diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'src/pluto/keys.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/pluto/keys.c | 1474 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1474 deletions
diff --git a/src/pluto/keys.c b/src/pluto/keys.c deleted file mode 100644 index c5adbfd11..000000000 --- a/src/pluto/keys.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1474 +0,0 @@ -/* mechanisms for preshared keys (public, private, and preshared secrets) - * Copyright (C) 1998-2001 D. Hugh Redelmeier. - * Copyright (C) 2009 Andreas Steffen - Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil - * - * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it - * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the - * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your - * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>. - * - * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but - * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY - * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License - * for more details. - */ - -#include <stddef.h> -#include <stdlib.h> -#include <string.h> -#include <ctype.h> -#include <unistd.h> -#include <errno.h> -#include <time.h> -#include <sys/socket.h> -#include <netinet/in.h> -#include <arpa/inet.h> -#include <resolv.h> -#include <arpa/nameser.h> /* missing from <resolv.h> on old systems */ -#include <sys/queue.h> - -#ifdef HAVE_GLOB_H -#include <glob.h> -#ifndef GLOB_ABORTED -# define GLOB_ABORTED GLOB_ABEND /* fix for old versions */ -#endif -#endif - -#include <freeswan.h> - -#include <library.h> -#include <asn1/asn1.h> -#include <credentials/certificates/pgp_certificate.h> -#include <credentials/sets/mem_cred.h> -#include <credentials/sets/callback_cred.h> - -#include "constants.h" -#include "defs.h" -#include "x509.h" -#include "certs.h" -#include "smartcard.h" -#include "connections.h" -#include "state.h" -#include "lex.h" -#include "keys.h" -#include "adns.h" /* needs <resolv.h> */ -#include "dnskey.h" /* needs keys.h and adns.h */ -#include "log.h" -#include "whack.h" /* for RC_LOG_SERIOUS */ -#include "timer.h" -#include "fetch.h" - -const char *shared_secrets_file = SHARED_SECRETS_FILE; - - -typedef enum secret_kind_t secret_kind_t; - -enum secret_kind_t { - SECRET_PSK, - SECRET_PUBKEY, - SECRET_XAUTH, - SECRET_PIN -}; - -typedef struct secret_t secret_t; - -struct secret_t { - linked_list_t *ids; - secret_kind_t kind; - union { - chunk_t preshared_secret; - private_key_t *private_key; - smartcard_t *smartcard; - } u; - secret_t *next; -}; - -/* - * free a public key struct - */ -static void free_public_key(pubkey_t *pk) -{ - DESTROY_IF(pk->id); - DESTROY_IF(pk->public_key); - DESTROY_IF(pk->issuer); - free(pk->serial.ptr); - free(pk); -} - -secret_t *secrets = NULL; - -/** - * Find the secret associated with the combination of me and the peer. - */ -const secret_t* match_secret(identification_t *my_id, identification_t *his_id, - secret_kind_t kind) -{ - enum { /* bits */ - match_default = 0x01, - match_him = 0x02, - match_me = 0x04 - }; - - unsigned int best_match = 0; - secret_t *s, *best = NULL; - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - unsigned int match = 0; - - if (s->kind != kind) - { - continue; - } - - if (s->ids->get_count(s->ids) == 0) - { - /* a default (signified by lack of ids): - * accept if no more specific match found - */ - match = match_default; - } - else - { - /* check if both ends match ids */ - enumerator_t *enumerator; - identification_t *id; - - enumerator = s->ids->create_enumerator(s->ids); - while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &id)) - { - if (my_id->equals(my_id, id)) - { - match |= match_me; - } - if (his_id->equals(his_id, id)) - { - match |= match_him; - } - } - enumerator->destroy(enumerator); - - /* If our end matched the only id in the list, - * default to matching any peer. - * A more specific match will trump this. - */ - if (match == match_me && s->ids->get_count(s->ids) == 1) - { - match |= match_default; - } - } - - switch (match) - { - case match_me: - /* if this is an asymmetric (eg. public key) system, - * allow this-side-only match to count, even if - * there are other ids in the list. - */ - if (kind != SECRET_PUBKEY) - { - break; - } - /* FALLTHROUGH */ - case match_default: /* default all */ - case match_me | match_default: /* default peer */ - case match_me | match_him: /* explicit */ - if (match == best_match) - { - /* two good matches are equally good: do they agree? */ - bool same = FALSE; - - switch (kind) - { - case