4")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_3, "strongSwan 2.5.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_2, "strongSwan 2.5.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_1, "strongSwan 2.5.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_5_0, "strongSwan 2.5.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_4, "strongSwan 2.4.4")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_3, "strongSwan 2.4.3")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_2, "strongSwan 2.4.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_1, "strongSwan 2.4.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_4_0, "strongSwan 2.4.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_2, "strongSwan 2.3.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_1, "strongSwan 2.3.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_3_0, "strongSwan 2.3.0")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_2, "strongSwan 2.2.2")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_1, "strongSwan 2.2.1")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(STRONGSWAN_2_2_0, "strongSwan 2.2.0")
+
+	/* NAT-Traversal */
+
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_STENBERG_01, "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-01")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_STENBERG_02, "draft-stenberg-ipsec-nat-traversal-02")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_HUTTUNEN, "ESPThruNAT")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_HUTTUNEN_ESPINUDP, "draft-huttunen-ipsec-esp-in-udp-00.txt")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_00, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-00")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_02, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02")
+	/* hash in draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02 contains '\n'... Accept both */
+	DEC_MD5_VID_D(NATT_IETF_02_N, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02\n", "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-02_n")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_IETF_03, "draft-ietf-ipsec-nat-t-ike-03")
+	DEC_MD5_VID(NATT_RFC, "RFC 3947")
+
+	/* misc */
+	
+	{ VID_MISC_XAUTH, VID_KEEP, NULL, "XAUTH",
+	    "\x09\x00\x26\x89\xdf\xd6\xb7\x12", 8 },
+
+	{ VID_MISC_DPD, VID_KEEP, NULL, "Dead Peer Detection",
+	    "\xaf\xca\xd7\x13\x68\xa1\xf1\xc9\x6b\x86\x96\xfc\x77\x57\x01\x00", 16 },
+
+	DEC_MD5_VID(MISC_FRAGMENTATION, "FRAGMENTATION")
+	
+	DEC_MD5_VID(INITIAL_CONTACT, "Vid-Initial-Contact")
+
+	/**
+	 * Cisco VPN 3000
+	 */
+	{ VID_MISC_FRAGMENTATION, VID_MD5HASH | VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA,
+	    "FRAGMENTATION", NULL, NULL, 0 },
+
+	/* -- */
+	{ 0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0 }
+
+};
+
+static const char _hexdig[] = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+static int _vid_struct_init = 0;
+
+void
+init_vendorid(void)
+{
+    struct vid_struct *vid;
+    MD5_CTX ctx;
+    int i;
+
+    for (vid = _vid_tab; vid->id; vid++)
+    {
+	if (vid->flags & VID_STRING)
+	{
+	    /** VendorID is a string **/
+	    vid->vid = strdup(vid->data);
+	    vid->vid_len = strlen(vid->data);
+	}
+	else if (vid->flags & VID_MD5HASH)
+	{
+	    /** VendorID is a string to hash with MD5 **/
+	    char *vidm =  malloc(MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	    vid->vid = vidm;
+	    if (vidm)
+	    {
+		MD5Init(&ctx);
+		MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)vid->data, strlen(vid->data));
+		MD5Final(vidm, &ctx);
+		vid->vid_len = MD5_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	    }
+	}
+	else if (vid->flags & VID_FSWAN_HASH)
+	{
+	    /** FreeS/WAN 2.00+ specific hash **/
+#define FSWAN_VID_SIZE 12
+	    unsigned char hash[MD5_DIGEST_SIZE];
+	    char *vidm =  malloc(FSWAN_VID_SIZE);
+
+	    vid->vid = vidm;
+	    if (vidm)
+	    {
+		MD5Init(&ctx);
+		MD5Update(&ctx, (const u_char *)vid->data, strlen(vid->data));
+		MD5Final(hash, &ctx);
+		vidm[0] = 'O';
+		vidm[1] = 'E';
+#if FSWAN_VID_SIZE - 2 <= MD5_DIGEST_SIZE
+		memcpy(vidm + 2, hash, FSWAN_VID_SIZE - 2);
+#else
+		memcpy(vidm + 2, hash, MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+		memset(vidm + 2 + MD5_DIGEST_SIZE, '\0',
+			FSWAN_VID_SIZE - 2 - MD5_DIGEST_SIZE);
+#endif
+		for (i = 2; i < FSWAN_VID_SIZE; i++)
+		{
+		    vidm[i] &= 0x7f;
+		    vidm[i] |= 0x40;
+		}
+		vid->vid_len = FSWAN_VID_SIZE;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	if (vid->descr == NULL)
+	{
+	    /** Find something to display **/
+	    vid->descr = vid->data;
+	}
+    }
+    _vid_struct_init = 1;
+}
+
+static void
+handle_known_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md
+, const char *vidstr, size_t len, struct vid_struct *vid)
+{
+    char vid_dump[128];
+    bool vid_useful = FALSE;
+    size_t i, j;
+
+    switch (vid->id) {
+    /* Remote side supports OpenPGP certificates */
+    case VID_OPENPGP:
+	md->openpgp = TRUE;
+	vid_useful = TRUE;
+	break;
+
+    /*
+     * Use most recent supported NAT-Traversal method and ignore the
+     * other ones (implementations will send all supported methods but
+     * only one will be used)
+     *
+     * Note: most recent == higher id in vendor.h
+     */
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_00:
+	if (!nat_traversal_support_non_ike)
+	    break;
+	if ((nat_traversal_enabled) && (!md->nat_traversal_vid))
+	{
+	    md->nat_traversal_vid = vid->id;
+	    vid_useful = TRUE;
+	}
+	break;
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_02:
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_02_N:
+    case VID_NATT_IETF_03:
+    case VID_NATT_RFC:
+	if (nat_traversal_support_port_floating
+	&& md->nat_traversal_vid < vid->id)
+	{
+	    md->nat_traversal_vid = vid->id;
+	    vid_useful = TRUE;
+	}
+	break;
+
+    /* Remote side would like to do DPD with us on this connection */
+    case VID_MISC_DPD:
+	md->dpd = TRUE;
+	vid_useful = TRUE;
+	break;
+    case VID_MISC_XAUTH:
+	vid_useful = TRUE;
+	break;
+    default:
+	break;
+    }
+
+    if (vid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPHEXA)
+    {
+	/* Dump description + Hexa */
+	memset(vid_dump, 0, sizeof(vid_dump));
+	snprintf(vid_dump, sizeof(vid_dump), "%s ",
+		 vid->descr ? vid->descr : "");
+	for (i = strlen(vid_dump), j = vid->vid_len;
+	     j < len && i < sizeof(vid_dump) - 2;
+	     i += 2, j++)
+	{
+	    vid_dump[i] = _hexdig[(vidstr[j] >> 4) & 0xF];
+	    vid_dump[i+1] = _hexdig[vidstr[j] & 0xF];
+	}
+    }
+    else if (vid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING_DUMPASCII)
+    {
+	/* Dump ASCII content */
+	memset(vid_dump, 0, sizeof(vid_dump));
+	for (i = 0; i < len && i < sizeof(vid_dump) - 1; i++)
+	{
+	    vid_dump[i] = (isprint(vidstr[i])) ? vidstr[i] : '.';
+	}
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	/* Dump description (descr) */
+	snprintf(vid_dump, sizeof(vid_dump), "%s",
+		 vid->descr ? vid->descr : "");
+    }
+
+    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s Vendor ID payload [%s]",
+	    vid_useful ? "received" : "ignoring", vid_dump);
+}
+
+void
+handle_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md, const char *vid, size_t len)
+{
+    struct vid_struct *pvid;
+
+    if (!_vid_struct_init)
+	init_vendorid();
+
+    /*
+     * Find known VendorID in _vid_tab
+     */
+    for (pvid = _vid_tab; pvid->id; pvid++)
+    {
+	if (pvid->vid && vid && pvid->vid_len && len)
+	{
+	    if (pvid->vid_len == len)
+	    {
+		if (memcmp(pvid->vid, vid, len) == 0)
+		{
+		    handle_known_vendorid(md, vid, len, pvid);
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+	    else if ((pvid->vid_len < len) && (pvid->flags & VID_SUBSTRING))
+	    {
+		if (memcmp(pvid->vid, vid, pvid->vid_len) == 0)
+		{
+		    handle_known_vendorid(md, vid, len, pvid);
+		    return;
+		}
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Unknown VendorID. Log the beginning.
