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Diffstat (limited to 'programs/pluto/keys.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | programs/pluto/keys.c | 1516 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1516 deletions
diff --git a/programs/pluto/keys.c b/programs/pluto/keys.c deleted file mode 100644 index 39726f424..000000000 --- a/programs/pluto/keys.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1516 +0,0 @@ -/* mechanisms for preshared keys (public, private, and preshared secrets) - * Copyright (C) 1998-2001 D. Hugh Redelmeier. - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it - * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the - * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your - * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but - * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY - * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License - * for more details. - * - * RCSID $Id: keys.c,v 1.26 2007/01/10 00:36:19 as Exp $ - */ - -#include <stddef.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <unistd.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <time.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <resolv.h> -#include <arpa/nameser.h> /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */ -#include <sys/queue.h> - -#include <glob.h> -#ifndef GLOB_ABORTED -# define GLOB_ABORTED GLOB_ABEND /* fix for old versions */ -#endif - -#include <freeswan.h> -#include <freeswan/ipsec_policy.h> - -#include "constants.h" -#include "defs.h" -#include "mp_defs.h" -#include "id.h" -#include "x509.h" -#include "pgp.h" -#include "certs.h" -#include "smartcard.h" -#include "connections.h" -#include "state.h" -#include "lex.h" -#include "keys.h" -#include "adns.h" /* needs <resolv.h> */ -#include "dnskey.h" /* needs keys.h and adns.h */ -#include "log.h" -#include "whack.h" /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */ -#include "timer.h" -#include "fetch.h" -#include "xauth.h" - -const char *shared_secrets_file = SHARED_SECRETS_FILE; - -typedef struct id_list id_list_t; - -struct id_list { - struct id id; - id_list_t *next; -}; - -typedef struct secret secret_t; - -struct secret { - id_list_t *ids; - enum PrivateKeyKind kind; - union { - chunk_t preshared_secret; - RSA_private_key_t RSA_private_key; - xauth_t xauth_secret; - smartcard_t *smartcard; - } u; - secret_t *next; -}; - -static pubkey_t* -allocate_RSA_public_key(const cert_t cert) -{ - pubkey_t *pk = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey"); - chunk_t e, n; - - switch (cert.type) - { - case CERT_PGP: - e = cert.u.pgp->publicExponent; - n = cert.u.pgp->modulus; - break; - case CERT_X509_SIGNATURE: - e = cert.u.x509->publicExponent; - n = cert.u.x509->modulus; - break; - default: - plog("RSA public key allocation error"); - } - - init_RSA_public_key(&pk->u.rsa, e, n); - DBG(DBG_RAW, - RSA_show_public_key(&pk->u.rsa) - ) - - pk->alg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA; - pk->id = empty_id; - pk->issuer = empty_chunk; - pk->serial = empty_chunk; - - return pk; -} - -/* - * free a public key struct - */ -static void -free_public_key(pubkey_t *pk) -{ - free_id_content(&pk->id); - freeanychunk(pk->issuer); - freeanychunk(pk->serial); - - /* algorithm-specific freeing */ - switch (pk->alg) - { - case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA: - free_RSA_public_content(&pk->u.rsa); - break; - default: - bad_case(pk->alg); - } - pfree(pk); -} - -secret_t *secrets = NULL; - -/* find the struct secret associated with the combination of - * me and the peer. We match the Id (if none, the IP address). - * Failure is indicated by a NULL. - */ -static const secret_t * -get_secret(const struct connection *c, enum PrivateKeyKind kind, bool asym) -{ - enum { /* bits */ - match_default = 01, - match_him = 02, - match_me = 04 - }; - - unsigned int best_match = 0; - secret_t *best = NULL; - secret_t *s; - const struct id *my_id = &c->spd.this.id - , *his_id = &c->spd.that.id; - struct id rw_id; - - /* is there a certificate assigned to this connection? */ - if (kind == PPK_RSA && c->spd.this.cert.type != CERT_NONE) - { - pubkey_t *my_public_key = allocate_RSA_public_key(c->spd.this.cert); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == kind && - same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &my_public_key->u.rsa)) - { - best = s; - break; /* we have found the private key - no sense in searching further */ - } - } - free_public_key(my_public_key); - return best; - } - - if (his_id_was_instantiated(c)) - { - /* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */ - rw_id.kind = c->spd.that.id.kind; - rw_id.name = empty_chunk; - happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr)); - his_id = &rw_id; - } -#ifdef NAT_TRAVERSAL - else if (kind == PPK_PSK - && (c->policy & (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK)) - && ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && c->spd.that.id.kind == ID_NONE) || - (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && id_is_ipaddr(&c->spd.that.id)))) - { - /* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */ - rw_id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR; - happy(anyaddr(addrtypeof(&c->spd.that.host_addr), &rw_id.ip_addr)); - his_id = &rw_id; - } -#endif - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == kind) - { - unsigned int match = 0; - - if (s->ids == NULL) - { - /* a default (signified by lack of ids): - * accept if no more specific match found - */ - match = match_default; - } - else - { - /* check if both ends match ids */ - id_list_t *i; - - for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = i->next) - { - if (same_id(my_id, &i->id)) - match |= match_me; - - if (same_id(his_id, &i->id)) - match |= match_him; - } - - /* If our end matched the only id in the list, - * default to matching any peer. - * A more specific match will trump this. - */ - if (match == match_me - && s->ids->next == NULL) - match |= match_default; - } - - switch (match) - { - case match_me: - /* if this is an asymmetric (eg. public key) system, - * allow this-side-only match to count, even if - * there are other ids in the list. - */ - if (!asym) - break; - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case match_default: /* default all */ - case match_me | match_default: /* default peer */ - case match_me | match_him: /* explicit */ - if (match == best_match) - { - /* two good matches are equally good: - * do they agree? - */ - bool same = FALSE; - - switch (kind) - { - case PPK_PSK: - same = s->u.preshared_secret.len == best->u.preshared_secret.len - && memcmp(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr, best->u.preshared_secret.ptr, s->u.preshared_secret.len) == 0; - break; - case PPK_RSA: - /* Dirty trick: since we have code to compare - * RSA public keys, but not private keys, we - * make the assumption that equal public keys - * mean equal private keys. This ought to work. - */ - same = same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub - , &best->u.RSA_private_key.pub); - break; - default: - bad_case(kind); - } - if (!same) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "multiple ipsec.secrets entries with distinct secrets match endpoints:" - " first secret used"); - best = s; /* list is backwards: take latest in list */ - } - } - else if (match > best_match) - { - /* this is the best match so far */ - best_match = match; - best = s; - } - } - } - } - return best; -} - -/* find the appropriate preshared key (see get_secret). - * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer. - * Note: the result is not to be freed by the caller. - */ -const chunk_t * -get_preshared_secret(const struct connection *c) -{ - const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_PSK, FALSE); - - DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, - if (s == NULL) - DBG_log("no Preshared Key Found"); - else - DBG_dump_chunk("Preshared Key", s->u.preshared_secret); - ) - return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.preshared_secret; -} - -/* check the existence of an RSA private key matching an RSA public - * key contained in an X.509 or OpenPGP certificate - */ -bool -has_private_key(cert_t cert) -{ - secret_t *s; - bool has_key = FALSE; - pubkey_t *pubkey = allocate_RSA_public_key(cert); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == PPK_RSA && - same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &pubkey->u.rsa)) - { - has_key = TRUE; - break; - } - } - free_public_key(pubkey); - return has_key; -} - -/* - * get the matching RSA private key belonging to a given X.509 certificate - */ -const RSA_private_key_t* -get_x509_private_key(const x509cert_t *cert) -{ - secret_t *s; - const RSA_private_key_t *pri = NULL; - const cert_t c = {CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert}}; - - pubkey_t *pubkey = allocate_RSA_public_key(c); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == PPK_RSA && - same_RSA_public_key(&s->u.RSA_private_key.pub, &pubkey->u.rsa)) - { - pri = &s->u.RSA_private_key; - break; - } - } - free_public_key(pubkey); - return pri; -} - -/* find the appropriate RSA private key (see get_secret). - * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer. - */ -const RSA_private_key_t * -get_RSA_private_key(const struct connection *c) -{ - const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, PPK_RSA, TRUE); - - return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.RSA_private_key; -} - -/* digest a secrets file - * - * The file is a sequence of records. A record is a maximal sequence of - * tokens such that the first, and only the first, is in the first column - * of a line. - * - * Tokens are generally separated by whitespace and are key words, ids, - * strings, or data suitable for ttodata(3). As a nod to convention, - * a trailing ":" on what would otherwise be a token is taken as a - * separate token. If preceded by whitespace, a "#" is taken as starting - * a comment: it and the rest of the line are ignored. - * - * One kind of record is an include directive. It starts with "include". - * The filename is the only other token in the record. - * If the filename does not start with /, it is taken to - * be relative to the directory containing the current file. - * - * The other kind of record describes a key. It starts with a - * sequence of ids and ends with key information. Each id - * is an IP address, a Fully Qualified Domain Name (which will immediately - * be resolved), or @FQDN which will be left as a name. - * - * The key part can be in several forms. - * - * The old form of the key is still supported: a simple - * quoted strings (with no escapes) is taken as a preshred key. - * - * The new form starts the key part with a ":". - * - * For Preshared Key, use the "PSK" keyword, and follow it by a string - * or a data token suitable for ttodata(3). - * - * For RSA Private Key, use the "RSA" keyword, followed by a - * brace-enclosed list of key field keywords and data values. - * The data values are large integers to be decoded by ttodata(3). - * The fields are a subset of those used by BIND 8.2 and have the - * same names. - */ - -/* parse PSK from file */ -static err_t -process_psk_secret(chunk_t *psk) -{ - err_t ugh = NULL; - - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') - { - clonetochunk(*psk, tok+1, flp->cur - tok - 2, "PSK"); - (void) shift(); - } - else - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; /* limit on size of binary representation of key */ - size_t sz; - - ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz - , diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS); - if (ugh != NULL) - { - /* ttodata didn't like PSK data */ - ugh = builddiag("PSK data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok); - } - else - { - clonetochunk(*psk, buf, sz, "PSK"); - (void) shift(); - } - } - return ugh; -} - -/* Parse fields of RSA private key. - * A braced list of keyword and value pairs. - * At the moment, each field is required, in order. - * The fields come from BIND 8.2's representation - */ -static err_t -process_rsa_secret(RSA_private_key_t *rsak) -{ - char buf[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES]; /* limit on size of binary representation of key */ - const struct fld *p; - - /* save bytes of Modulus and PublicExponent for keyid calculation */ - unsigned char ebytes[sizeof(buf)]; - unsigned char *eb_next = ebytes; - chunk_t pub_bytes[2]; - chunk_t *pb_next = &pub_bytes[0]; - - for (p = RSA_private_field; p < &RSA_private_field[RSA_PRIVATE_FIELD_ELEMENTS]; p++) - { - size_t sz; - err_t ugh; - - if (!shift()) - { - return "premature end of RSA key"; - } - else if (!tokeqword(p->name)) - { - return builddiag("%s keyword not found where expected in RSA key" - , p->name); - } - else if (!(shift() - && (!tokeq(":") || shift()))) /* ignore optional ":" */ - { - return "premature end of RSA key"; - } - else if (NULL != (ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok - , 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz, diag_space, sizeof(diag_space) - , TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS))) - { - /* in RSA key, ttodata didn't like */ - return builddiag("RSA data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok); - } - else - { - MP_INT *n = (MP_INT *) ((char *)rsak + p->offset); - - n_to_mpz(n, buf, sz); - if (pb_next < &pub_bytes[elemsof(pub_bytes)]) - { - if (eb_next - ebytes + sz > sizeof(ebytes)) - return "public key takes too many bytes"; - - setchunk(*pb_next, eb_next, sz); - memcpy(eb_next, buf, sz); - eb_next += sz; - pb_next++; - } -#if 0 /* debugging info that compromises security */ - { - size_t sz = mpz_sizeinbase(n, 16); - char buf[RSA_MAX_OCTETS * 2 + 2]; /* ought to be big enough */ - - passert(sz <= sizeof(buf)); - mpz_get_str(buf, 16, n); - - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s: %s", p->name, buf); - } -#endif - } - } - - /* We require an (indented) '}' and the end of the record. - * We break down the test so that the diagnostic will be - * more helpful. Some people don't seem to wish to