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diff --git a/doc/HowTo.html b/doc/HowTo.html deleted file mode 100644 index a6f92dda9..000000000 --- a/doc/HowTo.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,18733 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<CENTER><A HREF="#CONTENTS"><H1>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</H1></A><BR> -</CENTER> -<HR> -<H1 ALIGN="CENTER"><A NAME="CONTENTS">Table of Contents</A></H1> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#intro">Introduction</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ipsec.intro">IPsec, Security for the Internet Protocol</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#intro.interop">Interoperating with other IPsec - implementations</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#applications">Applications of IPsec</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#makeVPN">Using secure tunnels to create a VPN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#road.intro">Road Warriors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.intro">Opportunistic encryption</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#types">The need to authenticate gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#project">The FreeS/WAN project</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#goals">Project goals</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#staff">Project team</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#products">Products containing FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#distwith">Full Linux distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#kernel_dist">Linux kernel distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#office_dist">Office server distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#fw_dist">Firewall distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#turnkey">Firewall and VPN products</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#docs">Information sources</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#docformats">This HowTo, in multiple formats</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rtfm">RTFM (please Read The Fine Manuals)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#text">Other documents in the distribution</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#assumptions">Background material</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#archives">Archives of the project mailing list</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#howto">User-written HowTo information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#applied">Papers on FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#licensing">License and copyright information</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#sites">Distribution sites</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#1_5_1">Primary site</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#mirrors">Mirrors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#munitions">The "munitions" archive of Linux crypto - software</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#1_6">Links to other sections</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#2">Upgrading to FreeS/WAN 2.x</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#2_1">New! Built in Opportunistic connections</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#2_1_1">Upgrading Opportunistic Encryption to 2.01 (or - later)</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#2_2">New! Policy Groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_3">New! Packetdefault Connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_4">FreeS/WAN now disables Reverse Path Filtering</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_5">Revised ipsec.conf</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#2_5_1">No promise of compatibility</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_5_2">Most ipsec.conf files will work fine</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_5_3">Backward compatibility patch</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_5_4">Details</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#2_5_5">Upgrading from 1.x RPMs to 2.x RPMs</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#quickstart">Quickstart Guide to Opportunistic Encryption</A> -</B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.setup">Purpose</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_1_1">OE "flag day"</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.dns">Requirements</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#easy.install">RPM install</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_3_1">Download RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_3_2">Check signatures</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_3_3">Install the RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#testinstall">Test</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.setups.list">Our Opportunistic Setups</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_4_1">Full or partial opportunism?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.client">Initiate-only setup</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_1">Restrictions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#forward.dns">Create and publish a forward DNS record</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_2_1">Find a domain you can use</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_2_2">Choose your ID</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_2_3">Create a forward TXT record</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_2_4">Publish the forward TXT record</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_3">Test that your key has been published</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_4">Configure, if necessary</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_5_5">Test</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6">Full Opportunism</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_1">Put a TXT record in a Forward Domain</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_2">Put a TXT record in Reverse DNS</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_2_1">Create a Reverse DNS TXT record</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_2_2">Publish your TXT record</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_3">Test your DNS record</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_4">No Configuration Needed</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_5">Consider Firewalling</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_6">Test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_6_7">Test</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.test">Testing opportunistic connections</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_8">Now what?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_9">Notes</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_10">Troubleshooting OE</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#3_11">Known Issues</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#4">How to Configure Linux FreeS/WAN with Policy Groups</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#4_1">What are Policy Groups?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#4_1_1">Built-In Security Options</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#4_2">Using Policy Groups</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#4_2_1">Example 1: Using a Base Policy Group</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#4_2_2">Example 2: Defining IPsec Security Policy with - Groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#4_2_3">Example 3: Creating a Simple IPsec VPN with the - private Group</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#4_2_4">Example 4: New Policy Groups to Protect a Subnet</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#4_2_5">Example 5: Adding a Subnet to the VPN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#4_3">Appendix</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#4_3_1">Our Hidden Connections</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#4_3_2">Custom Policy Groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#4_3_3">Disabling Opportunistic Encryption</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#5">FreeS/WAN FAQ</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#questions">Index of FAQ questions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#whatzit">What is FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#problems">How do I report a problem or seek help?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#generic">Can I get ...</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#lemme_out">Can I get an off-the-shelf system that includes - FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#consultant">Can I hire consultants or staff who know - FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#commercial">Can I get commercial support?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#release">Release questions</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#rel.current">What is the current release?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#relwhen">When is the next release?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rel.bugs">Are there known bugs in the current release?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#mod_cons">Modifications and contributions</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#modify.faq">Can I modify FreeS/WAN to ...?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#contrib.faq">Can I contribute to the project?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ddoc.faq">Is there detailed design documentation?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#interact">Will FreeS/WAN work in my environment?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#interop.faq">Can FreeS/WAN talk to ...?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#old_to_new">Can different FreeS/WAN versions talk to each - other?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#faq.bandwidth">Is there a limit on throughput?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#faq.number">Is there a limit on number of tunnels?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#faq.speed">Is a ... fast enough to handle FreeS/WAN with - my loads?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#work_on">Will FreeS/WAN work on ... ?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on my version of Linux?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#nonIntel.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on non-Intel CPUs?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#multi.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on multiprocessors?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#k.old">Will FreeS/WAN work on an older kernel?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#k.versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on the latest kernel - version?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#interface.faq">Will FreeS/WAN work on unusual network - hardware?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#vlan">Will FreeS/WAN work on a VLAN (802.1q) network?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#features.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support ...</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#VPN.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support site-to-site VPN (Virtual - Private Network) applications?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#warrior.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users - connecting to a LAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#road.shared.possible">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users - using shared secret authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#wireless.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support wireless networks?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#PKIcert">Does FreeS/WAN support X.509 or other PKI - certificates?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#Radius">Does FreeS/WAN support user authentication - (Radius, SecureID, Smart Card...)?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#NATtraversal">Does FreeS/WAN support NAT traversal?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#virtID">Does FreeS/WAN support assigning a "virtual - identity" to a remote system?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noDES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support single DES encryption?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#AES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support AES encryption?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#other.cipher">Does FreeS/WAN support other encryption - algorithms?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#canI">Can I ...</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#policy.preconfig">Can I use policy groups along with - explicitly configured connections?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#policy.off">Can I turn off policy groups?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#reload">Can I reload connection info without restarting?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#masq.faq">Can I use several masqueraded subnets?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#dup_route">Can I use subnets masqueraded to the same - addresses?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#road.masq">Can I assign a road warrior an address on my - net (a virtual identity)?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#road.many">Can I support many road warriors with one - gateway?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#road.PSK">Can I have many road warriors using shared - secret authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#QoS">Can I use Quality of Service routing with FreeS/WAN?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#deadtunnel">Can I recognise dead tunnels and shut them - down?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#demanddial">Can I build IPsec tunnels over a demand-dialed - link?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#GRE">Can I build GRE, L2TP or PPTP tunnels over IPsec?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#NetBIOS">... use Network Neighborhood (Samba, NetBIOS) - over IPsec?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#setup.faq">Life's little mysteries</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#cantping">I cannot ping ....</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#forever">It takes forever to ...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#route">I send packets to the tunnel with route(8) but they - vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#down_route">When a tunnel goes down, packets vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#firewall_ate">The firewall ate my packets!</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#dropconn">Dropped connections</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#defaultroutegone">Disappearing %defaultroute</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#tcpdump.faq">TCPdump on the gateway shows strange things</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#no_trace">Traceroute does not show anything between the - gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#man4debug">Testing in stages</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#nomanual">Manually keyed connections don't work</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#spi_error">One manual connection works, but second one - fails</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#man_no_auto">Manual connections work, but automatic keying - doesn't</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#nocomp">IPsec works, but connections using compression - fail</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#pmtu.broken">Small packets work, but large transfers fail</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#subsub">Subnet-to-subnet works, but tests from the - gateways don't</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#compile.faq">Compilation problems</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#gmp.h_missing">gmp.h: No such file or directory</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noVM">... virtual memory exhausted</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#error">Interpreting error messages</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#route-client">route-client (or host) exited with status 7</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#unreachable">SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#modprobe">ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noKLIPS">ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack - KLIPS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noDNS">ipsec_setup: ... failure to fetch key for ... from - DNS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#dup_address">ipsec_setup: ... interfaces ... and ... share - address ...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#kflags">ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#message_num">Message numbers (MI3, QR1, et cetera) in - Pluto messages</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#conn_name">Connection names in Pluto error messages</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#cantorient">Pluto: ... can't orient connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#no.interface">... we have no ipsecN interface for either - end of this connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noconn">Pluto: ... no connection is known</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#nosuit">Pluto: ... no suitable connection ...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noconn.auth">Pluto: ... no connection has been authorized</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#noDESsupport">Pluto: ... OAKLEY_DES_CBC is not supported.</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#notransform">Pluto: ... no acceptable transform</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rsasigkey">rsasigkey dumps core</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#sig4">!Pluto failure!: ... exited with ... signal 4</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#econnrefused">ECONNREFUSED error message</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#no_eroute">klips_debug: ... no eroute!</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#SAused">... trouble writing to /dev/ipsec ... SA already - in use</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ignore">... ignoring ... payload</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#unknown_rightcert">unknown parameter name "rightcert"</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#spam">Why don't you restrict the mailing lists to reduce - spam?</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#manpages">FreeS/WAN manual pages</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#man.file">Files</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#man.command">Commands</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#man.lib">Library routines</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#firewall">FreeS/WAN and firewalls</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#filters">Filtering rules for IPsec packets</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#examplefw">Firewall configuration at boot</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#simple.rules">A simple set of rules</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#complex.rules">Other rules</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#7_2_2_1">Adding additional rules</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#7_2_2_2">Modifying existing rules</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#rules.pub">Published rule sets</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#Ranch.trinity">Scripts based on Ranch's work</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#seawall">The Seattle firewall</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rcf">The RCF scripts</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#asgard">Asgard scripts</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#user.scripts">User scripts from the mailing list</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#updown">Calling firewall scripts, named in ipsec.conf(5)</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#pre_post">Scripts called at IPsec start and stop</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#up_down">Scripts called at connection up and down</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#fw.default">The default script</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#userscript">User-written scripts</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ipchains.script">Scripts for ipchains or iptables</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#NAT">A complication: IPsec vs. NAT</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#nat_ok">NAT on or behind the IPsec gateway works</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#nat_bad">NAT between gateways is problematic</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#NAT.ref">Other references on NAT and IPsec</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#complications">Other complications</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#through">IPsec through the gateway</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ipsec_only">Preventing non-IPsec traffic</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#unknowngate">Filtering packets from unknown gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#otherfilter">Other packet filters</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ICMP">ICMP filtering</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#traceroute">UDP packets for traceroute</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#l2tp">UDP for L2TP</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#packets">How it all works: IPsec packet details</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#noport">ESP and AH do not have ports</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#header">Header layout</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#dhr">DHR on the updown script</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#trouble">Linux FreeS/WAN Troubleshooting Guide</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#overview">Overview</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#install">1. During Install</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_2_1">1.1 RPM install gotchas</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_2_2">1.2 Problems installing from source</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#install.check">1.3 Install checks</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#oe.trouble">1.3 Troubleshooting OE</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#negotiation">2. During Negotiation</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#state">2.1 Determine Connection State</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_1_1">Finding current state</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_1_2">What's this supposed to look like?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#find.pluto.error">2.2 Finding error text</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_2_1">Verbose start for more information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_2_2">Debug levels count</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_2_3">ipsec barf for lots of debugging information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_2_4">Find the error</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_2_5">Play both sides</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#interpret.pluto.error">2.3 Interpreting a Negotiation - Error</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ikepath">Connection stuck at STATE_MAIN_I1</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_3_3_2">Other errors</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#use">3. Using a Connection</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_1">3.1 Orienting yourself</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_1_1">How do I know if it works?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_1_2">ipsec barf is useful again</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_2">3.2 Those pesky configuration errors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#route.firewall">3.3 Check Routing and Firewalling</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_3_1">Background:</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ifconfig">View Interface and Firewall Statistics</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#sniff">3.4 When in doubt, sniff it out</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_4_1">Anticipate your packets' path</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#find.use.error">3.5 Check your logs</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#interpret.use.error">Interpreting log text</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#bigpacket">3.6 More testing for the truly thorough</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_6_1">Large Packets</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_4_6_2">Stress Tests</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#prob.report">4. Problem Reporting</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#8_5_1">4.1 How to ask for help</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#8_5_2">4.2 Where to ask</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#notes">5. Additional Notes on Troubleshooting</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#system.info">5.1 Information available on your system</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#logusage">Logs used</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#pages">man pages provided</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#statusinfo">Status information</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#testgates"> 5.2 Testing between security gateways</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ifconfig1">5.3 ifconfig reports for KLIPS debugging</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#gdb"> 5.4 Using GDB on Pluto</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#compat">Linux FreeS/WAN Compatibility Guide</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#spec">Implemented parts of the IPsec Specification</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#in">In Linux FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#dropped">Deliberately omitted</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#not">Not (yet) in Linux FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#pfkey">Our PF-Key implementation</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#pfk.port">PF-Key portability</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#otherk">Kernels other than the latest 2.2.x and 2.4.y</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#kernel.2.0">2.0.x kernels</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#kernel.production">2.2 and 2.4 kernels</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#otherdist">Intel Linux distributions other than Redhat</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#rh7">Redhat 7.0</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#suse">SuSE Linux</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#9_4_2_1">SuSE Linux 5.3</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#slack">Slackware</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#deb">Debian</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#caldera">Caldera</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#CPUs">CPUs other than Intel</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="# strongarm">Corel Netwinder (StrongARM CPU)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#yellowdog">Yellow Dog Linux on Power PC</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#mklinux">Mklinux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#alpha">Alpha 64-bit processors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#SPARC">Sun SPARC processors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#mips">MIPS processors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#crusoe">Transmeta Crusoe</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#coldfire">Motorola Coldfire</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#multiprocessor">Multiprocessor machines</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#hardware">Support for crypto hardware</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ipv6">IP version 6 (IPng)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#v6.back">IPv6 background</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#10">Interoperating with FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#10_1">Interop at a Glance</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#10_1_1">Key</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#10_2">Basic Interop Rules</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#10_3">Longer Stories</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#10_3_1">For More Compatible Implementations</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#freeswan">FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#isakmpd">isakmpd (OpenBSD)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#kame">Kame</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#mcafee">PGPNet/McAfee</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#microsoft">Microsoft Windows 2000/XP</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ssh">SSH Sentinel</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#safenet">Safenet SoftPK/SoftRemote</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#10_3_2">For Other Implementations</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#6wind">6Wind</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#alcatel">Alcatel Timestep</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#apple">Apple Macintosh System 10+</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ashleylaurent">AshleyLaurent VPCom</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#borderware">Borderware</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#checkpoint">Check Point VPN-1 or FW-1</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#cisco">Cisco</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#equinux">Equinux VPN tracker (for Mac OS X)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#fsecure">F-Secure</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#gauntlet">Gauntlet GVPN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#aix">IBM AIX</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#as400">IBM AS/400</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#intel">Intel Shiva LANRover / Net Structure</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#lancom">LanCom (formerly ELSA)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#linksys">Linksys</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#lucent">Lucent</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#netasq">Netasq</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#netcelo">Netcelo</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#netgear">Netgear fvs318</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#netscreen">Netscreen 100 or 5xp</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#nortel">Nortel Contivity</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#radguard">Radguard</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#raptor">Raptor (NT or Solaris)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#redcreek">Redcreek Ravlin</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#sonicwall">SonicWall</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#sun">Sun Solaris</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#symantec">Symantec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#watchguard">Watchguard Firebox</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#xedia">Xedia Access Point/QVPN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#zyxel">Zyxel</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#performance">Performance of FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#pub.bench">Published material</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#perf.estimate">Estimating CPU overheads</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#perf.more">Higher performance alternatives</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#11_2_2">Other considerations</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#biggate">Many tunnels from a single gateway</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#low-end">Low-end systems</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#klips.bench">Measuring KLIPS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#speed.compress">Speed with compression</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#methods">Methods of measuring</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#test.freeswan">Testing FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#test.oe">Testing opportunistic connections</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#12_1_1">Basic OE Test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#12_1_2">OE Gateway Test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#12_1_3">Additional OE tests</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#test.uml">Testing with User Mode Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#testnet">Configuration for a testbed network</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#testbed">Testbed network</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#tcpdump.test">Using packet sniffers in testing</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#verify.crypt">Verifying encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#mail.test">Mailing list pointers</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#kernelconfig">Kernel configuration for FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#notall">Not everyone needs to worry about kernel - configuration</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#assume">Assumptions and notation</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#labels">Labels used</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#kernelopt">Kernel options for FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#adv_config">Other configuration possibilities</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#thumb">Some rules of thumb about configuration</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#cheap.tunnel">Tunnels are cheap</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#subnet.size">Subnet sizes</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#example.more">Other network layouts</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#internet.subnet">The Internet as a big subnet</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#wireless.config">Wireless</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#choose">Choosing connection types</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#man-auto">Manual vs. automatic keying</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#auto-auth">Authentication methods for auto-keying</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#adv-pk">Advantages of public key methods</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#prodsecrets">Using shared secrets in production</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#secrets">Putting secrets in ipsec.secrets(5)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#securing.secrets">File security</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#notroadshared">Shared secrets for road warriors</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#prodman">Using manual keying in production</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ranbits">Creating keys with ranbits</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#boot">Setting up connections at boot time</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#multitunnel">Multiple tunnels between the same two - gateways</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#advroute">One tunnel plus advanced routing</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#opp.gate">An Opportunistic Gateway</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#14_7_1">Start from full opportunism</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#14_7_2">Reverse DNS TXT records for each protected machine</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#14_7_3">Publish your records</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#14_7_4">...and test them</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#14_7_5">No Configuration Needed</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#extruded.config">Extruded Subnets</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#roadvirt">Road Warrior with virtual IP address</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#dynamic">Dynamic Network Interfaces</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#basicdyn">Basics</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#bootdyn">Boot Time</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#changedyn">Change Time</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#unencrypted">Unencrypted tunnels</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#install">Installing FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_1">Requirements</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_2">Choose your install method</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_3">FreeS/WAN ships with some Linuxes</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_3_1">FreeS/WAN may be altered...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_3_2">You might need to create an authentication keypair</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_3_3">Start and test FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_4">RPM install</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_4_1">Download RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_4_2">For freeswan.org RPMs: check signatures</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_4_3">Install the RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_4_4">Start and Test FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5">Install from Source</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_1">Decide what functionality you need</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_2">Download FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_3">For freeswan.org source: check its signature</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_4">Untar, unzip</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_5">Patch if desired</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_6">... and Make</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_6_1">Userland-only Install for 2.6 kernels</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_5_6_2">KLIPS install for 2.2, 2.4, or 2.6 kernels</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#15_6">Start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_7">Test your install</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_8">Making FreeS/WAN play well with others</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#15_9">Configure for your needs</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#config">How to configure FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#16_1">Requirements</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#config.netnet">Net-to-Net connection</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#netnet.info.ex">Gather information</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_1_1">Get your leftrsasigkey</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_1_2">...and your rightrsasigkey</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_2">Edit /etc/ipsec.conf</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_3">Start your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be tunneled</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_5">Test your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_2_6">Finishing touches</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#config.rw">Road Warrior Configuration</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#rw.info.ex">Gather information</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_1_1">Get your leftrsasigkey...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_1_2">...and your rightrsasigkey</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_2">Customize /etc/ipsec.conf</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_3">Start your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be tunneled</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_5">Test your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_6">Finishing touches</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#16_3_7">Multiple Road Warriors</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#16_4">What next?</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#background">Linux FreeS/WAN background</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#dns.background">Some DNS background</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#forward.reverse">Forward and reverse maps</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#17_1_2">Hierarchy and delegation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#17_1_3">Syntax of DNS records</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#17_1_4">Cacheing, TTL and propagation delay</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#MTU.trouble">Problems with packet fragmentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#nat.background">Network address translation (NAT)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#17_3_1">NAT to non-routable addresses</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#17_3_2">NAT to routable addresses</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#user.examples">FreeS/WAN script examples</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#poltorak">Poltorak's Firewall script</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#makecheck">How to configure to use "make check"</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#19_1">What is "make check"</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#19_2">Running "make check"</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#20">How to write a "make check" test</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#20_1">Structure of a test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_2">The TESTLIST</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_3">Test kinds</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_4">Common parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_8">libtest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_10">umlXhost parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#20_12">module_compile paramaters</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#21">Current pitfalls</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing guide</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#22_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#22_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#23">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#23_1">Other notes about debugging</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#24">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#25">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#politics">History and politics of cryptography</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#intro.politics">Introduction</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#26_1_1">History</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#26_1_1_1">World War II</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#postwar">Postwar and Cold War</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#recent">Recent history -- the crypto wars</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#intro.poli">Politics</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#26_1_3">Links</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#26_1_4">Outline of this section</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#leader">From our project leader</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#gilmore">Swan: Securing the Internet against Wiretapping</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#26_2_1_1">Deployment of IPSEC</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#26_2_1_2">Current status</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#26_2_1_3">Why?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#26_2_1_4">What You Can Do</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#26_2_1_5">Related projects</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#policestate">Stopping wholesale monitoring</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#weak">Government promotion of weak crypto</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#escrow">Escrowed encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#shortkeys">Limited key lengths</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#26_3_2_1">Some real trade-offs</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#exlaw">Cryptography Export Laws</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#USlaw">US Law</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#UScontrib">US contributions to FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#wrong">What's wrong with restrictions on cryptography</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#Wassenaar">The Wassenaar Arrangement</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#status">Export status of Linux FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#help">Help spread IPsec around</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#desnotsecure">DES is Not Secure</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#deshware">Dedicated hardware breaks DES in a few days</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#spooks">Spooks may break DES faster yet</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#desnet">Networks break DES in a few weeks</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#no_des">We disable DES</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#40joke">40-bits is laughably weak</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#altdes">Triple DES is almost certainly secure</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#aes.ipsec">AES in IPsec</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#press">Press coverage of Linux FreeS/WAN:</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#26_6_1">FreeS/WAN 1.0 press</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#release">Press release for version 1.0</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#ipsec.detail">The IPsec protocols</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#27_1">Protocols and phases</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#others">Applying IPsec</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#limitations">Limitations of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#uses">IPsec is a general mechanism for securing IP</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#authonly">Using authentication without encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#encnoauth">Encryption without authentication is dangerous</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#multilayer">Multiple layers of IPsec processing are - possible</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#traffic.resist">Resisting traffic analysis</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#extra">Using "unnecessary" encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#multi-encrypt">Using multiple encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#fewer">Using fewer tunnels</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#primitives">Cryptographic components</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#block.cipher">Block ciphers</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#hash.ipsec">Hash functions</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#hmac.ipsec">The HMAC construct</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#27_3_2_2">Choice of hash algorithm</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#DH.keying">Diffie-Hellman key agreement</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#RSA.auth">RSA authentication</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#structure">Structure of IPsec</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#IKE.ipsec">IKE (Internet Key Exchange)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#phases">Phases of IKE</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#sequence">Sequence of messages in IKE</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#struct.exchange">Structure of IKE messages</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#services">IPsec Services, AH and ESP</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#AH.ipsec">The Authentication Header (AH)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#keyed">Keyed MD5 and Keyed SHA</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#sequence">Sequence numbers</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ESP.ipsec">Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#modes">IPsec modes</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#tunnel.ipsec">Tunnel mode</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#transport.ipsec">Transport mode</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#parts">FreeS/WAN parts</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#KLIPS.ipsec">KLIPS: Kernel IPsec Support</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#Pluto.ipsec">The Pluto daemon</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#command">The ipsec(8) command</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ipsec.conf">Linux FreeS/WAN configuration file</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#key">Key management</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#current">Currently Implemented Methods</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#manual">Manual keying</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#auto">Automatic keying</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#notyet">Methods not yet implemented</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#noauth">Unauthenticated key exchange</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#DNS">Key exchange using DNS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#PKI">Key exchange using a PKI</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#photuris">Photuris</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#skip">SKIP</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#lists">Mailing lists and newsgroups</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#list.fs">Mailing lists about FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#projlist">The project mailing lists</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#which.list">Which list should I use?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#policy.list">List policies</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#archive">Archives of the lists</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#indexes">Indexes of mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#otherlists">Lists for related software and topics</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#28_3_1">Products that include FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#linux.lists">Linux mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ietf">Lists for IETF working groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#other">Other mailing lists</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#newsgroups">Usenet newsgroups</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#weblink">Web links</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#freeswan">The Linux FreeS/WAN Project</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#patch">Add-ons and patches for FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#29_1_1_1">Current patches</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#29_1_1_2">Older patches</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#VPN.masq">VPN masquerade patches</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#dist">Distributions including FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#used">Things FreeS/WAN uses or could use</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#alternatives">Other approaches to VPNs for Linux</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#ipsec.link">The IPsec Protocols</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#general">General IPsec or VPN information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#overview">IPsec overview documents or slide sets</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#otherlang">IPsec information in languages other than - English</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#RFCs1">RFCs and other reference documents</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#analysis">Analysis and critiques of IPsec protocols</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#IP.background">Background information on IP</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#implement">IPsec Implementations</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#linuxprod">Linux products</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#router">IPsec in router products</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#fw.web">IPsec in firewall products</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#ipsecos">Operating systems with IPsec support</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#29_3_5">IPsec on network cards</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#opensource">Open source IPsec implementations</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#linuxipsec">Other Linux IPsec implementations</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#BSD">IPsec for BSD Unix</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#misc">IPsec for other systems</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#interop.web">Interoperability</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#result">Interoperability results</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#test1">Interoperability test sites</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#linux.link">Linux links</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#linux.basic">Basic and tutorial Linux information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#general">General Linux sites</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#docs.ldp">Documentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#advroute.web">Advanced routing</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#linsec">Security for Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#firewall.linux">Linux firewalls</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#linux.misc">Miscellaneous Linux information</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#crypto.link">Crypto and security links</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#security">Crypto and security resources</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#std.links">The standard link collections</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#FAQ">Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) documents</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#cryptover">Tutorials</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#standards">Crypto and security standards</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#quotes">Crypto quotes</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#policy">Cryptography law and policy</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#legal">Surveys of crypto law</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#oppose">Organisations opposing crypto restrictions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#other.policy">Other information on crypto policy</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#crypto.tech">Cryptography technical information</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#cryptolinks">Collections of crypto links</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#papers">Lists of online cryptography papers</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#interesting">Particularly interesting papers</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#compsec">Computer and network security</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#seclink">Security links</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#firewall.web">Firewall links</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#vpn">VPN links</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#tools">Security tools</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#people">Links to home pages</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#ourgloss">Glossary for the Linux FreeS/WAN project</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#jump">Jump to a letter in the glossary</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#gloss">Other glossaries</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#definitions">Definitions</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#biblio">Bibliography for the Linux FreeS/WAN project</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#RFC">IPsec RFCs and related documents</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#RFCfile">The RFCs.tar.gz Distribution File</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#sources">Other sources for RFCs & Internet drafts</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#RFCdown">RFCs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#drafts">Internet Drafts</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#FIPS1">FIPS standards</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="#RFCs.tar.gz">What's in the RFCs.tar.gz bundle?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#rfc.ov">Overview RFCs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#basic.prot">Basic protocols</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#key.ike">Key management</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rfc.detail">Details of various things used</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rfc.ref">Older RFCs which may be referenced</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rfc.dns">RFCs for secure DNS service, which IPsec may use</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rfc.exp">RFCs labelled "experimental"</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rfc.rel">Related RFCs</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#roadmap">Distribution Roadmap: What's Where in Linux - FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#top">Top directory</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#doc">Documentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#klips.roadmap">KLIPS: kernel IP security</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#pluto.roadmap">Pluto key and connection management daemon</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#utils">Utils</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#lib">Libraries</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#fswanlib">FreeS/WAN Library</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#otherlib">Imported Libraries</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#33_6_2_1">LibDES</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#33_6_2_2">GMP</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing guide</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#34_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#34_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#35">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#35_1">Other notes about debugging</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#36">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#37">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#makecheck">How to configure to use "make check"</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#38_1">What is "make check"</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#38_2">Running "make check"</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#39">How to write a "make check" test</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#39_1">Structure of a test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_2">The TESTLIST</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_3">Test kinds</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_4">Common parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_8">libtest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_10">umlXhost parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#39_12">module_compile paramaters</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="#40">Current pitfalls</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#nightly">Nightly regression testing</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="#nightlyhowto">How to setup the nightly build</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#42_1"> Files you need to know about</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#42_2">Configuring freeswan-regress-env.sh</A></LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="intro">Introduction</A></H1> -<P>This section gives an overview of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>what IP Security (IPsec) does</LI> -<LI>how IPsec works</LI> -<LI>why we are implementing it for Linux</LI> -<LI>how this implementation works</LI> -</UL> -<P>This section is intended to cover only the essentials,<EM> things you - should know before trying to use FreeS/WAN.</EM></P> -<P>For more detailed background information, see the<A href="#politics"> - history and politics</A> and<A href="#ipsec.detail"> IPsec protocols</A> - sections.</P> -<H2><A name="ipsec.intro">IPsec, Security for the Internet Protocol</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is a Linux implementation of the IPsec (IP security) - protocols. IPsec provides<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A> and<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> services at the IP (Internet Protocol) level of the - network protocol stack.</P> -<P>Working at this level, IPsec can protect any traffic carried over IP, - unlike other encryption which generally protects only a particular - higher-level protocol --<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> for mail,<A href="#ssh"> - SSH</A> for remote login,<A href="#SSL"> SSL</A> for web work, and so - on. This approach has both considerable advantages and some - limitations. For discussion, see our<A href="#others"> IPsec section</A> -</P> -<P>IPsec can be used on any machine which does IP networking. Dedicated - IPsec gateway machines can be installed wherever required to protect - traffic. IPsec can also run on routers, on firewall machines, on - various application servers, and on end-user desktop or laptop - machines.</P> -<P>Three protocols are used</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#AH">AH</A> (Authentication Header) provides a packet-level - authentication service</LI> -<LI><A href="#ESP">ESP</A> (Encapsulating Security Payload) provides - encryption plus authentication</LI> -<LI><A href="#IKE">IKE</A> (Internet Key Exchange) negotiates connection - parameters, including keys, for the other two</LI> -</UL> -<P>Our implementation has three main parts:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#KLIPS">KLIPS</A> (kernel IPsec) implements AH, ESP, and - packet handling within the kernel</LI> -<LI><A href="#Pluto">Pluto</A> (an IKE daemon) implements IKE, - negotiating connections with other systems</LI> -<LI>various scripts provide an adminstrator's interface to the machinery</LI> -</UL> -<P>IPsec is optional for the current (version 4) Internet Protocol. - FreeS/WAN adds IPsec to the Linux IPv4 network stack. Implementations - of<A href="#ipv6.gloss"> IP version 6</A> are required to include - IPsec. Work toward integrating FreeS/WAN into the Linux IPv6 stack has<A -href="#ipv6"> started</A>.</P> -<P>For more information on IPsec, see our<A href="#ipsec.detail"> IPsec - protocols</A> section, our collection of<A href="#ipsec.link"> IPsec - links</A> or the<A href="#RFC"> RFCs</A> which are the official - definitions of these protocols.</P> -<H3><A name="intro.interop">Interoperating with other IPsec - implementations</A></H3> -<P>IPsec is designed to let different implementations work together. We - provide:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="#implement"> list</A> of some other implementations</LI> -<LI>information on<A href="#interop"> using FreeS/WAN with other - implementations</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The VPN Consortium fosters cooperation among implementers and - interoperability among implementations. Their<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/"> - web site</A> has much more information.</P> -<H3><A name="advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>IPsec has a number of security advantages. Here are some - independently written articles which discuss these:</P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sans.org/rr/"> SANS institute papers</A>. See the - section on Encryption &VPNs. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns110/ns170/ns171/ns128/networking_solutions_white_papers_list.html"> - Cisco's white papers on "Networking Solutions"</A>. -<BR><A HREF="http://iscs.sourceforge.net/HowWhyBrief/HowWhyBrief.html"> - Advantages of ISCS (Linux Integrated Secure Communications System; - includes FreeS/WAN and other software)</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="applications">Applications of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>Because IPsec operates at the network layer, it is remarkably - flexible and can be used to secure nearly any type of Internet traffic. - Two applications, however, are extremely widespread:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="#VPN"> Virtual Private Network</A>, or VPN, allows - multiple sites to communicate securely over an insecure Internet by - encrypting all communication between the sites.</LI> -<LI>"Road Warriors" connect to the office from home, or perhaps from a - hotel somewhere</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is enough opportunity in these applications that vendors are - flocking to them. IPsec is being built into routers, into firewall - products, and into major operating systems, primarily to support these - applications. See our<A href="#implement"> list</A> of implementations - for details.</P> -<P>We support both of those applications, and various less common IPsec - applications as well, but we also add one of our own:</P> -<UL> -<LI>opportunistic encryption, the ability to set up FreeS/WAN gateways - so that any two of them can encrypt to each other, and will do so - whenever packets pass between them.</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is an extension we are adding to the protocols. FreeS/WAN is the - first prototype implementation, though we hope other IPsec - implementations will adopt the technique once we demonstrate it. See<A href="#goals"> - project goals</A> below for why we think this is important.</P> -<P>A somewhat more detailed description of each of these applications is - below. Our<A href="#quick_guide"> quickstart</A> section will show you - how to build each of them.</P> -<H4><A name="makeVPN">Using secure tunnels to create a VPN</A></H4> -<P>A VPN, or<STRONG> V</STRONG>irtual<STRONG> P</STRONG>rivate<STRONG> N</STRONG> -etwork lets two networks communicate securely when the only connection - between them is over a third network which they do not trust.</P> -<P>The method is to put a security gateway machine between each of the - communicating networks and the untrusted network. The gateway machines - encrypt packets entering the untrusted net and decrypt packets leaving - it, creating a secure tunnel through it.</P> -<P>If the cryptography is strong, the implementation is careful, and the - administration of the gateways is competent, then one can reasonably - trust the security of the tunnel. The two networks then behave like a - single large private network, some of whose links are encrypted tunnels - through untrusted nets.</P> -<P>Actual VPNs are often more complex. One organisation may have fifty - branch offices, plus some suppliers and clients, with whom it needs to - communicate securely. Another might have 5,000 stores, or 50,000 - point-of-sale devices. The untrusted network need not be the Internet. - All the same issues arise on a corporate or institutional network - whenever two departments want to communicate privately with each other.</P> -<P>Administratively, the nice thing about many VPN setups is that large - parts of them are static. You know the IP addresses of most of the - machines involved. More important, you know they will not change on - you. This simplifies some of the admin work. For cases where the - addresses do change, see the next section.</P> -<H4><A name="road.intro">Road Warriors</A></H4> -<P>The prototypical "Road Warrior" is a traveller connecting to home - base from a laptop machine. Administratively, most of the same problems - arise for a telecommuter connecting from home to the office, especially - if the telecommuter does not have a static IP address.</P> -<P>For purposes of this document:</P> -<UL> -<LI>anyone with a dynamic IP address is a "Road Warrior".</LI> -<LI>any machine doing IPsec processing is a "gateway". Think of the - single-user road warrior machine as a gateway with a degenerate subnet - (one machine, itself) behind it.</LI> -</UL> -<P>These require somewhat different setup than VPN gateways with static - addresses and with client systems behind them, but are basically not - problematic.</P> -<P>There are some difficulties which appear for some road warrior - connections:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Road Wariors who get their addresses via DHCP may have a problem. - FreeS/WAN can quite happily build and use a tunnel to such an address, - but when the DHCP lease expires, FreeS/WAN does not know that. The - tunnel fails, and the only recovery method is to tear it down and - re-build it.</LI> -<LI>If<A href="#NAT.gloss"> Network Address Translation</A> (NAT) is - applied between the two IPsec Gateways, this breaks IPsec. IPsec - authenticates packets on an end-to-end basis, to ensure they are not - altered en route. NAT rewrites packets as they go by. See our<A href="#NAT"> - firewalls</A> document for details.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In most situations, however, FreeS/WAN supports road warrior - connections just fine.</P> -<H4><A name="opp.intro">Opportunistic encryption</A></H4> -<P>One of the reasons we are working on FreeS/WAN is that it gives us - the opportunity to add what we call opportuntistic encryption. This - means that any two FreeS/WAN gateways will be able to encrypt their - traffic, even if the two gateway administrators have had no prior - contact and neither system has any preset information about the other.</P> -<P>Both systems pick up the authentication information they need from - the<A href="#DNS"> DNS</A> (domain name service), the service they - already use to look up IP addresses. Of course the administrators must - put that information in the DNS, and must set up their gateways with - opportunistic encryption enabled. Once that is done, everything is - automatic. The gateways look for opportunities to encrypt, and encrypt - whatever they can. Whether they also accept unencrypted communication - is a policy decision the administrator can make.</P> -<P>This technique can give two large payoffs:</P> -<UL> -<LI>It reduces the administrative overhead for IPsec enormously. You - configure your gateway and thereafter everything is automatic. The need - to configure the system on a per-tunnel basis disappears. Of course, - FreeS/WAN allows specifically configured tunnels to co-exist with - opportunistic encryption, but we hope to make them unnecessary in most - cases.</LI> -<LI>It moves us toward a more secure Internet, allowing users to create - an environment where message privacy is the default. All messages can - be encrypted, provided the other end is willing to co-operate. See our<A -href="#politics"> history and politics of cryptography</A> section for - discussion of why we think this is needed.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Opportunistic encryption is not (yet?) a standard part of the IPsec - protocols, but an extension we are proposing and demonstrating. For - details of our design, see<A href="#applied"> links</A> below.</P> -<P>Only one current product we know of implements a form of - opportunistic encryption.<A href="#ssmail"> Secure sendmail</A> will - automatically encrypt server-to-server mail transfers whenever - possible.</P> -<H3><A name="types">The need to authenticate gateways</A></H3> -<P>A complication, which applies to any type of connection -- VPN, Road - Warrior or opportunistic -- is that a secure connection cannot be - created magically.<EM> There must be some mechanism which enables the - gateways to reliably identify each other.</EM> Without this, they - cannot sensibly trust each other and cannot create a genuinely secure - link.</P> -<P>Any link they do create without some form of<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> will be vulnerable to a<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A>. If<A href="#alicebob"> Alice and Bob</A> - are the people creating the connection, a villian who can re-route or - intercept the packets can pose as Alice while talking to Bob and pose - as Bob while talking to Alice. Alice and Bob then both talk to the man - in the middle, thinking they are talking to each other, and the villain - gets everything sent on the bogus "secure" connection.</P> -<P>There are two ways to build links securely, both of which exclude the - man-in-the middle:</P> -<UL> -<LI>with<STRONG> manual keying</STRONG>, Alice and Bob share a secret - key (which must be transmitted securely, perhaps in a note or via PGP - or SSH) to encrypt their messages. For FreeS/WAN, such keys are stored - in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> file. Of - course, if an enemy gets the key, all is lost.</LI> -<LI>with<STRONG> automatic keying</STRONG>, the two systems authenticate - each other and negotiate their own secret keys. The keys are - automatically changed periodically.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Automatic keying is much more secure, since if an enemy gets one key - only messages between the previous re-keying and the next are exposed. - It is therefore the usual mode of operation for most IPsec deployment, - and the mode we use in our setup examples. FreeS/WAN does support - manual keying for special circumstanes. See this<A href="#prodman"> - section</A>.</P> -<P>For automatic keying, the two systems must authenticate each other - during the negotiations. There is a choice of methods for this:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<STRONG> shared secret</STRONG> provides authentication. If Alice - and Bob are the only ones who know a secret and Alice recives a message - which could not have been created without that secret, then Alice can - safely believe the message came from Bob.</LI> -<LI>a<A href="#public"> public key</A> can also provide authentication. - If Alice receives a message signed with Bob's private key (which of - course only he should know) and she has a trustworthy copy of his - public key (so that she can verify the signature), then she can safely - believe the message came from Bob.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Public key techniques are much preferable, for reasons discussed<A href="#choose"> - later</A>, and will be used in all our setup examples. FreeS/WAN does - also support auto-keying with shared secret authentication. See this<A href="#prodsecrets"> - section</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="project">The FreeS/WAN project</A></H2> -<P>For complete information on the project, see our web site,<A href="http://liberty.freeswan.org"> - freeswan.org</A>.</P> -<P>In summary, we are implementing the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> - protocols for Linux and extending them to do<A href="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="goals">Project goals</A></H3> -<P>Our overall goal in FreeS/WAN is to make the Internet more secure and - more private.</P> -<P>Our IPsec implementation supports VPNs and Road Warriors of course. - Those are important applications. Many users will want FreeS/WAN to - build corporate VPNs or to provide secure remote access.</P> -<P>However, our goals in building it go beyond that. We are trying to - help<STRONG> build security into the fabric of the Internet</STRONG> so - that anyone who choses to communicate securely can do so, as easily as - they can do anything else on the net.</P> -<P>More detailed objectives are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>extend IPsec to do<A href="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A> - so that -<UL> -<LI>any two systems can secure their communications without a - pre-arranged connection</LI> -<LI><STRONG>secure connections can be the default</STRONG>, falling back - to unencrypted connections only if: -<UL> -<LI><EM>both</EM> the partner is not set up to co-operate on securing - the connection</LI> -<LI><EM>and</EM> your policy allows insecure connections</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>a significant fraction of all Internet traffic is encrypted</LI> -<LI>wholesale monitoring of the net (<A href="#intro.poli">examples</A>) - becomes difficult or impossible</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>help make IPsec widespread by providing an implementation with no - restrictions: -<UL> -<LI>freely available in source code under the<A href="#GPL"> GNU General - Public License</A></LI> -<LI>running on a range of readily available hardware</LI> -<LI>not subject to US or other nations'<A href="#exlaw"> export - restrictions</A>. -<BR> Note that in order to avoid<EM> even the appearance</EM> of being - subject to those laws, the project cannot accept software contributions - --<EM> not even one-line bug fixes</EM> -- from US residents or - citizens.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>provide a high-quality IPsec implementation for Linux -<UL> -<LI>portable to all CPUs Linux supports:<A href="#CPUs"> (current list)</A> -</LI> -<LI>interoperable with other IPsec implementations:<A href="#interop"> - (current list)</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>If we can get opportunistic encryption implemented and widely - deployed, then it becomes impossible for even huge well-funded agencies - to monitor the net.</P> -<P>See also our section on<A href="#politics"> history and politics</A> - of cryptography, which includes our project leader's<A href="#gilmore"> - rationale</A> for starting the project.</P> -<H3><A name="staff">Project team</A></H3> -<P>Two of the team are from the US and can therefore contribute no code:</P> -<UL> -<LI>John Gilmore: founder and policy-maker (<A href="http://www.toad.com/gnu/"> -home page</A>)</LI> -<LI>Hugh Daniel: project manager, Most Demented Tester, and occasionally - Pointy-Haired Boss</LI> -</UL> -<P>The rest of the team are Canadians, working in Canada. (<A href="#status"> -Why Canada?</A>)</P> -<UL> -<LI>Hugh Redelmeier:<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto daemon</A> programmer</LI> -<LI>Richard Guy Briggs:<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> programmer</LI> -<LI>Michael Richardson: hacker without portfolio</LI> -<LI>Claudia Schmeing: documentation</LI> -<LI>Sam Sgro: technical support via the<A href="#lists"> mailing lists</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>The project is funded by civil libertarians who consider our goals - worthwhile. Most of the team are paid for this work.</P> -<P>People outside this core team have made substantial contributions. - See</P> -<UL> -<LI>our<A href="../CREDITS"> CREDITS</A> file</LI> -<LI>the<A href="#patch"> patches and add-ons</A> section of our web - references file</LI> -<LI>lists below of user-written<A href="#howto"> HowTos</A> and<A href="#applied"> - other papers</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Additional contributions are welcome. See the<A href="#contrib.faq"> - FAQ</A> for details.</P> -<H2><A name="products">Products containing FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<P>Unfortunately the<A href="#exlaw"> export laws</A> of some countries - restrict the distribution of strong cryptography. FreeS/WAN is - therefore not in the standard Linux kernel and not in all CD or web - distributions.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN is, however, quite widely used. Products we know of that - use it are listed below. We would appreciate hearing, via the<A href="#lists"> - mailing lists</A>, of any we don't know of.</P> -<H3><A name="distwith">Full Linux distributions</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is included in various general-purpose Linux distributions, - mostly from countries (shown in brackets) with more sensible laws:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.suse.com/">SuSE Linux</A> (Germany)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.conectiva.com">Conectiva</A> (Brazil)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/">Mandrake</A> (France)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.debian.org">Debian</A></LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.pld.org.pl/"> Polish(ed) Linux Distribution</A> - (Poland)</LI> -<LI><A>Best Linux</A> (Finland)</LI> -</UL> -<P>For distributions which do not include FreeS/WAN and are not Redhat - (which we develop and test on), there is additional information in our<A -href="#otherdist"> compatibility</A> section.</P> -<P>The server edition of<A href="http://www.corel.com"> Corel</A> Linux - (Canada) also had FreeS/WAN, but Corel have dropped that product line.</P> -<H3><A name="kernel_dist">Linux kernel distributions</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/wolk/">Working Overloaded - Linux Kernel (WOLK)</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="office_dist">Office server distributions</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is also included in several distributions aimed at the - market for turnkey business servers:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.e-smith.com/">e-Smith</A> (Canada), which has - recently been acquired and become the Network Server Solutions group of<A -href="http://www.mitel.com/"> Mitel Networks</A> (Canada)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.clarkconnect.org/">ClarkConnect</A> from Point - Clark Networks (Canada)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.trustix.net/">Trustix Secure Linux</A> (Norway)</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="fw_dist">Firewall distributions</A></H3> -<P>Several distributions intended for firewall and router applications - include FreeS/WAN:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.linuxrouter.org/"> Linux Router Project</A> - produces a Linux distribution that will boot from a single floppy. The<A -href="http://leaf.sourceforge.net"> LEAF</A> firewall project provides - several different LRP-based firewall packages. At least one of them, - Charles Steinkuehler's Dachstein, includes FreeS/WAN with X.509 - patches.</LI> -<LI>there are several distributions bootable directly from CD-ROM, - usable on a machine without hard disk. -<UL> -<LI>Dachstein (see above) can be used this way</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.gibraltar.at/">Gibraltar</A> is based on Debian - GNU/Linux.</LI> -<LI>at time of writing,<A href="www.xiloo.com"> Xiloo</A> is available - only in Chinese. An English version is expected.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.astaro.com/products/index.html">Astaro Security - Linux</A> includes FreeS/WAN. It has some web-based tools for managing - the firewall that include FreeS/WAN configuration management.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxwall.de">Linuxwall</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.smoothwall.org/">Smoothwall</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.devil-linux.org/">Devil Linux</A></LI> -<LI>Coyote Linux has a<A href="http://embedded.coyotelinux.com/wolverine/index.php"> - Wolverine</A> firewall/VPN server</LI> -</UL> -<P>There are also several sets of scripts available for managing a - firewall which is also acting as a FreeS/WAN IPsec gateway. See this<A href="#rules.pub"> - list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="turnkey">Firewall and VPN products</A></H3> -<P>Several vendors use FreeS/WAN as the IPsec component of a turnkey - firewall or VPN product.</P> -<P>Software-only products:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxmagic.com/vpn/index.html">Linux Magic</A> - offer a VPN/Firewall product using FreeS/WAN</LI> -<LI>The Software Group's<A href="http://www.wanware.com/sentinet/"> - Sentinet</A> product uses FreeS/WAN</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.merilus.com">Merilus</A> use FreeS/WAN in their - Gateway Guardian firewall product</LI> -</UL> -<P>Products that include the hardware:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.lasat.com"> LASAT SafePipe[tm]</A> series. is - an IPsec box based on an embedded MIPS running Linux with FreeS/WAN and - a web-config front end. This company also host our freeswan.org web - site.</LI> -<LI>Merilus<A href="http://www.merilus.com/products/fc/index.shtml"> - Firecard</A> is a Linux firewall on a PCI card.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.kyzo.com/">Kyzo</A> have a "pizza box" product - line with various types of server, all running from flash. One of them - is an IPsec/PPTP VPN server</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.pfn.com">PFN</A> use FreeS/WAN in some of their - products</LI> -</UL> -<P><A href="www.rebel.com">Rebel.com</A>, makers of the Netwinder Linux - machines (ARM or Crusoe based), had a product that used FreeS/WAN. The - company is in receivership so the future of the Netwinder is at best - unclear.<A href="#patch"> PKIX patches</A> for FreeS/WAN developed at - Rebel are listed in our web links document.</P> -<H2><A name="docs">Information sources</A></H2> -<H3><A name="docformats">This HowTo, in multiple formats</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN documentation up to version 1.5 was available only in HTML. - Now we ship two formats:</P> -<UL> -<LI>as HTML, one file for each doc section plus a global<A href="toc.html"> - Table of Contents</A></LI> -<LI><A href="HowTo.html">one big HTML file</A> for easy searching</LI> -</UL> -<P>and provide a Makefile to generate other formats if required:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="HowTo.pdf">PDF</A></LI> -<LI><A href="HowTo.ps">Postscript</A></LI> -<LI><A href="HowTo.txt">ASCII text</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The Makefile assumes the htmldoc tool is available. You can download - it from<A href="http://www.easysw.com"> Easy Software</A>.</P> -<P>All formats should be available at the following websites:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.freeswan.org/doc.html">FreeS/WAN project</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org">Linux Documentation Project</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The distribution tarball has only the two HTML formats.</P> -<P><STRONG>Note:</STRONG> If you need the latest doc version, for - example to see if anyone has managed to set up interoperation between - FreeS/WAN and whatever, then you should download the current snapshot. - What is on the web is documentation as of the last release. Snapshots - have all changes I've checked in to date.</P> -<H3><A name="rtfm">RTFM (please Read The Fine Manuals)</A></H3> -<P>As with most things on any Unix-like system, most parts of Linux - FreeS/WAN are documented in online manual pages. We provide a list of<A href="/mnt/floppy/manpages.html"> - FreeS/WAN man pages</A>, with links to HTML versions of them.</P> -<P>The man pages describing configuration files are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> -ipsec.secrets(5)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Man pages for common commands include:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.8.html">ipsec(8)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto(8)</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html"> -ipsec_newhostkey(8)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto(8)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>You can read these either in HTML using the links above or with the<VAR> - man(1)</VAR> command.</P> -<P>In the event of disagreement between this HTML documentation and the - man pages, the man pages are more likely correct since they are written - by the implementers. Please report any such inconsistency on the<A href="#lists"> - mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="text">Other documents in the distribution</A></H3> -<P>Text files in the main distribution directory are README, INSTALL, - CREDITS, CHANGES, BUGS and COPYING.</P> -<P>The Libdes encryption library we use has its own documentation. You - can find it in the library directory..</P> -<H3><A name="assumptions">Background material</A></H3> -<P>Throughout this documentation, I write as if the reader had at least - a general familiarity with Linux, with Internet Protocol networking, - and with the basic ideas of system and network security. Of course that - will certainly not be true for all readers, and quite likely not even - for a majority.</P> -<P>However, I must limit amount of detail on these topics in the main - text. For one thing, I don't understand all the details of those topics - myself. Even if I did, trying to explain everything here would produce - extremely long and almost completely unreadable documentation.</P> -<P>If one or more of those areas is unknown territory for you, there are - plenty of other resources you could look at:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Linux</DT> -<DD>the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org"> Linux Documentation Project</A> - or a local<A href="http://www.linux.org/groups/"> Linux User Group</A> - and these<A href="#linux.link"> links</A></DD> -<DT>IP networks</DT> -<DD>Rusty Russell's<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/networking-concepts-HOWTO/index.html"> - Networking Concepts HowTo</A> and these<A href="#IP.background"> links</A> -</DD> -<DT>Security</DT> -<DD>Schneier's book<A href="#secrets"> Secrets and Lies</A> and these<A href="#crypto.link"> - links</A></DD> -</DL> -<P>Also, I do make an effort to provide some background material in - these documents. All the basic ideas behind IPsec and FreeS/WAN are - explained here. Explanations that do not fit in the main text, or that - not everyone will need, are often in the<A href="#ourgloss"> glossary</A> -, which is the largest single file in this document set. There is also a<A -href="#background"> background</A> file containing various explanations - too long to fit in glossary definitions. All files are heavily - sprinkled with links to each other and to the glossary.<STRONG> If some - passage makes no sense to you, try the links</STRONG>.</P> -<P>For other reference material, see the<A href="#biblio"> bibliography</A> - and our collection of<A href="web.html#weblinks"> web links</A>.</P> -<P>Of course, no doubt I get this (and other things) wrong sometimes. - Feedback via the<A href="#lists"> mailing lists</A> is welcome.</P> -<H3><A name="archives">Archives of the project mailing list</A></H3> -<P>Until quite recently, there was only one FreeS/WAN mailing list, and - archives of it were:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec">Canada</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nexial.com">Holland</A></LI> -</UL> - The two archives use completely different search engines. You might - want to try both. -<P>More recently we have expanded to five lists, each with its own - archive.</P> -<P><A href="#lists">More information</A> on mailing lists.</P> -<H3><A name="howto">User-written HowTo information</A></H3> -<P>Various user-written HowTo documents are available. The ones covering - FreeS/WAN-to-FreeS/WAN connections are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Jean-Francois Nadeau's<A href="http://jixen.tripod.com/"> practical - configurations</A> document</LI> -<LI>Jens Zerbst's HowTo on<A href="http://dynipsec.tripod.com/"> Using - FreeS/WAN with dynamic IP addresses</A>.</LI> -<LI>an entry in Kurt Seifried's<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/kben00000013.html"> - Linux Security Knowledge Base</A>.</LI> -<LI>a section of David Ranch's<A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos"> - Trinity OS Guide</A></LI> -<LI>a section in David Bander's book<A href="#bander"> Linux Security - Toolkit</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>User-wriiten HowTo material may be<STRONG> especially helpful if you - need to interoperate with another IPsec implementation</STRONG>. We - have neither the equipment nor the manpower to test such - configurations. Users seem to be doing an admirable job of filling the - gaps.</P> -<UL> -<LI>list of user-written<A href="interop.html#otherpub"> interoperation - HowTos</A> in our interop document</LI> -</UL> -<P>Check what version of FreeS/WAN user-written documents cover. The - software is under active development and the current version may be - significantly different from what an older document describes.</P> -<H3><A name="applied">Papers on FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Two design documents show team thinking on new developments:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="opportunism.spec">Opportunistic Encryption</A> by technical - lead Henry Spencer and Pluto programmer Hugh Redelemeier</LI> -<LI>discussion of<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/SSW/freeswan/klips2req/"> - KLIPS redesign</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Both documents are works in progress and are frequently revised. For - the latest version, see the<A href="#lists"> design mailing list</A>. - Comments should go to that list.</P> -<P>There is now an<A href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-06.txt"> - Internet Draft on Opportunistic Encryption</A> by Michael Richardson, - Hugh Redelmeier and Henry Spencer. This is a first step toward getting - the protocol standardised so there can be multiple implementations of - it. Discussion of it takes place on the<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - IETF IPsec Working Group</A> mailing list.</P> -<P>A number of papers giving further background on FreeS/WAN, or - exploring its future or its applications, are also available:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Both Henry and Richard gave talks on FreeS/WAN at the 2000<A href="http://www.linuxsymposium.org"> - Ottawa Linux Symposium</A>. -<UL> -<LI>Richard's<A href="http://www.conscoop.ottawa.on.ca/rgb/freeswan/ols2k/"> - slides</A></LI> -<LI>Henry's paper</LI> -<LI>MP3 audio of their talks is available from the<A href="http://www.linuxsymposium.org/"> - conference page</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><CITE>Moat: A Virtual Private Network Appliances and Services - Platform</CITE> is a paper about large-scale (a few 100 links) use of - FreeS/WAN in a production application at AT&T Research. It is available - in Postscript or PDF from co-author Steve Bellovin's<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/index.html"> - papers list page</A>.</LI> -<LI>One of the Moat co-authors, John Denker, has also written -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/ipsec+routing.htm"> proposal</A> - for how future versions of FreeS/WAN might interact with routing - protocols</LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/wishlist.htm"> wishlist</A> of - possible new features</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Bart Trojanowski's web page has a draft design for<A href="http://www.jukie.net/~bart/linux-ipsec/"> - hardware acceleration</A> of FreeS/WAN</LI> -</UL> -<P>Several of these provoked interesting discussions on the mailing - lists, worth searching for in the<A href="#archive"> archives</A>.</P> -<P>There are also several papers in languages other than English, see - our<A href="#otherlang"> web links</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="licensing">License and copyright information</A></H3> -<P>All code and documentation written for this project is distributed - under either the GNU General Public License (<A href="#GPL">GPL</A>) or - the GNU Library General Public License. For details see the COPYING - file in the distribution.</P> -<P>Not all code in the distribution is ours, however. See the CREDITS - file for details. In particular, note that the<A href="#LIBDES"> Libdes</A> - library and the version of<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> that we use each have - their own license.</P> -<H2><A name="sites">Distribution sites</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is available from a number of sites.</P> -<H3><A NAME="1_5_1">Primary site</A></H3> -<P>Our primary site, is at xs4all (Thanks, folks!) in Holland:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan">HTTP</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan">FTP</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="mirrors">Mirrors</A></H3> -<P>There are also mirror sites all over the world:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.flora.org/freeswan">Eastern Canada</A> (limited - resouces)</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ludwig.doculink.com/pub/freeswan/">Eastern Canada</A> - (has older versions too)</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ntsc.notBSD.org/pub/crypto/freeswan/">Eastern Canada</A> - (has older versions too)</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.kame.net/pub/freeswan/">Japan</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.futuredynamics.com/freecrypto/FreeSWAN/">Hong - Kong</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ipsec.dk/pub/freeswan/">Denmark</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.net.lut.ac.uk/freeswan">the UK</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://storm.alert.sk/comp/mirrors/freeswan/">Slovak - Republic</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://the.wiretapped.net/security/vpn-tunnelling/freeswan/"> -Australia</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://freeswan.technolust.cx/">technolust</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://freeswan.devguide.de/">Germany</A></LI> -<LI>Ivan Moore's<A href="http://snowcrash.tdyc.com/freeswan/"> site</A></LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.cryptoarchive.net/"> Crypto Archive</A> on - the<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/"> Security Portal</A> site</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.wiretapped.net/">Wiretapped.net</A> in Australia</LI> -</UL> -<P>Thanks to those folks as well.</P> -<H3><A name="munitions">The "munitions" archive of Linux crypto software</A> -</H3> -<P>There is also an archive of Linux crypto software called "munitions", - with its own mirrors in a number of countries. It includes FreeS/WAN, - though not always the latest version. Some of its sites are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://munitions.vipul.net/">Germany</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://munitions.iglu.cjb.net/">Italy</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://munitions2.xs4all.nl/">Netherlands</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Any of those will have a list of other "munitions" mirrors. There is - also a CD available.</P> -<H2><A NAME="1_6">Links to other sections</A></H2> -<P>For more detailed background information, see:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#politics">history and politics</A> of cryptography</LI> -<LI><A href="#ipsec.detail">IPsec protocols</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>To begin working with FreeS/WAN, go to our<A href="quickstart.html#quick.guide"> - quickstart</A> guide.</P> -<HR> -<A NAME="upgrading"></A> -<H1><A NAME="2">Upgrading to FreeS/WAN 2.x</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="2_1">New! Built in Opportunistic connections</A></H2> -<P>Out of the box, FreeS/WAN 2.x will attempt to encrypt all your IP - traffic. It will try to establish IPsec connections for:</P> -<UL> -<LI> IP traffic from the Linux box on which you have installed - FreeS/WAN, and</LI> -<LI> outbound IP traffic routed through that Linux box (eg. from a - protected subnet).</LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x uses<STRONG> hidden, automatically enabled<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR> connections</STRONG> to do this.</P> -<P>This behaviour is part of our campaign to get Opportunistic - Encryption (OE) widespread in the Linux world, so that any two Linux - boxes can encrypt to one another without prearrangement. There's one - catch, however: you must<A HREF="#quickstart"> set up a few DNS records</A> - to distribute RSA public keys and (if applicable) IPsec gateway - information.</P> -<P>If you start FreeS/WAN before you have set up these DNS records, your - connectivity will be slow, and messages relating to the built in - connections will clutter your logs. If you are unable to set up DNS for - OE, you will wish to<A HREF="#disable_policygroups"> disable the hidden - connections</A>.</P> -<A NAME="upgrading.flagday"></A> -<H3><A NAME="2_1_1">Upgrading Opportunistic Encryption to 2.01 (or - later)</A></H3> -<P>As of FreeS/WAN 2.01, Opportunistic Encryption (OE) uses DNS TXT - resource records (RRs) only (rather than TXT with KEY). This change - causes a "flag day". Users of FreeS/WAN 2.00 (or earlier) OE who are - upgrading may need to post additional resource records.</P> -<P>If you are running<A HREF="#initiate-only"> initiate-only OE</A>, you<EM> - must</EM> put up a TXT record in any forward domain as per our<A HREF="#opp.client"> - quickstart instructions</A>. This replaces your old forward KEY.</P> -<P> If you are running full OE, you require no updates. You already have - the needed TXT record in the reverse domain. However, to facilitate - future features, you may also wish to publish that TXT record in a - forward domain as instructed<A HREF="#opp.incoming"> here</A>.</P> -<P>If you are running OE on a gateway (and encrypting on behalf of - subnetted boxes) you require no updates. You already have the required - TXT record in your gateway's reverse map, and the TXT records for any - subnetted boxes require no updating. However, to facilitate future - features, you may wish to publish your gateway's TXT record in a - forward domain as shown<A HREF="#opp.incoming"> here</A>.</P> -<P> During the transition, you may wish to leave any old KEY records up - for some time. They will provide limited backward compatibility. -<!-- -For more -detail on that compatibility, see <A HREF="oe.known-issues">Known Issues with -OE</A>. ---> -</P> -<H2><A NAME="2_2">New! Policy Groups</A></H2> -<P>We want to make it easy for you to declare security policy as it - applies to IPsec connections.</P> -<P>Policy Groups make it simple to say:</P> -<UL> -<LI>These are the folks I want to talk to in the clear.</LI> -<LI>These spammers' domains -- I don't want to talk to them at all.</LI> -<LI>To talk to the finance department, I must use IPsec.</LI> -<LI>For any other communication, try to encrypt, but it's okay if we - can't.</LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN then implements these policies, creating OE connections if - and when needed. You can use Policy Groups along with connections you - explicitly define in ipsec.conf.</P> -<P>For more information, see our<A HREF="policygroups.html"> Policy - Group HOWTO</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="2_3">New! Packetdefault Connection</A></H2> -<P>Free/SWAN 2.x ships with the<STRONG> automatically enabled, hidden - connection</STRONG><VAR> packetdefault</VAR>. This configures a - FreeS/WAN box as an OE gateway for any hosts located behind it. As - mentioned above, you must configure some<A HREF="quickstart.html"> DNS - records</A> for OE to work.</P> -<P>As the name implies, this connection functions as a default. If you - have more specific connections, such as policy groups which configure - your FreeS/WAN box as an OE gateway for a local subnet, these will - apply before<VAR> packetdefault</VAR>. You can view<VAR> packetdefault</VAR> -'s specifics in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A> -.</P> -<H2><A NAME="2_4">FreeS/WAN now disables Reverse Path Filtering</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN often doesn't work with reverse path filtering. At start - time, FreeS/WAN now turns rp_filter off, and logs a warning.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN does not turn it back on again. You can do this yourself - with a command like:</P> -<PRE> echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/eth0/rp_filter</PRE> -<P>For eth0, substitute the interface which FreeS/WAN was affecting.</P> -<A NAME="ipsec.conf_v2"></A> -<H2><A NAME="2_5">Revised<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR></A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_1">No promise of compatibility</A></H3> -<P>The FreeS/WAN team promised config-file compatibility throughout the - 1.x series. That means a 1.5 config file can be directly imported into - a fresh 1.99 install with no problems.</P> -<P>With FreeS/WAN 2.x, we've given ourselves permission to make the - config file easier to use. The cost: some FreeS/WAN 1.x configurations - will not work properly. Many of the new features are, however, backward - compatible.</P> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_2">Most<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR> files will work fine</A></H3> -<P>... so long as you paste this line,<STRONG> with no preceding - whitespace</STRONG>, at the top of your config file:</P> -<PRE> version 2</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_3">Backward compatibility patch</A></H3> -<P>If the new defaults bite you, use<A HREF="ipsec.conf.2_to_1"> this<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR> fragment</A> to simulate the old default values.</P> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_4">Details</A></H3> -<P> We've obsoleted various directives which almost no one was using:</P> -<PRE> dump - plutobackgroundload - no_eroute_pass - lifetime - rekeystart - rekeytries</PRE> -<P>For most of these, there is some other way to elicit the desired - behaviour. See<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2002-August/003243.html"> - this post</A>.</P> -<P> We've made some settings, which almost everyone was using, defaults. - For example:</P> -<PRE> interfaces=%defaultroute - plutoload=%search - plutostart=%search - uniqueids=yes</PRE> -<P>We've also changed some default values to help with OE and Policy - Groups:</P> -<PRE> authby=rsasig ## not secret!!! - leftrsasigkey=%dnsondemand ## looks up missing keys in DNS when needed. - rightrsasigkey=%dnsondemand</PRE> -<P> Of course, you can still override any defaults by explictly - declaring something else in your connection.</P> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2002-August/003243.html"> - A post with a list of many ipsec.conf changes.</A> -<BR><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> Current ipsec.conf manual.</A> -</P> -<A NAME="upgrading.rpms"></A> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_5">Upgrading from 1.x RPMs to 2.x RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Note: When upgrading from 1-series to 2-series RPMs,<VAR> rpm -U</VAR> - will not work.</P> -<P>You must instead erase the 1.x RPMs, then install the 2.x set:</P> -<PRE> rpm -e freeswan</PRE> -<PRE> rpm -e freeswan-module</PRE> -<P>On erasing, your old<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR> should be moved to<VAR> - ipsec.conf.rpmsave</VAR>. Keep this. You will probably want to copy - your existing connections to the end of your new 2.x file.</P> -<P>Install the RPMs suitable for your kernel version, such as:</P> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<P>Or, to splice the files:</P> -<PRE> cat /etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.conf.rpmsave > /etc/ipsec.conf.tmp - mv /etc/ipsec.conf.tmp /etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>Then, remove the redundant<VAR> conn %default</VAR> and<VAR> config - setup</VAR> sections. Unless you have done any special configuring - here, you'll likely want to remove the 1.x versions. Remove<VAR> conn - OEself</VAR>, if present.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="quickstart">Quickstart Guide to Opportunistic Encryption</A> -</H1> -<A name="quick_guide"></A> -<H2><A name="opp.setup">Purpose</A></H2> -<P>This page will get you started using Linux FreeS/WAN with - opportunistic encryption (OE). OE enables you to set up IPsec tunnels - without co-ordinating with another site administrator, and without hand - configuring each tunnel. If enough sites support OE, a "FAX effect" - occurs, and many of us can communicate without eavesdroppers.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_1_1">OE "flag day"</A></H3> -<P>As of FreeS/WAN 2.01, OE uses DNS TXT resource records (RRs) only - (rather than TXT with KEY). This change causes a<A href="http://jargon.watson-net.com/jargon.asp?w=flag+day"> - "flag day"</A>. Users of FreeS/WAN 2.00 (or earlier) OE who are - upgrading may require additional resource records, as detailed in our<A href="#upgrading.flagday"> - upgrading document</A>. OE setup instructions here are for 2.02 or - later.</P> -<H2><A name="opp.dns">Requirements</A></H2> -<P>To set up opportunistic encryption, you will need:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a Linux box. For OE to the public Internet, this box must NOT be - behind<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> Network Address Translation</A> (NAT).</LI> -<LI>to install Linux FreeS/WAN 2.02 or later</LI> -<LI>either control over your reverse DNS (for full opportunism) or the - ability to write to some forward domain (for initiator-only).<A HREF="http://www.fdns.net"> - This free DNS service</A> explicitly supports forward TXT records for - FreeS/WAN use.</LI> -<LI>(for full opportunism) a static IP</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note: Currently, only Linux FreeS/WAN supports opportunistic - encryption.</P> -<H2><A name="easy.install">RPM install</A></H2> -<P>Our instructions are for a recent Red Hat with a 2.4-series stock or - Red Hat updated kernel. For other ways to install, see our<A href="#install"> - install document</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_3_1">Download RPMs</A></H3> -<P>If we have prebuilt RPMs for your Red Hat system, this command will - get them:</P> -<PRE> ncftpget ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs/`uname -r | tr -d 'a-wy-z'`/\*</PRE> -<P>If that fails, you will need to try<A HREF="install.html"> another - install method</A>. Our kernel modules<B> will only work on the Red Hat - kernel they were built for</B>, since they are very sensitive to small - changes in the kernel.</P> -<P>If it succeeds, you will have userland tools, a kernel module, and an - RPM signing key:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm - freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm - freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="3_3_2">Check signatures</A></H3> -<P>If you're running RedHat 8.x or later, import the RPM signing key - into the RPM database:</P> -<PRE> rpm --import freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>For RedHat 7.x systems, you'll need to add it to your<A HREF="#PGP"> - PGP</A> keyring:</P> -<PRE> pgp -ka freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>Check the digital signatures on both RPMs using:</P> -<PRE> rpm --checksig freeswan*.rpm </PRE> -<P>You should see that these signatures are good:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK - freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="3_3_3">Install the RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Become root:</P> -<PRE> su</PRE> -<P>Install your RPMs with:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan*.rpm</PRE> -<P>If you're upgrading from FreeS/WAN 1.x RPMs, and have problems with - that command, see<A HREF="#upgrading.rpms"> this note</A>.</P> -<P>Then, start FreeS/WAN:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec start</PRE> -<H3><A name="testinstall">Test</A></H3> -<P>To check that you have a successful install, run:</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify</PRE> -<P>You should see as part of the<VAR> verify</VAR> output:</P> -<PRE> - Checking your system to see if IPsec got installed and started correctly - Version check and ipsec on-path [OK] - Checking for KLIPS support in kernel [OK] - Checking for RSA private key (/etc/ipsec.secrets) [OK] - Checking that pluto is running [OK] - ...</PRE> -<P>If any of these first four checks fails, see our<A href="#install.check"> - troubleshooting guide</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="opp.setups.list">Our Opportunistic Setups</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="3_4_1">Full or partial opportunism?</A></H3> -<P>Determine the best form of opportunism your system can support.</P> -<UL> -<LI>For<A HREF="#opp.incoming"> full opportunism</A>, you'll need a - static IP and and either control over your reverse DNS or an ISP that - can add the required TXT record for you.</LI> -<LI>If you have a dynamic IP, and/or write access to forward DNS only, - you can do<A HREF="#opp.client"> initiate-only opportunism</A></LI> -<LI>To protect traffic bound for real IPs behind your gateway, use<A HREF="#opp.gate"> - this form of full opportunism</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="opp.client">Initiate-only setup</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_1">Restrictions</A></H3> -<P>When you set up initiate-only Opportunistic Encryption (iOE):</P> -<UL> -<LI>there will be<STRONG> no incoming connection requests</STRONG>; you - can initiate all the IPsec connections you need.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>only one machine is visible</STRONG> on your end of the - connection.</LI> -<LI>iOE also protects traffic on behalf of<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> NATted</A> - hosts behind the iOE box.</LI> -</UL> -<P>You cannot network a group of initiator-only machines if none of - these is capable of responding to OE. If one is capable of responding, - you may be able to create a hub topology using routing.</P> -<H3><A name="forward.dns">Create and publish a forward DNS record</A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="3_5_2_1">Find a domain you can use</A></H4> -<P>Find a DNS forward domain (e.g. example.com) where you can publish - your key. You'll need access to the DNS zone files for that domain. - This is common for a domain you own. Some free DNS providers, such as<A HREF="http://www.fdns.net"> - this one</A>, also provide this service.</P> -<P>Dynamic IP users take note: the domain where you place your key need - not be associated with the IP address for your system, or even with - your system's usual hostname.</P> -<H4><A NAME="3_5_2_2">Choose your ID</A></H4> -<P>Choose a name within that domain which you will use to identify your - machine. It's convenient if this can be the same as your hostname:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# hostname --fqdn - xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>This name in FQDN (fully-qualified domain name) format will be your - ID, for DNS key lookup and IPsec negotiation.</P> -<H4><A NAME="3_5_2_3">Create a forward TXT record</A></H4> -<P>Generate a forward TXT record containing your system's public key - with a command like:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt @xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>using your chosen ID in place of xy.example.com. This command takes - the contents of /etc/ipsec.secrets and reformats it into something - usable by ISC's BIND. The result should look like this (with the key - data trimmed down for clarity):</P> -<PRE> - ; RSA 2192 bits xy.example.com Thu Jan 2 12:41:44 2003 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=@xy.example.com" - "AQOF8tZ2... ...+buFuFn/" -</PRE> -<H4><A NAME="3_5_2_4">Publish the forward TXT record</A></H4> -<P>Insert the record into DNS, or have a system adminstrator do it for - you. It may take up to 48 hours for the record to propagate, but it's - usually much quicker.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_3">Test that your key has been published</A></H3> -<P>Check your DNS work</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify --host xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>As part of the<VAR> verify</VAR> output, you ought to see something - like:</P> -<PRE> ... - Looking for TXT in forward map: xy.example.com [OK] - ...</PRE> -<P>For this type of opportunism, only the forward test is relevant; you - can ignore the tests designed to find reverse records.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_4">Configure, if necessary</A></H3> -<P> If your ID is the same as your hostname, you're ready to go. - FreeS/WAN will use its<A HREF="policygroups.html"> built-in connections</A> - to create your iOE functionality.</P> -<P>If you have chosen a different ID, you must tell FreeS/WAN about it - via<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"><VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR></A>:</P> -<PRE> config setup - myid=@myname.freedns.example.com</PRE> -<P>and restart FreeS/WAN:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<P>The new ID will be applied to the built-in connections.</P> -<P>Note: you can create more complex iOE configurations as explained in - our<A HREF="#policygroups"> policy groups document</A>, or disable OE - using<A HREF="#disable_policygroups"> these instructions</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_5">Test</A></H3> -<P>That's it!<A HREF="#opp.test"> Test your connections</A>.</P> -<A name="opp.incoming"></A> -<H2><A NAME="3_6">Full Opportunism</A></H2> -<P>Full opportunism allows you to initiate and receive opportunistic - connections on your machine.</P> -<A name="incoming.opp.dns"></A> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_1">Put a TXT record in a Forward Domain</A></H3> -<P>To set up full opportunism, first<A HREF="#forward.dns"> set up a - forward TXT record</A> as for<A HREF="#opp.client"> initiator-only OE</A> -, using an ID (for example, your hostname) that resolves to your IP. Do - not configure<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>, but continue with the - instructions for full opportunism, below.</P> -<P>Note that this forward record is not currently necessary for full OE, - but will facilitate future features.</P> -<A name="incoming.opp.dns"></A> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_2">Put a TXT record in Reverse DNS</A></H3> -<P>You must be able to publish your DNS RR directly in the reverse - domain. FreeS/WAN will not follow a PTR which appears in the reverse, - since a second lookup at connection start time is too costly.</P> -<H4><A NAME="3_6_2_1">Create a Reverse DNS TXT record</A></H4> -<P>This record serves to publicize your FreeS/WAN public key. In - addition, it lets others know that this machine can receive - opportunistic connections, and asserts that the machine is authorized - to encrypt on its own behalf.</P> -<P>Use the command:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt 192.0.2.11</PRE> -<P>where you replace 192.0.2.11 with your public IP.</P> -<P>The record (with key shortened) looks like:</P> -<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<H4><A NAME="3_6_2_2">Publish your TXT record</A></H4> -<P>Send these records to your ISP, to be published in your IP's reverse - map. It may take up to 48 hours for these to propagate, but usually - takes much less time.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_3">Test your DNS record</A></H3> -<P>Check your DNS work with</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify --host xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>As part of the<VAR> verify</VAR> output, you ought to see something - like:</P> -<PRE> ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ...</PRE> -<P>which indicates that you've passed the reverse-map test.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_4">No Configuration Needed</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x ships with full OE enabled, so you don't need to - configure anything. To enable OE out of the box, FreeS/WAN 2.x uses the - policy group<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR>, which creates IPsec - connections if possible (using OE if needed), and allows traffic in the - clear otherwise. You can create more complex OE configurations as - described in our<A HREF="#policygroups"> policy groups document</A>, or - disable OE using<A HREF="#disable_policygroups"> these instructions</A> -.</P> -<P>If you've previously configured for initiator-only opportunism, - remove<VAR> myid=</VAR> from<VAR> config setup</VAR>, so that peer - FreeS/WANs will look up your key by IP. Restart FreeS/WAN so that your - change will take effect, with</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_5">Consider Firewalling</A></H3> -<P>If you are running a default install of RedHat 8.x, take note: you - will need to alter your iptables rule setup to allow IPSec traffic - through your firewall. See<A HREF="#simple.rules"> our firewall - document</A> for sample<VAR> iptables</VAR> rules.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_6">Test</A></H3> -<P>That's it. Now,<A HREF="#opp.test"> test your connection</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_7">Test</A></H3> -<P>Instructions are in the next section.</P> -<H2><A NAME="opp.test">Testing opportunistic connections</A></H2> -<P>Be sure IPsec is running. You can see whether it is with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup status</PRE> -<P>If need be, you can restart it with:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<P>Load a FreeS/WAN test website from the host on which you're running - FreeS/WAN. Note: the feds may be watching these sites. Type one of:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.org</PRE> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.nl</PRE> - -<!--<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.ca</PRE>--> -<P>A positive result looks like this:</P> -<PRE> - You seem to be connecting from: 192.0.2.11 which DNS says is: - gateway.example.com - _________________________________________________________________ - - Status E-route - OE enabled 16 192.139.46.73/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x2097@192.0.2.11 - OE enabled 176 192.139.46.77/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x208a@192.0.2.11 -</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations! Your OE host or gateway will now - encrypt its own traffic whenever it can. For more OE tests, please see - our<A HREF="#test.oe"> testing document</A>. If you have difficulty, - see our<A HREF="#oe.trouble"> OE troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="3_8">Now what?</A></H2> -<P>Please see our<A HREF="policygroups.html"> policy groups document</A> - for more ways to set up Opportunistic Encryption.</P> -<P>You may also wish to make some<A HREF="config.html"> pre-configured - connections</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="3_9">Notes</A></H2> -<UL> -<LI>We assume some facts about your system in order to make - Opportunistic Encryption easier to configure. For example, we assume - that you wish to have FreeS/WAN secure your default interface.</LI> -<LI>You may change this, and other settings, by altering the<VAR> config - setup</VAR> section in<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>.</LI> -<LI>Note that the built-in connections used to build policy groups do - not inherit from<VAR> conn default</VAR>.</LI> - -<!-- -<LI>If you do not define your local identity -(eg. <VAR>leftid</VAR>), this will be the IP address of your default -FreeS/WAN interface. ---> -<LI> If you fail to define your local identity and do not fill in your - reverse DNS entry, you will not be able to use OE.</LI> -</UL> -<A NAME="oe.trouble"></A> -<H2><A NAME="3_10">Troubleshooting OE</A></H2> -<P>See the OE troubleshooting hints in our<A HREF="#oe.trouble"> - troubleshooting guide</A>.</P> -<A NAME="oe.known-issues"></A> -<H2><A NAME="3_11">Known Issues</A></H2> -<P>Please see<A HREF="opportunism.known-issues"> this list</A> of known - issues with Opportunistic Encryption.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="4">How to Configure Linux FreeS/WAN with Policy Groups</A></H1> -<A NAME="policygroups"></A> -<H2><A NAME="4_1">What are Policy Groups?</A></H2> -<P><STRONG>Policy Groups</STRONG> are an elegant general mechanism to - configure FreeS/WAN. They are useful for many FreeS/WAN users.</P> -<P>In previous FreeS/WAN versions, you needed to configure each IPsec - connection explicitly, on both local and remote hosts. This could - become complex.</P> -<P>By contrast, Policy Groups allow you to set local IPsec policy for - lists of remote hosts and networks, simply by listing the hosts and - networks which you wish to have special treatment in one of several - Policy Group files. FreeS/WAN then internally creates the connections - needed to implement each policy.</P> -<P>In the next section we describe our five Base Policy Groups, which - you can use to configure IPsec in many useful ways. Later, we will show - you how to create an IPsec VPN using one line of configuration for each - remote host or network.</P> -<A NAME="builtin_policygroups"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_1_1">Built-In Security Options</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN offers these Base Policy Groups:</P> -<DL> -<DT>private</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN only communicates privately with the listed<A HREF="#CIDR"> - CIDR</A> blocks. If needed, FreeS/WAN attempts to create a connection - opportunistically. If this fails, FreeS/WAN blocks communication. - Inbound blocking is assumed to be done by the firewall. FreeS/WAN - offers firewall hooks but no modern firewall rules to help with inbound - blocking.</DD> -<DT>private-or-clear</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN prefers private communication with the listed CIDR - blocks. If needed, FreeS/WAN attempts to create a connection - opportunistically. If this fails, FreeS/WAN allows traffic in the - clear.</DD> -<DT>clear-or-private</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN communicates cleartext with the listed CIDR blocks, but - also accepts inbound OE connection requests from them. Also known as<A HREF="#passive.OE"> - passive OE (pOE)</A>, this policy may be used to create an<A HREF="#responder"> - opportunistic responder</A>.</DD> -<DT>clear</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN only communicates cleartext with the listed CIDR blocks.</DD> -<DT>block</DT> -<DD>FreeS/WAN blocks traffic to and from and the listed CIDR blocks. - Inbound blocking is assumed to be done by the firewall. FreeS/WAN - offers firewall hooks but no modern firewall rules to help with inbound - blocking. -<!-- also called "blockdrop".--> -</DD> -</DL> -<A NAME="policy.group.notes"></A> -<P>Notes:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Base Policy Groups apply to communication with this host only.</LI> -<LI>The most specific rule (whether policy or pre-configured connection) - applies. This has several practical applications: -<UL> -<LI>If CIDR blocks overlap, FreeS/WAN chooses the most specific - applicable block.</LI> -<LI>This decision also takes into account any pre-configured connections - you may have.</LI> -<LI>If the most specific connection is a pre-configured connection, the - following procedure applies. If that connection is up, it will be used. - If it is routed, it will be brought up. If it is added, no action will - be taken.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Base Policy Groups are created using built-in connections. Details - in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A>.</LI> -<LI>All Policy Groups are bidirectional.<A HREF="src/policy-groups-table.html"> - This chart</A> shows some technical details. FreeS/WAN does not support - one-way encryption, since it can give users a false sense of security.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="4_2">Using Policy Groups</A></H2> -<P>The Base Policy Groups which build IPsec connections rely on - Opportunistic Encryption. To use the following examples, you must first - become OE-capable, as described in our<A HREF="#quickstart"> quickstart - guide</A>.<A NAME="example1"></A></P> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_1">Example 1: Using a Base Policy Group</A></H3> -<P>Simply place CIDR blocks (<A HREF="#dnswarning">names</A>, IPs or IP - ranges) in /etc/ipsec.d/policies/<VAR>[groupname]</VAR>, and reread the - policy group files.</P> -<P>For example, the<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR> policy tells FreeS/WAN - to prefer encrypted communication to the listed CIDR blocks. Failing - that, it allows talk in the clear.</P> -<P>To make this your default policy, place<A HREF="#fullnet"> fullnet</A> - in the<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR> policy group file:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cat /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear - # This file defines the set of CIDRs (network/mask-length) to which - # communication should be private, if possible, but in the clear otherwise. - .... - 0.0.0.0/0</PRE> -<P>and reload your policies with</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>Use<A HREF="#opp.test"> this test</A> to verify opportunistic - connections.</P> -<A NAME="example2"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_2">Example 2: Defining IPsec Security Policy with - Groups</A></H3> -<P>Defining IPsec security policy with Base Policy Groups is like - creating a shopping list: just put CIDR blocks in the appropriate group - files. For example:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cd /etc/ipsec.d/policies - [root@xy policies]# cat private - 192.0.2.96/27 # The finance department - 192.0.2.192/29 # HR - 192.0.2.12 # HR gateway - irc.private.example.com # Private IRC server - - [root@xy policies]# cat private-or-clear - 0.0.0.0/0 # My default policy: try to encrypt. - - [root@xy policies]# cat clear - 192.0.2.18/32 # My POP3 server - 192.0.2.19/32 # My Web proxy - - [root@xy policies]# cat block - spamsource.example.com</PRE> -<P>To make these settings take effect, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>Notes:</P> -<UL> -<LI>For opportunistic connection attempts to succeed, all participating - FreeS/WAN hosts and gateways must be configured for OE.</LI> -<LI>Examples 3 through 5 show how to implement a detailed<VAR> private</VAR> - policy.</LI> -<LI><A NAME="dnswarning"></A><FONT COLOR="RED"> Warning:</FONT> Using - DNS names in policy files and ipsec.conf can be tricky. If the name - does not resolve, the policy will not be implemented for that name. It - is therefore safer either to use IPs, or to put any critical names in - /etc/hosts. We plan to implement periodic DNS retry to help with this. -<BR> Names are resolved at FreeS/WAN startup, or when the policies are - reloaded. Unfortunately, name lookup can hold up the startup process. - If you have fast DNS servers, the problem may be less severe.</LI> -</UL> -<A HREF="example3"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_3">Example 3: Creating a Simple IPsec VPN with the<VAR> - private</VAR> Group</A></H3> -<P>You can create an IPsec VPN between several hosts, with only one line - of configuration per host, using the<VAR> private</VAR> policy group.</P> -<P>First, use our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> quickstart guide</A> to set - up each participating host with a FreeS/WAN install and OE.</P> -<P>In one host's<VAR> /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private</VAR>, list the - peers to which you wish to protect traffic. For example:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cd /etc/ipsec.d/policies - [root@xy policies]# cat private - 192.0.2.9 # several hosts at example.com - 192.0.2.11 - 192.0.2.12 - irc.private.example.com -</PRE> -<P>Copy the<VAR> private</VAR> file to each host. Remove the local host, - and add the initial host.</P> -<PRE> scp2 /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private root@192.0.2.12:/etc/ipsec.d/policies/private</PRE> -<P>On each host, reread the policy groups with</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>That's it! You're configured.</P> -<P>Test by pinging between two hosts. After a second or two, traffic - should flow, and</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>should yield something like</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.11/32 -> 192.0.2.8/32 => tun0x149f@192.0.2.8</PRE> -<P>where your host IPs are substituted for 192.0.2.11 and 192.0.2.8.</P> -<P>If traffic does not flow, there may be an error in your OE setup. - Revisit our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> quickstart guide</A>.</P> -<P>Our next two examples show you how to add subnets to this IPsec VPN.</P> -<A NAME="example4"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_4">Example 4: New Policy Groups to Protect a Subnet</A></H3> -<P>To protect traffic to a subnet behind your FreeS/WAN gateway, you'll - need additional DNS records, and new policy groups. To set up the DNS, - see our<A HREF="#opp.gate"> quickstart guide</A>. To create five new - policy groups for your subnet, copy these connections to<VAR> - /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>. Substitute your subnet's IPs for 192.0.2.128/29.</P> -<PRE> -conn private-net - also=private # inherits settings (eg. auto=start) from built in conn - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 # your subnet's IPs here - -conn private-or-clear-net - also=private-or-clear - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 - -conn clear-or-private-net - also=clear-or-private - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 - -conn clear-net - also=clear - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 - -conn block-net - also=block - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 -</PRE> -<P>Copy the gateway's files to serve as the initial policy group files - for the new groups:</P> -<PRE> - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/block /etc/ipsec.d/policies/block -</PRE> -<P><STRONG>Tip: Since a missing policy group file is equivalent to a - file with no entries, you need only create files for the connections - you'll use.</STRONG></P> -<P>To test one of your new groups, place the fullnet 0.0.0.0/0 in<VAR> - private-or-clear-net</VAR>. Perform the subnet test in<A HREF="#opp.test"> - our quickstart guide</A>. You should see a connection, and</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>should include an entry which mentions the subnet node's IP and the - OE test site IP, like this:</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.131/32 -> 192.139.46.77/32 => tun0x149f@192.0.2.11</PRE> -<A HREF="example5"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_5">Example 5: Adding a Subnet to the VPN</A></H3> -<P>Suppose you wish to secure traffic to a subnet 192.0.2.192/29 behind - a FreeS/WAN box 192.0.2.12.</P> -<P>First, add DNS entries to configure 192.0.2.12 as an opportunistic - gateway for that subnet. Instructions are in our<A HREF="#opp.gate"> - quickstart guide</A>. Next, create a<VAR> private-net</VAR> group on - 192.0.2.12 as described in<A HREF="#example4"> Example 4</A>.</P> -<P>On each other host, add the subnet 192.0.2.192/29 to<VAR> private</VAR> -, yielding for example</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cd /etc/ipsec.d/policies - [root@xy policies]# cat private - 192.0.2.9 # several hosts at example.com - 192.0.2.11 - 192.0.2.12 # HR department gateway - 192.0.2.192/29 # HR subnet - irc.private.example.com -</PRE> -<P>and reread policy groups with</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>That's all the configuration you need.</P> -<P>Test your VPN by pinging from a machine on 192.0.2.192/29 to any - other host:</P> -<PRE> [root@192.0.2.194]# ping 192.0.2.11</PRE> -<P>After a second or two, traffic should flow, and</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>should yield something like</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.11/32 -> 192.0.2.194/32 => tun0x149f@192.0.2.12 -</PRE> -<P>Key:</P> -<TABLE> -<TR><TD>1.</TD><TD>192.0.2.11/32</TD><TD>Local start point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>2.</TD><TD>192.0.2.194/32</TD><TD>Remote end point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>3.</TD><TD>192.0.2.12</TD><TD>Remote FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host). May be the same as (2).</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>4.</TD><TD>[not shown]</TD><TD>Local FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host), where you've produced the output. May be the same as (1).</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P>For additional assurance, you can verify with a packet sniffer that - the traffic is being encrypted.</P> -<P>Note</P> -<UL> -<LI>Because strangers may also connect via OE, this type of VPN may - require a stricter firewalling policy than a conventional VPN.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="4_3">Appendix</A></H2> -<A NAME="hiddenconn"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_3_1">Our Hidden Connections</A></H3> -<P>Our Base Policy Groups are created using hidden connections. These - are spelled out in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A> - and defined in<VAR> /usr/local/lib/ipsec/_confread</VAR>.</P> -<A NAME="custom_policygroups"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_3_2">Custom Policy Groups</A></H3> -<P>A policy group is built using a special connection description in<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR>, which:</P> -<UL> -<LI>is<STRONG> generic</STRONG>. It uses<VAR> - right=[%group|%opportunisticgroup]</VAR> rather than specific IPs. The - connection is cloned for every name or IP range listed in its Policy - Group file.</LI> -<LI>often has a<STRONG> failure rule</STRONG>. This rule, written<VAR> - failureshunt=[passthrough|drop|reject|none]</VAR>, tells FreeS/WAN what - to do with packets for these CIDRs if it fails to establish the - connection. Default is<VAR> none</VAR>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>To create a new group:</P> -<OL> -<LI>Create its connection definition in<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR>.</LI> -<LI>Create a Policy Group file in<VAR> /etc/ipsec.d/policies</VAR> with - the same name as your connection.</LI> -<LI>Put a CIDR block in that file.</LI> -<LI>Reread groups with<VAR> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</VAR>.</LI> -<LI>Test:<VAR> ping</VAR> to activate any OE connection, and view - results with<VAR> ipsec eroute</VAR>.</LI> -</OL> -<A NAME="disable_oe"></A><A NAME="disable_policygroups"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_3_3">Disabling Opportunistic Encryption</A></H3> -<P>To disable OE (eg. policy groups and packetdefault), cut and paste - the following lines to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>:</P> -<PRE>conn block - auto=ignore - -conn private - auto=ignore - -conn private-or-clear - auto=ignore - -conn clear-or-private - auto=ignore - -conn clear - auto=ignore - -conn packetdefault - auto=ignore</PRE> -<P>Restart FreeS/WAN so that the changes take effect:</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup restart</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="5">FreeS/WAN FAQ</A></H1> -<P>This is a collection of questions and answers, mostly taken from the - FreeS/WAN<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>. See the project<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - web site</A> for more information. All the FreeS/WAN documentation is - online there.</P> -<P>Contributions to the FAQ are welcome. Please send them to the project<A -href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>.</P> -<HR> -<H2><A name="questions">Index of FAQ questions</A></H2> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#whatzit">What is FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#problems">How do I report a problem or seek help?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#generic">Can I get ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#lemme_out">... an off-the-shelf system that includes - FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#contractor">... contractors or staff who know FreeS/WAN?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#commercial">... commercial support?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#release">Release questions</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#rel.current">What is the current release?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#relwhen">When is the next release?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#rel.bugs">Are there known bugs in the current release?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="mod_cons">Modifications and contributions</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#modify.faq">Can I modify FreeS/WAN to ...?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#contrib.faq">Can I contribute to the project?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#ddoc.faq">Is there detailed design documentation?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#interact">Will FreeS/WAN work in my environment?</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#interop.faq">Can FreeS/WAN talk to ... ?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#old_to_new">Can different FreeS/WAN versions talk to each - other?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#faq.bandwidth">Is there a limit on throughput?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#faq.number">Is there a limit on number of connections?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#faq.speed">Is a ... fast enough to handle FreeS/WAN with - my loads?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#work_on">Will FreeS/WAN work on ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#versions">... my version of Linux?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#nonIntel.faq">... non-Intel CPUs?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#multi.faq">... multiprocessors?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#k.old">... an older kernel?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#k.versions">... the latest kernel version?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#interface.faq">... unusual network hardware?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#vlan">... a VLAN (802.1q) network?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#features.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#VPN.faq">... site-to-site VPN applications</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#warrior.faq">... remote users connecting to a LAN</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.shared.possible">... remote users using shared secret - authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#wireless.faq">... wireless networks</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#PKIcert">... X.509 or other PKI certificates?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#Radius">... user authentication (Radius, SecureID, Smart - Card ...)?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#NATtraversal">... NAT traversal</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#virtID">... assigning a "virtual identity" to a remote - system?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noDES.faq">... single DES encryption?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#AES.faq">... AES encryption?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#other.cipher">... other encryption algorithms?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#canI">Can I ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#policy.preconfig">...use policy groups along with - explicitly configured connections?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#policy.off">...turn off policy groups?</A></LI> - -<!-- - <li><a href="#policy.otherinterface">...use policy groups - on an interface other than <VAR>%defaultroute</VAR>?</a></li> ---> -<LI><A href="#reload">... reload connection info without restarting?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#masq.faq">... use several masqueraded subnets?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#dup_route">... use subnets masqueraded to the same - addresses?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.masq">... assign a road warrior an address on my net - (a virtual identity)?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.many">... support many road warriors with one - gateway?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.PSK">... have many road warriors using shared secret - authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#QoS">... use Quality of Service routing with FreeS/WAN?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#deadtunnel">... recognise dead tunnels and shut them down?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#demanddial">... build IPsec tunnels over a demand-dialed - link?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#GRE">... build GRE, L2TP or PPTP tunnels over IPsec?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#NetBIOS">... use Network Neighborhood (Samba, NetBIOS) - over IPsec?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#setup.faq">Life's little mysteries</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#cantping">I cannot ping ....</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#forever">It takes forever to ...</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#route">I send packets to the tunnel with route(8) but they - vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#down_route">When a tunnel goes down, packets vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#firewall_ate">The firewall ate my packets!</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#dropconn">Dropped connections</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#defaultroutegone">Disappearing %defaultroute</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#tcpdump.faq">TCPdump on the gateway shows strange things</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#no_trace">Traceroute does not show anything between the - gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#man4debug">Testing in stages (or .... works but ... - doesn't)</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#nomanual">Manually keyed connections don't work</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#spi_error">One manual connection works, but second one - fails</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#man_no_auto">Manual connections work, but automatic keying - doesn't</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#nocomp">IPsec works, but connections using compression - fail</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#pmtu.broken">Small packets work, but large transfers fail</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#subsub">Subnet-to-subnet works, but tests from the - gateways don't</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#compile.faq">Compilation problems</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#gmp.h_missing">gmp.h: No such file or directory</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noVM">... virtual memory exhausted</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#error">Interpreting error messages</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#route-client">route-client (or host) exited with status 7</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#unreachable">SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#modprobe">ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate moduleipsec</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#noKLIPS">ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack - KLIPS</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noDNS">ipsec_setup: ... failure to fetch key for ... from - DNS</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#dup_address">ipsec_setup: ... interfaces ... and ... share - address ...</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#kflags">ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#message_num">Message numbers (MI3, QR1, et cetera) in - Pluto messages</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#conn_name">Connection names in Pluto error messages</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#cantorient">Pluto: ... can't orient connection</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#no.interface">... we have no ipsecN interface for either - end of this connection</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noconn">Pluto: ... no connection is known</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#nosuit">Pluto: ... no suitable connection ...</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noconn.auth">Pluto: ... no connection has been authorized</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#noDESsupport">Pluto: ... OAKLEY_DES_CBC is not supported.</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#notransform">Pluto: ... no acceptable transform</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#rsasigkey">rsasigkey dumps core</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#sig4">!Pluto failure!: ... exited with ... signal 4</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#econnrefused">ECONNREFUSED error message</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#no_eroute">klips_debug: ... no eroute!</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#SAused">... trouble writing to /dev/ipsec ... SA already - in use</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#ignore">... ignoring ... payload</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#unknown_rightcert">unknown parameter name "rightcert"</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#spam">Why don't you restrict the mailing lists to reduce - spam?</A></LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H2><A name="whatzit">What is FreeS/WAN?</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is a Linux implementation of the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> - protocols, providing security services at the IP (Internet Protocol) - level of the network.</P> -<P>For more detail, see our<A href="intro.html"> introduction</A> - document or the FreeS/WAN project<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - web site</A>.</P> -<P>To start setting it up, go to our<A href="quickstart.html"> - quickstart guide</A>.</P> -<P>Our<A href="web.html"> web links</A> document has information on<A href="#implement"> - IPsec for other systems</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="problems">How do I report a problem or seek help?</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT>Read our<A href="trouble.html"> troubleshooting</A> document.</DT> -<DD> -<P>It may guide you to a solution. If not, see its<A href="#prob.report"> - problem reporting</A> section.</P> -<P>Basically, what it says is<STRONG> give us the output from<VAR> ipsec - barf</VAR> from both gateways</STRONG>. Without full information, we - cannot diagnose a problem. However,<VAR> ipsec barf</VAR> produces a - lot of output. If at all possible,<STRONG> please make barfs accessible - via the web or FTP</STRONG> rather than sending enormous mail messages.</P> -</DD> -<DT><STRONG>Use the<A href="mail.html"> users mailing list</A> for - problem reports</STRONG>, rather than mailing developers directly.</DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>This gives you access to more expertise, including users who may - have encountered and solved the same problems.</LI> -<LI>It is more likely to get a quick response. Developers may get behind - on email, or even ignore it entirely for a while, but a list message - (given a reasonable Subject: line) is certain to be read by a fair - number of people within hours.</LI> -<LI>It may also be important because of<A href="#exlaw"> cryptography - export laws</A>. A US citizen who provides technical assistance to - foreign cryptographic work might be charged under the arms export - regulations. Such a charge would be easier to defend if the discussion - took place on a public mailing list than if it were done in private - mail.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT>Try irc.freenode.net#freeswan.</DT> -<DD> -<P>FreeS/WAN developers, volunteers and users can often be found there. - Be patient and be prepared to provide lots of information to support - your question.</P> -<P>If your question was really interesting, and you found an answer, - please share that with the class by posting to the<A href="mail.html"> - users mailing list</A>. That way others with the same problem can find - your answer in the archives.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Premium support is also available.</DT> -<DD> -<P>See the next several questions.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="generic">Can I get ...</A></H2> -<H3><A name="lemme_out">Can I get an off-the-shelf system that includes - FreeS/WAN?</A></H3> -<P>There are a number of Linux distributions or firewall products which - include FreeS/WAN. See this<A href="#products"> list</A>. Using one of - these, chosen to match your requirements and budget, may save you - considerable time and effort.</P> -<P>If you don't know your requirements, start by reading Schneier's<A href="#secrets"> - Secrets and Lies</A>. That gives the best overview of security issues I - have seen. Then consider hiring a consultant (see next question) to - help define your requirements.</P> -<H3><A name="consultant">Can I hire consultants or staff who know - FreeS/WAN?</A></H3> -<P>If you want the help of a contractor, or to hire staff with FreeS/WAN - expertise, you could:</P> -<UL> -<LI>check availability in your area through your local Linux User Group - (<A href="http://lugww.counter.li.org/">LUG Index</A>)</LI> -<LI>try asking on our<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>For companies offerring support, see the next question.</P> -<H3><A name="commercial">Can I get commercial support?</A></H3> -<P>Many of the distributions or firewall products which include - FreeS/WAN (see this<A href="#products"> list</A>) come with commercial - support or have it available as an option.</P> -<P>Various companies specialize in commercial support of open source - software. Our project leader was a founder of the first such company, - Cygnus Support. It has since been bought by<A href="http://www.redhat.com"> - Redhat</A>. Another such firm is<A href="http://www.linuxcare.com"> - Linuxcare</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="release">Release questions</A></H2> -<H3><A name="rel.current">What is the current release?</A></H3> -<P>The current release is the highest-numbered tarball on our<A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan"> - distribution site</A>. Almost always, any of<A href="#mirrors"> the - mirrors</A> will have the same file, though perhaps not for a day or so - after a release.</P> -<P>Unfortunately, the web site is not always updated as quickly as it - should be.</P> -<H3><A name="relwhen">When is the next release?</A></H3> -<P>We try to do a release approximately every six to eight weeks.</P> -<P>If pre-release tests fail and the fix appears complex, or more - generally if the code does not appear stable when a release is - scheduled, we will just skip that release.</P> -<P>For serious bugs, we may bring out an extra bug-fix release. These - get numbers in the normal release series. For example, there was a bug - found in FreeS/WAN 1.6, so we did another release less than two weeks - later. The bug-fix release was called 1.7.</P> -<H3><A name="rel.bugs">Are there known bugs in the current release?</A></H3> -<P>Any problems we are aware of at the time of a release are documented - in the<A href="../BUGS"> BUGS</A> file for that release. You should - also look at the<A href="../CHANGES"> CHANGES</A> file.</P> -<P>Bugs discovered after a release are discussed on the<A href="mail.html"> - mailing lists</A>. The easiest way to check for any problems in the - current code would be to peruse the<A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/briefs"> - List In Brief</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="mod_cons">Modifications and contributions</A></H2> -<H3><A name="modify.faq">Can I modify FreeS/WAN to ...?</A></H3> -<P>You are free to modify FreeS/WAN in any way. See the discussion of<A href="#licensing"> - licensing</A> in our introduction document.</P> -<P>Before investing much energy in any such project, we suggest that you</P> -<UL> -<LI>check the list of<A href="#patch"> existing patches</A></LI> -<LI>post something about your project to the<A href="mail.html"> design - mailing list</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>This may prevent duplicated effort, or lead to interesting - collaborations.</P> -<H3><A name="contrib.faq">Can I contribute to the project?</A></H3> - In general, we welcome contributions from the community. Various - contributed patches, either to fix bugs or to add features, have been - incorporated into our distribution. Other patches, not yet included in - the distribution, are listed in our<A href="#patch"> web links</A> - section. -<P>Users have also contributed heavily to documentation, both by - creating their own<A href="#howto"> HowTos</A> and by posting things on - the<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A> which I have quoted in these - HTML docs.</P> -<P>There are, however, some caveats.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN is being implemented in Canada, by Canadians, largely to - ensure that is it is entirely free of export restrictions. See this<A href="#status"> - discussion</A>. We<STRONG> cannot accept code contributions from US - residents or citizens</STRONG>, not even one-line bugs fixes. The - reasons for this were recently discussed extensively on the mailing - list, in a thread starting<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/01/msg00111.html"> - here</A>.</P> -<P>Not all contributions are of interest to us. The project has a set of - fairly ambitious and quite specific goals, described in our<A href="#goals"> - introduction</A>. Contributions that lead toward these goals are likely - to be welcomed enthusiastically. Other contributions may be seen as - lower priority, or even as a distraction.</P> -<P>Discussion of possible contributions takes place on the<A href="mail.html"> - design mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="ddoc.faq">Is there detailed design documentation?</A></H3> - There are: -<UL> -<LI><A href="rfc.html">RFCs</A> specifying the protocols we implement</LI> -<LI><A href="manpages.html">man pages</A> for our utilities, library - functions and file formats</LI> -<LI>comments in the source code</LI> -<LI><A href="index.html">HTML documentation</A> written primarily for - users</LI> -<LI>archived discussions from the<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI>other papers mentioned in our<A href="#applied"> introduction</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The only formal design documents are a few papers in the last - category above. All the other categories, however, have things to say - about design as well.</P> -<H2><A name="interact">Will FreeS/WAN work in my environment?</A></H2> -<H3><A name="interop.faq">Can FreeS/WAN talk to ...?</A></H3> -<P>The IPsec protocols are designed to support interoperation. In - theory, any two IPsec implementations should be able to talk to each - other. In practice, it is considerably more complex. We have a whole<A href="interop.html"> - interoperation document</A> devoted to this problem.</P> -<P>An important part of that document is links to the many<A href="interop.html#otherpub"> - user-written HowTos</A> on interoperation between FreeS/WAN and various - other implementations. Often the users know more than the developers - about these issues (and almost always more than me :-), so these - documents may be your best resource.</P> -<H3><A name="old_to_new">Can different FreeS/WAN versions talk to each - other?</A></H3> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN can interoperate with many IPsec implementations, - including earlier versions of Linux FreeS/WAN itself.</P> -<P>In a few cases, there are some complications. See our<A href="interop.html#oldswan"> - interoperation</A> document for details.</P> -<H3><A name="faq.bandwidth">Is there a limit on throughput?</A></H3> -<P>There is no hard limit, but see below.</P> -<H3><A name="faq.number">Is there a limit on number of tunnels?</A></H3> -<P>There is no hard limit, but see next question.</P> -<H3><A name="faq.speed">Is a ... fast enough to handle FreeS/WAN with my - loads?</A></H3> -<P>A quick summary:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Even a limited machine can be useful</DT> -<DD>A 486 can handle a T1, ADSL or cable link, though the machine may be - breathing hard.</DD> -<DT>A mid-range PC (say 800 MHz with good network cards) can do a lot of - IPsec</DT> -<DD>With up to roughly 50 tunnels and aggregate bandwidth of 20 Megabits - per second, it willl have cycles left over for other tasks.</DD> -<DT>There are limits</DT> -<DD>Even a high end CPU will not come close to handling a fully loaded - 100 Mbit/second Ethernet link. -<P>Beyond about 50 tunnels it needs careful management.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<P>See our<A href="performance.html"> FreeS/WAN performance</A> document - for details.</P> -<H2><A name="work_on">Will FreeS/WAN work on ... ?</A></H2> -<H3><A name="versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on my version of Linux?</A></H3> -<P>We build and test on Redhat distributions, but FreeS/WAN runs just - fine on several other distributions, sometimes with minor fiddles to - adapt to the local environment. Details are in our<A href="#otherdist"> - compatibility</A> document. Also, some distributions or products come - with<A href="#products"> FreeS/WAN included</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="nonIntel.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on non-Intel CPUs?</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is<STRONG> intended to run on all CPUs Linux supports</STRONG> -. We know of it being used in production on x86, ARM, Alpha and MIPS. It - has also had successful tests on PPC and SPARC, though we don't know of - actual use there. Details are in our<A href="#CPUs"> compatibility</A> - document.</P> -<H3><A name="multi.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on multiprocessors?</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is designed to work on any SMP architecture Linux supports, - and has been tested successfully on at least dual processor Intel - architecture machines. Details are in our<A href="#multiprocessor"> - compatibility</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="k.old">Will FreeS/WAN work on an older kernel?</A></H3> -<P>It might, but we strongly recommend using a recent 2.2 or 2.4 series - kernel. Sometimes the newer versions include security fixes which can - be quite important on a gateway.</P> -<P>Also, we use recent kernels for development and testing, so those are - better tested and, if you do encounter a problem, more easily - supported. If something breaks applying recent FreeS/WAN patches to an - older kernel, then "update your kernel" is almost certain to be the - first thing we suggest. It may be the only suggestion we have.</P> -<P>The precise kernel versions supported by a particular FreeS/WAN - release are given in the<A href="XX"> README</A> file of that release.</P> -<P>See the following question for more on kernels.</P> -<H3><A name="k.versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on the latest kernel - version?</A></H3> -<P>Sometimes yes, but quite often, no.</P> -<P>Kernel versions supported are given in the<A href="../README"> README</A> - file of each FreeS/WAN release. Typically, they are whatever production - kernels were current at the time of our release (or shortly before; we - might release for kernel<VAR> n</VAR> just as Linus releases<VAR> n+1</VAR> -). Often FreeS/WAN will work on slightly later kernels as well, but of - course this cannot be guaranteed.</P> -<P>For example, FreeS/WAN 1.91 was released for kernels 2.2.19 or 2.4.5, - the current kernels at the time. It also worked on 2.4.6, 2.4.7 and - 2.4.8, but 2.4.9 had changes that caused compilation errors if it was - patched with FreeS/WAN 1.91.</P> -<P>When such changes appear, we put a fix in the FreeS/WAN snapshots, - and distribute it with our next release. However, this is not a high - priority for us, and it may take anything from a few days to several - weeks for such a problem to find its way to the top of our kernel - programmer's To-Do list. In the meanwhile, you have two choices:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either stick with a slightly older kernel, even if it is not the - latest and greatest. This is recommended for production systems; new - versions may have new bugs.</LI> -<LI>or fix the problem yourself and send us a patch, via the<A href="mail.html"> - Users mailing list</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We don't even try to keep up with kernel changes outside the main 2.2 - and 2.4 branches, such as the 2.4.x-ac patched versions from Alan Cox - or the 2.5 series of development kernels. We'd rather work on - developing the FreeS/WAN code than on chasing these moving targets. We - are, however, happy to get patches for problems discovered there.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="install.html#choosek"> Choosing a kernel</A> - section of our installation document.</P> -<H3><A name="interface.faq">Will FreeS/WAN work on unusual network - hardware?</A></H3> -<P>IPsec is designed to work over any network that IP works over, and - FreeS/WAN is intended to work over any network interface hardware that - Linux supports.</P> -<P>If you have working IP on some unusual interface -- perhaps Arcnet, - Token Ring, ATM or Gigabit Ethernet -- then IPsec should "just work".</P> -<P>That said, practice is sometimes less tractable than theory. Our - testing is done almost entirely on:</P> -<UL> -<LI>10 or 100 Mbit Ethernet</LI> -<LI>ADSL or cable connections, with and without PPPoE</LI> -<LI>IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs (see<A href="#wireless.faq"> below</A>)</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you have some other interface, especially an uncommon one, it is - entirely possible you will get bitten either by a FreeS/WAN bug which - our testing did not turn up, or by a bug in the driver that shows up - only with our loads.</P> -<P>If IP works on your interface and FreeS/WAN doesn't, seek help on the<A -href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A>.</P> -<P>Another FAQ section describes<A href="#pmtu.broken"> MTU problems</A> -. These are a possibility for some interfaces.</P> -<H3><A name="vlan">Will FreeS/WAN work on a VLAN (802.1q) network?</A></H3> -<P> Yes, FreeSwan works fine, though some network drivers have problems - with jumbo sized ethernet frames. If you used interfaces=%defaultroute - you do not need to change anything, but if you specified an interface - (eg eth0) then remember you must change that to reflect the VLAN - interface (eg eth0.2 for VLAN ID 2).</P> -<P> The "eepro100" module is known to be broken, use the e100 driver for - those cards instead (included in 2.4 as 'alternative driver' for the - Intel EtherExpressPro/100.</P> -<P> You do not need to change any MTU setting (those are workarounds - that are only needed for buggy drivers)</P> -<P><EM>This FAQ contributed by Paul Wouters.</EM></P> -<H2><A name="features.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support ...</A></H2> -<P>For a discussion of which parts of the IPsec specifications FreeS/WAN - does and does not implement, see our<A href="#spec"> compatibility</A> - document.</P> -<P>For information on some often-requested features, see below.</P> -<H3><A name="VPN.faq"></A>Does FreeS/WAN support site-to-site VPN (<A HREF="#VPN"> -Virtual Private Network</A>) applications?</H3> -<P>Absolutely. See this FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN<A HREF="config.html"> - configuration example</A>. If only one site is using FreeS/WAN, there - may be a relevant HOWTO on our<A HREF="interop.html"> interop page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="warrior.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users connecting - to a LAN?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. We call the remote users "Road Warriors". Check out our - FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN<A HREF="#config.rw"> Road Warrior Configuration - Example</A>.</P> -<P>If your Road Warrior is a Windows or Mac PC, you may need to install - an IPsec implementation on that machine. Our<A HREF="interop.html"> - interop</A> page lists many available brands, and features links to - several HOWTOs.</P> -<H3><A name="road.shared.possible">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users - using shared secret authentication?</A></H3> -<P><STRONG>Yes, but</STRONG> there are severe restrictions, so<STRONG> - we strongly recommend using</STRONG><A href="#RSA"><STRONG> RSA</STRONG> -</A><STRONG> keys for</STRONG><A href="#authentication"><STRONG> - authentication</STRONG></A><STRONG> instead</STRONG>.</P> -<P>See this<A href="#road.PSK"> FAQ question</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="wireless.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support wireless networks?</A></H3> -<P>Yes, it is a common practice to use IPsec over wireless networks - because their built-in encryption,<A href="#WEP"> WEP</A>, is insecure.</P> -<P>There is some<A href="#wireless.config"> discussion</A> in our - advanced configuration document. See also the<A HREF="http://www.wavesec.org"> - WaveSEC site</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="PKIcert">Does FreeS/WAN support X.509 or other PKI - certificates?</A></H3> -<P>Vanilla FreeS/WAN does not support X.509, but Andreas Steffen and - others have provided a popular, well-supported X.509 patch.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan">patch</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca">Super FreeS/WAN</A> incorporates - this and other user-contributed patches.</LI> -<LI> Kai Martius'<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/install.htm"> - X.509 Installation and Configuration Guide</A></LI> -</UL> -<P> Linux FreeS/WAN features<A HREF="quickstart.html"> Opportunistic - Encryption</A>, an alternative Public Key Infrastructure based on - Secure DNS.</P> -<H3><A name="Radius">Does FreeS/WAN support user authentication (Radius, - SecureID, Smart Card...)?</A></H3> -<P>Andreas Steffen's<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan"> X.509 - patch</A> (v. 1.42+) supports Smart Cards. The patch does not ship with - vanilla FreeS/WAN, but will be incorporated into<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/"> - Super FreeS/WAN 2.01+</A>. The patch implements the PCKS#15 - Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard, using the OpenSC - smartcard library functions.</P> -<P>Older news:</P> -<P>A user-supported patch to FreeS/WAN 1.3, for smart card style - authentication, is available on<A HREF="http://alcatraz.webcriminals.com/~bastiaan/ipsec"> - Bastiaan's site</A>. It supports skeyid and ibutton. This patch is not - part of Super FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>For a while progress on this front was impeded by a lack of standard. - The IETF<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsra-charter.html"> - working group</A> has now nearly completed its recommended solution to - the problem; meanwhile several vendors have implemented various things.</P> - -<!-- -<p>The <a href="web.html#patch">patches</a> section of our web links document -has links to some user work on this.</p> ---> -<P>Of course, there are various ways to avoid any requirement for user - authentication in IPsec. Consider the situation where road warriors - build IPsec tunnels to your office net and you are considering - requiring user authentication during tunnel negotiation. Alternatives - include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If you can trust the road warrior machines, then set them up so that - only authorised users can create tunnels. If your road warriors use - laptops, consider the possibility of theft.</LI> -<LI>If the tunnel only provides access to particular servers and you can - trust those servers, then set the servers up to require user - authentication.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If either of those is trustworthy, it is not clear that you need user - authentication in IPsec.</P> -<H3><A name="NATtraversal">Does FreeS/WAN support NAT traversal?</A></H3> -<P>Vanilla FreeS/WAN does not, but thanks to Mathieu Lafon and Arkoon - Network Security, there's a patch to support this.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://open-source.arkoon.net">patch and documentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca">Super FreeS/WAN</A> incorporates - this and other user-contributed patches.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The NAT traversal patch has some issues with PSKs, so you may wish to - authenticate with RSA keys, or X.509 (requires a patch which is also - included in Super FreeS/WAN). Doing the latter also has advantages when - dealing with large numbers of clients who may be behind NAT; instead of - having to make an individual Roadwarrior connection for each virtual - IP, you can use the "rightsubnetwithin" parameter to specify a range. - See<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/install.htm#section_4.4"> - these<VAR> rightsubnetwithin</VAR> instructions</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="virtID">Does FreeS/WAN support assigning a "virtual - identity" to a remote system?</A></H3> -<P>Some IPsec implementations allow you to make the source address on - packets sent by a Road Warrior machine be something other than the - address of its interface to the Internet. This is sometimes described - as assigning a virtual identity to that machine.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN does not directly support this, but it can be done. See - this<A href="#road.masq"> FAQ question</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="noDES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support single DES encryption?</A> -</H3> -<P><STRONG>No</STRONG>, single DES is not used either at the<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A> level for negotiating connections or at the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> level for actually building them.</P> -<P>Single DES is<A href="#desnotsecure"> insecure</A>. As we see it, it - is more important to deliver real security than to comply with a - standard which has been subverted into allowing use of inadequate - methods. See this<A href="#weak"> discussion</A>.</P> -<P>If you want to interoperate with an IPsec implementation which offers - only DES, see our<A href="interop.html#noDES"> interoperation</A> - document.</P> -<H3><A name="AES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support AES encryption?</A></H3> -<P><A href="#AES">AES</A> is a new US government<A href="#block"> block - cipher</A> standard to replace the obsolete<A href="#DES"> DES</A>.</P> -<P>At time of writing (March 2002), the FreeS/WAN distribution does not - yet support AES but user-written<A href="#patch"> patches</A> are - available to add it. Our kernel programmer is working on integrating - those patches into the distribution, and there is active discussion of - this on the design mailimg list.</P> -<H3><A name="other.cipher">Does FreeS/WAN support other encryption - algorithms?</A></H3> -<P>Currently<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A> is the only cipher - supported. AES will almost certainly be added (see previous question), - and it is likely that in the process we will also add the other two AES - finalists with open licensing, Twofish and Serpent.</P> -<P>We are extremely reluctant to add other ciphers. This would make both - use and maintenance of FreeS/WAN more complex without providing any - clear benefit. Complexity is emphatically not desirable in a security - product.</P> -<P>Various users have written patches to add other ciphers. We provide<A href="#patch"> - links</A> to these.</P> -<H2><A name="canI">Can I ...</A></H2> -<H3><A name="policy.preconfig">Can I use policy groups along with - explicitly configured connections?</A></H3> -<P>Yes, you can, so long as you pay attention to the selection rule, - which can be summarized "the most specific connection wins". We - describe the rule in our<A HREF="#policy.group.notes"> policy groups</A> - document, and provide a more technical explanation in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - man ipsec.conf</A>.</P> -<P>A good guideline: If you have a regular connection defined in<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR>, ensure that a subset of that connection is not listed - in a less restrictive policy group. Otherwise, FreeS/WAN will use the - subset, with its more specific source/destination pair.</P> -<P>Here's an example. Suppose you are the system administrator at - 192.0.2.2. You have this connection in ipsec.conf:<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR> -:</P> -<PRE>conn net-to-net - left=192.0.2.2 # you are here - right=192.0.2.8 - rightsubnet=192.0.2.96/27 - .... -</PRE> -<P>If you then place a host or net within<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR>, (let's - say 192.0.2.98) in<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR>, you may find that - 192.0.2.2 at times communicates in the clear with 192.0.2.98. That's - consistent with the rule, but may be contrary to your expectations.</P> -<P>On the other hand, it's safe to put a larger subnet in a less - restrictive policy group file. If<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR> contains - 192.0.2.0/24, then the more specific<VAR> net-to-net</VAR> connection - is used for any communication to 192.0.2.96/27. The more general policy - applies only to communication with hosts or subnets in 192.0.2.0/24 - without a more specific policy or connection.</P> -<H3><A name="policy.off">Can I turn off policy groups?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. Use<A HREF="#disable_policygroups"> these instructions</A>.</P> - -<!-- -<h3><a name="policy.otherinterface">Can I use policy groups - on an interface other than <VAR>%defaultroute</VAR>?</a></h3> - -<p>??<p> ---> -<H3><A name="reload">Can I reload connection info without restarting?</A> -</H3> -<P>Yes, you can do this. Here are the details, in a mailing list message - from Pluto programmer Hugh Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>| How can I reload config's without restarting all of pluto and klips? I am using -| FreeSWAN -> PGPNet in a medium sized production environment, and would like to be -| able to add new connections ( i am using include config/* ) without dropping current -| SA's. -| -| Can this be done? -| -| If not, are there plans to add this kind of feature? - - ipsec auto --add whatever -This will look in the usual place (/etc/ipsec.conf) for a conn named -whatever and add it. - -If you added new secrets, you need to do - ipsec auto --rereadsecrets -before Pluto needs to know those secrets. - -| I have looked (perhaps not thoroughly enough tho) to see how to do this: - -There may be more bits to look for, depending on what you are trying -to do.</PRE> -<P>Another useful command here is<VAR> ipsec auto --replace <conn_name></VAR> - which re-reads data for a named connection.</P> -<H3><A name="masq.faq">Can I use several masqueraded subnets?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. This is done all the time. See the discussion in our<A href="config.html#route_or_not"> - setup</A> document. The only restriction is that the subnets on the two - ends must not overlap. See the next question.</P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message on the topic. The user incorrectly - thinks you need a 2.4 kernel for this -- actually various people have - been doing it on 2.0 and 2.2 for quite some time -- but he has it right - for 2.4.</P> -<PRE>Subject: Double NAT and freeswan working :) - Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 - From: Paul Wouters <paul@xtdnet.nl> - -Just to share my pleasure, and make an entry for people who are searching -the net on how to do this. Here's the very simple solution to have a double -NAT'ed network working with freeswan. (Not sure if this is old news, but I'm -not on the list (too much spam) and I didn't read this in any HOWTO/FAQ/doc -on the freeswan site yet (Sandy, put it in! :) - -10.0.0.0/24 --- 10.0.0.1 a.b.c.d ---- a.b.c.e {internet} ----+ - | -10.0.1.0/24 --- 10.0.1.1 f.g.h.i ---- f.g.h.j {internet} ----+ - -the goal is to have the first network do a VPN to the second one, yet also -have NAT in place for connections not destinated for the other side of the -NAT. Here the two Linux security gateways have one real IP number (cable -modem, dialup, whatever. - -The problem with NAT is you don't want packets from 10.*.*.* to 10.*.*.* -to be NAT'ed. While with Linux 2.2, you can't, with Linux 2.4 you can. - -(This has been tested and works for 2.4.2 with Freeswan snapshot2001mar8b) - -relevant parts of /etc/ipsec.conf: - - left=f.g.h.i - leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 - leftnexthop=f.g.h.j - leftfirewall=yes - leftid=@firewall.netone.nl - leftrsasigkey=0x0........ - right=a.b.c.d - rightsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 - rightnexthop=a.b.c.e - rightfirewall=yes - rightid=@firewall.nettwo.nl - rightrsasigkey=0x0...... - # To authorize this connection, but not actually start it, at startup, - # uncomment this. - auto=add - -and now the real trick. Setup the NAT correctly on both sites: - -iptables -t nat -F -iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -d \! 10.0.0.0/8 -j MASQUERADE - -This tells the NAT code to only do NAT for packets with destination other then -10.* networks. note the backslash to mask the exclamation mark to protect it -against the shell. - -Happy painting :) - -Paul</PRE> -<H3><A name="dup_route">Can I use subnets masqueraded to the same - addresses?</A></H3> -<P><STRONG>No.</STRONG> The notion that IP addresses are unique is one - of the fundamental principles of the IP protocol. Messing with it is - exceedingly perilous.</P> -<P>Fairly often a situation comes up where a company has several - branches, all using the same<A href="#non-routable"> non-routable - addresses</A>, perhaps 192.168.0.0/24. This works fine as long as those - nets are kept distinct. The<A href="#masq"> IP masquerading</A> on - their firewalls ensures that packets reaching the Internet carry the - firewall address, not the private address.</P> -<P>This can break down when IPsec enters the picture. FreeS/WAN builds a - tunnel that pokes through both masquerades and delivers packets from<VAR> - leftsubnet</VAR> to<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR> and vice versa. For this to - work, the two subnets<EM> must</EM> be distinct.</P> -<P>There are several solutions to this problem.</P> -<P>Usually, you<STRONG> re-number the subnets</STRONG>. Perhaps the - Vancouver office becomes 192.168.101.0/24, Calgary 192.168.102.0/24 and - so on. FreeS/WAN can happily handle this. With, for example<VAR> - leftsubnet=192.168.101.0/24</VAR> and<VAR> rightsubnet=192.168.102.0/24</VAR> - in a connection description, any machine in Calgary can talk to any - machine in Vancouver. If you want to be more restrictive and use - something like<VAR> leftsubnet=192.168.101.128/25</VAR> and<VAR> - rightsubnet=192.168.102.240/28</VAR> so only certain machines on each - end have access to the tunnel, that's fine too.</P> -<P>You could also<STRONG> split the subnet</STRONG> into smaller ones, - for example using<VAR> 192.168.1.0/25</VAR> in Vancouver and<VAR> - rightsubnet=192.168.0.128/25</VAR> in Calgary.</P> -<P>Alternately, you can just<STRONG> give up routing</STRONG> directly - to machines on the subnets. Omit the<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> - rightsubnet</VAR> parameters from your connection descriptions. Your - IPsec tunnels will then run between the public interfaces of the two - firewalls. Packets will be masqueraded both before they are put into - tunnels and after they emerge. Your Vancouver client machines will see - only one Calgary machine, the firewall.</P> -<H3><A name="road.masq">Can I assign a road warrior an address on my net - (a virtual identity)?</A></H3> -<P>Often it would be convenient to be able to give a Road Warrior an IP - address which appears to be on the local network. Some IPsec - implementations have support for this, sometimes calling the feature - "virtual identity".</P> -<P>Currently (Sept 2002) FreeS/WAN does not support this, and we have no - definite plans to add it. The difficulty is that is not yet a standard - mechanism for it. There is an Internet Draft for a method of doing it - using<A href="#DHCP"> DHCP</A> which looks promising. FreeS/WAN may - support that in a future release.</P> -<P>In the meanwhile, you can do it yourself using the Linux iproute2(8) - facilities. Details are in<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/iproute2.htm"> - this paper</A>.</P> -<P>Another method has also been discussed on the mailing list.:</P> -<UL> -<LI>You can use a variant of the<A href="#extruded.config"> extruded - subnet</A> procedure.</LI> -<LI>You have to avoid having the road warrior's assigned address within - the range you actually use at home base. See previous question.</LI> -<LI>On the other hand, you want the roadwarrior's address to be within - the range that<EM> seems</EM> to be on your network.</LI> -</UL> -<P>For example, you might have:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=a.b.c.0/25</DT> -<DD>head office network</DD> -<DT>rightsubnet=a.b.c.129/32</DT> -<DD>extruded to a road warrior. Note that this is not in a.b.c.0/25</DD> -<DT>a.b.c.0/24</DT> -<DD>whole network, including both the above</DD> -</DL> -<P>You then set up routing so that the office machines use the IPsec - gateway as their route to a.b.c.128/25. The leftsubnet parameter tells - the road warriors to use tunnels to reach a.b.c.0/25, so you should - have two-way communication. Depending or your network and applications, - there may be some additional work to do on DNS or Windows configuration</P> -<H3><A name="road.many">Can I support many road warriors with one - gateway?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. This is easily done, using</P> -<DL> -<DT>either RSA authentication</DT> -<DD>standard in the FreeS/WAN distribution</DD> -<DT>or X.509 certificates</DT> -<DD>requires<A href="#PKIcert"> Super FreeS/WAN or a patch</A>.</DD> -</DL> -<P>In either case, each Road Warrior must have a different key or - certificate.</P> -<P>It is also possible using pre-shared key authentication, though we - don't recommend this; see the<A href="#road.PSK"> next question</A> for - details.</P> -<P>If you expect to have more than a few dozen Road Warriors connecting - simultaneously, you may need a fairly powerful gateway machine. See our - document on<A href="performance.html"> FreeS/WAN performance</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="road.PSK">Can I have many road warriors using shared secret - authentication?</A></H3> -<P><STRONG>Yes, but avoid it if possible</STRONG>.</P> -<P>You can have multiple Road Warriors using shared secret - authentication<STRONG> only if they all use the same secret</STRONG>. - You must also set:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> uniqueids=no </PRE> -<P>in the connection definition.</P> -<P>Why it's less secure:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If you have many users, it becomes almost certain the secret will - leak</LI> -<LI>The secret becomes quite valuable to an attacker</LI> -<LI>All users authenticate the same way, so the gateway cannot tell them - apart for logging or access control purposes</LI> -<LI>Changing the secret is difficult. You have to securely notify all - users.</LI> -<LI>If you find out the secret has been compromised, you can change it, - but then what? None of your users can connect without the new secret. - How will you notify them all, quickly and securely, without using the - VPN?</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is a designed-in limitation of the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> key - negotiation protocol, not a problem with our implementation.</P> -<P><STRONG>We very strongly recommend that you avoid using shared secret - authentication for multiple Road Warriors.</STRONG> Use RSA - authentication instead.</P> -<P>The longer story: When using shared secrets, the protocol requires - that the responding gateway be able to determine which secret to use at - a time when all it knows about the initiator is an IP address. This - works fine if you know the initiator's address in advance and can use - it to look up the appropiriate secret. However, it fails for Road - Warriors since the gateway cannot know their IP addresses in advance.</P> -<P>With RSA signatures (or certificates) the protocol is slightly - different. The initiator provides an identifier early in the exchange - and the responder can use that identifier to look up the correct key or - certificate. See<A href="#road.many"> above</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="QoS">Can I use Quality of Service routing with FreeS/WAN?</A> -</H3> -<P>From project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>> Do QoS add to FreeS/WAN? -> For example integrating DiffServ and FreeS/WAN? - -With a current version of FreeS/WAN, you will have to add hidetos=no to -the config-setup section of your configuration file. By default, the TOS -field of tunnel packets is zeroed; with hidetos=no, it is copied from the -packet inside. (This is a modest security hole, which is why it is no -longer the default.) - -DiffServ does not interact well with tunneling in general. Ways of -improving this are being studied.</PRE> -<P>Copying the<A href="#TOS"> TOS</A> (type of service) information from - the encapsulated packet to the outer header reveals the TOS information - to an eavesdropper. This does not tell him much, but it might be of use - in<A href="#traffic"> traffic analysis</A>. Since we do not have to - give it to him, our default is not to.</P> -<P>Even with the TOS hidden, you can still:</P> -<UL> -<LI>apply QOS rules to the tunneled (ESP) packets; for example, by - giving ESP packets a certain priority.</LI> -<LI>apply QOS rules to the packets as they enter or exit the tunnel via - an IPsec virtual interface (eg.<VAR> ipsec0</VAR>).</LI> -</UL> -<P>See<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> for more - on the<VAR> hidetos=</VAR> parameter.</P> -<H3><A name="deadtunnel">Can I recognise dead tunnels and shut them - down?</A></H3> -<P>There is no general mechanism to do this is in the IPsec protocols.</P> -<P>From time to time, there is discussion on the IETF Working Group<A href="#ietf"> - mailing list</A> of adding a "keep-alive" mechanism (which some say - should be called "make-dead"), but it is a fairly complex problem and - no consensus has been reached on whether or how it should be done.</P> -<P>The protocol does have optional<A href="#ignore"> delete-SA</A> - messages which one side can send when it closes a connection in hopes - this will cause the other side to do the same. FreeS/WAN does not - currently support these. In any case, they would not solve the problem - since:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a gateway that crashes or hangs would not send the messages</LI> -<LI>the sender is not required to send them</LI> -<LI>they are not authenticated, so any receiver that trusts them leaves - itself open to a<A href="#DOS"> denial of service</A> attack</LI> -<LI>the receiver is not required to do anything about them</LI> -<LI>the receiver cannot acknowledge them; the protocol provides no - mechanism for that</LI> -<LI>since they are not acknowledged, the sender cannot rely on them</LI> -</UL> -<P>However, connections do have limited lifetimes and you can control - how many attempts your gateway makes to rekey before giving up. For - example, you can set:</P> -<PRE>conn default - keyingtries=3 - keylife=30m</PRE> -<P>With these settings old connections will be cleaned up. Within 30 - minutes of the other end dying, rekeying will be attempted. If it - succeeds, the new connection replaces the old one. If it fails, no new - connection is created. Either way, the old connection is taken down - when its lifetime expires.</P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message on the topic from FreeS/WAN tech - support person Claudia Schmeing:</P> -<PRE>You ask how to determine whether a tunnel is redundant: - -> Can anybody explain the best way to determine this. Esp when a RW has -> disconnected? I thought 'ipsec auto --status' might be one way. - -If a tunnel goes down from one end, Linux FreeS/WAN on the -other end has no way of knowing this until it attempts to rekey. -Once it tries to rekey and fails, it will 'know' that the tunnel is -down. - -Because it doesn't have a way of knowing the state until this point, -it will also not be able to tell you the state via ipsec auto --status. - -> However, comparing output from a working tunnel with that of one that -> was closed -> did not show clearly show tunnel status. - -If your tunnel is down but not 'unrouted' (see man ipsec_auto), you -should not be able to ping the opposite side of the tunnel. You can -use this as an indicator of tunnel status. - -On a related note, you may be interested to know that as of 1.7, -redundant tunnels caused by RW disconnections are likely to be -less of a pain. From doc/CHANGES: - - There is a new configuration parameter, uniqueids, to control a new Pluto - option: when a new connection is negotiated with the same ID as an old - one, the old one is deleted immediately. This should help eliminate - dangling Road Warrior connections when the same Road Warrior reconnects. - It thus requires that IDs not be shared by hosts (a previously legal but - probably useless capability). NOTE WELL: the sample ipsec.conf now has - uniqueids=yes in its config-setup section. - - -Cheers, - -Claudia</PRE> -<H3><A name="demanddial">Can I build IPsec tunnels over a demand-dialed - link?</A></H3> -<P>This is possible, but not easy. FreeS/WAN technical lead Henry - Spencer wrote:</P> -<PRE>> 5. If the ISDN link goes down in between and is reestablished, the SAs -> are still up but the eroute are deleted and the IPsec interface shows -> garbage (with ifconfig) -> 6. Only restarting IPsec will bring the VPN back online. - -This one is awkward to solve. If the real interface that the IPsec -interface is mounted on goes down, it takes most of the IPsec machinery -down with it, and a restart is the only good way to recover. - -The only really clean fix, right now, is to split the machines in two: - -1. A minimal machine serves as the network router, and only it is aware -that the link goes up and down. - -2. The IPsec is done on a separate gateway machine, which thinks it has -a permanent network connection, via the router. - -This is clumsy but it does work. Trying to do both functions within a -single machine is tricky. There is a software package (diald) which will -give the illusion of a permanent connection for demand-dialed modem -connections; I don't know whether it's usable for ISDN, or whether it can -be made to cooperate properly with FreeS/WAN. - -Doing a restart each time the interface comes up *does* work, although it -is a bit painful. I did that with PPP when I was running on a modem link; -it wasn't hard to arrange the PPP scripts to bring IPsec up and down at -the right times. (I'd meant to investigate diald but never found time.) - -In principle you don't need to do a complete restart on reconnect, but you -do have to rebuild some things, and we have no nice clean way of doing -only the necessary parts.</PRE> -<P>In the same thread, one user commented:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPsec and Dial Up Connections - Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2000 - From: Andy Bradford <andyb@calderasystems.com> - -On Wed, 22 Nov 2000 19:47:11 +0100, Philip Reetz wrote: - -> Are there any ideas what might be the cause of the problem and any way -> to work around it. -> Any help is highly appreciated. - -On my laptop, when using ppp there is a ip-up script in /etc/ppp that -will be executed each time that the ppp interface is brought up. -Likewise there is an ip-down script that is called when it is taken -down. You might consider custimzing those to stop and start FreeS/WAN -with each connection. I believe that ISDN uses the same files, though -I could be wrong---there should be something similar though.</PRE> -<H3><A name="GRE">Can I build GRE, L2TP or PPTP tunnels over IPsec?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. Normally this is not necessary, but it is useful in a few - special cases. For example, if you must route non-IP packets such as - IPX, you will need to use a tunneling protocol that can route these - packets. IPsec can be layered around it for extra security. Another - example: you can provide failover protection for high availability (HA) - environments by combining IPsec with other tools. Ken Bantoft describes - one such setup in<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/HA"> Using - FreeS/WAN with Linux-HA, GRE, OSPF and BGP for enterprise grade VPN - solutions</A>.</P> -<P>GRE over IPsec is covered as part of<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/HA"> - that document</A>.<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/07/msg00209.html"> - Here are links</A> to other GRE resources. Jacco de Leuw has created<A HREF="http://www.jacco2.dds.nl/networking/"> - this page on L2TP over IPsec</A> with instructions for FreeS/WAN and - several other brands of IPsec software.</P> -<P>Please let us know of other useful links via the<A HREF="mail.html"> - mailing lists</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="NetBIOS">... use Network Neighborhood (Samba, NetBIOS) over - IPsec?</A></H3> -<P>Your local PC needs to know how to translate NetBIOS names to IP - addresses. It may do this either via a local LMHOSTS file, or using a - local or remote WINS server. The WINS server is preferable since it - provides a centralized source of the information to the entire network. - To use a WINS server over the<A HREF="#VPN"> VPN</A> (or any IP-based - network), you must enable "NetBIOS over TCP".</P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.samba.org">Samba</A> can emulate a WINS server on - Linux.</P> -<P> See also several discussions in our<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-September/thread.html"> - September 2002 Users archives</A></P> -<H2><A name="setup.faq">Life's little mysteries</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is a fairly complex product. (Neither the networks it runs - on nor the protocols it uses are simple, so it could hardly be - otherwise.) It therefore sometimes exhibits behaviour which can be - somewhat confusing, or has problems which are not easy to diagnose. - This section tries to explain those problems.</P> -<P>Setup and configuration of FreeS/WAN are covered in other - documentation sections:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="quickstart.html">basic setup and configuration</A></LI> -<LI><A href="adv_config.html">advanced configuration</A></LI> -<LI><A href="trouble.html">Troubleshooting</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>However, we also list some of the commonest problems here.</P> -<H3><A name="cantping">I cannot ping ....</A></H3> -<P>This question is dealt with in the advanced configuration section - under the heading<A href="#multitunnel"> multiple tunnels</A>.</P> -<P>The standard subnet-to-subnet tunnel protects traffic<STRONG> only - between the subnets</STRONG>. To test it, you must use pings that go - from one subnet to the other.</P> -<P>For example, suppose you have:</P> -<PRE> subnet a.b.c.0/24 - | - eth1 = a.b.c.1 - gate1 - eth0 = 192.0.2.8 - | - - ~ internet ~ - - | - eth0 = 192.0.2.11 - gate2 - eth1 = x.y.z.1 - | - subnet x.y.z.0/24</PRE> -<P>and the connection description:</P> -<PRE>conn abc-xyz - left=192.0.2.8 - leftsubnet=a.b.c.0/24 - right=192.0.2.11 - rightsubnet=x.y.z.0/24</PRE> -<P>You can test this connection description only by sending a ping that - will actually go through the tunnel. Assuming you have machines at - addresses a.b.c.2 and x.y.z.2, pings you might consider trying are:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ping from x.y.z.2 to a.b.c.2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD>Succeeds if tunnel is working. This is the<STRONG> only valid test - of the tunnel</STRONG>.</DD> -<DT>ping from gate2 to a.b.c.2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Does not use tunnel</STRONG>. gate2 is not on protected - subnet.</DD> -<DT>ping from gate1 to x.y.z.2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Does not use tunnel</STRONG>. gate1 is not on protected - subnet.</DD> -<DT>ping from gate1 to gate2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Does not use tunnel</STRONG>. Neither gate is on a protected - subnet.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Only the first of these is a useful test of this tunnel. The others - do not use the tunnel. Depending on other details of your setup and - routing, they:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either fail, telling you nothing about the tunnel</LI> -<LI>or succeed, telling you nothing about the tunnel since these packets - use some other route</LI> -</UL> -<P>In some cases, you may be able to get around this. For the example - network above, you could use:</P> -<PRE> ping -I a.b.c.1 x.y.z.1</PRE> -<P>Both the adresses given are within protected subnets, so this should - go through the tunnel.</P> -<P>If required, you can build additional tunnels so that all the - machines involved can talk to all the others. See<A href="#multitunnel"> - multiple tunnels</A> in the advanced configuration document for - details.</P> -<H3><A name="forever">It takes forever to ...</A></H3> -<P>Users fairly often report various problems involving long delays, - sometimes on tunnel setup and sometimes on operations done through the - tunnel, occasionally on simple things like ping or more often on more - complex operations like doing NFS or Samba through the tunnel.</P> -<P>Almost always, these turn out to involve failure of a DNS lookup. The - timeouts waiting for DNS are typically set long so that you won't time - out when a query involves multiple lookups or long paths. Genuine - failures therefore produce long delays before they are detected.</P> -<P>A mailing list message from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>> ... when i run /etc/rc.d/init.d/ipsec start, i get: -> ipsec_setup: Starting FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.5... -> and it just sits there, doesn't give back my bash prompt. - -Almost certainly, the problem is that you're using DNS names in your -ipsec.conf, but DNS lookups are not working for some reason. You will -get your prompt back... eventually. But the DNS timeouts are long. -Doing something about this is on our list, but it is not easy.</PRE> -<P>In the meanwhile, we recommend that connection descriptions in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> use numeric IP addresses rather than names which will - require a DNS lookup.</P> -<P>Names that do not require a lookup are fine. For example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a road warrior might use the identity<VAR> - rightid=@lancelot.example.org</VAR></LI> -<LI>the gateway might use<VAR> leftid=@camelot.example.org</VAR></LI> -</UL> -<P>These are fine. The @ sign prevents any DNS lookup. However, do not - attempt to give the gateway address as<VAR> left=camelot.example.org</VAR> -. That requires a lookup.</P> -<P>A post from one user after solving a problem with long delays:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Final Answer to Delay!!! - Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2001 - From: "Felippe Solutions" <felippe@solutionstecnologia.com.br> - -Sorry people, but seems like the Delay problem had nothing to do with -freeswan. - -The problem was DNS as some people sad from the beginning, but not the way -they thought it was happening. Samba, ssh, telnet and other apps try to -reverse lookup addresses when you use IP numbers (Stupid that ahh). - -I could ping very fast because I always ping with "-n" option, but I don't -know the option on the other apps to stop reverse addressing so I don't use -it.</PRE> -<P>This post is fairly typical. These problems are often tricky and - frustrating to diagnose, and most turn out to be DNS-related.</P> -<P>One suggestion for diagnosis: test with both names and addresses if - possible. For example, try all of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>ping<VAR> address</VAR></LI> -<LI>ping -n<VAR> address</VAR></LI> -<LI>ping<VAR> name</VAR></LI> -</UL> -<P>If these behave differently, the problem must be DNS-related since - the three commands do exactly the same thing except for DNS lookups.</P> -<H3><A name="route">I send packets to the tunnel with route(8) but they - vanish</A></H3> -<P>IPsec connections are designed to carry only packets travelling - between pre-defined connection endpoints. As project technical lead - Henry Spencer put it:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> IPsec tunnels are not just virtual wires; they are virtual - wires with built-in access controls. Negotiation of an IPsec tunnel - includes negotiation of access rights for it, which don't include - packets to/from other IP addresses. (The protocols themselves are quite - inflexible about this, so there are limits to what we can do about it.)</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>For fairly obvious security reasons, and to comply with the IPsec - RFCs,<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> drops any packets it receives that are - not allowed on the tunnels currently defined. So if you send it packets - with<VAR> route(8)</VAR>, and suitable tunnels are not defined, the - packets vanish. Whether this is reported in the logs depends on the - setting of<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> in your<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> file.</P> -<P>To rescue vanishing packets, you must ensure that suitable tunnels - for them exist, by editing the connection descriptions in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>. For example, supposing you have a simple setup:</P> -<PRE> leftsubnet -- leftgateway === internet === roadwarrior</PRE> -<P>If you want to give the roadwarrior access to some resource that is - located behind the left gateway but is not in the currently defined - left subnet, then the usual procedure is to define an additional tunnel - for those packets by creating a new connection description.</P> -<P>In some cases, it may be easier to alter an existing connection - description, enlarging the definition of<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR>. For - example, instead of two connection descriptions with 192.168.8.0/24 and - 192.168.9.0/24 as their<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> parameters, you can use a - single description with 192.168.8.0/23.</P> -<P>If you have multiple endpoints on each side, you need to ensure that - there is a route for each pair of endpoints. See this<A href="#multitunnel"> - example</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="down_route">When a tunnel goes down, packets vanish</A></H3> -<P>This is a special case of the vanishing packet problem described in - the previous question. Whenever KLIPS sees packets for which it does - not have a tunnel, it drops them.</P> -<P>When a tunnel goes away, either because negotiations with the other - gateway failed or because you gave an<VAR> ipsec auto --down</VAR> - command, the route to its other end is left pointing into KLIPS, and - KLIPS will drop packets it has no tunnel for.</P> -<P>This is a documented design decision, not a bug. FreeS/WAN must not - automatically adjust things to send packets via another route. The - other route might be insecure.</P> -<P>Of course, re-routing may be necessary in many cases. In those cases, - you have to do it manually or via scripts. We provide the<VAR> ipsec - auto --unroute</VAR> command for these cases.</P> -<P>From<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html"> ipsec_auto(8)</A>:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> Normally, pluto establishes a route to the destination - specified for a connection as part of the --up operation. However, the - route and only the route can be established with the --route operation. - Until and unless an actual connection is established, this discards any - packets sent there, which may be preferable to having them sent - elsewhere based on a more general route (e.g., a default route).</BLOCKQUOTE><BLOCKQUOTE> - Normally, pluto's route to a destination remains in place when a --down - operation is used to take the connection down (or if connection setup, - or later automatic rekeying, fails). This permits establishing a new - connection (perhaps using a different specification; the route is - altered as necessary) without having a ``window'' in which packets - might go elsewhere based on a more general route. Such a route can be - removed using the --unroute operation (and is implicitly removed by - --delete).</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>See also this mailing list<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00523.html"> - message</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="firewall_ate">The firewall ate my packets!</A></H3> -<P>If firewalls filter out:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either the UDP port 500 packets used in IKE negotiations</LI> -<LI>or the ESP and AH (protocols 50 and 51) packets used to implement - the IPsec tunnel</LI> -</UL> -<P>then IPsec cannot work. The first thing to check if packets seem to - be vanishing is the firewall rules on the two gateway machines and any - other machines along the path that you have access to.</P> -<P>For details, see our document on<A href="firewall.html"> firewalls</A> -.</P> -<P>Some advice from technical lead Henry Spencer on diagnosing such - problems:</P> -<PRE>> > Packets vanishing between the hardware interface and the ipsecN interface -> > is usually the result of firewalls not being configured to let them in... -> -> Thanks for the suggestion. If only it were that simple! My ipchains startup -> script does take care of that, but just in case I manually inserted rules -> accepting everything from london on dublin. No difference. - -The other thing to check is whether the "RX packets dropped" count on the -ipsecN interface (run "ifconfig ipsecN", for N=1 or whatever, to see the -counts) is rising. If so, then there's some sort of configuration mismatch -between the two ends, and IPsec itself is rejecting them. If none of the -ipsecN counts is rising, then the packets are never reaching the IPsec -machinery, and the problem is almost certainly in firewalls etc.</PRE> -<H3><A name="dropconn">Dropped connections</A></H3> -<P>Networks being what they are, IPsec connections can be broken for any - number of reasons, ranging from hardware failures to various software - problems such as the path MTU problems discussed<A href="#pmtu.broken"> - elsewhere in the FAQ</A>. Fortunately, various diagnostic tools exist - that help you sort out many of the possible problems.</P> -<P>There is one situation, however, where FreeS/WAN (using default - settings) may destroy a connection for no readily apparent reason. This - occurs when things are<STRONG> misconfigured</STRONG> so that<STRONG> - two tunnels</STRONG> from the same gateway expect<STRONG> the same - subnet on the far end</STRONG>.</P> -<P>In this situation, the first tunnel comes up fine and works until the - second is established. At that point, because of the way we track - connections internally, the first tunnel ceases to exist as far as this - gateway is concerned. Of course the far end does not know that, and a - storm of error messages appears on both systems as it tries to use the - tunnel.</P> -<P>If the far end gives up, goes back to square one and negotiates a new - tunnel, then that wipes out the second tunnel and ...</P> -<P>The solution is simple.<STRONG> Do not build multiple conn - descriptions with the same remote subnet</STRONG>.</P> -<P>This is actually intended to be a feature, rather than a bug. - Consider the situation where a single remote system goes down, then - comes back up and reconnects to the gateway. It is useful to have the - gateway tear down the old tunnel and recover resources when the - reconnection is made. It recognises that situation by checking the - remote subnet for each tunnel it builds and discarding duplicates. This - works fine as long as you don't configure multiple tunnels with the - same remote subnet.</P> -<P>If this behaviour is inconvenient for you, you can disable it by - setting<VAR> uniqueids=no</VAR> in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="defaultroutegone">Disappearing %defaultroute</A></H3> -<P>When an underlying connection (eg. ppp) goes down, FreeS/WAN will not - recover properly without a little help. Here are the symptoms that - FreeS/WAN user Michael Carmody noticed:</P> -<PRE> -> After about 24 hours the freeswan connection takes over the default route. -> -> i.e instead of deafult gateway pointing to the router via eth0, it becomes a -> pointer to the router via ipsec0. - -> All internet access is then lost as all replies (and not just the link I -> wanted) are routed out ipsec0 and the router doesn't respond to the ipsec -> traffic. -</PRE> -<P>If you're using a FreeS/WAN 2.x/KLIPS system, simply re-attach the - IPsec virtual interface with<EM> ipsec tnconfig</EM> command such as:</P> -<PRE> ipsec tnconfig --attach --virtual ipsec0 --physical ppp0</PRE> -<P>In your command, name the physical and virtual interfaces as they - appear paired on your system during regular uptime. For a system with - several physical/virtual interface pairs on flaky links, you'll need - more than one such command. If you're using FreeS/WAN 1.x, you must - restart FreeS/WAN, which is more time consuming.</P> -<P><A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2002-July/003070.html"> - Here</A> is a script which can help to automate the process of - FreeS/WAN restart at need. It could easily be adapted to use tnconfig - instead.</P> -<H3><A name="tcpdump.faq">TCPdump on the gateway shows strange things</A> -</H3> - As another user pointed out, keeping the connect -<P>Attempting to look at IPsec packets by running monitoring tools on - the IPsec gateway machine can produce silly results. That machine is - mangling the packets for IPsec, and possibly for firewall or NAT - purposes as well. If the internals of the machine's IP stack are not - what the monitoring tool expects, then the tool can misinterpret them - and produce nonsense output.</P> -<P>See our<A href="#tcpdump.test"> testing</A> document for more detail.</P> -<H3><A name="no_trace">Traceroute does not show anything between the - gateways</A></H3> -<P>As far as traceroute can see, the two gateways are one hop apart; the - data packet goes directly from one to the other through the tunnel. Of - course the outer packets that implement the tunnel pass through - whatever lies between the gateways, but those packets are built and - dismantled by the gateways. Traceroute does not see them and cannot - report anything about their path.</P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message with more detail.</P> -<PRE>Date: Mon, 14 May 2001 -To: linux-ipsec@freeswan.org -From: "John S. Denker" <jsd@research.att.com< -Subject: Re: traceroute: one virtual hop - -At 02:20 PM 5/14/01 -0400, Claudia Schmeing wrote: -> ->> > A bonus question: traceroute in subnet to subnet enviroment looks like: ->> > ->> > traceroute to andris.dmz (172.20.24.10), 30 hops max, 38 byte packets ->> > 1 drama (172.20.1.1) 0.716 ms 0.942 ms 0.434 ms ->> > 2 * * * ->> > 3 andris.dmz (172.20.24.10) 73.576 ms 78.858 ms 79.434 ms ->> > ->> > Why aren't there the other hosts which take part in the delivery during -> * * * ? -> ->If there is an ipsec tunnel between GateA and Gate B, this tunnel forms a ->'virtual wire'. When it is tunneled, the original packet becomes an inner ->packet, and new ESP and/or AH headers are added to create an outer packet ->around it. You can see an example of how this is done for AH at ->doc/ipsec.html#AH . For ESP it is similar. -> ->Think about the packet's path from the inner packet's perspective. ->It leaves the subnet, goes into the tunnel, and re-emerges in the second ->subnet. This perspective is also the only one available to the ->'traceroute' command when the IPSec tunnel is up. - -Claudia got this exactly right. Let me just expand on a couple of points: - -*) GateB is exactly one (virtual) hop away from GateA. This is how it -would be if there were a physically private wire from A to B. The -virtually private connection should work the same, and it does. - -*) While the information is in transit from GateA to GateB, the hop count -of the outer header (the "envelope") is being decremented. The hop count -of the inner header (the "contents" of the envelope) is not decremented and -should not be decremented. The hop count of the outer header is not -derived from and should not be derived from the hop count of the inner header. - -Indeed, even if the packets did time out in transit along the tunnel, there -would be no way for traceroute to find out what happened. Just as -information cannot leak _out_ of the tunnel to the outside, information -cannot leak _into_ the tunnel from outside, and this includes ICMP messages -from routers along the path. - -There are some cases where one might wish for information about what is -happening at the IP layer (below the tunnel layer) -- but the protocol -makes no provision for this. This raises all sorts of conceptual issues. -AFAIK nobody has ever cared enough to really figure out what _should_ -happen, let alone implement it and standardize it. - -*) I consider the "* * *" to be a slight bug. One might wish for it to be -replaced by "GateB GateB GateB". It has to do with treating host-to-subnet -traffic different from subnet-to-subnet traffic (and other gory details). -I fervently hope KLIPS2 will make this problem go away. - -*) If you want to ask questions about the link from GateA to GateB at the -IP level (below the tunnel level), you have to ssh to GateA and launch a -traceroute from there.</PRE> -<H2><A name="man4debug">Testing in stages</A></H2> -<P>It is often useful in debugging to test things one at a time:</P> -<UL> -<LI>disable IPsec entirely, for example by turning it off with - chkconfig(8), and make sure routing works</LI> -<LI>Once that works, try a manually keyed connection. This does not - require key negotiation between Pluto and the key daemon on the other - end.</LI> -<LI>Once that works, try automatically keyed connections</LI> -<LI>Once IPsec works, add packet compression</LI> -<LI>Once everything seems to work, try stress tests with large - transfers, many connections, frequent re-keying, ...</LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN releases are tested for all of these, so you can be - reasonably certain they<EM> can</EM> do them all. Of course, that does - not mean they<EM> will</EM> on the first try, especially if you have - some unusual configuration.</P> -<P>The rest of this section gives information on diagnosing the problem - when each of the above steps fails.</P> -<H3><A name="nomanual">Manually keyed connections don't work</A></H3> -<P>Suspect one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>mis-configuration of IPsec system in the /etc/ipsec.conf file -<BR> common errors are incorrect interface or next hop information</LI> -<LI>mis-configuration of manual connection in the /etc/ipsec.conf file</LI> -<LI>routing problems causing IPsec packets to be lost</LI> -<LI>bugs in KLIPS</LI> -<LI>mismatch between the transforms we support and those another IPsec - implementation offers.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="spi_error">One manual connection works, but second one - fails</A></H3> -<P>This is a fairly common problem when attempting to configure multiple - manually keyed connections from a single gateway.</P> -<P>Each connection must be identified by a unique<A href="#SPI"> SPI</A> - value. For automatic connections, these values are assigned - automatically. For manual connections, you must set them with<VAR> spi=</VAR> - statements in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<P>Each manual connection must have a unique SPI value in the range - 0x100 to 0x999. Two or more with the same value will fail. For details, - see our doc section<A href="#prodman"> Using manual keying in - production</A> and the man page<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="man_no_auto">Manual connections work, but automatic keying - doesn't</A></H3> -<P>The most common reason for this behaviour is a firewall dropping the - UDP port 500 packets used in key negotiation.</P> -<P>Other possibilities:</P> -<UL> -<LI>mis-configuration of auto connection in the /etc/ipsec.conf file. -<P>One common configuration error is forgetting that you need<VAR> - auto=add</VAR> to load the connection description on the receiving end - so it recognises the connection when the other end asks for it.</P> -</LI> -<LI>error in shared secret in /etc/ipsec.secrets</LI> -<LI>one gateway lacks a route to the other so Pluto's UDP packets are - lost</LI> -<LI>bugs in Pluto</LI> -<LI>incompatibilities between Pluto's<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> - implementation and the IKE at the other end of the tunnel. -<P>Some possibile problems are discussed in out<A href="interop.html#interop.problem"> - interoperation</A> document.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="nocomp">IPsec works, but connections using compression fail</A> -</H3> -<P>When we first added compression, we saw some problems:</P> -<UL> -<LI>compatibility issues with other implementations. We followed the - RFCs and omitted some extra material that many compression libraries - add by default. Some other implementations left the extras in</LI> -<LI>bugs in assembler compression routines on non-Intel CPUs. The - workaround is to use C code instead of possibly problematic assembler.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We have not seen either problem in some time (at least six months as - I write in March 2002), but if you have some unusual configuration then - you may see them.</P> -<H3><A name="pmtu.broken">Small packets work, but large transfers fail</A> -</H3> -<P>If tests with ping(1) and a small packet size succeed, but tests or - transfers with larger packet sizes fail, suspect problems with packet - fragmentation and perhaps<A href="#pathMTU"> path MTU discovery</A>.</P> -<P>Our<A href="#bigpacket"> troubleshooting document</A> covers these - problems. Information on the underlying mechanism is in our<A href="#MTU.trouble"> - background</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="subsub">Subnet-to-subnet works, but tests from the gateways - don't</A></H3> -<P>This is described under<A href="#cantping"> I cannot ping...</A> - above.</P> -<H2><A name="compile.faq">Compilation problems</A></H2> -<H3><A name="gmp.h_missing">gmp.h: No such file or directory</A></H3> -<P>Pluto needs the GMP (<STRONG>G</STRONG>NU</P> -<P><STRONG>M</STRONG>ulti-<STRONG>P</STRONG>recision) library for the - large integer calculations it uses in<A href="#public"> public key</A> - cryptography. This error message indicates a failure to find the - library. You must install it before Pluto will compile.</P> -<P>The GMP library is included in most Linux distributions. Typically, - there are two RPMs, libgmp and libgmp-devel, You need to<EM> install - both</EM>, either from your distribution CDs or from your vendor's web - site.</P> -<P>On Debian, a mailing list message reports that the command to give is<VAR> - apt-get install gmp2</VAR>.</P> -<P>For more information and the latest version, see the<A href="http://www.swox.com/gmp/"> - GMP home page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="noVM">... virtual memory exhausted</A></H3> -<P>We have had several reports of this message appearing, all on SPARC - Linux. Here is a mailing message on a solution:</P> -<PRE>> ipsec_sha1.c: In function `SHA1Transform': -> ipsec_sha1.c:95: virtual memory exhausted - -I'm seeing exactly the same problem on an Ultra with 256MB ram and 500 -MB swap. Except I am compiling version 1.5 and its Red Hat 6.2. - -I can get around this by using -O instead of -O2 for the optimization -level. So it is probably a bug in the optimizer on the sparc complier. -I'll try and chase this down on the sparc lists.</PRE> -<H2><A name="error">Interpreting error messages</A></H2> -<H3><A name="route-client">route-client (or host) exited with status 7</A> -</H3> -<P>Here is a discussion of this error from FreeS/WAN "listress" (mailing - list tech support person) Claudia Schmeing. The "FAQ on the network - unreachable error" which she refers to is the next question below.</P> -<PRE>> I reached the point where the two boxes (both on dial-up connections, but -> treated as static IPs by getting the IP and editing ipsec.conf after the -> connection is established) to the point where they exchange some info, but I -> get an error like "route-client command exited with status 7 \n internal -> error". -> Where can I find a description of this error? - -In general, if the FAQ doesn't cover it, you can search the mailing list -archives - I like to use -http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/ -but you can see doc/mail.html for different archive formats. - - -Your error comes from the _updown script, which performs some -routing and firewall functions to help Linux FreeS/WAN. More info -is available at doc/firewall.html and man ipsec.conf. Its routing -is integral to the health of Linux FreeS/WAN; it also provides facility -to insert custom firewall rules to be executed when you create or destroy -a connection. - -Yours is, of course, a routing error. You can be fairly sure the routing -machinery is saying "network is unreachable". There's a FAQ on the -"network is unreachable" error, but more information is available now; read on. - -If your _updown script is recent (for example if it shipped with -Linux FreeS/WAN 1.91), you will see another debugging line in your logs -that looks something like this: - -> output: /usr/local/lib/ipsec/_updown: `route add -net 128.174.253.83 -> netmask 255.255.255.255 dev ipsec0 gw 66.92.93.161' failed - -This is, of course, the system route command that exited with status 7, -(ie. failed). Man route for details. Seeing the command typed out yields -more information. If your _updown script is older, you may wish to update -it to show the command explicitly. - -Three parameters fed to the route command: net, netmask and gw [gateway] -are derived from things you've put in ipsec.conf. - -Net and netmask are derived from the peer's IP and mask. In more detail: - -You may see a routing error when routing to a client (ie. subnet), or -to a host (IPSec gateway or freestanding host; a box that does IPSec for -itself). In _updown, the "route-client" section is responsible to set up -the route for IPSec'd (usually, read 'tunneled') packets headed to a -peer subnet. Similarly, route-host routes IPSec'd packets to a peer host -or IPSec gateway. - -When routing to a 'client', net and netmask are ipsec.conf's left- or -rightsubnet (whichever is not local). Similarly, when routing to a -'host' the net is left or right. Host netmask is always /32, indicating a -single machine. - -Gw is nexthop's value. Again, the value in question is left- or rightnexthop, -whichever is local. Where left/right or left-/rightnexthop has the special -value %defaultroute (described in man ipsec.conf), gw will automagically get -the value of the next hop on the default route. - -Q: "What's a nexthop and why do I need one?" - -A: 'nexthop' is a routing kluge; its value is the next hop away - from the machine that's doing IPSec, and toward your IPSec peer. - You need it to get the processed packets out of the local system and - onto the wire. While we often route other packets through the machine - that's now doing IPSec, and are done with it, this does not suffice here. - After packets are processed with IPSec, this machine needs to know where - they go next. Of course using the 'IPSec gateway' as their routing gateway - would cause an infinite loop! [To visualize this, see the packet flow - diagram at doc/firewall.html.] To avoid this, we route packets through - the next hop down their projected path. - -Now that you know the background, consider: -1. Did you test routing between the gateways in the absence of Linux - FreeS/WAN, as recommended? You need to ensure the two machines that - will be running Linux FreeS/WAN can route to one another before trying to - make a secure connection. -2. Is there anything obviously wrong with the sense of your route command? - -Normally, this problem is caused by an incorrect local nexthop parameter. -Check out the use of %defaultroute, described in man ipsec.conf. This is -a simple way to set nexthop for most people. To figure nexthop out by hand, -traceroute in-the-clear to your IPSec peer. Nexthop is the traceroute's -first hop after your IPSec gateway.</PRE> -<H3><A name="unreachable">SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable</A></H3> -<P>This message is not from FreeS/WAN, but from the Linux IP stack - itself. That stack is seeing packets it has no route for, either - because your routing was broken before FreeS/WAN started or because - FreeS/WAN's changes broke it.</P> -<P>Here is a message from Claudia suggesting ways to diagnose and fix - such problems:</P> -<PRE>You write, -> I have correctly installed freeswan-1.8 on RH7.0 kernel 2.2.17, but when -> I setup a VPN connection with the other machine(RH5.2 Kernel 2.0.36 -> freeswan-1.0, it works well.) it told me that -> "SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable"! But the network connection is no -> problem. - -Often this error is the result of a misconfiguration. - -Be sure that you can route successfully in the absence of Linux -FreeS/WAN. (You say this is no problem, so proceed to the next step.) - -Use a custom copy of the default updownscript. Do not change the route -commands, but add a diagnostic message revealing the exact text of the -route command. Is there a problem with the sense of the route command -that you can see? If so, then re-examine those ipsec.conf settings -that are being sent to the route command. - -You may wish to use the ipsec auto --route and --unroute commands to -troubleshoot the problem. See man ipsec_auto for details.</PRE> -<P>Since the above message was written, we have modified the updown - script to provide a better diagnostic for this problem. Check<VAR> - /var/log/messages</VAR>.</P> -<P>See also the FAQ question<A href="#route-client"> route-client (or - host) exited with status 7</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="modprobe">ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec</A> -</H3> -<H3><A name="noKLIPS">ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack - KLIPS</A></H3> -<P>These messages indicate an installation failure. The kernel you are - running does not contain the<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS (kernel IPsec)</A> - code.</P> -<P>Note that the "modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec" message appears - even if you are not using modules. If there is no KLIPS in your kernel, - FreeS/WAN tries to load it as a module. If that fails, you get this - message.</P> -<P>Commands you can quickly try are:</P> -<DL> -<DT><VAR>uname -a</VAR></DT> -<DD>to get details, including compilation date and time, of the - currently running kernel</DD> -<DT><VAR>ls /</VAR></DT> -<DT><VAR>ls /boot</VAR></DT> -<DD>to ensure a new kernel is where it should be. If kernel compilation - puts it in<VAR> /</VAR> but<VAR> lilo</VAR> wants it in<VAR> /boot</VAR> -, then you should uncomment the<VAR> INSTALL_PATH=/boot</VAR> line in - the kernel<VAR> Makefile</VAR>.</DD> -<DT><VAR>more /etc/lilo.conf</VAR></DT> -<DD>to see that<VAR> lilo</VAR> has correct information</DD> -<DT><VAR>lilo</VAR></DT> -<DD>to ensure that information in<VAR> /etc/lilo.conf</VAR> has been - transferred to the boot sector</DD> -</DL> -<P>If those don't find the problem, you have to go back and check - through the<A href="install.html"> install</A> procedure to see what - was missed.</P> -<P>Here is one of Claudia's messages on the topic:</P> -<PRE>> I tried to install freeswan 1.8 on my mandrake 7.2 test box. ... - -> It does show version and some output for whack. - -Yes, because the Pluto (daemon) part of ipsec is installed correctly, but -as we see below the kernel portion is not. - -> However, I get the following from /var/log/messages: -> -> Mar 11 22:11:55 pavillion ipsec_setup: Starting FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.8... -> Mar 11 22:12:02 pavillion ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec -> Mar 11 22:12:02 pavillion ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack -> KLIPS. - -This is your problem. You have not successfully installed a kernel with -IPSec machinery in it. - -Did you build Linux FreeS/WAN as a module? If so, you need to ensure that -your new module has been installed in the directory where your kernel -loader normally finds your modules. If not, you need to ensure -that the new IPSec-enabled kernel is being loaded correctly. - -See also doc/install.html, and INSTALL in the distro.</PRE> -<H3><A name="noDNS">ipsec_setup: ... failure to fetch key for ... from - DNS</A></H3> -<P>Quoting Henry:</P> -<PRE>Note that by default, FreeS/WAN is now set up to - (a) authenticate with RSA keys, and - (b) fetch the public key of the far end from DNS. -Explicit attention to ipsec.conf will be needed if you want -to do something different.</PRE> -<P>and Claudia, responding to the same user:</P> -<PRE>You write, - -> My current setup in ipsec.conf is leftrsasigkey=%dns I have -> commented this and authby=rsasig out. I am able to get ipsec running, -> but what I find is that the documentation only specifies for %dns are -> there any other values that can be placed in this variable other than -> %dns and the key? I am also assuming that this is where I would place -> my public key for the left and right side as well is this correct? - -Valid values for authby= are rsasig and secret, which entail authentication -by RSA signature or by shared secret, respectively. Because you have -commented authby=rsasig out, you are using the default value of authby=secret. - -When using RSA signatures, there are two ways to get the public key for the -IPSec peer: either copy it directly into *rsasigkey= in ipsec.conf, or -fetch it from dns. The magic value %dns for *rsasigkey parameters says to -try to fetch the peer's key from dns. - -For any parameters, you may find their significance and special values in -man ipsec.conf. If you are setting up keys or secrets, be sure also to -reference man ipsec.secrets.</PRE> -<H3><A name="dup_address">ipsec_setup: ... interfaces ... and ... share - address ...</A></H3> -<P>This is a fatal error. FreeS/WAN cannot cope with two or more - interfaces using the same IP address. You must re-configure to avoid - this.</P> -<P>A mailing list message on the topic from Pluto developer Hugh - Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>| I'm trying to get freeswan working between two machine where one has a ppp -| interface. -| I've already suceeded with two machines with ethernet ports but the ppp -| interface is causing me problems. -| basically when I run ipsec start i get -| ipsec_setup: Starting FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.7... -| ipsec_setup: 003 IP interfaces ppp1 and ppp0 share address 192.168.0.10! -| ipsec_setup: 003 IP interfaces ppp1 and ppp2 share address 192.168.0.10! -| ipsec_setup: 003 IP interfaces ppp0 and ppp2 share address 192.168.0.10! -| ipsec_setup: 003 no public interfaces found -| -| followed by lots of cannot work out interface for connection messages -| -| now I can specify the interface in ipsec.conf to be ppp0 , but this does -| not affect the above behaviour. A quick look in server.c indicates that the -| interfaces value is not used but some sort of raw detect happens. -| -| I guess I could prevent the formation of the extra ppp interfaces or -| allocate them different ip but I'd rather not. if at all possible. Any -| suggestions please. - -Pluto won't touch an interface that shares an IP address with another. -This will eventually change, but it probably won't happen soon. - -For now, you will have to give the ppp1 and ppp2 different addresses.</PRE> -<H3><A name="kflags">ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags</A></H3> -<P>A mailing list message form technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>> When FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.7 is starting on my 2.0.38 Linux kernel the following -> error message is generated: -> ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags, no /proc/sys/net/ipsec directory! -> What is supposed to create this directory and how can I fix this problem? - -I think that directory is a 2.2ism, although I'm not certain (I don't have -a 2.0.xx system handy any more for testing). Without it, some of the -ipsec.conf config-setup flags won't work, but otherwise things should -function. </PRE> -<P>You also need to enable the<VAR> /proc</VAR> filesystem in your - kernel configuration for these operations to work.</P> -<H3><A name="message_num">Message numbers (MI3, QR1, et cetera) in Pluto - messages</A></H3> -<P>Pluto messages often indicate where Pluto is in the IKE protocols. - The letters indicate<STRONG> M</STRONG>ain mode or<STRONG> Q</STRONG> -uick mode and<STRONG> I</STRONG>nitiator or<STRONG> R</STRONG>esponder. - The numerals are message sequence numbers. For more detail, see our<A href="#sequence"> - IPsec section</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="conn_name">Connection names in Pluto error messages</A></H3> -<P>From Pluto programmer Hugh Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>| Jan 17 16:21:10 remus Pluto[13631]: "jumble" #1: responding to Main Mode from Road Warrior 130.205.82.46 -| Jan 17 16:21:11 remus Pluto[13631]: "jumble" #1: no suitable connection for peer @banshee.wittsend.com -| -| The connection "jumble" has nothing to do with the incoming -| connection requests, which were meant for the connection "banshee". - -You are right. The message tells you which Connection Pluto is -currently using, which need not be the right one. It need not be the -right one now for the negotiation to eventually succeed! This is -described in ipsec_pluto(8) in the section "Road Warrior Support". - -There are two times when Pluto will consider switching Connections for -a state object. Both are in response to receiving ID payloads (one in -Phase 1 / Main Mode and one in Phase 2 / Quick Mode). The second is -not unique to Road Warriors. In fact, neither is the first any more -(two connections for the same pair of hosts could differ in Phase 1 ID -payload; probably nobody else has tried this).</PRE> -<H3><A name="cantorient">Pluto: ... can't orient connection</A></H3> -<P>Older versions of FreeS/WAN used this message. The same error now - gives the "we have no ipsecN ..." error described just below.</P> -<H3><A name="no.interface">... we have no ipsecN interface for either - end of this connection</A></H3> -<P>Your tunnel has no IP address which matches the IP address of any of - the available IPsec interfaces. Either you've misconfigured the - connection, or you need to define an appropriate IPsec interface - connection.<VAR> interfaces=%defaultroute</VAR> works in many cases.</P> -<P>A longer story: Pluto needs to know whether it is running on the - machine which the connection description calls<VAR> left</VAR> or on<VAR> - right</VAR>. It figures that out by:</P> -<UL> -<LI>looking at the interfaces given in<VAR> interfaces=</VAR> lines in - the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section</LI> -<LI>discovering the IP addresses for those interfaces</LI> -<LI>searching for a match between those addresses and the ones given in<VAR> - left=</VAR> or<VAR> right=</VAR> lines.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Normally a match is found. Then Pluto knows where it is and can set - up other things (for example, if it is<VAR> left</VAR>) using - parameters such as<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> leftnexthop</VAR>, - and sending its outgoing packets to<VAR> right</VAR>.</P> -<P>If no match is found, it emits the above error message.</P> -<H3><A name="noconn">Pluto: ... no connection is known</A></H3> -<P>This error message occurs when a remote system attempts to negotiate - a connection and Pluto does not have a connection description that - matches what the remote system has requested. The most common cause is - a configuration error on one end or the other.</P> -<P>Parameters involved in this match are<VAR> left</VAR>,<VAR> right</VAR> -,<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR>.</P> -<P><STRONG>The match must be exact</STRONG>. For example, if your left - subnet is a.b.c.0/24 then neither a single machine in that net nor a - smaller subnet such as a.b.c.64/26 will be considered a match.</P> -<P>The message can also occur when an appropriate description exists but - Pluto has not loaded it. Use an<VAR> auto=add</VAR> statement in the - connection description, or an<VAR> ipsec auto --add <conn_name></VAR> - command, to correct this.</P> -<P>An explanation from the Pluto developer:</P> -<PRE>| Jul 12 15:00:22 sohar58 Pluto[574]: "corp_road" #2: cannot respond to IPsec -| SA request because no connection is known for -| 216.112.83.112/32===216.112.83.112...216.67.25.118 - -This is the first message from the Pluto log showing a problem. It -means that PGPnet is trying to negotiate a set of SAs with this -topology: - -216.112.83.112/32===216.112.83.112...216.67.25.118 -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -client on our side our host PGPnet host, no client - -None of the conns you showed look like this. - -Use - ipsec auto --status -to see a snapshot of what connections are in pluto, what -negotiations are going on, and what SAs are established. - -The leftsubnet= (client) in your conn is 216.112.83.64/26. It must -exactly match what pluto is looking for, and it does not.</PRE> -<H3><A name="nosuit">Pluto: ... no suitable connection ...</A></H3> -<P>This is similar to the<A href="#noconn"> no connection known</A> - error, but occurs at a different point in Pluto processing.</P> -<P>Here is one of Claudia's messages explaining the problem:</P> -<PRE>You write, - -> What could be the reason of the following error? -> "no suitable connection for peer '@xforce'" - -When a connection is initiated by the peer, Pluto must choose which entry in -the conf file best matches the incoming connection. A preliminary choice is -made on the basis of source and destination IPs, since that information is -available at that time. - -A payload containing an ID arrives later in the negotiation. Based on this -id and the *id= parameters, Pluto refines its conn selection. ... - -The message "no suitable connection" indicates that in this refining step, -Pluto does not find a connection that matches that ID. - -Please see "Selecting a connection when responding" in man ipsec_pluto for -more details.</PRE> -<P>See also<A href="#conn_name"> Connection names in Pluto error - messages</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="noconn.auth">Pluto: ... no connection has been authorized</A> -</H3> -<P>Here is one of Claudia's messages discussing this problem:</P> -<PRE>You write, - -> May 22 10:46:31 debian Pluto[25834]: packet from x.y.z.p:10014: -> initial Main Mode message from x.y.z.p:10014 - but no connection has been authorized - -This error occurs early in the connection negotiation process, -at the first step of IKE negotiation (Main Mode), which is itself the -first of two negotiation phases involved in creating an IPSec connection. - -Here, Linux FreeS/WAN receives a packet from a potential peer, which -requests that they begin discussing a connection. - -The "no connection has been authorized" means that there is no connection -description in Linux FreeS/WAN's internal database that can be used to -link your ipsec interface with that peer. - -"But of course I configured that connection!" - -It may be that the appropriate connection description exists in ipsec.conf -but has not been added to the database with ipsec auto --add myconn or the -auto=add method. Or, the connection description may be misconfigured. - -The only parameters that are relevant in this decision are left= and right= . -Local and remote ports are also taken into account -- we see that the port -is printed in the message above -- but there is no way to control these -in ipsec.conf. - - -Failure at "no connection has been authorized" is similar to the -"no connection is known for..." error in the FAQ, and the "no suitable -connection" error described in the snapshot's FAQ. In all three cases, -Linux FreeS/WAN is trying to match parameters received in the -negotiation with the connection description in the local config file. - -As it receives more information, its matches take more parameters into -account, and become more precise: first the pair of potential peers, -then the peer IDs, then the endpoints (including any subnets). - -The "no suitable connection for peer *" occurs toward the end of IKE -(Main Mode) negotiation, when the IDs are matched. - -"no connection is known for a/b===c...d" is seen at the beginning of IPSec -(Quick Mode, phase 2) negotiation, when the connections are matched using -left, right, and any information about the subnets.</PRE> -<H3><A name="noDESsupport">Pluto: ... OAKLEY_DES_CBC is not supported.</A> -</H3> -<P>This message occurs when the other system attempts to negotiate a - connection using<A href="#DES"> single DES</A>, which we do not support - because it is<A href="#desnotsecure"> insecure</A>.</P> -<P>Our interoperation document has suggestions for<A href="interop.html#noDES"> - how to deal with</A> systems that attempt to use single DES.</P> -<H3><A name="notransform">Pluto: ... no acceptable transform</A></H3> -<P>This message means that the other gateway has made a proposal for - connection parameters, but nothing they proposed is acceptable to - Pluto. Possible causes include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>misconfiguration on either end</LI> -<LI>policy incompatibilities, for example we require encrypted - connections but they are trying to create one with just authentication</LI> -<LI>interoperation problems, for example they offer only single DES and - FreeS/WAN does not support that. See<A href="interop.html#interop.problem"> - discussion</A> in our interoperation document.</LI> -</UL> -<P>A more detailed explanation, from Pluto programmer Hugh Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>Background: - -When one IKE system (for example, Pluto) is negotiating with another -to create an SA, the Initiator proposes a bunch of choices and the -Responder replies with one that it has selected. - -The structure of the choices is fairly complicated. An SA payload -contains a list of lists of "Proposals". The outer list is a set of -choices: the selection must be from one element of this list. - -Each of these elements is a list of Proposals. A selection must be -made from each of the elements of the inner list. In other words, -*all* of them apply (that is how, for example, both AH and ESP can -apply at once). - -Within each of these Proposals is a list of Transforms. For each -Proposal selected, one Transform must be selected (in other words, -each Proposal provides a choice of Transforms). - -Each Transform is made up of a list of Attributes describing, well, -attributes. Such as lifetime of the SA. Such as algorithm to be -used. All the Attributes apply to a Transform. - -You will have noticed a pattern here: layers alternate between being -disjunctions ("or") and conjunctions ("and"). - -For Phase 1 / Main Mode (negotiating an ISAKMP SA), this structure is -cut back. There must be exactly one Proposal. So this degenerates to -a list of Transforms, one of which must be chosen. - -In your case, no proposal was considered acceptable to Pluto (the -Responder). So negotiation ceased. Pluto logs the reason it rejects -each Transform. So look back in the log to see what is going wrong.</PRE> -<H3><A name="rsasigkey">rsasigkey dumps core</A></H3> - A comment on this error from Henry: -<PRE>On Fri, 29 Jun 2001, Rodrigo Gruppelli wrote: -> ...Well, it seem that there's -> another problem with it. When I try to generate a pair of RSA keys, -> rsasigkey cores dump... - -*That* is a neon sign flashing "GMP LIBRARY IS BROKEN". Rsasigkey calls -GMP a lot, and our own library a little bit, and that's very nearly all it -does. Barring bugs in its code or our library -- which have happened, but -not very often -- a problem in rsasigkey is a problem in GMP.</PRE> -<P>See the next question for how to deal with GMP errors.</P> -<H3><A name="sig4">!Pluto failure!: ... exited with ... signal 4</A></H3> -<P>Pluto has died. Signal 4 is SIGILL, illegal instruction.</P> -<P>The most likely cause is that your<A href="#GMP"> GMP</A> (GNU - multi-precision) library is compiled for a different processor than - what you are running on. Pluto uses that library for its public key - calculations.</P> -<P>Try getting the GMP sources and recompile for your processor type. - Most Linux distributions will include this source, or you can download - it from the<A href="http://www.swox.com/gmp/"> GMP home page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="econnrefused">ECONNREFUSED error message</A></H3> -<P>From John Denker, on the mailing list:</P> -<PRE>1) The log message - some IKE message we sent has been rejected with - ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details) -is much more suitable than the previous version. Thanks. - -2) Minor suggestion for further improvement: it might be worth mentioning -that the command - tcpdump -i eth1 icmp[0] != 8 and icmp[0] != 0 -is useful for tracking down the details in question. We shouldn't expect -all IPsec users to figure that out on their own. The log message might -even provide a hint as to where to look in the docs.</PRE> -<P>Reply From Pluto developer Hugh Redelmeier</P> -<PRE>Good idea. - -I've added a bit pluto(8)'s BUGS section along these lines. -I didn't have the heart to lengthen this message.</PRE> -<H3><A name="no_eroute">klips_debug: ... no eroute!</A></H3> -<P>This message means<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> has received a packet - for which no IPsec tunnel has been defined.</P> -<P>Here is a more detailed duscussion from the team's tech support - person Claudia Schmeing, responding to a query on the mailing list:</P> -<PRE>> Why ipsec reports no eroute! ???? IP Masq... is disabled. - -In general, more information is required so that people on the list may -give you informed input. See doc/prob.report.</PRE> -<P>The document she refers to has since been replaced by a<A href="#prob.report"> - section</A> of the troubleshooting document.</P> -<PRE>However, I can make some general comments on this type of error. - -This error usually looks something like this (clipped from an archived -message): - -> ttl:64 proto:1 chk:45459 saddr:192.168.1.2 daddr:192.168.100.1 -> ... klips_debug:ipsec_findroute: 192.168.1.2->192.168.100.1 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: * See if we match exactly as a host destination -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: ** try to match a leaf, t=0xc1a260b0 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: *** start searching up the tree, t=0xc1a260b0 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: **** t=0xc1a260c8 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: **** t=0xc1fe5960 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: ***** not found. -> ... klips_debug:ipsec_tunnel_start_xmit: Original head/tailroom: 2, 28 -> ... klips_debug:ipsec_tunnel_start_xmit: no eroute!: ts=47.3030, dropping. - - -What does this mean? -- -------------------- - -"eroute" stands for "extended route", and is a special type of route -internal to Linux FreeS/WAN. For more information about this type of route, -see the section of man ipsec_auto on ipsec auto --route. - -"no eroute!" here means, roughly, that Linux FreeS/WAN cannot find an -appropriate tunnel that should have delivered this packet. Linux -FreeS/WAN therefore drops the packet, with the message "no eroute! ... -dropping", on the assumption that this packet is not a legitimate -transmission through a properly constructed tunnel. - - -How does this situation come about? -- ----------------------------------- - -Linux FreeS/WAN has a number of connection descriptions defined in -ipsec.conf. These must be successfully brought "up" to form actual tunnels. -(see doc/setup.html's step 15, man ipsec.conf and man ipsec_auto -for details). - -Such connections are often specific to the endpoints' IPs. However, in -some cases they may be more general, for example in the case of -Road Warriors where left or right is the special value %any. - -When Linux FreeS/WAN receives a packet, it verifies that the packet has -come through a legitimate channel, by checking that there is an -appropriate tunnel through which this packet might legitimately have -arrived. This is the process we see above. - -First, it checks for an eroute that exactly matches the packet. In the -example above, we see it checking for a route that begins at 192.168.1.2 -and ends at 192.168.100.1. This search favours the most specific match that -would apply to the route between these IPs. So, if there is a connection -description exactly matching these IPs, the search will end there. If not, -the code will search for a more general description matching the IPs. -If there is no match, either specific or general, the packet will be -dropped, as we see, above. - -Unless you are working with Road Warriors, only the first, specific part -of the matching process is likely to be relevant to you. - - -"But I defined the tunnel, and it came up, why do I have this error?" -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- - -One of the most common causes of this error is failure to specify enough -connection descriptions to cover all needed tunnels between any two -gateways and their respective subnets. As you have noticed, troubleshooting -this error may be complicated by the use of IP Masq. However, this error is -not limited to cases where IP Masq is used. - -See doc/configuration.html#multitunnel for a detailed example of the -solution to this type of problem.</PRE> -<P>The documentation section she refers to is now<A href="#multitunnel"> - here</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="SAused">... trouble writing to /dev/ipsec ... SA already in - use</A></H3> -<P>This error message occurs when two manual connections are set up with - the same SPI value.</P> -<P>See the FAQ for<A href="#spi_error"> One manual connection works, but - second one fails</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="ignore">... ignoring ... payload</A></H3> -<P>This message is harmless. The IKE protocol provides for a number of - optional messages types:</P> -<UL> -<LI>delete SA</LI> -<LI>initial contact</LI> -<LI>vendor ID</LI> -<LI>...</LI> -</UL> -<P>An implementation is never required to send these, but they are - allowed to. The receiver is not required to do anything with them. - FreeS/WAN ignores them, but notifies you via the logs.</P> -<P>For the "ignoring delete SA Payload" message, see also our discussion - of cleaning up<A href="#deadtunnel"> dead tunnels</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="unknown_rightcert">unknown parameter name "rightcert"</A></H3> -<P>This message can appear when you've upgraded an X.509-enabled Linux - FreeS/WAN with a vanilla Linux FreeS/WAN. To use your X.509 configs you - will need to overwrite the new install with<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> - Super FreeS/WAN</A>, or add the<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.ca/freeswan"> - X.509 patch</A> by hand.</P> -<H2><A name="spam">Why don't you restrict the mailing lists to reduce - spam?</A></H2> -<P>As a matter of policy, some of our<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A> - need to be open to non-subscribers. Project management feel strongly - that maintaining this openness is more important than blocking spam.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Users should be able to get help or report bugs without subscribing.</LI> -<LI>Even a user who is subscribed may not have access to his or her - subscribed account when he or she needs help, miles from home base in - the middle of setting up a client's gateway.</LI> -<LI>There is arguably a legal requirement for this policy. A US resident - or citizen could be charged under munitions export laws for providing - technical assistance to a foreign cryptographic project. Such a charge - would be more easily defended if the discussion takes place in public, - on an open list.</LI> -</UL> -<P>This has been discussed several times at some length on the list. See - the<A href="#archive"> list archives</A>. Bringing the topic up again - is unlikely to be useful. Please don't. Or at the very least, please - don't without reading the archives and being certain that whatever you - are about to suggest has not yet been discussed.</P> -<P>Project technical lead Henry Spencer summarised one discussion:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> For the third and last time: this list *will* *not* do - address-based filtering. This is a policy decision, not an - implementation problem. The decision is final, and is not open to - discussion. This needs to be communicated better to people, and steps - are being taken to do that.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>Adding this FAQ section is one of the steps he refers to.</P> -<P>You have various options other than just putting up with the spam, - filtering it yourself, or unsubscribing:</P> -<UL> -<LI>subscribe only to one or both of our lists with restricted posting - rules: -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:briefs@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe">briefs</A> -, weekly list summaries</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:announce@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe">announce</A> -, project-related announcements</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>read the other lists via the<A href="#archive"> archives</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>A number of tools are available to filter mail.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Many mail readers include some filtering capability.</LI> -<LI>Many Linux distributions include<A href="http://www.procmail.org/"> - procmail(8)</A> for server-side filtering.</LI> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.spambouncer.org/"> Spam Bouncer</A> is a set - of procmail(8) filters designed to combat spam.</LI> -<LI>Roaring Penguin have a<A href="http://www.roaringpenguin.com/mimedefang/"> - MIME defanger</A> that removes potentially dangerous attachments.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you use your ISP's mail server rather than running your own, - consider suggesting to the ISP that they tag suspected spam as<A href="http://www.msen.com/1997/spam.html#SUSPECTED"> - this ISP</A> does. They could just refuse mail from dubious sources, - but that is tricky and runs some risk of losing valuable mail or - senselessly annoying senders and their admins. However, they can safely - tag and deliver dubious mail. The tags can greatly assist your - filtering.</P> -<P>For information on tracking down spammers, see these<A href="http://www.rahul.net/falk/#howtos"> - HowTos</A>, or the<A href="http://www.sputum.com/index2.html"> Sputum</A> - site. Sputum have a Linux anti-spam screensaver available for download.</P> -<P>Here is a more detailed message from Henry:</P> -<PRE>On Mon, 15 Jan 2001, Jay Vaughan wrote: -> I know I'm flogging a dead horse here, but I'm curious as to the reasons for -> an aversion for a subscriber-only mailing list? - -Once again: for legal reasons, it is important that discussions of these -things be held in a public place -- the list -- and we do not want to -force people to subscribe to the list just to ask one question, because -that may be more than merely inconvenient for them. There are also real -difficulties with people who are temporarily forced to use alternate -addresses; that is precisely the time when they may be most in need of -help, yet a subscribers-only policy shuts them out. - -These issues do not apply to most mailing lists, but for a list that is -(necessarily) the primary user support route for a crypto package, they -are very important. This is *not* an ordinary mailing list; it has to -function under awkward constraints that make various simplistic solutions -inapplicable or undesirable. - -> We're *ALL* sick of hearing about list management problems, not just you -> old-timers, so why don't you DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE ABOUT IT... - -Because it's a lot harder than it looks, and many existing "solutions" -have problems when examined closely. - -> A suggestion for you, based on 10 years of experience with management of my -> own mailing lists would be to use mailman, which includes pretty much every -> feature under the sun that you guys need and want, plus some. The URL for -> mailman... - -I assure you, we're aware of mailman. Along with a whole bunch of others, -including some you almost certainly have never heard of (I hadn't!). - -> As for the argument that the list shouldn't be configured to enforce -> subscription - I contend that it *SHOULD* AT LEAST require manual address -> verification in order for posts to be redirected. - -You do realize, I hope, that interposing such a manual step might cause -your government to decide that this is not truly a public forum, and thus -you could go to jail if you don't get approval from them before mailing to -it? If you think this sounds irrational, your government is noted for -making irrational decisions in this area; we can't assume that they will -suddenly start being sensible. See above about awkward constraints. You -may be willing to take the risk, but we can't, in good conscience, insist -that all users with problems do so. - - Henry Spencer - henry@spsystems.net</PRE> -<P>and a message on the topic from project leader John Gilmore:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: The linux-ipsec list's topic - Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2000 - From: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com> - -I'll post this single message, once only, in this discussion, and then -not burden the list with any further off-topic messages. I encourage -everyone on the list to restrain themself from posting ANY off-topic -messages to the linux-ipsec list. - -The topic of the linux-ipsec mailing list is the FreeS/WAN software. - -I frequently see "discussions about spam on a list" overwhelm the -volume of "actual spam" on a list. BOTH kinds of messages are -off-topic messages. Twenty anti-spam messages take just as long to -detect and discard as twenty spam messages. - -The Linux-ipsec list encourages on-topic messages from people who have -not joined the list itself. We will not censor messages to the list -based on where they originate, or what return address they contain. -In other words, non-subscribers ARE allowed to post, and this will not -change. My own valid contributions have been rejected out-of-hand by -too many other mailing lists for me to want to impose that censorship -on anybody else's contributions. And every day I see the damage that -anti-spam zeal is causing in many other ways; that zeal is far more -damaging to the culture of the Internet than the nuisance of spam. - -In general, it is the responsibility of recipients to filter, -prioritize, or otherwise manage the handling of email that comes to -them. It is not the responsibility of the rest of the Internet -community to refrain from sending messages to recipients that they -might not want to see. If your software infrastructure for managing -your incoming email is insufficient, then improve it. If you think -the signal-to-noise ratio on linux-ipsec is too poor, then please -unsubscribe. But don't further increase the noise by posting to the -linux-ipsec list about those topics. - - John Gilmore - founder & sponsor, FreeS/WAN project</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A name="manpages">FreeS/WAN manual pages</A></H1> -<P>The various components of Linux FreeS/WAN are of course documented in - standard Unix manual pages, accessible via the man(1) command.</P> -<P>Links here take you to an HTML version of the man pages.</P> -<H2><A name="man.file">Files</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec configuration and connections</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets(5)</A></DT> -<DD>secrets for IKE authentication, either pre-shared keys or RSA - private keys</DD> -</DL> -<P>These files are also discussed in the<A href="config.html"> - configuration</A> section.</P> -<H2><A name="man.command">Commands</A></H2> -<P>Many users will never give most of the FreeS/WAN commands directly. - Configure the files listed above correctly and everything should be - automatic.</P> -<P>The exceptions are commands for mainpulating the<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> - keys used in Pluto authentication:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey(8)</A></DT> -<DD>generate keys</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html">ipsec_newhostkey(8)</A></DT> -<DD>generate keys in a convenient format</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey(8)</A> -</DT> -<DD>extract<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> keys from<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A> (or optionally, another file) and format them for - insertion in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> or - in DNS records</DD> -</DL> -<P>Note that:</P> -<UL> -<LI>These keys are for<STRONG> authentication only</STRONG>. They are<STRONG> - not secure for encryption</STRONG>.</LI> -<LI>The utility uses random(4) as a source of<A href="#random"> random - numbers</A>. This may block for some time if there is not enough - activity on the machine to provide the required entropy. You may want - to give it some bogus activity such as random mouse movements or some - command such as<NOBR> <TT>du /usr > /dev/null &</TT>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The following commands are fairly likely to be used, if only for - testing and status checks:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html">ipsec(8)</A></DT> -<DD>invoke IPsec utilities</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_setup.8.html">ipsec_setup(8)</A></DT> -<DD>control IPsec subsystem</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto(8)</A></DT> -<DD>control automatically-keyed IPsec connections</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual(8)</A></DT> -<DD>take manually-keyed IPsec connections up and down</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html">ipsec_ranbits(8)</A></DT> -<DD>generate random bits in ASCII form</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_look.8.html">ipsec_look(8)</A></DT> -<DD>show minimal debugging information</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html">ipsec_barf(8)</A></DT> -<DD>spew out collected IPsec debugging information</DD> -</DL> -<P>The lower-level utilities listed below are normally invoked via - scripts listed above, but they can also be used directly when required.</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute(8)</A></DT> -<DD>manipulate IPsec extended routing tables</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug(8)</A></DT> -<DD>set Klips (kernel IPsec support) debug features and level</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto(8)</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec IKE keying daemon</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi(8)</A></DT> -<DD>manage IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp(8)</A></DT> -<DD>group/ungroup IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg(8)</A></DT> -<DD>associate IPsec virtual interface with real interface</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html">ipsec_whack(8)</A></DT> -<DD>control interface for IPsec keying daemon</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="man.lib">Library routines</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_addrtoa.3.html">ipsec_addrtoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert Internet addresses to and from ASCII</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_subnettoa.3.html">ipsec_subnettoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert subnet/mask ASCII form to and from addresses</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atoasr.3.html">ipsec_atoasr(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert ASCII to Internet address, subnet, or range</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_rangetoa.3.html">ipsec_rangetoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert Internet address range to ASCII</DD> -<DT>ipsec_atodata(3)</DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_datatoa.3.html">ipsec_datatoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert binary data from and to ASCII formats</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atosa.3.html">ipsec_atosa(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_satoa.3.html">ipsec_satoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from ASCII</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atoul.3.html">ipsec_atoul(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ultoa.3.html">ipsec_ultoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert unsigned-long numbers to and from ASCII</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_goodmask.3.html">ipsec_goodmask(3)</A></DT> -<DD>is this Internet subnet mask a valid one?</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_masktobits.3.html">ipsec_masktobits(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert Internet subnet mask to bit count</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_bitstomask.3.html">ipsec_bitstomask(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert bit count to Internet subnet mask</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_optionsfrom.3.html">ipsec_optionsfrom(3)</A> -</DT> -<DD>read additional ``command-line'' options from file</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_subnetof.3.html">ipsec_subnetof(3)</A></DT> -<DD>given Internet address and subnet mask, return subnet number</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_hostof.3.html">ipsec_hostof(3)</A></DT> -<DD>given Internet address and subnet mask, return host part</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_broadcastof.3.html">ipsec_broadcastof(3)</A> -</DT> -<DD>given Internet address and subnet mask, return broadcast address</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="firewall">FreeS/WAN and firewalls</A></H1> -<P>FreeS/WAN, or other IPsec implementations, frequently run on gateway - machines, the same machines running firewall or packet filtering code. - This document discusses the relation between the two.</P> -<P>The firewall code in 2.4 and later kernels is called Netfilter. The - user-space utility to manage a firewall is iptables(8). See the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org"> - netfilter/iptables web site</A> for details.</P> -<H2><A name="filters">Filtering rules for IPsec packets</A></H2> -<P>The basic constraint is that<STRONG> an IPsec gateway must have - packet filters that allow IPsec packets</STRONG>, at least when talking - to other IPsec gateways:</P> -<UL> -<LI>UDP port 500 for<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> negotiations</LI> -<LI>protocol 50 if you use<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> encryption and/or - authentication (the typical case)</LI> -<LI>protocol 51 if you use<A href="#AH"> AH</A> packet-level - authentication</LI> -</UL> -<P>Your gateway and the other IPsec gateways it communicates with must - be able to exchange these packets for IPsec to work. Firewall rules - must allow UDP 500 and at least one of<A href="#AH"> AH</A> or<A href="#ESP"> - ESP</A> on the interface that communicates with the other gateway.</P> -<P>For nearly all FreeS/WAN applications, you must allow UDP port 500 - and the ESP protocol.</P> -<P>There are two ways to set this up:</P> -<DL> -<DT>easier but less flexible</DT> -<DD>Just set up your firewall scripts at boot time to allow IPsec - packets to and from your gateway. Let FreeS/WAN reject any bogus - packets.</DD> -<DT>more work, giving you more precise control</DT> -<DD>Have the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> ipsec_pluto(8)</A> - daemon call scripts to adjust firewall rules dynamically as required. - This is done by naming the scripts in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> variables<VAR> prepluto=</VAR>,<VAR> postpluto=</VAR> -,<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> and<VAR> rightupdown=</VAR>.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Both methods are described in more detail below.</P> -<H2><A name="examplefw">Firewall configuration at boot</A></H2> -<P>It is possible to set up both firewalling and IPsec with appropriate - scripts at boot and then not use<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> and<VAR> - rightupdown=</VAR>, or use them only for simple up and down operations.</P> -<P>Basically, the technique is</P> -<UL> -<LI>allow IPsec packets (typically, IKE on UDP port 500 plus ESP, - protocol 50) -<UL> -<LI>incoming, if the destination address is your gateway (and - optionally, only from known senders)</LI> -<LI>outgoing, with the from address of your gateway (and optionally, - only to known receivers)</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>let<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> deal with IKE</LI> -<LI>let<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> deal with ESP</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since Pluto authenticates its partners during the negotiation, and - KLIPS drops packets for which no tunnel has been negotiated, this may - be all you need.</P> -<H3><A name="simple.rules">A simple set of rules</A></H3> -<P>In simple cases, you need only a few rules, as in this example:</P> -<PRE># allow IPsec -# -# IKE negotiations -iptables -I INPUT -p udp --sport 500 --dport 500 -j ACCEPT -iptables -I OUTPUT -p udp --sport 500 --dport 500 -j ACCEPT -# ESP encryption and authentication -iptables -I INPUT -p 50 -j ACCEPT -iptables -I OUTPUT -p 50 -j ACCEPT -</PRE> -<P>This should be all you need to allow IPsec through<VAR> lokkit</VAR>, - which ships with Red Hat 9, on its medium security setting. Once you've - tweaked to your satisfaction, save your active rule set with:</P> -<PRE>service iptables save</PRE> -<H3><A name="complex.rules">Other rules</A></H3> - You can add additional rules, or modify existing ones, to work with - IPsec and with your network and policies. We give a some examples in - this section. -<P>However, while it is certainly possible to create an elaborate set of - rules yourself (please let us know via the<A href="mail.html"> mailing - list</A> if you do), it may be both easier and more secure to use a set - which has already been published and tested.</P> -<P>The published rule sets we know of are described in the<A href="#rules.pub"> - next section</A>.</P> -<H4><A NAME="7_2_2_1">Adding additional rules</A></H4> - If necessary, you can add additional rules to: -<DL> -<DT>reject IPsec packets that are not to or from known gateways</DT> -<DD>This possibility is discussed in more detail<A href="#unknowngate"> - later</A></DD> -<DT>allow systems behind your gateway to build IPsec tunnels that pass - through the gateway</DT> -<DD>This possibility is discussed in more detail<A href="#through"> - later</A></DD> -<DT>filter incoming packets emerging from KLIPS.</DT> -<DD>Firewall rules can recognise packets emerging from IPsec. They are - marked as arriving on an interface such as<VAR> ipsec0</VAR>, rather - than<VAR> eth0</VAR>,<VAR> ppp0</VAR> or whatever.</DD> -</DL> -<P>It is therefore reasonably straightforward to filter these packets in - whatever way suits your situation.</P> -<H4><A NAME="7_2_2_2">Modifying existing rules</A></H4> -<P>In some cases rules that work fine before you add IPsec may require - modification to work with IPsec.</P> -<P>This is especially likely for rules that deal with interfaces on the - Internet side of your system. IPsec adds a new interface; often the - rules must change to take account of that.</P> -<P>For example, consider the rules given in<A href="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//packet-filtering-HOWTO-5.html"> - this section</A> of the Netfilter documentation:</P> -<PRE>Most people just have a single PPP connection to the Internet, and don't -want anyone coming back into their network, or the firewall: - - ## Insert connection-tracking modules (not needed if built into kernel). - # insmod ip_conntrack - # insmod ip_conntrack_ftp - - ## Create chain which blocks new connections, except if coming from inside. - # iptables -N block - # iptables -A block -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i ! ppp0 -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -j DROP - - ## Jump to that chain from INPUT and FORWARD chains. - # iptables -A INPUT -j block - # iptables -A FORWARD -j block</PRE> -<P>On an IPsec gateway, those rules may need to be modified. The above - allows new connections from<EM> anywhere except ppp0</EM>. That means - new connections from ipsec0 are allowed.</P> -<P>Do you want to allow anyone who can establish an IPsec connection to - your gateway to initiate TCP connections to any service on your - network? Almost certainly not if you are using opportunistic - encryption. Quite possibly not even if you have only explicitly - configured connections.</P> -<P>To disallow incoming connections from ipsec0, change the middle - section above to:</P> -<PRE> ## Create chain which blocks new connections, except if coming from inside. - # iptables -N block - # iptables -A block -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i ppp+ -j DROP - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i ipsec+ -j DROP - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -j DROP</PRE> -<P>The original rules accepted NEW connections from anywhere except - ppp0. This version drops NEW connections from any PPP interface (ppp+) - and from any ipsec interface (ipsec+), then accepts the survivors.</P> -<P>Of course, these are only examples. You will need to adapt them to - your own situation.</P> -<H3><A name="rules.pub">Published rule sets</A></H3> -<P>Several sets of firewall rules that work with FreeS/WAN are - available.</P> -<H4><A name="Ranch.trinity">Scripts based on Ranch's work</A></H4> -<P>One user, Rob Hutton, posted his boot time scripts to the mailing - list, and we included them in previous versions of this documentation. - They are still available from our<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-1.5/doc/firewall.html#examplefw"> - web site</A>. However, they were for an earlier FreeS/WAN version so we - no longer recommend them. Also, they had some bugs. See this<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/04/msg00316.html"> - message</A>.</P> -<P>Those scripts were based on David Ranch's scripts for his "Trinity - OS" for setting up a secure Linux. Check his<A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html"> - home page</A> for the latest version and for information on his<A href="#ranch"> - book</A> on securing Linux. If you are going to base your firewalling - on Ranch's scripts, we recommend using his latest version, and sending - him any IPsec modifications you make for incorporation into later - versions.</P> -<H4><A name="seawall">The Seattle firewall</A></H4> -<P>We have had several mailing lists reports of good results using - FreeS/WAN with Seawall (the Seattle Firewall). See that project's<A href="http://seawall.sourceforge.net/"> - home page</A> on Sourceforge.</P> -<H4><A name="rcf">The RCF scripts</A></H4> -<P>Another set of firewall scripts with IPsec support are the RCF or - rc.firewall scripts. See their<A href="http://jsmoriss.mvlan.net/linux/rcf.html"> - home page</A>.</P> -<H4><A name="asgard">Asgard scripts</A></H4> -<P><A href="http://heimdall.asgardsrealm.net/linux/firewall/">Asgard's - Realm</A> has set of firewall scripts with FreeS/WAN support, for 2.4 - kernels and iptables.</P> -<H4><A name="user.scripts">User scripts from the mailing list</A></H4> -<P>One user gave considerable detail on his scripts, including - supporting<A href="#IPX"> IPX</A> through the tunnel. His message was - too long to conveniently be quoted here, so I've put it in a<A href="user_examples.html"> - separate file</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="updown">Calling firewall scripts, named in ipsec.conf(5)</A> -</H2> -<P>The<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> - configuration file has three pairs of parameters used to specify an - interface between FreeS/WAN and firewalling code.</P> -<P>Note that using these is not required if you have a static firewall - setup. In that case, you just set your firewall up at boot time (in a - way that permits the IPsec connections you want) and do not change it - thereafter. Omit all the FreeS/WAN firewall parameters and FreeS/WAN - will not attempt to adjust firewall rules at all. See<A href="#examplefw"> - above</A> for some information on appropriate scripts.</P> -<P>However, if you want your firewall rules to change when IPsec - connections change, then you need to use these parameters.</P> -<H3><A name="pre_post">Scripts called at IPsec start and stop</A></H3> -<P>One pair of parmeters are set in the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section - of the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> file and - affect all connections:</P> -<DL> -<DT>prepluto=</DT> -<DD>script to be called before<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> IKE daemon is started.</DD> -<DT>postpluto=</DT> -<DD>script to be called after<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> IKE daemon is stopped.</DD> -</DL> - These parameters allow you to change firewall parameters whenever IPsec - is started or stopped. -<P>They can also be used in other ways. For example, you might have<VAR> - prepluto</VAR> add a module to your kernel for the secure network - interface or make a dialup connection, and then have<VAR> postpluto</VAR> - remove the module or take the connection down.</P> -<H3><A name="up_down">Scripts called at connection up and down</A></H3> -<P>The other parameters are set in connection descriptions. They can be - set in individual connection descriptions, and could even call - different scripts for each connection for maximum flexibility. In most - applications, however, it makes sense to use only one script and to - call it from<VAR> conn %default</VAR> section so that it applies to all - connections.</P> -<P>You can:</P> -<DL> -<DT><STRONG>either</STRONG></DT> -<DD>set<VAR> leftfirewall=yes</VAR> or<VAR> rightfirewall=yes</VAR> to - use our supplied default script</DD> -<DT><STRONG>or</STRONG></DT> -<DD>assign a name in a<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> or<VAR> rightupdown=</VAR> - line to use your own script</DD> -</DL> -<P>Note that<STRONG> only one of these should be used</STRONG>. You - cannot sensibly use both. Since<STRONG> our default script is obsolete</STRONG> - (designed for firewalls using<VAR> ipfwadm(8)</VAR> on 2.0 kernels), - most users who need this service will<STRONG> need to write a custom - script</STRONG>.</P> -<H4><A name="fw.default">The default script</A></H4> -<P>We supply a default script named<VAR> _updown</VAR>.</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftfirewall=</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>rightfirewall=</DT> -<DD>indicates that the gateway is doing firewalling and that<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> should poke holes in the firewall as required.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Set these to<VAR> yes</VAR> and Pluto will call our default script<VAR> - _updown</VAR> with appropriate arguments whenever it:</P> -<UL> -<LI>starts or stops IPsec services</LI> -<LI>brings a connection up or down</LI> -</UL> -<P>The supplied default<VAR> _updown</VAR> script is appropriate for - simple cases using the<VAR> ipfwadm(8)</VAR> firewalling package.</P> -<H4><A name="userscript">User-written scripts</A></H4> -<P>You can also write your own script and have Pluto call it. Just put - the script's name in one of these<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> lines:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftupdown=</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>rightupdown=</DT> -<DD>specifies a script to call instead of our default script<VAR> - _updown</VAR>.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Your script should take the same arguments and use the same - environment variables as<VAR> _updown</VAR>. See the "updown command" - section of the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> ipsec_pluto(8)</A> - man page for details.</P> -<P>Note that<STRONG> you should not modify our _updown script in place</STRONG> -. If you did that, then upgraded FreeS/WAN, the upgrade would install a - new default script, overwriting your changes.</P> -<H3><A name="ipchains.script">Scripts for ipchains or iptables</A></H3> -<P>Our<VAR> _updown</VAR> is for firewalls using<VAR> ipfwadm(8)</VAR>, - the firewall code for the 2.0 series of Linux kernels. If you are using - the more recent packages<VAR> ipchains(8)</VAR> (for 2.2 kernels) or<VAR> - iptables(8)</VAR> (2.4 kernels), then you must do one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>use static firewall rules which are set up at boot time as described<A -href="#examplefw"> above</A> and do not need to be changed by Pluto</LI> -<LI>limit yourself to ipchains(8)'s ipfwadm(8) emulation mode in order - to use our script</LI> -<LI>write your own script and call it with<VAR> leftupdown</VAR> and<VAR> - rightupdown</VAR>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>You can write a script to do whatever you need with firewalling. - Specify its name in a<VAR> [left|right]updown=</VAR> parameter in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> and Pluto will automatically call it for you.</P> -<P>The arguments Pluto passes such a script are the same ones it passes - to our default _updown script, so the best way to build yours is to - copy ours and modify the copy.</P> -<P>Note, however, that<STRONG> you should not modify our _updown script - in place</STRONG>. If you did that, then upgraded FreeS/WAN, the - upgrade would install a new default script, overwriting your changes.</P> -<H2><A name="NAT">A complication: IPsec vs. NAT</A></H2> -<P><A href="#NAT.gloss">Network Address Translation</A>, also known as - IP masquerading, is a method of allocating IP addresses dynamically, - typically in circumstances where the total number of machines which - need to access the Internet exceeds the supply of IP addresses.</P> -<P>Any attempt to perform NAT operations on IPsec packets<EM> between - the IPsec gateways</EM> creates a basic conflict:</P> -<UL> -<LI>IPsec wants to authenticate packets and ensure they are unaltered on - a gateway-to-gateway basis</LI> -<LI>NAT rewrites packet headers as they go by</LI> -<LI>IPsec authentication fails if packets are rewritten anywhere between - the IPsec gateways</LI> -</UL> -<P>For<A href="#AH"> AH</A>, which authenticates parts of the packet - header including source and destination IP addresses, this is fatal. If - NAT changes those fields, AH authentication fails.</P> -<P>For<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> and<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> it is not - necessarily fatal, but is certainly an unwelcome complication.</P> -<H3><A name="nat_ok">NAT on or behind the IPsec gateway works</A></H3> -<P>This problem can be avoided by having the masquerading take place<EM> - on or behind</EM> the IPsec gateway.</P> -<P>This can be done physically with two machines, one physically behind - the other. A picture, using SG to indicate IPsec<STRONG> S</STRONG> -ecurity<STRONG> G</STRONG>ateways, is:</P> -<PRE> clients --- NAT ----- SG ---------- SG - two machines</PRE> -<P>In this configuration, the actual client addresses need not be given - in the<VAR> leftsubnet=</VAR> parameter of the FreeS/WAN connection - description. The security gateway just delivers packets to the NAT box; - it needs only that machine's address. What that machine does with them - does not affect FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>A more common setup has one machine performing both functions:</P> -<PRE> clients ----- NAT/SG ---------------SG - one machine</PRE> -<P>Here you have a choice of techniques depending on whether you want to - make your client subnet visible to clients on the other end:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If you want the single gateway to behave like the two shown above, - with your clients hidden behind the NAT, then omit the<VAR> leftsubnet=</VAR> - parameter. It then defaults to the gateway address. Clients on the - other end then talk via the tunnel only to your gateway. The gateway - takes packets emerging from the tunnel, applies normal masquerading, - and forwards them to clients.</LI> -<LI>If you want to make your client machines visible, then give the - client subnet addresses as the<VAR> leftsubnet=</VAR> parameter in the - connection description and -<DL> -<DT>either</DT> -<DD>set<VAR> leftfirewall=yes</VAR> to use the default<VAR> updown</VAR> - script</DD> -<DT>or</DT> -<DD>use your own script by giving its name in a<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> - parameter</DD> -</DL> - These scripts are described in their own<A href="#updown"> section</A>. -<P>In this case, no masquerading is done. Packets to or from the client - subnet are encrypted or decrypted without any change to their client - subnet addresses, although of course the encapsulating packets use - gateway addresses in their headers. Clients behind the right security - gateway see a route via that gateway to the left subnet.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="nat_bad">NAT between gateways is problematic</A></H3> -<P>We recommend not trying to build IPsec connections which pass through - a NAT machine. This setup poses problems:</P> -<PRE> clients --- SG --- NAT ---------- SG</PRE> -<P>If you must try it, some references are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Jean_Francois Nadeau's document on doing<A href="http://jixen.tripod.com/#NATed gateways"> - IPsec behind NAT</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#VPN.masq">VPN masquerade patches</A> to make a Linux NAT - box handle IPsec packets correctly</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="NAT.ref">Other references on NAT and IPsec</A></H3> -<P>Other documents which may be relevant include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>an Internet Draft on<A href="http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-aboba-nat-ipsec-04.txt"> - IPsec and NAT</A> which may eventually evolve into a standard solution - for this problem.</LI> -<LI>an informational<A href="http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/rfc/rfc2709.txt"> - RFC</A>,<CITE> Security Model with Tunnel-mode IPsec for NAT Domains</CITE> -.</LI> -<LI>an<A href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/759/ipj_3-4/ipj_3-4_nat.html"> - article</A> in Cisco's<CITE> Internet Protocol Journal</CITE></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="complications">Other complications</A></H2> -<P>Of course simply allowing UDP 500 and ESP packets is not the whole - story. Various other issues arise in making IPsec and packet filters - co-exist and even co-operate. Some of them are summarised below.</P> -<H3><A name="through">IPsec<EM> through</EM></A> the gateway</H3> -<P>Basic IPsec packet filtering rules deal only with packets addressed - to or sent from your IPsec gateway.</P> -<P>It is a separate policy decision whether to permit such packets to - pass through the gateway so that client machines can build end-to-end - IPsec tunnels of their own. This may not be practical if you are using<A -href="#NAT"> NAT (IP masquerade)</A> on your gateway, and may conflict - with some corporate security policies.</P> -<P>Where possible, allowing this is almost certainly a good idea. Using - IPsec on an end-to-end basis is more secure than gateway-to-gateway.</P> -<P>Doing it is quite simple. You just need firewall rules that allow UDP - port 500 and protocols 50 and 51 to pass through your gateway. If you - wish, you can of course restrict this to certain hosts.</P> -<H3><A name="ipsec_only">Preventing non-IPsec traffic</A></H3> - You can also filter<EM> everything but</EM> UDP port 500 and ESP or AH - to restrict traffic to IPsec only, either for anyone communicating with - your host or just for specific partners. -<P>One application of this is for the telecommuter who might have:</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East ================= firewall --- the Internet - home network untrusted net corporate network</PRE> -<P>The subnet on the right is 0.0.0.0/0, the whole Internet. The West - gateway is set up so that it allows only IPsec packets to East in or - out.</P> -<P>This configuration is used in AT&T Research's network. For details, - see the<A href="#applied"> papers</A> links in our introduction.</P> -<P>Another application would be to set up firewall rules so that an - internal machine, such as an employees-only web server, could not talk - to the outside world except via specific IPsec tunnels.</P> -<H3><A name="unknowngate">Filtering packets from unknown gateways</A></H3> -<P>It is possible to use firewall rules to restrict UDP 500, ESP and AH - packets so that these packets are accepted only from known gateways. - This is not strictly necessary since FreeS/WAN will discard packets - from unknown gateways. You might, however, want to do it for any of a - number of reasons. For example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Arguably, "belt and suspenders" is the sensible approach to - security. If you can block a potential attack in two ways, use both. - The only question is whether to look for a third way after implementing - the first two.</LI> -<LI>Some admins may prefer to use the firewall code this way because - they prefer firewall logging to FreeS/WAN's logging.</LI> -<LI>You may need it to implement your security policy. Consider an - employee working at home, and a policy that says traffic from the home - system to the Internet at large must go first via IPsec to the - corporate LAN and then out to the Internet via the corporate firewall. - One way to do that is to make<VAR> ipsec0</VAR> the default route on - the home gateway and provide exceptions only for UDP 500 and ESP to the - corporate gateway. Everything else is then routed via the tunnel to the - corporate gateway.</LI> -</UL> -<P>It is not possible to use only static firewall rules for this - filtering if you do not know the other gateways' IP addresses in - advance, for example if you have "road warriors" who may connect from a - different address each time or if want to do<A href="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> to arbitrary gateways. In these cases, you - can accept UDP 500 IKE packets from anywhere, then use the<A href="#updown"> - updown</A> script feature of<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> to dynamically adjust firewalling for each negotiated - tunnel.</P> -<P>Firewall packet filtering does not much reduce the risk of a<A href="#DOS"> - denial of service attack</A> on FreeS/WAN. The firewall can drop - packets from unknown gateways, but KLIPS does that quite efficiently - anyway, so you gain little. The firewall cannot drop otherwise - legitmate packets that fail KLIPS authentication, so it cannot protect - against an attack designed to exhaust resources by making FreeS/WAN - perform many expensive authentication operations.</P> -<P>In summary, firewall filtering of IPsec packets from unknown gateways - is possible but not strictly necessary.</P> -<H2><A name="otherfilter">Other packet filters</A></H2> -<P>When the IPsec gateway is also acting as your firewall, other packet - filtering rules will be in play. In general, those are outside the - scope of this document. See our<A href="#firewall.linux"> Linux - firewall links</A> for information. There are a few types of packet, - however, which can affect the operation of FreeS/WAN or of diagnostic - tools commonly used with it. These are discussed below.</P> -<H3><A name="ICMP">ICMP filtering</A></H3> -<P><A href="#ICMP.gloss">ICMP</A> is the<STRONG> I</STRONG>nternet<STRONG> - C</STRONG>ontrol<STRONG> M</STRONG>essage<STRONG> P</STRONG>rotocol. It - is used for messages between IP implementations themselves, whereas IP - used is used between the clients of those implementations. ICMP is, - unsurprisingly, used for control messages. For example, it is used to - notify a sender that a desination is not reachable, or to tell a router - to reroute certain packets elsewhere.</P> -<P>ICMP handling is tricky for firewalls.</P> -<UL> -<LI>You definitely want some ICMP messages to get through; things won't - work without them. For example, your clients need to know if some - destination they ask for is unreachable.</LI> -<LI>On the other hand, you do equally definitely do not want untrusted - folk sending arbitrary control messages to your machines. Imagine what - someone moderately clever and moderately malicious could do to you, - given control of your network's routing.</LI> -</UL> -<P>ICMP does not use ports. Messages are distinguished by a "message - type" field and, for some types, by an additional "code" field. The - definitive list of types and codes is on the<A href="http://www.iana.org"> - IANA</A> site.</P> -<P>One expert uses this definition for ICMP message types to be dropped - at the firewall.</P> -<PRE># ICMP types which lack socially redeeming value. -# 5 Redirect -# 9 Router Advertisement -# 10 Router Selection -# 15 Information Request -# 16 Information Reply -# 17 Address Mask Request -# 18 Address Mask Reply - -badicmp='5 9 10 15 16 17 18'</PRE> -<P>A more conservative approach would be to make a list of allowed types - and drop everything else.</P> -<P>Whichever way you do it, your ICMP filtering rules on a FreeS/WAN - gateway should allow at least the following ICMP packet types:</P> -<DL> -<DT>echo (type 8)</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>echo reply (type 0)</DT> -<DD>These are used by ping(1). We recommend allowing both types through - the tunnel and to or from your gateway's external interface, since - ping(1) is an essential testing tool. -<P>It is fairly common for firewalls to drop ICMP echo packets addressed - to machines behind the firewall. If that is your policy, please create - an exception for such packets arriving via an IPsec tunnel, at least - during intial testing of those tunnels.</P> -</DD> -<DT>destination unreachable (type 3)</DT> -<DD>This is used, with code 4 (Fragmentation Needed and Don't Fragment - was Set) in the code field, to control<A href="#pathMTU"> path MTU - discovery</A>. Since IPsec processing adds headers, enlarges packets - and may cause fragmentation, an IPsec gateway should be able to send - and receive these ICMP messages<STRONG> on both inside and outside - interfaces</STRONG>.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A name="traceroute">UDP packets for traceroute</A></H3> -<P>The traceroute(1) utility uses UDP port numbers from 33434 to - approximately 33633. Generally, these should be allowed through for - troubleshooting.</P> -<P>Some firewalls drop these packets to prevent outsiders exploring the - protected network with traceroute(1). If that is your policy, consider - creating an exception for such packets arriving via an IPsec tunnel, at - least during intial testing of those tunnels.</P> -<H3><A name="l2tp">UDP for L2TP</A></H3> -<P> Windows 2000 does, and products designed for compatibility with it - may, build<A href="#l2tp"> L2TP</A> tunnels over IPsec connections.</P> -<P>For this to work, you must allow UDP protocol 1701 packets coming out - of your tunnels to continue to their destination. You can, and probably - should, block such packets to or from your external interfaces, but - allow them from<VAR> ipsec0</VAR>.</P> -<P>See also our Windows 2000<A href="interop.html#win2k"> interoperation - discussion</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="packets">How it all works: IPsec packet details</A></H2> -<P>IPsec uses three main types of packet:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="#IKE">IKE</A> uses<STRONG> the UDP protocol and port 500</STRONG> -.</DT> -<DD>Unless you are using only (less secure, not recommended) manual - keying, you need IKE to negotiate connection parameters, acceptable - algorithms, key sizes and key setup. IKE handles everything required to - set up, rekey, repair or tear down IPsec connections.</DD> -<DT><A href="#ESP">ESP</A> is<STRONG> protocol number 50</STRONG></DT> -<DD>This is required for encrypted connections.</DD> -<DT><A href="#AH">AH</A> is<STRONG> protocol number 51</STRONG></DT> -<DD>This can be used where only authentication, not encryption, is - required.</DD> -</DL> -<P>All of those packets should have appropriate IPsec gateway addresses - in both the to and from IP header fields. Firewall rules can check this - if you wish, though it is not strictly necessary. This is discussed in - more detail<A href="#unknowngate"> later</A>.</P> -<P>IPsec processing of incoming packets authenticates them then removes - the ESP or AH header and decrypts if necessary. Successful processing - exposes an inner packet which is then delivered back to the firewall - machinery, marked as having arrived on an<VAR> ipsec[0-3]</VAR> - interface. Firewall rules can use that interface label to distinguish - these packets from unencrypted packets which are labelled with the - physical interface they arrived on (or perhaps with a non-IPsec virtual - interface such as<VAR> ppp0</VAR>).</P> -<P>One of our users sent a mailing list message with a<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00006.html"> - diagram</A> of the packet flow.</P> -<H3><A name="noport">ESP and AH do not have ports</A></H3> -<P>Some protocols, such as TCP and UDP, have the notion of ports. Others - protocols, including ESP and AH, do not. Quite a few IPsec newcomers - have become confused on this point. There are no ports<EM> in</EM> the - ESP or AH protocols, and no ports used<EM> for</EM> them. For these - protocols,<EM> the idea of ports is completely irrelevant</EM>.</P> -<H3><A name="header">Header layout</A></H3> -<P>The protocol numbers for ESP or AH are used in the 'next header' - field of the IP header. On most non-IPsec packets, that field would - have one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>1 for ICMP</LI> -<LI>4 for IP-in-IP encapsulation</LI> -<LI>6 for TCP</LI> -<LI>17 for UDP</LI> -<LI>... or one of about 100 other possibilities listed by<A href="http://www.iana.org"> - IANA</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Each header in the sequence tells what the next header will be. IPsec - adds headers for ESP or AH near the beginning of the sequence. The - original headers are kept and the 'next header' fields adjusted so that - all headers can be correctly interpreted.</P> -<P>For example, using<STRONG> [</STRONG><STRONG> ]</STRONG> to indicate - data protected by ESP and unintelligible to an eavesdropper between the - gateways:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a simple packet might have only IP and TCP headers with: -<UL> -<LI>IP header says next header --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>with ESP<A href="#transport"> transport mode</A> encapsulation, that - packet would have: -<UL> -<LI>IP header says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data<STRONG> ]</STRONG></LI> -</UL> - Note that the IP header is outside ESP protection, visible to an - attacker, and that the final destination must be the gateway.</LI> -<LI>with ESP in<A href="#tunnel"> tunnel mode</A>, we might have: -<UL> -<LI>IP header says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> IP</LI> -<LI>IP header says next header --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data<STRONG> ]</STRONG></LI> -</UL> - Here the inner IP header is protected by ESP, unreadable by an - attacker. Also, the inner header can have a different IP address than - the outer IP header, so the decrypted packet can be routed from the - IPsec gateway to a final destination which may be another machine.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Part of the ESP header itself is encrypted, which is why the<STRONG> - [</STRONG> indicating protected data appears in the middle of some - lines above. The next header field of the ESP header is protected. This - makes<A href="#traffic"> traffic analysis</A> more difficult. The next - header field would tell an eavesdropper whether your packet was UDP to - the gateway, TCP to the gateway, or encapsulated IP. It is better not - to give this information away. A clever attacker may deduce some of it - from the pattern of packet sizes and timings, but we need not make it - easy.</P> -<P>IPsec allows various combinations of these to match local policies, - including combinations that use both AH and ESP headers or that nest - multiple copies of these headers.</P> -<P>For example, suppose my employer has an IPsec VPN running between two - offices so all packets travelling between the gateways for those - offices are encrypted. If gateway policies allow it (The admins could - block UDP 500 and protocols 50 and 51 to disallow it), I can build an - IPsec tunnel from my desktop to a machine in some remote office. Those - packets will have one ESP header throughout their life, for my - end-to-end tunnel. For part of the route, however, they will also have - another ESP layer for the corporate VPN's encapsulation. The whole - header scheme for a packet on the Internet might be:</P> -<UL> -<LI>IP header (with gateway address) says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> IP</LI> -<LI>IP header (with receiving machine address) says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data<STRONG> ]]</STRONG></LI> -</UL> -<P>The first ESP (outermost) header is for the corporate VPN. The inner - ESP header is for the secure machine-to-machine link.</P> -<H3><A name="dhr">DHR on the updown script</A></H3> -<P>Here are some mailing list comments from<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> developer Hugh Redelmeier on an earlier draft of this - document:</P> -<PRE>There are many important things left out - -- firewalling is important but must reflect (implement) policy. Since - policy isn't the same for all our customers, and we're not experts, - we should concentrate on FW and MASQ interactions with FreeS/WAN. - -- we need a diagram to show packet flow WITHIN ONE MACHINE, assuming - IKE, IPsec, FW, and MASQ are all done on that machine. The flow is - obvious if the components are run on different machines (trace the - cables). - - IKE input: - + packet appears on public IF, as UDP port 500 - + input firewalling rules are applied (may discard) - + Pluto sees the packet. - - IKE output: - + Pluto generates the packet & writes to public IF, UDP port 500 - + output firewalling rules are applied (may discard) - + packet sent out public IF - - IPsec input, with encapsulated packet, outer destination of this host: - + packet appears on public IF, protocol 50 or 51. If this - packet is the result of decapsulation, it will appear - instead on the paired ipsec IF. - + input firewalling rules are applied (but packet is opaque) - + KLIPS decapsulates it, writes result to paired ipsec IF - + input firewalling rules are applied to resulting packet - as input on ipsec IF - + if the destination of the packet is this machine, the - packet is passed on to the appropriate protocol handler. - If the original packet was encapsulated more than once - and the new outer destination is this machine, that - handler will be KLIPS. - + otherwise: - * routing is done for the resulting packet. This may well - direct it into KLIPS for encoding or encrypting. What - happens then is described elsewhere. - * forwarding firewalling rules are applied - * output firewalling rules are applied - * the packet is sent where routing specified - - IPsec input, with encapsulated packet, outer destination of another host: - + packet appears on some IF, protocol 50 or 51 - + input firewalling rules are applied (but packet is opaque) - + routing selects where to send the packet - + forwarding firewalling rules are applied (but packet is opaque) - + packet forwarded, still encapsulated - - IPsec output, from this host or from a client: - + if from a client, input firewalling rules are applied as the - packet arrives on the private IF - + routing directs the packet to an ipsec IF (this is how the - system decides KLIPS processing is required) - + if from a client, forwarding firewalling rules are applied - + KLIPS eroute mechanism matches the source and destination - to registered eroutes, yielding a SPI group. This dictates - processing, and where the resulting packet is to be sent - (the destinations SG and the nexthop). - + output firewalling is not applied to the resulting - encapsulated packet - -- Until quite recently, KLIPS would double encapsulate packets that - didn't strictly need to be. Firewalling should be prepared for - those packets showing up as ESP and AH protocol input packets on - an ipsec IF. - -- MASQ processing seems to be done as if it were part of the - forwarding firewall processing (this should be verified). - -- If a firewall is being used, it is likely the case that it needs to - be adjusted whenever IPsec SAs are added or removed. Pluto invokes - a script to do this (and to adjust routing) at suitable times. The - default script is only suitable for ipfwadm-managed firewalls. Under - LINUX 2.2.x kernels, ipchains can be managed by ipfwadm (emulation), - but ipchains more powerful if manipulated using the ipchains command. - In this case, a custom updown script must be used. - - We think that the flexibility of ipchains precludes us supplying an - updown script that would be widely appropriate.</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="trouble"></A>Linux FreeS/WAN Troubleshooting Guide</H1> -<H2><A NAME="overview"></A>Overview</H2> -<P> This document covers several general places where you might have a - problem:</P> -<OL> -<LI><A HREF="#install">During install</A>.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#negotiation">During the negotiation process</A>.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#use">Using an established connection</A>.</LI> -</OL> -<P>This document also contains<A HREF="#notes"> notes</A> which expand - on points made in these sections, and tips for<A HREF="#prob.report"> - problem reporting</A>. If the other end of your connection is not - FreeS/WAN, you'll also want to read our<A HREF="interop.html#interop.problem"> - interoperation</A> document.</P> -<H2><A NAME="install"></A>1. During Install</H2> -<H3><A NAME="8_2_1">1.1 RPM install gotchas</A></H3> -<P>With the RPM method:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Be sure you have installed both the userland tools and the kernel - components. One will not work without the other. For example, when - using FreeS/WAN-produced RPMs for our 2.04 release, you need both: -<PRE> freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm - freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm -</PRE> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="8_2_2">1.2 Problems installing from source</A></H3> -<P>When installing from source, you may find these problems:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Missing library. See<A HREF="#gmp.h_missing"> this</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI>Missing utilities required for compile. See this<A HREF="install.html#tool.lib"> - checklist</A>.</LI> -<LI>Kernel version incompatibility. See<A HREF="#k.versions"> this</A> - FAQ.</LI> -<LI>Another compile problem. Find information in the out.* files, ie. - out.kpatch, out.kbuild, created at compile time in the top-level Linux - FreeS/WAN directory. Error messages generated by KLIPS during the boot - sequence are accessible with the<VAR> dmesg</VAR> command. -<BR> Check the list archives and the List in Brief to see if this is a - known issue. If it is not, report it to the bugs list as described in - our<A HREF="#prob.report"> problem reporting</A> section. In some - cases, you may be asked to provide debugging information using gdb; - details<A HREF="#gdb"> below</A>.</LI> -<LI>If your kernel compiles but you fail to install your new - FreeS/WAN-enabled kernel, review the sections on<A HREF="install.html#newk"> - installing the patched kernel</A>, and<A HREF="#testinstall"> testing</A> - to see if install succeeded.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="install.check"></A>1.3 Install checks</H3> -<P><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> checks a number of FreeS/WAN essentials. Here - are some hints on what do to when your system doesn't check out:</P> -<P></P> -<TABLE border="1"> -<TR><TD><STRONG>Problem</STRONG></TD><TD><STRONG>Status</STRONG></TD><TD> -<STRONG>Action</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec</VAR> not on-path</TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<P>Add<VAR> /usr/local/sbin</VAR> to your PATH.</P> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Missing KLIPS support</TD><TD><FONT COLOR="#FF0000">critical</FONT> -</TD><TD>See<A HREF="#noKLIPS"> this FAQ.</A></TD></TR> -<TR><TD>No RSA private key</TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<P>Follow<A HREF="install.html#genrsakey"> these instructions</A> to - create an RSA key pair for your host. RSA keys are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>required for opportunistic encryption, and</LI> -<LI>our preferred method to authenticate pre-configured connections.</LI> -</UL> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>pluto</VAR> not running</TD><TD><FONT COLOR="#FF0000"> -critical</FONT></TD><TD> -<PRE>service ipsec start</PRE> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>No port 500 hole</TD><TD><FONT COLOR="#FF0000">critical</FONT></TD><TD> -Open port 500 for IKE negotiation.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Port 500 check N/A</TD><TD> </TD><TD>Check that port 500 is open - for IKE negotiation.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Failed DNS checks</TD><TD> </TD><TD>Opportunistic encryption - requires information from DNS. To set this up, see<A HREF="#opp.setup"> - our instructions</A>.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>No public IP address</TD><TD> </TD><TD>Check that the interface - which you want to protect with IPSec is up and running.</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<H3><A NAME="oe.trouble"></A>1.3 Troubleshooting OE</H3> -<P>OE should work with no local configuration, if you have posted DNS - TXT records according to the instructions in our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> - quickstart guide</A>. If you encounter trouble, try these hints. We - welcome additional hints via the<A HREF="mail.html"> users' mailing - list</A>.</P> -<TABLE border="1"> -<TR><TD><STRONG>Symptom</STRONG></TD><TD><STRONG>Problem</STRONG></TD><TD> -<STRONG>Action</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD> You're running FreeS/WAN 2.01 (or later), and initiating a - connection to FreeS/WAN 2.00 (or earlier). In your logs, you see a - message like: -<PRE>no RSA public key known for '192.0.2.13'; -DNS search for KEY failed (no KEY record -for 13.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.)</PRE> - The older FreeS/WAN logs no error.</TD><TD><A NAME="oe.trouble.flagday"> -</A> A protocol level incompatibility between 2.01 (or later) and 2.00 - (or earlier) causes this error. It occurs when a FreeS/WAN 2.01 (or - later) box for which no KEY record is posted attempts to initiate an OE - connection to older FreeS/WAN versions (2.00 and earlier). Note that - older versions can initiate to newer versions without this error.</TD><TD> -If you control the peer host, upgrade its FreeS/WAN to 2.01 (or later), - and post new style TXT records for it. If not, but if you know its - sysadmin, perhaps a quick note is in order. If neither option is - possible, you can ease the transition by posting an old style KEY - record (created with a command like "ipsec showhostkey --key") to the - reverse map for the FreeS/WAN 2.01 (or later) box.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OE host is very slow to contact other hosts.</TD><TD>Slow DNS - service while running OE.</TD><TD>It's a good idea to run a caching DNS - server on your OE host, as outlined in<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2003-January/004205.html"> - this mailing list message</A>. If your DNS servers are elsewhere, put - their IPs in the<VAR> clear</VAR> policy group, and re-read groups with -<PRE>ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD> -<PRE>Can't Opportunistically initiate for -192.0.2.2 to 192.0.2.3: no TXT record -for 13.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.</PRE> -</TD><TD>Peer is not set up for OE.</TD><TD> -<P>None. Plenty of hosts on the Internet do not run OE. If, however, you - have set OE up on that peer, this may indicate that you need to wait up - to 48 hours for its DNS records to propagate.</P> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> does not find DNS records: -<PRE>... -Looking for TXT in forward map: - xy.example.com...[FAILED] -Looking for TXT in reverse map...[FAILED] -...</PRE> - You also experience authentication failure: -<BR> -<PRE>Possible authentication failure: -no acceptable response to our -first encrypted message</PRE> -</TD><TD>DNS records are not posted or have not propagated.</TD><TD>Did - you post the DNS records necessary for OE? If not, do so using the - instructions in our<A HREF="#quickstart"> quickstart guide</A>. If so, - wait up to 48 hours for the DNS records to propagate.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> does not find DNS records, and you - experience authentication failure.</TD><TD>For iOE, your ID does not - match location of forward DNS record.</TD><TD>In<VAR> config setup</VAR> -, change<VAR> myid=</VAR> to match the forward DNS where you posted the - record. Restart FreeS/WAN. For reference, see our<A HREF="#opp.client"> - iOE instructions</A>.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> finds DNS records, yet there is still - authentication failure. ( ? )</TD><TD>DNS records are malformed.</TD><TD> -Re-create the records and send new copies to your DNS administrator.</TD> -</TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> finds DNS records, yet there is still - authentication failure. ( ? )</TD><TD>DNS records show different keys - for a gateway vs. its subnet hosts.</TD><TD>All TXT records for boxes - protected by an OE gateway must contain the gateway's public key. - Re-create and re-post any incorrect records using<A HREF="#opp.incoming"> - these instructions</A>.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OE gateway loses connectivity to its subnet. The gateway's - routing table shows routes to the subnet through IPsec interfaces.</TD><TD> -The subnet is part of the<VAR> private</VAR> or<VAR> block</VAR> policy - group on the gateway.</TD><TD>Remove the subnet from the group, and - reread groups with -<PRE>ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OE does not work to hosts on the local LAN.</TD><TD>This is a - known issue.</TD><TD>See<A HREF="opportunism.known-issues"> this list</A> - of known issues with OE.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>FreeS/WAN does not seem to be executing your default policy. In - your logs, you see a message like: -<PRE>/etc/ipsec.d/policies/iprivate-or-clear" -line 14: subnet "0.0.0.0/0", -source 192.0.2.13/32, -already "private-or-clear"</PRE> -</TD><TD><A HREF="#fullnet">Fullnet</A> in a policy group file defines - your default policy. Fullnet should normally be present in only one - policy group file. The fine print: you can have two default policies - defined so long as they protect different local endpoints (e.g. the - FreeS/WAN gateway and a subnet).</TD><TD> Find all policies which - contain fullnet with: -<BR> -<PRE>grep -F 0.0.0.0/0 /etc/ipsec.d/policies/*</PRE> - then remove the unwanted occurrence(s).</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<H2><A NAME="negotiation"></A>2. During Negotiation</H2> -<P>When you fail to bring up a tunnel, you'll need to find out:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#state">what your connection state is,</A> and often</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#find.pluto.error">an error message</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>before you can<A HREF="#interpret.pluto.error"> diagnose your problem</A> -.</P> -<H3><A NAME="state"></A>2.1 Determine Connection State</H3> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_1_1">Finding current state</A></H4> -<P>You can see connection states (STATE_MAIN_I1 and so on) when you - bring up a connection on the command line. If you have missed this, or - brought up your connection automatically, use:</P> -<PRE>ipsec auto --status</PRE> -<P>The most relevant state is the last one reached.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_1_2"><VAR>What's this supposed to look like?</VAR></A></H4> -<P>Negotiations should proceed though various states, in the processes - of:</P> -<OL> -<LI>IKE negotiations (aka Phase 1, Main Mode, STATE_MAIN_*)</LI> -<LI>IPSEC negotiations (aka Phase 2, Quick Mode, STATE_QUICK_*)</LI> -</OL> -<P>These are done and a connection is established when you see messages - like:</P> -<PRE> 000 #21: "myconn" STATE_MAIN_I4 (ISAKMP SA established)... - 000 #2: "myconn" STATE_QUICK_I2 (sent QI2, IPsec SA established)...</PRE> -<P> Look for the key phrases are "ISAKMP SA established" and "IPSec SA - established", with the relevant connection name. Often, this happens at - STATE_MAIN_I4 and STATE_QUICK_I2, respectively.</P> -<P><VAR>ipsec auto --status</VAR> will tell you what states<STRONG> have - been achieved</STRONG>, rather than the current state. Since - determining the current state is rather more difficult to do, current - state information is not available from Linux FreeS/WAN. If you are - actively bringing a connection up, the status report's last states for - that connection likely reflect its current state. Beware, though, of - the case where a connection was correctly brought up but is now downed: - Linux FreeS/WAN will not notice this until it attempts to rekey. - Meanwhile, the last known state indicates that the connection has been - established.</P> -<P>If your connection is stuck at STATE_MAIN_I1, skip straight to<A HREF="#ikepath"> - here</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="find.pluto.error"></A>2.2 Finding error text</H3> -<P>Solving most errors will require you to find verbose error text, - either on the command line or in the logs.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_2_1">Verbose start for more information</A></H4> -<P> Note that you can get more detail from<VAR> ipsec auto</VAR> using - the --verbose flag:</P> -<PRE STYLE="margin-bottom: 0.2in"> ipsec auto --verbose --up west-east</PRE> -<P> More complete information can be gleaned from the<A HREF="#logusage"> - log files</A>.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_2_2">Debug levels count</A></H4> -<P>The amount of description you'll get here depends on ipsec.conf debug - settings,<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR>= and<VAR> plutodebug</VAR>=. When - troubleshooting, set at least one of these to<VAR> all</VAR>, and when - done, reset it to<VAR> none</VAR> so your logs don't fill up. Note that - you must have enabled the<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR><A HREF="install.html#allbut"> - compile-time option</A> for the<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> configuration - switch to work.</P> -<P>For negotiation problems<VAR> plutodebug</VAR> is most relevant.<VAR> - klipsdebug</VAR> applies mainly to attempts to use an - already-established connection. See also<A HREF="#parts"> this</A> - description of the division of duties within Linux FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>After raising your debug levels, restart Linux FreeS/WAN to ensure - that ipsec.conf is reread, then recreate the error to generate verbose - logs.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_2_3"><VAR>ipsec barf</VAR> for lots of debugging - information</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html"><VAR> ipsec barf (8)</VAR></A> - collects a bunch of useful debugging information, including these logs - Use the command</P> -<PRE> - ipsec barf > barf.west -</PRE> -<P>to generate one.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_2_4">Find the error</A></H4> -<P>Search out the failure point in your logs. Are there a handful of - lines which succinctly describe how things are going wrong or contrary - to your expectation? Sometimes the failure point is not immediately - obvious: Linux FreeS/WAN's errors are usually not marked "Error". Have - a look in the<A HREF="faq.html"> FAQ</A> for what some common failures - look like.</P> -<P>Tip: problems snowball. Focus your efforts on the first problem, - which is likely to be the cause of later errors.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_2_5">Play both sides</A></H4> -<P>Also find error text on the peer IPSec box. This gives you two - perspectives on the same failure.</P> -<P>At times you will require information which only one side has. The - peer can merely indicate the presence of an error, and its approximate - point in the negotiations. If one side keeps retrying, it may be - because there is a show stopper on the other side. Have a look at the - other side and figure out what it doesn't like.