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Diffstat (limited to 'programs/pluto/ipsec_doi.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | programs/pluto/ipsec_doi.c | 5696 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 5696 deletions
diff --git a/programs/pluto/ipsec_doi.c b/programs/pluto/ipsec_doi.c deleted file mode 100644 index f4ec22301..000000000 --- a/programs/pluto/ipsec_doi.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,5696 +0,0 @@ -/* IPsec DOI and Oakley resolution routines - * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis. - * Copyright (C) 1998-2002 D. Hugh Redelmeier. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it - * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the - * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your - * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but - * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY - * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License - * for more details. - * - * RCSID $Id: ipsec_doi.c,v 1.43 2007/02/21 14:21:48 as Exp $ - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <stddef.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <unistd.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <resolv.h> -#include <arpa/nameser.h> /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */ -#include <sys/queue.h> -#include <sys/time.h> /* for gettimeofday */ - -#include <freeswan.h> -#include <freeswan/ipsec_policy.h> - -#include "constants.h" -#include "defs.h" -#include "mp_defs.h" -#include "state.h" -#include "id.h" -#include "x509.h" -#include "crl.h" -#include "ca.h" -#include "certs.h" -#include "smartcard.h" -#include "connections.h" -#include "keys.h" -#include "packet.h" -#include "demux.h" /* needs packet.h */ -#include "adns.h" /* needs <resolv.h> */ -#include "dnskey.h" /* needs keys.h and adns.h */ -#include "kernel.h" -#include "log.h" -#include "cookie.h" -#include "server.h" -#include "spdb.h" -#include "timer.h" -#include "rnd.h" -#include "ipsec_doi.h" /* needs demux.h and state.h */ -#include "whack.h" -#include "fetch.h" -#include "pkcs7.h" -#include "asn1.h" - -#include "sha1.h" -#include "md5.h" -#include "crypto.h" /* requires sha1.h and md5.h */ -#include "vendor.h" -#include "alg_info.h" -#include "ike_alg.h" -#include "kernel_alg.h" -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL -#include "nat_traversal.h" -#endif -#ifdef VIRTUAL_IP -#include "virtual.h" -#endif - -/* - * are we sending Pluto's Vendor ID? - */ -#ifdef VENDORID -#define SEND_PLUTO_VID 1 -#else /* !VENDORID */ -#define SEND_PLUTO_VID 0 -#endif /* !VENDORID */ - -/* - * are we sending a Cisco Unity VID? - */ -#ifdef CISCO_QUIRKS -#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID 1 -#else /* !CISCO_QUIRKS */ -#define SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID 0 -#endif /* !CISCO_QUIRKS */ - -/* MAGIC: perform f, a function that returns notification_t - * and return from the ENCLOSING stf_status returning function if it fails. - */ -#define RETURN_STF_FAILURE(f) \ - { int r = (f); if (r != NOTHING_WRONG) return STF_FAIL + r; } - -/* create output HDR as replica of input HDR */ -void -echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np) -{ - struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr; /* mostly same as incoming header */ - - r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT; /* we won't ever turn on this bit */ - if (enc) - r_hdr.isa_flags |= ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION; - /* some day, we may have to set r_hdr.isa_version */ - r_hdr.isa_np = np; - if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody)) - impossible(); /* surely must have room and be well-formed */ -} - -/* Compute DH shared secret from our local secret and the peer's public value. - * We make the leap that the length should be that of the group - * (see quoted passage at start of ACCEPT_KE). - */ -static void -compute_dh_shared(struct state *st, const chunk_t g -, const struct oakley_group_desc *group) -{ - MP_INT mp_g, mp_shared; - struct timeval tv0, tv1; - unsigned long tv_diff; - - gettimeofday(&tv0, NULL); - passert(st->st_sec_in_use); - n_to_mpz(&mp_g, g.ptr, g.len); - mpz_init(&mp_shared); - mpz_powm(&mp_shared, &mp_g, &st->st_sec, group->modulus); - mpz_clear(&mp_g); - freeanychunk(st->st_shared); /* happens in odd error cases */ - st->st_shared = mpz_to_n(&mp_shared, group->bytes); - mpz_clear(&mp_shared); - gettimeofday(&tv1, NULL); - tv_diff=(tv1.tv_sec - tv0.tv_sec) * 1000000 + (tv1.tv_usec - tv0.tv_usec); - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("compute_dh_shared(): time elapsed (%s): %ld usec" - , enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group) - , tv_diff); - ); - /* if took more than 200 msec ... */ - if (tv_diff > 200000) { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "WARNING: compute_dh_shared(): for %s took " - "%ld usec" - , enum_show(&oakley_group_names, st->st_oakley.group->group) - , tv_diff); - } - - DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH shared secret:\n", st->st_shared); -} - -/* if we haven't already done so, compute a local DH secret (st->st_sec) and - * the corresponding public value (g). This is emitted as a KE payload. - */ -static bool -build_and_ship_KE(struct state *st, chunk_t *g -, const struct oakley_group_desc *group, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np) -{ - if (!st->st_sec_in_use) - { - u_char tmp[LOCALSECRETSIZE]; - MP_INT mp_g; - - get_rnd_bytes(tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE); - st->st_sec_in_use = TRUE; - n_to_mpz(&st->st_sec, tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE); - - mpz_init(&mp_g); - mpz_powm(&mp_g, &groupgenerator, &st->st_sec, group->modulus); - freeanychunk(*g); /* happens in odd error cases */ - *g = mpz_to_n(&mp_g, group->bytes); - mpz_clear(&mp_g); - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_dump("Local DH secret:\n", tmp, LOCALSECRETSIZE); - DBG_dump_chunk("Public DH value sent:\n", *g)); - } - return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_keyex_desc, outs, *g, "keyex value"); -} - -/* accept_ke - * - * Check and accept DH public value (Gi or Gr) from peer's message. - * According to RFC2409 "The Internet key exchange (IKE)" 5: - * The Diffie-Hellman public value passed in a KE payload, in either - * a phase 1 or phase 2 exchange, MUST be the length of the negotiated - * Diffie-Hellman group enforced, if necessary, by pre-pending the - * value with zeros. - */ -static notification_t -accept_KE(chunk_t *dest, const char *val_name -, const struct oakley_group_desc *gr -, pb_stream *pbs) -{ - if (pbs_left(pbs) != gr->bytes) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "KE has %u byte DH public value; %u required" - , (unsigned) pbs_left(pbs), (unsigned) gr->bytes); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - clonereplacechunk(*dest, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs), val_name); - DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH public value received:\n", *dest); - return NOTHING_WRONG; -} - -/* accept_PFS_KE - * - * Check and accept optional Quick Mode KE payload for PFS. - * Extends ACCEPT_PFS to check whether KE is allowed or required. - */ -static notification_t -accept_PFS_KE(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest -, const char *val_name, const char *msg_name) -{ - struct state *st = md->st; - struct payload_digest *const ke_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]; - - if (ke_pd == NULL) - { - if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing KE payload in %s message", msg_name); - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - } - else - { - if (st->st_pfs_group == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message KE payload requires a GROUP_DESCRIPTION attribute in SA" - , msg_name); - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - if (ke_pd->next != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message contains several KE payloads; we accept at most one", msg_name); - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; /* ??? */ - } - return accept_KE(dest, val_name, st->st_pfs_group, &ke_pd->pbs); - } - return NOTHING_WRONG; -} - -static bool -build_and_ship_nonce(chunk_t *n, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np -, const char *name) -{ - freeanychunk(*n); - setchunk(*n, alloc_bytes(DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE, name), DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE); - get_rnd_bytes(n->ptr, DEFAULT_NONCE_SIZE); - return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_nonce_desc, outs, *n, name); -} - -static bool -collect_rw_ca_candidates(struct msg_digest *md, generalName_t **top) -{ - struct connection *d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr - , pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, LEMPTY); - - for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next) - { - /* must be a road warrior connection */ - if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO) - && d->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL) - { - generalName_t *gn; - bool new_entry = TRUE; - - for (gn = *top; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next) - { - if (same_dn(gn->name, d->spd.that.ca)) - { - new_entry = FALSE; - break; - } - } - if (new_entry) - { - gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName"); - gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME; - gn->name = d->spd.that.ca; - gn->next = *top; - *top = gn; - } - } - } - return *top != NULL; -} - -static bool -build_and_ship_CR(u_int8_t type, chunk_t ca, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np) -{ - pb_stream cr_pbs; - struct isakmp_cr cr_hd; - cr_hd.isacr_np = np; - cr_hd.isacr_type = type; - - /* build CR header */ - if (!out_struct(&cr_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc, outs, &cr_pbs)) - return FALSE; - - if (ca.ptr != NULL) - { - /* build CR body containing the distinguished name of the CA */ - if (!out_chunk(ca, &cr_pbs, "CA")) - return FALSE; - } - close_output_pbs(&cr_pbs); - return TRUE; -} - -/* Send a notification to the peer. We could decide - * whether to send the notification, based on the type and the - * destination, if we care to. - */ -static void -send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, struct state *encst, - msgid_t msgid, u_char *icookie, u_char *rcookie, - u_char *spi, size_t spisize, u_char protoid) -{ - u_char buffer[1024]; - pb_stream pbs, r_hdr_pbs; - u_char *r_hashval = NULL; /* where in reply to jam hash value */ - u_char *r_hash_start = NULL; /* start of what is to be hashed */ - - passert((sndst) && (sndst->st_connection)); - - plog("sending %snotification %s to %s:%u" - , encst ? "encrypted " : "" - , enum_name(¬ification_names, type) - , ip_str(&sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr) - , (unsigned)sndst->st_connection->spd.that.host_port); - - memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer)); - init_pbs(&pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "ISAKMP notify"); - - /* HDR* */ - { - struct isakmp_hdr hdr; - - hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION; - hdr.isa_np = encst ? ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH : ISAKMP_NEXT_N; - hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO; - hdr.isa_msgid = msgid; - hdr.isa_flags = encst ? ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION : 0; - if (icookie) - memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - if (rcookie) - memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &pbs, &r_hdr_pbs)) - impossible(); - } - - /* HASH -- value to be filled later */ - if (encst) - { - pb_stream hash_pbs; - if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_N, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, - &hash_pbs)) - impossible(); - r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur; /* remember where to plant value */ - if (!out_zero( - encst->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH")) - impossible(); - close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); - r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH */ - } - - /* Notification Payload */ - { - pb_stream not_pbs; - struct isakmp_notification isan; - - isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC; - isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - isan.isan_type = type; - isan.isan_spisize = spisize; - isan.isan_protoid = protoid; - - if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, ¬_pbs) - || !out_raw(spi, spisize, ¬_pbs, "spi")) - impossible(); - close_output_pbs(¬_pbs); - } - - /* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */ - if (encst) - { - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, encst->st_oakley.hasher, encst->st_skeyid_a); - hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t)); - hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start); - hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx); - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("HASH computed:"); - DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size); - ) - } - - /* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */ - if (encst) - { - u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - - u_int old_iv_len = encst->st_iv_len; - u_int new_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len; - - if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) - impossible(); - - memcpy(old_iv, encst->st_iv, old_iv_len); - memcpy(new_iv, encst->st_new_iv, new_iv_len); - - if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(encst->st_state)) - { - memcpy(encst->st_ph1_iv, encst->st_new_iv, encst->st_new_iv_len); - encst->st_ph1_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len; - } - init_phase2_iv(encst, &msgid); - if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, encst)) - impossible(); - - /* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */ - memcpy(encst->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len); - memcpy(encst->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len); - encst->st_iv_len = old_iv_len; - encst->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len; - } - else - { - close_output_pbs(&r_hdr_pbs); - } - - /* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */ - { - chunk_t saved_tpacket = sndst->st_tpacket; - - setchunk(sndst->st_tpacket, pbs.start, pbs_offset(&pbs)); - send_packet(sndst, "ISAKMP notify"); - sndst->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket; - } -} - -void -send_notification_from_state(struct state *st, enum state_kind state, - u_int16_t type) -{ - struct state *p1st; - - passert(st); - - if (state == STATE_UNDEFINED) - state = st->st_state; - - if (IS_QUICK(state)) { - p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES); - if ((p1st == NULL) || (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(p1st->st_state))) { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, - "no Phase1 state for Quick mode notification"); - return; - } - send_notification(st, type, p1st, generate_msgid(p1st), - st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP); - } - else if (IS_ISAKMP_ENCRYPTED(state)) { - send_notification(st, type, st, generate_msgid(st), - st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP); - } - else { - /* no ISAKMP SA established - don't encrypt notification */ - send_notification(st, type, NULL, 0, - st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP); - } -} - -void -send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type) -{ - /** - * Create a dummy state to be able to use send_packet in - * send_notification - * - * we need to set: - * st_connection->that.host_addr - * st_connection->that.host_port - * st_connection->interface - */ - struct state st; - struct connection cnx; - - passert(md); - - memset(&st, 0, sizeof(st)); - memset(&cnx, 0, sizeof(cnx)); - st.st_connection = &cnx; - cnx.spd.that.host_addr = md->sender; - cnx.spd.that.host_port = md->sender_port; - cnx.interface = md->iface; - - send_notification(&st, type, NULL, 0, - md->hdr.isa_icookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, NULL, 0, PROTO_ISAKMP); -} - -/* Send a Delete Notification to announce deletion of ISAKMP SA or - * inbound IPSEC SAs. Does nothing if no such SAs are being deleted. - * Delete Notifications cannot announce deletion of outbound IPSEC/ISAKMP SAs. - */ -void -send_delete(struct state *st) -{ - pb_stream reply_pbs; - pb_stream r_hdr_pbs; - msgid_t msgid; - u_char buffer[8192]; - struct state *p1st; - ip_said said[EM_MAXRELSPIS]; - ip_said *ns = said; - u_char - *r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */ - *r_hash_start; /* start of what is to be hashed */ - bool isakmp_sa = FALSE; - - if (IS_IPSEC_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - { - p1st = find_phase1_state(st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES); - if (p1st == NULL) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("no Phase 1 state for Delete")); - return; - } - - if (st->st_ah.present) - { - ns->spi = st->st_ah.our_spi; - ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr; - ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_AH; - ns++; - } - if (st->st_esp.present) - { - ns->spi = st->st_esp.our_spi; - ns->dst = st->st_connection->spd.this.host_addr; - ns->proto = PROTO_IPSEC_ESP; - ns++; - } - - passert(ns != said); /* there must be some SAs to delete */ - } - else if (IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - { - p1st = st; - isakmp_sa = TRUE; - } - else - { - return; /* nothing to do */ - } - - msgid = generate_msgid(p1st); - - zero(buffer); - init_pbs(&reply_pbs, buffer, sizeof(buffer), "delete msg"); - - /* HDR* */ - { - struct isakmp_hdr hdr; - - hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION; - hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH; - hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO; - hdr.isa_msgid = msgid; - hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION; - memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, p1st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, p1st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply_pbs, &r_hdr_pbs)) - impossible(); - } - - /* HASH -- value to be filled later */ - { - pb_stream hash_pbs; - - if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_D, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &hash_pbs)) - impossible(); - r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur; /* remember where to plant value */ - if (!out_zero(p1st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH(1)")) - impossible(); - close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); - r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH(1) */ - } - - /* Delete Payloads */ - if (isakmp_sa) - { - pb_stream del_pbs; - struct isakmp_delete isad; - u_char isakmp_spi[2*COOKIE_SIZE]; - - isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC; - isad.isad_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - isad.isad_spisize = (2 * COOKIE_SIZE); - isad.isad_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP; - isad.isad_nospi = 1; - - memcpy(isakmp_spi, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - memcpy(isakmp_spi+COOKIE_SIZE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - - if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs) - || !out_raw(&isakmp_spi, (2*COOKIE_SIZE), &del_pbs, "delete payload")) - impossible(); - close_output_pbs(&del_pbs); - } - else - { - while (ns != said) - { - - pb_stream del_pbs; - struct isakmp_delete isad; - - ns--; - isad.isad_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC; - isad.isad_np = ns == said? ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE : ISAKMP_NEXT_D; - isad.isad_spisize = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t); - isad.isad_protoid = ns->proto; - - isad.isad_nospi = 1; - if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs) - || !out_raw(&ns->spi, sizeof(ipsec_spi_t), &del_pbs, "delete payload")) - impossible(); - close_output_pbs(&del_pbs); - } - } - - /* calculate hash value and patch into Hash Payload */ - { - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, p1st->st_oakley.hasher, p1st->st_skeyid_a); - hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t)); - hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, r_hdr_pbs.cur-r_hash_start); - hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx); - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("HASH(1) computed:"); - DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size); - ) - } - - /* Do a dance to avoid needing a new state object. - * We use the Phase 1 State. This is the one with right - * IV, for one thing. - * The tricky bits are: - * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_iv (but not st_iv_new) - * - we need to preserve (save/restore) st_tpacket. - */ - { - u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - chunk_t saved_tpacket = p1st->st_tpacket; - - memcpy(old_iv, p1st->st_iv, p1st->st_iv_len); - init_phase2_iv(p1st, &msgid); - - if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, p1st)) - impossible(); - - setchunk(p1st->st_tpacket, reply_pbs.start, pbs_offset(&reply_pbs)); - send_packet(p1st, "delete notify"); - p1st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket; - - /* get back old IV for this state */ - memcpy(p1st->st_iv, old_iv, p1st->st_iv_len); - } -} - -void -accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, struct payload_digest *p) -{ - struct isakmp_delete *d = &(p->payload.delete); - size_t sizespi; - int i; - - if (!md->encrypted) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: not encrypted"); - return; - } - - if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - { - /* can't happen (if msg is encrypt), but just to be sure */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: " - "ISAKMP SA not established"); - return; - } - - if (d->isad_nospi == 0) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: no SPI"); - return; - } - - switch (d->isad_protoid) - { - case PROTO_ISAKMP: - sizespi = 2 * COOKIE_SIZE; - break; - case PROTO_IPSEC_AH: - case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP: - sizespi = sizeof(ipsec_spi_t); - break; - case PROTO_IPCOMP: - /* nothing interesting to delete */ - return; - default: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "ignoring Delete SA payload: unknown Protocol ID (%s)" - , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid)); - return; - } - - if (d->isad_spisize != sizespi) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "ignoring Delete SA payload: bad SPI size (%d) for %s" - , d->isad_spisize, enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid)); - return; - } - - if (pbs_left(&p->pbs) != d->isad_nospi * sizespi) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "ignoring Delete SA payload: invalid payload size"); - return; - } - - for (i = 0; i < d->isad_nospi; i++) - { - u_char *spi = p->pbs.cur + (i * sizespi); - - if (d->isad_protoid == PROTO_ISAKMP) - { - /** - * ISAKMP - */ - struct state *dst = find_state(spi /*iCookie*/ - , spi+COOKIE_SIZE /*rCookie*/ - , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr - , MAINMODE_MSGID); - - if (dst == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: " - "ISAKMP SA not found (maybe expired)"); - } - else if (!same_peer_ids(st->st_connection, dst->st_connection, NULL)) - { - /* we've not authenticated the relevant identities */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring Delete SA payload: " - "ISAKMP SA used to convey Delete has different IDs from ISAKMP SA it deletes"); - } - else - { - struct connection *oldc; - - oldc = cur_connection; - set_cur_connection(dst->st_connection); -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (nat_traversal_enabled) - nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst); -#endif - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: " - "deleting ISAKMP State #%lu", dst->st_serialno); - delete_state(dst); - set_cur_connection(oldc); - } - } - else - { - /** - * IPSEC (ESP/AH) - */ - bool bogus; - struct state *dst = find_phase2_state_to_delete(st - , d->isad_protoid - , *(ipsec_spi_t *)spi /* network order */ - , &bogus); - - if (dst == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "ignoring Delete SA payload: %s SA(0x%08lx) not found (%s)" - , enum_show(&protocol_names, d->isad_protoid) - , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi) - , bogus ? "our SPI - bogus implementation" : "maybe expired"); - } - else - { - struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection; - struct connection *oldc; - - oldc = cur_connection; - set_cur_connection(rc); - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (nat_traversal_enabled) - nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst); -#endif - if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno - && (rc->policy & POLICY_UP)) - { - /* Last IPSec SA for a permanent connection that we - * have initiated. Replace it in a few seconds. - * - * Useful if the other peer is rebooting. - */ -#define DELETE_SA_DELAY EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0 - if (dst->st_event != NULL - && dst->st_event->ev_type == EVENT_SA_REPLACE - && dst->st_event->ev_time <= DELETE_SA_DELAY + now()) - { - /* Patch from Angus Lees to ignore retransmited - * Delete SA. - */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: " - "already replacing IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds" - , dst->st_serialno, (int)(dst->st_event->ev_time - now())); - } - else - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: " - "replace IPSEC State #%lu in %d seconds" - , dst->st_serialno, DELETE_SA_DELAY); - dst->st_margin = DELETE_SA_DELAY; - delete_event(dst); - event_schedule(EVENT_SA_REPLACE, DELETE_SA_DELAY, dst); - } - } - else - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA(0x%08lx) payload: " - "deleting IPSEC State #%lu" - , (unsigned long)ntohl((unsigned long)*(ipsec_spi_t *)spi) - , dst->st_serialno); - delete_state(dst); - } - - /* reset connection */ - set_cur_connection(oldc); - } - } - } -} - -/* The whole message must be a multiple of 4 octets. - * I'm not sure where this is spelled out, but look at - * rfc2408 3.6 Transform Payload. - * Note: it talks about 4 BYTE boundaries! - */ -void -close_message(pb_stream *pbs) -{ - size_t padding = pad_up(pbs_offset(pbs), 4); - - if (padding != 0) - (void) out_zero(padding, pbs, "message padding"); - close_output_pbs(pbs); -} - -/* Initiate an Oakley Main Mode exchange. - * --> HDR;SA - * Note: this is not called from demux.c - */ -static stf_status -main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor - , lset_t policy, unsigned long try) -{ - struct state *st = new_state(); - pb_stream reply; /* not actually a reply, but you know what I mean */ - pb_stream rbody; - - int vids_to_send = 0; - - /* set up new state */ - st->st_connection = c; - set_cur_state(st); /* we must reset before exit */ - st->st_policy = policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK; - st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock; - st->st_try = try; - st->st_state = STATE_MAIN_I1; - - /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */ - if (SEND_PLUTO_VID) - vids_to_send++; - if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID) - vids_to_send++; - if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP) - vids_to_send++; - /* always send XAUTH Vendor ID */ - vids_to_send++; - /* always send DPD Vendor ID */ - vids_to_send++; -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (nat_traversal_enabled) - vids_to_send++; -#endif - - get_cookie(TRUE, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &c->spd.that.host_addr); - - insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */ - - if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy)) - add_pending(dup_any(whack_sock), st, c, policy, 1 - , predecessor == NULL? SOS_NOBODY : predecessor->st_serialno); - - if (predecessor == NULL) - plog("initiating Main Mode"); - else - plog("initiating Main Mode to replace #%lu", predecessor->st_serialno); - - /* set up reply */ - init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet"); - - /* HDR out */ - { - struct isakmp_hdr hdr; - - zero(&hdr); /* default to 0 */ - hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION; - hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA; - hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_IDPROT; - memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - /* R-cookie, flags and MessageID are left zero */ - - if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* SA out */ - { - u_char *sa_start = rbody.cur; - lset_t auth_policy = policy & POLICY_ID_AUTH_MASK; - - if (!out_sa(&rbody, &oakley_sadb, st, TRUE - , vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* save initiator SA for later HASH */ - passert(st->st_p1isa.ptr == NULL); /* no leak! (MUST be first time) */ - clonetochunk(st->st_p1isa, sa_start, rbody.cur - sa_start - , "sa in main_outI1"); - } - - /* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */ - if (SEND_PLUTO_VID) - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */ - if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID) - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - /* if we have an OpenPGP certificate we assume an - * OpenPGP peer and have to send the Vendor ID - */ - if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP) - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &rbody, VID_OPENPGP)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */ - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */ - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &rbody, VID_MISC_DPD)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (nat_traversal_enabled) - { - /* Add supported NAT-Traversal VID */ - if (!nat_traversal_add_vid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &rbody)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } -#endif - - close_message(&rbody); - close_output_pbs(&reply); - - clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply) - , "reply packet for main_outI1"); - - /* Transmit */ - - send_packet(st, "main_outI1"); - - /* Set up a retransmission event, half a minute henceforth */ - delete_event(st); - event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st); - - if (predecessor != NULL) - { - update_pending(predecessor, st); - whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1 - , "%s: initiate, replacing #%lu" - , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state) - , predecessor->st_serialno); - } - else - { - whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_MAIN_I1 - , "%s: initiate", enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)); - } - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_OK; -} - -void -ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock -, struct connection *c -, lset_t policy -, unsigned long try -, so_serial_t replacing) -{ - /* If there's already an ISAKMP SA established, use that and - * go directly to Quick Mode. We are even willing to use one - * that is still being negotiated, but only if we are the Initiator - * (thus we can be sure that the IDs are not going to change; - * other issues around intent might matter). - * Note: there is no way to initiate with a Road Warrior. - */ - struct state *st = find_phase1_state(c - , ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES | PHASE1_INITIATOR_STATES); - - if (st == NULL) - { - (void) main_outI1(whack_sock, c, NULL, policy, try); - } - else if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy)) - { - if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - { - /* leave our Phase 2 negotiation pending */ - add_pending(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing); - } - else - { - /* ??? we assume that peer_nexthop_sin isn't important: - * we already have it from when we negotiated the ISAKMP SA! - * It isn't clear what to do with the error return. - */ - (void) quick_outI1(whack_sock, st, c, policy, try, replacing); - } - } - else - { - close_any(whack_sock); - } -} - -/* Replace SA with a fresh one that is similar - * - * Shares some logic with ipsecdoi_initiate, but not the same! - * - we must not reuse the ISAKMP SA if we are trying to replace it! - * - if trying to replace IPSEC SA, use ipsecdoi_initiate to build - * ISAKMP SA if needed. - * - duplicate whack fd, if live. - * Does not delete the old state -- someone else will do that. - */ -void -ipsecdoi_replace(struct state *st, unsigned long try) -{ - int whack_sock = dup_any(st->st_whack_sock); - lset_t policy = st->st_policy; - - if (IS_PHASE1(st->st_state)) - { - passert(!HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy)); - (void) main_outI1(whack_sock, st->st_connection, st, policy, try); - } - else - { - /* Add features of actual old state to policy. This ensures - * that rekeying doesn't downgrade security. I admit that - * this doesn't capture everything. - */ - if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) - policy |= POLICY_PFS; - if (st->st_ah.present) - { - policy |= POLICY_AUTHENTICATE; - if (st->st_ah.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL) - policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL; - } - if (st->st_esp.present && st->st_esp.attrs.transid != ESP_NULL) - { - policy |= POLICY_ENCRYPT; - if (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL) - policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL; - } - if (st->st_ipcomp.present) - { - policy |= POLICY_COMPRESS; - if (st->st_ipcomp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TUNNEL) - policy |= POLICY_TUNNEL; - } - passert(HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy)); - ipsecdoi_initiate(whack_sock, st->st_connection, policy, try - , st->st_serialno); - } -} - -/* SKEYID for preshared keys. - * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1 - */ -static bool -skeyid_preshared(struct state *st) -{ - const chunk_t *pss = get_preshared_secret(st->st_connection); - - if (pss == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secret disappeared!"); - return FALSE; - } - else - { - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, *pss); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_nr); - hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid, "st_skeyid in skeyid_preshared()", &ctx); - return TRUE; - } -} - -static bool -skeyid_digisig(struct state *st) -{ - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - chunk_t nir; - - /* We need to hmac_init with the concatenation of Ni_b and Nr_b, - * so we have to build a temporary concatentation. - */ - nir.len = st->st_ni.len + st->st_nr.len; - nir.ptr = alloc_bytes(nir.len, "Ni + Nr in skeyid_digisig"); - memcpy(nir.ptr, st->st_ni.ptr, st->st_ni.len); - memcpy(nir.ptr+st->st_ni.len, st->st_nr.ptr, st->st_nr.len); - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, nir); - pfree(nir.ptr); - - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared); - hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid, "st_skeyid in skeyid_digisig()", &ctx); - return TRUE; -} - -/* Generate the SKEYID_* and new IV - * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1 - */ -static bool -generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) -{ - /* Generate the SKEYID */ - switch (st->st_oakley.auth) - { - case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY: - case XAUTHInitPreShared: - case XAUTHRespPreShared: - if (!skeyid_preshared(st)) - return FALSE; - break; - - case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG: - case XAUTHInitRSA: - case XAUTHRespRSA: - if (!skeyid_digisig(st)) - return FALSE; - break; - - case OAKLEY_DSS_SIG: - /* XXX */ - - case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC: - case OAKLEY_RSA_ENC_REV: - case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC: - case OAKLEY_ELGAMAL_ENC_REV: - /* XXX */ - - default: - bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth); - } - - /* generate SKEYID_* from SKEYID */ - { - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid); - - /* SKEYID_D */ - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared); - hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1); - hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_d, "st_skeyid_d in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx); - - /* SKEYID_A */ - hmac_reinit(&ctx); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_skeyid_d); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared); - hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hmac_update(&ctx, "\1", 1); - hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_a, "st_skeyid_a in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx); - - /* SKEYID_E */ - hmac_reinit(&ctx); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_skeyid_a); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_shared); - hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hmac_update(&ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hmac_update(&ctx, "\2", 1); - hmac_final_chunk(st->st_skeyid_e, "st_skeyid_e in generate_skeyids_iv()", &ctx); - } - - /* generate IV */ - { - union hash_ctx hash_ctx; - const struct hash_desc *h = st->st_oakley.hasher; - - st->st_new_iv_len = h->hash_digest_size; - passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv)); - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_dump_chunk("DH_i:", st->st_gi); - DBG_dump_chunk("DH_r:", st->st_gr); - ); - h->hash_init(&hash_ctx); - h->hash_update(&hash_ctx, st->st_gi.ptr, st->st_gi.len); - h->hash_update(&hash_ctx, st->st_gr.ptr, st->st_gr.len); - h->hash_final(st->st_new_iv, &hash_ctx); - } - - /* Oakley Keying Material - * Derived from Skeyid_e: if it is not big enough, generate more - * using the PRF. - * See RFC 2409 "IKE" Appendix B - */ - { - /* const size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.encrypter->keydeflen/BITS_PER_BYTE; */ - const size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.enckeylen/BITS_PER_BYTE; - u_char keytemp[MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN + MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - u_char *k = st->st_skeyid_e.ptr; - - if (keysize > st->st_skeyid_e.len) - { - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - size_t i = 0; - - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_e); - hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1); - for (;;) - { - hmac_final(&keytemp[i], &ctx); - i += ctx.hmac_digest_size; - if (i >= keysize) - break; - hmac_reinit(&ctx); - hmac_update(&ctx, &keytemp[i - ctx.hmac_digest_size], ctx.hmac_digest_size); - } - k = keytemp; - } - clonereplacechunk(st->st_enc_key, k, keysize, "st_enc_key"); - } - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid: ", st->st_skeyid); - DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_d:", st->st_skeyid_d); - DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_a:", st->st_skeyid_a); - DBG_dump_chunk("Skeyid_e:", st->st_skeyid_e); - DBG_dump_chunk("enc key:", st->st_enc_key); - DBG_dump("IV:", st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len)); - return TRUE; -} - -/* Generate HASH_I or HASH_R for ISAKMP Phase I. - * This will *not* generate other hash payloads (eg. Phase II or Quick Mode, - * New Group Mode, or ISAKMP Informational Exchanges). - * If the hashi argument is TRUE, generate HASH_I; if FALSE generate HASH_R. - * If hashus argument is TRUE, we're generating a hash for our end. - * See RFC2409 IKE 5. - * - * Generating the SIG_I and SIG_R for DSS is an odd perversion of this: - * Most of the logic is the same, but SHA-1 is used in place of HMAC-whatever. - * The extensive common logic is embodied in main_mode_hash_body(). - * See draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 4.1 and 6.1.1.2 - */ - -typedef void (*hash_update_t)(union hash_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t) ; -static void -main_mode_hash_body(struct state *st -, bool hashi /* Initiator? */ -, const pb_stream *idpl /* ID payload, as PBS */ -, union hash_ctx *ctx -, void (*hash_update_void)(void *, const u_char *input, size_t)) -{ -#define HASH_UPDATE_T (union hash_ctx *, const u_char *input, unsigned int len) - hash_update_t hash_update=(hash_update_t) hash_update_void; -#if 0 /* if desperate to debug hashing */ -# define hash_update(ctx, input, len) { \ - DBG_dump("hash input", input, len); \ - (hash_update)(ctx, input, len); \ - } -#endif - -# define hash_update_chunk(ctx, ch) hash_update((ctx), (ch).ptr, (ch).len) - - if (hashi) - { - hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gi); - hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gr); - hash_update(ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hash_update(ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - } - else - { - hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gr); - hash_update_chunk(ctx, st->st_gi); - hash_update(ctx, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - hash_update(ctx, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - } - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("hashing %lu bytes of SA" - , (unsigned long) (st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)))); - - /* SA_b */ - hash_update(ctx, st->st_p1isa.ptr + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) - , st->st_p1isa.len - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)); - - /* Hash identification payload, without generic payload header. - * We used to reconstruct ID