Revert lots of Cryptlib updates.

OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys
I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker.

Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed
but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test
data to match the bug.

So that's pretty broken.

For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in
the wild to work.

This reverts commit 513cbe2aea689bf968f171f894f3d4cdb43524d5.
This reverts commit e9cc33d6f2b7f35c6f5e349fd83fb9ae0bc66226.
This reverts commit 80d49f758ead0180bfe6161931838e0578248303.
This reverts commit 9bc647e2b23bcfd69a0077c0717fbc454c919a57.
This reverts commit ae75df6232ad30f3e8736e9449692d58a7439260.
This reverts commit e883479f35644d17db7efed710657c8543cfcb68.
This reverts commit 97469449fda5ba933a64280917e776487301a127.
This reverts commit e39692647f78e13d757ddbfdd36f440d5f526050.
This reverts commit 0f3dfc01e2d5e7df882c963dd8dc4a0dfbfc96ad.
This reverts commit 4da6ac819510c7cc4ba21d7a735d69b45daa5873.
This reverts commit d064bd7eef201f26cb926450a76260b5187ac689.
This reverts commit 9bc86cfd6f9387f0da9d5c0102b6aa5627e91c91.
This reverts commit ab9a05a10f16b33f7ee1e9da360c7801eebdb9d2.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 127 insertions, 88 deletions

diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index 01056356..49c71b91 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -1,29 +1,77 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+/* crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c */
+/* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * This package is an SSL implementation written
+ * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
+ * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
+ *
+ * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
+ * the following conditions are aheared to.  The following conditions
+ * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
+ * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code.  The SSL documentation
+ * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
+ * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
+ * the code are not to be removed.
+ * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
+ * as the author of the parts of the library used.
+ * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
+ * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software
+ *    must display the following acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes cryptographic software written by
+ *     Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *    The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
+ *    being used are not cryptographic related :-).
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ *    the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
+ *    "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
  *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
+ * derivative of this code cannot be changed.  i.e. this code cannot simply be
+ * copied and put under another distribution licence
+ * [including the GNU Public Licence.]
  */
 
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <ctype.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/asn1.h>
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
-#include "internal/x509_int.h"
 
 int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
     int i;
-    const X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
+    X509_CINF *ai, *bi;
 
-    ai = &a->cert_info;
-    bi = &b->cert_info;
-    i = ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(&ai->serialNumber, &bi->serialNumber);
+    ai = a->cert_info;
+    bi = b->cert_info;
+    i = M_ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(ai->serialNumber, bi->serialNumber);
     if (i)
         return (i);
     return (X509_NAME_cmp(ai->issuer, bi->issuer));
@@ -33,97 +81,94 @@ int X509_issuer_and_serial_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
 {
     unsigned long ret = 0;
-    EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    EVP_MD_CTX ctx;
     unsigned char md[16];
     char *f;
 
-    if (ctx == NULL)
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
+    f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
         goto err;
-    f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info.issuer, NULL, 0);
-    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
-        goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
         goto err;
     OPENSSL_free(f);
     if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
-        (ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info.serialNumber.data,
-         (unsigned long)a->cert_info.serialNumber.length))
+        (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+         (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
         goto err;
-    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
         goto err;
     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
         ) & 0xffffffffL;
  err:
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
     return (ret);
 }
 #endif
 
 int X509_issuer_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.issuer, b->cert_info.issuer));
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->issuer, b->cert_info->issuer));
 }
 
 int X509_subject_name_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info.subject, b->cert_info.subject));
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->cert_info->subject, b->cert_info->subject));
 }
 
 int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl.issuer, b->crl.issuer));
+    return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
 {
     return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
 }
+#endif
 
-X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(const X509 *a)
+X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
 {
-    return (a->cert_info.issuer);
+    return (a->cert_info->issuer);
 }
 
 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.issuer));
+    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.issuer));
+    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
 }
 #endif
 
-X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(const X509 *a)
+X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
 {
-    return (a->cert_info.subject);
+    return (a->cert_info->subject);
 }
 
 ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get_serialNumber(X509 *a)
 {
-    return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
-}
-
-const ASN1_INTEGER *X509_get0_serialNumber(const X509 *a)
-{
-    return &a->cert_info.serialNumber;
+    return (a->cert_info->serialNumber);
 }
 
