diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'debian/patches/CVE-2015-4171_enforce_remote_auth.patch')
| -rw-r--r-- | debian/patches/CVE-2015-4171_enforce_remote_auth.patch | 101 |
1 files changed, 101 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/debian/patches/CVE-2015-4171_enforce_remote_auth.patch b/debian/patches/CVE-2015-4171_enforce_remote_auth.patch new file mode 100644 index 000000000..506a55f6f --- /dev/null +++ b/debian/patches/CVE-2015-4171_enforce_remote_auth.patch @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +From ca1a65cc6aef2e037b529574783b7c571d1d82a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Martin Willi <martin@strongswan.org> +Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2015 10:52:34 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] ikev2: Enforce remote authentication config before proceeding + with own authentication + +Previously the constraints in the authentication configuration of an +initiator were enforced only after all authentication rounds were +complete. This posed a problem if an initiator used EAP or PSK +authentication while the responder was authenticated with a certificate +and if a rogue server was able to authenticate itself with a valid +certificate issued by any CA the initiator trusted. + +Because any constraints for the responder's identity (rightid) or other +aspects of the authentication (e.g. rightca) the initiator had were not +enforced until the initiator itself finished its authentication such a rogue +responder was able to acquire usernames and password hashes from the client. +And if a client supported EAP-GTC it was even possible to trick it into +sending plaintext passwords. + +This patch enforces the configured constraints right after the responder's +authentication successfully finished for each round and before the initiator +starts with its own authentication. + +Fixes CVE-2015-4171. +--- + src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c +index bf747a49edde..2554496c1916 100644 +--- a/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c ++++ b/src/libcharon/sa/ikev2/tasks/ike_auth.c +@@ -112,6 +112,11 @@ struct private_ike_auth_t { + * received an INITIAL_CONTACT? + */ + bool initial_contact; ++ ++ /** ++ * Is EAP acceptable, did we strictly authenticate peer? ++ */ ++ bool eap_acceptable; + }; + + /** +@@ -879,6 +884,37 @@ static void send_auth_failed_informational(private_ike_auth_t *this, + message->destroy(message); + } + ++/** ++ * Check if strict constraint fullfillment required to continue current auth ++ */ ++static bool require_strict(private_ike_auth_t *this, bool mutual_eap) ++{ ++ auth_cfg_t *cfg; ++ ++ if (this->eap_acceptable) ++ { ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++ ++ cfg = this->ike_sa->get_auth_cfg(this->ike_sa, TRUE); ++ switch ((uintptr_t)cfg->get(cfg, AUTH_RULE_AUTH_CLASS)) ++ { ++ case AUTH_CLASS_EAP: ++ if (mutual_eap && this->my_auth) ++ { ++ this->eap_acceptable = TRUE; ++ return !this->my_auth->is_mutual(this->my_auth); ++ } ++ return TRUE; ++ case AUTH_CLASS_PSK: ++ return TRUE; ++ case AUTH_CLASS_PUBKEY: ++ case AUTH_CLASS_ANY: ++ default: ++ return FALSE; ++ } ++} ++ + METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t, + private_ike_auth_t *this, message_t *message) + { +@@ -1014,6 +1050,14 @@ METHOD(task_t, process_i, status_t, + } + } + ++ if (require_strict(this, mutual_eap)) ++ { ++ if (!update_cfg_candidates(this, TRUE)) ++ { ++ goto peer_auth_failed; ++ } ++ } ++ + if (this->my_auth) + { + switch (this->my_auth->process(this->my_auth, message)) +-- +1.9.1 + |