Revert lots of Cryptlib updates.

OpenSSL changes quite a bit of the key validation, and most of the keys
I can find in the wild aren't marked as trusted by the new checker.

Intel noticed this too: https://github.com/vathpela/edk2/commit/f536d7c3ed
but instead of fixing the compatibility error, they switched their test
data to match the bug.

So that's pretty broken.

For now, I'm reverting OpenSSL 1.1.0e, because we need those certs in
the wild to work.

This reverts commit 513cbe2aea689bf968f171f894f3d4cdb43524d5.
This reverts commit e9cc33d6f2b7f35c6f5e349fd83fb9ae0bc66226.
This reverts commit 80d49f758ead0180bfe6161931838e0578248303.
This reverts commit 9bc647e2b23bcfd69a0077c0717fbc454c919a57.
This reverts commit ae75df6232ad30f3e8736e9449692d58a7439260.
This reverts commit e883479f35644d17db7efed710657c8543cfcb68.
This reverts commit 97469449fda5ba933a64280917e776487301a127.
This reverts commit e39692647f78e13d757ddbfdd36f440d5f526050.
This reverts commit 0f3dfc01e2d5e7df882c963dd8dc4a0dfbfc96ad.
This reverts commit 4da6ac819510c7cc4ba21d7a735d69b45daa5873.
This reverts commit d064bd7eef201f26cb926450a76260b5187ac689.
This reverts commit 9bc86cfd6f9387f0da9d5c0102b6aa5627e91c91.
This reverts commit ab9a05a10f16b33f7ee1e9da360c7801eebdb9d2.

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>

1 files changed, 371 insertions, 236 deletions

diff --git a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
index 9f9246be..09b8691c 100644
--- a/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
+++ b/Cryptlib/OpenSSL/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c
@@ -1,13 +1,63 @@
+/* pcy_tree.c */
 /*
- * Copyright 2004-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Written by Dr Stephen N Henson (steve@openssl.org) for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2004.
+ */
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
  *
- * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
  */
 
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "cryptlib.h"
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
 #include <openssl/x509v3.h>
 
@@ -48,26 +98,22 @@ static void expected_print(BIO *err, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lev,
 static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
                        X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
 {
-    BIO *err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *plev;
-
-    if (err == NULL)
-        return;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
+    int i;
+    BIO *err;
+    err = BIO_new_fp(stderr, BIO_NOCLOSE);
     if (!curr)
         curr = tree->levels + tree->nlevel;
     else
         curr++;
-
     BIO_printf(err, "Level print after %s\n", str);
     BIO_printf(err, "Printing Up to Level %ld\n", curr - tree->levels);
     for (plev = tree->levels; plev != curr; plev++) {
-        int i;
-
         BIO_printf(err, "Level %ld, flags = %x\n",
-                   (long)(plev - tree->levels), plev->flags);
+                   plev - tree->levels, plev->flags);
         for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(plev->nodes); i++) {
-            X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
-
+            node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(plev->nodes, i);
             X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, node, 2);
             expected_print(err, plev, node, 2);
             BIO_printf(err, "  Flags: %x\n", node->data->flags);
@@ -75,17 +121,26 @@ static void tree_print(char *str, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
         if (plev->anyPolicy)
             X509_POLICY_NODE_print(err, plev->anyPolicy, 2);
     }
+
     BIO_free(err);
+
 }
+#else
+
+# define tree_print(a,b,c)      /* */
+
 #endif
 
