path: root/rfc/rfc3079.txt

Network Working Group                                            G. Zorn
Request for Comments: 3079                                 cisco Systems
Category: Informational                                       March 2001


 Deriving Keys for use with Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption (MPPE)

Status of this Memo

   This memo provides information for the Internet community.  It does
   not specify an Internet standard of any kind.  Distribution of this
   memo is unlimited.

Copyright Notice

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

Abstract

   The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP) provides a standard method for
   transporting multi-protocol datagrams over point-to-point links.

   The PPP Compression Control Protocol provides a method to negotiate
   and utilize compression protocols over PPP encapsulated links.

   Microsoft Point to Point Encryption (MPPE) is a means of representing
   PPP packets in an encrypted form.  MPPE uses the RSA RC4 algorithm to
   provide data confidentiality.  The length of the session key to be
   used for initializing encryption tables can be negotiated.  MPPE
   currently supports 40-bit, 56-bit and 128-bit session keys.  MPPE
   session keys are changed frequently; the exact frequency depends upon
   the options negotiated, but may be every packet.  MPPE is negotiated
   within option 18 in the Compression Control Protocol.

   This document describes the method used to derive initial MPPE
   session keys from a variety of credential types.  It is expected that
   this memo will be updated whenever Microsoft defines a new key
   derivation method for MPPE, since its primary purpose is to provide
   an open, easily accessible reference for third-parties wishing to
   interoperate with Microsoft products.

   MPPE itself (including the protocol used to negotiate its use, the
   details of the encryption method used and the algorithm used to
   change session keys during a session) is described in RFC 3078.







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Table of Contents

   1.  Specification of Requirements ............................... 2
   2.  Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP Credentials .............. 2
   2.1.  Generating 40-bit Session Keys ............................ 3
   2.2.  Generating 56-bit Session Keys ............................ 3
   2.3.  Generating 128-bit Session Keys ........................... 4
   2.4.  Key Derivation Functions .................................. 5
   2.5.  Sample Key Derivations .................................... 6
   2.5.1.  Sample 40-bit Key Derivation ............................ 6
   2.5.2.  Sample 56-bit Key Derivation ............................ 6
   2.5.3.  Sample 128-bit Key Derivation ........................... 7
   3.  Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP-2 Credentials ............ 7
   3.1.  Generating 40-bit Session Keys ............................ 8
   3.2.  Generating 56-bit Session Keys ............................ 9
   3.3.  Generating 128-bit Session Keys ...........................10
   3.4.  Key Derivation Functions ..................................11
   3.5.  Sample Key Derivations ....................................13
   3.5.1.  Sample 40-bit Key Derivation ............................13
   3.5.2.  Sample 56-bit Key Derivation ............................14
   3.5.3.  Sample 128-bit Key Derivation ...........................15
   4.  Deriving MPPE Session Keys from TLS Session Keys ............16
   4.1.  Generating 40-bit Session Keys ............................16
   4.2.  Generating 56-bit Session Keys ............................17
   4.3.  Generating 128-bit Session Keys ...........................17
   5.  Security Considerations .....................................18
   5.1.  MS-CHAP Credentials .......................................18
   5.2.  EAP-TLS Credentials .......................................19
   6.  References ..................................................19
   7.  Acknowledgements ............................................20
   8.  Author's Address ............................................20
   9.  Full Copyright Statement ....................................21

1.  Specification of Requirements

   In this document, the key words "MAY", "MUST, "MUST NOT", "optional",
   "recommended", "SHOULD", and "SHOULD NOT" are to be interpreted as
   described in [6].

2.  Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP Credentials

   The Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (MS-CHAP-1)
   [2] is a Microsoft-proprietary PPP [1] authentication protocol,
   providing the functionality to which LAN-based users are accustomed
   while integrating the encryption and hashing algorithms used on
   Windows networks.





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   The following sections detail the methods used to derive initial
   session keys (40-, 56- and 128-bit) from MS-CHAP-1 credentials.

   Implementation Note

      The initial session key in both directions is derived from the
      credentials of the peer that initiated the call and the challenge
      used (if any) is the challenge from the first authentication.
      This is true for both unilateral and bilateral authentication, as
      well as for each link in a multilink bundle.  In the multi-chassis
      multilink case, implementations are responsible for ensuring that
      the correct keys are generated on all participating machines.