Payload for this purpose, but now - * we use the bytes as they appear on the wire to avoid - * "spelling problems". - */ - hash_update(ctx - , idpl->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_generic) - , pbs_offset(idpl) - sizeof(struct isakmp_generic)); - -# undef hash_update_chunk -# undef hash_update -} - -static size_t /* length of hash */ -main_mode_hash(struct state *st -, u_char *hash_val /* resulting bytes */ -, bool hashi /* Initiator? */ -, const pb_stream *idpl) /* ID payload, as PBS; cur must be at end */ -{ - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid); - main_mode_hash_body(st, hashi, idpl, &ctx.hash_ctx, ctx.h->hash_update); - hmac_final(hash_val, &ctx); - return ctx.hmac_digest_size; -} - -#if 0 /* only needed for DSS */ -static void -main_mode_sha1(struct state *st -, u_char *hash_val /* resulting bytes */ -, size_t *hash_len /* length of hash */ -, bool hashi /* Initiator? */ -, const pb_stream *idpl) /* ID payload, as PBS */ -{ - union hash_ctx ctx; - - SHA1Init(&ctx.ctx_sha1); - SHA1Update(&ctx.ctx_sha1, st->st_skeyid.ptr, st->st_skeyid.len); - *hash_len = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE; - main_mode_hash_body(st, hashi, idpl, &ctx - , (void (*)(union hash_ctx *, const u_char *, unsigned int))&SHA1Update); - SHA1Final(hash_val, &ctx.ctx_sha1); -} -#endif - -/* Create an RSA signature of a hash. - * Poorly specified in draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.1.1.2. - * Use PKCS#1 version 1.5 encryption of hash (called - * RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5) in PKCS#2. - */ -static size_t -RSA_sign_hash(struct connection *c -, u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS] -, const u_char *hash_val, size_t hash_len) -{ - size_t sz = 0; - smartcard_t *sc = c->spd.this.sc; - - if (sc == NULL) /* no smartcard */ - { - const struct RSA_private_key *k = get_RSA_private_key(c); - - if (k == NULL) - return 0; /* failure: no key to use */ - - sz = k->pub.k; - passert(RSA_MIN_OCTETS <= sz && 4 + hash_len < sz && sz <= RSA_MAX_OCTETS); - sign_hash(k, hash_val, hash_len, sig_val, sz); - } - else if (sc->valid) /* if valid pin then sign hash on the smartcard */ - { - lock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash"); - if (!scx_establish_context(sc) || !scx_login(sc)) - { - scx_release_context(sc); - unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash"); - return 0; - } - - sz = scx_get_keylength(sc); - if (sz == 0) - { - plog("failed to get keylength from smartcard"); - scx_release_context(sc); - unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash"); - return 0; - } - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL | DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("signing hash with RSA key from smartcard (slot: %d, id: %s)" - , (int)sc->slot, sc->id) - ) - sz = scx_sign_hash(sc, hash_val, hash_len, sig_val, sz) ? sz : 0; - if (!pkcs11_keep_state) - scx_release_context(sc); - unlock_certs_and_keys("RSA_sign_hash"); - } - return sz; -} - -/* Check a Main Mode RSA Signature against computed hash using RSA public key k. - * - * As a side effect, on success, the public key is copied into the - * state object to record the authenticator. - * - * Can fail because wrong public key is used or because hash disagrees. - * We distinguish because diagnostics should also. - * - * The result is NULL if the Signature checked out. - * Otherwise, the first character of the result indicates - * how far along failure occurred. A greater character signifies - * greater progress. - * - * Classes: - * 0 reserved for caller - * 1 SIG length doesn't match key length -- wrong key - * 2-8 malformed ECB after decryption -- probably wrong key - * 9 decrypted hash != computed hash -- probably correct key - * - * Although the math should be the same for generating and checking signatures, - * it is not: the knowledge of the private key allows more efficient (i.e. - * different) computation for encryption. - */ -static err_t -try_RSA_signature(const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN], size_t hash_len -, const pb_stream *sig_pbs, pubkey_t *kr -, struct state *st) -{ - const u_char *sig_val = sig_pbs->cur; - size_t sig_len = pbs_left(sig_pbs); - u_char s[RSA_MAX_OCTETS]; /* for decrypted sig_val */ - u_char *hash_in_s = &s[sig_len - hash_len]; - const struct RSA_public_key *k = &kr->u.rsa; - - /* decrypt the signature -- reversing RSA_sign_hash */ - if (sig_len != k->k) - { - /* XXX notification: INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION */ - return "1" "SIG length does not match public key length"; - } - - /* actual exponentiation; see PKCS#1 v2.0 5.1 */ - { - chunk_t temp_s; - mpz_t c; - - n_to_mpz(c, sig_val, sig_len); - mpz_powm(c, c, &k->e, &k->n); - - temp_s = mpz_to_n(c, sig_len); /* back to octets */ - memcpy(s, temp_s.ptr, sig_len); - pfree(temp_s.ptr); - mpz_clear(c); - } - - /* sanity check on signature: see if it matches - * PKCS#1 v1.5 8.1 encryption-block formatting - */ - { - err_t ugh = NULL; - - if (s[0] != 0x00) - ugh = "2" "no leading 00"; - else if (hash_in_s[-1] != 0x00) - ugh = "3" "00 separator not present"; - else if (s[1] == 0x01) - { - const u_char *p; - - for (p = &s[2]; p != hash_in_s - 1; p++) - { - if (*p != 0xFF) - { - ugh = "4" "invalid Padding String"; - break; - } - } - } - else if (s[1] == 0x02) - { - const u_char *p; - - for (p = &s[2]; p != hash_in_s - 1; p++) - { - if (*p == 0x00) - { - ugh = "5" "invalid Padding String"; - break; - } - } - } - else - ugh = "6" "Block Type not 01 or 02"; - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - /* note: it might be a good idea to make sure that - * an observer cannot tell what kind of failure happened. - * I don't know what this means in practice. - */ - /* We probably selected the wrong public key for peer: - * SIG Payload decrypted into malformed ECB - */ - /* XXX notification: INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION */ - return ugh; - } - } - - /* We have the decoded hash: see if it matches. */ - if (memcmp(hash_val, hash_in_s, hash_len) != 0) - { - /* good: header, hash, signature, and other payloads well-formed - * good: we could find an RSA Sig key for the peer. - * bad: hash doesn't match - * Guess: sides disagree about key to be used. - */ - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "decrypted SIG", s, sig_len); - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed HASH", hash_val, hash_len); - /* XXX notification: INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION */ - return "9" "authentication failure: received SIG does not match computed HASH, but message is well-formed"; - } - - /* Success: copy successful key into state. - * There might be an old one if we previously aborted this - * state transition. - */ - unreference_key(&st->st_peer_pubkey); - st->st_peer_pubkey = reference_key(kr); - - return NULL; /* happy happy */ -} - -/* Check signature against all RSA public keys we can find. - * If we need keys from DNS KEY records, and they haven't been fetched, - * return STF_SUSPEND to ask for asynch DNS lookup. - * - * Note: parameter keys_from_dns contains results of DNS lookup for key - * or is NULL indicating lookup not yet tried. - * - * take_a_crack is a helper function. Mostly forensic. - * If only we had coroutines. - */ -struct tac_state { - /* RSA_check_signature's args that take_a_crack needs */ - struct state *st; - const u_char *hash_val; - size_t hash_len; - const pb_stream *sig_pbs; - - /* state carried between calls */ - err_t best_ugh; /* most successful failure */ - int tried_cnt; /* number of keys tried */ - char tried[50]; /* keyids of tried public keys */ - char *tn; /* roof of tried[] */ -}; - -static bool -take_a_crack(struct tac_state *s -, pubkey_t *kr -, const char *story USED_BY_DEBUG) -{ - err_t ugh = try_RSA_signature(s->hash_val, s->hash_len, s->sig_pbs - , kr, s->st); - const struct RSA_public_key *k = &kr->u.rsa; - - s->tried_cnt++; - if (ugh == NULL) - { - DBG(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_CONTROL - , DBG_log("an RSA Sig check passed with *%s [%s]" - , k->keyid, story)); - return TRUE; - } - else - { - DBG(DBG_CRYPT - , DBG_log("an RSA Sig check failure %s with *%s [%s]" - , ugh + 1, k->keyid, story)); - if (s->best_ugh == NULL || s->best_ugh[0] < ugh[0]) - s->best_ugh = ugh; - if (ugh[0] > '0' - && s->tn - s->tried + KEYID_BUF + 2 < (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(s->tried)) - { - strcpy(s->tn, " *"); - strcpy(s->tn + 2, k->keyid); - s->tn += strlen(s->tn); - } - return FALSE; - } -} - -static stf_status -RSA_check_signature(const struct id* peer -, struct state *st -, const u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN] -, size_t hash_len -, const pb_stream *sig_pbs -#ifdef USE_KEYRR -, const pubkey_list_t *keys_from_dns -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ -, const struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns -) -{ - const struct connection *c = st->st_connection; - struct tac_state s; - err_t dns_ugh = NULL; - - s.st = st; - s.hash_val = hash_val; - s.hash_len = hash_len; - s.sig_pbs = sig_pbs; - - s.best_ugh = NULL; - s.tried_cnt = 0; - s.tn = s.tried; - - /* try all gateway records hung off c */ - if (c->policy & POLICY_OPPO) - { - struct gw_info *gw; - - for (gw = c->gw_info; gw != NULL; gw = gw->next) - { - /* only consider entries that have a key and are for our peer */ - if (gw->gw_key_present - && same_id(&gw->gw_id, &c->spd.that.id) - && take_a_crack(&s, gw->key, "key saved from DNS TXT")) - return STF_OK; - } - } - - /* try all appropriate Public keys */ - { - pubkey_list_t *p, **pp; - - pp = &pubkeys; - - for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = *pp) - { - pubkey_t *key = p->key; - - if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && same_id(peer, &key->id)) - { - time_t now = time(NULL); - - /* check if found public key has expired */ - if (key->until_time != UNDEFINED_TIME && key->until_time < now) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, - "cached RSA public key has expired and has been deleted"); - *pp = free_public_keyentry(p); - continue; /* continue with next public key */ - } - - if (take_a_crack(&s, key, "preloaded key")) - return STF_OK; - } - pp = &p->next; - } - } - - /* if no key was found (evidenced by best_ugh == NULL) - * and that side of connection is key_from_DNS_on_demand - * then go search DNS for keys for peer. - */ - if (s.best_ugh == NULL && c->spd.that.key_from_DNS_on_demand) - { - if (gateways_from_dns != NULL) - { - /* TXT keys */ - const struct gw_info *gwp; - - for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) - if (gwp->gw_key_present - && take_a_crack(&s, gwp->key, "key from DNS TXT")) - return STF_OK; - } -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - else if (keys_from_dns != NULL) - { - /* KEY keys */ - const pubkey_list_t *kr; - - for (kr = keys_from_dns; kr != NULL; kr = kr->next) - if (kr->key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA - && take_a_crack(&s, kr->key, "key from DNS KEY")) - return STF_OK; - } -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - else - { - /* nothing yet: ask for asynch DNS lookup */ - return STF_SUSPEND; - } - } - - /* no acceptable key was found: diagnose */ - { - char id_buf[BUF_LEN]; /* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */ - - (void) idtoa(peer, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf)); - - if (s.best_ugh == NULL) - { - if (dns_ugh == NULL) - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'" - , id_buf); - else - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'" - "; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)" - , id_buf, dns_ugh); - - /* ??? is this the best code there is? */ - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - - if (s.best_ugh[0] == '9') - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s", s.best_ugh + 1); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; - } - else - { - if (s.tried_cnt == 1) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "Signature check (on %s) failed (wrong key?); tried%s" - , id_buf, s.tried); - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("public key for %s failed:" - " decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB (%s)" - , id_buf, s.best_ugh + 1)); - } - else - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "Signature check (on %s) failed:" - " tried%s keys but none worked." - , id_buf, s.tried); - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("all %d public keys for %s failed:" - " best decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB (%s)" - , s.tried_cnt, id_buf, s.best_ugh + 1)); - } - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - } -} - -static notification_t -accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, const char *name) -{ - pb_stream *nonce_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE]->pbs; - size_t len = pbs_left(nonce_pbs); - - if (len < MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE || MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE < len) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s length not between %d and %d" - , name , MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE, MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE); - return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; /* ??? */ - } - clonereplacechunk(*dest, nonce_pbs->cur, len, "nonce"); - return NOTHING_WRONG; -} - -/* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header - * IV is fetched from st->st_new_iv and stored into st->st_iv. - * The theory is that there will be no "backing out", so we commit to IV. - * We also close the pbs. - */ -bool -encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st) -{ - const struct encrypt_desc *e = st->st_oakley.encrypter; - u_int8_t *enc_start = pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr); - size_t enc_len = pbs_offset(pbs) - sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr); - - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_RAW, "encrypting:\n", enc_start, enc_len); - - /* Pad up to multiple of encryption blocksize. - * See the description associated with the definition of - * struct isakmp_hdr in packet.h. - */ - { - size_t padding = pad_up(enc_len, e->enc_blocksize); - - if (padding != 0) - { - if (!out_zero(padding, pbs, "encryption padding")) - return FALSE; - enc_len += padding; - } - } - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("encrypting using %s", enum_show(&oakley_enc_names, st->st_oakley.encrypt))); - - /* e->crypt(TRUE, enc_start, enc_len, st); */ - crypto_cbc_encrypt(e, TRUE, enc_start, enc_len, st); - - update_iv(st); - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "next IV:", st->st_iv, st->st_iv_len); - close_message(pbs); - return TRUE; -} - -/* Compute HASH(1), HASH(2) of Quick Mode. - * HASH(1) is part of Quick I1 message. - * HASH(2) is part of Quick R1 message. - * Used by: quick_outI1, quick_inI1_outR1 (twice), quick_inR1_outI2 - * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5, pg. 18 or draft-ietf-ipsec-ike-01.txt 6.2 pg 25) - */ -static size_t -quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, const u_char *start, const u_char *roof -, const struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid, bool hash2) -{ - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - -#if 0 /* if desperate to debug hashing */ -# define hmac_update(ctx, ptr, len) { \ - DBG_dump("hash input", (ptr), (len)); \ - (hmac_update)((ctx), (ptr), (len)); \ - } - DBG_dump("hash key", st->st_skeyid_a.ptr, st->st_skeyid_a.len); -#endif - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a); - hmac_update(&ctx, (const void *) msgid, sizeof(msgid_t)); - if (hash2) - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni); /* include Ni_b in the hash */ - hmac_update(&ctx, start, roof-start); - hmac_final(dest, &ctx); - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("HASH(%d) computed:", hash2 + 1); - DBG_dump("", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size)); - return ctx.hmac_digest_size; -# undef hmac_update -} - -/* Compute HASH(3) in Quick Mode (part of Quick I2 message). - * Used by: quick_inR1_outI2, quick_inI2 - * See RFC2409 "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)" 5.5. - * NOTE: this hash (unlike HASH(1) and HASH(2)) ONLY covers the - * Message ID and Nonces. This is a mistake. - */ -static size_t -quick_mode_hash3(u_char *dest, struct state *st) -{ - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a); - hmac_update(&ctx, "\0", 1); - hmac_update(&ctx, (u_char *) &st->st_msgid, sizeof(st->st_msgid)); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_ni); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx, st->st_nr); - hmac_final(dest, &ctx); - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "HASH(3) computed:", dest, ctx.hmac_digest_size); - return ctx.hmac_digest_size; -} - -/* Compute Phase 2 IV. - * Uses Phase 1 IV from st_iv; puts result in st_new_iv. - */ -void -init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid) -{ - const struct hash_desc *h = st->st_oakley.hasher; - union hash_ctx ctx; - - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last Phase 1 IV:" - , st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len); - - st->st_new_iv_len = h->hash_digest_size; - passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv)); - - h->hash_init(&ctx); - h->hash_update(&ctx, st->st_ph1_iv, st->st_ph1_iv_len); - passert(*msgid != 0); - h->hash_update(&ctx, (const u_char *)msgid, sizeof(*msgid)); - h->hash_final(st->st_new_iv, &ctx); - - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "computed Phase 2 IV:" - , st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len); -} - -/* Initiate quick mode. - * --> HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] - * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5) - * Note: this is not called from demux.c - */ - -static bool -emit_subnet_id(ip_subnet *net -, u_int8_t np, u_int8_t protoid, u_int16_t port, pb_stream *outs) -{ - struct isakmp_ipsec_id id; - pb_stream id_pbs; - ip_address ta; - const unsigned char *tbp; - size_t tal; - - id.isaiid_np = np; - id.isaiid_idtype = subnetishost(net) - ? aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_addr - : aftoinfo(subnettypeof(net))->id_subnet; - id.isaiid_protoid = protoid; - id.isaiid_port = port; - - if (!out_struct(&id, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, outs, &id_pbs)) - return FALSE; - - networkof(net, &ta); - tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp); - if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client network")) - return FALSE; - - if (!subnetishost(net)) - { - maskof(net, &ta); - tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp); - if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client mask")) - return FALSE; - } - - close_output_pbs(&id_pbs); - return TRUE; -} - -stf_status -quick_outI1(int whack_sock -, struct state *isakmp_sa -, struct connection *c -, lset_t policy -, unsigned long try -, so_serial_t replacing) -{ - struct state *st = duplicate_state(isakmp_sa); - pb_stream reply; /* not really a reply */ - pb_stream rbody; - u_char /* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */ - *r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */ - *r_hash_start; /* start of what is to be hashed */ - bool has_client = c->spd.this.has_client || c->spd.that.has_client || - c->spd.this.protocol || c->spd.that.protocol || - c->spd.this.port || c->spd.that.port; - - bool send_natoa = FALSE; - u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - - st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock; - st->st_connection = c; - set_cur_state(st); /* we must reset before exit */ - st->st_policy = policy; - st->st_try = try; - - st->st_myuserprotoid = c->spd.this.protocol; - st->st_peeruserprotoid = c->spd.that.protocol; - st->st_myuserport = c->spd.this.port; - st->st_peeruserport = c->spd.that.port; - - st->st_msgid = generate_msgid(isakmp_sa); - st->st_state = STATE_QUICK_I1; - - insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */ - - if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY) - plog("initiating Quick Mode %s {using isakmp#%lu}" - , prettypolicy(policy) - , isakmp_sa->st_serialno); - else - plog("initiating Quick Mode %s to replace #%lu {using isakmp#%lu}" - , prettypolicy(policy) - , replacing - , isakmp_sa->st_serialno); - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) - { - /* Duplicate nat_traversal status in new state */ - st->nat_traversal = isakmp_sa->nat_traversal; - - if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) - has_client = TRUE; - - nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(NULL, st); - } - else - st->nat_traversal = 0; - - /* are we going to send a NAT-OA payload? */ - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA) - && !