 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info.subject));
+    return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
 unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
 {
-    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info.subject));
+    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
 }
 #endif
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 /*
  * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
  * Although "cmp" operations are generally prototyped to take "const"
@@ -143,16 +188,16 @@ int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
     if (rv)
         return rv;
     /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
-    if (!a->cert_info.enc.modified && !b->cert_info.enc.modified) {
-        if (a->cert_info.enc.len < b->cert_info.enc.len)
-            return -1;
-        if (a->cert_info.enc.len > b->cert_info.enc.len)
-            return 1;
-        return memcmp(a->cert_info.enc.enc, b->cert_info.enc.enc,
-                      a->cert_info.enc.len);
+    if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
+        rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+        if (rv)
+            return rv;
+        return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+                      a->cert_info->enc.len);
     }
     return rv;
 }
+#endif
 
 int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
 {
@@ -206,23 +251,21 @@ unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
 
 unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
 {
-    EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
     unsigned long ret = 0;
     unsigned char md[16];
 
-    if (md_ctx == NULL)
-        return ret;
-
     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
-    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
-        && EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
-        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL))
+    EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
+    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+        && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
         ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
                ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
             ) & 0xffffffffL;
-    EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
 
     return (ret);
 }
@@ -233,13 +276,15 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name,
                                      ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
 {
     int i;
+    X509_CINF cinf;
     X509 x, *x509 = NULL;
 
     if (!sk)
         return NULL;
 
-    x.cert_info.serialNumber = *serial;
-    x.cert_info.issuer = name;
+    x.cert_info = &cinf;
+    cinf.serialNumber = serial;
+    cinf.issuer = name;
 
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) {
         x509 = sk_X509_value(sk, i);
@@ -262,26 +307,26 @@ X509 *X509_find_by_subject(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509_NAME *name)
     return (NULL);
 }
 
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get0_pubkey(const X509 *x)
+EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
 {
-    if (x == NULL)
-        return NULL;
-    return X509_PUBKEY_get0(x->cert_info.key);
+    if ((x == NULL) || (x->cert_info == NULL))
+        return (NULL);
+    return (X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info->key));
 }
 
-EVP_PKEY *X509_get_pubkey(X509 *x)
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
 {
-    if (x == NULL)
+    if (!x)
         return NULL;
-    return X509_PUBKEY_get(x->cert_info.key);
+    return x->cert_info->key->public_key;
 }
 
-int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
+int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
 {
-    const EVP_PKEY *xk;
+    EVP_PKEY *xk;
     int ret;
 
-    xk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+    xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
 
     if (xk)
         ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
@@ -300,6 +345,8 @@ int X509_check_private_key(const X509 *x, const EVP_PKEY *k)
     case -2:
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
     }
+    if (xk)
+        EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
     if (ret > 0)
         return 1;
     return 0;
@@ -317,8 +364,8 @@ static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
 {
     const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
     int curve_nid;
-    if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC)
-        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey));
+    if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
     if (!grp)
         return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
     curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
@@ -348,12 +395,11 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
                             unsigned long flags)
 {
     int rv, i, sign_nid;
-    EVP_PKEY *pk;
-    unsigned long tflags = flags;
-
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+    unsigned long tflags;
     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
         return X509_V_OK;
-
+    tflags = flags;
     /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
     if (x == NULL) {
         x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
@@ -361,17 +407,6 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
     } else
         i = 0;
 
-    pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
-
-    /*
-     * With DANE-EE(3) success, or DANE-EE(3)/PKIX-EE(1) failure we don't build
-     * a chain all, just report trust success or failure, but must also report
-     * Suite-B errors if applicable.  This is indicated via a NULL chain
-     * pointer.  All we need to do is check the leaf key algorithm.
-     */
-    if (chain == NULL)
-        return check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
-
     if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
         rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
         /* Correct error depth */
@@ -379,6 +414,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
         goto end;
     }
 
+    pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
     /* Check EE key only */
     rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
@@ -393,7 +429,8 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
             goto end;
         }
-        pk = X509_get0_pubkey(x);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+        pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
         rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
         if (rv != X509_V_OK)
             goto end;
@@ -402,6 +439,8 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
     /* Final check: root CA signature */
     rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
  end:
+    if (pk)
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
     if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
         /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
         if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
@@ -409,7 +448,7 @@ int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
             i--;
         /*
          * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
-         * with P-256. Use more meaningful error.
+         * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
          */
         if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
             rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
@@ -424,7 +463,7 @@ int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
     int sign_nid;
     if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
         return X509_V_OK;
-    sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl.sig_alg.algorithm);
+    sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
     return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
 }
 
@@ -453,7 +492,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
     ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
         X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
-        X509_up_ref(x);
+        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
     }
     return ret;
 }