diff options
| author | Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com> | 2015-07-28 11:46:38 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> | 2015-07-28 11:46:38 -0400 |
| commit | 5ce38c90cf43ee79cd999716ea83a5a44eeb819e (patch) | |
| tree | 2fb3d9dd667c772fae5f87fa61e1501cf12da0ce /Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c | |
| parent | 69ba24ff72921ecabbb47178de40dc5a79350040 (diff) | |
| download | efi-boot-shim-5ce38c90cf43ee79cd999716ea83a5a44eeb819e.tar.gz efi-boot-shim-5ce38c90cf43ee79cd999716ea83a5a44eeb819e.zip | |
Update openssl to 1.0.2d
Also update Cryptlib to edk2 r17731
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c | 1241 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1241 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c deleted file mode 100644 index f233b166..00000000 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/engine/eng_padlock.c +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1241 +0,0 @@ -/*- - * Support for VIA PadLock Advanced Cryptography Engine (ACE) - * Written by Michal Ludvig <michal@logix.cz> - * http://www.logix.cz/michal - * - * Big thanks to Andy Polyakov for a help with optimization, - * assembler fixes, port to MS Windows and a lot of other - * valuable work on this engine! - */ - -/* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999-2001 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. - * - * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without - * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions - * are met: - * - * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. - * - * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright - * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in - * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the - * distribution. - * - * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this - * software must display the following acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to - * endorse or promote products derived from this software without - * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact - * licensing@OpenSSL.org. - * - * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" - * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written - * permission of the OpenSSL Project. - * - * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following - * acknowledgment: - * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project - * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" - * - * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY - * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE - * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR - * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR - * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, - * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT - * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; - * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) - * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, - * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) - * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED - * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. - * ==================================================================== - * - * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young - * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim - * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). - * - */ - -#include <stdio.h> -#include <string.h> - -#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> -#include <openssl/crypto.h> -#include <openssl/dso.h> -#include <openssl/engine.h> -#include <openssl/evp.h> -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -# include <openssl/aes.h> -#endif -#include <openssl/rand.h> -#include <openssl/err.h> - -#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK - -/* Attempt to have a single source for both 0.9.7 and 0.9.8 :-) */ -# if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00908000L) -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE -# define DYNAMIC_ENGINE -# endif -# elif (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x00907000L) -# ifdef ENGINE_DYNAMIC_SUPPORT -# define DYNAMIC_ENGINE -# endif -# else -# error "Only OpenSSL >= 0.9.7 is supported" -# endif - -/* - * VIA PadLock AES is available *ONLY* on some x86 CPUs. Not only that it - * doesn't exist elsewhere, but it even can't be compiled on other platforms! - * - * In addition, because of the heavy use of inline assembler, compiler choice - * is