+     */
+    {
+	char log_vid[2*MAX_LOG_VID_LEN+1];
+	size_t i;
+
+	memset(log_vid, 0, sizeof(log_vid));
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len && i < MAX_LOG_VID_LEN; i++)
+	{
+	    log_vid[2*i] = _hexdig[(vid[i] >> 4) & 0xF];
+	    log_vid[2*i+1] = _hexdig[vid[i] & 0xF];
+	}
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Vendor ID payload [%s%s]",
+	       log_vid, (len>MAX_LOG_VID_LEN) ? "..." : "");
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Add a vendor id payload to the msg
+ */
+bool
+out_vendorid (u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs, enum known_vendorid vid)
+{
+    struct vid_struct *pvid;
+
+    if (!_vid_struct_init)
+	init_vendorid();
+
+    for (pvid = _vid_tab; pvid->id && pvid->id != vid; pvid++);
+
+    if (pvid->id != vid)
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* not found */
+    if (!pvid->vid)
+	return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* not initialized */
+
+    DBG(DBG_EMITTING,
+	DBG_log("out_vendorid(): sending [%s]", pvid->descr)
+    )
+    return out_generic_raw(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, outs,
+		pvid->vid, pvid->vid_len, "V_ID");
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/vendor.h b/src/pluto/vendor.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8e0444f4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/vendor.h
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+/* FreeS/WAN ISAKMP VendorID
+ * Copyright (C) 2002-2003 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: vendor.h,v 1.30 2006/04/12 16:44:28 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _VENDOR_H_
+#define _VENDOR_H_
+
+enum known_vendorid {
+/* 1 - 100 : Implementation names */
+  VID_OPENPGP			=  1,
+  VID_KAME_RACOON		=  2,
+  VID_MS_NT5			=  3,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL		=  4,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_1		=  5,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_2		=  6,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_3		=  7,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4		=  8,
+  VID_SSH_SENTINEL_1_4_1	=  9,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_0		= 10,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_1		= 11,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_1_2		= 12,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_2_1		= 13,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_1_2_2		= 14,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_0_0		= 15,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_0		= 16,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_1		= 17,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_2_1_2		= 18,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_3_0_0		= 19,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_3_0_1		= 20,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_0_0		= 21,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_0_1		= 22,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_1_0		= 23,
+  VID_SSH_IPSEC_4_2_0		= 24,
+  VID_CISCO_UNITY		= 25,
+  VID_CISCO3K			= 26,
+  VID_CISCO_IOS			= 27,
+  VID_TIMESTEP			= 28,
+  VID_SAFENET			= 29,
+  VID_MACOSX			= 30,
+  VID_OPENSWAN2			= 31,
+  VID_NCP_SERVER		= 32,
+  VID_NCP_CLIENT		= 33,
+  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP		= 34,
+  VID_VISTA_AUTHIP2		= 35,
+
+  VID_STRONGSWAN		= 36,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_0		= 37,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_1		= 38,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_2_2		= 39,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_0		= 40,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_1		= 41,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_3_2		= 42,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_0		= 43,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_1		= 44,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_2		= 45,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_3		= 46,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_4_4		= 47,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_0		= 48,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_1		= 49,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_2		= 50,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_3		= 51,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_4		= 52,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_5		= 53,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_6		= 54,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_5_7		= 55,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_0		= 56,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_1		= 57,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_2		= 58,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_3		= 59,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_6_4		= 60,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_0		= 61,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_1		= 62,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_2		= 63,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_7_3		= 64,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_0		= 65,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_1		= 66,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_2		= 67,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_3		= 68,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_2_8_4		= 69,
+
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_0		= 70,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_1		= 71,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_2		= 72,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_3		= 73,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_4		= 74,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_5		= 75,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_6		= 76,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_0_7		= 77,
+  VID_STRONGSWAN_4_1_0		= 78,
+
+  /* 101 - 200 : NAT-Traversal */
+  VID_NATT_STENBERG_01		=101,
+  VID_NATT_STENBERG_02		=102,
+  VID_NATT_HUTTUNEN		=103,
+  VID_NATT_HUTTUNEN_ESPINUDP	=104,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_00		=105,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_02_N		=106,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_02		=107,
+  VID_NATT_IETF_03		=108,
+  VID_NATT_RFC			=109,
+
+  /* 201 - 300 : Misc */
+  VID_MISC_XAUTH		=201,
+  VID_MISC_DPD			=202,
+  VID_MISC_HEARTBEAT_NOTIFY	=203,
+  VID_MISC_FRAGMENTATION	=204,
+  VID_INITIAL_CONTACT		=205,
+  VID_CISCO3K_FRAGMENTATION	=206
+};
+
+void init_vendorid(void);
+
+struct msg_digest;
+void handle_vendorid (struct msg_digest *md, const char *vid, size_t len);
+
+bool out_vendorid (u_int8_t np, pb_stream *outs, enum known_vendorid vid);
+
+#endif /* _VENDOR_H_ */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/virtual.c b/src/pluto/virtual.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d1553364e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/virtual.c
@@ -0,0 +1,334 @@
+/* FreeS/WAN Virtual IP Management
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: virtual.c,v 1.4 2004/04/02 10:38:52 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "connections.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "virtual.h"
+
+#define F_VIRTUAL_NO          1
+#define F_VIRTUAL_DHCP        2
+#define F_VIRTUAL_IKE_CONFIG  4
+#define F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE     8
+#define F_VIRTUAL_ALL         16
+#define F_VIRTUAL_HOST        32
+
+struct virtual_t {
+    unsigned short flags;
+    unsigned short n_net;
+    ip_subnet net[0];
+};
+
+static ip_subnet *private_net_ok=NULL, *private_net_ko=NULL;
+static unsigned short private_net_ok_len=0, private_net_ko_len=0;
+
+/**
+ * read %v4:x.x.x.x/y or %v6:xxxxxxxxx/yy
+ * or %v4:!x.x.x.x/y if dstko not NULL
+ */
+static bool
+_read_subnet(const char *src, size_t len, ip_subnet *dst, ip_subnet *dstko,
+    bool *isok)
+{
+    bool ok;
+    int af;
+
+    if ((len > 4) && (strncmp(src, "%v4:", 4)==0))
+    {
+	af = AF_INET;
+    }
+    else if ((len > 4) && (strncmp(src, "%v6:", 4)==0))
+    {
+	af = AF_INET6;
+    }
+    else
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    ok = (src[4] != '!');
+    src += ok ? 4 : 5;
+    len -= ok ? 4 : 5;
+
+    if (!len)
+	return FALSE;
+    if (!ok && !dstko)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    passert ( ((ok)?(dst):(dstko))!=NULL );
+
+    if (ttosubnet(src, len, af, ((ok)?(dst):(dstko))))
+    {
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+    if (isok)
+	*isok = ok;
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+void
+init_virtual_ip(const char *private_list)
+{
+    const char *next, *str=private_list;
+    unsigned short ign = 0, i_ok, i_ko;
+    ip_subnet sub;
+    bool ok;
+
+    /** Count **/
+    private_net_ok_len=0;
+    private_net_ko_len=0;
+
+    while (str)
+    {
+	next = strchr(str,',');
+	if (!next)
+	    next = str + strlen(str);
+	if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &sub, &sub, &ok))
+	    if (ok)
+		private_net_ok_len++;
+	    else
+		private_net_ko_len++;
+	else
+	    ign++;
+	str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+    }
+
+    if (!ign)
+    {
+	/** Allocate **/
+	if (private_net_ok_len)
+	{
+	    private_net_ok = (ip_subnet *)alloc_bytes(
+		(private_net_ok_len*sizeof(ip_subnet)),
+		"private_net_ok subnets");
+	}
+	if (private_net_ko_len)
+	{
+	    private_net_ko = (ip_subnet *)alloc_bytes(
+		(private_net_ko_len*sizeof(ip_subnet)),
+		"private_net_ko subnets");
+	}
+	if ((private_net_ok_len && !private_net_ok)
+	||  (private_net_ko_len && !private_net_ko))
+	{
+	    loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+		"can't alloc in init_virtual_ip");
+	    pfreeany(private_net_ok);
+	    private_net_ok = NULL;
+	    pfreeany(private_net_ko);
+	    private_net_ko = NULL;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    /** Fill **/
+	    str = private_list;
+	    i_ok = 0;
+	    i_ko = 0;
+
+	    while (str)
+	    {
+		next = strchr(str,',');
+		if (!next)
+		    next = str + strlen(str);
+		if (_read_subnet(str, next-str,
+		   &(private_net_ok[i_ok]), &(private_net_ko[i_ko]), &ok))
+		{
+		    if (ok)
+			i_ok++;
+		    else
+			i_ko++;
+		}
+		str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+	    }
+	}
+    }
+    else
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS,
+	    "%d bad entries in virtual_private - none loaded", ign);
+}
+
+/**
+ * virtual string must be :
+ * {vhost,vnet}:[%method]*
+ *
+ * vhost = accept only a host (/32)
+ * vnet  = accept any network
+ *
+ * %no   = no virtual IP (accept public IP)
+ * %dhcp = accept DHCP SA (0.0.0.0/0) of affected IP  [not implemented]
+ * %ike  = accept affected IKE Config Mode IP         [not implemented]
+ * %priv = accept system-wide private net list
+ * %v4:x = accept ipv4 in list 'x'
+ * %v6:x = accept ipv6 in list 'x'
+ * %all  = accept all ips                             [only for testing]
+ *
+ * ex: vhost:%no,%dhcp,%priv,%v4:192.168.1.0/24
+ */
+struct virtual_t
+*create_virtual(const struct connection *c, const char *string)
+{
+    unsigned short flags=0, n_net=0, i;
+    const char *str = string, *next, *first_net=NULL;
+    ip_subnet sub;
+    struct virtual_t *v;
+
+    if (!string || string[0] == '\0')
+	return NULL;
+
+    if (strlen(string) >= 6 && strncmp(string,"vhost:",6) == 0)
+    {
+	flags |= F_VIRTUAL_HOST;
+	str += 6;
+    }
+    else if (strlen(string) >= 5 && strncmp(string,"vnet:",5) == 0)
+	str += 5;
+    else
+	goto fail;
+
+    /**
+     * Parse string : fill flags & count subnets
+     */
+    while ((str) && (*str))
+    {
+	next = strchr(str,',');
+	if (!next) next = str + strlen(str);
+	if (next-str == 3 && strncmp(str, "%no", 3) == 0)
+	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_NO;
+#if 0
+	else if (next-str == 4 && strncmp(str, "%ike", 4) == 0)
+	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_IKE_CONFIG;
+	else if (next-str == 5 && strncmp(str, "%dhcp", 5) == 0)
+	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_DHCP;
+#endif
+	else if (next-str == 5 && strncmp(str, "%priv", 5) == 0)
+	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE;
+	else if (next-str == 4 && strncmp(str, "%all", 4) == 0)
+	    flags |= F_VIRTUAL_ALL;
+	else if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &sub, NULL, NULL))
+	{
+	    n_net++;
+	    if (!first_net)
+		first_net = str;
+	}
+	else
+	    goto fail;
+	
+	str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+    }
+
+    v = (struct virtual_t *)alloc_bytes(
+	sizeof(struct virtual_t) + (n_net*sizeof(ip_subnet)),
+	"virtual description");
+    if (!v) goto fail;
+
+    v->flags = flags;
+    v->n_net = n_net;
+    if (n_net && first_net)
+    {
+	/**
+	 * Save subnets in newly allocated struct
+	 */
+	for (str = first_net, i = 0; str && *str; )
+	{
+	    next = strchr(str,',');
+	    if (!next) next = str + strlen(str);