2.1.  Generating 40-bit Session Keys

   MPPE uses a derivative of the peer's LAN Manager password as the 40-
   bit session key used for initializing the RC4 encryption tables.

   The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using the
   LmPasswordHash() function (described in [2]).  The first 8 octets of
   the result are used as the basis for the session key generated in the
   following way:

/*
* PasswordHash is the basis for the session key
* SessionKey is a copy of PasswordHash and is the generative session key
* 8 is the length (in octets) of the key to be generated.
*
*/
Get_Key(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)

/*
* The effective length of the key is reduced to 40 bits by
* replacing the first three bytes as follows:
*/
SessionKey[0] = 0xd1 ;
SessionKey[1] = 0x26 ;
SessionKey[2] = 0x9e ;

2.2.  Generating 56-bit Session Keys

   MPPE uses a derivative of the peer's LAN Manager password as the 56-
   bit session key used for initializing the RC4 encryption tables.

   The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using the
   LmPasswordHash() function (described in [2]).  The first 8 octets of
   the result are used as the basis for the session key generated in the
   following way:



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/*
* PasswordHash is the basis for the session key
* SessionKey is a copy of PasswordHash and is the generative session key
* 8 is the length (in octets) of the key to be generated.
*
*/
Get_Key(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)

/*
* The effective length of the key is reduced to 56 bits by
* replacing the first byte as follows:
*/
SessionKey[0] = 0xd1 ;

2.3.  Generating 128-bit Session Keys

   MPPE uses a derivative of the peer's Windows NT password as the 128-
   bit session key used for initializing encryption tables.

   The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
   NtPasswordHash() function as described in [2].  The first 16 octets
   of the result are then hashed again using the MD4 algorithm.  The
   first 16 octets of the second hash are used as the basis for the
   session key generated in the following way:

/*
* Challenge (as described in [9]) is sent by the PPP authenticator
* during authentication and is 8 octets long.
* NtPasswordHashHash is the basis for the session key.
* On return, InitialSessionKey contains the initial session
* key to be used.
*/
Get_Start_Key(Challenge, NtPasswordHashHash, InitialSessionKey)

/*
* CurrentSessionKey is a copy of InitialSessionKey
* and is the generative session key.
* Length (in octets) of the key to generate is 16.
*
*/
Get_Key(InitialSessionKey, CurrentSessionKey, 16)










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2.4.  Key Derivation Functions

   The following procedures are used to derive the session key.

/*
 * Pads used in key derivation
 */

SHApad1[40] =
   {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};

SHApad2[40] =
   {0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
    0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
    0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
    0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2};

/*
 * SHAInit(), SHAUpdate() and SHAFinal() functions are an
 * implementation of Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) [7]. These are
 * available in public domain or can be licensed from
 * RSA Data Security, Inc.
 *
 * 1) InitialSessionKey is 8 octets long for 56- and 40-bit
 *    session keys, 16 octets long for 128 bit session keys.
 * 2) CurrentSessionKey is same as InitialSessionKey when this
 *    routine is called for the first time for the session.
 */

Get_Key(
IN     InitialSessionKey,
IN/OUT CurrentSessionKey
IN     LengthOfDesiredKey )
{
   SHAInit(Context)
   SHAUpdate(Context, InitialSessionKey, LengthOfDesiredKey)
   SHAUpdate(Context, SHAPad1, 40)
   SHAUpdate(Context, CurrentSessionKey, LengthOfDesiredKey)
   SHAUpdate(Context, SHAPad2, 40)
   SHAFinal(Context, Digest)
   memcpy(CurrentSessionKey, Digest, LengthOfDesiredKey)
}

Get_Start_Key(
IN  Challenge,



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IN  NtPasswordHashHash,
OUT InitialSessionKey)
{
   SHAInit(Context)
   SHAUpdate(Context, NtPasswordHashHash, 16)
   SHAUpdate(Context, NtPasswordHashHash, 16)
   SHAUpdate(Context, Challenge, 8)
   SHAFinal(Context, Digest)
   memcpy(InitialSessionKey, Digest, 16)
}

2.5.  Sample Key Derivations

   The following sections illustrate 40-, 56- and 128-bit key
   derivations.  All intermediate values are in hexadecimal.