limited to GCC and Microsoft C. - */ -# undef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK -# if !defined(I386_ONLY) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM) -# if (defined(__GNUC__) && (defined(__i386__) || defined(__i386))) || \ - (defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_IX86)) -# define COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK -static ENGINE *ENGINE_padlock(void); -# endif -# endif - -void ENGINE_load_padlock(void) -{ -/* On non-x86 CPUs it just returns. */ -# ifdef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK - ENGINE *toadd = ENGINE_padlock(); - if (!toadd) - return; - ENGINE_add(toadd); - ENGINE_free(toadd); - ERR_clear_error(); -# endif -} - -# ifdef COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK -/* - * We do these includes here to avoid header problems on platforms that do - * not have the VIA padlock anyway... - */ -# ifdef _MSC_VER -# include <malloc.h> -# define alloca _alloca -# elif defined(NETWARE_CLIB) && defined(__GNUC__) -void *alloca(size_t); -# define alloca(s) __builtin_alloca(s) -# else -# include <stdlib.h> -# endif - -/* Function for ENGINE detection and control */ -static int padlock_available(void); -static int padlock_init(ENGINE *e); - -/* RNG Stuff */ -static RAND_METHOD padlock_rand; - -/* Cipher Stuff */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -static int padlock_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, - const int **nids, int nid); -# endif - -/* Engine names */ -static const char *padlock_id = "padlock"; -static char padlock_name[100]; - -/* Available features */ -static int padlock_use_ace = 0; /* Advanced Cryptography Engine */ -static int padlock_use_rng = 0; /* Random Number Generator */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -static int padlock_aes_align_required = 1; -# endif - -/* ===== Engine "management" functions ===== */ - -/* Prepare the ENGINE structure for registration */ -static int padlock_bind_helper(ENGINE *e) -{ - /* Check available features */ - padlock_available(); - -# if 1 /* disable RNG for now, see commentary in - * vicinity of RNG code */ - padlock_use_rng = 0; -# endif - - /* Generate a nice engine name with available features */ - BIO_snprintf(padlock_name, sizeof(padlock_name), - "VIA PadLock (%s, %s)", - padlock_use_rng ? "RNG" : "no-RNG", - padlock_use_ace ? "ACE" : "no-ACE"); - - /* Register everything or return with an error */ - if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, padlock_id) || - !ENGINE_set_name(e, padlock_name) || - !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, padlock_init) || -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES - (padlock_use_ace && !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, padlock_ciphers)) || -# endif - (padlock_use_rng && !ENGINE_set_RAND(e, &padlock_rand))) { - return 0; - } - - /* Everything looks good */ - return 1; -} - -/* Constructor */ -static ENGINE *ENGINE_padlock(void) -{ - ENGINE *eng = ENGINE_new(); - - if (!eng) { - return NULL; - } - - if (!padlock_bind_helper(eng)) { - ENGINE_free(eng); - return NULL; - } - - return eng; -} - -/* Check availability of the engine */ -static int padlock_init(ENGINE *e) -{ - return (padlock_use_rng || padlock_use_ace); -} - -/* - * This stuff is needed if this ENGINE is being compiled into a - * self-contained shared-library. - */ -# ifdef DYNAMIC_ENGINE -static int padlock_bind_fn(ENGINE *e, const char *id) -{ - if (id && (strcmp(id, padlock_id) != 0)) { - return 0; - } - - if (!padlock_bind_helper(e)) { - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() - IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(padlock_bind_fn) -# endif /* DYNAMIC_ENGINE */ -/* ===== Here comes the "real" engine ===== */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -/* Some AES-related constants */ -# define AES_BLOCK_SIZE 16 -# define AES_KEY_SIZE_128 16 -# define AES_KEY_SIZE_192 24 -# define AES_KEY_SIZE_256 32 - /* - * Here we store the status information relevant to the current context. - */ - /* - * BIG FAT WARNING: Inline assembler in PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM() depends on - * the order of items in this structure. Don't blindly modify, reorder, - * etc! - */ -struct padlock_cipher_data { - unsigned char iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE]; /* Initialization vector */ - union { - unsigned int pad[4]; - struct { - int rounds:4; - int dgst:1; /* n/a in C3 */ - int align:1; /* n/a in C3 */ - int ciphr:1; /* n/a in C3 */ - unsigned int keygen:1; - int