</P> -<P>If the other end is not Linux FreeS/WAN, the principle is the same: - replicate the error with its most verbose logging on, and capture the - output to a file.</P> -<H3><A NAME="interpret.pluto.error"></A>2.3 Interpreting a Negotiation - Error</H3> -<H4><A NAME="ikepath"></A>Connection stuck at STATE_MAIN_I1</H4> -<P>This error commonly happens because IKE (port 500) packets, needed to - negotiate an IPSec connection, cannot travel freely between your IPSec - gateways. See<A HREF="#packets"> our firewall document</A> for details.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_3_3_2">Other errors</A></H4> -<P>Other errors require a bit more digging. Use the following resources:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html">the FAQ</A> . Since this document is constantly - updated, the snapshot's FAQ may have a new entry relevant to your - problem.</LI> -<LI>our<A HREF="background.html"> background document</A> . Special - considerations which, while not central to Linux FreeS/WAN, are often - tripped over. Includes problems with<A href="#MTU.trouble"> packet - fragmentation</A>, and considerations for testing opportunism.</LI> -<LI>the<A HREF="#lists"> list archives</A>. Each of the searchable - archives works differently, so it's worth checking each. Use a search - term which is generic, but identifies your error, for example "No - connection is known for". -<BR> Often, you will find that your question has been answered in the - past. Finding an archived answer is quicker than asking the list. You - may, however, find similar questions without answers. If you do, send - their URLs to the list with your trouble report. The additional - examples may help the list tech support person find your answer.</LI> -<LI>Look into the code where the error is being generated. The pluto - code is nicely documented with comments and meaningful variable names.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you have failed to solve your problem with the help of these - resources, send a detailed problem report to the users list, following - these<A HREF="#prob.report"> guidelines</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="use"></A>3. Using a Connection</H2> -<H3><A NAME="8_4_1">3.1 Orienting yourself</A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="8_4_1_1"><VAR>How do I know if it works?</VAR></A></H4> -<P>Test your connection by sending packets through it. The simplest way - to do this is with ping, but the ping needs to<STRONG> test the correct - tunnel.</STRONG> See<A HREF="#testgates"> this example scenario</A> if - you don't understand this.</P> -<P></P> -<P>If your ping returns, test any other connections you've brought u all - check out, great. You may wish to<A HREF="#bigpacket"> test with large - packets</A> for MTU problems.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_4_1_2"><VAR>ipsec barf</VAR> is useful again</A></H4> -<P>If your ping fails to return, generate an ipsec barf debugging report - on each IPSec gateway. On a non-Linux FreeS/WAN implementation, gather - equivalent information. Use this, and the tips in the next sections, to - troubleshoot. Are you sure that both endpoints are capable of hearing - and responding to ping?</P> -<H3><A NAME="8_4_2">3.2 Those pesky configuration errors</A></H3> -<P>IPSec may be dropping your ping packets since they do not belong in - the tunnels you have constructed:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Your ping may not test the tunnel you intend to test. For details, - see our<A HREF="#cantping"> "I can't ping"</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI> Alternately, you may have a configuration error. For example, you - may have configured one of the four possible tunnels between two - gateways, but not the one required to secure the important traffic - you're now testing. In this case, add and start the tunnel, and try - again.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In either case, you will often see a message like:</P> -<PRE>klipsdebug... no eroute</PRE> -<P>which we discuss in<A HREF="#no_eroute"> this FAQ</A>.</P> -<P>Note:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#NAT.gloss">Network Address Translation (NAT)</A> and<A HREF="#masq"> - IP masquerade</A> may have an effect on which tunnels you need to - configure.</LI> -<LI>When testing a tunnel that protects a multi-node subnet, try several - subnet nodes as ping targets, in case one node is routing incorrectly.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="route.firewall"></A>3.3 Check Routing and Firewalling</H3> -<P>If you've confirmed your configuration assumptions, the problem is - almost certainly with routing or firewalling. Isolate the problem using - interface statistics, firewall statistics, or a packet sniffer.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_4_3_1">Background:</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN supplies all the special routing it needs; you need - only route packets out through your IPSec gateway. Verify that on the<VAR> - subnetted</VAR> machines you are using for your ping-test, your routing - is as expected. I have seen a tunnel "fail" because the subnet machine - sending packets out an alternate gateway (not our IPSec gateway) on - their return path.</LI> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN requires particular<A HREF="firewall.html"> - firewalling considerations</A>. Check the firewall rules on your IPSec - gateways and ensure that they allow IPSec traffic through. Be sure that - no other machine - for example a router between the gateways - is - blocking your IPSec packets.</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A NAME="ifconfig"></A>View Interface and Firewall Statistics</H4> -<P>Interface reports and firewall statistics can help you track down - lost packets at a glance. Check any firewall statistics you may be - keeping on your IPSec gateways, for dropped packets.</P> -<P><STRONG>Tip</STRONG>: You can take a snapshot of the packets - processed by your firewall with:</P> -<PRE> iptables -L -n -v</PRE> -<P>You can get creative with "diff" to find out what happens to a - particular packet during transmission.</P> -<P>Both<VAR> cat /proc/net/dev</VAR> and<VAR> ifconfig</VAR> display - interface statistics, and both are included in<VAR> ipsec barf</VAR>. - Use either to check if any interface has dropped packets. If you find - that one has, test whether this is related to your ping. While you ping - continuously, print that interface's statistics several times. Does its - drop count increase in proportion to the ping? If so, check why the - packets are dropped there.</P> -<P>To do this, look at the firewall rules that apply to that interface. - If the interface is an IPSec interface, more information may be - available in the log. Grep for the word "drop" in a log which was - created with<VAR> klipsdebug=all</VAR> as the error happened.</P> -<P>See also this<A HREF="#ifconfig1"> discussion</A> on interpreting<VAR> - ifconfig</VAR> statistics.</P> -<H3><A NAME="sniff"></A>3.4 When in doubt, sniff it out</H3> -<P>If you have checked configuration assumptions, routing, and firewall - rules, and your interface statistics yield no clue, it remains for you - to investigate the mystery of the lost packet by the most thorough - method: with a packet sniffer (providing, of course, that this is legal - where you are working).</P> -<P>In order to detect packets on the ipsec virtual interfaces, you will - need an up-to-date sniffer (tcpdump, ethereal, ksnuffle) on your IPSec - gateway machines. You may also find it useful to sniff the ping - endpoints.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_4_4_1">Anticipate your packets' path</A></H4> -<P>Ping, and examine each interface along the projected path, checking - for your ping's arrival. If it doesn't get to the the next stop, you - have narrowed down where to look for it. In this way, you can isolate a - problem area, and narrow your troubleshooting focus.</P> -<P>Within a machine running Linux FreeS/WAN, this<A HREF="#packets"> - packet flow diagram</A> will help you anticipate a packet's path.</P> -<P>Note that:</P> -<UL> -<LI> from the perspective of the tunneled packet, the entire tunnel is - one hop. That's explained in<A HREF="#no_trace"> this</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI> an encapsulated IPSec packet will look different, when sniffed, - from the plaintext packet which generated it. You can see plaintext - packets entering an IPSec interface and the resulting cyphertext - packets as they emerge from the corresponding physical interface.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Once you isolate where the packet is lost, take a closer look at - firewall rules, routing and configuration assumptions as they affect - that specific area. If the packet is lost on an IPSec gateway, comb - through<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> output for anomalies.</P> -<P>If the packet goes through both gateways successfully and reaches the - ping target, but does not return, suspect routing. Check that the ping - target routes packets back to the IPSec gateway.</P> -<H3><A NAME="find.use.error"></A>3.5 Check your logs</H3> -<P>Here, too, log information can be useful. Start with the<A HREF="#find.pluto.error"> - guidelines above</A>.</P> -<P>For connection use problems, set<VAR> klipsdebug=all</VAR>. Note that - you must have enabled the<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR><A HREF="install.html#allbut"> - compile-time option</A> to do this. Restart Linux FreeS/WAN so that it - rereads<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR>, then recreate the error condition. When - searching through<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> data, look especially for the - keywords "drop" (as in dropped packets) and "error".</P> -<P>Often the problem with connection use is not software error, but - rather that the software is behaving contrary to expectation.</P> -<H4><A NAME="interpret.use.error"></A>Interpreting log text</H4> -<P>To interpret the Linux FreeS/WAN log text you've found, use the same - resources as indicated for troubleshooting connection negotiation:<A HREF="faq.html"> - the FAQ</A> , our<A HREF="background.html"> background document</A>, - and the<A HREF="#lists"> list archives</A>. Looking in the KLIPS code - is only for the very brave.</P> -<P>If you are still stuck, send a<A HREF="#prob.report"> detailed - problem report</A> to the users' list.</P> -<H3><A NAME="bigpacket"></A>3.6 More testing for the truly thorough</H3> -<H4><A NAME="8_4_6_1">Large Packets</A></H4> -<P>If each of your connections passed the ping test, you may wish to - test by pinging with large packets (2000 bytes or larger). If it does - not return, suspect MTU issues, and see this<A HREF="#MTU.trouble"> - discussion</A>.</P> -<H4><A NAME="8_4_6_2">Stress Tests</A></H4> -<P>In most users' view, a simple ping test, and perhaps a large-packet - ping test suffice to indicate a working IPSec connection.</P> -<P>Some people might like to do additional stress tests prior to - production use. They may be interested in this<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00224.html"> - testing protocol</A> we use at interoperation conferences, aka - "bakeoffs". We also have a<VAR> testing</VAR> directory that ships with - the release.</P> -<H2><A NAME="prob.report"></A>4. Problem Reporting</H2> -<H3><A NAME="8_5_1">4.1 How to ask for help</A></H3> -<P>Ask for troubleshooting help on the users' mailing list,<A HREF="mailto:users@lists.freeswan.org"> - users@lists.freeswan.org</A>. While sometimes an initial query with a - quick description of your intent and error will twig someone's memory - of a similar problem, it's often necessary to send a second mail with a - complete problem report.</P> -<P>When reporting problems to the mailing list(s), please include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a brief description of the problem</LI> -<LI>if it's a compile problem, the actual output from make, showing the - problem. Try to edit it down to only the relevant part, but when in - doubt, be as complete as you can. If it's a kernel compile problem, any - relevant out.* files</LI> -<LI>if it's a run-time problem, pointers to where we can find the - complete output from "ipsec barf" from BOTH ENDS (not just one of - them). Remember that it's common outside the US and Canada to pay for - download volume, so if you can't post barfs on the web and send the URL - to the mailing list, at least compress them with tar or gzip. -<BR> If you can, try to simplify the case that is causing the problem. - In particular, if you clear your logs, start FreeS/WAN with no other - connections running, cause the problem to happen, and then do<VAR> - ipsec barf</VAR> on both ends immediately, that gives the smallest and - least cluttered output.</LI> -<LI>any other error messages, complaints, etc. that you saw. Please send - the complete text of the messages, not just a summary.</LI> -<LI>what your network setup is. Include subnets, gateway addresses, etc. - A schematic diagram is a good format for this information.</LI> -<LI>exactly what you were trying to do with Linux FreeS/WAN, and exactly - what went wrong</LI> -<LI>a fix, if you have one. But remember, you are sending mail to people - all over the world; US residents and US citizens in particular, please - read doc/exportlaws.html before sending code -- even small bug fixes -- - to the list or to us.</LI> -<LI>When in doubt about whether to include some seemingly-trivial item - of information, include it. It is rare for problem reports to have too - much information, and common for them to have too little.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Here are some good general guidelines on bug reporting:<A href="http://tuxedo.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html"> - How To Ask Questions The Smart Way</A> and<A href="http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/bugs.html"> - How to Report Bugs Effectively</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="8_5_2">4.2 Where to ask</A></H3> -<P>To report a problem, send mail about it to the users' list. If you - are certain that you have found a bug, report it to the bugs list. If - you encounter a problem while doing your own coding on the Linux - FreeS/WAN codebase and think it is of interest to the design team, - notify the design list. When in doubt, default to the users' list. More - information about the mailing lists is found<A HREF="#lists"> here</A>.</P> -<P>For a number of reasons -- including export-control regulations - affecting almost any<STRONG> private</STRONG> discussion of encryption - software -- we prefer that problem reports and discussions go to the - lists, not directly to the team. Beware that the list goes worldwide; - US citizens, read this important information about your<A HREF="#exlaw"> - export laws</A>. If you're using this software, you really should be on - the lists. To get onto them, visit<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/"> - lists.freeswan.org</A>.</P> -<P>If you do send private mail to our coders or want a private reply - from them, please make sure that the return address on your mail (From - or Reply-To header) is a valid one. They have more important things to - do than to unravel addresses that have been mangled in an attempt to - confuse spammers.</P> -<H2><A NAME="notes"></A>5. Additional Notes on Troubleshooting</H2> -<P>The following sections supplement the Guide:<A HREF="#system.info"> - information available on your system</A>;<A HREF="#testgates"> testing - between security gateways</A>;<A HREF="#ifconfig1"> ifconfig reports - for KLIPS debugging</A>;<A HREF="#gdb"> using GDB on Pluto</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="system.info"></A>5.1 Information available on your system</H3> -<H4><A NAME="logusage"></A>Logs used</H4> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN logs to:</P> -<UL> -<LI>/var/log/secure (or, on Debian, /var/log/auth.log)</LI> -<LI>/var/log/messages</LI> -</UL> -<P>Check both places to get full information. If you find nothing, check - your<VAR> syslogd.conf(5)</VAR> to see where your /etc/syslog.conf or - equivalent is directing<VAR> authpriv</VAR> messages.</P> -<H4><A NAME="pages"></A>man pages provided</H4> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></DT> -<DD> Manual page for IPSEC configuration file.</DD> -<DT><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html"> ipsec(8)</A></DT> -<DD STYLE="margin-bottom: 0.2in"> Primary man page for ipsec utilities.</DD> -</DL> -<P> Other man pages are on<A HREF="manpages.html"> this list</A> and in</P> -<UL> -<LI>/usr/local/man/man3</LI> -<LI>/usr/local/man/man5</LI> -<LI>/usr/local/man/man8/ipsec_*</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A NAME="statusinfo"></A>Status information</H4> -<DL> -<DT>ipsec auto --status</DT> -<DD> Command to get status report from running system. Displays Pluto's - state. Includes the list of connections which are currently "added" to - Pluto's internal database; lists state objects reflecting ISAKMP and - IPsec SAs being negotiated or installed.</DD> -<DT> ipsec look</DT> -<DD> Brief status info.</DD> -<DT> ipsec barf</DT> -<DD STYLE="margin-bottom: 0.2in"> Copious debugging info.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A NAME="testgates"></A> 5.2 Testing between security gateways</H3> -<P>Sometimes you need to test a subnet-subnet tunnel. This is a tunnel - between two security gateways, which protects traffic on behalf of the - subnets behind these gateways. On this network:</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East=========Sunrise - IPSec gateway IPSec gateway - local net untrusted net local net</PRE> -<P> you might name this tunnel sunset-sunrise. You can test this tunnel - by having a machine behind one gateway ping a machine behind the other - gateway, but this is not always convenient or even possible.</P> -<P>Simply pinging one gateway from the other is not useful. Such a ping - does not normally go through the tunnel.<STRONG> The tunnel handles - traffic between the two protected subnets, not between the gateways</STRONG> - . Depending on the routing in place, a ping might</P> -<UL> -<LI>either succeed by finding an unencrypted route</LI> -<LI>or fail by finding no route. Packets without an IPSEC eroute are - discarded.</LI> -</UL> -<P><STRONG>Neither event tells you anything about the tunnel</STRONG>. - You can explicitly create an eroute to force such packets through the - tunnel, or you can create additional tunnels as described in our<A HREF="#multitunnel"> - configuration document</A>, but those may be unnecessary complications - in your situation.</P> -<P>The trick is to explicitly test between<STRONG> both gateways' - private-side IP addresses</STRONG>. Since the private-side interfaces - are on the protected subnets, the resulting packets do go via the - tunnel. Use either ping -I or traceroute -i, both of which allow you to - specify a source interface. (Note: unsupported on older Linuxes). The - same principles apply for a road warrior (or other) case where only one - end of your tunnel is a subnet.</P> -<H3><A NAME="ifconfig1"></A>5.3 ifconfig reports for KLIPS debugging</H3> -<P>When diagnosing problems using ifconfig statistics, you may wonder - what type of activity increments a particular counter for an ipsecN - device. Here's an index, posted by KLIPS developer Richard Guy Briggs:</P> -<PRE>Here is a catalogue of the types of errors that can occur for which -statistics are kept when transmitting and receiving packets via klips. -I notice that they are not necessarily logged in the right counter. -. . . - -Sources of ifconfig statistics for ipsec devices - -rx-errors: -- packet handed to ipsec_rcv that is not an ipsec packet. -- ipsec packet with payload length not modulo 4. -- ipsec packet with bad authenticator length. -- incoming packet with no SA. -- replayed packet. -- incoming authentication failed. -- got esp packet with length not modulo 8. - -tx_dropped: -- cannot process ip_options. -- packet ttl expired. -- packet with no eroute. -- eroute with no SA. -- cannot allocate sk_buff. -- cannot allocate kernel memory. -- sk_buff internal error. - - -The standard counters are: - -struct enet_statistics -{ - int rx_packets; /* total packets received */ - int tx_packets; /* total packets transmitted */ - int rx_errors; /* bad packets received */ - int tx_errors; /* packet transmit problems */ - int rx_dropped; /* no space in linux buffers */ - int tx_dropped; /* no space available in linux */ - int multicast; /* multicast packets received */ - int collisions; - - /* detailed rx_errors: */ - int rx_length_errors; - int rx_over_errors; /* receiver ring buff overflow */ - int rx_crc_errors; /* recved pkt with crc error */ - int rx_frame_errors; /* recv'd frame alignment error */ - int rx_fifo_errors; /* recv'r fifo overrun */ - int rx_missed_errors; /* receiver missed packet */ - - /* detailed tx_errors */ - int tx_aborted_errors; - int tx_carrier_errors; - int tx_fifo_errors; - int tx_heartbeat_errors; - int tx_window_errors; -}; - -of which I think only the first 6 are useful.</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="gdb"></A> 5.4 Using GDB on Pluto</H3> -<P>You may need to use the GNU debugger, gdb(1), on Pluto. This should - be necessary only in unusual cases, for example if you encounter a - problem which the Pluto developer cannot readily reproduce or if you - are modifying Pluto.</P> -<P>Here are the Pluto developer's suggestions for doing this:</P> -<PRE>Can you get a core dump and use gdb to find out what Pluto was doing -when it died? - -To get a core dump, you will have to set dumpdir to point to a -suitable directory (see <A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A>). - -To get gdb to tell you interesting stuff: - $ script - $ cd dump-directory-you-chose - $ gdb /usr/local/lib/ipsec/pluto core - (gdb) where - (gdb) quit - $ exit - -The resulting output will have been captured by the script command in -a file called "typescript". Send it to the list. - -Do not delete the core file. I may need to ask you to print out some -more relevant stuff.</PRE> -<P> Note that the<VAR> dumpdir</VAR> parameter takes effect only when - the IPsec subsystem is restarted -- reboot or ipsec setup restart.</P> -<P> -<BR> -<BR></P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="compat">Linux FreeS/WAN Compatibility Guide</A></H1> -<P>Much of this document is quoted directly from the Linux FreeS/WAN<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A>. Thanks very much to the community of testers, - patchers and commenters there, especially the ones quoted below but - also various contributors we haven't quoted.</P> -<H2><A name="spec">Implemented parts of the IPsec Specification</A></H2> -<P>In general, do not expect Linux FreeS/WAN to do everything yet. This - is a work-in-progress and some parts of the IPsec specification are not - yet implemented.</P> -<H3><A name="in">In Linux FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Things we do, as of version 1.96:</P> -<UL> -<LI>key management methods -<DL> -<DT>manually keyed</DT> -<DD>using keys stored in /etc/ipsec.conf</DD> -<DT>automatically keyed</DT> -<DD>Automatically negotiating session keys as required. All connections - are automatically re-keyed periodically. The<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> - daemon implements this using the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> protocol.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>Methods of authenticating gateways for IKE -<DL> -<DT>shared secrets</DT> -<DD>stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> ipsec.secrets(5)</A> -</DD> -<DT><A href="#RSA">RSA</A> signatures</DT> -<DD>For details, see<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> pluto(8)</A> -.</DD> -<DT>looking up RSA authentication keys from<A href="#DNS"> DNS</A>.</DT> -<DD>Note that this technique cannot be fully secure until<A href="#SDNS"> - secure DNS</A> is widely deployed.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>groups for<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key negotiation -<DL> -<DT>group 2, modp 1024-bit</DT> -<DT>group 5, modp 1536-bit</DT> -<DD>We implement these two groups. -<P>In negotiating a keying connection (ISAKMP SA, Phase 1) we propose - both groups when we are the initiator, and accept either when a peer - proposes them. Once the keying connection is made, we propose only the - alternative agreed there for data connections (IPsec SA's, Phase 2) - negotiated over that keying connection.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>encryption transforms -<DL> -<DT><A href="#DES">DES</A></DT> -<DD>DES is in the source code since it is needed to implement 3DES, but - single DES is not made available to users because<A href="#desnotsecure"> - DES is insecure</A>.</DD> -<DT><A href="#3DES">Triple DES</A></DT> -<DD>implemented, and used as the default encryption in Linux FreeS/WAN.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>authentication transforms -<DL> -<DT><A href="#HMAC">HMAC</A> using<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A></DT> -<DD>implemented, may be used in IKE or by by AH or ESP transforms.</DD> -<DT><A href="#HMAC">HMAC</A> using<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A></DT> -<DD>implemented, may be used in IKE or by AH or ESP transforms.</DD> -</DL> -<P>In negotiations, we propose both of these and accept either.</P> -</LI> -<LI>compression transforms -<DL> -<DT>IPComp</DT> -<DD>IPComp as described in RFC 2393 was added for FreeS/WAN 1.6. Note - that Pluto becomes confused if you ask it to do IPComp when the kernel - cannot.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>All combinations of implemented transforms are supported. Note that - some form of packet-level<STRONG> authentication is required whenever - encryption is used</STRONG>. Without it, the encryption will not be - secure.</P> -<H3><A name="dropped">Deliberately omitted</A></H3> - We do not implement everything in the RFCs because some of those things - are insecure. See our discussions of avoiding<A href="#weak"> bogus - security</A>. -<P>Things we deliberately omit which are required in the RFCs are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>null encryption (to use ESP as an authentication-only service)</LI> -<LI>single DES</LI> -<LI>DH group 1, a 768-bit modp group</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since these are the only encryption algorithms and DH group the RFCs - require, it is possible in theory to have a standards-conforming - implementation which will not interpoperate with FreeS/WAN. Such an - implementation would be inherently insecure, so we do not consider this - a problem.</P> -<P>Anyway, most implementations sensibly include more secure options as - well, so dropping null encryption, single DES and Group 1 does not - greatly hinder interoperation in practice.</P> -<P>We also do not implement some optional features allowed by the RFCs:</P> -<UL> -<LI>aggressive mode for negotiation of the keying channel or ISAKMP SA. - This mode is a little faster than main mode, but exposes more - information to an eavesdropper.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In theory, this should cause no interoperation problems since all - implementations are required to support the more secure main mode, - whether or not they also allow aggressive mode.</P> -<P>In practice, it does sometimes produce problems with implementations - such as Windows 2000 where aggressive mode is the default. Typically, - these are easily solved with a configuration change that overrides that - default.</P> -<H3><A name="not">Not (yet) in Linux FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Things we don't yet do, as of version 1.96:</P> -<UL> -<LI>key management methods -<UL> -<LI>authenticate key negotiations via local<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - server, but see links to user<A href="#patch"> patches</A></LI> -<LI>authenticate key negotiations via<A href="#SDNS"> secure DNS</A></LI> -<LI>unauthenticated key management, using<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> - key agreement protocol without authentication. Arguably, this would be - worth doing since it is secure against all passive attacks. On the - other hand, it is vulnerable to an active<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A>.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>encryption transforms -<P>Currently<A href="#3DES"> Triple DES</A> is the only encryption - method Pluto will negotiate.</P> -<P>No additional encryption transforms are implemented, though the RFCs - allow them and some other IPsec implementations support various of - them. We are not eager to add more. See this<A href="#other.cipher"> - FAQ question</A>.</P> -<P><A href="#AES">AES</A>, the successor to the DES standard, is an - excellent candidate for inclusion in FreeS/WAN, see links to user<A href="#patch"> - patches</A>.</P> -</LI> -<LI>authentication transforms -<P>No optional additional authentication transforms are currently - implemented. Likely<A href="#SHA-256"> SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512</A> - will be added when AES is.</P> -</LI> -<LI>Policy checking on decrypted packets -<P>To fully comply with the RFCs, it is not enough just to accept only - packets which survive any firewall rules in place to limit what IPsec - packets get in, and then pass KLIPS authentication. That is what - FreeS/WAN currently does.</P> -<P>We should also apply additional tests, for example ensuring that all - packets emerging from a particular tunnel have source and destination - addresses that fall within the subnets defined for that tunnel, and - that packets with those addresses that did not emerge from the - appropriate tunnel are disallowed.</P> -<P>This will be done as part of a KLIPS rewrite. See these<A href="#applied"> - links</A> and the<A href="mail.html"> design mailing list</A> for - discussion.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="pfkey">Our PF-Key implementation</A></H2> -<P>We use PF-key Version Two for communication between the KLIPS kernel - code and the Pluto Daemon. PF-Key v2 is defined by<A href="http://www.normos.org/ietf/rfc/rfc2367.txt"> - RFC 2367</A>.</P> -<P>The "PF" stands for Protocol Family. PF-Inet defines a - kernel/userspace interface for the TCP/IP Internet protocols (TCP/IP), - and other members of the PF series handle Netware, Appletalk, etc. - PF-Key is just a PF for key-related matters.</P> -<H3><A name="pfk.port">PF-Key portability</A></H3> -<P>PF-Key came out of Berkeley Unix work and is used in the various BSD - IPsec implementations, and in Solaris. This means there is some hope of - porting our Pluto(8) to one of the BSD distributions, or of running - their photurisd(8) on Linux if you prefer<A href="#photuris"> Photuris</A> - key management over IKE.</P> -<P>It is, however, more complex than that. The PK-Key RFC deliberately - deals only with keying, not policy management. The three PF-Key - implementations we have looked at -- ours, OpenBSD and KAME -- all have - extensions to deal with security policy, and the extensions are - different. There have been discussions aimed at sorting out the - differences, perhaps for a version three PF-Key spec. All players are - in favour of this, but everyone involved is busy and it is not clear - whether or when these discussions might bear fruit.</P> -<H2><A name="otherk">Kernels other than the latest 2.2.x and 2.4.y</A></H2> -<P>We develop and test on Redhat Linux using the most recent kernel in - the 2.2 and 2.4 series. In general, we recommend you use the latest - kernel in one of those series. Complications and caveats are discussed - below.</P> -<H3><A name="kernel.2.0">2.0.x kernels</A></H3> -<P>Consider upgrading to the 2.2 kernel series. If you want to stay with - the 2.0 series, then we strongly recommend 2.0.39. Some useful security - patches were added in 2.0.38.</P> -<P>Various versions of the code have run at various times on most 2.0.xx - kernels, but the current version is only lightly tested on 2.0.39, and - not at all on older kernels.</P> -<P>Some of our patches for older kernels are shipped in 2.0.37 and - later, so they are no longer provided in FreeS/WAN. This means recent - versions of FreeS/WAN will probably not compile on anything earlier - than 2.0.37.</P> -<H3><A name="kernel.production">2.2 and 2.4 kernels</A></H3> -<DL> -<DT>FreeS/WAN 1.0</DT> -<DD>ran only on 2.0 kernels</DD> -<DT>FreeS/WAN 1.1 to 1.8</DT> -<DD>ran on 2.0 or 2.2 kernels -<BR> ran on some development kernels, 2.3 or 2.4-test</DD> -<DT>FreeS/WAN 1.9 to 1.96</DT> -<DD>runs on 2.0, 2.2 or 2.4 kernels</DD> -</DL> -<P>In general,<STRONG> we suggest the latest 2.2 kernel or 2.4 for - production use</STRONG>.</P> -<P>Of course no release can be guaranteed to run on kernels more recent - than it is, so quite often there will be no stable FreeS/WAN for the - absolute latest kernel. See the<A href="#k.versions"> FAQ</A> for - discussion.</P> -<H2><A name="otherdist">Intel Linux distributions other than Redhat</A></H2> -<P>We develop and test on Redhat 6.1 for 2.2 kernels, and on Redhat 7.1 - or 7.2 for 2.4, so minor changes may be required for other - distributions.</P> -<H3><A name="rh7">Redhat 7.0</A></H3> -<P>There are some problems with FreeS/WAN on Redhat 7.0. They are - soluble, but we recommend you upgrade to a later Redhat instead..</P> -<P>Redhat 7 ships with two compilers.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Their<VAR> gcc</VAR> is version 2.96. Various people, including the - GNU compiler developers and Linus, have said fairly emphatically that - using this was a mistake. 2.96 is a development version, not intended - for production use. In particular, it will not compile a Linux kernel.</LI> -<LI>Redhat therefore also ship a separate compiler, which they call<VAR> - kgcc</VAR>, for compiling kernels.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Kernel Makefiles have<VAR> gcc</VAR> as a default, and must be - adjusted to use<VAR> kgcc</VAR> before a kernel will compile on 7.0. - This mailing list message gives details:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: AW: Installing IPsec on Redhat 7.0 - Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2001 14:32:52 -0200 (BRST) - From: Mads Rasmussen <mads@cit.com.br> - -> From www.redhat.com/support/docs/gotchas/7.0/gotchas-7-6.html#ss6.1 - -cd to /usr/src/linux and open the Makefile in your favorite editor. You -will need to look for a line similar to this: - -CC = $(CROSS_COMPILE)gcc -D__KERNEL__ -I$(HPATH) - -This line specifies which C compiler to use to build the kernel. It should -be changed to: - -CC = $(CROSS_COMPILE)kgcc -D__KERNEL__ -I$(HPATH) - -for Red Hat Linux 7. The kgcc compiler is egcs 2.91.66. From here you can -proceed with the typical compiling steps.</PRE> -<P>Check the<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A> archive for more - recent news.</P> -<H3><A name="suse">SuSE Linux</A></H3> -<P>SuSE 6.3 and later versions, at least in Europe, ship with FreeS/WAN - included.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN packages distributed for SuSE 7.0-7.2 were somehow - miscompiled. You can find fixed packages on<A HREF="http://www.suse.de/~garloff/linux/FreeSWAN"> - Kurt Garloff's page</A>.</P> -<P>Here are some notes for an earlier SuSE version.</P> -<H4><A NAME="9_4_2_1">SuSE Linux 5.3</A></H4> -<PRE>Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1998 -From: Peter Onion <ponion@srd.bt.co.uk> - -... I got Saturdays snapshot working between my two SUSE5.3 machines at home. - -The mods to the install process are quite simple. From memory and looking at -the files on the SUSE53 machine here at work.... - -And extra link in each of the /etc/init.d/rc?.d directories called K35ipsec -which SUSE use to shut a service down. - -A few mods in /etc/init.d/ipsec to cope with the different places that SUSE -put config info, and remove the inculsion of /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions and . -/etc/sysconfig/network as they don't exists and 1st one isn't needed anyway. - -insert ". /etc/rc.config" to pick up the SUSE config info and use - - if test -n "$NETCONFIG" -a "$NETCONFIG" != "YAST_ASK" ; then - -to replace - - [ ${NETWORKING} = "no" ] && exit 0 - -Create /etc/sysconfig as SUSE doesn't have one. - -I think that was all (but I prob forgot something)....</PRE> -<P>You may also need to fiddle initialisation scripts to ensure that<VAR> - /var/run/pluto.pid</VAR> is removed when rebooting. If this file is - present, Pluto does not come up correctly.</P> -<H3><A name="slack">Slackware</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-IPsec: Slackware distribution - Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 12:07:01 -0700 - From: Evan Brewer <dmessiah@silcon.com> - -> Very shortly, I will be needing to install IPsec on at least gateways that -> are running Slackware. . . . - -The only trick to getting it up is that on the slackware dist there is no -init.d directory in /etc/rc.d .. so create one. Then, what I do is take the -IPsec startup script which normally gets put into the init.d directory, and -put it in /etc/rc.d and name ir rc.ipsec .. then I symlink it to the file -in init.d. The only file in the dist you need to really edit is the -utils/Makefile, setup4: - -Everything else should be just fine.</PRE> -<P>A year or so later:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: HTML Docs- Need some cleanup? - Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2001 - From: Jody McIntyre <jodym@oeone.com> - -I have successfully installed FreeS/WAN on several Slackware 7.1 machines. -FreeS/WAN installed its rc.ipsec file in /etc/rc.d. I had to manually call -this script from rc.inet2. This seems to be an easier method than Evan -Brewer's.</PRE> -<H3><A name="deb">Debian</A></H3> -<P>A recent (Nov 2001) mailing list points to a<A href="http://www.thing.dyndns.org/debian/vpn.htm"> - web page</A> on setting up several types of tunnel, including IPsec, on - Debian.</P> -<P>Some older information:</P> -<PRE>Subject: FreeS/WAN 1.0 on Debian 2.1 - Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 - From: Tim Miller <cerebus+counterpane@haybaler.sackheads.org> - - Compiled and installed without error on a Debian 2.1 system -with kernel-source-2.0.36 after pointing RCDIR in utils/Makefile to -/etc/init.d. - - /var/lock/subsys/ doesn't exist on Debian boxen, needs to be -created; not a fatal error. - - Finally, IPsec scripts appear to be dependant on GNU awk -(gawk); the default Debian awk (mawk-1.3.3-2) had fatal difficulties. -With gawk installed and /etc/alternatives/awk linked to /usr/bin/gawk -operation appears flawless.</PRE> -<P>The scripts in question have been modified since this was posted. Awk - versions should no longer be a problem.</P> -<H3><A name="caldera">Caldera</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Re: HTML Docs- Need some cleanup? - Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2001 - From: Andy Bradford <andyb@calderasystems.com> - -On Sun, 07 Jan 2001 22:59:05 EST, Sandy Harris wrote: - -> Intel Linux distributions other than Redhat 5.x and 6.x -> Redhat 7.0 -> SuSE Linux -> SuSE Linux 5.3 -> Slackware -> Debian - -Can you please include Caldera in this list? I have tested it since -FreeS/Wan 1.1 and it works great with our systems---provided one -follows the FreeS/Wan documentation. :-) - -Thank you, -Andy</PRE> -<H2><A name="CPUs">CPUs other than Intel</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN has been run sucessfully on a number of different CPU - architectures. If you have tried it on one not listed here, please post - to the<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name=" strongarm">Corel Netwinder (StrongARM CPU)</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: linux-ipsec: Netwinder diffs -Date: Wed, 06 Jan 1999 -From: rhatfield@plaintree.com - -I had a mistake in my IPsec-auto, so I got things working this morning. - -Following are the diffs for my changes. Probably not the best and cleanest way -of doing it, but it works. . . . </PRE> -<P>These diffs are in the 0.92 and later distributions, so these should - work out-of-the-box on Netwinder.</P> -<H3><A name="yellowdog">Yellow Dog Linux on Power PC</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Compiling FreeS/WAN 1.1 on YellowDog Linux (PPC) - Date: 11 Dec 1999 - From: Darron Froese <darron@fudgehead.com> - -I'm summarizing here for the record - because it's taken me many hours to do -this (multiple times) and because I want to see IPsec on more linuxes than -just x86. - -Also, I can't remember if I actually did summarize it before... ;-) I'm -working too many late hours. - -That said - here goes. - -1. Get your linux kernel and unpack into /usr/src/linux/ - I used 2.2.13. -<http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.2/linux-2.2.13.tar.bz2> - -2. Get FreeS/WAN and unpack into /usr/src/freeswan-1.1 -<ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/freeswan-1.1.tar.gz> - -3. Get the gmp src rpm from here: -<ftp://ftp.yellowdoglinux.com//pub/yellowdog/champion-1.1/SRPMS/SRPMS/gmp-2.0.2-9a.src.rpm> - -4. Su to root and do this: rpm --rebuild gmp-2.0.2-9a.src.rpm - -You will see a lot of text fly by and when you start to see the rpm -recompiling like this: - -Executing: %build -+ umask 022 -+ cd /usr/src/redhat/BUILD -+ cd gmp-2.0.2 -+ libtoolize --copy --force -Remember to add `AM_PROG_LIBTOOL' to `configure.in'. -You should add the contents of `/usr/share/aclocal/libtool.m4' to -`aclocal.m4'. -+ CFLAGS=-O2 -fsigned-char -+ ./configure --prefix=/usr - -Hit Control-C to stop the rebuild. NOTE: We're doing this because for some -reason the gmp source provided with FreeS/WAN 1.1 won't build properly on -ydl. - -cd /usr/src/redhat/BUILD/ -cp -ar gmp-2.0.2 /usr/src/freeswan-1.1/ -cd /usr/src/freeswan-1.1/ -rm -rf gmp -mv gmp-2.0.2 gmp - -5. Open the freeswan Makefile and change the line that says: -KERNEL=$(b)zimage (or something like that) to -KERNEL=vmlinux - -6. cd ../linux/ - -7. make menuconfig -Select an option or two and then exit - saving your changes. - -8. cd ../freeswan-1.1/ ; make menugo - -That will start the whole process going - once that's finished compiling, -you have to install your new kernel and reboot. - -That should build FreeS/WAN on ydl (I tried it on 1.1).</PRE> - And a later message on the same topic: -<PRE>Subject: Re: FreeS/WAN, PGPnet and E-mail - Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2000 - From: Darron Froese <darron@fudgehead.com> - -on 1/22/00 6:47 PM, Philip Trauring at philip@trauring.com wrote: - -> I have a PowerMac G3 ... - -The PowerMac G3 can run YDL 1.1 just fine. It should also be able to run -FreeS/WAN 1.2patch1 with a couple minor modifications: - -1. In the Makefile it specifies a bzimage for the kernel compile - you have -to change that to vmlinux for the PPC. - -2. The gmp source that comes with FreeS/WAN (for whatever reason) fails to -compile. I have gotten around this by getting the gmp src rpm from here: - -ftp://ftp.yellowdoglinux.com//pub/yellowdog/champion-1.1/SRPMS/SRPMS/gmp-2.0.2-9a.src.rpm - -If you rip the source out of there - and place it where the gmp source -resides it will compile just fine.</PRE> -<P>FreeS/WAN no longer includes GMP source.</P> -<H3><A name="mklinux">Mklinux</A></H3> -<P>One user reports success on the Mach-based<STRONG> m</STRONG>icro<STRONG> -k</STRONG>ernel Linux.</P> -<PRE>Subject: Smiles on sparc and ppc - Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2000 - From: Jake Hill <jah@alien.bt.co.uk> - -You may or may not be interested to know that I have successfully built -FreeS/WAN on a number of non intel alpha architectures; namely on ppc -and sparc and also on osfmach3/ppc (MkLinux). I can report that it just -works, mostly, with few changes.</PRE> -<H3><A name="alpha">Alpha 64-bit processors</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: IT WORKS (again) between intel & alpha :-))))) - Date: Fri, 29 Jan 1999 - From: Peter Onion <ponion@srd.bt.co.uk> - -Well I'm happy to report that I've got an IPsec connection between by intel & alpha machines again :-)) - -If you look back on this list to 7th of December I wrote... - --On 07-Dec-98 Peter Onion wrote: --> --> I've about had enuf of wandering around inside the kernel trying to find out --> just what is corrupting outgoing packets... -- --Its 7:30 in the evening ..... -- --I FIXED IT :-)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) -- --It was my own fault :-(((((((((((((((((( -- --If you ask me very nicly I'll tell you where I was a little too over keen to --change unsigned long int __u32 :-) OPSE ... -- --So tomorrow it will full steam ahead to produce a set of diffs/patches against --0.91 -- --Peter Onion.</PRE> -<P>In general (there have been some glitches), FreeS/WAN has been - running on Alphas since then.</P> -<H3><A name="SPARC">Sun SPARC processors</A></H3> -<P>Several users have reported success with FreeS/WAN on SPARC Linux. - Here is one mailing list message:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Smiles on sparc and ppc - Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2000 - From: Jake Hill <jah@alien.bt.co.uk> - -You may or may not be interested to know that I have successfully built -FreeS/WAN on a number of non intel alpha architectures; namely on ppc -and sparc and also on osfmach3/ppc (MkLinux). I can report that it just -works, mostly, with few changes. - -I have a question, before I make up some patches. I need to hack -gmp/mpn/powerpc32/*.s to build them. Is this ok? The changes are -trivial, but could I also use a different version of gmp? Is it vanilla -here? - -I guess my only real headache is from ipchains, which appears to stop -running when IPsec has been started for a while. This is with 2.2.14 on -sparc.</PRE> -<P>This message, from a different mailing list, may be relevant for - anyone working with FreeS/WAN on Suns:</P> -<PRE>Subject: UltraSPARC DES assembler - Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2000 - From: svolaf@inet.uni2.dk (Svend Olaf Mikkelsen) - To: coderpunks@toad.com - -An UltraSPARC assembler version of the LibDES/SSLeay/OpenSSL des_enc.c -file is available at http://inet.uni2.dk/~svolaf/des.htm. - -This brings DES on UltraSPARC from slower than Pentium at the same -clock speed to significantly faster.</PRE> -<H3><A name="mips">MIPS processors</A></H3> -<P>We know FreeS/WAN runs on at least some MIPS processors because<A href="http://www.lasat.com"> - Lasat</A> manufacture an IPsec box based on an embedded MIPS running - Linux with FreeS/WAN. We have no details.</P> -<H3><A name="crusoe">Transmeta Crusoe</A></H3> -<P>The Merilus<A href="http://www.merilus.com/products/fc/index.shtml"> - Firecard</A>, a Linux firewall on a PCI card, is based on a Crusoe - processor and supports FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H3><A name="coldfire">Motorola Coldfire</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Re: Crypto hardware support - Date: Mon, 03 Jul 2000 - From: Dan DeVault <devault@tampabay.rr.com> - -.... I have been running -uClinux with FreeS/WAN 1.4 on a system built by Moreton Bay ( -http://www.moretonbay.com ) and it was using a Coldfire processor -and was able to do the Triple DES encryption at just about -1 mbit / sec rate....... they put a Hi/Fn 7901 hardware encryption -chip on their board and now their system does over 25 mbit of 3DES -encryption........ pretty significant increase if you ask me.</PRE> -<H2><A name="multiprocessor">Multiprocessor machines</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is designed to work on SMP (symmetric multi-processing) - Linux machines and is regularly tested on dual processor x86 machines.</P> -<P>We do not know of any testing on multi-processor machines with other - CPU architectures or with more than two CPUs. Anyone who does test - this, please report results to the<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A> -.</P> -<P>The current design does not make particularly efficient use of - multiprocessor machines; some of the kernel work is single-threaded.</P> -<H2><A name="hardware">Support for crypto hardware</A></H2> -<P>Supporting hardware cryptography accelerators has not been a high - priority for the development team because it raises a number of fairly - complex issues:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Can you trust the hardware? If it is not Open Source, how do you - audit its security? Even if it is, how do you check that the design has - no concealed traps?</LI> -<LI>If an interface is added for such hardware, can that interface be - subverted or misused?</LI> -<LI>Is hardware acceleration actually a performance win? It clearly is - in many cases, but on a fast machine it might be better to use the CPU - for the encryption than to pay the overheads of moving data to and from - a crypto board.</LI> -<LI>the current KLIPS code does not provide a clean interface for - hardware accelerators</LI> -</UL> -<P>That said, we have a<A href="#coldfire"> report</A> of FreeS/WAN - working with one crypto accelerator and some work is going on to modify - KLIPS to create a clean generic interface to such products. See this<A href="http://www.jukie.net/~bart/linux-ipsec/"> - web page</A> for some of the design discussion.</P> -<P>More recently, a patch to support some hardware accelerators has been - posted:</P> -<PRE>Subject: [Design] [PATCH] H/W acceleration patch - Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 - From: "Martin Gadbois" <martin.gadbois@colubris.com> - -Finally!! -Here's a web site with H/W acceleration patch for FreeS/WAN 1.91, including -S/W and Hifn 7901 crypto support. - -http://sources.colubris.com/ - -Martin Gadbois</PRE> -<P>Hardware accelerators could take performance well beyond what - FreeS/WAN can do in software (discussed<A href="performance.html"> here</A> -). Here is some discussion off the IETF IPsec list, October 2001:</P> -<PRE> ... Currently shipping chips deliver, 600 mbps throughput on a single - stream of 3DES IPsec traffic. There are also chips that use multiple - cores to do 2.4 gbps. We (Cavium) and others have announced even faster - chips. ... Mid 2002 versions will handle at line rate (OC48 and OC192) - IPsec and SSL/TLS traffic not only 3DES CBC but also AES and arc4.</PRE> -<P>The patches to date support chips that have been in production for - some time, not the state-of-the-art latest-and-greatest devices - described in that post. However, they may still outperform software and - they almost certainly reduce CPU overhead.</P> -<H2><A name="ipv6">IP version 6 (IPng)</A></H2> -<P>The Internet currently runs on version four of the IP protocols. IPv4 - is what is in the standard Linux IP stack, and what FreeS/WAN was built - for. In IPv4, IPsec is an optional feature.</P> -<P>The next version of the IP protocol suite is version six, usually - abbreviated either as "IPv6" or as "IPng" for "IP: the next - generation". For IPv6, IPsec is a required feature. Any machine doing - IPv6 is required to support IPsec, much as any machine doing (any - version of) IP is required to support ICMP.</P> -<P>There is a Linux implementation of IPv6 in Linux kernels 2.2 and - above. For details, see the<A href="http://www.cs-ipv6.lancs.ac.uk/ipv6/systems/linux/faq/"> - FAQ</A>. It does not yet support IPsec. The<A href="http://www.linux-ipv6.org/"> - USAGI</A> project are also working on IPv6 for Linux.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN was originally built for the current standard, IPv4, but we - are interested in seeing it work with IPv6. Some progress has been - made, and a patched version with IPv6 support is<A href="http://www.ipv6.iabg.de/downloadframe/index.html"> - available</A>. For more recent information, check the<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="v6.back">IPv6 background</A></H3> -<P>IPv6 has been specified by an IETF<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipngwg-charter.html"> - working group</A>. The group's page lists over 30 RFCs to date, and - many Internet Drafts as well. The overview is<A href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt"> - RFC 2460</A>. Major features include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>expansion of the address space from 32 to 128 bits,</LI> -<LI>changes to improve support for -<UL> -<LI>mobile IP</LI> -<LI>automatic network configuration</LI> -<LI>quality of service routing</LI> -<LI>...</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>improved security via IPsec</LI> -</UL> -<P>A number of projects are working on IPv6 implementation. A prominent - Open Source effort is<A href="http://www.kame.net/"> KAME</A>, a - collaboration among several large Japanese companies to implement IPv6 - for Berkeley Unix. Other major players are also working on IPv6. For - example, see pages at:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main.html">Sun</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/ipv6/index.html">Cisco</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/howitworks/communications/networkbasics/IPv6.asp"> -Microsoft</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The<A href="http://www.6bone.net/"> 6bone</A> (IPv6 backbone) testbed - network has been up for some time. There is an active<A href="http://www.ipv6.org/"> - IPv6 user group</A>.</P> -<P>One of the design goals for IPv6 was that it must be possible to - convert from v4 to v6 via a gradual transition process. Imagine the - mess if there were a "flag day" after which the entire Internet used - v6, and all software designed for v4 stopped working. Almost every - computer on the planet would need major software changes! There would - be huge costs to replace older equipment. Implementers would be worked - to death before "the day", systems administrators and technical support - would be completely swamped after it. The bugs in every implementation - would all bite simultaneously. Large chunks of the net would almost - certainly be down for substantial time periods. ...</P> -<P>Fortunately, the design avoids any "flag day". It is therefore a - little tricky to tell how quickly IPv6 will take over. The transition - has certainly begun. For examples, see announcements from<A href="http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/internet2/2000-03/0016.html"> - NTT</A> and<A href="http://www.vnunet.com/News/1102383"> Nokia</A>. - However, it is not yet clear how quickly the process will gain - momentum, or when it will be completed. Likely large parts of the - Internet will remain with IPv4 for years to come.</P> -<HR> -<A NAME="interop"></A> -<H1><A NAME="10">Interoperating with FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P>The FreeS/WAN project needs you! We rely on the user community to - keep up to date. Mail users@lists.freeswan.org with your interop - success stories.</P> -<P><STRONG>Please note</STRONG>: Most of our interop examples feature - Linux FreeS/WAN 1.x config files. You can convert them to 2.x files - fairly easily with the patch in our<A HREF="#ipsec.conf_v2"> Upgrading - Guide</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="10_1">Interop at a Glance</A></H2> -<TABLE BORDER="1"> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD colspan="5">FreeS/WAN VPN</TD><TD>Road Warrior</TD><TD> -OE</TD></TR> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD>PSK</TD><TD>RSA Secret</TD><TD>X.509 -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -NAT-Traversal -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -Manual -<BR>Keying</TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD></TR> -<TR><TD colspan="8">More Compatible</TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#freeswan">FreeS/WAN</A><A NAME="freeswan.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#isakmpd">isakmpd (OpenBSD)</A><A NAME="isakmpd.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No </FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#kame">Kame (FreeBSD, -<BR> NetBSD, MacOSX) -<BR> <SMALL>aka racoon</SMALL></A><A NAME="kame.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#mcafee">McAfee VPN -<BR><SMALL>was PGPNet</SMALL></A><A NAME="mcafee.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#microsoft">Microsoft -<BR> Windows 2000/XP</A><A NAME="microsoft.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#ssh">SSH Sentinel</A><A NAME="ssh.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#safenet">Safenet SoftPK -<BR>/SoftRemote</A><A NAME="safenet.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> -<TR><TD colspan="8">Other</TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#6wind">6Wind</A><A NAME="6wind.top"> </A></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#alcatel">Alcatel Timestep</A><A NAME="alcatel.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#apple">Apple Macintosh -<BR>System 10+</A><A NAME="apple.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#ashleylaurent">AshleyLaurent -<BR> VPCom</A><A NAME="ashleylaurent.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#borderware">Borderware</A><A NAME="borderware.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- -http://www.cequrux.com/vpn-guides.php3 -"coming soon" guide to connect with FreeS/WAN. ---> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#checkpoint">Check Point FW-1/VPN-1</A><A NAME="checkpoint.top"> - </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#cisco">Cisco with 3DES</A><A NAME="cisco.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT> -</TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#equinux">Equinux VPN Tracker -<BR> (for Mac OS X)</A><A NAME="equinux.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#fsecure">F-Secure</A><A NAME="fsecure.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#gauntlet">Gauntlet GVPN</A><A NAME="gauntlet.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#aix">IBM AIX</A><A NAME="aix.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#as400">IBM AS/400</A><A NAME="as400"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#intel">Intel Shiva -<BR>LANRover/Net Structure</A><A NAME="intel.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#lancom">LanCom (formerly ELSA)</A><A NAME="lancom.top"> - </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#linksys">Linksys</A><A NAME="linksys.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#lucent">Lucent</A><A NAME="lucent.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#cccc00">Partial</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netasq">Netasq</A><A NAME="netasq.top"> </A></TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netcelo">netcelo</A><A NAME="netcelo.top"> </A></TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netgear">Netgear fvs318</A><A NAME="netgear.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netscreen">Netscreen 100 -<BR>or 5xp</A><A NAME="netscreen.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#nortel">Nortel Contivity</A><A NAME="nortel.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Partial</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#radguard">RadGuard</A><A NAME="radguard.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#raptor">Raptor</A><A NAME="raptor"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#redcreek">Redcreek Ravlin</A><A NAME="redcreek.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT><FONT color="#cccc00">/Partial</FONT> -</TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#sonicwall">SonicWall</A><A NAME="sonicwall.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#sun">Sun Solaris</A><A NAME="sun.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT> -</TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#symantec">Symantec</A><A NAME="symantec.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#watchguard">Watchguard -<BR> Firebox</A><A NAME="watchguard.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#xedia">Xedia Access Point -<BR>/QVPN</A><A NAME="xedia.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#zyxel">Zyxel Zywall -<BR>/Prestige</A><A NAME="zyxel.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE - - -<TR> -<TD><A HREF="#sample">sample</A></TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD> -</TR> - ---> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD>PSK</TD><TD>RSA Secret</TD><TD>X.509 -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -NAT-Traversal -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -Manual -<BR>Keying</TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD></TR> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD colspan="5">FreeS/WAN VPN</TD><TD>Road Warrior</TD><TD> -OE</TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -</TABLE> -<H3><A NAME="10_1_1">Key</A></H3> -<TABLE BORDER="1"> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD>People report that this - works for them.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>[Blank]</TD><TD>We don't know.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD><TD>We have reason to - believe it was, at some point, not possible to get this to work.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Partial</FONT></TD><TD>Partial success. - For example, a connection can be created from one end only.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT><FONT color="#cccc00">/Partial</FONT> -</TD><TD>Mixed reports.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD>We think the answer - is "yes", but need confirmation.</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<A NAME="interoprules"></A> -<H2><A NAME="10_2">Basic Interop Rules</A></H2> -<P>Vanilla FreeS/WAN implements<A HREF="#compat"> these parts</A> of the - IPSec specifications. You can add more with<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> - Super FreeS/WAN</A>, but what we offer may be enough for many users.</P> -<UL> -<LI> To use X.509 certificates with FreeS/WAN, you will need the<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.org/freeswan"> - X.509 patch</A> or<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> Super FreeS/WAN</A> -, which includes that patch.</LI> -<LI> To use<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> Network Address Translation</A> (NAT) - traversal with FreeS/WAN, you will need Arkoon Network Security's<A HREF="http://open-source.arkoon.net"> - NAT traversal patch</A> or<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A>, which includes it.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We offer a set of proposals which is not user-adjustable, but covers - all combinations that we can offer. FreeS/WAN always proposes triple - DES encryption and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In addition, we - propose Diffie Hellman groups 5 and 2 (in that order), and MD5 and - SHA-1 hashes. We accept the same proposals, in the same order of - preference.</P> -<P>Other interop notes:</P> -<UL> -<LI> A<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-September/msg00462.html"> - SHA-1 bug in FreeS/WAN 2.00, 2.01 and 2.02</A> may affect some interop - scenarios. It does not affect 1.x versions, and is fixed in 2.03 and - later.</LI> -<LI> Some other implementations will close a connection with FreeS/WAN - after some time. This may be a problem with rekey lifetimes. Please see<A -HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00293.html"> - this tip</A> and<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-December/005758.html"> - this workaround</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="10_3">Longer Stories</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="10_3_1">For<EM> More Compatible</EM> Implementations</A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="freeswan">FreeS/WAN</A></H4> -<P> See our documentation at<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org"> - freeswan.org</A> and the Super FreeS/WAN docs at<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> - freeswan.ca</A>. Some user-written HOWTOs for FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN - connections are listed in<A HREF="#howto"> our Introduction</A>.</P> -<P>See also:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://lugbe.ch/action/reports/ipsec_htbe.phtml"> A German - FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN page by Markus Wernig (X.509)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="#freeswan.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="isakmpd">isakmpd (OpenBSD)</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq13.html">OpenBSD FAQ: Using - IPsec</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.rommel.stw.uni-erlangen.de/~hshoexer/ipsec-howto/HOWTO.html"> - Hans-Joerg Hoexer's interop Linux-OpenBSD (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.segfault.net/ipsec/"> Skyper's configuration - (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#isakmpd.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="kame">Kame</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>For FreeBSD and NetBSD. Ships with Mac OS X; see also our<A HREF="#apple"> - Mac</A> section.</LI> -<LI>Also known as<EM> racoon</EM>, its keying daemon.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.kame.net">Kame homepage, with FAQ</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.netbsd.org/Documentation/network/ipsec"> - NetBSD's IPSec FAQ</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00560.html"> - Ghislaine's post explaining some interop peculiarities</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/09/msg00511.html"> - Itojun's Kame-FreeS/WAN interop tips (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2000"> Ghislaine - Labouret's French page with links to matching FreeS/WAN and Kame - configs (RSA)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lugbe.ch/lostfound/contrib/freebsd_router/"> Markus - Wernig's HOWTO (X.509, BSD gateway)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://web.morgul.net/~frodo/docs/kame+freeswan_interop.html"> - Frodo's Kame-FreeS/WAN interop (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.wavesec.org/kame.phtml"> Kame as a WAVEsec - client.</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#kame.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="mcafee">PGPNet/McAfee</A></H4> -<P></P> -<UL> -<LI>Now called McAfee VPN Client.</LI> -<LI>PGPNet also came in a freeware version which did not support subnets</LI> -<LI>To support dhcp-over-ipsec, you need the X.509 patch, which is - included in<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> Super FreeS/WAN</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/WindowsInterop"> Tim Carr's - Windows Interop Guide (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.rommel.stw.uni-erlangen.de/~hshoexer/ipsec-howto/HOWTO.html#Interop2"> - Hans-Joerg Hoexer's Guide for Linux-PGPNet (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/04/msg00339.html"> - Kai Martius' instructions using RSA Key-Extractor Tool (RSA)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.zengl.net/freeswan/english.html">Christian - Zeng's page (RSA)</A> based on Kai's work. English or German. -<BR><A HREF="http://tirnanog.ls.fi.upm.es/CriptoLab/Biblioteca/InfTech/InfTech_CriptoLab.htm"> - Oscar Delgado's PDF (X.509, no configs)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www-ec.njit.edu/~rxt1077/Howto.txt"> Ryan's HOWTO - for FreeS/WAN-PGPNet (X.509)</A>. Through a Linksys Router with IPsec - Passthru enabled. -<BR><A HREF="http://jixen.tripod.com/#RW-PGP-to-Fwan"> Jean-Francois - Nadeau's Practical Configuration (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.evolvedatacom.nl/freeswan.html#toc"> Wouter - Prins' HOWTO (Road Warrior with X.509)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/01/msg00271.html"> - Rekeying problem with FreeS/WAN and older PGPNets</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/dhcprelay/index.htm"> DHCP - over IPSEC HOWTO for FreeS/WAN (requires X.509 and dhcprelay patches)</A> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#mcafee.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="microsoft">Microsoft Windows 2000/XP</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>IPsec comes with Win2k, and with XP Support Tools. May require<A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/recommended/encryption/default.asp"> - High Encryption Pack</A>. WinXP users have also reported better results - with Service Pack 1.</LI> -<LI>The Road Warrior setup works either way round. Windows (XP or 2K) - IPsec can connect as a Road Warrior to FreeS/WAN. However, FreeS/WAN - can also successfully connect as a Road Warrior to Windows IPsec (see - Nate Carlson's configs below).</LI> -<LI>FreeS/WAN version 1.92 or later is required to avoid an - interoperation problem with Windows native IPsec. Earlier FreeS/WAN - versions did not process the Commit Bit as Windows native IPsec - expected.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/WindowsInterop"> Tim Carr's - Windows Interop Guide (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://ipsec.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html"> James - Carter's instructions (X.509, NAT-T)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://jixen.tripod.com/#Win2000-Fwan"> Jean-Francois - Nadeau's Net-net Configuration (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://security.nta.no/freeswan-w2k.html"> Telenor's - Node-node Config (Transport-mode PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://vpn.ebootis.de"> Marcus Mueller's HOWTO using his - VPN config tool (X.509).</A> Tool also works with PSK. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.natecarlson.com/include/showpage.php?cat=linux&page=ipsec-x509"> - Nate Carlson's HOWTO using same tool (Road Warrior with X.509)</A>. - Unusually, FreeS/WAN is the Road Warrior here. -<BR><A HREF="http://tirnanog.ls.fi.upm.es/CriptoLab/Biblioteca/InfTech/InfTech_CriptoLab.htm"> - Oscar Delgado's PDF (X.509, no configs)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-July/022425.html"> - Tim Scannell's Windows XP Additional Checklist (X.509)</A> -<BR></P> - -<!-- Note to self: Include L2TP references? --> -<P><A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/en/server/help/default.asp?url=/windows2000/en/server/help/sag_TCPIP_ovr_secfeatures.htm"> - Microsoft's page on Win2k TCP/IP security features</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q257/2/25.ASP"> - Microsoft's Win2k IPsec debugging tips</A> -<BR> -<!-- Alt-URL http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q257225 -Perhaps newer? --> -<A HREF="http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,36336,00.html"> - MS VPN may fall back to 1DES</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#microsoft.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="ssh">SSH Sentinel</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Popular and well tested.</LI> -<LI>Also rebranded in<A HREF="http://www.zyxel.com"> Zyxel Zywall</A>. - Our Zyxel interop notes are<A HREF="#zyxel"> here</A>.</LI> -<LI> SSH supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -<LI>There is this<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/12/msg00370.html"> - potential problem</A> if you're not using the Legacy Proposal option.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.ssh.com/support/sentinel/documents.cfm"> SSH's - Sentinel-FreeSWAN interop PDF (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.nadmm.com/show.php?story=articles/vpn.inc"> - Nadeem Hassan's SUSE-to-Sentinel article (Road warrior with X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.zerozone.it/documents/Linux/HowTo/VPN-IPsec-Freeswan-HOWTO.html"> - O-Zone's Italian HOWTO (Road Warrior, X.509, DHCP)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#ssh.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="safenet">Safenet SoftPK/SoftRemote</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>People recommend SafeNet as a low cost Windows client.</LI> -<LI>SoftRemote seems to be the newer name for SoftPK.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005061.html"> - Whit Blauvelt's SoftRemote tips</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015591.html"> - Tim Wilson's tips (X.509)</A><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00607.html"> - Workaround for a "gotcha"</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://jixen.tripod.com/#Rw-IRE-to-Fwan"> Jean-Francois - Nadeau's Practical Configuration (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.terradoncommunications.com/security/whitepapers/safe_net-to-free_swan.pdf"> - Terradon Communications' PDF (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/?????.html"> - Seaan.net's PDF (Road Warrior to Subnet, with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.redbaronconsulting.com/freeswan/fswansafenet.pdf"> - Red Baron Consulting's PDF (Road Warrior with X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#safenet.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H3><A NAME="10_3_2">For<EM> Other Implementations</EM></A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="6wind">6Wind</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#6wind.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="alcatel">Alcatel Timestep</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-June/011878.html"> - Alain Sabban's settings (PSK or PSK road warrior; through static NAT)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/1999/06/msg00100.html"> - Derick Cassidy's configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/1999/08/msg00194.html"> - David Kerry's Timestep settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013711.html"> - Kevin Gerbracht's ipsec.conf (X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#alcatel.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="apple">Apple Macintosh System 10+</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Since the system is based on FreeBSD, this should interoperate<A HREF="#kame"> - just like FreeBSD</A>.</LI> -<LI> To use Appletalk over IPsec tunnels,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005116.html"> - run it over TCP/IP</A>, or use Open Door Networks' Shareway IP tool,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005426.html"> - described here.</A></LI> -<LI>See also the<A HREF="#equinux"> Equinux VPN Tracker</A> for Mac OS - X.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://ipsec.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html"> James - Carter's instructions (X.509, NAT-T)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#apple.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="ashleylaurent">AshleyLaurent VPCom</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.ashleylaurent.com/newsletter/01-28-00.htm"> - Successful interop report, no details</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#ashleylaurent.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="borderware">Borderware</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>I suspect the Borderware client is a rebranded Safenet. If that's - true, our<A HREF="#safenet"> Safenet section</A> will help.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-March/008288.html"> - Philip Reetz' configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/09/msg00217.html"> - Borderware server does not support FreeS/WAN road warriors</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007733.html"> - Older Borderware may not support Diffie Hellman groups 2, 5</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#borderware.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="checkpoint">Check Point VPN-1 or FW-1</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00099.html"> - Caveat about IP-range inclusion on Check Point.</A></LI> -<LI> Some versions of Check Point may require an aggressive mode patch - to interoperate with FreeS/WAN. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/code/super-freeswan"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A> now features this patch. -<!-- -<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/patches/aggressivemode">Steve Harvey's -aggressive mode patch for FreeS/WAN 1.5</A> ---> -</LI> -<LI></LI> -<LI>A Linux FreeS/WAN-Checkpoint connection may close after some time. - Try<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00293.html"> - this tip</A> toward a workaround.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.fw-1.de/aerasec/ng/vpn-freeswan/CPNG+Linux-FreeSWAN.html"> - AERAsec's Firewall-1 NG site (PSK, X.509, Road Warrior with X.509, - other algorithms)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.fw-1.de/aerasec/ng/vpn-freeswan/CPNG+Linux-FreeSWAN.html#support-matrix"> - AERAsec's detailed Check Point-FreeS/WAN support matrix</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://support.checkpoint.com/kb/docs/public/firewall1/4_1/pdf/fw-linuxvpn.pdf"> - Checkpoint.com PDF: Linux as a VPN Client to FW-1 (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.phoneboy.com"> PhoneBoy's Check Point FAQ (on - Check Point only, not FreeS/WAN)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-August/002351.html"> - Chris Harwell's tips FreeS/WAN configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009362.html"> - Daniel Tombeil's configs (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#checkpoint.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="cisco">Cisco</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> Cisco supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -<LI>Cisco VPN Client appears to use nonstandard IPsec and does not work - with FreeS/WAN.<A HREF="https://mj2.freeswan.org/archives/2003-August/maillist.html"> - This message</A> concerns Cisco VPN Client 4.01. -<!-- fix link --> -</LI> -<LI>A Linux FreeS/WAN-Cisco connection may close after some time.<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-December/005758.html"> - Here</A> is a workaround, and<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00293.html"> - here</A> is another comment on the same subject.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/120newft/120t/120t2/3desips.htm"> -Older Ciscos</A> purchased outside the United States may not have 3DES, - which FreeS/WAN requires.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-June/000406.html"> -RSA keying may not be possible between Cisco and FreeS/WAN.</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/004357.html"> -In ipsec.conf, VPN3000 DN (distinguished name) must be in binary (X.509 - only)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://rr.sans.org/encryption/cisco_router.php"> SANS - Institute HOWTO (PSK).</A> Detailed, with extensive references. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.worldbank.ro/IPSEC/cisco-linux.txt"> Short HOWTO - (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs for Cisco IOS, PIX and VPN 3000 (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-August/002966.html"> - Dave McFerren's sample configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-September/003422.html"> - Wolfgang Tremmel's sample configs (PSK road warrior)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00578.html"> - Old doc from Pete Davis, with William Watson's updated Tips (PSK)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><STRONG>Some PIX specific information:</STRONG> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.wlug.org.nz/FreeSwanToCiscoPix"> Waikato Linux - Users' Group HOWTO. Nice detail (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.johnleach.co.uk/documents/freeswan-pix/freeswan-pix.html"> - John Leach's configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.diverdown.cc/vpn/freeswanpix.html"> Greg - Robinson's settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007901.html"> - Scott's ipsec.conf for PIX (PSK, FreeS/WAN side only)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/003949.html"> - Rick Trimble's PIX and FreeS/WAN settings (PSK)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A href="http://www.cisco.com/public/support/tac"> Cisco VPN support - page</A> -<BR><A href="http://www.ieng.com/warp/public/707/index.shtml#ipsec"> - Cisco IPsec information page</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#cisco.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="equinux">Equinux VPN tracker (for Mac OS X)</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Graphical configurator for Mac OS X IPsec. May be an interface to - the<A HREF="#apple"> native Mac OS X IPsec</A>, which is essentially<A HREF="#kame"> - KAME</A>.</LI> -<LI>To use Appletalk over IPsec tunnels,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005116.html"> - run it over TCP/IP</A>, or use Open Door Networks' Shareway IP tool,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005426.html"> - described here.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P> Equinux provides<A HREF="http://www.equinux.com/download/HowTo_FreeSWAN.pdf"> - this excellent interop PDF</A> (PSK, RSA, X.509).</P> -<P><A HREF="#equinux.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="fsecure">F-Secure</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> -<!-- <A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007596.html"> --> - F-Secure supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.pingworks.de/tech/vpn/vpn.txt">pingworks.de's - "Connecting F-Secure's VPN+ to Linux FreeS/WAN" (PSK road warrior)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.pingworks.de/tech/vpn/vpn.pdf">Same thing - as PDF</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.exim.org/pipermail/linux-ipsec/Week-of-Mon-20010122/000061.html"> - Success report, no detail (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.exim.org/pipermail/linux-ipsec/Week-of-Mon-20010122/000041.html"> - Success report, no detail (Manual)</A></P> - -<!-- Other NAT traversers: -http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009136.html -and ssh sentinel: -http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-September/003108.html ---> -<P><A HREF="#fsecure.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="gauntlet">Gauntlet GVPN</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00535.html"> - Richard Reiner's ipsec.conf (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-June/011434.html"> - Might work without that pesky firewall... (PSK)</A> -<BR> -<!-- insert archive link --> - In late July, 2003 Alexandar Antik reported success interoperating - with Gauntlet 6.0 for Solaris (X.509). Unfortunately the message is not - properly archived at this time.</P> -<P><A HREF="#gauntlet.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="aix">IBM AIX</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www-1.ibm.com/servers/esdd/articles/security.html"> - IBM's "Built-In Network Security with AIX" (PSK, X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www-1.ibm.com/servers/aix/products/ibmsw/security/vpn/faqandtips/#ques20"> - IBM's tip: importing Linux FreeS/WAN settings into AIX's<VAR> ikedb</VAR> - (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#aix.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="as400">IBM AS/400</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009106.html"> - Road Warriors may act flaky</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-September/014264.html"> - Richard Welty's tips and tricks</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#as400.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="intel">Intel Shiva LANRover / Net Structure</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Intel Shiva LANRover is now known as Intel Net Structure.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/01/msg00298.html"> - Shiva seems to have two modes: IPsec or the proprietary "Shiva Tunnel".</A> - Of course, FreeS/WAN will only create IPsec tunnels.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00293.html"> - AH may not work for Shiva-FreeS/WAN.</A> That's OK, since FreeS/WAN has - phased out the use of AH.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://snowcrash.tdyc.com/freeswan/"> Snowcrash's configs - (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.opus1.com/vpn/index.html"> Old configs from an - interop (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/003831.html"> - The day Shiva tickled a Pluto bug (PSK)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/004270.html"> - Follow up: success!</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#intel.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="lancom">LanCom (formerly ELSA)</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>This router is popular in Germany.</LI> -</UL> -<P> Jakob Curdes successfully created a PSK connection with the LanCom - 1612 in August 2003. -<!-- add ML link when it appears --> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#lancom.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="linksys">Linksys</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Linksys may be used as an IPsec tunnel endpoint,<STRONG> OR</STRONG> - as a router in "IPsec passthrough" mode, so that the IPsec tunnel - passes through the Linksys.</LI> -</UL> -<H5>As tunnel endpoint</H5> -<P><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/BEFVP41/"> Ken Bantoft's - instructions (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007814.html"> - Nate Carlson's caveats</A></P> -<H5>In IPsec passthrough mode</H5> -<P><A HREF="http://www-ec.njit.edu/~rxt1077/Howto.txt"> Sample HOWTO - through a Linksys Router</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2002/02/msg00114.html"> - Nadeem Hasan's configs</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2002/02/msg00180.html"> - Brock Nanson's tips</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#linksys.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="lucent">Lucent</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010976.html"> - Partial success report; see also the next message in thread</A></P> - -<!-- section done --> -<P><A HREF="#lucent.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netasq">Netasq</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A></P> - -<!-- section done --> -<P><A HREF="#netasq.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netcelo">Netcelo</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A> -<!-- section done --> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#netcelo.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netgear">Netgear fvs318</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>With a recent Linux FreeS/WAN, you will require the latest (12/2002) - Netgear firmware, which supports Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 2. For - security reasons, we phased out DH 1 after Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-June/011833.html"> - This message</A> reports the incompatibility between Linux FreeS/WAN - 1.6+ and Netgear fvs318 without the firmware upgrade.</LI> -<LI>We believe Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5 and earlier will interoperate with - any NetGear firmware.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-February/017891.html"> - John Morris' setup (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#netgear.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netscreen">Netscreen 100 or 5xp</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013409.html"> - Errol Neal's settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015265.html"> - Corey Rogers' configs (PSK, no PFS)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013051.html"> - Jordan Share's configs (PSK, 2 subnets, through static NAT)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/08/msg00404.html"> - Set src proxy_id to your protected subnet/mask</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with ipsec.conf, Netscreen screen shots (X.509, may need to - revert to PSK...)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/sf/linux/2001-q2/0123.html"> - A report of a company using Netscreen with FreeS/WAN on a large scale - (FreeS/WAN road warriors?)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#netscreen.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="nortel">Nortel Contivity</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> Nortel supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00417.html"> - Some older versions of Contivity and FreeS/WAN will not communicate.</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010924.html"> - FreeS/WAN cannot be used as a "client" to a Nortel Contivity server, - but can be used as a branch-office tunnel.</A></LI> - -<!-- Probably obsoleted by Ken's post -<LI> -(Matthias siebler from old interop) -At one point you could not configure Nortel-FreeS/WAN tunnels as -"Client Tunnels" since FreeS/WAN does not support Aggressive Mode. -Current status of this problem: unknown. -<LI> -<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/004612.html"> -How do we map group and user passwords onto the data that FreeS/WAN wants? -</A> -</LI> ---> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015455.html"> - Contivity does not send Distinguished Names in the order FS wants them - (X.509).</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/03/msg00137.html"> - Connections may time out after 30-40 minutes idle.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/03/msg00137.html"> - JJ Streicher-Bremer's mini HOWTO for old new software. (PSK with two - subnets)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A>. This succeeds using the above - X.509 tip.</P> - -<!-- I could do more searching but this is a solid start. --> -<P><A HREF="#nortel.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="radguard">Radguard</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/05/msg00009.html"> - Marko Hausalo's configs (PSK).</A> Note: These do create a connection, - as you can see by "IPsec SA established". -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/???.html"> - Claudia Schmeing's comments</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#radguard.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="raptor">Raptor (NT or Solaris)</A></H4> -<P></P> -<UL> -<LI>Now known as Symantec Enterprise Firewall.</LI> -<LI>The Raptor does not normally come with X.509, but this may be - available as an add-on.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010256.html"> - Raptor requires alphanumberic PSK values, whereas FreeS/WAN uses hex.</A> -</LI> -<LI>Raptor's tunnel endpoint may be a host, subnet or group of subnets - (see<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2001-November/001295.html"> - this message</A> ). FreeS/WAN cannot handle the group of subnets; you - must create separate connections for each in order to interoperate.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010113.html"> - Some versions of Raptor accept only single DES.</A> According to this - German message,<A HREF="http://radawana.cg.tuwien.ac.at/mail-archives/lll/200012/msg00065.html"> - the Raptor Mobile Client demo offers single DES only.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-January/006935.html"> - Peter Mazinger's settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005522.html"> - Peter Gerland's configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/07/msg00597.html"> - Charles Griebel's configs (PSK).</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-July/012275.html"> - Lumir Srch's tips (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/05/msg00214.html"> - John Hardy's configs (Manual)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/01/msg00236.html"> - Older Raptors want 3DES keys in 3 parts (Manual).</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/06/msg00480.html"> - Different keys for each direction? (Manual)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#raptor.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="redcreek">Redcreek Ravlin</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Known issue #1: The Ravlin expects a quick mode renegotiation right - after every Main Mode negotiation.</LI> -<LI> Known issue #2: The Ravlin tries to negotiate a zero connection - lifetime, which it takes to mean "infinite".<A HREF="http://www.bear-cave.org.uk/linux/ravlin/"> - Jim Hague's patch</A> addresses both issues.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/03/msg00191.html"> - Interop works with Ravlin Firmware > 3.33. Includes tips (PSK).</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="#redcreek.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="sonicwall">SonicWall</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-June/000998.html"> - Sonicwall cannot be used for Road Warrior setups</A></LI> -<LI> At one point,<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/05/msg00217.html"> - only Sonicwall PRO supported triple DES</A>.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-March/008600.html"> - Older Sonicwalls (before Nov 2001) feature Diffie Hellman group 1 only</A> -.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.xinit.cx/docs/freeswan.html"> Paul Wouters' - config (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00073.html"> - Dilan Arumainathan's configuration (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.gravitas.co.uk/vpndebug"> Dariush's setup... - only opens one way (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-July/022302.html"> - Andreas Steffen's tips (X.509)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#sonicwall.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="sun">Sun Solaris</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> Solaris 8+ has a native (in kernel) IPsec implementation.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010503.html"> - Solaris does not seem to support tunnel mode, but you can make IP-in-IP - tunnels instead, like this.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-June/022216.html"> - Reports of some successful interops</A> from a fellow @sun.com. See - also<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-July/022247.html"> - these follow up posts</A>. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/03/msg00332.html"> - Aleks Shenkman's configs (Manual in transport mode)</A> -<BR> -<!--sparc 64 stuff goes where?--> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#solaris.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="symantec">Symantec</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>The Raptor, covered<A HREF="#raptor"> above</A>, is now known as - Symantec Enterprise Firewall.</LI> -<LI>Symantec's "distinguished name" is a KEY_ID. See Andreas Steffen's - post, below.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009037.html"> - Andreas Steffen's configs for Symantec 200R (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#symantec.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="watchguard">Watchguard Firebox</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Automatic keying works with WatchGuard 5.0+ only.</LI> -<LI>Seen to interoperate with WatchGuard 1000, II, III; firmware v. 5, - 6..</LI> -<LI>For manual keying, Watchguard's Policy Manager expects SPI numbers - and encryption and authentication keys in decimal (not hex).</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-July/012595.html"> - WatchGuard's HOWTO (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013342.html"> - Ronald C. Riviera's Settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00179.html"> - Walter Wickersham's Notes (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015587.html"> - Max Enders' Configs (Manual)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009404.html"> - Old known issue with auto keying</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00124.html"> - Tips on key generation and format (Manual)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#watchguard.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="xedia">Xedia Access Point/QVPN</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/12/msg00520.html"> - Hybrid IPsec/L2TP connection settings (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1999/08/msg00140.html"> - Xedia's LAN-LAN links don't use multiple tunnels</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1999/08/msg00140.html"> - That explanation, continued</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#xedia.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="zyxel">Zyxel</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>The Zyxel Zywall is a rebranded SSH Sentinel box. See also our - section on<A HREF="#ssh"> SSH</A>.</LI> -<LI>There seems to be a problem with keeping this connection alive. This - is caused at the Zyxel end. See this brief<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00141.html"> - discussion and solution.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.zyxel.com/support/supportnote/zywall/app/zw_freeswan.htm"> - Zyxel's Zywall to FreeS/WAN instructions (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.zyxel.com/support/supportnote/p652/app/zw_freeswan.htm"> - Zyxel's Prestige to FreeS/WAN instructions (PSK)</A>. Note: not all - Prestige versions include VPN software. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.lancry.net/techdocs/freeswan-zyxel.txt"> Fabrice - Cahen's HOWTO (PSK)</A> -<BR> </P> -<P><A HREF="#zyxel.top">Back to chart</A></P> - -<!-- SAMPLE ENTRY - -<H4><A NAME="timestep">Timestep</A></H4> - -<P>Text goes here. -</P> - ---> -<HR> -<H1><A name="performance">Performance of FreeS/WAN</A></H1> - The performance of FreeS/WAN is adequate for most applications. -<P>In normal operation, the main concern is the overhead for encryption, - decryption and authentication of the actual IPsec (<A href="#ESP">ESP</A> - and/or<A href="#AH"> AH</A>) data packets. Tunnel setup and rekeying - occur so much less frequently than packet processing that, in general, - their overheads are not worth worrying about.</P> -<P>At startup, however, tunnel setup overheads may be significant. If - you reboot a gateway and it needs to establish many tunnels, expect - some delay. This and other issues for large gateways are discussed<A href="#biggate"> - below</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="pub.bench">Published material</A></H2> -<P>The University of Wales at Aberystwyth has done quite detailed speed - tests and put<A href="http://tsc.llwybr.org.uk/public/reports/SWANTIME/"> - their results</A> on the web.</P> -<P>Davide Cerri's<A href="http://www.linux.it/~davide/doc/"> thesis (in - Italian)</A> includes performance results for FreeS/WAN and for<A href="#TLS"> - TLS</A>. He posted an<A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-December/006303.html"> - English summary</A> on the mailing list.</P> -<P>Steve Bellovin used one of AT&T Research's FreeS/WAN gateways as his - data source for an analysis of the cache sizes required for key - swapping in IPsec. Available as<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/talks/key-agility.email.txt"> - text</A> or<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/talks/key-agility.pdf"> - PDF slides</A> for a talk on the topic.</P> -<P>See also the NAI work mentioned in the next section.</P> -<H2><A name="perf.estimate">Estimating CPU overheads</A></H2> -<P>We can come up with a formula that roughly relates CPU speed to the - rate of IPsec processing possible. It is far from exact, but should be - usable as a first approximation.</P> -<P>An analysis of authentication overheads for high-speed networks, - including some tests using FreeS/WAN, is on the<A href="http://www.pgp.com/research/nailabs/cryptographic/adaptive-cryptographic.asp"> - NAI Labs site</A>. In particular, see figure 3 in this<A href="http://download.nai.com/products/media/pgp/pdf/acsa_final_report.pdf"> - PDF document</A>. Their estimates of overheads, measured in Pentium II - cycles per byte processed are:</P> -<TABLE align="center" border="1"><TBODY></TBODY> -<TR><TH></TH><TH>IPsec</TH><TH>authentication</TH><TH>encryption</TH><TH> -cycles/byte</TH></TR> -<TR><TD>Linux IP stack alone</TD><TD>no</TD><TD>no</TD><TD>no</TD><TD align="right"> -5</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>IPsec without crypto</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>no</TD><TD>no</TD><TD align="right"> -11</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>IPsec, authentication only</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>SHA-1</TD><TD>no</TD><TD -align="right">24</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>IPsec with encryption</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD -align="right">not tested</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P>Overheads for IPsec with encryption were not tested in the NAI work, - but Antoon Bosselaers'<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~bosselae/fast.html"> - web page</A> gives cost for his optimised Triple DES implementation as - 928 Pentium cycles per block, or 116 per byte. Adding that to the 24 - above, we get 140 cycles per byte for IPsec with encryption.</P> -<P>At 140 cycles per byte, a 140 MHz machine can handle a megabyte -- 8 - megabits -- per second. Speeds for other machines will be proportional - to this. To saturate a link with capacity C megabits per second, you - need a machine running at<VAR> C * 140/8 = C * 17.5</VAR> MHz.</P> -<P>However, that estimate is not precise. It ignores the differences - between:</P> -<UL> -<LI>NAI's test packets and real traffic</LI> -<LI>NAI's Pentium II cycles, Bosselaers' Pentium cycles, and your - machine's cycles</LI> -<LI>different 3DES implementations</LI> -<LI>SHA-1 and MD5</LI> -</UL> -<P>and does not account for some overheads you will almost certainly - have:</P> -<UL> -<LI>communication on the client-side interface</LI> -<LI>switching between multiple tunnels -- re-keying, cache reloading and - so on</LI> -</UL> -<P>so we suggest using<VAR> C * 25</VAR> to get an estimate with a bit - of a built-in safety factor.</P> -<P>This covers only IP and IPsec processing. If you have other loads on - your gateway -- for example if it is also working as a firewall -- then - you will need to add your own safety factor atop that.</P> -<P>This estimate matches empirical data reasonably well. For example, - Metheringham's tests, described<A href="#klips.bench"> below</A>, show - a 733 topping out between 32 and 36 Mbit/second, pushing data as fast - as it can down a 100 Mbit link. Our formula suggests you need at least - an 800 to handle a fully loaded 32 Mbit link. The two results are - consistent.</P> -<P>Some examples using this estimation method:</P> -<TABLE align="center" border="1"><TBODY></TBODY> -<TR><TH colspan="2">Interface</TH><TH colspan="3">Machine speed in MHz</TH> -</TR> -<TR><TH>Type</TH><TH>Mbit per -<BR> second</TH><TH>Estimate -<BR> Mbit*25</TH><TH>Minimum IPSEC gateway</TH><TH>Minimum with other - load -<P>(e.g. firewall)</P> -</TH></TR> -<TR><TD>DSL</TD><TD align="right">1</TD><TD align="right">25 MHz</TD><TD rowspan="2"> -whatever you have</TD><TD rowspan="2">133, or better if you have it</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>cable modem</TD><TD align="right">3</TD><TD align="right">75 MHz</TD> -</TR> -<TR><TD><STRONG>any link, light load</STRONG></TD><TD align="right"><STRONG> -5</STRONG></TD><TD align="right">125 MHz</TD><TD>133</TD><TD>200+,<STRONG> - almost any surplus machine</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Ethernet</TD><TD align="right">10</TD><TD align="right">250 MHz</TD><TD> -surplus 266 or 300</TD><TD>500+</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><STRONG>fast link, moderate load</STRONG></TD><TD align="right"><STRONG> -20</STRONG></TD><TD align="right">500 MHz</TD><TD>500</TD><TD>800+,<STRONG> - any current off-the-shelf PC</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD>T3 or E3</TD><TD align="right">45</TD><TD align="right">1125 MHz</TD><TD> -1200</TD><TD>1500+</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>fast Ethernet</TD><TD align="right">100</TD><TD align="right"> -2500 MHz</TD><TD align="center" colspan="2" rowspan="2">// not feasible - with 3DES in software on current machines //</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OC3</TD><TD align="right">155</TD><TD align="right">3875 MHz</TD> -</TR> -</TABLE> -<P>Such an estimate is far from exact, but should be usable as minimum - requirement for planning. The key observations are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>older<STRONG> surplus machines</STRONG> are fine for IPsec gateways - at loads up to<STRONG> 5 megabits per second</STRONG> or so</LI> -<LI>a<STRONG> mid-range new machine</STRONG> can handle IPsec at rates - up to<STRONG> 20 megabits per second</STRONG> or more</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="perf.more">Higher performance alternatives</A></H3> -<P><A href="#AES">AES</A> is a new US government block cipher standard, - designed to replace the obsolete<A href="#DES"> DES</A>. If FreeS/WAN - using<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A> is not fast enough for your application, - the AES<A href="#patch"> patch</A> may help.</P> -<P>To date (March 2002) we have had only one<A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007771.html"> - mailing list report</A> of measurements with the patch applied. It - indicates that, at least for the tested load on that user's network,<STRONG> - AES roughly doubles IPsec throughput</STRONG>. If further testing - confirms this, it may prove possible to saturate an OC3 link in - software on a high-end box.</P> -<P>Also, some work is being done toward support of<A href="#hardware"> - hardware IPsec acceleration</A> which might extend the range of - requirements FreeS/WAN could meet.</P> -<H3><A NAME="11_2_2">Other considerations</A></H3> -<P>CPU speed may be the main issue for IPsec performance, but of course - it isn't the only one.</P> -<P>You need good ethernet cards or other network interface hardware to - get the best performance. See this<A href="http://www.ethermanage.com/ethernet/ethernet.html"> - ethernet information</A> page and this<A href="http://www.scyld.com/diag"> - Linux network driver</A> page.</P> -<P>The current FreeS/WAN kernel code is largely single-threaded. It is - SMP safe, and will run just fine on a multiprocessor machine (<A href="#multiprocessor"> -discussion</A>), but the load within the kernel is not shared - effectively. This means that, for example to saturate a T3 -- which - needs about a 1200 MHz machine -- you cannot expect something like a - dual 800 to do the job.</P> -<P>On the other hand, SMP machines do tend to share loads well so -- - provided one CPU is fast enough for the IPsec work -- a multiprocessor - machine may be ideal for a gateway with a mixed load.</P> -<H2><A name="biggate">Many tunnels from a single gateway</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN allows a single gateway machine to build tunnels to many - others. There may, however, be some problems for large numbers as - indicated in this message from the mailing list:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: Maximum number of ipsec tunnels? - Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 - From: "John S. Denker" <jsd@research.att.com> - -Christopher Ferris wrote: - ->> What are the maximum number ipsec tunnels FreeS/WAN can handle?? - -Henry Spencer wrote: - ->There is no particular limit. Some of the setup procedures currently ->scale poorly to large numbers of connections, but there are (clumsy) ->workarounds for that now, and proper fixes are coming. - -1) "Large" numbers means anything over 50 or so. I routinely run boxes -with about 200 tunnels. Once you get more than 50 or so, you need to worry -about several scalability issues: - -a) You need to put a "-" sign in syslogd.conf, and rotate the logs daily -not weekly. - -b) Processor load per tunnel is small unless the tunnel is not up, in which -case a new half-key gets generated every 90 seconds, which can add up if -you've got a lot of down tunnels. - -c) There's other bits of lore you need when running a large number of -tunnels. For instance, systematically keeping the .conf file free of -conflicts requires tools that aren't shipped with the standard freeswan -package. - -d) The pluto startup behavior is quadratic. With 200 tunnels, this eats up -several minutes at every restart. I'm told fixes are coming soon. - -2) Other than item (1b), the CPU load depends mainly on the size of the -pipe attached, not on the number of tunnels. -</PRE> -<P>It is worth noting that item (1b) applies only to repeated attempts - to re-key a data connection (IPsec SA, Phase 2) over an established - keying connection (ISAKMP SA, Phase 1). There are two ways to reduce - this overhead using settings in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>:</P> -<UL> -<LI>set<VAR> keyingtries</VAR> to some small value to limit repetitions</LI> -<LI>set<VAR> keylife</VAR> to a short time so that a failing data - connection will be cleaned up when the keying connection is reset.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The overheads for establishing keying connections (ISAKMP SAs, Phase - 1) are lower because for these Pluto does not perform expensive - operations before receiving a reply from the peer.</P> -<P>A gateway that does a lot of rekeying -- many tunnels and/or low - settings for tunnel lifetimes -- will also need a lot of<A href="#random"> - random numbers</A> from the random(4) driver.</P> -<H2><A name="low-end">Low-end systems</A></H2> -<P><EM>Even a 486 can handle a T1 line</EM>, according to this mailing - list message:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPSec Masquerade - Date: Fri, 15 Jan 1999 11:13:22 -0500 - From: Michael Richardson - -. . . A 486/66 has been clocked by Phil Karn to do -10Mb/s encryption.. that uses all the CPU, so half that to get some CPU, -and you have 5Mb/s. 1/3 that for 3DES and you get 1.6Mb/s....</PRE> -<P>and a piece of mail from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>Oh yes, and a new timing point for Sandy's docs... A P60 -- yes, a 60MHz -Pentium, talk about antiques -- running a host-to-host tunnel to another -machine shows an FTP throughput (that is, end-to-end results with a real -protocol) of slightly over 5Mbit/s either way. (The other machine is much -faster, the network is 100Mbps, and the ether cards are good ones... so -the P60 is pretty definitely the bottleneck.)</PRE> -<P>From the above, and from general user experience as reported on the - list, it seems clear that a cheap surplus machine -- a reasonable 486, - a minimal Pentium box, a Sparc 5, ... -- can easily handle a home - office or a small company connection using any of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>ADSL service</LI> -<LI>cable modem</LI> -<LI>T1</LI> -<LI>E1</LI> -</UL> -<P>If available, we suggest using a Pentium 133 or better. This should - ensure that, even under maximum load, IPsec will use less than half the - CPU cycles. You then have enough left for other things you may want on - your gateway -- firewalling, web caching, DNS and such.</P> -<H2><A name="klips.bench">Measuring KLIPS</A></H2> -<P>Here is some additional data from the mailing list.</P> -<PRE>Subject: FreeSWAN (specically KLIPS) performance measurements - Date: Thu, 01 Feb 2001 - From: Nigel Metheringham <Nigel.Metheringham@intechnology.co.uk> - -I've spent a happy morning attempting performance tests against KLIPS -(this is due to me not being able to work out the CPU usage of KLIPS so -resorting to the crude measurements of maximum throughput to give a -baseline to work out loading of a box). - -Measurements were done using a set of 4 boxes arranged in a line, each -connected to the next by 100Mbit duplex ethernet. The inner 2 had an -ipsec tunnel between them (shared secret, but I was doing measurements -when the tunnel was up and running - keying should not be an issue -here). The outer pair of boxes were traffic generators or traffic sink. - -The crypt boxes are Compaq DL380s - Uniprocessor PIII/733 with 256K -cache. They have 128M main memory. Nothing significant was running on -the boxes other than freeswan. The kernel was a 2.2.19pre7 patched -with freeswan and ext3. - -Without an ipsec tunnel in the chain (ie the 2 inner boxes just being -100BaseT routers), throughput (measured with ttcp) was between 10644 -and 11320 KB/sec - -With an ipsec tunnel in place, throughput was between 3268 and 3402 -KB/sec - -These measurements are for data pushed across a TCP link, so the -traffic on the wire between the 2 ipsec boxes would have been higher -than this.... - -vmstat (run during some other tests, so not affecting those figures) on -the encrypting box shows approx 50% system & 50% idle CPU - which I -don't believe at all. Interactive feel of the box was significantly -sluggish. - -I also tried running the kernel profiler (see man readprofile) during -test runs. - -A box doing primarily decrypt work showed basically nothing happening - -I assume interrupts were off. -A box doing encrypt work showed the following:- - Ticks Function Load - ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ - 956 total 0.0010 - 532 des_encrypt2 0.1330 - 110 MD5Transform 0.0443 - 97 kmalloc 0.1880 - 39 des_encrypt3 0.1336 - 23 speedo_interrupt 0.0298 - 14 skb_copy_expand 0.0250 - 13 ipsec_tunnel_start_xmit 0.0009 - 13 Decode 0.1625 - 11 handle_IRQ_event 0.1019 - 11 .des_ncbc_encrypt_end 0.0229 - 10 speedo_start_xmit 0.0188 - 9 satoa 0.0225 - 8 kfree 0.0118 - 8 ip_fragment 0.0121 - 7 ultoa 0.0365 - 5 speedo_rx 0.0071 - 5 .des_encrypt2_end 5.0000 - 4 _stext 0.0140 - 4 ip_fw_check 0.0035 - 2 rj_match 0.0034 - 2 ipfw_output_check 0.0200 - 2 inet_addr_type 0.0156 - 2 eth_copy_and_sum 0.0139 - 2 dev_get 0.0294 - 2 addrtoa 0.0143 - 1 speedo_tx_buffer_gc 0.0024 - 1 speedo_refill_rx_buf 0.0022 - 1 restore_all 0.0667 - 1 number 0.0020 - 1 net_bh 0.0021 - 1 neigh_connected_output 0.0076 - 1 MD5Final 0.0083 - 1 kmem_cache_free 0.0016 - 1 kmem_cache_alloc 0.0022 - 1 __kfree_skb 0.0060 - 1 ipsec_rcv 0.0001 - 1 ip_rcv 0.0014 - 1 ip_options_fragment 0.0071 - 1 ip_local_deliver 0.0023 - 1 ipfw_forward_check 0.0139 - 1 ip_forward 0.0011 - 1 eth_header 0.0040 - 1 .des_encrypt3_end 0.0833 - 1 des_decrypt3 0.0034 - 1 csum_partial_copy_generic 0.0045 - 1 call_out_firewall 0.0125 - -Hope this data is helpful to someone... however the lack of visibility -into the decrypt side makes things less clear</PRE> -<H2><A name="speed.compress">Speed with compression</A></H2> -<P>Another user reported some results for connections with and without - IP compression:</P> -<PRE>Subject: [Users] Speed with compression - Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2001 - From: John McMonagle <johnm@advocap.org> - -Did a couple tests with compression using the new 1.91 freeswan. - -Running between 2 sites with cable modems. Both using approximately -130 mhz pentium. - -Transferred files with ncftp. - -Compressed file was a 6mb compressed installation file. -Non compressed was 18mb /var/lib/rpm/packages.rpm - - Compressed vpn regular vpn -Compress file 42.59 kBs 42.08 kBs -regular file 110.84 kBs 41.66 kBs - -Load was about 0 either way. -Ping times were very similar a bit above 9 ms. - -Compression looks attractive to me.</PRE> - Later in the same thread, project technical lead Henry Spencer added: -<PRE>> is there a reason not to switch compression on? I have large gateway boxes -> connecting 3 connections, one of them with a measly DS1 link... - -Run some timing tests with and without, with data and loads representative -of what you expect in production. That's the definitive way to decide. -If compression is a net loss, then obviously, leave it turned off. If it -doesn't make much difference, leave it off for simplicity and hence -robustness. If there's a substantial gain, by all means turn it on. - -If both ends support compression and can successfully negotiate a -compressed connection (trivially true if both are FreeS/WAN 1.91), then -the crucial question is CPU cycles. - -Compression has some overhead, so one question is whether *your* data -compresses well enough to save you more CPU cycles (by reducing the volume -of data going through CPU-intensive encryption/decryption) than it costs -you. Last time I ran such tests on data that was reasonably compressible -but not deliberately contrived to be so, this generally was not true -- -compression cost extra CPU cycles -- so compression was worthwhile only if -the link, not the CPU, was the bottleneck. However, that was before the -slow-compression bug was fixed. I haven't had a chance to re-run those -tests yet, but it sounds like I'd probably see a different result. </PRE> - The bug he refers to was a problem with the compression libraries that - had us using C code, rather than assembler, for compression. It was - fixed before 1.91. -<H2><A name="methods">Methods of measuring</A></H2> -<P>If you want to measure the loads FreeS/WAN puts on a system, note - that tools such as top or measurements such as load average are - more-or-less useless for this. They are not designed to measure - something that does most of its work inside the kernel.</P> -<P>Here is a message from FreeS/WAN kernel programmer Richard Guy Briggs - on this:</P> -<PRE>> I have a batch of boxes doing Freeswan stuff. -> I want to measure the CPU loading of the Freeswan tunnels, but am -> having trouble seeing how I get some figures out... -> -> - Keying etc is in userspace so will show up on the per-process -> and load average etc (ie pluto's load) - -Correct. - -> - KLIPS is in the kernel space, and does not show up in load average -> I think also that the KLIPS per-packet processing stuff is running -> as part of an interrupt handler so it does not show up in the -> /proc/stat system_cpu or even idle_cpu figures - -It is not running in interrupt handler. It is in the bottom half. -This is somewhere between user context (careful, this is not -userspace!) and hardware interrupt context. - -> Is this correct, and is there any means of instrumenting how much the -> cpu is being loaded - I don't like the idea of a system running out of -> steam whilst still showing 100% idle CPU :-) - -vmstat seems to do a fairly good job, but use a running tally to get a -good idea. A one-off call to vmstat gives different numbers than a -running stat. To do this, put an interval on your vmstat command -line.</PRE> - and another suggestion from the same thread: -<PRE>Subject: Re: Measuring the CPU usage of Freeswan - Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 - From: Patrick Michael Kane <modus@pr.es.to> - -The only truly accurate way to accurately track FreeSWAN CPU usage is to use -a CPU soaker. You run it on an unloaded system as a benchmark, then start up -FreeSWAN and take the difference to determine how much FreeSWAN is eating. -I believe someone has done this in the past, so you may find something in -the FreeSWAN archives. If not, someone recently posted a URL to a CPU -soaker benchmark tool on linux-kernel.</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A name="test.freeswan">Testing FreeS/WAN</A></H1> - This document discusses testing FreeS/WAN. -<P>Not all types of testing are described here. Other parts of the - documentation describe some tests:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="#testinstall">installation</A> document</DT> -<DD>testing for a successful install</DD> -<DT><A href="config.html#testsetup">configuration</A> document</DT> -<DD>basic tests for a working configuration</DD> -<DT><A href="#interop.web">web links</A> document</DT> -<DD>General information on tests for interoperability between various - IPsec implementations. This includes links to several test sites.</DD> -<DT><A href="interop.html">interoperation</A> document.</DT> -<DD>More specific information on FreeS/WAN interoperation with other - implementations.</DD> -<DT><A href="performance.html">performance</A> document</DT> -<DD>performance measurements</DD> -</DL> -<P>The test setups and procedures described here can also be used in - other testing, but this document focuses on testing the IPsec - functionality of FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H2><A NAME="test.oe">Testing opportunistic connections</A></H2> -<P>This section teaches you how to test your opportunistically encrypted - (OE) connections. To set up OE, please see the easy instructions in our<A -HREF="quickstart.html"> quickstart guide</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="12_1_1">Basic OE Test</A></H3> -<P>This test is for basic OE functionality. -<!-- You may use it on an -<A HREF="quickstart.html#oppo.client">initiate-only OE</A> box or a -<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming">full OE</A> box. --> - For additional tests, keep - reading.</P> -<P>Be sure IPsec is running. You can see whether it is with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup status</PRE> -<P>If need be, you can restart it with:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<P>Load a FreeS/WAN test website from the host on which you're running - FreeS/WAN. Note: the feds may be watching these sites. Type one of:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.org</PRE> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.nl</PRE> - -<!--<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.ca</PRE>--> -<P>A positive result looks like this:</P> -<PRE> - You seem to be connecting from: 192.0.2.11 which DNS says is: - gateway.example.com - _________________________________________________________________ - - Status E-route - OE enabled 16 192.139.46.73/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x2097@192.0.2.11 - OE enabled 176 192.139.46.77/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x208a@192.0.2.11 -</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations! Your OE box will now encrypt its - own traffic whenever it can. If you have difficulty, see our<A HREF="#oe.trouble"> - OE troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="12_1_2">OE Gateway Test</A></H3> -<P>If you've set up FreeS/WAN to protect a subnet behind your gateway, - you'll need to run another simple test, which can be done from a - machine running any OS. That's right, your Windows box can be protected - by opportunistic encryption without any FreeS/WAN install or - configuration on that box. From<STRONG> each protected subnet node</STRONG> -, load the FreeS/WAN website with:</P> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.org</PRE> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.nl</PRE> -<P>A positive result looks like this:</P> -<PRE> - You seem to be connecting from: 192.0.2.98 which DNS says is: - box98.example.com - _________________________________________________________________ - - Status E-route - OE enabled 16 192.139.46.73/32 -> 192.0.2.98/32 => - tun0x134ed@192.0.2.11 - OE enabled 176 192.139.46.77/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x134d2@192.0.2.11 -</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations! Your OE gateway will now encrypt - traffic for this subnet node whenever it can. If you have difficulty, - see our<A HREF="#oe.trouble"> OE troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="12_1_3">Additional OE tests</A></H3> -<P>When testing OE, you will often find it useful to execute this - command on the FreeS/WAN host:</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>If you have established a connection (either for or for a subnet - node) you will see a result like:</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.11/32 -> 192.139.46.73/32 => tun0x149f@192.139.46.38 -</PRE> -<P>Key:</P> -<TABLE> -<TR><TD>1.</TD><TD>192.0.2.11/32</TD><TD>Local start point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>2.</TD><TD>192.0.2.194/32</TD><TD>Remote end point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>3.</TD><TD>192.0.48.38</TD><TD>Remote FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host). May be the same as (2).</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>4.</TD><TD>[not shown]</TD><TD>Local FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host), where you've produced the output. May be the same as (1).</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P>For extra assurance, you may wish to use a packet sniffer such as<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org"> - tcpdump</A> to verify that packets are being encrypted. You should see - output that indicates<STRONG> ESP</STRONG> encrypted data, for example:</P> -<PRE> 02:17:47.353750 PPPoE [ses 0x1e12] IP 154: xy.example.com > oetest.freeswan.org: ESP(spi=0x87150d16,seq=0x55)</PRE> -<H2><A name="test.uml">Testing with User Mode Linux</A></H2> -<P><A href="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/">User Mode Linux</A> - allows you to run Linux as a user process on another Linux machine.</P> -<P>As of 1.92, the distribution has a new directory named testing. It - contains a collection of test scripts and sample configurations. Using - these, you can bring up several copies of Linux in user mode and have - them build tunnels to each other. This lets you do some testing of a - FreeS/WAN configuration on a single machine.</P> -<P>You need a moderately well-endowed machine for this to work well. - Each UML wants about 16 megs of memory by default, which is plenty for - FreeS/WAN usage. Typical regression testing only occasionally uses as - many as 4 UMLs. If one is doing nothing else with the machine (in - particular, not running X on it), then 128 megs and a 500MHz CPU are - fine.</P> - Documentation on these scripts is<A href="umltesting.html"> here</A>. - There is also documentation on automated testing<A href="makecheck.html"> - here</A>. -<H2><A name="testnet">Configuration for a testbed network</A></H2> -<P>A common test setup is to put a machine with dual Ethernet cards in - between two gateways under test. You need at least five machines; two - gateways, two clients and a testing machine in the middle.</P> -<P>The central machine both routes packets and provides a place to run - diagnostic software for checking IPsec packets. See next section for - discussion of<A href="#tcpdump.faq"> using tcpdump(8)</A> for this.</P> -<P>This makes things more complicated than if you just connected the two - gateway machines directly to each other, but it also makes your test - setup much more like the environment you actually use IPsec in. Those - environments nearly always involve routing, and quite a few apparent - IPsec failures turn out to be problems with routing or with firewalls - dropping packets. This approach lets you deal with those problems on - your test setup.</P> -<P>What you end up with looks like:</P> -<H3><A name="testbed">Testbed network</A></H3> -<PRE> subnet a.b.c.0/24 - | - eth1 = a.b.c.1 - gate1 - eth0 = 192.168.p.1 - | - | - eth0 = 192.168.p.2 - route/monitor box - eth1 = 192.168.q.2 - | - | - eth0 = 192.168.q.1 - gate2 - eth1 = x.y.z.1 - | - subnet x.y.z.0/24</PRE> -<PRE>Where p and q are any convenient values that do not interfere with other -routes you may have. The ipsec.conf(5) file then has, among other things:</PRE> -<PRE>conn abc-xyz - left=192.168.p.1 - leftnexthop=192.168.p.2 - right=192.168.q.1 - rightnexthop=192.168.q.2</PRE> -<P>Once that works, you can remove the "route/monitor box", and connect - the two gateways to the Internet. The only parameters in ipsec.conf(5) - that need to change are the four shown above. You replace them with - values appropriate for your Internet connection, and change the eth0 IP - addresses and the default routes on both gateways.</P> -<P>Note that nothing on either subnet needs to change. This lets you - test most of your IPsec setup before connecting to the insecure - Internet.</P> -<H3><A name="tcpdump.test">Using packet sniffers in testing</A></H3> -<P>A number of tools are available for looking at packets. We will - discuss using<A href="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> tcpdump(8)</A>, a - common Linux tool included in most distributions. Alternatives - offerring more-or-less the same functionality include:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="http://www.ethereal.com">Ethereal</A></DT> -<DD>Several people on our mailing list report a preference for this over - tcpdump.</DD> -<DT><A href="http://netgroup-serv.polito.it/windump/">windump</A></DT> -<DD>a Windows version of tcpdump(8), possibly handy if you have Windows - boxes in your network</DD> -<DT><A href="http://reptile.rug.ac.be/~coder/sniffit/sniffit.html"> -Sniffit</A></DT> -<DD>A linux sniffer that we don't know much about. If you use it, please - comment on our mailing list.</DD> -</DL> -<P>See also this<A href="http://www.tlsecurity.net/unix/ids/sniffer/"> - index</A> of packet sniffers.</P> -<P>tcpdump(8) may misbehave if run on the gateways themselves. It is - designed to look into a normal IP stack and may become confused if you - ask it to display data from a stack which has IPsec in play.</P> -<P>At one point, the problem was quite severe. Recent versions of - tcpdump, however, understand IPsec well enough to be usable on a - gateway. You can get the latest version from<A href="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - tcpdump.org</A>.</P> -<P>Even with a recent tcpdump, some care is required. Here is part of a - post from Henry on the topic:</P> -<PRE>> a) data from sunset to sunrise or the other way is not being -> encrypted (I am using tcpdump (ver. 3.4) -x/ping -p to check -> packages) - -What *interface* is tcpdump being applied to? Use the -i option to -control this. It matters! If tcpdump is looking at the ipsecN -interfaces, e.g. ipsec0, then it is seeing the packets before they are -encrypted or after they are decrypted, so of course they don't look -encrypted. You want to have tcpdump looking at the actual hardware -interfaces, e.g. eth0. - -Actually, the only way to be *sure* what you are sending on the wire is to -have a separate machine eavesdropping on the traffic. Nothing you can do -on the machines actually running IPsec is 100% guaranteed reliable in this -area (although tcpdump is a lot better now than it used to be).</PRE> -<P>The most certain way to examine IPsec packets is to look at them on - the wire. For security, you need to be certain, so we recommend doing - that. To do so, you need a<STRONG> separate sniffer machine located - between the two gateways</STRONG>. This machine can be routing IPsec - packets, but it must not be an IPsec gateway. Network configuration for - such testing is discussed<A href="#testnet"> above</A>.</P> -<P>Here's another mailing list message with advice on using tcpdump(8):</P> -<PRE>Subject: RE: [Users] Encrypted??? - Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 - From: "Joe Patterson" <jpatterson@asgardgroup.com> - -tcpdump -nl -i $EXT-IF proto 50 - --nl tells it not to buffer output or resolve names (if you don't do that it -may confuse you by not outputing anything for a while), -i $EXT-IF (replace -with your external interface) tells it what interface to listen on, and -proto 50 is ESP. Use "proto 51" if for some odd reason you're using AH, and -"udp port 500" if you want to see the isakmp key exchange/tunnel setup -packets. - -You can also run `tcpdump -nl -i ipsec0` to see what traffic is on that -virtual interface. Anything you see there *should* be either encrypted or -dropped (unless you've turned on some strange options in your ipsec.conf -file) - -Another very handy thing is ethereal (http://www.ethereal.com/) which runs -on just about anything, has a nice gui interface (or a nice text-based -interface), and does a great job of protocol breakdown. For ESP and AH -it'll basically just tell you that there's a packet of that protocol, and -what the spi is, but for isakmp it'll actually show you a lot of the tunnel -setup information (until it gets to the point in the protocol where isakmp -is encrypted....)</PRE> -<H2><A name="verify.crypt">Verifying encryption</A></H2> -<P>The question of how to verify that messages are actually encrypted - has been extensively discussed on the mailing list. See this<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/07/msg00262.html"> - thread</A>.</P> -<P>If you just want to verify that packets are encrypted, look at them - with a packet sniffer (see<A href="#tcpdump.test"> previous section</A> -) located between the gateways. The packets should, except for some of - the header information, be utterly unintelligible.<STRONG> The output - of good encryption looks<EM> exactly</EM> like random noise</STRONG>.</P> -<P>A packet sniffer can only tell you that the data you looked at was - encrypted. If you have stronger requirements -- for example if your - security policy requires verification that plaintext is not leaked - during startup or under various anomolous conditions -- then you will - need to devise much more thorough tests. If you do that, please post - any results or methodological details which your security policy allows - you to make public.</P> -<P>You can put recognizable data into ping packets with something like:</P> -<PRE> ping -p feedfacedeadbeef 11.0.1.1</PRE> -<P>"feedfacedeadbeef" is a legal hexadecimal pattern that is easy to - pick out of hex dumps.</P> -<P>For other protocols, you may need to check if you have encrypted data - or ASCII text. Encrypted data has approximately equal frequencies for - all 256 possible characters. ASCII text has most characters in the - printable range 0x20-0x7f, a few control characters less than 0x20, and - none at all in the range 0x80-0xff. 0x20, space, is a good character to - look for. In normal English text space occurs about once in seven - characters, versus about once in 256 for random or encrypted data.</P> -<P>One thing to watch for: the output of good compression, like that of - good encryption, looks just like random noise. You cannot tell just by - looking at a data stream whether it has been compressed, encrypted, or - both. You need a little care not to mistake compressed data for - encrypted data in your testing.</P> -<P>Note also that weak encryption also produces random-looking output. - You cannot tell whether the encryption is strong by looking at the - output. To be sure of that, you would need to have both the algorithms - and the implementation examined by experts.</P> -<P>For IPsec, you can get partial assurance from interoperability tests. - See our<A href="interop.html"> interop</A> document. When twenty - products all claim to implement<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A>, and they all - talk to each other, you can be fairly sure they have it right. Of - course, you might wonder whether all the implementers are consipring to - trick you or, more plausibly, whether some implementations might have - "back doors" so they can get also it wrong when required.. If you're - seriously worried about things like that, you need to get the code you - use audited (good luck if it is not Open Source), or perhaps to talk to - a psychiatrist about treatments for paranoia.</P> -<H2><A name="mail.test">Mailing list pointers</A></H2> -<P>Additional information on testing can be found in these<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A> messages:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a user's detailed<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00571.html"> - setup diary</A> for his testbed network</LI> -<LI>a FreeS/WAN team member's<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00425.html"> - notes</A> from testing at an IPsec interop "bakeoff"</LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="kernelconfig">Kernel configuration for FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P> This section lists many of the options available when configuring a - Linux kernel, and explains how they should be set on a FreeS/WAN IPsec - gateway.</P> -<H2><A name="notall">Not everyone needs to worry about kernel - configuration</A></H2> -<P>Note that in many cases you do not need to mess with these.</P> -<P> You may have a Linux distribution which comes with FreeS/WAN - installed (see this<A href="#products"> list</A>). In that case, you - need not do a FreeS/WAN installation or a kernel configuration. Of - course, you might still want to configure and rebuild your kernel to - improve performance or security. This can be done with standard tools - described in the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html"> - Kernel HowTo</A>.</P> -<P>If you need to install FreeS/WAN, then you do need to configure a - kernel. However, you may choose to do that using the simplest - procedure:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Configure, build and test a kernel for your system before adding - FreeS/WAN. See the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html"> - Kernel HowTo</A> for details.<STRONG> This step cannot be skipped</STRONG> -. FreeS/WAN needs the results of your configuration.</LI> -<LI>Then use FreeS/WAN's<VAR> make oldgo</VAR> command. This sets - everything FreeS/WAN needs and retains your values everywhere else.</LI> -</UL> -<P> This document is for those who choose to configure their FreeS/WAN - kernel themselves.</P> -<H2><A name="assume">Assumptions and notation</A></H2> -<P> Help text for most kernel options is included with the kernel files, - and is accessible from within the configuration utilities. We assume - you will refer to that, and to the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html"> - Kernel HowTo</A>, as necessary. This document covers only the - FreeS/WAN-specific aspects of the problem.</P> -<P> To avoid duplication, this document section does not cover settings - for the additional IPsec-related kernel options which become available - after you have patched your kernel with FreeS/WAN patches. There is - help text for those available from within the configuration utility.</P> -<P> We assume a common configuration in which the FreeS/WAN IPsec - gateway is also doing ipchains(8) firewalling for a local network, and - possibly masquerading as well.</P> -<P> Some suggestions below are labelled as appropriate for "a true - paranoid". By this we mean they may cause inconvenience and it is not - entirely clear they are necessary, but they appear to be the safest - choice. Not using them might entail some risk. Of course one suggested - mantra for security administrators is: "I know I'm paranoid. I wonder - if I'm paranoid enough."</P> -<H3><A name="labels">Labels used</A></H3> -<P> Six labels are used to indicate how options should be set. We mark - the labels with [square brackets]. For two of these labels, you have no - choice:</P> -<DL> -<DT>[required]</DT> -<DD>essential for FreeS/WAN operation.</DD> -<DT>[incompatible]</DT> -<DD>incompatible with FreeS/WAN.</DD> -</DL> -<P>those must be set correctly or FreeS/WAN will not work</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN should work with any settings of the others, though of - course not all combinations have been tested. We do label these in - various ways, but<EM> these labels are only suggestions</EM>.</P> -<DL> -<DT>[recommended]</DT> -<DD>useful on most FreeS/WAN gateways</DD> -<DT>[disable]</DT> -<DD>an unwelcome complication on a FreeS/WAN gateway.</DD> -<DT>[optional]</DT> -<DD>Your choice. We outline issues you might consider.</DD> -<DT>[anything]</DT> -<DD>This option has no direct effect on FreeS/WAN and related tools, so - you should be able to set it as you please.</DD> -</DL> -<P> Of course complexity is an enemy in any effort to build secure - systems.<STRONG> For maximum security, any feature that can reasonably - be turned off should be</STRONG>. "If in doubt, leave it out."</P> -<H2><A name="kernelopt">Kernel options for FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<P> Indentation is based on the nesting shown by 'make menuconfig' with - a 2.2.16 kernel for the i386 architecture.</P> -<DL> -<DT><A name="maturity">Code maturity and level options</A></DT> -<DD> -<DL> -<DT><A name="devel">Prompt for development ... code/drivers</A></DT> -<DD>[optional] If this is<VAR> no</VAR>, experimental drivers are not - shown in later menus. -<P>For most FreeS/WAN work,<VAR> no</VAR> is the preferred setting. - Using new or untested components is too risky for a security gateway.</P> -<P>However, for some hardware (such as the author's network cards) the - only drivers available are marked<VAR> new/experimental</VAR>. In such - cases, you must enable this option or your cards will not appear under - "network device support". A true paranoid would leave this option off - and replace the cards.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Processor type and features</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Loadable module support</DT> -<DD> -<DL> -<DT>Enable loadable module support</DT> -<DD>[optional] A true paranoid would disable this. An attacker who has - root access to your machine can fairly easily install a bogus module - that does awful things, provided modules are enabled. A common tool for - attackers is a "rootkit", a set of tools the attacker uses once he or - she has become root on your system. The kit introduces assorted - additional compromises so that the attacker will continue to "own" your - system despite most things you might do to recovery the situation. For - Linux, there is a tool called<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/knark.htm"> - knark</A> which is basically a rootkit packaged as a kernel module. -<P>With modules disabled, an attacker cannot install a bogus module. The - only way he can achieve the same effects is to install a new kernel and - reboot. This is considerably more likely to be noticed.</P> -<P>Many FreeS/WAN gateways run with modules enabled. This simplifies - some administrative tasks and some ipchains features are available only - as modules. Once an enemy has root on your machine your security is - nil, so arguably defenses which come into play only in that situation - are pointless.</P> -<P></P> -</DD> -<DT>Set version information ....</DT> -<DD>[optional] This provides a check to prevent loading modules compiled - for a different kernel.</DD> -<DT>Kernel module loader</DT> -<DD>[disable] It gives little benefit on a typical FreeS/WAN gate and - entails some risk.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>General setup</DT> -<DD>We list here only the options that matter for FreeS/WAN. -<DL> -<DT>Networking support</DT> -<DD>[required]</DD> -<DT>Sysctl interface</DT> -<DD>[optional] If this option is turned on and the<VAR> /proc</VAR> - filesystem installed, then you can control various system behaviours by - writing to files under<VAR> /proc/sys</VAR>. For example: -<PRE> echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipforward</PRE> - turns IP forwarding on. -<P>Disabling this option breaks many firewall scripts. A true paranoid - would disable it anyway since it might conceivably be of use to an - attacker.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>Plug and Play support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Block devices</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Networking options</DT> -<DD> -<DL> -<DT>Packet socket</DT> -<DD>[optional] This kernel feature supports tools such as tcpdump(8) - which communicate directly with network hardware, bypassing kernel - protocols. This is very much a two-edged sword: -<UL> -<LI>such tools can be very useful to the firewall admin, especially - during initial testing</LI> -<LI>should an evildoer breach your firewall, such tools could give him - or her a great deal of information about the rest of your network</LI> -</UL> - We recommend disabling this option on production gateways.</DD> -<DT><A name="netlink">Kernel/User netlink socket</A></DT> -<DD>[optional] Required if you want to use<A href="#adv"> advanced - router</A> features.</DD> -<DT>Routing messages</DT> -<DD>[optional]</DD> -<DT>Netlink device emulation</DT> -<DD>[optional]</DD> -<DT>Network firewalls</DT> -<DD>[recommended] You need this if the IPsec gateway also functions as a - firewall. -<P>Even if the IPsec gateway is not your primary firewall, we suggest - setting this so that you can protect the gateway with at least basic - local packet filters.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Socket filtering</DT> -<DD>[disable] This enables an older filtering interface. We suggest - using ipchains(8) instead. To do that, set the "Network firewalls" - option just above, and not this one.</DD> -<DT>Unix domain sockets</DT> -<DD>[required] These sockets are used for communication between the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html"> - ipsec(8)</A> commands and the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - ipsec_pluto(8)</A> daemon.</DD> -<DT>TCP/IP networking</DT> -<DD>[required] -<DL> -<DT>IP: multicasting</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT><A name="adv">IP: advanced router</A></DT> -<DD>[optional] This gives you policy routing, which some people have - used to good advantage in their scripts for FreeS/WAN gateway - management. It is not used in our distributed scripts, so not required - unless you want it for custom scripts. It requires the<A href="#netlink"> - netlink</A> interface between kernel code and the iproute2(8) command.</DD> -<DT>IP: kernel level autoconfiguration</DT> -<DD>[disable] It gives little benefit on a typical FreeS/WAN gate and - entails some risk.</DD> -<DT>IP: firewall packet netlink device</DT> -<DD>[disable]</DD> -<DT>IP: transparent proxy support</DT> -<DD>[optional] This is required in some firewall configurations, but - should be disabled unless you have a definite need for it.</DD> -<DT>IP: masquerading</DT> -<DD>[optional] Required if you want to use<A href="#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> private IP addresses for your local network.</DD> -<DT>IP: Optimize as router not host</DT> -<DD>[recommended]</DD> -<DT>IP: tunneling</DT> -<DD>[required]</DD> -<DT>IP: GRE tunnels over IP</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>IP: aliasing support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>IP: ARP daemon support (EXPERIMENTAL)</DT> -<DD>Not required on most systems, but might prove useful on - heavily-loaded gateways.</DD> -<DT>IP: TCP syncookie support</DT> -<DD>[recommended] It provides a defense against a<A href="#DOS"> denial - of service attack</A> which uses bogus TCP connection requests to waste - resources on the victim machine.</DD> -<DT>IP: Reverse ARP</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>IP: large window support</DT> -<DD>[recommended] unless you have less than 16 meg RAM</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>IPv6</DT> -<DD>[optional] FreeS/WAN does not currently support IPv6, though work on - integrating FreeS/WAN with the Linux IPv6 stack has begun.<A href="#ipv6"> - Details</A>. -<P> It should be possible to use IPv4 FreeS/WAN on a machine which also - does IPv6. This combination is not yet well tested. We would be quite - interested in hearing results from anyone expermenting with it, via the<A -href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>.</P> -<P> We do not recommend using IPv6 on production FreeS/WAN gateways - until more testing has been done.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Novell IPX</DT> -<DD>[disable]</DD> -<DT>Appletalk</DT> -<DD>[disable] Quite a few Linux installations use IP but also have some - other protocol, such as Appletalk or IPX, for communication with local - desktop machines. In theory it should be possible to configure IPsec - for the IP side of things without interfering with the second protocol. -<P>We do not recommend this. Keep the software on your gateway as simple - as possible. If you need a Linux-based Appletalk or IPX server, use a - separate machine.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>Telephony support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>SCSI support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>I2O device support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Network device support</DT> -<DD>[anything] should work, but there are some points to note. -<P>The development team test almost entirely on 10 or 100 megabit - Ethernet and modems. In principle, any device that can do IP should be - just fine for IPsec, but in the real world any device that has not been - well-tested is somewhat risky. By all means try it, but don't bet your - project on it until you have solid test results.</P> -<P>If you disabled experimental drivers in the<A href="#maturity"> Code - maturity</A> section above, then those drivers will not be shown here. - Check that option before going off to hunt for missing drivers.</P> -<P>If you want Linux to automatically find more than one ethernet - interface at boot time, you need to:</P> -<UL> -<LI>compile the appropriate driver(s) into your kernel. Modules will not - work for this</LI> -<LI>add a line such as -<PRE> - append="ether=0,0,eth0 ether=0,0,eth1" -</PRE> - to your /etc/lilo.conf file. In some cases you may need to specify - parameters such as IRQ or base address. The example uses "0,0" for - these, which tells the system to search. If the search does not succeed - on your hardware, then you should retry with explicit parameters. See - the lilo.conf(5) man page for details.</LI> -<LI>run lilo(8)</LI> -</UL> - Having Linux find the cards this way is not necessary, but is usually - more convenient than loading modules in your boot scripts.</DD> -<DT>Amateur radio support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>IrDA (infrared) support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>ISDN subsystem</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Old CDROM drivers</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Character devices</DT> -<DD>The only required character device is: -<DL> -<DT>random(4)</DT> -<DD>[required] This is a source of<A href="#random"> random</A> numbers - which are required for many cryptographic protocols, including several - used in IPsec. -<P>If you are comfortable with C source code, it is likely a good idea - to go in and adjust the<VAR> #define</VAR> lines in<VAR> - /usr/src/linux/drivers/char/random.c</VAR> to ensure that all sources - of randomness are enabled. Relying solely on keyboard and mouse - randomness is dubious procedure for a gateway machine. You could also - increase the randomness pool size from the default 512 bytes (128 - 32-bit words).</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>Filesystems</DT> -<DD>[anything] should work, but we suggest limiting a gateway machine to - the standard Linux ext2 filesystem in most cases.</DD> -<DT>Network filesystems</DT> -<DD>[disable] These systems are an unnecessary risk on an IPsec gateway.</DD> -<DT>Console drivers</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Sound</DT> -<DD>[anything] should work, but we suggest enabling sound only if you - plan to use audible alarms for firewall problems.</DD> -<DT>Kernel hacking</DT> -<DD>[disable] This might be enabled on test machines, but should not be - on production gateways.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="adv_config">Other configuration possibilities</A></H1> -<P>This document describes various options for FreeS/WAN configuration - which are less used or more complex (often both) than the standard - cases described in our<A href="#config"> config</A> and<A href="#quick_guide"> - quickstart</A> documents.</P> -<H2><A name="thumb">Some rules of thumb about configuration</A></H2> -<H3><A name="cheap.tunnel">Tunnels are cheap</A></H3> -<P>Nearly all of the overhead in IPsec processing is in the encryption - and authentication of packets. Our<A href="performance.html"> - performance</A> document discusses these overheads.</P> -<P>Beside those overheads, the cost of managing additional tunnels is - trivial. Whether your gateway supports one tunnel or ten just does not - matter. A hundred might be a problem; there is a<A href="#biggate"> - section</A> on this in the performance document.</P> -<P>So, in nearly all cases, if using multiple tunnels gives you a - reasonable way to describe what you need to do, you should describe it - that way in your configuration files.</P> -<P>For example, one user recently asked on a mailing list about this - network configuration:</P> -<PRE> netA---gwA---gwB---netB - |----netC - - netA and B are secured netC not. - netA and gwA can not access netC</PRE> -<P>The user had constructed only one tunnel, netA to netB, and wanted to - know how to use ip-route to get netC packets into it. This is entirely - unnecessary. One of the replies was:</P> -<PRE> The simplest way and indeed the right way to - solve this problem is to set up two connections: - - leftsubnet=NetA - left=gwA - right=gwB - rightsubnet=NetB - and - leftsubnet=NetA - left=gwA - right=gwB - rightsubnet=NetC</PRE> -<P>This would still be correct even if we added nets D, E, F, ... to the - above diagram and needed twenty tunnels.</P> -<P>Of course another possibility would be to just use one tunnel, with a - subnet mask that includes both netB and netC (or B, C, D, ...). See - next section.</P> -<P>In general, you can construct as many tunnels as you need. Networks - like netC in this example that do not connect directly to the gateway - are fine, as long as the gateway can route to them.</P> -<P>The number of tunnels can become an issue if it reaches 50 or so. - This is discussed in the<A href="#biggate"> performance</A> document. - Look there for information on supporting hundreds of Road Warriors from - one gateway.</P> -<P>If you find yourself with too many tunnels for some reason like - having eight subnets at one location and nine at another so you end up - with 9*8=72 tunnels, read the next section here.</P> -<H3><A name="subnet.size">Subnet sizes</A></H3> -<P>The subnets used in<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR> - can be of any size that fits your needs, and they need not correspond - to physical networks.</P> -<P>You adjust the size by changing the<A href="#subnet"> subnet mask</A> -, the number after the slash in the subnet description. For example</P> -<UL> -<LI>in 192.168.100.0/24 the /24 mask says 24 bits are used to designate - the network. This leave 8 bits to label machines. This subnet has 256 - addresses. .0 and .255 are reserved, so it can have 254 machines.</LI> -<LI>A subnet with a /23 mask would be twice as large, 512 addresses.</LI> -<LI>A subnet with a /25 mask would be half the size, 128 addresses.</LI> -<LI>/0 is the whole Internet</LI> -<LI>/32 is a single machine</LI> -</UL> -<P>As an example of using these in connection descriptions, suppose your - company's head office has four physical networks using the address - ranges:</P> -<DL> -<DT>192.168.100.0/24</DT> -<DD>development</DD> -<DT>192.168.101.0/24</DT> -<DD>production</DD> -<DT>192.168.102.0/24</DT> -<DD>marketing</DD> -<DT>192.168.103.0/24</DT> -<DD>administration</DD> -</DL> -<P>You can use exactly those subnets in your connection descriptions, or - use larger subnets to grant broad access if required:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access only development</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/23</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access development or production</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.102.0/23</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access marketing or administration</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/22</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access any of the four departments</DD> -</DL> -<P>or use smaller subnets to restrict access:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.0/24</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access any machine in administration</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.64/28</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access only certain machines in administration.</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.42/32</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access only one particular machine in - administration</DD> -</DL> -<P>To be exact, 192.68.103.64/28 means all addresses whose top 28 bits - match 192.168.103.64. There are 16 of these because there are 16 - possibilities for the remainingg 4 bits. Their addresses are - 192.168.103.64 to 192.168.103.79.</P> -<P>Each connection description can use a different subnet if required.</P> -<P>It is possible to use all the examples above on the same FreeS/WAN - gateway, each in a different connection description, perhaps for - different classes of user or for different remote offices.</P> -<P>It is also possible to have multiple tunnels using different<VAR> - leftsubnet</VAR> descriptions with the same<VAR> right</VAR>. For - example, when the marketing manager is on the road he or she might have - access to:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.102.0/24</DT> -<DD>all machines in marketing</DD> -<DT>192.168.101.32/29</DT> -<DD>some machines in production</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.42/32</DT> -<DD>one particular machine in administration</DD> -</DL> -<P>This takes three tunnels, but tunnels are cheap. If the laptop is set - up to build all three tunnels automatically, then he or she can access - all these machines concurrently, perhaps from different windows.</P> -<H3><A name="example.more">Other network layouts</A></H3> -<P>Here is the usual network picture for a site-to-site VPN::</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East=========Sunrise - local net untrusted net local net</PRE> -<P>and for the Road Warrior::</P> -<PRE> telecommuter's PC or - traveller's laptop - Sunset==========West------------------East - corporate LAN untrusted net</PRE> -<P>Other configurations are also possible.</P> -<H4><A name="internet.subnet">The Internet as a big subnet</A></H4> -<P>A telecommuter might have:</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East ================= firewall --- the Internet - home network untrusted net corporate network</PRE> -<P>This can be described as a special case of the general - subnet-to-subnet connection. The subnet on the right is 0.0.0.0/0, the - whole Internet.</P> -<P>West (the home gateway) can have its firewall rules set up so that - only IPsec packets to East are allowed out. It will then behave as if - its only connection to the world was a wire to East.</P> -<P>When machines on the home network need to reach the Internet, they do - so via the tunnel, East and the corporate firewall. From the viewpoint - of the Internet (perhaps of some EvilDoer trying to break in!), those - home office machines are behind the firewall and protected by it.</P> -<H4><A name="wireless.config">Wireless</A></H4> -<P>Another possible configuration comes up when you do not trust the - local network, either because you have very high security standards or - because your are using easily-intercepted wireless signals.</P> -<P>Some wireless networks have built-in encryption called<A href="#WEP"> - WEP</A>, but its security is dubious. It is a fairly common practice to - use IPsec instead.</P> -<P>In this case, part of your network may look like this:</P> -<PRE> West-----------------------------East == the rest of your network - workstation untrusted wireless net</PRE> -<P>Of course, there would likely be several wireless workstations, each - with its own IPsec tunnel to the East gateway.</P> -<P>The connection descriptions look much like Road Warrior descriptions:</P> -<UL> -<LI>each workstation should have its own unique -<UL> -<LI>identifier for IPsec</LI> -<LI>RSA key</LI> -<LI>connection description.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>on the gateway, use<VAR> left=%any</VAR>, or the workstation IP - address</LI> -<LI>on workstations,<VAR> left=%defaultroute</VAR>, or the workstation - IP address</LI> -<LI><VAR>leftsubnet=</VAR> is not used.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The<VAR> rightsubnet=</VAR> parameter might be set in any of several - ways:</P> -<DL> -<DT>rightsubnet=0.0.0.0/0</DT> -<DD>allowing workstations to access the entire Internet (see<A href="#internet.subnet"> - above</A>)</DD> -<DT>rightsubnet=a.b.c.0/24</DT> -<DD>allowing access to your entire local network</DD> -<DT>rightsubnet=a.b.c.d/32</DT> -<DD>restricting the workstation to connecting to a particular server</DD> -</DL> -<P>Of course you can mix and match these as required. For example, a - university might allow faculty full Internet access while letting - student laptops connect only to a group of lab machines.</P> -<H2><A name="choose">Choosing connection types</A></H2> -<P>One choice you need to make before configuring additional connections - is what type or types of connections you will use. There are several - options, and you can use more than one concurrently.</P> -<H3><A name="man-auto">Manual vs. automatic keying</A></H3> -<P>IPsec allows two types of connections, with manual or automatic - keying. FreeS/WAN starts them with commands such as:</P> -<PRE> ipsec manual --up <VAR>name</VAR> - ipsec auto --up <VAR>name</VAR></PRE> -<P>The difference is in how they are keyed.</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="#manual">Manually keyed</A> connections</DT> -<DD>use keys stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A href="#auto">Automatically keyed</A> connections</DT> -<DD>use keys automatically generated by the Pluto key negotiation - daemon. The key negotiation protocol,<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A>, must - authenticate the other system. (It is vulnerable to a<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A> if used without authentication.) We - currently support two authentication methods: -<UL> -<LI>using shared secrets stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets</A>.</LI> -<LI>RSA<A href="#public"> public key</A> authentication, with our - machine's private key in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets</A>. Public keys for other machines may either be placed - in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A> or provided via - DNS.</LI> -</UL> -<P>A third method, using RSA keys embedded in<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> - certtificates, is provided by user<A href="#patch"> patches</A>.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<P><A href="#manual">Manually keyed</A> connections provide weaker - security than<A href="#auto"> automatically keyed</A> connections. An - opponent who reads ipsec.secrets(5) gets your encryption key and can - read all data encrypted by it. If he or she has an archive of old - messages, all of them back to your last key change are also readable.</P> -<P>With automatically-(re)-keyed connections, an opponent who reads - ipsec.secrets(5) gets the key used to authenticate your system in IKE - -- the shared secret or your private key, depending what authentication - mechanism is in use. However, he or she does not automatically gain - access to any encryption keys or any data.</P> -<P>An attacker who has your authentication key can mount a<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A> and, if that succeeds, he or she will get - encryption keys and data. This is a serious danger, but it is better - than having the attacker read everyting as soon as he or she breaks - into ipsec.secrets(5).. Moreover, the keys change often so an opponent - who gets one key does not get a large amount of data. To read all your - data, he or she would have to do a man-in-the-middle attack at every - key change.</P> -<P>We discuss using<A href="#prodman"> manual keying in production</A> - below, but this is<STRONG> not recommended</STRONG> except in special - circumstances, such as needing to communicate with some implementation - that offers no auto-keyed mode compatible with FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>Manual keying may also be useful for testing. There is some - discussion of this in our<A href="#man4debug"> FAQ</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="auto-auth">Authentication methods for auto-keying</A></H3> -<P>The IKE protocol which Pluto uses to negotiate connections between - gateways must use some form of authentication of peers. A gateway must - know who it is talking to before it can create a secure connection. We - support two basic methods for this authentication:</P> -<UL> -<LI>shared secrets, stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A></LI> -<LI>RSA authentication</LI> -</UL> -<P>There are, howver, several variations on the RSA theme, using - different methods of managing the RSA keys:</P> -<UL> -<LI>our RSA private key in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A> with other gateways' public keys -<DL> -<DT>either</DT> -<DD>stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A></DD> -<DT>or</DT> -<DD>looked up via<A href="#DNS"> DNS</A></DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>authentication with<A href="#X509"> x.509</A> certificates.; See our<A -href="#patch"> links section</A> for information on user-contributed - patches for this.:</LI> -</UL> -<P>Public keys in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5</A> -) give a reasonably straightforward method of specifying keys for - explicitly configured connections.</P> -<P>Putting public keys in DNS allows us to support<A href="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>. Any two FreeS/WAN gateways can provide - secure communication, without either of them having any preset - information about the other.</P> -<P>X.509 certificates may be required to interface to various<A href="#PKI"> - PKI</A>s.</P> -<H3><A name="adv-pk">Advantages of public key methods</A></H3> -<P>Authentication with a<A href="#public"> public key</A> method such as<A -href="#RSA"> RSA</A> has some important advantages over using shared - secrets.</P> -<UL> -<LI>no problem of secure transmission of secrets -<UL> -<LI>A shared secret must be shared, so you have the problem of - transmitting it securely to the other party. If you get this wrong, you - have no security.</LI> -<LI>With a public key technique, you transmit only your public key. The - system is designed to ensure that it does not matter if an enemy - obtains public keys. The private key never leaves your machine.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>easier management -<UL> -<LI>Suppose you have 20 branch offices all connecting to one gateway at - head office, and all using shared secrets. Then the head office admin - has 20 secrets to manage. Each of them must be kept secret not only - from outsiders, but also from 19 of the branch office admins. The - branch office admins have only one secret each to manage. -<P>If the branch offices need to talk to each other, this becomes - problematic. You need another 20*19/2 = 190 secrets for - branch-to-branch communication, each known to exactly two branches. Now - all the branch admins have the headache of handling 20 keys, each - shared with exactly one other branch or with head office.</P> -<P>For larger numbers of branches, the number of connections and secrets - increases quadratically and managing them becomes a nightmare. A - 1000-gateway fully connected network needs 499,500 secrets, each known - to exactly two players. There are ways to reduce this problem, for - example by introducing a central key server, but these involve - additional communication overheads, more administrative work, and new - threats that must be carefully guarded against.</P> -</LI> -<LI>With public key techniques, the<EM> only</EM> thing you have to keep - secret is your private key, and<EM> you keep that secret from everyone</EM> -. -<P>As network size increaes, the number of public keys used increases - linearly with the number of nodes. This still requires careful - administration in large applications, but is nothing like the disaster - of a quadratic increase. On a 1000-gateway network, you have 1000 - private keys, each of which must be kept secure on one machine, and - 1000 public keys which must be distributed. This is not a trivial - problem, but it is manageable.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>does not require fixed IP addresses -<UL> -<LI>When shared secrets are used in IPsec, the responder must be able to - tell which secret to use by looking at the IP address on the incoming - packets. When the other parties do not have a fixed IP address to be - identified by (for example, on nearly all dialup ISP connections and - many cable or ADSL links), this does not work well -- all must share - the same secret!</LI> -<LI>When RSA authentication is in use, the initiator can identify itself - by name before the key must be determined. The responder then checks - that the message is signed with the public key corresponding to that - name.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is also a disadvantage:</P> -<UL> -<LI>your private key is a single point of attack, extremely valuable to - an enemy -<UL> -<LI>with shared secrets, an attacker who steals your ipsec.secrets file - can impersonate you or try<A href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle</A> - attacks, but can only attack connections described in that file</LI> -<LI>an attacker who steals your private key gains the chance to attack - not only existing connections<EM> but also any future connections</EM> - created using that key</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is partly counterbalanced by the fact that the key is never - transmitted and remains under your control at all times. It is likely - necessary, however, to take account of this in setting security policy. - For example, you should change gateway keys when an administrator - leaves the company, and should change them periodically in any case.</P> -<P>Overall, public key methods are<STRONG> more secure, more easily - managed and more flexible</STRONG>. We recommend that they be used for - all connections, unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.</P> -<H2><A name="prodsecrets">Using shared secrets in production</A></H2> -<P>Generally, public key methods are preferred for reasons given above, - but shared secrets can be used with no loss of security, just more work - and perhaps more need to take precautions.</P> -<P>What I call "shared secrets" are sometimes also called "pre-shared - keys". They are used only for for authentication, never for encryption. - Calling them "pre-shared keys" has confused some users into thinking - they were encryption keys, so I prefer to avoid the term..</P> -<P>If you are interoperating with another IPsec implementation, you may - find its documentation calling them "passphrases".</P> -<H3><A name="secrets">Putting secrets in ipsec.secrets(5)</A></H3> -<P>If shared secrets are to be used to<A href="#authentication"> - authenticate</A> communication for the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> - key exchange in the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> protocol, then those secrets - must be stored in<VAR> /etc/ipsec.secrets</VAR>. For details, see the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A> man page.</P> -<P>A few considerations are vital:</P> -<UL> -<LI>make the secrets long and unguessable. Since they need not be - remembered by humans, very long ugly strings may be used. We suggest - using our<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> ipsec_ranbits(8)</A> - utility to generate long (128 bits or more) random strings.</LI> -<LI>transmit secrets securely. You have to share them with other - systems, but you lose if they are intercepted and used against you. Use<A -href="#PGP"> PGP</A>,<A href="#ssh"> SSH</A>, hand delivery of a floppy - disk which is then destroyed, or some other trustworthy method to - deliver them.</LI> -<LI>store secrets securely, in root-owned files with permissions - rw------.</LI> -<LI>limit sharing of secrets. Alice, Bob, Carol and Dave may all talk to - each other, but only Alice and Bob should know the secret for an - Alice-Bob link.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>do not share private keys</STRONG>. The private key for RSA - authentication of your system is stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A>, but it is a different class of secret from the - pre-shared keys used for the "shared secret" authentication. No-one but - you should have the RSA private key.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Each line has the IP addresses of the two gateways plus the secret. - It should look something like this:</P> -<PRE> 10.0.0.1 11.0.0.1 : PSK "jxTR1lnmSjuj33n4W51uW3kTR55luUmSmnlRUuWnkjRj3UuTV4T3USSu23Uk55nWu5TkTUnjT"</PRE> -<P><VAR>PSK</VAR> indicates the use of a<STRONG> p</STRONG>re-<STRONG>s</STRONG> -hared<STRONG> k</STRONG>ey. The quotes and the whitespace shown are - required.</P> -<P>You can use any character string as your secret. For security, it - should be both long and extremely hard to guess. We provide a utility - to generate such strings,<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> - ipsec_ranbits(8)</A>.</P> -<P>You want the same secret on the two gateways used, so you create a - line with that secret and the two gateway IP addresses. The - installation process supplies an example secret, useful<EM> only</EM> - for testing. You must change it for production use.</P> -<H3><A name="securing.secrets">File security</A></H3> -<P>You must deliver this file, or the relevant part of it, to the other - gateway machine by some<STRONG> secure</STRONG> means.<EM> Don't just - FTP or mail the file!</EM> It is vital that the secrets in it remain - secret. An attacker who knew those could easily have<EM> all the data - on your "secure" connection</EM>.</P> -<P>This file must be owned by root and should have permissions<VAR> - rw-------</VAR>.</P> -<H3><A name="notroadshared">Shared secrets for road warriors</A></H3> -<P>You can use a shared secret to support a single road warrior - connecting to your gateway, and this is a reasonable thing to do in - some circumstances. Public key methods have advantages, discussed<A href="#choose"> - above</A>, but they are not critical in this case.</P> -<P>To do this, the line in ipsec.secrets(5) is something like:</P> -<PRE> 10.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 : PSK "jxTR1lnmSjuj33n4W51uW3kTR55luUmSmnlRUuWnkjRj3UuTV4T3USSu23Uk55nWu5TkTUnjT"</PRE> - where the<VAR> 0.0.0.0</VAR> means that any IP address is acceptable. -<P><STRONG>For more than one road warrior, shared secrets are<EM> not</EM> - recommended.</STRONG> If shared secrets are used, then when the - responder needs to look up the secret, all it knows about the sender is - an IP address. This is fine if the sender is at a fixed IP address - specified in the config file. It is also fine if only one road warrior - uses the wildcard<VAR> 0.0.0.0</VAR> address. However, if you have more - than one road warrior using shared secret authentication, then they - must all use that wildcard and therefore<STRONG> all road warriors - using PSK autentication must use the same secret</STRONG>. Obviously, - this is insecure.</P> -<P><STRONG>For multiple road warriors, use public key authentication.</STRONG> - Each roadwarrior can then have its own identity (our<VAR> leftid=</VAR> - or<VAR> rightid=</VAR> parameters), its own public/private key pair, - and its own secure connection.</P> -<H2><A name="prodman">Using manual keying in production</A></H2> -<P>Generally,<A href="#auto"> automatic keying</A> is preferred over<A href="#manual"> - manual keying</A> for production use because it is both easier to - manage and more secure. Automatic keying frees the admin from much of - the burden of managing keys securely, and can provide<A href="#PFS"> - perfect forward secrecy</A>. This is discussed in more detail<A href="#man-auto"> - above</A>.</P> -<P>However, it is possible to use manual keying in production if that is - what you want to do. This might be necessary, for example, in order to - interoperate with some device that either does not provide automatic - keying or provides it in some version we cannot talk to.</P> -<P>Note that with manual keying<STRONG> all security rests with the keys</STRONG> -. If an adversary acquires your keys, you've had it. He or she can read - everything ever sent with those keys, including old messages he or she - may have archived.</P> -<P>You need to<STRONG> be really paranoid about keys</STRONG> if you're - going to rely on manual keying for anything important.</P> -<UL> -<LI>keep keys in files with 600 permissions, owned by root</LI> -<LI>be extremely careful about security of your gateway systems. Anyone - who breaks into a gateway and gains root privileges can get all your - keys and read everything ever encrypted with those keys, both old - messages he has archived and any new ones you may send.</LI> -<LI>change keys regularly. This can be a considerable bother, (and - provides an excellent reason to consider automatic keying instead), but - it is<EM> absolutely essential</EM> for security. Consider a manually - keyed system in which you leave the same key in place for months: -<UL> -<LI>an attacker can have a very large sample of text sent with that key - to work with. This makes various cryptographic attacks much more likely - to succeed.</LI> -<LI>The chances of the key being compromised in some non-cryptographic - manner -- a spy finds it on a discarded notepad, someone breaks into - your server or your building and steals it, a staff member is bribed, - tricked, seduced or coerced into revealing it, etc. -- also increase - over time.</LI> -<LI>a successful attacker can read everything ever sent with that key. - This makes any successful attack extremely damaging.</LI> -</UL> - It is clear that you must change keys often to have any useful - security. The only question is how often.</LI> -<LI>use<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> or<A href="#ssh"> SSH</A> for all key - transfers</LI> -<LI>don't edit files with keys in them when someone can look over your - shoulder</LI> -<LI>worry about network security; could someone get keys by snooping - packets on the LAN between your X desktop and the gateway?</LI> -<LI>lock up your backup tapes for the gateway system</LI> -<LI>... and so on</LI> -</UL> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN provides some facilities to help with this. In - particular, it is good policy to<STRONG> keep keys in separate files</STRONG> - so you can edit configuration information in /etc/ipsec.conf without - exposing keys to "shoulder surfers" or network snoops. We support this - with the<VAR> also=</VAR> and<VAR> include</VAR> syntax in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<P>See the last example in our<A href="examples"> examples</A> file. In - the /etc/ipsec.conf<VAR> conn samplesep</VAR> section, it has the line:</P> -<PRE> also=samplesep-keys</PRE> -<P>which tells the "ipsec manual" script to insert the configuration - description labelled "samplesep-keys" if it can find it. The - /etc/ipsec.conf file must also have a line such as:</P> -<PRE>include ipsec.*.conf</PRE> -<P>which tells it to read other files. One of those other files then - might contain the additional data:</P> -<PRE>conn samplesep-keys - spi=0x200 - esp=3des-md5-96 - espenckey=0x01234567_89abcdef_02468ace_13579bdf_12345678_9abcdef0 - espauthkey=0x12345678_9abcdef0_2468ace0_13579bdf</PRE> -<P>The first line matches the label in the "also=" line, so the indented - lines are inserted. The net effect is exactly as if the inserted lines - had occurred in the original file in place of the "also=" line.</P> -<P>Variables set here are:</P> -<DL> -<DT>spi</DT> -<DD>A number needed by the manual keying code. Any 3-digit hex number - will do, but if you have more than one manual connection then<STRONG> - spi must be different</STRONG> for each connection.</DD> -<DT>esp</DT> -<DD>Options for<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> (Encapsulated Security Payload), - the usual IPsec encryption mode. Settings here are for<A href="#encryption"> - encryption</A> using<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A> and<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> using<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A>. Note that encryption - without authentication should not be used; it is insecure.</DD> -<DT>espenkey</DT> -<DD>Key for ESP encryption. Here, a 192-bit hex number for triple DES.</DD> -<DT>espauthkey</DT> -<DD>Key for ESP authentication. Here, a 128-bit hex number for MD5.</DD> -</DL> -<P><STRONG>Note</STRONG> that the<STRONG> example keys we supply</STRONG> - are intended<STRONG> only for testing</STRONG>. For real use, you - should go to automatic keying. If that is not possible, create your own - keys for manual mode and keep them secret</P> -<P>Of course, any files containing keys<STRONG> must</STRONG> have 600 - permissions and be owned by root.</P> -<P>If you connect in this way to multiple sites, we recommend that you - keep keys for each site in a separate file and adopt some naming - convention that lets you pick them all up with a single "include" line. - This minimizes the risk of losing several keys to one error or attack - and of accidentally giving another site admin keys which he or she has - no business knowing.</P> -<P>Also note that if you have multiple manually keyed connections on a - single machine, then the<VAR> spi</VAR> parameter must be different for - each one. Any 3-digit hex number is OK, provided they are different for - each connection. We reserve the range 0x100 to 0xfff for manual - connections. Pluto assigns SPIs from 0x1000 up for automatically keyed - connections.</P> -<P>If<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> contains - keys for manual mode connections, then it too must have permissions<VAR> - rw-------</VAR>. We recommend instead that, if you must manual keying - in production, you keep the keys in separate files.</P> -<P>Note also that<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A> - is installed with permissions<VAR> rw-r--r--</VAR>. If you plan to use - manually keyed connections for anything more than initial testing, you<B> - must</B>:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either change permissions to<VAR> rw-------</VAR></LI> -<LI>or store keys separately in secure files and access them via include - statements in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We recommend the latter method for all but the simplest - configurations.</P> -<H3><A name="ranbits">Creating keys with ranbits</A></H3> -<P>You can create new<A href="#random"> random</A> keys with the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> - ranbits(8)</A> utility. For example, the commands:</P> -<PRE> umask 177 - ipsec ranbits 192 > temp - ipsec ranbits 128 >> temp</PRE> -<P>create keys in the sizes needed for our default algorithms:</P> -<UL> -<LI>192-bit key for<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A> encryption -<BR> (only 168 bits are used; parity bits are ignored)</LI> -<LI>128-bit key for keyed<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> authentication</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you want to use<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A> instead of<A href="#MD5"> - MD5</A>, that requires a 160-bit key</P> -<P>Note that any<STRONG> temporary files</STRONG> used must be kept<STRONG> - secure</STRONG> since they contain keys. That is the reason for the - umask command above. The temporary file should be deleted as soon as - you are done with it. You may also want to change the umask back to its - default value after you are finished working on keys.</P> -<P>The ranbits utility may pause for a few seconds if not enough entropy - is available immediately. See ipsec_ranbits(8) and random(4) for - details. You may wish to provide some activity to feed entropy into the - system. For example, you might move the mouse around, type random - characters, or do<VAR> du /usr > /dev/null</VAR> in the background.</P> -<H2><A name="boot">Setting up connections at boot time</A></H2> -<P>You can tell the system to set up connections automatically at boot - time by putting suitable stuff in /etc/ipsec.conf on both systems. The - relevant section of the file is labelled by a line reading<VAR> config - setup</VAR>.</P> -<P>Details can be found in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> man page. We also provide a file of<A href="examples"> - example configurations</A>.</P> -<P>The most likely options are something like:</P> -<DL> -<DT>interfaces="ipsec0=eth0 ipsec1=ppp0"</DT> -<DD>Tells KLIPS which interfaces to use. Up to four interfaces numbered - ipsec[0-3] are supported. Each interface can support an arbitrary - number of tunnels. -<P>Note that for PPP, you give the ppp[0-9] device name here, not the - underlying device such as modem (or eth1 if you are using PPPoE).</P> -</DD> -<DT>interfaces=%defaultroute</DT> -<DD>Alternative setting, useful in simple cases. KLIPS will pick up both - its interface and the next hop information from the settings of the - Linux default route.</DD> -<DT>forwardcontrol=no</DT> -<DD>Normally "no". Set to "yes" if the IP forwarding option is disabled - in your network configuration. (This can be set as a kernel - configuration option or later. e.g. on Redhat, it's in - /etc/sysconfig/network and on SuSE you can adjust it with Yast.) Linux - FreeS/WAN will then enable forwarding when starting up and turn it off - when going down. This is used to ensure that no packets will be - forwarded before IPsec comes up and takes control.</DD> -<DT>syslog=daemon.error</DT> -<DD>Used in messages to the system logging daemon (syslogd) to specify - what type of software is sending the messages. If the settings are - "daemon.error" as in our example, then syslogd treats the messages as - error messages from a daemon. -<P>Note that<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> does not currently pay attention - to this variable. The variable controls setup messages only.</P> -</DD> -<DT>klipsdebug=</DT> -<DD>Debug settings for<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A>.</DD> -<DT>plutodebug=</DT> -<DD>Debug settings for<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A>.</DD> -<DT>... for both the above DEBUG settings</DT> -<DD>Normally, leave empty as shown above for no debugging output. -<BR> Use "all" for maximum information. -<BR> See ipsec_klipsdebug(8) and ipsec_pluto(8) man page for other - options. Beware that if you set /etc/ipsec.conf to enable debug output, - your system's log files may get large quickly.</DD> -<DT>dumpdir=/safe/directory</DT> -<DD>Normally, programs started by ipsec setup don't crash. If they do, - by default, no core dump will be produced because such dumps would - contain secrets. If you find you need to debug such crashes, you can - set dumpdir to the name of a directory in which to collect the core - file.</DD> -<DT>manualstart=</DT> -<DD>List of manually keyed connections to be automatically started at - boot time. Useful for testing, but not for long term use. Connections - which are automatically started should also be automatically re-keyed.</DD> -<DT>pluto=yes</DT> -<DD>Whether to start<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> when ipsec startup is - done. -<BR> This parameter is optional and defaults to "yes" if not present. -<P>"yes" is strongly recommended for production use so that the keying - daemon (Pluto) will automatically re-key the connections regularly. The - ipsec-auto parameters ikelifetime, ipseclifetime and reykeywindow give - you control over frequency of rekeying.</P> -</DD> -<DT>plutoload="reno-van reno-adam reno-nyc"</DT> -<DD>List of tunnels (by name, e.g. fred-susan or reno-van in our - examples) to be loaded into Pluto's internal database at startup. In - this example, Pluto loads three tunnels into its database when it is - started. -<P>If plutoload is "%search", Pluto will load any connections whose - description includes "auto=add" or "auto=start".</P> -</DD> -<DT>plutostart="reno-van reno-adam reno-nyc"</DT> -<DD>List of tunnels to attempt to negotiate when Pluto is started. -<P>If plutostart is "%search", Pluto will start any connections whose - description includes "auto=start".</P> -<P>Note that, for a connection intended to be permanent,<STRONG> both - gateways should be set try to start</STRONG> the tunnel. This allows - quick recovery if either gateway is rebooted or has its IPsec - restarted. If only one gateway is set to start the tunnel and the other - gateway restarts, the tunnel may not be rebuilt.</P> -</DD> -<DT>plutowait=no</DT> -<DD>Controls whether Pluto waits for one tunnel to be established before - starting to negotiate the next. You might set this to "yes" -<UL> -<LI>if your gateway is a very limited machine and you need to conserve - resources.</LI> -<LI>for debugging; the logs are clearer if only one connection is - brought up at a time</LI> -</UL> - For a busy and resource-laden production gateway, you likely want "no" - so that connections are brought up in parallel and the whole process - takes less time.</DD> -</DL> -<P>The example assumes you are at the Reno office and will use IPsec to - Vancouver, New York City and Amsterdam.</P> -<H2><A name="multitunnel">Multiple tunnels between the same two gateways</A> -</H2> -<P>Consider a pair of subnets, each with a security gateway, connected - via the Internet:</P> -<PRE> 192.168.100.0/24 left subnet - | - 192.168.100.1 - North Gateway - 101.101.101.101 left - | - 101.101.101.1 left next hop - [Internet] - 202.202.202.1 right next hop - | - 202.202.202.202 right - South gateway - 192.168.200.1 - | - 192.168.200.0/24 right subnet</PRE> -<P>A tunnel specification such as:</P> -<PRE>conn northnet-southnet - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24 - leftfirewall=yes - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1 - rightsubnet=192.168.200.0/24 - rightfirewall=yes</PRE> - will allow machines on the two subnets to talk to each other. You might - test this by pinging from polarbear (192.168.100.7) to penguin - (192.168.200.5). -<P>However,<STRONG> this does not cover other traffic you might want to - secure</STRONG>. To handle all the possibilities, you might also want - these connection descriptions:</P> -<PRE>conn northgate-southnet - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1 - rightsubnet=192.168.200.0/24 - rightfirewall=yes - -conn northnet-southgate - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24 - leftfirewall=yes - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1</PRE> -<P>Without these, neither gateway can do IPsec to the remote subnet. - There is no IPsec tunnel or eroute set up for the traffic.</P> -<P>In our example, with the non-routable 192.168.* addresses used, - packets would simply be discarded. In a different configuration, with - routable addresses for the remote subnet,<STRONG> they would be sent - unencrypted</STRONG> since there would be no IPsec eroute and there - would be a normal IP route.</P> -<P>You might also want:</P> -<PRE>conn northgate-southgate - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1</PRE> -<P>This is required if you want the two gateways to speak IPsec to each - other.</P> -<P>This requires a lot of duplication of details. Judicious use of<VAR> - also=</VAR> and<VAR> include</VAR> can reduce this problem.</P> -<P>Note that, while FreeS/WAN supports all four tunnel types, not all - implementations do. In particular, some versions of Windows 2000 and - the freely downloadable version of PGP provide only "client" - functionality. You cannot use them as gateways with a subnet behind - them. To get that functionality, you must upgrade to Windows 2000 - server or the commercially available PGP products.</P> -<H3><A name="advroute">One tunnel plus advanced routing</A></H3> - It is also possible to use the new routing features in 2.2 and later - kernels to avoid most needs for multple tunnels. Here is one mailing - list message on the topic: -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPSec packets not entering tunnel? - Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 - From: Justin Guyett <jfg@sonicity.com> - -On Mon, 20 Nov 2000, Claudia Schmeing wrote: - -> Right Left -> "home" "office" -> 10.92.10.0/24 ---- 24.93.85.110 ========= 216.175.164.91 ---- 10.91.10.24/24 -> -> I've created all four tunnels, and can ping to test each of them, -> *except* homegate-officenet. - -I keep wondering why people create all four tunnels. Why not route -traffic generated from home to 10.91.10.24/24 out ipsec0 with iproute2? -And 99% of the time you don't need to access "office" directly, which -means you can eliminate all but the subnet<->subnet connection.</PRE> - and FreeS/WAN technical lead Henry Spencer's comment: -<PRE>> I keep wondering why people create all four tunnels. Why not route -> traffic generated from home to 10.91.10.24/24 out ipsec0 with iproute2? - -This is feasible, given some iproute2 attention to source addresses, but -it isn't something we've documented yet... (partly because we're still -making some attempt to support 2.0.xx kernels, which can't do this, but -mostly because we haven't caught up with it yet). - -> And 99% of the time you don't need to access "office" directly, which -> means you can eliminate all but the subnet<->subnet connection. - -Correct in principle, but people will keep trying to ping to or from the -gateways during testing, and sometimes they want to run services on the -gateway machines too.</PRE> - -<!-- Is this in the right spot in this document? --> -<H2><A name="opp.gate">An Opportunistic Gateway</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_1">Start from full opportunism</A></H3> -<P>Full opportunism allows you to initiate and receive opportunistic - connections on your machine. The remaining instructions in this section - assume you have first set up full opportunism on your gateway using<A HREF="#opp.incoming"> - these instructions</A>. Both sets of instructions require mailing DNS - records to your ISP. Collect DNS records for both the gateway (above) - and the subnet nodes (below) before contacting your ISP.</P> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_2">Reverse DNS TXT records for each protected machine</A> -</H3> -<P>You need these so that your Opportunistic peers can:</P> -<UL> -<LI>discover the gateway's address, knowing only the IP address that - packets are bound for</LI> -<LI>verify that the gateway is authorised to encrypt for that endpoint</LI> -</UL> -<P>On the gateway, generate a TXT record with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt 192.0.2.11</PRE> -<P>Use your gateway address in place of 192.0.2.11.</P> -<P>You should see (keys are trimmed for clarity throughout our example):</P> -<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<P><B>This MUST BE the same key as in your gateway's TXT record, or - nothing will work.</B></P> -<P>In a text file, make one copy of this TXT record for each subnet - node:</P> -<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<P>Above each entry, insert a line like this:</P> -<PRE> 98.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR arthur.example.com.</PRE> -<P>It must include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The subnet node's address in reverse map format. For example, - 192.0.2.120 becomes<VAR> 120.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.</VAR>. Note the - final period.</LI> -<LI><VAR>IN PTR</VAR></LI> -<LI>The node's name, ie.<VAR> arthur.example.com.</VAR>. Note the final - period.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The result will be a file of TXT records, like this:</P> -<PRE> 98.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR arthur.example.com. - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - 99.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR ford.example.com. - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - 100.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR trillian.example.com. - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_3">Publish your records</A></H3> -<P>Ask your ISP to publish all the reverse DNS records you have - collected. There may be a delay of up to 48 hours as the records - propagate.</P> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_4">...and test them</A></H3> -<P>Check a couple of records with commands like this one:</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify --host ford.example.com - ipsec verify --host trillian.example.com</PRE> -<P>The<VAR> verify</VAR> command checks for TXT records for both the - subnet host and its gateway. You should see output like:</P> -<PRE> ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 99.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 100.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ...</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_5">No Configuration Needed</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x ships with a built-in, automatically enabled OE - connection<VAR> conn packetdefault</VAR> which applies OE, if possible, - to all outbound traffic routed through the FreeS/WAN box. The<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5) manual</A> describes this connection in detail. While the - effect is much the same as<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR>, the - implementation is different: notably, it does not use policy groups.</P> -<P>You can create more complex OE configurations for traffic forwarded - through a FreeS/WAN box, as explained in our<A HREF="#policygroups"> - policy groups document</A>, or disable OE using<A HREF="#disable_policygroups"> - these instructions</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="extruded.config">Extruded Subnets</A></H2> -<P>What we call<A href="glossary.html#extruded"> extruded subnets</A> - are a special case of<A href="glossary.html#VPN.gloss"> VPNs</A>.</P> -<P>If your buddy has some unused IP addresses, in his subnet far off at - the other side of the Internet, he can loan them to you... provided - that the connection between you and him is fast enough to carry all the - traffic between your machines and the rest of the Internet. In effect, - he "extrudes" a part of his address space over the network to you, with - your Internet traffic appearing to originate from behind his Internet - gateway.</P> -<P>As far as the Internet is concerned, your new extruded net is behind - your buddy's gateway. You route all your packets for the Internet at - large out his gateway, and receive return packets the same way. You - route your local packets locally.</P> -<P>Suppose your friend has a.b.c.0/24 and wants to give you - a.b.c.240/28. The initial situation is:</P> -<PRE> subnet gateway Internet - a.b.c.0/24 a.b.c.1 p.q.r.s</PRE> - where anything from the Internet destined for any machine in a.b.c.0/24 - is routed via p.q.r.s and that gateway knows what to do from there. -<P>Of course it is quite normal for various smaller subnets to exist - behind your friend's gateway. For example, your friend's company might - have a.b.c.16/28=development, a.b.c.32/28=marketing and so on. The - Internet neither knows not cares about this; it just delivers packets - to the p.q.r.s and lets the gateway do whatever needs to be done from - there.</P> -<P>What we want to do is take a subnet, perhaps a.b.c.240/28, out of - your friend's physical location<EM> while still having your friend's - gateway route to it</EM>. As far as the Internet is concerned, you - remain behind that gateway.</P> -<PRE> subnet gateway Internet your gate extruded - - a.b.c.0/24 a.b.c.1 p.q.r.s d.e.f.g a.b.c.240/28 - - ========== tunnel ==========</PRE> -<P>The extruded addresses have to be a complete subnet.</P> -<P>In our example, the friend's security gateway is also his Internet - gateway, but this is not necessary. As long as all traffic from the - Internet to his addresses passes through the Internet gate, the - security gate could be a machine behind that. The IG would need to - route all traffic for the extruded subnet to the SG, and the SG could - handle the rest.</P> -<P>First, configure your subnet using the extruded addresses. Your - security gateway's interface to your subnet needs to have an extruded - address (possibly using a Linux<A href="#virtual"> virtual interface</A> -, if it also has to have a different address). Your gateway needs to - have a route to the extruded subnet, pointing to that interface. The - other machines at your site need to have addresses in that subnet, and - default routes pointing to your gateway.</P> -<P>If any of your friend's machines need to talk to the extruded subnet,<EM> - they</EM> need to have a route for the extruded subnet, pointing at his - gateway.</P> -<P>Then set up an IPsec subnet-to-subnet tunnel between your gateway and - his, with your subnet specified as the extruded subnet, and his subnet - specified as "0.0.0.0/0".</P> -<P>The tunnel description should be:</P> -<PRE>conn extruded - left=p.q.r.s - leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0 - right=d.e.f.g - rightsubnet=a.b.c.0/28</PRE> -<P>If either side was doing firewalling for the extruded subnet before - the IPsec connection is set up, you'll need to poke holes in your<A HREF="#firewall"> - firewall</A> to allow packets through.</P> -<P>And it all just works. Your SG routes traffic for 0.0.0.0/0 -- that - is, the whole Internet -- through the tunnel to his SG, which then - sends it onward as if it came from his subnet. When traffic for the - extruded subnet arrives at his SG, it gets sent through the tunnel to - your SG, which passes it to the right machine.</P> -<P>Remember that when ipsec_manual or ipsec_auto takes a connection - down, it<EM> does not undo the route</EM> it made for that connection. - This lets you take a connection down and bring up a new one, or a - modified version of the old one, without having to rebuild the route it - uses and without any risk of packets which should use IPsec - accidentally going out in the clear. Because the route always points - into KLIPS, the packets will always go there. Because KLIPS temporarily - has no idea what to do with them (no eroute for them), they will be - discarded.</P> -<P>If you<EM> do</EM> want to take the route down, this is what the - "unroute" operation in manual and auto is for. Just do an unroute after - doing the down.</P> -<P>Note that the route for a connection may have replaced an existing - non-IPsec route. Nothing in Linux FreeS/WAN will put that pre-IPsec - route back. If you need it back, you have to create it with the route - command.</P> -<H2><A name="roadvirt">Road Warrior with virtual IP address</A></H2> -<P>Please note that<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A> now features DHCP-over-IPsec, which is an alternate - procedure for Virtual IP address assignment.</P> -<P></P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message about another way to configure for - road warrior support:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: understanding the vpn - Date: Thu, 28 Oct 1999 10:43:22 -0400 - From: Irving Reid <irving@nevex.com> - -> local-------linux------internet------mobile -> LAN box user -> ... - -> now when the mobile user connects to the linux box -> it is given a virtual IP address, i have configured it to -> be in the 10.x.x.x range. mobile user and linux box -> have a tunnel between them with these IP addresses. - -> Uptil this all is fine. - -If it is possible to configure your mobile client software *not* to -use a virtual IP address, that will make your life easier. It is easier -to configure FreeS/WAN to use the actual address the mobile user gets -from its ISP. - -Unfortunately, some Windows clients don't let you choose. - -> what i would like to know is that how does the mobile -> user communicate with other computers on the local -> LAN , of course with the vpn ? - -> what IP address should the local LAN -> computers have ? I guess their default gateway -> should be the linux box ? and does the linux box need -> to be a 2 NIC card box or one is fine. - -As someone else stated, yes, the Linux box would usually be the default -IP gateway for the local lan. - -However... - -If you mobile user has software that *must* use a virtual IP address, -the whole picture changes. Nobody has put much effort into getting -FreeS/WAN to play well in this environment, but here's a sketch of one -approach: - -Local Lan 1.0.0.0/24 - | - +- Linux FreeS/WAN 1.0.0.2 - | - | 1.0.0.1 - Router - | 2.0.0.1 - | -Internet - | - | 3.0.0.1 -Mobile User - Virtual Address: 1.0.0.3 - -Note that the Local Lan network (1.0.0.x) can be registered, routable -addresses. - -Now, the Mobile User sets up an IPSec security association with the -Linux box (1.0.0.2); it should ESP encapsulate all traffic to the -network 1.0.0.x **EXCEPT** UDP port 500. 500/udp is required for the key -negotiation, which needs to work outside of the IPSec tunnel. - -On the Linux side, there's a bunch of stuff you need to do by hand (for -now). FreeS/WAN should correctly handle setting up the IPSec SA and -routes, but I haven't tested it so this may not work... - -The FreeS/WAN conn should look like: - -conn mobile - right=1.0.0.2 - rightsubnet=1.0.0.0/24 - rightnexthop=1.0.0.1 - left=0.0.0.0 # The infamous "road warrior" - leftsubnet=1.0.0.3/32 - -Note that the left subnet contains *only* the remote host's virtual -address. - -Hopefully the routing table on the FreeS/WAN box ends up looking like -this: - -% netstat -rn -Kernel IP routing table -Destination Gateway Genmask Flags MSS Window irtt Iface -1.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 U 1500 0 0 eth0 -127.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 U 3584 0 0 lo -0.0.0.0 1.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 UG 1500 0 0 eth0 -1.0.0.3 1.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 UG 1433 0 0 ipsec0 - -So, if anybody sends a packet for 1.0.0.3 to the Linux box, it should -get bundled up and sent through the tunnel. To get the packets for -1.0.0.3 to the Linux box in the first place, you need to use "proxy -ARP". - -How this works is: when a host or router on the local Ethernet segment -wants to send a packet to 1.0.0.3, it sends out an Ethernet level -broadcast "ARP request". If 1.0.0.3 was on the local LAN, it would -reply, saying "send IP packets for 1.0.0.3 to my Ethernet address". - -Instead, you need to set up the Linux box so that _it_ answers ARP -requests for 1.0.0.3, even though that isn't its IP address. That -convinces everyone else on the lan to send 1.0.0.3 packets to the Linux -box, where the usual FreeS/WAN processing and routing take over. - -% arp -i eth0 -s 1.0.0.3 -D eth0 pub - -This says, if you see an ARP request on interface eth0 asking for -1.0.0.3, respond with the Ethernet address of interface eth0. - -Now, as I said at the very beginning, if it is *at all* possible to -configure your client *not* to use the virtual IP address, you can avoid -this whole mess.</PRE> -<H2><A name="dynamic">Dynamic Network Interfaces</A></H2> -<P>Sometimes you have to cope with a situation where the network - interface(s) aren't all there at boot. The common example is notebooks - with PCMCIA.</P> -<H3><A name="basicdyn">Basics</A></H3> -<P>The key issue here is that the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section of the<VAR> - /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR> configuration file lists the connection between - ipsecN and hardware interfaces, in the<VAR> interfaces=</VAR> variable. - At any time when<VAR> ipsec setup start</VAR> or<VAR> ipsec setup - restart</VAR> is run this variable<STRONG> must</STRONG> correspond to - the current real situation. More precisely, it<STRONG> must not</STRONG> - mention any hardware interfaces which don't currently exist. The - difficulty is that an<VAR> ipsec setup start</VAR> command is normally - run at boot time so interfaces that are not up then are mis-handled.</P> -<H3><A name="bootdyn">Boot Time</A></H3> -<P>Normally, an<VAR> ipsec setup start</VAR> is run at boot time. - However, if the hardware situation at boot time is uncertain, one of - two things must be done.</P> -<UL> -<LI>One possibility is simply not to have IPsec brought up at boot time. - To do this: -<PRE> chkconfig --level 2345 ipsec off</PRE> - That's for modern Red Hats or other Linuxes with chkconfig. Systems - which lack this will require fiddling with symlinks in /etc/rc.d/rc?.d - or the equivalent.</LI> -<LI>Another possibility is to bring IPsec up with no interfaces, which - is less aesthetically satisfying but simpler. Just put -<PRE> interfaces=</PRE> - in the configuration file. KLIPS and Pluto will be started, but won't - do anything.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="changedyn">Change Time</A></H3> -<P>When the hardware *is* in place, IPsec has to be made aware of it. - Someday there may be a nice way to do this.</P> -<P>Right now, the way to do it is to fix the<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR> - file appropriately, so<VAR> interfaces</VAR> reflects the new - situation, and then restart the IPsec subsystem. This does break any - existing IPsec connections.</P> -<P>If IPsec wasn't brought up at boot time, do</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup start</PRE> - while if it was, do -<PRE> ipsec setup restart</PRE> - which won't be as quick. -<P>If some of the hardware is to be taken out, before doing that, amend - the configuration file so interfaces no longer includes it, and do</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup restart</PRE> -<P>Again, this breaks any existing connections.</P> -<H2><A name="unencrypted">Unencrypted tunnels</A></H2> -<P>Sometimes you might want to create a tunnel without encryption. Often - this is a bad idea, even if you have some data which need not be - private. See this<A href="#traffic.resist"> discussion</A>.</P> -<P>The IPsec protocols provide two ways to do build such tunnels:</P> -<DL> -<DT>using ESP with null encryption</DT> -<DD>not supported by FreeS/WAN</DD> -<DT>using<A href="#AH"> AH</A> without<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A></DT> -<DD>supported for manually keyed connections</DD> -<DD>possible with explicit commands via<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html"> - ipsec_whack(8)</A> (see this<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00190.html"> - list message</A>)</DD> -<DD>not supported in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html"> - ipsec_auto(8)</A> scripts.</DD> -</DL> - One situation in which this comes up is when otherwise some data would - be encrypted twice. Alice wants a secure tunnel from her machine to - Bob's. Since she's behind one security gateway and he's behind another, - part of the tunnel that they build passes through the tunnel that their - site admins have built between the gateways. All of Alice and Bob's - messages are encrypted twice. -<P>There are several ways to handle this.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Just accept the overhead of double encryption. The site admins might - choose this if any of the following apply: -<UL> -<LI>policy says encrypt everything (usually, it should)</LI> -<LI>they don't entirely trust Alice and Bob (usually, if they don't have - to, they shouldn't)</LI> -<LI>if they don't feel the saved cycles are worth the time they'd need - to build a non-encrypted tunnel for Alice and Bob's packets (often, - they aren't)</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Use a plain IP-in-IP tunnel. These are not well documented. A good - starting point is in the Linux kernel source tree, in - /usr/src/linux/drivers/net/README.tunnel.</LI> -<LI>Use a manually-keyed AH-only tunnel.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that if Alice and Bob want end-to-end security, they must build - a tunnel end-to-end between their machines or use some other end-to-end - tool such as PGP or SSL that suits their data. The only question is - whether the admins build some special unencrypted tunnel for those - already-encrypted packets.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="install">Installing FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P>This document will teach you how to install Linux FreeS/WAN. If your - distribution comes with Linux FreeS/WAN, we offer tips to get you - started.</P> -<H2><A NAME="15_1">Requirements</A></H2> -<P>To install FreeS/WAN you must:</P> -<UL> -<LI>be running Linux with the 2.4 or 2.2 kernel series. See this<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php#contact"> - kernel compatibility table</A>. -<BR>We also have experimental support for 2.6 kernels. Here are two - basic approaches: -<UL> -<LI> install FreeS/WAN, including its<A HREF="#parts"> KLIPS</A> kernel - code. This will remove the native IPsec stack and replace it with - KLIPS.</LI> -<LI> install the FreeS/WAN<A HREF="#parts"> userland tools</A> (keying - daemon and supporting scripts) for use with<A HREF="http://lartc.org/howto/lartc.ipsec.html"> - 2.6 kernel native IPsec</A>,</LI> -</UL> - See also these<A HREF="2.6.known-issues"> known issues with 2.6</A>.</LI> -<LI>have root access to your Linux box</LI> -<LI>choose the version of FreeS/WAN you wish to install based on<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - mailing list reports</A> -<!-- or -our updates page (coming soon)--> -</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="15_2">Choose your install method</A></H2> -<P>There are three basic ways to get FreeS/WAN onto your system:</P> -<UL> -<LI>activating and testing a FreeS/WAN that<A HREF="#distroinstall"> - shipped with your Linux distribution</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rpminstall">RPM install</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#srcinstall">Install from source</A></LI> -</UL> -<A NAME="distroinstall"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_3">FreeS/WAN ships with some Linuxes</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN comes with<A HREF="#distwith"> these distributions</A>.</P> -<P>If you're running one of these, include FreeS/WAN in the choices you - make during installation, or add it later using the distribution's - tools.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_3_1">FreeS/WAN may be altered...</A></H3> -<P>Your distribution may have integrated extra features, such as Andreas - Steffen's X.509 patch, into FreeS/WAN. It may also use custom startup - script locations or directory names.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_3_2">You might need to create an authentication keypair</A> -</H3> -<P>If your FreeS/WAN came with your distribution, you may wish to - generate a fresh RSA key pair. FreeS/WAN will use these keys for - authentication.</P> -<P> To do this, become root, and type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec newhostkey --output /etc/ipsec.secrets --hostname xy.example.com - chmod 600 /etc/ipsec.secrets</PRE> -<P>where you replace xy.example.com with your machine's fully-qualified - domain name. Generate some randomness, for example by wiggling your - mouse, to speed the process.</P> -<P>The resulting ipsec.secrets looks like:</P> -<PRE>: RSA { - # RSA 2192 bits xy.example.com Sun Jun 8 13:42:19 2003 - # for signatures only, UNSAFE FOR ENCRYPTION - #pubkey=0sAQOFppfeE3cC7wqJi... - Modulus: 0x85a697de137702ef0... - # everything after this point is secret - PrivateExponent: 0x16466ea5033e807... - Prime1: 0xdfb5003c8947b7cc88759065... - Prime2: 0x98f199b9149fde11ec956c814... - Exponent1: 0x9523557db0da7a885af90aee... - Exponent2: 0x65f6667b63153eb69db8f300dbb... - Coefficient: 0x90ad00415d3ca17bebff123413fc518... - } -# do not change the indenting of that "}"</PRE> -<P>In the actual file, the strings are much longer.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_3_3">Start and test FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>You can now<A HREF="#starttest"> start FreeS/WAN and test whether - it's been successfully installed.</A>.</P> -<A NAME="rpminstall"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_4">RPM install</A></H2> -<P>These instructions are for a recent Red Hat with a stock Red Hat - kernel. We know that Mandrake and SUSE also produce FreeS/WAN RPMs. If - you're running either, install using your distribution's tools.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_1">Download RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Decide which functionality you need:</P> -<UL> -<LI>standard FreeS/WAN RPMs. Use these shortcuts: -<BR> -<UL> -<LI>(for 2.6 kernels: userland only) -<BR> ncftpget - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs/\*userland* -</LI> -<LI>(for 2.4 kernels) -<BR> ncftpget - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs/`uname -r - | tr -d 'a-wy-z'`/\*</LI> -<LI> or view all the offerings at our<A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs"> - FTP site</A>.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>unofficial<A href="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A> RPMs, which include Andreas Steffen's X.509 patch and - more. Super FreeS/WAN RPMs do not currently include<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation</A> (NAT) traversal, but Super FreeS/WAN - source does.</LI> -</UL> -<A NAME="2.6.rpm"></A> -<P>For 2.6 kernels, get the latest FreeS/WAN userland RPM, for example:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-userland-2.04.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<P>Note: FreeS/WAN's support for 2.6 kernel IPsec is preliminary. Please - see<A HREf="2.6.known-issues"> 2.6.known-issues</A>, and the latest<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - mailing list reports</A>.</P> -<P>Change to your new FreeS/WAN directory, and make and install the</P> -<P>For 2.4 kernels, get both kernel and userland RPMs. Check your kernel - version with</P> -<PRE> uname -r</PRE> -<P>Get a kernel module which matches that version. For example:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<P>Note: These modules<B> will only work on the Red Hat kernel they were - built for</B>, since they are very sensitive to small changes in the - kernel.</P> -<P>Get FreeS/WAN utilities to match. For example:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_2">For freeswan.org RPMs: check signatures</A></H3> -<P>While you're at our ftp site, grab the RPM signing key</P> -<PRE> freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>If you're running RedHat 8.x or later, import this key into the RPM - database:</P> -<PRE> rpm --import freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>For RedHat 7.x systems, you'll need to add it to your<A HREF="#PGP"> - PGP</A> keyring:</P> -<PRE> pgp -ka freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>Check the digital signatures on both RPMs using:</P> -<PRE> rpm --checksig freeswan*.rpm </PRE> -<P>You should see that these signatures are good:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK - freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_3">Install the RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Become root:</P> -<PRE> su</PRE> -<P>For a first time install, use:</P> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan*.rpm</PRE> -<P>To upgrade existing RPMs (and keep all .conf files in place), use:</P> -<PRE> rpm -Uvh freeswan*.rpm</PRE> -<P>If you're upgrading from FreeS/WAN 1.x to 2.x RPMs, and encounter - problems, see<A HREF="#upgrading.rpms"> this note</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_4">Start and Test FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Now,<A HREF="#starttest"> start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A>.</P> -<A NAME="srcinstall"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_5">Install from Source</A></H2> - -<!-- Most of this section, along with "Start and Test", can replace -INSTALL. --> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_1">Decide what functionality you need</A></H3> -<P>Your choices are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan">standard FreeS/WAN</A> -,</LI> -<LI>standard FreeS/WAN plus any of these<A HREF="#patch"> user-supported - patches</A>, or</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download">Super FreeS/WAN</A>, an - unofficial FreeS/WAN pre-patched with many of the above. Provides - additional algorithms, X.509, SA deletion, dead peer detection, and<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation</A> (NAT) traversal.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_2">Download FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Download the source tarball you've chosen, along with any patches.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_3">For freeswan.org source: check its signature</A></H3> -<P>While you're at our ftp site, get our source signing key</P> -<PRE> freeswan-sigkey.asc</PRE> -<P>Add it to your PGP keyring:</P> -<PRE> pgp -ka freeswan-sigkey.asc</PRE> -<P>Check the signature using:</P> -<PRE> pgp freeswan-2.04.tar.gz.sig freeswan-2.04.tar.gz</PRE> -<P>You should see something like:</P> -<PRE> Good signature from user "Linux FreeS/WAN Software Team (build@freeswan.org)". - Signature made 2002/06/26 21:04 GMT using 2047-bit key, key ID 46EAFCE1</PRE> - -<!-- Note to self: build@freeswan.org has angled brackets in the original. - Changed because it conflicts with HTML tags. --> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_4">Untar, unzip</A></H3> -<P>As root, unpack your FreeS/WAN source into<VAR> /usr/src</VAR>.</P> -<PRE> su - mv freeswan-2.04.tar.gz /usr/src - cd /usr/src - tar -xzf freeswan-2.04.tar.gz -</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_5">Patch if desired</A></H3> -<P>Now's the time to add any patches. The contributor may have special - instructions, or you may simply use the patch command.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_6">... and Make</A></H3> -<P>Choose one of the methods below.</P> -<H4><A NAME="15_5_6_1">Userland-only Install for 2.6 kernels</A></H4> -<A NAME="2.6.src"></A> -<P>Note: FreeS/WAN's support for 2.6 kernel IPsec is preliminary. Please - see<A HREf="2.6.known-issues"> 2.6.known-issues</A>, and the latest<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - mailing list reports</A>.</P> -<P>Change to your new FreeS/WAN directory, and make and install the - FreeS/WAN userland tools.</P> -<PRE> cd /usr/src/freeswan-2.04 - make programs - make install</PRE> -<P>Now,<A HREF="#starttest"> start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A>.</P> -<H4><A NAME="15_5_6_2">KLIPS install for 2.2, 2.4, or 2.6 kernels</A></H4> -<A NAME="modinstall"></A> -<P>To make a modular version of KLIPS, along with other FreeS/WAN - programs you'll need, use the command sequence below. This will change - to your new FreeS/WAN directory, make the FreeS/WAN module (and other - stuff), and install it all.</P> -<PRE> cd /usr/src/freeswan-2.04 - make oldmod - make minstall</PRE> -<P><A HREF="#starttest">Start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A>.</P> -<P>To link KLIPS statically into your kernel (using your old kernel - settings), and install other FreeS/WAN components, do:</P> -<PRE> cd /usr/src/freeswan-2.04 - make oldmod - make minstall</PRE> -<P>Reboot your system and<A HREF="#testonly"> test your install</A>.</P> -<P>For other ways to compile KLIPS, see our Makefile.</P> -<A name="starttest"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_6">Start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A></H2> -<P>Bring FreeS/WAN up with:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec start</PRE> -<P>This is not necessary if you've rebooted.</P> -<A name="testonly"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_7">Test your install</A></H2> -<P>To check that you have a successful install, run:</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify</PRE> -<P>You should see at least:</P> -<PRE> - Checking your system to see if IPsec got installed and started correctly - Version check and ipsec on-path [OK] - Checking for KLIPS support in kernel [OK] - Checking for RSA private key (/etc/ipsec.secrets) [OK] - Checking that pluto is running [OK] -</PRE> -<P>If any of these first four checks fails, see our<A href="#install.check"> - troubleshooting guide</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="15_8">Making FreeS/WAN play well with others</A></H2> -<P>There are at least a couple of things on your system that might - interfere with FreeS/WAN, and now's a good time to check these:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Firewalling. You need to allow UDP 500 through your firewall, plus - ESP (protocol 50) and AH (protocol 51). For more information, see our - updated firewalls document (coming soon).</LI> -<LI>Network address translation. Do not NAT the packets you will be - tunneling.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="15_9">Configure for your needs</A></H2> -<P>You'll need to configure FreeS/WAN for your local site. Have a look - at our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> opportunism quickstart guide</A> to - see if that easy method is right for your needs. Or, see how to<A HREF="config.html"> - configure a network-to-network or Road Warrior style VPN</A>.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="config">How to configure FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P>This page will teach you how to configure a simple network-to-network - link or a Road Warrior connection between two Linux FreeS/WAN boxes.</P> -<P>See also these related documents:</P> -<UL> -<LI>our<A HREF="#quickstart"> quickstart</A> guide to<A HREF="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A></LI> -<LI>our guide to configuration with<A HREF="#policygroups"> policy - groups</A></LI> -<LI>our<A HREF="#adv_config"> advanced configuration</A> document</LI> -</UL> -<P> The network-to-network setup allows you to connect two office - networks into one Virtual Private Network, while the Road Warrior - connection secures a laptop's telecommute to work. Our examples also - show the basic procedure on the Linux FreeS/WAN side where another - IPsec peer is in play.</P> -<P> Shortcut to<A HREF="#config.netnet"> net-to-net</A>. -<BR> Shortcut to<A HREF="#config.rw"> Road Warrior</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="16_1">Requirements</A></H2> -<P>To configure the network-to-network connection you must have:</P> -<UL> -<LI>two Linux gateways with static IPs</LI> -<LI>a network behind each gate. Networks must have non-overlapping IP - ranges.</LI> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN<A HREF="#install"> installed</A> on both gateways</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org"><VAR>tcpdump</VAR></A> on the local - gate, to test the connection</LI> -</UL> -<P>For the Road Warrior you need:</P> -<UL> -<LI>one Linux box with a static IP</LI> -<LI>a Linux laptop with a dynamic IP</LI> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN installed on both</LI> -<LI>for testing,<VAR> tcpdump</VAR> on your gateway or laptop</LI> -</UL> -<P>If both IPs are dynamic, your situation is a bit trickier. Your best - bet is a variation on the<A HREF="#config.rw"> Road Warrior</A>, as - described in<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00282.html"> - this mailing list message</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="config.netnet"></A>Net-to-Net connection</H2> -<H3><A name="netnet.info.ex">Gather information</A></H3> -<P>For each gateway, compile the following information:</P> -<UL> -<LI>gateway IP</LI> -<LI>IP range of the subnet you will be protecting. This doesn't have to - be your whole physical subnet.</LI> -<LI>a name by which that gateway can identify itself for IPsec - negotiations. Its form is a Fully Qualified Domain Name preceded by an - @ sign, ie. @xy.example.com. -<BR> It does not need to be within a domain that you own. It can be a - made-up name.</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A NAME="16_2_1_1">Get your leftrsasigkey</A></H4> -<P>On your local Linux FreeS/WAN gateway, print your IPsec public key:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --left</PRE> -<P>The output should look like this (with the key shortened for easy - reading):</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Fri Apr 26 15:01:41 2002 - leftrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt...</PRE> -<P>Don't have a key? Use<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html"><VAR> - ipsec newhostkey</VAR></A> to create one.</P> -<H4><A NAME="16_2_1_2">...and your rightrsasigkey</A></H4> -<P>Get a console on the remote side:</P> -<PRE> ssh2 ab.example.com</PRE> -<P>In that window, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --right</PRE> -<P>You'll see something like:</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2192 bits ab.example.com Thu May 16 15:26:20 2002 - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOqH55O...</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_2">Edit<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR></A></H3> -<P>Back on the local gate, copy our template to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR> -. (on Mandrake,<VAR> /etc/freeswan/ipsec.conf</VAR>). Substitute the - information you've gathered for our example data.</P> -<PRE>conn net-to-net - left=192.0.2.2 # Local vitals - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 # - leftid=@xy.example.com # - leftrsasigkey=0s1LgR7/oUM... # - leftnexthop=%defaultroute # correct in many situations - right=192.0.2.9 # Remote vitals - rightsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # - rightid=@ab.example.com # - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOqH55O... # - rightnexthop=%defaultroute # correct in many situations - auto=add # authorizes but doesn't start this - # connection at startup</PRE> -<P> "Left" and "right" should represent the machines that have FreeS/WAN - installed on them, and "leftsubnet" and "rightsubnet" machines that are - being protected. /32 is assumed for left/right and left/rightsubnet - parameters.</P> -<P>Copy<VAR> conn net-to-net</VAR> to the remote-side /etc/ipsec.conf. - If you've made no other modifications to either<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR>, - simply:</P> -<PRE> scp2 ipsec.conf root@ab.example.com:/etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_3">Start your connection</A></H3> -<P>Locally, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --up net-to-net</PRE> -<P>You should see:</P> -<PRE> 104 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I1: initiate - 106 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I2: sent MI2, expecting MR2 - 108 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I3: sent MI3, expecting MR3 - 004 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I4: ISAKMP SA established - 112 "net-net" #224: STATE_QUICK_I1: initiate - 004 "net-net" #224: STATE_QUICK_I2: sent QI2, IPsec SA established</PRE> -<P>The important thing is<VAR> IPsec SA established</VAR>. If you're - unsuccessful, see our<A HREF="#trouble"> troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be tunneled</A></H3> -<P>If you are using<A HREF="#masq"> IP masquerade</A> or<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation (NAT)</A> on either gateway, you must now - exempt the packets you wish to tunnel from this treatment. For example, - if you have a rule like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j MASQUERADE -</PRE> -<P>change it to something like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d \! 192.0.2.128/29 -j MASQUERADE</PRE> -<P>This may be necessary on both gateways.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_5">Test your connection</A></H3> -<P>Sit at one of your local subnet nodes (not the gateway), and ping a - subnet node on the other (again, not the gateway).</P> -<PRE> ping fileserver.toledo.example.com</PRE> -<P>While still pinging, go to the local gateway and snoop your outgoing - interface, for example:</P> -<PRE> tcpdump -i ppp0</PRE> -<P>You want to see ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) packets moving<B> - back and forth</B> between the two gateways at the same frequency as - your pings:</P> -<PRE> 19:16:32.046220 192.0.2.2 > 192.0.2.9: ESP(spi=0x3be6c4dc,seq=0x3) - 19:16:32.085630 192.0.2.9 > 192.0.2.2: ESP(spi=0x5fdd1cf8,seq=0x6)</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations are in order! You have a tunnel - which will protect any IP data from one subnet to the other, as it - passes between the two gates. If not, go and<A HREF="#trouble"> - troubleshoot</A>.</P> -<P>Note: your new tunnel protects only net-net traffic, not - gateway-gateway, or gateway-subnet. If you need this (for example, if - machines on one net need to securely contact a fileserver on the IPsec - gateway), you'll need to create<A HREF="#adv_config"> extra connections</A> -.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_6">Finishing touches</A></H3> -<P>Now that your connection works, name it something sensible, like:</P> -<PRE>conn winstonnet-toledonet</PRE> -<P>To have the tunnel come up on-boot, replace</P> -<PRE> auto=add</PRE> -<P>with:</P> -<PRE> auto=start</PRE> -<P>Copy these changes to the other side, for example:</P> -<PRE> scp2 ipsec.conf root@ab.example.com:/etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>Enjoy!</P> -<H2><A name="config.rw"></A>Road Warrior Configuration</H2> -<H3><A name="rw.info.ex">Gather information</A></H3> -<P>You'll need to know:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the gateway's static IP</LI> -<LI>the IP range of the subnet behind that gateway</LI> -<LI>a name by which each side can identify itself for IPsec - negotiations. Its form is a Fully Qualified Domain Name preceded by an - @ sign, ie. @road.example.com. -<BR> It does not need to be within a domain that you own. It can be a - made-up name.</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A NAME="16_3_1_1">Get your leftrsasigkey...</A></H4> -<P>On your laptop, print your IPsec public key:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --left</PRE> -<P>The output should look like this (with the key shortened for easy - reading):</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2192 bits road.example.com Sun Jun 9 02:45:02 2002 - leftrsasigkey=0sAQPIPN9uI...</PRE> -<P>Don't have a key? See<A HREF="old_config.html#genrsakey"> these - instructions</A>.</P> -<H4><A NAME="16_3_1_2">...and your rightrsasigkey</A></H4> -<P>Get a console on the gateway:</P> -<PRE> ssh2 xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>View the gateway's public key with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --right</PRE> -<P>This will yield something like</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Fri Apr 26 15:01:41 2002 - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt...</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_2">Customize<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR></A></H3> -<P>On your laptop, copy this template to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>. (on - Mandrake,<VAR> /etc/freeswan/ipsec.conf</VAR>). Substitute the - information you've gathered for our example data.</P> -<PRE>conn road - left=%defaultroute # Picks up our dynamic IP - leftnexthop=%defaultroute # - leftid=@road.example.com # Local information - leftrsasigkey=0sAQPIPN9uI... # - right=192.0.2.10 # Remote information - rightsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # - rightid=@xy.example.com # - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt... # - auto=add # authorizes but doesn't start this - # connection at startup</PRE> -<P>The template for the gateway is different. Notice how it reverses<VAR> - left</VAR> and<VAR> right</VAR>, in keeping with our convention that<STRONG> - L</STRONG>eft is<STRONG> L</STRONG>ocal,<STRONG> R</STRONG>ight<STRONG> - R</STRONG>emote. Be sure to switch your rsasigkeys in keeping with - this.</P> -<PRE> ssh2 xy.example.com - vi /etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>and add:</P> -<PRE>conn road - left=192.0.2.2 # Gateway's information - leftid=@xy.example.com # - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 # - leftrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt... # - rightnexthop=%defaultroute # correct in many situations - right=%any # Wildcard: we don't know the laptop's IP - rightid=@road.example.com # - rightrsasigkey=0sAQPIPN9uI... # - auto=add # authorizes but doesn't start this - # connection at startup</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_3">Start your connection</A></H3> -<P>You must start the connection from the Road Warrior side. On your - laptop, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --start net-to-net</PRE> -<P>You should see:</P> -<PRE>104 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I1: initiate -106 "road" #301: STATE_MAIN_I2: sent MI2, expecting MR2 -108 "road" #301: STATE_MAIN_I3: sent MI3, expecting MR3 -004 "road" #301: STATE_MAIN_I4: ISAKMP SA established -112 "road" #302: STATE_QUICK_I1: initiate -004 "road" #302: STATE_QUICK_I2: sent QI2, IPsec SA established</PRE> -<P>Look for<VAR> IPsec SA established</VAR>. If you're unsuccessful, see - our<A HREF="#trouble"> troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be tunneled</A></H3> -<P>If you are using<A HREF="#masq"> IP masquerade</A> or<A HREF="#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation (NAT)</A> on either gateway, you must now - exempt the packets you wish to tunnel from this treatment. For example, - if you have a rule like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j MASQUERADE -</PRE> -<P>change it to something like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d \! 192.0.2.128/29 -j MASQUERADE</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_5">Test your connection</A></H3> -<P>From your laptop, ping a subnet node behind the remote gateway. Do - not choose the gateway itself for this test.</P> -<PRE> ping ns.winston.example.com</PRE> -<P>Snoop the packets exiting the laptop, with a command like:</P> -<PRE> tcpdump -i wlan0</PRE> -<P>You have success if you see (Encapsulating Security Payload) packets - travelling<B> in both directions</B>:</P> -<PRE> 19:16:32.046220 192.0.2.2 > 192.0.2.9: ESP(spi=0x3be6c4dc,seq=0x3) - 19:16:32.085630 192.0.2.9 > 192.0.2.2: ESP(spi=0x5fdd1cf8,seq=0x6)</PRE> -<P>If you do, great! Traffic between your Road Warrior and the net - behind your gateway is protected. If not, see our<A HREF="#trouble"> - troubleshooting hints</A>.</P> -<P>Your new tunnel protects only traffic addressed to the net, not to - the IPsec gateway itself. If you need the latter, you'll want to make - an<A HREF="#adv_config"> extra tunnel.</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_6">Finishing touches</A></H3> -<P>On both ends, name your connection wisely, like:</P> -<PRE>conn mike-to-office</PRE> -<P><B>On the laptop only,</B> replace</P> -<PRE> auto=add</PRE> -<P>with:</P> -<PRE> auto=start</PRE> -<P>so that you'll be connected on-boot.</P> -<P>Happy telecommuting!</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_7">Multiple Road Warriors</A></H3> -<P>If you're using RSA keys, as we did in this example, you can add as - many Road Warriors as you like. The left/rightid parameter lets Linux - FreeS/WAN distinguish between multiple Road Warrior peers, each with - its own public key.</P> -<P>The situation is different for shared secrets (PSK). During a PSK - negotiation, ID information is not available at the time Pluto is - trying to determine which secret to use, so, effectively, you can only - define one Roadwarrior connection. All your PSK road warriors must - therefore share one secret.</P> -<H2><A NAME="16_4">What next?</A></H2> -<P>Using the principles illustrated here, you can try variations such - as:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a telecommuter with a static IP</LI> -<LI>a road warrior with a subnet behind it</LI> -</UL> -<P>Or, look at some of our<A HREF="#adv_config"> more complex - configuration examples.</A>.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="background">Linux FreeS/WAN background</A></H1> -<P>This section discusses a number of issues which have three things in - common:</P> -<UL> -<LI>They are not specifically FreeS/WAN problems</LI> -<LI>You may have to understand them to get FreeS/WAN working right</LI> -<LI>They are not simple questions</LI> -</UL> -<P>Grouping them here lets us provide the explanations some users will - need without unduly complicating the main text.</P> -<P>The explanations here are intended to be adequate for FreeS/WAN - purposes (please comment to the<A href="mail.html"> users mailing list</A> - if you don't find them so), but they are not trying to be complete or - definitive. If you need more information, see the references provided - in each section.</P> -<H2><A name="dns.background">Some DNS background</A></H2> -<P><A href="#carpediem">Opportunistic encryption</A> requires that the - gateway systems be able to fetch public keys, and other IPsec-related - information, from each other's DNS (Domain Name Service) records.</P> -<P><A href="#DNS">DNS</A> is a distributed database that maps names to - IP addresses and vice versa.</P> -<P>Much good reference material is available for DNS, including:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/DNS-HOWTO.html"> DNS HowTo</A> -</LI> -<LI>the standard<A href="#DNS.book"> DNS reference</A> book</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/LDP/nag2/index.html">Linux Network - Administrator's Guide</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nominum.com/resources/whitepapers/bind-white-paper.html"> -BIND overview</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nominum.com/resources/documentation/Bv9ARM.pdf"> -BIND 9 Administrator's Reference</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>We give only a brief overview here, intended to help you use DNS for - FreeS/WAN purposes.</P> -<H3><A name="forward.reverse">Forward and reverse maps</A></H3> -<P>Although the implementation is distributed, it is often useful to - speak of DNS as if it were just two enormous tables:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the forward map: look up a name, get an IP address</LI> -<LI>the reverse map: look up an IP address, get a name</LI> -</UL> -<P>Both maps can optionally contain additional data. For opportunistic - encryption, we insert the data need for IPsec authentication.</P> -<P>A system named gateway.example.com with IP address 10.20.30.40 should - have at least two DNS records, one in each map:</P> -<DL> -<DT>gateway.example.com. IN A 10.20.30.40</DT> -<DD>used to look up the name and get an IP address</DD> -<DT>40.30.20.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR gateway.example.com.</DT> -<DD>used for reverse lookups, looking up an address to get the - associated name. Notice that the digits here are in reverse order; the - actual address is 10.20.30.40 but we use 40.30.20.10 here.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A NAME="17_1_2">Hierarchy and delegation</A></H3> -<P>For both maps there is a hierarchy of DNS servers and a system of - delegating authority so that, for example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the DNS administrator for example.com can create entries of the form<VAR> - name</VAR>.example.com</LI> -<LI>the example.com admin cannot create an entry for counterexample.com; - only someone with authority for .com can do that</LI> -<LI>an admin might have authority for 20.10.in-addr.arpa.</LI> -<LI>in either map, authority can be delegated -<UL> -<LI>the example.com admin could give you authority for - westcoast.example.com</LI> -<LI>the 20.10.in-addr.arpa admin could give you authority for - 30.20.10.in-addr.arpa</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>DNS zones are the units of delegation. There is a hierarchy of zones.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_1_3">Syntax of DNS records</A></H3> -<P>Returning to the example records:</P> -<PRE> gateway.example.com. IN A 10.20.30.40 - 40.30.20.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR gateway.example.com.</PRE> -<P>some syntactic details are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the IN indicates that these records are for<STRONG> In</STRONG> -ternet addresses</LI> -<LI>The final periods in '.com.' and '.arpa.' are required. They - indicate the root of the domain name system.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The capitalised strings after IN indicate the type of record. - Possible types include:</P> -<UL> -<LI><STRONG>A</STRONG>ddress, for forward lookups</LI> -<LI><STRONG>P</STRONG>oin<STRONG>T</STRONG>e<STRONG>R</STRONG>, for - reverse lookups</LI> -<LI><STRONG>C</STRONG>anonical<STRONG> NAME</STRONG>, records to support - aliasing, multiple names for one address</LI> -<LI><STRONG>M</STRONG>ail e<STRONG>X</STRONG>change, used in mail - routing</LI> -<LI><STRONG>SIG</STRONG>nature, used in<A href="#SDNS"> secure DNS</A></LI> -<LI><STRONG>KEY</STRONG>, used in<A href="#SDNS"> secure DNS</A></LI> -<LI><STRONG>T</STRONG>e<STRONG>XT</STRONG>, a multi-purpose record type</LI> -</UL> -<P>To set up for opportunistic encryption, you add some TXT records to - your DNS data. Details are in our<A href="quickstart.html"> quickstart</A> - document.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_1_4">Cacheing, TTL and propagation delay</A></H3> -<P>DNS information is extensively cached. With no caching, a lookup by - your system of "www.freeswan.org" might involve:</P> -<UL> -<LI>your system asks your nameserver for "www.freeswan.org"</LI> -<LI>local nameserver asks root server about ".org", gets reply</LI> -<LI>local nameserver asks .org nameserver about "freeswan.org", gets - reply</LI> -<LI>local nameserver asks freeswan.org nameserver about - "www.freeswan.org", gets reply</LI> -</UL> -<P>However, this can be a bit inefficient. For example, if you are in - the Phillipines, the closest a root server is in Japan. That might send - you to a .org server in the US, and then to freeswan.org in Holland. If - everyone did all those lookups every time they clicked on a web link, - the net would grind to a halt.</P> -<P>Nameservers therefore cache information they look up. When you click - on another link at www.freeswan.org, your local nameserver has the IP - address for that server in its cache, and no further lookups are - required.</P> -<P>Intermediate results are also cached. If you next go to - lists.freeswan.org, your nameserver can just ask the freeswan.org - nameserver for that address; it does not need to query the root or .org - nameservers because it has a cached address for the freeswan.org zone - server.</P> -<P>Of course, like any cacheing mechanism, this can create problems of - consistency. What if the administrator for freeswan.org changes the IP - address, or the authentication key, for www.freeswan.org? If you use - old information from the cache, you may get it wrong. On the other - hand, you cannot afford to look up fresh information every time. Nor - can you expect the freeswan.org server to notify you; that isn't in the - protocols.</P> -<P>The solution that is in the protocols is fairly simple. Cacheable - records are marked with Time To Live (TTL) information. When the time - expires, the caching server discards the record. The next time someone - asks for it, the server fetches a fresh copy. Of course, a server may - also discard records before their TTL expires if it is running out of - cache space.</P> -<P>This implies that there will be some delay before the new version of - a changed record propagates around the net. Until the TTLs on all - copies of the old record expire, some users will see it because that is - what is in their cache. Other users may see the new record immediately - because they don't have an old one cached.</P> -<H2><A name="MTU.trouble">Problems with packet fragmentation</A></H2> -<P>It seems, from mailing list reports, to be moderately common for - problems to crop up in which small packets pass through the IPsec - tunnels just fine but larger packets fail.</P> -<P>These problems are caused by various devices along the way - mis-handling either packet fragments or<A href="#pathMTU"> path MTU - discovery</A>.</P> -<P>IPsec makes packets larger by adding an ESP or AH header. This can - tickle assorted bugs in fragment handling in routers and firewalls, or - in path MTU discovery mechanisms, and cause a variety of symptoms which - are both annoying and, often, quite hard to diagnose.</P> -<P>An explanation from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>The problem is IP fragmentation; more precisely, the problem is that the -second, third, etc. fragments of an IP packet are often difficult for -filtering mechanisms to classify. - -Routers cannot rely on reassembling the packet, or remembering what was in -earlier fragments, because the fragments may be out of order or may even -follow different routes. So any general, worst-case filtering decision -pretty much has to be made on each fragment independently. (If the router -knows that it is the only route to the destination, so all fragments -*must* pass through it, reassembly would be possible... but most routers -don't want to bother with the complications of that.) - -All fragments carry roughly the original IP header, but any higher-level -header is (for IP purposes) just the first part of the packet data... so -only the first fragment carries that. So, for example, on examining the -second fragment of a TCP packet, you could tell that it's TCP, but not -what port number it is destined for -- that information is in the TCP -header, which appears in the first fragment only. - -The result of this classification difficulty is that stupid routers and -over-paranoid firewalls may just throw fragments away. To get through -them, you must reduce your MTU enough that fragmentation will not occur. -(In some cases, they might be willing to attempt reassembly, but have very -limited resources to devote to it, meaning that packets must be small and -fragments few in number, leading to the same conclusion: smaller MTU.)</PRE> -<P>In addition to the problem Henry describes, you may also have trouble - with<A href="#pathMTU"> path MTU discovery</A>.</P> -<P>By default, FreeS/WAN uses a large<A href="#MTU"> MTU</A> for the - ipsec device. This avoids some problems, but may complicate others. - Here's an explanation from Claudia:</P> -<PRE>Here are a couple of pieces of background information. Apologies if you -have seen these already. An excerpt from one of my old posts: - - An MTU of 16260 on ipsec0 is usual. The IPSec device defaults to this - high MTU so that it does not fragment incoming packets before encryption - and encapsulation. If after IPSec processing packets are larger than 1500, - [ie. the mtu of eth0] then eth0 will fragment them. - - Adding IPSec headers adds a certain number of bytes to each packet. - The MTU of the IPSec interface refers to the maximum size of the packet - before the IPSec headers are added. In some cases, people find it helpful - to set ipsec0's MTU to 1500-(IPSec header size), which IIRC is about 1430. - - That way, the resulting encapsulated packets don't exceed 1500. On most - networks, packets less than 1500 will not need to be fragmented. - -and... (from Henry Spencer) - - The way it *ought* to work is that the MTU advertised by the ipsecN - interface should be that of the underlying hardware interface, less a - pinch for the extra headers needed. - - Unfortunately, in certain situations this breaks many applications. - There is a widespread implicit assumption that the smallest MTUs are - at the ends of paths, not in the middle, and another that MTUs are - never less than 1500. A lot of code is unprepared to handle paths - where there is an "interior minimum" in the MTU, especially when it's - less than 1500. So we advertise a big MTU and just let the resulting - big packets fragment. - -This usually works, but we do get bitten in cases where some intermediate -point can't handle all that fragmentation. We can't win on this one.</PRE> -<P>The MTU can be changed with an<VAR> overridemtu=</VAR> statement in - the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section of<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf.5</A>.</P> -<P>For a discussion of MTU issues and some possible solutions using - Linux advanced routing facilities, see the<A href="http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/2.4routing-15.html#ss15.6"> - Linux 2.4 Advanced Routing HOWTO</A>. For a discussion of MTU and NAT - (Network Address Translation), see<A HREF="http://harlech.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html"> - James Carter's MTU notes</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="nat.background">Network address translation (NAT)</A></H2> -<P><STRONG>N</STRONG>etwork<STRONG> A</STRONG>ddress<STRONG> T</STRONG> -ranslation is a service provided by some gateway machines. Calling it - NAPT (adding the word<STRONG> P</STRONG>ort) would be more precise, but - we will follow the widespread usage.</P> -<P>A gateway doing NAT rewrites the headers of packets it is forwarding, - changing one or more of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>source address</LI> -<LI>source port</LI> -<LI>destination address</LI> -<LI>destination port</LI> -</UL> -<P>On Linux 2.4, NAT services are provided by the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org"> - netfilter(8)</A> firewall code. There are several<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO"> - Netfilter HowTos</A> including one on NAT.</P> -<P>For older versions of Linux, this was referred to as "IP masquerade" - and different tools were used. See this<A href="http://www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq/"> - resource page</A>.</P> -<P>Putting an IPsec gateway behind a NAT gateway is not recommended. See - our<A href="#NAT"> firewalls document</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_3_1">NAT to non-routable addresses</A></H3> -<P>The most common application of NAT uses private<A href="#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> addresses.</P> -<P>Often a home or small office network will have:</P> -<UL> -<LI>one connection to the Internet</LI> -<LI>one assigned publicly visible IP address</LI> -<LI>several machines that all need access to the net</LI> -</UL> -<P>Of course this poses a problem since several machines cannot use one - address. The best solution might be to obtain more addresses, but often - this is impractical or uneconomical.</P> -<P>A common solution is to have:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#non-routable">non-routable</A> addresses on the local - network</LI> -<LI>the gateway machine doing NAT</LI> -<LI>all packets going outside the LAN rewritten to have the gateway as - their source address</LI> -</UL> -<P>The client machines are set up with reserved<A href="#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> IP addresses defined in RFC 1918. The masquerading - gateway, the machine with the actual link to the Internet, rewrites - packet headers so that all packets going onto the Internet appear to - come from one IP address, that of its Internet interface. It then gets - all the replies, does some table lookups and more header rewriting, and - delivers the replies to the appropriate client machines.</P> -<P>As far as anyone else on the Internet is concerned, the systems - behind the gateway are completely hidden. Only one machine with one IP - address is visible.</P> -<P>For IPsec on such a gateway, you can entirely ignore the NAT in:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI> -<LI>firewall rules affecting your Internet-side interface</LI> -</UL> -<P>Those can be set up exactly as they would be if your gateway had no - other systems behind it.</P> -<P>You do, however, have to take account of the NAT in firewall rules - which affect packet forwarding.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_3_2">NAT to routable addresses</A></H3> -<P>NAT to routable addresses is also possible, but is less common and - may make for rather tricky routing problems. We will not discuss it - here. See the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO"> - Netfilter HowTos</A>.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="user.examples">FreeS/WAN script examples</A></H1> - This file is intended to hold a collection of user-written example - scripts or configuration files for use with FreeS/WAN. -<P> So far it has only one entry.</P> -<H2><A name="poltorak">Poltorak's Firewall script</A></H2> -<PRE> -From: Poltorak Serguei <poltorak@dataforce.net> -Subject: [Users] Using FreeS/WAN -Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 - -Hello. - -I'm using FreeS/WAN IPsec for half a year. I learned a lot of things about -it and I think it would be interesting for someone to see the result of my -experiments and usage of FreeS/WAN. If you find a mistake in this -file, please e-mail me. And excuse me for my english... I'm learning.. :) - -I'll talk about vary simple configuration: - -addresses prefix = 192.168 - - lan1 sgw1 .0.0/24 (Internet) sgw2 lan2 - .1.0/24---[ .1.1 ; .0.1 ]===================[ .0.10 ; . 2.10 ]---.2.0/24 - - -We need to let lan1 see lan2 across Internet like it is behind sgw1. The -same for lan2. And we need to do IPX bridge for Novel Clients and NDS -synchronization. - -my config: -------------------- ipsec.conf ------------------- -conn lan1-lan2 - type=tunnel - compress=yes - #------------------- - left=192.168.0.1 - leftsubnet=192.168.1.0/24 - #------------------- - right=192.168.0.10 - rightsubnet=192.168.2.0/24 - #------------------- - auth=esp - authby=secret ---------------- end of ipsec.conf ---------------- - -ping .2.x from .1.y (y != 1) -It works?? Fine. Let's continue... - -Why y != 1 ?? Because kernel of sgw1 have 2 IP addresses and it will choose -the first IP (which is used to go to Internet) .0.1 and the packet won't go -through IPsec tunnel :( But if do ping on .1.1 kernel will respond from -that address (.1.1) and the packet will be tunneled. The same problem occurred then -.2.x sends a packet to .1.2 which is down at the moment. What happens? .1.1 -sends ARP requesting .1.2... after 3 tries it send to .2.x an destunreach, -but from his "natural" IP or .0.1 . So the error message won't be delivered! -It's a big problem... - -Resolution... One can manipulate with ipsec0 or ipsec0:0 to solve the -problem (if ipsec0 has .1.1 kernel will send packets correctly), but there -are powerful and elegant iproute2 :) We simply need to change source address -of packet that goes to other secure lan. This is done with - -ip route replace 192.168.2.0/24 via 192.168.0.10 dev ipsec0 src 192.168.1.1 - -Cool!! Now it works!! - -The second step. We want install firewall on sgw1 and sgw2. Encryption of -traffic without security isn't a good idea. I don't use {left|right}firewall, -because I'm running firewall from init scripts. - -We want IPsec data between lan1-lan2, some ICMP errors (destination -unreachable, TTL exceeded, parameter problem and source quench), replying on -pings from both lans and Internet, ipxtunnel data for IPX and of course SSH -between sgw1 and sgw2 and from/to one specified host. - -I'm using ipchains. With iptables there are some changes. - ----------------- rc.firewall --------------------- -#!/bin/sh -# -# Firewall for IPsec lan1-lan2 -# - -IPC=/sbin/ipchains -ANY=0.0.0.0/0 - -# left -SGW1_EXT=192.168.0.1 -SGW1_INT=192.168.1.1 -LAN1=192.168.1.0/24 - -# right -SGW2_EXT=192.168.0.10 -SGW2_INT=192.168.2.10 -LAN2=192.168.2.0/24 - -# SSH from and to this host -SSH_PEER_HOST=_SOME_HOST_ - -# this is for left. exchange these values for right. -MY_EXT=$SGW1_EXT -MY_INT=$SGW1_INT -PEER_EXT=$SGW2_EXT -PEER_INT=$SGW2_INT -INT_IF=eth1 -EXT_IF=eth0 -IPSEC_IF=ipsec0 -MY_LAN=$LAN1 -PEER_LAN=$LAN2 - -$IPC -F -$IPC -P input DENY -$IPC -P forward DENY -$IPC -P output DENY - -# Loopback traffic -$IPC -A input -i lo -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -i lo -j ACCEPT - -# for IPsec SGW1-SGW2 -## IKE -$IPC -A input -p udp -s $PEER_EXT 500 -d $MY_EXT 500 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p udp -s $MY_EXT 500 -d $PEER_EXT 500 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## ESP -$IPC -A input -p 50 -s $PEER_EXT -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### we don't need this line ### $IPC -A output -p 50 -s $MY_EXT -d $PEER_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## forward LAN1-LAN2 -$IPC -A forward -s $MY_LAN -d $PEER_LAN -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A forward -s $PEER_LAN -d $MY_LAN -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -s $PEER_LAN -d $MY_LAN -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A input -s $PEER_LAN -d $MY_LAN -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A input -s $MY_LAN -d $PEER_LAN -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -s $MY_LAN -d $PEER_LAN -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - -# ICMP -# -## Dest unreachable -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -# -## Source quench -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -# -## Parameter problem -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -# -## Time To Live exceeded -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - -# ICMP PINGs -## from Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT --icmp-type echo-request -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY --icmp-type echo-reply -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## from LAN -$IPC -A input -p icmp -s $ANY -d $MY_INT --icmp-type echo-request -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp -s $MY_INT -d $ANY --icmp-type echo-reply -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -## from Peer LAN -$IPC -A input -p icmp -s $ANY -d $MY_INT --icmp-type echo-request -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp -s $MY_INT -d $ANY --icmp-type echo-reply -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - -# SSH -## from SSH_PEER_HOST -$IPC -A input -p tcp -s $SSH_PEER_HOST -d $MY_EXT 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp \! -y -s $MY_EXT 22 -d $SSH_PEER_HOST -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## to SSH_PEER_HOST -$IPC -A input -p tcp \! -y -s $SSH_PEER_HOST 22 -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp -s $MY_EXT -d $SSH_PEER_HOST 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## from PEER -$IPC -A input -p tcp -s $PEER_EXT -d $MY_EXT 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp \! -y -s $MY_EXT 22 -d $PEER_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## to PEER -$IPC -A input -p tcp \! -y -s $PEER_EXT 22 -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp -s $MY_EXT -d $PEER_EXT 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT - -# ipxtunnel -$IPC -A input -p udp -s $PEER_INT 2005 -d $MY_INT 2005 -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p udp -s $MY_INT 2005 -d $PEER_INT 2005 -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - ----------------- end of rc.firewall ---------------------- - -To understand this we need to look on this scheme: - - ++-----------------------<----------------------------+ - || ipsec0 | - \/ | - eth0 +--------+ /---------/ yes /---------/ yes +-----------------------+ ------->| INPUT |-->/ ?local? /----->/ ?IPsec? /----->| decrypt decapsulate | - eth1 +--------+ /---------/ /---------/ +-----------------------+ - || no || no - \/ \/ - +----------+ +---------+ +-------+ - | routing | | local | | local | - | decision | | deliver | | send | - +----------+ +---------+ +-------+ - || || - \/ \/ - +---------+ +----------+ - | forward | | routing | - +---------+ | decision | - || +----------+ - || || - ++----------------<-----------------++ - || - \/ - +--------+ eth0 - | OUTPUT | eth1 - +--------+ ipsec0 - || - \/ - /---------/ yes +-----------------------+ - / ?IPsec? /----->| encrypt encapsulate | - /---------/ +-----------------------+ - || no || - || || - || \/ eth0, eth1 - ++-----------------------++--------------> - -This explain how a packet traverse TCP/IP stack in IPsec capable kernel. - -FIX ME, please, if there are any errors - -Test the new firewall now. - - -Now about IPX. I tried 3 programs for tunneling IPX: tipxd, SIB and ipxtunnel - -tipxd didn't send packets.. :( -SIB and ipxtunnel worked fine :) -With ipxtunnel there was a little problem. In sources there are an error. - ---------------------- in main.c ------------------------ -< bytes += p.len; ---- -> bytes += len; --------------------------------------------------------- - -After this FIX everything goes right... - -------------------- /etc/ipxtunnel.conf ---------------- -port 2005 -remote 192.168.101.97 2005 -interface eth1 ---------------- end of /etc/ipxtunnel.conf ------------- - -I use IPX tunnel between .1.1 and .2.10 so we don't need to encrypt nor -authenticate encapsulated IPX packets, it is done with IPsec. - -If you don't wont to use iproute2 to change source IP you need to use SIB -(it is able to bind local address) or establish tunnel between .0.1 and -.0.10 (external IPs, you need to do encryption in the program, but it isn't -strong). - -For now I'm using ipxtunnel. - -I think that's all for the moment. If there are any error, please e-mail me: -poltorak@df.ru . It would be cool if someone puts the scheme of TCP/IP in -kernel and firewall example on FreeS/WAN's manual pages. - -PoltoS -</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A name="makecheck">How to configure to use "make check"</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="19_1">What is "make check"</A></H2> -<P> "make check" is a target in the top level makefile. It takes care of - running a number of unit and system tests to confirm that FreeSWAN has - been compiled correctly, and that no new bugs have been introduced.</P> -<P> As FreeSWAN contains both kernel and userspace components, doing - testing of FreeSWAN requires that the kernel be simulated. This is - typically difficult to do as a kernel requires that it be run on bare - hardware. A technology has emerged that makes this simpler. This is<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net"> - User Mode Linux</A>.</P> -<P> User-Mode Linux is a way to build a Linux kernel such that it can - run as a process under another Linux (or in the future other) kernel. - Presently, this can only be done for 2.4 guest kernels. The host kernel - can be 2.2 or 2.4.</P> -<P> "make check" expects to be able to build User-Mode Linux kernels - with FreeSWAN included. To do this it needs to have some files - downloaded and extracted prior to running "make check". This is - described in the<A HREF="umltesting.html"> UML testing</A> document.</P> -<P> After having run the example in the UML testing document and - successfully brought up the four machine combination, you are ready to - use "make check"</P> -<H2><A NAME="19_2">Running "make check"</A></H2> -<P> "make check" works by walking the FreeSWAN source tree invoking the - "check" target at each node. At present there are tests defined only - for the <CODE>klips</CODE> directory. These tests will use the UML - infrastructure to test out pieces of the <CODE>klips</CODE> code.</P> -<P> The results of the tests can be recorded. If the environment - variable <CODE>$REGRESSRESULTS</CODE> is non-null, then the results of - each test will be recorded. This can be used as part of a nightly - regression testing system, see<A HREF="nightly.html"> Nightly testing</A> - for more details.</P> -<P> "make check" otherwise prints a minimal amount of output for each - test, and indicates pass/fail status of each test as they are run. - Failed tests do not cause failure of the target in the form of exit - codes.</P> -<H1><A NAME="20">How to write a "make check" test</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="20_1">Structure of a test</A></H2> -<P> Each test consists of a set of directories under <CODE>testing/</CODE> -. There are directories for <CODE>klips</CODE>, <CODE>pluto</CODE>, <CODE> -packaging</CODE> and <CODE>libraries</CODE>. Each directory has a list - of tests to run is stored in a file called <CODE>TESTLIST</CODE> in - that directory. e.g. <CODE>testing/klips/TESTLIST</CODE>.</P> -<H2 NAME="TESTLIST"><A NAME="20_2">The TESTLIST</A></H2> -<P> This isn't actually a shell script. It just looks like one. Some - tools other than /bin/sh process it. Lines that start with # are - comments.</P> -<PRE> -# test-kind directory-containing-test expectation [PR#] -</PRE> -<P>The first word provides the test type, detailed below.</P> -<P> The second word is the name of the test to run. This the directory - in which the test case is to be found..</P> -<P>The third word may be one of:</P> -<DL> -<DT> blank/good</DT> -<DD>the test is believed to function, report failure</DD> -<DT> bad</DT> -<DD> the test is known to fail, report unexpected success</DD> -<DT> suspended</DT> -<DD> the test should not be run</DD> -</DL> -<P> The fourth word may be a number, which is a PR# if the test is - failing.</P> -<H2><A NAME="20_3">Test kinds</A></H2> - The test types are: -<DL> -<DT>skiptest</DT> -<DD>means run no test.</DD> -<DT>ctltest</DT> -<DD>means run a single system without input/output.</DD> -<DT>klipstest</DT> -<DD>means run a single system with input/output networks</DD> -<DT><A HREF="#umlplutotest">umlplutotest</A></DT> -<DD>means run a pair of systems</DD> -<DT><A HREF="#umlXhost">umlXhost</A></DT> -<DD>run an arbitrary number of systems</DD> -<DT>suntest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a quad of east/west/sunrise/sunset</DD> -<DT>roadtest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a trio of east-sunrise + warrior</DD> -<DT>extrudedtest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a quad of east-sunrise + warriorsouth + park</DD> -<DT>mkinsttest</DT> -<DD>a test of the "make install" machinery.</DD> -<DT>kernel_test_patch</DT> -<DD>a test of the "make kernelpatch" machinery.</DD> -</DL> - Tests marked (TBD) have yet to be fully defined. -<P> Each test directory has a file in it called <CODE>testparams.sh</CODE> -. This file sets a number of environment variables to define the - parameters of the test.</P> -<H2><A NAME="20_4">Common parameters</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT>TESTNAME</DT> -<DD>the name of the test (repeated for checking purposes)</DD> -<DT>TEST_TYPE</DT> -<DD>the type of the test (repeat of type type above)</DD> -<DT>TESTHOST</DT> -<DD>the name of the UML machine to run for the test, typically "east" or - "west"</DD> -<DT>TEST_PURPOSE</DT> -<DD>The purpose of the test is one of: -<DL> -<DT>goal</DT> -<DD>The goal purpose is where a test is defined for code that is not yet - finished. The test indicates when the goals have in fact been reached.</DD> -<DT>regress</DT> -<DD>This is a test to determine that a previously existing bug has been - repaired. This test will initially be created to reproduce the bug in - isolation, and then the bug will be fixed.</DD> -<DT>exploit</DT> -<DD>This is a set of packets/programs that causes a vulnerability to be - exposed. It is a specific variation of the regress option.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>TEST_GOAL_ITEM</DT> -<DT></DT> -<DD>in the case of a goal test, this is a reference to the requirements - document</DD> -<DT>TEST_PROB_REPORT</DT> -<DD>in the case of regression test, this the problem report number from - GNATS</DD> -<DT>TEST_EXPLOIT_URL</DT> -<DD>in the case of an exploit, this is a URL referencing the paper - explaining the origin of the test and the origin of exploit software</DD> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a file in the test directory that contains the sanitized console - output against which to compare the output of the actual test.</DD> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS</DT> -<DD>a list of scripts (found in <CODE>klips/test/fixups</CODE>) to apply - to sanitize the console output of the machine under test. These are - typically perl, awk or sed scripts that remove things in the kernel - output that change each time the test is run and/or compiled.</DD> -<DT>INIT_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode prior to starting the tests. This file will usually - set up any eroute's and SADB entries that are required for the test.</P> -<P>Lines beginning with # are skipped. Blank lines are skipped. - Otherwise, a shell prompted is waited for each time (consisting of <CODE> -\n#</CODE>) and then the command is sent. Note that the prompt is waited - for before the command and not after, so completion of the last command - in the script is not required. This is often used to invoke a program - to monitor the system, e.g. <CODE>ipsec pf_key</CODE>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>RUN_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, before the packets are sent. On single machine tests, - this script doesn't provide any more power than INIT_SCRIPT, but is - implemented for consistency's sake.</P> -</DD> -<DT>FINAL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode after the final packet is sent. Similar to - INIT_SCRIPT, above. If not specified, then the single command "halt" is - sent. If specified, then the script should end with a halt command to - nicely shutdown the UML.</P> -</DD> -<DT>CONSOLEDIFFDEBUG</DT> -<DD>If set to "true" then the series of console fixups (see - REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS) will be output after it is constructed. (It should - be set to "false", or unset otherwise)</DD> -<DT>NETJIGDEBUG</DT> -<DD>If set to "true" then the series of console fixups (see - REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS) will be output after it is constructed. (It should - be set to "false", or unset otherwise)</DD> -<DT>NETJIGTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> If set to "netjig", then the results of talking to the <CODE> -uml_netjig</CODE> will be printed to stderr during the test. In - addition, the jig will be invoked with --debug, which causes it to log - its process ID, and wait 60 seconds before continuing. This can be used - if you are trying to debug the <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> program itself.</DD> -<DT>HOSTTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> If set to "hosttest", then the results of taling to the consoles of - the UMLs will be printed to stderr during the test.</DD> -<DT>NETJIGWAITUSER</DT> -<DD> If set to "waituser", then the scripts will wait forever for user - input before they shut the tests down. Use this is if you are debugging - through the kernel.</DD> -<DT>PACKETRATE</DT> -<DD> A number, in miliseconds (default is 500ms) at which packets will - be replayed by the netjig.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="20_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The klipstest function starts a program (<CODE> -testing/utils/uml_netjig/uml_netjig</CODE>) to setup a bunch of I/O - sockets (that simulate network interfaces). It then exports the - references to these sockets to the environment and invokes (using - system()) a given script. It waits for the script to finish.</P> - -<!-- <IMG SRC="single_netjig.png" ALT="block diagram of uml_netjig"> --> -<P> The script invoked (<CODE>testing/utils/host-test.tcl</CODE>) is a - TCL<A HREF="http://expect.nist.gov/"> expect</A> script that arranges - to start the UML and configure it appropriately for the test. The - configuration is done with the script given above for<VAR> INIT_SCRIPT</VAR> -. The TCL script then forks, leaves the UML in the background and exits. - uml_netjig continues. It then starts listening to the simulated network - answering ARPs and inserting packets as appropriate.</P> -<P> The klipstest function invokes <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> with - arguments to capture output from network interface(s) and insert - packets as appropriate:</P> -<DL> -<DT>PUB_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> file to feed in on the - public (encrypted) interface. (typically, eth1)</DD> -<DT>PRIV_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a pcap file to feed in on the private (plain-text) interface - (typically, eth0).</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the public (eth1) - interface are captured to a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> - file by <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. The klipstest function then uses - tcpdump on the file to produce text output, which is compared to the - file given.</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>REF_PRIV_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the private (eth0) - interface are captured and compared after conversion by tcpdump, as - with<VAR> REFPUBOUTPUT</VAR>.</DD> -<DT>REF_PRIV_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>EXITONEMPTY</DT> -<DD>a flag for <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. It should contain - "--exitonempty" of uml_netjig should exit when all of the input (<VAR> -PUBINPUT</VAR>,<VAR>PRIVINPUT</VAR>) packets have been injected.</DD> -<DT>ARPREPLY</DT> -<DD>a flag for <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. It should contain "--arpreply" - if <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> should reply to ARP requests. One will - typically set this to avoid having to fudge the ARP cache manually.</DD> -<DT>TCPDUMPFLAGS</DT> -<DD>a set of flags for the tcpdump used when converting captured output. - Typical values will include "-n" to turn off DNS, and often "-E" to set - the decryption key (tcpdump 3.7.1 and higher only) for ESP packets. The - "-t" flag (turn off timestamps) is provided automatically</DD> -<DT>NETJIG_EXTRA</DT> -<DD>additional comments to be sent to the netjig. This may arrange to - record or create additional networks, or may toggle options.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="20_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The basic concept of the <CODE>mkinsttest</CODE> test type is that - it performs a "make install" to a temporary $DESTDIR. The resulting - tree can then be examined to determine if it was done properly. The - files can be uninstalled to determine if the file list was correct, or - the contents of files can be examined more precisely.</P> -<DL> -<DT>INSTALL_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, then an install will be done. This provides the set of flags - to provide for the install. The target to be used (usually "install") - must be among the flags.</DD> -<DT>POSTINSTALL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD>If set, a script to run after initial "make install". Two arguments - are provided: an absolute path to the root of the FreeSWAN src tree, - and an absolute path to the temporary installation area.</DD> -<DT>INSTALL2_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, a second install will be done using these flags. Similarly - to INSTALL_FLAGS, the target must be among the flags.</DD> -<DT>UNINSTALL_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, an uninstall will be done using these flags. Similarly to - INSTALL_FLAGS, the target (usually "uninstall") must be among the - flags.</DD> -<DT>REF_FIND_f_l_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>If set, a <CODE>find $ROOT ( -type f -or -type -l )</CODE> will be - done to get a list of a real files and symlinks. The resulting file - will be compared to the file listed by this option.</DD> -<DT>REF_FILE_CONTENTS</DT> -<DD>If set, it should point to a file containing records for the form: -<PRE> - -<!--VARIABLE--> -reffile</(null)> -<!--VARIABLE--> -samplefile</(null)> -</PRE> - one record per line. A diff between the provided reference file, and - the sample file (located in the temporary installation root) will be - done for each record.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="20_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The <CODE>rpm_build_install_test</CODE> type is to verify that the - proper packing list is produced by "make rpm", and that the mechanisms - for building the kernel modules produce consistent results.</P> -<DL> -<DT>RPM_KERNEL_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>Point to an extracted copy of the RedHat kernel source code. - Variables from the environment may be used.</DD> -<DT>REF_RPM_CONTENTS</DT> -<DD>This is a file containing one record per line. Each record consists - of a RPM name (may contain wildcards) and a filename to compare the - contents to. The RPM will be located and a file list will be produced - with rpm2cpio.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="20_8">libtest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The libtest test is for testing library routines. The library file - is expected to provided an <CODE>#ifdef</CODE> by the name of<VAR> - library</VAR> -<!--CODE_MAIN</CODE--> -. The libtest type invokes the C compiler to compile this - file, links it against <CODE>libfreeswan.a</CODE> (to resolve any other - dependancies) and runs the test with the <CODE>-r</CODE> argument to - invoke a regression test.</(null)></P> -<P>The library test case is expected to do a self-test, exiting with - status code 0 if everything is okay, and with non-zero otherwise. A - core dump (exit code greater than 128) is noted specifically.</P> -<P> Unlike other tests, there are no subdirectories required, or other - parameters to set.</P> -<H2 NAME="umlplutotest"><A NAME="20_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The umlplutotest function starts a pair of user mode line processes. - This is a 2-host version of umlXhost. The "EAST" and "WEST" slots are - defined.</P> -<H2 NAME="umlXhost"><A NAME="20_10">umlXhost parameters</A></H2> -<P> The umlXtest function starts an arbitrary number of user mode line - processes.</P> - -<!-- <IMG SRC="single_netjig.png" ALT="block diagram of uml_netjig"> --> -<P> The script invoked (<CODE>testing/utils/Xhost-test.tcl</CODE>) is a - TCL<A HREF="http://expect.nist.gov/"> expect</A> script that arranges - to start each UML and configure it appropriately for the test. It then - starts listening (using uml_netjig) to the simulated network answering - ARPs and inserting packets as appropriate.</P> -<P> umlXtest has a series of slots, each of which should be filled by a - host. The list of slots is controlled by the variable, XHOST_LIST. This - variable should be set to a space seperated list of slots. The former - umlplutotest is now implemented as a variation of the umlXhost test, - with XHOST_LIST="EAST WEST".</P> -<P> For each host slot that is defined, a series of variables should be - filled in, defining what configuration scripts to use for that host.</P> -<P> The following are used to control the console input and output to - the system. Where the string ${host} is present, the host slot should - be filled in. I.e. for the two host system with XHOST_LIST="EAST WEST", - then the variables: EAST_INIT_SCRIPT and WEST_INIT_SCRIPT will exist.</P> -<DL> -<DT>${host}HOST</DT> -<DD>The name of the UML host which will fill this slot</DD> -<DT>${host}_INIT_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode prior to starting the tests. This file will usually - set up any eroute's and SADB entries that are required for the test. - Similar to INIT_SCRIPT, above.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_RUN_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, before the packets are sent. This set of commands is - run after all of the virtual machines are initialized. I.e. after - EAST_INIT_SCRIPT<B> AND</B> WEST_INIT_SCRIPT. This script can therefore - do things that require that all machines are properly configured.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_RUN2_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, after the packets are sent. This set of commands is - run before any of the virtual machines have been shut down. (I.e. - before EAST_FINAL_SCRIPT<B> AND</B> WEST_FINAL_SCRIPT.) This script can - therefore catch post-activity status reports.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_FINAL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode after the final packet is sent. Similar to - INIT_SCRIPT, above. If not specified, then the single command "halt" is - sent. Note that when this script is run, the other virtual machines may - already have been killed. If specified, then the script should end with - a halt command to nicely shutdown the UML.</P> -</DD> -<DT>REF_${host}_CONSOLE_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>Similar to REF_CONSOLE_OUTPUT, above.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Some additional flags apply to all hosts:</P> -<DL> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS</DT> -<DD>a list of scripts (found in <CODE>klips/test/fixups</CODE>) to apply - to sanitize the console output of the machine under test. These are - typically perl, awk or sed scripts that remove things in the kernel - output that change each time the test is run and/or compiled.</DD> -</DL> -<P> In addition to input to the console, the networks may have input fed - to them:</P> -<DL> -<DT>EAST_INPUT/WEST_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> file to feed in on the - private network side of each network. The "EAST" and "WEST" here refer - to the networks, not the hosts.</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>REF_EAST_FILTER/REF_WEST_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -< -<DT>TCPDUMPFLAGS</DT> -<DD>a set of flags for the tcpdump used when converting captured output. - Typical values will include "-n" to turn off DNS, and often "-E" to set - the decryption key (tcpdump 3.7.1 and higher only) for ESP packets. The - "-t" flag (turn off timestamps) is provided automatically</DD> -<DT>REF_EAST_OUTPUT/REF_WEST_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the private (eth0) - interface are captured and compared after conversion by tcpdump, as - with<VAR> REF_PUB_OUTPUT</VAR>.</DD> -<P> There are two additional environment variables that may be set on - the command line:</P> -<DL> -<DT> NETJIGVERBOSE=verbose export NETJIGVERBOSE</DT> -<DD> If set, then the test output will be "chatty", and let you know - what commands it is running, and as packets are sent. Without it set, - the output is limited to success/failure messages.</DD> -<DT> NETJIGTESTDEBUG=netjig export NETJIGTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> This will enable debugging of the communication with uml_netjig, - and turn on debugging in this utility. This does not imply - NETJIGVERBOSE.</DD> -</DL> -<DT> HOSTTESTDEBUG=hosttest export HOSTTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> This will show all interactions with the user-mode-linux consoles</DD> -</DL> -<H2 NAME="kernelpatch"><A NAME="20_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The kernel_patch_test function takes some kernel source, copies it - with lndir, and then applies the patch as produced by "make - kernelpatch".</P> -<P> The following are used to control the input and output to the - system:</P> -<DL> -<DT>KERNEL_NAME</DT> -<DD>the kernel name, typically something like "linus" or "rh"</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_VERSION</DT> -<DD>the kernel version number, as in "2.2" or "2.4".</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC</DT> -<DD>This variable should set in the environment, probably in - ~/freeswan-regress-env.sh. Examples of this variables would be - KERNEL_LINUS2_0_SRC or KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC. This variable should point to - an extracted copy of the kernel source in question.</DD> -<DT>REF_PATCH_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a copy of the patch output to compare against</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_PATCH_LEAVE_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>If set to a non-empty string, then the patched kernel source is not - removed at the end of the test. This will typically be set in the - environment while debugging.</DD> -</DL> -<H2 NAME="modtest"><A NAME="20_12">module_compile paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The module_compile test attempts to build the KLIPS module against a - given set of kernel source. This is also done by the RPM tests, but in - a very specific manner.</P> -<P> There are two variations of this test - one where the kernel either - doesn't need to be configured, or is already done, and tests were there - is a local configuration file.</P> -<P> Where the kernel doesn't need to be configured, the kernel source - that is found is simply used. It may be a RedHat-style kernel, where - one can cause it to configure itself via rhconfig.h-style definitions. - Or, it may just be a kernel tree that has been configured.</P> -<P> If the variable KERNEL_CONFIG_FILE is set, then a new directory is - created for the kernel source. It is populated with lndir(1). The - referenced file is then copied in as .config, and "make oldconfig" is - used to configure the kernel. This resulting kernel is then used as the - reference source.</P> -<P> In all cases, the kernel source is found the same was for the - kernelpatch test, i.e. via KERNEL_VERSION/KERNEL_NAME and - KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC.</P> -<P> Once there is kernel source, the module is compiled using the - top-level "make module" target.</P> -<P> The test is considered successful if an executable is found in - OUTPUT/module/ipsec.o at the end of the test.</P> -<DL> -<DT>KERNEL_NAME</DT> -<DD>the kernel name, typically something like "linus" or "rh"</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_VERSION</DT> -<DD>the kernel version number, as in "2.2" or "2.4".</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC</DT> -<DD>This variable should set in the environment, probably in - ~/freeswan-regress-env.sh. Examples of this variables would be - KERNEL_LINUS2_0_SRC or KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC. This variable should point to - an extracted copy of the kernel source in question.</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_CONFIG_FILE</DT> -<DD>The configuration file for the kernel.</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_PATCH_LEAVE_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>If set to a non-empty string, then the configured kernel source is - not removed at the end of the test. This will typically be set in the - environment while debugging.</DD> -<DT>MODULE_DEF_INCLUDE</DT> -<DD>The include file that will be used to configure the KLIPS module, - and possibly the kernel source.</DD> -</DL> -<H1><A NAME="21">Current pitfalls</A></H1> -<DL> -<DT> "tcpdump dissector" not available.</DT> -<DD> This is a non-fatal warning. If uml_netjig is invoked with the -t - option, then it will attempt to use tcpdump's dissector to decode each - packet that it processes. The dissector is presently not available, so - this option it normally turned off at compile time. The dissector - library will be released with tcpdump version 4.0.</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing guide</A></H1> -<P> User mode linux is a way to compile a linux kernel such that it can - run as a process in another linux system (potentially as a *BSD or - Windows process later). See<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/"> - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/</A></P> -<P> UML is a good platform for testing and experimenting with FreeS/WAN. - It allows several network nodes to be simulated on a single machine. - Creating, configuring, installing, monitoring, and controling these - nodes is generally easier and easier to script with UML than real - hardware.</P> -<P> You'll need about 500Mb of disk space for a full - sunrise-east-west-sunset setup. You can possibly get this down by 130Mb - if you remove the sunrise/sunset kernel build. If you just want to run, - then you can even remove the east/west kernel build.</P> -<P> Nothing need be done as super user. In a couple of steps, we note - where super user is required to install commands in system-wide - directories, but ~/bin could be used instead. UML seems to use a - system-wide /tmp/uml directory so different users may interfere with - one another. Later UMLs use ~/.uml instead, so multiple users running - UML tests should not be a problem, but note that a single user running - the UML tests will only be able run one set. Further, UMLs sometimes - get stuck and hang around. These "zombies" (most will actually be in - the "T" state in the process table) will interfere with subsequent - tests.</P> -<H2><A NAME="22_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></H2> -<P> As of 2003/3/1, the Light-Weight Resolver is used by pluto. This - requires that BIND9 be running. It also requires that BIND9 development - libraries be present in the build environment. The DNSSEC code is only - truly functional in BIND9 snapshots. The library code could be 9.2.2, - we believe. We are using BIND9 20021115 snapshot code from<A HREF="ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/snapshots"> - ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/snapshots</A>.</P> -<P> FreeS/WAN may well require a newer BIND than is on your system. Many - distributions have moved to BIND9.2.2 recently due to a security - advisory. BIND is five components.</P> -<OL> -<LI> named</LI> -<LI> dnssec-*</LI> -<LI> client side resolver libraries</LI> -<LI> client side utility libraries I thought there were lib and named - parts to dnsssec...</LI> -<LI> dynamic DNS update utilities</LI> -</OL> -<P> The only piece that we need for *building* is #4. That's the only - part that has to be on the build host. What is the difference between - resolver and util libs? If you want to edit - testing/baseconfigs/all/etc/bind, you'll need a snapshot version. The - resolver library contains the resolver. FreeS/WAN has its own copy of - that in lib/liblwres.</P> -<H2><A NAME="22_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<OL> -<LI> Get the following files: -<OL type="a"> -<LI> from<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/freeswan/uml/"> - http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/freeswan/uml/</A> - umlfreeroot-15.1.tar.gz (or highest numbered one). This is a debian - potato root file system. You can use this even on a Redhat host, as it - has the newer GLIBC2.2 libraries as well. -<!-- If you are using - Redhat 7.2 or newer as your development machine, you can create the - image from your installation media. See <A HREF="uml-rhroot.html">Building a RedHat root"></A>. - A future document will explain how to build this from .DEB files as well. ---> - -<!-- -<LI> umlfreesharemini.tar.gz (or umlfreeshareall.tar.gz). - If you are a Debian potato user, you don't need it you can use your - native /usr/share. -</UL> ---> -</LI> -<LI> From<A HREF="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/"> - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/</A> a snapshot or release - (1.92 or better)</LI> -<LI> From a<A HREF="http://www.kernel.org/mirrors/"> - http://www.kernel.org mirror</A>, the virgin 2.4.19 kernel. Please - realize that we have defaults in our tree for kernel configuration. We - try to track the latest UML kernels. If you use a newer kernel, you may - have faults in the kernel build process. You can see what the latest - that is being regularly tested by visiting<A HREF="http://bugs.freeswan.org:81/regress/HEAD/lastgood/freeswan-regress-env.sh"> - freeswan-regress-env.sh</A>.</LI> -<LI> -<!-- Note: this step is refered to as "step 1d" below. --> - Get<A HREF="http://ftp.nl.linux.org/uml/"> - http://ftp.nl.linux.org/uml/</A> uml-patch-2.4.19-47.bz2 or the one - associated with your kernel. As of 2003/03/05, uml-patch-2.4.19-47.bz2 - works for us.<STRONG> More recent versions of the patch have not been - tested by us.</STRONG></LI> -<LI> You'll probably want to visit<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net"> - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net</A> and get the UML utilities. - These are not needed for the build or interactive use (but - recommended). They are necessary for the regression testing procedures - used by "make check". We currently use uml_utilities_20020212.tar.bz2.</LI> -<LI> You need tcpdump version 3.7.1 or better. This is newer than the - version included in most LINUX distributions. You can check the version - of an installed tcpdump with the --version flag. If you need a newer - tcpdump fetch both tcpdump and libpcap source tar files from<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - http://www.tcpdump.org/</A> or a mirror.</LI> -</OL> -</LI> -<LI> Pick a suitable place, and extract the following files: -<OL type="a"> -<LI> -<!-- Note: this step is refered to as "step 2a" later. --> - 2.4.19 kernel. For instance: -<PRE> - <CODE> cd /c2/kernel - tar xzvf ../download/pub/linux/kernel/v2.4/linux-2.4.19.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> extract the umlfreeroot file -<!-- (unless you <A HREF="uml-rhroot.html">built your own from RPMs</A>) --> - -<PRE> - <CODE> mkdir -p /c2/user-mode-linux/basic-root - cd /c2/user-mode-linux/basic-root - tar xzvf ../download/umlfreeroot-15.1.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> FreeSWAN itself (or checkout "all" from CVS) -<PRE> - <CODE> mkdir -p /c2/freeswan/sandbox - cd /c2/freeswan/sandbox - tar xzvf ../download/snapshot.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -</OL> -</LI> -<LI> If you need to build a newer tcpdump: -<UL> -<LI> Make sure you have OpenSSL installed -- it is needed for - cryptographic routines.</LI> -<LI> Unpack libpcap and tcpdump source in parallel directories (the - tcpdump build procedures look for libpcap next door).</LI> -<LI> Change directory into the libpcap source directory and then build - the library: -<PRE> - <CODE> ./configure - make -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> Change into the tcpdump source directory, build tcpdump, and - install it. -<PRE> - <CODE> ./configure - make - # Need to be superuser to install in system directories. - # Installing in ~/bin would be an alternative. - su -c "make install" -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI> If you need the uml utilities, unpack them somewhere then build and - install them: -<PRE> - <CODE> cd tools - make all - # Need to be superuser to install in system directories. - # Installing in ~/bin would be an alternative. - su -c "make install BIN_DIR=/usr/local/bin" -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> set up the configuration file -<UL> -<LI> <CODE>cd /c2/freeswan/sandbox/freeswan-1.97/testing/utils</CODE></LI> -<LI> copy umlsetup-sample.sh to ../../umlsetup.sh: <CODE> cp - umlsetup-sample.sh ../../umlsetup.sh</CODE></LI> -<LI> open up ../../umlsetup.sh in your favorite editor.</LI> -<LI> change POOLSPACE= to point to the place with at least 500Mb of - disk. Best if it is on the same partition as the "umlfreeroot" - extraction, as it will attempt to use hard links if possible to save - disk space.</LI> -<LI> Set TESTINGROOT if you intend to run the script outside of the - sandbox/snapshot/release directory. Otherwise, it will configure - itself.</LI> -<LI> KERNPOOL should point to the directory with your 2.4.19 kernel - tree. This tree should be unconfigured! This is the directory you used - in step 2a.</LI> -<LI> UMLPATCH should point at the bz2 file you downloaded at 1d. If - using a kernel that already includes the patch, set this to /dev/null.</LI> -<LI> FREESWANDIR should point at the directory where you unpacked the - snapshot/release. Include the "freeswan-snap2001sep16b" or whatever in - it. If you are running from CVS, then you point at the directory where - top, klips, etc. are. The script will fix up the directory so that it - can be used.</LI> -<LI> BASICROOT should be set to the directory used in 2b, or to the - directory that you created with RPMs.</LI> -<LI> SHAREDIR should be set to the directory used in 2c, to /usr/share - for Debian potato users, or to $BASICROOT/usr/share.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI> -<PRE> <CODE>cd $TESTINGROOT/utils -sh make-uml.sh -</CODE></PRE> - It will grind for awhile. If there are errors it will bail. If so, run - it under "script" and send the output to bugs@lists.freeswan.org.</LI> -<LI> You will have a bunch of stuff under $POOLSPACE. Open four xterms: -<PRE> <CODE> for i in sunrise sunset east west - do - xterm -name $i -title $i -e $POOLSPACE/$i/start.sh done -</CODE></PRE> -</LI> -<LI> Login as root. Password is "root" (Note, these virtual machines are - networked together, but are not configured to talk to the rest of the - world.)</LI> -<LI> verify that pluto started on east/west, run "ipsec look"</LI> -<LI> login to sunrise. run "ping sunset"</LI> -<LI> login to west. run "tcpdump -p -i eth1 -n" (tcpdump must be version - 3.7.1 or newer)</LI> -<LI> Closing a console xterm will shut down that UML.</LI> -<LI> You can "make check", if you want to. It is run from - /c2/freeswan/sandbox/freeswan-1.97.</LI> -</OL> -<H1><A NAME="23">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></H1> -<P> With User-Mode-Linux, you can debug the kernel using GDB. See -<!--HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/debugging.html"--> - - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/debugging.html.</(null)></P> -<P> Typically, one will want to address a test case for a failing - situation. Running GDB from Emacs, or from other front ends is - possible. First start GDB.</P> -<P> Tell it to open the UMLPOOL/swan/linux program.</P> -<P> Note the PID of GDB:</P> -<PRE> -marajade-[projects/freeswan/mgmt/planning] mcr 1029 %ps ax | grep gdb - 1659 pts/9 SN 0:00 /usr/bin/gdb -fullname -cd /mara4/freeswan/kernpatch/UMLPOOL/swan/ linux -</PRE> -<P> Set the following in the environment:</P> -<PRE> -UML_east_OPT="debug gdb-pid=1659" -</PRE> -<P> Then start the user-mode-linux in the test scheme you wish:</P> -<PRE> -marajade-[kernpatch/testing/klips/east-icmp-02] mcr 1220 %../../utils/runme.sh -</PRE> - The user-mode-linux will stop on boot, giving you a chance to attach to - the process: -<PRE> -(gdb) file linux -Reading symbols from linux...done. -(gdb) attach 1 -Attaching to program: /mara4/freeswan/kernpatch/UMLPOOL/swan/linux, process 1 -0xa0118bc1 in kill () at hostfs_kern.c:770 -</PRE> -<P> At this point, break points should be created as appropriate.</P> -<H2><A NAME="23_1">Other notes about debugging</A></H2> -<P> If you are running a standard test, after all the packets are sent, - the UML will be shutdown. This can cause problems, because the UML may - get terminated while you are debugging.</P> -<P> The environment variable <CODE>NETJIGWAITUSER</CODE> can be set to - "waituser". If so, then the testing system will prompt before exiting - the test.</P> -<H1><A NAME="24">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></H1> -<UL> -<LI> running more than one UML of the same name (e.g. "west") can cause - problems.</LI> -<LI> running more than one UML from the same root file system is not a - good idea.</LI> -<LI> all this means that running "make check" twice on the same machine - is probably not a good idea.</LI> -<LI> occationally, UMLs will get stuck. This can happen like: -<!--BLOCK--> - 15134 ? T - 0:00 /spare/hugh/uml/uml2.4.18-sept5/umlbuild/east/linux (east) - [/bin/sh] 15138 ? T 0:00 - /spare/hugh/uml/uml2.4.18-sept5/umlbuild/east/linux (east) [halt]</(null)> - these will need to be killed. Note that they are in "T"racing mode.</LI> -<LI> UMLs can also hang, and will report "Tracing myself and I can't get - out". This is a bug in UML. There are ways to find out what is going on - and report this to the UML people, but we don't know the magic right - now.</LI> -</UL> -<H1><A NAME="25">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A></H1> -<P> uml_netjig can be compiled with a built-in tcpdump. This uses - not-yet-released code from<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - www.tcpdump.org</A>. Please see the instructions in <CODE> -testing/utils/uml_netjig/Makefile</CODE>.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="politics">History and politics of cryptography</A></H1> -<P>Cryptography has a long and interesting history, and has been the - subject of considerable political controversy.</P> -<H2><A name="intro.politics">Introduction</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="26_1_1">History</A></H3> -<P>The classic book on the history of cryptography is David Kahn's<A href="#Kahn"> - The Codebreakers</A>. It traces codes and codebreaking from ancient - Egypt to the 20th century.</P> -<P>Diffie and Landau<A href="#diffie"> Privacy on the Line: The Politics - of Wiretapping and Encryption</A> covers the history from the First - World War to the 1990s, with an emphasis on the US.</P> -<H4><A NAME="26_1_1_1">World War II</A></H4> -<P>During the Second World War, the British "Ultra" project achieved one - of the greatest intelligence triumphs in the history of warfare, - breaking many Axis codes. One major target was the Enigma cipher - machine, a German device whose users were convinced it was unbreakable. - The American "Magic" project had some similar triumphs against Japanese - codes.</P> -<P>There are many books on this period. See our bibliography for - several. Two I particularly like are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Andrew Hodges has done a superb<A href="http://www.turing.org.uk/book/"> - biography</A> of Alan Turing, a key player among the Ultra - codebreakers. Turing was also an important computer pioneer. The terms<A -href="http://www.abelard.org/turpap/turpap.htm"> Turing test</A> and<A href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/"> - Turing machine</A> are named for him, as is the<A href="http://www.acm.org"> - ACM</A>'s highest technical<A href="http://www.acm.org/awards/taward.html"> - award</A>.</LI> -<LI>Neal Stephenson's<A href="#neal"> Cryptonomicon</A> is a novel with - cryptography central to the plot. Parts of it take place during WW II, - other parts today.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Bletchley Park, where much of the Ultra work was done, now has a - museum and a<A href="http://www.bletchleypark.org.uk/"> web site</A>.</P> -<P>The Ultra work introduced three major innovations.</P> -<UL> -<LI>The first break of Enigma was achieved by Polish Intelligence in - 1931. Until then most code-breakers had been linguists, but a different - approach was needed to break machine ciphers. Polish Intelligence - recruited bright young mathematicians to crack the "unbreakable" - Enigma. When war came in 1939, the Poles told their allies about this, - putting Britain on the road to Ultra. The British also adopted a - mathematical approach.</LI> -<LI>Machines were extensively used in the attacks. First the Polish - "Bombe" for attacking Enigma, then British versions of it, then - machines such as Collosus for attacking other codes. By the end of the - war, some of these machines were beginning to closely resemble digital - computers. After the war, a team at Manchester University, several old - Ultra hands included, built one of the world's first actual - general-purpose digital computers.</LI> -<LI>Ultra made codebreaking a large-scale enterprise, producing - intelligence on an industrial scale. This was not a "black chamber", - not a hidden room in some obscure government building with a small crew - of code-breakers. The whole operation -- from wholesale interception of - enemy communications by stations around the world, through large-scale - code-breaking and analysis of the decrypted material (with an enormous - set of files for cross-referencing), to delivery of intelligence to - field commanders -- was huge, and very carefully managed.</LI> -</UL> -<P>So by the end of the war, Allied code-breakers were expert at - large-scale mechanised code-breaking. The payoffs were enormous.</P> -<H4><A name="postwar">Postwar and Cold War</A></H4> -<P>The wartime innovations were enthusiastically adopted by post-war and - Cold War signals intelligence agencies. Presumably many nations now - have some agency capable of sophisticated attacks on communications - security, and quite a few engage in such activity on a large scale.</P> -<P>America's<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A>, for example, is said to be both the - world's largest employer of mathematicians and the world's largest - purchaser of computer equipment. Such claims may be somewhat - exaggerated, but beyond doubt the NSA -- and similar agencies in other - countries -- have some excellent mathematicians, lots of powerful - computers, sophisticated software, and the organisation and funding to - apply them on a large scale. Details of the NSA budget are secret, but - there are some published<A href="http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/nsabudget.html"> - estimates</A>.</P> -<P>Changes in the world's communications systems since WW II have - provided these agencies with new targets. Cracking the codes used on an - enemy's military or diplomatic communications has been common practice - for centuries. Extensive use of radio in war made large-scale attacks - such as Ultra possible. Modern communications make it possible to go - far beyond that. Consider listening in on cell phones, or intercepting - electronic mail, or tapping into the huge volumes of data on new media - such as fiber optics or satellite links. None of these targets existed - in 1950. All of them can be attacked today, and almost certainly are - being attacked.</P> -<P>The Ultra story was not made public until the 1970s. Much of the - recent history of codes and code-breaking has not been made public, and - some of it may never be. Two important books are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Bamford's<A href="#puzzle"> The Puzzle Palace</A>, a history of the - NSA</LI> -<LI>Hager's<A href="http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sp/index.html"> Secret - Power</A>, about the<A href="http://sg.yahoo.com/government/intelligence/echelon_network/"> - Echelon</A> system -- the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - co-operating to monitor much of the world's communications.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that these books cover only part of what is actually going on, - and then only the activities of nations open and democratic enough that - (some of) what they are doing can be discovered. A full picture, - including:</P> -<UL> -<LI>actions of the English-speaking democracies not covered in those - books</LI> -<LI>actions of other more-or-less sane governments</LI> -<LI>the activities of various more-or-less insane governments</LI> -<LI>possibilities for unauthorized action by government employees</LI> -<LI>possible actions by large non-government organisations: - corporations, criminals, or conspiracies</LI> -</UL> -<P>might be really frightening.</P> -<H4><A name="recent">Recent history -- the crypto wars</A></H4> -<P>Until quite recently, cryptography was primarily a concern of - governments, especially of the military, of spies, and of diplomats. - Much of it was extremely secret.</P> -<P>In recent years, that has changed a great deal. With computers and - networking becoming ubiquitous, cryptography is now important to almost - everyone. Among the developments since the 1970s:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The US gov't established the Data Encryption Standard,<A href="#DES"> - DES</A>, a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> for cryptographic - protection of unclassfied documents.</LI> -<LI>DES also became widely used in industry, especially regulated - industries such as banking.</LI> -<LI>Other nations produced their own standards, such as<A href="glossary.html#GOST"> - GOST</A> in the Soviet Union.</LI> -<LI><A href="#public">Public key</A> cryptography was invented by Diffie - and Hellman.</LI> -<LI>Academic conferences such as<A href="http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/crypto2k.html"> - Crypto</A> and<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/"> - Eurocrypt</A> began.</LI> -<LI>Several companies began offerring cryptographic products:<A href="#RSAco"> - RSA</A>,<A href="#PGPI"> PGP</A>, the many vendors with<A href="#PKI"> - PKI</A> products, ...</LI> -<LI>Cryptography appeared in other products: operating systems, word - processors, ...</LI> -<LI>Network protocols based on crypto were developed:<A href="#ssh"> SSH</A> -,<A href="#SSL"> SSL</A>,<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A>, ...</LI> -<LI>Crytography came into widespread use to secure bank cards, - terminals, ...</LI> -<LI>The US government replaced<A href="#DES"> DES</A> with the much - stronger Advanced Encryption Standard,<A href="#AES"> AES</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>This has led to a complex ongoing battle between various mainly - government groups wanting to control the spread of crypto and various - others, notably the computer industry and the<A href="http://online.offshore.com.ai/security/"> - cypherpunk</A> crypto advocates, wanting to encourage widespread use.</P> -<P>Steven Levy has written a fine history of much of this, called<A href="#crypto"> - Crypto: How the Code rebels Beat the Government -- Saving Privacy in - the Digital Age</A>.</P> -<P>The FreeS/WAN project is to a large extent an outgrowth of cypherpunk - ideas. Our reasons for doing the project can be seen in these quotes - from the<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Crypto_misc/cypherpunk.manifesto"> - Cypherpunk Manifesto</A>:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic - age. ... -<P>We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless - organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence. It is to - their advantage to speak of us, and we should expect that they will - speak. ...</P> -<P>We must defend our own privacy if we expect to have any. ...</P> -<P>Cypherpunks write code. We know that someone has to write software to - defend privacy, and since we can't get privacy unless we all do, we're - going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow Cypherpunks - may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all to use, - worldwide. We don't much care if you don't approve of the software we - write. We know that software can't be destroyed and that a widely - dispersed system can't be shut down.</P> -<P>Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is - fundamentally a private act. ...</P> -<P>For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. - People must come and together deploy these systems for the common good. - ...</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>To quote project leader John Gilmore:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> We are literally in a race between our ability to build and - deploy technology, and their ability to build and deploy laws and - treaties. Neither side is likely to back down or wise up until it has - definitively lost the race.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>If FreeS/WAN reaches its goal of making<A href="#opp.intro"> - opportunistic encryption</A> widespread so that secure communication - can become the default for a large part of the net, we will have struck - a major blow.</P> -<H3><A name="intro.poli">Politics</A></H3> -<P>The political problem is that nearly all governments want to monitor - their enemies' communications, and some want to monitor their citizens. - They may be very interested in protecting some of their own - communications, and often some types of business communication, but not - in having everyone able to communicate securely. They therefore attempt - to restrict availability of strong cryptography as much as possible.</P> -<P>Things various governments have tried or are trying include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Echelon, a monitor-the-world project of the US, UK, NZ, Australian - and Canadian<A href="#SIGINT"> signals intelligence</A> agencies. See - this<A href="http://sg.yahoo.com/government/intelligence/echelon_network/"> - collection</A> of links and this<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2640682,00.html"> - story</A> on the French Parliament's reaction.</LI> -<LI>Others governments may well have their own Echelon-like projects. To - quote the Dutch Minister of Defense, as reported in a German<A href="http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/4729/1.html"> - magazine</A>:<BLOCKQUOTE> The government believes not only the - governments associated with Echelon are able to intercept communication - systems, but that it is an activity of the investigative authorities - and intelligence services of many countries with governments of - different political signature.</BLOCKQUOTE> Even if they have nothing - on the scale of Echelon, most intelligence agencies and police forces - certainly have some interception capability.</LI> -<LI><A href="#NSA">NSA</A> tapping of submarine communication cables, - described in<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2764372,00.html"> - this article</A></LI> -<LI>A proposal for international co-operation on<A href="http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/enfo/4306/1.html"> - Internet surveillance</A>.</LI> -<LI>Alleged<A href="http://cryptome.org/nsa-sabotage.htm"> sabotage</A> - of security products by the<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A> (the US signals - intelligence agency).</LI> -<LI>The German armed forces and some government departments will stop - using American software for fear of NSA "back doors", according to this<A -href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/17679.html"> news story</A> -.</LI> -<LI>The British Regulation of Investigatory Powers bill. See this<A href="http://www.fipr.org/rip/index.html"> - web page.</A> and perhaps this<A href="http://ars.userfriendly.org/cartoons/?id=20000806&mode=classic"> - cartoon</A>.</LI> -<LI>A Russian<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Foreign_and_local/Russia/russian_crypto_ban_english.edict"> - ban</A> on cryptography</LI> -<LI>Chinese<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Misc/Publications/Declan_McCullagh/www/global/china"> - controls</A> on net use.</LI> -<LI>The FBI's carnivore system for covert searches of email. See this<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2601502,00.html"> - news coverage</A> and this<A href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/carnivore-risks.html"> - risk assessment</A>. The government had an external review of some - aspects of this system done. See this<A href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/carnivore_report_comments.html"> - analysis</A> of that review. Possible defenses against Carnivore - include: -<UL> -<LI><A href="#PGP">PGP</A> for end-to-end mail encryption</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.home.aone.net.au/qualcomm/">secure sendmail</A> - for server-to-server encryption</LI> -<LI>IPsec encryption on the underlying IP network</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>export laws restricting strong cryptography as a munition. See<A href="#exlaw"> - discussion</A> below.</LI> -<LI>various attempts to convince people that fundamentally flawed - cryptography, such as encryption with a<A href="#escrow"> back door</A> - for government access to data or with<A href="#shortkeys"> inadequate - key lengths</A>, was adequate for their needs.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Of course governments are by no means the only threat to privacy and - security on the net. Other threats include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>industrial espionage, as for example in this<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2626931,00.html"> - news story</A></LI> -<LI>attacks by organised criminals, as in this<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/alerts/NTE-bank.htm"> - large-scale attack</A></LI> -<LI>collection of personal data by various companies. -<UL> -<LI>for example, consider the various corporate winners of Privacy - International's<A href="http://www.privacyinternational.org/bigbrother/"> - Big Brother Awards</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.zeroknowledge.com">Zero Knowledge</A> sell tools - to defend against this</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>individuals may also be a threat in a variety of ways and for a - variety of reasons</LI> -<LI>in particular, an individual with access to government or industry - data collections could do considerable damage using that data in - unauthorized ways.</LI> -</UL> -<P>One<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2640674,00.html"> - study</A> enumerates threats and possible responses for small and - medium businesses. VPNs are a key part of the suggested strategy.</P> -<P>We consider privacy a human right. See the UN's<A href="http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html"> - Universal Declaration of Human Rights</A>, article twelve:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with - his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his - honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the - law against such interference or attacks.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>Our objective is to help make privacy possible on the Internet using - cryptography strong enough not even those well-funded government - agencies are likely to break it. If we can do that, the chances of - anyone else breaking it are negliible.</P> -<H3><A NAME="26_1_3">Links</A></H3> -<P>Many groups are working in different ways to defend privacy on the - net and elsewhere. Please consider contributing to one or more of these - groups:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the EFF's<A href="http://www.eff.org/crypto/"> Privacy Now!</A> - campaign</LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.gilc.org"> Global Internet Liberty Campaign</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cpsr.org/program/privacy/privacy.html">Computer - Professionals for Social Responsibility</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>For more on these issues see:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Steven Levy (Newsweek's chief technology writer and author of the - classic "Hackers") new book<A href="#crypto"> Crypto: How the Code - Rebels Beat the Government--Saving Privacy in the Digital Age</A></LI> -<LI>Simson Garfinkel (Boston Globe columnist and author of books on<A href="#PGP"> - PGP</A> and<A href="#practical"> Unix Security</A>) book<A href="#Garfinkel"> - Database Nation: the death of privacy in the 21st century</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There are several collections of<A href="#quotes"> crypto quotes</A> - on the net.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="biblio.html"> bibliography</A> and our list of<A href="#policy"> - web references</A> on cryptography law and policy.</P> -<H3><A NAME="26_1_4">Outline of this section</A></H3> -<P>The remainder of this section includes two pieces of writing by our - project leader</P> -<UL> -<LI>his<A href="#gilmore"> rationale</A> for starting this</LI> -<LI>another<A href="#policestate"> discussion</A> of project goals</LI> -</UL> -<P>and discussions of:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#desnotsecure">why we do not use DES</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#exlaw">cryptography export laws</A></LI> -<LI>why<A href="#escrow"> government access to keys</A> is not a good - idea</LI> -<LI>the myth that<A href="#shortkeys"> short keys</A> are adequate for - some security requirements</LI> -</UL> -<P>and a section on<A href="#press"> press coverage of FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="leader">From our project leader</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN project founder John Gilmore wrote a web page about why we - are doing this. The version below is slightly edited, to fit this - format and to update some links. For a version without these edits, see - his<A href="http://www.toad.com/gnu/"> home page</A>.</P> -<CENTER> -<H3><A name="gilmore">Swan: Securing the Internet against Wiretapping</A> -</H3> -</CENTER> -<P>My project for 1996 was to<B> secure 5% of the Internet traffic - against passive wiretapping</B>. It didn't happen in 1996, so I'm still - working on it in 1997, 1998, and 1999! If we get 5% in 1999 or 2000, we - can secure 20% the next year, against both active and passive attacks; - and 80% the following year. Soon the whole Internet will be private and - secure. The project is called S/WAN or S/Wan or Swan for Secure Wide - Area Network; since it's free software, we call it FreeSwan to - distinguish it from various commercial implementations.<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsa/SWAN/"> - RSA</A> came up with the term "S/WAN". Our main web site is at<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - http://www.freeswan.org/</A>. Want to help?</P> -<P>The idea is to deploy PC-based boxes that will sit between your local - area network and the Internet (near your firewall or router) which - opportunistically encrypt your Internet packets. Whenever you talk to a - machine (like a Web site) that doesn't support encryption, your traffic - goes out "in the clear" as usual. Whenever you connect to a machine - that does support this kind of encryption, this box automatically - encrypts all your packets, and decrypts the ones that come in. In - effect, each packet gets put into an "envelope" on one side of the net, - and removed from the envelope when it reaches its destination. This - works for all kinds of Internet traffic, including Web access, Telnet, - FTP, email, IRC, Usenet, etc.</P> -<P>The encryption boxes are standard PC's that use freely available - Linux software that you can download over the Internet or install from - a cheap CDROM.</P> -<P>This wasn't just my idea; lots of people have been working on it for - years. The encryption protocols for these boxes are called<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPSEC (IP Security)</A>. They have been developed by the<A href="http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - IP Security Working Group</A> of the<A href="http://www.ietf.org/"> - Internet Engineering Task Force</A>, and will be a standard part of the - next major version of the Internet protocols (<A href="http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main.html"> -IPv6</A>). For today's (IP version 4) Internet, they are an option.</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.iab.org/iab"> Internet Architecture Board</A> - and<A href="http://www.ietf.org/"> Internet Engineering Steering Group</A> - have taken a<A href="iab-iesg.stmt"> strong stand</A> that the Internet - should use powerful encryption to provide security and privacy. I think - these protocols are the best chance to do that, because they can be - deployed very easily, without changing your hardware or software or - retraining your users. They offer the best security we know how to - build, using the Triple-DES, RSA, and Diffie-Hellman algorithms.</P> -<P>This "opportunistic encryption box" offers the "fax effect". As each - person installs one for their own use, it becomes more valuable for - their neighbors to install one too, because there's one more person to - use it with. The software automatically notices each newly installed - box, and doesn't require a network administrator to reconfigure it. - Instead of "virtual private networks" we have a "REAL private network"; - we add privacy to the real network instead of layering a - manually-maintained virtual network on top of an insecure Internet.</P> -<H4><A NAME="26_2_1_1">Deployment of IPSEC</A></H4> -<P>The US government would like to control the deployment of IP Security - with its<A href="#exlaw"> crypto export laws</A>. This isn't a problem - for my effort, because the cryptographic work is happening outside the - United States. A foreign philanthropist, and others, have donated the - resources required to add these protocols to the Linux operating - system.<A href="http://www.linux.org/"> Linux</A> is a complete, freely - available operating system for IBM PC's and several kinds of - workstation, which is compatible with Unix. It was written by Linus - Torvalds, and is still maintained by a talented team of expert - programmers working all over the world and coordinating over the - Internet. Linux is distributed under the<A href="#GPL"> GNU Public - License</A>, which gives everyone the right to copy it, improve it, - give it to their friends, sell it commercially, or do just about - anything else with it, without paying anyone for the privilege.</P> -<P>Organizations that want to secure their network will be able to put - two Ethernet cards into an IBM PC, install Linux on it from a $30 CDROM - or by downloading it over the net, and plug it in between their - Ethernet and their Internet link or firewall. That's all they'll have - to do to encrypt their Internet traffic everywhere outside their own - local area network.</P> -<P>Travelers will be able to run Linux on their laptops, to secure their - connection back to their home network (and to everywhere else that they - connect to, such as customer sites). Anyone who runs Linux on a - standalone PC will also be able to secure their network connections, - without changing their application software or how they operate their - computer from day to day.</P> -<P>There will also be numerous commercially available firewalls that use - this technology.<A href="http://www.rsa.com/"> RSA Data Security</A> is - coordinating the<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsa/SWAN"> S/Wan (Secure - Wide Area Network)</A> project among more than a dozen vendors who use - these protocols. There's a<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsa/SWAN/swan_test.htm"> - compatability chart</A> that shows which vendors have tested their - boxes against which other vendors to guarantee interoperatility.</P> -<P>Eventually it will also move into the operating systems and - networking protocol stacks of major vendors. This will probably take - longer, because those vendors will have to figure out what they want to - do about the export controls.