2.5.1.  Sample 40-bit Key Derivation


   Initial Values
      Password = "clientPass"

   Step 1: LmPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
      PasswordHash = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2

   Step 2: Copy PasswordHash to SessionKey
      SessionKey = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2

   Step 3: GetKey(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)
      SessionKey = d8 08 01 53 8c ec 4a 08

   Step 4: Reduce the effective key length to 40 bits
      SessionKey = d1 26 9e 53 8c ec 4a 08

2.5.2.  Sample 56-bit Key Derivation

   Initial Values
      Password = "clientPass"

   Step 1: LmPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
      PasswordHash = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2

   Step 2: Copy PasswordHash to SessionKey
      SessionKey = 76 a1 52 93 60 96 d7 83 0e 23 90 22 74 04 af d2

   Step 3: GetKey(PasswordHash, SessionKey, 8)
      SessionKey = d8 08 01 53 8c ec 4a 08




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   Step 4: Reduce the effective key length to 56 bits
      SessionKey = d1 08 01 53 8c ec 4a 08

2.5.3.  Sample 128-bit Key Derivation

Initial Values
   Password = "clientPass"
   Challenge = 10 2d b5 df 08 5d 30 41

Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
   PasswordHash = 44 eb ba 8d 53 12 b8 d6 11 47 44 11 f5 69 89 ae

Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
   PasswordHashHash = 41 c0 0c 58 4b d2 d9 1c 40 17 a2 a1 2f a5 9f 3f

Step 3: GetStartKey(Challenge, PasswordHashHash, InitialSessionKey)
   InitialSessionKey = a8 94 78 50 cf c0 ac ca d1 78 9f b6 2d dc dd b0

Step 4: Copy InitialSessionKey to CurrentSessionKey
   CurrentSessionKey = a8 94 78 50 cf c0 ac c1 d1 78 9f b6 2d dc dd b0

Step 5: GetKey(InitialSessionKey, CurrentSessionKey, 16)
   CurrentSessionKey = 59 d1 59 bc 09 f7 6f 1d a2 a8 6a 28 ff ec 0b 1e

3.  Deriving Session Keys from MS-CHAP-2 Credentials

   Version 2 of the Microsoft Challenge-Handshake Authentication
   Protocol (MS-CHAP-2) [8] is a Microsoft-proprietary PPP
   authentication protocol, providing the functionality to which LAN-
   based users are accustomed while integrating the encryption and
   hashing algorithms used on Windows networks.

   The following sections detail the methods used to derive initial
   session keys from MS-CHAP-2 credentials.  40-, 56- and 128-bit keys
   are all derived using the same algorithm from the authenticating
   peer's Windows NT password.  The only difference is in the length of
   the keys and their effective strength: 40- and 56-bit keys are 8
   octets in length, while 128-bit keys are 16 octets long.  Separate
   keys are derived for the send and receive directions of the session.

   Implementation Note

      The initial session keys in both directions are derived from the
      credentials of the peer that initiated the call and the challenges
      used are those from the first authentication.  This is true as
      well for each link in a multilink bundle.  In the multi-chassis
      multilink case, implementations are responsible for ensuring that
      the correct keys are generated on all participating machines.



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3.1.  Generating 40-bit Session Keys

   When used in conjunction with MS-CHAP-2 authentication, the initial
   MPPE session keys are derived from the peer's Windows NT password.

   The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
   NtPasswordHash() function as described in [8].

      NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)

   The first 16 octets of the result are then hashed again using the MD4
   algorithm.

      PasswordHashHash = md4(PasswordHash)

   The first 16 octets of this second hash are used together with the
   NT- Response field from the MS-CHAP-2 Response packet [8] as the
   basis for the master session key:

      GetMasterKey(PasswordHashHash, NtResponse, MasterKey)

   Once the master key has been generated, it is used to derive two 40-
   bit session keys, one for sending and one for receiving:

      GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterSendKey, 8, TRUE, TRUE)
      GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8, FALSE, TRUE)

   The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
   they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys.  The
   initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the function
   GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):

GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
                                               ReceiveSessionKey)

   Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
   first three octets to known constants:

      SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xd1
      SendSessionKey[1] = ReceiveSessionKey[1] = 0x26
      SendSessionKey[2] = ReceiveSessionKey[2] = 0x9e

   Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:

      rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
      rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)




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3.2.  Generating 56-bit Session Keys

   When used in conjunction with MS-CHAP-2 authentication, the initial
   MPPE session keys are derived from the peer's Windows NT password.

   The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
   NtPasswordHash() function as described in [8].

      NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)

   The first 16 octets of the result are then hashed again using the MD4
   algorithm.

