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diff --git a/linux/crypto/ciphers/des/des.doc b/linux/crypto/ciphers/des/des.doc deleted file mode 100644 index 1e3015812..000000000 --- a/linux/crypto/ciphers/des/des.doc +++ /dev/null @@ -1,505 +0,0 @@ -The DES library. - -Please note that this library was originally written to operate with -eBones, a version of Kerberos that had had encryption removed when it left -the USA and then put back in. As such there are some routines that I will -advise not using but they are still in the library for historical reasons. -For all calls that have an 'input' and 'output' variables, they can be the -same. - -This library requires the inclusion of 'des.h'. - -All of the encryption functions take what is called a des_key_schedule as an -argument. A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the des key. -A des_key is 8 bytes of odd parity, the type used to hold the key is a -des_cblock. A des_cblock is an array of 8 bytes, often in this library -description I will refer to input bytes when the function specifies -des_cblock's as input or output, this just means that the variable should -be a multiple of 8 bytes. - -The define DES_ENCRYPT is passed to specify encryption, DES_DECRYPT to -specify decryption. The functions and global variable are as follows: - -int des_check_key; - DES keys are supposed to be odd parity. If this variable is set to - a non-zero value, des_set_key() will check that the key has odd - parity and is not one of the known weak DES keys. By default this - variable is turned off; - -void des_set_odd_parity( -des_cblock *key ); - This function takes a DES key (8 bytes) and sets the parity to odd. - -int des_is_weak_key( -des_cblock *key ); - This function returns a non-zero value if the DES key passed is a - weak, DES key. If it is a weak key, don't use it, try a different - one. If you are using 'random' keys, the chances of hitting a weak - key are 1/2^52 so it is probably not worth checking for them. - -int des_set_key( -des_cblock *key, -des_key_schedule schedule); - Des_set_key converts an 8 byte DES key into a des_key_schedule. - A des_key_schedule is an expanded form of the key which is used to - perform actual encryption. It can be regenerated from the DES key - so it only needs to be kept when encryption or decryption is about - to occur. Don't save or pass around des_key_schedule's since they - are CPU architecture dependent, DES keys are not. If des_check_key - is non zero, zero is returned if the key has the wrong parity or - the key is a weak key, else 1 is returned. - -int des_key_sched( -des_cblock *key, -des_key_schedule schedule); - An alternative name for des_set_key(). - -int des_rw_mode; /* defaults to DES_PCBC_MODE */ - This flag holds either DES_CBC_MODE or DES_PCBC_MODE (default). - This specifies the function to use in the enc_read() and enc_write() - functions. - -void des_encrypt( -unsigned long *data, -des_key_schedule ks, -int enc); - This is the DES encryption function that gets called by just about - every other DES routine in the library. You should not use this - function except to implement 'modes' of DES. I say this because the - functions that call this routine do the conversion from 'char *' to - long, and this needs to be done to make sure 'non-aligned' memory - access do not occur. The characters are loaded 'little endian', - have a look at my source code for more details on how I use this - function. - Data is a pointer to 2 unsigned long's and ks is the - des_key_schedule to use. enc, is non zero specifies encryption, - zero if decryption. - -void des_encrypt2( -unsigned long *data, -des_key_schedule ks, -int enc); - This functions is the same as des_encrypt() except that the DES - initial permutation (IP) and final permutation (FP) have been left - out. As for des_encrypt(), you should not use this function. - It is used by the routines in my library that implement triple DES. - IP() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() des_encrypt2() FP() is the same - as des_encrypt() des_encrypt() des_encrypt() except faster :-). - -void des_ecb_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -des_key_schedule ks, -int enc); - This is the basic Electronic Code Book form of DES, the most basic - form. Input is encrypted into output using the key represented by - ks. If enc is non zero (DES_ENCRYPT), encryption occurs, otherwise - decryption occurs. Input is 8 bytes long and output is 8 bytes. - (the des_cblock structure is 8 chars). - -void des_ecb3_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -des_key_schedule ks1, -des_key_schedule ks2, -des_key_schedule ks3, -int enc); - This is the 3 key EDE mode of ECB DES. What this means is that - the 8 bytes of input is encrypted with ks1, decrypted with ks2 and - then encrypted again with ks3, before being put into output; - C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). There is a macro, des_ecb2_encrypt() - that only takes 2 des_key_schedules that