+	    if (_read_subnet(str, next-str, &(v->net[i]), NULL, NULL))
+		i++;
+	    str = *next ? next+1 : NULL;
+	}
+    }
+
+    return v;
+
+fail:
+    plog("invalid virtual string [%s] - "
+	"virtual selection disabled for connection '%s'", string, c->name);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+bool
+is_virtual_end(const struct end *that)
+{
+    return ((that->virt)?TRUE:FALSE);
+}
+
+bool
+is_virtual_connection(const struct connection *c)
+{
+    return ((c->spd.that.virt)?TRUE:FALSE);
+}
+
+static bool
+net_in_list(const ip_subnet *peer_net, const ip_subnet *list,
+    unsigned short len)
+{
+    unsigned short i;
+
+    if (!list || !len)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+    {
+	if (subnetinsubnet(peer_net, &(list[i])))
+	    return TRUE;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+bool
+is_virtual_net_allowed(const struct connection *c, const ip_subnet *peer_net,
+	const ip_address *his_addr)
+{
+    if (c->spd.that.virt == NULL)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_HOST)
+    &&  !subnetishost(peer_net))
+	return FALSE;
+
+    if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_NO)
+    &&  subnetishost(peer_net) &&  addrinsubnet(his_addr, peer_net))
+	return TRUE;
+
+    if ((c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_PRIVATE)
+    &&   net_in_list(peer_net, private_net_ok, private_net_ok_len)
+    &&  !net_in_list(peer_net, private_net_ko, private_net_ko_len))
+	return TRUE;
+
+    if (c->spd.that.virt->n_net
+    &&  net_in_list(peer_net, c->spd.that.virt->net, c->spd.that.virt->n_net))
+	return TRUE;
+    
+    if (c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_ALL)
+    {
+	/** %all must only be used for testing - log it **/
+	loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Warning - "
+	    "v%s:%%all must only be used for testing",
+	    (c->spd.that.virt->flags & F_VIRTUAL_HOST) ? "host" : "net");
+	return TRUE;
+    }
+
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/virtual.h b/src/pluto/virtual.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2d5bf27ae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/virtual.h
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/* FreeS/WAN Virtual IP Management
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: virtual.h,v 1.2 2004/03/22 21:53:20 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _VIRTUAL_IP_H
+#define _VIRTUAL_IP_H
+
+extern void init_virtual_ip(const char *private_list);
+
+extern struct virtual_t *create_virtual(const struct connection *c,
+    const char *string);
+
+extern bool is_virtual_end(const struct end *that);
+extern bool is_virtual_connection(const struct connection *c);
+extern bool is_virtual_net_allowed(const struct connection *c,
+    const ip_subnet *peer_net, const ip_address *his_addr);
+
+#endif /* _VIRTUAL_IP_H */
+
diff --git a/src/pluto/x509.c b/src/pluto/x509.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..2521244f7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/x509.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2241 @@
+/* Support of X.509 certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2000 Andreas Hess, Patric Lichtsteiner, Roger Wegmann
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Marco Bertossa, Andreas Schleiss
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Mario Strasser
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: x509.c,v 1.36 2006/04/10 16:08:33 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <dirent.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+#include <ipsec_policy.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "mp_defs.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "id.h"
+#include "asn1.h"
+#include "oid.h"
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "x509.h"
+#include "crl.h"
+#include "ca.h"
+#include "certs.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "whack.h"
+#include "fetch.h"
+#include "ocsp.h"
+#include "sha1.h"
+
+/* chained lists of X.509 end certificates */
+
+static x509cert_t *x509certs     = NULL;
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of a basicConstraints extension */
+
+static const asn1Object_t basicConstraintsObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "basicConstraints",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "CA",				ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,   "pathLenConstraint",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 1,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  3 */
+};
+
+#define BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA	1
+#define BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_ROOF	4
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of time */
+
+static const asn1Object_t timeObjects[] = {
+  { 0,   "utcTime",			ASN1_UTCTIME,         ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
+  { 0,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }, /*  1 */
+  { 0,   "generalizeTime",		ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, ASN1_OPT |
+							      ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 0,   "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,             ASN1_END  }  /*  3 */
+};
+
+#define TIME_UTC		0
+#define TIME_GENERALIZED	2
+#define TIME_ROOF		4
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of a keyIdentifier */
+
+static const asn1Object_t keyIdentifierObjects[] = {
+  { 0,   "keyIdentifier",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }  /*  0 */
+};
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of a authorityKeyIdentifier extension */
+
+static const asn1Object_t authorityKeyIdentifierObjects[] = {
+  { 0,   "authorityKeyIdentifier",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,     "keyIdentifier",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+  { 1,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
+  { 1,     "authorityCertIssuer",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  3 */
+  { 1,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  4 */
+  { 1,     "authorityCertSerialNumber",	ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+  { 1,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  6 */
+};
+
+#define AUTH_KEY_ID_KEY_ID		1
+#define AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_ISSUER		3
+#define AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_SERIAL		5
+#define AUTH_KEY_ID_ROOF		7
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of a authorityInfoAccess extension */
+
+static const asn1Object_t authorityInfoAccessObjects[] = {
+  { 0,   "authorityInfoAccess",         ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,     "accessDescription",         ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,       "accessMethod",            ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 2,       "accessLocation",          ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  3 */
+  { 0,   "end loop",                    ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  4 */
+};
+
+#define AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_METHOD		2
+#define AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION	3
+#define AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_ROOF		5
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of a extendedKeyUsage extension */
+
+static const asn1Object_t extendedKeyUsageObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "extendedKeyUsage",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "keyPurposeID",		ASN1_OID,     	   ASN1_BODY }, /*  1 */
+  { 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,	   ASN1_END  }, /*  2 */
+};
+
+#define EXT_KEY_USAGE_PURPOSE_ID	1
+#define EXT_KEY_USAGE_ROOF		3
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of generalNames */
+
+static const asn1Object_t generalNamesObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "generalNames",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "generalName",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  1 */
+  { 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /*  2 */
+};
+
+#define GENERAL_NAMES_GN	1
+#define GENERAL_NAMES_ROOF	3
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of generalName */
+
+static const asn1Object_t generalNameObjects[] = {
+  { 0,   "otherName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  1 */
+  { 0,   "rfc822Name",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_1,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  2 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  3 */
+  { 0,   "dnsName",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_2,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  5 */
+  { 0,   "x400Address",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_3,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  6 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
+  { 0,   "directoryName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_4,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+  { 0,   "ediPartyName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_5,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
+  { 0,   "uniformResourceIdentifier",	ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 12 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 13 */
+  { 0,   "ipAddress",			ASN1_CONTEXT_S_7,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 14 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 15 */
+  { 0,   "registeredID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_S_8,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
+  { 0,   "end choice",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }  /* 17 */
+};
+
+#define GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME	 0
+#define GN_OBJ_RFC822_NAME	 2
+#define GN_OBJ_DNS_NAME		 4
+#define GN_OBJ_X400_ADDRESS	 6
+#define GN_OBJ_DIRECTORY_NAME	 8
+#define GN_OBJ_EDI_PARTY_NAME	10
+#define GN_OBJ_URI		12
+#define GN_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS	14
+#define GN_OBJ_REGISTERED_ID	16
+#define GN_OBJ_ROOF		18
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of otherName */
+
+static const asn1Object_t otherNameObjects[] = {
+  {0, "type-id",			ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /*  0 */
+  {0, "value",				ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_BODY }  /*  1 */
+};
+
+#define ON_OBJ_ID_TYPE		0
+#define ON_OBJ_VALUE		1
+#define ON_OBJ_ROOF		2
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of crlDistributionPoints */
+
+static const asn1Object_t crlDistributionPointsObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "crlDistributionPoints",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "DistributionPoint",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,     "distributionPoint",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_LOOP }, /*  2 */
+  { 3,       "fullName",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  3 */
+  { 3,       "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  4 */
+  { 3,       "nameRelativeToCRLIssuer",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  5 */
+  { 3,       "end choice",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  6 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  7 */
+  { 2,     "reasons",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /*  8 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /*  9 */
+  { 2,     "crlIssuer",			ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,  ASN1_OPT |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 10 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 11 */
+  { 0, "end loop",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 12 */
+};
+
+#define CRL_DIST_POINTS_FULLNAME	 3
+#define CRL_DIST_POINTS_ROOF		13
+
+/* ASN.1 definition of an X.509v3 certificate */
+
+static const asn1Object_t certObjects[] = {
+  { 0, "certificate",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  0 */
+  { 1,   "tbsCertificate",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  1 */
+  { 2,     "DEFAULT v1",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0,  ASN1_DEF  }, /*  2 */
+  { 3,       "version",			ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  3 */
+  { 2,     "serialNumber",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /*  4 */
+  { 2,     "signature",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  5 */
+  { 2,     "issuer",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /*  6 */
+  { 2,     "validity",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /*  7 */
+  { 3,       "notBefore",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  8 */
+  { 3,       "notAfter",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /*  9 */
+  { 2,     "subject",			ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 10 */
+  { 2,     "subjectPublicKeyInfo",	ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 11 */
+  { 3,       "algorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 12 */