      PasswordHashHash = md4(PasswordHash)

   The first 16 octets of this second hash are used together with the
   NT-Response field from the MS-CHAP-2 Response packet [8] as the basis
   for the master session key:

      GetMasterKey(PasswordHashHash, NtResponse, MasterKey)

   Once the master key has been generated, it is used to derive two
   56-bit session keys, one for sending and one for receiving:

      GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterSendKey, 8, TRUE, TRUE)
      GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8, FALSE, TRUE)

   The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
   they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys.  The
   initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the function
   GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):

GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
                                               ReceiveSessionKey)

   Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
   first octet to a known constant:

      SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xd1

   Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:

      rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
      rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)






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3.3.  Generating 128-bit Session Keys

   When used in conjunction with MS-CHAP-2 authentication, the initial
   MPPE session keys are derived from the peer's Windows NT password.

   The first step is to obfuscate the peer's password using
   NtPasswordHash() function as described in [8].

      NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)

   The first 16 octets of the result are then hashed again using the MD4
   algorithm.

      PasswordHashHash = md4(PasswordHash)

   The first 16 octets of this second hash are used together with the
   NT-Response field from the MS-CHAP-2 Response packet [8] as the basis
   for the master session key:

      GetMasterKey(PasswordHashHash, NtResponse, MasterKey)

   Once the master key has been generated, it is used to derive two
   128-bit master session keys, one for sending and one for receiving:

GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterSendKey, 16, TRUE, TRUE)
GetAsymmetricStartKey(MasterKey, MasterReceiveKey, 16, FALSE, TRUE)

   The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
   they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys.  The
   initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the function
   GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):

GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 16, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 16,
                                                ReceiveSessionKey)

   Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:

      rc4_key(SendRC4key, 16, SendSessionKey)
      rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 16, ReceiveSessionKey)











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3.4.  Key Derivation Functions

   The following procedures are used to derive the session key.

/*
 * Pads used in key derivation
 */

SHSpad1[40] =
   {0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
    0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00};

SHSpad2[40] =
   {0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
    0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
    0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2,
    0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xf2};

/*
 * "Magic" constants used in key derivations
 */

Magic1[27] =
   {0x54, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74,
    0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x4d, 0x50, 0x50, 0x45, 0x20, 0x4d,
    0x61, 0x73, 0x74, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x4b, 0x65, 0x79};

Magic2[84] =
   {0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
    0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
    0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
    0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79,
    0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73,
    0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65,
    0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
    0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
    0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e};

Magic3[84] =
   {0x4f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69,
    0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x73, 0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20,
    0x74, 0x68, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
    0x65, 0x20, 0x72, 0x65, 0x63, 0x65, 0x69, 0x76, 0x65, 0x20,
    0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x3b, 0x20, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x20, 0x74, 0x68,
    0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x73,
    0x69, 0x64, 0x65, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x69, 0x74, 0x20, 0x69, 0x73,



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    0x20, 0x74, 0x68, 0x65, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x20,
    0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x2e};


   GetMasterKey(
   IN  16-octet  PasswordHashHash,
   IN  24-octet  NTResponse,
   OUT 16-octet  MasterKey )
   {
      20-octet Digest

      ZeroMemory(Digest, sizeof(Digest));

      /*
       * SHSInit(), SHSUpdate() and SHSFinal()
       * are an implementation of the Secure Hash Standard [7].
       */

      SHSInit(Context);
      SHSUpdate(Context, PasswordHashHash, 16);
      SHSUpdate(Context, NTResponse, 24);
      SHSUpdate(Context, Magic1, 27);
      SHSFinal(Context, Digest);

      MoveMemory(MasterKey, Digest, 16);
   }

   VOID
   GetAsymetricStartKey(
   IN   16-octet      MasterKey,
   OUT  8-to-16 octet SessionKey,
   IN   INTEGER       SessionKeyLength,
   IN   BOOLEAN       IsSend,
   IN   BOOLEAN       IsServer )
   {

      20-octet Digest;

      ZeroMemory(Digest, 20);

      if (IsSend) {
         if (IsServer) {
            s = Magic3
         } else {
            s = Magic2
         }
      } else {
         if (IsServer) {



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            s = Magic2
         } else {
            s = Magic3
         }
      }

      /*
       * SHSInit(), SHSUpdate() and SHSFinal()
       * are an implementation of the Secure Hash Standard [7].
       */

      SHSInit(Context);
      SHSUpdate(Context, MasterKey, 16);
      SHSUpdate(Context, SHSpad1, 40);
      SHSUpdate(Context, s, 84);
      SHSUpdate(Context, SHSpad2, 40);
      SHSFinal(Context, Digest);

      MoveMemory(SessionKey, Digest, SessionKeyLength);
   }

3.5.  Sample Key Derivations

   The following sections illustrate 40-, 56- and 128-bit key
   derivations. All intermediate values are in hexadecimal.