</P> -<H4><A NAME="26_2_1_2">Current status</A></H4> -<P>My initial goal of securing 5% of the net by Christmas '96 was not - met. It was an ambitious goal, and inspired me and others to work hard, - but was ultimately too ambitious. The protocols were in an early stage - of development, and needed a lot more protocol design before they could - be implemented. As of April 1999, we have released version 1.0 of the - software (<A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/freeswan/freeswan-1.0.tar.gz"> -freeswan-1.0.tar.gz</A>), which is suitable for setting up Virtual - Private Networks using shared secrets for authentication. It does not - yet do opportunistic encryption, or use DNSSEC for authentication; - those features are coming in a future release.</P> -<DL> -<DT>Protocols</DT> -<DD>The low-level encrypted packet formats are defined. The system for - publishing keys and providing secure domain name service is defined. - The IP Security working group has settled on an NSA-sponsored protocol - for key agreement (called ISAKMP/Oakley), but it is still being worked - on, as the protocol and its documentation is too complex and - incomplete. There are prototype implementations of ISAKMP. The protocol - is not yet defined to enable opportunistic encryption or the use of - DNSSEC keys.</DD> -<DT>Linux Implementation</DT> -<DD>The Linux implementation has reached its first major release and is - ready for production use in manually-configured networks, using Linux - kernel version 2.0.36.</DD> -<DT>Domain Name System Security</DT> -<DD>There is now a release of BIND 8.2 that includes most DNS Security - features. -<P>The first prototype implementation of Domain Name System Security was - funded by<A href="#DARPA"> DARPA</A> as part of their<A href="http://www.darpa.mil/ito/research/is/index.html"> - Information Survivability program</A>.<A href="http://www.tis.com"> - Trusted Information Systems</A> wrote a modified version of<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - BIND</A>, the widely-used Berkeley implementation of the Domain Name - System.</P> -<P>TIS, ISC, and I merged the prototype into the standard version of - BIND. The first production version that supports KEY and SIG records is<B> - bind-4.9.5</B>. This or any later version of BIND will do for - publishing keys. It is available from the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - Internet Software Consortium</A>. This version of BIND is not - export-controlled since it does not contain any cryptography. Later - releases starting with BIND 8.2 include cryptography for authenticating - DNS records, which is also exportable. Better documentation is needed.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<H4><A NAME="26_2_1_3">Why?</A></H4> -<P>Because I can. I have made enough money from several successful - startup companies, that for a while I don't have to work to support - myself. I spend my energies and money creating the kind of world that - I'd like to live in and that I'd like my (future) kids to live in. - Keeping and improving on the civil rights we have in the United States, - as we move more of our lives into cyberspace, is a particular goal of - mine.</P> -<H4><A NAME="26_2_1_4">What You Can Do</A></H4> -<DL> -<DT>Install the latest BIND at your site.</DT> -<DD>You won't be able to publish any keys for your domain, until you - have upgraded your copy of BIND. The thing you really need from it is - the new version of<I> named</I>, the Name Daemon, which knows about the - new KEY and SIG record types. So, download it from the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - Internet Software Consortium</A> and install it on your name server - machine (or get your system administrator, or Internet Service - Provider, to install it). Both your primary DNS site and all of your - secondary DNS sites will need the new release before you will be able - to publish your keys. You can tell which sites this is by running the - Unix command "dig MYDOMAIN ns" and seeing which sites are mentioned in - your NS (name server) records.</DD> -<DT>Set up a Linux system and run a 2.0.x kernel on it</DT> -<DD>Get a machine running Linux (say the 5.2 release from<A href="http://www.redhat.com"> - Red Hat</A>). Give the machine two Ethernet cards.</DD> -<DT>Install the Linux IPSEC (Freeswan) software</DT> -<DD>If you're an experienced sysadmin or Linux hacker, install the - freeswan-1.0 release, or any later release or snapshot. These releases - do NOT provide automated "opportunistic" operation; they must be - manually configured for each site you wish to encrypt with.</DD> -<DT>Get on the linux-ipsec mailing list</DT> -<DD>The discussion forum for people working on the project, and testing - the code and documentation, is: linux-ipsec@clinet.fi. To join this - mailing list, send email to<A href="mailto:linux-ipsec-REQUEST@clinet.fi"> - linux-ipsec-REQUEST@clinet.fi</A> containing a line of text that says - "subscribe linux-ipsec". (You can later get off the mailing list the - same way -- just send "unsubscribe linux-ipsec").</DD> -<P></P> -<DT>Check back at this web page every once in a while</DT> -<DD>I update this page periodically, and there may be new information in - it that you haven't seen. My intent is to send email to the mailing - list when I update the page in any significant way, so subscribing to - the list is an alternative.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Would you like to help? I can use people who are willing to write - documentation, install early releases for testing, write cryptographic - code outside the United States, sell pre-packaged software or systems - including this technology, and teach classes for network administrators - who want to install this technology. To offer to help, send me email at - gnu@toad.com. Tell me what country you live in and what your - citizenship is (it matters due to the export control laws; personally I - don't care). Include a copy of your resume and the URL of your home - page. Describe what you'd like to do for the project, and what you're - uniquely qualified for. Mention what other volunteer projects you've - been involved in (and how they worked out). Helping out will require - that you be able to commit to doing particular things, meet your - commitments, and be responsive by email. Volunteer projects just don't - work without those things.</P> -<H4><A NAME="26_2_1_5">Related projects</A></H4> -<DL> -<DT>IPSEC for NetBSD</DT> -<DD>This prototype implementation of the IP Security protocols is for - another free operating system.<A href="ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/unix/security/net/ip/BSDipsec.tar.gz"> - Download BSDipsec.tar.gz</A>.</DD> -<DT>IPSEC for<A href="http://www.openbsd.org"> OpenBSD</A></DT> -<DD>This prototype implementation of the IP Security protocols is for - yet another free operating system. It is directly integrated into the - OS release, since the OS is maintained in Canada, which has freedom of - speech in software.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A name="policestate">Stopping wholesale monitoring</A></H3> -<P>From a message project leader John Gilmore posted to the mailing - list:</P> -<PRE>John Denker wrote: - -> Indeed there are several ways in which the documentation overstates the -> scope of what this project does -- starting with the name -> FreeS/WAN. There's a big difference between having an encrypted IP tunnel -> versus having a Secure Wide-Area Network. This software does a fine job of -> the former, which is necessary but not sufficient for the latter. - -The goal of the project is to make it very hard to tap your wide area -communications. The current system provides very good protection -against passive attacks (wiretapping and those big antenna farms). -Active attacks, which involve the intruder sending packets to your -system (like packets that break into sendmail and give them a root -shell :-) are much harder to guard against. Active attacks that -involve sending people (breaking into your house and replacing parts -of your computer with ones that transmit what you're doing) are also -much harder to guard against. Though we are putting effort into -protecting against active attacks, it's a much bigger job than merely -providing strong encryption. It involves general computer security, -and general physical security, which are two very expensive problems -for even a site to solve, let alone to build into a whole society. - -The societal benefit of building an infrastructure that protects -well against passive attacks is that it makes it much harder to do -undetected bulk monitoring of the population. It's a defense against -police-states, not against policemen. - -Policemen can put in the effort required to actively attack sites that -they have strong suspicions about. But police states won't be able to -build systems that automatically monitor everyone's communications. -Either they will be able to monitor only a small subset of the -populace (by targeting those who screwed up their passive security), -or their monitoring activities will be detectable by those monitored -(active attacks leave packet traces or footprints), which can then be -addressed through the press and through political means if they become -too widespread. - -FreeS/WAN does not protect very well against traffic analysis, which -is a kind of widespread police-state style monitoring that still -reveals significant information (who's talking to who) without -revealing the contents of what was said. Defenses against traffic -analysis are an open research problem. Zero Knowledge Systems is -actively deploying a system designed to thwart it, designed by Ian -Goldberg. The jury is out on whether it actually works; a lot more -experience with it will be needed.</PRE> -<P>Notes on things mentioned in that message:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Denker is a co-author of a<A href="#applied"> paper</A> on a large - FreeS/WAN application.</LI> -<LI>Information on Zero Knowledge is on their<A href="http://www.zks.net/"> - web site</A>. Their Freedom product, designed to provide untracable - pseudonyms for use on the net, is no longer marketed.</LI> -<LI>Another section of our documentation discusses ways to<A href="#traffic.resist"> - resist traffic analysis</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="weak">Government promotion of weak crypto</A></H2> -<P>Various groups, especially governments and especially the US - government, have a long history of advocating various forms of bogus - security.</P> -<P>We regard bogus security as extremely dangerous. If users are - deceived into relying on bogus security, then they may be exposed to - large risks. They would be better off having no security and knowing - it. At least then they would be careful about what they said.</P> -<P><STRONG>Avoiding bogus security is a key design criterion for - everything we do in FreeS/WAN</STRONG>. The most conspicuous example is - our refusal to support<A href="#desnotsecure"> single DES</A>. Other - IPsec "features" which we do not implement are discussed in our<A href="#dropped"> - compatibility</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="escrow">Escrowed encryption</A></H3> -<P>Various governments have made persistent attempts to encourage or - mandate "escrowed encrytion", also called "key recovery", or GAK for - "government access to keys". The idea is that cryptographic keys be - held by some third party and turned over to law enforcement or security - agencies under some conditions.</P> -<PRE> Mary had a little key - she kept it in escrow, - and every thing that Mary said, - the feds were sure to know.</PRE> -<P>A<A href="#quotes"> crypto quotes</A> page attributes this to<A href="http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/"> - Sam Simpson</A>.</P> -<P>There is an excellent paper available on<A href="http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/"> - Risks of Escrowed Encryption</A>, from a group of cryptographic - luminaries which included our project leader.</P> -<P>Like any unnecessary complication, GAK tends to weaken security of - any design it infects. For example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Matt Blaze found a fatal flaw in the US government's Clipper chip - shortly after design information became public. See his paper "Protocol - Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard" on his<A href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/"> - papers</A> page.</LI> -<LI>a rather<A href="http://www.pgp.com/other/advisories/adk.asp"> nasty - bug</A> was found in the "additional decryption keys" "feature" of some - releases of<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN does not support escrowed encryption, and never will.</P> -<H3><A name="shortkeys">Limited key lengths</A></H3> -<P>Various governments, and some vendors, have also made persistent - attempts to convince people that:</P> -<UL> -<LI>weak systems are sufficient for some data</LI> -<LI>strong cryptography should be reserved for cases where the extra - overheads are justified</LI> -</UL> -<P><STRONG>This is utter nonsense</STRONG>.</P> -<P>Weak systems touted include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the ludicrously weak (deliberately crippled) 40-bit ciphers that - until recently were all various<A href="#exlaw"> export laws</A> - allowed</LI> -<LI>56-bit single DES, discussed<A href="#desnotsecure"> below</A></LI> -<LI>64-bit symmetric ciphers and 512-bit RSA, the maximums for - unrestricted export under various current laws</LI> -</UL> -<P>The notion that choice of ciphers or keysize should be determined by - a trade-off between security requirements and overheads is pure - bafflegab.</P> -<UL> -<LI>For most<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric ciphers</A>, it is simply a - lie. Any block cipher has some natural maximum keysize inherent in the - design -- 128 bits for<A href="#IDEA"> IDEA</A> or<A href="#CAST128"> - CAST-128</A>, 256 for Serpent or Twofish, 448 for<A href="#Blowfish"> - Blowfish</A> and 2048 for<A href="#RC4"> RC4</A>. Using a key size - smaller than that limit gives<EM> exactly zero</EM> savings in - overhead. The crippled 40-bit or 64-bit version of the cipher provides<EM> - no advantage whatsoever</EM>.</LI> -<LI><A href="#AES">AES</A> uses 10 rounds with 128-bit keys, 12 rounds - for 192-bit and 14 rounds for 256-bit, so there actually is a small - difference in overhead, but not enough to matter in most applications.</LI> -<LI>For<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A> there is a grain of truth in the - argument. 3DES is indeed three times slower than single DES. However, - the solution is not to use the insecure single DES, but to pick a - faster secure cipher.<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A>,<A href="#Blowfish"> - Blowfish</A> and the<A href="#AES"> AES candidate</A> ciphers are are - all considerably faster in software than DES (let alone 3DES!), and - apparently secure.</LI> -<LI>For<A href="#public"> public key</A> techniques, there are extra - overheads for larger keys, but they generally do not affect overall - performance significantly. Practical public key applications are - usually<A href="#hybrid"> hybrid</A> systems in which the bulk of the - work is done by a symmetric cipher. The effect of increasing the cost - of the public key operations is typically negligible because the public - key operations use only a tiny fraction of total resources. -<P>For example, suppose public key operations use use 1% of the time in - a hybrid system and you triple the cost of public key operations. The - cost of symmetric cipher operations is unchanged at 99% of the original - total cost, so the overall effect is a jump from 99 + 1 = 100 to 99 + 3 - = 102, a 2% rise in system cost.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>In short,<STRONG> there has never been any technical reason to use - inadequate ciphers</STRONG>. The only reason there has ever been for - anyone to use such ciphers is that government agencies want weak - ciphers used so that they can crack them. The alleged savings are - simply propaganda.</P> -<PRE> Mary had a little key (It's all she could export), - and all the email that she sent was opened at the Fort.</PRE> -<P>A<A href="#quotes"> crypto quotes</A> page attributes this to<A href="http://theory.lcs.mit.edu:80/~rivest/"> - Ron Rivest</A>. NSA headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland.</P> -<P>Our policy in FreeS/WAN is to use only cryptographic components with - adequate keylength and no known weaknesses.</P> -<UL> -<LI>We do not implement single DES because it is clearly<A href="#desnotsecure"> - insecure</A>, so implemeting it would violate our policy of avoiding - bogus security. Our default cipher is<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A></LI> -<LI>Similarly, we do not implement the 768-bit Group 1 for<A href="#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key negotiation. We provide only the 1024-bit Group - 2 and 1536-bit Group 5.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Detailed discussion of which IPsec features we implement or omit is - in out<A href="compat.html"> compatibility document</A>.</P> -<P>These decisions imply that we cannot fully conform to the IPsec RFCs, - since those have DES as the only required cipher and Group 1 as the - only required DH group. (In our view, the standards were subverted into - offerring bogus security.) Fortunately, we can still interoperate with - most other IPsec implementations since nearly all implementers provide - at least 3DES and Group 2 as well.</P> -<P>We hope that eventually the RFCs will catch up with our (and others') - current practice and reject dubious components. Some of our team and a - number of others are working on this in<A href="#ietf"> IETF</A> - working groups.</P> -<H4><A NAME="26_3_2_1">Some real trade-offs</A></H4> -<P>Of course, making systems secure does involve costs, and trade-offs - can be made between cost and security. However, the real trade-offs - have nothing to do with using weaker ciphers.</P> -<P>There can be substantial hardware and software costs. There are often - substantial training costs, both to train administrators and to - increase user awareness of security issues and procedures. There are - almost always substantial staff or contracting costs.</P> -<P>Security takes staff time for planning, implementation, testing and - auditing. Some of the issues are subtle; you need good (hence often - expensive) people for this. You also need people to monitor your - systems and respond to problems. The best safe ever built is insecure - if an attacker can work on it for days without anyone noticing. Any - computer is insecure if the administrator is "too busy" to check the - logs.</P> -<P>Moreover, someone in your organisation (or on contract to it) needs - to spend considerable time keeping up with new developments. EvilDoers<EM> - will</EM> know about new attacks shortly after they are found. You need - to know about them before your systems are attacked. If your vendor - provides a patch, you need to apply it. If the vendor does nothing, you - need to complain or start looking for another vendor.</P> -<P>For a fairly awful example, see this<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/alerts/NTE-bank.htm"> - report</A>. In that case over a million credit card numbers were taken - from e-commerce sites, using security flaws in Windows NT servers. - Microsoft had long since released patches for most or all of the flaws, - but the site administrators had not applied them.</P> -<P>At an absolute minimum, you must do something about such issues<EM> - before</EM> an exploitation tool is posted to the net for downloading - by dozens of "script kiddies". Such a tool might appear at any time - from the announcement of the security hole to several months later. - Once it appears, anyone with a browser and an attitude can break any - system whose administrators have done nothing about the flaw.</P> -<P>Compared to those costs, cipher overheads are an insignificant factor - in the cost of security.</P> -<P>The only thing using a weak cipher can do for you is to cause all - your other investment to be wasted.</P> -<H2><A name="exlaw">Cryptography Export Laws</A></H2> -<P>Many nations restrict the export of cryptography and some restrict - its use by their citizens or others within their borders.</P> -<H3><A name="USlaw">US Law</A></H3> -<P>US laws, as currently interpreted by the US government, forbid export - of most cryptographic software from the US in machine-readable form - without government permission. In general, the restrictions apply even - if the software is widely-disseminated or public-domain and even if it - came from outside the US originally. Cryptography is legally a munition - and export is tightly controlled under the<A href="#EAR"> EAR</A> - Export Administration Regulations.</P> -<P>If you are a US citizen, your brain is considered US territory no - matter where it is physically located at the moment. The US believes - that its laws apply to its citizens everywhere, not just within the US. - Providing technical assistance or advice to foreign "munitions" - projects is illegal. The US government has very little sense of humor - about this issue and does not consider good intentions to be sufficient - excuse. Beware.</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/"> official website</A> - for these regulations is run by the Commerce Department's Bureau of - Export Administration (BXA).</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.eff.org/bernstein/"> Bernstein case</A> - challenges the export restrictions on Constitutional grounds. Code is - speech so restrictions on export of code violate the First Amendment's - free speech provisions. This argument has succeeded in two levels of - court so far. It is quite likely to go on to the Supreme Court.</P> -<P>The regulations were changed substantially in January 2000, - apparently as a government attempt to get off the hook in the Bernstein - case. It is now legal to export public domain source code for - encryption, provided you notify the<A href="#BXA"> BXA</A>.</P> -<P>There are, however, still restrictions in force. Moreover, the - regulations can still be changed again whenever the government chooses - to do so. Short of a Supreme Court ruling (in the Berstein case or - another) that overturns the regulations completely, the problem of - export regulation is not likely to go away in the forseeable future.</P> -<H4><A name="UScontrib">US contributions to FreeS/WAN</A></H4> -<P>The FreeS/WAN project<STRONG> cannot accept software contributions,<EM> - not even small bug fixes</EM>, from US citizens or residents</STRONG>. - We want it to be absolutely clear that our distribution is not subject - to US export law. Any contribution from an American might open that - question to a debate we'd prefer to avoid. It might also put the - contributor at serious legal risk.</P> -<P>Of course Americans can still make valuable contributions (many - already have) by reporting bugs, or otherwise contributing to - discussions, on the project<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>. Since - the list is public, this is clearly constitutionally protected free - speech.</P> -<P>Note, however, that the export laws restrict Americans from providing - technical assistance to foreign "munitions" projects. The government - might claim that private discussions or correspondence with FreeS/WAN - developers were covered by this. It is not clear what the courts would - do with such a claim, so we strongly encourage Americans to use the - list rather than risk the complications.</P> -<H3><A name="wrong">What's wrong with restrictions on cryptography</A></H3> -<P>Some quotes from prominent cryptography experts:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The real aim of current policy is to ensure the continued - effectiveness of US information warfare assets against individuals, - businesses and governments in Europe and elsewhere. -<BR><A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14"> Ross Anderson, - Cambridge University</A></BLOCKQUOTE><BLOCKQUOTE> If the government - were honest about its motives, then the debate about crypto export - policy would have ended years ago. -<BR><A href="http://www.counterpane.com"> Bruce Schneier, Counterpane - Systems</A></BLOCKQUOTE><BLOCKQUOTE> The NSA regularly lies to people - who ask it for advice on export control. They have no reason not to; - accomplishing their goal by any legal means is fine by them. Lying by - government employees is legal. -<BR> John Gilmore.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering - Steering Group (IESG) made a<A href="iab-iesg.stmt"> strong statement</A> - in favour of worldwide access to strong cryptography. Essentially the - same statement is in the appropriately numbered<A href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1984.txt"> - RFC 1984</A>. Two critical paragraphs are:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> ... various governments have actual or proposed policies on - access to cryptographic technology ... -<P>(a) ... export controls ... -<BR> (b) ... short cryptographic keys ... -<BR> (c) ... keys should be in the hands of the government or ... -<BR> (d) prohibit the use of cryptology ...</P> -<P>We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers - and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of - military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to - law enforcement agencies, ...</P> -<P>The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready - access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet - users in all countries.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>Our goal in the FreeS/WAN project is to build just such "strong - cryptographic technology" and to distribute it "for all Internet users - in all countries".</P> -<P>More recently, the same two bodies (IESG and IAB) have issued<A href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2804.txt"> - RFC 2804</A> on why the IETF should not build wiretapping capabilities - into protocols for the convenience of security or law enforcement - agenicies. The abstract from that document is:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been asked - to take a position on the inclusion into IETF standards-track documents - of functionality designed to facilitate wiretapping. -<P>This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its - answer is "no", and what that answer means.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> A quote from the debate leading up to that RFC:<BLOCKQUOTE> - We should not be building surveillance technology into standards. Law - enforcement was not supposed to be easy. Where it is easy, it's called - a police state. -<BR> Jeff Schiller of MIT, in a discussion of FBI demands for wiretap - capability on the net, as quoted by<A href="http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,31895,00.html"> - Wired</A>.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>The<A href="http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven"> Raven</A> - mailing list was set up for this IETF discussion.</P> -<P>Our goal is to go beyond that RFC and prevent Internet wiretapping - entirely.</P> -<H3><A name="Wassenaar">The Wassenaar Arrangement</A></H3> -<P>Restrictions on the export of cryptography are not just US policy, - though some consider the US at least partly to blame for the policies - of other nations in this area.</P> -<P>A number of countries:</P> -<P>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech - Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, - Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, - Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak - Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom - and United States</P> -<P>have signed the Wassenaar Arrangement which restricts export of - munitions and other tools of war. Cryptographic sofware is covered - there.</P> -<P>Wassenaar details are available from the<A href="http://www.wassenaar.org/"> - Wassenaar Secretariat</A>, and elsewhere in a more readable<A href="http://www.fitug.de/news/wa/index.html"> - HTML version</A>.</P> -<P>For a critique see the<A href="http://www.gilc.org/crypto/wassenaar"> - GILC site</A>:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) has begun a - campaign calling for the removal of cryptography controls from the - Wassenaar Arrangement. -<P>The aim of the Wassenaar Arrangement is to prevent the build up of - military capabilities that threaten regional and international security - and stability . . .</P> -<P>There is no sound basis within the Wassenaar Arrangement for the - continuation of any export controls on cryptographic products.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>We agree entirely.</P> -<P>An interesting analysis of Wassenaar can be found on the<A href="http://www.cyber-rights.org/crypto/wassenaar.htm"> - cyber-rights.org</A> site.</P> -<H3><A name="status">Export status of Linux FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>We believe our software is entirely exempt from these controls since - the Wassenaar<A href="http://www.wassenaar.org/list/GTN%20and%20GSN%20-%2099.pdf"> - General Software Note</A> says:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The Lists do not control "software" which is either: -<OL> -<LI>Generally available to the public by . . . retail . . . or</LI> -<LI>"In the public domain".</LI> -</OL> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>There is a note restricting some of this, but it is a sub-heading - under point 1, so it appears not to apply to public domain software.</P> -<P>Their glossary defines "In the public domain" as:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> . . . "technology" or "software" which has been made - available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. -<P>N.B. Copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" or "software" - from being "in the public domain".</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>We therefore believe that software freely distributed under the<A href="#GPL"> - GNU Public License</A>, such as Linux FreeS/WAN, is exempt from - Wassenaar restrictions.</P> -<P>Most of the development work is being done in Canada. Our - understanding is that the Canadian government accepts this - interpretation.</P> -<UL> -<LI>A web statement of<A href="http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~eicb/notices/ser113-e.htm"> - Canadian policy</A> is available from the Department of Foreign Affairs - and International Trade.</LI> -<LI>Another document from that department states that<A href="http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~eicb/export/gr1_e.htm"> - public domain software</A> is exempt from the export controls.</LI> -<LI>A researcher's<A href="http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/crypto-export.html"> - analysis</A> of Canadian policy is also available.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Recent copies of the freely modifiable and distributable source code - exist in many countries. Citizens all over the world participate in its - use and evolution, and guard its ongoing distribution. Even if Canadian - policy were to change, the software would continue to evolve in - countries which do not restrict exports, and would continue to be - imported from there into unfree countries. "The Net culture treats - censorship as damage, and routes around it."</P> -<H3><A name="help">Help spread IPsec around</A></H3> -<P>You can help. If you don't know of a Linux FreeS/WAN archive in your - own country, please download it now to your personal machine, and - consider making it publicly accessible if that doesn't violate your own - laws. If you have the resources, consider going one step further and - setting up a mirror site for the whole<A href="#munitions"> munitions</A> - Linux crypto software archive.</P> -<P>If you make Linux CD-ROMs, please consider including this code, in a - way that violates no laws (in a free country, or in a domestic-only CD - product).</P> -<P>Please send a note about any new archive mirror sites or CD - distributions to linux-ipsec@clinet.fi so we can update the - documentation.</P> -<P>Lists of current<A href="#sites"> mirror sites</A> and of<A href="#distwith"> - distributions</A> which include FreeS/WAN are in our introduction - section.</P> -<H2><A name="desnotsecure">DES is Not Secure</A></H2> -<P>DES, the<STRONG> D</STRONG>ata<STRONG> E</STRONG>ncryption<STRONG> S</STRONG> -tandard, can no longer be considered secure. While no major flaws in its - innards are known, it is fundamentally inadequate because its<STRONG> - 56-bit key is too short</STRONG>. It is vulnerable to<A href="#brute"> - brute-force search</A> of the whole key space, either by large - collections of general-purpose machines or even more quickly by - specialized hardware. Of course this also applies to<STRONG> any other - cipher with only a 56-bit key</STRONG>. The only reason anyone could - have for using a 56 or 64-bit key is to comply with various<A href="exportlaw.html"> - export laws</A> intended to ensure the use of breakable ciphers.</P> -<P>Non-government cryptologists have been saying DES's 56-bit key was - too short for some time -- some of them were saying it in the 70's when - DES became a standard -- but the US government has consistently - ridiculed such suggestions.</P> -<P>A group of well-known cryptographers looked at key lengths in a<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/keylength.html"> - 1996 paper</A>. They suggested a<EM> minimum</EM> of 75 bits to - consider an existing cipher secure and a<EM> minimum of 90 bits for new - ciphers</EM>. More recent papers, covering both<A href="#symmetric"> - symmetric</A> and<A href="#public"> public key</A> systems are at<A href="http://www.cryptosavvy.com/"> - cryptosavvy.com</A> and<A href="http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/bulletins/bulletin13.html"> - rsa.com</A>. For all algorithms, the minimum keylengths recommended in - such papers are significantly longer than the maximums allowed by - various export laws.</P> -<P>In a<A href="http://www.privacy.nb.ca/cryptography/archives/cryptography/html/1998-09/0095.html"> - 1998 ruling</A>, a German court described DES as "out-of-date and not - safe enough" and held a bank liable for using it.</P> -<H3><A name="deshware">Dedicated hardware breaks DES in a few days</A></H3> -<P>The question of DES security has now been settled once and for all. - In early 1998, the<A href="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier - Foundation</A> built a<A href="http://www.eff.org/descracker.html"> - DES-cracking machine</A>. It can find a DES key in an average of a few - days' search. The details of all this, including complete code listings - and complete plans for the machine, have been published in<A href="#EFF"> -<CITE> Cracking DES</CITE></A>, by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.</P> -<P>That machine cost just over $200,000 to design and build. "Moore's - Law" is that machines get faster (or cheaper, for the same speed) by - roughly a factor of two every 18 months. At that rate, their $200,000 - in 1998 becomes $50,000 in 2001.</P> -<P>However, Moore's Law is not exact and the $50,000 estimate does not - allow for the fact that a copy based on the published EFF design would - cost far less than the original. We cannot say exactly what such a - cracker would cost today, but it would likely be somewhere between - $10,000 and $100,000.</P> -<P>A large corporation could build one of these out of petty cash. The - cost is low enough for a senior manager to hide it in a departmental - budget and avoid having to announce or justify the project. Any - government agency, from a major municipal police force up, could afford - one. Or any other group with a respectable budget -- criminal - organisations, political groups, labour unions, religious groups, ... - Or any millionaire with an obsession or a grudge, or just strange taste - in toys.</P> -<P>One might wonder if a private security or detective agency would have - one for rent. They wouldn't need many clients to pay off that - investment.</P> -<H3><A name="spooks">Spooks may break DES faster yet</A></H3> -<P>As for the security and intelligence agencies of various nations, - they may have had DES crackers for years, and theirs may be much - faster. It is difficult to make most computer applications work well on - parallel machines, or to design specialised hardware to accelerate - them. Cipher-cracking is one of the very few exceptions. It is entirely - straightforward to speed up cracking by just adding hardware. Within - very broad limits, you can make it as fast as you like if you have the - budget. The EFF's $200,000 machine breaks DES in a few days. An<A href="http://www.planepage.com/"> - aviation website</A> gives the cost of a B1 bomber as $200,000,000. - Spending that much, an intelligence agency could break DES in an - average time of<EM> six and a half minutes</EM>.</P> -<P>That estimate assumes they use the EFF's 1998 technology and just - spend more money. They may have an attack that is superior to brute - force, they quite likely have better chip technology (Moore's law, a - bigger budget, and whatever secret advances they may have made) and of - course they may have spent the price of an aircraft carrier, not just - one aircraft.</P> -<P>In short, we have<EM> no idea</EM> how quickly these organisations - can break DES. Unless they're spectacularly incompetent or horribly - underfunded, they can certainly break it, but we cannot guess how - quickly. Pick any time unit between days and milliseconds; none is - entirely unbelievable. More to the point, none of them is of any - comfort if you don't want such organisations reading your - communications.</P> -<P>Note that this may be a concern even if nothing you do is a threat to - anyone's national security. An intelligence agency might well consider - it to be in their national interest for certain companies to do well. - If you're competing against such companies in a world market and that - agency can read your secrets, you have a serious problem.</P> -<P>One might wonder about technology the former Soviet Union and its - allies developed for cracking DES during the Cold War. They must have - tried; the cipher was an American standard and widely used. Certainly - those countries have some fine mathematicians, and those agencies had - budget. How well did they succeed? Is their technology now for sale or - rent?</P> -<H3><A name="desnet">Networks break DES in a few weeks</A></H3> -<P>Before the definitive EFF effort, DES had been cracked several times - by people using many machines. See this<A href="http://www.distributed.net/pressroom/DESII-1-PR.html"> - press release</A> for example.</P> -<P>A major corporation, university, or government department could break - DES by using spare cycles on their existing collection of computers, by - dedicating a group of otherwise surplus machines to the problem, or by - combining the two approaches. It might take them weeks or months, - rather than the days required for the EFF machine, but they could do - it.</P> -<P>What about someone working alone, without the resources of a large - organisation? For them, cracking DES will not be easy, but it may be - possible. A few thousand dollars buys a lot of surplus workstations. A - pile of such machines will certainly heat your garage nicely and might - break DES in a few months or years. Or enroll at a university and use - their machines. Or use an employer's machines. Or crack security - somewhere and steal the resources to crack a DES key. Or write a virus - that steals small amounts of resources on many machines. Or . . .</P> -<P>None of these approaches are easy or break DES really quickly, but an - attacker only needs to find one that is feasible and breaks DES quickly - enough to be dangerous. How much would you care to bet that this will - be impossible if the attacker is clever and determined? How valuable is - your data? Are you authorised to risk it on a dubious bet?</P> -<H3><A name="no_des">We disable DES</A></H3> -<P>In short, it is now absolutely clear that<STRONG> DES is not secure</STRONG> - against</P> -<UL> -<LI>any<STRONG> well-funded opponent</STRONG></LI> -<LI>any opponent (even a penniless one) with access (even stolen access) - to<STRONG> enough general purpose computers</STRONG></LI> -</UL> -<P>That is why<STRONG> Linux FreeS/WAN disables all transforms which use - plain DES</STRONG> for encryption.</P> -<P>DES is in the source code, because we need DES to implement our - default encryption transform,<A href="#3DES"> Triple DES</A>.<STRONG> - We urge you not to use single DES</STRONG>. We do not provide any easy - way to enable it in FreeS/WAN, and our policy is to provide no - assistance to anyone wanting to do so.</P> -<H3><A name="40joke">40-bits is laughably weak</A></H3> -<P>The same is true, in spades, of ciphers -- DES or others -- crippled - by 40-bit keys, as many ciphers were required to be until recently - under various<A href="#exlaw"> export laws</A>. A brute force search of - such a cipher's keyspace is 2<SUP>16</SUP> times faster than a similar - search against DES. The EFF's machine can do a brute-force search of a - 40-bit key space in<EM> seconds</EM>. One contest to crack a 40-bit - cipher was won by a student<A href="http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/18.80.html#subj1"> - using a few hundred idle machines at his university</A>. It took only - three and half hours.</P> -<P>We do not, and will not, implement any 40-bit cipher.</P> -<H3><A name="altdes">Triple DES is almost certainly secure</A></H3> -<P><A href="#3DES">Triple DES</A>, usually abbreviated 3DES, applies DES - three times, with three different keys. DES seems to be basically an - excellent cipher design; it has withstood several decades of intensive - analysis without any disastrous flaws being found. It's only major flaw - is that the small keyspace allows brute force attacks to succeeed. - Triple DES enlarges the key space to 168 bits, making brute-force - search a ridiculous impossibility.</P> -<P>3DES is currently the only block cipher implemented in FreeS/WAN. - 3DES is, unfortunately, about 1/3 the speed of DES, but modern CPUs - still do it at quite respectable speeds. Some<A href="#benchmarks"> - speed measurements</A> for our code are available.</P> -<H3><A name="aes.ipsec">AES in IPsec</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="#AES"> AES</A> project has chosen a replacement for DES, - a new standard cipher for use in non-classified US government work and - in regulated industries such as banking. This cipher will almost - certainly become widely used for many applications, including IPsec.</P> -<P>The winner, announced in October 2000 after several years of analysis - and discussion, was the<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/"> - Rijndael</A> cipher from two Belgian designers.</P> -<P>It is almost certain that FreeS/WAN will add AES support.<A href="#patch"> - AES patches</A> are already available.</P> -<H2><A name="press">Press coverage of Linux FreeS/WAN:</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="26_6_1">FreeS/WAN 1.0 press</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/19136.html"> -Wired</A> "Linux-Based Crypto Stops Snoops", James Glave April 15 1999</LI> -<LI><A href="http://slashdot.org/articles/99/04/15/1851212.shtml"> -Slashdot</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://dgl.com/itinfo/1999/it990415.html">DGL</A>, Damar - Group Limited; looking at FreeS/WAN from a perspective of business - computing</LI> -<LI><A href="http://linuxtoday.com/stories/5010.html">Linux Today</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tbtf.com/archive/1999-04-21.html#Tcep">TBTF</A>, - Tasty Bits from the Technology Front</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.salonmagazine.com/tech/log/1999/04/16/encryption/index.html"> -Salon Magazine</A> "Free Encryption Takes a Big Step"</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="release">Press release for version 1.0</A></H3> -<PRE> Strong Internet Privacy Software Free for Linux Users Worldwide - -Toronto, ON, April 14, 1999 - - -The Linux FreeS/WAN project today released free software to protect -the privacy of Internet communications using strong encryption codes. -FreeS/WAN automatically encrypts data as it crosses the Internet, to -prevent unauthorized people from receiving or modifying it. One -ordinary PC per site runs this free software under Linux to become a -secure gateway in a Virtual Private Network, without having to modify -users' operating systems or application software. The project built -and released the software outside the United States, avoiding US -government regulations which prohibit good privacy protection. -FreeS/WAN version 1.0 is available immediately for downloading at -http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan/. - -"Today's FreeS/WAN release allows network administrators to build -excellent secure gateways out of old PCs at no cost, or using a cheap -new PC," said John Gilmore, the entrepreneur who instigated the -project in 1996. "They can build operational experience with strong -network encryption and protect their users' most important -communications worldwide." - -"The software was written outside the United States, and we do not -accept contributions from US citizens or residents, so that it can be -freely published for use in every country," said Henry Spencer, who -built the release in Toronto, Canada. "Similar products based in the -US require hard-to-get government export licenses before they can be -provided to non-US users, and can never be simply published on a Web -site. Our product is freely available worldwide for immediate -downloading, at no cost." - -FreeS/WAN provides privacy against both quiet eavesdropping (such as -"packet sniffing") and active attempts to compromise communications -(such as impersonating participating computers). Secure "tunnels" carry -information safely across the Internet between locations such as a -company's main office, distant sales offices, and roaming laptops. This -protects the privacy and integrity of all information sent among those -locations, including sensitive intra-company email, financial transactions -such as mergers and acquisitions, business negotiations, personal medical -records, privileged correspondence with lawyers, and information about -crimes or civil rights violations. The software will be particularly -useful to frequent wiretapping targets such as private companies competing -with government-owned companies, civil rights groups and lawyers, -opposition political parties, and dissidents. - -FreeS/WAN provides privacy for Internet packets using the proposed -standard Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) protocols. FreeS/WAN -negotiates strong keys using Diffie-Hellman key agreement with 1024-bit -keys, and encrypts each packet with 168-bit Triple-DES (3DES). A modern -$500 PC can set up a tunnel in less than a second, and can encrypt -6 megabits of packets per second, easily handling the whole available -bandwidth at the vast majority of Internet sites. In preliminary testing, -FreeS/WAN interoperated with 3DES IPSEC products from OpenBSD, PGP, SSH, -Cisco, Raptor, and Xedia. Since FreeS/WAN is distributed as source code, -its innards are open to review by outside experts and sophisticated users, -reducing the chance of undetected bugs or hidden security compromises. - -The software has been in development for several years. It has been -funded by several philanthropists interested in increased privacy on -the Internet, including John Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic -Frontier Foundation, a leading online civil rights group. - -Press contacts: -Hugh Daniel, +1 408 353 8124, hugh@toad.com -Henry Spencer, +1 416 690 6561, henry@spsystems.net - -* FreeS/WAN derives its name from S/WAN, which is a trademark of RSA Data - Security, Inc; used by permission.</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A name="ipsec.detail">The IPsec protocols</A></H1> -<P>This section provides information on the IPsec protocols which - FreeS/WAN implements. For more detail, see the<A href="rfc.html"> RFCs</A> -.</P> -<P>The basic idea of IPsec is to provide security functions,<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> and<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A>, at the IP - (Internet Protocol) level. This requires a higher-level protocol (IKE) - to set things up for the IP-level services (ESP and AH).</P> -<H2><A NAME="27_1">Protocols and phases</A></H2> -<P>Three protocols are used in an IPsec implementation:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ESP, Encapsulating Security Payload</DT> -<DD>Encrypts and/or authenticates data</DD> -<DT>AH, Authentication Header</DT> -<DD>Provides a packet authentication service</DD> -<DT>IKE, Internet Key Exchange</DT> -<DD>Negotiates connection parameters, including keys, for the other two</DD> -</DL> -<P>The term "IPsec" (also written as IPSEC) is slightly ambiguous. In - some contexts, it includes all three of the above but in other contexts - it refers only to AH and ESP.</P> -<P>There is more detail below, but a quick summary of how the whole - thing works is:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Phase one IKE (main mode exchange)</DT> -<DD>sets up a keying channel (ISAKMP SA) between the two gateways</DD> -<DT>Phase two IKE (quick mode exchange)</DT> -<DD>sets up data channels (IPsec SAs)</DD> -<DT>IPsec proper</DT> -<DD>exchanges data using AH or ESP</DD> -</DL> -<P>Both phases of IKE are repeated periodically to automate re-keying.</P> -<H2><A name="others">Applying IPsec</A></H2> -<P>Authentication and encryption functions for network data can, of - course, be provided at other levels. Many security protocols work at - levels above IP.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#PGP">PGP</A> encrypts and authenticates mail messages</LI> -<LI><A href="#ssh">SSH</A> authenticates remote logins and then encrypts - the session</LI> -<LI><A href="#SSL">SSL</A> or<A href="#TLS"> TLS</A> provides security - at the sockets layer, e.g. for secure web browsing</LI> -</UL> -<P>and so on. Other techniques work at levels below IP. For example, - data on a communications circuit or an entire network can be encrypted - by specialised hardware. This is common practice in high-security - applications.</P> -<H3><A name="advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>There are, however, advantages to doing it at the IP level instead - of, or as well as, at other levels.</P> -<P>IPsec is the<STRONG> most general way to provide these services for - the Internet</STRONG>.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Higher-level services protect a<EM> single protocol</EM>; for - example PGP protects mail.</LI> -<LI>Lower level services protect a<EM> single medium</EM>; for example a - pair of encryption boxes on the ends of a line make wiretaps on that - line useless unless the attacker is capable of breaking the encryption.</LI> -</UL> -<P>IPsec, however, can protect<EM> any protocol</EM> running above IP - and<EM> any medium</EM> which IP runs over. More to the point, it can - protect a mixture of application protocols running over a complex - combination of media. This is the normal situation for Internet - communication; IPsec is the only general solution.</P> -<P>IPsec can also provide some security services "in the background", - with<STRONG> no visible impact on users</STRONG>. To use<A href="#PGP"> - PGP</A> encryption and signatures on mail, for example, the user must - at least:</P> -<UL> -<LI>remember his or her passphrase,</LI> -<LI>keep it secure</LI> -<LI>follow procedures to validate correspondents' keys</LI> -</UL> -<P>These systems can be designed so that the burden on users is not - onerous, but any system will place some requirements on users. No such - system can hope to be secure if users are sloppy about meeting those - requirements. The author has seen username and password stuck on - terminals with post-it notes in an allegedly secure environment, for - example.</P> -<H3><A name="limitations">Limitations of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>IPsec is designed to secure IP links between machines. It does that - well, but it is important to remember that there are many things it - does not do. Some of the important limitations are:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A name="depends">IPsec cannot be secure if your system isn't</A></DT> -<DD>System security on IPsec gateway machines is an essential - requirement if IPsec is to function as designed. No system can be - trusted if the underlying machine has been subverted. See books on Unix - security such as<A href="#practical"> Garfinkel and Spafford</A> or our - web references for<A href="#linsec"> Linux security</A> or more general<A -href="#compsec"> computer security</A>. -<P>Of course, there is another side to this. IPsec can be a powerful - tool for improving system and network security. For example, requiring - packet authentication makes various spoofing attacks harder and IPsec - tunnels can be extremely useful for secure remote administration of - various things.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="not-end-to-end">IPsec is not end-to-end</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec cannot provide the same end-to-end security as systems working - at higher levels. IPsec encrypts an IP connection between two machines, - which is quite a different thing than encrypting messages between users - or between applications. -<P>For example, if you need mail encrypted from the sender's desktop to - the recipient's desktop and decryptable only by the recipient, use<A href="#PGP"> - PGP</A> or another such system. IPsec can encrypt any or all of the - links involved -- between the two mail servers, or between either - server and its clients. It could even be used to secure a direct IP - link from the sender's desktop machine to the recipient's, cutting out - any sort of network snoop. What it cannot ensure is end-to-end - user-to-user security. If only IPsec is used to secure mail, then - anyone with appropriate privileges on any machine where that mail is - stored (at either end or on any store-and-forward servers in the path) - can read it.</P> -<P>In another common setup, IPsec encrypts packets at a security gateway - machine as they leave the sender's site and decrypts them on arrival at - the gateway to the recipient's site. This does provide a useful - security service -- only encrypted data is passed over the Internet -- - but it does not even come close to providing an end-to-end service. In - particular, anyone with appropriate privileges on either site's LAN can - intercept the message in unencrypted form.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="notpanacea">IPsec cannot do everything</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec also cannot provide all the functions of systems working at - higher levels of the protocol stack. If you need a document - electronically signed by a particular person, then you need his or her<A -href="#signature"> digital signature</A> and a<A href="#public"> public - key cryptosystem</A> to verify it with. -<P>Note, however, that IPsec authentication of the underlying - communication can make various attacks on higher-level protocols more - difficult. In particular, authentication prevents<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="no_user">IPsec authenticates machines, not users</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec uses strong authentication mechanisms to control which - messages go to which machines, but it does not have the concept of user - ID, which is vital to many other security mechansims and policies. This - means some care must be taken in fitting the various security - mechansims on a network together. For example, if you need to control - which users access your database server, you need some non-IPsec - mechansim for that. IPsec can control which machines connect to the - server, and can ensure that data transfer to those machines is done - securely, but that is all. Either the machines themselves must control - user access or there must be some form of user authentication to the - database, independent of IPsec.</DD> -<DT><A name="DoS">IPsec does not stop denial of service attacks</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#DOS">Denial of service</A> attacks aim at causing a system - to crash, overload, or become confused so that legitimate users cannot - get whatever services the system is supposed to provide. These are - quite different from attacks in which the attacker seeks either to use - the service himself or to subvert the service into delivering incorrect - results. -<P>IPsec shifts the ground for DoS attacks; the attacks possible against - systems using IPsec are different than those that might be used against - other systems. It does not, however, eliminate the possibility of such - attacks.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="traffic">IPsec does not stop traffic analysis</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#traffic">Traffic analysis</A> is the attempt to derive - intelligence from messages without regard for their contents. In the - case of IPsec, it would mean analysis based on things visible in the - unencrypted headers of encrypted packets -- source and destination - gateway addresses, packet size, et cetera. Given the resources to - acquire such data and some skill in analysing it (both of which any - national intelligence agency should have), this can be a very powerful - technique. -<P>IPsec is not designed to defend against this. Partial defenses are - certainly possible, and some are<A href="#traffic.resist"> described - below</A>, but it is not clear that any complete defense can be - provided.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A name="uses">IPsec is a general mechanism for securing IP</A></H3> -<P>While IPsec does not provide all functions of a mail encryption - package, it can encrypt your mail. In particular, it can ensure that - all mail passing between a pair or a group of sites is encrypted. An - attacker looking only at external traffic, without access to anything - on or behind the IPsec gateway, cannot read your mail. He or she is - stymied by IPsec just as he or she would be by<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A>.</P> -<P>The advantage is that IPsec can provide the same protection for<STRONG> - anything transmitted over IP</STRONG>. In a corporate network example, - PGP lets the branch offices exchange secure mail with head office. SSL - and SSH allow them to securely view web pages, connect as terminals to - machines, and so on. IPsec can support all those applications, plus - database queries, file sharing (NFS or Windows), other protocols - encapsulated in IP (Netware, Appletalk, ...), phone-over-IP, - video-over-IP, ... anything-over-IP. The only limitation is that IP - Multicast is not yet supported, though there are Internet Draft - documents for that.</P> -<P>IPsec creates<STRONG> secure tunnels through untrusted networks</STRONG> -. Sites connected by these tunnels form VPNs,<A href="#VPN"> Virtual - Private Networks</A>.</P> -<P>IPsec gateways can be installed wherever they are required.</P> -<UL> -<LI>One organisation might choose to install IPsec only on firewalls - between their LANs and the Internet. This would allow them to create a - VPN linking several offices. It would provide protection against anyone - outside their sites.</LI> -<LI>Another might install IPsec on departmental servers so everything on - the corporate backbone net was encrypted. This would protect messages - on that net from everyone except the sending and receiving department.</LI> -<LI>Another might be less concerned with information secrecy and more - with controlling access to certain resources. They might use IPsec - packet authentication as part of an access control mechanism, with or - without also using the IPsec encryption service.</LI> -<LI>It is even possible (assuming adequate processing power and an IPsec - implementation in each node) to make every machine its own IPsec - gateway so that everything on a LAN is encrypted. This protects - information from everyone outside the sending and receiving machine.</LI> -<LI>These techniques can be combined in various ways. One might, for - example, require authentication everywhere on a network while using - encryption only for a few links.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Which of these, or of the many other possible variants, to use is up - to you.<STRONG> IPsec provides mechanisms; you provide the policy</STRONG> -.</P> -<P><STRONG>No end user action is required</STRONG> for IPsec security to - be used; they don't even have to know about it. The site - administrators, of course, do have to know about it and to put some - effort into making it work. Poor administration can compromise IPsec as - badly as the post-it notes mentioned above. It seems reasonable, - though, for organisations to hope their system administrators are - generally both more security-conscious than end users and more able to - follow computer security procedures. If not, at least there are fewer - of them to educate or replace.</P> -<P>IPsec can be, and often should be, used with along with security - protocols at other levels. If two sites communicate with each other via - the Internet, then IPsec is the obvious way to protect that - communication. If two others have a direct link between them, either - link encryption or IPsec would make sense. Choose one or use both. - Whatever you use at and below the IP level, use other things as - required above that level. Whatever you use above the IP level, - consider what can be done with IPsec to make attacks on the higher - levels harder. For example,<A href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle attacks</A> - on various protocols become difficult if authentication at packet level - is in use on the potential victims' communication channel.</P> -<H3><A name="authonly">Using authentication without encryption</A></H3> -<P>Where appropriate, IPsec can provide authentication without - encryption. One might do this, for example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>where the data is public but one wants to be sure of getting the - right data, for example on some web sites</LI> -<LI>where encryption is judged unnecessary, for example on some company - or department LANs</LI> -<LI>where strong encryption is provided at link level, below IP</LI> -<LI>where strong encryption is provided in other protocols, above IP -<BR> Note that IPsec authentication may make some attacks on those - protocols harder.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Authentication has lower overheads than encryption.</P> -<P>The protocols provide four ways to build such connections, using - either an AH-only connection or ESP using null encryption, and in - either manually or automatically keyed mode. FreeS/WAN supports only - one of these, manually keyed AH-only connections, and<STRONG> we do not - recommend using that</STRONG>. Our reasons are discussed under<A href="#traffic.resist"> - Resisting traffic analysis</A> a few sections further along.</P> -<H3><A name="encnoauth">Encryption without authentication is dangerous</A> -</H3> -<P>Originally, the IPsec encryption protocol<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> - didn't do integrity checking. It only did encryption. Steve Bellovin - found many ways to attack ESP used without authentication. See his - paper<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/badesp.ps"> - Problem areas for the IP Security Protocols</A>. To make a secure - connection, you had to add an<A href="#AH"> AH</A> Authentication - Header as well as ESP. Rather than incur the overhead of several layers - (and rather than provide an ESP layer that didn't actually protect the - traffic), the IPsec working group built integrity and replay checking - directly into ESP.</P> -<P>Today, typical usage is one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>ESP for encryption and authentication</LI> -<LI>AH for authentication alone</LI> -</UL> -<P>Other variants are allowed by the standard, but not much used:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ESP encryption without authentication</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Bellovin has demonstrated fatal flaws in this. Do not use.</STRONG> -</DD> -<DT>ESP encryption with AH authentication</DT> -<DD>This has higher overheads than using the authentication in ESP, and - no obvious benefit in most cases. The exception might be a network - where AH authentication was widely or universally used. If you're going - to do AH to conform with network policy, why authenticate again in the - ESP layer?</DD> -<DT>Authenticate twice, with AH and with ESP</DT> -<DD>Why? Of course, some folk consider "belt and suspenders" the - sensible approach to security. If you're among them, you might use both - protocols here. You might also use both to satisfy different parts of a - security policy. For example, an organisation might require AH - authentication everywhere but two users within the organisation might - use ESP as well.</DD> -<DT>ESP authentication without encryption</DT> -<DD>The standard allows this, calling it "null encryption". FreeS/WAN - does not support it. We recommend that you use AH instead if - authentication is all you require. AH authenticates parts of the IP - header, which ESP-null does not do.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Some of these variants cannot be used with FreeS/WAN because we do - not support ESP-null and do not support automatic keying of AH-only - connections.</P> -<P>There are fairly frequent suggestions that AH be dropped entirely - from the IPsec specifications since ESP and null encryption can handle - that situation. It is not clear whether this will occur. My guess is - that it is unlikely.</P> -<H3><A name="multilayer">Multiple layers of IPsec processing are - possible</A></H3> -<P>The above describes combinations possible on a single IPsec - connection. In a complex network you may have several layers of IPsec - in play, with any of the above combinations at each layer.</P> -<P>For example, a connection from a desktop machine to a database server - might require AH authentication. Working with other host, network and - database security measures, AH might be just the thing for access - control. You might decide not to use ESP encryption on such packets, - since it uses resources and might complicate network debugging. Within - the site where the server is, then, only AH would be used on those - packets.</P> -<P>Users at another office, however, might have their whole connection - (AH headers and all) passing over an IPsec tunnel connecting their - office to the one with the database server. Such a tunnel should use - ESP encryption and authentication. You need authentication in this - layer because without authentication the encryption is vulnerable and - the gateway cannot verify the AH authentication. The AH is between - client and database server; the gateways aren't party to it.</P> -<P>In this situation, some packets would get multiple layers of IPsec - applied to them, AH on an end-to-end client-to-server basis and ESP - from one office's security gateway to the other.</P> -<H3><A name="traffic.resist">Resisting traffic analysis</A></H3> -<P><A href="#traffic">Traffic analysis</A> is the attempt to derive - useful intelligence from encrypted traffic without breaking the - encryption.</P> -<P>Is your CEO exchanging email with a venture capital firm? With - bankruptcy trustees? With an executive recruiting agency? With the - holder of some important patents? If an eavesdropper learns about any - of those, then he has interesting intelligence on your company, whether - or not he can read the messages themselves.</P> -<P>Even just knowing that there is network traffic between two sites may - tell an analyst something useful, especially when combined with - whatever other information he or she may have. For example, if you know - Company A is having cashflow problems and Company B is looking for - aquisitions, then knowing that packets are passing between the two is - interesting. It is more interesting if you can tell it is email, and - perhaps yet more if you know the sender and recipient.</P> -<P>Except in the simplest cases, traffic analysis is hard to do well. It - requires both considerable resources and considerable analytic skill. - However, intelligence agencies of various nations have been doing it - for centuries and many of them are likely quite good at it by now. - Various commercial organisations, especially those working on "targeted - marketing" may also be quite good at analysing certain types of - traffic.</P> -<P>In general, defending against traffic analysis is also difficult. - Inventing a really good defense could get you a PhD and some - interesting job offers.</P> -<P>IPsec is not designed to stop traffic analysis and we know of no - plausible method of extending it to do so. That said, there are ways to - make traffic analysis harder. This section describes them.</P> -<H4><A name="extra">Using "unnecessary" encryption</A></H4> -<P>One might choose to use encryption even where it appears unnecessary - in order to make analysis more difficult. Consider two offices which - pass a small volume of business data between them using IPsec and also - transfer large volumes of Usenet news. At first glance, it would seem - silly to encrypt the newsfeed, except possibly for any newsgroups that - are internal to the company. Why encrypt data that is all publicly - available from many sites?</P> -<P>However, if we encrypt a lot of news and send it down the same - connection as our business data, we make<A href="#traffic"> traffic - analysis</A> much harder. A snoop cannot now make inferences based on - patterns in the volume, direction, sizes, sender, destination, or - timing of our business messages. Those messages are hidden in a mass of - news messages encapsulated in the same way.</P> -<P>If we're going to do this we need to ensure that keys change often - enough to remain secure even with high volumes and with the adversary - able to get plaintext of much of the data. We also need to look at - other attacks this might open up. For example, can the adversary use a - chosen plaintext attack, deliberately posting news articles which, when - we receive and encrypt them, will help break our encryption? Or can he - block our business data transmission by flooding us with silly news - articles? Or ...</P> -<P>Also, note that this does not provide complete protection against - traffic analysis. A clever adversary might still deduce useful - intelligence from statistical analysis (perhaps comparing the input - newsfeed to encrypted output, or comparing the streams we send to - different branch offices), or by looking for small packets which might - indicate establishment of TCP connections, or ...</P> -<P>As a general rule, though, to improve resistance to traffic analysis, - you should<STRONG> encrypt as much traffic as possible, not just as - much as seems necessary.</STRONG></P> -<H4><A name="multi-encrypt">Using multiple encryption</A></H4> -<P>This also applies to using multiple layers of encryption. If you have - an IPsec tunnel between two branch offices, it might appear silly to - send<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A>-encrypted email through that tunnel. - However, if you suspect someone is snooping your traffic, then it does - make sense:</P> -<UL> -<LI>it protects the mail headers; they cannot even see who is mailing - who</LI> -<LI>it protects against user bungles or software malfunctions that - accidentally send messages in the clear</LI> -<LI>it makes any attack on the mail encryption much harder; they have to - break IPsec or break into your network before they can start on the - mail encryption</LI> -</UL> -<P>Similar arguments apply for<A href="#SSL"> SSL</A>-encrypted web - traffic or<A href="#ssh"> SSH</A>-encrypted remote login sessions, even - for end-to-end IPsec tunnels between systems in the two offices.</P> -<H4><A name="fewer">Using fewer tunnels</A></H4> -<P>It may also help to use fewer tunnels. For example, if all you - actually need encrypted is connections between:</P> -<UL> -<LI>mail servers at branch and head offices</LI> -<LI>a few branch office users and the head office database server</LI> -</UL> -<P>You might build one tunnel per mail server and one per remote - database user, restricting traffic to those applications. This gives - the traffic analyst some information, however. He or she can - distinguish the tunnels by looking at information in the ESP header - and, given that distinction and the patterns of tunnel usage, might be - able to figure out something useful. Perhaps not, but why take the - risk?</P> -<P>We suggest instead that you build one tunnel per branch office, - encrypting everything passing from head office to branches. This has a - number of advantages:</P> -<UL> -<LI>it is easier to build and administer</LI> -<LI>it resists traffic analysis somewhat better</LI> -<LI>it provides security for whatever you forgot. For example, if some - user at a remote office browses proprietary company data on some head - office web page (that the security people may not even know about!), - then that data is encrypted before it reaches the Internet.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Of course you might also want to add additional tunnels. For example, - if some of the database data is confidential and should not be exposed - even within the company, then you need protection from the user's - desktop to the database server. We suggest you do that in whatever way - seems appropriate -- IPsec, SSH or SSL might fit -- but, whatever you - choose, pass it between locations via a gateway-to-gateway IPsec tunnel - to provide some resistance to traffic analysis.</P> -<H2><A name="primitives">Cryptographic components</A></H2> -<P>IPsec combines a number of cryptographic techniques, all of them - well-known and well-analyzed. The overall design approach was - conservative; no new or poorly-understood components were included.</P> -<P>This section gives a brief overview of each technique. It is intended - only as an introduction. There is more information, and links to - related topics, in our<A href="glossary.html"> glossary</A>. See also - our<A href="biblio.html"> bibliography</A> and cryptography<A href="#crypto.link"> - web links</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="block.cipher">Block ciphers</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A> in the<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> - encapsulation protocol is done with a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> -.</P> -<P>We do not implement<A href="#DES"> single DES</A>. It is<A href="#desnotsecure"> - insecure</A>. Our default, and currently only, block cipher is<A href="#3DES"> - triple DES</A>.</P> -<P>The<A href="#rijndael"> Rijndael</A> block cipher has won the<A href="#AES"> - AES</A> competition to choose a relacement for DES. It will almost - certainly be added to FreeS/WAN and to other IPsec implementations.<A href="#patch"> - Patches</A> are already available.</P> -<H3><A name="hash.ipsec">Hash functions</A></H3> -<H4><A name="hmac.ipsec">The HMAC construct</A></H4> -<P>IPsec packet authentication is done with the<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A> - construct. This is not just a hash of the packet data, but a more - complex operation which uses both a hashing algorithm and a key. It - therefore does more than a simple hash would. A simple hash would only - tell you that the packet data was not changed in transit, or that - whoever changed it also regenerated the hash. An HMAC also tells you - that the sender knew the HMAC key.</P> -<P>For IPsec HMAC, the output of the hash algorithm is truncated to 96 - bits. This saves some space in the packets. More important, it prevents - an attacker from seeing all the hash output bits and perhaps creating - some sort of attack based on that knowledge.</P> -<H4><A NAME="27_3_2_2">Choice of hash algorithm</A></H4> -<P>The IPsec RFCs require two hash algorithms --<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> - and<A href="#SHA"> SHA-1</A> -- both of which FreeS/WAN implements.</P> -<P>Various other algorithms -- such as RIPEMD and Tiger -- are listed in - the RFCs as optional. None of these are in the FreeS/WAN distribution, - or are likely to be added, although user<A href="#patch"> patches</A> - exist for several of them.</P> -<P>Additional hash algorithms --<A href="#SHA-256"> SHA-256, SHA-384 and - SHA-512</A> -- may be required to give hash strength matching the - strength of<A href="#AES"> AES</A>. These are likely to be added to - FreeS/WAN along with AES.</P> -<H3><A name="DH.keying">Diffie-Hellman key agreement</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement protocol allows - two parties (A and B or<A href="#alicebob"> Alice and Bob</A>) to agree - on a key in such a way that an eavesdropper who intercepts the entire - conversation cannot learn the key.</P> -<P>The protocol is based on the<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithm</A> - problem and is therefore thought to be secure. Mathematicians have been - working on that problem for years and seem no closer to a solution, - though there is no proof that an efficient solution is impossible.</P> -<H3><A name="RSA.auth">RSA authentication</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> algorithm (named for its inventors -- - Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) is a very widely used<A href="glossary.html#"> - public key</A> cryptographic technique. It is used in IPsec as one - method of authenticating gateways for Diffie-Hellman key negotiation.</P> -<H2><A name="structure">Structure of IPsec</A></H2> -<P>There are three protocols used in an IPsec implementation:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ESP, Encapsulating Security Payload</DT> -<DD>Encrypts and/or authenticates data</DD> -<DT>AH, Authentication Header</DT> -<DD>Provides a packet authentication service</DD> -<DT>IKE, Internet Key Exchange</DT> -<DD>Negotiates connection parameters, including keys, for the other two</DD> -</DL> -<P>The term "IPsec" is slightly ambiguous. In some contexts, it includes - all three of the above but in other contexts it refers only to AH and - ESP.</P> -<H3><A name="IKE.ipsec">IKE (Internet Key Exchange)</A></H3> -<P>The IKE protocol sets up IPsec (ESP or AH) connections after - negotiating appropriate parameters (algorithms to be used, keys, - connection lifetimes) for them. This is done by exchanging packets on - UDP port 500 between the two gateways.</P> -<P>IKE (RFC 2409) was the outcome of a long, complex process in which - quite a number of protocols were proposed and debated. Oversimplifying - mildly, IKE combines:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ISAKMP (RFC 2408)</DT> -<DD>The<STRONG> I</STRONG>nternet<STRONG> S</STRONG>ecurity<STRONG> A</STRONG> -ssociation and<STRONG> K</STRONG>ey<STRONG> M</STRONG>anagement<STRONG> - P</STRONG>rotocol manages negotiation of connections and defines<A href="#SA"> - SA</A>s (Security Associations) as a means of describing connection - properties.</DD> -<DT>IPsec DOI for ISAKMP (RFC 2407)</DT> -<DD>A<STRONG> D</STRONG>omain<STRONG> O</STRONG>f<STRONG> I</STRONG> -nterpretation fills in the details necessary to turn the rather abstract - ISAKMP protocol into a more tightly specified protocol, so it becomes - applicable in a particular domain.</DD> -<DT>Oakley key determination protocol (RFC 2412)</DT> -<DD>Oakley creates keys using the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key - agreement protocol.</DD> -</DL> -<P>For all the details, you would need to read the four<A href="rfc.html"> - RFCs</A> just mentioned (over 200 pages) and a number of others. We - give a summary below, but it is far from complete.</P> -<H4><A name="phases">Phases of IKE</A></H4> -<P>IKE negotiations have two phases.</P> -<DL> -<DT>Phase one</DT> -<DD>The two gateways negotiate and set up a two-way ISAKMP SA which they - can then use to handle phase two negotiations. One such SA between a - pair of gateways can handle negotiations for multiple tunnels.</DD> -<DT>Phase two</DT> -<DD>Using the ISAKMP SA, the gateways negotiate IPsec (ESP and/or AH) - SAs as required. IPsec SAs are unidirectional (a different key is used - in each direction) and are always negotiated in pairs to handle two-way - traffic. There may be more than one pair defined between two gateways.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Both of these phases use the UDP protocol and port 500 for their - negotiations.</P> -<P>After both IKE phases are complete, you have IPsec SAs to carry your - encrypted data. These use the ESP or AH protocols. These protocols do - not have ports. Ports apply only to UDP or TCP.</P> -<P>The IKE protocol is designed to be extremely flexible. Among the - things that can be negotiated (separately for each SA) are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>SA lifetime before rekeying</LI> -<LI>encryption algorithm used. We currently support only<A href="#3DES"> - triple DES</A>. Single DES is<A href="#desnotsecure"> insecure</A>. The - RFCs say you MUST do DES, SHOULD do 3DES and MAY do various others. We - do not do any of the others.</LI> -<LI>authentication algorithms. We support<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> and<A href="#SHA"> - SHA</A>. These are the two the RFCs require.</LI> -<LI>choice of group for<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement. - We currently support Groups 2 and 5 (which are defined modulo primes of - various lengths) and do not support Group 1 (defined modulo a shorter - prime, and therefore cryptographically weak) or groups 3 and 4 (defined - using elliptic curves). The RFCs require only Group 1.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The protocol also allows implementations to add their own encryption - algorithms, authentication algorithms or Diffie-Hellman groups. We do - not support any such extensions, but there are some<A href="#patch"> - patches</A> that do.</P> -<P>There are a number of complications:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The gateways must be able to authenticate each other's identities - before they can create a secure connection. This host authentication is - part of phase one negotiations, and is a required prerequisite for - packet authentication used later. Host authentication can be done in a - variety of ways. Those supported by FreeS/WAN are discussed in our<A href="#auto-auth"> - advanced configuration</A> document.</LI> -<LI>Phase one can be done in two ways. -<UL> -<LI>Main Mode is required by the RFCs and supported in FreeS/WAN. It - uses a 6-packet exzchange.</LI> -<LI>Aggressive Mode is somewhat faster (only 3 packets) but reveals more - to an eavesdropper. This is optional in the RFCs, not currently - supported by FreeS/WAN, and not likely to be.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>A new group exchange may take place after phase one but before phase - two, defining an additional group for use in the<A href="#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement part of phase two. FreeS/WAN does not - currently support this.</LI> -<LI>Phase two always uses Quick Mode, but there are two variants of - that: -<UL> -<LI>One variant provides<A href="#PFS"> Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)</A> -. An attacker that obtains your long-term host authentication key does - not immediately get any of your short-term packet encryption of packet - authentication keys. He must conduct another successful attack each - time you rekey to get the short-term keys. Having some short-term keys - does not help him learn others. In particular, breaking your system - today does not let him read messages he archived yestarday, assuming - you've changed short-term keys in the meanwhile. We enable PFS as the - default.</LI> -<LI>The other variant disables PFS and is therefore slightly faster. We - do not recommend this since it is less secure, but FreeS/WAN does - support it. You can enable it with a<VAR> pfs=no</VAR> statement in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</LI> -<LI>The protocol provides no way to negotiate which variant will be - used. If one gateway is set for PFS and the other is not, the - negotiation fails. This has proved a fairly common source of - interoperation problems.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Several types of notification message may be sent by either side - during either phase, or later. FreeS/WAN does not currently support - these, but they are a likely addition in future releases.</LI> -<LI>There is a commit flag which may optionally be set on some messages. - The<A href="http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html"> errata</A> page - for the RFCs includes two changes related to this, one to clarify the - description of its use and one to block a<A href="#DOS"> denial of - service</A> attack which uses it. We currently do not implement this - feature.</LI> -</UL> -<P>These complications can of course lead to problems, particularly when - two different implementations attempt to interoperate. For example, we - have seen problems such as:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Some implementations (often products crippled by<A href="#exlaw"> - export laws</A>) have the insecure DES algorithm as their only - supported encryption method. Other parts of our documentation discuss - the<A href="#desnotsecure"> reasons we do not implement single DES</A>, - and<A href="interop.html#noDES"> how to cope with crippled products</A> -.</LI> -<LI>Windows 2000 IPsec tries to negotiate using Aggressive Mode, which - we don't support. Later on, it uses the commit bit, which we also don't - support.</LI> -<LI>Various implementations disable PFS by default, and therefore will - not talk to FreeS/WAN until you either turn on PFS on their end or turn - it off in FreeS/WAN with a<VAR> pfs=no</VAR> entry in the connection - description.</LI> -<LI>FreeS/WAN's interaction with PGPnet is complicated by their use of - notification messages we do not yet support.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Despite this, we do interoperate successfully with many - implementations, including both Windows 2000 and PGPnet. Details are in - our<A href="interop.html"> interoperability</A> document.</P> -<H4><A name="sequence">Sequence of messages in IKE</A></H4> -<P>Each phase (see<A href="#phases"> previous section</A>)of IKE - involves a series of messages. In Pluto error messages, these are - abbreviated using:</P> -<DL> -<DT>M</DT> -<DD><STRONG>M</STRONG>ain mode, settting up the keying channel (ISAKMP - SA)</DD> -<DT>Q</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Q</STRONG>uick mode, setting up the data channel (IPsec SA)</DD> -<DT>I</DT> -<DD><STRONG>I</STRONG>nitiator, the machine that starts the negotiation</DD> -<DT>R</DT> -<DD><STRONG>R</STRONG>esponder</DD> -</DL> -<P>For example, the six messages of a main mode negotiation, in - sequence, are labelled:</P> -<PRE> MI1 ----------> - <---------- MR1 - MI2 ----------> - <---------- MR2 - MI3 ----------> - <---------- MR3</PRE> -<H4><A name="struct.exchange">Structure of IKE messages</A></H4> -<P>Here is our Pluto developer explaining some of this on the mailing - list:</P> -<PRE>When one IKE system (for example, Pluto) is negotiating with another -to create an SA, the Initiator proposes a bunch of choices and the -Responder replies with one that it has selected. - -The structure of the choices is fairly complicated. An SA payload -contains a list of lists of "Proposals". The outer list is a set of -choices: the selection must be from one element of this list. - -Each of these elements is a list of Proposals. A selection must be -made from each of the elements of the inner list. In other words, -*all* of them apply (that is how, for example, both AH and ESP can -apply at once). - -Within each of these Proposals is a list of Transforms. For each -Proposal selected, one Transform must be selected (in other words, -each Proposal provides a choice of Transforms). - -Each Transform is made up of a list of Attributes describing, well, -attributes. Such as lifetime of the SA. Such as algorithm to be -used. All the Attributes apply to a Transform. - -You will have noticed a pattern here: layers alternate between being -disjunctions ("or") and conjunctions ("and"). - -For Phase 1 / Main Mode (negotiating an ISAKMP SA), this structure is -cut back. There must be exactly one Proposal. So this degenerates to -a list of Transforms, one of which must be chosen.</PRE> -<H3><A name="services">IPsec Services, AH and ESP</A></H3> -<P>IPsec offers two services,<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> - and<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A>. These can be used separately - but are often used together.</P> -<DL> -<DT>Authentication</DT> -<DD>Packet-level authentication allows you to be confident that a packet - came from a particular machine and that its contents were not altered - en route to you. No attempt is made to conceal or protect the contents, - only to assure their integrity. Packet authentication can be provided - separately using an<A href="#AH"> Authentication Header</A>, described - just below, or it can be included as part of the<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> - (Encapsulated Security Payload) service, described in the following - section. That service offers encryption as well as authentication. In - either case, the<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A> construct is used as the - authentication mechanism. -<P>There is a separate authentication operation at the IKE level, in - which each gateway authenticates the other. This can be done in a - variety of ways.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Encryption</DT> -<DD>Encryption allows you to conceal the contents of a message from - eavesdroppers. -<P>In IPsec this is done using a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> - (normally<A href="#3DES"> Triple DES</A> for Linux). In the most used - setup, keys are automatically negotiated, and periodically - re-negotiated, using the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> (Internet Key Exchange) - protocol. In Linux FreeS/WAN this is handled by the Pluto Daemon.</P> -<P>The IPsec protocol offering encryption is<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A>, - Encapsulated Security Payload. It can also include a packet - authentication service.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<P>Note that<STRONG> encryption should always be used with some packet - authentication service</STRONG>. Unauthenticated encryption is - vulnerable to<A href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle attacks</A>. Also - note that encryption does not prevent<A href="#traffic"> traffic - analysis</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="AH.ipsec">The Authentication Header (AH)</A></H3> -<P>Packet authentication can be provided separately from encryption by - adding an authentication header (AH) after the IP header but before the - other headers on the packet. This is the subject of this section. - Details are in RFC 2402.</P> -<P>Each of the several headers on a packet header contains a "next - protocol" field telling the system what header to look for next. IP - headers generally have either TCP or UDP in this field. When IPsec - authentication is used, the packet IP header has AH in this field, - saying that an Authentication Header comes next. The AH header then has - the next header type -- usually TCP, UDP or encapsulated IP.</P> -<P>IPsec packet authentication can be added in transport mode, as a - modification of standard IP transport. This is shown in this diagram - from the RFC:</P> -<PRE> BEFORE APPLYING AH - ---------------------------- - IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | - |(any options)| TCP | Data | - ---------------------------- - - AFTER APPLYING AH - --------------------------------- - IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | | - |(any options)| AH | TCP | Data | - --------------------------------- - || - except for mutable fields</PRE> -<P>Athentication can also be used in tunnel mode, encapsulating the - underlying IP packet beneath AH and an additional IP header.</P> -<PRE> || -IPv4 | new IP hdr* | | orig IP hdr* | | | - |(any options)| AH | (any options) |TCP | Data | - ------------------------------------------------ - || - | in the new IP hdr |</PRE> -<P>This would normally be used in a gateway-to-gateway tunnel. The - receiving gateway then strips the outer IP header and the AH header and - forwards the inner IP packet.</P> -<P>The mutable fields referred to are things like the time-to-live field - in the IP header. These cannot be included in authentication - calculations because they change as the packet travels.</P> -<H4><A name="keyed">Keyed MD5 and Keyed SHA</A></H4> -<P>The actual authentication data in the header is typically 96 bits and - depends both on a secret shared between sender and receiver and on - every byte of the data being authenticated. The technique used is<A href="#HMAC"> - HMAC</A>, defined in RFC 2104.</P> -<P>The algorithms involved are the<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> Message Digest - Algorithm or<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A>, the Secure Hash Algorithm. For - details on their use in this application, see RFCs 2403 and 2404 - respectively.</P> -<P>For descriptions of the algorithms themselves, see RFC 1321 for MD5 - and<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS</A> (Federal Information Processing Standard) - number 186 from<A href="#NIST"> NIST</A>, the US National Institute of - Standards and Technology for SHA.<A href="#schneier"><CITE> Applied - Cryptography</CITE></A> covers both in some detail, MD5 starting on - page 436 and SHA on 442.</P> -<P>These algorithms are intended to make it nearly impossible for anyone - to alter the authenticated data in transit. The sender calculates a - digest or hash value from that data and includes the result in the - authentication header. The recipient does the same calculation and - compares results. For unchanged data, the results will be identical. - The hash algorithms are designed to make it extremely difficult to - change the data in any way and still get the correct hash.</P> -<P>Since the shared secret key is also used in both calculations, an - interceptor cannot simply alter the authenticated data and change the - hash value to match. Without the key, he or she (or even the dreaded - They) cannot produce a usable hash.</P> -<H4><A name="sequence">Sequence numbers</A></H4> -<P>The authentication header includes a sequence number field which the - sender is required to increment for each packet. The receiver can - ignore it or use it to check that packets are indeed arriving in the - expected sequence.</P> -<P>This provides partial protection against<A href="#replay"> replay - attacks</A> in which an attacker resends intercepted packets in an - effort to confuse or subvert the receiver. Complete protection is not - possible since it is necessary to handle legitmate packets which are - lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order, but use of sequence - numbers makes the attack much more difficult.</P> -<P>The RFCs require that sequence numbers never cycle, that a new key - always be negotiated before the sequence number reaches 2^32-1. This - protects both against replays attacks using packets from a previous - cyclce and against<A href="#birthday"> birthday attacks</A> on the the - packet authentication algorithm.</P> -<P>In Linux FreeS/WAN, the sequence number is ignored for manually keyed - connections and checked for automatically keyed ones. In manual mode, - there is no way to negotiate a new key, or to recover from a sequence - number problem, so we don't use sequence numbers.</P> -<H3><A name="ESP.ipsec">Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)</A></H3> -<P>The ESP protocol is defined in RFC 2406. It provides one or both of - encryption and packet authentication. It may be used with or without AH - packet authentication.</P> -<P>Note that<STRONG> some form of packet authentication should<EM> - always</EM> be used whenever data is encrypted</STRONG>. Without - authentication, the encryption is vulnerable to active attacks which - may allow an enemy to break the encryption. ESP should<STRONG> always</STRONG> - either include its own authentication or be used with AH - authentication.</P> -<P>The RFCs require support for only two mandatory encryption algorithms - --<A href="#DES"> DES</A>, and null encryption -- and for two - authentication methods -- keyed MD5 and keyed SHA. Implementers may - choose to support additional algorithms in either category.</P> -<P>The authentication algorithms are the same ones used in the IPsec<A href="#AH"> - authentication header</A>.</P> -<P>We do not implement single DES since<A href="#desnotsecure"> DES is - insecure</A>. Instead we provide<A href="#3DES"> triple DES or 3DES</A> -. This is currently the only encryption algorithm supported.</P> -<P>We do not implement null encryption since it is obviously insecure.</P> -<H2><A name="modes">IPsec modes</A></H2> -<P>IPsec can connect in two modes. Transport mode is a host-to-host - connection involving only two machines. In tunnel mode, the IPsec - machines act as gateways and trafiic for any number of client machines - may be carried.</P> -<H3><A name="tunnel.ipsec">Tunnel mode</A></H3> -<P>Security gateways are required to support tunnel mode connections. In - this mode the gateways provide tunnels for use by client machines - behind the gateways. The client machines need not do any IPsec - processing; all they have to do is route things to gateways.</P> -<H3><A name="transport.ipsec">Transport mode</A></H3> -<P>Host machines (as opposed to security gateways) with IPsec - implementations must also support transport mode. In this mode, the - host does its own IPsec processing and routes some packets via IPsec.</P> -<H2><A name="parts">FreeS/WAN parts</A></H2> -<H3><A name="KLIPS.ipsec">KLIPS: Kernel IPsec Support</A></H3> -<P>KLIPS is<STRONG> K</STRONG>erne<STRONG>L</STRONG><STRONG> IP</STRONG> -SEC<STRONG> S</STRONG>upport, the modifications necessary to support - IPsec within the Linux kernel. KILPS does all the actual IPsec - packet-handling, including</P> -<UL> -<LI>encryption</LI> -<LI>packet authentication calculations</LI> -<LI>creation of ESP and AH headers for outgoing packets</LI> -<LI>interpretation of those headers on incoming packets</LI> -</UL> -<P>KLIPS also checks all non-IPsec packets to ensure they are not - bypassing IPsec security policies.</P> -<H3><A name="Pluto.ipsec">The Pluto daemon</A></H3> -<P><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">Pluto(8)</A> is a daemon which - implements the IKE protocol. It</P> -<UL> -<LI>handles all the Phase one ISAKMP SAs</LI> -<LI>performs host authentication and negotiates with other gateways</LI> -<LI>creates IPsec SAs and passes the data required to run them to KLIPS</LI> -<LI>adjust routing and firewall setup to meet IPsec requirements. See - our<A href="firewall.html"> IPsec and firewalling</A> document for - details.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Pluto is controlled mainly by the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> configuration file.</P> -<H3><A name="command">The ipsec(8) command</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html"> ipsec(8)</A> command is a front - end shellscript that allows control over IPsec activity.</P> -<H3><A name="ipsec.conf">Linux FreeS/WAN configuration file</A></H3> -<P>The configuration file for Linux FreeS/WAN is</P> -<PRE> /etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>For details see the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> manual page .</P> -<H2><A name="key">Key management</A></H2> -<P>There are several ways IPsec can manage keys. Not all are implemented - in Linux FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H3><A name="current">Currently Implemented Methods</A></H3> -<H4><A name="manual">Manual keying</A></H4> -<P>IPsec allows keys to be manually set. In Linux FreeS/WAN, such keys - are stored with the connection definitions in /etc/ipsec.conf.</P> -<P><A href="#manual">Manual keying</A> is useful for debugging since it - allows you to test the<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> kernel IPsec code - without the<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> daemon doing key negotiation.</P> -<P>In general, however, automatic keying is preferred because it is more - secure.</P> -<H4><A name="auto">Automatic keying</A></H4> -<P>In automatic keying, the<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> daemon negotiates - keys using the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> Internet Key Exchange protocol. - Connections are automatically re-keyed periodically.</P> -<P>This is considerably more secure than manual keying. In either case - an attacker who acquires a key can read every message encrypted with - that key, but automatic keys can be changed every few hours or even - every few minutes without breaking the connection or requiring - intervention by the system administrators. Manual keys can only be - changed manually; you need to shut down the connection and have the two - admins make changes. Moreover, they have to communicate the new keys - securely, perhaps with<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> or<A href="#ssh"> SSH</A> -. This may be possible in some cases, but as a general solution it is - expensive, bothersome and unreliable. Far better to let<A href="#Pluto"> - Pluto</A> handle these chores; no doubt the administrators have enough - to do.</P> -<P>Also, automatic keying is inherently more secure against an attacker - who manages to subvert your gateway system. If manual keying is in use - and an adversary acquires root privilege on your gateway, he reads your - keys from /etc/ipsec.conf and then reads all messages encrypted with - those keys.</P> -<P>If automatic keying is used, an adversary with the same privileges - can read /etc/ipsec.secrets, but this does not contain any keys, only - the secrets used to authenticate key exchanges. Having an adversary - able to authenticate your key exchanges need not worry you overmuch. - Just having the secrets does not give him any keys. You are still - secure against<A href="#passive"> passive</A> attacks. This property of - automatic keying is called<A href="#PFS"> perfect forward secrecy</A>, - abbreviated PFS.</P> -<P>Unfortunately, having the secrets does allow an<A href="#active"> - active attack</A>, specifically a<A href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle</A> - attack. Losing these secrets to an attacker may not be quite as - disastrous as losing the actual keys, but it is<EM> still a serious - security breach</EM>. These secrets should be guarded as carefully as - keys.</P> -<H3><A name="notyet">Methods not yet implemented</A></H3> -<H4><A name="noauth">Unauthenticated key exchange</A></H4> -<P>It would be possible to exchange keys without authenticating the - players. This would support<A href="#carpediem"> opportunistic - encryption</A> -- allowing any two systems to encrypt their - communications without requiring a shared PKI or a previously - negotiated secret -- and would be secure against<A href="#passive"> - passive attacks</A>. It would, however, be highly vulnerable to active<A -href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle</A> attacks. RFC 2408 therefore - specifies that all<A href="#ISAKMP"> ISAKMP</A> key management - interactions<EM> must</EM> be authenticated.</P> -<P>There is room for debate here. Should we provide immediate security - against<A href="#passive"> passive attacks</A> and encourage widespread - use of encryption, at the expense of risking the more difficult<A href="#active"> - active attacks</A>? Or should we wait until we can implement a solution - that can both be widespread and offer security against active attacks?</P> -<P>So far, we have chosen the second course, complying with the RFCs and - waiting for secure DNS (see<A href="#DNS"> below</A>) so that we can do<A -href="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A> right.</P> -<H4><A name="DNS">Key exchange using DNS</A></H4> -<P>The IPsec RFCs allow key exchange based on authentication services - provided by<A href="#SDNS"> Secure DNS</A>. Once Secure DNS service - becomes widely available, we expect to make this the<EM> primary key - management method for Linux FreeS/WAN</EM>. It is the best way we know - of to support<A href="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A>, - allowing two systems without a common PKI or previous negotiation to - secure their communication.</P> -<P>We currently have code to acquire RSA keys from DNS but do not yet - have code to validate Secure DNS signatures.</P> -<H4><A name="PKI">Key exchange using a PKI</A></H4> -<P>The IPsec RFCs allow key exchange based on authentication services - provided by a<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> or Public Key Infrastructure. With - many vendors selling such products and many large organisations - building these infrastructures, this will clearly be an important - application of IPsec and one Linux FreeS/WAN will eventually support.</P> -<P>On the other hand, this is not as high a priority for Linux FreeS/WAN - as solutions based on<A href="#SDNS"> secure DNS</A>. We do not expect - any PKI to become as universal as DNS.</P> -<P>Some<A href="#patch"> patches</A> to handle authentication with X.509 - certificates, which most PKIs use, are available.</P> -<H4><A name="photuris">Photuris</A></H4> -<P><A href="#photuris">Photuris</A> is another key management protocol, - an alternative to IKE and ISAKMP, described in RFCs 2522 and 2523 which - are labelled "experimental". Adding Photuris support to Linux FreeS/WAN - might be a good project for a volunteer. The likely starting point - would be the OpenBSD photurisd code.</P> -<H4><A name="skip">SKIP</A></H4> -<P><A href="#SKIP">SKIP</A> is yet another key management protocol, - developed by Sun. At one point it was fairly widely used, but it now - seems moribund, displaced by IKE. Sun now (as of Solaris 8.0) ship an - IPsec implementation using IKE. We have no plans to implement SKIP. If - a user were to implement it, we would almost certainly not want to add - the code to our distribution.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="lists">Mailing lists and newsgroups</A></H1> -<H2><A name="list.fs">Mailing lists about FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<H3><A name="projlist">The project mailing lists</A></H3> -<P>The Linux FreeS/WAN project has several email lists for user support, - bug reports and software development discussions.</P> -<P>We had a single list on clinet.fi for several years (Thanks, folks!), - then one list on freeswan.org, but now we've split into several lists:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="mailto:users-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -users</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>The general list for discussing use of the software</LI> -<LI>The place for seeking<STRONG> help with problems</STRONG> (but - please check the<A href="faq.html"> FAQ</A> first).</LI> -<LI>Anyone can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:bugs-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe">bugs</A> -</DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>For<STRONG> bug reports</STRONG>.</LI> -<LI>If you are not certain what is going on -- could be a bug, a - configuration error, a network problem, ... -- please post to the users - list instead.</LI> -<LI>Anyone can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:design-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -design</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI><STRONG>Design discussions</STRONG>, for people working on FreeS/WAN - development or others with an interest in design and security issues.</LI> -<LI>It would be a good idea to read the existing design papers (see this<A -href="#applied"> list</A>) before posting.</LI> -<LI>Anyone can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:announce-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -announce</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>A<STRONG> low-traffic</STRONG> list.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>Announcements</STRONG> about FreeS/WAN and related software.</LI> -<LI>All posts here are also sent to the users list. You need not - subscribe to both.</LI> -<LI>Only the FreeS/WAN team can post.</LI> -<LI>If you have something you feel should go on this list, send it to<VAR> - announce-admin@lists.freeswan.org</VAR>. Unless it is obvious, please - include a short note explaining why we should post it.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:briefs-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -briefs</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>A<STRONG> low-traffic</STRONG> list.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>Weekly summaries</STRONG> of activity on the users list.</LI> -<LI>All posts here are also sent to the users list. You need not - subscribe to both.</LI> -<LI>Only the FreeS/WAN team can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -</DL> -<P>To subscribe to any of these, you can:</P> -<UL> -<LI>just follow the links above</LI> -<LI>use our<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> web interface</A> -</LI> -<LI>send mail to<VAR> listname</VAR>-request@lists.freeswan.org with a - one-line message body "subscribe"</LI> -</UL> -<P>Archives of these lists are available via the<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - web interface</A>.</P> -<H4><A name="which.list">Which list should I use?</A></H4> -<P>For most questions, please check the<A href="faq.html"> FAQ</A> - first, and if that does not have an answer, ask on the users list. "My - configuration doesn't work." does not belong on the bugs list, and "Can - FreeS/WAN do such-and-such" or "How do I configure it to..." do not - belong in design discussions.</P> -<P>Cross-posting the same message to two or more of these lists is - discouraged. Quite a few people read more than one list and getting - multiple copies is annoying.</P> -<H4><A name="policy.list">List policies</A></H4> -<P><STRONG>US citizens or residents are asked not to post code to the - lists, not even one-line bug fixes</STRONG>. The project cannot accept - code which might entangle it in US<A href="#exlaw"> export restrictions</A> -.</P> -<P>Non-subscribers can post to some of these lists. This is necessary; - someone working on a gateway install who encounters a problem may not - have access to a subscribed account.</P> -<P>Some spam turns up on these lists from time to time. For discussion - of why we do not attempt to filter it, see the<A href="#spam"> FAQ</A>. - Please do not clutter the lists with complaints about this.</P> -<H3><A name="archive">Archives of the lists</A></H3> -<P>Searchable archives of the old single list have existed for some - time. At time of writing, it is not yet clear how they will change for - the new multi-list structure.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec">Canada</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nexial.com">Holland</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that these use different search engines. Try both.</P> -<P>Archives of the new lists are available via the<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - web interface</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="indexes">Indexes of mailing lists</A></H2> -<P><A href="http://paml.net/">PAML</A> is the standard reference for<STRONG> - P</STRONG>ublicly<STRONG> A</STRONG>ccessible<STRONG> M</STRONG>ailing<STRONG> - L</STRONG>ists. When we last checked, it had over 7500 lists on an - amazing variety of topics. It also has FAQ information and a search - engine.</P> -<P>There is an index of<A href="http://oslab.snu.ac.kr/~djshin/linux/mail-list/index.shtml"> - Linux mailing lists</A> available.</P> -<P>A list of<A href="http://xforce.iss.net/maillists/otherlists.php"> - computer security mailing lists</A>, with descriptions.</P> -<H2><A name="otherlists">Lists for related software and topics</A></H2> -<P>Most links in this section point to subscription addresses for the - various lists. Send the one-line message "subscribe<VAR> list_name</VAR> -" to subscribe to any of them.</P> -<H3><A NAME="28_3_1">Products that include FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Our introduction document gives a<A href="#products"> list of - products that include FreeS/WAN</A>. If you have, or are considering, - one of those, check the supplier's web site for information on mailing - lists for their users.</P> -<H3><A name="linux.lists">Linux mailing lists</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:majordomo@vger.kernel.org"> -linux-admin@vger.kernel.org</A>, for Linux system administrators</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:netfilter-request@lists.samba.org"> -netfilter@lists.samba.org</A>, about Netfilter, which replaces IPchains - in kernels 2.3.15 and later</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:security-audit-request@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk"> -security-audit@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk</A>, for people working on security - audits of various Linux programs</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:securedistros-request@humbolt.geo.uu.nl"> -securedistros@humbolt.geo.uu.nl</A>, for discussion of issues common to - all the half dozen projects working on secure Linux distributions.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Each of the scure distribution projects also has its own web site and - mailing list. Some of the sites are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://bastille-linux.org/">Bastille Linux</A> scripts to - harden Redhat, e.g. by changing permissions and modifying inialisation - scripts</LI> -<LI><A href="http://immunix.org/">Immunix</A> take a different approach, - using a modified compiler to build kernel and utilities with better - resistance to various types of overflow and exploit</LI> -<LI>the<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A> have contractors working on a<A href="#SElinux"> - Security Enhanced Linux</A>, primarily adding stronger access control - mechanisms. You can download the current version (which interestingly - is under GPL and not export resrtricted) or subscribe to the mailing - list from the<A href="http://www.nsa.gov/selinux"> project web page</A> -.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="ietf">Lists for IETF working groups</A></H3> -<P>Each<A href="#ietf"> IETF</A> working group has an associated mailing - list where much of the work takes place.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:majordomo@lists.tislabs.com">ipsec@lists.tislabs.com</A> -, the IPsec<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - working group</A>. This is where the protocols are discussed, new - drafts announced, and so on. By now, the IPsec working group is winding - down since the work is essentially complete. A<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/"> - list archive</A> is available.</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:ipsec-policy-request@vpnc.org">IPsec policy</A> - list, and its<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/ipsec-policy/"> archive</A></LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:ietf-ipsra-request@vpnc.org">IP secure remote access</A> - list, and its<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsra/mail-archive/"> - archive</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="other">Other mailing lists</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:ipc-announce-request@privacy.org"> -ipc-announce@privacy.org</A> a low-traffic list with announcements of - developments in privacy, encryption and online civil rights</LI> -<LI>a VPN mailing list's<A href="http://kubarb.phsx.ukans.edu/~tbird/vpn.html"> - home page</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="newsgroups">Usenet newsgroups</A></H2> -<UL> -<LI>sci.crypt</LI> -<LI>sci.crypt.research</LI> -<LI>comp.dcom.vpn</LI> -<LI>talk.politics.crypto</LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="weblink">Web links</A></H1> -<H2><A name="freeswan">The Linux FreeS/WAN Project</A></H2> -<P>The main project web site is<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - www.freeswan.org</A>.</P> -<P>Links to other project-related<A href="#sites"> sites</A> are - provided in our introduction section.</P> -<H3><A name="patch">Add-ons and patches for FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Some user-contributed patches have been integrated into the FreeS/WAN - distribution. For a variety of reasons, those listed below have not.</P> -<P>Note that not all patches are a good idea.</P> -<UL> -<LI>There are a number of "features" of IPsec which we do not implement - because they reduce security. See this<A href="#dropped"> discussion</A> -. We do not recommend using patches that implement these. One example is - aggressive mode.</LI> -<LI>We do not recommend adding "features" of any sort unless they are - clearly necessary, or at least have clear benefits. For example, - FreeS/WAN would not become more secure if it offerred a choice of 14 - ciphers. If even one was flawed, it would certainly become less secure - for anyone using that cipher. Even with 14 wonderful ciphers, it would - be harder to maintain and administer, hence more vulnerable to various - human errors.</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is not to say that patches are necessarily bad, only that using - them requires some deliberation. For example, there might be perfectly - good reasons to add a specific cipher in your application: perhaps GOST - to comply with government standards in Eastern Europe, or AES for - performance benefits.</P> -<H4><A NAME="29_1_1_1">Current patches</A></H4> -<P>Patches believed current::</P> -<UL> -<LI>patches for<A href="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/"> X.509 - certificate support</A>, also available from a<A href="http://www.twi.ch/~sna/strongsec/freeswan/"> - mirror site</A></LI> -<LI>patches to add<A href="http://www.irrigacion.gov.ar/juanjo/ipsec"> - AES and other ciphers</A>. There is preliminary data indicating AES - gives a substantial<A href="#perf.more"> performance gain</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is also one add-on that takes the form of a modified FreeS/WAN - distribution, rather than just patches to the standard distribution:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ipv6.iabg.de/downloadframe/index.html">IPv6 - support</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Before using any of the above,, check the<A href="mail.html"> mailing - lists</A> for news of newer versions and to see whether they have been - incorporated into more recent versions of FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H4><A NAME="29_1_1_2">Older patches</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://sources.colubris.com/en/projects/FreeSWAN/">hardware - acceleration</A></LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://tzukanov.narod.ru/"> series</A> of patches that -<UL> -<LI>provide GOST, a Russian gov't. standard cipher, in MMX assembler</LI> -<LI>add GOST to OpenSSL</LI> -<LI>add GOST to the International kernel patch</LI> -<LI>let FreeS/WAN use International kernel patch ciphers</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Neil Dunbar's patches for<A href="ftp://hplose.hpl.hp.com/pub/nd/pluto-openssl.tar.gz"> - certificate support</A>, using code from<A href="http://www.openssl.org"> - Open SSL</A>.</LI> -<LI>Luc Lanthier's<A href="ftp://ftp.netwinder.org/users/f/firesoul/"> - patches</A> for<A href="#PKIX"> PKIX</A> support.</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.heise.de/pub/ct/listings/9916-180.tgz">patches</A> - to add<A href="#Blowfish"> Blowfish</A>,<A href="#IDEA"> IDEA</A> and<A href="#CAST128"> - CAST-128</A> to FreeS/WAN</LI> -<LI>patches for FreeS/WAN 1.3, Pluto support for<A href="http://alcatraz.webcriminals.com/~bastiaan/ipsec/"> - external authentication</A>, for example with a smartcard or SKEYID.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.zengl.net/freeswan/download/">patches and - utilities</A> for using FreeS/WAN with PGPnet</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.freelith.com/lithworks/crypto/freeswan_patch.htm"> -Blowfish encryption and Tiger hash</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cendio.se/~bellman/aggressive-pluto.snap.tar.gz"> -patches</A> for aggressive mode support</LI> -</UL> -<P>These patches are for older versions of FreeS/WAN and will likely not - work with the current version. Older versions of FreeS/WAN may be - available on some of the<A href="#sites"> distribution sites</A>, but - we recommend using the current release.</P> -<H4><A name="VPN.masq">VPN masquerade patches</A></H4> -<P>Finally, there are some patches to other code that may be useful with - FreeS/WAN:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="ftp://ftp.rubyriver.com/pub/jhardin/masquerade/ip_masq_vpn.html"> - patch</A> to make IPsec, PPTP and SSH VPNs work through a Linux - firewall with<A href="#masq"> IP masquerade</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/VPN-Masquerade-HOWTO.html"> -Linux VPN Masquerade HOWTO</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that this is not required if the same machine does IPsec and - masquerading, only if you want a to locate your IPsec gateway on a - masqueraded network. See our<A href="#NAT"> firewalls</A> document for - discussion of why this is problematic.</P> -<P>At last report, this patch could not co-exist with FreeS/WAN on the - same machine.</P> -<H3><A name="dist">Distributions including FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>The introductory section of our document set lists several<A href="#distwith"> - Linux distributions</A> which include FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H3><A name="used">Things FreeS/WAN uses or could use</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://openpgp.net/random">/dev/random</A> support page, - discussion of and code for the Linux<A href="#random"> random number - driver</A>. Out-of-date when we last checked (January 2000), but still - useful.</LI> -<LI>other programs related to random numbers: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.mindrot.org/audio-entropyd.html">audio entropy - daemon</A> to gather noise from a sound card and feed it into - /dev/random</LI> -<LI>an<A href="http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/"> entropy-gathering - daemon</A></LI> -<LI>a driver for the random number generator in recent<A href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/gkernel/"> - Intel chipsets</A>. This driver is included as standard in 2.4 kernels.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>a Linux<A href="http://www.marko.net/l2tp/"> L2TP Daemon</A> which - might be useful for communicating with Windows 2000 which builds L2TP - tunnels over its IPsec connections</LI> -<LI>to use opportunistic encryption, you need a recent version of<A href="#BIND"> - BIND</A>. You can get one from the<A href="http://www.isc.org"> - Internet Software Consortium</A> who maintain BIND.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="alternatives">Other approaches to VPNs for Linux</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>other Linux<A href="#linuxipsec"> IPsec implementations</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~skip/">ENskip</A>, a free - implementation of Sun's<A href="#SKIP"> SKIP</A> protocol</LI> -<LI><A href="http://sunsite.auc.dk/vpnd/">vpnd</A>, a non-IPsec VPN - daemon for Linux which creates tunnels using<A href="#Blowfish"> - Blowfish</A> encryption</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.winton.org.uk/zebedee/">Zebedee</A>, a simple - GPLd tunnel-building program with Linux and Win32 versions. The name is - from<STRONG> Z</STRONG>lib compression,<STRONG> B</STRONG>lowfish - encryption and<STRONG> D</STRONG>iffie-Hellman key exchange.</LI> -<LI>There are at least two PPTP implementations for Linux -<UL> -<LI>Moreton Bay's<A href="http://www.moretonbay.com/vpn/pptp.html"> - PoPToP</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://cag.lcs.mit.edu/~cananian/Projects/PPTP/">PPTP-Linux</A> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/cipe.html">CIPE</A> - (crypto IP encapsulation) project, using their own lightweight protocol - to encrypt between routers</LI> -<LI><A href="http://tinc.nl.linux.org/">tinc</A>, a VPN Daemon</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is a list of<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/10000000/kben10000005.html"> - Linux VPN</A> software in the<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/kben00000001.html"> - Linux Security Knowledge Base</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="ipsec.link">The IPsec Protocols</A></H2> -<H3><A name="general">General IPsec or VPN information</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.vpnc.org"> VPN Consortium</A> is a group for - vendors of IPsec products. Among other things, they have a good - collection of<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/white-papers.html"> IPsec - white papers</A>.</LI> -<LI>A VPN mailing list with a<A href="http://kubarb.phsx.ukans.edu/~tbird/vpn.html"> - home page</A>, a FAQ, some product comparisons, and many links.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.opus1.com/vpn/index.html">VPN pointer page</A></LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.epm.ornl.gov/~dunigan/vpn.html"> collection</A> - of VPN links, and some explanation</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="overview">IPsec overview documents or slide sets</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>the FreeS/WAN<A href="ipsec.html"> document section</A> on these - protocols</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="otherlang">IPsec information in languages other than - English</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.imib.med.tu-dresden.de/imib/Internet/Literatur/ipsec-docu.html"> -German</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.kame.net/index-j.html">Japanese</A></LI> -<LI>Feczak Szabolcs' thesis in<A href="http://feczo.koli.kando.hu/vpn/"> - Hungarian</A></LI> -<LI>Davide Cerri's thesis and some presentation slides<A href="http://www.linux.it/~davide/doc/"> - Italian</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="RFCs1">RFCs and other reference documents</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="rfc.html">Our document</A> listing the RFCs relevant to - Linux FreeS/WAN and giving various ways of obtaining both RFCs and - Internet Drafts.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.vpnc.org/vpn-standards.html">VPN Standards</A> - page maintained by<A href="#VPNC"> VPNC</A>. This covers both RFCs and - Drafts, and classifies them in a fairly helpful way.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org">RFC archive</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsec.html">Internet Drafts</A> - related to IPsec</LI> -<LI>US government<A href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs"> site</A> - with their<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS</A> standards</LI> -<LI>Archives of the ipsec@tis.com mailing list where discussion of - drafts takes place. -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec">Eastern Canada</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsec">California</A>.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="analysis">Analysis and critiques of IPsec protocols</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>Counterpane's<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/ipsec.pdf"> - evaluation</A> of the protocols</LI> -<LI>Simpson's<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/1999/06/msg00319.html"> - IKE Considered Dangerous</A> paper. Note that this is a link to an - archive of our mailing list. There are several replies in addition to - the paper itself.</LI> -<LI>Fate Labs<A href="http://www.fatelabs.com/loki-vpn.pdf"> Virual - Private Problems: the Broken Dream</A></LI> -<LI>Catherine Meadows' paper<CITE> Analysis of the Internet Key Exchange - Protocol Using the NRL Protocol Analyzer</CITE>, in<A href="http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/1999/1999meadows-IEEE99.pdf"> - PDF</A> or<A href="http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/1999/1999meadows-IEEE99.ps"> - Postscript</A>.</LI> -<LI>Perlman and Kaufmnan -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://snoopy.seas.smu.edu/ee8392_summer01/week7/perlman2.pdf"> -Key Exchange in IPsec</A></LI> -<LI>a newer<A href="http://sec.femto.org/wetice-2001/papers/radia-paper.pdf"> - PDF paper</A>,<CITE> Analysis of the IPsec Key Exchange Standard</CITE> -.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Bellovin's<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/index.html"> - papers</A> page including his: -<UL> -<LI><CITE>Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite</CITE> (1989)</LI> -<LI><CITE>Problem Areas for the IP Security Protocols</CITE> (1996)</LI> -<LI><CITE>Probable Plaintext Cryptanalysis of the IP Security Protocols</CITE> - (1997)</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>An<A href="http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html"> errata list</A> - for the IPsec RFCs.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="IP.background">Background information on IP</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>An<A href="http://ipprimer.windsorcs.com/"> IP tutorial</A> that - seems to be written mainly for Netware or Microsoft LAN admins entering - a new world</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.iana.org">IANA</A>, Internet Assigned Numbers - Authority</LI> -<LI><A href="http://public.pacbell.net/dedicated/cidr.html">CIDR</A>, - Classless Inter-Domain Routing</LI> -<LI>Also see our<A href="biblio.html"> bibliography</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="implement">IPsec Implementations</A></H2> -<H3><A name="linuxprod">Linux products</A></H3> -<P>Vendors using FreeS/WAN in turnkey firewall or VPN products are - listed in our<A href="#turnkey"> introduction</A>.</P> -<P>Other vendors have Linux IPsec products which, as far as we know, do - not use FreeS/WAN</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.redcreek.com/products/shareware.html">Redcreek</A> - provide an open source Linux driver for their PCI hardware VPN card. - This card has a 100 Mbit Ethernet port, an Intel 960 CPU plus more - specialised crypto chips, and claimed encryption performance of 45 - Mbit/sec. The PC sees it as an Ethernet board.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://linuxtoday.com/stories/8428.html?nn">Paktronix</A> - offer a Linux-based VPN with hardware encryption</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.watchguard.com/">Watchguard</A> use Linux in - their Firebox product.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.entrust.com">Entrust</A> offer a developers' - toolkit for using their<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> for IPsec authentication</LI> -<LI>According to a report on our mailing list,<A href="http://www.axent.com"> - Axent</A> have a Linux version of their product.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="router">IPsec in router products</A></H3> -<P>All the major router vendors support IPsec, at least in some models.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/16.html">Cisco</A> - IPsec information</LI> -<LI>Ascend, now part of<A href="http://www.lucent.com/"> Lucent</A>, - have some IPsec-based products</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nortelnetworks.com/">Bay Networks</A>, now part - of Nortel, use IPsec in their Contivity switch product line</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.3com.com/products/enterprise.html">3Com</A> have - a number of VPN products, some using IPsec</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="fw.web">IPsec in firewall products</A></H3> -<P>Many firewall vendors offer IPsec, either as a standard part of their - product, or an optional extra. A few we know about are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.borderware.com/">Borderware</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ashleylaurent.com/vpn/ipsec_vpn.htm">Ashley - Laurent</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.watchguard.com">Watchguard</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.fx.dk/firewall/ipsec.html">Injoy</A> for OS/2</LI> -</UL> -<P>Vendors using FreeS/WAN in turnkey firewall products are listed in - our<A href="#turnkey"> introduction</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="ipsecos">Operating systems with IPsec support</A></H3> -<P>All the major open source operating systems support IPsec. See below - for details on<A href="#BSD"> BSD-derived</A> Unix variants.</P> -<P>Among commercial OS vendors, IPsec players include:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/isapi/msdnlib.idc?theURL=/library/backgrnd/html/msdn_ip_security.htm"> -Microsoft</A> have put IPsec in their Windows 2000 and XP products</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.s390.ibm.com/stories/1999/os390v2r8_pr.html">IBM</A> - announce a release of OS390 with IPsec support via a crypto - co-processor</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.sun.com/solaris/ds/ds-security/ds-security.pdf"> -Sun</A> include IPsec in Solaris 8</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.hp.com/security/products/extranet-security.html"> -Hewlett Packard</A> offer IPsec for their Unix machines</LI> -<LI>Certicom have IPsec available for the<A href="http://www.certicom.com/products/movian/movianvpn_tech.html"> - Palm</A>.</LI> -<LI>There were reports before the release that Apple's Mac OS X would - have IPsec support built in, but it did not seem to be there when we - last checked. If you find, it please let us know via the<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="29_3_5">IPsec on network cards</A></H3> -<P>Network cards with built-in IPsec acceleration are available from at - least Intel, 3Com and Redcreek.</P> -<H3><A name="opensource">Open source IPsec implementations</A></H3> -<H4><A name="linuxipsec">Other Linux IPsec implementations</A></H4> -<P>We like to think of FreeS/WAN as<EM> the</EM> Linux IPsec - implementation, but it is not the only one. Others we know of are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.enst.fr/~beyssac/pipsec/">pipsecd</A>, a - lightweight implementation of IPsec for Linux. Does not require kernel - recompilation.</LI> -<LI>Petr Novak's<A href="ftp://ftp.eunet.cz/icz/ipnsec/"> ipnsec</A>, - based on the OpenBSD IPsec code and using<A href="#photuris"> Photuris</A> - for key management</LI> -<LI>A now defunct project at<A href="http://www.cs.arizona.edu/security/hpcc-blue/linux.html"> - U of Arizona</A> (export controlled)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://snad.ncsl.nist.gov/cerberus">NIST Cerebus</A> - (export controlled)</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="BSD">IPsec for BSD Unix</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.kame.net/project-overview.html">KAME</A>, - several large Japanese companies co-operating on IPv6 and IPsec</LI> -<LI><A href="http://web.mit.edu/network/isakmp">US Naval Research Lab</A> - implementation of IPv6 and of IPsec for IPv4 (export controlled)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.openbsd.org">OpenBSD</A> includes IPsec as a - standard part of the distribution</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.r4k.net/ipsec">IPsec for FreeBSD</A></LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.netbsd.org/Documentation/network/ipsec/"> FAQ</A> - on NetBSD's IPsec implementation</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="misc">IPsec for other systems</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tcm.hut.fi/Tutkimus/IPSEC/">Helsinki U of - Technolgy</A> have implemented IPsec for Solaris, Java and Macintosh</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="interop.web">Interoperability</A></H3> -<P>The IPsec protocols are designed so that different implementations - should be able to work together. As they say "the devil is in the - details". IPsec has a lot of details, but considerable success has been - achieved.</P> -<H4><A name="result">Interoperability results</A></H4> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN has been tested for interoperability with many other - IPsec implementations. Results to date are in our<A href="interop.html"> - interoperability</A> section.</P> -<P>Various other sites have information on interoperability between - various IPsec implementations:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.opus1.com/vpn/atl99display.html">interop results</A> - from a bakeoff in Atlanta, September 1999.</LI> -<LI>a French company, HSC's,<A href="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/presentations/ipsec99/index.html.en"> - interoperability</A> test data covers FreeS/WAN, Open BSD, KAME, Linux - pipsecd, Checkpoint, Red Creek Ravlin, and Cisco IOS</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.icsa.net/">ICSA</A> offer certification programs - for various security-related products. See their list of<A href="http://www.icsa.net/html/communities/ipsec/certification/certified_products/index.shtml"> - certified IPsec</A> products. Linux FreeS/WAN is not currently on that - list, but several products with which we interoperate are.</LI> -<LI>VPNC have a page on why they are not yet doing<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/interop.html"> - interoperability</A> testing and a page on the<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/conformance.html"> - spec conformance</A> testing that they are doing</LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.commweb.com/article/COM20000912S0009"> review</A> - comparing a dozen commercial IPsec implemetations. Unfortunately, the - reviewers did not look at Open Source implementations such as FreeS/WAN - or OpenBSD.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tanu.org/~sakane/doc/public/report-ike-interop0007.html"> -results</A> from interoperability tests at a conference. FreeS/WAN was - not tested there.</LI> -<LI>test results from the<A href="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/veille/ipsec/ipsec2000/"> - IPSEC 2000</A> conference</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="test1">Interoperability test sites</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tahi.org/">TAHI</A>, a Japanese IPv6 testing - project with free IPsec validation software</LI> -<LI><A href="http://ipsec-wit.antd.nist.gov">National Institute of - Standards and Technology</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/">SSH Communications Security</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="linux.link">Linux links</A></H2> -<H3><A name="linux.basic">Basic and tutorial Linux information</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>Linux<A href="http://linuxcentral.com/linux/LDP/LDP/gs/gs.html"> - Getting Started</A> HOWTO document</LI> -<LI>A getting started guide from the<A href="http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~cchome/linuxgettingstarted.html"> - U of Oregon</A></LI> -<LI>A large<A href="http://www.herring.org/techie.html"> link collection</A> - which includes a lot of introductory and tutorial material on Unix, - Linux, the net, . . .</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="general">General Linux sites</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.freshmeat.net">Freshmeat</A> Linux news</LI> -<LI><A href="http://slashdot.org">Slashdot</A> "News for Nerds"</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linux.org">Linux Online</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxhq.com">Linux HQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tux.org">tux.org</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="docs.ldp">Documentation</A></H3> -<P>Nearly any Linux documentation you are likely to want can be found at - the<A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP"> Linux Documentation Project</A> - or LDP.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/META-FAQ.html">Meta-FAQ</A> - guide to Linux information sources</LI> -<LI>The LDP's HowTo documents are a standard Linux reference. See this<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/docs.html#howto"> - list</A>. Documents there most relevant to a FreeS/WAN gateway are: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html">Kernel - HOWTO</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Networking-Overview-HOWTO.html"> -Networking Overview HOWTO</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Security-HOWTO.html"> -Security HOWTO</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>The LDP do a series of Guides, book-sized publications with more - detail (and often more "why do it this way?") than the HowTos. See this<A -href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/guides.html"> list</A>. Documents there - most relevant to a FreeS/WAN gateway are: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tml.hut.fi/~viu/linux/sag/">System - Administrator's Guide</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/LDP/nag2/index.html">Network - Adminstrator's Guide</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.seifried.org/lasg/">Linux Administrator's - Security Guide</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>You may not need to go to the LDP to get this material. Most Linux - distributions include the HowTos on their CDs and several include the - Guides as well. Also, most of the Guides and some collections of HowTos - are available in book form from various publishers.</P> -<P>Much of the LDP material is also available in languages other than - English. See this<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/links/nenglish.html"> - LDP page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="advroute.web">Advanced routing</A></H3> -<P>The Linux IP stack has some new features in 2.4 kernels. Some HowTos - have been written:</P> -<UL> -<LI>several HowTos for the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/"> - netfilter</A> firewall code in newer kernels</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ds9a.nl/2.4Networking/HOWTO//cvs/2.4routing/output/2.4networking.html"> -2.4 networking</A> HowTo</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ds9a.nl/2.4Networking/HOWTO//cvs/2.4routing/output/2.4routing.html"> -2.4 routing</A> HowTo</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="linsec">Security for Linux</A></H3> -<P>See also the<A href="#docs.ldp"> LDP material</A> above.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos"> -Trinity OS guide to setting up Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.deter.com/unix">Unix security</A> page</LI> -<LI><A href="http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/">PPDD</A> encrypting - filesystem</LI> -<LI><A href="http://EncryptionHOWTO.sourceforge.net/">Linux Encryption - HowTo</A> (outdated when last checked, had an Oct 2000 revision date in - March 2002)</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="firewall.linux">Linux firewalls</A></H3> -<P>Our<A href="firewall.html"> FreeS/WAN and firewalls</A> document - includes links to several sets of<A href="#examplefw"> scripts</A> - known to work with FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>Other information sources:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://ipmasq.cjb.net/">IP Masquerade resource page</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/">netfilter</A> - firewall code in 2.4 kernels</LI> -<LI>Our list of general<A href="#firewall.web"> firewall references</A> - on the web</LI> -<LI><A href="http://users.dhp.com/~whisper/mason/">Mason</A>, a tool for - automatically configuring Linux firewalls</LI> -<LI>the web cache software<A href="http://www.squid-cache.org/"> squid</A> - and<A href="http://www.squidguard.org/"> squidguard</A> which turns - Squid into a filtering web proxy</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="linux.misc">Miscellaneous Linux information</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://lwn.net/current/dists.php3">Linux distribution - vendors</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linux.org/groups/">Linux User Groups</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="crypto.link">Crypto and security links</A></H2> -<H3><A name="security">Crypto and security resources</A></H3> -<H4><A name="std.links">The standard link collections</A></H4> -<P>Two enormous collections of links, each the standard reference in its - area:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Gene Spafford's<A href="http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist/"> - COAST hotlist</A></DT> -<DD>Computer and network security.</DD> -<DT>Peter Gutmann's<A href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/links.html"> - Encryption and Security-related Resources</A></DT> -<DD>Cryptography.</DD> -</DL> -<H4><A name="FAQ">Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) documents</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cryptography-faq/">Cryptography - FAQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.interhack.net/pubs/fwfaq">Firewall FAQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.whitefang.com/sup/secure-faq.html">Secure Unix - Programming FAQ</A></LI> -<LI>FAQs for specific programs are listed in the<A href="#tools"> tools</A> - section below.</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="cryptover">Tutorials</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Gary Kessler's<A href="http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html"> - Overview of Cryptography</A></LI> -<LI>Terry Ritter's<A href="http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/LEARNING.HTM"> - introduction</A></LI> -<LI>Peter Gutman's<A href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/index.html"> - cryptography</A> tutorial (500 slides in PDF format)</LI> -<LI>Amir Herzberg of IBM's sildes for his course<A href="http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com/mpay/course.html"> - Introduction to Cryptography and Electronic Commerce</A></LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c173.html"> concepts - section</A> of the<A href="#GPG"> GNU Privacy Guard</A> documentation</LI> -<LI>Bruce Schneier's self-study<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/self-study.html"> - cryptanalysis</A> course</LI> -</UL> -<P>See also the<A href="#interesting"> interesting papers</A> section - below.</P> -<H4><A name="standards">Crypto and security standards</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/cc">Common Criteria</A>, new - international computer and network security standards to replace the - "Rainbow" series</LI> -<LI>AES<A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/aes_home.htm"> - Advanced Encryption Standard</A> which will replace DES</LI> -<LI><A href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363">IEEE P-1363 public key - standard</A></LI> -<LI>our collection of links for the<A href="#ipsec.link"> IPsec</A> - standards</LI> -<LI>history of<A href="http://www.visi.com/crypto/evalhist/index.html"> - formal evaluation</A> of security policies and implementation</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="quotes">Crypto quotes</A></H4> -<P>There are several collections of cryptographic quotes on the net:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/quotes.eff">the EFF</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.samsimpson.com/cquotes.php">Sam Simpson</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.amk.ca/quotations/cryptography/page-1.html">AM - Kutchling</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="policy">Cryptography law and policy</A></H3> -<H4><A name="legal">Surveys of crypto law</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>International survey of<A href="http://cwis.kub.nl/~FRW/PEOPLE/koops/lawsurvy.htm"> - crypto law</A>.</LI> -<LI>International survey of<A href="http://rechten.kub.nl/simone/ds-lawsu.htm"> - digital signature law</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="oppose">Organisations opposing crypto restrictions</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="#EFF"> EFF</A>'s archives on<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/"> - privacy</A> and<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/"> - export control</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.gilc.org">Global Internet Liberty Campaign</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cdt.org/crypto">Center for Democracy and - Technology</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.privacyinternational.org/">Privacy International</A> -, who give out<A href="http://www.bigbrotherawards.org/"> Big Brother - Awards</A> to snoopy organisations</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="other.policy">Other information on crypto policy</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1984.txt">RFC 1984</A>, the<A href="#IAB"> - IAB</A> and<A href="#IESG"> IESG</A> Statement on Cryptographic - Technology and the Internet.</LI> -<LI>John Young's collection of<A href="http://cryptome.org/"> documents</A> - of interest to the cryptography, open government and privacy movements, - organized chronologically</LI> -<LI>AT&T researcher Matt Blaze's Encryption, Privacy and Security<A href="http://www.crypto.com"> - Resource Page</A></LI> -<LI>A good<A href="http://cryptome.org/crypto97-ne.htm"> overview</A> of - the issues from Australia.</LI> -</UL> -<P>See also our documentation section on the<A href="politics.html"> - history and politics</A> of cryptography.</P> -<H3><A name="crypto.tech">Cryptography technical information</A></H3> -<H4><A name="cryptolinks">Collections of crypto links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/hotlist.html">Counterpane</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/links.html">Peter - Gutman's links</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.pca.dfn.de/eng/team/ske/pem-dok.html">PKI links</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://crypto.yashy.com/www/">Robert Guerra's links</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="papers">Lists of online cryptography papers</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/biblio">Counterpane</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cryptography.com/resources/papers"> -cryptography.com</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cryptosoft.com/html/secpub.htm">Cryptosoft</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="interesting">Particularly interesting papers</A></H4> -<P>These papers emphasize important issues around the use of - cryptography, and the design and management of secure systems.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/keylength.html">Key length - requirements for security</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/wcf.html">Why - Cryptosystems Fail</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/">Risks of escrowed - encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/pitfalls.html">Security pitfalls - in cryptography</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95">Reflections on Trusting - Trust</A>, Ken Thompson on Trojan horse design</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.apache-ssl.org/disclosure.pdf">Security against - Compelled Disclosure</A>, how to maintain privacy in the face of legal - or other coersion</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="compsec">Computer and network security</A></H3> -<H4><A name="seclink">Security links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist">COAST Hotlist</A></LI> -<LI>DMOZ open directory project<A href="http://dmoz.org/Computers/Security/"> - computer security</A> links</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/bsy/sec.html">Bennet Yee</A></LI> -<LI>Mike Fuhr's<A href="http://www.fuhr.org/~mfuhr/computers/security.html"> - link collection</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk/">links</A> with an - emphasis on intrusion detection</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="firewall.web">Firewall links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/firewalls">COAST firewalls</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.zeuros.co.uk">Firewalls Resource page</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="vpn">VPN links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.vpnc.org">VPN Consortium</A></LI> -<LI>First VPN's<A href="http://www.firstvpn.com/research/rhome.html"> - white paper</A> collection</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="tools">Security tools</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>PGP -- mail encryption -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.pgp.com/">PGP Inc.</A> (part of NAI) for - commercial versions</LI> -<LI><A href="http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html">MIT</A> distributes - the NAI product for non-commercial use</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.pgpi.org/">international</A> distribution site</LI> -<LI><A href="http://gnupg.org">GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.dk.pgp.net/pgpnet/pgp-faq/">PGP FAQ</A></LI> -</UL> - A message in our mailing list archive has considerable detail on<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00029.html"> - available versions</A> of PGP and on IPsec support in them. -<P><STRONG>Note:</STRONG> A fairly nasty bug exists in all commercial - PGP versions from 5.5 through 6.5.3. If you have one of those,<STRONG> - upgrade now</STRONG>.</P> -</LI> -<LI>SSH -- secure remote login -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ssh.fi">SSH Communications Security</A>, for the - original software. It is free for trial, academic and non-commercial - use.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.openssh.com/">Open SSH</A>, the Open BSD team's - free replacement</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.freessh.org/">freessh.org</A>, links to free - implementations for many systems</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.uni-karlsruhe.de/~ig25/ssh-faq">SSH FAQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/">Putty</A> -, an SSH client for Windows</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Tripwire saves message digests of your system files. Re-calculate - the digests and compare to saved values to detect any file changes. - There are several versions available: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tripwiresecurity.com/">commercial version</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tripwire.org/">Open Source</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.snort.org">Snort</A> and<A href="http://www.lids.org"> - LIDS</A> are intrusion detection system for Linux</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.fish.com/~zen/satan/satan.html">SATAN</A> System - Administrators Tool for Analysing Networks</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.insecure.org/nmap/">NMAP</A> Network Mapper</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html">Wietse - Venema's page</A> with various tools</LI> -<LI><A href="http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/index.html">Internet Traffic Archive</A> -, various tools to analyze network traffic, mostly scripts to organise - and format tcpdump(8) output for specific purposes</LI> -<LI><A name="ssmail">ssmail -- sendmail patched to do</A><A href="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.home.aone.net.au/qualcomm/">web page</A> with - links to code and to a Usenix paper describing it, in PDF</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.openca.org/">Open CA</A> project to develop a - freely distributed<A href="#CA"> Certification Authority</A> for - building a open<A href="#PKI"> Public Key Infrastructure</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="people">Links to home pages</A></H3> -<P>David Wagner at Berkeley provides a set of links to<A href="http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/people/crypto.html"> - home pages</A> of cryptographers, cypherpunks and computer security - people.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="ourgloss">Glossary for the Linux FreeS/WAN project</A></H1> -<P>Entries are in alphabetical order. Some entries are only one line or - one paragraph long. Others run to several paragraphs. I have tried to - put the essential information in the first paragraph so you can skip - the other paragraphs if that seems appropriate.</P> -<HR> -<H2><A name="jump">Jump to a letter in the glossary</A></H2> -<CENTER> <BIG><B><A href="#0">numeric</A><A href="#A"> A</A><A href="#B"> - B</A><A href="#C"> C</A><A href="#D"> D</A><A href="#E"> E</A><A href="#F"> - F</A><A href="#G"> G</A><A href="#H"> H</A><A href="#I"> I</A><A href="#J"> - J</A><A href="#K"> K</A><A href="#L"> L</A><A href="#M"> M</A><A href="#N"> - N</A><A href="#O"> O</A><A href="#P"> P</A><A href="#Q"> Q</A><A href="#R"> - R</A><A href="#S"> S</A><A href="#T"> T</A><A href="#U"> U</A><A href="#V"> - V</A><A href="#W"> W</A><A href="#X"> X</A><A href="#Y"> Y</A><A href="#Z"> - Z</A></B></BIG></CENTER> -<HR> -<H2><A name="gloss">Other glossaries</A></H2> -<P>Other glossaries which overlap this one include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The VPN Consortium's glossary of<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/terms.html"> - VPN terms</A>.</LI> -<LI>glossary portion of the<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/B.html"> - Cryptography FAQ</A></LI> -<LI>an extensive crytographic glossary on<A href="http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/GLOSSARY.HTM"> - Terry Ritter's</A> page.</LI> -<LI>The<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A>'s<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/glossary.htm"> - glossary of computer security</A> on the<A href="http://www.sans.org"> - SANS Institute</A> site.</LI> -<LI>a small glossary for Internet Security at<A href="http://www5.zdnet.com/pcmag/pctech/content/special/glossaries/internetsecurity.html"> - PC magazine</A></LI> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.visi.com/crypto/inet-crypto/glossary.html"> - glossary</A> from Richard Smith's book<A href="#Smith"> Internet - Cryptography</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Several Internet glossaries are available as RFCs:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1208.txt">Glossary of - Networking Terms</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1983.txt">Internet User's - Glossary</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt">Internet - Security Glossary</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>More general glossary or dictionary information:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Free Online Dictionary of Computing (FOLDOC) -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.nightflight.com/foldoc">North America</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/index.html">Europe</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nue.org/foldoc/index.html">Japan</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There are many more mirrors of this dictionary.</P> -</LI> -<LI>The Jargon File, the definitive resource for hacker slang and - folklore -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.netmeg.net/jargon">North America</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://info.wins.uva.nl/~mes/jargon/">Holland</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/jargon">home page</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There are also many mirrors of this. See the home page for a list.</P> -</LI> -<LI>A general<A href="http://www.trinity.edu/~rjensen/245glosf.htm#Navigate"> - technology glossary</A></LI> -<LI>An<A href="http://www.yourdictionary.com/"> online dictionary - resource page</A> with pointers to many dictionaries for many languages</LI> -<LI>A<A href="http://www.onelook.com/"> search engine</A> that accesses - several hundred online dictionaries</LI> -<LI>O'Reilly<A href="http://www.ora.com/reference/dictionary/"> - Dictionary of PC Hardware and Data Communications Terms</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.FreeSoft.org/CIE/index.htm">Connected</A> - Internet encyclopedia</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.whatis.com/">whatis.com</A></LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H2><A name="definitions">Definitions</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT><A name="0">0</A></DT> -<DT><A name="3DES">3DES (Triple DES)</A></DT> -<DD>Using three<A href="#DES"> DES</A> encryptions on a single data - block, with at least two different keys, to get higher security than is - available from a single DES pass. The three-key version of 3DES is the - default encryption algorithm for<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> -. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> always does 3DES with three different - keys, as required by RFC 2451. For an explanation of the two-key - variant, see<A href="#2key"> two key triple DES</A>. Both use an<A href="#EDE"> - EDE</A> encrypt-decrypt-encrpyt sequence of operations.</P> -<P>Single<A href="#DES"> DES</A> is<A href="#desnotsecure"> insecure</A> -.</P> -<P>Double DES is ineffective. Using two 56-bit keys, one might expect an - attacker to have to do 2<SUP>112</SUP> work to break it. In fact, only - 2<SUP>57</SUP> work is required with a<A href="#meet"> - meet-in-the-middle attack</A>, though a large amount of memory is also - required. Triple DES is vulnerable to a similar attack, but that just - reduces the work factor from the 2<SUP>168</SUP> one might expect to 2<SUP> -112</SUP>. That provides adequate protection against<A href="#brute"> - brute force</A> attacks, and no better attack is known.</P> -<P>3DES can be somewhat slow compared to other ciphers. It requires - three DES encryptions per block. DES was designed for hardware - implementation and includes some operations which are difficult in - software. However, the speed we get is quite acceptable for many uses. - See our<A href="performance.html"> performance</A> document for - details.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="A">A</A></DT> -<DT><A name="active">Active attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack in which the attacker does not merely eavesdrop (see<A href="#passive"> - passive attack</A>) but takes action to change, delete, reroute, add, - forge or divert data. Perhaps the best-known active attack is<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle</A>. In general,<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> is a useful defense against active attacks.</DD> -<DT><A name="AES">AES</A></DT> -<DD>The<B> A</B>dvanced<B> E</B>ncryption<B> S</B>tandard -- a new<A href="#block"> - block cipher</A> standard to replace<A href="#desnotsecure"> DES</A> -- - developed by<A href="#NIST"> NIST</A>, the US National Institute of - Standards and Technology. DES used 64-bit blocks and a 56-bit key. AES - ciphers use a 128-bit block and 128, 192 or 256-bit keys. The larger - block size helps resist<A href="#birthday"> birthday attacks</A> while - the large key size prevents<A href="#brute"> brute force attacks</A>. -<P>Fifteen proposals meeting NIST's basic criteria were submitted in - 1998 and subjected to intense discussion and analysis, "round one" - evaluation. In August 1999, NIST narrowed the field to five "round two" - candidates:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.research.ibm.com/security/mars.html">Mars</A> - from IBM</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/aes/">RC6</A> from RSA</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/">Rijndael</A> - from two Belgian researchers</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html">Serpent</A>, a - British-Norwegian-Israeli collaboration</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/twofish.html">Twofish</A> from - the consulting firm<A href="http://www.counterpane.com"> Counterpane</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>Three of the five finalists -- Rijndael, Serpent and Twofish -- have - completely open licenses.</P> -<P>In October 2000, NIST announced the winner -- Rijndael.</P> -<P>For more information, see:</P> -<UL> -<LI>NIST's<A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/aes_home.htm"> - AES home page</A></LI> -<LI>the Block Cipher Lounge<A href="http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/aes.html"> - AES page</A></LI> -<LI>Brian Gladman's<A href="http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/index.htm"> - code and benchmarks</A></LI> -<LI>Helger Lipmaa's<A href="http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/aes/"> survey - of implementations</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>AES will be added to a future release of<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux - FreeS/WAN</A>. Likely we will add all three of the finalists with good - licenses. User-written<A href="#patch"> AES patches</A> are already - available.</P> -<P>Adding AES may also require adding stronger hashes,<A href="#SHA-256"> - SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="AH">AH</A></DT> -<DD>The<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A><B> A</B>uthentication<B> H</B>eader, - added after the IP header. For details, see our<A href="#AH.ipsec"> - IPsec</A> document and/or RFC 2402.</DD> -<DT><A name="alicebob">Alice and Bob</A></DT> -<DD>A and B, the standard example users in writing on cryptography and - coding theory. Carol and Dave join them for protocols which require - more players. -<P>Bruce Schneier extends these with many others such as Eve the - Eavesdropper and Victor the Verifier. His extensions seem to be in the - process of becoming standard as well. See page 23 of<A href="#schneier"> - Applied Cryptography</A></P> -<P>Alice and Bob have an amusing<A href="http://www.conceptlabs.co.uk/alicebob.html"> - biography</A> on the web.</P> -</DD> -<DT>ARPA</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#DARPA"> DARPA</A></DD> -<DT><A name="ASIO">ASIO</A></DT> -<DD>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.</DD> -<DT>Asymmetric cryptography</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#public"> public key cryptography</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="authentication">Authentication</A></DT> -<DD>Ensuring that a message originated from the expected sender and has - not been altered on route.<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> uses - authentication in two places: -<UL> -<LI>peer authentication, authenticating the players in<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A>'s<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchanges to prevent<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A>. This can be done in a number of ways. - The methods supported by FreeS/WAN are discussed in our<A href="#choose"> - advanced configuration</A> document.</LI> -<LI>packet authentication, authenticating packets on an established<A href="#SA"> - SA</A>, either with a separate<A href="#AH"> authentication header</A> - or with the optional authentication in the<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> - protocol. In either case, packet authentication uses a<A href="#HMAC"> - hashed message athentication code</A> technique.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Outside IPsec, passwords are perhaps the most common authentication - mechanism. Their function is essentially to authenticate the person's - identity to the system. Passwords are generally only as secure as the - network they travel over. If you send a cleartext password over a - tapped phone line or over a network with a packet sniffer on it, the - security provided by that password becomes zero. Sending an encrypted - password is no better; the attacker merely records it and reuses it at - his convenience. This is called a<A href="#replay"> replay</A> attack.</P> -<P>A common solution to this problem is a<A href="#challenge"> - challenge-response</A> system. This defeats simple eavesdropping and - replay attacks. Of course an attacker might still try to break the - cryptographic algorithm used, or the<A href="#random"> random number</A> - generator.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="auto">Automatic keying</A></DT> -<DD>A mode in which keys are automatically generated at connection - establisment and new keys automaically created periodically thereafter. - Contrast with<A href="#manual"> manual keying</A> in which a single - stored key is used. -<P>IPsec uses the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol</A> - to create keys. An<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> - mechansim is required for this. FreeS/WAN normally uses<A href="#RSA"> - RSA</A> for this. Other methods supported are discussed in our<A href="#choose"> - advanced configuration</A> document.</P> -<P>Having an attacker break the authentication is emphatically not a - good idea. An attacker that breaks authentication, and manages to - subvert some other network entities (DNS, routers or gateways), can use - a<A href="#middle"> man-in-the middle attack</A> to break the security - of your IPsec connections.</P> -<P>However, having an attacker break the authentication in automatic - keying is not quite as bad as losing the key in manual keying.</P> -<UL> -<LI>An attacker who reads /etc/ipsec.conf and gets the keys for a - manually keyed connection can, without further effort, read all - messages encrypted with those keys, including any old messages he may - have archived.</LI> -<LI>Automatic keying has a property called<A href="#PFS"> perfect - forward secrecy</A>. An attacker who breaks the authentication gets - none of the automatically generated keys and cannot immediately read - any messages. He has to mount a successful<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A> in real time before he can read anything. - He cannot read old archived messages at all and will not be able to - read any future messages not caught by man-in-the-middle tricks.</LI> -</UL> -<P>That said, the secrets used for authentication, stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A>, should still be protected as tightly as - cryptographic keys.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="B">B</A></DT> -<DT><A href="http://www.nortelnetworks.com">Bay Networks</A></DT> -<DD>A vendor of routers, hubs and related products, now a subsidiary of - Nortel. Interoperation between their IPsec products and Linux FreeS/WAN - was problematic at last report; see our<A href="interop.html#bay"> - interoperation</A> section.</DD> -<DT><A name="benchmarks">benchmarks</A></DT> -<DD>Our default block cipher,<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A>, is slower - than many alternate ciphers that might be used. Speeds achieved, - however, seem adequate for many purposes. For example, the assembler - code from the<A href="#LIBDES"> LIBDES</A> library we use encrypts 1.6 - megabytes per second on a Pentium 200, according to the test program - supplied with the library. -<P>For more detail, see our document on<A href="performance.html"> - FreeS/WAN performance</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="BIND">BIND</A></DT> -<DD><B>B</B>erkeley<B> I</B>nternet<B> N</B>ame<B> D</B>aemon, a widely - used implementation of<A href="#DNS"> DNS</A> (Domain Name Service). - See our bibliography for a<A href="#DNS"> useful reference</A>. See the<A -href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> BIND home page</A> for more - information and the latest version.</DD> -<DT><A name="birthday">Birthday attack</A></DT> -<DD>A cryptographic attack based on the mathematics exemplified by the<A href="#paradox"> - birthday paradox</A>. This math turns up whenever the question of two - cryptographic operations producing the same result becomes an issue: -<UL> -<LI><A href="#collision">collisions</A> in<A href="#digest"> message - digest</A> functions.</LI> -<LI>identical output blocks from a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A></LI> -<LI>repetition of a challenge in a<A href="#challenge"> - challenge-response</A> system</LI> -</UL> -<P>Resisting such attacks is part of the motivation for:</P> -<UL> -<LI>hash algorithms such as<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A> and<A href="#RIPEMD"> - RIPEMD-160</A> giving a 160-bit result rather than the 128 bits of<A href="#MD4"> - MD4</A>,<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> and<A href="#RIPEMD"> RIPEMD-128</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="#AES">AES</A> block ciphers using a 128-bit block instead - of the 64-bit block of most current ciphers</LI> -<LI><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> using a 32-bit counter for packets sent - on an<A href="#auto"> automatically keyed</A><A href="#SA"> SA</A> and - requiring that the connection always be rekeyed before the counter - overflows.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A name="paradox">Birthday paradox</A></DT> -<DD>Not really a paradox, just a rather counter-intuitive mathematical - fact. In a group of 23 people, the chance of a least one pair having - the same birthday is over 50%. -<P>The second person has 1 chance in 365 (ignoring leap years) of - matching the first. If they don't match, the third person's chances of - matching one of them are 2/365. The 4th, 3/365, and so on. The total of - these chances grows more quickly than one might guess.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="block">Block cipher</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cipher</A> which operates on - fixed-size blocks of plaintext, giving a block of ciphertext for each. - Contrast with<A href="#stream"> stream cipher</A>. Block ciphers can be - used in various<A href="#mode"> modes</A> when multiple block are to be - encrypted. -<P><A href="#DES">DES</A> is among the the best known and widely used - block ciphers, but is now obsolete. Its 56-bit key size makes it<A href="#desnotsecure"> - highly insecure</A> today.<A href="#3DES"> Triple DES</A> is the - default block cipher for<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -<P>The current generation of block ciphers -- such as<A href="#Blowfish"> - Blowfish</A>,<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> and<A href="#IDEA"> IDEA</A> - -- all use 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys. The next generation,<A href="#AES"> - AES</A>, uses 128-bit blocks and supports key sizes up to 256 bits.</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/bc.html"> Block Cipher Lounge</A> - web site has more information.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="Blowfish">Blowfish</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> using 64-bit blocks and keys of - up to 448 bits, designed by<A href="#schneier"> Bruce Schneier</A> and - used in several products. -<P>This is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="brute">Brute force attack (exhaustive search)</A></DT> -<DD>Breaking a cipher by trying all possible keys. This is always - possible in theory (except against a<A href="#OTP"> one-time pad</A>), - but it becomes practical only if the key size is inadequate. For an - important example, see our document on the<A href="#desnotsecure"> - insecurity of DES</A> with its 56-bit key. For an analysis of key sizes - required to resist plausible brute force attacks, see<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/keylength.html"> - this paper</A>. -<P>Longer keys protect against brute force attacks. Each extra bit in - the key doubles the number of possible keys and therefore doubles the - work a brute force attack must do. A large enough key defeats<STRONG> - any</STRONG> brute force attack.</P> -<P>For example, the EFF's<A href="#EFF"> DES Cracker</A> searches a - 56-bit key space in an average of a few days. Let us assume an attacker - that can find a 64-bit key (256 times harder) by brute force search in - a second (a few hundred thousand times faster). For a 96-bit key, that - attacker needs 2<SUP>32</SUP> seconds, about 135 years. Against a - 128-bit key, he needs 2<SUP>32</SUP> times that, over 500,000,000,000 - years. Your data is then obviously secure against brute force attacks. - Even if our estimate of the attacker's speed is off by a factor of a - million, it still takes him over 500,000 years to crack a message.</P> -<P>This is why</P> -<UL> -<LI>single<A href="#DES"> DES</A> is now considered<A href="#desnotsecure"> - dangerously insecure</A></LI> -<LI>all of the current generation of<A href="#block"> block ciphers</A> - use a 128-bit or longer key</LI> -<LI><A href="#AES">AES</A> ciphers support keysizes 128, 192 and 256 - bits</LI> -<LI>any cipher we add to Linux FreeS/WAN will have<EM> at least</EM> a - 128-bit key</LI> -</UL> -<P><STRONG>Cautions:</STRONG> -<BR><EM> Inadequate keylength always indicates a weak cipher</EM> but it - is important to note that<EM> adequate keylength does not necessarily - indicate a strong cipher</EM>. There are many attacks other than brute - force, and adequate keylength<EM> only</EM> guarantees resistance to - brute force. Any cipher, whatever its key size, will be weak if design - or implementation flaws allow other attacks.</P> -<P>Also,<EM> once you have adequate keylength</EM> (somewhere around 90 - or 100 bits),<EM> adding more key bits make no practical difference</EM> -, even against brute force. Consider our 128-bit example above that - takes 500,000,000,000 years to break by brute force. We really don't - care how many zeroes there are on the end of that, as long as the - number remains ridiculously large. That is, we don't care exactly how - large the key is as long as it is large enough.</P> -<P>There may be reasons of convenience in the design of the cipher to - support larger keys. For example<A href="#Blowfish"> Blowfish</A> - allows up to 448 bits and<A href="#RC4"> RC4</A> up to 2048, but beyond - 100-odd bits it makes no difference to practical security.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Bureau of Export Administration</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#BXA"> BXA</A></DD> -<DT><A name="BXA">BXA</A></DT> -<DD>The US Commerce Department's<B> B</B>ureau of E<B>x</B>port<B> A</B> -dministration which administers the<A href="#EAR"> EAR</A> Export - Administration Regulations controling the export of, among other - things, cryptography.</DD> -<DT><A name="C">C</A></DT> -<DT><A name="CA">CA</A></DT> -<DD><B>C</B>ertification<B> A</B>uthority, an entity in a<A href="#PKI"> - public key infrastructure</A> that can certify keys by signing them. - Usually CAs form a hierarchy. The top of this hierarchy is called the<A href="#rootCA"> - root CA</A>. -<P>See<A href="#web"> Web of Trust</A> for an alternate model.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="CAST128">CAST-128</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit - keys, described in RFC 2144 and used in products such as<A href="#Entrust"> - Entrust</A> and recent versions of<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A>. -<P>This is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>CAST-256</DT> -<DD><A href="#Entrust">Entrust</A>'s candidate cipher for the<A href="#AES"> - AES standard</A>, largely based on the<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> - design.</DD> -<DT><A name="CBC">CBC mode</A></DT> -<DD><B>C</B>ipher<B> B</B>lock<B> C</B>haining<A href="#mode"> mode</A>, - a method of using a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> in which for each - block except the first, the result of the previous encryption is XORed - into the new block before it is encrypted. CBC is the mode used in<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A>. -<P>An<A href="#IV"> initialisation vector</A> (IV) must be provided. It - is XORed into the first block before encryption. The IV need not be - secret but should be different for each message and unpredictable.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="CIDR">CIDR</A></DT> -<DD><B>C</B>lassless<B> I</B>nter-<B>D</B>omain<B> R</B>outing, an - addressing scheme used to describe networks not restricted to the old - Class A, B, and C sizes. A CIDR block is written<VAR> address</VAR>/<VAR> -mask</VAR>, where<VAR> address</VAR> is a 32-bit Internet address. The - first<VAR> mask</VAR> bits of<VAR> address</VAR> are part of the - gateway address, while the remaining bits designate other host - addresses. For example, the CIDR block 192.0.2.96/27 describes a - network with gateway 192.0.2.96, hosts 192.0.2.96 through 192.0.2.126 - and broadcast 192.0.2.127. -<P>FreeS/WAN policy group files accept CIDR blocks of the format<VAR> - address</VAR>/[<VAR>mask</VAR>], where<VAR> address</VAR> may take the - form<VAR> name.domain.tld</VAR>. An absent<VAR> mask</VAR> is assumed - to be /32.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Certification Authority</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#CA"> CA</A></DD> -<DT><A name="challenge">Challenge-response authentication</A></DT> -<DD>An<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> system in which one - player generates a<A href="#random"> random number</A>, encrypts it and - sends the result as a challenge. The other player decrypts and sends - back the result. If the result is correct, that proves to the first - player that the second player knew the appropriate secret, required for - the decryption. Variations on this technique exist using<A href="#public"> - public key</A> or<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric</A> cryptography. Some - provide two-way authentication, assuring each player of the other's - identity. -<P>This is more secure than passwords against two simple attacks:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If cleartext passwords are sent across the wire (e.g. for telnet), - an eavesdropper can grab them. The attacker may even be able to break - into other systems if the user has chosen the same password for them.</LI> -<LI>If an encrypted password is sent, an attacker can record the - encrypted form and use it later. This is called a replay attack.</LI> -</UL> -<P>A challenge-response system never sends a password, either cleartext - or encrypted. An attacker cannot record the response to one challenge - and use it as a response to a later challenge. The random number is - different each time.</P> -<P>Of course an attacker might still try to break the cryptographic - algorithm used, or the<A href="#random"> random number</A> generator.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="mode">Cipher Modes</A></DT> -<DD>Different ways of using a block cipher when encrypting multiple - blocks. -<P>Four standard modes were defined for<A href="#DES"> DES</A> in<A href="#FIPS"> - FIPS</A> 81. They can actually be applied with any block cipher.</P> -<TABLE><TBODY></TBODY> -<TR><TD></TD><TD><A href="#ECB">ECB</A></TD><TD>Electronic CodeBook</TD><TD> -encrypt each block independently</TD></TR> -<TR><TD></TD><TD><A href="#CBC">CBC</A></TD><TD>Cipher Block Chaining -<BR></TD><TD>XOR previous block ciphertext into new block plaintext - before encrypting new block</TD></TR> -<TR><TD></TD><TD>CFB</TD><TD>Cipher FeedBack</TD><TD></TD></TR> -<TR><TD></TD><TD>OFB</TD><TD>Output FeedBack</TD><TD></TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> uses<A href="#CBC"> CBC</A> mode since - this is only marginally slower than<A href="#ECB"> ECB</A> and is more - secure. In ECB mode the same plaintext always encrypts to the same - ciphertext, unless the key is changed. In CBC mode, this does not - occur.</P> -<P>Various other modes are also possible, but none of them are used in - IPsec.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="ciphertext">Ciphertext</A></DT> -<DD>The encrypted output of a cipher, as opposed to the unencrypted<A href="#plaintext"> - plaintext</A> input.</DD> -<DT><A href="http://www.cisco.com">Cisco</A></DT> -<DD>A vendor of routers, hubs and related products. Their IPsec products - interoperate with Linux FreeS/WAN; see our<A href="#cisco"> interop</A> - section.</DD> -<DT><A name="client">Client</A></DT> -<DD>This term has at least two distinct uses in discussing IPsec: -<UL> -<LI>The<STRONG> clients of an IPsec gateway</STRONG> are the machines it - protects, typically on one or more subnets behind the gateway. In this - usage, all the machines on an office network are clients of that - office's IPsec gateway. Laptop or home machines connecting to the - office, however, are<EM> not</EM> clients of that gateway. They are - remote gateways, running the other end of an IPsec connection. Each of - them is also its own client.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>IPsec client software</STRONG> is used to describe software - which runs on various standalone machines to let them connect to IPsec - networks. In this usage, a laptop or home machine connecting to the - office is a client, and the office gateway is the server.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We generally use the term in the first sense. Vendors of Windows - IPsec solutions often use it in the second. See this<A href="interop.html#client.server"> - discussion</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="cc">Common Criteria</A></DT> -<DD>A set of international security classifications which are replacing - the old US<A href="#rainbow"> Rainbow Book</A> standards and similar - standards in other countries. -<P>Web references include this<A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/cc"> US - government site</A> and this<A href="http://www.commoncriteria.org"> - global home page</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Conventional cryptography</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cryptography</A></DD> -<DT><A name="collision">Collision resistance</A></DT> -<DD>The property of a<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> algorithm - which makes it hard for an attacker to find or construct two inputs - which hash to the same output.</DD> -<DT>Copyleft</DT> -<DD>see GNU<A href="#GPL"> General Public License</A></DD> -<DT><A name="CSE">CSE</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/">Communications Security - Establishment</A>, the Canadian organisation for<A href="#SIGINT"> - signals intelligence</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="D">D</A></DT> -<DT><A name="DARPA">DARPA (sometimes just ARPA)</A></DT> -<DD>The US government's<B> D</B>efense<B> A</B>dvanced<B> R</B>esearch<B> - P</B>rojects<B> A</B>gency. Projects they have funded over the years - have included the Arpanet which evolved into the Internet, the TCP/IP - protocol suite (as a replacement for the original Arpanet suite), the - Berkeley 4.x BSD Unix projects, and<A href="#SDNS"> Secure DNS</A>. -<P>For current information, see their<A href="http://www.darpa.mil/ito"> - web site</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="DOS">Denial of service (DoS) attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack that aims at denying some service to legitimate users of a - system, rather than providing a service to the attacker. -<UL> -<LI>One variant is a flooding attack, overwhelming the system with too - many packets, to much email, or whatever.</LI> -<LI>A closely related variant is a resource exhaustion attack. For - example, consider a "TCP SYN flood" attack. Setting up a TCP connection - involves a three-packet exchange: -<UL> -<LI>Initiator: Connection please (SYN)</LI> -<LI>Responder: OK (ACK)</LI> -<LI>Initiator: OK here too</LI> -</UL> -<P>If the attacker puts bogus source information in the first packet, - such that the second is never delivered, the responder may wait a long - time for the third to come back. If responder has already allocated - memory for the connection data structures, and if many of these bogus - packets arrive, the responder may run out of memory.</P> -</LI> -<LI>Another variant is to feed the system undigestible data, hoping to - make it sick. For example, IP packets are limited in size to 64K bytes - and a fragment carries information on where it starts within that 64K - and how long it is. The "ping of death" delivers fragments that say, - for example, that they start at 60K and are 20K long. Attempting to - re-assemble these without checking for overflow can be fatal.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The two example attacks discussed were both quite effective when - first discovered, capable of crashing or disabling many operating - systems. They were also well-publicised, and today far fewer systems - are vulnerable to them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="DES">DES</A></DT> -<DD>The<B> D</B>ata<B> E</B>ncryption<B> S</B>tandard, a<A href="#block"> - block cipher</A> with 64-bit blocks and a 56-bit key. Probably the most - widely used<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cipher</A> ever devised. DES - has been a US government standard for their own use (only for - unclassified data), and for some regulated industries such as banking, - since the late 70's. It is now being replaced by<A href="#AES"> AES</A> -. -<P><A href="#desnotsecure">DES is seriously insecure against current - attacks.</A></P> -<P><A href="#FreeSWAN">Linux FreeS/WAN</A> does not include DES, even - though the RFCs specify it.<B> We strongly recommend that single DES - not be used.</B></P> -<P>See also<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A> and<A href="#DESX"> DESX</A>, - stronger ciphers based on DES.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="DESX">DESX</A></DT> -<DD>An improved<A href="#DES"> DES</A> suggested by Ron Rivest of RSA - Data Security. It XORs extra key material into the text before and - after applying the DES cipher. -<P>This is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>. DESX would - be the easiest additional transform to add; there would be very little - code to write. It would be much faster than 3DES and almost certainly - more secure than DES. However, since it is not in the RFCs other IPsec - implementations cannot be expected to have it.</P> -</DD> -<DT>DH</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A></DD> -<DT><A name="DHCP">DHCP</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>D</STRONG>ynamic<STRONG> H</STRONG>ost<STRONG> C</STRONG> -onfiguration<STRONG> P</STRONG>rotocol, a method of assigning<A href="#dynamic"> - dynamic IP addresses</A>, and providing additional information such as - addresses of DNS servers and of gateways. See this<A href="http://www.dhcp.org"> - DHCP resource page.</A></DD> -<DT><A name="DH">Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol</A></DT> -<DD>A protocol that allows two parties without any initial shared secret - to create one in a manner immune to eavesdropping. Once they have done - this, they can communicate privately by using that shared secret as a - key for a block cipher or as the basis for key exchange. -<P>The protocol is secure against all<A href="#passive"> passive attacks</A> -, but it is not at all resistant to active<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A>. If a third party can impersonate Bob to - Alice and vice versa, then no useful secret can be created. - Authentication of the participants is a prerequisite for safe - Diffie-Hellman key exchange. IPsec can use any of several<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> mechanisims. Those supported by FreeS/WAN are - discussed in our<A href="#choose"> configuration</A> section.</P> -<P>The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the<A href="#dlog"> - discrete logarithm</A> problem and is secure unless someone finds an - efficient solution to that problem.</P> -<P>Given a prime<VAR> p</VAR> and generator<VAR> g</VAR> (explained - under<A href="#dlog"> discrete log</A> below), Alice:</P> -<UL> -<LI>generates a random number<VAR> a</VAR></LI> -<LI>calculates<VAR> A = g^a modulo p</VAR></LI> -<LI>sends<VAR> A</VAR> to Bob</LI> -</UL> -<P>Meanwhile Bob:</P> -<UL> -<LI>generates a random number<VAR> b</VAR></LI> -<LI>calculates<VAR> B = g^b modulo p</VAR></LI> -<LI>sends<VAR> B</VAR> to Alice</LI> -</UL> -<P>Now Alice and Bob can both calculate the shared secret<VAR> s = - g^(ab)</VAR>. Alice knows<VAR> a</VAR> and<VAR> B</VAR>, so she - calculates<VAR> s = B^a</VAR>. Bob knows<VAR> A</VAR> and<VAR> b</VAR> - so he calculates<VAR> s = A^b</VAR>.</P> -<P>An eavesdropper will know<VAR> p</VAR> and<VAR> g</VAR> since these - are made public, and can intercept<VAR> A</VAR> and<VAR> B</VAR> but, - short of solving the<A href="#dlog"> discrete log</A> problem, these do - not let him or her discover the secret<VAR> s</VAR>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="signature">Digital signature</A></DT> -<DD>Sender: -<UL> -<LI>calculates a<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> of a document</LI> -<LI>encrypts the digest with his or her private key, using some<A href="#public"> - public key cryptosystem</A>.</LI> -<LI>attaches the encrypted digest to the document as a signature</LI> -</UL> -<P>Receiver:</P> -<UL> -<LI>calculates a digest of the document (not including the signature)</LI> -<LI>decrypts the signature with the signer's public key</LI> -<LI>verifies that the two results are identical</LI> -</UL> -<P>If the public-key system is secure and the verification succeeds, - then the receiver knows</P> -<UL> -<LI>that the document was not altered between signing and verification</LI> -<LI>that the signer had access to the private key</LI> -</UL> -<P>Such an encrypted message digest can be treated as a signature since - it cannot be created without<EM> both</EM> the document<EM> and</EM> - the private key which only the sender should possess. The<A href="#legal"> - legal issues</A> are complex, but several countries are moving in the - direction of legal recognition for digital signatures.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="dlog">discrete logarithm problem</A></DT> -<DD>The problem of finding logarithms in a finite field. Given a field - defintion (such definitions always include some operation analogous to - multiplication) and two numbers, a base and a target, find the power - which the base must be raised to in order to yield the target. -<P>The discrete log problem is the basis of several cryptographic - systems, including the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchange - used in the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> protocol. The useful property is - that exponentiation is relatively easy but the inverse operation, - finding the logarithm, is hard. The cryptosystems are designed so that - the user does only easy operations (exponentiation in the field) but an - attacker must solve the hard problem (discrete log) to crack the - system.</P> -<P>There are several variants of the problem for different types of - field. The IKE/Oakley key determination protocol uses two variants, - either over a field modulo a prime or over a field defined by an - elliptic curve. We give an example modulo a prime below. For the - elliptic curve version, consult an advanced text such as<A href="#handbook"> - Handbook of Applied Cryptography</A>.</P> -<P>Given a prime<VAR> p</VAR>, a generator<VAR> g</VAR> for the field - modulo that prime, and a number<VAR> x</VAR> in the field, the problem - is to find<VAR> y</VAR> such that<VAR> g^y = x</VAR>.</P> -<P>For example, let p = 13. The field is then the integers from 0 to 12. - Any integer equals one of these modulo 13. That is, the remainder when - any integer is divided by 13 must be one of these.</P> -<P>2 is a generator for this field. That is, the powers of two modulo 13 - run through all the non-zero numbers in the field. Modulo 13 we have:</P> -<PRE> y x - 2^0 == 1 - 2^1 == 2 - 2^2 == 4 - 2^3 == 8 - 2^4 == 3 that is, the remainder from 16/13 is 3 - 2^5 == 6 the remainder from 32/13 is 6 - 2^6 == 12 and so on - 2^7 == 11 - 2^8 == 9 - 2^9 == 5 - 2^10 == 10 - 2^11 == 7 - 2^12 == 1</PRE> -<P>Exponentiation in such a field is not difficult. Given, say,<NOBR><VAR> - y = 11</VAR>,calculating<NOBR><VAR> x = 7</VAR>is straightforward. One - method is just to calculate<NOBR><VAR> 2^11 = 2048</VAR>,then<NOBR><VAR> - 2048 mod 13 == 7</VAR>.When the field is modulo a large prime (say a - few 100 digits) you need a silghtly cleverer method and even that is - moderately expensive in computer time, but the calculation is still not - problematic in any basic way.</P> -<P>The discrete log problem is the reverse. In our example, given<NOBR><VAR> - x = 7</VAR>,find the logarithm<NOBR><VAR> y = 11</VAR>.When the field - is modulo a large prime (or is based on a suitable elliptic curve), - this is indeed problematic. No solution method that is not - catastrophically expensive is known. Quite a few mathematicians have - tackled this problem. No efficient method has been found and - mathematicians do not expect that one will be. It seems likely no - efficient solution to either of the main variants the discrete log - problem exists.</P> -<P>Note, however, that no-one has proven such methods do not exist. If a - solution to either variant were found, the security of any crypto - system using that variant would be destroyed. This is one reason<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A> supports two variants. If one is broken, we can switch to the - other.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="discretionary">discretionary access control</A></DT> -<DD>access control mechanisms controlled by the user, for example Unix - rwx file permissions. These contrast with<A href="#mandatory"> - mandatory access controls</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="DNS">DNS</A></DT> -<DD><B>D</B>omain<B> N</B>ame<B> S</B>ervice, a distributed database - through which names are associated with numeric addresses and other - information in the Internet Protocol Suite. See also the<A href="#dns.background"> - DNS background</A> section of our documentation.</DD> -<DT>DOS attack</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#DOS"> Denial Of Service</A> attack</DD> -<DT><A name="dynamic">dynamic IP address</A></DT> -<DD>an IP address which is automatically assigned, either by<A href="#DHCP"> - DHCP</A> or by some protocol such as<A href="#PPP"> PPP</A> or<A href="#PPPoE"> - PPPoE</A> which the machine uses to connect to the Internet. This is - the opposite of a<A href="#static"> static IP address</A>, pre-set on - the machine itself.</DD> -<DT><A name="E">E</A></DT> -<DT><A name="EAR">EAR</A></DT> -<DD>The US government's<B> E</B>xport<B> A</B>dministration<B> R</B> -egulations, administered by the<A href="#BXA"> Bureau of Export - Administration</A>. These have replaced the earlier<A href="#ITAR"> - ITAR</A> regulations as the controls on export of cryptography.</DD> -<DT><A name="ECB">ECB mode</A></DT> -<DD><B>E</B>lectronic<B> C</B>ode<B>B</B>ook mode, the simplest way to - use a block cipher. See<A href="#mode"> Cipher Modes</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="EDE">EDE</A></DT> -<DD>The sequence of operations normally used in either the three-key - variant of<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A> used in<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> or the<A href="#2key"> two-key</A> variant used in some other - systems. -<P>The sequence is:</P> -<UL> -<LI><B>E</B>ncrypt with key1</LI> -<LI><B>D</B>ecrypt with key2</LI> -<LI><B>E</B>ncrypt with key3</LI> -</UL> -<P>For the two-key version, key1=key3.</P> -<P>The "advantage" of this EDE order of operations is that it makes it - simple to interoperate with older devices offering only single DES. Set - key1=key2=key3 and you have the worst of both worlds, the overhead of - triple DES with the "security" of single DES. Since both the<A href="#desnotsecure"> - security of single DES</A> and the overheads of triple DES are - seriously inferior to many other ciphers, this is a spectacularly - dubious "advantage".</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="Entrust">Entrust</A></DT> -<DD>A Canadian company offerring enterprise<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - products using<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> symmetric crypto,<A href="#RSA"> - RSA</A> public key and<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> directories.<A href="http://www.entrust.com"> - Web site</A></DD> -<DT><A name="EFF">EFF</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.eff.org">Electronic Frontier Foundation</A>, an - advocacy group for civil rights in cyberspace.</DD> -<DT><A name="encryption">Encryption</A></DT> -<DD>Techniques for converting a readable message (<A href="#plaintext"> -plaintext</A>) into apparently random material (<A href="#ciphertext"> -ciphertext</A>) which cannot be read if intercepted. A key is required - to read the message. -<P>Major variants include<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric</A> encryption - in which sender and receiver use the same secret key and<A href="#public"> - public key</A> methods in which the sender uses one of a matched pair - of keys and the receiver uses the other. Many current systems, - including<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A>, are<A href="#hybrid"> hybrids</A> - combining the two techniques.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="ESP">ESP</A></DT> -<DD><B>E</B>ncapsulated<B> S</B>ecurity<B> P</B>ayload, the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> protocol which provides<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A>. - It can also provide<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> - service and may be used with null encryption (which we do not - recommend). For details see our<A href="#ESP.ipsec"> IPsec</A> document - and/or RFC 2406.</DD> -<DT><A name="#extruded">Extruded subnet</A></DT> -<DD>A situation in which something IP sees as one network is actually in - two or more places. -<P>For example, the Internet may route all traffic for a particular - company to that firm's corporate gateway. It then becomes the company's - problem to get packets to various machines on their<A href="#subnet"> - subnets</A> in various departments. They may decide to treat a branch - office like a subnet, giving it IP addresses "on" their corporate net. - This becomes an extruded subnet.</P> -<P>Packets bound for it are delivered to the corporate gateway, since as - far as the outside world is concerned, that subnet is part of the - corporate network. However, instead of going onto the corporate LAN (as - they would for, say, the accounting department) they are then - encapsulated and sent back onto the Internet for delivery to the branch - office.</P> -<P>For information on doing this with Linux FreeS/WAN, look in our<A href="#extruded.config"> - advanced configuration</A> section.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Exhaustive search</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#brute"> brute force attack</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="F">F</A></DT> -<DT><A name="FIPS">FIPS</A></DT> -<DD><B>F</B>ederal<B> I</B>nformation<B> P</B>rocessing<B> S</B>tandard, - the US government's standards for products it buys. These are issued by<A -href="#NIST"> NIST</A>. Among other things,<A href="#DES"> DES</A> and<A href="#SHA"> - SHA</A> are defined in FIPS documents. NIST have a<A href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs"> - FIPS home page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="FSF">Free Software Foundation (FSF)</A></DT> -<DD>An organisation to promote free software, free in the sense of these - quotes from their web pages</DD> -<DD><BLOCKQUOTE> "Free software" is a matter of liberty, not price. To - understand the concept, you should think of "free speech", not "free - beer." -<P>"Free software" refers to the users' freedom to run, copy, - distribute, study, change and improve the software.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>See also<A href="#GNU"> GNU</A>,<A href="#GPL"> GNU General Public - License</A>, and<A href="http://www.fsf.org"> the FSF site</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>FreeS/WAN</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A></DD> -<DT><A name="fullnet">Fullnet</A></DT> -<DD>The CIDR block containing all IPs of its IP version. The<A HREF="#IPv4"> - IPv4</A> fullnet is written 0.0.0.0/0. Also known as "all" and - "default", fullnet may be used in a routing table to specify a default - route, and in a FreeS/WAN<A HREF="#policygroups"> policy group</A> file - to specify a default IPsec policy.</DD> -<DT>FSF</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#FSF"> Free software Foundation</A></DD> -<DT><A name="G">G</A></DT> -<DT><A name="GCHQ">GCHQ</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.gchq.gov.uk">Government Communications - Headquarters</A>, the British organisation for<A href="#SIGINT"> - signals intelligence</A>.</DD> -<DT>generator of a prime field</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithm problem</A></DD> -<DT><A name="GILC">GILC</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.gilc.org">Global Internet Liberty Campaign</A>, - an international organisation advocating, among other things, free - availability of cryptography. They have a<A href="http://www.gilc.org/crypto/wassenaar"> - campaign</A> to remove cryptographic software from the<A href="#Wassenaar.gloss"> - Wassenaar Arrangement</A>.</DD> -<DT>Global Internet Liberty Campaign</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#GILC"> GILC</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="GTR">Global Trust Register</A></DT> -<DD>An attempt to create something like a<A href="#rootCA"> root CA</A> - for<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> by publishing both<A href="#GTR"> as a book</A> - and<A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Trust-Register"> - on the web</A> the fingerprints of a set of verified keys for - well-known users and organisations.</DD> -<DT><A name="GMP">GMP</A></DT> -<DD>The<B> G</B>NU<B> M</B>ulti-<B>P</B>recision library code, used in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> by<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> for<A href="#public"> - public key</A> calculations. See the<A href="http://www.swox.com/gmp"> - GMP home page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="GNU">GNU</A></DT> -<DD><B>G</B>NU's<B> N</B>ot<B> U</B>nix, the<A href="#FSF"> Free - Software Foundation's</A> project aimed at creating a free system with - at least the capabilities of Unix.<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A> uses GNU - utilities extensively.</DD> -<DT><A name="#GOST">GOST</A></DT> -<DD>a Soviet government standard<A href="#block"> block cipher</A>.<A href="#schneier"> - Applied Cryptography</A> has details.</DD> -<DT>GPG</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#GPG"> GNU Privacy Guard</A></DD> -<DT><A name="GPL">GNU General Public License</A>(GPL, copyleft)</DT> -<DD>The license developed by the<A href="#FSF"> Free Software Foundation</A> - under which<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A>,<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux - FreeS/WAN</A> and many other pieces of software are distributed. The - license allows anyone to redistribute and modify the code, but forbids - anyone from distributing executables without providing access to source - code. For more details see the file<A href="../COPYING"> COPYING</A> - included with GPLed source distributions, including ours, or<A href="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html"> - the GNU site's GPL page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="GPG">GNU Privacy Guard</A></DT> -<DD>An open source implementation of Open<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> as - defined in RFC 2440. See their<A href="http://www.gnupg.org"> web site</A> -</DD> -<DT>GPL</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#GPL"> GNU General Public License</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="H">H</A></DT> -<DT><A name="hash">Hash</A></DT> -<DD>see<A href="#digest"> message digest</A></DD> -<DT><A name="HMAC">Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)</A></DT> -<DD>using keyed<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> functions to - authenticate a message. This differs from other uses of these - functions: -<UL> -<LI>In normal usage, the hash function's internal variable are - initialised in some standard way. Anyone can reproduce the hash to - check that the message has not been altered.</LI> -<LI>For HMAC usage, you initialise the internal variables from the key. - Only someone with the key can reproduce the hash. A successful check of - the hash indicates not only that the message is unchanged but also that - the creator knew the key.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The exact techniques used in<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> are defined - in RFC 2104. They are referred to as HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 - because they output only 96 bits of the hash. This makes some attacks - on the hash functions harder.</P> -</DD> -<DT>HMAC</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#HMAC"> Hashed Message Authentication Code</A></DD> -<DT>HMAC-MD5-96</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#HMAC"> Hashed Message Authentication Code</A></DD> -<DT>HMAC-SHA-96</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#HMAC"> Hashed Message Authentication Code</A></DD> -<DT><A name="hybrid">Hybrid cryptosystem</A></DT> -<DD>A system using both<A href="#public"> public key</A> and<A href="#symmetric"> - symmetric cipher</A> techniques. This works well. Public key methods - provide key management and<A href="#signature"> digital signature</A> - facilities which are not readily available using symmetric ciphers. The - symmetric cipher, however, can do the bulk of the encryption work much - more efficiently than public key methods.</DD> -<DT><A name="I">I</A></DT> -<DT><A name="IAB">IAB</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.iab.org/iab">Internet Architecture Board</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="ICMP.gloss">ICMP</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>I</STRONG>nternet<STRONG> C</STRONG>ontrol<STRONG> M</STRONG> -essage<STRONG> P</STRONG>rotocol. This is used for various IP-connected - devices to manage the network.</DD> -<DT><A name="IDEA">IDEA</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternational<B> D</B>ata<B> E</B>ncrypion<B> A</B>lgorithm, - developed in Europe as an alternative to exportable American ciphers - such as<A href="#DES"> DES</A> which were<A href="#desnotsecure"> too - weak for serious use</A>. IDEA is a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> - using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys, and is used in products such as<A href="#PGP"> - PGP</A>. -<P>IDEA is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -<P>IDEA is patented and, with strictly limited exceptions for personal - use, using it requires a license from<A href="http://www.ascom.com"> - Ascom</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="IEEE">IEEE</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.ieee.org">Institute of Electrical and Electronic - Engineers</A>, a professional association which, among other things, - sets some technical standards</DD> -<DT><A name="IESG">IESG</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.iesg.org">Internet Engineering Steering Group</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A name="IETF">IETF</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.ietf.org">Internet Engineering Task Force</A>, - the umbrella organisation whose various working groups make most of the - technical decisions for the Internet. The IETF<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - IPsec working group</A> wrote the<A href="#RFC"> RFCs</A> we are - implementing.</DD> -<DT><A name="IKE">IKE</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> K</B>ey<B> E</B>xchange, based on the<A href="#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchange protocol. For details, see RFC 2409 and - our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec</A> document. IKE is implemented in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> by the<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto daemon</A>.</DD> -<DT>IKE v2</DT> -<DD>A proposed replacement for<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A>. There are other - candidates, such as<A href="#JFK"> JFK</A>, and at time of writing - (March 2002) the choice between them has not yet been made and does not - appear imminent.</DD> -<DT><A name="iOE">iOE</A></DT> -<DD>See<A HREF="#initiate-only"> Initiate-only opportunistic encryption</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A name="IP">IP</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> P</B>rotocol.</DD> -<DT><A name="masq">IP masquerade</A></DT> -<DD>A mostly obsolete term for a method of allowing multiple machines to - communicate over the Internet when only one IP address is available for - their use. The more current term is Network Address Translation or<A href="#NAT.gloss"> - NAT</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="IPng">IPng</A></DT> -<DD>"IP the Next Generation", see<A href="#ipv6.gloss"> IPv6</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="IPv4">IPv4</A></DT> -<DD>The current version of the<A href="#IP"> Internet protocol suite</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A name="ipv6.gloss">IPv6 (IPng)</A></DT> -<DD>Version six of the<A href="#IP"> Internet protocol suite</A>, - currently being developed. It will replace the current<A href="#IPv4"> - version four</A>. IPv6 has<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> as a mandatory - component. -<P>See this<A href="http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main.html"> - web site</A> for more details, and our<A href="#ipv6"> compatibility</A> - document for information on FreeS/WAN and the Linux implementation of - IPv6.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="IPSEC">IPsec</A> or IPSEC</DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> P</B>rotocol<B> SEC</B>urity, security functions - (<A href="#authentication">authentication</A> and<A href="#encryption"> - encryption</A>) implemented at the IP level of the protocol stack. It - is optional for<A href="#IPv4"> IPv4</A> and mandatory for<A href="#ipv6.gloss"> - IPv6</A>. -<P>This is the standard<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> is - implementing. For more details, see our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec - Overview</A>. For the standards, see RFCs listed in our<A href="#RFC"> - RFCs document</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="IPX">IPX</A></DT> -<DD>Novell's Netware protocol tunnelled over an IP link. Our<A href="#user.scripts"> - firewalls</A> document includes an example of using this through an - IPsec tunnel.</DD> -<DT><A name="ISAKMP">ISAKMP</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> S</B>ecurity<B> A</B>ssociation and<B> K</B>ey<B> - M</B>anagement<B> P</B>rotocol, defined in RFC 2408.</DD> -<DT><A name="ITAR">ITAR</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternational<B> T</B>raffic in<B> A</B>rms<B> R</B> -egulations, US regulations administered by the State Department which - until recently limited export of, among other things, cryptographic - technology and software. ITAR still exists, but the limits on - cryptography have now been transferred to the<A href="#EAR"> Export - Administration Regulations</A> under the Commerce Department's<A href="#BXA"> - Bureau of Export Administration</A>.</DD> -<DT>IV</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#IV"> Initialisation vector</A></DD> -<DT><A name="IV">Initialisation Vector (IV)</A></DT> -<DD>Some cipher<A href="#mode"> modes</A>, including the<A href="#CBC"> - CBC</A> mode which IPsec uses, require some extra data at the - beginning. This data is called the initialisation vector. It need not - be secret, but should be different for each message. Its function is to - prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the - same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best - prevented.</DD> -<DT><A name="initiate-only">Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)</A> -</DT> -<DD>A form of<A HREF="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A> (OE) in - which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse - DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection - requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the - system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map - for the host's external IP. -<P>Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described - in our<A href="#opp.client"> quickstart</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="J">J</A></DT> -<DT><A name="JFK">JFK</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>J</STRONG>ust<STRONG> F</STRONG>ast<STRONG> K</STRONG>eying, - a proposed simpler replacement for<A href="#IKE"> IKE.</A></DD> -<DT><A name="K">K</A></DT> -<DT><A name="kernel">Kernel</A></DT> -<DD>The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls - the hardware and provides services to all other programs. -<P>In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.<STRONG> -2</STRONG>.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number - as in 2.<STRONG>3</STRONG>.x indicates an experimental or development - kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the - production series. The development kernels are primarily for people - doing kernel development. Others should consider using development - kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet - available in production kernels.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Keyed message digest</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A>.</DD> -<DT>Key length</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#brute"> brute force attack</A></DD> -<DT><A name="KLIPS">KLIPS</A></DT> -<DD><B>K</B>erne<B>l</B><B> IP</B><B> S</B>ecurity, the<A href="#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> project's changes to the<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A> - kernel to support the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> protocols.</DD> -<DT><A name="L">L</A></DT> -<DT><A name="LDAP">LDAP</A></DT> -<DD><B>L</B>ightweight<B> D</B>irectory<B> A</B>ccess<B> P</B>rotocol, - defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored - in directories. LDAP is used by several<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - implementations, often with X.501 directories and<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> - certificates. It may also be used by<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> to - obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented - in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="LIBDES">LIBDES</A></DT> -<DD>A publicly available library of<A href="#DES"> DES</A> code, written - by Eric Young, which<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> uses in - both<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> and<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="Linux">Linux</A></DT> -<DD>A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel - originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student - Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the<A href="#GNU"> - GNU</A> utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many - others led to explosive growth. -<P>Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU - architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC - and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple - CPUs on some architectures.</P> -<P><A href="#FreeSWAN">Linux FreeS/WAN</A> is intended to run on all - CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our<A href="#CPUs"> - compatibility</A> section for a list.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="FreeSWAN">Linux FreeS/WAN</A></DT> -<DD>Our implementation of the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> protocols, - intended to be freely redistributable source code with<A href="#GPL"> a - GNU GPL license</A> and no constraints under US or other<A href="#exlaw"> - export laws</A>. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other<A -href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> implementations. The name is partly taken, with - permission, from the<A href="#SWAN"> S/WAN</A> multi-vendor IPsec - compatability effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,<A href="#KLIPS"> - KLIPS</A> (KerneL IPsec Support) and the<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> - daemon which manages the whole thing. -<P>See our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec section</A> for more detail. For - the code see our<A href="http://freeswan.org"> primary site</A> or one - of the mirror sites on<A href="#mirrors"> this list</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="LSM">Linux Security Modules (LSM)</A></DT> -<DD>a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports - plug-in modules for various security policies. -<P>This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches - to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular - approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing - Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were - incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your - houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".</P> -<P>It seems to be working. There is a fairly active<A href="http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module"> - LSM mailing list</A>, and several projects are already using the - interface.</P> -</DD> -<DT>LSM</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#LSM"> Linux Security Modules</A></DD> -<DT><A name="M">M</A></DT> -<DT><A name="list">Mailing list</A></DT> -<DD>The<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> project has several - public email lists for bug reports and software development - discussions. See our document on<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="middle">Man-in-the-middle attack</A></DT> -<DD>An<A href="#active"> active attack</A> in which the attacker - impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other. -<P>For example, if<A href="#alicebob"> Alice and Bob</A> are negotiating - a key via the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement, and are - not using<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> to be certain - they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself - in the communication path can deceive both players.</P> -<P>Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For - Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated, - Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key - they have is Alice-to-Bob.</P> -<P>A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it, - reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key - and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply - which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.</P> -<P>To make this attack effective, Mallory must</P> -<UL> -<LI>subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out - the deception -<BR> possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server, - ...</LI> -<LI>beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use -<BR> strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A> requires authentication</LI> -<LI>work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay - large enough to alert the victims -<BR> not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some - situations.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to - read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge - anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication - completely.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="mandatory">mandatory access control</A></DT> -<DD>access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see<A href="#discretionary"> - discretionary access control</A>), but are enforced by the system. -<P>For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable - only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra. - Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries. - For example, even if you can read it, you should not be able to e-mail - it (unless the recipient is appropriately cleared) or print it (unless - certain printers are authorised for that classification).</P> -<P>Mandatory access control is a required feature for some levels of<A href="#rainbow"> - Rainbow Book</A> or<A href="#cc"> Common Criteria</A> classification, - but has not been widely used outside the military and government. There - is a good discussion of the issues in Anderson's<A href="#anderson"> - Security Engineering</A>.</P> -<P>The<A href="#SElinux"> Security Enhanced Linux</A> project is adding - mandatory access control to Linux.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="manual">Manual keying</A></DT> -<DD>An IPsec mode in which the keys are provided by the administrator. - In FreeS/WAN, they are stored in /etc/ipsec.conf. The alternative,<A href="#auto"> - automatic keying</A>, is preferred in most cases. See this<A href="#man-auto"> - discussion</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="MD4">MD4</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#digest">Message Digest Algorithm</A> Four from Ron Rivest - of<A href="#RSAco"> RSA</A>. MD4 was widely used a few years ago, but - is now considered obsolete. It has been replaced by its descendants<A href="#MD5"> - MD5</A> and<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="MD5">MD5</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#digest">Message Digest Algorithm</A> Five from Ron Rivest - of<A href="#RSAco"> RSA</A>, an improved variant of his<A href="#MD4"> - MD4</A>. Like MD4, it produces a 128-bit hash. For details see RFC - 1321. -<P>MD5 is one of two message digest algorithms available in IPsec. The - other is<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A>. SHA produces a longer hash and is - therefore more resistant to<A href="#birthday"> birthday attacks</A>, - but this is not a concern for IPsec. The<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A> - method used in IPsec is secure even if the underlying hash is not - particularly strong against this attack.</P> -<P>Hans Dobbertin found a weakness in MD5, and people often ask whether - this means MD5 is unsafe for IPsec. It doesn't. The IPsec RFCs discuss - Dobbertin's attack and conclude that it does not affect MD5 as used for - HMAC in IPsec.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="meet">Meet-in-the-middle attack</A></DT> -<DD>A divide-and-conquer attack which breaks a cipher into two parts, - works against each separately, and compares results. Probably the best - known example is an attack on double DES. This applies in principle to - any pair of block ciphers, e.g. to an encryption system using, say, - CAST-128 and Blowfish, but we will describe it for double DES. -<P>Double DES encryption and decryption can be written:</P> -<PRE> C = E(k2,E(k1,P)) - P = D(k1,D(k2,C))</PRE> -<P>Where C is ciphertext, P is plaintext, E is encryption, D is - decryption, k1 is one key, and k2 is the other key. If we know a P, C - pair, we can try and find the keys with a brute force attack, trying - all possible k1, k2 pairs. Since each key is 56 bits, there are 2<SUP> -112</SUP> such pairs and this attack is painfully inefficient.</P> -<P>The meet-in-the middle attack re-writes the equations to calculate a - middle value M:</P> -<PRE> M = E(k1,P) - M = D(k2,C)</PRE> -<P>Now we can try some large number of D(k2,C) decryptions with various - values of k2 and store the results in a table. Then start doing E(k1,P) - encryptions, checking each result to see if it is in the table.</P> -<P>With enough table space, this breaks double DES with<NOBR> 2<SUP>56</SUP> - + 2<SUP>56</SUP> = 2<SUP>57</SUP>work. Against triple DES, you need<NOBR> - 2<SUP>56</SUP> + 2<SUP>112</SUP> ~= 2<SUP>112</SUP>.</P> -<P>The memory requirements for such attacks can be prohibitive, but - there is a whole body of research literature on methods of reducing - them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="digest">Message Digest Algorithm</A></DT> -<DD>An algorithm which takes a message as input and produces a hash or - digest of it, a fixed-length set of bits which depend on the message - contents in some highly complex manner. Design criteria include making - it extremely difficult for anyone to counterfeit a digest or to change - a message without altering its digest. One essential property is<A href="#collision"> - collision resistance</A>. The main applications are in message<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> and<A href="#signature"> digital signature</A> - schemes. Widely used algorithms include<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> and<A href="#SHA"> - SHA</A>. In IPsec, message digests are used for<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A> - authentication of packets.</DD> -<DT><A name="MTU">MTU</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>M</STRONG>aximum<STRONG> T</STRONG>ransmission<STRONG> U</STRONG> -nit, the largest size of packet that can be sent over a link. This is - determined by the underlying network, but must be taken account of at - the IP level. -<P>IP packets, which can be up to 64K bytes each, must be packaged into - lower-level packets of the appropriate size for the underlying - network(s) and re-assembled on the other end. When a packet must pass - over multiple networks, each with its own MTU, and many of the MTUs are - unknown to the sender, this becomes a fairly complex problem. See<A href="#pathMTU"> - path MTU discovery</A> for details.</P> -<P>Often the MTU is a few hundred bytes on serial links and 1500 on - Ethernet. There are, however, serial link protocols which use a larger - MTU to avoid fragmentation at the ethernet/serial boundary, and newer - (especially gigabit) Ethernet networks sometimes support much larger - packets because these are more efficient in some applications.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="N">N</A></DT> -<DT><A name="NAI">NAI</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.nai.com">Network Associates</A>, a conglomerate - formed from<A href="#PGPI"> PGP Inc.</A>, TIS (Trusted Information - Systems, a firewall vendor) and McAfee anti-virus products. Among other - things, they offer an IPsec-based VPN product.</DD> -<DT><A name="NAT.gloss">NAT</A></DT> -<DD><B>N</B>etwork<B> A</B>ddress<B> T</B>ranslation, a process by which - firewall machines may change the addresses on packets as they go - through. For discussion, see our<A href="#nat.background"> background</A> - section.</DD> -<DT><A name="NIST">NIST</A></DT> -<DD>The US<A href="http://www.nist.gov"> National Institute of Standards - and Technology</A>, responsible for<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS standards</A> - including<A href="#DES"> DES</A> and its replacement,<A href="#AES"> - AES</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="nonce">Nonce</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#random"> random</A> value used in an<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> protocol.</DD> -<DT></DT> -<DT><A name="non-routable">Non-routable IP address</A></DT> -<DD>An IP address not normally allowed in the "to" or "from" IP address - field header of IP packets. -<P>Almost invariably, the phrase "non-routable address" means one of the - addresses reserved by RFC 1918 for private networks:</P> -<UL> -<LI>10.anything</LI> -<LI>172.x.anything with 16 <= x <= 31</LI> -<LI>192.168.anything</LI> -</UL> -<P>These addresses are commonly used on private networks, e.g. behind a - Linux machines doing<A href="#masq"> IP masquerade</A>. Machines within - the private network can address each other with these addresses. All - packets going outside that network, however, have these addresses - replaced before they reach the Internet.</P> -<P>If any packets using these addresses do leak out, they do not go far. - Most routers automatically discard all such packets.</P> -<P>Various other addresses -- the 127.0.0.0/8 block reserved for local - use, 0.0.0.0, various broadcast and network addresses -- cannot be - routed over the Internet, but are not normally included in the meaning - when the phrase "non-routable address" is used.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="NSA">NSA</A></DT> -<DD>The US<A href="http://www.nsa.gov"> National Security Agency</A>, - the American organisation for<A href="#SIGINT"> signals intelligence</A> -, the protection of US government messages and the interception and - analysis of other messages. For details, see Bamford's<A href="#puzzle"> - "The Puzzle Palace"</A>. -<P>Some<A href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html"> - history of NSA</A> documents were declassified in response to a FOIA - (Freedom of Information Act) request.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="O">O</A></DT> -<DT><A name="oakley">Oakley</A></DT> -<DD>A key determination protocol, defined in RFC 2412.</DD> -<DT>Oakley groups</DT> -<DD>The groups used as the basis of<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key - exchange in the Oakley protocol, and in<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A>. Four - were defined in the original RFC, and a fifth has been<A href="http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html"> - added since</A>. -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN currently supports the three groups based on finite - fields modulo a prime (Groups 1, 2 and 5) and does not support the - elliptic curve groups (3 and 4). For a description of the difference of - the types, see<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithms</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="OTP">One time pad</A></DT> -<DD>A cipher in which the key is: -<UL> -<LI>as long as the total set of messages to be enciphered</LI> -<LI>absolutely<A href="#random"> random</A></LI> -<LI>never re-used</LI> -</UL> -<P>Given those three conditions, it can easily be proved that the cipher - is perfectly secure, in the sense that an attacker with intercepted - message in hand has no better chance of guessing the message than an - attacker who has not intercepted the message and only knows the message - length. No such proof exists for any other cipher.</P> -<P>There are, however, several problems with this "perfect" cipher.</P> -<P>First, it is<STRONG> wildly impractical</STRONG> for most - applications. Key management is at best difficult, often completely - impossible.</P> -<P>Second, it is<STRONG> extremely fragile</STRONG>. Small changes which - violate the conditions listed above do not just weaken the cipher - liitle. Quite often they destroy its security completely.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Re-using the pad weakens the cipher to the point where it can be - broken with pencil and paper. With a computer, the attack is trivially - easy.</LI> -<LI>Using<EM> anything</EM> less than truly<A href="#random"> random</A> - numbers<EM> completely</EM> invalidates the security proof.</LI> -<LI>In particular, using computer-generated pseudo-random numbers may - give an extremely weak cipher. It might also produce a good stream - cipher, if the pseudo-random generator is both well-designed and - properely seeded.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Marketing claims about the "unbreakable" security of various products - which somewhat resemble one-time pads are common. Such claims are one - of the surest signs of cryptographic<A href="#snake"> snake oil</A>; - most systems marketed with such claims are worthless.</P> -<P>Finally, even if the system is implemented and used correctly, it is<STRONG> - highly vulnerable to a substitution attack</STRONG>. If an attacker - knows some plaintext and has an intercepted message, he can discover - the pad.</P> -<UL> -<LI>This does not matter if the attacker is just a<A href="#passive"> - passive</A> eavesdropper. It gives him no plaintext he didn't already - know and we don't care that he learns a pad which we will never re-use.</LI> -<LI>However, an<A href="#active"> active</A> attacker who knows the - plaintext can recover the pad, then use it to encode with whatever he - chooses. If he can get his version delivered instead of yours, this may - be a disaster. If you send "attack at dawn", the delivered message can - be anything the same length -- perhaps "retreat to east" or "shoot - generals".</LI> -<LI>An active attacker with only a reasonable guess at the plaintext can - try the same attack. If the guess is correct, this works and the - attacker's bogus message is delivered. If the guess is wrong, a garbled - message is delivered.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In general then, despite its theoretical perfection, the one-time-pad - has very limited practical application.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="http://pubweb.nfr.net/~mjr/pubs/otpfaq/"> one - time pad FAQ</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="carpediem">Opportunistic encryption (OE)</A></DT> -<DD>A situation in which any two IPsec-aware machines can secure their - communications, without a pre-shared secret and without a common<A href="#PKI"> - PKI</A> or previous exchange of public keys. This is one of the goals - of the Linux FreeS/WAN project, discussed in our<A href="#goals"> - introduction</A> section. -<P>Setting up for opportunistic encryption is described in our<A href="#quickstart"> - quickstart</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="responder">Opportunistic responder</A></DT> -<DD>A host which accepts, but does not initiate, requests for<A HREF="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> (OE). An opportunistic responder has - enabled OE in its<A HREF="#passive.OE"> passive</A> form (pOE) only. A - web server or file server may be usefully set up as an opportunistic - responder. -<P>Configuring passive OE is described in our<A href="#policygroups"> - policy groups</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="orange">Orange book</A></DT> -<DD>the most basic and best known of the US government's<A href="#rainbow"> - Rainbow Book</A> series of computer security standards.</DD> -<DT><A name="P">P</A></DT> -<DT><A name="P1363">P1363 standard</A></DT> -<DD>An<A href="#IEEE"> IEEE</A> standard for public key cryptography.<A href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363"> - Web page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="pOE">pOE</A></DT> -<DD>See<A href="#passive.OE"> Passive opportunistic encryption</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="passive">Passive attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack in which the attacker only eavesdrops and attempts to - analyse intercepted messages, as opposed to an<A href="#active"> active - attack</A> in which he diverts messages or generates his own.</DD> -<DT><A name="passive.OE">Passive opportunistic encryption (pOE)</A></DT> -<DD>A form of<A HREF="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A> (OE) in - which the host will accept opportunistic connection requests, but will - not initiate such requests. A host which runs OE in its passive form - only is known as an<A HREF="#responder"> opportunistic responder</A>. -<P>Configuring passive OE is described in our<A href="#policygroups"> - policy groups</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="pathMTU">Path MTU discovery</A></DT> -<DD>The process of discovering the largest packet size which all links - on a path can handle without fragmentation -- that is, without any - router having to break the packet up into smaller pieces to match the<A href="#MTU"> - MTU</A> of its outgoing link. -<P>This is done as follows:</P> -<UL> -<LI>originator sends the largest packets allowed by<A href="#MTU"> MTU</A> - of the first link, setting the DF (<STRONG>d</STRONG>on't<STRONG> f</STRONG> -ragment) bit in the packet header</LI> -<LI>any router which cannot send the packet on (outgoing MTU is too - small for it, and DF prevents fragmenting it to match) sends back an<A href="#ICMP.gloss"> - ICMP</A> packet reporting the problem</LI> -<LI>originator looks at ICMP message and tries a smaller size</LI> -<LI>eventually, you settle on a size that can pass all routers</LI> -<LI>thereafter, originator just sends that size and no-one has to - fragment</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since this requires co-operation of many systems, and since the next - packet may travel a different path, this is one of the trickier areas - of IP programming. Bugs that have shown up over the years have - included:</P> -<UL> -<LI>malformed ICMP messages</LI> -<LI>hosts that ignore or mishandle these ICMP messages</LI> -<LI>firewalls blocking the ICMP messages so host does not see them</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since IPsec adds a header, it increases packet size and may require - fragmentation even where incoming and outgoing MTU are equal.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="PFS">Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)</A></DT> -<DD>A property of systems such as<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key - exchange which use a long-term key (such as the shared secret in IKE) - and generate short-term keys as required. If an attacker who acquires - the long-term key<EM> provably</EM> can -<UL> -<LI><EM>neither</EM> read previous messages which he may have archived</LI> -<LI><EM>nor</EM> read future messages without performing additional - successful attacks</LI> -</UL> -<P>then the system has PFS. The attacker needs the short-term keys in - order to read the trafiic and merely having the long-term key does not - allow him to infer those. Of course, it may allow him to conduct - another attack (such as<A href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle</A>) which - gives him some short-term keys, but he does not automatically get them - just by acquiring the long-term key.</P> -<P>See also<A href="http://sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1996/08/msg00123.html"> - Phil Karn's definition</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>PFS</DT> -<DD>see Perfect Forward Secrecy</DD> -<DT><A name="PGP">PGP</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>retty<B> G</B>ood<B> P</B>rivacy, a personal encryption - system for email based on public key technology, written by Phil - Zimmerman. -<P>The 2.xx versions of PGP used the<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> public key - algorithm and used<A href="#IDEA"> IDEA</A> as the symmetric cipher. - These versions are described in RFC 1991 and in<A href="#PGP"> - Garfinkel's book</A>. Since version 5, the products from<A href="#PGPI"> - PGP Inc</A>. have used<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> public key - methods and<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> symmetric encryption. These - can verify signatures from the 2.xx versions, but cannot exchange - encryted messages with them.</P> -<P>An<A href="#IETF"> IETF</A> working group has issued RFC 2440 for an - "Open PGP" standard, similar to the 5.x versions. PGP Inc. staff were - among the authors. A free<A href="#GPG"> Gnu Privacy Guard</A> based on - that standard is now available.</P> -<P>For more information on PGP, including how to obtain it, see our - cryptography<A href="#tools"> links</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="PGPI">PGP Inc.</A></DT> -<DD>A company founded by Zimmerman, the author of<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> -, now a division of<A href="#NAI"> NAI</A>. See the<A href="http://www.pgp.com"> - corporate website</A>. Zimmerman left in 2001, and early in 2002 NAI - announced that they would no longer sell PGP.. -<P>Versions 6.5 and later of the PGP product include PGPnet, an IPsec - client for Macintosh or for Windows 95/98/NT. See our<A href="interop.html#pgpnet"> - interoperation documen</A>t.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="photuris">Photuris</A></DT> -<DD>Another key negotiation protocol, an alternative to<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A>, described in RFCs 2522 and 2523.</DD> -<DT><A name="PPP">PPP</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>oint-to-<B>P</B>oint<B> P</B>rotocol, originally a method of - connecting over modems or serial lines, but see also PPPoE.</DD> -<DT><A name="PPPoE">PPPoE</A></DT> -<DD><B>PPP</B><B> o</B>ver<B> E</B>thernet, a somewhat odd protocol that - makes Ethernet look like a point-to-point serial link. It is widely - used for cable or ADSL Internet services, apparently mainly because it - lets the providers use access control and address assignmment - mechanisms developed for dialup networks.<A href="http://www.roaringpenguin.com"> - Roaring Penguin</A> provide a widely used Linux implementation.</DD> -<DT><A name="PPTP">PPTP</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>oint-to-<B>P</B>oint<B> T</B>unneling<B> P</B>rotocol, used - in some Microsoft VPN implementations. Papers discussing weaknesses in - it are on<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/publish.html"> - counterpane.com</A>. It is now largely obsolete, replaced by L2TP.</DD> -<DT><A name="PKI">PKI</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>ublic<B> K</B>ey<B> I</B>nfrastructure, the things an - organisation or community needs to set up in order to make<A href="#public"> - public key</A> cryptographic technology a standard part of their - operating procedures. -<P>There are several PKI products on the market. Typically they use a - hierarchy of<A href="#CA"> Certification Authorities (CAs)</A>. Often - they use<A href="#LDAP"> LDAP</A> access to<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> - directories to implement this.</P> -<P>See<A href="#web"> Web of Trust</A> for a different sort of - infrastructure.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="PKIX">PKIX</A></DT> -<DD><B>PKI</B> e<B>X</B>change, an<A href="#IETF"> IETF</A> standard - that allows<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A>s to talk to each other. -<P>This is required, for example, when users of a corporate PKI need to - communicate with people at client, supplier or government - organisations, any of which may have a different PKI in place. I should - be able to talk to you securely whenever:</P> -<UL> -<LI>your organisation and mine each have a PKI in place</LI> -<LI>you and I are each set up to use those PKIs</LI> -<LI>the two PKIs speak PKIX</LI> -<LI>the configuration allows the conversation</LI> -</UL> -<P>At time of writing (March 1999), this is not yet widely implemented - but is under quite active development by several groups.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="plaintext">Plaintext</A></DT> -<DD>The unencrypted input to a cipher, as opposed to the encrypted<A href="#ciphertext"> - ciphertext</A> output.</DD> -<DT><A name="Pluto">Pluto</A></DT> -<DD>The<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> daemon which handles key - exchange via the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> protocol, connection - negotiation, and other higher-level tasks. Pluto calls the<A href="#KLIPS"> - KLIPS</A> kernel code as required. For details, see the manual page - ipsec_pluto(8).</DD> -<DT><A name="public">Public Key Cryptography</A></DT> -<DD>In public key cryptography, keys are created in matched pairs. - Encrypt with one half of a pair and only the matching other half can - decrypt it. This contrasts with<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric or - secret key cryptography</A> in which a single key known to both parties - is used for both encryption and decryption. -<P>One half of each pair, called the public key, is made public. The - other half, called the private key, is kept secret. Messages can then - be sent by anyone who knows the public key to the holder of the private - key. Encrypt with the public key and you know that only someone with - the matching private key can decrypt.</P> -<P>Public key techniques can be used to create<A href="#signature"> - digital signatures</A> and to deal with key management issues, perhaps - the hardest part of effective deployment of<A href="#symmetric"> - symmetric ciphers</A>. The resulting<A href="#hybrid"> hybrid - cryptosystems</A> use public key methods to manage keys for symmetric - ciphers.</P> -<P>Many organisations are currently creating<A href="#PKI"> PKIs, public - key infrastructures</A> to make these benefits widely available.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Public Key Infrastructure</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A></DD> -<DT><A name="Q">Q</A></DT> -<DT><A name="R">R</A></DT> -<DT><A name="rainbow">Rainbow books</A></DT> -<DD>A set of US government standards for evaluation of "trusted computer - systems", of which the best known was the<A href="#orange"> Orange Book</A> -. One fairly often hears references to "C2 security" or a product - "evaluated at B1". The Rainbow books define the standards referred to - in those comments. -<P>See this<A href="http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow.htm"> reference - page</A>.</P> -<P>The Rainbow books are now mainly obsolete, replaced by the - international<A href="#cc"> Common Criteria</A> standards.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="random">Random</A></DT> -<DD>A remarkably tricky term, far too much so for me to attempt a - definition here. Quite a few cryptosystems have been broken via attacks - on weak random number generators, even when the rest of the system was - sound. -<P>See<A href="http://nis.nsf.net/internet/documents/rfc/rfc1750.txt"> - RFC 1750</A> for the theory.</P> -<P>See the manual pages for<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> - ipsec_ranbits(8)</A> and ipsec_prng(3) for more on FreeS/WAN's use of - randomness. Both depend on the random(4) device driver..</P> -<P>A couple of years ago, there was extensive mailing list discussion - (archived<A href="http://www.openpgp.net/random/index.html"> here</A> -)of Linux /dev/random and FreeS/WAN. Since then, the design of the - random(4) driver has changed considerably. Linux 2.4 kernels have the - new driver..</P> -</DD> -<DT>Raptor</DT> -<DD>A firewall product for Windows NT offerring IPsec-based VPN - services. Linux FreeS/WAN interoperates with Raptor; see our<A href="#raptor"> - interop</A> document for details. Raptor have recently merged with - Axent.</DD> -<DT><A name="RC4">RC4</A></DT> -<DD><B>R</B>ivest<B> C</B>ipher four, designed by Ron Rivest of<A href="#RSAco"> - RSA</A> and widely used. Believed highly secure with adequate key - length, but often implemented with inadequate key length to comply with - export restrictions.</DD> -<DT><A name="RC6">RC6</A></DT> -<DD><B>R</B>ivest<B> C</B>ipher six,<A href="#RSAco"> RSA</A>'s<A href="#AES"> - AES</A> candidate cipher.</DD> -<DT><A name="replay">Replay attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack in which the attacker records data and later replays it in - an attempt to deceive the recipient.</DD> -<DT><A name="reverse">Reverse map</A></DT> -<DD>In<A href="#DNS"> DNS</A>, a table where IP addresses can be used as - the key for lookups which return a system name and/or other - information.</DD> -<DT>RFC</DT> -<DD><B>R</B>equest<B> F</B>or<B> C</B>omments, an Internet document. - Some RFCs are just informative. Others are standards. -<P>Our list of<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> and other security-related - RFCs is<A href="#RFC"> here</A>, along with information on methods of - obtaining them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="rijndael">Rijndael</A></DT> -<DD>a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> designed by two Belgian - cryptographers, winner of the US government's<A href="#AES"> AES</A> - contest to pick a replacement for<A href="#DES"> DES</A>. See the<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael"> - Rijndael home page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="RIPEMD">RIPEMD</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> algorithm. The current - version is RIPEMD-160 which gives a 160-bit hash.</DD> -<DT><A name="rootCA">Root CA</A></DT> -<DD>The top level<A href="#CA"> Certification Authority</A> in a - hierachy of such authorities.</DD> -<DT><A name="routable">Routable IP address</A></DT> -<DD>Most IP addresses can be used as "to" and "from" addresses in packet - headers. These are the routable addresses; we expect routing to be - possible for them. If we send a packet to one of them, we expect (in - most cases; there are various complications) that it will be delivered - if the address is in use and will cause an<A href="#ICMP.gloss"> ICMP</A> - error packet to come back to us if not. -<P>There are also several classes of<A href="#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> IP addresses.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="RSA">RSA algorithm</A></DT> -<DD><B>R</B>ivest<B> S</B>hamir<B> A</B>dleman<A href="#public"> public - key</A> algorithm, named for its three inventors. It is widely used and - likely to become moreso since it became free of patent encumbrances in - September 2000. -<P>RSA can be used to provide either<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A> - or<A href="#signature"> digital signatures</A>. In IPsec, it is used - only for signatures. These provide gateway-to-gateway<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> for<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> negotiations.</P> -<P>For a full explanation of the algorithm, consult one of the standard - references such as<A href="#schneier"> Applied Cryptography</A>. A - simple explanation is:</P> -<P>The great 17th century French mathematician<A href="http://www-groups.dcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Fermat.html"> - Fermat</A> proved that,</P> -<P>for any prime p and number x, 0 <= x < p:</P> -<PRE> x^p == x modulo p - x^(p-1) == 1 modulo p, non-zero x - </PRE> -<P>From this it follows that if we have a pair of primes p, q and two - numbers e, d such that:</P> -<PRE> ed == 1 modulo lcm( p-1, q-1) - </PRE> - where lcm() is least common multiple, then -<BR> for all x, 0 <= x < pq: -<PRE> x^ed == x modulo pq - </PRE> -<P>So we construct such as set of numbers p, q, e, d and publish the - product N=pq and e as the public key. Using c for<A href="#ciphertext"> - ciphertext</A> and i for the input<A href="#plaintext"> plaintext</A>, - encryption is then:</P> -<PRE> c = i^e modulo N - </PRE> -<P>An attacker cannot deduce i from the cyphertext c, short of either - factoring N or solving the<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithm</A> - problem for this field. If p, q are large primes (hundreds or thousands - of bits) no efficient solution to either problem is known.</P> -<P>The receiver, knowing the private key (N and d), can readily recover - the plaintext p since:</P> -<PRE> c^d == (i^e)^d modulo N - == i^ed modulo N - == i modulo N - </PRE> -<P>This gives an effective public key technique, with only a couple of - problems. It uses a good deal of computer time, since calculations with - large integers are not cheap, and there is no proof it is necessarily - secure since no-one has proven either factoring or discrete log cannot - be done efficiently. Quite a few good mathematicians have tried both - problems, and no-one has announced success, but there is no proof they - are insoluble.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="RSAco">RSA Data Security</A></DT> -<DD>A company founded by the inventors of the<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> - public key algorithm.</DD> -<DT><A name="S">S</A></DT> -<DT><A name="SA">SA</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecurity<B> A</B>ssociation, the channel negotiated by the - higher levels of an<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> implementation (<A href="#IKE"> -IKE</A>) and used by the lower (<A href="#ESP">ESP</A> and<A href="#AH"> - AH</A>). SAs are unidirectional; you need a pair of them for two-way - communication. -<P>An SA is defined by three things -- the destination, the protocol (<A href="#AH"> -AH</A> or<A href="#ESP">ESP</A>) and the<A href="SPI"> SPI</A>, security - parameters index. It is used as an index to look up other things such - as session keys and intialisation vectors.</P> -<P>For more detail, see our section on<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec</A> - and/or RFC 2401.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SElinux">SE Linux</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>S</STRONG>ecurity<STRONG> E</STRONG>nhanced Linux, an<A href="#NSA"> - NSA</A>-funded project to add<A href="#mandatory"> mandatory access - control</A> to Linux. See the<A href="http://www.nsa.gov/selinux"> - project home page</A>. -<P>According to their web pages, this work will include extending - mandatory access controls to IPsec tunnels.</P> -<P>Recent versions of SE Linux code use the<A href="#LSM"> Linux - Security Module</A> interface.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SDNS">Secure DNS</A></DT> -<DD>A version of the<A href="#DNS"> DNS or Domain Name Service</A> - enhanced with authentication services. This is being designed by the<A href="#IETF"> - IETF</A> DNS security<A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/dnssec.html"> - working group</A>. Check the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - Internet Software Consortium</A> for information on implementation - progress and for the latest version of<A href="#BIND"> BIND</A>. - Another site has<A href="http://www.toad.com/~dnssec"> more information</A> -. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> can use this plus<A href="#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman key exchange</A> to bootstrap itself. This allows<A href="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>. Any pair of machines which can - authenticate each other via DNS can communicate securely, without - either a pre-existing shared secret or a shared<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Secret key cryptography</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cryptography</A></DD> -<DT>Security Association</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#SA"> SA</A></DD> -<DT>Security Enhanced Linux</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#SElinux"> SE Linux</A></DD> -<DT><A name="sequence">Sequence number</A></DT> -<DD>A number added to a packet or message which indicates its position - in a sequence of packets or messages. This provides some security - against<A href="#replay"> replay attacks</A>. -<P>For<A href="#auto"> automatic keying</A> mode, the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> RFCs require that the sender generate sequence numbers for - each packet, but leave it optional whether the receiver does anything - with them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SHA">SHA</A></DT> -<DT>SHA-1</DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecure<B> H</B>ash<B> A</B>lgorithm, a<A href="#digest"> - message digest algorithm</A> developed by the<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A> - for use in the Digital Signature standard,<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS</A> - number 186 from<A href="#NIST"> NIST</A>. SHA is an improved variant of<A -href="#MD4"> MD4</A> producing a 160-bit hash. -<P>SHA is one of two message digest algorithms available in IPsec. The - other is<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A>. Some people do not trust SHA because - it was developed by the<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A>. There is, as far as we - know, no cryptographic evidence that SHA is untrustworthy, but this - does not prevent that view from being strongly held.</P> -<P>The NSA made one small change after the release of the original SHA. - They did not give reasons. Iit may be a defense against some attack - they found and do not wish to disclose. Technically the modified - algorithm should be called SHA-1, but since it has replaced the - original algorithm in nearly all applications, it is generally just - referred to as SHA..</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SHA-256">SHA-256</A></DT> -<DT>SHA-384</DT> -<DT>SHA-512</DT> -<DD>Newer variants of SHA designed to match the strength of the 128, 192 - and 256-bit keys of<A href="#AES"> AES</A>. The work to break an - encryption algorithm's strength by<A href="#brute"> brute force</A> is - 2 -<!--math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"--> - -<!--msup--> - -<!--mi--> - keylength</(null)></(null)></(null)> operations but a<A href="birthday"> - birthday attack</A> on a hash needs only 2 -<!--math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"--> - -<!--msup--> - -<!--mrow--> - -<!--mi--> - hashlength</(null)> -<!--mo--> - /</(null)> -<!--mn--> - - 2</(null)></(null)></(null)></(null)> , so as a general rule you need a - hash twice the size of the key to get similar strength. SHA-256, - SHA-384 and SHA-512 are designed to match the 128, 192 and 256-bit key - sizes of AES, respectively.</DD> -<DT><A name="SIGINT">Signals intelligence (SIGINT)</A></DT> -<DD>Activities of government agencies from various nations aimed at - protecting their own communications and reading those of others. - Cryptography, cryptanalysis, wiretapping, interception and monitoring - of various sorts of signals. The players include the American<A href="#NSA"> - NSA</A>, British<A href="#GCHQ"> GCHQ</A> and Canadian<A href="#CSE"> - CSE</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="SKIP">SKIP</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>imple<B> K</B>ey management for<B> I</B>nternet<B> P</B> -rotocols, an alternative to<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> developed by Sun and - being marketed by their<A href="http://skip.incog.com"> Internet - Commerce Group</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="snake">Snake oil</A></DT> -<DD>Bogus cryptography. See the<A href="http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html"> - Snake Oil FAQ</A> or<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9902.html#snakeoil"> - this paper</A> by Schneier.</DD> -<DT><A name="SPI">SPI</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecurity<B> P</B>arameter<B> I</B>ndex, an index used within<A -href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> to keep connections distinct. A<A href="#SA"> - Security Association (SA)</A> is defined by destination, protocol and - SPI. Without the SPI, two connections to the same gateway using the - same protocol could not be distinguished. -<P>For more detail, see our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec</A> section - and/or RFC 2401.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SSH">SSH</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecure<B> SH</B>ell, an encrypting replacement for the - insecure Berkeley commands whose names begin with "r" for "remote": - rsh, rlogin, etc. -<P>For more information on SSH, including how to obtain it, see our - cryptography<A href="#tools"> links</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SSHco">SSH Communications Security</A></DT> -<DD>A company founded by the authors of<A href="#SSH"> SSH</A>. Offices - are in<A href="http://www.ssh.fi"> Finland</A> and<A href="http://www.ipsec.com"> - California</A>. They have a toolkit for developers of IPsec - applications.</DD> -<DT><A name="SSL">SSL</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://home.netscape.com/eng/ssl3">Secure Sockets Layer</A> -, a set of encryption and authentication services for web browsers, - developed by Netscape. Widely used in Internet commerce. Also known as<A -href="#TLS"> TLS</A>.</DD> -<DT>SSLeay</DT> -<DD>A free implementation of<A href="#SSL"> SSL</A> by Eric Young (eay) - and others. Developed in Australia; not subject to US export controls.</DD> -<DT><A name="static">static IP address</A></DT> -<DD>an IP adddress which is pre-set on the machine itself, as opposed to - a<A href="#dynamic"> dynamic address</A> which is assigned by a<A href="#DHCP"> - DHCP</A> server or obtained as part of the process of establishing a<A href="#PPP"> - PPP</A> or<A href="#PPPoE"> PPPoE</A> connection</DD> -<DT><A name="stream">Stream cipher</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cipher</A> which produces a stream - of output which can be combined (often using XOR or bytewise addition) - with the plaintext to produce ciphertext. Contrasts with<A href="#block"> - block cipher</A>. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> does not use stream ciphers. Their main - application is link-level encryption, for example of voice, video or - data streams on a wire or a radio signal.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="subnet">subnet</A></DT> -<DD>A group of IP addresses which are logically one network, typically - (but not always) assigned to a group of physically connected machines. - The range of addresses in a subnet is described using a subnet mask. - See next entry.</DD> -<DT>subnet mask</DT> -<DD>A method of indicating the addresses included in a subnet. Here are - two equivalent examples: -<UL> -<LI>101.101.101.0/24</LI> -<LI>101.101.101.0 with mask 255.255.255.0</LI> -</UL> -<P>The '24' is shorthand for a mask with the top 24 bits one and the - rest zero. This is exactly the same as 255.255.255.0 which has three - all-ones bytes and one all-zeros byte.</P> -<P>These indicate that, for this range of addresses, the top 24 bits are - to be treated as naming a network (often referred to as "the - 101.101.101.0/24 subnet") while most combinations of the low 8 bits can - be used to designate machines on that network. Two addresses are - reserved; 101.101.101.0 refers to the subnet rather than a specific - machine while 101.101.101.255 is a broadcast address. 1 to 254 are - available for machines.</P> -<P>It is common to find subnets arranged in a hierarchy. For example, a - large company might have a /16 subnet and allocate /24 subnets within - that to departments. An ISP might have a large subnet and allocate /26 - subnets (64 addresses, 62 usable) to business customers and /29 subnets - (8 addresses, 6 usable) to residential clients.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SWAN">S/WAN</A></DT> -<DD>Secure Wide Area Network, a project involving<A href="#RSAco"> RSA - Data Security</A> and a number of other companies. The goal was to - ensure that all their<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> implementations would - interoperate so that their customers can communicate with each other - securely.</DD> -<DT><A name="symmetric">Symmetric cryptography</A></DT> -<DD>Symmetric cryptography, also referred to as conventional or secret - key cryptography, relies on a<EM> shared secret key</EM>, identical for - sender and receiver. Sender encrypts with that key, receiver decrypts - with it. The idea is that an eavesdropper without the key be unable to - read the messages. There are two main types of symmetric cipher,<A href="#block"> - block ciphers</A> and<A href="#stream"> stream ciphers</A>. -<P>Symmetric cryptography contrasts with<A href="#public"> public key</A> - or asymmetric systems where the two players use different keys.</P> -<P>The great difficulty in symmetric cryptography is, of course, key - management. Sender and receiver<EM> must</EM> have identical keys and - those keys<EM> must</EM> be kept secret from everyone else. Not too - much of a problem if only two people are involved and they can - conveniently meet privately or employ a trusted courier. Quite a - problem, though, in other circumstances.</P> -<P>It gets much worse if there are many people. An application might be - written to use only one key for communication among 100 people, for - example, but there would be serious problems. Do you actually trust all - of them that much? Do they trust each other that much? Should they? - What is at risk if that key is compromised? How are you going to - distribute that key to everyone without risking its secrecy? What do - you do when one of them leaves the company? Will you even know?</P> -<P>On the other hand, if you need unique keys for every possible - connection between a group of 100, then each user must have 99 keys. - You need either 99*100/2 = 4950<EM> secure</EM> key exchanges between - users or a central authority that<EM> securely</EM> distributes 100 key - packets, each with a different set of 99 keys.</P> -<P>Either of these is possible, though tricky, for 100 users. Either - becomes an administrative nightmare for larger numbers. Moreover, keys<EM> - must</EM> be changed regularly, so the problem of key distribution - comes up again and again. If you use the same key for many messages - then an attacker has more text to work with in an attempt to crack that - key. Moreover, one successful crack will give him or her the text of - all those messages.</P> -<P>In short, the<EM> hardest part of conventional cryptography is key - management</EM>. Today the standard solution is to build a<A href="#hybrid"> - hybrid system</A> using<A href="#public"> public key</A> techniques to - manage keys.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="T">T</A></DT> -<DT><A name="TIS">TIS</A></DT> -<DD>Trusted Information Systems, a firewall vendor now part of<A href="#NAI"> - NAI</A>. Their Gauntlet product offers IPsec VPN services. TIS - implemented the first version of<A href="#SDNS"> Secure DNS</A> on a<A href="#DARPA"> - DARPA</A> contract.</DD> -<DT><A name="TLS">TLS</A></DT> -<DD><B>T</B>ransport<B> L</B>ayer<B> S</B>ecurity, a newer name for<A href="#SSL"> - SSL</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="TOS">TOS field</A></DT> -<DD>The<STRONG> T</STRONG>ype<STRONG> O</STRONG>f<STRONG> S</STRONG> -ervice field in an IP header, used to control qualkity of service - routing.</DD> -<DT><A name="traffic">Traffic analysis</A></DT> -<DD>Deducing useful intelligence from patterns of message traffic, - without breaking codes or reading the messages. In one case during - World War II, the British guessed an attack was coming because all - German radio traffic stopped. The "radio silence" order, intended to - preserve security, actually gave the game away. -<P>In an industrial espionage situation, one might deduce something - interesting just by knowing that company A and company B were talking, - especially if one were able to tell which departments were involved, or - if one already knew that A was looking for acquisitions and B was - seeking funds for expansion.</P> -<P>In general, traffic analysis by itself is not very useful. However, - in the context of a larger intelligence effort where quite a bit is - already known, it can be very useful. When you are solving a complex - puzzle, every little bit helps.</P> -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> itself does not defend against traffic - analysis, but carefully thought out systems using IPsec can provide at - least partial protection. In particular, one might want to encrypt more - traffic than was strictly necessary, route things in odd ways, or even - encrypt dummy packets, to confuse the analyst. We discuss this<A href="#traffic.resist"> - here</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="transport">Transport mode</A></DT> -<DD>An IPsec application in which the IPsec gateway is the destination - of the protected packets, a machine acts as its own gateway. Contrast - with<A href="#tunnel"> tunnel mode</A>.</DD> -<DT>Triple DES</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A></DD> -<DT><A name="TTL">TTL</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>T</STRONG>ime<STRONG> T</STRONG>o<STRONG> L</STRONG>ive, - used to control<A href="#DNS"> DNS</A> caching. Servers discard cached - records whose TTL expires</DD> -<DT><A name="tunnel">Tunnel mode</A></DT> -<DD>An IPsec application in which an IPsec gateway provides protection - for packets to and from other systems. Contrast with<A href="#transport"> - transport mode</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="2key">Two-key Triple DES</A></DT> -<DD>A variant of<A href="#3DES"> triple DES or 3DES</A> in which only - two keys are used. As in the three-key version, the order of operations - is<A href="#EDE"> EDE</A> or encrypt-decrypt-encrypt, but in the - two-key variant the first and third keys are the same. -<P>3DES with three keys has 3*56 = 168 bits of key but has only 112-bit - strength against a<A href="#meet"> meet-in-the-middle</A> attack, so it - is possible that the two key version is just as strong. Last I looked, - this was an open question in the research literature.</P> -<P>RFC 2451 defines triple DES for<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> as the - three-key variant. The two-key variant should not be used and is not - implemented directly in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>. It - cannot be used in automatically keyed mode without major fiddles in the - source code. For manually keyed connections, you could make Linux - FreeS/WAN talk to a two-key implementation by setting two keys the same - in /etc/ipsec.conf.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="U">U</A></DT> -<DT><A name="V">V</A></DT> -<DT><A name="virtual">Virtual Interface</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A> feature which allows one physical - network interface to have two or more IP addresses. See the<CITE> Linux - Network Administrator's Guide</CITE> in<A href="#kirch"> book form</A> - or<A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/LDP/nag/node1.html"> on the web</A> - for details.</DD> -<DT>Virtual Private Network</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#VPN"> VPN</A></DD> -<DT><A name="VPN">VPN</A></DT> -<DD><B>V</B>irtual<B> P</B>rivate<B> N</B>etwork, a network which can - safely be used as if it were private, even though some of its - communication uses insecure connections. All traffic on those - connections is encrypted. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> is not the only technique available for - building VPNs, but it is the only method defined by<A href="#RFC"> RFCs</A> - and supported by many vendors. VPNs are by no means the only thing you - can do with IPsec, but they may be the most important application for - many users.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="VPNC">VPNC</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.vpnc.org">Virtual Private Network Consortium</A> -, an association of vendors of VPN products.</DD> -<DT><A name="W">W</A></DT> -<DT><A name="Wassenaar.gloss">Wassenaar Arrangement</A></DT> -<DD>An international agreement restricting export of munitions and other - tools of war. Unfortunately, cryptographic software is also restricted - under the current version of the agreement.<A href="#Wassenaar"> - Discussion</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="web">Web of Trust</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#PGP">PGP</A>'s method of certifying keys. Any user can - sign a key; you decide which signatures or combinations of signatures - to accept as certification. This contrasts with the hierarchy of<A href="#CA"> - CAs (Certification Authorities)</A> used in many<A href="#PKI"> PKIs - (Public Key Infrastructures)</A>. -<P>See<A href="#GTR"> Global Trust Register</A> for an interesting - addition to the web of trust.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="WEP">WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)</A></DT> -<DD>The cryptographic part of the<A href="#IEEE"> IEEE</A> standard for - wireless LANs. As the name suggests, this is designed to be only as - secure as a normal wired ethernet. Anyone with a network conection can - tap it. Its advocates would claim this is good design, refusing to - build in complex features beyond the actual requirements. -<P>Critics refer to WEP as "Wire<EM>tap</EM> Equivalent Privacy", and - consider it a horribly flawed design based on bogus "requirements". You - do not control radio waves as you might control your wires, so the - metaphor in the rationale is utterly inapplicable. A security policy - that chooses not to invest resources in protecting against certain - attacks which can only be conducted by people physically plugged into - your LAN may or may not be reasonable. The same policy is completely - unreasonable when someone can "plug in" from a laptop half a block - away..</P> -<P>There has been considerable analysis indicating that WEP is seriously - flawed. A FAQ on attacks against WEP is available. Part of it reads:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> ... attacks are practical to mount using only inexpensive - off-the-shelf equipment. We recommend that anyone using an 802.11 - wireless network not rely on WEP for security, and employ other - security measures to protect their wireless network. Note that our - attacks apply to both 40-bit and the so-called 128-bit versions of WEP - equally well.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>WEP appears to be yet another instance of governments, and - unfortunately some vendors and standards bodies, deliberately promoting - hopelessly flawed "security" products, apparently mainly for the - benefit of eavesdropping agencies. See this<A href="#weak"> discussion</A> -.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="X">X</A></DT> -<DT><A name="X509">X.509</A></DT> -<DD>A standard from the<A href="http://www.itu.int"> ITU (International - Telecommunication Union)</A>, for hierarchical directories with - authentication services, used in many<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - implementations. -<P>Use of X.509 services, via the<A href="#LDAP"> LDAP protocol</A>, for - certification of keys is allowed but not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> RFCs. It is not yet implemented in<A href="#FreeSWAN"> Linux - FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Xedia</DT> -<DD>A vendor of router and Internet access products, now part of Lucent. - Their QVPN products interoperate with Linux FreeS/WAN; see our<A href="#xedia"> - interop document</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="Y">Y</A></DT> -<DT><A name="Z">Z</A></DT> -</DL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="biblio">Bibliography for the Linux FreeS/WAN project</A></H1> -<P>For extensive bibliographic links, see the<A href="http://liinwww.ira.uka.de/bibliography/index.html"> - Collection of Computer Science Bibliographies</A></P> -<P>See our<A href="web.html"> web links</A> for material available - online.</P> -<HR><A name="adams"> Carlisle Adams and Steve Lloyd<CITE> Understanding - Public Key Infrastructure</CITE> -<BR></A> Macmillan 1999 ISBN 1-57870-166-x -<P>An overview, mainly concentrating on policy and strategic issues - rather than the technical details. Both authors work for<A href="#PKI"> - PKI</A> vendor<A href="http://www.entrust.com/"> Entrust</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="DNS.book"> Albitz, Liu & Loukides<CITE> DNS & BIND</CITE> - 3rd edition -<BR></A> O'Reilly 1998 ISBN 1-56592-512-2 -<P>The standard reference on the<A href="#DNS"> Domain Name Service</A> - and<A href="#BIND"> Berkeley Internet Name Daemon</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="anderson"> Ross Anderson</A>,<CITE> Security Engineering - - a Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems</CITE> -<BR> Wiley, 2001, ISBN 0471389226 -<P>Easily the best book for the security professional I have seen.<STRONG> - Highly recommended</STRONG>. See the<A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html"> - book web page</A>.</P> -<P>This is quite readable, but Schneier's<A href="#secrets"> Secrets and - Lies</A> might be an easier introduction.</P> -<HR><A name="puzzle"> Bamford<CITE> The Puzzle Palace, A report on NSA, - Americas's most Secret Agency</CITE> -<BR> Houghton Mifflin 1982 ISBN 0-395-31286-8</A> -<HR> Bamford<CITE> Body of Secrets</CITE> -<P>The sequel.</P> -<HR><A name="bander"> David Bander</A>,<CITE> Linux Security Toolkit</CITE> -<BR> IDG Books, 2000, ISBN: 0764546902 -<P>This book has a short section on FreeS/WAN and includes Caldera Linux - on CD.</P> -<HR><A name="CZR"> Chapman, Zwicky & Russell</A>,<CITE> Building - Internet Firewalls</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1995 ISBN 1-56592-124-0 -<HR><A name="firewall.book"> Cheswick and Bellovin</A><CITE> Firewalls - and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker</CITE> -<BR> Addison-Wesley 1994 ISBN 0201633574 -<P>A fine book on firewalls in particular and security in general from - two of AT&T's system adminstrators.</P> -<P>Bellovin has also done a number of<A href="#papers"> papers</A> on - IPsec and co-authored a<A href="#applied"> paper</A> on a large - FreeS/WAN application.</P> -<HR><A name="comer"> Comer<CITE> Internetworking with TCP/IP</CITE> -<BR> Prentice Hall</A> -<UL> -<LI>Vol. I: Principles, Protocols, & Architecture, 3rd Ed. 1995 - ISBN:0-13-216987-8</LI> -<LI>Vol. II: Design, Implementation, & Internals, 2nd Ed. 1994 - ISBN:0-13-125527-4</LI> -<LI>Vol. III: Client/Server Programming & Applications -<UL> -<LI>AT&T TLI Version 1994 ISBN:0-13-474230-3</LI> -<LI>BSD Socket Version 1996 ISBN:0-13-260969-X</LI> -<LI>Windows Sockets Version 1997 ISBN:0-13-848714-6</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you need to deal with the details of the network protocols, read - either this series or the<A href="#stevens"> Stevens and Wright</A> - series before you start reading the RFCs.</P> -<HR><A name="diffie"> Diffie and Landau</A><CITE> Privacy on the Line: - The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption</CITE> -<BR> MIT press 1998 ISBN 0-262-04167-7 (hardcover) or 0-262-54100-9 -<BR> -<HR><A name="d_and_hark"> Doraswamy and Harkins<CITE> IP Sec: The New - Security Standard for the Internet, Intranets and Virtual Private - Networks</CITE> -<BR> Prentice Hall 1999 ISBN: 0130118982</A> -<HR><A name="EFF"> Electronic Frontier Foundation<CITE> Cracking DES: - Secrets of Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics and Chip Design</CITE> -<BR></A> O'Reilly 1998 ISBN 1-56592-520-3 -<P>To conclusively demonstrate that DES is inadequate for continued use, - the<A href="#EFF"> EFF</A> built a machine for just over $200,000 that - breaks DES encryption in under five days on average, under nine in the - worst case.</P> -<P>The book provides details of their design and, perhaps even more - important, discusses why they felt the project was necessary. - Recommended for anyone interested in any of the three topics mentioned - in the subtitle.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="http://www.eff.org/descracker.html"> EFF page on - this project</A> and our discussion of<A href="#desnotsecure"> DES - insecurity</A>.</P> -<HR> Martin Freiss<CITE> Protecting Networks with SATAN</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1998 ISBN 1-56592-425-8 -<BR> translated from a 1996 work in German -<P>SATAN is a Security Administrator's Tool for Analysing Networks. This - book is a tutorial in its use.</P> -<HR> Gaidosch and Kunzinger<CITE> A Guide to Virtual Private Networks</CITE> -<BR> Prentice Hall 1999 ISBN: 0130839647 -<HR><A name="Garfinkel"> Simson Garfinkel</A><CITE> Database Nation: the - death of privacy in the 21st century</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 2000 ISBN 1-56592-653-6 -<P>A thoughtful and rather scary book.</P> -<HR><A name="PGP"> Simson Garfinkel</A><CITE> PGP: Pretty Good Privacy</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1995 ISBN 1-56592-098-8 -<P>An excellent introduction and user manual for the<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> - email-encryption package. PGP is a good package with a complex and - poorly-designed user interface. This book or one like it is a must for - anyone who has to use it at length.</P> -<P>The book covers using PGP in Unix, PC and Macintosh environments, - plus considerable background material on both the technical and - political issues around cryptography.</P> -<P>The book is now seriously out of date. It does not cover recent - developments such as commercial versions since PGP 5, the Open PGP - standard or GNU PG..</P> -<HR><A name="practical"> Garfinkel and Spafford</A><CITE> Practical Unix - Security</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1996 ISBN 1-56592-148-8 -<P>A standard reference.</P> -<P>Spafford's web page has an excellent collection of<A href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist"> - crypto and security links</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="Kahn"> David Kahn</A><CITE> The Codebreakers: the - Comprehensive History of Secret Communications from Ancient Times to - the Internet</CITE> -<BR> second edition Scribner 1996 ISBN 0684831309 -<P>A history of codes and code-breaking from ancient Egypt to the 20th - century. Well-written and exhaustively researched.<STRONG> Highly - recommended</STRONG>, even though it does not have much on computer - cryptography.</P> -<HR> David Kahn<CITE> Seizing the Enigma, The Race to Break the German - U-Boat codes, 1939-1943</CITE> -<BR> Houghton Mifflin 1991 ISBN 0-395-42739-8 -<HR><A name="kirch"> Olaf Kirch</A><CITE> Linux Network Administrator's - Guide</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1995 ISBN 1-56592-087-2 -<P>Now becoming somewhat dated in places, but still a good introductory - book and general reference.</P> -<HR><A name="LinVPN"> Kolesnikov and Hatch</A>,<CITE> Building Linux - Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)</CITE> -<BR> New Riders 2002 -<P>This has had a number of favorable reviews, including<A href="http://www.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=02/02/27/0115214&mode=thread&tid=172"> - this one</A> on Slashdot. The book has a<A href="http://www.buildinglinuxvpns.net/"> - web site</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="RFCs"> Pete Loshin<CITE> Big Book of IPsec RFCs</CITE> -<BR> Morgan Kaufmann 2000 ISBN: 0-12-455839-9</A> -<HR><A name="crypto"> Steven Levy<CITE> Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat - the Government -- Saving Privacy in the Digital Age</CITE></A> -<BR> Penguin 2001, ISBN 0-670--85950-8 -<P><STRONG>Highly recommended</STRONG>. A fine history of recent (about - 1970-2000) developments in the field, and the related political - controversies. FreeS/WAN project founder and leader John Gilmore - appears several times.</P> -<P>The book does not cover IPsec or FreeS/WAN, but this project is very - much another battle in the same war. See our discussion of the<A href="politics.html"> - politics</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="GTR"> Matyas, Anderson et al.</A><CITE> The Global Trust - Register</CITE> -<BR> Northgate Consultants Ltd 1998 ISBN: 0953239705 -<BR> hard cover edition MIT Press 1999 ISBN 0262511053 -<P>From<A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Trust-Register"> - their web page:</A></P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> This book is a register of the fingerprints of the world's - most important public keys; it implements a top-level certification - authority (CA) using paper and ink rather than in an electronic system.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<HR><A name="handbook"> Menezies, van Oorschot and Vanstone<CITE> - Handbook of Applied Cryptography</CITE></A> -<BR> CRC Press 1997 -<BR> ISBN 0-8493-8523-7 -<P>An excellent reference. Read<A href="#schneier"> Schneier</A> before - tackling this.</P> -<HR> Michael Padlipsky<CITE> Elements of Networking Style</CITE> -<BR> Prentice-Hall 1985 ISBN 0-13-268111-0 or 0-13-268129-3 -<P>Probably<STRONG> the funniest technical book ever written</STRONG>, - this is a vicious but well-reasoned attack on the OSI "seven layer - model" and all that went with it. Several chapters of it are also - available as RFCs 871 to 875.</P> -<HR><A name="matrix"> John S. Quarterman</A><CITE> The Matrix: Computer - Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide</CITE> -<BR> Digital Press 1990 ISBN 155558-033-5 -<BR> Prentice-Hall ISBN 0-13-565607-9 -<P>The best general treatment of computer-mediated communication we have - seen. It naturally has much to say about the Internet, but also covers - UUCP, Fidonet and so on.</P> -<HR><A name="ranch"> David Ranch</A><CITE> Securing Linux Step by Step</CITE> -<BR> SANS Institute, 1999 -<P><A href="http://www.sans.org/">SANS</A> is a respected organisation, - this guide is part of a well-known series, and Ranch has previously - written the useful<A href=" http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos"> - Trinity OS</A> guide to securing Linux, so my guess would be this is a - pretty good book. I haven't read it yet, so I'm not certain. It can be - ordered online from<A href="http://www.sans.org/"> SANS</A>.</P> -<P>Note (Mar 1, 2002): a new edition with different editors in the - works. Expect it this year.</P> -<HR><A name="schneier"> Bruce Schneier</A><CITE> Applied Cryptography, - Second Edition</CITE> -<BR> John Wiley & Sons, 1996 -<BR> ISBN 0-471-12845-7 hardcover -<BR> ISBN 0-471-11709-9 paperback -<P>A standard reference on computer cryptography. For more recent - essays, see the<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/"> author's - company's web site</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="secrets"> Bruce Schneier</A><CITE> Secrets and Lies</CITE> -<BR> Wiley 2000, ISBN 0-471-25311-1 -<P>An interesting discussion of security and privacy issues, written - with more of an "executive overview" approach rather than a narrow - focus on the technical issues.<STRONG> Highly recommended</STRONG>.</P> -<P>This is worth reading even if you already understand security issues, - or think you do. To go deeper, follow it with Anderson's<A href="#anderson"> - Security Engineering</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="VPNbook"> Scott, Wolfe and Irwin<CITE> Virtual Private - Networks</CITE></A> -<BR> 2nd edition, O'Reilly 1999 ISBN: 1-56592-529-7 -<P>This is the only O'Reilly book, out of a dozen I own, that I'm - disappointed with. It deals mainly with building VPNs with various - proprietary tools --<A href="#PPTP"> PPTP</A>,<A href="#ssh"> SSH</A>, - Cisco PIX, ... -- and touches only lightly on IPsec-based approaches.</P> -<P>That said, it appears to deal competently with what it does cover and - it has readable explanations of many basic VPN and security concepts. - It may be exactly what some readers require, even if I find the - emphasis unfortunate.</P> -<HR><A name="LASG"> Kurt Seifried<CITE> Linux Administrator's Security - Guide</CITE></A> -<P>Available online from<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lasg/"> - Security Portal</A>. It has fairly extensive coverage of IPsec.</P> -<HR><A name="Smith"> Richard E Smith<CITE> Internet Cryptography</CITE> -<BR></A> ISBN 0-201-92480-3, Addison Wesley, 1997 -<P>See the book's<A href="http://www.visi.com/crypto/inet-crypto/index.html"> - home page</A></P> -<HR><A name="neal"> Neal Stephenson<CITE> Cryptonomicon</CITE></A> -<BR> Hardcover ISBN -380-97346-4, Avon, 1999. -<P>A novel in which cryptography and the net figure prominently.<STRONG> - Highly recommended</STRONG>: I liked it enough I immediately went out - and bought all the author's other books.</P> -<P>There is also a paperback edition. Sequels are expected.</P> -<HR><A name="stevens"> Stevens and Wright</A><CITE> TCP/IP Illustrated</CITE> -<BR> Addison-Wesley -<UL> -<LI>Vol. I: The Protocols 1994 ISBN:0-201-63346-9</LI> -<LI>Vol. II: The Implementation 1995 ISBN:0-201-63354-X</LI> -<LI>Vol. III: TCP for Transactions, HTTP, NNTP, and the UNIX Domain - Protocols 1996 ISBN: 0-201-63495-3</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you need to deal with the details of the network protocols, read - either this series or the<A href="#comer"> Comer</A> series before you - start reading the RFCs.</P> -<HR><A name="Rubini"> Rubini</A><CITE> Linux Device Drivers</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. 1998 ISBN 1-56592-292-1 -<HR><A name="Zeigler"> Robert Zeigler</A><CITE> Linux Firewalls</CITE> -<BR> Newriders Publishing, 2000 ISBN 0-7537-0900-9 -<P>A good book, with detailed coverage of ipchains(8) firewalls and of - many related issues.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="RFC">IPsec RFCs and related documents</A></H1> -<H2><A name="RFCfile">The RFCs.tar.gz Distribution File</A></H2> -<P>The Linux FreeS/WAN distribution is available from<A href="http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan"> - our primary distribution site</A> and various mirror sites. To give - people more control over their downloads, the RFCs that define IP - security are bundled separately in the file RFCs.tar.gz.</P> -<P>The file you are reading is included in the main distribution and is - available on the web site. It describes the RFCs included in the<A href="#RFCs.tar.gz"> - RFCs.tar.gz</A> bundle and gives some pointers to<A href="#sources"> - other ways to get them</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="sources">Other sources for RFCs & Internet drafts</A></H2> -<H3><A name="RFCdown">RFCs</A></H3> -<P>RFCs are downloadble at many places around the net such as:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org">http://www.rfc-editor.org</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://nis.nsf.net/internet/documents/rfc">NSF.net</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://sunsite.doc.ic.ac.uk/computing/internet/rfc">Sunsite - in the UK</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>browsable in HTML form at others such as:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.landfield.com/rfcs/index.html">landfield.com</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.library.ucg.ie/Connected/RFC">Connected Internet - Encyclopedia</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>and some of them are available in translation:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.eisti.fr/eistiweb/docs/normes/">French</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There is also a published<A href="#RFCs"> Big Book of IPSEC RFCs</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="drafts">Internet Drafts</A></H3> -<P>Internet Drafts, working documents which sometimes evolve into RFCs, - are also available.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ID.html">Overall reference page</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsec.html">IPsec</A> working - group</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsra.html">IPSRA (IPsec - Remote Access)</A> working group</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsp.html">IPsec Policy</A> - working group</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/kink.html">KINK (Kerberized - Internet Negotiation of Keys)</A> working group</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note: some of these may be obsolete, replaced by later drafts or by - RFCs.</P> -<H3><A name="FIPS1">FIPS standards</A></H3> -<P>Some things used by<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A>, such as<A href="#DES"> - DES</A> and<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A>, are defined by US government - standards called<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS</A>. The issuing organisation,<A href="#NIST"> - NIST</A>, have a<A href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs"> FIPS - home page</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="RFCs.tar.gz">What's in the RFCs.tar.gz bundle?</A></H2> -<P>All filenames are of the form rfc*.txt, with the * replaced with the - RFC number.</P> -<PRE>RFC# Title</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.ov">Overview RFCs</A></H3> -<PRE>2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol -2411 IP Security Document Roadmap</PRE> -<H3><A name="basic.prot">Basic protocols</A></H3> -<PRE>2402 IP Authentication Header -2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)</PRE> -<H3><A name="key.ike">Key management</A></H3> -<PRE>2367 PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2 -2407 The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP -2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) -2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) -2412 The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol -2528 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.detail">Details of various things used</A></H3> -<PRE>2085 HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention -2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication -2202 Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 -2207 RSVP Extensions for IPSEC Data Flows -2403 The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH -2404 The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH -2405 The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV -2410 The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec -2451 The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms -2521 ICMP Security Failures Messages</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.ref">Older RFCs which may be referenced</A></H3> -<PRE>1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm -1828 IP Authentication using Keyed MD5 -1829 The ESP DES-CBC Transform -1851 The ESP Triple DES Transform -1852 IP Authentication using Keyed SHA</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.dns">RFCs for secure DNS service, which IPsec may use</A> -</H3> -<PRE>2137 Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update -2230 Key Exchange Delegation Record for the DNS -2535 Domain Name System Security Extensions -2536 DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS) -2537 RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS) -2538 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS) -2539 Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS)</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.exp">RFCs labelled "experimental"</A></H3> -<PRE>2521 ICMP Security Failures Messages -2522 Photuris: Session-Key Management Protocol -2523 Photuris: Extended Schemes and Attributes</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.rel">Related RFCs</A></H3> -<PRE>1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security -1918 Address Allocation for Private Internets -1984 IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet -2144 The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm</PRE> -<HR> -<H1><A name="roadmap">Distribution Roadmap: What's Where in Linux - FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P> This file is a guide to the locations of files within the FreeS/WAN - distribution. Everything described here should be on your system once - you download, gunzip, and untar the distribution.</P> -<P>This distribution contains two major subsystems</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="#klips.roadmap">KLIPS</A></DT> -<DD>the kernel code</DD> -<DT><A href="#pluto.roadmap">Pluto</A></DT> -<DD>the user-level key-management daemon</DD> -</DL> -<P>plus assorted odds and ends.</P> -<H2><A name="top">Top directory</A></H2> -<P>The top directory has essential information in text files:</P> -<DL> -<DT>README</DT> -<DD>introduction to the software</DD> -<DT>INSTALL</DT> -<DD>short experts-only installation procedures. More detalied procedures - are in<A href="install.html"> installation</A> and<A href="config.html"> - configuration</A> HTML documents.</DD> -<DT>BUGS</DT> -<DD>major known bugs in the current release.</DD> -<DT>CHANGES</DT> -<DD>changes from previous releases</DD> -<DT>CREDITS</DT> -<DD>acknowledgement of contributors</DD> -<DT>COPYING</DT> -<DD>licensing and distribution information</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="doc">Documentation</A></H2> -<P> The doc directory contains the bulk of the documentation, most of it - in HTML format. See the<A href="index.html"> index file</A> for - details.</P> -<H2><A name="klips.roadmap">KLIPS: kernel IP security</A></H2> -<P><A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> is<STRONG> K</STRONG>erne<STRONG>L</STRONG><STRONG> - IP</STRONG><STRONG> S</STRONG>ecurity. It lives in the klips directory, - of course.</P> -<DL> -<DT>klips/doc</DT> -<DD>documentation</DD> -<DT>klips/patches</DT> -<DD>patches for existing kernel files</DD> -<DT>klips/test</DT> -<DD>test stuff</DD> -<DT>klips/utils</DT> -<DD>low-level user utilities</DD> -<DT>klips/net/ipsec</DT> -<DD>actual klips kernel files</DD> -<DT>klips/src</DT> -<DD>symbolic link to klips/net/ipsec -<P>The "make insert" step of installation installs the patches and makes - a symbolic link from the kernel tree to klips/net/ipsec. The odd name - of klips/net/ipsec is dictated by some annoying limitations of the - scripts which build the Linux kernel. The symbolic-link business is a - bit messy, but all the alternatives are worse.</P> -<P></P> -</DD> -<DT>klips/utils</DT> -<DD>Utility programs: -<P></P> -<DL> -<DT>eroute</DT> -<DD>manipulate IPsec extended routing tables</DD> -<DT>klipsdebug</DT> -<DD>set Klips (kernel IPsec support) debug features and level</DD> -<DT>spi</DT> -<DD>manage IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT>spigrp</DT> -<DD>group/ungroup IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT>tncfg</DT> -<DD>associate IPsec virtual interface with real interface</DD> -</DL> -<P>These are all normally invoked by ipsec(8) with commands such as</P> -<PRE> ipsec tncfg <VAR>arguments</VAR></PRE> - There are section 8 man pages for all of these; the names have "ipsec_" - as a prefix, so your man command should be something like: -<PRE> man 8 ipsec_tncfg</PRE> -</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="pluto.roadmap">Pluto key and connection management daemon</A> -</H2> -<P><A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> is our key management and negotiation - daemon. It lives in the pluto directory, along with its low-level user - utility, whack.</P> -<P> There are no subdirectories. Documentation is a man page,<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto.8</A>. This covers whack as well.</P> -<H2><A name="utils">Utils</A></H2> -<P> The utils directory contains a growing collection of higher-level - user utilities, the commands that administer and control the software. - Most of the things that you will actually have to run yourself are in - there.</P> -<DL> -<DT>ipsec</DT> -<DD>invoke IPsec utilities -<P>ipsec(8) is normally the only program installed in a standard - directory, /usr/local/sbin. It is used to invoke the others, both those - listed below and the ones in klips/utils mentioned above.</P> -<P></P> -</DD> -<DT>auto</DT> -<DD>control automatically-keyed IPsec connections</DD> -<DT>manual</DT> -<DD>take manually-keyed IPsec connections up and down</DD> -<DT>barf</DT> -<DD>generate copious debugging output</DD> -<DT>look</DT> -<DD>generate moderate amounts of debugging output</DD> -</DL> -<P> There are .8 manual pages for these. look is covered in barf.8. The - man pages have an "ipsec_" prefix so your man command should be - something like:</P> -<PRE> - man 8 ipsec_auto -</PRE> -<P> Examples are in various files with names utils/*.eg</P> -<H2><A name="lib">Libraries</A></H2> -<H3><A name="fswanlib">FreeS/WAN Library</A></H3> -<P> The lib directory is the FreeS/WAN library, also steadily growing, - used by both user-level and kernel code. -<BR /> It includes section 3<A href="manpages.html"> man pages</A> for - the library routines.</P> -<H3><A name="otherlib">Imported Libraries</A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="33_6_2_1">LibDES</A></H4> - The libdes library, originally from SSLeay, is used by both Klips and - Pluto for<A href="#3DES"> Triple DES</A> encryption. Single DES is not - used because<A href="#desnotsecure"> it is insecure</A>. -<P> Note that this library has its own license, different from the<A href="#GPL"> - GPL</A> used for other code in FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P> The library includes its own documentation.</P> -<H4><A NAME="33_6_2_2">GMP</A></H4> - The GMP (GNU multi-precision) library is used for multi-precision - arithmetic in Pluto's key-exchange code and public key code. -<P> Older versions (up to 1.7) of FreeS/WAN included a copy of this - library in the FreeS/WAN distribution.</P> -<P> Since 1.8, we have begun to rely on the system copy of GMP.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing guide</A></H1> -<P> User mode linux is a way to compile a linux kernel such that it can - run as a process in another linux system (potentially as a *BSD or - Windows process later). See<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/"> - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/</A></P> -<P> UML is a good platform for testing and experimenting with FreeS/WAN. - It allows several network nodes to be simulated on a single machine. - Creating, configuring, installing, monitoring, and controling these - nodes is generally easier and easier to script with UML than real - hardware.</P> -<P> You'll need about 500Mb of disk space for a full - sunrise-east-west-sunset setup. You can possibly get this down by 130Mb - if you remove the sunrise/sunset kernel build. If you just want to run, - then you can even remove the east/west kernel build.</P> -<P> Nothing need be done as super user. In a couple of steps, we note - where super user is required to install commands in system-wide - directories, but ~/bin could be used instead. UML seems to use a - system-wide /tmp/uml directory so different users may interfere with - one another. Later UMLs use ~/.uml instead, so multiple users running - UML tests should not be a problem, but note that a single user running - the UML tests will only be able run one set. Further, UMLs sometimes - get stuck and hang around. These "zombies" (most will actually be in - the "T" state in the process table) will interfere with subsequent - tests.</P> -<H2><A NAME="34_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></H2> -<P> As of 2003/3/1, the Light-Weight Resolver is used by pluto. This - requires that BIND9 be running. It also requires that BIND9 development - libraries be present in the build environment. The DNSSEC code is only - truly functional in BIND9 snapshots. The library code could be 9.2.2, - we believe. We are using BIND9 20021115 snapshot code from<A HREF="ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/snapshots"> - ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/snapshots</A>.</P> -<P> FreeS/WAN may well require a newer BIND than is on your system. Many - distributions have moved to BIND9.2.2 recently due to a security - advisory. BIND is five components.</P> -<OL> -<LI> named</LI> -<LI> dnssec-*</LI> -<LI> client side resolver libraries</LI> -<LI> client side utility libraries I thought there were lib and named - parts to dnsssec...</LI> -<LI> dynamic DNS update utilities</LI> -</OL> -<P> The only piece that we need for *building* is #4. That's the only - part that has to be on the build host. What is the difference between - resolver and util libs? If you want to edit - testing/baseconfigs/all/etc/bind, you'll need a snapshot version. The - resolver library contains the resolver. FreeS/WAN has its own copy of - that in lib/liblwres.</P> -<H2><A NAME="34_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<OL> -<LI> Get the following files: -<OL type="a"> -<LI> from<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/freeswan/uml/"> - http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/freeswan/uml/</A> - umlfreeroot-15.1.tar.gz (or highest numbered one). This is a debian - potato root file system. You can use this even on a Redhat host, as it - has the newer GLIBC2.2 libraries as well. -<!-- If you are using - Redhat 7.2 or newer as your development machine, you can create the - image from your installation media. See <A HREF="uml-rhroot.html">Building a RedHat root"></A>. - A future document will explain how to build this from .DEB files as well. ---> - -<!-- -<LI> umlfreesharemini.tar.gz (or umlfreeshareall.tar.gz). - If you are a Debian potato user, you don't need it you can use your - native /usr/share. -</UL> ---> -</LI> -<LI> From<A HREF="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/"> - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/</A> a snapshot or release - (1.92 or better)</LI> -<LI> From a<A HREF="http://www.kernel.org/mirrors/"> - http://www.kernel.org mirror</A>, the virgin 2.4.19 kernel. Please - realize that we have defaults in our tree for kernel configuration. We - try to track the latest UML kernels. If you use a newer kernel, you may - have faults in the kernel build process. You can see what the latest - that is being regularly tested by visiting<A HREF="http://bugs.freeswan.org:81/regress/HEAD/lastgood/freeswan-regress-env.sh"> - freeswan-regress-env.sh</A>.</LI> -<LI> -<!-- Note: this step is refered to as "step 1d" below. --> - Get<A HREF="http://ftp.nl.linux.org/uml/"> - http://ftp.nl.linux.org/uml/</A> uml-patch-2.4.19-47.bz2 or the one - associated with your kernel. As of 2003/03/05, uml-patch-2.4.19-47.bz2 - works for us.<STRONG> More recent versions of the patch have not been - tested by us.</STRONG></LI> -<LI> You'll probably want to visit<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net"> - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net</A> and get the UML utilities. - These are not needed for the build or interactive use (but - recommended). They are necessary for the regression testing procedures - used by "make check". We currently use uml_utilities_20020212.tar.bz2.</LI> -<LI> You need tcpdump version 3.7.1 or better. This is newer than the - version included in most LINUX distributions. You can check the version - of an installed tcpdump with the --version flag. If you need a newer - tcpdump fetch both tcpdump and libpcap source tar files from<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - http://www.tcpdump.org/</A> or a mirror.</LI> -</OL> -</LI> -<LI> Pick a suitable place, and extract the following files: -<OL type="a"> -<LI> -<!-- Note: this step is refered to as "step 2a" later. --> - 2.4.19 kernel. For instance: -<PRE> - <CODE> cd /c2/kernel - tar xzvf ../download/pub/linux/kernel/v2.4/linux-2.4.19.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> extract the umlfreeroot file -<!-- (unless you <A HREF="uml-rhroot.html">built your own from RPMs</A>) --> - -<PRE> - <CODE> mkdir -p /c2/user-mode-linux/basic-root - cd /c2/user-mode-linux/basic-root - tar xzvf ../download/umlfreeroot-15.1.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> FreeSWAN itself (or checkout "all" from CVS) -<PRE> - <CODE> mkdir -p /c2/freeswan/sandbox - cd /c2/freeswan/sandbox - tar xzvf ../download/snapshot.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -</OL> -</LI> -<LI> If you need to build a newer tcpdump: -<UL> -<LI> Make sure you have OpenSSL installed -- it is needed for - cryptographic routines.</LI> -<LI> Unpack libpcap and tcpdump source in parallel directories (the - tcpdump build procedures look for libpcap next door).</LI> -<LI> Change directory into the libpcap source directory and then build - the library: -<PRE> - <CODE> ./configure - make -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> Change into the tcpdump source directory, build tcpdump, and - install it. -<PRE> - <CODE> ./configure - make - # Need to be superuser to install in system directories. - # Installing in ~/bin would be an alternative. - su -c "make install" -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI> If you need the uml utilities, unpack them somewhere then build and - install them: -<PRE> - <CODE> cd tools - make all - # Need to be superuser to install in system directories. - # Installing in ~/bin would be an alternative. - su -c "make install BIN_DIR=/usr/local/bin" -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> set up the configuration file -<UL> -<LI> <CODE>cd /c2/freeswan/sandbox/freeswan-1.97/testing/utils</CODE></LI> -<LI> copy umlsetup-sample.sh to ../../umlsetup.sh: <CODE> cp - umlsetup-sample.sh ../../umlsetup.sh</CODE></LI> -<LI> open up ../../umlsetup.sh in your favorite editor.</LI> -<LI> change POOLSPACE= to point to the place with at least 500Mb of - disk. Best if it is on the same partition as the "umlfreeroot" - extraction, as it will attempt to use hard links if possible to save - disk space.</LI> -<LI> Set TESTINGROOT if you intend to run the script outside of the - sandbox/snapshot/release directory. Otherwise, it will configure - itself.</LI> -<LI> KERNPOOL should point to the directory with your 2.4.19 kernel - tree. This tree should be unconfigured! This is the directory you used - in step 2a.</LI> -<LI> UMLPATCH should point at the bz2 file you downloaded at 1d. If - using a kernel that already includes the patch, set this to /dev/null.</LI> -<LI> FREESWANDIR should point at the directory where you unpacked the - snapshot/release. Include the "freeswan-snap2001sep16b" or whatever in - it. If you are running from CVS, then you point at the directory where - top, klips, etc. are. The script will fix up the directory so that it - can be used.</LI> -<LI> BASICROOT should be set to the directory used in 2b, or to the - directory that you created with RPMs.</LI> -<LI> SHAREDIR should be set to the directory used in 2c, to /usr/share - for Debian potato users, or to $BASICROOT/usr/share.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI> -<PRE> <CODE>cd $TESTINGROOT/utils -sh make-uml.sh -</CODE></PRE> - It will grind for awhile. If there are errors it will bail. If so, run - it under "script" and send the output to bugs@lists.freeswan.org.</LI> -<LI> You will have a bunch of stuff under $POOLSPACE. Open four xterms: -<PRE> <CODE> for i in sunrise sunset east west - do - xterm -name $i -title $i -e $POOLSPACE/$i/start.sh done -</CODE></PRE> -</LI> -<LI> Login as root. Password is "root" (Note, these virtual machines are - networked together, but are not configured to talk to the rest of the - world.)</LI> -<LI> verify that pluto started on east/west, run "ipsec look"</LI> -<LI> login to sunrise. run "ping sunset"</LI> -<LI> login to west. run "tcpdump -p -i eth1 -n" (tcpdump must be version - 3.7.1 or newer)</LI> -<LI> Closing a console xterm will shut down that UML.</LI> -<LI> You can "make check", if you want to. It is run from - /c2/freeswan/sandbox/freeswan-1.97.</LI> -</OL> -<H1><A NAME="35">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></H1> -<P> With User-Mode-Linux, you can debug the kernel using GDB. See -<!--HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/debugging.html"--> - - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/debugging.html.</(null)></P> -<P> Typically, one will want to address a test case for a failing - situation. Running GDB from Emacs, or from other front ends is - possible. First start GDB.</P> -<P> Tell it to open the UMLPOOL/swan/linux program.</P> -<P> Note the PID of GDB:</P> -<PRE> -marajade-[projects/freeswan/mgmt/planning] mcr 1029 %ps ax | grep gdb - 1659 pts/9 SN 0:00 /usr/bin/gdb -fullname -cd /mara4/freeswan/kernpatch/UMLPOOL/swan/ linux -</PRE> -<P> Set the following in the environment:</P> -<PRE> -UML_east_OPT="debug gdb-pid=1659" -</PRE> -<P> Then start the user-mode-linux in the test scheme you wish:</P> -<PRE> -marajade-[kernpatch/testing/klips/east-icmp-02] mcr 1220 %../../utils/runme.sh -</PRE> - The user-mode-linux will stop on boot, giving you a chance to attach to - the process: -<PRE> -(gdb) file linux -Reading symbols from linux...done. -(gdb) attach 1 -Attaching to program: /mara4/freeswan/kernpatch/UMLPOOL/swan/linux, process 1 -0xa0118bc1 in kill () at hostfs_kern.c:770 -</PRE> -<P> At this point, break points should be created as appropriate.</P> -<H2><A NAME="35_1">Other notes about debugging</A></H2> -<P> If you are running a standard test, after all the packets are sent, - the UML will be shutdown. This can cause problems, because the UML may - get terminated while you are debugging.</P> -<P> The environment variable <CODE>NETJIGWAITUSER</CODE> can be set to - "waituser". If so, then the testing system will prompt before exiting - the test.</P> -<H1><A NAME="36">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></H1> -<UL> -<LI> running more than one UML of the same name (e.g. "west") can cause - problems.</LI> -<LI> running more than one UML from the same root file system is not a - good idea.</LI> -<LI> all this means that running "make check" twice on the same machine - is probably not a good idea.</LI> -<LI> occationally, UMLs will get stuck. This can happen like: -<!--BLOCK--> - 15134 ? T - 0:00 /spare/hugh/uml/uml2.4.18-sept5/umlbuild/east/linux (east) - [/bin/sh] 15138 ? T 0:00 - /spare/hugh/uml/uml2.4.18-sept5/umlbuild/east/linux (east) [halt]</(null)> - these will need to be killed. Note that they are in "T"racing mode.</LI> -<LI> UMLs can also hang, and will report "Tracing myself and I can't get - out". This is a bug in UML. There are ways to find out what is going on - and report this to the UML people, but we don't know the magic right - now.</LI> -</UL> -<H1><A NAME="37">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A></H1> -<P> uml_netjig can be compiled with a built-in tcpdump. This uses - not-yet-released code from<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - www.tcpdump.org</A>. Please see the instructions in <CODE> -testing/utils/uml_netjig/Makefile</CODE>.</P> -<HR> -<H1><A name="makecheck">How to configure to use "make check"</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="38_1">What is "make check"</A></H2> -<P> "make check" is a target in the top level makefile. It takes care of - running a number of unit and system tests to confirm that FreeSWAN has - been compiled correctly, and that no new bugs have been introduced.</P> -<P> As FreeSWAN contains both kernel and userspace components, doing - testing of FreeSWAN requires that the kernel be simulated. This is - typically difficult to do as a kernel requires that it be run on bare - hardware. A technology has emerged that makes this simpler. This is<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net"> - User Mode Linux</A>.</P> -<P> User-Mode Linux is a way to build a Linux kernel such that it can - run as a process under another Linux (or in the future other) kernel. - Presently, this can only be done for 2.4 guest kernels. The host kernel - can be 2.2 or 2.4.</P> -<P> "make check" expects to be able to build User-Mode Linux kernels - with FreeSWAN included. To do this it needs to have some files - downloaded and extracted prior to running "make check". This is - described in the<A HREF="umltesting.html"> UML testing</A> document.</P> -<P> After having run the example in the UML testing document and - successfully brought up the four machine combination, you are ready to - use "make check"</P> -<H2><A NAME="38_2">Running "make check"</A></H2> -<P> "make check" works by walking the FreeSWAN source tree invoking the - "check" target at each node. At present there are tests defined only - for the <CODE>klips</CODE> directory. These tests will use the UML - infrastructure to test out pieces of the <CODE>klips</CODE> code.</P> -<P> The results of the tests can be recorded. If the environment - variable <CODE>$REGRESSRESULTS</CODE> is non-null, then the results of - each test will be recorded. This can be used as part of a nightly - regression testing system, see<A HREF="nightly.html"> Nightly testing</A> - for more details.</P> -<P> "make check" otherwise prints a minimal amount of output for each - test, and indicates pass/fail status of each test as they are run. - Failed tests do not cause failure of the target in the form of exit - codes.</P> -<H1><A NAME="39">How to write a "make check" test</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="39_1">Structure of a test</A></H2> -<P> Each test consists of a set of directories under <CODE>testing/</CODE> -. There are directories for <CODE>klips</CODE>, <CODE>pluto</CODE>, <CODE> -packaging</CODE> and <CODE>libraries</CODE>. Each directory has a list - of tests to run is stored in a file called <CODE>TESTLIST</CODE> in - that directory. e.g. <CODE>testing/klips/TESTLIST</CODE>.</P> -<H2 NAME="TESTLIST"><A NAME="39_2">The TESTLIST</A></H2> -<P> This isn't actually a shell script. It just looks like one. Some - tools other than /bin/sh process it. Lines that start with # are - comments.</P> -<PRE> -# test-kind directory-containing-test expectation [PR#] -</PRE> -<P>The first word provides the test type, detailed below.</P> -<P> The second word is the name of the test to run. This the directory - in which the test case is to be found..</P> -<P>The third word may be one of:</P> -<DL> -<DT> blank/good</DT> -<DD>the test is believed to function, report failure</DD> -<DT> bad</DT> -<DD> the test is known to fail, report unexpected success</DD> -<DT> suspended</DT> -<DD> the test should not be run</DD> -</DL> -<P> The fourth word may be a number, which is a PR# if the test is - failing.</P> -<H2><A NAME="39_3">Test kinds</A></H2> - The test types are: -<DL> -<DT>skiptest</DT> -<DD>means run no test.</DD> -<DT>ctltest</DT> -<DD>means run a single system without input/output.</DD> -<DT>klipstest</DT> -<DD>means run a single system with input/output networks</DD> -<DT><A HREF="#umlplutotest">umlplutotest</A></DT> -<DD>means run a pair of systems</DD> -<DT><A HREF="#umlXhost">umlXhost</A></DT> -<DD>run an arbitrary number of systems</DD> -<DT>suntest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a quad of east/west/sunrise/sunset</DD> -<DT>roadtest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a trio of east-sunrise + warrior</DD> -<DT>extrudedtest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a quad of east-sunrise + warriorsouth + park</DD> -<DT>mkinsttest</DT> -<DD>a test of the "make install" machinery.</DD> -<DT>kernel_test_patch</DT> -<DD>a test of the "make kernelpatch" machinery.</DD> -</DL> - Tests marked (TBD) have yet to be fully defined. -<P> Each test directory has a file in it called <CODE>testparams.sh</CODE> -. This file sets a number of environment variables to define the - parameters of the test.</P> -<H2><A NAME="39_4">Common parameters</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT>TESTNAME</DT> -<DD>the name of the test (repeated for checking purposes)</DD> -<DT>TEST_TYPE</DT> -<DD>the type of the test (repeat of type type above)</DD> -<DT>TESTHOST</DT> -<DD>the name of the UML machine to run for the test, typically "east" or - "west"</DD> -<DT>TEST_PURPOSE</DT> -<DD>The purpose of the test is one of: -<DL> -<DT>goal</DT> -<DD>The goal purpose is where a test is defined for code that is not yet - finished. The test indicates when the goals have in fact been reached.</DD> -<DT>regress</DT> -<DD>This is a test to determine that a previously existing bug has been - repaired. This test will initially be created to reproduce the bug in - isolation, and then the bug will be fixed.</DD> -<DT>exploit</DT> -<DD>This is a set of packets/programs that causes a vulnerability to be - exposed. It is a specific variation of the regress option.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>TEST_GOAL_ITEM</DT> -<DT></DT> -<DD>in the case of a goal test, this is a reference to the requirements - document</DD> -<DT>TEST_PROB_REPORT</DT> -<DD>in the case of regression test, this the problem report number from - GNATS</DD> -<DT>TEST_EXPLOIT_URL</DT> -<DD>in the case of an exploit, this is a URL referencing the paper - explaining the origin of the test and the origin of exploit software</DD> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a file in the test directory that contains the sanitized console - output against which to compare the output of the actual test.</DD> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS</DT> -<DD>a list of scripts (found in <CODE>klips/test/fixups</CODE>) to apply - to sanitize the console output of the machine under test. These are - typically perl, awk or sed scripts that remove things in the kernel - output that change each time the test is run and/or compiled.</DD> -<DT>INIT_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode prior to starting the tests. This file will usually - set up any eroute's and SADB entries that are required for the test.</P> -<P>Lines beginning with # are skipped. Blank lines are skipped. - Otherwise, a shell prompted is waited for each time (consisting of <CODE> -\n#</CODE>) and then the command is sent. Note that the prompt is waited - for before the command and not after, so completion of the last command - in the script is not required. This is often used to invoke a program - to monitor the system, e.g. <CODE>ipsec pf_key</CODE>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>RUN_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, before the packets are sent. On single machine tests, - this script doesn't provide any more power than INIT_SCRIPT, but is - implemented for consistency's sake.</P> -</DD> -<DT>FINAL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode after the final packet is sent. Similar to - INIT_SCRIPT, above. If not specified, then the single command "halt" is - sent. If specified, then the script should end with a halt command to - nicely shutdown the UML.</P> -</DD> -<DT>CONSOLEDIFFDEBUG</DT> -<DD>If set to "true" then the series of console fixups (see - REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS) will be output after it is constructed. (It should - be set to "false", or unset otherwise)</DD> -<DT>NETJIGDEBUG</DT> -<DD>If set to "true" then the series of console fixups (see - REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS) will be output after it is constructed. (It should - be set to "false", or unset otherwise)</DD> -<DT>NETJIGTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> If set to "netjig", then the results of talking to the <CODE> -uml_netjig</CODE> will be printed to stderr during the test. In - addition, the jig will be invoked with --debug, which causes it to log - its process ID, and wait 60 seconds before continuing. This can be used - if you are trying to debug the <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> program itself.</DD> -<DT>HOSTTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> If set to "hosttest", then the results of taling to the consoles of - the UMLs will be printed to stderr during the test.</DD> -<DT>NETJIGWAITUSER</DT> -<DD> If set to "waituser", then the scripts will wait forever for user - input before they shut the tests down. Use this is if you are debugging - through the kernel.</DD> -<DT>PACKETRATE</DT> -<DD> A number, in miliseconds (default is 500ms) at which packets will - be replayed by the netjig.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The klipstest function starts a program (<CODE> -testing/utils/uml_netjig/uml_netjig</CODE>) to setup a bunch of I/O - sockets (that simulate network interfaces). It then exports the - references to these sockets to the environment and invokes (using - system()) a given script. It waits for the script to finish.</P> - -<!-- <IMG SRC="single_netjig.png" ALT="block diagram of uml_netjig"> --> -<P> The script invoked (<CODE>testing/utils/host-test.tcl</CODE>) is a - TCL<A HREF="http://expect.nist.gov/"> expect</A> script that arranges - to start the UML and configure it appropriately for the test. The - configuration is done with the script given above for<VAR> INIT_SCRIPT</VAR> -. The TCL script then forks, leaves the UML in the background and exits. - uml_netjig continues. It then starts listening to the simulated network - answering ARPs and inserting packets as appropriate.</P> -<P> The klipstest function invokes <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> with - arguments to capture output from network interface(s) and insert - packets as appropriate:</P> -<DL> -<DT>PUB_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> file to feed in on the - public (encrypted) interface. (typically, eth1)</DD> -<DT>PRIV_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a pcap file to feed in on the private (plain-text) interface - (typically, eth0).</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the public (eth1) - interface are captured to a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> - file by <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. The klipstest function then uses - tcpdump on the file to produce text output, which is compared to the - file given.