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| author | Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com> | 2015-07-28 11:46:38 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> | 2015-07-28 11:46:38 -0400 |
| commit | 5ce38c90cf43ee79cd999716ea83a5a44eeb819e (patch) | |
| tree | 2fb3d9dd667c772fae5f87fa61e1501cf12da0ce /Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c | |
| parent | 69ba24ff72921ecabbb47178de40dc5a79350040 (diff) | |
| download | efi-boot-shim-5ce38c90cf43ee79cd999716ea83a5a44eeb819e.tar.gz efi-boot-shim-5ce38c90cf43ee79cd999716ea83a5a44eeb819e.zip | |
Update openssl to 1.0.2d
Also update Cryptlib to edk2 r17731
Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c | 167 |
1 files changed, 115 insertions, 52 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c index 4c9496c0..f2ae1e57 100644 --- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c +++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/evp/p5_crpt2.c @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ * 1999. */ /* ==================================================================== - * Copyright (c) 1999 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. + * Copyright (c) 1999-2006 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions @@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ # include <openssl/x509.h> # include <openssl/evp.h> # include <openssl/hmac.h> +# include "evp_locl.h" /* set this to print out info about the keygen algorithm */ /* #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 */ @@ -73,31 +74,38 @@ static void h__dump(const unsigned char *p, int len); /* * This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key - * derivation function PBKDF2 using the only currently defined function HMAC - * with SHA1. Verified against test vectors posted by Peter Gutmann - * <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to the PKCS-TNG <pkcs-tng@rsa.com> mailing - * list. + * derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors + * posted by Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz> to the PKCS-TNG + * <pkcs-tng@rsa.com> mailing list. */ -int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, - const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, - int keylen, unsigned char *out) +int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(const char *pass, int passlen, + const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, + const EVP_MD *digest, int keylen, unsigned char *out) { - unsigned char digtmp[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH], *p, itmp[4]; - int cplen, j, k, tkeylen; + unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4]; + int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen; unsigned long i = 1; - HMAC_CTX hctx; + HMAC_CTX hctx_tpl, hctx; - HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); + mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest); + if (mdlen < 0) + return 0; + + HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx_tpl); p = out; tkeylen = keylen; if (!pass) passlen = 0; else if (passlen == -1) passlen = strlen(pass); + if (!HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); + return 0; + } while (tkeylen) { - if (tkeylen > SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) - cplen = SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; + if (tkeylen > mdlen) + cplen = mdlen; else cplen = tkeylen; /* @@ -108,14 +116,31 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff); itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff); itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff); - HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, pass, passlen, EVP_sha1(), NULL); - HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen); - HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4); - HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL); + if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); + return 0; + } + if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, salt, saltlen) + || !HMAC_Update(&hctx, itmp, 4) + || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + return 0; + } + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen); for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) { - HMAC(EVP_sha1(), pass, passlen, - digtmp, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, digtmp, NULL); + if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(&hctx, &hctx_tpl)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); + return 0; + } + if (!HMAC_Update(&hctx, digtmp, mdlen) + || !HMAC_Final(&hctx, digtmp, NULL)) { + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + return 0; + } + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++) p[k] ^= digtmp[k]; } @@ -123,7 +148,7 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, i++; p += cplen; } - HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); + HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx_tpl); # ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2 fprintf(stderr, "Password:\n"); h__dump(pass, passlen); @@ -136,6 +161,14 @@ int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, return 1; } +int PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(const char *pass, int passlen, + const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter, + int keylen, unsigned char *out) +{ + return PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, EVP_sha1(), + keylen, out); +} + # ifdef DO_TEST main() { @@ -158,25 +191,24 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) { - unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; const unsigned char *pbuf; - int saltlen, iter, plen; - unsigned int keylen; + int plen; PBE2PARAM *pbe2 = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *cipher; - PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; + + int rv = 0; if (param == NULL || param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || param->value.sequence == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); - return 0; + goto err; } pbuf = param->value.sequence->data; plen = param->value.sequence->length; if (!(pbe2 = d2i_PBE2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen))) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); - return 0; + goto err; } /* See if we recognise the key derivation function */ @@ -191,9 +223,7 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, * lets see if we recognise the encryption algorithm. */ - cipher = - EVP_get_cipherbyname(OBJ_nid2sn - (OBJ_obj2nid(pbe2->encryption->algorithm))); + cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(pbe2->encryption->algorithm); if (!cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); @@ -201,46 +231,81 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, } /* Fixup cipher based on AlgorithmIdentifier */ - EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de); + if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, NULL, NULL, en_de)) + goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(ctx, pbe2->encryption->parameter) < 0) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_CIPHER_PARAMETER_ERROR); goto err; } + rv = PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(ctx, pass, passlen, + pbe2->keyfunc->parameter, c, md, en_de); + err: + PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); + return rv; +} + +int PKCS5_v2_PBKDF2_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, + int passlen, ASN1_TYPE *param, + const EVP_CIPHER *c, const EVP_MD *md, int en_de) +{ + unsigned char *salt, key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + const unsigned char *pbuf; + int saltlen, iter, plen; + int rv = 0; + unsigned int keylen = 0; + int prf_nid, hmac_md_nid; + PBKDF2PARAM *kdf = NULL; + const EVP_MD *prfmd; + + if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); + goto err; + } keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); OPENSSL_assert(keylen <= sizeof key); - /* Now decode key derivation function */ + /* Decode parameter */ - if (!pbe2->keyfunc->parameter || - (pbe2->keyfunc->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); + if (!param || (param->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } - pbuf = pbe2->keyfunc->parameter->value.sequence->data; - plen = pbe2->keyfunc->parameter->value.sequence->length; + pbuf = param->value.sequence->data; + plen = param->value.sequence->length; + if (!(kdf = d2i_PBKDF2PARAM(NULL, &pbuf, plen))) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } - PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); - pbe2 = NULL; + keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Now check the parameters of the kdf */ if (kdf->keylength && (ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->keylength) != (int)keylen)) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH); + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEYLENGTH); goto err; } - if (kdf->prf && (OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm) != NID_hmacWithSHA1)) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); + if (kdf->prf) + prf_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kdf->prf->algorithm); + else + prf_nid = NID_hmacWithSHA1; + + if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, prf_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, 0)) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); + goto err; + } + + prfmd = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid); + if (prfmd == NULL) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_PRF); goto err; } if (kdf->salt->type != V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING) { - EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBE_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE); + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKCS5_V2_PBKDF2_KEYIVGEN, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE); goto err; } @@ -248,16 +313,14 @@ int PKCS5_v2_PBE_keyivgen(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const char *pass, int passlen, salt = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->data; saltlen = kdf->salt->value.octet_string->length; iter = ASN1_INTEGER_get(kdf->iter); - PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA1(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, keylen, key); - EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); - OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); - PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); - return 1; - + if (!PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, iter, prfmd, + keylen, key)) + goto err; + rv = EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, en_de); err: - PBE2PARAM_free(pbe2); + OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen); PBKDF2PARAM_free(kdf); - return 0; + return rv; } # ifdef DEBUG_PKCS5V2 |