+  { 3,       "subjectPublicKey",	ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_NONE }, /* 13 */
+  { 4,         "RSAPublicKey",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_OBJ  }, /* 14 */
+  { 5,           "modulus",		ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 15 */
+  { 5,           "publicExponent",	ASN1_INTEGER,      ASN1_BODY }, /* 16 */
+  { 2,     "issuerUniqueID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_1,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 17 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 18 */
+  { 2,     "subjectUniqueID",		ASN1_CONTEXT_C_2,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 19 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 20 */
+  { 2,     "optional extensions",	ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3,  ASN1_OPT  }, /* 21 */
+  { 3,       "extensions",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_LOOP }, /* 22 */
+  { 4,         "extension",		ASN1_SEQUENCE,     ASN1_NONE }, /* 23 */
+  { 5,           "extnID",		ASN1_OID,          ASN1_BODY }, /* 24 */
+  { 5,           "critical",		ASN1_BOOLEAN,      ASN1_DEF |
+							   ASN1_BODY }, /* 25 */
+  { 5,           "extnValue",		ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_BODY }, /* 26 */
+  { 3,       "end loop",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 27 */
+  { 2,     "end opt",			ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_END  }, /* 28 */
+  { 1,   "signatureAlgorithm",		ASN1_EOC,          ASN1_RAW  }, /* 29 */
+  { 1,   "signatureValue",		ASN1_BIT_STRING,   ASN1_BODY }  /* 30 */
+};
+
+#define X509_OBJ_CERTIFICATE			 0
+#define X509_OBJ_TBS_CERTIFICATE		 1
+#define X509_OBJ_VERSION			 3
+#define X509_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER			 4
+#define X509_OBJ_SIG_ALG			 5
+#define X509_OBJ_ISSUER 			 6
+#define X509_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE			 8
+#define X509_OBJ_NOT_AFTER			 9
+#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT			10
+#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM	12
+#define X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY		13
+#define X509_OBJ_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY			14
+#define X509_OBJ_MODULUS			15
+#define X509_OBJ_PUBLIC_EXPONENT		16
+#define X509_OBJ_EXTN_ID			24
+#define X509_OBJ_CRITICAL			25
+#define X509_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE			26
+#define X509_OBJ_ALGORITHM			29
+#define X509_OBJ_SIGNATURE			30
+#define X509_OBJ_ROOF				31
+
+
+const x509cert_t empty_x509cert = {
+      NULL        , /* *next */
+    UNDEFINED_TIME, /* installed */
+            0     , /* count */
+      FALSE       , /* smartcard */
+     AUTH_NONE    , /* authority_flags */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /* certificate */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*   tbsCertificate */
+            1	  , /*     version */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     serialNumber */
+    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*     sigAlg */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     issuer */
+                    /*     validity */
+            0     , /*       notBefore */
+            0     , /*       notAfter */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*     subject */
+                    /*     subjectPublicKeyInfo */
+    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*       subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*       subjectPublicKey */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*         modulus */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*         publicExponent */
+                    /*     issuerUniqueID */
+                    /*     subjectUniqueID */
+                    /*     extensions */
+                    /*       extension */
+                    /*         extnID */
+                    /*         critical */
+                    /*         extnValue */
+      FALSE       , /*           isCA */
+      FALSE       , /*           isOcspSigner */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           subjectKeyID */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeyID */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           authKeySerialNumber */
+    { NULL, 0 }   , /*           accessLocation */
+      NULL        , /*           subjectAltName */
+      NULL        , /*           crlDistributionPoints */
+    OID_UNKNOWN   , /*   algorithm */
+    { NULL, 0 }     /*   signature */
+};
+
+/* coding of X.501 distinguished name */
+
+typedef struct {
+    const u_char *name;
+    chunk_t oid;
+    u_char type;
+} x501rdn_t;
+
+/* X.501 acronyms for well known object identifiers (OIDs) */
+
+static u_char oid_ND[]  = {0x02, 0x82, 0x06, 0x01,
+			   0x0A, 0x07, 0x14};
+static u_char oid_UID[] = {0x09, 0x92, 0x26, 0x89, 0x93,
+			   0xF2, 0x2C, 0x64, 0x01, 0x01};
+static u_char oid_DC[]  = {0x09, 0x92, 0x26, 0x89, 0x93,
+			   0xF2, 0x2C, 0x64, 0x01, 0x19};
+static u_char oid_CN[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x03};
+static u_char oid_S[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x04};
+static u_char oid_SN[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x05};
+static u_char oid_C[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x06};
+static u_char oid_L[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x07};
+static u_char oid_ST[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x08};
+static u_char oid_O[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x0A};
+static u_char oid_OU[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x0B};
+static u_char oid_T[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x0C};
+static u_char oid_D[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x0D};
+static u_char oid_N[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x29};
+static u_char oid_G[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x2A};
+static u_char oid_I[]   = {0x55, 0x04, 0x2B};
+static u_char oid_ID[]  = {0x55, 0x04, 0x2D};
+static u_char oid_EN[]  = {0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x86,
+			   0xF8, 0x42, 0x03, 0x01, 0x03};
+static u_char oid_E[]   = {0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7,
+			   0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01};
+static u_char oid_UN[]  = {0x2A, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xF7,
+			   0x0D, 0x01, 0x09, 0x02};
+static u_char oid_TCGID[] = {0x2B, 0x06, 0x01, 0x04, 0x01, 0x89,
+			     0x31, 0x01, 0x01, 0x02, 0x02, 0x4B};
+
+static const x501rdn_t x501rdns[] = {
+  {"ND"              , {oid_ND,     7}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"UID"             , {oid_UID,   10}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"DC"              , {oid_DC,    10}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"CN"              , {oid_CN,     3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"S"               , {oid_S,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"SN"              , {oid_SN,     3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"serialNumber"    , {oid_SN,     3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"C"               , {oid_C,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"L"               , {oid_L,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"ST"              , {oid_ST,     3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"O"               , {oid_O,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"OU"              , {oid_OU,     3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"T"               , {oid_T,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"D"               , {oid_D,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"N"               , {oid_N,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"G"               , {oid_G,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"I"               , {oid_I,      3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"ID"              , {oid_ID,     3}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"EN"              , {oid_EN,    10}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"employeeNumber"  , {oid_EN,    10}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING},
+  {"E"               , {oid_E,      9}, ASN1_IA5STRING},
+  {"Email"           , {oid_E,      9}, ASN1_IA5STRING},
+  {"emailAddress"    , {oid_E,      9}, ASN1_IA5STRING},
+  {"UN"              , {oid_UN,     9}, ASN1_IA5STRING},
+  {"unstructuredName", {oid_UN,     9}, ASN1_IA5STRING},
+  {"TCGID"           , {oid_TCGID, 12}, ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING}
+};
+
+#define X501_RDN_ROOF   26
+
+static u_char ASN1_subjectAltName_oid_str[] = {
+    0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x1D, 0x11
+};
+
+static const chunk_t ASN1_subjectAltName_oid = strchunk(ASN1_subjectAltName_oid_str);
+
+static void
+update_chunk(chunk_t *ch, int n)
+{
+    n = (n > -1 && n < (int)ch->len)? n : (int)ch->len-1;
+    ch->ptr += n; ch->len -= n;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Pointer is set to the first RDN in a DN
+ */
+static err_t
+init_rdn(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *rdn, chunk_t *attribute, bool *next)
+{
+    *rdn = empty_chunk;
+    *attribute = empty_chunk;
+
+    /* a DN is a SEQUENCE OF RDNs */
+
+    if (*dn.ptr != ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+    {
+	return "DN is not a SEQUENCE";
+    }
+
+    rdn->len = asn1_length(&dn);
+
+    if (rdn->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	return "Invalid RDN length";
+
+    rdn->ptr = dn.ptr;
+
+    /* are there any RDNs ? */
+    *next = rdn->len > 0;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Fetches the next RDN in a DN
+ */
+static err_t
+get_next_rdn(chunk_t *rdn, chunk_t * attribute, chunk_t *oid, chunk_t *value
+, asn1_t *type, bool *next)
+{
+    chunk_t body;
+
+    /* initialize return values */
+    *oid   = empty_chunk;
+    *value = empty_chunk;
+
+    /* if all attributes have been parsed, get next rdn */
+    if (attribute->len <= 0)
+    {
+	/* an RDN is a SET OF attributeTypeAndValue */
+	if (*rdn->ptr != ASN1_SET)
+	    return "RDN is not a SET";
+
+	attribute->len = asn1_length(rdn);
+	
+	if (attribute->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	    return "Invalid attribute length";
+
+	attribute->ptr = rdn->ptr;
+
+	/* advance to start of next RDN */
+	rdn->ptr += attribute->len;
+	rdn->len -= attribute->len;
+    }
+
+    /* an attributeTypeAndValue is a SEQUENCE */
+    if (*attribute->ptr != ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ 	return "attributeTypeAndValue is not a SEQUENCE";
+
+    /* extract the attribute body */
+    body.len = asn1_length(attribute);
+    
+    if (body.len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	return "Invalid attribute body length";
+
+    body.ptr = attribute->ptr;
+    
+    /* advance to start of next attribute */
+    attribute->ptr += body.len;
+    attribute->len -= body.len;
+
+    /* attribute type is an OID */
+    if (*body.ptr != ASN1_OID)
+	return "attributeType is not an OID";
+
+    /* extract OID */
+    oid->len = asn1_length(&body);
+    
+    if (oid->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	return "Invalid attribute OID length";
+
+    oid->ptr = body.ptr;
+
+    /* advance to the attribute value */
+    body.ptr += oid->len;
+    body.len -= oid->len;
+
+    /* extract string type */
+    *type = *body.ptr;
+
+    /* extract string value */
+    value->len = asn1_length(&body);
+    
+    if (value->len == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+	return "Invalid attribute string length";
+
+    value->ptr = body.ptr;
+
+    /* are there any RDNs left? */
+    *next = rdn->len > 0 || attribute->len > 0;
+
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Parses an ASN.1 distinguished name int its OID/value pairs
+ */
+static err_t
+dn_parse(chunk_t dn, chunk_t *str)
+{
+    chunk_t rdn, oid, attribute, value;
+    asn1_t type;
+    int oid_code;
+    bool next;
+    bool first = TRUE;
+
+    err_t ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
+
+    if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+        return ugh;
+
+    while (next)
+    {
+	ugh = get_next_rdn(&rdn, &attribute, &oid, &value, &type, &next);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+	    return ugh;
+
+	if (first)		/* first OID/value pair */
+	    first = FALSE;
+	else			/* separate OID/value pair by a comma */
+	    update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,", "));
+
+	/* print OID */
+	oid_code = known_oid(oid);
+	if (oid_code == OID_UNKNOWN)	/* OID not found in list */
+	    hex_str(oid, str);
+	else
+	    update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"%s",
+			      oid_names[oid_code].name));
+
+	/* print value */
+	update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"=%.*s",
