Update openssl to 1.0.2d

Also update Cryptlib to edk2 r17731

Signed-off-by: Gary Ching-Pang Lin <glin@suse.com>

1 files changed, 240 insertions, 167 deletions

diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
index de66d378..49c71b91 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c
@@ -87,16 +87,21 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_and_serial_hash(X509 *a)
 
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx);
     f = X509_NAME_oneline(a->cert_info->issuer, NULL, 0);
-    ret = strlen(f);
-    EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, ret);
+    if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)f, strlen(f)))
+        goto err;
     OPENSSL_free(f);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
-                     (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length);
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL);
+    if (!EVP_DigestUpdate
+        (&ctx, (unsigned char *)a->cert_info->serialNumber->data,
+         (unsigned long)a->cert_info->serialNumber->length))
+        goto err;
+    if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, &(md[0]), NULL))
+        goto err;
     ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
            ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
         ) & 0xffffffffL;
+ err:
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
     return (ret);
 }
@@ -117,6 +122,13 @@ int X509_CRL_cmp(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
     return (X509_NAME_cmp(a->crl->issuer, b->crl->issuer));
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
+int X509_CRL_match(const X509_CRL *a, const X509_CRL *b)
+{
+    return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, 20);
+}
+#endif
+
 X509_NAME *X509_get_issuer_name(X509 *a)
 {
     return (a->cert_info->issuer);
@@ -127,6 +139,13 @@ unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash(X509 *x)
     return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->issuer));
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_issuer_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->issuer));
+}
+#endif
+
 X509_NAME *X509_get_subject_name(X509 *a)
 {
     return (a->cert_info->subject);
@@ -142,6 +161,13 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
     return (X509_NAME_hash(x->cert_info->subject));
 }
 
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
+unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash_old(X509 *x)
+{
+    return (X509_NAME_hash_old(x->cert_info->subject));
+}
+#endif
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA
 /*
  * Compare two certificates: they must be identical for this to work. NB:
@@ -153,161 +179,68 @@ unsigned long X509_subject_name_hash(X509 *x)
  */
 int X509_cmp(const X509 *a, const X509 *b)
 {
+    int rv;
     /* ensure hash is valid */
     X509_check_purpose((X509 *)a, -1, 0);
     X509_check_purpose((X509 *)b, -1, 0);
 
-    return memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    rv = memcmp(a->sha1_hash, b->sha1_hash, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+    if (rv)
+        return rv;
+    /* Check for match against stored encoding too */
+    if (!a->cert_info->enc.modified && !b->cert_info->enc.modified) {
+        rv = (int)(a->cert_info->enc.len - b->cert_info->enc.len);
+        if (rv)
+            return rv;
+        return memcmp(a->cert_info->enc.enc, b->cert_info->enc.enc,
+                      a->cert_info->enc.len);
+    }
+    return rv;
 }
 #endif
 
-/* Case insensitive string comparision */
-static int nocase_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
+int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
 {
-    int i;
+    int ret;
 
-    if (a->length != b->length)
-        return (a->length - b->length);
+    /* Ensure canonical encoding is present and up to date */
 
-    for (i = 0; i < a->length; i++) {
-        int ca, cb;
-
-        ca = tolower(a->data[i]);
-        cb = tolower(b->data[i]);
-
-        if (ca != cb)
-            return (ca - cb);
+    if (!a->canon_enc || a->modified) {
+        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, NULL);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return -2;
     }
-    return 0;
-}
 
-/*
- * Case insensitive string comparision with space normalization Space
- * normalization - ignore leading, trailing spaces, multiple spaces between
- * characters are replaced by single space
- */
-static int nocase_spacenorm_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b)
-{
-    unsigned char *pa = NULL, *pb = NULL;
-    int la, lb;
-
-    la = a->length;
-    lb = b->length;
-    pa = a->data;
-    pb = b->data;
-
-    /* skip leading spaces */
-    while (la > 0 && isspace(*pa)) {
-        la--;
-        pa++;
-    }
-    while (lb > 0 && isspace(*pb)) {
-        lb--;
-        pb++;
+    if (!b->canon_enc || b->modified) {
+        ret = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, NULL);
+        if (ret < 0)
+            return -2;
     }
 
