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authorPeter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>2017-08-31 13:57:30 -0400
committerPeter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>2017-08-31 15:13:58 -0400
commit1d39ada8cb336d9e7c156be7526b674851fbdd40 (patch)
treedc497e33b1d4830bf58d79dedc3026087f31f044 /Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf
parenteae64276ffe0361d2b4087c48390d12f157f65f0 (diff)
downloadefi-boot-shim-1d39ada8cb336d9e7c156be7526b674851fbdd40.tar.gz
efi-boot-shim-1d39ada8cb336d9e7c156be7526b674851fbdd40.zip
Revert lots of Cryptlib updates.
OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker. Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test data to match the bug. So that's pretty broken. For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in the wild to work. This reverts commit 513cbe2aea689bf968f171f894f3d4cdb43524d5. This reverts commit e9cc33d6f2b7f35c6f5e349fd83fb9ae0bc66226. This reverts commit 80d49f758ead0180bfe6161931838e0578248303. This reverts commit 9bc647e2b23bcfd69a0077c0717fbc454c919a57. This reverts commit ae75df6232ad30f3e8736e9449692d58a7439260. This reverts commit e883479f35644d17db7efed710657c8543cfcb68. This reverts commit 97469449fda5ba933a64280917e776487301a127. This reverts commit e39692647f78e13d757ddbfdd36f440d5f526050. This reverts commit 0f3dfc01e2d5e7df882c963dd8dc4a0dfbfc96ad. This reverts commit 4da6ac819510c7cc4ba21d7a735d69b45daa5873. This reverts commit d064bd7eef201f26cb926450a76260b5187ac689. This reverts commit 9bc86cfd6f9387f0da9d5c0102b6aa5627e91c91. This reverts commit ab9a05a10f16b33f7ee1e9da360c7801eebdb9d2. Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf')
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c293
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c46
-rw-r--r--Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c265
3 files changed, 0 insertions, 604 deletions
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 00b95b5a..00000000
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,293 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <openssl/hmac.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-
-#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
-
-static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
-
-static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len);
-
-static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
-
-typedef struct {
- const EVP_MD *md;
- unsigned char *salt;
- size_t salt_len;
- unsigned char *key;
- size_t key_len;
- unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
- size_t info_len;
-} HKDF_PKEY_CTX;
-
-static int pkey_hkdf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
-
- kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
- if (kctx == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- ctx->data = kctx;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void pkey_hkdf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->info, kctx->info_len);
- OPENSSL_free(kctx);
-}
-
-static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
-{
- HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-
- switch (type) {
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_MD:
- if (p2 == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- kctx->md = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT:
- if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (p1 < 0)
- return 0;
-
- if (kctx->salt != NULL)
- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
-
- kctx->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
- if (kctx->salt == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- kctx->salt_len = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY:
- if (p1 < 0)
- return 0;
-
- if (kctx->key != NULL)
- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->key, kctx->key_len);
-
- kctx->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
- if (kctx->key == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- kctx->key_len = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO:
- if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
- return 1;
-
- if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(HKDF_MAXBUF - kctx->info_len))
- return 0;
-
- memcpy(kctx->info + kctx->info_len, p2, p1);
- kctx->info_len += p1;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
-
- }
-}
-
-static int pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
- const char *value)
-{
- if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md(ctx, EVP_get_digestbyname(value));
-
- if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_SALT, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_KEY, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value);
-
- if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_HKDF_INFO, value);
-
- return -2;
-}
-
-static int pkey_hkdf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
- size_t *keylen)
-{
- HKDF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-
- if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->key == NULL)
- return 0;
-
- if (HKDF(kctx->md, kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len, kctx->key, kctx->key_len,
- kctx->info, kctx->info_len, key, *keylen) == NULL)
- {
- return 0;
- }
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hkdf_pkey_meth = {
- EVP_PKEY_HKDF,
- 0,
- pkey_hkdf_init,
- 0,
- pkey_hkdf_cleanup,
-
- 0, 0,
- 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- 0,
-
- 0,
- 0,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_hkdf_derive,
- pkey_hkdf_ctrl,
- pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str
-};
-
-static unsigned char *HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
-{
- unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t prk_len;
-
- if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &prk_len))
- return NULL;
-
- return HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
-}
-
-static unsigned char *HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
- const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
- unsigned char *prk, size_t *prk_len)
-{
- unsigned int tmp_len;
-
- if (!HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, &tmp_len))
- return NULL;
-
- *prk_len = tmp_len;
- return prk;
-}
-
-static unsigned char *HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
- const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
- const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
- unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
-{
- HMAC_CTX *hmac;
-
- unsigned int i;
-
- unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
-
- size_t done_len = 0, dig_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
-
- size_t n = okm_len / dig_len;
- if (okm_len % dig_len)
- n++;
-
- if (n > 255)
- return NULL;
-
- if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return NULL;
-
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
- size_t copy_len;
- const unsigned char ctr = i;
-
- if (i > 1) {
- if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
- goto err;
- }
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
- goto err;
-
- if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
- goto err;
-
- if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
- goto err;
-
- copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
- okm_len - done_len :
- dig_len;
-
- memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
-
- done_len += copy_len;
- }
-
- HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
- return okm;
-
- err:
- HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
- return NULL;
-}
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
deleted file mode 100644
index d7d71b35..00000000
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <openssl/err.h>
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-
-/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-
-# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,func,0)
-# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF,0,reason)
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
- {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR), "pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str"},
- {ERR_FUNC(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE), "pkey_tls1_prf_derive"},
- {0, NULL}
-};
-
-static ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = {
- {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
- {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER), "missing parameter"},
- {ERR_REASON(KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
- {0, NULL}
-};
-
-#endif
-
-int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void)
-{
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-
- if (ERR_func_error_string(KDF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
- ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_functs);
- ERR_load_strings(0, KDF_str_reasons);
- }
-#endif
- return 1;
-}
diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
deleted file mode 100644
index fa13732b..00000000
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/kdf.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#include "internal/evp_int.h"
-
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
- const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
- const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
- unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
-
-#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
-
-/* TLS KDF pkey context structure */
-
-typedef struct {
- /* Digest to use for PRF */
- const EVP_MD *md;
- /* Secret value to use for PRF */
- unsigned char *sec;
- size_t seclen;
- /* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
- unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
- size_t seedlen;
-} TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX;
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
-
- kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
- if (kctx == NULL)
- return 0;
- ctx->data = kctx;
-
- return 1;
-}
-
-static void pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-{
- TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
- OPENSSL_free(kctx);
-}
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
-{
- TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
- switch (type) {
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_MD:
- kctx->md = p2;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET:
- if (p1 < 0)
- return 0;
- if (kctx->sec != NULL)
- OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->sec, kctx->seclen);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen);
- kctx->seedlen = 0;
- kctx->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p2, p1);
- if (kctx->sec == NULL)
- return 0;
- kctx->seclen = p1;
- return 1;
-
- case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED:
- if (p1 == 0 || p2 == NULL)
- return 1;
- if (p1 < 0 || p1 > (int)(TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - kctx->seedlen))
- return 0;
- memcpy(kctx->seed + kctx->seedlen, p2, p1);
- kctx->seedlen += p1;
- return 1;
-
- default:
- return -2;
-
- }
-}
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
- const char *type, const char *value)
-{
- if (value == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
- return 0;
- }
- if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) {
- TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
-
- const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value);
- if (md == NULL) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
- return 0;
- }
- kctx->md = md;
- return 1;
- }
- if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
- if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SECRET, value);
- if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
- if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
- return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_TLS_SEED, value);
- return -2;
-}
-
-static int pkey_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
- size_t *keylen)
-{
- TLS1_PRF_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
- if (kctx->md == NULL || kctx->sec == NULL || kctx->seedlen == 0) {
- KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER);
- return 0;
- }
- return tls1_prf_alg(kctx->md, kctx->sec, kctx->seclen,
- kctx->seed, kctx->seedlen,
- key, *keylen);
-}
-
-const EVP_PKEY_METHOD tls1_prf_pkey_meth = {
- EVP_PKEY_TLS1_PRF,
- 0,
- pkey_tls1_prf_init,
- 0,
- pkey_tls1_prf_cleanup,
-
- 0, 0,
- 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- 0,
-
- 0,
- 0,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0, 0,
-
- 0,
- pkey_tls1_prf_derive,
- pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl,
- pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str
-};
-
-static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
- const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
- const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
- unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
-{
- int chunk;
- EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_tmp = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
- EVP_PKEY *mac_key = NULL;
- unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
- size_t A1_len;
- int ret = 0;
-
- chunk = EVP_MD_size(md);
- OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0);
-
- ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- ctx_tmp = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
- if (ctx == NULL || ctx_tmp == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
- goto err;
- EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(ctx_init, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
- mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len);
- if (mac_key == NULL)
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx_init, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
- goto err;
- if (seed != NULL && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
-
- for (;;) {
- /* Reinit mac contexts */
- if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init))
- goto err;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, A1, A1_len))
- goto err;
- if (olen > (size_t)chunk && !EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx_tmp, ctx))
- goto err;
- if (seed && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, seed, seed_len))
- goto err;
-
- if (olen > (size_t)chunk) {
- size_t mac_len;
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, out, &mac_len))
- goto err;
- out += mac_len;
- olen -= mac_len;
- /* calc the next A1 value */
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
- } else { /* last one */
-
- if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, A1, &A1_len))
- goto err;
- memcpy(out, A1, olen);
- break;
- }
- }
- ret = 1;
- err:
- EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_tmp);
- EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1));
- return ret;
-}
-
-static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
- const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
- const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
- unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
-{
-
- if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
- size_t i;
- unsigned char *tmp;
- if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
- seed, seed_len, out, olen))
- return 0;
-
- tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen);
- if (tmp == NULL)
- return 0;
- if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen/2, slen/2 + (slen & 1),
- seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
- OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
- return 0;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
- out[i] ^= tmp[i];
- OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
- return 1;
- }
- if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
- return 0;
-
- return 1;
-}