+			      (int)value.len,value.ptr));
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Count the number of wildcard RDNs in a distinguished name
+ */
+int
+dn_count_wildcards(chunk_t dn)
+{
+    chunk_t rdn, attribute, oid, value;
+    asn1_t type;
+    bool next;
+    int wildcards = 0;
+
+    err_t ugh = init_rdn(dn, &rdn, &attribute, &next);
+
+    if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+        return -1;
+
+    while (next)
+    {
+	ugh = get_next_rdn(&rdn, &attribute, &oid, &value, &type, &next);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL) /* a parsing error has occured */
+	    return -1;
+	if (value.len == 1 && *value.ptr == '*')
+	    wildcards++; /* we have found a wildcard RDN */
+    }
+    return wildcards;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Prints a binary string in hexadecimal form
+ */
+void
+hex_str(chunk_t bin, chunk_t *str)
+{
+    u_int i;
+    update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"0x"));
+    for (i=0; i < bin.len; i++)
+	update_chunk(str, snprintf(str->ptr,str->len,"%02X",*bin.ptr++));
+}
+
+
+/*  Converts a binary DER-encoded ASN.1 distinguished name
+ *  into LDAP-style human-readable ASCII format
+ */
+int
+dntoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn)
+{
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+    chunk_t str;
+
+    str.ptr = dst;
+    str.len = dstlen;
+    ugh = dn_parse(dn, &str);
+
+    if (ugh != NULL) /* error, print DN as hex string */
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	    DBG_log("error in DN parsing: %s", ugh)
+	)
+	str.ptr = dst;
+	str.len = dstlen;
+	hex_str(dn, &str);
+    }
+    return (int)(dstlen - str.len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Same as dntoa but prints a special string for a null dn
+ */
+int
+dntoa_or_null(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn, const char* null_dn)
+{
+    if (dn.ptr == NULL)
+	return snprintf(dst, dstlen, "%s", null_dn);
+    else
+	return dntoa(dst, dstlen, dn);
+}
+
+/*  Converts an LDAP-style human-readable ASCII-encoded
+ *  ASN.1 distinguished name into binary DER-encoded format
+ */
+err_t
+atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn)
+{
+  /* finite state machine for atodn */
+
+    typedef enum {
+	SEARCH_OID =	0,
+	READ_OID =	1,
+	SEARCH_NAME =	2,
+	READ_NAME =	3,
+        UNKNOWN_OID =	4
+    } state_t;
+
+    u_char oid_len_buf[3];
+    u_char name_len_buf[3];
+    u_char rdn_seq_len_buf[3];
+    u_char rdn_set_len_buf[3];
+    u_char dn_seq_len_buf[3];
+
+    chunk_t asn1_oid_len     = { oid_len_buf,     0 };
+    chunk_t asn1_name_len    = { name_len_buf,    0 };
+    chunk_t asn1_rdn_seq_len = { rdn_seq_len_buf, 0 };
+    chunk_t asn1_rdn_set_len = { rdn_set_len_buf, 0 };
+    chunk_t asn1_dn_seq_len  = { dn_seq_len_buf,  0 };
+    chunk_t oid  = empty_chunk;
+    chunk_t name = empty_chunk;
+
+    int whitespace  = 0;
+    int rdn_seq_len = 0;
+    int rdn_set_len = 0;
+    int dn_seq_len  = 0;
+    int pos         = 0;
+
+    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+    u_char *dn_ptr = dn->ptr + 4;
+
+    state_t state = SEARCH_OID;
+
+    do
+    {
+        switch (state)
+	{
+	case SEARCH_OID:
+	    if (*src != ' ' && *src != '/' && *src !=  ',')
+	    {
+		oid.ptr = src;
+		oid.len = 1;
+		state = READ_OID;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case READ_OID:
+	    if (*src != ' ' && *src != '=')
+		oid.len++;
+	    else
+	    {
+		for (pos = 0; pos < X501_RDN_ROOF; pos++)
+		{
+		    if (strlen(x501rdns[pos].name) == oid.len &&
+			strncasecmp(x501rdns[pos].name, oid.ptr, oid.len) == 0)
+			break; /* found a valid OID */
+		}
+		if (pos == X501_RDN_ROOF)
+		{
+		    ugh = "unknown OID in distinguished name";
+		    state = UNKNOWN_OID;
+		    break;
+		}
+		code_asn1_length(x501rdns[pos].oid.len, &asn1_oid_len);
+
+		/* reset oid and change state */
+		oid = empty_chunk;
+		state = SEARCH_NAME;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case SEARCH_NAME:
+	    if (*src != ' ' && *src != '=')
+	    {
+		name.ptr = src;
+		name.len = 1;
+		whitespace = 0;
+		state = READ_NAME;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case READ_NAME:
+	    if (*src != ',' && *src != '/' && *src != '\0')
+	    {
+		name.len++;
+		if (*src == ' ')
+		    whitespace++;
+		else
+		    whitespace = 0;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		name.len -= whitespace;
+		code_asn1_length(name.len, &asn1_name_len);
+
+		/* compute the length of the relative distinguished name sequence */
+		rdn_seq_len = 1 + asn1_oid_len.len + x501rdns[pos].oid.len +
+			      1 + asn1_name_len.len + name.len;
+		code_asn1_length(rdn_seq_len, &asn1_rdn_seq_len);
+
+		/* compute the length of the relative distinguished name set */
+		rdn_set_len = 1 + asn1_rdn_seq_len.len + rdn_seq_len;
+		code_asn1_length(rdn_set_len, &asn1_rdn_set_len);
+
+		/* encode the relative distinguished name */
+		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SET;
+		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_set_len);
+		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_rdn_seq_len);
+		*dn_ptr++ = ASN1_OID;
+		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_oid_len);
+		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, x501rdns[pos].oid);
+		/* encode the ASN.1 character string type of the name */
+		*dn_ptr++ = (x501rdns[pos].type == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING
+		    && !is_printablestring(name))? ASN1_T61STRING : x501rdns[pos].type;
+		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_name_len);
+		chunkcpy(dn_ptr, name);
+
+		/* accumulate the length of the distinguished name sequence */
+		dn_seq_len += 1 + asn1_rdn_set_len.len + rdn_set_len;
+
+		/* reset name and change state */
+		name = empty_chunk;
+		state = SEARCH_OID;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case UNKNOWN_OID:
+	    break;
+	}
+    } while (*src++ != '\0');
+
+    /* complete the distinguished name sequence*/
+    code_asn1_length(dn_seq_len, &asn1_dn_seq_len);
+    dn->ptr += 3 - asn1_dn_seq_len.len;
+    dn->len =  1 + asn1_dn_seq_len.len + dn_seq_len;
+    dn_ptr = dn->ptr;
+    *dn_ptr++ = ASN1_SEQUENCE;
+    chunkcpy(dn_ptr, asn1_dn_seq_len);
+    return ugh;
+}
+
+/*  compare two distinguished names by
+ *  comparing the individual RDNs
+ */
+bool
+same_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+{
+    chunk_t rdn_a, rdn_b, attribute_a, attribute_b;
+    chunk_t oid_a, oid_b, value_a, value_b;
+    asn1_t type_a, type_b;
+    bool next_a, next_b;
+
+    /* same lengths for the DNs */
+    if (a.len != b.len)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    /* try a binary comparison first */
+    if (memcmp(a.ptr, b.ptr, b.len) == 0)
+	return TRUE;
+ 
+    /* initialize DN parsing */
+    if (init_rdn(a, &rdn_a, &attribute_a, &next_a) != NULL
+    ||  init_rdn(b, &rdn_b, &attribute_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    /* fetch next RDN pair */
+    while (next_a && next_b)
+    {
+	/* parse next RDNs and check for errors */
+	if (get_next_rdn(&rdn_a, &attribute_a, &oid_a, &value_a, &type_a, &next_a) != NULL
+	||  get_next_rdn(&rdn_b, &attribute_b, &oid_b, &value_b, &type_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+	{
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* OIDs must agree */
+	if (oid_a.len != oid_b.len || memcmp(oid_a.ptr, oid_b.ptr, oid_b.len) != 0)
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	/* same lengths for values */
+	if (value_a.len != value_b.len)
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	/* printableStrings and email RDNs require uppercase comparison */
+	if (type_a == type_b && (type_a == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
+	   (type_a == ASN1_IA5STRING && known_oid(oid_a) == OID_PKCS9_EMAIL)))
+	{
+	    if (strncasecmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (strncmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+    /* both DNs must have same number of RDNs */
+    if (next_a || next_b)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    /* the two DNs are equal! */
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/*  compare two distinguished names by comparing the individual RDNs.
+ *  A single'*' character designates a wildcard RDN in DN b.
+ */
+bool
+match_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *wildcards)
+{
+    chunk_t rdn_a, rdn_b, attribute_a, attribute_b;
+    chunk_t oid_a, oid_b, value_a, value_b;
+    asn1_t type_a,  type_b;
+    bool next_a, next_b;
+
+    /* initialize wildcard counter */
+    *wildcards = 0;
+
+    /* initialize DN parsing */
+    if (init_rdn(a, &rdn_a, &attribute_a, &next_a) != NULL
+    ||  init_rdn(b, &rdn_b, &attribute_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+    	return FALSE;
+
+    /* fetch next RDN pair */
+    while (next_a && next_b)
+    {
+	/* parse next RDNs and check for errors */
+	if (get_next_rdn(&rdn_a, &attribute_a, &oid_a, &value_a, &type_a, &next_a) != NULL
+	||  get_next_rdn(&rdn_b, &attribute_b, &oid_b, &value_b, &type_b, &next_b) != NULL)
+	{
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	/* OIDs must agree */
+	if (oid_a.len != oid_b.len || memcmp(oid_a.ptr, oid_b.ptr, oid_b.len) != 0)
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	/* does rdn_b contain a wildcard? */
+	if (value_b.len == 1 && *value_b.ptr == '*')
+	{
+	    (*wildcards)++;
+	    continue;
+	}
+
+	/* same lengths for values */
+	if (value_a.len != value_b.len)
+	    return FALSE;
+
+	/* printableStrings and email RDNs require uppercase comparison */
+	if (type_a == type_b && (type_a == ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING ||
+	   (type_a == ASN1_IA5STRING && known_oid(oid_a) == OID_PKCS9_EMAIL)))
+	{
+	    if (strncasecmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    if (strncmp(value_a.ptr, value_b.ptr, value_b.len) != 0)
+		return FALSE;
+	}
+    }
+    /* both DNs must have same number of RDNs */
+    if (next_a || next_b)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    /* the two DNs match! */
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  compare two X.509 certificates by comparing their signatures
+ */
+bool
+same_x509cert(const x509cert_t *a, const x509cert_t *b)
+{
+    return same_chunk(a->signature, b->signature);
+}
+
+/*  for each link pointing to the certificate
+ "  increase the count by one
+ */
+void
+share_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    if (cert != NULL)
+ 	cert->count++;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  add a X.509 user/host certificate to the chained list
+ */
+x509cert_t*
+add_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    x509cert_t *c = x509certs;
+
+    while (c != NULL)
+    {
+	if (same_x509cert(c, cert)) /* already in chain, free cert */
+	{
+	    free_x509cert(cert);
+	    return c;
+	}
+	c = c->next;
+    }
+
+    /* insert new cert at the root of the chain */
+    lock_certs_and_keys("add_x509cert");
+    cert->next = x509certs;
+    x509certs = cert;
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_log("  x509 cert inserted")
+    )
+    unlock_certs_and_keys("add_x509cert");
+    return cert;
+}
+
+/*
+ * choose either subject DN or a subjectAltName as connection end ID
+ */
+void
+select_x509cert_id(x509cert_t *cert, struct id *end_id)
+{
+    bool copy_subject_dn = TRUE;	 /* ID is subject DN */
+
+    if (end_id->kind != ID_NONE) /* check for matching subjectAltName */
+    {
+	generalName_t *gn = cert->subjectAltName;
+
+	while (gn != NULL)
+	{
+	    struct id id = empty_id;
+
+	    gntoid(&id, gn);
+	    if (same_id(&id, end_id))
+	    {
+		copy_subject_dn = FALSE; /* take subjectAltName instead */
+		break;
+	    }
+	    gn = gn->next;
+	}
+    }
+
+    if (copy_subject_dn)
+    {
+	if (end_id->kind != ID_NONE && end_id->kind != ID_DER_ASN1_DN)
+	{
+	     char buf[BUF_LEN];
+
+	     idtoa(end_id, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	     plog("  no subjectAltName matches ID '%s', replaced by subject DN", buf);
+	}
+	end_id->kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN;
+	end_id->name.len = cert->subject.len;
+	end_id->name.ptr = temporary_cyclic_buffer();
+	memcpy(end_id->name.ptr, cert->subject.ptr, cert->subject.len);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * check for equality between two key identifiers
+ */
+bool
+same_keyid(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+{
+    if (a.ptr == NULL || b.ptr == NULL)
+	return FALSE;
+
+    return same_chunk(a, b);
+}
+
+/*
+ * check for equality between two serial numbers
+ */
+bool
+same_serial(chunk_t a, chunk_t b)
+{
+    /* do not compare serial numbers if one of them is not defined */
+    if (a.ptr == NULL || b.ptr == NULL)
+	return TRUE;
+
+    return same_chunk(a, b);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  get a X.509 certificate with a given issuer found at a certain position
+ */
+x509cert_t*
+get_x509cert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid, x509cert_t *chain)