-    /* skip trailing spaces */
-    while (la > 0 && isspace(pa[la - 1]))
-        la--;
-    while (lb > 0 && isspace(pb[lb - 1]))
-        lb--;
-
-    /* compare strings with space normalization */
-    while (la > 0 && lb > 0) {
-        int ca, cb;
-
-        /* compare character */
-        ca = tolower(*pa);
-        cb = tolower(*pb);
-        if (ca != cb)
-            return (ca - cb);
-
-        pa++;
-        pb++;
-        la--;
-        lb--;
-
-        if (la <= 0 || lb <= 0)
-            break;
-
-        /* is white space next character ? */
-        if (isspace(*pa) && isspace(*pb)) {
-            /* skip remaining white spaces */
-            while (la > 0 && isspace(*pa)) {
-                la--;
-                pa++;
-            }
-            while (lb > 0 && isspace(*pb)) {
-                lb--;
-                pb++;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    if (la > 0 || lb > 0)
-        return la - lb;
+    ret = a->canon_enclen - b->canon_enclen;
 
-    return 0;
-}
+    if (ret)
+        return ret;
 
-static int asn1_string_memcmp(ASN1_STRING *a, ASN1_STRING *b)
-{
-    int j;
-    j = a->length - b->length;
-    if (j)
-        return j;
-    return memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length);
-}
+    return memcmp(a->canon_enc, b->canon_enc, a->canon_enclen);
 
-#define STR_TYPE_CMP (B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING|B_ASN1_T61STRING|B_ASN1_UTF8STRING)
+}
 
-int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
 {
-    int i, j;
-    X509_NAME_ENTRY *na, *nb;
-
-    unsigned long nabit, nbbit;
-
-    j = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries)
-        - sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(b->entries);
-    if (j)
-        return j;
-    for (i = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-        na = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
-        nb = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(b->entries, i);
-        j = na->value->type - nb->value->type;
-        if (j) {
-            nabit = ASN1_tag2bit(na->value->type);
-            nbbit = ASN1_tag2bit(nb->value->type);
-            if (!(nabit & STR_TYPE_CMP) || !(nbbit & STR_TYPE_CMP))
-                return j;
-            if (!asn1_string_memcmp(na->value, nb->value))
-                j = 0;
-        } else if (na->value->type == V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
-            j = nocase_spacenorm_cmp(na->value, nb->value);
-        else if (na->value->type == V_ASN1_IA5STRING
-                 && OBJ_obj2nid(na->object) == NID_pkcs9_emailAddress)
-            j = nocase_cmp(na->value, nb->value);
-        else
-            j = asn1_string_memcmp(na->value, nb->value);
-        if (j)
-            return (j);
-        j = na->set - nb->set;
-        if (j)
-            return (j);
-    }
+    unsigned long ret = 0;
+    unsigned char md[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
 
-    /*
-     * We will check the object types after checking the values since the
-     * values will more often be different than the object types.
-     */
-    for (i = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-        na = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i);
-        nb = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(b->entries, i);
-        j = OBJ_cmp(na->object, nb->object);
-        if (j)
-            return (j);
-    }
-    return (0);
+    /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
+    i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
+    if (!EVP_Digest(x->canon_enc, x->canon_enclen, md, NULL, EVP_sha1(),
+                    NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+        ) & 0xffffffffL;
+    return (ret);
 }
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5
@@ -315,24 +248,25 @@ int X509_NAME_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
  * I now DER encode the name and hash it.  Since I cache the DER encoding,
  * this is reasonably efficient.
  */
-unsigned long X509_NAME_hash(X509_NAME *x)
+
+unsigned long X509_NAME_hash_old(X509_NAME *x)
 {
+    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
     unsigned long ret = 0;
     unsigned char md[16];
-    EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
 
     /* Make sure X509_NAME structure contains valid cached encoding */
     i2d_X509_NAME(x, NULL);
     EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx);
     EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW);
-    EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL);
-    EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length);
-    EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL);
+    if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_md5(), NULL)
+        && EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, x->bytes->data, x->bytes->length)
+        && EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, md, NULL))
+        ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
+               ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
+            ) & 0xffffffffL;
     EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx);
 