implements, - C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))) in that the final encrypt is done with ks1. - -void des_cbc_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec, -int enc); - This routine implements DES in Cipher Block Chaining mode. - Input, which should be a multiple of 8 bytes is encrypted - (or decrypted) to output which will also be a multiple of 8 bytes. - The number of bytes is in length (and from what I've said above, - should be a multiple of 8). If length is not a multiple of 8, I'm - not being held responsible :-). ivec is the initialisation vector. - This function does not modify this variable. To correctly implement - cbc mode, you need to do one of 2 things; copy the last 8 bytes of - cipher text for use as the next ivec in your application, - or use des_ncbc_encrypt(). - Only this routine has this problem with updating the ivec, all - other routines that are implementing cbc mode update ivec. - -void des_ncbc_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule sk, -des_cblock *ivec, -int enc); - For historical reasons, des_cbc_encrypt() did not update the - ivec with the value requires so that subsequent calls to - des_cbc_encrypt() would 'chain'. This was needed so that the same - 'length' values would not need to be used when decrypting. - des_ncbc_encrypt() does the right thing. It is the same as - des_cbc_encrypt accept that ivec is updates with the correct value - to pass in subsequent calls to des_ncbc_encrypt(). I advise using - des_ncbc_encrypt() instead of des_cbc_encrypt(); - -void des_xcbc_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule sk, -des_cblock *ivec, -des_cblock *inw, -des_cblock *outw, -int enc); - This is RSA's DESX mode of DES. It uses inw and outw to - 'whiten' the encryption. inw and outw are secret (unlike the iv) - and are as such, part of the key. So the key is sort of 24 bytes. - This is much better than cbc des. - -void des_3cbc_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule sk1, -des_key_schedule sk2, -des_cblock *ivec1, -des_cblock *ivec2, -int enc); - This function is flawed, do not use it. I have left it in the - library because it is used in my des(1) program and will function - correctly when used by des(1). If I removed the function, people - could end up unable to decrypt files. - This routine implements outer triple cbc encryption using 2 ks and - 2 ivec's. Use des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() instead. - -void des_ede3_cbc_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks1, -des_key_schedule ks2, -des_key_schedule ks3, -des_cblock *ivec, -int enc); - This function implements inner triple CBC DES encryption with 3 - keys. What this means is that each 'DES' operation - inside the cbc mode is really an C=E(ks3,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). - Again, this is cbc mode so an ivec is requires. - This mode is used by SSL. - There is also a des_ede2_cbc_encrypt() that only uses 2 - des_key_schedule's, the first being reused for the final - encryption. C=E(ks1,D(ks2,E(ks1,M))). This form of triple DES - is used by the RSAref library. - -void des_pcbc_encrypt( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec, -int enc); - This is Propagating Cipher Block Chaining mode of DES. It is used - by Kerberos v4. It's parameters are the same as des_ncbc_encrypt(). - -void des_cfb_encrypt( -unsigned char *in, -unsigned char *out, -int numbits, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec, -int enc); - Cipher Feedback Back mode of DES. This implementation 'feeds back' - in numbit blocks. The input (and output) is in multiples of numbits - bits. numbits should to be a multiple of 8 bits. Length is the - number of bytes input. If numbits is not a multiple of 8 bits, - the extra bits in the bytes will be considered padding. So if - numbits is 12, for each 2 input bytes, the 4 high bits of the - second byte will be ignored. So to encode 72 bits when using - a numbits of 12 take 12 bytes. To encode 72 bits when using - numbits of 9 will take 16 bytes. To encode 80 bits when using - numbits of 16 will take 10 bytes. etc, etc. This padding will - apply to both input and output. - - -void des_cfb64_encrypt( -unsigned char *in, -unsigned char *out, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec, -int *num, -int enc); - This is one of the more useful functions in this DES library, it - implements CFB mode of DES with 64bit feedback. Why is this - useful you ask? Because this routine will allow you to encrypt an - arbitrary number of bytes, no 8 byte padding. Each call to this - routine will encrypt the input bytes to output and then update ivec - and num. num contains 'how far' we are though ivec. If this does - not make much sense, read more about cfb mode of DES :-). - -void des_ede3_cfb64_encrypt( -unsigned char *in, -unsigned char *out, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks1, -des_key_schedule ks2, -des_key_schedule ks3, -des_cblock *ivec, -int *num, -int enc); - Same as