diff options
| author | Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <mathieu.trudel-lapierre@canonical.com> | 2015-05-06 09:49:41 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre <mathieu.trudel-lapierre@canonical.com> | 2015-05-06 09:49:41 -0400 |
| commit | a14921c5944c340056312f2f5b1728d698f628b1 (patch) | |
| tree | 110242b91b3ade02e586bd65b9aedb05511bd34a /Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec | |
| parent | 72bb39c0237f8bcc3afa8b623e8b097eec6d69cd (diff) | |
| parent | 7361f67dbd7f7fe98a807d3d12f90a87262124d6 (diff) | |
| download | efi-boot-shim-a14921c5944c340056312f2f5b1728d698f628b1.tar.gz efi-boot-shim-a14921c5944c340056312f2f5b1728d698f628b1.zip | |
Import upstream version 0.8
Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec')
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c | 26 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_check.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_err.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_key.c | 13 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c | 12 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_print.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r--[-rwxr-xr-x] | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c | 174 |
14 files changed, 108 insertions, 117 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c index 7dca5e4b..6b570a3f 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_mult.c @@ -208,9 +208,12 @@ static int gf2m_Mxy(const EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BIG /* Computes scalar*point and stores the result in r. * point can not equal r. - * Uses algorithm 2P of + * Uses a modified algorithm 2P of * Lopex, J. and Dahab, R. "Fast multiplication on elliptic curves over * GF(2^m) without precomputation". + * + * To protect against side-channel attack the function uses constant time + * swap avoiding conditional branches. */ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx) @@ -244,6 +247,11 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, x2 = &r->X; z2 = &r->Y; + bn_wexpand(x1, group->field.top); + bn_wexpand(z1, group->field.top); + bn_wexpand(x2, group->field.top); + bn_wexpand(z2, group->field.top); + if (!BN_GF2m_mod_arr(x1, &point->X, group->poly)) goto err; /* x1 = x */ if (!BN_one(z1)) goto err; /* z1 = 1 */ if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, z2, x1, ctx)) goto err; /* z2 = x1^2 = x^2 */ @@ -266,16 +274,12 @@ static int ec_GF2m_montgomery_point_multiply(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, { for (; j >= 0; j--) { - if (scalar->d[i] & mask) - { - if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x1, z1, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err; - if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x2, z2, ctx)) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; - if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; - } + BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top); + BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top); + if (!gf2m_Madd(group, &point->X, x2, z2, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; + if (!gf2m_Mdouble(group, x1, z1, ctx)) goto err; + BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, x1, x2, group->field.top); + BN_consttime_swap(scalar->d[i] & mask, z1, z2, group->field.top); mask >>= 1; } j = BN_BITS2 - 1; diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c index c06b3b66..c06b3b66 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c index ae555398..ae555398 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_check.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_check.c index 0e316b4b..0e316b4b 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_check.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_check.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c index beac2096..beac2096 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c index d45640ba..d45640ba 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_err.c index d04c8955..d04c8955 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_err.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_err.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_key.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_key.c index 522802c0..6c933d22 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_key.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_key.c @@ -435,18 +435,27 @@ void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t cform) void *EC_KEY_get_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *)) { - return EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func); + void *ret; + + CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); + ret = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func); + CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); + + return ret; } -void EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data, +void *EC_KEY_insert_key_method_data(EC_KEY *key, void *data, void *(*dup_func)(void *), void (*free_func)(void *), void (*clear_free_func)(void *)) { EC_EXTRA_DATA *ex_data; + CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); ex_data = EC_EX_DATA_get_data(key->method_data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func); if (ex_data == NULL) EC_EX_DATA_set_data(&key->method_data, data, dup_func, free_func, clear_free_func); CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_EC); + + return ex_data; } void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *key, int flag) diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c index 5af84376..e7d11ffe 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c @@ -480,10 +480,10 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx) if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(a)) != EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(b))) return 1; - /* compare the curve name (if present) */ + /* compare the curve name (if present in both) */ if (EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) && EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b) && - EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) == EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b)) - return 0; + EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(a) != EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(b)) + return 1; if (!ctx) ctx_new = ctx = BN_CTX_new(); @@ -1010,7 +1010,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX * int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx) { - if (group->meth->dbl == 0) + if (group->meth->invert == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; @@ -1061,12 +1061,12 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN if (group->meth->point_cmp == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); - return 0; + return -1; } if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS); - return 0; + return -1; } return group->meth->point_cmp(group, a, b, ctx); } diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c index ee422697..ee422697 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_print.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_print.c index f7c8a303..f7c8a303 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_print.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ec_print.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c index 9fc4a466..9fc4a466 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_mont.