+{
+    x509cert_t *cert = (chain != NULL)? chain->next : x509certs;
+
+    while (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	if ((keyid.ptr != NULL) ? same_keyid(keyid, cert->authKeyID)
+	    : (same_dn(issuer, cert->issuer)
+	       && same_serial(serial, cert->authKeySerialNumber)))
+	{
+	    return cert;
+	}
+	cert = cert->next;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * encode a linked list of subjectAltNames
+ */
+chunk_t
+build_subjectAltNames(generalName_t *subjectAltNames)
+{
+    u_char *pos;
+    chunk_t names;
+    size_t len = 0;
+    generalName_t *gn = subjectAltNames;
+	
+   /* compute the total size of the ASN.1 attributes object */
+    while (gn != NULL)
+    {
+	len += gn->name.len;
+	gn = gn->next;
+    }
+
+    pos = build_asn1_object(&names, ASN1_SEQUENCE, len);
+
+    gn = subjectAltNames;
+    while (gn != NULL)
+    {
+	chunkcpy(pos, gn->name);
+	gn = gn->next;
+    }
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "cm"
+		, ASN1_subjectAltName_oid
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, "m", names));
+}
+
+/*
+ * build a to-be-signed X.509 certificate body
+ */
+static chunk_t
+build_tbs_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, const RSA_public_key_t *rsa)
+{
+    /* version is always X.509v3 */
+    chunk_t version = asn1_simple_object(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_0, ASN1_INTEGER_2);
+
+    chunk_t extensions = empty_chunk;
+
+    if (cert->subjectAltName != NULL)
+    {
+	extensions = asn1_wrap(ASN1_CONTEXT_C_3, "m"
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "m"
+		, build_subjectAltNames(cert->subjectAltName)));
+    }
+
+    return asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mmccmcmm"
+		, version
+		, asn1_simple_object(ASN1_INTEGER, cert->serialNumber)
+		, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(cert->sigAlg)
+		, cert->issuer
+		, asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mm"
+		    , timetoasn1(&cert->notBefore, ASN1_UTCTIME) 
+		    , timetoasn1(&cert->notAfter,  ASN1_UTCTIME)
+		  )
+		, cert->subject
+		, pkcs1_build_publicKeyInfo(rsa)
+		, extensions
+	   );
+}
+
+/*
+ * build a DER-encoded X.509 certificate
+ */
+void
+build_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, const RSA_public_key_t *cert_key
+, const RSA_private_key_t *signer_key)
+{
+    chunk_t tbs_cert = build_tbs_x509cert(cert, cert_key);
+
+    chunk_t signature = pkcs1_build_signature(tbs_cert, cert->sigAlg
+			    , signer_key, TRUE);
+
+    cert->certificate = asn1_wrap(ASN1_SEQUENCE, "mcm"
+				, tbs_cert
+				, asn1_algorithmIdentifier(cert->sigAlg)
+				, signature);
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free the dynamic memory used to store generalNames
+ */
+void
+free_generalNames(generalName_t* gn, bool free_name)
+{
+    while (gn != NULL)
+    {
+	generalName_t *gn_top = gn;
+	if (free_name)
+	{
+	    pfree(gn->name.ptr);
+	}
+	gn = gn->next;
+	pfree(gn_top);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  free a X.509 certificate
+ */
+void
+free_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    if (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	free_generalNames(cert->subjectAltName, FALSE);
+	free_generalNames(cert->crlDistributionPoints, FALSE);
+	pfreeany(cert->certificate.ptr);
+	pfree(cert);
+	cert = NULL;
+    }
+}
+
+/*  release of a certificate decreases the count by one
+ "  the certificate is freed when the counter reaches zero
+ */
+void
+release_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    if (cert != NULL && --cert->count == 0)
+    {
+	x509cert_t **pp = &x509certs;
+	while (*pp != cert)
+	    pp = &(*pp)->next;
+        *pp = cert->next;
+	free_x509cert(cert);
+    }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * stores a chained list of end certs and CA certs
+ */
+void
+store_x509certs(x509cert_t **firstcert, bool strict)
+{
+    x509cert_t *cacerts = NULL;
+    x509cert_t **pp = firstcert;
+
+    /* first extract CA certs, discarding root CA certs */
+
+    while (*pp != NULL)
+    {
+	x509cert_t *cert = *pp;
+
+	if (cert->isCA)
+	{
+	    *pp = cert->next;
+	    
+	    /* we don't accept self-signed CA certs */
+	    if (same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+	    {
+		plog("self-signed cacert rejected");
+		free_x509cert(cert);
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		/* insertion into temporary chain of candidate CA certs */
+		cert->next = cacerts;
+		cacerts = cert;
+	    }
+	}
+	else
+	    pp = &cert->next;
+    }
+
+    /* now verify the candidate CA certs */
+    
+    while (cacerts != NULL)
+    {
+	x509cert_t *cert = cacerts;
+	
+	cacerts = cacerts->next;
+
+	if (trust_authcert_candidate(cert, cacerts))
+	{
+	    add_authcert(cert, AUTH_CA);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("intermediate cacert rejected");
+	    free_x509cert(cert);
+	}
+    }
+    
+    /* now verify the end certificates */
+
+    pp = firstcert;
+
+    while (*pp != NULL)
+    {
+	time_t valid_until;
+	x509cert_t *cert = *pp;
+
+	if (verify_x509cert(cert, strict, &valid_until))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("public key validated")
+	    )
+	    add_x509_public_key(cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED);
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    plog("X.509 certificate rejected");
+	}
+	*pp = cert->next;
+	free_x509cert(cert);
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  decrypts an RSA signature using the issuer's certificate
+ */
+static bool
+decrypt_sig(chunk_t sig, int alg, const x509cert_t *issuer_cert,
+	    chunk_t *digest)
+{
+    switch (alg)
+    {
+	chunk_t decrypted;
+
+	case OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION:
+	case OID_MD2_WITH_RSA:
+	case OID_MD5_WITH_RSA:
+	case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA:
+	case OID_SHA1_WITH_RSA_OIW:
+	case OID_SHA256_WITH_RSA:
+	case OID_SHA384_WITH_RSA:
+	case OID_SHA512_WITH_RSA:
+	{
+	    mpz_t s;
+	    RSA_public_key_t rsa;
+
+	    init_RSA_public_key(&rsa, issuer_cert->publicExponent
+				    , issuer_cert->modulus);
+
+	    /* decrypt the signature s = s^e mod n */
+	    n_to_mpz(s, sig.ptr, sig.len);
+	    mpz_powm(s, s, &rsa.e, &rsa.n);
+
+	    /* convert back to bytes */
+	    decrypted = mpz_to_n(s, rsa.k);
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_dump_chunk("  decrypted signature: ", decrypted)
+	    )
+
+	    /*  copy the least significant bits of decrypted signature
+	     *  into the digest string
+	    */
+	    memcpy(digest->ptr, decrypted.ptr + decrypted.len - digest->len,
+		   digest->len);
+
+	    /* free memory */
+	    free_RSA_public_content(&rsa);
+	    pfree(decrypted.ptr);
+	    mpz_clear(s);
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+	default:
+	    digest->len = 0;
+	    return FALSE;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *   Check if a signature over binary blob is genuine
+ */
+bool
+check_signature(chunk_t tbs, chunk_t sig, int digest_alg, int enc_alg
+, const x509cert_t *issuer_cert)
+{
+    u_char digest_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    u_char decrypted_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+    chunk_t digest = {digest_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN};
+    chunk_t decrypted = {decrypted_buf, MAX_DIGEST_LEN};
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	if (digest_alg != OID_UNKNOWN)
+	    DBG_log("signature digest algorithm: '%s'",oid_names[digest_alg].name);
+	else
+	    DBG_log("unknown signature digest algorithm");
+    )
+
+    if (!compute_digest(tbs, digest_alg, &digest))
+    {
+	plog("  digest algorithm not supported");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	DBG_dump_chunk("  digest:", digest)
+    )
+
+    decrypted.len = digest.len; /* we want the same digest length */
+
+    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+	if (enc_alg != OID_UNKNOWN)
+	    DBG_log("signature encryption algorithm: '%s'",oid_names[enc_alg].name);
+	else
+	    DBG_log("unknown signature encryption algorithm");
+    )
+
+    if (!decrypt_sig(sig, enc_alg, issuer_cert, &decrypted))
+    {
+    	plog("  decryption algorithm not supported");
+	return FALSE;
+    }
+
+    /* check if digests are equal */
+    return !memcmp(decrypted.ptr, digest.ptr, digest.len);
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts the basicConstraints extension
+ */
+static bool
+parse_basicConstraints(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+    bool isCA = FALSE;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_ROOF) {
+
+	if (!extract_object(basicConstraintsObjects, &objectID,
+			    &object,&level, &ctx))
+	     break;
+
+	if (objectID == BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_CA)
+	{
+	    isCA = object.len && *object.ptr;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s",(isCA)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+	    )
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return isCA;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  Converts a X.500 generalName into an ID
+ */
+void
+gntoid(struct id *id, const generalName_t *gn)
+{
+    switch(gn->kind)
+    {
+    case GN_DNS_NAME:		/* ID type: ID_FQDN */
+	id->kind = ID_FQDN;
+	id->name = gn->name;
+	break;
+    case GN_IP_ADDRESS:		/* ID type: ID_IPV4_ADDR */
+	{
+	    const struct af_info *afi = &af_inet4_info;
+	    err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	    id->kind = afi->id_addr;
+	    ugh = initaddr(gn->name.ptr, gn->name.len, afi->af, &id->ip_addr);
+	}
+	break;
+    case GN_RFC822_NAME:	/* ID type: ID_USER_FQDN */
+	id->kind = ID_USER_FQDN;
+	id->name = gn->name;
+	break;
+    default:
+	id->kind = ID_NONE;
+	id->name = empty_chunk;
+    }
+}
+
+/* compute the subjectKeyIdentifier according to section 4.2.1.2 of RFC 3280
+ * as the 160 bit SHA-1 hash of the public key
+ */
+void
+compute_subjectKeyID(x509cert_t *cert, chunk_t subjectKeyID)
+{
+    SHA1_CTX context;
+
+    SHA1Init(&context);
+    SHA1Update(&context
+	      , cert->subjectPublicKey.ptr
+	      , cert->subjectPublicKey.len);
+    SHA1Final(subjectKeyID.ptr, &context);
+    subjectKeyID.len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts an otherName
+ */
+static bool
+parse_otherName(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    int objectID = 0;
+    u_int level;
+    int oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < ON_OBJ_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(otherNameObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	switch (objectID)
+	{
+	case ON_OBJ_ID_TYPE:
+	    oid = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case ON_OBJ_VALUE:
+	    if (oid == OID_XMPP_ADDR)
+	    {
+		if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&object, ASN1_UTF8STRING
+					     , level + 1, "xmppAddr"))
+		{
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * extracts a generalName
+ */
+static generalName_t*
+parse_generalName(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    int objectID = 0;
+    u_int level;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < GN_OBJ_ROOF)
+    {
+	bool valid_gn = FALSE;
+	
+	if (!extract_object(generalNameObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return NULL;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	case GN_OBJ_RFC822_NAME:
+	case GN_OBJ_DNS_NAME:
+	case GN_OBJ_URI:
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  '%.*s'", (int)object.len, object.ptr);
+	    )
+	    valid_gn = TRUE;
+	    break;
+	case GN_OBJ_DIRECTORY_NAME:
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'", buf)
+	    )
+	    valid_gn = TRUE;
+	    break;
+	case GN_OBJ_IP_ADDRESS:
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  '%d.%d.%d.%d'", *object.ptr, *(object.ptr+1),
+				      *(object.ptr+2), *(object.ptr+3));
+	    )
+	    valid_gn = TRUE;
+	    break;
+	case GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME:
+	    if (!parse_otherName(object, level + 1))
+		return NULL;
+	    break;
+	case GN_OBJ_X400_ADDRESS:
+	case GN_OBJ_EDI_PARTY_NAME:
+	case GN_OBJ_REGISTERED_ID:
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+
+	if (valid_gn)
+	{
+	    generalName_t *gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName");
+	    gn->kind = (objectID - GN_OBJ_OTHER_NAME) / 2;
+	    gn->name = object;
+	    gn->next = NULL;
+	    return gn;
+        }
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * extracts one or several GNs and puts them into a chained list
+ */
+static generalName_t*
+parse_generalNames(chunk_t blob, int level0, bool implicit)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    generalName_t *top_gn = NULL;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, implicit, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < GENERAL_NAMES_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(generalNamesObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return NULL;
+	     
