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-.TH IPSEC_PRNG 3 "1 April 2002"
-.SH NAME
-ipsec prng_init \- initialize IPsec pseudorandom-number generator
-.br
-ipsec prng_bytes \- get bytes from IPsec pseudorandom-number generator
-.br
-ipsec prng_final \- close down IPsec pseudorandom-number generator
-.SH SYNOPSIS
-.B "#include <freeswan.h>
-.sp
-.B "void prng_init(struct prng *prng,"
-.ti +1c
-.B "const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);"
-.br
-.B "void prng_bytes(struct prng *prng, char *dst,"
-.ti +1c
-.B "size_t dstlen);"
-.br
-.B "unsigned long prng_count(struct prng *prng);"
-.br
-.B "void prng_final(struct prng *prng);"
-.SH DESCRIPTION
-.I Prng_init
-initializes a crypto-quality pseudo-random-number generator from a key;
-.I prng_bytes
-obtains pseudo-random bytes from it;
-.I prng_count
-reports the number of bytes extracted from it to date;
-.I prng_final
-closes it down.
-It is the user's responsibility to initialize a PRNG before using it,
-and not to use it again after it is closed down.
-.PP
-.I Prng_init
-initializes,
-or re-initializes,
-the specified
-.I prng
-from the
-.IR key ,
-whose length is given by
-.IR keylen .
-The user must allocate the
-.B "struct prng"
-pointed to by
-.IR prng .
-There is no particular constraint on the length of the key,
-although a key longer than 256 bytes is unnecessary because
-only the first 256 would be used.
-Initialization requires on the order of 3000 integer operations,
-independent of key length.
-.PP
-.I Prng_bytes
-obtains
-.I dstlen
-pseudo-random bytes from the PRNG and puts them in
-.IR buf .
-This is quite fast,
-on the order of 10 integer operations per byte.
-.PP
-.I Prng_count
-reports the number of bytes obtained from the PRNG
-since it was (last) initialized.
-.PP
-.I Prng_final
-closes down a PRNG by
-zeroing its internal memory,
-obliterating all trace of the state used to generate its previous output.
-This requires on the order of 250 integer operations.
-.PP
-The
-.B <freeswan.h>
-header file supplies the definition of the
-.B prng
-structure.
-Examination of its innards is discouraged, as they may change.
-.PP
-The PRNG algorithm
-used by these functions is currently identical to that of RC4(TM).
-This algorithm is cryptographically strong,
-sufficiently unpredictable that even a hostile observer will
-have difficulty determining the next byte of output from past history,
-provided it is initialized from a reasonably large key composed of
-highly random bytes (see
-.IR random (4)).
-The usual run of software pseudo-random-number generators
-(e.g.
-.IR random (3))
-are
-.I not
-cryptographically strong.
-.PP
-The well-known attacks against RC4(TM),
-e.g. as found in 802.11b's WEP encryption system,
-apply only if multiple PRNGs are initialized with closely-related keys
-(e.g., using a counter appended to a base key).
-If such keys are used, the first few hundred pseudo-random bytes
-from each PRNG should be discarded,
-to give the PRNGs a chance to randomize their innards properly.
-No useful attacks are known if the key is well randomized to begin with.
-.SH SEE ALSO
-random(3), random(4)
-.br
-Bruce Schneier,
-\fIApplied Cryptography\fR, 2nd ed., 1996, ISBN 0-471-11709-9,
-pp. 397-8.
-.SH HISTORY
-Written for the FreeS/WAN project by Henry Spencer.
-.SH BUGS
-If an attempt is made to obtain more than 4e9 bytes
-between initializations,
-the PRNG will continue to work but
-.IR prng_count 's
-output will stick at
-.BR 4000000000 .
-Fixing this would require a longer integer type and does
-not seem worth the trouble,
-since you should probably re-initialize before then anyway...
-.PP
-``RC4'' is a trademark of RSA Data Security, Inc.