3.5.1.  Sample 40-bit Key Derivation

Initial Values
   UserName = "User"
            =  55 73 65 72

   Password = "clientPass"
            = 63 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00
              74 00 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00

   AuthenticatorChallenge = 5B 5D 7C 7D 7B 3F 2F 3E 3C 2C
                            60 21 32 26 26 28
   PeerChallenge = 21 40 23 24 25 5E 26 2A 28 29 5F 2B 3A 33 7C 7E

   Challenge = D0 2E 43 86 BC E9 12 26

   NT-Response =
   82 30 9E CD 8D 70 8B 5E A0 8F AA 39 81 CD 83 54 42 33
   11 4A 3D 85 D6 DF

Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
   PasswordHash = 44 EB BA 8D 53 12 B8 D6 11 47 44 11 F5 69 89 AE



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Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
   PasswordHashHash = 41 C0 0C 58 4B D2 D9 1C 40 17 A2 A1 2F A5 9F 3F

Step 3: Derive the master key (GetMasterKey())
   MasterKey = FD EC E3 71 7A 8C 83 8C B3 88 E5 27 AE 3C DD 31

Step 4: Derive the master send session key (GetAsymmetricStartKey())
   SendStartKey40 = 8B 7C DC 14 9B 99 3A 1B

Step 5: Derive the initial send session key (GetNewKeyFromSHA())
   SendSessionKey40 = D1 26 9E C4 9F A6 2E 3E

Sample Encrypted Message
   rc4(SendSessionKey40, "test message") = 92 91 37 91 7E 58 03 D6
                                           68 D7 58 98

3.5.2.  Sample 56-bit Key Derivation

Initial Values
   UserName = "User"
            =  55 73 65 72

   Password = "clientPass"
            = 63 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00 74 00 50
              00 61 00 73 00 73 00

   AuthenticatorChallenge = 5B 5D 7C 7D 7B 3F 2F 3E 3C 2C
                            60 21 32 26 26 28
   PeerChallenge = 21 40 23 24 25 5E 26 2A 28 29 5F 2B 3A 33 7C 7E

   Challenge = D0 2E 43 86 BC E9 12 26

   NT-Response =
   82 30 9E CD 8D 70 8B 5E A0 8F AA 39 81 CD 83 54 42 33
   11 4A 3D 85 D6 DF

Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
   PasswordHash = 44 EB BA 8D 53 12 B8 D6 11 47 44 11 F5 69 89 AE

Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
   PasswordHashHash = 41 C0 0C 58 4B D2 D9 1C 40 17 A2 A1 2F A5 9F 3F

Step 3: Derive the master key (GetMasterKey())
   MasterKey = FD EC E3 71 7A 8C 83 8C B3 88 E5 27 AE 3C DD 31

Step 4: Derive the master send session key (GetAsymmetricStartKey())
   SendStartKey56 = 8B 7C DC 14 9B 99 3A 1B




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Step 5: Derive the initial send session key (GetNewKeyFromSHA())
   SendSessionKey56 = D1 5C 00 C4 9F A6 2E 3E

Sample Encrypted Message
   rc4(SendSessionKey40, "test message") = 3F 10 68 33 FA 44 8D
                                           A8 42 BC 57 58

3.5.3.  Sample 128-bit Key Derivation

Initial Values
   UserName = "User"
            =  55 73 65 72

   Password = "clientPass"
            = 63 00 6C 00 69 00 65 00 6E 00
              74 00 50 00 61 00 73 00 73 00

   AuthenticatorChallenge = 5B 5D 7C 7D 7B 3F 2F 3E 3C 2C
                            60 21 32 26 26 28

   PeerChallenge = 21 40 23 24 25 5E 26 2A 28 29 5F 2B 3A 33 7C 7E

   Challenge = D0 2E 43 86 BC E9 12 26

   NT-Response =
   82 30 9E CD 8D 70 8B 5E A0 8F AA 39 81 CD 83 54 42 33
   11 4A 3D 85 D6 DF

