Import upstream version 0.7

1 files changed, 147 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/replacements.c b/replacements.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..bac5e5d7
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+++ b/replacements.c
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+/*
+ * shim - trivial UEFI first-stage bootloader
+ *
+ * Copyright 2012 Red Hat, Inc <mjg@redhat.com>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ *
+ * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ * distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+ * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+ * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
+ * FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+ * COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * Significant portions of this code are derived from Tianocore
+ * (http://tianocore.sf.net) and are Copyright 2009-2012 Intel
+ * Corporation.
+ */
+
+/*   Chemical agents lend themselves to covert use in sabotage against
+ * which it is exceedingly difficult to visualize any really effective
+ * defense... I will not dwell upon this use of CBW because, as one
+ * pursues the possibilities of such covert uses, one discovers that the
+ * scenarios resemble that in which the components of a nuclear weapon
+ * are smuggled into New York City and assembled in the basement of the
+ * Empire State Building.
+ *   In other words, once the possibility is recognized to exist, about
+ * all that one can do is worry about it.
+ *   -- Dr. Ivan L Bennett, Jr., testifying before the Subcommittee on
+ *      National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, November 20,
+ *      1969.
+ */
+
+#include <efi.h>
+#include <efiapi.h>
+#include <efilib.h>
+#include "shim.h"
+#include "replacements.h"
+
+/* oh for fuck's sakes.*/
+#ifndef EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
+#define EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION 26
+#endif
+
+static EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *systab;
+
+static typeof(systab->BootServices->StartImage) system_start_image;
+static typeof(systab->BootServices->Exit) system_exit;
+static typeof(systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices) system_exit_boot_services;
+
+extern UINT8 insecure_mode;
+
+void
+unhook_system_services(void)
+{
+	if (insecure_mode)
+		return;
+	systab->BootServices->Exit = system_exit;
+	systab->BootServices->StartImage = system_start_image;
+	systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices = system_exit_boot_services;
+}
+
+static EFI_STATUS EFIAPI
+start_image(EFI_HANDLE image_handle, UINTN *exit_data_size, CHAR16 **exit_data)
+{
+	EFI_STATUS status;
+	unhook_system_services();
+	status = systab->BootServices->StartImage(image_handle, exit_data_size, exit_data);
+	if (EFI_ERROR(status))
+		hook_system_services(systab);
+	return status;
+}
+
+static EFI_STATUS EFIAPI
+exit_boot_services(EFI_HANDLE image_key, UINTN map_key)
+{
+	if (loader_is_participating || verification_method == VERIFIED_BY_HASH) {
+		unhook_system_services();
+		EFI_STATUS status;
+		status = systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices(image_key, map_key);
+		if (status != EFI_SUCCESS)
+			hook_system_services(systab);
+		return status;
+	}
+
+	Print(L"Bootloader has not verified loaded image.\n");
+	Print(L"System is compromised.  halting.\n");
+	systab->BootServices->Stall(5000000);
+	systab->RuntimeServices->ResetSystem(EfiResetShutdown, EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION, 0, NULL);
+	return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+}
+
+static EFI_STATUS EFIAPI
+exit(EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle, EFI_STATUS ExitStatus,
+     UINTN ExitDataSize, CHAR16 *ExitData)
+{
+	EFI_STATUS status;
+	unhook_system_services();
+
+	status = systab->BootServices->Exit(ImageHandle, ExitStatus, ExitDataSize, ExitData);
+	if (EFI_ERROR(status))
+		hook_system_services(systab);
+	return status;
+}
+
+
+void
+hook_system_services(EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *local_systab)
+{
+	if (insecure_mode)
+		return;
+	systab = local_systab;
+
+	/* We need to hook various calls to make this work... */
+
+	/* we need StartImage() so that we can allow chain booting to an
+	 * image trusted by the firmware */
+	system_start_image = systab->BootServices->StartImage;
+	systab->BootServices->StartImage = start_image;
+
+	/* we need to hook ExitBootServices() so a) we can enforce the policy
+	 * and b) we can unwrap when we're done. */
+	system_exit_boot_services = systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices;
+	systab->BootServices->ExitBootServices = exit_boot_services;
+
+	/* we need to hook Exit() so that we can allow users to quit the
+	 * bootloader and still e.g. start a new one or run an internal
+	 * shell. */
+	system_exit = systab->BootServices->Exit;
+	systab->BootServices->Exit = exit;
+}