interm:1; - unsigned int encdec:1; - int ksize:2; - } b; - } cword; /* Control word */ - AES_KEY ks; /* Encryption key */ -}; - -/* - * Essentially this variable belongs in thread local storage. - * Having this variable global on the other hand can only cause - * few bogus key reloads [if any at all on single-CPU system], - * so we accept the penatly... - */ -static volatile struct padlock_cipher_data *padlock_saved_context; -# endif - -/*- - * ======================================================= - * Inline assembler section(s). - * ======================================================= - * Order of arguments is chosen to facilitate Windows port - * using __fastcall calling convention. If you wish to add - * more routines, keep in mind that first __fastcall - * argument is passed in %ecx and second - in %edx. - * ======================================================= - */ -# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 -/* - * As for excessive "push %ebx"/"pop %ebx" found all over. - * When generating position-independent code GCC won't let - * us use "b" in assembler templates nor even respect "ebx" - * in "clobber description." Therefore the trouble... - */ - -/* - * Helper function - check if a CPUID instruction is available on this CPU - */ -static int padlock_insn_cpuid_available(void) -{ - int result = -1; - - /* - * We're checking if the bit #21 of EFLAGS can be toggled. If yes = - * CPUID is available. - */ - asm volatile ("pushf\n" - "popl %%eax\n" - "xorl $0x200000, %%eax\n" - "movl %%eax, %%ecx\n" - "andl $0x200000, %%ecx\n" - "pushl %%eax\n" - "popf\n" - "pushf\n" - "popl %%eax\n" - "andl $0x200000, %%eax\n" - "xorl %%eax, %%ecx\n" - "movl %%ecx, %0\n":"=r" (result)::"eax", "ecx"); - - return (result == 0); -} - -/* - * Load supported features of the CPU to see if the PadLock is available. - */ -static int padlock_available(void) -{ - char vendor_string[16]; - unsigned int eax, edx; - - /* First check if the CPUID instruction is available at all... */ - if (!padlock_insn_cpuid_available()) - return 0; - - /* Are we running on the Centaur (VIA) CPU? */ - eax = 0x00000000; - vendor_string[12] = 0; - asm volatile ("pushl %%ebx\n" - "cpuid\n" - "movl %%ebx,(%%edi)\n" - "movl %%edx,4(%%edi)\n" - "movl %%ecx,8(%%edi)\n" - "popl %%ebx":"+a" (eax):"D"(vendor_string):"ecx", "edx"); - if (strcmp(vendor_string, "CentaurHauls") != 0) - return 0; - - /* Check for Centaur Extended Feature Flags presence */ - eax = 0xC0000000; - asm volatile ("pushl %%ebx; cpuid; popl %%ebx":"+a" (eax)::"ecx", "edx"); - if (eax < 0xC0000001) - return 0; - - /* Read the Centaur Extended Feature Flags */ - eax = 0xC0000001; - asm volatile ("pushl %%ebx; cpuid; popl %%ebx":"+a" (eax), - "=d"(edx)::"ecx"); - - /* Fill up some flags */ - padlock_use_ace = ((edx & (0x3 << 6)) == (0x3 << 6)); - padlock_use_rng = ((edx & (0x3 << 2)) == (0x3 << 2)); - - return padlock_use_ace + padlock_use_rng; -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -/* Our own htonl()/ntohl() */ -static inline void padlock_bswapl(AES_KEY *ks) -{ - size_t i = sizeof(ks->rd_key) / sizeof(ks->rd_key[0]); - unsigned int *key = ks->rd_key; - - while (i--) { - asm volatile ("bswapl %0":"+r" (*key)); - key++; - } -} -# endif - -/* - * Force key reload from memory to the CPU microcode. Loading EFLAGS from the - * stack clears EFLAGS[30] which does the trick. - */ -static inline void padlock_reload_key(void) -{ - asm volatile ("pushfl; popfl"); -} - -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -/* - * This is heuristic key context tracing. At first one - * believes that one should use atomic swap instructions, - * but it's not actually necessary. Point is that if - * padlock_saved_context was changed by another thread - * after we've read it and before we compare it with cdata, - * our key *shall* be reloaded upon thread context switch - * and we are therefore set in either case... - */ -static inline void padlock_verify_context(struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata) -{ - asm volatile ("pushfl\n" - " btl $30,(%%esp)\n" - " jnc 1f\n" - " cmpl %2,%1\n" - " je 1f\n" - " popfl\n" - " subl $4,%%esp\n" - "1: addl $4,%%esp\n" - " movl %2,%0":"+m" (padlock_saved_context) - :"r"(padlock_saved_context), "r"(cdata):"cc"); -} - -/* Template for padlock_xcrypt_* modes */ -/* - * BIG FAT WARNING: The offsets used with 'leal' instructions describe items - * of the 'padlock_cipher_data' structure. - */ -# define PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(name,rep_xcrypt) \ -static inline void *name(size_t cnt, \ - struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata, \ - void *out, const void *inp) \ -{ void *iv; \ - asm volatile ( "pushl %%ebx\n" \ - " leal 16(%0),%%edx\n" \ - " leal 32(%0),%%ebx\n" \ - rep_xcrypt "\n" \ - " popl %%ebx" \ - : "=a"(iv), "=c"(cnt), "=D"(out), "=S"(inp) \ - : "0"(cdata), "1"(cnt), "2"(out), "3"(inp) \ - : "edx", "cc", "memory"); \ - return iv; \ -} - -/* Generate all functions with appropriate opcodes */ -/* rep xcryptecb */ -PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ecb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xc8") -/* rep xcryptcbc */ - PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cbc, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xd0") -/* rep xcryptcfb */ - PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cfb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xe0") -/* rep xcryptofb */ - PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ofb, ".byte 0xf3,0x0f,0xa7,0xe8") -# endif -/* The RNG call itself */ -static inline unsigned int padlock_xstore(void *addr, unsigned int edx_in) -{ - unsigned int eax_out; - - asm volatile (".byte 0x0f,0xa7,0xc0" /* xstore */ - :"=a" (eax_out), "=m"(*(unsigned *)addr) - :"D"(addr), "d"(edx_in) - ); - - return eax_out; -} - -/* - * Why not inline 'rep movsd'? I failed to find information on what value in - * Direction Flag one can expect and consequently have to apply - * "better-safe-than-sorry" approach and assume "undefined." I could - * explicitly clear it and restore the original value upon return from - * padlock_aes_cipher, but it's presumably too much trouble for too little - * gain... In case you wonder 'rep xcrypt*' instructions above are *not* - * affected by the Direction Flag and pointers advance toward larger - * addresses unconditionally. - */ -static inline unsigned char *padlock_memcpy(void *dst, const void *src, - size_t n) -{ - long *d = dst; - const long *s = src; - - n /= sizeof(*d); - do { - *d++ = *s++; - } while (--n); - - return dst; -} - -# elif defined(_MSC_VER) -/* - * Unlike GCC these are real functions. In order to minimize impact - * on performance we adhere to __fastcall calling convention in - * order to get two first arguments passed through %ecx and %edx. - * Which kind of suits very well, as instructions in question use - * both %ecx and %edx as input:-) - */ -# define REP_XCRYPT(code) \ - _asm _emit 0xf3 \ - _asm _emit 0x0f _asm _emit 0xa7 \ - _asm _emit code - -/* - * BIG FAT WARNING: The offsets used with 'lea' instructions describe items - * of the 'padlock_cipher_data' structure. - */ -# define PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(name,code) \ -static void * __fastcall \ - name (size_t cnt, void *cdata, \ - void *outp, const void *inp) \ -{ _asm mov eax,edx \ - _asm lea edx,[eax+16] \ - _asm lea ebx,[eax+32] \ - _asm mov edi,outp \ - _asm mov esi,inp \ - REP_XCRYPT(code) \ -} - -PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ecb,0xc8) -PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cbc,0xd0) -PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_cfb,0xe0) -PADLOCK_XCRYPT_ASM(padlock_xcrypt_ofb,0xe8) - -static int __fastcall padlock_xstore(void *outp, unsigned int code) -{ - _asm mov edi,ecx - _asm _emit 0x0f _asm _emit 0xa7 _asm _emit 0xc0 -} - -static void __fastcall padlock_reload_key(void) -{ - _asm pushfd - _asm popfd -} - -static void __fastcall padlock_verify_context(void *cdata) -{ - _asm { - pushfd - bt DWORD PTR[esp],30 - jnc skip - cmp ecx,padlock_saved_context - je skip - popfd - sub esp,4 - skip: add esp,4 - mov padlock_saved_context,ecx - } -} - -static int -padlock_available(void) -{ - _asm { - pushfd - pop eax - mov ecx,eax - xor eax,1<<21 - push eax - popfd - pushfd - pop eax - xor eax,ecx - bt eax,21 - jnc noluck - mov eax,0 - cpuid - xor eax,eax - cmp ebx,'tneC' - jne noluck - cmp edx,'Hrua' - jne noluck - cmp ecx,'slua' - jne noluck - mov eax,0xC0000000 - cpuid - mov edx,eax - xor eax,eax - cmp edx,0xC0000001 - jb noluck - mov eax,0xC0000001 - cpuid - xor eax,eax - bt edx,6 - jnc skip_a - bt edx,7 - jnc skip_a - mov padlock_use_ace,1 - inc eax - skip_a: bt edx,2 - jnc skip_r - bt edx,3 - jnc skip_r - mov padlock_use_rng,1 - inc eax - skip_r: - noluck: - } -} - -static void __fastcall padlock_bswapl(void *key) -{ - _asm { - pushfd - cld - mov esi,ecx - mov edi,ecx - mov ecx,60 - up: lodsd - bswap eax - stosd - loop up - popfd - } -} - -/* - * MS actually specifies status of Direction Flag and compiler even manages - * to compile following as 'rep movsd' all by itself... - */ -# define