indent - * the brace! - */ - if (!shift() || !tokeq("}")) - { - return "malformed end of RSA private key -- indented '}' required"; - } - else if (shift()) - { - return "malformed end of RSA private key -- unexpected token after '}'"; - } - else - { - unsigned bits = mpz_sizeinbase(&rsak->pub.n, 2); - - rsak->pub.k = (bits + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE; - rsak->pub.keyid[0] = '\0'; /* in case of splitkeytoid failure */ - splitkeytoid(pub_bytes[1].ptr, pub_bytes[1].len - , pub_bytes[0].ptr, pub_bytes[0].len - , rsak->pub.keyid, sizeof(rsak->pub.keyid)); - return RSA_private_key_sanity(rsak); - } -} - -/* process rsa key file protected with optional passphrase which can either be - * read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for by using whack - */ -static err_t -process_rsa_keyfile(RSA_private_key_t *rsak, int whackfd) -{ - char filename[BUF_LEN]; - prompt_pass_t pass; - - memset(filename,'\0', BUF_LEN); - memset(pass.secret,'\0', sizeof(pass.secret)); - pass.prompt = FALSE; - pass.fd = whackfd; - - /* we expect the filename of a PKCS#1 private key file */ - - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') /* quoted filename */ - memcpy(filename, tok+1, flp->cur - tok - 2); - else - memcpy(filename, tok, flp->cur - tok); - - if (shift()) - { - /* we expect an appended passphrase or passphrase prompt*/ - if (tokeqword("%prompt")) - { - if (pass.fd == NULL_FD) - return "RSA private key file -- enter passphrase using 'ipsec secrets'"; - pass.prompt = TRUE; - } - else - { - char *passphrase = tok; - size_t len = flp->cur - passphrase; - - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') /* quoted passphrase */ - { - passphrase++; - len -= 2; - } - if (len > PROMPT_PASS_LEN) - return "RSA private key file -- passphrase exceeds 64 characters"; - - memcpy(pass.secret, passphrase, len); - } - if (shift()) - return "RSA private key file -- unexpected token after passphrase"; - } - return load_rsa_private_key(filename, &pass, rsak); -} - -/* - * process xauth secret read from ipsec.secrets - */ -static err_t -process_xauth(secret_t *s) -{ - chunk_t user_name; - - s->kind = PPK_XAUTH; - - if (!shift()) - return "missing xauth user name"; - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') /* quoted user name */ - { - user_name.ptr = tok + 1; - user_name.len = flp->cur - tok - 2; - } - else - { - user_name.ptr = tok; - user_name.len = flp->cur - tok; - } - plog(" loaded xauth credentials of user '%.*s'" - , user_name.len - , user_name.ptr); - clonetochunk(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name - , user_name.ptr, user_name.len, "xauth user name"); - - if (!shift()) - return "missing xauth user password"; - return process_psk_secret(&s->u.xauth_secret.user_password); -} - -/* get XAUTH secret from chained secrets lists - * only one entry is currently supported - */ -static bool -xauth_get_secret(xauth_t *xauth_secret) -{ - secret_t *s; - bool found = FALSE; - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH) - { - if (found) - { - plog("found multiple xauth secrets - first selected"); - } - else - { - found = TRUE; - *xauth_secret = s->u.xauth_secret; - } - } - } - return found; -} - -/* - * find a matching secret - */ -static bool -xauth_verify_secret(const xauth_t *xauth_secret) -{ - bool found = FALSE; - secret_t *s; - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == PPK_XAUTH) - { - if (!same_chunk(xauth_secret->user_name, s->u.xauth_secret.user_name)) - continue; - found = TRUE; - if (same_chunk(xauth_secret->user_password, s->u.xauth_secret.user_password)) - return TRUE; - } - } - plog("xauth user '%.*s' %s" - , xauth_secret->user_name.len, xauth_secret->user_name.ptr - , found? "sent wrong password":"not found"); - return FALSE; -} - -/* - * the global xauth_module struct is defined here - */ -xauth_module_t xauth_module; - -/* - * assign the default xauth functions to any null function pointers - */ -void -xauth_defaults(void) -{ - if (xauth_module.get_secret == NULL) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("xauth module: using default get_secret() function") - ) - xauth_module.get_secret = xauth_get_secret; - } - if (xauth_module.verify_secret == NULL) - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("xauth module: using default verify_secret() function") - ) - xauth_module.verify_secret = xauth_verify_secret; - } -}; - -/* - * process pin read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for it using whack - */ -static err_t -process_pin(secret_t *s, int whackfd) -{ - smartcard_t *sc; - const char *pin_status = "no pin"; - - s->kind = PPK_PIN; - - /* looking for the smartcard keyword */ - if (!shift() || strncmp(tok, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) != 0) - return "PIN keyword must be followed by %smartcard<reader>:<id>"; - - sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(tok + strlen(SCX_TOKEN))); - s->u.smartcard = sc; - scx_share(sc); - if (sc->pin.ptr != NULL) - { - scx_release_context(sc); - scx_free_pin(&sc->pin); - } - sc->valid = FALSE; - - if (!shift()) - return "PIN statement must be terminated either by <pin code>, %pinpad or %prompt"; - - if (tokeqword("%prompt")) - { - shift(); - /* if whackfd exists, whack will be used to prompt for a pin */ - if (whackfd != NULL_FD) - pin_status = scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd) ? "valid pin" : "invalid pin"; - else - pin_status = "pin entry via prompt"; - } - else if (tokeqword("%pinpad")) - { - shift(); - /* pin will be entered via pin pad during verification */ - clonetochunk(sc->pin, "", 0, "empty pin"); - sc->pinpad = TRUE; - sc->valid = TRUE; - pin_status = "pin entry via pad"; - if (pkcs11_keep_state) - scx_verify_pin(sc); - } - else - { - /* we read the pin directly from ipsec.secrets */ - err_t ugh = process_psk_secret(&sc->pin); - if (ugh != NULL) - return ugh; - /* verify the pin */ - pin_status = scx_verify_pin(sc) ? "valid PIN" : "invalid PIN"; - } -#ifdef SMARTCARD - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - if (sc->any_slot) - snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot"); - else - snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %lu", sc->slot); - - plog(" %s for #%d (%s, id: %s)" - , pin_status, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id); - } -#else - plog(" warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!"); -#endif - return NULL; -} - -static void -process_secret(secret_t *s, int whackfd) -{ - err_t ugh = NULL; - - s->kind = PPK_PSK; /* default */ - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') - { - /* old PSK format: just a string */ - ugh = process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret); - } - else if (tokeqword("psk")) - { - /* preshared key: quoted string or ttodata format */ - ugh = !shift()? "unexpected end of record in PSK" - : process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret); - } - else if (tokeqword("rsa")) - { - /* RSA key: the fun begins. - * A braced list of keyword and value pairs. - */ - s->kind = PPK_RSA; - if (!shift()) - { - ugh = "bad RSA key syntax"; - } - else if (tokeq("{")) - { - ugh = process_rsa_secret(&s->u.RSA_private_key); - } - else - { - ugh = process_rsa_keyfile(&s->u.RSA_private_key, whackfd); - } - } - else if (tokeqword("xauth")) - { - ugh = process_xauth(s); - } - else if (tokeqword("pin")) - { - ugh = process_pin(s, whackfd); - } - else - { - ugh = builddiag("unrecognized key format: %s", tok); - } - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s" - , flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh); - pfree(s); - } - else if (flushline("expected record boundary in key")) - { - /* gauntlet has been run: install new secret */ - lock_certs_and_keys("process_secret"); - s->next = secrets; - secrets = s; - unlock_certs_and_keys("process_secrets"); - } -} - -static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd); /* forward declaration */ - -static void -process_secret_records(int whackfd) -{ - /* read records from ipsec.secrets and load them into our table */ - for (;;) - { - (void)flushline(NULL); /* silently ditch leftovers, if any */ - if (flp->bdry == B_file) - break; - - flp->bdry = B_none; /* eat the Record Boundary */ - (void)shift(); /* get real first token */ - - if (tokeqword("include")) - { - /* an include directive */ - char fn[MAX_TOK_LEN]; /* space for filename (I hope) */ - char *p = fn; - char *end_prefix = strrchr(flp->filename, '/'); - - if (!shift()) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of include directive" - , flp->filename, flp->lino); - continue; /* abandon this record */ - } - - /* if path is relative and including file's pathname has - * a non-empty dirname, prefix this path with that dirname. - */ - if (tok[0] != '/' && end_prefix != NULL) - { - size_t pl = end_prefix - flp->filename + 1; - - /* "clamp" length to prevent problems now; - * will be rediscovered and reported later. - */ - if (pl > sizeof(fn)) - pl = sizeof(fn); - memcpy(fn, flp->filename, pl); - p += pl; - } - if (flp->cur - tok >= &fn[sizeof(fn)] - p) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: include pathname too long" - , flp->filename, flp->lino); - continue; /* abandon this record */ - } - strcpy(p, tok); - (void) shift(); /* move to Record Boundary, we hope */ - if (flushline("ignoring malformed INCLUDE -- expected Record Boundary after filename")) - { - process_secrets_file(fn, whackfd); - tok = NULL; /* correct, but probably redundant */ - } - } - else - { - /* expecting a list of indices and then the key info */ - secret_t *s = alloc_thing(secret_t, "secret"); - - s->ids = NULL; - s->kind = PPK_PSK; /* default */ - setchunk(s->u.preshared_secret, NULL, 0); - s->next = NULL; - - for (;;) - { - if (tok[0] == '"' || tok[0] == '\'') - { - /* found key part */ - process_secret(s, whackfd); - break; - } - else if (tokeq(":")) - { - /* found key part */ - shift(); /* discard explicit separator */ - process_secret(s, whackfd); - break; - } - else - { - /* an id - * See RFC2407 IPsec Domain of Interpretation 4.6.2 - */ - struct id id; - err_t ugh; - - if (tokeq("%any")) - { - id = empty_id; - id.kind = ID_IPV4_ADDR; - ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET, &id.ip_addr); - } - else if (tokeq("%any6")) - { - id = empty_id; - id.kind = ID_IPV6_ADDR; - ugh = anyaddr(AF_INET6, &id.ip_addr); - } - else - { - ugh = atoid(tok, &id, FALSE); - } - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "ERROR \"%s\" line %d: index \"%s\" %s" - , flp->filename, flp->lino, tok, ugh); - } - else - { - id_list_t *i = alloc_thing(id_list_t - , "id_list"); - - i->id = id; - unshare_id_content(&i->id); - i->next = s->ids; - s->ids = i; - /* DBG_log("id type %d: %s %.*s", i->kind, ip_str(&i->ip_addr), (int)i->name.len, i->name.ptr); */ - } - if (!shift()) - { - /* unexpected Record Boundary or EOF */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of id list" - , flp->filename, flp->lino); - break; - } - } - } - } - } -} - -static int -globugh(const char *epath, int eerrno) -{ - log_errno_routine(eerrno, "problem with secrets file \"%s\"", epath); - return 1; /* stop glob */ -} - -static void -process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd) -{ - struct file_lex_position pos; - char **fnp; - glob_t globbuf; - - pos.depth = flp == NULL? 0 : flp->depth + 1; - - if (pos.depth > 10) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secrets file \"%s\" nested too deeply", file_pat); - return; - } - - /* do globbing */ - { - int r = glob(file_pat, GLOB_ERR, globugh, &globbuf); - - if (r != 0) - { - switch (r) - { - case GLOB_NOSPACE: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "out of space processing secrets filename \"%s\"", file_pat); - break; - case GLOB_ABORTED: - break; /* already logged */ - case GLOB_NOMATCH: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no secrets filename matched \"%s\"", file_pat); - break; - default: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown glob error %d", r); - break; - } - globfree(&globbuf); - return; - } - } - - /* for each file... */ - for (fnp = globbuf.gl_pathv; *fnp != NULL; fnp++) - { - if (lexopen(&pos, *fnp, FALSE)) - { - plog("loading secrets from \"%s\"", *fnp); - (void) flushline("file starts with indentation (continuation notation)"); - process_secret_records(whackfd); - lexclose(); - } - } - - globfree(&globbuf); -} - -void -free_preshared_secrets(void) -{ - lock_certs_and_keys("free_preshared_secrets"); - - if (secrets != NULL) - { - secret_t *s, *ns; - - plog("forgetting secrets"); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = ns) - { - id_list_t *i, *ni; - - ns = s->next; /* grab before freeing s */ - for (i = s->ids; i != NULL; i = ni) - { - ni = i->next; /* grab before freeing i */ - free_id_content(&i->id); - pfree(i); - } - switch (s->kind) - { - case PPK_PSK: - pfree(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr); - break; - case PPK_RSA: - free_RSA_private_content(&s->u.RSA_private_key); - break; - case PPK_XAUTH: - pfree(s->u.xauth_secret.user_name.ptr); - pfree(s->u.xauth_secret.user_password.ptr); - break; - case PPK_PIN: - scx_release(s->u.smartcard); - break; - default: - bad_case(s->kind); - } - pfree(s); - } - secrets = NULL; - } - - unlock_certs_and_keys("free_preshard_secrets"); -} - -void -load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd) -{ - free_preshared_secrets(); - (void) process_secrets_file(shared_secrets_file, whackfd); -} - -/* public key machinery - * Note: caller must set dns_auth_level. - */ - -pubkey_t * -public_key_from_rsa(const RSA_public_key_t *k) -{ - pubkey_t *p = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey"); - - p->id = empty_id; /* don't know, doesn't matter */ - p->issuer = empty_chunk; - p->serial = empty_chunk; - p->alg = PUBKEY_ALG_RSA; - - memcpy(p->u.rsa.keyid, k->keyid, sizeof(p->u.rsa.keyid)); - p->u.rsa.k = k->k; - mpz_init_set(&p->u.rsa.e, &k->e); - mpz_init_set(&p->u.rsa.n, &k->n); - - /* note that we return a 1 reference count upon creation: - * invariant: recount > 0. - */ - p->refcnt = 1; - time(&p->installed_time); - return p; -} - -/* Free