diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c | 1165 |
1 files changed, 721 insertions, 444 deletions
diff --git a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c index 57f4fb54b..1f8917d79 100644 --- a/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c +++ b/src/pluto/ipsec_doi.c @@ -25,7 +25,6 @@ #include <resolv.h> #include <arpa/nameser.h> /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */ #include <sys/queue.h> -#include <sys/time.h> /* for gettimeofday */ #include <freeswan.h> @@ -36,12 +35,14 @@ #include <crypto/rngs/rng.h> #include <credentials/keys/private_key.h> #include <credentials/keys/public_key.h> +#include <utils/identification.h> #include "constants.h" #include "defs.h" +#include "myid.h" #include "state.h" -#include "id.h" #include "x509.h" +#include "ac.h" #include "crl.h" #include "ca.h" #include "certs.h" @@ -101,21 +102,24 @@ * and return from the ENCLOSING stf_status returning function if it fails. */ #define RETURN_STF_FAILURE(f) \ - { int r = (f); if (r != NOTHING_WRONG) return STF_FAIL + r; } + { int r = (f); if (r != ISAKMP_NOTHING_WRONG) return STF_FAIL + r; } /* create output HDR as replica of input HDR */ -void -echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np) +void echo_hdr(struct msg_digest *md, bool enc, u_int8_t np) { struct isakmp_hdr r_hdr = md->hdr; /* mostly same as incoming header */ r_hdr.isa_flags &= ~ISAKMP_FLAG_COMMIT; /* we won't ever turn on this bit */ if (enc) + { r_hdr.isa_flags |= ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION; + } /* some day, we may have to set r_hdr.isa_version */ r_hdr.isa_np = np; if (!out_struct(&r_hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &md->reply, &md->rbody)) + { impossible(); /* surely must have room and be well-formed */ + } } /* Compute DH shared secret from our local secret and the peer's public value. @@ -172,13 +176,13 @@ static notification_t accept_KE(chunk_t *dest, const char *val_name, loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "KE has %u byte DH public value; %u required" , (unsigned) pbs_left(pbs), gr->ke_size); /* XXX Could send notification back */ - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; + return ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; } free(dest->ptr); *dest = chunk_create(pbs->cur, pbs_left(pbs)); *dest = chunk_clone(*dest); DBG_cond_dump_chunk(DBG_CRYPT, "DH public value received:\n", *dest); - return NOTHING_WRONG; + return ISAKMP_NOTHING_WRONG; } /* accept_PFS_KE @@ -197,7 +201,7 @@ static notification_t accept_PFS_KE(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "missing KE payload in %s message", msg_name); - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; + return ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; } } else @@ -206,16 +210,16 @@ static notification_t accept_PFS_KE(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message KE payload requires a GROUP_DESCRIPTION attribute in SA" , msg_name); - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; + return ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; } if (ke_pd->next != NULL) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s message contains several KE payloads; we accept at most one", msg_name); - return INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; /* ??? */ + return ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; /* ??? */ } return accept_KE(dest, val_name, st->st_pfs_group, &ke_pd->pbs); } - return NOTHING_WRONG; + return ISAKMP_NOTHING_WRONG; } static bool build_and_ship_nonce(chunk_t *n, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np, @@ -231,39 +235,42 @@ static bool build_and_ship_nonce(chunk_t *n, pb_stream *outs, u_int8_t np, return out_generic_chunk(np, &isakmp_nonce_desc, outs, *n, name); } -static bool collect_rw_ca_candidates(struct msg_digest *md, generalName_t **top) +static linked_list_t* collect_rw_ca_candidates(struct msg_digest *md) { - struct connection *d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr - , pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, LEMPTY); + linked_list_t *list = linked_list_create(); + connection_t *d; + + d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr, pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, + md->sender_port, LEMPTY); for (; d != NULL; d = d->hp_next) { /* must be a road warrior connection */ - if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO) - && d->spd.that.ca.ptr != NULL) + if (d->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && !(d->policy & POLICY_OPPO) && + d->spd.that.ca) { - generalName_t *gn; + enumerator_t *enumerator; + identification_t *ca; bool new_entry = TRUE; - for (gn = *top; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next) + enumerator = list->create_enumerator(list); + while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &ca)) { - if (same_dn(gn->name, d->spd.that.ca)) + if (ca->equals(ca, d->spd.that.ca)) { new_entry = FALSE; break; - } + } } + enumerator->destroy(enumerator); + if (new_entry) { - gn = malloc_thing(generalName_t); - gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME; - gn->name = d->spd.that.ca; - gn->next = *top; - *top = gn; + list->insert_last(list, d->spd.that.ca->clone(d->spd.that.ca)); } } } - return *top != NULL; + return list; } static bool build_and_ship_CR(u_int8_t type, chunk_t ca, pb_stream *outs, @@ -276,8 +283,9 @@ static bool build_and_ship_CR(u_int8_t type, chunk_t ca, pb_stream *outs, /* build CR header */ if (!out_struct(&cr_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_cert_req_desc, outs, &cr_pbs)) + { return FALSE; - + } if (ca.ptr != NULL) { /* build CR body containing the distinguished name of the CA */ @@ -323,24 +331,33 @@ static void send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, hdr.isa_msgid = msgid; hdr.isa_flags = encst ? ISAKMP_FLAG_ENCRYPTION : 0; if (icookie) + { memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); + } if (rcookie) + { memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); + } if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &pbs, &r_hdr_pbs)) + { impossible(); + } } /* HASH -- value to be filled later */ if (encst) { pb_stream hash_pbs; - if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_N, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, - &hash_pbs)) + if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_N, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &hash_pbs)) + { impossible(); + } r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur; /* remember where to plant value */ if (!out_zero( encst->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH")) + { impossible(); + } close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH */ } @@ -358,7 +375,9 @@ static void send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, ¬_pbs) || !out_raw(spi, spisize, ¬_pbs, "spi")) + { impossible(); + } close_output_pbs(¬_pbs); } @@ -393,8 +412,9 @@ static void send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, u_int new_iv_len = encst->st_new_iv_len; if (old_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN || new_iv_len > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) + { impossible(); - + } memcpy(old_iv, encst->st_iv, old_iv_len); memcpy(new_iv, encst->st_new_iv, new_iv_len); @@ -405,8 +425,10 @@ static void send_notification(struct state *sndst, u_int16_t type, } init_phase2_iv(encst, &msgid); if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, encst)) + { impossible(); - + } + /* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */ memcpy(encst->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len); memcpy(encst->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len); @@ -475,7 +497,7 @@ void send_notification_from_md(struct msg_digest *md, u_int16_t type) * st_connection->interface */ struct state st; - struct connection cnx; + connection_t cnx; passert(md); @@ -569,10 +591,14 @@ void send_delete(struct state *st) pb_stream hash_pbs; if (!out_generic(ISAKMP_NEXT_D, &isakmp_hash_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &hash_pbs)) + { impossible(); + } r_hashval = hash_pbs.cur; /* remember where to plant value */ if (!out_zero(p1st->st_oakley.hasher->hash_digest_size, &hash_pbs, "HASH(1)")) + { impossible(); + } close_output_pbs(&hash_pbs); r_hash_start = r_hdr_pbs.cur; /* hash from after HASH(1) */ } @@ -595,7 +621,9 @@ void send_delete(struct state *st) if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs) || !out_raw(&isakmp_spi, (2*COOKIE_SIZE), &del_pbs, "delete payload")) + { impossible(); + } close_output_pbs(&del_pbs); } else @@ -615,7 +643,9 @@ void send_delete(struct state *st) isad.isad_nospi = 1; if (!out_struct(&isad, &isakmp_delete_desc, &r_hdr_pbs, &del_pbs) || !out_raw(&ns->spi, sizeof(ipsec_spi_t), &del_pbs, "delete payload")) + { impossible(); + } close_output_pbs(&del_pbs); } } @@ -656,8 +686,9 @@ void send_delete(struct state *st) init_phase2_iv(p1st, &msgid); if (!encrypt_message(&r_hdr_pbs, p1st)) + { impossible(); - + } p1st->st_tpacket = chunk_create(reply_pbs.start, pbs_offset(&reply_pbs)); send_packet(p1st, "delete notify"); p1st->st_tpacket = saved_tpacket; @@ -755,14 +786,15 @@ void accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, } else { - struct connection *oldc; - + connection_t *oldc; + oldc = cur_connection; set_cur_connection(dst->st_connection); if (nat_traversal_enabled) + { nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst); - + } loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Delete SA payload: " "deleting ISAKMP State #%lu", dst->st_serialno); delete_state(dst); @@ -790,18 +822,19 @@ void accept_delete(struct state *st, struct msg_digest *md, } else { - struct connection *rc = dst->st_connection; - struct connection *oldc; - + connection_t *rc = dst->st_connection; + connection_t *oldc; + oldc = cur_connection; set_cur_connection(rc); if (nat_traversal_enabled) + { nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(md, dst); - + } if (rc->newest_ipsec_sa == dst->st_serialno && (rc->policy & POLICY_UP)) - { + { /* Last IPSec SA for a permanent connection that we * have initiated. Replace it in a few seconds. * @@ -855,7 +888,9 @@ void close_message(pb_stream *pbs) size_t padding = pad_up(pbs_offset(pbs), 4); if (padding != 0) + { (void) out_zero(padding, pbs, "message padding"); + } close_output_pbs(pbs); } @@ -864,15 +899,14 @@ void close_message(pb_stream *pbs) * Note: this is not called from demux.c */ static stf_status -main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor +main_outI1(int whack_sock, connection_t *c, struct state *predecessor , lset_t policy, unsigned long try) { struct state *st = new_state(); pb_stream reply; /* not actually a reply, but you know what I mean */ pb_stream rbody; - int vids_to_send = 0; - + /* set up new state */ st->st_connection = c; set_cur_state(st); /* we must reset before exit */ @@ -883,30 +917,48 @@ main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor /* determine how many Vendor ID payloads we will be sending */ if (SEND_PLUTO_VID) + { vids_to_send++; + } if (SEND_CISCO_UNITY_VID) + { vids_to_send++; - if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP) + } + if (c->spd.this.cert && + c->spd.this.cert->cert->get_type(c->spd.this.cert->cert) == CERT_GPG) + { vids_to_send++; + } if (SEND_XAUTH_VID) + { vids_to_send++; + } + /* always send DPD Vendor ID */ - vids_to_send++; + vids_to_send++; + if (nat_traversal_enabled) + { vids_to_send++; + } get_cookie(TRUE, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, &c->spd.that.host_addr); insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid (0) */ if (HAS_IPSEC_POLICY(policy)) + { add_pending(dup_any(whack_sock), st, c, policy, 1 , predecessor == NULL? SOS_NOBODY : predecessor->st_serialno); - + } if (predecessor == NULL) + { plog("initiating Main Mode"); + } else + { plog("initiating Main Mode to replace #%lu", predecessor->st_serialno); + } /* set up reply */ init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "reply packet"); @@ -970,7 +1022,8 @@ main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor /* if we have an OpenPGP certificate we assume an * OpenPGP peer and have to send the Vendor ID */ - if (c->spd.this.cert.type == CERT_PGP) + if (c->spd.this.cert && + c->spd.this.cert->cert->get_type(c->spd.this.cert->cert) == CERT_GPG) { if (!out_vendorid(vids_to_send-- ? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE , &rbody, VID_OPENPGP)) @@ -1042,7 +1095,7 @@ main_outI1(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, struct state *predecessor return STF_OK; } -void ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock, struct connection *c, lset_t policy, +void ipsecdoi_initiate(int whack_sock, connection_t *c, lset_t policy, unsigned long try, so_serial_t replacing) { /* If there's already an ISAKMP SA established, use that and @@ -1155,7 +1208,7 @@ static bool skeyid_preshared(struct state *st) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%N not available to compute skeyid", pseudo_random_function_names, prf_alg); - return FALSE; + return FALSE; } free(st->st_skeyid.ptr); prf->set_key(prf, *pss); @@ -1166,8 +1219,7 @@ static bool skeyid_preshared(struct state *st) } } -static bool -skeyid_digisig(struct state *st) +static bool skeyid_digisig(struct state *st) { chunk_t nir; pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg; @@ -1234,12 +1286,9 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) /* generate SKEYID_* from SKEYID */ { - char buf_skeyid_d[] = { 0x00 }; - char buf_skeyid_a[] = { 0x01 }; - char buf_skeyid_e[] = { 0x02 }; - chunk_t seed_skeyid_d = chunk_from_buf(buf_skeyid_d); - chunk_t seed_skeyid_a = chunk_from_buf(buf_skeyid_a); - chunk_t seed_skeyid_e = chunk_from_buf(buf_skeyid_e); + chunk_t seed_skeyid_d = chunk_from_chars(0x00); + chunk_t seed_skeyid_a = chunk_from_chars(0x01); + chunk_t seed_skeyid_e = chunk_from_chars(0x02); chunk_t icookie = { st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE }; chunk_t rcookie = { st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE }; pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg; @@ -1254,7 +1303,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, NULL); prf->allocate_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL); prf->allocate_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL); - prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_d, &st->st_skeyid_d); + prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_d, &st->st_skeyid_d); /* SKEYID_A */ free(st->st_skeyid_a.ptr); @@ -1262,7 +1311,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, NULL); prf->allocate_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL); prf->allocate_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL); - prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_a, &st->st_skeyid_a); + prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_a, &st->st_skeyid_a); /* SKEYID_E */ free(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr); @@ -1270,7 +1319,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) prf->allocate_bytes(prf, st->st_shared, NULL); prf->allocate_bytes(prf, icookie, NULL); prf->allocate_bytes(prf, rcookie, NULL); - prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_e, &st->st_skeyid_e); + prf->allocate_bytes(prf, seed_skeyid_e, &st->st_skeyid_e); prf->destroy(prf); } @@ -1289,7 +1338,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) DBG_dump_chunk("DH_i:", st->st_gi); DBG_dump_chunk("DH_r:", st->st_gr); ); - + hasher->get_hash(hasher, st->st_gi, NULL); hasher->get_hash(hasher, st->st_gr, st->st_new_iv); hasher->destroy(hasher); @@ -1302,15 +1351,14 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) */ { size_t keysize = st->st_oakley.enckeylen/BITS_PER_BYTE; - + /* free any existing key */ free(st->st_enc_key.ptr); if (keysize > st->st_skeyid_e.len) { u_char keytemp[MAX_OAKLEY_KEY_LEN + MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - char seed_buf[] = { 0x00 }; - chunk_t seed = chunk_from_buf(seed_buf); + chunk_t seed = chunk_from_chars(0x00); size_t prf_block_size, i; pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg; prf_t *prf; @@ -1319,7 +1367,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg); prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_e); prf_block_size = prf->get_block_size(prf); - + for (i = 0;;) { prf->get_bytes(prf, seed, &keytemp[i]); @@ -1336,7 +1384,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) else { st->st_enc_key = chunk_create(st->st_skeyid_e.ptr, keysize); - } + } st->st_enc_key = chunk_clone(st->st_enc_key); } @@ -1421,7 +1469,7 @@ static bool generate_skeyids_iv(struct state *st) * Use PKCS#1 version 1.5 encryption of hash (called * RSAES-PKCS1-V1_5) in PKCS#2. */ -static size_t sign_hash(signature_scheme_t scheme, struct connection *c, +static size_t sign_hash(signature_scheme_t scheme, connection_t *c, u_char sig_val[RSA_MAX_OCTETS], chunk_t hash) { size_t sz = 0; @@ -1469,7 +1517,9 @@ static size_t sign_hash(signature_scheme_t scheme, struct connection *c, ) sz = scx_sign_hash(sc, hash.ptr, hash.len, sig_val, sz) ? sz : 0; if (!pkcs11_keep_state) + { scx_release_context(sc); + } unlock_certs_and_keys("sign_hash"); } return sz; @@ -1487,7 +1537,7 @@ static size_t sign_hash(signature_scheme_t scheme, struct connection *c, */ struct tac_state { struct state *st; - chunk_t hash; + chunk_t hash; chunk_t sig; int tried_cnt; /* number of keys tried */ }; @@ -1495,17 +1545,18 @@ struct tac_state { static bool take_a_crack(struct tac_state *s, pubkey_t *kr) { public_key_t *pub_key = kr->public_key; - identification_t *keyid = pub_key->get_id(pub_key, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1); + chunk_t keyid = chunk_empty; signature_scheme_t scheme; s->tried_cnt++; scheme = oakley_to_signature_scheme(s->st->st_oakley.auth); + pub_key->get_fingerprint(pub_key, KEY_ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1, &keyid); if (pub_key->verify(pub_key, scheme, s->hash, s->sig)) { DBG(DBG_CRYPT | DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("%s check passed with keyid %Y", - enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, s->st->st_oakley.auth), keyid) + DBG_log("%s check passed with keyid %#B", + enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, s->st->st_oakley.auth), &keyid) ) unreference_key(&s->st->st_peer_pubkey); s->st->st_peer_pubkey = reference_key(kr); @@ -1514,14 +1565,14 @@ static bool take_a_crack(struct tac_state *s, pubkey_t *kr) else { DBG(DBG_CRYPT, - DBG_log("%s check failed with keyid %Y", - enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, s->st->st_oakley.auth), keyid) + DBG_log("%s check failed with keyid %#B", + enum_show(&oakley_auth_names, s->st->st_oakley.auth), &keyid) ) return FALSE; } } -static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer, +static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, identification_t* peer, struct state *st, chunk_t hash, const pb_stream *sig_pbs, #ifdef USE_KEYRR @@ -1529,7 +1580,7 @@ static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer, #endif /* USE_KEYRR */ const struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns) { - const struct connection *c = st->st_connection; + const connection_t *c = st->st_connection; struct tac_state s; s.st = st; @@ -1545,7 +1596,8 @@ static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer, for (gw = c->gw_info; gw != NULL; gw = gw->next) { /* only consider entries that have a key and are for our peer */ - if (gw->gw_key_present && same_id(&gw->gw_id, &c->spd.that.id)&& + if (gw->gw_key_present && + gw->gw_id->equals(gw->gw_id, c->spd.that.id) && take_a_crack(&s, gw->key)) { return STF_OK; @@ -1564,7 +1616,7 @@ static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer, pubkey_t *key = p->key; key_type_t type = key->public_key->get_type(key->public_key); - if (type == key_type && same_id(peer, &key->id)) + if (type == key_type && peer->equals(peer, key->id)) { time_t now = time(NULL); @@ -1576,7 +1628,6 @@ static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer, *pp = free_public_keyentry(p); continue; /* continue with next public key */ } - if (take_a_crack(&s, key)) { return STF_OK; @@ -1628,34 +1679,30 @@ static stf_status check_signature(key_type_t key_type, const struct id* peer, /* no acceptable key was found: diagnose */ { - char id_buf[BUF_LEN]; /* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */ - - idtoa(peer, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf)); - if (s.tried_cnt == 0) { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no public key known for '%s'", id_buf); + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no public key known for '%Y'", peer); } else if (s.tried_cnt == 1) { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "signature check for '%s' failed: " - " wrong key?; tried %d", id_buf, s.tried_cnt); + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "signature check for '%Y' failed: " + " wrong key?; tried %d", peer, s.tried_cnt); DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("public key for '%s' failed: " - "decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB", id_buf) + DBG_log("public key for '%Y' failed: " + "decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB", peer) ) } else { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "signature check for '%s' failed: " - "tried %d keys but none worked.", id_buf, s.tried_cnt); + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "signature check for '%Y' failed: " + "tried %d keys but none worked.", peer, s.tried_cnt); DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - DBG_log("all %d public keys for '%s' failed: " + DBG_log("all %d public keys for '%Y' failed: " "best decrypted SIG payload into a malformed ECB", - s.tried_cnt, id_buf) + s.tried_cnt, peer) ) } - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; } } @@ -1669,12 +1716,12 @@ static notification_t accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s length