diff options
| author | Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> | 2023-07-27 14:58:55 -0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> | 2023-12-05 13:20:00 -0500 |
| commit | afdc5039de0a4a3a40162a32daa070f94a883f09 (patch) | |
| tree | 5d59ea0ee92348fa8e4c140fda82d2e44573eefb /Cryptlib/opensslconf-diff.patch | |
| parent | e7f5fdf53ee68025f3ef2688e2f27ccb0082db83 (diff) | |
| download | efi-boot-shim-afdc5039de0a4a3a40162a32daa070f94a883f09.tar.gz efi-boot-shim-afdc5039de0a4a3a40162a32daa070f94a883f09.zip | |
CVE-2023-40549 Authenticode: verify that the signature header is in bounds.
In the validation logic in verify_buffer_authenticode(), there is yet
another case where we need to guarantee an object is in the binary but
we're only validating the pointer to it. In this case, we're validating
that the actual signature data is in the binary, but unfortunately we
failed to validate that the header describing it is, so a malformed
binary can cause us to take an out-of-bounds read (probably but not
necessarily on the same page) past the end of the buffer.
This patch adds a bounds check to verify that the signature is
actually within the bounds.
It seems unlikely this can be used for more than a denial of service,
and if you can get shim to try to verify a malformed binary, you've
effectively already accomplished a DoS.
Resolves: CVE-2023-40549
Reported-by: gkirkpatrick@google.com
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'Cryptlib/opensslconf-diff.patch')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