SECRET_PSK: - case SECRET_XAUTH: - same = chunk_equals(s->u.preshared_secret, - best->u.preshared_secret); - break; - case SECRET_PUBKEY: - same = s->u.private_key->equals(s->u.private_key, - best->u.private_key); - break; - default: - bad_case(kind); - } - if (!same) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "multiple ipsec.secrets entries with " - "distinct secrets match endpoints: first secret used"); - best = s; /* list is backwards: take latest in list */ - } - } - else if (match > best_match) - { - /* this is the best match so far */ - best_match = match; - best = s; - } - } - } - return best; -} - -/** - * Retrieves an XAUTH secret primarily based on the user ID and - * secondarily based on the server ID - */ -bool get_xauth_secret(identification_t *user, identification_t *server, - chunk_t *secret) -{ - const secret_t *s; - - s = match_secret(user, server, SECRET_XAUTH); - if (s) - { - *secret = chunk_clone(s->u.preshared_secret); - return TRUE; - } - else - { - *secret = chunk_empty; - return FALSE; - } -} - -/** - * We match the ID (if none, the IP address). Failure is indicated by a NULL. - */ -static const secret_t* get_secret(const connection_t *c, secret_kind_t kind) -{ - identification_t *my_id, *his_id; - const secret_t *best; - - my_id = c->spd.this.id; - - if (his_id_was_instantiated(c)) - { - /* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */ - his_id = identification_create_from_string("%any"); - } - else if (kind == SECRET_PSK && (c->policy & (POLICY_PSK | POLICY_XAUTH_PSK)) && - ((c->kind == CK_TEMPLATE && - c->spd.that.id->get_type(c->spd.that.id) == ID_ANY) || - (c->kind == CK_INSTANCE && id_is_ipaddr(c->spd.that.id)))) - { - /* roadwarrior: replace him with 0.0.0.0 */ - his_id = identification_create_from_string("%any"); - } - else - { - his_id = c->spd.that.id->clone(c->spd.that.id); - } - - best = match_secret(my_id, his_id, kind); - - his_id->destroy(his_id); - return best; -} - -/* find the appropriate preshared key (see get_secret). - * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer. - * Note: the result is not to be freed by the caller. - */ -const chunk_t* get_preshared_secret(const connection_t *c) -{ - const secret_t *s = get_secret(c, SECRET_PSK); - - DBG(DBG_PRIVATE, - if (s == NULL) - DBG_log("no Preshared Key Found"); - else - DBG_dump_chunk("Preshared Key", s->u.preshared_secret); - ) - return s == NULL? NULL : &s->u.preshared_secret; -} - -/* check the existence of a private key matching a public key contained - * in an X.509 or OpenPGP certificate - */ -bool has_private_key(cert_t *cert) -{ - secret_t *s; - bool has_key = FALSE; - public_key_t *pub_key = cert->cert->get_public_key(cert->cert); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == SECRET_PUBKEY && - s->u.private_key->belongs_to(s->u.private_key, pub_key)) - { - has_key = TRUE; - break; - } - } - pub_key->destroy(pub_key); - return has_key; -} - -/* - * get the matching private key belonging to a given X.509 certificate - */ -private_key_t* get_x509_private_key(const cert_t *cert) -{ - public_key_t *public_key = cert->cert->get_public_key(cert->cert); - private_key_t *private_key = NULL; - secret_t *s; - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - - if (s->kind == SECRET_PUBKEY && - s->u.private_key->belongs_to(s->u.private_key, public_key)) - { - private_key = s->u.private_key; - break; - } - } - public_key->destroy(public_key); - return private_key; -} - -/* find the appropriate private key (see get_secret). - * Failure is indicated by a NULL pointer. - */ -private_key_t* get_private_key(const connection_t *c) -{ - const secret_t *s, *best = NULL; - - /* is a certificate assigned to this connection? */ - if (c->spd.this.cert) - { - certificate_t *certificate; - public_key_t *pub_key; - - certificate = c->spd.this.cert->cert; - pub_key = certificate->get_public_key(certificate); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = s->next) - { - if (s->kind == SECRET_PUBKEY && - s->u.private_key->belongs_to(s->u.private_key, pub_key)) - { - best = s; - break; /* found the private key - no sense in searching further */ - } - } - pub_key->destroy(pub_key); - } - else - { - best = get_secret(c, SECRET_PUBKEY); - } - return best ? best->u.private_key : NULL; -} - -/* digest a secrets file - * - * The file is a sequence of records. A record is a maximal sequence of - * tokens such that the first, and only the first, is in the first column - * of a line. - * - * Tokens are generally separated by whitespace and are key words, ids, - * strings, or data suitable for