</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>REF_PRIV_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the private (eth0) - interface are captured and compared after conversion by tcpdump, as - with<VAR> REFPUBOUTPUT</VAR>.</DD> -<DT>REF_PRIV_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>EXITONEMPTY</DT> -<DD>a flag for <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. It should contain - "--exitonempty" of uml_netjig should exit when all of the input (<VAR> -PUBINPUT</VAR>,<VAR>PRIVINPUT</VAR>) packets have been injected.</DD> -<DT>ARPREPLY</DT> -<DD>a flag for <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. It should contain "--arpreply" - if <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> should reply to ARP requests. One will - typically set this to avoid having to fudge the ARP cache manually.</DD> -<DT>TCPDUMPFLAGS</DT> -<DD>a set of flags for the tcpdump used when converting captured output. - Typical values will include "-n" to turn off DNS, and often "-E" to set - the decryption key (tcpdump 3.7.1 and higher only) for ESP packets. The - "-t" flag (turn off timestamps) is provided automatically</DD> -<DT>NETJIG_EXTRA</DT> -<DD>additional comments to be sent to the netjig. This may arrange to - record or create additional networks, or may toggle options.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The basic concept of the <CODE>mkinsttest</CODE> test type is that - it performs a "make install" to a temporary $DESTDIR. The resulting - tree can then be examined to determine if it was done properly. The - files can be uninstalled to determine if the file list was correct, or - the contents of files can be examined more precisely.</P> -<DL> -<DT>INSTALL_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, then an install will be done. This provides the set of flags - to provide for the install. The target to be used (usually "install") - must be among the flags.</DD> -<DT>POSTINSTALL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD>If set, a script to run after initial "make install". Two arguments - are provided: an absolute path to the root of the FreeSWAN src tree, - and an absolute path to the temporary installation area.</DD> -<DT>INSTALL2_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, a second install will be done using these flags. Similarly - to INSTALL_FLAGS, the target must be among the flags.</DD> -<DT>UNINSTALL_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, an uninstall will be done using these flags. Similarly to - INSTALL_FLAGS, the target (usually "uninstall") must be among the - flags.</DD> -<DT>REF_FIND_f_l_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>If set, a <CODE>find $ROOT ( -type f -or -type -l )</CODE> will be - done to get a list of a real files and symlinks. The resulting file - will be compared to the file listed by this option.</DD> -<DT>REF_FILE_CONTENTS</DT> -<DD>If set, it should point to a file containing records for the form: -<PRE> - -<!--VARIABLE--> -reffile</(null)> -<!--VARIABLE--> -samplefile</(null)> -</PRE> - one record per line. A diff between the provided reference file, and - the sample file (located in the temporary installation root) will be - done for each record.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The <CODE>rpm_build_install_test</CODE> type is to verify that the - proper packing list is produced by "make rpm", and that the mechanisms - for building the kernel modules produce consistent results.</P> -<DL> -<DT>RPM_KERNEL_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>Point to an extracted copy of the RedHat kernel source code. - Variables from the environment may be used.</DD> -<DT>REF_RPM_CONTENTS</DT> -<DD>This is a file containing one record per line. Each record consists - of a RPM name (may contain wildcards) and a filename to compare the - contents to. The RPM will be located and a file list will be produced - with rpm2cpio.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_8">libtest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The libtest test is for testing library routines. The library file - is expected to provided an <CODE>#ifdef</CODE> by the name of<VAR> - library</VAR> -<!--CODE_MAIN</CODE--> -. The libtest type invokes the C compiler to compile this - file, links it against <CODE>libfreeswan.a</CODE> (to resolve any other - dependancies) and runs the test with the <CODE>-r</CODE> argument to - invoke a regression test.</(null)></P> -<P>The library test case is expected to do a self-test, exiting with - status code 0 if everything is okay, and with non-zero otherwise. A - core dump (exit code greater than 128) is noted specifically.</P> -<P> Unlike other tests, there are no subdirectories required, or other - parameters to set.</P> -<H2 NAME="umlplutotest"><A NAME="39_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The umlplutotest function starts a pair of user mode line processes. - This is a 2-host version of umlXhost. The "EAST" and "WEST" slots are - defined.</P> -<H2 NAME="umlXhost"><A NAME="39_10">umlXhost parameters</A></H2> -<P> The umlXtest function starts an arbitrary number of user mode line - processes.</P> - -<!-- <IMG SRC="single_netjig.png" ALT="block diagram of uml_netjig"> --> -<P> The script invoked (<CODE>testing/utils/Xhost-test.tcl</CODE>) is a - TCL<A HREF="http://expect.nist.gov/"> expect</A> script that arranges - to start each UML and configure it appropriately for the test. It then - starts listening (using uml_netjig) to the simulated network answering - ARPs and inserting packets as appropriate.</P> -<P> umlXtest has a series of slots, each of which should be filled by a - host. The list of slots is controlled by the variable, XHOST_LIST. This - variable should be set to a space seperated list of slots. The former - umlplutotest is now implemented as a variation of the umlXhost test, - with XHOST_LIST="EAST WEST".</P> -<P> For each host slot that is defined, a series of variables should be - filled in, defining what configuration scripts to use for that host.</P> -<P> The following are used to control the console input and output to - the system. Where the string ${host} is present, the host slot should - be filled in. I.e. for the two host system with XHOST_LIST="EAST WEST", - then the variables: EAST_INIT_SCRIPT and WEST_INIT_SCRIPT will exist.</P> -<DL> -<DT>${host}HOST</DT> -<DD>The name of the UML host which will fill this slot</DD> -<DT>${host}_INIT_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode prior to starting the tests. This file will usually - set up any eroute's and SADB entries that are required for the test. - Similar to INIT_SCRIPT, above.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_RUN_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, before the packets are sent. This set of commands is - run after all of the virtual machines are initialized. I.e. after - EAST_INIT_SCRIPT<B> AND</B> WEST_INIT_SCRIPT. This script can therefore - do things that require that all machines are properly configured.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_RUN2_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, after the packets are sent. This set of commands is - run before any of the virtual machines have been shut down. (I.e. - before EAST_FINAL_SCRIPT<B> AND</B> WEST_FINAL_SCRIPT.) This script can - therefore catch post-activity status reports.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_FINAL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode after the final packet is sent. Similar to - INIT_SCRIPT, above. If not specified, then the single command "halt" is - sent. Note that when this script is run, the other virtual machines may - already have been killed. If specified, then the script should end with - a halt command to nicely shutdown the UML.</P> -</DD> -<DT>REF_${host}_CONSOLE_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>Similar to REF_CONSOLE_OUTPUT, above.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Some additional flags apply to all hosts:</P> -<DL> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS</DT> -<DD>a list of scripts (found in <CODE>klips/test/fixups</CODE>) to apply - to sanitize the console output of the machine under test. These are - typically perl, awk or sed scripts that remove things in the kernel - output that change each time the test is run and/or compiled.</DD> -</DL> -<P> In addition to input to the console, the networks may have input fed - to them:</P> -<DL> -<DT>EAST_INPUT/WEST_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> file to feed in on the - private network side of each network. The "EAST" and "WEST" here refer - to the networks, not the hosts.</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>REF_EAST_FILTER/REF_WEST_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -< -<DT>TCPDUMPFLAGS</DT> -<DD>a set of flags for the tcpdump used when converting captured output. - Typical values will include "-n" to turn off DNS, and often "-E" to set - the decryption key (tcpdump 3.7.1 and higher only) for ESP packets. The - "-t" flag (turn off timestamps) is provided automatically</DD> -<DT>REF_EAST_OUTPUT/REF_WEST_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the private (eth0) - interface are captured and compared after conversion by tcpdump, as - with<VAR> REF_PUB_OUTPUT</VAR>.</DD> -<P> There are two additional environment variables that may be set on - the command line:</P> -<DL> -<DT> NETJIGVERBOSE=verbose export NETJIGVERBOSE</DT> -<DD> If set, then the test output will be "chatty", and let you know - what commands it is running, and as packets are sent. Without it set, - the output is limited to success/failure messages.</DD> -<DT> NETJIGTESTDEBUG=netjig export NETJIGTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> This will enable debugging of the communication with uml_netjig, - and turn on debugging in this utility. This does not imply - NETJIGVERBOSE.</DD> -</DL> -<DT> HOSTTESTDEBUG=hosttest export HOSTTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> This will show all interactions with the user-mode-linux consoles</DD> -</DL> -<H2 NAME="kernelpatch"><A NAME="39_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The kernel_patch_test function takes some kernel source, copies it - with lndir, and then applies the patch as produced by "make - kernelpatch".</P> -<P> The following are used to control the input and output to the - system:</P> -<DL> -<DT>KERNEL_NAME</DT> -<DD>the kernel name, typically something like "linus" or "rh"</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_VERSION</DT> -<DD>the kernel version number, as in "2.2" or "2.4".</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC</DT> -<DD>This variable should set in the environment, probably in - ~/freeswan-regress-env.sh. Examples of this variables would be - KERNEL_LINUS2_0_SRC or KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC. This variable should point to - an extracted copy of the kernel source in question.</DD> -<DT>REF_PATCH_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a copy of the patch output to compare against</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_PATCH_LEAVE_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>If set to a non-empty string, then the patched kernel source is not - removed at the end of the test. This will typically be set in the - environment while debugging.</DD> -</DL> -<H2 NAME="modtest"><A NAME="39_12">module_compile paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The module_compile test attempts to build the KLIPS module against a - given set of kernel source. This is also done by the RPM tests, but in - a very specific manner.</P> -<P> There are two variations of this test - one where the kernel either - doesn't need to be configured, or is already done, and tests were there - is a local configuration file.</P> -<P> Where the kernel doesn't need to be configured, the kernel source - that is found is simply used. It may be a RedHat-style kernel, where - one can cause it to configure itself via rhconfig.h-style definitions. - Or, it may just be a kernel tree that has been configured.</P> -<P> If the variable KERNEL_CONFIG_FILE is set, then a new directory is - created for the kernel source. It is populated with lndir(1). The - referenced file is then copied in as .config, and "make oldconfig" is - used to configure the kernel. This resulting kernel is then used as the - reference source.</P> -<P> In all cases, the kernel source is found the same was for the - kernelpatch test, i.e. via KERNEL_VERSION/KERNEL_NAME and - KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC.</P> -<P> Once there is kernel source, the module is compiled using the - top-level "make module" target.</P> -<P> The test is considered successful if an executable is found in - OUTPUT/module/ipsec.o at the end of the test.</P> -<DL> -<DT>KERNEL_NAME</DT> -<DD>the kernel name, typically something like "linus" or "rh"</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_VERSION</DT> -<DD>the kernel version number, as in "2.2" or "2.4".</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC</DT> -<DD>This variable should set in the environment, probably in - ~/freeswan-regress-env.sh. Examples of this variables would be - KERNEL_LINUS2_0_SRC or KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC. This variable should point to - an extracted copy of the kernel source in question.</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_CONFIG_FILE</DT> -<DD>The configuration file for the kernel.</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_PATCH_LEAVE_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>If set to a non-empty string, then the configured kernel source is - not removed at the end of the test. This will typically be set in the - environment while debugging.</DD> -<DT>MODULE_DEF_INCLUDE</DT> -<DD>The include file that will be used to configure the KLIPS module, - and possibly the kernel source.</DD> -</DL> -<H1><A NAME="40">Current pitfalls</A></H1> -<DL> -<DT> "tcpdump dissector" not available.</DT> -<DD> This is a non-fatal warning. If uml_netjig is invoked with the -t - option, then it will attempt to use tcpdump's dissector to decode each - packet that it processes. The dissector is presently not available, so - this option it normally turned off at compile time. The dissector - library will be released with tcpdump version 4.0.</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<H1><A name="nightly">Nightly regression testing</A></H1> -<P> The nightly regression testing system consists of several shell - scripts and some perl scripts. The goal is to check out a fresh tree, - run "make check" on it, record the results and summarize the results to - the team and to the web site.</P> -<P> Output can be found on<A HREF="http://bugs.freeswan.org:81/"> adams</A> -, although the tests are actually run on another project machine.</P> -<H1><A name="nightlyhowto">How to setup the nightly build</A></H1> -<P> The best way to do nightly testing is to setup a new account. We - call the account "build" - you could call it something else, but there - may still be some references to ~build in the scripts.</P> -<H2><A NAME="42_1"> Files you need to know about</A></H2> -<P> As few files as possible need to be extracted from the source tree - - files are run from the source tree whenever possible. However, there - are some bootstrap and configuration files that are necessary.</P> -<P> There are 7 files in testing/utils that are involved:</P> -<DL> -<DT> nightly-sample.sh</DT> -<DD> This is the root of the build process. This file should be copied - out of the CVS tree, to $HOME/bin/nightly.sh of the build account. This - file should be invoked from cron.</DD> -<DT> freeswan-regress-env-sample.sh</DT> -<DD> This file should be copied to $HOME/freeswan-regress-env.sh. It - should be edited to localize the values. See below.</DD> -<DT> regress-cleanup.pl</DT> -<DD> This file needs to be copied to $HOME/bin/regress-cleanup.pl. It is - invoked by the nightly file before doing anything else. It removes - previous nights builds in order to free up disk space for the build - about to be done.</DD> -<DT> teammail-sample.sh</DT> -<DD> A script used to send results email to the "team". This sample - script could be copied to $HOME/bin/teammail.sh. This version will PGP - encrypt all the output to the team members. If this script is used, - then PGP will have to be properly setup to have the right keys.</DD> -<DT> regress-nightly.sh</DT> -<DD> This is the first stage of the nightly build. This stage will call - other scripts as appropriate, and will extract the source code from - CVS. This script should be copied to $HOME/bin/regress-nightly.sh</DD> -<DT> regress-stage2.sh</DT> -<DD> This is the second stage of the nightly build. It is called in - place. It essentially sets up the UML setup in umlsetup.sh, and calls - "make check".</DD> -<DT> regress-summarize-results.pl</DT> -<DD> This script will summarize the results from the tests to a - permanent directory set by $REGRESSRESULTS. It is invoked from the - stage2 nightly script.</DD> -<DT> regress-chart.sh</DT> -<DD> This script is called at the end of the build process, and will - summarize each night's results (as saved into $REGRESSRESULTS by - regress-summarize-results.pl) as a chart using gnuplot. Note that this - requires at least gnuplot 3.7.2.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="42_2">Configuring freeswan-regress-env.sh</A></H2> -<P>For more info on KERNPOOL, UMLPATCH, BASICROOT and SHAREDIR, see<A HREF="umltesting.html"> - User-Mode-Linux testing guide</A>.</P> -<DL> -<DT> KERNPOOL</DT> -<DD> Extract copy of some kernel source to be used for UML builds</DD> -<DT> UMLPATCH</DT> -<DD> matching User-Mode-Linux patch.</DD> -<DT> BASICROOT</DT> -<DD> the root file system image (see<A HREF="umltesting.html"> - User-Mode-Linux testing guide</A>).</DD> -<DT> SHAREDIR=${BASICROOT}/usr/share</DT> -<DD> The /usr/share to use.</DD> -<DT> REGRESSTREE</DT> -<DD> A directory in which to store the nightly regression results. - Directories will be created by date in this tree.</DD> -<DT> TCPDUMP=tcpdump-3.7.1</DT> -<DD> The path to the<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> tcpdump</A> to - use. This must have crypto compiled in, and must be at least 3.7.1</DD> -<DT> KERNEL_RH7_2_SRC=/a3/kernel_sources/linux-2.4.9-13/</DT> -<DD> An extracted copy of the RedHat 7.2. kernel source. If set, then - the packaging/rpm-rh72-install-01 test will be run, and an RPM will be - built as a test.</DD> -<DT> KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC=/a3/kernel_sources/rh/linux-2.4.18-5</DT> -<DD> An extracted copy of the RedHat 7.3. kernel source. If set, then - the packaging/rpm-rh73-install-01 test will be run, and an RPM will be - built as a test.</DD> -<DT> NIGHTLY_WATCHERS="userid,userid,userid"</DT> -<DD> The list of people who should receive nightly output. This is used - by teammail.sh</DD> -<DT> FAILLINES=128</DT> -<DD> How many lines of failed test output to include in the nightly - output</DD> -<DT> PATH=$PATH:/sandel/bin export PATH</DT> -<DD> You can also override the path if necessary here.</DD> -<DT> CVSROOT=:pserver:anoncvs@ip212.xs4net.freeswan.org:/freeswan/MASTER</DT> -<DD> The CVSROOT to use. This example may work for anonymous CVS, but - will be 12 hours behind the primary, and is still experimental</DD> -<DT> SNAPSHOTSIGDIR=$HOME/snapshot-sig</DT> -<DD> For the release tools, where to put the generated per-snapshot - signature keys</DD> -<DT> LASTREL=1.97</DT> -<DD> the name of the last release branch (to find the right per-snapshot - signature</DD> -<DD></DD> -</DL> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/adv_config.html b/doc/adv_config.html deleted file mode 100644 index 4b779c753..000000000 --- a/doc/adv_config.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1232 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="kernel.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="install.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="adv_config">Other configuration possibilities</A></H1> -<P>This document describes various options for FreeS/WAN configuration - which are less used or more complex (often both) than the standard - cases described in our<A href="config.html#config"> config</A> and<A href="quickstart.html#quick_guide"> - quickstart</A> documents.</P> -<H2><A name="thumb">Some rules of thumb about configuration</A></H2> -<H3><A name="cheap.tunnel">Tunnels are cheap</A></H3> -<P>Nearly all of the overhead in IPsec processing is in the encryption - and authentication of packets. Our<A href="performance.html"> - performance</A> document discusses these overheads.</P> -<P>Beside those overheads, the cost of managing additional tunnels is - trivial. Whether your gateway supports one tunnel or ten just does not - matter. A hundred might be a problem; there is a<A href="performance.html#biggate"> - section</A> on this in the performance document.</P> -<P>So, in nearly all cases, if using multiple tunnels gives you a - reasonable way to describe what you need to do, you should describe it - that way in your configuration files.</P> -<P>For example, one user recently asked on a mailing list about this - network configuration:</P> -<PRE> netA---gwA---gwB---netB - |----netC - - netA and B are secured netC not. - netA and gwA can not access netC</PRE> -<P>The user had constructed only one tunnel, netA to netB, and wanted to - know how to use ip-route to get netC packets into it. This is entirely - unnecessary. One of the replies was:</P> -<PRE> The simplest way and indeed the right way to - solve this problem is to set up two connections: - - leftsubnet=NetA - left=gwA - right=gwB - rightsubnet=NetB - and - leftsubnet=NetA - left=gwA - right=gwB - rightsubnet=NetC</PRE> -<P>This would still be correct even if we added nets D, E, F, ... to the - above diagram and needed twenty tunnels.</P> -<P>Of course another possibility would be to just use one tunnel, with a - subnet mask that includes both netB and netC (or B, C, D, ...). See - next section.</P> -<P>In general, you can construct as many tunnels as you need. Networks - like netC in this example that do not connect directly to the gateway - are fine, as long as the gateway can route to them.</P> -<P>The number of tunnels can become an issue if it reaches 50 or so. - This is discussed in the<A href="performance.html#biggate"> performance</A> - document. Look there for information on supporting hundreds of Road - Warriors from one gateway.</P> -<P>If you find yourself with too many tunnels for some reason like - having eight subnets at one location and nine at another so you end up - with 9*8=72 tunnels, read the next section here.</P> -<H3><A name="subnet.size">Subnet sizes</A></H3> -<P>The subnets used in<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR> - can be of any size that fits your needs, and they need not correspond - to physical networks.</P> -<P>You adjust the size by changing the<A href="glossary.html#subnet"> - subnet mask</A>, the number after the slash in the subnet description. - For example</P> -<UL> -<LI>in 192.168.100.0/24 the /24 mask says 24 bits are used to designate - the network. This leave 8 bits to label machines. This subnet has 256 - addresses. .0 and .255 are reserved, so it can have 254 machines.</LI> -<LI>A subnet with a /23 mask would be twice as large, 512 addresses.</LI> -<LI>A subnet with a /25 mask would be half the size, 128 addresses.</LI> -<LI>/0 is the whole Internet</LI> -<LI>/32 is a single machine</LI> -</UL> -<P>As an example of using these in connection descriptions, suppose your - company's head office has four physical networks using the address - ranges:</P> -<DL> -<DT>192.168.100.0/24</DT> -<DD>development</DD> -<DT>192.168.101.0/24</DT> -<DD>production</DD> -<DT>192.168.102.0/24</DT> -<DD>marketing</DD> -<DT>192.168.103.0/24</DT> -<DD>administration</DD> -</DL> -<P>You can use exactly those subnets in your connection descriptions, or - use larger subnets to grant broad access if required:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access only development</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/23</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access development or production</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.102.0/23</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access marketing or administration</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/22</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access any of the four departments</DD> -</DL> -<P>or use smaller subnets to restrict access:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.0/24</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access any machine in administration</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.64/28</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access only certain machines in administration.</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.42/32</DT> -<DD>remote hosts can access only one particular machine in - administration</DD> -</DL> -<P>To be exact, 192.68.103.64/28 means all addresses whose top 28 bits - match 192.168.103.64. There are 16 of these because there are 16 - possibilities for the remainingg 4 bits. Their addresses are - 192.168.103.64 to 192.168.103.79.</P> -<P>Each connection description can use a different subnet if required.</P> -<P>It is possible to use all the examples above on the same FreeS/WAN - gateway, each in a different connection description, perhaps for - different classes of user or for different remote offices.</P> -<P>It is also possible to have multiple tunnels using different<VAR> - leftsubnet</VAR> descriptions with the same<VAR> right</VAR>. For - example, when the marketing manager is on the road he or she might have - access to:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.102.0/24</DT> -<DD>all machines in marketing</DD> -<DT>192.168.101.32/29</DT> -<DD>some machines in production</DD> -<DT>leftsubnet=192.168.103.42/32</DT> -<DD>one particular machine in administration</DD> -</DL> -<P>This takes three tunnels, but tunnels are cheap. If the laptop is set - up to build all three tunnels automatically, then he or she can access - all these machines concurrently, perhaps from different windows.</P> -<H3><A name="example.more">Other network layouts</A></H3> -<P>Here is the usual network picture for a site-to-site VPN::</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East=========Sunrise - local net untrusted net local net</PRE> -<P>and for the Road Warrior::</P> -<PRE> telecommuter's PC or - traveller's laptop - Sunset==========West------------------East - corporate LAN untrusted net</PRE> -<P>Other configurations are also possible.</P> -<H4><A name="internet.subnet">The Internet as a big subnet</A></H4> -<P>A telecommuter might have:</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East ================= firewall --- the Internet - home network untrusted net corporate network</PRE> -<P>This can be described as a special case of the general - subnet-to-subnet connection. The subnet on the right is 0.0.0.0/0, the - whole Internet.</P> -<P>West (the home gateway) can have its firewall rules set up so that - only IPsec packets to East are allowed out. It will then behave as if - its only connection to the world was a wire to East.</P> -<P>When machines on the home network need to reach the Internet, they do - so via the tunnel, East and the corporate firewall. From the viewpoint - of the Internet (perhaps of some EvilDoer trying to break in!), those - home office machines are behind the firewall and protected by it.</P> -<H4><A name="wireless.config">Wireless</A></H4> -<P>Another possible configuration comes up when you do not trust the - local network, either because you have very high security standards or - because your are using easily-intercepted wireless signals.</P> -<P>Some wireless networks have built-in encryption called<A href="glossary.html#WEP"> - WEP</A>, but its security is dubious. It is a fairly common practice to - use IPsec instead.</P> -<P>In this case, part of your network may look like this:</P> -<PRE> West-----------------------------East == the rest of your network - workstation untrusted wireless net</PRE> -<P>Of course, there would likely be several wireless workstations, each - with its own IPsec tunnel to the East gateway.</P> -<P>The connection descriptions look much like Road Warrior descriptions:</P> -<UL> -<LI>each workstation should have its own unique -<UL> -<LI>identifier for IPsec</LI> -<LI>RSA key</LI> -<LI>connection description.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>on the gateway, use<VAR> left=%any</VAR>, or the workstation IP - address</LI> -<LI>on workstations,<VAR> left=%defaultroute</VAR>, or the workstation - IP address</LI> -<LI><VAR>leftsubnet=</VAR> is not used.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The<VAR> rightsubnet=</VAR> parameter might be set in any of several - ways:</P> -<DL> -<DT>rightsubnet=0.0.0.0/0</DT> -<DD>allowing workstations to access the entire Internet (see<A href="#internet.subnet"> - above</A>)</DD> -<DT>rightsubnet=a.b.c.0/24</DT> -<DD>allowing access to your entire local network</DD> -<DT>rightsubnet=a.b.c.d/32</DT> -<DD>restricting the workstation to connecting to a particular server</DD> -</DL> -<P>Of course you can mix and match these as required. For example, a - university might allow faculty full Internet access while letting - student laptops connect only to a group of lab machines.</P> -<H2><A name="choose">Choosing connection types</A></H2> -<P>One choice you need to make before configuring additional connections - is what type or types of connections you will use. There are several - options, and you can use more than one concurrently.</P> -<H3><A name="man-auto">Manual vs. automatic keying</A></H3> -<P>IPsec allows two types of connections, with manual or automatic - keying. FreeS/WAN starts them with commands such as:</P> -<PRE> ipsec manual --up <VAR>name</VAR> - ipsec auto --up <VAR>name</VAR></PRE> -<P>The difference is in how they are keyed.</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#manual">Manually keyed</A> connections</DT> -<DD>use keys stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#auto">Automatically keyed</A> connections</DT> -<DD>use keys automatically generated by the Pluto key negotiation - daemon. The key negotiation protocol,<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> -, must authenticate the other system. (It is vulnerable to a<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A> if used without authentication.) We - currently support two authentication methods: -<UL> -<LI>using shared secrets stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets</A>.</LI> -<LI>RSA<A href="glossary.html#public"> public key</A> authentication, - with our machine's private key in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets</A>. Public keys for other machines may either be placed - in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A> or provided via - DNS.</LI> -</UL> -<P>A third method, using RSA keys embedded in<A href="glossary.html#X509"> - X.509</A> certtificates, is provided by user<A href="web.html#patch"> - patches</A>.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<P><A href="glossary.html#manual">Manually keyed</A> connections provide - weaker security than<A href="glossary.html#auto"> automatically keyed</A> - connections. An opponent who reads ipsec.secrets(5) gets your - encryption key and can read all data encrypted by it. If he or she has - an archive of old messages, all of them back to your last key change - are also readable.</P> -<P>With automatically-(re)-keyed connections, an opponent who reads - ipsec.secrets(5) gets the key used to authenticate your system in IKE - -- the shared secret or your private key, depending what authentication - mechanism is in use. However, he or she does not automatically gain - access to any encryption keys or any data.</P> -<P>An attacker who has your authentication key can mount a<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A> and, if that succeeds, he or she will get - encryption keys and data. This is a serious danger, but it is better - than having the attacker read everyting as soon as he or she breaks - into ipsec.secrets(5).. Moreover, the keys change often so an opponent - who gets one key does not get a large amount of data. To read all your - data, he or she would have to do a man-in-the-middle attack at every - key change.</P> -<P>We discuss using<A href="#prodman"> manual keying in production</A> - below, but this is<STRONG> not recommended</STRONG> except in special - circumstances, such as needing to communicate with some implementation - that offers no auto-keyed mode compatible with FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>Manual keying may also be useful for testing. There is some - discussion of this in our<A href="faq.html#man4debug"> FAQ</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="auto-auth">Authentication methods for auto-keying</A></H3> -<P>The IKE protocol which Pluto uses to negotiate connections between - gateways must use some form of authentication of peers. A gateway must - know who it is talking to before it can create a secure connection. We - support two basic methods for this authentication:</P> -<UL> -<LI>shared secrets, stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A></LI> -<LI>RSA authentication</LI> -</UL> -<P>There are, howver, several variations on the RSA theme, using - different methods of managing the RSA keys:</P> -<UL> -<LI>our RSA private key in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A> with other gateways' public keys -<DL> -<DT>either</DT> -<DD>stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A></DD> -<DT>or</DT> -<DD>looked up via<A href="glossary.html#DNS"> DNS</A></DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>authentication with<A href="glossary.html#x509"> x.509</A> - certificates.; See our<A href="web.html#patch"> links section</A> for - information on user-contributed patches for this.:</LI> -</UL> -<P>Public keys in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5</A> -) give a reasonably straightforward method of specifying keys for - explicitly configured connections.</P> -<P>Putting public keys in DNS allows us to support<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>. Any two FreeS/WAN gateways can provide - secure communication, without either of them having any preset - information about the other.</P> -<P>X.509 certificates may be required to interface to various<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> - PKI</A>s.</P> -<H3><A name="adv-pk">Advantages of public key methods</A></H3> -<P>Authentication with a<A href="glossary.html#public"> public key</A> - method such as<A href="glossary.html#RSA"> RSA</A> has some important - advantages over using shared secrets.</P> -<UL> -<LI>no problem of secure transmission of secrets -<UL> -<LI>A shared secret must be shared, so you have the problem of - transmitting it securely to the other party. If you get this wrong, you - have no security.</LI> -<LI>With a public key technique, you transmit only your public key. The - system is designed to ensure that it does not matter if an enemy - obtains public keys. The private key never leaves your machine.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>easier management -<UL> -<LI>Suppose you have 20 branch offices all connecting to one gateway at - head office, and all using shared secrets. Then the head office admin - has 20 secrets to manage. Each of them must be kept secret not only - from outsiders, but also from 19 of the branch office admins. The - branch office admins have only one secret each to manage. -<P>If the branch offices need to talk to each other, this becomes - problematic. You need another 20*19/2 = 190 secrets for - branch-to-branch communication, each known to exactly two branches. Now - all the branch admins have the headache of handling 20 keys, each - shared with exactly one other branch or with head office.</P> -<P>For larger numbers of branches, the number of connections and secrets - increases quadratically and managing them becomes a nightmare. A - 1000-gateway fully connected network needs 499,500 secrets, each known - to exactly two players. There are ways to reduce this problem, for - example by introducing a central key server, but these involve - additional communication overheads, more administrative work, and new - threats that must be carefully guarded against.</P> -</LI> -<LI>With public key techniques, the<EM> only</EM> thing you have to keep - secret is your private key, and<EM> you keep that secret from everyone</EM> -. -<P>As network size increaes, the number of public keys used increases - linearly with the number of nodes. This still requires careful - administration in large applications, but is nothing like the disaster - of a quadratic increase. On a 1000-gateway network, you have 1000 - private keys, each of which must be kept secure on one machine, and - 1000 public keys which must be distributed. This is not a trivial - problem, but it is manageable.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>does not require fixed IP addresses -<UL> -<LI>When shared secrets are used in IPsec, the responder must be able to - tell which secret to use by looking at the IP address on the incoming - packets. When the other parties do not have a fixed IP address to be - identified by (for example, on nearly all dialup ISP connections and - many cable or ADSL links), this does not work well -- all must share - the same secret!</LI> -<LI>When RSA authentication is in use, the initiator can identify itself - by name before the key must be determined. The responder then checks - that the message is signed with the public key corresponding to that - name.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is also a disadvantage:</P> -<UL> -<LI>your private key is a single point of attack, extremely valuable to - an enemy -<UL> -<LI>with shared secrets, an attacker who steals your ipsec.secrets file - can impersonate you or try<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle</A> attacks, but can only attack connections - described in that file</LI> -<LI>an attacker who steals your private key gains the chance to attack - not only existing connections<EM> but also any future connections</EM> - created using that key</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is partly counterbalanced by the fact that the key is never - transmitted and remains under your control at all times. It is likely - necessary, however, to take account of this in setting security policy. - For example, you should change gateway keys when an administrator - leaves the company, and should change them periodically in any case.</P> -<P>Overall, public key methods are<STRONG> more secure, more easily - managed and more flexible</STRONG>. We recommend that they be used for - all connections, unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise.</P> -<H2><A name="prodsecrets">Using shared secrets in production</A></H2> -<P>Generally, public key methods are preferred for reasons given above, - but shared secrets can be used with no loss of security, just more work - and perhaps more need to take precautions.</P> -<P>What I call "shared secrets" are sometimes also called "pre-shared - keys". They are used only for for authentication, never for encryption. - Calling them "pre-shared keys" has confused some users into thinking - they were encryption keys, so I prefer to avoid the term..</P> -<P>If you are interoperating with another IPsec implementation, you may - find its documentation calling them "passphrases".</P> -<H3><A name="secrets">Putting secrets in ipsec.secrets(5)</A></H3> -<P>If shared secrets are to be used to<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> - authenticate</A> communication for the<A href="glossary.html#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchange in the<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> - protocol, then those secrets must be stored in<VAR> /etc/ipsec.secrets</VAR> -. For details, see the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A> man page.</P> -<P>A few considerations are vital:</P> -<UL> -<LI>make the secrets long and unguessable. Since they need not be - remembered by humans, very long ugly strings may be used. We suggest - using our<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> ipsec_ranbits(8)</A> - utility to generate long (128 bits or more) random strings.</LI> -<LI>transmit secrets securely. You have to share them with other - systems, but you lose if they are intercepted and used against you. Use<A -href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A>,<A href="glossary.html#SSH"> SSH</A>, - hand delivery of a floppy disk which is then destroyed, or some other - trustworthy method to deliver them.</LI> -<LI>store secrets securely, in root-owned files with permissions - rw------.</LI> -<LI>limit sharing of secrets. Alice, Bob, Carol and Dave may all talk to - each other, but only Alice and Bob should know the secret for an - Alice-Bob link.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>do not share private keys</STRONG>. The private key for RSA - authentication of your system is stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A>, but it is a different class of secret from the - pre-shared keys used for the "shared secret" authentication. No-one but - you should have the RSA private key.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Each line has the IP addresses of the two gateways plus the secret. - It should look something like this:</P> -<PRE> 10.0.0.1 11.0.0.1 : PSK "jxTR1lnmSjuj33n4W51uW3kTR55luUmSmnlRUuWnkjRj3UuTV4T3USSu23Uk55nWu5TkTUnjT"</PRE> -<P><VAR>PSK</VAR> indicates the use of a<STRONG> p</STRONG>re-<STRONG>s</STRONG> -hared<STRONG> k</STRONG>ey. The quotes and the whitespace shown are - required.</P> -<P>You can use any character string as your secret. For security, it - should be both long and extremely hard to guess. We provide a utility - to generate such strings,<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> - ipsec_ranbits(8)</A>.</P> -<P>You want the same secret on the two gateways used, so you create a - line with that secret and the two gateway IP addresses. The - installation process supplies an example secret, useful<EM> only</EM> - for testing. You must change it for production use.</P> -<H3><A name="securing.secrets">File security</A></H3> -<P>You must deliver this file, or the relevant part of it, to the other - gateway machine by some<STRONG> secure</STRONG> means.<EM> Don't just - FTP or mail the file!</EM> It is vital that the secrets in it remain - secret. An attacker who knew those could easily have<EM> all the data - on your "secure" connection</EM>.</P> -<P>This file must be owned by root and should have permissions<VAR> - rw-------</VAR>.</P> -<H3><A name="notroadshared">Shared secrets for road warriors</A></H3> -<P>You can use a shared secret to support a single road warrior - connecting to your gateway, and this is a reasonable thing to do in - some circumstances. Public key methods have advantages, discussed<A href="#choose"> - above</A>, but they are not critical in this case.</P> -<P>To do this, the line in ipsec.secrets(5) is something like:</P> -<PRE> 10.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 : PSK "jxTR1lnmSjuj33n4W51uW3kTR55luUmSmnlRUuWnkjRj3UuTV4T3USSu23Uk55nWu5TkTUnjT"</PRE> - where the<VAR> 0.0.0.0</VAR> means that any IP address is acceptable. -<P><STRONG>For more than one road warrior, shared secrets are<EM> not</EM> - recommended.</STRONG> If shared secrets are used, then when the - responder needs to look up the secret, all it knows about the sender is - an IP address. This is fine if the sender is at a fixed IP address - specified in the config file. It is also fine if only one road warrior - uses the wildcard<VAR> 0.0.0.0</VAR> address. However, if you have more - than one road warrior using shared secret authentication, then they - must all use that wildcard and therefore<STRONG> all road warriors - using PSK autentication must use the same secret</STRONG>. Obviously, - this is insecure.</P> -<P><STRONG>For multiple road warriors, use public key authentication.</STRONG> - Each roadwarrior can then have its own identity (our<VAR> leftid=</VAR> - or<VAR> rightid=</VAR> parameters), its own public/private key pair, - and its own secure connection.</P> -<H2><A name="prodman">Using manual keying in production</A></H2> -<P>Generally,<A href="glossary.html#auto"> automatic keying</A> is - preferred over<A href="glossary.html#manual"> manual keying</A> for - production use because it is both easier to manage and more secure. - Automatic keying frees the admin from much of the burden of managing - keys securely, and can provide<A href="glossary.html#PFS"> perfect - forward secrecy</A>. This is discussed in more detail<A href="#man-auto"> - above</A>.</P> -<P>However, it is possible to use manual keying in production if that is - what you want to do. This might be necessary, for example, in order to - interoperate with some device that either does not provide automatic - keying or provides it in some version we cannot talk to.</P> -<P>Note that with manual keying<STRONG> all security rests with the keys</STRONG> -. If an adversary acquires your keys, you've had it. He or she can read - everything ever sent with those keys, including old messages he or she - may have archived.</P> -<P>You need to<STRONG> be really paranoid about keys</STRONG> if you're - going to rely on manual keying for anything important.</P> -<UL> -<LI>keep keys in files with 600 permissions, owned by root</LI> -<LI>be extremely careful about security of your gateway systems. Anyone - who breaks into a gateway and gains root privileges can get all your - keys and read everything ever encrypted with those keys, both old - messages he has archived and any new ones you may send.</LI> -<LI>change keys regularly. This can be a considerable bother, (and - provides an excellent reason to consider automatic keying instead), but - it is<EM> absolutely essential</EM> for security. Consider a manually - keyed system in which you leave the same key in place for months: -<UL> -<LI>an attacker can have a very large sample of text sent with that key - to work with. This makes various cryptographic attacks much more likely - to succeed.</LI> -<LI>The chances of the key being compromised in some non-cryptographic - manner -- a spy finds it on a discarded notepad, someone breaks into - your server or your building and steals it, a staff member is bribed, - tricked, seduced or coerced into revealing it, etc. -- also increase - over time.</LI> -<LI>a successful attacker can read everything ever sent with that key. - This makes any successful attack extremely damaging.</LI> -</UL> - It is clear that you must change keys often to have any useful - security. The only question is how often.</LI> -<LI>use<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A> or<A href="glossary.html#SSH"> - SSH</A> for all key transfers</LI> -<LI>don't edit files with keys in them when someone can look over your - shoulder</LI> -<LI>worry about network security; could someone get keys by snooping - packets on the LAN between your X desktop and the gateway?</LI> -<LI>lock up your backup tapes for the gateway system</LI> -<LI>... and so on</LI> -</UL> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN provides some facilities to help with this. In - particular, it is good policy to<STRONG> keep keys in separate files</STRONG> - so you can edit configuration information in /etc/ipsec.conf without - exposing keys to "shoulder surfers" or network snoops. We support this - with the<VAR> also=</VAR> and<VAR> include</VAR> syntax in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<P>See the last example in our<A href="examples"> examples</A> file. In - the /etc/ipsec.conf<VAR> conn samplesep</VAR> section, it has the line:</P> -<PRE> also=samplesep-keys</PRE> -<P>which tells the "ipsec manual" script to insert the configuration - description labelled "samplesep-keys" if it can find it. The - /etc/ipsec.conf file must also have a line such as:</P> -<PRE>include ipsec.*.conf</PRE> -<P>which tells it to read other files. One of those other files then - might contain the additional data:</P> -<PRE>conn samplesep-keys - spi=0x200 - esp=3des-md5-96 - espenckey=0x01234567_89abcdef_02468ace_13579bdf_12345678_9abcdef0 - espauthkey=0x12345678_9abcdef0_2468ace0_13579bdf</PRE> -<P>The first line matches the label in the "also=" line, so the indented - lines are inserted. The net effect is exactly as if the inserted lines - had occurred in the original file in place of the "also=" line.</P> -<P>Variables set here are:</P> -<DL> -<DT>spi</DT> -<DD>A number needed by the manual keying code. Any 3-digit hex number - will do, but if you have more than one manual connection then<STRONG> - spi must be different</STRONG> for each connection.</DD> -<DT>esp</DT> -<DD>Options for<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> ESP</A> (Encapsulated - Security Payload), the usual IPsec encryption mode. Settings here are - for<A href="glossary.html#encryption"> encryption</A> using<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> - triple DES</A> and<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> - authentication</A> using<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> MD5</A>. Note that - encryption without authentication should not be used; it is insecure.</DD> -<DT>espenkey</DT> -<DD>Key for ESP encryption. Here, a 192-bit hex number for triple DES.</DD> -<DT>espauthkey</DT> -<DD>Key for ESP authentication. Here, a 128-bit hex number for MD5.</DD> -</DL> -<P><STRONG>Note</STRONG> that the<STRONG> example keys we supply</STRONG> - are intended<STRONG> only for testing</STRONG>. For real use, you - should go to automatic keying. If that is not possible, create your own - keys for manual mode and keep them secret</P> -<P>Of course, any files containing keys<STRONG> must</STRONG> have 600 - permissions and be owned by root.</P> -<P>If you connect in this way to multiple sites, we recommend that you - keep keys for each site in a separate file and adopt some naming - convention that lets you pick them all up with a single "include" line. - This minimizes the risk of losing several keys to one error or attack - and of accidentally giving another site admin keys which he or she has - no business knowing.</P> -<P>Also note that if you have multiple manually keyed connections on a - single machine, then the<VAR> spi</VAR> parameter must be different for - each one. Any 3-digit hex number is OK, provided they are different for - each connection. We reserve the range 0x100 to 0xfff for manual - connections. Pluto assigns SPIs from 0x1000 up for automatically keyed - connections.</P> -<P>If<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> contains - keys for manual mode connections, then it too must have permissions<VAR> - rw-------</VAR>. We recommend instead that, if you must manual keying - in production, you keep the keys in separate files.</P> -<P>Note also that<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A> - is installed with permissions<VAR> rw-r--r--</VAR>. If you plan to use - manually keyed connections for anything more than initial testing, you<B> - must</B>:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either change permissions to<VAR> rw-------</VAR></LI> -<LI>or store keys separately in secure files and access them via include - statements in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We recommend the latter method for all but the simplest - configurations.</P> -<H3><A name="ranbits">Creating keys with ranbits</A></H3> -<P>You can create new<A href="glossary.html#random"> random</A> keys - with the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> ranbits(8)</A> - utility. For example, the commands:</P> -<PRE> umask 177 - ipsec ranbits 192 > temp - ipsec ranbits 128 >> temp</PRE> -<P>create keys in the sizes needed for our default algorithms:</P> -<UL> -<LI>192-bit key for<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> 3DES</A> encryption -<BR> (only 168 bits are used; parity bits are ignored)</LI> -<LI>128-bit key for keyed<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> MD5</A> - authentication</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you want to use<A href="glossary.html#SHA"> SHA</A> instead of<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> - MD5</A>, that requires a 160-bit key</P> -<P>Note that any<STRONG> temporary files</STRONG> used must be kept<STRONG> - secure</STRONG> since they contain keys. That is the reason for the - umask command above. The temporary file should be deleted as soon as - you are done with it. You may also want to change the umask back to its - default value after you are finished working on keys.</P> -<P>The ranbits utility may pause for a few seconds if not enough entropy - is available immediately. See ipsec_ranbits(8) and random(4) for - details. You may wish to provide some activity to feed entropy into the - system. For example, you might move the mouse around, type random - characters, or do<VAR> du /usr > /dev/null</VAR> in the background.</P> -<H2><A name="boot">Setting up connections at boot time</A></H2> -<P>You can tell the system to set up connections automatically at boot - time by putting suitable stuff in /etc/ipsec.conf on both systems. The - relevant section of the file is labelled by a line reading<VAR> config - setup</VAR>.</P> -<P>Details can be found in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> man page. We also provide a file of<A href="examples"> - example configurations</A>.</P> -<P>The most likely options are something like:</P> -<DL> -<DT>interfaces="ipsec0=eth0 ipsec1=ppp0"</DT> -<DD>Tells KLIPS which interfaces to use. Up to four interfaces numbered - ipsec[0-3] are supported. Each interface can support an arbitrary - number of tunnels. -<P>Note that for PPP, you give the ppp[0-9] device name here, not the - underlying device such as modem (or eth1 if you are using PPPoE).</P> -</DD> -<DT>interfaces=%defaultroute</DT> -<DD>Alternative setting, useful in simple cases. KLIPS will pick up both - its interface and the next hop information from the settings of the - Linux default route.</DD> -<DT>forwardcontrol=no</DT> -<DD>Normally "no". Set to "yes" if the IP forwarding option is disabled - in your network configuration. (This can be set as a kernel - configuration option or later. e.g. on Redhat, it's in - /etc/sysconfig/network and on SuSE you can adjust it with Yast.) Linux - FreeS/WAN will then enable forwarding when starting up and turn it off - when going down. This is used to ensure that no packets will be - forwarded before IPsec comes up and takes control.</DD> -<DT>syslog=daemon.error</DT> -<DD>Used in messages to the system logging daemon (syslogd) to specify - what type of software is sending the messages. If the settings are - "daemon.error" as in our example, then syslogd treats the messages as - error messages from a daemon. -<P>Note that<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto</A> does not currently - pay attention to this variable. The variable controls setup messages - only.</P> -</DD> -<DT>klipsdebug=</DT> -<DD>Debug settings for<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A>.</DD> -<DT>plutodebug=</DT> -<DD>Debug settings for<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto</A>.</DD> -<DT>... for both the above DEBUG settings</DT> -<DD>Normally, leave empty as shown above for no debugging output. -<BR> Use "all" for maximum information. -<BR> See ipsec_klipsdebug(8) and ipsec_pluto(8) man page for other - options. Beware that if you set /etc/ipsec.conf to enable debug output, - your system's log files may get large quickly.</DD> -<DT>dumpdir=/safe/directory</DT> -<DD>Normally, programs started by ipsec setup don't crash. If they do, - by default, no core dump will be produced because such dumps would - contain secrets. If you find you need to debug such crashes, you can - set dumpdir to the name of a directory in which to collect the core - file.</DD> -<DT>manualstart=</DT> -<DD>List of manually keyed connections to be automatically started at - boot time. Useful for testing, but not for long term use. Connections - which are automatically started should also be automatically re-keyed.</DD> -<DT>pluto=yes</DT> -<DD>Whether to start<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto</A> when ipsec - startup is done. -<BR> This parameter is optional and defaults to "yes" if not present. -<P>"yes" is strongly recommended for production use so that the keying - daemon (Pluto) will automatically re-key the connections regularly. The - ipsec-auto parameters ikelifetime, ipseclifetime and reykeywindow give - you control over frequency of rekeying.</P> -</DD> -<DT>plutoload="reno-van reno-adam reno-nyc"</DT> -<DD>List of tunnels (by name, e.g. fred-susan or reno-van in our - examples) to be loaded into Pluto's internal database at startup. In - this example, Pluto loads three tunnels into its database when it is - started. -<P>If plutoload is "%search", Pluto will load any connections whose - description includes "auto=add" or "auto=start".</P> -</DD> -<DT>plutostart="reno-van reno-adam reno-nyc"</DT> -<DD>List of tunnels to attempt to negotiate when Pluto is started. -<P>If plutostart is "%search", Pluto will start any connections whose - description includes "auto=start".</P> -<P>Note that, for a connection intended to be permanent,<STRONG> both - gateways should be set try to start</STRONG> the tunnel. This allows - quick recovery if either gateway is rebooted or has its IPsec - restarted. If only one gateway is set to start the tunnel and the other - gateway restarts, the tunnel may not be rebuilt.</P> -</DD> -<DT>plutowait=no</DT> -<DD>Controls whether Pluto waits for one tunnel to be established before - starting to negotiate the next. You might set this to "yes" -<UL> -<LI>if your gateway is a very limited machine and you need to conserve - resources.</LI> -<LI>for debugging; the logs are clearer if only one connection is - brought up at a time</LI> -</UL> - For a busy and resource-laden production gateway, you likely want "no" - so that connections are brought up in parallel and the whole process - takes less time.</DD> -</DL> -<P>The example assumes you are at the Reno office and will use IPsec to - Vancouver, New York City and Amsterdam.</P> -<H2><A name="multitunnel">Multiple tunnels between the same two gateways</A> -</H2> -<P>Consider a pair of subnets, each with a security gateway, connected - via the Internet:</P> -<PRE> 192.168.100.0/24 left subnet - | - 192.168.100.1 - North Gateway - 101.101.101.101 left - | - 101.101.101.1 left next hop - [Internet] - 202.202.202.1 right next hop - | - 202.202.202.202 right - South gateway - 192.168.200.1 - | - 192.168.200.0/24 right subnet</PRE> -<P>A tunnel specification such as:</P> -<PRE>conn northnet-southnet - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24 - leftfirewall=yes - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1 - rightsubnet=192.168.200.0/24 - rightfirewall=yes</PRE> - will allow machines on the two subnets to talk to each other. You might - test this by pinging from polarbear (192.168.100.7) to penguin - (192.168.200.5). -<P>However,<STRONG> this does not cover other traffic you might want to - secure</STRONG>. To handle all the possibilities, you might also want - these connection descriptions:</P> -<PRE>conn northgate-southnet - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1 - rightsubnet=192.168.200.0/24 - rightfirewall=yes - -conn northnet-southgate - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - leftsubnet=192.168.100.0/24 - leftfirewall=yes - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1</PRE> -<P>Without these, neither gateway can do IPsec to the remote subnet. - There is no IPsec tunnel or eroute set up for the traffic.</P> -<P>In our example, with the non-routable 192.168.* addresses used, - packets would simply be discarded. In a different configuration, with - routable addresses for the remote subnet,<STRONG> they would be sent - unencrypted</STRONG> since there would be no IPsec eroute and there - would be a normal IP route.</P> -<P>You might also want:</P> -<PRE>conn northgate-southgate - left=101.101.101.101 - leftnexthop=101.101.101.1 - right=202.202.202.202 - rightnexthop=202.202.202.1</PRE> -<P>This is required if you want the two gateways to speak IPsec to each - other.</P> -<P>This requires a lot of duplication of details. Judicious use of<VAR> - also=</VAR> and<VAR> include</VAR> can reduce this problem.</P> -<P>Note that, while FreeS/WAN supports all four tunnel types, not all - implementations do. In particular, some versions of Windows 2000 and - the freely downloadable version of PGP provide only "client" - functionality. You cannot use them as gateways with a subnet behind - them. To get that functionality, you must upgrade to Windows 2000 - server or the commercially available PGP products.</P> -<H3><A name="advroute">One tunnel plus advanced routing</A></H3> - It is also possible to use the new routing features in 2.2 and later - kernels to avoid most needs for multple tunnels. Here is one mailing - list message on the topic: -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPSec packets not entering tunnel? - Date: Mon, 20 Nov 2000 - From: Justin Guyett <jfg@sonicity.com> - -On Mon, 20 Nov 2000, Claudia Schmeing wrote: - -> Right Left -> "home" "office" -> 10.92.10.0/24 ---- 24.93.85.110 ========= 216.175.164.91 ---- 10.91.10.24/24 -> -> I've created all four tunnels, and can ping to test each of them, -> *except* homegate-officenet. - -I keep wondering why people create all four tunnels. Why not route -traffic generated from home to 10.91.10.24/24 out ipsec0 with iproute2? -And 99% of the time you don't need to access "office" directly, which -means you can eliminate all but the subnet<->subnet connection.</PRE> - and FreeS/WAN technical lead Henry Spencer's comment: -<PRE>> I keep wondering why people create all four tunnels. Why not route -> traffic generated from home to 10.91.10.24/24 out ipsec0 with iproute2? - -This is feasible, given some iproute2 attention to source addresses, but -it isn't something we've documented yet... (partly because we're still -making some attempt to support 2.0.xx kernels, which can't do this, but -mostly because we haven't caught up with it yet). - -> And 99% of the time you don't need to access "office" directly, which -> means you can eliminate all but the subnet<->subnet connection. - -Correct in principle, but people will keep trying to ping to or from the -gateways during testing, and sometimes they want to run services on the -gateway machines too.</PRE> - -<!-- Is this in the right spot in this document? --> -<H2><A name="opp.gate">An Opportunistic Gateway</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_1">Start from full opportunism</A></H3> -<P>Full opportunism allows you to initiate and receive opportunistic - connections on your machine. The remaining instructions in this section - assume you have first set up full opportunism on your gateway using<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming"> - these instructions</A>. Both sets of instructions require mailing DNS - records to your ISP. Collect DNS records for both the gateway (above) - and the subnet nodes (below) before contacting your ISP.</P> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_2">Reverse DNS TXT records for each protected machine</A> -</H3> -<P>You need these so that your Opportunistic peers can:</P> -<UL> -<LI>discover the gateway's address, knowing only the IP address that - packets are bound for</LI> -<LI>verify that the gateway is authorised to encrypt for that endpoint</LI> -</UL> -<P>On the gateway, generate a TXT record with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt 192.0.2.11</PRE> -<P>Use your gateway address in place of 192.0.2.11.</P> -<P>You should see (keys are trimmed for clarity throughout our example):</P> -<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<P><B>This MUST BE the same key as in your gateway's TXT record, or - nothing will work.</B></P> -<P>In a text file, make one copy of this TXT record for each subnet - node:</P> -<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<P>Above each entry, insert a line like this:</P> -<PRE> 98.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR arthur.example.com.</PRE> -<P>It must include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The subnet node's address in reverse map format. For example, - 192.0.2.120 becomes<VAR> 120.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.</VAR>. Note the - final period.</LI> -<LI><VAR>IN PTR</VAR></LI> -<LI>The node's name, ie.<VAR> arthur.example.com.</VAR>. Note the final - period.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The result will be a file of TXT records, like this:</P> -<PRE> 98.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR arthur.example.com. - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - 99.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR ford.example.com. - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" - - 100.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR trillian.example.com. - ; RSA 2048 bits gateway.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_3">Publish your records</A></H3> -<P>Ask your ISP to publish all the reverse DNS records you have - collected. There may be a delay of up to 48 hours as the records - propagate.</P> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_4">...and test them</A></H3> -<P>Check a couple of records with commands like this one:</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify --host ford.example.com - ipsec verify --host trillian.example.com</PRE> -<P>The<VAR> verify</VAR> command checks for TXT records for both the - subnet host and its gateway. You should see output like:</P> -<PRE> ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 99.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 100.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ...</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="14_7_5">No Configuration Needed</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x ships with a built-in, automatically enabled OE - connection<VAR> conn packetdefault</VAR> which applies OE, if possible, - to all outbound traffic routed through the FreeS/WAN box. The<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5) manual</A> describes this connection in detail. While the - effect is much the same as<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR>, the - implementation is different: notably, it does not use policy groups.</P> -<P>You can create more complex OE configurations for traffic forwarded - through a FreeS/WAN box, as explained in our<A HREF="policygroups.html#policygroups"> - policy groups document</A>, or disable OE using<A HREF="policygroups.html#disable_policygroups"> - these instructions</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="extruded.config">Extruded Subnets</A></H2> -<P>What we call<A href="glossary.html#extruded"> extruded subnets</A> - are a special case of<A href="glossary.html#VPN.gloss"> VPNs</A>.</P> -<P>If your buddy has some unused IP addresses, in his subnet far off at - the other side of the Internet, he can loan them to you... provided - that the connection between you and him is fast enough to carry all the - traffic between your machines and the rest of the Internet. In effect, - he "extrudes" a part of his address space over the network to you, with - your Internet traffic appearing to originate from behind his Internet - gateway.</P> -<P>As far as the Internet is concerned, your new extruded net is behind - your buddy's gateway. You route all your packets for the Internet at - large out his gateway, and receive return packets the same way. You - route your local packets locally.</P> -<P>Suppose your friend has a.b.c.0/24 and wants to give you - a.b.c.240/28. The initial situation is:</P> -<PRE> subnet gateway Internet - a.b.c.0/24 a.b.c.1 p.q.r.s</PRE> - where anything from the Internet destined for any machine in a.b.c.0/24 - is routed via p.q.r.s and that gateway knows what to do from there. -<P>Of course it is quite normal for various smaller subnets to exist - behind your friend's gateway. For example, your friend's company might - have a.b.c.16/28=development, a.b.c.32/28=marketing and so on. The - Internet neither knows not cares about this; it just delivers packets - to the p.q.r.s and lets the gateway do whatever needs to be done from - there.</P> -<P>What we want to do is take a subnet, perhaps a.b.c.240/28, out of - your friend's physical location<EM> while still having your friend's - gateway route to it</EM>. As far as the Internet is concerned, you - remain behind that gateway.</P> -<PRE> subnet gateway Internet your gate extruded - - a.b.c.0/24 a.b.c.1 p.q.r.s d.e.f.g a.b.c.240/28 - - ========== tunnel ==========</PRE> -<P>The extruded addresses have to be a complete subnet.</P> -<P>In our example, the friend's security gateway is also his Internet - gateway, but this is not necessary. As long as all traffic from the - Internet to his addresses passes through the Internet gate, the - security gate could be a machine behind that. The IG would need to - route all traffic for the extruded subnet to the SG, and the SG could - handle the rest.</P> -<P>First, configure your subnet using the extruded addresses. Your - security gateway's interface to your subnet needs to have an extruded - address (possibly using a Linux<A href="glossary.html#virtual"> virtual - interface</A>, if it also has to have a different address). Your - gateway needs to have a route to the extruded subnet, pointing to that - interface. The other machines at your site need to have addresses in - that subnet, and default routes pointing to your gateway.</P> -<P>If any of your friend's machines need to talk to the extruded subnet,<EM> - they</EM> need to have a route for the extruded subnet, pointing at his - gateway.</P> -<P>Then set up an IPsec subnet-to-subnet tunnel between your gateway and - his, with your subnet specified as the extruded subnet, and his subnet - specified as "0.0.0.0/0".</P> -<P>The tunnel description should be:</P> -<PRE>conn extruded - left=p.q.r.s - leftsubnet=0.0.0.0/0 - right=d.e.f.g - rightsubnet=a.b.c.0/28</PRE> -<P>If either side was doing firewalling for the extruded subnet before - the IPsec connection is set up, you'll need to poke holes in your<A HREF="firewall.html#firewall"> - firewall</A> to allow packets through.</P> -<P>And it all just works. Your SG routes traffic for 0.0.0.0/0 -- that - is, the whole Internet -- through the tunnel to his SG, which then - sends it onward as if it came from his subnet. When traffic for the - extruded subnet arrives at his SG, it gets sent through the tunnel to - your SG, which passes it to the right machine.</P> -<P>Remember that when ipsec_manual or ipsec_auto takes a connection - down, it<EM> does not undo the route</EM> it made for that connection. - This lets you take a connection down and bring up a new one, or a - modified version of the old one, without having to rebuild the route it - uses and without any risk of packets which should use IPsec - accidentally going out in the clear. Because the route always points - into KLIPS, the packets will always go there. Because KLIPS temporarily - has no idea what to do with them (no eroute for them), they will be - discarded.</P> -<P>If you<EM> do</EM> want to take the route down, this is what the - "unroute" operation in manual and auto is for. Just do an unroute after - doing the down.</P> -<P>Note that the route for a connection may have replaced an existing - non-IPsec route. Nothing in Linux FreeS/WAN will put that pre-IPsec - route back. If you need it back, you have to create it with the route - command.</P> -<H2><A name="roadvirt">Road Warrior with virtual IP address</A></H2> -<P>Please note that<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A> now features DHCP-over-IPsec, which is an alternate - procedure for Virtual IP address assignment.</P> -<P></P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message about another way to configure for - road warrior support:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: understanding the vpn - Date: Thu, 28 Oct 1999 10:43:22 -0400 - From: Irving Reid <irving@nevex.com> - -> local-------linux------internet------mobile -> LAN box user -> ... - -> now when the mobile user connects to the linux box -> it is given a virtual IP address, i have configured it to -> be in the 10.x.x.x range. mobile user and linux box -> have a tunnel between them with these IP addresses. - -> Uptil this all is fine. - -If it is possible to configure your mobile client software *not* to -use a virtual IP address, that will make your life easier. It is easier -to configure FreeS/WAN to use the actual address the mobile user gets -from its ISP. - -Unfortunately, some Windows clients don't let you choose. - -> what i would like to know is that how does the mobile -> user communicate with other computers on the local -> LAN , of course with the vpn ? - -> what IP address should the local LAN -> computers have ? I guess their default gateway -> should be the linux box ? and does the linux box need -> to be a 2 NIC card box or one is fine. - -As someone else stated, yes, the Linux box would usually be the default -IP gateway for the local lan. - -However... - -If you mobile user has software that *must* use a virtual IP address, -the whole picture changes. Nobody has put much effort into getting -FreeS/WAN to play well in this environment, but here's a sketch of one -approach: - -Local Lan 1.0.0.0/24 - | - +- Linux FreeS/WAN 1.0.0.2 - | - | 1.0.0.1 - Router - | 2.0.0.1 - | -Internet - | - | 3.0.0.1 -Mobile User - Virtual Address: 1.0.0.3 - -Note that the Local Lan network (1.0.0.x) can be registered, routable -addresses. - -Now, the Mobile User sets up an IPSec security association with the -Linux box (1.0.0.2); it should ESP encapsulate all traffic to the -network 1.0.0.x **EXCEPT** UDP port 500. 500/udp is required for the key -negotiation, which needs to work outside of the IPSec tunnel. - -On the Linux side, there's a bunch of stuff you need to do by hand (for -now). FreeS/WAN should correctly handle setting up the IPSec SA and -routes, but I haven't tested it so this may not work... - -The FreeS/WAN conn should look like: - -conn mobile - right=1.0.0.2 - rightsubnet=1.0.0.0/24 - rightnexthop=1.0.0.1 - left=0.0.0.0 # The infamous "road warrior" - leftsubnet=1.0.0.3/32 - -Note that the left subnet contains *only* the remote host's virtual -address. - -Hopefully the routing table on the FreeS/WAN box ends up looking like -this: - -% netstat -rn -Kernel IP routing table -Destination Gateway Genmask Flags MSS Window irtt Iface -1.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.255.255.0 U 1500 0 0 eth0 -127.0.0.0 0.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 U 3584 0 0 lo -0.0.0.0 1.0.0.1 0.0.0.0 UG 1500 0 0 eth0 -1.0.0.3 1.0.0.1 255.255.255.255 UG 1433 0 0 ipsec0 - -So, if anybody sends a packet for 1.0.0.3 to the Linux box, it should -get bundled up and sent through the tunnel. To get the packets for -1.0.0.3 to the Linux box in the first place, you need to use "proxy -ARP". - -How this works is: when a host or router on the local Ethernet segment -wants to send a packet to 1.0.0.3, it sends out an Ethernet level -broadcast "ARP request". If 1.0.0.3 was on the local LAN, it would -reply, saying "send IP packets for 1.0.0.3 to my Ethernet address". - -Instead, you need to set up the Linux box so that _it_ answers ARP -requests for 1.0.0.3, even though that isn't its IP address. That -convinces everyone else on the lan to send 1.0.0.3 packets to the Linux -box, where the usual FreeS/WAN processing and routing take over. - -% arp -i eth0 -s 1.0.0.3 -D eth0 pub - -This says, if you see an ARP request on interface eth0 asking for -1.0.0.3, respond with the Ethernet address of interface eth0. - -Now, as I said at the very beginning, if it is *at all* possible to -configure your client *not* to use the virtual IP address, you can avoid -this whole mess.</PRE> -<H2><A name="dynamic">Dynamic Network Interfaces</A></H2> -<P>Sometimes you have to cope with a situation where the network - interface(s) aren't all there at boot. The common example is notebooks - with PCMCIA.</P> -<H3><A name="basicdyn">Basics</A></H3> -<P>The key issue here is that the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section of the<VAR> - /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR> configuration file lists the connection between - ipsecN and hardware interfaces, in the<VAR> interfaces=</VAR> variable. - At any time when<VAR> ipsec setup start</VAR> or<VAR> ipsec setup - restart</VAR> is run this variable<STRONG> must</STRONG> correspond to - the current real situation. More precisely, it<STRONG> must not</STRONG> - mention any hardware interfaces which don't currently exist. The - difficulty is that an<VAR> ipsec setup start</VAR> command is normally - run at boot time so interfaces that are not up then are mis-handled.</P> -<H3><A name="bootdyn">Boot Time</A></H3> -<P>Normally, an<VAR> ipsec setup start</VAR> is run at boot time. - However, if the hardware situation at boot time is uncertain, one of - two things must be done.</P> -<UL> -<LI>One possibility is simply not to have IPsec brought up at boot time. - To do this: -<PRE> chkconfig --level 2345 ipsec off</PRE> - That's for modern Red Hats or other Linuxes with chkconfig. Systems - which lack this will require fiddling with symlinks in /etc/rc.d/rc?.d - or the equivalent.</LI> -<LI>Another possibility is to bring IPsec up with no interfaces, which - is less aesthetically satisfying but simpler. Just put -<PRE> interfaces=</PRE> - in the configuration file. KLIPS and Pluto will be started, but won't - do anything.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="changedyn">Change Time</A></H3> -<P>When the hardware *is* in place, IPsec has to be made aware of it. - Someday there may be a nice way to do this.</P> -<P>Right now, the way to do it is to fix the<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR> - file appropriately, so<VAR> interfaces</VAR> reflects the new - situation, and then restart the IPsec subsystem. This does break any - existing IPsec connections.</P> -<P>If IPsec wasn't brought up at boot time, do</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup start</PRE> - while if it was, do -<PRE> ipsec setup restart</PRE> - which won't be as quick. -<P>If some of the hardware is to be taken out, before doing that, amend - the configuration file so interfaces no longer includes it, and do</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup restart</PRE> -<P>Again, this breaks any existing connections.</P> -<H2><A name="unencrypted">Unencrypted tunnels</A></H2> -<P>Sometimes you might want to create a tunnel without encryption. Often - this is a bad idea, even if you have some data which need not be - private. See this<A href="ipsec.html#traffic.resist"> discussion</A>.</P> -<P>The IPsec protocols provide two ways to do build such tunnels:</P> -<DL> -<DT>using ESP with null encryption</DT> -<DD>not supported by FreeS/WAN</DD> -<DT>using<A href="glossary.html#AH"> AH</A> without<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> - ESP</A></DT> -<DD>supported for manually keyed connections</DD> -<DD>possible with explicit commands via<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html"> - ipsec_whack(8)</A> (see this<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00190.html"> - list message</A>)</DD> -<DD>not supported in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html"> - ipsec_auto(8)</A> scripts.</DD> -</DL> - One situation in which this comes up is when otherwise some data would - be encrypted twice. Alice wants a secure tunnel from her machine to - Bob's. Since she's behind one security gateway and he's behind another, - part of the tunnel that they build passes through the tunnel that their - site admins have built between the gateways. All of Alice and Bob's - messages are encrypted twice. -<P>There are several ways to handle this.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Just accept the overhead of double encryption. The site admins might - choose this if any of the following apply: -<UL> -<LI>policy says encrypt everything (usually, it should)</LI> -<LI>they don't entirely trust Alice and Bob (usually, if they don't have - to, they shouldn't)</LI> -<LI>if they don't feel the saved cycles are worth the time they'd need - to build a non-encrypted tunnel for Alice and Bob's packets (often, - they aren't)</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Use a plain IP-in-IP tunnel. These are not well documented. A good - starting point is in the Linux kernel source tree, in - /usr/src/linux/drivers/net/README.tunnel.</LI> -<LI>Use a manually-keyed AH-only tunnel.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that if Alice and Bob want end-to-end security, they must build - a tunnel end-to-end between their machines or use some other end-to-end - tool such as PGP or SSL that suits their data. The only question is - whether the admins build some special unencrypted tunnel for those - already-encrypted packets.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="kernel.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="install.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/background.html b/doc/background.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8f24cad4a..000000000 --- a/doc/background.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,323 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="config.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="user_examples.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="background">Linux FreeS/WAN background</A></H1> -<P>This section discusses a number of issues which have three things in - common:</P> -<UL> -<LI>They are not specifically FreeS/WAN problems</LI> -<LI>You may have to understand them to get FreeS/WAN working right</LI> -<LI>They are not simple questions</LI> -</UL> -<P>Grouping them here lets us provide the explanations some users will - need without unduly complicating the main text.</P> -<P>The explanations here are intended to be adequate for FreeS/WAN - purposes (please comment to the<A href="mail.html"> users mailing list</A> - if you don't find them so), but they are not trying to be complete or - definitive. If you need more information, see the references provided - in each section.</P> -<H2><A name="dns.background">Some DNS background</A></H2> -<P><A href="glossary.html#carpediem">Opportunistic encryption</A> - requires that the gateway systems be able to fetch public keys, and - other IPsec-related information, from each other's DNS (Domain Name - Service) records.</P> -<P><A href="glossary.html#DNS">DNS</A> is a distributed database that - maps names to IP addresses and vice versa.</P> -<P>Much good reference material is available for DNS, including:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/DNS-HOWTO.html"> DNS HowTo</A> -</LI> -<LI>the standard<A href="biblio.html#DNS.book"> DNS reference</A> book</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/LDP/nag2/index.html">Linux Network - Administrator's Guide</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nominum.com/resources/whitepapers/bind-white-paper.html"> -BIND overview</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nominum.com/resources/documentation/Bv9ARM.pdf"> -BIND 9 Administrator's Reference</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>We give only a brief overview here, intended to help you use DNS for - FreeS/WAN purposes.</P> -<H3><A name="forward.reverse">Forward and reverse maps</A></H3> -<P>Although the implementation is distributed, it is often useful to - speak of DNS as if it were just two enormous tables:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the forward map: look up a name, get an IP address</LI> -<LI>the reverse map: look up an IP address, get a name</LI> -</UL> -<P>Both maps can optionally contain additional data. For opportunistic - encryption, we insert the data need for IPsec authentication.</P> -<P>A system named gateway.example.com with IP address 10.20.30.40 should - have at least two DNS records, one in each map:</P> -<DL> -<DT>gateway.example.com. IN A 10.20.30.40</DT> -<DD>used to look up the name and get an IP address</DD> -<DT>40.30.20.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR gateway.example.com.</DT> -<DD>used for reverse lookups, looking up an address to get the - associated name. Notice that the digits here are in reverse order; the - actual address is 10.20.30.40 but we use 40.30.20.10 here.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A NAME="17_1_2">Hierarchy and delegation</A></H3> -<P>For both maps there is a hierarchy of DNS servers and a system of - delegating authority so that, for example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the DNS administrator for example.com can create entries of the form<VAR> - name</VAR>.example.com</LI> -<LI>the example.com admin cannot create an entry for counterexample.com; - only someone with authority for .com can do that</LI> -<LI>an admin might have authority for 20.10.in-addr.arpa.</LI> -<LI>in either map, authority can be delegated -<UL> -<LI>the example.com admin could give you authority for - westcoast.example.com</LI> -<LI>the 20.10.in-addr.arpa admin could give you authority for - 30.20.10.in-addr.arpa</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>DNS zones are the units of delegation. There is a hierarchy of zones.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_1_3">Syntax of DNS records</A></H3> -<P>Returning to the example records:</P> -<PRE> gateway.example.com. IN A 10.20.30.40 - 40.30.20.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR gateway.example.com.</PRE> -<P>some syntactic details are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the IN indicates that these records are for<STRONG> In</STRONG> -ternet addresses</LI> -<LI>The final periods in '.com.' and '.arpa.' are required. They - indicate the root of the domain name system.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The capitalised strings after IN indicate the type of record. - Possible types include:</P> -<UL> -<LI><STRONG>A</STRONG>ddress, for forward lookups</LI> -<LI><STRONG>P</STRONG>oin<STRONG>T</STRONG>e<STRONG>R</STRONG>, for - reverse lookups</LI> -<LI><STRONG>C</STRONG>anonical<STRONG> NAME</STRONG>, records to support - aliasing, multiple names for one address</LI> -<LI><STRONG>M</STRONG>ail e<STRONG>X</STRONG>change, used in mail - routing</LI> -<LI><STRONG>SIG</STRONG>nature, used in<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> - secure DNS</A></LI> -<LI><STRONG>KEY</STRONG>, used in<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> secure - DNS</A></LI> -<LI><STRONG>T</STRONG>e<STRONG>XT</STRONG>, a multi-purpose record type</LI> -</UL> -<P>To set up for opportunistic encryption, you add some TXT records to - your DNS data. Details are in our<A href="quickstart.html"> quickstart</A> - document.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_1_4">Cacheing, TTL and propagation delay</A></H3> -<P>DNS information is extensively cached. With no caching, a lookup by - your system of "www.freeswan.org" might involve:</P> -<UL> -<LI>your system asks your nameserver for "www.freeswan.org"</LI> -<LI>local nameserver asks root server about ".org", gets reply</LI> -<LI>local nameserver asks .org nameserver about "freeswan.org", gets - reply</LI> -<LI>local nameserver asks freeswan.org nameserver about - "www.freeswan.org", gets reply</LI> -</UL> -<P>However, this can be a bit inefficient. For example, if you are in - the Phillipines, the closest a root server is in Japan. That might send - you to a .org server in the US, and then to freeswan.org in Holland. If - everyone did all those lookups every time they clicked on a web link, - the net would grind to a halt.</P> -<P>Nameservers therefore cache information they look up. When you click - on another link at www.freeswan.org, your local nameserver has the IP - address for that server in its cache, and no further lookups are - required.</P> -<P>Intermediate results are also cached. If you next go to - lists.freeswan.org, your nameserver can just ask the freeswan.org - nameserver for that address; it does not need to query the root or .org - nameservers because it has a cached address for the freeswan.org zone - server.</P> -<P>Of course, like any cacheing mechanism, this can create problems of - consistency. What if the administrator for freeswan.org changes the IP - address, or the authentication key, for www.freeswan.org? If you use - old information from the cache, you may get it wrong. On the other - hand, you cannot afford to look up fresh information every time. Nor - can you expect the freeswan.org server to notify you; that isn't in the - protocols.</P> -<P>The solution that is in the protocols is fairly simple. Cacheable - records are marked with Time To Live (TTL) information. When the time - expires, the caching server discards the record. The next time someone - asks for it, the server fetches a fresh copy. Of course, a server may - also discard records before their TTL expires if it is running out of - cache space.</P> -<P>This implies that there will be some delay before the new version of - a changed record propagates around the net. Until the TTLs on all - copies of the old record expire, some users will see it because that is - what is in their cache. Other users may see the new record immediately - because they don't have an old one cached.</P> -<H2><A name="MTU.trouble">Problems with packet fragmentation</A></H2> -<P>It seems, from mailing list reports, to be moderately common for - problems to crop up in which small packets pass through the IPsec - tunnels just fine but larger packets fail.</P> -<P>These problems are caused by various devices along the way - mis-handling either packet fragments or<A href="glossary.html#pathMTU"> - path MTU discovery</A>.</P> -<P>IPsec makes packets larger by adding an ESP or AH header. This can - tickle assorted bugs in fragment handling in routers and firewalls, or - in path MTU discovery mechanisms, and cause a variety of symptoms which - are both annoying and, often, quite hard to diagnose.</P> -<P>An explanation from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>The problem is IP fragmentation; more precisely, the problem is that the -second, third, etc. fragments of an IP packet are often difficult for -filtering mechanisms to classify. - -Routers cannot rely on reassembling the packet, or remembering what was in -earlier fragments, because the fragments may be out of order or may even -follow different routes. So any general, worst-case filtering decision -pretty much has to be made on each fragment independently. (If the router -knows that it is the only route to the destination, so all fragments -*must* pass through it, reassembly would be possible... but most routers -don't want to bother with the complications of that.) - -All fragments carry roughly the original IP header, but any higher-level -header is (for IP purposes) just the first part of the packet data... so -only the first fragment carries that. So, for example, on examining the -second fragment of a TCP packet, you could tell that it's TCP, but not -what port number it is destined for -- that information is in the TCP -header, which appears in the first fragment only. - -The result of this classification difficulty is that stupid routers and -over-paranoid firewalls may just throw fragments away. To get through -them, you must reduce your MTU enough that fragmentation will not occur. -(In some cases, they might be willing to attempt reassembly, but have very -limited resources to devote to it, meaning that packets must be small and -fragments few in number, leading to the same conclusion: smaller MTU.)</PRE> -<P>In addition to the problem Henry describes, you may also have trouble - with<A href="glossary.html#pathMTU"> path MTU discovery</A>.</P> -<P>By default, FreeS/WAN uses a large<A href="glossary.html#MTU"> MTU</A> - for the ipsec device. This avoids some problems, but may complicate - others. Here's an explanation from Claudia:</P> -<PRE>Here are a couple of pieces of background information. Apologies if you -have seen these already. An excerpt from one of my old posts: - - An MTU of 16260 on ipsec0 is usual. The IPSec device defaults to this - high MTU so that it does not fragment incoming packets before encryption - and encapsulation. If after IPSec processing packets are larger than 1500, - [ie. the mtu of eth0] then eth0 will fragment them. - - Adding IPSec headers adds a certain number of bytes to each packet. - The MTU of the IPSec interface refers to the maximum size of the packet - before the IPSec headers are added. In some cases, people find it helpful - to set ipsec0's MTU to 1500-(IPSec header size), which IIRC is about 1430. - - That way, the resulting encapsulated packets don't exceed 1500. On most - networks, packets less than 1500 will not need to be fragmented. - -and... (from Henry Spencer) - - The way it *ought* to work is that the MTU advertised by the ipsecN - interface should be that of the underlying hardware interface, less a - pinch for the extra headers needed. - - Unfortunately, in certain situations this breaks many applications. - There is a widespread implicit assumption that the smallest MTUs are - at the ends of paths, not in the middle, and another that MTUs are - never less than 1500. A lot of code is unprepared to handle paths - where there is an "interior minimum" in the MTU, especially when it's - less than 1500. So we advertise a big MTU and just let the resulting - big packets fragment. - -This usually works, but we do get bitten in cases where some intermediate -point can't handle all that fragmentation. We can't win on this one.</PRE> -<P>The MTU can be changed with an<VAR> overridemtu=</VAR> statement in - the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section of<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf.5</A>.</P> -<P>For a discussion of MTU issues and some possible solutions using - Linux advanced routing facilities, see the<A href="http://www.linuxguruz.org/iptables/howto/2.4routing-15.html#ss15.6"> - Linux 2.4 Advanced Routing HOWTO</A>. For a discussion of MTU and NAT - (Network Address Translation), see<A HREF="http://harlech.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html"> - James Carter's MTU notes</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="nat.background">Network address translation (NAT)</A></H2> -<P><STRONG>N</STRONG>etwork<STRONG> A</STRONG>ddress<STRONG> T</STRONG> -ranslation is a service provided by some gateway machines. Calling it - NAPT (adding the word<STRONG> P</STRONG>ort) would be more precise, but - we will follow the widespread usage.</P> -<P>A gateway doing NAT rewrites the headers of packets it is forwarding, - changing one or more of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>source address</LI> -<LI>source port</LI> -<LI>destination address</LI> -<LI>destination port</LI> -</UL> -<P>On Linux 2.4, NAT services are provided by the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org"> - netfilter(8)</A> firewall code. There are several<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO"> - Netfilter HowTos</A> including one on NAT.</P> -<P>For older versions of Linux, this was referred to as "IP masquerade" - and different tools were used. See this<A href="http://www.e-infomax.com/ipmasq/"> - resource page</A>.</P> -<P>Putting an IPsec gateway behind a NAT gateway is not recommended. See - our<A href="firewall.html#NAT"> firewalls document</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_3_1">NAT to non-routable addresses</A></H3> -<P>The most common application of NAT uses private<A href="glossary.html#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> addresses.</P> -<P>Often a home or small office network will have:</P> -<UL> -<LI>one connection to the Internet</LI> -<LI>one assigned publicly visible IP address</LI> -<LI>several machines that all need access to the net</LI> -</UL> -<P>Of course this poses a problem since several machines cannot use one - address. The best solution might be to obtain more addresses, but often - this is impractical or uneconomical.</P> -<P>A common solution is to have:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#non-routable">non-routable</A> addresses on - the local network</LI> -<LI>the gateway machine doing NAT</LI> -<LI>all packets going outside the LAN rewritten to have the gateway as - their source address</LI> -</UL> -<P>The client machines are set up with reserved<A href="glossary.html#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> IP addresses defined in RFC 1918. The masquerading - gateway, the machine with the actual link to the Internet, rewrites - packet headers so that all packets going onto the Internet appear to - come from one IP address, that of its Internet interface. It then gets - all the replies, does some table lookups and more header rewriting, and - delivers the replies to the appropriate client machines.</P> -<P>As far as anyone else on the Internet is concerned, the systems - behind the gateway are completely hidden. Only one machine with one IP - address is visible.</P> -<P>For IPsec on such a gateway, you can entirely ignore the NAT in:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI> -<LI>firewall rules affecting your Internet-side interface</LI> -</UL> -<P>Those can be set up exactly as they would be if your gateway had no - other systems behind it.</P> -<P>You do, however, have to take account of the NAT in firewall rules - which affect packet forwarding.</P> -<H3><A NAME="17_3_2">NAT to routable addresses</A></H3> -<P>NAT to routable addresses is also possible, but is less common and - may make for rather tricky routing problems. We will not discuss it - here. See the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/documentation/index.html#HOWTO"> - Netfilter HowTos</A>.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="config.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="user_examples.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/biblio.html b/doc/biblio.html deleted file mode 100644 index d54af5cbf..000000000 --- a/doc/biblio.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="glossary.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="rfc.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="biblio">Bibliography for the Linux FreeS/WAN project</A></H1> -<P>For extensive bibliographic links, see the<A href="http://liinwww.ira.uka.de/bibliography/index.html"> - Collection of Computer Science Bibliographies</A></P> -<P>See our<A href="web.html"> web links</A> for material available - online.</P> -<HR><A name="adams"> Carlisle Adams and Steve Lloyd<CITE> Understanding - Public Key Infrastructure</CITE> -<BR></A> Macmillan 1999 ISBN 1-57870-166-x -<P>An overview, mainly concentrating on policy and strategic issues - rather than the technical details. Both authors work for<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> - PKI</A> vendor<A href="http://www.entrust.com/"> Entrust</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="DNS.book"> Albitz, Liu & Loukides<CITE> DNS & BIND</CITE> - 3rd edition -<BR></A> O'Reilly 1998 ISBN 1-56592-512-2 -<P>The standard reference on the<A href="glossary.html#DNS"> Domain Name - Service</A> and<A href="glossary.html#BIND"> Berkeley Internet Name - Daemon</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="anderson"> Ross Anderson</A>,<CITE> Security Engineering - - a Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems</CITE> -<BR> Wiley, 2001, ISBN 0471389226 -<P>Easily the best book for the security professional I have seen.<STRONG> - Highly recommended</STRONG>. See the<A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/book.html"> - book web page</A>.</P> -<P>This is quite readable, but Schneier's<A href="#secrets"> Secrets and - Lies</A> might be an easier introduction.</P> -<HR><A name="puzzle"> Bamford<CITE> The Puzzle Palace, A report on NSA, - Americas's most Secret Agency</CITE> -<BR> Houghton Mifflin 1982 ISBN 0-395-31286-8</A> -<HR> Bamford<CITE> Body of Secrets</CITE> -<P>The sequel.</P> -<HR><A name="bander"> David Bander</A>,<CITE> Linux Security Toolkit</CITE> -<BR> IDG Books, 2000, ISBN: 0764546902 -<P>This book has a short section on FreeS/WAN and includes Caldera Linux - on CD.</P> -<HR><A name="CZR"> Chapman, Zwicky & Russell</A>,<CITE> Building - Internet Firewalls</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1995 ISBN 1-56592-124-0 -<HR><A name="firewall.book"> Cheswick and Bellovin</A><CITE> Firewalls - and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker</CITE> -<BR> Addison-Wesley 1994 ISBN 0201633574 -<P>A fine book on firewalls in particular and security in general from - two of AT&T's system adminstrators.</P> -<P>Bellovin has also done a number of<A href="web.html#papers"> papers</A> - on IPsec and co-authored a<A href="intro.html#applied"> paper</A> on a - large FreeS/WAN application.</P> -<HR><A name="comer"> Comer<CITE> Internetworking with TCP/IP</CITE> -<BR> Prentice Hall</A> -<UL> -<LI>Vol. I: Principles, Protocols, & Architecture, 3rd Ed. 1995 - ISBN:0-13-216987-8</LI> -<LI>Vol. II: Design, Implementation, & Internals, 2nd Ed. 1994 - ISBN:0-13-125527-4</LI> -<LI>Vol. III: Client/Server Programming & Applications -<UL> -<LI>AT&T TLI Version 1994 ISBN:0-13-474230-3</LI> -<LI>BSD Socket Version 1996 ISBN:0-13-260969-X</LI> -<LI>Windows Sockets Version 1997 ISBN:0-13-848714-6</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you need to deal with the details of the network protocols, read - either this series or the<A href="#stevens"> Stevens and Wright</A> - series before you start reading the RFCs.</P> -<HR><A name="diffie"> Diffie and Landau</A><CITE> Privacy on the Line: - The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption</CITE> -<BR> MIT press 1998 ISBN 0-262-04167-7 (hardcover) or 0-262-54100-9 -<BR> -<HR><A name="d_and_hark"> Doraswamy and Harkins<CITE> IP Sec: The New - Security Standard for the Internet, Intranets and Virtual Private - Networks</CITE> -<BR> Prentice Hall 1999 ISBN: 0130118982</A> -<HR><A name="EFF"> Electronic Frontier Foundation<CITE> Cracking DES: - Secrets of Encryption Research, Wiretap Politics and Chip Design</CITE> -<BR></A> O'Reilly 1998 ISBN 1-56592-520-3 -<P>To conclusively demonstrate that DES is inadequate for continued use, - the<A href="glossary.html#EFF"> EFF</A> built a machine for just over - $200,000 that breaks DES encryption in under five days on average, - under nine in the worst case.</P> -<P>The book provides details of their design and, perhaps even more - important, discusses why they felt the project was necessary. - Recommended for anyone interested in any of the three topics mentioned - in the subtitle.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="http://www.eff.org/descracker.html"> EFF page on - this project</A> and our discussion of<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - DES insecurity</A>.</P> -<HR> Martin Freiss<CITE> Protecting Networks with SATAN</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1998 ISBN 1-56592-425-8 -<BR> translated from a 1996 work in German -<P>SATAN is a Security Administrator's Tool for Analysing Networks. This - book is a tutorial in its use.</P> -<HR> Gaidosch and Kunzinger<CITE> A Guide to Virtual Private Networks</CITE> -<BR> Prentice Hall 1999 ISBN: 0130839647 -<HR><A name="Garfinkel"> Simson Garfinkel</A><CITE> Database Nation: the - death of privacy in the 21st century</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 2000 ISBN 1-56592-653-6 -<P>A thoughtful and rather scary book.</P> -<HR><A name="PGP"> Simson Garfinkel</A><CITE> PGP: Pretty Good Privacy</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1995 ISBN 1-56592-098-8 -<P>An excellent introduction and user manual for the<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> - PGP</A> email-encryption package. PGP is a good package with a complex - and poorly-designed user interface. This book or one like it is a must - for anyone who has to use it at length.</P> -<P>The book covers using PGP in Unix, PC and Macintosh environments, - plus considerable background material on both the technical and - political issues around cryptography.</P> -<P>The book is now seriously out of date. It does not cover recent - developments such as commercial versions since PGP 5, the Open PGP - standard or GNU PG..</P> -<HR><A name="practical"> Garfinkel and Spafford</A><CITE> Practical Unix - Security</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1996 ISBN 1-56592-148-8 -<P>A standard reference.</P> -<P>Spafford's web page has an excellent collection of<A href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist"> - crypto and security links</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="Kahn"> David Kahn</A><CITE> The Codebreakers: the - Comprehensive History of Secret Communications from Ancient Times to - the Internet</CITE> -<BR> second edition Scribner 1996 ISBN 0684831309 -<P>A history of codes and code-breaking from ancient Egypt to the 20th - century. Well-written and exhaustively researched.<STRONG> Highly - recommended</STRONG>, even though it does not have much on computer - cryptography.</P> -<HR> David Kahn<CITE> Seizing the Enigma, The Race to Break the German - U-Boat codes, 1939-1943</CITE> -<BR> Houghton Mifflin 1991 ISBN 0-395-42739-8 -<HR><A name="kirch"> Olaf Kirch</A><CITE> Linux Network Administrator's - Guide</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly 1995 ISBN 1-56592-087-2 -<P>Now becoming somewhat dated in places, but still a good introductory - book and general reference.</P> -<HR><A name="LinVPN"> Kolesnikov and Hatch</A>,<CITE> Building Linux - Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)</CITE> -<BR> New Riders 2002 -<P>This has had a number of favorable reviews, including<A href="http://www.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=02/02/27/0115214&mode=thread&tid=172"> - this one</A> on Slashdot. The book has a<A href="http://www.buildinglinuxvpns.net/"> - web site</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="RFCs"> Pete Loshin<CITE> Big Book of IPsec RFCs</CITE> -<BR> Morgan Kaufmann 2000 ISBN: 0-12-455839-9</A> -<HR><A name="crypto"> Steven Levy<CITE> Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat - the Government -- Saving Privacy in the Digital Age</CITE></A> -<BR> Penguin 2001, ISBN 0-670--85950-8 -<P><STRONG>Highly recommended</STRONG>. A fine history of recent (about - 1970-2000) developments in the field, and the related political - controversies. FreeS/WAN project founder and leader John Gilmore - appears several times.</P> -<P>The book does not cover IPsec or FreeS/WAN, but this project is very - much another battle in the same war. See our discussion of the<A href="politics.html"> - politics</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="GTR"> Matyas, Anderson et al.</A><CITE> The Global Trust - Register</CITE> -<BR> Northgate Consultants Ltd 1998 ISBN: 0953239705 -<BR> hard cover edition MIT Press 1999 ISBN 0262511053 -<P>From<A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Trust-Register"> - their web page:</A></P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> This book is a register of the fingerprints of the world's - most important public keys; it implements a top-level certification - authority (CA) using paper and ink rather than in an electronic system.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<HR><A name="handbook"> Menezies, van Oorschot and Vanstone<CITE> - Handbook of Applied Cryptography</CITE></A> -<BR> CRC Press 1997 -<BR> ISBN 0-8493-8523-7 -<P>An excellent reference. Read<A href="#schneier"> Schneier</A> before - tackling this.</P> -<HR> Michael Padlipsky<CITE> Elements of Networking Style</CITE> -<BR> Prentice-Hall 1985 ISBN 0-13-268111-0 or 0-13-268129-3 -<P>Probably<STRONG> the funniest technical book ever written</STRONG>, - this is a vicious but well-reasoned attack on the OSI "seven layer - model" and all that went with it. Several chapters of it are also - available as RFCs 871 to 875.</P> -<HR><A name="matrix"> John S. Quarterman</A><CITE> The Matrix: Computer - Networks and Conferencing Systems Worldwide</CITE> -<BR> Digital Press 1990 ISBN 155558-033-5 -<BR> Prentice-Hall ISBN 0-13-565607-9 -<P>The best general treatment of computer-mediated communication we have - seen. It naturally has much to say about the Internet, but also covers - UUCP, Fidonet and so on.</P> -<HR><A name="ranch"> David Ranch</A><CITE> Securing Linux Step by Step</CITE> -<BR> SANS Institute, 1999 -<P><A href="http://www.sans.org/">SANS</A> is a respected organisation, - this guide is part of a well-known series, and Ranch has previously - written the useful<A href=" http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos"> - Trinity OS</A> guide to securing Linux, so my guess would be this is a - pretty good book. I haven't read it yet, so I'm not certain. It can be - ordered online from<A href="http://www.sans.org/"> SANS</A>.</P> -<P>Note (Mar 1, 2002): a new edition with different editors in the - works. Expect it this year.</P> -<HR><A name="schneier"> Bruce Schneier</A><CITE> Applied Cryptography, - Second Edition</CITE> -<BR> John Wiley & Sons, 1996 -<BR> ISBN 0-471-12845-7 hardcover -<BR> ISBN 0-471-11709-9 paperback -<P>A standard reference on computer cryptography. For more recent - essays, see the<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/"> author's - company's web site</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="secrets"> Bruce Schneier</A><CITE> Secrets and Lies</CITE> -<BR> Wiley 2000, ISBN 0-471-25311-1 -<P>An interesting discussion of security and privacy issues, written - with more of an "executive overview" approach rather than a narrow - focus on the technical issues.<STRONG> Highly recommended</STRONG>.</P> -<P>This is worth reading even if you already understand security issues, - or think you do. To go deeper, follow it with Anderson's<A href="#anderson"> - Security Engineering</A>.</P> -<HR><A name="VPNbook"> Scott, Wolfe and Irwin<CITE> Virtual Private - Networks</CITE></A> -<BR> 2nd edition, O'Reilly 1999 ISBN: 1-56592-529-7 -<P>This is the only O'Reilly book, out of a dozen I own, that I'm - disappointed with. It deals mainly with building VPNs with various - proprietary tools --<A href="glossary.html#PPTP"> PPTP</A>,<A href="glossary.html#SSH"> - SSH</A>, Cisco PIX, ... -- and touches only lightly on IPsec-based - approaches.</P> -<P>That said, it appears to deal competently with what it does cover and - it has readable explanations of many basic VPN and security concepts. - It may be exactly what some readers require, even if I find the - emphasis unfortunate.</P> -<HR><A name="LASG"> Kurt Seifried<CITE> Linux Administrator's Security - Guide</CITE></A> -<P>Available online from<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lasg/"> - Security Portal</A>. It has fairly extensive coverage of IPsec.</P> -<HR><A name="Smith"> Richard E Smith<CITE> Internet Cryptography</CITE> -<BR></A> ISBN 0-201-92480-3, Addison Wesley, 1997 -<P>See the book's<A href="http://www.visi.com/crypto/inet-crypto/index.html"> - home page</A></P> -<HR><A name="neal"> Neal Stephenson<CITE> Cryptonomicon</CITE></A> -<BR> Hardcover ISBN -380-97346-4, Avon, 1999. -<P>A novel in which cryptography and the net figure prominently.<STRONG> - Highly recommended</STRONG>: I liked it enough I immediately went out - and bought all the author's other books.</P> -<P>There is also a paperback edition. Sequels are expected.</P> -<HR><A name="stevens"> Stevens and Wright</A><CITE> TCP/IP Illustrated</CITE> -<BR> Addison-Wesley -<UL> -<LI>Vol. I: The Protocols 1994 ISBN:0-201-63346-9</LI> -<LI>Vol. II: The Implementation 1995 ISBN:0-201-63354-X</LI> -<LI>Vol. III: TCP for Transactions, HTTP, NNTP, and the UNIX Domain - Protocols 1996 ISBN: 0-201-63495-3</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you need to deal with the details of the network protocols, read - either this series or the<A href="#comer"> Comer</A> series before you - start reading the RFCs.</P> -<HR><A name="Rubini"> Rubini</A><CITE> Linux Device Drivers</CITE> -<BR> O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. 1998 ISBN 1-56592-292-1 -<HR><A name="Zeigler"> Robert Zeigler</A><CITE> Linux Firewalls</CITE> -<BR> Newriders Publishing, 2000 ISBN 0-7537-0900-9 -<P>A good book, with detailed coverage of ipchains(8) firewalls and of - many related issues.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="glossary.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="rfc.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/compat.html b/doc/compat.html deleted file mode 100644 index f01efa64c..000000000 --- a/doc/compat.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,707 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="trouble.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="interop.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="compat">Linux FreeS/WAN Compatibility Guide</A></H1> -<P>Much of this document is quoted directly from the Linux FreeS/WAN<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A>. Thanks very much to the community of testers, - patchers and commenters there, especially the ones quoted below but - also various contributors we haven't quoted.</P> -<H2><A name="spec">Implemented parts of the IPsec Specification</A></H2> -<P>In general, do not expect Linux FreeS/WAN to do everything yet. This - is a work-in-progress and some parts of the IPsec specification are not - yet implemented.</P> -<H3><A name="in">In Linux FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Things we do, as of version 1.96:</P> -<UL> -<LI>key management methods -<DL> -<DT>manually keyed</DT> -<DD>using keys stored in /etc/ipsec.conf</DD> -<DT>automatically keyed</DT> -<DD>Automatically negotiating session keys as required. All connections - are automatically re-keyed periodically. The<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> - Pluto</A> daemon implements this using the<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> - IKE</A> protocol.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>Methods of authenticating gateways for IKE -<DL> -<DT>shared secrets</DT> -<DD>stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> ipsec.secrets(5)</A> -</DD> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#RSA">RSA</A> signatures</DT> -<DD>For details, see<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> pluto(8)</A> -.</DD> -<DT>looking up RSA authentication keys from<A href="glossary.html#DNS"> - DNS</A>.</DT> -<DD>Note that this technique cannot be fully secure until<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> - secure DNS</A> is widely deployed.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>groups for<A href="glossary.html#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key - negotiation -<DL> -<DT>group 2, modp 1024-bit</DT> -<DT>group 5, modp 1536-bit</DT> -<DD>We implement these two groups. -<P>In negotiating a keying connection (ISAKMP SA, Phase 1) we propose - both groups when we are the initiator, and accept either when a peer - proposes them. Once the keying connection is made, we propose only the - alternative agreed there for data connections (IPsec SA's, Phase 2) - negotiated over that keying connection.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>encryption transforms -<DL> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#DES">DES</A></DT> -<DD>DES is in the source code since it is needed to implement 3DES, but - single DES is not made available to users because<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - DES is insecure</A>.</DD> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#3DES">Triple DES</A></DT> -<DD>implemented, and used as the default encryption in Linux FreeS/WAN.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -<LI>authentication transforms -<DL> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#HMAC">HMAC</A> using<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> - MD5</A></DT> -<DD>implemented, may be used in IKE or by by AH or ESP transforms.</DD> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#HMAC">HMAC</A> using<A href="glossary.html#SHA"> - SHA</A></DT> -<DD>implemented, may be used in IKE or by AH or ESP transforms.</DD> -</DL> -<P>In negotiations, we propose both of these and accept either.</P> -</LI> -<LI>compression transforms -<DL> -<DT>IPComp</DT> -<DD>IPComp as described in RFC 2393 was added for FreeS/WAN 1.6. Note - that Pluto becomes confused if you ask it to do IPComp when the kernel - cannot.</DD> -</DL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>All combinations of implemented transforms are supported. Note that - some form of packet-level<STRONG> authentication is required whenever - encryption is used</STRONG>. Without it, the encryption will not be - secure.</P> -<H3><A name="dropped">Deliberately omitted</A></H3> - We do not implement everything in the RFCs because some of those things - are insecure. See our discussions of avoiding<A href="politics.html#weak"> - bogus security</A>. -<P>Things we deliberately omit which are required in the RFCs are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>null encryption (to use ESP as an authentication-only service)</LI> -<LI>single DES</LI> -<LI>DH group 1, a 768-bit modp group</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since these are the only encryption algorithms and DH group the RFCs - require, it is possible in theory to have a standards-conforming - implementation which will not interpoperate with FreeS/WAN. Such an - implementation would be inherently insecure, so we do not consider this - a problem.</P> -<P>Anyway, most implementations sensibly include more secure options as - well, so dropping null encryption, single DES and Group 1 does not - greatly hinder interoperation in practice.</P> -<P>We also do not implement some optional features allowed by the RFCs:</P> -<UL> -<LI>aggressive mode for negotiation of the keying channel or ISAKMP SA. - This mode is a little faster than main mode, but exposes more - information to an eavesdropper.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In theory, this should cause no interoperation problems since all - implementations are required to support the more secure main mode, - whether or not they also allow aggressive mode.</P> -<P>In practice, it does sometimes produce problems with implementations - such as Windows 2000 where aggressive mode is the default. Typically, - these are easily solved with a configuration change that overrides that - default.</P> -<H3><A name="not">Not (yet) in Linux FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Things we don't yet do, as of version 1.96:</P> -<UL> -<LI>key management methods -<UL> -<LI>authenticate key negotiations via local<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> - PKI</A> server, but see links to user<A href="web.html#patch"> patches</A> -</LI> -<LI>authenticate key negotiations via<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> - secure DNS</A></LI> -<LI>unauthenticated key management, using<A href="glossary.html#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement protocol without authentication. - Arguably, this would be worth doing since it is secure against all - passive attacks. On the other hand, it is vulnerable to an active<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A>.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>encryption transforms -<P>Currently<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> Triple DES</A> is the only - encryption method Pluto will negotiate.</P> -<P>No additional encryption transforms are implemented, though the RFCs - allow them and some other IPsec implementations support various of - them. We are not eager to add more. See this<A href="faq.html#other.cipher"> - FAQ question</A>.</P> -<P><A href="glossary.html#AES">AES</A>, the successor to the DES - standard, is an excellent candidate for inclusion in FreeS/WAN, see - links to user<A href="web.html#patch"> patches</A>.</P> -</LI> -<LI>authentication transforms -<P>No optional additional authentication transforms are currently - implemented. Likely<A href="glossary.html#SHA-256"> SHA-256, SHA-384 - and SHA-512</A> will be added when AES is.</P> -</LI> -<LI>Policy checking on decrypted packets -<P>To fully comply with the RFCs, it is not enough just to accept only - packets which survive any firewall rules in place to limit what IPsec - packets get in, and then pass KLIPS authentication. That is what - FreeS/WAN currently does.</P> -<P>We should also apply additional tests, for example ensuring that all - packets emerging from a particular tunnel have source and destination - addresses that fall within the subnets defined for that tunnel, and - that packets with those addresses that did not emerge from the - appropriate tunnel are disallowed.</P> -<P>This will be done as part of a KLIPS rewrite. See these<A href="intro.html#applied"> - links</A> and the<A href="mail.html"> design mailing list</A> for - discussion.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="pfkey">Our PF-Key implementation</A></H2> -<P>We use PF-key Version Two for communication between the KLIPS kernel - code and the Pluto Daemon. PF-Key v2 is defined by<A href="http://www.normos.org/ietf/rfc/rfc2367.txt"> - RFC 2367</A>.</P> -<P>The "PF" stands for Protocol Family. PF-Inet defines a - kernel/userspace interface for the TCP/IP Internet protocols (TCP/IP), - and other members of the PF series handle Netware, Appletalk, etc. - PF-Key is just a PF for key-related matters.</P> -<H3><A name="pfk.port">PF-Key portability</A></H3> -<P>PF-Key came out of Berkeley Unix work and is used in the various BSD - IPsec implementations, and in Solaris. This means there is some hope of - porting our Pluto(8) to one of the BSD distributions, or of running - their photurisd(8) on Linux if you prefer<A href="glossary.html#photuris"> - Photuris</A> key management over IKE.</P> -<P>It is, however, more complex than that. The PK-Key RFC deliberately - deals only with keying, not policy management. The three PF-Key - implementations we have looked at -- ours, OpenBSD and KAME -- all have - extensions to deal with security policy, and the extensions are - different. There have been discussions aimed at sorting out the - differences, perhaps for a version three PF-Key spec. All players are - in favour of this, but everyone involved is busy and it is not clear - whether or when these discussions might bear fruit.</P> -<H2><A name="otherk">Kernels other than the latest 2.2.x and 2.4.y</A></H2> -<P>We develop and test on Redhat Linux using the most recent kernel in - the 2.2 and 2.4 series. In general, we recommend you use the latest - kernel in one of those series. Complications and caveats are discussed - below.</P> -<H3><A name="kernel.2.0">2.0.x kernels</A></H3> -<P>Consider upgrading to the 2.2 kernel series. If you want to stay with - the 2.0 series, then we strongly recommend 2.0.39. Some useful security - patches were added in 2.0.38.</P> -<P>Various versions of the code have run at various times on most 2.0.xx - kernels, but the current version is only lightly tested on 2.0.39, and - not at all on older kernels.</P> -<P>Some of our patches for older kernels are shipped in 2.0.37 and - later, so they are no longer provided in FreeS/WAN. This means recent - versions of FreeS/WAN will probably not compile on anything earlier - than 2.0.37.</P> -<H3><A name="kernel.production">2.2 and 2.4 kernels</A></H3> -<DL> -<DT>FreeS/WAN 1.0</DT> -<DD>ran only on 2.0 kernels</DD> -<DT>FreeS/WAN 1.1 to 1.8</DT> -<DD>ran on 2.0 or 2.2 kernels -<BR> ran on some development kernels, 2.3 or 2.4-test</DD> -<DT>FreeS/WAN 1.9 to 1.96</DT> -<DD>runs on 2.0, 2.2 or 2.4 kernels</DD> -</DL> -<P>In general,<STRONG> we suggest the latest 2.2 kernel or 2.4 for - production use</STRONG>.</P> -<P>Of course no release can be guaranteed to run on kernels more recent - than it is, so quite often there will be no stable FreeS/WAN for the - absolute latest kernel. See the<A href="faq.html#k.versions"> FAQ</A> - for discussion.</P> -<H2><A name="otherdist">Intel Linux distributions other than Redhat</A></H2> -<P>We develop and test on Redhat 6.1 for 2.2 kernels, and on Redhat 7.1 - or 7.2 for 2.4, so minor changes may be required for other - distributions.</P> -<H3><A name="rh7">Redhat 7.0</A></H3> -<P>There are some problems with FreeS/WAN on Redhat 7.0. They are - soluble, but we recommend you upgrade to a later Redhat instead..</P> -<P>Redhat 7 ships with two compilers.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Their<VAR> gcc</VAR> is version 2.96. Various people, including the - GNU compiler developers and Linus, have said fairly emphatically that - using this was a mistake. 2.96 is a development version, not intended - for production use. In particular, it will not compile a Linux kernel.</LI> -<LI>Redhat therefore also ship a separate compiler, which they call<VAR> - kgcc</VAR>, for compiling kernels.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Kernel Makefiles have<VAR> gcc</VAR> as a default, and must be - adjusted to use<VAR> kgcc</VAR> before a kernel will compile on 7.0. - This mailing list message gives details:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: AW: Installing IPsec on Redhat 7.0 - Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2001 14:32:52 -0200 (BRST) - From: Mads Rasmussen <mads@cit.com.br> - -> From www.redhat.com/support/docs/gotchas/7.0/gotchas-7-6.html#ss6.1 - -cd to /usr/src/linux and open the Makefile in your favorite editor. You -will need to look for a line similar to this: - -CC = $(CROSS_COMPILE)gcc -D__KERNEL__ -I$(HPATH) - -This line specifies which C compiler to use to build the kernel. It should -be changed to: - -CC = $(CROSS_COMPILE)kgcc -D__KERNEL__ -I$(HPATH) - -for Red Hat Linux 7. The kgcc compiler is egcs 2.91.66. From here you can -proceed with the typical compiling steps.</PRE> -<P>Check the<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A> archive for more - recent news.</P> -<H3><A name="suse">SuSE Linux</A></H3> -<P>SuSE 6.3 and later versions, at least in Europe, ship with FreeS/WAN - included.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN packages distributed for SuSE 7.0-7.2 were somehow - miscompiled. You can find fixed packages on<A HREF="http://www.suse.de/~garloff/linux/FreeSWAN"> - Kurt Garloff's page</A>.</P> -<P>Here are some notes for an earlier SuSE version.</P> -<H4>SuSE Linux 5.3</H4> -<PRE>Date: Mon, 30 Nov 1998 -From: Peter Onion <ponion@srd.bt.co.uk> - -... I got Saturdays snapshot working between my two SUSE5.3 machines at home. - -The mods to the install process are quite simple. From memory and looking at -the files on the SUSE53 machine here at work.... - -And extra link in each of the /etc/init.d/rc?.d directories called K35ipsec -which SUSE use to shut a service down. - -A few mods in /etc/init.d/ipsec to cope with the different places that SUSE -put config info, and remove the inculsion of /etc/rc.d/init.d/functions and . -/etc/sysconfig/network as they don't exists and 1st one isn't needed anyway. - -insert ". /etc/rc.config" to pick up the SUSE config info and use - - if test -n "$NETCONFIG" -a "$NETCONFIG" != "YAST_ASK" ; then - -to replace - - [ ${NETWORKING} = "no" ] && exit 0 - -Create /etc/sysconfig as SUSE doesn't have one. - -I think that was all (but I prob forgot something)....</PRE> -<P>You may also need to fiddle initialisation scripts to ensure that<VAR> - /var/run/pluto.pid</VAR> is removed when rebooting. If this file is - present, Pluto does not come up correctly.</P> -<H3><A name="slack">Slackware</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-IPsec: Slackware distribution - Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 12:07:01 -0700 - From: Evan Brewer <dmessiah@silcon.com> - -> Very shortly, I will be needing to install IPsec on at least gateways that -> are running Slackware. . . . - -The only trick to getting it up is that on the slackware dist there is no -init.d directory in /etc/rc.d .. so create one. Then, what I do is take the -IPsec startup script which normally gets put into the init.d directory, and -put it in /etc/rc.d and name ir rc.ipsec .. then I symlink it to the file -in init.d. The only file in the dist you need to really edit is the -utils/Makefile, setup4: - -Everything else should be just fine.</PRE> -<P>A year or so later:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: HTML Docs- Need some cleanup? - Date: Mon, 8 Jan 2001 - From: Jody McIntyre <jodym@oeone.com> - -I have successfully installed FreeS/WAN on several Slackware 7.1 machines. -FreeS/WAN installed its rc.ipsec file in /etc/rc.d. I had to manually call -this script from rc.inet2. This seems to be an easier method than Evan -Brewer's.</PRE> -<H3><A name="deb">Debian</A></H3> -<P>A recent (Nov 2001) mailing list points to a<A href="http://www.thing.dyndns.org/debian/vpn.htm"> - web page</A> on setting up several types of tunnel, including IPsec, on - Debian.</P> -<P>Some older information:</P> -<PRE>Subject: FreeS/WAN 1.0 on Debian 2.1 - Date: Tue, 20 Apr 1999 - From: Tim Miller <cerebus+counterpane@haybaler.sackheads.org> - - Compiled and installed without error on a Debian 2.1 system -with kernel-source-2.0.36 after pointing RCDIR in utils/Makefile to -/etc/init.d. - - /var/lock/subsys/ doesn't exist on Debian boxen, needs to be -created; not a fatal error. - - Finally, IPsec scripts appear to be dependant on GNU awk -(gawk); the default Debian awk (mawk-1.3.3-2) had fatal difficulties. -With gawk installed and /etc/alternatives/awk linked to /usr/bin/gawk -operation appears flawless.</PRE> -<P>The scripts in question have been modified since this was posted. Awk - versions should no longer be a problem.</P> -<H3><A name="caldera">Caldera</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Re: HTML Docs- Need some cleanup? - Date: Mon, 08 Jan 2001 - From: Andy Bradford <andyb@calderasystems.com> - -On Sun, 07 Jan 2001 22:59:05 EST, Sandy Harris wrote: - -> Intel Linux distributions other than Redhat 5.x and 6.x -> Redhat 7.0 -> SuSE Linux -> SuSE Linux 5.3 -> Slackware -> Debian - -Can you please include Caldera in this list? I have tested it since -FreeS/Wan 1.1 and it works great with our systems---provided one -follows the FreeS/Wan documentation. :-) - -Thank you, -Andy</PRE> -<H2><A name="CPUs">CPUs other than Intel</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN has been run sucessfully on a number of different CPU - architectures. If you have tried it on one not listed here, please post - to the<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name=" strongarm">Corel Netwinder (StrongARM CPU)</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: linux-ipsec: Netwinder diffs -Date: Wed, 06 Jan 1999 -From: rhatfield@plaintree.com - -I had a mistake in my IPsec-auto, so I got things working this morning. - -Following are the diffs for my changes. Probably not the best and cleanest way -of doing it, but it works. . . . </PRE> -<P>These diffs are in the 0.92 and later distributions, so these should - work out-of-the-box on Netwinder.</P> -<H3><A name="yellowdog">Yellow Dog Linux on Power PC</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Compiling FreeS/WAN 1.1 on YellowDog Linux (PPC) - Date: 11 Dec 1999 - From: Darron Froese <darron@fudgehead.com> - -I'm summarizing here for the record - because it's taken me many hours to do -this (multiple times) and because I want to see IPsec on more linuxes than -just x86. - -Also, I can't remember if I actually did summarize it before... ;-) I'm -working too many late hours. - -That said - here goes. - -1. Get your linux kernel and unpack into /usr/src/linux/ - I used 2.2.13. -<http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v2.2/linux-2.2.13.tar.bz2> - -2. Get FreeS/WAN and unpack into /usr/src/freeswan-1.1 -<ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/freeswan-1.1.tar.gz> - -3. Get the gmp src rpm from here: -<ftp://ftp.yellowdoglinux.com//pub/yellowdog/champion-1.1/SRPMS/SRPMS/gmp-2.0.2-9a.src.rpm> - -4. Su to root and do this: rpm --rebuild gmp-2.0.2-9a.src.rpm - -You will see a lot of text fly by and when you start to see the rpm -recompiling like this: - -Executing: %build -+ umask 022 -+ cd /usr/src/redhat/BUILD -+ cd gmp-2.0.2 -+ libtoolize --copy --force -Remember to add `AM_PROG_LIBTOOL' to `configure.in'. -You should add the contents of `/usr/share/aclocal/libtool.m4' to -`aclocal.m4'. -+ CFLAGS=-O2 -fsigned-char -+ ./configure --prefix=/usr - -Hit Control-C to stop the rebuild. NOTE: We're doing this because for some -reason the gmp source provided with FreeS/WAN 1.1 won't build properly on -ydl. - -cd /usr/src/redhat/BUILD/ -cp -ar gmp-2.0.2 /usr/src/freeswan-1.1/ -cd /usr/src/freeswan-1.1/ -rm -rf gmp -mv gmp-2.0.2 gmp - -5. Open the freeswan Makefile and change the line that says: -KERNEL=$(b)zimage (or something like that) to -KERNEL=vmlinux - -6. cd ../linux/ - -7. make menuconfig -Select an option or two and then exit - saving your changes. - -8. cd ../freeswan-1.1/ ; make menugo - -That will start the whole process going - once that's finished compiling, -you have to install your new kernel and reboot. - -That should build FreeS/WAN on ydl (I tried it on 1.1).</PRE> - And a later message on the same topic: -<PRE>Subject: Re: FreeS/WAN, PGPnet and E-mail - Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2000 - From: Darron Froese <darron@fudgehead.com> - -on 1/22/00 6:47 PM, Philip Trauring at philip@trauring.com wrote: - -> I have a PowerMac G3 ... - -The PowerMac G3 can run YDL 1.1 just fine. It should also be able to run -FreeS/WAN 1.2patch1 with a couple minor modifications: - -1. In the Makefile it specifies a bzimage for the kernel compile - you have -to change that to vmlinux for the PPC. - -2. The gmp source that comes with FreeS/WAN (for whatever reason) fails to -compile. I have gotten around this by getting the gmp src rpm from here: - -ftp://ftp.yellowdoglinux.com//pub/yellowdog/champion-1.1/SRPMS/SRPMS/gmp-2.0.2-9a.src.rpm - -If you rip the source out of there - and place it where the gmp source -resides it will compile just fine.</PRE> -<P>FreeS/WAN no longer includes GMP source.</P> -<H3><A name="mklinux">Mklinux</A></H3> -<P>One user reports success on the Mach-based<STRONG> m</STRONG>icro<STRONG> -k</STRONG>ernel Linux.</P> -<PRE>Subject: Smiles on sparc and ppc - Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2000 - From: Jake Hill <jah@alien.bt.co.uk> - -You may or may not be interested to know that I have successfully built -FreeS/WAN on a number of non intel alpha architectures; namely on ppc -and sparc and also on osfmach3/ppc (MkLinux). I can report that it just -works, mostly, with few changes.</PRE> -<H3><A name="alpha">Alpha 64-bit processors</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: IT WORKS (again) between intel & alpha :-))))) - Date: Fri, 29 Jan 1999 - From: Peter Onion <ponion@srd.bt.co.uk> - -Well I'm happy to report that I've got an IPsec connection between by intel & alpha machines again :-)) - -If you look back on this list to 7th of December I wrote... - --On 07-Dec-98 Peter Onion wrote: --> --> I've about had enuf of wandering around inside the kernel trying to find out --> just what is corrupting outgoing packets... -- --Its 7:30 in the evening ..... -- --I FIXED IT :-)))))))))))))))))))))))))))))))) -- --It was my own fault :-(((((((((((((((((( -- --If you ask me very nicly I'll tell you where I was a little too over keen to --change unsigned long int __u32 :-) OPSE ... -- --So tomorrow it will full steam ahead to produce a set of diffs/patches against --0.91 -- --Peter Onion.</PRE> -<P>In general (there have been some glitches), FreeS/WAN has been - running on Alphas since then.</P> -<H3><A name="SPARC">Sun SPARC processors</A></H3> -<P>Several users have reported success with FreeS/WAN on SPARC Linux. - Here is one mailing list message:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Smiles on sparc and ppc - Date: Fri, 10 Mar 2000 - From: Jake Hill <jah@alien.bt.co.uk> - -You may or may not be interested to know that I have successfully built -FreeS/WAN on a number of non intel alpha architectures; namely on ppc -and sparc and also on osfmach3/ppc (MkLinux). I can report that it just -works, mostly, with few changes. - -I have a question, before I make up some patches. I need to hack -gmp/mpn/powerpc32/*.s to build them. Is this ok? The changes are -trivial, but could I also use a different version of gmp? Is it vanilla -here? - -I guess my only real headache is from ipchains, which appears to stop -running when IPsec has been started for a while. This is with 2.2.14 on -sparc.</PRE> -<P>This message, from a different mailing list, may be relevant for - anyone working with FreeS/WAN on Suns:</P> -<PRE>Subject: UltraSPARC DES assembler - Date: Thu, 13 Apr 2000 - From: svolaf@inet.uni2.dk (Svend Olaf Mikkelsen) - To: coderpunks@toad.com - -An UltraSPARC assembler version of the LibDES/SSLeay/OpenSSL des_enc.c -file is available at http://inet.uni2.dk/~svolaf/des.htm. - -This brings DES on UltraSPARC from slower than Pentium at the same -clock speed to significantly faster.</PRE> -<H3><A name="mips">MIPS processors</A></H3> -<P>We know FreeS/WAN runs on at least some MIPS processors because<A href="http://www.lasat.com"> - Lasat</A> manufacture an IPsec box based on an embedded MIPS running - Linux with FreeS/WAN. We have no details.</P> -<H3><A name="crusoe">Transmeta Crusoe</A></H3> -<P>The Merilus<A href="http://www.merilus.com/products/fc/index.shtml"> - Firecard</A>, a Linux firewall on a PCI card, is based on a Crusoe - processor and supports FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H3><A name="coldfire">Motorola Coldfire</A></H3> -<PRE>Subject: Re: Crypto hardware support - Date: Mon, 03 Jul 2000 - From: Dan DeVault <devault@tampabay.rr.com> - -.... I have been running -uClinux with FreeS/WAN 1.4 on a system built by Moreton Bay ( -http://www.moretonbay.com ) and it was using a Coldfire processor -and was able to do the Triple DES encryption at just about -1 mbit / sec rate....... they put a Hi/Fn 7901 hardware encryption -chip on their board and now their system does over 25 mbit of 3DES -encryption........ pretty significant increase if you ask me.</PRE> -<H2><A name="multiprocessor">Multiprocessor machines</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is designed to work on SMP (symmetric multi-processing) - Linux machines and is regularly tested on dual processor x86 machines.</P> -<P>We do not know of any testing on multi-processor machines with other - CPU architectures or with more than two CPUs. Anyone who does test - this, please report results to the<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A> -.</P> -<P>The current design does not make particularly efficient use of - multiprocessor machines; some of the kernel work is single-threaded.</P> -<H2><A name="hardware">Support for crypto hardware</A></H2> -<P>Supporting hardware cryptography accelerators has not been a high - priority for the development team because it raises a number of fairly - complex issues:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Can you trust the hardware? If it is not Open Source, how do you - audit its security? Even if it is, how do you check that the design has - no concealed traps?</LI> -<LI>If an interface is added for such hardware, can that interface be - subverted or misused?</LI> -<LI>Is hardware acceleration actually a performance win? It clearly is - in many cases, but on a fast machine it might be better to use the CPU - for the encryption than to pay the overheads of moving data to and from - a crypto board.</LI> -<LI>the current KLIPS code does not provide a clean interface for - hardware accelerators</LI> -</UL> -<P>That said, we have a<A href="#coldfire"> report</A> of FreeS/WAN - working with one crypto accelerator and some work is going on to modify - KLIPS to create a clean generic interface to such products. See this<A href="http://www.jukie.net/~bart/linux-ipsec/"> - web page</A> for some of the design discussion.</P> -<P>More recently, a patch to support some hardware accelerators has been - posted:</P> -<PRE>Subject: [Design] [PATCH] H/W acceleration patch - Date: Tue, 18 Sep 2001 - From: "Martin Gadbois" <martin.gadbois@colubris.com> - -Finally!! -Here's a web site with H/W acceleration patch for FreeS/WAN 1.91, including -S/W and Hifn 7901 crypto support. - -http://sources.colubris.com/ - -Martin Gadbois</PRE> -<P>Hardware accelerators could take performance well beyond what - FreeS/WAN can do in software (discussed<A href="performance.html"> here</A> -). Here is some discussion off the IETF IPsec list, October 2001:</P> -<PRE> ... Currently shipping chips deliver, 600 mbps throughput on a single - stream of 3DES IPsec traffic. There are also chips that use multiple - cores to do 2.4 gbps. We (Cavium) and others have announced even faster - chips. ... Mid 2002 versions will handle at line rate (OC48 and OC192) - IPsec and SSL/TLS traffic not only 3DES CBC but also AES and arc4.</PRE> -<P>The patches to date support chips that have been in production for - some time, not the state-of-the-art latest-and-greatest devices - described in that post. However, they may still outperform software and - they almost certainly reduce CPU overhead.</P> -<H2><A name="ipv6">IP version 6 (IPng)</A></H2> -<P>The Internet currently runs on version four of the IP protocols. IPv4 - is what is in the standard Linux IP stack, and what FreeS/WAN was built - for. In IPv4, IPsec is an optional feature.</P> -<P>The next version of the IP protocol suite is version six, usually - abbreviated either as "IPv6" or as "IPng" for "IP: the next - generation". For IPv6, IPsec is a required feature. Any machine doing - IPv6 is required to support IPsec, much as any machine doing (any - version of) IP is required to support ICMP.</P> -<P>There is a Linux implementation of IPv6 in Linux kernels 2.2 and - above. For details, see the<A href="http://www.cs-ipv6.lancs.ac.uk/ipv6/systems/linux/faq/"> - FAQ</A>. It does not yet support IPsec. The<A href="http://www.linux-ipv6.org/"> - USAGI</A> project are also working on IPv6 for Linux.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN was originally built for the current standard, IPv4, but we - are interested in seeing it work with IPv6. Some progress has been - made, and a patched version with IPv6 support is<A href="http://www.ipv6.iabg.de/downloadframe/index.html"> - available</A>. For more recent information, check the<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="v6.back">IPv6 background</A></H3> -<P>IPv6 has been specified by an IETF<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipngwg-charter.html"> - working group</A>. The group's page lists over 30 RFCs to date, and - many Internet Drafts as well. The overview is<A href="http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2460.txt"> - RFC 2460</A>. Major features include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>expansion of the address space from 32 to 128 bits,</LI> -<LI>changes to improve support for -<UL> -<LI>mobile IP</LI> -<LI>automatic network configuration</LI> -<LI>quality of service routing</LI> -<LI>...</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>improved security via IPsec</LI> -</UL> -<P>A number of projects are working on IPv6 implementation. A prominent - Open Source effort is<A href="http://www.kame.net/"> KAME</A>, a - collaboration among several large Japanese companies to implement IPv6 - for Berkeley Unix. Other major players are also working on IPv6. For - example, see pages at:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main.html">Sun</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/732/ipv6/index.html">Cisco</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/techinfo/howitworks/communications/networkbasics/IPv6.asp"> -Microsoft</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The<A href="http://www.6bone.net/"> 6bone</A> (IPv6 backbone) testbed - network has been up for some time. There is an active<A href="http://www.ipv6.org/"> - IPv6 user group</A>.</P> -<P>One of the design goals for IPv6 was that it must be possible to - convert from v4 to v6 via a gradual transition process. Imagine the - mess if there were a "flag day" after which the entire Internet used - v6, and all software designed for v4 stopped working. Almost every - computer on the planet would need major software changes! There would - be huge costs to replace older equipment. Implementers would be worked - to death before "the day", systems administrators and technical support - would be completely swamped after it. The bugs in every implementation - would all bite simultaneously. Large chunks of the net would almost - certainly be down for substantial time periods. ...</P> -<P>Fortunately, the design avoids any "flag day". It is therefore a - little tricky to tell how quickly IPv6 will take over. The transition - has certainly begun. For examples, see announcements from<A href="http://www.mailbase.ac.uk/lists/internet2/2000-03/0016.html"> - NTT</A> and<A href="http://www.vnunet.com/News/1102383"> Nokia</A>. - However, it is not yet clear how quickly the process will gain - momentum, or when it will be completed. Likely large parts of the - Internet will remain with IPv4 for years to come.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="trouble.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="interop.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/config.html b/doc/config.html deleted file mode 100644 index 4e9f0a513..000000000 --- a/doc/config.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,308 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="install.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="background.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="config">How to configure FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P>This page will teach you how to configure a simple network-to-network - link or a Road Warrior connection between two Linux FreeS/WAN boxes.</P> -<P>See also these related documents:</P> -<UL> -<LI>our<A HREF="quickstart.html#quickstart"> quickstart</A> guide to<A HREF="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A></LI> -<LI>our guide to configuration with<A HREF="policygroups.html#policygroups"> - policy groups</A></LI> -<LI>our<A HREF="adv_config.html#adv_config"> advanced configuration</A> - document</LI> -</UL> -<P> The network-to-network setup allows you to connect two office - networks into one Virtual Private Network, while the Road Warrior - connection secures a laptop's telecommute to work. Our examples also - show the basic procedure on the Linux FreeS/WAN side where another - IPsec peer is in play.</P> -<P> Shortcut to<A HREF="#config.netnet"> net-to-net</A>. -<BR> Shortcut to<A HREF="#config.rw"> Road Warrior</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="16_1">Requirements</A></H2> -<P>To configure the network-to-network connection you must have:</P> -<UL> -<LI>two Linux gateways with static IPs</LI> -<LI>a network behind each gate. Networks must have non-overlapping IP - ranges.</LI> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN<A HREF="install.html#install"> installed</A> on both - gateways</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org"><VAR>tcpdump</VAR></A> on the local - gate, to test the connection</LI> -</UL> -<P>For the Road Warrior you need:</P> -<UL> -<LI>one Linux box with a static IP</LI> -<LI>a Linux laptop with a dynamic IP</LI> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN installed on both</LI> -<LI>for testing,<VAR> tcpdump</VAR> on your gateway or laptop</LI> -</UL> -<P>If both IPs are dynamic, your situation is a bit trickier. Your best - bet is a variation on the<A HREF="#config.rw"> Road Warrior</A>, as - described in<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00282.html"> - this mailing list message</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="config.netnet"></A>Net-to-Net connection</H2> -<H3><A name="netnet.info.ex">Gather information</A></H3> -<P>For each gateway, compile the following information:</P> -<UL> -<LI>gateway IP</LI> -<LI>IP range of the subnet you will be protecting. This doesn't have to - be your whole physical subnet.</LI> -<LI>a name by which that gateway can identify itself for IPsec - negotiations. Its form is a Fully Qualified Domain Name preceded by an - @ sign, ie. @xy.example.com. -<BR> It does not need to be within a domain that you own. It can be a - made-up name.</LI> -</UL> -<H4>Get your leftrsasigkey</H4> -<P>On your local Linux FreeS/WAN gateway, print your IPsec public key:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --left</PRE> -<P>The output should look like this (with the key shortened for easy - reading):</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Fri Apr 26 15:01:41 2002 - leftrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt...</PRE> -<P>Don't have a key? Use<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html"><VAR> - ipsec newhostkey</VAR></A> to create one.</P> -<H4>...and your rightrsasigkey</H4> -<P>Get a console on the remote side:</P> -<PRE> ssh2 ab.example.com</PRE> -<P>In that window, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --right</PRE> -<P>You'll see something like:</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2192 bits ab.example.com Thu May 16 15:26:20 2002 - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOqH55O...</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_2">Edit<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR></A></H3> -<P>Back on the local gate, copy our template to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR> -. (on Mandrake,<VAR> /etc/freeswan/ipsec.conf</VAR>). Substitute the - information you've gathered for our example data.</P> -<PRE>conn net-to-net - left=192.0.2.2 # Local vitals - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 # - leftid=@xy.example.com # - leftrsasigkey=0s1LgR7/oUM... # - leftnexthop=%defaultroute # correct in many situations - right=192.0.2.9 # Remote vitals - rightsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # - rightid=@ab.example.com # - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOqH55O... # - rightnexthop=%defaultroute # correct in many situations - auto=add # authorizes but doesn't start this - # connection at startup</PRE> -<P> "Left" and "right" should represent the machines that have FreeS/WAN - installed on them, and "leftsubnet" and "rightsubnet" machines that are - being protected. /32 is assumed for left/right and left/rightsubnet - parameters.</P> -<P>Copy<VAR> conn net-to-net</VAR> to the remote-side /etc/ipsec.conf. - If you've made no other modifications to either<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR>, - simply:</P> -<PRE> scp2 ipsec.conf root@ab.example.com:/etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_3">Start your connection</A></H3> -<P>Locally, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --up net-to-net</PRE> -<P>You should see:</P> -<PRE> 104 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I1: initiate - 106 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I2: sent MI2, expecting MR2 - 108 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I3: sent MI3, expecting MR3 - 004 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I4: ISAKMP SA established - 112 "net-net" #224: STATE_QUICK_I1: initiate - 004 "net-net" #224: STATE_QUICK_I2: sent QI2, IPsec SA established</PRE> -<P>The important thing is<VAR> IPsec SA established</VAR>. If you're - unsuccessful, see our<A HREF="trouble.html#trouble"> troubleshooting - tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be tunneled</A></H3> -<P>If you are using<A HREF="glossary.html#masq"> IP masquerade</A> or<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation (NAT)</A> on either gateway, you must now - exempt the packets you wish to tunnel from this treatment. For example, - if you have a rule like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j MASQUERADE -</PRE> -<P>change it to something like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d \! 192.0.2.128/29 -j MASQUERADE</PRE> -<P>This may be necessary on both gateways.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_5">Test your connection</A></H3> -<P>Sit at one of your local subnet nodes (not the gateway), and ping a - subnet node on the other (again, not the gateway).</P> -<PRE> ping fileserver.toledo.example.com</PRE> -<P>While still pinging, go to the local gateway and snoop your outgoing - interface, for example:</P> -<PRE> tcpdump -i ppp0</PRE> -<P>You want to see ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload) packets moving<B> - back and forth</B> between the two gateways at the same frequency as - your pings:</P> -<PRE> 19:16:32.046220 192.0.2.2 > 192.0.2.9: ESP(spi=0x3be6c4dc,seq=0x3) - 19:16:32.085630 192.0.2.9 > 192.0.2.2: ESP(spi=0x5fdd1cf8,seq=0x6)</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations are in order! You have a tunnel - which will protect any IP data from one subnet to the other, as it - passes between the two gates. If not, go and<A HREF="trouble.html#trouble"> - troubleshoot</A>.</P> -<P>Note: your new tunnel protects only net-net traffic, not - gateway-gateway, or gateway-subnet. If you need this (for example, if - machines on one net need to securely contact a fileserver on the IPsec - gateway), you'll need to create<A HREF="adv_config.html#adv_config"> - extra connections</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_2_6">Finishing touches</A></H3> -<P>Now that your connection works, name it something sensible, like:</P> -<PRE>conn winstonnet-toledonet</PRE> -<P>To have the tunnel come up on-boot, replace</P> -<PRE> auto=add</PRE> -<P>with:</P> -<PRE> auto=start</PRE> -<P>Copy these changes to the other side, for example:</P> -<PRE> scp2 ipsec.conf root@ab.example.com:/etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>Enjoy!</P> -<H2><A name="config.rw"></A>Road Warrior Configuration</H2> -<H3><A name="rw.info.ex">Gather information</A></H3> -<P>You'll need to know:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the gateway's static IP</LI> -<LI>the IP range of the subnet behind that gateway</LI> -<LI>a name by which each side can identify itself for IPsec - negotiations. Its form is a Fully Qualified Domain Name preceded by an - @ sign, ie. @road.example.com. -<BR> It does not need to be within a domain that you own. It can be a - made-up name.</LI> -</UL> -<H4>Get your leftrsasigkey...</H4> -<P>On your laptop, print your IPsec public key:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --left</PRE> -<P>The output should look like this (with the key shortened for easy - reading):</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2192 bits road.example.com Sun Jun 9 02:45:02 2002 - leftrsasigkey=0sAQPIPN9uI...</PRE> -<P>Don't have a key? See<A HREF="old_config.html#genrsakey"> these - instructions</A>.</P> -<H4>...and your rightrsasigkey</H4> -<P>Get a console on the gateway:</P> -<PRE> ssh2 xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>View the gateway's public key with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --right</PRE> -<P>This will yield something like</P> -<PRE> # RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Fri Apr 26 15:01:41 2002 - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt...</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_2">Customize<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR></A></H3> -<P>On your laptop, copy this template to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>. (on - Mandrake,<VAR> /etc/freeswan/ipsec.conf</VAR>). Substitute the - information you've gathered for our example data.</P> -<PRE>conn road - left=%defaultroute # Picks up our dynamic IP - leftnexthop=%defaultroute # - leftid=@road.example.com # Local information - leftrsasigkey=0sAQPIPN9uI... # - right=192.0.2.10 # Remote information - rightsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 # - rightid=@xy.example.com # - rightrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt... # - auto=add # authorizes but doesn't start this - # connection at startup</PRE> -<P>The template for the gateway is different. Notice how it reverses<VAR> - left</VAR> and<VAR> right</VAR>, in keeping with our convention that<STRONG> - L</STRONG>eft is<STRONG> L</STRONG>ocal,<STRONG> R</STRONG>ight<STRONG> - R</STRONG>emote. Be sure to switch your rsasigkeys in keeping with - this.</P> -<PRE> ssh2 xy.example.com - vi /etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>and add:</P> -<PRE>conn road - left=192.0.2.2 # Gateway's information - leftid=@xy.example.com # - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 # - leftrsasigkey=0sAQOnwiBPt... # - rightnexthop=%defaultroute # correct in many situations - right=%any # Wildcard: we don't know the laptop's IP - rightid=@road.example.com # - rightrsasigkey=0sAQPIPN9uI... # - auto=add # authorizes but doesn't start this - # connection at startup</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_3">Start your connection</A></H3> -<P>You must start the connection from the Road Warrior side. On your - laptop, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --start net-to-net</PRE> -<P>You should see:</P> -<PRE>104 "net-net" #223: STATE_MAIN_I1: initiate -106 "road" #301: STATE_MAIN_I2: sent MI2, expecting MR2 -108 "road" #301: STATE_MAIN_I3: sent MI3, expecting MR3 -004 "road" #301: STATE_MAIN_I4: ISAKMP SA established -112 "road" #302: STATE_QUICK_I1: initiate -004 "road" #302: STATE_QUICK_I2: sent QI2, IPsec SA established</PRE> -<P>Look for<VAR> IPsec SA established</VAR>. If you're unsuccessful, see - our<A HREF="trouble.html#trouble"> troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be tunneled</A></H3> -<P>If you are using<A HREF="glossary.html#masq"> IP masquerade</A> or<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation (NAT)</A> on either gateway, you must now - exempt the packets you wish to tunnel from this treatment. For example, - if you have a rule like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -j MASQUERADE -</PRE> -<P>change it to something like:</P> -<PRE>iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -s 10.0.0.0/24 -d \! 192.0.2.128/29 -j MASQUERADE</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_5">Test your connection</A></H3> -<P>From your laptop, ping a subnet node behind the remote gateway. Do - not choose the gateway itself for this test.</P> -<PRE> ping ns.winston.example.com</PRE> -<P>Snoop the packets exiting the laptop, with a command like:</P> -<PRE> tcpdump -i wlan0</PRE> -<P>You have success if you see (Encapsulating Security Payload) packets - travelling<B> in both directions</B>:</P> -<PRE> 19:16:32.046220 192.0.2.2 > 192.0.2.9: ESP(spi=0x3be6c4dc,seq=0x3) - 19:16:32.085630 192.0.2.9 > 192.0.2.2: ESP(spi=0x5fdd1cf8,seq=0x6)</PRE> -<P>If you do, great! Traffic between your Road Warrior and the net - behind your gateway is protected. If not, see our<A HREF="trouble.html#trouble"> - troubleshooting hints</A>.</P> -<P>Your new tunnel protects only traffic addressed to the net, not to - the IPsec gateway itself. If you need the latter, you'll want to make - an<A HREF="adv_config.html#adv_config"> extra tunnel.</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_6">Finishing touches</A></H3> -<P>On both ends, name your connection wisely, like:</P> -<PRE>conn mike-to-office</PRE> -<P><B>On the laptop only,</B> replace</P> -<PRE> auto=add</PRE> -<P>with:</P> -<PRE> auto=start</PRE> -<P>so that you'll be connected on-boot.</P> -<P>Happy telecommuting!</P> -<H3><A NAME="16_3_7">Multiple Road Warriors</A></H3> -<P>If you're using RSA keys, as we did in this example, you can add as - many Road Warriors as you like. The left/rightid parameter lets Linux - FreeS/WAN distinguish between multiple Road Warrior peers, each with - its own public key.</P> -<P>The situation is different for shared secrets (PSK). During a PSK - negotiation, ID information is not available at the time Pluto is - trying to determine which secret to use, so, effectively, you can only - define one Roadwarrior connection. All your PSK road warriors must - therefore share one secret.</P> -<H2><A NAME="16_4">What next?</A></H2> -<P>Using the principles illustrated here, you can try variations such - as:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a telecommuter with a static IP</LI> -<LI>a road warrior with a subnet behind it</LI> -</UL> -<P>Or, look at some of our<A HREF="adv_config.html#adv_config"> more - complex configuration examples.</A>.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="install.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="background.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/faq.html b/doc/faq.html deleted file mode 100644 index b0fed502e..000000000 --- a/doc/faq.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2339 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="policygroups.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="manpages.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="5">FreeS/WAN FAQ</A></H1> -<P>This is a collection of questions and answers, mostly taken from the - FreeS/WAN<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>. See the project<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - web site</A> for more information. All the FreeS/WAN documentation is - online there.</P> -<P>Contributions to the FAQ are welcome. Please send them to the project<A -href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>.</P> -<HR> -<H2><A name="questions">Index of FAQ questions</A></H2> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#whatzit">What is FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#problems">How do I report a problem or seek help?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#generic">Can I get ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#lemme_out">... an off-the-shelf system that includes - FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#contractor">... contractors or staff who know FreeS/WAN?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#commercial">... commercial support?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#release">Release questions</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#rel.current">What is the current release?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#relwhen">When is the next release?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#rel.bugs">Are there known bugs in the current release?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="mod_cons">Modifications and contributions</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#modify.faq">Can I modify FreeS/WAN to ...?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#contrib.faq">Can I contribute to the project?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#ddoc.faq">Is there detailed design documentation?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#interact">Will FreeS/WAN work in my environment?</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#interop.faq">Can FreeS/WAN talk to ... ?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#old_to_new">Can different FreeS/WAN versions talk to each - other?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#faq.bandwidth">Is there a limit on throughput?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#faq.number">Is there a limit on number of connections?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#faq.speed">Is a ... fast enough to handle FreeS/WAN with - my loads?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#work_on">Will FreeS/WAN work on ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#versions">... my version of Linux?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#nonIntel.faq">... non-Intel CPUs?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#multi.faq">... multiprocessors?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#k.old">... an older kernel?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#k.versions">... the latest kernel version?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#interface.faq">... unusual network hardware?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#vlan">... a VLAN (802.1q) network?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#features.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#VPN.faq">... site-to-site VPN applications</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#warrior.faq">... remote users connecting to a LAN</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.shared.possible">... remote users using shared secret - authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#wireless.faq">... wireless networks</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#PKIcert">... X.509 or other PKI certificates?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#Radius">... user authentication (Radius, SecureID, Smart - Card ...)?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#NATtraversal">... NAT traversal</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#virtID">... assigning a "virtual identity" to a remote - system?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noDES.faq">... single DES encryption?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#AES.faq">... AES encryption?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#other.cipher">... other encryption algorithms?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#canI">Can I ...</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#policy.preconfig">...use policy groups along with - explicitly configured connections?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#policy.off">...turn off policy groups?</A></LI> - -<!-- - <li><a href="#policy.otherinterface">...use policy groups - on an interface other than <VAR>%defaultroute</VAR>?</a></li> ---> -<LI><A href="#reload">... reload connection info without restarting?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#masq.faq">... use several masqueraded subnets?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#dup_route">... use subnets masqueraded to the same - addresses?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.masq">... assign a road warrior an address on my net - (a virtual identity)?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.many">... support many road warriors with one - gateway?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#road.PSK">... have many road warriors using shared secret - authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#QoS">... use Quality of Service routing with FreeS/WAN?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#deadtunnel">... recognise dead tunnels and shut them down?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#demanddial">... build IPsec tunnels over a demand-dialed - link?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#GRE">... build GRE, L2TP or PPTP tunnels over IPsec?</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#NetBIOS">... use Network Neighborhood (Samba, NetBIOS) - over IPsec?</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#setup.faq">Life's little mysteries</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#cantping">I cannot ping ....</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#forever">It takes forever to ...</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#route">I send packets to the tunnel with route(8) but they - vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#down_route">When a tunnel goes down, packets vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#firewall_ate">The firewall ate my packets!</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#dropconn">Dropped connections</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#defaultroutegone">Disappearing %defaultroute</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#tcpdump.faq">TCPdump on the gateway shows strange things</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#no_trace">Traceroute does not show anything between the - gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#man4debug">Testing in stages (or .... works but ... - doesn't)</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#nomanual">Manually keyed connections don't work</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#spi_error">One manual connection works, but second one - fails</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#man_no_auto">Manual connections work, but automatic keying - doesn't</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#nocomp">IPsec works, but connections using compression - fail</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#pmtu.broken">Small packets work, but large transfers fail</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#subsub">Subnet-to-subnet works, but tests from the - gateways don't</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#compile.faq">Compilation problems</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#gmp.h_missing">gmp.h: No such file or directory</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noVM">... virtual memory exhausted</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#error">Interpreting error messages</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#route-client">route-client (or host) exited with status 7</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#unreachable">SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#modprobe">ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate moduleipsec</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#noKLIPS">ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack - KLIPS</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noDNS">ipsec_setup: ... failure to fetch key for ... from - DNS</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#dup_address">ipsec_setup: ... interfaces ... and ... share - address ...</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#kflags">ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#message_num">Message numbers (MI3, QR1, et cetera) in - Pluto messages</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#conn_name">Connection names in Pluto error messages</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#cantorient">Pluto: ... can't orient connection</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#no.interface">... we have no ipsecN interface for either - end of this connection</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noconn">Pluto: ... no connection is known</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#nosuit">Pluto: ... no suitable connection ...</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#noconn.auth">Pluto: ... no connection has been authorized</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#noDESsupport">Pluto: ... OAKLEY_DES_CBC is not supported.</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#notransform">Pluto: ... no acceptable transform</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#rsasigkey">rsasigkey dumps core</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#sig4">!Pluto failure!: ... exited with ... signal 4</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#econnrefused">ECONNREFUSED error message</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#no_eroute">klips_debug: ... no eroute!</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#SAused">... trouble writing to /dev/ipsec ... SA already - in use</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#ignore">... ignoring ... payload</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#unknown_rightcert">unknown parameter name "rightcert"</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="#spam">Why don't you restrict the mailing lists to reduce - spam?</A></LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H2><A name="whatzit">What is FreeS/WAN?</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is a Linux implementation of the<A href="glossary.html#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> protocols, providing security services at the IP (Internet - Protocol) level of the network.</P> -<P>For more detail, see our<A href="intro.html"> introduction</A> - document or the FreeS/WAN project<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - web site</A>.</P> -<P>To start setting it up, go to our<A href="quickstart.html"> - quickstart guide</A>.</P> -<P>Our<A href="web.html"> web links</A> document has information on<A href="web.html#implement"> - IPsec for other systems</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="problems">How do I report a problem or seek help?</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT>Read our<A href="trouble.html"> troubleshooting</A> document.</DT> -<DD> -<P>It may guide you to a solution. If not, see its<A href="trouble.html#prob.report"> - problem reporting</A> section.</P> -<P>Basically, what it says is<STRONG> give us the output from<VAR> ipsec - barf</VAR> from both gateways</STRONG>. Without full information, we - cannot diagnose a problem. However,<VAR> ipsec barf</VAR> produces a - lot of output. If at all possible,<STRONG> please make barfs accessible - via the web or FTP</STRONG> rather than sending enormous mail messages.</P> -</DD> -<DT><STRONG>Use the<A href="mail.html"> users mailing list</A> for - problem reports</STRONG>, rather than mailing developers directly.</DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>This gives you access to more expertise, including users who may - have encountered and solved the same problems.</LI> -<LI>It is more likely to get a quick response. Developers may get behind - on email, or even ignore it entirely for a while, but a list message - (given a reasonable Subject: line) is certain to be read by a fair - number of people within hours.</LI> -<LI>It may also be important because of<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> - cryptography export laws</A>. A US citizen who provides technical - assistance to foreign cryptographic work might be charged under the - arms export regulations. Such a charge would be easier to defend if the - discussion took place on a public mailing list than if it were done in - private mail.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT>Try irc.freenode.net#freeswan.</DT> -<DD> -<P>FreeS/WAN developers, volunteers and users can often be found there. - Be patient and be prepared to provide lots of information to support - your question.</P> -<P>If your question was really interesting, and you found an answer, - please share that with the class by posting to the<A href="mail.html"> - users mailing list</A>. That way others with the same problem can find - your answer in the archives.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Premium support is also available.</DT> -<DD> -<P>See the next several questions.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="generic">Can I get ...</A></H2> -<H3><A name="lemme_out">Can I get an off-the-shelf system that includes - FreeS/WAN?</A></H3> -<P>There are a number of Linux distributions or firewall products which - include FreeS/WAN. See this<A href="intro.html#products"> list</A>. - Using one of these, chosen to match your requirements and budget, may - save you considerable time and effort.</P> -<P>If you don't know your requirements, start by reading Schneier's<A href="biblio.html#secrets"> - Secrets and Lies</A>. That gives the best overview of security issues I - have seen. Then consider hiring a consultant (see next question) to - help define your requirements.</P> -<H3><A name="consultant">Can I hire consultants or staff who know - FreeS/WAN?</A></H3> -<P>If you want the help of a contractor, or to hire staff with FreeS/WAN - expertise, you could:</P> -<UL> -<LI>check availability in your area through your local Linux User Group - (<A href="http://lugww.counter.li.org/">LUG Index</A>)</LI> -<LI>try asking on our<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>For companies offerring support, see the next question.</P> -<H3><A name="commercial">Can I get commercial support?</A></H3> -<P>Many of the distributions or firewall products which include - FreeS/WAN (see this<A href="intro.html#products"> list</A>) come with - commercial support or have it available as an option.</P> -<P>Various companies specialize in commercial support of open source - software. Our project leader was a founder of the first such company, - Cygnus Support. It has since been bought by<A href="http://www.redhat.com"> - Redhat</A>. Another such firm is<A href="http://www.linuxcare.com"> - Linuxcare</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="release">Release questions</A></H2> -<H3><A name="rel.current">What is the current release?</A></H3> -<P>The current release is the highest-numbered tarball on our<A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan"> - distribution site</A>. Almost always, any of<A href="intro.html#mirrors"> - the mirrors</A> will have the same file, though perhaps not for a day - or so after a release.</P> -<P>Unfortunately, the web site is not always updated as quickly as it - should be.</P> -<H3><A name="relwhen">When is the next release?</A></H3> -<P>We try to do a release approximately every six to eight weeks.</P> -<P>If pre-release tests fail and the fix appears complex, or more - generally if the code does not appear stable when a release is - scheduled, we will just skip that release.</P> -<P>For serious bugs, we may bring out an extra bug-fix release. These - get numbers in the normal release series. For example, there was a bug - found in FreeS/WAN 1.6, so we did another release less than two weeks - later. The bug-fix release was called 1.7.</P> -<H3><A name="rel.bugs">Are there known bugs in the current release?</A></H3> -<P>Any problems we are aware of at the time of a release are documented - in the<A href="../BUGS"> BUGS</A> file for that release. You should - also look at the<A href="../CHANGES"> CHANGES</A> file.</P> -<P>Bugs discovered after a release are discussed on the<A href="mail.html"> - mailing lists</A>. The easiest way to check for any problems in the - current code would be to peruse the<A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/briefs"> - List In Brief</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="mod_cons">Modifications and contributions</A></H2> -<H3><A name="modify.faq">Can I modify FreeS/WAN to ...?</A></H3> -<P>You are free to modify FreeS/WAN in any way. See the discussion of<A href="intro.html#licensing"> - licensing</A> in our introduction document.</P> -<P>Before investing much energy in any such project, we suggest that you</P> -<UL> -<LI>check the list of<A href="web.html#patch"> existing patches</A></LI> -<LI>post something about your project to the<A href="mail.html"> design - mailing list</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>This may prevent duplicated effort, or lead to interesting - collaborations.</P> -<H3><A name="contrib.faq">Can I contribute to the project?</A></H3> - In general, we welcome contributions from the community. Various - contributed patches, either to fix bugs or to add features, have been - incorporated into our distribution. Other patches, not yet included in - the distribution, are listed in our<A href="web.html#patch"> web links</A> - section. -<P>Users have also contributed heavily to documentation, both by - creating their own<A href="intro.html#howto"> HowTos</A> and by posting - things on the<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A> which I have quoted - in these HTML docs.</P> -<P>There are, however, some caveats.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN is being implemented in Canada, by Canadians, largely to - ensure that is it is entirely free of export restrictions. See this<A href="politics.html#status"> - discussion</A>. We<STRONG> cannot accept code contributions from US - residents or citizens</STRONG>, not even one-line bugs fixes. The - reasons for this were recently discussed extensively on the mailing - list, in a thread starting<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/01/msg00111.html"> - here</A>.</P> -<P>Not all contributions are of interest to us. The project has a set of - fairly ambitious and quite specific goals, described in our<A href="intro.html#goals"> - introduction</A>. Contributions that lead toward these goals are likely - to be welcomed enthusiastically. Other contributions may be seen as - lower priority, or even as a distraction.</P> -<P>Discussion of possible contributions takes place on the<A href="mail.html"> - design mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="ddoc.faq">Is there detailed design documentation?</A></H3> - There are: -<UL> -<LI><A href="rfc.html">RFCs</A> specifying the protocols we implement</LI> -<LI><A href="manpages.html">man pages</A> for our utilities, library - functions and file formats</LI> -<LI>comments in the source code</LI> -<LI><A href="index.html">HTML documentation</A> written primarily for - users</LI> -<LI>archived discussions from the<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI>other papers mentioned in our<A href="intro.html#applied"> - introduction</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The only formal design documents are a few papers in the last - category above. All the other categories, however, have things to say - about design as well.</P> -<H2><A name="interact">Will FreeS/WAN work in my environment?</A></H2> -<H3><A name="interop.faq">Can FreeS/WAN talk to ...?</A></H3> -<P>The IPsec protocols are designed to support interoperation. In - theory, any two IPsec implementations should be able to talk to each - other. In practice, it is considerably more complex. We have a whole<A href="interop.html"> - interoperation document</A> devoted to this problem.</P> -<P>An important part of that document is links to the many<A href="interop.html#otherpub"> - user-written HowTos</A> on interoperation between FreeS/WAN and various - other implementations. Often the users know more than the developers - about these issues (and almost always more than me :-), so these - documents may be your best resource.</P> -<H3><A name="old_to_new">Can different FreeS/WAN versions talk to each - other?</A></H3> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN can interoperate with many IPsec implementations, - including earlier versions of Linux FreeS/WAN itself.</P> -<P>In a few cases, there are some complications. See our<A href="interop.html#oldswan"> - interoperation</A> document for details.</P> -<H3><A name="faq.bandwidth">Is there a limit on throughput?</A></H3> -<P>There is no hard limit, but see below.</P> -<H3><A name="faq.number">Is there a limit on number of tunnels?</A></H3> -<P>There is no hard limit, but see next question.</P> -<H3><A name="faq.speed">Is a ... fast enough to handle FreeS/WAN with my - loads?</A></H3> -<P>A quick summary:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Even a limited machine can be useful</DT> -<DD>A 486 can handle a T1, ADSL or cable link, though the machine may be - breathing hard.</DD> -<DT>A mid-range PC (say 800 MHz with good network cards) can do a lot of - IPsec</DT> -<DD>With up to roughly 50 tunnels and aggregate bandwidth of 20 Megabits - per second, it willl have cycles left over for other tasks.</DD> -<DT>There are limits</DT> -<DD>Even a high end CPU will not come close to handling a fully loaded - 100 Mbit/second Ethernet link. -<P>Beyond about 50 tunnels it needs careful management.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<P>See our<A href="performance.html"> FreeS/WAN performance</A> document - for details.</P> -<H2><A name="work_on">Will FreeS/WAN work on ... ?</A></H2> -<H3><A name="versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on my version of Linux?</A></H3> -<P>We build and test on Redhat distributions, but FreeS/WAN runs just - fine on several other distributions, sometimes with minor fiddles to - adapt to the local environment. Details are in our<A href="compat.html#otherdist"> - compatibility</A> document. Also, some distributions or products come - with<A href="intro.html#products"> FreeS/WAN included</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="nonIntel.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on non-Intel CPUs?</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is<STRONG> intended to run on all CPUs Linux supports</STRONG> -. We know of it being used in production on x86, ARM, Alpha and MIPS. It - has also had successful tests on PPC and SPARC, though we don't know of - actual use there. Details are in our<A href="compat.html#CPUs"> - compatibility</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="multi.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on multiprocessors?</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is designed to work on any SMP architecture Linux supports, - and has been tested successfully on at least dual processor Intel - architecture machines. Details are in our<A href="compat.html#multiprocessor"> - compatibility</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="k.old">Will FreeS/WAN work on an older kernel?</A></H3> -<P>It might, but we strongly recommend using a recent 2.2 or 2.4 series - kernel. Sometimes the newer versions include security fixes which can - be quite important on a gateway.</P> -<P>Also, we use recent kernels for development and testing, so those are - better tested and, if you do encounter a problem, more easily - supported. If something breaks applying recent FreeS/WAN patches to an - older kernel, then "update your kernel" is almost certain to be the - first thing we suggest. It may be the only suggestion we have.</P> -<P>The precise kernel versions supported by a particular FreeS/WAN - release are given in the<A href="XX"> README</A> file of that release.</P> -<P>See the following question for more on kernels.</P> -<H3><A name="k.versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on the latest kernel - version?</A></H3> -<P>Sometimes yes, but quite often, no.</P> -<P>Kernel versions supported are given in the<A href="../README"> README</A> - file of each FreeS/WAN release. Typically, they are whatever production - kernels were current at the time of our release (or shortly before; we - might release for kernel<VAR> n</VAR> just as Linus releases<VAR> n+1</VAR> -). Often FreeS/WAN will work on slightly later kernels as well, but of - course this cannot be guaranteed.</P> -<P>For example, FreeS/WAN 1.91 was released for kernels 2.2.19 or 2.4.5, - the current kernels at the time. It also worked on 2.4.6, 2.4.7 and - 2.4.8, but 2.4.9 had changes that caused compilation errors if it was - patched with FreeS/WAN 1.91.</P> -<P>When such changes appear, we put a fix in the FreeS/WAN snapshots, - and distribute it with our next release. However, this is not a high - priority for us, and it may take anything from a few days to several - weeks for such a problem to find its way to the top of our kernel - programmer's To-Do list. In the meanwhile, you have two choices:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either stick with a slightly older kernel, even if it is not the - latest and greatest. This is recommended for production systems; new - versions may have new bugs.</LI> -<LI>or fix the problem yourself and send us a patch, via the<A href="mail.html"> - Users mailing list</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We don't even try to keep up with kernel changes outside the main 2.2 - and 2.4 branches, such as the 2.4.x-ac patched versions from Alan Cox - or the 2.5 series of development kernels. We'd rather work on - developing the FreeS/WAN code than on chasing these moving targets. We - are, however, happy to get patches for problems discovered there.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="install.html#choosek"> Choosing a kernel</A> - section of our installation document.</P> -<H3><A name="interface.faq">Will FreeS/WAN work on unusual network - hardware?</A></H3> -<P>IPsec is designed to work over any network that IP works over, and - FreeS/WAN is intended to work over any network interface hardware that - Linux supports.</P> -<P>If you have working IP on some unusual interface -- perhaps Arcnet, - Token Ring, ATM or Gigabit Ethernet -- then IPsec should "just work".</P> -<P>That said, practice is sometimes less tractable than theory. Our - testing is done almost entirely on:</P> -<UL> -<LI>10 or 100 Mbit Ethernet</LI> -<LI>ADSL or cable connections, with and without PPPoE</LI> -<LI>IEEE 802.11 wireless LANs (see<A href="#wireless.faq"> below</A>)</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you have some other interface, especially an uncommon one, it is - entirely possible you will get bitten either by a FreeS/WAN bug which - our testing did not turn up, or by a bug in the driver that shows up - only with our loads.</P> -<P>If IP works on your interface and FreeS/WAN doesn't, seek help on the<A -href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A>.</P> -<P>Another FAQ section describes<A href="#pmtu.broken"> MTU problems</A> -. These are a possibility for some interfaces.</P> -<H3><A name="vlan">Will FreeS/WAN work on a VLAN (802.1q) network?</A></H3> -<P> Yes, FreeSwan works fine, though some network drivers have problems - with jumbo sized ethernet frames. If you used interfaces=%defaultroute - you do not need to change anything, but if you specified an interface - (eg eth0) then remember you must change that to reflect the VLAN - interface (eg eth0.2 for VLAN ID 2).</P> -<P> The "eepro100" module is known to be broken, use the e100 driver for - those cards instead (included in 2.4 as 'alternative driver' for the - Intel EtherExpressPro/100.</P> -<P> You do not need to change any MTU setting (those are workarounds - that are only needed for buggy drivers)</P> -<P><EM>This FAQ contributed by Paul Wouters.</EM></P> -<H2><A name="features.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support ...</A></H2> -<P>For a discussion of which parts of the IPsec specifications FreeS/WAN - does and does not implement, see our<A href="compat.html#spec"> - compatibility</A> document.</P> -<P>For information on some often-requested features, see below.</P> -<H3><A name="VPN.faq"></A>Does FreeS/WAN support site-to-site VPN (<A HREF="glossary.html#VPN"> -Virtual Private Network</A>) applications?</H3> -<P>Absolutely. See this FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN<A HREF="config.html"> - configuration example</A>. If only one site is using FreeS/WAN, there - may be a relevant HOWTO on our<A HREF="interop.html"> interop page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="warrior.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users connecting - to a LAN?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. We call the remote users "Road Warriors". Check out our - FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN<A HREF="config.html#config.rw"> Road Warrior - Configuration Example</A>.</P> -<P>If your Road Warrior is a Windows or Mac PC, you may need to install - an IPsec implementation on that machine. Our<A HREF="interop.html"> - interop</A> page lists many available brands, and features links to - several HOWTOs.</P> -<H3><A name="road.shared.possible">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users - using shared secret authentication?</A></H3> -<P><STRONG>Yes, but</STRONG> there are severe restrictions, so<STRONG> - we strongly recommend using</STRONG><A href="glossary.html#RSA"><STRONG> - RSA</STRONG></A><STRONG> keys for</STRONG><A href="glossary.html#authentication"> -<STRONG> authentication</STRONG></A><STRONG> instead</STRONG>.</P> -<P>See this<A href="#road.PSK"> FAQ question</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="wireless.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support wireless networks?</A></H3> -<P>Yes, it is a common practice to use IPsec over wireless networks - because their built-in encryption,<A href="glossary.html#WEP"> WEP</A>, - is insecure.</P> -<P>There is some<A href="adv_config.html#wireless.config"> discussion</A> - in our advanced configuration document. See also the<A HREF="http://www.wavesec.org"> - WaveSEC site</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="PKIcert">Does FreeS/WAN support X.509 or other PKI - certificates?</A></H3> -<P>Vanilla FreeS/WAN does not support X.509, but Andreas Steffen and - others have provided a popular, well-supported X.509 patch.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan">patch</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca">Super FreeS/WAN</A> incorporates - this and other user-contributed patches.</LI> -<LI> Kai Martius'<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/install.htm"> - X.509 Installation and Configuration Guide</A></LI> -</UL> -<P> Linux FreeS/WAN features<A HREF="quickstart.html"> Opportunistic - Encryption</A>, an alternative Public Key Infrastructure based on - Secure DNS.</P> -<H3><A name="Radius">Does FreeS/WAN support user authentication (Radius, - SecureID, Smart Card...)?</A></H3> -<P>Andreas Steffen's<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan"> X.509 - patch</A> (v. 1.42+) supports Smart Cards. The patch does not ship with - vanilla FreeS/WAN, but will be incorporated into<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/"> - Super FreeS/WAN 2.01+</A>. The patch implements the PCKS#15 - Cryptographic Token Information Format Standard, using the OpenSC - smartcard library functions.</P> -<P>Older news:</P> -<P>A user-supported patch to FreeS/WAN 1.3, for smart card style - authentication, is available on<A HREF="http://alcatraz.webcriminals.com/~bastiaan/ipsec"> - Bastiaan's site</A>. It supports skeyid and ibutton. This patch is not - part of Super FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>For a while progress on this front was impeded by a lack of standard. - The IETF<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsra-charter.html"> - working group</A> has now nearly completed its recommended solution to - the problem; meanwhile several vendors have implemented various things.</P> - -<!-- -<p>The <a href="web.html#patch">patches</a> section of our web links document -has links to some user work on this.</p> ---> -<P>Of course, there are various ways to avoid any requirement for user - authentication in IPsec. Consider the situation where road warriors - build IPsec tunnels to your office net and you are considering - requiring user authentication during tunnel negotiation. Alternatives - include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If you can trust the road warrior machines, then set them up so that - only authorised users can create tunnels. If your road warriors use - laptops, consider the possibility of theft.</LI> -<LI>If the tunnel only provides access to particular servers and you can - trust those servers, then set the servers up to require user - authentication.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If either of those is trustworthy, it is not clear that you need user - authentication in IPsec.</P> -<H3><A name="NATtraversal">Does FreeS/WAN support NAT traversal?</A></H3> -<P>Vanilla FreeS/WAN does not, but thanks to Mathieu Lafon and Arkoon - Network Security, there's a patch to support this.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://open-source.arkoon.net">patch and documentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca">Super FreeS/WAN</A> incorporates - this and other user-contributed patches.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The NAT traversal patch has some issues with PSKs, so you may wish to - authenticate with RSA keys, or X.509 (requires a patch which is also - included in Super FreeS/WAN). Doing the latter also has advantages when - dealing with large numbers of clients who may be behind NAT; instead of - having to make an individual Roadwarrior connection for each virtual - IP, you can use the "rightsubnetwithin" parameter to specify a range. - See<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/install.htm#section_4.4"> - these<VAR> rightsubnetwithin</VAR> instructions</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="virtID">Does FreeS/WAN support assigning a "virtual - identity" to a remote system?</A></H3> -<P>Some IPsec implementations allow you to make the source address on - packets sent by a Road Warrior machine be something other than the - address of its interface to the Internet. This is sometimes described - as assigning a virtual identity to that machine.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN does not directly support this, but it can be done. See - this<A href="#road.masq"> FAQ question</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="noDES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support single DES encryption?</A> -</H3> -<P><STRONG>No</STRONG>, single DES is not used either at the<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> - IKE</A> level for negotiating connections or at the<A href="glossary.html#IPsec"> - IPsec</A> level for actually building them.</P> -<P>Single DES is<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> insecure</A>. As - we see it, it is more important to deliver real security than to comply - with a standard which has been subverted into allowing use of - inadequate methods. See this<A href="politics.html#weak"> discussion</A> -.</P> -<P>If you want to interoperate with an IPsec implementation which offers - only DES, see our<A href="interop.html#noDES"> interoperation</A> - document.</P> -<H3><A name="AES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support AES encryption?</A></H3> -<P><A href="glossary.html#AES">AES</A> is a new US government<A href="glossary.html#block"> - block cipher</A> standard to replace the obsolete<A href="glossary.html#DES"> - DES</A>.</P> -<P>At time of writing (March 2002), the FreeS/WAN distribution does not - yet support AES but user-written<A href="web.html#patch"> patches</A> - are available to add it. Our kernel programmer is working on - integrating those patches into the distribution, and there is active - discussion of this on the design mailimg list.</P> -<H3><A name="other.cipher">Does FreeS/WAN support other encryption - algorithms?</A></H3> -<P>Currently<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> triple DES</A> is the only - cipher supported. AES will almost certainly be added (see previous - question), and it is likely that in the process we will also add the - other two AES finalists with open licensing, Twofish and Serpent.</P> -<P>We are extremely reluctant to add other ciphers. This would make both - use and maintenance of FreeS/WAN more complex without providing any - clear benefit. Complexity is emphatically not desirable in a security - product.</P> -<P>Various users have written patches to add other ciphers. We provide<A href="web.html#patch"> - links</A> to these.</P> -<H2><A name="canI">Can I ...</A></H2> -<H3><A name="policy.preconfig">Can I use policy groups along with - explicitly configured connections?</A></H3> -<P>Yes, you can, so long as you pay attention to the selection rule, - which can be summarized "the most specific connection wins". We - describe the rule in our<A HREF="policygroups.html#policy.group.notes"> - policy groups</A> document, and provide a more technical explanation in<A -HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A>.</P> -<P>A good guideline: If you have a regular connection defined in<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR>, ensure that a subset of that connection is not listed - in a less restrictive policy group. Otherwise, FreeS/WAN will use the - subset, with its more specific source/destination pair.</P> -<P>Here's an example. Suppose you are the system administrator at - 192.0.2.2. You have this connection in ipsec.conf:<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR> -:</P> -<PRE>conn net-to-net - left=192.0.2.2 # you are here - right=192.0.2.8 - rightsubnet=192.0.2.96/27 - .... -</PRE> -<P>If you then place a host or net within<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR>, (let's - say 192.0.2.98) in<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR>, you may find that - 192.0.2.2 at times communicates in the clear with 192.0.2.98. That's - consistent with the rule, but may be contrary to your expectations.</P> -<P>On the other hand, it's safe to put a larger subnet in a less - restrictive policy group file. If<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR> contains - 192.0.2.0/24, then the more specific<VAR> net-to-net</VAR> connection - is used for any communication to 192.0.2.96/27. The more general policy - applies only to communication with hosts or subnets in 192.0.2.0/24 - without a more specific policy or connection.</P> -<H3><A name="policy.off">Can I turn off policy groups?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. Use<A HREF="policygroups.html#disable_policygroups"> these - instructions</A>.</P> - -<!-- -<h3><a name="policy.otherinterface">Can I use policy groups - on an interface other than <VAR>%defaultroute</VAR>?</a></h3> - -<p>??<p> ---> -<H3><A name="reload">Can I reload connection info without restarting?</A> -</H3> -<P>Yes, you can do this. Here are the details, in a mailing list message - from Pluto programmer Hugh Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>| How can I reload config's without restarting all of pluto and klips? I am using -| FreeSWAN -> PGPNet in a medium sized production environment, and would like to be -| able to add new connections ( i am using include config/* ) without dropping current -| SA's. -| -| Can this be done? -| -| If not, are there plans to add this kind of feature? - - ipsec auto --add whatever -This will look in the usual place (/etc/ipsec.conf) for a conn named -whatever and add it. - -If you added new secrets, you need to do - ipsec auto --rereadsecrets -before Pluto needs to know those secrets. - -| I have looked (perhaps not thoroughly enough tho) to see how to do this: - -There may be more bits to look for, depending on what you are trying -to do.</PRE> -<P>Another useful command here is<VAR> ipsec auto --replace <conn_name></VAR> - which re-reads data for a named connection.</P> -<H3><A name="masq.faq">Can I use several masqueraded subnets?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. This is done all the time. See the discussion in our<A href="config.html#route_or_not"> - setup</A> document. The only restriction is that the subnets on the two - ends must not overlap. See the next question.</P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message on the topic. The user incorrectly - thinks you need a 2.4 kernel for this -- actually various people have - been doing it on 2.0 and 2.2 for quite some time -- but he has it right - for 2.4.</P> -<PRE>Subject: Double NAT and freeswan working :) - Date: Sun, 11 Mar 2001 - From: Paul Wouters <paul@xtdnet.nl> - -Just to share my pleasure, and make an entry for people who are searching -the net on how to do this. Here's the very simple solution to have a double -NAT'ed network working with freeswan. (Not sure if this is old news, but I'm -not on the list (too much spam) and I didn't read this in any HOWTO/FAQ/doc -on the freeswan site yet (Sandy, put it in! :) - -10.0.0.0/24 --- 10.0.0.1 a.b.c.d ---- a.b.c.e {internet} ----+ - | -10.0.1.0/24 --- 10.0.1.1 f.g.h.i ---- f.g.h.j {internet} ----+ - -the goal is to have the first network do a VPN to the second one, yet also -have NAT in place for connections not destinated for the other side of the -NAT. Here the two Linux security gateways have one real IP number (cable -modem, dialup, whatever. - -The problem with NAT is you don't want packets from 10.*.*.* to 10.*.*.* -to be NAT'ed. While with Linux 2.2, you can't, with Linux 2.4 you can. - -(This has been tested and works for 2.4.2 with Freeswan snapshot2001mar8b) - -relevant parts of /etc/ipsec.conf: - - left=f.g.h.i - leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 - leftnexthop=f.g.h.j - leftfirewall=yes - leftid=@firewall.netone.nl - leftrsasigkey=0x0........ - right=a.b.c.d - rightsubnet=10.0.0.0/24 - rightnexthop=a.b.c.e - rightfirewall=yes - rightid=@firewall.nettwo.nl - rightrsasigkey=0x0...... - # To authorize this connection, but not actually start it, at startup, - # uncomment this. - auto=add - -and now the real trick. Setup the NAT correctly on both sites: - -iptables -t nat -F -iptables -t nat -A POSTROUTING -o eth0 -d \! 10.0.0.0/8 -j MASQUERADE - -This tells the NAT code to only do NAT for packets with destination other then -10.* networks. note the backslash to mask the exclamation mark to protect it -against the shell. - -Happy painting :) - -Paul</PRE> -<H3><A name="dup_route">Can I use subnets masqueraded to the same - addresses?</A></H3> -<P><STRONG>No.</STRONG> The notion that IP addresses are unique is one - of the fundamental principles of the IP protocol. Messing with it is - exceedingly perilous.</P> -<P>Fairly often a situation comes up where a company has several - branches, all using the same<A href="glossary.html#non-routable"> - non-routable addresses</A>, perhaps 192.168.0.0/24. This works fine as - long as those nets are kept distinct. The<A href="glossary.html#masq"> - IP masquerading</A> on their firewalls ensures that packets reaching - the Internet carry the firewall address, not the private address.</P> -<P>This can break down when IPsec enters the picture. FreeS/WAN builds a - tunnel that pokes through both masquerades and delivers packets from<VAR> - leftsubnet</VAR> to<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR> and vice versa. For this to - work, the two subnets<EM> must</EM> be distinct.</P> -<P>There are several solutions to this problem.</P> -<P>Usually, you<STRONG> re-number the subnets</STRONG>. Perhaps the - Vancouver office becomes 192.168.101.0/24, Calgary 192.168.102.0/24 and - so on. FreeS/WAN can happily handle this. With, for example<VAR> - leftsubnet=192.168.101.0/24</VAR> and<VAR> rightsubnet=192.168.102.0/24</VAR> - in a connection description, any machine in Calgary can talk to any - machine in Vancouver. If you want to be more restrictive and use - something like<VAR> leftsubnet=192.168.101.128/25</VAR> and<VAR> - rightsubnet=192.168.102.240/28</VAR> so only certain machines on each - end have access to the tunnel, that's fine too.</P> -<P>You could also<STRONG> split the subnet</STRONG> into smaller ones, - for example using<VAR> 192.168.1.0/25</VAR> in Vancouver and<VAR> - rightsubnet=192.168.0.128/25</VAR> in Calgary.</P> -<P>Alternately, you can just<STRONG> give up routing</STRONG> directly - to machines on the subnets. Omit the<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> - rightsubnet</VAR> parameters from your connection descriptions. Your - IPsec tunnels will then run between the public interfaces of the two - firewalls. Packets will be masqueraded both before they are put into - tunnels and after they emerge. Your Vancouver client machines will see - only one Calgary machine, the firewall.</P> -<H3><A name="road.masq">Can I assign a road warrior an address on my net - (a virtual identity)?</A></H3> -<P>Often it would be convenient to be able to give a Road Warrior an IP - address which appears to be on the local network. Some IPsec - implementations have support for this, sometimes calling the feature - "virtual identity".</P> -<P>Currently (Sept 2002) FreeS/WAN does not support this, and we have no - definite plans to add it. The difficulty is that is not yet a standard - mechanism for it. There is an Internet Draft for a method of doing it - using<A href="glossary.html#DHCP"> DHCP</A> which looks promising. - FreeS/WAN may support that in a future release.</P> -<P>In the meanwhile, you can do it yourself using the Linux iproute2(8) - facilities. Details are in<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/iproute2.htm"> - this paper</A>.</P> -<P>Another method has also been discussed on the mailing list.:</P> -<UL> -<LI>You can use a variant of the<A href="adv_config.html#extruded.config"> - extruded subnet</A> procedure.</LI> -<LI>You have to avoid having the road warrior's assigned address within - the range you actually use at home base. See previous question.</LI> -<LI>On the other hand, you want the roadwarrior's address to be within - the range that<EM> seems</EM> to be on your network.</LI> -</UL> -<P>For example, you might have:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftsubnet=a.b.c.0/25</DT> -<DD>head office network</DD> -<DT>rightsubnet=a.b.c.129/32</DT> -<DD>extruded to a road warrior. Note that this is not in a.b.c.0/25</DD> -<DT>a.b.c.0/24</DT> -<DD>whole network, including both the above</DD> -</DL> -<P>You then set up routing so that the office machines use the IPsec - gateway as their route to a.b.c.128/25. The leftsubnet parameter tells - the road warriors to use tunnels to reach a.b.c.0/25, so you should - have two-way communication. Depending or your network and applications, - there may be some additional work to do on DNS or Windows configuration</P> -<H3><A name="road.many">Can I support many road warriors with one - gateway?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. This is easily done, using</P> -<DL> -<DT>either RSA authentication</DT> -<DD>standard in the FreeS/WAN distribution</DD> -<DT>or X.509 certificates</DT> -<DD>requires<A href="#PKIcert"> Super FreeS/WAN or a patch</A>.</DD> -</DL> -<P>In either case, each Road Warrior must have a different key or - certificate.</P> -<P>It is also possible using pre-shared key authentication, though we - don't recommend this; see the<A href="#road.PSK"> next question</A> for - details.</P> -<P>If you expect to have more than a few dozen Road Warriors connecting - simultaneously, you may need a fairly powerful gateway machine. See our - document on<A href="performance.html"> FreeS/WAN performance</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="road.PSK">Can I have many road warriors using shared secret - authentication?</A></H3> -<P><STRONG>Yes, but avoid it if possible</STRONG>.</P> -<P>You can have multiple Road Warriors using shared secret - authentication<STRONG> only if they all use the same secret</STRONG>. - You must also set:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> uniqueids=no </PRE> -<P>in the connection definition.</P> -<P>Why it's less secure:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If you have many users, it becomes almost certain the secret will - leak</LI> -<LI>The secret becomes quite valuable to an attacker</LI> -<LI>All users authenticate the same way, so the gateway cannot tell them - apart for logging or access control purposes</LI> -<LI>Changing the secret is difficult. You have to securely notify all - users.</LI> -<LI>If you find out the secret has been compromised, you can change it, - but then what? None of your users can connect without the new secret. - How will you notify them all, quickly and securely, without using the - VPN?</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is a designed-in limitation of the<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> - IKE</A> key negotiation protocol, not a problem with our - implementation.</P> -<P><STRONG>We very strongly recommend that you avoid using shared secret - authentication for multiple Road Warriors.</STRONG> Use RSA - authentication instead.</P> -<P>The longer story: When using shared secrets, the protocol requires - that the responding gateway be able to determine which secret to use at - a time when all it knows about the initiator is an IP address. This - works fine if you know the initiator's address in advance and can use - it to look up the appropiriate secret. However, it fails for Road - Warriors since the gateway cannot know their IP addresses in advance.</P> -<P>With RSA signatures (or certificates) the protocol is slightly - different. The initiator provides an identifier early in the exchange - and the responder can use that identifier to look up the correct key or - certificate. See<A href="#road.many"> above</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="QoS">Can I use Quality of Service routing with FreeS/WAN?</A> -</H3> -<P>From project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>> Do QoS add to FreeS/WAN? -> For example integrating DiffServ and FreeS/WAN? - -With a current version of FreeS/WAN, you will have to add hidetos=no to -the config-setup section of your configuration file. By default, the TOS -field of tunnel packets is zeroed; with hidetos=no, it is copied from the -packet inside. (This is a modest security hole, which is why it is no -longer the default.) - -DiffServ does not interact well with tunneling in general. Ways of -improving this are being studied.</PRE> -<P>Copying the<A href="glossary.html#TOS"> TOS</A> (type of service) - information from the encapsulated packet to the outer header reveals - the TOS information to an eavesdropper. This does not tell him much, - but it might be of use in<A href="glossary.html#traffic"> traffic - analysis</A>. Since we do not have to give it to him, our default is - not to.</P> -<P>Even with the TOS hidden, you can still:</P> -<UL> -<LI>apply QOS rules to the tunneled (ESP) packets; for example, by - giving ESP packets a certain priority.</LI> -<LI>apply QOS rules to the packets as they enter or exit the tunnel via - an IPsec virtual interface (eg.<VAR> ipsec0</VAR>).</LI> -</UL> -<P>See<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> for more - on the<VAR> hidetos=</VAR> parameter.</P> -<H3><A name="deadtunnel">Can I recognise dead tunnels and shut them - down?</A></H3> -<P>There is no general mechanism to do this is in the IPsec protocols.</P> -<P>From time to time, there is discussion on the IETF Working Group<A href="mail.html#ietf"> - mailing list</A> of adding a "keep-alive" mechanism (which some say - should be called "make-dead"), but it is a fairly complex problem and - no consensus has been reached on whether or how it should be done.</P> -<P>The protocol does have optional<A href="#ignore"> delete-SA</A> - messages which one side can send when it closes a connection in hopes - this will cause the other side to do the same. FreeS/WAN does not - currently support these. In any case, they would not solve the problem - since:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a gateway that crashes or hangs would not send the messages</LI> -<LI>the sender is not required to send them</LI> -<LI>they are not authenticated, so any receiver that trusts them leaves - itself open to a<A href="glossary.html#DOS"> denial of service</A> - attack</LI> -<LI>the receiver is not required to do anything about them</LI> -<LI>the receiver cannot acknowledge them; the protocol provides no - mechanism for that</LI> -<LI>since they are not acknowledged, the sender cannot rely on them</LI> -</UL> -<P>However, connections do have limited lifetimes and you can control - how many attempts your gateway makes to rekey before giving up. For - example, you can set:</P> -<PRE>conn default - keyingtries=3 - keylife=30m</PRE> -<P>With these settings old connections will be cleaned up. Within 30 - minutes of the other end dying, rekeying will be attempted. If it - succeeds, the new connection replaces the old one. If it fails, no new - connection is created. Either way, the old connection is taken down - when its lifetime expires.</P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message on the topic from FreeS/WAN tech - support person Claudia Schmeing:</P> -<PRE>You ask how to determine whether a tunnel is redundant: - -> Can anybody explain the best way to determine this. Esp when a RW has -> disconnected? I thought 'ipsec auto --status' might be one way. - -If a tunnel goes down from one end, Linux FreeS/WAN on the -other end has no way of knowing this until it attempts to rekey. -Once it tries to rekey and fails, it will 'know' that the tunnel is -down. - -Because it doesn't have a way of knowing the state until this point, -it will also not be able to tell you the state via ipsec auto --status. - -> However, comparing output from a working tunnel with that of one that -> was closed -> did not show clearly show tunnel status. - -If your tunnel is down but not 'unrouted' (see man ipsec_auto), you -should not be able to ping the opposite side of the tunnel. You can -use this as an indicator of tunnel status. - -On a related note, you may be interested to know that as of 1.7, -redundant tunnels caused by RW disconnections are likely to be -less of a pain. From doc/CHANGES: - - There is a new configuration parameter, uniqueids, to control a new Pluto - option: when a new connection is negotiated with the same ID as an old - one, the old one is deleted immediately. This should help eliminate - dangling Road Warrior connections when the same Road Warrior reconnects. - It thus requires that IDs not be shared by hosts (a previously legal but - probably useless capability). NOTE WELL: the sample ipsec.conf now has - uniqueids=yes in its config-setup section. - - -Cheers, - -Claudia</PRE> -<H3><A name="demanddial">Can I build IPsec tunnels over a demand-dialed - link?</A></H3> -<P>This is possible, but not easy. FreeS/WAN technical lead Henry - Spencer wrote:</P> -<PRE>> 5. If the ISDN link goes down in between and is reestablished, the SAs -> are still up but the eroute are deleted and the IPsec interface shows -> garbage (with ifconfig) -> 6. Only restarting IPsec will bring the VPN back online. - -This one is awkward to solve. If the real interface that the IPsec -interface is mounted on goes down, it takes most of the IPsec machinery -down with it, and a restart is the only good way to recover. - -The only really clean fix, right now, is to split the machines in two: - -1. A minimal machine serves as the network router, and only it is aware -that the link goes up and down. - -2. The IPsec is done on a separate gateway machine, which thinks it has -a permanent network connection, via the router. - -This is clumsy but it does work. Trying to do both functions within a -single machine is tricky. There is a software package (diald) which will -give the illusion of a permanent connection for demand-dialed modem -connections; I don't know whether it's usable for ISDN, or whether it can -be made to cooperate properly with FreeS/WAN. - -Doing a restart each time the interface comes up *does* work, although it -is a bit painful. I did that with PPP when I was running on a modem link; -it wasn't hard to arrange the PPP scripts to bring IPsec up and down at -the right times. (I'd meant to investigate diald but never found time.) - -In principle you don't need to do a complete restart on reconnect, but you -do have to rebuild some things, and we have no nice clean way of doing -only the necessary parts.</PRE> -<P>In the same thread, one user commented:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPsec and Dial Up Connections - Date: Wed, 22 Nov 2000 - From: Andy Bradford <andyb@calderasystems.com> - -On Wed, 22 Nov 2000 19:47:11 +0100, Philip Reetz wrote: - -> Are there any ideas what might be the cause of the problem and any way -> to work around it. -> Any help is highly appreciated. - -On my laptop, when using ppp there is a ip-up script in /etc/ppp that -will be executed each time that the ppp interface is brought up. -Likewise there is an ip-down script that is called when it is taken -down. You might consider custimzing those to stop and start FreeS/WAN -with each connection. I believe that ISDN uses the same files, though -I could be wrong---there should be something similar though.</PRE> -<H3><A name="GRE">Can I build GRE, L2TP or PPTP tunnels over IPsec?</A></H3> -<P>Yes. Normally this is not necessary, but it is useful in a few - special cases. For example, if you must route non-IP packets such as - IPX, you will need to use a tunneling protocol that can route these - packets. IPsec can be layered around it for extra security. Another - example: you can provide failover protection for high availability (HA) - environments by combining IPsec with other tools. Ken Bantoft describes - one such setup in<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/HA"> Using - FreeS/WAN with Linux-HA, GRE, OSPF and BGP for enterprise grade VPN - solutions</A>.</P> -<P>GRE over IPsec is covered as part of<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/HA"> - that document</A>.<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/07/msg00209.html"> - Here are links</A> to other GRE resources. Jacco de Leuw has created<A HREF="http://www.jacco2.dds.nl/networking/"> - this page on L2TP over IPsec</A> with instructions for FreeS/WAN and - several other brands of IPsec software.</P> -<P>Please let us know of other useful links via the<A HREF="mail.html"> - mailing lists</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="NetBIOS">... use Network Neighborhood (Samba, NetBIOS) over - IPsec?</A></H3> -<P>Your local PC needs to know how to translate NetBIOS names to IP - addresses. It may do this either via a local LMHOSTS file, or using a - local or remote WINS server. The WINS server is preferable since it - provides a centralized source of the information to the entire network. - To use a WINS server over the<A HREF="glossary.html#VPN"> VPN</A> (or - any IP-based network), you must enable "NetBIOS over TCP".</P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.samba.org">Samba</A> can emulate a WINS server on - Linux.</P> -<P> See also several discussions in our<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-September/thread.html"> - September 2002 Users archives</A></P> -<H2><A name="setup.faq">Life's little mysteries</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is a fairly complex product. (Neither the networks it runs - on nor the protocols it uses are simple, so it could hardly be - otherwise.) It therefore sometimes exhibits behaviour which can be - somewhat confusing, or has problems which are not easy to diagnose. - This section tries to explain those problems.</P> -<P>Setup and configuration of FreeS/WAN are covered in other - documentation sections:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="quickstart.html">basic setup and configuration</A></LI> -<LI><A href="adv_config.html">advanced configuration</A></LI> -<LI><A href="trouble.html">Troubleshooting</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>However, we also list some of the commonest problems here.</P> -<H3><A name="cantping">I cannot ping ....</A></H3> -<P>This question is dealt with in the advanced configuration section - under the heading<A href="adv_config.html#multitunnel"> multiple - tunnels</A>.</P> -<P>The standard subnet-to-subnet tunnel protects traffic<STRONG> only - between the subnets</STRONG>. To test it, you must use pings that go - from one subnet to the other.</P> -<P>For example, suppose you have:</P> -<PRE> subnet a.b.c.0/24 - | - eth1 = a.b.c.1 - gate1 - eth0 = 192.0.2.8 - | - - ~ internet ~ - - | - eth0 = 192.0.2.11 - gate2 - eth1 = x.y.z.1 - | - subnet x.y.z.0/24</PRE> -<P>and the connection description:</P> -<PRE>conn abc-xyz - left=192.0.2.8 - leftsubnet=a.b.c.0/24 - right=192.0.2.11 - rightsubnet=x.y.z.0/24</PRE> -<P>You can test this connection description only by sending a ping that - will actually go through the tunnel. Assuming you have machines at - addresses a.b.c.2 and x.y.z.2, pings you might consider trying are:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ping from x.y.z.2 to a.b.c.2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD>Succeeds if tunnel is working. This is the<STRONG> only valid test - of the tunnel</STRONG>.</DD> -<DT>ping from gate2 to a.b.c.2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Does not use tunnel</STRONG>. gate2 is not on protected - subnet.</DD> -<DT>ping from gate1 to x.y.z.2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Does not use tunnel</STRONG>. gate1 is not on protected - subnet.</DD> -<DT>ping from gate1 to gate2 or vice versa</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Does not use tunnel</STRONG>. Neither gate is on a protected - subnet.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Only the first of these is a useful test of this tunnel. The others - do not use the tunnel. Depending on other details of your setup and - routing, they:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either fail, telling you nothing about the tunnel</LI> -<LI>or succeed, telling you nothing about the tunnel since these packets - use some other route</LI> -</UL> -<P>In some cases, you may be able to get around this. For the example - network above, you could use:</P> -<PRE> ping -I a.b.c.1 x.y.z.1</PRE> -<P>Both the adresses given are within protected subnets, so this should - go through the tunnel.</P> -<P>If required, you can build additional tunnels so that all the - machines involved can talk to all the others. See<A href="adv_config.html#multitunnel"> - multiple tunnels</A> in the advanced configuration document for - details.</P> -<H3><A name="forever">It takes forever to ...</A></H3> -<P>Users fairly often report various problems involving long delays, - sometimes on tunnel setup and sometimes on operations done through the - tunnel, occasionally on simple things like ping or more often on more - complex operations like doing NFS or Samba through the tunnel.</P> -<P>Almost always, these turn out to involve failure of a DNS lookup. The - timeouts waiting for DNS are typically set long so that you won't time - out when a query involves multiple lookups or long paths. Genuine - failures therefore produce long delays before they are detected.</P> -<P>A mailing list message from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>> ... when i run /etc/rc.d/init.d/ipsec start, i get: -> ipsec_setup: Starting FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.5... -> and it just sits there, doesn't give back my bash prompt. - -Almost certainly, the problem is that you're using DNS names in your -ipsec.conf, but DNS lookups are not working for some reason. You will -get your prompt back... eventually. But the DNS timeouts are long. -Doing something about this is on our list, but it is not easy.</PRE> -<P>In the meanwhile, we recommend that connection descriptions in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> use numeric IP addresses rather than names which will - require a DNS lookup.</P> -<P>Names that do not require a lookup are fine. For example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a road warrior might use the identity<VAR> - rightid=@lancelot.example.org</VAR></LI> -<LI>the gateway might use<VAR> leftid=@camelot.example.org</VAR></LI> -</UL> -<P>These are fine. The @ sign prevents any DNS lookup. However, do not - attempt to give the gateway address as<VAR> left=camelot.example.org</VAR> -. That requires a lookup.</P> -<P>A post from one user after solving a problem with long delays:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Final Answer to Delay!!! - Date: Mon, 19 Feb 2001 - From: "Felippe Solutions" <felippe@solutionstecnologia.com.br> - -Sorry people, but seems like the Delay problem had nothing to do with -freeswan. - -The problem was DNS as some people sad from the beginning, but not the way -they thought it was happening. Samba, ssh, telnet and other apps try to -reverse lookup addresses when you use IP numbers (Stupid that ahh). - -I could ping very fast because I always ping with "-n" option, but I don't -know the option on the other apps to stop reverse addressing so I don't use -it.</PRE> -<P>This post is fairly typical. These problems are often tricky and - frustrating to diagnose, and most turn out to be DNS-related.</P> -<P>One suggestion for diagnosis: test with both names and addresses if - possible. For example, try all of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>ping<VAR> address</VAR></LI> -<LI>ping -n<VAR> address</VAR></LI> -<LI>ping<VAR> name</VAR></LI> -</UL> -<P>If these behave differently, the problem must be DNS-related since - the three commands do exactly the same thing except for DNS lookups.</P> -<H3><A name="route">I send packets to the tunnel with route(8) but they - vanish</A></H3> -<P>IPsec connections are designed to carry only packets travelling - between pre-defined connection endpoints. As project technical lead - Henry Spencer put it:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> IPsec tunnels are not just virtual wires; they are virtual - wires with built-in access controls. Negotiation of an IPsec tunnel - includes negotiation of access rights for it, which don't include - packets to/from other IP addresses. (The protocols themselves are quite - inflexible about this, so there are limits to what we can do about it.)</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>For fairly obvious security reasons, and to comply with the IPsec - RFCs,<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> drops any packets it - receives that are not allowed on the tunnels currently defined. So if - you send it packets with<VAR> route(8)</VAR>, and suitable tunnels are - not defined, the packets vanish. Whether this is reported in the logs - depends on the setting of<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> in your<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> file.</P> -<P>To rescue vanishing packets, you must ensure that suitable tunnels - for them exist, by editing the connection descriptions in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>. For example, supposing you have a simple setup:</P> -<PRE> leftsubnet -- leftgateway === internet === roadwarrior</PRE> -<P>If you want to give the roadwarrior access to some resource that is - located behind the left gateway but is not in the currently defined - left subnet, then the usual procedure is to define an additional tunnel - for those packets by creating a new connection description.</P> -<P>In some cases, it may be easier to alter an existing connection - description, enlarging the definition of<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR>. For - example, instead of two connection descriptions with 192.168.8.0/24 and - 192.168.9.0/24 as their<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> parameters, you can use a - single description with 192.168.8.0/23.</P> -<P>If you have multiple endpoints on each side, you need to ensure that - there is a route for each pair of endpoints. See this<A href="adv_config.html#multitunnel"> - example</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="down_route">When a tunnel goes down, packets vanish</A></H3> -<P>This is a special case of the vanishing packet problem described in - the previous question. Whenever KLIPS sees packets for which it does - not have a tunnel, it drops them.</P> -<P>When a tunnel goes away, either because negotiations with the other - gateway failed or because you gave an<VAR> ipsec auto --down</VAR> - command, the route to its other end is left pointing into KLIPS, and - KLIPS will drop packets it has no tunnel for.</P> -<P>This is a documented design decision, not a bug. FreeS/WAN must not - automatically adjust things to send packets via another route. The - other route might be insecure.</P> -<P>Of course, re-routing may be necessary in many cases. In those cases, - you have to do it manually or via scripts. We provide the<VAR> ipsec - auto --unroute</VAR> command for these cases.</P> -<P>From<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html"> ipsec_auto(8)</A>:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> Normally, pluto establishes a route to the destination - specified for a connection as part of the --up operation. However, the - route and only the route can be established with the --route operation. - Until and unless an actual connection is established, this discards any - packets sent there, which may be preferable to having them sent - elsewhere based on a more general route (e.g., a default route).</BLOCKQUOTE><BLOCKQUOTE> - Normally, pluto's route to a destination remains in place when a --down - operation is used to take the connection down (or if connection setup, - or later automatic rekeying, fails). This permits establishing a new - connection (perhaps using a different specification; the route is - altered as necessary) without having a ``window'' in which packets - might go elsewhere based on a more general route. Such a route can be - removed using the --unroute operation (and is implicitly removed by - --delete).</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>See also this mailing list<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00523.html"> - message</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="firewall_ate">The firewall ate my packets!</A></H3> -<P>If firewalls filter out:</P> -<UL> -<LI>either the UDP port 500 packets used in IKE negotiations</LI> -<LI>or the ESP and AH (protocols 50 and 51) packets used to implement - the IPsec tunnel</LI> -</UL> -<P>then IPsec cannot work. The first thing to check if packets seem to - be vanishing is the firewall rules on the two gateway machines and any - other machines along the path that you have access to.</P> -<P>For details, see our document on<A href="firewall.html"> firewalls</A> -.</P> -<P>Some advice from technical lead Henry Spencer on diagnosing such - problems:</P> -<PRE>> > Packets vanishing between the hardware interface and the ipsecN interface -> > is usually the result of firewalls not being configured to let them in... -> -> Thanks for the suggestion. If only it were that simple! My ipchains startup -> script does take care of that, but just in case I manually inserted rules -> accepting everything from london on dublin. No difference. - -The other thing to check is whether the "RX packets dropped" count on the -ipsecN interface (run "ifconfig ipsecN", for N=1 or whatever, to see the -counts) is rising. If so, then there's some sort of configuration mismatch -between the two ends, and IPsec itself is rejecting them. If none of the -ipsecN counts is rising, then the packets are never reaching the IPsec -machinery, and the problem is almost certainly in firewalls etc.</PRE> -<H3><A name="dropconn">Dropped connections</A></H3> -<P>Networks being what they are, IPsec connections can be broken for any - number of reasons, ranging from hardware failures to various software - problems such as the path MTU problems discussed<A href="#pmtu.broken"> - elsewhere in the FAQ</A>. Fortunately, various diagnostic tools exist - that help you sort out many of the possible problems.</P> -<P>There is one situation, however, where FreeS/WAN (using default - settings) may destroy a connection for no readily apparent reason. This - occurs when things are<STRONG> misconfigured</STRONG> so that<STRONG> - two tunnels</STRONG> from the same gateway expect<STRONG> the same - subnet on the far end</STRONG>.</P> -<P>In this situation, the first tunnel comes up fine and works until the - second is established. At that point, because of the way we track - connections internally, the first tunnel ceases to exist as far as this - gateway is concerned. Of course the far end does not know that, and a - storm of error messages appears on both systems as it tries to use the - tunnel.</P> -<P>If the far end gives up, goes back to square one and negotiates a new - tunnel, then that wipes out the second tunnel and ...</P> -<P>The solution is simple.<STRONG> Do not build multiple conn - descriptions with the same remote subnet</STRONG>.</P> -<P>This is actually intended to be a feature, rather than a bug. - Consider the situation where a single remote system goes down, then - comes back up and reconnects to the gateway. It is useful to have the - gateway tear down the old tunnel and recover resources when the - reconnection is made. It recognises that situation by checking the - remote subnet for each tunnel it builds and discarding duplicates. This - works fine as long as you don't configure multiple tunnels with the - same remote subnet.</P> -<P>If this behaviour is inconvenient for you, you can disable it by - setting<VAR> uniqueids=no</VAR> in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="defaultroutegone">Disappearing %defaultroute</A></H3> -<P>When an underlying connection (eg. ppp) goes down, FreeS/WAN will not - recover properly without a little help. Here are the symptoms that - FreeS/WAN user Michael Carmody noticed:</P> -<PRE> -> After about 24 hours the freeswan connection takes over the default route. -> -> i.e instead of deafult gateway pointing to the router via eth0, it becomes a -> pointer to the router via ipsec0. - -> All internet access is then lost as all replies (and not just the link I -> wanted) are routed out ipsec0 and the router doesn't respond to the ipsec -> traffic. -</PRE> -<P>If you're using a FreeS/WAN 2.x/KLIPS system, simply re-attach the - IPsec virtual interface with<EM> ipsec tnconfig</EM> command such as:</P> -<PRE> ipsec tnconfig --attach --virtual ipsec0 --physical ppp0</PRE> -<P>In your command, name the physical and virtual interfaces as they - appear paired on your system during regular uptime. For a system with - several physical/virtual interface pairs on flaky links, you'll need - more than one such command. If you're using FreeS/WAN 1.x, you must - restart FreeS/WAN, which is more time consuming.</P> -<P><A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2002-July/003070.html"> - Here</A> is a script which can help to automate the process of - FreeS/WAN restart at need. It could easily be adapted to use tnconfig - instead.</P> -<H3><A name="tcpdump.faq">TCPdump on the gateway shows strange things</A> -</H3> - As another user pointed out, keeping the connect -<P>Attempting to look at IPsec packets by running monitoring tools on - the IPsec gateway machine can produce silly results. That machine is - mangling the packets for IPsec, and possibly for firewall or NAT - purposes as well. If the internals of the machine's IP stack are not - what the monitoring tool expects, then the tool can misinterpret them - and produce nonsense output.</P> -<P>See our<A href="testing.html#tcpdump.test"> testing</A> document for - more detail.</P> -<H3><A name="no_trace">Traceroute does not show anything between the - gateways</A></H3> -<P>As far as traceroute can see, the two gateways are one hop apart; the - data packet goes directly from one to the other through the tunnel. Of - course the outer packets that implement the tunnel pass through - whatever lies between the gateways, but those packets are built and - dismantled by the gateways. Traceroute does not see them and cannot - report anything about their path.</P> -<P>Here is a mailing list message with more detail.</P> -<PRE>Date: Mon, 14 May 2001 -To: linux-ipsec@freeswan.org -From: "John S. Denker" <jsd@research.att.com< -Subject: Re: traceroute: one virtual hop - -At 02:20 PM 5/14/01 -0400, Claudia Schmeing wrote: -> ->> > A bonus question: traceroute in subnet to subnet enviroment looks like: ->> > ->> > traceroute to andris.dmz (172.20.24.10), 30 hops max, 38 byte packets ->> > 1 drama (172.20.1.1) 0.716 ms 0.942 ms 0.434 ms ->> > 2 * * * ->> > 3 andris.dmz (172.20.24.10) 73.576 ms 78.858 ms 79.434 ms ->> > ->> > Why aren't there the other hosts which take part in the delivery during -> * * * ? -> ->If there is an ipsec tunnel between GateA and Gate B, this tunnel forms a ->'virtual wire'. When it is tunneled, the original packet becomes an inner ->packet, and new ESP and/or AH headers are added to create an outer packet ->around it. You can see an example of how this is done for AH at ->doc/ipsec.html#AH . For ESP it is similar. -> ->Think about the packet's path from the inner packet's perspective. ->It leaves the subnet, goes into the tunnel, and re-emerges in the second ->subnet. This perspective is also the only one available to the ->'traceroute' command when the IPSec tunnel is up. - -Claudia got this exactly right. Let me just expand on a couple of points: - -*) GateB is exactly one (virtual) hop away from GateA. This is how it -would be if there were a physically private wire from A to B. The -virtually private connection should work the same, and it does. - -*) While the information is in transit from GateA to GateB, the hop count -of the outer header (the "envelope") is being decremented. The hop count -of the inner header (the "contents" of the envelope) is not decremented and -should not be decremented. The hop count of the outer header is not -derived from and should not be derived from the hop count of the inner header. - -Indeed, even if the packets did time out in transit along the tunnel, there -would be no way for traceroute to find out what happened. Just as -information cannot leak _out_ of the tunnel to the outside, information -cannot leak _into_ the tunnel from outside, and this includes ICMP messages -from routers along the path. - -There are some cases where one might wish for information about what is -happening at the IP layer (below the tunnel layer) -- but the protocol -makes no provision for this. This raises all sorts of conceptual issues. -AFAIK nobody has ever cared enough to really figure out what _should_ -happen, let alone implement it and standardize it. - -*) I consider the "* * *" to be a slight bug. One might wish for it to be -replaced by "GateB GateB GateB". It has to do with treating host-to-subnet -traffic different from subnet-to-subnet traffic (and other gory details). -I fervently hope KLIPS2 will make this problem go away. - -*) If you want to ask questions about the link from GateA to GateB at the -IP level (below the tunnel level), you have to ssh to GateA and launch a -traceroute from there.</PRE> -<H2><A name="man4debug">Testing in stages</A></H2> -<P>It is often useful in debugging to test things one at a time:</P> -<UL> -<LI>disable IPsec entirely, for example by turning it off with - chkconfig(8), and make sure routing works</LI> -<LI>Once that works, try a manually keyed connection. This does not - require key negotiation between Pluto and the key daemon on the other - end.</LI> -<LI>Once that works, try automatically keyed connections</LI> -<LI>Once IPsec works, add packet compression</LI> -<LI>Once everything seems to work, try stress tests with large - transfers, many connections, frequent re-keying, ...</LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN releases are tested for all of these, so you can be - reasonably certain they<EM> can</EM> do them all. Of course, that does - not mean they<EM> will</EM> on the first try, especially if you have - some unusual configuration.</P> -<P>The rest of this section gives information on diagnosing the problem - when each of the above steps fails.</P> -<H3><A name="nomanual">Manually keyed connections don't work</A></H3> -<P>Suspect one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>mis-configuration of IPsec system in the /etc/ipsec.conf file -<BR> common errors are incorrect interface or next hop information</LI> -<LI>mis-configuration of manual connection in the /etc/ipsec.conf file</LI> -<LI>routing problems causing IPsec packets to be lost</LI> -<LI>bugs in KLIPS</LI> -<LI>mismatch between the transforms we support and those another IPsec - implementation offers.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="spi_error">One manual connection works, but second one - fails</A></H3> -<P>This is a fairly common problem when attempting to configure multiple - manually keyed connections from a single gateway.</P> -<P>Each connection must be identified by a unique<A href="glossary.html#SPI"> - SPI</A> value. For automatic connections, these values are assigned - automatically. For manual connections, you must set them with<VAR> spi=</VAR> - statements in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<P>Each manual connection must have a unique SPI value in the range - 0x100 to 0x999. Two or more with the same value will fail. For details, - see our doc section<A href="adv_config.html#prodman"> Using manual - keying in production</A> and the man page<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="man_no_auto">Manual connections work, but automatic keying - doesn't</A></H3> -<P>The most common reason for this behaviour is a firewall dropping the - UDP port 500 packets used in key negotiation.</P> -<P>Other possibilities:</P> -<UL> -<LI>mis-configuration of auto connection in the /etc/ipsec.conf file. -<P>One common configuration error is forgetting that you need<VAR> - auto=add</VAR> to load the connection description on the receiving end - so it recognises the connection when the other end asks for it.</P> -</LI> -<LI>error in shared secret in /etc/ipsec.secrets</LI> -<LI>one gateway lacks a route to the other so Pluto's UDP packets are - lost</LI> -<LI>bugs in Pluto</LI> -<LI>incompatibilities between Pluto's<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> - implementation and the IKE at the other end of the tunnel. -<P>Some possibile problems are discussed in out<A href="interop.html#interop.problem"> - interoperation</A> document.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="nocomp">IPsec works, but connections using compression fail</A> -</H3> -<P>When we first added compression, we saw some problems:</P> -<UL> -<LI>compatibility issues with other implementations. We followed the - RFCs and omitted some extra material that many compression libraries - add by default. Some other implementations left the extras in</LI> -<LI>bugs in assembler compression routines on non-Intel CPUs. The - workaround is to use C code instead of possibly problematic assembler.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We have not seen either problem in some time (at least six months as - I write in March 2002), but if you have some unusual configuration then - you may see them.</P> -<H3><A name="pmtu.broken">Small packets work, but large transfers fail</A> -</H3> -<P>If tests with ping(1) and a small packet size succeed, but tests or - transfers with larger packet sizes fail, suspect problems with packet - fragmentation and perhaps<A href="glossary.html#pathMTU"> path MTU - discovery</A>.</P> -<P>Our<A href="trouble.html#bigpacket"> troubleshooting document</A> - covers these problems. Information on the underlying mechanism is in - our<A href="background.html#MTU.trouble"> background</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="subsub">Subnet-to-subnet works, but tests from the gateways - don't</A></H3> -<P>This is described under<A href="#cantping"> I cannot ping...</A> - above.</P> -<H2><A name="compile.faq">Compilation problems</A></H2> -<H3><A name="gmp.h_missing">gmp.h: No such file or directory</A></H3> -<P>Pluto needs the GMP (<STRONG>G</STRONG>NU</P> -<P><STRONG>M</STRONG>ulti-<STRONG>P</STRONG>recision) library for the - large integer calculations it uses in<A href="glossary.html#public"> - public key</A> cryptography. This error message indicates a failure to - find the library. You must install it before Pluto will compile.</P> -<P>The GMP library is included in most Linux distributions. Typically, - there are two RPMs, libgmp and libgmp-devel, You need to<EM> install - both</EM>, either from your distribution CDs or from your vendor's web - site.</P> -<P>On Debian, a mailing list message reports that the command to give is<VAR> - apt-get install gmp2</VAR>.</P> -<P>For more information and the latest version, see the<A href="http://www.swox.com/gmp/"> - GMP home page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="noVM">... virtual memory exhausted</A></H3> -<P>We have had several reports of this message appearing, all on SPARC - Linux. Here is a mailing message on a solution:</P> -<PRE>> ipsec_sha1.c: In function `SHA1Transform': -> ipsec_sha1.c:95: virtual memory exhausted - -I'm seeing exactly the same problem on an Ultra with 256MB ram and 500 -MB swap. Except I am compiling version 1.5 and its Red Hat 6.2. - -I can get around this by using -O instead of -O2 for the optimization -level. So it is probably a bug in the optimizer on the sparc complier. -I'll try and chase this down on the sparc lists.</PRE> -<H2><A name="error">Interpreting error messages</A></H2> -<H3><A name="route-client">route-client (or host) exited with status 7</A> -</H3> -<P>Here is a discussion of this error from FreeS/WAN "listress" (mailing - list tech support person) Claudia Schmeing. The "FAQ on the network - unreachable error" which she refers to is the next question below.</P> -<PRE>> I reached the point where the two boxes (both on dial-up connections, but -> treated as static IPs by getting the IP and editing ipsec.conf after the -> connection is established) to the point where they exchange some info, but I -> get an error like "route-client command exited with status 7 \n internal -> error". -> Where can I find a description of this error? - -In general, if the FAQ doesn't cover it, you can search the mailing list -archives - I like to use -http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/ -but you can see doc/mail.html for different archive formats. - - -Your error comes from the _updown script, which performs some -routing and firewall functions to help Linux FreeS/WAN. More info -is available at doc/firewall.html and man ipsec.conf. Its routing -is integral to the health of Linux FreeS/WAN; it also provides facility -to insert custom firewall rules to be executed when you create or destroy -a connection. - -Yours is, of course, a routing error. You can be fairly sure the routing -machinery is saying "network is unreachable". There's a FAQ on the -"network is unreachable" error, but more information is available now; read on. - -If your _updown script is recent (for example if it shipped with -Linux FreeS/WAN 1.91), you will see another debugging line in your logs -that looks something like this: - -> output: /usr/local/lib/ipsec/_updown: `route add -net 128.174.253.83 -> netmask 255.255.255.255 dev ipsec0 gw 66.92.93.161' failed - -This is, of course, the system route command that exited with status 7, -(ie. failed). Man route for details. Seeing the command typed out yields -more information. If your _updown script is older, you may wish to update -it to show the command explicitly. - -Three parameters fed to the route command: net, netmask and gw [gateway] -are derived from things you've put in ipsec.conf. - -Net and netmask are derived from the peer's IP and mask. In more detail: - -You may see a routing error when routing to a client (ie. subnet), or -to a host (IPSec gateway or freestanding host; a box that does IPSec for -itself). In _updown, the "route-client" section is responsible to set up -the route for IPSec'd (usually, read 'tunneled') packets headed to a -peer subnet. Similarly, route-host routes IPSec'd packets to a peer host -or IPSec gateway. - -When routing to a 'client', net and netmask are ipsec.conf's left- or -rightsubnet (whichever is not local). Similarly, when routing to a -'host' the net is left or right. Host netmask is always /32, indicating a -single machine. - -Gw is nexthop's value. Again, the value in question is left- or rightnexthop, -whichever is local. Where left/right or left-/rightnexthop has the special -value %defaultroute (described in man ipsec.conf), gw will automagically get -the value of the next hop on the default route. - -Q: "What's a nexthop and why do I need one?" - -A: 'nexthop' is a routing kluge; its value is the next hop away - from the machine that's doing IPSec, and toward your IPSec peer. - You need it to get the processed packets out of the local system and - onto the wire. While we often route other packets through the machine - that's now doing IPSec, and are done with it, this does not suffice here. - After packets are processed with IPSec, this machine needs to know where - they go next. Of course using the 'IPSec gateway' as their routing gateway - would cause an infinite loop! [To visualize this, see the packet flow - diagram at doc/firewall.html.] To avoid this, we route packets through - the next hop down their projected path. - -Now that you know the background, consider: -1. Did you test routing between the gateways in the absence of Linux - FreeS/WAN, as recommended? You need to ensure the two machines that - will be running Linux FreeS/WAN can route to one another before trying to - make a secure connection. -2. Is there anything obviously wrong with the sense of your route command? - -Normally, this problem is caused by an incorrect local nexthop parameter. -Check out the use of %defaultroute, described in man ipsec.conf. This is -a simple way to set nexthop for most people. To figure nexthop out by hand, -traceroute in-the-clear to your IPSec peer. Nexthop is the traceroute's -first hop after your IPSec gateway.</PRE> -<H3><A name="unreachable">SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable</A></H3> -<P>This message is not from FreeS/WAN, but from the Linux IP stack - itself. That stack is seeing packets it has no route for, either - because your routing was broken before FreeS/WAN started or because - FreeS/WAN's changes broke it.</P> -<P>Here is a message from Claudia suggesting ways to diagnose and fix - such problems:</P> -<PRE>You write, -> I have correctly installed freeswan-1.8 on RH7.0 kernel 2.2.17, but when -> I setup a VPN connection with the other machine(RH5.2 Kernel 2.0.36 -> freeswan-1.0, it works well.) it told me that -> "SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable"! But the network connection is no -> problem. - -Often this error is the result of a misconfiguration. - -Be sure that you can route successfully in the absence of Linux -FreeS/WAN. (You say this is no problem, so proceed to the next step.) - -Use a custom copy of the default updownscript. Do not change the route -commands, but add a diagnostic message revealing the exact text of the -route command. Is there a problem with the sense of the route command -that you can see? If so, then re-examine those ipsec.conf settings -that are being sent to the route command. - -You may wish to use the ipsec auto --route and --unroute commands to -troubleshoot the problem. See man ipsec_auto for details.</PRE> -<P>Since the above message was written, we have modified the updown - script to provide a better diagnostic for this problem. Check<VAR> - /var/log/messages</VAR>.</P> -<P>See also the FAQ question<A href="#route-client"> route-client (or - host) exited with status 7</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="modprobe">ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec</A> -</H3> -<H3><A name="noKLIPS">ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack - KLIPS</A></H3> -<P>These messages indicate an installation failure. The kernel you are - running does not contain the<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS - (kernel IPsec)</A> code.</P> -<P>Note that the "modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec" message appears - even if you are not using modules. If there is no KLIPS in your kernel, - FreeS/WAN tries to load it as a module. If that fails, you get this - message.</P> -<P>Commands you can quickly try are:</P> -<DL> -<DT><VAR>uname -a</VAR></DT> -<DD>to get details, including compilation date and time, of the - currently running kernel</DD> -<DT><VAR>ls /</VAR></DT> -<DT><VAR>ls /boot</VAR></DT> -<DD>to ensure a new kernel is where it should be. If kernel compilation - puts it in<VAR> /</VAR> but<VAR> lilo</VAR> wants it in<VAR> /boot</VAR> -, then you should uncomment the<VAR> INSTALL_PATH=/boot</VAR> line in - the kernel<VAR> Makefile</VAR>.</DD> -<DT><VAR>more /etc/lilo.conf</VAR></DT> -<DD>to see that<VAR> lilo</VAR> has correct information</DD> -<DT><VAR>lilo</VAR></DT> -<DD>to ensure that information in<VAR> /etc/lilo.conf</VAR> has been - transferred to the boot sector</DD> -</DL> -<P>If those don't find the problem, you have to go back and check - through the<A href="install.html"> install</A> procedure to see what - was missed.</P> -<P>Here is one of Claudia's messages on the topic:</P> -<PRE>> I tried to install freeswan 1.8 on my mandrake 7.2 test box. ... - -> It does show version and some output for whack. - -Yes, because the Pluto (daemon) part of ipsec is installed correctly, but -as we see below the kernel portion is not. - -> However, I get the following from /var/log/messages: -> -> Mar 11 22:11:55 pavillion ipsec_setup: Starting FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.8... -> Mar 11 22:12:02 pavillion ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate module ipsec -> Mar 11 22:12:02 pavillion ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears to lack -> KLIPS. - -This is your problem. You have not successfully installed a kernel with -IPSec machinery in it. - -Did you build Linux FreeS/WAN as a module? If so, you need to ensure that -your new module has been installed in the directory where your kernel -loader normally finds your modules. If not, you need to ensure -that the new IPSec-enabled kernel is being loaded correctly. - -See also doc/install.html, and INSTALL in the distro.</PRE> -<H3><A name="noDNS">ipsec_setup: ... failure to fetch key for ... from - DNS</A></H3> -<P>Quoting Henry:</P> -<PRE>Note that by default, FreeS/WAN is now set up to - (a) authenticate with RSA keys, and - (b) fetch the public key of the far end from DNS. -Explicit attention to ipsec.conf will be needed if you want -to do something different.</PRE> -<P>and Claudia, responding to the same user:</P> -<PRE>You write, - -> My current setup in ipsec.conf is leftrsasigkey=%dns I have -> commented this and authby=rsasig out. I am able to get ipsec running, -> but what I find is that the documentation only specifies for %dns are -> there any other values that can be placed in this variable other than -> %dns and the key? I am also assuming that this is where I would place -> my public key for the left and right side as well is this correct? - -Valid values for authby= are rsasig and secret, which entail authentication -by RSA signature or by shared secret, respectively. Because you have -commented authby=rsasig out, you are using the default value of authby=secret. - -When using RSA signatures, there are two ways to get the public key for the -IPSec peer: either copy it directly into *rsasigkey= in ipsec.conf, or -fetch it from dns. The magic value %dns for *rsasigkey parameters says to -try to fetch the peer's key from dns. - -For any parameters, you may find their significance and special values in -man ipsec.conf. If you are setting up keys or secrets, be sure also to -reference man ipsec.secrets.</PRE> -<H3><A name="dup_address">ipsec_setup: ... interfaces ... and ... share - address ...</A></H3> -<P>This is a fatal error. FreeS/WAN cannot cope with two or more - interfaces using the same IP address. You must re-configure to avoid - this.</P> -<P>A mailing list message on the topic from Pluto developer Hugh - Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>| I'm trying to get freeswan working between two machine where one has a ppp -| interface. -| I've already suceeded with two machines with ethernet ports but the ppp -| interface is causing me problems. -| basically when I run ipsec start i get -| ipsec_setup: Starting FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.7... -| ipsec_setup: 003 IP interfaces ppp1 and ppp0 share address 192.168.0.10! -| ipsec_setup: 003 IP interfaces ppp1 and ppp2 share address 192.168.0.10! -| ipsec_setup: 003 IP interfaces ppp0 and ppp2 share address 192.168.0.10! -| ipsec_setup: 003 no public interfaces found -| -| followed by lots of cannot work out interface for connection messages -| -| now I can specify the interface in ipsec.conf to be ppp0 , but this does -| not affect the above behaviour. A quick look in server.c indicates that the -| interfaces value is not used but some sort of raw detect happens. -| -| I guess I could prevent the formation of the extra ppp interfaces or -| allocate them different ip but I'd rather not. if at all possible. Any -| suggestions please. - -Pluto won't touch an interface that shares an IP address with another. -This will eventually change, but it probably won't happen soon. - -For now, you will have to give the ppp1 and ppp2 different addresses.</PRE> -<H3><A name="kflags">ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags</A></H3> -<P>A mailing list message form technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>> When FreeS/WAN IPsec 1.7 is starting on my 2.0.38 Linux kernel the following -> error message is generated: -> ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags, no /proc/sys/net/ipsec directory! -> What is supposed to create this directory and how can I fix this problem? - -I think that directory is a 2.2ism, although I'm not certain (I don't have -a 2.0.xx system handy any more for testing). Without it, some of the -ipsec.conf config-setup flags won't work, but otherwise things should -function. </PRE> -<P>You also need to enable the<VAR> /proc</VAR> filesystem in your - kernel configuration for these operations to work.</P> -<H3><A name="message_num">Message numbers (MI3, QR1, et cetera) in Pluto - messages</A></H3> -<P>Pluto messages often indicate where Pluto is in the IKE protocols. - The letters indicate<STRONG> M</STRONG>ain mode or<STRONG> Q</STRONG> -uick mode and<STRONG> I</STRONG>nitiator or<STRONG> R</STRONG>esponder. - The numerals are message sequence numbers. For more detail, see our<A href="ipsec.html#sequence"> - IPsec section</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="conn_name">Connection names in Pluto error messages</A></H3> -<P>From Pluto programmer Hugh Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>| Jan 17 16:21:10 remus Pluto[13631]: "jumble" #1: responding to Main Mode from Road Warrior 130.205.82.46 -| Jan 17 16:21:11 remus Pluto[13631]: "jumble" #1: no suitable connection for peer @banshee.wittsend.com -| -| The connection "jumble" has nothing to do with the incoming -| connection requests, which were meant for the connection "banshee". - -You are right. The message tells you which Connection Pluto is -currently using, which need not be the right one. It need not be the -right one now for the negotiation to eventually succeed! This is -described in ipsec_pluto(8) in the section "Road Warrior Support". - -There are two times when Pluto will consider switching Connections for -a state object. Both are in response to receiving ID payloads (one in -Phase 1 / Main Mode and one in Phase 2 / Quick Mode). The second is -not unique to Road Warriors. In fact, neither is the first any more -(two connections for the same pair of hosts could differ in Phase 1 ID -payload; probably nobody else has tried this).</PRE> -<H3><A name="cantorient">Pluto: ... can't orient connection</A></H3> -<P>Older versions of FreeS/WAN used this message. The same error now - gives the "we have no ipsecN ..." error described just below.</P> -<H3><A name="no.interface">... we have no ipsecN interface for either - end of this connection</A></H3> -<P>Your tunnel has no IP address which matches the IP address of any of - the available IPsec interfaces. Either you've misconfigured the - connection, or you need to define an appropriate IPsec interface - connection.<VAR> interfaces=%defaultroute</VAR> works in many cases.</P> -<P>A longer story: Pluto needs to know whether it is running on the - machine which the connection description calls<VAR> left</VAR> or on<VAR> - right</VAR>. It figures that out by:</P> -<UL> -<LI>looking at the interfaces given in<VAR> interfaces=</VAR> lines in - the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section</LI> -<LI>discovering the IP addresses for those interfaces</LI> -<LI>searching for a match between those addresses and the ones given in<VAR> - left=</VAR> or<VAR> right=</VAR> lines.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Normally a match is found. Then Pluto knows where it is and can set - up other things (for example, if it is<VAR> left</VAR>) using - parameters such as<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> leftnexthop</VAR>, - and sending its outgoing packets to<VAR> right</VAR>.</P> -<P>If no match is found, it emits the above error message.</P> -<H3><A name="noconn">Pluto: ... no connection is known</A></H3> -<P>This error message occurs when a remote system attempts to negotiate - a connection and Pluto does not have a connection description that - matches what the remote system has requested. The most common cause is - a configuration error on one end or the other.</P> -<P>Parameters involved in this match are<VAR> left</VAR>,<VAR> right</VAR> -,<VAR> leftsubnet</VAR> and<VAR> rightsubnet</VAR>.</P> -<P><STRONG>The match must be exact</STRONG>. For example, if your left - subnet is a.b.c.0/24 then neither a single machine in that net nor a - smaller subnet such as a.b.c.64/26 will be considered a match.</P> -<P>The message can also occur when an appropriate description exists but - Pluto has not loaded it. Use an<VAR> auto=add</VAR> statement in the - connection description, or an<VAR> ipsec auto --add <conn_name></VAR> - command, to correct this.</P> -<P>An explanation from the Pluto developer:</P> -<PRE>| Jul 12 15:00:22 sohar58 Pluto[574]: "corp_road" #2: cannot respond to IPsec -| SA request because no connection is known for -| 216.112.83.112/32===216.112.83.112...216.67.25.118 - -This is the first message from the Pluto log showing a problem. It -means that PGPnet is trying to negotiate a set of SAs with this -topology: - -216.112.83.112/32===216.112.83.112...216.67.25.118 -^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ -client on our side our host PGPnet host, no client - -None of the conns you showed look like this. - -Use - ipsec auto --status -to see a snapshot of what connections are in pluto, what -negotiations are going on, and what SAs are established. - -The leftsubnet= (client) in your conn is 216.112.83.64/26. It must -exactly match what pluto is looking for, and it does not.</PRE> -<H3><A name="nosuit">Pluto: ... no suitable connection ...</A></H3> -<P>This is similar to the<A href="#noconn"> no connection known</A> - error, but occurs at a different point in Pluto processing.</P> -<P>Here is one of Claudia's messages explaining the problem:</P> -<PRE>You write, - -> What could be the reason of the following error? -> "no suitable connection for peer '@xforce'" - -When a connection is initiated by the peer, Pluto must choose which entry in -the conf file best matches the incoming connection. A preliminary choice is -made on the basis of source and destination IPs, since that information is -available at that time. - -A payload containing an ID arrives later in the negotiation. Based on this -id and the *id= parameters, Pluto refines its conn selection. ... - -The message "no suitable connection" indicates that in this refining step, -Pluto does not find a connection that matches that ID. - -Please see "Selecting a connection when responding" in man ipsec_pluto for -more details.</PRE> -<P>See also<A href="#conn_name"> Connection names in Pluto error - messages</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="noconn.auth">Pluto: ... no connection has been authorized</A> -</H3> -<P>Here is one of Claudia's messages discussing this problem:</P> -<PRE>You write, - -> May 22 10:46:31 debian Pluto[25834]: packet from x.y.z.p:10014: -> initial Main Mode message from x.y.z.p:10014 - but no connection has been authorized - -This error occurs early in the connection negotiation process, -at the first step of IKE negotiation (Main Mode), which is itself the -first of two negotiation phases involved in creating an IPSec connection. - -Here, Linux FreeS/WAN receives a packet from a potential peer, which -requests that they begin discussing a connection. - -The "no connection has been authorized" means that there is no connection -description in Linux FreeS/WAN's internal database that can be used to -link your ipsec interface with that peer. - -"But of course I configured that connection!" - -It may be that the appropriate connection description exists in ipsec.conf -but has not been added to the database with ipsec auto --add myconn or the -auto=add method. Or, the connection description may be misconfigured. - -The only parameters that are relevant in this decision are left= and right= . -Local and remote ports are also taken into account -- we see that the port -is printed in the message above -- but there is no way to control these -in ipsec.conf. - - -Failure at "no connection has been authorized" is similar to the -"no connection is known for..." error in the FAQ, and the "no suitable -connection" error described in the snapshot's FAQ. In all three cases, -Linux FreeS/WAN is trying to match parameters received in the -negotiation with the connection description in the local config file. - -As it receives more information, its matches take more parameters into -account, and become more precise: first the pair of potential peers, -then the peer IDs, then the endpoints (including any subnets). - -The "no suitable connection for peer *" occurs toward the end of IKE -(Main Mode) negotiation, when the IDs are matched. - -"no connection is known for a/b===c...d" is seen at the beginning of IPSec -(Quick Mode, phase 2) negotiation, when the connections are matched using -left, right, and any information about the subnets.</PRE> -<H3><A name="noDESsupport">Pluto: ... OAKLEY_DES_CBC is not supported.</A> -</H3> -<P>This message occurs when the other system attempts to negotiate a - connection using<A href="glossary.html#DES"> single DES</A>, which we - do not support because it is<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - insecure</A>.</P> -<P>Our interoperation document has suggestions for<A href="interop.html#noDES"> - how to deal with</A> systems that attempt to use single DES.</P> -<H3><A name="notransform">Pluto: ... no acceptable transform</A></H3> -<P>This message means that the other gateway has made a proposal for - connection parameters, but nothing they proposed is acceptable to - Pluto. Possible causes include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>misconfiguration on either end</LI> -<LI>policy incompatibilities, for example we require encrypted - connections but they are trying to create one with just authentication</LI> -<LI>interoperation problems, for example they offer only single DES and - FreeS/WAN does not support that. See<A href="interop.html#interop.problem"> - discussion</A> in our interoperation document.</LI> -</UL> -<P>A more detailed explanation, from Pluto programmer Hugh Redelmeier:</P> -<PRE>Background: - -When one IKE system (for example, Pluto) is negotiating with another -to create an SA, the Initiator proposes a bunch of choices and the -Responder replies with one that it has selected. - -The structure of the choices is fairly complicated. An SA payload -contains a list of lists of "Proposals". The outer list is a set of -choices: the selection must be from one element of this list. - -Each of these elements is a list of Proposals. A selection must be -made from each of the elements of the inner list. In other words, -*all* of them apply (that is how, for example, both AH and ESP can -apply at once). - -Within each of these Proposals is a list of Transforms. For each -Proposal selected, one Transform must be selected (in other words, -each Proposal provides a choice of Transforms). - -Each Transform is made up of a list of Attributes describing, well, -attributes. Such as lifetime of the SA. Such as algorithm to be -used. All the Attributes apply to a Transform. - -You will have noticed a pattern here: layers alternate between being -disjunctions ("or") and conjunctions ("and"). - -For Phase 1 / Main Mode (negotiating an ISAKMP SA), this structure is -cut back. There must be exactly one Proposal. So this degenerates to -a list of Transforms, one of which must be chosen. - -In your case, no proposal was considered acceptable to Pluto (the -Responder). So negotiation ceased. Pluto logs the reason it rejects -each Transform. So look back in the log to see what is going wrong.</PRE> -<H3><A name="rsasigkey">rsasigkey dumps core</A></H3> - A comment on this error from Henry: -<PRE>On Fri, 29 Jun 2001, Rodrigo Gruppelli wrote: -> ...Well, it seem that there's -> another problem with it. When I try to generate a pair of RSA keys, -> rsasigkey cores dump... - -*That* is a neon sign flashing "GMP LIBRARY IS BROKEN". Rsasigkey calls -GMP a lot, and our own library a little bit, and that's very nearly all it -does. Barring bugs in its code or our library -- which have happened, but -not very often -- a problem in rsasigkey is a problem in GMP.</PRE> -<P>See the next question for how to deal with GMP errors.</P> -<H3><A name="sig4">!Pluto failure!: ... exited with ... signal 4</A></H3> -<P>Pluto has died. Signal 4 is SIGILL, illegal instruction.</P> -<P>The most likely cause is that your<A href="glossary.html#GMP"> GMP</A> - (GNU multi-precision) library is compiled for a different processor - than what you are running on. Pluto uses that library for its public - key calculations.</P> -<P>Try getting the GMP sources and recompile for your processor type. - Most Linux distributions will include this source, or you can download - it from the<A href="http://www.swox.com/gmp/"> GMP home page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="econnrefused">ECONNREFUSED error message</A></H3> -<P>From John Denker, on the mailing list:</P> -<PRE>1) The log message - some IKE message we sent has been rejected with - ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details) -is much more suitable than the previous version. Thanks. - -2) Minor suggestion for further improvement: it might be worth mentioning -that the command - tcpdump -i eth1 icmp[0] != 8 and icmp[0] != 0 -is useful for tracking down the details in question. We shouldn't expect -all IPsec users to figure that out on their own. The log message might -even provide a hint as to where to look in the docs.</PRE> -<P>Reply From Pluto developer Hugh Redelmeier</P> -<PRE>Good idea. - -I've added a bit pluto(8)'s BUGS section along these lines. -I didn't have the heart to lengthen this message.</PRE> -<H3><A name="no_eroute">klips_debug: ... no eroute!</A></H3> -<P>This message means<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> has - received a packet for which no IPsec tunnel has been defined.</P> -<P>Here is a more detailed duscussion from the team's tech support - person Claudia Schmeing, responding to a query on the mailing list:</P> -<PRE>> Why ipsec reports no eroute! ???? IP Masq... is disabled. - -In general, more information is required so that people on the list may -give you informed input. See doc/prob.report.</PRE> -<P>The document she refers to has since been replaced by a<A href="trouble.html#prob.report"> - section</A> of the troubleshooting document.</P> -<PRE>However, I can make some general comments on this type of error. - -This error usually looks something like this (clipped from an archived -message): - -> ttl:64 proto:1 chk:45459 saddr:192.168.1.2 daddr:192.168.100.1 -> ... klips_debug:ipsec_findroute: 192.168.1.2->192.168.100.1 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: * See if we match exactly as a host destination -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: ** try to match a leaf, t=0xc1a260b0 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: *** start searching up the tree, t=0xc1a260b0 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: **** t=0xc1a260c8 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: **** t=0xc1fe5960 -> ... klips_debug:rj_match: ***** not found. -> ... klips_debug:ipsec_tunnel_start_xmit: Original head/tailroom: 2, 28 -> ... klips_debug:ipsec_tunnel_start_xmit: no eroute!: ts=47.3030, dropping. - - -What does this mean? -- -------------------- - -"eroute" stands for "extended route", and is a special type of route -internal to Linux FreeS/WAN. For more information about this type of route, -see the section of man ipsec_auto on ipsec auto --route. - -"no eroute!" here means, roughly, that Linux FreeS/WAN cannot find an -appropriate tunnel that should have delivered this packet. Linux -FreeS/WAN therefore drops the packet, with the message "no eroute! ... -dropping", on the assumption that this packet is not a legitimate -transmission through a properly constructed tunnel. - - -How does this situation come about? -- ----------------------------------- - -Linux FreeS/WAN has a number of connection descriptions defined in -ipsec.conf. These must be successfully brought "up" to form actual tunnels. -(see doc/setup.html's step 15, man ipsec.conf and man ipsec_auto -for details). - -Such connections are often specific to the endpoints' IPs. However, in -some cases they may be more general, for example in the case of -Road Warriors where left or right is the special value %any. - -When Linux FreeS/WAN receives a packet, it verifies that the packet has -come through a legitimate channel, by checking that there is an -appropriate tunnel through which this packet might legitimately have -arrived. This is the process we see above. - -First, it checks for an eroute that exactly matches the packet. In the -example above, we see it checking for a route that begins at 192.168.1.2 -and ends at 192.168.100.1. This search favours the most specific match that -would apply to the route between these IPs. So, if there is a connection -description exactly matching these IPs, the search will end there. If not, -the code will search for a more general description matching the IPs. -If there is no match, either specific or general, the packet will be -dropped, as we see, above. - -Unless you are working with Road Warriors, only the first, specific part -of the matching process is likely to be relevant to you. - - -"But I defined the tunnel, and it came up, why do I have this error?" -- --------------------------------------------------------------------- - -One of the most common causes of this error is failure to specify enough -connection descriptions to cover all needed tunnels between any two -gateways and their respective subnets. As you have noticed, troubleshooting -this error may be complicated by the use of IP Masq. However, this error is -not limited to cases where IP Masq is used. - -See doc/configuration.html#multitunnel for a detailed example of the -solution to this type of problem.</PRE> -<P>The documentation section she refers to is now<A href="adv_config.html#multitunnel"> - here</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="SAused">... trouble writing to /dev/ipsec ... SA already in - use</A></H3> -<P>This error message occurs when two manual connections are set up with - the same SPI value.</P> -<P>See the FAQ for<A href="#spi_error"> One manual connection works, but - second one fails</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="ignore">... ignoring ... payload</A></H3> -<P>This message is harmless. The IKE protocol provides for a number of - optional messages types:</P> -<UL> -<LI>delete SA</LI> -<LI>initial contact</LI> -<LI>vendor ID</LI> -<LI>...</LI> -</UL> -<P>An implementation is never required to send these, but they are - allowed to. The receiver is not required to do anything with them. - FreeS/WAN ignores them, but notifies you via the logs.</P> -<P>For the "ignoring delete SA Payload" message, see also our discussion - of cleaning up<A href="#deadtunnel"> dead tunnels</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="unknown_rightcert">unknown parameter name "rightcert"</A></H3> -<P>This message can appear when you've upgraded an X.509-enabled Linux - FreeS/WAN with a vanilla Linux FreeS/WAN. To use your X.509 configs you - will need to overwrite the new install with<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> - Super FreeS/WAN</A>, or add the<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.ca/freeswan"> - X.509 patch</A> by hand.</P> -<H2><A name="spam">Why don't you restrict the mailing lists to reduce - spam?</A></H2> -<P>As a matter of policy, some of our<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A> - need to be open to non-subscribers. Project management feel strongly - that maintaining this openness is more important than blocking spam.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Users should be able to get help or report bugs without subscribing.</LI> -<LI>Even a user who is subscribed may not have access to his or her - subscribed account when he or she needs help, miles from home base in - the middle of setting up a client's gateway.</LI> -<LI>There is arguably a legal requirement for this policy. A US resident - or citizen could be charged under munitions export laws for providing - technical assistance to a foreign cryptographic project. Such a charge - would be more easily defended if the discussion takes place in public, - on an open list.</LI> -</UL> -<P>This has been discussed several times at some length on the list. See - the<A href="mail.html#archive"> list archives</A>. Bringing the topic - up again is unlikely to be useful. Please don't. Or at the very least, - please don't without reading the archives and being certain that - whatever you are about to suggest has not yet been discussed.</P> -<P>Project technical lead Henry Spencer summarised one discussion:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> For the third and last time: this list *will* *not* do - address-based filtering. This is a policy decision, not an - implementation problem. The decision is final, and is not open to - discussion. This needs to be communicated better to people, and steps - are being taken to do that.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>Adding this FAQ section is one of the steps he refers to.</P> -<P>You have various options other than just putting up with the spam, - filtering it yourself, or unsubscribing:</P> -<UL> -<LI>subscribe only to one or both of our lists with restricted posting - rules: -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:briefs@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe">briefs</A> -, weekly list summaries</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:announce@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe">announce</A> -, project-related announcements</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>read the other lists via the<A href="mail.html#archive"> archives</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>A number of tools are available to filter mail.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Many mail readers include some filtering capability.</LI> -<LI>Many Linux distributions include<A href="http://www.procmail.org/"> - procmail(8)</A> for server-side filtering.</LI> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.spambouncer.org/"> Spam Bouncer</A> is a set - of procmail(8) filters designed to combat spam.</LI> -<LI>Roaring Penguin have a<A href="http://www.roaringpenguin.com/mimedefang/"> - MIME defanger</A> that removes potentially dangerous attachments.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you use your ISP's mail server rather than running your own, - consider suggesting to the ISP that they tag suspected spam as<A href="http://www.msen.com/1997/spam.html#SUSPECTED"> - this ISP</A> does. They could just refuse mail from dubious sources, - but that is tricky and runs some risk of losing valuable mail or - senselessly annoying senders and their admins. However, they can safely - tag and deliver dubious mail. The tags can greatly assist your - filtering.</P> -<P>For information on tracking down spammers, see these<A href="http://www.rahul.net/falk/#howtos"> - HowTos</A>, or the<A href="http://www.sputum.com/index2.html"> Sputum</A> - site. Sputum have a Linux anti-spam screensaver available for download.</P> -<P>Here is a more detailed message from Henry:</P> -<PRE>On Mon, 15 Jan 2001, Jay Vaughan wrote: -> I know I'm flogging a dead horse here, but I'm curious as to the reasons for -> an aversion for a subscriber-only mailing list? - -Once again: for legal reasons, it is important that discussions of these -things be held in a public place -- the list -- and we do not want to -force people to subscribe to the list just to ask one question, because -that may be more than merely inconvenient for them. There are also real -difficulties with people who are temporarily forced to use alternate -addresses; that is precisely the time when they may be most in need of -help, yet a subscribers-only policy shuts them out. - -These issues do not apply to most mailing lists, but for a list that is -(necessarily) the primary user support route for a crypto package, they -are very important. This is *not* an ordinary mailing list; it has to -function under awkward constraints that make various simplistic solutions -inapplicable or undesirable. - -> We're *ALL* sick of hearing about list management problems, not just you -> old-timers, so why don't you DO SOMETHING EFFECTIVE ABOUT IT... - -Because it's a lot harder than it looks, and many existing "solutions" -have problems when examined closely. - -> A suggestion for you, based on 10 years of experience with management of my -> own mailing lists would be to use mailman, which includes pretty much every -> feature under the sun that you guys need and want, plus some. The URL for -> mailman... - -I assure you, we're aware of mailman. Along with a whole bunch of others, -including some you almost certainly have never heard of (I hadn't!). - -> As for the argument that the list shouldn't be configured to enforce -> subscription - I contend that it *SHOULD* AT LEAST require manual address -> verification in order for posts to be redirected. - -You do realize, I hope, that interposing such a manual step might cause -your government to decide that this is not truly a public forum, and thus -you could go to jail if you don't get approval from them before mailing to -it? If you think this sounds irrational, your government is noted for -making irrational decisions in this area; we can't assume that they will -suddenly start being sensible. See above about awkward constraints. You -may be willing to take the risk, but we can't, in good conscience, insist -that all users with problems do so. - - Henry Spencer - henry@spsystems.net</PRE> -<P>and a message on the topic from project leader John Gilmore:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: The linux-ipsec list's topic - Date: Sat, 30 Dec 2000 - From: John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com> - -I'll post this single message, once only, in this discussion, and then -not burden the list with any further off-topic messages. I encourage -everyone on the list to restrain themself from posting ANY off-topic -messages to the linux-ipsec list. - -The topic of the linux-ipsec mailing list is the FreeS/WAN software. - -I frequently see "discussions about spam on a list" overwhelm the -volume of "actual spam" on a list. BOTH kinds of messages are -off-topic messages. Twenty anti-spam messages take just as long to -detect and discard as twenty spam messages. - -The Linux-ipsec list encourages on-topic messages from people who have -not joined the list itself. We will not censor messages to the list -based on where they originate, or what return address they contain. -In other words, non-subscribers ARE allowed to post, and this will not -change. My own valid contributions have been rejected out-of-hand by -too many other mailing lists for me to want to impose that censorship -on anybody else's contributions. And every day I see the damage that -anti-spam zeal is causing in many other ways; that zeal is far more -damaging to the culture of the Internet than the nuisance of spam. - -In general, it is the responsibility of recipients to filter, -prioritize, or otherwise manage the handling of email that comes to -them. It is not the responsibility of the rest of the Internet -community to refrain from sending messages to recipients that they -might not want to see. If your software infrastructure for managing -your incoming email is insufficient, then improve it. If you think -the signal-to-noise ratio on linux-ipsec is too poor, then please -unsubscribe. But don't further increase the noise by posting to the -linux-ipsec list about those topics. - - John Gilmore - founder & sponsor, FreeS/WAN project</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="policygroups.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="manpages.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/firewall.html b/doc/firewall.html deleted file mode 100644 index 0747ab83d..000000000 --- a/doc/firewall.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,767 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="manpages.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="trouble.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="firewall">FreeS/WAN and firewalls</A></H1> -<P>FreeS/WAN, or other IPsec implementations, frequently run on gateway - machines, the same machines running firewall or packet filtering code. - This document discusses the relation between the two.</P> -<P>The firewall code in 2.4 and later kernels is called Netfilter. The - user-space utility to manage a firewall is iptables(8). See the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org"> - netfilter/iptables web site</A> for details.</P> -<H2><A name="filters">Filtering rules for IPsec packets</A></H2> -<P>The basic constraint is that<STRONG> an IPsec gateway must have - packet filters that allow IPsec packets</STRONG>, at least when talking - to other IPsec gateways:</P> -<UL> -<LI>UDP port 500 for<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> negotiations</LI> -<LI>protocol 50 if you use<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> ESP</A> - encryption and/or authentication (the typical case)</LI> -<LI>protocol 51 if you use<A href="glossary.html#AH"> AH</A> - packet-level authentication</LI> -</UL> -<P>Your gateway and the other IPsec gateways it communicates with must - be able to exchange these packets for IPsec to work. Firewall rules - must allow UDP 500 and at least one of<A href="glossary.html#AH"> AH</A> - or<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> ESP</A> on the interface that - communicates with the other gateway.</P> -<P>For nearly all FreeS/WAN applications, you must allow UDP port 500 - and the ESP protocol.</P> -<P>There are two ways to set this up:</P> -<DL> -<DT>easier but less flexible</DT> -<DD>Just set up your firewall scripts at boot time to allow IPsec - packets to and from your gateway. Let FreeS/WAN reject any bogus - packets.</DD> -<DT>more work, giving you more precise control</DT> -<DD>Have the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> ipsec_pluto(8)</A> - daemon call scripts to adjust firewall rules dynamically as required. - This is done by naming the scripts in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> variables<VAR> prepluto=</VAR>,<VAR> postpluto=</VAR> -,<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> and<VAR> rightupdown=</VAR>.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Both methods are described in more detail below.</P> -<H2><A name="examplefw">Firewall configuration at boot</A></H2> -<P>It is possible to set up both firewalling and IPsec with appropriate - scripts at boot and then not use<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> and<VAR> - rightupdown=</VAR>, or use them only for simple up and down operations.</P> -<P>Basically, the technique is</P> -<UL> -<LI>allow IPsec packets (typically, IKE on UDP port 500 plus ESP, - protocol 50) -<UL> -<LI>incoming, if the destination address is your gateway (and - optionally, only from known senders)</LI> -<LI>outgoing, with the from address of your gateway (and optionally, - only to known receivers)</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>let<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto</A> deal with IKE</LI> -<LI>let<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> deal with ESP</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since Pluto authenticates its partners during the negotiation, and - KLIPS drops packets for which no tunnel has been negotiated, this may - be all you need.</P> -<H3><A name="simple.rules">A simple set of rules</A></H3> -<P>In simple cases, you need only a few rules, as in this example:</P> -<PRE># allow IPsec -# -# IKE negotiations -iptables -I INPUT -p udp --sport 500 --dport 500 -j ACCEPT -iptables -I OUTPUT -p udp --sport 500 --dport 500 -j ACCEPT -# ESP encryption and authentication -iptables -I INPUT -p 50 -j ACCEPT -iptables -I OUTPUT -p 50 -j ACCEPT -</PRE> -<P>This should be all you need to allow IPsec through<VAR> lokkit</VAR>, - which ships with Red Hat 9, on its medium security setting. Once you've - tweaked to your satisfaction, save your active rule set with:</P> -<PRE>service iptables save</PRE> -<H3><A name="complex.rules">Other rules</A></H3> - You can add additional rules, or modify existing ones, to work with - IPsec and with your network and policies. We give a some examples in - this section. -<P>However, while it is certainly possible to create an elaborate set of - rules yourself (please let us know via the<A href="mail.html"> mailing - list</A> if you do), it may be both easier and more secure to use a set - which has already been published and tested.</P> -<P>The published rule sets we know of are described in the<A href="#rules.pub"> - next section</A>.</P> -<H4>Adding additional rules</H4> - If necessary, you can add additional rules to: -<DL> -<DT>reject IPsec packets that are not to or from known gateways</DT> -<DD>This possibility is discussed in more detail<A href="#unknowngate"> - later</A></DD> -<DT>allow systems behind your gateway to build IPsec tunnels that pass - through the gateway</DT> -<DD>This possibility is discussed in more detail<A href="#through"> - later</A></DD> -<DT>filter incoming packets emerging from KLIPS.</DT> -<DD>Firewall rules can recognise packets emerging from IPsec. They are - marked as arriving on an interface such as<VAR> ipsec0</VAR>, rather - than<VAR> eth0</VAR>,<VAR> ppp0</VAR> or whatever.</DD> -</DL> -<P>It is therefore reasonably straightforward to filter these packets in - whatever way suits your situation.</P> -<H4>Modifying existing rules</H4> -<P>In some cases rules that work fine before you add IPsec may require - modification to work with IPsec.</P> -<P>This is especially likely for rules that deal with interfaces on the - Internet side of your system. IPsec adds a new interface; often the - rules must change to take account of that.</P> -<P>For example, consider the rules given in<A href="http://www.netfilter.org/documentation/HOWTO//packet-filtering-HOWTO-5.html"> - this section</A> of the Netfilter documentation:</P> -<PRE>Most people just have a single PPP connection to the Internet, and don't -want anyone coming back into their network, or the firewall: - - ## Insert connection-tracking modules (not needed if built into kernel). - # insmod ip_conntrack - # insmod ip_conntrack_ftp - - ## Create chain which blocks new connections, except if coming from inside. - # iptables -N block - # iptables -A block -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i ! ppp0 -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -j DROP - - ## Jump to that chain from INPUT and FORWARD chains. - # iptables -A INPUT -j block - # iptables -A FORWARD -j block</PRE> -<P>On an IPsec gateway, those rules may need to be modified. The above - allows new connections from<EM> anywhere except ppp0</EM>. That means - new connections from ipsec0 are allowed.</P> -<P>Do you want to allow anyone who can establish an IPsec connection to - your gateway to initiate TCP connections to any service on your - network? Almost certainly not if you are using opportunistic - encryption. Quite possibly not even if you have only explicitly - configured connections.</P> -<P>To disallow incoming connections from ipsec0, change the middle - section above to:</P> -<PRE> ## Create chain which blocks new connections, except if coming from inside. - # iptables -N block - # iptables -A block -m state --state ESTABLISHED,RELATED -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i ppp+ -j DROP - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i ipsec+ -j DROP - # iptables -A block -m state --state NEW -i -j ACCEPT - # iptables -A block -j DROP</PRE> -<P>The original rules accepted NEW connections from anywhere except - ppp0. This version drops NEW connections from any PPP interface (ppp+) - and from any ipsec interface (ipsec+), then accepts the survivors.</P> -<P>Of course, these are only examples. You will need to adapt them to - your own situation.</P> -<H3><A name="rules.pub">Published rule sets</A></H3> -<P>Several sets of firewall rules that work with FreeS/WAN are - available.</P> -<H4><A name="Ranch.trinity">Scripts based on Ranch's work</A></H4> -<P>One user, Rob Hutton, posted his boot time scripts to the mailing - list, and we included them in previous versions of this documentation. - They are still available from our<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/freeswan_trees/freeswan-1.5/doc/firewall.html#examplefw"> - web site</A>. However, they were for an earlier FreeS/WAN version so we - no longer recommend them. Also, they had some bugs. See this<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/04/msg00316.html"> - message</A>.</P> -<P>Those scripts were based on David Ranch's scripts for his "Trinity - OS" for setting up a secure Linux. Check his<A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html"> - home page</A> for the latest version and for information on his<A href="biblio.html#ranch"> - book</A> on securing Linux. If you are going to base your firewalling - on Ranch's scripts, we recommend using his latest version, and sending - him any IPsec modifications you make for incorporation into later - versions.</P> -<H4><A name="seawall">The Seattle firewall</A></H4> -<P>We have had several mailing lists reports of good results using - FreeS/WAN with Seawall (the Seattle Firewall). See that project's<A href="http://seawall.sourceforge.net/"> - home page</A> on Sourceforge.</P> -<H4><A name="rcf">The RCF scripts</A></H4> -<P>Another set of firewall scripts with IPsec support are the RCF or - rc.firewall scripts. See their<A href="http://jsmoriss.mvlan.net/linux/rcf.html"> - home page</A>.</P> -<H4><A name="asgard">Asgard scripts</A></H4> -<P><A href="http://heimdall.asgardsrealm.net/linux/firewall/">Asgard's - Realm</A> has set of firewall scripts with FreeS/WAN support, for 2.4 - kernels and iptables.</P> -<H4><A name="user.scripts">User scripts from the mailing list</A></H4> -<P>One user gave considerable detail on his scripts, including - supporting<A href="glossary.html#IPX"> IPX</A> through the tunnel. His - message was too long to conveniently be quoted here, so I've put it in - a<A href="user_examples.html"> separate file</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="updown">Calling firewall scripts, named in ipsec.conf(5)</A> -</H2> -<P>The<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> - configuration file has three pairs of parameters used to specify an - interface between FreeS/WAN and firewalling code.</P> -<P>Note that using these is not required if you have a static firewall - setup. In that case, you just set your firewall up at boot time (in a - way that permits the IPsec connections you want) and do not change it - thereafter. Omit all the FreeS/WAN firewall parameters and FreeS/WAN - will not attempt to adjust firewall rules at all. See<A href="#examplefw"> - above</A> for some information on appropriate scripts.</P> -<P>However, if you want your firewall rules to change when IPsec - connections change, then you need to use these parameters.</P> -<H3><A name="pre_post">Scripts called at IPsec start and stop</A></H3> -<P>One pair of parmeters are set in the<VAR> config setup</VAR> section - of the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> file and - affect all connections:</P> -<DL> -<DT>prepluto=</DT> -<DD>script to be called before<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> IKE daemon is started.</DD> -<DT>postpluto=</DT> -<DD>script to be called after<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> IKE daemon is stopped.</DD> -</DL> - These parameters allow you to change firewall parameters whenever IPsec - is started or stopped. -<P>They can also be used in other ways. For example, you might have<VAR> - prepluto</VAR> add a module to your kernel for the secure network - interface or make a dialup connection, and then have<VAR> postpluto</VAR> - remove the module or take the connection down.</P> -<H3><A name="up_down">Scripts called at connection up and down</A></H3> -<P>The other parameters are set in connection descriptions. They can be - set in individual connection descriptions, and could even call - different scripts for each connection for maximum flexibility. In most - applications, however, it makes sense to use only one script and to - call it from<VAR> conn %default</VAR> section so that it applies to all - connections.</P> -<P>You can:</P> -<DL> -<DT><STRONG>either</STRONG></DT> -<DD>set<VAR> leftfirewall=yes</VAR> or<VAR> rightfirewall=yes</VAR> to - use our supplied default script</DD> -<DT><STRONG>or</STRONG></DT> -<DD>assign a name in a<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> or<VAR> rightupdown=</VAR> - line to use your own script</DD> -</DL> -<P>Note that<STRONG> only one of these should be used</STRONG>. You - cannot sensibly use both. Since<STRONG> our default script is obsolete</STRONG> - (designed for firewalls using<VAR> ipfwadm(8)</VAR> on 2.0 kernels), - most users who need this service will<STRONG> need to write a custom - script</STRONG>.</P> -<H4><A name="fw.default">The default script</A></H4> -<P>We supply a default script named<VAR> _updown</VAR>.</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftfirewall=</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>rightfirewall=</DT> -<DD>indicates that the gateway is doing firewalling and that<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> should poke holes in the firewall as required.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Set these to<VAR> yes</VAR> and Pluto will call our default script<VAR> - _updown</VAR> with appropriate arguments whenever it:</P> -<UL> -<LI>starts or stops IPsec services</LI> -<LI>brings a connection up or down</LI> -</UL> -<P>The supplied default<VAR> _updown</VAR> script is appropriate for - simple cases using the<VAR> ipfwadm(8)</VAR> firewalling package.</P> -<H4><A name="userscript">User-written scripts</A></H4> -<P>You can also write your own script and have Pluto call it. Just put - the script's name in one of these<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> lines:</P> -<DL> -<DT>leftupdown=</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>rightupdown=</DT> -<DD>specifies a script to call instead of our default script<VAR> - _updown</VAR>.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Your script should take the same arguments and use the same - environment variables as<VAR> _updown</VAR>. See the "updown command" - section of the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> ipsec_pluto(8)</A> - man page for details.</P> -<P>Note that<STRONG> you should not modify our _updown script in place</STRONG> -. If you did that, then upgraded FreeS/WAN, the upgrade would install a - new default script, overwriting your changes.</P> -<H3><A name="ipchains.script">Scripts for ipchains or iptables</A></H3> -<P>Our<VAR> _updown</VAR> is for firewalls using<VAR> ipfwadm(8)</VAR>, - the firewall code for the 2.0 series of Linux kernels. If you are using - the more recent packages<VAR> ipchains(8)</VAR> (for 2.2 kernels) or<VAR> - iptables(8)</VAR> (2.4 kernels), then you must do one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>use static firewall rules which are set up at boot time as described<A -href="#examplefw"> above</A> and do not need to be changed by Pluto</LI> -<LI>limit yourself to ipchains(8)'s ipfwadm(8) emulation mode in order - to use our script</LI> -<LI>write your own script and call it with<VAR> leftupdown</VAR> and<VAR> - rightupdown</VAR>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>You can write a script to do whatever you need with firewalling. - Specify its name in a<VAR> [left|right]updown=</VAR> parameter in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> and Pluto will automatically call it for you.</P> -<P>The arguments Pluto passes such a script are the same ones it passes - to our default _updown script, so the best way to build yours is to - copy ours and modify the copy.</P> -<P>Note, however, that<STRONG> you should not modify our _updown script - in place</STRONG>. If you did that, then upgraded FreeS/WAN, the - upgrade would install a new default script, overwriting your changes.</P> -<H2><A name="NAT">A complication: IPsec vs. NAT</A></H2> -<P><A href="glossary.html#NAT.gloss">Network Address Translation</A>, - also known as IP masquerading, is a method of allocating IP addresses - dynamically, typically in circumstances where the total number of - machines which need to access the Internet exceeds the supply of IP - addresses.</P> -<P>Any attempt to perform NAT operations on IPsec packets<EM> between - the IPsec gateways</EM> creates a basic conflict:</P> -<UL> -<LI>IPsec wants to authenticate packets and ensure they are unaltered on - a gateway-to-gateway basis</LI> -<LI>NAT rewrites packet headers as they go by</LI> -<LI>IPsec authentication fails if packets are rewritten anywhere between - the IPsec gateways</LI> -</UL> -<P>For<A href="glossary.html#AH"> AH</A>, which authenticates parts of - the packet header including source and destination IP addresses, this - is fatal. If NAT changes those fields, AH authentication fails.</P> -<P>For<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> and<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> - ESP</A> it is not necessarily fatal, but is certainly an unwelcome - complication.</P> -<H3><A name="nat_ok">NAT on or behind the IPsec gateway works</A></H3> -<P>This problem can be avoided by having the masquerading take place<EM> - on or behind</EM> the IPsec gateway.</P> -<P>This can be done physically with two machines, one physically behind - the other. A picture, using SG to indicate IPsec<STRONG> S</STRONG> -ecurity<STRONG> G</STRONG>ateways, is:</P> -<PRE> clients --- NAT ----- SG ---------- SG - two machines</PRE> -<P>In this configuration, the actual client addresses need not be given - in the<VAR> leftsubnet=</VAR> parameter of the FreeS/WAN connection - description. The security gateway just delivers packets to the NAT box; - it needs only that machine's address. What that machine does with them - does not affect FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>A more common setup has one machine performing both functions:</P> -<PRE> clients ----- NAT/SG ---------------SG - one machine</PRE> -<P>Here you have a choice of techniques depending on whether you want to - make your client subnet visible to clients on the other end:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If you want the single gateway to behave like the two shown above, - with your clients hidden behind the NAT, then omit the<VAR> leftsubnet=</VAR> - parameter. It then defaults to the gateway address. Clients on the - other end then talk via the tunnel only to your gateway. The gateway - takes packets emerging from the tunnel, applies normal masquerading, - and forwards them to clients.</LI> -<LI>If you want to make your client machines visible, then give the - client subnet addresses as the<VAR> leftsubnet=</VAR> parameter in the - connection description and -<DL> -<DT>either</DT> -<DD>set<VAR> leftfirewall=yes</VAR> to use the default<VAR> updown</VAR> - script</DD> -<DT>or</DT> -<DD>use your own script by giving its name in a<VAR> leftupdown=</VAR> - parameter</DD> -</DL> - These scripts are described in their own<A href="#updown"> section</A>. -<P>In this case, no masquerading is done. Packets to or from the client - subnet are encrypted or decrypted without any change to their client - subnet addresses, although of course the encapsulating packets use - gateway addresses in their headers. Clients behind the right security - gateway see a route via that gateway to the left subnet.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="nat_bad">NAT between gateways is problematic</A></H3> -<P>We recommend not trying to build IPsec connections which pass through - a NAT machine. This setup poses problems:</P> -<PRE> clients --- SG --- NAT ---------- SG</PRE> -<P>If you must try it, some references are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Jean_Francois Nadeau's document on doing<A href="http://jixen.tripod.com/#NATed gateways"> - IPsec behind NAT</A></LI> -<LI><A href="web.html#VPN.masq">VPN masquerade patches</A> to make a - Linux NAT box handle IPsec packets correctly</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="NAT.ref">Other references on NAT and IPsec</A></H3> -<P>Other documents which may be relevant include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>an Internet Draft on<A href="http://search.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-aboba-nat-ipsec-04.txt"> - IPsec and NAT</A> which may eventually evolve into a standard solution - for this problem.</LI> -<LI>an informational<A href="http://www.cis.ohio-state.edu/rfc/rfc2709.txt"> - RFC</A>,<CITE> Security Model with Tunnel-mode IPsec for NAT Domains</CITE> -.</LI> -<LI>an<A href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/759/ipj_3-4/ipj_3-4_nat.html"> - article</A> in Cisco's<CITE> Internet Protocol Journal</CITE></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="complications">Other complications</A></H2> -<P>Of course simply allowing UDP 500 and ESP packets is not the whole - story. Various other issues arise in making IPsec and packet filters - co-exist and even co-operate. Some of them are summarised below.</P> -<H3><A name="through">IPsec<EM> through</EM></A> the gateway</H3> -<P>Basic IPsec packet filtering rules deal only with packets addressed - to or sent from your IPsec gateway.</P> -<P>It is a separate policy decision whether to permit such packets to - pass through the gateway so that client machines can build end-to-end - IPsec tunnels of their own. This may not be practical if you are using<A -href="#NAT"> NAT (IP masquerade)</A> on your gateway, and may conflict - with some corporate security policies.</P> -<P>Where possible, allowing this is almost certainly a good idea. Using - IPsec on an end-to-end basis is more secure than gateway-to-gateway.</P> -<P>Doing it is quite simple. You just need firewall rules that allow UDP - port 500 and protocols 50 and 51 to pass through your gateway. If you - wish, you can of course restrict this to certain hosts.</P> -<H3><A name="ipsec_only">Preventing non-IPsec traffic</A></H3> - You can also filter<EM> everything but</EM> UDP port 500 and ESP or AH - to restrict traffic to IPsec only, either for anyone communicating with - your host or just for specific partners. -<P>One application of this is for the telecommuter who might have:</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East ================= firewall --- the Internet - home network untrusted net corporate network</PRE> -<P>The subnet on the right is 0.0.0.0/0, the whole Internet. The West - gateway is set up so that it allows only IPsec packets to East in or - out.</P> -<P>This configuration is used in AT&T Research's network. For details, - see the<A href="intro.html#applied"> papers</A> links in our - introduction.</P> -<P>Another application would be to set up firewall rules so that an - internal machine, such as an employees-only web server, could not talk - to the outside world except via specific IPsec tunnels.</P> -<H3><A name="unknowngate">Filtering packets from unknown gateways</A></H3> -<P>It is possible to use firewall rules to restrict UDP 500, ESP and AH - packets so that these packets are accepted only from known gateways. - This is not strictly necessary since FreeS/WAN will discard packets - from unknown gateways. You might, however, want to do it for any of a - number of reasons. For example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Arguably, "belt and suspenders" is the sensible approach to - security. If you can block a potential attack in two ways, use both. - The only question is whether to look for a third way after implementing - the first two.</LI> -<LI>Some admins may prefer to use the firewall code this way because - they prefer firewall logging to FreeS/WAN's logging.</LI> -<LI>You may need it to implement your security policy. Consider an - employee working at home, and a policy that says traffic from the home - system to the Internet at large must go first via IPsec to the - corporate LAN and then out to the Internet via the corporate firewall. - One way to do that is to make<VAR> ipsec0</VAR> the default route on - the home gateway and provide exceptions only for UDP 500 and ESP to the - corporate gateway. Everything else is then routed via the tunnel to the - corporate gateway.</LI> -</UL> -<P>It is not possible to use only static firewall rules for this - filtering if you do not know the other gateways' IP addresses in - advance, for example if you have "road warriors" who may connect from a - different address each time or if want to do<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> to arbitrary gateways. In these cases, you - can accept UDP 500 IKE packets from anywhere, then use the<A href="#updown"> - updown</A> script feature of<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> to dynamically adjust firewalling for each negotiated - tunnel.</P> -<P>Firewall packet filtering does not much reduce the risk of a<A href="glossary.html#DOS"> - denial of service attack</A> on FreeS/WAN. The firewall can drop - packets from unknown gateways, but KLIPS does that quite efficiently - anyway, so you gain little. The firewall cannot drop otherwise - legitmate packets that fail KLIPS authentication, so it cannot protect - against an attack designed to exhaust resources by making FreeS/WAN - perform many expensive authentication operations.</P> -<P>In summary, firewall filtering of IPsec packets from unknown gateways - is possible but not strictly necessary.</P> -<H2><A name="otherfilter">Other packet filters</A></H2> -<P>When the IPsec gateway is also acting as your firewall, other packet - filtering rules will be in play. In general, those are outside the - scope of this document. See our<A href="web.html#firewall.linux"> Linux - firewall links</A> for information. There are a few types of packet, - however, which can affect the operation of FreeS/WAN or of diagnostic - tools commonly used with it. These are discussed below.</P> -<H3><A name="ICMP">ICMP filtering</A></H3> -<P><A href="glossary.html#ICMP.gloss">ICMP</A> is the<STRONG> I</STRONG> -nternet<STRONG> C</STRONG>ontrol<STRONG> M</STRONG>essage<STRONG> P</STRONG> -rotocol. It is used for messages between IP implementations themselves, - whereas IP used is used between the clients of those implementations. - ICMP is, unsurprisingly, used for control messages. For example, it is - used to notify a sender that a desination is not reachable, or to tell - a router to reroute certain packets elsewhere.</P> -<P>ICMP handling is tricky for firewalls.</P> -<UL> -<LI>You definitely want some ICMP messages to get through; things won't - work without them. For example, your clients need to know if some - destination they ask for is unreachable.</LI> -<LI>On the other hand, you do equally definitely do not want untrusted - folk sending arbitrary control messages to your machines. Imagine what - someone moderately clever and moderately malicious could do to you, - given control of your network's routing.</LI> -</UL> -<P>ICMP does not use ports. Messages are distinguished by a "message - type" field and, for some types, by an additional "code" field. The - definitive list of types and codes is on the<A href="http://www.iana.org"> - IANA</A> site.</P> -<P>One expert uses this definition for ICMP message types to be dropped - at the firewall.</P> -<PRE># ICMP types which lack socially redeeming value. -# 5 Redirect -# 9 Router Advertisement -# 10 Router Selection -# 15 Information Request -# 16 Information Reply -# 17 Address Mask Request -# 18 Address Mask Reply - -badicmp='5 9 10 15 16 17 18'</PRE> -<P>A more conservative approach would be to make a list of allowed types - and drop everything else.</P> -<P>Whichever way you do it, your ICMP filtering rules on a FreeS/WAN - gateway should allow at least the following ICMP packet types:</P> -<DL> -<DT>echo (type 8)</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>echo reply (type 0)</DT> -<DD>These are used by ping(1). We recommend allowing both types through - the tunnel and to or from your gateway's external interface, since - ping(1) is an essential testing tool. -<P>It is fairly common for firewalls to drop ICMP echo packets addressed - to machines behind the firewall. If that is your policy, please create - an exception for such packets arriving via an IPsec tunnel, at least - during intial testing of those tunnels.</P> -</DD> -<DT>destination unreachable (type 3)</DT> -<DD>This is used, with code 4 (Fragmentation Needed and Don't Fragment - was Set) in the code field, to control<A href="glossary.html#pathMTU"> - path MTU discovery</A>. Since IPsec processing adds headers, enlarges - packets and may cause fragmentation, an IPsec gateway should be able to - send and receive these ICMP messages<STRONG> on both inside and outside - interfaces</STRONG>.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A name="traceroute">UDP packets for traceroute</A></H3> -<P>The traceroute(1) utility uses UDP port numbers from 33434 to - approximately 33633. Generally, these should be allowed through for - troubleshooting.</P> -<P>Some firewalls drop these packets to prevent outsiders exploring the - protected network with traceroute(1). If that is your policy, consider - creating an exception for such packets arriving via an IPsec tunnel, at - least during intial testing of those tunnels.</P> -<H3><A name="l2tp">UDP for L2TP</A></H3> -<P> Windows 2000 does, and products designed for compatibility with it - may, build<A href="glossary.html#L2TP"> L2TP</A> tunnels over IPsec - connections.</P> -<P>For this to work, you must allow UDP protocol 1701 packets coming out - of your tunnels to continue to their destination. You can, and probably - should, block such packets to or from your external interfaces, but - allow them from<VAR> ipsec0</VAR>.</P> -<P>See also our Windows 2000<A href="interop.html#win2k"> interoperation - discussion</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="packets">How it all works: IPsec packet details</A></H2> -<P>IPsec uses three main types of packet:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#IKE">IKE</A> uses<STRONG> the UDP protocol - and port 500</STRONG>.</DT> -<DD>Unless you are using only (less secure, not recommended) manual - keying, you need IKE to negotiate connection parameters, acceptable - algorithms, key sizes and key setup. IKE handles everything required to - set up, rekey, repair or tear down IPsec connections.</DD> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#ESP">ESP</A> is<STRONG> protocol number 50</STRONG> -</DT> -<DD>This is required for encrypted connections.</DD> -<DT><A href="glossary.html#AH">AH</A> is<STRONG> protocol number 51</STRONG> -</DT> -<DD>This can be used where only authentication, not encryption, is - required.</DD> -</DL> -<P>All of those packets should have appropriate IPsec gateway addresses - in both the to and from IP header fields. Firewall rules can check this - if you wish, though it is not strictly necessary. This is discussed in - more detail<A href="#unknowngate"> later</A>.</P> -<P>IPsec processing of incoming packets authenticates them then removes - the ESP or AH header and decrypts if necessary. Successful processing - exposes an inner packet which is then delivered back to the firewall - machinery, marked as having arrived on an<VAR> ipsec[0-3]</VAR> - interface. Firewall rules can use that interface label to distinguish - these packets from unencrypted packets which are labelled with the - physical interface they arrived on (or perhaps with a non-IPsec virtual - interface such as<VAR> ppp0</VAR>).</P> -<P>One of our users sent a mailing list message with a<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00006.html"> - diagram</A> of the packet flow.</P> -<H3><A name="noport">ESP and AH do not have ports</A></H3> -<P>Some protocols, such as TCP and UDP, have the notion of ports. Others - protocols, including ESP and AH, do not. Quite a few IPsec newcomers - have become confused on this point. There are no ports<EM> in</EM> the - ESP or AH protocols, and no ports used<EM> for</EM> them. For these - protocols,<EM> the idea of ports is completely irrelevant</EM>.</P> -<H3><A name="header">Header layout</A></H3> -<P>The protocol numbers for ESP or AH are used in the 'next header' - field of the IP header. On most non-IPsec packets, that field would - have one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>1 for ICMP</LI> -<LI>4 for IP-in-IP encapsulation</LI> -<LI>6 for TCP</LI> -<LI>17 for UDP</LI> -<LI>... or one of about 100 other possibilities listed by<A href="http://www.iana.org"> - IANA</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Each header in the sequence tells what the next header will be. IPsec - adds headers for ESP or AH near the beginning of the sequence. The - original headers are kept and the 'next header' fields adjusted so that - all headers can be correctly interpreted.</P> -<P>For example, using<STRONG> [</STRONG><STRONG> ]</STRONG> to indicate - data protected by ESP and unintelligible to an eavesdropper between the - gateways:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a simple packet might have only IP and TCP headers with: -<UL> -<LI>IP header says next header --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>with ESP<A href="glossary.html#transport"> transport mode</A> - encapsulation, that packet would have: -<UL> -<LI>IP header says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data<STRONG> ]</STRONG></LI> -</UL> - Note that the IP header is outside ESP protection, visible to an - attacker, and that the final destination must be the gateway.</LI> -<LI>with ESP in<A href="glossary.html#tunnel"> tunnel mode</A>, we might - have: -<UL> -<LI>IP header says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> IP</LI> -<LI>IP header says next header --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data<STRONG> ]</STRONG></LI> -</UL> - Here the inner IP header is protected by ESP, unreadable by an - attacker. Also, the inner header can have a different IP address than - the outer IP header, so the decrypted packet can be routed from the - IPsec gateway to a final destination which may be another machine.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Part of the ESP header itself is encrypted, which is why the<STRONG> - [</STRONG> indicating protected data appears in the middle of some - lines above. The next header field of the ESP header is protected. This - makes<A href="glossary.html#traffic"> traffic analysis</A> more - difficult. The next header field would tell an eavesdropper whether - your packet was UDP to the gateway, TCP to the gateway, or encapsulated - IP. It is better not to give this information away. A clever attacker - may deduce some of it from the pattern of packet sizes and timings, but - we need not make it easy.</P> -<P>IPsec allows various combinations of these to match local policies, - including combinations that use both AH and ESP headers or that nest - multiple copies of these headers.</P> -<P>For example, suppose my employer has an IPsec VPN running between two - offices so all packets travelling between the gateways for those - offices are encrypted. If gateway policies allow it (The admins could - block UDP 500 and protocols 50 and 51 to disallow it), I can build an - IPsec tunnel from my desktop to a machine in some remote office. Those - packets will have one ESP header throughout their life, for my - end-to-end tunnel. For part of the route, however, they will also have - another ESP layer for the corporate VPN's encapsulation. The whole - header scheme for a packet on the Internet might be:</P> -<UL> -<LI>IP header (with gateway address) says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> IP</LI> -<LI>IP header (with receiving machine address) says next header --> ESP</LI> -<LI>ESP header<STRONG> [</STRONG> says next --> TCP</LI> -<LI>TCP header port number --> which process to send data to</LI> -<LI>data<STRONG> ]]</STRONG></LI> -</UL> -<P>The first ESP (outermost) header is for the corporate VPN. The inner - ESP header is for the secure machine-to-machine link.</P> -<H3><A name="dhr">DHR on the updown script</A></H3> -<P>Here are some mailing list comments from<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto(8)</A> developer Hugh Redelmeier on an earlier draft of this - document:</P> -<PRE>There are many important things left out - -- firewalling is important but must reflect (implement) policy. Since - policy isn't the same for all our customers, and we're not experts, - we should concentrate on FW and MASQ interactions with FreeS/WAN. - -- we need a diagram to show packet flow WITHIN ONE MACHINE, assuming - IKE, IPsec, FW, and MASQ are all done on that machine. The flow is - obvious if the components are run on different machines (trace the - cables). - - IKE input: - + packet appears on public IF, as UDP port 500 - + input firewalling rules are applied (may discard) - + Pluto sees the packet. - - IKE output: - + Pluto generates the packet & writes to public IF, UDP port 500 - + output firewalling rules are applied (may discard) - + packet sent out public IF - - IPsec input, with encapsulated packet, outer destination of this host: - + packet appears on public IF, protocol 50 or 51. If this - packet is the result of decapsulation, it will appear - instead on the paired ipsec IF. - + input firewalling rules are applied (but packet is opaque) - + KLIPS decapsulates it, writes result to paired ipsec IF - + input firewalling rules are applied to resulting packet - as input on ipsec IF - + if the destination of the packet is this machine, the - packet is passed on to the appropriate protocol handler. - If the original packet was encapsulated more than once - and the new outer destination is this machine, that - handler will be KLIPS. - + otherwise: - * routing is done for the resulting packet. This may well - direct it into KLIPS for encoding or encrypting. What - happens then is described elsewhere. - * forwarding firewalling rules are applied - * output firewalling rules are applied - * the packet is sent where routing specified - - IPsec input, with encapsulated packet, outer destination of another host: - + packet appears on some IF, protocol 50 or 51 - + input firewalling rules are applied (but packet is opaque) - + routing selects where to send the packet - + forwarding firewalling rules are applied (but packet is opaque) - + packet forwarded, still encapsulated - - IPsec output, from this host or from a client: - + if from a client, input firewalling rules are applied as the - packet arrives on the private IF - + routing directs the packet to an ipsec IF (this is how the - system decides KLIPS processing is required) - + if from a client, forwarding firewalling rules are applied - + KLIPS eroute mechanism matches the source and destination - to registered eroutes, yielding a SPI group. This dictates - processing, and where the resulting packet is to be sent - (the destinations SG and the nexthop). - + output firewalling is not applied to the resulting - encapsulated packet - -- Until quite recently, KLIPS would double encapsulate packets that - didn't strictly need to be. Firewalling should be prepared for - those packets showing up as ESP and AH protocol input packets on - an ipsec IF. - -- MASQ processing seems to be done as if it were part of the - forwarding firewall processing (this should be verified). - -- If a firewall is being used, it is likely the case that it needs to - be adjusted whenever IPsec SAs are added or removed. Pluto invokes - a script to do this (and to adjust routing) at suitable times. The - default script is only suitable for ipfwadm-managed firewalls. Under - LINUX 2.2.x kernels, ipchains can be managed by ipfwadm (emulation), - but ipchains more powerful if manipulated using the ipchains command. - In this case, a custom updown script must be used. - - We think that the flexibility of ipchains precludes us supplying an - updown script that would be widely appropriate.</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="manpages.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="trouble.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/glossary.html b/doc/glossary.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3ca33810f..000000000 --- a/doc/glossary.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,2132 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="web.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="biblio.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="ourgloss">Glossary for the Linux FreeS/WAN project</A></H1> -<P>Entries are in alphabetical order. Some entries are only one line or - one paragraph long. Others run to several paragraphs. I have tried to - put the essential information in the first paragraph so you can skip - the other paragraphs if that seems appropriate.