Step 1: NtPasswordHash(Password, PasswordHash)
   PasswordHash = 44 EB BA 8D 53 12 B8 D6 11 47 44 11 F5 69 89 AE

Step 2: PasswordHashHash = MD4(PasswordHash)
   PasswordHashHash = 41 C0 0C 58 4B D2 D9 1C 40 17 A2 A1 2F A5 9F 3F

Step 2: Derive the master key (GetMasterKey())
   MasterKey = FD EC E3 71 7A 8C 83 8C B3 88 E5 27 AE 3C DD 31

Step 3: Derive the send master session key (GetAsymmetricStartKey())

   SendStartKey128 = 8B 7C DC 14 9B 99 3A 1B A1 18 CB 15 3F 56 DC CB

Step 4: Derive the initial send session key (GetNewKeyFromSHA())
   SendSessionKey128 = 40 5C B2 24 7A 79 56 E6 E2 11 00 7A E2 7B 22 D4

Sample Encrypted Message
  rc4(SendSessionKey128, "test message") = 81 84 83 17 DF 68
                                           84 62 72 FB 5A BE




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4.  Deriving MPPE Session Keys from TLS Session Keys

   The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) [10] is a PPP extension
   that provides support  for  additional  authentication methods within
   PPP.  Transport  Level  Security  (TLS) [11] provides for mutual
   authentication, integrity-protected ciphersuite negotiation and key
   exchange between two  endpoints.  EAP-TLS [12] is an EAP
   authentication type which allows the use of TLS within the PPP
   authentication framework.  The following sections describe the
   methods used to derive initial session keys from TLS session keys.
   56-, 40- and 128-bit keys are derived using the same algorithm.  The
   only difference is in the length of the keys and their effective
   strength: 56- and 40-bit keys are 8 octets in length, while 128-bit
   keys are 16 octets long.  Separate keys are derived for the send and
   receive directions of the session.

4.1.  Generating 40-bit Session Keys

   When MPPE is used in conjunction with EAP-TLS authentication, the TLS
   master secret is used as the master session key.

   The algorithm used to derive asymmetrical master session keys from
   the TLS master secret is described in [12].  The master session keys
   are never used to encrypt or decrypt data; they are only used in the
   derivation of transient session keys.

   Implementation Note

      If the asymmetrical master keys are less than 8 octets in length,
      they MUST be padded on the left with zeroes before being used to
      derive the initial transient session keys.  Conversely, if the
      asymmetrical master keys are more than 8 octets in length, they
      must be truncated to 8 octets before being used to derive the
      initial transient session keys.

   The initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the
   function GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):

GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
ReceiveSessionKey)

   Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
   first three octets to known constants:

      SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xD1
      SendSessionKey[1] = ReceiveSessionKey[1] = 0x26
      SendSessionKey[2] = ReceiveSessionKey[2] = 0x9E



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   Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:

      rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
      rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)

4.2.  Generating 56-bit Session Keys

   When MPPE is used in conjunction with EAP-TLS authentication, the TLS
   master secret is used as the master session key.

   The algorithm used to derive asymmetrical master session keys from
   the TLS master secret is described in [12].  The master session keys
   are never used to encrypt or decrypt data; they are only used in the
   derivation of transient session keys.

   Implementation Note

      If the asymmetrical master keys are less than 8 octets in length,
      they MUST be padded on the left with zeroes before being used to
      derive the initial transient session keys.  Conversely, if the
      asymmetrical master keys are more than 8 octets in length, they
      must be truncated to 8 octets before being used to derive the
      initial transient session keys.

   The initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the
   function GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):

GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 8, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 8,
ReceiveSessionKey)

   Next, the effective strength of both keys is reduced by setting the
   initial octet to a known constant:

      SendSessionKey[0] = ReceiveSessionKey[0] = 0xD1

   Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:

      rc4_key(SendRC4key, 8, SendSessionKey)
      rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 8, ReceiveSessionKey)

4.3.  Generating 128-bit Session Keys

   When MPPE is used in conjunction with EAP-TLS authentication, the TLS
   master secret is used as the master session key.






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   The algorithm used to derive asymmetrical master session keys from
   the TLS master secret is described in [12].  Note that the send key
   on one side is the receive key on the other.

   The master session keys are never used to encrypt or decrypt data;
   they are only used in the derivation of transient session keys.