+	if (objectID == GENERAL_NAMES_GN)
+	{
+	    generalName_t *gn = parse_generalName(object, level+1);
+	    if (gn != NULL)
+	    {
+		gn->next = top_gn;
+		top_gn = gn;
+	    }
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return top_gn;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns a directoryName
+ */
+chunk_t get_directoryName(chunk_t blob, int level, bool implicit)
+{
+    chunk_t name = empty_chunk;
+    generalName_t * gn = parse_generalNames(blob, level, implicit);
+
+    if (gn != NULL && gn->kind == GN_DIRECTORY_NAME)
+	name= gn->name;
+
+    free_generalNames(gn, FALSE);
+
+    return name;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts and converts a UTCTIME or GENERALIZEDTIME object
+ */
+time_t
+parse_time(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < TIME_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(timeObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return UNDEFINED_TIME;
+
+	if (objectID == TIME_UTC || objectID == TIME_GENERALIZED)
+	{
+	    return asn1totime(&object, (objectID == TIME_UTC)
+			? ASN1_UTCTIME : ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME);
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return UNDEFINED_TIME;
+ }
+
+/*
+ * extracts a keyIdentifier
+ */
+static chunk_t
+parse_keyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0, bool implicit)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, implicit, DBG_RAW);
+
+    extract_object(keyIdentifierObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx);
+    return object;
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts an authoritykeyIdentifier
+ */
+void
+parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0
+    , chunk_t *authKeyID, chunk_t *authKeySerialNumber)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < AUTH_KEY_ID_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(authorityKeyIdentifierObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	case AUTH_KEY_ID_KEY_ID:
+	    *authKeyID = parse_keyIdentifier(object, level+1, TRUE);
+	    break;
+	case AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_ISSUER:
+	    {
+		generalName_t * gn = parse_generalNames(object, level+1, TRUE);
+
+		free_generalNames(gn, FALSE);
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case AUTH_KEY_ID_CERT_SERIAL:
+	    *authKeySerialNumber = object;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts an authorityInfoAcess location
+ */
+static void
+parse_authorityInfoAccess(chunk_t blob, int level0, chunk_t *accessLocation)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    u_int accessMethod = OID_UNKNOWN;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(authorityInfoAccessObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	case AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_METHOD:
+	    accessMethod = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case AUTH_INFO_ACCESS_LOCATION:
+	    {
+		switch (accessMethod)
+		{
+		case OID_OCSP:
+		    if (*object.ptr == ASN1_CONTEXT_S_6)
+		    {
+			if (asn1_length(&object) == ASN1_INVALID_LENGTH)
+			    return;
+
+			DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+			    DBG_log("  '%.*s'",(int)object.len, object.ptr)
+			)
+
+			/* only HTTP(S) URIs accepted */
+			if (strncasecmp(object.ptr, "http", 4) == 0)
+			{
+			    *accessLocation = object;
+			    return;
+			}
+		    }
+		    plog("warning: ignoring OCSP InfoAccessLocation with unkown protocol");
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    /* unkown accessMethod, ignoring */
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * extracts extendedKeyUsage OIDs
+ */
+static bool
+parse_extendedKeyUsage(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < EXT_KEY_USAGE_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(extendedKeyUsageObjects, &objectID
+			    , &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	if (objectID == EXT_KEY_USAGE_PURPOSE_ID
+	&& known_oid(object) == OID_OCSP_SIGNING)
+	    return TRUE;
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*  extracts one or several crlDistributionPoints and puts them into
+ *  a chained list
+ */
+static generalName_t*
+parse_crlDistributionPoints(chunk_t blob, int level0)
+{
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    generalName_t *top_gn = NULL;      /* top of the chained list */
+    generalName_t **tail_gn = &top_gn; /* tail of the chained list */
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < CRL_DIST_POINTS_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(crlDistributionPointsObjects, &objectID,
+			    &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return NULL;
+
+	if (objectID == CRL_DIST_POINTS_FULLNAME)
+	{
+	    generalName_t *gn = parse_generalNames(object, level+1, TRUE);
+	    /* append extracted generalNames to existing chained list */
+	    *tail_gn = gn;
+	    /* find new tail of the chained list */
+            while (gn != NULL)
+	    {
+		tail_gn = &gn->next;  gn = gn->next;
+	    }
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    return top_gn;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ *  Parses an X.509v3 certificate
+ */
+bool
+parse_x509cert(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509cert_t *cert)
+{
+    u_char  buf[BUF_LEN];
+    asn1_ctx_t ctx;
+    bool critical;
+    chunk_t object;
+    u_int level;
+    u_int extn_oid = OID_UNKNOWN;
+    int objectID = 0;
+
+    asn1_init(&ctx, blob, level0, FALSE, DBG_RAW);
+
+    while (objectID < X509_OBJ_ROOF)
+    {
+	if (!extract_object(certObjects, &objectID, &object, &level, &ctx))
+	     return FALSE;
+
+	/* those objects which will parsed further need the next higher level */
+	level++;
+
+	switch (objectID) {
+	case X509_OBJ_CERTIFICATE:
+	    cert->certificate = object;
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_TBS_CERTIFICATE:
+	    cert->tbsCertificate = object;
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_VERSION:
+	    cert->version = (object.len) ? (1+(u_int)*object.ptr) : 1;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  v%d", cert->version);
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_SERIAL_NUMBER:
+	    cert->serialNumber = object;
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_SIG_ALG:
+	    cert->sigAlg = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_ISSUER:
+	    cert->issuer = object;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_NOT_BEFORE:
+	    cert->notBefore = parse_time(object, level);
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_NOT_AFTER:
+	    cert->notAfter = parse_time(object, level);
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT:
+	    cert->subject = object;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, object);
+		DBG_log("  '%s'",buf)
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY_ALGORITHM:
+	    if (parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL) == OID_RSA_ENCRYPTION)
+		cert->subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA;
+	    else
+	    {
+		plog("  unsupported public key algorithm");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_SUBJECT_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	    if (ctx.blobs[4].len > 0 && *ctx.blobs[4].ptr == 0x00)
+	    {
+		/* skip initial bit string octet defining 0 unused bits */
+		ctx.blobs[4].ptr++; ctx.blobs[4].len--;
+	    }
+	    else
+	    {
+		plog("  invalid RSA public key format");
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY:
+	    cert->subjectPublicKey = object;
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_MODULUS:
+	    if (object.len < RSA_MIN_OCTETS + 1)
+	    {
+		plog("  " RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    if (object.len > RSA_MAX_OCTETS + (size_t)(*object.ptr == 0x00))
+	    {
+		plog("  " RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH);
+		return FALSE;
+	    }
+	    cert->modulus = object;
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_PUBLIC_EXPONENT:
+	    cert->publicExponent = object;
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_EXTN_ID:
+	    extn_oid = known_oid(object);
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_CRITICAL:
+	    critical = object.len && *object.ptr;
+	    DBG(DBG_PARSING,
+		DBG_log("  %s",(critical)?"TRUE":"FALSE");
+	    )
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_EXTN_VALUE:
+	    {
+		switch (extn_oid) {
+		case OID_SUBJECT_KEY_ID:
+		    cert->subjectKeyID =
+			parse_keyIdentifier(object, level, FALSE);
+		    break;
+		case OID_SUBJECT_ALT_NAME:
+		    cert->subjectAltName =
+			parse_generalNames(object, level, FALSE);
+		    break;
+		case OID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS:
+		    cert->isCA =
+			parse_basicConstraints(object, level);
+		    break;
+		case OID_CRL_DISTRIBUTION_POINTS:
+		    cert->crlDistributionPoints =
+			parse_crlDistributionPoints(object, level);
+		    break;
+		 case OID_AUTHORITY_KEY_ID:
+		    parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(object, level
+			, &cert->authKeyID, &cert->authKeySerialNumber);
+		    break;
+		case OID_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS:
+		    parse_authorityInfoAccess(object, level, &cert->accessLocation);
+		    break;
+		case OID_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE:
+		    cert->isOcspSigner = parse_extendedKeyUsage(object, level);
+		    break;
+		case OID_NS_REVOCATION_URL:
+		case OID_NS_CA_REVOCATION_URL:
+		case OID_NS_CA_POLICY_URL:
+		case OID_NS_COMMENT:
+		    if (!parse_asn1_simple_object(&object, ASN1_IA5STRING
+		    , level, oid_names[extn_oid].name))
+		    {
+			return FALSE;
+		    }
+		    break;
+		default:
+		    break;
+		}
+	    }
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_ALGORITHM:
+	    cert->algorithm = parse_algorithmIdentifier(object, level, NULL);
+	    break;
+	case X509_OBJ_SIGNATURE:
+	    cert->signature = object;
+	    break;
+	default:
+	    break;
+	}
+	objectID++;
+    }
+    time(&cert->installed);
+    return TRUE;
+}
+
+/* verify the validity of a certificate by
+ * checking the notBefore and notAfter dates
+ */
+err_t
+check_validity(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until)
+{
+    time_t current_time;
+
+    time(&current_time);
+    DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_PARSING ,
+	DBG_log("  not before  : %s", timetoa(&cert->notBefore, TRUE));
+	DBG_log("  current time: %s", timetoa(&current_time, TRUE));
+	DBG_log("  not after   : %s", timetoa(&cert->notAfter, TRUE));
+    )
+
+    if (cert->notAfter < *until) *until = cert->notAfter;
+
+    if (current_time < cert->notBefore)
+	return "certificate is not valid yet";
+    if (current_time > cert->notAfter)
+	return "certificate has expired";
+    else
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  verifies a X.509 certificate
+ */
+bool
+verify_x509cert(const x509cert_t *cert, bool strict, time_t *until)
+{
+    int pathlen;
+
+    *until = cert->notAfter;
+
+    for (pathlen = 0; pathlen < MAX_CA_PATH_LEN; pathlen++)
+    {
+	x509cert_t *issuer_cert;
+	u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	err_t ugh = NULL;
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+	    DBG_log("subject: '%s'",buf);
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+	    DBG_log("issuer:  '%s'",buf);
+	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		DBG_log("authkey:  %s", buf);
+	    }
+	)
+
+	ugh = check_validity(cert, until);
+
+	if (ugh != NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("%s", ugh);
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("certificate is valid")
+	)
+
+	lock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+	issuer_cert = get_authcert(cert->issuer, cert->authKeySerialNumber
+	    , cert->authKeyID, AUTH_CA);
+
+	if (issuer_cert == NULL)
+	{
+	    plog("issuer cacert not found");
+	    unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("issuer cacert found")
+	)
+
+	if (!check_signature(cert->tbsCertificate, cert->signature
+			   , cert->algorithm, cert->algorithm, issuer_cert))
+	{
+	    plog("certificate signature is invalid");
+	    unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+	    return FALSE;
+	}
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("certificate signature is valid")
+	)
+	unlock_authcert_list("verify_x509cert");
+
+	/* check if cert is a self-signed root ca */
+	if (pathlen > 0 && same_dn(cert->issuer, cert->subject))
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("reached self-signed root ca")
+	    )
+	    return TRUE;
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    time_t nextUpdate = *until;
+	    time_t revocationDate = UNDEFINED_TIME;
+	    crl_reason_t revocationReason = REASON_UNSPECIFIED;
+
+	    /* first check certificate revocation using ocsp */
+	    cert_status_t status = verify_by_ocsp(cert, &nextUpdate
+		, &revocationDate, &revocationReason);
+
+	    /* if ocsp service is not available then fall back to crl */
+	    if ((status == CERT_UNDEFINED)