(st->st_policy & POLICY_TUNNEL) - && (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME))) - { - send_natoa = TRUE; - np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ? - ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATOA_DRAFTS; - } -#endif - - /* set up reply */ - init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet"); - - /* HDR* out */ - { - struct isakmp_hdr hdr; - - hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION; - hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH; - hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_QUICK; - hdr.isa_msgid = st->st_msgid; - hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION; - memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* HASH(1) -- create and note space to be filled later */ - START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA); - - /* SA out */ - - /* - * See if pfs_group has been specified for this conn, - * if not, fallback to old use-same-as-P1 behaviour - */ -#ifndef NO_IKE_ALG - if (st->st_connection) - st->st_pfs_group = ike_alg_pfsgroup(st->st_connection, policy); - if (!st->st_pfs_group) -#endif - /* If PFS specified, use the same group as during Phase 1: - * since no negotiation is possible, we pick one that is - * very likely supported. - */ - st->st_pfs_group = policy & POLICY_PFS? isakmp_sa->st_oakley.group : NULL; - - /* Emit SA payload based on a subset of the policy bits. - * POLICY_COMPRESS is considered iff we can do IPcomp. - */ - { - lset_t pm = POLICY_ENCRYPT | POLICY_AUTHENTICATE; - - if (can_do_IPcomp) - pm |= POLICY_COMPRESS; - - if (!out_sa(&rbody - , &ipsec_sadb[(st->st_policy & pm) >> POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT] - , st, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* Ni out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &rbody - , policy & POLICY_PFS? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np - , "Ni")) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */ - - if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) - { - if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group - , &rbody, has_client? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : np)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */ - if (has_client) - { - /* IDci (we are initiator), then IDcr (peer is responder) */ - if (!emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.this.client - , ISAKMP_NEXT_ID, st->st_myuserprotoid, st->st_myuserport, &rbody) - || !emit_subnet_id(&c->spd.that.client - , np, st->st_peeruserprotoid, st->st_peeruserport, &rbody)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - /* Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed */ - if (send_natoa) - { - if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &rbody, st)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } -#endif - - /* finish computing HASH(1), inserting it in output */ - (void) quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, rbody.cur - , st, &st->st_msgid, FALSE); - - /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */ - - init_phase2_iv(isakmp_sa, &st->st_msgid); - st->st_new_iv_len = isakmp_sa->st_new_iv_len; - memcpy(st->st_new_iv, isakmp_sa->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len); - - if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st)) - { - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* save packet, now that we know its size */ - clonetochunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply) - , "reply packet from quick_outI1"); - - /* send the packet */ - - send_packet(st, "quick_outI1"); - - delete_event(st); - event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st); - - if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY) - whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1 - , "%s: initiate" - , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)); - else - whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1 - , "%s: initiate to replace #%lu" - , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state) - , replacing); - reset_cur_state(); - return STF_OK; -} - - -/* - * Decode the CERT payload of Phase 1. - */ -static void -decode_cert(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct payload_digest *p; - - for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT]; p != NULL; p = p->next) - { - struct isakmp_cert *const cert = &p->payload.cert; - chunk_t blob; - time_t valid_until; - blob.ptr = p->pbs.cur; - blob.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs); - if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE) - { - x509cert_t cert = empty_x509cert; - if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, &cert)) - { - if (verify_x509cert(&cert, strict_crl_policy, &valid_until)) - { - DBG(DBG_PARSING, - DBG_log("Public key validated") - ) - add_x509_public_key(&cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED); - } - else - { - plog("X.509 certificate rejected"); - } - free_generalNames(cert.subjectAltName, FALSE); - free_generalNames(cert.crlDistributionPoints, FALSE); - } - else - plog("Syntax error in X.509 certificate"); - } - else if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509) - { - x509cert_t *cert = NULL; - - if (pkcs7_parse_signedData(blob, NULL, &cert, NULL, NULL)) - store_x509certs(&cert, strict_crl_policy); - else - plog("Syntax error in PKCS#7 wrapped X.509 certificates"); - } - else - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate payload", - enum_show(&cert_type_names, cert->isacert_type)); - DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CERT:\n", blob); - } - } -} - -/* - * Decode the CR payload of Phase 1. - */ -static void -decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c) -{ - struct payload_digest *p; - - for (p = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_CR]; p != NULL; p = p->next) - { - struct isakmp_cr *const cr = &p->payload.cr; - chunk_t ca_name; - - ca_name.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs); - ca_name.ptr = (ca_name.len > 0)? p->pbs.cur : NULL; - - DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_PARSING, "CR", ca_name); - - if (cr->isacr_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE) - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - if (ca_name.len > 0) - { - generalName_t *gn; - - if (!is_asn1(ca_name)) - continue; - - gn = alloc_thing(generalName_t, "generalName"); - clonetochunk(ca_name, ca_name.ptr,ca_name.len, "ca name"); - gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME; - gn->name = ca_name; - gn->next = c->requested_ca; - c->requested_ca = gn; - } - c->got_certrequest = TRUE; - - DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, ca_name, "%any"); - DBG_log("requested CA: '%s'", buf); - ) - } - else - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate request payload", - enum_show(&cert_type_names, cr->isacr_type)); - } -} - -/* Decode the ID payload of Phase 1 (main_inI3_outR3 and main_inR3) - * Note: we may change connections as a result. - * We must be called before SIG or HASH are decoded since we - * may change the peer's RSA key or ID. - */ -static bool -decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - struct payload_digest *const id_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; - const pb_stream *const id_pbs = &id_pld->pbs; - struct isakmp_id *const id = &id_pld->payload.id; - - /* I think that RFC2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.6.2 is confused. - * It talks about the protocol ID and Port fields of the ID - * Payload, but they don't exist as such in Phase 1. - * We use more appropriate names. - * isaid_doi_specific_a is in place of Protocol ID. - * isaid_doi_specific_b is in place of Port. - * Besides, there is no good reason for allowing these to be - * other than 0 in Phase 1. - */ -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_PORT_FLOATING) - && id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP - && (id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0 || id->isaid_doi_specific_b == NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT)) - { - DBG_log("protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload is %d/%d. " - "accepted with port_floating NAT-T", - id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b); - } - else -#endif - if (!(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == 0 && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == 0) - && !(id->isaid_doi_specific_a == IPPROTO_UDP && id->isaid_doi_specific_b == IKE_UDP_PORT)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "protocol/port in Phase 1 ID Payload must be 0/0 or %d/%d" - " but are %d/%d" - , IPPROTO_UDP, IKE_UDP_PORT - , id->isaid_doi_specific_a, id->isaid_doi_specific_b); - return FALSE; - } - - peer->kind = id->isaid_idtype; - - switch (peer->kind) - { - case ID_IPV4_ADDR: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR: - /* failure mode for initaddr is probably inappropriate address length */ - { - err_t ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs) - , peer->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR? AF_INET : AF_INET6 - , &peer->ip_addr); - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s identification payload: %s" - , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind), ugh); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - } - break; - - case ID_USER_FQDN: - if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '@', pbs_left(id_pbs)) == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer's ID_USER_FQDN contains no @"); - return FALSE; - } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case ID_FQDN: - if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '\0', pbs_left(id_pbs)) != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Phase 1 ID Payload of type %s contains a NUL" - , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind)); - return FALSE; - } - - /* ??? ought to do some more sanity check, but what? */ - - setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - break; - - case ID_KEY_ID: - setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - DBG(DBG_PARSING, - DBG_dump_chunk("KEY ID:", peer->name)); - break; - - case ID_DER_ASN1_DN: - setchunk(peer->name, id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - DBG(DBG_PARSING, - DBG_dump_chunk("DER ASN1 DN:", peer->name)); - break; - - default: - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unacceptable identity type (%s) in Phase 1 ID Payload" - , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind)); - return FALSE; - } - - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf)); - plog("Peer ID is %s: '%s'", - enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype), buf); - } - - /* check for certificates */ - decode_cert(md); - return TRUE; -} - -/* Now that we've decoded the ID payload, let's see if we - * need to switch connections. - * We must not switch horses if we initiated: - * - if the initiation was explicit, we'd be ignoring user's intent - * - if opportunistic, we'll lose our HOLD info - */ -static bool -switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, bool initiator) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - struct connection *c = st->st_connection; - - chunk_t peer_ca = (st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL) - ? st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer : empty_chunk; - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, peer_ca, "%none"); - DBG_log("peer CA: '%s'", buf); - ) - - if (initiator) - { - int pathlen; - - if (!same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer)) - { - char expect[BUF_LEN] - , found[BUF_LEN]; - - idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, expect, sizeof(expect)); - idtoa(peer, found, sizeof(found)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "we require peer to have ID '%s', but peer declares '%s'" - , expect, found); - return FALSE; - } - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, c->spd.this.ca, "%none"); - DBG_log("required CA: '%s'", buf); - ) - - if (!trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "we don't accept the peer's CA"); - return FALSE; - } - } - else - { - struct connection *r; - - /* check for certificate requests */ - decode_cr(md, c); - - r = refine_host_connection(st, peer, peer_ca); - - /* delete the collected certificate requests */ - free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE); - c->requested_ca = NULL; - - if (r == NULL) - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no suitable connection for peer '%s'", buf); - return FALSE; - } - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, r->spd.this.ca, "%none"); - DBG_log("offered CA: '%s'", buf); - ) - - if (r != c) - { - /* apparently, r is an improvement on c -- replace */ - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL - , DBG_log("switched from \"%s\" to \"%s\"", c->name, r->name)); - if (r->kind == CK_TEMPLATE) - { - /* instantiate it, filling in peer's ID */ - r = rw_instantiate(r, &c->spd.that.host_addr, -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - c->spd.that.host_port, -#endif -#ifdef VIRTUAL_IP - NULL, -#endif - peer); - } - - /* copy certificate request info */ - r->got_certrequest = c->got_certrequest; - - st->st_connection = r; /* kill reference to c */ - set_cur_connection(r); - connection_discard(c); - } - else if (c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards) - { - free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id); - c->spd.that.id = *peer; - c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE; - unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id); - } - } - return TRUE; -} - -/* Decode the variable part of an ID packet (during Quick Mode). - * This is designed for packets that identify clients, not peers. - * Rejects 0.0.0.0/32 or IPv6 equivalent because - * (1) it is wrong and (2) we use this value for inband signalling. - */ -static bool -decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id -, pb_stream *id_pbs -, ip_subnet *net -, const char *which) -{ - const struct af_info *afi = NULL; - - /* Note: the following may be a pointer into static memory - * that may be recycled, but only if the type is not known. - * That case is disposed of very early -- in the first switch. - */ - const char *idtypename = enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaiid_idtype); - - switch (id->isaiid_idtype) - { - case ID_IPV4_ADDR: - case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET: - case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE: - afi = &af_inet4_info; - break; - case ID_IPV6_ADDR: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE: - afi = &af_inet6_info; - break; - case ID_FQDN: - return TRUE; - default: - /* XXX support more */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unsupported ID type %s" - , idtypename); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - - switch (id->isaiid_idtype) - { - case ID_IPV4_ADDR: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR: - { - ip_address temp_address; - err_t ugh; - - ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs), afi->af, &temp_address); - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s has wrong length in Quick I1 (%s)" - , which, idtypename, ugh); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - if (isanyaddr(&temp_address)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s is invalid (%s) in Quick I1" - , which, idtypename, ip_str(&temp_address)); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - happy(addrtosubnet(&temp_address, net)); - DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL - , DBG_log("%s is %s", which, ip_str(&temp_address))); - break; - } - - case ID_IPV4_ADDR_SUBNET: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR_SUBNET: - { - ip_address temp_address, temp_mask; - err_t ugh; - - if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1" - , which, idtypename); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur - , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address); - if (ugh == NULL) - ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz - , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_mask); - if (ugh == NULL) - ugh = initsubnet(&temp_address, masktocount(&temp_mask) - , '0', net); - if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net)) - ugh = "contains only anyaddr"; - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s bad subnet in Quick I1 (%s)" - , which, idtypename, ugh); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, - { - char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - - subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff)); - DBG_log("%s is subnet %s", which, temp_buff); - }); - break; - } - - case ID_IPV4_ADDR_RANGE: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR_RANGE: - { - ip_address temp_address_from, temp_address_to; - err_t ugh; - - if (pbs_left(id_pbs) != 2 * afi->ia_sz) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s wrong length in Quick I1" - , which, idtypename); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_from); - if (ugh == NULL) - ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz - , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_to); - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s malformed (%s) in Quick I1" - , which, idtypename, ugh); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return FALSE; - } - - ugh = rangetosubnet(&temp_address_from, &temp_address_to, net); - if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net)) - ugh = "contains only anyaddr"; - if (ugh != NULL) - { - char temp_buff1[ADDRTOT_BUF], temp_buff2[ADDRTOT_BUF]; - - addrtot(&temp_address_from, 0, temp_buff1, sizeof(temp_buff1)); - addrtot(&temp_address_to, 0, temp_buff2, sizeof(temp_buff2)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload in Quick I1, %s" - " %s - %s unacceptable: %s" - , which, idtypename, temp_buff1, temp_buff2, ugh); - return FALSE; - } - DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, - { - char temp_buff[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - - subnettot(net, 0, temp_buff, sizeof(temp_buff)); - DBG_log("%s is subnet %s (received as range)" - , which, temp_buff); - }); - break; - } - } - - /* set the port selector */ - setportof(htons(id->isaiid_port), &net->addr); - - DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("%s protocol/port is %d/%d", which, id->isaiid_protoid, id->isaiid_port) - ) - - return TRUE; -} - -/* like decode, but checks that what is received matches what was sent */ -static bool - -check_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id -, pb_stream *id_pbs -, u_int8_t *protoid -, u_int16_t *port -, ip_subnet *net -, const char *which) -{ - ip_subnet net_temp; - - if (!decode_net_id(id, id_pbs, &net_temp, which)) - return FALSE; - - if (!samesubnet(net, &net_temp) - || *protoid != id->isaiid_protoid || *port != id->isaiid_port) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID returned doesn't match my proposal", which); - return FALSE; - } - return TRUE; -} - -/* - * look for the existence of a non-expiring preloaded public key - */ -static bool -has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st) -{ - struct connection *c = st->st_connection; - - /* do not consider rw connections since - * the peer's identity must be known - */ - if (c->kind == CK_PERMANENT) - { - pubkey_list_t *p; - - /* look for a matching RSA public key */ - for (p = pubkeys; p != NULL; p = p->next) - { - pubkey_t *key = p->key; - - if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA && - same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &key->id) && - key->until_time == UNDEFINED_TIME) - { - /* found a preloaded public key */ - return TRUE; - } - } - } - return FALSE; -} - -/* - * Produce the new key material of Quick Mode. - * RFC 2409 "IKE" section 5.5 - * specifies how this is to be done. - */ -static void -compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st -, u_int8_t protoid -, struct ipsec_proto_info *pi) -{ - size_t needed_len; /* bytes of keying material needed */ - - /* Add up the requirements for keying material - * (It probably doesn't matter if we produce too much!) - */ - switch (protoid) - { - case PROTO_IPSEC_ESP: - switch (pi->attrs.transid) - { - case ESP_NULL: - needed_len = 0; - break; - case ESP_DES: - needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE; - break; - case ESP_3DES: - needed_len = DES_CBC_BLOCK_SIZE * 3; - break; - default: -#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG - if((needed_len=kernel_alg_esp_enc_keylen(pi->attrs.transid))>0) { - /* XXX: check key_len "coupling with kernel.c's */ - if (pi->attrs.key_len) { - needed_len=pi->attrs.key_len/8; - DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:" - "key_len=%d from peer", - (int)needed_len)); - } - break; - } -#endif - bad_case(pi->attrs.transid); - } - -#ifndef NO_KERNEL_ALG - DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:" - "needed_len (after ESP enc)=%d", - (int)needed_len)); - if (kernel_alg_esp_auth_ok(pi->attrs.auth, NULL)) { - needed_len += kernel_alg_esp_auth_keylen(pi->attrs.auth); - } else -#endif - switch (pi->attrs.auth) - { - case AUTH_ALGORITHM_NONE: - break; - case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_MD5: - needed_len += HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN; - break; - case AUTH_ALGORITHM_HMAC_SHA1: - needed_len += HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN; - break; - case AUTH_ALGORITHM_DES_MAC: - default: - bad_case(pi->attrs.auth); - } - DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("compute_proto_keymat:" - "needed_len (after ESP auth)=%d", - (int)needed_len)); - break; - - case PROTO_IPSEC_AH: - switch (pi->attrs.transid) - { - case AH_MD5: - needed_len = HMAC_MD5_KEY_LEN; - break; - case AH_SHA: - needed_len = HMAC_SHA1_KEY_LEN; - break; - default: - bad_case(pi->attrs.transid); - } - break; - - default: - bad_case(protoid); - } - - pi->keymat_len = needed_len; - - /* Allocate space for the keying material. - * Although only needed_len bytes are desired, we - * must round up to a multiple of ctx.hmac_digest_size - * so that our buffer isn't overrun. - */ - { - struct hmac_ctx ctx_me, ctx_peer; - size_t needed_space; /* space needed for keying material (rounded up) */ - size_t i; - - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_d); - ctx_peer = ctx_me; /* duplicate initial conditions */ - - needed_space = needed_len + pad_up(needed_len, ctx_me.hmac_digest_size); - replace(pi->our_keymat, alloc_bytes(needed_space, "keymat in compute_keymat()")); - replace(pi->peer_keymat, alloc_bytes(needed_space, "peer_keymat in quick_inI1_outR1()")); - - for (i = 0;; ) - { - if (st->st_shared.ptr != NULL) - { - /* PFS: include the g^xy */ - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_shared); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_shared); - } - hmac_update(&ctx_me, &protoid, sizeof(protoid)); - hmac_update(&ctx_peer, &protoid, sizeof(protoid)); - - hmac_update(&ctx_me, (u_char *)&pi->our_spi, sizeof(pi->our_spi)); - hmac_update(&ctx_peer, (u_char *)&pi->attrs.spi, sizeof(pi->attrs.spi)); - - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_ni); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_ni); - - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_me, st->st_nr); - hmac_update_chunk(&ctx_peer, st->st_nr); - - hmac_final(pi->our_keymat + i, &ctx_me); - hmac_final(pi->peer_keymat + i, &ctx_peer); - - i += ctx_me.hmac_digest_size; - if (i >= needed_space) - break; - - /* more keying material needed: prepare to go around again */ - - hmac_reinit(&ctx_me); - hmac_reinit(&ctx_peer); - - hmac_update(&ctx_me, pi->our_keymat + i - ctx_me.hmac_digest_size - , ctx_me.hmac_digest_size); - hmac_update(&ctx_peer, pi->peer_keymat + i - ctx_peer.hmac_digest_size - , ctx_peer.hmac_digest_size); - } - } - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_dump("KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->our_keymat, pi->keymat_len); - DBG_dump("Peer KEYMAT computed:\n", pi->peer_keymat, pi->keymat_len)); -} - -static void -compute_keymats(struct state *st) -{ - if (st->st_ah.present) - compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah); - if (st->st_esp.present) - compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp); -} - -/* State Transition Functions. - * - * The definition of state_microcode_table in demux.c is a good - * overview of these routines. - * - * - Called from process_packet; result handled by complete_state_transition - * - struct state_microcode member "processor" points to these - * - these routine definitionss are in state order - * - these routines must be restartable from any point of error return: - * beware of memory allocated before any error. - * - output HDR is usually emitted by process_packet (if state_microcode - * member first_out_payload isn't ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE). - * - * The transition functions' functions include: - * - process and judge payloads - * - update st_iv (result of decryption is in st_new_iv) - * - build reply packet - */ - -/* Handle a Main Mode Oakley first packet (responder side). - * HDR;SA --> HDR;SA - */ -stf_status -main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA]; - struct state *st; - struct connection *c; - struct isakmp_proposal proposal; - pb_stream proposal_pbs; - pb_stream r_sa_pbs; - u_int32_t ipsecdoisit; - lset_t policy = LEMPTY; - int vids_to_send = 0; - - /* We preparse the peer's proposal in order to determine - * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK) - */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sa_pd->payload.sa - , &sa_pd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal)); - - backup_pbs(&proposal_pbs); - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_policy(&proposal_pbs - , proposal.isap_notrans, &policy)); - restore_pbs(&proposal_pbs); - - /* We are only considering candidate connections that match - * the requested authentication policy (RSA or PSK) - */ - c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, pluto_port - , &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy); - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (c == NULL && md->iface->ike_float) - { - c = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, NAT_T_IKE_FLOAT_PORT - , &md->sender, md->sender_port, policy); - } -#endif - - if (c == NULL) - { - /* See if a wildcarded connection can be found. - * We cannot pick the right connection, so we're making a guess. - * All Road Warrior connections are fair game: - * we pick the first we come across (if any). - * If we don't find any, we pick the first opportunistic - * with the smallest subnet that includes the peer. - * There is, of course, no necessary relationship between - * an Initiator's address and that of its client, - * but Food Groups kind of assumes one. - */ - { - struct connection *d; - - d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr - , pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, policy); - - for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next) - { - if (d->kind == CK_GROUP) - { - /* ignore */ - } - else - { - if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO)) - { - /* must be Road Warrior: we have a winner */ - c = d; - break; - } - - /* Opportunistic or Shunt: pick tightest match */ - if (addrinsubnet(&md->sender, &d->spd.that.client) - && (c == NULL || !subnetinsubnet(&c->spd.that.client, &d->spd.that.client))) - c = d; - } - } - } - - if (c == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u" - " but no connection has been authorized%s%s" - , ip_str(&md->iface->addr), ntohs(portof(&md->iface->addr)) - , (policy != LEMPTY) ? " with policy=" : "" - , (policy != LEMPTY) ? bitnamesof(sa_policy_bit_names, policy) : ""); - /* XXX notification is in order! */ - return STF_IGNORE; - } - else if (c->kind != CK_TEMPLATE) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "initial Main Mode message received on %s:%u" - " but \"%s\" forbids connection" - , ip_str(&md->iface->addr), pluto_port, c->name); - /* XXX notification is in order! */ - return STF_IGNORE; - } - else - { - /* Create a temporary connection that is a copy of this one. - * His ID isn't declared yet. - */ - c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - md->sender_port, -#endif -#ifdef VIRTUAL_IP - NULL, -#endif - NULL); - } - } - else if (c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE) - { - /* Create an instance - * This is a rare case: wildcard peer ID but static peer IP address - */ - c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, &c->spd.that.id); - } - - /* Set up state */ - md->st = st = new_state(); - st->st_connection = c; - set_cur_state(st); /* (caller will reset cur_state) */ - st->st_try = 0; /* not our job to try again from start */ - st->st_policy = c->policy & ~POLICY_IPSEC_MASK; /* only as accurate as connection */ - - memcpy(st->st_icookie, md->hdr.isa_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - get_cookie(FALSE, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &md->sender); - - insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */ - - st->st_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC; - st->st_situation = SIT_IDENTITY_ONLY; /* We only support this */ - - if ((c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) && (c->spd.that.host_port != pluto_port)) - { - plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s:%u" - , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr), c->spd.that.host_port); - } - else if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) - { - plog("responding to Main Mode from unknown peer %s" - , ip_str(&c->spd.that.host_addr)); - } - else - { - plog("responding to Main Mode"); - } - - /* parse_isakmp_sa also spits out a winning SA into our reply, - * so we have to build our md->reply and emit HDR before calling it. - */ - - /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */ - if (SEND_PLUTO_VID) - vids_to_send++; - if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID) - vids_to_send++; - if (md->openpgp) - vids_to_send++; - /* always send XAUTH Vendor ID */ - vids_to_send++; - /* always send DPD Vendor ID */ - vids_to_send++; -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled) - vids_to_send++; -#endif - - /* HDR out. - * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because we must - * fill in the cookie. - */ - { - struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr; - - r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT; /* we won't ever turn on this bit */ - memcpy(r_hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - r_hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SA; - if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* start of SA out */ - { - struct isakmp_sa r_sa = sa_pd->payload.sa; - - r_sa.isasa_np = vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - - if (!out_struct(&r_sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* SA body in and out */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs - ,&proposal, &r_sa_pbs, st, FALSE)); - - /* if enabled send Pluto Vendor ID */ - if (SEND_PLUTO_VID) - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &md->rbody, VID_STRONGSWAN)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* if enabled send Cisco Unity Vendor ID */ - if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID) - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &md->rbody, VID_CISCO_UNITY)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* - * if the peer sent an OpenPGP Vendor ID we offer the same capability - */ - if (md->openpgp) - { - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &md->rbody, VID_OPENPGP)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* Announce our ability to do eXtended AUTHentication to the peer */ - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &md->rbody, VID_MISC_XAUTH)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* Announce our ability to do Dead Peer Detection to the peer */ - if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &md->rbody, VID_MISC_DPD)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("sender checking NAT-t: %d and %d" - , nat_traversal_enabled, md->nat_traversal_vid) - ) - if (md->nat_traversal_vid && nat_traversal_enabled) - { - /* reply if NAT-Traversal draft is supported */ - st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid); - - if (st->nat_traversal - && !out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , &md->rbody, md->nat_traversal_vid)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } -#endif - - close_message(&md->rbody); - - /* save initiator SA for HASH */ - clonereplacechunk(st->st_p1isa, sa_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs), "sa in main_inI1_outR1()"); - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* STATE_MAIN_I1: HDR, SA --> auth dependent - * PSK_AUTH, DS_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, Ni - * - * The following are not yet implemented: - * PKE_AUTH: --> HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r - * RPKE_AUTH: --> HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, - * <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i] - * - * We must verify that the proposal received matches one we sent. - */ -stf_status -main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - - u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - - /* verify echoed SA */ - { - u_int32_t ipsecdoisit; - pb_stream proposal_pbs; - struct isakmp_proposal proposal; - struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA]; - - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(preparse_isakmp_sa_body(&sapd->payload.sa - ,&sapd->pbs, &ipsecdoisit, &proposal_pbs, &proposal)); - if (proposal.isap_notrans != 1) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "a single Transform is required in a selecting Oakley Proposal; found %u" - , (unsigned)proposal.isap_notrans); - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX); - } - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit - , &proposal_pbs, &proposal, NULL, st, TRUE)); - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("sender checking NAT-t: %d and %d" - , nat_traversal_enabled, md->nat_traversal_vid) - ) - if (nat_traversal_enabled && md->nat_traversal_vid) - { - st->nat_traversal = nat_traversal_vid_to_method(md->nat_traversal_vid); - plog("enabling possible NAT-traversal with method %s" - , bitnamesof(natt_type_bitnames, st->nat_traversal)); - } - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) - { - np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ? - ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS; - } - #endif - - /**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Ni ****************/ - - /* HDR out. - * We can't leave this to comm_handle() because the isa_np - * depends on the type of Auth (eventually). - */ - echo_hdr(md, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_KE); - - /* KE out */ - if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group - , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - -#ifdef DEBUG - /* Ni out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody - , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np, "Ni")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2) - { - /* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */ - pb_stream vid_pbs; - - if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs); - } -#else - /* Ni out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody, np, "Ni")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; -#endif - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) - { - if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } -#endif - - /* finish message */ - close_message(&md->rbody); - - /* Reinsert the state, using the responder cookie we just received */ - unhash_state(st); - memcpy(st->st_rcookie, md->hdr.isa_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */ - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* STATE_MAIN_R1: - * PSK_AUTH, DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Ni --> HDR, KE, Nr - * - * The following are not yet implemented: - * PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ] <IDi1_b>PubKey_r, <Ni_b>PubKey_r - * --> HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i - * RPKE_AUTH: - * HDR, [ HASH(1), ] <Ni_b>Pubkey_r, <KE_b>Ke_i, <IDi1_b>Ke_i [,<<Cert-I_b>Ke_i] - * --> HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r - */ -stf_status -main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - pb_stream *keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs; - - /* send CR if auth is RSA and no preloaded RSA public key exists*/ - bool RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG - || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA - || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA; - bool send_cr = !no_cr_send && RSA_auth && !has_preloaded_public_key(st); - - u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - - /* KE in */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gi, "Gi", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs)); - - /* Ni in */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni")); - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("inI2: checking NAT-t: %d and %d" - , nat_traversal_enabled, st->nat_traversal) - ) - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) - { - nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md); - - np = (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_RFC_VALUES) ? - ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_RFC : ISAKMP_NEXT_NATD_DRAFTS; - } - if (st->nat_traversal) - { - nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port); - } - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA) - { - nat_traversal_new_ka_event(); - } -#endif - - /* decode certificate requests */ - st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE; - decode_cr(md, st->st_connection); - - /**************** build output packet HDR;KE;Nr ****************/ - - /* HDR out done */ - - /* KE out */ - if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group - , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - -#ifdef DEBUG - /* Nr out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody - , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID - : (send_cr? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np), "Nr")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2) - { - /* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */ - pb_stream vid_pbs; - - if (!out_generic((send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np, - &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs); - } -#else - /* Nr out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody, - (send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np, "Nr")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; -#endif - - /* CR out */ - if (send_cr) - { - if (st->st_connection->kind == CK_PERMANENT) - { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE - , st->st_connection->spd.that.ca - , &md->rbody, np)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - else - { - generalName_t *ca = NULL; - - if (collect_rw_ca_candidates(md, &ca)) - { - generalName_t *gn; - - for (gn = ca; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next) - { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, gn->name - , &md->rbody - , gn->next == NULL ? np : ISAKMP_NEXT_CR)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - free_generalNames(ca, FALSE); - } - else - { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, empty_chunk - , &md->rbody, np)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) - { - if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } -#endif - - /* finish message */ - close_message(&md->rbody); - - /* next message will be encrypted, but not this one. - * We could defer this calculation. - */ - compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group); - if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st)) - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; - update_iv(st); - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* STATE_MAIN_I2: - * SMF_PSK_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I - * SMF_DS_AUTH: HDR, KE, Nr --> HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I - * - * The following are not yet implemented. - * SMF_PKE_AUTH: HDR, KE, <IDr1_b>PubKey_i, <Nr_b>PubKey_i - * --> HDR*, HASH_I - * SMF_RPKE_AUTH: HDR, <Nr_b>PubKey_i, <KE_b>Ke_r, <IDr1_b>Ke_r - * --> HDR*, HASH_I - */ -stf_status -main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - pb_stream *const keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs; - pb_stream id_pbs; /* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */ - - certpolicy_t cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert; - cert_t mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert; - bool requested, send_cert, send_cr; - - bool RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG - || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA - || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA; - - int auth_payload = RSA_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH; - - /* KE in */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_KE(&st->st_gr, "Gr", st->st_oakley.group, keyex_pbs)); - - /* Nr in */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr")); - - /* decode certificate requests */ - st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE; - decode_cr(md, st->st_connection); - - /* free collected certificate requests since as initiator - * we don't heed them anyway - */ - free_generalNames(st->st_connection->requested_ca, TRUE); - st->st_connection->requested_ca = NULL; - - /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want - * or are requested to send it - */ - requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED - && st->st_connection->got_certrequest; - send_cert = RSA_auth && mycert.type != CERT_NONE - && (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested); - - /* send certificate request if we don't have a preloaded RSA public key */ - send_cr = !no_cr_send && send_cert && !has_preloaded_public_key(st); - - /* done parsing; initialize crypto */ - - compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group); - if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st)) - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) { - nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md); - } - if (st->nat_traversal) { - nat_traversal_show_result(st->nat_traversal, md->sender_port); - } - if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_KA) { - nat_traversal_new_ka_event(); - } -#endif - - /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDii;HASH/SIG_I ***************/ - /* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inI3_outR3's code */ - - /* HDR* out done */ - - /* IDii out */ - { - struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd; - chunk_t id_b; - - build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this); - id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload; - if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &id_pbs) - || !out_chunk(id_b, &id_pbs, "my identity")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(&id_pbs); - } - - /* CERT out */ - if (RSA_auth) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("our certificate policy is %s" - , enum_name(&cert_policy_names, cert_policy)) - ) - if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE) - { - const char *request_text = ""; - - if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED) - request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request"; - plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s" - , send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text); - } - else - { - plog("we don't have a cert"); - } - } - if (send_cert) - { - pb_stream cert_pbs; - - struct isakmp_cert cert_hd; - cert_hd.isacert_np = (send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG; - cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type; - - if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_chunk(get_mycert(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs); - } - - /* CR out */ - if (send_cr) - { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(mycert.type, st->st_connection->spd.that.ca - , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - - /* HASH_I or SIG_I out */ - { - u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - size_t hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, TRUE, &id_pbs); - - if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) - { - /* HASH_I out */ - if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody - , hash_val, hash_len, "HASH_I")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - else - { - /* SIG_I out */ - u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS]; - size_t sig_len = RSA_sign_hash(st->st_connection - , sig_val, hash_val, hash_len); - - if (sig_len == 0) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for RSA Signature"); - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; - } - - if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc - , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_I")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */ - - /* st_new_iv was computed by generate_skeyids_iv */ - if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* Shared logic for asynchronous lookup of DNS KEY records. - * Used for STATE_MAIN_R2 and STATE_MAIN_I3. - */ - -enum key_oppo_step { - kos_null, - kos_his_txt -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - , kos_his_key -#endif -}; - -struct key_continuation { - struct adns_continuation ac; /* common prefix */ - struct msg_digest *md; - enum key_oppo_step step; - bool failure_ok; - err_t last_ugh; -}; - -typedef stf_status (key_tail_fn)(struct msg_digest *md - , struct key_continuation *kc); -static void -report_key_dns_failure(struct id *id, err_t ugh) -{ - char id_buf[BUF_LEN]; /* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */ - - (void) idtoa(id, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'" - "; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)", id_buf, ugh); -} - - -/* Processs the Main Mode ID Payload and the Authenticator - * (Hash or Signature Payload). - * If a DNS query is still needed to get the other host's public key, - * the query is initiated and STF_SUSPEND is returned. - * Note: parameter kc is a continuation containing the results from - * the previous DNS query, or NULL indicating no query has been issued. - */ -static stf_status -main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md - , bool initiator /* are we the Initiator? */ - , cont_fn_t cont_fn /* continuation function */ - , const struct key_continuation *kc /* current state, can be NULL */ -) -{ - struct state *st = md->st; - u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - size_t hash_len; - struct id peer; - stf_status r = STF_OK; - - /* ID Payload in */ - if (!decode_peer_id(md, &peer)) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - - /* Hash the ID Payload. - * main_mode_hash requires idpl->cur to be at end of payload - * so we temporarily set if so. - */ - { - pb_stream *idpl = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]->pbs; - u_int8_t *old_cur = idpl->cur; - - idpl->cur = idpl->roof; - hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, !initiator, idpl); - idpl->cur = old_cur; - } - - switch (st->st_oakley.auth) - { - case OAKLEY_PRESHARED_KEY: - case XAUTHInitPreShared: - case XAUTHRespPreShared: - { - pb_stream *const hash_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH]->pbs; - - if (pbs_left(hash_pbs) != hash_len - || memcmp(hash_pbs->cur, hash_val, hash_len) != 0) - { - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "received HASH:" - , hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Hash Payload does not match computed value"); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; - } - } - break; - - case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG: - case XAUTHInitRSA: - case XAUTHRespRSA: - r = RSA_check_signature(&peer, st, hash_val, hash_len - , &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - , kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.keys_from_dns -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - , kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.gateways_from_dns - ); - - if (r == STF_SUSPEND) - { - /* initiate/resume asynchronous DNS lookup for key */ - struct key_continuation *nkc - = alloc_thing(struct key_continuation, "key continuation"); - enum key_oppo_step step_done = kc == NULL? kos_null : kc->step; - err_t ugh; - - /* Record that state is used by a suspended md */ - passert(st->st_suspended_md == NULL); - st->st_suspended_md = md; - - nkc->failure_ok = FALSE; - nkc->md = md; - - switch (step_done) - { - case kos_null: - /* first try: look for the TXT records */ - nkc->step = kos_his_txt; -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - nkc->failure_ok = TRUE; -#endif - ugh = start_adns_query(&peer - , &peer /* SG itself */ - , T_TXT - , cont_fn - , &nkc->ac); - break; - -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - case kos_his_txt: - /* second try: look for the KEY records */ - nkc->step = kos_his_key; - ugh = start_adns_query(&peer - , NULL /* no sgw for KEY */ - , T_KEY - , cont_fn - , &nkc->ac); - break; -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - - default: - bad_case(step_done); - } - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - report_key_dns_failure(&peer, ugh); - st->st_suspended_md = NULL; - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - } - break; - - default: - bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth); - } - if (r != STF_OK) - return r; - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("authentication succeeded")); - - /* - * With the peer ID known, let's see if we need to switch connections. - */ - if (!switch_connection(md, &peer, initiator)) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - - return r; -} - -/* This continuation is called as part of either - * the main_inI3_outR3 state or main_inR3 state. - * - * The "tail" function is the corresponding tail - * function main_inI3_outR3_tail | main_inR3_tail, - * either directly when the state is started, or via - * adns continuation. - * - * Basically, we go around in a circle: - * main_in?3* -> key_continue - * ^ \ - * / V - * adns main_in?3*_tail - * ^ | - * \ V - * main_id_and_auth - * - * until such time as main_id_and_auth is able - * to find authentication, or we run out of things - * to try. - */ -static void -key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr -, err_t ugh -, key_tail_fn *tail) -{ - struct key_continuation *kc = (void *)cr; - struct state *st = kc->md->st; - - passert(cur_state == NULL); - - /* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */ - if (st != NULL) - { - stf_status r; - - passert(st->st_suspended_md == kc->md); - st->st_suspended_md = NULL; /* no longer connected or suspended */ - cur_state = st; - - if (!kc->failure_ok && ugh != NULL) - { - report_key_dns_failure(&st->st_connection->spd.that.id, ugh); - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; - } - else - { - -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt || kc->step == kos_his_key); -#else - passert(kc->step == kos_his_txt); -#endif - kc->last_ugh = ugh; /* record previous error in case we need it */ - r = (*tail)(kc->md, kc); - } - complete_state_transition(&kc->md, r); - } - if (kc->md != NULL) - release_md(kc->md); - cur_state = NULL; -} - -/* STATE_MAIN_R2: - * PSK_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, HASH_I --> HDR*, IDr1, HASH_R - * DS_AUTH: HDR*, IDi1, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --> HDR*, IDr1, [ CERT, ] SIG_R - * PKE_AUTH, RPKE_AUTH: HDR*, HASH_I --> HDR*, HASH_R - * - * Broken into parts to allow asynchronous DNS lookup. - * - * - main_inI3_outR3 to start - * - main_inI3_outR3_tail to finish or suspend for DNS lookup - * - main_inI3_outR3_continue to start main_inI3_outR3_tail again - */ -static key_tail_fn main_inI3_outR3_tail; /* forward */ - -stf_status -main_inI3_outR3(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - return main_inI3_outR3_tail(md, NULL); -} - -static void -main_inI3_outR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh) -{ - key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inI3_outR3_tail); -} - -static stf_status -main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md -, struct key_continuation *kc) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - u_int8_t auth_payload; - pb_stream r_id_pbs; /* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */ - certpolicy_t cert_policy; - cert_t mycert; - bool RSA_auth; - bool send_cert; - bool requested; - - /* ID and HASH_I or SIG_I in - * Note: this may switch the connection being used! - */ - { - stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, FALSE - , main_inI3_outR3_continue - , kc); - - if (r != STF_OK) - return r; - } - - /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want - * or are requested to send it - */ - cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert; - mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert; - requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED - && st->st_connection->got_certrequest; - RSA_auth = st->st_oakley.auth == OAKLEY_RSA_SIG - || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHInitRSA - || st->st_oakley.auth == XAUTHRespRSA; - send_cert = RSA_auth - && mycert.type != CERT_NONE - && (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested); - - /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R ***************/ - /* proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR* - * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE. - * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially - * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS. - */ - /* ??? NOTE: this is almost the same as main_inR2_outI3's code */ - - /* HDR* out - * If auth were PKE_AUTH or RPKE_AUTH, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH would - * be first payload. - */ - echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_ID); - - auth_payload = RSA_auth ? ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG : ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH; - - /* IDir out */ - { - /* id_hd should be struct isakmp_id, but struct isakmp_ipsec_id - * allows build_id_payload() to work for both phases. - */ - struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd; - chunk_t id_b; - - build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this); - id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload; - if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &r_id_pbs) - || !out_chunk(id_b, &r_id_pbs, "my identity")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(&r_id_pbs); - } - - /* CERT out */ - if (RSA_auth) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("our certificate policy is %s" - , enum_name(&cert_policy_names, cert_policy)) - ) - if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE) - { - const char *request_text = ""; - - if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED) - request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request"; - plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s" - , send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text); - } - else - { - plog("we don't have a cert"); - } - } - if (send_cert) - { - pb_stream cert_pbs; - - struct isakmp_cert cert_hd; - cert_hd.isacert_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG; - cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type; - - if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_chunk(get_mycert(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs); - } - - /* HASH_R or SIG_R out */ - { - u_char hash_val[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - size_t hash_len = main_mode_hash(st, hash_val, FALSE, &r_id_pbs); - - if (auth_payload == ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH) - { - /* HASH_R out */ - if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_hash_desc, &md->rbody - , hash_val, hash_len, "HASH_R")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - else - { - /* SIG_R out */ - u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS]; - size_t sig_len = RSA_sign_hash(st->st_connection - , sig_val, hash_val, hash_len); - - if (sig_len == 0) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for RSA Signature"); - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; - } - - if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc - , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_R")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - - /* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header */ - - if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - - /* Last block of Phase 1 (R3), kept for Phase 2 IV generation */ - DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last encrypted block of Phase 1:" - , st->st_new_iv, st->st_new_iv_len); - - ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno); - - /* Save Phase 1 IV */ - st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len; - set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv); - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* STATE_MAIN_I3: - * Handle HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R from responder. - * - * Broken into parts to allow asynchronous DNS for KEY records. - * - * - main_inR3 to start - * - main_inR3_tail to finish or suspend for DNS lookup - * - main_inR3_continue to start main_inR3_tail again - */ - -static key_tail_fn main_inR3_tail; /* forward */ - -stf_status -main_inR3(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - return main_inR3_tail(md, NULL); -} - -static void -main_inR3_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh) -{ - key_continue(cr, ugh, main_inR3_tail); -} - -static stf_status -main_inR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md -, struct key_continuation *kc) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - - /* ID and HASH_R or SIG_R in - * Note: this may switch the connection being used! - */ - { - stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, TRUE, main_inR3_continue, kc); - - if (r != STF_OK) - return r; - } - - /**************** done input ****************/ - - ISAKMP_SA_established(st->st_connection, st->st_serialno); - - /* Save Phase 1 IV */ - st->st_ph1_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len; - set_ph1_iv(st, st->st_new_iv); - - - update_iv(st); /* finalize our Phase 1 IV */ - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* Handle first message of Phase 2 -- Quick Mode. - * HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] --> - * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] - * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5) - * Installs inbound IPsec SAs. - * Although this seems early, we know enough to do so, and - * this way we know that it is soon enough to catch all - * packets that other side could send using this IPsec SA. - * - * Broken into parts to allow asynchronous DNS for TXT records: - * - * - quick_inI1_outR1 starts the ball rolling. - * It checks and parses enough to learn the Phase 2 IDs - * - * - quick_inI1_outR1_tail does the rest of the job - * unless DNS must be consulted. In that case, - * it starts a DNS query, salts away what is needed - * to continue, and suspends. Calls - * + quick_inI1_outR1_start_query - * + quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer - * - * - quick_inI1_outR1_continue will restart quick_inI1_outR1_tail - * when DNS comes back with an answer. - * - * A big chunk of quick_inI1_outR1_tail is executed twice. - * This is necessary because the set of connections - * might change while we are awaiting DNS. - * When first called, gateways_from_dns == NULL. If DNS is - * consulted asynchronously, gateways_from_dns != NULL the second time. - * Remember that our state object might disappear too! - * - * - * If the connection is opportunistic, we must verify delegation. - * - * 1. Check that we are authorized to be SG for - * our client. We look for the TXT record that - * delegates us. We also check that the public - * key (if present) matches the private key we used. - * Eventually, we should probably require DNSsec - * authentication for our side. - * - * 2. If our client TXT record did not include a - * public key, check the KEY record indicated - * by the identity in the TXT record. - * - * 3. If the peer's client is the peer itself, we - * consider it authenticated. Otherwise, we check - * the TXT record for the client to see that - * the identity of the SG matches the peer and - * that some public key (if present in the TXT) - * matches. We need not check the public key if - * it isn't in the TXT record. - * - * Since p isn't yet instantiated, we need to look - * in c for description of peer. - * - * We cannot afford to block waiting for a DNS query. - * The code here is structured as two halves: - * - process the result of just completed - * DNS query (if any) - * - if another query is needed, initiate the next - * DNS query and suspend - */ - -enum verify_oppo_step { - vos_fail, - vos_start, - vos_our_client, - vos_our_txt, -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - vos_our_key, -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - vos_his_client, - vos_done -}; - -static const char *const verify_step_name[] = { - "vos_fail", - "vos_start", - "vos_our_client", - "vos_our_txt", -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - "vos_our_key", -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - "vos_his_client", - "vos_done" -}; - -/* hold anything we can handle of a Phase 2 ID */ -struct p2id { - ip_subnet net; - u_int8_t proto; - u_int16_t port; -}; - -struct verify_oppo_bundle { - enum verify_oppo_step step; - bool failure_ok; /* if true, quick_inI1_outR1_continue will try - * other things on DNS failure */ - struct msg_digest *md; - struct p2id my, his; - unsigned int new_iv_len; /* p1st's might change */ - u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - /* int whackfd; */ /* not needed because we are Responder */ -}; - -struct verify_oppo_continuation { - struct adns_continuation ac; /* common prefix */ - struct verify_oppo_bundle b; -}; - -static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b - , struct adns_continuation *ac); - -stf_status -quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - const struct state *const p1st = md->st; - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; - struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; - struct verify_oppo_bundle b; - - /* HASH(1) in */ - CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md - , quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof - , p1st, &md->hdr.isa_msgid, FALSE) - , "HASH(1)", "Quick I1"); - - /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in - * We do this now (probably out of physical order) because - * we wish to select the correct connection before we consult - * it for policy. - */ - - if (id_pd != NULL) - { - /* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */ - - /* IDci (initiator is peer) */ - - if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs - , &b.his.net, "peer client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - - /* Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */ - - if (id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_idtype == ID_FQDN) - happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net)); - - /* End Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */ - - b.his.proto = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid; - b.his.port = id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port; - b.his.