not between %d and %d" , name , MINIMUM_NONCE_SIZE, MAXIMUM_NONCE_SIZE); - return PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; /* ??? */ + return ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; /* ??? */ } free(dest->ptr); *dest = chunk_create(nonce_pbs->cur, len); *dest = chunk_clone(*dest); - return NOTHING_WRONG; + return ISAKMP_NOTHING_WRONG; } /* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header @@ -1682,8 +1729,7 @@ static notification_t accept_nonce(struct msg_digest *md, chunk_t *dest, * The theory is that there will be no "backing out", so we commit to IV. * We also close the pbs. */ -bool -encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st) +bool encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st) { u_int8_t *enc_start = pbs->start + sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr); size_t enc_len = pbs_offset(pbs) - sizeof(struct isakmp_hdr); @@ -1723,7 +1769,7 @@ encrypt_message(pb_stream *pbs, struct state *st) crypter->set_key(crypter, st->st_enc_key); crypter->encrypt(crypter, data, iv, NULL); crypter->destroy(crypter); - + new_iv = data.ptr + data.len - crypter_block_size; memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, crypter_block_size); update_iv(st); @@ -1755,7 +1801,7 @@ static size_t quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, u_char *start, u_char *roof, if (hash2) { prf->get_bytes(prf, st->st_ni, NULL); /* include Ni_b in the hash */ - } + } prf->get_bytes(prf, msg_chunk, dest); prf_block_size = prf->get_block_size(prf); prf->destroy(prf); @@ -1775,13 +1821,12 @@ static size_t quick_mode_hash12(u_char *dest, u_char *start, u_char *roof, */ static size_t quick_mode_hash3(u_char *dest, struct state *st) { - char seed_buf[] = { 0x00 }; - chunk_t seed_chunk = chunk_from_buf(seed_buf); + chunk_t seed_chunk = chunk_from_chars(0x00); chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(st->st_msgid); pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg; prf_t *prf; size_t prf_block_size; - + prf_alg = oakley_to_prf(st->st_oakley.hash); prf = lib->crypto->create_prf(lib->crypto, prf_alg); prf->set_key(prf, st->st_skeyid_a); @@ -1814,7 +1859,7 @@ void init_phase2_iv(struct state *st, const msgid_t *msgid) st->st_new_iv_len = hasher->get_hash_size(hasher); passert(st->st_new_iv_len <= sizeof(st->st_new_iv)); - + hasher->get_hash(hasher, iv_chunk, NULL); hasher->get_hash(hasher, msgid_chunk, st->st_new_iv); hasher->destroy(hasher); @@ -1846,27 +1891,30 @@ static bool emit_subnet_id(ip_subnet *net, u_int8_t np, u_int8_t protoid, id.isaiid_port = port; if (!out_struct(&id, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, outs, &id_pbs)) + { return FALSE; - + } networkof(net, &ta); tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp); if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client network")) + { return FALSE; - + } if (!subnetishost(net)) { maskof(net, &ta); tal = addrbytesptr(&ta, &tbp); if (!out_raw(tbp, tal, &id_pbs, "client mask")) + { return FALSE; + } } - close_output_pbs(&id_pbs); return TRUE; } stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa, - struct connection *c, lset_t policy, unsigned long try, + connection_t *c, lset_t policy, unsigned long try, so_serial_t replacing) { struct state *st = duplicate_state(isakmp_sa); @@ -1878,10 +1926,27 @@ stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa, bool has_client = c->spd.this.has_client || c->spd.that.has_client || c->spd.this.protocol || c->spd.that.protocol || c->spd.this.port || c->spd.that.port; - + bool send_natoa = FALSE; u_int8_t np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; + if (c->spd.this.modecfg && !c->spd.this.has_client && + isanyaddr(&c->spd.this.host_srcip)) + { + connection_t *ph1_c = isakmp_sa->st_connection; + + if (ph1_c->spd.this.modecfg && !isanyaddr(&ph1_c->spd.this.host_srcip)) + { + char srcip[ADDRTOT_BUF]; + + c->spd.this.host_srcip = ph1_c->spd.this.host_srcip; + c->spd.this.client = ph1_c->spd.this.client; + c->spd.this.has_client = TRUE; + addrtot(&c->spd.this.host_srcip, 0, srcip, sizeof(srcip)); + plog("inheriting virtual IP source address %s from ModeCfg", srcip); + } + } + st->st_whack_sock = whack_sock; st->st_connection = c; set_cur_state(st); /* we must reset before exit */ @@ -1899,27 +1964,30 @@ stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa, insert_state(st); /* needs cookies, connection, and msgid */ if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY) - plog("initiating Quick Mode %s {using isakmp#%lu}" - , prettypolicy(policy) - , isakmp_sa->st_serialno); + { + plog("initiating Quick Mode %s {using isakmp#%lu}", + prettypolicy(policy), isakmp_sa->st_serialno); + } else - plog("initiating Quick Mode %s to replace #%lu {using isakmp#%lu}" - , prettypolicy(policy) - , replacing - , isakmp_sa->st_serialno); - + { + plog("initiating Quick Mode %s to replace #%lu {using isakmp#%lu}", + prettypolicy(policy), replacing, isakmp_sa->st_serialno); + } if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) { /* Duplicate nat_traversal status in new state */ st->nat_traversal = isakmp_sa->nat_traversal; if (isakmp_sa->nat_traversal & LELEM(NAT_TRAVERSAL_NAT_BHND_ME)) + { has_client = TRUE; - + } nat_traversal_change_port_lookup(NULL, st); } else + { st->nat_traversal = 0; + } /* are we going to send a NAT-OA payload? */ if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA) @@ -1957,13 +2025,15 @@ stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa, /* SA out */ - /* + /* * See if pfs_group has been specified for this conn, * if not, fallback to old use-same-as-P1 behaviour */ #ifndef NO_IKE_ALG if (st->st_connection) + { st->st_pfs_group = ike_alg_pfsgroup(st->st_connection, policy); + } if (!st->st_pfs_group) #endif /* If PFS specified, use the same group as during Phase 1: @@ -1979,11 +2049,12 @@ stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa, lset_t pm = POLICY_ENCRYPT | POLICY_AUTHENTICATE; if (can_do_IPcomp) + { pm |= POLICY_COMPRESS; - - if (!out_sa(&rbody - , &ipsec_sadb[(st->st_policy & pm) >> POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT] - , st, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) + } + if (!out_sa(&rbody, + &ipsec_sadb[(st->st_policy & pm) >> POLICY_IPSEC_SHIFT], + st, FALSE, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) { reset_cur_state(); return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; @@ -2063,14 +2134,18 @@ stf_status quick_outI1(int whack_sock, struct state *isakmp_sa, event_schedule(EVENT_RETRANSMIT, EVENT_RETRANSMIT_DELAY_0, st); if (replacing == SOS_NOBODY) + { whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1 , "%s: initiate" , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state)); + } else + { whack_log(RC_NEW_STATE + STATE_QUICK_I1 , "%s: initiate to replace #%lu" , enum_name(&state_names, st->st_state) , replacing); + } reset_cur_state(); return STF_OK; } @@ -2092,35 +2167,45 @@ static void decode_cert(struct msg_digest *md) blob.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs); if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE) { - x509cert_t cert = empty_x509cert; - if (parse_x509cert(blob, 0, &cert)) + cert_t x509cert = cert_empty; + + x509cert.cert = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, + CRED_CERTIFICATE, CERT_X509, + BUILD_BLOB_ASN1_DER, blob, + BUILD_END); + if (x509cert.cert) { - if (verify_x509cert(&cert, strict_crl_policy, &valid_until)) + if (verify_x509cert(&x509cert, strict_crl_policy, &valid_until)) { DBG(DBG_PARSING, DBG_log("Public key validated") ) - add_x509_public_key(&cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED); + add_public_key_from_cert(&x509cert, valid_until, DAL_SIGNED); } else { plog("X.509 certificate rejected"); } - DESTROY_IF(cert.public_key); - free_generalNames(cert.subjectAltName, FALSE); - free_generalNames(cert.crlDistributionPoints, FALSE); + x509cert.cert->destroy(x509cert.cert); } else + { plog("Syntax error in X.509 certificate"); + } } else if (cert->isacert_type == CERT_PKCS7_WRAPPED_X509) { - x509cert_t *cert = NULL; + linked_list_t *certs = linked_list_create(); - if (pkcs7_parse_signedData(blob, NULL, &cert, NULL, NULL)) - store_x509certs(&cert, strict_crl_policy); + if (pkcs7_parse_signedData(blob, NULL, certs, NULL, NULL)) + { + store_x509certs(certs, strict_crl_policy); + } else + { plog("Syntax error in PKCS#7 wrapped X.509 certificates"); + } + certs->destroy_offset(certs, offsetof(certificate_t, destroy)); } else { @@ -2134,7 +2219,7 @@ static void decode_cert(struct msg_digest *md) /* * Decode the CR payload of Phase 1. */ -static void decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c) +static void decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, connection_t *c) { struct payload_digest *p; @@ -2142,7 +2227,7 @@ static void decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c) { struct isakmp_cr *const cr = &p->payload.cr; chunk_t ca_name; - + ca_name.len = pbs_left(&p->pbs); ca_name.ptr = (ca_name.len > 0)? p->pbs.cur : NULL; @@ -2150,32 +2235,37 @@ static void decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c) if (cr->isacr_type == CERT_X509_SIGNATURE) { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - if (ca_name.len > 0) { - generalName_t *gn; - + identification_t *ca; + if (!is_asn1(ca_name)) + { continue; - - gn = malloc_thing(generalName_t); - ca_name = chunk_clone(ca_name); - gn->kind = GN_DIRECTORY_NAME; - gn->name = ca_name; - gn->next = c->requested_ca; - c->requested_ca = gn; + } + if (c->requested_ca == NULL) + { + c->requested_ca = linked_list_create(); + } + ca = identification_create_from_encoding(ID_DER_ASN1_DN, ca_name); + c->requested_ca->insert_last(c->requested_ca, ca); + DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("requested CA: \"%Y\"", ca) + ) + } + else + { + DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("requested CA: %%any") + ) } c->got_certrequest = TRUE; - - DBG(DBG_PARSING | DBG_CONTROL, - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, ca_name, "%any"); - DBG_log("requested CA: '%s'", buf); - ) } else + { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "ignoring %s certificate request payload", enum_show(&cert_type_names, cr->isacr_type)); + } } } @@ -2184,12 +2274,13 @@ static void decode_cr(struct msg_digest *md, struct connection *c) * We must be called before SIG or HASH are decoded since we * may change the peer's public key or ID. */ -static bool decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer) +static bool decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, identification_t **peer) { struct state *const st = md->st; struct payload_digest *const id_pld = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; const pb_stream *const id_pbs = &id_pld->pbs; struct isakmp_id *const id = &id_pld->payload.id; + chunk_t id_payload; /* I think that RFC2407 (IPSEC DOI) 4.6.2 is confused. * It talks about the protocol ID and Port fields of the ID @@ -2218,74 +2309,50 @@ static bool decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer) return FALSE; } - peer->kind = id->isaid_idtype; + id_payload = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - switch (peer->kind) + switch (id->isaid_idtype) { - case ID_IPV4_ADDR: - case ID_IPV6_ADDR: - /* failure mode for initaddr is probably inappropriate address length */ - { - err_t ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs) - , peer->kind == ID_IPV4_ADDR? AF_INET : AF_INET6 - , &peer->ip_addr); - - if (ugh != NULL) + case ID_IPV4_ADDR: + if (id_payload.len != 4) { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s identification payload: %s" - , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind), ugh); - /* XXX Could send notification back */ + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s Phase 1 ID payload", + enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype)); return FALSE; } - } - break; - - case ID_USER_FQDN: - if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '@', pbs_left(id_pbs)) == NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer's ID_USER_FQDN contains no @"); - return FALSE; - } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case ID_FQDN: - if (memchr(id_pbs->cur, '\0', pbs_left(id_pbs)) != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Phase 1 ID Payload of type %s contains a NUL" - , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind)); + break; + case ID_IPV6_ADDR: + if (id_payload.len != 16) + { + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "improper %s Phase 1 ID payload", + enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype)); + return FALSE; + } + break; + case ID_USER_FQDN: + case ID_FQDN: + if (memchr(id_payload.ptr, '\0', id_payload.len) != NULL) + { + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s Phase 1 ID payload contains " + "a NUL character", + enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype)); + return FALSE; + } + break; + case ID_KEY_ID: + case ID_DER_ASN1_DN: + break; + default: + /* XXX Could send notification back */ + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unacceptable identity type (%s) " + "in Phase 1 ID payload", + enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype)); return FALSE; - } - - /* ??? ought to do some more sanity check, but what? */ - - peer->name = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - break; - - case ID_KEY_ID: - peer->name = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - DBG(DBG_PARSING, - DBG_dump_chunk("KEY ID:", peer->name)); - break; - - case ID_DER_ASN1_DN: - peer->name = chunk_create(id_pbs->cur, pbs_left(id_pbs)); - DBG(DBG_PARSING, - DBG_dump_chunk("DER ASN1 DN:", peer->name)); - break; - - default: - /* XXX Could send notification back */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "Unacceptable identity type (%s) in Phase 1 ID Payload" - , enum_show(&ident_names, peer->kind)); - return FALSE; } + *peer = identification_create_from_encoding(id->isaid_idtype, id_payload); - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf)); - plog("Peer ID is %s: '%s'", - enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype), buf); - } + plog("Peer ID is %s: '%Y'", enum_show(&ident_names, id->isaid_idtype), + *peer); /* check for certificates */ decode_cert(md); @@ -2298,45 +2365,51 @@ static bool decode_peer_id(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer) * - if the initiation was explicit, we'd be ignoring user's intent * - if opportunistic, we'll lose our HOLD info */ -static bool switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, +static bool switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, identification_t *peer, bool initiator) { struct state *const st = md->st; - struct connection *c = st->st_connection; - - chunk_t peer_ca = (st->st_peer_pubkey != NULL) - ? st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer : chunk_empty; + connection_t *c = st->st_connection; + identification_t *peer_ca; - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, peer_ca, "%none"); - DBG_log("peer CA: '%s'", buf); - ) + peer_ca = st->st_peer_pubkey ? st->st_peer_pubkey->issuer : NULL; + if (peer_ca) + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("peer CA: \"%Y\"", peer_ca) + ) + } + else + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("peer CA: %%none") + ) + } if (initiator) { int pathlen; - if (!same_id(&c->spd.that.id, peer)) + if (!peer->equals(peer, c->spd.that.id)) { - char expect[BUF_LEN] - , found[BUF_LEN]; - - idtoa(&c->spd.that.id, expect, sizeof(expect)); - idtoa(peer, found, sizeof(found)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS - , "we require peer to have ID '%s', but peer declares '%s'" - , expect, found); + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, + "we require peer to have ID '%Y', but peer declares '%Y'", + c->spd.that.id, peer); return FALSE; } - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, c->spd.that.ca, "%none"); - DBG_log("required CA: '%s'", buf); - ) + if (c->spd.that.ca) + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("required CA: \"%s\"", c->spd.that.ca); + ) + } + else + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("required CA: %%none"); + ) + } if (!trusted_ca(peer_ca, c->spd.that.ca, &pathlen)) { @@ -2347,7 +2420,7 @@ static bool switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, } else { - struct connection *r; + connection_t *r; /* check for certificate requests */ decode_cr(md, c); @@ -2355,24 +2428,31 @@ static bool switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, r = refine_host_connection(st, peer, peer_ca); /* delete the collected certificate requests */ - free_generalNames(c->requested_ca, TRUE); - c->requested_ca = NULL; + if (c->requested_ca) + { + c->requested_ca->destroy_offset(c->requested_ca, + offsetof(identification_t, destroy)); + c->requested_ca = NULL; + } if (r == NULL) { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - idtoa(peer, buf, sizeof(buf)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no suitable connection for peer '%s'", buf); + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no suitable connection for peer '%Y'", peer); return FALSE; } - DBG(DBG_CONTROL, - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - dntoa_or_null(buf, BUF_LEN, r->spd.this.ca, "%none"); - DBG_log("offered CA: '%s'", buf); - ) + if (r->spd.this.ca) + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("offered CA: \"%Y\"", r->spd.this.ca) + ) + } + else + { + DBG(DBG_CONTROL, + DBG_log("offered CA: %%none") + ) + } if (r != c) { @@ -2396,10 +2476,9 @@ static bool switch_connection(struct msg_digest *md, struct id *peer, } else if (c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards) { - free_id_content(&c->spd.that.id); - c->spd.that.id = *peer; + c->spd.that.id->destroy(c->spd.that.id); + c->spd.that.id = peer->clone(peer); c->spd.that.has_id_wildcards = FALSE; - unshare_id_content(&c->spd.that.id); } } return TRUE; @@ -2489,13 +2568,19 @@ static bool decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs, ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address); if (ugh == NULL) + { ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_mask); + } if (ugh == NULL) + { ugh = initsubnet(&temp_address, masktocount(&temp_mask) , '0', net); + } if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net)) + { ugh = "contains only anyaddr"; + } if (ugh != NULL) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s bad subnet in Quick I1 (%s)" @@ -2528,8 +2613,10 @@ static bool decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs, } ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur, afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_from); if (ugh == NULL) + { ugh = initaddr(id_pbs->cur + afi->ia_sz , afi->ia_sz, afi->af, &temp_address_to); + } if (ugh != NULL) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "%s ID payload %s malformed (%s) in Quick I1" @@ -2540,7 +2627,9 @@ static bool decode_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs, ugh = rangetosubnet(&temp_address_from, &temp_address_to, net); if (ugh == NULL && subnetisnone(net)) + { ugh = "contains only anyaddr"; + } if (ugh != NULL) { char temp_buff1[ADDRTOT_BUF], temp_buff2[ADDRTOT_BUF]; @@ -2582,8 +2671,9 @@ static bool check_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs, ip_subnet net_temp; if (!decode_net_id(id, id_pbs, &net_temp, which)) + { return FALSE; - + } if (!samesubnet(net, &net_temp) || *protoid != id->isaiid_protoid || *port != id->isaiid_port) { @@ -2598,7 +2688,7 @@ static bool check_net_id(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *id, pb_stream *id_pbs, */ static bool has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st) { - struct connection *c = st->st_connection; + connection_t *c = st->st_connection; /* do not consider rw connections since * the peer's identity must be known @@ -2613,7 +2703,8 @@ static bool has_preloaded_public_key(struct state *st) pubkey_t *key = p->key; key_type_t type = key->public_key->get_type(key->public_key); - if (type == KEY_RSA && same_id(&c->spd.that.id, &key->id) && + if (type == KEY_RSA && + c->spd.that.id->equals(c->spd.that.id, key->id) && key->until_time == UNDEFINED_TIME) { /* found a preloaded public key */ @@ -2646,7 +2737,7 @@ static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st, u_int8_t protoid, if (needed_len && pi->attrs.key_len) { needed_len = pi->attrs.key_len / BITS_PER_BYTE; - } + } switch (pi->attrs.transid) { @@ -2745,7 +2836,7 @@ static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st, u_int8_t protoid, char *keymat_i_peer = pi->peer_keymat + i; chunk_t keymat_our = { keymat_i_our, prf_block_size }; chunk_t keymat_peer = { keymat_i_peer, prf_block_size }; - + if (st->st_shared.ptr != NULL) { /* PFS: include the g^xy */ @@ -2785,9 +2876,13 @@ static void compute_proto_keymat(struct state *st, u_int8_t protoid, static void compute_keymats(struct state *st) { if (st->st_ah.present) + { compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_AH, &st->st_ah); + } if (st->st_esp.present) + { compute_proto_keymat(st, PROTO_IPSEC_ESP, &st->st_esp); + } } static bool uses_pubkey_auth(int auth) @@ -2807,6 +2902,38 @@ static bool uses_pubkey_auth(int auth) } } +/* build an ID payload + * Note: no memory is allocated for the body of the payload (tl->ptr). + * We assume it will end up being a pointer into a sufficiently + * stable datastructure. It only needs to last a short time. + */ +static void build_id_payload(struct isakmp_ipsec_id *hd, chunk_t *tl, struct end *end) +{ + identification_t *id = resolve_myid(end->id); + + zero(hd); + hd->isaiid_idtype = id->get_type(id); + + switch (id->get_type(id)) + { + case ID_ANY: + hd->isaiid_idtype = aftoinfo(addrtypeof(&end->host_addr))->id_addr; + tl->len = addrbytesptr(&end->host_addr, + (const unsigned char **)&tl->ptr); /* sets tl->ptr too */ + break; + case ID_IPV4_ADDR: + case ID_IPV6_ADDR: + case ID_FQDN: + case ID_USER_FQDN: + case ID_DER_ASN1_DN: + case ID_KEY_ID: + *tl = id->get_encoding(id); + break; + default: + bad_case(id->get_type(id)); + } +} + /* State Transition Functions. * * The definition of state_microcode_table in demux.c is a good @@ -2833,7 +2960,7 @@ stf_status main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) { struct payload_digest *const sa_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SA]; struct state *st; - struct connection *c; + connection_t *c; struct isakmp_proposal proposal; pb_stream proposal_pbs; pb_stream r_sa_pbs; @@ -2877,7 +3004,7 @@ stf_status main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) * but Food Groups kind of assumes one. */ { - struct connection *d; + connection_t *d; d = find_host_connection(&md->iface->addr , pluto_port, (ip_address*)NULL, md->sender_port, policy); @@ -2936,7 +3063,7 @@ stf_status main_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) /* Create an instance * This is a rare case: wildcard peer ID but static peer IP address */ - c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, &c->spd.that.id); + c = rw_instantiate(c, &md->sender, md->sender_port, NULL, c->spd.that.id); } /* Set up state */ @@ -3126,7 +3253,7 @@ stf_status main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "a single Transform is required in a selecting Oakley Proposal; found %u" , (unsigned)proposal.isap_notrans); - RETURN_STF_FAILURE(BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX); + RETURN_STF_FAILURE(ISAKMP_BAD_PROPOSAL_SYNTAX); } RETURN_STF_FAILURE(parse_isakmp_sa_body(ipsecdoisit , &proposal_pbs, &proposal, NULL, st, TRUE)); @@ -3155,35 +3282,46 @@ stf_status main_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) /* KE out */ if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gi, st->st_oakley.group , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } #ifdef DEBUG /* Ni out */ if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : np, "Ni")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - + } if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MI2) { /* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */ pb_stream vid_pbs; if (!out_generic(np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs); } #else /* Ni out */ if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_ni, &md->rbody, np, "Ni")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } #endif if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) { if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } } /* finish message */ @@ -3251,15 +3389,18 @@ stf_status main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md) /* KE out */ if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_oakley.group , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } #ifdef DEBUG /* Nr out */ - if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody - , (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID + if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody, + (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2)? ISAKMP_NEXT_VID : (send_cr? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np), "Nr")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - + } if (cur_debugging & IMPAIR_BUST_MR2) { /* generate a pointless large VID payload to push message over MTU */ @@ -3267,9 +3408,13 @@ stf_status main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md) if (!out_generic((send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np, &isakmp_vendor_id_desc, &md->rbody, &vid_pbs)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } if (!out_zero(1500 /*MTU?*/, &vid_pbs, "Filler VID")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } close_output_pbs(&vid_pbs); } #else @@ -3284,33 +3429,50 @@ stf_status main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md) { if (st->st_connection->kind == CK_PERMANENT) { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE - , st->st_connection->spd.that.ca - , &md->rbody, np)) + identification_t *ca = st->st_connection->spd.that.ca; + chunk_t cr = (ca) ? ca->get_encoding(ca) : chunk_empty; + + if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, cr, &md->rbody, np)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } } else { - generalName_t *ca = NULL; + linked_list_t *list = collect_rw_ca_candidates(md); + int count = list->get_count(list); + bool error = FALSE; - if (collect_rw_ca_candidates(md, &ca)) + if (count) { - generalName_t *gn; + enumerator_t *enumerator; + identification_t *ca; - for (gn = ca; gn != NULL; gn = gn->next) + enumerator = list->create_enumerator(list); + while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &ca)) { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, gn->name - , &md->rbody - , gn->next == NULL ? np : ISAKMP_NEXT_CR)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, + ca->get_encoding(ca), &md->rbody, + --count ? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : np)) + { + error = TRUE; + break; + } } - free_generalNames(ca, FALSE); + enumerator->destroy(enumerator); } else { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, chunk_empty - , &md->rbody, np)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, chunk_empty, + &md->rbody, np)) + { + error = TRUE; + } + } + list->destroy_offset(list, offsetof(identification_t, destroy)); + if (error) + { + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; } } } @@ -3318,7 +3480,9 @@ stf_status main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md) if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) { if (!nat_traversal_add_natd(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &md->rbody, md)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } } /* finish message */ @@ -3329,7 +3493,9 @@ stf_status main_inI2_outR2(struct msg_digest *md) */ compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi); if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st)) - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; + } update_iv(st); return STF_OK; @@ -3350,9 +3516,10 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) struct state *const st = md->st; pb_stream *const keyex_pbs = &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_KE]->pbs; pb_stream id_pbs; /* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */ - - certpolicy_t cert_policy = st->st_connection->spd.this.sendcert; - cert_t mycert = st->st_connection->spd.this.cert; + + connection_t *c = st->st_connection; + certpolicy_t cert_policy = c->spd.this.sendcert; + cert_t *mycert = c->spd.this.cert; bool requested, send_cert, send_cr; bool pubkey_auth = uses_pubkey_auth(st->st_oakley.auth); @@ -3365,22 +3532,26 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_nonce(md, &st->st_nr, "Nr")); /* decode certificate requests */ - st->st_connection->got_certrequest = FALSE; - decode_cr(md, st->st_connection); + c->got_certrequest = FALSE; + decode_cr(md, c); /* free collected certificate requests since as initiator * we don't heed them anyway */ - free_generalNames(st->st_connection->requested_ca, TRUE); - st->st_connection->requested_ca = NULL; + if (c->requested_ca) + { + c->requested_ca->destroy_offset(c->requested_ca, + offsetof(identification_t, destroy)); + c->requested_ca = NULL; + } /* send certificate if auth is RSA, we have one and we want * or are requested to send it */ - requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED - && st->st_connection->got_certrequest; - send_cert = pubkey_auth && mycert.type != CERT_NONE - && (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested); + requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED && c->got_certrequest; + send_cert = pubkey_auth && mycert && + mycert->cert->get_type(mycert->cert) == CERT_X509 && + (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested); /* send certificate request if we don't have a preloaded RSA public key */ send_cr = !no_cr_send && send_cert && !has_preloaded_public_key(st); @@ -3388,8 +3559,9 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) /* done parsing; initialize crypto */ compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr); if (!generate_skeyids_iv(st)) - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; - + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; + } if (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATD) { nat_traversal_natd_lookup(md); @@ -3413,11 +3585,13 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) struct isakmp_ipsec_id id_hd; chunk_t id_b; - build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &st->st_connection->spd.this); + build_id_payload(&id_hd, &id_b, &c->spd.this); id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload; if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &id_pbs) || !out_chunk(id_b, &id_pbs, "my identity")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } close_output_pbs(&id_pbs); } @@ -3427,12 +3601,14 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("our certificate policy is %N", cert_policy_names, cert_policy) ) - if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE) + if (mycert && mycert->cert->get_type(mycert->cert) == CERT_X509) { const char *request_text = ""; if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED) + { request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request"; + } plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s" , send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text); } @@ -3443,31 +3619,43 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) } if (send_cert) { + bool success; + chunk_t cert_encoding; pb_stream cert_pbs; struct isakmp_cert cert_hd; cert_hd.isacert_np = (send_cr)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CR : ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG; - cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type; + cert_hd.isacert_type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE; if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_chunk(cert_get_encoding(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT")) + } + cert_encoding = mycert->cert->get_encoding(mycert->cert); + success = out_chunk(cert_encoding, &cert_pbs, "CERT"); + free(cert_encoding.ptr); + if (!success) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs); } /* CR out */ if (send_cr) { - if (!build_and_ship_CR(mycert.type, st->st_connection->spd.that.ca - , &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG)) + identification_t *ca = st->st_connection->spd.that.ca; + chunk_t cr = (ca) ? ca->get_encoding(ca) : chunk_empty; + + if (!build_and_ship_CR(CERT_X509_SIGNATURE, cr, &md->rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } } /* HASH_I or SIG_I out */ { - u_char hash_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - chunk_t hash = chunk_from_buf(hash_buf); + chunk_t hash = chunk_alloca(MAX_DIGEST_LEN); main_mode_hash(st, &hash, TRUE, &id_pbs); @@ -3489,16 +3677,18 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) scheme = oakley_to_signature_scheme(st->st_oakley.auth); - sig_len = sign_hash(scheme, st->st_connection, sig_val, hash); + sig_len = sign_hash(scheme, c, sig_val, hash); if (sig_len == 0) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for signature"); - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; } if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_I")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } } } @@ -3506,8 +3696,9 @@ stf_status main_inR2_outI3(struct msg_digest *md) /* st_new_iv was computed by generate_skeyids_iv */ if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - + } return STF_OK; } @@ -3534,13 +3725,10 @@ struct key_continuation { typedef stf_status (key_tail_fn)(struct msg_digest *md , struct key_continuation *kc); -static void report_key_dns_failure(struct id *id, err_t ugh) +static void report_key_dns_failure(identification_t *id, err_t ugh) { - char id_buf[BUF_LEN]; /* arbitrary limit on length of ID reported */ - - (void) idtoa(id, id_buf, sizeof(id_buf)); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%s'" - "; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)", id_buf, ugh); + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no RSA public key known for '%Y'" + "; DNS search for KEY failed (%s)", id, ugh); } @@ -3558,15 +3746,16 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md , const struct key_continuation *kc /* current state, can be NULL */ ) { - u_char hash_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - chunk_t hash = chunk_from_buf(hash_buf); + chunk_t hash = chunk_alloca(MAX_DIGEST_LEN); struct state *st = md->st; - struct id peer; + identification_t *peer; stf_status r = STF_OK; /* ID Payload in */ if (!decode_peer_id(md, &peer)) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } /* Hash the ID Payload. * main_mode_hash requires idpl->cur to be at end of payload @@ -3596,7 +3785,7 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md , hash_pbs->cur, pbs_left(hash_pbs)); loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "received Hash Payload does not match computed value"); /* XXX Could send notification back */ - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; + r = STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_HASH_INFORMATION; } } break; @@ -3604,14 +3793,14 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md case OAKLEY_RSA_SIG: case XAUTHInitRSA: case XAUTHRespRSA: - r = check_signature(KEY_RSA, &peer, st, hash, - &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs, + r = check_signature(KEY_RSA, peer, st, hash, + &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs, #ifdef USE_KEYRR - kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.keys_from_dns, + kc == NULL ? NULL : kc->ac.keys_from_dns, #endif /* USE_KEYRR */ - kc == NULL? NULL : kc->ac.gateways_from_dns + kc == NULL ? NULL : kc->ac.gateways_from_dns ); - + if (r == STF_SUSPEND) { /* initiate/resume asynchronous DNS lookup for key */ @@ -3634,22 +3823,14 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md #ifdef USE_KEYRR nkc->failure_ok = TRUE; #endif - ugh = start_adns_query(&peer - , &peer /* SG itself */ - , T_TXT - , cont_fn - , &nkc->ac); + ugh = start_adns_query(peer, peer, T_TXT, cont_fn, &nkc->ac); break; #ifdef USE_KEYRR case kos_his_txt: /* second try: look for the KEY records */ nkc->step = kos_his_key; - ugh = start_adns_query(&peer - , NULL /* no sgw for KEY */ - , T_KEY - , cont_fn - , &nkc->ac); + ugh = start_adns_query(peer, NULL, T_KEY, cont_fn, &nkc->ac); break; #endif /* USE_KEYRR */ @@ -3659,9 +3840,9 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md if (ugh != NULL) { - report_key_dns_failure(&peer, ugh); + report_key_dns_failure(peer, ugh); st->st_suspended_md = NULL; - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; + r = STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; } } break; @@ -3669,7 +3850,7 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md case OAKLEY_ECDSA_256: case OAKLEY_ECDSA_384: case OAKLEY_ECDSA_521: - r = check_signature(KEY_ECDSA, &peer, st, hash, + r = check_signature(KEY_ECDSA, peer, st, hash, &md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG]->pbs, #ifdef USE_KEYRR NULL, @@ -3681,16 +3862,20 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md bad_case(st->st_oakley.auth); } if (r != STF_OK) + { + peer->destroy(peer); return r; - + } DBG(DBG_CRYPT, DBG_log("authentication succeeded")); /* * With the peer ID known, let's see if we need to switch connections. */ - if (!switch_connection(md, &peer, initiator)) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - + if (!switch_connection(md, peer, initiator)) + { + r = STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } + peer->destroy(peer); return r; } @@ -3715,7 +3900,7 @@ main_id_and_auth(struct msg_digest *md * to find authentication, or we run out of things * to try. */ -static void key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh, +static void key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh, key_tail_fn *tail) { struct key_continuation *kc = (void *)cr; @@ -3734,8 +3919,8 @@ static void key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh, if (!kc->failure_ok && ugh != NULL) { - report_key_dns_failure(&st->st_connection->spd.that.id, ugh); - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; + report_key_dns_failure(st->st_connection->spd.that.id, ugh); + r = STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_KEY_INFORMATION; } else { @@ -3751,7 +3936,9 @@ static void key_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh, complete_state_transition(&kc->md, r); } if (kc->md != NULL) + { release_md(kc->md); + } cur_state = NULL; } @@ -3786,7 +3973,7 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md u_int8_t auth_payload; pb_stream r_id_pbs; /* ID Payload; also used for hash calculation */ certpolicy_t cert_policy; - cert_t mycert; + cert_t *mycert; bool pubkey_auth, send_cert, requested; /* ID and HASH_I or SIG_I in @@ -3798,7 +3985,9 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md , kc); if (r != STF_OK) + { return r; + } } /* send certificate if pubkey authentication is used, we have one @@ -3809,7 +3998,8 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md requested = cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED && st->st_connection->got_certrequest; pubkey_auth = uses_pubkey_auth(st->st_oakley.auth); - send_cert = pubkey_auth && mycert.type != CERT_NONE && + send_cert = pubkey_auth && mycert && + mycert->cert->get_type(mycert->cert) == CERT_X509 && (cert_policy == CERT_ALWAYS_SEND || requested); /*************** build output packet HDR*;IDir;HASH/SIG_R ***************/ @@ -3840,7 +4030,9 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md id_hd.isaiid_np = (send_cert)? ISAKMP_NEXT_CERT : auth_payload; if (!out_struct(&id_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_identification_desc, &md->rbody, &r_id_pbs) || !out_chunk(id_b, &r_id_pbs, "my identity")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } close_output_pbs(&r_id_pbs); } @@ -3850,12 +4042,14 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md DBG(DBG_CONTROL, DBG_log("our certificate policy is %N", cert_policy_names, cert_policy) ) - if (mycert.type != CERT_NONE) + if (mycert && mycert->cert->get_type(mycert->cert) == CERT_X509) { const char *request_text = ""; if (cert_policy == CERT_SEND_IF_ASKED) + { request_text = (send_cert)? "upon request":"without request"; + } plog("we have a cert %s sending it %s" , send_cert? "and are":"but are not", request_text); } @@ -3866,23 +4060,31 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md } if (send_cert) { + bool success; + chunk_t cert_encoding; pb_stream cert_pbs; - struct isakmp_cert cert_hd; + cert_hd.isacert_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_SIG; - cert_hd.isacert_type = mycert.type; + cert_hd.isacert_type = CERT_X509_SIGNATURE; if (!out_struct(&cert_hd, &isakmp_ipsec_certificate_desc, &md->rbody, &cert_pbs)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - if (!out_chunk(cert_get_encoding(mycert), &cert_pbs, "CERT")) + { + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + cert_encoding = mycert->cert->get_encoding(mycert->cert); + success = out_chunk(cert_encoding, &cert_pbs, "CERT"); + free(cert_encoding.ptr); + if (!success) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } close_output_pbs(&cert_pbs); } /* HASH_R or SIG_R out */ { - u_char hash_buf[MAX_DIGEST_LEN]; - chunk_t hash = chunk_from_buf(hash_buf); + chunk_t hash = chunk_alloca(MAX_DIGEST_LEN); main_mode_hash(st, &hash, FALSE, &r_id_pbs); @@ -3908,19 +4110,23 @@ main_inI3_outR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md if (sig_len == 0) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unable to locate my private key for signature"); - return STF_FAIL + AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED; } if (!out_generic_raw(ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE, &isakmp_signature_desc , &md->rbody, sig_val, sig_len, "SIG_R")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } } } /* encrypt message, sans fixed part of header */ if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ + } /* Last block of Phase 1 (R3), kept for Phase 2 IV generation */ DBG_cond_dump(DBG_CRYPT, "last encrypted block of Phase 1:" @@ -3969,7 +4175,9 @@ static stf_status main_inR3_tail(struct msg_digest *md, stf_status r = main_id_and_auth(md, TRUE, main_inR3_continue, kc); if (r != STF_OK) + { return r; + } } /**************** done input ****************/ @@ -4103,7 +4311,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b stf_status quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) { const struct state *const p1st = md->st; - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; + connection_t *c = p1st->st_connection; struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; struct verify_oppo_bundle b; @@ -4127,12 +4335,16 @@ stf_status quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->pbs , &b.his.net, "peer client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } /* Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */ if (id_pd->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_idtype == ID_FQDN) + { happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net)); + } /* End Hack for MS 818043 NAT-T Update */ @@ -4144,8 +4356,9 @@ stf_status quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) if (!decode_net_id(&id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id, &id_pd->next->pbs , &b.my.net, "our client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; - + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } b.my.proto = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_protoid; b.my.port = id_pd->next->payload.ipsec_id.isaiid_port; b.my.net.addr.u.v4.sin_port = htons(b.my.port); @@ -4154,8 +4367,9 @@ stf_status quick_inI1_outR1(struct msg_digest *md) { /* implicit IDci and IDcr: peer and self */ if (!sameaddrtype(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &c->spd.that.host_addr)) + { return