 /*-
- * Return value: <= 0 on error, or positive bit mask:
- *
- * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
- * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree (including bare TA case)
- * X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT: explicit policy required
+ * Initialize policy tree. Return values:
+ *  0 Some internal error occurred.
+ * -1 Inconsistent or invalid extensions in certificates.
+ *  1 Tree initialized OK.
+ *  2 Policy tree is empty.
+ *  5 Tree OK and requireExplicitPolicy true.
+ *  6 Tree empty and requireExplicitPolicy true.
  */
+
 static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                      unsigned int flags)
 {
@@ -93,112 +148,114 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level;
     const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache;
     X509_POLICY_DATA *data = NULL;
-    int ret = X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
-    int n = sk_X509_num(certs) - 1; /* RFC5280 paths omit the TA */
-    int explicit_policy = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY) ? 0 : n+1;
-    int any_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) ? 0 : n+1;
-    int map_skip = (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP) ? 0 : n+1;
-    int i;
-
+    X509 *x;
+    int ret = 1;
+    int i, n;
+    int explicit_policy;
+    int any_skip;
+    int map_skip;
     *ptree = NULL;
+    n = sk_X509_num(certs);
 
-    /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
-    if (n == 0)
-        return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+#if 0
+    /* Disable policy mapping for now... */
+    flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
+#endif
 
-    /*
-     * First setup the policy cache in all n non-TA certificates, this will be
-     * used in X509_verify_cert() which will invoke the verify callback for all
-     * certificates with invalid policy extensions.
-     */
-    for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXPLICIT_POLICY)
+        explicit_policy = 0;
+    else
+        explicit_policy = n + 1;
 
-        /* Call for side-effect of computing hash and caching extensions */
-        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0);
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
+        any_skip = 0;
+    else
+        any_skip = n + 1;
 
-        /* If cache is NULL, likely ENOMEM: return immediately */
-        if (policy_cache_set(x) == NULL)
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
-    }
+    if (flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP)
+        map_skip = 0;
+    else
+        map_skip = n + 1;
 
+    /* Can't do anything with just a trust anchor */
+    if (n == 1)
+        return 1;
     /*
-     * At this point check for invalid policies and required explicit policy.
-     * Note that the explicit_policy counter is a count-down to zero, with the
-     * requirement kicking in if and once it does that.  The counter is
-     * decremented for every non-self-issued certificate in the path, but may
-     * be further reduced by policy constraints in a non-leaf certificate.
-     *
-     * The ultimate policy set is the intersection of all the policies along
-     * the path, if we hit a certificate with an empty policy set, and explicit
-     * policy is required we're done.
+     * First setup policy cache in all certificates apart from the trust
+     * anchor. Note any bad cache results on the way. Also can calculate
+     * explicit_policy value at this point.
      */
-    for (i = n - 1;
-         i >= 0 && (explicit_policy > 0 || (ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) == 0);
-         i--) {
-        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
-        uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
-
-        /* All the policies are already cached, we can return early */
-        if (ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID;
-
-        /* Access the cache which we now know exists */
+    for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        X509_check_purpose(x, -1, -1);
         cache = policy_cache_set(x);
-
-        if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) && cache->data == NULL)
-            ret = X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
+        /* If cache NULL something bad happened: return immediately */
+        if (cache == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        /*
+         * If inconsistent extensions keep a note of it but continue
+         */
+        if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)
+            ret = -1;
+        /*
+         * Otherwise if we have no data (hence no CertificatePolicies) and
+         * haven't already set an inconsistent code note it.
+         */
+        else if ((ret == 1) && !cache->data)
+            ret = 2;
         if (explicit_policy > 0) {
-            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
                 explicit_policy--;
-            if ((cache->explicit_skip >= 0)
+            if ((cache->explicit_skip != -1)
                 && (cache->explicit_skip < explicit_policy))
                 explicit_policy = cache->explicit_skip;
         }
     }
 
-    if (explicit_policy == 0)
-        ret |= X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT;
-    if ((ret & X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) == 0)
+    if (ret != 1) {
+        if (ret == 2 && !explicit_policy)
+            return 6;
         return ret;
+    }
 
     /* If we get this far initialize the tree */
-    if ((tree = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree))) == NULL)
-        return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
 