</P> -<HR> -<H2><A name="jump">Jump to a letter in the glossary</A></H2> -<CENTER> <BIG><B><A href="#0">numeric</A><A href="#A"> A</A><A href="#B"> - B</A><A href="#C"> C</A><A href="#D"> D</A><A href="#E"> E</A><A href="#F"> - F</A><A href="#G"> G</A><A href="#H"> H</A><A href="#I"> I</A><A href="#J"> - J</A><A href="#K"> K</A><A href="#L"> L</A><A href="#M"> M</A><A href="#N"> - N</A><A href="#O"> O</A><A href="#P"> P</A><A href="#Q"> Q</A><A href="#R"> - R</A><A href="#S"> S</A><A href="#T"> T</A><A href="#U"> U</A><A href="#V"> - V</A><A href="#W"> W</A><A href="#X"> X</A><A href="#Y"> Y</A><A href="#Z"> - Z</A></B></BIG></CENTER> -<HR> -<H2><A name="gloss">Other glossaries</A></H2> -<P>Other glossaries which overlap this one include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The VPN Consortium's glossary of<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/terms.html"> - VPN terms</A>.</LI> -<LI>glossary portion of the<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/faq/B.html"> - Cryptography FAQ</A></LI> -<LI>an extensive crytographic glossary on<A href="http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/GLOSSARY.HTM"> - Terry Ritter's</A> page.</LI> -<LI>The<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A>'s<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/glossary.htm"> - glossary of computer security</A> on the<A href="http://www.sans.org"> - SANS Institute</A> site.</LI> -<LI>a small glossary for Internet Security at<A href="http://www5.zdnet.com/pcmag/pctech/content/special/glossaries/internetsecurity.html"> - PC magazine</A></LI> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.visi.com/crypto/inet-crypto/glossary.html"> - glossary</A> from Richard Smith's book<A href="biblio.html#Smith"> - Internet Cryptography</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Several Internet glossaries are available as RFCs:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1208.txt">Glossary of - Networking Terms</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc1983.txt">Internet User's - Glossary</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc2828.txt">Internet - Security Glossary</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>More general glossary or dictionary information:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Free Online Dictionary of Computing (FOLDOC) -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.nightflight.com/foldoc">North America</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://wombat.doc.ic.ac.uk/foldoc/index.html">Europe</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nue.org/foldoc/index.html">Japan</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There are many more mirrors of this dictionary.</P> -</LI> -<LI>The Jargon File, the definitive resource for hacker slang and - folklore -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.netmeg.net/jargon">North America</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://info.wins.uva.nl/~mes/jargon/">Holland</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tuxedo.org/~esr/jargon">home page</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There are also many mirrors of this. See the home page for a list.</P> -</LI> -<LI>A general<A href="http://www.trinity.edu/~rjensen/245glosf.htm#Navigate"> - technology glossary</A></LI> -<LI>An<A href="http://www.yourdictionary.com/"> online dictionary - resource page</A> with pointers to many dictionaries for many languages</LI> -<LI>A<A href="http://www.onelook.com/"> search engine</A> that accesses - several hundred online dictionaries</LI> -<LI>O'Reilly<A href="http://www.ora.com/reference/dictionary/"> - Dictionary of PC Hardware and Data Communications Terms</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.FreeSoft.org/CIE/index.htm">Connected</A> - Internet encyclopedia</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.whatis.com/">whatis.com</A></LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<H2><A name="definitions">Definitions</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT><A name="0">0</A></DT> -<DT><A name="3DES">3DES (Triple DES)</A></DT> -<DD>Using three<A href="#DES"> DES</A> encryptions on a single data - block, with at least two different keys, to get higher security than is - available from a single DES pass. The three-key version of 3DES is the - default encryption algorithm for<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux - FreeS/WAN</A>. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> always does 3DES with three different - keys, as required by RFC 2451. For an explanation of the two-key - variant, see<A href="#2key"> two key triple DES</A>. Both use an<A href="#EDE"> - EDE</A> encrypt-decrypt-encrpyt sequence of operations.</P> -<P>Single<A href="#DES"> DES</A> is<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - insecure</A>.</P> -<P>Double DES is ineffective. Using two 56-bit keys, one might expect an - attacker to have to do 2<SUP>112</SUP> work to break it. In fact, only - 2<SUP>57</SUP> work is required with a<A href="#meet"> - meet-in-the-middle attack</A>, though a large amount of memory is also - required. Triple DES is vulnerable to a similar attack, but that just - reduces the work factor from the 2<SUP>168</SUP> one might expect to 2<SUP> -112</SUP>. That provides adequate protection against<A href="#brute"> - brute force</A> attacks, and no better attack is known.</P> -<P>3DES can be somewhat slow compared to other ciphers. It requires - three DES encryptions per block. DES was designed for hardware - implementation and includes some operations which are difficult in - software. However, the speed we get is quite acceptable for many uses. - See our<A href="performance.html"> performance</A> document for - details.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="A">A</A></DT> -<DT><A name="active">Active attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack in which the attacker does not merely eavesdrop (see<A href="#passive"> - passive attack</A>) but takes action to change, delete, reroute, add, - forge or divert data. Perhaps the best-known active attack is<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle</A>. In general,<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> is a useful defense against active attacks.</DD> -<DT><A name="AES">AES</A></DT> -<DD>The<B> A</B>dvanced<B> E</B>ncryption<B> S</B>tandard -- a new<A href="#block"> - block cipher</A> standard to replace<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - DES</A> -- developed by<A href="#NIST"> NIST</A>, the US National - Institute of Standards and Technology. DES used 64-bit blocks and a - 56-bit key. AES ciphers use a 128-bit block and 128, 192 or 256-bit - keys. The larger block size helps resist<A href="#birthday"> birthday - attacks</A> while the large key size prevents<A href="#brute"> brute - force attacks</A>. -<P>Fifteen proposals meeting NIST's basic criteria were submitted in - 1998 and subjected to intense discussion and analysis, "round one" - evaluation. In August 1999, NIST narrowed the field to five "round two" - candidates:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.research.ibm.com/security/mars.html">Mars</A> - from IBM</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/aes/">RC6</A> from RSA</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/">Rijndael</A> - from two Belgian researchers</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html">Serpent</A>, a - British-Norwegian-Israeli collaboration</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/twofish.html">Twofish</A> from - the consulting firm<A href="http://www.counterpane.com"> Counterpane</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>Three of the five finalists -- Rijndael, Serpent and Twofish -- have - completely open licenses.</P> -<P>In October 2000, NIST announced the winner -- Rijndael.</P> -<P>For more information, see:</P> -<UL> -<LI>NIST's<A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/aes_home.htm"> - AES home page</A></LI> -<LI>the Block Cipher Lounge<A href="http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/aes.html"> - AES page</A></LI> -<LI>Brian Gladman's<A href="http://fp.gladman.plus.com/cryptography_technology/index.htm"> - code and benchmarks</A></LI> -<LI>Helger Lipmaa's<A href="http://www.tcs.hut.fi/~helger/aes/"> survey - of implementations</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>AES will be added to a future release of<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A>. Likely we will add all three of the finalists with - good licenses. User-written<A href="web.html#patch"> AES patches</A> - are already available.</P> -<P>Adding AES may also require adding stronger hashes,<A href="#SHA-256"> - SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="AH">AH</A></DT> -<DD>The<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A><B> A</B>uthentication<B> H</B>eader, - added after the IP header. For details, see our<A href="ipsec.html#AH.ipsec"> - IPsec</A> document and/or RFC 2402.</DD> -<DT><A name="alicebob">Alice and Bob</A></DT> -<DD>A and B, the standard example users in writing on cryptography and - coding theory. Carol and Dave join them for protocols which require - more players. -<P>Bruce Schneier extends these with many others such as Eve the - Eavesdropper and Victor the Verifier. His extensions seem to be in the - process of becoming standard as well. See page 23 of<A href="biblio.html#schneier"> - Applied Cryptography</A></P> -<P>Alice and Bob have an amusing<A href="http://www.conceptlabs.co.uk/alicebob.html"> - biography</A> on the web.</P> -</DD> -<DT>ARPA</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#DARPA"> DARPA</A></DD> -<DT><A name="ASIO">ASIO</A></DT> -<DD>Australian Security Intelligence Organisation.</DD> -<DT>Asymmetric cryptography</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#public"> public key cryptography</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="authentication">Authentication</A></DT> -<DD>Ensuring that a message originated from the expected sender and has - not been altered on route.<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> uses - authentication in two places: -<UL> -<LI>peer authentication, authenticating the players in<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A>'s<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchanges to prevent<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A>. This can be done in a number of ways. - The methods supported by FreeS/WAN are discussed in our<A href="adv_config.html#choose"> - advanced configuration</A> document.</LI> -<LI>packet authentication, authenticating packets on an established<A href="#SA"> - SA</A>, either with a separate<A href="#AH"> authentication header</A> - or with the optional authentication in the<A href="#ESP"> ESP</A> - protocol. In either case, packet authentication uses a<A href="#HMAC"> - hashed message athentication code</A> technique.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Outside IPsec, passwords are perhaps the most common authentication - mechanism. Their function is essentially to authenticate the person's - identity to the system. Passwords are generally only as secure as the - network they travel over. If you send a cleartext password over a - tapped phone line or over a network with a packet sniffer on it, the - security provided by that password becomes zero. Sending an encrypted - password is no better; the attacker merely records it and reuses it at - his convenience. This is called a<A href="#replay"> replay</A> attack.</P> -<P>A common solution to this problem is a<A href="#challenge"> - challenge-response</A> system. This defeats simple eavesdropping and - replay attacks. Of course an attacker might still try to break the - cryptographic algorithm used, or the<A href="#random"> random number</A> - generator.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="auto">Automatic keying</A></DT> -<DD>A mode in which keys are automatically generated at connection - establisment and new keys automaically created periodically thereafter. - Contrast with<A href="ipsec.html#manual"> manual keying</A> in which a - single stored key is used. -<P>IPsec uses the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol</A> - to create keys. An<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> - mechansim is required for this. FreeS/WAN normally uses<A href="#RSA"> - RSA</A> for this. Other methods supported are discussed in our<A href="adv_config.html#choose"> - advanced configuration</A> document.</P> -<P>Having an attacker break the authentication is emphatically not a - good idea. An attacker that breaks authentication, and manages to - subvert some other network entities (DNS, routers or gateways), can use - a<A href="#middle"> man-in-the middle attack</A> to break the security - of your IPsec connections.</P> -<P>However, having an attacker break the authentication in automatic - keying is not quite as bad as losing the key in manual keying.</P> -<UL> -<LI>An attacker who reads /etc/ipsec.conf and gets the keys for a - manually keyed connection can, without further effort, read all - messages encrypted with those keys, including any old messages he may - have archived.</LI> -<LI>Automatic keying has a property called<A href="#PFS"> perfect - forward secrecy</A>. An attacker who breaks the authentication gets - none of the automatically generated keys and cannot immediately read - any messages. He has to mount a successful<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A> in real time before he can read anything. - He cannot read old archived messages at all and will not be able to - read any future messages not caught by man-in-the-middle tricks.</LI> -</UL> -<P>That said, the secrets used for authentication, stored in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A>, should still be protected as tightly as - cryptographic keys.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="B">B</A></DT> -<DT><A href="http://www.nortelnetworks.com">Bay Networks</A></DT> -<DD>A vendor of routers, hubs and related products, now a subsidiary of - Nortel. Interoperation between their IPsec products and Linux FreeS/WAN - was problematic at last report; see our<A href="interop.html#bay"> - interoperation</A> section.</DD> -<DT><A name="benchmarks">benchmarks</A></DT> -<DD>Our default block cipher,<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A>, is slower - than many alternate ciphers that might be used. Speeds achieved, - however, seem adequate for many purposes. For example, the assembler - code from the<A href="#LIBDES"> LIBDES</A> library we use encrypts 1.6 - megabytes per second on a Pentium 200, according to the test program - supplied with the library. -<P>For more detail, see our document on<A href="performance.html"> - FreeS/WAN performance</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="BIND">BIND</A></DT> -<DD><B>B</B>erkeley<B> I</B>nternet<B> N</B>ame<B> D</B>aemon, a widely - used implementation of<A href="ipsec.html#DNS"> DNS</A> (Domain Name - Service). See our bibliography for a<A href="ipsec.html#DNS"> useful - reference</A>. See the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> BIND home - page</A> for more information and the latest version.</DD> -<DT><A name="birthday">Birthday attack</A></DT> -<DD>A cryptographic attack based on the mathematics exemplified by the<A href="#paradox"> - birthday paradox</A>. This math turns up whenever the question of two - cryptographic operations producing the same result becomes an issue: -<UL> -<LI><A href="#collision">collisions</A> in<A href="#digest"> message - digest</A> functions.</LI> -<LI>identical output blocks from a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A></LI> -<LI>repetition of a challenge in a<A href="#challenge"> - challenge-response</A> system</LI> -</UL> -<P>Resisting such attacks is part of the motivation for:</P> -<UL> -<LI>hash algorithms such as<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A> and<A href="#RIPEMD"> - RIPEMD-160</A> giving a 160-bit result rather than the 128 bits of<A href="#MD4"> - MD4</A>,<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> and<A href="#RIPEMD"> RIPEMD-128</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="#AES">AES</A> block ciphers using a 128-bit block instead - of the 64-bit block of most current ciphers</LI> -<LI><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> using a 32-bit counter for packets sent - on an<A href="ipsec.html#auto"> automatically keyed</A><A href="#SA"> - SA</A> and requiring that the connection always be rekeyed before the - counter overflows.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A name="paradox">Birthday paradox</A></DT> -<DD>Not really a paradox, just a rather counter-intuitive mathematical - fact. In a group of 23 people, the chance of a least one pair having - the same birthday is over 50%. -<P>The second person has 1 chance in 365 (ignoring leap years) of - matching the first. If they don't match, the third person's chances of - matching one of them are 2/365. The 4th, 3/365, and so on. The total of - these chances grows more quickly than one might guess.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="block">Block cipher</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cipher</A> which operates on - fixed-size blocks of plaintext, giving a block of ciphertext for each. - Contrast with<A href="#stream"> stream cipher</A>. Block ciphers can be - used in various<A href="#mode"> modes</A> when multiple block are to be - encrypted. -<P><A href="#DES">DES</A> is among the the best known and widely used - block ciphers, but is now obsolete. Its 56-bit key size makes it<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - highly insecure</A> today.<A href="#3DES"> Triple DES</A> is the - default block cipher for<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> -.</P> -<P>The current generation of block ciphers -- such as<A href="#Blowfish"> - Blowfish</A>,<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> and<A href="#IDEA"> IDEA</A> - -- all use 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys. The next generation,<A href="#AES"> - AES</A>, uses 128-bit blocks and supports key sizes up to 256 bits.</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.ii.uib.no/~larsr/bc.html"> Block Cipher Lounge</A> - web site has more information.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="Blowfish">Blowfish</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> using 64-bit blocks and keys of - up to 448 bits, designed by<A href="biblio.html#schneier"> Bruce - Schneier</A> and used in several products. -<P>This is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="brute">Brute force attack (exhaustive search)</A></DT> -<DD>Breaking a cipher by trying all possible keys. This is always - possible in theory (except against a<A href="#OTP"> one-time pad</A>), - but it becomes practical only if the key size is inadequate. For an - important example, see our document on the<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - insecurity of DES</A> with its 56-bit key. For an analysis of key sizes - required to resist plausible brute force attacks, see<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/keylength.html"> - this paper</A>. -<P>Longer keys protect against brute force attacks. Each extra bit in - the key doubles the number of possible keys and therefore doubles the - work a brute force attack must do. A large enough key defeats<STRONG> - any</STRONG> brute force attack.</P> -<P>For example, the EFF's<A href="#EFF"> DES Cracker</A> searches a - 56-bit key space in an average of a few days. Let us assume an attacker - that can find a 64-bit key (256 times harder) by brute force search in - a second (a few hundred thousand times faster). For a 96-bit key, that - attacker needs 2<SUP>32</SUP> seconds, about 135 years. Against a - 128-bit key, he needs 2<SUP>32</SUP> times that, over 500,000,000,000 - years. Your data is then obviously secure against brute force attacks. - Even if our estimate of the attacker's speed is off by a factor of a - million, it still takes him over 500,000 years to crack a message.</P> -<P>This is why</P> -<UL> -<LI>single<A href="#DES"> DES</A> is now considered<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - dangerously insecure</A></LI> -<LI>all of the current generation of<A href="#block"> block ciphers</A> - use a 128-bit or longer key</LI> -<LI><A href="#AES">AES</A> ciphers support keysizes 128, 192 and 256 - bits</LI> -<LI>any cipher we add to Linux FreeS/WAN will have<EM> at least</EM> a - 128-bit key</LI> -</UL> -<P><STRONG>Cautions:</STRONG> -<BR><EM> Inadequate keylength always indicates a weak cipher</EM> but it - is important to note that<EM> adequate keylength does not necessarily - indicate a strong cipher</EM>. There are many attacks other than brute - force, and adequate keylength<EM> only</EM> guarantees resistance to - brute force. Any cipher, whatever its key size, will be weak if design - or implementation flaws allow other attacks.</P> -<P>Also,<EM> once you have adequate keylength</EM> (somewhere around 90 - or 100 bits),<EM> adding more key bits make no practical difference</EM> -, even against brute force. Consider our 128-bit example above that - takes 500,000,000,000 years to break by brute force. We really don't - care how many zeroes there are on the end of that, as long as the - number remains ridiculously large. That is, we don't care exactly how - large the key is as long as it is large enough.</P> -<P>There may be reasons of convenience in the design of the cipher to - support larger keys. For example<A href="#Blowfish"> Blowfish</A> - allows up to 448 bits and<A href="#RC4"> RC4</A> up to 2048, but beyond - 100-odd bits it makes no difference to practical security.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Bureau of Export Administration</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#BXA"> BXA</A></DD> -<DT><A name="BXA">BXA</A></DT> -<DD>The US Commerce Department's<B> B</B>ureau of E<B>x</B>port<B> A</B> -dministration which administers the<A href="#EAR"> EAR</A> Export - Administration Regulations controling the export of, among other - things, cryptography.</DD> -<DT><A name="C">C</A></DT> -<DT><A name="CA">CA</A></DT> -<DD><B>C</B>ertification<B> A</B>uthority, an entity in a<A href="#PKI"> - public key infrastructure</A> that can certify keys by signing them. - Usually CAs form a hierarchy. The top of this hierarchy is called the<A href="#rootCA"> - root CA</A>. -<P>See<A href="#web"> Web of Trust</A> for an alternate model.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="CAST128">CAST-128</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit - keys, described in RFC 2144 and used in products such as<A href="#Entrust"> - Entrust</A> and recent versions of<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A>. -<P>This is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>CAST-256</DT> -<DD><A href="#Entrust">Entrust</A>'s candidate cipher for the<A href="#AES"> - AES standard</A>, largely based on the<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> - design.</DD> -<DT><A name="CBC">CBC mode</A></DT> -<DD><B>C</B>ipher<B> B</B>lock<B> C</B>haining<A href="#mode"> mode</A>, - a method of using a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> in which for each - block except the first, the result of the previous encryption is XORed - into the new block before it is encrypted. CBC is the mode used in<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A>. -<P>An<A href="#IV"> initialisation vector</A> (IV) must be provided. It - is XORed into the first block before encryption. The IV need not be - secret but should be different for each message and unpredictable.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="CIDR">CIDR</A></DT> -<DD><B>C</B>lassless<B> I</B>nter-<B>D</B>omain<B> R</B>outing, an - addressing scheme used to describe networks not restricted to the old - Class A, B, and C sizes. A CIDR block is written<VAR> address</VAR>/<VAR> -mask</VAR>, where<VAR> address</VAR> is a 32-bit Internet address. The - first<VAR> mask</VAR> bits of<VAR> address</VAR> are part of the - gateway address, while the remaining bits designate other host - addresses. For example, the CIDR block 192.0.2.96/27 describes a - network with gateway 192.0.2.96, hosts 192.0.2.96 through 192.0.2.126 - and broadcast 192.0.2.127. -<P>FreeS/WAN policy group files accept CIDR blocks of the format<VAR> - address</VAR>/[<VAR>mask</VAR>], where<VAR> address</VAR> may take the - form<VAR> name.domain.tld</VAR>. An absent<VAR> mask</VAR> is assumed - to be /32.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Certification Authority</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#CA"> CA</A></DD> -<DT><A name="challenge">Challenge-response authentication</A></DT> -<DD>An<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> system in which one - player generates a<A href="#random"> random number</A>, encrypts it and - sends the result as a challenge. The other player decrypts and sends - back the result. If the result is correct, that proves to the first - player that the second player knew the appropriate secret, required for - the decryption. Variations on this technique exist using<A href="#public"> - public key</A> or<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric</A> cryptography. Some - provide two-way authentication, assuring each player of the other's - identity. -<P>This is more secure than passwords against two simple attacks:</P> -<UL> -<LI>If cleartext passwords are sent across the wire (e.g. for telnet), - an eavesdropper can grab them. The attacker may even be able to break - into other systems if the user has chosen the same password for them.</LI> -<LI>If an encrypted password is sent, an attacker can record the - encrypted form and use it later. This is called a replay attack.</LI> -</UL> -<P>A challenge-response system never sends a password, either cleartext - or encrypted. An attacker cannot record the response to one challenge - and use it as a response to a later challenge. The random number is - different each time.</P> -<P>Of course an attacker might still try to break the cryptographic - algorithm used, or the<A href="#random"> random number</A> generator.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="mode">Cipher Modes</A></DT> -<DD>Different ways of using a block cipher when encrypting multiple - blocks. -<P>Four standard modes were defined for<A href="#DES"> DES</A> in<A href="#FIPS"> - FIPS</A> 81. They can actually be applied with any block cipher.</P> -<TABLE><TBODY></TBODY> -<TR><TD></TD><TD><A href="#ECB">ECB</A></TD><TD>Electronic CodeBook</TD><TD> -encrypt each block independently</TD></TR> -<TR><TD></TD><TD><A href="#CBC">CBC</A></TD><TD>Cipher Block Chaining -<BR></TD><TD>XOR previous block ciphertext into new block plaintext - before encrypting new block</TD></TR> -<TR><TD></TD><TD>CFB</TD><TD>Cipher FeedBack</TD><TD></TD></TR> -<TR><TD></TD><TD>OFB</TD><TD>Output FeedBack</TD><TD></TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> uses<A href="#CBC"> CBC</A> mode since - this is only marginally slower than<A href="#ECB"> ECB</A> and is more - secure. In ECB mode the same plaintext always encrypts to the same - ciphertext, unless the key is changed. In CBC mode, this does not - occur.</P> -<P>Various other modes are also possible, but none of them are used in - IPsec.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="ciphertext">Ciphertext</A></DT> -<DD>The encrypted output of a cipher, as opposed to the unencrypted<A href="#plaintext"> - plaintext</A> input.</DD> -<DT><A href="http://www.cisco.com">Cisco</A></DT> -<DD>A vendor of routers, hubs and related products. Their IPsec products - interoperate with Linux FreeS/WAN; see our<A href="interop.html#Cisco"> - interop</A> section.</DD> -<DT><A name="client">Client</A></DT> -<DD>This term has at least two distinct uses in discussing IPsec: -<UL> -<LI>The<STRONG> clients of an IPsec gateway</STRONG> are the machines it - protects, typically on one or more subnets behind the gateway. In this - usage, all the machines on an office network are clients of that - office's IPsec gateway. Laptop or home machines connecting to the - office, however, are<EM> not</EM> clients of that gateway. They are - remote gateways, running the other end of an IPsec connection. Each of - them is also its own client.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>IPsec client software</STRONG> is used to describe software - which runs on various standalone machines to let them connect to IPsec - networks. In this usage, a laptop or home machine connecting to the - office is a client, and the office gateway is the server.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We generally use the term in the first sense. Vendors of Windows - IPsec solutions often use it in the second. See this<A href="interop.html#client.server"> - discussion</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="cc">Common Criteria</A></DT> -<DD>A set of international security classifications which are replacing - the old US<A href="#rainbow"> Rainbow Book</A> standards and similar - standards in other countries. -<P>Web references include this<A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/cc"> US - government site</A> and this<A href="http://www.commoncriteria.org"> - global home page</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Conventional cryptography</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cryptography</A></DD> -<DT><A name="collision">Collision resistance</A></DT> -<DD>The property of a<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> algorithm - which makes it hard for an attacker to find or construct two inputs - which hash to the same output.</DD> -<DT>Copyleft</DT> -<DD>see GNU<A href="#GPL"> General Public License</A></DD> -<DT><A name="CSE">CSE</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/">Communications Security - Establishment</A>, the Canadian organisation for<A href="#SIGINT"> - signals intelligence</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="D">D</A></DT> -<DT><A name="DARPA">DARPA (sometimes just ARPA)</A></DT> -<DD>The US government's<B> D</B>efense<B> A</B>dvanced<B> R</B>esearch<B> - P</B>rojects<B> A</B>gency. Projects they have funded over the years - have included the Arpanet which evolved into the Internet, the TCP/IP - protocol suite (as a replacement for the original Arpanet suite), the - Berkeley 4.x BSD Unix projects, and<A href="#SDNS"> Secure DNS</A>. -<P>For current information, see their<A href="http://www.darpa.mil/ito"> - web site</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="DOS">Denial of service (DoS) attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack that aims at denying some service to legitimate users of a - system, rather than providing a service to the attacker. -<UL> -<LI>One variant is a flooding attack, overwhelming the system with too - many packets, to much email, or whatever.</LI> -<LI>A closely related variant is a resource exhaustion attack. For - example, consider a "TCP SYN flood" attack. Setting up a TCP connection - involves a three-packet exchange: -<UL> -<LI>Initiator: Connection please (SYN)</LI> -<LI>Responder: OK (ACK)</LI> -<LI>Initiator: OK here too</LI> -</UL> -<P>If the attacker puts bogus source information in the first packet, - such that the second is never delivered, the responder may wait a long - time for the third to come back. If responder has already allocated - memory for the connection data structures, and if many of these bogus - packets arrive, the responder may run out of memory.</P> -</LI> -<LI>Another variant is to feed the system undigestible data, hoping to - make it sick. For example, IP packets are limited in size to 64K bytes - and a fragment carries information on where it starts within that 64K - and how long it is. The "ping of death" delivers fragments that say, - for example, that they start at 60K and are 20K long. Attempting to - re-assemble these without checking for overflow can be fatal.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The two example attacks discussed were both quite effective when - first discovered, capable of crashing or disabling many operating - systems. They were also well-publicised, and today far fewer systems - are vulnerable to them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="DES">DES</A></DT> -<DD>The<B> D</B>ata<B> E</B>ncryption<B> S</B>tandard, a<A href="#block"> - block cipher</A> with 64-bit blocks and a 56-bit key. Probably the most - widely used<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cipher</A> ever devised. DES - has been a US government standard for their own use (only for - unclassified data), and for some regulated industries such as banking, - since the late 70's. It is now being replaced by<A href="#AES"> AES</A> -. -<P><A href="politics.html#desnotsecure">DES is seriously insecure - against current attacks.</A></P> -<P><A href="web.html#FreeSWAN">Linux FreeS/WAN</A> does not include DES, - even though the RFCs specify it.<B> We strongly recommend that single - DES not be used.</B></P> -<P>See also<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A> and<A href="#DESX"> DESX</A>, - stronger ciphers based on DES.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="DESX">DESX</A></DT> -<DD>An improved<A href="#DES"> DES</A> suggested by Ron Rivest of RSA - Data Security. It XORs extra key material into the text before and - after applying the DES cipher. -<P>This is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>. DESX - would be the easiest additional transform to add; there would be very - little code to write. It would be much faster than 3DES and almost - certainly more secure than DES. However, since it is not in the RFCs - other IPsec implementations cannot be expected to have it.</P> -</DD> -<DT>DH</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A></DD> -<DT><A name="DHCP">DHCP</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>D</STRONG>ynamic<STRONG> H</STRONG>ost<STRONG> C</STRONG> -onfiguration<STRONG> P</STRONG>rotocol, a method of assigning<A href="#dynamic"> - dynamic IP addresses</A>, and providing additional information such as - addresses of DNS servers and of gateways. See this<A href="http://www.dhcp.org"> - DHCP resource page.</A></DD> -<DT><A name="DH">Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol</A></DT> -<DD>A protocol that allows two parties without any initial shared secret - to create one in a manner immune to eavesdropping. Once they have done - this, they can communicate privately by using that shared secret as a - key for a block cipher or as the basis for key exchange. -<P>The protocol is secure against all<A href="#passive"> passive attacks</A> -, but it is not at all resistant to active<A href="#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A>. If a third party can impersonate Bob to - Alice and vice versa, then no useful secret can be created. - Authentication of the participants is a prerequisite for safe - Diffie-Hellman key exchange. IPsec can use any of several<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> mechanisims. Those supported by FreeS/WAN are - discussed in our<A href="config.html#choose"> configuration</A> - section.</P> -<P>The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is based on the<A href="#dlog"> - discrete logarithm</A> problem and is secure unless someone finds an - efficient solution to that problem.</P> -<P>Given a prime<VAR> p</VAR> and generator<VAR> g</VAR> (explained - under<A href="#dlog"> discrete log</A> below), Alice:</P> -<UL> -<LI>generates a random number<VAR> a</VAR></LI> -<LI>calculates<VAR> A = g^a modulo p</VAR></LI> -<LI>sends<VAR> A</VAR> to Bob</LI> -</UL> -<P>Meanwhile Bob:</P> -<UL> -<LI>generates a random number<VAR> b</VAR></LI> -<LI>calculates<VAR> B = g^b modulo p</VAR></LI> -<LI>sends<VAR> B</VAR> to Alice</LI> -</UL> -<P>Now Alice and Bob can both calculate the shared secret<VAR> s = - g^(ab)</VAR>. Alice knows<VAR> a</VAR> and<VAR> B</VAR>, so she - calculates<VAR> s = B^a</VAR>. Bob knows<VAR> A</VAR> and<VAR> b</VAR> - so he calculates<VAR> s = A^b</VAR>.</P> -<P>An eavesdropper will know<VAR> p</VAR> and<VAR> g</VAR> since these - are made public, and can intercept<VAR> A</VAR> and<VAR> B</VAR> but, - short of solving the<A href="#dlog"> discrete log</A> problem, these do - not let him or her discover the secret<VAR> s</VAR>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="signature">Digital signature</A></DT> -<DD>Sender: -<UL> -<LI>calculates a<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> of a document</LI> -<LI>encrypts the digest with his or her private key, using some<A href="#public"> - public key cryptosystem</A>.</LI> -<LI>attaches the encrypted digest to the document as a signature</LI> -</UL> -<P>Receiver:</P> -<UL> -<LI>calculates a digest of the document (not including the signature)</LI> -<LI>decrypts the signature with the signer's public key</LI> -<LI>verifies that the two results are identical</LI> -</UL> -<P>If the public-key system is secure and the verification succeeds, - then the receiver knows</P> -<UL> -<LI>that the document was not altered between signing and verification</LI> -<LI>that the signer had access to the private key</LI> -</UL> -<P>Such an encrypted message digest can be treated as a signature since - it cannot be created without<EM> both</EM> the document<EM> and</EM> - the private key which only the sender should possess. The<A href="web.html#legal"> - legal issues</A> are complex, but several countries are moving in the - direction of legal recognition for digital signatures.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="dlog">discrete logarithm problem</A></DT> -<DD>The problem of finding logarithms in a finite field. Given a field - defintion (such definitions always include some operation analogous to - multiplication) and two numbers, a base and a target, find the power - which the base must be raised to in order to yield the target. -<P>The discrete log problem is the basis of several cryptographic - systems, including the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchange - used in the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> protocol. The useful property is - that exponentiation is relatively easy but the inverse operation, - finding the logarithm, is hard. The cryptosystems are designed so that - the user does only easy operations (exponentiation in the field) but an - attacker must solve the hard problem (discrete log) to crack the - system.</P> -<P>There are several variants of the problem for different types of - field. The IKE/Oakley key determination protocol uses two variants, - either over a field modulo a prime or over a field defined by an - elliptic curve. We give an example modulo a prime below. For the - elliptic curve version, consult an advanced text such as<A href="biblio.html#handbook"> - Handbook of Applied Cryptography</A>.</P> -<P>Given a prime<VAR> p</VAR>, a generator<VAR> g</VAR> for the field - modulo that prime, and a number<VAR> x</VAR> in the field, the problem - is to find<VAR> y</VAR> such that<VAR> g^y = x</VAR>.</P> -<P>For example, let p = 13. The field is then the integers from 0 to 12. - Any integer equals one of these modulo 13. That is, the remainder when - any integer is divided by 13 must be one of these.</P> -<P>2 is a generator for this field. That is, the powers of two modulo 13 - run through all the non-zero numbers in the field. Modulo 13 we have:</P> -<PRE> y x - 2^0 == 1 - 2^1 == 2 - 2^2 == 4 - 2^3 == 8 - 2^4 == 3 that is, the remainder from 16/13 is 3 - 2^5 == 6 the remainder from 32/13 is 6 - 2^6 == 12 and so on - 2^7 == 11 - 2^8 == 9 - 2^9 == 5 - 2^10 == 10 - 2^11 == 7 - 2^12 == 1</PRE> -<P>Exponentiation in such a field is not difficult. Given, say,<NOBR><VAR> - y = 11</VAR>,calculating<NOBR><VAR> x = 7</VAR>is straightforward. One - method is just to calculate<NOBR><VAR> 2^11 = 2048</VAR>,then<NOBR><VAR> - 2048 mod 13 == 7</VAR>.When the field is modulo a large prime (say a - few 100 digits) you need a silghtly cleverer method and even that is - moderately expensive in computer time, but the calculation is still not - problematic in any basic way.</P> -<P>The discrete log problem is the reverse. In our example, given<NOBR><VAR> - x = 7</VAR>,find the logarithm<NOBR><VAR> y = 11</VAR>.When the field - is modulo a large prime (or is based on a suitable elliptic curve), - this is indeed problematic. No solution method that is not - catastrophically expensive is known. Quite a few mathematicians have - tackled this problem. No efficient method has been found and - mathematicians do not expect that one will be. It seems likely no - efficient solution to either of the main variants the discrete log - problem exists.</P> -<P>Note, however, that no-one has proven such methods do not exist. If a - solution to either variant were found, the security of any crypto - system using that variant would be destroyed. This is one reason<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A> supports two variants. If one is broken, we can switch to the - other.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="discretionary">discretionary access control</A></DT> -<DD>access control mechanisms controlled by the user, for example Unix - rwx file permissions. These contrast with<A href="#mandatory"> - mandatory access controls</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="DNS">DNS</A></DT> -<DD><B>D</B>omain<B> N</B>ame<B> S</B>ervice, a distributed database - through which names are associated with numeric addresses and other - information in the Internet Protocol Suite. See also the<A href="background.html#dns.background"> - DNS background</A> section of our documentation.</DD> -<DT>DOS attack</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#DOS"> Denial Of Service</A> attack</DD> -<DT><A name="dynamic">dynamic IP address</A></DT> -<DD>an IP address which is automatically assigned, either by<A href="#DHCP"> - DHCP</A> or by some protocol such as<A href="#PPP"> PPP</A> or<A href="#PPPoE"> - PPPoE</A> which the machine uses to connect to the Internet. This is - the opposite of a<A href="#static"> static IP address</A>, pre-set on - the machine itself.</DD> -<DT><A name="E">E</A></DT> -<DT><A name="EAR">EAR</A></DT> -<DD>The US government's<B> E</B>xport<B> A</B>dministration<B> R</B> -egulations, administered by the<A href="#BXA"> Bureau of Export - Administration</A>. These have replaced the earlier<A href="#ITAR"> - ITAR</A> regulations as the controls on export of cryptography.</DD> -<DT><A name="ECB">ECB mode</A></DT> -<DD><B>E</B>lectronic<B> C</B>ode<B>B</B>ook mode, the simplest way to - use a block cipher. See<A href="#mode"> Cipher Modes</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="EDE">EDE</A></DT> -<DD>The sequence of operations normally used in either the three-key - variant of<A href="#3DES"> triple DES</A> used in<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> or the<A href="#2key"> two-key</A> variant used in some other - systems. -<P>The sequence is:</P> -<UL> -<LI><B>E</B>ncrypt with key1</LI> -<LI><B>D</B>ecrypt with key2</LI> -<LI><B>E</B>ncrypt with key3</LI> -</UL> -<P>For the two-key version, key1=key3.</P> -<P>The "advantage" of this EDE order of operations is that it makes it - simple to interoperate with older devices offering only single DES. Set - key1=key2=key3 and you have the worst of both worlds, the overhead of - triple DES with the "security" of single DES. Since both the<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - security of single DES</A> and the overheads of triple DES are - seriously inferior to many other ciphers, this is a spectacularly - dubious "advantage".</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="Entrust">Entrust</A></DT> -<DD>A Canadian company offerring enterprise<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - products using<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> symmetric crypto,<A href="#RSA"> - RSA</A> public key and<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> directories.<A href="http://www.entrust.com"> - Web site</A></DD> -<DT><A name="EFF">EFF</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.eff.org">Electronic Frontier Foundation</A>, an - advocacy group for civil rights in cyberspace.</DD> -<DT><A name="encryption">Encryption</A></DT> -<DD>Techniques for converting a readable message (<A href="#plaintext"> -plaintext</A>) into apparently random material (<A href="#ciphertext"> -ciphertext</A>) which cannot be read if intercepted. A key is required - to read the message. -<P>Major variants include<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric</A> encryption - in which sender and receiver use the same secret key and<A href="#public"> - public key</A> methods in which the sender uses one of a matched pair - of keys and the receiver uses the other. Many current systems, - including<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A>, are<A href="#hybrid"> hybrids</A> - combining the two techniques.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="ESP">ESP</A></DT> -<DD><B>E</B>ncapsulated<B> S</B>ecurity<B> P</B>ayload, the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> protocol which provides<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A>. - It can also provide<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> - service and may be used with null encryption (which we do not - recommend). For details see our<A href="ipsec.html#ESP.ipsec"> IPsec</A> - document and/or RFC 2406.</DD> -<DT><A name="#extruded">Extruded subnet</A></DT> -<DD>A situation in which something IP sees as one network is actually in - two or more places. -<P>For example, the Internet may route all traffic for a particular - company to that firm's corporate gateway. It then becomes the company's - problem to get packets to various machines on their<A href="#subnet"> - subnets</A> in various departments. They may decide to treat a branch - office like a subnet, giving it IP addresses "on" their corporate net. - This becomes an extruded subnet.</P> -<P>Packets bound for it are delivered to the corporate gateway, since as - far as the outside world is concerned, that subnet is part of the - corporate network. However, instead of going onto the corporate LAN (as - they would for, say, the accounting department) they are then - encapsulated and sent back onto the Internet for delivery to the branch - office.</P> -<P>For information on doing this with Linux FreeS/WAN, look in our<A href="adv_config.html#extruded.config"> - advanced configuration</A> section.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Exhaustive search</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#brute"> brute force attack</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="F">F</A></DT> -<DT><A name="FIPS">FIPS</A></DT> -<DD><B>F</B>ederal<B> I</B>nformation<B> P</B>rocessing<B> S</B>tandard, - the US government's standards for products it buys. These are issued by<A -href="#NIST"> NIST</A>. Among other things,<A href="#DES"> DES</A> and<A href="#SHA"> - SHA</A> are defined in FIPS documents. NIST have a<A href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs"> - FIPS home page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="FSF">Free Software Foundation (FSF)</A></DT> -<DD>An organisation to promote free software, free in the sense of these - quotes from their web pages</DD> -<DD><BLOCKQUOTE> "Free software" is a matter of liberty, not price. To - understand the concept, you should think of "free speech", not "free - beer." -<P>"Free software" refers to the users' freedom to run, copy, - distribute, study, change and improve the software.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>See also<A href="#GNU"> GNU</A>,<A href="#GPL"> GNU General Public - License</A>, and<A href="http://www.fsf.org"> the FSF site</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>FreeS/WAN</DT> -<DD>see<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A></DD> -<DT><A name="fullnet">Fullnet</A></DT> -<DD>The CIDR block containing all IPs of its IP version. The<A HREF="#IPv4"> - IPv4</A> fullnet is written 0.0.0.0/0. Also known as "all" and - "default", fullnet may be used in a routing table to specify a default - route, and in a FreeS/WAN<A HREF="policygroups.html#policygroups"> - policy group</A> file to specify a default IPsec policy.</DD> -<DT>FSF</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#FSF"> Free software Foundation</A></DD> -<DT><A name="G">G</A></DT> -<DT><A name="GCHQ">GCHQ</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.gchq.gov.uk">Government Communications - Headquarters</A>, the British organisation for<A href="#SIGINT"> - signals intelligence</A>.</DD> -<DT>generator of a prime field</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithm problem</A></DD> -<DT><A name="GILC">GILC</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.gilc.org">Global Internet Liberty Campaign</A>, - an international organisation advocating, among other things, free - availability of cryptography. They have a<A href="http://www.gilc.org/crypto/wassenaar"> - campaign</A> to remove cryptographic software from the<A href="#Wassenaar.gloss"> - Wassenaar Arrangement</A>.</DD> -<DT>Global Internet Liberty Campaign</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#GILC"> GILC</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="GTR">Global Trust Register</A></DT> -<DD>An attempt to create something like a<A href="#rootCA"> root CA</A> - for<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> by publishing both<A href="biblio.html#GTR"> - as a book</A> and<A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/Research/Security/Trust-Register"> - on the web</A> the fingerprints of a set of verified keys for - well-known users and organisations.</DD> -<DT><A name="GMP">GMP</A></DT> -<DD>The<B> G</B>NU<B> M</B>ulti-<B>P</B>recision library code, used in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> by<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> for<A href="#public"> - public key</A> calculations. See the<A href="http://www.swox.com/gmp"> - GMP home page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="GNU">GNU</A></DT> -<DD><B>G</B>NU's<B> N</B>ot<B> U</B>nix, the<A href="#FSF"> Free - Software Foundation's</A> project aimed at creating a free system with - at least the capabilities of Unix.<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A> uses GNU - utilities extensively.</DD> -<DT><A name="#GOST">GOST</A></DT> -<DD>a Soviet government standard<A href="#block"> block cipher</A>.<A href="biblio.html#schneier"> - Applied Cryptography</A> has details.</DD> -<DT>GPG</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#GPG"> GNU Privacy Guard</A></DD> -<DT><A name="GPL">GNU General Public License</A>(GPL, copyleft)</DT> -<DD>The license developed by the<A href="#FSF"> Free Software Foundation</A> - under which<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A>,<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> and many other pieces of software are distributed. - The license allows anyone to redistribute and modify the code, but - forbids anyone from distributing executables without providing access - to source code. For more details see the file<A href="../COPYING"> - COPYING</A> included with GPLed source distributions, including ours, - or<A href="http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.html"> the GNU site's GPL - page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="GPG">GNU Privacy Guard</A></DT> -<DD>An open source implementation of Open<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> as - defined in RFC 2440. See their<A href="http://www.gnupg.org"> web site</A> -</DD> -<DT>GPL</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#GPL"> GNU General Public License</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="H">H</A></DT> -<DT><A name="hash">Hash</A></DT> -<DD>see<A href="#digest"> message digest</A></DD> -<DT><A name="HMAC">Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC)</A></DT> -<DD>using keyed<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> functions to - authenticate a message. This differs from other uses of these - functions: -<UL> -<LI>In normal usage, the hash function's internal variable are - initialised in some standard way. Anyone can reproduce the hash to - check that the message has not been altered.</LI> -<LI>For HMAC usage, you initialise the internal variables from the key. - Only someone with the key can reproduce the hash. A successful check of - the hash indicates not only that the message is unchanged but also that - the creator knew the key.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The exact techniques used in<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> are defined - in RFC 2104. They are referred to as HMAC-MD5-96 and HMAC-SHA-96 - because they output only 96 bits of the hash. This makes some attacks - on the hash functions harder.</P> -</DD> -<DT>HMAC</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#HMAC"> Hashed Message Authentication Code</A></DD> -<DT>HMAC-MD5-96</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#HMAC"> Hashed Message Authentication Code</A></DD> -<DT>HMAC-SHA-96</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#HMAC"> Hashed Message Authentication Code</A></DD> -<DT><A name="hybrid">Hybrid cryptosystem</A></DT> -<DD>A system using both<A href="#public"> public key</A> and<A href="#symmetric"> - symmetric cipher</A> techniques. This works well. Public key methods - provide key management and<A href="#signature"> digital signature</A> - facilities which are not readily available using symmetric ciphers. The - symmetric cipher, however, can do the bulk of the encryption work much - more efficiently than public key methods.</DD> -<DT><A name="I">I</A></DT> -<DT><A name="IAB">IAB</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.iab.org/iab">Internet Architecture Board</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="ICMP.gloss">ICMP</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>I</STRONG>nternet<STRONG> C</STRONG>ontrol<STRONG> M</STRONG> -essage<STRONG> P</STRONG>rotocol. This is used for various IP-connected - devices to manage the network.</DD> -<DT><A name="IDEA">IDEA</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternational<B> D</B>ata<B> E</B>ncrypion<B> A</B>lgorithm, - developed in Europe as an alternative to exportable American ciphers - such as<A href="#DES"> DES</A> which were<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - too weak for serious use</A>. IDEA is a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> - using 64-bit blocks and 128-bit keys, and is used in products such as<A href="#PGP"> - PGP</A>. -<P>IDEA is not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> RFCs and not - currently used in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -<P>IDEA is patented and, with strictly limited exceptions for personal - use, using it requires a license from<A href="http://www.ascom.com"> - Ascom</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="IEEE">IEEE</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.ieee.org">Institute of Electrical and Electronic - Engineers</A>, a professional association which, among other things, - sets some technical standards</DD> -<DT><A name="IESG">IESG</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.iesg.org">Internet Engineering Steering Group</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A name="IETF">IETF</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.ietf.org">Internet Engineering Task Force</A>, - the umbrella organisation whose various working groups make most of the - technical decisions for the Internet. The IETF<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - IPsec working group</A> wrote the<A href="rfc.html#RFC"> RFCs</A> we - are implementing.</DD> -<DT><A name="IKE">IKE</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> K</B>ey<B> E</B>xchange, based on the<A href="#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key exchange protocol. For details, see RFC 2409 and - our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec</A> document. IKE is implemented in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> by the<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto daemon</A>.</DD> -<DT>IKE v2</DT> -<DD>A proposed replacement for<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A>. There are other - candidates, such as<A href="#JFK"> JFK</A>, and at time of writing - (March 2002) the choice between them has not yet been made and does not - appear imminent.</DD> -<DT><A name="iOE">iOE</A></DT> -<DD>See<A HREF="#initiate-only"> Initiate-only opportunistic encryption</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A name="IP">IP</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> P</B>rotocol.</DD> -<DT><A name="masq">IP masquerade</A></DT> -<DD>A mostly obsolete term for a method of allowing multiple machines to - communicate over the Internet when only one IP address is available for - their use. The more current term is Network Address Translation or<A href="#NAT.gloss"> - NAT</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="IPng">IPng</A></DT> -<DD>"IP the Next Generation", see<A href="#ipv6.gloss"> IPv6</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="IPv4">IPv4</A></DT> -<DD>The current version of the<A href="#IP"> Internet protocol suite</A> -.</DD> -<DT><A name="ipv6.gloss">IPv6 (IPng)</A></DT> -<DD>Version six of the<A href="#IP"> Internet protocol suite</A>, - currently being developed. It will replace the current<A href="#IPv4"> - version four</A>. IPv6 has<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> as a mandatory - component. -<P>See this<A href="http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main.html"> - web site</A> for more details, and our<A href="compat.html#ipv6"> - compatibility</A> document for information on FreeS/WAN and the Linux - implementation of IPv6.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="IPSEC">IPsec</A> or IPSEC</DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> P</B>rotocol<B> SEC</B>urity, security functions - (<A href="#authentication">authentication</A> and<A href="#encryption"> - encryption</A>) implemented at the IP level of the protocol stack. It - is optional for<A href="#IPv4"> IPv4</A> and mandatory for<A href="#ipv6.gloss"> - IPv6</A>. -<P>This is the standard<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> - is implementing. For more details, see our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec - Overview</A>. For the standards, see RFCs listed in our<A href="rfc.html#RFC"> - RFCs document</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="IPX">IPX</A></DT> -<DD>Novell's Netware protocol tunnelled over an IP link. Our<A href="firewall.html#user.scripts"> - firewalls</A> document includes an example of using this through an - IPsec tunnel.</DD> -<DT><A name="ISAKMP">ISAKMP</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternet<B> S</B>ecurity<B> A</B>ssociation and<B> K</B>ey<B> - M</B>anagement<B> P</B>rotocol, defined in RFC 2408.</DD> -<DT><A name="ITAR">ITAR</A></DT> -<DD><B>I</B>nternational<B> T</B>raffic in<B> A</B>rms<B> R</B> -egulations, US regulations administered by the State Department which - until recently limited export of, among other things, cryptographic - technology and software. ITAR still exists, but the limits on - cryptography have now been transferred to the<A href="#EAR"> Export - Administration Regulations</A> under the Commerce Department's<A href="#BXA"> - Bureau of Export Administration</A>.</DD> -<DT>IV</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#IV"> Initialisation vector</A></DD> -<DT><A name="IV">Initialisation Vector (IV)</A></DT> -<DD>Some cipher<A href="#mode"> modes</A>, including the<A href="#CBC"> - CBC</A> mode which IPsec uses, require some extra data at the - beginning. This data is called the initialisation vector. It need not - be secret, but should be different for each message. Its function is to - prevent messages which begin with the same text from encrypting to the - same ciphertext. That might give an analyst an opening, so it is best - prevented.</DD> -<DT><A name="initiate-only">Initiate-only opportunistic encryption (iOE)</A> -</DT> -<DD>A form of<A HREF="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A> (OE) in - which a host proposes opportunistic connections, but lacks the reverse - DNS records necessary to support incoming opportunistic connection - requests. Common among hosts on cable or pppoe connections where the - system administrator does not have write access to the DNS reverse map - for the host's external IP. -<P>Configuring for initiate-only opportunistic encryption is described - in our<A href="quickstart.html#opp.client"> quickstart</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="J">J</A></DT> -<DT><A name="JFK">JFK</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>J</STRONG>ust<STRONG> F</STRONG>ast<STRONG> K</STRONG>eying, - a proposed simpler replacement for<A href="#IKE"> IKE.</A></DD> -<DT><A name="K">K</A></DT> -<DT><A name="kernel">Kernel</A></DT> -<DD>The basic part of an operating system (e.g. Linux) which controls - the hardware and provides services to all other programs. -<P>In the Linux release numbering system, an even second digit as in 2.<STRONG> -2</STRONG>.x indicates a stable or production kernel while an odd number - as in 2.<STRONG>3</STRONG>.x indicates an experimental or development - kernel. Most users should run a recent kernel version from the - production series. The development kernels are primarily for people - doing kernel development. Others should consider using development - kernels only if they have an urgent need for some feature not yet - available in production kernels.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Keyed message digest</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A>.</DD> -<DT>Key length</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#brute"> brute force attack</A></DD> -<DT><A name="KLIPS">KLIPS</A></DT> -<DD><B>K</B>erne<B>l</B><B> IP</B><B> S</B>ecurity, the<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A> project's changes to the<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A> - kernel to support the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> protocols.</DD> -<DT><A name="L">L</A></DT> -<DT><A name="LDAP">LDAP</A></DT> -<DD><B>L</B>ightweight<B> D</B>irectory<B> A</B>ccess<B> P</B>rotocol, - defined in RFCs 1777 and 1778, a method of accessing information stored - in directories. LDAP is used by several<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - implementations, often with X.501 directories and<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> - certificates. It may also be used by<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> to - obtain key certifications from those PKIs. This is not yet implemented - in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="LIBDES">LIBDES</A></DT> -<DD>A publicly available library of<A href="#DES"> DES</A> code, written - by Eric Young, which<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> - uses in both<A href="#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> and<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="Linux">Linux</A></DT> -<DD>A freely available Unix-like operating system based on a kernel - originally written for the Intel 386 architecture by (then) student - Linus Torvalds. Once his 32-bit kernel was available, the<A href="#GNU"> - GNU</A> utilities made it a usable system and contributions from many - others led to explosive growth. -<P>Today Linux is a complete Unix replacement available for several CPU - architectures -- Intel, DEC/Compaq Alpha, Power PC, both 32-bit SPARC - and the 64-bit UltraSPARC, SrongARM, . . . -- with support for multiple - CPUs on some architectures.</P> -<P><A href="web.html#FreeSWAN">Linux FreeS/WAN</A> is intended to run on - all CPUs supported by Linux and is known to work on several. See our<A href="compat.html#CPUs"> - compatibility</A> section for a list.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="FreeSWAN">Linux FreeS/WAN</A></DT> -<DD>Our implementation of the<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> protocols, - intended to be freely redistributable source code with<A href="#GPL"> a - GNU GPL license</A> and no constraints under US or other<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> - export laws</A>. Linux FreeS/WAN is intended to interoperate with other<A -href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> implementations. The name is partly taken, with - permission, from the<A href="#SWAN"> S/WAN</A> multi-vendor IPsec - compatability effort. Linux FreeS/WAN has two major components,<A href="#KLIPS"> - KLIPS</A> (KerneL IPsec Support) and the<A href="#Pluto"> Pluto</A> - daemon which manages the whole thing. -<P>See our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec section</A> for more detail. For - the code see our<A href="http://freeswan.org"> primary site</A> or one - of the mirror sites on<A href="intro.html#mirrors"> this list</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="LSM">Linux Security Modules (LSM)</A></DT> -<DD>a project to create an interface in the Linux kernel that supports - plug-in modules for various security policies. -<P>This allows multiple security projects to take different approaches - to security enhancement without tying the kernel down to one particular - approach. As I understand the history, several projects were pressing - Linus to incorporate their changes, the various sets of changes were - incompatible, and his answer was more-or-less "a plague on all your - houses; I'll give you an interface, but I won't incorporate anything".</P> -<P>It seems to be working. There is a fairly active<A href="http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module"> - LSM mailing list</A>, and several projects are already using the - interface.</P> -</DD> -<DT>LSM</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#LSM"> Linux Security Modules</A></DD> -<DT><A name="M">M</A></DT> -<DT><A name="list">Mailing list</A></DT> -<DD>The<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> project has - several public email lists for bug reports and software development - discussions. See our document on<A href="mail.html"> mailing lists</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="middle">Man-in-the-middle attack</A></DT> -<DD>An<A href="#active"> active attack</A> in which the attacker - impersonates each of the legitimate players in a protocol to the other. -<P>For example, if<A href="#alicebob"> Alice and Bob</A> are negotiating - a key via the<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement, and are - not using<A href="#authentication"> authentication</A> to be certain - they are talking to each other, then an attacker able to insert himself - in the communication path can deceive both players.</P> -<P>Call the attacker Mallory. For Bob, he pretends to be Alice. For - Alice, he pretends to be Bob. Two keys are then negotiated, - Alice-to-Mallory and Bob-to-Mallory. Alice and Bob each think the key - they have is Alice-to-Bob.</P> -<P>A message from Alice to Bob then goes to Mallory who decrypts it, - reads it and/or saves a copy, re-encrypts using the Bob-to-Mallory key - and sends it along to Bob. Bob decrypts successfully and sends a reply - which Mallory decrypts, reads, re-encrypts and forwards to Alice.</P> -<P>To make this attack effective, Mallory must</P> -<UL> -<LI>subvert some part of the network in some way that lets him carry out - the deception -<BR> possible targets: DNS, router, Alice or Bob's machine, mail server, - ...</LI> -<LI>beat any authentication mechanism Alice and Bob use -<BR> strong authentication defeats the attack entirely; this is why<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A> requires authentication</LI> -<LI>work in real time, delivering messages without introducing a delay - large enough to alert the victims -<BR> not hard if Alice and Bob are using email; quite difficult in some - situations.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If he manages it, however, it is devastating. He not only gets to - read all the messages; he can alter messages, inject his own, forge - anything he likes, . . . In fact, he controls the communication - completely.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="mandatory">mandatory access control</A></DT> -<DD>access control mechanisims which are not settable by the user (see<A href="#discretionary"> - discretionary access control</A>), but are enforced by the system. -<P>For example, a document labelled "secret, zebra" might be readable - only by someone with secret clearance working on Project Zebra. - Ideally, the system will prevent any transfer outside those boundaries. - For example, even if you can read it, you should not be able to e-mail - it (unless the recipient is appropriately cleared) or print it (unless - certain printers are authorised for that classification).</P> -<P>Mandatory access control is a required feature for some levels of<A href="#rainbow"> - Rainbow Book</A> or<A href="#cc"> Common Criteria</A> classification, - but has not been widely used outside the military and government. There - is a good discussion of the issues in Anderson's<A href="biblio.html#anderson"> - Security Engineering</A>.</P> -<P>The<A href="#SElinux"> Security Enhanced Linux</A> project is adding - mandatory access control to Linux.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="manual">Manual keying</A></DT> -<DD>An IPsec mode in which the keys are provided by the administrator. - In FreeS/WAN, they are stored in /etc/ipsec.conf. The alternative,<A href="ipsec.html#auto"> - automatic keying</A>, is preferred in most cases. See this<A href="adv_config.html#man-auto"> - discussion</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="MD4">MD4</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#digest">Message Digest Algorithm</A> Four from Ron Rivest - of<A href="#RSAco"> RSA</A>. MD4 was widely used a few years ago, but - is now considered obsolete. It has been replaced by its descendants<A href="#MD5"> - MD5</A> and<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="MD5">MD5</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#digest">Message Digest Algorithm</A> Five from Ron Rivest - of<A href="#RSAco"> RSA</A>, an improved variant of his<A href="#MD4"> - MD4</A>. Like MD4, it produces a 128-bit hash. For details see RFC - 1321. -<P>MD5 is one of two message digest algorithms available in IPsec. The - other is<A href="#SHA"> SHA</A>. SHA produces a longer hash and is - therefore more resistant to<A href="#birthday"> birthday attacks</A>, - but this is not a concern for IPsec. The<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A> - method used in IPsec is secure even if the underlying hash is not - particularly strong against this attack.</P> -<P>Hans Dobbertin found a weakness in MD5, and people often ask whether - this means MD5 is unsafe for IPsec. It doesn't. The IPsec RFCs discuss - Dobbertin's attack and conclude that it does not affect MD5 as used for - HMAC in IPsec.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="meet">Meet-in-the-middle attack</A></DT> -<DD>A divide-and-conquer attack which breaks a cipher into two parts, - works against each separately, and compares results. Probably the best - known example is an attack on double DES. This applies in principle to - any pair of block ciphers, e.g. to an encryption system using, say, - CAST-128 and Blowfish, but we will describe it for double DES. -<P>Double DES encryption and decryption can be written:</P> -<PRE> C = E(k2,E(k1,P)) - P = D(k1,D(k2,C))</PRE> -<P>Where C is ciphertext, P is plaintext, E is encryption, D is - decryption, k1 is one key, and k2 is the other key. If we know a P, C - pair, we can try and find the keys with a brute force attack, trying - all possible k1, k2 pairs. Since each key is 56 bits, there are 2<SUP> -112</SUP> such pairs and this attack is painfully inefficient.</P> -<P>The meet-in-the middle attack re-writes the equations to calculate a - middle value M:</P> -<PRE> M = E(k1,P) - M = D(k2,C)</PRE> -<P>Now we can try some large number of D(k2,C) decryptions with various - values of k2 and store the results in a table. Then start doing E(k1,P) - encryptions, checking each result to see if it is in the table.</P> -<P>With enough table space, this breaks double DES with<NOBR> 2<SUP>56</SUP> - + 2<SUP>56</SUP> = 2<SUP>57</SUP>work. Against triple DES, you need<NOBR> - 2<SUP>56</SUP> + 2<SUP>112</SUP> ~= 2<SUP>112</SUP>.</P> -<P>The memory requirements for such attacks can be prohibitive, but - there is a whole body of research literature on methods of reducing - them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="digest">Message Digest Algorithm</A></DT> -<DD>An algorithm which takes a message as input and produces a hash or - digest of it, a fixed-length set of bits which depend on the message - contents in some highly complex manner. Design criteria include making - it extremely difficult for anyone to counterfeit a digest or to change - a message without altering its digest. One essential property is<A href="#collision"> - collision resistance</A>. The main applications are in message<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> and<A href="#signature"> digital signature</A> - schemes. Widely used algorithms include<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A> and<A href="#SHA"> - SHA</A>. In IPsec, message digests are used for<A href="#HMAC"> HMAC</A> - authentication of packets.</DD> -<DT><A name="MTU">MTU</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>M</STRONG>aximum<STRONG> T</STRONG>ransmission<STRONG> U</STRONG> -nit, the largest size of packet that can be sent over a link. This is - determined by the underlying network, but must be taken account of at - the IP level. -<P>IP packets, which can be up to 64K bytes each, must be packaged into - lower-level packets of the appropriate size for the underlying - network(s) and re-assembled on the other end. When a packet must pass - over multiple networks, each with its own MTU, and many of the MTUs are - unknown to the sender, this becomes a fairly complex problem. See<A href="#pathMTU"> - path MTU discovery</A> for details.</P> -<P>Often the MTU is a few hundred bytes on serial links and 1500 on - Ethernet. There are, however, serial link protocols which use a larger - MTU to avoid fragmentation at the ethernet/serial boundary, and newer - (especially gigabit) Ethernet networks sometimes support much larger - packets because these are more efficient in some applications.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="N">N</A></DT> -<DT><A name="NAI">NAI</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.nai.com">Network Associates</A>, a conglomerate - formed from<A href="#PGPI"> PGP Inc.</A>, TIS (Trusted Information - Systems, a firewall vendor) and McAfee anti-virus products. Among other - things, they offer an IPsec-based VPN product.</DD> -<DT><A name="NAT.gloss">NAT</A></DT> -<DD><B>N</B>etwork<B> A</B>ddress<B> T</B>ranslation, a process by which - firewall machines may change the addresses on packets as they go - through. For discussion, see our<A href="background.html#nat.background"> - background</A> section.</DD> -<DT><A name="NIST">NIST</A></DT> -<DD>The US<A href="http://www.nist.gov"> National Institute of Standards - and Technology</A>, responsible for<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS standards</A> - including<A href="#DES"> DES</A> and its replacement,<A href="#AES"> - AES</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="nonce">Nonce</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#random"> random</A> value used in an<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> protocol.</DD> -<DT></DT> -<DT><A name="non-routable">Non-routable IP address</A></DT> -<DD>An IP address not normally allowed in the "to" or "from" IP address - field header of IP packets. -<P>Almost invariably, the phrase "non-routable address" means one of the - addresses reserved by RFC 1918 for private networks:</P> -<UL> -<LI>10.anything</LI> -<LI>172.x.anything with 16 <= x <= 31</LI> -<LI>192.168.anything</LI> -</UL> -<P>These addresses are commonly used on private networks, e.g. behind a - Linux machines doing<A href="#masq"> IP masquerade</A>. Machines within - the private network can address each other with these addresses. All - packets going outside that network, however, have these addresses - replaced before they reach the Internet.</P> -<P>If any packets using these addresses do leak out, they do not go far. - Most routers automatically discard all such packets.</P> -<P>Various other addresses -- the 127.0.0.0/8 block reserved for local - use, 0.0.0.0, various broadcast and network addresses -- cannot be - routed over the Internet, but are not normally included in the meaning - when the phrase "non-routable address" is used.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="NSA">NSA</A></DT> -<DD>The US<A href="http://www.nsa.gov"> National Security Agency</A>, - the American organisation for<A href="#SIGINT"> signals intelligence</A> -, the protection of US government messages and the interception and - analysis of other messages. For details, see Bamford's<A href="biblio.html#puzzle"> - "The Puzzle Palace"</A>. -<P>Some<A href="http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html"> - history of NSA</A> documents were declassified in response to a FOIA - (Freedom of Information Act) request.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="O">O</A></DT> -<DT><A name="oakley">Oakley</A></DT> -<DD>A key determination protocol, defined in RFC 2412.</DD> -<DT>Oakley groups</DT> -<DD>The groups used as the basis of<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key - exchange in the Oakley protocol, and in<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A>. Four - were defined in the original RFC, and a fifth has been<A href="http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html"> - added since</A>. -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN currently supports the three groups based on finite - fields modulo a prime (Groups 1, 2 and 5) and does not support the - elliptic curve groups (3 and 4). For a description of the difference of - the types, see<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithms</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="OTP">One time pad</A></DT> -<DD>A cipher in which the key is: -<UL> -<LI>as long as the total set of messages to be enciphered</LI> -<LI>absolutely<A href="#random"> random</A></LI> -<LI>never re-used</LI> -</UL> -<P>Given those three conditions, it can easily be proved that the cipher - is perfectly secure, in the sense that an attacker with intercepted - message in hand has no better chance of guessing the message than an - attacker who has not intercepted the message and only knows the message - length. No such proof exists for any other cipher.</P> -<P>There are, however, several problems with this "perfect" cipher.</P> -<P>First, it is<STRONG> wildly impractical</STRONG> for most - applications. Key management is at best difficult, often completely - impossible.</P> -<P>Second, it is<STRONG> extremely fragile</STRONG>. Small changes which - violate the conditions listed above do not just weaken the cipher - liitle. Quite often they destroy its security completely.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Re-using the pad weakens the cipher to the point where it can be - broken with pencil and paper. With a computer, the attack is trivially - easy.</LI> -<LI>Using<EM> anything</EM> less than truly<A href="#random"> random</A> - numbers<EM> completely</EM> invalidates the security proof.</LI> -<LI>In particular, using computer-generated pseudo-random numbers may - give an extremely weak cipher. It might also produce a good stream - cipher, if the pseudo-random generator is both well-designed and - properely seeded.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Marketing claims about the "unbreakable" security of various products - which somewhat resemble one-time pads are common. Such claims are one - of the surest signs of cryptographic<A href="#snake"> snake oil</A>; - most systems marketed with such claims are worthless.</P> -<P>Finally, even if the system is implemented and used correctly, it is<STRONG> - highly vulnerable to a substitution attack</STRONG>. If an attacker - knows some plaintext and has an intercepted message, he can discover - the pad.</P> -<UL> -<LI>This does not matter if the attacker is just a<A href="#passive"> - passive</A> eavesdropper. It gives him no plaintext he didn't already - know and we don't care that he learns a pad which we will never re-use.</LI> -<LI>However, an<A href="#active"> active</A> attacker who knows the - plaintext can recover the pad, then use it to encode with whatever he - chooses. If he can get his version delivered instead of yours, this may - be a disaster. If you send "attack at dawn", the delivered message can - be anything the same length -- perhaps "retreat to east" or "shoot - generals".</LI> -<LI>An active attacker with only a reasonable guess at the plaintext can - try the same attack. If the guess is correct, this works and the - attacker's bogus message is delivered. If the guess is wrong, a garbled - message is delivered.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In general then, despite its theoretical perfection, the one-time-pad - has very limited practical application.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="http://pubweb.nfr.net/~mjr/pubs/otpfaq/"> one - time pad FAQ</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="carpediem">Opportunistic encryption (OE)</A></DT> -<DD>A situation in which any two IPsec-aware machines can secure their - communications, without a pre-shared secret and without a common<A href="#PKI"> - PKI</A> or previous exchange of public keys. This is one of the goals - of the Linux FreeS/WAN project, discussed in our<A href="intro.html#goals"> - introduction</A> section. -<P>Setting up for opportunistic encryption is described in our<A href="quickstart.html#quickstart"> - quickstart</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="responder">Opportunistic responder</A></DT> -<DD>A host which accepts, but does not initiate, requests for<A HREF="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> (OE). An opportunistic responder has - enabled OE in its<A HREF="#passive.OE"> passive</A> form (pOE) only. A - web server or file server may be usefully set up as an opportunistic - responder. -<P>Configuring passive OE is described in our<A href="policygroups.html#policygroups"> - policy groups</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="orange">Orange book</A></DT> -<DD>the most basic and best known of the US government's<A href="#rainbow"> - Rainbow Book</A> series of computer security standards.</DD> -<DT><A name="P">P</A></DT> -<DT><A name="P1363">P1363 standard</A></DT> -<DD>An<A href="#IEEE"> IEEE</A> standard for public key cryptography.<A href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363"> - Web page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="pOE">pOE</A></DT> -<DD>See<A href="#passive.OE"> Passive opportunistic encryption</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="passive">Passive attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack in which the attacker only eavesdrops and attempts to - analyse intercepted messages, as opposed to an<A href="#active"> active - attack</A> in which he diverts messages or generates his own.</DD> -<DT><A name="passive.OE">Passive opportunistic encryption (pOE)</A></DT> -<DD>A form of<A HREF="#carpediem"> opportunistic encryption</A> (OE) in - which the host will accept opportunistic connection requests, but will - not initiate such requests. A host which runs OE in its passive form - only is known as an<A HREF="#responder"> opportunistic responder</A>. -<P>Configuring passive OE is described in our<A href="policygroups.html#policygroups"> - policy groups</A> document.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="pathMTU">Path MTU discovery</A></DT> -<DD>The process of discovering the largest packet size which all links - on a path can handle without fragmentation -- that is, without any - router having to break the packet up into smaller pieces to match the<A href="#MTU"> - MTU</A> of its outgoing link. -<P>This is done as follows:</P> -<UL> -<LI>originator sends the largest packets allowed by<A href="#MTU"> MTU</A> - of the first link, setting the DF (<STRONG>d</STRONG>on't<STRONG> f</STRONG> -ragment) bit in the packet header</LI> -<LI>any router which cannot send the packet on (outgoing MTU is too - small for it, and DF prevents fragmenting it to match) sends back an<A href="#ICMP.gloss"> - ICMP</A> packet reporting the problem</LI> -<LI>originator looks at ICMP message and tries a smaller size</LI> -<LI>eventually, you settle on a size that can pass all routers</LI> -<LI>thereafter, originator just sends that size and no-one has to - fragment</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since this requires co-operation of many systems, and since the next - packet may travel a different path, this is one of the trickier areas - of IP programming. Bugs that have shown up over the years have - included:</P> -<UL> -<LI>malformed ICMP messages</LI> -<LI>hosts that ignore or mishandle these ICMP messages</LI> -<LI>firewalls blocking the ICMP messages so host does not see them</LI> -</UL> -<P>Since IPsec adds a header, it increases packet size and may require - fragmentation even where incoming and outgoing MTU are equal.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="PFS">Perfect forward secrecy (PFS)</A></DT> -<DD>A property of systems such as<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key - exchange which use a long-term key (such as the shared secret in IKE) - and generate short-term keys as required. If an attacker who acquires - the long-term key<EM> provably</EM> can -<UL> -<LI><EM>neither</EM> read previous messages which he may have archived</LI> -<LI><EM>nor</EM> read future messages without performing additional - successful attacks</LI> -</UL> -<P>then the system has PFS. The attacker needs the short-term keys in - order to read the trafiic and merely having the long-term key does not - allow him to infer those. Of course, it may allow him to conduct - another attack (such as<A href="#middle"> man-in-the-middle</A>) which - gives him some short-term keys, but he does not automatically get them - just by acquiring the long-term key.</P> -<P>See also<A href="http://sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1996/08/msg00123.html"> - Phil Karn's definition</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>PFS</DT> -<DD>see Perfect Forward Secrecy</DD> -<DT><A name="PGP">PGP</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>retty<B> G</B>ood<B> P</B>rivacy, a personal encryption - system for email based on public key technology, written by Phil - Zimmerman. -<P>The 2.xx versions of PGP used the<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> public key - algorithm and used<A href="#IDEA"> IDEA</A> as the symmetric cipher. - These versions are described in RFC 1991 and in<A href="#PGP"> - Garfinkel's book</A>. Since version 5, the products from<A href="#PGPI"> - PGP Inc</A>. have used<A href="#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> public key - methods and<A href="#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> symmetric encryption. These - can verify signatures from the 2.xx versions, but cannot exchange - encryted messages with them.</P> -<P>An<A href="mail.html#IETF"> IETF</A> working group has issued RFC - 2440 for an "Open PGP" standard, similar to the 5.x versions. PGP Inc. - staff were among the authors. A free<A href="#GPG"> Gnu Privacy Guard</A> - based on that standard is now available.</P> -<P>For more information on PGP, including how to obtain it, see our - cryptography<A href="web.html#tools"> links</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="PGPI">PGP Inc.</A></DT> -<DD>A company founded by Zimmerman, the author of<A href="#PGP"> PGP</A> -, now a division of<A href="#NAI"> NAI</A>. See the<A href="http://www.pgp.com"> - corporate website</A>. Zimmerman left in 2001, and early in 2002 NAI - announced that they would no longer sell PGP.. -<P>Versions 6.5 and later of the PGP product include PGPnet, an IPsec - client for Macintosh or for Windows 95/98/NT. See our<A href="interop.html#pgpnet"> - interoperation documen</A>t.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="photuris">Photuris</A></DT> -<DD>Another key negotiation protocol, an alternative to<A href="#IKE"> - IKE</A>, described in RFCs 2522 and 2523.</DD> -<DT><A name="PPP">PPP</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>oint-to-<B>P</B>oint<B> P</B>rotocol, originally a method of - connecting over modems or serial lines, but see also PPPoE.</DD> -<DT><A name="PPPoE">PPPoE</A></DT> -<DD><B>PPP</B><B> o</B>ver<B> E</B>thernet, a somewhat odd protocol that - makes Ethernet look like a point-to-point serial link. It is widely - used for cable or ADSL Internet services, apparently mainly because it - lets the providers use access control and address assignmment - mechanisms developed for dialup networks.<A href="http://www.roaringpenguin.com"> - Roaring Penguin</A> provide a widely used Linux implementation.</DD> -<DT><A name="PPTP">PPTP</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>oint-to-<B>P</B>oint<B> T</B>unneling<B> P</B>rotocol, used - in some Microsoft VPN implementations. Papers discussing weaknesses in - it are on<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/publish.html"> - counterpane.com</A>. It is now largely obsolete, replaced by L2TP.</DD> -<DT><A name="PKI">PKI</A></DT> -<DD><B>P</B>ublic<B> K</B>ey<B> I</B>nfrastructure, the things an - organisation or community needs to set up in order to make<A href="#public"> - public key</A> cryptographic technology a standard part of their - operating procedures. -<P>There are several PKI products on the market. Typically they use a - hierarchy of<A href="#CA"> Certification Authorities (CAs)</A>. Often - they use<A href="#LDAP"> LDAP</A> access to<A href="#X509"> X.509</A> - directories to implement this.</P> -<P>See<A href="#web"> Web of Trust</A> for a different sort of - infrastructure.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="PKIX">PKIX</A></DT> -<DD><B>PKI</B> e<B>X</B>change, an<A href="mail.html#IETF"> IETF</A> - standard that allows<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A>s to talk to each other. -<P>This is required, for example, when users of a corporate PKI need to - communicate with people at client, supplier or government - organisations, any of which may have a different PKI in place. I should - be able to talk to you securely whenever:</P> -<UL> -<LI>your organisation and mine each have a PKI in place</LI> -<LI>you and I are each set up to use those PKIs</LI> -<LI>the two PKIs speak PKIX</LI> -<LI>the configuration allows the conversation</LI> -</UL> -<P>At time of writing (March 1999), this is not yet widely implemented - but is under quite active development by several groups.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="plaintext">Plaintext</A></DT> -<DD>The unencrypted input to a cipher, as opposed to the encrypted<A href="#ciphertext"> - ciphertext</A> output.</DD> -<DT><A name="Pluto">Pluto</A></DT> -<DD>The<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> daemon which - handles key exchange via the<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> protocol, - connection negotiation, and other higher-level tasks. Pluto calls the<A href="#KLIPS"> - KLIPS</A> kernel code as required. For details, see the manual page - ipsec_pluto(8).</DD> -<DT><A name="public">Public Key Cryptography</A></DT> -<DD>In public key cryptography, keys are created in matched pairs. - Encrypt with one half of a pair and only the matching other half can - decrypt it. This contrasts with<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric or - secret key cryptography</A> in which a single key known to both parties - is used for both encryption and decryption. -<P>One half of each pair, called the public key, is made public. The - other half, called the private key, is kept secret. Messages can then - be sent by anyone who knows the public key to the holder of the private - key. Encrypt with the public key and you know that only someone with - the matching private key can decrypt.</P> -<P>Public key techniques can be used to create<A href="#signature"> - digital signatures</A> and to deal with key management issues, perhaps - the hardest part of effective deployment of<A href="#symmetric"> - symmetric ciphers</A>. The resulting<A href="#hybrid"> hybrid - cryptosystems</A> use public key methods to manage keys for symmetric - ciphers.</P> -<P>Many organisations are currently creating<A href="#PKI"> PKIs, public - key infrastructures</A> to make these benefits widely available.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Public Key Infrastructure</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A></DD> -<DT><A name="Q">Q</A></DT> -<DT><A name="R">R</A></DT> -<DT><A name="rainbow">Rainbow books</A></DT> -<DD>A set of US government standards for evaluation of "trusted computer - systems", of which the best known was the<A href="#orange"> Orange Book</A> -. One fairly often hears references to "C2 security" or a product - "evaluated at B1". The Rainbow books define the standards referred to - in those comments. -<P>See this<A href="http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/rainbow.htm"> reference - page</A>.</P> -<P>The Rainbow books are now mainly obsolete, replaced by the - international<A href="#cc"> Common Criteria</A> standards.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="random">Random</A></DT> -<DD>A remarkably tricky term, far too much so for me to attempt a - definition here. Quite a few cryptosystems have been broken via attacks - on weak random number generators, even when the rest of the system was - sound. -<P>See<A href="http://nis.nsf.net/internet/documents/rfc/rfc1750.txt"> - RFC 1750</A> for the theory.</P> -<P>See the manual pages for<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html"> - ipsec_ranbits(8)</A> and ipsec_prng(3) for more on FreeS/WAN's use of - randomness. Both depend on the random(4) device driver..</P> -<P>A couple of years ago, there was extensive mailing list discussion - (archived<A href="http://www.openpgp.net/random/index.html"> here</A> -)of Linux /dev/random and FreeS/WAN. Since then, the design of the - random(4) driver has changed considerably. Linux 2.4 kernels have the - new driver..</P> -</DD> -<DT>Raptor</DT> -<DD>A firewall product for Windows NT offerring IPsec-based VPN - services. Linux FreeS/WAN interoperates with Raptor; see our<A href="interop.html#Raptor"> - interop</A> document for details. Raptor have recently merged with - Axent.</DD> -<DT><A name="RC4">RC4</A></DT> -<DD><B>R</B>ivest<B> C</B>ipher four, designed by Ron Rivest of<A href="#RSAco"> - RSA</A> and widely used. Believed highly secure with adequate key - length, but often implemented with inadequate key length to comply with - export restrictions.</DD> -<DT><A name="RC6">RC6</A></DT> -<DD><B>R</B>ivest<B> C</B>ipher six,<A href="#RSAco"> RSA</A>'s<A href="#AES"> - AES</A> candidate cipher.</DD> -<DT><A name="replay">Replay attack</A></DT> -<DD>An attack in which the attacker records data and later replays it in - an attempt to deceive the recipient.</DD> -<DT><A name="reverse">Reverse map</A></DT> -<DD>In<A href="ipsec.html#DNS"> DNS</A>, a table where IP addresses can - be used as the key for lookups which return a system name and/or other - information.</DD> -<DT>RFC</DT> -<DD><B>R</B>equest<B> F</B>or<B> C</B>omments, an Internet document. - Some RFCs are just informative. Others are standards. -<P>Our list of<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> and other security-related - RFCs is<A href="rfc.html#RFC"> here</A>, along with information on - methods of obtaining them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="rijndael">Rijndael</A></DT> -<DD>a<A href="#block"> block cipher</A> designed by two Belgian - cryptographers, winner of the US government's<A href="#AES"> AES</A> - contest to pick a replacement for<A href="#DES"> DES</A>. See the<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael"> - Rijndael home page</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="RIPEMD">RIPEMD</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#digest"> message digest</A> algorithm. The current - version is RIPEMD-160 which gives a 160-bit hash.</DD> -<DT><A name="rootCA">Root CA</A></DT> -<DD>The top level<A href="#CA"> Certification Authority</A> in a - hierachy of such authorities.</DD> -<DT><A name="routable">Routable IP address</A></DT> -<DD>Most IP addresses can be used as "to" and "from" addresses in packet - headers. These are the routable addresses; we expect routing to be - possible for them. If we send a packet to one of them, we expect (in - most cases; there are various complications) that it will be delivered - if the address is in use and will cause an<A href="#ICMP.gloss"> ICMP</A> - error packet to come back to us if not. -<P>There are also several classes of<A href="#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> IP addresses.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="RSA">RSA algorithm</A></DT> -<DD><B>R</B>ivest<B> S</B>hamir<B> A</B>dleman<A href="#public"> public - key</A> algorithm, named for its three inventors. It is widely used and - likely to become moreso since it became free of patent encumbrances in - September 2000. -<P>RSA can be used to provide either<A href="#encryption"> encryption</A> - or<A href="#signature"> digital signatures</A>. In IPsec, it is used - only for signatures. These provide gateway-to-gateway<A href="#authentication"> - authentication</A> for<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> negotiations.</P> -<P>For a full explanation of the algorithm, consult one of the standard - references such as<A href="biblio.html#schneier"> Applied Cryptography</A> -. A simple explanation is:</P> -<P>The great 17th century French mathematician<A href="http://www-groups.dcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/~history/Mathematicians/Fermat.html"> - Fermat</A> proved that,</P> -<P>for any prime p and number x, 0 <= x < p:</P> -<PRE> x^p == x modulo p - x^(p-1) == 1 modulo p, non-zero x - </PRE> -<P>From this it follows that if we have a pair of primes p, q and two - numbers e, d such that:</P> -<PRE> ed == 1 modulo lcm( p-1, q-1) - </PRE> - where lcm() is least common multiple, then -<BR> for all x, 0 <= x < pq: -<PRE> x^ed == x modulo pq - </PRE> -<P>So we construct such as set of numbers p, q, e, d and publish the - product N=pq and e as the public key. Using c for<A href="#ciphertext"> - ciphertext</A> and i for the input<A href="#plaintext"> plaintext</A>, - encryption is then:</P> -<PRE> c = i^e modulo N - </PRE> -<P>An attacker cannot deduce i from the cyphertext c, short of either - factoring N or solving the<A href="#dlog"> discrete logarithm</A> - problem for this field. If p, q are large primes (hundreds or thousands - of bits) no efficient solution to either problem is known.</P> -<P>The receiver, knowing the private key (N and d), can readily recover - the plaintext p since:</P> -<PRE> c^d == (i^e)^d modulo N - == i^ed modulo N - == i modulo N - </PRE> -<P>This gives an effective public key technique, with only a couple of - problems. It uses a good deal of computer time, since calculations with - large integers are not cheap, and there is no proof it is necessarily - secure since no-one has proven either factoring or discrete log cannot - be done efficiently. Quite a few good mathematicians have tried both - problems, and no-one has announced success, but there is no proof they - are insoluble.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="RSAco">RSA Data Security</A></DT> -<DD>A company founded by the inventors of the<A href="#RSA"> RSA</A> - public key algorithm.</DD> -<DT><A name="S">S</A></DT> -<DT><A name="SA">SA</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecurity<B> A</B>ssociation, the channel negotiated by the - higher levels of an<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> implementation (<A href="#IKE"> -IKE</A>) and used by the lower (<A href="#ESP">ESP</A> and<A href="#AH"> - AH</A>). SAs are unidirectional; you need a pair of them for two-way - communication. -<P>An SA is defined by three things -- the destination, the protocol (<A href="#AH"> -AH</A> or<A href="#ESP">ESP</A>) and the<A href="SPI"> SPI</A>, security - parameters index. It is used as an index to look up other things such - as session keys and intialisation vectors.</P> -<P>For more detail, see our section on<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec</A> - and/or RFC 2401.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SElinux">SE Linux</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>S</STRONG>ecurity<STRONG> E</STRONG>nhanced Linux, an<A href="#NSA"> - NSA</A>-funded project to add<A href="#mandatory"> mandatory access - control</A> to Linux. See the<A href="http://www.nsa.gov/selinux"> - project home page</A>. -<P>According to their web pages, this work will include extending - mandatory access controls to IPsec tunnels.</P> -<P>Recent versions of SE Linux code use the<A href="#LSM"> Linux - Security Module</A> interface.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SDNS">Secure DNS</A></DT> -<DD>A version of the<A href="ipsec.html#DNS"> DNS or Domain Name Service</A> - enhanced with authentication services. This is being designed by the<A href="mail.html#IETF"> - IETF</A> DNS security<A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/dnssec.html"> - working group</A>. Check the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - Internet Software Consortium</A> for information on implementation - progress and for the latest version of<A href="#BIND"> BIND</A>. - Another site has<A href="http://www.toad.com/~dnssec"> more information</A> -. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> can use this plus<A href="#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman key exchange</A> to bootstrap itself. This allows<A href="#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>. Any pair of machines which can - authenticate each other via DNS can communicate securely, without - either a pre-existing shared secret or a shared<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Secret key cryptography</DT> -<DD>See<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cryptography</A></DD> -<DT>Security Association</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#SA"> SA</A></DD> -<DT>Security Enhanced Linux</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#SElinux"> SE Linux</A></DD> -<DT><A name="sequence">Sequence number</A></DT> -<DD>A number added to a packet or message which indicates its position - in a sequence of packets or messages. This provides some security - against<A href="#replay"> replay attacks</A>. -<P>For<A href="ipsec.html#auto"> automatic keying</A> mode, the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> RFCs require that the sender generate sequence numbers for - each packet, but leave it optional whether the receiver does anything - with them.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SHA">SHA</A></DT> -<DT>SHA-1</DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecure<B> H</B>ash<B> A</B>lgorithm, a<A href="#digest"> - message digest algorithm</A> developed by the<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A> - for use in the Digital Signature standard,<A href="#FIPS"> FIPS</A> - number 186 from<A href="#NIST"> NIST</A>. SHA is an improved variant of<A -href="#MD4"> MD4</A> producing a 160-bit hash. -<P>SHA is one of two message digest algorithms available in IPsec. The - other is<A href="#MD5"> MD5</A>. Some people do not trust SHA because - it was developed by the<A href="#NSA"> NSA</A>. There is, as far as we - know, no cryptographic evidence that SHA is untrustworthy, but this - does not prevent that view from being strongly held.</P> -<P>The NSA made one small change after the release of the original SHA. - They did not give reasons. Iit may be a defense against some attack - they found and do not wish to disclose. Technically the modified - algorithm should be called SHA-1, but since it has replaced the - original algorithm in nearly all applications, it is generally just - referred to as SHA..</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SHA-256">SHA-256</A></DT> -<DT>SHA-384</DT> -<DT>SHA-512</DT> -<DD>Newer variants of SHA designed to match the strength of the 128, 192 - and 256-bit keys of<A href="#AES"> AES</A>. The work to break an - encryption algorithm's strength by<A href="#brute"> brute force</A> is - 2 -<!--math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"--> - -<!--msup--> - -<!--mi--> - keylength</(null)></(null)></(null)> operations but a<A href="birthday"> - birthday attack</A> on a hash needs only 2 -<!--math xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML"--> - -<!--msup--> - -<!--mrow--> - -<!--mi--> - hashlength</(null)> -<!--mo--> - /</(null)> -<!--mn--> - - 2</(null)></(null)></(null)></(null)> , so as a general rule you need a - hash twice the size of the key to get similar strength. SHA-256, - SHA-384 and SHA-512 are designed to match the 128, 192 and 256-bit key - sizes of AES, respectively.</DD> -<DT><A name="SIGINT">Signals intelligence (SIGINT)</A></DT> -<DD>Activities of government agencies from various nations aimed at - protecting their own communications and reading those of others. - Cryptography, cryptanalysis, wiretapping, interception and monitoring - of various sorts of signals. The players include the American<A href="#NSA"> - NSA</A>, British<A href="#GCHQ"> GCHQ</A> and Canadian<A href="#CSE"> - CSE</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="SKIP">SKIP</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>imple<B> K</B>ey management for<B> I</B>nternet<B> P</B> -rotocols, an alternative to<A href="#IKE"> IKE</A> developed by Sun and - being marketed by their<A href="http://skip.incog.com"> Internet - Commerce Group</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="snake">Snake oil</A></DT> -<DD>Bogus cryptography. See the<A href="http://www.interhack.net/people/cmcurtin/snake-oil-faq.html"> - Snake Oil FAQ</A> or<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/crypto-gram-9902.html#snakeoil"> - this paper</A> by Schneier.</DD> -<DT><A name="SPI">SPI</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecurity<B> P</B>arameter<B> I</B>ndex, an index used within<A -href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> to keep connections distinct. A<A href="#SA"> - Security Association (SA)</A> is defined by destination, protocol and - SPI. Without the SPI, two connections to the same gateway using the - same protocol could not be distinguished. -<P>For more detail, see our<A href="ipsec.html"> IPsec</A> section - and/or RFC 2401.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SSH">SSH</A></DT> -<DD><B>S</B>ecure<B> SH</B>ell, an encrypting replacement for the - insecure Berkeley commands whose names begin with "r" for "remote": - rsh, rlogin, etc. -<P>For more information on SSH, including how to obtain it, see our - cryptography<A href="web.html#tools"> links</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SSHco">SSH Communications Security</A></DT> -<DD>A company founded by the authors of<A href="#SSH"> SSH</A>. Offices - are in<A href="http://www.ssh.fi"> Finland</A> and<A href="http://www.ipsec.com"> - California</A>. They have a toolkit for developers of IPsec - applications.</DD> -<DT><A name="SSL">SSL</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://home.netscape.com/eng/ssl3">Secure Sockets Layer</A> -, a set of encryption and authentication services for web browsers, - developed by Netscape. Widely used in Internet commerce. Also known as<A -href="#TLS"> TLS</A>.</DD> -<DT>SSLeay</DT> -<DD>A free implementation of<A href="#SSL"> SSL</A> by Eric Young (eay) - and others. Developed in Australia; not subject to US export controls.</DD> -<DT><A name="static">static IP address</A></DT> -<DD>an IP adddress which is pre-set on the machine itself, as opposed to - a<A href="#dynamic"> dynamic address</A> which is assigned by a<A href="#DHCP"> - DHCP</A> server or obtained as part of the process of establishing a<A href="#PPP"> - PPP</A> or<A href="#PPPoE"> PPPoE</A> connection</DD> -<DT><A name="stream">Stream cipher</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#symmetric"> symmetric cipher</A> which produces a stream - of output which can be combined (often using XOR or bytewise addition) - with the plaintext to produce ciphertext. Contrasts with<A href="#block"> - block cipher</A>. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> does not use stream ciphers. Their main - application is link-level encryption, for example of voice, video or - data streams on a wire or a radio signal.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="subnet">subnet</A></DT> -<DD>A group of IP addresses which are logically one network, typically - (but not always) assigned to a group of physically connected machines. - The range of addresses in a subnet is described using a subnet mask. - See next entry.</DD> -<DT>subnet mask</DT> -<DD>A method of indicating the addresses included in a subnet. Here are - two equivalent examples: -<UL> -<LI>101.101.101.0/24</LI> -<LI>101.101.101.0 with mask 255.255.255.0</LI> -</UL> -<P>The '24' is shorthand for a mask with the top 24 bits one and the - rest zero. This is exactly the same as 255.255.255.0 which has three - all-ones bytes and one all-zeros byte.</P> -<P>These indicate that, for this range of addresses, the top 24 bits are - to be treated as naming a network (often referred to as "the - 101.101.101.0/24 subnet") while most combinations of the low 8 bits can - be used to designate machines on that network. Two addresses are - reserved; 101.101.101.0 refers to the subnet rather than a specific - machine while 101.101.101.255 is a broadcast address. 1 to 254 are - available for machines.</P> -<P>It is common to find subnets arranged in a hierarchy. For example, a - large company might have a /16 subnet and allocate /24 subnets within - that to departments. An ISP might have a large subnet and allocate /26 - subnets (64 addresses, 62 usable) to business customers and /29 subnets - (8 addresses, 6 usable) to residential clients.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="SWAN">S/WAN</A></DT> -<DD>Secure Wide Area Network, a project involving<A href="#RSAco"> RSA - Data Security</A> and a number of other companies. The goal was to - ensure that all their<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> implementations would - interoperate so that their customers can communicate with each other - securely.</DD> -<DT><A name="symmetric">Symmetric cryptography</A></DT> -<DD>Symmetric cryptography, also referred to as conventional or secret - key cryptography, relies on a<EM> shared secret key</EM>, identical for - sender and receiver. Sender encrypts with that key, receiver decrypts - with it. The idea is that an eavesdropper without the key be unable to - read the messages. There are two main types of symmetric cipher,<A href="#block"> - block ciphers</A> and<A href="#stream"> stream ciphers</A>. -<P>Symmetric cryptography contrasts with<A href="#public"> public key</A> - or asymmetric systems where the two players use different keys.</P> -<P>The great difficulty in symmetric cryptography is, of course, key - management. Sender and receiver<EM> must</EM> have identical keys and - those keys<EM> must</EM> be kept secret from everyone else. Not too - much of a problem if only two people are involved and they can - conveniently meet privately or employ a trusted courier. Quite a - problem, though, in other circumstances.</P> -<P>It gets much worse if there are many people. An application might be - written to use only one key for communication among 100 people, for - example, but there would be serious problems. Do you actually trust all - of them that much? Do they trust each other that much? Should they? - What is at risk if that key is compromised? How are you going to - distribute that key to everyone without risking its secrecy? What do - you do when one of them leaves the company? Will you even know?</P> -<P>On the other hand, if you need unique keys for every possible - connection between a group of 100, then each user must have 99 keys. - You need either 99*100/2 = 4950<EM> secure</EM> key exchanges between - users or a central authority that<EM> securely</EM> distributes 100 key - packets, each with a different set of 99 keys.</P> -<P>Either of these is possible, though tricky, for 100 users. Either - becomes an administrative nightmare for larger numbers. Moreover, keys<EM> - must</EM> be changed regularly, so the problem of key distribution - comes up again and again. If you use the same key for many messages - then an attacker has more text to work with in an attempt to crack that - key. Moreover, one successful crack will give him or her the text of - all those messages.</P> -<P>In short, the<EM> hardest part of conventional cryptography is key - management</EM>. Today the standard solution is to build a<A href="#hybrid"> - hybrid system</A> using<A href="#public"> public key</A> techniques to - manage keys.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="T">T</A></DT> -<DT><A name="TIS">TIS</A></DT> -<DD>Trusted Information Systems, a firewall vendor now part of<A href="#NAI"> - NAI</A>. Their Gauntlet product offers IPsec VPN services. TIS - implemented the first version of<A href="#SDNS"> Secure DNS</A> on a<A href="#DARPA"> - DARPA</A> contract.</DD> -<DT><A name="TLS">TLS</A></DT> -<DD><B>T</B>ransport<B> L</B>ayer<B> S</B>ecurity, a newer name for<A href="#SSL"> - SSL</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="TOS">TOS field</A></DT> -<DD>The<STRONG> T</STRONG>ype<STRONG> O</STRONG>f<STRONG> S</STRONG> -ervice field in an IP header, used to control qualkity of service - routing.</DD> -<DT><A name="traffic">Traffic analysis</A></DT> -<DD>Deducing useful intelligence from patterns of message traffic, - without breaking codes or reading the messages. In one case during - World War II, the British guessed an attack was coming because all - German radio traffic stopped. The "radio silence" order, intended to - preserve security, actually gave the game away. -<P>In an industrial espionage situation, one might deduce something - interesting just by knowing that company A and company B were talking, - especially if one were able to tell which departments were involved, or - if one already knew that A was looking for acquisitions and B was - seeking funds for expansion.</P> -<P>In general, traffic analysis by itself is not very useful. However, - in the context of a larger intelligence effort where quite a bit is - already known, it can be very useful. When you are solving a complex - puzzle, every little bit helps.</P> -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> itself does not defend against traffic - analysis, but carefully thought out systems using IPsec can provide at - least partial protection. In particular, one might want to encrypt more - traffic than was strictly necessary, route things in odd ways, or even - encrypt dummy packets, to confuse the analyst. We discuss this<A href="ipsec.html#traffic.resist"> - here</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="transport">Transport mode</A></DT> -<DD>An IPsec application in which the IPsec gateway is the destination - of the protected packets, a machine acts as its own gateway. Contrast - with<A href="#tunnel"> tunnel mode</A>.</DD> -<DT>Triple DES</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#3DES"> 3DES</A></DD> -<DT><A name="TTL">TTL</A></DT> -<DD><STRONG>T</STRONG>ime<STRONG> T</STRONG>o<STRONG> L</STRONG>ive, - used to control<A href="ipsec.html#DNS"> DNS</A> caching. Servers - discard cached records whose TTL expires</DD> -<DT><A name="tunnel">Tunnel mode</A></DT> -<DD>An IPsec application in which an IPsec gateway provides protection - for packets to and from other systems. Contrast with<A href="#transport"> - transport mode</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="2key">Two-key Triple DES</A></DT> -<DD>A variant of<A href="#3DES"> triple DES or 3DES</A> in which only - two keys are used. As in the three-key version, the order of operations - is<A href="#EDE"> EDE</A> or encrypt-decrypt-encrypt, but in the - two-key variant the first and third keys are the same. -<P>3DES with three keys has 3*56 = 168 bits of key but has only 112-bit - strength against a<A href="#meet"> meet-in-the-middle</A> attack, so it - is possible that the two key version is just as strong. Last I looked, - this was an open question in the research literature.</P> -<P>RFC 2451 defines triple DES for<A href="#IPSEC"> IPsec</A> as the - three-key variant. The two-key variant should not be used and is not - implemented directly in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> Linux FreeS/WAN</A> -. It cannot be used in automatically keyed mode without major fiddles in - the source code. For manually keyed connections, you could make Linux - FreeS/WAN talk to a two-key implementation by setting two keys the same - in /etc/ipsec.conf.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="U">U</A></DT> -<DT><A name="V">V</A></DT> -<DT><A name="virtual">Virtual Interface</A></DT> -<DD>A<A href="#Linux"> Linux</A> feature which allows one physical - network interface to have two or more IP addresses. See the<CITE> Linux - Network Administrator's Guide</CITE> in<A href="biblio.html#kirch"> - book form</A> or<A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/LDP/nag/node1.html"> - on the web</A> for details.</DD> -<DT>Virtual Private Network</DT> -<DD>see<A href="#VPN"> VPN</A></DD> -<DT><A name="VPN">VPN</A></DT> -<DD><B>V</B>irtual<B> P</B>rivate<B> N</B>etwork, a network which can - safely be used as if it were private, even though some of its - communication uses insecure connections. All traffic on those - connections is encrypted. -<P><A href="#IPSEC">IPsec</A> is not the only technique available for - building VPNs, but it is the only method defined by<A href="rfc.html#RFC"> - RFCs</A> and supported by many vendors. VPNs are by no means the only - thing you can do with IPsec, but they may be the most important - application for many users.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="VPNC">VPNC</A></DT> -<DD><A href="http://www.vpnc.org">Virtual Private Network Consortium</A> -, an association of vendors of VPN products.</DD> -<DT><A name="W">W</A></DT> -<DT><A name="Wassenaar.gloss">Wassenaar Arrangement</A></DT> -<DD>An international agreement restricting export of munitions and other - tools of war. Unfortunately, cryptographic software is also restricted - under the current version of the agreement.<A href="politics.html#Wassenaar"> - Discussion</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="web">Web of Trust</A></DT> -<DD><A href="#PGP">PGP</A>'s method of certifying keys. Any user can - sign a key; you decide which signatures or combinations of signatures - to accept as certification. This contrasts with the hierarchy of<A href="#CA"> - CAs (Certification Authorities)</A> used in many<A href="#PKI"> PKIs - (Public Key Infrastructures)</A>. -<P>See<A href="#GTR"> Global Trust Register</A> for an interesting - addition to the web of trust.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="WEP">WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy)</A></DT> -<DD>The cryptographic part of the<A href="#IEEE"> IEEE</A> standard for - wireless LANs. As the name suggests, this is designed to be only as - secure as a normal wired ethernet. Anyone with a network conection can - tap it. Its advocates would claim this is good design, refusing to - build in complex features beyond the actual requirements. -<P>Critics refer to WEP as "Wire<EM>tap</EM> Equivalent Privacy", and - consider it a horribly flawed design based on bogus "requirements". You - do not control radio waves as you might control your wires, so the - metaphor in the rationale is utterly inapplicable. A security policy - that chooses not to invest resources in protecting against certain - attacks which can only be conducted by people physically plugged into - your LAN may or may not be reasonable. The same policy is completely - unreasonable when someone can "plug in" from a laptop half a block - away..</P> -<P>There has been considerable analysis indicating that WEP is seriously - flawed. A FAQ on attacks against WEP is available. Part of it reads:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> ... attacks are practical to mount using only inexpensive - off-the-shelf equipment. We recommend that anyone using an 802.11 - wireless network not rely on WEP for security, and employ other - security measures to protect their wireless network. Note that our - attacks apply to both 40-bit and the so-called 128-bit versions of WEP - equally well.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>WEP appears to be yet another instance of governments, and - unfortunately some vendors and standards bodies, deliberately promoting - hopelessly flawed "security" products, apparently mainly for the - benefit of eavesdropping agencies. See this<A href="politics.html#weak"> - discussion</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="X">X</A></DT> -<DT><A name="X509">X.509</A></DT> -<DD>A standard from the<A href="http://www.itu.int"> ITU (International - Telecommunication Union)</A>, for hierarchical directories with - authentication services, used in many<A href="#PKI"> PKI</A> - implementations. -<P>Use of X.509 services, via the<A href="#LDAP"> LDAP protocol</A>, for - certification of keys is allowed but not required by the<A href="#IPSEC"> - IPsec</A> RFCs. It is not yet implemented in<A href="web.html#FreeSWAN"> - Linux FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Xedia</DT> -<DD>A vendor of router and Internet access products, now part of Lucent. - Their QVPN products interoperate with Linux FreeS/WAN; see our<A href="interop.html#Xedia"> - interop document</A>.</DD> -<DT><A name="Y">Y</A></DT> -<DT><A name="Z">Z</A></DT> -</DL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="web.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="biblio.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/index.html b/doc/index.html deleted file mode 100644 index 427ed7ea7..000000000 --- a/doc/index.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,55 +0,0 @@ -<html> -<head> - <meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html"> - <title>FreeS/WAN index</title> - <meta name="keywords" - content="Linux, IPsec, VPN, security, encryption, cryptography, FreeS/WAN, FreeSWAN"> - <!-- - - Written by Claudia Schmeing for the Linux FreeS/WAN project - Freely distributable under the GNU General Public License - - More information at www.freeswan.org - Feedback to users@lists.freeswan.org - - CVS information: - RCS ID: $Id: index.html,v 1.1 2004/03/15 20:35:21 as Exp $ - Last changed: $Date: 2004/03/15 20:35:21 $ - Revision number: $Revision: 1.1 $ - - CVS revision numbers do not correspond to FreeS/WAN release numbers. - --> -</head> - -<body> -<h1>FreeS/WAN documentation</h1> - -<ul> - <li><a href="intro.html">Introduction</a></li> - <li><a href="upgrading.html">Upgrading to 2.x</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul> - <li><a href="quickstart.html">Quickstart guide to Opportunistic Encryption</a></li> - <li><a href="install.html">Installing</a></li> - <li><a href="config.html">Configuring</a></li> - <li><a href="policygroups.html">Policy Groups</a> - </li> - <li><a href="interop.html">Interoperating</a> -<FONT COLOR="#FF0000">New and improved!</FONT></li> - <li><a href="faq.html">FAQ</a></li> - <li><a href="trouble.html">Troubleshooting and problem reporting</a></li> -</ul> - -<ul> - <li><a href="toc.html">Full table of contents, with much more</a></li> - <li><a href="HowTo.html">All our docs as one big file</a></li> -</ul> - -<p>For technical support and other questions, use our <a -href="mail.html">mailing lists</a>.</p> - -<pre> This index last changed: $Date: 2004/03/15 20:35:21 $</pre> - -</body> -</html> diff --git a/doc/install.html b/doc/install.html deleted file mode 100644 index 6cd55535e..000000000 --- a/doc/install.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,286 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="adv_config.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="config.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="install">Installing FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P>This document will teach you how to install Linux FreeS/WAN. If your - distribution comes with Linux FreeS/WAN, we offer tips to get you - started.</P> -<H2><A NAME="15_1">Requirements</A></H2> -<P>To install FreeS/WAN you must:</P> -<UL> -<LI>be running Linux with the 2.4 or 2.2 kernel series. See this<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php#contact"> - kernel compatibility table</A>. -<BR>We also have experimental support for 2.6 kernels. Here are two - basic approaches: -<UL> -<LI> install FreeS/WAN, including its<A HREF="ipsec.html#parts"> KLIPS</A> - kernel code. This will remove the native IPsec stack and replace it - with KLIPS.</LI> -<LI> install the FreeS/WAN<A HREF="ipsec.html#parts"> userland tools</A> - (keying daemon and supporting scripts) for use with<A HREF="http://lartc.org/howto/lartc.ipsec.html"> - 2.6 kernel native IPsec</A>,</LI> -</UL> - See also these<A HREF="2.6.known-issues"> known issues with 2.6</A>.</LI> -<LI>have root access to your Linux box</LI> -<LI>choose the version of FreeS/WAN you wish to install based on<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - mailing list reports</A> -<!-- or -our updates page (coming soon)--> -</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="15_2">Choose your install method</A></H2> -<P>There are three basic ways to get FreeS/WAN onto your system:</P> -<UL> -<LI>activating and testing a FreeS/WAN that<A HREF="#distroinstall"> - shipped with your Linux distribution</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#rpminstall">RPM install</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="#srcinstall">Install from source</A></LI> -</UL> -<A NAME="distroinstall"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_3">FreeS/WAN ships with some Linuxes</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN comes with<A HREF="intro.html#distwith"> these - distributions</A>.</P> -<P>If you're running one of these, include FreeS/WAN in the choices you - make during installation, or add it later using the distribution's - tools.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_3_1">FreeS/WAN may be altered...</A></H3> -<P>Your distribution may have integrated extra features, such as Andreas - Steffen's X.509 patch, into FreeS/WAN. It may also use custom startup - script locations or directory names.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_3_2">You might need to create an authentication keypair</A> -</H3> -<P>If your FreeS/WAN came with your distribution, you may wish to - generate a fresh RSA key pair. FreeS/WAN will use these keys for - authentication.</P> -<P> To do this, become root, and type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec newhostkey --output /etc/ipsec.secrets --hostname xy.example.com - chmod 600 /etc/ipsec.secrets</PRE> -<P>where you replace xy.example.com with your machine's fully-qualified - domain name. Generate some randomness, for example by wiggling your - mouse, to speed the process.</P> -<P>The resulting ipsec.secrets looks like:</P> -<PRE>: RSA { - # RSA 2192 bits xy.example.com Sun Jun 8 13:42:19 2003 - # for signatures only, UNSAFE FOR ENCRYPTION - #pubkey=0sAQOFppfeE3cC7wqJi... - Modulus: 0x85a697de137702ef0... - # everything after this point is secret - PrivateExponent: 0x16466ea5033e807... - Prime1: 0xdfb5003c8947b7cc88759065... - Prime2: 0x98f199b9149fde11ec956c814... - Exponent1: 0x9523557db0da7a885af90aee... - Exponent2: 0x65f6667b63153eb69db8f300dbb... - Coefficient: 0x90ad00415d3ca17bebff123413fc518... - } -# do not change the indenting of that "}"</PRE> -<P>In the actual file, the strings are much longer.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_3_3">Start and test FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>You can now<A HREF="install.html#starttest"> start FreeS/WAN and test - whether it's been successfully installed.</A>.</P> -<A NAME="rpminstall"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_4">RPM install</A></H2> -<P>These instructions are for a recent Red Hat with a stock Red Hat - kernel. We know that Mandrake and SUSE also produce FreeS/WAN RPMs. If - you're running either, install using your distribution's tools.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_1">Download RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Decide which functionality you need:</P> -<UL> -<LI>standard FreeS/WAN RPMs. Use these shortcuts: -<BR> -<UL> -<LI>(for 2.6 kernels: userland only) -<BR> ncftpget - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs/\*userland* -</LI> -<LI>(for 2.4 kernels) -<BR> ncftpget - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs/`uname -r - | tr -d 'a-wy-z'`/\*</LI> -<LI> or view all the offerings at our<A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs"> - FTP site</A>.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>unofficial<A href="http://www.freeswan.ca/download.php"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A> RPMs, which include Andreas Steffen's X.509 patch and - more. Super FreeS/WAN RPMs do not currently include<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation</A> (NAT) traversal, but Super FreeS/WAN - source does.</LI> -</UL> -<A NAME="2.6.rpm"></A> -<P>For 2.6 kernels, get the latest FreeS/WAN userland RPM, for example:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-userland-2.04.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<P>Note: FreeS/WAN's support for 2.6 kernel IPsec is preliminary. Please - see<A HREf="2.6.known-issues"> 2.6.known-issues</A>, and the latest<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - mailing list reports</A>.</P> -<P>Change to your new FreeS/WAN directory, and make and install the</P> -<P>For 2.4 kernels, get both kernel and userland RPMs. Check your kernel - version with</P> -<PRE> uname -r</PRE> -<P>Get a kernel module which matches that version. For example:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<P>Note: These modules<B> will only work on the Red Hat kernel they were - built for</B>, since they are very sensitive to small changes in the - kernel.</P> -<P>Get FreeS/WAN utilities to match. For example:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_2">For freeswan.org RPMs: check signatures</A></H3> -<P>While you're at our ftp site, grab the RPM signing key</P> -<PRE> freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>If you're running RedHat 8.x or later, import this key into the RPM - database:</P> -<PRE> rpm --import freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>For RedHat 7.x systems, you'll need to add it to your<A HREF="glossary.html#PGP"> - PGP</A> keyring:</P> -<PRE> pgp -ka freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>Check the digital signatures on both RPMs using:</P> -<PRE> rpm --checksig freeswan*.rpm </PRE> -<P>You should see that these signatures are good:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK - freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_3">Install the RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Become root:</P> -<PRE> su</PRE> -<P>For a first time install, use:</P> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan*.rpm</PRE> -<P>To upgrade existing RPMs (and keep all .conf files in place), use:</P> -<PRE> rpm -Uvh freeswan*.rpm</PRE> -<P>If you're upgrading from FreeS/WAN 1.x to 2.x RPMs, and encounter - problems, see<A HREF="upgrading.html#upgrading.rpms"> this note</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_4_4">Start and Test FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Now,<A HREF="install.html#starttest"> start FreeS/WAN and test your - install</A>.</P> -<A NAME="srcinstall"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_5">Install from Source</A></H2> - -<!-- Most of this section, along with "Start and Test", can replace -INSTALL. --> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_1">Decide what functionality you need</A></H3> -<P>Your choices are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan">standard FreeS/WAN</A> -,</LI> -<LI>standard FreeS/WAN plus any of these<A HREF="web.html#patch"> - user-supported patches</A>, or</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/download">Super FreeS/WAN</A>, an - unofficial FreeS/WAN pre-patched with many of the above. Provides - additional algorithms, X.509, SA deletion, dead peer detection, and<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> - Network Address Translation</A> (NAT) traversal.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_2">Download FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Download the source tarball you've chosen, along with any patches.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_3">For freeswan.org source: check its signature</A></H3> -<P>While you're at our ftp site, get our source signing key</P> -<PRE> freeswan-sigkey.asc</PRE> -<P>Add it to your PGP keyring:</P> -<PRE> pgp -ka freeswan-sigkey.asc</PRE> -<P>Check the signature using:</P> -<PRE> pgp freeswan-2.04.tar.gz.sig freeswan-2.04.tar.gz</PRE> -<P>You should see something like:</P> -<PRE> Good signature from user "Linux FreeS/WAN Software Team (build@freeswan.org)". - Signature made 2002/06/26 21:04 GMT using 2047-bit key, key ID 46EAFCE1</PRE> - -<!-- Note to self: build@freeswan.org has angled brackets in the original. - Changed because it conflicts with HTML tags. --> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_4">Untar, unzip</A></H3> -<P>As root, unpack your FreeS/WAN source into<VAR> /usr/src</VAR>.</P> -<PRE> su - mv freeswan-2.04.tar.gz /usr/src - cd /usr/src - tar -xzf freeswan-2.04.tar.gz -</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_5">Patch if desired</A></H3> -<P>Now's the time to add any patches. The contributor may have special - instructions, or you may simply use the patch command.</P> -<H3><A NAME="15_5_6">... and Make</A></H3> -<P>Choose one of the methods below.</P> -<H4>Userland-only Install for 2.6 kernels</H4> -<A NAME="2.6.src"></A> -<P>Note: FreeS/WAN's support for 2.6 kernel IPsec is preliminary. Please - see<A HREf="2.6.known-issues"> 2.6.known-issues</A>, and the latest<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - mailing list reports</A>.</P> -<P>Change to your new FreeS/WAN directory, and make and install the - FreeS/WAN userland tools.</P> -<PRE> cd /usr/src/freeswan-2.04 - make programs - make install</PRE> -<P>Now,<A HREF="install.html#starttest"> start FreeS/WAN and test your - install</A>.</P> -<H4>KLIPS install for 2.2, 2.4, or 2.6 kernels</H4> -<A NAME="modinstall"></A> -<P>To make a modular version of KLIPS, along with other FreeS/WAN - programs you'll need, use the command sequence below. This will change - to your new FreeS/WAN directory, make the FreeS/WAN module (and other - stuff), and install it all.</P> -<PRE> cd /usr/src/freeswan-2.04 - make oldmod - make minstall</PRE> -<P><A HREF="install.html#starttest">Start FreeS/WAN and test your - install</A>.</P> -<P>To link KLIPS statically into your kernel (using your old kernel - settings), and install other FreeS/WAN components, do:</P> -<PRE> cd /usr/src/freeswan-2.04 - make oldmod - make minstall</PRE> -<P>Reboot your system and<A HREF="install.html#testonly"> test your - install</A>.</P> -<P>For other ways to compile KLIPS, see our Makefile.</P> -<A name="starttest"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_6">Start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A></H2> -<P>Bring FreeS/WAN up with:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec start</PRE> -<P>This is not necessary if you've rebooted.</P> -<A name="testonly"></A> -<H2><A NAME="15_7">Test your install</A></H2> -<P>To check that you have a successful install, run:</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify</PRE> -<P>You should see at least:</P> -<PRE> - Checking your system to see if IPsec got installed and started correctly - Version check and ipsec on-path [OK] - Checking for KLIPS support in kernel [OK] - Checking for RSA private key (/etc/ipsec.secrets) [OK] - Checking that pluto is running [OK] -</PRE> -<P>If any of these first four checks fails, see our<A href="trouble.html#install.check"> - troubleshooting guide</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="15_8">Making FreeS/WAN play well with others</A></H2> -<P>There are at least a couple of things on your system that might - interfere with FreeS/WAN, and now's a good time to check these:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Firewalling. You need to allow UDP 500 through your firewall, plus - ESP (protocol 50) and AH (protocol 51). For more information, see our - updated firewalls document (coming soon).</LI> -<LI>Network address translation. Do not NAT the packets you will be - tunneling.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="15_9">Configure for your needs</A></H2> -<P>You'll need to configure FreeS/WAN for your local site. Have a look - at our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> opportunism quickstart guide</A> to - see if that easy method is right for your needs. Or, see how to<A HREF="config.html"> - configure a network-to-network or Road Warrior style VPN</A>.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="adv_config.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="config.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/interop.html b/doc/interop.html deleted file mode 100644 index 1cd7b9e78..000000000 --- a/doc/interop.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,983 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="compat.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="performance.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<A NAME="interop"></A> -<H1><A NAME="10">Interoperating with FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P>The FreeS/WAN project needs you! We rely on the user community to - keep up to date. Mail users@lists.freeswan.org with your interop - success stories.</P> -<P><STRONG>Please note</STRONG>: Most of our interop examples feature - Linux FreeS/WAN 1.x config files. You can convert them to 2.x files - fairly easily with the patch in our<A HREF="upgrading.html#ipsec.conf_v2"> - Upgrading Guide</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="10_1">Interop at a Glance</A></H2> -<TABLE BORDER="1"> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD colspan="5">FreeS/WAN VPN</TD><TD>Road Warrior</TD><TD> -OE</TD></TR> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD>PSK</TD><TD>RSA Secret</TD><TD>X.509 -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -NAT-Traversal -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -Manual -<BR>Keying</TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD></TR> -<TR><TD colspan="8">More Compatible</TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="web.html#freeswan">FreeS/WAN</A><A NAME="freeswan.top"> - </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#isakmpd">isakmpd (OpenBSD)</A><A NAME="isakmpd.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No </FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#kame">Kame (FreeBSD, -<BR> NetBSD, MacOSX) -<BR> <SMALL>aka racoon</SMALL></A><A NAME="kame.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#mcafee">McAfee VPN -<BR><SMALL>was PGPNet</SMALL></A><A NAME="mcafee.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#microsoft">Microsoft -<BR> Windows 2000/XP</A><A NAME="microsoft.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="glossary.html#ssh">SSH Sentinel</A><A NAME="ssh.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#safenet">Safenet SoftPK -<BR>/SoftRemote</A><A NAME="safenet.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> -<TR><TD colspan="8">Other</TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#6wind">6Wind</A><A NAME="6wind.top"> </A></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#alcatel">Alcatel Timestep</A><A NAME="alcatel.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#apple">Apple Macintosh -<BR>System 10+</A><A NAME="apple.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#ashleylaurent">AshleyLaurent -<BR> VPCom</A><A NAME="ashleylaurent.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#borderware">Borderware</A><A NAME="borderware.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- -http://www.cequrux.com/vpn-guides.php3 -"coming soon" guide to connect with FreeS/WAN. ---> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#checkpoint">Check Point FW-1/VPN-1</A><A NAME="checkpoint.top"> - </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#cisco">Cisco with 3DES</A><A NAME="cisco.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT> -</TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#equinux">Equinux VPN Tracker -<BR> (for Mac OS X)</A><A NAME="equinux.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#fsecure">F-Secure</A><A NAME="fsecure.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#gauntlet">Gauntlet GVPN</A><A NAME="gauntlet.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#aix">IBM AIX</A><A NAME="aix.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#as400">IBM AS/400</A><A NAME="as400"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#intel">Intel Shiva -<BR>LANRover/Net Structure</A><A NAME="intel.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#lancom">LanCom (formerly ELSA)</A><A NAME="lancom.top"> - </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#linksys">Linksys</A><A NAME="linksys.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#lucent">Lucent</A><A NAME="lucent.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#cccc00">Partial</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netasq">Netasq</A><A NAME="netasq.top"> </A></TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netcelo">netcelo</A><A NAME="netcelo.top"> </A></TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netgear">Netgear fvs318</A><A NAME="netgear.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#netscreen">Netscreen 100 -<BR>or 5xp</A><A NAME="netscreen.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00"> -Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#nortel">Nortel Contivity</A><A NAME="nortel.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Partial</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#radguard">RadGuard</A><A NAME="radguard.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#raptor">Raptor</A><A NAME="raptor"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#redcreek">Redcreek Ravlin</A><A NAME="redcreek.top"> </A> -</TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT><FONT color="#cccc00">/Partial</FONT> -</TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000"> -No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#sonicwall">SonicWall</A><A NAME="sonicwall.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#sun">Sun Solaris</A><A NAME="sun.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT -color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT> -</TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#symantec">Symantec</A><A NAME="symantec.top"> </A></TD><TD> -<FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> - </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#watchguard">Watchguard -<BR> Firebox</A><A NAME="watchguard.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#xedia">Xedia Access Point -<BR>/QVPN</A><A NAME="xedia.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -<TR><TD><A HREF="#zyxel">Zyxel Zywall -<BR>/Prestige</A><A NAME="zyxel.top"> </A></TD><TD><FONT color="#00cc00"> -Yes</FONT></TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD><TD><FONT -color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE - - -<TR> -<TD><A HREF="#sample">sample</A></TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD> </TD> -<TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD> -</TR> - ---> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD>PSK</TD><TD>RSA Secret</TD><TD>X.509 -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -NAT-Traversal -<BR><SMALL><A HREF="#interoprules">(requires patch)</A></SMALL></TD><TD> -Manual -<BR>Keying</TD><TD> </TD><TD> </TD></TR> -<TR><TD> </TD><TD colspan="5">FreeS/WAN VPN</TD><TD>Road Warrior</TD><TD> -OE</TD></TR> - -<!-- PSK RSA X.509 NAT-T Manual RW OE --> -</TABLE> -<H3><A NAME="10_1_1">Key</A></H3> -<TABLE BORDER="1"> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT></TD><TD>People report that this - works for them.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>[Blank]</TD><TD>We don't know.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#cc0000">No</FONT></TD><TD>We have reason to - believe it was, at some point, not possible to get this to work.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Partial</FONT></TD><TD>Partial success. - For example, a connection can be created from one end only.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#00cc00">Yes</FONT><FONT color="#cccc00">/Partial</FONT> -</TD><TD>Mixed reports.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><FONT color="#cccc00">Maybe</FONT></TD><TD>We think the answer - is "yes", but need confirmation.</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<A NAME="interoprules"></A> -<H2><A NAME="10_2">Basic Interop Rules</A></H2> -<P>Vanilla FreeS/WAN implements<A HREF="compat.html#compat"> these parts</A> - of the IPSec specifications. You can add more with<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> - Super FreeS/WAN</A>, but what we offer may be enough for many users.</P> -<UL> -<LI> To use X.509 certificates with FreeS/WAN, you will need the<A HREF="http://www.strongsec.org/freeswan"> - X.509 patch</A> or<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> Super FreeS/WAN</A> -, which includes that patch.</LI> -<LI> To use<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> Network Address - Translation</A> (NAT) traversal with FreeS/WAN, you will need Arkoon - Network Security's<A HREF="http://open-source.arkoon.net"> NAT - traversal patch</A> or<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> Super FreeS/WAN</A> -, which includes it.</LI> -</UL> -<P>We offer a set of proposals which is not user-adjustable, but covers - all combinations that we can offer. FreeS/WAN always proposes triple - DES encryption and Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). In addition, we - propose Diffie Hellman groups 5 and 2 (in that order), and MD5 and - SHA-1 hashes. We accept the same proposals, in the same order of - preference.</P> -<P>Other interop notes:</P> -<UL> -<LI> A<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-September/msg00462.html"> - SHA-1 bug in FreeS/WAN 2.00, 2.01 and 2.02</A> may affect some interop - scenarios. It does not affect 1.x versions, and is fixed in 2.03 and - later.</LI> -<LI> Some other implementations will close a connection with FreeS/WAN - after some time. This may be a problem with rekey lifetimes. Please see<A -HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00293.html"> - this tip</A> and<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-December/005758.html"> - this workaround</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="10_3">Longer Stories</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="10_3_1">For<EM> More Compatible</EM> Implementations</A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="freeswan">FreeS/WAN</A></H4> -<P> See our documentation at<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org"> - freeswan.org</A> and the Super FreeS/WAN docs at<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> - freeswan.ca</A>. Some user-written HOWTOs for FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN - connections are listed in<A HREF="intro.html#howto"> our Introduction</A> -.</P> -<P>See also:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://lugbe.ch/action/reports/ipsec_htbe.phtml"> A German - FreeS/WAN-FreeS/WAN page by Markus Wernig (X.509)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="#freeswan.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="isakmpd">isakmpd (OpenBSD)</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.openbsd.org/faq/faq13.html">OpenBSD FAQ: Using - IPsec</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.rommel.stw.uni-erlangen.de/~hshoexer/ipsec-howto/HOWTO.html"> - Hans-Joerg Hoexer's interop Linux-OpenBSD (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.segfault.net/ipsec/"> Skyper's configuration - (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#isakmpd.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="kame">Kame</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>For FreeBSD and NetBSD. Ships with Mac OS X; see also our<A HREF="#apple"> - Mac</A> section.</LI> -<LI>Also known as<EM> racoon</EM>, its keying daemon.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.kame.net">Kame homepage, with FAQ</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.netbsd.org/Documentation/network/ipsec"> - NetBSD's IPSec FAQ</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00560.html"> - Ghislaine's post explaining some interop peculiarities</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/09/msg00511.html"> - Itojun's Kame-FreeS/WAN interop tips (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2000"> Ghislaine - Labouret's French page with links to matching FreeS/WAN and Kame - configs (RSA)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lugbe.ch/lostfound/contrib/freebsd_router/"> Markus - Wernig's HOWTO (X.509, BSD gateway)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://web.morgul.net/~frodo/docs/kame+freeswan_interop.html"> - Frodo's Kame-FreeS/WAN interop (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.wavesec.org/kame.phtml"> Kame as a WAVEsec - client.</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#kame.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="mcafee">PGPNet/McAfee</A></H4> -<P></P> -<UL> -<LI>Now called McAfee VPN Client.</LI> -<LI>PGPNet also came in a freeware version which did not support subnets</LI> -<LI>To support dhcp-over-ipsec, you need the X.509 patch, which is - included in<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca"> Super FreeS/WAN</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/WindowsInterop"> Tim Carr's - Windows Interop Guide (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.rommel.stw.uni-erlangen.de/~hshoexer/ipsec-howto/HOWTO.html#Interop2"> - Hans-Joerg Hoexer's Guide for Linux-PGPNet (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/04/msg00339.html"> - Kai Martius' instructions using RSA Key-Extractor Tool (RSA)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.zengl.net/freeswan/english.html">Christian - Zeng's page (RSA)</A> based on Kai's work. English or German. -<BR><A HREF="http://tirnanog.ls.fi.upm.es/CriptoLab/Biblioteca/InfTech/InfTech_CriptoLab.htm"> - Oscar Delgado's PDF (X.509, no configs)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www-ec.njit.edu/~rxt1077/Howto.txt"> Ryan's HOWTO - for FreeS/WAN-PGPNet (X.509)</A>. Through a Linksys Router with IPsec - Passthru enabled. -<BR><A HREF="http://jixen.tripod.com/#RW-PGP-to-Fwan"> Jean-Francois - Nadeau's Practical Configuration (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.evolvedatacom.nl/freeswan.html#toc"> Wouter - Prins' HOWTO (Road Warrior with X.509)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/01/msg00271.html"> - Rekeying problem with FreeS/WAN and older PGPNets</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/dhcprelay/index.htm"> DHCP - over IPSEC HOWTO for FreeS/WAN (requires X.509 and dhcprelay patches)</A> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#mcafee.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="microsoft">Microsoft Windows 2000/XP</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>IPsec comes with Win2k, and with XP Support Tools. May require<A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/downloads/recommended/encryption/default.asp"> - High Encryption Pack</A>. WinXP users have also reported better results - with Service Pack 1.</LI> -<LI>The Road Warrior setup works either way round. Windows (XP or 2K) - IPsec can connect as a Road Warrior to FreeS/WAN. However, FreeS/WAN - can also successfully connect as a Road Warrior to Windows IPsec (see - Nate Carlson's configs below).</LI> -<LI>FreeS/WAN version 1.92 or later is required to avoid an - interoperation problem with Windows native IPsec. Earlier FreeS/WAN - versions did not process the Commit Bit as Windows native IPsec - expected.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/WindowsInterop"> Tim Carr's - Windows Interop Guide (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://ipsec.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html"> James - Carter's instructions (X.509, NAT-T)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://jixen.tripod.com/#Win2000-Fwan"> Jean-Francois - Nadeau's Net-net Configuration (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://security.nta.no/freeswan-w2k.html"> Telenor's - Node-node Config (Transport-mode PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://vpn.ebootis.de"> Marcus Mueller's HOWTO using his - VPN config tool (X.509).</A> Tool also works with PSK. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.natecarlson.com/include/showpage.php?cat=linux&page=ipsec-x509"> - Nate Carlson's HOWTO using same tool (Road Warrior with X.509)</A>. - Unusually, FreeS/WAN is the Road Warrior here. -<BR><A HREF="http://tirnanog.ls.fi.upm.es/CriptoLab/Biblioteca/InfTech/InfTech_CriptoLab.htm"> - Oscar Delgado's PDF (X.509, no configs)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-July/022425.html"> - Tim Scannell's Windows XP Additional Checklist (X.509)</A> -<BR></P> - -<!-- Note to self: Include L2TP references? --> -<P><A HREF="http://www.microsoft.com/windows2000/en/server/help/default.asp?url=/windows2000/en/server/help/sag_TCPIP_ovr_secfeatures.htm"> - Microsoft's page on Win2k TCP/IP security features</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/Q257/2/25.ASP"> - Microsoft's Win2k IPsec debugging tips</A> -<BR> -<!-- Alt-URL http://support.microsoft.com/default.aspx?scid=kb;EN-US;q257225 -Perhaps newer? --> -<A HREF="http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,36336,00.html"> - MS VPN may fall back to 1DES</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#microsoft.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="ssh">SSH Sentinel</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Popular and well tested.</LI> -<LI>Also rebranded in<A HREF="http://www.zyxel.com"> Zyxel Zywall</A>. - Our Zyxel interop notes are<A HREF="#zyxel"> here</A>.</LI> -<LI> SSH supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -<LI>There is this<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/12/msg00370.html"> - potential problem</A> if you're not using the Legacy Proposal option.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.ssh.com/support/sentinel/documents.cfm"> SSH's - Sentinel-FreeSWAN interop PDF (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.nadmm.com/show.php?story=articles/vpn.inc"> - Nadeem Hassan's SUSE-to-Sentinel article (Road warrior with X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.zerozone.it/documents/Linux/HowTo/VPN-IPsec-Freeswan-HOWTO.html"> - O-Zone's Italian HOWTO (Road Warrior, X.509, DHCP)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#ssh.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="safenet">Safenet SoftPK/SoftRemote</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>People recommend SafeNet as a low cost Windows client.</LI> -<LI>SoftRemote seems to be the newer name for SoftPK.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005061.html"> - Whit Blauvelt's SoftRemote tips</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015591.html"> - Tim Wilson's tips (X.509)</A><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00607.html"> - Workaround for a "gotcha"</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://jixen.tripod.com/#Rw-IRE-to-Fwan"> Jean-Francois - Nadeau's Practical Configuration (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.terradoncommunications.com/security/whitepapers/safe_net-to-free_swan.pdf"> - Terradon Communications' PDF (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/?????.html"> - Seaan.net's PDF (Road Warrior to Subnet, with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.redbaronconsulting.com/freeswan/fswansafenet.pdf"> - Red Baron Consulting's PDF (Road Warrior with X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#safenet.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H3><A NAME="10_3_2">For<EM> Other Implementations</EM></A></H3> -<H4><A NAME="6wind">6Wind</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#6wind.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="alcatel">Alcatel Timestep</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-June/011878.html"> - Alain Sabban's settings (PSK or PSK road warrior; through static NAT)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/1999/06/msg00100.html"> - Derick Cassidy's configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/1999/08/msg00194.html"> - David Kerry's Timestep settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013711.html"> - Kevin Gerbracht's ipsec.conf (X.509)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#alcatel.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="apple">Apple Macintosh System 10+</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Since the system is based on FreeBSD, this should interoperate<A HREF="#kame"> - just like FreeBSD</A>.</LI> -<LI> To use Appletalk over IPsec tunnels,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005116.html"> - run it over TCP/IP</A>, or use Open Door Networks' Shareway IP tool,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005426.html"> - described here.</A></LI> -<LI>See also the<A HREF="#equinux"> Equinux VPN Tracker</A> for Mac OS - X.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://ipsec.math.ucla.edu/services/ipsec.html"> James - Carter's instructions (X.509, NAT-T)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#apple.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="ashleylaurent">AshleyLaurent VPCom</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.ashleylaurent.com/newsletter/01-28-00.htm"> - Successful interop report, no details</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#ashleylaurent.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="borderware">Borderware</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>I suspect the Borderware client is a rebranded Safenet. If that's - true, our<A HREF="#safenet"> Safenet section</A> will help.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-March/008288.html"> - Philip Reetz' configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/09/msg00217.html"> - Borderware server does not support FreeS/WAN road warriors</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007733.html"> - Older Borderware may not support Diffie Hellman groups 2, 5</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#borderware.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="checkpoint">Check Point VPN-1 or FW-1</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00099.html"> - Caveat about IP-range inclusion on Check Point.</A></LI> -<LI> Some versions of Check Point may require an aggressive mode patch - to interoperate with FreeS/WAN. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/code/super-freeswan"> Super - FreeS/WAN</A> now features this patch. -<!-- -<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/patches/aggressivemode">Steve Harvey's -aggressive mode patch for FreeS/WAN 1.5</A> ---> -</LI> -<LI></LI> -<LI>A Linux FreeS/WAN-Checkpoint connection may close after some time. - Try<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00293.html"> - this tip</A> toward a workaround.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.fw-1.de/aerasec/ng/vpn-freeswan/CPNG+Linux-FreeSWAN.html"> - AERAsec's Firewall-1 NG site (PSK, X.509, Road Warrior with X.509, - other algorithms)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.fw-1.de/aerasec/ng/vpn-freeswan/CPNG+Linux-FreeSWAN.html#support-matrix"> - AERAsec's detailed Check Point-FreeS/WAN support matrix</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://support.checkpoint.com/kb/docs/public/firewall1/4_1/pdf/fw-linuxvpn.pdf"> - Checkpoint.com PDF: Linux as a VPN Client to FW-1 (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.phoneboy.com"> PhoneBoy's Check Point FAQ (on - Check Point only, not FreeS/WAN)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-August/002351.html"> - Chris Harwell's tips FreeS/WAN configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009362.html"> - Daniel Tombeil's configs (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#checkpoint.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="cisco">Cisco</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> Cisco supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -<LI>Cisco VPN Client appears to use nonstandard IPsec and does not work - with FreeS/WAN.<A HREF="https://mj2.freeswan.org/archives/2003-August/maillist.html"> - This message</A> concerns Cisco VPN Client 4.01. -<!-- fix link --> -</LI> -<LI>A Linux FreeS/WAN-Cisco connection may close after some time.<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-December/005758.html"> - Here</A> is a workaround, and<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00293.html"> - here</A> is another comment on the same subject.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/120newft/120t/120t2/3desips.htm"> -Older Ciscos</A> purchased outside the United States may not have 3DES, - which FreeS/WAN requires.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-June/000406.html"> -RSA keying may not be possible between Cisco and FreeS/WAN.</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/004357.html"> -In ipsec.conf, VPN3000 DN (distinguished name) must be in binary (X.509 - only)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://rr.sans.org/encryption/cisco_router.php"> SANS - Institute HOWTO (PSK).</A> Detailed, with extensive references. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.worldbank.ro/IPSEC/cisco-linux.txt"> Short HOWTO - (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs for Cisco IOS, PIX and VPN 3000 (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-August/002966.html"> - Dave McFerren's sample configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-September/003422.html"> - Wolfgang Tremmel's sample configs (PSK road warrior)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00578.html"> - Old doc from Pete Davis, with William Watson's updated Tips (PSK)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><STRONG>Some PIX specific information:</STRONG> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.wlug.org.nz/FreeSwanToCiscoPix"> Waikato Linux - Users' Group HOWTO. Nice detail (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.johnleach.co.uk/documents/freeswan-pix/freeswan-pix.html"> - John Leach's configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.diverdown.cc/vpn/freeswanpix.html"> Greg - Robinson's settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007901.html"> - Scott's ipsec.conf for PIX (PSK, FreeS/WAN side only)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/003949.html"> - Rick Trimble's PIX and FreeS/WAN settings (PSK)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A href="http://www.cisco.com/public/support/tac"> Cisco VPN support - page</A> -<BR><A href="http://www.ieng.com/warp/public/707/index.shtml#ipsec"> - Cisco IPsec information page</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#cisco.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="equinux">Equinux VPN tracker (for Mac OS X)</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Graphical configurator for Mac OS X IPsec. May be an interface to - the<A HREF="#apple"> native Mac OS X IPsec</A>, which is essentially<A HREF="#kame"> - KAME</A>.</LI> -<LI>To use Appletalk over IPsec tunnels,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005116.html"> - run it over TCP/IP</A>, or use Open Door Networks' Shareway IP tool,<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005426.html"> - described here.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P> Equinux provides<A HREF="http://www.equinux.com/download/HowTo_FreeSWAN.pdf"> - this excellent interop PDF</A> (PSK, RSA, X.509).</P> -<P><A HREF="#equinux.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="fsecure">F-Secure</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> -<!-- <A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007596.html"> --> - F-Secure supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.pingworks.de/tech/vpn/vpn.txt">pingworks.de's - "Connecting F-Secure's VPN+ to Linux FreeS/WAN" (PSK road warrior)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.pingworks.de/tech/vpn/vpn.pdf">Same thing - as PDF</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.exim.org/pipermail/linux-ipsec/Week-of-Mon-20010122/000061.html"> - Success report, no detail (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.exim.org/pipermail/linux-ipsec/Week-of-Mon-20010122/000041.html"> - Success report, no detail (Manual)</A></P> - -<!-- Other NAT traversers: -http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009136.html -and ssh sentinel: -http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-September/003108.html ---> -<P><A HREF="#fsecure.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="gauntlet">Gauntlet GVPN</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00535.html"> - Richard Reiner's ipsec.conf (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-June/011434.html"> - Might work without that pesky firewall... (PSK)</A> -<BR> -<!-- insert archive link --> - In late July, 2003 Alexandar Antik reported success interoperating - with Gauntlet 6.0 for Solaris (X.509). Unfortunately the message is not - properly archived at this time.</P> -<P><A HREF="#gauntlet.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="aix">IBM AIX</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www-1.ibm.com/servers/esdd/articles/security.html"> - IBM's "Built-In Network Security with AIX" (PSK, X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www-1.ibm.com/servers/aix/products/ibmsw/security/vpn/faqandtips/#ques20"> - IBM's tip: importing Linux FreeS/WAN settings into AIX's<VAR> ikedb</VAR> - (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#aix.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="as400">IBM AS/400</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009106.html"> - Road Warriors may act flaky</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-September/014264.html"> - Richard Welty's tips and tricks</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#as400.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="intel">Intel Shiva LANRover / Net Structure</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Intel Shiva LANRover is now known as Intel Net Structure.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/01/msg00298.html"> - Shiva seems to have two modes: IPsec or the proprietary "Shiva Tunnel".</A> - Of course, FreeS/WAN will only create IPsec tunnels.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00293.html"> - AH may not work for Shiva-FreeS/WAN.</A> That's OK, since FreeS/WAN has - phased out the use of AH.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://snowcrash.tdyc.com/freeswan/"> Snowcrash's configs - (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.opus1.com/vpn/index.html"> Old configs from an - interop (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/003831.html"> - The day Shiva tickled a Pluto bug (PSK)</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-October/004270.html"> - Follow up: success!</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#intel.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="lancom">LanCom (formerly ELSA)</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>This router is popular in Germany.</LI> -</UL> -<P> Jakob Curdes successfully created a PSK connection with the LanCom - 1612 in August 2003. -<!-- add ML link when it appears --> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#lancom.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="linksys">Linksys</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Linksys may be used as an IPsec tunnel endpoint,<STRONG> OR</STRONG> - as a router in "IPsec passthrough" mode, so that the IPsec tunnel - passes through the Linksys.</LI> -</UL> -<H5>As tunnel endpoint</H5> -<P><A HREF="http://www.freeswan.ca/docs/BEFVP41/"> Ken Bantoft's - instructions (Road Warrior with PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007814.html"> - Nate Carlson's caveats</A></P> -<H5>In IPsec passthrough mode</H5> -<P><A HREF="http://www-ec.njit.edu/~rxt1077/Howto.txt"> Sample HOWTO - through a Linksys Router</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2002/02/msg00114.html"> - Nadeem Hasan's configs</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2002/02/msg00180.html"> - Brock Nanson's tips</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#linksys.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="lucent">Lucent</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010976.html"> - Partial success report; see also the next message in thread</A></P> - -<!-- section done --> -<P><A HREF="#lucent.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netasq">Netasq</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A></P> - -<!-- section done --> -<P><A HREF="#netasq.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netcelo">Netcelo</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A> -<!-- section done --> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#netcelo.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netgear">Netgear fvs318</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>With a recent Linux FreeS/WAN, you will require the latest (12/2002) - Netgear firmware, which supports Diffie-Hellman (DH) group 2. For - security reasons, we phased out DH 1 after Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-June/011833.html"> - This message</A> reports the incompatibility between Linux FreeS/WAN - 1.6+ and Netgear fvs318 without the firmware upgrade.</LI> -<LI>We believe Linux FreeS/WAN 1.5 and earlier will interoperate with - any NetGear firmware.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-February/017891.html"> - John Morris' setup (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#netgear.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="netscreen">Netscreen 100 or 5xp</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013409.html"> - Errol Neal's settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015265.html"> - Corey Rogers' configs (PSK, no PFS)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013051.html"> - Jordan Share's configs (PSK, 2 subnets, through static NAT)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/08/msg00404.html"> - Set src proxy_id to your protected subnet/mask</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with ipsec.conf, Netscreen screen shots (X.509, may need to - revert to PSK...)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://archives.neohapsis.com/archives/sf/linux/2001-q2/0123.html"> - A report of a company using Netscreen with FreeS/WAN on a large scale - (FreeS/WAN road warriors?)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#netscreen.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="nortel">Nortel Contivity</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> Nortel supports IPsec-over-UDP NAT traversal.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00417.html"> - Some older versions of Contivity and FreeS/WAN will not communicate.</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010924.html"> - FreeS/WAN cannot be used as a "client" to a Nortel Contivity server, - but can be used as a branch-office tunnel.</A></LI> - -<!-- Probably obsoleted by Ken's post -<LI> -(Matthias siebler from old interop) -At one point you could not configure Nortel-FreeS/WAN tunnels as -"Client Tunnels" since FreeS/WAN does not support Aggressive Mode. -Current status of this problem: unknown. -<LI> -<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/004612.html"> -How do we map group and user passwords onto the data that FreeS/WAN wants? -</A> -</LI> ---> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015455.html"> - Contivity does not send Distinguished Names in the order FS wants them - (X.509).</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/03/msg00137.html"> - Connections may time out after 30-40 minutes idle.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/03/msg00137.html"> - JJ Streicher-Bremer's mini HOWTO for old new software. (PSK with two - subnets)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/ipsec/ipsec2001/#config"> - French page with configs (X.509)</A>. This succeeds using the above - X.509 tip.</P> - -<!-- I could do more searching but this is a solid start. --> -<P><A HREF="#nortel.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="radguard">Radguard</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/05/msg00009.html"> - Marko Hausalo's configs (PSK).</A> Note: These do create a connection, - as you can see by "IPsec SA established". -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/???.html"> - Claudia Schmeing's comments</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#radguard.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="raptor">Raptor (NT or Solaris)</A></H4> -<P></P> -<UL> -<LI>Now known as Symantec Enterprise Firewall.</LI> -<LI>The Raptor does not normally come with X.509, but this may be - available as an add-on.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010256.html"> - Raptor requires alphanumberic PSK values, whereas FreeS/WAN uses hex.</A> -</LI> -<LI>Raptor's tunnel endpoint may be a host, subnet or group of subnets - (see<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2001-November/001295.html"> - this message</A> ). FreeS/WAN cannot handle the group of subnets; you - must create separate connections for each in order to interoperate.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010113.html"> - Some versions of Raptor accept only single DES.</A> According to this - German message,<A HREF="http://radawana.cg.tuwien.ac.at/mail-archives/lll/200012/msg00065.html"> - the Raptor Mobile Client demo offers single DES only.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-January/006935.html"> - Peter Mazinger's settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-November/005522.html"> - Peter Gerland's configs (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/07/msg00597.html"> - Charles Griebel's configs (PSK).</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-July/012275.html"> - Lumir Srch's tips (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/05/msg00214.html"> - John Hardy's configs (Manual)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/01/msg00236.html"> - Older Raptors want 3DES keys in 3 parts (Manual).</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/06/msg00480.html"> - Different keys for each direction? (Manual)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#raptor.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="redcreek">Redcreek Ravlin</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Known issue #1: The Ravlin expects a quick mode renegotiation right - after every Main Mode negotiation.</LI> -<LI> Known issue #2: The Ravlin tries to negotiate a zero connection - lifetime, which it takes to mean "infinite".<A HREF="http://www.bear-cave.org.uk/linux/ravlin/"> - Jim Hague's patch</A> addresses both issues.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/03/msg00191.html"> - Interop works with Ravlin Firmware > 3.33. Includes tips (PSK).</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="#redcreek.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="sonicwall">SonicWall</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-June/000998.html"> - Sonicwall cannot be used for Road Warrior setups</A></LI> -<LI> At one point,<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/05/msg00217.html"> - only Sonicwall PRO supported triple DES</A>.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-March/008600.html"> - Older Sonicwalls (before Nov 2001) feature Diffie Hellman group 1 only</A> -.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.xinit.cx/docs/freeswan.html"> Paul Wouters' - config (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00073.html"> - Dilan Arumainathan's configuration (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.gravitas.co.uk/vpndebug"> Dariush's setup... - only opens one way (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-July/022302.html"> - Andreas Steffen's tips (X.509)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#sonicwall.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="sun">Sun Solaris</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI> Solaris 8+ has a native (in kernel) IPsec implementation.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-May/010503.html"> - Solaris does not seem to support tunnel mode, but you can make IP-in-IP - tunnels instead, like this.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-June/022216.html"> - Reports of some successful interops</A> from a fellow @sun.com. See - also<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2003-July/022247.html"> - these follow up posts</A>. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/03/msg00332.html"> - Aleks Shenkman's configs (Manual in transport mode)</A> -<BR> -<!--sparc 64 stuff goes where?--> -</P> -<P><A HREF="#solaris.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="symantec">Symantec</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>The Raptor, covered<A HREF="#raptor"> above</A>, is now known as - Symantec Enterprise Firewall.</LI> -<LI>Symantec's "distinguished name" is a KEY_ID. See Andreas Steffen's - post, below.</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009037.html"> - Andreas Steffen's configs for Symantec 200R (PSK)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#symantec.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="watchguard">Watchguard Firebox</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Automatic keying works with WatchGuard 5.0+ only.</LI> -<LI>Seen to interoperate with WatchGuard 1000, II, III; firmware v. 5, - 6..</LI> -<LI>For manual keying, Watchguard's Policy Manager expects SPI numbers - and encryption and authentication keys in decimal (not hex).</LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-July/012595.html"> - WatchGuard's HOWTO (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-August/013342.html"> - Ronald C. Riviera's Settings (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00179.html"> - Walter Wickersham's Notes (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-October/015587.html"> - Max Enders' Configs (Manual)</A></P> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-April/009404.html"> - Old known issue with auto keying</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/02/msg00124.html"> - Tips on key generation and format (Manual)</A> -<BR></P> -<P><A HREF="#watchguard.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="xedia">Xedia Access Point/QVPN</A></H4> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2001/12/msg00520.html"> - Hybrid IPsec/L2TP connection settings (X.509)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1999/08/msg00140.html"> - Xedia's LAN-LAN links don't use multiple tunnels</A> -<BR> <A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/1999/08/msg00140.html"> - That explanation, continued</A></P> -<P><A HREF="#xedia.top">Back to chart</A></P> -<H4><A NAME="zyxel">Zyxel</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>The Zyxel Zywall is a rebranded SSH Sentinel box. See also our - section on<A HREF="glossary.html#ssh"> SSH</A>.</LI> -<LI>There seems to be a problem with keeping this connection alive. This - is caused at the Zyxel end. See this brief<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/archives/users/2003-October/msg00141.html"> - discussion and solution.</A></LI> -</UL> -<P><A HREF="http://www.zyxel.com/support/supportnote/zywall/app/zw_freeswan.htm"> - Zyxel's Zywall to FreeS/WAN instructions (PSK)</A> -<BR><A HREF="http://www.zyxel.com/support/supportnote/p652/app/zw_freeswan.htm"> - Zyxel's Prestige to FreeS/WAN instructions (PSK)</A>. Note: not all - Prestige versions include VPN software. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.lancry.net/techdocs/freeswan-zyxel.txt"> Fabrice - Cahen's HOWTO (PSK)</A> -<BR> </P> -<P><A HREF="#zyxel.top">Back to chart</A></P> - -<!-- SAMPLE ENTRY - -<H4><A NAME="timestep">Timestep</A></H4> - -<P>Text goes here. -</P> - ---> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="compat.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="performance.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/intro.html b/doc/intro.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3afc3e324..000000000 --- a/doc/intro.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,733 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="upgrading.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="intro">Introduction</A></H1> -<P>This section gives an overview of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>what IP Security (IPsec) does</LI> -<LI>how IPsec works</LI> -<LI>why we are implementing it for Linux</LI> -<LI>how this implementation works</LI> -</UL> -<P>This section is intended to cover only the essentials,<EM> things you - should know before trying to use FreeS/WAN.</EM></P> -<P>For more detailed background information, see the<A href="politics.html#politics"> - history and politics</A> and<A href="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail"> IPsec - protocols</A> sections.</P> -<H2><A name="ipsec.intro">IPsec, Security for the Internet Protocol</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is a Linux implementation of the IPsec (IP security) - protocols. IPsec provides<A href="glossary.html#encryption"> encryption</A> - and<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> authentication</A> services - at the IP (Internet Protocol) level of the network protocol stack.</P> -<P>Working at this level, IPsec can protect any traffic carried over IP, - unlike other encryption which generally protects only a particular - higher-level protocol --<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A> for mail,<A -href="glossary.html#SSH"> SSH</A> for remote login,<A href="glossary.html#SSL"> - SSL</A> for web work, and so on. This approach has both considerable - advantages and some limitations. For discussion, see our<A href="ipsec.html#others"> - IPsec section</A></P> -<P>IPsec can be used on any machine which does IP networking. Dedicated - IPsec gateway machines can be installed wherever required to protect - traffic. IPsec can also run on routers, on firewall machines, on - various application servers, and on end-user desktop or laptop - machines.</P> -<P>Three protocols are used</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#AH">AH</A> (Authentication Header) provides a - packet-level authentication service</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#ESP">ESP</A> (Encapsulating Security Payload) - provides encryption plus authentication</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#IKE">IKE</A> (Internet Key Exchange) - negotiates connection parameters, including keys, for the other two</LI> -</UL> -<P>Our implementation has three main parts:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#KLIPS">KLIPS</A> (kernel IPsec) implements - AH, ESP, and packet handling within the kernel</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#Pluto">Pluto</A> (an IKE daemon) implements - IKE, negotiating connections with other systems</LI> -<LI>various scripts provide an adminstrator's interface to the machinery</LI> -</UL> -<P>IPsec is optional for the current (version 4) Internet Protocol. - FreeS/WAN adds IPsec to the Linux IPv4 network stack. Implementations - of<A href="glossary.html#ipv6.gloss"> IP version 6</A> are required to - include IPsec. Work toward integrating FreeS/WAN into the Linux IPv6 - stack has<A href="compat.html#ipv6"> started</A>.</P> -<P>For more information on IPsec, see our<A href="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail"> - IPsec protocols</A> section, our collection of<A href="web.html#ipsec.link"> - IPsec links</A> or the<A href="rfc.html#RFC"> RFCs</A> which are the - official definitions of these protocols.</P> -<H3><A name="intro.interop">Interoperating with other IPsec - implementations</A></H3> -<P>IPsec is designed to let different implementations work together. We - provide:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="web.html#implement"> list</A> of some other - implementations</LI> -<LI>information on<A href="interop.html#interop"> using FreeS/WAN with - other implementations</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The VPN Consortium fosters cooperation among implementers and - interoperability among implementations. Their<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/"> - web site</A> has much more information.</P> -<H3><A name="advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>IPsec has a number of security advantages. Here are some - independently written articles which discuss these:</P> -<P><A HREF="http://www.sans.org/rr/"> SANS institute papers</A>. See the - section on Encryption &VPNs. -<BR><A HREF="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/netsol/ns110/ns170/ns171/ns128/networking_solutions_white_papers_list.html"> - Cisco's white papers on "Networking Solutions"</A>. -<BR><A HREF="http://iscs.sourceforge.net/HowWhyBrief/HowWhyBrief.html"> - Advantages of ISCS (Linux Integrated Secure Communications System; - includes FreeS/WAN and other software)</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="applications">Applications of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>Because IPsec operates at the network layer, it is remarkably - flexible and can be used to secure nearly any type of Internet traffic. - Two applications, however, are extremely widespread:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="glossary.html#VPN"> Virtual Private Network</A>, or VPN, - allows multiple sites to communicate securely over an insecure Internet - by encrypting all communication between the sites.</LI> -<LI>"Road Warriors" connect to the office from home, or perhaps from a - hotel somewhere</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is enough opportunity in these applications that vendors are - flocking to them. IPsec is being built into routers, into firewall - products, and into major operating systems, primarily to support these - applications. See our<A href="web.html#implement"> list</A> of - implementations for details.</P> -<P>We support both of those applications, and various less common IPsec - applications as well, but we also add one of our own:</P> -<UL> -<LI>opportunistic encryption, the ability to set up FreeS/WAN gateways - so that any two of them can encrypt to each other, and will do so - whenever packets pass between them.</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is an extension we are adding to the protocols. FreeS/WAN is the - first prototype implementation, though we hope other IPsec - implementations will adopt the technique once we demonstrate it. See<A href="#goals"> - project goals</A> below for why we think this is important.</P> -<P>A somewhat more detailed description of each of these applications is - below. Our<A href="quickstart.html#quick_guide"> quickstart</A> section - will show you how to build each of them.</P> -<H4><A name="makeVPN">Using secure tunnels to create a VPN</A></H4> -<P>A VPN, or<STRONG> V</STRONG>irtual<STRONG> P</STRONG>rivate<STRONG> N</STRONG> -etwork lets two networks communicate securely when the only connection - between them is over a third network which they do not trust.</P> -<P>The method is to put a security gateway machine between each of the - communicating networks and the untrusted network. The gateway machines - encrypt packets entering the untrusted net and decrypt packets leaving - it, creating a secure tunnel through it.</P> -<P>If the cryptography is strong, the implementation is careful, and the - administration of the gateways is competent, then one can reasonably - trust the security of the tunnel. The two networks then behave like a - single large private network, some of whose links are encrypted tunnels - through untrusted nets.</P> -<P>Actual VPNs are often more complex. One organisation may have fifty - branch offices, plus some suppliers and clients, with whom it needs to - communicate securely. Another might have 5,000 stores, or 50,000 - point-of-sale devices. The untrusted network need not be the Internet. - All the same issues arise on a corporate or institutional network - whenever two departments want to communicate privately with each other.</P> -<P>Administratively, the nice thing about many VPN setups is that large - parts of them are static. You know the IP addresses of most of the - machines involved. More important, you know they will not change on - you. This simplifies some of the admin work. For cases where the - addresses do change, see the next section.</P> -<H4><A name="road.intro">Road Warriors</A></H4> -<P>The prototypical "Road Warrior" is a traveller connecting to home - base from a laptop machine. Administratively, most of the same problems - arise for a telecommuter connecting from home to the office, especially - if the telecommuter does not have a static IP address.</P> -<P>For purposes of this document:</P> -<UL> -<LI>anyone with a dynamic IP address is a "Road Warrior".</LI> -<LI>any machine doing IPsec processing is a "gateway". Think of the - single-user road warrior machine as a gateway with a degenerate subnet - (one machine, itself) behind it.</LI> -</UL> -<P>These require somewhat different setup than VPN gateways with static - addresses and with client systems behind them, but are basically not - problematic.</P> -<P>There are some difficulties which appear for some road warrior - connections:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Road Wariors who get their addresses via DHCP may have a problem. - FreeS/WAN can quite happily build and use a tunnel to such an address, - but when the DHCP lease expires, FreeS/WAN does not know that. The - tunnel fails, and the only recovery method is to tear it down and - re-build it.</LI> -<LI>If<A href="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> Network Address Translation</A> - (NAT) is applied between the two IPsec Gateways, this breaks IPsec. - IPsec authenticates packets on an end-to-end basis, to ensure they are - not altered en route. NAT rewrites packets as they go by. See our<A href="firewall.html#NAT"> - firewalls</A> document for details.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In most situations, however, FreeS/WAN supports road warrior - connections just fine.</P> -<H4><A name="opp.intro">Opportunistic encryption</A></H4> -<P>One of the reasons we are working on FreeS/WAN is that it gives us - the opportunity to add what we call opportuntistic encryption. This - means that any two FreeS/WAN gateways will be able to encrypt their - traffic, even if the two gateway administrators have had no prior - contact and neither system has any preset information about the other.</P> -<P>Both systems pick up the authentication information they need from - the<A href="glossary.html#DNS"> DNS</A> (domain name service), the - service they already use to look up IP addresses. Of course the - administrators must put that information in the DNS, and must set up - their gateways with opportunistic encryption enabled. Once that is - done, everything is automatic. The gateways look for opportunities to - encrypt, and encrypt whatever they can. Whether they also accept - unencrypted communication is a policy decision the administrator can - make.</P> -<P>This technique can give two large payoffs:</P> -<UL> -<LI>It reduces the administrative overhead for IPsec enormously. You - configure your gateway and thereafter everything is automatic. The need - to configure the system on a per-tunnel basis disappears. Of course, - FreeS/WAN allows specifically configured tunnels to co-exist with - opportunistic encryption, but we hope to make them unnecessary in most - cases.</LI> -<LI>It moves us toward a more secure Internet, allowing users to create - an environment where message privacy is the default. All messages can - be encrypted, provided the other end is willing to co-operate. See our<A -href="politics.html#politics"> history and politics of cryptography</A> - section for discussion of why we think this is needed.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Opportunistic encryption is not (yet?) a standard part of the IPsec - protocols, but an extension we are proposing and demonstrating. For - details of our design, see<A href="#applied"> links</A> below.</P> -<P>Only one current product we know of implements a form of - opportunistic encryption.<A href="web.html#ssmail"> Secure sendmail</A> - will automatically encrypt server-to-server mail transfers whenever - possible.</P> -<H3><A name="types">The need to authenticate gateways</A></H3> -<P>A complication, which applies to any type of connection -- VPN, Road - Warrior or opportunistic -- is that a secure connection cannot be - created magically.<EM> There must be some mechanism which enables the - gateways to reliably identify each other.</EM> Without this, they - cannot sensibly trust each other and cannot create a genuinely secure - link.</P> -<P>Any link they do create without some form of<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> - authentication</A> will be vulnerable to a<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attack</A>. If<A href="glossary.html#alicebob"> Alice - and Bob</A> are the people creating the connection, a villian who can - re-route or intercept the packets can pose as Alice while talking to - Bob and pose as Bob while talking to Alice. Alice and Bob then both - talk to the man in the middle, thinking they are talking to each other, - and the villain gets everything sent on the bogus "secure" connection.</P> -<P>There are two ways to build links securely, both of which exclude the - man-in-the middle:</P> -<UL> -<LI>with<STRONG> manual keying</STRONG>, Alice and Bob share a secret - key (which must be transmitted securely, perhaps in a note or via PGP - or SSH) to encrypt their messages. For FreeS/WAN, such keys are stored - in the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> file. Of - course, if an enemy gets the key, all is lost.</LI> -<LI>with<STRONG> automatic keying</STRONG>, the two systems authenticate - each other and negotiate their own secret keys. The keys are - automatically changed periodically.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Automatic keying is much more secure, since if an enemy gets one key - only messages between the previous re-keying and the next are exposed. - It is therefore the usual mode of operation for most IPsec deployment, - and the mode we use in our setup examples. FreeS/WAN does support - manual keying for special circumstanes. See this<A href="adv_config.html#prodman"> - section</A>.</P> -<P>For automatic keying, the two systems must authenticate each other - during the negotiations. There is a choice of methods for this:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<STRONG> shared secret</STRONG> provides authentication. If Alice - and Bob are the only ones who know a secret and Alice recives a message - which could not have been created without that secret, then Alice can - safely believe the message came from Bob.</LI> -<LI>a<A href="glossary.html#public"> public key</A> can also provide - authentication. If Alice receives a message signed with Bob's private - key (which of course only he should know) and she has a trustworthy - copy of his public key (so that she can verify the signature), then she - can safely believe the message came from Bob.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Public key techniques are much preferable, for reasons discussed<A href="config.html#choose"> - later</A>, and will be used in all our setup examples. FreeS/WAN does - also support auto-keying with shared secret authentication. See this<A href="adv_config.html#prodsecrets"> - section</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="project">The FreeS/WAN project</A></H2> -<P>For complete information on the project, see our web site,<A href="http://liberty.freeswan.org"> - freeswan.org</A>.</P> -<P>In summary, we are implementing the<A href="glossary.html#IPsec"> - IPsec</A> protocols for Linux and extending them to do<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="goals">Project goals</A></H3> -<P>Our overall goal in FreeS/WAN is to make the Internet more secure and - more private.</P> -<P>Our IPsec implementation supports VPNs and Road Warriors of course. - Those are important applications. Many users will want FreeS/WAN to - build corporate VPNs or to provide secure remote access.</P> -<P>However, our goals in building it go beyond that. We are trying to - help<STRONG> build security into the fabric of the Internet</STRONG> so - that anyone who choses to communicate securely can do so, as easily as - they can do anything else on the net.</P> -<P>More detailed objectives are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>extend IPsec to do<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> opportunistic - encryption</A> so that -<UL> -<LI>any two systems can secure their communications without a - pre-arranged connection</LI> -<LI><STRONG>secure connections can be the default</STRONG>, falling back - to unencrypted connections only if: -<UL> -<LI><EM>both</EM> the partner is not set up to co-operate on securing - the connection</LI> -<LI><EM>and</EM> your policy allows insecure connections</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>a significant fraction of all Internet traffic is encrypted</LI> -<LI>wholesale monitoring of the net (<A href="politics.html#intro.poli"> -examples</A>) becomes difficult or impossible</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>help make IPsec widespread by providing an implementation with no - restrictions: -<UL> -<LI>freely available in source code under the<A href="glossary.html#GPL"> - GNU General Public License</A></LI> -<LI>running on a range of readily available hardware</LI> -<LI>not subject to US or other nations'<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> - export restrictions</A>. -<BR> Note that in order to avoid<EM> even the appearance</EM> of being - subject to those laws, the project cannot accept software contributions - --<EM> not even one-line bug fixes</EM> -- from US residents or - citizens.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>provide a high-quality IPsec implementation for Linux -<UL> -<LI>portable to all CPUs Linux supports:<A href="compat.html#CPUs"> - (current list)</A></LI> -<LI>interoperable with other IPsec implementations:<A href="interop.html#interop"> - (current list)</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>If we can get opportunistic encryption implemented and widely - deployed, then it becomes impossible for even huge well-funded agencies - to monitor the net.</P> -<P>See also our section on<A href="politics.html#politics"> history and - politics</A> of cryptography, which includes our project leader's<A href="politics.html#gilmore"> - rationale</A> for starting the project.</P> -<H3><A name="staff">Project team</A></H3> -<P>Two of the team are from the US and can therefore contribute no code:</P> -<UL> -<LI>John Gilmore: founder and policy-maker (<A href="http://www.toad.com/gnu/"> -home page</A>)</LI> -<LI>Hugh Daniel: project manager, Most Demented Tester, and occasionally - Pointy-Haired Boss</LI> -</UL> -<P>The rest of the team are Canadians, working in Canada. (<A href="politics.html#status"> -Why Canada?</A>)</P> -<UL> -<LI>Hugh Redelmeier:<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto daemon</A> - programmer</LI> -<LI>Richard Guy Briggs:<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> - programmer</LI> -<LI>Michael Richardson: hacker without portfolio</LI> -<LI>Claudia Schmeing: documentation</LI> -<LI>Sam Sgro: technical support via the<A href="mail.html#lists"> - mailing lists</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The project is funded by civil libertarians who consider our goals - worthwhile. Most of the team are paid for this work.</P> -<P>People outside this core team have made substantial contributions. - See</P> -<UL> -<LI>our<A href="../CREDITS"> CREDITS</A> file</LI> -<LI>the<A href="web.html#patch"> patches and add-ons</A> section of our - web references file</LI> -<LI>lists below of user-written<A href="#howto"> HowTos</A> and<A href="#applied"> - other papers</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Additional contributions are welcome. See the<A href="faq.html#contrib.faq"> - FAQ</A> for details.</P> -<H2><A name="products">Products containing FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<P>Unfortunately the<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> export laws</A> of - some countries restrict the distribution of strong cryptography. - FreeS/WAN is therefore not in the standard Linux kernel and not in all - CD or web distributions.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN is, however, quite widely used. Products we know of that - use it are listed below. We would appreciate hearing, via the<A href="mail.html#lists"> - mailing lists</A>, of any we don't know of.</P> -<H3><A name="distwith">Full Linux distributions</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is included in various general-purpose Linux distributions, - mostly from countries (shown in brackets) with more sensible laws:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.suse.com/">SuSE Linux</A> (Germany)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.conectiva.com">Conectiva</A> (Brazil)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linux-mandrake.com/en/">Mandrake</A> (France)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.debian.org">Debian</A></LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.pld.org.pl/"> Polish(ed) Linux Distribution</A> - (Poland)</LI> -<LI><A>Best Linux</A> (Finland)</LI> -</UL> -<P>For distributions which do not include FreeS/WAN and are not Redhat - (which we develop and test on), there is additional information in our<A -href="compat.html#otherdist"> compatibility</A> section.</P> -<P>The server edition of<A href="http://www.corel.com"> Corel</A> Linux - (Canada) also had FreeS/WAN, but Corel have dropped that product line.</P> -<H3><A name="kernel_dist">Linux kernel distributions</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/wolk/">Working Overloaded - Linux Kernel (WOLK)</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="office_dist">Office server distributions</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN is also included in several distributions aimed at the - market for turnkey business servers:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.e-smith.com/">e-Smith</A> (Canada), which has - recently been acquired and become the Network Server Solutions group of<A -href="http://www.mitel.com/"> Mitel Networks</A> (Canada)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.clarkconnect.org/">ClarkConnect</A> from Point - Clark Networks (Canada)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.trustix.net/">Trustix Secure Linux</A> (Norway)</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="fw_dist">Firewall distributions</A></H3> -<P>Several distributions intended for firewall and router applications - include FreeS/WAN:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.linuxrouter.org/"> Linux Router Project</A> - produces a Linux distribution that will boot from a single floppy. The<A -href="http://leaf.sourceforge.net"> LEAF</A> firewall project provides - several different LRP-based firewall packages. At least one of them, - Charles Steinkuehler's Dachstein, includes FreeS/WAN with X.509 - patches.</LI> -<LI>there are several distributions bootable directly from CD-ROM, - usable on a machine without hard disk. -<UL> -<LI>Dachstein (see above) can be used this way</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.gibraltar.at/">Gibraltar</A> is based on Debian - GNU/Linux.</LI> -<LI>at time of writing,<A href="www.xiloo.com"> Xiloo</A> is available - only in Chinese. An English version is expected.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.astaro.com/products/index.html">Astaro Security - Linux</A> includes FreeS/WAN. It has some web-based tools for managing - the firewall that include FreeS/WAN configuration management.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxwall.de">Linuxwall</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.smoothwall.org/">Smoothwall</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.devil-linux.org/">Devil Linux</A></LI> -<LI>Coyote Linux has a<A href="http://embedded.coyotelinux.com/wolverine/index.php"> - Wolverine</A> firewall/VPN server</LI> -</UL> -<P>There are also several sets of scripts available for managing a - firewall which is also acting as a FreeS/WAN IPsec gateway. See this<A href="firewall.html#rules.pub"> - list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="turnkey">Firewall and VPN products</A></H3> -<P>Several vendors use FreeS/WAN as the IPsec component of a turnkey - firewall or VPN product.</P> -<P>Software-only products:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxmagic.com/vpn/index.html">Linux Magic</A> - offer a VPN/Firewall product using FreeS/WAN</LI> -<LI>The Software Group's<A href="http://www.wanware.com/sentinet/"> - Sentinet</A> product uses FreeS/WAN</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.merilus.com">Merilus</A> use FreeS/WAN in their - Gateway Guardian firewall product</LI> -</UL> -<P>Products that include the hardware:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.lasat.com"> LASAT SafePipe[tm]</A> series. is - an IPsec box based on an embedded MIPS running Linux with FreeS/WAN and - a web-config front end. This company also host our freeswan.org web - site.</LI> -<LI>Merilus<A href="http://www.merilus.com/products/fc/index.shtml"> - Firecard</A> is a Linux firewall on a PCI card.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.kyzo.com/">Kyzo</A> have a "pizza box" product - line with various types of server, all running from flash. One of them - is an IPsec/PPTP VPN server</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.pfn.com">PFN</A> use FreeS/WAN in some of their - products</LI> -</UL> -<P><A href="www.rebel.com">Rebel.com</A>, makers of the Netwinder Linux - machines (ARM or Crusoe based), had a product that used FreeS/WAN. The - company is in receivership so the future of the Netwinder is at best - unclear.<A href="web.html#patch"> PKIX patches</A> for FreeS/WAN - developed at Rebel are listed in our web links document.</P> -<H2><A name="docs">Information sources</A></H2> -<H3><A name="docformats">This HowTo, in multiple formats</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN documentation up to version 1.5 was available only in HTML. - Now we ship two formats:</P> -<UL> -<LI>as HTML, one file for each doc section plus a global<A href="toc.html"> - Table of Contents</A></LI> -<LI><A href="HowTo.html">one big HTML file</A> for easy searching</LI> -</UL> -<P>and provide a Makefile to generate other formats if required:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="HowTo.pdf">PDF</A></LI> -<LI><A href="HowTo.ps">Postscript</A></LI> -<LI><A href="HowTo.txt">ASCII text</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The Makefile assumes the htmldoc tool is available. You can download - it from<A href="http://www.easysw.com"> Easy Software</A>.</P> -<P>All formats should be available at the following websites:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.freeswan.org/doc.html">FreeS/WAN project</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org">Linux Documentation Project</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>The distribution tarball has only the two HTML formats.</P> -<P><STRONG>Note:</STRONG> If you need the latest doc version, for - example to see if anyone has managed to set up interoperation between - FreeS/WAN and whatever, then you should download the current snapshot. - What is on the web is documentation as of the last release. Snapshots - have all changes I've checked in to date.</P> -<H3><A name="rtfm">RTFM (please Read The Fine Manuals)</A></H3> -<P>As with most things on any Unix-like system, most parts of Linux - FreeS/WAN are documented in online manual pages. We provide a list of<A href="/mnt/floppy/manpages.html"> - FreeS/WAN man pages</A>, with links to HTML versions of them.</P> -<P>The man pages describing configuration files are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> -ipsec.secrets(5)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Man pages for common commands include:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec.8.html">ipsec(8)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto(8)</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html"> -ipsec_newhostkey(8)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="/mnt/floppy/manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto(8)</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>You can read these either in HTML using the links above or with the<VAR> - man(1)</VAR> command.</P> -<P>In the event of disagreement between this HTML documentation and the - man pages, the man pages are more likely correct since they are written - by the implementers. Please report any such inconsistency on the<A href="mail.html#lists"> - mailing list</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="text">Other documents in the distribution</A></H3> -<P>Text files in the main distribution directory are README, INSTALL, - CREDITS, CHANGES, BUGS and COPYING.</P> -<P>The Libdes encryption library we use has its own documentation. You - can find it in the library directory..</P> -<H3><A name="assumptions">Background material</A></H3> -<P>Throughout this documentation, I write as if the reader had at least - a general familiarity with Linux, with Internet Protocol networking, - and with the basic ideas of system and network security. Of course that - will certainly not be true for all readers, and quite likely not even - for a majority.</P> -<P>However, I must limit amount of detail on these topics in the main - text. For one thing, I don't understand all the details of those topics - myself. Even if I did, trying to explain everything here would produce - extremely long and almost completely unreadable documentation.</P> -<P>If one or more of those areas is unknown territory for you, there are - plenty of other resources you could look at:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Linux</DT> -<DD>the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org"> Linux Documentation Project</A> - or a local<A href="http://www.linux.org/groups/"> Linux User Group</A> - and these<A href="web.html#linux.link"> links</A></DD> -<DT>IP networks</DT> -<DD>Rusty Russell's<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/networking-concepts-HOWTO/index.html"> - Networking Concepts HowTo</A> and these<A href="web.html#IP.background"> - links</A></DD> -<DT>Security</DT> -<DD>Schneier's book<A href="biblio.html#secrets"> Secrets and Lies</A> - and these<A href="web.html#crypto.link"> links</A></DD> -</DL> -<P>Also, I do make an effort to provide some background material in - these documents. All the basic ideas behind IPsec and FreeS/WAN are - explained here. Explanations that do not fit in the main text, or that - not everyone will need, are often in the<A href="glossary.html#ourgloss"> - glossary</A>, which is the largest single file in this document set. - There is also a<A href="background.html#background"> background</A> - file containing various explanations too long to fit in glossary - definitions. All files are heavily sprinkled with links to each other - and to the glossary.<STRONG> If some passage makes no sense to you, try - the links</STRONG>.</P> -<P>For other reference material, see the<A href="biblio.html#biblio"> - bibliography</A> and our collection of<A href="web.html#weblinks"> web - links</A>.</P> -<P>Of course, no doubt I get this (and other things) wrong sometimes. - Feedback via the<A href="mail.html#lists"> mailing lists</A> is - welcome.</P> -<H3><A name="archives">Archives of the project mailing list</A></H3> -<P>Until quite recently, there was only one FreeS/WAN mailing list, and - archives of it were:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec">Canada</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nexial.com">Holland</A></LI> -</UL> - The two archives use completely different search engines. You might - want to try both. -<P>More recently we have expanded to five lists, each with its own - archive.</P> -<P><A href="mail.html#lists">More information</A> on mailing lists.</P> -<H3><A name="howto">User-written HowTo information</A></H3> -<P>Various user-written HowTo documents are available. The ones covering - FreeS/WAN-to-FreeS/WAN connections are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Jean-Francois Nadeau's<A href="http://jixen.tripod.com/"> practical - configurations</A> document</LI> -<LI>Jens Zerbst's HowTo on<A href="http://dynipsec.tripod.com/"> Using - FreeS/WAN with dynamic IP addresses</A>.</LI> -<LI>an entry in Kurt Seifried's<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/kben00000013.html"> - Linux Security Knowledge Base</A>.</LI> -<LI>a section of David Ranch's<A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos"> - Trinity OS Guide</A></LI> -<LI>a section in David Bander's book<A href="biblio.html#bander"> Linux - Security Toolkit</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>User-wriiten HowTo material may be<STRONG> especially helpful if you - need to interoperate with another IPsec implementation</STRONG>. We - have neither the equipment nor the manpower to test such - configurations. Users seem to be doing an admirable job of filling the - gaps.</P> -<UL> -<LI>list of user-written<A href="interop.html#otherpub"> interoperation - HowTos</A> in our interop document</LI> -</UL> -<P>Check what version of FreeS/WAN user-written documents cover. The - software is under active development and the current version may be - significantly different from what an older document describes.</P> -<H3><A name="applied">Papers on FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Two design documents show team thinking on new developments:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="opportunism.spec">Opportunistic Encryption</A> by technical - lead Henry Spencer and Pluto programmer Hugh Redelemeier</LI> -<LI>discussion of<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/SSW/freeswan/klips2req/"> - KLIPS redesign</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Both documents are works in progress and are frequently revised. For - the latest version, see the<A href="mail.html#lists"> design mailing - list</A>. Comments should go to that list.</P> -<P>There is now an<A href="http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-richardson-ipsec-opportunistic-06.txt"> - Internet Draft on Opportunistic Encryption</A> by Michael Richardson, - Hugh Redelmeier and Henry Spencer. This is a first step toward getting - the protocol standardised so there can be multiple implementations of - it. Discussion of it takes place on the<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - IETF IPsec Working Group</A> mailing list.</P> -<P>A number of papers giving further background on FreeS/WAN, or - exploring its future or its applications, are also available:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Both Henry and Richard gave talks on FreeS/WAN at the 2000<A href="http://www.linuxsymposium.org"> - Ottawa Linux Symposium</A>. -<UL> -<LI>Richard's<A href="http://www.conscoop.ottawa.on.ca/rgb/freeswan/ols2k/"> - slides</A></LI> -<LI>Henry's paper</LI> -<LI>MP3 audio of their talks is available from the<A href="http://www.linuxsymposium.org/"> - conference page</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><CITE>Moat: A Virtual Private Network Appliances and Services - Platform</CITE> is a paper about large-scale (a few 100 links) use of - FreeS/WAN in a production application at AT&T Research. It is available - in Postscript or PDF from co-author Steve Bellovin's<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/index.html"> - papers list page</A>.</LI> -<LI>One of the Moat co-authors, John Denker, has also written -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/ipsec+routing.htm"> proposal</A> - for how future versions of FreeS/WAN might interact with routing - protocols</LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.av8n.com/vpn/wishlist.htm"> wishlist</A> of - possible new features</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Bart Trojanowski's web page has a draft design for<A href="http://www.jukie.net/~bart/linux-ipsec/"> - hardware acceleration</A> of FreeS/WAN</LI> -</UL> -<P>Several of these provoked interesting discussions on the mailing - lists, worth searching for in the<A href="mail.html#archive"> archives</A> -.</P> -<P>There are also several papers in languages other than English, see - our<A href="web.html#otherlang"> web links</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="licensing">License and copyright information</A></H3> -<P>All code and documentation written for this project is distributed - under either the GNU General Public License (<A href="glossary.html#GPL"> -GPL</A>) or the GNU Library General Public License. For details see the - COPYING file in the distribution.</P> -<P>Not all code in the distribution is ours, however. See the CREDITS - file for details. In particular, note that the<A href="glossary.html#LIBDES"> - Libdes</A> library and the version of<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> MD5</A> - that we use each have their own license.</P> -<H2><A name="sites">Distribution sites</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN is available from a number of sites.</P> -<H3><A NAME="1_5_1">Primary site</A></H3> -<P>Our primary site, is at xs4all (Thanks, folks!) in Holland:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan">HTTP</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan">FTP</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="mirrors">Mirrors</A></H3> -<P>There are also mirror sites all over the world:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.flora.org/freeswan">Eastern Canada</A> (limited - resouces)</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ludwig.doculink.com/pub/freeswan/">Eastern Canada</A> - (has older versions too)</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ntsc.notBSD.org/pub/crypto/freeswan/">Eastern Canada</A> - (has older versions too)</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.kame.net/pub/freeswan/">Japan</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.futuredynamics.com/freecrypto/FreeSWAN/">Hong - Kong</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ipsec.dk/pub/freeswan/">Denmark</A></LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.net.lut.ac.uk/freeswan">the UK</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://storm.alert.sk/comp/mirrors/freeswan/">Slovak - Republic</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://the.wiretapped.net/security/vpn-tunnelling/freeswan/"> -Australia</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://freeswan.technolust.cx/">technolust</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://freeswan.devguide.de/">Germany</A></LI> -<LI>Ivan Moore's<A href="http://snowcrash.tdyc.com/freeswan/"> site</A></LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.cryptoarchive.net/"> Crypto Archive</A> on - the<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/"> Security Portal</A> site</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.wiretapped.net/">Wiretapped.net</A> in Australia</LI> -</UL> -<P>Thanks to those folks as well.</P> -<H3><A name="munitions">The "munitions" archive of Linux crypto software</A> -</H3> -<P>There is also an archive of Linux crypto software called "munitions", - with its own mirrors in a number of countries. It includes FreeS/WAN, - though not always the latest version. Some of its sites are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://munitions.vipul.net/">Germany</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://munitions.iglu.cjb.net/">Italy</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://munitions2.xs4all.nl/">Netherlands</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Any of those will have a list of other "munitions" mirrors. There is - also a CD available.</P> -<H2><A NAME="1_6">Links to other sections</A></H2> -<P>For more detailed background information, see:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="politics.html#politics">history and politics</A> of - cryptography</LI> -<LI><A href="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail">IPsec protocols</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>To begin working with FreeS/WAN, go to our<A href="quickstart.html#quick.guide"> - quickstart</A> guide.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="upgrading.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/ipsec.html b/doc/ipsec.html deleted file mode 100644 index 4fb27b92b..000000000 --- a/doc/ipsec.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1040 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="politics.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="mail.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="ipsec.detail">The IPsec protocols</A></H1> -<P>This section provides information on the IPsec protocols which - FreeS/WAN implements. For more detail, see the<A href="rfc.html"> RFCs</A> -.</P> -<P>The basic idea of IPsec is to provide security functions,<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> - authentication</A> and<A href="glossary.html#encryption"> encryption</A> -, at the IP (Internet Protocol) level. This requires a higher-level - protocol (IKE) to set things up for the IP-level services (ESP and AH).</P> -<H2><A NAME="27_1">Protocols and phases</A></H2> -<P>Three protocols are used in an IPsec implementation:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ESP, Encapsulating Security Payload</DT> -<DD>Encrypts and/or authenticates data</DD> -<DT>AH, Authentication Header</DT> -<DD>Provides a packet authentication service</DD> -<DT>IKE, Internet Key Exchange</DT> -<DD>Negotiates connection parameters, including keys, for the other two</DD> -</DL> -<P>The term "IPsec" (also written as IPSEC) is slightly ambiguous. In - some contexts, it includes all three of the above but in other contexts - it refers only to AH and ESP.</P> -<P>There is more detail below, but a quick summary of how the whole - thing works is:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Phase one IKE (main mode exchange)</DT> -<DD>sets up a keying channel (ISAKMP SA) between the two gateways</DD> -<DT>Phase two IKE (quick mode exchange)</DT> -<DD>sets up data channels (IPsec SAs)</DD> -<DT>IPsec proper</DT> -<DD>exchanges data using AH or ESP</DD> -</DL> -<P>Both phases of IKE are repeated periodically to automate re-keying.</P> -<H2><A name="others">Applying IPsec</A></H2> -<P>Authentication and encryption functions for network data can, of - course, be provided at other levels. Many security protocols work at - levels above IP.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#PGP">PGP</A> encrypts and authenticates mail - messages</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#SSH">SSH</A> authenticates remote logins and - then encrypts the session</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#SSL">SSL</A> or<A href="glossary.html#TLS"> - TLS</A> provides security at the sockets layer, e.g. for secure web - browsing</LI> -</UL> -<P>and so on. Other techniques work at levels below IP. For example, - data on a communications circuit or an entire network can be encrypted - by specialised hardware. This is common practice in high-security - applications.</P> -<H3><A name="advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>There are, however, advantages to doing it at the IP level instead - of, or as well as, at other levels.</P> -<P>IPsec is the<STRONG> most general way to provide these services for - the Internet</STRONG>.</P> -<UL> -<LI>Higher-level services protect a<EM> single protocol</EM>; for - example PGP protects mail.</LI> -<LI>Lower level services protect a<EM> single medium</EM>; for example a - pair of encryption boxes on the ends of a line make wiretaps on that - line useless unless the attacker is capable of breaking the encryption.</LI> -</UL> -<P>IPsec, however, can protect<EM> any protocol</EM> running above IP - and<EM> any medium</EM> which IP runs over. More to the point, it can - protect a mixture of application protocols running over a complex - combination of media. This is the normal situation for Internet - communication; IPsec is the only general solution.</P> -<P>IPsec can also provide some security services "in the background", - with<STRONG> no visible impact on users</STRONG>. To use<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> - PGP</A> encryption and signatures on mail, for example, the user must - at least:</P> -<UL> -<LI>remember his or her passphrase,</LI> -<LI>keep it secure</LI> -<LI>follow procedures to validate correspondents' keys</LI> -</UL> -<P>These systems can be designed so that the burden on users is not - onerous, but any system will place some requirements on users. No such - system can hope to be secure if users are sloppy about meeting those - requirements. The author has seen username and password stuck on - terminals with post-it notes in an allegedly secure environment, for - example.</P> -<H3><A name="limitations">Limitations of IPsec</A></H3> -<P>IPsec is designed to secure IP links between machines. It does that - well, but it is important to remember that there are many things it - does not do. Some of the important limitations are:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A name="depends">IPsec cannot be secure if your system isn't</A></DT> -<DD>System security on IPsec gateway machines is an essential - requirement if IPsec is to function as designed. No system can be - trusted if the underlying machine has been subverted. See books on Unix - security such as<A href="biblio.html#practical"> Garfinkel and Spafford</A> - or our web references for<A href="web.html#linsec"> Linux security</A> - or more general<A href="web.html#compsec"> computer security</A>. -<P>Of course, there is another side to this. IPsec can be a powerful - tool for improving system and network security. For example, requiring - packet authentication makes various spoofing attacks harder and IPsec - tunnels can be extremely useful for secure remote administration of - various things.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="not-end-to-end">IPsec is not end-to-end</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec cannot provide the same end-to-end security as systems working - at higher levels. IPsec encrypts an IP connection between two machines, - which is quite a different thing than encrypting messages between users - or between applications. -<P>For example, if you need mail encrypted from the sender's desktop to - the recipient's desktop and decryptable only by the recipient, use<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> - PGP</A> or another such system. IPsec can encrypt any or all of the - links involved -- between the two mail servers, or between either - server and its clients. It could even be used to secure a direct IP - link from the sender's desktop machine to the recipient's, cutting out - any sort of network snoop. What it cannot ensure is end-to-end - user-to-user security. If only IPsec is used to secure mail, then - anyone with appropriate privileges on any machine where that mail is - stored (at either end or on any store-and-forward servers in the path) - can read it.</P> -<P>In another common setup, IPsec encrypts packets at a security gateway - machine as they leave the sender's site and decrypts them on arrival at - the gateway to the recipient's site. This does provide a useful - security service -- only encrypted data is passed over the Internet -- - but it does not even come close to providing an end-to-end service. In - particular, anyone with appropriate privileges on either site's LAN can - intercept the message in unencrypted form.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="notpanacea">IPsec cannot do everything</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec also cannot provide all the functions of systems working at - higher levels of the protocol stack. If you need a document - electronically signed by a particular person, then you need his or her<A -href="glossary.html#signature"> digital signature</A> and a<A href="glossary.html#public"> - public key cryptosystem</A> to verify it with. -<P>Note, however, that IPsec authentication of the underlying - communication can make various attacks on higher-level protocols more - difficult. In particular, authentication prevents<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A>.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="no_user">IPsec authenticates machines, not users</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec uses strong authentication mechanisms to control which - messages go to which machines, but it does not have the concept of user - ID, which is vital to many other security mechansims and policies. This - means some care must be taken in fitting the various security - mechansims on a network together. For example, if you need to control - which users access your database server, you need some non-IPsec - mechansim for that. IPsec can control which machines connect to the - server, and can ensure that data transfer to those machines is done - securely, but that is all. Either the machines themselves must control - user access or there must be some form of user authentication to the - database, independent of IPsec.</DD> -<DT><A name="DoS">IPsec does not stop denial of service attacks</A></DT> -<DD><A href="glossary.html#DOS">Denial of service</A> attacks aim at - causing a system to crash, overload, or become confused so that - legitimate users cannot get whatever services the system is supposed to - provide. These are quite different from attacks in which the attacker - seeks either to use the service himself or to subvert the service into - delivering incorrect results. -<P>IPsec shifts the ground for DoS attacks; the attacks possible against - systems using IPsec are different than those that might be used against - other systems. It does not, however, eliminate the possibility of such - attacks.</P> -</DD> -<DT><A name="traffic">IPsec does not stop traffic analysis</A></DT> -<DD><A href="glossary.html#traffic">Traffic analysis</A> is the attempt - to derive intelligence from messages without regard for their contents. - In the case of IPsec, it would mean analysis based on things visible in - the unencrypted headers of encrypted packets -- source and destination - gateway addresses, packet size, et cetera. Given the resources to - acquire such data and some skill in analysing it (both of which any - national intelligence agency should have), this can be a very powerful - technique. -<P>IPsec is not designed to defend against this. Partial defenses are - certainly possible, and some are<A href="#traffic.resist"> described - below</A>, but it is not clear that any complete defense can be - provided.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A name="uses">IPsec is a general mechanism for securing IP</A></H3> -<P>While IPsec does not provide all functions of a mail encryption - package, it can encrypt your mail. In particular, it can ensure that - all mail passing between a pair or a group of sites is encrypted. An - attacker looking only at external traffic, without access to anything - on or behind the IPsec gateway, cannot read your mail. He or she is - stymied by IPsec just as he or she would be by<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> - PGP</A>.</P> -<P>The advantage is that IPsec can provide the same protection for<STRONG> - anything transmitted over IP</STRONG>. In a corporate network example, - PGP lets the branch offices exchange secure mail with head office. SSL - and SSH allow them to securely view web pages, connect as terminals to - machines, and so on. IPsec can support all those applications, plus - database queries, file sharing (NFS or Windows), other protocols - encapsulated in IP (Netware, Appletalk, ...), phone-over-IP, - video-over-IP, ... anything-over-IP. The only limitation is that IP - Multicast is not yet supported, though there are Internet Draft - documents for that.</P> -<P>IPsec creates<STRONG> secure tunnels through untrusted networks</STRONG> -. Sites connected by these tunnels form VPNs,<A href="glossary.html#VPN"> - Virtual Private Networks</A>.</P> -<P>IPsec gateways can be installed wherever they are required.</P> -<UL> -<LI>One organisation might choose to install IPsec only on firewalls - between their LANs and the Internet. This would allow them to create a - VPN linking several offices. It would provide protection against anyone - outside their sites.</LI> -<LI>Another might install IPsec on departmental servers so everything on - the corporate backbone net was encrypted. This would protect messages - on that net from everyone except the sending and receiving department.</LI> -<LI>Another might be less concerned with information secrecy and more - with controlling access to certain resources. They might use IPsec - packet authentication as part of an access control mechanism, with or - without also using the IPsec encryption service.</LI> -<LI>It is even possible (assuming adequate processing power and an IPsec - implementation in each node) to make every machine its own IPsec - gateway so that everything on a LAN is encrypted. This protects - information from everyone outside the sending and receiving machine.</LI> -<LI>These techniques can be combined in various ways. One might, for - example, require authentication everywhere on a network while using - encryption only for a few links.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Which of these, or of the many other possible variants, to use is up - to you.<STRONG> IPsec provides mechanisms; you provide the policy</STRONG> -.</P> -<P><STRONG>No end user action is required</STRONG> for IPsec security to - be used; they don't even have to know about it. The site - administrators, of course, do have to know about it and to put some - effort into making it work. Poor administration can compromise IPsec as - badly as the post-it notes mentioned above. It seems reasonable, - though, for organisations to hope their system administrators are - generally both more security-conscious than end users and more able to - follow computer security procedures. If not, at least there are fewer - of them to educate or replace.</P> -<P>IPsec can be, and often should be, used with along with security - protocols at other levels. If two sites communicate with each other via - the Internet, then IPsec is the obvious way to protect that - communication. If two others have a direct link between them, either - link encryption or IPsec would make sense. Choose one or use both. - Whatever you use at and below the IP level, use other things as - required above that level. Whatever you use above the IP level, - consider what can be done with IPsec to make attacks on the higher - levels harder. For example,<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle attacks</A> on various protocols become difficult if - authentication at packet level is in use on the potential victims' - communication channel.</P> -<H3><A name="authonly">Using authentication without encryption</A></H3> -<P>Where appropriate, IPsec can provide authentication without - encryption. One might do this, for example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>where the data is public but one wants to be sure of getting the - right data, for example on some web sites</LI> -<LI>where encryption is judged unnecessary, for example on some company - or department LANs</LI> -<LI>where strong encryption is provided at link level, below IP</LI> -<LI>where strong encryption is provided in other protocols, above IP -<BR> Note that IPsec authentication may make some attacks on those - protocols harder.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Authentication has lower overheads than encryption.</P> -<P>The protocols provide four ways to build such connections, using - either an AH-only connection or ESP using null encryption, and in - either manually or automatically keyed mode. FreeS/WAN supports only - one of these, manually keyed AH-only connections, and<STRONG> we do not - recommend using that</STRONG>. Our reasons are discussed under<A href="#traffic.resist"> - Resisting traffic analysis</A> a few sections further along.</P> -<H3><A name="encnoauth">Encryption without authentication is dangerous</A> -</H3> -<P>Originally, the IPsec encryption protocol<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> - ESP</A> didn't do integrity checking. It only did encryption. Steve - Bellovin found many ways to attack ESP used without authentication. See - his paper<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/badesp.ps"> - Problem areas for the IP Security Protocols</A>. To make a secure - connection, you had to add an<A href="glossary.html#AH"> AH</A> - Authentication Header as well as ESP. Rather than incur the overhead of - several layers (and rather than provide an ESP layer that didn't - actually protect the traffic), the IPsec working group built integrity - and replay checking directly into ESP.</P> -<P>Today, typical usage is one of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>ESP for encryption and authentication</LI> -<LI>AH for authentication alone</LI> -</UL> -<P>Other variants are allowed by the standard, but not much used:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ESP encryption without authentication</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Bellovin has demonstrated fatal flaws in this. Do not use.</STRONG> -</DD> -<DT>ESP encryption with AH authentication</DT> -<DD>This has higher overheads than using the authentication in ESP, and - no obvious benefit in most cases. The exception might be a network - where AH authentication was widely or universally used. If you're going - to do AH to conform with network policy, why authenticate again in the - ESP layer?</DD> -<DT>Authenticate twice, with AH and with ESP</DT> -<DD>Why? Of course, some folk consider "belt and suspenders" the - sensible approach to security. If you're among them, you might use both - protocols here. You might also use both to satisfy different parts of a - security policy. For example, an organisation might require AH - authentication everywhere but two users within the organisation might - use ESP as well.</DD> -<DT>ESP authentication without encryption</DT> -<DD>The standard allows this, calling it "null encryption". FreeS/WAN - does not support it. We recommend that you use AH instead if - authentication is all you require. AH authenticates parts of the IP - header, which ESP-null does not do.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Some of these variants cannot be used with FreeS/WAN because we do - not support ESP-null and do not support automatic keying of AH-only - connections.</P> -<P>There are fairly frequent suggestions that AH be dropped entirely - from the IPsec specifications since ESP and null encryption can handle - that situation. It is not clear whether this will occur. My guess is - that it is unlikely.</P> -<H3><A name="multilayer">Multiple layers of IPsec processing are - possible</A></H3> -<P>The above describes combinations possible on a single IPsec - connection. In a complex network you may have several layers of IPsec - in play, with any of the above combinations at each layer.</P> -<P>For example, a connection from a desktop machine to a database server - might require AH authentication. Working with other host, network and - database security measures, AH might be just the thing for access - control. You might decide not to use ESP encryption on such packets, - since it uses resources and might complicate network debugging. Within - the site where the server is, then, only AH would be used on those - packets.</P> -<P>Users at another office, however, might have their whole connection - (AH headers and all) passing over an IPsec tunnel connecting their - office to the one with the database server. Such a tunnel should use - ESP encryption and authentication. You need authentication in this - layer because without authentication the encryption is vulnerable and - the gateway cannot verify the AH authentication. The AH is between - client and database server; the gateways aren't party to it.</P> -<P>In this situation, some packets would get multiple layers of IPsec - applied to them, AH on an end-to-end client-to-server basis and ESP - from one office's security gateway to the other.</P> -<H3><A name="traffic.resist">Resisting traffic analysis</A></H3> -<P><A href="glossary.html#traffic">Traffic analysis</A> is the attempt - to derive useful intelligence from encrypted traffic without breaking - the encryption.</P> -<P>Is your CEO exchanging email with a venture capital firm? With - bankruptcy trustees? With an executive recruiting agency? With the - holder of some important patents? If an eavesdropper learns about any - of those, then he has interesting intelligence on your company, whether - or not he can read the messages themselves.</P> -<P>Even just knowing that there is network traffic between two sites may - tell an analyst something useful, especially when combined with - whatever other information he or she may have. For example, if you know - Company A is having cashflow problems and Company B is looking for - aquisitions, then knowing that packets are passing between the two is - interesting. It is more interesting if you can tell it is email, and - perhaps yet more if you know the sender and recipient.</P> -<P>Except in the simplest cases, traffic analysis is hard to do well. It - requires both considerable resources and considerable analytic skill. - However, intelligence agencies of various nations have been doing it - for centuries and many of them are likely quite good at it by now. - Various commercial organisations, especially those working on "targeted - marketing" may also be quite good at analysing certain types of - traffic.</P> -<P>In general, defending against traffic analysis is also difficult. - Inventing a really good defense could get you a PhD and some - interesting job offers.</P> -<P>IPsec is not designed to stop traffic analysis and we know of no - plausible method of extending it to do so. That said, there are ways to - make traffic analysis harder. This section describes them.</P> -<H4><A name="extra">Using "unnecessary" encryption</A></H4> -<P>One might choose to use encryption even where it appears unnecessary - in order to make analysis more difficult. Consider two offices which - pass a small volume of business data between them using IPsec and also - transfer large volumes of Usenet news. At first glance, it would seem - silly to encrypt the newsfeed, except possibly for any newsgroups that - are internal to the company. Why encrypt data that is all publicly - available from many sites?</P> -<P>However, if we encrypt a lot of news and send it down the same - connection as our business data, we make<A href="glossary.html#traffic"> - traffic analysis</A> much harder. A snoop cannot now make inferences - based on patterns in the volume, direction, sizes, sender, destination, - or timing of our business messages. Those messages are hidden in a mass - of news messages encapsulated in the same way.</P> -<P>If we're going to do this we need to ensure that keys change often - enough to remain secure even with high volumes and with the adversary - able to get plaintext of much of the data. We also need to look at - other attacks this might open up. For example, can the adversary use a - chosen plaintext attack, deliberately posting news articles which, when - we receive and encrypt them, will help break our encryption? Or can he - block our business data transmission by flooding us with silly news - articles? Or ...</P> -<P>Also, note that this does not provide complete protection against - traffic analysis. A clever adversary might still deduce useful - intelligence from statistical analysis (perhaps comparing the input - newsfeed to encrypted output, or comparing the streams we send to - different branch offices), or by looking for small packets which might - indicate establishment of TCP connections, or ...</P> -<P>As a general rule, though, to improve resistance to traffic analysis, - you should<STRONG> encrypt as much traffic as possible, not just as - much as seems necessary.</STRONG></P> -<H4><A name="multi-encrypt">Using multiple encryption</A></H4> -<P>This also applies to using multiple layers of encryption. If you have - an IPsec tunnel between two branch offices, it might appear silly to - send<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A>-encrypted email through that - tunnel. However, if you suspect someone is snooping your traffic, then - it does make sense:</P> -<UL> -<LI>it protects the mail headers; they cannot even see who is mailing - who</LI> -<LI>it protects against user bungles or software malfunctions that - accidentally send messages in the clear</LI> -<LI>it makes any attack on the mail encryption much harder; they have to - break IPsec or break into your network before they can start on the - mail encryption</LI> -</UL> -<P>Similar arguments apply for<A href="glossary.html#SSL"> SSL</A> --encrypted web traffic or<A href="glossary.html#SSH"> SSH</A>-encrypted - remote login sessions, even for end-to-end IPsec tunnels between - systems in the two offices.</P> -<H4><A name="fewer">Using fewer tunnels</A></H4> -<P>It may also help to use fewer tunnels. For example, if all you - actually need encrypted is connections between:</P> -<UL> -<LI>mail servers at branch and head offices</LI> -<LI>a few branch office users and the head office database server</LI> -</UL> -<P>You might build one tunnel per mail server and one per remote - database user, restricting traffic to those applications. This gives - the traffic analyst some information, however. He or she can - distinguish the tunnels by looking at information in the ESP header - and, given that distinction and the patterns of tunnel usage, might be - able to figure out something useful. Perhaps not, but why take the - risk?</P> -<P>We suggest instead that you build one tunnel per branch office, - encrypting everything passing from head office to branches. This has a - number of advantages:</P> -<UL> -<LI>it is easier to build and administer</LI> -<LI>it resists traffic analysis somewhat better</LI> -<LI>it provides security for whatever you forgot. For example, if some - user at a remote office browses proprietary company data on some head - office web page (that the security people may not even know about!), - then that data is encrypted before it reaches the Internet.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Of course you might also want to add additional tunnels. For example, - if some of the database data is confidential and should not be exposed - even within the company, then you need protection from the user's - desktop to the database server. We suggest you do that in whatever way - seems appropriate -- IPsec, SSH or SSL might fit -- but, whatever you - choose, pass it between locations via a gateway-to-gateway IPsec tunnel - to provide some resistance to traffic analysis.</P> -<H2><A name="primitives">Cryptographic components</A></H2> -<P>IPsec combines a number of cryptographic techniques, all of them - well-known and well-analyzed. The overall design approach was - conservative; no new or poorly-understood components were included.</P> -<P>This section gives a brief overview of each technique. It is intended - only as an introduction. There is more information, and links to - related topics, in our<A href="glossary.html"> glossary</A>. See also - our<A href="biblio.html"> bibliography</A> and cryptography<A href="web.html#crypto.link"> - web links</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="block.cipher">Block ciphers</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="glossary.html#encryption"> encryption</A> in the<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> - ESP</A> encapsulation protocol is done with a<A href="glossary.html#block"> - block cipher</A>.</P> -<P>We do not implement<A href="glossary.html#DES"> single DES</A>. It is<A -href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> insecure</A>. Our default, and - currently only, block cipher is<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> triple DES</A> -.</P> -<P>The<A href="glossary.html#rijndael"> Rijndael</A> block cipher has - won the<A href="glossary.html#AES"> AES</A> competition to choose a - relacement for DES. It will almost certainly be added to FreeS/WAN and - to other IPsec implementations.<A href="web.html#patch"> Patches</A> - are already available.</P> -<H3><A name="hash.ipsec">Hash functions</A></H3> -<H4><A name="hmac.ipsec">The HMAC construct</A></H4> -<P>IPsec packet authentication is done with the<A href="glossary.html#HMAC"> - HMAC</A> construct. This is not just a hash of the packet data, but a - more complex operation which uses both a hashing algorithm and a key. - It therefore does more than a simple hash would. A simple hash would - only tell you that the packet data was not changed in transit, or that - whoever changed it also regenerated the hash. An HMAC also tells you - that the sender knew the HMAC key.</P> -<P>For IPsec HMAC, the output of the hash algorithm is truncated to 96 - bits. This saves some space in the packets. More important, it prevents - an attacker from seeing all the hash output bits and perhaps creating - some sort of attack based on that knowledge.</P> -<H4>Choice of hash algorithm</H4> -<P>The IPsec RFCs require two hash algorithms --<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> - MD5</A> and<A href="glossary.html#SHA"> SHA-1</A> -- both of which - FreeS/WAN implements.</P> -<P>Various other algorithms -- such as RIPEMD and Tiger -- are listed in - the RFCs as optional. None of these are in the FreeS/WAN distribution, - or are likely to be added, although user<A href="web.html#patch"> - patches</A> exist for several of them.</P> -<P>Additional hash algorithms --<A href="glossary.html#SHA-256"> - SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512</A> -- may be required to give hash - strength matching the strength of<A href="glossary.html#AES"> AES</A>. - These are likely to be added to FreeS/WAN along with AES.</P> -<H3><A name="DH.keying">Diffie-Hellman key agreement</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="glossary.html#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement - protocol allows two parties (A and B or<A href="glossary.html#alicebob"> - Alice and Bob</A>) to agree on a key in such a way that an eavesdropper - who intercepts the entire conversation cannot learn the key.</P> -<P>The protocol is based on the<A href="glossary.html#dlog"> discrete - logarithm</A> problem and is therefore thought to be secure. - Mathematicians have been working on that problem for years and seem no - closer to a solution, though there is no proof that an efficient - solution is impossible.</P> -<H3><A name="RSA.auth">RSA authentication</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="glossary.html#RSA"> RSA</A> algorithm (named for its - inventors -- Rivest, Shamir and Adleman) is a very widely used<A href="glossary.html#"> - public key</A> cryptographic technique. It is used in IPsec as one - method of authenticating gateways for Diffie-Hellman key negotiation.</P> -<H2><A name="structure">Structure of IPsec</A></H2> -<P>There are three protocols used in an IPsec implementation:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ESP, Encapsulating Security Payload</DT> -<DD>Encrypts and/or authenticates data</DD> -<DT>AH, Authentication Header</DT> -<DD>Provides a packet authentication service</DD> -<DT>IKE, Internet Key Exchange</DT> -<DD>Negotiates connection parameters, including keys, for the other two</DD> -</DL> -<P>The term "IPsec" is slightly ambiguous. In some contexts, it includes - all three of the above but in other contexts it refers only to AH and - ESP.</P> -<H3><A name="IKE.ipsec">IKE (Internet Key Exchange)</A></H3> -<P>The IKE protocol sets up IPsec (ESP or AH) connections after - negotiating appropriate parameters (algorithms to be used, keys, - connection lifetimes) for them. This is done by exchanging packets on - UDP port 500 between the two gateways.</P> -<P>IKE (RFC 2409) was the outcome of a long, complex process in which - quite a number of protocols were proposed and debated. Oversimplifying - mildly, IKE combines:</P> -<DL> -<DT>ISAKMP (RFC 2408)</DT> -<DD>The<STRONG> I</STRONG>nternet<STRONG> S</STRONG>ecurity<STRONG> A</STRONG> -ssociation and<STRONG> K</STRONG>ey<STRONG> M</STRONG>anagement<STRONG> - P</STRONG>rotocol manages negotiation of connections and defines<A href="glossary.html#SA"> - SA</A>s (Security Associations) as a means of describing connection - properties.</DD> -<DT>IPsec DOI for ISAKMP (RFC 2407)</DT> -<DD>A<STRONG> D</STRONG>omain<STRONG> O</STRONG>f<STRONG> I</STRONG> -nterpretation fills in the details necessary to turn the rather abstract - ISAKMP protocol into a more tightly specified protocol, so it becomes - applicable in a particular domain.</DD> -<DT>Oakley key determination protocol (RFC 2412)</DT> -<DD>Oakley creates keys using the<A href="glossary.html#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement protocol.</DD> -</DL> -<P>For all the details, you would need to read the four<A href="rfc.html"> - RFCs</A> just mentioned (over 200 pages) and a number of others. We - give a summary below, but it is far from complete.</P> -<H4><A name="phases">Phases of IKE</A></H4> -<P>IKE negotiations have two phases.</P> -<DL> -<DT>Phase one</DT> -<DD>The two gateways negotiate and set up a two-way ISAKMP SA which they - can then use to handle phase two negotiations. One such SA between a - pair of gateways can handle negotiations for multiple tunnels.</DD> -<DT>Phase two</DT> -<DD>Using the ISAKMP SA, the gateways negotiate IPsec (ESP and/or AH) - SAs as required. IPsec SAs are unidirectional (a different key is used - in each direction) and are always negotiated in pairs to handle two-way - traffic. There may be more than one pair defined between two gateways.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Both of these phases use the UDP protocol and port 500 for their - negotiations.</P> -<P>After both IKE phases are complete, you have IPsec SAs to carry your - encrypted data. These use the ESP or AH protocols. These protocols do - not have ports. Ports apply only to UDP or TCP.</P> -<P>The IKE protocol is designed to be extremely flexible. Among the - things that can be negotiated (separately for each SA) are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>SA lifetime before rekeying</LI> -<LI>encryption algorithm used. We currently support only<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> - triple DES</A>. Single DES is<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - insecure</A>. The RFCs say you MUST do DES, SHOULD do 3DES and MAY do - various others. We do not do any of the others.</LI> -<LI>authentication algorithms. We support<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> - MD5</A> and<A href="glossary.html#SHA"> SHA</A>. These are the two the - RFCs require.</LI> -<LI>choice of group for<A href="glossary.html#DH"> Diffie-Hellman</A> - key agreement. We currently support Groups 2 and 5 (which are defined - modulo primes of various lengths) and do not support Group 1 (defined - modulo a shorter prime, and therefore cryptographically weak) or groups - 3 and 4 (defined using elliptic curves). The RFCs require only Group 1.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The protocol also allows implementations to add their own encryption - algorithms, authentication algorithms or Diffie-Hellman groups. We do - not support any such extensions, but there are some<A href="web.html#patch"> - patches</A> that do.</P> -<P>There are a number of complications:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The gateways must be able to authenticate each other's identities - before they can create a secure connection. This host authentication is - part of phase one negotiations, and is a required prerequisite for - packet authentication used later. Host authentication can be done in a - variety of ways. Those supported by FreeS/WAN are discussed in our<A href="adv_config.html#auto-auth"> - advanced configuration</A> document.</LI> -<LI>Phase one can be done in two ways. -<UL> -<LI>Main Mode is required by the RFCs and supported in FreeS/WAN. It - uses a 6-packet exzchange.</LI> -<LI>Aggressive Mode is somewhat faster (only 3 packets) but reveals more - to an eavesdropper. This is optional in the RFCs, not currently - supported by FreeS/WAN, and not likely to be.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>A new group exchange may take place after phase one but before phase - two, defining an additional group for use in the<A href="glossary.html#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key agreement part of phase two. FreeS/WAN does not - currently support this.</LI> -<LI>Phase two always uses Quick Mode, but there are two variants of - that: -<UL> -<LI>One variant provides<A href="glossary.html#PFS"> Perfect Forward - Secrecy (PFS)</A>. An attacker that obtains your long-term host - authentication key does not immediately get any of your short-term - packet encryption of packet authentication keys. He must conduct - another successful attack each time you rekey to get the short-term - keys. Having some short-term keys does not help him learn others. In - particular, breaking your system today does not let him read messages - he archived yestarday, assuming you've changed short-term keys in the - meanwhile. We enable PFS as the default.</LI> -<LI>The other variant disables PFS and is therefore slightly faster. We - do not recommend this since it is less secure, but FreeS/WAN does - support it. You can enable it with a<VAR> pfs=no</VAR> statement in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>.</LI> -<LI>The protocol provides no way to negotiate which variant will be - used. If one gateway is set for PFS and the other is not, the - negotiation fails. This has proved a fairly common source of - interoperation problems.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Several types of notification message may be sent by either side - during either phase, or later. FreeS/WAN does not currently support - these, but they are a likely addition in future releases.</LI> -<LI>There is a commit flag which may optionally be set on some messages. - The<A href="http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html"> errata</A> page - for the RFCs includes two changes related to this, one to clarify the - description of its use and one to block a<A href="glossary.html#DOS"> - denial of service</A> attack which uses it. We currently do not - implement this feature.</LI> -</UL> -<P>These complications can of course lead to problems, particularly when - two different implementations attempt to interoperate. For example, we - have seen problems such as:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Some implementations (often products crippled by<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> - export laws</A>) have the insecure DES algorithm as their only - supported encryption method. Other parts of our documentation discuss - the<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> reasons we do not implement - single DES</A>, and<A href="interop.html#noDES"> how to cope with - crippled products</A>.</LI> -<LI>Windows 2000 IPsec tries to negotiate using Aggressive Mode, which - we don't support. Later on, it uses the commit bit, which we also don't - support.</LI> -<LI>Various implementations disable PFS by default, and therefore will - not talk to FreeS/WAN until you either turn on PFS on their end or turn - it off in FreeS/WAN with a<VAR> pfs=no</VAR> entry in the connection - description.</LI> -<LI>FreeS/WAN's interaction with PGPnet is complicated by their use of - notification messages we do not yet support.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Despite this, we do interoperate successfully with many - implementations, including both Windows 2000 and PGPnet. Details are in - our<A href="interop.html"> interoperability</A> document.</P> -<H4><A name="sequence">Sequence of messages in IKE</A></H4> -<P>Each phase (see<A href="#phases"> previous section</A>)of IKE - involves a series of messages. In Pluto error messages, these are - abbreviated using:</P> -<DL> -<DT>M</DT> -<DD><STRONG>M</STRONG>ain mode, settting up the keying channel (ISAKMP - SA)</DD> -<DT>Q</DT> -<DD><STRONG>Q</STRONG>uick mode, setting up the data channel (IPsec SA)</DD> -<DT>I</DT> -<DD><STRONG>I</STRONG>nitiator, the machine that starts the negotiation</DD> -<DT>R</DT> -<DD><STRONG>R</STRONG>esponder</DD> -</DL> -<P>For example, the six messages of a main mode negotiation, in - sequence, are labelled:</P> -<PRE> MI1 ----------> - <---------- MR1 - MI2 ----------> - <---------- MR2 - MI3 ----------> - <---------- MR3</PRE> -<H4><A name="struct.exchange">Structure of IKE messages</A></H4> -<P>Here is our Pluto developer explaining some of this on the mailing - list:</P> -<PRE>When one IKE system (for example, Pluto) is negotiating with another -to create an SA, the Initiator proposes a bunch of choices and the -Responder replies with one that it has selected. - -The structure of the choices is fairly complicated. An SA payload -contains a list of lists of "Proposals". The outer list is a set of -choices: the selection must be from one element of this list. - -Each of these elements is a list of Proposals. A selection must be -made from each of the elements of the inner list. In other words, -*all* of them apply (that is how, for example, both AH and ESP can -apply at once). - -Within each of these Proposals is a list of Transforms. For each -Proposal selected, one Transform must be selected (in other words, -each Proposal provides a choice of Transforms). - -Each Transform is made up of a list of Attributes describing, well, -attributes. Such as lifetime of the SA. Such as algorithm to be -used. All the Attributes apply to a Transform. - -You will have noticed a pattern here: layers alternate between being -disjunctions ("or") and conjunctions ("and"). - -For Phase 1 / Main Mode (negotiating an ISAKMP SA), this structure is -cut back. There must be exactly one Proposal. So this degenerates to -a list of Transforms, one of which must be chosen.</PRE> -<H3><A name="services">IPsec Services, AH and ESP</A></H3> -<P>IPsec offers two services,<A href="glossary.html#authentication"> - authentication</A> and<A href="glossary.html#encryption"> encryption</A> -. These can be used separately but are often used together.</P> -<DL> -<DT>Authentication</DT> -<DD>Packet-level authentication allows you to be confident that a packet - came from a particular machine and that its contents were not altered - en route to you. No attempt is made to conceal or protect the contents, - only to assure their integrity. Packet authentication can be provided - separately using an<A href="glossary.html#AH"> Authentication Header</A> -, described just below, or it can be included as part of the<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> - ESP</A> (Encapsulated Security Payload) service, described in the - following section. That service offers encryption as well as - authentication. In either case, the<A href="glossary.html#HMAC"> HMAC</A> - construct is used as the authentication mechanism. -<P>There is a separate authentication operation at the IKE level, in - which each gateway authenticates the other. This can be done in a - variety of ways.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Encryption</DT> -<DD>Encryption allows you to conceal the contents of a message from - eavesdroppers. -<P>In IPsec this is done using a<A href="glossary.html#block"> block - cipher</A> (normally<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> Triple DES</A> for - Linux). In the most used setup, keys are automatically negotiated, and - periodically re-negotiated, using the<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> - (Internet Key Exchange) protocol. In Linux FreeS/WAN this is handled by - the Pluto Daemon.</P> -<P>The IPsec protocol offering encryption is<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> - ESP</A>, Encapsulated Security Payload. It can also include a packet - authentication service.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<P>Note that<STRONG> encryption should always be used with some packet - authentication service</STRONG>. Unauthenticated encryption is - vulnerable to<A href="glossary.html#middle"> man-in-the-middle attacks</A> -. Also note that encryption does not prevent<A href="glossary.html#traffic"> - traffic analysis</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="AH.ipsec">The Authentication Header (AH)</A></H3> -<P>Packet authentication can be provided separately from encryption by - adding an authentication header (AH) after the IP header but before the - other headers on the packet. This is the subject of this section. - Details are in RFC 2402.</P> -<P>Each of the several headers on a packet header contains a "next - protocol" field telling the system what header to look for next. IP - headers generally have either TCP or UDP in this field. When IPsec - authentication is used, the packet IP header has AH in this field, - saying that an Authentication Header comes next. The AH header then has - the next header type -- usually TCP, UDP or encapsulated IP.</P> -<P>IPsec packet authentication can be added in transport mode, as a - modification of standard IP transport. This is shown in this diagram - from the RFC:</P> -<PRE> BEFORE APPLYING AH - ---------------------------- - IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | - |(any options)| TCP | Data | - ---------------------------- - - AFTER APPLYING AH - --------------------------------- - IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | | - |(any options)| AH | TCP | Data | - --------------------------------- - || - except for mutable fields</PRE> -<P>Athentication can also be used in tunnel mode, encapsulating the - underlying IP packet beneath AH and an additional IP header.</P> -<PRE> || -IPv4 | new IP hdr* | | orig IP hdr* | | | - |(any options)| AH | (any options) |TCP | Data | - ------------------------------------------------ - || - | in the new IP hdr |</PRE> -<P>This would normally be used in a gateway-to-gateway tunnel. The - receiving gateway then strips the outer IP header and the AH header and - forwards the inner IP packet.</P> -<P>The mutable fields referred to are things like the time-to-live field - in the IP header. These cannot be included in authentication - calculations because they change as the packet travels.</P> -<H4><A name="keyed">Keyed MD5 and Keyed SHA</A></H4> -<P>The actual authentication data in the header is typically 96 bits and - depends both on a secret shared between sender and receiver and on - every byte of the data being authenticated. The technique used is<A href="glossary.html#HMAC"> - HMAC</A>, defined in RFC 2104.</P> -<P>The algorithms involved are the<A href="glossary.html#MD5"> MD5</A> - Message Digest Algorithm or<A href="glossary.html#SHA"> SHA</A>, the - Secure Hash Algorithm. For details on their use in this application, - see RFCs 2403 and 2404 respectively.</P> -<P>For descriptions of the algorithms themselves, see RFC 1321 for MD5 - and<A href="glossary.html#FIPS"> FIPS</A> (Federal Information - Processing Standard) number 186 from<A href="glossary.html#NIST"> NIST</A> -, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology for SHA.<A href="biblio.html#schneier"> -<CITE> Applied Cryptography</CITE></A> covers both in some detail, MD5 - starting on page 436 and SHA on 442.</P> -<P>These algorithms are intended to make it nearly impossible for anyone - to alter the authenticated data in transit. The sender calculates a - digest or hash value from that data and includes the result in the - authentication header. The recipient does the same calculation and - compares results. For unchanged data, the results will be identical. - The hash algorithms are designed to make it extremely difficult to - change the data in any way and still get the correct hash.</P> -<P>Since the shared secret key is also used in both calculations, an - interceptor cannot simply alter the authenticated data and change the - hash value to match. Without the key, he or she (or even the dreaded - They) cannot produce a usable hash.</P> -<H4><A name="sequence">Sequence numbers</A></H4> -<P>The authentication header includes a sequence number field which the - sender is required to increment for each packet. The receiver can - ignore it or use it to check that packets are indeed arriving in the - expected sequence.</P> -<P>This provides partial protection against<A href="glossary.html#replay"> - replay attacks</A> in which an attacker resends intercepted packets in - an effort to confuse or subvert the receiver. Complete protection is - not possible since it is necessary to handle legitmate packets which - are lost, duplicated, or delivered out of order, but use of sequence - numbers makes the attack much more difficult.</P> -<P>The RFCs require that sequence numbers never cycle, that a new key - always be negotiated before the sequence number reaches 2^32-1. This - protects both against replays attacks using packets from a previous - cyclce and against<A href="glossary.html#birthday"> birthday attacks</A> - on the the packet authentication algorithm.</P> -<P>In Linux FreeS/WAN, the sequence number is ignored for manually keyed - connections and checked for automatically keyed ones. In manual mode, - there is no way to negotiate a new key, or to recover from a sequence - number problem, so we don't use sequence numbers.</P> -<H3><A name="ESP.ipsec">Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)</A></H3> -<P>The ESP protocol is defined in RFC 2406. It provides one or both of - encryption and packet authentication. It may be used with or without AH - packet authentication.</P> -<P>Note that<STRONG> some form of packet authentication should<EM> - always</EM> be used whenever data is encrypted</STRONG>. Without - authentication, the encryption is vulnerable to active attacks which - may allow an enemy to break the encryption. ESP should<STRONG> always</STRONG> - either include its own authentication or be used with AH - authentication.</P> -<P>The RFCs require support for only two mandatory encryption algorithms - --<A href="glossary.html#DES"> DES</A>, and null encryption -- and for - two authentication methods -- keyed MD5 and keyed SHA. Implementers may - choose to support additional algorithms in either category.</P> -<P>The authentication algorithms are the same ones used in the IPsec<A href="glossary.html#AH"> - authentication header</A>.</P> -<P>We do not implement single DES since<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> - DES is insecure</A>. Instead we provide<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> - triple DES or 3DES</A>. This is currently the only encryption algorithm - supported.</P> -<P>We do not implement null encryption since it is obviously insecure.</P> -<H2><A name="modes">IPsec modes</A></H2> -<P>IPsec can connect in two modes. Transport mode is a host-to-host - connection involving only two machines. In tunnel mode, the IPsec - machines act as gateways and trafiic for any number of client machines - may be carried.</P> -<H3><A name="tunnel.ipsec">Tunnel mode</A></H3> -<P>Security gateways are required to support tunnel mode connections. In - this mode the gateways provide tunnels for use by client machines - behind the gateways. The client machines need not do any IPsec - processing; all they have to do is route things to gateways.</P> -<H3><A name="transport.ipsec">Transport mode</A></H3> -<P>Host machines (as opposed to security gateways) with IPsec - implementations must also support transport mode. In this mode, the - host does its own IPsec processing and routes some packets via IPsec.</P> -<H2><A name="parts">FreeS/WAN parts</A></H2> -<H3><A name="KLIPS.ipsec">KLIPS: Kernel IPsec Support</A></H3> -<P>KLIPS is<STRONG> K</STRONG>erne<STRONG>L</STRONG><STRONG> IP</STRONG> -SEC<STRONG> S</STRONG>upport, the modifications necessary to support - IPsec within the Linux kernel. KILPS does all the actual IPsec - packet-handling, including</P> -<UL> -<LI>encryption</LI> -<LI>packet authentication calculations</LI> -<LI>creation of ESP and AH headers for outgoing packets</LI> -<LI>interpretation of those headers on incoming packets</LI> -</UL> -<P>KLIPS also checks all non-IPsec packets to ensure they are not - bypassing IPsec security policies.</P> -<H3><A name="Pluto.ipsec">The Pluto daemon</A></H3> -<P><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">Pluto(8)</A> is a daemon which - implements the IKE protocol. It</P> -<UL> -<LI>handles all the Phase one ISAKMP SAs</LI> -<LI>performs host authentication and negotiates with other gateways</LI> -<LI>creates IPsec SAs and passes the data required to run them to KLIPS</LI> -<LI>adjust routing and firewall setup to meet IPsec requirements. See - our<A href="firewall.html"> IPsec and firewalling</A> document for - details.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Pluto is controlled mainly by the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> configuration file.</P> -<H3><A name="command">The ipsec(8) command</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html"> ipsec(8)</A> command is a front - end shellscript that allows control over IPsec activity.</P> -<H3><A name="ipsec.conf">Linux FreeS/WAN configuration file</A></H3> -<P>The configuration file for Linux FreeS/WAN is</P> -<PRE> /etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>For details see the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A> manual page .</P> -<H2><A name="key">Key management</A></H2> -<P>There are several ways IPsec can manage keys. Not all are implemented - in Linux FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H3><A name="current">Currently Implemented Methods</A></H3> -<H4><A name="manual">Manual keying</A></H4> -<P>IPsec allows keys to be manually set. In Linux FreeS/WAN, such keys - are stored with the connection definitions in /etc/ipsec.conf.</P> -<P><A href="glossary.html#manual">Manual keying</A> is useful for - debugging since it allows you to test the<A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> - KLIPS</A> kernel IPsec code without the<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> - Pluto</A> daemon doing key negotiation.</P> -<P>In general, however, automatic keying is preferred because it is more - secure.</P> -<H4><A name="auto">Automatic keying</A></H4> -<P>In automatic keying, the<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto</A> - daemon negotiates keys using the<A href="glossary.html#IKE"> IKE</A> - Internet Key Exchange protocol. Connections are automatically re-keyed - periodically.</P> -<P>This is considerably more secure than manual keying. In either case - an attacker who acquires a key can read every message encrypted with - that key, but automatic keys can be changed every few hours or even - every few minutes without breaking the connection or requiring - intervention by the system administrators. Manual keys can only be - changed manually; you need to shut down the connection and have the two - admins make changes. Moreover, they have to communicate the new keys - securely, perhaps with<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A> or<A href="glossary.html#SSH"> - SSH</A>. This may be possible in some cases, but as a general solution - it is expensive, bothersome and unreliable. Far better to let<A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> - Pluto</A> handle these chores; no doubt the administrators have enough - to do.</P> -<P>Also, automatic keying is inherently more secure against an attacker - who manages to subvert your gateway system. If manual keying is in use - and an adversary acquires root privilege on your gateway, he reads your - keys from /etc/ipsec.conf and then reads all messages encrypted with - those keys.</P> -<P>If automatic keying is used, an adversary with the same privileges - can read /etc/ipsec.secrets, but this does not contain any keys, only - the secrets used to authenticate key exchanges. Having an adversary - able to authenticate your key exchanges need not worry you overmuch. - Just having the secrets does not give him any keys. You are still - secure against<A href="glossary.html#passive"> passive</A> attacks. - This property of automatic keying is called<A href="glossary.html#PFS"> - perfect forward secrecy</A>, abbreviated PFS.</P> -<P>Unfortunately, having the secrets does allow an<A href="glossary.html#active"> - active attack</A>, specifically a<A href="glossary.html#middle"> - man-in-the-middle</A> attack. Losing these secrets to an attacker may - not be quite as disastrous as losing the actual keys, but it is<EM> - still a serious security breach</EM>. These secrets should be guarded - as carefully as keys.</P> -<H3><A name="notyet">Methods not yet implemented</A></H3> -<H4><A name="noauth">Unauthenticated key exchange</A></H4> -<P>It would be possible to exchange keys without authenticating the - players. This would support<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> -- allowing any two systems to encrypt - their communications without requiring a shared PKI or a previously - negotiated secret -- and would be secure against<A href="glossary.html#passive"> - passive attacks</A>. It would, however, be highly vulnerable to active<A -href="glossary.html#middle"> man-in-the-middle</A> attacks. RFC 2408 - therefore specifies that all<A href="glossary.html#ISAKMP"> ISAKMP</A> - key management interactions<EM> must</EM> be authenticated.</P> -<P>There is room for debate here. Should we provide immediate security - against<A href="glossary.html#passive"> passive attacks</A> and - encourage widespread use of encryption, at the expense of risking the - more difficult<A href="glossary.html#active"> active attacks</A>? Or - should we wait until we can implement a solution that can both be - widespread and offer security against active attacks?</P> -<P>So far, we have chosen the second course, complying with the RFCs and - waiting for secure DNS (see<A href="glossary.html#DNS"> below</A>) so - that we can do<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> opportunistic - encryption</A> right.</P> -<H4><A name="DNS">Key exchange using DNS</A></H4> -<P>The IPsec RFCs allow key exchange based on authentication services - provided by<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> Secure DNS</A>. Once Secure - DNS service becomes widely available, we expect to make this the<EM> - primary key management method for Linux FreeS/WAN</EM>. It is the best - way we know of to support<A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A>, allowing two systems without a common PKI - or previous negotiation to secure their communication.</P> -<P>We currently have code to acquire RSA keys from DNS but do not yet - have code to validate Secure DNS signatures.</P> -<H4><A name="PKI">Key exchange using a PKI</A></H4> -<P>The IPsec RFCs allow key exchange based on authentication services - provided by a<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> PKI</A> or Public Key - Infrastructure. With many vendors selling such products and many large - organisations building these infrastructures, this will clearly be an - important application of IPsec and one Linux FreeS/WAN will eventually - support.</P> -<P>On the other hand, this is not as high a priority for Linux FreeS/WAN - as solutions based on<A href="glossary.html#SDNS"> secure DNS</A>. We - do not expect any PKI to become as universal as DNS.</P> -<P>Some<A href="web.html#patch"> patches</A> to handle authentication - with X.509 certificates, which most PKIs use, are available.</P> -<H4><A name="photuris">Photuris</A></H4> -<P><A href="glossary.html#photuris">Photuris</A> is another key - management protocol, an alternative to IKE and ISAKMP, described in - RFCs 2522 and 2523 which are labelled "experimental". Adding Photuris - support to Linux FreeS/WAN might be a good project for a volunteer. The - likely starting point would be the OpenBSD photurisd code.</P> -<H4><A name="skip">SKIP</A></H4> -<P><A href="glossary.html#SKIP">SKIP</A> is yet another key management - protocol, developed by Sun. At one point it was fairly widely used, but - it now seems moribund, displaced by IKE. Sun now (as of Solaris 8.0) - ship an IPsec implementation using IKE. We have no plans to implement - SKIP. If a user were to implement it, we would almost certainly not - want to add the code to our distribution.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="politics.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="mail.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/kernel.html b/doc/kernel.html deleted file mode 100644 index de305683a..000000000 --- a/doc/kernel.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,353 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="testing.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="adv_config.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="kernelconfig">Kernel configuration for FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P> This section lists many of the options available when configuring a - Linux kernel, and explains how they should be set on a FreeS/WAN IPsec - gateway.</P> -<H2><A name="notall">Not everyone needs to worry about kernel - configuration</A></H2> -<P>Note that in many cases you do not need to mess with these.</P> -<P> You may have a Linux distribution which comes with FreeS/WAN - installed (see this<A href="intro.html#products"> list</A>). In that - case, you need not do a FreeS/WAN installation or a kernel - configuration. Of course, you might still want to configure and rebuild - your kernel to improve performance or security. This can be done with - standard tools described in the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html"> - Kernel HowTo</A>.</P> -<P>If you need to install FreeS/WAN, then you do need to configure a - kernel. However, you may choose to do that using the simplest - procedure:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Configure, build and test a kernel for your system before adding - FreeS/WAN. See the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html"> - Kernel HowTo</A> for details.<STRONG> This step cannot be skipped</STRONG> -. FreeS/WAN needs the results of your configuration.</LI> -<LI>Then use FreeS/WAN's<VAR> make oldgo</VAR> command. This sets - everything FreeS/WAN needs and retains your values everywhere else.</LI> -</UL> -<P> This document is for those who choose to configure their FreeS/WAN - kernel themselves.</P> -<H2><A name="assume">Assumptions and notation</A></H2> -<P> Help text for most kernel options is included with the kernel files, - and is accessible from within the configuration utilities. We assume - you will refer to that, and to the<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html"> - Kernel HowTo</A>, as necessary. This document covers only the - FreeS/WAN-specific aspects of the problem.</P> -<P> To avoid duplication, this document section does not cover settings - for the additional IPsec-related kernel options which become available - after you have patched your kernel with FreeS/WAN patches. There is - help text for those available from within the configuration utility.</P> -<P> We assume a common configuration in which the FreeS/WAN IPsec - gateway is also doing ipchains(8) firewalling for a local network, and - possibly masquerading as well.</P> -<P> Some suggestions below are labelled as appropriate for "a true - paranoid". By this we mean they may cause inconvenience and it is not - entirely clear they are necessary, but they appear to be the safest - choice. Not using them might entail some risk. Of course one suggested - mantra for security administrators is: "I know I'm paranoid. I wonder - if I'm paranoid enough."</P> -<H3><A name="labels">Labels used</A></H3> -<P> Six labels are used to indicate how options should be set. We mark - the labels with [square brackets]. For two of these labels, you have no - choice:</P> -<DL> -<DT>[required]</DT> -<DD>essential for FreeS/WAN operation.</DD> -<DT>[incompatible]</DT> -<DD>incompatible with FreeS/WAN.</DD> -</DL> -<P>those must be set correctly or FreeS/WAN will not work</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN should work with any settings of the others, though of - course not all combinations have been tested. We do label these in - various ways, but<EM> these labels are only suggestions</EM>.</P> -<DL> -<DT>[recommended]</DT> -<DD>useful on most FreeS/WAN gateways</DD> -<DT>[disable]</DT> -<DD>an unwelcome complication on a FreeS/WAN gateway.</DD> -<DT>[optional]</DT> -<DD>Your choice. We outline issues you might consider.</DD> -<DT>[anything]</DT> -<DD>This option has no direct effect on FreeS/WAN and related tools, so - you should be able to set it as you please.</DD> -</DL> -<P> Of course complexity is an enemy in any effort to build secure - systems.<STRONG> For maximum security, any feature that can reasonably - be turned off should be</STRONG>. "If in doubt, leave it out."</P> -<H2><A name="kernelopt">Kernel options for FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<P> Indentation is based on the nesting shown by 'make menuconfig' with - a 2.2.16 kernel for the i386 architecture.</P> -<DL> -<DT><A name="maturity">Code maturity and level options</A></DT> -<DD> -<DL> -<DT><A name="devel">Prompt for development ... code/drivers</A></DT> -<DD>[optional] If this is<VAR> no</VAR>, experimental drivers are not - shown in later menus. -<P>For most FreeS/WAN work,<VAR> no</VAR> is the preferred setting. - Using new or untested components is too risky for a security gateway.</P> -<P>However, for some hardware (such as the author's network cards) the - only drivers available are marked<VAR> new/experimental</VAR>. In such - cases, you must enable this option or your cards will not appear under - "network device support". A true paranoid would leave this option off - and replace the cards.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Processor type and features</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Loadable module support</DT> -<DD> -<DL> -<DT>Enable loadable module support</DT> -<DD>[optional] A true paranoid would disable this. An attacker who has - root access to your machine can fairly easily install a bogus module - that does awful things, provided modules are enabled. A common tool for - attackers is a "rootkit", a set of tools the attacker uses once he or - she has become root on your system. The kit introduces assorted - additional compromises so that the attacker will continue to "own" your - system despite most things you might do to recovery the situation. For - Linux, there is a tool called<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/IDFAQ/knark.htm"> - knark</A> which is basically a rootkit packaged as a kernel module. -<P>With modules disabled, an attacker cannot install a bogus module. The - only way he can achieve the same effects is to install a new kernel and - reboot. This is considerably more likely to be noticed.</P> -<P>Many FreeS/WAN gateways run with modules enabled. This simplifies - some administrative tasks and some ipchains features are available only - as modules. Once an enemy has root on your machine your security is - nil, so arguably defenses which come into play only in that situation - are pointless.</P> -<P></P> -</DD> -<DT>Set version information ....</DT> -<DD>[optional] This provides a check to prevent loading modules compiled - for a different kernel.</DD> -<DT>Kernel module loader</DT> -<DD>[disable] It gives little benefit on a typical FreeS/WAN gate and - entails some risk.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>General setup</DT> -<DD>We list here only the options that matter for FreeS/WAN. -<DL> -<DT>Networking support</DT> -<DD>[required]</DD> -<DT>Sysctl interface</DT> -<DD>[optional] If this option is turned on and the<VAR> /proc</VAR> - filesystem installed, then you can control various system behaviours by - writing to files under<VAR> /proc/sys</VAR>. For example: -<PRE> echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ipforward</PRE> - turns IP forwarding on. -<P>Disabling this option breaks many firewall scripts. A true paranoid - would disable it anyway since it might conceivably be of use to an - attacker.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>Plug and Play support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Block devices</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Networking options</DT> -<DD> -<DL> -<DT>Packet socket</DT> -<DD>[optional] This kernel feature supports tools such as tcpdump(8) - which communicate directly with network hardware, bypassing kernel - protocols. This is very much a two-edged sword: -<UL> -<LI>such tools can be very useful to the firewall admin, especially - during initial testing</LI> -<LI>should an evildoer breach your firewall, such tools could give him - or her a great deal of information about the rest of your network</LI> -</UL> - We recommend disabling this option on production gateways.</DD> -<DT><A name="netlink">Kernel/User netlink socket</A></DT> -<DD>[optional] Required if you want to use<A href="#adv"> advanced - router</A> features.</DD> -<DT>Routing messages</DT> -<DD>[optional]</DD> -<DT>Netlink device emulation</DT> -<DD>[optional]</DD> -<DT>Network firewalls</DT> -<DD>[recommended] You need this if the IPsec gateway also functions as a - firewall. -<P>Even if the IPsec gateway is not your primary firewall, we suggest - setting this so that you can protect the gateway with at least basic - local packet filters.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Socket filtering</DT> -<DD>[disable] This enables an older filtering interface. We suggest - using ipchains(8) instead. To do that, set the "Network firewalls" - option just above, and not this one.</DD> -<DT>Unix domain sockets</DT> -<DD>[required] These sockets are used for communication between the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html"> - ipsec(8)</A> commands and the<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - ipsec_pluto(8)</A> daemon.</DD> -<DT>TCP/IP networking</DT> -<DD>[required] -<DL> -<DT>IP: multicasting</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT><A name="adv">IP: advanced router</A></DT> -<DD>[optional] This gives you policy routing, which some people have - used to good advantage in their scripts for FreeS/WAN gateway - management. It is not used in our distributed scripts, so not required - unless you want it for custom scripts. It requires the<A href="#netlink"> - netlink</A> interface between kernel code and the iproute2(8) command.</DD> -<DT>IP: kernel level autoconfiguration</DT> -<DD>[disable] It gives little benefit on a typical FreeS/WAN gate and - entails some risk.</DD> -<DT>IP: firewall packet netlink device</DT> -<DD>[disable]</DD> -<DT>IP: transparent proxy support</DT> -<DD>[optional] This is required in some firewall configurations, but - should be disabled unless you have a definite need for it.</DD> -<DT>IP: masquerading</DT> -<DD>[optional] Required if you want to use<A href="glossary.html#non-routable"> - non-routable</A> private IP addresses for your local network.</DD> -<DT>IP: Optimize as router not host</DT> -<DD>[recommended]</DD> -<DT>IP: tunneling</DT> -<DD>[required]</DD> -<DT>IP: GRE tunnels over IP</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>IP: aliasing support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>IP: ARP daemon support (EXPERIMENTAL)</DT> -<DD>Not required on most systems, but might prove useful on - heavily-loaded gateways.</DD> -<DT>IP: TCP syncookie support</DT> -<DD>[recommended] It provides a defense against a<A href="glossary.html#DOS"> - denial of service attack</A> which uses bogus TCP connection requests - to waste resources on the victim machine.</DD> -<DT>IP: Reverse ARP</DT> -<DD></DD> -<DT>IP: large window support</DT> -<DD>[recommended] unless you have less than 16 meg RAM</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>IPv6</DT> -<DD>[optional] FreeS/WAN does not currently support IPv6, though work on - integrating FreeS/WAN with the Linux IPv6 stack has begun.<A href="compat.html#ipv6"> - Details</A>. -<P> It should be possible to use IPv4 FreeS/WAN on a machine which also - does IPv6. This combination is not yet well tested. We would be quite - interested in hearing results from anyone expermenting with it, via the<A -href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>.</P> -<P> We do not recommend using IPv6 on production FreeS/WAN gateways - until more testing has been done.</P> -</DD> -<DT>Novell IPX</DT> -<DD>[disable]</DD> -<DT>Appletalk</DT> -<DD>[disable] Quite a few Linux installations use IP but also have some - other protocol, such as Appletalk or IPX, for communication with local - desktop machines. In theory it should be possible to configure IPsec - for the IP side of things without interfering with the second protocol. -<P>We do not recommend this. Keep the software on your gateway as simple - as possible. If you need a Linux-based Appletalk or IPX server, use a - separate machine.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>Telephony support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>SCSI support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>I2O device support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Network device support</DT> -<DD>[anything] should work, but there are some points to note. -<P>The development team test almost entirely on 10 or 100 megabit - Ethernet and modems. In principle, any device that can do IP should be - just fine for IPsec, but in the real world any device that has not been - well-tested is somewhat risky. By all means try it, but don't bet your - project on it until you have solid test results.</P> -<P>If you disabled experimental drivers in the<A href="#maturity"> Code - maturity</A> section above, then those drivers will not be shown here. - Check that option before going off to hunt for missing drivers.</P> -<P>If you want Linux to automatically find more than one ethernet - interface at boot time, you need to:</P> -<UL> -<LI>compile the appropriate driver(s) into your kernel. Modules will not - work for this</LI> -<LI>add a line such as -<PRE> - append="ether=0,0,eth0 ether=0,0,eth1" -</PRE> - to your /etc/lilo.conf file. In some cases you may need to specify - parameters such as IRQ or base address. The example uses "0,0" for - these, which tells the system to search. If the search does not succeed - on your hardware, then you should retry with explicit parameters. See - the lilo.conf(5) man page for details.</LI> -<LI>run lilo(8)</LI> -</UL> - Having Linux find the cards this way is not necessary, but is usually - more convenient than loading modules in your boot scripts.</DD> -<DT>Amateur radio support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>IrDA (infrared) support</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>ISDN subsystem</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Old CDROM drivers</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Character devices</DT> -<DD>The only required character device is: -<DL> -<DT>random(4)</DT> -<DD>[required] This is a source of<A href="glossary.html#random"> random</A> - numbers which are required for many cryptographic protocols, including - several used in IPsec. -<P>If you are comfortable with C source code, it is likely a good idea - to go in and adjust the<VAR> #define</VAR> lines in<VAR> - /usr/src/linux/drivers/char/random.c</VAR> to ensure that all sources - of randomness are enabled. Relying solely on keyboard and mouse - randomness is dubious procedure for a gateway machine. You could also - increase the randomness pool size from the default 512 bytes (128 - 32-bit words).</P> -</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>Filesystems</DT> -<DD>[anything] should work, but we suggest limiting a gateway machine to - the standard Linux ext2 filesystem in most cases.</DD> -<DT>Network filesystems</DT> -<DD>[disable] These systems are an unnecessary risk on an IPsec gateway.</DD> -<DT>Console drivers</DT> -<DD>[anything]</DD> -<DT>Sound</DT> -<DD>[anything] should work, but we suggest enabling sound only if you - plan to use audible alarms for firewall problems.</DD> -<DT>Kernel hacking</DT> -<DD>[disable] This might be enabled on test machines, but should not be - on production gateways.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="testing.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="adv_config.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/mail.html b/doc/mail.html deleted file mode 100644 index 68b5d8cd8..000000000 --- a/doc/mail.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,216 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="ipsec.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="web.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="lists">Mailing lists and newsgroups</A></H1> -<H2><A name="list.fs">Mailing lists about FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<H3><A name="projlist">The project mailing lists</A></H3> -<P>The Linux FreeS/WAN project has several email lists for user support, - bug reports and software development discussions.</P> -<P>We had a single list on clinet.fi for several years (Thanks, folks!), - then one list on freeswan.org, but now we've split into several lists:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="mailto:users-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -users</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>The general list for discussing use of the software</LI> -<LI>The place for seeking<STRONG> help with problems</STRONG> (but - please check the<A href="faq.html"> FAQ</A> first).</LI> -<LI>Anyone can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:bugs-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe">bugs</A> -</DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>For<STRONG> bug reports</STRONG>.</LI> -<LI>If you are not certain what is going on -- could be a bug, a - configuration error, a network problem, ... -- please post to the users - list instead.</LI> -<LI>Anyone can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:design-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -design</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI><STRONG>Design discussions</STRONG>, for people working on FreeS/WAN - development or others with an interest in design and security issues.</LI> -<LI>It would be a good idea to read the existing design papers (see this<A -href="intro.html#applied"> list</A>) before posting.</LI> -<LI>Anyone can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:announce-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -announce</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>A<STRONG> low-traffic</STRONG> list.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>Announcements</STRONG> about FreeS/WAN and related software.</LI> -<LI>All posts here are also sent to the users list. You need not - subscribe to both.</LI> -<LI>Only the FreeS/WAN team can post.</LI> -<LI>If you have something you feel should go on this list, send it to<VAR> - announce-admin@lists.freeswan.org</VAR>. Unless it is obvious, please - include a short note explaining why we should post it.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -<DT><A href="mailto:briefs-request@lists.freeswan.org?body=subscribe"> -briefs</A></DT> -<DD> -<UL> -<LI>A<STRONG> low-traffic</STRONG> list.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>Weekly summaries</STRONG> of activity on the users list.</LI> -<LI>All posts here are also sent to the users list. You need not - subscribe to both.</LI> -<LI>Only the FreeS/WAN team can post.</LI> -</UL> -</DD> -</DL> -<P>To subscribe to any of these, you can:</P> -<UL> -<LI>just follow the links above</LI> -<LI>use our<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> web interface</A> -</LI> -<LI>send mail to<VAR> listname</VAR>-request@lists.freeswan.org with a - one-line message body "subscribe"</LI> -</UL> -<P>Archives of these lists are available via the<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - web interface</A>.</P> -<H4><A name="which.list">Which list should I use?</A></H4> -<P>For most questions, please check the<A href="faq.html"> FAQ</A> - first, and if that does not have an answer, ask on the users list. "My - configuration doesn't work." does not belong on the bugs list, and "Can - FreeS/WAN do such-and-such" or "How do I configure it to..." do not - belong in design discussions.</P> -<P>Cross-posting the same message to two or more of these lists is - discouraged. Quite a few people read more than one list and getting - multiple copies is annoying.</P> -<H4><A name="policy.list">List policies</A></H4> -<P><STRONG>US citizens or residents are asked not to post code to the - lists, not even one-line bug fixes</STRONG>. The project cannot accept - code which might entangle it in US<A href="politics.html#exlaw"> export - restrictions</A>.</P> -<P>Non-subscribers can post to some of these lists. This is necessary; - someone working on a gateway install who encounters a problem may not - have access to a subscribed account.</P> -<P>Some spam turns up on these lists from time to time. For discussion - of why we do not attempt to filter it, see the<A href="faq.html#spam"> - FAQ</A>. Please do not clutter the lists with complaints about this.</P> -<H3><A name="archive">Archives of the lists</A></H3> -<P>Searchable archives of the old single list have existed for some - time. At time of writing, it is not yet clear how they will change for - the new multi-list structure.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec">Canada</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nexial.com">Holland</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that these use different search engines. Try both.</P> -<P>Archives of the new lists are available via the<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/mail.html"> - web interface</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="indexes">Indexes of mailing lists</A></H2> -<P><A href="http://paml.net/">PAML</A> is the standard reference for<STRONG> - P</STRONG>ublicly<STRONG> A</STRONG>ccessible<STRONG> M</STRONG>ailing<STRONG> - L</STRONG>ists. When we last checked, it had over 7500 lists on an - amazing variety of topics. It also has FAQ information and a search - engine.</P> -<P>There is an index of<A href="http://oslab.snu.ac.kr/~djshin/linux/mail-list/index.shtml"> - Linux mailing lists</A> available.</P> -<P>A list of<A href="http://xforce.iss.net/maillists/otherlists.php"> - computer security mailing lists</A>, with descriptions.</P> -<H2><A name="otherlists">Lists for related software and topics</A></H2> -<P>Most links in this section point to subscription addresses for the - various lists. Send the one-line message "subscribe<VAR> list_name</VAR> -" to subscribe to any of them.</P> -<H3><A NAME="28_3_1">Products that include FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Our introduction document gives a<A href="intro.html#products"> list - of products that include FreeS/WAN</A>. If you have, or are - considering, one of those, check the supplier's web site for - information on mailing lists for their users.</P> -<H3><A name="linux.lists">Linux mailing lists</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:majordomo@vger.kernel.org"> -linux-admin@vger.kernel.org</A>, for Linux system administrators</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:netfilter-request@lists.samba.org"> -netfilter@lists.samba.org</A>, about Netfilter, which replaces IPchains - in kernels 2.3.15 and later</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:security-audit-request@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk"> -security-audit@ferret.lmh.ox.ac.uk</A>, for people working on security - audits of various Linux programs</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:securedistros-request@humbolt.geo.uu.nl"> -securedistros@humbolt.geo.uu.nl</A>, for discussion of issues common to - all the half dozen projects working on secure Linux distributions.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Each of the scure distribution projects also has its own web site and - mailing list. Some of the sites are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://bastille-linux.org/">Bastille Linux</A> scripts to - harden Redhat, e.g. by changing permissions and modifying inialisation - scripts</LI> -<LI><A href="http://immunix.org/">Immunix</A> take a different approach, - using a modified compiler to build kernel and utilities with better - resistance to various types of overflow and exploit</LI> -<LI>the<A href="glossary.html#NSA"> NSA</A> have contractors working on - a<A href="glossary.html#SElinux"> Security Enhanced Linux</A>, - primarily adding stronger access control mechanisms. You can download - the current version (which interestingly is under GPL and not export - resrtricted) or subscribe to the mailing list from the<A href="http://www.nsa.gov/selinux"> - project web page</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="ietf">Lists for IETF working groups</A></H3> -<P>Each<A href="glossary.html#IETF"> IETF</A> working group has an - associated mailing list where much of the work takes place.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:majordomo@lists.tislabs.com">ipsec@lists.tislabs.com</A> -, the IPsec<A href="http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - working group</A>. This is where the protocols are discussed, new - drafts announced, and so on. By now, the IPsec working group is winding - down since the work is essentially complete. A<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec/"> - list archive</A> is available.</LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:ipsec-policy-request@vpnc.org">IPsec policy</A> - list, and its<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/ipsec-policy/"> archive</A></LI> -<LI><A href="mailto:ietf-ipsra-request@vpnc.org">IP secure remote access</A> - list, and its<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsra/mail-archive/"> - archive</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="other">Other mailing lists</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="mailto:ipc-announce-request@privacy.org"> -ipc-announce@privacy.org</A> a low-traffic list with announcements of - developments in privacy, encryption and online civil rights</LI> -<LI>a VPN mailing list's<A href="http://kubarb.phsx.ukans.edu/~tbird/vpn.html"> - home page</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="newsgroups">Usenet newsgroups</A></H2> -<UL> -<LI>sci.crypt</LI> -<LI>sci.crypt.research</LI> -<LI>comp.dcom.vpn</LI> -<LI>talk.politics.crypto</LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="ipsec.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="web.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/makecheck.html b/doc/makecheck.html deleted file mode 100644 index e77631782..000000000 --- a/doc/makecheck.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,523 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="umltesting.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="nightly.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="makecheck">How to configure to use "make check"</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="38_1">What is "make check"</A></H2> -<P> "make check" is a target in the top level makefile. It takes care of - running a number of unit and system tests to confirm that FreeSWAN has - been compiled correctly, and that no new bugs have been introduced.</P> -<P> As FreeSWAN contains both kernel and userspace components, doing - testing of FreeSWAN requires that the kernel be simulated. This is - typically difficult to do as a kernel requires that it be run on bare - hardware. A technology has emerged that makes this simpler. This is<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net"> - User Mode Linux</A>.</P> -<P> User-Mode Linux is a way to build a Linux kernel such that it can - run as a process under another Linux (or in the future other) kernel. - Presently, this can only be done for 2.4 guest kernels. The host kernel - can be 2.2 or 2.4.</P> -<P> "make check" expects to be able to build User-Mode Linux kernels - with FreeSWAN included. To do this it needs to have some files - downloaded and extracted prior to running "make check". This is - described in the<A HREF="umltesting.html"> UML testing</A> document.</P> -<P> After having run the example in the UML testing document and - successfully brought up the four machine combination, you are ready to - use "make check"</P> -<H2><A NAME="38_2">Running "make check"</A></H2> -<P> "make check" works by walking the FreeSWAN source tree invoking the - "check" target at each node. At present there are tests defined only - for the <CODE>klips</CODE> directory. These tests will use the UML - infrastructure to test out pieces of the <CODE>klips</CODE> code.</P> -<P> The results of the tests can be recorded. If the environment - variable <CODE>$REGRESSRESULTS</CODE> is non-null, then the results of - each test will be recorded. This can be used as part of a nightly - regression testing system, see<A HREF="nightly.html"> Nightly testing</A> - for more details.</P> -<P> "make check" otherwise prints a minimal amount of output for each - test, and indicates pass/fail status of each test as they are run. - Failed tests do not cause failure of the target in the form of exit - codes.</P> -<H1><A NAME="39">How to write a "make check" test</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="39_1">Structure of a test</A></H2> -<P> Each test consists of a set of directories under <CODE>testing/</CODE> -. There are directories for <CODE>klips</CODE>, <CODE>pluto</CODE>, <CODE> -packaging</CODE> and <CODE>libraries</CODE>. Each directory has a list - of tests to run is stored in a file called <CODE>TESTLIST</CODE> in - that directory. e.g. <CODE>testing/klips/TESTLIST</CODE>.</P> -<H2 NAME="TESTLIST"><A NAME="39_2">The TESTLIST</A></H2> -<P> This isn't actually a shell script. It just looks like one. Some - tools other than /bin/sh process it. Lines that start with # are - comments.</P> -<PRE> -# test-kind directory-containing-test expectation [PR#] -</PRE> -<P>The first word provides the test type, detailed below.</P> -<P> The second word is the name of the test to run. This the directory - in which the test case is to be found..</P> -<P>The third word may be one of:</P> -<DL> -<DT> blank/good</DT> -<DD>the test is believed to function, report failure</DD> -<DT> bad</DT> -<DD> the test is known to fail, report unexpected success</DD> -<DT> suspended</DT> -<DD> the test should not be run</DD> -</DL> -<P> The fourth word may be a number, which is a PR# if the test is - failing.</P> -<H2><A NAME="39_3">Test kinds</A></H2> - The test types are: -<DL> -<DT>skiptest</DT> -<DD>means run no test.</DD> -<DT>ctltest</DT> -<DD>means run a single system without input/output.</DD> -<DT>klipstest</DT> -<DD>means run a single system with input/output networks</DD> -<DT><A HREF="#umlplutotest">umlplutotest</A></DT> -<DD>means run a pair of systems</DD> -<DT><A HREF="#umlXhost">umlXhost</A></DT> -<DD>run an arbitrary number of systems</DD> -<DT>suntest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a quad of east/west/sunrise/sunset</DD> -<DT>roadtest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a trio of east-sunrise + warrior</DD> -<DT>extrudedtest (TBD)</DT> -<DD>means run a quad of east-sunrise + warriorsouth + park</DD> -<DT>mkinsttest</DT> -<DD>a test of the "make install" machinery.</DD> -<DT>kernel_test_patch</DT> -<DD>a test of the "make kernelpatch" machinery.</DD> -</DL> - Tests marked (TBD) have yet to be fully defined. -<P> Each test directory has a file in it called <CODE>testparams.sh</CODE> -. This file sets a number of environment variables to define the - parameters of the test.</P> -<H2><A NAME="39_4">Common parameters</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT>TESTNAME</DT> -<DD>the name of the test (repeated for checking purposes)</DD> -<DT>TEST_TYPE</DT> -<DD>the type of the test (repeat of type type above)</DD> -<DT>TESTHOST</DT> -<DD>the name of the UML machine to run for the test, typically "east" or - "west"</DD> -<DT>TEST_PURPOSE</DT> -<DD>The purpose of the test is one of: -<DL> -<DT>goal</DT> -<DD>The goal purpose is where a test is defined for code that is not yet - finished. The test indicates when the goals have in fact been reached.</DD> -<DT>regress</DT> -<DD>This is a test to determine that a previously existing bug has been - repaired. This test will initially be created to reproduce the bug in - isolation, and then the bug will be fixed.</DD> -<DT>exploit</DT> -<DD>This is a set of packets/programs that causes a vulnerability to be - exposed. It is a specific variation of the regress option.</DD> -</DL> -</DD> -<DT>TEST_GOAL_ITEM</DT> -<DT></DT> -<DD>in the case of a goal test, this is a reference to the requirements - document</DD> -<DT>TEST_PROB_REPORT</DT> -<DD>in the case of regression test, this the problem report number from - GNATS</DD> -<DT>TEST_EXPLOIT_URL</DT> -<DD>in the case of an exploit, this is a URL referencing the paper - explaining the origin of the test and the origin of exploit software</DD> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a file in the test directory that contains the sanitized console - output against which to compare the output of the actual test.</DD> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS</DT> -<DD>a list of scripts (found in <CODE>klips/test/fixups</CODE>) to apply - to sanitize the console output of the machine under test. These are - typically perl, awk or sed scripts that remove things in the kernel - output that change each time the test is run and/or compiled.</DD> -<DT>INIT_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode prior to starting the tests. This file will usually - set up any eroute's and SADB entries that are required for the test.</P> -<P>Lines beginning with # are skipped. Blank lines are skipped. - Otherwise, a shell prompted is waited for each time (consisting of <CODE> -\n#</CODE>) and then the command is sent. Note that the prompt is waited - for before the command and not after, so completion of the last command - in the script is not required. This is often used to invoke a program - to monitor the system, e.g. <CODE>ipsec pf_key</CODE>.</P> -</DD> -<DT>RUN_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, before the packets are sent. On single machine tests, - this script doesn't provide any more power than INIT_SCRIPT, but is - implemented for consistency's sake.</P> -</DD> -<DT>FINAL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode after the final packet is sent. Similar to - INIT_SCRIPT, above. If not specified, then the single command "halt" is - sent. If specified, then the script should end with a halt command to - nicely shutdown the UML.</P> -</DD> -<DT>CONSOLEDIFFDEBUG</DT> -<DD>If set to "true" then the series of console fixups (see - REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS) will be output after it is constructed. (It should - be set to "false", or unset otherwise)</DD> -<DT>NETJIGDEBUG</DT> -<DD>If set to "true" then the series of console fixups (see - REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS) will be output after it is constructed. (It should - be set to "false", or unset otherwise)</DD> -<DT>NETJIGTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> If set to "netjig", then the results of talking to the <CODE> -uml_netjig</CODE> will be printed to stderr during the test. In - addition, the jig will be invoked with --debug, which causes it to log - its process ID, and wait 60 seconds before continuing. This can be used - if you are trying to debug the <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> program itself.</DD> -<DT>HOSTTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> If set to "hosttest", then the results of taling to the consoles of - the UMLs will be printed to stderr during the test.</DD> -<DT>NETJIGWAITUSER</DT> -<DD> If set to "waituser", then the scripts will wait forever for user - input before they shut the tests down. Use this is if you are debugging - through the kernel.</DD> -<DT>PACKETRATE</DT> -<DD> A number, in miliseconds (default is 500ms) at which packets will - be replayed by the netjig.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The klipstest function starts a program (<CODE> -testing/utils/uml_netjig/uml_netjig</CODE>) to setup a bunch of I/O - sockets (that simulate network interfaces). It then exports the - references to these sockets to the environment and invokes (using - system()) a given script. It waits for the script to finish.</P> - -<!-- <IMG SRC="single_netjig.png" ALT="block diagram of uml_netjig"> --> -<P> The script invoked (<CODE>testing/utils/host-test.tcl</CODE>) is a - TCL<A HREF="http://expect.nist.gov/"> expect</A> script that arranges - to start the UML and configure it appropriately for the test. The - configuration is done with the script given above for<VAR> INIT_SCRIPT</VAR> -. The TCL script then forks, leaves the UML in the background and exits. - uml_netjig continues. It then starts listening to the simulated network - answering ARPs and inserting packets as appropriate.</P> -<P> The klipstest function invokes <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> with - arguments to capture output from network interface(s) and insert - packets as appropriate:</P> -<DL> -<DT>PUB_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> file to feed in on the - public (encrypted) interface. (typically, eth1)</DD> -<DT>PRIV_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a pcap file to feed in on the private (plain-text) interface - (typically, eth0).</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the public (eth1) - interface are captured to a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> - file by <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. The klipstest function then uses - tcpdump on the file to produce text output, which is compared to the - file given.</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>REF_PRIV_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the private (eth0) - interface are captured and compared after conversion by tcpdump, as - with<VAR> REFPUBOUTPUT</VAR>.</DD> -<DT>REF_PRIV_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>EXITONEMPTY</DT> -<DD>a flag for <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. It should contain - "--exitonempty" of uml_netjig should exit when all of the input (<VAR> -PUBINPUT</VAR>,<VAR>PRIVINPUT</VAR>) packets have been injected.</DD> -<DT>ARPREPLY</DT> -<DD>a flag for <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE>. It should contain "--arpreply" - if <CODE>uml_netjig</CODE> should reply to ARP requests. One will - typically set this to avoid having to fudge the ARP cache manually.</DD> -<DT>TCPDUMPFLAGS</DT> -<DD>a set of flags for the tcpdump used when converting captured output. - Typical values will include "-n" to turn off DNS, and often "-E" to set - the decryption key (tcpdump 3.7.1 and higher only) for ESP packets. The - "-t" flag (turn off timestamps) is provided automatically</DD> -<DT>NETJIG_EXTRA</DT> -<DD>additional comments to be sent to the netjig. This may arrange to - record or create additional networks, or may toggle options.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The basic concept of the <CODE>mkinsttest</CODE> test type is that - it performs a "make install" to a temporary $DESTDIR. The resulting - tree can then be examined to determine if it was done properly. The - files can be uninstalled to determine if the file list was correct, or - the contents of files can be examined more precisely.</P> -<DL> -<DT>INSTALL_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, then an install will be done. This provides the set of flags - to provide for the install. The target to be used (usually "install") - must be among the flags.</DD> -<DT>POSTINSTALL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD>If set, a script to run after initial "make install". Two arguments - are provided: an absolute path to the root of the FreeSWAN src tree, - and an absolute path to the temporary installation area.</DD> -<DT>INSTALL2_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, a second install will be done using these flags. Similarly - to INSTALL_FLAGS, the target must be among the flags.</DD> -<DT>UNINSTALL_FLAGS</DT> -<DD>If set, an uninstall will be done using these flags. Similarly to - INSTALL_FLAGS, the target (usually "uninstall") must be among the - flags.</DD> -<DT>REF_FIND_f_l_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>If set, a <CODE>find $ROOT ( -type f -or -type -l )</CODE> will be - done to get a list of a real files and symlinks. The resulting file - will be compared to the file listed by this option.</DD> -<DT>REF_FILE_CONTENTS</DT> -<DD>If set, it should point to a file containing records for the form: -<PRE> - -<!--VARIABLE--> -reffile</(null)> -<!--VARIABLE--> -samplefile</(null)> -</PRE> - one record per line. A diff between the provided reference file, and - the sample file (located in the temporary installation root) will be - done for each record.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The <CODE>rpm_build_install_test</CODE> type is to verify that the - proper packing list is produced by "make rpm", and that the mechanisms - for building the kernel modules produce consistent results.</P> -<DL> -<DT>RPM_KERNEL_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>Point to an extracted copy of the RedHat kernel source code. - Variables from the environment may be used.</DD> -<DT>REF_RPM_CONTENTS</DT> -<DD>This is a file containing one record per line. Each record consists - of a RPM name (may contain wildcards) and a filename to compare the - contents to. The RPM will be located and a file list will be produced - with rpm2cpio.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="39_8">libtest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The libtest test is for testing library routines. The library file - is expected to provided an <CODE>#ifdef</CODE> by the name of<VAR> - library</VAR> -<!--CODE_MAIN</CODE--> -. The libtest type invokes the C compiler to compile this - file, links it against <CODE>libfreeswan.a</CODE> (to resolve any other - dependancies) and runs the test with the <CODE>-r</CODE> argument to - invoke a regression test.</(null)></P> -<P>The library test case is expected to do a self-test, exiting with - status code 0 if everything is okay, and with non-zero otherwise. A - core dump (exit code greater than 128) is noted specifically.</P> -<P> Unlike other tests, there are no subdirectories required, or other - parameters to set.</P> -<H2 NAME="umlplutotest"><A NAME="39_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The umlplutotest function starts a pair of user mode line processes. - This is a 2-host version of umlXhost. The "EAST" and "WEST" slots are - defined.</P> -<H2 NAME="umlXhost"><A NAME="39_10">umlXhost parameters</A></H2> -<P> The umlXtest function starts an arbitrary number of user mode line - processes.</P> - -<!-- <IMG SRC="single_netjig.png" ALT="block diagram of uml_netjig"> --> -<P> The script invoked (<CODE>testing/utils/Xhost-test.tcl</CODE>) is a - TCL<A HREF="http://expect.nist.gov/"> expect</A> script that arranges - to start each UML and configure it appropriately for the test. It then - starts listening (using uml_netjig) to the simulated network answering - ARPs and inserting packets as appropriate.</P> -<P> umlXtest has a series of slots, each of which should be filled by a - host. The list of slots is controlled by the variable, XHOST_LIST. This - variable should be set to a space seperated list of slots. The former - umlplutotest is now implemented as a variation of the umlXhost test, - with XHOST_LIST="EAST WEST".</P> -<P> For each host slot that is defined, a series of variables should be - filled in, defining what configuration scripts to use for that host.</P> -<P> The following are used to control the console input and output to - the system. Where the string ${host} is present, the host slot should - be filled in. I.e. for the two host system with XHOST_LIST="EAST WEST", - then the variables: EAST_INIT_SCRIPT and WEST_INIT_SCRIPT will exist.</P> -<DL> -<DT>${host}HOST</DT> -<DD>The name of the UML host which will fill this slot</DD> -<DT>${host}_INIT_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode prior to starting the tests. This file will usually - set up any eroute's and SADB entries that are required for the test. - Similar to INIT_SCRIPT, above.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_RUN_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, before the packets are sent. This set of commands is - run after all of the virtual machines are initialized. I.e. after - EAST_INIT_SCRIPT<B> AND</B> WEST_INIT_SCRIPT. This script can therefore - do things that require that all machines are properly configured.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_RUN2_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode, after the packets are sent. This set of commands is - run before any of the virtual machines have been shut down. (I.e. - before EAST_FINAL_SCRIPT<B> AND</B> WEST_FINAL_SCRIPT.) This script can - therefore catch post-activity status reports.</P> -</DD> -<DT>${host}_FINAL_SCRIPT</DT> -<DD> -<P>a file of commands that is fed into the virtual machine's console in - single user mode after the final packet is sent. Similar to - INIT_SCRIPT, above. If not specified, then the single command "halt" is - sent. Note that when this script is run, the other virtual machines may - already have been killed. If specified, then the script should end with - a halt command to nicely shutdown the UML.</P> -</DD> -<DT>REF_${host}_CONSOLE_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>Similar to REF_CONSOLE_OUTPUT, above.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Some additional flags apply to all hosts:</P> -<DL> -<DT>REF_CONSOLE_FIXUPS</DT> -<DD>a list of scripts (found in <CODE>klips/test/fixups</CODE>) to apply - to sanitize the console output of the machine under test. These are - typically perl, awk or sed scripts that remove things in the kernel - output that change each time the test is run and/or compiled.</DD> -</DL> -<P> In addition to input to the console, the networks may have input fed - to them:</P> -<DL> -<DT>EAST_INPUT/WEST_INPUT</DT> -<DD>a<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> pcap</A> file to feed in on the - private network side of each network. The "EAST" and "WEST" here refer - to the networks, not the hosts.</DD> -<DT>REF_PUB_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -<DT>REF_EAST_FILTER/REF_WEST_FILTER</DT> -<DD>a program that will filter the TCPDUMP output to do further - processing. Defaults to "cat".</DD> -< -<DT>TCPDUMPFLAGS</DT> -<DD>a set of flags for the tcpdump used when converting captured output. - Typical values will include "-n" to turn off DNS, and often "-E" to set - the decryption key (tcpdump 3.7.1 and higher only) for ESP packets. The - "-t" flag (turn off timestamps) is provided automatically</DD> -<DT>REF_EAST_OUTPUT/REF_WEST_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a text file containing tcpdump output. Packets on the private (eth0) - interface are captured and compared after conversion by tcpdump, as - with<VAR> REF_PUB_OUTPUT</VAR>.