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/*
* Copyright (C) 2011 Tobias Brunner
* Hochschule fuer Technik Rapperswil
*
* This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify it
* under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by the
* Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or (at your
* option) any later version. See <http://www.fsf.org/copyleft/gpl.txt>.
*
* This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but
* WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY
* or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License
* for more details.
*/
/**
* @defgroup keymat_v1 keymat_v1
* @{ @ingroup ikev1
*/
#ifndef KEYMAT_V1_H_
#define KEYMAT_V1_H_
#include <sa/keymat.h>
#include <sa/authenticator.h>
typedef struct keymat_v1_t keymat_v1_t;
/**
* Derivation and management of sensitive keying material, IKEv1 variant.
*/
struct keymat_v1_t {
/**
* Implements keymat_t.
*/
keymat_t keymat;
/**
* Derive keys for the IKE_SA.
*
* These keys are not handed out, but are used by the associated signers,
* crypters and authentication functions.
*
* @param proposal selected algorithms
* @param dh diffie hellman key allocated by create_dh()
* @param dh_other public DH value from other peer
* @param nonce_i initiators nonce value
* @param nonce_r responders nonce value
* @param id IKE_SA identifier
* @param auth authentication method
* @param shared_key PSK in case of AUTH_CLASS_PSK, NULL otherwise
* @return TRUE on success
*/
bool (*derive_ike_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
diffie_hellman_t *dh, chunk_t dh_other,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r, ike_sa_id_t *id,
auth_method_t auth, shared_key_t *shared_key);
/**
* Derive keys for the CHILD_SA.
*
* @param proposal selected algorithms
* @param dh diffie hellman key, NULL if none used
* @param spi_i SPI chosen by initiatior
* @param spi_r SPI chosen by responder
* @param nonce_i quick mode initiator nonce
* @param nonce_r quick mode responder nonce
* @param encr_i allocated initiators encryption key
* @param integ_i allocated initiators integrity key
* @param encr_r allocated responders encryption key
* @param integ_r allocated responders integrity key
*/
bool (*derive_child_keys)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal,
diffie_hellman_t *dh, u_int32_t spi_i, u_int32_t spi_r,
chunk_t nonce_i, chunk_t nonce_r,
chunk_t *encr_i, chunk_t *integ_i,
chunk_t *encr_r, chunk_t *integ_r);
/**
* Create the negotiated hasher.
*
* @param proposal selected algorithms
* @return TRUE, if creation was successful
*/
bool (*create_hasher)(keymat_v1_t *this, proposal_t *proposal);
/**
* Get the negotiated hasher.
*
* @return allocated hasher or NULL
*/
hasher_t *(*get_hasher)(keymat_v1_t *this);
/**
* Get HASH data for authentication.
*
* @param initiatior TRUE to create HASH_I, FALSE for HASH_R
* @param dh public DH value of peer to create HASH for
* @param dh_other others public DH value
* @param ike_sa_id IKE_SA identifier
* @param sa_i encoded SA payload of initiator
* @param id encoded IDii payload for HASH_I (IDir for HASH_R)
* @param hash chunk receiving allocated HASH data
* @return TRUE if hash allocated successfully
*/
bool (*get_hash)(keymat_v1_t *this, bool initiator,
chunk_t dh, chunk_t dh_other, ike_sa_id_t *ike_sa_id,
chunk_t sa_i, chunk_t id, chunk_t *hash);
/**
* Get HASH data for integrity/authentication in Phase 2 exchanges.
*
* @param message message to generate the HASH data for
* @param hash chunk receiving allocated hash data
* @return TRUE if hash allocated successfully
*/
bool (*get_hash_phase2)(keymat_v1_t *this, message_t *message, chunk_t *hash);
/**
* Returns the IV for a message with the given message ID.
*
* The return chunk contains internal data and is valid until the next
* get_iv/udpate_iv/confirm_iv call.
*
* @param mid message ID
* @param iv chunk receiving IV, internal data
* @return TRUE if IV allocated successfully
*/
bool (*get_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t *iv);
/**
* Updates the IV for the next message with the given message ID.
*
* A call of confirm_iv() is required in order to actually make the IV
* available. This is needed for the inbound case where we store the last
* block of the encrypted message but want to update the IV only after
* verification of the decrypted message.
*
* @param mid message ID
* @param last_block last block of encrypted message (gets cloned)
* @return TRUE if IV updated successfully
*/
bool (*update_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid, chunk_t last_block);
/**
* Confirms the updated IV for the given message ID.
*
* To actually make the new IV available via get_iv this method has to
* be called after update_iv.
*
* @param mid message ID
* @return TRUE if IV confirmed successfully
*/
bool (*confirm_iv)(keymat_v1_t *this, u_int32_t mid);
};
/**
* Create a keymat instance.
*
* @param initiator TRUE if we are the initiator
* @return keymat instance
*/
keymat_v1_t *keymat_v1_create(bool initiator);
#endif /** KEYMAT_V1_H_ @}*/
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