des_cfb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is - triple DES. As usual, there is a macro for - des_ede2_cfb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1. - -void des_ofb_encrypt( -unsigned char *in, -unsigned char *out, -int numbits, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec); - This is a implementation of Output Feed Back mode of DES. It is - the same as des_cfb_encrypt() in that numbits is the size of the - units dealt with during input and output (in bits). - -void des_ofb64_encrypt( -unsigned char *in, -unsigned char *out, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec, -int *num); - The same as des_cfb64_encrypt() except that it is Output Feed Back - mode. - -void des_ede3_ofb64_encrypt( -unsigned char *in, -unsigned char *out, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks1, -des_key_schedule ks2, -des_key_schedule ks3, -des_cblock *ivec, -int *num); - Same as des_ofb64_encrypt() accept that the DES operation is - triple DES. As usual, there is a macro for - des_ede2_ofb64_encrypt() which reuses ks1. - -int des_read_pw_string( -char *buf, -int length, -char *prompt, -int verify); - This routine is used to get a password from the terminal with echo - turned off. Buf is where the string will end up and length is the - size of buf. Prompt is a string presented to the 'user' and if - verify is set, the key is asked for twice and unless the 2 copies - match, an error is returned. A return code of -1 indicates a - system error, 1 failure due to use interaction, and 0 is success. - -unsigned long des_cbc_cksum( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *ivec); - This function produces an 8 byte checksum from input that it puts in - output and returns the last 4 bytes as a long. The checksum is - generated via cbc mode of DES in which only the last 8 byes are - kept. I would recommend not using this function but instead using - the EVP_Digest routines, or at least using MD5 or SHA. This - function is used by Kerberos v4 so that is why it stays in the - library. - -char *des_fcrypt( -const char *buf, -const char *salt -char *ret); - This is my fast version of the unix crypt(3) function. This version - takes only a small amount of space relative to other fast - crypt() implementations. This is different to the normal crypt - in that the third parameter is the buffer that the return value - is written into. It needs to be at least 14 bytes long. This - function is thread safe, unlike the normal crypt. - -char *crypt( -const char *buf, -const char *salt); - This function calls des_fcrypt() with a static array passed as the - third parameter. This emulates the normal non-thread safe semantics - of crypt(3). - -void des_string_to_key( -char *str, -des_cblock *key); - This function takes str and converts it into a DES key. I would - recommend using MD5 instead and use the first 8 bytes of output. - When I wrote the first version of these routines back in 1990, MD5 - did not exist but I feel these routines are still sound. This - routines is compatible with the one in MIT's libdes. - -void des_string_to_2keys( -char *str, -des_cblock *key1, -des_cblock *key2); - This function takes str and converts it into 2 DES keys. - I would recommend using MD5 and using the 16 bytes as the 2 keys. - I have nothing against these 2 'string_to_key' routines, it's just - that if you say that your encryption key is generated by using the - 16 bytes of an MD5 hash, every-one knows how you generated your - keys. - -int des_read_password( -des_cblock *key, -char *prompt, -int verify); - This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_key(). - -int des_read_2passwords( -des_cblock *key1, -des_cblock *key2, -char *prompt, -int verify); - This routine combines des_read_pw_string() with des_string_to_2key(). - -void des_random_seed( -des_cblock key); - This routine sets a starting point for des_random_key(). - -void des_random_key( -des_cblock ret); - This function return a random key. Make sure to 'seed' the random - number generator (with des_random_seed()) before using this function. - I personally now use a MD5 based random number system. - -int des_enc_read( -int fd, -char *buf, -int len, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *iv); - This function will write to a file descriptor the encrypted data - from buf. This data will be preceded by a 4 byte 'byte count' and - will be padded out to 8 bytes. The encryption is either CBC of - PCBC depending on the value of des_rw_mode. If it is DES_PCBC_MODE, - pcbc is used, if DES_CBC_MODE, cbc is used. The default is to use - DES_PCBC_MODE. - -int des_enc_write( -int fd, -char *buf, -int len, -des_key_schedule ks, -des_cblock *iv); - This routines read stuff written by des_enc_read() and decrypts it. - I have used these routines quite a lot but I don't believe they are - suitable for non-blocking io. If you are after a full - authentication/encryption over networks, have a look at SSL instead. - -unsigned long des_quad_cksum( -des_cblock *input, -des_cblock *output, -long length, -int out_count, -des_cblock *seed); - This is a function from Kerberos v4 that is not anything to do with - DES but was needed. It is a cksum that is quicker to generate than - des_cbc_cksum(); I personally would use MD5 routines now. -===== -Modes of DES -Quite a bit of the following information has been taken from - AS 2805.5.2 - Australian Standard - Electronic funds transfer - Requirements for interfaces, - Part 5.2: Modes of operation for an n-bit block cipher algorithm - Appendix A - -There are several different modes in which DES can be used, they are -as follows. - -Electronic Codebook Mode (ECB) (des_ecb_encrypt()) -- 64 bits are enciphered at a time. -- The order of the blocks can be rearranged without detection. -- The same plaintext block always produces the same ciphertext block - (for the same key) making it vulnerable to a 'dictionary attack'. -- An error will only affect one ciphertext block. - -Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC) (des_cbc_encrypt()) -- a multiple of 64 bits are enciphered at a time. -- The CBC mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same - plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. -- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext blocks dependent on the - current and all preceding plaintext blocks and therefore blocks can not - be rearranged. -- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext - enciphering to the same ciphertext. -- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext blocks. - -Cipher Feedback Mode (CFB) (des_cfb_encrypt()) -- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. -- The CFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same - plaintext is encrypted using the same key and starting variable. -- The chaining operation makes the ciphertext variables dependent on the - current and all preceding variables and therefore j-bit variables are - chained together and can not be rearranged. -- The use of different starting variables prevents the same plaintext - enciphering to the same ciphertext. -- The strength of the CFB mode depends on the size of k (maximal if - j == k). In my implementation this is always the case. -- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through - the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause - greater processing overheads. -- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. -- An error will affect the current and the following ciphertext variables. - -Output Feedback Mode (OFB) (des_ofb_encrypt()) -- a number of bits (j) <= 64 are enciphered at a time. -- The OFB mode produces the same ciphertext whenever the same - plaintext enciphered using the same key and starting variable. More - over, in the OFB mode the same key stream is produced when the same - key and start variable are used. Consequently, for security reasons - a specific start variable should be used only once for a given key. -- The absence of chaining makes the OFB more vulnerable to specific attacks. -- The use of different start variables values prevents the same - plaintext enciphering to the same ciphertext, by producing different - key streams. -- Selection of a small value for j will require more cycles through - the encipherment algorithm per unit of plaintext and thus cause - greater processing overheads. -- Only multiples of j bits can be enciphered. -- OFB mode of operation does not extend ciphertext errors in the - resultant plaintext output. Every bit error in the ciphertext causes - only one bit to be in error in the deciphered plaintext. -- OFB mode is not self-synchronising. If the two operation of - encipherment and decipherment get out of synchronism, the system needs - to be re-initialised. -- Each re-initialisation should use a value of the start variable - different from the start variable values used before with the same - key. The reason for this is that an identical bit stream would be - produced each time from the same parameters. This would be - susceptible to a ' known plaintext' attack. - -Triple ECB Mode (des_ecb3_encrypt()) -- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and encrypt with key3 again. -- As for ECB encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits. - There are theoretic attacks that can be used that make the effective - key length 112 bits, but this attack also requires 2^56 blocks of - memory, not very likely, even for the NSA. -- If both keys are the same it is equivalent to encrypting once with - just one key. -- If the first and last key are the same, the key length is 112 bits. - There are attacks that could reduce the key space to 55 bit's but it - requires 2^56 blocks of memory. -- If all 3 keys are the same, this is effectively the same as normal - ecb mode. - -Triple CBC Mode (des_ede3_cbc_encrypt()) -- Encrypt with key1, decrypt with key2 and then encrypt with key3. -- As for CBC encryption but increases the key length to 168 bits with - the same restrictions as for triple ecb mode. |