a public key record. - * As a convenience, this returns a pointer to next. - */ -pubkey_list_t * -free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p) -{ - pubkey_list_t *nxt = p->next; - - if (p->key != NULL) - unreference_key(&p->key); - pfree(p); - return nxt; -} - -void -free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys) -{ - while (*keys != NULL) - *keys = free_public_keyentry(*keys); -} - -/* root of chained public key list */ - -pubkey_list_t *pubkeys = NULL; /* keys from ipsec.conf */ - -void -free_remembered_public_keys(void) -{ - free_public_keys(&pubkeys); -} - -/* transfer public keys from *keys list to front of pubkeys list */ -void -transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns -#ifdef USE_KEYRR -, pubkey_list_t **keys -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ -) -{ - { - struct gw_info *gwp; - - for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) - { - pubkey_list_t *pl = alloc_thing(pubkey_list_t, "from TXT"); - - pl->key = gwp->key; /* note: this is a transfer */ - gwp->key = NULL; /* really, it is! */ - pl->next = pubkeys; - pubkeys = pl; - } - } - -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - { - pubkey_list_t **pp = keys; - - while (*pp != NULL) - pp = &(*pp)->next; - *pp = pubkeys; - pubkeys = *keys; - *keys = NULL; - } -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ -} - -/* decode of RSA pubkey chunk - * - format specified in RFC 2537 RSA/MD5 Keys and SIGs in the DNS - * - exponent length in bytes (1 or 3 octets) - * + 1 byte if in [1, 255] - * + otherwise 0x00 followed by 2 bytes of length - * - exponent - * - modulus - */ -err_t -unpack_RSA_public_key(RSA_public_key_t *rsa, const chunk_t *pubkey) -{ - chunk_t exp; - chunk_t mod; - - if (pubkey->len < 3) - return "RSA public key blob way to short"; /* not even room for length! */ - - if (pubkey->ptr[0] != 0x00) - { - setchunk(exp, pubkey->ptr + 1, pubkey->ptr[0]); - } - else - { - setchunk(exp, pubkey->ptr + 3 - , (pubkey->ptr[1] << BITS_PER_BYTE) + pubkey->ptr[2]); - } - - if (pubkey->len - (exp.ptr - pubkey->ptr) < exp.len + RSA_MIN_OCTETS_RFC) - return "RSA public key blob too short"; - - mod.ptr = exp.ptr + exp.len; - mod.len = &pubkey->ptr[pubkey->len] - mod.ptr; - - if (mod.len < RSA_MIN_OCTETS) - return RSA_MIN_OCTETS_UGH; - - if (mod.len > RSA_MAX_OCTETS) - return RSA_MAX_OCTETS_UGH; - - init_RSA_public_key(rsa, exp, mod); - rsa->k = mpz_sizeinbase(&rsa->n, 2); /* size in bits, for a start */ - rsa->k = (rsa->k + BITS_PER_BYTE - 1) / BITS_PER_BYTE; /* now octets */ - DBG(DBG_RAW, - RSA_show_public_key(rsa) - ) - - if (rsa->k != mod.len) - { - mpz_clear(&rsa->e); - mpz_clear(&rsa->n); - return "RSA modulus shorter than specified"; - } - - return NULL; -} - -static void -install_public_key(pubkey_t *pk, pubkey_list_t **head) -{ - pubkey_list_t *p = alloc_thing(pubkey_list_t, "pubkey entry"); - - unshare_id_content(&pk->id); - - /* copy issuer dn */ - if (pk->issuer.ptr != NULL) - pk->issuer.ptr = clone_bytes(pk->issuer.ptr, pk->issuer.len, "issuer dn"); - - /* copy serial number */ - if (pk->serial.ptr != NULL) - pk->serial.ptr = clone_bytes(pk->serial.ptr, pk->serial.len, "serialNumber"); - - /* store the time the public key was installed */ - time(&pk->installed_time); - - /* install new key at front */ - p->key = reference_key(pk); - p->next = *head; - *head = p; -} - - -void -delete_public_keys(const struct id *id, enum pubkey_alg alg -, chunk_t issuer, chunk_t serial) -{ - pubkey_list_t **pp, *p; - pubkey_t *pk; - - for (pp = &pubkeys; (p = *pp) != NULL; ) - { - pk = p->key; - - if (same_id(id, &pk->id) && pk->alg == alg - && (issuer.ptr == NULL || pk->issuer.ptr == NULL - || same_dn(issuer, pk->issuer)) - && same_serial(serial, pk->serial)) - *pp = free_public_keyentry(p); - else - pp = &p->next; - } -} - -pubkey_t * -reference_key(pubkey_t *pk) -{ - pk->refcnt++; - return pk; -} - -void -unreference_key(pubkey_t **pkp) -{ - pubkey_t *pk = *pkp; - char b[BUF_LEN]; - - if (pk == NULL) - return; - - /* print stuff */ - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - idtoa(&pk->id, b, sizeof(b)); - DBG_log("unreference key: %p %s cnt %d--", pk, b, pk->refcnt) - ) - - /* cancel out the pointer */ - *pkp = NULL; - - passert(pk->refcnt != 0); - pk->refcnt--; - if (pk->refcnt == 0) - free_public_key(pk); -} - -err_t -add_public_key(const struct id *id -, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level -, enum pubkey_alg alg -, const chunk_t *key -, pubkey_list_t **head) -{ - pubkey_t *pk = alloc_thing(pubkey_t, "pubkey"); - - /* first: algorithm-specific decoding of key chunk */ - switch (alg) - { - case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA: - { - err_t