-    /*
-     * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3.
-     *
-     * The top level is implicitly for the trust anchor with valid expected
-     * policies of anyPolicy.  (RFC 5280 has the TA at depth 0 and the leaf at
-     * depth n, we have the leaf at depth 0 and the TA at depth n).
-     */
-    if ((tree->levels = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*tree->levels)*(n+1))) == NULL) {
+    tree = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_TREE));
+
+    if (!tree)
+        return 0;
+
+    tree->flags = 0;
+    tree->levels = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL) * n);
+    tree->nlevel = 0;
+    tree->extra_data = NULL;
+    tree->auth_policies = NULL;
+    tree->user_policies = NULL;
+
+    if (!tree->levels) {
         OPENSSL_free(tree);
-        return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+        return 0;
     }
-    tree->nlevel = n+1;
+
+    memset(tree->levels, 0, n * sizeof(X509_POLICY_LEVEL));
+
+    tree->nlevel = n;
+
     level = tree->levels;
-    if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL)
-        goto bad_tree;
-    if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) {
-        policy_data_free(data);
-        goto bad_tree;
-    }
 
-    /*
-     * In this pass initialize all the tree levels and whether anyPolicy and
-     * policy mapping are inhibited at each level.
-     */
-    for (i = n - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
-        X509 *x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
-        uint32_t ex_flags = X509_get_extension_flags(x);
+    /* Root data: initialize to anyPolicy */
 
-        /* Access the cache which we now know exists */
-        cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+    data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0);
 
-        X509_up_ref(x);
-        (++level)->cert = x;
+    if (!data || !level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree))
+        goto bad_tree;
+
+    for (i = n - 2; i >= 0; i--) {
+        level++;
+        x = sk_X509_value(certs, i);
+        cache = policy_cache_set(x);
+        CRYPTO_add(&x->references, 1, CRYPTO_LOCK_X509);
+        level->cert = x;
 
         if (!cache->anyPolicy)
             level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
@@ -206,57 +263,63 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
         /* Determine inhibit any and inhibit map flags */
         if (any_skip == 0) {
             /*
-             * Any matching allowed only if certificate is self issued and not
-             * the last in the chain.
+             * Any matching allowed if certificate is self issued and not the
+             * last in the chain.
              */
-            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) || (i == 0))
                 level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY;
         } else {
-            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
                 any_skip--;
-            if ((cache->any_skip >= 0) && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
+            if ((cache->any_skip >= 0)
+                && (cache->any_skip < any_skip))
                 any_skip = cache->any_skip;
         }
 
         if (map_skip == 0)
             level->flags |= X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_MAP;
         else {
-            if (!(ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
+            if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI))
                 map_skip--;
-            if ((cache->map_skip >= 0) && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
+            if ((cache->map_skip >= 0)
+                && (cache->map_skip < map_skip))
                 map_skip = cache->map_skip;
         }
+
     }
 
     *ptree = tree;
-    return ret;
+
+    if (explicit_policy)
+        return 1;
+    else
+        return 5;
 
  bad_tree:
+
     X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-    return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+
+    return 0;
+
 }
 
-/*
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
- */
 static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
-                                    X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
+                                    const X509_POLICY_DATA *data)
 {
     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
+    X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
     int i, matched = 0;
-
     /* Iterate through all in nodes linking matches */
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(last->nodes); i++) {
-        X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
-
+        node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i);
         if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) {
-            if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL)
+            if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL))
                 return 0;
             matched = 1;
         }
     }
     if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) {
-        if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
+        if (!level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
             return 0;
     }
     return 1;
@@ -265,17 +328,29 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
 /*
  * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(1): link any data from
  * CertificatePolicies onto matching parent or anyPolicy if no match.
- *
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
  */
+
 static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
                            const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache)
 {
     int i;
+    X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
 