padlock_memcpy(o,i,n) ((unsigned char *)memcpy((o),(i),(n)&~3U)) -# endif -/* ===== AES encryption/decryption ===== */ -# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_AES -# if defined(NID_aes_128_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_cfb) -# define NID_aes_128_cfb NID_aes_128_cfb128 -# endif -# if defined(NID_aes_128_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_128_ofb) -# define NID_aes_128_ofb NID_aes_128_ofb128 -# endif -# if defined(NID_aes_192_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_cfb) -# define NID_aes_192_cfb NID_aes_192_cfb128 -# endif -# if defined(NID_aes_192_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_192_ofb) -# define NID_aes_192_ofb NID_aes_192_ofb128 -# endif -# if defined(NID_aes_256_cfb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_cfb) -# define NID_aes_256_cfb NID_aes_256_cfb128 -# endif -# if defined(NID_aes_256_ofb128) && ! defined (NID_aes_256_ofb) -# define NID_aes_256_ofb NID_aes_256_ofb128 -# endif -/* - * List of supported ciphers. - */ static int padlock_cipher_nids[] = { - NID_aes_128_ecb, - NID_aes_128_cbc, - NID_aes_128_cfb, - NID_aes_128_ofb, - - NID_aes_192_ecb, - NID_aes_192_cbc, - NID_aes_192_cfb, - NID_aes_192_ofb, - - NID_aes_256_ecb, - NID_aes_256_cbc, - NID_aes_256_cfb, - NID_aes_256_ofb, -}; - -static int padlock_cipher_nids_num = (sizeof(padlock_cipher_nids) / - sizeof(padlock_cipher_nids[0])); - -/* Function prototypes ... */ -static int padlock_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc); -static int padlock_aes_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, - const unsigned char *in, size_t nbytes); - -# define NEAREST_ALIGNED(ptr) ( (unsigned char *)(ptr) + \ - ( (0x10 - ((size_t)(ptr) & 0x0F)) & 0x0F ) ) -# define ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx) ((struct padlock_cipher_data *)\ - NEAREST_ALIGNED(ctx->cipher_data)) - -# define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_ECB AES_BLOCK_SIZE -# define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CBC AES_BLOCK_SIZE -# define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_OFB 1 -# define EVP_CIPHER_block_size_CFB 1 - -/* - * Declaring so many ciphers by hand would be a pain. Instead introduce a bit - * of preprocessor magic :-) - */ -# define DECLARE_AES_EVP(ksize,lmode,umode) \ -static const EVP_CIPHER padlock_aes_##ksize##_##lmode = { \ - NID_aes_##ksize##_##lmode, \ - EVP_CIPHER_block_size_##umode, \ - AES_KEY_SIZE_##ksize, \ - AES_BLOCK_SIZE, \ - 0 | EVP_CIPH_##umode##_MODE, \ - padlock_aes_init_key, \ - padlock_aes_cipher, \ - NULL, \ - sizeof(struct padlock_cipher_data) + 16, \ - EVP_CIPHER_set_asn1_iv, \ - EVP_CIPHER_get_asn1_iv, \ - NULL, \ - NULL \ -} - -DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, ecb, ECB); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, cbc, CBC); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, cfb, CFB); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(128, ofb, OFB); - -DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, ecb, ECB); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, cbc, CBC); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, cfb, CFB); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(192, ofb, OFB); - -DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, ecb, ECB); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, cbc, CBC); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, cfb, CFB); -DECLARE_AES_EVP(256, ofb, OFB); - -static int -padlock_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, - int nid) -{ - /* No specific cipher => return a list of supported nids ... */ - if (!cipher) { - *nids = padlock_cipher_nids; - return padlock_cipher_nids_num; - } - - /* ... or the requested "cipher" otherwise */ - switch (nid) { - case NID_aes_128_ecb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_128_cbc: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_128_cfb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_cfb; - break; - case NID_aes_128_ofb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_128_ofb; - break; - - case NID_aes_192_ecb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_192_cbc: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_192_cfb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_cfb; - break; - case NID_aes_192_ofb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_192_ofb; - break; - - case NID_aes_256_ecb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_ecb; - break; - case NID_aes_256_cbc: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_cbc; - break; - case