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authorKamil Aronowski <kamil.aronowski@yahoo.com>2024-08-05 13:22:01 +0200
committerSteve McIntyre <48764113+steve-mcintyre@users.noreply.github.com>2024-08-20 12:00:04 +0100
commitdc0743201742f8d0ef3a96a4982456fb0d74f61f (patch)
tree9dfe4c7738dce3ea05064cce8d847fcfe0df487d
parent3685b1348c9208bb9319a1225e5c15a4e6653eac (diff)
downloadefi-boot-shim-dc0743201742f8d0ef3a96a4982456fb0d74f61f.tar.gz
efi-boot-shim-dc0743201742f8d0ef3a96a4982456fb0d74f61f.zip
Realize the suggestions as part of PR #672
Signed-off-by: Kamil Aronowski <kamil.aronowski@yahoo.com>
-rw-r--r--SBAT.md13
1 files changed, 5 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/SBAT.md b/SBAT.md
index c7231c09..81e27aa6 100644
--- a/SBAT.md
+++ b/SBAT.md
@@ -214,8 +214,7 @@ product. Setting a product-specific generation number for such an event
eliminates the need for other vendors to have to re-release the binaries for
their products with an incremented global number.
-The current consensus is for both generation numbers to only ever go up and not
-be reset.
+Both generation numbers should only ever go up; they should never be reset.
#### Example: a vendor forking a global project
@@ -242,15 +241,13 @@ grub,4,Free Software Foundation,[...]
grub.vendorc,1,Vendor C,[...]
```
-In the perfect scenario, to provide the perfect security, the UEFI SBAT
-revocation variable (named *SbatLevel*) would then be set, so that GRUB with a
-global generation number of only 4 or higher would be able to be booted. (In
-reality there's naturally going to be a certain grace period)
+After this, the UEFI SBAT revocation variable (named *SbatLevel*) would be
+updated to raise the mandatory minimal global generation number for GRUB to 4.
However, Vendor C mis-merges the patches into one of their products and does
not become aware of the fact that this mis-merge created an additional
vulnerability until after they have published a signed binary in that vulnerable
-state. Vendor C's GRUB binary can now be used to compromise everyone's systems.
+state. Vendor C's GRUB binary can now be abused to compromise their systems.
To remedy this, Vendor C will release a security-fixed binary with the same
global generation number and an updated product-specific generation number (set
@@ -281,7 +278,7 @@ grub,5,Free Software Foundation,[...]
grub.vendorc,2,Vendor C,[...]
```
-The goal is generally to limit end customer impact with as few
+The goal is generally to limit end user impact with as few
re-releases as possible, while not creating an unnecessarily large UEFI
revocation variable payload.