+	    ||  (status == CERT_UNKNOWN && strict))
+	    {
+		status = verify_by_crl(cert, &nextUpdate, &revocationDate
+		    , &revocationReason);
+	    }
+ 
+	    switch (status)
+	    {
+	    case CERT_GOOD:
+		/* if status information is stale */
+		if (strict && nextUpdate < time(NULL))
+		{
+		    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+			DBG_log("certificate is good but status is stale")
+		    )
+		    remove_x509_public_key(cert);
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+		DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		    DBG_log("certificate is good")
+		)
+		
+		/* with strict crl policy the public key must have the same
+		 * lifetime as the validity of the ocsp status or crl lifetime
+		 */
+		if (strict && nextUpdate < *until)
+		    *until = nextUpdate;
+		break;
+	    case CERT_REVOKED:
+		plog("certificate was revoked on %s, reason: %s"
+		    , timetoa(&revocationDate, TRUE)
+		    , enum_name(&crl_reason_names, revocationReason));
+		remove_x509_public_key(cert);
+		return FALSE;
+	    case CERT_UNKNOWN:
+	    case CERT_UNDEFINED:
+	    default:
+		plog("certificate status unknown");
+		if (strict)
+		{
+		    remove_x509_public_key(cert);
+		    return FALSE;
+		}
+		break;
+	    }
+	}
+
+	/* go up one step in the trust chain */
+	cert = issuer_cert;
+    }
+    plog("maximum ca path length of %d levels exceeded", MAX_CA_PATH_LEN);
+    return FALSE;
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all X.509 certs in a chained list
+ */
+void
+list_x509cert_chain(const char *caption, x509cert_t* cert, u_char auth_flags
+ , bool utc)
+{
+    bool first = TRUE;
+    time_t now;
+
+    /* determine the current time */
+    time(&now);
+
+    while (cert != NULL)
+    {
+	if (auth_flags == AUTH_NONE || (auth_flags & cert->authority_flags))
+	{
+	    unsigned keysize;
+	    char keyid[KEYID_BUF];
+	    u_char buf[BUF_LEN];
+	    cert_t c;
+
+	    c.type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE;
+	    c.u.x509 = cert;
+
+	    if (first)
+	    {
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of X.509 %s Certificates:", caption);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " ");
+		first = FALSE;
+	    }
+
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, count: %d", timetoa(&cert->installed, utc),
+		cert->count);
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->subject);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subject:  '%s'", buf);
+	    dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, cert->issuer);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       issuer:   '%s'", buf);
+	    datatot(cert->serialNumber.ptr, cert->serialNumber.len, ':'
+		, buf, BUF_LEN);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       serial:    %s", buf);
+	    form_keyid(cert->publicExponent, cert->modulus, keyid, &keysize);
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       pubkey:    %4d RSA Key %s%s"
+		, 8*keysize, keyid
+		, cert->smartcard ? ", on smartcard" :
+		(has_private_key(c)? ", has private key" : ""));
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       validity:  not before %s %s",
+		timetoa(&cert->notBefore, utc),
+		(cert->notBefore < now)?"ok":"fatal (not valid yet)");
+	    whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "                  not after  %s %s",
+		timetoa(&cert->notAfter, utc),
+		check_expiry(cert->notAfter, CA_CERT_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE));
+	    if (cert->subjectKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(cert->subjectKeyID.ptr, cert->subjectKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       subjkey:   %s", buf);
+	    }
+	    if (cert->authKeyID.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(cert->authKeyID.ptr, cert->authKeyID.len, ':'
+		    , buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       authkey:   %s", buf);
+	    }
+	    if (cert->authKeySerialNumber.ptr != NULL)
+	    {
+		datatot(cert->authKeySerialNumber.ptr, cert->authKeySerialNumber.len
+		    , ':', buf, BUF_LEN);
+		whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "       aserial:   %s", buf);
+	    }
+	}
+	cert = cert->next;
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+ *  list all X.509 end certificates in a chained list
+ */
+void
+list_x509_end_certs(bool utc)
+{
+    list_x509cert_chain("End", x509certs, AUTH_NONE, utc);
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/x509.h b/src/pluto/x509.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..d15b3da53
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/x509.h
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+/* Support of X.509 certificates
+ * Copyright (C) 2000 Andreas Hess, Patric Lichtsteiner, Roger Wegmann
+ * Copyright (C) 2001 Marco Bertossa, Andreas Schleiss
+ * Copyright (C) 2002 Mario Strasser
+ * Copyright (C) 2000-2004 Andreas Steffen, Zuercher Hochschule Winterthur
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: x509.h,v 1.10 2005/12/06 22:52:44 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _X509_H
+#define _X509_H
+
+#include "pkcs1.h"
+#include "id.h"
+
+/* Definition of generalNames kinds */
+
+typedef enum {
+    GN_OTHER_NAME =		0,
+    GN_RFC822_NAME =		1,
+    GN_DNS_NAME =		2,
+    GN_X400_ADDRESS =		3,
+    GN_DIRECTORY_NAME =		4,
+    GN_EDI_PARTY_NAME = 	5,
+    GN_URI =			6,
+    GN_IP_ADDRESS =		7,
+    GN_REGISTERED_ID =		8
+} generalNames_t;
+
+/* access structure for a GeneralName */
+
+typedef struct generalName generalName_t;
+
+struct generalName {
+    generalName_t   *next;
+    generalNames_t  kind;
+    chunk_t         name;
+};
+
+/* access structure for an X.509v3 certificate */
+
+typedef struct x509cert x509cert_t;
+
+struct x509cert {
+  x509cert_t     *next;
+  time_t	 installed;
+  int		 count;
+  bool		 smartcard;
+  u_char	 authority_flags;
+  chunk_t	 certificate;
+  chunk_t          tbsCertificate;
+  u_int              version;
+  chunk_t            serialNumber;
+                /*   signature */
+  int                  sigAlg;
+  chunk_t            issuer;
+                /*   validity */
+  time_t               notBefore;
+  time_t               notAfter;
+  chunk_t            subject;
+                /*   subjectPublicKeyInfo */
+  enum pubkey_alg      subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm;
+  chunk_t              subjectPublicKey;
+  chunk_t                modulus;
+  chunk_t                publicExponent;
+                /*   issuerUniqueID */
+                /*   subjectUniqueID */
+                /*   v3 extensions */
+                /*   extension */
+                /*     extension */
+                /*       extnID */
+                /*       critical */
+                /*       extnValue */
+  bool			   isCA;
+  bool			   isOcspSigner; /* ocsp */
+  chunk_t		   subjectKeyID;
+  chunk_t		   authKeyID;
+  chunk_t		   authKeySerialNumber;
+  chunk_t		   accessLocation; /* ocsp */
+  generalName_t		   *subjectAltName;
+  generalName_t		   *crlDistributionPoints;
+		/* signatureAlgorithm */
+  int                algorithm;
+  chunk_t          signature;
+};
+
+/* used for initialization */
+extern const x509cert_t empty_x509cert;
+
+extern bool same_serial(chunk_t a, chunk_t b);
+extern bool same_keyid(chunk_t a, chunk_t b);
+extern bool same_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b);
+extern bool match_dn(chunk_t a, chunk_t b, int *wildcards);
+extern bool same_x509cert(const x509cert_t *a, const x509cert_t *b);
+extern void hex_str(chunk_t bin, chunk_t *str);
+extern int dn_count_wildcards(chunk_t dn);
+extern int dntoa(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn);
+extern int dntoa_or_null(char *dst, size_t dstlen, chunk_t dn
+    , const char* null_dn);
+extern err_t atodn(char *src, chunk_t *dn);
+extern void gntoid(struct id *id, const generalName_t *gn);
+extern void compute_subjectKeyID(x509cert_t *cert, chunk_t subjectKeyID);
+extern void select_x509cert_id(x509cert_t *cert, struct id *end_id);
+extern bool parse_x509cert(chunk_t blob, u_int level0, x509cert_t *cert);
+extern time_t parse_time(chunk_t blob, int level0);
+extern void parse_authorityKeyIdentifier(chunk_t blob, int level0
+    , chunk_t *authKeyID, chunk_t *authKeySerialNumber);
+extern chunk_t get_directoryName(chunk_t blob, int level, bool implicit);
+extern err_t check_validity(const x509cert_t *cert, time_t *until);
+extern bool check_signature(chunk_t tbs, chunk_t sig, int digest_alg
+    , int enc_alg, const x509cert_t *issuer_cert);
+extern bool verify_x509cert(const x509cert_t *cert, bool strict, time_t *until);
+extern x509cert_t* add_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
+extern x509cert_t* get_x509cert(chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial, chunk_t keyid
+    , x509cert_t* chain);
+extern void build_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert, const RSA_public_key_t *cert_key
+    , const RSA_private_key_t *signer_key);
+extern chunk_t build_subjectAltNames(generalName_t *subjectAltNames);
+extern void share_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
+extern void release_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
+extern void free_x509cert(x509cert_t *cert);
+extern void store_x509certs(x509cert_t **firstcert, bool strict);
+extern void list_x509cert_chain(const char *caption, x509cert_t* cert
+    , u_char auth_flags, bool utc);
+extern void list_x509_end_certs(bool utc);
+extern void free_generalNames(generalName_t* gn, bool free_name);
+
+#endif /* _X509_H */
diff --git a/src/pluto/xauth.c b/src/pluto/xauth.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..3d30ad227
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/xauth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* Initialization and finalization of the dynamic XAUTH module
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ * 
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: xauth.c,v 1.1 2005/01/06 22:10:15 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "xauth.h"
+#include "keys.h"
+#include "log.h"
+
+void 
+xauth_init(void)
+{
+#ifdef XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB
+    xauth_module.handle = dlopen(XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB, RTLD_NOW);
+
+    if (xauth_module.handle != NULL)
+    {
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    DBG_log("xauth module '%s' loading'", XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB)
+	)
+	xauth_module.get_secret = (bool (*) (const xauth_t*))
+			dlsym(xauth_module.handle, "get_secret");
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    if (xauth_module.get_secret != NULL)
+	    {
+		DBG_log("xauth module: found get_secret() function");
+	    }
+	)
+	xauth_module.verify_secret = (bool (*) (const xauth_t*))
+			dlsym(xauth_module.handle, "verify_secret");
+	DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+	    if (xauth_module.verify_secret != NULL)
+	    {
+		DBG_log("xauth module: found verify_secret() function");
+	    }
+	)
+    }
+#endif
+    /* any null function pointers will be filled in by default functions */
+    xauth_defaults();
+}
+
+void
+xauth_finalize(void)
+{
+#ifdef XAUTH_DEFAULT_LIB
+    if (xauth_module.handle != NULL)
+    {
+	if (dlclose(xauth_module.handle))
+	{
+	    plog("failed to unload xauth module");
+	}
+	else
+	{
+	    DBG(DBG_CONTROL,
+		DBG_log("xauth module unloaded")
+	    )
+	}
+    }
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/src/pluto/xauth.h b/src/pluto/xauth.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..1f06aefd9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/pluto/xauth.h
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+/* Interface definition of the XAUTH server and|or client module
+ * Copyright (C) 2006 Andreas Steffen
+ * Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil, Switzerland
+ * 
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version.  See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: xauth.h,v 1.1 2005/01/06 22:10:15 as Exp $
+ */
+
+#ifndef _XAUTH_H
+#define _XAUTH_H
+
+/* XAUTH credentials */
+
+struct chunk_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    chunk_t user_name;
+    chunk_t user_password;
+} xauth_t;
+
+typedef struct {
+    void *handle;
+    bool (*get_secret) (xauth_t *xauth_secret);
+    bool (*verify_secret) (const xauth_t *xauth_secret);
+} xauth_module_t;
+
+extern xauth_module_t xauth_module;
+
+extern void xauth_init(void);
+extern void xauth_finalize(void);
+
+#endif /* _XAUTH_H */
author	Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org>	2007-04-12 20:30:08 +0000
committer	Rene Mayrhofer <rene@mayrhofer.eu.org>	2007-04-12 20:30:08 +0000
commit	b0d8ed94fe9e74afb49fdf5f11e4add29879c65c (patch)
tree	b20167235628771046e940a82a906a6d0991ee4a /src/pluto
parent	ea939d07c84d2a8e51215458063fc05e9c399290 (diff)
download	vyos-strongswan-b0d8ed94fe9e74afb49fdf5f11e4add29879c65c.tar.gz vyos-strongswan-b0d8ed94fe9e74afb49fdf5f11e4add29879c65c.zip