</DD> -<P> There are two additional environment variables that may be set on - the command line:</P> -<DL> -<DT> NETJIGVERBOSE=verbose export NETJIGVERBOSE</DT> -<DD> If set, then the test output will be "chatty", and let you know - what commands it is running, and as packets are sent. Without it set, - the output is limited to success/failure messages.</DD> -<DT> NETJIGTESTDEBUG=netjig export NETJIGTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> This will enable debugging of the communication with uml_netjig, - and turn on debugging in this utility. This does not imply - NETJIGVERBOSE.</DD> -</DL> -<DT> HOSTTESTDEBUG=hosttest export HOSTTESTDEBUG</DT> -<DD> This will show all interactions with the user-mode-linux consoles</DD> -</DL> -<H2 NAME="kernelpatch"><A NAME="39_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The kernel_patch_test function takes some kernel source, copies it - with lndir, and then applies the patch as produced by "make - kernelpatch".</P> -<P> The following are used to control the input and output to the - system:</P> -<DL> -<DT>KERNEL_NAME</DT> -<DD>the kernel name, typically something like "linus" or "rh"</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_VERSION</DT> -<DD>the kernel version number, as in "2.2" or "2.4".</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC</DT> -<DD>This variable should set in the environment, probably in - ~/freeswan-regress-env.sh. Examples of this variables would be - KERNEL_LINUS2_0_SRC or KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC. This variable should point to - an extracted copy of the kernel source in question.</DD> -<DT>REF_PATCH_OUTPUT</DT> -<DD>a copy of the patch output to compare against</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_PATCH_LEAVE_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>If set to a non-empty string, then the patched kernel source is not - removed at the end of the test. This will typically be set in the - environment while debugging.</DD> -</DL> -<H2 NAME="modtest"><A NAME="39_12">module_compile paramaters</A></H2> -<P> The module_compile test attempts to build the KLIPS module against a - given set of kernel source. This is also done by the RPM tests, but in - a very specific manner.</P> -<P> There are two variations of this test - one where the kernel either - doesn't need to be configured, or is already done, and tests were there - is a local configuration file.</P> -<P> Where the kernel doesn't need to be configured, the kernel source - that is found is simply used. It may be a RedHat-style kernel, where - one can cause it to configure itself via rhconfig.h-style definitions. - Or, it may just be a kernel tree that has been configured.</P> -<P> If the variable KERNEL_CONFIG_FILE is set, then a new directory is - created for the kernel source. It is populated with lndir(1). The - referenced file is then copied in as .config, and "make oldconfig" is - used to configure the kernel. This resulting kernel is then used as the - reference source.</P> -<P> In all cases, the kernel source is found the same was for the - kernelpatch test, i.e. via KERNEL_VERSION/KERNEL_NAME and - KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC.</P> -<P> Once there is kernel source, the module is compiled using the - top-level "make module" target.</P> -<P> The test is considered successful if an executable is found in - OUTPUT/module/ipsec.o at the end of the test.</P> -<DL> -<DT>KERNEL_NAME</DT> -<DD>the kernel name, typically something like "linus" or "rh"</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_VERSION</DT> -<DD>the kernel version number, as in "2.2" or "2.4".</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_${KERNEL_NAME}${KERNEL_VERSION}_SRC</DT> -<DD>This variable should set in the environment, probably in - ~/freeswan-regress-env.sh. Examples of this variables would be - KERNEL_LINUS2_0_SRC or KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC. This variable should point to - an extracted copy of the kernel source in question.</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_CONFIG_FILE</DT> -<DD>The configuration file for the kernel.</DD> -<DT>KERNEL_PATCH_LEAVE_SOURCE</DT> -<DD>If set to a non-empty string, then the configured kernel source is - not removed at the end of the test. This will typically be set in the - environment while debugging.</DD> -<DT>MODULE_DEF_INCLUDE</DT> -<DD>The include file that will be used to configure the KLIPS module, - and possibly the kernel source.</DD> -</DL> -<H1><A NAME="40">Current pitfalls</A></H1> -<DL> -<DT> "tcpdump dissector" not available.</DT> -<DD> This is a non-fatal warning. If uml_netjig is invoked with the -t - option, then it will attempt to use tcpdump's dissector to decode each - packet that it processes. The dissector is presently not available, so - this option it normally turned off at compile time. The dissector - library will be released with tcpdump version 4.0.</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="umltesting.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="nightly.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index ff9b7ca39..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,215 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 26 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec - invoke IPsec utilities -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -command [ argument ...] -<P> -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>--help</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>--version</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>--versioncode</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>--copyright</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>--directory</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>--confdir</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ipsec</I> - -invokes any of several utilities involved in controlling the IPsec -encryption/authentication system, -running the specified -<I>command</I> - -with the specified -<I>argument</I>s - -as if it had been invoked directly. -This largely eliminates possible name collisions with other software, -and also permits some centralized services. -<P> - -In particular, -<I>ipsec</I> - -supplies the invoked -<I>command</I> - -with a suitable PATH environment variable, -and also provides IPSEC_DIR, -IPSEC_CONFS, and IPSEC_VERSION environment variables, -containing respectively -the full pathname of the directory where the IPsec utilities are stored, -the full pathname of the directory where the configuration files live, -and the IPsec version number. -<P> - -<B>ipsec --help</B> - -lists the available commands. -Most have their own manual pages, e.g. -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) - -for -<I>auto</I>. - -<P> - -<B>ipsec --version</B> - -outputs version information about Linux FreeS/WAN. -A version code of the form ``U<I>xxx</I>/K<I>yyy</I>'' -indicates that the user-level utilities are version <I>xxx</I> -but the kernel portion appears to be version <I>yyy</I> -(this form is used only if the two disagree). -<P> - -<B>ipsec --versioncode</B> - -outputs <I>just</I> the version code, -with none of -<B>--version</B>'s - -supporting information, -for use by scripts. -<P> - -<B>ipsec --copyright</B> - -supplies boring copyright details. -<P> - -<B>ipsec --directory</B> - -reports where -<I>ipsec</I> - -thinks the IPsec utilities are stored. -<P> - -<B>ipsec --confdir</B> - -reports where -<I>ipsec</I> - -thinks the IPsec configuration files are stored. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/usr/local/lib/ipsec<TT> </TT>usual utilities directory<BR> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>ENVIRONMENT</H2> - -<P> - -The following environment variables control where FreeS/WAN finds its -components. -The -<B>ipsec</B> - -command sets them if they are not already set. -<PRE> -IPSEC_EXECDIR directory containing published commands -IPSEC_LIBDIR directory containing internal executables -IPSEC_SBINDIR directory containing <B>ipsec</B> command -IPSEC_CONFS directory containing configuration files -</PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - - - -<A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_barf.8.html">ipsec_barf</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_setup.8.html">ipsec_setup</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_showdefaults.8.html">ipsec_showdefaults</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey</A>(8) - - -<P> - -HTML documentation shipped with the release, starting with -<I>doc/index.html</I>. - -<I><<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/doc.html">http://www.freeswan.org/doc.html</A>></I> - -may also be of use. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for Linux FreeS/WAN -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The provision of centralized services, -while convenient, -does compromise the original concept of making the utilities -invocable directly as well as via -<I>ipsec</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">ENVIRONMENT</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 36e0452ef..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1830 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC.CONF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC.CONF</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 26 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec.conf - IPsec configuration and connections -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The optional -<I>ipsec.conf</I> - -file -specifies most configuration and control information for the -FreeS/WAN IPsec subsystem. -(The major exception is secrets for authentication; -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5).) - -Its contents are not security-sensitive -<I>unless</I> - -manual keying is being done for more than just testing, -in which case the encryption/authentication keys in the -descriptions for the manually-keyed connections are very sensitive -(and those connection descriptions -are probably best kept in a separate file, -via the include facility described below). -<P> - -The file is a text file, consisting of one or more -<I>sections</I>. - -White space followed by -<B>#</B> - -followed by anything to the end of the line -is a comment and is ignored, -as are empty lines which are not within a section. -<P> - -A line which contains -<B>include</B> - -and a file name, separated by white space, -is replaced by the contents of that file, -preceded and followed by empty lines. -If the file name is not a full pathname, -it is considered to be relative to the directory containing the -including file. -Such inclusions can be nested. -Only a single filename may be supplied, and it may not contain white space, -but it may include shell wildcards (see -<I><A HREF="sh.1.html">sh</A></I>(1)); - -for example: -<P> - -<B>include</B> - -<B>ipsec.*.conf</B> - -<P> - -The intention of the include facility is mostly to permit keeping -information on connections, or sets of connections, -separate from the main configuration file. -This permits such connection descriptions to be changed, -copied to the other security gateways involved, etc., -without having to constantly extract them from the configuration -file and then insert them back into it. -Note also the -<B>also</B> - -and -<B>alsoflip</B> - -parameters (described below) which permit splitting a single logical section -(e.g. a connection description) into several actual sections. -<P> - -The first significant line of the file must specify the version -of this specification that it conforms to: -<P> - -<B>version 2</B> -<P> - -A section -begins with a line of the form: -<P> - -<I>type</I> - -<I>name</I> - -<P> - -where -<I>type</I> - -indicates what type of section follows, and -<I>name</I> - -is an arbitrary name which distinguishes the section from others -of the same type. -(Names must start with a letter and may contain only -letters, digits, periods, underscores, and hyphens.) -All subsequent non-empty lines -which begin with white space are part of the section; -comments within a section must begin with white space too. -There may be only one section of a given type with a given name. -<P> - -Lines within the section are generally of the form -<P> - - <I>parameter</I><B>=</B><I>value</I> -<P> - -(note the mandatory preceding white space). -There can be white space on either side of the -<B>=</B>. - -Parameter names follow the same syntax as section names, -and are specific to a section type. -Unless otherwise explicitly specified, -no parameter name may appear more than once in a section. -<P> - -An empty -<I>value</I> - -stands for the system default value (if any) of the parameter, -i.e. it is roughly equivalent to omitting the parameter line entirely. -A -<I>value</I> - -may contain white space only if the entire -<I>value</I> - -is enclosed in double quotes (<B>"</B>); -a -<I>value</I> - -cannot itself contain a double quote, -nor may it be continued across more than one line. -<P> - -Numeric values are specified to be either an ``integer'' -(a sequence of digits) or a ``decimal number'' -(sequence of digits optionally followed by `.' and another sequence of digits). -<P> - -There is currently one parameter which is available in any type of -section: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>also</B> - -<DD> -the value is a section name; -the parameters of that section are appended to this section, -as if they had been written as part of it. -The specified section must exist, must follow the current one, -and must have the same section type. -(Nesting is permitted, -and there may be more than one -<B>also</B> - -in a single section, -although it is forbidden to append the same section more than once.) -This allows, for example, keeping the encryption keys -for a connection in a separate file -from the rest of the description, by using both an -<B>also</B> - -parameter and an -<B>include</B> - -line. -(Caution, see BUGS below for some restrictions.) -<DT><B>alsoflip</B> - -<DD> -can be used in a -<B>conn</B> - -section. -It acts like an -<B>also</B> - -that flips the referenced section's entries left-for-right. -</DL> -<P> - -Parameter names beginning with -<B>x-</B> - -(or -<B>X-</B>, - -or -<B>x_</B>, - -or -<B>X_</B>) - -are reserved for user extensions and will never be assigned meanings -by IPsec. -Parameters with such names must still observe the syntax rules -(limits on characters used in the name; -no white space in a non-quoted value; -no newlines or double quotes within the value). -All other as-yet-unused parameter names are reserved for future IPsec -improvements. -<P> - -A section with name -<B>%default</B> - -specifies defaults for sections of the same type. -For each parameter in it, -any section of that type which does not have a parameter of the same name -gets a copy of the one from the -<B>%default</B> - -section. -There may be multiple -<B>%default</B> - -sections of a given type, -but only one default may be supplied for any specific parameter name, -and all -<B>%default</B> - -sections of a given type must precede all non-<B>%default</B> - -sections of that type. -<B>%default</B> - -sections may not contain -<B>also</B> - -or -<B>alsoflip</B> - -parameters. -<P> - -Currently there are two types of section: -a -<B>config</B> - -section specifies general configuration information for IPsec, -while a -<B>conn</B> - -section specifies an IPsec connection. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>CONN SECTIONS</H2> - -A -<B>conn</B> - -section contains a -<I>connection specification</I>, - -defining a network connection to be made using IPsec. -The name given is arbitrary, and is used to identify the connection to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) - -and -<I><A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A></I>(8). - -Here's a simple example: -<P> - - -<PRE> -<B> -conn snt - left=10.11.11.1 - leftsubnet=10.0.1.0/24 - leftnexthop=172.16.55.66 - right=192.168.22.1 - rightsubnet=10.0.2.0/24 - rightnexthop=172.16.88.99 - keyingtries=%forever -</B></PRE> - -<P> - -A note on terminology... -In automatic keying, there are two kinds of communications going on: -transmission of user IP packets, and gateway-to-gateway negotiations for -keying, rekeying, and general control. -The data path (a set of ``IPsec SAs'') used for user packets is herein -referred to as the ``connection''; -the path used for negotiations (built with ``ISAKMP SAs'') is referred to as -the ``keying channel''. -<P> - -To avoid trivial editing of the configuration file to suit it to each system -involved in a connection, -connection specifications are written in terms of -<I>left</I> - -and -<I>right</I> - -participants, -rather than in terms of local and remote. -Which participant is considered -<I>left</I> - -or -<I>right</I> - -is arbitrary; -IPsec figures out which one it is being run on based on internal information. -This permits using identical connection specifications on both ends. -There are cases where there is no symmetry; a good convention is to -use -<I>left</I> - -for the local side and -<I>right</I> - -for the remote side (the first letters are a good mnemonic). -<P> - -Many of the parameters relate to one participant or the other; -only the ones for -<I>left</I> - -are listed here, but every parameter whose name begins with -<B>left</B> - -has a -<B>right</B> - -counterpart, -whose description is the same but with -<B>left</B> - -and -<B>right</B> - -reversed. -<P> - -Parameters are optional unless marked ``(required)''; -a parameter required for manual keying need not be included for -a connection which will use only automatic keying, and vice versa. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H3>CONN PARAMETERS: GENERAL</H3> - -The following parameters are relevant to both automatic and manual keying. -Unless otherwise noted, -for a connection to work, -in general it is necessary for the two ends to agree exactly -on the values of these parameters. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>type</B> - -<DD> -the type of the connection; currently the accepted values -are -<B>tunnel</B> - -(the default) -signifying a host-to-host, host-to-subnet, or subnet-to-subnet tunnel; -<B>transport</B>, - -signifying host-to-host transport mode; -<B>passthrough</B>, - -signifying that no IPsec processing should be done at all; -<B>drop</B>, - -signifying that packets should be discarded; and -<B>reject</B>, - -signifying that packets should be discarded and a diagnostic ICMP returned. -<DT><B>left</B> - -<DD> -(required) -the IP address of the left participant's public-network interface, -in any form accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) - -or one of several magic values. -If it is -<B>%defaultroute</B>, - -and -the -<B>config</B> - -<B>setup</B> - -section's, -<B>interfaces</B> - -specification contains -<B>%defaultroute,</B> - -<B>left</B> - -will be filled in automatically with the local address -of the default-route interface (as determined at IPsec startup time); -this also overrides any value supplied for -<B>leftnexthop</B>. - -(Either -<B>left</B> - -or -<B>right</B> - -may be -<B>%defaultroute</B>, - -but not both.) -The value -<B>%any</B> - -signifies an address to be filled in (by automatic keying) during -negotiation. -The value -<B>%opportunistic</B> - -signifies that both -<B>left</B> - -and -<B>leftnexthop</B> - -are to be filled in (by automatic keying) from DNS data for -<B>left</B>'s - -client. -The values -<B>%group</B> - -and -<B>%opportunisticgroup</B> - -makes this a policy group conn: one that will be instantiated -into a regular or opportunistic conn for each CIDR block listed in the -policy group file with the same name as the conn. -<DT><B>leftsubnet</B> - -<DD> -private subnet behind the left participant, expressed as -<I>network</I><B>/</B><I>netmask</I> -(actually, any form acceptable to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A></I>(3)); - -if omitted, essentially assumed to be <I>left</I><B>/32</B>, -signifying that the left end of the connection goes to the left participant only -<DT><B>leftnexthop</B> - -<DD> -next-hop gateway IP address for the left participant's connection -to the public network; -defaults to -<B>%direct</B> - -(meaning -<I>right</I>). - -If the value is to be overridden by the -<B>left=%defaultroute</B> - -method (see above), -an explicit value must -<I>not</I> - -be given. -If that method is not being used, -but -<B>leftnexthop</B> - -is -<B>%defaultroute</B>, - -and -<B>interfaces=%defaultroute</B> - -is used in the -<B>config</B> - -<B>setup</B> - -section, -the next-hop gateway address of the default-route interface -will be used. -The magic value -<B>%direct</B> - -signifies a value to be filled in (by automatic keying) -with the peer's address. -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -<DT><B>leftupdown</B> - -<DD> -what ``updown'' script to run to adjust routing and/or firewalling -when the status of the connection -changes (default -<B>ipsec _updown</B>). - -May include positional parameters separated by white space -(although this requires enclosing the whole string in quotes); -including shell metacharacters is unwise. -See -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8) - -for details. -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -<DT><B>leftfirewall</B> - -<DD> -whether the left participant is doing forwarding-firewalling -(including masquerading) for traffic from <I>leftsubnet</I>, -which should be turned off (for traffic to the other subnet) -once the connection is established; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -and (the default) -<B>no</B>. - -May not be used in the same connection description with -<B>leftupdown</B>. - -Implemented as a parameter to the default -<I>updown</I> - -script. -See notes below. -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -</DL> -<P> - -If one or both security gateways are doing forwarding firewalling -(possibly including masquerading), -and this is specified using the firewall parameters, -tunnels established with IPsec are exempted from it -so that packets can flow unchanged through the tunnels. -(This means that all subnets connected in this manner must have -distinct, non-overlapping subnet address blocks.) -This is done by the default -<I>updown</I> - -script (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8)). - -<P> - -The implementation of this makes certain assumptions about firewall setup, -notably the use of the old -<I>ipfwadm</I> - -interface to the firewall. -In situations calling for more control, -it may be preferable for the user to supply his own -<I>updown</I> - -script, -which makes the appropriate adjustments for his system. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H3>CONN PARAMETERS: AUTOMATIC KEYING</H3> - -The following parameters are relevant only to automatic keying, -and are ignored in manual keying. -Unless otherwise noted, -for a connection to work, -in general it is necessary for the two ends to agree exactly -on the values of these parameters. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>keyexchange</B> - -<DD> -method of key exchange; -the default and currently the only accepted value is -<B>ike</B> - -<DT><B>auto</B> - -<DD> -what operation, if any, should be done automatically at IPsec startup; -currently-accepted values are -<B>add</B> - -(signifying an -<B>ipsec auto</B> - -<B>--add</B>), - -<B>route</B> - -(signifying that plus an -<B>ipsec auto</B> - -<B>--route</B>), - -<B>start</B> - -(signifying that plus an -<B>ipsec auto</B> - -<B>--up</B>), - -<B>manual</B> - -(signifying an -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>manual</B> - -<B>--up</B>), - -and -<B>ignore</B> - -(also the default) (signifying no automatic startup operation). -See the -<B>config</B> - -<B>setup</B> - -discussion below. -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it -(but in general, for an intended-to-be-permanent connection, -both ends should use -<B>auto=start</B> - -to ensure that any reboot causes immediate renegotiation). -<DT><B>auth</B> - -<DD> -whether authentication should be done as part of -ESP encryption, or separately using the AH protocol; -acceptable values are -<B>esp</B> - -(the default) and -<B>ah</B>. - -<DT><B>authby</B> - -<DD> -how the two security gateways should authenticate each other; -acceptable values are -<B>secret</B> - -for shared secrets, -<B>rsasig</B> - -for RSA digital signatures (the default), -<B>secret|rsasig</B> - -for either, and -<B>never</B> - -if negotiation is never to be attempted or accepted (useful for shunt-only conns). -Digital signatures are superior in every way to shared secrets. -<DT><B>leftid</B> - -<DD> -how -the left participant -should be identified for authentication; -defaults to -<B>left</B>. - -Can be an IP address (in any -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) - -syntax) -or a fully-qualified domain name preceded by -<B>@</B> - -(which is used as a literal string and not resolved). -The magic value -<B>%myid</B> - -stands for the current setting of <I>myid</I>. -This is set in <B>config setup</B> or by <I><A HREF="ipsec_whack.8.html">ipsec_whack</A></I>(8)), or, if not set, -it is the IP address in <B>%defaultroute</B> (if that is supported by a TXT record in its reverse domain), or otherwise -it is the system's hostname (if that is supported by a TXT record in its forward domain), or otherwise it is undefined. -<DT><B>leftrsasigkey</B> - -<DD> -the left participant's -public key for RSA signature authentication, -in RFC 2537 format using -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttodata.3.html">ipsec_ttodata</A></I>(3) - -encoding. -The magic value -<B>%none</B> - -means the same as not specifying a value (useful to override a default). -The value -<B>%dnsondemand</B> - -(the default) -means the key is to be fetched from DNS at the time it is needed. -The value -<B>%dnsonload</B> - -means the key is to be fetched from DNS at the time -the connection description is read from -<I>ipsec.conf</I>; - -currently this will be treated as -<B>%none</B> - -if -<B>right=%any</B> - -or -<B>right=%opportunistic</B>. - -The value -<B>%dns</B> - -is currently treated as -<B>%dnsonload</B> - -but will change to -<B>%dnsondemand</B> - -in the future. -The identity used for the left participant -must be a specific host, not -<B>%any</B> - -or another magic value. -<B>Caution:</B> - -if two connection descriptions -specify different public keys for the same -<B>leftid</B>, - -confusion and madness will ensue. -<DT><B>leftrsasigkey2</B> - -<DD> -if present, a second public key. -Either key can authenticate the signature, allowing for key rollover. -<DT><B>pfs</B> - -<DD> -whether Perfect Forward Secrecy of keys is desired on the connection's -keying channel -(with PFS, penetration of the key-exchange protocol -does not compromise keys negotiated earlier); -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -(the default) -and -<B>no</B>. - -<DT><B>keylife</B> - -<DD> -how long a particular instance of a connection -(a set of encryption/authentication keys for user packets) should last, -from successful negotiation to expiry; -acceptable values are an integer optionally followed by -<B>s</B> - -(a time in seconds) -or a decimal number followed by -<B>m</B>, - -<B>h</B>, - -or -<B>d</B> - -(a time -in minutes, hours, or days respectively) -(default -<B>8.0h</B>, - -maximum -<B>24h</B>). - -Normally, the connection is renegotiated (via the keying channel) -before it expires. -The two ends need not exactly agree on -<B>keylife</B>, - -although if they do not, -there will be some clutter of superseded connections on the end -which thinks the lifetime is longer. -<DT><B>rekey</B> - -<DD> -whether a connection should be renegotiated when it is about to expire; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -(the default) -and -<B>no</B>. - -The two ends need not agree, -but while a value of -<B>no</B> - -prevents Pluto from requesting renegotiation, -it does not prevent responding to renegotiation requested from the other end, -so -<B>no</B> - -will be largely ineffective unless both ends agree on it. -<DT><B>rekeymargin</B> - -<DD> -how long before connection expiry or keying-channel expiry -should attempts to -negotiate a replacement -begin; acceptable values as for -<B>keylife</B> - -(default -<B>9m</B>). - -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -<DT><B>rekeyfuzz</B> - -<DD> -maximum percentage by which -<B>rekeymargin</B> - -should be randomly increased to randomize rekeying intervals -(important for hosts with many connections); -acceptable values are an integer, -which may exceed 100, -followed by a `%' -(default set by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8), - -currently -<B>100%</B>). - -The value of -<B>rekeymargin</B>, - -after this random increase, -must not exceed -<B>keylife</B>. - -The value -<B>0%</B> - -will suppress time randomization. -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -<DT><B>keyingtries</B> - -<DD> -how many attempts (a whole number or <B>%forever</B>) should be made to -negotiate a connection, or a replacement for one, before giving up -(default -<B>%forever</B>). - -The value <B>%forever</B> -means ``never give up'' (obsolete: this can be written <B>0</B>). -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -<DT><B>ikelifetime</B> - -<DD> -how long the keying channel of a connection (buzzphrase: ``ISAKMP SA'') -should last before being renegotiated; -acceptable values as for -<B>keylife</B> - -(default set by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8), - -currently -<B>1h</B>, - -maximum -<B>8h</B>). - -The two-ends-disagree case is similar to that of -<B>keylife</B>. - -<DT><B>compress</B> - -<DD> -whether IPComp compression of content is proposed on the connection -(link-level compression does not work on encrypted data, -so to be effective, compression must be done <I>before</I> encryption); -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -and -<B>no</B> - -(the default). -The two ends need not agree. -A value of -<B>yes</B> - -causes IPsec to propose both compressed and uncompressed, -and prefer compressed. -A value of -<B>no</B> - -prevents IPsec from proposing compression; -a proposal to compress will still be accepted. -<DT><B>disablearrivalcheck</B> - -<DD> -whether KLIPS's normal tunnel-exit check -(that a packet emerging from a tunnel has plausible addresses in its header) -should be disabled; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -and -<B>no</B> - -(the default). -Tunnel-exit checks improve security and do not break any normal configuration. -Relevant only locally, other end need not agree on it. -<DT><B>failureshunt</B> - -<DD> -what to do with packets when negotiation fails. -The default is -<B>none</B>: - -no shunt; -<B>passthrough</B>, - -<B>drop</B>, - -and -<B>reject</B> - -have the obvious meanings. -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H3>CONN PARAMETERS: MANUAL KEYING</H3> - -The following parameters are relevant only to manual keying, -and are ignored in automatic keying. -Unless otherwise noted, -for a connection to work, -in general it is necessary for the two ends to agree exactly -on the values of these parameters. -A manually-keyed -connection must specify at least one of AH or ESP. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>spi</B> - -<DD> -(this or -<B>spibase</B> - -required for manual keying) -the SPI number to be used for the connection (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A></I>(8)); - -must be of the form <B>0x</B><I>hex</I><B></B>, -where -<I>hex</I> - -is one or more hexadecimal digits -(note, it will generally be necessary to make -<I>spi</I> - -at least -<B>0x100</B> - -to be acceptable to KLIPS, -and use of SPIs in the range -<B>0x100</B>-<B>0xfff</B> - -is recommended) -<DT><B>spibase</B> - -<DD> -(this or -<B>spi</B> - -required for manual keying) -the base number for the SPIs to be used for the connection (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A></I>(8)); - -must be of the form <B>0x</B><I>hex</I><B>0</B>, -where -<I>hex</I> - -is one or more hexadecimal digits -(note, it will generally be necessary to make -<I>spibase</I> - -at least -<B>0x100</B> - -for the resulting SPIs -to be acceptable to KLIPS, -and use of numbers in the range -<B>0x100</B>-<B>0xff0</B> - -is recommended) -<DT><B>esp</B> - -<DD> -ESP encryption/authentication algorithm to be used -for the connection, e.g. -<B>3des-md5-96</B> - -(must be suitable as a value of -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A></I>(8)'s - -<B>--esp</B> - -option); -default is not to use ESP -<DT><B>espenckey</B> - -<DD> -ESP encryption key -(must be suitable as a value of -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A></I>(8)'s - -<B>--enckey</B> - -option) -(may be specified separately for each direction using -<B>leftespenckey</B> - -(leftward SA) -and -<B>rightespenckey</B> - -parameters) -<DT><B>espauthkey</B> - -<DD> -ESP authentication key -(must be suitable as a value of -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A></I>(8)'s - -<B>--authkey</B> - -option) -(may be specified separately for each direction using -<B>leftespauthkey</B> - -(leftward SA) -and -<B>rightespauthkey</B> - -parameters) -<DT><B>espreplay_window</B> - -<DD> -ESP replay-window setting, -an integer from -<B>0</B> - -(the -<I>ipsec_manual</I> - -default, which turns off replay protection) to -<B>64</B>; - -relevant only if ESP authentication is being used -<DT><B>leftespspi</B> - -<DD> -SPI to be used for the leftward ESP SA, overriding -automatic assignment using -<B>spi</B> - -or -<B>spibase</B>; - -typically a hexadecimal number beginning with -<B>0x</B> - -<DT><B>ah</B> - -<DD> -AH authentication algorithm to be used -for the connection, e.g. -<B>hmac-md5-96</B> - -(must be suitable as a value of -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A></I>(8)'s - -<B>--ah</B> - -option); -default is not to use AH -<DT><B>ahkey</B> - -<DD> -(required if -<B>ah</B> - -is present) AH authentication key -(must be suitable as a value of -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A></I>(8)'s - -<B>--authkey</B> - -option) -(may be specified separately for each direction using -<B>leftahkey</B> - -(leftward SA) -and -<B>rightahkey</B> - -parameters) -<DT><B>ahreplay_window</B> - -<DD> -AH replay-window setting, -an integer from -<B>0</B> - -(the -<I>ipsec_manual</I> - -default, which turns off replay protection) to -<B>64</B> - -<DT><B>leftahspi</B> - -<DD> -SPI to be used for the leftward AH SA, overriding -automatic assignment using -<B>spi</B> - -or -<B>spibase</B>; - -typically a hexadecimal number beginning with -<B>0x</B> - -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>CONFIG SECTIONS</H2> - -At present, the only -<B>config</B> - -section known to the IPsec software is the one named -<B>setup</B>, - -which contains information used when the software is being started -(see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_setup.8.html">ipsec_setup</A></I>(8)). - -Here's an example: -<P> - - -<PRE> -<B> -config setup - interfaces="ipsec0=eth1 ipsec1=ppp0" - klipsdebug=none - plutodebug=all - manualstart= -</B></PRE> - -<P> - -Parameters are optional unless marked ``(required)''. -The currently-accepted -<I>parameter</I> - -names in a -<B>config</B> - -<B>setup</B> - -section are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>myid</B> - -<DD> -the identity to be used for -<B>%myid</B>. - -<B>%myid</B> - -is used in the implicit policy group conns and can be used as -an identity in explicit conns. -If unspecified, -<B>%myid</B> - -is set to the IP address in <B>%defaultroute</B> (if that is supported by a TXT record in its reverse domain), or otherwise -the system's hostname (if that is supported by a TXT record in its forward domain), or otherwise it is undefined. -An explicit value generally starts with ``<B>@</B>''. -<DT><B>interfaces</B> - -<DD> -virtual and physical interfaces for IPsec to use: -a single -<I>virtual</I><B>=</B><I>physical</I> pair, a (quoted!) list of pairs separated -by white space, or -<B>%none</B>. - -One of the pairs may be written as -<B>%defaultroute</B>, - -which means: find the interface <I>d</I> that the default route points to, -and then act as if the value was ``<B>ipsec0=</B><I>d</I>''. -<B>%defaultroute</B> - -is the default; -<B>%none</B> - -must be used to denote no interfaces. -If -<B>%defaultroute</B> - -is used (implicitly or explicitly) -information about the default route and its interface is noted for -use by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A></I>(8) - -and -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8).) - -<DT><B>forwardcontrol</B> - -<DD> -whether -<I>setup</I> - -should turn IP forwarding on -(if it's not already on) as IPsec is started, -and turn it off again (if it was off) as IPsec is stopped; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -and (the default) -<B>no</B>. - -For this to have full effect, forwarding must be -disabled before the hardware interfaces are brought -up (e.g., -<B>net.ipv4.ip_forward = 0</B> - -in Red Hat 6.x -<I>/etc/sysctl.conf</I>), - -because IPsec doesn't get control early enough to do that. -<DT><B>rp_filter</B> - -<DD> -whether and how -<I>setup</I> - -should adjust the reverse path filtering mechanism for the -physical devices to be used. -Values are <B>%unchanged</B> (to leave it alone) -or <B>0</B>, <B>1</B>, <B>2</B> (values to set it to). -<I>/proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/PHYS/rp_filter</I> -is badly documented; it must be <B>0</B> in many cases -for ipsec to function. -The default value for the parameter is <B>0</B>. -<DT><B>syslog</B> - -<DD> -the -<I><A HREF="syslog.2.html">syslog</A></I>(2) - -``facility'' name and priority to use for -startup/shutdown log messages, -default -<B>daemon.error</B>. - -<DT><B>klipsdebug</B> - -<DD> -how much KLIPS debugging output should be logged. -An empty value, -or the magic value -<B>none</B>, - -means no debugging output (the default). -The magic value -<B>all</B> - -means full output. -Otherwise only the specified types of output -(a quoted list, names separated by white space) are enabled; -for details on available debugging types, see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A></I>(8). - -<DT><B>plutodebug</B> - -<DD> -how much Pluto debugging output should be logged. -An empty value, -or the magic value -<B>none</B>, - -means no debugging output (the default). -The magic value -<B>all</B> - -means full output. -Otherwise only the specified types of output -(a quoted list, names without the -<B>--debug-</B> - -prefix, -separated by white space) are enabled; -for details on available debugging types, see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8). - -<DT><B>plutoopts</B> - -<DD> -additional options to pass to pluto upon startup. See -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8). - -<DT><B>plutostderrlog</B> - -<DD> -do not use syslog, but rather log to stderr, and direct stderr to the -argument file. -<DT><B>dumpdir</B> - -<DD> -in what directory should things started by -<I>setup</I> - -(notably the Pluto daemon) be allowed to -dump core? -The empty value (the default) means they are not -allowed to. -<DT><B>manualstart</B> - -<DD> -which manually-keyed connections to set up at startup -(empty, a name, or a quoted list of names separated by white space); -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A></I>(8). - -Default is none. -<DT><B>pluto</B> - -<DD> -whether to start Pluto or not; -Values are -<B>yes</B> - -(the default) -or -<B>no</B> - -(useful only in special circumstances). -<DT><B>plutowait</B> - -<DD> -should Pluto wait for each -negotiation attempt that is part of startup to -finish before proceeding with the next? -Values are -<B>yes</B> - -or -<B>no</B> - -(the default). -<DT><B>prepluto</B> - -<DD> -shell command to run before starting Pluto -(e.g., to decrypt an encrypted copy of the -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> - -file). -It's run in a very simple way; -complexities like I/O redirection are best hidden within a script. -Any output is redirected for logging, -so running interactive commands is difficult unless they use -<I>/dev/tty</I> - -or equivalent for their interaction. -Default is none. -<DT><B>postpluto</B> - -<DD> -shell command to run after starting Pluto -(e.g., to remove a decrypted copy of the -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> - -file). -It's run in a very simple way; -complexities like I/O redirection are best hidden within a script. -Any output is redirected for logging, -so running interactive commands is difficult unless they use -<I>/dev/tty</I> - -or equivalent for their interaction. -Default is none. -<DT><B>fragicmp</B> - -<DD> -whether a tunnel's need to fragment a packet should be reported -back with an ICMP message, -in an attempt to make the sender lower his PMTU estimate; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -(the default) -and -<B>no</B>. - -<DT><B>hidetos</B> - -<DD> -whether a tunnel packet's TOS field should be set to -<B>0</B> - -rather than copied from the user packet inside; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -(the default) -and -<B>no</B>. - -<DT><B>uniqueids</B> - -<DD> -whether a particular participant ID should be kept unique, -with any new (automatically keyed) -connection using an ID from a different IP address -deemed to replace all old ones using that ID; -acceptable values are -<B>yes</B> - -(the default) -and -<B>no</B>. - -Participant IDs normally <I>are</I> unique, -so a new (automatically-keyed) connection using the same ID is -almost invariably intended to replace an old one. -<DT><B>overridemtu</B> - -<DD> -value that the MTU of the ipsec<I>n</I> interface(s) should be set to, -overriding IPsec's (large) default. -This parameter is needed only in special situations. -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>IMPLICIT CONNS</H2> - -<P> - -The system automatically defines several conns to implement -default policy groups. Each can be overridden by explicitly -defining a new conn with the same name. If the new conn has <B>auto=ignore</B>, -the definition is suppressed. -<P> - -Here are the automatically supplied definitions. -<P> - - -<PRE> -<B> -conn clear - type=passthrough - authby=never - left=%defaultroute - right=%group - auto=route - -conn clear-or-private - type=passthrough - left=%defaultroute - leftid=%myid - right=%opportunisticgroup - failureshunt=passthrough - keyingtries=3 - ikelifetime=1h - keylife=1h - rekey=no - auto=route - -conn private-or-clear - type=tunnel - left=%defaultroute - leftid=%myid - right=%opportunisticgroup - failureshunt=passthrough - keyingtries=3 - ikelifetime=1h - keylife=1h - rekey=no - auto=route - -conn private - type=tunnel - left=%defaultroute - leftid=%myid - right=%opportunisticgroup - failureshunt=drop - keyingtries=3 - ikelifetime=1h - keylife=1h - rekey=no - auto=route - -conn block - type=reject - authby=never - left=%defaultroute - right=%group - auto=route - -# default policy -conn packetdefault - type=tunnel - left=%defaultroute - leftid=%myid - left=0.0.0.0/0 - right=%opportunistic - failureshunt=passthrough - keyingtries=3 - ikelifetime=1h - keylife=1h - rekey=no - auto=route -</B></PRE> - -<P> - -These conns are <I>not</I> affected by anything in <B>conn %default</B>. -They will only work if <B>%defaultroute</B> works. -The <B>leftid</B> will be the interfaces IP address; this -requires that reverse DNS records be set up properly. -<P> - -The implicit conns are defined after all others. It is -appropriate and reasonable to use <B>also=private-or-clear</B> -(for example) in any other opportunistic conn. -<A NAME="lbAJ"> </A> -<H2>POLICY GROUP FILES</H2> - -<P> - -The optional files under -<I>/etc/ipsec.d/policy</I>, - -including -<PRE> - -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/private -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/block - -</PRE> - -may contain policy group configuration information to -supplement -<I>ipsec.conf</I>. - -Their contents are not security-sensitive. -<P> - -These files are text files. -Each consists of a list of CIDR blocks, one per line. -White space followed by # followed by anything to the end of the line -is a comment and is ignored, as are empty lines. -<P> - -A connection in -<I>/etc/ipsec.conf</I> - -which has -<B>right=%group</B> - -or -<B>right=%opportunisticgroup</B> - -is a policy group connection. -When a policy group file of the same name is loaded, with -<P> - - <B>ipsec auto --rereadgroups</B> -<P> - -or at system start, the connection is instantiated such that each -CIDR block serves as an instance's -<B>right</B> - -value. The system treats the -resulting instances as normal connections. -<P> - -For example, given a suitable connection definition -<B>private</B>, - -and the file -<I>/etc/ipsec.d/policy/private </I> - -with an entry 192.0.2.3, -the system creates a connection instance -<B>private#192.0.2.3.</B> - -This connection inherits all details from -<B>private</B>, - -except that its right client is 192.0.2.3. -<A NAME="lbAK"> </A> -<H2>DEFAULT POLICY GROUPS</H2> - -<P> - -The standard FreeS/WAN install includes several policy groups -which provide a way of classifying possible peers into IPsec security classes: -<B>private</B> - -(talk encrypted only), -<B>private-or-clear</B> - -(prefer encryption), -<B>clear-or-private</B> - -(respond to requests for encryption), -<B>clear</B> - -and -<B>block</B>. - -Implicit policy groups apply to the local host only, -and are implemented by the -<B>IMPLICIT CONNECTIONS </B> - -described above. -<A NAME="lbAL"> </A> -<H2>CHOOSING A CONNECTION</H2> - -<P> - -When choosing a connection to apply to an outbound packet caught with a -<B>%trap,</B> - -the system prefers the one with the most specific eroute that -includes the packet's source and destination IP addresses. -Source subnets are examined before destination subnets. -For initiating, only routed connections are considered. For responding, -unrouted but added connections are considered. -<P> - -When choosing a connection to use to respond to a negotiation which -doesn't match an ordinary conn, an opportunistic connection -may be instantiated. Eventually, its instance will be /32 -> /32, but -for earlier stages of the negotiation, there will not be enough -information about the client subnets to complete the instantiation. -<A NAME="lbAM"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<PRE> -/etc/ipsec.conf -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/private -/etc/ipsec.d/policies/block -</PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAN"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.8.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAO"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Designed for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAP"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<P> - -When -<B>type</B> - -or -<B>failureshunt</B> - -is set to -<B>drop</B> - -or -<B>reject,</B> - -FreeS/WAN blocks outbound packets using eroutes, but assumes inbound -blocking is handled by the firewall. FreeS/WAN offers firewall hooks -via an ``updown'' script. However, the default -<B>ipsec _updown</B> - -provides no help in controlling a modern firewall. -<P> - -Including attributes of the keying channel -(authentication methods, -<B>ikelifetime</B>, - -etc.) -as an attribute of a connection, -rather than of a participant pair, is dubious and incurs limitations. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_manual</I> - -is not nearly as generous about the syntax of subnets, -addresses, etc. as the usual FreeS/WAN user interfaces. -Four-component dotted-decimal must be used for all addresses. -It -<I>is</I> - -smart enough to translate bit-count netmasks to dotted-decimal form. -<P> - -It would be good to have a line-continuation syntax, -especially for the very long lines involved in -RSA signature keys. -<P> - -The ability to specify different identities, -<B>authby</B>, - -and public keys for different automatic-keyed connections -between the same participants is misleading; -this doesn't work dependably because the identity of the participants -is not known early enough. -This is especially awkward for the ``Road Warrior'' case, -where the remote IP address is specified as -<B>0.0.0.0</B>, - -and that is considered to be the ``participant'' for such connections. -<P> - -In principle it might be necessary to control MTU on an -interface-by-interface basis, -rather than with the single global override that -<B>overridemtu</B> - -provides. -<P> - -A number of features which <I>could</I> be implemented in -both manual and automatic keying -actually are not yet implemented for manual keying. -This is unlikely to be fixed any time soon. -<P> - -If conns are to be added before DNS is available, -<B>left=</B><I>FQDN</I>, -<B>leftnextop=</B><I>FQDN</I>, -and -<B>leftrsasigkey=%dnsonload</B> - -will fail. -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8) - -does not actually use the public key for our side of a conn but it -isn't generally known at a add-time which side is ours (Road Warrior -and Opportunistic conns are currently exceptions). -<P> - -The <B>myid</B> option does not affect explicit <B> ipsec auto --add</B> or <B>ipsec auto --replace</B> commands for implicit conns. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">CONN SECTIONS</A><DD> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">CONN PARAMETERS: GENERAL</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">CONN PARAMETERS: AUTOMATIC KEYING</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">CONN PARAMETERS: MANUAL KEYING</A><DD> -</DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">CONFIG SECTIONS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">IMPLICIT CONNS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAJ">POLICY GROUP FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAK">DEFAULT POLICY GROUPS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAL">CHOOSING A CONNECTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAM">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAN">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAO">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAP">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8abc1f492..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,227 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC.SECRETS</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC.SECRETS</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 28 March 1999<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec.secrets - secrets for IKE/IPsec authentication -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The file <I>ipsec.secrets</I> holds a table of secrets. -These secrets are used by <I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8), the FreeS/WAN Internet Key -Exchange daemon, to authenticate other hosts. -Currently there are two kinds of secrets: preshared secrets and - -RSA private keys. -<P> - -It is vital that these secrets be protected. The file should be owned -by the super-user, -and its permissions should be set to block all access by others. -<P> - -The file is a sequence of entries and include directives. -Here is an example. Each entry or directive must start at the -left margin, but if it continues beyond a single line, each continuation -line must be indented. -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -# sample /etc/ipsec.secrets file for 10.1.0.1 -10.1.0.1 10.2.0.1: PSK "secret shared by two hosts" - -# an entry may be split across lines, -# but indentation matters -<A HREF="http://www.xs4all.nl">www.xs4all.nl</A> @<A HREF="http://www.kremvax.ru">www.kremvax.ru</A> - 10.6.0.1 10.7.0.1 1.8.0.1: PSK "secret shared by 5" - -# an RSA private key. -# note that the lines are too wide for a -# man page, so ... has been substituted for -# the truncated part -@my.com: rsa { - Modulus: 0syXpo/6waam+ZhSs8Lt6jnBzu3C4grtt... - PublicExponent: 0sAw== - PrivateExponent: 0shlGbVR1m8Z+7rhzSyenCaBN... - Prime1: 0s8njV7WTxzVzRz7AP+0OraDxmEAt1BL5l... - Prime2: 0s1LgR7/oUMo9BvfU8yRFNos1s211KX5K0... - Exponent1: 0soaXj85ihM5M2inVf/NfHmtLutVz4r... - Exponent2: 0sjdAL9VFizF+BKU4ohguJFzOd55OG6... - Coefficient: 0sK1LWwgnNrNFGZsS/2GuMBg9nYVZ... - } - -include ipsec.*.secrets # get secrets from other files -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -Each entry in the file is a list of indices, followed by a secret. -The two parts are separated by a colon (<B>:</B>) that is -followed by whitespace or a newline. For compatability -with the previous form of this file, if the key part is just a -double-quoted string the colon may be left out. -<P> - -An index is an IP address, or a Fully Qualified Domain Name, <A HREF="mailto:user@FQDN">user@FQDN</A>, -<B>%any</B> or <B>%any6</B> (other kinds may come). An IP address may be written -in the familiar dotted quad form or as a domain name to be looked up -when the file is loaded -(or in any of the forms supported by the FreeS/WAN <I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) -routine). In many cases it is a bad idea to use domain names because -the name server may not be running or may be insecure. To denote a -Fully Qualified Domain Name (as opposed to an IP address denoted by -its domain name), precede the name with an at sign (<B>@</B>). -<P> - -Matching IDs with indices is fairly straightforward: they have to be -equal. In the case of a ``Road Warrior'' connection, if an equal -match is not found for the Peer's ID, and it is in the form of an IP -address, an index of <B>%any</B> will match the peer's IP address if IPV4 -and <B>%any6</B> will match a the peer's IP address if IPV6. -Currently, the obsolete notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> may be used in place of -<B>%any</B>. -<P> - -An additional complexity -arises in the case of authentication by preshared secret: the -responder will need to look up the secret before the Peer's ID payload has -been decoded, so the ID used will be the IP address. -<P> - -To authenticate a connection between two hosts, the entry that most -specifically matches the host and peer IDs is used. An entry with no -index will match any host and peer. More specifically, an entry with one index will -match a host and peer if the index matches the host's ID (the peer isn't -considered). Still more specifically, an entry with multiple indices will match a host and -peer if the host ID and peer ID each match one of the indices. If the key -is for an asymmetric authentication technique (i.e. a public key -system such as RSA), an entry with multiple indices will match a host -and peer even if only the host ID matches an index (it is presumed that the -multiple indices are all identities of the host). -It is acceptable for two entries to be the best match as -long as they agree about the secret or private key. -<P> - -Authentication by preshared secret requires that both systems find the -identical secret (the secret is not actually transmitted by the IKE -protocol). If both the host and peer appear in the index list, the -same entry will be suitable for both systems so verbatim copying -between systems can be used. This naturally extends to larger groups -sharing the same secret. Thus multiple-index entries are best for PSK -authentication. -<P> - -Authentication by RSA Signatures requires that each host have its own private -key. A host could reasonably use a different private keys -for different interfaces and for different peers. But it would not -be normal to share entries between systems. Thus thus no-index and -one-index forms of entry often make sense for RSA Signature authentication. -<P> - -The key part of an entry may start with a token indicating the kind of -key. ``RSA'' signifies RSA private key and ``PSK'' signifies -PreShared Key (case is ignored). For compatability with previous -forms of this file, PSK is the default. -<P> - -A preshared secret is most conveniently represented as a sequence of -characters, delimited by the double-quote -character (<B>"</B>). The sequence cannot contain a newline or -double-quote. Strictly speaking, the secret is actually the sequence -of bytes that is used in the file to represent the sequence of -characters (excluding the delimiters). -A preshared secret may also be represented, without quotes, in any form supported by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttodata.3.html">ipsec_ttodata</A></I>(3). -<P> - -An RSA private key is a composite of eight generally large numbers. The notation -used is a brace-enclosed list of field name and value pairs (see the example above). -A suitable key, in a suitable format, may be generated by <I><A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A></I>(8). -The structure is very similar to that used by BIND 8.2.2 or later, but note that -the numbers must have a ``0s'' prefix if they are in base 64. The order of -the fields is fixed. -<P> - -The first token an entry must start in -the first column of its line. Subsequent tokens must be -separated by whitespace, -except for a colon token, which only needs to be followed by whitespace. -A newline is taken as whitespace, but every -line of an entry after the first must be indented. -<P> - -Whitespace at the end of a line is ignored (except in the 0t -notation for a key). At the start of line or -after whitespace, <B>#</B> and the following text up to the end of the -line is treated as a comment. Within entries, all lines must be -indented (except for lines with no tokens). -Outside entries, no line may be indented (this is to make sure that -the file layout reflects its structure). -<P> - -An include directive causes the contents of the named file to be processed -before continuing with the current file. The filename is subject to -``globbing'' as in <I><A HREF="sh.1.html">sh</A></I>(1), so every file with a matching name -is processed. Includes may be nested to a modest -depth (10, currently). If the filename doesn't start with a <B>/</B>, the -directory containing the current file is prepended to the name. The -include directive is a line that starts with the word <B>include</B>, -followed by whitespace, followed by the filename (which must not contain -whitespace). -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/etc/ipsec.secrets -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -The rest of the FreeS/WAN distribution, in particular -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5), -<I><A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A></I>(8), -<I><A HREF="ipsec_newhostkey.8.html">ipsec_newhostkey</A></I>(8), -<I><A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A></I>(8), -<I><A HREF="ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey</A></I>(8), -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) <B>--rereadsecrets</B>, -and <I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8) <B>--listen</B>,. -<BR> - -BIND 8.2.2 or later, <A HREF="ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/">ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind/src/</A> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Designed for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by D. Hugh Redelmeier. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -If an ID is <B>0.0.0.0</B>, it will match <B>%any</B>; -if it is <B>0::0</B>, it will match <B>%any6</B>. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__confread.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__confread.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index ecc120c7e..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__confread.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,58 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _CONFREAD</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_CONFREAD</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _confread - internal routing to parse config file -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_confread </I> - -is an internal script used for parsing /etc/ipsec.conf into a canonical format. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_conf.8.html">ipsec_conf</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Program written by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__copyright.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__copyright.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 7f78b3feb..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__copyright.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,62 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _COPYRIGHT</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_COPYRIGHT</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _copyright - prints FreeSWAN copyright -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_copyright</I> - -outputs the FreeSWAN copyright, and version numbers for "ipsec --copyright" -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Program written by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__include.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__include.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index d85ee7852..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__include.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,67 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _INCLUDE</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_INCLUDE</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _include - internal script to process config files -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_include</I> - -is used by -<I>_confread </I> - -to process -<B>include </B> - -directives in /etc/ipsec.conf. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__confread.8.html">ipsec__confread</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Program written by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__keycensor.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__keycensor.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 22e574932..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__keycensor.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _KEYCENSOR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_KEYCENSOR</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _keycensor - internal routine to remove sensitive information -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_keycensor</I> - -is used by -<B>ipsec barf</B> - -to process the /etc/ipsec.secrets file, removing private key info. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_barf.8.html">ipsec_barf</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__plutoload.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__plutoload.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2c4968300..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__plutoload.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,64 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _PLUTOLOAD</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_PLUTOLOAD</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _plutoload - internal script to start pluto -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_plutoload</I> - -is called by -<B>_plutorun</B> - -to actually start the pluto executable. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_setup.8.html">ipsec_setup</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__realsetup.8.html">ipsec__realsetup</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__plutorun.8.html">ipsec__plutorun</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__plutorun.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__plutorun.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 1b5a1da11..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__plutorun.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,70 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _PLUTORUN</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_PLUTORUN</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _plutorun - internal script to start pluto -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_plutorun</I> - -is called by -<B>_realsetup</B> - -to configure and bring up -<B><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A>(8).</B> - -It calls -<B>_plutoload</B> - -to invoke pluto, and watches to makes sure that pluto is restarted if it fails. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_setup.8.html">ipsec_setup</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__realsetup.8.html">ipsec__realsetup</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__plutoload.8.html">ipsec__plutoload</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A>(8). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program written by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__realsetup.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__realsetup.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index f45bec647..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__realsetup.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _REALSETUP</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_REALSETUP</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _realsetup - internal routine to start FreeS/WAN. -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_realsetup</I> - -is called by the system init scripts to start the FreeS/WAN -system. It starts -<B>KLIPS </B> - -(the kernel component) and -<B>pluto </B> - -(the userspace keying component). -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__klipsstart.8.html">ipsec__klipsstart</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec__plutorun.8.html">ipsec__plutorun</A>(8). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__secretcensor.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__secretcensor.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 6c6ea312d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__secretcensor.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,65 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _SECRETCENSOR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_SECRETCENSOR</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _secretcensor - internal routing to sanitize files -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_secretcensor</I> - -is called by -<B>ipsec barf</B> - -to process the /etc/ipsec.secrets file to remove the private key components -from the file prior to revealing the contents. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_barf.8.html">ipsec_barf</A>(8). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__startklips.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__startklips.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3ad565e57..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__startklips.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _STARTKLIPS</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_STARTKLIPS</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _startklips - internal script to bring up kernel components -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>_startklips</I> - -brings up the FreeS/WAN kernel component. This involves loading any -required modules, attaching and configuring the ipsecX pseudo-devices and -attaching the pseudo-devices to the physical devices. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__updown.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__updown.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 73bf8a343..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec__updown.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,63 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of _UPDOWN</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>_UPDOWN</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec _updown - klips manipulation script -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<I>_updown</I> - -is invoked by pluto when it has brought up a new connection. This script -is used to insert the appropriate routing entries for IPsec operation. -The interface to the script is documented in the pluto man page. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A>(8). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program written by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrbytesof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrbytesof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ca1f857e7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrbytesof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initaddr - initialize an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrtypeof - get address type of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrlenof - get length of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesof - get copy of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesptr - get pointer to address within an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrtypeof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesof(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesptr(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char **dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -to contain one of the (currently two) types of IP address. -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_address</I> - -from an address -(in network byte order, -indicated by a pointer -<I>src</I> - -and a length -<I>srclen</I>) - -and an address family -<I>af</I> - -(typically -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The length must be consistent with the address family. -<P> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -returns the address type of an address, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Addrlenof</I> - -returns the size (in bytes) of the address within an -<I>ip_address</I>, - -to permit storage allocation etc. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesof</I> - -copies the address within the -<I>ip_address</I> - -<I>src</I> - -to the buffer indicated by the pointer -<I>dst</I> - -and the length -<I>dstlen</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If the address will not fit, -as many bytes as will fit are copied; -the returned length is still the full length. -It is the caller's responsibility to check the -returned value to ensure that there was enough room. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesptr</I> - -sets -<I>*dst</I> - -to a pointer to the internal address within the -<I>ip_address</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If -<I>dst</I> - -is -<B>NULL</B>, - -it just returns the address length. -The pointer points to -<B>const</B> - -to discourage misuse. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -The functions which return -<I>size_t</I> - -return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -An unknown address family is a fatal error for any of these functions -except -<I>addrtypeof</I>. - -An address-size mismatch is a fatal error for -<I>initaddr</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -should probably have been named -<I>addrfamilyof</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrbytesptr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrbytesptr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ca1f857e7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrbytesptr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initaddr - initialize an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrtypeof - get address type of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrlenof - get length of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesof - get copy of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesptr - get pointer to address within an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrtypeof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesof(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesptr(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char **dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -to contain one of the (currently two) types of IP address. -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_address</I> - -from an address -(in network byte order, -indicated by a pointer -<I>src</I> - -and a length -<I>srclen</I>) - -and an address family -<I>af</I> - -(typically -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The length must be consistent with the address family. -<P> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -returns the address type of an address, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Addrlenof</I> - -returns the size (in bytes) of the address within an -<I>ip_address</I>, - -to permit storage allocation etc. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesof</I> - -copies the address within the -<I>ip_address</I> - -<I>src</I> - -to the buffer indicated by the pointer -<I>dst</I> - -and the length -<I>dstlen</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If the address will not fit, -as many bytes as will fit are copied; -the returned length is still the full length. -It is the caller's responsibility to check the -returned value to ensure that there was enough room. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesptr</I> - -sets -<I>*dst</I> - -to a pointer to the internal address within the -<I>ip_address</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If -<I>dst</I> - -is -<B>NULL</B>, - -it just returns the address length. -The pointer points to -<B>const</B> - -to discourage misuse. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -The functions which return -<I>size_t</I> - -return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -An unknown address family is a fatal error for any of these functions -except -<I>addrtypeof</I>. - -An address-size mismatch is a fatal error for -<I>initaddr</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -should probably have been named -<I>addrfamilyof</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrcmp.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrcmp.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 93ac522cd..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrcmp.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrinsubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrinsubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 93ac522cd..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrinsubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrlenof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrlenof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ca1f857e7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrlenof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initaddr - initialize an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrtypeof - get address type of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrlenof - get length of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesof - get copy of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesptr - get pointer to address within an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrtypeof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesof(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesptr(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char **dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -to contain one of the (currently two) types of IP address. -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_address</I> - -from an address -(in network byte order, -indicated by a pointer -<I>src</I> - -and a length -<I>srclen</I>) - -and an address family -<I>af</I> - -(typically -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The length must be consistent with the address family. -<P> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -returns the address type of an address, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Addrlenof</I> - -returns the size (in bytes) of the address within an -<I>ip_address</I>, - -to permit storage allocation etc. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesof</I> - -copies the address within the -<I>ip_address</I> - -<I>src</I> - -to the buffer indicated by the pointer -<I>dst</I> - -and the length -<I>dstlen</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If the address will not fit, -as many bytes as will fit are copied; -the returned length is still the full length. -It is the caller's responsibility to check the -returned value to ensure that there was enough room. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesptr</I> - -sets -<I>*dst</I> - -to a pointer to the internal address within the -<I>ip_address</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If -<I>dst</I> - -is -<B>NULL</B>, - -it just returns the address length. -The pointer points to -<B>const</B> - -to discourage misuse. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -The functions which return -<I>size_t</I> - -return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -An unknown address family is a fatal error for any of these functions -except -<I>addrtypeof</I>. - -An address-size mismatch is a fatal error for -<I>initaddr</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -should probably have been named -<I>addrfamilyof</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtoa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtoa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8f0d765e5..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtoa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,448 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoaddr, addrtoa - convert Internet addresses to and from ASCII -<BR> - -ipsec atosubnet, subnettoa - convert subnet/mask ASCII form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtoa(struct in_addr addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr, struct in_addr *mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettoa(struct in_addr addr, struct in_addr mask,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int format, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atoaddr</I> - -converts an ASCII name or dotted-decimal address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Addrtoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII dotted-decimal address. -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' ASCII form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An address is specified in ASCII as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -ASCII-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in -a hexadecimal address may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -Name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>atoaddr</I>. - -In addition, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettoa</I> - -generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros, -unless the mask is non-contiguous. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoaddr</I> - -and -<I>atosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOA_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOA_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available. -This parameter is a hedge against future needs. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-ASCII functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal form; -dotted-decimal component too large to fit in 8 bits. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>atoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -The restriction of ASCII-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtosubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtosubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index e442a9100..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtosubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 12 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initsubnet - initialize an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec addrtosubnet - initialize a singleton ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec subnettypeof - get address type of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec masktocount - convert subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec networkof - get base address of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec maskof - get subnet mask of an ip_subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initsubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int maskbits, int clash, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *addrtosubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<P> -<B>int subnettypeof(const ip_subnet *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktocount(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void networkof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void maskof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -to contain a description of an IP subnet -(base address plus mask). -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -from a base address and -a count of mask bits. -The -<I>clash</I> - -parameter specifies what to do if the base address includes -<B>1</B> - -bits outside the prefix specified by the mask -(that is, in the ``host number'' part of the address): -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>'0'<DD> -zero out host-number bits -<DT>'x'<DD> -non-zero host-number bits are an error -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Addrtosubnet</I> - -initializes an -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -variable -<I>*dst</I> - -to a ``singleton subnet'' containing the single address -<I>*addr</I>. - -It returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure. -<P> - -<I>Subnettypeof</I> - -returns the address type of a subnet, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Masktocount</I> - -converts a subnet mask, expressed as an address, to a bit count -suitable for use with -<I>initsubnet</I>. - -It returns -<B>-1</B> - -for error; see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Networkof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the base address of subnet -<I>src</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Maskof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the subnet mask of subnet -<I>src</I>, - -expressed as an address. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html">ipsec_rangetosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>initsubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -unknown -<I>clash</I> - -value; -impossible mask bit count; -non-zero host-number bits and -<I>clash</I> - -is -<B>'x'</B>. - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtosubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family. -Fatal errors in -<I>masktocount</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -mask bits not contiguous. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtot.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtot.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index eccb946e6..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtot.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,569 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Sept 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoaddr, tnatoaddr, addrtot - convert Internet addresses to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec ttosubnet, subnettot - convert subnet/mask text form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *tnatoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtot(const ip_address *addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettot(const ip_subnet *sub, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -converts a text-string name or numeric address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -does the same conversion, -but the only text forms it accepts are -the ``official'' forms of -numeric address (dotted-decimal for IPv4, colon-hex for IPv6). -<I>Addrtot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, from binary address back to a text form. -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An IPv4 address is specified in text as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -text-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv4 address is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -An IPv6 address is specified in text with -colon-hex notation (e.g. -<B>0:56:78ab:22:33:44:55:66</B>), - -colon-hex with -<B>::</B> - -abbreviating at most one subsequence of multiple zeros (e.g. -<B>99:ab::54:068</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>99:ab:0:0:0:0:54:68</B>), - -or a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3). - -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv6 address will use -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation if possible, -and will not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in hexadecimal -may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -IPv4 name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -In addition, and preferably, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -in IPv4 means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B> - -or -<B>::/0</B> - -in IPv4 or IPv6 respectively. -<P> - -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettot</I> - -always generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the text string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>af</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the address family of interest. -It should be either -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOT_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOT_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available in -<I>subnettot</I>. - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -also accepts format values -<B>'r'</B> - -(signifying a text form suitable for DNS reverse lookups, -e.g. -<B>4.3.2.1.IN-ADDR.ARPA.</B> - -for IPv4 and -RFC 2874 format for IPv6), -and -<B>'R'</B> - -(signifying an alternate reverse-lookup form, -an error for IPv4 and RFC 1886 format for IPv6). -Reverse-lookup names always end with a ``.''. -<P> - -The text-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-text functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown address family; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal or colon-hex form; -dotted-decimal or colon-hex component too large. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -does not support the mixed colon-hex-dotted-decimal -convention used to embed an IPv4 address in an IPv6 address. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -always uses the -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation (which can appear only once in an address) for the -<I>first</I> - -sequence of multiple zeros in an IPv6 address. -One can construct addresses (unlikely ones) in which this is suboptimal. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -<B>'r'</B> - -conversion of an IPv6 address uses lowercase hexadecimal, -not the uppercase used in RFC 2874's examples. -It takes careful reading of RFCs 2874, 2673, and 2234 to realize -that lowercase is technically legitimate here, -and there may be software which botches this -and hence would have trouble with lowercase hex. -<P> - -Possibly -<I>subnettot</I> - -ought to recognize the -<B>%default</B> - -case and generate that string as its output. -Currently it doesn't. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -probably should enforce completeness of dotted-decimal addresses. -<P> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtypeof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtypeof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ca1f857e7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_addrtypeof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initaddr - initialize an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrtypeof - get address type of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrlenof - get length of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesof - get copy of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesptr - get pointer to address within an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrtypeof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesof(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesptr(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char **dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -to contain one of the (currently two) types of IP address. -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_address</I> - -from an address -(in network byte order, -indicated by a pointer -<I>src</I> - -and a length -<I>srclen</I>) - -and an address family -<I>af</I> - -(typically -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The length must be consistent with the address family. -<P> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -returns the address type of an address, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Addrlenof</I> - -returns the size (in bytes) of the address within an -<I>ip_address</I>, - -to permit storage allocation etc. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesof</I> - -copies the address within the -<I>ip_address</I> - -<I>src</I> - -to the buffer indicated by the pointer -<I>dst</I> - -and the length -<I>dstlen</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If the address will not fit, -as many bytes as will fit are copied; -the returned length is still the full length. -It is the caller's responsibility to check the -returned value to ensure that there was enough room. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesptr</I> - -sets -<I>*dst</I> - -to a pointer to the internal address within the -<I>ip_address</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If -<I>dst</I> - -is -<B>NULL</B>, - -it just returns the address length. -The pointer points to -<B>const</B> - -to discourage misuse. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -The functions which return -<I>size_t</I> - -return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -An unknown address family is a fatal error for any of these functions -except -<I>addrtypeof</I>. - -An address-size mismatch is a fatal error for -<I>initaddr</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -should probably have been named -<I>addrfamilyof</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_anyaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_anyaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 974236005..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_anyaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,166 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec anyaddr - get "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec isanyaddr - test address for equality to "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec unspecaddr - get "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec isunspecaddr - test address for equality to "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec loopbackaddr - get loopback address -<BR> - -ipsec isloopbackaddr - test address for equality to loopback address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *anyaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isanyaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *unspecaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isunspecaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *loopbackaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isloopbackaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions fill in, and test for, special values of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I> - -fills in the destination -<I>*dst</I> - -with the ``any'' address of address family -<I>af</I> - -(normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The IPv4 ``any'' address is the one embodied in the old -<B>INADDR_ANY</B> - -macro. -<P> - -<I>Isanyaddr</I> - -returns -<B>1</B> - -if the -<I>src</I> - -address equals the ``any'' address, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>unspecaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>isunspecaddr</I> - -tests for, -the ``unspecified'' address, -which may be the same as the ``any'' address. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>islookbackaddr</I> - -tests for, -the loopback address. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I>, - -<I>unspecaddr</I>, - -and -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -return -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_addrtot.3.html">ipsec_addrtot</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_sameaddr.3.html">ipsec_sameaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in the address-supplying functions are: -unknown address family. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8f0d765e5..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,448 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoaddr, addrtoa - convert Internet addresses to and from ASCII -<BR> - -ipsec atosubnet, subnettoa - convert subnet/mask ASCII form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtoa(struct in_addr addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr, struct in_addr *mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettoa(struct in_addr addr, struct in_addr mask,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int format, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atoaddr</I> - -converts an ASCII name or dotted-decimal address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Addrtoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII dotted-decimal address. -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' ASCII form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An address is specified in ASCII as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -ASCII-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in -a hexadecimal address may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -Name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>atoaddr</I>. - -In addition, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettoa</I> - -generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros, -unless the mask is non-contiguous. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoaddr</I> - -and -<I>atosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOA_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOA_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available. -This parameter is a hedge against future needs. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-ASCII functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal form; -dotted-decimal component too large to fit in 8 bits. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>atoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -The restriction of ASCII-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoasr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoasr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 7c9e2c4aa..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoasr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,294 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOASR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOASR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoasr - convert ASCII to Internet address, subnet, or range -<BR> - -ipsec rangetoa - convert Internet address range to ASCII -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoasr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *type, struct in_addr *addrs);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t rangetoa(struct in_addr *addrs, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; -there is no current equivalent, -because so far they have not proved useful. -<P> - -<I>Atoasr</I> - -converts an ASCII address, subnet, or address range -into a suitable combination of binary addresses -(in network byte order). -<I>Rangetoa</I> - -converts an address range back into ASCII, -using dotted-decimal form for the addresses -(the other reverse conversions are handled by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_addrtoa.3.html">ipsec_addrtoa</A></I>(3) - -and -<I><A HREF="ipsec_subnettoa.3.html">ipsec_subnettoa</A></I>(3)). - -<P> - -A single address can be any form acceptable to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3): - -dotted decimal, DNS name, or hexadecimal number. -A subnet -specification uses the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I> -interpreted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -An address range is two -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3) - -addresses separated by a -<B>...</B> - -delimiter. -If there are four dots rather than three, the first is taken as -part of the begin address, -e.g. for a complete DNS name which ends with -<B>.</B> - -to suppress completion attempts. -The begin address of a range must be -less than or equal to the end address. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoasr</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>type</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoasr</I> - -must point to a -<B>char</B> - -variable used to record which form was found. -The -<I>addrs</I> - -parameter must point to a two-element array of -<B>struct in_addr</B> - -which receives the results. -The values stored into -<B>*type</B>, - -and the corresponding values in the array, are: -<P> - - - -<TT> </TT>*typeaddrs[0]addrs[1]<BR> -<P> -address<B>'a'</B>address-<BR> -<BR> - -subnet<TT> </TT><B>'s'</B>networkmask<BR> -<BR> - -range<TT> </TT><B>'r'</B>beginend<BR> -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>rangetoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>RANGETOA_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>rangetoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available. -This parameter is a hedge against future needs. -<P> - -<I>Atoasr</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Rangetoa</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoasr</I> - -are: -empty input; -error in -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3) - -or -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3) - -during conversion; -begin address of range exceeds end address. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>rangetoa</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoasr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atosa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atosa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 9e2dc2f61..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atosa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,347 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOSA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOSA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atosa, satoa - convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from ASCII -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atosa(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct sa_id *sa);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t satoa(struct sa_id sa, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>struct sa_id {</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr dst;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec_spi_t spi;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>};</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttosa.3.html">ipsec_ttosa</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atosa</I> - -converts an ASCII Security Association (SA) specifier into an -<B>sa_id</B> - -structure (containing -a destination-host address -in network byte order, -an SPI number in network byte order, and -a protocol code). -<I>Satoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII SA specifier. -<P> - -An SA is specified in ASCII with a mail-like syntax, e.g. -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp507@1.2.3.4">esp507@1.2.3.4</A></B>. - -An SA specifier contains -a protocol prefix (currently -<B>ah</B>, - -<B>esp</B>, - -or -<B>tun</B>), - -an unsigned integer SPI number, -and an IP address. -The SPI number can be decimal or hexadecimal -(with -<B>0x</B> - -prefix), as accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoul.3.html">ipsec_atoul</A></I>(3). - -The IP address can be any form accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3), - -e.g. dotted-decimal address or DNS name. -<P> - -As a special case, the SA specifier -<B>%passthrough</B> - -signifies the special SA used to indicate that packets should be -passed through unaltered. -(At present, this is a synonym for -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun0x0@0.0.0.0">tun0x0@0.0.0.0</A></B>, - -but that is subject to change without notice.) -This form is known to both -<I>atosa</I> - -and -<I>satoa</I>, - -so the internal form of -<B>%passthrough</B> - -is never visible. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the -<B>sa_id</B> - -structure, as well as a data type -<B>ipsec_spi_t</B> - -which is an unsigned 32-bit integer. -(There is no consistency between kernel and user on what such a type -is called, hence the header hides the differences.) -<P> - -The protocol code uses the same numbers that IP does. -For user convenience, given the difficulty in acquiring the exact set of -protocol names used by the kernel, -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -defines the names -<B>SA_ESP</B>, - -<B>SA_AH</B>, - -and -<B>SA_IPIP</B> - -to have the same values as the kernel names -<B>IPPROTO_ESP</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_AH</B>, - -and -<B>IPPROTO_IPIP</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atosa</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>satoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>SATOA_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>satoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default -(currently -lowercase protocol prefix, lowercase hexadecimal SPI, dotted-decimal address). -The value -<B>d</B> - -causes the SPI to be generated in decimal instead. -<P> - -<I>Atosa</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Satoa</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_atoul.3.html">ipsec_atoul</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atosa</I> - -are: -empty input; -input too small to be a legal SA specifier; -no -<B>@</B> - -in input; -unknown protocol prefix; -conversion error in -<I>atoul</I> - -or -<I>atoaddr</I>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>satoa</I> - -are: -unknown format; unknown protocol code. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The -<B>tun</B> - -protocol code is a FreeS/WANism which may eventually disappear. -<P> - -The restriction of ASCII-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atosubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atosubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8f0d765e5..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atosubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,448 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoaddr, addrtoa - convert Internet addresses to and from ASCII -<BR> - -ipsec atosubnet, subnettoa - convert subnet/mask ASCII form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtoa(struct in_addr addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr, struct in_addr *mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettoa(struct in_addr addr, struct in_addr mask,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int format, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atoaddr</I> - -converts an ASCII name or dotted-decimal address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Addrtoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII dotted-decimal address. -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' ASCII form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An address is specified in ASCII as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -ASCII-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in -a hexadecimal address may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -Name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>atoaddr</I>. - -In addition, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettoa</I> - -generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros, -unless the mask is non-contiguous. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoaddr</I> - -and -<I>atosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOA_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOA_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available. -This parameter is a hedge against future needs. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-ASCII functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal form; -dotted-decimal component too large to fit in 8 bits. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>atoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -The restriction of ASCII-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoul.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoul.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 923a16131..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_atoul.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,266 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOUL</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOUL</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoul, ultoa - convert unsigned-long numbers to and from ASCII -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoul(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, unsigned long *n);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t ultoa(unsigned long n, int base, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoul.3.html">ipsec_ttoul</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atoul</I> - -converts an ASCII number into a binary -<B>unsigned long</B> - -value. -<I>Ultoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII version. -<P> - -Numbers are specified in ASCII as -decimal (e.g. -<B>123</B>), - -octal with a leading zero (e.g. -<B>012</B>, - -which has value 10), -or hexadecimal with a leading -<B>0x</B> - -(e.g. -<B>0x1f</B>, - -which has value 31) -in either upper or lower case. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoul</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoul</I> - -can be -<B>8</B>, - -<B>10</B>, - -or -<B>16</B>, - -in which case the number supplied is assumed to be of that form -(and in the case of -<B>16</B>, - -to lack any -<B>0x</B> - -prefix). -It can also be -<B>0</B>, - -in which case the number is examined for a leading zero -or a leading -<B>0x</B> - -to determine its base, -or -<B>13</B> - -(halfway between 10 and 16), -which has the same effect as -<B>0</B> - -except that a non-hexadecimal -number is considered decimal regardless of any leading zero. -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultoa</I> - -must be -<B>8</B>, - -<B>10</B>, - -or -<B>16</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Atoul</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Ultoa</I> - -returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="atol.3.html">atol</A>(3), <A HREF="strtoul.3.html">strtoul</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoul</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown -<I>base</I>; - -non-digit character found; -number too large for an -<B>unsigned long</B>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -There is no provision for reporting an invalid -<I>base</I> - -parameter given to -<I>ultoa</I>. - -<P> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoul( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 68ca61bdc..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,416 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_AUTO</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_AUTO</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 31 Jan 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec auto - control automatically-keyed IPsec connections -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>auto</B> - -[ -<B>--show</B> - -] [ -<B>--showonly</B> - -] [ -<B>--asynchronous</B> - -] -<BR> - - [ -<B>--config</B> - -configfile -] [ -<B>--verbose</B> - -] -<BR> - - operation -connection -<P> -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>auto</B> - -[ -<B>--show</B> - -] [ -<B>--showonly</B> - -] operation -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Auto</I> - -manipulates automatically-keyed FreeS/WAN IPsec connections, -setting them up and shutting them down -based on the information in the IPsec configuration file. -In the normal usage, -<I>connection</I> - -is the name of a connection specification in the configuration file; -<I>operation</I> - -is -<B>--add</B>, - -<B>--delete</B>, - -<B>--replace</B>, - -<B>--up</B>, - -<B>--down</B>, - -<B>--route</B>, - -or -<B>--unroute</B>. - -The -<B>--ready</B>, - -<B>--rereadsecrets</B>, - -<B>--rereadgroups</B>, - -and -<B>--status</B> - -<I>operations</I> - -do not take a connection name. -<I>Auto</I> - -generates suitable -commands and feeds them to a shell for execution. -<P> - -The -<B>--add</B> - -operation adds a connection specification to the internal database -within -<I>pluto</I>; - -it will fail if -<I>pluto</I> - -already has a specification by that name. -The -<B>--delete</B> - -operation deletes a connection specification from -<I>pluto</I>'s - -internal database (also tearing down any connections based on it); -it will fail if the specification does not exist. -The -<B>--replace</B> - -operation is equivalent to -<B>--delete</B> - -(if there is already a specification by the given name) -followed by -<B>--add</B>, - -and is a convenience for updating -<I>pluto</I>'s - -internal specification to match an external one. -(Note that a -<B>--rereadsecrets</B> - -may also be needed.) -The -<B>--rereadgroups</B> - -operation causes any changes to the policy group files to take effect -(this is currently a synonym for -<B>--ready</B>, - -but that may change). -None of the other operations alters the internal database. -<P> - -The -<B>--up</B> - -operation asks -<I>pluto</I> - -to establish a connection based on an entry in its internal database. -The -<B>--down</B> - -operation tells -<I>pluto</I> - -to tear down such a connection. -<P> - -Normally, -<I>pluto</I> - -establishes a route to the destination specified for a connection as -part of the -<B>--up</B> - -operation. -However, the route and only the route can be established with the -<B>--route</B> - -operation. -Until and unless an actual connection is established, -this discards any packets sent there, -which may be preferable to having them sent elsewhere based on a more -general route (e.g., a default route). -<P> - -Normally, -<I>pluto</I>'s - -route to a destination remains in place when a -<B>--down</B> - -operation is used to take the connection down -(or if connection setup, or later automatic rekeying, fails). -This permits establishing a new connection (perhaps using a -different specification; the route is altered as necessary) -without having a ``window'' in which packets might go elsewhere -based on a more general route. -Such a route can be removed using the -<B>--unroute</B> - -operation -(and is implicitly removed by -<B>--delete</B>). - -<P> - -The -<B>--ready</B> - -operation tells -<I>pluto</I> - -to listen for connection-setup requests from other hosts. -Doing an -<B>--up</B> - -operation before doing -<B>--ready</B> - -on both ends is futile and will not work, -although this is now automated as part of IPsec startup and -should not normally be an issue. -<P> - -The -<B>--status</B> - -operation asks -<I>pluto</I> - -for current connection status. -The output format is ad-hoc and likely to change. -<P> - -The -<B>--rereadsecrets</B> - -operation tells -<I>pluto</I> - -to re-read the -<I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I> - -secret-keys file, -which it normally reads only at startup time. -(This is currently a synonym for -<B>--ready</B>, - -but that may change.) -<P> - -The -<B>--show</B> - -option turns on the -<B>-x</B> - -option of the shell used to execute the commands, -so each command is shown as it is executed. -<P> - -The -<B>--showonly</B> - -option causes -<I>auto</I> - -to show the commands it would run, on standard output, -and not run them. -<P> - -The -<B>--asynchronous</B> - -option, applicable only to the -<B>up</B> - -operation, -tells -<I>pluto</I> - -to attempt to establish the connection, -but does not delay to report results. -This is especially useful to start multiple connections in parallel -when network links are slow. -<P> - -The -<B>--verbose</B> - -option instructs -<I>auto</I> - -to pass through all output from -<I><A HREF="ipsec_whack.8.html">ipsec_whack</A></I>(8), - -including log output that is normally filtered out as uninteresting. -<P> - -The -<B>--config</B> - -option specifies a non-standard location for the IPsec -configuration file (default -<I>/etc/ipsec.conf</I>). - -<P> - -See -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5) - -for details of the configuration file. -Apart from the basic parameters which specify the endpoints and routing -of a connection (<B>left</B> -and -<B>right</B>, - -plus possibly -<B>leftsubnet</B>, - -<B>leftnexthop</B>, - -<B>leftfirewall</B>, - -their -<B>right</B> - -equivalents, -and perhaps -<B>type</B>), - -an -<I>auto</I> - -connection almost certainly needs a -<B>keyingtries</B> - -parameter (since the -<B>keyingtries</B> - -default is poorly chosen). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - - - -/etc/ipsec.conf<TT> </TT>default IPSEC configuration file<BR> -<BR> - -/var/run/ipsec.info<TT> </TT><B>%defaultroute</B> information<BR> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_whack.8.html">ipsec_whack</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Although an -<B>--up</B> - -operation does connection setup on both ends, -<B>--down</B> - -tears only one end of the connection down -(although the orphaned end will eventually time out). -<P> - -There is no support for -<B>passthrough</B> - -connections. -<P> - -A connection description which uses -<B>%defaultroute</B> - -for one of its -<B>nexthop</B> - -parameters but not the other may be falsely -rejected as erroneous in some circumstances. -<P> - -The exit status of -<B>--showonly</B> - -does not always reflect errors discovered during processing of the request. -(This is fine for human inspection, but not so good for use in scripts.) -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index e7b7200e0..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,150 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_BARF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_BARF</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 17 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec barf - spew out collected IPsec debugging information -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>barf</B> - -[ -<B>--short</B> - -] -<P> -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Barf</I> - -outputs (on standard output) a collection of debugging information -(contents of files, selections from logs, etc.) -related to the IPsec encryption/authentication system. -It is primarily a convenience for remote debugging, -a single command which packages up (and labels) all information -that might be relevant to diagnosing a problem in IPsec. -<P> - -<P> - -The -<B>--short</B> - -option limits the length of -the log portion of -<I>barf</I>'s - -output, which can otherwise be extremely voluminous -if debug logging is turned on. -<P> - -<I>Barf</I> - -censors its output, -replacing keys -and secrets with brief checksums to avoid revealing sensitive information. -<P> - -Beware that the output of both commands is aimed at humans, -not programs, -and the output format is subject to change without warning. -<P> - -<I>Barf</I> - -has to figure out which files in -<I>/var/log</I> - -contain the IPsec log messages. -It looks for KLIPS and general log messages first in -<I>messages</I> - -and -<I>syslog</I>, - -and for Pluto messages first in -<I>secure</I>, - -<I>auth.log</I>, - -and -<I>debug</I>. - -In both cases, -if it does not find what it is looking for in one of those ``likely'' places, -it will resort to a brute-force search of most (non-compressed) files in -<I>/var/log</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<PRE> -/proc/net/* -/var/log/* -/etc/ipsec.conf -/etc/ipsec.secrets -</PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Barf</I> - -uses heuristics to try to pick relevant material out of the logs, -and relevant messages -which are not labelled with any of the tags that -<I>barf</I> - -looks for will be lost. -We think we've eliminated the last such case, but one never knows... -<P> - -Finding -<I>updown</I> - -scripts (so they can be included in output) is, in general, difficult. -<I>Barf</I> - -uses a very simple heuristic that is easily fooled. -<P> - -The brute-force search for the right log files can get expensive on -systems with a lot of clutter in -<I>/var/log</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_bitstomask.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_bitstomask.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index a67a08d83..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_bitstomask.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_GOODMASK</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_GOODMASK</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec goodmask - is this Internet subnet mask a valid one? -<BR> - -ipsec masktobits - convert Internet subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec bitstomask - convert bit count to Internet subnet mask -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int goodmask(struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktobits(struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr bitstomask(int n);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_masktocount.3.html">ipsec_masktocount</A></I>(3) - -for a partial replacement. -<P> - -<I>Goodmask</I> - -reports whether the subnet -<I>mask</I> - -is a valid one, -i.e. consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of -<B>1</B>s - -followed by a (possibly empty) sequence of -<B>0</B>s. - -<I>Masktobits</I> - -takes a (valid) subnet mask and returns the number of -<B>1</B> - -bits in it. -<I>Bitstomask</I> - -reverses this, -returning the subnet mask corresponding to bit count -<I>n</I>. - -<P> - -All masks are in network byte order. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Masktobits</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B> - -for an invalid mask. -<I>Bitstomask</I> - -returns an all-zeros mask for a negative or out-of-range -<I>n</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The error-reporting convention of -<I>bitstomask</I> - -is less than ideal; -zero is sometimes a legitimate mask. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_broadcastof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_broadcastof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 57d4a5648..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_broadcastof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SUBNETOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SUBNETOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec subnetof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return subnet number -<BR> - -ipsec hostof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return host part -<BR> - -ipsec broadcastof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return broadcast address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>struct in_addr subnetof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr hostof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr broadcastof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_networkof.3.html">ipsec_networkof</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Subnetof</I> - -takes an Internet -<I>address</I> - -and a subnet -<I>mask</I> - -and returns the network part of the address -(all in network byte order). -<I>Hostof</I> - -similarly returns the host part, and -<I>broadcastof</I> - -returns the broadcast address (all-1s convention) for the network. -<P> - -These functions are provided to hide the Internet bit-munging inside -an API, in hopes of easing the eventual transition to IPv6. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Calling functions for this is more costly than doing it yourself. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_calcgoo.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_calcgoo.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8379ac6a4..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_calcgoo.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,78 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_CALCGOO</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_CALCGOO</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 8 June 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec calcgoo - calculate hex value for matching modules and kernels -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>calcgoo</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>calcgoo</I> - -accepts the output of -<B>nm -ao</B> - -or -<B>/proc/ksyms</B> - -and extracts a release dependant list of symbols from it. The symbols -are processed to extract the values assigned during the MODVERSIONS -process. This process makes sure that Linux modules are only loaded -on matching kernels. - -This routine is used to find an appropriate module to match the currently -running kernel by _startklips. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<PRE> -/proc/ksyms -</PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec__startklips.8.html">ipsec__startklips</A>(8), <A HREF="genksyms.8.html">genksyms</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Michael Richardson. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_copyright_notice.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_copyright_notice.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index c832e01f7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_copyright_notice.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_VERSION</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_VERSION</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 21 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ipsec_version_code - get IPsec version code -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_version_string - get full IPsec version string -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_copyright_notice - get IPsec copyright notice -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ipsec_version_code(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *ipsec_version_string(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char **ipsec_copyright_notice(void);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions provide information on version numbering and copyright -of the Linux FreeS/WAN IPsec implementation. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_code</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant -containing the current IPsec version code, -such as ``1.92'' or ``snap2001Nov19b''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_string</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant giving a full version identification, -consisting of the version code preceded by a prefix identifying the software, -e.g. ``Linux FreeS/WAN 1.92''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_copyright_notice</I> - -returns a pointer to a vector of pointers, -terminated by a -<B>NULL</B>, - -which is the text of a suitable copyright notice. -Each pointer points to a string constant (possibly empty) which is one line -of the somewhat-verbose copyright notice. -The strings are NUL-terminated and do not contain a newline; -supplying suitable line termination for the output device is -the caller's responsibility. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_datatot.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_datatot.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 628558001..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_datatot.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,439 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTODATA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTODATA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 16 August 2003<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttodata, datatot - convert binary data bytes from and to text formats -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttodata(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, char *dst, size_t dstlen, size_t *lenp);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *ttodatav(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, char *dst, size_t dstlen, size_t *lenp,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *errp, size_t errlen, int flags);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t datatot(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int format, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttodata</I>, - -<I>ttodatav</I>, - -and -<I>datatot</I> - -convert arbitrary binary data (e.g. encryption or authentication keys) -from and to more-or-less human-readable text formats. -<P> - -Currently supported formats are hexadecimal, base64, and characters. -<P> - -A hexadecimal text value begins with a -<B>0x</B> - -(or -<B>0X</B>) - -prefix and continues with two-digit groups -of hexadecimal digits (0-9, and a-f or A-F), -each group encoding the value of one binary byte, high-order digit first. -A single -<B>_</B> - -(underscore) -between consecutive groups is ignored, permitting punctuation to improve -readability; doing this every eight digits seems about right. -<P> - -A base64 text value begins with a -<B>0s</B> - -(or -<B>0S</B>) - -prefix -and continues with four-digit groups of base64 digits (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, +, and /), -each group encoding the value of three binary bytes as described in -section 6.8 of RFC 2045. -If -<B>flags</B> - -has the -<B>TTODATAV_IGNORESPACE</B> - -bit on, blanks are ignore (after the prefix). -Note that the last one or two digits of a base64 group can be -<B>=</B> - -to indicate that fewer than three binary bytes are encoded. -<P> - -A character text value begins with a -<B>0t</B> - -(or -<B>0T</B>) - -prefix -and continues with text characters, each being the value of one binary byte. -<P> - -All these functions basically copy data from -<I>src</I> - -(whose size is specified by -<I>srclen</I>) - -to -<I>dst</I> - -(whose size is specified by -<I>dstlen</I>), - -doing the conversion en route. -If the result will not fit in -<I>dst</I>, - -it is truncated; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes of result written to -<I>dst</I>. - -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result bytes are written at all. -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttodata</I> - -and -<I>ttodatav</I> - -specifies what format the input is in; -normally it should be -<B>0</B> - -to signify that this gets figured out from the prefix. -Values of -<B>16</B>, - -<B>64</B>, - -and -<B>256</B> - -respectively signify hexadecimal, base64, and character-text formats -without prefixes. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>datatot</I>, - -a single character used as a type code, -specifies which text format is wanted. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not ASCII -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) specifies a reasonable default. -Other currently-supported values are: -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>'x'</B> - -<DD> -continuous lower-case hexadecimal with a -<B>0x</B> - -prefix -<DT><B>'h'</B> - -<DD> -lower-case hexadecimal with a -<B>0x</B> - -prefix and a -<B>_</B> - -every eight digits -<DT><B>':'</B> - -<DD> -lower-case hexadecimal with no prefix and a -<B>:</B> - -(colon) every two digits -<DT><B>16</B> - -<DD> -lower-case hexadecimal with no prefix or -<B>_</B> - -<DT><B>'s'</B> - -<DD> -continuous base64 with a -<B>0s</B> - -prefix -<DT><B>64</B> - -<DD> -continuous base64 with no prefix -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -The default format is currently -<B>'h'</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Ttodata</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -On success, -if and only if -<I>lenp</I> - -is non-NULL, -<B>*lenp</B> - -is set to the number of bytes required to contain the full untruncated result. -It is the caller's responsibility to check this against -<I>dstlen</I> - -to determine whether he has obtained a complete result. -The -<B>*lenp</B> - -value is correct even if -<I>dstlen</I> - -is zero, which offers a way to determine how much space would be needed -before having to allocate any. -<P> - -<I>Ttodatav</I> - -is just like -<I>ttodata</I> - -except that in certain cases, -if -<I>errp</I> - -is non-NULL, -the buffer pointed to by -<I>errp</I> - -(whose length is given by -<I>errlen</I>) - -is used to hold a more detailed error message. -The return value is NULL for success, -and is either -<I>errp</I> - -or a pointer to a string literal for failure. -If the size of the error-message buffer is -inadequate for the desired message, -<I>ttodatav</I> - -will fall back on returning a pointer to a literal string instead. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant -<B>TTODATAV_BUF</B> - -which is the size of a buffer large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The normal return value of -<I>datatot</I> - -is the number of bytes required -to contain the full untruncated result. -It is the caller's responsibility to check this against -<I>dstlen</I> - -to determine whether he has obtained a complete result. -The return value is correct even if -<I>dstlen</I> - -is zero, which offers a way to determine how much space would be needed -before having to allocate any. -A return value of -<B>0</B> - -signals a fatal error of some kind -(see DIAGNOSTICS). -<P> - -A zero value for -<I>srclen</I> - -in -<I>ttodata</I> - -(but not -<I>datatot</I>!) - -is synonymous with -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -A non-zero -<I>srclen</I> - -in -<I>ttodata</I> - -must not include the terminating NUL. -<P> - -Unless -<I>dstlen</I> - -is zero, -the result supplied by -<I>datatot</I> - -is always NUL-terminated, -and its needed-size return value includes space for the terminating NUL. -<P> - -Several obsolete variants of these functions -(<I>atodata</I>, - -<I>datatoa</I>, - -<I>atobytes</I>, - -and -<I>bytestoa</I>) - -are temporarily also supported. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="sprintf.3.html">sprintf</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttodata</I> - -and -<I>ttodatav</I> - -are: -unknown characters in the input; -unknown or missing prefix; -unknown base; -incomplete digit group; -non-zero padding in a base64 less-than-three-bytes digit group; -zero-length input. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>datatot</I> - -are: -unknown format code; -zero-length input. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Datatot</I> - -should have a format code to produce character-text output. -<P> - -The -<B>0s</B> - -and -<B>0t</B> - -prefixes are the author's inventions and are not a standard -of any kind. -They have been chosen to avoid collisions with existing practice -(some C implementations use -<B>0b</B> - -for binary) -and possible confusion with unprefixed hexadecimal. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 158b57015..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,370 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_EROUTE</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_EROUTE</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 20 Sep 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_eroute - list of existing eroutes -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<P> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec_eroute</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec_eroute</I> - -lists the IPSEC extended routing tables, -which control what (if any) processing is applied -to non-encrypted packets arriving for IPSEC processing and forwarding. -At this point it is a read-only file. -<P> - -A table entry consists of: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -packet count, -<DT>+<DD> -source address with mask, -<DT>+<DD> -a '->' separator for visual and automated parsing between src and dst -<DT>+<DD> -destination address with mask -<DT>+<DD> -a '=>' separator for visual and automated parsing between selection -criteria and SAID to use -<DT>+<DD> -SAID (Security Association IDentifier), comprised of: -<DT>+<DD> -protocol -(<I>proto</I>), -<DT>+<DD> -address family -(<I>af</I>), -where '.' stands for IPv4 and ':' for IPv6 -<DT>+<DD> -Security Parameters Index -(<I>SPI</I>), -<DT>+<DD> -effective destination -(<I>edst</I>), -where the packet should be forwarded after processing -(normally the other security gateway) -together indicate which Security Association should be used to process -the packet, -<DT>+<DD> -source identity text string with no whitespace, in parens, -<DT>+<DD> -destination identity text string with no whitespace, in parens -</DL> -<P> - -Addresses are written as IPv4 dotted quads or IPv6 coloned hex, -protocol is one of "ah", "esp", "comp" or "tun" -and -SPIs are prefixed hexadecimal numbers where the prefix '.' is for IPv4 and the prefix ':' is for IPv6 -<P> - -SAIDs are written as "<A HREF="mailto:protoafSPI@edst">protoafSPI@edst</A>". There are also 5 -"magic" SAIDs which have special meaning: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%drop</B> - -means that matches are to be dropped -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%reject</B> - -means that matches are to be dropped and an ICMP returned, if -possible to inform -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%trap</B> - -means that matches are to trigger an ACQUIRE message to the Key -Management daemon(s) and a hold eroute will be put in place to -prevent subsequent packets also triggering ACQUIRE messages. -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%hold</B> - -means that matches are to stored until the eroute is replaced or -until that eroute gets reaped -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%pass</B> - -means that matches are to allowed to pass without IPSEC processing -<BR> - - -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<P> - -<B>1867 172.31.252.0/24 -> 0.0.0.0/0 => <A HREF="mailto:tun.130@192.168.43.1">tun.130@192.168.43.1</A> </B> - -<BR> - -<B> ()<TT> </TT>()</B> - -<P> - -means that 1,867 packets have been sent to an<BR> -<B>eroute</B> - -that has been set up to protect traffic between the subnet -<B>172.31.252.0</B> - -with a subnet mask of -<B>24</B> - -bits and the default address/mask represented by an address of -<B>0.0.0.0</B> - -with a subnet mask of -<B>0</B> - -bits using the local machine as a security gateway on this end of the -tunnel and the machine -<B>192.168.43.1</B> - -on the other end of the tunnel with a Security Association IDentifier of -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun0x130@192.168.43.1">tun0x130@192.168.43.1</A></B> - -which means that it is a tunnel mode connection (4, IPPROTO_IPIP) with a -Security Parameters Index of -<B>130</B> - -in hexadecimal with no identies defined for either end. -<P> - -<B>125 3049:1::/64 -> 0:0/0 => tun:<A HREF="mailto:130@3058">130@3058</A>:4::5<TT> </TT>()<TT> </TT>()</B> - -<P> - -means that 125 packets have been sent to an<BR> -<B>eroute</B> - -that has been set up to protect traffic between the subnet -<B>3049:1::</B> - -with a subnet mask of -<B>64</B> - -bits and the default address/mask represented by an address of -<B>0:0</B> - -with a subnet mask of -<B>0</B> - -bits using the local machine as a security gateway on this end of the -tunnel and the machine -<B>3058:4::5</B> - -on the other end of the tunnel with a Security Association IDentifier of -<B>tun:<A HREF="mailto:130@3058">130@3058</A>:4::5</B> - -which means that it is a tunnel mode connection with a -Security Parameters Index of -<B>130</B> - -in hexadecimal with no identies defined for either end. -<P> - -<B>42 192.168.6.0/24 -> 192.168.7.0/24 => %passthrough</B> - -<P> - -means that 42 packets have been sent to an -<B>eroute</B> - -that has been set up to pass the traffic from the subnet -<B>192.168.6.0</B> - -with a subnet mask of -<B>24</B> - -bits and to subnet -<B>192.168.7.0</B> - -with a subnet mask of -<B>24</B> - -bits without any IPSEC processing with no identies defined for either end. -<P> - -<B>2112 192.168.8.55/32 -> 192.168.9.47/24 => %hold<TT> </TT>(east)<TT> </TT>()</B> - -<P> - -means that 2112 packets have been sent to an<BR> -<B>eroute</B> - -that has been set up to hold the traffic from the host -<B>192.168.8.55</B> - -and to host -<B>192.168.9.47</B> - -until a key exchange from a Key Management daemon -succeeds and puts in an SA or fails and puts in a pass -or drop eroute depending on the default configuration with the local client -defined as "east" and no identy defined for the remote end. -<P> - -<B>2001 192.168.2.110/32 -> 192.168.2.120/32 => </B> - -<BR> - -<B> <A HREF="mailto:esp.e6de@192.168.2.120">esp.e6de@192.168.2.120</A><TT> </TT>()<TT> </TT>()</B> - -<P> - -means that 2001 packets have been sent to an<BR> -<B>eroute</B> - -that has been set up to protect traffic between the host -<B>192.168.2.110</B> - -and the host -<B>192.168.2.120</B> - -using -<B>192.168.2.110</B> - -as a security gateway on this end of the -connection and the machine -<B>192.168.2.120</B> - -on the other end of the connection with a Security Association IDentifier of -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp.e6de@192.168.2.120">esp.e6de@192.168.2.120</A></B> - -which means that it is a transport mode connection with a Security -Parameters Index of -<B>e6de</B> - -in hexadecimal using Encapsuation Security Payload protocol (50, -IPPROTO_ESP) with no identies defined for either end. -<P> - -<B>1984 3049:1::110/128 -> 3049:1::120/128 => </B> - -<BR> - -<B> ah:<A HREF="mailto:f5ed@3049">f5ed@3049</A>:1::120<TT> </TT>()<TT> </TT>()</B> - -<P> - -means that 1984 packets have been sent to an<BR> -<B>eroute</B> - -that has been set up to authenticate traffic between the host -<B>3049:1::110</B> - -and the host -<B>3049:1::120</B> - -using -<B>3049:1::110</B> - -as a security gateway on this end of the -connection and the machine -<B>3049:1::120</B> - -on the other end of the connection with a Security Association IDentifier of -<B>ah:<A HREF="mailto:f5ed@3049">f5ed@3049</A>:1::120</B> - -which means that it is a transport mode connection with a Security -Parameters Index of -<B>f5ed</B> - -in hexadecimal using Authentication Header protocol (51, -IPPROTO_AH) with no identies defined for either end. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_eroute, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.5.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 7489462d7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,421 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_EROUTE</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_EROUTE</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 21 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec eroute - manipulate IPSEC extended routing tables -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<B>--add</B> - -<B>--eraf (inet | inet6)</B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src/srcmaskbits|srcmask -<B>--dst</B> - -dst/dstmaskbits|dstmask -<SAID> -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<B>--replace</B> - -<B>--eraf (inet | inet6)</B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src/srcmaskbits|srcmask -<B>--dst</B> - -dst/dstmaskbits|dstmask -<SAID> -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<B>--del</B> - -<B>--eraf (inet | inet6)</B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src/srcmaskbits|srcmask -<B>--dst</B> - -dst/dstmaskbits|dstmask -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<B>--clear</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<B>--help</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>eroute</B> - -<B>--version</B> - -<P> - -Where <SAID> is -<B>--af</B> - -(inet | inet6) -<B>--edst</B> - -edst -<B>--spi</B> - -spi -<B>--proto</B> - -proto -OR -<B>--said</B> - -said -OR -<B>--said</B> - -<B>(%passthrough | %passthrough4 | %passthrough6)</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Eroute</I> - -manages the IPSEC extended routing tables, -which control what (if any) processing is applied -to non-encrypted packets arriving for IPSEC processing and forwarding. -The form with no additional arguments lists the contents of -/proc/net/ipsec_eroute. -The -<B>--add</B> - -form adds a table entry, the -<B>--replace</B> - -form replaces a table entry, while the -<B>--del</B> - -form deletes one. The -<B>--clear</B> - -form deletes the entire table. -<P> - -A table entry consists of: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -source and destination addresses, -with masks, -for selection of packets -<DT>+<DD> -Security Association IDentifier, comprised of: -<DT>+<DD> -protocol -(<I>proto</I>), indicating (together with the -effective destination and the security parameters index) -which Security Association should be used to process the packet -<DT>+<DD> -address family -(<I>af</I>), -<DT>+<DD> -Security Parameters Index -(<I>spi</I>), indicating (together with the -effective destination and protocol) -which Security Association should be used to process the packet -(must be larger than or equal to 0x100) -<DT>+<DD> -effective destination -(<I>edst</I>), -where the packet should be forwarded after processing -(normally the other security gateway) -<DT>+<DD> -OR -<DT>+<DD> -SAID -(<I>said</I>), indicating -which Security Association should be used to process the packet -</DL> -<P> - -Addresses are written as IPv4 dotted quads or IPv6 coloned hex, -protocol is one of "ah", "esp", "comp" or "tun" and SPIs are -prefixed hexadecimal numbers where '.' represents IPv4 and ':' -stands for IPv6. -<P> - -SAIDs are written as "<A HREF="mailto:protoafSPI@address">protoafSPI@address</A>". There are also 5 -"magic" SAIDs which have special meaning: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%drop</B> - -means that matches are to be dropped -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%reject</B> - -means that matches are to be dropped and an ICMP returned, if -possible to inform -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%trap</B> - -means that matches are to trigger an ACQUIRE message to the Key -Management daemon(s) and a hold eroute will be put in place to -prevent subsequent packets also triggering ACQUIRE messages. -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%hold</B> - -means that matches are to stored until the eroute is replaced or -until that eroute gets reaped -<DT>+<DD> -<B>%pass</B> - -means that matches are to allowed to pass without IPSEC processing -</DL> -<P> - -The format of /proc/net/ipsec_eroute is listed in <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5). -<BR> - - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec eroute --add --eraf inet --src 192.168.0.1/32 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --dst 192.168.2.0/24 --af inet --edst 192.168.0.2 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --spi 0x135 --proto tun</B> - -<P> - -sets up an -<B>eroute</B> - -on a Security Gateway to protect traffic between the host -<B>192.168.0.1</B> - -and the subnet -<B>192.168.2.0</B> - -with -<B>24</B> - -bits of subnet mask via Security Gateway -<B>192.168.0.2</B> - -using the Security Association with address -<B>192.168.0.2</B>, - -Security Parameters Index -<B>0x135</B> - -and protocol -<B>tun</B> - -(50, IPPROTO_ESP). -<P> - -<B>ipsec eroute --add --eraf inet6 --src 3049:1::1/128 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --dst 3049:2::/64 --af inet6 --edst 3049:1::2 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --spi 0x145 --proto tun</B> - -<P> - -sets up an -<B>eroute</B> - -on a Security Gateway to protect traffic between the host -<B>3049:1::1</B> - -and the subnet -<B>3049:2::</B> - -with -<B>64</B> - -bits of subnet mask via Security Gateway -<B>3049:1::2</B> - -using the Security Association with address -<B>3049:1::2</B>, - -Security Parameters Index -<B>0x145</B> - -and protocol -<B>tun</B> - -(50, IPPROTO_ESP). -<P> - -<B>ipsec eroute --replace --eraf inet --src company.com/24 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --dst <A HREF="ftp://ftp.ngo.org">ftp.ngo.org</A>/32 --said <A HREF="mailto:tun.135@gw.ngo.org">tun.135@gw.ngo.org</A></B> - -<P> - -replaces an -<B>eroute</B> - -on a Security Gateway to protect traffic between the subnet -<B>company.com</B> - -with -<B>24</B> - -bits of subnet mask and the host -<B><A HREF="ftp://ftp.ngo.org">ftp.ngo.org</A></B> - -via Security Gateway -<B>gw.ngo.org</B> - -using the Security Association with Security Association ID -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun0x135@gw.ngo.org">tun0x135@gw.ngo.org</A></B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec eroute --del --eraf inet --src company.com/24 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --dst <A HREF="http://www.ietf.org">www.ietf.org</A>/32 --said %passthrough4</B> - -<P> - -deletes an -<B>eroute</B> - -on a Security Gateway that allowed traffic between the subnet -<B>company.com</B> - -with -<B>24</B> - -bits of subnet mask and the host -<B><A HREF="http://www.ietf.org">www.ietf.org</A></B> - -to pass in the clear, unprocessed. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_eroute, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_goodmask.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_goodmask.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index a67a08d83..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_goodmask.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_GOODMASK</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_GOODMASK</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec goodmask - is this Internet subnet mask a valid one? -<BR> - -ipsec masktobits - convert Internet subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec bitstomask - convert bit count to Internet subnet mask -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int goodmask(struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktobits(struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr bitstomask(int n);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_masktocount.3.html">ipsec_masktocount</A></I>(3) - -for a partial replacement. -<P> - -<I>Goodmask</I> - -reports whether the subnet -<I>mask</I> - -is a valid one, -i.e. consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of -<B>1</B>s - -followed by a (possibly empty) sequence of -<B>0</B>s. - -<I>Masktobits</I> - -takes a (valid) subnet mask and returns the number of -<B>1</B> - -bits in it. -<I>Bitstomask</I> - -reverses this, -returning the subnet mask corresponding to bit count -<I>n</I>. - -<P> - -All masks are in network byte order. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Masktobits</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B> - -for an invalid mask. -<I>Bitstomask</I> - -returns an all-zeros mask for a negative or out-of-range -<I>n</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The error-reporting convention of -<I>bitstomask</I> - -is less than ideal; -zero is sometimes a legitimate mask. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_hostof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_hostof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 57d4a5648..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_hostof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SUBNETOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SUBNETOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec subnetof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return subnet number -<BR> - -ipsec hostof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return host part -<BR> - -ipsec broadcastof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return broadcast address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>struct in_addr subnetof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr hostof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr broadcastof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_networkof.3.html">ipsec_networkof</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Subnetof</I> - -takes an Internet -<I>address</I> - -and a subnet -<I>mask</I> - -and returns the network part of the address -(all in network byte order). -<I>Hostof</I> - -similarly returns the host part, and -<I>broadcastof</I> - -returns the broadcast address (all-1s convention) for the network. -<P> - -These functions are provided to hide the Internet bit-munging inside -an API, in hopes of easing the eventual transition to IPv6. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Calling functions for this is more costly than doing it yourself. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ikeping.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ikeping.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 03ed961f3..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ikeping.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,137 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_IKEPING</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_IKEPING</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 23 Feb 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ikeping - send/receive ISAKMP/IKE echo requests/replies -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>ikeping</B> - -[ -<B>--listen</B> - -] [ -<B>--verbose</B> - -] [ -<B>--wait </B> - -time ] [ -<B>--exchangenum </B> - -num ] [ -<B>--ikeport </B> - -localport ] [ -<B>--ikeaddress </B> - -address ] [ -<B>--inet</B> - -] [ -<B>--inet6</B> - -] destaddr[/dstport] ... -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ikeping</I> - -sends and receives ISAKMP/IKE echo request and echo reply packets. These -packets are intended for diagnostics purposes, in a manner similar to -<I><A HREF="ping.8.html">ping</A></I>(8) - -does for ICMP echo request/reply packets. -<P> - -At the time of this writing, the ISAKMP echo request/reply exchange is still -an internet-draft, and is therefore completely non-standard. -<P> - -<I>Ikeping</I> - -will bind to the local address given by -<B>--ikeaddress</B> - -and the port number given by -<B>--ikeport</B> - -defaulting to the wildcard address and the ISAKMP port 500. An ISAKMP -exchange of type 244 (a private use number) is sent to each of the -address/ports listed on the command line. The exchange number may be -overridden by the -<B>--exchangenum </B> - -option. -<P> - -<I>Ikeping</I> - -then listens for replies, printing them as they are received. Replies -are of exchange type 245 or the specified exchange number plus 1. -<I>Ikeping </I> - -will keep listening until it either receives as many echo responses as it sent, -or until the timeout period (10 seconds) has been reached. Receipt of a -packet will reset the timer. The -<B>--wait</B> - -option can be used to specify a different timeout period. -<P> - -If the -<B>--listen</B> - -option is given, then -<I>ikeping</I> - -will not send any packets. Instead, it will listen for them and reply to -each request received. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -no external files -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ping.8.html">ping</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Michael Richardson. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ca1f857e7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,232 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initaddr - initialize an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrtypeof - get address type of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrlenof - get length of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesof - get copy of address within an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec addrbytesptr - get pointer to address within an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrtypeof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesof(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrbytesptr(const ip_address *src,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char **dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -to contain one of the (currently two) types of IP address. -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_address</I> - -from an address -(in network byte order, -indicated by a pointer -<I>src</I> - -and a length -<I>srclen</I>) - -and an address family -<I>af</I> - -(typically -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The length must be consistent with the address family. -<P> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -returns the address type of an address, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Addrlenof</I> - -returns the size (in bytes) of the address within an -<I>ip_address</I>, - -to permit storage allocation etc. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesof</I> - -copies the address within the -<I>ip_address</I> - -<I>src</I> - -to the buffer indicated by the pointer -<I>dst</I> - -and the length -<I>dstlen</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If the address will not fit, -as many bytes as will fit are copied; -the returned length is still the full length. -It is the caller's responsibility to check the -returned value to ensure that there was enough room. -<P> - -<I>Addrbytesptr</I> - -sets -<I>*dst</I> - -to a pointer to the internal address within the -<I>ip_address</I>, - -and returns the address length (in bytes). -If -<I>dst</I> - -is -<B>NULL</B>, - -it just returns the address length. -The pointer points to -<B>const</B> - -to discourage misuse. -<P> - -<I>Initaddr</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -The functions which return -<I>size_t</I> - -return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -An unknown address family is a fatal error for any of these functions -except -<I>addrtypeof</I>. - -An address-size mismatch is a fatal error for -<I>initaddr</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Addrtypeof</I> - -should probably have been named -<I>addrfamilyof</I>. - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initsaid.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initsaid.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2ba79a8ac..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initsaid.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,453 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOSA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOSA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 26 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttosa, satot - convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec initsaid - initialize an SA ID -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>typedef struct {</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_address dst;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec_spi_t spi;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>} ip_said;</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosa(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_said *sa);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t satot(const ip_said *sa, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void initsaid(const ip_address *addr, ipsec_spi_t spi,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto, ip_said *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttosa</I> - -converts an ASCII Security Association (SA) specifier into an -<B>ip_said</B> - -structure (containing -a destination-host address -in network byte order, -an SPI number in network byte order, and -a protocol code). -<I>Satot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to a text SA specifier. -<I>Initsaid</I> - -initializes an -<B>ip_said</B> - -from separate items of information. -<P> - -An SA is specified in text with a mail-like syntax, e.g. -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp.5a7@1.2.3.4">esp.5a7@1.2.3.4</A></B>. - -An SA specifier contains -a protocol prefix (currently -<B>ah</B>, - -<B>esp</B>, - -<B>tun</B>, - -<B>comp</B>, - -or -<B>int</B>), - -a single character indicating the address family -(<B>.</B> - -for IPv4, -<B>:</B> - -for IPv6), -an unsigned integer SPI number in hexadecimal (with no -<B>0x</B> - -prefix), -and an IP address. -The IP address can be any form accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3), - -e.g. dotted-decimal IPv4 address, -colon-hex IPv6 address, -or DNS name. -<P> - -As a special case, the SA specifier -<B>%passthrough4</B> - -or -<B>%passthrough6</B> - -signifies the special SA used to indicate that packets should be -passed through unaltered. -(At present, these are synonyms for -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun.0@0.0.0.0">tun.0@0.0.0.0</A></B> - -and -<B>tun:0@::</B> - -respectively, -but that is subject to change without notice.) -<B>%passthrough</B> - -is a historical synonym for -<B>%passthrough4</B>. - -These forms are known to both -<I>ttosa</I> - -and -<I>satot</I>, - -so the internal representation is never visible. -<P> - -Similarly, the SA specifiers -<B>%pass</B>, - -<B>%drop</B>, - -<B>%reject</B>, - -<B>%hold</B>, - -<B>%trap</B>, - -and -<B>%trapsubnet</B> - -signify special ``magic'' SAs used to indicate that packets should be -passed, dropped, rejected (dropped with ICMP notification), -held, -and trapped (sent up to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8), - -with either of two forms of -<B>%hold</B> - -automatically installed) -respectively. -These forms too are known to both routines, -so the internal representation of the magic SAs should never be visible. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the -<B>ip_said</B> - -structure, as well as a data type -<B>ipsec_spi_t</B> - -which is an unsigned 32-bit integer. -(There is no consistency between kernel and user on what such a type -is called, hence the header hides the differences.) -<P> - -The protocol code uses the same numbers that IP does. -For user convenience, given the difficulty in acquiring the exact set of -protocol names used by the kernel, -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -defines the names -<B>SA_ESP</B>, - -<B>SA_AH</B>, - -<B>SA_IPIP</B>, - -and -<B>SA_COMP</B> - -to have the same values as the kernel names -<B>IPPROTO_ESP</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_AH</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_IPIP</B>, - -and -<B>IPPROTO_COMP</B>. - -<P> - -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -also defines -<B>SA_INT</B> - -to have the value -<B>61</B> - -(reserved by IANA for ``any host internal protocol'') -and -<B>SPI_PASS</B>, - -<B>SPI_DROP</B>, - -<B>SPI_REJECT</B>, - -<B>SPI_HOLD</B>, - -and -<B>SPI_TRAP</B> - -to have the values 256-260 (in <I>host</I> byte order) respectively. -These are used in constructing the magic SAs -(which always have address -<B>0.0.0.0</B>). - -<P> - -If -<I>satot</I> - -encounters an unknown protocol code, e.g. 77, -it yields output using a prefix -showing the code numerically, e.g. ``unk77''. -This form is -<I>not</I> - -recognized by -<I>ttosa</I>. - -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttosa</I> - -specifies the length of the string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>satot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>SATOT_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>satot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default -(currently -lowercase protocol prefix, lowercase hexadecimal SPI, -dotted-decimal or colon-hex address). -The value -<B>'f'</B> - -is similar except that the SPI is padded with -<B>0</B>s - -to a fixed 32-bit width, to ease aligning displayed tables. -<P> - -<I>Ttosa</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Satot</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<P> - -There is also, temporarily, support for some obsolete -forms of SA specifier which lack the address-family indicator. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_ttoul.3.html">ipsec_ttoul</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_samesaid.3.html">ipsec_samesaid</A>(3), <A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosa</I> - -are: -empty input; -input too small to be a legal SA specifier; -no -<B>@</B> - -in input; -unknown protocol prefix; -conversion error in -<I>ttoul</I> - -or -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>satot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttosa( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initsubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initsubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index e442a9100..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_initsubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 12 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initsubnet - initialize an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec addrtosubnet - initialize a singleton ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec subnettypeof - get address type of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec masktocount - convert subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec networkof - get base address of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec maskof - get subnet mask of an ip_subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initsubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int maskbits, int clash, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *addrtosubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<P> -<B>int subnettypeof(const ip_subnet *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktocount(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void networkof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void maskof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -to contain a description of an IP subnet -(base address plus mask). -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -from a base address and -a count of mask bits. -The -<I>clash</I> - -parameter specifies what to do if the base address includes -<B>1</B> - -bits outside the prefix specified by the mask -(that is, in the ``host number'' part of the address): -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>'0'<DD> -zero out host-number bits -<DT>'x'<DD> -non-zero host-number bits are an error -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Addrtosubnet</I> - -initializes an -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -variable -<I>*dst</I> - -to a ``singleton subnet'' containing the single address -<I>*addr</I>. - -It returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure. -<P> - -<I>Subnettypeof</I> - -returns the address type of a subnet, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Masktocount</I> - -converts a subnet mask, expressed as an address, to a bit count -suitable for use with -<I>initsubnet</I>. - -It returns -<B>-1</B> - -for error; see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Networkof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the base address of subnet -<I>src</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Maskof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the subnet mask of subnet -<I>src</I>, - -expressed as an address. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html">ipsec_rangetosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>initsubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -unknown -<I>clash</I> - -value; -impossible mask bit count; -non-zero host-number bits and -<I>clash</I> - -is -<B>'x'</B>. - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtosubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family. -Fatal errors in -<I>masktocount</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -mask bits not contiguous. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isanyaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isanyaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 974236005..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isanyaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,166 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec anyaddr - get "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec isanyaddr - test address for equality to "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec unspecaddr - get "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec isunspecaddr - test address for equality to "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec loopbackaddr - get loopback address -<BR> - -ipsec isloopbackaddr - test address for equality to loopback address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *anyaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isanyaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *unspecaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isunspecaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *loopbackaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isloopbackaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions fill in, and test for, special values of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I> - -fills in the destination -<I>*dst</I> - -with the ``any'' address of address family -<I>af</I> - -(normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The IPv4 ``any'' address is the one embodied in the old -<B>INADDR_ANY</B> - -macro. -<P> - -<I>Isanyaddr</I> - -returns -<B>1</B> - -if the -<I>src</I> - -address equals the ``any'' address, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>unspecaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>isunspecaddr</I> - -tests for, -the ``unspecified'' address, -which may be the same as the ``any'' address. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>islookbackaddr</I> - -tests for, -the loopback address. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I>, - -<I>unspecaddr</I>, - -and -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -return -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_addrtot.3.html">ipsec_addrtot</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_sameaddr.3.html">ipsec_sameaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in the address-supplying functions are: -unknown address family. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isloopbackaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isloopbackaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 974236005..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isloopbackaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,166 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec anyaddr - get "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec isanyaddr - test address for equality to "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec unspecaddr - get "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec isunspecaddr - test address for equality to "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec loopbackaddr - get loopback address -<BR> - -ipsec isloopbackaddr - test address for equality to loopback address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *anyaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isanyaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *unspecaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isunspecaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *loopbackaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isloopbackaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions fill in, and test for, special values of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I> - -fills in the destination -<I>*dst</I> - -with the ``any'' address of address family -<I>af</I> - -(normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The IPv4 ``any'' address is the one embodied in the old -<B>INADDR_ANY</B> - -macro. -<P> - -<I>Isanyaddr</I> - -returns -<B>1</B> - -if the -<I>src</I> - -address equals the ``any'' address, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>unspecaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>isunspecaddr</I> - -tests for, -the ``unspecified'' address, -which may be the same as the ``any'' address. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>islookbackaddr</I> - -tests for, -the loopback address. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I>, - -<I>unspecaddr</I>, - -and -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -return -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_addrtot.3.html">ipsec_addrtot</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_sameaddr.3.html">ipsec_sameaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in the address-supplying functions are: -unknown address family. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isunspecaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isunspecaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 974236005..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_isunspecaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,166 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec anyaddr - get "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec isanyaddr - test address for equality to "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec unspecaddr - get "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec isunspecaddr - test address for equality to "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec loopbackaddr - get loopback address -<BR> - -ipsec isloopbackaddr - test address for equality to loopback address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *anyaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isanyaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *unspecaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isunspecaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *loopbackaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isloopbackaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions fill in, and test for, special values of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I> - -fills in the destination -<I>*dst</I> - -with the ``any'' address of address family -<I>af</I> - -(normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The IPv4 ``any'' address is the one embodied in the old -<B>INADDR_ANY</B> - -macro. -<P> - -<I>Isanyaddr</I> - -returns -<B>1</B> - -if the -<I>src</I> - -address equals the ``any'' address, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>unspecaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>isunspecaddr</I> - -tests for, -the ``unspecified'' address, -which may be the same as the ``any'' address. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>islookbackaddr</I> - -tests for, -the loopback address. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I>, - -<I>unspecaddr</I>, - -and -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -return -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_addrtot.3.html">ipsec_addrtot</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_sameaddr.3.html">ipsec_sameaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in the address-supplying functions are: -unknown address family. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:17 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_keyblobtoid.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_keyblobtoid.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 109cfafa7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_keyblobtoid.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 25 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec keyblobtoid, splitkeytoid - generate key IDs from RSA keys -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>size_t keyblobtoid(const unsigned char *blob,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t bloblen, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t splitkeytoid(const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Keyblobtoid</I> - -and -<I>splitkeytoid</I> - -generate -key IDs -from RSA keys, -for use in messages and reporting, -writing the result to -<I>dst</I>. - -A -<I>key ID</I> - -is a short ASCII string identifying a key; -currently it is just the first nine characters of the base64 -encoding of the RFC 2537/3110 ``byte blob'' representation of the key. -(Beware that no finite key ID can be collision-proof: -there is always some small chance of two random keys having the -same ID.) -<P> - -<I>Keyblobtoid</I> - -generates a key ID from a key which is already in the form of an -RFC 2537/3110 binary key -<I>blob</I> - -(encoded exponent length, exponent, modulus). -<P> - -<I>Splitkeytoid</I> - -generates a key ID from a key given in the form of a separate -(binary) exponent -<I>e</I> - -and modulus -<I>m</I>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of either -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant -<B>KEYID_BUF</B> - -which is the size of a buffer large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -Both functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. - -With keys generated by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.3.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A></I>(3), - -the first two base64 digits are always the same, -and the third carries only about one bit of information. -It's worse with keys using longer fixed exponents, -e.g. the 24-bit exponent that's common in X.509 certificates. -However, being able to relate key IDs to the full -base64 text form of keys by eye is sufficiently useful that this -waste of space seems justifiable. -The choice of nine digits is a compromise between bulk and -probability of collision. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -RFC 3110, -<I>RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</I>, -Eastlake, 2001 -(superseding the older but better-known RFC 2537). -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors are: -key too short to supply enough bits to construct a complete key ID -(almost certainly indicating a garbage key); -exponent too long for its length to be representable. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 964329256..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,229 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_KLIPSDEBUG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_KLIPSDEBUG</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 26 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_klipsdebug - list KLIPS (kernel IPSEC support) debug features and level -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<P> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec_klipsdebug</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec_klipsdebug</I> - -lists flags that control various parts of the debugging output of Klips -(the kernel portion of FreeS/WAN IPSEC). -At this point it is a read-only file. -<P> - -A table entry consists of: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -a KLIPS debug variable -<DT>+<DD> -a '=' separator for visual and automated parsing between the variable -name and its current value -<DT>+<DD> -hexadecimal bitmap of variable's flags. -</DL> -<P> - -The variable names roughly describe the scope of the debugging variable. -Currently, no flags are documented or individually accessible yet except -tunnel-xmit. - -<P> - -The variable names are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>tunnel</B> - -<DD> -tunnelling code -<DT><B>netlink</B> - -<DD> -userspace communication code (obsolete) -<DT><B>xform</B> - -<DD> -transform selection and manipulation code -<DT><B>eroute</B> - -<DD> -eroute table manipulation code -<DT><B>spi</B> - -<DD> -SA table manipulation code -<DT><B>radij</B> - -<DD> -radij tree manipulation code -<DT><B>esp</B> - -<DD> -encryptions transforms code -<DT><B>ah</B> - -<DD> -authentication transforms code -<DT><B>rcv</B> - -<DD> -receive code -<DT><B>ipcomp</B> - -<DD> -ip compression transforms code -<DT><B>verbose</B> - -<DD> -give even more information, beware this will probably trample the 4k kernel printk buffer giving inaccurate output -</DL> -<P> - -All KLIPS debug output appears as -<B>kernel.info</B> - -messages to -<I><A HREF="syslogd.8.html">syslogd</A></I>(8). - -Most systems are set up -to log these messages to -<I>/var/log/messages</I>. - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<P> - -<B>debug_tunnel=00000010.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_netlink=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_xform=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_eroute=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_spi=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_radij=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_esp=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_ah=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_rcv=00000000.</B> - -<BR> - -<B>debug_pfkey=ffffffff.</B> - -<P> - -means that one -<B>tunnel</B> - -flag has been set (tunnel-xmit), -full -<B>pfkey</B> - -sockets debugging has been set and everything else is not set. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_klipsdebug, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 67b1c3a5d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,264 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_KLIPSDEBUG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_KLIPSDEBUG</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 21 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec klipsdebug - set KLIPS (kernel IPSEC support) debug features and level -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--set</B> - -flagname -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--clear</B> - -flagname -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--all</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--none</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--help</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--version</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Klipsdebug</I> - -sets and clears flags that control -various parts of the debugging output of Klips -(the kernel portion of FreeS/WAN IPSEC). -The form with no additional arguments lists the present contents of -/proc/net/ipsec_klipsdebug. -The -<B>--set</B> - -form turns the specified flag on, -while the -<B>--clear</B> - -form turns the specified flag off. -The -<B>--all</B> - -form -turns all flags on except verbose, while the -<B>--none</B> - -form turns all flags off. -<P> - -The current flag names are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>tunnel</B> - -<DD> -tunnelling code -<DT><B>tunnel-xmit</B> - -<DD> -tunnelling transmit only code -<DT><B>pfkey</B> - -<DD> -userspace communication code -<DT><B>xform</B> - -<DD> -transform selection and manipulation code -<DT><B>eroute</B> - -<DD> -eroute table manipulation code -<DT><B>spi</B> - -<DD> -SA table manipulation code -<DT><B>radij</B> - -<DD> -radij tree manipulation code -<DT><B>esp</B> - -<DD> -encryptions transforms code -<DT><B>ah</B> - -<DD> -authentication transforms code -<B>rcv</B> - -receive code -<DT><B>ipcomp</B> - -<DD> -ip compression transforms code -<DT><B>verbose</B> - -<DD> -give even more information, BEWARE: -a)this will print authentication and encryption keys in the logs -b)this will probably trample the 4k kernel printk buffer giving inaccurate output -</DL> -<P> - -All Klips debug output appears as -<B>kernel.info</B> - -messages to -<I><A HREF="syslogd.8.html">syslogd</A></I>(8). - -Most systems are set up -to log these messages to -<I>/var/log/messages</I>. - -Beware that -<B>klipsdebug</B> - -<B>--all</B> - -produces a lot of output and the log file will grow quickly. -<P> - -The file format for /proc/net/ipsec_klipsdebug is discussed in -<A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>klipsdebug --all</B> - -<DD> -turns on all KLIPS debugging except verbose. -<DT><B>klipsdebug --clear tunnel</B> - -<DD> -turns off only the -<B>tunnel</B> - -debugging messages. -</DL> -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_klipsdebug, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -It really ought to be possible to set or unset selective combinations -of flags. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_look.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_look.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index ffe07a57c..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_look.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,76 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of look</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>look</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 25 Apr 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec look - get a quick summary of FreeS/WAN status -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<I>look</I> - -is used to get a quick overview of what the status of FreeSWAN is. -It is equivalent to: - ipsec eroute -<P> - ipsec spigrp -<P> - ipsec tncfg -<P> - ipsec spi -<P> - netstat -rn -<P> -<P> - -However a bit of processing is done to combine the outputs. -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), -<A HREF="netstat.8.html">netstat</A>(8). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Man page written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson. Original program written by Henry Spencer. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_loopbackaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_loopbackaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 92f69d99c..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_loopbackaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,166 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec anyaddr - get "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec isanyaddr - test address for equality to "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec unspecaddr - get "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec isunspecaddr - test address for equality to "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec loopbackaddr - get loopback address -<BR> - -ipsec isloopbackaddr - test address for equality to loopback address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *anyaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isanyaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *unspecaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isunspecaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *loopbackaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isloopbackaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions fill in, and test for, special values of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I> - -fills in the destination -<I>*dst</I> - -with the ``any'' address of address family -<I>af</I> - -(normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The IPv4 ``any'' address is the one embodied in the old -<B>INADDR_ANY</B> - -macro. -<P> - -<I>Isanyaddr</I> - -returns -<B>1</B> - -if the -<I>src</I> - -address equals the ``any'' address, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>unspecaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>isunspecaddr</I> - -tests for, -the ``unspecified'' address, -which may be the same as the ``any'' address. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>islookbackaddr</I> - -tests for, -the loopback address. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I>, - -<I>unspecaddr</I>, - -and -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -return -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_addrtot.3.html">ipsec_addrtot</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_sameaddr.3.html">ipsec_sameaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in the address-supplying functions are: -unknown address family. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_lwdnsq.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_lwdnsq.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 1122b188a..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_lwdnsq.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,400 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC LWDNSQ</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC LWDNSQ</H1> -Section: (8)<BR>Updated: <BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -lwdnsq - lookup items in DNS to help pluto (and others) -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<P> -<PRE> -<B>ipsec lwdnsq</B> lwdnsq [<B>--prompt</B>] [<B>--serial</B>] -</PRE> - -<P> -<PRE> -<B>ipsec lwdnsq</B> lwdnsq [<B>--help</B>] -</PRE> - -<P> -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<P> -<P> - -The <B>ipsec lwdnsq</B> is a helper program that does DNS lookups for other programs. It implements an asynchronous interface on stdin/stdout, with an ASCII driven command language. -<P> -<P> - -If stdin is a tty or if the <B>--prompt</B> option is given, then it issues a prompt to the user. Otherwise, it is silent, except for results. -<P> -<P> - -The program will accept multiple queries concurrently, with each result being marked with the ID provided on the output. The IDs are strings. -<P> -<P> - -If the <B>--serial</B> option is given, then the program will not attempt to execute concurrent queries, but will serialize all input and output. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>QUERY LANGUAGE</H2> - -<P> -<P> - -There are eleven command that the program understands. This is to lookup different types of records in both the forward and reverse maps. Every query includes a queryid, which is returned in the output, on every single line to identify the transaction. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H3>KEY queryid FQDN</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the KEY resource record for the given <B>FQDN.</B>. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H3>KEY4 queryid A.B.C.D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the KEY resource record found in the reverse map for the IP version 4 address <B>A.B.C.D</B>, i.e. it looks up D.C.B.A.in-addr.arpa. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H3>KEY6 queryid A:B::C:D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the KEY resource record found in the reverse map for the IPv6 address <B>A:B::C:D</B>, i.e. it looks the 32-nibble long entry in ip6.arpa (and ip6.int). -<P> -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H3>TXT4 queryid A.B.C.D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the TXT resource record found in the reverse map for the IP version 4 address <B>A.B.C.D</B>, i.e. it looks up D.C.B.A.in-addr.arpa. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAJ"> </A> -<H3>TXT6 queryid A:B::C:D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the TXT resource record found in the reverse map for the IPv6 address <B>A:B::C:D</B>, i.e. it looks the 32-nibble long entry in ip6.arpa (and ip6.int). -<P> -<A NAME="lbAK"> </A> -<H3>KEY queryid FQDN</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the IPSECKEY resource record for the given <B>FQDN.</B>. See note about IPSECKEY processing, below. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAL"> </A> -<H3>IPSECKEY4 queryid A.B.C.D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the IPSECKEY resource record found in the reverse map for the IP version 4 address <B>A.B.C.D</B>, i.e. it looks up D.C.B.A.in-addr.arpa. See special note about IPSECKEY processing, below. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAM"> </A> -<H3>IPSECKEY6 queryid A:B::C:D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the IPSECKEY resource record found in the reverse map for the IPv6 address <B>A:B::C:D</B>, i.e. it looks the 32-nibble long entry in ip6.arpa (and ip6.int). See special note about IPSECKEY processing, below. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAN"> </A> -<H3>OE4 queryid A.B.C.D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks an appropriate record for Opportunistic Encryption for the given IP address. This attempts to look for the delegation record. This may be one of IPSECKEY, KEY, or TXT record. Unless configured otherwise, (see OE4 Directives, below), then a query type of ANY will be used to retrieve all relevant records, and all will be returned. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAO"> </A> -<H3>OE6 queryid A:B::C:D</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks an appropriate record for Opportunistic Encryption for the given IPv6 address. This attempts to look for the delegation record. This may be one of IPSECKEY, KEY, or TXT record. Unless configured otherwise, (see OE Directives, below), then a query type of ALL will be used to retrieve all relevant records, and all will be returned. i.e. it looks the 32-nibble long entry in ip6.arpa (and ip6.int). -<P> -<A NAME="lbAP"> </A> -<H3>A queryid FQDN</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the A (IPv4) resource record for the given <B>FQDN.</B>. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAQ"> </A> -<H3>AAAA queryid FQDN</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This request looks up the AAAA (IPv6) resource record for the given <B>FQDN.</B>. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAR"> </A> -<H2>REPLIES TO QUERIES</H2> - -<P> -<P> - -All replies from the queries are in the following format: -<P> -<PRE> - -<ID> <TIME> <TTL> <TYPE> <TYPE-SPECIFIC> \n - -</PRE> - -<BR> -<P> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><I>ID</I><DD> -this is the <B>queryid</B> value that was provided in the query. It is repeated on every line to permit the replies to be properly associated with the query. When the response is not ascribable to particular query (such as for a mis-formed query), then the query ID "0" will be used. -<P> -<DT><I>TIME</I><DD> -this is the current time in seconds since epoch. -<P> -<DT><I>TTL</I><DD> -for answers which have a time to live, this is the current value. The answer is valid for this number of seconds. If there is no useful value here, then the number 0 is used. -<P> -<DT><I>TYPE</I><DD> -This is the type of the record that is being returned. The types are described in the next section. The TYPE specific data that follows is specific to the type. -<BR> -<P> -</DL> -<P> - -The replies are limited to 4096 bytes, a value defined as <B>LWDNSQ_RESULT_LEN_MAX</B>. This is defined in <I>freeswan.h</I>. -<P> -<P> - -All of the replies which include resource records use the standard presentation format (with no line feeds or carriage returns) in their answer. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAS"> </A> -<H3>START</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This reply indicates that a query has been received and has been started. It serves as an anchor point for timing, as well as an acknowledgement. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAT"> </A> -<H3>DONE</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This reply indicates that a query is entirely over, and no further information from this query will be sent. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAU"> </A> -<H3>RETRY</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This reply indicates that a query is entirely over, but that no data was found. The records may exist, but appropriate servers could not be reached. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAV"> </A> -<H3>FATAL</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This reply indicates that a query is entirely over, and that no data of the type requested could be found. There were no timeouts, and all servers were available and confirmed non-existances. There may be NXT records returned prior to this. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAW"> </A> -<H3>CNAME</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply, and indicates that a CNAME was found (and followed) while performing the query. The value of the CNAME is present in the type specific section. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAX"> </A> -<H3>CNAMEFROM</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply, and indicates that a CNAME was found. The original name that was queries for was not the canonical name, and this reply indicates the name that was actually followed. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAY"> </A> -<H3>NAME</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. The original name that was queries for was not the canonical name. This reply indicates the canonical name. -<P> -<A NAME="lbAZ"> </A> -<H3>DNSSEC</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. It is followed either by "OKAY" or "not present. It indicates if DNSSEC was available on the reply. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBA"> </A> -<H3>TXT and AD-TXT</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. If there are TXT resource records in the reply, then each one is presented using this type. If preceeded by AD-, then this record was signed with DNSSEC. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBB"> </A> -<H3>A and AD-A</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. If there are A resource records in the reply, then each one is presented using this type. If preceeded by AD-, then this record was signed with DNSSEC. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBC"> </A> -<H3>AAAA and AD-AAAA</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. If there are AAAA resource records in the reply, then each one is presented using this type. If preceeded by AD-, then this record was signed with DNSSEC. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBD"> </A> -<H3>PTR and AD-PTR</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. If there are PTR resource records in the reply, then each one is presented using this type. If preceeded by AD-, then this record was signed with DNSSEC. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBE"> </A> -<H3>KEY and AD-KEY</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. If there are KEY resource records in the reply, then each one is presented using this type. If preceeded by AD-, then this record was signed with DNSSEC. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBF"> </A> -<H3>IPSECKEY and AD-IPSECKEY</H3> - -<P> -<P> - -This is an interim reply. If there are IPSEC resource records in the reply, then each one is presented using this type. If preceeded by AD-, then this record was signed with DNSSEC. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBG"> </A> -<H2>SPECIAL IPSECKEY PROCESSING</H2> - -<P> -<P> - -At the time of this writing, the IPSECKEY resource record is not entirely specified. In particular no resource record number has been assigned. This program assumes that it is resource record number 45. If the file /etc/ipsec.d/lwdnsq.conf exists, and contains a line like -<P> -<PRE> - -ipseckey_rr=<B>number</B> - -</PRE> - -<BR> then this number will be used instead. The file is read only once at startup. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBH"> </A> -<H2>OE DIRECTIVES</H2> - -<P> -<P> - -If the file /etc/ipsec.d/lwdnsq.conf exists, and contains a line like -<P> -<PRE> - -queryany=false - -</PRE> - -<BR> then instead of doing an ALL query when looking for OE delegation records, lwdnsq will do a series of queries. It will first look for IPSECKEY, and then TXT record. If it finds neither, it will then look for KEY records of all kinds, although they do not contain delegation information. -<P> -<A NAME="lbBI"> </A> -<H2>SPECIAL IPSECKEY PROCESSING</H2> - -<P> -<PRE> - -/etc/ipsec.d/lwdnsq.conf - -</PRE> - -<P> -<A NAME="lbBJ"> </A> -<H2>AUTHOR</H2> - -Michael Richardson <<A HREF="mailto:mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca">mcr@sandelman.ottawa.on.ca</A>>. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">QUERY LANGUAGE</A><DD> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">KEY queryid FQDN</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">KEY4 queryid A.B.C.D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">KEY6 queryid A:B::C:D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">TXT4 queryid A.B.C.D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAJ">TXT6 queryid A:B::C:D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAK">KEY queryid FQDN</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAL">IPSECKEY4 queryid A.B.C.D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAM">IPSECKEY6 queryid A:B::C:D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAN">OE4 queryid A.B.C.D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAO">OE6 queryid A:B::C:D</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAP">A queryid FQDN</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAQ">AAAA queryid FQDN</A><DD> -</DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAR">REPLIES TO QUERIES</A><DD> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAS">START</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAT">DONE</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAU">RETRY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAV">FATAL</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAW">CNAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAX">CNAMEFROM</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAY">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAZ">DNSSEC</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBA">TXT and AD-TXT</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBB">A and AD-A</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBC">AAAA and AD-AAAA</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBD">PTR and AD-PTR</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBE">KEY and AD-KEY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBF">IPSECKEY and AD-IPSECKEY</A><DD> -</DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBG">SPECIAL IPSECKEY PROCESSING</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBH">OE DIRECTIVES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBI">SPECIAL IPSECKEY PROCESSING</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBJ">AUTHOR</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_mailkey.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_mailkey.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 83a532563..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_mailkey.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,97 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_MAILKEY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_MAILKEY</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 21 Feb 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec mailkey - mail DNS records for Opportunistic Encryption -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>mailkey</B> - ---me -<A HREF="mailto:my@address.tld">my@address.tld</A> -[ -<B>--reverse</B> - -1.2.3.4 -] [ -<B>--forward</B> - -hostname.domain.tld -] -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>mailkey</I> - -is a meta-program. It generates a script which will attempt to mail the TXT -records required to enable Opportunistic Encryption (OE). -<P> - -An e-mail address for the domain's DNS administrator is derived from SOA records. -The mail body and destination address are freely editable in the script. -<P> - -If no administrator can be located, the output file will not be executable. -<P> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--me</B> <I><A HREF="mailto:my@address.tld">my@address.tld</A></I><DD> -set the Reply-To: address of the mail to be sent. -<DT><B>--forward</B> <I>hostname.domain.tld</I><DD> -the domain name to be used for initator-only OE. -<DT><B>--reverse</B> <I>1.2.3.4</I><DD> -the IP address to be used for full Opportunistic Encryption. -</DL> -<P> - -Only one of --forward or --reverse may be specified. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<PRE> -/etc/ipsec.secrets -</PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey</A>(8), <A HREF="host.8.html">host</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project <<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> by Sam Sgro. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -May produce indeterminate results when processing non-routable IPs. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_manual.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_manual.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 77134f7d0..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_manual.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,414 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_MANUAL</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_MANUAL</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 17 July 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec manual - take manually-keyed IPsec connections up and down -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>manual</B> - -[ -<B>--show</B> - -] [ -<B>--showonly</B> - -] [ -<B>--other</B> - -] -<BR> - - [ -<B>--iam</B> - -address<B>@</B>interface - -] [ -<B>--config</B> - -configfile -] -<BR> - - operation connection -<P> -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>manual</B> - -[ -<I>options</I> - -] -<B>--union</B> - -operation part ... -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Manual</I> - -manipulates manually-keyed FreeS/WAN IPsec connections, -setting them up and shutting them down, -based on the information in the IPsec configuration file. -In the normal usage, -<I>connection</I> - -is the name of a connection specification in the configuration file; -<I>operation</I> - -is -<B>--up</B>, - -<B>--down</B>, - -<B>--route</B>, - -or -<B>--unroute</B>. - -<I>Manual</I> - -generates setup (<B>--route</B> - -or -<B>--up</B>) - -or -teardown (<B>--down</B> - -or -<B>--unroute</B>) - -commands for the connection and feeds them to a shell for execution. -<P> - -The -<B>--up</B> - -operation brings the specified connection up, including establishing a -suitable route for it if necessary. -<P> - -The -<B>--route</B> - -operation just establishes the route for a connection. -Unless and until an -<B>--up</B> - -operation is done, packets routed by that route will simply be discarded. -<P> - -The -<B>--down</B> - -operation tears the specified connection down, -<I>except</I> - -that it leaves the route in place. -Unless and until an -<B>--unroute</B> - -operation is done, packets routed by that route will simply be discarded. -This permits establishing another connection to the same destination -without any ``window'' in which packets can pass without encryption. -<P> - -The -<B>--unroute</B> - -operation (and only the -<B>--unroute</B> - -operation) deletes any route established for a connection. -<P> - -In the -<B>--union</B> - -usage, each -<I>part</I> - -is the name of a partial connection specification in the configuration file, -and the union of all the partial specifications is the -connection specification used. -The effect is as if the contents of the partial specifications were -concatenated together; -restrictions on duplicate parameters, etc., do apply to the result. -(The same effect can now be had, more gracefully, using the -<B>also</B> - -parameter in connection descriptions; -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5) - -for details.) -<P> - -The -<B>--show</B> - -option turns on the -<B>-x</B> - -option of the shell used to execute the commands, -so each command is shown as it is executed. -<P> - -The -<B>--showonly</B> - -option causes -<I>manual</I> - -to show the commands it would run, on standard output, -and not run them. -<P> - -The -<B>--other</B> - -option causes -<I>manual</I> - -to pretend it is the other end of the connection. -This is probably not useful except in combination with -<B>--showonly</B>. - -<P> - -The -<B>--iam</B> - -option causes -<I>manual</I> - -to believe it is running on the host with the specified IP -<I>address</I>, - -and that it should use the specified -<I>interface</I> - -(normally it determines all this automatically, -based on what IPsec interfaces are up and how they are configured). -<P> - -The -<B>--config</B> - -option specifies a non-standard location for the FreeS/WAN IPsec -configuration file (default -<I>/etc/ipsec.conf</I>). - -<P> - -See -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5) - -for details of the configuration file. -Apart from the basic parameters which specify the endpoints and routing -of a connection (<B>left</B> -and -<B>right</B>, - -plus possibly -<B>leftsubnet</B>, - -<B>leftnexthop</B>, - -<B>leftfirewall</B>, - -their -<B>right</B> - -equivalents, -and perhaps -<B>type</B>), - -a non-<B>passthrough</B> -<I>manual</I> - -connection needs an -<B>spi</B> - -or -<B>spibase</B> - -parameter and some parameters specifying encryption, authentication, or -both, most simply -<B>esp</B>, - -<B>espenckey</B>, - -and -<B>espauthkey</B>. - -Moderately-secure keys can be obtained from -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ranbits.8.html">ipsec_ranbits</A></I>(8). - -For production use of manually-keyed connections, -it is strongly recommended that the keys be kept in a separate file -(with permissions -<B>rw-------</B>) - -using the -<B>include</B> - -and -<B>also</B> - -facilities of the configuration file (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5)). - -<P> - -If an -<B>spi</B> - -parameter is given, -<I>manual</I> - -uses that value as the SPI number for all the SAs -(which are in separate number spaces anyway). -If an -<B>spibase</B> - -parameter is given instead, -<I>manual</I> - -assigns SPI values by altering the bottom digit -of that value; -SAs going from left to right get even digits starting at 0, -SAs going from right to left get odd digits starting at 1. -Either way, it is suggested that manually-keyed connections use -three-digit SPIs with the first digit non-zero, -i.e. in the range -<B>0x100</B> - -through -<B>0xfff</B>; - -FreeS/WAN reserves those for manual keying and will not -attempt to use them for automatic keying (unless requested to, -presumably by a non-FreeS/WAN other end). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - - - -/etc/ipsec.conf<TT> </TT>default IPsec configuration file<BR> -<BR> - -/var/run/ipsec.info<TT> </TT><B>%defaultroute</B> information<BR> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), -<A HREF="route.8.html">route</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -It's not nearly as generous about the syntax of subnets, -addresses, etc. as the usual FreeS/WAN user interfaces. -Four-component dotted-decimal must be used for all addresses. -It -<I>is</I> - -smart enough to translate bit-count netmasks to dotted-decimal form. -<P> - -If the connection specification for a connection is changed between an -<B>--up</B> - -and the ensuing -<B>--down</B>, - -chaos may ensue. -<P> - -The -<B>--up</B> - -operation is not smart enough to notice whether the connection is already up. -<P> - -<I>Manual</I> - -is not smart enough to reject insecure combinations of algorithms, -e.g. encryption with no authentication at all. -<P> - -Any non-IPsec route to the other end which is replaced by the -<B>--up</B> - -or -<B>--route</B> - -operation will not be re-established by -<B>--unroute</B>. - -Whether this is a feature or a bug depends on your viewpoint. -<P> - -The optional parameters which -override the automatic -<B>spibase</B>-based - -SPI assignment are a messy area of the code and bugs are likely. -<P> - -``Road warrior'' handling, -and other special forms of setup which -require negotiation between the two security gateways, -inherently cannot be done with -<I>manual</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Manual</I> - -generally lags behind -<I>auto</I> - -in support of various features, -even when implementation <I>would</I> be possible. -For example, currently it does not do IPComp content compression. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_maskof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_maskof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ea0f83f82..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_maskof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 12 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initsubnet - initialize an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec addrtosubnet - initialize a singleton ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec subnettypeof - get address type of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec masktocount - convert subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec networkof - get base address of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec maskof - get subnet mask of an ip_subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initsubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int maskbits, int clash, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *addrtosubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<P> -<B>int subnettypeof(const ip_subnet *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktocount(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void networkof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void maskof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -to contain a description of an IP subnet -(base address plus mask). -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -from a base address and -a count of mask bits. -The -<I>clash</I> - -parameter specifies what to do if the base address includes -<B>1</B> - -bits outside the prefix specified by the mask -(that is, in the ``host number'' part of the address): -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>'0'<DD> -zero out host-number bits -<DT>'x'<DD> -non-zero host-number bits are an error -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Addrtosubnet</I> - -initializes an -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -variable -<I>*dst</I> - -to a ``singleton subnet'' containing the single address -<I>*addr</I>. - -It returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure. -<P> - -<I>Subnettypeof</I> - -returns the address type of a subnet, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Masktocount</I> - -converts a subnet mask, expressed as an address, to a bit count -suitable for use with -<I>initsubnet</I>. - -It returns -<B>-1</B> - -for error; see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Networkof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the base address of subnet -<I>src</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Maskof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the subnet mask of subnet -<I>src</I>, - -expressed as an address. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html">ipsec_rangetosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>initsubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -unknown -<I>clash</I> - -value; -impossible mask bit count; -non-zero host-number bits and -<I>clash</I> - -is -<B>'x'</B>. - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtosubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family. -Fatal errors in -<I>masktocount</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -mask bits not contiguous. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_masktobits.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_masktobits.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 6eccdd8d5..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_masktobits.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_GOODMASK</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_GOODMASK</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec goodmask - is this Internet subnet mask a valid one? -<BR> - -ipsec masktobits - convert Internet subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec bitstomask - convert bit count to Internet subnet mask -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int goodmask(struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktobits(struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr bitstomask(int n);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_masktocount.3.html">ipsec_masktocount</A></I>(3) - -for a partial replacement. -<P> - -<I>Goodmask</I> - -reports whether the subnet -<I>mask</I> - -is a valid one, -i.e. consists of a (possibly empty) sequence of -<B>1</B>s - -followed by a (possibly empty) sequence of -<B>0</B>s. - -<I>Masktobits</I> - -takes a (valid) subnet mask and returns the number of -<B>1</B> - -bits in it. -<I>Bitstomask</I> - -reverses this, -returning the subnet mask corresponding to bit count -<I>n</I>. - -<P> - -All masks are in network byte order. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Masktobits</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B> - -for an invalid mask. -<I>Bitstomask</I> - -returns an all-zeros mask for a negative or out-of-range -<I>n</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The error-reporting convention of -<I>bitstomask</I> - -is less than ideal; -zero is sometimes a legitimate mask. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_masktocount.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_masktocount.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ea0f83f82..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_masktocount.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 12 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initsubnet - initialize an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec addrtosubnet - initialize a singleton ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec subnettypeof - get address type of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec masktocount - convert subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec networkof - get base address of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec maskof - get subnet mask of an ip_subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initsubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int maskbits, int clash, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *addrtosubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<P> -<B>int subnettypeof(const ip_subnet *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktocount(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void networkof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void maskof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -to contain a description of an IP subnet -(base address plus mask). -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -from a base address and -a count of mask bits. -The -<I>clash</I> - -parameter specifies what to do if the base address includes -<B>1</B> - -bits outside the prefix specified by the mask -(that is, in the ``host number'' part of the address): -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>'0'<DD> -zero out host-number bits -<DT>'x'<DD> -non-zero host-number bits are an error -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Addrtosubnet</I> - -initializes an -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -variable -<I>*dst</I> - -to a ``singleton subnet'' containing the single address -<I>*addr</I>. - -It returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure. -<P> - -<I>Subnettypeof</I> - -returns the address type of a subnet, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Masktocount</I> - -converts a subnet mask, expressed as an address, to a bit count -suitable for use with -<I>initsubnet</I>. - -It returns -<B>-1</B> - -for error; see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Networkof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the base address of subnet -<I>src</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Maskof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the subnet mask of subnet -<I>src</I>, - -expressed as an address. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html">ipsec_rangetosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>initsubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -unknown -<I>clash</I> - -value; -impossible mask bit count; -non-zero host-number bits and -<I>clash</I> - -is -<B>'x'</B>. - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtosubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family. -Fatal errors in -<I>masktocount</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -mask bits not contiguous. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_networkof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_networkof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ea0f83f82..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_networkof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 12 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initsubnet - initialize an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec addrtosubnet - initialize a singleton ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec subnettypeof - get address type of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec masktocount - convert subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec networkof - get base address of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec maskof - get subnet mask of an ip_subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initsubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int maskbits, int clash, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *addrtosubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<P> -<B>int subnettypeof(const ip_subnet *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktocount(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void networkof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void maskof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -to contain a description of an IP subnet -(base address plus mask). -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -from a base address and -a count of mask bits. -The -<I>clash</I> - -parameter specifies what to do if the base address includes -<B>1</B> - -bits outside the prefix specified by the mask -(that is, in the ``host number'' part of the address): -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>'0'<DD> -zero out host-number bits -<DT>'x'<DD> -non-zero host-number bits are an error -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Addrtosubnet</I> - -initializes an -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -variable -<I>*dst</I> - -to a ``singleton subnet'' containing the single address -<I>*addr</I>. - -It returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure. -<P> - -<I>Subnettypeof</I> - -returns the address type of a subnet, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Masktocount</I> - -converts a subnet mask, expressed as an address, to a bit count -suitable for use with -<I>initsubnet</I>. - -It returns -<B>-1</B> - -for error; see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Networkof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the base address of subnet -<I>src</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Maskof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the subnet mask of subnet -<I>src</I>, - -expressed as an address. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html">ipsec_rangetosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>initsubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -unknown -<I>clash</I> - -value; -impossible mask bit count; -non-zero host-number bits and -<I>clash</I> - -is -<B>'x'</B>. - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtosubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family. -Fatal errors in -<I>masktocount</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -mask bits not contiguous. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index e6cf302bf..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,196 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_NEWHOSTKEY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_NEWHOSTKEY</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 4 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec newhostkey - generate a new host authentication key -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>newhostkey</B> - -<B>--output</B> - -filename -[ -<B>--quiet</B> - -] -<B>\</B> - -<BR> - - -[ -<B>--bits</B> - -n -] -[ -<B>--hostname</B> - -host -] -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Newhostkey</I> - -outputs (into -<I>filename</I>, - -which can be `<B>-</B>' for standard output) -an RSA private key suitable for this host, -in -<I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I> - -format -(see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5)). - -Normally, -<I>newhostkey</I> - -invokes -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -(see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A></I>(8)) - -with the -<B>--verbose</B> - -option, so a narrative of what is being done appears on standard error. -<P> - -The -<B>--output</B> - -specifier, although it is syntactically an option and can appear at -any point among the options (it doesn't have to be first), -is not optional. -The specified -<I>filename</I> - -is created under umask -<B>077</B> - -if nonexistent; -if it already exists and is non-empty, -a warning message about that is sent to standard error, -and the output is appended to the file. -<P> - -The -<B>--quiet</B> - -option suppresses both the -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -narrative and the existing-file warning message. -<P> - -The -<B>--bits</B> - -option specifies the number of bits in the key; -the current default is 2192 and we do not recommend use of anything -shorter unless unusual constraints demand it. -<P> - -The -<B>--hostname</B> - -option is passed through to -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -to tell it what host name to label the output with -(via its -<B>--hostname</B> - -option). -<P> - -The output format is that of -<I>rsasigkey</I>, - -with bracketing added to complete the -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> - -format. -In the usual case, where -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> - -contains only the host's own private key, -the output of -<I>newhostkey</I> - -is sufficient as a complete -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> - -file. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -As with -<I>rsasigkey</I>, - -the run time is difficult to predict, -since depletion of the system's randomness pool can cause -arbitrarily long waits for random bits, -and the prime-number searches can also take unpredictable -(and potentially large) amounts of CPU time. -See -<I><A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A></I>(8) - -for some typical performance numbers. -<P> - -A higher-level tool which could handle the clerical details -of changing to a new key would be helpful. -<P> - -The requirement for -<B>--output</B> - -is a blemish, -but private keys are extremely sensitive information -and unusual precautions seem justified. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_optionsfrom.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_optionsfrom.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 05d045e4d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_optionsfrom.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,275 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_OPTIONSFROM</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_OPTIONSFROM</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 16 Oct 1998<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec optionsfrom - read additional ``command-line'' options from file -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *optionsfrom(char *filename, int *argcp,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char ***argvp, int optind, FILE *errsto);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Optionsfrom</I> - -is called from within a -<I><A HREF="getopt_long.3.html">getopt_long</A></I>(3) - -scan, -as the result of the appearance of an option (preferably -<B>--optionsfrom</B>) - -to insert additional ``command-line'' arguments -into the scan immediately after -the option. -Typically this would be done to pick up options which are -security-sensitive and should not be visible to -<I><A HREF="ps.1.html">ps</A></I>(1) - -and similar commands, -and hence cannot be supplied as part -of the actual command line or the environment. -<P> - -<I>Optionsfrom</I> - -reads the additional arguments from the specified -<I>filename</I>, - -allocates a new argument vector to hold pointers to the existing -arguments plus the new ones, -and amends -<I>argc</I> - -and -<I>argv</I> - -(via the pointers -<I>argcp</I> - -and -<I>argvp</I>, - -which must point to the -<I>argc</I> - -and -<I>argv</I> - -being supplied to -<I><A HREF="getopt_long.3.html">getopt_long</A></I>(3)) - -accordingly. -<I>Optind</I> - -must be the index, in the original argument vector, -of the next argument. -<P> - -If -<I>errsto</I> - -is NULL, -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -If -<I>errsto</I> - -is non-NULL and an error occurs, -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -prints a suitable complaint onto the -<I>errsto</I> - -descriptor and invokes -<I>exit</I> - -with an exit status of 2; -this is a convenience for cases where more sophisticated -responses are not required. -<P> - -The text of existing arguments is not disturbed by -<I>optionsfrom</I>, - -so pointers to them and into them remain valid. -<P> - -The file of additional arguments is an ASCII text file. -Lines consisting solely of white space, -and lines beginning with -<B>#</B>, - -are comments and are ignored. -Otherwise, a line which does not begin with -<B>-</B> - -is taken to be a single argument; -if it both begins and ends with double-quote ("), -those quotes are stripped off (note, no other processing is done within -the line!). -A line beginning with -<B>-</B> - -is considered to contain multiple arguments separated by white space. -<P> - -Because -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -reads its entire file before the -<I><A HREF="getopt_long.3.html">getopt_long</A></I>(3) - -scan is resumed, an -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -file can contain another -<B>--optionsfrom</B> - -option. -Obviously, infinite loops are possible here. -If -<I>errsto</I> - -is non-NULL, -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -considers it an error to be called more than 100 times. -If -<I>errsto</I> - -is NULL, -loop detection is up to the caller -(and the internal loop counter is zeroed out). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLE</H2> - -A reasonable way to invoke -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -would be like so: -<P> - -<PRE> -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/getopt.h">getopt.h</A>> - -struct option opts[] = { - /* ... */ - "optionsfrom", 1, NULL, '+', - /* ... */ -}; - -int -main(argc, argv) -int argc; -char *argv[]; -{ - int opt; - extern char *optarg; - extern int optind; - - while ((opt = getopt_long(argc, argv, "", opts, NULL)) != EOF) - switch (opt) { - /* ... */ - case '+': /* optionsfrom */ - optionsfrom(optarg, &argc, &argv, optind, stderr); - /* does not return on error */ - break; - /* ... */ - } - /* ... */ -</B></PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="getopt_long.3.html">getopt_long</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Errors in -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -are: -unable to open file; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for argument or -argument vector failed; -read error in file; -line too long. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The double-quote convention is rather simplistic. -<P> - -Line length is currently limited to 1023 bytes, -and there is no continuation convention. -<P> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -<P> - -There is a certain element of unwarranted chumminess with -the insides of -<I><A HREF="getopt_long.3.html">getopt_long</A></I>(3) - -here. -No non-public interfaces are actually used, but -<I>optionsfrom</I> - -does rely on -<I><A HREF="getopt_long.3.html">getopt_long</A></I>(3) - -being well-behaved in certain ways that are not actually -promised by the specs. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLE</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pf_key.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pf_key.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 420c12900..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pf_key.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,176 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PF_KEY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PF_KEY</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 29 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_pf_key - lists PF_KEY sockets registered with KLIPS -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/pf_key</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/pf_key</I> - -is a read-only file which lists the presently open PF_KEY sockets on the -local system and their parameters. -<P> - -Each line lists one PF_KEY socket. -A table entry consists of: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -sock pointer (sock) -<DT>+<DD> -PID of the socket owner (pid) -<DT>+<DD> -flag to indicate if the socket is dead (d) -<DT>+<DD> -socket wait queue (sleep) -<DT>+<DD> -socket pointer (socket) -<DT>+<DD> -next socket in chain (next) -<DT>+<DD> -previous socket in chain (prev) -<DT>+<DD> -last socket error (e) -<DT>+<DD> -pointer to destruct routine (destruct) -<DT>+<DD> -is this a reused socket (r) -<DT>+<DD> -has this socket been zapped (z) -<DT>+<DD> -socket family to which this socket belongs (fa) -<DT>+<DD> -local port number (n) -<DT>+<DD> -protocol version number (p) -<DT>+<DD> -Receive queue bytes committed (r) -<DT>+<DD> -Transmit queue bytes committed (w) -<DT>+<DD> -option memory allocations (o) -<DT>+<DD> -size of send buffer in bytes (sndbf) -<DT>+<DD> -timestamp in seconds (stamp) -<DT>+<DD> -socket flags (Flags) -<DT>+<DD> -socket type (Type) -<DT>+<DD> -connection state (St) -<B>.SH</B>EXAMPLES - -<DT> -<DD> -<DT><B>c3b8c140 3553 0 c0599818 c05997fc 0 0 0 0 1 0 15 0 2 0 0 0 65535 0.103232 00000000 00000003 01</B> - -<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -shows that there is one pf_key socket set up that starts at -<B>c3b8c140</B>, - -whose owning process has PID -<B>3553</B>, - -the socket is not dead, its wait queue is at -<B>c0599818</B>, - -whose owning socket is at -<B>c05997fc</B>, - -with no other sockets in the chain, no errors, no destructor, it is a -reused socket which has not been zapped, from protocol family -<B>15</B> - -(PF_KEY), local port number -<B>0</B>, - -protocol socket version -<B>2</B>, - -no memory allocated to transmit, receive or option queues, a send buffer -of almost -<B>64kB</B>, - -a timestamp of -<B>0.103232</B>, - -no flags set, type -<B>3</B>, - -in state -<B>1</B>. - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/pf_key -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pf_key.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pf_key.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index e40cfb15b..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pf_key.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,122 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PF_KEY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PF_KEY</H1> -Section: User Commands (1)<BR>Updated: 17 Oct 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -pf_key - shows pfkey messages emitted by the kernel -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>pf_key</B> - -<B>--ah</B> - -<B>--esp</B> - -<B>--ipip</B> - -<B>--ipcomp</B> - -<B>--daemon </B> - -<I>file</I> - -<B>hmac-md5-96</B>|<B>hmac-sha1-96</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<B>pf_key</B> - -is a program to open a PF_KEY socket and print all messages that are received -from it. With no options, it will register itself to receive key requests for -AH, ESP, IPIP and IPCOMP security associations. If given more specific -options, then it will listen only to those protocols which are listed. -<P> - -If the messages are recognized, the messages will be decoded. -<P> - -If the option -<B>--daemon</B> - -is provided, then after doing the registrations, the program will fork -into the background. The provided file will be opened and the process ID of -the background process will be written to it. This option is present to -present race conditions in regression testing. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> -<DD> -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/pf_key -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="pf_key.5.html">pf_key</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson <<A HREF="mailto:mcr@freeswan.org">mcr@freeswan.org</A>> - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2e2ce4c2f..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1824 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PLUTO</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PLUTO</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 28 March 1999<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec pluto - IPsec IKE keying daemon -<BR> - -ipsec whack - control interface for IPSEC keying daemon -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - - - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec pluto -[--help] -[--version] -[--optionsfrom </B><I>filename</I>] -[--nofork] -[--stderrlog] -[--noklips] -[--uniqueids] -[<B>--interface</B> <I>interfacename</I>] -[--ikeport <I>portnumber</I>] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--secretsfile <I>secrets-file</I>] -[--adns <I>pathname</I>] -[--lwdnsq <I>pathname</I>] -[--perpeerlog] -[--perpeerlogbase <I>dirname</I>] -[--debug-none] -[--debug-all] -[--debug-raw] -[--debug-crypt] -[--debug-parsing] -[--debug-emitting] -[--debug-control] -[--debug-lifecycle] -[--debug-klips] -[--debug-dns] -[--debug-oppo] -[--debug-private] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack -[--help] -[--version] -<DT> - -<DD>ipsec whack ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -<BR> - -[--id <I>id</I>] [--host <I>ip-address</I>] -[--ikeport <I>port-number</I>] -[--nexthop <I>ip-address</I>] -[--client <I>subnet</I>] -[--dnskeyondemand] -[--updown <I>updown</I>] -<BR> - ---to -<BR> - -[--id <I>id</I>] -[--host <I>ip-address</I>] -[--ikeport <I>port-number</I>] -[--nexthop <I>ip-address</I>] -[--client <I>subnet</I>] -[--dnskeyondemand] -[--updown <I>updown</I>] -<BR> - -[--psk] -[--rsasig] -[--encrypt] -[--authenticate] -[--compress] -[--tunnel] -[--pfs] -[--disablearrivalcheck] -[--ipv4] -[--ipv6] -[--tunnelipv4] -[--tunnelipv6] -[--ikelifetime <I>seconds</I>] -[--ipseclifetime <I>seconds</I>] -[--rekeymargin <I>seconds</I>] -[--rekeyfuzz <I>percentage</I>] -[--keyingtries <I>count</I>] -[--dontrekey] -[--delete] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---keyid </B><I>id</I> -[--addkey] -[--pubkeyrsa <I>key</I>] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---myid </B><I>id</I> -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---listen|--unlisten -[--ctlbase </B><I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---route|--unroute ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---initiate|--terminate ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -[--asynchronous] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack -[--tunnelipv4] -[--tunnelipv6] ---oppohere </B><I>ip-address</I> ---oppothere <I>ip-address</I> -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---delete ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---deletestate </B><I>state-number</I> -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack -[--name </B><I>connection-name</I>] -[--debug-none] -[--debug-all] -[--debug-raw] -[--debug-crypt] -[--debug-parsing] -[--debug-emitting] -[--debug-control] -[--debug-lifecycle] -[--debug-klips] -[--debug-dns] -[--debug-oppo] -[--debug-private] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---status -[--ctlbase </B><I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---shutdown -[--ctlbase </B><I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] - - - -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<B>pluto</B> - -is an IKE (``IPsec Key Exchange'') daemon. -<B>whack</B> - -is an auxiliary program to allow requests to be made to a running -<B>pluto</B>. - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> - -is used to automatically build shared ``security associations'' on a -system that has IPsec, the secure IP protocol. -In other words, -<B>pluto</B> - -can eliminate much of the work of manual keying. -The actual -secure transmission of packets is the responsibility of other parts of -the system (see -<B>KLIPS</B>, - -the companion implementation of IPsec). -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) provides a more convenient interface to -<B>pluto</B> and <B>whack</B>. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H3>IKE's Job</H3> - -<P> - -A <I>Security Association</I> (<I>SA</I>) is an agreement between two network nodes on -how to process certain traffic between them. This processing involves -encapsulation, authentication, encryption, or compression. -<P> - -IKE can be deployed on a network node to negotiate Security -Associations for that node. These IKE implementations can only -negotiate with other IKE implementations, so IKE must be on each node -that is to be an endpoint of an IKE-negotiated Security Association. -No other nodes need to be running IKE. -<P> - -An IKE instance (i.e. an IKE implementation on a particular network -node) communicates with another IKE instance using UDP IP packets, so -there must be a route between the nodes in each direction. -<P> - -The negotiation of Security Associations requires a number of choices -that involve tradeoffs between security, convenience, trust, and -efficiency. These are policy issues and are normally specified to the -IKE instance by the system administrator. -<P> - -IKE deals with two kinds of Security Associations. The first part of -a negotiation between IKE instances is to build an ISAKMP SA. An -ISAKMP SA is used to protect communication between the two IKEs. -IPsec SAs can then be built by the IKEs - these are used to carry -protected IP traffic between the systems. -<P> - -The negotiation of the ISAKMP SA is known as Phase 1. In theory, -Phase 1 can be accomplished by a couple of different exchange types, -but we only implement one called Main Mode (we don't implement -Aggressive Mode). -<P> - -Any negotiation under the protection of an ISAKMP SA, including the -negotiation of IPsec SAs, is part of Phase 2. The exchange type -that we use to negotiate an IPsec SA is called Quick Mode. -<P> - -IKE instances must be able to authenticate each other as part of their -negotiation of an ISAKMP SA. This can be done by several mechanisms -described in the draft standards. -<P> - -IKE negotiation can be initiated by any instance with any other. If -both can find an agreeable set of characteristics for a Security -Association, and both recognize each others authenticity, they can set -up a Security Association. The standards do not specify what causes -an IKE instance to initiate a negotiation. -<P> - -In summary, an IKE instance is prepared to automate the management of -Security Associations in an IPsec environment, but a number of issues -are considered policy and are left in the system administrator's hands. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H3>Pluto</H3> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> is an implementation of IKE. It runs as a daemon on a network -node. Currently, this network node must be a LINUX system running the -<B>KLIPS</B> implementation of IPsec. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> only implements a subset of IKE. This is enough for it to -interoperate with other instances of <B>pluto</B>, and many other IKE -implementations. We are working on implementing more of IKE. -<P> - -The policy for acceptable characteristics for Security Associations is -mostly hardwired into the code of <B>pluto</B> (spdb.c). Eventually -this will be moved into a security policy database with reasonable -expressive power and more convenience. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> uses shared secrets or RSA signatures to authenticate -peers with whom it is negotiating. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> initiates negotiation of a Security Association when it is -manually prodded: the program <B>whack</B> is run to trigger this. -It will also initiate a negotiation when <B>KLIPS</B> traps an outbound packet -for Opportunistic Encryption. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> implements ISAKMP SAs itself. After it has negotiated the -characteristics of an IPsec SA, it directs <B>KLIPS</B> to implement it. -It also invokes a script to adjust any firewall and issue <I><A HREF="route.8.html">route</A></I>(8) -commands to direct IP packets through <B>KLIPS</B>. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> shuts down, it closes all Security Associations. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H3>Before Running Pluto</H3> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> runs as a daemon with userid root. Before running it, a few -things must be set up. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> requires <B>KLIPS</B>, the FreeS/WAN implementation of IPsec. -All of the components of <B>KLIPS</B> and <B>pluto</B> should be installed. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> supports multiple public networks (that is, networks -that are considered insecure and thus need to have their traffic -encrypted or authenticated). It discovers the -public interfaces to use by looking at all interfaces that are -configured (the <B>--interface</B> option can be used to limit -the interfaces considered). -It does this only when <B>whack</B> tells it to --listen, -so the interfaces must be configured by then. Each interface with a name of the form -<B>ipsec</B>[<B>0</B>-<B>9</B>] is taken as a <B>KLIPS</B> virtual public interface. -Another network interface with the same IP address (there should be only -one) is taken as the corresponding real public -interface. <I><A HREF="ifconfig.8.html">ifconfig</A></I>(8) with the <B>-a</B> flag will show -the name and status of each network interface. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> requires a database of preshared secrets and RSA private keys. -This is described in the -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5). - -<B>pluto</B> is told of RSA public keys via <B>whack</B> commands. -If the connection is Opportunistic, and no RSA public key is known, -<B>pluto</B> will attempt to fetch RSA keys using the Domain Name System. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H3>Setting up <B>KLIPS</B> for <B>pluto</B></H3> - -<P> - -The most basic network topology that <B>pluto</B> supports has two security -gateways negotiating on behalf of client subnets. The diagram of RGB's -testbed is a good example (see <I>klips/doc/rgb_setup.txt</I>). -<P> - -The file <I>INSTALL</I> in the base directory of this distribution -explains how to start setting up the whole system, including <B>KLIPS</B>. -<P> - -Make sure that the security gateways have routes to each other. This -is usually covered by the default route, but may require issuing -<I><A HREF="route.8.html">route</A></I>(8) - -commands. The route must go through a particular IP -interface (we will assume it is <I>eth0</I>, but it need not be). The -interface that connects the security gateway to its client must be a -different one. -<P> - -It is necessary to issue a -<I><A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A></I>(8) - -command on each gateway. The required command is: -<P> - ipsec tncfg --attach --virtual ipsec0 --physical eth0 -<P> -A command to set up the ipsec0 virtual interface will also need to be -run. It will have the same parameters as the command used to set up -the physical interface to which it has just been connected using -<I><A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A></I>(8). - -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H3>ipsec.secrets file</H3> - -<P> - -A <B>pluto</B> daemon and another IKE daemon (for example, another instance -of <B>pluto</B>) must convince each other that they are who they are supposed -to be before any negotiation can succeed. This authentication is -accomplished by using either secrets that have been shared beforehand -(manually) or by using RSA signatures. There are other techniques, -but they have not been implemented in <B>pluto</B>. -<P> - -The file <I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I> is used to keep preshared secret keys -and RSA private keys for -authentication with other IKE daemons. For debugging, there is an -argument to the <B>pluto</B> command to use a different file. -This file is described in -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5). - -<A NAME="lbAJ"> </A> -<H3>Running Pluto</H3> - -<P> - -To fire up the daemon, just type <B>pluto</B> (be sure to be running as -the superuser). -The default IKE port number is 500, the UDP port assigned by IANA for IKE Daemons. -<B>pluto</B> must be run by the superuser to be able to use the UDP 500 port. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> attempts to create a lockfile with the name -<I>/var/run/pluto.pid</I>. If the lockfile cannot be created, -<B>pluto</B> exits - this prevents multiple <B>pluto</B>s from -competing Any ``leftover'' lockfile must be removed before -<B>pluto</B> will run. <B>pluto</B> writes its pid into this file so -that scripts can find it. This lock will not function properly if it -is on an NFS volume (but sharing locks on multiple machines doesn't -make sense anyway). -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> then forks and the parent exits. This is the conventional -``daemon fork''. It can make debugging awkward, so there is an option -to suppress this fork. -<P> - -All logging, including diagnostics, is sent to -<I><A HREF="syslog.3.html">syslog</A></I>(3) - -with facility=authpriv; -it decides where to put these messages (possibly in /var/log/secure). -Since this too can make debugging awkward, there is an option to -steer logging to stderr. -<P> - -If the <B>--perpeerlog</B> option is given, then pluto will open -a log file per connection. By default, this is in /var/log/pluto/peer, -in a subdirectory formed by turning all dot (.) [IPv4} or colon (:) -[IPv6] into slashes (/). -<P> - -The base directory can be changed with the <B>--perpeerlogbase</B>. -<P> - -Once <B>pluto</B> is started, it waits for requests from <B>whack</B>. -<A NAME="lbAK"> </A> -<H3>Pluto's Internal State</H3> - -<P> - -To understand how to use <B>pluto</B>, it is helpful to understand a little -about its internal state. Furthermore, the terminology is needed to decipher -some of the diagnostic messages. -<P> - -The <I>(potential) connection</I> database describes attributes of a -connection. These include the IP addresses of the hosts and client -subnets and the security characteristics desired. <B>pluto</B> -requires this information (simply called a connection) before it can -respond to a request to build an SA. Each connection is given a name -when it is created, and all references are made using this name. -<P> - -During the IKE exchange to build an SA, the information about the -negotiation is represented in a <I>state object</I>. Each state object -reflects how far the negotiation has reached. Once the negotiation is -complete and the SA established, the state object remains to represent -the SA. When the SA is terminated, the state object is discarded. -Each State object is given a serial number and this is used to refer -to the state objects in logged messages. -<P> - -Each state object corresponds to a connection and can be thought of -as an instantiation of that connection. -At any particular time, there may be any number of state objects -corresponding to a particular connection. -Often there is one representing an ISAKMP SA and another representing -an IPsec SA. -<P> - -<B>KLIPS</B> hooks into the routing code in a LINUX kernel. -Traffic to be processed by an IPsec SA must be directed through -<B>KLIPS</B> by routing commands. Furthermore, the processing to be -done is specified by <I>ipsec <A HREF="eroute.8.html">eroute</A>(8)</I> commands. -<B>pluto</B> takes the responsibility of managing both of these special -kinds of routes. -<P> - -Each connection may be routed, and must be while it has an IPsec SA. -The connection specifies the characteristics of the route: the -interface on this machine, the ``gateway'' (the nexthop), -and the peer's client subnet. Two -connections may not be simultaneously routed if they are for the same -peer's client subnet but use different interfaces or gateways -(<B>pluto</B>'s logic does not reflect any advanced routing capabilities). -<P> - -Each eroute is associated with the state object for an IPsec SA -because it has the particular characteristics of the SA. -Two eroutes conflict if they specify the identical local -and remote clients (unlike for routes, the local clients are -taken into account). -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> needs to install a route for a connection, -it must make sure that no conflicting route is in use. If another -connection has a conflicting route, that route will be taken down, as long -as there is no IPsec SA instantiating that connection. -If there is such an IPsec SA, the attempt to install a route will fail. -<P> - -There is an exception. If <B>pluto</B>, as Responder, needs to install -a route to a fixed client subnet for a connection, and there is -already a conflicting route, then the SAs using the route are deleted -to make room for the new SAs. The rationale is that the new -connection is probably more current. The need for this usually is a -product of Road Warrior connections (these are explained later; they -cannot be used to initiate). -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> needs to install an eroute for an IPsec SA (for a -state object), first the state object's connection must be routed (if -this cannot be done, the eroute and SA will not be installed). -If a conflicting eroute is already in place for another connection, -the eroute and SA will not be installed (but note that the routing -exception mentioned above may have already deleted potentially conflicting SAs). -If another IPsec -SA for the same connection already has an eroute, all its outgoing traffic -is taken over by the new eroute. The incoming traffic will still be -processed. This characteristic is exploited during rekeying. -<P> - -All of these routing characteristics are expected change when -<B>KLIPS</B> is modified to use the firewall hooks in the LINUX 2.4.x -kernel. -<A NAME="lbAL"> </A> -<H3>Using Whack</H3> - -<P> - -<B>whack</B> is used to command a running <B>pluto</B>. -<B>whack</B> uses a UNIX domain socket to speak to <B>pluto</B> -(by default, <I>/var/pluto.ctl</I>). -<P> - -<B>whack</B> has an intricate argument syntax. -This syntax allows many different functions to be specified. -The help form shows the usage or version information. -The connection form gives <B>pluto</B> a description of a potential connection. -The public key form informs <B>pluto</B> of the RSA public key for a potential peer. -The delete form deletes a connection description and all SAs corresponding -to it. -The listen form tells <B>pluto</B> to start or stop listening on the public interfaces -for IKE requests from peers. -The route form tells <B>pluto</B> to set up routing for a connection; -the unroute form undoes this. -The initiate form tells <B>pluto</B> to negotiate an SA corresponding to a connection. -The terminate form tells <B>pluto</B> to remove all SAs corresponding to a connection, -including those being negotiated. -The status form displays the <B>pluto</B>'s internal state. -The debug form tells <B>pluto</B> to change the selection of debugging output -``on the fly''. The shutdown form tells -<B>pluto</B> to shut down, deleting all SAs. -<P> - -Most options are specific to one of the forms, and will be described -with that form. There are three options that apply to all forms. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--ctlbase</B> <I>path</I><DD> -<I>path</I>.ctl is used as the UNIX domain socket for talking -to <B>pluto</B>. -This option facilitates debugging. -<DT><B>--optionsfrom</B> <I>filename</I><DD> -adds the contents of the file to the argument list. -<DT><B>--label</B> <I>string</I><DD> -adds the string to all error messages generated by <B>whack</B>. -</DL> -<P> - -The help form of <B>whack</B> is self-explanatory. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--help</B><DD> -display the usage message. -<DT><B>--version</B><DD> -display the version of <B>whack</B>. -</DL> -<P> - -The connection form describes a potential connection to <B>pluto</B>. -<B>pluto</B> needs to know what connections can and should be negotiated. -When <B>pluto</B> is the initiator, it needs to know what to propose. -When <B>pluto</B> is the responder, it needs to know enough to decide whether -is is willing to set up the proposed connection. -<P> - -The description of a potential connection can specify a large number -of details. Each connection has a unique name. This name will appear -in a updown shell command, so it should not contain punctuation -that would make the command ill-formed. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The topology of -a connection is symmetric, so to save space here is half a picture: -<P> - client_subnet<-->host:ikeport<-->nexthop<--- -<P> -A similar trick is used in the flags. The same flag names are used for -both ends. Those before the <B>--to</B> flag describe the left side -and those afterwards describe the right side. When <B>pluto</B> attempts -to use the connection, it decides whether it is the left side or the right -side of the connection, based on the IP numbers of its interfaces. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--id</B> <I>id</I><DD> -the identity of the end. Currently, this can be an IP address (specified -as dotted quad or as a Fully Qualified Domain Name, which will be resolved -immediately) or as a Fully Qualified Domain Name itself (prefixed by ``@'' -to signify that it should not be resolved), or as <A HREF="mailto:user@FQDN">user@FQDN</A>, or as the -magic value <B>%myid</B>. -<B>Pluto</B> only authenticates the identity, and does not use it for -addressing, so, for example, an IP address need not be the one to which -packets are to be sent. If the option is absent, the -identity defaults to the IP address specified by <B>--host</B>. -<B>%myid</B> allows the identity to be separately specified (by the <B>pluto</B> or <B>whack</B> option <B>--myid</B> -or by the <B><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></B>(5) <B>config setup</B> parameter myid). -Otherwise, <B>pluto</B> tries to guess what <B>%myid</B> should stand for: -the IP address of <B>%defaultroute</B>, if it is supported by a suitable TXT record in the reverse domain for that IP address, -or the system's hostname, if it is supported by a suitable TXT record in its forward domain. - -<DT><B>--host</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -<DT><B>--host</B> <B>%any</B><DD> -<DT><B>--host</B> <B>%opportunistic</B><DD> -the IP address of the end (generally the public interface). -If <B>pluto</B> is to act as a responder -for IKE negotiations initiated from unknown IP addresses (the -``Road Warrior'' case), the -IP address should be specified as <B>%any</B> (currently, -the obsolete notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> is also accepted for this). -If <B>pluto</B> is to opportunistically initiate the connection, -use <B>%opportunistic</B> -<DT><B>--ikeport</B> <I>port-number</I><DD> -the UDP port that IKE listens to on that host. The default is 500. -(<B>pluto</B> on this machine uses the port specified by its own command -line argument, so this only affects where <B>pluto</B> sends messages.) -<DT><B>--nexthop</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -where to route packets for the peer's client (presumably for the peer too, -but it will not be used for this). -When <B>pluto</B> installs an IPsec SA, it issues a route command. -It uses the nexthop as the gateway. -The default is the peer's IP address (this can be explicitly written as -<B>%direct</B>; the obsolete notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> is accepted). -This option is necessary if <B>pluto</B>'s host's interface used for sending -packets to the peer is neither point-to-point nor directly connected to the -peer. -<DT><B>--client</B> <I>subnet</I><DD> -the subnet for which the IPsec traffic will be destined. If not specified, -the host will be the client. -The subnet can be specified in any of the forms supported by <I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3). -The general form is <I>address</I>/<I>mask</I>. The <I>address</I> can be either -a domain name or four decimal numbers (specifying octets) separated by dots. -The most convenient form of the <I>mask</I> is a decimal integer, specifying -the number of leading one bits in the mask. So, for example, 10.0.0.0/8 -would specify the class A network ``Net 10''. -<DT><B>--dnskeyondemand]</B><DD> -specifies that when an RSA public key is needed to authenticate this -host, and it isn't already known, fetch it from DNS. -<DT><B>--updown</B> <I>updown</I><DD> -specifies an external shell command to be run whenever <B>pluto</B> -brings up or down a connection. -The script is used to build a shell command, so it may contain positional -parameters, but ought not to have punctuation that would cause the -resulting command to be ill-formed. -The default is <I>ipsec _updown</I>. -<DT><B>--to</B><DD> -separates the specification of the left and right ends of the connection. -</DL> -<P> - -The potential connection description also specifies characteristics of -rekeying and security. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--psk</B><DD> -Propose and allow preshared secret authentication for IKE peers. This authentication -requires that each side use the same secret. May be combined with <B>--rsasig</B>; -at least one must be specified. -<DT><B>--rsasig</B><DD> -Propose and allow RSA signatures for authentication of IKE peers. This authentication -requires that each side have have a private key of its own and know the -public key of its peer. May be combined with <B>--psk</B>; -at least one must be specified. -<DT><B>--encrypt</B><DD> -All proposed or accepted IPsec SAs will include non-null ESP. -The actual choices of transforms are wired into <B>pluto</B>. -<DT><B>--authenticate</B><DD> -All proposed IPsec SAs will include AH. -All accepted IPsec SAs will include AH or ESP with authentication. -The actual choices of transforms are wired into <B>pluto</B>. -Note that this has nothing to do with IKE authentication. -<DT><B>--compress</B><DD> -All proposed IPsec SAs will include IPCOMP (compression). -This will be ignored if KLIPS is not configured with IPCOMP support. -<DT><B>--tunnel</B><DD> -the IPsec SA should use tunneling. Implicit if the SA is for clients. -Must only be used with <B>--authenticate</B> or <B>--encrypt</B>. -<DT><B>--ipv4</B><DD> -The host addresses will be interpreted as IPv4 addresses. This is the -default. Note that for a connection, all host addresses must be of -the same Address Family (IPv4 and IPv6 use different Address Families). -<DT><B>--ipv6</B><DD> -The host addresses (including nexthop) will be interpreted as IPv6 addresses. -Note that for a connection, all host addresses must be of -the same Address Family (IPv4 and IPv6 use different Address Families). -<DT><B>--tunnelipv4</B><DD> -The client addresses will be interpreted as IPv4 addresses. The default is -to match what the host will be. This does not imply <B>--tunnel</B> so the -flag can be safely used when no tunnel is actually specified. -Note that for a connection, all tunnel addresses must be of the same -Address Family. -<DT><B>--tunnelipv6</B><DD> -The client addresses will be interpreted as IPv6 addresses. The default is -to match what the host will be. This does not imply <B>--tunnel</B> so the -flag can be safely used when no tunnel is actually specified. -Note that for a connection, all tunnel addresses must be of the same -Address Family. -<DT><B>--pfs</B><DD> -There should be Perfect Forward Secrecy - new keying material will -be generated for each IPsec SA rather than being derived from the ISAKMP -SA keying material. -Since the group to be used cannot be negotiated (a dubious feature of the -standard), <B>pluto</B> will propose the same group that was used during Phase 1. -We don't implement a stronger form of PFS which would require that the -ISAKMP SA be deleted after the IPSEC SA is negotiated. -<DT><B>--disablearrivalcheck</B><DD> -If the connection is a tunnel, allow packets arriving through the tunnel -to have any source and destination addresses. -</DL> -<P> - -If none of the <B>--encrypt</B>, <B>--authenticate</B>, <B>--compress</B>, -or <B>--pfs</B> flags is given, the initiating the connection will -only build an ISAKMP SA. For such a connection, client subnets have -no meaning and must not be specified. -<P> - -More work is needed to allow for flexible policies. Currently -policy is hardwired in the source file spdb.c. The ISAKMP SAs may use -Oakley groups MODP1024 and MODP1536; 3DES encryption; SHA1-96 -and MD5-96 authentication. The IPsec SAs may use 3DES and -MD5-96 or SHA1-96 for ESP, or just MD5-96 or SHA1-96 for AH. -IPCOMP Compression is always Deflate. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--ikelifetime</B> <I>seconds</I><DD> -how long <B>pluto</B> will propose that an ISAKMP SA be allowed to live. -The default is 3600 (one hour) and the maximum is 28800 (8 hours). -This option will not affect what is accepted. -<B>pluto</B> will reject proposals that exceed the maximum. -<DT><B>--ipseclifetime</B> <I>seconds</I><DD> -how long <B>pluto</B> will propose that an IPsec SA be allowed to live. -The default is 28800 (eight hours) and the maximum is 86400 (one day). -This option will not affect what is accepted. -<B>pluto</B> will reject proposals that exceed the maximum. -<DT><B>--rekeymargin</B> <I>seconds</I><DD> -how long before an SA's expiration should <B>pluto</B> try to negotiate -a replacement SA. This will only happen if <B>pluto</B> was the initiator. -The default is 540 (nine minutes). -<DT><B>--rekeyfuzz</B> <I>percentage</I><DD> -maximum size of random component to add to rekeymargin, expressed as -a percentage of rekeymargin. <B>pluto</B> will select a delay uniformly -distributed within this range. By default, the percentage will be 100. -If greater determinism is desired, specify 0. It may be appropriate -for the percentage to be much larger than 100. -<DT><B>--keyingtries</B> <I>count</I><DD> -how many times <B>pluto</B> should try to negotiate an SA, -either for the first time or for rekeying. -A value of 0 is interpreted as a very large number: never give up. -The default is three. -<DT><B>--dontrekey</B><DD> -A misnomer. -Only rekey a connection if we were the Initiator and there was recent -traffic on the existing connection. -This applies to Phase 1 and Phase 2. -This is currently the only automatic way for a connection to terminate. -It may be useful with Road Warrior or Opportunistic connections. -<BR> - -Since SA lifetime negotiation is take-it-or-leave it, a Responder -normally uses the shorter of the negotiated or the configured lifetime. -This only works because if the lifetime is shorter than negotiated, -the Responder will rekey in time so that everything works. -This interacts badly with <B>--dontrekey</B>. In this case, -the Responder will end up rekeying to rectify a shortfall in an IPsec SA -lifetime; for an ISAKMP SA, the Responder will accept the negotiated -lifetime. -<DT><B>--delete</B><DD> -when used in the connection form, it causes any previous connection -with this name to be deleted before this one is added. Unlike a -normal delete, no diagnostic is produced if there was no previous -connection to delete. Any routing in place for the connection is undone. -</DL> -<P> - -The delete form deletes a named connection description and any -SAs established or negotiations initiated using this connection. -Any routing in place for the connection is undone. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--delete</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The deletestate form deletes the state object with the specified serial number. -This is useful for selectively deleting instances of connections. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--deletestate</B> <I>state-number</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The route form of the <B>whack</B> command tells <B>pluto</B> to set up -routing for a connection. -Although like a traditional route, it uses an ipsec device as a -virtual interface. -Once routing is set up, no packets will be -sent ``in the clear'' to the peer's client specified in the connection. -A TRAP shunt eroute will be installed; if outbound traffic is caught, -Pluto will initiate the connection. -An explicit <B>whack</B> route is not always needed: if it hasn't been -done when an IPsec SA is being installed, one will be automatically attempted. -<P> - -When a routing is attempted for a connection, there must not already -be a routing for a different connection with the same subnet but different -interface or destination, or if -there is, it must not be being used by an IPsec SA. Otherwise the -attempt will fail. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--route</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The unroute form of the <B>whack</B> command tells <B>pluto</B> to undo -a routing. <B>pluto</B> will refuse if an IPsec SA is using the connection. -If another connection is sharing the same routing, it will be left in place. -Without a routing, packets will be sent without encryption or authentication. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--unroute</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The initiate form tells <B>pluto</B> to initiate a negotiation with another -<B>pluto</B> (or other IKE daemon) according to the named connection. -Initiation requires a route that <B>--route</B> would provide; -if none is in place at the time an IPsec SA is being installed, -<B>pluto</B> attempts to set one up. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--initiate</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -<DT><B>--asynchronous<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The initiate form of the whack</B> command will relay back from -<B>pluto</B> status information via the UNIX domain socket (unless ---asynchronous is specified). The status information is meant to -look a bit like that from <B>FTP</B>. Currently <B>whack</B> simply -copies this to stderr. When the request is finished (eg. the SAs are -established or <B>pluto</B> gives up), <B>pluto</B> closes the channel, -causing <B>whack</B> to terminate. -<P> - -The opportunistic initiate form is mainly used for debugging. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--tunnelipv4</B><DD> -<DT><B>--tunnelipv6</B><DD> -<DT><B>--oppohere</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -<DT><B>--oppothere</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -This will cause <B>pluto</B> to attempt to opportunistically initiate a -connection from here to the there, even if a previous attempt -had been made. -The whack log will show the progress of this attempt. -<P> - -The terminate form tells <B>pluto</B> to delete any SAs that use the specified -connection and to stop any negotiations in process. -It does not prevent new negotiations from starting (the delete form -has this effect). -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--terminate</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The public key for informs <B>pluto</B> of the RSA public key for a potential peer. -Private keys must be kept secret, so they are kept in -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5). - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--keyid </B><I>id</I><DD> -specififies the identity of the peer for which a public key should be used. -Its form is identical to the identity in the connection. -If no public key is specified, <B>pluto</B> attempts to find KEY records -from DNS for the id (if a FQDN) or through reverse lookup (if an IP address). -Note that there several interesting ways in which this is not secure. -<DT><B>--addkey</B><DD> -specifies that the new key is added to the collection; otherwise the -new key replaces any old ones. -<DT><B>--pubkeyrsa </B><I>key</I><DD> -specifies the value of the RSA public key. It is a sequence of bytes -as described in RFC 2537 ``RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS)''. -It is denoted in a way suitable for <I><A HREF="ipsec_ttodata.3.html">ipsec_ttodata</A></I>(3). -For example, a base 64 numeral starts with 0s. -</DL> -<P> - -The listen form tells <B>pluto</B> to start listening for IKE requests -on its public interfaces. To avoid race conditions, it is normal to -load the appropriate connections into <B>pluto</B> before allowing it -to listen. If <B>pluto</B> isn't listening, it is pointless to -initiate negotiations, so it will refuse requests to do so. Whenever -the listen form is used, <B>pluto</B> looks for public interfaces and -will notice when new ones have been added and when old ones have been -removed. This is also the trigger for <B>pluto</B> to read the -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> file. So listen may useful more than once. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--listen</B><DD> -start listening for IKE traffic on public interfaces. -<DT><B>--unlisten</B><DD> -stop listening for IKE traffic on public interfaces. -</DL> -<P> - -The status form will display information about the internal state of -<B>pluto</B>: information about each potential connection, about -each state object, and about each shunt that <B>pluto</B> is managing -without an associated connection. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--status</B><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The shutdown form is the proper way to shut down <B>pluto</B>. -It will tear down the SAs on this machine that <B>pluto</B> has negotiated. -It does not inform its peers, so the SAs on their machines remain. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--shutdown</B><DD> -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAM"> </A> -<H3>Examples</H3> - -<P> - -It would be normal to start <B>pluto</B> in one of the system initialization -scripts. It needs to be run by the superuser. Generally, no arguments are needed. -To run in manually, the superuser can simply type -<P> - ipsec pluto -<P> -The command will immediately return, but a <B>pluto</B> process will be left -running, waiting for requests from <B>whack</B> or a peer. -<P> - -Using <B>whack</B>, several potential connections would be described: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> - - ipsec whack --name silly ---host 127.0.0.1 --to --host 127.0.0.2 ---ikelifetime 900 --ipseclifetime 800 --keyingtries 3 - -</DL> -<P> - -<DD>Since this silly connection description specifies neither encryption, -authentication, nor tunneling, it could only be used to establish -an ISAKMP SA. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> - - ipsec whack --name secret --host 10.0.0.1 --client 10.0.1.0/24 ---to --host 10.0.0.2 --client 10.0.2.0/24 ---encrypt - -</DL> -<P> - -<DD>This is something that must be done on both sides. If the other -side is <B>pluto</B>, the same <B>whack</B> command could be used on it -(the command syntax is designed to not distinguish which end is ours). -<P> - -Now that the connections are specified, <B>pluto</B> is ready to handle -requests and replies via the public interfaces. We must tell it to discover -those interfaces and start accepting messages from peers: -<P> - ipsec whack --listen -<P> - -If we don't immediately wish to bring up a secure connection between -the two clients, we might wish to prevent insecure traffic. -The routing form asks <B>pluto</B> to cause the packets sent from -our client to the peer's client to be routed through the ipsec0 -device; if there is no SA, they will be discarded: -<P> - ipsec whack --route secret -<P> - -Finally, we are ready to get <B>pluto</B> to initiate negotiation -for an IPsec SA (and implicitly, an ISAKMP SA): -<P> - ipsec whack --initiate --name secret -<P> -A small log of interesting events will appear on standard output -(other logging is sent to syslog). -<P> - -<B>whack</B> can also be used to terminate <B>pluto</B> cleanly, tearing down -all SAs that it has negotiated. -<P> - ipsec whack --shutdown -<P> -Notification of any IPSEC SA deletion, but not ISAKMP SA deletion -is sent to the peer. Unfortunately, such Notification is not reliable. -Furthermore, <B>pluto</B> itself ignores Notifications. -<A NAME="lbAN"> </A> -<H3>The updown command</H3> - -<P> - -Whenever <B>pluto</B> brings a connection up or down, it invokes -the updown command. This command is specified using the <B>--updown</B> -option. This allows for customized control over routing and firewall manipulation. -<P> - -The updown is invoked for five different operations. Each of -these operations can be for our client subnet or for our host itself. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>prepare-host</B> or <B>prepare-client</B><DD> -is run before bringing up a new connection if no other connection -with the same clients is up. Generally, this is useful for deleting a -route that might have been set up before <B>pluto</B> was run or -perhaps by some agent not known to <B>pluto</B>. -<DT><B>route-host</B> or <B>route-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing up a connection for a new peer client subnet -(even if <B>prepare-host</B> or <B>prepare-client</B> was run). The -command should install a suitable route. Routing decisions are based -only on the destination (peer's client) subnet address, unlike eroutes -which discriminate based on source too. -<DT><B>unroute-host</B> or <B>unroute-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing down the last connection for a particular peer -client subnet. It should undo what the <B>route-host</B> or <B>route-client</B> -did. -<DT><B>up-host</B> or <B>up-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing up a tunnel eroute with a pair of client subnets -that does not already have a tunnel eroute. -This command should install firewall rules as appropriate. -It is generally a good idea to allow IKE messages (UDP port 500) -travel between the hosts. -<DT><B>down-host</B> or <B>down-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing down the eroute for a pair of client subnets. -This command should delete firewall rules as appropriate. Note that -there may remain some inbound IPsec SAs with these client subnets. -</DL> -<P> - -The script is passed a large number of environment variables to specify -what needs to be done. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>PLUTO_VERSION</B><DD> -indicates what version of this interface is being used. This document -describes version 1.1. This is upwardly compatible with version 1.0. -<DT><B>PLUTO_VERB</B><DD> -specifies the name of the operation to be performed -(<B>prepare-host</B>,r <B>prepare-client</B>, -<B>up-host</B>, <B>up-client</B>, -<B>down-host</B>, or <B>down-client</B>). If the address family for -security gateway to security gateway communications is IPv6, then -a suffix of -v6 is added to the verb. -<DT><B>PLUTO_CONNECTION</B><DD> -is the name of the connection for which we are routing. -<DT><B>PLUTO_NEXT_HOP</B><DD> -is the next hop to which packets bound for the peer must be sent. -<DT><B>PLUTO_INTERFACE</B><DD> -is the name of the ipsec interface to be used. -<DT><B>PLUTO_ME</B><DD> -is the IP address of our host. -<DT><B>PLUTO_MY_CLIENT</B><DD> -is the IP address / count of our client subnet. -If the client is just the host, this will be the host's own IP address / max -(where max is 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). -<DT><B>PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET</B><DD> -is the IP address of our client net. -If the client is just the host, this will be the host's own IP address. -<DT><B>PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK</B><DD> -is the mask for our client net. -If the client is just the host, this will be 255.255.255.255. -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER</B><DD> -is the IP address of our peer. -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT</B><DD> -is the IP address / count of the peer's client subnet. -If the client is just the peer, this will be the peer's own IP address / max -(where max is 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET</B><DD> -is the IP address of the peer's client net. -If the client is just the peer, this will be the peer's own IP address. -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK</B><DD> -is the mask for the peer's client net. -If the client is just the peer, this will be 255.255.255.255. -</DL> -<P> - -All output sent by the script to stderr or stdout is logged. The -script should return an exit status of 0 if and only if it succeeds. -<P> - -<B>Pluto</B> waits for the script to finish and will not do any other -processing while it is waiting. -The script may assume that <B>pluto</B> will not change anything -while the script runs. -The script should avoid doing anything that takes much time and it -should not issue any command that requires processing by <B>pluto</B>. -Either of these activities could be performed by a background -subprocess of the script. -<A NAME="lbAO"> </A> -<H3>Rekeying</H3> - -<P> - -When an SA that was initiated by <B>pluto</B> has only a bit of -lifetime left, -<B>pluto</B> will initiate the creation of a new SA. This applies to -ISAKMP and IPsec SAs. -The rekeying will be initiated when the SA's remaining lifetime is -less than the rekeymargin plus a random percentage, between 0 and -rekeyfuzz, of the rekeymargin. -<P> - -Similarly, when an SA that was initiated by the peer has only a bit of -lifetime left, <B>pluto</B> will try to initiate the creation of a -replacement. -To give preference to the initiator, this rekeying will only be initiated -when the SA's remaining lifetime is half of rekeymargin. -If rekeying is done by the responder, the roles will be reversed: the -responder for the old SA will be the initiator for the replacement. -The former initiator might also initiate rekeying, so there may -be redundant SAs created. -To avoid these complications, make sure that rekeymargin is generous. -<P> - -One risk of having the former responder initiate is that perhaps -none of its proposals is acceptable to the former initiator -(they have not been used in a successful negotiation). -To reduce the chances of this happening, and to prevent loss of security, -the policy settings are taken from the old SA (this is the case even if -the former initiator is initiating). -These may be stricter than those of the connection. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> will not rekey an SA if that SA is not the most recent of its -type (IPsec or ISAKMP) for its potential connection. -This avoids creating redundant SAs. -<P> - -The random component in the rekeying time (rekeyfuzz) is intended to -make certain pathological patterns of rekeying unstable. If both -sides decide to rekey at the same time, twice as many SAs as necessary -are created. This could become a stable pattern without the -randomness. -<P> - -Another more important case occurs when a security gateway has SAs -with many other security gateways. Each of these connections might -need to be rekeyed at the same time. This would cause a high peek -requirement for resources (network bandwidth, CPU time, entropy for -random numbers). The rekeyfuzz can be used to stagger the rekeying -times. -<P> - -Once a new set of SAs has been negotiated, <B>pluto</B> will never send -traffic on a superseded one. Traffic will be accepted on an old SA -until it expires. -<A NAME="lbAP"> </A> -<H3>Selecting a Connection When Responding: Road Warrior Support</H3> - -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> receives an initial Main Mode message, it needs to -decide which connection this message is for. It picks based solely on -the source and destination IP addresses of the message. There might -be several connections with suitable IP addresses, in which case one -of them is arbitrarily chosen. (The ISAKMP SA proposal contained in -the message could be taken into account, but it is not.) -<P> - -The ISAKMP SA is negotiated before the parties pass further -identifying information, so all ISAKMP SA characteristics specified in -the connection description should be the same for every connection -with the same two host IP addresses. At the moment, the only -characteristic that might differ is authentication method. -<P> - -Up to this point, -all configuring has presumed that the IP addresses -are known to all parties ahead of time. This will not work -when either end is mobile (or assigned a dynamic IP address for other -reasons). We call this situation ``Road Warrior''. It is fairly tricky -and has some important limitations, most of which are features of -the IKE protocol. -<P> - -Only the initiator may be mobile: -the initiator may have an IP number unknown to the responder. When -the responder doesn't recognize the IP address on the first Main Mode -packet, it looks for a connection with itself as one end and <B>%any</B> -as the other. -If it cannot find one, it refuses to negotiate. If it -does find one, it creates a temporary connection that is a duplicate -except with the <B>%any</B> replaced by the source IP address from the -packet; if there was no identity specified for the peer, the new IP -address will be used. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> is using one of these temporary connections and -needs to find the preshared secret or RSA private key in <I>ipsec.secrets</I>, -and and the connection specified no identity for the peer, <B>%any</B> -is used as its identity. After all, the real IP address was apparently -unknown to the configuration, so it is unreasonable to require that -it be used in this table. -<P> - -Part way into the Phase 1 (Main Mode) negotiation using one of these -temporary connection descriptions, <B>pluto</B> will be receive an -Identity Payload. At this point, <B>pluto</B> checks for a more -appropriate connection, one with an identity for the peer that matches -the payload but which would use the same keys so-far used for -authentication. If it finds one, it will switch to using this better -connection (or a temporary derived from this, if it has <B>%any</B> -for the peer's IP address). It may even turn out that no connection -matches the newly discovered identity, including the current connection; -if so, <B>pluto</B> terminates negotiation. -<P> - -Unfortunately, if preshared secret authentication is being used, the -Identity Payload is encrypted using this secret, so the secret must be -selected by the responder without knowing this payload. This -limits there to being at most one preshared secret for all Road Warrior -systems connecting to a host. RSA Signature authentications does not -require that the responder know how to select the initiator's public key -until after the initiator's Identity Payload is decoded (using the -responder's private key, so that must be preselected). -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> is responding to a Quick Mode negotiation via one of these -temporary connection descriptions, it may well find that the subnets -specified by the initiator don't match those in the temporary -connection description. If so, it will look for a connection with -matching subnets, its own host address, a peer address of <B>%any</B> -and matching identities. -If it finds one, a new temporary connection is derived from this one -and used for the Quick Mode negotiation of IPsec SAs. If it does not -find one, <B>pluto</B> terminates negotiation. -<P> - -Be sure to specify an appropriate nexthop for the responder -to send a message to the initiator: <B>pluto</B> has no way of guessing -it (if forwarding isn't required, use an explicit <B>%direct</B> as the nexthop -and the IP address of the initiator will be filled in; the obsolete -notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> is still accepted). -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> has no special provision for the initiator side. The current -(possibly dynamic) IP address and nexthop must be used in defining -connections. These must be -properly configured each time the initiator's IP address changes. -<B>pluto</B> has no mechanism to do this automatically. -<P> - -Although we call this Road Warrior Support, it could also be used to -support encrypted connections with anonymous initiators. The -responder's organization could announce the preshared secret that would be used -with unrecognized initiators and let anyone connect. Of course the initiator's -identity would not be authenticated. -<P> - -If any Road Warrior connections are supported, <B>pluto</B> cannot -reject an exchange initiated by an unknown host until it has -determined that the secret is not shared or the signature is invalid. -This must await the -third Main Mode message from the initiator. If no Road Warrior -connection is supported, the first message from an unknown source -would be rejected. This has implications for ease of debugging -configurations and for denial of service attacks. -<P> - -Although a Road Warrior connection must be initiated by the mobile -side, the other side can and will rekey using the temporary connection -it has created. If the Road Warrior wishes to be able to disconnect, -it is probably wise to set <B>--keyingtries</B> to 1 in the -connection on the non-mobile side to prevent it trying to rekey the -connection. Unfortunately, there is no mechanism to unroute the -connection automatically. -<A NAME="lbAQ"> </A> -<H3>Debugging</H3> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> accepts several optional arguments, useful mostly for debugging. -Except for <B>--interface</B>, each should appear at most once. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--interface</B> <I>interfacename</I><DD> -specifies that the named real public network interface should be considered. -The interface name specified should not be <B>ipsec</B><I>N</I>. -If the option doesn't appear, all interfaces are considered. -To specify several interfaces, use the option once for each. -One use of this option is to specify which interface should be used -when two or more share the same IP address. -<DT><B>--ikeport</B> <I>port-number</I><DD> -changes the UDP port that <B>pluto</B> will use -(default, specified by IANA: 500) -<DT><B>--ctlbase</B> <I>path</I><DD> -basename for control files. -<I>path</I>.ctl is the socket through which <B>whack</B> communicates with -<B>pluto</B>. -<I>path</I>.pid is the lockfile to prevent multiple <B>pluto</B> instances. -The default is <I>/var/run/pluto</I>). -<DT><B>--secretsfile</B> <I>file</I><DD> -specifies the file for authentication secrets -(default: <I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I>). -This name is subject to ``globbing'' as in <I><A HREF="sh.1.html">sh</A></I>(1), -so every file with a matching name is processed. -Quoting is generally needed to prevent the shell from doing the globbing. -<DT><B>--adns</B> <I>pathname</I><DD> -<DT><B>--lwdnsq</B> <I>pathname</I><DD> -specifies where to find <B>pluto</B>'s helper program for asynchronous DNS lookup. -<B>pluto</B> can be built to use one of two helper programs: <B>_pluto_adns</B> -or <B>lwdnsq</B>. You must use the program for which it was built. -By default, <B>pluto</B> will look for the program in -<B>$IPSEC_DIR</B> (if that environment variable is defined) or, failing that, -in the same directory as <B>pluto</B>. -<DT><B>--nofork</B><DD> -disable ``daemon fork'' (default is to fork). In addition, after the -lock file and control socket are created, print the line ``Pluto -initialized'' to standard out. -<DT><B>--noklips</B><DD> -don't actually implement negotiated IPsec SAs -<DT><B>--uniqueids</B><DD> -if this option has been selected, whenever a new ISAKMP SA is -established, any connection with the same Peer ID but a different -Peer IP address is unoriented (causing all its SAs to be deleted). -This helps clean up dangling SAs when a connection is lost and -then regained at another IP address. -<DT><B>--stderrlog</B><DD> -log goes to standard out {default is to use <I><A HREF="syslogd.8.html">syslogd</A></I>(8)) -</DL> -<P> - -For example -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>pluto --secretsfile ipsec.secrets --ctlbase pluto.base --ikeport 8500 --nofork --noklips --stderrlog<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -lets one test <B>pluto</B> without using the superuser account. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> is willing to produce a prodigious amount of debugging -information. To do so, it must be compiled with -DDEBUG. There are -several classes of debugging output, and <B>pluto</B> may be directed to -produce a selection of them. All lines of -debugging output are prefixed with ``| '' to distinguish them from error -messages. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> is invoked, it may be given arguments to specify -which classes to output. The current options are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--debug-raw</B><DD> -show the raw bytes of messages -<DT><B>--debug-crypt</B><DD> -show the encryption and decryption of messages -<DT><B>--debug-parsing</B><DD> -show the structure of input messages -<DT><B>--debug-emitting</B><DD> -show the structure of output messages -<DT><B>--debug-control</B><DD> -show <B>pluto</B>'s decision making -<DT><B>--debug-lifecycle</B><DD> -[this option is temporary] log more detail of lifecycle of SAs -<DT><B>--debug-klips</B><DD> -show <B>pluto</B>'s interaction with <B>KLIPS</B> -<DT><B>--debug-dns</B><DD> -show <B>pluto</B>'s interaction with <B>DNS</B> for KEY and TXT records -<DT><B>--debug-oppo</B><DD> -show why <B>pluto</B> didn't find a suitable DNS TXT record to authorize opportunistic initiation -<DT><B>--debug-all</B><DD> -all of the above -<DT><B>--debug-private</B><DD> -allow debugging output with private keys. -<DT><B>--debug-none</B><DD> -none of the above -</DL> -<P> - -The debug form of the -<B>whack</B> command will change the selection in a running -<B>pluto</B>. -If a connection name is specified, the flags are added whenever -<B>pluto</B> has identified that it is dealing with that connection. -Unfortunately, this is often part way into the operation being observed. -<P> - -For example, to start a <B>pluto</B> with a display of the structure of input -and output: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -pluto --debug-emitting --debug-parsing -</DL> -<P> - -To later change this <B>pluto</B> to only display raw bytes: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -whack --debug-raw -</DL> -<P> - -For testing, SSH's IKE test page is quite useful: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -<I><A HREF="http://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/">http://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/</A></I> -</DL> -<P> - -Hint: ISAKMP SAs are often kept alive by IKEs even after the IPsec SA -is established. This allows future IPsec SA's to be negotiated -directly. If one of the IKEs is restarted, the other may try to use -the ISAKMP SA but the new IKE won't know about it. This can lead to -much confusion. <B>pluto</B> is not yet smart enough to get out of such a -mess. -<A NAME="lbAR"> </A> -<H3>Pluto's Behaviour When Things Go Wrong</H3> - -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> doesn't understand or accept a message, it just -ignores the message. It is not yet capable of communicating the -problem to the other IKE daemon (in the future it might use -Notifications to accomplish this in many cases). It does log a diagnostic. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> gets no response from a message, it resends the same -message (a message will be sent at most three times). This is -appropriate: UDP is unreliable. -<P> - -When pluto gets a message that it has already seen, there are many -cases when it notices and discards it. This too is appropriate for UDP. -<P> - -Combine these three rules, and you can explain many apparently -mysterious behaviours. In a <B>pluto</B> log, retrying isn't usually the -interesting event. The critical thing is either earlier (<B>pluto</B> -got a message which it didn't like and so ignored, so it was still -awaiting an acceptable message and got impatient) or on the other -system (<B>pluto</B> didn't send a reply because it wasn't happy with -the previous message). -<A NAME="lbAS"> </A> -<H3>Notes</H3> - -<P> - -If <B>pluto</B> is compiled without -DKLIPS, it negotiates Security -Associations but never ask the kernel to put them in place and never -makes routing changes. This allows <B>pluto</B> to be tested on systems -without <B>KLIPS</B>, but makes it rather useless. -<P> - -Each IPsec SA is assigned an SPI, a 32-bit number used to refer to the SA. -The IKE protocol lets the destination of the SA choose the SPI. -The range 0 to 0xFF is reserved for IANA. -<B>Pluto</B> also avoids choosing an SPI in the range 0x100 to 0xFFF, -leaving these SPIs free for manual keying. -Remember that the peer, if not <B>pluto</B>, may well chose -SPIs in this range. -<A NAME="lbAT"> </A> -<H3>Policies</H3> - -<P> - -This catalogue of policies may be of use when trying to configure -<B>Pluto</B> and another IKE implementation to interoperate. -<P> - -In Phase 1, only Main Mode is supported. We are not sure that -Aggressive Mode is secure. For one thing, it does not support -identity protection. It may allow more severe Denial Of Service -attacks. -<P> - -No Informational Exchanges are supported. These are optional and -since their delivery is not assured, they must not matter. -It is the case that some IKE implementations won't interoperate -without Informational Exchanges, but we feel they are broken. -<P> - -No Informational Payloads are supported. These are optional, but -useful. It is of concern that these payloads are not authenticated in -Phase 1, nor in those Phase 2 messages authenticated with <A HREF="HASH.3.html">HASH</A>(3). -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>*<DD> -Diffie Hellman Groups MODP 1024 and MODP 1536 (2 and 5) -are supported. -Group MODP768 (1) is not supported because it is too weak. -<DT>*<DD> -Host authetication can be done by RSA Signatures or Pre-Shared -Secrets. -<DT>*<DD> -3DES CBC (Cypher Block Chaining mode) is the only encryption -supported, both for ISAKMP SAs and IPSEC SAs. -<DT>*<DD> -MD5 and SHA1 hashing are supported for packet authentication in both -kinds of SAs. -<DT>*<DD> -The ESP, AH, or AH plus ESP are supported. If, and only if, AH and -ESP are combined, the ESP need not have its own authentication -component. The selection is controlled by the --encrypt and ---authenticate flags. -<DT>*<DD> -Each of these may be combined with IPCOMP Deflate compression, -but only if the potential connection specifies compression and only -if KLIPS is configured with IPCOMP support. -<DT>*<DD> -The IPSEC SAs may be tunnel or transport mode, where appropriate. -The --tunnel flag controls this when <B>pluto</B> is initiating. -<DT>*<DD> -When responding to an ISAKMP SA proposal, the maximum acceptable -lifetime is eight hours. The default is one hour. There is no -minimum. The --ikelifetime flag controls this when <B>pluto</B> -is initiating. -<DT>*<DD> -When responding to an IPSEC SA proposal, the maximum acceptable -lifetime is one day. The default is eight hours. There is no -minimum. The --ipseclifetime flag controls this when <B>pluto</B> -is initiating. -<DT>*<DD> -PFS is acceptable, and will be proposed if the --pfs flag was -specified. The DH group proposed will be the same as negotiated for -Phase 1. -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAU"> </A> -<H2>SIGNALS</H2> - -<P> - -<B>Pluto</B> responds to <B>SIGHUP</B> by issuing a suggestion that ``<B>whack</B> ---listen'' might have been intended. -<P> - -<B>Pluto</B> exits when it recieves <B>SIGTERM</B>. -<A NAME="lbAV"> </A> -<H2>EXIT STATUS</H2> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> normally forks a daemon process, so the exit status is -normally a very preliminary result. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>0<DD> -means that all is OK so far. -<DT>1<DD> -means that something was wrong. -<DT>10<DD> -means that the lock file already exists. -</DL> -<P> - -If <B>whack</B> detects a problem, it will return an exit status of 1. -If it received progress messages from <B>pluto</B>, it returns as status -the value of the numeric prefix from the last such message -that was not a message sent to syslog or a comment -(but the prefix for success is treated as 0). -Otherwise, the exit status is 0. -<A NAME="lbAW"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<I>/var/run/pluto.pid</I> -<BR> - -<I>/var/run/pluto.ctl</I> -<BR> - -<I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I> -<BR> - -<I>$IPSEC_LIBDIR/_pluto_adns</I> -<BR> - -<I>$IPSEC_EXECDIR/lwdnsq</I> -<BR> - -<I>/dev/urandom</I> -<A NAME="lbAX"> </A> -<H2>ENVIRONMENT</H2> - -<I>IPSEC_LIBDIR</I> -<BR> - -<I>IPSEC_EXECDIR</I> -<BR> - -<I>IPSECmyid</I> -<A NAME="lbAY"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<P> - -The rest of the FreeS/WAN distribution, in particular <I><A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A></I>(8). -<P> - -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) is designed to make using <B>pluto</B> more pleasant. -Use it! -<P> - -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5) - -describes the format of the secrets file. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3), part of the FreeS/WAN distribution, describes the -forms that IP addresses may take. -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3), part of the FreeS/WAN distribution, describes the -forms that subnet specifications. -<P> - -For more information on IPsec, the mailing list, and the relevant -documents, see: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> - -<I><A HREF="http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html">http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html</A></I> - -</DL> -<P> - -At the time of writing, the most relevant IETF RFCs are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -RFC2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) -<DT><DD> -RFC2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) -<DT><DD> -RFC2407 The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP -</DL> -<P> - -The FreeS/WAN web site <<A HREF="htp://www.freeswan.org">htp://www.freeswan.org</A>> -and the mailing lists described there. -<A NAME="lbAZ"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -This code is released under the GPL terms. -See the accompanying file COPYING-2.0 for more details. -The GPL does NOT apply to those pieces of code written by others -which are included in this distribution, except as noted by the -individual authors. -<P> - -This software was originally written -for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Angelos D. Keromytis -(<A HREF="mailto:angelos@dsl.cis.upenn.edu">angelos@dsl.cis.upenn.edu</A>), in May/June 1997, in Athens, Greece. -Thanks go to John Ioannidis for his help. -<P> - -It is currently (2000) -being developed and maintained by D. Hugh Redelmeier -(<A HREF="mailto:hugh@mimosa.com">hugh@mimosa.com</A>), in Canada. The regulations of Greece and Canada -allow us to make the code freely redistributable. -<P> - -Kai Martius (<A HREF="mailto:admin@imib.med.tu-dresden.de">admin@imib.med.tu-dresden.de</A>) contributed the initial -version of the code supporting PFS. -<P> - -Richard Guy Briggs <<A HREF="mailto:rgb@conscoop.ottawa.on.ca">rgb@conscoop.ottawa.on.ca</A>> and Peter Onion -<<A HREF="mailto:ponion@srd.bt.co.uk">ponion@srd.bt.co.uk</A>> added the PFKEY2 support. -<P> - -We gratefully acknowledge that we use parts of Eric Young's <I>libdes</I> -package; see <I>../libdes/COPYRIGHT</I>. -<A NAME="lbBA"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<B>pluto</B> - -is a work-in-progress. It currently has many limitations. -For example, it ignores notification messages that it receives, and -it generates only Delete Notifications and those only for IPSEC SAs. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> does not support the Commit Flag. -The Commit Flag is a bad feature of the IKE protocol. -It isn't protected -- neither encrypted nor authenticated. -A man in the middle could turn it on, leading to DoS. -We just ignore it, with a warning. -This should let us interoperate with -implementations that insist on it, with minor damage. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> does not check that the SA returned by the Responder -is actually one that was proposed. It only checks that the SA is -acceptable. The difference is not large, but can show up in attributes -such as SA lifetime. -<P> - -There is no good way for a connection to be automatically terminated. -This is a problem for Road Warrior and Opportunistic connections. -The <B>--dontrekey</B> option does prevent the SAs from -being rekeyed on expiry. -Additonally, if a Road Warrior connection has a client subnet with a fixed IP -address, a negotiation with that subnet will cause any other -connection instantiations with that same subnet to be unoriented -(deleted, in effect). -See also the --uniqueids option for an extension of this. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> sends a message to a peer that has disappeared, -<B>pluto</B> receives incomplete information from the kernel, so it -logs the unsatisfactory message ``some IKE message we sent has been -rejected with ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details)''. John -Denker suggests that this command is useful for tracking down the -source of these problems: -<BR> - -<TT> </TT>tcpdump -i eth0 icmp[0] != 8 and icmp[0] != 0<BR> -<BR> - -Substitute your public interface for eth0 if it is different. -<P> - -The word ``authenticate'' is used for two different features. We must -authenticate each IKE peer to the other. This is an important task of -Phase 1. Each packet must be authenticated, both in IKE and in IPsec, -and the method for IPsec is negotiated as an AH SA or part of an ESP SA. -Unfortunately, the protocol has no mechanism for authenticating the Phase 2 -identities. -<P> - -Bugs should be reported to the <<A HREF="mailto:users@lists.freeswan.org">users@lists.freeswan.org</A>> mailing list. -Caution: we cannot accept -actual code from US residents, or even US citizens living outside the -US, because that would bring FreeS/WAN under US export law. Some -other countries cause similar problems. In general, we would prefer -that you send detailed problem reports rather than code: we want -FreeS/WAN to be unquestionably freely exportable, which means being -very careful about where the code comes from, and for a small bug fix, -that is often more time-consuming than just reinventing the fix -ourselves. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">IKE's Job</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">Pluto</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">Before Running Pluto</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">Setting up <B>KLIPS</B> for <B>pluto</B></A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">ipsec.secrets file</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAJ">Running Pluto</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAK">Pluto's Internal State</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAL">Using Whack</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAM">Examples</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAN">The updown command</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAO">Rekeying</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAP">Selecting a Connection When Responding: Road Warrior Support</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAQ">Debugging</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAR">Pluto's Behaviour When Things Go Wrong</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAS">Notes</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAT">Policies</A><DD> -</DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAU">SIGNALS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAV">EXIT STATUS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAW">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAX">ENVIRONMENT</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAY">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAZ">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBA">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_portof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_portof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3965ca62d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_portof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PORTOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PORTOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec portof - get port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec setportof - set port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrof - get pointer to internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrlenof - get length of internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int portof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void setportof(int port, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct sockaddr *sockaddrof(ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t sockaddrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -contains one of the -<I>sockaddr</I> - -types internally. -<I>Reliance on this feature is discouraged</I>, -but it may occasionally be necessary. -These functions provide low-level tools for this purpose. -<P> - -<I>Portof</I> - -and -<I>setportof</I> - -respectively read and write the port-number field of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>. - -The values are in network byte order. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrof</I> - -returns a pointer to the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for passing to other functions. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrlenof</I> - -reports the size of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for use in storage allocation. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Portof</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<I>sockaddrof</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B>, - -and -<I>sockaddrlenof</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -if an unknown address family is found within the -<I>ip_address</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -These functions all depend on low-level details of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type, which are in principle subject to change. -Avoid using them unless really necessary. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 27763a2bb..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PRNG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PRNG</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 1 April 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec prng_init - initialize IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_bytes - get bytes from IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_final - close down IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>void prng_init(struct prng *prng,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_bytes(struct prng *prng, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned long prng_count(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_final(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes a crypto-quality pseudo-random-number generator from a key; -<I>prng_bytes</I> - -obtains pseudo-random bytes from it; -<I>prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes extracted from it to date; -<I>prng_final</I> - -closes it down. -It is the user's responsibility to initialize a PRNG before using it, -and not to use it again after it is closed down. -<P> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes, -or re-initializes, -the specified -<I>prng</I> - -from the -<I>key</I>, - -whose length is given by -<I>keylen</I>. - -The user must allocate the -<B>struct prng</B> - -pointed to by -<I>prng</I>. - -There is no particular constraint on the length of the key, -although a key longer than 256 bytes is unnecessary because -only the first 256 would be used. -Initialization requires on the order of 3000 integer operations, -independent of key length. -<P> - -<I>Prng_bytes</I> - -obtains -<I>dstlen</I> - -pseudo-random bytes from the PRNG and puts them in -<I>buf</I>. - -This is quite fast, -on the order of 10 integer operations per byte. -<P> - -<I>Prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes obtained from the PRNG -since it was (last) initialized. -<P> - -<I>Prng_final</I> - -closes down a PRNG by -zeroing its internal memory, -obliterating all trace of the state used to generate its previous output. -This requires on the order of 250 integer operations. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the definition of the -<B>prng</B> - -structure. -Examination of its innards is discouraged, as they may change. -<P> - -The PRNG algorithm -used by these functions is currently identical to that of RC4(TM). -This algorithm is cryptographically strong, -sufficiently unpredictable that even a hostile observer will -have difficulty determining the next byte of output from past history, -provided it is initialized from a reasonably large key composed of -highly random bytes (see -<I><A HREF="random.4.html">random</A></I>(4)). - -The usual run of software pseudo-random-number generators -(e.g. -<I><A HREF="random.3.html">random</A></I>(3)) - -are -<I>not</I> - -cryptographically strong. -<P> - -The well-known attacks against RC4(TM), -e.g. as found in 802.11b's WEP encryption system, -apply only if multiple PRNGs are initialized with closely-related keys -(e.g., using a counter appended to a base key). -If such keys are used, the first few hundred pseudo-random bytes -from each PRNG should be discarded, -to give the PRNGs a chance to randomize their innards properly. -No useful attacks are known if the key is well randomized to begin with. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="random.3.html">random</A>(3), <A HREF="random.4.html">random</A>(4) -<BR> - -Bruce Schneier, -<I>Applied Cryptography</I>, 2nd ed., 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9, -pp. 397-8. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -If an attempt is made to obtain more than 4e9 bytes -between initializations, -the PRNG will continue to work but -<I>prng_count</I>'s - -output will stick at -<B>4000000000</B>. - -Fixing this would require a longer integer type and does -not seem worth the trouble, -since you should probably re-initialize before then anyway... -<P> - -``RC4'' is a trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_bytes.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_bytes.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 27763a2bb..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_bytes.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PRNG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PRNG</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 1 April 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec prng_init - initialize IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_bytes - get bytes from IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_final - close down IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>void prng_init(struct prng *prng,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_bytes(struct prng *prng, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned long prng_count(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_final(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes a crypto-quality pseudo-random-number generator from a key; -<I>prng_bytes</I> - -obtains pseudo-random bytes from it; -<I>prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes extracted from it to date; -<I>prng_final</I> - -closes it down. -It is the user's responsibility to initialize a PRNG before using it, -and not to use it again after it is closed down. -<P> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes, -or re-initializes, -the specified -<I>prng</I> - -from the -<I>key</I>, - -whose length is given by -<I>keylen</I>. - -The user must allocate the -<B>struct prng</B> - -pointed to by -<I>prng</I>. - -There is no particular constraint on the length of the key, -although a key longer than 256 bytes is unnecessary because -only the first 256 would be used. -Initialization requires on the order of 3000 integer operations, -independent of key length. -<P> - -<I>Prng_bytes</I> - -obtains -<I>dstlen</I> - -pseudo-random bytes from the PRNG and puts them in -<I>buf</I>. - -This is quite fast, -on the order of 10 integer operations per byte. -<P> - -<I>Prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes obtained from the PRNG -since it was (last) initialized. -<P> - -<I>Prng_final</I> - -closes down a PRNG by -zeroing its internal memory, -obliterating all trace of the state used to generate its previous output. -This requires on the order of 250 integer operations. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the definition of the -<B>prng</B> - -structure. -Examination of its innards is discouraged, as they may change. -<P> - -The PRNG algorithm -used by these functions is currently identical to that of RC4(TM). -This algorithm is cryptographically strong, -sufficiently unpredictable that even a hostile observer will -have difficulty determining the next byte of output from past history, -provided it is initialized from a reasonably large key composed of -highly random bytes (see -<I><A HREF="random.4.html">random</A></I>(4)). - -The usual run of software pseudo-random-number generators -(e.g. -<I><A HREF="random.3.html">random</A></I>(3)) - -are -<I>not</I> - -cryptographically strong. -<P> - -The well-known attacks against RC4(TM), -e.g. as found in 802.11b's WEP encryption system, -apply only if multiple PRNGs are initialized with closely-related keys -(e.g., using a counter appended to a base key). -If such keys are used, the first few hundred pseudo-random bytes -from each PRNG should be discarded, -to give the PRNGs a chance to randomize their innards properly. -No useful attacks are known if the key is well randomized to begin with. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="random.3.html">random</A>(3), <A HREF="random.4.html">random</A>(4) -<BR> - -Bruce Schneier, -<I>Applied Cryptography</I>, 2nd ed., 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9, -pp. 397-8. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -If an attempt is made to obtain more than 4e9 bytes -between initializations, -the PRNG will continue to work but -<I>prng_count</I>'s - -output will stick at -<B>4000000000</B>. - -Fixing this would require a longer integer type and does -not seem worth the trouble, -since you should probably re-initialize before then anyway... -<P> - -``RC4'' is a trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_final.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_final.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 27763a2bb..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_final.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PRNG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PRNG</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 1 April 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec prng_init - initialize IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_bytes - get bytes from IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_final - close down IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>void prng_init(struct prng *prng,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_bytes(struct prng *prng, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned long prng_count(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_final(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes a crypto-quality pseudo-random-number generator from a key; -<I>prng_bytes</I> - -obtains pseudo-random bytes from it; -<I>prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes extracted from it to date; -<I>prng_final</I> - -closes it down. -It is the user's responsibility to initialize a PRNG before using it, -and not to use it again after it is closed down. -<P> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes, -or re-initializes, -the specified -<I>prng</I> - -from the -<I>key</I>, - -whose length is given by -<I>keylen</I>. - -The user must allocate the -<B>struct prng</B> - -pointed to by -<I>prng</I>. - -There is no particular constraint on the length of the key, -although a key longer than 256 bytes is unnecessary because -only the first 256 would be used. -Initialization requires on the order of 3000 integer operations, -independent of key length. -<P> - -<I>Prng_bytes</I> - -obtains -<I>dstlen</I> - -pseudo-random bytes from the PRNG and puts them in -<I>buf</I>. - -This is quite fast, -on the order of 10 integer operations per byte. -<P> - -<I>Prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes obtained from the PRNG -since it was (last) initialized. -<P> - -<I>Prng_final</I> - -closes down a PRNG by -zeroing its internal memory, -obliterating all trace of the state used to generate its previous output. -This requires on the order of 250 integer operations. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the definition of the -<B>prng</B> - -structure. -Examination of its innards is discouraged, as they may change. -<P> - -The PRNG algorithm -used by these functions is currently identical to that of RC4(TM). -This algorithm is cryptographically strong, -sufficiently unpredictable that even a hostile observer will -have difficulty determining the next byte of output from past history, -provided it is initialized from a reasonably large key composed of -highly random bytes (see -<I><A HREF="random.4.html">random</A></I>(4)). - -The usual run of software pseudo-random-number generators -(e.g. -<I><A HREF="random.3.html">random</A></I>(3)) - -are -<I>not</I> - -cryptographically strong. -<P> - -The well-known attacks against RC4(TM), -e.g. as found in 802.11b's WEP encryption system, -apply only if multiple PRNGs are initialized with closely-related keys -(e.g., using a counter appended to a base key). -If such keys are used, the first few hundred pseudo-random bytes -from each PRNG should be discarded, -to give the PRNGs a chance to randomize their innards properly. -No useful attacks are known if the key is well randomized to begin with. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="random.3.html">random</A>(3), <A HREF="random.4.html">random</A>(4) -<BR> - -Bruce Schneier, -<I>Applied Cryptography</I>, 2nd ed., 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9, -pp. 397-8. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -If an attempt is made to obtain more than 4e9 bytes -between initializations, -the PRNG will continue to work but -<I>prng_count</I>'s - -output will stick at -<B>4000000000</B>. - -Fixing this would require a longer integer type and does -not seem worth the trouble, -since you should probably re-initialize before then anyway... -<P> - -``RC4'' is a trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_init.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_init.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 27763a2bb..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_prng_init.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,204 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PRNG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PRNG</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 1 April 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec prng_init - initialize IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_bytes - get bytes from IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<BR> - -ipsec prng_final - close down IPsec pseudorandom-number generator -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>void prng_init(struct prng *prng,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_bytes(struct prng *prng, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>unsigned long prng_count(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void prng_final(struct prng *prng);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes a crypto-quality pseudo-random-number generator from a key; -<I>prng_bytes</I> - -obtains pseudo-random bytes from it; -<I>prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes extracted from it to date; -<I>prng_final</I> - -closes it down. -It is the user's responsibility to initialize a PRNG before using it, -and not to use it again after it is closed down. -<P> - -<I>Prng_init</I> - -initializes, -or re-initializes, -the specified -<I>prng</I> - -from the -<I>key</I>, - -whose length is given by -<I>keylen</I>. - -The user must allocate the -<B>struct prng</B> - -pointed to by -<I>prng</I>. - -There is no particular constraint on the length of the key, -although a key longer than 256 bytes is unnecessary because -only the first 256 would be used. -Initialization requires on the order of 3000 integer operations, -independent of key length. -<P> - -<I>Prng_bytes</I> - -obtains -<I>dstlen</I> - -pseudo-random bytes from the PRNG and puts them in -<I>buf</I>. - -This is quite fast, -on the order of 10 integer operations per byte. -<P> - -<I>Prng_count</I> - -reports the number of bytes obtained from the PRNG -since it was (last) initialized. -<P> - -<I>Prng_final</I> - -closes down a PRNG by -zeroing its internal memory, -obliterating all trace of the state used to generate its previous output. -This requires on the order of 250 integer operations. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the definition of the -<B>prng</B> - -structure. -Examination of its innards is discouraged, as they may change. -<P> - -The PRNG algorithm -used by these functions is currently identical to that of RC4(TM). -This algorithm is cryptographically strong, -sufficiently unpredictable that even a hostile observer will -have difficulty determining the next byte of output from past history, -provided it is initialized from a reasonably large key composed of -highly random bytes (see -<I><A HREF="random.4.html">random</A></I>(4)). - -The usual run of software pseudo-random-number generators -(e.g. -<I><A HREF="random.3.html">random</A></I>(3)) - -are -<I>not</I> - -cryptographically strong. -<P> - -The well-known attacks against RC4(TM), -e.g. as found in 802.11b's WEP encryption system, -apply only if multiple PRNGs are initialized with closely-related keys -(e.g., using a counter appended to a base key). -If such keys are used, the first few hundred pseudo-random bytes -from each PRNG should be discarded, -to give the PRNGs a chance to randomize their innards properly. -No useful attacks are known if the key is well randomized to begin with. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="random.3.html">random</A>(3), <A HREF="random.4.html">random</A>(4) -<BR> - -Bruce Schneier, -<I>Applied Cryptography</I>, 2nd ed., 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9, -pp. 397-8. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -If an attempt is made to obtain more than 4e9 bytes -between initializations, -the PRNG will continue to work but -<I>prng_count</I>'s - -output will stick at -<B>4000000000</B>. - -Fixing this would require a longer integer type and does -not seem worth the trouble, -since you should probably re-initialize before then anyway... -<P> - -``RC4'' is a trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 036b2a351..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,147 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_RANBITS</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_RANBITS</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 22 Aug 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ranbits - generate random bits in ASCII form -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>ranbits</B> - -[ -<B>--quick</B> - -] [ -<B>--continuous</B> - -] [ -<B>--bytes</B> - -] nbits -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ranbits</I> - -obtains -<I>nbits</I> - -(rounded up to the nearest byte) -high-quality random bits from -<I><A HREF="random.4.html">random</A></I>(4), - -and emits them on standard output as an ASCII string. -The default output format is -<I><A HREF="datatot.3.html">datatot</A></I>(3) - -<B>h</B> - -format: -lowercase hexadecimal with a -<B>0x</B> - -prefix and an underscore every 32 bits. -<P> - -The -<B>--quick</B> - -option produces quick-and-dirty random bits: -instead of using the high-quality random bits from -<I>/dev/random</I>, - -which may take some time to supply the necessary bits if -<I>nbits</I> - -is large, -<I>ranbits</I> - -uses -<I>/dev/urandom</I>, - -which yields prompt results but lower-quality randomness. -<P> - -The -<B>--continuous</B> - -option uses -<I><A HREF="datatot.3.html">datatot</A></I>(3) - -<B>x</B> - -output format, like -<B>h</B> - -but without the underscores. -<P> - -The -<B>--bytes</B> - -option causes -<I>nbits</I> - -to be interpreted as a byte count rather than a bit count. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/dev/random, /dev/urandom -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_datatot.3.html">ipsec_datatot</A>(3), <A HREF="random.4.html">random</A>(4) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -There is an internal limit on -<I>nbits</I>, - -currently 20000. -<P> - -Without -<B>--quick</B>, - -<I>ranbits</I>'s - -run time is difficult to predict. -A request for a large number of bits, -at a time when the system's entropy pool is low on randomness, -may take quite a while to satisfy. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rangetoa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rangetoa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3bacd5943..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rangetoa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,294 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOASR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOASR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoasr - convert ASCII to Internet address, subnet, or range -<BR> - -ipsec rangetoa - convert Internet address range to ASCII -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoasr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *type, struct in_addr *addrs);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t rangetoa(struct in_addr *addrs, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; -there is no current equivalent, -because so far they have not proved useful. -<P> - -<I>Atoasr</I> - -converts an ASCII address, subnet, or address range -into a suitable combination of binary addresses -(in network byte order). -<I>Rangetoa</I> - -converts an address range back into ASCII, -using dotted-decimal form for the addresses -(the other reverse conversions are handled by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_addrtoa.3.html">ipsec_addrtoa</A></I>(3) - -and -<I><A HREF="ipsec_subnettoa.3.html">ipsec_subnettoa</A></I>(3)). - -<P> - -A single address can be any form acceptable to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3): - -dotted decimal, DNS name, or hexadecimal number. -A subnet -specification uses the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I> -interpreted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -An address range is two -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3) - -addresses separated by a -<B>...</B> - -delimiter. -If there are four dots rather than three, the first is taken as -part of the begin address, -e.g. for a complete DNS name which ends with -<B>.</B> - -to suppress completion attempts. -The begin address of a range must be -less than or equal to the end address. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoasr</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>type</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoasr</I> - -must point to a -<B>char</B> - -variable used to record which form was found. -The -<I>addrs</I> - -parameter must point to a two-element array of -<B>struct in_addr</B> - -which receives the results. -The values stored into -<B>*type</B>, - -and the corresponding values in the array, are: -<P> - - - -<TT> </TT>*typeaddrs[0]addrs[1]<BR> -<P> -address<B>'a'</B>address-<BR> -<BR> - -subnet<TT> </TT><B>'s'</B>networkmask<BR> -<BR> - -range<TT> </TT><B>'r'</B>beginend<BR> -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>rangetoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>RANGETOA_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>rangetoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available. -This parameter is a hedge against future needs. -<P> - -<I>Atoasr</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Rangetoa</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoasr</I> - -are: -empty input; -error in -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3) - -or -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3) - -during conversion; -begin address of range exceeds end address. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>rangetoa</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoasr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 9e03244ea..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,116 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_RANGETOSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_RANGETOSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec rangetosubnet - convert address range to subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *rangetosubnet(const ip_address *start,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const ip_address *stop, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Rangetosubnet</I> - -accepts two IP addresses which define an address range, -from -<I>start</I> - -to -<I>stop</I> - -inclusive, -and converts this to a subnet if possible. -The addresses must both be IPv4 or both be IPv6, -and the address family of the resulting subnet is the same. -<P> - -<I>Rangetosubnet</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_initsubnet.3.html">ipsec_initsubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>rangetosubnet</I> - -are: -mixed address families; -unknown address family; -<I>start</I> - -and -<I>stop</I> - -do not define a subnet. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = rangetosubnet( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3173a9f13..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,401 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_RSASIGKEY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_RSASIGKEY</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 22 July 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec rsasigkey - generate RSA signature key -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>rsasigkey</B> - -[ -<B>--verbose</B> - -] [ -<B>--random</B> - -filename -] -<B>\</B> - -<BR> - - [ -<B>--rounds</B> - -nr -] [ -<B>--hostname</B> - -host ] [ -<B>--noopt</B> - -] nbits -<BR> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>rsasigkey</B> - -[ -<B>--verbose</B> - -] [ -<B>--hostname</B> - -host ] -<B>\</B> - -<BR> - - -[ -<B>--noopt</B> - -] -<B>--oldkey</B> - -file -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Rsasigkey</I> - -generates an RSA public/private key pair, -suitable for digital signatures, -of (exactly) -<I>nbits</I> - -bits (that is, two primes each of exactly -<I>nbits</I>/2 - -bits, -and related numbers) -and emits it on standard output as ASCII (mostly hex) data. -<I>nbits</I> - -must be a multiple of 16. -<P> - -The public exponent is forced to the value -<B>3</B>, - -which has important speed advantages for signature checking. -Beware that the resulting keys have known weaknesses as encryption keys -<I>and should not be used for that purpose</I>. -<P> - -The -<B>--verbose</B> - -option makes -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -give a running commentary on standard error. -By default, it works in silence until it is ready to generate output. -<P> - -The -<B>--random</B> - -option specifies a source for random bits. -The default is -<I>/dev/random</I> - -(see -<I><A HREF="random.4.html">random</A></I>(4)). - -Normally, -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -reads exactly -<I>nbits</I> - -random bits from the source; -in extremely-rare circumstances it may need more. -<P> - -The -<B>--rounds</B> - -option specifies the number of rounds to be done by the -<I>mpz_probab_prime_p</I> - -probabilistic primality checker. -The default, 30, is fairly rigorous and should not normally -have to be overridden. -<P> - -The -<B>--hostname</B> - -option specifies what host name to use in -the first line of the output (see below); -the default is what -<I><A HREF="gethostname.2.html">gethostname</A></I>(2) - -returns. -<P> - -The -<B>--noopt</B> - -option suppresses an optimization of the private key -(to be precise, setting of the decryption exponent to -<B>lcm(p-1,q-1)</B> - -rather than -<B>(p-1)*(q-1)</B>) - -which speeds up operations on it slightly -but can cause it to flunk a validity check in old RSA implementations -(notably, obsolete versions of -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8)). - -<P> - -The -<B>--oldkey</B> - -option specifies that rather than generate a new key, -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -should read an old key from the -<I>file</I> - -(the name -<B>-</B> - -means ``standard input'') -and use that to generate its output. -Input lines which do not look like -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -output are silently ignored. -This permits updating old keys to the current format. -<P> - -The output format looks like this (with long numbers trimmed down -for clarity): -<P> - - -<PRE> - # RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - # for signatures only, UNSAFE FOR ENCRYPTION - #pubkey=0sAQOF8tZ2NZt...Y1P+buFuFn/ - Modulus: 0xcc2a86fcf440...cf1011abb82d1 - PublicExponent: 0x03 - # everything after this point is secret - PrivateExponent: 0x881c59fdf8...ab05c8c77d23 - Prime1: 0xf49fd1f779...46504c7bf3 - Prime2: 0xd5a9108453...321d43cb2b - Exponent1: 0xa31536a4fb...536d98adda7f7 - Exponent2: 0x8e70b5ad8d...9142168d7dcc7 - Coefficient: 0xafb761d001...0c13e98d98 -</PRE> - -<P> - -The first (comment) line, -indicating the nature and date of the key, -and giving a host name, -is used by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey</A></I>(8) - -when generating some forms of key output. -<P> - -The commented-out -<B>pubkey=</B> - -line contains the public key---the public exponent and the modulus---combined -in approximately RFC 2537 format -(the one deviation is that the combined value is given with a -<B>0s</B> - -prefix, rather than in unadorned base-64), -suitable for use in the -<I>ipsec.conf</I> - -file. -<P> - -The -<B>Modulus</B>, - -<B>PublicExponent</B>, - -and -<B>PrivateExponent</B> - -lines give the basic signing and verification data. -<P> - -The -<B>Prime1</B> - -and -<B>Prime2</B> - -lines give the primes themselves (aka -<I>p</I> - -and -<I>q</I>), - -largest first. -The -<B>Exponent1</B> - -and -<B>Exponent2</B> - -lines give -the private exponent mod -<I>p-1</I> - -and -<I>q-1</I> - -respectively. -The -<B>Coefficient</B> - -line gives the Chinese Remainder Theorem coefficient, -which is the inverse of -<I>q</I>, - -mod -<I>p</I>. - -These additional numbers (which must all be kept as secret as the -private exponent) are precomputed aids to rapid signature generation. -<P> - -No attempt is made to break long lines. -<P> - -The US patent on the RSA algorithm expired 20 Sept 2000. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec rsasigkey --verbose 2192 >mykey</B> - -<DD> -generates a 2192-bit signature key and puts it in the file -<I>mykey</I>, - -with running commentary on standard error. -The file contents can be inserted verbatim into a suitable entry in the -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> - -file (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5)), - -and the public key can then be extracted and edited into the -<I>ipsec.conf</I> - -file (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5)). - -<DT><B>ipsec rsasigkey --verbose --oldkey oldie >latest</B> - -<DD> -takes the old signature key from file -<I>oldie</I> - -and puts a version in the current format into the file -<I>latest</I>, - -with running commentary on standard error. -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/dev/random -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="random.4.html">random</A>(4), <A HREF="ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey</A>(8) -<BR> - -<I>Applied Cryptography</I>, 2nd. ed., by Bruce Schneier, Wiley 1996. -<BR> - -RFCs 2537, 2313. -<BR> - -<I>GNU MP, the GNU multiple precision arithmetic library, edition 2.0.2</I>, -by Torbj Granlund. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -There is an internal limit on -<I>nbits</I>, - -currently 20000. -<P> - -<I>Rsasigkey</I>'s - -run time is difficult to predict, -since -<I>/dev/random</I> - -output can be arbitrarily delayed if -the system's entropy pool is low on randomness, -and the time taken by the search for primes is also somewhat unpredictable. -A reasonably typical time for a 1024-bit key on a quiet 200MHz Pentium MMX -with plenty of randomness available is 20 seconds, -almost all of it in the prime searches. -Generating a 2192-bit key on the same system usually takes several minutes. -A 4096-bit key took an hour and a half of CPU time. -<P> - -The -<B>--oldkey</B> - -option does not check its input format as rigorously as it might. -Corrupted -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -output may confuse it. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sameaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sameaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sameaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sameaddrtype.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sameaddrtype.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sameaddrtype.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesaid.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesaid.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesaid.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesubnettype.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesubnettype.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_samesubnettype.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_satoa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_satoa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2b2c7425c..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_satoa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,347 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOSA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOSA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atosa, satoa - convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from ASCII -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atosa(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct sa_id *sa);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t satoa(struct sa_id sa, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>struct sa_id {</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr dst;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec_spi_t spi;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>};</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttosa.3.html">ipsec_ttosa</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atosa</I> - -converts an ASCII Security Association (SA) specifier into an -<B>sa_id</B> - -structure (containing -a destination-host address -in network byte order, -an SPI number in network byte order, and -a protocol code). -<I>Satoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII SA specifier. -<P> - -An SA is specified in ASCII with a mail-like syntax, e.g. -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp507@1.2.3.4">esp507@1.2.3.4</A></B>. - -An SA specifier contains -a protocol prefix (currently -<B>ah</B>, - -<B>esp</B>, - -or -<B>tun</B>), - -an unsigned integer SPI number, -and an IP address. -The SPI number can be decimal or hexadecimal -(with -<B>0x</B> - -prefix), as accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoul.3.html">ipsec_atoul</A></I>(3). - -The IP address can be any form accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3), - -e.g. dotted-decimal address or DNS name. -<P> - -As a special case, the SA specifier -<B>%passthrough</B> - -signifies the special SA used to indicate that packets should be -passed through unaltered. -(At present, this is a synonym for -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun0x0@0.0.0.0">tun0x0@0.0.0.0</A></B>, - -but that is subject to change without notice.) -This form is known to both -<I>atosa</I> - -and -<I>satoa</I>, - -so the internal form of -<B>%passthrough</B> - -is never visible. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the -<B>sa_id</B> - -structure, as well as a data type -<B>ipsec_spi_t</B> - -which is an unsigned 32-bit integer. -(There is no consistency between kernel and user on what such a type -is called, hence the header hides the differences.) -<P> - -The protocol code uses the same numbers that IP does. -For user convenience, given the difficulty in acquiring the exact set of -protocol names used by the kernel, -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -defines the names -<B>SA_ESP</B>, - -<B>SA_AH</B>, - -and -<B>SA_IPIP</B> - -to have the same values as the kernel names -<B>IPPROTO_ESP</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_AH</B>, - -and -<B>IPPROTO_IPIP</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atosa</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>satoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>SATOA_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>satoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default -(currently -lowercase protocol prefix, lowercase hexadecimal SPI, dotted-decimal address). -The value -<B>d</B> - -causes the SPI to be generated in decimal instead. -<P> - -<I>Atosa</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Satoa</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_atoul.3.html">ipsec_atoul</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atosa</I> - -are: -empty input; -input too small to be a legal SA specifier; -no -<B>@</B> - -in input; -unknown protocol prefix; -conversion error in -<I>atoul</I> - -or -<I>atoaddr</I>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>satoa</I> - -are: -unknown format; unknown protocol code. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The -<B>tun</B> - -protocol code is a FreeS/WANism which may eventually disappear. -<P> - -The restriction of ASCII-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_satot.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_satot.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 1e457fc24..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_satot.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,453 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOSA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOSA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 26 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttosa, satot - convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec initsaid - initialize an SA ID -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>typedef struct {</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_address dst;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec_spi_t spi;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>} ip_said;</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosa(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_said *sa);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t satot(const ip_said *sa, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void initsaid(const ip_address *addr, ipsec_spi_t spi,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto, ip_said *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttosa</I> - -converts an ASCII Security Association (SA) specifier into an -<B>ip_said</B> - -structure (containing -a destination-host address -in network byte order, -an SPI number in network byte order, and -a protocol code). -<I>Satot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to a text SA specifier. -<I>Initsaid</I> - -initializes an -<B>ip_said</B> - -from separate items of information. -<P> - -An SA is specified in text with a mail-like syntax, e.g. -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp.5a7@1.2.3.4">esp.5a7@1.2.3.4</A></B>. - -An SA specifier contains -a protocol prefix (currently -<B>ah</B>, - -<B>esp</B>, - -<B>tun</B>, - -<B>comp</B>, - -or -<B>int</B>), - -a single character indicating the address family -(<B>.</B> - -for IPv4, -<B>:</B> - -for IPv6), -an unsigned integer SPI number in hexadecimal (with no -<B>0x</B> - -prefix), -and an IP address. -The IP address can be any form accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3), - -e.g. dotted-decimal IPv4 address, -colon-hex IPv6 address, -or DNS name. -<P> - -As a special case, the SA specifier -<B>%passthrough4</B> - -or -<B>%passthrough6</B> - -signifies the special SA used to indicate that packets should be -passed through unaltered. -(At present, these are synonyms for -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun.0@0.0.0.0">tun.0@0.0.0.0</A></B> - -and -<B>tun:0@::</B> - -respectively, -but that is subject to change without notice.) -<B>%passthrough</B> - -is a historical synonym for -<B>%passthrough4</B>. - -These forms are known to both -<I>ttosa</I> - -and -<I>satot</I>, - -so the internal representation is never visible. -<P> - -Similarly, the SA specifiers -<B>%pass</B>, - -<B>%drop</B>, - -<B>%reject</B>, - -<B>%hold</B>, - -<B>%trap</B>, - -and -<B>%trapsubnet</B> - -signify special ``magic'' SAs used to indicate that packets should be -passed, dropped, rejected (dropped with ICMP notification), -held, -and trapped (sent up to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8), - -with either of two forms of -<B>%hold</B> - -automatically installed) -respectively. -These forms too are known to both routines, -so the internal representation of the magic SAs should never be visible. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the -<B>ip_said</B> - -structure, as well as a data type -<B>ipsec_spi_t</B> - -which is an unsigned 32-bit integer. -(There is no consistency between kernel and user on what such a type -is called, hence the header hides the differences.) -<P> - -The protocol code uses the same numbers that IP does. -For user convenience, given the difficulty in acquiring the exact set of -protocol names used by the kernel, -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -defines the names -<B>SA_ESP</B>, - -<B>SA_AH</B>, - -<B>SA_IPIP</B>, - -and -<B>SA_COMP</B> - -to have the same values as the kernel names -<B>IPPROTO_ESP</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_AH</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_IPIP</B>, - -and -<B>IPPROTO_COMP</B>. - -<P> - -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -also defines -<B>SA_INT</B> - -to have the value -<B>61</B> - -(reserved by IANA for ``any host internal protocol'') -and -<B>SPI_PASS</B>, - -<B>SPI_DROP</B>, - -<B>SPI_REJECT</B>, - -<B>SPI_HOLD</B>, - -and -<B>SPI_TRAP</B> - -to have the values 256-260 (in <I>host</I> byte order) respectively. -These are used in constructing the magic SAs -(which always have address -<B>0.0.0.0</B>). - -<P> - -If -<I>satot</I> - -encounters an unknown protocol code, e.g. 77, -it yields output using a prefix -showing the code numerically, e.g. ``unk77''. -This form is -<I>not</I> - -recognized by -<I>ttosa</I>. - -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttosa</I> - -specifies the length of the string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>satot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>SATOT_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>satot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default -(currently -lowercase protocol prefix, lowercase hexadecimal SPI, -dotted-decimal or colon-hex address). -The value -<B>'f'</B> - -is similar except that the SPI is padded with -<B>0</B>s - -to a fixed 32-bit width, to ease aligning displayed tables. -<P> - -<I>Ttosa</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Satot</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<P> - -There is also, temporarily, support for some obsolete -forms of SA specifier which lack the address-family indicator. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_ttoul.3.html">ipsec_ttoul</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_samesaid.3.html">ipsec_samesaid</A>(3), <A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosa</I> - -are: -empty input; -input too small to be a legal SA specifier; -no -<B>@</B> - -in input; -unknown protocol prefix; -conversion error in -<I>ttoul</I> - -or -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>satot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttosa( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_send-pr.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_send-pr.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 19026543a..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_send-pr.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,427 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of SEND-PR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>SEND-PR</H1> -Section: User Commands (1)<BR>Updated: xVERSIONx<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec send-pr - send problem report (PR) to a central support site -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -[ -<I>site</I> - -] -[ -<B>-f</B> - -<I>problem-report</I> - -] -[ -<B>-t</B> - -<I>mail-address</I> - -] -<BR> - - -[ -<B>-P</B> - -] -[ -<B>-L</B> - -] -[ -<B>-s</B> - -<I>severity</I> - -] -[ -<B>-c</B> - -<I>address</I> - -] -<BR> - -[ -<B>--request-id</B> - -] -[ -<B>-V</B> - -] -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -is a tool used to submit -<I>problem reports </I> - - -(PRs) to a central support site. In most cases the correct -<I>site</I> - -will be the default. This argument indicates the support site which -is responsible for the category of problem involved. Some sites may -use a local address as a default. -<I>site</I> - -values are defined by using the -<B><A HREF="aliases.5.html">aliases</A></B>(5). - -<P> - -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -invokes an editor on a problem report template (after trying to fill -in some fields with reasonable default values). When you exit the -editor, -<B>ipsec send-pr </B> - -sends the completed form to the -<I>Problem Report Management System</I> - -(<B>GNATS</B>) at a central support site. At the support site, the PR -is assigned a unique number and is stored in the <B>GNATS</B> database -according to its category and submitter-id. <B>GNATS</B> automatically -replies with an acknowledgement, citing the category and the PR -number. -<P> - -To ensure that a PR is handled promptly, it should contain your (unique) -<I>submitter-id</I> and one of the available <I>categories</I> to identify the -problem area. (Use -<B>`ipsec send-pr -L'</B> - -to see a list of categories.) -<P> - -The -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -template at your site should already be customized with your -submitter-id (running `<B>install-sid</B> <I>submitter-id</I>' to -accomplish this is part of the installation procedures for -<B>ipsec</B>send-pr<B>).</B> - -If this hasn't been done, see your system administrator for your -submitter-id, or request one from your support site by invoking -<B>`ipsec send-pr --request-id'.</B> - -If your site does not distinguish between different user sites, or if -you are not affiliated with the support site, use -<B>`net'</B> - -for this field. -<P> - -The more precise your problem description and the more complete your -information, the faster your support team can solve your problems. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>OPTIONS</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>-f</B><I> problem-report</I> - -<DD> -specify a file (<I>problem-report</I>) which already contains a -complete problem report. -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -sends the contents of the file without invoking the editor. If -the value for -<I>problem-report</I> - -is -<B>`-'</B>, - -then -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -reads from standard input. -<DT><B>-s</B><I> severity</I> - -<DD> -Give the problem report the severity -<I>severity</I>. - -<DT><B>-t</B><I> mail-address</I> - -<DD> -Change mail address at the support site for problem reports. The -default -<I>mail-address</I> - -is the address used for the default -<I>site</I>. - -Use the -<I>site</I> - -argument rather than this option in nearly all cases. -<DT><B>-c</B><I> address</I> - -<DD> -Put -<I>address</I> - -in the -<B>Cc:</B> - -header of the message. -<DT><B>-P</B> - -<DD> -print the form specified by the environment variable -<B>PR_FORM </B> - -on standard output. If -<B>PR_FORM</B> - -is not set, print the standard blank PR template. No mail is sent. -<DT><B>-L</B> - -<DD> -print the list of available categories. No mail is sent. -<DT><B>--request-id</B> - -<DD> -sends mail to the default support site, or -<I>site</I> - -if specified, with a request for your -<I>submitter-id</I>. - -If you are -not affiliated with -<I>site</I>, - -use a -<I>submitter-id</I> - -of -<B>net</B>'. - -<DT><B>-V</B> - -<DD> -Display the -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -version number. -</DL> -<P> - -Note: use -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -to submit problem reports rather than mailing them directly. Using -both the template and -<B>ipsec send-pr</B> - -itself will help ensure all necessary information will reach the -support site. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>ENVIRONMENT</H2> - -The environment variable -<B>EDITOR</B> - -specifies the editor to invoke on the template. -<BR> - -default: -<B>vi</B> - -<P> -If the environment variable -<B>PR_FORM</B> - -is set, then its value is used as the file name of the template for -your problem-report editing session. You can use this to start with a -partially completed form (for example, a form with the identification -fields already completed). -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HOW TO FILL OUT A PROBLEM REPORT</H2> - -Problem reports have to be in a particular form so that a program can -easily manage them. Please remember the following guidelines: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>*<DD> -describe only -<B>one problem</B> - -with each problem report. -<DT>*<DD> -For follow-up mail, use the same subject line as the one in the automatic -acknowledgent. It consists of category, PR number and the original synopsis -line. This allows the support site to relate several mail messages to a -particular PR and to record them automatically. -<DT>*<DD> -Please try to be as accurate as possible in the subject and/or synopsis line. -<DT>*<DD> -The subject and the synopsis line are not confidential. This is -because open-bugs lists are compiled from them. Avoid confidential -information there. -</DL> -<P> - -See the GNU -<B>Info </B> - -file -<B>send-pr.info</B> - -or the document <I>Reporting Problems With send-pr</I> for detailed -information on reporting problems -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HOW TO SUBMIT TEST CASES, CODE, ETC.</H2> - -Submit small code samples with the PR. Contact the support site for -instructions on submitting larger test cases and problematic source -code. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - - - -/tmp/p$$<TT> </TT>copy of PR used in editing session<BR> -<BR> - -/tmp/pf$$<TT> </TT>copy of empty PR form, for testing purposes<BR> -<BR> - -/tmp/pbad$$<TT> </TT>file for rejected PRs<BR> -<BR> - -@IPSEC_DIR@/send-pr.confscript to customize send-pr.<BR> -<A NAME="lbAJ"> </A> -<H2>EMACS USER INTERFACE</H2> - -An Emacs user interface for -<B>send-pr</B> - -with completion of field values is part of the -<B>send-pr</B> - -distribution (invoked with -<B>M-x send-pr</B>). - -See the file -<B>send-pr.info</B> - -or the ASCII file -<B>INSTALL</B> - -in the top level directory of the distribution for configuration and -installation information. The Emacs LISP template file is -<B>send-pr-el.in</B> - -and is installed as -<B>send-pr.el</B>. - -<A NAME="lbAK"> </A> -<H2>INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION</H2> - -See -<B>send-pr.info</B> - -or -<B>INSTALL</B> - -for installation instructions. -<A NAME="lbAL"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<I>Reporting Problems Using send-pr</I> - -(also installed as the GNU Info file -<B>send-pr.info</B>). - -<P> - -<B><A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html?l+gnats">gnats</A></B>(l), - -<B><A HREF="query-pr.1.html">query-pr</A></B>(1), - -<B><A HREF="edit-pr.1.html">edit-pr</A></B>(1), - -<B><A HREF="gnats.8.html">gnats</A></B>(8), - -<B><A HREF="queue-pr.8.html">queue-pr</A></B>(8), - -<B><A HREF="at-pr.8.html">at-pr</A></B>(8), - -<B><A HREF="mkcat.8.html">mkcat</A></B>(8), - -<B><A HREF="mkdist.8.html">mkdist</A></B>(8). - -<A NAME="lbAM"> </A> -<H2>AUTHORS</H2> - -Jeffrey Osier, Brendan Kehoe, Jason Merrill, Heinz G. Seidl (Cygnus -Support) -<A NAME="lbAN"> </A> -<H2>COPYING</H2> - -Copyright (c) 1992, 1993 Free Software Foundation, Inc. -<P> - -Permission is granted to make and distribute verbatim copies of -this manual provided the copyright notice and this permission notice -are preserved on all copies. -<P> - -Permission is granted to copy and distribute modified versions of this -manual under the conditions for verbatim copying, provided that the -entire resulting derived work is distributed under the terms of a -permission notice identical to this one. -<P> - -Permission is granted to copy and distribute translations of this -manual into another language, under the above conditions for modified -versions, except that this permission notice may be included in -translations approved by the Free Software Foundation instead of in -the original English. -<P> -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">OPTIONS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">ENVIRONMENT</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HOW TO FILL OUT A PROBLEM REPORT</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HOW TO SUBMIT TEST CASES, CODE, ETC.</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAJ">EMACS USER INTERFACE</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAK">INSTALLATION AND CONFIGURATION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAL">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAM">AUTHORS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAN">COPYING</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_setportof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_setportof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3965ca62d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_setportof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PORTOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PORTOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec portof - get port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec setportof - set port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrof - get pointer to internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrlenof - get length of internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int portof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void setportof(int port, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct sockaddr *sockaddrof(ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t sockaddrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -contains one of the -<I>sockaddr</I> - -types internally. -<I>Reliance on this feature is discouraged</I>, -but it may occasionally be necessary. -These functions provide low-level tools for this purpose. -<P> - -<I>Portof</I> - -and -<I>setportof</I> - -respectively read and write the port-number field of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>. - -The values are in network byte order. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrof</I> - -returns a pointer to the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for passing to other functions. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrlenof</I> - -reports the size of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for use in storage allocation. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Portof</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<I>sockaddrof</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B>, - -and -<I>sockaddrlenof</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -if an unknown address family is found within the -<I>ip_address</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -These functions all depend on low-level details of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type, which are in principle subject to change. -Avoid using them unless really necessary. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_setup.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_setup.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 7197e2b18..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_setup.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,237 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SETUP</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SETUP</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 23 July 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec setup - control IPsec subsystem -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>setup</B> - -[ -<B>--show</B> - -| -<B>--showonly</B> - -] -command -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Setup</I> - -controls the FreeS/WAN IPsec subsystem, -including both the Klips kernel code and the Pluto key-negotiation daemon. -(It is a synonym for the ``rc'' script for the subsystem; -the system runs the equivalent of -<B>ipsec setup start</B> - -at boot time, -and -<B>ipsec setup stop</B> - -at shutdown time, more or less.) -<P> - -The action taken depends on the specific -<I>command</I>, - -and on the contents of the -<B>config</B> - -<B>setup</B> - -section of the -IPsec configuration file (<I>/etc/ipsec.conf</I>, - -see -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5)). - -Current -<I>command</I>s - -are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>start</B> - -<DD> -start Klips and Pluto, -including setting up Klips to do crypto operations on the -interface(s) specified in the configuration file, -and (if the configuration file so specifies) -setting up manually-keyed connections and/or -asking Pluto to negotiate automatically-keyed connections -to other security gateways -<DT><B>stop</B> - -<DD> -shut down Klips and Pluto, -including tearing down all existing crypto connections -<DT><B>restart</B> - -<DD> -equivalent to -<B>stop</B> - -followed by -<B>start</B> - -<DT><B>status</B> - -<DD> -report the status of the subsystem; -normally just reports -<B>IPsec running</B> - -and -<B>pluto pid </B><I>nnn</I>, - -or -<B>IPsec stopped</B>, - -and exits with status 0, -but will go into more detail (and exit with status 1) -if something strange is found. -(An ``illicit'' Pluto is one that does not match the process ID in -Pluto's lock file; -an ``orphaned'' Pluto is one with no lock file.) -</DL> -<P> - -The -<B>stop</B> - -operation tries to clean up properly even if assorted accidents -have occurred, -e.g. Pluto having died without removing its lock file. -If -<B>stop</B> - -discovers that the subsystem is (supposedly) not running, -it will complain, -but will do its cleanup anyway before exiting with status 1. -<P> - -Although a number of configuration-file parameters influence -<I>setup</I>'s - -operations, the key one is the -<B>interfaces</B> - -parameter, which must be right or chaos will ensue. -<P> - -The -<B>--show</B> - -and -<B>--showonly</B> - -options cause -<I>setup</I> - -to display the shell commands that it would execute. -<B>--showonly</B> - -suppresses their execution. -Only -<B>start</B>, - -<B>stop</B>, - -and -<B>restart</B> - -commands recognize these flags. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - - - -/etc/rc.d/init.d/ipsec<TT> </TT>the script itself<BR> -<BR> - -/etc/init.d/ipsec<TT> </TT>alternate location for the script<BR> -<BR> - -/etc/ipsec.conf<TT> </TT>IPsec configuration file<BR> -<BR> - -/proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward<TT> </TT>forwarding control<BR> -<BR> - -/var/run/ipsec.info<TT> </TT>saved information<BR> -<BR> - -/var/run/pluto.pid<TT> </TT>Pluto lock file<BR> -<BR> - -/var/run/ipsec_setup.pid<TT> </TT>IPsec lock file<BR> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A>(8), <A HREF="route.8.html">route</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -All output from the commands -<B>start</B> - -and -<B>stop</B> - -goes both to standard -output and to -<I><A HREF="syslogd.8.html">syslogd</A></I>(8), - -via -<I><A HREF="logger.1.html">logger</A></I>(1). - -Selected additional information is logged only to -<I><A HREF="syslogd.8.html">syslogd</A></I>(8). - -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Old versions of -<I><A HREF="logger.1.html">logger</A></I>(1) - -inject spurious extra newlines onto standard output. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showdefaults.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showdefaults.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index e1786dc0a..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showdefaults.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,82 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SHOWDEFAULTS</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SHOWDEFAULTS</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 23 Jan 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec showdefaults - show %defaultroute defaults -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>showdefaults</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Showdefaults</I> - -outputs (on standard output) a terse description of the defaults -used by the -<B>%defaultroute</B> - -facilities in -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) - -and -<I><A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A></I>(8). - -<P> - -Beware that the exact output format is subject to change. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Normal exit status is 0. -If no defaults are available, -i.e. the -<B>interfaces</B> - -parameter in -<B>config setup</B> - -is not -<B>%defaultroute</B>, - -produces a message on standard error and exits with status 1. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/var/run/ipsec.info -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showhostkey.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showhostkey.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 90a16d5ee..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showhostkey.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,269 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SHOWHOSTKEY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SHOWHOSTKEY</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 5 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec showhostkey - show host's authentication key -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>showhostkey</B> - -[ -<B>--key</B> - -] [ -<B>--left</B> - -] [ -<B>--right</B> - -] [ -<B>--txt</B> - -gateway -] [ -<B>--dhclient</B> - -] [ -<B>--file</B> - -secretfile -] [ -<B>--id</B> - -identity -] -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Showhostkey</I> - -outputs (on standard output) a public key suitable for this host, -in the format specified, -using the host key information stored in -<I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I>. - -In general only the super-user can run this command, -since only he can read -<I>ipsec.secrets</I>. - -<P> - -The -<B>--txt</B> - -option causes the output to be in opportunistic-encryption DNS TXT record -format, -with the specified -<I>gateway</I> - -value. -If information about how the key was generated is available, -that is provided as a DNS-file comment. -For example, -<B>--txt 10.11.12.13</B> - -might give (with the key data trimmed for clarity): -<P> - -<PRE> - ; RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=10.11.12.13 AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/" -</PRE> - -<P> - -No name is supplied in the TXT record -because there are too many possibilities, -depending on how it will be used. -If the text string is longer than 255 bytes, -it is split up into multiple strings (matching the restrictions of -the DNS TXT binary format). -If any split is needed, the first split will be at the start of the key: -this increases the chances that later hand editing will work. -<P> - -The -<B>--left</B> - -and -<B>--right</B> - -options cause the output to be in -<I><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></I>(5) - -format, as a -<B>leftrsasigkey</B> - -or -<B>rightrsasigkey</B> - -parameter respectively. -Again, generation information is included if available. -For example, -<B>--left</B> - -might give (with the key data trimmed down for clarity): -<P> - -<PRE> - # RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - leftrsasigkey=0sAQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/ -</PRE> - -<P> - -The -<B>--dhclient</B> - -option cause the output to be suitable for inclusion in -<I><A HREF="dhclient.conf.5.html">dhclient.conf</A></I>(5) - -as part of configuring WAVEsec. -See <<A HREF="http://www.wavesec.org">http://www.wavesec.org</A>>. -<P> - -If -<B>--key</B> - -is specified, -the output format is the text form of a DNS KEY record; -the host name is the one included in the key information -(or, if that is not available, -the output of -<B>hostname --fqdn</B>), - -with a -<B>.</B> - -appended. -Again, generation information is included if available. -For example (with the key data trimmed down for clarity): -<P> - -<PRE> - ; RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - xy.example.com. IN KEY 0x4200 4 1 AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/ -</PRE> - -<P> - -Normally, the default key for this host -(the one with no host identities specified for it) is the one extracted. -The -<B>--id</B> - -option overrides this, -causing extraction of the key labeled with the specified -<I>identity</I>, - -if any. -The specified -<I>identity</I> - -must -<I>exactly</I> - -match the identity in the file; -in particular, the comparison is case-sensitive. -<P> - -The -<B>--file</B> - -option overrides the default for where the key information should be -found, and takes it from the specified -<I>secretfile</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -A complaint about ``no pubkey line found'' indicates that the -host has a key but it was generated with an old version of FreeS/WAN -and does not contain the information that -<I>showhostkey</I> - -needs. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/etc/ipsec.secrets -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Arguably, -rather than just reporting the no-IN-KEY-line-found problem, -<I>showhostkey</I> - -should be smart enough to run the existing key through -<I>rsasigkey</I> - -with the -<B>--oldkey</B> - -option, to generate a suitable output line. -<P> - -The need to specify the gateway address (etc.) for -<B>--txt</B> - -is annoying, but there is no good way to determine it automatically. -<P> - -There should be a way to specify the priority value for TXT records; -currently it is hardwired to -<B>10</B>. - -<P> - -The -<B>--id</B> - -option assumes that the -<I>identity</I> - -appears on the same line as the -<B>: RSA {</B> - -that begins the key proper. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showpolicy.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showpolicy.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 470c40879..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_showpolicy.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,88 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SHOWPOLICY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SHOWPOLICY</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 7 May 2003<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec showpolicy - dump policy of socket found as stdin -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>showpolicy</B> - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>showpolicy</I> - -calls the -<I><A HREF="ipsec_policy_lookup.3.html">ipsec_policy_lookup</A></I>(3) - -function on the file description which is its stdin. -<P> - -It then dumps the resulting query in a human readable form. -<P> - -This is a test program. One might run it from inetd, via: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>discard stream tcp nowait nobody /usr/local/libexec/ipsec/showpolicy showpolicy<DD> -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/var/run/ipsecpolicy.ctl -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_policy_query.3.html">ipsec_policy_query</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael Richardson -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sockaddrlenof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sockaddrlenof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3965ca62d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sockaddrlenof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PORTOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PORTOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec portof - get port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec setportof - set port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrof - get pointer to internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrlenof - get length of internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int portof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void setportof(int port, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct sockaddr *sockaddrof(ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t sockaddrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -contains one of the -<I>sockaddr</I> - -types internally. -<I>Reliance on this feature is discouraged</I>, -but it may occasionally be necessary. -These functions provide low-level tools for this purpose. -<P> - -<I>Portof</I> - -and -<I>setportof</I> - -respectively read and write the port-number field of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>. - -The values are in network byte order. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrof</I> - -returns a pointer to the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for passing to other functions. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrlenof</I> - -reports the size of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for use in storage allocation. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Portof</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<I>sockaddrof</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B>, - -and -<I>sockaddrlenof</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -if an unknown address family is found within the -<I>ip_address</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -These functions all depend on low-level details of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type, which are in principle subject to change. -Avoid using them unless really necessary. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sockaddrof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sockaddrof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 3965ca62d..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_sockaddrof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,143 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PORTOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PORTOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec portof - get port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec setportof - set port field of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrof - get pointer to internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<BR> - -ipsec sockaddrlenof - get length of internal sockaddr of an ip_address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int portof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void setportof(int port, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct sockaddr *sockaddrof(ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t sockaddrlenof(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -internal type -<I>ip_address</I> - -contains one of the -<I>sockaddr</I> - -types internally. -<I>Reliance on this feature is discouraged</I>, -but it may occasionally be necessary. -These functions provide low-level tools for this purpose. -<P> - -<I>Portof</I> - -and -<I>setportof</I> - -respectively read and write the port-number field of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>. - -The values are in network byte order. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrof</I> - -returns a pointer to the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for passing to other functions. -<P> - -<I>Sockaddrlenof</I> - -reports the size of the internal -<I>sockaddr</I>, - -for use in storage allocation. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -<I>Portof</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<I>sockaddrof</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B>, - -and -<I>sockaddrlenof</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -if an unknown address family is found within the -<I>ip_address</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -These functions all depend on low-level details of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type, which are in principle subject to change. -Avoid using them unless really necessary. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spi.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spi.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index b1cf89033..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spi.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,305 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SPI</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SPI</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 26 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_spi - list IPSEC Security Associations -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<P> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec_spi</B> - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec_spi</I> - -is a read-only file that lists the current IPSEC Security Associations. -A Security Association (SA) is a transform through which packet contents -are to be processed before being forwarded. A transform can be an -IPv4-in-IPv4 or IPv6-in-IPv6 encapsulation, an IPSEC Authentication Header (authentication -with no encryption), or an IPSEC Encapsulation Security Payload -(encryption, possibly including authentication). -<P> - -When a packet is passed from a higher networking layer through an IPSEC -virtual interface, a search in the extended routing table (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A></I>(5)) - -yields -a IP protocol number -, -a Security Parameters Index (SPI) -and -an effective destination address -When an IPSEC packet arrives from the network, -its ostensible destination, an SPI and an IP protocol -specified by its outermost IPSEC header are used. -The destination/SPI/protocol combination is used to select a relevant SA. -(See -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A></I>(5) - -for discussion of how multiple transforms are combined.) -<P> - -An -<I>spi ,</I> - -<I>proto, </I> - -<I>daddr</I> - -and -<I>address_family</I> - -arguments specify an SAID. -<I>Proto</I> - -is an ASCII string, "ah", "esp", "comp" or "tun", specifying the IP protocol. -<I>Spi</I> - -is a number, preceded by '.' indicating hexadecimal and IPv4 or by ':' indicating hexadecimal and IPv6, -where each hexadecimal digit represents 4 bits, -between -<B>0x100</B> - -and -<B>0xffffffff</B>; - -values from -<B>0x0</B> - -to -<B>0xff</B> - -are reserved. -<I>Daddr</I> - -is a dotted-decimal IPv4 destination address or a coloned hex IPv6 destination address. -<P> - -An -<I>SAID</I> - -combines the three parameters above, such as: "<A HREF="mailto:tun.101@1.2.3.4">tun.101@1.2.3.4</A>" for IPv4 or "tun:<A HREF="mailto:101@3049">101@3049</A>:1::1" for IPv6 -<P> - -A table entry consists of: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -<B>SAID</B> - -<DT>+<DD> -<transform name (proto,encalg,authalg)>: -<DT>+<DD> -direction (dir=) -<DT>+<DD> -source address (src=) -<DT>+<DD> -source and destination addresses and masks for inner header policy check -addresses (policy=), as dotted-quads or coloned hex, separated by '->', -for IPv4-in-IPv4 or IPv6-in-IPv6 SAs only -<DT>+<DD> -initialisation vector length and value (iv_bits=, iv=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -out-of-order window size, number of out-of-order errors, sequence -number, recently received packet bitmask, maximum difference between -sequence numbers (ooowin=, ooo_errs=, seq=, bit=, max_seq_diff=) if SA -is AH or ESP and if individual items are non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -extra flags (flags=) if any are set -<DT>+<DD> -authenticator length in bits (alen=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -authentication key length in bits (aklen=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -authentication errors (auth_errs=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -encryption key length in bits (eklen=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -encryption size errors (encr_size_errs=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -encryption padding error warnings (encr_pad_errs=) if non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -lifetimes legend, c=Current status, s=Soft limit when exceeded will -initiate rekeying, h=Hard limit will cause termination of SA (life(c,s,h)=) -<DT>+<DD> -number of connections to which the SA is allocated (c), that will cause a -rekey (s), that will cause an expiry (h) (alloc=), if any value is non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -number of bytes processesd by this SA (c), that will cause a rekey (s), that -will cause an expiry (h) (bytes=), if any value is non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -time since the SA was added (c), until rekey (s), until expiry (h), in seconds (add=) -<DT>+<DD> -time since the SA was first used (c), until rekey (s), until expiry (h), in seconds (used=), -if any value is non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -number of packets processesd by this SA (c), that will cause a rekey (s), that -will cause an expiry (h) (packets=), if any value is non-zero -<DT>+<DD> -time since the last packet was processed, in seconds (idle=), if SA has -been used -<DT><DD> -average compression ratio (ratio=) -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun.12a@192.168.43.1">tun.12a@192.168.43.1</A> IPIP: dir=out src=192.168.43.2</B> - -<BR> - -<B> life(c,s,h)=bytes(14073,0,0)add(269,0,0)</B> - -<BR> - -<B> use(149,0,0)packets(14,0,0)</B> - -<BR> - -<B> idle=23</B> - -<P> - -is an outbound IPv4-in-IPv4 (protocol 4) tunnel-mode SA set up between machines -192.168.43.2 and 192.168.43.1 with an SPI of 12a in hexadecimal that has -passed about 14 kilobytes of traffic in 14 packets since it was created, -269 seconds ago, first used 149 seconds ago and has been idle for 23 -seconds. -<P> - -<B>esp:<A HREF="mailto:9a35fc02@3049">9a35fc02@3049</A>:1::1 ESP_3DES_HMAC_MD5:</B> - -<BR> - -<B> dir=in src=<A HREF="mailto:9a35fc02@3049">9a35fc02@3049</A>:1::2</B> - -<BR> - -<B> ooowin=32 seq=7149 bit=0xffffffff</B> - -<BR> - -<B> alen=128 aklen=128 eklen=192</B> - -<BR> - -<B> life(c,s,h)=bytes(1222304,0,0)add(4593,0,0)</B> - -<BR> - -<B> use(3858,0,0)packets(7149,0,0)</B> - -<BR> - -<B> idle=23</B> - -<P> - -is an inbound Encapsulating Security Payload (protocol 50) SA on machine -3049:1::1 with an SPI of 9a35fc02 that uses 3DES as the encryption -cipher, HMAC MD5 as the authentication algorithm, an out-of-order -window of 32 packets, a present sequence number of 7149, every one of -the last 32 sequence numbers was received, the authenticator length and -keys is 128 bits, the encryption key is 192 bits (actually 168 for 3DES -since 1 of 8 bits is a parity bit), has passed 1.2 Mbytes of data in -7149 packets, was added 4593 seconds ago, first used -3858 seconds ago and has been idle for 23 seconds. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_spi, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.5.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The add and use times are awkward, displayed in seconds since machine -start. It would be better to display them in seconds before now for -human readability. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spi.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spi.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index a40d06d9b..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spi.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,790 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SPI</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SPI</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 23 Oct 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec spi - manage IPSEC Security Associations -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<BR> - -Note: In the following, -<BR> - -<B><SA></B> - -means: -<B>--af</B> - -(inet | inet6) -<B>--edst</B> - -daddr -<B>--spi</B> - -spi -<B>--proto</B> - -proto OR -<B>--said</B> - -said, -<BR> - -<B><life></B> - -means: -<B>--life</B> - -(soft | hard)-(allocations | bytes | addtime | usetime | packets)=value[,...] -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src -<B>--ah</B> - -<B>hmac-md5-96</B>|<B>hmac-sha1-96</B> - -[ -<B>--replay_window</B> - -replayw ] -[ -<B><life></B> - -] -<B>--authkey</B> - -akey -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src -<B>--esp</B> - -<B>3des</B> - -[ -<B>--replay_window</B> - -replayw ] -[ -<B><life></B> - -] -<B>--enckey</B> - -ekey -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src -<B>--esp</B> - -<B>3des-md5-96</B>|<B>3des-sha1-96</B> - -[ -<B>--replay_window</B> - -replayw ] -[ -<B><life></B> - -] -<B>--enckey</B> - -ekey -<B>--authkey</B> - -akey -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--src</B> - -src -<B>--comp</B> - -<B>deflate</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--ip4</B> - -<B>--src</B> - -encap-src -<B>--dst</B> - -encap-dst -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--ip6</B> - -<B>--src</B> - -encap-src -<B>--dst</B> - -encap-dst -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B><SA></B> - -<B>--del</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B>--help</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B>--version</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spi</B> - -<B>--clear</B> - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Spi</I> - -creates and deletes IPSEC Security Associations. -A Security Association (SA) is a transform through which packet -contents are to be processed before being forwarded. -A transform can be an IPv4-in-IPv4 or an IPv6-in-IPv6 encapsulation, -an IPSEC Authentication Header (authentication with no encryption), -or an IPSEC Encapsulation Security Payload (encryption, possibly -including authentication). -<P> - -When a packet is passed from a higher networking layer -through an IPSEC virtual interface, -a search in the extended routing table (see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A></I>(8)) - -yields an effective destination address, a -Security Parameters Index (SPI) and a IP protocol number. -When an IPSEC packet arrives from the network, -its ostensible destination, an SPI and an IP protocol -specified by its outermost IPSEC header are used. -The destination/SPI/protocol combination is used to select a relevant SA. -(See -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A></I>(8) - -for discussion of how multiple transforms are combined.) -<P> - -The -<I>af</I>, - -<I>daddr</I>, - -<I>spi</I> - -and -<I>proto</I> - -arguments specify the SA to be created or deleted. -<I>af</I> - -is the address family (inet for IPv4, inet6 for IPv6). -<I>Daddr</I> - -is a destination address -in dotted-decimal notation for IPv4 -or in a coloned hex notation for IPv6. -<I>Spi</I> - -is a number, preceded by '0x' for hexadecimal, -between -<B>0x100</B> - -and -<B>0xffffffff</B>; - -values from -<B>0x0</B> - -to -<B>0xff</B> - -are reserved. -<I>Proto</I> - -is an ASCII string, "ah", "esp", "comp" or "tun", specifying the IP protocol. -The protocol must agree with the algorithm selected. -<P> - -Alternatively, the -<I>said</I> - -argument can also specify an SA to be created or deleted. -<I>Said</I> - -combines the three parameters above, such as: "<A HREF="mailto:tun.101@1.2.3.4">tun.101@1.2.3.4</A>" or "tun:101@1:2::3:4", -where the address family is specified by "." for IPv4 and ":" for IPv6. The address -family indicators substitute the "0x" for hexadecimal. -<P> - -The source address, -<I>src</I>, - -must also be provided for the inbound policy check to -function. The source address does not need to be included if inbound -policy checking has been disabled. -<P> - -Keys vectors must be entered as hexadecimal or base64 numbers. -They should be cryptographically strong random numbers. -<P> - -All hexadecimal numbers are entered as strings of hexadecimal digits -(0-9 and a-f), without spaces, preceded by '0x', where each hexadecimal -digit represents 4 bits. -All base64 numbers are entered as strings of base64 digits -<BR> (0-9, A-Z, a-z, '+' and '/'), without spaces, preceded by '0s', -where each hexadecimal digit represents 6 bits and '=' is used for padding. -<P> - -The deletion of an SA which has been grouped will result in the entire chain -being deleted. -<P> - -The form with no additional arguments lists the contents of -/proc/net/ipsec_spi. The format of /proc/net/ipsec_spi is discussed in -<A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5). -<P> - -The lifetime severity of -<B>soft</B> - -sets a limit when the key management daemons are asked to rekey the SA. -The lifetime severity of -<B>hard</B> - -sets a limit when the SA must expire. -The lifetime type -<B>allocations</B> - -tells the system when to expire the SA because it is being shared by too many -eroutes (not currently used). The lifetime type of -<B>bytes</B> - -tells the system to expire the SA after a certain number of bytes have been -processed with that SA. The lifetime type of -<B>addtime</B> - -tells the system to expire the SA a certain number of seconds after the SA was -installed. The lifetime type of -<B>usetime</B> - -tells the system to expire the SA a certain number of seconds after that SA has -processed its first packet. The lifetime type of -<B>packets</B> - -tells the system to expire the SA after a certain number of packets have been -processed with that SA. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>OPTIONS</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--af</B> - -<DD> -specifies the address family (inet for IPv4, inet6 for IPv6) -<DT><B>--edst</B> - -<DD> -specifies the effective destination -<I>daddr</I> - -of the Security Association -<DT><B>--spi</B> - -<DD> -specifies the Security Parameters Index -<I>spi</I> - -of the Security Association -<DT><B>--proto</B> - -<DD> -specifies the IP protocol -<I>proto</I> - -of the Security Association -<DT><B>--said</B> - -<DD> -specifies the Security Association in monolithic format -<DT><B>--ah</B> - -<DD> -add an SA for an IPSEC Authentication Header, -specified by the following transform identifier -(<B>hmac-md5-96</B> - -or -<B>hmac-sha1-96</B>) - -(RFC2402, obsoletes RFC1826) -<DT><B>hmac-md5-96</B> - -<DD> -transform following the HMAC and MD5 standards, -using a 128-bit -<I>key</I> - -to produce a 96-bit authenticator (RFC2403) -<DT><B>hmac-sha1-96</B> - -<DD> -transform following the HMAC and SHA1 standards, -using a 160-bit -<I>key</I> - -to produce a 96-bit authenticator (RFC2404) -<DT><B>--esp</B> - -<DD> -add an SA for an IPSEC Encapsulation Security Payload, -specified by the following -transform identifier (<B>3des</B>, - -or -<B>3des-md5-96</B>) - -(RFC2406, obsoletes RFC1827) -<DT><B>3des</B> - -<DD> -encryption transform following the Triple-DES standard in -Cipher-Block-Chaining mode using a 64-bit -<I>iv</I> - -(internally generated) and a 192-bit 3DES -<I>ekey</I> - -(RFC2451) -<DT><B>3des-md5-96</B> - -<DD> -encryption transform following the Triple-DES standard in -Cipher-Block-Chaining mode with authentication provided by -HMAC and MD5 -(96-bit authenticator), -using a 64-bit -<I>iv</I> - -(internally generated), a 192-bit 3DES -<I>ekey</I> - -and a 128-bit HMAC-MD5 -<I>akey</I> - -(RFC2451, RFC2403) -<DT><B>3des-sha1-96</B> - -<DD> -encryption transform following the Triple-DES standard in -Cipher-Block-Chaining mode with authentication provided by -HMAC and SHA1 -(96-bit authenticator), -using a 64-bit -<I>iv</I> - -(internally generated), a 192-bit 3DES -<I>ekey</I> - -and a 160-bit HMAC-SHA1 -<I>akey</I> - -(RFC2451, RFC2404) -<DT><B>--replay_window</B> replayw - -<DD> -sets the replay window size; valid values are decimal, 1 to 64 -<DT><B>--life</B> life_param[,life_param] - -<DD> -sets the lifetime expiry; the format of -<B>life_param</B> - -consists of a comma-separated list of lifetime specifications without spaces; -a lifetime specification is comprised of a severity of -<B>soft</B> or <B>hard</B> - -followed by a '-', followed by a lifetime type of -<B>allocations</B>, <B>bytes</B>, <B>addtime</B>, <B>usetime</B> or <B>packets</B> - -followed by an '=' and finally by a value -<DT><B>--comp</B> - -<DD> -add an SA for IPSEC IP Compression, -specified by the following -transform identifier (<B>deflate</B>) - -(RFC2393) -<DT><B>deflate</B> - -<DD> -compression transform following the patent-free Deflate compression algorithm -(RFC2394) -<DT><B>--ip4</B> - -<DD> -add an SA for an IPv4-in-IPv4 -tunnel from -<I>encap-src</I> - -to -<I>encap-dst</I> - -<DT><B>--ip6</B> - -<DD> -add an SA for an IPv6-in-IPv6 -tunnel from -<I>encap-src</I> - -to -<I>encap-dst</I> - -<DT><B>--src</B> - -<DD> -specify the source end of an IP-in-IP tunnel from -<I>encap-src</I> - -to -<I>encap-dst</I> - -and also specifies the source address of the Security Association to be -used in inbound policy checking and must be the same address -family as -<I>af</I> - -and -<I>edst</I> - -<DT><B>--dst</B> - -<DD> -specify the destination end of an IP-in-IP tunnel from -<I>encap-src</I> - -to -<I>encap-dst</I> - -<DT><B>--del</B> - -<DD> -delete the specified SA -<DT><B>--clear</B> - -<DD> -clears the table of -<B>SA</B>s - -<DT><B>--help</B> - -<DD> -display synopsis -<DT><B>--version</B> - -<DD> -display version information -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -To keep line lengths down and reduce clutter, -some of the long keys in these examples have been abbreviated -by replacing part of their text with -``<I>...</I>''. - -Keys used when the programs are actually run must, -of course, be the full length required for the particular algorithm. -<P> - -<B>ipsec spi --af inet --edst gw2 --spi 0x125 --proto esp \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --src gw1 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --esp 3des-md5-96 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --enckey 0x6630</B><I>...</I><B>97ce \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --authkey 0x9941</B><I>...</I><B>71df</B> - -<P> - -sets up an SA from -<B>gw1</B> - -to -<B>gw2</B> - -with an SPI of -<B>0x125</B> - -and protocol -<B>ESP</B> - -(50) using -<B>3DES</B> - -encryption with integral -<B>MD5-96</B> - -authentication transform, using an encryption key of -<B>0x6630</B><I>...</I><B>97ce</B> - -and an authentication key of -<B>0x9941</B><I>...</I><B>71df</B> - -(see note above about abbreviated keys). -<P> - -<B>ipsec spi --af inet6 --edst 3049:9::9000:3100 --spi 0x150 --proto ah \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --src 3049:9::9000:3101 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --ah hmac-md5-96 \</B> - -<BR> - -<B> --authkey 0x1234</B><I>...</I><B>2eda \</B> - -<P> - -sets up an SA from -<B>3049:9::9000:3101</B> - -to -<B>3049:9::9000:3100</B> - -with an SPI of -<B>0x150</B> - -and protocol -<B>AH</B> - -(50) using -<B>MD5-96</B> - -authentication transform, using an authentication key of -<B>0x1234</B><I>...</I><B>2eda</B> - -(see note above about abbreviated keys). -<P> - -<B>ipsec spi --said <A HREF="mailto:tun.987@192.168.100.100">tun.987@192.168.100.100</A> --del </B> - -<P> - -deletes an SA to -<B>192.168.100.100</B> - -with an SPI of -<B>0x987</B> - -and protocol -<B>IPv4-in-IPv4</B> - -(4). -<P> - -<B>ipsec spi --said tun:<A HREF="mailto:500@3049">500@3049</A>:9::1000:1 --del </B> - -<P> - -deletes an SA to -<B>3049:9::1000:1</B> - -with an SPI of -<B>0x500</B> - -and protocol -<B>IPv6-in-IPv6</B> - -(4). -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_spi, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. -<A NAME="lbAJ"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The syntax is messy and the transform naming needs work. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">OPTIONS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAJ">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index e0efcb73e..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,193 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SPIGRP</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SPIGRP</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 27 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_spigrp - list IPSEC Security Association groupings -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spigrp</B> - -<P> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec_spigrp</B> - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec_spigrp</I> - -is a read-only file that lists groups of IPSEC Security Associations -(SAs). -<P> - -An entry in the IPSEC extended routing table can only point (via an -SAID) to one SA. If more than one transform must be applied to a given -type of packet, this can be accomplished by setting up several SAs with -the same destination address but potentially different SPIs and -protocols, and grouping them with -<I><A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8)</I>. - -<P> - -The SA groups are listed, one line per connection/group, as a sequence -of SAs to be applied (or that should have been applied, in the case of -an incoming packet) from inside to outside the packet. An SA is -identified by its SAID, which consists of protocol ("ah", "esp", "comp" or -"tun"), SPI (with '.' for IPv4 or ':' for IPv6 prefixed hexadecimal number ) and destination address -(IPv4 dotted quad or IPv6 coloned hex) prefixed by '@', in the format <proto><af><spi>@<dest>. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B><A HREF="mailto:tun.3d0@192.168.2.110">tun.3d0@192.168.2.110</A></B> - -<DD> -<B><A HREF="mailto:comp.3d0@192.168.2.110">comp.3d0@192.168.2.110</A></B> - -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp.187a101b@192.168.2.110">esp.187a101b@192.168.2.110</A></B> - -<B><A HREF="mailto:ah.187a101a@192.168.2.110">ah.187a101a@192.168.2.110</A> </B> - -</DL> -<P> - -is a group of 3 SAs, destined for -<B>192.168.2.110</B> - -with an IPv4-in-IPv4 tunnel SA applied first with an SPI of -<B>3d0</B> - -in hexadecimal, followed by a Deflate compression header to compress -the packet with CPI of -<B>3d0</B> - -in hexadecimal, followed by an Encapsulating Security Payload header to -encrypt the packet with SPI -<B>187a101b</B> - -in hexadecimal, followed by an Authentication Header to authenticate the -packet with SPI -<B>187a101a</B> - -in hexadecimal, applied from inside to outside the packet. This could -be an incoming or outgoing group, depending on the address of the local -machine. -<P> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>tun:<A HREF="mailto:3d0@3049">3d0@3049</A>:1::2</B> - -<DD> -<B>comp:<A HREF="mailto:3d0@3049">3d0@3049</A>:1::2</B> - -<B>esp:<A HREF="mailto:187a101b@3049">187a101b@3049</A>:1::2</B> - -<B>ah:<A HREF="mailto:187a101a@3049">187a101a@3049</A>:1::2 </B> - -</DL> -<P> - -is a group of 3 SAs, destined for -<B>3049:1::2</B> - -with an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel SA applied first with an SPI of -<B>3d0</B> - -in hexadecimal, followed by a Deflate compression header to compress -the packet with CPI of -<B>3d0</B> - -in hexadecimal, followed by an Encapsulating Security Payload header to -encrypt the packet with SPI -<B>187a101b</B> - -in hexadecimal, followed by an Authentication Header to authenticate the -packet with SPI -<B>187a101a</B> - -in hexadecimal, applied from inside to outside the packet. This could -be an incoming or outgoing group, depending on the address of the local -machine. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_spigrp, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.5.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -:-) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2e96c0574..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,280 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SPIGRP</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SPIGRP</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 21 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec spigrp - group/ungroup IPSEC Security Associations -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spigrp</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spigrp</B> - -[ -<B>--label</B> - -label ] -af1 dst1 spi1 proto1 [ af2 dst2 spi2 proto2 [ af3 dst3 spi3 proto3 [ af4 dst4 spi4 proto4 ] ] ] -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spigrp</B> - -[ -<B>--label</B> - -label ] -<B>--said</B> - -SA1 [ SA2 [ SA3 [ SA4 ] ] ] -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spigrp</B> - -<B>--help</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>spigrp</B> - -<B>--version</B> - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Spigrp</I> - -groups IPSEC Security Associations (SAs) together or ungroups -previously grouped SAs. -An entry in the IPSEC extended -routing table can only point -(via a destination address, a Security Parameters Index (SPI) and -a protocol identifier) to one SA. -If more than one transform must be applied to a given type of packet, -this can be accomplished by setting up several SAs -with the same destination address but potentially different SPIs and protocols, -and grouping them with -<I>spigrp</I>. - -<P> - -The SAs to be grouped, -specified by destination address (DNS name lookup, IPv4 dotted quad or IPv6 coloned hex), SPI -('0x'-prefixed hexadecimal number) and protocol ("ah", "esp", "comp" or "tun"), -are listed from the inside transform to the -outside; -in other words, the transforms are applied in -the order of the command line and removed in the reverse -order. -The resulting SA group is referred to by its first SA (by -<I>af1</I>, - -<I>dst1</I>, - -<I>spi1</I> - -and -<I>proto1</I>). - -<P> - -The --said option indicates that the SA IDs are to be specified as -one argument each, in the format <proto><af><spi>@<dest>. The SA IDs must -all be specified as separate parameters without the --said option or -all as monolithic parameters after the --said option. -<P> - -The SAs must already exist and must not already -be part of a group. -<P> - -If -<I>spigrp</I> - -is invoked with only one SA specification, -it ungroups the previously-grouped set of SAs containing -the SA specified. -<P> - -The --label option identifies all responses from that command -invocation with a user-supplied label, provided as an argument to the -label option. This can be helpful for debugging one invocation of the -command out of a large number. -<P> - -The command form with no additional arguments lists the contents of -/proc/net/ipsec_spigrp. The format of /proc/net/ipsec_spigrp is -discussed in <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec spigrp inet gw2 0x113 tun inet gw2 0x115 esp inet gw2 0x116 ah</B> - -<DD> -groups 3 SAs together, all destined for -<B>gw2</B>, - -but with an IPv4-in-IPv4 tunnel SA applied first with SPI -<B>0x113</B>, - -then an ESP header to encrypt the packet with SPI -<B>0x115</B>, - -and finally an AH header to authenticate the packet with SPI -<B>0x116</B>. - -</DL> -<P> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec spigrp --said tun.113@gw2 esp.115@gw2 ah.116@gw2 </B> - -<DD> -groups 3 SAs together, all destined for -<B>gw2</B>, - -but with an IPv4-in-IPv4 tunnel SA applied first with SPI -<B>0x113</B>, - -then an ESP header to encrypt the packet with SPI -<B>0x115</B>, - -and finally an AH header to authenticate the packet with SPI -<B>0x116</B>. - -</DL> -<P> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec spigrp --said tun:<A HREF="mailto:233@3049">233@3049</A>:1::1 esp:<A HREF="mailto:235@3049">235@3049</A>:1::1 ah:<A HREF="mailto:236@3049">236@3049</A>:1::1 </B> - -<DD> -groups 3 SAs together, all destined for -<B>3049:1::1,</B> - -but with an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel SA applied first with SPI -<B>0x233</B>, - -then an ESP header to encrypt the packet with SPI -<B>0x235</B>, - -and finally an AH header to authenticate the packet with SPI -<B>0x236</B>. - -</DL> -<P> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec spigrp inet6 3049:1::1 0x233 tun inet6 3049:1::1 0x235 esp inet6 3049:1::1 0x236 ah</B> - -<DD> -groups 3 SAs together, all destined for -<B>3049:1::1,</B> - -but with an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel SA applied first with SPI -<B>0x233</B>, - -then an ESP header to encrypt the packet with SPI -<B>0x235</B>, - -and finally an AH header to authenticate the packet with SPI -<B>0x236</B>. - -</DL> -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_spigrp, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Yes, it really is limited to a maximum of four SAs, -although admittedly it's hard to see why you would need more. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_splitkeytoid.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_splitkeytoid.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 109cfafa7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_splitkeytoid.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,174 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_KEYBLOBTOID</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 25 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec keyblobtoid, splitkeytoid - generate key IDs from RSA keys -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>size_t keyblobtoid(const unsigned char *blob,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t bloblen, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t splitkeytoid(const unsigned char *e, size_t elen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const unsigned char *m, size_t mlen, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Keyblobtoid</I> - -and -<I>splitkeytoid</I> - -generate -key IDs -from RSA keys, -for use in messages and reporting, -writing the result to -<I>dst</I>. - -A -<I>key ID</I> - -is a short ASCII string identifying a key; -currently it is just the first nine characters of the base64 -encoding of the RFC 2537/3110 ``byte blob'' representation of the key. -(Beware that no finite key ID can be collision-proof: -there is always some small chance of two random keys having the -same ID.) -<P> - -<I>Keyblobtoid</I> - -generates a key ID from a key which is already in the form of an -RFC 2537/3110 binary key -<I>blob</I> - -(encoded exponent length, exponent, modulus). -<P> - -<I>Splitkeytoid</I> - -generates a key ID from a key given in the form of a separate -(binary) exponent -<I>e</I> - -and modulus -<I>m</I>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of either -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant -<B>KEYID_BUF</B> - -which is the size of a buffer large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -Both functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. - -With keys generated by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_rsasigkey.3.html">ipsec_rsasigkey</A></I>(3), - -the first two base64 digits are always the same, -and the third carries only about one bit of information. -It's worse with keys using longer fixed exponents, -e.g. the 24-bit exponent that's common in X.509 certificates. -However, being able to relate key IDs to the full -base64 text form of keys by eye is sufficiently useful that this -waste of space seems justifiable. -The choice of nine digits is a compromise between bulk and -probability of collision. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -RFC 3110, -<I>RSA/SHA-1 SIGs and RSA KEYs in the Domain Name System (DNS)</I>, -Eastlake, 2001 -(superseding the older but better-known RFC 2537). -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors are: -key too short to supply enough bits to construct a complete key ID -(almost certainly indicating a garbage key); -exponent too long for its length to be representable. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetinsubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetinsubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetinsubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetishost.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetishost.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 414a0d513..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetishost.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,274 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Nov 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec sameaddr - are two addresses the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrcmp - ordered comparison of addresses -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnet - are two subnets the same? -<BR> - -ipsec addrinsubnet - is an address within a subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetinsubnet - is a subnet within another subnet? -<BR> - -ipsec subnetishost - is a subnet a single host? -<BR> - -ipsec samesaid - are two SA IDs the same? -<BR> - -ipsec sameaddrtype - are two addresses of the same address family? -<BR> - -ipsec samesubnettype - are two subnets of the same address family? -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>int sameaddr(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrcmp(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int addrinsubnet(const ip_address *a, const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetinsubnet(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int subnetishost(const ip_subnet *s);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesaid(const ip_said *a, const ip_said *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int sameaddrtype(const ip_address *a, const ip_address *b);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int samesubnettype(const ip_subnet *a, const ip_subnet *b);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions do various comparisons and tests on the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type and -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -types. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddr</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Addresses of different families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrcmp</I> - -returns -<B>-1</B>, - -<B>0</B>, - -or -<B>1</B> - -respectively -if address -<I>a</I> - -is less than, equal to, or greater than -<I>b</I>. - -If they are not of the same address family, -they are never equal; -the ordering reported in this case is arbitrary -(and probably not useful) but consistent. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -Subnets of different address families are never identical. -<P> - -<I>Addrinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if address -<I>a</I> - -is within subnet -<I>s</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -An address is never within a -subnet of a different address family. -<P> - -<I>Subnetinsubnet</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>a</I> - -is a subset of subnet -<I>b</I> - -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -A subnet is deemed to be a subset of itself. -A subnet is never a subset of another -subnet if their address families differ. -<P> - -<I>Subnetishost</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnet -<I>s</I> - -is in fact only a single host, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesaid</I> - -returns -non-zero -if SA IDs -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are identical, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Sameaddrtype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if addresses -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -<I>Samesubnettype</I> - -returns -non-zero -if subnets -<I>a</I> - -and -<I>b</I> - -are of the same address family, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_initaddr.3.html">ipsec_initaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index a185d716b..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnetof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_SUBNETOF</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_SUBNETOF</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec subnetof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return subnet number -<BR> - -ipsec hostof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return host part -<BR> - -ipsec broadcastof - given Internet address and subnet mask, return broadcast address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>struct in_addr subnetof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr hostof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr broadcastof(struct in_addr addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr mask);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_networkof.3.html">ipsec_networkof</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Subnetof</I> - -takes an Internet -<I>address</I> - -and a subnet -<I>mask</I> - -and returns the network part of the address -(all in network byte order). -<I>Hostof</I> - -similarly returns the host part, and -<I>broadcastof</I> - -returns the broadcast address (all-1s convention) for the network. -<P> - -These functions are provided to hide the Internet bit-munging inside -an API, in hopes of easing the eventual transition to IPv6. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Calling functions for this is more costly than doing it yourself. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettoa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettoa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 718fa935a..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettoa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,448 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoaddr, addrtoa - convert Internet addresses to and from ASCII -<BR> - -ipsec atosubnet, subnettoa - convert subnet/mask ASCII form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtoa(struct in_addr addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>struct in_addr *addr, struct in_addr *mask);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettoa(struct in_addr addr, struct in_addr mask,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int format, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atoaddr</I> - -converts an ASCII name or dotted-decimal address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Addrtoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII dotted-decimal address. -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' ASCII form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An address is specified in ASCII as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -ASCII-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in -a hexadecimal address may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -Name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>atoaddr</I>. - -In addition, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Atosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettoa</I> - -generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros, -unless the mask is non-contiguous. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoaddr</I> - -and -<I>atosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOA_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOA_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available. -This parameter is a hedge against future needs. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-ASCII functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal form; -dotted-decimal component too large to fit in 8 bits. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>atoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtoa</I> - -and -<I>subnettoa</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -The restriction of ASCII-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The ASCII-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettot.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettot.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 199937a35..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettot.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,569 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Sept 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoaddr, tnatoaddr, addrtot - convert Internet addresses to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec ttosubnet, subnettot - convert subnet/mask text form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *tnatoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtot(const ip_address *addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettot(const ip_subnet *sub, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -converts a text-string name or numeric address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -does the same conversion, -but the only text forms it accepts are -the ``official'' forms of -numeric address (dotted-decimal for IPv4, colon-hex for IPv6). -<I>Addrtot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, from binary address back to a text form. -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An IPv4 address is specified in text as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -text-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv4 address is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -An IPv6 address is specified in text with -colon-hex notation (e.g. -<B>0:56:78ab:22:33:44:55:66</B>), - -colon-hex with -<B>::</B> - -abbreviating at most one subsequence of multiple zeros (e.g. -<B>99:ab::54:068</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>99:ab:0:0:0:0:54:68</B>), - -or a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3). - -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv6 address will use -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation if possible, -and will not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in hexadecimal -may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -IPv4 name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -In addition, and preferably, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -in IPv4 means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B> - -or -<B>::/0</B> - -in IPv4 or IPv6 respectively. -<P> - -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettot</I> - -always generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the text string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>af</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the address family of interest. -It should be either -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOT_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOT_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available in -<I>subnettot</I>. - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -also accepts format values -<B>'r'</B> - -(signifying a text form suitable for DNS reverse lookups, -e.g. -<B>4.3.2.1.IN-ADDR.ARPA.</B> - -for IPv4 and -RFC 2874 format for IPv6), -and -<B>'R'</B> - -(signifying an alternate reverse-lookup form, -an error for IPv4 and RFC 1886 format for IPv6). -Reverse-lookup names always end with a ``.''. -<P> - -The text-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-text functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown address family; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal or colon-hex form; -dotted-decimal or colon-hex component too large. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -does not support the mixed colon-hex-dotted-decimal -convention used to embed an IPv4 address in an IPv6 address. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -always uses the -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation (which can appear only once in an address) for the -<I>first</I> - -sequence of multiple zeros in an IPv6 address. -One can construct addresses (unlikely ones) in which this is suboptimal. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -<B>'r'</B> - -conversion of an IPv6 address uses lowercase hexadecimal, -not the uppercase used in RFC 2874's examples. -It takes careful reading of RFCs 2874, 2673, and 2234 to realize -that lowercase is technically legitimate here, -and there may be software which botches this -and hence would have trouble with lowercase hex. -<P> - -Possibly -<I>subnettot</I> - -ought to recognize the -<B>%default</B> - -case and generate that string as its output. -Currently it doesn't. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -probably should enforce completeness of dotted-decimal addresses. -<P> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettypeof.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettypeof.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index ea0f83f82..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_subnettypeof.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,238 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_INITSUBNET</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_INITSUBNET</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 12 March 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec initsubnet - initialize an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec addrtosubnet - initialize a singleton ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec subnettypeof - get address type of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec masktocount - convert subnet mask to bit count -<BR> - -ipsec networkof - get base address of an ip_subnet -<BR> - -ipsec maskof - get subnet mask of an ip_subnet -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *initsubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int maskbits, int clash, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *addrtosubnet(const ip_address *addr,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<P> -<B>int subnettypeof(const ip_subnet *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int masktocount(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void networkof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void maskof(const ip_subnet *src, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -library uses an internal type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -to contain a description of an IP subnet -(base address plus mask). -These functions provide basic tools for creating and examining this type. -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -initializes a variable -<I>*dst</I> - -of type -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -from a base address and -a count of mask bits. -The -<I>clash</I> - -parameter specifies what to do if the base address includes -<B>1</B> - -bits outside the prefix specified by the mask -(that is, in the ``host number'' part of the address): -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>'0'<DD> -zero out host-number bits -<DT>'x'<DD> -non-zero host-number bits are an error -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Initsubnet</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Addrtosubnet</I> - -initializes an -<I>ip_subnet</I> - -variable -<I>*dst</I> - -to a ``singleton subnet'' containing the single address -<I>*addr</I>. - -It returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure. -<P> - -<I>Subnettypeof</I> - -returns the address type of a subnet, -normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -(The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file arranges to include the necessary headers for these -names to be known.) -<P> - -<I>Masktocount</I> - -converts a subnet mask, expressed as an address, to a bit count -suitable for use with -<I>initsubnet</I>. - -It returns -<B>-1</B> - -for error; see DIAGNOSTICS. -<P> - -<I>Networkof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the base address of subnet -<I>src</I>. - -<P> - -<I>Maskof</I> - -fills in -<I>*dst</I> - -with the subnet mask of subnet -<I>src</I>, - -expressed as an address. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html">ipsec_ttosubnet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_rangetosubnet.3.html">ipsec_rangetosubnet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>initsubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -unknown -<I>clash</I> - -value; -impossible mask bit count; -non-zero host-number bits and -<I>clash</I> - -is -<B>'x'</B>. - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtosubnet</I> - -are: -unknown address family. -Fatal errors in -<I>masktocount</I> - -are: -unknown address family; -mask bits not contiguous. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tnatoaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tnatoaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 199937a35..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tnatoaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,569 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Sept 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoaddr, tnatoaddr, addrtot - convert Internet addresses to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec ttosubnet, subnettot - convert subnet/mask text form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *tnatoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtot(const ip_address *addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettot(const ip_subnet *sub, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -converts a text-string name or numeric address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -does the same conversion, -but the only text forms it accepts are -the ``official'' forms of -numeric address (dotted-decimal for IPv4, colon-hex for IPv6). -<I>Addrtot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, from binary address back to a text form. -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An IPv4 address is specified in text as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -text-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv4 address is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -An IPv6 address is specified in text with -colon-hex notation (e.g. -<B>0:56:78ab:22:33:44:55:66</B>), - -colon-hex with -<B>::</B> - -abbreviating at most one subsequence of multiple zeros (e.g. -<B>99:ab::54:068</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>99:ab:0:0:0:0:54:68</B>), - -or a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3). - -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv6 address will use -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation if possible, -and will not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in hexadecimal -may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -IPv4 name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -In addition, and preferably, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -in IPv4 means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B> - -or -<B>::/0</B> - -in IPv4 or IPv6 respectively. -<P> - -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettot</I> - -always generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the text string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>af</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the address family of interest. -It should be either -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOT_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOT_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available in -<I>subnettot</I>. - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -also accepts format values -<B>'r'</B> - -(signifying a text form suitable for DNS reverse lookups, -e.g. -<B>4.3.2.1.IN-ADDR.ARPA.</B> - -for IPv4 and -RFC 2874 format for IPv6), -and -<B>'R'</B> - -(signifying an alternate reverse-lookup form, -an error for IPv4 and RFC 1886 format for IPv6). -Reverse-lookup names always end with a ``.''. -<P> - -The text-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-text functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown address family; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal or colon-hex form; -dotted-decimal or colon-hex component too large. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -does not support the mixed colon-hex-dotted-decimal -convention used to embed an IPv4 address in an IPv6 address. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -always uses the -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation (which can appear only once in an address) for the -<I>first</I> - -sequence of multiple zeros in an IPv6 address. -One can construct addresses (unlikely ones) in which this is suboptimal. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -<B>'r'</B> - -conversion of an IPv6 address uses lowercase hexadecimal, -not the uppercase used in RFC 2874's examples. -It takes careful reading of RFCs 2874, 2673, and 2234 to realize -that lowercase is technically legitimate here, -and there may be software which botches this -and hence would have trouble with lowercase hex. -<P> - -Possibly -<I>subnettot</I> - -ought to recognize the -<B>%default</B> - -case and generate that string as its output. -Currently it doesn't. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -probably should enforce completeness of dotted-decimal addresses. -<P> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index e4082a28f..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,175 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TNCFG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TNCFG</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 27 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_tncfg - lists IPSEC virtual interfaces attached to real interfaces -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<P> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec_tncfg</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec_tncfg</I> - -is a read-only file which lists which IPSEC virtual interfaces are -attached to which real interfaces, through which packets will be -forwarded once processed by IPSEC. -<P> - -Each line lists one ipsec I/F. -A table entry consists of: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>+<DD> -an ipsec virtual I/F name -<DT>+<DD> -a visual and machine parsable separator '->', separating the virtual I/F -and the physical I/F, -<DT>+<DD> -a physical I/F name, to which the ipsec virtual I/F is attached or NULL -if it is not attached, -<DT>+<DD> -the keyword -<B>mtu=</B>, - -<DT>+<DD> -the MTU of the ipsec virtual I/F, -<DT>+<DD> -the automatically adjusted effective MTU for PMTU discovery, in brackets, -<DT>+<DD> -a visual and machine parsable separator '->', separating the virtual I/F -MTU and the physical I/F MTU, -<DT>+<DD> -the MTU of the attached physical I/F. -<B>.SH</B>EXAMPLES - -<DT><B>ipsec2 -> eth3 mtu=16260(1443) -> 1500</B> - -<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -shows that virtual device -<B>ipsec2</B> - -with an MTU of -<B>16260</B> - -is connected to physical device -<B>eth3</B> - -with an MTU of -<B>1500</B> - -and that the effective MTU as a result of PMTU discovery has been -automatically set to -<B>1443.</B> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec0 -> wvlan0 mtu=1400(16260) -> 1500</B> - -<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -shows that virtual device -<B>ipsec0</B> - -with an MTU of -<B>1400</B> - -is connected to physical device -<B>wvlan0</B> - -with an MTU of -<B>1500</B> - -and no PMTU packets have gotten far enough to bump down the effective MTU -from its default of 16260. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec3 -> NULL mtu=0(0) -> 0</B> - -<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -shows that virtual device -<B>ipsec3</B> - -is not connected to any physical device. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_tncfg, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_version.5.html">ipsec_version</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index e5965267c..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,195 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TNCFG</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TNCFG</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 21 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec tncfg - associate IPSEC virtual interface with physical interface -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<B>--attach</B> - -<B>--virtual</B> - -virtual -<B>--physical</B> - -physical -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<B>--detach</B> - -<B>--virtual</B> - -virtual -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<B>--clear</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<B>--version</B> - -<P> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>tncfg</B> - -<B>--help</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Tncfg</I> - -attaches/detaches IPSEC virtual interfaces to/from -physical interfaces, -through which packets will be forwarded once processed by IPSEC. -<P> - -The form with no additional arguments lists the contents of -/proc/net/ipsec_tncfg. The format of /proc/net/ipsec_tncfg is discussed -in <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.5.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(5). -The -<B>--attach</B> - -form attaches the -<I>virtual</I> - -interface to the -<I>physical</I> - -one. -The -<B>--detach</B> - -form detaches the -<I>virtual</I> - -interface from whichever physical interface it is attached to. -The -<B>--clear</B> - -form clears all the -<I>virtual</I> - -interfaces from whichever physical interfaces they were attached to. -<P> - -Virtual interfaces typically have names like -<B>ipsec0</B>, - -while physical interfaces typically have names like -<B>eth0</B> - -or -<B>ppp0</B>. - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>ipsec tncfg --attach --virtual ipsec0 --physical eth0</B> - -<DD> -attaches the -<B>ipsec0</B> - -virtual device to the -<B>eth0</B> - -physical device. -</DL> -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_tncfg, /usr/local/bin/ipsec -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi</A>(8), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.5.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_trap_count.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_trap_count.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 8da655f77..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_trap_count.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,74 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TRAP_COUNT</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TRAP_COUNT</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 19 Jun 2003<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -trap_count - KLIPS statistic on number of ACQUIREs -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec/stats/trap_count</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec/stats/trap_count</I> - -is a read-only file. It contains a hexadecimal number which records the -number of attempts to send PF_ACQUIRE messages. Only those recorded by -trap_sendcount were actually successfully passed to userland. Note that the -userland may still have lost them on its own. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec/stats/trap_sendcount -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5), <A HREF="trap_sendcount.5.html">trap_sendcount</A>(5), <A HREF="pluto.8.html">pluto</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael C. Richardson <<A HREF="mailto:mcr@freeswan.org">mcr@freeswan.org</A>> - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_trap_sendcount.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_trap_sendcount.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 94f56b3a7..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_trap_sendcount.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TRAP_SENDCOUNT</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TRAP_SENDCOUNT</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 19 Jun 2003<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -trap_sendcount - KLIPS statistic on number of successful ACQUIREs -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec/stats/trap_sendcount</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec/stats/trap_sendcount</I> - -is a read-only file. It contains a hexadecimal number which records the -number of successful PF_ACQUIRE messages that were sent. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec/stats/trap_sendcount -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5), <A HREF="trap_count.5.html">trap_count</A>(5), <A HREF="pluto.8.html">pluto</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Michael C. Richardson <<A HREF="mailto:mcr@freeswan.org">mcr@freeswan.org</A>> - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 199937a35..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,569 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Sept 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoaddr, tnatoaddr, addrtot - convert Internet addresses to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec ttosubnet, subnettot - convert subnet/mask text form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *tnatoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtot(const ip_address *addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettot(const ip_subnet *sub, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -converts a text-string name or numeric address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -does the same conversion, -but the only text forms it accepts are -the ``official'' forms of -numeric address (dotted-decimal for IPv4, colon-hex for IPv6). -<I>Addrtot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, from binary address back to a text form. -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An IPv4 address is specified in text as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -text-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv4 address is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -An IPv6 address is specified in text with -colon-hex notation (e.g. -<B>0:56:78ab:22:33:44:55:66</B>), - -colon-hex with -<B>::</B> - -abbreviating at most one subsequence of multiple zeros (e.g. -<B>99:ab::54:068</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>99:ab:0:0:0:0:54:68</B>), - -or a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3). - -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv6 address will use -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation if possible, -and will not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in hexadecimal -may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -IPv4 name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -In addition, and preferably, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -in IPv4 means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B> - -or -<B>::/0</B> - -in IPv4 or IPv6 respectively. -<P> - -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettot</I> - -always generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the text string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>af</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the address family of interest. -It should be either -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOT_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOT_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available in -<I>subnettot</I>. - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -also accepts format values -<B>'r'</B> - -(signifying a text form suitable for DNS reverse lookups, -e.g. -<B>4.3.2.1.IN-ADDR.ARPA.</B> - -for IPv4 and -RFC 2874 format for IPv6), -and -<B>'R'</B> - -(signifying an alternate reverse-lookup form, -an error for IPv4 and RFC 1886 format for IPv6). -Reverse-lookup names always end with a ``.''. -<P> - -The text-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-text functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown address family; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal or colon-hex form; -dotted-decimal or colon-hex component too large. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -does not support the mixed colon-hex-dotted-decimal -convention used to embed an IPv4 address in an IPv6 address. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -always uses the -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation (which can appear only once in an address) for the -<I>first</I> - -sequence of multiple zeros in an IPv6 address. -One can construct addresses (unlikely ones) in which this is suboptimal. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -<B>'r'</B> - -conversion of an IPv6 address uses lowercase hexadecimal, -not the uppercase used in RFC 2874's examples. -It takes careful reading of RFCs 2874, 2673, and 2234 to realize -that lowercase is technically legitimate here, -and there may be software which botches this -and hence would have trouble with lowercase hex. -<P> - -Possibly -<I>subnettot</I> - -ought to recognize the -<B>%default</B> - -case and generate that string as its output. -Currently it doesn't. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -probably should enforce completeness of dotted-decimal addresses. -<P> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttodata.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttodata.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 960392fe0..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttodata.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,439 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTODATA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTODATA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 16 August 2003<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttodata, datatot - convert binary data bytes from and to text formats -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttodata(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, char *dst, size_t dstlen, size_t *lenp);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *ttodatav(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, char *dst, size_t dstlen, size_t *lenp,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *errp, size_t errlen, int flags);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t datatot(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int format, char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttodata</I>, - -<I>ttodatav</I>, - -and -<I>datatot</I> - -convert arbitrary binary data (e.g. encryption or authentication keys) -from and to more-or-less human-readable text formats. -<P> - -Currently supported formats are hexadecimal, base64, and characters. -<P> - -A hexadecimal text value begins with a -<B>0x</B> - -(or -<B>0X</B>) - -prefix and continues with two-digit groups -of hexadecimal digits (0-9, and a-f or A-F), -each group encoding the value of one binary byte, high-order digit first. -A single -<B>_</B> - -(underscore) -between consecutive groups is ignored, permitting punctuation to improve -readability; doing this every eight digits seems about right. -<P> - -A base64 text value begins with a -<B>0s</B> - -(or -<B>0S</B>) - -prefix -and continues with four-digit groups of base64 digits (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, +, and /), -each group encoding the value of three binary bytes as described in -section 6.8 of RFC 2045. -If -<B>flags</B> - -has the -<B>TTODATAV_IGNORESPACE</B> - -bit on, blanks are ignore (after the prefix). -Note that the last one or two digits of a base64 group can be -<B>=</B> - -to indicate that fewer than three binary bytes are encoded. -<P> - -A character text value begins with a -<B>0t</B> - -(or -<B>0T</B>) - -prefix -and continues with text characters, each being the value of one binary byte. -<P> - -All these functions basically copy data from -<I>src</I> - -(whose size is specified by -<I>srclen</I>) - -to -<I>dst</I> - -(whose size is specified by -<I>dstlen</I>), - -doing the conversion en route. -If the result will not fit in -<I>dst</I>, - -it is truncated; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes of result written to -<I>dst</I>. - -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result bytes are written at all. -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttodata</I> - -and -<I>ttodatav</I> - -specifies what format the input is in; -normally it should be -<B>0</B> - -to signify that this gets figured out from the prefix. -Values of -<B>16</B>, - -<B>64</B>, - -and -<B>256</B> - -respectively signify hexadecimal, base64, and character-text formats -without prefixes. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>datatot</I>, - -a single character used as a type code, -specifies which text format is wanted. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not ASCII -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) specifies a reasonable default. -Other currently-supported values are: -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>'x'</B> - -<DD> -continuous lower-case hexadecimal with a -<B>0x</B> - -prefix -<DT><B>'h'</B> - -<DD> -lower-case hexadecimal with a -<B>0x</B> - -prefix and a -<B>_</B> - -every eight digits -<DT><B>':'</B> - -<DD> -lower-case hexadecimal with no prefix and a -<B>:</B> - -(colon) every two digits -<DT><B>16</B> - -<DD> -lower-case hexadecimal with no prefix or -<B>_</B> - -<DT><B>'s'</B> - -<DD> -continuous base64 with a -<B>0s</B> - -prefix -<DT><B>64</B> - -<DD> -continuous base64 with no prefix -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -The default format is currently -<B>'h'</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Ttodata</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -On success, -if and only if -<I>lenp</I> - -is non-NULL, -<B>*lenp</B> - -is set to the number of bytes required to contain the full untruncated result. -It is the caller's responsibility to check this against -<I>dstlen</I> - -to determine whether he has obtained a complete result. -The -<B>*lenp</B> - -value is correct even if -<I>dstlen</I> - -is zero, which offers a way to determine how much space would be needed -before having to allocate any. -<P> - -<I>Ttodatav</I> - -is just like -<I>ttodata</I> - -except that in certain cases, -if -<I>errp</I> - -is non-NULL, -the buffer pointed to by -<I>errp</I> - -(whose length is given by -<I>errlen</I>) - -is used to hold a more detailed error message. -The return value is NULL for success, -and is either -<I>errp</I> - -or a pointer to a string literal for failure. -If the size of the error-message buffer is -inadequate for the desired message, -<I>ttodatav</I> - -will fall back on returning a pointer to a literal string instead. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant -<B>TTODATAV_BUF</B> - -which is the size of a buffer large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The normal return value of -<I>datatot</I> - -is the number of bytes required -to contain the full untruncated result. -It is the caller's responsibility to check this against -<I>dstlen</I> - -to determine whether he has obtained a complete result. -The return value is correct even if -<I>dstlen</I> - -is zero, which offers a way to determine how much space would be needed -before having to allocate any. -A return value of -<B>0</B> - -signals a fatal error of some kind -(see DIAGNOSTICS). -<P> - -A zero value for -<I>srclen</I> - -in -<I>ttodata</I> - -(but not -<I>datatot</I>!) - -is synonymous with -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -A non-zero -<I>srclen</I> - -in -<I>ttodata</I> - -must not include the terminating NUL. -<P> - -Unless -<I>dstlen</I> - -is zero, -the result supplied by -<I>datatot</I> - -is always NUL-terminated, -and its needed-size return value includes space for the terminating NUL. -<P> - -Several obsolete variants of these functions -(<I>atodata</I>, - -<I>datatoa</I>, - -<I>atobytes</I>, - -and -<I>bytestoa</I>) - -are temporarily also supported. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="sprintf.3.html">sprintf</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttodata</I> - -and -<I>ttodatav</I> - -are: -unknown characters in the input; -unknown or missing prefix; -unknown base; -incomplete digit group; -non-zero padding in a base64 less-than-three-bytes digit group; -zero-length input. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>datatot</I> - -are: -unknown format code; -zero-length input. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Datatot</I> - -should have a format code to produce character-text output. -<P> - -The -<B>0s</B> - -and -<B>0t</B> - -prefixes are the author's inventions and are not a standard -of any kind. -They have been chosen to avoid collisions with existing practice -(some C implementations use -<B>0b</B> - -for binary) -and possible confusion with unprefixed hexadecimal. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttosa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttosa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 1e457fc24..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttosa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,453 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOSA</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOSA</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 26 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttosa, satot - convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec initsaid - initialize an SA ID -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>typedef struct {</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_address dst;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ipsec_spi_t spi;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto;</B> - -<BR> - -<B>} ip_said;</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosa(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>ip_said *sa);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t satot(const ip_said *sa, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>void initsaid(const ip_address *addr, ipsec_spi_t spi,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int proto, ip_said *dst);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttosa</I> - -converts an ASCII Security Association (SA) specifier into an -<B>ip_said</B> - -structure (containing -a destination-host address -in network byte order, -an SPI number in network byte order, and -a protocol code). -<I>Satot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to a text SA specifier. -<I>Initsaid</I> - -initializes an -<B>ip_said</B> - -from separate items of information. -<P> - -An SA is specified in text with a mail-like syntax, e.g. -<B><A HREF="mailto:esp.5a7@1.2.3.4">esp.5a7@1.2.3.4</A></B>. - -An SA specifier contains -a protocol prefix (currently -<B>ah</B>, - -<B>esp</B>, - -<B>tun</B>, - -<B>comp</B>, - -or -<B>int</B>), - -a single character indicating the address family -(<B>.</B> - -for IPv4, -<B>:</B> - -for IPv6), -an unsigned integer SPI number in hexadecimal (with no -<B>0x</B> - -prefix), -and an IP address. -The IP address can be any form accepted by -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A></I>(3), - -e.g. dotted-decimal IPv4 address, -colon-hex IPv6 address, -or DNS name. -<P> - -As a special case, the SA specifier -<B>%passthrough4</B> - -or -<B>%passthrough6</B> - -signifies the special SA used to indicate that packets should be -passed through unaltered. -(At present, these are synonyms for -<B><A HREF="mailto:tun.0@0.0.0.0">tun.0@0.0.0.0</A></B> - -and -<B>tun:0@::</B> - -respectively, -but that is subject to change without notice.) -<B>%passthrough</B> - -is a historical synonym for -<B>%passthrough4</B>. - -These forms are known to both -<I>ttosa</I> - -and -<I>satot</I>, - -so the internal representation is never visible. -<P> - -Similarly, the SA specifiers -<B>%pass</B>, - -<B>%drop</B>, - -<B>%reject</B>, - -<B>%hold</B>, - -<B>%trap</B>, - -and -<B>%trapsubnet</B> - -signify special ``magic'' SAs used to indicate that packets should be -passed, dropped, rejected (dropped with ICMP notification), -held, -and trapped (sent up to -<I><A HREF="ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto</A></I>(8), - -with either of two forms of -<B>%hold</B> - -automatically installed) -respectively. -These forms too are known to both routines, -so the internal representation of the magic SAs should never be visible. -<P> - -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file supplies the -<B>ip_said</B> - -structure, as well as a data type -<B>ipsec_spi_t</B> - -which is an unsigned 32-bit integer. -(There is no consistency between kernel and user on what such a type -is called, hence the header hides the differences.) -<P> - -The protocol code uses the same numbers that IP does. -For user convenience, given the difficulty in acquiring the exact set of -protocol names used by the kernel, -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -defines the names -<B>SA_ESP</B>, - -<B>SA_AH</B>, - -<B>SA_IPIP</B>, - -and -<B>SA_COMP</B> - -to have the same values as the kernel names -<B>IPPROTO_ESP</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_AH</B>, - -<B>IPPROTO_IPIP</B>, - -and -<B>IPPROTO_COMP</B>. - -<P> - -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -also defines -<B>SA_INT</B> - -to have the value -<B>61</B> - -(reserved by IANA for ``any host internal protocol'') -and -<B>SPI_PASS</B>, - -<B>SPI_DROP</B>, - -<B>SPI_REJECT</B>, - -<B>SPI_HOLD</B>, - -and -<B>SPI_TRAP</B> - -to have the values 256-260 (in <I>host</I> byte order) respectively. -These are used in constructing the magic SAs -(which always have address -<B>0.0.0.0</B>). - -<P> - -If -<I>satot</I> - -encounters an unknown protocol code, e.g. 77, -it yields output using a prefix -showing the code numerically, e.g. ``unk77''. -This form is -<I>not</I> - -recognized by -<I>ttosa</I>. - -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttosa</I> - -specifies the length of the string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>satot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<B><<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>SATOT_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>satot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the ASCII character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default -(currently -lowercase protocol prefix, lowercase hexadecimal SPI, -dotted-decimal or colon-hex address). -The value -<B>'f'</B> - -is similar except that the SPI is padded with -<B>0</B>s - -to a fixed 32-bit width, to ease aligning displayed tables. -<P> - -<I>Ttosa</I> - -returns -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Satot</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<P> - -There is also, temporarily, support for some obsolete -forms of SA specifier which lack the address-family indicator. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec_ttoul.3.html">ipsec_ttoul</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_ttoaddr.3.html">ipsec_ttoaddr</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_samesaid.3.html">ipsec_samesaid</A>(3), <A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosa</I> - -are: -empty input; -input too small to be a legal SA specifier; -no -<B>@</B> - -in input; -unknown protocol prefix; -conversion error in -<I>ttoul</I> - -or -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>satot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttosa( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 199937a35..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttosubnet.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,569 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 28 Sept 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoaddr, tnatoaddr, addrtot - convert Internet addresses to and from text -<BR> - -ipsec ttosubnet, subnettot - convert subnet/mask text form to and from addresses -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *tnatoaddr(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_address *addr);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t addrtot(const ip_address *addr, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttosubnet(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int af, ip_subnet *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t subnettot(const ip_subnet *sub, int format,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>char *dst, size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -converts a text-string name or numeric address into a binary address -(in network byte order). -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -does the same conversion, -but the only text forms it accepts are -the ``official'' forms of -numeric address (dotted-decimal for IPv4, colon-hex for IPv6). -<I>Addrtot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, from binary address back to a text form. -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -do likewise for the ``address/mask'' form used to write a -specification of a subnet. -<P> - -An IPv4 address is specified in text as a -dotted-decimal address (e.g. -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit network-order hexadecimal number with the usual C prefix (e.g. -<B>0x01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B>), - -an eight-digit host-order hexadecimal number with a -<B>0h</B> - -prefix (e.g. -<B>0h01020304</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>1.2.3.4</B> - -on a big-endian host and -<B>4.3.2.1</B> - -on a little-endian host), -a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3), - -or an old-style network name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3). - -<P> - -A dotted-decimal address may be incomplete, in which case -text-to-binary conversion implicitly appends -as many instances of -<B>.0</B> - -as necessary to bring it up to four components. -The components of a dotted-decimal address are always taken as -decimal, and leading zeros are ignored. -For example, -<B>10</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.0.0.0</B>, - -and -<B>128.009.000.032</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>128.9.0.32</B> - -(the latter example is verbatim from RFC 1166). -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv4 address is always complete and does not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -Use of hexadecimal addresses is -<B>strongly</B> - -<B>discouraged</B>; - -they are included only to save hassles when dealing with -the handful of perverted programs which already print -network addresses in hexadecimal. -<P> - -An IPv6 address is specified in text with -colon-hex notation (e.g. -<B>0:56:78ab:22:33:44:55:66</B>), - -colon-hex with -<B>::</B> - -abbreviating at most one subsequence of multiple zeros (e.g. -<B>99:ab::54:068</B>, - -which is synonymous with -<B>99:ab:0:0:0:0:54:68</B>), - -or a DNS name to be looked up via -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname.3.html">gethostbyname</A></I>(3). - -The result of applying -<I>addrtot</I> - -to an IPv6 address will use -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation if possible, -and will not contain leading zeros. -<P> - -The letters in hexadecimal -may be uppercase or lowercase or any mixture thereof. -<P> - -DNS names may be complete (optionally terminated with a ``.'') -or incomplete, and are looked up as specified by local system configuration -(see -<I><A HREF="resolver.5.html">resolver</A></I>(5)). - -The -<I>h_addr</I> - -value returned by -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -is used, -so with current DNS implementations, -the result when the name corresponds to more than one address is -difficult to predict. -IPv4 name lookup resorts to -<I><A HREF="getnetbyname.3.html">getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -only if -<I><A HREF="gethostbyname2.3.html">gethostbyname2</A></I>(3) - -fails. -<P> - -A subnet specification is of the form <I>network</I><B>/</B><I>mask</I>. -The -<I>network</I> - -and -<I>mask</I> - -can be any form acceptable to -<I>ttoaddr</I>. - -In addition, and preferably, the -<I>mask</I> - -can be a decimal integer (leading zeros ignored) giving a bit count, -in which case -it stands for a mask with that number of high bits on and all others off -(e.g., -<B>24</B> - -in IPv4 means -<B>255.255.255.0</B>). - -In any case, the mask must be contiguous -(a sequence of high bits on and all remaining low bits off). -As a special case, the subnet specification -<B>%default</B> - -is a synonym for -<B>0.0.0.0/0</B> - -or -<B>::/0</B> - -in IPv4 or IPv6 respectively. -<P> - -<I>Ttosubnet</I> - -ANDs the mask with the address before returning, -so that any non-network bits in the address are turned off -(e.g., -<B>10.1.2.3/24</B> - -is synonymous with -<B>10.1.2.0/24</B>). - -<I>Subnettot</I> - -always generates the decimal-integer-bit-count -form of the mask, -with no leading zeros. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the length of the text string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>af</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -and -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -specifies the address family of interest. -It should be either -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines constants, -<B>ADDRTOT_BUF</B> - -and -<B>SUBNETTOT_BUF</B>, - -which are the sizes of buffers just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -specifies what format is to be used for the conversion. -The value -<B>0</B> - -(not the character -<B>'0'</B>, - -but a zero value) -specifies a reasonable default, -and is in fact the only format currently available in -<I>subnettot</I>. - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -also accepts format values -<B>'r'</B> - -(signifying a text form suitable for DNS reverse lookups, -e.g. -<B>4.3.2.1.IN-ADDR.ARPA.</B> - -for IPv4 and -RFC 2874 format for IPv6), -and -<B>'R'</B> - -(signifying an alternate reverse-lookup form, -an error for IPv4 and RFC 1886 format for IPv6). -Reverse-lookup names always end with a ``.''. -<P> - -The text-to-binary functions return NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -The binary-to-text functions return -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -always return the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown address family; -attempt to allocate temporary storage for a very long name failed; -name lookup failed; -syntax error in dotted-decimal or colon-hex form; -dotted-decimal or colon-hex component too large. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttosubnet</I> - -are: -no -<B>/</B> - -in -<I>src</I>; - -<I>ttoaddr</I> - -error in conversion of -<I>network</I> - -or -<I>mask</I>; - -bit-count mask too big; -mask non-contiguous. -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>addrtot</I> - -and -<I>subnettot</I> - -are: -unknown format. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -The interpretation of incomplete dotted-decimal addresses -(e.g. -<B>10/24</B> - -means -<B>10.0.0.0/24</B>) - -differs from that of some older conversion -functions, e.g. those of -<I><A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A></I>(3). - -The behavior of the older functions has never been -particularly consistent or particularly useful. -<P> - -Ignoring leading zeros in dotted-decimal components and bit counts -is arguably the most useful behavior in this application, -but it might occasionally cause confusion with the historical use of leading -zeros to denote octal numbers. -<P> - -<I>Ttoaddr</I> - -does not support the mixed colon-hex-dotted-decimal -convention used to embed an IPv4 address in an IPv6 address. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -always uses the -<B>::</B> - -abbreviation (which can appear only once in an address) for the -<I>first</I> - -sequence of multiple zeros in an IPv6 address. -One can construct addresses (unlikely ones) in which this is suboptimal. -<P> - -<I>Addrtot</I> - -<B>'r'</B> - -conversion of an IPv6 address uses lowercase hexadecimal, -not the uppercase used in RFC 2874's examples. -It takes careful reading of RFCs 2874, 2673, and 2234 to realize -that lowercase is technically legitimate here, -and there may be software which botches this -and hence would have trouble with lowercase hex. -<P> - -Possibly -<I>subnettot</I> - -ought to recognize the -<B>%default</B> - -case and generate that string as its output. -Currently it doesn't. -<P> - -It is barely possible that somebody, somewhere, -might have a legitimate use for non-contiguous subnet masks. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="Getnetbyname.3.html">Getnetbyname</A></I>(3) - -is a historical dreg. -<P> - -<I>Tnatoaddr</I> - -probably should enforce completeness of dotted-decimal addresses. -<P> - -The restriction of text-to-binary error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The text-to-binary error-reporting convention lends itself -to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoaddr( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttoul.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttoul.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index b722dcc13..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ttoul.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,310 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOUL</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOUL</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 16 Aug 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoul, ultot - convert unsigned-long numbers to and from text -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoul(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, unsigned long *n);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t ultot(unsigned long n, int format, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoul</I> - -converts a text-string number into a binary -<B>unsigned long</B> - -value. -<I>Ultot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to a text version. -<P> - -Numbers are specified in text as -decimal (e.g. -<B>123</B>), - -octal with a leading zero (e.g. -<B>012</B>, - -which has value 10), -or hexadecimal with a leading -<B>0x</B> - -(e.g. -<B>0x1f</B>, - -which has value 31) -in either upper or lower case. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoul</I> - -specifies the length of the string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoul</I> - -can be -<B>8</B>, - -<B>10</B>, - -or -<B>16</B>, - -in which case the number supplied is assumed to be of that form -(and in the case of -<B>16</B>, - -to lack any -<B>0x</B> - -prefix). -It can also be -<B>0</B>, - -in which case the number is examined for a leading zero -or a leading -<B>0x</B> - -to determine its base. -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>ULTOT_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultot</I> - -must be one of: -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>'o'</B><DD> -octal conversion with leading -<B>0</B> - -<DT><B> 8</B><DD> -octal conversion with no leading -<B>0</B> - -<DT><B>'d'</B><DD> -decimal conversion -<DT><B>10</B><DD> -same as -<B>d</B> - -<DT><B>'x'</B><DD> -hexadecimal conversion, including leading -<B>0x</B> - -<DT><B>16</B><DD> -hexadecimal conversion with no leading -<B>0x</B> - -<DT><B>17</B><DD> -like -<B>16</B> - -except padded on left with -<B>0</B>s - -to eight digits (full width of a 32-bit number) -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Ttoul</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Ultot</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL -(it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="atol.3.html">atol</A>(3), <A HREF="strtoul.3.html">strtoul</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoul</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown -<I>base</I>; - -non-digit character found; -number too large for an -<B>unsigned long</B>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ultot</I> - -are: -unknown -<I>format</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Conversion of -<B>0</B> - -with format -<B>o</B> - -yields -<B>00</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Ultot</I> - -format -<B>17</B> - -is a bit of a kludge. -<P> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoul( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ultoa.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ultoa.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 7669dce52..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ultoa.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,266 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ATOUL</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ATOUL</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 11 June 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec atoul, ultoa - convert unsigned-long numbers to and from ASCII -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *atoul(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, unsigned long *n);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t ultoa(unsigned long n, int base, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions are obsolete; see -<I><A HREF="ipsec_ttoul.3.html">ipsec_ttoul</A></I>(3) - -for their replacements. -<P> - -<I>Atoul</I> - -converts an ASCII number into a binary -<B>unsigned long</B> - -value. -<I>Ultoa</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to an ASCII version. -<P> - -Numbers are specified in ASCII as -decimal (e.g. -<B>123</B>), - -octal with a leading zero (e.g. -<B>012</B>, - -which has value 10), -or hexadecimal with a leading -<B>0x</B> - -(e.g. -<B>0x1f</B>, - -which has value 31) -in either upper or lower case. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoul</I> - -specifies the length of the ASCII string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>atoul</I> - -can be -<B>8</B>, - -<B>10</B>, - -or -<B>16</B>, - -in which case the number supplied is assumed to be of that form -(and in the case of -<B>16</B>, - -to lack any -<B>0x</B> - -prefix). -It can also be -<B>0</B>, - -in which case the number is examined for a leading zero -or a leading -<B>0x</B> - -to determine its base, -or -<B>13</B> - -(halfway between 10 and 16), -which has the same effect as -<B>0</B> - -except that a non-hexadecimal -number is considered decimal regardless of any leading zero. -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultoa</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultoa</I> - -must be -<B>8</B>, - -<B>10</B>, - -or -<B>16</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Atoul</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Ultoa</I> - -returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL; -it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="atol.3.html">atol</A>(3), <A HREF="strtoul.3.html">strtoul</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>atoul</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown -<I>base</I>; - -non-digit character found; -number too large for an -<B>unsigned long</B>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -There is no provision for reporting an invalid -<I>base</I> - -parameter given to -<I>ultoa</I>. - -<P> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = atoul( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ultot.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ultot.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index b722dcc13..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_ultot.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,310 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_TTOUL</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_TTOUL</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 16 Aug 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ttoul, ultot - convert unsigned-long numbers to and from text -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ttoul(const char *src, size_t srclen,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int base, unsigned long *n);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t ultot(unsigned long n, int format, char *dst,</B> - -<BR> - -<B>size_t dstlen);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>Ttoul</I> - -converts a text-string number into a binary -<B>unsigned long</B> - -value. -<I>Ultot</I> - -does the reverse conversion, back to a text version. -<P> - -Numbers are specified in text as -decimal (e.g. -<B>123</B>), - -octal with a leading zero (e.g. -<B>012</B>, - -which has value 10), -or hexadecimal with a leading -<B>0x</B> - -(e.g. -<B>0x1f</B>, - -which has value 31) -in either upper or lower case. -<P> - -The -<I>srclen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoul</I> - -specifies the length of the string pointed to by -<I>src</I>; - -it is an error for there to be anything else -(e.g., a terminating NUL) within that length. -As a convenience for cases where an entire NUL-terminated string is -to be converted, -a -<I>srclen</I> - -value of -<B>0</B> - -is taken to mean -<B>strlen(src)</B>. - -<P> - -The -<I>base</I> - -parameter of -<I>ttoul</I> - -can be -<B>8</B>, - -<B>10</B>, - -or -<B>16</B>, - -in which case the number supplied is assumed to be of that form -(and in the case of -<B>16</B>, - -to lack any -<B>0x</B> - -prefix). -It can also be -<B>0</B>, - -in which case the number is examined for a leading zero -or a leading -<B>0x</B> - -to determine its base. -<P> - -The -<I>dstlen</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultot</I> - -specifies the size of the -<I>dst</I> - -parameter; -under no circumstances are more than -<I>dstlen</I> - -bytes written to -<I>dst</I>. - -A result which will not fit is truncated. -<I>Dstlen</I> - -can be zero, in which case -<I>dst</I> - -need not be valid and no result is written, -but the return value is unaffected; -in all other cases, the (possibly truncated) result is NUL-terminated. -The -<I>freeswan.h</I> - -header file defines a constant, -<B>ULTOT_BUF</B>, - -which is the size of a buffer just large enough for worst-case results. -<P> - -The -<I>format</I> - -parameter of -<I>ultot</I> - -must be one of: -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>'o'</B><DD> -octal conversion with leading -<B>0</B> - -<DT><B> 8</B><DD> -octal conversion with no leading -<B>0</B> - -<DT><B>'d'</B><DD> -decimal conversion -<DT><B>10</B><DD> -same as -<B>d</B> - -<DT><B>'x'</B><DD> -hexadecimal conversion, including leading -<B>0x</B> - -<DT><B>16</B><DD> -hexadecimal conversion with no leading -<B>0x</B> - -<DT><B>17</B><DD> -like -<B>16</B> - -except padded on left with -<B>0</B>s - -to eight digits (full width of a 32-bit number) -</DL> -</DL> - -<P> - -<I>Ttoul</I> - -returns NULL for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<I>Ultot</I> - -returns -<B>0</B> - -for a failure, and otherwise -returns the size of buffer which would -be needed to -accommodate the full conversion result, including terminating NUL -(it is the caller's responsibility to check this against the size of -the provided buffer to determine whether truncation has occurred). -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="atol.3.html">atol</A>(3), <A HREF="strtoul.3.html">strtoul</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ttoul</I> - -are: -empty input; -unknown -<I>base</I>; - -non-digit character found; -number too large for an -<B>unsigned long</B>. - -<P> - -Fatal errors in -<I>ultot</I> - -are: -unknown -<I>format</I>. - -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -Conversion of -<B>0</B> - -with format -<B>o</B> - -yields -<B>00</B>. - -<P> - -<I>Ultot</I> - -format -<B>17</B> - -is a bit of a kludge. -<P> - -The restriction of error reports to literal strings -(so that callers don't need to worry about freeing them or copying them) -does limit the precision of error reporting. -<P> - -The error-reporting convention lends itself to slightly obscure code, -because many readers will not think of NULL as signifying success. -A good way to make it clearer is to write something like: -<P> - -<DL COMPACT><DT><DD> -<PRE> -<B>const char *error;</B> - -<B>error = ttoul( /* ... */ );</B> -<B>if (error != NULL) {</B> -<B> /* something went wrong */</B> -</PRE> - -</DL> - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_unspecaddr.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_unspecaddr.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index 92f69d99c..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_unspecaddr.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,166 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_ANYADDR</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_ANYADDR</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 8 Sept 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec anyaddr - get "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec isanyaddr - test address for equality to "any" address -<BR> - -ipsec unspecaddr - get "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec isunspecaddr - test address for equality to "unspecified" address -<BR> - -ipsec loopbackaddr - get loopback address -<BR> - -ipsec isloopbackaddr - test address for equality to loopback address -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *anyaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isanyaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *unspecaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isunspecaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *loopbackaddr(int af, ip_address *dst);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>int isloopbackaddr(const ip_address *src);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions fill in, and test for, special values of the -<I>ip_address</I> - -type. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I> - -fills in the destination -<I>*dst</I> - -with the ``any'' address of address family -<I>af</I> - -(normally -<B>AF_INET</B> - -or -<B>AF_INET6</B>). - -The IPv4 ``any'' address is the one embodied in the old -<B>INADDR_ANY</B> - -macro. -<P> - -<I>Isanyaddr</I> - -returns -<B>1</B> - -if the -<I>src</I> - -address equals the ``any'' address, -and -<B>0</B> - -otherwise. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>unspecaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>isunspecaddr</I> - -tests for, -the ``unspecified'' address, -which may be the same as the ``any'' address. -<P> - -Similarly, -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -supplies, and -<I>islookbackaddr</I> - -tests for, -the loopback address. -<P> - -<I>Anyaddr</I>, - -<I>unspecaddr</I>, - -and -<I>loopbackaddr</I> - -return -<B>NULL</B> - -for success and -a pointer to a string-literal error message for failure; -see DIAGNOSTICS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="inet.3.html">inet</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_addrtot.3.html">ipsec_addrtot</A>(3), <A HREF="ipsec_sameaddr.3.html">ipsec_sameaddr</A>(3) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>DIAGNOSTICS</H2> - -Fatal errors in the address-supplying functions are: -unknown address family. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">DIAGNOSTICS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_verify.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_verify.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 09d04894b..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_verify.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,107 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_VERIFY</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_VERIFY</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 8 June 2002<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec verify - see if FreeSWAN has been installed correctly -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>ipsec</B> - -<B>verify</B> - -[ -<B>--host</B> - - name ] -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<P> - -Invoked without argument, -<I>verify </I> - -examines the local system for a number of common system faults: -IPsec not in path, no secrets file generated, -pluto not running, and IPsec support not present in kernel -(or IPsec module not loaded). -If two or more interfaces are found, it performs checks relevant on an -IPsec gateway: whether IP forwarding is allowed, and if so, -whether MASQ or NAT rules are in play. -<P> - -In addition, -<I>verify </I> - -performs checks relevant to Opportunistic Encryption. -It looks in forward DNS for a TXT record for the system's hostname, and -in reverse DNS for a TXT record for the system's IP addresses. -It checks whether the system has a public IP. -<P> - -The -<B>--host</B> - -option causes -<B>verify</B> - -to look for a TXT record for -<I>name</I> - -in forward and reverse DNS. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<PRE> -/proc/net/ipsec_eroute -/etc/ipsec.secrets -</PRE> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Michael Richardson. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<I>Verify </I> - -does not check for -<B>ipchains</B> - -masquerading. -<P> - -<I>Verify</I> - -does not look for TXT records for Opportunistic clients behind the system. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index bcad75a46..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_VERSION</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_VERSION</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 21 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ipsec_version_code - get IPsec version code -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_version_string - get full IPsec version string -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_copyright_notice - get IPsec copyright notice -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ipsec_version_code(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *ipsec_version_string(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char **ipsec_copyright_notice(void);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions provide information on version numbering and copyright -of the Linux FreeS/WAN IPsec implementation. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_code</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant -containing the current IPsec version code, -such as ``1.92'' or ``snap2001Nov19b''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_string</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant giving a full version identification, -consisting of the version code preceded by a prefix identifying the software, -e.g. ``Linux FreeS/WAN 1.92''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_copyright_notice</I> - -returns a pointer to a vector of pointers, -terminated by a -<B>NULL</B>, - -which is the text of a suitable copyright notice. -Each pointer points to a string constant (possibly empty) which is one line -of the somewhat-verbose copyright notice. -The strings are NUL-terminated and do not contain a newline; -supplying suitable line termination for the output device is -the caller's responsibility. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version.5.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version.5.html deleted file mode 100644 index 89bee0f97..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version.5.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,103 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_VERSION</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_VERSION</H1> -Section: File Formats (5)<BR>Updated: 29 Jun 2000<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec_version - lists KLIPS version information -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>cat</B> - -<B>/proc/net/ipsec_version</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<I>/proc/net/ipsec_version</I> - -is a read-only file which lists the currently running KLIPS version -information. -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>EXAMPLES</H2> - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>FreeS/WAN version: 1.4</B> - -<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -shows that the currently loaded -<B>KLIPS</B> - -is from -<B>FreeS/WAN 1.4.</B> - -<P> - -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -/proc/net/ipsec_version -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_eroute.5.html">ipsec_eroute</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_spi.5.html">ipsec_spi</A>(5), -<A HREF="ipsec_spigrp.5.html">ipsec_spigrp</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_klipsdebug.5.html">ipsec_klipsdebug</A>(5), <A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A>(8), <A HREF="ipsec_pf_key.5.html">ipsec_pf_key</A>(5) -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the Linux FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org/">http://www.freeswan.org/</A>> -by Richard Guy Briggs. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">EXAMPLES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version_code.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version_code.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index bcad75a46..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version_code.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_VERSION</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_VERSION</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 21 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ipsec_version_code - get IPsec version code -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_version_string - get full IPsec version string -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_copyright_notice - get IPsec copyright notice -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ipsec_version_code(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *ipsec_version_string(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char **ipsec_copyright_notice(void);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions provide information on version numbering and copyright -of the Linux FreeS/WAN IPsec implementation. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_code</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant -containing the current IPsec version code, -such as ``1.92'' or ``snap2001Nov19b''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_string</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant giving a full version identification, -consisting of the version code preceded by a prefix identifying the software, -e.g. ``Linux FreeS/WAN 1.92''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_copyright_notice</I> - -returns a pointer to a vector of pointers, -terminated by a -<B>NULL</B>, - -which is the text of a suitable copyright notice. -Each pointer points to a string constant (possibly empty) which is one line -of the somewhat-verbose copyright notice. -The strings are NUL-terminated and do not contain a newline; -supplying suitable line termination for the output device is -the caller's responsibility. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version_string.3.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version_string.3.html deleted file mode 100644 index bcad75a46..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_version_string.3.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,94 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_VERSION</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_VERSION</H1> -Section: C Library Functions (3)<BR>Updated: 21 Nov 2001<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec ipsec_version_code - get IPsec version code -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_version_string - get full IPsec version string -<BR> - -ipsec ipsec_copyright_notice - get IPsec copyright notice -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - -<B>#include <<A HREF="file:/usr/include/freeswan.h">freeswan.h</A>></B> - -<P> -<B>const char *ipsec_version_code(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char *ipsec_version_string(void);</B> - -<BR> - -<B>const char **ipsec_copyright_notice(void);</B> - -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -These functions provide information on version numbering and copyright -of the Linux FreeS/WAN IPsec implementation. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_code</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant -containing the current IPsec version code, -such as ``1.92'' or ``snap2001Nov19b''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_version_string</I> - -returns a pointer to a string constant giving a full version identification, -consisting of the version code preceded by a prefix identifying the software, -e.g. ``Linux FreeS/WAN 1.92''. -<P> - -<I>Ipsec_copyright_notice</I> - -returns a pointer to a vector of pointers, -terminated by a -<B>NULL</B>, - -which is the text of a suitable copyright notice. -Each pointer points to a string constant (possibly empty) which is one line -of the somewhat-verbose copyright notice. -The strings are NUL-terminated and do not contain a newline; -supplying suitable line termination for the output device is -the caller's responsibility. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A>(8) -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">HISTORY</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html b/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2e2ce4c2f..000000000 --- a/doc/manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1824 +0,0 @@ -Content-type: text/html - -<HTML><HEAD><TITLE>Manpage of IPSEC_PLUTO</TITLE> -</HEAD><BODY> -<H1>IPSEC_PLUTO</H1> -Section: Maintenance Commands (8)<BR>Updated: 28 March 1999<BR><A HREF="#index">Index</A> -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">Return to Main Contents</A><HR> - -<A NAME="lbAB"> </A> -<H2>NAME</H2> - -ipsec pluto - IPsec IKE keying daemon -<BR> - -ipsec whack - control interface for IPSEC keying daemon -<A NAME="lbAC"> </A> -<H2>SYNOPSIS</H2> - - - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec pluto -[--help] -[--version] -[--optionsfrom </B><I>filename</I>] -[--nofork] -[--stderrlog] -[--noklips] -[--uniqueids] -[<B>--interface</B> <I>interfacename</I>] -[--ikeport <I>portnumber</I>] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--secretsfile <I>secrets-file</I>] -[--adns <I>pathname</I>] -[--lwdnsq <I>pathname</I>] -[--perpeerlog] -[--perpeerlogbase <I>dirname</I>] -[--debug-none] -[--debug-all] -[--debug-raw] -[--debug-crypt] -[--debug-parsing] -[--debug-emitting] -[--debug-control] -[--debug-lifecycle] -[--debug-klips] -[--debug-dns] -[--debug-oppo] -[--debug-private] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack -[--help] -[--version] -<DT> - -<DD>ipsec whack ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -<BR> - -[--id <I>id</I>] [--host <I>ip-address</I>] -[--ikeport <I>port-number</I>] -[--nexthop <I>ip-address</I>] -[--client <I>subnet</I>] -[--dnskeyondemand] -[--updown <I>updown</I>] -<BR> - ---to -<BR> - -[--id <I>id</I>] -[--host <I>ip-address</I>] -[--ikeport <I>port-number</I>] -[--nexthop <I>ip-address</I>] -[--client <I>subnet</I>] -[--dnskeyondemand] -[--updown <I>updown</I>] -<BR> - -[--psk] -[--rsasig] -[--encrypt] -[--authenticate] -[--compress] -[--tunnel] -[--pfs] -[--disablearrivalcheck] -[--ipv4] -[--ipv6] -[--tunnelipv4] -[--tunnelipv6] -[--ikelifetime <I>seconds</I>] -[--ipseclifetime <I>seconds</I>] -[--rekeymargin <I>seconds</I>] -[--rekeyfuzz <I>percentage</I>] -[--keyingtries <I>count</I>] -[--dontrekey] -[--delete] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---keyid </B><I>id</I> -[--addkey] -[--pubkeyrsa <I>key</I>] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---myid </B><I>id</I> -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---listen|--unlisten -[--ctlbase </B><I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---route|--unroute ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---initiate|--terminate ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -[--asynchronous] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack -[--tunnelipv4] -[--tunnelipv6] ---oppohere </B><I>ip-address</I> ---oppothere <I>ip-address</I> -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---delete ---name </B><I>connection-name</I> -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---deletestate </B><I>state-number</I> -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack -[--name </B><I>connection-name</I>] -[--debug-none] -[--debug-all] -[--debug-raw] -[--debug-crypt] -[--debug-parsing] -[--debug-emitting] -[--debug-control] -[--debug-lifecycle] -[--debug-klips] -[--debug-dns] -[--debug-oppo] -[--debug-private] -[--ctlbase <I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---status -[--ctlbase </B><I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] -<DT> -<B> -<DD>ipsec whack ---shutdown -[--ctlbase </B><I>path</I>] -[--optionsfrom <I>filename</I>] -[--label <I>string</I>] - - - -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAD"> </A> -<H2>DESCRIPTION</H2> - -<B>pluto</B> - -is an IKE (``IPsec Key Exchange'') daemon. -<B>whack</B> - -is an auxiliary program to allow requests to be made to a running -<B>pluto</B>. - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> - -is used to automatically build shared ``security associations'' on a -system that has IPsec, the secure IP protocol. -In other words, -<B>pluto</B> - -can eliminate much of the work of manual keying. -The actual -secure transmission of packets is the responsibility of other parts of -the system (see -<B>KLIPS</B>, - -the companion implementation of IPsec). -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) provides a more convenient interface to -<B>pluto</B> and <B>whack</B>. -<A NAME="lbAE"> </A> -<H3>IKE's Job</H3> - -<P> - -A <I>Security Association</I> (<I>SA</I>) is an agreement between two network nodes on -how to process certain traffic between them. This processing involves -encapsulation, authentication, encryption, or compression. -<P> - -IKE can be deployed on a network node to negotiate Security -Associations for that node. These IKE implementations can only -negotiate with other IKE implementations, so IKE must be on each node -that is to be an endpoint of an IKE-negotiated Security Association. -No other nodes need to be running IKE. -<P> - -An IKE instance (i.e. an IKE implementation on a particular network -node) communicates with another IKE instance using UDP IP packets, so -there must be a route between the nodes in each direction. -<P> - -The negotiation of Security Associations requires a number of choices -that involve tradeoffs between security, convenience, trust, and -efficiency. These are policy issues and are normally specified to the -IKE instance by the system administrator. -<P> - -IKE deals with two kinds of Security Associations. The first part of -a negotiation between IKE instances is to build an ISAKMP SA. An -ISAKMP SA is used to protect communication between the two IKEs. -IPsec SAs can then be built by the IKEs - these are used to carry -protected IP traffic between the systems. -<P> - -The negotiation of the ISAKMP SA is known as Phase 1. In theory, -Phase 1 can be accomplished by a couple of different exchange types, -but we only implement one called Main Mode (we don't implement -Aggressive Mode). -<P> - -Any negotiation under the protection of an ISAKMP SA, including the -negotiation of IPsec SAs, is part of Phase 2. The exchange type -that we use to negotiate an IPsec SA is called Quick Mode. -<P> - -IKE instances must be able to authenticate each other as part of their -negotiation of an ISAKMP SA. This can be done by several mechanisms -described in the draft standards. -<P> - -IKE negotiation can be initiated by any instance with any other. If -both can find an agreeable set of characteristics for a Security -Association, and both recognize each others authenticity, they can set -up a Security Association. The standards do not specify what causes -an IKE instance to initiate a negotiation. -<P> - -In summary, an IKE instance is prepared to automate the management of -Security Associations in an IPsec environment, but a number of issues -are considered policy and are left in the system administrator's hands. -<A NAME="lbAF"> </A> -<H3>Pluto</H3> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> is an implementation of IKE. It runs as a daemon on a network -node. Currently, this network node must be a LINUX system running the -<B>KLIPS</B> implementation of IPsec. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> only implements a subset of IKE. This is enough for it to -interoperate with other instances of <B>pluto</B>, and many other IKE -implementations. We are working on implementing more of IKE. -<P> - -The policy for acceptable characteristics for Security Associations is -mostly hardwired into the code of <B>pluto</B> (spdb.c). Eventually -this will be moved into a security policy database with reasonable -expressive power and more convenience. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> uses shared secrets or RSA signatures to authenticate -peers with whom it is negotiating. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> initiates negotiation of a Security Association when it is -manually prodded: the program <B>whack</B> is run to trigger this. -It will also initiate a negotiation when <B>KLIPS</B> traps an outbound packet -for Opportunistic Encryption. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> implements ISAKMP SAs itself. After it has negotiated the -characteristics of an IPsec SA, it directs <B>KLIPS</B> to implement it. -It also invokes a script to adjust any firewall and issue <I><A HREF="route.8.html">route</A></I>(8) -commands to direct IP packets through <B>KLIPS</B>. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> shuts down, it closes all Security Associations. -<A NAME="lbAG"> </A> -<H3>Before Running Pluto</H3> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> runs as a daemon with userid root. Before running it, a few -things must be set up. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> requires <B>KLIPS</B>, the FreeS/WAN implementation of IPsec. -All of the components of <B>KLIPS</B> and <B>pluto</B> should be installed. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> supports multiple public networks (that is, networks -that are considered insecure and thus need to have their traffic -encrypted or authenticated). It discovers the -public interfaces to use by looking at all interfaces that are -configured (the <B>--interface</B> option can be used to limit -the interfaces considered). -It does this only when <B>whack</B> tells it to --listen, -so the interfaces must be configured by then. Each interface with a name of the form -<B>ipsec</B>[<B>0</B>-<B>9</B>] is taken as a <B>KLIPS</B> virtual public interface. -Another network interface with the same IP address (there should be only -one) is taken as the corresponding real public -interface. <I><A HREF="ifconfig.8.html">ifconfig</A></I>(8) with the <B>-a</B> flag will show -the name and status of each network interface. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> requires a database of preshared secrets and RSA private keys. -This is described in the -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5). - -<B>pluto</B> is told of RSA public keys via <B>whack</B> commands. -If the connection is Opportunistic, and no RSA public key is known, -<B>pluto</B> will attempt to fetch RSA keys using the Domain Name System. -<A NAME="lbAH"> </A> -<H3>Setting up <B>KLIPS</B> for <B>pluto</B></H3> - -<P> - -The most basic network topology that <B>pluto</B> supports has two security -gateways negotiating on behalf of client subnets. The diagram of RGB's -testbed is a good example (see <I>klips/doc/rgb_setup.txt</I>). -<P> - -The file <I>INSTALL</I> in the base directory of this distribution -explains how to start setting up the whole system, including <B>KLIPS</B>. -<P> - -Make sure that the security gateways have routes to each other. This -is usually covered by the default route, but may require issuing -<I><A HREF="route.8.html">route</A></I>(8) - -commands. The route must go through a particular IP -interface (we will assume it is <I>eth0</I>, but it need not be). The -interface that connects the security gateway to its client must be a -different one. -<P> - -It is necessary to issue a -<I><A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A></I>(8) - -command on each gateway. The required command is: -<P> - ipsec tncfg --attach --virtual ipsec0 --physical eth0 -<P> -A command to set up the ipsec0 virtual interface will also need to be -run. It will have the same parameters as the command used to set up -the physical interface to which it has just been connected using -<I><A HREF="ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg</A></I>(8). - -<A NAME="lbAI"> </A> -<H3>ipsec.secrets file</H3> - -<P> - -A <B>pluto</B> daemon and another IKE daemon (for example, another instance -of <B>pluto</B>) must convince each other that they are who they are supposed -to be before any negotiation can succeed. This authentication is -accomplished by using either secrets that have been shared beforehand -(manually) or by using RSA signatures. There are other techniques, -but they have not been implemented in <B>pluto</B>. -<P> - -The file <I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I> is used to keep preshared secret keys -and RSA private keys for -authentication with other IKE daemons. For debugging, there is an -argument to the <B>pluto</B> command to use a different file. -This file is described in -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5). - -<A NAME="lbAJ"> </A> -<H3>Running Pluto</H3> - -<P> - -To fire up the daemon, just type <B>pluto</B> (be sure to be running as -the superuser). -The default IKE port number is 500, the UDP port assigned by IANA for IKE Daemons. -<B>pluto</B> must be run by the superuser to be able to use the UDP 500 port. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> attempts to create a lockfile with the name -<I>/var/run/pluto.pid</I>. If the lockfile cannot be created, -<B>pluto</B> exits - this prevents multiple <B>pluto</B>s from -competing Any ``leftover'' lockfile must be removed before -<B>pluto</B> will run. <B>pluto</B> writes its pid into this file so -that scripts can find it. This lock will not function properly if it -is on an NFS volume (but sharing locks on multiple machines doesn't -make sense anyway). -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> then forks and the parent exits. This is the conventional -``daemon fork''. It can make debugging awkward, so there is an option -to suppress this fork. -<P> - -All logging, including diagnostics, is sent to -<I><A HREF="syslog.3.html">syslog</A></I>(3) - -with facility=authpriv; -it decides where to put these messages (possibly in /var/log/secure). -Since this too can make debugging awkward, there is an option to -steer logging to stderr. -<P> - -If the <B>--perpeerlog</B> option is given, then pluto will open -a log file per connection. By default, this is in /var/log/pluto/peer, -in a subdirectory formed by turning all dot (.) [IPv4} or colon (:) -[IPv6] into slashes (/). -<P> - -The base directory can be changed with the <B>--perpeerlogbase</B>. -<P> - -Once <B>pluto</B> is started, it waits for requests from <B>whack</B>. -<A NAME="lbAK"> </A> -<H3>Pluto's Internal State</H3> - -<P> - -To understand how to use <B>pluto</B>, it is helpful to understand a little -about its internal state. Furthermore, the terminology is needed to decipher -some of the diagnostic messages. -<P> - -The <I>(potential) connection</I> database describes attributes of a -connection. These include the IP addresses of the hosts and client -subnets and the security characteristics desired. <B>pluto</B> -requires this information (simply called a connection) before it can -respond to a request to build an SA. Each connection is given a name -when it is created, and all references are made using this name. -<P> - -During the IKE exchange to build an SA, the information about the -negotiation is represented in a <I>state object</I>. Each state object -reflects how far the negotiation has reached. Once the negotiation is -complete and the SA established, the state object remains to represent -the SA. When the SA is terminated, the state object is discarded. -Each State object is given a serial number and this is used to refer -to the state objects in logged messages. -<P> - -Each state object corresponds to a connection and can be thought of -as an instantiation of that connection. -At any particular time, there may be any number of state objects -corresponding to a particular connection. -Often there is one representing an ISAKMP SA and another representing -an IPsec SA. -<P> - -<B>KLIPS</B> hooks into the routing code in a LINUX kernel. -Traffic to be processed by an IPsec SA must be directed through -<B>KLIPS</B> by routing commands. Furthermore, the processing to be -done is specified by <I>ipsec <A HREF="eroute.8.html">eroute</A>(8)</I> commands. -<B>pluto</B> takes the responsibility of managing both of these special -kinds of routes. -<P> - -Each connection may be routed, and must be while it has an IPsec SA. -The connection specifies the characteristics of the route: the -interface on this machine, the ``gateway'' (the nexthop), -and the peer's client subnet. Two -connections may not be simultaneously routed if they are for the same -peer's client subnet but use different interfaces or gateways -(<B>pluto</B>'s logic does not reflect any advanced routing capabilities). -<P> - -Each eroute is associated with the state object for an IPsec SA -because it has the particular characteristics of the SA. -Two eroutes conflict if they specify the identical local -and remote clients (unlike for routes, the local clients are -taken into account). -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> needs to install a route for a connection, -it must make sure that no conflicting route is in use. If another -connection has a conflicting route, that route will be taken down, as long -as there is no IPsec SA instantiating that connection. -If there is such an IPsec SA, the attempt to install a route will fail. -<P> - -There is an exception. If <B>pluto</B>, as Responder, needs to install -a route to a fixed client subnet for a connection, and there is -already a conflicting route, then the SAs using the route are deleted -to make room for the new SAs. The rationale is that the new -connection is probably more current. The need for this usually is a -product of Road Warrior connections (these are explained later; they -cannot be used to initiate). -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> needs to install an eroute for an IPsec SA (for a -state object), first the state object's connection must be routed (if -this cannot be done, the eroute and SA will not be installed). -If a conflicting eroute is already in place for another connection, -the eroute and SA will not be installed (but note that the routing -exception mentioned above may have already deleted potentially conflicting SAs). -If another IPsec -SA for the same connection already has an eroute, all its outgoing traffic -is taken over by the new eroute. The incoming traffic will still be -processed. This characteristic is exploited during rekeying. -<P> - -All of these routing characteristics are expected change when -<B>KLIPS</B> is modified to use the firewall hooks in the LINUX 2.4.x -kernel. -<A NAME="lbAL"> </A> -<H3>Using Whack</H3> - -<P> - -<B>whack</B> is used to command a running <B>pluto</B>. -<B>whack</B> uses a UNIX domain socket to speak to <B>pluto</B> -(by default, <I>/var/pluto.ctl</I>). -<P> - -<B>whack</B> has an intricate argument syntax. -This syntax allows many different functions to be specified. -The help form shows the usage or version information. -The connection form gives <B>pluto</B> a description of a potential connection. -The public key form informs <B>pluto</B> of the RSA public key for a potential peer. -The delete form deletes a connection description and all SAs corresponding -to it. -The listen form tells <B>pluto</B> to start or stop listening on the public interfaces -for IKE requests from peers. -The route form tells <B>pluto</B> to set up routing for a connection; -the unroute form undoes this. -The initiate form tells <B>pluto</B> to negotiate an SA corresponding to a connection. -The terminate form tells <B>pluto</B> to remove all SAs corresponding to a connection, -including those being negotiated. -The status form displays the <B>pluto</B>'s internal state. -The debug form tells <B>pluto</B> to change the selection of debugging output -``on the fly''. The shutdown form tells -<B>pluto</B> to shut down, deleting all SAs. -<P> - -Most options are specific to one of the forms, and will be described -with that form. There are three options that apply to all forms. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--ctlbase</B> <I>path</I><DD> -<I>path</I>.ctl is used as the UNIX domain socket for talking -to <B>pluto</B>. -This option facilitates debugging. -<DT><B>--optionsfrom</B> <I>filename</I><DD> -adds the contents of the file to the argument list. -<DT><B>--label</B> <I>string</I><DD> -adds the string to all error messages generated by <B>whack</B>. -</DL> -<P> - -The help form of <B>whack</B> is self-explanatory. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--help</B><DD> -display the usage message. -<DT><B>--version</B><DD> -display the version of <B>whack</B>. -</DL> -<P> - -The connection form describes a potential connection to <B>pluto</B>. -<B>pluto</B> needs to know what connections can and should be negotiated. -When <B>pluto</B> is the initiator, it needs to know what to propose. -When <B>pluto</B> is the responder, it needs to know enough to decide whether -is is willing to set up the proposed connection. -<P> - -The description of a potential connection can specify a large number -of details. Each connection has a unique name. This name will appear -in a updown shell command, so it should not contain punctuation -that would make the command ill-formed. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The topology of -a connection is symmetric, so to save space here is half a picture: -<P> - client_subnet<-->host:ikeport<-->nexthop<--- -<P> -A similar trick is used in the flags. The same flag names are used for -both ends. Those before the <B>--to</B> flag describe the left side -and those afterwards describe the right side. When <B>pluto</B> attempts -to use the connection, it decides whether it is the left side or the right -side of the connection, based on the IP numbers of its interfaces. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--id</B> <I>id</I><DD> -the identity of the end. Currently, this can be an IP address (specified -as dotted quad or as a Fully Qualified Domain Name, which will be resolved -immediately) or as a Fully Qualified Domain Name itself (prefixed by ``@'' -to signify that it should not be resolved), or as <A HREF="mailto:user@FQDN">user@FQDN</A>, or as the -magic value <B>%myid</B>. -<B>Pluto</B> only authenticates the identity, and does not use it for -addressing, so, for example, an IP address need not be the one to which -packets are to be sent. If the option is absent, the -identity defaults to the IP address specified by <B>--host</B>. -<B>%myid</B> allows the identity to be separately specified (by the <B>pluto</B> or <B>whack</B> option <B>--myid</B> -or by the <B><A HREF="ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf</A></B>(5) <B>config setup</B> parameter myid). -Otherwise, <B>pluto</B> tries to guess what <B>%myid</B> should stand for: -the IP address of <B>%defaultroute</B>, if it is supported by a suitable TXT record in the reverse domain for that IP address, -or the system's hostname, if it is supported by a suitable TXT record in its forward domain. - -<DT><B>--host</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -<DT><B>--host</B> <B>%any</B><DD> -<DT><B>--host</B> <B>%opportunistic</B><DD> -the IP address of the end (generally the public interface). -If <B>pluto</B> is to act as a responder -for IKE negotiations initiated from unknown IP addresses (the -``Road Warrior'' case), the -IP address should be specified as <B>%any</B> (currently, -the obsolete notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> is also accepted for this). -If <B>pluto</B> is to opportunistically initiate the connection, -use <B>%opportunistic</B> -<DT><B>--ikeport</B> <I>port-number</I><DD> -the UDP port that IKE listens to on that host. The default is 500. -(<B>pluto</B> on this machine uses the port specified by its own command -line argument, so this only affects where <B>pluto</B> sends messages.) -<DT><B>--nexthop</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -where to route packets for the peer's client (presumably for the peer too, -but it will not be used for this). -When <B>pluto</B> installs an IPsec SA, it issues a route command. -It uses the nexthop as the gateway. -The default is the peer's IP address (this can be explicitly written as -<B>%direct</B>; the obsolete notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> is accepted). -This option is necessary if <B>pluto</B>'s host's interface used for sending -packets to the peer is neither point-to-point nor directly connected to the -peer. -<DT><B>--client</B> <I>subnet</I><DD> -the subnet for which the IPsec traffic will be destined. If not specified, -the host will be the client. -The subnet can be specified in any of the forms supported by <I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3). -The general form is <I>address</I>/<I>mask</I>. The <I>address</I> can be either -a domain name or four decimal numbers (specifying octets) separated by dots. -The most convenient form of the <I>mask</I> is a decimal integer, specifying -the number of leading one bits in the mask. So, for example, 10.0.0.0/8 -would specify the class A network ``Net 10''. -<DT><B>--dnskeyondemand]</B><DD> -specifies that when an RSA public key is needed to authenticate this -host, and it isn't already known, fetch it from DNS. -<DT><B>--updown</B> <I>updown</I><DD> -specifies an external shell command to be run whenever <B>pluto</B> -brings up or down a connection. -The script is used to build a shell command, so it may contain positional -parameters, but ought not to have punctuation that would cause the -resulting command to be ill-formed. -The default is <I>ipsec _updown</I>. -<DT><B>--to</B><DD> -separates the specification of the left and right ends of the connection. -</DL> -<P> - -The potential connection description also specifies characteristics of -rekeying and security. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--psk</B><DD> -Propose and allow preshared secret authentication for IKE peers. This authentication -requires that each side use the same secret. May be combined with <B>--rsasig</B>; -at least one must be specified. -<DT><B>--rsasig</B><DD> -Propose and allow RSA signatures for authentication of IKE peers. This authentication -requires that each side have have a private key of its own and know the -public key of its peer. May be combined with <B>--psk</B>; -at least one must be specified. -<DT><B>--encrypt</B><DD> -All proposed or accepted IPsec SAs will include non-null ESP. -The actual choices of transforms are wired into <B>pluto</B>. -<DT><B>--authenticate</B><DD> -All proposed IPsec SAs will include AH. -All accepted IPsec SAs will include AH or ESP with authentication. -The actual choices of transforms are wired into <B>pluto</B>. -Note that this has nothing to do with IKE authentication. -<DT><B>--compress</B><DD> -All proposed IPsec SAs will include IPCOMP (compression). -This will be ignored if KLIPS is not configured with IPCOMP support. -<DT><B>--tunnel</B><DD> -the IPsec SA should use tunneling. Implicit if the SA is for clients. -Must only be used with <B>--authenticate</B> or <B>--encrypt</B>. -<DT><B>--ipv4</B><DD> -The host addresses will be interpreted as IPv4 addresses. This is the -default. Note that for a connection, all host addresses must be of -the same Address Family (IPv4 and IPv6 use different Address Families). -<DT><B>--ipv6</B><DD> -The host addresses (including nexthop) will be interpreted as IPv6 addresses. -Note that for a connection, all host addresses must be of -the same Address Family (IPv4 and IPv6 use different Address Families). -<DT><B>--tunnelipv4</B><DD> -The client addresses will be interpreted as IPv4 addresses. The default is -to match what the host will be. This does not imply <B>--tunnel</B> so the -flag can be safely used when no tunnel is actually specified. -Note that for a connection, all tunnel addresses must be of the same -Address Family. -<DT><B>--tunnelipv6</B><DD> -The client addresses will be interpreted as IPv6 addresses. The default is -to match what the host will be. This does not imply <B>--tunnel</B> so the -flag can be safely used when no tunnel is actually specified. -Note that for a connection, all tunnel addresses must be of the same -Address Family. -<DT><B>--pfs</B><DD> -There should be Perfect Forward Secrecy - new keying material will -be generated for each IPsec SA rather than being derived from the ISAKMP -SA keying material. -Since the group to be used cannot be negotiated (a dubious feature of the -standard), <B>pluto</B> will propose the same group that was used during Phase 1. -We don't implement a stronger form of PFS which would require that the -ISAKMP SA be deleted after the IPSEC SA is negotiated. -<DT><B>--disablearrivalcheck</B><DD> -If the connection is a tunnel, allow packets arriving through the tunnel -to have any source and destination addresses. -</DL> -<P> - -If none of the <B>--encrypt</B>, <B>--authenticate</B>, <B>--compress</B>, -or <B>--pfs</B> flags is given, the initiating the connection will -only build an ISAKMP SA. For such a connection, client subnets have -no meaning and must not be specified. -<P> - -More work is needed to allow for flexible policies. Currently -policy is hardwired in the source file spdb.c. The ISAKMP SAs may use -Oakley groups MODP1024 and MODP1536; 3DES encryption; SHA1-96 -and MD5-96 authentication. The IPsec SAs may use 3DES and -MD5-96 or SHA1-96 for ESP, or just MD5-96 or SHA1-96 for AH. -IPCOMP Compression is always Deflate. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--ikelifetime</B> <I>seconds</I><DD> -how long <B>pluto</B> will propose that an ISAKMP SA be allowed to live. -The default is 3600 (one hour) and the maximum is 28800 (8 hours). -This option will not affect what is accepted. -<B>pluto</B> will reject proposals that exceed the maximum. -<DT><B>--ipseclifetime</B> <I>seconds</I><DD> -how long <B>pluto</B> will propose that an IPsec SA be allowed to live. -The default is 28800 (eight hours) and the maximum is 86400 (one day). -This option will not affect what is accepted. -<B>pluto</B> will reject proposals that exceed the maximum. -<DT><B>--rekeymargin</B> <I>seconds</I><DD> -how long before an SA's expiration should <B>pluto</B> try to negotiate -a replacement SA. This will only happen if <B>pluto</B> was the initiator. -The default is 540 (nine minutes). -<DT><B>--rekeyfuzz</B> <I>percentage</I><DD> -maximum size of random component to add to rekeymargin, expressed as -a percentage of rekeymargin. <B>pluto</B> will select a delay uniformly -distributed within this range. By default, the percentage will be 100. -If greater determinism is desired, specify 0. It may be appropriate -for the percentage to be much larger than 100. -<DT><B>--keyingtries</B> <I>count</I><DD> -how many times <B>pluto</B> should try to negotiate an SA, -either for the first time or for rekeying. -A value of 0 is interpreted as a very large number: never give up. -The default is three. -<DT><B>--dontrekey</B><DD> -A misnomer. -Only rekey a connection if we were the Initiator and there was recent -traffic on the existing connection. -This applies to Phase 1 and Phase 2. -This is currently the only automatic way for a connection to terminate. -It may be useful with Road Warrior or Opportunistic connections. -<BR> - -Since SA lifetime negotiation is take-it-or-leave it, a Responder -normally uses the shorter of the negotiated or the configured lifetime. -This only works because if the lifetime is shorter than negotiated, -the Responder will rekey in time so that everything works. -This interacts badly with <B>--dontrekey</B>. In this case, -the Responder will end up rekeying to rectify a shortfall in an IPsec SA -lifetime; for an ISAKMP SA, the Responder will accept the negotiated -lifetime. -<DT><B>--delete</B><DD> -when used in the connection form, it causes any previous connection -with this name to be deleted before this one is added. Unlike a -normal delete, no diagnostic is produced if there was no previous -connection to delete. Any routing in place for the connection is undone. -</DL> -<P> - -The delete form deletes a named connection description and any -SAs established or negotiations initiated using this connection. -Any routing in place for the connection is undone. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--delete</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The deletestate form deletes the state object with the specified serial number. -This is useful for selectively deleting instances of connections. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--deletestate</B> <I>state-number</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The route form of the <B>whack</B> command tells <B>pluto</B> to set up -routing for a connection. -Although like a traditional route, it uses an ipsec device as a -virtual interface. -Once routing is set up, no packets will be -sent ``in the clear'' to the peer's client specified in the connection. -A TRAP shunt eroute will be installed; if outbound traffic is caught, -Pluto will initiate the connection. -An explicit <B>whack</B> route is not always needed: if it hasn't been -done when an IPsec SA is being installed, one will be automatically attempted. -<P> - -When a routing is attempted for a connection, there must not already -be a routing for a different connection with the same subnet but different -interface or destination, or if -there is, it must not be being used by an IPsec SA. Otherwise the -attempt will fail. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--route</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The unroute form of the <B>whack</B> command tells <B>pluto</B> to undo -a routing. <B>pluto</B> will refuse if an IPsec SA is using the connection. -If another connection is sharing the same routing, it will be left in place. -Without a routing, packets will be sent without encryption or authentication. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--unroute</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The initiate form tells <B>pluto</B> to initiate a negotiation with another -<B>pluto</B> (or other IKE daemon) according to the named connection. -Initiation requires a route that <B>--route</B> would provide; -if none is in place at the time an IPsec SA is being installed, -<B>pluto</B> attempts to set one up. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--initiate</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -<DT><B>--asynchronous<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The initiate form of the whack</B> command will relay back from -<B>pluto</B> status information via the UNIX domain socket (unless ---asynchronous is specified). The status information is meant to -look a bit like that from <B>FTP</B>. Currently <B>whack</B> simply -copies this to stderr. When the request is finished (eg. the SAs are -established or <B>pluto</B> gives up), <B>pluto</B> closes the channel, -causing <B>whack</B> to terminate. -<P> - -The opportunistic initiate form is mainly used for debugging. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--tunnelipv4</B><DD> -<DT><B>--tunnelipv6</B><DD> -<DT><B>--oppohere</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -<DT><B>--oppothere</B> <I>ip-address</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -This will cause <B>pluto</B> to attempt to opportunistically initiate a -connection from here to the there, even if a previous attempt -had been made. -The whack log will show the progress of this attempt. -<P> - -The terminate form tells <B>pluto</B> to delete any SAs that use the specified -connection and to stop any negotiations in process. -It does not prevent new negotiations from starting (the delete form -has this effect). -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--terminate</B><DD> -<DT><B>--name</B> <I>connection-name</I><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The public key for informs <B>pluto</B> of the RSA public key for a potential peer. -Private keys must be kept secret, so they are kept in -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5). - -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--keyid </B><I>id</I><DD> -specififies the identity of the peer for which a public key should be used. -Its form is identical to the identity in the connection. -If no public key is specified, <B>pluto</B> attempts to find KEY records -from DNS for the id (if a FQDN) or through reverse lookup (if an IP address). -Note that there several interesting ways in which this is not secure. -<DT><B>--addkey</B><DD> -specifies that the new key is added to the collection; otherwise the -new key replaces any old ones. -<DT><B>--pubkeyrsa </B><I>key</I><DD> -specifies the value of the RSA public key. It is a sequence of bytes -as described in RFC 2537 ``RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS)''. -It is denoted in a way suitable for <I><A HREF="ipsec_ttodata.3.html">ipsec_ttodata</A></I>(3). -For example, a base 64 numeral starts with 0s. -</DL> -<P> - -The listen form tells <B>pluto</B> to start listening for IKE requests -on its public interfaces. To avoid race conditions, it is normal to -load the appropriate connections into <B>pluto</B> before allowing it -to listen. If <B>pluto</B> isn't listening, it is pointless to -initiate negotiations, so it will refuse requests to do so. Whenever -the listen form is used, <B>pluto</B> looks for public interfaces and -will notice when new ones have been added and when old ones have been -removed. This is also the trigger for <B>pluto</B> to read the -<I>ipsec.secrets</I> file. So listen may useful more than once. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--listen</B><DD> -start listening for IKE traffic on public interfaces. -<DT><B>--unlisten</B><DD> -stop listening for IKE traffic on public interfaces. -</DL> -<P> - -The status form will display information about the internal state of -<B>pluto</B>: information about each potential connection, about -each state object, and about each shunt that <B>pluto</B> is managing -without an associated connection. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--status</B><DD> -</DL> -<P> - -The shutdown form is the proper way to shut down <B>pluto</B>. -It will tear down the SAs on this machine that <B>pluto</B> has negotiated. -It does not inform its peers, so the SAs on their machines remain. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--shutdown</B><DD> -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAM"> </A> -<H3>Examples</H3> - -<P> - -It would be normal to start <B>pluto</B> in one of the system initialization -scripts. It needs to be run by the superuser. Generally, no arguments are needed. -To run in manually, the superuser can simply type -<P> - ipsec pluto -<P> -The command will immediately return, but a <B>pluto</B> process will be left -running, waiting for requests from <B>whack</B> or a peer. -<P> - -Using <B>whack</B>, several potential connections would be described: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> - - ipsec whack --name silly ---host 127.0.0.1 --to --host 127.0.0.2 ---ikelifetime 900 --ipseclifetime 800 --keyingtries 3 - -</DL> -<P> - -<DD>Since this silly connection description specifies neither encryption, -authentication, nor tunneling, it could only be used to establish -an ISAKMP SA. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT> - - ipsec whack --name secret --host 10.0.0.1 --client 10.0.1.0/24 ---to --host 10.0.0.2 --client 10.0.2.0/24 ---encrypt - -</DL> -<P> - -<DD>This is something that must be done on both sides. If the other -side is <B>pluto</B>, the same <B>whack</B> command could be used on it -(the command syntax is designed to not distinguish which end is ours). -<P> - -Now that the connections are specified, <B>pluto</B> is ready to handle -requests and replies via the public interfaces. We must tell it to discover -those interfaces and start accepting messages from peers: -<P> - ipsec whack --listen -<P> - -If we don't immediately wish to bring up a secure connection between -the two clients, we might wish to prevent insecure traffic. -The routing form asks <B>pluto</B> to cause the packets sent from -our client to the peer's client to be routed through the ipsec0 -device; if there is no SA, they will be discarded: -<P> - ipsec whack --route secret -<P> - -Finally, we are ready to get <B>pluto</B> to initiate negotiation -for an IPsec SA (and implicitly, an ISAKMP SA): -<P> - ipsec whack --initiate --name secret -<P> -A small log of interesting events will appear on standard output -(other logging is sent to syslog). -<P> - -<B>whack</B> can also be used to terminate <B>pluto</B> cleanly, tearing down -all SAs that it has negotiated. -<P> - ipsec whack --shutdown -<P> -Notification of any IPSEC SA deletion, but not ISAKMP SA deletion -is sent to the peer. Unfortunately, such Notification is not reliable. -Furthermore, <B>pluto</B> itself ignores Notifications. -<A NAME="lbAN"> </A> -<H3>The updown command</H3> - -<P> - -Whenever <B>pluto</B> brings a connection up or down, it invokes -the updown command. This command is specified using the <B>--updown</B> -option. This allows for customized control over routing and firewall manipulation. -<P> - -The updown is invoked for five different operations. Each of -these operations can be for our client subnet or for our host itself. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>prepare-host</B> or <B>prepare-client</B><DD> -is run before bringing up a new connection if no other connection -with the same clients is up. Generally, this is useful for deleting a -route that might have been set up before <B>pluto</B> was run or -perhaps by some agent not known to <B>pluto</B>. -<DT><B>route-host</B> or <B>route-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing up a connection for a new peer client subnet -(even if <B>prepare-host</B> or <B>prepare-client</B> was run). The -command should install a suitable route. Routing decisions are based -only on the destination (peer's client) subnet address, unlike eroutes -which discriminate based on source too. -<DT><B>unroute-host</B> or <B>unroute-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing down the last connection for a particular peer -client subnet. It should undo what the <B>route-host</B> or <B>route-client</B> -did. -<DT><B>up-host</B> or <B>up-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing up a tunnel eroute with a pair of client subnets -that does not already have a tunnel eroute. -This command should install firewall rules as appropriate. -It is generally a good idea to allow IKE messages (UDP port 500) -travel between the hosts. -<DT><B>down-host</B> or <B>down-client</B><DD> -is run when bringing down the eroute for a pair of client subnets. -This command should delete firewall rules as appropriate. Note that -there may remain some inbound IPsec SAs with these client subnets. -</DL> -<P> - -The script is passed a large number of environment variables to specify -what needs to be done. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>PLUTO_VERSION</B><DD> -indicates what version of this interface is being used. This document -describes version 1.1. This is upwardly compatible with version 1.0. -<DT><B>PLUTO_VERB</B><DD> -specifies the name of the operation to be performed -(<B>prepare-host</B>,r <B>prepare-client</B>, -<B>up-host</B>, <B>up-client</B>, -<B>down-host</B>, or <B>down-client</B>). If the address family for -security gateway to security gateway communications is IPv6, then -a suffix of -v6 is added to the verb. -<DT><B>PLUTO_CONNECTION</B><DD> -is the name of the connection for which we are routing. -<DT><B>PLUTO_NEXT_HOP</B><DD> -is the next hop to which packets bound for the peer must be sent. -<DT><B>PLUTO_INTERFACE</B><DD> -is the name of the ipsec interface to be used. -<DT><B>PLUTO_ME</B><DD> -is the IP address of our host. -<DT><B>PLUTO_MY_CLIENT</B><DD> -is the IP address / count of our client subnet. -If the client is just the host, this will be the host's own IP address / max -(where max is 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). -<DT><B>PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_NET</B><DD> -is the IP address of our client net. -If the client is just the host, this will be the host's own IP address. -<DT><B>PLUTO_MY_CLIENT_MASK</B><DD> -is the mask for our client net. -If the client is just the host, this will be 255.255.255.255. -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER</B><DD> -is the IP address of our peer. -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT</B><DD> -is the IP address / count of the peer's client subnet. -If the client is just the peer, this will be the peer's own IP address / max -(where max is 32 for IPv4 and 128 for IPv6). -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_NET</B><DD> -is the IP address of the peer's client net. -If the client is just the peer, this will be the peer's own IP address. -<DT><B>PLUTO_PEER_CLIENT_MASK</B><DD> -is the mask for the peer's client net. -If the client is just the peer, this will be 255.255.255.255. -</DL> -<P> - -All output sent by the script to stderr or stdout is logged. The -script should return an exit status of 0 if and only if it succeeds. -<P> - -<B>Pluto</B> waits for the script to finish and will not do any other -processing while it is waiting. -The script may assume that <B>pluto</B> will not change anything -while the script runs. -The script should avoid doing anything that takes much time and it -should not issue any command that requires processing by <B>pluto</B>. -Either of these activities could be performed by a background -subprocess of the script. -<A NAME="lbAO"> </A> -<H3>Rekeying</H3> - -<P> - -When an SA that was initiated by <B>pluto</B> has only a bit of -lifetime left, -<B>pluto</B> will initiate the creation of a new SA. This applies to -ISAKMP and IPsec SAs. -The rekeying will be initiated when the SA's remaining lifetime is -less than the rekeymargin plus a random percentage, between 0 and -rekeyfuzz, of the rekeymargin. -<P> - -Similarly, when an SA that was initiated by the peer has only a bit of -lifetime left, <B>pluto</B> will try to initiate the creation of a -replacement. -To give preference to the initiator, this rekeying will only be initiated -when the SA's remaining lifetime is half of rekeymargin. -If rekeying is done by the responder, the roles will be reversed: the -responder for the old SA will be the initiator for the replacement. -The former initiator might also initiate rekeying, so there may -be redundant SAs created. -To avoid these complications, make sure that rekeymargin is generous. -<P> - -One risk of having the former responder initiate is that perhaps -none of its proposals is acceptable to the former initiator -(they have not been used in a successful negotiation). -To reduce the chances of this happening, and to prevent loss of security, -the policy settings are taken from the old SA (this is the case even if -the former initiator is initiating). -These may be stricter than those of the connection. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> will not rekey an SA if that SA is not the most recent of its -type (IPsec or ISAKMP) for its potential connection. -This avoids creating redundant SAs. -<P> - -The random component in the rekeying time (rekeyfuzz) is intended to -make certain pathological patterns of rekeying unstable. If both -sides decide to rekey at the same time, twice as many SAs as necessary -are created. This could become a stable pattern without the -randomness. -<P> - -Another more important case occurs when a security gateway has SAs -with many other security gateways. Each of these connections might -need to be rekeyed at the same time. This would cause a high peek -requirement for resources (network bandwidth, CPU time, entropy for -random numbers). The rekeyfuzz can be used to stagger the rekeying -times. -<P> - -Once a new set of SAs has been negotiated, <B>pluto</B> will never send -traffic on a superseded one. Traffic will be accepted on an old SA -until it expires. -<A NAME="lbAP"> </A> -<H3>Selecting a Connection When Responding: Road Warrior Support</H3> - -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> receives an initial Main Mode message, it needs to -decide which connection this message is for. It picks based solely on -the source and destination IP addresses of the message. There might -be several connections with suitable IP addresses, in which case one -of them is arbitrarily chosen. (The ISAKMP SA proposal contained in -the message could be taken into account, but it is not.) -<P> - -The ISAKMP SA is negotiated before the parties pass further -identifying information, so all ISAKMP SA characteristics specified in -the connection description should be the same for every connection -with the same two host IP addresses. At the moment, the only -characteristic that might differ is authentication method. -<P> - -Up to this point, -all configuring has presumed that the IP addresses -are known to all parties ahead of time. This will not work -when either end is mobile (or assigned a dynamic IP address for other -reasons). We call this situation ``Road Warrior''. It is fairly tricky -and has some important limitations, most of which are features of -the IKE protocol. -<P> - -Only the initiator may be mobile: -the initiator may have an IP number unknown to the responder. When -the responder doesn't recognize the IP address on the first Main Mode -packet, it looks for a connection with itself as one end and <B>%any</B> -as the other. -If it cannot find one, it refuses to negotiate. If it -does find one, it creates a temporary connection that is a duplicate -except with the <B>%any</B> replaced by the source IP address from the -packet; if there was no identity specified for the peer, the new IP -address will be used. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> is using one of these temporary connections and -needs to find the preshared secret or RSA private key in <I>ipsec.secrets</I>, -and and the connection specified no identity for the peer, <B>%any</B> -is used as its identity. After all, the real IP address was apparently -unknown to the configuration, so it is unreasonable to require that -it be used in this table. -<P> - -Part way into the Phase 1 (Main Mode) negotiation using one of these -temporary connection descriptions, <B>pluto</B> will be receive an -Identity Payload. At this point, <B>pluto</B> checks for a more -appropriate connection, one with an identity for the peer that matches -the payload but which would use the same keys so-far used for -authentication. If it finds one, it will switch to using this better -connection (or a temporary derived from this, if it has <B>%any</B> -for the peer's IP address). It may even turn out that no connection -matches the newly discovered identity, including the current connection; -if so, <B>pluto</B> terminates negotiation. -<P> - -Unfortunately, if preshared secret authentication is being used, the -Identity Payload is encrypted using this secret, so the secret must be -selected by the responder without knowing this payload. This -limits there to being at most one preshared secret for all Road Warrior -systems connecting to a host. RSA Signature authentications does not -require that the responder know how to select the initiator's public key -until after the initiator's Identity Payload is decoded (using the -responder's private key, so that must be preselected). -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> is responding to a Quick Mode negotiation via one of these -temporary connection descriptions, it may well find that the subnets -specified by the initiator don't match those in the temporary -connection description. If so, it will look for a connection with -matching subnets, its own host address, a peer address of <B>%any</B> -and matching identities. -If it finds one, a new temporary connection is derived from this one -and used for the Quick Mode negotiation of IPsec SAs. If it does not -find one, <B>pluto</B> terminates negotiation. -<P> - -Be sure to specify an appropriate nexthop for the responder -to send a message to the initiator: <B>pluto</B> has no way of guessing -it (if forwarding isn't required, use an explicit <B>%direct</B> as the nexthop -and the IP address of the initiator will be filled in; the obsolete -notation <B>0.0.0.0</B> is still accepted). -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> has no special provision for the initiator side. The current -(possibly dynamic) IP address and nexthop must be used in defining -connections. These must be -properly configured each time the initiator's IP address changes. -<B>pluto</B> has no mechanism to do this automatically. -<P> - -Although we call this Road Warrior Support, it could also be used to -support encrypted connections with anonymous initiators. The -responder's organization could announce the preshared secret that would be used -with unrecognized initiators and let anyone connect. Of course the initiator's -identity would not be authenticated. -<P> - -If any Road Warrior connections are supported, <B>pluto</B> cannot -reject an exchange initiated by an unknown host until it has -determined that the secret is not shared or the signature is invalid. -This must await the -third Main Mode message from the initiator. If no Road Warrior -connection is supported, the first message from an unknown source -would be rejected. This has implications for ease of debugging -configurations and for denial of service attacks. -<P> - -Although a Road Warrior connection must be initiated by the mobile -side, the other side can and will rekey using the temporary connection -it has created. If the Road Warrior wishes to be able to disconnect, -it is probably wise to set <B>--keyingtries</B> to 1 in the -connection on the non-mobile side to prevent it trying to rekey the -connection. Unfortunately, there is no mechanism to unroute the -connection automatically. -<A NAME="lbAQ"> </A> -<H3>Debugging</H3> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> accepts several optional arguments, useful mostly for debugging. -Except for <B>--interface</B>, each should appear at most once. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--interface</B> <I>interfacename</I><DD> -specifies that the named real public network interface should be considered. -The interface name specified should not be <B>ipsec</B><I>N</I>. -If the option doesn't appear, all interfaces are considered. -To specify several interfaces, use the option once for each. -One use of this option is to specify which interface should be used -when two or more share the same IP address. -<DT><B>--ikeport</B> <I>port-number</I><DD> -changes the UDP port that <B>pluto</B> will use -(default, specified by IANA: 500) -<DT><B>--ctlbase</B> <I>path</I><DD> -basename for control files. -<I>path</I>.ctl is the socket through which <B>whack</B> communicates with -<B>pluto</B>. -<I>path</I>.pid is the lockfile to prevent multiple <B>pluto</B> instances. -The default is <I>/var/run/pluto</I>). -<DT><B>--secretsfile</B> <I>file</I><DD> -specifies the file for authentication secrets -(default: <I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I>). -This name is subject to ``globbing'' as in <I><A HREF="sh.1.html">sh</A></I>(1), -so every file with a matching name is processed. -Quoting is generally needed to prevent the shell from doing the globbing. -<DT><B>--adns</B> <I>pathname</I><DD> -<DT><B>--lwdnsq</B> <I>pathname</I><DD> -specifies where to find <B>pluto</B>'s helper program for asynchronous DNS lookup. -<B>pluto</B> can be built to use one of two helper programs: <B>_pluto_adns</B> -or <B>lwdnsq</B>. You must use the program for which it was built. -By default, <B>pluto</B> will look for the program in -<B>$IPSEC_DIR</B> (if that environment variable is defined) or, failing that, -in the same directory as <B>pluto</B>. -<DT><B>--nofork</B><DD> -disable ``daemon fork'' (default is to fork). In addition, after the -lock file and control socket are created, print the line ``Pluto -initialized'' to standard out. -<DT><B>--noklips</B><DD> -don't actually implement negotiated IPsec SAs -<DT><B>--uniqueids</B><DD> -if this option has been selected, whenever a new ISAKMP SA is -established, any connection with the same Peer ID but a different -Peer IP address is unoriented (causing all its SAs to be deleted). -This helps clean up dangling SAs when a connection is lost and -then regained at another IP address. -<DT><B>--stderrlog</B><DD> -log goes to standard out {default is to use <I><A HREF="syslogd.8.html">syslogd</A></I>(8)) -</DL> -<P> - -For example -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>pluto --secretsfile ipsec.secrets --ctlbase pluto.base --ikeport 8500 --nofork --noklips --stderrlog<DD> -</DL> -<P> - -lets one test <B>pluto</B> without using the superuser account. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> is willing to produce a prodigious amount of debugging -information. To do so, it must be compiled with -DDEBUG. There are -several classes of debugging output, and <B>pluto</B> may be directed to -produce a selection of them. All lines of -debugging output are prefixed with ``| '' to distinguish them from error -messages. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> is invoked, it may be given arguments to specify -which classes to output. The current options are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><B>--debug-raw</B><DD> -show the raw bytes of messages -<DT><B>--debug-crypt</B><DD> -show the encryption and decryption of messages -<DT><B>--debug-parsing</B><DD> -show the structure of input messages -<DT><B>--debug-emitting</B><DD> -show the structure of output messages -<DT><B>--debug-control</B><DD> -show <B>pluto</B>'s decision making -<DT><B>--debug-lifecycle</B><DD> -[this option is temporary] log more detail of lifecycle of SAs -<DT><B>--debug-klips</B><DD> -show <B>pluto</B>'s interaction with <B>KLIPS</B> -<DT><B>--debug-dns</B><DD> -show <B>pluto</B>'s interaction with <B>DNS</B> for KEY and TXT records -<DT><B>--debug-oppo</B><DD> -show why <B>pluto</B> didn't find a suitable DNS TXT record to authorize opportunistic initiation -<DT><B>--debug-all</B><DD> -all of the above -<DT><B>--debug-private</B><DD> -allow debugging output with private keys. -<DT><B>--debug-none</B><DD> -none of the above -</DL> -<P> - -The debug form of the -<B>whack</B> command will change the selection in a running -<B>pluto</B>. -If a connection name is specified, the flags are added whenever -<B>pluto</B> has identified that it is dealing with that connection. -Unfortunately, this is often part way into the operation being observed. -<P> - -For example, to start a <B>pluto</B> with a display of the structure of input -and output: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -pluto --debug-emitting --debug-parsing -</DL> -<P> - -To later change this <B>pluto</B> to only display raw bytes: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -whack --debug-raw -</DL> -<P> - -For testing, SSH's IKE test page is quite useful: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -<I><A HREF="http://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/">http://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/</A></I> -</DL> -<P> - -Hint: ISAKMP SAs are often kept alive by IKEs even after the IPsec SA -is established. This allows future IPsec SA's to be negotiated -directly. If one of the IKEs is restarted, the other may try to use -the ISAKMP SA but the new IKE won't know about it. This can lead to -much confusion. <B>pluto</B> is not yet smart enough to get out of such a -mess. -<A NAME="lbAR"> </A> -<H3>Pluto's Behaviour When Things Go Wrong</H3> - -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> doesn't understand or accept a message, it just -ignores the message. It is not yet capable of communicating the -problem to the other IKE daemon (in the future it might use -Notifications to accomplish this in many cases). It does log a diagnostic. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> gets no response from a message, it resends the same -message (a message will be sent at most three times). This is -appropriate: UDP is unreliable. -<P> - -When pluto gets a message that it has already seen, there are many -cases when it notices and discards it. This too is appropriate for UDP. -<P> - -Combine these three rules, and you can explain many apparently -mysterious behaviours. In a <B>pluto</B> log, retrying isn't usually the -interesting event. The critical thing is either earlier (<B>pluto</B> -got a message which it didn't like and so ignored, so it was still -awaiting an acceptable message and got impatient) or on the other -system (<B>pluto</B> didn't send a reply because it wasn't happy with -the previous message). -<A NAME="lbAS"> </A> -<H3>Notes</H3> - -<P> - -If <B>pluto</B> is compiled without -DKLIPS, it negotiates Security -Associations but never ask the kernel to put them in place and never -makes routing changes. This allows <B>pluto</B> to be tested on systems -without <B>KLIPS</B>, but makes it rather useless. -<P> - -Each IPsec SA is assigned an SPI, a 32-bit number used to refer to the SA. -The IKE protocol lets the destination of the SA choose the SPI. -The range 0 to 0xFF is reserved for IANA. -<B>Pluto</B> also avoids choosing an SPI in the range 0x100 to 0xFFF, -leaving these SPIs free for manual keying. -Remember that the peer, if not <B>pluto</B>, may well chose -SPIs in this range. -<A NAME="lbAT"> </A> -<H3>Policies</H3> - -<P> - -This catalogue of policies may be of use when trying to configure -<B>Pluto</B> and another IKE implementation to interoperate. -<P> - -In Phase 1, only Main Mode is supported. We are not sure that -Aggressive Mode is secure. For one thing, it does not support -identity protection. It may allow more severe Denial Of Service -attacks. -<P> - -No Informational Exchanges are supported. These are optional and -since their delivery is not assured, they must not matter. -It is the case that some IKE implementations won't interoperate -without Informational Exchanges, but we feel they are broken. -<P> - -No Informational Payloads are supported. These are optional, but -useful. It is of concern that these payloads are not authenticated in -Phase 1, nor in those Phase 2 messages authenticated with <A HREF="HASH.3.html">HASH</A>(3). -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>*<DD> -Diffie Hellman Groups MODP 1024 and MODP 1536 (2 and 5) -are supported. -Group MODP768 (1) is not supported because it is too weak. -<DT>*<DD> -Host authetication can be done by RSA Signatures or Pre-Shared -Secrets. -<DT>*<DD> -3DES CBC (Cypher Block Chaining mode) is the only encryption -supported, both for ISAKMP SAs and IPSEC SAs. -<DT>*<DD> -MD5 and SHA1 hashing are supported for packet authentication in both -kinds of SAs. -<DT>*<DD> -The ESP, AH, or AH plus ESP are supported. If, and only if, AH and -ESP are combined, the ESP need not have its own authentication -component. The selection is controlled by the --encrypt and ---authenticate flags. -<DT>*<DD> -Each of these may be combined with IPCOMP Deflate compression, -but only if the potential connection specifies compression and only -if KLIPS is configured with IPCOMP support. -<DT>*<DD> -The IPSEC SAs may be tunnel or transport mode, where appropriate. -The --tunnel flag controls this when <B>pluto</B> is initiating. -<DT>*<DD> -When responding to an ISAKMP SA proposal, the maximum acceptable -lifetime is eight hours. The default is one hour. There is no -minimum. The --ikelifetime flag controls this when <B>pluto</B> -is initiating. -<DT>*<DD> -When responding to an IPSEC SA proposal, the maximum acceptable -lifetime is one day. The default is eight hours. There is no -minimum. The --ipseclifetime flag controls this when <B>pluto</B> -is initiating. -<DT>*<DD> -PFS is acceptable, and will be proposed if the --pfs flag was -specified. The DH group proposed will be the same as negotiated for -Phase 1. -</DL> -<A NAME="lbAU"> </A> -<H2>SIGNALS</H2> - -<P> - -<B>Pluto</B> responds to <B>SIGHUP</B> by issuing a suggestion that ``<B>whack</B> ---listen'' might have been intended. -<P> - -<B>Pluto</B> exits when it recieves <B>SIGTERM</B>. -<A NAME="lbAV"> </A> -<H2>EXIT STATUS</H2> - -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> normally forks a daemon process, so the exit status is -normally a very preliminary result. -<DL COMPACT> -<DT>0<DD> -means that all is OK so far. -<DT>1<DD> -means that something was wrong. -<DT>10<DD> -means that the lock file already exists. -</DL> -<P> - -If <B>whack</B> detects a problem, it will return an exit status of 1. -If it received progress messages from <B>pluto</B>, it returns as status -the value of the numeric prefix from the last such message -that was not a message sent to syslog or a comment -(but the prefix for success is treated as 0). -Otherwise, the exit status is 0. -<A NAME="lbAW"> </A> -<H2>FILES</H2> - -<I>/var/run/pluto.pid</I> -<BR> - -<I>/var/run/pluto.ctl</I> -<BR> - -<I>/etc/ipsec.secrets</I> -<BR> - -<I>$IPSEC_LIBDIR/_pluto_adns</I> -<BR> - -<I>$IPSEC_EXECDIR/lwdnsq</I> -<BR> - -<I>/dev/urandom</I> -<A NAME="lbAX"> </A> -<H2>ENVIRONMENT</H2> - -<I>IPSEC_LIBDIR</I> -<BR> - -<I>IPSEC_EXECDIR</I> -<BR> - -<I>IPSECmyid</I> -<A NAME="lbAY"> </A> -<H2>SEE ALSO</H2> - -<P> - -The rest of the FreeS/WAN distribution, in particular <I><A HREF="ipsec.8.html">ipsec</A></I>(8). -<P> - -<I><A HREF="ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto</A></I>(8) is designed to make using <B>pluto</B> more pleasant. -Use it! -<P> - -<I><A HREF="ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets</A></I>(5) - -describes the format of the secrets file. -<P> - -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr</A></I>(3), part of the FreeS/WAN distribution, describes the -forms that IP addresses may take. -<I><A HREF="ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet</A></I>(3), part of the FreeS/WAN distribution, describes the -forms that subnet specifications. -<P> - -For more information on IPsec, the mailing list, and the relevant -documents, see: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> - -<I><A HREF="http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html">http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html</A></I> - -</DL> -<P> - -At the time of writing, the most relevant IETF RFCs are: -<DL COMPACT> -<DT><DD> -RFC2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) -<DT><DD> -RFC2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) -<DT><DD> -RFC2407 The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP -</DL> -<P> - -The FreeS/WAN web site <<A HREF="htp://www.freeswan.org">htp://www.freeswan.org</A>> -and the mailing lists described there. -<A NAME="lbAZ"> </A> -<H2>HISTORY</H2> - -This code is released under the GPL terms. -See the accompanying file COPYING-2.0 for more details. -The GPL does NOT apply to those pieces of code written by others -which are included in this distribution, except as noted by the -individual authors. -<P> - -This software was originally written -for the FreeS/WAN project -<<A HREF="http://www.freeswan.org">http://www.freeswan.org</A>> -by Angelos D. Keromytis -(<A HREF="mailto:angelos@dsl.cis.upenn.edu">angelos@dsl.cis.upenn.edu</A>), in May/June 1997, in Athens, Greece. -Thanks go to John Ioannidis for his help. -<P> - -It is currently (2000) -being developed and maintained by D. Hugh Redelmeier -(<A HREF="mailto:hugh@mimosa.com">hugh@mimosa.com</A>), in Canada. The regulations of Greece and Canada -allow us to make the code freely redistributable. -<P> - -Kai Martius (<A HREF="mailto:admin@imib.med.tu-dresden.de">admin@imib.med.tu-dresden.de</A>) contributed the initial -version of the code supporting PFS. -<P> - -Richard Guy Briggs <<A HREF="mailto:rgb@conscoop.ottawa.on.ca">rgb@conscoop.ottawa.on.ca</A>> and Peter Onion -<<A HREF="mailto:ponion@srd.bt.co.uk">ponion@srd.bt.co.uk</A>> added the PFKEY2 support. -<P> - -We gratefully acknowledge that we use parts of Eric Young's <I>libdes</I> -package; see <I>../libdes/COPYRIGHT</I>. -<A NAME="lbBA"> </A> -<H2>BUGS</H2> - -<B>pluto</B> - -is a work-in-progress. It currently has many limitations. -For example, it ignores notification messages that it receives, and -it generates only Delete Notifications and those only for IPSEC SAs. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> does not support the Commit Flag. -The Commit Flag is a bad feature of the IKE protocol. -It isn't protected -- neither encrypted nor authenticated. -A man in the middle could turn it on, leading to DoS. -We just ignore it, with a warning. -This should let us interoperate with -implementations that insist on it, with minor damage. -<P> - -<B>pluto</B> does not check that the SA returned by the Responder -is actually one that was proposed. It only checks that the SA is -acceptable. The difference is not large, but can show up in attributes -such as SA lifetime. -<P> - -There is no good way for a connection to be automatically terminated. -This is a problem for Road Warrior and Opportunistic connections. -The <B>--dontrekey</B> option does prevent the SAs from -being rekeyed on expiry. -Additonally, if a Road Warrior connection has a client subnet with a fixed IP -address, a negotiation with that subnet will cause any other -connection instantiations with that same subnet to be unoriented -(deleted, in effect). -See also the --uniqueids option for an extension of this. -<P> - -When <B>pluto</B> sends a message to a peer that has disappeared, -<B>pluto</B> receives incomplete information from the kernel, so it -logs the unsatisfactory message ``some IKE message we sent has been -rejected with ECONNREFUSED (kernel supplied no details)''. John -Denker suggests that this command is useful for tracking down the -source of these problems: -<BR> - -<TT> </TT>tcpdump -i eth0 icmp[0] != 8 and icmp[0] != 0<BR> -<BR> - -Substitute your public interface for eth0 if it is different. -<P> - -The word ``authenticate'' is used for two different features. We must -authenticate each IKE peer to the other. This is an important task of -Phase 1. Each packet must be authenticated, both in IKE and in IPsec, -and the method for IPsec is negotiated as an AH SA or part of an ESP SA. -Unfortunately, the protocol has no mechanism for authenticating the Phase 2 -identities. -<P> - -Bugs should be reported to the <<A HREF="mailto:users@lists.freeswan.org">users@lists.freeswan.org</A>> mailing list. -Caution: we cannot accept -actual code from US residents, or even US citizens living outside the -US, because that would bring FreeS/WAN under US export law. Some -other countries cause similar problems. In general, we would prefer -that you send detailed problem reports rather than code: we want -FreeS/WAN to be unquestionably freely exportable, which means being -very careful about where the code comes from, and for a small bug fix, -that is often more time-consuming than just reinventing the fix -ourselves. -<P> - -<HR> -<A NAME="index"> </A><H2>Index</H2> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAB">NAME</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAC">SYNOPSIS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAD">DESCRIPTION</A><DD> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAE">IKE's Job</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAF">Pluto</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAG">Before Running Pluto</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAH">Setting up <B>KLIPS</B> for <B>pluto</B></A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAI">ipsec.secrets file</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAJ">Running Pluto</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAK">Pluto's Internal State</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAL">Using Whack</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAM">Examples</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAN">The updown command</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAO">Rekeying</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAP">Selecting a Connection When Responding: Road Warrior Support</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAQ">Debugging</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAR">Pluto's Behaviour When Things Go Wrong</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAS">Notes</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAT">Policies</A><DD> -</DL> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAU">SIGNALS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAV">EXIT STATUS</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAW">FILES</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAX">ENVIRONMENT</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAY">SEE ALSO</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbAZ">HISTORY</A><DD> -<DT><A HREF="#lbBA">BUGS</A><DD> -</DL> -<HR> -This document was created by -<A HREF="http://localhost/cgi-bin/man/man2html">man2html</A>, -using the manual pages.<BR> -Time: 21:40:18 GMT, November 11, 2003 -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/manpages.html b/doc/manpages.html deleted file mode 100644 index 81ca11ae0..000000000 --- a/doc/manpages.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,145 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="faq.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="firewall.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="manpages">FreeS/WAN manual pages</A></H1> -<P>The various components of Linux FreeS/WAN are of course documented in - standard Unix manual pages, accessible via the man(1) command.</P> -<P>Links here take you to an HTML version of the man pages.</P> -<H2><A name="man.file">Files</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec configuration and connections</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html">ipsec.secrets(5)</A></DT> -<DD>secrets for IKE authentication, either pre-shared keys or RSA - private keys</DD> -</DL> -<P>These files are also discussed in the<A href="config.html"> - configuration</A> section.</P> -<H2><A name="man.command">Commands</A></H2> -<P>Many users will never give most of the FreeS/WAN commands directly. - Configure the files listed above correctly and everything should be - automatic.</P> -<P>The exceptions are commands for mainpulating the<A href="glossary.html#RSA"> - RSA</A> keys used in Pluto authentication:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_rsasigkey.8.html">ipsec_rsasigkey(8)</A></DT> -<DD>generate keys</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_newhostkey.8.html">ipsec_newhostkey(8)</A></DT> -<DD>generate keys in a convenient format</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_showhostkey.8.html">ipsec_showhostkey(8)</A> -</DT> -<DD>extract<A href="glossary.html#RSA"> RSA</A> keys from<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.secrets.5.html"> - ipsec.secrets(5)</A> (or optionally, another file) and format them for - insertion in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> ipsec.conf(5)</A> or - in DNS records</DD> -</DL> -<P>Note that:</P> -<UL> -<LI>These keys are for<STRONG> authentication only</STRONG>. They are<STRONG> - not secure for encryption</STRONG>.</LI> -<LI>The utility uses random(4) as a source of<A href="glossary.html#random"> - random numbers</A>. This may block for some time if there is not enough - activity on the machine to provide the required entropy. You may want - to give it some bogus activity such as random mouse movements or some - command such as<NOBR> <TT>du /usr > /dev/null &</TT>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The following commands are fairly likely to be used, if only for - testing and status checks:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html">ipsec(8)</A></DT> -<DD>invoke IPsec utilities</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_setup.8.html">ipsec_setup(8)</A></DT> -<DD>control IPsec subsystem</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_auto.8.html">ipsec_auto(8)</A></DT> -<DD>control automatically-keyed IPsec connections</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_manual.8.html">ipsec_manual(8)</A></DT> -<DD>take manually-keyed IPsec connections up and down</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ranbits.8.html">ipsec_ranbits(8)</A></DT> -<DD>generate random bits in ASCII form</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_look.8.html">ipsec_look(8)</A></DT> -<DD>show minimal debugging information</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html">ipsec_barf(8)</A></DT> -<DD>spew out collected IPsec debugging information</DD> -</DL> -<P>The lower-level utilities listed below are normally invoked via - scripts listed above, but they can also be used directly when required.</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_eroute.8.html">ipsec_eroute(8)</A></DT> -<DD>manipulate IPsec extended routing tables</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_klipsdebug.8.html">ipsec_klipsdebug(8)</A></DT> -<DD>set Klips (kernel IPsec support) debug features and level</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html">ipsec_pluto(8)</A></DT> -<DD>IPsec IKE keying daemon</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_spi.8.html">ipsec_spi(8)</A></DT> -<DD>manage IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_spigrp.8.html">ipsec_spigrp(8)</A></DT> -<DD>group/ungroup IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_tncfg.8.html">ipsec_tncfg(8)</A></DT> -<DD>associate IPsec virtual interface with real interface</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_whack.8.html">ipsec_whack(8)</A></DT> -<DD>control interface for IPsec keying daemon</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="man.lib">Library routines</A></H2> -<DL> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atoaddr.3.html">ipsec_atoaddr(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_addrtoa.3.html">ipsec_addrtoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert Internet addresses to and from ASCII</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atosubnet.3.html">ipsec_atosubnet(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_subnettoa.3.html">ipsec_subnettoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert subnet/mask ASCII form to and from addresses</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atoasr.3.html">ipsec_atoasr(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert ASCII to Internet address, subnet, or range</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_rangetoa.3.html">ipsec_rangetoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert Internet address range to ASCII</DD> -<DT>ipsec_atodata(3)</DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_datatoa.3.html">ipsec_datatoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert binary data from and to ASCII formats</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atosa.3.html">ipsec_atosa(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_satoa.3.html">ipsec_satoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert IPsec Security Association IDs to and from ASCII</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_atoul.3.html">ipsec_atoul(3)</A></DT> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_ultoa.3.html">ipsec_ultoa(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert unsigned-long numbers to and from ASCII</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_goodmask.3.html">ipsec_goodmask(3)</A></DT> -<DD>is this Internet subnet mask a valid one?</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_masktobits.3.html">ipsec_masktobits(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert Internet subnet mask to bit count</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_bitstomask.3.html">ipsec_bitstomask(3)</A></DT> -<DD>convert bit count to Internet subnet mask</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_optionsfrom.3.html">ipsec_optionsfrom(3)</A> -</DT> -<DD>read additional ``command-line'' options from file</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_subnetof.3.html">ipsec_subnetof(3)</A></DT> -<DD>given Internet address and subnet mask, return subnet number</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_hostof.3.html">ipsec_hostof(3)</A></DT> -<DD>given Internet address and subnet mask, return host part</DD> -<DT><A href="manpage.d/ipsec_broadcastof.3.html">ipsec_broadcastof(3)</A> -</DT> -<DD>given Internet address and subnet mask, return broadcast address</DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="faq.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="firewall.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/nightly.html b/doc/nightly.html deleted file mode 100644 index 580fc0fc5..000000000 --- a/doc/nightly.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,125 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="makecheck.html">Previous</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="nightly">Nightly regression testing</A></H1> -<P> The nightly regression testing system consists of several shell - scripts and some perl scripts. The goal is to check out a fresh tree, - run "make check" on it, record the results and summarize the results to - the team and to the web site.</P> -<P> Output can be found on<A HREF="http://bugs.freeswan.org:81/"> adams</A> -, although the tests are actually run on another project machine.</P> -<H1><A name="nightlyhowto">How to setup the nightly build</A></H1> -<P> The best way to do nightly testing is to setup a new account. We - call the account "build" - you could call it something else, but there - may still be some references to ~build in the scripts.</P> -<H2><A NAME="42_1"> Files you need to know about</A></H2> -<P> As few files as possible need to be extracted from the source tree - - files are run from the source tree whenever possible. However, there - are some bootstrap and configuration files that are necessary.</P> -<P> There are 7 files in testing/utils that are involved:</P> -<DL> -<DT> nightly-sample.sh</DT> -<DD> This is the root of the build process. This file should be copied - out of the CVS tree, to $HOME/bin/nightly.sh of the build account. This - file should be invoked from cron.</DD> -<DT> freeswan-regress-env-sample.sh</DT> -<DD> This file should be copied to $HOME/freeswan-regress-env.sh. It - should be edited to localize the values. See below.</DD> -<DT> regress-cleanup.pl</DT> -<DD> This file needs to be copied to $HOME/bin/regress-cleanup.pl. It is - invoked by the nightly file before doing anything else. It removes - previous nights builds in order to free up disk space for the build - about to be done.</DD> -<DT> teammail-sample.sh</DT> -<DD> A script used to send results email to the "team". This sample - script could be copied to $HOME/bin/teammail.sh. This version will PGP - encrypt all the output to the team members. If this script is used, - then PGP will have to be properly setup to have the right keys.</DD> -<DT> regress-nightly.sh</DT> -<DD> This is the first stage of the nightly build. This stage will call - other scripts as appropriate, and will extract the source code from - CVS. This script should be copied to $HOME/bin/regress-nightly.sh</DD> -<DT> regress-stage2.sh</DT> -<DD> This is the second stage of the nightly build. It is called in - place. It essentially sets up the UML setup in umlsetup.sh, and calls - "make check".</DD> -<DT> regress-summarize-results.pl</DT> -<DD> This script will summarize the results from the tests to a - permanent directory set by $REGRESSRESULTS. It is invoked from the - stage2 nightly script.</DD> -<DT> regress-chart.sh</DT> -<DD> This script is called at the end of the build process, and will - summarize each night's results (as saved into $REGRESSRESULTS by - regress-summarize-results.pl) as a chart using gnuplot. Note that this - requires at least gnuplot 3.7.2.</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A NAME="42_2">Configuring freeswan-regress-env.sh</A></H2> -<P>For more info on KERNPOOL, UMLPATCH, BASICROOT and SHAREDIR, see<A HREF="umltesting.html"> - User-Mode-Linux testing guide</A>.</P> -<DL> -<DT> KERNPOOL</DT> -<DD> Extract copy of some kernel source to be used for UML builds</DD> -<DT> UMLPATCH</DT> -<DD> matching User-Mode-Linux patch.</DD> -<DT> BASICROOT</DT> -<DD> the root file system image (see<A HREF="umltesting.html"> - User-Mode-Linux testing guide</A>).</DD> -<DT> SHAREDIR=${BASICROOT}/usr/share</DT> -<DD> The /usr/share to use.</DD> -<DT> REGRESSTREE</DT> -<DD> A directory in which to store the nightly regression results. - Directories will be created by date in this tree.</DD> -<DT> TCPDUMP=tcpdump-3.7.1</DT> -<DD> The path to the<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> tcpdump</A> to - use. This must have crypto compiled in, and must be at least 3.7.1</DD> -<DT> KERNEL_RH7_2_SRC=/a3/kernel_sources/linux-2.4.9-13/</DT> -<DD> An extracted copy of the RedHat 7.2. kernel source. If set, then - the packaging/rpm-rh72-install-01 test will be run, and an RPM will be - built as a test.</DD> -<DT> KERNEL_RH7_3_SRC=/a3/kernel_sources/rh/linux-2.4.18-5</DT> -<DD> An extracted copy of the RedHat 7.3. kernel source. If set, then - the packaging/rpm-rh73-install-01 test will be run, and an RPM will be - built as a test.</DD> -<DT> NIGHTLY_WATCHERS="userid,userid,userid"</DT> -<DD> The list of people who should receive nightly output. This is used - by teammail.sh</DD> -<DT> FAILLINES=128</DT> -<DD> How many lines of failed test output to include in the nightly - output</DD> -<DT> PATH=$PATH:/sandel/bin export PATH</DT> -<DD> You can also override the path if necessary here.</DD> -<DT> CVSROOT=:pserver:anoncvs@ip212.xs4net.freeswan.org:/freeswan/MASTER</DT> -<DD> The CVSROOT to use. This example may work for anonymous CVS, but - will be 12 hours behind the primary, and is still experimental</DD> -<DT> SNAPSHOTSIGDIR=$HOME/snapshot-sig</DT> -<DD> For the release tools, where to put the generated per-snapshot - signature keys</DD> -<DT> LASTREL=1.97</DT> -<DD> the name of the last release branch (to find the right per-snapshot - signature</DD> -<DD></DD> -</DL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="makecheck.html">Previous</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/performance.html b/doc/performance.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2258eeeda..000000000 --- a/doc/performance.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,458 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="interop.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="testing.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="performance">Performance of FreeS/WAN</A></H1> - The performance of FreeS/WAN is adequate for most applications. -<P>In normal operation, the main concern is the overhead for encryption, - decryption and authentication of the actual IPsec (<A href="glossary.html#ESP"> -ESP</A> and/or<A href="glossary.html#AH"> AH</A>) data packets. Tunnel - setup and rekeying occur so much less frequently than packet processing - that, in general, their overheads are not worth worrying about.</P> -<P>At startup, however, tunnel setup overheads may be significant. If - you reboot a gateway and it needs to establish many tunnels, expect - some delay. This and other issues for large gateways are discussed<A href="#biggate"> - below</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="pub.bench">Published material</A></H2> -<P>The University of Wales at Aberystwyth has done quite detailed speed - tests and put<A href="http://tsc.llwybr.org.uk/public/reports/SWANTIME/"> - their results</A> on the web.</P> -<P>Davide Cerri's<A href="http://www.linux.it/~davide/doc/"> thesis (in - Italian)</A> includes performance results for FreeS/WAN and for<A href="glossary.html#TLS"> - TLS</A>. He posted an<A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2001-December/006303.html"> - English summary</A> on the mailing list.</P> -<P>Steve Bellovin used one of AT&T Research's FreeS/WAN gateways as his - data source for an analysis of the cache sizes required for key - swapping in IPsec. Available as<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/talks/key-agility.email.txt"> - text</A> or<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/talks/key-agility.pdf"> - PDF slides</A> for a talk on the topic.</P> -<P>See also the NAI work mentioned in the next section.</P> -<H2><A name="perf.estimate">Estimating CPU overheads</A></H2> -<P>We can come up with a formula that roughly relates CPU speed to the - rate of IPsec processing possible. It is far from exact, but should be - usable as a first approximation.</P> -<P>An analysis of authentication overheads for high-speed networks, - including some tests using FreeS/WAN, is on the<A href="http://www.pgp.com/research/nailabs/cryptographic/adaptive-cryptographic.asp"> - NAI Labs site</A>. In particular, see figure 3 in this<A href="http://download.nai.com/products/media/pgp/pdf/acsa_final_report.pdf"> - PDF document</A>. Their estimates of overheads, measured in Pentium II - cycles per byte processed are:</P> -<TABLE align="center" border="1"><TBODY></TBODY> -<TR><TH></TH><TH>IPsec</TH><TH>authentication</TH><TH>encryption</TH><TH> -cycles/byte</TH></TR> -<TR><TD>Linux IP stack alone</TD><TD>no</TD><TD>no</TD><TD>no</TD><TD align="right"> -5</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>IPsec without crypto</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>no</TD><TD>no</TD><TD align="right"> -11</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>IPsec, authentication only</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>SHA-1</TD><TD>no</TD><TD -align="right">24</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>IPsec with encryption</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD>yes</TD><TD -align="right">not tested</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P>Overheads for IPsec with encryption were not tested in the NAI work, - but Antoon Bosselaers'<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~bosselae/fast.html"> - web page</A> gives cost for his optimised Triple DES implementation as - 928 Pentium cycles per block, or 116 per byte. Adding that to the 24 - above, we get 140 cycles per byte for IPsec with encryption.</P> -<P>At 140 cycles per byte, a 140 MHz machine can handle a megabyte -- 8 - megabits -- per second. Speeds for other machines will be proportional - to this. To saturate a link with capacity C megabits per second, you - need a machine running at<VAR> C * 140/8 = C * 17.5</VAR> MHz.</P> -<P>However, that estimate is not precise. It ignores the differences - between:</P> -<UL> -<LI>NAI's test packets and real traffic</LI> -<LI>NAI's Pentium II cycles, Bosselaers' Pentium cycles, and your - machine's cycles</LI> -<LI>different 3DES implementations</LI> -<LI>SHA-1 and MD5</LI> -</UL> -<P>and does not account for some overheads you will almost certainly - have:</P> -<UL> -<LI>communication on the client-side interface</LI> -<LI>switching between multiple tunnels -- re-keying, cache reloading and - so on</LI> -</UL> -<P>so we suggest using<VAR> C * 25</VAR> to get an estimate with a bit - of a built-in safety factor.</P> -<P>This covers only IP and IPsec processing. If you have other loads on - your gateway -- for example if it is also working as a firewall -- then - you will need to add your own safety factor atop that.</P> -<P>This estimate matches empirical data reasonably well. For example, - Metheringham's tests, described<A href="#klips.bench"> below</A>, show - a 733 topping out between 32 and 36 Mbit/second, pushing data as fast - as it can down a 100 Mbit link. Our formula suggests you need at least - an 800 to handle a fully loaded 32 Mbit link. The two results are - consistent.</P> -<P>Some examples using this estimation method:</P> -<TABLE align="center" border="1"><TBODY></TBODY> -<TR><TH colspan="2">Interface</TH><TH colspan="3">Machine speed in MHz</TH> -</TR> -<TR><TH>Type</TH><TH>Mbit per -<BR> second</TH><TH>Estimate -<BR> Mbit*25</TH><TH>Minimum IPSEC gateway</TH><TH>Minimum with other - load -<P>(e.g. firewall)</P> -</TH></TR> -<TR><TD>DSL</TD><TD align="right">1</TD><TD align="right">25 MHz</TD><TD rowspan="2"> -whatever you have</TD><TD rowspan="2">133, or better if you have it</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>cable modem</TD><TD align="right">3</TD><TD align="right">75 MHz</TD> -</TR> -<TR><TD><STRONG>any link, light load</STRONG></TD><TD align="right"><STRONG> -5</STRONG></TD><TD align="right">125 MHz</TD><TD>133</TD><TD>200+,<STRONG> - almost any surplus machine</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Ethernet</TD><TD align="right">10</TD><TD align="right">250 MHz</TD><TD> -surplus 266 or 300</TD><TD>500+</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><STRONG>fast link, moderate load</STRONG></TD><TD align="right"><STRONG> -20</STRONG></TD><TD align="right">500 MHz</TD><TD>500</TD><TD>800+,<STRONG> - any current off-the-shelf PC</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD>T3 or E3</TD><TD align="right">45</TD><TD align="right">1125 MHz</TD><TD> -1200</TD><TD>1500+</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>fast Ethernet</TD><TD align="right">100</TD><TD align="right"> -2500 MHz</TD><TD align="center" colspan="2" rowspan="2">// not feasible - with 3DES in software on current machines //</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OC3</TD><TD align="right">155</TD><TD align="right">3875 MHz</TD> -</TR> -</TABLE> -<P>Such an estimate is far from exact, but should be usable as minimum - requirement for planning. The key observations are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>older<STRONG> surplus machines</STRONG> are fine for IPsec gateways - at loads up to<STRONG> 5 megabits per second</STRONG> or so</LI> -<LI>a<STRONG> mid-range new machine</STRONG> can handle IPsec at rates - up to<STRONG> 20 megabits per second</STRONG> or more</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="perf.more">Higher performance alternatives</A></H3> -<P><A href="glossary.html#AES">AES</A> is a new US government block - cipher standard, designed to replace the obsolete<A href="glossary.html#DES"> - DES</A>. If FreeS/WAN using<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> 3DES</A> is - not fast enough for your application, the AES<A href="web.html#patch"> - patch</A> may help.</P> -<P>To date (March 2002) we have had only one<A href="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/users/2002-February/007771.html"> - mailing list report</A> of measurements with the patch applied. It - indicates that, at least for the tested load on that user's network,<STRONG> - AES roughly doubles IPsec throughput</STRONG>. If further testing - confirms this, it may prove possible to saturate an OC3 link in - software on a high-end box.</P> -<P>Also, some work is being done toward support of<A href="compat.html#hardware"> - hardware IPsec acceleration</A> which might extend the range of - requirements FreeS/WAN could meet.</P> -<H3><A NAME="11_2_2">Other considerations</A></H3> -<P>CPU speed may be the main issue for IPsec performance, but of course - it isn't the only one.</P> -<P>You need good ethernet cards or other network interface hardware to - get the best performance. See this<A href="http://www.ethermanage.com/ethernet/ethernet.html"> - ethernet information</A> page and this<A href="http://www.scyld.com/diag"> - Linux network driver</A> page.</P> -<P>The current FreeS/WAN kernel code is largely single-threaded. It is - SMP safe, and will run just fine on a multiprocessor machine (<A href="compat.html#multiprocessor"> -discussion</A>), but the load within the kernel is not shared - effectively. This means that, for example to saturate a T3 -- which - needs about a 1200 MHz machine -- you cannot expect something like a - dual 800 to do the job.</P> -<P>On the other hand, SMP machines do tend to share loads well so -- - provided one CPU is fast enough for the IPsec work -- a multiprocessor - machine may be ideal for a gateway with a mixed load.</P> -<H2><A name="biggate">Many tunnels from a single gateway</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN allows a single gateway machine to build tunnels to many - others. There may, however, be some problems for large numbers as - indicated in this message from the mailing list:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: Maximum number of ipsec tunnels? - Date: Tue, 18 Apr 2000 - From: "John S. Denker" <jsd@research.att.com> - -Christopher Ferris wrote: - ->> What are the maximum number ipsec tunnels FreeS/WAN can handle?? - -Henry Spencer wrote: - ->There is no particular limit. Some of the setup procedures currently ->scale poorly to large numbers of connections, but there are (clumsy) ->workarounds for that now, and proper fixes are coming. - -1) "Large" numbers means anything over 50 or so. I routinely run boxes -with about 200 tunnels. Once you get more than 50 or so, you need to worry -about several scalability issues: - -a) You need to put a "-" sign in syslogd.conf, and rotate the logs daily -not weekly. - -b) Processor load per tunnel is small unless the tunnel is not up, in which -case a new half-key gets generated every 90 seconds, which can add up if -you've got a lot of down tunnels. - -c) There's other bits of lore you need when running a large number of -tunnels. For instance, systematically keeping the .conf file free of -conflicts requires tools that aren't shipped with the standard freeswan -package. - -d) The pluto startup behavior is quadratic. With 200 tunnels, this eats up -several minutes at every restart. I'm told fixes are coming soon. - -2) Other than item (1b), the CPU load depends mainly on the size of the -pipe attached, not on the number of tunnels. -</PRE> -<P>It is worth noting that item (1b) applies only to repeated attempts - to re-key a data connection (IPsec SA, Phase 2) over an established - keying connection (ISAKMP SA, Phase 1). There are two ways to reduce - this overhead using settings in<A href="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> - ipsec.conf(5)</A>:</P> -<UL> -<LI>set<VAR> keyingtries</VAR> to some small value to limit repetitions</LI> -<LI>set<VAR> keylife</VAR> to a short time so that a failing data - connection will be cleaned up when the keying connection is reset.</LI> -</UL> -<P>The overheads for establishing keying connections (ISAKMP SAs, Phase - 1) are lower because for these Pluto does not perform expensive - operations before receiving a reply from the peer.</P> -<P>A gateway that does a lot of rekeying -- many tunnels and/or low - settings for tunnel lifetimes -- will also need a lot of<A href="glossary.html#random"> - random numbers</A> from the random(4) driver.</P> -<H2><A name="low-end">Low-end systems</A></H2> -<P><EM>Even a 486 can handle a T1 line</EM>, according to this mailing - list message:</P> -<PRE>Subject: Re: linux-ipsec: IPSec Masquerade - Date: Fri, 15 Jan 1999 11:13:22 -0500 - From: Michael Richardson - -. . . A 486/66 has been clocked by Phil Karn to do -10Mb/s encryption.. that uses all the CPU, so half that to get some CPU, -and you have 5Mb/s. 1/3 that for 3DES and you get 1.6Mb/s....</PRE> -<P>and a piece of mail from project technical lead Henry Spencer:</P> -<PRE>Oh yes, and a new timing point for Sandy's docs... A P60 -- yes, a 60MHz -Pentium, talk about antiques -- running a host-to-host tunnel to another -machine shows an FTP throughput (that is, end-to-end results with a real -protocol) of slightly over 5Mbit/s either way. (The other machine is much -faster, the network is 100Mbps, and the ether cards are good ones... so -the P60 is pretty definitely the bottleneck.)</PRE> -<P>From the above, and from general user experience as reported on the - list, it seems clear that a cheap surplus machine -- a reasonable 486, - a minimal Pentium box, a Sparc 5, ... -- can easily handle a home - office or a small company connection using any of:</P> -<UL> -<LI>ADSL service</LI> -<LI>cable modem</LI> -<LI>T1</LI> -<LI>E1</LI> -</UL> -<P>If available, we suggest using a Pentium 133 or better. This should - ensure that, even under maximum load, IPsec will use less than half the - CPU cycles. You then have enough left for other things you may want on - your gateway -- firewalling, web caching, DNS and such.</P> -<H2><A name="klips.bench">Measuring KLIPS</A></H2> -<P>Here is some additional data from the mailing list.</P> -<PRE>Subject: FreeSWAN (specically KLIPS) performance measurements - Date: Thu, 01 Feb 2001 - From: Nigel Metheringham <Nigel.Metheringham@intechnology.co.uk> - -I've spent a happy morning attempting performance tests against KLIPS -(this is due to me not being able to work out the CPU usage of KLIPS so -resorting to the crude measurements of maximum throughput to give a -baseline to work out loading of a box). - -Measurements were done using a set of 4 boxes arranged in a line, each -connected to the next by 100Mbit duplex ethernet. The inner 2 had an -ipsec tunnel between them (shared secret, but I was doing measurements -when the tunnel was up and running - keying should not be an issue -here). The outer pair of boxes were traffic generators or traffic sink. - -The crypt boxes are Compaq DL380s - Uniprocessor PIII/733 with 256K -cache. They have 128M main memory. Nothing significant was running on -the boxes other than freeswan. The kernel was a 2.2.19pre7 patched -with freeswan and ext3. - -Without an ipsec tunnel in the chain (ie the 2 inner boxes just being -100BaseT routers), throughput (measured with ttcp) was between 10644 -and 11320 KB/sec - -With an ipsec tunnel in place, throughput was between 3268 and 3402 -KB/sec - -These measurements are for data pushed across a TCP link, so the -traffic on the wire between the 2 ipsec boxes would have been higher -than this.... - -vmstat (run during some other tests, so not affecting those figures) on -the encrypting box shows approx 50% system & 50% idle CPU - which I -don't believe at all. Interactive feel of the box was significantly -sluggish. - -I also tried running the kernel profiler (see man readprofile) during -test runs. - -A box doing primarily decrypt work showed basically nothing happening - -I assume interrupts were off. -A box doing encrypt work showed the following:- - Ticks Function Load - ~~~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~~~~~ - 956 total 0.0010 - 532 des_encrypt2 0.1330 - 110 MD5Transform 0.0443 - 97 kmalloc 0.1880 - 39 des_encrypt3 0.1336 - 23 speedo_interrupt 0.0298 - 14 skb_copy_expand 0.0250 - 13 ipsec_tunnel_start_xmit 0.0009 - 13 Decode 0.1625 - 11 handle_IRQ_event 0.1019 - 11 .des_ncbc_encrypt_end 0.0229 - 10 speedo_start_xmit 0.0188 - 9 satoa 0.0225 - 8 kfree 0.0118 - 8 ip_fragment 0.0121 - 7 ultoa 0.0365 - 5 speedo_rx 0.0071 - 5 .des_encrypt2_end 5.0000 - 4 _stext 0.0140 - 4 ip_fw_check 0.0035 - 2 rj_match 0.0034 - 2 ipfw_output_check 0.0200 - 2 inet_addr_type 0.0156 - 2 eth_copy_and_sum 0.0139 - 2 dev_get 0.0294 - 2 addrtoa 0.0143 - 1 speedo_tx_buffer_gc 0.0024 - 1 speedo_refill_rx_buf 0.0022 - 1 restore_all 0.0667 - 1 number 0.0020 - 1 net_bh 0.0021 - 1 neigh_connected_output 0.0076 - 1 MD5Final 0.0083 - 1 kmem_cache_free 0.0016 - 1 kmem_cache_alloc 0.0022 - 1 __kfree_skb 0.0060 - 1 ipsec_rcv 0.0001 - 1 ip_rcv 0.0014 - 1 ip_options_fragment 0.0071 - 1 ip_local_deliver 0.0023 - 1 ipfw_forward_check 0.0139 - 1 ip_forward 0.0011 - 1 eth_header 0.0040 - 1 .des_encrypt3_end 0.0833 - 1 des_decrypt3 0.0034 - 1 csum_partial_copy_generic 0.0045 - 1 call_out_firewall 0.0125 - -Hope this data is helpful to someone... however the lack of visibility -into the decrypt side makes things less clear</PRE> -<H2><A name="speed.compress">Speed with compression</A></H2> -<P>Another user reported some results for connections with and without - IP compression:</P> -<PRE>Subject: [Users] Speed with compression - Date: Fri, 29 Jun 2001 - From: John McMonagle <johnm@advocap.org> - -Did a couple tests with compression using the new 1.91 freeswan. - -Running between 2 sites with cable modems. Both using approximately -130 mhz pentium. - -Transferred files with ncftp. - -Compressed file was a 6mb compressed installation file. -Non compressed was 18mb /var/lib/rpm/packages.rpm - - Compressed vpn regular vpn -Compress file 42.59 kBs 42.08 kBs -regular file 110.84 kBs 41.66 kBs - -Load was about 0 either way. -Ping times were very similar a bit above 9 ms. - -Compression looks attractive to me.</PRE> - Later in the same thread, project technical lead Henry Spencer added: -<PRE>> is there a reason not to switch compression on? I have large gateway boxes -> connecting 3 connections, one of them with a measly DS1 link... - -Run some timing tests with and without, with data and loads representative -of what you expect in production. That's the definitive way to decide. -If compression is a net loss, then obviously, leave it turned off. If it -doesn't make much difference, leave it off for simplicity and hence -robustness. If there's a substantial gain, by all means turn it on. - -If both ends support compression and can successfully negotiate a -compressed connection (trivially true if both are FreeS/WAN 1.91), then -the crucial question is CPU cycles. - -Compression has some overhead, so one question is whether *your* data -compresses well enough to save you more CPU cycles (by reducing the volume -of data going through CPU-intensive encryption/decryption) than it costs -you. Last time I ran such tests on data that was reasonably compressible -but not deliberately contrived to be so, this generally was not true -- -compression cost extra CPU cycles -- so compression was worthwhile only if -the link, not the CPU, was the bottleneck. However, that was before the -slow-compression bug was fixed. I haven't had a chance to re-run those -tests yet, but it sounds like I'd probably see a different result. </PRE> - The bug he refers to was a problem with the compression libraries that - had us using C code, rather than assembler, for compression. It was - fixed before 1.91. -<H2><A name="methods">Methods of measuring</A></H2> -<P>If you want to measure the loads FreeS/WAN puts on a system, note - that tools such as top or measurements such as load average are - more-or-less useless for this. They are not designed to measure - something that does most of its work inside the kernel.</P> -<P>Here is a message from FreeS/WAN kernel programmer Richard Guy Briggs - on this:</P> -<PRE>> I have a batch of boxes doing Freeswan stuff. -> I want to measure the CPU loading of the Freeswan tunnels, but am -> having trouble seeing how I get some figures out... -> -> - Keying etc is in userspace so will show up on the per-process -> and load average etc (ie pluto's load) - -Correct. - -> - KLIPS is in the kernel space, and does not show up in load average -> I think also that the KLIPS per-packet processing stuff is running -> as part of an interrupt handler so it does not show up in the -> /proc/stat system_cpu or even idle_cpu figures - -It is not running in interrupt handler. It is in the bottom half. -This is somewhere between user context (careful, this is not -userspace!) and hardware interrupt context. - -> Is this correct, and is there any means of instrumenting how much the -> cpu is being loaded - I don't like the idea of a system running out of -> steam whilst still showing 100% idle CPU :-) - -vmstat seems to do a fairly good job, but use a running tally to get a -good idea. A one-off call to vmstat gives different numbers than a -running stat. To do this, put an interval on your vmstat command -line.</PRE> - and another suggestion from the same thread: -<PRE>Subject: Re: Measuring the CPU usage of Freeswan - Date: Mon, 29 Jan 2001 - From: Patrick Michael Kane <modus@pr.es.to> - -The only truly accurate way to accurately track FreeSWAN CPU usage is to use -a CPU soaker. You run it on an unloaded system as a benchmark, then start up -FreeSWAN and take the difference to determine how much FreeSWAN is eating. -I believe someone has done this in the past, so you may find something in -the FreeSWAN archives. If not, someone recently posted a URL to a CPU -soaker benchmark tool on linux-kernel.</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="interop.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="testing.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/policygroups.html b/doc/policygroups.html deleted file mode 100644 index 6a507b1f6..000000000 --- a/doc/policygroups.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,341 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="quickstart.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="faq.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="4">How to Configure Linux FreeS/WAN with Policy Groups</A></H1> -<A NAME="policygroups"></A> -<H2><A NAME="4_1">What are Policy Groups?</A></H2> -<P><STRONG>Policy Groups</STRONG> are an elegant general mechanism to - configure FreeS/WAN. They are useful for many FreeS/WAN users.</P> -<P>In previous FreeS/WAN versions, you needed to configure each IPsec - connection explicitly, on both local and remote hosts. This could - become complex.</P> -<P>By contrast, Policy Groups allow you to set local IPsec policy for - lists of remote hosts and networks, simply by listing the hosts and - networks which you wish to have special treatment in one of several - Policy Group files. FreeS/WAN then internally creates the connections - needed to implement each policy.</P> -<P>In the next section we describe our five Base Policy Groups, which - you can use to configure IPsec in many useful ways. Later, we will show - you how to create an IPsec VPN using one line of configuration for each - remote host or network.</P> -<A NAME="builtin_policygroups"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_1_1">Built-In Security Options</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN offers these Base Policy Groups:</P> -<DL> -<DT>private</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN only communicates privately with the listed<A HREF="glossary.html#CIDR"> - CIDR</A> blocks. If needed, FreeS/WAN attempts to create a connection - opportunistically. If this fails, FreeS/WAN blocks communication. - Inbound blocking is assumed to be done by the firewall. FreeS/WAN - offers firewall hooks but no modern firewall rules to help with inbound - blocking.</DD> -<DT>private-or-clear</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN prefers private communication with the listed CIDR - blocks. If needed, FreeS/WAN attempts to create a connection - opportunistically. If this fails, FreeS/WAN allows traffic in the - clear.</DD> -<DT>clear-or-private</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN communicates cleartext with the listed CIDR blocks, but - also accepts inbound OE connection requests from them. Also known as<A HREF="glossary.html#passive.OE"> - passive OE (pOE)</A>, this policy may be used to create an<A HREF="glossary.html#responder"> - opportunistic responder</A>.</DD> -<DT>clear</DT> -<DD> FreeS/WAN only communicates cleartext with the listed CIDR blocks.</DD> -<DT>block</DT> -<DD>FreeS/WAN blocks traffic to and from and the listed CIDR blocks. - Inbound blocking is assumed to be done by the firewall. FreeS/WAN - offers firewall hooks but no modern firewall rules to help with inbound - blocking. -<!-- also called "blockdrop".--> -</DD> -</DL> -<A NAME="policy.group.notes"></A> -<P>Notes:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Base Policy Groups apply to communication with this host only.</LI> -<LI>The most specific rule (whether policy or pre-configured connection) - applies. This has several practical applications: -<UL> -<LI>If CIDR blocks overlap, FreeS/WAN chooses the most specific - applicable block.</LI> -<LI>This decision also takes into account any pre-configured connections - you may have.</LI> -<LI>If the most specific connection is a pre-configured connection, the - following procedure applies. If that connection is up, it will be used. - If it is routed, it will be brought up. If it is added, no action will - be taken.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Base Policy Groups are created using built-in connections. Details - in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A>.</LI> -<LI>All Policy Groups are bidirectional.<A HREF="src/policy-groups-table.html"> - This chart</A> shows some technical details. FreeS/WAN does not support - one-way encryption, since it can give users a false sense of security.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="4_2">Using Policy Groups</A></H2> -<P>The Base Policy Groups which build IPsec connections rely on - Opportunistic Encryption. To use the following examples, you must first - become OE-capable, as described in our<A HREF="quickstart.html#quickstart"> - quickstart guide</A>.<A NAME="example1"></A></P> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_1">Example 1: Using a Base Policy Group</A></H3> -<P>Simply place CIDR blocks (<A HREF="#dnswarning">names</A>, IPs or IP - ranges) in /etc/ipsec.d/policies/<VAR>[groupname]</VAR>, and reread the - policy group files.</P> -<P>For example, the<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR> policy tells FreeS/WAN - to prefer encrypted communication to the listed CIDR blocks. Failing - that, it allows talk in the clear.</P> -<P>To make this your default policy, place<A HREF="glossary.html#fullnet"> - fullnet</A> in the<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR> policy group file:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cat /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear - # This file defines the set of CIDRs (network/mask-length) to which - # communication should be private, if possible, but in the clear otherwise. - .... - 0.0.0.0/0</PRE> -<P>and reload your policies with</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>Use<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.test"> this test</A> to verify - opportunistic connections.</P> -<A NAME="example2"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_2">Example 2: Defining IPsec Security Policy with - Groups</A></H3> -<P>Defining IPsec security policy with Base Policy Groups is like - creating a shopping list: just put CIDR blocks in the appropriate group - files. For example:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cd /etc/ipsec.d/policies - [root@xy policies]# cat private - 192.0.2.96/27 # The finance department - 192.0.2.192/29 # HR - 192.0.2.12 # HR gateway - irc.private.example.com # Private IRC server - - [root@xy policies]# cat private-or-clear - 0.0.0.0/0 # My default policy: try to encrypt. - - [root@xy policies]# cat clear - 192.0.2.18/32 # My POP3 server - 192.0.2.19/32 # My Web proxy - - [root@xy policies]# cat block - spamsource.example.com</PRE> -<P>To make these settings take effect, type:</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>Notes:</P> -<UL> -<LI>For opportunistic connection attempts to succeed, all participating - FreeS/WAN hosts and gateways must be configured for OE.</LI> -<LI>Examples 3 through 5 show how to implement a detailed<VAR> private</VAR> - policy.</LI> -<LI><A NAME="dnswarning"></A><FONT COLOR="RED"> Warning:</FONT> Using - DNS names in policy files and ipsec.conf can be tricky. If the name - does not resolve, the policy will not be implemented for that name. It - is therefore safer either to use IPs, or to put any critical names in - /etc/hosts. We plan to implement periodic DNS retry to help with this. -<BR> Names are resolved at FreeS/WAN startup, or when the policies are - reloaded. Unfortunately, name lookup can hold up the startup process. - If you have fast DNS servers, the problem may be less severe.</LI> -</UL> -<A HREF="example3"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_3">Example 3: Creating a Simple IPsec VPN with the<VAR> - private</VAR> Group</A></H3> -<P>You can create an IPsec VPN between several hosts, with only one line - of configuration per host, using the<VAR> private</VAR> policy group.</P> -<P>First, use our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> quickstart guide</A> to set - up each participating host with a FreeS/WAN install and OE.</P> -<P>In one host's<VAR> /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private</VAR>, list the - peers to which you wish to protect traffic. For example:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cd /etc/ipsec.d/policies - [root@xy policies]# cat private - 192.0.2.9 # several hosts at example.com - 192.0.2.11 - 192.0.2.12 - irc.private.example.com -</PRE> -<P>Copy the<VAR> private</VAR> file to each host. Remove the local host, - and add the initial host.</P> -<PRE> scp2 /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private root@192.0.2.12:/etc/ipsec.d/policies/private</PRE> -<P>On each host, reread the policy groups with</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>That's it! You're configured.</P> -<P>Test by pinging between two hosts. After a second or two, traffic - should flow, and</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>should yield something like</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.11/32 -> 192.0.2.8/32 => tun0x149f@192.0.2.8</PRE> -<P>where your host IPs are substituted for 192.0.2.11 and 192.0.2.8.</P> -<P>If traffic does not flow, there may be an error in your OE setup. - Revisit our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> quickstart guide</A>.</P> -<P>Our next two examples show you how to add subnets to this IPsec VPN.</P> -<A NAME="example4"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_4">Example 4: New Policy Groups to Protect a Subnet</A></H3> -<P>To protect traffic to a subnet behind your FreeS/WAN gateway, you'll - need additional DNS records, and new policy groups. To set up the DNS, - see our<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.gate"> quickstart guide</A>. To - create five new policy groups for your subnet, copy these connections - to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>. Substitute your subnet's IPs for - 192.0.2.128/29.</P> -<PRE> -conn private-net - also=private # inherits settings (eg. auto=start) from built in conn - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 # your subnet's IPs here - -conn private-or-clear-net - also=private-or-clear - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 - -conn clear-or-private-net - also=clear-or-private - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 - -conn clear-net - also=clear - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 - -conn block-net - also=block - leftsubnet=192.0.2.128/29 -</PRE> -<P>Copy the gateway's files to serve as the initial policy group files - for the new groups:</P> -<PRE> - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/private-or-clear-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-or-private-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear /etc/ipsec.d/policies/clear-net - cp -p /etc/ipsec.d/policies/block /etc/ipsec.d/policies/block -</PRE> -<P><STRONG>Tip: Since a missing policy group file is equivalent to a - file with no entries, you need only create files for the connections - you'll use.</STRONG></P> -<P>To test one of your new groups, place the fullnet 0.0.0.0/0 in<VAR> - private-or-clear-net</VAR>. Perform the subnet test in<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.test"> - our quickstart guide</A>. You should see a connection, and</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>should include an entry which mentions the subnet node's IP and the - OE test site IP, like this:</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.131/32 -> 192.139.46.77/32 => tun0x149f@192.0.2.11</PRE> -<A HREF="example5"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_2_5">Example 5: Adding a Subnet to the VPN</A></H3> -<P>Suppose you wish to secure traffic to a subnet 192.0.2.192/29 behind - a FreeS/WAN box 192.0.2.12.</P> -<P>First, add DNS entries to configure 192.0.2.12 as an opportunistic - gateway for that subnet. Instructions are in our<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.gate"> - quickstart guide</A>. Next, create a<VAR> private-net</VAR> group on - 192.0.2.12 as described in<A HREF="#example4"> Example 4</A>.</P> -<P>On each other host, add the subnet 192.0.2.192/29 to<VAR> private</VAR> -, yielding for example</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# cd /etc/ipsec.d/policies - [root@xy policies]# cat private - 192.0.2.9 # several hosts at example.com - 192.0.2.11 - 192.0.2.12 # HR department gateway - 192.0.2.192/29 # HR subnet - irc.private.example.com -</PRE> -<P>and reread policy groups with</P> -<PRE> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -<P>That's all the configuration you need.</P> -<P>Test your VPN by pinging from a machine on 192.0.2.192/29 to any - other host:</P> -<PRE> [root@192.0.2.194]# ping 192.0.2.11</PRE> -<P>After a second or two, traffic should flow, and</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>should yield something like</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.11/32 -> 192.0.2.194/32 => tun0x149f@192.0.2.12 -</PRE> -<P>Key:</P> -<TABLE> -<TR><TD>1.</TD><TD>192.0.2.11/32</TD><TD>Local start point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>2.</TD><TD>192.0.2.194/32</TD><TD>Remote end point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>3.</TD><TD>192.0.2.12</TD><TD>Remote FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host). May be the same as (2).</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>4.</TD><TD>[not shown]</TD><TD>Local FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host), where you've produced the output. May be the same as (1).</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P>For additional assurance, you can verify with a packet sniffer that - the traffic is being encrypted.</P> -<P>Note</P> -<UL> -<LI>Because strangers may also connect via OE, this type of VPN may - require a stricter firewalling policy than a conventional VPN.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A NAME="4_3">Appendix</A></H2> -<A NAME="hiddenconn"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_3_1">Our Hidden Connections</A></H3> -<P>Our Base Policy Groups are created using hidden connections. These - are spelled out in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A> - and defined in<VAR> /usr/local/lib/ipsec/_confread</VAR>.</P> -<A NAME="custom_policygroups"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_3_2">Custom Policy Groups</A></H3> -<P>A policy group is built using a special connection description in<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR>, which:</P> -<UL> -<LI>is<STRONG> generic</STRONG>. It uses<VAR> - right=[%group|%opportunisticgroup]</VAR> rather than specific IPs. The - connection is cloned for every name or IP range listed in its Policy - Group file.</LI> -<LI>often has a<STRONG> failure rule</STRONG>. This rule, written<VAR> - failureshunt=[passthrough|drop|reject|none]</VAR>, tells FreeS/WAN what - to do with packets for these CIDRs if it fails to establish the - connection. Default is<VAR> none</VAR>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>To create a new group:</P> -<OL> -<LI>Create its connection definition in<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR>.</LI> -<LI>Create a Policy Group file in<VAR> /etc/ipsec.d/policies</VAR> with - the same name as your connection.</LI> -<LI>Put a CIDR block in that file.</LI> -<LI>Reread groups with<VAR> ipsec auto --rereadgroups</VAR>.</LI> -<LI>Test:<VAR> ping</VAR> to activate any OE connection, and view - results with<VAR> ipsec eroute</VAR>.</LI> -</OL> -<A NAME="disable_oe"></A><A NAME="disable_policygroups"></A> -<H3><A NAME="4_3_3">Disabling Opportunistic Encryption</A></H3> -<P>To disable OE (eg. policy groups and packetdefault), cut and paste - the following lines to<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>:</P> -<PRE>conn block - auto=ignore - -conn private - auto=ignore - -conn private-or-clear - auto=ignore - -conn clear-or-private - auto=ignore - -conn clear - auto=ignore - -conn packetdefault - auto=ignore</PRE> -<P>Restart FreeS/WAN so that the changes take effect:</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup restart</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="quickstart.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="faq.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/politics.html b/doc/politics.html deleted file mode 100644 index 5dd1e9f96..000000000 --- a/doc/politics.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1231 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="umltesting.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="ipsec.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="politics">History and politics of cryptography</A></H1> -<P>Cryptography has a long and interesting history, and has been the - subject of considerable political controversy.</P> -<H2><A name="intro.politics">Introduction</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="26_1_1">History</A></H3> -<P>The classic book on the history of cryptography is David Kahn's<A href="biblio.html#Kahn"> - The Codebreakers</A>. It traces codes and codebreaking from ancient - Egypt to the 20th century.</P> -<P>Diffie and Landau<A href="biblio.html#diffie"> Privacy on the Line: - The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption</A> covers the history from - the First World War to the 1990s, with an emphasis on the US.</P> -<H4>World War II</H4> -<P>During the Second World War, the British "Ultra" project achieved one - of the greatest intelligence triumphs in the history of warfare, - breaking many Axis codes. One major target was the Enigma cipher - machine, a German device whose users were convinced it was unbreakable. - The American "Magic" project had some similar triumphs against Japanese - codes.</P> -<P>There are many books on this period. See our bibliography for - several. Two I particularly like are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Andrew Hodges has done a superb<A href="http://www.turing.org.uk/book/"> - biography</A> of Alan Turing, a key player among the Ultra - codebreakers. Turing was also an important computer pioneer. The terms<A -href="http://www.abelard.org/turpap/turpap.htm"> Turing test</A> and<A href="http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/turing-machine/"> - Turing machine</A> are named for him, as is the<A href="http://www.acm.org"> - ACM</A>'s highest technical<A href="http://www.acm.org/awards/taward.html"> - award</A>.</LI> -<LI>Neal Stephenson's<A href="biblio.html#neal"> Cryptonomicon</A> is a - novel with cryptography central to the plot. Parts of it take place - during WW II, other parts today.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Bletchley Park, where much of the Ultra work was done, now has a - museum and a<A href="http://www.bletchleypark.org.uk/"> web site</A>.</P> -<P>The Ultra work introduced three major innovations.</P> -<UL> -<LI>The first break of Enigma was achieved by Polish Intelligence in - 1931. Until then most code-breakers had been linguists, but a different - approach was needed to break machine ciphers. Polish Intelligence - recruited bright young mathematicians to crack the "unbreakable" - Enigma. When war came in 1939, the Poles told their allies about this, - putting Britain on the road to Ultra. The British also adopted a - mathematical approach.</LI> -<LI>Machines were extensively used in the attacks. First the Polish - "Bombe" for attacking Enigma, then British versions of it, then - machines such as Collosus for attacking other codes. By the end of the - war, some of these machines were beginning to closely resemble digital - computers. After the war, a team at Manchester University, several old - Ultra hands included, built one of the world's first actual - general-purpose digital computers.</LI> -<LI>Ultra made codebreaking a large-scale enterprise, producing - intelligence on an industrial scale. This was not a "black chamber", - not a hidden room in some obscure government building with a small crew - of code-breakers. The whole operation -- from wholesale interception of - enemy communications by stations around the world, through large-scale - code-breaking and analysis of the decrypted material (with an enormous - set of files for cross-referencing), to delivery of intelligence to - field commanders -- was huge, and very carefully managed.</LI> -</UL> -<P>So by the end of the war, Allied code-breakers were expert at - large-scale mechanised code-breaking. The payoffs were enormous.</P> -<H4><A name="postwar">Postwar and Cold War</A></H4> -<P>The wartime innovations were enthusiastically adopted by post-war and - Cold War signals intelligence agencies. Presumably many nations now - have some agency capable of sophisticated attacks on communications - security, and quite a few engage in such activity on a large scale.</P> -<P>America's<A href="glossary.html#NSA"> NSA</A>, for example, is said - to be both the world's largest employer of mathematicians and the - world's largest purchaser of computer equipment. Such claims may be - somewhat exaggerated, but beyond doubt the NSA -- and similar agencies - in other countries -- have some excellent mathematicians, lots of - powerful computers, sophisticated software, and the organisation and - funding to apply them on a large scale. Details of the NSA budget are - secret, but there are some published<A href="http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/nsabudget.html"> - estimates</A>.</P> -<P>Changes in the world's communications systems since WW II have - provided these agencies with new targets. Cracking the codes used on an - enemy's military or diplomatic communications has been common practice - for centuries. Extensive use of radio in war made large-scale attacks - such as Ultra possible. Modern communications make it possible to go - far beyond that. Consider listening in on cell phones, or intercepting - electronic mail, or tapping into the huge volumes of data on new media - such as fiber optics or satellite links. None of these targets existed - in 1950. All of them can be attacked today, and almost certainly are - being attacked.</P> -<P>The Ultra story was not made public until the 1970s. Much of the - recent history of codes and code-breaking has not been made public, and - some of it may never be. Two important books are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Bamford's<A href="biblio.html#puzzle"> The Puzzle Palace</A>, a - history of the NSA</LI> -<LI>Hager's<A href="http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/sp/index.html"> Secret - Power</A>, about the<A href="http://sg.yahoo.com/government/intelligence/echelon_network/"> - Echelon</A> system -- the US, UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand - co-operating to monitor much of the world's communications.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that these books cover only part of what is actually going on, - and then only the activities of nations open and democratic enough that - (some of) what they are doing can be discovered. A full picture, - including:</P> -<UL> -<LI>actions of the English-speaking democracies not covered in those - books</LI> -<LI>actions of other more-or-less sane governments</LI> -<LI>the activities of various more-or-less insane governments</LI> -<LI>possibilities for unauthorized action by government employees</LI> -<LI>possible actions by large non-government organisations: - corporations, criminals, or conspiracies</LI> -</UL> -<P>might be really frightening.</P> -<H4><A name="recent">Recent history -- the crypto wars</A></H4> -<P>Until quite recently, cryptography was primarily a concern of - governments, especially of the military, of spies, and of diplomats. - Much of it was extremely secret.</P> -<P>In recent years, that has changed a great deal. With computers and - networking becoming ubiquitous, cryptography is now important to almost - everyone. Among the developments since the 1970s:</P> -<UL> -<LI>The US gov't established the Data Encryption Standard,<A href="glossary.html#DES"> - DES</A>, a<A href="glossary.html#block"> block cipher</A> for - cryptographic protection of unclassfied documents.</LI> -<LI>DES also became widely used in industry, especially regulated - industries such as banking.</LI> -<LI>Other nations produced their own standards, such as<A href="glossary.html#GOST"> - GOST</A> in the Soviet Union.</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#public">Public key</A> cryptography was - invented by Diffie and Hellman.</LI> -<LI>Academic conferences such as<A href="http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/mihir/crypto2k.html"> - Crypto</A> and<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/"> - Eurocrypt</A> began.</LI> -<LI>Several companies began offerring cryptographic products:<A href="glossary.html#RSAco"> - RSA</A>,<A href="glossary.html#PGPI"> PGP</A>, the many vendors with<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> - PKI</A> products, ...</LI> -<LI>Cryptography appeared in other products: operating systems, word - processors, ...</LI> -<LI>Network protocols based on crypto were developed:<A href="glossary.html#SSH"> - SSH</A>,<A href="glossary.html#SSL"> SSL</A>,<A href="glossary.html#IPsec"> - IPsec</A>, ...</LI> -<LI>Crytography came into widespread use to secure bank cards, - terminals, ...</LI> -<LI>The US government replaced<A href="glossary.html#DES"> DES</A> with - the much stronger Advanced Encryption Standard,<A href="glossary.html#AES"> - AES</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>This has led to a complex ongoing battle between various mainly - government groups wanting to control the spread of crypto and various - others, notably the computer industry and the<A href="http://online.offshore.com.ai/security/"> - cypherpunk</A> crypto advocates, wanting to encourage widespread use.</P> -<P>Steven Levy has written a fine history of much of this, called<A href="biblio.html#crypto"> - Crypto: How the Code rebels Beat the Government -- Saving Privacy in - the Digital Age</A>.</P> -<P>The FreeS/WAN project is to a large extent an outgrowth of cypherpunk - ideas. Our reasons for doing the project can be seen in these quotes - from the<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Crypto_misc/cypherpunk.manifesto"> - Cypherpunk Manifesto</A>:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> Privacy is necessary for an open society in the electronic - age. ... -<P>We cannot expect governments, corporations, or other large, faceless - organizations to grant us privacy out of their beneficence. It is to - their advantage to speak of us, and we should expect that they will - speak. ...</P> -<P>We must defend our own privacy if we expect to have any. ...</P> -<P>Cypherpunks write code. We know that someone has to write software to - defend privacy, and since we can't get privacy unless we all do, we're - going to write it. We publish our code so that our fellow Cypherpunks - may practice and play with it. Our code is free for all to use, - worldwide. We don't much care if you don't approve of the software we - write. We know that software can't be destroyed and that a widely - dispersed system can't be shut down.</P> -<P>Cypherpunks deplore regulations on cryptography, for encryption is - fundamentally a private act. ...</P> -<P>For privacy to be widespread it must be part of a social contract. - People must come and together deploy these systems for the common good. - ...</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>To quote project leader John Gilmore:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> We are literally in a race between our ability to build and - deploy technology, and their ability to build and deploy laws and - treaties. Neither side is likely to back down or wise up until it has - definitively lost the race.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>If FreeS/WAN reaches its goal of making<A href="intro.html#opp.intro"> - opportunistic encryption</A> widespread so that secure communication - can become the default for a large part of the net, we will have struck - a major blow.</P> -<H3><A name="intro.poli">Politics</A></H3> -<P>The political problem is that nearly all governments want to monitor - their enemies' communications, and some want to monitor their citizens. - They may be very interested in protecting some of their own - communications, and often some types of business communication, but not - in having everyone able to communicate securely. They therefore attempt - to restrict availability of strong cryptography as much as possible.</P> -<P>Things various governments have tried or are trying include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Echelon, a monitor-the-world project of the US, UK, NZ, Australian - and Canadian<A href="glossary.html#SIGINT"> signals intelligence</A> - agencies. See this<A href="http://sg.yahoo.com/government/intelligence/echelon_network/"> - collection</A> of links and this<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2640682,00.html"> - story</A> on the French Parliament's reaction.</LI> -<LI>Others governments may well have their own Echelon-like projects. To - quote the Dutch Minister of Defense, as reported in a German<A href="http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/4729/1.html"> - magazine</A>:<BLOCKQUOTE> The government believes not only the - governments associated with Echelon are able to intercept communication - systems, but that it is an activity of the investigative authorities - and intelligence services of many countries with governments of - different political signature.</BLOCKQUOTE> Even if they have nothing - on the scale of Echelon, most intelligence agencies and police forces - certainly have some interception capability.</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#NSA">NSA</A> tapping of submarine - communication cables, described in<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2764372,00.html"> - this article</A></LI> -<LI>A proposal for international co-operation on<A href="http://www.heise.de/tp/english/special/enfo/4306/1.html"> - Internet surveillance</A>.</LI> -<LI>Alleged<A href="http://cryptome.org/nsa-sabotage.htm"> sabotage</A> - of security products by the<A href="glossary.html#NSA"> NSA</A> (the US - signals intelligence agency).</LI> -<LI>The German armed forces and some government departments will stop - using American software for fear of NSA "back doors", according to this<A -href="http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/4/17679.html"> news story</A> -.</LI> -<LI>The British Regulation of Investigatory Powers bill. See this<A href="http://www.fipr.org/rip/index.html"> - web page.</A> and perhaps this<A href="http://ars.userfriendly.org/cartoons/?id=20000806&mode=classic"> - cartoon</A>.</LI> -<LI>A Russian<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/Foreign_and_local/Russia/russian_crypto_ban_english.edict"> - ban</A> on cryptography</LI> -<LI>Chinese<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Misc/Publications/Declan_McCullagh/www/global/china"> - controls</A> on net use.</LI> -<LI>The FBI's carnivore system for covert searches of email. See this<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2601502,00.html"> - news coverage</A> and this<A href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/carnivore-risks.html"> - risk assessment</A>. The government had an external review of some - aspects of this system done. See this<A href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/carnivore_report_comments.html"> - analysis</A> of that review. Possible defenses against Carnivore - include: -<UL> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#PGP">PGP</A> for end-to-end mail encryption</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.home.aone.net.au/qualcomm/">secure sendmail</A> - for server-to-server encryption</LI> -<LI>IPsec encryption on the underlying IP network</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>export laws restricting strong cryptography as a munition. See<A href="#exlaw"> - discussion</A> below.</LI> -<LI>various attempts to convince people that fundamentally flawed - cryptography, such as encryption with a<A href="#escrow"> back door</A> - for government access to data or with<A href="#shortkeys"> inadequate - key lengths</A>, was adequate for their needs.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Of course governments are by no means the only threat to privacy and - security on the net. Other threats include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>industrial espionage, as for example in this<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2626931,00.html"> - news story</A></LI> -<LI>attacks by organised criminals, as in this<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/alerts/NTE-bank.htm"> - large-scale attack</A></LI> -<LI>collection of personal data by various companies. -<UL> -<LI>for example, consider the various corporate winners of Privacy - International's<A href="http://www.privacyinternational.org/bigbrother/"> - Big Brother Awards</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.zeroknowledge.com">Zero Knowledge</A> sell tools - to defend against this</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>individuals may also be a threat in a variety of ways and for a - variety of reasons</LI> -<LI>in particular, an individual with access to government or industry - data collections could do considerable damage using that data in - unauthorized ways.</LI> -</UL> -<P>One<A href="http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2640674,00.html"> - study</A> enumerates threats and possible responses for small and - medium businesses. VPNs are a key part of the suggested strategy.</P> -<P>We consider privacy a human right. See the UN's<A href="http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html"> - Universal Declaration of Human Rights</A>, article twelve:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with - his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his - honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the - law against such interference or attacks.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>Our objective is to help make privacy possible on the Internet using - cryptography strong enough not even those well-funded government - agencies are likely to break it. If we can do that, the chances of - anyone else breaking it are negliible.</P> -<H3><A NAME="26_1_3">Links</A></H3> -<P>Many groups are working in different ways to defend privacy on the - net and elsewhere. Please consider contributing to one or more of these - groups:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the EFF's<A href="http://www.eff.org/crypto/"> Privacy Now!</A> - campaign</LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.gilc.org"> Global Internet Liberty Campaign</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cpsr.org/program/privacy/privacy.html">Computer - Professionals for Social Responsibility</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>For more on these issues see:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Steven Levy (Newsweek's chief technology writer and author of the - classic "Hackers") new book<A href="biblio.html#crypto"> Crypto: How - the Code Rebels Beat the Government--Saving Privacy in the Digital Age</A> -</LI> -<LI>Simson Garfinkel (Boston Globe columnist and author of books on<A href="biblio.html#PGP"> - PGP</A> and<A href="biblio.html#practical"> Unix Security</A>) book<A href="biblio.html#Garfinkel"> - Database Nation: the death of privacy in the 21st century</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There are several collections of<A href="web.html#quotes"> crypto - quotes</A> on the net.</P> -<P>See also the<A href="biblio.html"> bibliography</A> and our list of<A href="web.html#policy"> - web references</A> on cryptography law and policy.</P> -<H3><A NAME="26_1_4">Outline of this section</A></H3> -<P>The remainder of this section includes two pieces of writing by our - project leader</P> -<UL> -<LI>his<A href="#gilmore"> rationale</A> for starting this</LI> -<LI>another<A href="#policestate"> discussion</A> of project goals</LI> -</UL> -<P>and discussions of:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="#desnotsecure">why we do not use DES</A></LI> -<LI><A href="#exlaw">cryptography export laws</A></LI> -<LI>why<A href="#escrow"> government access to keys</A> is not a good - idea</LI> -<LI>the myth that<A href="#shortkeys"> short keys</A> are adequate for - some security requirements</LI> -</UL> -<P>and a section on<A href="#press"> press coverage of FreeS/WAN</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="leader">From our project leader</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN project founder John Gilmore wrote a web page about why we - are doing this. The version below is slightly edited, to fit this - format and to update some links. For a version without these edits, see - his<A href="http://www.toad.com/gnu/"> home page</A>.</P> -<CENTER> -<H3><A name="gilmore">Swan: Securing the Internet against Wiretapping</A> -</H3> -</CENTER> -<P>My project for 1996 was to<B> secure 5% of the Internet traffic - against passive wiretapping</B>. It didn't happen in 1996, so I'm still - working on it in 1997, 1998, and 1999! If we get 5% in 1999 or 2000, we - can secure 20% the next year, against both active and passive attacks; - and 80% the following year. Soon the whole Internet will be private and - secure. The project is called S/WAN or S/Wan or Swan for Secure Wide - Area Network; since it's free software, we call it FreeSwan to - distinguish it from various commercial implementations.<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsa/SWAN/"> - RSA</A> came up with the term "S/WAN". Our main web site is at<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - http://www.freeswan.org/</A>. Want to help?</P> -<P>The idea is to deploy PC-based boxes that will sit between your local - area network and the Internet (near your firewall or router) which - opportunistically encrypt your Internet packets. Whenever you talk to a - machine (like a Web site) that doesn't support encryption, your traffic - goes out "in the clear" as usual. Whenever you connect to a machine - that does support this kind of encryption, this box automatically - encrypts all your packets, and decrypts the ones that come in. In - effect, each packet gets put into an "envelope" on one side of the net, - and removed from the envelope when it reaches its destination. This - works for all kinds of Internet traffic, including Web access, Telnet, - FTP, email, IRC, Usenet, etc.</P> -<P>The encryption boxes are standard PC's that use freely available - Linux software that you can download over the Internet or install from - a cheap CDROM.</P> -<P>This wasn't just my idea; lots of people have been working on it for - years. The encryption protocols for these boxes are called<A href="glossary.html#IPsec"> - IPSEC (IP Security)</A>. They have been developed by the<A href="http://www.ietf.cnri.reston.va.us/html.charters/ipsec-charter.html"> - IP Security Working Group</A> of the<A href="http://www.ietf.org/"> - Internet Engineering Task Force</A>, and will be a standard part of the - next major version of the Internet protocols (<A href="http://playground.sun.com/pub/ipng/html/ipng-main.html"> -IPv6</A>). For today's (IP version 4) Internet, they are an option.</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.iab.org/iab"> Internet Architecture Board</A> - and<A href="http://www.ietf.org/"> Internet Engineering Steering Group</A> - have taken a<A href="iab-iesg.stmt"> strong stand</A> that the Internet - should use powerful encryption to provide security and privacy. I think - these protocols are the best chance to do that, because they can be - deployed very easily, without changing your hardware or software or - retraining your users. They offer the best security we know how to - build, using the Triple-DES, RSA, and Diffie-Hellman algorithms.</P> -<P>This "opportunistic encryption box" offers the "fax effect". As each - person installs one for their own use, it becomes more valuable for - their neighbors to install one too, because there's one more person to - use it with. The software automatically notices each newly installed - box, and doesn't require a network administrator to reconfigure it. - Instead of "virtual private networks" we have a "REAL private network"; - we add privacy to the real network instead of layering a - manually-maintained virtual network on top of an insecure Internet.</P> -<H4>Deployment of IPSEC</H4> -<P>The US government would like to control the deployment of IP Security - with its<A href="#exlaw"> crypto export laws</A>. This isn't a problem - for my effort, because the cryptographic work is happening outside the - United States. A foreign philanthropist, and others, have donated the - resources required to add these protocols to the Linux operating - system.<A href="http://www.linux.org/"> Linux</A> is a complete, freely - available operating system for IBM PC's and several kinds of - workstation, which is compatible with Unix. It was written by Linus - Torvalds, and is still maintained by a talented team of expert - programmers working all over the world and coordinating over the - Internet. Linux is distributed under the<A href="glossary.html#GPL"> - GNU Public License</A>, which gives everyone the right to copy it, - improve it, give it to their friends, sell it commercially, or do just - about anything else with it, without paying anyone for the privilege.</P> -<P>Organizations that want to secure their network will be able to put - two Ethernet cards into an IBM PC, install Linux on it from a $30 CDROM - or by downloading it over the net, and plug it in between their - Ethernet and their Internet link or firewall. That's all they'll have - to do to encrypt their Internet traffic everywhere outside their own - local area network.</P> -<P>Travelers will be able to run Linux on their laptops, to secure their - connection back to their home network (and to everywhere else that they - connect to, such as customer sites). Anyone who runs Linux on a - standalone PC will also be able to secure their network connections, - without changing their application software or how they operate their - computer from day to day.</P> -<P>There will also be numerous commercially available firewalls that use - this technology.<A href="http://www.rsa.com/"> RSA Data Security</A> is - coordinating the<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsa/SWAN"> S/Wan (Secure - Wide Area Network)</A> project among more than a dozen vendors who use - these protocols. There's a<A href="http://www.rsa.com/rsa/SWAN/swan_test.htm"> - compatability chart</A> that shows which vendors have tested their - boxes against which other vendors to guarantee interoperatility.</P> -<P>Eventually it will also move into the operating systems and - networking protocol stacks of major vendors. This will probably take - longer, because those vendors will have to figure out what they want to - do about the export controls.</P> -<H4>Current status</H4> -<P>My initial goal of securing 5% of the net by Christmas '96 was not - met. It was an ambitious goal, and inspired me and others to work hard, - but was ultimately too ambitious. The protocols were in an early stage - of development, and needed a lot more protocol design before they could - be implemented. As of April 1999, we have released version 1.0 of the - software (<A href="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/freeswan/freeswan-1.0.tar.gz"> -freeswan-1.0.tar.gz</A>), which is suitable for setting up Virtual - Private Networks using shared secrets for authentication. It does not - yet do opportunistic encryption, or use DNSSEC for authentication; - those features are coming in a future release.</P> -<DL> -<DT>Protocols</DT> -<DD>The low-level encrypted packet formats are defined. The system for - publishing keys and providing secure domain name service is defined. - The IP Security working group has settled on an NSA-sponsored protocol - for key agreement (called ISAKMP/Oakley), but it is still being worked - on, as the protocol and its documentation is too complex and - incomplete. There are prototype implementations of ISAKMP. The protocol - is not yet defined to enable opportunistic encryption or the use of - DNSSEC keys.</DD> -<DT>Linux Implementation</DT> -<DD>The Linux implementation has reached its first major release and is - ready for production use in manually-configured networks, using Linux - kernel version 2.0.36.</DD> -<DT>Domain Name System Security</DT> -<DD>There is now a release of BIND 8.2 that includes most DNS Security - features. -<P>The first prototype implementation of Domain Name System Security was - funded by<A href="glossary.html#DARPA"> DARPA</A> as part of their<A href="http://www.darpa.mil/ito/research/is/index.html"> - Information Survivability program</A>.<A href="http://www.tis.com"> - Trusted Information Systems</A> wrote a modified version of<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - BIND</A>, the widely-used Berkeley implementation of the Domain Name - System.</P> -<P>TIS, ISC, and I merged the prototype into the standard version of - BIND. The first production version that supports KEY and SIG records is<B> - bind-4.9.5</B>. This or any later version of BIND will do for - publishing keys. It is available from the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - Internet Software Consortium</A>. This version of BIND is not - export-controlled since it does not contain any cryptography. Later - releases starting with BIND 8.2 include cryptography for authenticating - DNS records, which is also exportable. Better documentation is needed.</P> -</DD> -</DL> -<H4>Why?</H4> -<P>Because I can. I have made enough money from several successful - startup companies, that for a while I don't have to work to support - myself. I spend my energies and money creating the kind of world that - I'd like to live in and that I'd like my (future) kids to live in. - Keeping and improving on the civil rights we have in the United States, - as we move more of our lives into cyberspace, is a particular goal of - mine.</P> -<H4>What You Can Do</H4> -<DL> -<DT>Install the latest BIND at your site.</DT> -<DD>You won't be able to publish any keys for your domain, until you - have upgraded your copy of BIND. The thing you really need from it is - the new version of<I> named</I>, the Name Daemon, which knows about the - new KEY and SIG record types. So, download it from the<A href="http://www.isc.org/bind.html"> - Internet Software Consortium</A> and install it on your name server - machine (or get your system administrator, or Internet Service - Provider, to install it). Both your primary DNS site and all of your - secondary DNS sites will need the new release before you will be able - to publish your keys. You can tell which sites this is by running the - Unix command "dig MYDOMAIN ns" and seeing which sites are mentioned in - your NS (name server) records.</DD> -<DT>Set up a Linux system and run a 2.0.x kernel on it</DT> -<DD>Get a machine running Linux (say the 5.2 release from<A href="http://www.redhat.com"> - Red Hat</A>). Give the machine two Ethernet cards.</DD> -<DT>Install the Linux IPSEC (Freeswan) software</DT> -<DD>If you're an experienced sysadmin or Linux hacker, install the - freeswan-1.0 release, or any later release or snapshot. These releases - do NOT provide automated "opportunistic" operation; they must be - manually configured for each site you wish to encrypt with.</DD> -<DT>Get on the linux-ipsec mailing list</DT> -<DD>The discussion forum for people working on the project, and testing - the code and documentation, is: linux-ipsec@clinet.fi. To join this - mailing list, send email to<A href="mailto:linux-ipsec-REQUEST@clinet.fi"> - linux-ipsec-REQUEST@clinet.fi</A> containing a line of text that says - "subscribe linux-ipsec". (You can later get off the mailing list the - same way -- just send "unsubscribe linux-ipsec").</DD> -<P></P> -<DT>Check back at this web page every once in a while</DT> -<DD>I update this page periodically, and there may be new information in - it that you haven't seen. My intent is to send email to the mailing - list when I update the page in any significant way, so subscribing to - the list is an alternative.</DD> -</DL> -<P>Would you like to help? I can use people who are willing to write - documentation, install early releases for testing, write cryptographic - code outside the United States, sell pre-packaged software or systems - including this technology, and teach classes for network administrators - who want to install this technology. To offer to help, send me email at - gnu@toad.com. Tell me what country you live in and what your - citizenship is (it matters due to the export control laws; personally I - don't care). Include a copy of your resume and the URL of your home - page. Describe what you'd like to do for the project, and what you're - uniquely qualified for. Mention what other volunteer projects you've - been involved in (and how they worked out). Helping out will require - that you be able to commit to doing particular things, meet your - commitments, and be responsive by email. Volunteer projects just don't - work without those things.</P> -<H4>Related projects</H4> -<DL> -<DT>IPSEC for NetBSD</DT> -<DD>This prototype implementation of the IP Security protocols is for - another free operating system.<A href="ftp://ftp.funet.fi/pub/unix/security/net/ip/BSDipsec.tar.gz"> - Download BSDipsec.tar.gz</A>.</DD> -<DT>IPSEC for<A href="http://www.openbsd.org"> OpenBSD</A></DT> -<DD>This prototype implementation of the IP Security protocols is for - yet another free operating system. It is directly integrated into the - OS release, since the OS is maintained in Canada, which has freedom of - speech in software.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A name="policestate">Stopping wholesale monitoring</A></H3> -<P>From a message project leader John Gilmore posted to the mailing - list:</P> -<PRE>John Denker wrote: - -> Indeed there are several ways in which the documentation overstates the -> scope of what this project does -- starting with the name -> FreeS/WAN. There's a big difference between having an encrypted IP tunnel -> versus having a Secure Wide-Area Network. This software does a fine job of -> the former, which is necessary but not sufficient for the latter. - -The goal of the project is to make it very hard to tap your wide area -communications. The current system provides very good protection -against passive attacks (wiretapping and those big antenna farms). -Active attacks, which involve the intruder sending packets to your -system (like packets that break into sendmail and give them a root -shell :-) are much harder to guard against. Active attacks that -involve sending people (breaking into your house and replacing parts -of your computer with ones that transmit what you're doing) are also -much harder to guard against. Though we are putting effort into -protecting against active attacks, it's a much bigger job than merely -providing strong encryption. It involves general computer security, -and general physical security, which are two very expensive problems -for even a site to solve, let alone to build into a whole society. - -The societal benefit of building an infrastructure that protects -well against passive attacks is that it makes it much harder to do -undetected bulk monitoring of the population. It's a defense against -police-states, not against policemen. - -Policemen can put in the effort required to actively attack sites that -they have strong suspicions about. But police states won't be able to -build systems that automatically monitor everyone's communications. -Either they will be able to monitor only a small subset of the -populace (by targeting those who screwed up their passive security), -or their monitoring activities will be detectable by those monitored -(active attacks leave packet traces or footprints), which can then be -addressed through the press and through political means if they become -too widespread. - -FreeS/WAN does not protect very well against traffic analysis, which -is a kind of widespread police-state style monitoring that still -reveals significant information (who's talking to who) without -revealing the contents of what was said. Defenses against traffic -analysis are an open research problem. Zero Knowledge Systems is -actively deploying a system designed to thwart it, designed by Ian -Goldberg. The jury is out on whether it actually works; a lot more -experience with it will be needed.</PRE> -<P>Notes on things mentioned in that message:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Denker is a co-author of a<A href="intro.html#applied"> paper</A> on - a large FreeS/WAN application.</LI> -<LI>Information on Zero Knowledge is on their<A href="http://www.zks.net/"> - web site</A>. Their Freedom product, designed to provide untracable - pseudonyms for use on the net, is no longer marketed.</LI> -<LI>Another section of our documentation discusses ways to<A href="ipsec.html#traffic.resist"> - resist traffic analysis</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="weak">Government promotion of weak crypto</A></H2> -<P>Various groups, especially governments and especially the US - government, have a long history of advocating various forms of bogus - security.</P> -<P>We regard bogus security as extremely dangerous. If users are - deceived into relying on bogus security, then they may be exposed to - large risks. They would be better off having no security and knowing - it. At least then they would be careful about what they said.</P> -<P><STRONG>Avoiding bogus security is a key design criterion for - everything we do in FreeS/WAN</STRONG>. The most conspicuous example is - our refusal to support<A href="#desnotsecure"> single DES</A>. Other - IPsec "features" which we do not implement are discussed in our<A href="compat.html#dropped"> - compatibility</A> document.</P> -<H3><A name="escrow">Escrowed encryption</A></H3> -<P>Various governments have made persistent attempts to encourage or - mandate "escrowed encrytion", also called "key recovery", or GAK for - "government access to keys". The idea is that cryptographic keys be - held by some third party and turned over to law enforcement or security - agencies under some conditions.</P> -<PRE> Mary had a little key - she kept it in escrow, - and every thing that Mary said, - the feds were sure to know.</PRE> -<P>A<A href="web.html#quotes"> crypto quotes</A> page attributes this to<A -href="http://www.scramdisk.clara.net/"> Sam Simpson</A>.</P> -<P>There is an excellent paper available on<A href="http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/"> - Risks of Escrowed Encryption</A>, from a group of cryptographic - luminaries which included our project leader.</P> -<P>Like any unnecessary complication, GAK tends to weaken security of - any design it infects. For example:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Matt Blaze found a fatal flaw in the US government's Clipper chip - shortly after design information became public. See his paper "Protocol - Failure in the Escrowed Encryption Standard" on his<A href="http://www.crypto.com/papers/"> - papers</A> page.</LI> -<LI>a rather<A href="http://www.pgp.com/other/advisories/adk.asp"> nasty - bug</A> was found in the "additional decryption keys" "feature" of some - releases of<A href="glossary.html#PGP"> PGP</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN does not support escrowed encryption, and never will.</P> -<H3><A name="shortkeys">Limited key lengths</A></H3> -<P>Various governments, and some vendors, have also made persistent - attempts to convince people that:</P> -<UL> -<LI>weak systems are sufficient for some data</LI> -<LI>strong cryptography should be reserved for cases where the extra - overheads are justified</LI> -</UL> -<P><STRONG>This is utter nonsense</STRONG>.</P> -<P>Weak systems touted include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>the ludicrously weak (deliberately crippled) 40-bit ciphers that - until recently were all various<A href="#exlaw"> export laws</A> - allowed</LI> -<LI>56-bit single DES, discussed<A href="#desnotsecure"> below</A></LI> -<LI>64-bit symmetric ciphers and 512-bit RSA, the maximums for - unrestricted export under various current laws</LI> -</UL> -<P>The notion that choice of ciphers or keysize should be determined by - a trade-off between security requirements and overheads is pure - bafflegab.</P> -<UL> -<LI>For most<A href="glossary.html#symmetric"> symmetric ciphers</A>, it - is simply a lie. Any block cipher has some natural maximum keysize - inherent in the design -- 128 bits for<A href="glossary.html#IDEA"> - IDEA</A> or<A href="glossary.html#CAST128"> CAST-128</A>, 256 for - Serpent or Twofish, 448 for<A href="glossary.html#Blowfish"> Blowfish</A> - and 2048 for<A href="glossary.html#RC4"> RC4</A>. Using a key size - smaller than that limit gives<EM> exactly zero</EM> savings in - overhead. The crippled 40-bit or 64-bit version of the cipher provides<EM> - no advantage whatsoever</EM>.</LI> -<LI><A href="glossary.html#AES">AES</A> uses 10 rounds with 128-bit - keys, 12 rounds for 192-bit and 14 rounds for 256-bit, so there - actually is a small difference in overhead, but not enough to matter in - most applications.</LI> -<LI>For<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> triple DES</A> there is a grain of - truth in the argument. 3DES is indeed three times slower than single - DES. However, the solution is not to use the insecure single DES, but - to pick a faster secure cipher.<A href="glossary.html#CAST128"> - CAST-128</A>,<A href="glossary.html#Blowfish"> Blowfish</A> and the<A href="glossary.html#AES"> - AES candidate</A> ciphers are are all considerably faster in software - than DES (let alone 3DES!), and apparently secure.</LI> -<LI>For<A href="glossary.html#public"> public key</A> techniques, there - are extra overheads for larger keys, but they generally do not affect - overall performance significantly. Practical public key applications - are usually<A href="glossary.html#hybrid"> hybrid</A> systems in which - the bulk of the work is done by a symmetric cipher. The effect of - increasing the cost of the public key operations is typically - negligible because the public key operations use only a tiny fraction - of total resources. -<P>For example, suppose public key operations use use 1% of the time in - a hybrid system and you triple the cost of public key operations. The - cost of symmetric cipher operations is unchanged at 99% of the original - total cost, so the overall effect is a jump from 99 + 1 = 100 to 99 + 3 - = 102, a 2% rise in system cost.</P> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>In short,<STRONG> there has never been any technical reason to use - inadequate ciphers</STRONG>. The only reason there has ever been for - anyone to use such ciphers is that government agencies want weak - ciphers used so that they can crack them. The alleged savings are - simply propaganda.</P> -<PRE> Mary had a little key (It's all she could export), - and all the email that she sent was opened at the Fort.</PRE> -<P>A<A href="web.html#quotes"> crypto quotes</A> page attributes this to<A -href="http://theory.lcs.mit.edu:80/~rivest/"> Ron Rivest</A>. NSA - headquarters is at Fort Meade, Maryland.</P> -<P>Our policy in FreeS/WAN is to use only cryptographic components with - adequate keylength and no known weaknesses.</P> -<UL> -<LI>We do not implement single DES because it is clearly<A href="#desnotsecure"> - insecure</A>, so implemeting it would violate our policy of avoiding - bogus security. Our default cipher is<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> 3DES</A> -</LI> -<LI>Similarly, we do not implement the 768-bit Group 1 for<A href="glossary.html#DH"> - Diffie-Hellman</A> key negotiation. We provide only the 1024-bit Group - 2 and 1536-bit Group 5.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Detailed discussion of which IPsec features we implement or omit is - in out<A href="compat.html"> compatibility document</A>.</P> -<P>These decisions imply that we cannot fully conform to the IPsec RFCs, - since those have DES as the only required cipher and Group 1 as the - only required DH group. (In our view, the standards were subverted into - offerring bogus security.) Fortunately, we can still interoperate with - most other IPsec implementations since nearly all implementers provide - at least 3DES and Group 2 as well.</P> -<P>We hope that eventually the RFCs will catch up with our (and others') - current practice and reject dubious components. Some of our team and a - number of others are working on this in<A href="glossary.html#IETF"> - IETF</A> working groups.