     for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_num(cache->data); i++) {
-        X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
-
+        data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i);
+        /*
+         * If a node is mapped any it doesn't have a corresponding
+         * CertificatePolicies entry. However such an identical node would
+         * be created if anyPolicy matching is enabled because there would be
+         * no match with the parent valid_policy_set. So we create link
+         * because then it will have the mapping flags right and we can prune
+         * it later.
+         */
+#if 0
+        if ((data->flags & POLICY_DATA_FLAG_MAPPED_ANY)
+            && !(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY))
+            continue;
+#endif
         /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */
         if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data))
             return 0;
@@ -286,38 +361,35 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
 /*
  * This corresponds to RFC3280 6.1.3(d)(2): Create new data for any unmatched
  * policies in the parent and link to anyPolicy.
- *
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
  */
+
 static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
                               const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
                               const ASN1_OBJECT *id,
                               X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 {
     X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
-
     if (id == NULL)
         id = node->data->valid_policy;
     /*
      * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from unmatched
      * node.
      */
-    if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node))) == NULL)
-        return 0;
+    data = policy_data_new(NULL, id, node_critical(node));
 
+    if (data == NULL)
+        return 0;
     /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
     data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
     data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
-    if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) {
+    if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
         policy_data_free(data);
         return 0;
     }
+
     return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
- */
 static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
                                const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
                                X509_POLICY_NODE *node, X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
@@ -348,17 +420,19 @@ static int tree_link_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
         }
 
     }
+
     return 1;
+
 }
 
-/*
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise
- */
 static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
                          const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache,
                          X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 {
     int i;
+    /*
+     * X509_POLICY_DATA *data;
+     */
     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
     X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1;
 
@@ -367,24 +441,50 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr,
 
         if (!tree_link_unmatched(curr, cache, node, tree))
             return 0;
+
+#if 0
+
+        /*
+         * Skip any node with any children: we only want unmathced nodes.
+         * Note: need something better for policy mapping because each node
+         * may have multiple children
+         */
+        if (node->nchild)
+            continue;
+
+        /*
+         * Create a new node with qualifiers from anyPolicy and id from
+         * unmatched node.
+         */
+        data = policy_data_new(NULL, node->data->valid_policy,
+                               node_critical(node));
+
+        if (data == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */
+        data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set;
+        data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS;
+        if (!level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree)) {
+            policy_data_free(data);
+            return 0;
+        }
+#endif
+
     }
     /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */
-    if (last->anyPolicy &&
-        level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL)
-        return 0;
+    if (last->anyPolicy) {
+        if (!level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL))
+            return 0;
+    }
     return 1;
 }
 
-/*-
- * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level then
- * proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever have no
- * data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
- *
- * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
- *
- * X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
- * X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
+/*
+ * Prune the tree: delete any child mapped child data on the current level
+ * then proceed up the tree deleting any data with no children. If we ever
+ * have no data on a level we can halt because the tree will be empty.
  */
+
 static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
 {
     STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes;
@@ -423,43 +523,41 @@ static int tree_prune(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr)
         if (curr == tree->levels) {
             /* If we zapped anyPolicy at top then tree is empty */
             if (!curr->anyPolicy)
-                return X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY;
-            break;
+                return 2;
+            return 1;
         }
     }
-    return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+
+    return 1;
+
 }
 
-/*
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
- */
 static int tree_add_auth_node(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes,
                               X509_POLICY_NODE *pcy)
 {
-    if (*pnodes == NULL &&
-        (*pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new()) == NULL)
-        return 0;
-    if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
+    if (!*pnodes) {
+        *pnodes = policy_node_cmp_new();
+        if (!*pnodes)
+            return 0;
+    } else if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_find(*pnodes, pcy) != -1)
         return 1;
-    return sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy) != 0;
-}
 
-#define TREE_CALC_FAILURE 0
-#define TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE 1
-#define TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE 2
+    if (!sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_push(*pnodes, pcy))
+        return 0;
 