ugh = unpack_RSA_public_key(&pk->u.rsa, key); - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - pfree(pk); - return ugh; - } - } - break; - default: - bad_case(alg); - } - - pk->id = *id; - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->alg = alg; - pk->until_time = UNDEFINED_TIME; - pk->issuer = empty_chunk; - pk->serial = empty_chunk; - - install_public_key(pk, head); - return NULL; -} - -/* extract id and public key from x.509 certificate and - * insert it into a pubkeyrec - */ -void -add_x509_public_key(x509cert_t *cert , time_t until - , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level) -{ - generalName_t *gn; - pubkey_t *pk; - cert_t c = { CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert} }; - - /* we support RSA only */ - if (cert->subjectPublicKeyAlgorithm != PUBKEY_ALG_RSA) - return; - - /* ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (X.509 subject field) */ - pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c); - pk->id.kind = ID_DER_ASN1_DN; - pk->id.name = cert->subject; - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = until; - pk->issuer = cert->issuer; - pk->serial = cert->serialNumber; - delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, pk->issuer, pk->serial); - install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys); - - gn = cert->subjectAltName; - - while (gn != NULL) /* insert all subjectAltNames */ - { - struct id id = empty_id; - - gntoid(&id, gn); - if (id.kind != ID_NONE) - { - pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c); - pk->id = id; - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = until; - pk->issuer = cert->issuer; - pk->serial = cert->serialNumber; - delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, pk->issuer, pk->serial); - install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys); - } - gn = gn->next; - } -} - -/* extract id and public key from OpenPGP certificate and - * insert it into a pubkeyrec - */ -void -add_pgp_public_key(pgpcert_t *cert , time_t until - , enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level) -{ - pubkey_t *pk; - cert_t c; - - c.type = CERT_PGP; - c.u.pgp = cert; - - /* we support RSA only */ - if (cert->pubkeyAlg != PUBKEY_ALG_RSA) - { - plog(" RSA public keys supported only"); - return; - } - - pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c); - pk->id.kind = ID_KEY_ID; - pk->id.name.ptr = cert->fingerprint; - pk->id.name.len = PGP_FINGERPRINT_SIZE; - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = until; - delete_public_keys(&pk->id, pk->alg, empty_chunk, empty_chunk); - install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys); -} - -/* when a X.509 certificate gets revoked, all instances of - * the corresponding public key must be removed - */ -void -remove_x509_public_key(const x509cert_t *cert) -{ - const cert_t c = {CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, {cert}}; - pubkey_list_t *p, **pp; - pubkey_t *revoked_pk; - - revoked_pk = allocate_RSA_public_key(c); - p = pubkeys; - pp = &pubkeys; - - while(p != NULL) - { - if (same_RSA_public_key(&p->key->u.rsa, &revoked_pk->u.rsa)) - { - /* remove p from list and free memory */ - *pp = free_public_keyentry(p); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, - "invalid RSA public key deleted"); - } - else - { - pp = &p->next; - } - p =*pp; - } - free_public_key(revoked_pk); -} - -/* - * list all public keys in the chained list - */ -void list_public_keys(bool utc) -{ - pubkey_list_t *p = pubkeys; - - if (p != NULL) - { - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " "); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Public Keys:"); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " "); - } - - while (p != NULL) - { - pubkey_t *key = p->key; - - if (key->alg == PUBKEY_ALG_RSA) - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - char expires_buf[TIMETOA_BUF]; - - idtoa(&key->id, buf, BUF_LEN); - strcpy(expires_buf, timetoa(&key->until_time, utc)); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "%s, %4d RSA Key %s, until %s %s", - - timetoa(&key->installed_time, utc), 8*key->u.rsa.k, key->u.rsa.keyid, - expires_buf, - check_expiry(key->until_time, PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE)); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT," %s '%s'", - enum_show(&ident_names, key->id.kind), buf); - if (key->issuer.len > 0) - { - dntoa(buf, BUF_LEN, key->issuer); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT," issuer: '%s'", buf); - } - if (key->serial.len > 0) - { - datatot(key->serial.ptr, key->serial.len, ':' - , buf, BUF_LEN); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT," serial: %s", buf); - } - } - p = p->next; - } -} |