ttodata(3). As a nod to convention, - * a trailing ":" on what would otherwise be a token is taken as a - * separate token. If preceded by whitespace, a "#" is taken as starting - * a comment: it and the rest of the line are ignored. - * - * One kind of record is an include directive. It starts with "include". - * The filename is the only other token in the record. - * If the filename does not start with /, it is taken to - * be relative to the directory containing the current file. - * - * The other kind of record describes a key. It starts with a - * sequence of ids and ends with key information. Each id - * is an IP address, a Fully Qualified Domain Name (which will immediately - * be resolved), or @FQDN which will be left as a name. - * - * The key part can be in several forms. - * - * The old form of the key is still supported: a simple - * quoted strings (with no escapes) is taken as a preshred key. - * - * The new form starts the key part with a ":". - * - * For Preshared Key, use the "PSK" keyword, and follow it by a string - * or a data token suitable for ttodata(3). - * - * For RSA Private Key, use the "RSA" keyword, followed by a - * brace-enclosed list of key field keywords and data values. - * The data values are large integers to be decoded by ttodata(3). - * The fields are a subset of those used by BIND 8.2 and have the - * same names. - */ - -/* parse PSK from file */ -static err_t process_psk_secret(chunk_t *psk) -{ - err_t ugh = NULL; - - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') - { - chunk_t secret = { tok + 1, flp->cur - tok -2 }; - - *psk = chunk_clone(secret); - (void) shift(); - } - else - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; /* limit on size of binary representation of key */ - size_t sz; - - ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz - , diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS); - if (ugh != NULL) - { - /* ttodata didn't like PSK data */ - ugh = builddiag("PSK data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok); - } - else - { - chunk_t secret = { buf, sz }; - *psk = chunk_clone(secret); - (void) shift(); - } - } - return ugh; -} - -typedef enum rsa_private_key_part_t rsa_private_key_part_t; - -enum rsa_private_key_part_t { - RSA_PART_MODULUS = 0, - RSA_PART_PUBLIC_EXPONENT = 1, - RSA_PART_PRIVATE_EXPONENT = 2, - RSA_PART_PRIME1 = 3, - RSA_PART_PRIME2 = 4, - RSA_PART_EXPONENT1 = 5, - RSA_PART_EXPONENT2 = 6, - RSA_PART_COEFFICIENT = 7 -}; - -const char *rsa_private_key_part_names[] = { - "Modulus", - "PublicExponent", - "PrivateExponent", - "Prime1", - "Prime2", - "Exponent1", - "Exponent2", - "Coefficient" -}; - -/** - * Parse fields of an RSA private key in BIND 8.2's representation - * consistiong of a braced list of keyword and value pairs in required order. - */ -static err_t process_rsa_secret(private_key_t **key) -{ - chunk_t rsa_chunk[countof(rsa_private_key_part_names)]; - u_char buf[RSA_MAX_ENCODING_BYTES]; /* limit on size of binary representation of key */ - rsa_private_key_part_t part, p; - size_t sz; - err_t ugh; - - for (part = RSA_PART_MODULUS; part <= RSA_PART_COEFFICIENT; part++) - { - const char *keyword = rsa_private_key_part_names[part]; - - if (!shift()) - { - ugh = "premature end of RSA key"; - goto end; - } - if (!tokeqword(keyword)) - { - ugh = builddiag("%s keyword not found where expected in RSA key" - , keyword); - goto end; - } - if (!(shift() && (!tokeq(":") || shift()))) /* ignore optional ":" */ - { - ugh = "premature end of RSA key"; - goto end; - } - ugh = ttodatav(tok, flp->cur - tok, 0, buf, sizeof(buf), &sz, - diag_space, sizeof(diag_space), TTODATAV_SPACECOUNTS); - if (ugh) - { - ugh = builddiag("RSA data malformed (%s): %s", ugh, tok); - goto end; - } - rsa_chunk[part] = chunk_create(buf, sz); - rsa_chunk[part] = chunk_clone(rsa_chunk[part]); - } - - /* We require an (indented) '}' and the end of the record. - * We break down the test so that the diagnostic will be more helpful. - * Some people don't seem to wish to indent the brace! - */ - if (!shift() || !tokeq("}")) - { - ugh = "malformed end of RSA private key -- indented '}' required"; - goto end; - } - if (shift()) - { - ugh = "malformed end of RSA private key -- unexpected token after '}'"; - goto