-/*-
- * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter is
- * used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user set.
- * If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to the
- * authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set of
- * valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes.
- *
- * Return value:
- *  TREE_CALC_FAILURE on failure,
- *  TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE on success and pnodes need not be freed,
- *  TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE on success and pnodes needs to be freed
+    return 1;
+
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the authority set based on policy tree. The 'pnodes' parameter
+ * is used as a store for the set of policy nodes used to calculate the user
+ * set. If the authority set is not anyPolicy then pnodes will just point to
+ * the authority set. If however the authority set is anyPolicy then the set
+ * of valid policies (other than anyPolicy) is store in pnodes. The return
+ * value of '2' is used in this case to indicate that pnodes should be freed.
  */
+
 static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
                                         STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) **pnodes)
 {
@@ -472,7 +570,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
     /* If last level contains anyPolicy set is anyPolicy */
     if (curr->anyPolicy) {
         if (!tree_add_auth_node(&tree->auth_policies, curr->anyPolicy))
-            return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
+            return 0;
         addnodes = pnodes;
     } else
         /* Add policies to authority set */
@@ -484,31 +582,25 @@ static int tree_calculate_authority_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
          * If no anyPolicy node on this this level it can't appear on lower
          * levels so end search.
          */
-        if ((anyptr = curr->anyPolicy) == NULL)
+        if (!(anyptr = curr->anyPolicy))
             break;
         curr++;
         for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(curr->nodes); j++) {
             node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(curr->nodes, j);
             if ((node->parent == anyptr)
-                && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node)) {
-                if (addnodes == pnodes) {
-                    sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(*pnodes);
-                    *pnodes = NULL;
-                }
-                return TREE_CALC_FAILURE;
-            }
+                && !tree_add_auth_node(addnodes, node))
+                return 0;
         }
     }
+
     if (addnodes == pnodes)
-        return TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE;
+        return 2;
 
     *pnodes = tree->auth_policies;
-    return TREE_CALC_OK_NOFREE;
+
+    return 1;
 }
 
-/*
- * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
- */
 static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
                                    STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids,
                                    STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *auth_nodes)
@@ -516,6 +608,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
     int i;
     X509_POLICY_NODE *node;
     ASN1_OBJECT *oid;
+
     X509_POLICY_NODE *anyPolicy;
     X509_POLICY_DATA *extra;
 
@@ -523,6 +616,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
      * Check if anyPolicy present in authority constrained policy set: this
      * will happen if it is a leaf node.
      */
+
     if (sk_ASN1_OBJECT_num(policy_oids) <= 0)
         return 1;
 
@@ -547,7 +641,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
              * from anyPolicy.
              */
             extra = policy_data_new(NULL, oid, node_critical(anyPolicy));
-            if (extra == NULL)
+            if (!extra)
                 return 0;
             extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set;
             extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS
@@ -563,14 +657,9 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree,
             return 0;
     }
     return 1;
+
 }
 
-/*-
- * Return value: <= 0 error, otherwise one of:
- *  X509_PCY_TREE_VALID: valid tree
- *  X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY: empty tree
- * (see tree_prune()).
- */
 static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 {
     int ret, i;
@@ -580,19 +669,19 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
     for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
         cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert);
         if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache))
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+            return 0;
 
         if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY)
             && !tree_link_any(curr, cache, tree))
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
-#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+            return 0;
         tree_print("before tree_prune()", tree, curr);
-#endif
         ret = tree_prune(tree, curr);
-        if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID)
+        if (ret != 1)
             return ret;
     }
-    return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+
+    return 1;
+
 }
 
 static void exnode_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node)
@@ -613,12 +702,17 @@ void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
     sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(tree->user_policies, exnode_free);
 
     for (i = 0, curr = tree->levels; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) {
-        X509_free(curr->cert);
-        sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
-        policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
+        if (curr->cert)
+            X509_free(curr->cert);
+        if (curr->nodes)
+            sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_pop_free(curr->nodes, policy_node_free);
+        if (curr->anyPolicy)
+            policy_node_free(curr->anyPolicy);
     }
 
