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Diffstat (limited to 'src/charon/network/receiver.c')
-rw-r--r--src/charon/network/receiver.c84
1 files changed, 39 insertions, 45 deletions
diff --git a/src/charon/network/receiver.c b/src/charon/network/receiver.c
index ab4d6d592..6cd99439b 100644
--- a/src/charon/network/receiver.c
+++ b/src/charon/network/receiver.c
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
-#include <pthread.h>
#include "receiver.h"
@@ -50,57 +49,52 @@ struct private_receiver_t {
* Public part of a receiver_t object.
*/
receiver_t public;
-
+
/**
* Threads job receiving packets
*/
callback_job_t *job;
-
- /**
- * Assigned thread.
- */
- pthread_t assigned_thread;
-
+
/**
* current secret to use for cookie calculation
*/
char secret[SECRET_LENGTH];
-
+
/**
* previous secret used to verify older cookies
*/
char secret_old[SECRET_LENGTH];
-
+
/**
* how many times we have used "secret" so far
*/
u_int32_t secret_used;
-
+
/**
* time we did the cookie switch
*/
u_int32_t secret_switch;
-
+
/**
* time offset to use, hides our system time
*/
u_int32_t secret_offset;
-
+
/**
* the RNG to use for secret generation
*/
rng_t *rng;
-
+
/**
* hasher to use for cookie calculation
*/
hasher_t *hasher;
-
+
/**
* require cookies after this many half open IKE_SAs
*/
u_int32_t cookie_threshold;
-
+
/**
* how many half open IKE_SAs per peer before blocking
*/
@@ -119,7 +113,7 @@ static void send_notify(message_t *request, notify_type_t type, chunk_t data)
host_t *src, *dst;
packet_t *packet;
ike_sa_id_t *ike_sa_id;
-
+
response = message_create();
dst = request->get_source(request);
src = request->get_destination(request);
@@ -149,7 +143,7 @@ static chunk_t cookie_build(private_receiver_t *this, message_t *message,
u_int64_t spi = message->get_initiator_spi(message);
host_t *ip = message->get_source(message);
chunk_t input, hash;
-
+
/* COOKIE = t | sha1( IPi | SPIi | t | secret ) */
input = chunk_cata("cccc", ip->get_address(ip), chunk_from_thing(spi),
chunk_from_thing(t), secret);
@@ -167,18 +161,18 @@ static bool cookie_verify(private_receiver_t *this, message_t *message,
u_int32_t t, now;
chunk_t reference;
chunk_t secret;
-
- now = time(NULL);
+
+ now = time_monotonic(NULL);
t = *(u_int32_t*)cookie.ptr;
-
+
if (cookie.len != sizeof(u_int32_t) +
- this->hasher->get_hash_size(this->hasher) ||
+ this->hasher->get_hash_size(this->hasher) ||
t < now - this->secret_offset - COOKIE_LIFETIME)
{
DBG2(DBG_NET, "received cookie lifetime expired, rejecting");
- return FALSE;
+ return FALSE;
}
-
+
/* check if cookie is derived from old_secret */
if (t + this->secret_offset > this->secret_switch)
{
@@ -188,7 +182,7 @@ static bool cookie_verify(private_receiver_t *this, message_t *message,
{
secret = chunk_from_thing(this->secret_old);
}
-
+
/* compare own calculation against received */
reference = cookie_build(this, message, t, secret);
if (chunk_equals(reference, cookie))
@@ -206,20 +200,20 @@ static bool cookie_verify(private_receiver_t *this, message_t *message,
static bool cookie_required(private_receiver_t *this, message_t *message)
{
bool failed = FALSE;
-
+
if (charon->ike_sa_manager->get_half_open_count(charon->ike_sa_manager,
NULL) >= this->cookie_threshold)
{
/* check for a cookie. We don't use our parser here and do it
- * quick and dirty for performance reasons.
- * we assume the cookie is the first payload (which is a MUST), and
+ * quick and dirty for performance reasons.