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.his.port); - - /* IDcr (we are responder) */ - - if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs - , &b.my.net, "our client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - - b.my.proto = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid; - b.my.port = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port; - b.my.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.my.port); - } - else - { - /* implicit IDci and IDcr: peer and self */ - if (!sameaddrtype(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr)) - return STF_FAIL; - - happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b.my.net)); - happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net)); - b.his.proto = b.my.proto = 0; - b.his.port = b.my.port = 0; - } - b.step = vos_start; - b.md = md; - b.new_iv_len = p1st->st_new_iv_len; - memcpy(b.new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv, p1st->st_new_iv_len); - return quick_inI1_outR1_tail(&b, NULL); -} - -static void -report_verify_failure(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, err_t ugh) -{ - struct state *st = b->md->st; - char fgwb[ADDRTOT_BUF] - , cb[ADDRTOT_BUF]; - ip_address client; - err_t which; - - switch (b->step) - { - case vos_our_client: - case vos_our_txt: -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - case vos_our_key: -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - which = "our"; - networkof(&b->my.net, &client); - break; - - case vos_his_client: - which = "his"; - networkof(&b->his.net, &client); - break; - - case vos_start: - case vos_done: - case vos_fail: - default: - bad_case(b->step); - } - - addrtot(&st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0, fgwb, sizeof(fgwb)); - addrtot(&client, 0, cb, sizeof(cb)); - loglog(RC_OPPOFAILURE - , "gateway %s wants connection with %s as %s client, but DNS fails to confirm delegation: %s" - , fgwb, cb, which, ugh); -} - -static void -quick_inI1_outR1_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh) -{ - stf_status r; - struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc = (void *)cr; - struct verify_oppo_bundle *b = &vc->b; - struct state *st = b->md->st; - - passert(cur_state == NULL); - /* if st == NULL, our state has been deleted -- just clean up */ - if (st != NULL) - { - passert(st->st_suspended_md == b->md); - st->st_suspended_md = NULL; /* no longer connected or suspended */ - cur_state = st; - if (!b->failure_ok && ugh != NULL) - { - report_verify_failure(b, ugh); - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - } - else - { - r = quick_inI1_outR1_tail(b, cr); - } - complete_state_transition(&b->md, r); - } - if (b->md != NULL) - release_md(b->md); - cur_state = NULL; -} - -static stf_status -quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b -, enum verify_oppo_step next_step) -{ - struct msg_digest *md = b->md; - struct state *p1st = md->st; - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; - struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc - = alloc_thing(struct verify_oppo_continuation, "verify continuation"); - struct id id /* subject of query */ - , *our_id /* needed for myid playing */ - , our_id_space; /* ephemeral: no need for unshare_id_content */ - ip_address client; - err_t ugh; - - /* Record that state is used by a suspended md */ - b->step = next_step; /* not just vc->b.step */ - vc->b = *b; - passert(p1st->st_suspended_md == NULL); - p1st->st_suspended_md = b->md; - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - { - char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - - subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours)); - subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his)); - - DBG_log("responding with DNS query - from %s to %s new state: %s" - , ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]); - }); - - /* Resolve %myid in a cheesy way. - * We have to do the resolution because start_adns_query - * et al have insufficient information to do so. - * If %myid is already known, we'll use that value - * (XXX this may be a mistake: it could be stale). - * If %myid is unknown, we should check to see if - * there are credentials for the IP address or the FQDN. - * Instead, we'll just assume the IP address since we are - * acting as the responder and only the IP address would - * have gotten it to us. - * We don't even try to do this for the other side: - * %myid makes no sense for the other side (but it is syntactically - * legal). - */ - our_id = resolve_myid(&c->spd.this.id); - if (our_id->kind == ID_NONE) - { - iptoid(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &our_id_space); - our_id = &our_id_space; - } - - switch (next_step) - { - case vos_our_client: - networkof(&b->my.net, &client); - iptoid(&client, &id); - vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE; - ugh = start_adns_query(&id - , our_id - , T_TXT - , quick_inI1_outR1_continue - , &vc->ac); - break; - - case vos_our_txt: - vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = TRUE; - ugh = start_adns_query(our_id - , our_id /* self as SG */ - , T_TXT - , quick_inI1_outR1_continue - , &vc->ac); - break; - -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - case vos_our_key: - vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE; - ugh = start_adns_query(our_id - , NULL - , T_KEY - , quick_inI1_outR1_continue - , &vc->ac); - break; -#endif - - case vos_his_client: - networkof(&b->his.net, &client); - iptoid(&client, &id); - vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE; - ugh = start_adns_query(&id - , &c->spd.that.id - , T_TXT - , quick_inI1_outR1_continue - , &vc->ac); - break; - - default: - bad_case(next_step); - } - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - /* note: we'd like to use vc->b but vc has been freed - * so we have to use b. This is why we plunked next_state - * into b, not just vc->b. - */ - report_verify_failure(b, ugh); - p1st->st_suspended_md = NULL; - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - } - else - { - return STF_SUSPEND; - } -} - -static enum verify_oppo_step -quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b -, struct adns_continuation *ac -, struct state *p1st) -{ - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; - enum verify_oppo_step next_step; - err_t ugh = NULL; - - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - { - char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - - subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours)); - subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his)); - DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s state: %s" - , ours, his, verify_step_name[b->step]); - }); - - /* process just completed DNS query (if any) */ - switch (b->step) - { - case vos_start: - /* no query to digest */ - next_step = vos_our_client; - break; - - case vos_our_client: - next_step = vos_his_client; - { - const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c); - struct gw_info *gwp; - - if (pri == NULL) - { - ugh = "we don't know our own key"; - break; - } - ugh = "our client does not delegate us as its Security Gateway"; - for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) - { - ugh = "our client delegates us as its Security Gateway but with the wrong public key"; - /* If there is no key in the TXT record, - * we count it as a win, but we will have - * to separately fetch and check the KEY record. - * If there is a key from the TXT record, - * we count it as a win if we match the key. - */ - if (!gwp->gw_key_present) - { - next_step = vos_our_txt; - ugh = NULL; /* good! */ - break; - } - else if (same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa)) - { - ugh = NULL; /* good! */ - break; - } - } - } - break; - - case vos_our_txt: - next_step = vos_his_client; - { - const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c); - - if (pri == NULL) - { - ugh = "we don't know our own key"; - break; - } - { - struct gw_info *gwp; - - for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) - { -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - /* not an error yet, because we have to check KEY RR as well */ - ugh = NULL; -#else - ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key"; -#endif - if (gwp->gw_key_present - && same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &gwp->key->u.rsa)) - { - ugh = NULL; /* good! */ - break; - } -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - next_step = vos_our_key; -#endif - } - } - } - break; - -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - case vos_our_key: - next_step = vos_his_client; - { - const struct RSA_private_key *pri = get_RSA_private_key(c); - - if (pri == NULL) - { - ugh = "we don't know our own key"; - break; - } - { - pubkey_list_t *kp; - - ugh = "our client delegation depends on our missing " RRNAME " record"; - for (kp = ac->keys_from_dns; kp != NULL; kp = kp->next) - { - ugh = "our client delegation depends on our " RRNAME " record, but it has the wrong public key"; - if (same_RSA_public_key(&pri->pub, &kp->key->u.rsa)) - { - /* do this only once a day */ - if (!logged_txt_warning) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "found KEY RR but not TXT RR. See http://www.freeswan.org/err/txt-change.html."); - logged_txt_warning = TRUE; - } - ugh = NULL; /* good! */ - break; - } - } - } - } - break; -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - - case vos_his_client: - next_step = vos_done; - { - struct gw_info *gwp; - - /* check that the public key that authenticated - * the ISAKMP SA (p1st) will do for this gateway. - */ - - ugh = "peer's client does not delegate to peer"; - for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) - { - ugh = "peer and its client disagree about public key"; - /* If there is a key from the TXT record, - * we count it as a win if we match the key. - * If there was no key, we claim a match since - * it implies fetching a KEY from the same - * place we must have gotten it. - */ - if (!gwp->gw_key_present - || same_RSA_public_key(&p1st->st_peer_pubkey->u.rsa - , &gwp->key->u.rsa)) - { - ugh = NULL; /* good! */ - break; - } - } - } - break; - - default: - bad_case(b->step); - } - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - report_verify_failure(b, ugh); - next_step = vos_fail; - } - return next_step; -} - -static stf_status -quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b -, struct adns_continuation *ac) -{ - struct msg_digest *md = b->md; - struct state *const p1st = md->st; - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; - struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; - ip_subnet *our_net = &b->my.net - , *his_net = &b->his.net; - - u_char /* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */ - *r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */ - *r_hash_start; /* from where to start hashing */ - - /* Now that we have identities of client subnets, we must look for - * a suitable connection (our current one only matches for hosts). - */ - { - struct connection *p = find_client_connection(c - , our_net, his_net, b->my.proto, b->my.port, b->his.proto, b->his.port); - - if (p == NULL) - { - /* This message occurs in very puzzling circumstances - * so we must add as much information and beauty as we can. - */ - struct end - me = c->spd.this, - he = c->spd.that; - char buf[2*SUBNETTOT_BUF + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 2*BUF_LEN + 2*ADDRTOT_BUF + 12]; /* + 12 for separating */ - size_t l; - - me.client = *our_net; - me.has_client = !subnetisaddr(our_net, &me.host_addr); - me.protocol = b->my.proto; - me.port = b->my.port; - - he.client = *his_net; - he.has_client = !subnetisaddr(his_net, &he.host_addr); - he.protocol = b->his.proto; - he.port = b->his.port; - - l = format_end(buf, sizeof(buf), &me, NULL, TRUE, LEMPTY); - l += snprintf(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, "..."); - (void)format_end(buf + l, sizeof(buf) - l, &he, NULL, FALSE, LEMPTY); - plog("cannot respond to IPsec SA request" - " because no connection is known for %s" - , buf); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - } - else if (p != c) - { - /* We've got a better connection: it can support the - * specified clients. But it may need instantiation. - */ - if (p->kind == CK_TEMPLATE) - { - /* Yup, it needs instantiation. How much? - * Is it a Road Warrior connection (simple) - * or is it an Opportunistic connection (needing gw validation)? - */ - if (p->policy & POLICY_OPPO) - { - /* Opportunistic case: delegation must be verified. - * Here be dragons. - */ - enum verify_oppo_step next_step; - ip_address our_client, his_client; - - passert(subnetishost(our_net) && subnetishost(his_net)); - networkof(our_net, &our_client); - networkof(his_net, &his_client); - - next_step = quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(b, ac, p1st); - if (next_step == vos_fail) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - - /* short circuit: if peer's client is self, - * accept that we've verified delegation in Phase 1 - */ - if (next_step == vos_his_client - && sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &his_client)) - next_step = vos_done; - - /* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */ - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - { - char ours[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - char his[SUBNETTOT_BUF]; - - subnettot(&c->spd.this.client, 0, ours, sizeof(ours)); - subnettot(&c->spd.that.client, 0, his, sizeof(his)); - - DBG_log("responding on demand from %s to %s new state: %s" - , ours, his, verify_step_name[next_step]); - }); - - /* start next DNS query and suspend (if necessary) */ - if (next_step != vos_done) - return quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(b, next_step); - - /* Instantiate inbound Opportunistic connection, - * carrying over authenticated peer ID - * and filling in a few more details. - * We used to include gateways_from_dns, but that - * seems pointless at this stage of negotiation. - * We should record DNS sec use, if any -- belongs in - * state during perhaps. - */ - p = oppo_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.id - , NULL, &our_client, &his_client); - } - else - { - /* Plain Road Warrior: - * instantiate, carrying over authenticated peer ID - */ - p = rw_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - md->sender_port, -#endif -#ifdef VIRTUAL_IP - his_net, -#endif - &c->spd.that.id); - } - } -#ifdef DEBUG - /* temporarily bump up cur_debugging to get "using..." message - * printed if we'd want it with new connection. - */ - { - lset_t old_cur_debugging = cur_debugging; - - cur_debugging |= p->extra_debugging; - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("using connection \"%s\"", p->name)); - cur_debugging = old_cur_debugging; - } -#endif - c = p; - } - /* fill in the client's true ip address/subnet */ - if (p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard) - { - p->spd.that.client = *his_net; - p->spd.that.has_client_wildcard = FALSE; - } - -#ifdef VIRTUAL_IP - else if (is_virtual_connection(c)) - { - c->spd.that.client = *his_net; - c->spd.that.virt = NULL; - if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, his_net)) - c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE; - } -#endif - - /* fill in the client's true port */ - if (p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard) - { - int port = htons(b->his.port); - - setportof(port, &p->spd.that.host_addr); - setportof(port, &p->spd.that.client.addr); - - p->spd.that.port = b->his.port; - p->spd.that.has_port_wildcard = FALSE; - } - } - - /* now that we are sure of our connection, create our new state */ - { - struct state *const st = duplicate_state(p1st); - - /* first: fill in missing bits of our new state object - * note: we don't copy over st_peer_pubkey, the public key - * that authenticated the ISAKMP SA. We only need it in this - * routine, so we can "reach back" to p1st to get it. - */ - - if (st->st_connection != c) - { - struct connection *t = st->st_connection; - - st->st_connection = c; - set_cur_connection(c); - connection_discard(t); - } - - st->st_try = 0; /* not our job to try again from start */ - - st->st_msgid = md->hdr.isa_msgid; - - st->st_new_iv_len = b->new_iv_len; - memcpy(st->st_new_iv, b->new_iv, b->new_iv_len); - - set_cur_state(st); /* (caller will reset) */ - md->st = st; /* feed back new state */ - - st->st_peeruserprotoid = b->his.proto; - st->st_peeruserport = b->his.port; - st->st_myuserprotoid = b->my.proto; - st->st_myuserport = b->my.port; - - insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */ - - /* copy the connection's - * IPSEC policy into our state. The ISAKMP policy is water under - * the bridge, I think. It will reflect the ISAKMP SA that we - * are using. - */ - st->st_policy = (p1st->st_policy & POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK) - | (c->policy & ~POLICY_ISAKMP_MASK); - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if (p1st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) - { - st->nat_traversal = p1st->nat_traversal; - nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, md->st); - } - else - { - st->nat_traversal = 0; - } - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) && - (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)) - { - nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md); - } -#endif - - /* Start the output packet. - * - * proccess_packet() would automatically generate the HDR* - * payload if smc->first_out_payload is not ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE. - * We don't do this because we wish there to be no partially - * built output packet if we need to suspend for asynch DNS. - * - * We build the reply packet as we parse the message since - * the parse_ipsec_sa_body emits the reply SA - */ - - /* HDR* out */ - echo_hdr(md, TRUE, ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH); - - /* HASH(2) out -- first pass */ - START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SA); - - /* process SA (in and out) */ - { - struct payload_digest *const sapd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA]; - pb_stream r_sa_pbs; - struct isakmp_sa sa = sapd->payload.sa; - - /* sa header is unchanged -- except for np */ - sa.isasa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE; - if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* parse and accept body */ - st->st_pfs_group = &unset_group; - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sapd->pbs - , &sapd->payload.sa, &r_sa_pbs, FALSE, st)); - } - - passert(st->st_pfs_group != &unset_group); - - if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_PFS) && st->st_pfs_group == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "we require PFS but Quick I1 SA specifies no GROUP_DESCRIPTION"); - return STF_FAIL + NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN; /* ??? */ - } - - /* Ni in */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_ni, "Ni")); - - /* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gi, "Gi", "Quick Mode I1")); - - plog("responding to Quick Mode"); - - /**** finish reply packet: Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] ****/ - - /* Nr out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody - , st->st_pfs_group != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE - , "Nr")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */ - - if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) - { - if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group - , &md->rbody, id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* MPZ-Operations might be done after sending the packet... */ - compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi, st->st_pfs_group); - } - - /* [ IDci, IDcr ] out */ - if (id_pd != NULL) - { - struct isakmp_ipsec_id *p = (void *)md->rbody.cur; /* UGH! */ - - if (!out_raw(id_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDci")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_ID; - - p = (void *)md->rbody.cur; /* UGH! */ - - if (!out_raw(id_pd->next->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->next->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDcr")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA) - && (st->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) - && (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT)) - { - /** Send NAT-OA if our address is NATed and if we use Transport Mode */ - if (!nat_traversal_add_natoa(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md->st)) - { - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - } - } - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) - && (st->st_esp.attrs.encapsulation == ENCAPSULATION_MODE_TRANSPORT) - && (c->spd.that.has_client)) - { - /** Remove client **/ - addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.client); - c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE; - } -#endif - - /* Compute reply HASH(2) and insert in output */ - (void)quick_mode_hash12(r_hashval, r_hash_start, md->rbody.cur - , st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE); - - /* Derive new keying material */ - compute_keymats(st); - - /* Tell the kernel to establish the new inbound SA - * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support). - * We do this before any state updating so that - * failure won't look like success. - */ - if (!install_inbound_ipsec_sa(st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - - /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */ - - if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - - return STF_OK; - } -} - -/* - * Initialize RFC 3706 Dead Peer Detection - */ -static void -dpd_init(struct state *st) -{ - struct state *p1st = find_state(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie - , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0); - - if (p1st == NULL) - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "could not find phase 1 state for DPD"); - else if (p1st->st_dpd) - { - plog("Dead Peer Detection (RFC 3706) enabled"); - /* randomize the first DPD event */ - - event_schedule(EVENT_DPD - , (0.5 + rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.E0)) * st->st_connection->dpd_delay - , st); - } -} - -/* Handle (the single) message from Responder in Quick Mode. - * HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] --> - * HDR*, HASH(3) - * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5) - * Installs inbound and outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc. - */ -stf_status -quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - const struct connection *c = st->st_connection; - - /* HASH(2) in */ - CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md - , quick_mode_hash12(hash_val, hash_pbs->roof, md->message_pbs.roof - , st, &st->st_msgid, TRUE) - , "HASH(2)", "Quick R1"); - - /* SA in */ - { - struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA]; - - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_ipsec_sa_body(&sa_pd->pbs - , &sa_pd->payload.sa, NULL, TRUE, st)); - } - - /* Nr in */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr")); - - /* [ KE ] in (for PFS) */ - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gr, "Gr", "Quick Mode R1")); - - if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) - compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group); - - /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in; these must match what we sent */ - - { - struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; - - if (id_pd != NULL) - { - /* ??? we are assuming IPSEC_DOI */ - - /* IDci (we are initiator) */ - - if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs - , &st->st_myuserprotoid, &st->st_myuserport - , &st->st_connection->spd.this.client - , "our client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - - /* IDcr (responder is peer) */ - - if (!check_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs - , &st->st_peeruserprotoid, &st->st_peeruserport - , &st->st_connection->spd.that.client - , "peer client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - } - else - { - /* no IDci, IDcr: we must check that the defaults match our proposal */ - if (!subnetisaddr(&c->spd.this.client, &c->spd.this.host_addr) - || !subnetisaddr(&c->spd.that.client, &c->spd.that.host_addr)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IDci, IDcr payloads missing in message" - " but default does not match proposal"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - } - } - } - - /* check the peer's group attributes */ - - { - const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL; - - get_peer_ca_and_groups(st->st_connection, &peer_list); - - if (!group_membership(peer_list, st->st_connection->name - , st->st_connection->spd.that.groups)) - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - format_groups(st->st_connection->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer is not member of one of the groups: %s" - , buf); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - } - } - -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) - && (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)) - { - nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md); - } -#endif - - /* ??? We used to copy the accepted proposal into the state, but it was - * never used. From sa_pd->pbs.start, length pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs). - */ - - /**************** build reply packet HDR*, HASH(3) ****************/ - - /* HDR* out done */ - - /* HASH(3) out -- since this is the only content, no passes needed */ - { - u_char /* set by START_HASH_PAYLOAD: */ - *r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */ - *r_hash_start; /* start of what is to be hashed */ - - START_HASH_PAYLOAD(md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE); - (void)quick_mode_hash3(r_hashval, st); - } - - /* Derive new keying material */ - compute_keymats(st); - - /* Tell the kernel to establish the inbound, outbound, and routing part - * of the new SA (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support). - * We do this before any state updating so that - * failure won't look like success. - */ - if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */ - - if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inR1_outI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)" - , st->st_connection->name - , st->st_connection->instance_serial - , st->st_serialno - , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa - , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner)); - } - - st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno; - - /* note (presumed) success */ - if (c->gw_info != NULL) - c->gw_info->key->last_worked_time = now(); - - /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */ - if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE) - dpd_init(st); - - return STF_OK; -} - -/* Handle last message of Quick Mode. - * HDR*, HASH(3) -> done - * (see RFC 2409 "IKE" 5.5) - * Installs outbound IPsec SAs, routing, etc. - */ -stf_status -quick_inI2(struct msg_digest *md) -{ - struct state *const st = md->st; - - /* HASH(3) in */ - CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md, quick_mode_hash3(hash_val, st) - , "HASH(3)", "Quick I2"); - - /* Tell the kernel to establish the outbound and routing part of the new SA - * (the previous state established inbound) - * (unless the commit bit is set -- which we don't support). - * We do this before any state updating so that - * failure won't look like success. - */ - if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)" - , st->st_connection->name - , st->st_connection->instance_serial - , st->st_serialno - , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa - , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner)); - } - - st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno; - - update_iv(st); /* not actually used, but tidy */ - - /* note (presumed) success */ - { - struct gw_info *gw = st->st_connection->gw_info; - - if (gw != NULL) - gw->key->last_worked_time = now(); - } - - /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */ - if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE) - dpd_init(st); - - return STF_OK; -} - -static stf_status -send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type - , const void *data, size_t len) -{ - msgid_t msgid; - pb_stream reply; - pb_stream rbody; - u_char - *r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */ - *r_hash_start; /* start of what is to be hashed */ - - msgid = generate_msgid(st); - - init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "ISAKMP notify"); - - /* HDR* */ - { - struct isakmp_hdr hdr; - - hdr.isa_version = ISAKMP_MAJOR_VERSION << ISA_MAJ_SHIFT | ISAKMP_MINOR_VERSION; - hdr.isa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_HASH; - hdr.isa_xchg = ISAKMP_XCHG_INFO; - hdr.isa_msgid = msgid; - hdr.isa_flags = ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION; - memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); - if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody)) - impossible(); - } - /* HASH -- create and note space to be filled later */ - START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_N); - - /* NOTIFY */ - { - pb_stream notify_pbs; - struct isakmp_notification isan; - - isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; - isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC; - isan.isan_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP; - isan.isan_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE * 2; - isan.isan_type = type; - if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &rbody, ¬ify_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_raw(st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, ¬ify_pbs, "notify icookie")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_raw(st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, ¬ify_pbs, "notify rcookie")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (data != NULL && len > 0) - if (!out_raw(data, len, ¬ify_pbs, "notify data")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - close_output_pbs(¬ify_pbs); - } - - { - /* finish computing HASH */ - struct hmac_ctx ctx; - hmac_init_chunk(&ctx, st->st_oakley.hasher, st->st_skeyid_a); - hmac_update(&ctx, (const u_char *) &msgid, sizeof(msgid_t)); - hmac_update(&ctx, r_hash_start, rbody.cur-r_hash_start); - hmac_final(r_hashval, &ctx); - - DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("HASH computed:"); - DBG_dump("", r_hashval, ctx.hmac_digest_size)); - } - - /* Encrypt message (preserve st_iv and st_new_iv) */ - { - u_char old_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - u_char new_iv[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - - u_int old_iv_len = st->st_iv_len; - u_int new_iv_len = st->st_new_iv_len; - - if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - memcpy(old_iv, st->st_iv, old_iv_len); - memcpy(new_iv, st->st_new_iv, new_iv_len); - - init_phase2_iv(st, &msgid); - if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - - /* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */ - memcpy(st->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len); - memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len); - st->st_iv_len = old_iv_len; - st->st_new_iv_len = new_iv_len; - } - - /* Send packet (preserve st_tpacket) */ - { - chunk_t saved_tpacket = st->st_tpacket; - - setchunk(st->st_tpacket, reply.start, pbs_offset(&reply)); - send_packet(st, "ISAKMP notify"); - st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket; - } - - return STF_IGNORE; -} - -/* - * DPD Out Initiator - */ -void -dpd_outI(struct state *p2st) -{ - struct state *st; - u_int32_t seqno; - time_t tm; - time_t idle_time; - time_t delay = p2st->st_connection->dpd_delay; - time_t timeout = p2st->st_connection->dpd_timeout; - - /* find the newest related Phase 1 state */ - st = find_phase1_state(p2st->st_connection, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES); - - if (st == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not find newest phase 1 state"); - return; - } - - /* If no DPD, then get out of here */ - if (!st->st_dpd) - return; - - /* schedule the next periodic DPD event */ - event_schedule(EVENT_DPD, delay, p2st); - - /* Current time */ - tm = now(); - - /* Make sure we really need to invoke DPD */ - if (!was_eroute_idle(p2st, delay, &idle_time)) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("recent eroute activity %u seconds ago, " - "no need to send DPD notification" - , (int)idle_time) - ) - st->st_last_dpd = tm; - delete_dpd_event(st); - return; - } - - /* If an R_U_THERE has been sent or received recently, or if a - * companion Phase 2 SA has shown eroute activity, - * then we don't need to invoke DPD. - */ - if (tm < st->st_last_dpd + delay) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("recent DPD activity %u seconds ago, " - "no need to send DPD notification" - , (int)(tm - st->st_last_dpd)) - ) - return; - } - - if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - return; - - if (!st->st_dpd_seqno) - { - /* Get a non-zero random value that has room to grow */ - get_rnd_bytes((u_char *)&st->st_dpd_seqno, sizeof(st->st_dpd_seqno)); - st->st_dpd_seqno &= 0x7fff; - st->st_dpd_seqno++; - } - seqno = htonl(st->st_dpd_seqno); - - if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE, &seqno, sizeof(seqno)) != STF_IGNORE) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Could not send R_U_THERE"); - return; - } - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", st->st_dpd_seqno) - ) - st->st_dpd_expectseqno = st->st_dpd_seqno++; - st->st_last_dpd = tm; - /* Only schedule a new timeout if there isn't one currently, - * or if it would be sooner than the current timeout. */ - if (st->st_dpd_event == NULL - || st->st_dpd_event->ev_time > tm + timeout) - { - delete_dpd_event(st); - event_schedule(EVENT_DPD_TIMEOUT, timeout, st); - } -} - -/* - * DPD in Initiator, out Responder - */ -stf_status -dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs) -{ - time_t tm = now(); - u_int32_t seqno; - - if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received R_U_THERE for unestablished ISKAMP SA"); - return STF_IGNORE; - } - if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid SPI length (%d)", n->isan_spisize); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; - } - - if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) - { -#ifdef APPLY_CRISCO - /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */ -#else - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid icookie (broken Cisco?)"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; -#endif - } - pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; - - if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid rcookie (broken Cisco?)"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; - } - pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; - - if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid data length (%d)" - , (int) pbs_left(pbs)); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; - } - - seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur); - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE with seqno = %u", seqno) - ) - - if (st->st_dpd_peerseqno && seqno <= st->st_dpd_peerseqno) { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Received old or duplicate R_U_THERE"); - return STF_IGNORE; - } - - st->st_dpd_peerseqno = seqno; - delete_dpd_event(st); - - if (send_isakmp_notification(st, R_U_THERE_ACK, pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs)) != STF_IGNORE) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD Info: could not send R_U_THERE_ACK"); - return STF_IGNORE; - } - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("sent DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u", seqno) - ) - - st->st_last_dpd = tm; - return STF_IGNORE; -} - -/* - * DPD out Responder - */ -stf_status -dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *pbs) -{ - u_int32_t seqno; - - if (!IS_ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED(st->st_state)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "DPD: Received R_U_THERE_ACK for unestablished ISKAMP SA"); - return STF_FAIL; - } - - if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid SPI length (%d)" - , n->isan_spisize); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; - } - - if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) - { -#ifdef APPLY_CRISCO - /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */ -#else - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid icookie"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; -#endif - } - pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; - - if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) - { -#ifdef APPLY_CRISCO - /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */ -#else - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid rcookie"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; -#endif - } - pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; - - if (pbs_left(pbs) != sizeof(seqno)) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , " DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid data length (%d)" - , (int) pbs_left(pbs)); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; - } - - seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur); - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("received DPD notification R_U_THERE_ACK with seqno = %u" - , seqno) - ) - - if (!st->st_dpd_expectseqno && seqno != st->st_dpd_expectseqno) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has unexpected sequence number"); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; - } - - st->st_dpd_expectseqno = 0; - delete_dpd_event(st); - return STF_IGNORE; -} - -/* - * DPD Timeout Function - * - * This function is called when a timeout DPD_EVENT occurs. We set clear/trap - * both the SA and the eroutes, depending on what the connection definition - * tells us (either 'hold' or 'clear') - */ -void -dpd_timeout(struct state *st) -{ - struct state *newest_phase1_st; - struct connection *c = st->st_connection; - int action = st->st_connection->dpd_action; - - passert(action == DPD_ACTION_HOLD - || action == DPD_ACTION_CLEAR - || DPD_ACTION_RESTART); - - /* is there a newer phase1_state? */ - newest_phase1_st = find_phase1_state(c, ISAKMP_SA_ESTABLISHED_STATES); - if (newest_phase1_st != NULL && newest_phase1_st != st) - { - plog("DPD: Phase1 state #%ld has been superseded by #%ld" - " - timeout ignored" - , st->st_serialno, newest_phase1_st->st_serialno); - return; - } - - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: No response from peer - declaring peer dead"); - - /* delete the state, which is probably in phase 2 */ - set_cur_connection(c); - plog("DPD: Terminating all SAs using this connection"); - delete_states_by_connection(c, TRUE); - reset_cur_connection(); - - switch (action) - { - case DPD_ACTION_HOLD: - /* dpdaction=hold - Wipe the SA's but %trap the eroute so we don't - * leak traffic. Also, being in %trap means new packets will - * force an initiation of the conn again. - */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Putting connection into %%trap"); - break; - case DPD_ACTION_CLEAR: - /* dpdaction=clear - Wipe the SA & eroute - everything */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Clearing connection"); - unroute_connection(c); - break; - case DPD_ACTION_RESTART: - /* dpdaction=restart - Restart connection, - * except if roadwarrior connection - */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Restarting connection"); - unroute_connection(c); - initiate_connection(c->name, NULL_FD); - break; - default: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: unknown action"); - } -} - |