-    sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
+    if (tree->extra_data)
+        sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_pop_free(tree->extra_data, policy_data_free);
+
     OPENSSL_free(tree->levels);
     OPENSSL_free(tree);
 
@@ -627,70 +721,111 @@ void X509_policy_tree_free(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree)
 /*-
  * Application policy checking function.
  * Return codes:
- *  X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE:  Failure to satisfy explicit policy
- *  X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID:  Inconsistent or invalid extensions
- *  X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL: Internal error, most likely malloc
- *  X509_PCY_TREE_VALID:    Success (null tree if empty or bare TA)
+ *  0   Internal Error.
+ *  1   Successful.
+ * -1   One or more certificates contain invalid or inconsistent extensions
+ * -2   User constrained policy set empty and requireExplicit true.
  */
+
 int X509_policy_check(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, int *pexplicit_policy,
                       STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
                       STACK_OF(ASN1_OBJECT) *policy_oids, unsigned int flags)
 {
-    int init_ret;
     int ret;
     X509_POLICY_TREE *tree = NULL;
     STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *nodes, *auth_nodes = NULL;
-
     *ptree = NULL;
+
     *pexplicit_policy = 0;
-    init_ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
+    ret = tree_init(&tree, certs, flags);
 
-    if (init_ret <= 0)
-        return init_ret;
+    switch (ret) {
 
-    if ((init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) == 0) {
-        if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
-            X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
-        }
-    } else {
+        /* Tree empty requireExplicit False: OK */
+    case 2:
+        return 1;
+
+        /* Some internal error */
+    case -1:
+        return -1;
+
+        /* Some internal error */
+    case 0:
+        return 0;
+
+        /* Tree empty requireExplicit True: Error */
+
+    case 6:
         *pexplicit_policy = 1;
-        /* Tree empty and requireExplicit True: Error */
-        if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY)
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+        return -2;
+
+        /* Tree OK requireExplicit True: OK and continue */
+    case 5:
+        *pexplicit_policy = 1;
+        break;
+
+        /* Tree OK: continue */
+
+    case 1:
+        if (!tree)
+            /*
+             * tree_init() returns success and a null tree
+             * if it's just looking at a trust anchor.
+             * I'm not sure that returning success here is
+             * correct, but I'm sure that reporting this
+             * as an internal error which our caller
+             * interprets as a malloc failure is wrong.
+             */
+            return 1;
+        break;
     }
 
+    if (!tree)
+        goto error;
     ret = tree_evaluate(tree);
-#ifdef OPENSSL_POLICY_DEBUG
+
     tree_print("tree_evaluate()", tree, NULL);
-#endif
+
     if (ret <= 0)
         goto error;
 
-    if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_EMPTY) {
+    /* Return value 2 means tree empty */
+    if (ret == 2) {
         X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-        if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT)
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
-        return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+        if (*pexplicit_policy)
+            return -2;
+        else
+            return 1;
     }
 
     /* Tree is not empty: continue */
-    if ((ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes)) == 0 ||
-        !tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
+
+    ret = tree_calculate_authority_set(tree, &auth_nodes);
+
+    if (!ret)
         goto error;
-    if (ret == TREE_CALC_OK_DOFREE)
+
+    if (!tree_calculate_user_set(tree, policy_oids, auth_nodes))
+        goto error;
+
+    if (ret == 2)
         sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_free(auth_nodes);
 
-    *ptree = tree;
+    if (tree)
+        *ptree = tree;
 
-    if (init_ret & X509_PCY_TREE_EXPLICIT) {
+    if (*pexplicit_policy) {
         nodes = X509_policy_tree_get0_user_policies(tree);
         if (sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_num(nodes) <= 0)
-            return X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE;
+            return -2;
     }
-    return X509_PCY_TREE_VALID;
+
+    return 1;
 
  error:
+
     X509_policy_tree_free(tree);
-    return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL;
+
+    return 0;
+
 }