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c index 71893d5e..71893d5e 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c index 66a92e2a..b2390882 100755..100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c @@ -1540,9 +1540,8 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ct int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx) { BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL; - BIGNUM *tmp0, *tmp1; - size_t pow2 = 0; - BIGNUM **heap = NULL; + BIGNUM *tmp, *tmp_Z; + BIGNUM **prod_Z = NULL; size_t i; int ret = 0; @@ -1557,124 +1556,104 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT } BN_CTX_start(ctx); - tmp0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - tmp1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx); - if (tmp0 == NULL || tmp1 == NULL) goto err; + tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + tmp_Z = BN_CTX_get(ctx); + if (tmp == NULL || tmp_Z == NULL) goto err; - /* Before converting the individual points, compute inverses of all Z values. - * Modular inversion is rather slow, but luckily we can do with a single - * explicit inversion, plus about 3 multiplications per input value. - */ + prod_Z = OPENSSL_malloc(num * sizeof prod_Z[0]); + if (prod_Z == NULL) goto err; + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) + { + prod_Z[i] = BN_new(); + if (prod_Z[i] == NULL) goto err; + } - pow2 = 1; - while (num > pow2) - pow2 <<= 1; - /* Now pow2 is the smallest power of 2 satifsying pow2 >= num. - * We need twice that. */ - pow2 <<= 1; + /* Set each prod_Z[i] to the product of points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z, + * skipping any zero-valued inputs (pretend that they're 1). */ - heap = OPENSSL_malloc(pow2 * sizeof heap[0]); - if (heap == NULL) goto err; - - /* The array is used as a binary tree, exactly as in heapsort: - * - * heap[1] - * heap[2] heap[3] - * heap[4] heap[5] heap[6] heap[7] - * heap[8]heap[9] heap[10]heap[11] heap[12]heap[13] heap[14] heap[15] - * - * We put the Z's in the last line; - * then we set each other node to the product of its two child-nodes (where - * empty or 0 entries are treated as ones); - * then we invert heap[1]; - * then we invert each other node by replacing it by the product of its - * parent (after inversion) and its sibling (before inversion). - */ - heap[0] = NULL; - for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--) - heap[i] = NULL; - for (i = 0; i < num; i++) - heap[pow2/2 + i] = &points[i]->Z; - for (i = pow2/2 + num; i < pow2; i++) - heap[i] = NULL; - - /* set each node to the product of its children */ - for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--) + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z)) { - heap[i] = BN_new(); - if (heap[i] == NULL) goto err; - - if (heap[2*i] != NULL) + if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[0], &points[0]->Z)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { - if ((heap[2*i + 1] == NULL) || BN_is_zero(heap[2*i + 1])) - { - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i])) goto err; - } - else - { - if (BN_is_zero(heap[2*i])) - { - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[2*i + 1])) goto err; - } - else - { - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, heap[i], - heap[2*i], heap[2*i + 1], ctx)) goto err; - } - } + if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, prod_Z[0], ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_one(prod_Z[0])) goto err; } } - /* invert heap[1] */ - if (!BN_is_zero(heap[1])) + for (i = 1; i < num; i++) { - if (!BN_mod_inverse(heap[1], heap[1], &group->field, ctx)) + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z)) { - ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); - goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1], &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; + } + else + { + if (!BN_copy(prod_Z[i], prod_Z[i - 1])) goto err; } } + + /* Now use a single explicit inversion to replace every + * non-zero points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ + + if (!BN_mod_inverse(tmp, prod_Z[num - 1], &group->field, ctx)) + { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_GFP_SIMPLE_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); + goto err; + } if (group->meth->field_encode != 0) { - /* in the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) + /* In the Montgomery case, we just turned R*H (representing H) * into 1/(R*H), but we need R*(1/H) (representing 1/H); - * i.e. we have need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice */ - if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, heap[1], heap[1], ctx)) goto err; + * i.e. we need to multiply by the Montgomery factor twice. */ + if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_encode(group, tmp, tmp, ctx)) goto err; } - /* set other heap[i]'s to their inverses */ - for (i = 2; i < pow2/2 + num; i += 2) + for (i = num - 1; i > 0; --i) { - /* i is even */ - if ((heap[i + 1] != NULL) && !BN_is_zero(heap[i + 1])) - { - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp0, heap[i/2], heap[i + 1], ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, heap[i/2], heap[i], ctx)) goto err; - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], tmp0)) goto err; - if (!BN_copy(heap[i + 1], tmp1)) goto err; - } - else + /* Loop invariant: tmp is the product of the inverses of + * points[0]->Z .. points[i]->Z (zero-valued inputs skipped). */ + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[i]->Z)) { - if (!BN_copy(heap[i], heap[i/2])) goto err; + /* Set tmp_Z to the inverse of points[i]->Z (as product + * of Z inverses 0 .. i, Z values 0 .. i - 1). */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp_Z, prod_Z[i - 1], tmp, ctx)) goto err; + /* Update tmp to satisfy the loop invariant for i - 1. */ + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &points[i]->Z, ctx)) goto err; + /* Replace points[i]->Z by its inverse. */ + if (!BN_copy(&points[i]->Z, tmp_Z)) goto err; } } - /* we have replaced all non-zero Z's by their inverses, now fix up all the points */ + if (!BN_is_zero(&points[0]->Z)) + { + /* Replace points[0]->Z by its inverse. */ + if (!BN_copy(&points[0]->Z, tmp)) goto err; + } + + /* Finally, fix up the X and Y coordinates for all points. */ + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { EC_POINT *p = points[i]; - + if (!BN_is_zero(&p->Z)) { /* turn (X, Y, 1/Z) into (X/Z^2, Y/Z^3, 1) */ - if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp1, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_sqr(group, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->X, &p->X, tmp, ctx)) goto err; + + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp, tmp, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; + if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp, ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, tmp1, tmp1, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; - if (!group->meth->field_mul(group, &p->Y, &p->Y, tmp1, ctx)) goto err; - if (group->meth->field_set_to_one != 0) { if (!group->meth->field_set_to_one(group, &p->Z, ctx)) goto err; @@ -1688,20 +1667,19 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT } ret = 1; - + err: BN_CTX_end(ctx); if (new_ctx != NULL) BN_CTX_free(new_ctx); - if (heap != NULL) + if (prod_Z != NULL) { - /* heap[pow2/2] .. heap[pow2-1] have not been allocated locally! */ - for (i = pow2/2 - 1; i > 0; i--) + for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { - if (heap[i] != NULL) - BN_clear_free(heap[i]); + if (prod_Z[i] != NULL) + BN_clear_free(prod_Z[i]); } - OPENSSL_free(heap); + OPENSSL_free(prod_Z); } return ret; } |
