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+/* randomness machinery
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Angelos D. Keromytis.
+ * Copyright (C) 1998-2001 D. Hugh Redelmeier.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
+ * under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
+ * Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
+ * option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
+ * WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
+ * or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
+ * for more details.
+ *
+ * RCSID $Id: rnd.c,v 1.3 2005/09/08 16:26:30 as Exp $
+ */
+
+/* A true random number generator (we hope)
+ *
+ * Under LINUX ("linux" predefined), use /dev/urandom.
+ * Under OpenBSD ("__OpenBSD__" predefined), use arc4random().
+ * Otherwise use our own random number generator based on clock skew.
+ * I (ADK) first heard of the idea from John Ioannidis, who heard it
+ * from Matt Blaze and/or Jack Lacy.
+ * ??? Why is mixing need for linux but not OpenBSD?
+ */
+
+/* Pluto's uses of randomness:
+ *
+ * - Setting up the "secret_of_the_day". This changes every hour! 20
+ * bytes a shot. It is used in building responder cookies.
+ *
+ * - generating initiator cookies (8 bytes, once per Phase 1 initiation).
+ *
+ * - 32 bytes per DH local secret. Once per Main Mode exchange and once
+ * per Quick Mode Exchange with PFS. (Size is our choice, with
+ * tradeoffs.)
+ *
+ * - 16 bytes per nonce we generate. Once per Main Mode exchange and
+ * once per Quick Mode exchange. (Again, we choose the size.)
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes per SPI number that we generate. We choose the SPIs for all
+ * inbound SPIs, one to three per IPSEC SA (one for AH (rare, probably)
+ * one for ESP (almost always), and one for tunnel (very common)).
+ * I don't actually know how the kernel would generate these numbers --
+ * currently Pluto generates them; this isn't the way things will be
+ * done in the future.
+ *
+ * - 4 bytes per Message ID we need to generate. One per Quick Mode
+ * exchange. Eventually, one per informational exchange.
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+
+#include <freeswan.h>
+
+#include "sha1.h"
+#include "constants.h"
+#include "defs.h"
+#include "rnd.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "timer.h"
+
+#ifdef linux
+# define USE_DEV_RANDOM 1
+# define RANDOM_PATH DEV_URANDOM
+#else
+# ifdef __OpenBSD__
+# define USE_ARC4RANDOM
+# else
+# define USE_CLOCK_SLEW
+# endif
+#endif
+
+#ifdef USE_ARC4RANDOM
+
+#define get_rnd_byte() (arc4random() % 256)
+
+#else /**** start of large #else ****/
+
+#ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
+static int random_fd = NULL_FD;
+#endif
+
+#define RANDOM_POOL_SIZE SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE
+static u_char random_pool[RANDOM_POOL_SIZE];
+
+#ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
+
+/* Generate (what we hope is) a true random byte using /dev/urandom */
+static u_char
+generate_rnd_byte(void)
+{
+ u_char c;
+
+ if (read(random_fd, &c, sizeof(c)) == -1)
+ exit_log_errno((e, "read() failed in get_rnd_byte()"));
+
+ return c;
+}
+
+#else /* !USE_DEV_RANDOM */
+
+/* Generate (what we hope is) a true random byte using the clock skew trick.
+ * Note: this code is not maintained! In particular, LINUX signal(2)
+ * semantics changed with glibc2 (and not for the better). It isn't clear
+ * that this code will work. We keep the code because someday it might
+ * come in handy.
+ */
+# error "This code is not maintained. Please define USE_DEV_RANDOM."
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t i, j, k;
+
+/* timer signal handler */
+static void
+rnd_handler(int ignore_me UNUSED)
+{
+ k <<= 1; /* Shift left by 1 */
+ j++;
+ k |= (i & 0x1); /* Get lsbit of counter */
+
+ if (j != 8)
+ signal(SIGVTALRM, rnd_handler);
+}
+
+static u_char
+generate_rnd_byte(void)
+{
+ struct itimerval tmval, ntmval;
+
+# ifdef NEVER /* ??? */
+# ifdef linux
+ int mask = siggetmask();
+
+ mask |= SIGVTALRM;
+ sigsetmask(mask);
+# endif
+# endif
+
+ i = 0;
+ j = 0;
+
+ ntmval.it_interval.tv_sec = 0;
+ ntmval.it_interval.tv_usec = 1;
+ ntmval.it_value.tv_sec = 0;
+ ntmval.it_value.tv_usec = 1;
+ signal(SIGVTALRM, rnd_handler);
+ setitimer(ITIMER_VIRTUAL, &ntmval, &tmval);
+
+ while (j != 8)
+ i++;
+
+ setitimer(ITIMER_VIRTUAL, &tmval, &ntmval);
+ signal(SIGVTALRM, SIG_IGN);
+
+# ifdef NEVER /* ??? */
+# ifdef linux
+ mask ^= SIGVTALRM;
+ sigsetmask(mask);
+# endif
+# endif
+
+ return k;
+}
+
+#endif /* !USE_DEV_RANDOM */
+
+static void
+mix_pool(void)
+{
+ SHA1_CTX ctx;
+
+ SHA1Init(&ctx);
+ SHA1Update(&ctx, random_pool, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE);
+ SHA1Final(random_pool, &ctx);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Get a single random byte.
+ */
+static u_char
+get_rnd_byte(void)
+{
+ random_pool[RANDOM_POOL_SIZE - 1] = generate_rnd_byte();
+ random_pool[0] = generate_rnd_byte();
+ mix_pool();
+ return random_pool[0];
+}
+
+#endif /* !USE_ARC4RANDOM */ /**** end of large #else ****/
+
+void
+get_rnd_bytes(u_char *buffer, int length)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < length; i++)
+ buffer[i] = get_rnd_byte();
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize the random pool.
+ */
+void
+init_rnd_pool(void)
+{
+#ifndef USE_ARC4RANDOM
+# ifdef USE_DEV_RANDOM
+ DBG(DBG_KLIPS, DBG_log("opening %s", RANDOM_PATH));
+ random_fd = open(RANDOM_PATH, O_RDONLY);
+ if (random_fd == -1)
+ exit_log_errno((e, "open of %s failed in init_rnd_pool()", RANDOM_PATH));
+ fcntl(random_fd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
+# endif
+
+ get_rnd_bytes(random_pool, RANDOM_POOL_SIZE);
+ mix_pool();
+#endif /* !USE_ARC4RANDOM */
+
+ /* start of rand(3) on the right foot */
+ {
+ unsigned int seed;
+
+ get_rnd_bytes((void *)&seed, sizeof(seed));
+ srand(seed);
+ }
+}
+
+u_char secret_of_the_day[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE];
+
+#ifndef NO_PLUTO
+
+void
+init_secret(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Generate the secret value for responder cookies, and
+ * schedule an event for refresh.
+ */
+ get_rnd_bytes(secret_of_the_day, sizeof(secret_of_the_day));
+ event_schedule(EVENT_REINIT_SECRET, EVENT_REINIT_SECRET_DELAY, NULL);
+}
+
+#endif /* NO_PLUTO */