STF_FAIL; - + } happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &b.my.net)); happy(addrtosubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &b.his.net)); b.his.proto = b.my.proto = 0; @@ -4224,7 +4438,7 @@ static void quick_inI1_outR1_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh) if (!b->failure_ok && ugh != NULL) { report_verify_failure(b, ugh); - r = STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + r = STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; } else { @@ -4233,7 +4447,9 @@ static void quick_inI1_outR1_continue(struct adns_continuation *cr, err_t ugh) complete_state_transition(&b->md, r); } if (b->md != NULL) + { release_md(b->md); + } cur_state = NULL; } @@ -4242,11 +4458,11 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, { struct msg_digest *md = b->md; struct state *p1st = md->st; - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; + connection_t *c = p1st->st_connection; struct verify_oppo_continuation *vc = malloc_thing(struct verify_oppo_continuation); - struct id id /* subject of query */ - , *our_id /* needed for myid playing */ - , our_id_space; /* ephemeral: no need for unshare_id_content */ + identification_t *id; /* subject of query */ + identification_t *our_id; /* needed for myid playing */ + identification_t *our_id_space; /* ephemeral: no need for unshare_id_content */ ip_address client; err_t ugh = NULL; @@ -4282,20 +4498,20 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, * %myid makes no sense for the other side (but it is syntactically * legal). */ - our_id = resolve_myid(&c->spd.this.id); - if (our_id->kind == ID_ANY) + our_id = resolve_myid(c->spd.this.id); + if (our_id->get_type(our_id) == ID_ANY) { - iptoid(&c->spd.this.host_addr, &our_id_space); - our_id = &our_id_space; + our_id_space = identification_create_from_sockaddr((sockaddr_t*)&c->spd.this.host_addr); + our_id = our_id_space; } switch (next_step) { case vos_our_client: networkof(&b->my.net, &client); - iptoid(&client, &id); + id = identification_create_from_sockaddr((sockaddr_t*)&client); vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE; - ugh = start_adns_query(&id + ugh = start_adns_query(id , our_id , T_TXT , quick_inI1_outR1_continue @@ -4324,10 +4540,10 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, case vos_his_client: networkof(&b->his.net, &client); - iptoid(&client, &id); + id = identification_create_from_sockaddr((sockaddr_t*)&client); vc->b.failure_ok = b->failure_ok = FALSE; - ugh = start_adns_query(&id - , &c->spd.that.id + ugh = start_adns_query(id + , c->spd.that.id , T_TXT , quick_inI1_outR1_continue , &vc->ac); @@ -4345,7 +4561,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, */ report_verify_failure(b, ugh); p1st->st_suspended_md = NULL; - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; } else { @@ -4358,7 +4574,7 @@ static enum verify_oppo_step quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer( struct adns_continuation *ac, struct state *p1st) { - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; + connection_t *c = p1st->st_connection; enum verify_oppo_step next_step = vos_our_client; err_t ugh = NULL; @@ -4491,14 +4707,12 @@ static enum verify_oppo_step quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer( next_step = vos_done; { public_key_t *pub_key; - identification_t *p1st_keyid; struct gw_info *gwp; - + /* check that the public key that authenticated * the ISAKMP SA (p1st) will do for this gateway. */ pub_key = p1st->st_peer_pubkey->public_key; - p1st_keyid = pub_key->get_id(pub_key, ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1); ugh = "peer's client does not delegate to peer"; for (gwp = ac->gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) @@ -4510,10 +4724,8 @@ static enum verify_oppo_step quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer( * it implies fetching a KEY from the same * place we must have gotten it. */ - if (!gwp->gw_key_present || p1st_keyid->equals(p1st_keyid, - gwp->key->public_key->get_id(gwp->key->public_key, - ID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1)) - ) + if (!gwp->gw_key_present || + pub_key->equals(pub_key, gwp->key->public_key)) { ugh = NULL; /* good! */ break; @@ -4539,7 +4751,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, { struct msg_digest *md = b->md; struct state *const p1st = md->st; - struct connection *c = p1st->st_connection; + connection_t *c = p1st->st_connection; struct payload_digest *const id_pd = md->chain[ISAKMP_NEXT_ID]; ip_subnet *our_net = &b->my.net , *his_net = &b->his.net; @@ -4552,7 +4764,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, * a suitable connection (our current one only matches for hosts). */ { - struct connection *p = find_client_connection(c + connection_t *p = find_client_connection(c , our_net, his_net, b->my.proto, b->my.port, b->his.proto, b->his.port); if (p == NULL) @@ -4582,7 +4794,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, plog("cannot respond to IPsec SA request" " because no connection is known for %s" , buf); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; } else if (p != c) { @@ -4609,14 +4821,18 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, next_step = quick_inI1_outR1_process_answer(b, ac, p1st); if (next_step == vos_fail) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } /* short circuit: if peer's client is self, * accept that we've verified delegation in Phase 1 */ if (next_step == vos_his_client && sameaddr(&c->spd.that.host_addr, &his_client)) + { next_step = vos_done; + } /* the second chunk: initiate the next DNS query (if any) */ DBG(DBG_CONTROL, @@ -4633,7 +4849,9 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, /* start next DNS query and suspend (if necessary) */ if (next_step != vos_done) + { return quick_inI1_outR1_start_query(b, next_step); + } /* Instantiate inbound Opportunistic connection, * carrying over authenticated peer ID @@ -4643,7 +4861,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, * We should record DNS sec use, if any -- belongs in * state during perhaps. */ - p = oppo_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, &c->spd.that.id + p = oppo_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, c->spd.that.id , NULL, &our_client, &his_client); } else @@ -4652,7 +4870,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, * instantiate, carrying over authenticated peer ID */ p = rw_instantiate(p, &c->spd.that.host_addr, md->sender_port - , his_net, &c->spd.that.id); + , his_net, c->spd.that.id); } } #ifdef DEBUG @@ -4680,7 +4898,9 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, c->spd.that.client = *his_net; c->spd.that.virt = NULL; if (subnetishost(his_net) && addrinsubnet(&c->spd.that.host_addr, his_net)) + { c->spd.that.has_client = FALSE; + } } /* fill in the client's true port */ @@ -4708,7 +4928,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, if (st->st_connection != c) { - struct connection *t = st->st_connection; + connection_t *t = st->st_connection; st->st_connection = c; set_cur_connection(c); @@ -4781,7 +5001,9 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, /* sa header is unchanged -- except for np */ sa.isasa_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONCE; if (!out_struct(&sa, &isakmp_sa_desc, &md->rbody, &r_sa_pbs)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } /* parse and accept body */ st->st_pfs_group = &unset_group; @@ -4794,7 +5016,7 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, if ((st->st_policy & POLICY_PFS) && st->st_pfs_group == NULL) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "we require PFS but Quick I1 SA specifies no GROUP_DESCRIPTION"); - return STF_FAIL + NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN; /* ??? */ + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_NO_PROPOSAL_CHOSEN; } /* Ni in */ @@ -4811,7 +5033,9 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, if (!build_and_ship_nonce(&st->st_nr, &md->rbody , st->st_pfs_group != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_KE : id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE , "Nr")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } /* [ KE ] out (for PFS) */ @@ -4819,7 +5043,9 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, { if (!build_and_ship_KE(st, &st->st_gr, st->st_pfs_group , &md->rbody, id_pd != NULL? ISAKMP_NEXT_ID : ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + { + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } /* MPZ-Operations might be done after sending the packet... */ compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gi); @@ -4831,13 +5057,17 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, struct isakmp_ipsec_id *p = (void *)md->rbody.cur; /* UGH! */ if (!out_raw(id_pd->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDci")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_ID; p = (void *)md->rbody.cur; /* UGH! */ if (!out_raw(id_pd->next->pbs.start, pbs_room(&id_pd->next->pbs), &md->rbody, "IDcr")) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } p->isaiid_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; } @@ -4873,12 +5103,16 @@ static stf_status quick_inI1_outR1_tail(struct verify_oppo_bundle *b, * failure won't look like success. */ if (!install_inbound_ipsec_sa(st)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ + } /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */ if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ + } return STF_OK; } @@ -4891,14 +5125,16 @@ static void dpd_init(struct state *st) { struct state *p1st = find_state(st->st_icookie, st->st_rcookie , &st->st_connection->spd.that.host_addr, 0); - + if (p1st == NULL) + { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "could not find phase 1 state for DPD"); + } else if (p1st->st_dpd) { plog("Dead Peer Detection (RFC 3706) enabled"); /* randomize the first DPD event */ - + event_schedule(EVENT_DPD , (0.5 + rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.E0)) * st->st_connection->dpd_delay , st); @@ -4914,7 +5150,7 @@ static void dpd_init(struct state *st) stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) { struct state *const st = md->st; - const struct connection *c = st->st_connection; + const connection_t *c = st->st_connection; /* HASH(2) in */ CHECK_QUICK_HASH(md @@ -4937,7 +5173,9 @@ stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) RETURN_STF_FAILURE(accept_PFS_KE(md, &st->st_gr, "Gr", "Quick Mode R1")); if (st->st_pfs_group != NULL) + { compute_dh_shared(st, st->st_gr); + } /* [ IDci, IDcr ] in; these must match what we sent */ @@ -4954,7 +5192,9 @@ stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) , &st->st_myuserprotoid, &st->st_myuserport , &st->st_connection->spd.this.client , "our client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } /* IDcr (responder is peer) */ @@ -4962,7 +5202,9 @@ stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) , &st->st_peeruserprotoid, &st->st_peeruserport , &st->st_connection->spd.that.client , "peer client")) - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + { + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + } } else { @@ -4972,35 +5214,40 @@ stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "IDci, IDcr payloads missing in message" " but default does not match proposal"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; } } } /* check the peer's group attributes */ - { - const ietfAttrList_t *peer_list = NULL; - - get_peer_ca_and_groups(st->st_connection, &peer_list); + identification_t *peer_ca = NULL; + ietf_attributes_t *peer_attributes = NULL; + bool match; - if (!group_membership(peer_list, st->st_connection->name - , st->st_connection->spd.that.groups)) + get_peer_ca_and_groups(st->st_connection, &peer_ca, &peer_attributes); + match = match_group_membership(peer_attributes, + st->st_connection->name, + st->st_connection->spd.that.groups); + DESTROY_IF(peer_attributes); + + if (!match) { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; + ietf_attributes_t *groups = st->st_connection->spd.that.groups; - format_groups(st->st_connection->spd.that.groups, buf, BUF_LEN); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "peer is not member of one of the groups: %s" - , buf); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; + loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, + "peer with attributes '%s' is not a member of the groups '%s'", + peer_attributes->get_string(peer_attributes), + groups->get_string(groups)); + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_ID_INFORMATION; } } - if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) - && (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)) - { - nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md); - } + if ((st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_DETECTED) + && (st->nat_traversal & NAT_T_WITH_NATOA)) + { + nat_traversal_natoa_lookup(md); + } /* ??? We used to copy the accepted proposal into the state, but it was * never used. From sa_pd->pbs.start, length pbs_room(&sa_pd->pbs). @@ -5029,32 +5276,37 @@ stf_status quick_inR1_outI2(struct msg_digest *md) * failure won't look like success. */ if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, TRUE)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } /* encrypt message, except for fixed part of header */ if (!encrypt_message(&md->rbody, st)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inR1_outI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)" + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* ??? we may be partly committed */ + } + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("inR1_outI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)" , st->st_connection->name , st->st_connection->instance_serial , st->st_serialno , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa - , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner)); - } - + , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner) + ) st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno; /* note (presumed) success */ if (c->gw_info != NULL) + { c->gw_info->key->last_worked_time = now(); + } /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */ if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE) + { dpd_init(st); - + } return STF_OK; } @@ -5078,17 +5330,17 @@ stf_status quick_inI2(struct msg_digest *md) * failure won't look like success. */ if (!install_ipsec_sa(st, FALSE)) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - { - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, DBG_log("inI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)" + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, + DBG_log("inI2: instance %s[%ld], setting newest_ipsec_sa to #%ld (was #%ld) (spd.eroute=#%ld)" , st->st_connection->name , st->st_connection->instance_serial , st->st_serialno , st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa - , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner)); - } - + , st->st_connection->spd.eroute_owner) + ) st->st_connection->newest_ipsec_sa = st->st_serialno; update_iv(st); /* not actually used, but tidy */ @@ -5098,13 +5350,16 @@ stf_status quick_inI2(struct msg_digest *md) struct gw_info *gw = st->st_connection->gw_info; if (gw != NULL) + { gw->key->last_worked_time = now(); + } } /* If we want DPD on this connection then initialize it */ if (st->st_connection->dpd_action != DPD_ACTION_NONE) + { dpd_init(st); - + } return STF_OK; } @@ -5117,9 +5372,9 @@ static stf_status send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type, u_char *r_hashval, /* where in reply to jam hash value */ *r_hash_start; /* start of what is to be hashed */ - + msgid = generate_msgid(st); - + init_pbs(&reply, reply_buffer, sizeof(reply_buffer), "ISAKMP notify"); /* HDR* */ @@ -5134,7 +5389,9 @@ static stf_status send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type, memcpy(hdr.isa_icookie, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE); memcpy(hdr.isa_rcookie, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE); if (!out_struct(&hdr, &isakmp_hdr_desc, &reply, &rbody)) + { impossible(); + } } /* HASH -- create and note space to be filled later */ START_HASH_PAYLOAD(rbody, ISAKMP_NEXT_N); @@ -5147,22 +5404,32 @@ static stf_status send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type, isan.isan_np = ISAKMP_NEXT_NONE; isan.isan_doi = ISAKMP_DOI_IPSEC; isan.isan_protoid = PROTO_ISAKMP; - isan.isan_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE * 2; + isan.isan_spisize = COOKIE_SIZE * 2; isan.isan_type = type; if (!out_struct(&isan, &isakmp_notification_desc, &rbody, ¬ify_pbs)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } if (!out_raw(st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE, ¬ify_pbs, "notify icookie")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + { + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } if (!out_raw(st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE, ¬ify_pbs, "notify rcookie")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + { + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } if (data != NULL && len > 0) + { if (!out_raw(data, len, ¬ify_pbs, "notify data")) - return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + { + return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } + } close_output_pbs(¬ify_pbs); } - + { - /* finish computing HASH */ + /* finish computing HASH */ chunk_t msgid_chunk = chunk_from_thing(msgid); chunk_t msg_chunk = { r_hash_start, rbody.cur-r_hash_start }; pseudo_random_function_t prf_alg; @@ -5197,8 +5464,10 @@ static stf_status send_isakmp_notification(struct state *st, u_int16_t type, init_phase2_iv(st, &msgid); if (!encrypt_message(&rbody, st)) + { return STF_INTERNAL_ERROR; - + } + /* restore preserved st_iv and st_new_iv */ memcpy(st->st_iv, old_iv, old_iv_len); memcpy(st->st_new_iv, new_iv, new_iv_len); @@ -5241,7 +5510,9 @@ void dpd_outI(struct state *p2st) /* If no DPD, then get out of here */ if (!st->st_dpd) + { return; + } /* schedule the next periodic DPD event */ event_schedule(EVENT_DPD, delay, p2st); @@ -5329,7 +5600,7 @@ dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *p if (n->isan_spisize != COOKIE_SIZE * 2 || pbs_left(pbs) < COOKIE_SIZE * 2) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid SPI length (%d)", n->isan_spisize); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; } if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) @@ -5338,7 +5609,7 @@ dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *p /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */ #else loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid icookie (broken Cisco?)"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_COOKIE; #endif } pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; @@ -5346,7 +5617,7 @@ dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *p if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_rcookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid rcookie (broken Cisco?)"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_COOKIE; } pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; @@ -5354,7 +5625,7 @@ dpd_inI_outR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, pb_stream *p { loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE has invalid data length (%d)" , (int) pbs_left(pbs)); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; } seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur); @@ -5403,7 +5674,7 @@ stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid SPI length (%d)" , n->isan_spisize); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; } if (memcmp(pbs->cur, st->st_icookie, COOKIE_SIZE) != 0) @@ -5412,7 +5683,7 @@ stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */ #else loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid icookie"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_COOKIE; #endif } pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; @@ -5423,7 +5694,7 @@ stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, /* Ignore it, cisco sends odd icookies */ #else loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid rcookie"); - return STF_FAIL + INVALID_COOKIE; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_INVALID_COOKIE; #endif } pbs->cur += COOKIE_SIZE; @@ -5433,7 +5704,7 @@ stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS , " DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has invalid data length (%d)" , (int) pbs_left(pbs)); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; } seqno = ntohl(*(u_int32_t *)pbs->cur); @@ -5447,7 +5718,7 @@ stf_status dpd_inR(struct state *st, struct isakmp_notification *const n, loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS , "DPD: R_U_THERE_ACK has unexpected sequence number %u (expected %u)" , seqno, st->st_dpd_expectseqno); - return STF_FAIL + PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; + return STF_FAIL + ISAKMP_PAYLOAD_MALFORMED; } st->st_dpd_expectseqno = 0; @@ -5466,7 +5737,7 @@ void dpd_timeout(struct state *st) { struct state *newest_phase1_st; - struct connection *c = st->st_connection; + connection_t *c = st->st_connection; int action = st->st_connection->dpd_action; char cname[BUF_LEN]; @@ -5501,14 +5772,18 @@ dpd_timeout(struct state *st) */ loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Putting connection \"%s\" into %%trap", c->name); if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) + { delete_connection(c, TRUE); + } break; case DPD_ACTION_CLEAR: /* dpdaction=clear - Wipe the SA & eroute - everything */ loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "DPD: Clearing connection \"%s\"", c->name); unroute_connection(c); if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) + { delete_connection(c, TRUE); + } break; case DPD_ACTION_RESTART: /* dpdaction=restart - Restart connection, @@ -5521,7 +5796,9 @@ dpd_timeout(struct state *st) strncpy(cname, c->name, BUF_LEN); if (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE) + { delete_connection(c, TRUE); + } initiate_connection(cname, NULL_FD); break; default: |