-    ret = (((unsigned long)md[0]) | ((unsigned long)md[1] << 8L) |
-           ((unsigned long)md[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)md[3] << 24L)
-        ) & 0xffffffffL;
     return (ret);
 }
 #endif
@@ -389,13 +323,18 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *X509_get0_pubkey_bitstr(const X509 *x)
 
 int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
 {
-    EVP_PKEY *xk = NULL;
-    int ok = 0;
+    EVP_PKEY *xk;
+    int ret;
 
     xk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
-    switch (EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k)) {
+
+    if (xk)
+        ret = EVP_PKEY_cmp(xk, k);
+    else
+        ret = -2;
+
+    switch (ret) {
     case 1:
-        ok = 1;
         break;
     case 0:
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_VALUES_MISMATCH);
@@ -404,22 +343,156 @@ int X509_check_private_key(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *k)
         X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH);
         break;
     case -2:
+        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+    }
+    if (xk)
+        EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
+    if (ret > 0)
+        return 1;
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Check a suite B algorithm is permitted: pass in a public key and the NID
+ * of its signature (or 0 if no signature). The pflags is a pointer to a
+ * flags field which must contain the suite B verification flags.
+ */
+
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
-        if (k->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
-            X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
-            break;
-        }
-#endif
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
-        if (k->type == EVP_PKEY_DH) {
-            /* No idea */
-            X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_CANT_CHECK_DH_KEY);
-            break;
+
+static int check_suite_b(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int sign_nid, unsigned long *pflags)
+{
+    const EC_GROUP *grp = NULL;
+    int curve_nid;
+    if (pkey && pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+        grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(pkey->pkey.ec);
+    if (!grp)
+        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM;
+    curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp);
+    /* Check curve is consistent with LOS */
+    if (curve_nid == NID_secp384r1) { /* P-384 */
+        /*
+         * Check signature algorithm is consistent with curve.
+         */
+        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA384)
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS))
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+        /* If we encounter P-384 we cannot use P-256 later */
+        *pflags &= ~X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+    } else if (curve_nid == NID_X9_62_prime256v1) { /* P-256 */
+        if (sign_nid != -1 && sign_nid != NID_ecdsa_with_SHA256)
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM;
+        if (!(*pflags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY))
+            return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED;
+    } else
+        return X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE;
+
+    return X509_V_OK;
+}
+
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                            unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int rv, i, sign_nid;
+    EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+    unsigned long tflags;
+    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+        return X509_V_OK;
+    tflags = flags;
+    /* If no EE certificate passed in must be first in chain */
+    if (x == NULL) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, 0);
+        i = 1;
+    } else
+        i = 0;
+
+    if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+        rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+        /* Correct error depth */
+        i = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+    /* Check EE key only */
+    rv = check_suite_b(pk, -1, &tflags);
+    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+        /* Correct error depth */
+        i = 0;
+        goto end;
+    }
+    for (; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+        sign_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(x);
+        x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+        if (X509_get_version(x) != 2) {
+            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION;
+            goto end;
         }
-#endif
-        X509err(X509_F_X509_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, X509_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_TYPE);
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+        pk = X509_get_pubkey(x);
+        rv = check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &tflags);
+        if (rv != X509_V_OK)
+            goto end;
     }
 
-    EVP_PKEY_free(xk);
-    return (ok);
+    /* Final check: root CA signature */
+    rv = check_suite_b(pk, X509_get_signature_nid(x), &tflags);
+ end:
+    if (pk)
+        EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+    if (rv != X509_V_OK) {
+        /* Invalid signature or LOS errors are for previous cert */
+        if ((rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM
+             || rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED) && i)
+            i--;
+        /*
+         * If we have LOS error and flags changed then we are signing P-384
+         * with P-256. Use more meaninggul error.
+         */
+        if (rv == X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED && flags != tflags)
+            rv = X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256;
+        if (perror_depth)
+            *perror_depth = i;
+    }
+    return rv;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    int sign_nid;
+    if (!(flags & X509_V_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS))
+        return X509_V_OK;
+    sign_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(crl->crl->sig_alg->algorithm);
+    return check_suite_b(pk, sign_nid, &flags);
+}
+
+#else
+int X509_chain_check_suiteb(int *perror_depth, X509 *x, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                            unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+int X509_CRL_check_suiteb(X509_CRL *crl, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned long flags)
+{
+    return 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+/*
+ * Not strictly speaking an "up_ref" as a STACK doesn't have a reference
+ * count but it has the same effect by duping the STACK and upping the ref of
+ * each X509 structure.
+ */
+STACK_OF(X509) *X509_chain_up_ref(STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+    STACK_OF(X509) *ret;
+    int i;
+    ret = sk_X509_dup(chain);
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ret); i++) {
+        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ret, i);
+        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+    }
+    return ret;
 }