end; - } - - *key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, KEY_RSA, - BUILD_RSA_MODULUS, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_MODULUS], - BUILD_RSA_PUB_EXP, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_PUBLIC_EXPONENT], - BUILD_RSA_PRIV_EXP, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_PRIVATE_EXPONENT], - BUILD_RSA_PRIME1, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_PRIME1], - BUILD_RSA_PRIME2, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_PRIME2], - BUILD_RSA_EXP1, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_EXPONENT1], - BUILD_RSA_EXP2, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_EXPONENT2], - BUILD_RSA_COEFF, rsa_chunk[RSA_PART_COEFFICIENT], - BUILD_END); - - if (*key == NULL) - { - ugh = "parsing of RSA private key failed"; - } - -end: - /* clean up and return */ - for (p = RSA_PART_MODULUS ; p < part; p++) - { - chunk_clear(&rsa_chunk[p]); - } - return ugh; -} - -/* struct used to prompt for a secret passphrase - * from a console with file descriptor fd - */ -typedef struct { - char secret[PROMPT_PASS_LEN+1]; - bool prompt; - int fd; - int try; -} prompt_pass_t; - -/** - * Passphrase callback to read from whack fd - */ -static shared_key_t* whack_pass_cb(prompt_pass_t *pass, shared_key_type_t type, - identification_t *me, identification_t *other, - id_match_t *match_me, id_match_t *match_other) -{ - int n; - - if (type != SHARED_ANY && type != SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY_PASS) - { - return NULL; - } - - if (pass->try > MAX_PROMPT_PASS_TRIALS) - { - whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid passphrase, too many trials"); - return NULL; - } - if (pass->try == 1) - { - whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "need passphrase for 'private key'"); - } - else - { - whack_log(RC_ENTERSECRET, "invalid passphrase, please try again"); - } - pass->try++; - - n = read(pass->fd, pass->secret, PROMPT_PASS_LEN); - if (n == -1) - { - whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "read(whackfd) failed"); - return NULL; - } - pass->secret[n-1] = '\0'; - - if (strlen(pass->secret) == 0) - { - whack_log(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no passphrase entered, aborted"); - return NULL; - } - if (match_me) - { - *match_me = ID_MATCH_PERFECT; - } - if (match_other) - { - *match_other = ID_MATCH_NONE; - } - return shared_key_create(SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY_PASS, - chunk_clone(chunk_create(pass->secret, strlen(pass->secret)))); -} - -/** - * Loads a PKCS#1 or PGP private key file - */ -static private_key_t* load_private_key(char* filename, prompt_pass_t *pass, - key_type_t type) -{ - private_key_t *key = NULL; - char *path; - - path = concatenate_paths(PRIVATE_KEY_PATH, filename); - if (pass && pass->prompt && pass->fd != NULL_FD) - { /* use passphrase callback */ - callback_cred_t *cb; - - cb = callback_cred_create_shared((void*)whack_pass_cb, pass); - lib->credmgr->add_local_set(lib->credmgr, &cb->set); - - key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, type, - BUILD_FROM_FILE, path, BUILD_END); - lib->credmgr->remove_local_set(lib->credmgr, &cb->set); - cb->destroy(cb); - if (key) - { - whack_log(RC_SUCCESS, "valid passphrase"); - } - } - else if (pass) - { /* use a given passphrase */ - mem_cred_t *mem; - shared_key_t *shared; - - mem = mem_cred_create(); - lib->credmgr->add_local_set(lib->credmgr, &mem->set); - shared = shared_key_create(SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY_PASS, - chunk_clone(chunk_create(pass->secret, strlen(pass->secret)))); - mem->add_shared(mem, shared, NULL); - key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, type, - BUILD_FROM_FILE, path, BUILD_END); - lib->credmgr->remove_local_set(lib->credmgr, &mem->set); - mem->destroy(mem); - } - else - { /* no passphrase */ - key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PRIVATE_KEY, type, - BUILD_FROM_FILE, path, BUILD_END); - - } - if (key) - { - plog(" loaded private key from '%s'", filename); - } - else - { - plog(" syntax error in private key file"); - } - return key; -} - -/** - * process a key file protected with optional passphrase which can either be - * read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for by using whack - */ -static err_t process_keyfile(private_key_t **key, key_type_t type, int whackfd) -{ - char filename[BUF_LEN]; - prompt_pass_t pass; - - memset(filename,'\0', BUF_LEN); - memset(pass.secret,'\0', sizeof(pass.secret)); - pass.prompt = FALSE; - pass.fd = whackfd; - pass.try = 1; - - /* we expect the filename of a PKCS#1 private key file */ - - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') /* quoted filename */ - memcpy(filename, tok+1, flp->cur - tok - 2); - else - memcpy(filename, tok, flp->cur - tok); - - if (shift()) - { - /* we expect an appended passphrase or