   Implementation Note

      If the asymmetrical master keys are less than 16 octets in length,
      they MUST be padded on the left with zeroes before being used to
      derive the initial transient session keys.  Conversely, if the
      asymmetrical master keys are more than 16 octets in length, they
      must be truncated to 16 octets before being used to derive the
      initial transient session keys.

   The initial transient session keys are obtained by calling the
   function GetNewKeyFromSHA() (described in [3]):

GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterSendKey, MasterSendKey, 16, SendSessionKey)
GetNewKeyFromSHA(MasterReceiveKey, MasterReceiveKey, 16,
ReceiveSessionKey)

   Finally, the RC4 tables are initialized using the new session keys:

      rc4_key(SendRC4key, 16, SendSessionKey)
      rc4_key(ReceiveRC4key, 16, ReceiveSessionKey)

5.  Security Considerations

5.1.  MS-CHAP Credentials

   Because of the way in which 40-bit keys are derived from MS-CHAP-1
   credentials, the initial 40-bit session key will be identical in all
   sessions established under the same peer credentials.  For this
   reason, and because RC4 with a 40-bit key length is believed to be a
   relatively weak cipher, peers SHOULD NOT use 40-bit keys derived from
   the LAN Manager password hash (as described above) if it can be
   avoided.

   Since the MPPE session keys are derived from user passwords (in the
   MS- CHAP-1 and MS-CHAP-2 cases), care should be taken to ensure the
   selection of strong passwords and passwords should be changed
   frequently.







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5.2.  EAP-TLS Credentials

   The strength of the session keys is dependent upon the security of
   the TLS protocol.

   The EAP server may be on a separate machine from the PPP
   authenticator; if this is the case, adequate care must be taken in
   the transmission of the EAP-TLS master keys to the authenticator.

6.  References

   [1]  Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", STD 51, RFC
        1661, July 1994.

   [2]  Zorn, G. and S. Cobb, "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions", RFC 2433,
        October 1998.

   [3]  Pall, G. and G. Zorn, "Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption
        (MPPE) RFC 3078, March 2001.

   [4]  RC4 is a proprietary encryption algorithm available under
        license from RSA Data Security Inc.  For licensing information,
        contact:
               RSA Data Security, Inc.
               100 Marine Parkway
               Redwood City, CA 94065-1031

   [5]  Pall, G., "Microsoft Point-to-Point Compression (MPPC)
        Protocol", RFC 2118, March 1997.

   [6]  Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
        Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, March 1997.

   [7]  "Secure Hash Standard", Federal Information Processing Standards
        Publication 180-1, National Institute of Standards and
        Technology, April 1995.

   [8]  Zorn, G., "Microsoft PPP CHAP Extensions, Version 2", RFC 2759,
        January 2000.

   [9]  Simpson, W., "PPP Challenge Handshake Authentication Protocol
        (CHAP)", RFC 1994, August 1996.

   [10] Blunk, L. and J. Vollbrecht, "PPP Extensible Authentication
        Protocol (EAP)", RFC 2284, March 1998.






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   [11] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", RFC
        2246, January 1999.

   [12] Aboba, B. and D. Simon, "PPP EAP TLS Authentication Protocol",
        RFC 2716, October 1999.

7.  Acknowledgements

   Anthony Bell, Richard B. Ward, Terence Spies and Thomas Dimitri, all
   of Microsoft Corporation, significantly contributed to the design and
   development of MPPE.

   Additional thanks to Robert Friend, Joe Davies, Jody Terrill, Archie
   Cobbs, Mark Deuser, Vijay Baliga, Brad Robel-Forrest and Jeff Haag
   for useful feedback.

   The technical portions of this memo were completed while the author
   was employed by Microsoft Corporation.

8.  Author's Address

   Questions about this memo can also be directed to:

   Glen Zorn
   cisco Systems
   500 108th Avenue N.E.
   Suite 500
   Bellevue, Washington 98004
   USA

   Phone: +1 425 438 8218
   FAX:   +1 425 438 1848
   EMail: gwz@cisco.com


















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9.  Full Copyright Statement

   Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2001).  All Rights Reserved.

   This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
   others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
   or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
   and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
   kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
   included on all such copies and derivative works.  However, this
   document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
   the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
   Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
   developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
   copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
   followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
   English.

   The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
   revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.

   This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
   "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
   TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
   BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
   HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
   MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.

Acknowledgement

   Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
   Internet Society.



















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