NID_aes_256_cfb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_cfb; - break; - case NID_aes_256_ofb: - *cipher = &padlock_aes_256_ofb; - break; - - default: - /* Sorry, we don't support this NID */ - *cipher = NULL; - return 0; - } - - return 1; -} - -/* Prepare the encryption key for PadLock usage */ -static int -padlock_aes_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, - const unsigned char *iv, int enc) -{ - struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata; - int key_len = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8; - - if (key == NULL) - return 0; /* ERROR */ - - cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx); - memset(cdata, 0, sizeof(struct padlock_cipher_data)); - - /* Prepare Control word. */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE) - cdata->cword.b.encdec = 0; - else - cdata->cword.b.encdec = (ctx->encrypt == 0); - cdata->cword.b.rounds = 10 + (key_len - 128) / 32; - cdata->cword.b.ksize = (key_len - 128) / 64; - - switch (key_len) { - case 128: - /* - * PadLock can generate an extended key for AES128 in hardware - */ - memcpy(cdata->ks.rd_key, key, AES_KEY_SIZE_128); - cdata->cword.b.keygen = 0; - break; - - case 192: - case 256: - /* - * Generate an extended AES key in software. Needed for AES192/AES256 - */ - /* - * Well, the above applies to Stepping 8 CPUs and is listed as - * hardware errata. They most likely will fix it at some point and - * then a check for stepping would be due here. - */ - if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE || - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE || enc) - AES_set_encrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks); - else - AES_set_decrypt_key(key, key_len, &cdata->ks); -# ifndef AES_ASM - /* - * OpenSSL C functions use byte-swapped extended key. - */ - padlock_bswapl(&cdata->ks); -# endif - cdata->cword.b.keygen = 1; - break; - - default: - /* ERROR */ - return 0; - } - - /* - * This is done to cover for cases when user reuses the - * context for new key. The catch is that if we don't do - * this, padlock_eas_cipher might proceed with old key... - */ - padlock_reload_key(); - - return 1; -} - -/*- - * Simplified version of padlock_aes_cipher() used when - * 1) both input and output buffers are at aligned addresses. - * or when - * 2) running on a newer CPU that doesn't require aligned buffers. - */ -static int -padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg, - const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes) -{ - struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata; - void *iv; - - cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx); - padlock_verify_context(cdata); - - switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) { - case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE: - padlock_xcrypt_ecb(nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg); - break; - - case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE: - memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, - in_arg); - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - break; - - case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE: - memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - iv = padlock_xcrypt_cfb(nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, - in_arg); - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - break; - - case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE: - memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - padlock_xcrypt_ofb(nbytes / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out_arg, in_arg); - memcpy(ctx->iv, cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - break; - - default: - return 0; - } - - memset(cdata->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - return 1; -} - -# ifndef PADLOCK_CHUNK -# define PADLOCK_CHUNK 512 /* Must be a power of 2 larger than 16 */ -# endif -# if PADLOCK_CHUNK<16 || PADLOCK_CHUNK&(PADLOCK_CHUNK-1) -# error "insane PADLOCK_CHUNK..." -# endif - -/* - * Re-align the arguments to 16-Bytes boundaries and run the encryption - * function itself. This function is not AES-specific. - */ -static int -padlock_aes_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out_arg, - const unsigned char *in_arg, size_t nbytes) -{ - struct padlock_cipher_data *cdata; - const void *inp; - unsigned char *out; - void *iv; - int inp_misaligned, out_misaligned, realign_in_loop; - size_t chunk, allocated = 0; - - /* - * ctx->num is maintained in byte-oriented modes, such as CFB and OFB... - */ - if ((chunk = ctx->num)) { /* borrow chunk variable */ - unsigned char *ivp = ctx->iv; - - switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) { - case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE: - if (chunk >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; /* bogus value */ - - if (ctx->encrypt) - while (chunk < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && nbytes != 0) { - ivp[chunk] = *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ ivp[chunk]; - chunk++, nbytes--; - } else - while (chunk < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && nbytes != 0) { - unsigned char c = *(in_arg++); - *(out_arg++) = c ^ ivp[chunk]; - ivp[chunk++] = c, nbytes--; - } - - ctx->num = chunk % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - break; - case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE: - if (chunk >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; /* bogus value */ - - while (chunk < AES_BLOCK_SIZE && nbytes != 0) { - *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ ivp[chunk]; - chunk++, nbytes--; - } - - ctx->num = chunk % AES_BLOCK_SIZE; - break; - } - } - - if (nbytes == 0) - return 1; -# if 0 - if (nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - return 0; /* are we expected to do tail processing? */ -# else - /* - * nbytes is always multiple of AES_BLOCK_SIZE in ECB and CBC modes and - * arbitrary value in byte-oriented modes, such as CFB and OFB... - */ -# endif - - /* - * VIA promises CPUs that won't require alignment in the future. For now - * padlock_aes_align_required is initialized to 1 and the condition is - * never met... - */ - /* - * C7 core is capable to manage unaligned input in non-ECB[!] mode, but - * performance penalties appear to be approximately same as for software - * alignment below or ~3x. They promise to improve it in the future, but - * for now we can just as well pretend that it can only handle aligned - * input... - */ - if (!padlock_aes_align_required && (nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) - return padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(ctx, out_arg, in_arg, nbytes); - - inp_misaligned = (((size_t)in_arg) & 0x0F); - out_misaligned = (((size_t)out_arg) & 0x0F); - - /* - * Note that even if output is aligned and input not, I still prefer to - * loop instead of copy the whole input and then encrypt in one stroke. - * This is done in order to improve L1 cache utilization... - */ - realign_in_loop = out_misaligned | inp_misaligned; - - if (!realign_in_loop && (nbytes % AES_BLOCK_SIZE) == 0) - return padlock_aes_cipher_omnivorous(ctx, out_arg, in_arg, nbytes); - - /* this takes one "if" out of the loops */ - chunk = nbytes; - chunk %= PADLOCK_CHUNK; - if (chunk == 0) - chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK; - - if (out_misaligned) { - /* optmize for small input */ - allocated = (chunk < nbytes ? PADLOCK_CHUNK : nbytes); - out = alloca(0x10 + allocated); - out = NEAREST_ALIGNED(out); - } else - out = out_arg; - - cdata = ALIGNED_CIPHER_DATA(ctx); - padlock_verify_context(cdata); - - switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) { - case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE: - do { - if (inp_misaligned) - inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk); - else - inp = in_arg; - in_arg += chunk; - - padlock_xcrypt_ecb(chunk / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp); - - if (out_misaligned) - out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk; - else - out = out_arg += chunk; - - nbytes -= chunk; - chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK; - } while (nbytes); - break; - - case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE: - memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - goto cbc_shortcut; - do { - if (iv != cdata->iv) - memcpy(cdata->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK; - cbc_shortcut: /* optimize for small input */ - if (inp_misaligned) - inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk); - else - inp = in_arg; - in_arg += chunk; - - iv = padlock_xcrypt_cbc(chunk / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp); - - if (out_misaligned) - out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk; - else - out = out_arg += chunk; - - } while (nbytes -= chunk); - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - break; - - case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE: - memcpy(iv = cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - chunk &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); - if (chunk) - goto