</P> -<H4>Some real trade-offs</H4> -<P>Of course, making systems secure does involve costs, and trade-offs - can be made between cost and security. However, the real trade-offs - have nothing to do with using weaker ciphers.</P> -<P>There can be substantial hardware and software costs. There are often - substantial training costs, both to train administrators and to - increase user awareness of security issues and procedures. There are - almost always substantial staff or contracting costs.</P> -<P>Security takes staff time for planning, implementation, testing and - auditing. Some of the issues are subtle; you need good (hence often - expensive) people for this. You also need people to monitor your - systems and respond to problems. The best safe ever built is insecure - if an attacker can work on it for days without anyone noticing. Any - computer is insecure if the administrator is "too busy" to check the - logs.</P> -<P>Moreover, someone in your organisation (or on contract to it) needs - to spend considerable time keeping up with new developments. EvilDoers<EM> - will</EM> know about new attacks shortly after they are found. You need - to know about them before your systems are attacked. If your vendor - provides a patch, you need to apply it. If the vendor does nothing, you - need to complain or start looking for another vendor.</P> -<P>For a fairly awful example, see this<A href="http://www.sans.org/newlook/alerts/NTE-bank.htm"> - report</A>. In that case over a million credit card numbers were taken - from e-commerce sites, using security flaws in Windows NT servers. - Microsoft had long since released patches for most or all of the flaws, - but the site administrators had not applied them.</P> -<P>At an absolute minimum, you must do something about such issues<EM> - before</EM> an exploitation tool is posted to the net for downloading - by dozens of "script kiddies". Such a tool might appear at any time - from the announcement of the security hole to several months later. - Once it appears, anyone with a browser and an attitude can break any - system whose administrators have done nothing about the flaw.</P> -<P>Compared to those costs, cipher overheads are an insignificant factor - in the cost of security.</P> -<P>The only thing using a weak cipher can do for you is to cause all - your other investment to be wasted.</P> -<H2><A name="exlaw">Cryptography Export Laws</A></H2> -<P>Many nations restrict the export of cryptography and some restrict - its use by their citizens or others within their borders.</P> -<H3><A name="USlaw">US Law</A></H3> -<P>US laws, as currently interpreted by the US government, forbid export - of most cryptographic software from the US in machine-readable form - without government permission. In general, the restrictions apply even - if the software is widely-disseminated or public-domain and even if it - came from outside the US originally. Cryptography is legally a munition - and export is tightly controlled under the<A href="glossary.html#EAR"> - EAR</A> Export Administration Regulations.</P> -<P>If you are a US citizen, your brain is considered US territory no - matter where it is physically located at the moment. The US believes - that its laws apply to its citizens everywhere, not just within the US. - Providing technical assistance or advice to foreign "munitions" - projects is illegal. The US government has very little sense of humor - about this issue and does not consider good intentions to be sufficient - excuse. Beware.</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/"> official website</A> - for these regulations is run by the Commerce Department's Bureau of - Export Administration (BXA).</P> -<P>The<A href="http://www.eff.org/bernstein/"> Bernstein case</A> - challenges the export restrictions on Constitutional grounds. Code is - speech so restrictions on export of code violate the First Amendment's - free speech provisions. This argument has succeeded in two levels of - court so far. It is quite likely to go on to the Supreme Court.</P> -<P>The regulations were changed substantially in January 2000, - apparently as a government attempt to get off the hook in the Bernstein - case. It is now legal to export public domain source code for - encryption, provided you notify the<A href="glossary.html#BXA"> BXA</A> -.</P> -<P>There are, however, still restrictions in force. Moreover, the - regulations can still be changed again whenever the government chooses - to do so. Short of a Supreme Court ruling (in the Berstein case or - another) that overturns the regulations completely, the problem of - export regulation is not likely to go away in the forseeable future.</P> -<H4><A name="UScontrib">US contributions to FreeS/WAN</A></H4> -<P>The FreeS/WAN project<STRONG> cannot accept software contributions,<EM> - not even small bug fixes</EM>, from US citizens or residents</STRONG>. - We want it to be absolutely clear that our distribution is not subject - to US export law. Any contribution from an American might open that - question to a debate we'd prefer to avoid. It might also put the - contributor at serious legal risk.</P> -<P>Of course Americans can still make valuable contributions (many - already have) by reporting bugs, or otherwise contributing to - discussions, on the project<A href="mail.html"> mailing list</A>. Since - the list is public, this is clearly constitutionally protected free - speech.</P> -<P>Note, however, that the export laws restrict Americans from providing - technical assistance to foreign "munitions" projects. The government - might claim that private discussions or correspondence with FreeS/WAN - developers were covered by this. It is not clear what the courts would - do with such a claim, so we strongly encourage Americans to use the - list rather than risk the complications.</P> -<H3><A name="wrong">What's wrong with restrictions on cryptography</A></H3> -<P>Some quotes from prominent cryptography experts:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The real aim of current policy is to ensure the continued - effectiveness of US information warfare assets against individuals, - businesses and governments in Europe and elsewhere. -<BR><A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14"> Ross Anderson, - Cambridge University</A></BLOCKQUOTE><BLOCKQUOTE> If the government - were honest about its motives, then the debate about crypto export - policy would have ended years ago. -<BR><A href="http://www.counterpane.com"> Bruce Schneier, Counterpane - Systems</A></BLOCKQUOTE><BLOCKQUOTE> The NSA regularly lies to people - who ask it for advice on export control. They have no reason not to; - accomplishing their goal by any legal means is fine by them. Lying by - government employees is legal. -<BR> John Gilmore.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>The Internet Architecture Board (IAB) and the Internet Engineering - Steering Group (IESG) made a<A href="iab-iesg.stmt"> strong statement</A> - in favour of worldwide access to strong cryptography. Essentially the - same statement is in the appropriately numbered<A href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1984.txt"> - RFC 1984</A>. Two critical paragraphs are:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> ... various governments have actual or proposed policies on - access to cryptographic technology ... -<P>(a) ... export controls ... -<BR> (b) ... short cryptographic keys ... -<BR> (c) ... keys should be in the hands of the government or ... -<BR> (d) prohibit the use of cryptology ...</P> -<P>We believe that such policies are against the interests of consumers - and the business community, are largely irrelevant to issues of - military security, and provide only a marginal or illusory benefit to - law enforcement agencies, ...</P> -<P>The IAB and IESG would like to encourage policies that allow ready - access to uniform strong cryptographic technology for all Internet - users in all countries.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>Our goal in the FreeS/WAN project is to build just such "strong - cryptographic technology" and to distribute it "for all Internet users - in all countries".</P> -<P>More recently, the same two bodies (IESG and IAB) have issued<A href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc2804.txt"> - RFC 2804</A> on why the IETF should not build wiretapping capabilities - into protocols for the convenience of security or law enforcement - agenicies. The abstract from that document is:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has been asked - to take a position on the inclusion into IETF standards-track documents - of functionality designed to facilitate wiretapping. -<P>This memo explains what the IETF thinks the question means, why its - answer is "no", and what that answer means.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> A quote from the debate leading up to that RFC:<BLOCKQUOTE> - We should not be building surveillance technology into standards. Law - enforcement was not supposed to be easy. Where it is easy, it's called - a police state. -<BR> Jeff Schiller of MIT, in a discussion of FBI demands for wiretap - capability on the net, as quoted by<A href="http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,31895,00.html"> - Wired</A>.</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>The<A href="http://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/raven"> Raven</A> - mailing list was set up for this IETF discussion.</P> -<P>Our goal is to go beyond that RFC and prevent Internet wiretapping - entirely.</P> -<H3><A name="Wassenaar">The Wassenaar Arrangement</A></H3> -<P>Restrictions on the export of cryptography are not just US policy, - though some consider the US at least partly to blame for the policies - of other nations in this area.</P> -<P>A number of countries:</P> -<P>Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech - Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, - Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, - Portugal, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak - Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom - and United States</P> -<P>have signed the Wassenaar Arrangement which restricts export of - munitions and other tools of war. Cryptographic sofware is covered - there.</P> -<P>Wassenaar details are available from the<A href="http://www.wassenaar.org/"> - Wassenaar Secretariat</A>, and elsewhere in a more readable<A href="http://www.fitug.de/news/wa/index.html"> - HTML version</A>.</P> -<P>For a critique see the<A href="http://www.gilc.org/crypto/wassenaar"> - GILC site</A>:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The Global Internet Liberty Campaign (GILC) has begun a - campaign calling for the removal of cryptography controls from the - Wassenaar Arrangement. -<P>The aim of the Wassenaar Arrangement is to prevent the build up of - military capabilities that threaten regional and international security - and stability . . .</P> -<P>There is no sound basis within the Wassenaar Arrangement for the - continuation of any export controls on cryptographic products.</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>We agree entirely.</P> -<P>An interesting analysis of Wassenaar can be found on the<A href="http://www.cyber-rights.org/crypto/wassenaar.htm"> - cyber-rights.org</A> site.</P> -<H3><A name="status">Export status of Linux FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>We believe our software is entirely exempt from these controls since - the Wassenaar<A href="http://www.wassenaar.org/list/GTN%20and%20GSN%20-%2099.pdf"> - General Software Note</A> says:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> The Lists do not control "software" which is either: -<OL> -<LI>Generally available to the public by . . . retail . . . or</LI> -<LI>"In the public domain".</LI> -</OL> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>There is a note restricting some of this, but it is a sub-heading - under point 1, so it appears not to apply to public domain software.</P> -<P>Their glossary defines "In the public domain" as:</P> -<BLOCKQUOTE> . . . "technology" or "software" which has been made - available without restrictions upon its further dissemination. -<P>N.B. Copyright restrictions do not remove "technology" or "software" - from being "in the public domain".</P> -</BLOCKQUOTE> -<P>We therefore believe that software freely distributed under the<A href="glossary.html#GPL"> - GNU Public License</A>, such as Linux FreeS/WAN, is exempt from - Wassenaar restrictions.</P> -<P>Most of the development work is being done in Canada. Our - understanding is that the Canadian government accepts this - interpretation.</P> -<UL> -<LI>A web statement of<A href="http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~eicb/notices/ser113-e.htm"> - Canadian policy</A> is available from the Department of Foreign Affairs - and International Trade.</LI> -<LI>Another document from that department states that<A href="http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/~eicb/export/gr1_e.htm"> - public domain software</A> is exempt from the export controls.</LI> -<LI>A researcher's<A href="http://insight.mcmaster.ca/org/efc/pages/doc/crypto-export.html"> - analysis</A> of Canadian policy is also available.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Recent copies of the freely modifiable and distributable source code - exist in many countries. Citizens all over the world participate in its - use and evolution, and guard its ongoing distribution. Even if Canadian - policy were to change, the software would continue to evolve in - countries which do not restrict exports, and would continue to be - imported from there into unfree countries. "The Net culture treats - censorship as damage, and routes around it."</P> -<H3><A name="help">Help spread IPsec around</A></H3> -<P>You can help. If you don't know of a Linux FreeS/WAN archive in your - own country, please download it now to your personal machine, and - consider making it publicly accessible if that doesn't violate your own - laws. If you have the resources, consider going one step further and - setting up a mirror site for the whole<A href="intro.html#munitions"> - munitions</A> Linux crypto software archive.</P> -<P>If you make Linux CD-ROMs, please consider including this code, in a - way that violates no laws (in a free country, or in a domestic-only CD - product).</P> -<P>Please send a note about any new archive mirror sites or CD - distributions to linux-ipsec@clinet.fi so we can update the - documentation.</P> -<P>Lists of current<A href="intro.html#sites"> mirror sites</A> and of<A href="intro.html#distwith"> - distributions</A> which include FreeS/WAN are in our introduction - section.</P> -<H2><A name="desnotsecure">DES is Not Secure</A></H2> -<P>DES, the<STRONG> D</STRONG>ata<STRONG> E</STRONG>ncryption<STRONG> S</STRONG> -tandard, can no longer be considered secure. While no major flaws in its - innards are known, it is fundamentally inadequate because its<STRONG> - 56-bit key is too short</STRONG>. It is vulnerable to<A href="glossary.html#brute"> - brute-force search</A> of the whole key space, either by large - collections of general-purpose machines or even more quickly by - specialized hardware. Of course this also applies to<STRONG> any other - cipher with only a 56-bit key</STRONG>. The only reason anyone could - have for using a 56 or 64-bit key is to comply with various<A href="exportlaw.html"> - export laws</A> intended to ensure the use of breakable ciphers.</P> -<P>Non-government cryptologists have been saying DES's 56-bit key was - too short for some time -- some of them were saying it in the 70's when - DES became a standard -- but the US government has consistently - ridiculed such suggestions.</P> -<P>A group of well-known cryptographers looked at key lengths in a<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/keylength.html"> - 1996 paper</A>. They suggested a<EM> minimum</EM> of 75 bits to - consider an existing cipher secure and a<EM> minimum of 90 bits for new - ciphers</EM>. More recent papers, covering both<A href="glossary.html#symmetric"> - symmetric</A> and<A href="glossary.html#public"> public key</A> systems - are at<A href="http://www.cryptosavvy.com/"> cryptosavvy.com</A> and<A href="http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/bulletins/bulletin13.html"> - rsa.com</A>. For all algorithms, the minimum keylengths recommended in - such papers are significantly longer than the maximums allowed by - various export laws.</P> -<P>In a<A href="http://www.privacy.nb.ca/cryptography/archives/cryptography/html/1998-09/0095.html"> - 1998 ruling</A>, a German court described DES as "out-of-date and not - safe enough" and held a bank liable for using it.</P> -<H3><A name="deshware">Dedicated hardware breaks DES in a few days</A></H3> -<P>The question of DES security has now been settled once and for all. - In early 1998, the<A href="http://www.eff.org/"> Electronic Frontier - Foundation</A> built a<A href="http://www.eff.org/descracker.html"> - DES-cracking machine</A>. It can find a DES key in an average of a few - days' search. The details of all this, including complete code listings - and complete plans for the machine, have been published in<A href="biblio.html#EFF"> -<CITE> Cracking DES</CITE></A>, by the Electronic Frontier Foundation.</P> -<P>That machine cost just over $200,000 to design and build. "Moore's - Law" is that machines get faster (or cheaper, for the same speed) by - roughly a factor of two every 18 months. At that rate, their $200,000 - in 1998 becomes $50,000 in 2001.</P> -<P>However, Moore's Law is not exact and the $50,000 estimate does not - allow for the fact that a copy based on the published EFF design would - cost far less than the original. We cannot say exactly what such a - cracker would cost today, but it would likely be somewhere between - $10,000 and $100,000.</P> -<P>A large corporation could build one of these out of petty cash. The - cost is low enough for a senior manager to hide it in a departmental - budget and avoid having to announce or justify the project. Any - government agency, from a major municipal police force up, could afford - one. Or any other group with a respectable budget -- criminal - organisations, political groups, labour unions, religious groups, ... - Or any millionaire with an obsession or a grudge, or just strange taste - in toys.</P> -<P>One might wonder if a private security or detective agency would have - one for rent. They wouldn't need many clients to pay off that - investment.</P> -<H3><A name="spooks">Spooks may break DES faster yet</A></H3> -<P>As for the security and intelligence agencies of various nations, - they may have had DES crackers for years, and theirs may be much - faster. It is difficult to make most computer applications work well on - parallel machines, or to design specialised hardware to accelerate - them. Cipher-cracking is one of the very few exceptions. It is entirely - straightforward to speed up cracking by just adding hardware. Within - very broad limits, you can make it as fast as you like if you have the - budget. The EFF's $200,000 machine breaks DES in a few days. An<A href="http://www.planepage.com/"> - aviation website</A> gives the cost of a B1 bomber as $200,000,000. - Spending that much, an intelligence agency could break DES in an - average time of<EM> six and a half minutes</EM>.</P> -<P>That estimate assumes they use the EFF's 1998 technology and just - spend more money. They may have an attack that is superior to brute - force, they quite likely have better chip technology (Moore's law, a - bigger budget, and whatever secret advances they may have made) and of - course they may have spent the price of an aircraft carrier, not just - one aircraft.</P> -<P>In short, we have<EM> no idea</EM> how quickly these organisations - can break DES. Unless they're spectacularly incompetent or horribly - underfunded, they can certainly break it, but we cannot guess how - quickly. Pick any time unit between days and milliseconds; none is - entirely unbelievable. More to the point, none of them is of any - comfort if you don't want such organisations reading your - communications.</P> -<P>Note that this may be a concern even if nothing you do is a threat to - anyone's national security. An intelligence agency might well consider - it to be in their national interest for certain companies to do well. - If you're competing against such companies in a world market and that - agency can read your secrets, you have a serious problem.</P> -<P>One might wonder about technology the former Soviet Union and its - allies developed for cracking DES during the Cold War. They must have - tried; the cipher was an American standard and widely used. Certainly - those countries have some fine mathematicians, and those agencies had - budget. How well did they succeed? Is their technology now for sale or - rent?</P> -<H3><A name="desnet">Networks break DES in a few weeks</A></H3> -<P>Before the definitive EFF effort, DES had been cracked several times - by people using many machines. See this<A href="http://www.distributed.net/pressroom/DESII-1-PR.html"> - press release</A> for example.</P> -<P>A major corporation, university, or government department could break - DES by using spare cycles on their existing collection of computers, by - dedicating a group of otherwise surplus machines to the problem, or by - combining the two approaches. It might take them weeks or months, - rather than the days required for the EFF machine, but they could do - it.</P> -<P>What about someone working alone, without the resources of a large - organisation? For them, cracking DES will not be easy, but it may be - possible. A few thousand dollars buys a lot of surplus workstations. A - pile of such machines will certainly heat your garage nicely and might - break DES in a few months or years. Or enroll at a university and use - their machines. Or use an employer's machines. Or crack security - somewhere and steal the resources to crack a DES key. Or write a virus - that steals small amounts of resources on many machines. Or . . .</P> -<P>None of these approaches are easy or break DES really quickly, but an - attacker only needs to find one that is feasible and breaks DES quickly - enough to be dangerous. How much would you care to bet that this will - be impossible if the attacker is clever and determined? How valuable is - your data? Are you authorised to risk it on a dubious bet?</P> -<H3><A name="no_des">We disable DES</A></H3> -<P>In short, it is now absolutely clear that<STRONG> DES is not secure</STRONG> - against</P> -<UL> -<LI>any<STRONG> well-funded opponent</STRONG></LI> -<LI>any opponent (even a penniless one) with access (even stolen access) - to<STRONG> enough general purpose computers</STRONG></LI> -</UL> -<P>That is why<STRONG> Linux FreeS/WAN disables all transforms which use - plain DES</STRONG> for encryption.</P> -<P>DES is in the source code, because we need DES to implement our - default encryption transform,<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> Triple DES</A> -.<STRONG> We urge you not to use single DES</STRONG>. We do not provide - any easy way to enable it in FreeS/WAN, and our policy is to provide no - assistance to anyone wanting to do so.</P> -<H3><A name="40joke">40-bits is laughably weak</A></H3> -<P>The same is true, in spades, of ciphers -- DES or others -- crippled - by 40-bit keys, as many ciphers were required to be until recently - under various<A href="#exlaw"> export laws</A>. A brute force search of - such a cipher's keyspace is 2<SUP>16</SUP> times faster than a similar - search against DES. The EFF's machine can do a brute-force search of a - 40-bit key space in<EM> seconds</EM>. One contest to crack a 40-bit - cipher was won by a student<A href="http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/18.80.html#subj1"> - using a few hundred idle machines at his university</A>. It took only - three and half hours.</P> -<P>We do not, and will not, implement any 40-bit cipher.</P> -<H3><A name="altdes">Triple DES is almost certainly secure</A></H3> -<P><A href="glossary.html#3DES">Triple DES</A>, usually abbreviated - 3DES, applies DES three times, with three different keys. DES seems to - be basically an excellent cipher design; it has withstood several - decades of intensive analysis without any disastrous flaws being found. - It's only major flaw is that the small keyspace allows brute force - attacks to succeeed. Triple DES enlarges the key space to 168 bits, - making brute-force search a ridiculous impossibility.</P> -<P>3DES is currently the only block cipher implemented in FreeS/WAN. - 3DES is, unfortunately, about 1/3 the speed of DES, but modern CPUs - still do it at quite respectable speeds. Some<A href="glossary.html#benchmarks"> - speed measurements</A> for our code are available.</P> -<H3><A name="aes.ipsec">AES in IPsec</A></H3> -<P>The<A href="glossary.html#AES"> AES</A> project has chosen a - replacement for DES, a new standard cipher for use in non-classified US - government work and in regulated industries such as banking. This - cipher will almost certainly become widely used for many applications, - including IPsec.</P> -<P>The winner, announced in October 2000 after several years of analysis - and discussion, was the<A href="http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/"> - Rijndael</A> cipher from two Belgian designers.</P> -<P>It is almost certain that FreeS/WAN will add AES support.<A href="web.html#patch"> - AES patches</A> are already available.</P> -<H2><A name="press">Press coverage of Linux FreeS/WAN:</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="26_6_1">FreeS/WAN 1.0 press</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.wired.com/news/news/technology/story/19136.html"> -Wired</A> "Linux-Based Crypto Stops Snoops", James Glave April 15 1999</LI> -<LI><A href="http://slashdot.org/articles/99/04/15/1851212.shtml"> -Slashdot</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://dgl.com/itinfo/1999/it990415.html">DGL</A>, Damar - Group Limited; looking at FreeS/WAN from a perspective of business - computing</LI> -<LI><A href="http://linuxtoday.com/stories/5010.html">Linux Today</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tbtf.com/archive/1999-04-21.html#Tcep">TBTF</A>, - Tasty Bits from the Technology Front</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.salonmagazine.com/tech/log/1999/04/16/encryption/index.html"> -Salon Magazine</A> "Free Encryption Takes a Big Step"</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="release">Press release for version 1.0</A></H3> -<PRE> Strong Internet Privacy Software Free for Linux Users Worldwide - -Toronto, ON, April 14, 1999 - - -The Linux FreeS/WAN project today released free software to protect -the privacy of Internet communications using strong encryption codes. -FreeS/WAN automatically encrypts data as it crosses the Internet, to -prevent unauthorized people from receiving or modifying it. One -ordinary PC per site runs this free software under Linux to become a -secure gateway in a Virtual Private Network, without having to modify -users' operating systems or application software. The project built -and released the software outside the United States, avoiding US -government regulations which prohibit good privacy protection. -FreeS/WAN version 1.0 is available immediately for downloading at -http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan/. - -"Today's FreeS/WAN release allows network administrators to build -excellent secure gateways out of old PCs at no cost, or using a cheap -new PC," said John Gilmore, the entrepreneur who instigated the -project in 1996. "They can build operational experience with strong -network encryption and protect their users' most important -communications worldwide." - -"The software was written outside the United States, and we do not -accept contributions from US citizens or residents, so that it can be -freely published for use in every country," said Henry Spencer, who -built the release in Toronto, Canada. "Similar products based in the -US require hard-to-get government export licenses before they can be -provided to non-US users, and can never be simply published on a Web -site. Our product is freely available worldwide for immediate -downloading, at no cost." - -FreeS/WAN provides privacy against both quiet eavesdropping (such as -"packet sniffing") and active attempts to compromise communications -(such as impersonating participating computers). Secure "tunnels" carry -information safely across the Internet between locations such as a -company's main office, distant sales offices, and roaming laptops. This -protects the privacy and integrity of all information sent among those -locations, including sensitive intra-company email, financial transactions -such as mergers and acquisitions, business negotiations, personal medical -records, privileged correspondence with lawyers, and information about -crimes or civil rights violations. The software will be particularly -useful to frequent wiretapping targets such as private companies competing -with government-owned companies, civil rights groups and lawyers, -opposition political parties, and dissidents. - -FreeS/WAN provides privacy for Internet packets using the proposed -standard Internet Protocol Security (IPSEC) protocols. FreeS/WAN -negotiates strong keys using Diffie-Hellman key agreement with 1024-bit -keys, and encrypts each packet with 168-bit Triple-DES (3DES). A modern -$500 PC can set up a tunnel in less than a second, and can encrypt -6 megabits of packets per second, easily handling the whole available -bandwidth at the vast majority of Internet sites. In preliminary testing, -FreeS/WAN interoperated with 3DES IPSEC products from OpenBSD, PGP, SSH, -Cisco, Raptor, and Xedia. Since FreeS/WAN is distributed as source code, -its innards are open to review by outside experts and sophisticated users, -reducing the chance of undetected bugs or hidden security compromises. - -The software has been in development for several years. It has been -funded by several philanthropists interested in increased privacy on -the Internet, including John Gilmore, co-founder of the Electronic -Frontier Foundation, a leading online civil rights group. - -Press contacts: -Hugh Daniel, +1 408 353 8124, hugh@toad.com -Henry Spencer, +1 416 690 6561, henry@spsystems.net - -* FreeS/WAN derives its name from S/WAN, which is a trademark of RSA Data - Security, Inc; used by permission.</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="umltesting.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="ipsec.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/quickstart.html b/doc/quickstart.html deleted file mode 100644 index 44d73abc5..000000000 --- a/doc/quickstart.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,323 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="upgrading.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="policygroups.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="quickstart">Quickstart Guide to Opportunistic Encryption</A> -</H1> -<A name="quick_guide"></A> -<H2><A name="opp.setup">Purpose</A></H2> -<P>This page will get you started using Linux FreeS/WAN with - opportunistic encryption (OE). OE enables you to set up IPsec tunnels - without co-ordinating with another site administrator, and without hand - configuring each tunnel. If enough sites support OE, a "FAX effect" - occurs, and many of us can communicate without eavesdroppers.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_1_1">OE "flag day"</A></H3> -<P>As of FreeS/WAN 2.01, OE uses DNS TXT resource records (RRs) only - (rather than TXT with KEY). This change causes a<A href="http://jargon.watson-net.com/jargon.asp?w=flag+day"> - "flag day"</A>. Users of FreeS/WAN 2.00 (or earlier) OE who are - upgrading may require additional resource records, as detailed in our<A href="upgrading.html#upgrading.flagday"> - upgrading document</A>. OE setup instructions here are for 2.02 or - later.</P> -<H2><A name="opp.dns">Requirements</A></H2> -<P>To set up opportunistic encryption, you will need:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a Linux box. For OE to the public Internet, this box must NOT be - behind<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> Network Address Translation</A> - (NAT).</LI> -<LI>to install Linux FreeS/WAN 2.02 or later</LI> -<LI>either control over your reverse DNS (for full opportunism) or the - ability to write to some forward domain (for initiator-only).<A HREF="http://www.fdns.net"> - This free DNS service</A> explicitly supports forward TXT records for - FreeS/WAN use.</LI> -<LI>(for full opportunism) a static IP</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note: Currently, only Linux FreeS/WAN supports opportunistic - encryption.</P> -<H2><A name="easy.install">RPM install</A></H2> -<P>Our instructions are for a recent Red Hat with a 2.4-series stock or - Red Hat updated kernel. For other ways to install, see our<A href="install.html#install"> - install document</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_3_1">Download RPMs</A></H3> -<P>If we have prebuilt RPMs for your Red Hat system, this command will - get them:</P> -<PRE> ncftpget ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/binaries/RedHat-RPMs/`uname -r | tr -d 'a-wy-z'`/\*</PRE> -<P>If that fails, you will need to try<A HREF="install.html"> another - install method</A>. Our kernel modules<B> will only work on the Red Hat - kernel they were built for</B>, since they are very sensitive to small - changes in the kernel.</P> -<P>If it succeeds, you will have userland tools, a kernel module, and an - RPM signing key:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm - freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm - freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="3_3_2">Check signatures</A></H3> -<P>If you're running RedHat 8.x or later, import the RPM signing key - into the RPM database:</P> -<PRE> rpm --import freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>For RedHat 7.x systems, you'll need to add it to your<A HREF="glossary.html#PGP"> - PGP</A> keyring:</P> -<PRE> pgp -ka freeswan-rpmsign.asc</PRE> -<P>Check the digital signatures on both RPMs using:</P> -<PRE> rpm --checksig freeswan*.rpm </PRE> -<P>You should see that these signatures are good:</P> -<PRE> freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK - freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm: pgp md5 OK</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="3_3_3">Install the RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Become root:</P> -<PRE> su</PRE> -<P>Install your RPMs with:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan*.rpm</PRE> -<P>If you're upgrading from FreeS/WAN 1.x RPMs, and have problems with - that command, see<A HREF="upgrading.html#upgrading.rpms"> this note</A> -.</P> -<P>Then, start FreeS/WAN:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec start</PRE> -<H3><A name="testinstall">Test</A></H3> -<P>To check that you have a successful install, run:</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify</PRE> -<P>You should see as part of the<VAR> verify</VAR> output:</P> -<PRE> - Checking your system to see if IPsec got installed and started correctly - Version check and ipsec on-path [OK] - Checking for KLIPS support in kernel [OK] - Checking for RSA private key (/etc/ipsec.secrets) [OK] - Checking that pluto is running [OK] - ...</PRE> -<P>If any of these first four checks fails, see our<A href="trouble.html#install.check"> - troubleshooting guide</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="opp.setups.list">Our Opportunistic Setups</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="3_4_1">Full or partial opportunism?</A></H3> -<P>Determine the best form of opportunism your system can support.</P> -<UL> -<LI>For<A HREF="#opp.incoming"> full opportunism</A>, you'll need a - static IP and and either control over your reverse DNS or an ISP that - can add the required TXT record for you.</LI> -<LI>If you have a dynamic IP, and/or write access to forward DNS only, - you can do<A HREF="#opp.client"> initiate-only opportunism</A></LI> -<LI>To protect traffic bound for real IPs behind your gateway, use<A HREF="adv_config.html#opp.gate"> - this form of full opportunism</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="opp.client">Initiate-only setup</A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_1">Restrictions</A></H3> -<P>When you set up initiate-only Opportunistic Encryption (iOE):</P> -<UL> -<LI>there will be<STRONG> no incoming connection requests</STRONG>; you - can initiate all the IPsec connections you need.</LI> -<LI><STRONG>only one machine is visible</STRONG> on your end of the - connection.</LI> -<LI>iOE also protects traffic on behalf of<A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss"> - NATted</A> hosts behind the iOE box.</LI> -</UL> -<P>You cannot network a group of initiator-only machines if none of - these is capable of responding to OE. If one is capable of responding, - you may be able to create a hub topology using routing.</P> -<H3><A name="forward.dns">Create and publish a forward DNS record</A></H3> -<H4>Find a domain you can use</H4> -<P>Find a DNS forward domain (e.g. example.com) where you can publish - your key. You'll need access to the DNS zone files for that domain. - This is common for a domain you own. Some free DNS providers, such as<A HREF="http://www.fdns.net"> - this one</A>, also provide this service.</P> -<P>Dynamic IP users take note: the domain where you place your key need - not be associated with the IP address for your system, or even with - your system's usual hostname.</P> -<H4>Choose your ID</H4> -<P>Choose a name within that domain which you will use to identify your - machine. It's convenient if this can be the same as your hostname:</P> -<PRE> [root@xy root]# hostname --fqdn - xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>This name in FQDN (fully-qualified domain name) format will be your - ID, for DNS key lookup and IPsec negotiation.</P> -<H4>Create a forward TXT record</H4> -<P>Generate a forward TXT record containing your system's public key - with a command like:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt @xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>using your chosen ID in place of xy.example.com. This command takes - the contents of /etc/ipsec.secrets and reformats it into something - usable by ISC's BIND. The result should look like this (with the key - data trimmed down for clarity):</P> -<PRE> - ; RSA 2192 bits xy.example.com Thu Jan 2 12:41:44 2003 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=@xy.example.com" - "AQOF8tZ2... ...+buFuFn/" -</PRE> -<H4>Publish the forward TXT record</H4> -<P>Insert the record into DNS, or have a system adminstrator do it for - you. It may take up to 48 hours for the record to propagate, but it's - usually much quicker.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_3">Test that your key has been published</A></H3> -<P>Check your DNS work</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify --host xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>As part of the<VAR> verify</VAR> output, you ought to see something - like:</P> -<PRE> ... - Looking for TXT in forward map: xy.example.com [OK] - ...</PRE> -<P>For this type of opportunism, only the forward test is relevant; you - can ignore the tests designed to find reverse records.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_4">Configure, if necessary</A></H3> -<P> If your ID is the same as your hostname, you're ready to go. - FreeS/WAN will use its<A HREF="policygroups.html"> built-in connections</A> - to create your iOE functionality.</P> -<P>If you have chosen a different ID, you must tell FreeS/WAN about it - via<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"><VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR></A>:</P> -<PRE> config setup - myid=@myname.freedns.example.com</PRE> -<P>and restart FreeS/WAN:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<P>The new ID will be applied to the built-in connections.</P> -<P>Note: you can create more complex iOE configurations as explained in - our<A HREF="policygroups.html#policygroups"> policy groups document</A> -, or disable OE using<A HREF="policygroups.html#disable_policygroups"> - these instructions</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_5_5">Test</A></H3> -<P>That's it!<A HREF="#opp.test"> Test your connections</A>.</P> -<A name="opp.incoming"></A> -<H2><A NAME="3_6">Full Opportunism</A></H2> -<P>Full opportunism allows you to initiate and receive opportunistic - connections on your machine.</P> -<A name="incoming.opp.dns"></A> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_1">Put a TXT record in a Forward Domain</A></H3> -<P>To set up full opportunism, first<A HREF="#forward.dns"> set up a - forward TXT record</A> as for<A HREF="#opp.client"> initiator-only OE</A> -, using an ID (for example, your hostname) that resolves to your IP. Do - not configure<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>, but continue with the - instructions for full opportunism, below.</P> -<P>Note that this forward record is not currently necessary for full OE, - but will facilitate future features.</P> -<A name="incoming.opp.dns"></A> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_2">Put a TXT record in Reverse DNS</A></H3> -<P>You must be able to publish your DNS RR directly in the reverse - domain. FreeS/WAN will not follow a PTR which appears in the reverse, - since a second lookup at connection start time is too costly.</P> -<H4>Create a Reverse DNS TXT record</H4> -<P>This record serves to publicize your FreeS/WAN public key. In - addition, it lets others know that this machine can receive - opportunistic connections, and asserts that the machine is authorized - to encrypt on its own behalf.</P> -<P>Use the command:</P> -<PRE> ipsec showhostkey --txt 192.0.2.11</PRE> -<P>where you replace 192.0.2.11 with your public IP.</P> -<P>The record (with key shortened) looks like:</P> -<PRE> ; RSA 2048 bits xy.example.com Sat Apr 15 13:53:22 2000 - IN TXT "X-IPsec-Server(10)=192.0.2.11" " AQOF8tZ2...+buFuFn/"</PRE> -<H4>Publish your TXT record</H4> -<P>Send these records to your ISP, to be published in your IP's reverse - map. It may take up to 48 hours for these to propagate, but usually - takes much less time.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_3">Test your DNS record</A></H3> -<P>Check your DNS work with</P> -<PRE> ipsec verify --host xy.example.com</PRE> -<P>As part of the<VAR> verify</VAR> output, you ought to see something - like:</P> -<PRE> ... - Looking for TXT in reverse map: 11.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa [OK] - ...</PRE> -<P>which indicates that you've passed the reverse-map test.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_4">No Configuration Needed</A></H3> -<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x ships with full OE enabled, so you don't need to - configure anything. To enable OE out of the box, FreeS/WAN 2.x uses the - policy group<VAR> private-or-clear</VAR>, which creates IPsec - connections if possible (using OE if needed), and allows traffic in the - clear otherwise. You can create more complex OE configurations as - described in our<A HREF="policygroups.html#policygroups"> policy groups - document</A>, or disable OE using<A HREF="policygroups.html#disable_policygroups"> - these instructions</A>.</P> -<P>If you've previously configured for initiator-only opportunism, - remove<VAR> myid=</VAR> from<VAR> config setup</VAR>, so that peer - FreeS/WANs will look up your key by IP. Restart FreeS/WAN so that your - change will take effect, with</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_5">Consider Firewalling</A></H3> -<P>If you are running a default install of RedHat 8.x, take note: you - will need to alter your iptables rule setup to allow IPSec traffic - through your firewall. See<A HREF="firewall.html#simple.rules"> our - firewall document</A> for sample<VAR> iptables</VAR> rules.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_6">Test</A></H3> -<P>That's it. Now,<A HREF="#opp.test"> test your connection</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="3_6_7">Test</A></H3> -<P>Instructions are in the next section.</P> -<H2><A NAME="opp.test">Testing opportunistic connections</A></H2> -<P>Be sure IPsec is running. You can see whether it is with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup status</PRE> -<P>If need be, you can restart it with:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<P>Load a FreeS/WAN test website from the host on which you're running - FreeS/WAN. Note: the feds may be watching these sites. Type one of:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.org</PRE> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.nl</PRE> - -<!--<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.ca</PRE>--> -<P>A positive result looks like this:</P> -<PRE> - You seem to be connecting from: 192.0.2.11 which DNS says is: - gateway.example.com - _________________________________________________________________ - - Status E-route - OE enabled 16 192.139.46.73/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x2097@192.0.2.11 - OE enabled 176 192.139.46.77/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x208a@192.0.2.11 -</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations! Your OE host or gateway will now - encrypt its own traffic whenever it can. For more OE tests, please see - our<A HREF="testing.html#test.oe"> testing document</A>. If you have - difficulty, see our<A HREF="#oe.trouble"> OE troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="3_8">Now what?</A></H2> -<P>Please see our<A HREF="policygroups.html"> policy groups document</A> - for more ways to set up Opportunistic Encryption.</P> -<P>You may also wish to make some<A HREF="config.html"> pre-configured - connections</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="3_9">Notes</A></H2> -<UL> -<LI>We assume some facts about your system in order to make - Opportunistic Encryption easier to configure. For example, we assume - that you wish to have FreeS/WAN secure your default interface.</LI> -<LI>You may change this, and other settings, by altering the<VAR> config - setup</VAR> section in<VAR> /etc/ipsec.conf</VAR>.</LI> -<LI>Note that the built-in connections used to build policy groups do - not inherit from<VAR> conn default</VAR>.</LI> - -<!-- -<LI>If you do not define your local identity -(eg. <VAR>leftid</VAR>), this will be the IP address of your default -FreeS/WAN interface. ---> -<LI> If you fail to define your local identity and do not fill in your - reverse DNS entry, you will not be able to use OE.</LI> -</UL> -<A NAME="oe.trouble"></A> -<H2><A NAME="3_10">Troubleshooting OE</A></H2> -<P>See the OE troubleshooting hints in our<A HREF="trouble.html#oe.trouble"> - troubleshooting guide</A>.</P> -<A NAME="oe.known-issues"></A> -<H2><A NAME="3_11">Known Issues</A></H2> -<P>Please see<A HREF="opportunism.known-issues"> this list</A> of known - issues with Opportunistic Encryption.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="upgrading.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="policygroups.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/rfc.html b/doc/rfc.html deleted file mode 100644 index 29785d8de..000000000 --- a/doc/rfc.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,135 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="biblio.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="roadmap.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="RFC">IPsec RFCs and related documents</A></H1> -<H2><A name="RFCfile">The RFCs.tar.gz Distribution File</A></H2> -<P>The Linux FreeS/WAN distribution is available from<A href="http://www.xs4all.nl/~freeswan"> - our primary distribution site</A> and various mirror sites. To give - people more control over their downloads, the RFCs that define IP - security are bundled separately in the file RFCs.tar.gz.</P> -<P>The file you are reading is included in the main distribution and is - available on the web site. It describes the RFCs included in the<A href="#RFCs.tar.gz"> - RFCs.tar.gz</A> bundle and gives some pointers to<A href="#sources"> - other ways to get them</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="sources">Other sources for RFCs & Internet drafts</A></H2> -<H3><A name="RFCdown">RFCs</A></H3> -<P>RFCs are downloadble at many places around the net such as:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org">http://www.rfc-editor.org</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://nis.nsf.net/internet/documents/rfc">NSF.net</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://sunsite.doc.ic.ac.uk/computing/internet/rfc">Sunsite - in the UK</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>browsable in HTML form at others such as:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.landfield.com/rfcs/index.html">landfield.com</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.library.ucg.ie/Connected/RFC">Connected Internet - Encyclopedia</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>and some of them are available in translation:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.eisti.fr/eistiweb/docs/normes/">French</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>There is also a published<A href="biblio.html#RFCs"> Big Book of - IPSEC RFCs</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="drafts">Internet Drafts</A></H3> -<P>Internet Drafts, working documents which sometimes evolve into RFCs, - are also available.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ID.html">Overall reference page</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsec.html">IPsec</A> working - group</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsra.html">IPSRA (IPsec - Remote Access)</A> working group</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsp.html">IPsec Policy</A> - working group</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/kink.html">KINK (Kerberized - Internet Negotiation of Keys)</A> working group</LI> -</UL> -<P>Note: some of these may be obsolete, replaced by later drafts or by - RFCs.</P> -<H3><A name="FIPS1">FIPS standards</A></H3> -<P>Some things used by<A href="glossary.html#IPSEC"> IPsec</A>, such as<A -href="glossary.html#DES"> DES</A> and<A href="glossary.html#SHA"> SHA</A> -, are defined by US government standards called<A href="glossary.html#FIPS"> - FIPS</A>. The issuing organisation,<A href="glossary.html#NIST"> NIST</A> -, have a<A href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs"> FIPS home page</A> -.</P> -<H2><A name="RFCs.tar.gz">What's in the RFCs.tar.gz bundle?</A></H2> -<P>All filenames are of the form rfc*.txt, with the * replaced with the - RFC number.</P> -<PRE>RFC# Title</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.ov">Overview RFCs</A></H3> -<PRE>2401 Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol -2411 IP Security Document Roadmap</PRE> -<H3><A name="basic.prot">Basic protocols</A></H3> -<PRE>2402 IP Authentication Header -2406 IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)</PRE> -<H3><A name="key.ike">Key management</A></H3> -<PRE>2367 PF_KEY Key Management API, Version 2 -2407 The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP -2408 Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) -2409 The Internet Key Exchange (IKE) -2412 The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol -2528 Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.detail">Details of various things used</A></H3> -<PRE>2085 HMAC-MD5 IP Authentication with Replay Prevention -2104 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication -2202 Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 -2207 RSVP Extensions for IPSEC Data Flows -2403 The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH -2404 The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH -2405 The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV -2410 The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec -2451 The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms -2521 ICMP Security Failures Messages</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.ref">Older RFCs which may be referenced</A></H3> -<PRE>1321 The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm -1828 IP Authentication using Keyed MD5 -1829 The ESP DES-CBC Transform -1851 The ESP Triple DES Transform -1852 IP Authentication using Keyed SHA</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.dns">RFCs for secure DNS service, which IPsec may use</A> -</H3> -<PRE>2137 Secure Domain Name System Dynamic Update -2230 Key Exchange Delegation Record for the DNS -2535 Domain Name System Security Extensions -2536 DSA KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS) -2537 RSA/MD5 KEYs and SIGs in the Domain Name System (DNS) -2538 Storing Certificates in the Domain Name System (DNS) -2539 Storage of Diffie-Hellman Keys in the Domain Name System (DNS)</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.exp">RFCs labelled "experimental"</A></H3> -<PRE>2521 ICMP Security Failures Messages -2522 Photuris: Session-Key Management Protocol -2523 Photuris: Extended Schemes and Attributes</PRE> -<H3><A name="rfc.rel">Related RFCs</A></H3> -<PRE>1750 Randomness Recommendations for Security -1918 Address Allocation for Private Internets -1984 IAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet -2144 The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="biblio.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="roadmap.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/roadmap.html b/doc/roadmap.html deleted file mode 100644 index ce547582c..000000000 --- a/doc/roadmap.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,167 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="rfc.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="umltesting.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="roadmap">Distribution Roadmap: What's Where in Linux - FreeS/WAN</A></H1> -<P> This file is a guide to the locations of files within the FreeS/WAN - distribution. Everything described here should be on your system once - you download, gunzip, and untar the distribution.</P> -<P>This distribution contains two major subsystems</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="#klips.roadmap">KLIPS</A></DT> -<DD>the kernel code</DD> -<DT><A href="#pluto.roadmap">Pluto</A></DT> -<DD>the user-level key-management daemon</DD> -</DL> -<P>plus assorted odds and ends.</P> -<H2><A name="top">Top directory</A></H2> -<P>The top directory has essential information in text files:</P> -<DL> -<DT>README</DT> -<DD>introduction to the software</DD> -<DT>INSTALL</DT> -<DD>short experts-only installation procedures. More detalied procedures - are in<A href="install.html"> installation</A> and<A href="config.html"> - configuration</A> HTML documents.</DD> -<DT>BUGS</DT> -<DD>major known bugs in the current release.</DD> -<DT>CHANGES</DT> -<DD>changes from previous releases</DD> -<DT>CREDITS</DT> -<DD>acknowledgement of contributors</DD> -<DT>COPYING</DT> -<DD>licensing and distribution information</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="doc">Documentation</A></H2> -<P> The doc directory contains the bulk of the documentation, most of it - in HTML format. See the<A href="index.html"> index file</A> for - details.</P> -<H2><A name="klips.roadmap">KLIPS: kernel IP security</A></H2> -<P><A href="glossary.html#KLIPS"> KLIPS</A> is<STRONG> K</STRONG>erne<STRONG> -L</STRONG><STRONG> IP</STRONG><STRONG> S</STRONG>ecurity. It lives in - the klips directory, of course.</P> -<DL> -<DT>klips/doc</DT> -<DD>documentation</DD> -<DT>klips/patches</DT> -<DD>patches for existing kernel files</DD> -<DT>klips/test</DT> -<DD>test stuff</DD> -<DT>klips/utils</DT> -<DD>low-level user utilities</DD> -<DT>klips/net/ipsec</DT> -<DD>actual klips kernel files</DD> -<DT>klips/src</DT> -<DD>symbolic link to klips/net/ipsec -<P>The "make insert" step of installation installs the patches and makes - a symbolic link from the kernel tree to klips/net/ipsec. The odd name - of klips/net/ipsec is dictated by some annoying limitations of the - scripts which build the Linux kernel. The symbolic-link business is a - bit messy, but all the alternatives are worse.</P> -<P></P> -</DD> -<DT>klips/utils</DT> -<DD>Utility programs: -<P></P> -<DL> -<DT>eroute</DT> -<DD>manipulate IPsec extended routing tables</DD> -<DT>klipsdebug</DT> -<DD>set Klips (kernel IPsec support) debug features and level</DD> -<DT>spi</DT> -<DD>manage IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT>spigrp</DT> -<DD>group/ungroup IPsec Security Associations</DD> -<DT>tncfg</DT> -<DD>associate IPsec virtual interface with real interface</DD> -</DL> -<P>These are all normally invoked by ipsec(8) with commands such as</P> -<PRE> ipsec tncfg <VAR>arguments</VAR></PRE> - There are section 8 man pages for all of these; the names have "ipsec_" - as a prefix, so your man command should be something like: -<PRE> man 8 ipsec_tncfg</PRE> -</DD> -</DL> -<H2><A name="pluto.roadmap">Pluto key and connection management daemon</A> -</H2> -<P><A href="glossary.html#Pluto"> Pluto</A> is our key management and - negotiation daemon. It lives in the pluto directory, along with its - low-level user utility, whack.</P> -<P> There are no subdirectories. Documentation is a man page,<A href="manpage.d/ipsec_pluto.8.html"> - pluto.8</A>. This covers whack as well.</P> -<H2><A name="utils">Utils</A></H2> -<P> The utils directory contains a growing collection of higher-level - user utilities, the commands that administer and control the software. - Most of the things that you will actually have to run yourself are in - there.</P> -<DL> -<DT>ipsec</DT> -<DD>invoke IPsec utilities -<P>ipsec(8) is normally the only program installed in a standard - directory, /usr/local/sbin. It is used to invoke the others, both those - listed below and the ones in klips/utils mentioned above.</P> -<P></P> -</DD> -<DT>auto</DT> -<DD>control automatically-keyed IPsec connections</DD> -<DT>manual</DT> -<DD>take manually-keyed IPsec connections up and down</DD> -<DT>barf</DT> -<DD>generate copious debugging output</DD> -<DT>look</DT> -<DD>generate moderate amounts of debugging output</DD> -</DL> -<P> There are .8 manual pages for these. look is covered in barf.8. The - man pages have an "ipsec_" prefix so your man command should be - something like:</P> -<PRE> - man 8 ipsec_auto -</PRE> -<P> Examples are in various files with names utils/*.eg</P> -<H2><A name="lib">Libraries</A></H2> -<H3><A name="fswanlib">FreeS/WAN Library</A></H3> -<P> The lib directory is the FreeS/WAN library, also steadily growing, - used by both user-level and kernel code. -<BR /> It includes section 3<A href="manpages.html"> man pages</A> for - the library routines.</P> -<H3><A name="otherlib">Imported Libraries</A></H3> -<H4>LibDES</H4> - The libdes library, originally from SSLeay, is used by both Klips and - Pluto for<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> Triple DES</A> encryption. - Single DES is not used because<A href="politics.html#desnotsecure"> it - is insecure</A>. -<P> Note that this library has its own license, different from the<A href="glossary.html#GPL"> - GPL</A> used for other code in FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P> The library includes its own documentation.</P> -<H4>GMP</H4> - The GMP (GNU multi-precision) library is used for multi-precision - arithmetic in Pluto's key-exchange code and public key code. -<P> Older versions (up to 1.7) of FreeS/WAN included a copy of this - library in the FreeS/WAN distribution.</P> -<P> Since 1.8, we have begun to rely on the system copy of GMP.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="rfc.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="umltesting.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/testing.html b/doc/testing.html deleted file mode 100644 index 77626ba5d..000000000 --- a/doc/testing.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,332 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="performance.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="kernel.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="test.freeswan">Testing FreeS/WAN</A></H1> - This document discusses testing FreeS/WAN. -<P>Not all types of testing are described here. Other parts of the - documentation describe some tests:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="install.html#testinstall">installation</A> document</DT> -<DD>testing for a successful install</DD> -<DT><A href="config.html#testsetup">configuration</A> document</DT> -<DD>basic tests for a working configuration</DD> -<DT><A href="web.html#interop.web">web links</A> document</DT> -<DD>General information on tests for interoperability between various - IPsec implementations. This includes links to several test sites.</DD> -<DT><A href="interop.html">interoperation</A> document.</DT> -<DD>More specific information on FreeS/WAN interoperation with other - implementations.</DD> -<DT><A href="performance.html">performance</A> document</DT> -<DD>performance measurements</DD> -</DL> -<P>The test setups and procedures described here can also be used in - other testing, but this document focuses on testing the IPsec - functionality of FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H2><A NAME="test.oe">Testing opportunistic connections</A></H2> -<P>This section teaches you how to test your opportunistically encrypted - (OE) connections. To set up OE, please see the easy instructions in our<A -HREF="quickstart.html"> quickstart guide</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="12_1_1">Basic OE Test</A></H3> -<P>This test is for basic OE functionality. -<!-- You may use it on an -<A HREF="quickstart.html#oppo.client">initiate-only OE</A> box or a -<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming">full OE</A> box. --> - For additional tests, keep - reading.</P> -<P>Be sure IPsec is running. You can see whether it is with:</P> -<PRE> ipsec setup status</PRE> -<P>If need be, you can restart it with:</P> -<PRE> service ipsec restart</PRE> -<P>Load a FreeS/WAN test website from the host on which you're running - FreeS/WAN. Note: the feds may be watching these sites. Type one of:</P> -<P></P> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.org</PRE> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.nl</PRE> - -<!--<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.ca</PRE>--> -<P>A positive result looks like this:</P> -<PRE> - You seem to be connecting from: 192.0.2.11 which DNS says is: - gateway.example.com - _________________________________________________________________ - - Status E-route - OE enabled 16 192.139.46.73/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x2097@192.0.2.11 - OE enabled 176 192.139.46.77/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x208a@192.0.2.11 -</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations! Your OE box will now encrypt its - own traffic whenever it can. If you have difficulty, see our<A HREF="quickstart.html#oe.trouble"> - OE troubleshooting tips</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="12_1_2">OE Gateway Test</A></H3> -<P>If you've set up FreeS/WAN to protect a subnet behind your gateway, - you'll need to run another simple test, which can be done from a - machine running any OS. That's right, your Windows box can be protected - by opportunistic encryption without any FreeS/WAN install or - configuration on that box. From<STRONG> each protected subnet node</STRONG> -, load the FreeS/WAN website with:</P> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.org</PRE> -<PRE> links oetest.freeswan.nl</PRE> -<P>A positive result looks like this:</P> -<PRE> - You seem to be connecting from: 192.0.2.98 which DNS says is: - box98.example.com - _________________________________________________________________ - - Status E-route - OE enabled 16 192.139.46.73/32 -> 192.0.2.98/32 => - tun0x134ed@192.0.2.11 - OE enabled 176 192.139.46.77/32 -> 192.0.2.11/32 => - tun0x134d2@192.0.2.11 -</PRE> -<P>If you see this, congratulations! Your OE gateway will now encrypt - traffic for this subnet node whenever it can. If you have difficulty, - see our<A HREF="quickstart.html#oe.trouble"> OE troubleshooting tips</A> -.</P> -<H3><A NAME="12_1_3">Additional OE tests</A></H3> -<P>When testing OE, you will often find it useful to execute this - command on the FreeS/WAN host:</P> -<PRE> ipsec eroute</PRE> -<P>If you have established a connection (either for or for a subnet - node) you will see a result like:</P> -<PRE> 192.0.2.11/32 -> 192.139.46.73/32 => tun0x149f@192.139.46.38 -</PRE> -<P>Key:</P> -<TABLE> -<TR><TD>1.</TD><TD>192.0.2.11/32</TD><TD>Local start point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>2.</TD><TD>192.0.2.194/32</TD><TD>Remote end point of the - protected traffic.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>3.</TD><TD>192.0.48.38</TD><TD>Remote FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host). May be the same as (2).</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>4.</TD><TD>[not shown]</TD><TD>Local FreeS/WAN node (gateway or - host), where you've produced the output. May be the same as (1).</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<P>For extra assurance, you may wish to use a packet sniffer such as<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org"> - tcpdump</A> to verify that packets are being encrypted. You should see - output that indicates<STRONG> ESP</STRONG> encrypted data, for example:</P> -<PRE> 02:17:47.353750 PPPoE [ses 0x1e12] IP 154: xy.example.com > oetest.freeswan.org: ESP(spi=0x87150d16,seq=0x55)</PRE> -<H2><A name="test.uml">Testing with User Mode Linux</A></H2> -<P><A href="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/">User Mode Linux</A> - allows you to run Linux as a user process on another Linux machine.</P> -<P>As of 1.92, the distribution has a new directory named testing. It - contains a collection of test scripts and sample configurations. Using - these, you can bring up several copies of Linux in user mode and have - them build tunnels to each other. This lets you do some testing of a - FreeS/WAN configuration on a single machine.</P> -<P>You need a moderately well-endowed machine for this to work well. - Each UML wants about 16 megs of memory by default, which is plenty for - FreeS/WAN usage. Typical regression testing only occasionally uses as - many as 4 UMLs. If one is doing nothing else with the machine (in - particular, not running X on it), then 128 megs and a 500MHz CPU are - fine.</P> - Documentation on these scripts is<A href="umltesting.html"> here</A>. - There is also documentation on automated testing<A href="makecheck.html"> - here</A>. -<H2><A name="testnet">Configuration for a testbed network</A></H2> -<P>A common test setup is to put a machine with dual Ethernet cards in - between two gateways under test. You need at least five machines; two - gateways, two clients and a testing machine in the middle.</P> -<P>The central machine both routes packets and provides a place to run - diagnostic software for checking IPsec packets. See next section for - discussion of<A href="faq.html#tcpdump.faq"> using tcpdump(8)</A> for - this.</P> -<P>This makes things more complicated than if you just connected the two - gateway machines directly to each other, but it also makes your test - setup much more like the environment you actually use IPsec in. Those - environments nearly always involve routing, and quite a few apparent - IPsec failures turn out to be problems with routing or with firewalls - dropping packets. This approach lets you deal with those problems on - your test setup.</P> -<P>What you end up with looks like:</P> -<H3><A name="testbed">Testbed network</A></H3> -<PRE> subnet a.b.c.0/24 - | - eth1 = a.b.c.1 - gate1 - eth0 = 192.168.p.1 - | - | - eth0 = 192.168.p.2 - route/monitor box - eth1 = 192.168.q.2 - | - | - eth0 = 192.168.q.1 - gate2 - eth1 = x.y.z.1 - | - subnet x.y.z.0/24</PRE> -<PRE>Where p and q are any convenient values that do not interfere with other -routes you may have. The ipsec.conf(5) file then has, among other things:</PRE> -<PRE>conn abc-xyz - left=192.168.p.1 - leftnexthop=192.168.p.2 - right=192.168.q.1 - rightnexthop=192.168.q.2</PRE> -<P>Once that works, you can remove the "route/monitor box", and connect - the two gateways to the Internet. The only parameters in ipsec.conf(5) - that need to change are the four shown above. You replace them with - values appropriate for your Internet connection, and change the eth0 IP - addresses and the default routes on both gateways.</P> -<P>Note that nothing on either subnet needs to change. This lets you - test most of your IPsec setup before connecting to the insecure - Internet.</P> -<H3><A name="tcpdump.test">Using packet sniffers in testing</A></H3> -<P>A number of tools are available for looking at packets. We will - discuss using<A href="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> tcpdump(8)</A>, a - common Linux tool included in most distributions. Alternatives - offerring more-or-less the same functionality include:</P> -<DL> -<DT><A href="http://www.ethereal.com">Ethereal</A></DT> -<DD>Several people on our mailing list report a preference for this over - tcpdump.</DD> -<DT><A href="http://netgroup-serv.polito.it/windump/">windump</A></DT> -<DD>a Windows version of tcpdump(8), possibly handy if you have Windows - boxes in your network</DD> -<DT><A href="http://reptile.rug.ac.be/~coder/sniffit/sniffit.html"> -Sniffit</A></DT> -<DD>A linux sniffer that we don't know much about. If you use it, please - comment on our mailing list.</DD> -</DL> -<P>See also this<A href="http://www.tlsecurity.net/unix/ids/sniffer/"> - index</A> of packet sniffers.</P> -<P>tcpdump(8) may misbehave if run on the gateways themselves. It is - designed to look into a normal IP stack and may become confused if you - ask it to display data from a stack which has IPsec in play.</P> -<P>At one point, the problem was quite severe. Recent versions of - tcpdump, however, understand IPsec well enough to be usable on a - gateway. You can get the latest version from<A href="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - tcpdump.org</A>.</P> -<P>Even with a recent tcpdump, some care is required. Here is part of a - post from Henry on the topic:</P> -<PRE>> a) data from sunset to sunrise or the other way is not being -> encrypted (I am using tcpdump (ver. 3.4) -x/ping -p to check -> packages) - -What *interface* is tcpdump being applied to? Use the -i option to -control this. It matters! If tcpdump is looking at the ipsecN -interfaces, e.g. ipsec0, then it is seeing the packets before they are -encrypted or after they are decrypted, so of course they don't look -encrypted. You want to have tcpdump looking at the actual hardware -interfaces, e.g. eth0. - -Actually, the only way to be *sure* what you are sending on the wire is to -have a separate machine eavesdropping on the traffic. Nothing you can do -on the machines actually running IPsec is 100% guaranteed reliable in this -area (although tcpdump is a lot better now than it used to be).</PRE> -<P>The most certain way to examine IPsec packets is to look at them on - the wire. For security, you need to be certain, so we recommend doing - that. To do so, you need a<STRONG> separate sniffer machine located - between the two gateways</STRONG>. This machine can be routing IPsec - packets, but it must not be an IPsec gateway. Network configuration for - such testing is discussed<A href="#testnet"> above</A>.</P> -<P>Here's another mailing list message with advice on using tcpdump(8):</P> -<PRE>Subject: RE: [Users] Encrypted??? - Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2001 - From: "Joe Patterson" <jpatterson@asgardgroup.com> - -tcpdump -nl -i $EXT-IF proto 50 - --nl tells it not to buffer output or resolve names (if you don't do that it -may confuse you by not outputing anything for a while), -i $EXT-IF (replace -with your external interface) tells it what interface to listen on, and -proto 50 is ESP. Use "proto 51" if for some odd reason you're using AH, and -"udp port 500" if you want to see the isakmp key exchange/tunnel setup -packets. - -You can also run `tcpdump -nl -i ipsec0` to see what traffic is on that -virtual interface. Anything you see there *should* be either encrypted or -dropped (unless you've turned on some strange options in your ipsec.conf -file) - -Another very handy thing is ethereal (http://www.ethereal.com/) which runs -on just about anything, has a nice gui interface (or a nice text-based -interface), and does a great job of protocol breakdown. For ESP and AH -it'll basically just tell you that there's a packet of that protocol, and -what the spi is, but for isakmp it'll actually show you a lot of the tunnel -setup information (until it gets to the point in the protocol where isakmp -is encrypted....)</PRE> -<H2><A name="verify.crypt">Verifying encryption</A></H2> -<P>The question of how to verify that messages are actually encrypted - has been extensively discussed on the mailing list. See this<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/07/msg00262.html"> - thread</A>.</P> -<P>If you just want to verify that packets are encrypted, look at them - with a packet sniffer (see<A href="#tcpdump.test"> previous section</A> -) located between the gateways. The packets should, except for some of - the header information, be utterly unintelligible.<STRONG> The output - of good encryption looks<EM> exactly</EM> like random noise</STRONG>.</P> -<P>A packet sniffer can only tell you that the data you looked at was - encrypted. If you have stronger requirements -- for example if your - security policy requires verification that plaintext is not leaked - during startup or under various anomolous conditions -- then you will - need to devise much more thorough tests. If you do that, please post - any results or methodological details which your security policy allows - you to make public.</P> -<P>You can put recognizable data into ping packets with something like:</P> -<PRE> ping -p feedfacedeadbeef 11.0.1.1</PRE> -<P>"feedfacedeadbeef" is a legal hexadecimal pattern that is easy to - pick out of hex dumps.</P> -<P>For other protocols, you may need to check if you have encrypted data - or ASCII text. Encrypted data has approximately equal frequencies for - all 256 possible characters. ASCII text has most characters in the - printable range 0x20-0x7f, a few control characters less than 0x20, and - none at all in the range 0x80-0xff. 0x20, space, is a good character to - look for. In normal English text space occurs about once in seven - characters, versus about once in 256 for random or encrypted data.</P> -<P>One thing to watch for: the output of good compression, like that of - good encryption, looks just like random noise. You cannot tell just by - looking at a data stream whether it has been compressed, encrypted, or - both. You need a little care not to mistake compressed data for - encrypted data in your testing.</P> -<P>Note also that weak encryption also produces random-looking output. - You cannot tell whether the encryption is strong by looking at the - output. To be sure of that, you would need to have both the algorithms - and the implementation examined by experts.</P> -<P>For IPsec, you can get partial assurance from interoperability tests. - See our<A href="interop.html"> interop</A> document. When twenty - products all claim to implement<A href="glossary.html#3DES"> 3DES</A>, - and they all talk to each other, you can be fairly sure they have it - right. Of course, you might wonder whether all the implementers are - consipring to trick you or, more plausibly, whether some - implementations might have "back doors" so they can get also it wrong - when required.. If you're seriously worried about things like that, you - need to get the code you use audited (good luck if it is not Open - Source), or perhaps to talk to a psychiatrist about treatments for - paranoia.</P> -<H2><A name="mail.test">Mailing list pointers</A></H2> -<P>Additional information on testing can be found in these<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A> messages:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a user's detailed<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00571.html"> - setup diary</A> for his testbed network</LI> -<LI>a FreeS/WAN team member's<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/11/msg00425.html"> - notes</A> from testing at an IPsec interop "bakeoff"</LI> -</UL> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="performance.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="kernel.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/toc.html b/doc/toc.html deleted file mode 100644 index 047833020..000000000 --- a/doc/toc.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1019 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<H1 ALIGN="CENTER"><A NAME="CONTENTS">Table of Contents</A></H1> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="intro.html#intro">Introduction</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#ipsec.intro">IPsec, Security for the Internet - Protocol</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#intro.interop">Interoperating with other IPsec - implementations</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#applications">Applications of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#types">The need to authenticate gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#project">The FreeS/WAN project</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#goals">Project goals</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#staff">Project team</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#products">Products containing FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#distwith">Full Linux distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#kernel_dist">Linux kernel distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#office_dist">Office server distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#fw_dist">Firewall distributions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#turnkey">Firewall and VPN products</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#docs">Information sources</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#docformats">This HowTo, in multiple formats</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#rtfm">RTFM (please Read The Fine Manuals)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#text">Other documents in the distribution</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#assumptions">Background material</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#archives">Archives of the project mailing list</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#howto">User-written HowTo information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#applied">Papers on FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#licensing">License and copyright information</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#sites">Distribution sites</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#1_5_1">Primary site</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#mirrors">Mirrors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#munitions">The "munitions" archive of Linux - crypto software</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="intro.html#1_6">Links to other sections</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="upgrading.html#2">Upgrading to FreeS/WAN 2.x</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_1">New! Built in Opportunistic connections</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_1_1">Upgrading Opportunistic Encryption to - 2.01 (or later)</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_2">New! Policy Groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_3">New! Packetdefault Connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_4">FreeS/WAN now disables Reverse Path - Filtering</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_5">Revised ipsec.conf</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_5_1">No promise of compatibility</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_5_2">Most ipsec.conf files will work fine</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_5_3">Backward compatibility patch</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_5_4">Details</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="upgrading.html#2_5_5">Upgrading from 1.x RPMs to 2.x RPMs</A> -</LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="quickstart.html#quickstart">Quickstart Guide to - Opportunistic Encryption</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.setup">Purpose</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_1_1">OE "flag day"</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.dns">Requirements</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#easy.install">RPM install</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_3_1">Download RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_3_2">Check signatures</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_3_3">Install the RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#testinstall">Test</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.setups.list">Our Opportunistic Setups</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_4_1">Full or partial opportunism?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.client">Initiate-only setup</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_5_1">Restrictions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#forward.dns">Create and publish a forward - DNS record</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_5_3">Test that your key has been - published</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_5_4">Configure, if necessary</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_5_5">Test</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6">Full Opportunism</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_1">Put a TXT record in a Forward Domain</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_2">Put a TXT record in Reverse DNS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_3">Test your DNS record</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_4">No Configuration Needed</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_5">Consider Firewalling</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_6">Test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_6_7">Test</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.test">Testing opportunistic connections</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_8">Now what?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_9">Notes</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_10">Troubleshooting OE</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#3_11">Known Issues</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="policygroups.html#4">How to Configure Linux FreeS/WAN with - Policy Groups</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_1">What are Policy Groups?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_1_1">Built-In Security Options</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_2">Using Policy Groups</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_2_1">Example 1: Using a Base Policy - Group</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_2_2">Example 2: Defining IPsec Security - Policy with Groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_2_3">Example 3: Creating a Simple IPsec - VPN with the private Group</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_2_4">Example 4: New Policy Groups to - Protect a Subnet</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_2_5">Example 5: Adding a Subnet to the - VPN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_3">Appendix</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_3_1">Our Hidden Connections</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_3_2">Custom Policy Groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="policygroups.html#4_3_3">Disabling Opportunistic Encryption</A> -</LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="faq.html#5">FreeS/WAN FAQ</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#questions">Index of FAQ questions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#whatzit">What is FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#problems">How do I report a problem or seek help?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#generic">Can I get ...</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#lemme_out">Can I get an off-the-shelf system that - includes FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#consultant">Can I hire consultants or staff who - know FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#commercial">Can I get commercial support?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#release">Release questions</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#rel.current">What is the current release?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#relwhen">When is the next release?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#rel.bugs">Are there known bugs in the current - release?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#mod_cons">Modifications and contributions</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#modify.faq">Can I modify FreeS/WAN to ...?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#contrib.faq">Can I contribute to the project?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#ddoc.faq">Is there detailed design documentation?</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#interact">Will FreeS/WAN work in my environment?</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#interop.faq">Can FreeS/WAN talk to ...?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#old_to_new">Can different FreeS/WAN versions talk - to each other?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#faq.bandwidth">Is there a limit on throughput?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#faq.number">Is there a limit on number of tunnels?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#faq.speed">Is a ... fast enough to handle - FreeS/WAN with my loads?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#work_on">Will FreeS/WAN work on ... ?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on my version of - Linux?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#nonIntel.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on non-Intel - CPUs?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#multi.faq">Will FreeS/WAN run on multiprocessors?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#k.old">Will FreeS/WAN work on an older kernel?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#k.versions">Will FreeS/WAN run on the latest - kernel version?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#interface.faq">Will FreeS/WAN work on unusual - network hardware?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#vlan">Will FreeS/WAN work on a VLAN (802.1q) - network?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#features.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support ...</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#VPN.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support site-to-site VPN ( -Virtual Private Network) applications?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#warrior.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support remote users - connecting to a LAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#road.shared.possible">Does FreeS/WAN support - remote users using shared secret authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#wireless.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support wireless - networks?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#PKIcert">Does FreeS/WAN support X.509 or other PKI - certificates?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#Radius">Does FreeS/WAN support user authentication - (Radius, SecureID, Smart Card...)?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#NATtraversal">Does FreeS/WAN support NAT - traversal?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#virtID">Does FreeS/WAN support assigning a - "virtual identity" to a remote system?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noDES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support single DES - encryption?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#AES.faq">Does FreeS/WAN support AES encryption?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#other.cipher">Does FreeS/WAN support other - encryption algorithms?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#canI">Can I ...</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#policy.preconfig">Can I use policy groups along - with explicitly configured connections?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#policy.off">Can I turn off policy groups?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#reload">Can I reload connection info without - restarting?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#masq.faq">Can I use several masqueraded subnets?</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#dup_route">Can I use subnets masqueraded to the - same addresses?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#road.masq">Can I assign a road warrior an address - on my net (a virtual identity)?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#road.many">Can I support many road warriors with - one gateway?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#road.PSK">Can I have many road warriors using - shared secret authentication?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#QoS">Can I use Quality of Service routing with - FreeS/WAN?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#deadtunnel">Can I recognise dead tunnels and shut - them down?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#demanddial">Can I build IPsec tunnels over a - demand-dialed link?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#GRE">Can I build GRE, L2TP or PPTP tunnels over - IPsec?</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#NetBIOS">... use Network Neighborhood (Samba, - NetBIOS) over IPsec?</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#setup.faq">Life's little mysteries</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#cantping">I cannot ping ....</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#forever">It takes forever to ...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#route">I send packets to the tunnel with route(8) - but they vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#down_route">When a tunnel goes down, packets - vanish</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#firewall_ate">The firewall ate my packets!</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#dropconn">Dropped connections</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#defaultroutegone">Disappearing %defaultroute</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#tcpdump.faq">TCPdump on the gateway shows strange - things</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#no_trace">Traceroute does not show anything - between the gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#man4debug">Testing in stages</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#nomanual">Manually keyed connections don't work</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#spi_error">One manual connection works, but second - one fails</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#man_no_auto">Manual connections work, but - automatic keying doesn't</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#nocomp">IPsec works, but connections using - compression fail</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#pmtu.broken">Small packets work, but large - transfers fail</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#subsub">Subnet-to-subnet works, but tests from the - gateways don't</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#compile.faq">Compilation problems</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#gmp.h_missing">gmp.h: No such file or directory</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noVM">... virtual memory exhausted</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#error">Interpreting error messages</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#route-client">route-client (or host) exited with - status 7</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#unreachable">SIOCADDRT:Network is unreachable</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#modprobe">ipsec_setup: modprobe: Can't locate - module ipsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noKLIPS">ipsec_setup: Fatal error, kernel appears - to lack KLIPS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noDNS">ipsec_setup: ... failure to fetch key for - ... from DNS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#dup_address">ipsec_setup: ... interfaces ... and - ... share address ...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#kflags">ipsec_setup: Cannot adjust kernel flags</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#message_num">Message numbers (MI3, QR1, et cetera) - in Pluto messages</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#conn_name">Connection names in Pluto error - messages</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#cantorient">Pluto: ... can't orient connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#no.interface">... we have no ipsecN interface for - either end of this connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noconn">Pluto: ... no connection is known</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#nosuit">Pluto: ... no suitable connection ...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noconn.auth">Pluto: ... no connection has been - authorized</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#noDESsupport">Pluto: ... OAKLEY_DES_CBC is not - supported.</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#notransform">Pluto: ... no acceptable transform</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#rsasigkey">rsasigkey dumps core</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#sig4">!Pluto failure!: ... exited with ... signal - 4</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#econnrefused">ECONNREFUSED error message</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#no_eroute">klips_debug: ... no eroute!</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#SAused">... trouble writing to /dev/ipsec ... SA - already in use</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#ignore">... ignoring ... payload</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#unknown_rightcert">unknown parameter name - "rightcert"</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#spam">Why don't you restrict the mailing lists to - reduce spam?</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="manpages.html#manpages">FreeS/WAN manual pages</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="manpages.html#man.file">Files</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="manpages.html#man.command">Commands</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="manpages.html#man.lib">Library routines</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="firewall.html#firewall">FreeS/WAN and firewalls</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#filters">Filtering rules for IPsec packets</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#examplefw">Firewall configuration at boot</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#simple.rules">A simple set of rules</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#complex.rules">Other rules</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#rules.pub">Published rule sets</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#updown">Calling firewall scripts, named in - ipsec.conf(5)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#pre_post">Scripts called at IPsec start and - stop</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#up_down">Scripts called at connection up and - down</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#ipchains.script">Scripts for ipchains or - iptables</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#NAT">A complication: IPsec vs. NAT</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#nat_ok">NAT on or behind the IPsec gateway - works</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#nat_bad">NAT between gateways is problematic</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#NAT.ref">Other references on NAT and IPsec</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#complications">Other complications</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#through">IPsec through the gateway</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#ipsec_only">Preventing non-IPsec traffic</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#unknowngate">Filtering packets from unknown - gateways</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#otherfilter">Other packet filters</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#ICMP">ICMP filtering</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#traceroute">UDP packets for traceroute</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#l2tp">UDP for L2TP</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#packets">How it all works: IPsec packet - details</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#noport">ESP and AH do not have ports</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#header">Header layout</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="firewall.html#dhr">DHR on the updown script</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="trouble.html#trouble">Linux FreeS/WAN Troubleshooting Guide</A> -</B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#overview">Overview</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#install">1. During Install</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#8_2_1">1.1 RPM install gotchas</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#8_2_2">1.2 Problems installing from source</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#install.check">1.3 Install checks</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="quickstart.html#oe.trouble">1.3 Troubleshooting OE</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#negotiation">2. During Negotiation</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#state">2.1 Determine Connection State</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#find.pluto.error">2.2 Finding error text</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#interpret.pluto.error">2.3 Interpreting a - Negotiation Error</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#use">3. Using a Connection</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#8_4_1">3.1 Orienting yourself</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#8_4_2">3.2 Those pesky configuration errors</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#route.firewall">3.3 Check Routing and - Firewalling</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#sniff">3.4 When in doubt, sniff it out</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#find.use.error">3.5 Check your logs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#bigpacket">3.6 More testing for the truly - thorough</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#prob.report">4. Problem Reporting</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#8_5_1">4.1 How to ask for help</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#8_5_2">4.2 Where to ask</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#notes">5. Additional Notes on Troubleshooting</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#system.info">5.1 Information available on your - system</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#testgates"> 5.2 Testing between security - gateways</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#ifconfig1">5.3 ifconfig reports for KLIPS - debugging</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#gdb"> 5.4 Using GDB on Pluto</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="compat.html#compat">Linux FreeS/WAN Compatibility Guide</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#spec">Implemented parts of the IPsec - Specification</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#in">In Linux FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#dropped">Deliberately omitted</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#not">Not (yet) in Linux FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#pfkey">Our PF-Key implementation</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#pfk.port">PF-Key portability</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#otherk">Kernels other than the latest 2.2.x and - 2.4.y</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#kernel.2.0">2.0.x kernels</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#kernel.production">2.2 and 2.4 kernels</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#otherdist">Intel Linux distributions other than - Redhat</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#rh7">Redhat 7.0</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#suse">SuSE Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#slack">Slackware</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#deb">Debian</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#caldera">Caldera</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#CPUs">CPUs other than Intel</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html# strongarm">Corel Netwinder (StrongARM CPU)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#yellowdog">Yellow Dog Linux on Power PC</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#mklinux">Mklinux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#alpha">Alpha 64-bit processors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#SPARC">Sun SPARC processors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#mips">MIPS processors</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#crusoe">Transmeta Crusoe</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#coldfire">Motorola Coldfire</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#multiprocessor">Multiprocessor machines</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#hardware">Support for crypto hardware</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#ipv6">IP version 6 (IPng)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="compat.html#v6.back">IPv6 background</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="interop.html#10">Interoperating with FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="interop.html#10_1">Interop at a Glance</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="interop.html#10_1_1">Key</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="interop.html#10_2">Basic Interop Rules</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="interop.html#10_3">Longer Stories</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="interop.html#10_3_1">For More Compatible Implementations</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="interop.html#10_3_2">For Other Implementations</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="performance.html#performance">Performance of FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#pub.bench">Published material</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#perf.estimate">Estimating CPU overheads</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#perf.more">Higher performance alternatives</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#11_2_2">Other considerations</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#biggate">Many tunnels from a single - gateway</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#low-end">Low-end systems</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#klips.bench">Measuring KLIPS</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#speed.compress">Speed with compression</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="performance.html#methods">Methods of measuring</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="testing.html#test.freeswan">Testing FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#test.oe">Testing opportunistic connections</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#12_1_1">Basic OE Test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#12_1_2">OE Gateway Test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#12_1_3">Additional OE tests</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#test.uml">Testing with User Mode Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#testnet">Configuration for a testbed network</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#testbed">Testbed network</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#tcpdump.test">Using packet sniffers in testing</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#verify.crypt">Verifying encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="testing.html#mail.test">Mailing list pointers</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="kernel.html#kernelconfig">Kernel configuration for FreeS/WAN</A> -</B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="kernel.html#notall">Not everyone needs to worry about - kernel configuration</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="kernel.html#assume">Assumptions and notation</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="kernel.html#labels">Labels used</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="kernel.html#kernelopt">Kernel options for FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="adv_config.html#adv_config">Other configuration - possibilities</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#thumb">Some rules of thumb about - configuration</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#cheap.tunnel">Tunnels are cheap</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#subnet.size">Subnet sizes</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#example.more">Other network layouts</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#choose">Choosing connection types</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#man-auto">Manual vs. automatic keying</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#auto-auth">Authentication methods for - auto-keying</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#adv-pk">Advantages of public key methods</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#prodsecrets">Using shared secrets in - production</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="biblio.html#secrets">Putting secrets in ipsec.secrets(5)</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#securing.secrets">File security</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#notroadshared">Shared secrets for road - warriors</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#prodman">Using manual keying in production</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#ranbits">Creating keys with ranbits</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#boot">Setting up connections at boot time</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#multitunnel">Multiple tunnels between the - same two gateways</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#advroute">One tunnel plus advanced routing</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#opp.gate">An Opportunistic Gateway</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#14_7_1">Start from full opportunism</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#14_7_2">Reverse DNS TXT records for each - protected machine</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#14_7_3">Publish your records</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#14_7_4">...and test them</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#14_7_5">No Configuration Needed</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#extruded.config">Extruded Subnets</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#roadvirt">Road Warrior with virtual IP - address</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="glossary.html#dynamic">Dynamic Network Interfaces</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#basicdyn">Basics</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#bootdyn">Boot Time</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#changedyn">Change Time</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="adv_config.html#unencrypted">Unencrypted tunnels</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="trouble.html#install">Installing FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_1">Requirements</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_2">Choose your install method</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_3">FreeS/WAN ships with some Linuxes</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_3_1">FreeS/WAN may be altered...</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_3_2">You might need to create an - authentication keypair</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_3_3">Start and test FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_4">RPM install</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_4_1">Download RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_4_2">For freeswan.org RPMs: check - signatures</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_4_3">Install the RPMs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_4_4">Start and Test FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5">Install from Source</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5_1">Decide what functionality you need</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5_2">Download FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5_3">For freeswan.org source: check its - signature</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5_4">Untar, unzip</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5_5">Patch if desired</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_5_6">... and Make</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_6">Start FreeS/WAN and test your install</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_7">Test your install</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_8">Making FreeS/WAN play well with others</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="install.html#15_9">Configure for your needs</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="config.html#config">How to configure FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_1">Requirements</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#config.netnet">Net-to-Net connection</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#netnet.info.ex">Gather information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_2_2">Edit /etc/ipsec.conf</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_2_3">Start your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_2_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be - tunneled</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_2_5">Test your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_2_6">Finishing touches</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#config.rw">Road Warrior Configuration</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#rw.info.ex">Gather information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_3_2">Customize /etc/ipsec.conf</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_3_3">Start your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_3_4">Do not MASQ or NAT packets to be - tunneled</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_3_5">Test your connection</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_3_6">Finishing touches</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_3_7">Multiple Road Warriors</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="config.html#16_4">What next?</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="background.html#background">Linux FreeS/WAN background</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#dns.background">Some DNS background</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#forward.reverse">Forward and reverse maps</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#17_1_2">Hierarchy and delegation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#17_1_3">Syntax of DNS records</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#17_1_4">Cacheing, TTL and propagation delay</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#MTU.trouble">Problems with packet - fragmentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#nat.background">Network address translation - (NAT)</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#17_3_1">NAT to non-routable addresses</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="background.html#17_3_2">NAT to routable addresses</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="user_examples.html#user.examples">FreeS/WAN script examples</A> -</B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="user_examples.html#poltorak">Poltorak's Firewall script</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="makecheck.html#makecheck">How to configure to use "make - check"</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#19_1">What is "make check"</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#19_2">Running "make check"</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="makecheck.html#20">How to write a "make check" test</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_1">Structure of a test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_2">The TESTLIST</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_3">Test kinds</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_4">Common parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_8">libtest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_10">umlXhost parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#20_12">module_compile paramaters</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="makecheck.html#21">Current pitfalls</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="umltesting.html#umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing - guide</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="umltesting.html#22_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="umltesting.html#22_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="umltesting.html#23">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="umltesting.html#23_1">Other notes about debugging</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="umltesting.html#24">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="umltesting.html#25">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A> -</B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="politics.html#politics">History and politics of - cryptography</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#intro.politics">Introduction</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#26_1_1">History</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#intro.poli">Politics</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#26_1_3">Links</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#26_1_4">Outline of this section</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#leader">From our project leader</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#gilmore">Swan: Securing the Internet against - Wiretapping</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#policestate">Stopping wholesale monitoring</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#weak">Government promotion of weak crypto</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#escrow">Escrowed encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#shortkeys">Limited key lengths</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#exlaw">Cryptography Export Laws</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#USlaw">US Law</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#wrong">What's wrong with restrictions on - cryptography</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#Wassenaar">The Wassenaar Arrangement</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#status">Export status of Linux FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#help">Help spread IPsec around</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#desnotsecure">DES is Not Secure</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#deshware">Dedicated hardware breaks DES in a - few days</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#spooks">Spooks may break DES faster yet</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#desnet">Networks break DES in a few weeks</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#no_des">We disable DES</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#40joke">40-bits is laughably weak</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#altdes">Triple DES is almost certainly secure</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#aes.ipsec">AES in IPsec</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#press">Press coverage of Linux FreeS/WAN:</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="politics.html#26_6_1">FreeS/WAN 1.0 press</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html#release">Press release for version 1.0</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="ipsec.html#ipsec.detail">The IPsec protocols</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#27_1">Protocols and phases</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#others">Applying IPsec</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#advantages">Advantages of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#limitations">Limitations of IPsec</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#uses">IPsec is a general mechanism for securing - IP</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#authonly">Using authentication without - encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#encnoauth">Encryption without authentication is - dangerous</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#multilayer">Multiple layers of IPsec processing - are possible</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#traffic.resist">Resisting traffic analysis</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#primitives">Cryptographic components</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#block.cipher">Block ciphers</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#hash.ipsec">Hash functions</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#DH.keying">Diffie-Hellman key agreement</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#RSA.auth">RSA authentication</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#structure">Structure of IPsec</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#IKE.ipsec">IKE (Internet Key Exchange)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#services">IPsec Services, AH and ESP</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#AH.ipsec">The Authentication Header (AH)</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#ESP.ipsec">Encapsulated Security Payload (ESP)</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#modes">IPsec modes</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#tunnel.ipsec">Tunnel mode</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#transport.ipsec">Transport mode</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#parts">FreeS/WAN parts</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#KLIPS.ipsec">KLIPS: Kernel IPsec Support</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#Pluto.ipsec">The Pluto daemon</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#command">The ipsec(8) command</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#ipsec.conf">Linux FreeS/WAN configuration file</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#key">Key management</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#current">Currently Implemented Methods</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="ipsec.html#notyet">Methods not yet implemented</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="mail.html#lists">Mailing lists and newsgroups</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#list.fs">Mailing lists about FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#projlist">The project mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#archive">Archives of the lists</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#indexes">Indexes of mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#otherlists">Lists for related software and topics</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#28_3_1">Products that include FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#linux.lists">Linux mailing lists</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#ietf">Lists for IETF working groups</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#other">Other mailing lists</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="mail.html#newsgroups">Usenet newsgroups</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="web.html#weblink">Web links</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#freeswan">The Linux FreeS/WAN Project</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#patch">Add-ons and patches for FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#dist">Distributions including FreeS/WAN</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#used">Things FreeS/WAN uses or could use</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#alternatives">Other approaches to VPNs for Linux</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#ipsec.link">The IPsec Protocols</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#general">General IPsec or VPN information</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="trouble.html#overview">IPsec overview documents or slide - sets</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#otherlang">IPsec information in languages other - than English</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#RFCs1">RFCs and other reference documents</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#analysis">Analysis and critiques of IPsec - protocols</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#IP.background">Background information on IP</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#implement">IPsec Implementations</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#linuxprod">Linux products</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#router">IPsec in router products</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#fw.web">IPsec in firewall products</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#ipsecos">Operating systems with IPsec support</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#29_3_5">IPsec on network cards</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#opensource">Open source IPsec implementations</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#interop.web">Interoperability</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#linux.link">Linux links</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#linux.basic">Basic and tutorial Linux information</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#general">General Linux sites</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#docs.ldp">Documentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#advroute.web">Advanced routing</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#linsec">Security for Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#firewall.linux">Linux firewalls</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#linux.misc">Miscellaneous Linux information</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#crypto.link">Crypto and security links</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#security">Crypto and security resources</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#policy">Cryptography law and policy</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#crypto.tech">Cryptography technical information</A> -</LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#compsec">Computer and network security</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="web.html#people">Links to home pages</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="glossary.html#ourgloss">Glossary for the Linux FreeS/WAN - project</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="glossary.html#jump">Jump to a letter in the glossary</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="glossary.html#gloss">Other glossaries</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="glossary.html#definitions">Definitions</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="biblio.html#biblio">Bibliography for the Linux FreeS/WAN - project</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="rfc.html#RFC">IPsec RFCs and related documents</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#RFCfile">The RFCs.tar.gz Distribution File</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#sources">Other sources for RFCs & Internet drafts</A> -</LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#RFCdown">RFCs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#drafts">Internet Drafts</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#FIPS1">FIPS standards</A></LI> -</UL> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#RFCs.tar.gz">What's in the RFCs.tar.gz bundle?</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#rfc.ov">Overview RFCs</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#basic.prot">Basic protocols</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#key.ike">Key management</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#rfc.detail">Details of various things used</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#rfc.ref">Older RFCs which may be referenced</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#rfc.dns">RFCs for secure DNS service, which IPsec - may use</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#rfc.exp">RFCs labelled "experimental"</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="rfc.html#rfc.rel">Related RFCs</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="roadmap.html#roadmap">Distribution Roadmap: What's Where in - Linux FreeS/WAN</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#top">Top directory</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#doc">Documentation</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#klips.roadmap">KLIPS: kernel IP security</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#pluto.roadmap">Pluto key and connection - management daemon</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#utils">Utils</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#lib">Libraries</A></LI> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#fswanlib">FreeS/WAN Library</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="roadmap.html#otherlib">Imported Libraries</A></LI> -</UL> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="umltesting.html#umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing guide</A> -</B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="umltesting.html#34_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="umltesting.html#34_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A> -</LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="umltesting.html#35">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="umltesting.html#35_1">Other notes about debugging</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="umltesting.html#36">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="umltesting.html#37">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A> -</B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="makecheck.html#makecheck">How to configure to use "make - check"</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#38_1">What is "make check"</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#38_2">Running "make check"</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="makecheck.html#39">How to write a "make check" test</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_1">Structure of a test</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_2">The TESTLIST</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_3">Test kinds</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_4">Common parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_5">KLIPStest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_6">mkinsttest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_7">rpm_build_install_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_8">libtest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_9">umlplutotest paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_10">umlXhost parameters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_11">kernel_patch_test paramaters</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="makecheck.html#39_12">module_compile paramaters</A></LI> -</UL> -<B><A HREF="makecheck.html#40">Current pitfalls</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="nightly.html#nightly">Nightly regression testing</A></B> -<BR> -<BR><B><A HREF="nightly.html#nightlyhowto">How to setup the nightly - build</A></B> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="nightly.html#42_1"> Files you need to know about</A></LI> -<LI><A HREF="nightly.html#42_2">Configuring freeswan-regress-env.sh</A></LI> -</UL> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/trouble.html b/doc/trouble.html deleted file mode 100644 index 2123f3805..000000000 --- a/doc/trouble.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,706 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="firewall.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="compat.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A NAME="trouble"></A>Linux FreeS/WAN Troubleshooting Guide</H1> -<H2><A NAME="overview"></A>Overview</H2> -<P> This document covers several general places where you might have a - problem:</P> -<OL> -<LI><A HREF="#install">During install</A>.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#negotiation">During the negotiation process</A>.</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#use">Using an established connection</A>.</LI> -</OL> -<P>This document also contains<A HREF="#notes"> notes</A> which expand - on points made in these sections, and tips for<A HREF="#prob.report"> - problem reporting</A>. If the other end of your connection is not - FreeS/WAN, you'll also want to read our<A HREF="interop.html#interop.problem"> - interoperation</A> document.</P> -<H2><A NAME="install"></A>1. During Install</H2> -<H3><A NAME="8_2_1">1.1 RPM install gotchas</A></H3> -<P>With the RPM method:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Be sure you have installed both the userland tools and the kernel - components. One will not work without the other. For example, when - using FreeS/WAN-produced RPMs for our 2.04 release, you need both: -<PRE> freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm - freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm -</PRE> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="8_2_2">1.2 Problems installing from source</A></H3> -<P>When installing from source, you may find these problems:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Missing library. See<A HREF="faq.html#gmp.h_missing"> this</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI>Missing utilities required for compile. See this<A HREF="install.html#tool.lib"> - checklist</A>.</LI> -<LI>Kernel version incompatibility. See<A HREF="faq.html#k.versions"> - this</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI>Another compile problem. Find information in the out.* files, ie. - out.kpatch, out.kbuild, created at compile time in the top-level Linux - FreeS/WAN directory. Error messages generated by KLIPS during the boot - sequence are accessible with the<VAR> dmesg</VAR> command. -<BR> Check the list archives and the List in Brief to see if this is a - known issue. If it is not, report it to the bugs list as described in - our<A HREF="#prob.report"> problem reporting</A> section. In some - cases, you may be asked to provide debugging information using gdb; - details<A HREF="#gdb"> below</A>.</LI> -<LI>If your kernel compiles but you fail to install your new - FreeS/WAN-enabled kernel, review the sections on<A HREF="install.html#newk"> - installing the patched kernel</A>, and<A HREF="install.html#testinstall"> - testing</A> to see if install succeeded.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="install.check"></A>1.3 Install checks</H3> -<P><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> checks a number of FreeS/WAN essentials. Here - are some hints on what do to when your system doesn't check out:</P> -<P></P> -<TABLE border="1"> -<TR><TD><STRONG>Problem</STRONG></TD><TD><STRONG>Status</STRONG></TD><TD> -<STRONG>Action</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec</VAR> not on-path</TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<P>Add<VAR> /usr/local/sbin</VAR> to your PATH.</P> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Missing KLIPS support</TD><TD><FONT COLOR="#FF0000">critical</FONT> -</TD><TD>See<A HREF="faq.html#noKLIPS"> this FAQ.</A></TD></TR> -<TR><TD>No RSA private key</TD><TD> </TD><TD> -<P>Follow<A HREF="install.html#genrsakey"> these instructions</A> to - create an RSA key pair for your host. RSA keys are:</P> -<UL> -<LI>required for opportunistic encryption, and</LI> -<LI>our preferred method to authenticate pre-configured connections.</LI> -</UL> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>pluto</VAR> not running</TD><TD><FONT COLOR="#FF0000"> -critical</FONT></TD><TD> -<PRE>service ipsec start</PRE> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>No port 500 hole</TD><TD><FONT COLOR="#FF0000">critical</FONT></TD><TD> -Open port 500 for IKE negotiation.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Port 500 check N/A</TD><TD> </TD><TD>Check that port 500 is open - for IKE negotiation.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>Failed DNS checks</TD><TD> </TD><TD>Opportunistic encryption - requires information from DNS. To set this up, see<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.setup"> - our instructions</A>.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>No public IP address</TD><TD> </TD><TD>Check that the interface - which you want to protect with IPSec is up and running.</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<H3><A NAME="oe.trouble"></A>1.3 Troubleshooting OE</H3> -<P>OE should work with no local configuration, if you have posted DNS - TXT records according to the instructions in our<A HREF="quickstart.html"> - quickstart guide</A>. If you encounter trouble, try these hints. We - welcome additional hints via the<A HREF="mail.html"> users' mailing - list</A>.</P> -<TABLE border="1"> -<TR><TD><STRONG>Symptom</STRONG></TD><TD><STRONG>Problem</STRONG></TD><TD> -<STRONG>Action</STRONG></TD></TR> -<TR><TD> You're running FreeS/WAN 2.01 (or later), and initiating a - connection to FreeS/WAN 2.00 (or earlier). In your logs, you see a - message like: -<PRE>no RSA public key known for '192.0.2.13'; -DNS search for KEY failed (no KEY record -for 13.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.)</PRE> - The older FreeS/WAN logs no error.</TD><TD><A NAME="oe.trouble.flagday"> -</A> A protocol level incompatibility between 2.01 (or later) and 2.00 - (or earlier) causes this error. It occurs when a FreeS/WAN 2.01 (or - later) box for which no KEY record is posted attempts to initiate an OE - connection to older FreeS/WAN versions (2.00 and earlier). Note that - older versions can initiate to newer versions without this error.</TD><TD> -If you control the peer host, upgrade its FreeS/WAN to 2.01 (or later), - and post new style TXT records for it. If not, but if you know its - sysadmin, perhaps a quick note is in order. If neither option is - possible, you can ease the transition by posting an old style KEY - record (created with a command like "ipsec showhostkey --key") to the - reverse map for the FreeS/WAN 2.01 (or later) box.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OE host is very slow to contact other hosts.</TD><TD>Slow DNS - service while running OE.</TD><TD>It's a good idea to run a caching DNS - server on your OE host, as outlined in<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2003-January/004205.html"> - this mailing list message</A>. If your DNS servers are elsewhere, put - their IPs in the<VAR> clear</VAR> policy group, and re-read groups with -<PRE>ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD> -<PRE>Can't Opportunistically initiate for -192.0.2.2 to 192.0.2.3: no TXT record -for 13.2.0.192.in-addr.arpa.</PRE> -</TD><TD>Peer is not set up for OE.</TD><TD> -<P>None. Plenty of hosts on the Internet do not run OE. If, however, you - have set OE up on that peer, this may indicate that you need to wait up - to 48 hours for its DNS records to propagate.</P> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> does not find DNS records: -<PRE>... -Looking for TXT in forward map: - xy.example.com...[FAILED] -Looking for TXT in reverse map...[FAILED] -...</PRE> - You also experience authentication failure: -<BR> -<PRE>Possible authentication failure: -no acceptable response to our -first encrypted message</PRE> -</TD><TD>DNS records are not posted or have not propagated.</TD><TD>Did - you post the DNS records necessary for OE? If not, do so using the - instructions in our<A HREF="quickstart.html#quickstart"> quickstart - guide</A>. If so, wait up to 48 hours for the DNS records to propagate.</TD> -</TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> does not find DNS records, and you - experience authentication failure.</TD><TD>For iOE, your ID does not - match location of forward DNS record.</TD><TD>In<VAR> config setup</VAR> -, change<VAR> myid=</VAR> to match the forward DNS where you posted the - record. Restart FreeS/WAN. For reference, see our<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.client"> - iOE instructions</A>.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> finds DNS records, yet there is still - authentication failure. ( ? )</TD><TD>DNS records are malformed.</TD><TD> -Re-create the records and send new copies to your DNS administrator.</TD> -</TR> -<TR><TD><VAR>ipsec verify</VAR> finds DNS records, yet there is still - authentication failure. ( ? )</TD><TD>DNS records show different keys - for a gateway vs. its subnet hosts.</TD><TD>All TXT records for boxes - protected by an OE gateway must contain the gateway's public key. - Re-create and re-post any incorrect records using<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming"> - these instructions</A>.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OE gateway loses connectivity to its subnet. The gateway's - routing table shows routes to the subnet through IPsec interfaces.</TD><TD> -The subnet is part of the<VAR> private</VAR> or<VAR> block</VAR> policy - group on the gateway.</TD><TD>Remove the subnet from the group, and - reread groups with -<PRE>ipsec auto --rereadgroups</PRE> -</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>OE does not work to hosts on the local LAN.</TD><TD>This is a - known issue.</TD><TD>See<A HREF="opportunism.known-issues"> this list</A> - of known issues with OE.</TD></TR> -<TR><TD>FreeS/WAN does not seem to be executing your default policy. In - your logs, you see a message like: -<PRE>/etc/ipsec.d/policies/iprivate-or-clear" -line 14: subnet "0.0.0.0/0", -source 192.0.2.13/32, -already "private-or-clear"</PRE> -</TD><TD><A HREF="glossary.html#fullnet">Fullnet</A> in a policy group - file defines your default policy. Fullnet should normally be present in - only one policy group file. The fine print: you can have two default - policies defined so long as they protect different local endpoints - (e.g. the FreeS/WAN gateway and a subnet).</TD><TD> Find all policies - which contain fullnet with: -<BR> -<PRE>grep -F 0.0.0.0/0 /etc/ipsec.d/policies/*</PRE> - then remove the unwanted occurrence(s).</TD></TR> -</TABLE> -<H2><A NAME="negotiation"></A>2. During Negotiation</H2> -<P>When you fail to bring up a tunnel, you'll need to find out:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="#state">what your connection state is,</A> and often</LI> -<LI><A HREF="#find.pluto.error">an error message</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>before you can<A HREF="#interpret.pluto.error"> diagnose your problem</A> -.</P> -<H3><A NAME="state"></A>2.1 Determine Connection State</H3> -<H4>Finding current state</H4> -<P>You can see connection states (STATE_MAIN_I1 and so on) when you - bring up a connection on the command line. If you have missed this, or - brought up your connection automatically, use:</P> -<PRE>ipsec auto --status</PRE> -<P>The most relevant state is the last one reached.</P> -<H4><VAR>What's this supposed to look like?</VAR></H4> -<P>Negotiations should proceed though various states, in the processes - of:</P> -<OL> -<LI>IKE negotiations (aka Phase 1, Main Mode, STATE_MAIN_*)</LI> -<LI>IPSEC negotiations (aka Phase 2, Quick Mode, STATE_QUICK_*)</LI> -</OL> -<P>These are done and a connection is established when you see messages - like:</P> -<PRE> 000 #21: "myconn" STATE_MAIN_I4 (ISAKMP SA established)... - 000 #2: "myconn" STATE_QUICK_I2 (sent QI2, IPsec SA established)...</PRE> -<P> Look for the key phrases are "ISAKMP SA established" and "IPSec SA - established", with the relevant connection name. Often, this happens at - STATE_MAIN_I4 and STATE_QUICK_I2, respectively.</P> -<P><VAR>ipsec auto --status</VAR> will tell you what states<STRONG> have - been achieved</STRONG>, rather than the current state. Since - determining the current state is rather more difficult to do, current - state information is not available from Linux FreeS/WAN. If you are - actively bringing a connection up, the status report's last states for - that connection likely reflect its current state. Beware, though, of - the case where a connection was correctly brought up but is now downed: - Linux FreeS/WAN will not notice this until it attempts to rekey. - Meanwhile, the last known state indicates that the connection has been - established.</P> -<P>If your connection is stuck at STATE_MAIN_I1, skip straight to<A HREF="#ikepath"> - here</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="find.pluto.error"></A>2.2 Finding error text</H3> -<P>Solving most errors will require you to find verbose error text, - either on the command line or in the logs.</P> -<H4>Verbose start for more information</H4> -<P> Note that you can get more detail from<VAR> ipsec auto</VAR> using - the --verbose flag:</P> -<PRE STYLE="margin-bottom: 0.2in"> ipsec auto --verbose --up west-east</PRE> -<P> More complete information can be gleaned from the<A HREF="#logusage"> - log files</A>.</P> -<H4>Debug levels count</H4> -<P>The amount of description you'll get here depends on ipsec.conf debug - settings,<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR>= and<VAR> plutodebug</VAR>=. When - troubleshooting, set at least one of these to<VAR> all</VAR>, and when - done, reset it to<VAR> none</VAR> so your logs don't fill up. Note that - you must have enabled the<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR><A HREF="install.html#allbut"> - compile-time option</A> for the<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> configuration - switch to work.</P> -<P>For negotiation problems<VAR> plutodebug</VAR> is most relevant.<VAR> - klipsdebug</VAR> applies mainly to attempts to use an - already-established connection. See also<A HREF="ipsec.html#parts"> - this</A> description of the division of duties within Linux FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>After raising your debug levels, restart Linux FreeS/WAN to ensure - that ipsec.conf is reread, then recreate the error to generate verbose - logs.</P> -<H4><VAR>ipsec barf</VAR> for lots of debugging information</H4> -<P><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec_barf.8.html"><VAR> ipsec barf (8)</VAR></A> - collects a bunch of useful debugging information, including these logs - Use the command</P> -<PRE> - ipsec barf > barf.west -</PRE> -<P>to generate one.</P> -<H4>Find the error</H4> -<P>Search out the failure point in your logs. Are there a handful of - lines which succinctly describe how things are going wrong or contrary - to your expectation? Sometimes the failure point is not immediately - obvious: Linux FreeS/WAN's errors are usually not marked "Error". Have - a look in the<A HREF="faq.html"> FAQ</A> for what some common failures - look like.</P> -<P>Tip: problems snowball. Focus your efforts on the first problem, - which is likely to be the cause of later errors.</P> -<H4>Play both sides</H4> -<P>Also find error text on the peer IPSec box. This gives you two - perspectives on the same failure.</P> -<P>At times you will require information which only one side has. The - peer can merely indicate the presence of an error, and its approximate - point in the negotiations. If one side keeps retrying, it may be - because there is a show stopper on the other side. Have a look at the - other side and figure out what it doesn't like.</P> -<P>If the other end is not Linux FreeS/WAN, the principle is the same: - replicate the error with its most verbose logging on, and capture the - output to a file.</P> -<H3><A NAME="interpret.pluto.error"></A>2.3 Interpreting a Negotiation - Error</H3> -<H4><A NAME="ikepath"></A>Connection stuck at STATE_MAIN_I1</H4> -<P>This error commonly happens because IKE (port 500) packets, needed to - negotiate an IPSec connection, cannot travel freely between your IPSec - gateways. See<A HREF="firewall.html#packets"> our firewall document</A> - for details.</P> -<H4>Other errors</H4> -<P>Other errors require a bit more digging. Use the following resources:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="faq.html">the FAQ</A> . Since this document is constantly - updated, the snapshot's FAQ may have a new entry relevant to your - problem.</LI> -<LI>our<A HREF="background.html"> background document</A> . Special - considerations which, while not central to Linux FreeS/WAN, are often - tripped over. Includes problems with<A href="background.html#MTU.trouble"> - packet fragmentation</A>, and considerations for testing opportunism.</LI> -<LI>the<A HREF="mail.html#lists"> list archives</A>. Each of the - searchable archives works differently, so it's worth checking each. Use - a search term which is generic, but identifies your error, for example - "No connection is known for". -<BR> Often, you will find that your question has been answered in the - past. Finding an archived answer is quicker than asking the list. You - may, however, find similar questions without answers. If you do, send - their URLs to the list with your trouble report. The additional - examples may help the list tech support person find your answer.</LI> -<LI>Look into the code where the error is being generated. The pluto - code is nicely documented with comments and meaningful variable names.</LI> -</UL> -<P>If you have failed to solve your problem with the help of these - resources, send a detailed problem report to the users list, following - these<A HREF="#prob.report"> guidelines</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="use"></A>3. Using a Connection</H2> -<H3><A NAME="8_4_1">3.1 Orienting yourself</A></H3> -<H4><VAR>How do I know if it works?</VAR></H4> -<P>Test your connection by sending packets through it. The simplest way - to do this is with ping, but the ping needs to<STRONG> test the correct - tunnel.</STRONG> See<A HREF="#testgates"> this example scenario</A> if - you don't understand this.</P> -<P></P> -<P>If your ping returns, test any other connections you've brought u all - check out, great. You may wish to<A HREF="#bigpacket"> test with large - packets</A> for MTU problems.</P> -<H4><VAR>ipsec barf</VAR> is useful again</H4> -<P>If your ping fails to return, generate an ipsec barf debugging report - on each IPSec gateway. On a non-Linux FreeS/WAN implementation, gather - equivalent information. Use this, and the tips in the next sections, to - troubleshoot. Are you sure that both endpoints are capable of hearing - and responding to ping?</P> -<H3><A NAME="8_4_2">3.2 Those pesky configuration errors</A></H3> -<P>IPSec may be dropping your ping packets since they do not belong in - the tunnels you have constructed:</P> -<UL> -<LI>Your ping may not test the tunnel you intend to test. For details, - see our<A HREF="faq.html#cantping"> "I can't ping"</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI> Alternately, you may have a configuration error. For example, you - may have configured one of the four possible tunnels between two - gateways, but not the one required to secure the important traffic - you're now testing. In this case, add and start the tunnel, and try - again.</LI> -</UL> -<P>In either case, you will often see a message like:</P> -<PRE>klipsdebug... no eroute</PRE> -<P>which we discuss in<A HREF="faq.html#no_eroute"> this FAQ</A>.</P> -<P>Note:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A HREF="glossary.html#NAT.gloss">Network Address Translation (NAT)</A> - and<A HREF="glossary.html#masq"> IP masquerade</A> may have an effect - on which tunnels you need to configure.</LI> -<LI>When testing a tunnel that protects a multi-node subnet, try several - subnet nodes as ping targets, in case one node is routing incorrectly.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="route.firewall"></A>3.3 Check Routing and Firewalling</H3> -<P>If you've confirmed your configuration assumptions, the problem is - almost certainly with routing or firewalling. Isolate the problem using - interface statistics, firewall statistics, or a packet sniffer.</P> -<H4>Background:</H4> -<UL> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN supplies all the special routing it needs; you need - only route packets out through your IPSec gateway. Verify that on the<VAR> - subnetted</VAR> machines you are using for your ping-test, your routing - is as expected. I have seen a tunnel "fail" because the subnet machine - sending packets out an alternate gateway (not our IPSec gateway) on - their return path.</LI> -<LI>Linux FreeS/WAN requires particular<A HREF="firewall.html"> - firewalling considerations</A>. Check the firewall rules on your IPSec - gateways and ensure that they allow IPSec traffic through. Be sure that - no other machine - for example a router between the gateways - is - blocking your IPSec packets.</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A NAME="ifconfig"></A>View Interface and Firewall Statistics</H4> -<P>Interface reports and firewall statistics can help you track down - lost packets at a glance. Check any firewall statistics you may be - keeping on your IPSec gateways, for dropped packets.</P> -<P><STRONG>Tip</STRONG>: You can take a snapshot of the packets - processed by your firewall with:</P> -<PRE> iptables -L -n -v</PRE> -<P>You can get creative with "diff" to find out what happens to a - particular packet during transmission.</P> -<P>Both<VAR> cat /proc/net/dev</VAR> and<VAR> ifconfig</VAR> display - interface statistics, and both are included in<VAR> ipsec barf</VAR>. - Use either to check if any interface has dropped packets. If you find - that one has, test whether this is related to your ping. While you ping - continuously, print that interface's statistics several times. Does its - drop count increase in proportion to the ping? If so, check why the - packets are dropped there.</P> -<P>To do this, look at the firewall rules that apply to that interface. - If the interface is an IPSec interface, more information may be - available in the log. Grep for the word "drop" in a log which was - created with<VAR> klipsdebug=all</VAR> as the error happened.</P> -<P>See also this<A HREF="#ifconfig1"> discussion</A> on interpreting<VAR> - ifconfig</VAR> statistics.</P> -<H3><A NAME="sniff"></A>3.4 When in doubt, sniff it out</H3> -<P>If you have checked configuration assumptions, routing, and firewall - rules, and your interface statistics yield no clue, it remains for you - to investigate the mystery of the lost packet by the most thorough - method: with a packet sniffer (providing, of course, that this is legal - where you are working).</P> -<P>In order to detect packets on the ipsec virtual interfaces, you will - need an up-to-date sniffer (tcpdump, ethereal, ksnuffle) on your IPSec - gateway machines. You may also find it useful to sniff the ping - endpoints.</P> -<H4>Anticipate your packets' path</H4> -<P>Ping, and examine each interface along the projected path, checking - for your ping's arrival. If it doesn't get to the the next stop, you - have narrowed down where to look for it. In this way, you can isolate a - problem area, and narrow your troubleshooting focus.</P> -<P>Within a machine running Linux FreeS/WAN, this<A HREF="firewall.html#packets"> - packet flow diagram</A> will help you anticipate a packet's path.</P> -<P>Note that:</P> -<UL> -<LI> from the perspective of the tunneled packet, the entire tunnel is - one hop. That's explained in<A HREF="faq.html#no_trace"> this</A> FAQ.</LI> -<LI> an encapsulated IPSec packet will look different, when sniffed, - from the plaintext packet which generated it. You can see plaintext - packets entering an IPSec interface and the resulting cyphertext - packets as they emerge from the corresponding physical interface.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Once you isolate where the packet is lost, take a closer look at - firewall rules, routing and configuration assumptions as they affect - that specific area. If the packet is lost on an IPSec gateway, comb - through<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> output for anomalies.</P> -<P>If the packet goes through both gateways successfully and reaches the - ping target, but does not return, suspect routing. Check that the ping - target routes packets back to the IPSec gateway.</P> -<H3><A NAME="find.use.error"></A>3.5 Check your logs</H3> -<P>Here, too, log information can be useful. Start with the<A HREF="#find.pluto.error"> - guidelines above</A>.</P> -<P>For connection use problems, set<VAR> klipsdebug=all</VAR>. Note that - you must have enabled the<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR><A HREF="install.html#allbut"> - compile-time option</A> to do this. Restart Linux FreeS/WAN so that it - rereads<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR>, then recreate the error condition. When - searching through<VAR> klipsdebug</VAR> data, look especially for the - keywords "drop" (as in dropped packets) and "error".</P> -<P>Often the problem with connection use is not software error, but - rather that the software is behaving contrary to expectation.</P> -<H4><A NAME="interpret.use.error"></A>Interpreting log text</H4> -<P>To interpret the Linux FreeS/WAN log text you've found, use the same - resources as indicated for troubleshooting connection negotiation:<A HREF="faq.html"> - the FAQ</A> , our<A HREF="background.html"> background document</A>, - and the<A HREF="mail.html#lists"> list archives</A>. Looking in the - KLIPS code is only for the very brave.</P> -<P>If you are still stuck, send a<A HREF="#prob.report"> detailed - problem report</A> to the users' list.</P> -<H3><A NAME="bigpacket"></A>3.6 More testing for the truly thorough</H3> -<H4>Large Packets</H4> -<P>If each of your connections passed the ping test, you may wish to - test by pinging with large packets (2000 bytes or larger). If it does - not return, suspect MTU issues, and see this<A HREF="background.html#MTU.trouble"> - discussion</A>.</P> -<H4>Stress Tests</H4> -<P>In most users' view, a simple ping test, and perhaps a large-packet - ping test suffice to indicate a working IPSec connection.</P> -<P>Some people might like to do additional stress tests prior to - production use. They may be interested in this<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00224.html"> - testing protocol</A> we use at interoperation conferences, aka - "bakeoffs". We also have a<VAR> testing</VAR> directory that ships with - the release.</P> -<H2><A NAME="prob.report"></A>4. Problem Reporting</H2> -<H3><A NAME="8_5_1">4.1 How to ask for help</A></H3> -<P>Ask for troubleshooting help on the users' mailing list,<A HREF="mailto:users@lists.freeswan.org"> - users@lists.freeswan.org</A>. While sometimes an initial query with a - quick description of your intent and error will twig someone's memory - of a similar problem, it's often necessary to send a second mail with a - complete problem report.</P> -<P>When reporting problems to the mailing list(s), please include:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a brief description of the problem</LI> -<LI>if it's a compile problem, the actual output from make, showing the - problem. Try to edit it down to only the relevant part, but when in - doubt, be as complete as you can. If it's a kernel compile problem, any - relevant out.* files</LI> -<LI>if it's a run-time problem, pointers to where we can find the - complete output from "ipsec barf" from BOTH ENDS (not just one of - them). Remember that it's common outside the US and Canada to pay for - download volume, so if you can't post barfs on the web and send the URL - to the mailing list, at least compress them with tar or gzip. -<BR> If you can, try to simplify the case that is causing the problem. - In particular, if you clear your logs, start FreeS/WAN with no other - connections running, cause the problem to happen, and then do<VAR> - ipsec barf</VAR> on both ends immediately, that gives the smallest and - least cluttered output.</LI> -<LI>any other error messages, complaints, etc. that you saw. Please send - the complete text of the messages, not just a summary.</LI> -<LI>what your network setup is. Include subnets, gateway addresses, etc. - A schematic diagram is a good format for this information.</LI> -<LI>exactly what you were trying to do with Linux FreeS/WAN, and exactly - what went wrong</LI> -<LI>a fix, if you have one. But remember, you are sending mail to people - all over the world; US residents and US citizens in particular, please - read doc/exportlaws.html before sending code -- even small bug fixes -- - to the list or to us.</LI> -<LI>When in doubt about whether to include some seemingly-trivial item - of information, include it. It is rare for problem reports to have too - much information, and common for them to have too little.</LI> -</UL> -<P>Here are some good general guidelines on bug reporting:<A href="http://tuxedo.org/~esr/faqs/smart-questions.html"> - How To Ask Questions The Smart Way</A> and<A href="http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/bugs.html"> - How to Report Bugs Effectively</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="8_5_2">4.2 Where to ask</A></H3> -<P>To report a problem, send mail about it to the users' list. If you - are certain that you have found a bug, report it to the bugs list. If - you encounter a problem while doing your own coding on the Linux - FreeS/WAN codebase and think it is of interest to the design team, - notify the design list. When in doubt, default to the users' list. More - information about the mailing lists is found<A HREF="mail.html#lists"> - here</A>.</P> -<P>For a number of reasons -- including export-control regulations - affecting almost any<STRONG> private</STRONG> discussion of encryption - software -- we prefer that problem reports and discussions go to the - lists, not directly to the team. Beware that the list goes worldwide; - US citizens, read this important information about your<A HREF="politics.html#exlaw"> - export laws</A>. If you're using this software, you really should be on - the lists. To get onto them, visit<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/"> - lists.freeswan.org</A>.</P> -<P>If you do send private mail to our coders or want a private reply - from them, please make sure that the return address on your mail (From - or Reply-To header) is a valid one. They have more important things to - do than to unravel addresses that have been mangled in an attempt to - confuse spammers.</P> -<H2><A NAME="notes"></A>5. Additional Notes on Troubleshooting</H2> -<P>The following sections supplement the Guide:<A HREF="#system.info"> - information available on your system</A>;<A HREF="#testgates"> testing - between security gateways</A>;<A HREF="#ifconfig1"> ifconfig reports - for KLIPS debugging</A>;<A HREF="#gdb"> using GDB on Pluto</A>.</P> -<H3><A NAME="system.info"></A>5.1 Information available on your system</H3> -<H4><A NAME="logusage"></A>Logs used</H4> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN logs to:</P> -<UL> -<LI>/var/log/secure (or, on Debian, /var/log/auth.log)</LI> -<LI>/var/log/messages</LI> -</UL> -<P>Check both places to get full information. If you find nothing, check - your<VAR> syslogd.conf(5)</VAR> to see where your /etc/syslog.conf or - equivalent is directing<VAR> authpriv</VAR> messages.</P> -<H4><A NAME="pages"></A>man pages provided</H4> -<DL> -<DT><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A></DT> -<DD> Manual page for IPSEC configuration file.</DD> -<DT><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.8.html"> ipsec(8)</A></DT> -<DD STYLE="margin-bottom: 0.2in"> Primary man page for ipsec utilities.</DD> -</DL> -<P> Other man pages are on<A HREF="manpages.html"> this list</A> and in</P> -<UL> -<LI>/usr/local/man/man3</LI> -<LI>/usr/local/man/man5</LI> -<LI>/usr/local/man/man8/ipsec_*</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A NAME="statusinfo"></A>Status information</H4> -<DL> -<DT>ipsec auto --status</DT> -<DD> Command to get status report from running system. Displays Pluto's - state. Includes the list of connections which are currently "added" to - Pluto's internal database; lists state objects reflecting ISAKMP and - IPsec SAs being negotiated or installed.</DD> -<DT> ipsec look</DT> -<DD> Brief status info.</DD> -<DT> ipsec barf</DT> -<DD STYLE="margin-bottom: 0.2in"> Copious debugging info.</DD> -</DL> -<H3><A NAME="testgates"></A> 5.2 Testing between security gateways</H3> -<P>Sometimes you need to test a subnet-subnet tunnel. This is a tunnel - between two security gateways, which protects traffic on behalf of the - subnets behind these gateways. On this network:</P> -<PRE> Sunset==========West------------------East=========Sunrise - IPSec gateway IPSec gateway - local net untrusted net local net</PRE> -<P> you might name this tunnel sunset-sunrise. You can test this tunnel - by having a machine behind one gateway ping a machine behind the other - gateway, but this is not always convenient or even possible.</P> -<P>Simply pinging one gateway from the other is not useful. Such a ping - does not normally go through the tunnel.<STRONG> The tunnel handles - traffic between the two protected subnets, not between the gateways</STRONG> - . Depending on the routing in place, a ping might</P> -<UL> -<LI>either succeed by finding an unencrypted route</LI> -<LI>or fail by finding no route. Packets without an IPSEC eroute are - discarded.</LI> -</UL> -<P><STRONG>Neither event tells you anything about the tunnel</STRONG>. - You can explicitly create an eroute to force such packets through the - tunnel, or you can create additional tunnels as described in our<A HREF="config.html#multitunnel"> - configuration document</A>, but those may be unnecessary complications - in your situation.</P> -<P>The trick is to explicitly test between<STRONG> both gateways' - private-side IP addresses</STRONG>. Since the private-side interfaces - are on the protected subnets, the resulting packets do go via the - tunnel. Use either ping -I or traceroute -i, both of which allow you to - specify a source interface. (Note: unsupported on older Linuxes). The - same principles apply for a road warrior (or other) case where only one - end of your tunnel is a subnet.</P> -<H3><A NAME="ifconfig1"></A>5.3 ifconfig reports for KLIPS debugging</H3> -<P>When diagnosing problems using ifconfig statistics, you may wonder - what type of activity increments a particular counter for an ipsecN - device. Here's an index, posted by KLIPS developer Richard Guy Briggs:</P> -<PRE>Here is a catalogue of the types of errors that can occur for which -statistics are kept when transmitting and receiving packets via klips. -I notice that they are not necessarily logged in the right counter. -. . . - -Sources of ifconfig statistics for ipsec devices - -rx-errors: -- packet handed to ipsec_rcv that is not an ipsec packet. -- ipsec packet with payload length not modulo 4. -- ipsec packet with bad authenticator length. -- incoming packet with no SA. -- replayed packet. -- incoming authentication failed. -- got esp packet with length not modulo 8. - -tx_dropped: -- cannot process ip_options. -- packet ttl expired. -- packet with no eroute. -- eroute with no SA. -- cannot allocate sk_buff. -- cannot allocate kernel memory. -- sk_buff internal error. - - -The standard counters are: - -struct enet_statistics -{ - int rx_packets; /* total packets received */ - int tx_packets; /* total packets transmitted */ - int rx_errors; /* bad packets received */ - int tx_errors; /* packet transmit problems */ - int rx_dropped; /* no space in linux buffers */ - int tx_dropped; /* no space available in linux */ - int multicast; /* multicast packets received */ - int collisions; - - /* detailed rx_errors: */ - int rx_length_errors; - int rx_over_errors; /* receiver ring buff overflow */ - int rx_crc_errors; /* recved pkt with crc error */ - int rx_frame_errors; /* recv'd frame alignment error */ - int rx_fifo_errors; /* recv'r fifo overrun */ - int rx_missed_errors; /* receiver missed packet */ - - /* detailed tx_errors */ - int tx_aborted_errors; - int tx_carrier_errors; - int tx_fifo_errors; - int tx_heartbeat_errors; - int tx_window_errors; -}; - -of which I think only the first 6 are useful.</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="gdb"></A> 5.4 Using GDB on Pluto</H3> -<P>You may need to use the GNU debugger, gdb(1), on Pluto. This should - be necessary only in unusual cases, for example if you encounter a - problem which the Pluto developer cannot readily reproduce or if you - are modifying Pluto.</P> -<P>Here are the Pluto developer's suggestions for doing this:</P> -<PRE>Can you get a core dump and use gdb to find out what Pluto was doing -when it died? - -To get a core dump, you will have to set dumpdir to point to a -suitable directory (see <A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html">ipsec.conf(5)</A>). - -To get gdb to tell you interesting stuff: - $ script - $ cd dump-directory-you-chose - $ gdb /usr/local/lib/ipsec/pluto core - (gdb) where - (gdb) quit - $ exit - -The resulting output will have been captured by the script command in -a file called "typescript". Send it to the list. - -Do not delete the core file. I may need to ask you to print out some -more relevant stuff.</PRE> -<P> Note that the<VAR> dumpdir</VAR> parameter takes effect only when - the IPsec subsystem is restarted -- reboot or ipsec setup restart.</P> -<P> -<BR> -<BR></P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="firewall.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="compat.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/umltesting.html b/doc/umltesting.html deleted file mode 100644 index 35bcef96d..000000000 --- a/doc/umltesting.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,313 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="roadmap.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="makecheck.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="umltesting">User-Mode-Linux Testing guide</A></H1> -<P> User mode linux is a way to compile a linux kernel such that it can - run as a process in another linux system (potentially as a *BSD or - Windows process later). See<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/"> - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/</A></P> -<P> UML is a good platform for testing and experimenting with FreeS/WAN. - It allows several network nodes to be simulated on a single machine. - Creating, configuring, installing, monitoring, and controling these - nodes is generally easier and easier to script with UML than real - hardware.</P> -<P> You'll need about 500Mb of disk space for a full - sunrise-east-west-sunset setup. You can possibly get this down by 130Mb - if you remove the sunrise/sunset kernel build. If you just want to run, - then you can even remove the east/west kernel build.</P> -<P> Nothing need be done as super user. In a couple of steps, we note - where super user is required to install commands in system-wide - directories, but ~/bin could be used instead. UML seems to use a - system-wide /tmp/uml directory so different users may interfere with - one another. Later UMLs use ~/.uml instead, so multiple users running - UML tests should not be a problem, but note that a single user running - the UML tests will only be able run one set. Further, UMLs sometimes - get stuck and hang around. These "zombies" (most will actually be in - the "T" state in the process table) will interfere with subsequent - tests.</P> -<H2><A NAME="34_1">Preliminary Notes on BIND</A></H2> -<P> As of 2003/3/1, the Light-Weight Resolver is used by pluto. This - requires that BIND9 be running. It also requires that BIND9 development - libraries be present in the build environment. The DNSSEC code is only - truly functional in BIND9 snapshots. The library code could be 9.2.2, - we believe. We are using BIND9 20021115 snapshot code from<A HREF="ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/snapshots"> - ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/snapshots</A>.</P> -<P> FreeS/WAN may well require a newer BIND than is on your system. Many - distributions have moved to BIND9.2.2 recently due to a security - advisory. BIND is five components.</P> -<OL> -<LI> named</LI> -<LI> dnssec-*</LI> -<LI> client side resolver libraries</LI> -<LI> client side utility libraries I thought there were lib and named - parts to dnsssec...</LI> -<LI> dynamic DNS update utilities</LI> -</OL> -<P> The only piece that we need for *building* is #4. That's the only - part that has to be on the build host. What is the difference between - resolver and util libs? If you want to edit - testing/baseconfigs/all/etc/bind, you'll need a snapshot version. The - resolver library contains the resolver. FreeS/WAN has its own copy of - that in lib/liblwres.</P> -<H2><A NAME="34_2">Steps to Install UML for FreeS/WAN</A></H2> -<OL> -<LI> Get the following files: -<OL type="a"> -<LI> from<A HREF="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/freeswan/uml/"> - http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/freeswan/uml/</A> - umlfreeroot-15.1.tar.gz (or highest numbered one). This is a debian - potato root file system. You can use this even on a Redhat host, as it - has the newer GLIBC2.2 libraries as well. -<!-- If you are using - Redhat 7.2 or newer as your development machine, you can create the - image from your installation media. See <A HREF="uml-rhroot.html">Building a RedHat root"></A>. - A future document will explain how to build this from .DEB files as well. ---> - -<!-- -<LI> umlfreesharemini.tar.gz (or umlfreeshareall.tar.gz). - If you are a Debian potato user, you don't need it you can use your - native /usr/share. -</UL> ---> -</LI> -<LI> From<A HREF="ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/"> - ftp://ftp.xs4all.nl/pub/crypto/freeswan/</A> a snapshot or release - (1.92 or better)</LI> -<LI> From a<A HREF="http://www.kernel.org/mirrors/"> - http://www.kernel.org mirror</A>, the virgin 2.4.19 kernel. Please - realize that we have defaults in our tree for kernel configuration. We - try to track the latest UML kernels. If you use a newer kernel, you may - have faults in the kernel build process. You can see what the latest - that is being regularly tested by visiting<A HREF="http://bugs.freeswan.org:81/regress/HEAD/lastgood/freeswan-regress-env.sh"> - freeswan-regress-env.sh</A>.</LI> -<LI> -<!-- Note: this step is refered to as "step 1d" below. --> - Get<A HREF="http://ftp.nl.linux.org/uml/"> - http://ftp.nl.linux.org/uml/</A> uml-patch-2.4.19-47.bz2 or the one - associated with your kernel. As of 2003/03/05, uml-patch-2.4.19-47.bz2 - works for us.<STRONG> More recent versions of the patch have not been - tested by us.</STRONG></LI> -<LI> You'll probably want to visit<A HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net"> - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net</A> and get the UML utilities. - These are not needed for the build or interactive use (but - recommended). They are necessary for the regression testing procedures - used by "make check". We currently use uml_utilities_20020212.tar.bz2.</LI> -<LI> You need tcpdump version 3.7.1 or better. This is newer than the - version included in most LINUX distributions. You can check the version - of an installed tcpdump with the --version flag. If you need a newer - tcpdump fetch both tcpdump and libpcap source tar files from<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - http://www.tcpdump.org/</A> or a mirror.</LI> -</OL> -</LI> -<LI> Pick a suitable place, and extract the following files: -<OL type="a"> -<LI> -<!-- Note: this step is refered to as "step 2a" later. --> - 2.4.19 kernel. For instance: -<PRE> - <CODE> cd /c2/kernel - tar xzvf ../download/pub/linux/kernel/v2.4/linux-2.4.19.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> extract the umlfreeroot file -<!-- (unless you <A HREF="uml-rhroot.html">built your own from RPMs</A>) --> - -<PRE> - <CODE> mkdir -p /c2/user-mode-linux/basic-root - cd /c2/user-mode-linux/basic-root - tar xzvf ../download/umlfreeroot-15.1.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> FreeSWAN itself (or checkout "all" from CVS) -<PRE> - <CODE> mkdir -p /c2/freeswan/sandbox - cd /c2/freeswan/sandbox - tar xzvf ../download/snapshot.tar.gz -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -</OL> -</LI> -<LI> If you need to build a newer tcpdump: -<UL> -<LI> Make sure you have OpenSSL installed -- it is needed for - cryptographic routines.</LI> -<LI> Unpack libpcap and tcpdump source in parallel directories (the - tcpdump build procedures look for libpcap next door).</LI> -<LI> Change directory into the libpcap source directory and then build - the library: -<PRE> - <CODE> ./configure - make -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> Change into the tcpdump source directory, build tcpdump, and - install it. -<PRE> - <CODE> ./configure - make - # Need to be superuser to install in system directories. - # Installing in ~/bin would be an alternative. - su -c "make install" -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI> If you need the uml utilities, unpack them somewhere then build and - install them: -<PRE> - <CODE> cd tools - make all - # Need to be superuser to install in system directories. - # Installing in ~/bin would be an alternative. - su -c "make install BIN_DIR=/usr/local/bin" -</CODE> -</PRE> -</LI> -<LI> set up the configuration file -<UL> -<LI> <CODE>cd /c2/freeswan/sandbox/freeswan-1.97/testing/utils</CODE></LI> -<LI> copy umlsetup-sample.sh to ../../umlsetup.sh: <CODE> cp - umlsetup-sample.sh ../../umlsetup.sh</CODE></LI> -<LI> open up ../../umlsetup.sh in your favorite editor.</LI> -<LI> change POOLSPACE= to point to the place with at least 500Mb of - disk. Best if it is on the same partition as the "umlfreeroot" - extraction, as it will attempt to use hard links if possible to save - disk space.</LI> -<LI> Set TESTINGROOT if you intend to run the script outside of the - sandbox/snapshot/release directory. Otherwise, it will configure - itself.</LI> -<LI> KERNPOOL should point to the directory with your 2.4.19 kernel - tree. This tree should be unconfigured! This is the directory you used - in step 2a.</LI> -<LI> UMLPATCH should point at the bz2 file you downloaded at 1d. If - using a kernel that already includes the patch, set this to /dev/null.</LI> -<LI> FREESWANDIR should point at the directory where you unpacked the - snapshot/release. Include the "freeswan-snap2001sep16b" or whatever in - it. If you are running from CVS, then you point at the directory where - top, klips, etc. are. The script will fix up the directory so that it - can be used.</LI> -<LI> BASICROOT should be set to the directory used in 2b, or to the - directory that you created with RPMs.</LI> -<LI> SHAREDIR should be set to the directory used in 2c, to /usr/share - for Debian potato users, or to $BASICROOT/usr/share.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI> -<PRE> <CODE>cd $TESTINGROOT/utils -sh make-uml.sh -</CODE></PRE> - It will grind for awhile. If there are errors it will bail. If so, run - it under "script" and send the output to bugs@lists.freeswan.org.</LI> -<LI> You will have a bunch of stuff under $POOLSPACE. Open four xterms: -<PRE> <CODE> for i in sunrise sunset east west - do - xterm -name $i -title $i -e $POOLSPACE/$i/start.sh done -</CODE></PRE> -</LI> -<LI> Login as root. Password is "root" (Note, these virtual machines are - networked together, but are not configured to talk to the rest of the - world.)</LI> -<LI> verify that pluto started on east/west, run "ipsec look"</LI> -<LI> login to sunrise. run "ping sunset"</LI> -<LI> login to west. run "tcpdump -p -i eth1 -n" (tcpdump must be version - 3.7.1 or newer)</LI> -<LI> Closing a console xterm will shut down that UML.</LI> -<LI> You can "make check", if you want to. It is run from - /c2/freeswan/sandbox/freeswan-1.97.</LI> -</OL> -<H1><A NAME="35">Debugging the kernel with GDB</A></H1> -<P> With User-Mode-Linux, you can debug the kernel using GDB. See -<!--HREF="http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/debugging.html"--> - - http://user-mode-linux.sourceforge.net/debugging.html.</(null)></P> -<P> Typically, one will want to address a test case for a failing - situation. Running GDB from Emacs, or from other front ends is - possible. First start GDB.</P> -<P> Tell it to open the UMLPOOL/swan/linux program.</P> -<P> Note the PID of GDB:</P> -<PRE> -marajade-[projects/freeswan/mgmt/planning] mcr 1029 %ps ax | grep gdb - 1659 pts/9 SN 0:00 /usr/bin/gdb -fullname -cd /mara4/freeswan/kernpatch/UMLPOOL/swan/ linux -</PRE> -<P> Set the following in the environment:</P> -<PRE> -UML_east_OPT="debug gdb-pid=1659" -</PRE> -<P> Then start the user-mode-linux in the test scheme you wish:</P> -<PRE> -marajade-[kernpatch/testing/klips/east-icmp-02] mcr 1220 %../../utils/runme.sh -</PRE> - The user-mode-linux will stop on boot, giving you a chance to attach to - the process: -<PRE> -(gdb) file linux -Reading symbols from linux...done. -(gdb) attach 1 -Attaching to program: /mara4/freeswan/kernpatch/UMLPOOL/swan/linux, process 1 -0xa0118bc1 in kill () at hostfs_kern.c:770 -</PRE> -<P> At this point, break points should be created as appropriate.</P> -<H2><A NAME="35_1">Other notes about debugging</A></H2> -<P> If you are running a standard test, after all the packets are sent, - the UML will be shutdown. This can cause problems, because the UML may - get terminated while you are debugging.</P> -<P> The environment variable <CODE>NETJIGWAITUSER</CODE> can be set to - "waituser". If so, then the testing system will prompt before exiting - the test.</P> -<H1><A NAME="36">User-Mode-Linux mysteries</A></H1> -<UL> -<LI> running more than one UML of the same name (e.g. "west") can cause - problems.</LI> -<LI> running more than one UML from the same root file system is not a - good idea.</LI> -<LI> all this means that running "make check" twice on the same machine - is probably not a good idea.</LI> -<LI> occationally, UMLs will get stuck. This can happen like: -<!--BLOCK--> - 15134 ? T - 0:00 /spare/hugh/uml/uml2.4.18-sept5/umlbuild/east/linux (east) - [/bin/sh] 15138 ? T 0:00 - /spare/hugh/uml/uml2.4.18-sept5/umlbuild/east/linux (east) [halt]</(null)> - these will need to be killed. Note that they are in "T"racing mode.</LI> -<LI> UMLs can also hang, and will report "Tracing myself and I can't get - out". This is a bug in UML. There are ways to find out what is going on - and report this to the UML people, but we don't know the magic right - now.</LI> -</UL> -<H1><A NAME="37">Getting more info from uml_netjig</A></H1> -<P> uml_netjig can be compiled with a built-in tcpdump. This uses - not-yet-released code from<A HREF="http://www.tcpdump.org/"> - www.tcpdump.org</A>. Please see the instructions in <CODE> -testing/utils/uml_netjig/Makefile</CODE>.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="roadmap.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="makecheck.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/upgrading.html b/doc/upgrading.html deleted file mode 100644 index ce9fba3d2..000000000 --- a/doc/upgrading.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,184 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="intro.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="quickstart.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<A NAME="upgrading"></A> -<H1><A NAME="2">Upgrading to FreeS/WAN 2.x</A></H1> -<H2><A NAME="2_1">New! Built in Opportunistic connections</A></H2> -<P>Out of the box, FreeS/WAN 2.x will attempt to encrypt all your IP - traffic. It will try to establish IPsec connections for:</P> -<UL> -<LI> IP traffic from the Linux box on which you have installed - FreeS/WAN, and</LI> -<LI> outbound IP traffic routed through that Linux box (eg. from a - protected subnet).</LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN 2.x uses<STRONG> hidden, automatically enabled<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR> connections</STRONG> to do this.</P> -<P>This behaviour is part of our campaign to get Opportunistic - Encryption (OE) widespread in the Linux world, so that any two Linux - boxes can encrypt to one another without prearrangement. There's one - catch, however: you must<A HREF="quickstart.html#quickstart"> set up a - few DNS records</A> to distribute RSA public keys and (if applicable) - IPsec gateway information.</P> -<P>If you start FreeS/WAN before you have set up these DNS records, your - connectivity will be slow, and messages relating to the built in - connections will clutter your logs. If you are unable to set up DNS for - OE, you will wish to<A HREF="policygroups.html#disable_policygroups"> - disable the hidden connections</A>.</P> -<A NAME="upgrading.flagday"></A> -<H3><A NAME="2_1_1">Upgrading Opportunistic Encryption to 2.01 (or - later)</A></H3> -<P>As of FreeS/WAN 2.01, Opportunistic Encryption (OE) uses DNS TXT - resource records (RRs) only (rather than TXT with KEY). This change - causes a "flag day". Users of FreeS/WAN 2.00 (or earlier) OE who are - upgrading may need to post additional resource records.</P> -<P>If you are running<A HREF="glossary.html#initiate-only"> - initiate-only OE</A>, you<EM> must</EM> put up a TXT record in any - forward domain as per our<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.client"> - quickstart instructions</A>. This replaces your old forward KEY.</P> -<P> If you are running full OE, you require no updates. You already have - the needed TXT record in the reverse domain. However, to facilitate - future features, you may also wish to publish that TXT record in a - forward domain as instructed<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming"> - here</A>.</P> -<P>If you are running OE on a gateway (and encrypting on behalf of - subnetted boxes) you require no updates. You already have the required - TXT record in your gateway's reverse map, and the TXT records for any - subnetted boxes require no updating. However, to facilitate future - features, you may wish to publish your gateway's TXT record in a - forward domain as shown<A HREF="quickstart.html#opp.incoming"> here</A> -.</P> -<P> During the transition, you may wish to leave any old KEY records up - for some time. They will provide limited backward compatibility. -<!-- -For more -detail on that compatibility, see <A HREF="oe.known-issues">Known Issues with -OE</A>. ---> -</P> -<H2><A NAME="2_2">New! Policy Groups</A></H2> -<P>We want to make it easy for you to declare security policy as it - applies to IPsec connections.</P> -<P>Policy Groups make it simple to say:</P> -<UL> -<LI>These are the folks I want to talk to in the clear.</LI> -<LI>These spammers' domains -- I don't want to talk to them at all.</LI> -<LI>To talk to the finance department, I must use IPsec.</LI> -<LI>For any other communication, try to encrypt, but it's okay if we - can't.</LI> -</UL> -<P>FreeS/WAN then implements these policies, creating OE connections if - and when needed. You can use Policy Groups along with connections you - explicitly define in ipsec.conf.</P> -<P>For more information, see our<A HREF="policygroups.html"> Policy - Group HOWTO</A>.</P> -<H2><A NAME="2_3">New! Packetdefault Connection</A></H2> -<P>Free/SWAN 2.x ships with the<STRONG> automatically enabled, hidden - connection</STRONG><VAR> packetdefault</VAR>. This configures a - FreeS/WAN box as an OE gateway for any hosts located behind it. As - mentioned above, you must configure some<A HREF="quickstart.html"> DNS - records</A> for OE to work.</P> -<P>As the name implies, this connection functions as a default. If you - have more specific connections, such as policy groups which configure - your FreeS/WAN box as an OE gateway for a local subnet, these will - apply before<VAR> packetdefault</VAR>. You can view<VAR> packetdefault</VAR> -'s specifics in<A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> man ipsec.conf</A> -.</P> -<H2><A NAME="2_4">FreeS/WAN now disables Reverse Path Filtering</A></H2> -<P>FreeS/WAN often doesn't work with reverse path filtering. At start - time, FreeS/WAN now turns rp_filter off, and logs a warning.</P> -<P>FreeS/WAN does not turn it back on again. You can do this yourself - with a command like:</P> -<PRE> echo 1 > /proc/sys/net/ipv4/conf/eth0/rp_filter</PRE> -<P>For eth0, substitute the interface which FreeS/WAN was affecting.</P> -<A NAME="ipsec.conf_v2"></A> -<H2><A NAME="2_5">Revised<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR></A></H2> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_1">No promise of compatibility</A></H3> -<P>The FreeS/WAN team promised config-file compatibility throughout the - 1.x series. That means a 1.5 config file can be directly imported into - a fresh 1.99 install with no problems.</P> -<P>With FreeS/WAN 2.x, we've given ourselves permission to make the - config file easier to use. The cost: some FreeS/WAN 1.x configurations - will not work properly. Many of the new features are, however, backward - compatible.</P> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_2">Most<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR> files will work fine</A></H3> -<P>... so long as you paste this line,<STRONG> with no preceding - whitespace</STRONG>, at the top of your config file:</P> -<PRE> version 2</PRE> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_3">Backward compatibility patch</A></H3> -<P>If the new defaults bite you, use<A HREF="ipsec.conf.2_to_1"> this<VAR> - ipsec.conf</VAR> fragment</A> to simulate the old default values.</P> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_4">Details</A></H3> -<P> We've obsoleted various directives which almost no one was using:</P> -<PRE> dump - plutobackgroundload - no_eroute_pass - lifetime - rekeystart - rekeytries</PRE> -<P>For most of these, there is some other way to elicit the desired - behaviour. See<A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2002-August/003243.html"> - this post</A>.</P> -<P> We've made some settings, which almost everyone was using, defaults. - For example:</P> -<PRE> interfaces=%defaultroute - plutoload=%search - plutostart=%search - uniqueids=yes</PRE> -<P>We've also changed some default values to help with OE and Policy - Groups:</P> -<PRE> authby=rsasig ## not secret!!! - leftrsasigkey=%dnsondemand ## looks up missing keys in DNS when needed. - rightrsasigkey=%dnsondemand</PRE> -<P> Of course, you can still override any defaults by explictly - declaring something else in your connection.</P> -<P><A HREF="http://lists.freeswan.org/pipermail/design/2002-August/003243.html"> - A post with a list of many ipsec.conf changes.</A> -<BR><A HREF="manpage.d/ipsec.conf.5.html"> Current ipsec.conf manual.</A> -</P> -<A NAME="upgrading.rpms"></A> -<H3><A NAME="2_5_5">Upgrading from 1.x RPMs to 2.x RPMs</A></H3> -<P>Note: When upgrading from 1-series to 2-series RPMs,<VAR> rpm -U</VAR> - will not work.</P> -<P>You must instead erase the 1.x RPMs, then install the 2.x set:</P> -<PRE> rpm -e freeswan</PRE> -<PRE> rpm -e freeswan-module</PRE> -<P>On erasing, your old<VAR> ipsec.conf</VAR> should be moved to<VAR> - ipsec.conf.rpmsave</VAR>. Keep this. You will probably want to copy - your existing connections to the end of your new 2.x file.</P> -<P>Install the RPMs suitable for your kernel version, such as:</P> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan-module-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<PRE> rpm -ivh freeswan-userland-2.04_2.4.20_20.9-0.i386.rpm</PRE> -<P>Or, to splice the files:</P> -<PRE> cat /etc/ipsec.conf /etc/ipsec.conf.rpmsave > /etc/ipsec.conf.tmp - mv /etc/ipsec.conf.tmp /etc/ipsec.conf</PRE> -<P>Then, remove the redundant<VAR> conn %default</VAR> and<VAR> config - setup</VAR> sections. Unless you have done any special configuring - here, you'll likely want to remove the 1.x versions. Remove<VAR> conn - OEself</VAR>, if present.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="intro.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="quickstart.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/user_examples.html b/doc/user_examples.html deleted file mode 100644 index d683c92e1..000000000 --- a/doc/user_examples.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,320 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="background.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="makecheck.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="user.examples">FreeS/WAN script examples</A></H1> - This file is intended to hold a collection of user-written example - scripts or configuration files for use with FreeS/WAN. -<P> So far it has only one entry.</P> -<H2><A name="poltorak">Poltorak's Firewall script</A></H2> -<PRE> -From: Poltorak Serguei <poltorak@dataforce.net> -Subject: [Users] Using FreeS/WAN -Date: Tue, 16 Oct 2001 - -Hello. - -I'm using FreeS/WAN IPsec for half a year. I learned a lot of things about -it and I think it would be interesting for someone to see the result of my -experiments and usage of FreeS/WAN. If you find a mistake in this -file, please e-mail me. And excuse me for my english... I'm learning.. :) - -I'll talk about vary simple configuration: - -addresses prefix = 192.168 - - lan1 sgw1 .0.0/24 (Internet) sgw2 lan2 - .1.0/24---[ .1.1 ; .0.1 ]===================[ .0.10 ; . 2.10 ]---.2.0/24 - - -We need to let lan1 see lan2 across Internet like it is behind sgw1. The -same for lan2. And we need to do IPX bridge for Novel Clients and NDS -synchronization. - -my config: -------------------- ipsec.conf ------------------- -conn lan1-lan2 - type=tunnel - compress=yes - #------------------- - left=192.168.0.1 - leftsubnet=192.168.1.0/24 - #------------------- - right=192.168.0.10 - rightsubnet=192.168.2.0/24 - #------------------- - auth=esp - authby=secret ---------------- end of ipsec.conf ---------------- - -ping .2.x from .1.y (y != 1) -It works?? Fine. Let's continue... - -Why y != 1 ?? Because kernel of sgw1 have 2 IP addresses and it will choose -the first IP (which is used to go to Internet) .0.1 and the packet won't go -through IPsec tunnel :( But if do ping on .1.1 kernel will respond from -that address (.1.1) and the packet will be tunneled. The same problem occurred then -.2.x sends a packet to .1.2 which is down at the moment. What happens? .1.1 -sends ARP requesting .1.2... after 3 tries it send to .2.x an destunreach, -but from his "natural" IP or .0.1 . So the error message won't be delivered! -It's a big problem... - -Resolution... One can manipulate with ipsec0 or ipsec0:0 to solve the -problem (if ipsec0 has .1.1 kernel will send packets correctly), but there -are powerful and elegant iproute2 :) We simply need to change source address -of packet that goes to other secure lan. This is done with - -ip route replace 192.168.2.0/24 via 192.168.0.10 dev ipsec0 src 192.168.1.1 - -Cool!! Now it works!! - -The second step. We want install firewall on sgw1 and sgw2. Encryption of -traffic without security isn't a good idea. I don't use {left|right}firewall, -because I'm running firewall from init scripts. - -We want IPsec data between lan1-lan2, some ICMP errors (destination -unreachable, TTL exceeded, parameter problem and source quench), replying on -pings from both lans and Internet, ipxtunnel data for IPX and of course SSH -between sgw1 and sgw2 and from/to one specified host. - -I'm using ipchains. With iptables there are some changes. - ----------------- rc.firewall --------------------- -#!/bin/sh -# -# Firewall for IPsec lan1-lan2 -# - -IPC=/sbin/ipchains -ANY=0.0.0.0/0 - -# left -SGW1_EXT=192.168.0.1 -SGW1_INT=192.168.1.1 -LAN1=192.168.1.0/24 - -# right -SGW2_EXT=192.168.0.10 -SGW2_INT=192.168.2.10 -LAN2=192.168.2.0/24 - -# SSH from and to this host -SSH_PEER_HOST=_SOME_HOST_ - -# this is for left. exchange these values for right. -MY_EXT=$SGW1_EXT -MY_INT=$SGW1_INT -PEER_EXT=$SGW2_EXT -PEER_INT=$SGW2_INT -INT_IF=eth1 -EXT_IF=eth0 -IPSEC_IF=ipsec0 -MY_LAN=$LAN1 -PEER_LAN=$LAN2 - -$IPC -F -$IPC -P input DENY -$IPC -P forward DENY -$IPC -P output DENY - -# Loopback traffic -$IPC -A input -i lo -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -i lo -j ACCEPT - -# for IPsec SGW1-SGW2 -## IKE -$IPC -A input -p udp -s $PEER_EXT 500 -d $MY_EXT 500 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p udp -s $MY_EXT 500 -d $PEER_EXT 500 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## ESP -$IPC -A input -p 50 -s $PEER_EXT -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### we don't need this line ### $IPC -A output -p 50 -s $MY_EXT -d $PEER_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## forward LAN1-LAN2 -$IPC -A forward -s $MY_LAN -d $PEER_LAN -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A forward -s $PEER_LAN -d $MY_LAN -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -s $PEER_LAN -d $MY_LAN -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A input -s $PEER_LAN -d $MY_LAN -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A input -s $MY_LAN -d $PEER_LAN -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -s $MY_LAN -d $PEER_LAN -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - -# ICMP -# -## Dest unreachable -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type destination-unreachable -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -# -## Source quench -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type source-quench -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -# -## Parameter problem -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### from/to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type parameter-problem -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -# -## Time To Live exceeded -### from/to Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -### to Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -### to Peer Lan -$IPC -A input -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $ANY -d $MY_INT -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp --icmp-type time-exceeded -s $MY_INT -d $ANY -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - -# ICMP PINGs -## from Internet -$IPC -A input -p icmp -s $ANY -d $MY_EXT --icmp-type echo-request -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp -s $MY_EXT -d $ANY --icmp-type echo-reply -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## from LAN -$IPC -A input -p icmp -s $ANY -d $MY_INT --icmp-type echo-request -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp -s $MY_INT -d $ANY --icmp-type echo-reply -i $INT_IF -j ACCEPT -## from Peer LAN -$IPC -A input -p icmp -s $ANY -d $MY_INT --icmp-type echo-request -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p icmp -s $MY_INT -d $ANY --icmp-type echo-reply -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - -# SSH -## from SSH_PEER_HOST -$IPC -A input -p tcp -s $SSH_PEER_HOST -d $MY_EXT 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp \! -y -s $MY_EXT 22 -d $SSH_PEER_HOST -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## to SSH_PEER_HOST -$IPC -A input -p tcp \! -y -s $SSH_PEER_HOST 22 -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp -s $MY_EXT -d $SSH_PEER_HOST 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## from PEER -$IPC -A input -p tcp -s $PEER_EXT -d $MY_EXT 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp \! -y -s $MY_EXT 22 -d $PEER_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -## to PEER -$IPC -A input -p tcp \! -y -s $PEER_EXT 22 -d $MY_EXT -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p tcp -s $MY_EXT -d $PEER_EXT 22 -i $EXT_IF -j ACCEPT - -# ipxtunnel -$IPC -A input -p udp -s $PEER_INT 2005 -d $MY_INT 2005 -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT -$IPC -A output -p udp -s $MY_INT 2005 -d $PEER_INT 2005 -i $IPSEC_IF -j ACCEPT - ----------------- end of rc.firewall ---------------------- - -To understand this we need to look on this scheme: - - ++-----------------------<----------------------------+ - || ipsec0 | - \/ | - eth0 +--------+ /---------/ yes /---------/ yes +-----------------------+ ------->| INPUT |-->/ ?local? /----->/ ?IPsec? /----->| decrypt decapsulate | - eth1 +--------+ /---------/ /---------/ +-----------------------+ - || no || no - \/ \/ - +----------+ +---------+ +-------+ - | routing | | local | | local | - | decision | | deliver | | send | - +----------+ +---------+ +-------+ - || || - \/ \/ - +---------+ +----------+ - | forward | | routing | - +---------+ | decision | - || +----------+ - || || - ++----------------<-----------------++ - || - \/ - +--------+ eth0 - | OUTPUT | eth1 - +--------+ ipsec0 - || - \/ - /---------/ yes +-----------------------+ - / ?IPsec? /----->| encrypt encapsulate | - /---------/ +-----------------------+ - || no || - || || - || \/ eth0, eth1 - ++-----------------------++--------------> - -This explain how a packet traverse TCP/IP stack in IPsec capable kernel. - -FIX ME, please, if there are any errors - -Test the new firewall now. - - -Now about IPX. I tried 3 programs for tunneling IPX: tipxd, SIB and ipxtunnel - -tipxd didn't send packets.. :( -SIB and ipxtunnel worked fine :) -With ipxtunnel there was a little problem. In sources there are an error. - ---------------------- in main.c ------------------------ -< bytes += p.len; ---- -> bytes += len; --------------------------------------------------------- - -After this FIX everything goes right... - -------------------- /etc/ipxtunnel.conf ---------------- -port 2005 -remote 192.168.101.97 2005 -interface eth1 ---------------- end of /etc/ipxtunnel.conf ------------- - -I use IPX tunnel between .1.1 and .2.10 so we don't need to encrypt nor -authenticate encapsulated IPX packets, it is done with IPsec. - -If you don't wont to use iproute2 to change source IP you need to use SIB -(it is able to bind local address) or establish tunnel between .0.1 and -.0.10 (external IPs, you need to do encryption in the program, but it isn't -strong). - -For now I'm using ipxtunnel. - -I think that's all for the moment. If there are any error, please e-mail me: -poltorak@df.ru . It would be cool if someone puts the scheme of TCP/IP in -kernel and firewall example on FreeS/WAN's manual pages. - -PoltoS -</PRE> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="background.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="makecheck.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/doc/web.html b/doc/web.html deleted file mode 100644 index 0c084d289..000000000 --- a/doc/web.html +++ /dev/null @@ -1,749 +0,0 @@ -<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN" "http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40/loose.dtd"> -<HTML> -<HEAD> -<TITLE>Introduction to FreeS/WAN</TITLE> -<META HTTP-EQUIV="Content-Type" CONTENT="text/html; CHARSET=iso-8859-1"> -<STYLE TYPE="text/css"><!-- -BODY { font-family: serif } -H1 { font-family: sans-serif } -H2 { font-family: sans-serif } -H3 { font-family: sans-serif } -H4 { font-family: sans-serif } -H5 { font-family: sans-serif } -H6 { font-family: sans-serif } -SUB { font-size: smaller } -SUP { font-size: smaller } -PRE { font-family: monospace } ---></STYLE> -</HEAD> -<BODY> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="mail.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="glossary.html">Next</A> -<HR> -<H1><A name="weblink">Web links</A></H1> -<H2><A name="freeswan">The Linux FreeS/WAN Project</A></H2> -<P>The main project web site is<A href="http://www.freeswan.org/"> - www.freeswan.org</A>.</P> -<P>Links to other project-related<A href="intro.html#sites"> sites</A> - are provided in our introduction section.</P> -<H3><A name="patch">Add-ons and patches for FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>Some user-contributed patches have been integrated into the FreeS/WAN - distribution. For a variety of reasons, those listed below have not.</P> -<P>Note that not all patches are a good idea.</P> -<UL> -<LI>There are a number of "features" of IPsec which we do not implement - because they reduce security. See this<A href="compat.html#dropped"> - discussion</A>. We do not recommend using patches that implement these. - One example is aggressive mode.</LI> -<LI>We do not recommend adding "features" of any sort unless they are - clearly necessary, or at least have clear benefits. For example, - FreeS/WAN would not become more secure if it offerred a choice of 14 - ciphers. If even one was flawed, it would certainly become less secure - for anyone using that cipher. Even with 14 wonderful ciphers, it would - be harder to maintain and administer, hence more vulnerable to various - human errors.</LI> -</UL> -<P>This is not to say that patches are necessarily bad, only that using - them requires some deliberation. For example, there might be perfectly - good reasons to add a specific cipher in your application: perhaps GOST - to comply with government standards in Eastern Europe, or AES for - performance benefits.</P> -<H4>Current patches</H4> -<P>Patches believed current::</P> -<UL> -<LI>patches for<A href="http://www.strongsec.com/freeswan/"> X.509 - certificate support</A>, also available from a<A href="http://www.twi.ch/~sna/strongsec/freeswan/"> - mirror site</A></LI> -<LI>patches to add<A href="http://www.irrigacion.gov.ar/juanjo/ipsec"> - AES and other ciphers</A>. There is preliminary data indicating AES - gives a substantial<A href="performance.html#perf.more"> performance - gain</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is also one add-on that takes the form of a modified FreeS/WAN - distribution, rather than just patches to the standard distribution:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ipv6.iabg.de/downloadframe/index.html">IPv6 - support</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Before using any of the above,, check the<A href="mail.html"> mailing - lists</A> for news of newer versions and to see whether they have been - incorporated into more recent versions of FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H4>Older patches</H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://sources.colubris.com/en/projects/FreeSWAN/">hardware - acceleration</A></LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://tzukanov.narod.ru/"> series</A> of patches that -<UL> -<LI>provide GOST, a Russian gov't. standard cipher, in MMX assembler</LI> -<LI>add GOST to OpenSSL</LI> -<LI>add GOST to the International kernel patch</LI> -<LI>let FreeS/WAN use International kernel patch ciphers</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Neil Dunbar's patches for<A href="ftp://hplose.hpl.hp.com/pub/nd/pluto-openssl.tar.gz"> - certificate support</A>, using code from<A href="http://www.openssl.org"> - Open SSL</A>.</LI> -<LI>Luc Lanthier's<A href="ftp://ftp.netwinder.org/users/f/firesoul/"> - patches</A> for<A href="glossary.html#PKIX"> PKIX</A> support.</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.heise.de/pub/ct/listings/9916-180.tgz">patches</A> - to add<A href="glossary.html#blowfish"> Blowfish</A>,<A href="glossary.html#IDEA"> - IDEA</A> and<A href="glossary.html#CAST128"> CAST-128</A> to FreeS/WAN</LI> -<LI>patches for FreeS/WAN 1.3, Pluto support for<A href="http://alcatraz.webcriminals.com/~bastiaan/ipsec/"> - external authentication</A>, for example with a smartcard or SKEYID.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.zengl.net/freeswan/download/">patches and - utilities</A> for using FreeS/WAN with PGPnet</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.freelith.com/lithworks/crypto/freeswan_patch.htm"> -Blowfish encryption and Tiger hash</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cendio.se/~bellman/aggressive-pluto.snap.tar.gz"> -patches</A> for aggressive mode support</LI> -</UL> -<P>These patches are for older versions of FreeS/WAN and will likely not - work with the current version. Older versions of FreeS/WAN may be - available on some of the<A href="intro.html#sites"> distribution sites</A> -, but we recommend using the current release.</P> -<H4><A name="VPN.masq">VPN masquerade patches</A></H4> -<P>Finally, there are some patches to other code that may be useful with - FreeS/WAN:</P> -<UL> -<LI>a<A href="ftp://ftp.rubyriver.com/pub/jhardin/masquerade/ip_masq_vpn.html"> - patch</A> to make IPsec, PPTP and SSH VPNs work through a Linux - firewall with<A href="glossary.html#masq"> IP masquerade</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/HOWTO/VPN-Masquerade-HOWTO.html"> -Linux VPN Masquerade HOWTO</A></LI> -</UL> -<P>Note that this is not required if the same machine does IPsec and - masquerading, only if you want a to locate your IPsec gateway on a - masqueraded network. See our<A href="firewall.html#NAT"> firewalls</A> - document for discussion of why this is problematic.</P> -<P>At last report, this patch could not co-exist with FreeS/WAN on the - same machine.</P> -<H3><A name="dist">Distributions including FreeS/WAN</A></H3> -<P>The introductory section of our document set lists several<A href="intro.html#distwith"> - Linux distributions</A> which include FreeS/WAN.</P> -<H3><A name="used">Things FreeS/WAN uses or could use</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://openpgp.net/random">/dev/random</A> support page, - discussion of and code for the Linux<A href="glossary.html#random"> - random number driver</A>. Out-of-date when we last checked (January - 2000), but still useful.</LI> -<LI>other programs related to random numbers: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.mindrot.org/audio-entropyd.html">audio entropy - daemon</A> to gather noise from a sound card and feed it into - /dev/random</LI> -<LI>an<A href="http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/"> entropy-gathering - daemon</A></LI> -<LI>a driver for the random number generator in recent<A href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/gkernel/"> - Intel chipsets</A>. This driver is included as standard in 2.4 kernels.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>a Linux<A href="http://www.marko.net/l2tp/"> L2TP Daemon</A> which - might be useful for communicating with Windows 2000 which builds L2TP - tunnels over its IPsec connections</LI> -<LI>to use opportunistic encryption, you need a recent version of<A href="glossary.html#BIND"> - BIND</A>. You can get one from the<A href="http://www.isc.org"> - Internet Software Consortium</A> who maintain BIND.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="alternatives">Other approaches to VPNs for Linux</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>other Linux<A href="#linuxipsec"> IPsec implementations</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tik.ee.ethz.ch/~skip/">ENskip</A>, a free - implementation of Sun's<A href="glossary.html#SKIP"> SKIP</A> protocol</LI> -<LI><A href="http://sunsite.auc.dk/vpnd/">vpnd</A>, a non-IPsec VPN - daemon for Linux which creates tunnels using<A href="glossary.html#Blowfish"> - Blowfish</A> encryption</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.winton.org.uk/zebedee/">Zebedee</A>, a simple - GPLd tunnel-building program with Linux and Win32 versions. The name is - from<STRONG> Z</STRONG>lib compression,<STRONG> B</STRONG>lowfish - encryption and<STRONG> D</STRONG>iffie-Hellman key exchange.</LI> -<LI>There are at least two PPTP implementations for Linux -<UL> -<LI>Moreton Bay's<A href="http://www.moretonbay.com/vpn/pptp.html"> - PoPToP</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://cag.lcs.mit.edu/~cananian/Projects/PPTP/">PPTP-Linux</A> -</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/cipe.html">CIPE</A> - (crypto IP encapsulation) project, using their own lightweight protocol - to encrypt between routers</LI> -<LI><A href="http://tinc.nl.linux.org/">tinc</A>, a VPN Daemon</LI> -</UL> -<P>There is a list of<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/10000000/kben10000005.html"> - Linux VPN</A> software in the<A href="http://www.securityportal.com/lskb/kben00000001.html"> - Linux Security Knowledge Base</A>.</P> -<H2><A name="ipsec.link">The IPsec Protocols</A></H2> -<H3><A name="general">General IPsec or VPN information</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="http://www.vpnc.org"> VPN Consortium</A> is a group for - vendors of IPsec products. Among other things, they have a good - collection of<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/white-papers.html"> IPsec - white papers</A>.</LI> -<LI>A VPN mailing list with a<A href="http://kubarb.phsx.ukans.edu/~tbird/vpn.html"> - home page</A>, a FAQ, some product comparisons, and many links.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.opus1.com/vpn/index.html">VPN pointer page</A></LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.epm.ornl.gov/~dunigan/vpn.html"> collection</A> - of VPN links, and some explanation</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="overview">IPsec overview documents or slide sets</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>the FreeS/WAN<A href="ipsec.html"> document section</A> on these - protocols</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="otherlang">IPsec information in languages other than - English</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.imib.med.tu-dresden.de/imib/Internet/Literatur/ipsec-docu.html"> -German</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.kame.net/index-j.html">Japanese</A></LI> -<LI>Feczak Szabolcs' thesis in<A href="http://feczo.koli.kando.hu/vpn/"> - Hungarian</A></LI> -<LI>Davide Cerri's thesis and some presentation slides<A href="http://www.linux.it/~davide/doc/"> - Italian</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="RFCs1">RFCs and other reference documents</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="rfc.html">Our document</A> listing the RFCs relevant to - Linux FreeS/WAN and giving various ways of obtaining both RFCs and - Internet Drafts.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.vpnc.org/vpn-standards.html">VPN Standards</A> - page maintained by<A href="glossary.html#VPNC"> VPNC</A>. This covers - both RFCs and Drafts, and classifies them in a fairly helpful way.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.rfc-editor.org">RFC archive</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ietf.org/ids.by.wg/ipsec.html">Internet Drafts</A> - related to IPsec</LI> -<LI>US government<A href="http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs"> site</A> - with their<A href="glossary.html#FIPS"> FIPS</A> standards</LI> -<LI>Archives of the ipsec@tis.com mailing list where discussion of - drafts takes place. -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/ipsec">Eastern Canada</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.vpnc.org/ietf-ipsec">California</A>.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="analysis">Analysis and critiques of IPsec protocols</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>Counterpane's<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/ipsec.pdf"> - evaluation</A> of the protocols</LI> -<LI>Simpson's<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/1999/06/msg00319.html"> - IKE Considered Dangerous</A> paper. Note that this is a link to an - archive of our mailing list. There are several replies in addition to - the paper itself.</LI> -<LI>Fate Labs<A href="http://www.fatelabs.com/loki-vpn.pdf"> Virual - Private Problems: the Broken Dream</A></LI> -<LI>Catherine Meadows' paper<CITE> Analysis of the Internet Key Exchange - Protocol Using the NRL Protocol Analyzer</CITE>, in<A href="http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/1999/1999meadows-IEEE99.pdf"> - PDF</A> or<A href="http://chacs.nrl.navy.mil/publications/CHACS/1999/1999meadows-IEEE99.ps"> - Postscript</A>.</LI> -<LI>Perlman and Kaufmnan -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://snoopy.seas.smu.edu/ee8392_summer01/week7/perlman2.pdf"> -Key Exchange in IPsec</A></LI> -<LI>a newer<A href="http://sec.femto.org/wetice-2001/papers/radia-paper.pdf"> - PDF paper</A>,<CITE> Analysis of the IPsec Key Exchange Standard</CITE> -.</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Bellovin's<A href="http://www.research.att.com/~smb/papers/index.html"> - papers</A> page including his: -<UL> -<LI><CITE>Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite</CITE> (1989)</LI> -<LI><CITE>Problem Areas for the IP Security Protocols</CITE> (1996)</LI> -<LI><CITE>Probable Plaintext Cryptanalysis of the IP Security Protocols</CITE> - (1997)</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>An<A href="http://www.lounge.org/ike_doi_errata.html"> errata list</A> - for the IPsec RFCs.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="IP.background">Background information on IP</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>An<A href="http://ipprimer.windsorcs.com/"> IP tutorial</A> that - seems to be written mainly for Netware or Microsoft LAN admins entering - a new world</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.iana.org">IANA</A>, Internet Assigned Numbers - Authority</LI> -<LI><A href="http://public.pacbell.net/dedicated/cidr.html">CIDR</A>, - Classless Inter-Domain Routing</LI> -<LI>Also see our<A href="biblio.html"> bibliography</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="implement">IPsec Implementations</A></H2> -<H3><A name="linuxprod">Linux products</A></H3> -<P>Vendors using FreeS/WAN in turnkey firewall or VPN products are - listed in our<A href="intro.html#turnkey"> introduction</A>.</P> -<P>Other vendors have Linux IPsec products which, as far as we know, do - not use FreeS/WAN</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.redcreek.com/products/shareware.html">Redcreek</A> - provide an open source Linux driver for their PCI hardware VPN card. - This card has a 100 Mbit Ethernet port, an Intel 960 CPU plus more - specialised crypto chips, and claimed encryption performance of 45 - Mbit/sec. The PC sees it as an Ethernet board.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://linuxtoday.com/stories/8428.html?nn">Paktronix</A> - offer a Linux-based VPN with hardware encryption</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.watchguard.com/">Watchguard</A> use Linux in - their Firebox product.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.entrust.com">Entrust</A> offer a developers' - toolkit for using their<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> PKI</A> for IPsec - authentication</LI> -<LI>According to a report on our mailing list,<A href="http://www.axent.com"> - Axent</A> have a Linux version of their product.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="router">IPsec in router products</A></H3> -<P>All the major router vendors support IPsec, at least in some models.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/16.html">Cisco</A> - IPsec information</LI> -<LI>Ascend, now part of<A href="http://www.lucent.com/"> Lucent</A>, - have some IPsec-based products</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.nortelnetworks.com/">Bay Networks</A>, now part - of Nortel, use IPsec in their Contivity switch product line</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.3com.com/products/enterprise.html">3Com</A> have - a number of VPN products, some using IPsec</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="fw.web">IPsec in firewall products</A></H3> -<P>Many firewall vendors offer IPsec, either as a standard part of their - product, or an optional extra. A few we know about are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.borderware.com/">Borderware</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ashleylaurent.com/vpn/ipsec_vpn.htm">Ashley - Laurent</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.watchguard.com">Watchguard</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.fx.dk/firewall/ipsec.html">Injoy</A> for OS/2</LI> -</UL> -<P>Vendors using FreeS/WAN in turnkey firewall products are listed in - our<A href="intro.html#turnkey"> introduction</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="ipsecos">Operating systems with IPsec support</A></H3> -<P>All the major open source operating systems support IPsec. See below - for details on<A href="#BSD"> BSD-derived</A> Unix variants.</P> -<P>Among commercial OS vendors, IPsec players include:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://msdn.microsoft.com/isapi/msdnlib.idc?theURL=/library/backgrnd/html/msdn_ip_security.htm"> -Microsoft</A> have put IPsec in their Windows 2000 and XP products</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.s390.ibm.com/stories/1999/os390v2r8_pr.html">IBM</A> - announce a release of OS390 with IPsec support via a crypto - co-processor</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.sun.com/solaris/ds/ds-security/ds-security.pdf"> -Sun</A> include IPsec in Solaris 8</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.hp.com/security/products/extranet-security.html"> -Hewlett Packard</A> offer IPsec for their Unix machines</LI> -<LI>Certicom have IPsec available for the<A href="http://www.certicom.com/products/movian/movianvpn_tech.html"> - Palm</A>.</LI> -<LI>There were reports before the release that Apple's Mac OS X would - have IPsec support built in, but it did not seem to be there when we - last checked. If you find, it please let us know via the<A href="mail.html"> - mailing list</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A NAME="29_3_5">IPsec on network cards</A></H3> -<P>Network cards with built-in IPsec acceleration are available from at - least Intel, 3Com and Redcreek.</P> -<H3><A name="opensource">Open source IPsec implementations</A></H3> -<H4><A name="linuxipsec">Other Linux IPsec implementations</A></H4> -<P>We like to think of FreeS/WAN as<EM> the</EM> Linux IPsec - implementation, but it is not the only one. Others we know of are:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.enst.fr/~beyssac/pipsec/">pipsecd</A>, a - lightweight implementation of IPsec for Linux. Does not require kernel - recompilation.</LI> -<LI>Petr Novak's<A href="ftp://ftp.eunet.cz/icz/ipnsec/"> ipnsec</A>, - based on the OpenBSD IPsec code and using<A href="glossary.html#photuris"> - Photuris</A> for key management</LI> -<LI>A now defunct project at<A href="http://www.cs.arizona.edu/security/hpcc-blue/linux.html"> - U of Arizona</A> (export controlled)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://snad.ncsl.nist.gov/cerberus">NIST Cerebus</A> - (export controlled)</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="BSD">IPsec for BSD Unix</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.kame.net/project-overview.html">KAME</A>, - several large Japanese companies co-operating on IPv6 and IPsec</LI> -<LI><A href="http://web.mit.edu/network/isakmp">US Naval Research Lab</A> - implementation of IPv6 and of IPsec for IPv4 (export controlled)</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.openbsd.org">OpenBSD</A> includes IPsec as a - standard part of the distribution</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.r4k.net/ipsec">IPsec for FreeBSD</A></LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.netbsd.org/Documentation/network/ipsec/"> FAQ</A> - on NetBSD's IPsec implementation</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="misc">IPsec for other systems</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tcm.hut.fi/Tutkimus/IPSEC/">Helsinki U of - Technolgy</A> have implemented IPsec for Solaris, Java and Macintosh</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="interop.web">Interoperability</A></H3> -<P>The IPsec protocols are designed so that different implementations - should be able to work together. As they say "the devil is in the - details". IPsec has a lot of details, but considerable success has been - achieved.</P> -<H4><A name="result">Interoperability results</A></H4> -<P>Linux FreeS/WAN has been tested for interoperability with many other - IPsec implementations. Results to date are in our<A href="interop.html"> - interoperability</A> section.</P> -<P>Various other sites have information on interoperability between - various IPsec implementations:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.opus1.com/vpn/atl99display.html">interop results</A> - from a bakeoff in Atlanta, September 1999.</LI> -<LI>a French company, HSC's,<A href="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/presentations/ipsec99/index.html.en"> - interoperability</A> test data covers FreeS/WAN, Open BSD, KAME, Linux - pipsecd, Checkpoint, Red Creek Ravlin, and Cisco IOS</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.icsa.net/">ICSA</A> offer certification programs - for various security-related products. See their list of<A href="http://www.icsa.net/html/communities/ipsec/certification/certified_products/index.shtml"> - certified IPsec</A> products. Linux FreeS/WAN is not currently on that - list, but several products with which we interoperate are.</LI> -<LI>VPNC have a page on why they are not yet doing<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/interop.html"> - interoperability</A> testing and a page on the<A href="http://www.vpnc.org/conformance.html"> - spec conformance</A> testing that they are doing</LI> -<LI>a<A href="http://www.commweb.com/article/COM20000912S0009"> review</A> - comparing a dozen commercial IPsec implemetations. Unfortunately, the - reviewers did not look at Open Source implementations such as FreeS/WAN - or OpenBSD.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tanu.org/~sakane/doc/public/report-ike-interop0007.html"> -results</A> from interoperability tests at a conference. FreeS/WAN was - not tested there.</LI> -<LI>test results from the<A href="http://www.hsc.fr/ressources/veille/ipsec/ipsec2000/"> - IPSEC 2000</A> conference</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="test1">Interoperability test sites</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tahi.org/">TAHI</A>, a Japanese IPv6 testing - project with free IPsec validation software</LI> -<LI><A href="http://ipsec-wit.antd.nist.gov">National Institute of - Standards and Technology</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://isakmp-test.ssh.fi/">SSH Communications Security</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="linux.link">Linux links</A></H2> -<H3><A name="linux.basic">Basic and tutorial Linux information</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI>Linux<A href="http://linuxcentral.com/linux/LDP/LDP/gs/gs.html"> - Getting Started</A> HOWTO document</LI> -<LI>A getting started guide from the<A href="http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~cchome/linuxgettingstarted.html"> - U of Oregon</A></LI> -<LI>A large<A href="http://www.herring.org/techie.html"> link collection</A> - which includes a lot of introductory and tutorial material on Unix, - Linux, the net, . . .</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="general">General Linux sites</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.freshmeat.net">Freshmeat</A> Linux news</LI> -<LI><A href="http://slashdot.org">Slashdot</A> "News for Nerds"</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linux.org">Linux Online</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxhq.com">Linux HQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tux.org">tux.org</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="docs.ldp">Documentation</A></H3> -<P>Nearly any Linux documentation you are likely to want can be found at - the<A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP"> Linux Documentation Project</A> - or LDP.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/META-FAQ.html">Meta-FAQ</A> - guide to Linux information sources</LI> -<LI>The LDP's HowTo documents are a standard Linux reference. See this<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/docs.html#howto"> - list</A>. Documents there most relevant to a FreeS/WAN gateway are: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Kernel-HOWTO.html">Kernel - HOWTO</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Networking-Overview-HOWTO.html"> -Networking Overview HOWTO</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://metalab.unc.edu/LDP/HOWTO/Security-HOWTO.html"> -Security HOWTO</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>The LDP do a series of Guides, book-sized publications with more - detail (and often more "why do it this way?") than the HowTos. See this<A -href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/guides.html"> list</A>. Documents there - most relevant to a FreeS/WAN gateway are: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tml.hut.fi/~viu/linux/sag/">System - Administrator's Guide</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/LDP/nag2/index.html">Network - Adminstrator's Guide</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.seifried.org/lasg/">Linux Administrator's - Security Guide</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -</UL> -<P>You may not need to go to the LDP to get this material. Most Linux - distributions include the HowTos on their CDs and several include the - Guides as well. Also, most of the Guides and some collections of HowTos - are available in book form from various publishers.</P> -<P>Much of the LDP material is also available in languages other than - English. See this<A href="http://www.linuxdoc.org/links/nenglish.html"> - LDP page</A>.</P> -<H3><A name="advroute.web">Advanced routing</A></H3> -<P>The Linux IP stack has some new features in 2.4 kernels. Some HowTos - have been written:</P> -<UL> -<LI>several HowTos for the<A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/"> - netfilter</A> firewall code in newer kernels</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ds9a.nl/2.4Networking/HOWTO//cvs/2.4routing/output/2.4networking.html"> -2.4 networking</A> HowTo</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.ds9a.nl/2.4Networking/HOWTO//cvs/2.4routing/output/2.4routing.html"> -2.4 routing</A> HowTo</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="linsec">Security for Linux</A></H3> -<P>See also the<A href="#docs.ldp"> LDP material</A> above.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ecst.csuchico.edu/~dranch/LINUX/index-linux.html#trinityos"> -Trinity OS guide to setting up Linux</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.deter.com/unix">Unix security</A> page</LI> -<LI><A href="http://linux01.gwdg.de/~alatham/">PPDD</A> encrypting - filesystem</LI> -<LI><A href="http://EncryptionHOWTO.sourceforge.net/">Linux Encryption - HowTo</A> (outdated when last checked, had an Oct 2000 revision date in - March 2002)</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="firewall.linux">Linux firewalls</A></H3> -<P>Our<A href="firewall.html"> FreeS/WAN and firewalls</A> document - includes links to several sets of<A href="firewall.html#examplefw"> - scripts</A> known to work with FreeS/WAN.</P> -<P>Other information sources:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://ipmasq.cjb.net/">IP Masquerade resource page</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://netfilter.samba.org/unreliable-guides/">netfilter</A> - firewall code in 2.4 kernels</LI> -<LI>Our list of general<A href="#firewall.web"> firewall references</A> - on the web</LI> -<LI><A href="http://users.dhp.com/~whisper/mason/">Mason</A>, a tool for - automatically configuring Linux firewalls</LI> -<LI>the web cache software<A href="http://www.squid-cache.org/"> squid</A> - and<A href="http://www.squidguard.org/"> squidguard</A> which turns - Squid into a filtering web proxy</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="linux.misc">Miscellaneous Linux information</A></H3> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://lwn.net/current/dists.php3">Linux distribution - vendors</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.linux.org/groups/">Linux User Groups</A></LI> -</UL> -<H2><A name="crypto.link">Crypto and security links</A></H2> -<H3><A name="security">Crypto and security resources</A></H3> -<H4><A name="std.links">The standard link collections</A></H4> -<P>Two enormous collections of links, each the standard reference in its - area:</P> -<DL> -<DT>Gene Spafford's<A href="http://www.cerias.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist/"> - COAST hotlist</A></DT> -<DD>Computer and network security.</DD> -<DT>Peter Gutmann's<A href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/links.html"> - Encryption and Security-related Resources</A></DT> -<DD>Cryptography.</DD> -</DL> -<H4><A name="FAQ">Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) documents</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cryptography-faq/">Cryptography - FAQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.interhack.net/pubs/fwfaq">Firewall FAQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.whitefang.com/sup/secure-faq.html">Secure Unix - Programming FAQ</A></LI> -<LI>FAQs for specific programs are listed in the<A href="#tools"> tools</A> - section below.</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="cryptover">Tutorials</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>Gary Kessler's<A href="http://www.garykessler.net/library/crypto.html"> - Overview of Cryptography</A></LI> -<LI>Terry Ritter's<A href="http://www.ciphersbyritter.com/LEARNING.HTM"> - introduction</A></LI> -<LI>Peter Gutman's<A href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/tutorial/index.html"> - cryptography</A> tutorial (500 slides in PDF format)</LI> -<LI>Amir Herzberg of IBM's sildes for his course<A href="http://www.hrl.il.ibm.com/mpay/course.html"> - Introduction to Cryptography and Electronic Commerce</A></LI> -<LI>the<A href="http://www.gnupg.org/gph/en/manual/c173.html"> concepts - section</A> of the<A href="glossary.html#GPG"> GNU Privacy Guard</A> - documentation</LI> -<LI>Bruce Schneier's self-study<A href="http://www.counterpane.com/self-study.html"> - cryptanalysis</A> course</LI> -</UL> -<P>See also the<A href="#interesting"> interesting papers</A> section - below.</P> -<H4><A name="standards">Crypto and security standards</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/cc">Common Criteria</A>, new - international computer and network security standards to replace the - "Rainbow" series</LI> -<LI>AES<A href="http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/aes_home.htm"> - Advanced Encryption Standard</A> which will replace DES</LI> -<LI><A href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363">IEEE P-1363 public key - standard</A></LI> -<LI>our collection of links for the<A href="#ipsec.link"> IPsec</A> - standards</LI> -<LI>history of<A href="http://www.visi.com/crypto/evalhist/index.html"> - formal evaluation</A> of security policies and implementation</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="quotes">Crypto quotes</A></H4> -<P>There are several collections of cryptographic quotes on the net:</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/EFF/quotes.eff">the EFF</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.samsimpson.com/cquotes.php">Sam Simpson</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.amk.ca/quotations/cryptography/page-1.html">AM - Kutchling</A></LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="policy">Cryptography law and policy</A></H3> -<H4><A name="legal">Surveys of crypto law</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>International survey of<A href="http://cwis.kub.nl/~FRW/PEOPLE/koops/lawsurvy.htm"> - crypto law</A>.</LI> -<LI>International survey of<A href="http://rechten.kub.nl/simone/ds-lawsu.htm"> - digital signature law</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="oppose">Organisations opposing crypto restrictions</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>The<A href="glossary.html#EFF"> EFF</A>'s archives on<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/"> - privacy</A> and<A href="http://www.eff.org/pub/Privacy/ITAR_export/"> - export control</A>.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.gilc.org">Global Internet Liberty Campaign</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cdt.org/crypto">Center for Democracy and - Technology</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.privacyinternational.org/">Privacy International</A> -, who give out<A href="http://www.bigbrotherawards.org/"> Big Brother - Awards</A> to snoopy organisations</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="other.policy">Other information on crypto policy</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.isi.edu/in-notes/rfc1984.txt">RFC 1984</A>, the<A href="glossary.html#IAB"> - IAB</A> and<A href="glossary.html#IESG"> IESG</A> Statement on - Cryptographic Technology and the Internet.</LI> -<LI>John Young's collection of<A href="http://cryptome.org/"> documents</A> - of interest to the cryptography, open government and privacy movements, - organized chronologically</LI> -<LI>AT&T researcher Matt Blaze's Encryption, Privacy and Security<A href="http://www.crypto.com"> - Resource Page</A></LI> -<LI>A good<A href="http://cryptome.org/crypto97-ne.htm"> overview</A> of - the issues from Australia.</LI> -</UL> -<P>See also our documentation section on the<A href="politics.html"> - history and politics</A> of cryptography.</P> -<H3><A name="crypto.tech">Cryptography technical information</A></H3> -<H4><A name="cryptolinks">Collections of crypto links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/hotlist.html">Counterpane</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~pgut001/links.html">Peter - Gutman's links</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.pca.dfn.de/eng/team/ske/pem-dok.html">PKI links</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://crypto.yashy.com/www/">Robert Guerra's links</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="papers">Lists of online cryptography papers</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/biblio">Counterpane</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cryptography.com/resources/papers"> -cryptography.com</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cryptosoft.com/html/secpub.htm">Cryptosoft</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="interesting">Particularly interesting papers</A></H4> -<P>These papers emphasize important issues around the use of - cryptography, and the design and management of secure systems.</P> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/keylength.html">Key length - requirements for security</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/wcf.html">Why - Cryptosystems Fail</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.cdt.org/crypto/risks98/">Risks of escrowed - encryption</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.counterpane.com/pitfalls.html">Security pitfalls - in cryptography</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.acm.org/classics/sep95">Reflections on Trusting - Trust</A>, Ken Thompson on Trojan horse design</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.apache-ssl.org/disclosure.pdf">Security against - Compelled Disclosure</A>, how to maintain privacy in the face of legal - or other coersion</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="compsec">Computer and network security</A></H3> -<H4><A name="seclink">Security links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/hotlist">COAST Hotlist</A></LI> -<LI>DMOZ open directory project<A href="http://dmoz.org/Computers/Security/"> - computer security</A> links</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/users/bsy/sec.html">Bennet Yee</A></LI> -<LI>Mike Fuhr's<A href="http://www.fuhr.org/~mfuhr/computers/security.html"> - link collection</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.networkintrusion.co.uk/">links</A> with an - emphasis on intrusion detection</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="firewall.web">Firewall links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.cs.purdue.edu/coast/firewalls">COAST firewalls</A> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.zeuros.co.uk">Firewalls Resource page</A></LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="vpn">VPN links</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.vpnc.org">VPN Consortium</A></LI> -<LI>First VPN's<A href="http://www.firstvpn.com/research/rhome.html"> - white paper</A> collection</LI> -</UL> -<H4><A name="tools">Security tools</A></H4> -<UL> -<LI>PGP -- mail encryption -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.pgp.com/">PGP Inc.</A> (part of NAI) for - commercial versions</LI> -<LI><A href="http://web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html">MIT</A> distributes - the NAI product for non-commercial use</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.pgpi.org/">international</A> distribution site</LI> -<LI><A href="http://gnupg.org">GNU Privacy Guard (GPG)</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.dk.pgp.net/pgpnet/pgp-faq/">PGP FAQ</A></LI> -</UL> - A message in our mailing list archive has considerable detail on<A href="http://www.sandelman.ottawa.on.ca/linux-ipsec/html/2000/12/msg00029.html"> - available versions</A> of PGP and on IPsec support in them. -<P><STRONG>Note:</STRONG> A fairly nasty bug exists in all commercial - PGP versions from 5.5 through 6.5.3. If you have one of those,<STRONG> - upgrade now</STRONG>.</P> -</LI> -<LI>SSH -- secure remote login -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.ssh.fi">SSH Communications Security</A>, for the - original software. It is free for trial, academic and non-commercial - use.</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.openssh.com/">Open SSH</A>, the Open BSD team's - free replacement</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.freessh.org/">freessh.org</A>, links to free - implementations for many systems</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.uni-karlsruhe.de/~ig25/ssh-faq">SSH FAQ</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/putty/">Putty</A> -, an SSH client for Windows</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI>Tripwire saves message digests of your system files. Re-calculate - the digests and compare to saved values to detect any file changes. - There are several versions available: -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.tripwiresecurity.com/">commercial version</A></LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.tripwire.org/">Open Source</A></LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.snort.org">Snort</A> and<A href="http://www.lids.org"> - LIDS</A> are intrusion detection system for Linux</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.fish.com/~zen/satan/satan.html">SATAN</A> System - Administrators Tool for Analysing Networks</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.insecure.org/nmap/">NMAP</A> Network Mapper</LI> -<LI><A href="ftp://ftp.porcupine.org/pub/security/index.html">Wietse - Venema's page</A> with various tools</LI> -<LI><A href="http://ita.ee.lbl.gov/index.html">Internet Traffic Archive</A> -, various tools to analyze network traffic, mostly scripts to organise - and format tcpdump(8) output for specific purposes</LI> -<LI><A name="ssmail">ssmail -- sendmail patched to do</A><A href="glossary.html#carpediem"> - opportunistic encryption</A> -<UL> -<LI><A href="http://www.home.aone.net.au/qualcomm/">web page</A> with - links to code and to a Usenix paper describing it, in PDF</LI> -</UL> -</LI> -<LI><A href="http://www.openca.org/">Open CA</A> project to develop a - freely distributed<A href="glossary.html#CA"> Certification Authority</A> - for building a open<A href="glossary.html#PKI"> Public Key - Infrastructure</A>.</LI> -</UL> -<H3><A name="people">Links to home pages</A></H3> -<P>David Wagner at Berkeley provides a set of links to<A href="http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/people/crypto.html"> - home pages</A> of cryptographers, cypherpunks and computer security - people.</P> -<HR> -<A HREF="toc.html">Contents</A> -<A HREF="mail.html">Previous</A> -<A HREF="glossary.html">Next</A> -</BODY> -</HTML> diff --git a/programs/starter/lex.yy.c b/programs/starter/lex.yy.c deleted file mode 100644 index 1626f1050..000000000 --- a/programs/starter/lex.yy.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1966 +0,0 @@ - -#line 3 "lex.yy.c" - -#define YY_INT_ALIGNED short int - -/* A lexical scanner generated by flex */ - -#define FLEX_SCANNER -#define YY_FLEX_MAJOR_VERSION 2 -#define YY_FLEX_MINOR_VERSION 5 -#define YY_FLEX_SUBMINOR_VERSION 33 -#if YY_FLEX_SUBMINOR_VERSION > 0 -#define FLEX_BETA -#endif - -/* First, we deal with platform-specific or compiler-specific issues. */ - -/* begin standard C headers. */ -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <stdlib.h> - -/* end standard C headers. */ - -/* flex integer type definitions */ - -#ifndef FLEXINT_H -#define FLEXINT_H - -/* C99 systems have <inttypes.h>. Non-C99 systems may or may not. */ - -#if __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L - -/* C99 says to define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS before including stdint.h, - * if you want the limit (max/min) macros for int types. - */ -#ifndef __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS -#define __STDC_LIMIT_MACROS 1 -#endif - -#include <inttypes.h> -typedef int8_t flex_int8_t; -typedef uint8_t flex_uint8_t; -typedef int16_t flex_int16_t; -typedef uint16_t flex_uint16_t; -typedef int32_t flex_int32_t; -typedef uint32_t flex_uint32_t; -#else -typedef signed char flex_int8_t; -typedef short int flex_int16_t; -typedef int flex_int32_t; -typedef unsigned char flex_uint8_t; -typedef unsigned short int flex_uint16_t; -typedef unsigned int flex_uint32_t; -#endif /* ! C99 */ - -/* Limits of integral types. */ -#ifndef INT8_MIN -#define INT8_MIN (-128) -#endif -#ifndef INT16_MIN -#define INT16_MIN (-32767-1) -#endif -#ifndef INT32_MIN -#define INT32_MIN (-2147483647-1) -#endif -#ifndef INT8_MAX -#define INT8_MAX (127) -#endif -#ifndef INT16_MAX -#define INT16_MAX (32767) -#endif -#ifndef INT32_MAX -#define INT32_MAX (2147483647) -#endif -#ifndef UINT8_MAX -#define UINT8_MAX (255U) -#endif -#ifndef UINT16_MAX -#define UINT16_MAX (65535U) -#endif -#ifndef UINT32_MAX -#define UINT32_MAX (4294967295U) -#endif - -#endif /* ! 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(yy_buffer_stack)[(yy_buffer_stack_top)] \ - : NULL) - -/* Same as previous macro, but useful when we know that the buffer stack is not - * NULL or when we need an lvalue. For internal use only. - */ -#define YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE (yy_buffer_stack)[(yy_buffer_stack_top)] - -/* yy_hold_char holds the character lost when yytext is formed. */ -static char yy_hold_char; -static int yy_n_chars; /* number of characters read into yy_ch_buf */ -int yyleng; - -/* Points to current character in buffer. */ -static char *yy_c_buf_p = (char *) 0; -static int yy_init = 0; /* whether we need to initialize */ -static int yy_start = 0; /* start state number */ - -/* Flag which is used to allow yywrap()'s to do buffer switches - * instead of setting up a fresh yyin. A bit of a hack ... - */ -static int yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof; - -void yyrestart (FILE *input_file ); -void yy_switch_to_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE new_buffer ); -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_create_buffer (FILE *file,int size ); -void yy_delete_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE b ); -void yy_flush_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE b ); -void yypush_buffer_state (YY_BUFFER_STATE new_buffer ); -void yypop_buffer_state (void ); - -static void yyensure_buffer_stack (void ); -static void yy_load_buffer_state (void ); -static void yy_init_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE b,FILE *file ); - -#define YY_FLUSH_BUFFER yy_flush_buffer(YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ) - -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_scan_buffer (char *base,yy_size_t size ); -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_scan_string (yyconst char *yy_str ); -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_scan_bytes (yyconst char *bytes,int len ); - -void *yyalloc (yy_size_t ); -void *yyrealloc (void *,yy_size_t ); -void yyfree (void * ); - -#define yy_new_buffer yy_create_buffer - -#define yy_set_interactive(is_interactive) \ - { \ - if ( ! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ){ \ - yyensure_buffer_stack (); \ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = \ - yy_create_buffer(yyin,YY_BUF_SIZE ); \ - } \ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_is_interactive = is_interactive; \ - } - -#define yy_set_bol(at_bol) \ - { \ - if ( ! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ){\ - yyensure_buffer_stack (); \ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = \ - yy_create_buffer(yyin,YY_BUF_SIZE ); \ - } \ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_at_bol = at_bol; \ - } - -#define YY_AT_BOL() (YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_at_bol) - -/* Begin user sect3 */ - -typedef unsigned char YY_CHAR; - -FILE *yyin = (FILE *) 0, *yyout = (FILE *) 0; - -typedef int yy_state_type; - -extern int yylineno; - -int yylineno = 1; - -extern char *yytext; -#define yytext_ptr yytext - -static yy_state_type yy_get_previous_state (void ); -static yy_state_type yy_try_NUL_trans (yy_state_type current_state ); -static int yy_get_next_buffer (void ); -static void yy_fatal_error (yyconst char msg[] ); - -/* Done after the current pattern has been matched and before the - * corresponding action - sets up yytext. - */ -#define YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION \ - (yytext_ptr) = yy_bp; \ - yyleng = (size_t) (yy_cp - yy_bp); \ - (yy_hold_char) = *yy_cp; \ - *yy_cp = '\0'; \ - (yy_c_buf_p) = yy_cp; - -#define YY_NUM_RULES 14 -#define YY_END_OF_BUFFER 15 -/* This struct is not used in this scanner, - but its presence is necessary. */ -struct yy_trans_info - { - flex_int32_t yy_verify; - flex_int32_t yy_nxt; - }; -static yyconst flex_int16_t yy_accept[47] = - { 0, - 0, 0, 15, 11, 2, 4, 13, 11, 3, 11, - 11, 11, 11, 1, 11, 2, 0, 12, 11, 0, - 4, 8, 11, 11, 11, 11, 1, 11, 11, 11, - 11, 11, 7, 11, 11, 11, 11, 11, 6, 11, - 5, 11, 11, 9, 10, 0 - } ; - -static yyconst flex_int32_t yy_ec[256] = - { 0, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 2, 3, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 2, 1, 4, 5, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 6, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 7, 1, 8, 9, - - 10, 11, 12, 1, 13, 1, 1, 14, 1, 15, - 16, 17, 1, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1 - } ; - -static yyconst flex_int32_t yy_meta[23] = - { 0, - 1, 2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1 - } ; - -static yyconst flex_int16_t yy_base[51] = - { 0, - 0, 69, 70, 0, 67, 72, 64, 21, 72, 19, - 52, 56, 55, 62, 0, 61, 58, 72, 34, 58, - 72, 0, 45, 51, 38, 39, 54, 17, 41, 33, - 34, 39, 0, 30, 33, 36, 27, 25, 0, 17, - 0, 21, 15, 0, 0, 72, 28, 40, 42, 45 - } ; - -static yyconst flex_int16_t yy_def[51] = - { 0, - 46, 1, 46, 47, 46, 46, 48, 49, 46, 47, - 47, 47, 47, 46, 47, 46, 48, 46, 49, 50, - 46, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 46, 47, 47, 47, - 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, - 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 0, 46, 46, 46, 46 - } ; - -static yyconst flex_int16_t yy_nxt[95] = - { 0, - 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 4, 10, 4, 4, - 4, 4, 11, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 12, 4, - 4, 13, 20, 21, 20, 22, 20, 32, 15, 45, - 44, 33, 43, 42, 23, 20, 21, 20, 41, 20, - 17, 17, 19, 19, 19, 20, 20, 20, 40, 39, - 38, 37, 36, 35, 34, 27, 31, 30, 29, 28, - 21, 18, 16, 27, 26, 25, 24, 18, 16, 46, - 14, 3, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, - 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, - 46, 46, 46, 46 - - } ; - -static yyconst flex_int16_t yy_chk[95] = - { 0, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, - 1, 1, 8, 8, 8, 10, 8, 28, 47, 43, - 42, 28, 40, 38, 10, 19, 19, 19, 37, 19, - 48, 48, 49, 49, 49, 50, 50, 50, 36, 35, - 34, 32, 31, 30, 29, 27, 26, 25, 24, 23, - 20, 17, 16, 14, 13, 12, 11, 7, 5, 3, - 2, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, - 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, - 46, 46, 46, 46 - - } ; - -static yy_state_type yy_last_accepting_state; -static char *yy_last_accepting_cpos; - -extern int yy_flex_debug; -int yy_flex_debug = 0; - -/* The intent behind this definition is that it'll catch - * any uses of REJECT which flex missed. - */ -#define REJECT reject_used_but_not_detected -#define yymore() yymore_used_but_not_detected -#define YY_MORE_ADJ 0 -#define YY_RESTORE_YY_MORE_OFFSET -char *yytext; -#line 1 "parser.l" -#line 2 "parser.l" -/* FreeS/WAN config file parser (parser.l) - * Copyright (C) 2001 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it - * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the - * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your - * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but - * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY - * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License - * for more details. - * - * RCSID $Id: lex.yy.c,v 1.4 2006/03/28 22:32:49 as Exp $ - */ - -#include <string.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <glob.h> - -#include "parser.tab.h" - -#define MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH 20 - -#define YY_NO_UNPUT -extern void yyerror(const char *); -extern int yylex (void); - -static struct { - int stack_ptr; - YY_BUFFER_STATE stack[MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH]; - FILE *file[MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH]; - unsigned int line[MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH]; - char *filename[MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH]; -} __parser_y_private; - -void _parser_y_error(char *b, int size, const char *s); -void _parser_y_init (const char *f); -void _parser_y_fini (void); -int _parser_y_include (const char *filename); - -void _parser_y_error(char *b, int size, const char *s) -{ - extern char *yytext; // was: char yytext[]; - - snprintf(b, size, "%s:%d: %s [%s]", - __parser_y_private.filename[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr], - __parser_y_private.line[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr], - s, yytext); -} - -void _parser_y_init (const char *f) -{ - memset(&__parser_y_private, 0, sizeof(__parser_y_private)); - __parser_y_private.line[0] = 1; - __parser_y_private.filename[0] = strdup(f); -} - -void _parser_y_fini (void) -{ - unsigned int i; - - for (i = 0; i < MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH; i++) - { - if (__parser_y_private.filename[i]) - free(__parser_y_private.filename[i]); - if (__parser_y_private.file[i]) - fclose(__parser_y_private.file[i]); - } - memset(&__parser_y_private, 0, sizeof(__parser_y_private)); -} - -int _parser_y_include (const char *filename) -{ - glob_t files; - int i, ret; - - ret = glob(filename, GLOB_ERR, NULL, &files); - if (ret) - { - const char *err; - - switch (ret) - { - case GLOB_NOSPACE: - err = "include files ran out of memory"; - break; - case GLOB_ABORTED: - err = "include files aborted due to read error"; - break; - case GLOB_NOMATCH: - err = "include files found no matches"; - break; - default: - err = "unknown include files error"; - } - yyerror(err); - return 1; - } - - for (i = 0; i < files.gl_pathc; i++) - { - FILE *f; - unsigned int p = __parser_y_private.stack_ptr + 1; - - if (p >= MAX_INCLUDE_DEPTH) - { - yyerror("max inclusion depth reached"); - return 1; - } - - f = fopen(files.gl_pathv[i], "r"); - if (!f) - { - yyerror("can't open include filename"); - continue; - } - - __parser_y_private.stack_ptr++; - __parser_y_private.file[p] = f; - __parser_y_private.stack[p] = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER; - __parser_y_private.line[p] = 1; - __parser_y_private.filename[p] = strdup(files.gl_pathv[i]); - - yy_switch_to_buffer(yy_create_buffer(f,YY_BUF_SIZE)); - } - globfree(&files); - return 0; -} - -#line 618 "lex.yy.c" - -#define INITIAL 0 - -#ifndef YY_NO_UNISTD_H -/* Special case for "unistd.h", since it is non-ANSI. We include it way - * down here because we want the user's section 1 to have been scanned first. - * The user has a chance to override it with an option. - */ -#include <unistd.h> -#endif - -#ifndef YY_EXTRA_TYPE -#define YY_EXTRA_TYPE void * -#endif - -static int yy_init_globals (void ); - -/* Macros after this point can all be overridden by user definitions in - * section 1. - */ - -#ifndef YY_SKIP_YYWRAP -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" int yywrap (void ); -#else -extern int yywrap (void ); -#endif -#endif - - static void yyunput (int c,char *buf_ptr ); - -#ifndef yytext_ptr -static void yy_flex_strncpy (char *,yyconst char *,int ); -#endif - -#ifdef YY_NEED_STRLEN -static int yy_flex_strlen (yyconst char * ); -#endif - -#ifndef YY_NO_INPUT - -#ifdef __cplusplus -static int yyinput (void ); -#else -static int input (void ); -#endif - -#endif - -/* Amount of stuff to slurp up with each read. */ -#ifndef YY_READ_BUF_SIZE -#define YY_READ_BUF_SIZE 8192 -#endif - -/* Copy whatever the last rule matched to the standard output. */ -#ifndef ECHO -/* This used to be an fputs(), but since the string might contain NUL's, - * we now use fwrite(). - */ -#define ECHO (void) fwrite( yytext, yyleng, 1, yyout ) -#endif - -/* Gets input and stuffs it into "buf". number of characters read, or YY_NULL, - * is returned in "result". - */ -#ifndef YY_INPUT -#define YY_INPUT(buf,result,max_size) \ - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_is_interactive ) \ - { \ - int c = '*'; \ - size_t n; \ - for ( n = 0; n < max_size && \ - (c = getc( yyin )) != EOF && c != '\n'; ++n ) \ - buf[n] = (char) c; \ - if ( c == '\n' ) \ - buf[n++] = (char) c; \ - if ( c == EOF && ferror( yyin ) ) \ - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "input in flex scanner failed" ); \ - result = n; \ - } \ - else \ - { \ - errno=0; \ - while ( (result = fread(buf, 1, max_size, yyin))==0 && ferror(yyin)) \ - { \ - if( errno != EINTR) \ - { \ - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "input in flex scanner failed" ); \ - break; \ - } \ - errno=0; \ - clearerr(yyin); \ - } \ - }\ -\ - -#endif - -/* No semi-colon after return; correct usage is to write "yyterminate();" - - * we don't want an extra ';' after the "return" because that will cause - * some compilers to complain about unreachable statements. - */ -#ifndef yyterminate -#define yyterminate() return YY_NULL -#endif - -/* Number of entries by which start-condition stack grows. */ -#ifndef YY_START_STACK_INCR -#define YY_START_STACK_INCR 25 -#endif - -/* Report a fatal error. */ -#ifndef YY_FATAL_ERROR -#define YY_FATAL_ERROR(msg) yy_fatal_error( msg ) -#endif - -/* end tables serialization structures and prototypes */ - -/* Default declaration of generated scanner - a define so the user can - * easily add parameters. - */ -#ifndef YY_DECL -#define YY_DECL_IS_OURS 1 - -extern int yylex (void); - -#define YY_DECL int yylex (void) -#endif /* !YY_DECL */ - -/* Code executed at the beginning of each rule, after yytext and yyleng - * have been set up. - */ -#ifndef YY_USER_ACTION -#define YY_USER_ACTION -#endif - -/* Code executed at the end of each rule. */ -#ifndef YY_BREAK -#define YY_BREAK break; -#endif - -#define YY_RULE_SETUP \ - if ( yyleng > 0 ) \ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_at_bol = \ - (yytext[yyleng - 1] == '\n'); \ - YY_USER_ACTION - -/** The main scanner function which does all the work. - */ -YY_DECL -{ - register yy_state_type yy_current_state; - register char *yy_cp, *yy_bp; - register int yy_act; - -#line 134 "parser.l" - - -#line 777 "lex.yy.c" - - if ( !(yy_init) ) - { - (yy_init) = 1; - -#ifdef YY_USER_INIT - YY_USER_INIT; -#endif - - if ( ! (yy_start) ) - (yy_start) = 1; /* first start state */ - - if ( ! yyin ) - yyin = stdin; - - if ( ! yyout ) - yyout = stdout; - - if ( ! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ) { - yyensure_buffer_stack (); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = - yy_create_buffer(yyin,YY_BUF_SIZE ); - } - - yy_load_buffer_state( ); - } - - while ( 1 ) /* loops until end-of-file is reached */ - { - yy_cp = (yy_c_buf_p); - - /* Support of yytext. */ - *yy_cp = (yy_hold_char); - - /* yy_bp points to the position in yy_ch_buf of the start of - * the current run. - */ - yy_bp = yy_cp; - - yy_current_state = (yy_start); - yy_current_state += YY_AT_BOL(); -yy_match: - do - { - register YY_CHAR yy_c = yy_ec[YY_SC_TO_UI(*yy_cp)]; - if ( yy_accept[yy_current_state] ) - { - (yy_last_accepting_state) = yy_current_state; - (yy_last_accepting_cpos) = yy_cp; - } - while ( yy_chk[yy_base[yy_current_state] + yy_c] != yy_current_state ) - { - yy_current_state = (int) yy_def[yy_current_state]; - if ( yy_current_state >= 47 ) - yy_c = yy_meta[(unsigned int) yy_c]; - } - yy_current_state = yy_nxt[yy_base[yy_current_state] + (unsigned int) yy_c]; - ++yy_cp; - } - while ( yy_base[yy_current_state] != 72 ); - -yy_find_action: - yy_act = yy_accept[yy_current_state]; - if ( yy_act == 0 ) - { /* have to back up */ - yy_cp = (yy_last_accepting_cpos); - yy_current_state = (yy_last_accepting_state); - yy_act = yy_accept[yy_current_state]; - } - - YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION; - -do_action: /* This label is used only to access EOF actions. */ - - switch ( yy_act ) - { /* beginning of action switch */ - case 0: /* must back up */ - /* undo the effects of YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION */ - *yy_cp = (yy_hold_char); - yy_cp = (yy_last_accepting_cpos); - yy_current_state = (yy_last_accepting_state); - goto yy_find_action; - -case YY_STATE_EOF(INITIAL): -#line 136 "parser.l" -{ - if (__parser_y_private.filename[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr]) { - free(__parser_y_private.filename[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr]); - __parser_y_private.filename[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr] = NULL; - } - if (__parser_y_private.file[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr]) { - fclose(__parser_y_private.file[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr]); - __parser_y_private.file[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr] = NULL; - yy_delete_buffer (YY_CURRENT_BUFFER); - yy_switch_to_buffer - (__parser_y_private.stack[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr]); - } - if (--__parser_y_private.stack_ptr < 0) { - yyterminate(); - } -} - YY_BREAK -case 1: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 153 "parser.l" -return FIRST_SPACES; - YY_BREAK -case 2: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 155 "parser.l" -/* ignore spaces in line */ ; - YY_BREAK -case 3: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 157 "parser.l" -return EQUAL; - YY_BREAK -case 4: -/* rule 4 can match eol */ -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 159 "parser.l" -{ - __parser_y_private.line[__parser_y_private.stack_ptr]++; - return EOL; - } - YY_BREAK -case 5: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 164 "parser.l" -return CONFIG; - YY_BREAK -case 6: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 165 "parser.l" -return SETUP; - YY_BREAK -case 7: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 166 "parser.l" -return CONN; - YY_BREAK -case 8: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 167 "parser.l" -return CA; - YY_BREAK -case 9: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 168 "parser.l" -return INCLUDE; - YY_BREAK -case 10: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 169 "parser.l" -return VERSION; - YY_BREAK -case 11: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 171 "parser.l" -{ - yylval.s = strdup(yytext); - return STRING; - } - YY_BREAK -case 12: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 176 "parser.l" -{ - yylval.s = strdup(yytext+1); - if (yylval.s) yylval.s[strlen(yylval.s)-1]='\0'; - return STRING; - } - YY_BREAK -case 13: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 182 "parser.l" -yyerror(yytext); - YY_BREAK -case 14: -YY_RULE_SETUP -#line 184 "parser.l" -ECHO; - YY_BREAK -#line 961 "lex.yy.c" - - case YY_END_OF_BUFFER: - { - /* Amount of text matched not including the EOB char. */ - int yy_amount_of_matched_text = (int) (yy_cp - (yytext_ptr)) - 1; - - /* Undo the effects of YY_DO_BEFORE_ACTION. */ - *yy_cp = (yy_hold_char); - YY_RESTORE_YY_MORE_OFFSET - - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buffer_status == YY_BUFFER_NEW ) - { - /* We're scanning a new file or input source. It's - * possible that this happened because the user - * just pointed yyin at a new source and called - * yylex(). If so, then we have to assure - * consistency between YY_CURRENT_BUFFER and our - * globals. Here is the right place to do so, because - * this is the first action (other than possibly a - * back-up) that will match for the new input source. - */ - (yy_n_chars) = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars; - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_input_file = yyin; - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buffer_status = YY_BUFFER_NORMAL; - } - - /* Note that here we test for yy_c_buf_p "<=" to the position - * of the first EOB in the buffer, since yy_c_buf_p will - * already have been incremented past the NUL character - * (since all states make transitions on EOB to the - * end-of-buffer state). Contrast this with the test - * in input(). - */ - if ( (yy_c_buf_p) <= &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[(yy_n_chars)] ) - { /* This was really a NUL. */ - yy_state_type yy_next_state; - - (yy_c_buf_p) = (yytext_ptr) + yy_amount_of_matched_text; - - yy_current_state = yy_get_previous_state( ); - - /* Okay, we're now positioned to make the NUL - * transition. We couldn't have - * yy_get_previous_state() go ahead and do it - * for us because it doesn't know how to deal - * with the possibility of jamming (and we don't - * want to build jamming into it because then it - * will run more slowly). - */ - - yy_next_state = yy_try_NUL_trans( yy_current_state ); - - yy_bp = (yytext_ptr) + YY_MORE_ADJ; - - if ( yy_next_state ) - { - /* Consume the NUL. */ - yy_cp = ++(yy_c_buf_p); - yy_current_state = yy_next_state; - goto yy_match; - } - - else - { - yy_cp = (yy_c_buf_p); - goto yy_find_action; - } - } - - else switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( ) ) - { - case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE: - { - (yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof) = 0; - - if ( yywrap( ) ) - { - /* Note: because we've taken care in - * yy_get_next_buffer() to have set up - * yytext, we can now set up - * yy_c_buf_p so that if some total - * hoser (like flex itself) wants to - * call the scanner after we return the - * YY_NULL, it'll still work - another - * YY_NULL will get returned. - */ - (yy_c_buf_p) = (yytext_ptr) + YY_MORE_ADJ; - - yy_act = YY_STATE_EOF(YY_START); - goto do_action; - } - - else - { - if ( ! (yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof) ) - YY_NEW_FILE; - } - break; - } - - case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN: - (yy_c_buf_p) = - (yytext_ptr) + yy_amount_of_matched_text; - - yy_current_state = yy_get_previous_state( ); - - yy_cp = (yy_c_buf_p); - yy_bp = (yytext_ptr) + YY_MORE_ADJ; - goto yy_match; - - case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH: - (yy_c_buf_p) = - &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[(yy_n_chars)]; - - yy_current_state = yy_get_previous_state( ); - - yy_cp = (yy_c_buf_p); - yy_bp = (yytext_ptr) + YY_MORE_ADJ; - goto yy_find_action; - } - break; - } - - default: - YY_FATAL_ERROR( - "fatal flex scanner internal error--no action found" ); - } /* end of action switch */ - } /* end of scanning one token */ -} /* end of yylex */ - -/* yy_get_next_buffer - try to read in a new buffer - * - * Returns a code representing an action: - * EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH - - * EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN - continue scanning from current position - * EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE - end of file - */ -static int yy_get_next_buffer (void) -{ - register char *dest = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf; - register char *source = (yytext_ptr); - register int number_to_move, i; - int ret_val; - - if ( (yy_c_buf_p) > &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[(yy_n_chars) + 1] ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( - "fatal flex scanner internal error--end of buffer missed" ); - - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_fill_buffer == 0 ) - { /* Don't try to fill the buffer, so this is an EOF. */ - if ( (yy_c_buf_p) - (yytext_ptr) - YY_MORE_ADJ == 1 ) - { - /* We matched a single character, the EOB, so - * treat this as a final EOF. - */ - return EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE; - } - - else - { - /* We matched some text prior to the EOB, first - * process it. - */ - return EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH; - } - } - - /* Try to read more data. */ - - /* First move last chars to start of buffer. */ - number_to_move = (int) ((yy_c_buf_p) - (yytext_ptr)) - 1; - - for ( i = 0; i < number_to_move; ++i ) - *(dest++) = *(source++); - - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buffer_status == YY_BUFFER_EOF_PENDING ) - /* don't do the read, it's not guaranteed to return an EOF, - * just force an EOF - */ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars = (yy_n_chars) = 0; - - else - { - int num_to_read = - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_size - number_to_move - 1; - - while ( num_to_read <= 0 ) - { /* Not enough room in the buffer - grow it. */ - - /* just a shorter name for the current buffer */ - YY_BUFFER_STATE b = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER; - - int yy_c_buf_p_offset = - (int) ((yy_c_buf_p) - b->yy_ch_buf); - - if ( b->yy_is_our_buffer ) - { - int new_size = b->yy_buf_size * 2; - - if ( new_size <= 0 ) - b->yy_buf_size += b->yy_buf_size / 8; - else - b->yy_buf_size *= 2; - - b->yy_ch_buf = (char *) - /* Include room in for 2 EOB chars. */ - yyrealloc((void *) b->yy_ch_buf,b->yy_buf_size + 2 ); - } - else - /* Can't grow it, we don't own it. */ - b->yy_ch_buf = 0; - - if ( ! b->yy_ch_buf ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( - "fatal error - scanner input buffer overflow" ); - - (yy_c_buf_p) = &b->yy_ch_buf[yy_c_buf_p_offset]; - - num_to_read = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_size - - number_to_move - 1; - - } - - if ( num_to_read > YY_READ_BUF_SIZE ) - num_to_read = YY_READ_BUF_SIZE; - - /* Read in more data. */ - YY_INPUT( (&YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[number_to_move]), - (yy_n_chars), num_to_read ); - - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars = (yy_n_chars); - } - - if ( (yy_n_chars) == 0 ) - { - if ( number_to_move == YY_MORE_ADJ ) - { - ret_val = EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE; - yyrestart(yyin ); - } - - else - { - ret_val = EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH; - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buffer_status = - YY_BUFFER_EOF_PENDING; - } - } - - else - ret_val = EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN; - - (yy_n_chars) += number_to_move; - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[(yy_n_chars)] = YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR; - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[(yy_n_chars) + 1] = YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR; - - (yytext_ptr) = &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[0]; - - return ret_val; -} - -/* yy_get_previous_state - get the state just before the EOB char was reached */ - - static yy_state_type yy_get_previous_state (void) -{ - register yy_state_type yy_current_state; - register char *yy_cp; - - yy_current_state = (yy_start); - yy_current_state += YY_AT_BOL(); - - for ( yy_cp = (yytext_ptr) + YY_MORE_ADJ; yy_cp < (yy_c_buf_p); ++yy_cp ) - { - register YY_CHAR yy_c = (*yy_cp ? yy_ec[YY_SC_TO_UI(*yy_cp)] : 1); - if ( yy_accept[yy_current_state] ) - { - (yy_last_accepting_state) = yy_current_state; - (yy_last_accepting_cpos) = yy_cp; - } - while ( yy_chk[yy_base[yy_current_state] + yy_c] != yy_current_state ) - { - yy_current_state = (int) yy_def[yy_current_state]; - if ( yy_current_state >= 47 ) - yy_c = yy_meta[(unsigned int) yy_c]; - } - yy_current_state = yy_nxt[yy_base[yy_current_state] + (unsigned int) yy_c]; - } - - return yy_current_state; -} - -/* yy_try_NUL_trans - try to make a transition on the NUL character - * - * synopsis - * next_state = yy_try_NUL_trans( current_state ); - */ - static yy_state_type yy_try_NUL_trans (yy_state_type yy_current_state ) -{ - register int yy_is_jam; - register char *yy_cp = (yy_c_buf_p); - - register YY_CHAR yy_c = 1; - if ( yy_accept[yy_current_state] ) - { - (yy_last_accepting_state) = yy_current_state; - (yy_last_accepting_cpos) = yy_cp; - } - while ( yy_chk[yy_base[yy_current_state] + yy_c] != yy_current_state ) - { - yy_current_state = (int) yy_def[yy_current_state]; - if ( yy_current_state >= 47 ) - yy_c = yy_meta[(unsigned int) yy_c]; - } - yy_current_state = yy_nxt[yy_base[yy_current_state] + (unsigned int) yy_c]; - yy_is_jam = (yy_current_state == 46); - - return yy_is_jam ? 0 : yy_current_state; -} - - static void yyunput (int c, register char * yy_bp ) -{ - register char *yy_cp; - - yy_cp = (yy_c_buf_p); - - /* undo effects of setting up yytext */ - *yy_cp = (yy_hold_char); - - if ( yy_cp < YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf + 2 ) - { /* need to shift things up to make room */ - /* +2 for EOB chars. */ - register int number_to_move = (yy_n_chars) + 2; - register char *dest = &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_size + 2]; - register char *source = - &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[number_to_move]; - - while ( source > YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf ) - *--dest = *--source; - - yy_cp += (int) (dest - source); - yy_bp += (int) (dest - source); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars = - (yy_n_chars) = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_size; - - if ( yy_cp < YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf + 2 ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "flex scanner push-back overflow" ); - } - - *--yy_cp = (char) c; - - (yytext_ptr) = yy_bp; - (yy_hold_char) = *yy_cp; - (yy_c_buf_p) = yy_cp; -} - -#ifndef YY_NO_INPUT -#ifdef __cplusplus - static int yyinput (void) -#else - static int input (void) -#endif - -{ - int c; - - *(yy_c_buf_p) = (yy_hold_char); - - if ( *(yy_c_buf_p) == YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR ) - { - /* yy_c_buf_p now points to the character we want to return. - * If this occurs *before* the EOB characters, then it's a - * valid NUL; if not, then we've hit the end of the buffer. - */ - if ( (yy_c_buf_p) < &YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_ch_buf[(yy_n_chars)] ) - /* This was really a NUL. */ - *(yy_c_buf_p) = '\0'; - - else - { /* need more input */ - int offset = (yy_c_buf_p) - (yytext_ptr); - ++(yy_c_buf_p); - - switch ( yy_get_next_buffer( ) ) - { - case EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH: - /* This happens because yy_g_n_b() - * sees that we've accumulated a - * token and flags that we need to - * try matching the token before - * proceeding. But for input(), - * there's no matching to consider. - * So convert the EOB_ACT_LAST_MATCH - * to EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE. - */ - - /* Reset buffer status. */ - yyrestart(yyin ); - - /*FALLTHROUGH*/ - - case EOB_ACT_END_OF_FILE: - { - if ( yywrap( ) ) - return EOF; - - if ( ! (yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof) ) - YY_NEW_FILE; -#ifdef __cplusplus - return yyinput(); -#else - return input(); -#endif - } - - case EOB_ACT_CONTINUE_SCAN: - (yy_c_buf_p) = (yytext_ptr) + offset; - break; - } - } - } - - c = *(unsigned char *) (yy_c_buf_p); /* cast for 8-bit char's */ - *(yy_c_buf_p) = '\0'; /* preserve yytext */ - (yy_hold_char) = *++(yy_c_buf_p); - - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_at_bol = (c == '\n'); - - return c; -} -#endif /* ifndef YY_NO_INPUT */ - -/** Immediately switch to a different input stream. - * @param input_file A readable stream. - * - * @note This function does not reset the start condition to @c INITIAL . - */ - void yyrestart (FILE * input_file ) -{ - - if ( ! YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ){ - yyensure_buffer_stack (); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = - yy_create_buffer(yyin,YY_BUF_SIZE ); - } - - yy_init_buffer(YY_CURRENT_BUFFER,input_file ); - yy_load_buffer_state( ); -} - -/** Switch to a different input buffer. - * @param new_buffer The new input buffer. - * - */ - void yy_switch_to_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE new_buffer ) -{ - - /* TODO. We should be able to replace this entire function body - * with - * yypop_buffer_state(); - * yypush_buffer_state(new_buffer); - */ - yyensure_buffer_stack (); - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER == new_buffer ) - return; - - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ) - { - /* Flush out information for old buffer. */ - *(yy_c_buf_p) = (yy_hold_char); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_pos = (yy_c_buf_p); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars = (yy_n_chars); - } - - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = new_buffer; - yy_load_buffer_state( ); - - /* We don't actually know whether we did this switch during - * EOF (yywrap()) processing, but the only time this flag - * is looked at is after yywrap() is called, so it's safe - * to go ahead and always set it. - */ - (yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof) = 1; -} - -static void yy_load_buffer_state (void) -{ - (yy_n_chars) = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars; - (yytext_ptr) = (yy_c_buf_p) = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_pos; - yyin = YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_input_file; - (yy_hold_char) = *(yy_c_buf_p); -} - -/** Allocate and initialize an input buffer state. - * @param file A readable stream. - * @param size The character buffer size in bytes. When in doubt, use @c YY_BUF_SIZE. - * - * @return the allocated buffer state. - */ - YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_create_buffer (FILE * file, int size ) -{ - YY_BUFFER_STATE b; - - b = (YY_BUFFER_STATE) yyalloc(sizeof( struct yy_buffer_state ) ); - if ( ! b ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in yy_create_buffer()" ); - - b->yy_buf_size = size; - - /* yy_ch_buf has to be 2 characters longer than the size given because - * we need to put in 2 end-of-buffer characters. - */ - b->yy_ch_buf = (char *) yyalloc(b->yy_buf_size + 2 ); - if ( ! b->yy_ch_buf ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in yy_create_buffer()" ); - - b->yy_is_our_buffer = 1; - - yy_init_buffer(b,file ); - - return b; -} - -/** Destroy the buffer. - * @param b a buffer created with yy_create_buffer() - * - */ - void yy_delete_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE b ) -{ - - if ( ! b ) - return; - - if ( b == YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ) /* Not sure if we should pop here. */ - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = (YY_BUFFER_STATE) 0; - - if ( b->yy_is_our_buffer ) - yyfree((void *) b->yy_ch_buf ); - - yyfree((void *) b ); -} - -#ifndef _UNISTD_H /* assume unistd.h has isatty() for us */ -#ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -#endif -#ifdef __THROW /* this is a gnuism */ -extern int isatty (int ) __THROW; -#else -extern int isatty (int ); -#endif -#ifdef __cplusplus -} -#endif -#endif - -/* Initializes or reinitializes a buffer. - * This function is sometimes called more than once on the same buffer, - * such as during a yyrestart() or at EOF. - */ - static void yy_init_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE b, FILE * file ) - -{ - int oerrno = errno; - - yy_flush_buffer(b ); - - b->yy_input_file = file; - b->yy_fill_buffer = 1; - - /* If b is the current buffer, then yy_init_buffer was _probably_ - * called from yyrestart() or through yy_get_next_buffer. - * In that case, we don't want to reset the lineno or column. - */ - if (b != YY_CURRENT_BUFFER){ - b->yy_bs_lineno = 1; - b->yy_bs_column = 0; - } - - b->yy_is_interactive = file ? (isatty( fileno(file) ) > 0) : 0; - - errno = oerrno; -} - -/** Discard all buffered characters. On the next scan, YY_INPUT will be called. - * @param b the buffer state to be flushed, usually @c YY_CURRENT_BUFFER. - * - */ - void yy_flush_buffer (YY_BUFFER_STATE b ) -{ - if ( ! b ) - return; - - b->yy_n_chars = 0; - - /* We always need two end-of-buffer characters. The first causes - * a transition to the end-of-buffer state. The second causes - * a jam in that state. - */ - b->yy_ch_buf[0] = YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR; - b->yy_ch_buf[1] = YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR; - - b->yy_buf_pos = &b->yy_ch_buf[0]; - - b->yy_at_bol = 1; - b->yy_buffer_status = YY_BUFFER_NEW; - - if ( b == YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ) - yy_load_buffer_state( ); -} - -/** Pushes the new state onto the stack. The new state becomes - * the current state. This function will allocate the stack - * if necessary. - * @param new_buffer The new state. - * - */ -void yypush_buffer_state (YY_BUFFER_STATE new_buffer ) -{ - if (new_buffer == NULL) - return; - - yyensure_buffer_stack(); - - /* This block is copied from yy_switch_to_buffer. */ - if ( YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ) - { - /* Flush out information for old buffer. */ - *(yy_c_buf_p) = (yy_hold_char); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_buf_pos = (yy_c_buf_p); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE->yy_n_chars = (yy_n_chars); - } - - /* Only push if top exists. Otherwise, replace top. */ - if (YY_CURRENT_BUFFER) - (yy_buffer_stack_top)++; - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = new_buffer; - - /* copied from yy_switch_to_buffer. */ - yy_load_buffer_state( ); - (yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof) = 1; -} - -/** Removes and deletes the top of the stack, if present. - * The next element becomes the new top. - * - */ -void yypop_buffer_state (void) -{ - if (!YY_CURRENT_BUFFER) - return; - - yy_delete_buffer(YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = NULL; - if ((yy_buffer_stack_top) > 0) - --(yy_buffer_stack_top); - - if (YY_CURRENT_BUFFER) { - yy_load_buffer_state( ); - (yy_did_buffer_switch_on_eof) = 1; - } -} - -/* Allocates the stack if it does not exist. - * Guarantees space for at least one push. - */ -static void yyensure_buffer_stack (void) -{ - int num_to_alloc; - - if (!(yy_buffer_stack)) { - - /* First allocation is just for 2 elements, since we don't know if this - * scanner will even need a stack. We use 2 instead of 1 to avoid an - * immediate realloc on the next call. - */ - num_to_alloc = 1; - (yy_buffer_stack) = (struct yy_buffer_state**)yyalloc - (num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*) - ); - - memset((yy_buffer_stack), 0, num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)); - - (yy_buffer_stack_max) = num_to_alloc; - (yy_buffer_stack_top) = 0; - return; - } - - if ((yy_buffer_stack_top) >= ((yy_buffer_stack_max)) - 1){ - - /* Increase the buffer to prepare for a possible push. */ - int grow_size = 8 /* arbitrary grow size */; - - num_to_alloc = (yy_buffer_stack_max) + grow_size; - (yy_buffer_stack) = (struct yy_buffer_state**)yyrealloc - ((yy_buffer_stack), - num_to_alloc * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*) - ); - - /* zero only the new slots.*/ - memset((yy_buffer_stack) + (yy_buffer_stack_max), 0, grow_size * sizeof(struct yy_buffer_state*)); - (yy_buffer_stack_max) = num_to_alloc; - } -} - -/** Setup the input buffer state to scan directly from a user-specified character buffer. - * @param base the character buffer - * @param size the size in bytes of the character buffer - * - * @return the newly allocated buffer state object. - */ -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_scan_buffer (char * base, yy_size_t size ) -{ - YY_BUFFER_STATE b; - - if ( size < 2 || - base[size-2] != YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR || - base[size-1] != YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR ) - /* They forgot to leave room for the EOB's. */ - return 0; - - b = (YY_BUFFER_STATE) yyalloc(sizeof( struct yy_buffer_state ) ); - if ( ! b ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in yy_scan_buffer()" ); - - b->yy_buf_size = size - 2; /* "- 2" to take care of EOB's */ - b->yy_buf_pos = b->yy_ch_buf = base; - b->yy_is_our_buffer = 0; - b->yy_input_file = 0; - b->yy_n_chars = b->yy_buf_size; - b->yy_is_interactive = 0; - b->yy_at_bol = 1; - b->yy_fill_buffer = 0; - b->yy_buffer_status = YY_BUFFER_NEW; - - yy_switch_to_buffer(b ); - - return b; -} - -/** Setup the input buffer state to scan a string. The next call to yylex() will - * scan from a @e copy of @a str. - * @param str a NUL-terminated string to scan - * - * @return the newly allocated buffer state object. - * @note If you want to scan bytes that may contain NUL values, then use - * yy_scan_bytes() instead. - */ -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_scan_string (yyconst char * __yystr ) -{ - - return yy_scan_bytes(__yystr,strlen(__yystr) ); -} - -/** Setup the input buffer state to scan the given bytes. The next call to yylex() will - * scan from a @e copy of @a bytes. - * @param bytes the byte buffer to scan - * @param len the number of bytes in the buffer pointed to by @a bytes. - * - * @return the newly allocated buffer state object. - */ -YY_BUFFER_STATE yy_scan_bytes (yyconst char * yybytes, int _yybytes_len ) -{ - YY_BUFFER_STATE b; - char *buf; - yy_size_t n; - int i; - - /* Get memory for full buffer, including space for trailing EOB's. */ - n = _yybytes_len + 2; - buf = (char *) yyalloc(n ); - if ( ! buf ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "out of dynamic memory in yy_scan_bytes()" ); - - for ( i = 0; i < _yybytes_len; ++i ) - buf[i] = yybytes[i]; - - buf[_yybytes_len] = buf[_yybytes_len+1] = YY_END_OF_BUFFER_CHAR; - - b = yy_scan_buffer(buf,n ); - if ( ! b ) - YY_FATAL_ERROR( "bad buffer in yy_scan_bytes()" ); - - /* It's okay to grow etc. this buffer, and we should throw it - * away when we're done. - */ - b->yy_is_our_buffer = 1; - - return b; -} - -#ifndef YY_EXIT_FAILURE -#define YY_EXIT_FAILURE 2 -#endif - -static void yy_fatal_error (yyconst char* msg ) -{ - (void) fprintf( stderr, "%s\n", msg ); - exit( YY_EXIT_FAILURE ); -} - -/* Redefine yyless() so it works in section 3 code. */ - -#undef yyless -#define yyless(n) \ - do \ - { \ - /* Undo effects of setting up yytext. */ \ - int yyless_macro_arg = (n); \ - YY_LESS_LINENO(yyless_macro_arg);\ - yytext[yyleng] = (yy_hold_char); \ - (yy_c_buf_p) = yytext + yyless_macro_arg; \ - (yy_hold_char) = *(yy_c_buf_p); \ - *(yy_c_buf_p) = '\0'; \ - yyleng = yyless_macro_arg; \ - } \ - while ( 0 ) - -/* Accessor methods (get/set functions) to struct members. */ - -/** Get the current line number. - * - */ -int yyget_lineno (void) -{ - - return yylineno; -} - -/** Get the input stream. - * - */ -FILE *yyget_in (void) -{ - return yyin; -} - -/** Get the output stream. - * - */ -FILE *yyget_out (void) -{ - return yyout; -} - -/** Get the length of the current token. - * - */ -int yyget_leng (void) -{ - return yyleng; -} - -/** Get the current token. - * - */ - -char *yyget_text (void) -{ - return yytext; -} - -/** Set the current line number. - * @param line_number - * - */ -void yyset_lineno (int line_number ) -{ - - yylineno = line_number; -} - -/** Set the input stream. This does not discard the current - * input buffer. - * @param in_str A readable stream. - * - * @see yy_switch_to_buffer - */ -void yyset_in (FILE * in_str ) -{ - yyin = in_str ; -} - -void yyset_out (FILE * out_str ) -{ - yyout = out_str ; -} - -int yyget_debug (void) -{ - return yy_flex_debug; -} - -void yyset_debug (int bdebug ) -{ - yy_flex_debug = bdebug ; -} - -static int yy_init_globals (void) -{ - /* Initialization is the same as for the non-reentrant scanner. - * This function is called from yylex_destroy(), so don't allocate here. - */ - - (yy_buffer_stack) = 0; - (yy_buffer_stack_top) = 0; - (yy_buffer_stack_max) = 0; - (yy_c_buf_p) = (char *) 0; - (yy_init) = 0; - (yy_start) = 0; - -/* Defined in main.c */ -#ifdef YY_STDINIT - yyin = stdin; - yyout = stdout; -#else - yyin = (FILE *) 0; - yyout = (FILE *) 0; -#endif - - /* For future reference: Set errno on error, since we are called by - * yylex_init() - */ - return 0; -} - -/* yylex_destroy is for both reentrant and non-reentrant scanners. */ -int yylex_destroy (void) -{ - - /* Pop the buffer stack, destroying each element. */ - while(YY_CURRENT_BUFFER){ - yy_delete_buffer(YY_CURRENT_BUFFER ); - YY_CURRENT_BUFFER_LVALUE = NULL; - yypop_buffer_state(); - } - - /* Destroy the stack itself. */ - yyfree((yy_buffer_stack) ); - (yy_buffer_stack) = NULL; - - /* Reset the globals. This is important in a non-reentrant scanner so the next time - * yylex() is called, initialization will occur. */ - yy_init_globals( ); - - return 0; -} - -/* - * Internal utility routines. - */ - -#ifndef yytext_ptr -static void yy_flex_strncpy (char* s1, yyconst char * s2, int n ) -{ - register int i; - for ( i = 0; i < n; ++i ) - s1[i] = s2[i]; -} -#endif - -#ifdef YY_NEED_STRLEN -static int yy_flex_strlen (yyconst char * s ) -{ - register int n; - for ( n = 0; s[n]; ++n ) - ; - - return n; -} -#endif - -void *yyalloc (yy_size_t size ) -{ - return (void *) malloc( size ); -} - -void *yyrealloc (void * ptr, yy_size_t size ) -{ - /* The cast to (char *) in the following accommodates both - * implementations that use char* generic pointers, and those - * that use void* generic pointers. It works with the latter - * because both ANSI C and C++ allow castless assignment from - * any pointer type to void*, and deal with argument conversions - * as though doing an assignment. - */ - return (void *) realloc( (char *) ptr, size ); -} - -void yyfree (void * ptr ) -{ - free( (char *) ptr ); /* see yyrealloc() for (char *) cast */ -} - -#define YYTABLES_NAME "yytables" - -#line 184 "parser.l" - - - -int yywrap(void) -{ - return 1; -} - - diff --git a/programs/starter/parser.tab.c b/programs/starter/parser.tab.c deleted file mode 100644 index bc21a2fd3..000000000 --- a/programs/starter/parser.tab.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1666 +0,0 @@ -/* A Bison parser, made by GNU Bison 2.1. */ - -/* Skeleton parser for Yacc-like parsing with Bison, - Copyright (C) 1984, 1989, 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - - This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) - any later version. - - This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - GNU General Public License for more details. - - You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, - Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA. */ - -/* As a special exception, when this file is copied by Bison into a - Bison output file, you may use that output file without restriction. - This special exception was added by the Free Software Foundation - in version 1.24 of Bison. */ - -/* Written by Richard Stallman by simplifying the original so called - ``semantic'' parser. */ - -/* All symbols defined below should begin with yy or YY, to avoid - infringing on user name space. This should be done even for local - variables, as they might otherwise be expanded by user macros. - There are some unavoidable exceptions within include files to - define necessary library symbols; they are noted "INFRINGES ON - USER NAME SPACE" below. */ - -/* Identify Bison output. */ -#define YYBISON 1 - -/* Bison version. */ -#define YYBISON_VERSION "2.1" - -/* Skeleton name. */ -#define YYSKELETON_NAME "yacc.c" - -/* Pure parsers. */ -#define YYPURE 0 - -/* Using locations. */ -#define YYLSP_NEEDED 0 - - - -/* Tokens. */ -#ifndef YYTOKENTYPE -# define YYTOKENTYPE - /* Put the tokens into the symbol table, so that GDB and other debuggers - know about them. */ - enum yytokentype { - EQUAL = 258, - FIRST_SPACES = 259, - EOL = 260, - CONFIG = 261, - SETUP = 262, - CONN = 263, - CA = 264, - INCLUDE = 265, - VERSION = 266, - STRING = 267 - }; -#endif -/* Tokens. */ -#define EQUAL 258 -#define FIRST_SPACES 259 -#define EOL 260 -#define CONFIG 261 -#define SETUP 262 -#define CONN 263 -#define CA 264 -#define INCLUDE 265 -#define VERSION 266 -#define STRING 267 - - - - -/* Copy the first part of user declarations. */ -#line 1 "parser.y" - -/* strongSwan config file parser (parser.y) - * Copyright (C) 2001 Mathieu Lafon - Arkoon Network Security - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it - * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the - * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your - * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but - * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY - * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License - * for more details. - * - * RCSID $Id: parser.tab.c,v 1.5 2006/03/28 22:32:49 as Exp $ - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include <freeswan.h> - -#include "../pluto/constants.h" -#include "../pluto/defs.h" -#include "../pluto/log.h" -#include "parser.h" - -#define YYERROR_VERBOSE -#define ERRSTRING_LEN 256 - -/** - * Bison - */ -static char parser_errstring[ERRSTRING_LEN+1]; - -extern void yyerror(const char *s); -extern int yylex (void); -extern void _parser_y_error(char *b, int size, const char *s); - -/** - * Static Globals - */ -static int _save_errors_; -static config_parsed_t *_parser_cfg; -static kw_list_t **_parser_kw, *_parser_kw_last; -static char errbuf[ERRSTRING_LEN+1]; - -/** - * Gperf - */ -extern kw_entry_t *in_word_set (char *str, unsigned int len); - - - -/* Enabling traces. */ -#ifndef YYDEBUG -# define YYDEBUG 0 -#endif - -/* Enabling verbose error messages. */ -#ifdef YYERROR_VERBOSE -# undef YYERROR_VERBOSE -# define YYERROR_VERBOSE 1 -#else -# define YYERROR_VERBOSE 0 -#endif - -/* Enabling the token table. */ -#ifndef YYTOKEN_TABLE -# define YYTOKEN_TABLE 0 -#endif - -#if ! defined (YYSTYPE) && ! defined (YYSTYPE_IS_DECLARED) -#line 56 "parser.y" -typedef union YYSTYPE { char *s; } YYSTYPE; -/* Line 196 of yacc.c. */ -#line 166 "parser.tab.c" -# define yystype YYSTYPE /* obsolescent; will be withdrawn */ -# define YYSTYPE_IS_DECLARED 1 -# define YYSTYPE_IS_TRIVIAL 1 -#endif - - - -/* Copy the second part of user declarations. */ - - -/* Line 219 of yacc.c. */ -#line 178 "parser.tab.c" - -#if ! defined (YYSIZE_T) && defined (__SIZE_TYPE__) -# define YYSIZE_T __SIZE_TYPE__ -#endif -#if ! defined (YYSIZE_T) && defined (size_t) -# define YYSIZE_T size_t -#endif -#if ! defined (YYSIZE_T) && (defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus)) -# include <stddef.h> /* INFRINGES ON USER NAME SPACE */ -# define YYSIZE_T size_t -#endif -#if ! defined (YYSIZE_T) -# define YYSIZE_T unsigned int -#endif - -#ifndef YY_ -# if YYENABLE_NLS -# if ENABLE_NLS -# include <libintl.h> /* INFRINGES ON USER NAME SPACE */ -# define YY_(msgid) dgettext ("bison-runtime", msgid) -# endif -# endif -# ifndef YY_ -# define YY_(msgid) msgid -# endif -#endif - -#if ! defined (yyoverflow) || YYERROR_VERBOSE - -/* The parser invokes alloca or malloc; define the necessary symbols. */ - -# ifdef YYSTACK_USE_ALLOCA -# if YYSTACK_USE_ALLOCA -# ifdef __GNUC__ -# define YYSTACK_ALLOC __builtin_alloca -# else -# define YYSTACK_ALLOC alloca -# if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -# include <stdlib.h> /* INFRINGES ON USER NAME SPACE */ -# define YYINCLUDED_STDLIB_H -# endif -# endif -# endif -# endif - -# ifdef YYSTACK_ALLOC - /* Pacify GCC's `empty if-body' warning. */ -# define YYSTACK_FREE(Ptr) do { /* empty */; } while (0) -# ifndef YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM - /* The OS might guarantee only one guard page at the bottom of the stack, - and a page size can be as small as 4096 bytes. So we cannot safely - invoke alloca (N) if N exceeds 4096. Use a slightly smaller number - to allow for a few compiler-allocated temporary stack slots. */ -# define YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM 4032 /* reasonable circa 2005 */ -# endif -# else -# define YYSTACK_ALLOC YYMALLOC -# define YYSTACK_FREE YYFREE -# ifndef YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM -# define YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM ((YYSIZE_T) -1) -# endif -# ifdef __cplusplus -extern "C" { -# endif -# ifndef YYMALLOC -# define YYMALLOC malloc -# if (! defined (malloc) && ! defined (YYINCLUDED_STDLIB_H) \ - && (defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus))) -void *malloc (YYSIZE_T); /* INFRINGES ON USER NAME SPACE */ -# endif -# endif -# ifndef YYFREE -# define YYFREE free -# if (! defined (free) && ! defined (YYINCLUDED_STDLIB_H) \ - && (defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus))) -void free (void *); /* INFRINGES ON USER NAME SPACE */ -# endif -# endif -# ifdef __cplusplus -} -# endif -# endif -#endif /* ! defined (yyoverflow) || YYERROR_VERBOSE */ - - -#if (! defined (yyoverflow) \ - && (! defined (__cplusplus) \ - || (defined (YYSTYPE_IS_TRIVIAL) && YYSTYPE_IS_TRIVIAL))) - -/* A type that is properly aligned for any stack member. */ -union yyalloc -{ - short int yyss; - YYSTYPE yyvs; - }; - -/* The size of the maximum gap between one aligned stack and the next. */ -# define YYSTACK_GAP_MAXIMUM (sizeof (union yyalloc) - 1) - -/* The size of an array large to enough to hold all stacks, each with - N elements. */ -# define YYSTACK_BYTES(N) \ - ((N) * (sizeof (short int) + sizeof (YYSTYPE)) \ - + YYSTACK_GAP_MAXIMUM) - -/* Copy COUNT objects from FROM to TO. The source and destination do - not overlap. */ -# ifndef YYCOPY -# if defined (__GNUC__) && 1 < __GNUC__ -# define YYCOPY(To, From, Count) \ - __builtin_memcpy (To, From, (Count) * sizeof (*(From))) -# else -# define YYCOPY(To, From, Count) \ - do \ - { \ - YYSIZE_T yyi; \ - for (yyi = 0; yyi < (Count); yyi++) \ - (To)[yyi] = (From)[yyi]; \ - } \ - while (0) -# endif -# endif - -/* Relocate STACK from its old location to the new one. The - local variables YYSIZE and YYSTACKSIZE give the old and new number of - elements in the stack, and YYPTR gives the new location of the - stack. Advance YYPTR to a properly aligned location for the next - stack. */ -# define YYSTACK_RELOCATE(Stack) \ - do \ - { \ - YYSIZE_T yynewbytes; \ - YYCOPY (&yyptr->Stack, Stack, yysize); \ - Stack = &yyptr->Stack; \ - yynewbytes = yystacksize * sizeof (*Stack) + YYSTACK_GAP_MAXIMUM; \ - yyptr += yynewbytes / sizeof (*yyptr); \ - } \ - while (0) - -#endif - -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) - typedef signed char yysigned_char; -#else - typedef short int yysigned_char; -#endif - -/* YYFINAL -- State number of the termination state. */ -#define YYFINAL 2 -/* YYLAST -- Last index in YYTABLE. */ -#define YYLAST 27 - -/* YYNTOKENS -- Number of terminals. */ -#define YYNTOKENS 13 -/* YYNNTS -- Number of nonterminals. */ -#define YYNNTS 9 -/* YYNRULES -- Number of rules. */ -#define YYNRULES 18 -/* YYNRULES -- Number of states. */ -#define YYNSTATES 34 - -/* YYTRANSLATE(YYLEX) -- Bison symbol number corresponding to YYLEX. */ -#define YYUNDEFTOK 2 -#define YYMAXUTOK 267 - -#define YYTRANSLATE(YYX) \ - ((unsigned int) (YYX) <= YYMAXUTOK ? yytranslate[YYX] : YYUNDEFTOK) - -/* YYTRANSLATE[YYLEX] -- Bison symbol number corresponding to YYLEX. */ -static const unsigned char yytranslate[] = -{ - 0, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, - 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 1, 2, 3, 4, - 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 -}; - -#if YYDEBUG -/* YYPRHS[YYN] -- Index of the first RHS symbol of rule number YYN in - YYRHS. */ -static const unsigned char yyprhs[] = -{ - 0, 0, 3, 6, 7, 11, 12, 18, 19, 25, - 26, 32, 33, 38, 40, 45, 46, 50, 53 -}; - -/* YYRHS -- A `-1'-separated list of the rules' RHS. */ -static const yysigned_char yyrhs[] = -{ - 14, 0, -1, 14, 15, -1, -1, 11, 12, 5, - -1, -1, 6, 7, 5, 16, 20, -1, -1, 8, - 12, 5, 17, 20, -1, -1, 9, 12, 5, 18, - 20, -1, -1, 10, 12, 19, 5, -1, 5, -1, - 4, 21, 5, 20, -1, -1, 12, 3, 12, -1, - 12, 3, -1, -1 -}; - -/* YYRLINE[YYN] -- source line where rule number YYN was defined. */ -static const unsigned char yyrline[] = -{ - 0, 67, 67, 68, 72, 77, 76, 82, 81, 99, - 98, 115, 114, 120, 124, 125, 129, 154, 158 -}; -#endif - -#if YYDEBUG || YYERROR_VERBOSE || YYTOKEN_TABLE -/* YYTNAME[SYMBOL-NUM] -- String name of the symbol SYMBOL-NUM. - First, the terminals, then, starting at YYNTOKENS, nonterminals. */ -static const char *const yytname[] = -{ - "$end", "error", "$undefined", "EQUAL", "FIRST_SPACES", "EOL", "CONFIG", - "SETUP", "CONN", "CA", "INCLUDE", "VERSION", "STRING", "$accept", - "config_file", "section_or_include", "@1", "@2", "@3", "@4", - "kw_section", "statement_kw", 0 -}; -#endif - -# ifdef YYPRINT -/* YYTOKNUM[YYLEX-NUM] -- Internal token number corresponding to - token YYLEX-NUM. */ -static const unsigned short int yytoknum[] = -{ - 0, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, - 265, 266, 267 -}; -# endif - -/* YYR1[YYN] -- Symbol number of symbol that rule YYN derives. */ -static const unsigned char yyr1[] = -{ - 0, 13, 14, 14, 15, 16, 15, 17, 15, 18, - 15, 19, 15, 15, 20, 20, 21, 21, 21 -}; - -/* YYR2[YYN] -- Number of symbols composing right hand side of rule YYN. */ -static const unsigned char yyr2[] = -{ - 0, 2, 2, 0, 3, 0, 5, 0, 5, 0, - 5, 0, 4, 1, 4, 0, 3, 2, 0 -}; - -/* YYDEFACT[STATE-NAME] -- Default rule to reduce with in state - STATE-NUM when YYTABLE doesn't specify something else to do. Zero - means the default is an error. */ -static const unsigned char yydefact[] = -{ - 3, 0, 1, 13, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, - 0, 0, 0, 11, 0, 5, 7, 9, 0, 4, - 15, 15, 15, 12, 18, 6, 8, 10, 0, 0, - 17, 15, 16, 14 -}; - -/* YYDEFGOTO[NTERM-NUM]. */ -static const yysigned_char yydefgoto[] = -{ - -1, 1, 9, 20, 21, 22, 18, 25, 29 -}; - -/* YYPACT[STATE-NUM] -- Index in YYTABLE of the portion describing - STATE-NUM. */ -#define YYPACT_NINF -20 -static const yysigned_char yypact[] = -{ - -20, 0, -20, -20, -6, -8, -5, 1, 2, -20, - 10, 11, 12, -20, 13, -20, -20, -20, 14, -20, - 16, 16, 16, -20, 9, -20, -20, -20, 19, 18, - 15, 16, -20, -20 -}; - -/* YYPGOTO[NTERM-NUM]. */ -static const yysigned_char yypgoto[] = -{ - -20, -20, -20, -20, -20, -20, -20, -19, -20 -}; - -/* YYTABLE[YYPACT[STATE-NUM]]. What to do in state STATE-NUM. If - positive, shift that token. If negative, reduce the rule which - number is the opposite. If zero, do what YYDEFACT says. - If YYTABLE_NINF, syntax error. */ -#define YYTABLE_NINF -1 -static const unsigned char yytable[] = -{ - 2, 10, 26, 27, 11, 3, 4, 12, 5, 6, - 7, 8, 33, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 23, - 24, 28, 30, 31, 0, 0, 0, 32 -}; - -static const yysigned_char yycheck[] = -{ - 0, 7, 21, 22, 12, 5, 6, 12, 8, 9, - 10, 11, 31, 12, 12, 5, 5, 5, 5, 5, - 4, 12, 3, 5, -1, -1, -1, 12 -}; - -/* YYSTOS[STATE-NUM] -- The (internal number of the) accessing - symbol of state STATE-NUM. */ -static const unsigned char yystos[] = -{ - 0, 14, 0, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, - 7, 12, 12, 12, 12, 5, 5, 5, 19, 5, - 16, 17, 18, 5, 4, 20, 20, 20, 12, 21, - 3, 5, 12, 20 -}; - -#define yyerrok (yyerrstatus = 0) -#define yyclearin (yychar = YYEMPTY) -#define YYEMPTY (-2) -#define YYEOF 0 - -#define YYACCEPT goto yyacceptlab -#define YYABORT goto yyabortlab -#define YYERROR goto yyerrorlab - - -/* Like YYERROR except do call yyerror. This remains here temporarily - to ease the transition to the new meaning of YYERROR, for GCC. - Once GCC version 2 has supplanted version 1, this can go. */ - -#define YYFAIL goto yyerrlab - -#define YYRECOVERING() (!!yyerrstatus) - -#define YYBACKUP(Token, Value) \ -do \ - if (yychar == YYEMPTY && yylen == 1) \ - { \ - yychar = (Token); \ - yylval = (Value); \ - yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar); \ - YYPOPSTACK; \ - goto yybackup; \ - } \ - else \ - { \ - yyerror (YY_("syntax error: cannot back up")); \ - YYERROR; \ - } \ -while (0) - - -#define YYTERROR 1 -#define YYERRCODE 256 - - -/* YYLLOC_DEFAULT -- Set CURRENT to span from RHS[1] to RHS[N]. - If N is 0, then set CURRENT to the empty location which ends - the previous symbol: RHS[0] (always defined). */ - -#define YYRHSLOC(Rhs, K) ((Rhs)[K]) -#ifndef YYLLOC_DEFAULT -# define YYLLOC_DEFAULT(Current, Rhs, N) \ - do \ - if (N) \ - { \ - (Current).first_line = YYRHSLOC (Rhs, 1).first_line; \ - (Current).first_column = YYRHSLOC (Rhs, 1).first_column; \ - (Current).last_line = YYRHSLOC (Rhs, N).last_line; \ - (Current).last_column = YYRHSLOC (Rhs, N).last_column; \ - } \ - else \ - { \ - (Current).first_line = (Current).last_line = \ - YYRHSLOC (Rhs, 0).last_line; \ - (Current).first_column = (Current).last_column = \ - YYRHSLOC (Rhs, 0).last_column; \ - } \ - while (0) -#endif - - -/* YY_LOCATION_PRINT -- Print the location on the stream. - This macro was not mandated originally: define only if we know - we won't break user code: when these are the locations we know. */ - -#ifndef YY_LOCATION_PRINT -# if YYLTYPE_IS_TRIVIAL -# define YY_LOCATION_PRINT(File, Loc) \ - fprintf (File, "%d.%d-%d.%d", \ - (Loc).first_line, (Loc).first_column, \ - (Loc).last_line, (Loc).last_column) -# else -# define YY_LOCATION_PRINT(File, Loc) ((void) 0) -# endif -#endif - - -/* YYLEX -- calling `yylex' with the right arguments. */ - -#ifdef YYLEX_PARAM -# define YYLEX yylex (YYLEX_PARAM) -#else -# define YYLEX yylex () -#endif - -/* Enable debugging if requested. */ -#if YYDEBUG - -# ifndef YYFPRINTF -# include <stdio.h> /* INFRINGES ON USER NAME SPACE */ -# define YYFPRINTF fprintf -# endif - -# define YYDPRINTF(Args) \ -do { \ - if (yydebug) \ - YYFPRINTF Args; \ -} while (0) - -# define YY_SYMBOL_PRINT(Title, Type, Value, Location) \ -do { \ - if (yydebug) \ - { \ - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "%s ", Title); \ - yysymprint (stderr, \ - Type, Value); \ - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "\n"); \ - } \ -} while (0) - -/*------------------------------------------------------------------. -| yy_stack_print -- Print the state stack from its BOTTOM up to its | -| TOP (included). | -`------------------------------------------------------------------*/ - -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -static void -yy_stack_print (short int *bottom, short int *top) -#else -static void -yy_stack_print (bottom, top) - short int *bottom; - short int *top; -#endif -{ - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "Stack now"); - for (/* Nothing. */; bottom <= top; ++bottom) - YYFPRINTF (stderr, " %d", *bottom); - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "\n"); -} - -# define YY_STACK_PRINT(Bottom, Top) \ -do { \ - if (yydebug) \ - yy_stack_print ((Bottom), (Top)); \ -} while (0) - - -/*------------------------------------------------. -| Report that the YYRULE is going to be reduced. | -`------------------------------------------------*/ - -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -static void -yy_reduce_print (int yyrule) -#else -static void -yy_reduce_print (yyrule) - int yyrule; -#endif -{ - int yyi; - unsigned long int yylno = yyrline[yyrule]; - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "Reducing stack by rule %d (line %lu), ", - yyrule - 1, yylno); - /* Print the symbols being reduced, and their result. */ - for (yyi = yyprhs[yyrule]; 0 <= yyrhs[yyi]; yyi++) - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "%s ", yytname[yyrhs[yyi]]); - YYFPRINTF (stderr, "-> %s\n", yytname[yyr1[yyrule]]); -} - -# define YY_REDUCE_PRINT(Rule) \ -do { \ - if (yydebug) \ - yy_reduce_print (Rule); \ -} while (0) - -/* Nonzero means print parse trace. It is left uninitialized so that - multiple parsers can coexist. */ -int yydebug; -#else /* !YYDEBUG */ -# define YYDPRINTF(Args) -# define YY_SYMBOL_PRINT(Title, Type, Value, Location) -# define YY_STACK_PRINT(Bottom, Top) -# define YY_REDUCE_PRINT(Rule) -#endif /* !YYDEBUG */ - - -/* YYINITDEPTH -- initial size of the parser's stacks. */ -#ifndef YYINITDEPTH -# define YYINITDEPTH 200 -#endif - -/* YYMAXDEPTH -- maximum size the stacks can grow to (effective only - if the built-in stack extension method is used). - - Do not make this value too large; the results are undefined if - YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM < YYSTACK_BYTES (YYMAXDEPTH) - evaluated with infinite-precision integer arithmetic. */ - -#ifndef YYMAXDEPTH -# define YYMAXDEPTH 10000 -#endif - - - -#if YYERROR_VERBOSE - -# ifndef yystrlen -# if defined (__GLIBC__) && defined (_STRING_H) -# define yystrlen strlen -# else -/* Return the length of YYSTR. */ -static YYSIZE_T -# if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -yystrlen (const char *yystr) -# else -yystrlen (yystr) - const char *yystr; -# endif -{ - const char *yys = yystr; - - while (*yys++ != '\0') - continue; - - return yys - yystr - 1; -} -# endif -# endif - -# ifndef yystpcpy -# if defined (__GLIBC__) && defined (_STRING_H) && defined (_GNU_SOURCE) -# define yystpcpy stpcpy -# else -/* Copy YYSRC to YYDEST, returning the address of the terminating '\0' in - YYDEST. */ -static char * -# if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -yystpcpy (char *yydest, const char *yysrc) -# else -yystpcpy (yydest, yysrc) - char *yydest; - const char *yysrc; -# endif -{ - char *yyd = yydest; - const char *yys = yysrc; - - while ((*yyd++ = *yys++) != '\0') - continue; - - return yyd - 1; -} -# endif -# endif - -# ifndef yytnamerr -/* Copy to YYRES the contents of YYSTR after stripping away unnecessary - quotes and backslashes, so that it's suitable for yyerror. The - heuristic is that double-quoting is unnecessary unless the string - contains an apostrophe, a comma, or backslash (other than - backslash-backslash). YYSTR is taken from yytname. If YYRES is - null, do not copy; instead, return the length of what the result - would have been. */ -static YYSIZE_T -yytnamerr (char *yyres, const char *yystr) -{ - if (*yystr == '"') - { - size_t yyn = 0; - char const *yyp = yystr; - - for (;;) - switch (*++yyp) - { - case '\'': - case ',': - goto do_not_strip_quotes; - - case '\\': - if (*++yyp != '\\') - goto do_not_strip_quotes; - /* Fall through. */ - default: - if (yyres) - yyres[yyn] = *yyp; - yyn++; - break; - - case '"': - if (yyres) - yyres[yyn] = '\0'; - return yyn; - } - do_not_strip_quotes: ; - } - - if (! yyres) - return yystrlen (yystr); - - return yystpcpy (yyres, yystr) - yyres; -} -# endif - -#endif /* YYERROR_VERBOSE */ - - - -#if YYDEBUG -/*--------------------------------. -| Print this symbol on YYOUTPUT. | -`--------------------------------*/ - -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -static void -yysymprint (FILE *yyoutput, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep) -#else -static void -yysymprint (yyoutput, yytype, yyvaluep) - FILE *yyoutput; - int yytype; - YYSTYPE *yyvaluep; -#endif -{ - /* Pacify ``unused variable'' warnings. */ - (void) yyvaluep; - - if (yytype < YYNTOKENS) - YYFPRINTF (yyoutput, "token %s (", yytname[yytype]); - else - YYFPRINTF (yyoutput, "nterm %s (", yytname[yytype]); - - -# ifdef YYPRINT - if (yytype < YYNTOKENS) - YYPRINT (yyoutput, yytoknum[yytype], *yyvaluep); -# endif - switch (yytype) - { - default: - break; - } - YYFPRINTF (yyoutput, ")"); -} - -#endif /* ! YYDEBUG */ -/*-----------------------------------------------. -| Release the memory associated to this symbol. | -`-----------------------------------------------*/ - -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -static void -yydestruct (const char *yymsg, int yytype, YYSTYPE *yyvaluep) -#else -static void -yydestruct (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep) - const char *yymsg; - int yytype; - YYSTYPE *yyvaluep; -#endif -{ - /* Pacify ``unused variable'' warnings. */ - (void) yyvaluep; - - if (!yymsg) - yymsg = "Deleting"; - YY_SYMBOL_PRINT (yymsg, yytype, yyvaluep, yylocationp); - - switch (yytype) - { - - default: - break; - } -} - - -/* Prevent warnings from -Wmissing-prototypes. */ - -#ifdef YYPARSE_PARAM -# if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -int yyparse (void *YYPARSE_PARAM); -# else -int yyparse (); -# endif -#else /* ! YYPARSE_PARAM */ -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -int yyparse (void); -#else -int yyparse (); -#endif -#endif /* ! YYPARSE_PARAM */ - - - -/* The look-ahead symbol. */ -int yychar; - -/* The semantic value of the look-ahead symbol. */ -YYSTYPE yylval; - -/* Number of syntax errors so far. */ -int yynerrs; - - - -/*----------. -| yyparse. | -`----------*/ - -#ifdef YYPARSE_PARAM -# if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -int yyparse (void *YYPARSE_PARAM) -# else -int yyparse (YYPARSE_PARAM) - void *YYPARSE_PARAM; -# endif -#else /* ! YYPARSE_PARAM */ -#if defined (__STDC__) || defined (__cplusplus) -int -yyparse (void) -#else -int -yyparse () - ; -#endif -#endif -{ - - int yystate; - int yyn; - int yyresult; - /* Number of tokens to shift before error messages enabled. */ - int yyerrstatus; - /* Look-ahead token as an internal (translated) token number. */ - int yytoken = 0; - - /* Three stacks and their tools: - `yyss': related to states, - `yyvs': related to semantic values, - `yyls': related to locations. - - Refer to the stacks thru separate pointers, to allow yyoverflow - to reallocate them elsewhere. */ - - /* The state stack. */ - short int yyssa[YYINITDEPTH]; - short int *yyss = yyssa; - short int *yyssp; - - /* The semantic value stack. */ - YYSTYPE yyvsa[YYINITDEPTH]; - YYSTYPE *yyvs = yyvsa; - YYSTYPE *yyvsp; - - - -#define YYPOPSTACK (yyvsp--, yyssp--) - - YYSIZE_T yystacksize = YYINITDEPTH; - - /* The variables used to return semantic value and location from the - action routines. */ - YYSTYPE yyval; - - - /* When reducing, the number of symbols on the RHS of the reduced - rule. */ - int yylen; - - YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Starting parse\n")); - - yystate = 0; - yyerrstatus = 0; - yynerrs = 0; - yychar = YYEMPTY; /* Cause a token to be read. */ - - /* Initialize stack pointers. - Waste one element of value and location stack - so that they stay on the same level as the state stack. - The wasted elements are never initialized. */ - - yyssp = yyss; - yyvsp = yyvs; - - goto yysetstate; - -/*------------------------------------------------------------. -| yynewstate -- Push a new state, which is found in yystate. | -`------------------------------------------------------------*/ - yynewstate: - /* In all cases, when you get here, the value and location stacks - have just been pushed. so pushing a state here evens the stacks. - */ - yyssp++; - - yysetstate: - *yyssp = yystate; - - if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp) - { - /* Get the current used size of the three stacks, in elements. */ - YYSIZE_T yysize = yyssp - yyss + 1; - -#ifdef yyoverflow - { - /* Give user a chance to reallocate the stack. Use copies of - these so that the &'s don't force the real ones into - memory. */ - YYSTYPE *yyvs1 = yyvs; - short int *yyss1 = yyss; - - - /* Each stack pointer address is followed by the size of the - data in use in that stack, in bytes. This used to be a - conditional around just the two extra args, but that might - be undefined if yyoverflow is a macro. */ - yyoverflow (YY_("memory exhausted"), - &yyss1, yysize * sizeof (*yyssp), - &yyvs1, yysize * sizeof (*yyvsp), - - &yystacksize); - - yyss = yyss1; - yyvs = yyvs1; - } -#else /* no yyoverflow */ -# ifndef YYSTACK_RELOCATE - goto yyexhaustedlab; -# else - /* Extend the stack our own way. */ - if (YYMAXDEPTH <= yystacksize) - goto yyexhaustedlab; - yystacksize *= 2; - if (YYMAXDEPTH < yystacksize) - yystacksize = YYMAXDEPTH; - - { - short int *yyss1 = yyss; - union yyalloc *yyptr = - (union yyalloc *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (YYSTACK_BYTES (yystacksize)); - if (! yyptr) - goto yyexhaustedlab; - YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyss); - YYSTACK_RELOCATE (yyvs); - -# undef YYSTACK_RELOCATE - if (yyss1 != yyssa) - YYSTACK_FREE (yyss1); - } -# endif -#endif /* no yyoverflow */ - - yyssp = yyss + yysize - 1; - yyvsp = yyvs + yysize - 1; - - - YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Stack size increased to %lu\n", - (unsigned long int) yystacksize)); - - if (yyss + yystacksize - 1 <= yyssp) - YYABORT; - } - - YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Entering state %d\n", yystate)); - - goto yybackup; - -/*-----------. -| yybackup. | -`-----------*/ -yybackup: - -/* Do appropriate processing given the current state. */ -/* Read a look-ahead token if we need one and don't already have one. */ -/* yyresume: */ - - /* First try to decide what to do without reference to look-ahead token. */ - - yyn = yypact[yystate]; - if (yyn == YYPACT_NINF) - goto yydefault; - - /* Not known => get a look-ahead token if don't already have one. */ - - /* YYCHAR is either YYEMPTY or YYEOF or a valid look-ahead symbol. */ - if (yychar == YYEMPTY) - { - YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Reading a token: ")); - yychar = YYLEX; - } - - if (yychar <= YYEOF) - { - yychar = yytoken = YYEOF; - YYDPRINTF ((stderr, "Now at end of input.\n")); - } - else - { - yytoken = YYTRANSLATE (yychar); - YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Next token is", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc); - } - - /* If the proper action on seeing token YYTOKEN is to reduce or to - detect an error, take that action. */ - yyn += yytoken; - if (yyn < 0 || YYLAST < yyn || yycheck[yyn] != yytoken) - goto yydefault; - yyn = yytable[yyn]; - if (yyn <= 0) - { - if (yyn == 0 || yyn == YYTABLE_NINF) - goto yyerrlab; - yyn = -yyn; - goto yyreduce; - } - - if (yyn == YYFINAL) - YYACCEPT; - - /* Shift the look-ahead token. */ - YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yytoken, &yylval, &yylloc); - - /* Discard the token being shifted unless it is eof. */ - if (yychar != YYEOF) - yychar = YYEMPTY; - - *++yyvsp = yylval; - - - /* Count tokens shifted since error; after three, turn off error - status. */ - if (yyerrstatus) - yyerrstatus--; - - yystate = yyn; - goto yynewstate; - - -/*-----------------------------------------------------------. -| yydefault -- do the default action for the current state. | -`-----------------------------------------------------------*/ -yydefault: - yyn = yydefact[yystate]; - if (yyn == 0) - goto yyerrlab; - goto yyreduce; - - -/*-----------------------------. -| yyreduce -- Do a reduction. | -`-----------------------------*/ -yyreduce: - /* yyn is the number of a rule to reduce with. */ - yylen = yyr2[yyn]; - - /* If YYLEN is nonzero, implement the default value of the action: - `$$ = $1'. - - Otherwise, the following line sets YYVAL to garbage. - This behavior is undocumented and Bison - users should not rely upon it. Assigning to YYVAL - unconditionally makes the parser a bit smaller, and it avoids a - GCC warning that YYVAL may be used uninitialized. */ - yyval = yyvsp[1-yylen]; - - - YY_REDUCE_PRINT (yyn); - switch (yyn) - { - case 4: -#line 73 "parser.y" - { - free((yyvsp[-1].s)); - ;} - break; - - case 5: -#line 77 "parser.y" - { - _parser_kw = &(_parser_cfg->config_setup); - _parser_kw_last = NULL; - ;} - break; - - case 7: -#line 82 "parser.y" - { - section_list_t *section = (section_list_t *)alloc_thing(section_list_t - , "section_list_t"); - - section->name = clone_str((yyvsp[-1].s), "conn section name"); - section->kw = NULL; - section->next = NULL; - _parser_kw = &(section->kw); - if (!_parser_cfg->conn_first) - _parser_cfg->conn_first = section; - if (_parser_cfg->conn_last) - _parser_cfg->conn_last->next = section; - _parser_cfg->conn_last = section; - _parser_kw_last = NULL; - free((yyvsp[-1].s)); - ;} - break; - - case 9: -#line 99 "parser.y" - { - section_list_t *section = (section_list_t *)alloc_thing(section_list_t - , "section_list_t"); - section->name = clone_str((yyvsp[-1].s), "ca section name"); - section->kw = NULL; - section->next = NULL; - _parser_kw = &(section->kw); - if (!_parser_cfg->ca_first) - _parser_cfg->ca_first = section; - if (_parser_cfg->ca_last) - _parser_cfg->ca_last->next = section; - _parser_cfg->ca_last = section; - _parser_kw_last = NULL; - free((yyvsp[-1].s)); - ;} - break; - - case 11: -#line 115 "parser.y" - { - extern void _parser_y_include (const char *f); - _parser_y_include((yyvsp[0].s)); - free((yyvsp[0].s)); - ;} - break; - - case 16: -#line 130 "parser.y" - { - kw_list_t *new; - kw_entry_t *entry = in_word_set((yyvsp[-2].s), strlen((yyvsp[-2].s))); - - if (entry == NULL) - { - snprintf(errbuf, ERRSTRING_LEN, "unknown keyword '%s'", (yyvsp[-2].s)); - yyerror(errbuf); - } - else if (_parser_kw) - { - new = (kw_list_t *)alloc_thing(kw_list_t, "kw_list_t"); - new->entry = entry; - new->value = clone_str((yyvsp[0].s), "kw_list value"); - new->next = NULL; - if (_parser_kw_last) - _parser_kw_last->next = new; - _parser_kw_last = new; - if (!*_parser_kw) - *_parser_kw = new; - } - free((yyvsp[-2].s)); - free((yyvsp[0].s)); - ;} - break; - - case 17: -#line 155 "parser.y" - { - free((yyvsp[-1].s)); - ;} - break; - - - default: break; - } - -/* Line 1126 of yacc.c. */ -#line 1275 "parser.tab.c" - - yyvsp -= yylen; - yyssp -= yylen; - - - YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp); - - *++yyvsp = yyval; - - - /* Now `shift' the result of the reduction. Determine what state - that goes to, based on the state we popped back to and the rule - number reduced by. */ - - yyn = yyr1[yyn]; - - yystate = yypgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS] + *yyssp; - if (0 <= yystate && yystate <= YYLAST && yycheck[yystate] == *yyssp) - yystate = yytable[yystate]; - else - yystate = yydefgoto[yyn - YYNTOKENS]; - - goto yynewstate; - - -/*------------------------------------. -| yyerrlab -- here on detecting error | -`------------------------------------*/ -yyerrlab: - /* If not already recovering from an error, report this error. */ - if (!yyerrstatus) - { - ++yynerrs; -#if YYERROR_VERBOSE - yyn = yypact[yystate]; - - if (YYPACT_NINF < yyn && yyn < YYLAST) - { - int yytype = YYTRANSLATE (yychar); - YYSIZE_T yysize0 = yytnamerr (0, yytname[yytype]); - YYSIZE_T yysize = yysize0; - YYSIZE_T yysize1; - int yysize_overflow = 0; - char *yymsg = 0; -# define YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM 5 - char const *yyarg[YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM]; - int yyx; - -#if 0 - /* This is so xgettext sees the translatable formats that are - constructed on the fly. */ - YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s"); - YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s"); - YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s"); - YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s or %s"); - YY_("syntax error, unexpected %s, expecting %s or %s or %s or %s"); -#endif - char *yyfmt; - char const *yyf; - static char const yyunexpected[] = "syntax error, unexpected %s"; - static char const yyexpecting[] = ", expecting %s"; - static char const yyor[] = " or %s"; - char yyformat[sizeof yyunexpected - + sizeof yyexpecting - 1 - + ((YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM - 2) - * (sizeof yyor - 1))]; - char const *yyprefix = yyexpecting; - - /* Start YYX at -YYN if negative to avoid negative indexes in - YYCHECK. */ - int yyxbegin = yyn < 0 ? -yyn : 0; - - /* Stay within bounds of both yycheck and yytname. */ - int yychecklim = YYLAST - yyn; - int yyxend = yychecklim < YYNTOKENS ? yychecklim : YYNTOKENS; - int yycount = 1; - - yyarg[0] = yytname[yytype]; - yyfmt = yystpcpy (yyformat, yyunexpected); - - for (yyx = yyxbegin; yyx < yyxend; ++yyx) - if (yycheck[yyx + yyn] == yyx && yyx != YYTERROR) - { - if (yycount == YYERROR_VERBOSE_ARGS_MAXIMUM) - { - yycount = 1; - yysize = yysize0; - yyformat[sizeof yyunexpected - 1] = '\0'; - break; - } - yyarg[yycount++] = yytname[yyx]; - yysize1 = yysize + yytnamerr (0, yytname[yyx]); - yysize_overflow |= yysize1 < yysize; - yysize = yysize1; - yyfmt = yystpcpy (yyfmt, yyprefix); - yyprefix = yyor; - } - - yyf = YY_(yyformat); - yysize1 = yysize + yystrlen (yyf); - yysize_overflow |= yysize1 < yysize; - yysize = yysize1; - - if (!yysize_overflow && yysize <= YYSTACK_ALLOC_MAXIMUM) - yymsg = (char *) YYSTACK_ALLOC (yysize); - if (yymsg) - { - /* Avoid sprintf, as that infringes on the user's name space. - Don't have undefined behavior even if the translation - produced a string with the wrong number of "%s"s. */ - char *yyp = yymsg; - int yyi = 0; - while ((*yyp = *yyf)) - { - if (*yyp == '%' && yyf[1] == 's' && yyi < yycount) - { - yyp += yytnamerr (yyp, yyarg[yyi++]); - yyf += 2; - } - else - { - yyp++; - yyf++; - } - } - yyerror (yymsg); - YYSTACK_FREE (yymsg); - } - else - { - yyerror (YY_("syntax error")); - goto yyexhaustedlab; - } - } - else -#endif /* YYERROR_VERBOSE */ - yyerror (YY_("syntax error")); - } - - - - if (yyerrstatus == 3) - { - /* If just tried and failed to reuse look-ahead token after an - error, discard it. */ - - if (yychar <= YYEOF) - { - /* Return failure if at end of input. */ - if (yychar == YYEOF) - YYABORT; - } - else - { - yydestruct ("Error: discarding", yytoken, &yylval); - yychar = YYEMPTY; - } - } - - /* Else will try to reuse look-ahead token after shifting the error - token. */ - goto yyerrlab1; - - -/*---------------------------------------------------. -| yyerrorlab -- error raised explicitly by YYERROR. | -`---------------------------------------------------*/ -yyerrorlab: - - /* Pacify compilers like GCC when the user code never invokes - YYERROR and the label yyerrorlab therefore never appears in user - code. */ - if (0) - goto yyerrorlab; - -yyvsp -= yylen; - yyssp -= yylen; - yystate = *yyssp; - goto yyerrlab1; - - -/*-------------------------------------------------------------. -| yyerrlab1 -- common code for both syntax error and YYERROR. | -`-------------------------------------------------------------*/ -yyerrlab1: - yyerrstatus = 3; /* Each real token shifted decrements this. */ - - for (;;) - { - yyn = yypact[yystate]; - if (yyn != YYPACT_NINF) - { - yyn += YYTERROR; - if (0 <= yyn && yyn <= YYLAST && yycheck[yyn] == YYTERROR) - { - yyn = yytable[yyn]; - if (0 < yyn) - break; - } - } - - /* Pop the current state because it cannot handle the error token. */ - if (yyssp == yyss) - YYABORT; - - - yydestruct ("Error: popping", yystos[yystate], yyvsp); - YYPOPSTACK; - yystate = *yyssp; - YY_STACK_PRINT (yyss, yyssp); - } - - if (yyn == YYFINAL) - YYACCEPT; - - *++yyvsp = yylval; - - - /* Shift the error token. */ - YY_SYMBOL_PRINT ("Shifting", yystos[yyn], yyvsp, yylsp); - - yystate = yyn; - goto yynewstate; - - -/*-------------------------------------. -| yyacceptlab -- YYACCEPT comes here. | -`-------------------------------------*/ -yyacceptlab: - yyresult = 0; - goto yyreturn; - -/*-----------------------------------. -| yyabortlab -- YYABORT comes here. | -`-----------------------------------*/ -yyabortlab: - yyresult = 1; - goto yyreturn; - -#ifndef yyoverflow -/*-------------------------------------------------. -| yyexhaustedlab -- memory exhaustion comes here. | -`-------------------------------------------------*/ -yyexhaustedlab: - yyerror (YY_("memory exhausted")); - yyresult = 2; - /* Fall through. */ -#endif - -yyreturn: - if (yychar != YYEOF && yychar != YYEMPTY) - yydestruct ("Cleanup: discarding lookahead", - yytoken, &yylval); - while (yyssp != yyss) - { - yydestruct ("Cleanup: popping", - yystos[*yyssp], yyvsp); - YYPOPSTACK; - } -#ifndef yyoverflow - if (yyss != yyssa) - YYSTACK_FREE (yyss); -#endif - return yyresult; -} - - -#line 161 "parser.y" - - -void -yyerror(const char *s) -{ - if (_save_errors_) - _parser_y_error(parser_errstring, ERRSTRING_LEN, s); -} - -config_parsed_t * -parser_load_conf(const char *file) -{ - config_parsed_t *cfg = NULL; - int err = 0; - FILE *f; - - extern void _parser_y_init (const char *f); - extern FILE *yyin; - - memset(parser_errstring, 0, ERRSTRING_LEN+1); - - cfg = (config_parsed_t *)alloc_thing(config_parsed_t, "config_parsed_t"); - if (cfg) - { - memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(config_parsed_t)); - f = fopen(file, "r"); - if (f) - { - yyin = f; - _parser_y_init(file); - _save_errors_ = 1; - _parser_cfg = cfg; - - if (yyparse() !=0 ) - { - if (parser_errstring[0] == '\0') - { - snprintf(parser_errstring, ERRSTRING_LEN, "Unknown error..."); - } - _save_errors_ = 0; - while (yyparse() != 0); - err++; - } - else if (parser_errstring[0] != '\0') - { - err++; - } - else - { - /** - * Config valid - */ - } - - fclose(f); - } - else - { - snprintf(parser_errstring, ERRSTRING_LEN, "can't load file '%s'", file); - err++; - } - } - else - { - snprintf(parser_errstring, ERRSTRING_LEN, "can't allocate memory"); - err++; - } - - if (err) - { - plog("%s", parser_errstring); - - if (cfg) - parser_free_conf(cfg); - cfg = NULL; - } - - return cfg; -} - -static void -parser_free_kwlist(kw_list_t *list) -{ - kw_list_t *elt; - - while (list) - { - elt = list; - list = list->next; - if (elt->value) - pfree(elt->value); - pfree(elt); - } -} - -void -parser_free_conf(config_parsed_t *cfg) -{ - section_list_t *sec; - if (cfg) - { - parser_free_kwlist(cfg->config_setup); - while (cfg->conn_first) - { - sec = cfg->conn_first; - cfg->conn_first = cfg->conn_first->next; - if (sec->name) - pfree(sec->name); - parser_free_kwlist(sec->kw); - pfree(sec); - } - while (cfg->ca_first) - { - sec = cfg->ca_first; - cfg->ca_first = cfg->ca_first->next; - if (sec->name) - pfree(sec->name); - parser_free_kwlist(sec->kw); - pfree(sec); - } - pfree(cfg); - } -} - diff --git a/programs/starter/parser.tab.h b/programs/starter/parser.tab.h deleted file mode 100644 index 1ded28fdb..000000000 --- a/programs/starter/parser.tab.h +++ /dev/null @@ -1,72 +0,0 @@ -/* A Bison parser, made by GNU Bison 2.1. */ - -/* Skeleton parser for Yacc-like parsing with Bison, - Copyright (C) 1984, 1989, 1990, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 Free Software Foundation, Inc. - - This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify - it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by - the Free Software Foundation; either version 2, or (at your option) - any later version. - - This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, - but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of - MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the - GNU General Public License for more details. - - You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License - along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software - Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, - Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA. */ - -/* As a special exception, when this file is copied by Bison into a - Bison output file, you may use that output file without restriction. - This special exception was added by the Free Software Foundation - in version 1.24 of Bison. */ - -/* Tokens. */ -#ifndef YYTOKENTYPE -# define YYTOKENTYPE - /* Put the tokens into the symbol table, so that GDB and other debuggers - know about them. */ - enum yytokentype { - EQUAL = 258, - FIRST_SPACES = 259, - EOL = 260, - CONFIG = 261, - SETUP = 262, - CONN = 263, - CA = 264, - INCLUDE = 265, - VERSION = 266, - STRING = 267 - }; -#endif -/* Tokens. */ -#define EQUAL 258 -#define FIRST_SPACES 259 -#define EOL 260 -#define CONFIG 261 -#define SETUP 262 -#define CONN 263 -#define CA 264 -#define INCLUDE 265 -#define VERSION 266 -#define STRING 267 - - - - -#if ! defined (YYSTYPE) && ! defined (YYSTYPE_IS_DECLARED) -#line 56 "parser.y" -typedef union YYSTYPE { char *s; } YYSTYPE; -/* Line 1447 of yacc.c. */ -#line 64 "parser.tab.h" -# define yystype YYSTYPE /* obsolescent; will be withdrawn */ -# define YYSTYPE_IS_DECLARED 1 -# define YYSTYPE_IS_TRIVIAL 1 -#endif - -extern YYSTYPE yylval; - - - |