+ * we assume the cookie is the first payload (which is a MUST), and
* the cookie's SPI length is zero. */
packet_t *packet = message->get_packet(message);
chunk_t data = packet->get_data(packet);
- if (data.len <
+ if (data.len <
IKE_HEADER_LENGTH + NOTIFY_PAYLOAD_HEADER_LENGTH +
sizeof(u_int32_t) + this->hasher->get_hash_size(this->hasher) ||
- *(data.ptr + 16) != NOTIFY ||
+ *(data.ptr + 16) != NOTIFY ||
*(u_int16_t*)(data.ptr + IKE_HEADER_LENGTH + 6) != htons(COOKIE))
{
/* no cookie found */
@@ -261,14 +255,14 @@ static job_requeue_t receive_packets(private_receiver_t *this)
packet_t *packet;
message_t *message;
job_t *job;
-
+
/* read in a packet */
if (charon->socket->receive(charon->socket, &packet) != SUCCESS)
{
DBG2(DBG_NET, "receiving from socket failed!");
return JOB_REQUEUE_FAIR;
}
-
+
/* parse message header */
message = message_create_from_packet(packet);
if (message->parse_header(message) != SUCCESS)
@@ -278,28 +272,28 @@ static job_requeue_t receive_packets(private_receiver_t *this)
message->destroy(message);
return JOB_REQUEUE_DIRECT;
}
-
+
/* check IKE major version */
if (message->get_major_version(message) != IKE_MAJOR_VERSION)
{
DBG1(DBG_NET, "received unsupported IKE version %d.%d from %H, "
- "sending INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION", message->get_major_version(message),
+ "sending INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION", message->get_major_version(message),
message->get_minor_version(message), packet->get_source(packet));
send_notify(message, INVALID_MAJOR_VERSION, chunk_empty);
message->destroy(message);
return JOB_REQUEUE_DIRECT;
}
-
+
if (message->get_request(message) &&
message->get_exchange_type(message) == IKE_SA_INIT)
{
/* check for cookies */
if (this->cookie_threshold && cookie_required(this, message))
{
- u_int32_t now = time(NULL);
+ u_int32_t now = time_monotonic(NULL);
chunk_t cookie = cookie_build(this, message, now - this->secret_offset,
- chunk_from_thing(this->secret));
-
+ chunk_from_thing(this->secret));
+
DBG2(DBG_NET, "received packet from: %#H to %#H",
message->get_source(message),
message->get_destination(message));
@@ -312,7 +306,7 @@ static job_requeue_t receive_packets(private_receiver_t *this)
/* create new cookie */
DBG1(DBG_NET, "generating new cookie secret after %d uses",
this->secret_used);
- memcpy(this->secret_old, this->secret, SECRET_LENGTH);
+ memcpy(this->secret_old, this->secret, SECRET_LENGTH);
this->rng->get_bytes(this->rng, SECRET_LENGTH, this->secret);
this->secret_switch = now;
this->secret_used = 0;
@@ -320,7 +314,7 @@ static job_requeue_t receive_packets(private_receiver_t *this)
message->destroy(message);
return JOB_REQUEUE_DIRECT;
}
-
+
/* check if peer has not too many IKE_SAs half open */
if (this->block_threshold && peer_to_aggressive(this, message))
{
@@ -352,10 +346,10 @@ static void destroy(private_receiver_t *this)
receiver_t *receiver_create()
{
private_receiver_t *this = malloc_thing(private_receiver_t);
- u_int32_t now = time(NULL);
-
+ u_int32_t now = time_monotonic(NULL);
+
this->public.destroy = (void(*)(receiver_t*)) destroy;
-
+
this->hasher = lib->crypto->create_hasher(lib->crypto, HASH_PREFERRED);
if (this->hasher == NULL)
{
@@ -385,11 +379,11 @@ receiver_t *receiver_create()
this->cookie_threshold = 0;
this->block_threshold = 0;
}
-
+
this->job = callback_job_create((callback_job_cb_t)receive_packets,
this, NULL, NULL);
charon->processor->queue_job(charon->processor, (job_t*)this->job);
-
+
return &this->public;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-15 13:45:43 +0000