passphrase prompt*/ - if (tokeqword("%prompt")) - { - if (pass.fd == NULL_FD) - { - return "Private key file -- enter passphrase using 'ipsec secrets'"; - } - pass.prompt = TRUE; - } - else - { - char *passphrase = tok; - size_t len = flp->cur - passphrase; - - if (*tok == '"' || *tok == '\'') /* quoted passphrase */ - { - passphrase++; - len -= 2; - } - if (len > PROMPT_PASS_LEN) - { - return "Private key file -- passphrase exceeds 64 characters"; - } - memcpy(pass.secret, passphrase, len); - } - if (shift()) - { - return "Private key file -- unexpected token after passphrase"; - } - } - *key = load_private_key(filename, &pass, type); - - return *key ? NULL : "Private key file -- could not be loaded"; -} - -/** - * Process pin read from ipsec.secrets or prompted for it using whack - */ -static err_t process_pin(secret_t *s, int whackfd) -{ - smartcard_t *sc; - const char *pin_status = "no pin"; - - s->kind = SECRET_PIN; - - /* looking for the smartcard keyword */ - if (!shift() || strncmp(tok, SCX_TOKEN, strlen(SCX_TOKEN)) != 0) - return "PIN keyword must be followed by %smartcard<reader>:<id>"; - - sc = scx_add(scx_parse_number_slot_id(tok + strlen(SCX_TOKEN))); - s->u.smartcard = sc; - scx_share(sc); - if (sc->pin.ptr != NULL) - { - scx_release_context(sc); - scx_free_pin(&sc->pin); - } - sc->valid = FALSE; - - if (!shift()) - return "PIN statement must be terminated either by <pin code>, %pinpad or %prompt"; - - if (tokeqword("%prompt")) - { - shift(); - /* if whackfd exists, whack will be used to prompt for a pin */ - if (whackfd != NULL_FD) - pin_status = scx_get_pin(sc, whackfd) ? "valid pin" : "invalid pin"; - else - pin_status = "pin entry via prompt"; - } - else if (tokeqword("%pinpad")) - { - chunk_t empty_pin = { "", 0 }; - - shift(); - - /* pin will be entered via pin pad during verification */ - sc->pin = chunk_clone(empty_pin); - sc->pinpad = TRUE; - sc->valid = TRUE; - pin_status = "pin entry via pad"; - if (pkcs11_keep_state) - { - scx_verify_pin(sc); - } - } - else - { - /* we read the pin directly from ipsec.secrets */ - err_t ugh = process_psk_secret(&sc->pin); - if (ugh != NULL) - return ugh; - /* verify the pin */ - pin_status = scx_verify_pin(sc) ? "valid PIN" : "invalid PIN"; - } -#ifdef SMARTCARD - { - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - - if (sc->any_slot) - snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "any slot"); - else - snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "slot: %lu", sc->slot); - - plog(" %s for #%d (%s, id: %s)" - , pin_status, sc->number, scx_print_slot(sc, ""), sc->id); - } -#else - plog(" warning: SMARTCARD support is deactivated in pluto/Makefile!"); -#endif - return NULL; -} - -static void log_psk(char *label, secret_t *s) -{ - int n = 0; - char buf[BUF_LEN]; - enumerator_t *enumerator; - identification_t *id; - - if (s->ids->get_count(s->ids) == 0) - { - n = snprintf(buf, BUF_LEN, "%%any"); - } - else - { - enumerator = s->ids->create_enumerator(s->ids); - while(enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &id)) - { - n += snprintf(buf + n, BUF_LEN - n, "%Y ", id); - if (n >= BUF_LEN) - { - n = BUF_LEN - 1; - break; - } - } - enumerator->destroy(enumerator); - } - plog(" loaded %s secret for %.*s", label, n, buf); -} - -static void process_secret(secret_t *s, int whackfd) -{ - err_t ugh = NULL; - - s->kind = SECRET_PSK; /* default */ - if (tokeqword("psk")) - { - log_psk("PSK", s); - - /* preshared key: quoted string or ttodata format */ - ugh = !shift()? "unexpected end of record in PSK" - : process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret); - } - else if (tokeqword("xauth")) - { - s->kind = SECRET_XAUTH; - log_psk("XAUTH", s); - - /* xauth secret: quoted string or ttodata format */ - ugh = !shift()? "unexpected end of record in XAUTH" - : process_psk_secret(&s->u.preshared_secret); - } - else if (tokeqword("rsa")) - { - /* RSA key: the fun begins. - * A braced list of keyword and value pairs. - */ - s->kind = SECRET_PUBKEY; - if (!shift()) - { - ugh = "bad RSA key syntax"; - } - else if (tokeq("{")) - { - ugh = process_rsa_secret(&s->u.private_key); - } - else - { - ugh = process_keyfile(&s->u.private_key, KEY_RSA, whackfd); - } - } - else if (tokeqword("ecdsa")) - { - s->kind = SECRET_PUBKEY; - if (!shift()) - { - ugh = "bad ECDSA key syntax"; - } - else - { - ugh = process_keyfile(&s->u.private_key, KEY_ECDSA, whackfd); - } - } - else if (tokeqword("pin")) - { - ugh = process_pin(s, whackfd); - } - else - { - ugh = builddiag("unrecognized key format: %s", tok); - } - - if (ugh != NULL) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: %s" - , flp->filename, flp->lino, ugh); - s->ids->destroy_offset(s->ids, offsetof(identification_t, destroy)); - free(s); - } - else if (flushline("expected record boundary in key")) - { - /* gauntlet has been run: install new secret */ - lock_certs_and_keys("process_secret"); - s->next = secrets; - secrets = s; - unlock_certs_and_keys("process_secrets"); - } -} - -static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd); /* forward declaration */ - -static void process_secret_records(int whackfd) -{ - /* read records from ipsec.secrets and load them into our table */ - for (;;) - { - (void)flushline(NULL); /* silently ditch leftovers, if any */ - if (flp->bdry == B_file) - { - break; - } - flp->bdry = B_none; /* eat the Record Boundary */ - (void)shift(); /* get real first token */ - - if (tokeqword("include")) - { - /* an include directive */ - char fn[MAX_TOK_LEN]; /* space for filename (I hope) */ - char *p = fn; - char *end_prefix = strrchr(flp->filename, '/'); - - if (!shift()) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end of include directive" - , flp->filename, flp->lino); - continue; /* abandon this record */ - } - - /* if path is relative and including file's pathname has - * a non-empty dirname, prefix this path with that dirname. - */ - if (tok[0] != '/' && end_prefix != NULL) - { - size_t pl = end_prefix - flp->filename + 1; - - /* "clamp" length to prevent problems now; - * will be rediscovered and reported later. - */ - if (pl > sizeof(fn)) - { - pl = sizeof(fn); - } - memcpy(fn, flp->filename, pl); - p += pl; - } - if (flp->cur - tok >= &fn[sizeof(fn)] - p) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: include pathname too long" - , flp->filename, flp->lino); - continue; /* abandon this record */ - } - strcpy(p, tok); - (void) shift(); /* move to Record Boundary, we hope */ - if (flushline("ignoring malformed INCLUDE -- expected Record Boundary after filename")) - { - process_secrets_file(fn, whackfd); - tok = NULL; /* correct, but probably redundant */ - } - } - else - { - /* expecting a list of indices and then the key info */ - secret_t *s = malloc_thing(secret_t); - - zero(s); - s->ids = linked_list_create(); - s->kind = SECRET_PSK; /* default */ - s->u.preshared_secret = chunk_empty; - s->next = NULL; - - for (;;) - { - if (tokeq(":")) - { - /* found key part */ - shift(); /* discard explicit separator */ - process_secret(s, whackfd); - break; - } - else - { - identification_t *id; - - id = identification_create_from_string(tok); - s->ids->insert_last(s->ids, id); - - if (!shift()) - { - /* unexpected Record Boundary or EOF */ - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "\"%s\" line %d: unexpected end" - " of id list", flp->filename, flp->lino); - s->ids->destroy_offset(s->ids, - offsetof(identification_t, destroy)); - free(s); - break; - } - } - } - } - } -} - -static int globugh(const char *epath, int eerrno) -{ - log_errno_routine(eerrno, "problem with secrets file \"%s\"", epath); - return 1; /* stop glob */ -} - -static void process_secrets_file(const char *file_pat, int whackfd) -{ - struct file_lex_position pos; - char **fnp; - - pos.depth = flp == NULL? 0 : flp->depth + 1; - - if (pos.depth > 10) - { - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "preshared secrets file \"%s\" nested too deeply", file_pat); - return; - } - -#ifdef HAVE_GLOB_H - /* do globbing */ - { - glob_t globbuf; - int r = glob(file_pat, GLOB_ERR, globugh, &globbuf); - - if (r != 0) - { - switch (r) - { - case GLOB_NOSPACE: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "out of space processing secrets filename \"%s\"", file_pat); - break; - case GLOB_ABORTED: - break; /* already logged */ - case GLOB_NOMATCH: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "no secrets filename matched \"%s\"", file_pat); - break; - default: - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "unknown glob error %d", r); - break; - } - globfree(&globbuf); - return; - } - - /* for each file... */ - for (fnp = globbuf.gl_pathv; *fnp != NULL; fnp++) - { - if (lexopen(&pos, *fnp, FALSE)) - { - plog("loading secrets from \"%s\"", *fnp); - flushline("file starts with indentation (continuation notation)"); - process_secret_records(whackfd); - lexclose(); - } - } - - globfree(&globbuf); - } -#else /* HAVE_GLOB_H */ - /* if glob(3) is not available, try to load pattern directly */ - if (lexopen(&pos, file_pat, FALSE)) - { - plog("loading secrets from \"%s\"", file_pat); - flushline("file starts with indentation (continuation notation)"); - process_secret_records(whackfd); - lexclose(); - } -#endif /* HAVE_GLOB_H */ -} - -void free_preshared_secrets(void) -{ - lock_certs_and_keys("free_preshared_secrets"); - - if (secrets != NULL) - { - secret_t *s, *ns; - - plog("forgetting secrets"); - - for (s = secrets; s != NULL; s = ns) - { - ns = s->next; - s->ids->destroy_offset(s->ids, offsetof(identification_t, destroy)); - - switch (s->kind) - { - case SECRET_PSK: - case SECRET_XAUTH: - free(s->u.preshared_secret.ptr); - break; - case SECRET_PUBKEY: - DESTROY_IF(s->u.private_key); - break; - case SECRET_PIN: - scx_release(s->u.smartcard); - break; - default: - bad_case(s->kind); - } - free(s); - } - secrets = NULL; - } - - unlock_certs_and_keys("free_preshard_secrets"); -} - -void load_preshared_secrets(int whackfd) -{ - free_preshared_secrets(); - (void) process_secrets_file(shared_secrets_file, whackfd); -} - -/* public key machinery - * Note: caller must set dns_auth_level. - */ - -pubkey_t* public_key_from_rsa(public_key_t *key) -{ - pubkey_t *p = malloc_thing(pubkey_t); - - zero(p); - p->id = identification_create_from_string("%any"); /* don't know, doesn't matter */ - p->issuer = NULL; - p->serial = chunk_empty; - p->public_key = key; - - /* note that we return a 1 reference count upon creation: - * invariant: recount > 0. - */ - p->refcnt = 1; - return p; -} - -/* Free a public key record. - * As a convenience, this returns a pointer to next. - */ -pubkey_list_t* free_public_keyentry(pubkey_list_t *p) -{ - pubkey_list_t *nxt = p->next; - - if (p->key != NULL) - { - unreference_key(&p->key); - } - free(p); - return nxt; -} - -void free_public_keys(pubkey_list_t **keys) -{ - while (*keys != NULL) - { - *keys = free_public_keyentry(*keys); - } -} - -/* root of chained public key list */ - -pubkey_list_t *pubkeys = NULL; /* keys from ipsec.conf */ - -void free_remembered_public_keys(void) -{ - free_public_keys(&pubkeys); -} - -/** - * Transfer public keys from *keys list to front of pubkeys list - */ -void transfer_to_public_keys(struct gw_info *gateways_from_dns -#ifdef USE_KEYRR -, pubkey_list_t **keys -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ -) -{ - { - struct gw_info *gwp; - - for (gwp = gateways_from_dns; gwp != NULL; gwp = gwp->next) - { - pubkey_list_t *pl = malloc_thing(pubkey_list_t); - - pl->key = gwp->key; /* note: this is a transfer */ - gwp->key = NULL; /* really, it is! */ - pl->next = pubkeys; - pubkeys = pl; - } - } - -#ifdef USE_KEYRR - { - pubkey_list_t **pp = keys; - - while (*pp != NULL) - { - pp = &(*pp)->next; - } - *pp = pubkeys; - pubkeys = *keys; - *keys = NULL; - } -#endif /* USE_KEYRR */ -} - - -static void install_public_key(pubkey_t *pk, pubkey_list_t **head) -{ - pubkey_list_t *p = malloc_thing(pubkey_list_t); - - /* install new key at front */ - p->key = reference_key(pk); - p->next = *head; - *head = p; -} - -void delete_public_keys(identification_t *id, key_type_t type, - identification_t *issuer, chunk_t serial) -{ - pubkey_list_t **pp, *p; - pubkey_t *pk; - key_type_t pk_type; - - for (pp = &pubkeys; (p = *pp) != NULL; ) - { - pk = p->key; - pk_type = pk->public_key->get_type(pk->public_key); - - if (id->equals(id, pk->id) && pk_type == type - && (issuer == NULL || pk->issuer == NULL - || issuer->equals(issuer, pk->issuer)) - && (serial.ptr == NULL || chunk_equals(serial, pk->serial))) - { - *pp = free_public_keyentry(p); - } - else - { - pp = &p->next; - } - } -} - -pubkey_t* reference_key(pubkey_t *pk) -{ - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log(" ref key: %p %p cnt %d '%Y'", - pk, pk->public_key, pk->refcnt, pk->id) - ) - pk->refcnt++; - return pk; -} - -void unreference_key(pubkey_t **pkp) -{ - pubkey_t *pk = *pkp; - - if (pk == NULL) - { - return; - } - - DBG(DBG_CONTROLMORE, - DBG_log("unref key: %p %p cnt %d '%Y'", - pk, pk->public_key, pk->refcnt, pk->id) - ) - - /* cancel out the pointer */ - *pkp = NULL; - - passert(pk->refcnt != 0); - pk->refcnt--; - if (pk->refcnt == 0) - { - free_public_key(pk); - } -} - -bool add_public_key(identification_t *id, enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level, - enum pubkey_alg alg, chunk_t rfc3110_key, - pubkey_list_t **head) -{ - public_key_t *key = NULL; - pubkey_t *pk; - - /* first: algorithm-specific decoding of key chunk */ - switch (alg) - { - case PUBKEY_ALG_RSA: - key = lib->creds->create(lib->creds, CRED_PUBLIC_KEY, KEY_RSA, - BUILD_BLOB_DNSKEY, rfc3110_key, - BUILD_END); - if (key == NULL) - { - return FALSE; - } - break; - default: - bad_case(alg); - } - - pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t); - zero(pk); - pk->public_key = key; - pk->id = id->clone(id); - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = UNDEFINED_TIME; - pk->issuer = NULL; - pk->serial = chunk_empty; - install_public_key(pk, head); - return TRUE; -} - -/** - * Extract id and public key a certificate and insert it into a pubkeyrec - */ -void add_public_key_from_cert(cert_t *cert , time_t until, - enum dns_auth_level dns_auth_level) -{ - certificate_t *certificate = cert->cert; - identification_t *subject = certificate->get_subject(certificate); - identification_t *issuer = NULL; - identification_t *id; - chunk_t serialNumber = chunk_empty; - pubkey_t *pk; - key_type_t pk_type; - - /* ID type: ID_DER_ASN1_DN (X.509 subject field) */ - pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t); - zero(pk); - pk->public_key = certificate->get_public_key(certificate); - pk_type = pk->public_key->get_type(pk->public_key); - pk->id = subject->clone(subject); - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = until; - if (certificate->get_type(certificate) == CERT_X509) - { - x509_t *x509 = (x509_t*)certificate; - - issuer = certificate->get_issuer(certificate); - serialNumber = x509->get_serial(x509); - pk->issuer = issuer->clone(issuer); - pk->serial = chunk_clone(serialNumber); - } - delete_public_keys(pk->id, pk_type, pk->issuer, pk->serial); - install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys); - - if (certificate->get_type(certificate) == CERT_X509) - { - x509_t *x509 = (x509_t*)certificate; - enumerator_t *enumerator; - - /* insert all subjectAltNames from X.509 certificates */ - enumerator = x509->create_subjectAltName_enumerator(x509); - while (enumerator->enumerate(enumerator, &id)) - { - if (id->get_type(id) != ID_ANY) - { - pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t); - zero(pk); - pk->id = id->clone(id); - pk->public_key = certificate->get_public_key(certificate); - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = until; - pk->issuer = issuer->clone(issuer); - pk->serial = chunk_clone(serialNumber); - delete_public_keys(pk->id, pk_type, pk->issuer, pk->serial); - install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys); - } - } - enumerator->destroy(enumerator); - } - else - { - pgp_certificate_t *pgp_cert = (pgp_certificate_t*)certificate; - chunk_t fingerprint = pgp_cert->get_fingerprint(pgp_cert); - - /* add v3 or v4 PGP fingerprint */ - pk = malloc_thing(pubkey_t); - zero(pk); - pk->id = identification_create_from_encoding(ID_KEY_ID, fingerprint); - pk->public_key = certificate->get_public_key(certificate); - pk->dns_auth_level = dns_auth_level; - pk->until_time = until; - delete_public_keys(pk->id, pk_type, pk->issuer, pk->serial); - install_public_key(pk, &pubkeys); - } -} - -/* when a X.509 certificate gets revoked, all instances of - * the corresponding public key must be removed - */ -void remove_x509_public_key(const cert_t *cert) -{ - public_key_t *revoked_key = cert->cert->get_public_key(cert->cert); - pubkey_list_t *p, **pp; - - p = pubkeys; - pp = &pubkeys; - - while(p != NULL) - { - if (revoked_key->equals(revoked_key, p->key->public_key)) - { - /* remove p from list and free memory */ - *pp = free_public_keyentry(p); - loglog(RC_LOG_SERIOUS, "invalid public key deleted"); - } - else - { - pp = &p->next; - } - p =*pp; - } - revoked_key->destroy(revoked_key); -} - -/* - * list all public keys in the chained list - */ -void list_public_keys(bool utc) -{ - pubkey_list_t *p = pubkeys; - chunk_t serial; - - if (p != NULL) - { - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " "); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, "List of Public Keys:"); - } - - while (p != NULL) - { - pubkey_t *key = p->key; - public_key_t *public = key->public_key; - chunk_t keyid; - - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " "); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " identity: '%Y'", key->id); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT, " pubkey: %N %4d bits, until %T %s", - key_type_names, public->get_type(public), - public->get_keysize(public), - &key->until_time, utc, - check_expiry(key->until_time, PUBKEY_WARNING_INTERVAL, TRUE)); - if (public->get_fingerprint(public, KEYID_PUBKEY_INFO_SHA1, &keyid)) - { - whack_log(RC_COMMENT," keyid: %#B", &keyid); - } - if (key->issuer) - { - whack_log(RC_COMMENT," issuer: \"%Y\"", key->issuer); - } - if (key->serial.len) - { - serial = chunk_skip_zero(key->serial); - whack_log(RC_COMMENT," serial: %#B", &serial); - } - p = p->next; - } -} |