cfb_shortcut; - else - goto cfb_skiploop; - do { - if (iv != cdata->iv) - memcpy(cdata->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK; - cfb_shortcut: /* optimize for small input */ - if (inp_misaligned) - inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk); - else - inp = in_arg; - in_arg += chunk; - - iv = padlock_xcrypt_cfb(chunk / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp); - - if (out_misaligned) - out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk; - else - out = out_arg += chunk; - - nbytes -= chunk; - } while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - cfb_skiploop: - if (nbytes) { - unsigned char *ivp = cdata->iv; - - if (iv != ivp) { - memcpy(ivp, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - iv = ivp; - } - ctx->num = nbytes; - if (cdata->cword.b.encdec) { - cdata->cword.b.encdec = 0; - padlock_reload_key(); - padlock_xcrypt_ecb(1, cdata, ivp, ivp); - cdata->cword.b.encdec = 1; - padlock_reload_key(); - while (nbytes) { - unsigned char c = *(in_arg++); - *(out_arg++) = c ^ *ivp; - *(ivp++) = c, nbytes--; - } - } else { - padlock_reload_key(); - padlock_xcrypt_ecb(1, cdata, ivp, ivp); - padlock_reload_key(); - while (nbytes) { - *ivp = *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ *ivp; - ivp++, nbytes--; - } - } - } - - memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - break; - - case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE: - memcpy(cdata->iv, ctx->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - chunk &= ~(AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1); - if (chunk) - do { - if (inp_misaligned) - inp = padlock_memcpy(out, in_arg, chunk); - else - inp = in_arg; - in_arg += chunk; - - padlock_xcrypt_ofb(chunk / AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cdata, out, inp); - - if (out_misaligned) - out_arg = padlock_memcpy(out_arg, out, chunk) + chunk; - else - out = out_arg += chunk; - - nbytes -= chunk; - chunk = PADLOCK_CHUNK; - } while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - if (nbytes) { - unsigned char *ivp = cdata->iv; - - ctx->num = nbytes; - padlock_reload_key(); /* empirically found */ - padlock_xcrypt_ecb(1, cdata, ivp, ivp); - padlock_reload_key(); /* empirically found */ - while (nbytes) { - *(out_arg++) = *(in_arg++) ^ *ivp; - ivp++, nbytes--; - } - } - - memcpy(ctx->iv, cdata->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - break; - - default: - return 0; - } - - /* Clean the realign buffer if it was used */ - if (out_misaligned) { - volatile unsigned long *p = (void *)out; - size_t n = allocated / sizeof(*p); - while (n--) - *p++ = 0; - } - - memset(cdata->iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE); - - return 1; -} - -# endif /* OPENSSL_NO_AES */ - -/* ===== Random Number Generator ===== */ -/* - * This code is not engaged. The reason is that it does not comply - * with recommendations for VIA RNG usage for secure applications - * (posted at http://www.via.com.tw/en/viac3/c3.jsp) nor does it - * provide meaningful error control... - */ -/* - * Wrapper that provides an interface between the API and the raw PadLock - * RNG - */ -static int padlock_rand_bytes(unsigned char *output, int count) -{ - unsigned int eax, buf; - - while (count >= 8) { - eax = padlock_xstore(output, 0); - if (!(eax & (1 << 6))) - return 0; /* RNG disabled */ - /* this ---vv--- covers DC bias, Raw Bits and String Filter */ - if (eax & (0x1F << 10)) - return 0; - if ((eax & 0x1F) == 0) - continue; /* no data, retry... */ - if ((eax & 0x1F) != 8) - return 0; /* fatal failure... */ - output += 8; - count -= 8; - } - while (count > 0) { - eax = padlock_xstore(&buf, 3); - if (!(eax & (1 << 6))) - return 0; /* RNG disabled */ - /* this ---vv--- covers DC bias, Raw Bits and String Filter */ - if (eax & (0x1F << 10)) - return 0; - if ((eax & 0x1F) == 0) - continue; /* no data, retry... */ - if ((eax & 0x1F) != 1) - return 0; /* fatal failure... */ - *output++ = (unsigned char)buf; - count--; - } - *(volatile unsigned int *)&buf = 0; - - return 1; -} - -/* Dummy but necessary function */ -static int padlock_rand_status(void) -{ - return 1; -} - -/* Prepare structure for registration */ -static RAND_METHOD padlock_rand = { - NULL, /* seed */ - padlock_rand_bytes, /* bytes */ - NULL, /* cleanup */ - NULL, /* add */ - padlock_rand_bytes, /* pseudorand */ - padlock_rand_status, /* rand status */ -}; - -# endif /* COMPILE_HW_PADLOCK */ - -# endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW_PADLOCK */ -#endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_HW */ |
